Red-Baiting and Misinformation in Digital Congressional Campaigns: A Simmering Red Scare? by Dalton Ty Bouzek A dissertation accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication and Media Studies Dissertation Committee: Dr. Maxwell Foxman, Chair, Advisor Dr. Julianne Newton, Core Member Dr. Senyo Ofori-Parku, Core Member Dr. Ramon Alvarado, Core Member University of Oregon Summer 2025 © 2025 Dalton Ty Bouzek 2 DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Dalton Ty Bouzek Doctor of Philosophy in Communication and Media Studies Title: Red-Baiting and Misinformation in Digital Congressional Campaigns: A Simmering Red Scare? Red-baiting — using terms like "socialist" and "communist" as political attacks, remains a significant phenomenon in American politics dating back to the first Red Scare in the early 20th century. While scholars have studied this practice during historical Red Scare periods, little research has examined its prevalence and impact in contemporary political discourse, particularly on social media. This mixed-methods study analyzed tweets from 488 Congressional candidates during the 2020 U.S. general election campaign to understand how frequently red-baiting rhetoric occurred, which candidates employed it, and its relationship to engagement metrics and electoral outcomes. Using Tweet Flash (a Twitter API), 268,320 tweets were collected and ana- lyzed both quantitatively for frequency and engagement patterns, and qualitatively through in- ductive thematic analysis to identify key frames and themes. Using Cultivation Theory and other media effects theories to understand the power of red-baiting terms in campaign rhetoric. These theories combined to create the novel “Cultivation Model of Political Realities.” Results showed that while roughly 1% of tweets contained red- baiting (or adjacent) language, these tweets generated significantly higher engagement than non- red-baiting tweets. Republicans used red-baiting terms substantially more often than Democrats, though the practice was not clearly associated with electoral success for either party. Common 3 themes included framing perceptually hostile nations as a Communist threat, characterizing so- cial movements as Marxist, and positioning policy debates as battles between American values and leftist ideology. This study argues that rather than being confined to discrete historical peri- ods, Red Scare sentiment remains an undercurrent in American political discourse that can be inflamed by certain conditions and actors. The findings suggest that while red-baiting may drive social media engagement, it does not necessarily translate to electoral advantages, raising questions about its continued use as a campaign tactic. These insights are particularly relevant given Twitter's rightward shift under Elon Musk's ownership and the platform's potential role in amplifying inflammatory rhetoric during the 2024 election cycle, suggesting a need for both platforms and users to develop better mechanisms for identifying and contextualizing red-baiting claims. Keywords: Twitter, Red-Baiting, Socialism, Election, Campaign, Cultivation       4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is the culmination of roughly 22 years of formal education, on the road to ful- filling my life’s primary goal — becoming a college professor so that I can give back to my community, my students, and the overall pantheon of knowledge. No act we undertake in life is truly a solo venture. Accordingly, there are so many I must thank, and I will make it my mission to pay the help, guidance, and support I’ve received forward. To my incredibly supportive, flexi- ble, insightful and understanding dissertation committee — Dr. Maxwell Foxman, Dr. Julieanne Newton, Dr. Senyo Ofori-Parku, and Dr. Ramon Alvarado — I extend my eternal gratitude. To my advisors at Marquette University, Dr. Erik Ugland and Dr. Pamela Nettleton, thank you for keeping me afloat and encouraging me to push forward to achieve my lofty goals. To my many mentors at St. Norbert College, I express my sincere appreciation for entrenching my love with the academy and opening my eyes to a world of possibilities. In an “industry” (I loathe that term) that does not always love you back, make sure to take a moment and love the people wherever you may find yourselves. To all of my wonderful peers at the SOJC, who against incredible odds at times, banded together and built a life-long family, this work is all of ours. In such an uncer- tain time for academia, our country, and the world, community and love are what will get us all through. I often reflect on how incredibly lucky I am to have had such an incredible supporting family behind me, without them, none of this would be possible. The biggest thank you to my parents, Julie and Ty, and my brother Adam, who despite all of his teasing, would always relent that I was “the one with the brains.” I hope I have and will continue to make you all proud and 5 that your efforts will manifest ten-fold in the future, as I look to repay you and future genera- tions. To the love of my life, Kali, I could not have finished this endeavor without your uncondi- tional belief in me and our future. I am so excited to see where our next steps take us, to Kansas and beyond! Ultimately, this work is just a microscopic piece of a grand puzzle that we all must solve together, in order to make our world a better place. My two personal mantras that have guided my work and my life are “there may not always be a right or wrong answer, but there should al- ways be a well-reasoned one” and “any man-made problem has a man-made solution.” I hope these philosophies inspire others to work together with one another to achieve a better future, built on compassion, curiosity, and understanding. