IDEOLOGIES OF TFIE MEN'S MOVEMENT
IDEOLOGIES OF TFIE MEN'S MOVEMENT
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Missouri - Columbia
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
by
LARRY S. WLLIAMS
Clarence l,o Thesis Supervisor
August, 1989
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Teri Ciacchi for encouraglng me to pursue this project and for
providing valuable support -- material and emotional -- during my research and writing.  I
would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Clarence Lo, for his valuable insights and his
encouragement throughout. I am indebted to the other members of my committee, Jim
McCar"tney and PatPeritore, who also took time out of busy schedules to help me complete
this project. My thanks to the UMC Peace Studies hogram  and Robbie Lieberman for
their valuable contribution to my education. And frnally, to my fellow graduate students in
the Department of Sociology, my warmest regards and best wishes as I leave vou.
IDEOLOGIES OF TFM MEN'S MOVEMENT
Larry S. Williams
Clarence L,o Thesis Supervisor
ABSTRACT
In this paper I shall argue that a shift in state ideology has contributed to greater
visibility for one ideological segment of the men's movement whom I call the
"masculinists." The masculinists join with restrictive liberals to argue that feminism has
gone too far and that radical feminists, in particular, are demanding too much. I contrast
the masculinist men with pro-feminist and traditionalist men in their respective ideologies,
their relarion to state ideology and patriarchy, and their ability to attain public visibility.
ul
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
LIST OF TABLES
I.  INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM
B. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
C. IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
1. Liberalism and Social Oppression
2. Shift in Patriarchal 
II.  CONTEXT OF THE MEN'S MOVEMENT
A.  CONTEXT FOR PRO-FEMINIST MEN
1. Expansive 
2. Liberal Feminism and Women's Rights
3. Radical Feminism and Women's Liberation
4. Conflict in Feminist Ideology
B. SHIFT IN STATE IDEOLOGY
C. CONTEXT FOR TRADITIONALIST MEN
1. Conservative  to the Liberal Crisis
2. Anti-Feminist Women
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6
l2
t2
25
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D.  CONTEXT FOR MASCULINIST  MEN
1. Restrictive Liberalism
a. Search for a New Center
b.  The New Class
c. Restrictive Liberal Women
2.  The Liberal C-ountermovement
a. The Human Potential Movement
b. Feminine Mystique
c. Masculine Mystique
trI.  MEN'S MOYEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
A.  PRO-FEMIMST MEN'S MOVEMENT
1. History of Pro-Feminist 
2. National Organization  Changing Men
3. Internal Conflict
4. Pro-Male Culture
a. Spirituality
b. Homophobia
5. Limitations of Liberal Feminism
a. Activist Men's Caucus
b. Sexual 
c. "Domestic" Violence
d. Child Custody
6. Conclusions
B. TRADMONALIST MEN'S MOVEMENT
1. History of Divorce Reform
2. Traditionalist Men's Organizations
a. Men's Rights Association
b. National Organization  Men
29
45
47
63
3. Traditional Values
a. Divorce and the Welfare State
b.  Paternal Custody
c.  "Domestic" Violence
d.  View of Male Traitors
e. Affirmative Action
4.  Conclusions
C.  MASCIJLINIST  MEN'S MOVEMENT
1. History of Masculinist Men
2.  Masculinist Men's Organizations
a. National Congress for Men
b. The Coalition of Free Men
c.  Men's Rights, [nc.
3.  Father's Rights
a. Joint Custody
b.  Alimony and Child Support
4.  Free Men
a. "Domestic" Violence
b. Sexual Politics
c.  Men's Rights
5.  Conclusions
TV. CONCLUSIONS
BIBLIOCRAPHY
74
92
95
vl
Table l.
Table 2.
Table 3.
Table 4.
LIST OF TABLES
Organizations according to ideological faction.
Irvel  of analysis and level of involvement in men's issues.
Response  men's movement factions to state ideology and patriarchy.
Rough estimation of membership  men's movement factions.
46
47
47
94
vu
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I shall examine the U.S. men's movement in a broad social and
historical context. I shall comparc and contrast the ideologies of traditionalist, masculinist,
and pro-feminist men's organizations in terms of their relation to changes in patriarchy and
state ideology. I shall use this approach to measure the visibility of men's movement
organizations.
The pro'feminist men's movement has its roots in a period of expansive liberalism
when feminist women established significant political opportunities. Other segments of the
men's nrovement associate with ideological traditions that challenge both expansive
liberalism and feminism. The traditionalist men draw from conservative political theory
and directly oppose feminist goals. The masculinist men, like the restrictive liberals in state
policy, stress principles of individualism and freedom and suggest that feminism and
expansive liberalism have gone too far in seeking equality.
The pro-feminist men's movement has thus far been unable to attain much
visibility.  In part this can be attributed to divisions within the major national organization.
With both liberal pro-feminiss and radical (or socialist) pro-feminists in the leadership of
the organization, a cohesive agenda has not yet emerged. This division is reminiscent of
the feminist women's movement with its split between theories of the feminine mystique
and sexual politics.
The traditionalist men's movement has not received much public attention. In paft,
this has been due to a propensity of their organizations to rely upon their founders, who
continue to be the central organizers and theorists for this strand of the movement.
Furthermore, like the New Right, the traditionalist men's movement attempts to return to a
form of gender relations that has been made outrnded by changes in the needs of capital
and in the state's emerging political ideology.
The masculinist men's movement has thus far been the most successful at
presenting itself to the media and public. Although this strand of the movemenr is also still
small, is  focus has been relatively cohesive, and its ideology is consistent with a more
restrictively liberal state. The ground, then, seems most fertile for this strand of the
movement.
In the second chapter of this paper I shall focus on the historical and ideological
context of different strands of the men's movement. The resurgence of feminism as a mass
movement is an important historical event in gender relations and will help explain the
posturing of these different strands of the emerging men's movement. To make the
challenge presented by feminism clearer,I will also examine ideolbgical shifts in the state
and the ideas of the human potential movement that have contributed to the liberal
countermovement. In the third chapter I will then focus more specifically on  men's
movement organizations and how they affect and are affected by the prevailing liberal
ideology. A process will emerge that reflects the resiliency of liberalism. Liberals in the
movement challenge the system during a period of expansive liberalism. but then esrablish
an important liberal counterrnovement during a period of restictive  liberalism.
PROBLEM
An adequate framework has not yet been developed to assess the visibility  and
political opportunities of different ideological segments of the men's movement. Further,
while several authors have addressed divisions within the men's movement, they have
generally not related these differences to broader changes in patriarchal relations and state
ideology. The most recent and most complete charactenzation of ideological differences
within the men's movement is Kenneth Clatterbaugh's article on "Masculinist perspectives"
(Clatterbaugh 1988). Clatterbaugh defines "masculinism" as "any point of view that offers
an analysis of the social reality of American men and offers an agenda for them"
(Clatterbaugh 1988: 4). He then divides the movement into six categories: conservative
masculinism, anti-sexist masculinism, men's rights masculinism, new age masculinism,
socialist masculinism, and group specific masculinisms.
My own categorization  the movement differs in two ways. Fistly,I use
"masculinism" to refer only to the faction that Clatterbaugh calls "men's rights
masculinism." f do so because this faction claims to represent a parallel to feminism.
Whereas feminists seek women's rights and equality for women, masculinists seek men's
rights and equality for men. In contrast, the conservatives (or traditionalists) don't seek
gender equality at all and the anti-sexists (or pro-feminiss) begin with their support for
feminist goals. Given Clatterbaugh's definition of masculinism, we wbuld expect
feminism to include conservatives, such as Schlafly, who have an analysis of women's
social position and an agenda for women. This clearly would be misleading.
Secondly, I combine some of the categories. Because the only national pro-
feminist organization (The National Organization for Changing Men) includes socialists and
proponents of New Age spirituality, I combine these categories with the liberal and radical
anti-sexist men. I agree with Clanerbaugh that these positions are theoretically distinct and
that New Age men differ considerably in their ideological focus. However, neither the
socialists nor the New Age advocates have found a home in other national organizations
and tend to associate themselves primarily with pro-feminist men.
Clatterbaugh's categories are a useful starting point because they do rely upon
movement ideology as it relates to patriarchy. However, his argument is incomplete
because it does not specifically address men's movement organizatioru or the mntext in
which these organizations have emerged.
Ehrenreich (1983) develops the ideological roos of men's liberation and men's
rights, which are primarily associated with the liberal masculinist men's movement. Her
study attempts to derive the source of a "male revolt" against the bneadwinner ethic and the
family wage. This so-called revolt is dubbed the "flight from commitment." She does
reveal some of the contradictions in liberal thought ttrat provide women with bottt
inspiration and constraints. However, her study fails to distinguish beween the ideological
positions of the various organizations in the men's rnovement and thus provides little point
of reference in assessing the relative visibility of the liberal masculinists as opposed to prG.
feminist nren or traditionalist men.
This present study will  attempt to fill  these gaps.  My concern is how various
strands of the men's nrovement may affect the goals of feminism, given historical changes
in patriarchy and the state ideology. There has been a shift in patriarchy because as
industry has employed greater numbers of women in the paid labor force, the authority of
man as father and husband has been diminished. Meanwhile, women have become  .
increasingly conscious of the gender stratihcation that exiss in the paid labor market. This
is, therefore, an important juncture in terms of the state's attempt to mystify gender
relations and discourage sexual consciousness,  would promote radical democracy.
If the masculinist men's movement gains in size and visibility, then, it could be used to
legitimate social patriarchy and deny the demands of radical and socialist feminists.
REVIEW OF RELEVENT LITERATURE
The visibility of the pro-feminist, traditionalist and masculinist strands of the men's
movement depend upon l)  the cohesiveness  their ideology and 2) how that ideology
relates to changes in state ideology and patriarchal relations. Ehrenreich (1983) lnThe
Hearts of Men looked primarily at the masculinist strand of the movement as a liberal
challenge to feminism and tried to explain the roots of these liberal masculinist ideas.
Ehrenreich (1983) focussed on the 1950s to formulate a thesis of man's "flight
from commitnent."  She argued that the "family wage" was initially undermined by "a
rnale revolt -- though hardly organized and seldom conscious of its goals -- against the
breadwinner ethic" (13). As a result, she argued, women "are increasingly dependent on
our own resources, but in a society and an economy that never intended to admit us as
independent persons, much less as breadwinners for others" (Ehrenreich 1983: 175). The
concepts of commitrnent and revolt, though, are misleading. In fact, Ehrenreich expresses
her own reservations in the conclusion of her book:
My  own judgment, as the reader must know, is an ambivalent one.  At
times I have felt that the various trends and intellectual shifts examined here
deserve to be called less a'revolt'than  an accomodation. What has been
understood as masculinity ... was at odds with the more 'feminine' traits
appropriate to a consumption-oriented society...
@hrenreich 1983: 170).
Astrachan (1986) criticizes Ehrenreich's study, because she doesn't address the role
of the women's movement "in changing the traditional family" (199). Astrachan attributes
this oversight to Ehrenreich's interest in asserting "that feminism has not made war on the.
idea of marriage" (Astrachan 1983: l99).  My own contention is that Ehrenreich (1983)
writes herself into a corner by accepting a premise of conservative theorists. The thesis of
a male revolt relies upon the premise that men have no incentive to marry, because the
market has subsumed the wife's role of providing services. As a consequence, Ehrenreich
opposes economic inequality but also bemoans the abandonment of the breadwinner ethic,
which encouraged married women to stay out of the paid labor force. The increasingly
service economy, while it may have displaced part of the housewife's traditional role by
providing more services, has also employed more married women. And many men
(according to Blumstein and Schwartz) would provide for their wives if they could.
Ehrenreich also misrepresents the significance of men's stated reluctance to marry.
While men have for centuries bemoaned an obligation to marry, "the vitality of marriage
has been quite stupendous. Men have cursed it, aimed barbed witticisms at it, denigrated
it, bemoaned it -- and never ceased to want and need it or profit from it" (Bernard 1982:
16). And, in fact, the "gray flannel dissidents," the consumers of Playboy, andthe Beats
of whom Ehrenreich wrote found themselves incapable of successfully rebelling: "White-
coll.u men fretted about conformity or fantasized about 'cheating' with the smooth, pink
lovelies in Ployboy, but there was no real way out of the interlocking demands ofjob  and
marriage" (Ehrenreich 1983: 55). And "the Beats remained a miniscule minority," who had
scant appeal to most glown men" (Ehrenreich 1983: 53).
Astrachan notes that most of the trends that Ehrenreich establishes "preceded ... and
helped shape male responses"  the women's movement (Astrachan 1983: 199). The
organized men's movement, however, did not emerge until after the resurgence of
feminism and after the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966
(the exception is the conservative divorce reformers whom Ehrenreich doesn't mention).
In fact the masculinists refer to early statements from Friedan and NOW when they
condemn the breadwinner ethic as no longer beneficial to men. Rather than focusing on an
unconscious and unorganized "male revolt" against the commitment to protect women, we'
should be concerned with men's responsibility for their privileged positon in society. This
includes a social and political responsibility for the oppression of women. As Astrachan
points out, men "have seldom initiated demands for independence or equality between the
sexes." lnstead, they "were usually tying to have it both ways, privilege but no
burdens..." (Astrachan 1983: 199). What Ehrenreich does accomplish, however, is to
raise the issue of the ideology of men's liberation, which (as we shall see) is how the
masculinist men's movement fits into the state's attempt to solve the crisis of liberalism and
remystify patriarchal relations.
IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
ln order to establish the importance of the ideological legitimation of power, I shall
begin with the prevailing liberal ideology, its inherent conmdictions in explaining social
oppression and its importance for both those privileged groups seeking to maintain the
status quo and those social movements challenging the existing order. I will  specifically
consider how liberalism addresses  and racial inequality. In both race and gender
relations the state tries to mediate power relations within  the constraints of liberal theory
and the demands of a capitalist economy. In trying to resolve contradictions between
liberat values and the inequalities produced by capitalist, race and gender relations, the state
attempts to modify the form of these inequalities and their ideological justification.
I shall also address shifts in patriarchal relations. While the patriarchal family has
come under attack, social patriarchy remains strong. This shift in patriarchal relations
favors the ideology of masculinist men, who attack the patriarchal family but generally
accept social patriarchy.
Liberalism and Social Oppression
The liberal state attempts to maintain order while preserving the privilege of white .
males and the profits of capitalists. In the process, however, contradictions are sometimes
revealed when citizens organize to place demands upon the system. As long as these
demands remain focused upon an individual or group's right to participate within the
existing system, the challenge is to expand the system. However, the system does not
expand without pressure. In response to radical consciousness  radical demands that
threaten existing relations, the state may either embrace liberal procedural reforms to
demonstrate the system's ability to change (during a time of expansive liberalism) or it may
discourage such demands by redefining liberalism to remystify power relations and to
stress the limitations of reform (during a time of restrictive liberalism).
Privileged grcups rely upon ideology to explain and thus to more easily maintain
their dominance. As Blauner (1972) explains, social oppression is built upon "the creation
and defense of group privileges" (21):  "To generate privilege, certain people have to be
exploited, and to be exploited they must be controlled -- directly or indirectly. The
mechanisms of control ... are therefore central to an understanding of oppression" (22).
Important mechanisms in "controlling" blacks in the U.S., for instance, have been
7
constraints "ovetr the movements of the oppressed and restriction of their full participation
in society" (37). These mechanisms may be enforced through law (such as vagrancy or
pass laws) o'r direct repression (such as white supremacist violence), but "the most
common and more stable mechanisms reside in cultural beliefs and psychological
adaptations. Here the notion of place is central" (Blauner 1972: 37). This
institutionalized sense of boundaries is also central to the oppression of women for whom
one definition of their rightful place has been "in the home."
Social movements also rely upon ideology to explain and thus to sfengthen their
challenge to the dominant order. Both the system and the insurgents, then, draw upon a
liberal tradition that is versatile enough to support contesting positions. Robert Blauner
argues that universalism, "the central value of the liberal philosophy," has nvo faces. On
the one hand it "has been one of the great progressive ideas, affirming the essential
humanity of all people..." (Blauner 1972: 267). On the other hand, universalism "goes
hand in hand with individualism, and in the area of race the nro join in the ideal of 'color
blindness"' (Blauner 1972: 267). Liberals define sexism and racism as prejudice rather
than institutional oppression and exploitation. Opposition to affirmative action quotas, for
instance, has become mainstream with the curent concern over "reverse discrimination."
While resources are important to a movement, the emergence of insurgency
depends upon support from indigenous resources (McAdam 1982). The elite do not
suppoft insurgency, which would threaten their status and power. However, liberal
funders and policy planners may provide support and encouragement to reformist goals in
the face of social revolutionary pressures, particularly when a mass movement is strong.
During this period of expansive liberalism, state elites may seem supportive of the
movement. However, while elite support may increase after the movement becomes more
active (and experiences some success), their support will tend to encourage activists to
moderate the goals of the rnovement. Liberals in the movement will  be more likely  to ury
working within the system. When radicals continue to press demands that cannot be
satisfied within the system, the movement risks becoming fragmented.
Radical demands, along with the growing expense of implemented reforms, hasten
a phase of restrictive liberalism. Restrictive liberals attempt to contain the movement's
goals by arguing that the reforms haven't worked, that government progmms have just
raised expectations, and that the electorate must be satisfied with less. Unlike the
conservatives, the restrictive liberals accept many of the reforms (which they saw as
necessary), but they also recognize the danger of radicals within the movement, who are
"extreme" in their demands. The liberals recognize that containing the movement is more
consistent with the stated principles of a liberal democracy than is direct repression (except
in dire circumstances). Repression, after all, will reveal the contradictions that exist
between elite rule and liberal ideals of eoualiw and freedom.
Shift in  Patriarchal Relations
According to Eisenstein, "The understanding of patriarchy cannot be limited to
either a particular family form (father, husband) or a static notion of male biological power
(strength, aggression)" @isenstein 1984: 90). Rather than being a static reality, then,
patriarchy adopts new forms as the economic and social structure of society changes.
Gerson and Peiss (1985) dehne patriarchy in terms of boundaries,  are "the complex
structures -- physical, social, ideological, and psychological -- which establish the
differences and commonalities ... shaping and constraining the behavior and attitudes of
each gendergroup" (Gerson &Peiss 1985: 318).
To define patriarchy in terms of the demands of sex roles is inadequate, because
this explanation fails to convey the problematic nature of pariarchy.  And, as Bowles and
Gintis (1987) have observed, "the perpetuation of any power structure is generally
problematic" (94). In response to the inadequacy of sexual roles in defining patriarchy,
Gerson and Peiss (1985) have established a definition based instead upon gender
relations. From this perspective, they argue, "gender is not a reified analytic category
imposed on human experience but a fluid one whose meaning emerges in specific social
contexts as it is created and recreated through human actions" (317).
The boundaries have changed, but the negotiated relationship of gender has
continued to be charactetizedby male dominance. For instance, women have increasingly
entered the "public sphere" in a way ttrat shifts the boundaries between public and private
life.  This certainly threatens the stability of a particular reified form of patriarchy, but
patriarchal relations may continue in another form with renewed legitimacy.  As Bowser
(1985) points out, racism also takes different forms as socioeconomic conditions change:
"As each mode of discrimination is challenged, a new one can easily take its place because
the central motivation is still intact and unchanged" (Bowser 1985: 319).
Although the participation of women in the workforce has never fallen to the pre-
World War tr level, women's "position in the work force" after World War II  "dropped
drastically" (Freeman 1975: 23). As McAdam argues some historical periods provide a
more conducive environment for insurrection than do others. By the early 1960s, the
political opportunities for women had increased considerably because of shifting
boundaries that made contradictions between women's position and liberal promises more
apparent.
Here then is the contradiction: advanced  because  structural
changes  inflation, has required married women to enter the labor force.
