Oregon Law Review : Vol. 83, No. 1, p. 207-286 : In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)

dc.contributor.authorBush, Darren
dc.contributor.authorMayne, Carrie
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-31T19:05:55Z
dc.date.available2007-07-31T19:05:55Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description80 p.en
dc.format.extent425769 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citation83 Or. L. Rev. 207 (2004)en
dc.identifier.issn0196-2043
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/4641
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon School of Lawen
dc.subjectAntitrust law
dc.subjectCalifornia -- Economic conditions
dc.titleOregon Law Review : Vol. 83, No. 1, p. 207-286 : In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)en
dc.title.alternativeIn (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)en
dc.title.alternativeWhy Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)en
dc.typeArticleen

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