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 7 LIST OF FIGURES 11 LIST OF TABLES 11 Chapter I — Introduction 12 Significance of This Research 18 Practical contributions 18 Theoretical and conceptual contributions 20 Chapter II — Background 22 Contemporary Overview 22 Foundational Concepts for this Study 24 Red-baiting 24 Other forms of political mischaracterization 25 Significance of terms 26 Red Scare History 27 Pretext of the first Red Scare 28 McCarthyism and The Red Scare 30 McCarthyist Framing 31 Policy as communism 31 Public Health 33 Education 34 Entertainment and the arts as communism 40 Decline of the Second Red Scare 44 Synthesis of frames 45 Rhetorical Tactics 54 Consistency in themes and frames 57 7 Nadirs 58 Historical parallels to 2016 and beyond 59 War and Global Strife 59 High Stakes Elections 63 Popular Support 68 Parallels from second Trump term 70 Contemporary Issues 70 New conflations 70 Political literacy 71 Political literacy and social media 72 Role of Twitter 74 Political discourse on Twitter 77 Future outlook 78 Chapter III - Theory and Literature Review 80 Theoretical Backing 80 Agenda-setting 80 Cultivation Theory 82 Priming 84 Framing 85 Spiral of Silence, Public Opinion and the Manufacturing of Consent 86 Free Media Thesis 89 Synthesis of related theories 91 Literature Review 94 Gaps in Existing Literature 103 Research Questions 106 RQ1: Do red-baiting tweets receive more engagement than non red-baiting tweets? 106 RQ2: Is there an association between party affiliation and the frequency of red-baiting style tweets? 106 8 RQ3: Is race competitiveness associated with using red-baiting tweets more frequently than in relatively non-competitive races? 106 RQ4: Do candidates who use red-baiting tweets more frequently than their opponents tend to win their races more often than candidates that use red-baiting style tweets less often? 106 RQ5: What were the most common frames , themes, and sentiments embedded in tweets with red- baiting language? 106 RQ6: Do red-baiting tweets tend to be more policy-focused or candidate-focused? 106 Theoretical linkages and anticipated results 107 Chapter IV - Methodology 108 Structure of Study 108 Definitions and Operationalization 108 Omitted Terms 114 Unit of analysis 116 Population 117 Sample 118 Research Instruments 119 Data Collection Process 120 Data Coding and Organization 121 Research question specific variable codes 121 Coding for red-baiting terms 122 Candidate specific codes 122 Additional qualitative data organizational process 123 Qualitative Coding Process 124 Other Considerations 125 Bots 125 Data Outliers 126 CHAPTER V – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 128 Quantitative Measures and Outputs 128 Initial Outputs 128 9 Statistical Analysis 131 RQ1. Relationship between Red-baiting and Engagement 131 RQ2 — Party affiliation and red-baiting frequency 134 RQ4 — Does red-baiting impact election outcome? 138 RQ5 — Most common themes and frames in red-baiting 144 RQ6 — Do red-baiting tweets tend to be more policy-focused or candidate-focused? 150 Chapter VI - Discussion 157 Summary 157 Cultivation Model of Political Realities 158 Salience of Red-Baiting 159 Partisan differences and similarities 161 China as "Red Menace” 163 Grouping adversaries 165 Lack of rebuttal 168 What is socialism? 170 Sentiments 173 Where is red-baiting directed? 175 Other takeaways 176 Is this a Red Scare? 178 Limitations 179 Future Implications/Solutions 181 Summary of Study 185 Concluding Remarks 187 References 190 10 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Red Scare education propaganda 35 2. Anti-academic Red Scare propaganda 38 3. Anti-immigrant Red Scare propaganda 50 4. Cultivation Model of Political Reality 93 5. Data collection flow chart 121 6. Qualitative word cloud 147 7. Congress member tweets by topic 161 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Red-baiting and engagement metrics 132 2. Red-baiting and engagement metrics controlling for competitiveness 133 3. Party affiliation and red-baiting frequency 134 4. Red-baiting in relation to race competitiveness 135 5. Red-baiting in relation to incumbency 137 6. Red-baiting’s impact on election outcomes 138 7. Red-baiting and electoral outcome by party 139 8. Red-baiting and electoral outcome by gender 141 9. Red-baiting by incumbency 142 10. Red-baiting by chamber of Congress 143 11 Chapter I — Introduction The United States has been embroiled in an identity crisis nearly since its foundation. Culture wars, coupled with choosing which side one belongs to in those wars, has long been a feature of what it means to be an “American” (Gitlin, 1995). This “us versus them” dichotomy has been engrained in the American psyche through legislation, political discourse in legacy me- dia and social media, and persists in the 2010-2020s (Gitlin, 1995). Rather than providing a rem- edy to these issues, the American political apparatus, coupled with contemporary social media, has seemingly exacerbated them. For example, the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, which was a policy designed to ensure representation of multiple sides of an issue over public airwaves, as well as the Telecommunication’s Act of 1996, which allowed for more conglomeration and ho- mogenization of news media, have arguably allowed for further deterioration of what researcher Todd Gitlin calls “common dreams,” or shared goals and visions with society. Safeguards designed to preserve healthy debate and fair dissemination of information have generally eroded (Gitlin, 1995). Researchers and pundits alike speak of this new era as a “post- truth” world, which “arguably emerged as a result of societal mega-trends, such as a decline in social capital, growing economic inequality, increased polarization, declining trust in science, and an increasingly fractionated media landscape” (Lewandowsky, Ecker & Cook, 2017, p. 3). A post-truth world may be characterized as when “falsehoods and misinformation inundate the me- dia, public trust in traditional sources of knowledge has declined, public disagreements about established empirical findings are rampant, and opinion often takes precedence over evidence” (Chinn, Barzilai & Duncan, 2021, p.51). Combative, dehumanizing rhetoric has seemingly be- 12 come a prominent feature of American political discourse, and its leads one to wonder about its level of salience in present day American society. Even the most mundane instances and verifiable facts are not immune to critique in this post- truth world (Schindler, 2020). For example, Donald Trump and press secretary Kellyanne Con- way referred to pushback over their claims that Trump’s presidential inauguration was the most well attended in history as “alternative facts.” Likewise, a claim by a politician that their oppo- nent’s policies are “communist” or “fascist" when the specifications of the policy are demonstra- bly not shaped by that economic structure, would fall under the same category. Regardless of the exact claim, the spread of alternative facts and fake news has tangible impacts on voting behav- ior and shaping and limiting popular public political discourse (Monsees, 2023). Unfortunately, social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) are algorithmically structured to encourage and 1 exacerbate the spread of hyperbolic claims and alternative facts. Since one of the main functions of social media campaigns is to improve name recognition of the candidate (Kobayashi & Ichifu- ji, 2015), candidates strive to increase the engagement metrics of their posts to expand their reach. Posts with hyperbolic claims and alternative facts tend to facilitate more engagement than posts without (Dujeancourt et al., 2022), and posts with higher engagement metrics have a wider reach on the platform (Bandy & Diakopoulos, 2021). Therefore, candidates are incentivized to make hyperbolic and sensationalized claims as a method to increase their name recognition. The past two presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 were notable for the spread of sensation- alized claims on social media (Rossini, Stromer-Galley & Korsunska, 2021). This misinforma- Just after the data collection portion of this study concluded, Twitter had its official name changed to X. For con1 - sistency sake, X will be simply referred to as Twitter in the remainder of this paper, as it is also popularly known as Twitter, as well. 13 tion was one of the factors that ultimately led to instances of political violence, such as the Jan- uary 6th storming of the US Capitol (Kovacs, Cotfas & Delcea, 2022). Therefore, further explo- ration of other sensationalized claims that may elicit violence, or at the very least, sow divide and confusion, is prudent. Some scholars have claimed that we are in an era of a new “Cold War,” particularly between the United States and China (Legvold, 2014; Brands & Gaddis, 2021; Schindler, DiCarlo & Paudel, 2022). In tandem with this conceptualization of the current geopolitical situation, according to search trends from Google and Twitter “communism” and “socialism” spike in interest not only during election years, but peak roughly around the time of the election date. Therefore, interrogating both how often these sorts of terms are used by politicians on Twitter and how they are employ- ing them can provide insights as to their salience among the American public, the sentiment con- nected to them, and potentially their impacts on election outcomes. Zooming out, these peaks in interest of terms like “communism” and “socialism” are also as- sociated with “Red Scares.” A Red Scare is generally described as a mass hysteria event where a fear of leftist politics, usually simplified to “communism” and “socialism,” manifests in persecu- tions of those sympathetic (either real or imagined) to those political orientations (Gibson, 1988). “Red-baiting” is the term used to describe this process of oversimplification and conflation of leftist politics and terms for the purposes of attacking a political adversary (Collins 2008; Schrecker, 2004). Though not correctly used to describe leftist policy, the term “fascist” is also used to demonize politicians and policies, often interchangeably with terms like “communist” during Red Scares. 14 Historically, the term “Red Scare” has been reserved for specific time periods in American history, from 1917-1920 and 1947-1957. Red Scares are induced by “status anxiety” of the hegemonic powers that be (Schmidt, 2004, p. 9). Status anxieties are exacerbated by war, eco- nomic instability, political shifts, and changes in social and cultural norms. Historically, this leads to suppression and persecution of individuals or groups that are believed to be sympathetic to leftist causes and has substantial policy and social impacts. These fears, whether grounded or not, disproportionately lead to the targeting of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, women, and labor unions, with an array of consequences, ranging from loss of employment or social sta- tus, imprisonment, exile, and overall oppression on rates and scales far greater than non-Red Scare periods. Red Scares are characterized as populist, hyper-nationalist, and are inherently reactionary in nature, as they aspire to return to a past time where religion, homogeneity, individualism and un- fettered capitalism were free to reign. They are generally propagated by influential actors in the political and media arenas that stand to benefit from a non-leftist status quo that capitalizes on existing issues that may be economic, political, or cultural and frames those issues as rooted in leftist politics and their supposed supporters. Accordingly, these imagined threatened entities must be eradicated, or at least significantly subdued, to restore conditions beneficial to the group in power, or for those who wish to seize power. While Red Scares may be thought of as relics that serve as cautionary tales in history classes, the central argument of this study is that Red Scares never truly go away. They may simmer un- der the surface of political activity and discourse and indirectly impact both, but under the right conditions, they may inflame based upon a myriad of factors. While there are no clear criteria 15 defining a Red Scare, comparison of political, economic, and social conditions, as well as the rhetoric surrounding them, can provide clues as to whether an inflammation has taken place. Ac- cordingly, in this work, I thoroughly explore the foundations and evolutions of the Red Scares not only to provide context for the study itself, but also as a warning and reminder to readers that liberal democracies are not to be taken for granted, and the time to act to preserve them are when these warning signs are present. Therefore, the objectives of this study were to delineate what conditions and rhetorical tactics are prominent in Red Scares and to compare them to the contemporary political landscape to see if they persist. Comparing these conditions alone is a necessary, yet insufficient method to ascer- tain whether there is indeed a new Red Scare, as the rhetoric and prevailing political discourse surrounding these conditions are what leads to the aforementioned large-scale consequences of Red Scares. Since Red Scares are as much of a local event as they are a national one (Schmidt, 2004), one can infer that the Red Scare rhetoric must also be present on a more localized level, too. So, while Red Scares may originate at the top of the political ladder, they rely on others un- derneath to spread these messages, and make them palatable and relatable for local contexts. Though Red Scares are inherently reactionary, their proponents may not be explicitly sympa- thetic to reactionary causes. As Red Scares tend to manifest and proliferate out of a systematic coordination between political apparatuses, the media, capitalist interests, and eventually the public, they rely on the direct and indirect efforts of all of these actors. Historically, those both on the right and left (at least nominally) in the United States have been active participants in Red Scare rhetoric and action. Some prominent Democrats, like former president Harry Truman, have explicitly used Red Scare rhetoric to demonize leftist politics and entities, while others have tac- 16 itly approved of this demonization by voting on resolutions and policy based upon these senti- ments. While those on the nominal left are generally the targets of Red Scares, the US, for all intents and purposes, does not have a true “left-wing” in its mainstream contemporary politics, especially compared to the rest of the globe (Hamby, 2004; Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; Alto et al., 2022). Accordingly, even those in the Democratic Party that are most often the current targets of these red-baiting charges may indirectly reinforce Red Scare sentiment by deflecting these claims that they do not identify with, which further ostracizes these terms from acceptable politi- cal debate and discourse, and ultimately can further prime their supporters to do the same. This necessitates examining the campaign rhetoric of both Democrats and Republicans to gather a more holistic picture of contemporary Red Scare status. Salience – defined as something seemingly notable or important (Epstein & Siegel, 2000) — is key to the success and further transmission of Red Scare sentiment. Sentiment — defined as the subjective view or attitude toward an idea or event (Mejova, 2009)— can be understood in Red Scare contexts as feelings that Red Scare messages conjure, such as fear, anger, or appre- hension. So long as red-baiting terms are salient and contextualized for the target audience, the solutions presented to them to cure the supposed issues they face, that are caused by the demo- nized group of “communists” and “socialists,” are more palatable. This study examines rhetoric — in this case, persuasive speech and figures of speech used in campaigns — from Congression- al campaigns, which past studies have largely ignored. “Red-baiting rhetoric," for the purposes of this study, refers to actual use of red-baiting terms (eg. communism) and comparable terms that refer to the political right (eg. Fascism), but in a mischaracterized manner, as traditional red-bait- ing terms typically are. 17 Significance of This Research Through comparing the themes, frames, rhetoric, prevalence and salience of Red Scare peri- ods of the past, present, and future, as well as understanding their contexts, I define “Red Scares” in a way that can be used outside of commonly held historical context. I then make a profound case that a Red Scare has been inflamed, through a thorough historicization of the Red Scares and comparing those periods to present day. Most Red Scare histories do not examine time peri- ods past the Second Red Scare in the 1960s, so this narrative is the first of its kind that I am aware of after review of the relevant literature. The goal in this historicization is to extract the foundational elements of the Red Scare periods and showcase how these practices, conditions, and solutions are not time bound. Instead, through the isolation of these particular elements and thoroughly analyzing them in this light, we can see that any time these conditions are present, those interested in keeping free democracies should be on high alert. Interestingly, since the be- ginning of this study and up into its conclusion in 2025, these elements are even more pro- nounced. Thus, understanding the history of the Red Scares and applying them to present con- texts, such as Twitter campaigns, serves as a crucial example and warning sign that the time to act is now. Much inspiration for this study and the solutions it prescribes are borrowed from Wittgenstein in his assertion that “the limits of my language are the limits of my world.” There- fore, expanding and coming to precise definitions of our shared language of democracy will ex- pand the boundaries of what our democracy can accomplish. Practical contributions 18 On a practical level, results from this study and their analysis provides a basis to help the pub- lic better understand why and how these terms are used in political discourse, especially on so- cial media. Social media, particularly Twitter, depends on an algorithmic formula to present cer- tain topics to each user, based upon engagement metrics such as “favorites” and “reposts.” The more engagement a post has, the more visible it becomes, which creates a snowball effect of fur- ther discussion of that topic. Once a sufficient level of search queries and engagement with a top- ic is reached, determined by the algorithm, that topic is considered “trending.” Trending topics create a shared sense of “social reality” for users, and those topics, either real or theoretical, can shape one’s conception of reality and what is salient (Zhang & Ng, 2023). This study reveals how the visibility of Red Scare and red-baiting rhetoric on social media can create a misleading perception of its prevalence, as the content's reach is amplified more by the influence of who is posting than by organic public engagement. Ultimately, this work will also serve highlight and make recommendations as to what social media users, social media platforms, and politicians can do to foster a better space for political discourse. From the perspective of social media platforms, both scholars and media practitioners who hold civic responsibility as a core value may look to this study as a catalyst to discourage Red Scare sentiment. Safeguards may be put in place to stop this fear-mongering from spreading fur- ther. For example, Twitter has an already existing “community notes” feature that allows for users to contextualize and push back on posts that spread misinformation and disinformation, which Red Scare and red-baiting language both fall under. More severe consequences for spread- ing misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech is not without precedent, as many platforms, Twitter included, have taken action by banning accounts and filtering language that promotes 19 hate towards vulnerable groups, which I argue is one of the most important, if not the most im- portant, foundations for Red Scare inflammations. These actions may only be realized in an ide- alistic world, as removing vast quantities of prominent accounts detract from overall engagement with the platform, which would have a negative impact in terms of profitability, thereby disin- centivizing platforms to act. The results of this study provides an empirical basis that may actually discourage red-baiting and Red Scare sentiments in the context of campaigns. As part of this study analyzed the election outcomes in relation to the usage of these terms, this study can highlight negligible or non-exis- tent benefits that using these terms actually have on winning an election. Therefore, provided that there is not a strong correlation between using red-baiting and Red Scare sentiment and win- ning elections, political campaigns and consultants may shy away from these tactics in the future, which has positive benefits for political discourse. Conversely, as this is the first known study of red-baiting in Congressional campaigns and social media, this also supplements existing litera- ture on potential positive electoral outcomes when utilizing negative political advertising. While generally negative political ads can lead to election wins, the specific practice of red-baiting as a negative tactic has seldom been explored. Theoretical and conceptual contributions On a theoretical and conceptual level, this study is one of, if not the first, to operationalize red-baiting, specifically, as a form of misinformation. Extensive reviews of political misinforma- tion tend to focus on specific policy matters and events, and make the distinction that misinfor- mation is different from “rumor” and “conspiracy” (Jerit & Zhao, 2020). In a sense, red-baiting can be thought of as a combination of all three, depending on the specific claim and the context. 20 For example, if a politician is warning of a “communist plot” in the legislature to “strip away all of our constitutional rights,” this would be an example of misinformation, as it may be a confi- dently held untrue belief, as well as rumor and conspiracy depending on the further context of the claim. Misinformation and disinformation are primarily distinguished by intent to harm, so depending on the politician or group’s intent when using red-baiting, the claim may fall under one of the two categories. Further, if a red-baiting claim is deliberately misleading and its mes- sage as crafted and disguised as legitimate news, it may be classified as “fake news.” Therefore, for the purposes of this study, red-baiting falls under an umbrella of what I call MDFN, or “mis- information, disinformation, and fake news,” which is a novel way of conceptualizing red-bait- ing. With this conceptualization in mind, this study can fill in literature gaps left by similar re- search that looks at misinformation and disinformation too narrowly. Weeks and Gil de Zuniga (2021) acknowledge that much of the existing work on political misinformation gets bogged down by what exactly constitutes “misinformation or “disinformation,” in an effort to stick to operationalizations and conceptualizations that make for the most easily measured variables. Therefore, by using the flexibility of the conceptual definitions of “misinformation” and “disin- formation” and all they encompass, this work also functions as something of a proof of concept that by operationalizing a specific type of rhetoric as MDFN, scholars can uncover new insights relating to the myriad of ways that MDFN can impact the political landscape. 21 Chapter II — Background Contemporary Overview The 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump showcased the potential of social me- dia in shaping the minds and attitudes of prospective voters (Francia, 2018). While there are well-documented accounts of blatant “fake news” spreading via Twitter, especially during elec- tion season (Grinberg et al., 2019; Bovet & Makse, 2019), there are instances of less insidious, but arguably as damaging, misinformation campaigns. Politicians like Georgia Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene have tweeted such claims as, “The Democrats are launching a commu- nist takeover of our country with their infrastructure plan” (Marjorie Taylor Greene, 2021). Of course, there is nothing communist about the policy in question, yet the term “communist,” here, is used in the pejorative, and in a manner that conflates basic infrastructure planning with a state- less, classless, moneyless society. The misuse of terms like “communism” may not necessarily be the result of ignorance, but rather genuine malice, due to attitudes and precedents set during the Cold War (Schrecker, 2004b). False equivalencies between “communism” and “Nazi-ism” sets a foundation for future political strife and violence not only for the public, but for political actors, as well (Ghodsee, 2014; Wodak, 2015; Nacos, Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2020). For example, conflation of these terms is a marker of what Ghodsee (2014) calls the “double genocide thesis,” which is predicated upon the idea that the end nodes of the political spectrum are akin to genocide, and thus, they must be opposed with force. If these sorts of terms are misunderstood, the citizenry, as well as 22 politicians, may have a more difficult time making well-informed political decisions (Carr, Hoechsmann & Thesee, 2018). Further, the large scale permissibility of these misuses and conflations allow for Red Scare rhetoric to become a greater part of the political vernacular. Once it has become acceptable to falsely characterize political opposition and policies with these terms, these terms lose their actual meaning, and not only do these political systems further stray from becoming a true alter- native to the status quo, they can also become weapons for the prevailing political structure as any person, group, or policy tagged with these labels may be easily dismissed (or worse) by politicians, the media, and the public that are either expressly complicit or none the wiser. This weaponization can lead to further persecution, suppression and violence, all of which are se- verely detrimental to a functioning civil society and democracy. While this study examined the 2020 General Elections in the US, its implications stretch far beyond this limited scope. In 2024, Donald Trump was once again elected, bringing with him a new wave of anti-leftist sentiment that has extended into nearly every facet of public and pri- vate life, ranging from dismantling cultural institutions that conflict with his ideology to attacks on universities that promote inclusive practices, and even forcibly deporting legal student resi- dents for speaking out against injustice. This re-ignited fervor underscores the importance of this research, where rhetorical tactics, like red-baiting continue to pose a danger to democracies worldwide. 23 Foundational Concepts for this Study Red-baiting The practice of red-baiting — using labels like “communist” or “anarchist” to pejoratively describe political opponents — is typically used to discredit the merits of political opponents by ascribing to them extremist terms and connotations (Nichols, 2015; Hedges, 2011; Edsforth & Bennett, 1999). The “red,” here, refers to the classic colors used to represent communism and other leftist politics (though, in this case, I will explore the use of other right-wing terms, like “fascism” under a sort of red-baiting umbrella, while acknowledging there is no equivalence be- tween fascism and leftist politics).While originating during the first Red Scare following World War I (Levin, 1971), the practice has undergone a revitalization in the 21st century in America, where the Republican Party has leveraged these claims in increasing numbers (Nichols, 2015). This practice is not limited to members of the Republican Party, however. For example, while on the campaign trail, then presidential candidate Joe Biden (2020) tweeted “I ain’t a socialist. I ain’t a plutocrat. I’m a Democrat — and I'm proud of it.” In this case, Biden was separating himself from, and implicitly marginalizing socialists by comparing them to plutocrats, while fur- ther legitimizing the Democratic Party as the most viable option. As this example highlights, red- baiting may simply not only consist of calling an opponent a “socialist” or a “communist,” but also encompasses conflating these political positions with inherently contradictory terms, (Ghod- see, 2014). 24 Other forms of political mischaracterization The conflation of contradictory political positions, such as fascism and communism, has been prevalent in America since at least the 1930s (Adler & Patterson, 1970). During that time, US presidents on relatively opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, such as Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman, drew parallels between the two opposite forms of governance, and placed them under the umbrella of “totalitarianism,” as antithetical to democratic practices (Adler & Patter- son, 1970, p.1048). A recent example of this practice was a 2021 tweet from House Representa- tive Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) equating COVID-19 vaccination measures to both commu- nism and Nazi-ism. According to Rozado and Kaufman (2022), “the prevalence of terms denoting political ex- tremism in U.S. and U.K. news media has been increasing dramatically since at least 2008 and that this trend is particularly acute for terms denoting far-right extremism” (p.13). That is to say, this phenomenon works both ways. The term “fascist” has been used to pejoratively describe po- litical opponents and policy since the 1920s (Haro, 2011), and has been used by members on all sides of the political spectrum (Granieri, 2020). Noted writer and leftist George Orwell lamented the over-use of the term “fascist” by other leftists to describe opposition as early as the 1940s, and its subsequent impact on correctly identi- fying fascism in practice. Orwell (1944) opined: [T]he people who recklessly fling the word 'Fascist' in every direction attach at any rate an emotional significance to it. By 'Fascism' they mean, roughly speaking, something