Although the structure  the capitalist  is patriarchal,  ideology is
definately liberal... Therein lies a major crisis for liberalism: the
contradictory  of patriarchal inequality in an ideology of (liberal)
equality is being uncovered  the married wage-earning 
(Eisenstein  52)
The issues around which both the women's and men's movements  mobilize
became  because  these shifting boundaries.  long as the patriarchal 
remained  stable, the family could be dehned as "protected  the relations of
power in society" @isenstein  46). Women's relations to power could thus be
10
mystified by establishing that women (and pafticularly married women with children)
worked in the home, which was a private (thus not a political) realm. With an increasingly
service economy, though, "some of the relational and ideological needs of patriarchy have
been undermined, and as a result the system of familial  patriarchy  appears less able to
sustain tlu  rystem of social patriarchy" [emphasis added] (Eisenstein 1983: 47). Given
this instability, the state has attempted to mediate the needs of capitalism and the patriarchal
family @isenstein 1984: 94). Inasmuch as the state provides support for social patriarchy,
it discourages the political visibility of pro-feminist men. And given the weakening of the
patriarchal family, traditionalist men are marginalized. The masculinists, though, represent
the "new man," who can maintain male dominance while changing his defined role in the
family.  Because this is consistent with the dominant state ideology, masculinist men have
received considerably more attention than the other factions.
11
CHAPTER II
THE CONTEXT OF THE MEN'S MOVEMENT
CONTEXT FOR PRO.FEMINIST 
The context in which the profeminist men's movement emerged was one of
expansive liberalism. Public support for liberal feminist reforms was high, and the state
was making some concessions. Most of the men who organized and joined the pro-
feminist rnen's movement supported the goals of women's righs  but may have felt some
ambivalence toward radical feminism. Organizations that were formed and disbanded in
the 1970s had such titles as Men Allied Nationally for the Equal Rights Amendment
(M.A.N. for E.R.A.) and Men's Alliance for Liberation and Equality (M.A.L.E.) (see
Farrell 1978 and Kleiman 1978).
As with feminist women, the ideology of pro'feminist men was divided from its
inception. The larger number have pressed for legal reforms to protect women's rights and
legally recognize women's equality. A smaller number have worked on such issues as
male violence and pornography, arguing that inequality has its roots not just in law but also
in cultural meaning and personal relations and that these roots must also be addressed
politically.
In order to understand the ideological divisions within the pro-feminist men's
movement and its present position relative to state ideology, I will examine the general
concept of expansive liberalism and the re-emergence  feminism as a mass movement
divided between liberals and radicals.
Expansive Liberalism
Again, it is imponant note that the elite do not have an interest supporting
social movements until they present some challenge. James Geschwender (1977) explains
t2
that when "the resistance is too strong to be crushed, then the exploiting group may be
forced to retreat through a panial abandonment  the system of racial exploitation" (2).
The same is true of gender exploitation. This is the response of expansive liberalism.
Because gender relations function within a political context, the state has an interest
in maintaining the pariarchal privilege of men in our society. State policies, then, shift to
provide new ways of resolving conflicts that surface between the needs of capital, gender
relations, and the prevailing interpretation of liberal values. As the liberal center has shifted
in the past twenty yqlrs, the reaction of the state to demands of the women's movement and
the men's movement has changed accordingly.
In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration attempted to moderate the goals of
feminists by providing support to limited legal reforms for women's rights. Feree and
Hess suggest that John Kennedy "brought women's righs  back into the political forum"
during the 1960 campaign (Feree and Hess 1985: 20). Yet, Kennedy was no women's
rights activist. A year after being elected, Kennedy was confronted at a news conference
by May Craig of the Portland (ME) Press-Herald. The report appeared under the heading,
"A Chivalrous Kennedy Backs Women's Rights":
President Kennedy smiled his way out of a bristling question on
women's rights at his news conference today.
A woman questioner noted that the Democratic presidential platrorm
had promised equal rights for women, including equal pay. She asked:
"What have you done for the women according to the promises of
the plaform?"
"'Well," said Mr. Kennedy, "I am sure we have not done enough."
He added when the laughter subsided, that he believed in equal pay
for equal work and thought "we ought to do better than we are doing."
"I  am glad you reminded me of it,"  he concluded to more male
laughter from the audience" (New York Times, 1961, N9, 14: 6).
Still, Kennedy did offer some impetus to the rights of professional women. In
December of 1961, Kennedy established  President's  on the Status of
Women "at the behest of Esther Peterson, then director of the Women's Bureau [footrote
removedl" @reeman 1975: 52). Evans (1979) has written that "the pu{pose, in fact, may
t3
have been to quell a growing pressure for an Equal Rights Amendment, but unwittingly the
government organized its own opposition" (16).
In 1963 Kennedy's commission issued its report, rejecting the ERA as unnecessary
but recommending equal pay in federal employment. In response, Kennedy signed the
Equal Pay Act.  If women were to be hired for professional jobs, they had to be paid
equally. Freeman (1975) noted that such legislation had been previously suggested by
protectionists to keep women from undercutting men's wages. And, in fact, both Peterson
and honorary chair Eleanor Roosevelt had long supported equal pay as an alternative to the
ERA.  Freeman writes, however, that "equal pay was irrelevent without equal job
opportunity" (Freeman 1975: 176).
Similarly, Doug McAdam (1982) notes that, in the early 1960s, the goals of black.
insurgency "centered more on the integration of blacks into various areas of American life
rather than on any major restructuring of the dominant economic and political institutions of
society" (McAdam 1982: 164). This liberal focus on legal rights found increasing support
in the general public and was not adamently opposed by the state, except when illegal
tactics were used.  Unlike the conservatives, who favored continued repression, the
expansive liberals recognized that because of public support for the movement's goals, "the
cost of openly racist rhetoric or policies" in the early 1960s was "the disaffection of the
white liberal community..." (McAdam 1982: 159).
For women of all races, then, the early 1960s was a time when expansive liberals
agreed to some beneficial legal reforms.  These reforms had the effect of removing some of
the constraints to opportunity, though it didn't assure just results.
Liberal Feminism and Women's Rights
Changes in gender relations and the development of a notion of sexual politics must
be understood within the b'roader socioeconomic context of the United States. After
t4
women gained the vote in the United States, the women's suffrage coalition unraveled.
Reportedly the movement "died" to be reborn in response to Kennedy's Commission on
the Status of Women. In fact, a deep split emerged in the feminist movement that would
not be mended until the late 1960s.
Excluding black women (of whom nearly half over the age of 16 worked) the vast
majority (77Vo) of women in the paid labor force in the 1920s were "young and single,
mostly from immigrant and poor families" (Feree and Hess 1985: 2).  Most women who
remained in the paid labor force during the Depression years of  1928-1939 were limited to
low-paying occupations, and laws restricted married women from working because of a
concern that they would take jobs from male breadwinners. These conditions tended to
divide women on the basis of class, race, and marital status. Women's groups, then, were
largely divided by class into professional clubs and labor unions.
The National Women's Party had emerged from the suffrage campaign with a dual
focus of support for the Equal Rights Amendment (first introduced in Congress in 1923)
and for women running for public office.  Norma Krause Herzfeld (1960) wrote that the
ERA had "split organized American womanhood right in two" (517). Among the groups
supponing the ERA were the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's
Clubs and the General Federation of Women's Clubs. Groups opposing the ERA included
the National League of Women Voters, the National Association of University Women, the
National Council of Catholic Women and "labor groups" (Herzfeld 1960: 518).
Feminists who opposed the ERA supported laws guaranteeing "e4ual pay for equal
work" but thought the ERA would threaten legislation protecting working women.
According to Frances Perkins (1927), "the trade union women" were "leaders in the
movement for" protective legislation (23). Such legislation included a minimum wage for
women and limits upon the number of hours women could work per day. Herzfeld (1960)
suggested that under equal pay legislation professional women worked "on a kind of
15
'separate but equal' basis..." (518). Elizabeth Faulkner Baker (1927) noted, in fact, that
protective legislation did not benefit women if they were "in the minority  in the occupation
or industry" to which the laws applied (12). In these occupations, she says, women "may
well fear for the security of their positions" (Baker 1927: 26).
Supporters of the ERA, who were critical of "special legislative protection" argued
that such protection should be provided to all workers regardless of gender. The question
posed was whether women workers needed protection because they were women (as the
courts and many male unions believed) or because they were workers. And if the latter,
was it more effective to first end discrimination or to use special protection as "a stepping
stone to the legal protection of all workers" (Baker 1927: l2).
Following World War II, the United States entered a period of prolonged economic
expansion that was distinguished by a growing public sector and an increasingly service
economy. The family wage was threatened (for those who had it) by inflation and "there
was a high need for well-educated low-paid clerical and service workers" (Freeman 1975:
24). Maried  women began entering the workforce in greater numbers to fill  positions in
these new industries and to provide additional income for a growing consumer demand.
The trend between 1940 and 1960 was of women re-entering the workforce in middle age
after their children were raised. The state was characterized by exparuive liberalism.
In spite of a cultural focus upon women's role in the home, "the percentage of
wife-mothers in the labor force rose steadily in the 1950's in response to labor demand and
the consumer economy, which benefitted from a supplemented family wage" (Feree and
Hess 1985: 5). Among women whose husbands were present in the family, l4.7Vo were
employed in 1940. Except for a bnief decline after World War II, employment in this group
has risen steadily to 5l%o in 1981. In comparison employment among single women
increased from 48.l%o to 62.3Vo and among widowed or divorced women from32Vo to
41.9 percent.
There has also been a crisis in the marital union. What needs to be explained,
16
though, is not the breakdown of the family p?r  s,  but the erosion of a particular family
form in which the husband and father had authority. With women earning money in the
paid labor force, some men have questioned their own role as sole financial provider.  In
fact, "the historical evidence suggests that while both masculinity and femininity are
socially constructed with [the] historical context of gender relations, definitions of
masculinity are historically reactive to changing definitions of femininity" (Kimmel 1987:
123).  Both feminism and restrictive liberal masculinism responded to structural changes
that have made traditional relations vulnerable to attack. The "male revolt" and the "flight
from commiftnent", then, are part of men's response to their diminishing role as protector
of women. By arguing that men do not benefit from this role, Ehrenreich tends to
undermine the theoretical notion of the patriarchal family.  She conveniently dismisses
offhand, for instance, Jessie Bernard's contention that men gain emotional security while
maintaining economic power:  "... contrary to all the charges leveled against it, the
husband's marriage, whether they like it or not (and they do), is awfully good for them"
(Bernard 1982: 16).
By the 1960s women were also better educated than they had ever been before
(Freeman 1975: 29). The National Woman's Party was still pushing for passage of the
ERA.  During the presidential campaign of 1960, the National Woman's Party sent
"deputations to all announced candidates for President in behalf of the long-pending equal-
rights amendment" (New York Times 1960, Jan. 6, 19: 5). In 1963, Betty Friedan wrote
The Feminine Mystique, which called upon women to get out of the home and do more
with their lives.  Between 1960 and 1980, moreover, more "mothers intemrpted
employment for increasingly shorter periods of child raising, or simply shifted to part-time
work" (Feree and Hess 1985: 2).
In 1964 the provision of equal employment oppornrnity in the Civil Rights Act was
amended to include "sex." In part this was attributed to a procedural maneuver by
t7
legislators attempting to kill  the Civil Rights Act.  Consequently, the enforcement of equal
employment opportunity for women was less than vigorously enforced. This became the
focus of a renewed interest in feminism. In June 1966, at the third annual convention of
the state commissions, a resolution to pressure the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to enforce equal opportunity for women was squelched by
conference offrcials. In response, Beffy Friedan and two dozen conference delegates
formed the National Organization for Women (NOUD to end employment discrimination
against women (Freeman 1975: 55).
Freeman (1975) argues that, during its frst  year, NOW "reflected its limited origins
more than its broad goals" (75). At its second conference in November 1967, NOW had
increased its membership to 1,200 p?rsons.  Conflict erupted over proposals to support an
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and women's reproductive rights.  Some women who
had wanted to maintain a niurow agenda formed the Women's Equity Action kague  in the
fall of 1968. In addition, a couple of NOW lawyers formed the Human Rights for
Women. Even with the issues of the ERA and reproductive freedom, though, NOW was
basically a liberal organization: "NOW's intention never was to subvert male bastions of
power, but to ... enable women to work alongside men in education, employment and
politics" (Wickenden 1986: 20). In fact, Ehrenreich (1987) recently noted in an article for
Ms. that most of the successes  the women's movement thus far have benefitted
professional women more than working class and poor women.
The National Organization forWomen rediscovered the issue of the Equal Rights
Amendment as an avenue for ending sex discrimination. Still, the ERA, though apparently
necessary, was a limited strategy for achieving women's equality. In fact, "the ERA
campaign was in part an effoft by the moderate women's movement to shake off the vague
revolutionism of radical feminism," and "even many supporters of the ERA were skeptical
about its potential for bringing a more egalitarian society" (Wickenden 1986: 20). While
Burris has shown that working class families generally supported the ERA as a means of
18
helping working women, the emphasis on the ERA may have come at the expense of
programs that could have been more helpful:  "Pay equity may result at last in higher wages
for women in underpaid jobs.  But it will  not necessarily ensure an equal distribution of
labor" (Wickenden 1986: 24). Rather, it is necessary to address the demands of the
institution of motherhood. These include legal and economic a@ess to binh control,
abortion and day care. It also includes exploring new family forms and organizing
women's labor. As the women of NOW have focused on these other issues they have
sharpened their critique of patriarchy.
The National Organization for Women was established as a national group without
an agenda for grassroots organizing. Evans (1979) wrote that "in general, the professional
women who created NOW accepted the division benveen the public and private spheres and
chose to seek equality primarily in the public realm" (19). It was for this reason, suggests
Evans, that NOW could not alone organize a mass movement at the grassroots.
As NOW grew in size, the organization became more decentralized and established
regional and state structures to coordinate local activities with national goals. Following a
demonstration for women's rights on August 26,1970, the involvement grew quickly, and
the composition of NOW changed (Freeman, p. 85). Increasingly radical women from the
women's liberation groups became involved with NOW at the local level, and these groups
(and their publications) served as "an ideological vanguard" in the transformation of NOW
(Freeman 1975: 99\.
ln  l97l  NOW passed a resolution recognizing lesbian sexuality as a legitimate
option for women. This came after Friedan, in 1969 and 1970, had set out "to 'purge'
NOW of what she called the 'lavendar menace"' (Freeman 1975: 99). Eisenstein (1981),
recognizing this shift in NOWs agenda, cornmented that "NOW appears to be moving
away from Friedan's mainstream politics of the 1960's" (192). She cautions, however,
that NOV/ remains limited by its liberal origins and its failure to develop an explicitly
19
radical feminist identity to guide its more radical agenda- Reproductive freedom and
lesbian righs  are defined in terms of liberal law rather than as sexual politics.  Thus, for
instance, it has been difficult to mobilize for financial arcess to abortion services.
While the ERA is a limited goal and abortion has been defined in terms of liberal
rights rather than as an issue of power, these have become campaigns on which liberal and
radical feminists could work together, and NOW has tended to include more radical
demands than when it began. In part this is due to difficulties in achieving equality through
liberal means. Ending sex discrimination is not complete and has failed to create political
and economic equality for women. Women's wages continue to be less than those of men.
Most positions of institutional leadenhip (including the corporate boardrooms and the halls
of Congress) continue to be occupied by men. "In 1980 two out of three adults who fit
into the federal definition of poverty were women, and more than half the families defined'
as poor were maintained by single women" @hrenreich 1983: 172). This "feminization of
poverty" was documented by Diana Pearce (1978). While divorced women with children
tend to experience a loss of their standard of living, divorced men tend to enjoy an increase
in their standard of living (see Weitzman 1985).
Radical Feminism and Women's Liberation
In an effort to explain the connections between their sexual degradation and male
dominance in the so-called public sphere, feminist theorists began to challenge the
limitations placed upon political theory and action. According to Evans (1979), a
workshop at the 1965 conference of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) planted
the seeds of the women's liberation movement that would come to fruition n  1967. Casey
Hayden and Mary King composed a memo that criticized "a caste system that, at its worst,
uses and exploits women" @vans 1979: 235). The workshop also utilized many of the
processes  consciousness-raising  would be central to the independent women's
liberation movement. The Free Speech Movement and protests against the Vietnam War
20
had begun to transform the character of SDS, and "as the movement grew and changed, the
question of women's roles had simultaneously begun to surface" @vans 1979: 159).
While the movement constituency grew larger and students began focusing on their
own position in the system, women in the movement found it "more alienating, more
massive, competitive, and sexually exploitive" @vans 1979: l7O). The movement became
more focused on the university setting, and the culnrral protests were becoming more
focused on young men resisting the draft.
The older wornen in the movement, who were often married and had much
experience in SDS, raised the issue of women's position, but it was their younger sisters
who frequently expressed greater anger @vans 1979: 167). A statement that emerged
from the December 1965 conference challenged the men of the movement to explore within
themselves their inconsistency in relating to movement women. Some men eventually took
such a challenge to heart and anended consciousness-raising groups that would be the
beginning of a pro-feminist men's movement.
A "Women's Liberation Workshop" was organized at the SDS convention of June
1967. This workshop presented a set of demands, along with an analysis that compared
women's status to that of Third World nations. Conflict ensued: "Most of the men who
spoke accepted the notion of sexual caste system, but they argued strenuously against the
third world analogy" @vans 1979: 192). Women's demands were belittled and the New
Ldt  Notes included an unsympathetic graphic with its report of the evenrs.
The radical women's movement consisted of small autonomous groups who
organized dramatic actions and called themselves such names as Redstockings, Bread and
Roses, or W.I.T.C.H. (Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy From Hell).  Many
women's liberation groups formed in late 1967 and into 1968. In 1968, twenty-two
women from women's liberation groups met in Sandy Springs, Maryland.  Many activist
women wanted to maintain their ties to the New lrft,  and the only issue settled was to hold
an open convention in Chicago on Thanksgiving. At that meetin g200 women attended and
2l
were involved in much debate and dissension before retuming to work in their local areas
(Freeman 1975: 106-7). While many of the new women to join  such groups focused only
on "women's issues," those women with experience in the New Left continued to view
women's concerns within a broader pottical context. The former preferred the term
"women's liberation" while the latterpreferred the term "radical women" (108). As we
shall see, the pro-feminist men have also been divided over the terrns used to define
themselves.
The New York Radical Women organized a protest at the Miss America Pagaent on
September  Two hundred women demonstrated  the pagaent with such
activities "as the crowning of a live sheep as Miss America ... and a Freedom Trash Can
into which demonstrators  their steno pads, dish cloths, curlers, false eyelashes,
girdles and bras" (McAllister 1988: 138). The media characterized the event as "b'ra
burning," apparently to convey a similarity to other radical actions, such as flag or draft
card burnings.
Violence against women has been a central facet of the sexual politics that concern
radical women. Beauty pagaents  a target, explains McAllister (1988), because they
"serve to sanction public scrutiny and ranking of female bodies and thus legitimize the
objectification of women. This objectification, the protesters claim, feeds the climate of
violence against women" (139). In addition to beauty pagaents, radical women have
organized against pornography, marital violence, rape, sexual harassment, and so on.
By 1983, according to Feree and Hess, "the vital and influential liberation groups
had either dissolved or lost focus..." (Feree and Hess 1985: 62). This supposedly
coincided with a merglng of radical women and liberal feminists. Yet many radical
feminists continue to act autonomously of NOW and other liberal feminist organizations.
ln 1974, for instance, women on the West Coast began an annual protest of the
Miss California Pagaent. Among the activities have been women "in the streets outside the
22
auditorium" yelling chants and wearing "banners  the inscriptions 'MISS-
INFORMED, "MI$$-USED, "MIS S -FORT"[.JNE,  S -OGYNE,' and'MIS S ANNA-
REXIA"'(McAllister 1988: 139). Nikki Craft, whom McAllister (1988) calls "a guiding
spirit at the protess" (139), has founded such organizations  the Preying Mantis Brigade,
Citizens for Media Responsibility  l-aw (a.k.a. Outlaws for Social Responsibility),
Cross Your Heart Support Network, and Naturiss Opposed  Pornographic 
(N.O.P.E.).
Conflict in Feminist ldeology
One issue of great contention between feminist women is how to confront
pornography. Andrea Dworkin, a radical feminist who helped draft ordinances in
Minneapolis and Indianapolis, expresses and often represents this conflict:
While many feminists disavow Miss Dworkin and her work, she, in turn, is
critical of what she calls "organized feminism" for not taking a stronger
stand against pornography. "The National Organization for Women is
incredibly cowardly and timid on the issue," she said, "because they don't
want to alienate their liberal supporters"
(New YorkTimes, Aug. 26,1985,87:  2).
Radical feminists like Dworkin recognize that the liberal notions of freedom and
privacy (implying that the personal is not political) are frequently exploited by capitalists in
the sex industry. Irgal  rights in a liberal society are an enigma. Our focus is usually upon
the liberation of the citizenry from illegitimate repression. However, in our capitalist
society corporations are also legally persons with penonal rights (which is related to the
concept of free enterprise). In such a society "free speech" has difficulty  competing with
"bought spe@h." Marcuse addressed this paradox of freedom in a repressive society when
he wrote that "freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech) becomes an instrument for
absolving servitude. And yet ... the existence and practice of these liberties remain a
precondition for the restoration of their original oppostional function ..." (Marcuse 1965:
84).
23
While liberals risk being ccopted  or exploited by free enterprise, the radical critique
of male violence runs the risk of being co-opted by conservative theorists who want to
repress sexuality. Many radical feminists who write about pornography or "distinctions
between erotica and pornognphy" tend to use terms that make it "very difficult to think
about the issue of sex in any other than protective terms" (Eisenstein 1984: 249). They do
this by stressing the connections between the consumption of pornography and male
violence against women. Writes Eisenstein (1984): "Most of the anti-pornography
movement links sex and violence, heterosexual sex and rape" (250). Eisenstein adds that
unless one wants to argue that all sexually active women are victims of false
consciousness,  must deal with the contradictory mechanism by which,
in  spite of  the patriarchal contours, heterosexual women desire sexual
pleasure with men, women are aroused by pornography ... and so on.
@isenstein 1984: 250)
Many radical and socialist feminists, though, resist pornography without appealing
to the law for protection. The Outlaws for Social Responsibility, for instance, practice civil
disobedience to empower women and to stress "corporate and individual responsibiliry"
(Craft 1985: 7).  The Outlaws for Social Responsibility promote sexual liberation while
acting against exploitation. They express support for "nudity and sensuality," for "diverse
consenting sexual experience,"  for "explicit sexual materials" (Craft 1985: 7). At the
same time, they also recognize that pornography is not an abstract issue removed from
capital and sexual class relations. Rather, pornography represents the prevailing images of
women and sexuality, which are part of the cultural legitimation of patriarchal relations, of
the boundaries that restrict women and of the domination exercised by men as a sexual
class. Furthermore, as in other businesses, the "sex indusbry" typically follows the model
of men owning and profiting from women's labor.
The Outlaws for Social Responsibility believe that pornography and advertising use
women's images to reflect and promote "body hatred and guilt conceming normal
functions" (Craft  1985: 7).  They object to the use of "women's bodies to sell products"
24
and violence against women sold "for entertainment and men's profit..." (Craft 1985: 7).
Because they perceive pornogrlphy to be consistent with other cultural representations 
wornen and with other exploitation of women's labor, they want to publicly confront
pornography without censoring or banning is  production or consumption. They believe
that a ban would sweep the issue under the table and protect it from scrutiny. To be clear
about what they are protesting, they state up front, "SEX IS NOT OBSCENE!  The real
obscenity is the marketing of women as products..." (Craft 1985: 7). Rather than
focusing on contractual or legal rights, then, the Outlaws for Social Responsibility
emphasize the class rights of women.
SHIFT  IN  STATE  IDEOLOGY
The post-Vietnam perid  has been marked by a search for a new ideological center.
Elite funders have become dissatisfred with the gowth  of the welfare sector and the liberal
agenda that has supported it.  Neoconservative or restictive liberal policy planners have
developed plans to slow liberal reforms and "correct" for the presumed excesses of
liberalism (see, for example, Ferguson and Rogers 1986). The state has thus assumed an
ideology of restrictive liberalism.
Since the Vieuram War, the U.S. economy has been increasingly plagued, and the
Republican Pany has maintained the presidency with the exception of the four years of the
Carter Administration following the Watergate scandal. Liberal feminists and blacks have
made significant gains, particularly in terms of legal protections and some new social
services, but econornic troubles combined with pressures from the civil rights, new left,
and feminist movements fueled a reactionary movement from the new right.  The new
center is now being established by restrictive liberal policy planners. These restrictive
liberals express the sentiment that liberalism has gone too far.  In order to constrain the
demands placed upon government, they attempt to limit the notion of equal oppornrnity to
25
its most narow  interpretation. Meanwhile, they attempt to avert the possibility that
demands made on the basis of equal opportunity will expose the contradictions between the
concept of equality and the continued existence of hierarchy and oppression (see Eisenstein
1981). These restrictive liberals may ally themselves with some conservatives and even
borrow some of their rhetoric. Their goal, however, is not a conservative revolution, but a
new liberal center.
CONTEXT FOR TBADITIONALIST MEN
Traditionalist men have organized in a spirit of resistance to changes that threaten
the traditionally personal authority of men. Traditionalist men may concede that women are
capable of performing some jobs in the paid labor force, and they may even accept some
changes in women's role. They are clear, however, that men and women are different and
that, even if they perform new roles, women shouldn't undermine male authority. For
Gilder the risk is that men will lose their motivation. For activists in the traditionalist men's
movement the risks are 1) that women will be given so much special treatrnent by the state
and the courts that they won't need their husbands and2) that children will either be soft or
overly rebellious without male authority and discipline. The traditionalist men's
movement, then, is connected with conservative theories and the goals of anti-feminists of
the "pro-family" New Right.
Conservative  Response to  the  Liberal Crisis
Conservatives  responded primarily to a crisis of authority and proposed a
return of previous boundaries. Some conservative scholars have used sociobiology in an
attempt to defend traditional values and respect for authority as natural. philip Green
(1981) argues that these conservative "arguments, taken together, ... implicitly ... repudiate
the entire ethos of liberal democracy; their appeal is designedfor a time of crisis, notfor
tlrc long run femphasis addedl" (10). A brief glimpse at these conservarives will
26
demonstrate that the so called "neoconservatives"  in fact, liberals.
Steven Goldberg, the author of The Inevitability of Patriarcfty, reflects the interests
of the true conservatives in his assertion "that by nature women can never be the equals of
men in the quest for leadership" b@ause men "are much more likely than women to exhibit
a drive to dominance" (Green l98l:  127).  Goldberg attributes this male aggression to
hormones, which determine the needs of the male psyche. Men must, by their nature,
dominate; otherwise they would not be men. George Gilder, "one of Goldberg's
populizers" (Green l98l:  134), develops a self-consciously  political agenda.
Recognizing that women can and do work in the paid labor force, Gilder relies on a
variation of protecting the man's family wage. For the sake of their husbands, their
marriages and their counbry, argues Gilder, women should not work even though they are
capable of doing so. When women work, he explains, they undermine the man's sense of
obligation to support lrri family.  They also undermine the work ethic for the man, who is,
by nature more inclined to reckless abandon and the unbridled pursuit of pleasure (male
aggression gone wild).  In short, women's role in the paid labor force has supposedly
worked to undermine patriarchal authority and stability (Gilder 1973; see also Armstrong
1983 and Eisenstein 1984).
Gilder argues that marriage is necessary to control men's sexual drive because
"sexual freedom is seen as destructive to the moral fabric of society..." @isenstein 1984:
55). This control is the wife's role. For the conservatives the corrolary to this is that
women are more privileged than men.  The conservatives argue that for women to protect
their natural privilege and for the moral good of the nation, women should return to the
home and men should resume their bneadwinner role. The conservatives contend that this
"commitment" as breadwinner is the mechanism of social conrol that prevents men from an
unrestrained punuit of pleasure. Gilder "argues for inequality between men and women in
the economic realm in order to establish the importance and privilege of man as
breadwinner, to counter the 'natural privilege of women"' (Eisenstein 1984: 54).
27
Anti-Feminist Women
Before founding the Eagle Forum, Phyllis Schlafly was an organizer within the
conservative wing of the Republican Party. Klarch (1987) associates this wing of the
Republicans with the John Birch Society: "While the John Birch Society epitomizes the
radical right of the 1950s, ... the Society is a crucial link between the Old Right and the
social conservatism of the New Right" (225).
The Eagle Forum's "pro-family" agenda stresses a need for authority in the family,
which is presumed to be a traditional nuclear family.  This demands also a cultural respect
for authority:  "The Eagle Forum, 'a national organization of women and men who believe
in God, Home, and Country,'believes that it is the responsibility of society to honor the
career of motherhood by recognizing the right of women to be a full-time wife and mother.
and to have laws that obligate her husband to provide the primary financial support and a
home for her and their children Bagle Forum flyer, Box 618, Alton, n-  62002)"
@isenstein 1984: 177). It's clear that authority also carries a burden of responsibility, and
women are considered to be in the enviable position of being protected by good masters.
Likewise the citizens are protected by benevolent leaders in a hierarchy that is part of ttre
natural order: "Antifeminists ... argue against sexual equality and for'justice,' that is,
difference and protection" (Eisenstein 1984: 169).
Deidre English (1983) has observed that these anti-feminists also claim "to stand for
the best interests of all women" (477). These women have blamed feminism for the
breakdown of the family.  English (1983) characterizes the anti-feminist women's
movement as expressing a "fear that feminism will free men first":
If  women hold jobs, no matter how poorly paid, men may more easily
renounce any responsibility for  the economic support of  women and
children.  Thus woman's meager new economic independence, and her
grcater sexual freedom outside the bounds of marriage have allowed men to
gamer great new freedom. (481)
28
CONTEXT OF THE MASCULINIST  MOVEMENT
The masculinist men's movement is the one strand whose roots Ehrenreich (1983)
addressed at length. From her argument I draw the importance of the human potential
movement as a source of the individualism that's vital to men's liberation and men's rights.
Because I am also concerned with the changing ideology of the state, though, I begin my
examination of the roots of masculinism with a description of restrictive liberalism. Here I
draw primarily from Steinfels' (1979) study of neoconservatives,  contending that the
neoconservative is nrore appropriately deemed a restrictive liberal.  I will  then focus on the
liberal countefinovement to show how both the women's movement and men's movement
have been affected by the shift in state ideology. As I stated earlier, when liberals within
the movement attempt to work within the state while radicals press demands that cannot be
satisfied within the system, the movement risks fragmentation. One fragment that emerges
is the liberal countennovement, which continues to press for limited liberal reforms while
also chastising the radicals and expansive liberals in the movement that demand too much
or use extreme tactics.
Restrictive Liberalism
The stability of the U.S. polity relies upon a process of legitimating authority, and
the ideology of liberal democracy allows stability without the overt use of force. We shift
then from clear submission to a more murky form of acquiescence,  is defined as
consensus. Intellectuals are important to this process because "as traffickers in society's
symbols and values ... and ... as political theorists and shapers of general ideas
intellectuals are legitimators" (Steinfels 1979: 6).
Steinfels (1979) traces the roots of "neoconservative" thought to the Cold War
period. Functionalism was popular in the 1950s. During this time liberal intellectuals
attacked mass politics as anti-intellectual and undemocratic. To do this, however, they
used a particular definition of democracy that has become the modus operendi of restrictive
29
liberalism. Steinfels establishes five components of this definition, each of which are
founded upon liberal theories of society: l)  pluralism, 2) consensus, 3) objectivity, 4)
status politics, and 5) pragmatism. The overarching component is pluralism, which sets
out to explain how our system functions to assure liberal values of equality and freedom.
Social groups are said to compete in a fashion that will maintain balance, harmony and
social order. Individuals are represented by these groups rather than participating
themselves: "Citizen apathy is rationalized, and any degree of mass citizen participation is
perceived as a threat and a precursor of totalitarian democracy" (Steinfels 1979: 34). The
threat to democracy is presumed to be an idealistic belief that everyone can participate
personally without representation. The elites and the inequality they represent,
consequently, are not deemed threatening
The concept of consensus relies upon the principles of objectivity and pragmatism.
"The clash of groups" is supposed to have taken "place within a consensus about the rules
of the game and the fundamental values that sustained these rules" (Steinfels 1979: 35).
Anyone who contested the procedures of democracy or the markets were deemed to be
ideologues. The terminology has been popular among political conunentators in the 1980s.
Aides to Reagan and now to Bush are divided into camps of ideologues (in this case right-
wing) and pragmatists. By declaring an end to ideology, these intellectuals endorsed the
liberal center without taking responsibility for this position. Anyone who contested the
fundamental values of society were labeled "moralists." Of considerable significance for
our discussion of changing boundaries, it was argued that "moralism dissolved the lines
between public and private, between law and morality, that liberalism had established in
hope of minimizing conflict over fundamental beliefs..." (Steinfels 1979: 36).
The final concept was meant to explain the occasional conflict that did arise. Status
politics was characteized by status anxiety. Insurgents struggle, therefore, not against
oppression but against modernism. The argument relied heavily upon psychological
30
characteristics,  "as a staple of political argument..., the'new framework' ... turned out
to be another, slightly more sophisticated, reductionism" (Steinfels 1979: 38).
With black insurgency, the New Left, and women's liberation, a respect for law
and a reverence for experts was undermined by civil disobedience, rioting, an6 insurgency
in general. Whereas the "neoconsewative" intellectuals had once argued that moralism was
"intolerant of accomodation and ambiguity" (Steinfels 1979: 36), they were now
bemoaning the loss of "values." While these values were central to conservative thought,
the restrictive liberals or "neoconse,rvatives"  not abandoning their pragmatism.
Instead, it seemed pragmatic to build a coalition with some of the conservatives to protect
liberal society. As we shall see, these values did not challenge the objective or the
pragmatic. Rather, those unspoken and supposedly consensual values were thought to be
the underpinning of liberal stability.
Writes Steinfels: "Neoconseryatives, like most Americans, disapprove of the
unequal treatment suffered by racial minorities, women and the poor. But they ... are
strongly opposed to minority separatism, disruption as a means of dramatizing conditions
and forcing action, and civil disobedience except in very extreme circumstances" [emphasis
addedl (Steinfels 1979: 50). This is the classic dilemma of the liberal, who "quickly and
self-consciously  two obvious alternatives which he [sic] defines as 'extremes"'
(Ryan l97l:  27). During the C-old War, these liberals seemed to be alligned with the kft
in their anack on McCarthyism, because the lib?ral  "cannot side with an openly reactionary,
repressive position," which is considered "repugnant" (Ryan l97l:.  27). Then during the
early 1970s, these liberals seemed to be aligned with conservatives, because the liberals
abandon "the'extreme'solution of radical social change, and ... cannot bring themselves
to attack the system that has been so good to them" (Ryan l97l:  27).
In terms of race, Geschwender also notes that "retreat usually takes the form of
retrenchment in a new system of racial exploitation which provides many of the advantages
of the old system at lesser cost" (Geschwender 1977: 2).  Resrictive liberals formulate the
3l
terms of the retrenchment and, in the process, align themselves with some conservatives.
By the mid to late 1960s, "the issue of an anachronistic regional caste system was replaced
by fundamental questions concerning the equity of the prevailing distributions of wealth
and power in America" (McAdam 1982: 206). Beginning in 1966 there was a "white
backlash" reflected in a shifting political agenda- This was characterized by increasing
white majorities for conservative political candidates and "the effors of elected officials and
political candidates to discredit the shifting patterns of black insurgency characteristic of
this period" (McAdam 1982: 2A0.  By the 1980s this white backlash had become part of
the prevailing political ideology of restrictive liberalism.
Although racial prejudice has declined, efforts to improve the status of blacks has
fallen upon disfavor. In part this can be attributed to the belief that liberal reforms have
already created racial equality: "Polls reveal that an increasing number of white Americans
are committed to the concept and the ideal of integration. Many of them believe that true
equality of opportunity has been attained as a result of the passage of civil rights laws..."
(Gill 1981: 189-190). As a result many U.S. citizens oppose "governmental and societal
efforts that are thought to favor blacks [New York Times, December 3,1979, p. 68]" (Gill
1981: 189-190).
In 1984 the Heritage Foundation prepared an agenda for President Reagan's second
term and a summary of his administration's first four years. Prior to Reagan, according to
this report, "judicial battles were being won by the argument that racial justice actually
consists of race-consciousness -- and that the law must favor some races over others. This
momentum, however, has been halted by the Reagan Administration's Justice Departrnent.
It has returned to the original vision of color-blind justice" (Butler 1984: 156). There
continued to be contradictions within the state, as officials tried to maintain an image of
liberal equality. Specifically, while the Justice Department opposed "quotas in any form,"
others in the White House reportedly "sought to woo minority businessmen [sic]" (Butler
32
1984: 156).
Steinfels concedes that "it has not been easy to settle upon a label" for ttrose he calls
"neoconservatives" (Steinfels 1979: 2). He also recognizes that "liberalism itself contains
important conservative elements" and that it is this conservative aspect of liberalism that
"ne@onsetrvatives reemphasize" (Steinfels 1979: 3).  Steinfels rejects the use of liberalism,
because he rightly believes that "ne@onservatism" is somehow different from the
expansive liberalism of the New Frontier and the Great Society. In doing so, however, he
suggests that these views are new or are removed somehow from the liberal tradition rather
than being rooted in a fundamental contradiction in our liberal society. They are still
liberals but now in a restrictive phase.
Search for a New Center
The restrictive liberals hold open the possibiliry of equality but insist that
government should not be expected to provide equal conditions. Rather, while restrictive
liberals respect raditional values and reject the counterculture and radical politics, they
favor equal opportunity. This opportunity, they believe, will  be provided by the market
"while preserving individual freedom" (Steinfels 1979: 5l).  According to rhe restrictive
liberals, limits upon equality are not founded in the physiological or psychological
dominance of man, nor upon the need to balance women's sexual power as Gilder argues.
Instead, they posit a basic conflict between equality and liberty, a concept that was popular
in the nineteenth century (Steinfels 1979: 231). Medcalf and Dolbeare (1985) suggest that
"sometimes freedom and equality appear to be in direct conflict, so that one or the other
must be given priority" (17). The restrictive liberals tend, then, to stress the freedom to
compete, which is consistent with our capitalist system and tends to mystify both racial and
gender domination. They express a concern that the call for equality will contribute to a
"levelling" of society that will endanger ttre authority of experts and the role of meritocracy,
which are, they believe, essential to the stability of liberal representative democracy.
33
While the restictive  liberals are not fundamentally opposed to the welfare/warfare
state, they blame affirmative action quotas and the programs of the Great Society's war on
poverty for the increasing demands and diminishing legitimacy of the state. Resources
available for government programs are viewed as being in competition with industry's
needs for economic expansion. Further, to restore confidence in traditional authority,
greater emphasis is placed upon nationalism and national security. This emphasis can be
used to stress that "we are all Americans" and that dramatic changes or extreme demands
could be hazardous to our collective well-being. Military obligations and economic
constraints can underscore the argument that government cannot solve all problems.
"Furthermore, if impossible demands doom a high proportion of government progmms to
failure, the authority of government should be shielded by dispersing responsibility for this
failure as much as possible" (Steinfels 1979: 64). This can be managed by shifting
responsibility for many programs to state and local governments and stressing the role of
the market in solving problems.
Ronald Reagan campaigned in 1980 as the flag bearer for the New Right. Eight
years later it was clear that his administration had taken a decisive turn toward a restrictive
liberal agenda. Faced with a Congress that has continued (with a six year lapse in the
Senate) to be controlled by Democrats and with public opinion that was less than the
mandate he claimed, Reagan was unable to achieve many New Right goals: a human life
amendment, restoration of prayer in schools, elimination of the Department of Fducation,
and so forth.  This prompted some New Right activists to criticize Reagan (as they had
Nixon before him) for not living up to his stated conservative ideals.
What Reagan did accomplish, in what might be catled the Reagan Reformation, was
to tighten restrictions on welfare and entitlement payments, reduce funding for many social
progmms, narrow the definition of affirmative action and other programs he personally
opposed, and appoint a host of conservative judges throughout the country (including three
Supreme Court justices and a new chief justice). By emphasizing the "private sector," seH-
34
reliance, color blindness, and strict interpretations of the Constitution, Reagan had begun to
again couch inequality as equal competition or "equal opportunity" defined in its most
niuTow tenns.
ln Reagan's chosen successor, George Bush, the legacy of restrictive liberalism is
nearly complete. While qpeaking of a "kinder and gentler nation" and claiming to hear "the
little people," Bush's militaristic policy plans did not deviate much from the course set by
Reagan. Meanwhile, the Democratic campaign of 1988 set out to reclaim the so-called
"Reagan Democrats," who were white and mostly male. The gender gap has two faces --
that of conservative white men who think the liberal programs have gone too far and that of
blacks and women who are concerned for their future if there are not significant changes in
the course of government. While Michael Dukakis chased the former and distanced himself
from Jesse Jackson, Bush offerred a bit of soft rhetoric to cut his losses with the latter.
Bush seemed confident in the growing solidity of a restrictive liberal center and
declared that Dukakis was "out of the mainstream." While stressing conventional themes
of social control and military power, Bush advanced a restrictive liberal agenda marked by
proposals to (l)  limit abortions to cases of rape, incest and threats to the life of the mother
and (2) offer tax credis to families that use day care. At one point, Bush went so far as to
accuse Dukakis of being "sexist" for having suggested that women had been "forced" into
the labor force.
The New Class
Restrictive liberals are also concerned about the "New Class" of professionals who
occupy their time creating the reform strategies that have "overloaded" government.
Michael Novak (1976) wrote of the "knowledge industry":  "... federal and local
government workers, researchers, lawyers, planners, consultants, educators, information
systems operatives, journalists, social workers and others ... depend for their livelihood on
35
expanding and activist government expenditure (with its attendant comrptions)." One
might imagine, then, that the rising expectations were caused by the overzealousness  this
"new class" of professional problem solvers. If this new class, many of whom are women
and minorities, could be disempowered, it might reduce the demands and the correspondent
diminishment of authority (see Eisenstein 1984). "In particular, the neoconseryatives [sic]
have set themselves against two weapons, believed to be in the hands of the new class --
sentimental humanitarianism and guilt" (Steinfels 1979: 65).
Against sentimentalism the restrictive liberals argue that one cannot be certain of the
results of a program. In fact, they demonstrated this uncertainty by claiming that the war
on poverty had failed (or at least couldn't be proven to have succeeded). Against guilt they
argued that the privileged must be protected from wallowing in the guilt associated with
inequality and their privileged positions. Don't feel bad, we are told, because there's a
limit to what we can do.  "The attack on guilt ... is part of the wash of psychologizing that
spread over social theory in the 1940s and 1950s. ... whatever responses 
neoconservative [sic] critic judges to be self-abnegating or excessive are interpreted as
'guilt"' (Steinfels 1979: 66). As we shall see, a strikingly similar argument is used by the
masculinist men's movement.
Restrictive  Women
The restrictive liberal women occupy more prominent positions in the Republican
Party mainstrsrm. Klatch (1987) refers to these women as "laissez-faire conseryatives" to
convey their libertarian roots. "In the laissez-faire conservative world view," writes
Klarch, "economic issues take precedence  social issues..." (Klatch 1987: 38). While
restrictive liberal women support women's involvement in public life -- in politics and
management -- they are not politically conscious as a gender class. Rather, these women
tend to identify more with their economic class. They believe that their status will  improve
as the general economy improves, so that is their primary focus.
36
In terms of discrimination, they recogni ze thatit exists and believe some action
should be taken. However, individuals are responsible for solving such problems. These
women don't want to get any special trearnent that men in their fields don't get. They tend
to suppoft reproductive freedom but not government funded abortions. Their emphasis is
on the individual and individual liberties. While they "are closer to feminiss in their
recognition of sexual discrimination, they do not recognize the institutional basis for sexual
inequality nor do they call for collective responses or government action to remedy
injustice" (Klarch 1987: 53). Klarch notes that an alliance has not yet been forged between
restrictive liberal women and the feminists. With Friedan's "second stage" and the "post-
feminist generation," though, some feminists are closer to the restrictive liberal women.
The  Liberal Countermovement
Liberalism relies upon individualism. The youth culture (or counterculture) that
was associated by many with the New kft  attempted to interpret ideas of personal freedom
in a political context and tended to disdain the conformiry of the capitalist enterprise. It is
significant, though, that the counter-culture seemed to assume "that hedonism was
inevitably anti-capitalist." Although capitalism was, in terms of the work ethic, aptly
associated wi th "puri tani sm and deferred gratifi cation s, "
where consumption was concerned,.[capitalism] urged people to gratify
their slightest wish. -It.exploited se* itri-'etesslyio itrii".,i-riiliiJ"?I  ui,
law and custom... whici was not to say that'sexuJ.;d ;i#i;d'o-,
were not good things in their own right.- But there was no assurance that
behavioral liberty would not grow aithe expense of politicaiitr.lo-.  n
was one ,hil,g,,g Ty  th,*,j.ei.promoted mintal  healih, anottrer to-say lt
advanced social justice. (O'Neil[ 1975: 329)
The growing acceptance of humanistic psychology and the Human potential
Movement heralded potential liberation and growth. This emphasis on growth applied to
both sexes, and provided a new form of individualism that was less rugged and better
suited to new, more ambiguous gender boundaries. "Once the lid was off the life cycle, so
37
to speak, anything was possible for women as well as men, at least in principle"
@hrenreich 1983: 97).
However, some women began to sense that it was they who were being consumed.
While the sexual revolution had ttre effect of providing men and women with more sexual
options, it also maintained male dominance and male standards. Evans noted, for instance,
the sense that men had expected wornen to be sexually liberated in their terrns: "Men
believed that women would simply adopt their own more promiscuous standards" (Evans
1979: 153). Marge Piercy (1970) contrasts the styles of male supremacists and male
liberals within the New Left.  The sexism of the male supremacists was overt: "The male
supremacist tends to exploit women new to the Movement or on its fringes. His concept of
women is conventionally patriarchal: they are for bed, board, babies and, also, for doing
his typing and running his office machines and doing his tedious research" (Piercy 1970: '
434). T\e  male liberals, on the other hand had a more subtle approach that invited
acquiescence  than demandin g submission :
The male liberal respects the pride of women.  He has learned well the
rhetoric of women's liberation and offers apparent partnership... He is just
as career-oriented  just as exploitative as the male supremacist, bui he
gives back enough tidbits of flattery and attention to makb the relationship
appear reciprocal by contrast with what goes on with bullier males, and h-e
i;^Q far 1le  more fficient  long-range co-opter  [emphasis added] (piercy
1970: 435).
Clearly then, pursuing freedom is not sufficient to attain sexual justice. Kappeler makes
this point by using Sade to explain the ideological shift from sexual conservatism to sexual
liberalism -- labelled "liberation" (Kappeler 137). Yet, structural consmints remain with
this new libeny.
As the structural boundaries shift, patriarchal privilege must be masked in new
ways. Corresponding with a structural shift from an industrial based economy to an
increasingly service economy, the ideology of management and of patriarchy also shifted.
The model of paternalism, or blatant oppression, has given way to the model of team
38
nurnagement,  "repressive tolerance": Without equality "the conditions of tolerance are
'loaded': they are determined and defined by the institutionalized inequality (which is
certainly compatible with constitutional equality), i.e., by the class structure of society"
(Marcuse 1965: 85).
This shift in the ideological legitimation of patriarchy empowers the liberal
countermovement that wants reform but criticizes radical demands as too extreme: "Thus,
within a repressive society, even progressive movements threaten to trun into their opposite
to the degree to which they accept the rules of the game" (Marcuse 1965: 83). This has
been the position of Friedan's liberal feminism. It has also been the position of the
masculinist men's movement, which promises men's rights and men's liberation in the
guise of growth. Like the restrictive liberals, the masculinists attack radical theorists for
succumbing to guilt.
Human Potential 
Existential philosophy was a precursor to the growing acceptance of humanistic
psychology. But while the impulse of existentialism was political and tended toward
revolutionary change, humanistic psychology has been more optimistic about personal
change. Rowan (1976) notes that what became known as the T-group had its roots in
research by social psychologist Kurt kwin  in 1946. Together with the client-centered
therapy developed by Carl Rogers in the late 1940's and the research of self-actualizing
gowth  by Abraham Maslow, Lewin's work was one of three strands of humanistic
psychology that "converged in the early 1950's" (8).
Michael Murphy, along with fellow Stanford graduate Richard Price, founded the
Esalen Institute n  1962 in Big Sur, California. The encounter group, the best-known
human potential activity at Esalen, was designed to respond to the alienation of modern
society. The encounter group had evolved from the T-group (a.k.a. sensitivity training
39
gtoups) that "had originated in the Northeastern United States and had existed primarily as
a means of helping administrators and business executives become more sensitive to the
interpersonal aspects of their jobs and organizations" (Shaffer 1978: 4-5).
According to Shaffer (1978) "two central emphases within humanistic theory" that
deal with alienation are "man's [sic] essential wholeness and his [sic] unfulfilled potential"
(7). The encounter group, then, "was expressly designed to allow individuals to encounter
aspects of their being that they had become deadened to; this included encounters with their
body feelings, with their fellow group participants, and with nature" (7).
Psychology had adjusted to changes in the work role of middle class men and
developed the notion of growth as a positive aspect of masculinity. ThroughoutThe
Hearts of Men, Ehrenreich recognizes the social control function of what is officially
prescribed as healthy and nanrral. Men were declared weak by Today's Healthin  1957
when the medical profession began warning that men were disproportionately subject to
heart disease @hrenreich 1983: 70). Yet, "psychology was not ready to condemn
masculinity as a health hazard, and medicine was not about to indict the corporate system
for generating toxic levels of occupational stress" @hrenreich 1983: 8l).  The result was a
myriad of advice to wives about how to better nuture and pander to their "weak"
husbands.
This did not, however, reflect the experiences of working and lower class men,
including numy men of color. Patriarchal styles, then, have varied according to race and
economic class. The central characteristic of traditional masculinity is the perceived need to
maintain control. Aggression and particularly competitiveness can be part of maintaining
control, so at times (as the leaders of the T-groups recognized) could sensitivity and
cooperation. Ehrenreich also notes a class interest involved in the concern that liberal men
have with beitg more sensitive (Ehrenreich 1984). Brod argues, just as Piercy noted
earlier, that the more comfortable liberal exploiter may be the more insidious:
40
Thus men may appear more personally congenial farther up the economic
ladder, even as they exercise the institutional power responsible for
women's lower status. In contrast, men who have but their personal power
are more conspicuous but actually less efficacious when exercising their
power in patriarchy's service.
(Brod 1987: 15)
Feminine 
In 1963 Betty Friedan wrote Tlrc Feminine Mystiquc, which was a liberal feminist
critique that stressed human potential. Both women and men were denied liberty, she
argued, by the narrowness of their sex roles. Accordingly, women's potential had been
restricted by a glorification of femininity.  Friedan, then, frames the issue of women's
status in terms of sex role socialization rather than sexual politics:  "Friedan does not see
women's liberation involving a struggle for power. According to her view men have
nothing to lose and women have only to take the risk" @isenstein 1981: 185-186).
In developing her thesis of the feminine mystique, Friedan refers to humanistic
psychologist Abraham Maslow. She failed meanwhile to further the beginnings of a radical
analysis to be found in the writings of Wollstonecraft and Stanton (see Eisenstein 1981).
In short, "she tries to smooth over the tensions benveen the liberal state and feminists rather
than uncover them" (Eisenstein 1981: 178). While feminism attributes women's unequal
position to their sexual class (or caste), liberal indidualism attributes inequality to individual
characteristics or the failure of a social group to compete in a supposedly pluralist polity.
Because Friedan attempts to resolve a problem cornmon to women without expounding a
theory of sexual class, she is unable to develop a consistent feminist theory: "It would
seem that Friedan should know that women are clearly overeducated for their jobs and for
their work in the home. But she still offers individual solutions as a political one"
(Eisenstein  188).
Friedan and NOW presented a challenge to the status quo in 1966 when they set out
to provide grcater economic opportunities for women. In the years since, though, NOW
4l
has issued a more radical agenda (although still defined in liberal terms), and Friedan finds
herself adopting a relativety more conservative argument. In fact, Friedan's position is in
many ways nearer to the restrictive liberal ideology of the state, since the state has accepted
some procedural aspects of equality for women that were the initial goals of NOW.
In 1981 Friedan wrote TIU Second Stage. Ehrenreich (1987) calls it "one of the
early signs of lethargy" within the feminist movement (166). Stacey reflects that "Friedan
is one of many disenchanted liberals who retain a progressivist faith in capitalist
development and individual initiative despite their serious loss of confidence in the
prospects for, or the efficacy of, federally sponsored social reforms" (Stacey 1983: 568).
Eisenstein (1984) suggests that "Friedan and Schlafly have come to share the same
enemy," namely radical feminism (193). And Daniel Bell says approvingly, "Although the
NOW movement may have gone too far..., they are pulling back. Betty Friedan
represents  pullback" (Bell 1987: 204).
Stacey (1983) has identified Friedan as part of "the new conseryative feminism" of
which the "central, definitive characteristic  is a repudiation of sexual politics..." (561).
Additional distinguishing marks of this new conservative feminism are (1) a renewed focus
on the needs of the middle class nuclear family, (2) a glorification of feminine qualities that
are neglected in the masculine public sphere, and (3) the belief that important political goals
have been sacrificed due to distraction caused by a "struggle against male domination"
(Stacey 1983: 561-562). One distraction according to Friedan's The Second Stage is
work against pornography. Friedan clearly is concerned that feminism be more relevant to
the needs of the dual career family and that women and men work togetlvr for change.
Stacey (1983) concludes:
The Second Stage represents a liberal's response to the failure of liberalism
and a feminist's response to the setbacks of feminism... While maintaining
sexual equality as a vague, futuristic goal, Friedan seeks to curtail explicitly
feminist  struggles to  achieve it,  and  she collaborates with  the
neoconservative [sic] program to dismantle the welfare state. (564)
42
Masculine 
Hthe identification with femininity had confined women to the role of housewife,
then masculinity had confined rnen to the roles of protector and provider.  The feminine and
masculine mystiques, then were complementary problems with complementary solutions.
Don Anderson wrote "Warren the Success Object" in which he reviews Warren Fa:rell's
The Liberated Man:  Beyond Masculinity.  Says Anderson (1975):
Warren Farrell is a contradiction who, like all media stars, both reaches
farther and compromises more than others struggling with the same issues.
...his major thesis is that Women's Liberation is not threatening to men, and
indeed that its main effect is to relieve men of many of the pressures they
now experience (e.g. freedom from nagging wives).
Farrell had at one time been elected to the Board of Directors of the National Onganization
for Women and, in 1971, had formed the NOW Task Force of the Masculine Mystique
(Anderson 1975: 146). In 1975 Warren Farrell wrote The Liberated Man.  Farrell
concludes that liberated men attain "new freedoms -- freedom beyond proving oneself;
beyond worrying about appffimnces..."  While women sought greater access to the
paid labor force, men set out to get in touch with themselves, their partners, and their
children. Men were encouraged to be more emotionally expressive, more affectionate,
more sensitive, and more domestic. Liberated men should get "beyond condescension and
contempt toward women, needing to be in control...; beyond specializing, needing to
become the expeft, being the sole breadwinner, the victim of bribes -- ultimately a security
object" (313).
A year later Herb Goldberg (197 6) wrote Tle Hazards of Being Male.  Goldberg
is a California psychotherapist who believes that men are challenged by the women's
movement to recognize their own need for change. He is critical of men's liberation
groups, however, for encouraging guilt and self-hating attitudes and for having "introjected
the voices of their feminist accusers" and fostered a "competition to be the least competitive
and most free of ttre stereotyped version of male chauvinism" (Goldberg 1976: 5).
43
At the same time, however, Goldberg stresses what men can gain from changing
roles. Goldberg lists several impossible binds that seem to be related to one of two major
conflicts:  (1) How can men be devoted to work and to the work ethic and still be a caring
and responsible person at home and at rest? and (2) How can men both maintain a position
of power relative to women and still enjoy the benefits of sharing in an equal partnership?
He summarizes his main argument as follows:  "By what perverse logic can the male
continue to imagine himself 'top dog?' Emotionally repressed, out of touch with his body,
alienated and isolated from other men, terrorizedby  the fear of failure, afraid to ask for
help, thrown out at a moment's notice on the occupational  (Goldberg 1976:
181).
Astrachan writes that "When Goldberg speaks publicly, he states frankly that he
says nothing about power in his books because 'I'm pretty naive in that area'or'I'm
politically stupid"' (305). Warren Farrell proved to be not much brighter on the subject of
social power. In the mid-7O's Farrell was considered to be a spokesman for feminist men,
but he has since aligned himself with the masculinist wing of the men's movement, which
grew out of Goldberg's ideas. Farrell's most recent book is Why Men Are the Way They
Are.  In the introduction he writes:  "The more deeply I understood women's experience
of powerlesJness, the more I asswned men had the power women did not have. Infact,
what I was understanding wasthefema/e experience of male power" (Fanell 1986: xvii).
Actually, he seemed to have rediscovered the argument that Goldberg had made ten ye:rs
earlier, i.e. men and women are equally oppressed. Male liberal feminism is difficult to
maintain without directly facing the contradictions between liberalism and feminism, and
Farrell seems unable to do so.
M
CHAPTER III
MEN'S MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
I have established a context for each srand of the men's movement, paying
particular attention to two aspects of social rnovement emergence conveyed by McAdam
(1982):  l)  socioeconomic processes and2) cognitive liberation. I will now describe the
present organizations of the men's movement primarily in terms of their ideologies --
values, goals and tactics, as found in organizational literature and statements of purpose
(see Gerlach and Hines 1970: xvii).  It should be noted that such a study of organizational
characteristics will  not encompass the entire breadth of the movement. I am focusing on
organizations in order to address the dynamic of social power. I will rely on such
documents as newletters, statements of purpose, and periodicals to develop an image of
organizational ideology. I will use bnoad strokes to paint my portrait of the different
strands of the men's movement.
I initially identified many national organizations through the Encyclopedia of
Associations (1987). In addition to the Encyclopedia, I found current references in
"Resources for Change" (compiled by J. Kilbourne, 51 Church St., Boston, MA  02116),
"A History of the Men's Movement" by T.Williamson (1985) and "Men: A Movement of
Their Own" by A.Astrachan (1984). Some additional organizational names and addresses
were derived from the original contacts. This includes some periodicals of the men's
movement.
I am concerned with the general history of the organizations and of the movement.
The study, as a cross-section of the movement, represents some limitations in terms of
historical data. Still, much historical information can be derived from existing data.
Kimmel, for instance, utilizes historical data to posit a consistent male response to crises in
gender relations, consisting of l)  the antifeminist backlash, 2) the promale backlash and 3)
45
profeminist men (Kimmel  1987  143-153). I refer to the modern men's movement as
consisting of the traditionalists, the masculinists and the pro-feminists. Table I shows the
organizations in each segment of the movement.
Table l.  Organizations  to ideological faction.
Pro-Feminisf  National Organization for Changing Men
Traditionalis[  Men'sRightsAssociation
National Organization for Men
Masculinist: National Congress for Men
The Coalition of Free Men
Men's Rights Inc.
It could well be argued that most organizations in our society disproportionately
advance the interests of men as a group. It is important, therefore, to note that while the
men's movement may attempt to advance men's perceived best interests, this is not the
movement's distinguishing characteristic. For differing reasons the members of the men's
movement believe that the existing masculine role is itself not in the best interests of the
male sex. This includes organizations with a primary focus on changing how men function
in such contexts as divorce law, child custody, parenting, work behavior, interpersonal
relations, and male violence. The different segments of the men's movement, then, are
divided (and the pro-feminist group is suMivided) by the level of analysis and the kinds of
issues addressed. Table 2 separates  segments according to this dimension.
Because the different strands of the men's movement are divided by ideology, their
views of the world are different. With the exception of some traditionalists and
masculinists working on divorce reform the factions rarely work together. Table 3 shows
how different factions of the rnen's movement relate to state ideology and patriarchy, which
were discussed in the first two chapten.
46
Table 2. Level of analysis and level of involvement in men's issues.
Personal
Liberal ho-Feminists -- personal expression  alternative insdnrtions
Masculinists -- personal  and pottical rights for men
Strucnral
Radical Pro-FeminisS -- resistance  op'pressive 
Traditionalists -- resistance to loss of power
Table 3. Response  men's movement  to state ideology and patriarchy
Relation to  Relation to
Faction  Favored State Ideology  Patriarchal Family  Social Patriarchy
Pro-Feminist  Expansive  Opposition  Opposition
Traditionalkt  Conservatism  Support  Support
Masculinist  Restrictive Liberalism  Opposition  Acreptance
PRO.FEMINIST  MEN'S  MOVEMENT
The pro-feminist men's movement has been dominated by supporters of liberal
feminism. A smaller group of men espousing radical and socialist feminism have
organized themselves within the only national pro-feminist men's organization, but they
have met some resistance. In response to their proposal to eliminate the term "male
positive" from the organization's statement of purpose, a lengthy letter in the newsletter
suggested that they should "organize themselves as a men's auxiliary to NOW"  (brother,
December 1988). Futher, the letter's author queried, "Is the men's movement to be
considered as full partners with the women's movement, or functionaries with someone
else's agenda?" (brother, December 1988).
NOCM describes iself  as "male-positive, pro-feminist and gay affirmitive."  The
statement of purpose elaborates each of these aspects and concludes, in part: "Many people
are oppressed  because  class, age and religion and physical condition.
We believe that such injustices are vitally connected to sexism, with its fundamental
premise of unequal distribution of power." This portion of the statement speaks to the
47
cenm,lity of sexism in the nexus of power relations. However, the organization has been
effectively divided benveen liberal profeminist  men (who tend to focus more on culture)
and radical and socialist prefeminists  (who are !rying to make the organization more
politically active). This dMsion within the National Organization for Changing Men
(NOCM) is similar to ttre division within the feminist women's movement.  Clatterbaugh
(1988) makes this same point by saying ttrat profeminist men "get caught in the same
sectarian battles that afflict feminism" (Clatterbaugh 1988: 5). From the beginning the
organization has been limited in its effectiveness because of this division and because a
strong faction of liberal reformers have preferred to focus on personal liberation at the
expense of political action.
History of Pro-Feminist 
The Men's Center in Berkeley was established  1970 (Williamson 1985). Also in
1970 Jack Sawyer wrote an article, "On Male Liberation," in Liberationmagazine
(Astrachan 1986). There were certainly men's consciousness-raising  groups prior to
this time however. Snodgrass (1977) refers to a C-R group that was formed in 1969 in
New York.  This group wrote a pamphlet (published in 1971) called Unbecoming Men.
Snodgrass notes that this pamphlet contained "excellent illustrations of the feelings of self-
degradation and hopelessness  penonal change that men often experience" when they
do C-R exercises to discover their sexism (110). He goes on to say that the men of this
group "were all young, white, mostly middle class, heterosexual, movement activists.
They drew together out of a sense of isolation accentuated by the new meaning that women
found in the enthusiasm and affection of sisterhood" (110).
Snodgrass was himself introduced to feminism through a personal relationship with
a feminist woman. Evennrally, he says, he "began to accept the accuracy of the accusation
that [he] was a male supremacist, but felt helpless to do anything about it" (7). He tried C-
R groups with little satisfaction and eventually "helped form the los  Angeles Men's
48
Collective in October 1974" (8). This is probably typical of the early profeminist  men's
rnovement. Many of the early participans were undoubtedly political activists. Thiesen
writes, for instance, that members of the National Organization for Changing Men "have
tended to corne from the feminist movement and the political left" (Thiesen 1988: 59).
And probably most of the men in the early C-R groups had personal relationships with
feminist wornen. According to Fred Small, "The bulk of men in NOCM came to the
movement either through theirrelationships with women who were experiencing the
feminist revolution or through their own role in the gay community" (Thiesen 1988: 123).
National Organization for  Changing Men
The first national Men & Masculinity (M&M)  Conference was organizeAin 1974
"by the Women's Studies Program at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville"  (Interrante
1982: 5). Subsequent  were held at Penn State, Pennsylvania;  Moines,
IA; St. [.ouis, MO; Los Angeles, CA; and Milwaukee, WI.  A national organization was
launched in Boston, MA, at the seventh M&M  Conference (brother, winter 1983). This
organization, which was to become the National Organization for Changing Men (NOCM),
is the only national organization of pro-feminist men in the U.S.
According to the newsletter, the National Council is "the most powerful body of the
organization" (brother, winter 1983). The first National Council members were elected in
the spring of 1982, and Bob Brannon was elected to be the National Council chair. When
the nine council members convened their first meeting in San Francisco on August l2-I4,
1982, the major result was an "agreement on an organizational structure proposed by
Pleck, Brannon, Shapiro, and Morgan" (brother, winter 1983). Besides the council, the
organization consists of  action positions, task groups (and task group leaders), regional
and local groups, and an annual national conference.
There was (and has continued to be) considerable frustration regarding the task of
organizing pro-feminist men nationally. In the first issue of NOCM's newsletter, brother,
49
the first chair of the national council (Bob Brannon) reflected that pro-feminist men "have
always had a compelling practical weakness... We were afraid to get organized, afraid to
have a structtrre, afraid of leadership roles that might be abused." He went on to say that
"seven years and countless meetings" after he first joined a C-R goup  "two intruders from
New Zealand disrupted our first major aftempt to start an organization. But other meetings
that had no intruders produced the same result" (brother, winter 1983). Astrachan also
notes that "the M&M  Conference hesitated to move to national organizations ..., and they
hesitated to court media publicity lest they be subjected to glamorized misunderstanding"
(Astrachan 1986: 312).
NOCM is made up of volunteers who do most of the work.  Their primary source
of funds is membership dues. There were no paid staff members until the fall of 1988
when NOCM hired one person and set up an office in Pittsburgh. Prior to that time all
administrative and liaison duties had been performed by holders of action positions, which
was sometimes an inefficient system. NOCM has about 1000 members nationwide but has
experienced a lot of turnover in membership. In part, this has been due to a failure to send
renewal notices.
Many of the volunteers belong to one or more task groups, which focus on various
issues and can prornote "public statements and actions."  Presently NOCM has eleven task
groups and nineteen action positions. The first issue of Drother descnbr.'i, a task group as
"having its own funds, projects, committees, etc. Task Groups will  have considerable
power and autonomy: all detailed policy statements, resolutions, political actions, and
other organizational activities dealing with the issues in its jurisdiction shall originate only
from the appropriate Task Group" (brother, winter 1983). Most of the task groups have
their own newsletters to sharc information and strategies for action, but task groups vary in
their effectiveness due to the frequently great distance between members.
NOCM now has two regional groups. The first is C.A.M.P. Caucus, which had
50
met in California for several year prior to the formation of NOCM.  The second regional
group is the Northeast Men's Emerging Network (NEMEN).  The fint  local chapter was
NOCM-I-A,  which was officially  added on January 25,1986.  At that time the group had
fifty  members. Still, local organizing has also been slow and awkward.
In spite of Brannon's expectation that the organization would have a "profound
positive effect on this society" in its first five years, problems continue to plague NOCM.
In fact, five years later Jon Cohen, of the Activist Men's Caucus, wrote *rat "NOCM, as a
structure and as a vehicle for any kind of social change, is still in its infancy.  (It is just
now getting ready to set up a national office)" (The Activist Men's Journal, March 1988).
Internal Conflict
When the first issue  is quarterly  brother,  out in the winter of '
1983, the organization still did not have a name. In choosing an identity, the unresolved
factions within the group clearly emerged. The first issue of brother reponed that "words
such as 'liberation', 'feminist', and 'gender'were felt to be problematic to at least some
potential members" (brother, winter 1983). The membership was surveyed to choose one
of the following three names: The National Organization for Men, Changing Men, and The
National Organization for Changing Men. Fifty-eight percent (58Vo) of the members
responding chose to call themselves The National Organization for Men.  However, some
were reportedly displeased  a name that "seemed to be'bland'and neutral, and didn't
convey anything about [their] values and politics" (brother, summer 1983).
A year later, because Sidney Siller had already incorporated his taditionalist men's
group as the National Organization for Men in New York  state, the pro'feminist  group
opted to change its name. Although only one-third of the membership (182 people) voted
on the name change, there were 104 votes for the National Organization for Changing Men
and 58 votes for the National Organization of Men Against Sexism. Joseph Pleck, writing
in brother, noted that there was again controversy over the chosen identity. Pleck argued,
51
however, that the new name (NOCM) would seem "more accessible to'mainstream'men"
than would have the other option (brother, surnmer 1984). The liberal reformers, then,
still had grcater organizational strenglh at this juncture. Accordingly there was a concern
not to turn away men who were ready for some personal change but weren't ready or
interested in political action against sexism and male privilege. Stoltenberg (1977) has
criticized this approach, writing *We need to be clear that we're not talking about a market
strategy for the men's movement; we're not talking about how to package the men's
movement so that we can mn it up the flagpole and all the men in America will  salute"
(128).
Ironically, at about the same time a major pro-feminist publication , M:  Gentle Men
for  Gend'er fusdce, was having name problems of their own.  It was reported that the
publication had filed suit against Fairchild Publications, which began irs own magazine
called M.  Accordingto brother, "Fairchild's M is a lifestyle and advertising publication
with an initial circulation of 58,400; its subscribers have a median income of $67,000"
(brother, summer 1984). M:  Gentle Menfor  Gender Jwrice subsequently changed its
title to Clnnging Men. This narne change was consistent with that of NOCM -- a focus on
change without clarifying what men might become or why.  With both the organization and
the publication, moreover, groups representing traditional male privilege subsumed generic
titles, leaving the pro-feminists to again define themselves. They still opted for liberal
tenns.
Pro-Male Culture
Liberal profeminists have tended to focus on a supportive culture for men who are
in transition or who have assumed new role responsibilities. Such issues as fatherhood,
men and mental health, spirituality, and homophobia fall into this rubric. Liberal feminists
tend to focus on helping individuals adjust to structural changes rarher than create them.
52
They support feminist demands for legal equality and oppose social patriarchy in principle,
but they do so by helping men to be more sensitive and supportive of women's changes
and demands. As we shall see this is in many ways similar to the emphasis of masculinist
men, except that liberal pro-feminists accept a liberal feminist agenda.
Spirituality
Part of ttre rhetoric  liberal profeminists  on developing positive 
spirituality.  Thiesen observes that this is "what some might think of as the human
potential,''New Age'and'touchy-feely'groups within the movement," and Shepard Bliss
refers to this as the "mythopoetic part of the men's movement" (fhiesen 1988: 122). The
work of Robert Bly has been central to New Age men who are seeking a more positive
image of themselves. Bly senses a problem with the emphasis on gentleness to which
many changing men subscribe, and he is concerned that young men have become too soft.
He argues, for instance, that "young men for various reasons wanted harder women, and
women began to desire softer men. It seems like a nice arrangement, but it isn't working
out" (Thompson 1987: 167). Bly's solution is to focus on the myth of the Wildman. He
intends for this to be a corrective for men who have become too gentle, "but for men who
have never done the feminine bit at all, who are umeconstructed male chauvinists, the
Wildman is simply an invitation to be even more aggressive" (Rowan 1987: 111).
He frames the issue as a denial of masculinity, wounding of the male, and
alienation from the father. Radical pro-feminists might attribute the sense of loss that men
experience in being "soft" and nurturing to passivity. Personal and political change, they
might add, only occur through action, and the personal cannot be separated from its
political constructs. As Stoltenberg notes, men can neither be satisfied with being more
brotherly nor with passivity (under the pretense that a lack of action represents a lack of
harm):  "The pride to which we aspire is not in being menbut in being men wln...  -- men
who are living their lives in a way that will make a difference" (Stoltenberg 1987: 129).
53
Bly, however, is unable to frarne the issue in ttre same way, because his version of
power relations relies upon archetypes of traditional sex roles. This New Age philosophy
"believes that there is a male and female essence" (Clanerbaugh 1988: 6). According to
Bly, "the unbalanced pursuit of the Vietnam'War," for instance, was caused by the
expectations placed upon men in the 1950s that "lacked feminine space ... lacked some
sense of flow ... lacked compassion..." (Thompson 1987: 166). And the hazard in
becoming too soft or too feminine is, as he cites Jung, that a boy "will  see his father
through his mother's eyes" (Thompson 1987: 179). This is similar to the statement that
Fa:rell made about the male mystique when he "realized" that men don't really have more
power than do women:  "In fact, what I was understanding was thefemale experience of
male power" (Farrell 1986: xvii).
Clatterbaugh notes that "this perspective can harmonize with either liberationist or  '
men's righs  perspectives. Since women have their own inner self, they can neither
describe nor fully understand  male inner self. ... in a more anti-feminist tone, women
can be seen as actively preventing men from discovering their inner man" (Clatterbaugh
1988: 6). Also, as I've stated before, this focus on personal change and personality
characteristics tends to detract from the more political goals of radical and socialist pro-
feminist men.
Homophobia
The gay affirmative aspect of the changing men's movement is important for several
reasons. Two of these are that 1) because gay men do not abide by the heterosexual norm
of masculinity they are alienated from the dominant culture, and2) men are reluctant to be
physically and emotionally intimate with one another for fear of being labelled a sissy or a
"homo."  These are deemed heterosexism and homophobia respectively. Both of these
concerns are related to attempts to transform men's identification with traditional masculine
attitudes and behaviors. The liberal concerns of men's liberation and a corresponding gay
54
liberation, though, are limited in their challenge to patriarchal relations. John Stoltenberg
(1977) wrote that "the dilemma of gay men... is how to get cultural confirmation of their
masculinity, how to come out and be one of the guys, how to have full  access to all the
powers, prestige, prerogatives, and privileges that other men have over and against
women" (78-79).
While the concern with homophobia, then, is important in changing how men can
and do relate to one another, it does not usually address directly men's relationship to
women in our society. One benefit for women that's usually expressed in having all-male
groups, for instance, is that men will  learn to not rely upon women for emotional suppoft.
By iself,  though, this is paradoxical as it may reduce both women's emotional burden and
intellectual influence on the goup.
Limitations of  Liberal Feminism
In the 1970s most of the media coverage of the men's movement referred to the
New Man and focused on liberal pro-feminist men or the men's liberation movement.
Newsweek published an article in 1970 on the "Gents Auxiliary" (Newsweek 1970). A
Ms. article in 1978 asked if it was "rhe year of the man" (Tawis 1978). when Jon
Snodgrass edited For Men Agairct Sexism in 1975, many of the authors expressed
suspicions of the early men's liberation movement. Wrote Grimstad & Rennie (1975):
Men liberationists  aim to free themselves from being oppressors.
Women, however, see a very real danger in men grouping togetherbcause
the focus of their bonding can so easily shift to dealing eicluiively with the
side-effects  being oppressors  than with the disease  (152)
More recently most of the press coverage attained by the pro'feminist men's movement is
about the men's studies task group memb?rs, such as Joseph Pleck and Harry Brod.
In 1985 Harry Brod wrote an article entitled "Feminism for Men: Beyond
Liberalism." In this article he wrote that "many men in our movement take pride in their
55
moral stance in favor of liberal feminism" (brother, June 1985). He contends, however,
that the only motivations for men to adopt liberal feminism are "altruistic."  "Liberalism,"
Brod explains, "ends up supporting those institutions of power in our society which do the
very damage to the male psyche we're urying to undo" (brother, June 1985). John
Stoltenberg (1987) explains the process by which this occurs:
... an anti-sexist man's moral identity might respond to the feminist analysis
of the sex-class system by wanting to be an exception to it... But then his
sex-class identity rejects any critique of men as a class, reacts either as if he
is the defender of his whole sex class or as if  his spectacularly exemplary
life redeems it and thus refutes the analysis (128).
By the time a pro-feminist organization was formed in 1983, other groups
espousing men's liberation and men's righs had been launched with a masculinist agenda.
The relationship between the restrictive liberal masculinists and the profeminists eventually
helped to call attention to the division within NOCM.
On October 24,1982, Michael Kimmel and Jim Creane attended a forum at the
New York Center of Men in order to introduce the formation of the pro-feminist group.
They were "met with 'insights' from a number of Free Men supporters who shouted 'It's
women who oppress men!"' (brother, winter 1983). Five years later Robert Brannon
wrote of the l2th Men and Masculinity Conference in Hartford, Connecticut:
...many of us were shocked to find that seven Anti-Feminist ("Men's
Rights") males had been not only invited to the conference,  given
prominent spots on our program. One of them (Hayward) was even given a
45 minute block of time at the annual Council meeting to discuss 'a
coalition'and'how  can work together"'  December 
Activist Men's Caucus
When the conflict over the presence of the masculinists ensued at the Hartford
conference, a "progressive men's caucus" was formed. They began The Activist Men's
Jourral  with 4l  names and a common concern about NOCM's "lack of political action."
The Activist Men's Caucus has now been in existence for more than a year, and six issues
56
of Thc Activist Men's Journal have been produced. Jon Cohen was chosen to represent
the Caucus on the NOCM National Council. He first conceived of his role as a new liaison
position but was offered a "full member" status instead. Six men from the Activist Caucus
ran for election to the National Council in 1988. Of these two were elected. In addition,
one member was re-elected.
Issues that have been brought up in the National Council include consensus
decision making (which was rejected by a majority vote), a proposal to delete "male-
positive" from the statement of purpose (rejected) or to change the order of principles so
that "pro-feminist" would appe:tr before "gay-affirmative" and "male-positive" (rejected), a
proposal to make the liaison position to men's rights organizations inactive (rejected), and a
proposal to require that workshops should only be led by persons who agree with NOCM
principles (approved). These issues were introduced at the mid-winter meetings, which
were held before the 1988 elections.
The Activist Men's Caucus functions both within and beyond NOCM although its
most substantive contribution thus far has been in its identification of and communication
between radical and socialist pro'feminist men. Recognizing that NOCM has been limited
by a divided tradition that includes liberal roots and continues to be strongly influenced by
reform liberals, the Activist Men's Caucus has pursued two paths. The first is an attempt
to obtain greater influence in the NOCM National Council, to sever official ties with
masculinist men's groups, and to strengthen the stated political and pro-feminist goals of
the organization. The second is an attempt to work within certain NOCM task groups
(particularly those on portwgraphy, men's violence and the new group on child custody)
and within other organizations working on peace or social justice concerns.
Sexual 
Pornography a concern that divides feminists, and the prefeminist men's
57
movement reflects this division:  "Radicals would ban or restrict it, while liberals believe it
is protected by the right of free expression" (clatterbaugh lggg:  5).
The Activist Men's Caucus organized a protest at the l3th M & M Conference in
Seattle' The demonstration that took place at the Champ Arcade was controversial among
Conference attenders. In fact, the editor of brotler  cornmented that some conference
attenders felt that the protesters "got what they deserved" when they were maced by a
"passer-by" (brother 7, no. l; December 1988). Even among members of the
pornography task group there was a difference of strategy. Some participated in the
demonstration as a way to get at a pressure point.  Others felt more comfortable promoting
such erotica as David Steinberg's book, Erotic By Nature.
The chair of the task group on pornography and one of the organizers of the Champ
Arcade protest was John Stoltenberg. B. Charles Thiesen (1988), writing in Connecticut-
Magazine, referred to Stoltenberg (who has long worked with Andrea Dworkin) as "a
well-known anti-pomography activist and a founder of Men Against pornography."
Thiesen notes also that Stoltenberg is "pro-censorship" (122). In fact, the demonstration
used a flyer that emphasized that pornographers abuse and assault workers in the industry,
and demonstrators chanted such slogans as "Shut it down!"
Thiesen argues that "there is no reason why a pro-eroticism group couldn't exist
within NOCM, even a goup  with an anti-censorship position. Both these positions are
certainly represented within NOCM membership" (122). Thiesen meims this as an example
of healthy diversity, but this kind of liberal tolerance and peaceful co-existence of diverging
positions has also limited the political effectiveness of the organization. Different positions
co-exist and do their own thing, but the tension is clearly still there.
The pro-censorship wing risks providing legitimacy to more powerful
conservatives who might ban all representations of nudity and explicit sexuality as obscene.
I addressed this dilemma earlier in my discussion of how pornography divides feminists.
On the other hand, the pro-erotica wing risks letting the market determine what will  be
58
consumed, which means that the erotica produced will have to compete with the larger
producers of pornography. But the lack of dialogue created by separate workshops,
separate actions and the distance between task group members discourages mutual
confrontation on these issues. As a result the organization remains split without being able
to produce a cohesive agenda. Such an agenda might address such structural issues as the
business exploitation and cultural degradation of women in much pornography, while also
recognizing personal issues by encouraging and depicting a healthy male sexuality.
"Domestic" 
The pro-feminist faction of the men's movement is the only one that focuses on
ending men's violence toward women. Such affiliated organizations as Men Against Rape
in Madison, Wisconsin, and RAVEN in St. Louis, Missouri, provide resources for
activists throughout the counury. These goups also work closely with feminist women and
share a common political agenda.
In November 1977, at the 6th National Men & Masculinity Conference  St.
Louis, a group of six men "organizedto confront the issue of male violence against
women" flraflet,  "Who Is Raven?"). They established a study group that met periodically
for eight months. In September 1978 they formed RAVEN  (Rape and Violence End
Now).  Trained counselors and peer counselors volunteer their time and make decisions by
consensus.
In 1986 RAVEN, along with NOCM's Ending Men's Violence Task Group,
published the lst edition of "The Ending Men's Violence National Referral Directory."
This directory lists 145 groups across the counury. Most of these $oups have programs
for men who batter. Other progams are offerred for men who rape or commit child sexual
assault, for male victims of battering, frp?  or child sexual assault, and for male "significant
others." In addition several $oups only provide education, research or networking
services.
59
Not all of these gloups consider themselves to be part of the men's movement.
David Adams, in response to a survey, stated that EMERGE is "a s@ial action and social
service organization concerned with men's violence against women," not part of the men's
movement. EMERGE:  A Men's Counseling Service on Domestic Violence was formed in
Cambridge, Massachusens  1977.
The RAYEN  group asserts that violence in the home is not just a problem of
isolated individuals, nor can it be explained entirely by a man's psychology:
Violence against women is an institution among men, only to appear as an
individually-motivated behavior... The expectation that our home lives
must be a perfect refuge from the horrors of public life leads men to blame
women and children for all of their fears and insecurities.
(RAVEN leaflet)
EMERGE also contends that violence against women "is a societally condoned method of .
male dominance" (EMERGE newsletter, December 1986), and AMEND  (Abusive Men
Exploring New Drections) in Boulder, Colorado, suggests that one common characteristic
of an "abusive partner" is a belief in "traditional male role models of the family; e.g. the
man should dominate" (AMEND pamphlet).
Because of their belief in a societal explanation for patterns of male violence, these
groups stress the need to work with battered women's shelters. RAVEN  has a policy of
not taking grant money that might otherwise go to the shelters. EMERGE notes in their
newsletter that, through contact with abused partners and "follow-up evaluations", the
woman's safety remains their "first priority."  This is improtant to the feminist community,
as indicated by a book advertised in the directory: Safety for  Women: Monitoring
Batterers' Progrcnts (available from the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence).
These programs stress the need for men to accept responsibility for their behavior
as a precondition for change. Among the "common characteristics of an abusive partner"
listed by AMEND  are an exEeme fear of "losing partner", a low sense of self-esteem,
60
"great difficulty  trusting anyone", a belief that "the world is a hostile place where
aggression is neressary for survival", and a tendency to blame others for his actions. Such
persons may have "witnessed abuse between parents" or been a "victim of abuse as a
child."  The abusive partner may feel insecure and jealous. Feelings of pain, fear, guilt
and./or a sense of loss are experienced as anger, which is expressed through violence.
The pro-feminists, following early men's liberationists like Jon Sawyer, recognize
that the power that men have in society can limit their abiliry to be in touch with their
emotional and physical health and to express their emotions. Men may feel insecure and
powerless in their individual lives, and they may feel unable to control their own lives and
circumstances, but this does not mean that men do not disproportionately benefit from their
gender. Furthermore, ending violence in the family requires an understanding of class and
gender power relations as well as the cultural legitimation of violence.
Child Custody
The pro-feminist Activist Men's Caucus has just recently begun to focus on the
problem of child custody and has formed a task group to address the issue. The concern
with custody is, in part, a response to efforts by the masculinist men's movement (in
conjunction with the Joint Custody Association) to enact legislation establishing mandatory
joint custody.
John Stoltenberg (1987) argues that "voluntary joint custody is not the problem,"
but that mandatory joint cusrody would be (Acrivist Men's Journal vl  #3 Decfan  lggT_
88). Stoltenberg cites studies indicating that fathers still do nor assume as many child care
responsibilities as do mothers, and he suggests that custody is more vigorously contested
when boy children are involved.  "Mandated joint custody," writes Stoltenberg, ,,intersects
issues of sexual justice, sexual violence, and economic class." Mandated joint custody, he
further asserts' "has also been used to guaranrce that an abusive ex-husband/father
61
continues to have court-protected access to the woman and/or children he has abused"
(Activist Men's Journal vl  #3 Dec[an  1987-88).
John Straton (1987), NOCM's co-liaison to feminist women's groups, confirms
the dangers of mandatory joint custody while also recognizing the limitations of sole
custody ("Resources on the Effecs  of Child Custody Laws" Activist Men's Journal vl
#3).  Straton concludes that "loyalty to nren cannot come at" the expense of "women and
children." He thus recommends a policy based upon the "Primary Caretaker Parent Rule"
of West Virginia (R. Neely, Yale lnw  and Policy Review III,168  -- Fall 1984). "Such a
rule," he writes, "reflects that a custody settlement cannot be expected to undo a father's
lack of participation in parenting within the marriage while also validating claims to custody
by fathers who were fully involved within the marriage" (Activist Men's Journal, vl  #3
Dec[an  1987/88).
Concf usions
Liberal pro.feminists don't generally conflict with the activists in what they say as
much as in what they don't say. Radical pro-feminists, for instance, agree that
homophobia and heterosexism are a problem; they agree that consciousness-raising 
spiritual sustenance  necessary; and they also recognize that masculinity, as it has been
naditionally defined, is confining. The radical pro-feminists insist though, that the pro-
feminist men's movement must begin by stating its allegiance to feminism and its
determination to struggle against sexism, male domination and male violence. Goode
(1980) notes that men have never been as constrained by the cultural demands of
masculinity as has been recently implied. Rather, one could assert that men have had
relatively grcater flexibility  than have women to reject role demands without losing their
privileged position. Here again the concept of gender roles is more limited than the more
actively constructed gender relations. The liberals tend to focus upon one gender in
isolation as if men could ignore their dominance. In fact, Goode suggests, in what could
62
be a cautionary note to pro-feminist role theorists, that men seem to react most defensively
to not being as central as we once were.
TRADITIONALIST MEN'S MOVEMENT
While traditionalist men provide a direct challenge to feminist goals, their ideology
is largely inconsistent with the political and economic strucnres that prevail in the U.S.
today. Although President Reagan clearly used a good deal of rhetoric from the
conservative "pro-family" perspective, little of his social agenda was actually adopted. In
fact, even arnong his own advisors much of the conservative attack on the welfare state was
only marginally supported and generally not considered realistic. Analysts in the press
began distinguishing between ideologues and pragmatists in the Reagan adminisnation, an!
by the end the pragmatists were clearly stronger. While in the short term a call for a return
to traditional male authority may rally action, in the long term few people accept the entire
conservative agenda. So, for instance, while the ERA was defeated amidst the perception
that many women opposed feminism, a 1986 Gallup Poll found that only 4 percent of
women in the U.S. identify themselves  "anti-feminist" (Ehrenreich 1987: 168). While
the conservative position may provide a focus for debate and act as a vanguard against
change, it isn't viable in terms of creating policy.
History of Divorce Reform
The traditionalist men's movement focuses primarily on the loss of patriarchal
privilege associated with the bneakdown of the nuclear family.  Meanwhile, traditionalist
men criticize liberal reformers for their acceptance of the diminishing role of the father and
husband. Unlike the masculinist men, traditionalists don't talk about personal growth
(though they may both talk about men's rights).
In the late 1950s an organization called the National Men's lrgion  "tried to link
63
feminism to communism and to a decline in American morals" (Williamson 1985: 315). It
seenx, though, that not much is known about the group. More recently the traditionalist
men's movement has its roots in the "men's divorce reform movement," whose earliest
group was the Divorce Racket Busters, founded in 1960 and later renamed the United
States Divorce Reform (Williamson 1985: 316). In 1964 men from the U.S. Divorce
Reform testified during the Assembly Judiciary Committee hearings on California divorce
law.  "Their contention was that the existing law strongly favored women and allowed
them to'take their husbands to the cleaners'via alimony and property awards [Kay 1977:
2ll"  (Weitzman 1985: l7).  In 1966 the U.S. Divorce Reform "attempted to get an
initiative for divorce reform on the November 1966 Califomia ballot."  The proposal failed
but "would have abolished alimony and established Family Arbitration centers to deal with
divorce [Y:ay 1977: 41]" (Weitzrnan 1985: l7).  While these divorce reform organizations
were founded prior to feminism's re-emergence as a mass movement, they clearly were
responding to the same broad social and economic trends that seemed to be undermining
the authority of the father and exploiting instability in the family.  So these divorce
reformers weren't initially a direct "backlash" against the modern movement for women's
liberation and women's rights. They do suggest, though, that men were getting the raw
end of the deal in divorce, and they joined a broad coalition with liberal reformers to
support groundbreaking changes in California's divorce law.
Traditionalist Men's Organizations
Men's Rights Association
Two national organizations  can presently  identified as belonging to a
traditionalist  movement  the Men's Rights Association  and The National
Organization  Men,Inc. (NOM). The Men's Righs Association  Lyons, Forest
Lake, MN 55025) was formed by Richard Doyle in 1973. Doyle remains the president 
MRA and makes decisions  MRA claims to have served more than 6000
&
"members" over the past decade and relies upon $20 membership fees to support its work.
Membership numbers seem to be loosely defined as providing some frnancial support and
the primary activity seems to be disseminating information about divorce law and providing
legal referrals. MRA  works closely with MEN (Men's Equality Now) International, which
is described as an international coalition.  MEN International was also formed by Doyle in
1977.
National  for Men
The National Organization for Men (381 Park Avenue South, New York, NY
10016) was founded in 1983 by Sidney Siller, columnist for Penthonse magazine. NOM
has a quarterly newletter called The Quest- NOM claims to have 36(X) member
nationally, including 175 in New Jersey. They report organizing chapters in Florida,
California, Pennsylvani4 Arizona, and the Chicago,Illinois area. While NOM has
chapters and seemingly a more active membership, Siller remains the single central figure.
Like Doyle, he seems to be a crusader. Maggie Gallagher of the National Review notes
that "by his own account, Siller thought up the men's rights movement more than twenty
years ago..." (Gallagher 1987: 39). In many ways Siller could be considered more liberal
than the traditionalist view represented by Doyle.  NOM, for instance, criticizes the failure
to draft women, and Siller has associated himself with humanism and, of course, the
availability of pornography. Still, NOM stresses the breakdown of the family as a
fundamental problem, and neither NOM nor the masculinist groups mention working with
each other. In fac! when I asked Francis Baumli (a prominent member of the Coalition of
Free Men and editor of a book from a masculinist perspective) about Tle Quest, he wrote
that he hadn't heard of it.  One wonders too how much the membership is involved in
decision making. When Gallagher went to one of NOM's monthly board meetings, it was
in "a corporate conference room ... not far from Wall Sreet" (Gallagher 1987: 39).
65
Traditional Values
The basis of both Doyle's and Siller's organizations is primarily the defense of the
patriarchal family.  Although it seems that they also support male privilege in general, their
main focus is on legal reforms in the area of divorce and child custody. Unlike
masculinists, furthermore, they stress paternal custody rather than joint custody. In terms
of legitimating patriarchal relations, they tend to be less effective than the liberal
masculinists. The traditionalists, like theorists of the New Right, aren't comfortable with
New Deal liberalism and the effects of government intervention in the family.  And, unlike
the masculinist, traditionalists aren't concerned with appeasing liberal feminists by
opposing alimony because it's "sexist." Instead, the traditionalists bluntly assert that
women are screwing them over and that the nation is becoming more chaotic without the
clear expression of natural male authority.
Doyle, for instance, is described by Williamson as being "a disciple of Charles
Metz " (Williamson 1985: 318). Mez  was a member of the United States Divorce Reform,
who in 1968 wrote a book entitled Divorce and Custody for Men: A Guide and primer
Designcd Exclusively to Help MenWin Just Senlements. According to Williamson,
"Metz believed that men were to blame for female domination of men. As he saw it, men,
who were in positions of power, were using that power to oppress men via a perverse
chivalry which tried to win the favors and approval of women" (Williamson 1985: 317).
Doyle does, in fact, continue this line of thought.
Doyle claims in a letter to potential memben that his organization is not reactionary
or "anti-women." Rather, he claims that the efforts of male divorce reformers "predate the
term 'women's lib"'and are aimed at achieving justice (a concept also used by anti-feminist
women). While the divorce reform movement was organized prior to the current
movement for women's liberation, both followed a general trend of increasing numbers of
married women entering the workforce. Concurrent with this trend was a growing
66
instability in the instirution of marriage and an increase in divorce (see Klein 1984).
Justice, according to the traditionalist men is to be found in fintly  making divorce less
attractive to women (so as not to undermine the existing family unit) and secondly making
divorce less costly to nren (so as not to reward ex-wives). In fact, while they claim not to
be anti-women, they are patently anti-feminist, and both Doyle'sThe Men's Manifesto and
NoM's, The Qucst, cite c.H. ("Max") Freedman's (1985) book, Manrtood Re&u:
Standing Up to Feminism.
The traditionalists are opposed to most changes in the female role and threatened by
feminism. A promotional flyer for NOM claims that "the feminiss' growth of power is
designed to denigrate men, exempt women from the draft and to encourage the
disintegration of the family."  Feminists, then, are believed to be causing the disintegration
of the family, which is patriarchal. The traditionalists hope to preserve the patriarchal
family.
Divorce and the Welfare State
The traditionalists are the only faction of the men's movement that attacks the
welfare state. According to traditionalist men, the patriarchal family has been undermined
because l)  the courts and the rest of government have been too chivalrous and 2) the
government has replaced the husband and father as the protector and guardian for women
and children. As Doyle expresses the process, women are filing for divorce and the courts
view women as being in need of protection. The courts then give wives large portions of
their husbands' property and custody of the children while requiring the husband to pay
alimony and child support. This rewards women for seeking divorce.
In addition to being anti-feminist, Doyle is opposed to rhe welfare state's
intervention into the privacy of the family.  He writes that "the socialist philosophy holds
that government ... replace 'the man of the family.' Consequently the role of the male is
shrinking, as the roles of judges, police, and social services personnel increase" (Doyle
67
1987: l2).  The state has attempted to mediate the conflict benveen patriarchy and
capitalism. As the patriarchal family came under attack in some segments of society and its
position was compromised, the state established policies that would strengthen social
patriarchy. The state tried to dictate, for instance, that men should continue to financially
support their ex-wives as a continuation of the family wage. Alimony payments and child
support, however, were difficult to enforce. Failing that, the state would provide limited
subsidies to female-headed households. This has effectively contributed to male privilege
even though the patriarchal family has been weakened, especially in the middle class.  The
traditionalists, though, criticize liberal state policies. Doyle assorts that welfare undermines
the family.  As evidence he cites the findings of the Task Force on the Family, which was
appointed by President Reagan.
Siller wrote in 1970 regarding alimony:  "Women have sought and been granted
equal rights in the ownership of property, voting and employment opportunities...
therefore there is no longer any need for the ancient anachronism of alimony..." (Siller
1970: 2l).  Women are able to work in the paid labor force, so they shouldn't rely on their
ex-husbands. This does not mean, however, that Siller opposes men supporting their
wives financially while married. He points out that if a woman re-marries in some states,
she "can be supported by two husbands, her ex and her present" (Siller  1970: 20). He
suggests that this is unfair to the ex-husband. It's also unfair to the ex-husband, though, if
he re-marries and still has to support his ex-wife.  Siller writes of men who "had remarried
and discovered that they couldn't adequately support their new family on the salary that
remained after alimony payments" Siller 1970: 20). In fact, the National Organization for
Men works with another Siller group called the National Committee for Second Wives.
68
Paternal Custody
Your wife can accuse you of rape at any time during your marriage. That
charge can lead to your arrest, prosecution, and incarceration in many of the
fifty  states. Your protection against this conjugal lie is absolutely nil.  It's
her word against yours... As the law now stands in some states, a rape
charge can deprive a husband of child custody and be used against him in a
divorce trial -- even if it turns out that the charge is false.
Sidney Siller, Penthnuse,
"'Wife Rape'-- Who Really Gets Screwed"
While masculinist groups advocate joint custody, traditionalists promote paternal
custody. The traditionalist men's groups typically refer to studies that stress the importance
of a strong father figure. Doyle, for instance, laments the loss of paternal authority as the
result of divorce and the threat of divorce. He claims that juvenile delinquency is greater
among children in maternal custody. Writes Doyle, "What else can we expect from two
generations of fatherless youths? Both men and women are pamperizedin the process"
@oyle 1987: 2). Doyle claims that fathers should be given custody of their children.
While he recognizes that child care is not traditionally the venue of men, he argues that
divorce itself is neither traditional nor moral. Under the circumstances, then, if a child is to
have only one parcnt it is better to have a father @oyle 1987: 7).
Most of the work of raditionalist men's groups continues to be directed toward
divorce reform and child custdy.  This includes providing referrals to attorneys and
counselors. MRA  sponsors an annual demonstration in New York's Times Square to
commemorate Father's Day.  Both NOM and MRA also try to promote research. NOM has
established the Institute for the Study of Matrimony Laws as a "research and education
foundation for the study of the nation's divorce, alimony, custdy  and visitation laws."
NOM also plans to initiate'the first Men's Library and Research Center and the first Men's
l-egal Defense Fund." MRA researches the causes and effects of divorce as well as various
reform strategies. Doyle claims to have evidence that links juvenile delinquency and child
abuse with matemal custody. Says Doyle, "Our research has uncovered sociological
69
studies in defense of masculinity," which reportedly reveal "the duplicity of many laws and
judicial practices" (Doyle, ktter  to Potential Memben).
