Are Good Deeds Rewarded? Director Awards and the Market for Directorships

dc.contributor.advisorDel Guercio, Diane
dc.contributor.authorTran, Hai
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-18T23:07:29Z
dc.date.available2015-08-18T23:07:29Z
dc.date.issued2015-08-18
dc.description.abstractPrior studies document that board directors who fail to act as effective monitors of management are penalized by the labor market in the form of fewer subsequent board seats. However, there is little evidence on how the market rewards directors for exceptional advising and monitoring on corporate boards. In this paper, I use national director awards as a positive shock to directors’ reputations and examine changes in board seats for award-winning directors. Award-winning directors gain more board seats than non-winning directors, both after and before the awards. Event study tests suggest that the quality of award-winning directors may have been revealed to the labor market before the awards but not to the broader stock market. Stock market reactions to appointments of award-winning directors are positive and statistically significant only after the awards, not before.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/19292
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.
dc.subjectBoard of directorsen_US
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectDirector awardsen_US
dc.subjectMarket for directorshipsen_US
dc.titleAre Good Deeds Rewarded? Director Awards and the Market for Directorships
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineDepartment of Finance
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Oregon
thesis.degree.leveldoctoral
thesis.degree.namePh.D.

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