Private Delegations and Eminent Domain
dc.contributor.author | Asbridge, Jessica L. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-05-16T19:54:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-05-16T19:54:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-05-01 | |
dc.description | 64 pages | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This Article is the first to explore why private delegations of the eminent domain power have received such different treatment from other private delegations of legislative power and to critically analyze these delegations under the Supreme Court’s modern due process, separation-of-powers, and takings jurisprudence. It ultimately concludes that these delegations generally should be viewed as presumptively invalid absent meaningful government oversight over the exercise of the power. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | 101 Or. L. Rev. 359 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0196-2043 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/29463 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Oregon School of Law | en_US |
dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | en_US |
dc.subject | Eminent domain | en_US |
dc.subject | Due process of the law | en_US |
dc.subject | Legislative power | en_US |
dc.title | Private Delegations and Eminent Domain | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |