National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints
| dc.contributor.author | Chopra, Surabhi | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-04T16:35:54Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-05-04T16:35:54Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-05-03 | |
| dc.description | 70 pages | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In this Article, significant security legislation in India and trace the ways in which it enhances the executive’s powers are examined. I argue that the usual constitutional limits on the executive—electoral democracy, legislative scrutiny, judicial review, and constitutional rights—have failed to restrain the executive’s power and actions under security laws. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | 17 Or. Rev. Int'l. L. 1 (2015) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1543-9860 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/19846 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon School of Law | en_US |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | en_US |
| dc.subject | National security laws | en_US |
| dc.subject | Terrorism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Organized crime | en_US |
| dc.title | National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |