Ethics of Argument in Perelman and Gadamer

dc.contributor.advisorFrank, David
dc.contributor.authorMajor, Julia
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-06T21:43:20Z
dc.date.issued2017-09-06
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates ethical argumentation in Perelman and Gadamer to claim that the central theoretical framework in each philosophy simultaneously inflects and deflects available avenues of persuasion. I argue in each system there is a “confused notion” whose ambiguity underpins the available methods of rhetorical argument. For Perelman, the confused notion of the universal audience and its relationship to epideictic rhetoric determines the form of ethical persuasion that requires consensus in order to incite action for justice. For Gadamer, the confused notion of Vorurteil (prejudice, or fore- judgment) is used to critique tradition, Enlightenment reason, and historical hermeneutics. This mode of ethical argument suggests that open dialogue with an other is the best means for addressing prejudice in order to reach mutual understanding. I argue that by placing these two approaches to ethical argument into critical dialogue, their respective capacities, limitations, and distinctive rhetorical outcomes can be more clearly apprehended.en_US
dc.description.embargo10000-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/22648
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.
dc.subjectArgumenten_US
dc.subjectEpideicticen_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectPrejudiceen_US
dc.subjectUnderstandingen_US
dc.subjectUniversal audienceen_US
dc.titleEthics of Argument in Perelman and Gadamer
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineConflict and Dispute Resolution Program
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Oregon
thesis.degree.levelmasters
thesis.degree.nameM.A.

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Name:
Major_oregon_0171N_11839.pdf
Size:
604.01 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format