Oregon Law Review : Vol. 83, No. 1, p. 207-286 : In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)
dc.contributor.author | Bush, Darren | |
dc.contributor.author | Mayne, Carrie | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-07-31T19:05:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-07-31T19:05:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.description | 80 p. | en |
dc.format.extent | 425769 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.citation | 83 Or. L. Rev. 207 (2004) | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0196-2043 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/4641 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | University of Oregon School of Law | en |
dc.subject | Antitrust law | |
dc.subject | California -- Economic conditions | |
dc.title | Oregon Law Review : Vol. 83, No. 1, p. 207-286 : In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) | en |
dc.title.alternative | In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) | en |
dc.title.alternative | Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) | en |
dc.type | Article | en |