Unlike the masculinists, traditionalist men are skeptical ofjoint  custody
:urangements. Ken Pangborn, the president of MEN International (which was founded by
traditionalist Richard Doyle), opposes joint custody as detracting fathen from seeking sole
custdy.  Pangborn argues that the success of joint custody can be attributed to its
voluntary adoption by the parents. It would work less well, however, if it were imposed
by the courts:
Joint custody has an appeal to the obvious sense of fairness in people. But
... it distorts perceptions of reality. Joint custdy  works well when there is
cooperation of both parents, and the children. But it is horrendous when
there exists that level of belligerance that makes such an agreement difficult(201).
Pangborn suggests that "desperate and lazy men" prefer joint custody to seeking
sole custody (201). In another context, though, he writes of illusions that fathers may
harbor about the ease of having custody. In this vein, he writes:  "I have seen many men
seeking a custody modification who really want their new wives or girlfriends to be baby-
sitters or the 'parent,' and they are not motivated by a genuine desire to'be' a custodial
parent themselves" (154).
"Domestic" 
Doyle discounts the significance of violence perpetrated by men against women.
He claims that there is "evidence there is more battering of husbands than of wives (the
foregoing refen to physical battering; men usually can't hold a candle to women in
psychological battering)" @oyle 1987: 13). The image seems to be one of a domineering
wife and a henpecked husband. How this is resolved with the notion of paternal auttrority
is not clear. In any case, Doyle argues that "men must cease irccepting blame for the
alleged subordination of women" (Doyle 1987: 15).
70
View of Male Traitors
The raditionalists  pro-feminist  as deviant,  and weak. Pro-
feminist men believe that women have been oppressd  that men have been imbued with
social privilege, and that a more egalitarian society would be more just.  These men are
viewed as traitors by the traditionalists. In 1986 NOM gave its ftstWIMP  Awardto  a
judge in Illinois who refused to glve a convicted rapist a new trial after the victim recanted.
Siller claimed that the judge "was affected by the media attention and the power of the
feminist press in this country, and refused to vacate because of the gender issues
involved."  Doyle refers to "nominal males (wimps) who have banded together to denounce
their masculinity, cry a lot, grope at each other in 'consciousness  sessions, 
celebrate the virtues of homosexuality. A masochistic tendency in their character is capable
of seeing fault only in males and manhood" @oyle 1987: 11).
Affirmative Action
Both NOM and MRA oppose affirmative action policies, which they believe are
designed to promote undeserving women. Doyle writes: "Liberals and envious women ...
have managed to implement far reaching anti-male prejudicial practices. Gender and
quotas, rather than ability, are the criteria now largely used to hire and promote employees"
@oyle 1987). The ideology of equal opportunity is accepted as self-evident.
The traditionalist men seem unable to resolve themselves to married women's role
in the paid labor force. Although Siller seems to recognize women as workers when he
tugues against alimony, he seems to be speaking only of single or divorced women. And,
in particular, he is concerned that young women, who have not committed as much time or
energy to their marriages or their husbands'careers,  be expected to support
themselves after a divorce. When faced with the issue of women's lower wages relative to
men's, Doyle iugues that most women are simply not qualified for work traditionally
performed by men. This contention, of course, ignores historical evidence to the contrary.
7l
Responding to attempts to achieve wage parity for women, Doyle claims that men have
greater work skills and do more difficult work @oyle 1987: 8).
Conclusions
The traditionalist men's movement has lacked a b'road-based  and has
tended to rely upon founding fathers. More importantly, the traditionalist men have failed
to come to terrns with the role of married women in the paid labor force.  Their frame of
reference is the patriarchal nuclear family while more U.S. families now have dual income
eiuners or have only a single parent. Furthermore single parent households are rarely
headed by a man (see Pangborn 1985).
Traditionalist antagonism to the welfare state undermines the usefulness of
traditional rhetoric in today's state policy agenda. Even Reagan implemented much less
conservative policy than he advocated. As Eisenstein points out, the welfare state was
initially conceived as a means of resolving conflicts between the need (1) to maintain social
order and thus the general welfare and (2) to maintain male and white privilege and the
ability of owners of capital to exploit labor. Neither the New Right, nor the more n,urow
traditionalist men's movement, can provide the means to mystify male privilege in a service
economy that requires most women (single or married) to work in the paid labor force.
The raditionalist men have been unable to inspire a majority opinion. Ferguson
and Rogers (1986) note that polls indicate a consistent support for liberal social positions.
Although polls indicate that a significant minority of married men still subscribe to
traditionalist views, most men are now more egalitarian or more ambivalent (see Blumstein
& Schwaru and Cherlin & Walters 1981). Blumstein and Shwartz(1984) note that 34Vo of
maried men clearly disagree with the assertion that both spouses should work outside of
the home (118). Although that number increases to 64Vo when small children are present
(Blumstein & Schwartz 1984: 568), Astrachan suggests that ttre percentage of men in two-
72
income families who hold this position is probably less than that of men in traditional
nuclear families (which are now a statistical minority in ttre U.S.) (Astrachan 1983: 202).
Blumstein and Schwartz se?m  to confirm this in a foou:rote. Ninety-one percent of those
husbands who believe both spouses should work are from two-income families.  By
comparison, 78 percent of husbands who have "neutral or mixed feelings" and 57 percent
of husbands who believe that women should not work are from two-income families
(Blumstein &  Schwartz 1984: 565). As woincome  families become more prevalent,
ttren, attitudes will  likely become less traditional.
Regardless of how men and women conceptuali ze the ideal family, there are real
economic demands that require most women to work outside of the home. Says
Astrachan, "Women go to work primarily because the economy no longer frs the myth of
the male wage qrner;  a family needs more than one income to live on middle-class terms,'
and many need more than one just to survive" (198). There are two clear implications to
this reality. The first is that while women are working, their male relatives are likely to
oppose discrimination against them. In fact, Blumstein and Schwartz (1934) found that
husbands tended to be happier with their marriages when their wives were successful at
work (l6l).  This was especially tnre for men who thought both partners should be
working.  Burris found in his study of support for the ERA, moreover, that "the more men
depend upon a second income (i.e., the lower their personal income) and/or the greater the
actual contribution of a second wage-earner (i.e., the higher their spouse's income) the
greater their suppoft for equal righs  for women [footnote removed]" (Burris 1983: 313-
314). The second implication is that because of structural changes and the demands of the
women's movement (that have been widely accepted in their liberal form), the ideology of
raditional gender roles tends to be unacceptable to policy planners. As Green (1981)
suggested of the conservatives, traditionalist men provide a challenge for the short-term but
cannot provide the basis for effective long-term social policy.
73
MASCULINIST MEN'S MOVEMENT
The masculinists,like raditionalists,  concerned  men's  and
criticize the pro-feminists for blaming men for social oppression. Like the restrictive
liberals, masculinist men warn against acting out of guilt.  Instead, men must create their
own agenda for action.
Unlike the traditionalists, though, masculinist men stress that men have much to
gain by women's legal equality. Masculinists draw upon the liberal human potential
rnovernent and counter culture in aMicating the role of protecting and providing for women
and instead assuming a new involvement in fathering. These concerns are similar to the
cultural issues addressed by pro-feminist men.
While the masculinists combine the conservative men's rights issues and the liberal
men's liberation, the emphasis is always upon an agenda for men with little concern about'
how it affects women. The feminists presumably will  take care of themselves, and the
masculinists don't want the interests of men to be subsumed  feminism. One prominent
interest of masculinist men is the right to be active fathers.
History of Masculinism
The masculinist movement builds upon a pluralist theory of power to assert that
men and women have, in the past, had spheres of power and different kinds of oppressive
role constraints. Accordingly, they assert, men's power and women's oppression were not
greater than -- only different from -- women's power and men's oppression. They now
speak of equal rights and gender justice as they work for men's rights in an attempt to
balance the activities of feminist groups. ln  1970 Men's Liberation, Inc., a group of 16
men who had been trytng to changing alimony laws,  "b,roadened its goals" to "liberating
ourselves from having to prove our masculinity 24 hours a day" (New York Times Oct.
23, 1970,36: 1). They argued that "men, no less than women, are victims of a fixed set of
rules, based generally on mores, rather than biology," that "relationships with women as
74
equals would be more rewarding..."  that "men would be fre?d  from the total
responsibility for the family's economic well-being" (New York Times Oct. 23, L970,36:
1).
Masculinist Organizations
National  for Men
The National Congress  Men (2231 15th St. SE, Washington,  20003) was
formed in 1981 with James Cook as its president. John Rossler of the Fathers Righs
Association, Inc. is the curent president. The National Congress for Men (NCM) is a
coalition that combines the Coalition of Free Men, Men's Rights, Inc. and more than a
dozen fathers' rights groups. Its newsletter is called NeIWORK.  "As of July 10, 1987 ,
NCM had 687 dues paying members" representing 47 of the 50 states (NeIWORA
Cook estimated, though, that the combined membership of associated local groups was
7000 to 8000 (Astrachan 1986: 309). Astrachan notes that the National Congress for Men
was not at all reluctant to seek press coverage:
The National Congress decided as a matter of course at its frrst meeting to
set up a national organization and won CBS, NBC, National Public Radio,
New  York  Times  and Washington Post  coverage --  all  steps toward
getting a finger on the levers of power, that is, changing the divorce laws in
as many states as possible.  (The New York  Times  sent a style page
reporter to the opening press conference of NOCM and then refused to run
the story she wrote, on the pretext that the Times doesn't cover embryonic
organizations; nobody thought of that when the Houston correspondent sent
a news story on the first meeting of the National Congress for Men to the
national desk in 1981.)
(Astrachan 1986: 312-313).
The National Congress for Men (NCM) has one staff person who does many
different tasks. NCM refers fathers who are going through divorce to local fathers groups.
They maintain a directory of such groups across the country and claim to refer about 150
fathers per month. They also claim that"20Vo of the callers ... are women seeking help for
their fathers, brothers, sons, uncles, husbands and lovers" (NeIWORIQ.
75
At their first conference  1981, Fredric Hayward said that "the objective of the
National Congress  Men ... is not to fight feminism or roll back its gains, but to extend
sexual equality to both sexes." The New YorkTimes reported, however, that
although both Mr. Hayward and the conference generally sought to dovetail
its philosophy with that of feminists, the feminists nonetheless  in for
some hard words.  Feminism, Mr.  Hayward asserted, is too often sexist
itself.  That is, he explained, it  insists on  a female perspective, is
monopolized by female concerns, and perpetuates myths about males -- for
example, that all men are privileged, all are rapists, all are dominant.
(New YorkTimes 1981, B9: 2)
The conference was attended primarily by divorced men. They argued that "men are
sexually discriminated against in employment sometimes, and in miliury  service almost all
the time" and that "abortions, performed unilaterally by women, often rample on the
legitimate rights of the father to be" (New YorkTirnes 1981, B9:  2).  Among the
workshops offered at the 1987 NCM Convention are several about courtroom strategies for
divorce settlements  joint custody judgments, including such topics as "defending false
allegations of sexual abuse," "defending parental aMuction," and "the use of a private
detective in domestic matters" NeMORK.
The Coalition  Free Men
The Coalition of Free Men (PO Box 129, Manhasset, NIY I1030) began in the fall
of 1980 as the New York chapter of Free Men, Inc.  Free Men, Inc. was formed in
December l976by  a group of men in Maryland. Free Men has since become inactive, but
the Coalition of Free Men has gained national prominence. The president of The Coalition
of Free Men is Tom Williamson and its bimonthly newsletter isTransitiors.
The stationary of The Coalition of Free Men lists Herb Goldberg, Edward Asner,
Dan Greenberg and Gregory Hines as members of the Board of Advisors. The
organization is incorporated as a "nonprofit (501XC3) educational organization that looks at
the ways sex discrimination affects men" (Williamson, response to survey). The only
76
source of financial support are dues and voluntary contributions, and all of the workers are
volunteers. The Board of Directors include the presideng vice president, administrative
vice-president, recording secretary, and treasurer.
According to Williamson, "day to day running of the organization is [the]
responsibility of the president. Policy decisions are made by the Board of Directon."  The
directors are supposed to be elected as "delegates" from the chapters. Williamson notes,
however, that "chapter formation comes and goes" and that they presently "have a self
perpetuating Board" (Williamson, response to survey). There are "state representatives" in
Massachusetts,  Illinois, Texas, Michigan,Indiana, Oregon, California,
Wisconsin, Texas, Arizona, and West Virginia.  There are also committees on feminist
ideology and on men's studies. CFM sponsors national conferences and public meetings,
forms men's suppoft groups, provides a speakers bureau, promotes public awareness,
promotes men's studies courses and provides resources, provides a referral service for men
who are getting a divorce, and does research to find data on men's issues.
Men's Rights, 
In addition to Free Men, Inc., 1977 marked the beginning of Fred Hayward's
Men's Rights, Inc. (PO Box 163180, Sacramento,  95816). Fred Hayward is the
founder and director of Men's Rights, Inc. (MR, Inc.) Dr. Barry Sandrew has been
appointed to direct East Coast Operations. MR, Inc. is a non-profit, tax-exempt
organization that relies upon voluntary donations from individuals as its source of financial
support. MR,Inc.  has no chapters or local groups. Individuals can become members by
donating a designated amount each year. According to Hayward, they do not solicit
members and have no intention of becoming "a large, gnss roots political organization"
(Hayward, response to survey). When asked how decisions were made, Hayward
responded that people are encouraged to do things and that if someone wants to do
77
something, they do it.  MR,Inc.  works closely with the Coalition of Free Men and the
National Congress for Men as well as several local groups (Equal Rights for Fathers,
VOCAL  & Single Fathers'Support Group).
MR,Inc.  helps organizations to form and network and was a founding member of
the National Congress for Men.  They provide referrals and speakers, help researchers,
sponsor demonstrations and programs for the community. They produce some literarure,
attempt to generate publicity and take legal action. Four legal actions were cited:  1)
Eliminating sex discrimination in automobile insurance in Massachusetts,  successfully
getting "a Massachusetts  banning l-adies Nights'in bars," 3) providing a legal
argument at the U.S. Supreme Court against "all-male military conscription," and 4)
supporting a suit by the Massachusetts  Against Discrimination against higher
premiums for men receiving life insurance policies.
MR, Inc. created MR MEDIA  WATCH  in 1984 "to improve the image of men in
the media." In 1986 the project began making awards for the best and worst in advertising.
Other projecs are MR ERA and MR PARENTAL LEAVE.  "MR, Inc. is dedicated to
ending sexism in a way that recognizes the social, psychological, physical, legal, and
economic problems of men. It seeks to make available to men the wide range of options
that are now available to women..." (Statement of Purpose).
Father's Rights
Joint Custody
... more and more divorced and separated fathers are being accused (often
falsely) of sexually and physically abusing their children to the point where
such allegations are being made in three out of ten divorces.
Jane Young, Transitions
speech at Father's Day Rally
Both the pro-feminist and traditionalist groups criticize the masculinist focus on
joint custody. Pro-feminist radicals advocate a primary caretaker rule, and traditionalists
78
support paternal custdy  arrangements. When the National Congress for Men was formed
in 1980, the masculinist groups forged an alliance with fathers'rights organizations. The
National Congress for Men reportedly published a directory in 1985 that lists "more than
one thousand... men's organizations" (Williamson 1985: 320).
Father's rights and specifically child custdy  have become a central focus of the
masculinist men's movenrent. Haddad explained that "the dominant issue of the women's
movement has been employment, ttrat sphere has always been man's domain. The
corresponding domain for women has been child-rearing, and that is where men must and
will  muscle in on the action" (Haddad 1984: 50). They argue that, in the interests of
fairness and equality, joint custdy  legislation should be adopted nationwide. This has
contributed to a conflict with many feminists. theWall  Street Journal in 1986 wrote of
"an increasingly bitter fight with women -- in the nation's courts and in the state legislarures
-- over the issue of joint custody of children in divorce cases" (Wall Street Journal, Aug.
21,'86:  54).
Jane Young, a member of the Fathers Rights Association's steering committee,
delivered a speech at a Father's Day Rally in which she used a pronouncement from the
early NOW to support her position. In 1966 NOW said in its Statement of Purpose:
We reject the current assumptions that a man must carry the sole burden of
supporting himself, his wife, and family, and that a woman is automatically
entitled to lifelong  support by a man upon her marriage, or that marriage,
home and family are primarily  woman's world and responsibility -- hers to
dominate -- his to support.
(NOW SOP, Oct. 29,1966\
For Young and others in the masculinist men's movement, NOW's more recent opposition
to joint custody legislation has seemed to be in bad faith.  Young claims that "a lot of
women are scared" that "men want to horn in on women's traditional turf, their power
base" (Young, Transitions v.7 #5, Sept/Oct. 1987). John Rossler (NCM's president) and
Jane Young (NCM's Women's Issues Advisor) wrote a letter to 301 editors of newspapers
79
carrying Parade Magazine. They were responding to an article entitled "Should We Make
It Harder for Men to Walk Out on Wives and Children?" In their letter they advocate no-
fault divorce and joint custody: "Arrangemens of shared parenting in the event of divorce
are philosophically consistent with early equal rights theory because they free both men and
women from strict adherence to stereotypical gender roles" (NeIWORK, v.1, n. 3).
When toward the late 1970's NOW opposed joint custody legislation, argued
Williamson, "the women's movement looked more and more like just another special
interest group" (322). According to Williamson, Watren Farrell had viewed the early
NOW "as a voice for human rights" and "expected from them more encouragement for
males" (322).
Daniel Calvin has written an article on joint custdy  that Baumli (1985) refers to as
a "classic within the men's movement" (325). He refers frequently to a book by Roman
and Haddad (1978) called The Disposable Parent. Calvin (1985) argues that the current
tradition of maternal custody following divorce is damaging to everyone involved:  "... our
current arrangements tend to make ex-parents of fathers, painfully deprived creatures of the
children, and overburdened persons out of the mothers" (188). Calvin then argues that
joint custody is the best alternative.
Along the way Calvin observes: "the vast majority of women ... work out of
economic necessity" (186); "men have almost never agreed on any large scale to share
responsibility for the home" (187); "divorce decisions are based upon the extension of
assumptions and values that underlie and support the required structure and roles of the
American nuclear family" (188); "until the beginning of the twentieth century, 'patriarchy'
almost exclusively determined the legal status of children [footnote removed]" (l9l);
"industrialization, which split the wage labor of men and the private labor of women, was
behind the exaltation of motherhood and the maternal instinct" (L92); and "when joint
custody would not work (where the parents themselves say it will  not work), no court in
the land will make it happen" (195).
80
From just the above statements,  would believe that this is a clearly feminist
argument. However, in spite of agreement about the sexist nature of assumptions of the
nuclear family (upon which public policy is erected), clear conflicts do exist between
masculinist and feminist proposals on child custody. Phyllis Chesler (1986) has wriuen a
book on the subject, entitled Mothers onTrial:  The Battlefor Children andCusndy.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Chesler "argues that all too often a father may seek
joint custody ... as a way of 'retaining the marital home and other assets and as a way of
monitoring, controlling and harassing his ex-wife"' (Wall Street Journal, Aug 21, '86:
54). It's important to note that joint custody "does not refer to the living iurangement of the
children" (Salt 1986: 110). Rather, this custodial arrangement  parental rights
regarding the children
In some divorces the parents agree upon custodial arrangements and do not contest
this issue in court. In these circumstances maternal custody (which Calvin criticizes)
would not be forced. Accordingly, Calvin is primarily concerned with court directed
custdy judgements. Calvin's argument is essentially that, when custody is contested, the
court should give preference to joint custody rather than to maternal custody. In Calvin's
words "joint custody ... needs to be the legislative presumption" (195).
Calvin goes on to recognize that this "presumption in favor ofjoint  custody" may
be seen as "coercive." Nevertheless, he asserts, "the current bias in favor of the mother is
also coercive" (195). Provisions of joint custody include the following:  the parents share
legal custody, which precludes the notion of "visitation"; "responsibility and decision-
making" are shared; and there is no requirement of "child support" (191).
Alimony and Child Support
Masculinist  the traditionalists,  alimony and child support
requirements.  March 2,1987, Jack Kammer,  Executive  testified 
81
the Senate subcommittee on Social Security & Family Policy chaired by restrictive liberal
Patrick Moynihan. He told the subcommittee that alimony was an injustice and that men
often do not pay alimony and child support because they no longer feel like part of the
family.  He explained that men are willing  to sacrifice to eam a living  for their families but
only if they will reap the rewards of having that family to come home to.  Referring to
Weitzman's (1985) "claim that men's Standard of Living goes up after divorce, Kammer
pointed out that'men voluntarily lower their Standard of Living in order to achieve the love
and affection, the feeling of purpose and connectedness that only a family can bring"'
(NeIWORK, v. 1, no.2).  Later that same month Kammer also testified in hearings on the
Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987. Representative Harold Ford of Tennessee presided
over these hearings (NeIWORK, v. l, no. 2).
Fredric Hayward, director of Men's Rights Inc., used a similar approach to the
issue in his column on the so-called "deadbeat dad." Hayward explained that some of these
men never wanted to be parents and that men should have the option of non-support if their
partner refuses to have an abortion. Others, he said, changed their minds but, unlike the
mother, didn't have the option of putting the child up for adoption. Others are denied
custody or "resent their second-class status as parents." A final group simply can't afford
to make the support payments. Hayward sums up the problem by saying that "once you
rob someone of the rewards of parenthood -- the warmth of a family, the continued
experience of a child's growth, the contribution of one's values -- you rob him of his sense
of duty" (Los AngelesTimes II, 5: l).
Free Men
Women are free to pursue careers, so masculinist men are now pursuing their own
liberation. As was discussed earlier, the masculine mystique consists of being limited to
the roles of provider and protector. Now men are turning to a concern with their own
individual gowth. While they attack the patriarchal family for demanding that husbands
82
and fathers act as insensitive pocketbooks, masculinist men tend to accept social patriarchy.
This follows from their view of powerrelations. Women, acting in their own interest, are
pressing for greater equality in the paid labor force. Masculinist men, though, don't want
their agenda to be set by the needs of women.  Rather, these men are concerned to promote
their interests as emotionally expressive individuals and active parents.
Goldberg had suggested that male privilege was a myth perpetuated by men's more
active style. In other words, masculine aggressive behavior has a more apparent (but not
more real) impact than does feminine passive aggression. Haddad (1984) builds upon this
idea with a revised theory of male power based upon the myth of male privilege.
According to Baumli (1985), "Richard Haddad, as one of the founding members of Free
Men in Columbia, Maryland, and as publisher of American Man, the most important
journal in the men's movement, has been spoken of as the messiah of men's liberation"
(326).
While Haddad recognizes that most elite political and economic positions are
occupied by men, he says that it "sounds too silly" to explicitly suggest "a conspiracy of
some men to govern for the benefit of other men" (Haddad 1984: l4).  He also recognizes
that, while the majority of men do not occupy these elite positions, they do typically earn
more than do women. However, Haddad argues, most men are economically
disempowered because "the power of money is in the spending, not the earning" (Haddad
1984: l4).  He seems to imply, then, that a man's earning power should be balanced
against a wife's propensity to spend her husband's money. In regard to political power,
Haddad points to "mandated alimony payments" and the social security system as primarily
benefiting women. Furthermore, he says, "the same lawmakers who frowned on working
women also frowned on vagrant men..." (Haddad 1984: 15).
Pro-feminist men might point out that lawmakers also represent the interests of
capital, which is sometimes at odds with the interests of the male sexual class. Still, social
patriarchy provides all men with privileges within society. An individual man may or may
83
not be a male supremacist, but he still enjoys social privilege from being part of the
dominant sexual class (see Ehrlich ln7>.  Brod (1987) notes: "Capitalism increasingly
creates a gap benveen institutional and personal power [footnote removed]. For men, this
creates a disjunction between the facts of public male power and the feelings of men's
private powerlessness"  Gerson and Peiss (1985) explain this process in terms of
negotiated dominance:
Domination describes the systems of male control and coercion while negotiation
addresses the processes by which men and women bargain for privileges and
resources. Each group has some assets which enable it to cooperate with or resist
existing social :urangements, although clearly these resources and consequent
power are unequal (318).
Liberalism typically masks social domination in a shroud of liberty while allowing an equal
right to bargain.
But Haddad would likely find this explanation unacceptable: "We speak
contemptuously of 'The System' as if it were something the government or industry or
both have created and maintain primarily to exploit the citizen-worker. The government
does not run the system. Neither does the corporation. The system runs both, and we --
men and women -- run the system" (Haddad 1985: 288). Haddad's concepr of power,
then, is patently pluralist. If men have occupied positions of political and economic
decision-making, it's only because that has been their defined sphere of influence.
Women, meanwhile, have traditionally occupied the domestic sphere and, according to
Haddad, exercised power in that sphere. Because mothers have been responsible for child-
rearing, they are central to the socialization process and to conveying values to children.
Asks Haddad: "Exactly how important are men in society's scheme of things if it was not
thought necessary for them to be around while we were growing up...?" (Haddad 1984:
l6).
84
"Domestic" 
Unlike pro-feminist  who focus on male violence  women, masculinist
men stress the male victim.  Baumli (1985) includes a section on "violence and the male
victim," which is divided into material on battered and murdered husbands and mass media
portrayals of men as legitimate victims. Masculinist men frame the issue of "domestic"
violence in pluralist terms. Feminist women, they assert, have fostered a concern with
violence against women. This, furtherrnore, detracts from services for men who are vitims
of violence in the home. The traditionalists express a similar concern, although one would
suspect that traditionalist men would attribute the phenomenon to the man's loss of
authority. For masculinist men, as for the researchers they cite, the concern is to
demonstrate that violence in the family is less an expression of man's patriarchal privilege
than of a culture that encourages violent solutions to conflict.  In pluralist politics, further,'
masculinist men represent the interests of men.
The masculinists'concern about family violence is expressed by an insert in the
first 1988 issue of Tra nsitions. This was an article from Social Work on battered
husbands, a subject that has caused a furor in the social work profession. The article
contends that husband battering is as frequent as wife battering and that wives frequently
falsely accuse men of child abuse in order to gain custody. These are popular contentions
among the masculinist men's goups.  According to the Wall Street Journal, the Fathers'
Righs Association of New York (a member group of the National Congress for Men) "sent
a copy of the article to Gov. Mario Cuomo, along with a letter charging that the state,
because of 'feminist misrepresentations,'  against men in its domestic-violence
policies" (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, 358:  4).
Critics contend that "the researchers  to consider whether women are striking
their husbands merely in self-defense. 'If you look at a hit or an assault out of context, it
doesn't tell you much of anything,' argues Barbara Hart, an attorney for the Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Domestic Violence." Feminiss seem to be concerned that a focus on
85
violence against husbands will  diminish concern about wife abuse. According to the
article, Warren Farell,  who has recently become associated with the masculinist men's
movement, also "fears that in the short run the controversial article will  make men's groups
self-righteous and both sexes more defensive" (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, 35E:  4).
Sexual Politics
Haddad also denies that men have any advantage in sexual politics. He notes that
men either have a greater sex drive or are at least burdened with greater expectations of
sexual performance: "Does that not make the male more vulnerable in interpersonal
relationships? Have you ever thought of the male sex drive in terrns of the power it gives
women?" (Haddad 1984: 16). Apparently this is the power of rejection -- the "power" to
say no. Jerry Boggs wrote an article called "'Women's Hidden Power" in which he
discusses a study that asked women how they get their way and found that they often use
emotional ploys (Transitions, v. 7 #5). D. McDonnell [I, writing of "Sex Harassment on
the Job," argues that "a woman can have 'fun' by dangling the carrot of willingness and
watch the men trip over themselves... Yet women continue to clamor that they are
powerless in the supposedly  dominated society" (Transitions,v'7 #5 SepVOct.
1987). Boggs and McDonnell II try, in this way, to distort the message  feminism.
Most feminists recognize that women have some personal power, which they can use to
work for change. This does not, however, dismiss the institutional power and privilege
that men use to maintain their dominance over women as a sexual class (and often as
individuals).
In another issue of Transitions, Mel Feit tries to establish "A New Defrnition of
Rape." Writes Feit, "She decides if and when there is going to be a sexual encounter. He
asks. She decides. She has the power." This, Feit concludes, should be considered rape
because dating makes men "feel belittled, enraged, degraded, dehumanized, humiliated and
powerless" (fransitions v. 8 #1 Jan/Feb 1988). Robert Tyler expands this notion as power
86
derived from sexual passivity:
The first and quite basic power -- or perhaps more neutrally at this point,
advantage -- of women over men is in the basic biological  nature of our
sexual jobs...  Women have no necessary duties to perform in coition...
Short of clinical  vaginissmus, the woman can 'perform' quite adequately,
even as she lies on her back and plans her next day's shopping list, or her
Board of Directors agenda (fyler  1984: 6).
These are the words of a man who proclaims, "I am a liberal, on the right side, a life-long
supporter of feminism.  ...I am puzzled, by my general assent to feminist goals and
ideology and by my complete failure to'feel'its contents" (Tyler 1984: 4-5). This liberal
author reduces human sexuality to coition and then dismisses any coition that is not
performed in the missionary positon.
Finally, David Morrow reviewed a book that the editor of Trarsitions said had
"considerable merit."  The book is entitled Shy Men, Sex and Castrattng Women (Balls
1985). It describes the "castrating woman" as being "callous and manipulative." She is
portrayed as victimizing "shy men" and exhibiting such traits as "habitual lying, menstrual
problems, claims of previous rape or incest, and ... aversion to breast play..."
(Transitions v. 8 #l  Jan/Feb 1988). Although Morrow believes that "other, less violent
alternatives are more practical and to be preferred," the book suggests that "such women
can be handled with manipulation, emotional retaliation, at times a slap upside the head,
and often best with forced sex" (Transitions v.8, #l  Jan/Feb 1988).
Men's Rights
Men's Rights activists agree with feminists that sexist language is a problem, but
they are specifically concerned about disparaging remarks about men. Tom Williamson of
the Coalition of Free Men, for instance, dislikes the terms wimp andmacln:  "I don't like
the way wimp makes a judgment. And macho is just another way of saying'male
chauvinist pig."'  Warren Farrell rebuts arguments about the male pronoun associated with
87
God by noting that the Devil is also referred to as male, which is unfair to men (New York
Times, January 13, 1986, B52).  A  special issue of The Universiry of Dayton Review on
men's studies is advertised as including topics such as "anti-male bias in English" and
"institutionalized sexism against men" and is available from the chair of CFM's committee
on men's studies (Network, v.1, n.2). In fact, "activists in men's rights organizations are
entering the fray with talk show appearances  angy  letters over language and innuendo
in advertisements, movies, news broadcasts, women's magazines and television
programming" (New YorkTimes, January 13, 1986, B52).
Conclusions
Survey data indicates that general support for gender equality has increased since
1970. Ferguson and Rogers (1986) note, for instance, that feminism is among "the policy
areas in which the public has shown the sharpest increase in liberalism since World War II.
The rate of increase slowed during the posrl973 period, but at no time did the public
actually become nrore conservative on these issues" (Ferguson & Rogers 1986: 16).
Writes William J. Gmde, "Through men's eyes, at least ttreprinciple of equality seems
more acceptable than in the past. Thefu resistance is not set against that abstract idea"
(Goode 1980: 189). And for that reason the masculinists can be more useful to policy
planners than other wings of the men's movement. They do not oppose equality and, in
fact, they complain about sexism against men and about women's continuing dependence.
They do, however, often resist the "consrete application" of equality, as Goode calls it.
The rhetoric of men's liberation and of men's righs  fits in well with a restrictive liberal
agenda that wants a color-blind, gender-blind approach to equal oppornrnity. It fits in well
with claims of reverse discrimination.
The state has attempted to shore up patriarchal relations in several ways, including
(1) state paternalism through family policy and welfare regulations and (2) a sex segregated
labor force in which women earn less. Surveys indicate that men still have more leverage,
88
do less housework, and expect women to stay home with small children (see e.g.
Blumstein &  Schwartz 1983). While traditionalist statements supporting the patriarchal
family are blatant and liable to inspire more support for radical feminist goals, opposition to
welfare and affirmative action quotas iue not.
Masculinists have suffered setbacks in their campaign to establish a presumption of
joint custody in divorce laws (Califomia recently reversed such a policy because of its
presumed effect on children passed between conflicting parents). They have, however,
gotten their issues on the public agenda. In the fall of 1983, a retired professor addressed
the Rotary Club in St. Joseph, Michigan on the subject of "men -- an endangered species."
He opened by saying that he would "provide some highly needed refutation to those wild-
eyed Women's Libbers" (Hampton 1984: 335). And among his concluding remarks, he .
quotes Frederic Hayward (of Men's Rights, Inc.) as saying, in part, that men "only want to
make it a fairer world for everyone. That includes us!" (Hampton 1984: 339).
In l9T9 Longres and Bailey set out to frnd studies of men in the social work
journals. They selected 52 articles to review. Of these only three dealt with "explicit
conceptualizations of sexism" (Longres & Bailey 1979: 27). And one of these was by a
radical pro-feminist activist, John Stoltenberg. They did find additional articles addressing
male privilege, but "generally, when authors take note of sex-role issues they do so to point
out how men may be oppressed by norms relating to sex roles" (Ilngres  &Bailey  1979:
29). Whether these studies explicitly support the masculinist men's movement, they do
provide fodder for their efforts. Further, they note, that only two of the fifty-two  articles
"explicitly support maintaining traditional norrns of male behavior" (l,ongres & Bailey
1979: 29).
In 1986 the National Congress for Men celebnated small measure of
"congressional recognition" when NCM successfully lobbied the House Select Committee
on Children, Youth and Families to add "men's issues to the list of topics about which it
89
will  compile and distribute information" (NeIWORK, v. 1, no. 2).
The "New Man" may, in fact, have become associated with a rare, but popularized,
breed -- the YUPPIE.  Writes Ehrenreich, "h  the insecure 1980's, class lines are being
hastily drawn, and many features of the new manhood can best be understood as efforts to
stay on the right side of the line separating ... upscale from merely middle class"
@hrenreich 1984: 44) As an example of this upscale concern, Ehrenreich cites the concern
with sensititivity, though she expresses a sense that "it may be largely a verbal
accomplishment" (Ehrenreich 1984: 46\. She explains:
The vocabulary of  sensitivity, at least, has become part of  the new
masculine politesse; certainly no new man would admit to being insensitive
or willfully  'out of touch with his feelings.' Quite possibly, as sensitivity
has spread, it has lost its moorings in the therapeutic experience and come to
signify the heightened receptivity associated with consumerism...
Ehrenreich 1984: 46
Although many pro-feminist men stress the need for greater sensitivity, they clearly
are not as likely to be upscale or, to cite another of Ehrenreich's concerns, to advocate
irresponsibility or lack of commitment. Astrachan (1988) notes the different backgrounds
of men who attend conferences of pro-feminist and masculinist organizations. The
masculinists tend to come from better paid professional trades. It is perhaps a touch of
irony, then, that the pro-feminist magazine Changing Men lost rights to its prior niune,
M.,to  an upscale journal for the fashion conscious man who is not just sensitive but
sophisticated as well.  Keep in mind, though, what Piercy said about liberal manipulators --
much more effective.
The masculinists are the most likely strand of the men's movement to provide the
ideological basis for rejecting the claims of radical feminists (which are founded upon
notions of sexual politics and a sexual class system rather than liberal legal reform).  In
terrns of the ongoing struggle for more egalitarian institutions, the masculinists present a
conrmon sense approach that says men and women are now equal and both are oppressed.
They agree, then, with restrictive liberal Daniel Bell when he says that "the l9CIs helped
90
bring an end to patiarchy"  and "although ttre NOW movement may have gone too far...,
they are pulling back. Betty Friedan represents this'second-stage'pullback"' (Bell 1987:
2M).  This justifies a renewed emphasis on the needs of men, which seems to come at the
expense of feminism
Because much of the pro-feminist men's movement (like the feminist women's
movement) has been dominated by a liberal ideology, it has been unable to adequately meet
the challenge represented by the restrictive liberals and the masculinist men.
9T
CHAPTER 
CONCLUSIONS
Whereas Ehrenreich (1983) traced historical trends that created a setting conducive
to the "new man," I have focused on the political climate and the challenges of the women's
movement to suggest that some particular men's movement organizations have a gleater
oppornrnity to effectively shape public consciousness  perhaps policy.  The distinctions
between the ideologies of pro-feminist, traditionalist and masculinist men are clear. I have
suggested, though, a connection that has been less clear in previous work, that is the
ideological tradition of the state and the segment of the women's movement that help shape
each strand of the men's movement-
Each ideological faction of the men's movement seems to have begun with a
personal concern or set of personal concerns. Pro-feminist men generally derive an initial
concern from theirrelationships with feminist women or the gay community. In
supporting feminist women, they attempt to critique men's privileged position in society
and the destructiveness  their dominance relative to women. The pro.feminist approach
to power relations, then, tends to include some analysis and critique of patriarchy. For
radical and socialist pro-feminists, power is exercised by an economic and sexual class.
Liberal pro-feminists may be less concerned with class politics, but are critical of laws that
discriminate against women.
The radical and socialist pro.feminists are politically astute, which is a valuable
resource for movement organizing and action. The political tradition from which they draw
(i.e. - democratic socialism), however, has not been generally accepted in the U.S. political
system. As a result" their political opportunities are limited.  Liberal pro-feminists draw
from a radition  of expansive liberalism, which has a declining but established position.
The political oppornrnities for liberal pro-feminists, then, is also limited in the present
92
political climate, though not its severely as that of the radical and socialist pro-feminists.
The traditionalists began with a concern about their marriages and divorces. They
consider alimony and child support to be discriminatory toward them, while also
undermining marriage, the family, and their traditional authority as husbands and fathers.
From this personal interest they derive a conservative theory of gender relations and power.
Conservatives, while respected, are swimming upstream in a liberal political system.
Accordingly, the raditionalists have limited political oppornrnites because they reject some
liberal principles that are central to the status quo.
Masculinist men also began with a concern for their roles in the family.  They have
been primarily concerned with gaining joint custody iurangements, being more active
fathers, and being more emotionally expressive and sensitive persons. Their emphasis on
sensitivity and fathering is similar to that of pro-feminist men, but they share with
traditionalists a concern for men's rights. From this perspective they develop a pluralist
view of power relations that is consistent with the ideology of restrictive liberals. As a
result masculinist men have greater political oppornrnities than do other factions of the
men's movement. If they do not realize their potential, it may be due to a lack of political
experience and organizational resources.
My measures of movement effectiveness are not complete. Clearly the masculinist
men's movement seems ideologically consistent with the modern phenomenon of restrictive
liberalism and its concern with limiting the goals of radical feminists. While the
traditionalist organizations claim a comparable membership size, their measure of
membership includes all consumers of services, many of which are for father's rights and
thus are conducive with the masculinists. The traditionalists, furthermore, are clearly
outside of mainstream public opinion. Compared with the pro-feminist men, masculinists
not only have a larger membership but have also been more ambitious and more effective in
seeking coverage in the mass media. Table 4 shows the relative membership size of
different men's movement factions.
93
Table 4.  Rough estimation of membership  men's movement factions.
Faction
Pro-Feminist
Traditionalist
lvlasculinist
Approximate  of memben
lm0
9500
7500
In terms of specific policy changes, the story is not as clear. While the pro'feminist
men do not seem particularly effective thus far, feminist women have clearly established a
political presence. The masculinist men, then, are in the precarious position of speaking
for the interests of men (which many have felt to be ignored recently) while public support
for liberal feminism remains strong. A more thorough examination of lobbying activity, of
media coverage, and of policy changes would be in order. This would include a more in
depth observation of several local men's groups and activists. I cannot, as well as I would
like, demonsmte the direct effecs of the men's movement, but this study does suggest the
importance of the movement and of the present conflict benveen masculinist men and
feminist women.
94
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