cruel, un- scrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and anti-working-class. Except for the relatively small number of Fascist sympathizers, almost any English person would accept 'bully' as a syn- onym for 'Fascist'. That is about as near to a definition as this much-abused word has come.” 25 Harkening back to Shapiro and Brown (2018), these practices may be effective due to a lack of political literacy, as a more educated public may not be as susceptible to these sorts of mis- characterizations. Significance of terms While there are a plethora of terms that are used to describe and denounce so-called political extremism, this study focuses on terms that are more appropriately used to describe a type of government or economic system. Especially in America, economic and governmental systems have a history of being described in simplistic, generalized terms (Ostrom, 2010). The multi- faceted issues a society faces cannot always be remedied by one-size-fits-all approaches, there- fore, better understandings of how political, economic, and ecological systems and their integra- tions are needed in order to solve those issues (Costanza, et al., 1993). Thus, understanding how widespread the practice of utilizing terms typically reserved for economic and governmental sys- tems for the purpose of political gain may be important to understanding how far or near Ameri- can society is from being able to understand, debate, and solve complex problems that may not have an easy solution, let alone developing a type of institution or government suited to solve those problems. While terms like “authoritarian” may be used to describe real or imagined governmental prac- tices, there is neither a left nor right directionality in that term, and it is subjective enough to be applied in many scenarios. Therefore, focusing on the use and misuse of technical and specific terms to refer to governments and governmental processes used to describe opponents and op- posing policy matters can highlight a root of an issue that may cause divide along real or imag- ined political lines, hindering the ability to work to solve complex societal issues. For example, 26 voters in Maine introduced a ballot initiative to make their power production and services pub- licly owned. While poll numbers and the addition of the question to the ballot indicate there is a relatively high level of interest in practices like this (Kobin, 2023), one can understand how cast- ing socializing publicly used utilities in the same light as abolishing private ownership of goods, or some other strawman-type argument, would potentially skew attitudes differently. In accord with historical trends, politicians and news outlets opposed to this proposal have tied this event to “Socialist Bernie Sanders,” in reference to his support of his neighboring state’s initiative (Robinson, 2019). While this is not the campaign-style context this study seeks to examine, this example highlights the notion that these terms referring to economic systems are still used pejo- ratively and may have real policy implications. Ascertaining how often terms referring to specific of government or economic systems are used during campaigns, and within what context, may underscore an important disconnect when discussing the very fundamentals of policy and societal discussion. Thus, the focus of this study is not on adjectives describing an economic or governmental system, such as “crony” capitalism, “radical” socialism, nor flavors of systems like “neoliberalism” is to capitalism. Rather, this study examines specific government and economic systems and their raw usage in campaign communications on Twitter, then their specific context and sentiment were analyzed in order to understand trends in their usage. Red Scare History Extremism and the fear of extremism is not a novel concept in America. The backdrop of both the first World War and The Cold War presented an opportune platform for this type of fear- mongering, in what was known as The Red Scare and the second Red Scare, respectively. A Red 27 Scare is the result of mass government, public, and media hysteria of the perceived threat of communism. There were two distinct Red Scare periods in United States history, with the first beginning roughly in 1917, following communist uprisings and takeovers in Eastern Europe. During this time, hyper-nationalist sentiments that proliferated during World War I rooted them- selves within the borders of America, as well. Due to the success of labor movements in Europe, those with governmental and economic interests became frightened that similar success could be achieved in America (Ness, 2015). Semi-recent American history was weaponized and used as partial justification for suspicions, too. The Haymarket Square Riot in Chicago, which started as a labor strike for more reasonable working hours in 1888, quickly turned violent after a worker was killed and bombs were subsequently thrown at law enforcement, leading to claims of “anar- chists” in labor movements (Ness, 2015). This event, coupled with hyper-nationalism and other anti-labor sentiments resulted in raids and suppression of speech amongst alleged communists. Pretext of the first Red Scare Led by A. Mitchell Palmer, then US Attorney General and J. Edgar Hoover, then head of the General Intelligence Division in the Bureau of Investigation (BOI), the anti-communist and labor sentiments were operationalized and codified (Ness, 2015). First, in one of the first large scale propaganda efforts on behalf of the United States government, then president Woodrow Wilson established the “Committee on Public Information” (CPI) in 1917, which primarily was used to cultivate feelings of patriotism in the public and bolster support for America’s involvement in World War I. The CPI mobilized a vast multi-media propaganda effort, including, but not limited to, posters, film, concise “Four Minute Man” public speeches, as well as newspaper and maga- zine articles, with the intention of reaching every possible American (Kazin, 1995). One of the 28 primary reasons for the programs success, at least initially, was the consistency in messaging, regardless of the media source and location (Sweeney, 2001) For example, historians described the CPI’s “information management” as such that, “Every item of war news they saw—in the country weekly, in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens were getting at the same moment.” (Sweeney, 2001, p.16). This sort of deliberate propaganda dissemination ensured that key issues important to the United States government would have a high likelihood of maintaining salience amongst the public. Though the CPI was primarily focused its efforts within American borders, they also made a concerted effort to spread the same messages abroad, as well. The CPI set up bureaus across the globe, in places including, but not limited to, Peru, China, Russia, Spain, Argentina and Italy, with the intention of not only spreading pro-war, pro-capitalist and pro-democracy messages, but also to sow tension between international political actors (Fischer, 2016). For example, the CPI spread false information regarding the intentions of Bolsheviks in Russia, and claimed the movement was actually a proxy for Germany, which had vastly different goals (Fischer, 2016). Due to the influence of the CPI, many of these claims were accepted uncritically by mainstream news sources, and ultimately had a significant impact on the foreign policy of other stakeholder nations, and planted the seeds for hostility towards Russia from the United States in the subse- quent decades (Fischer, 2016). To strengthen support for the war, CPI activities also involved suppression and persecution of existing organizations that were vocally against the war efforts, such as the Industrial Workers of 29 the World (IWW) and the Socialist Party of America (Kazin, 1995). Journalists that expressed negative views about the committee and its proponents were also targeted (Fleming, 2008). Cen- sorship powers became a key weapon for the committee as several pieces of legislation, as well as an official declaration of war, allowed the CPI to amass and wield extraordinary power. Noted historian on anti-communism in the United States, Nick Fischer (2016), plainly laid out the chain reaction of events: The Espionage Act of June 1917 expanded these controls and gave the government near-total capacity to define and proscribe conduct or opinion that prejudiced the war effort or aided the enemy. The October 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act empowered the president to censor sub- versive literature and monitor mail, and required editors of foreign language material to file any copy dealing with government policy and the war with official translators (p. 57). These acts were justified through a formal declaration of war, which was largely accepted by the public. From there extraordinary powers translated to the CPI and allowed the committee to extend beyond soft influence on the public, media, and international stakeholders. For example, the CPI was able to physically edit print news stories, limit the distribution of information, and worked closely with the Censorship Board to censor radio broadcasts and telegraph systems (Fischer, 2016). Ultimately, the CPI’s censorship efforts would not have been as successful if not for the cooperation from most media outlets, due to both the soft and strong influence the com- mittee exerted (Fischer, 2016). McCarthyism and The Red Scare While the first Red Scare primarily centered around communists within American labor movements, the second Red Scare was more concerned with alleged communist infiltration of the United States’ government. Fear of a perceived foreign influence emanating from the East allowed for politicians like Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy to promote a hunt of alleged 30 communist sympathizers in both the government itself, as well as the entertainment industry. Or- dinary citizens, high-profile public figures, and politicians alike were classified as “communists” by their opponents, whether there was any merit to those claims, or not (Renshaw, 1968). In order to ensure the palatability and relatability of anti-communist rhetoric to the general public, McCarthyism relied on variety of “common themes” that made the threat of communist infiltration to seem more real (Rovere, 1959). These themes are not unlike those that are used in present day argumentations against left-wing policies and had broad appeal to conservatives and moderates (Rovere, 1959). Just as tweets act as snapshots of a perspective in at a given point in time, propaganda fliers and posters from the more clearly defined Red Scare periods are included in the following sections to illustrate the parallels of Red Scare rhetoric in the mass media be- tween then and now. These themes and the history they are rooted in will allow for a clearer pic- ture as to how Red Scare imagery, fear-mongering, and resulting political outcomes are realized today. McCarthyist Framing Policy as communism As part of his initial attacks on the American social and political fabrics, McCarthy claimed that public service style policies, like that of The New Deal, were part of an intrusive communist plot, designed to wipe out capitalism. The New Deal was a milestone for left-wing politics in the United States, and marked a key attitudinal shift not previously seen in the nation’s history (Schrecker, 1998). As social and economic successes of The New Deal became apparent, so, too, did the backlash from conservatives, as they believed there was now room for substantial influ- 31 ence from radical groups, like the Communist Party. Indeed, some historians argue that the Communist Party did actually garner some influence during this time: “For the first time, the federal government actually condoned labor unions; and Communists, for whom labor organizing was a primary activity, threw themselves into the great surge of unionization that occurred in the mid-1930s. Within a few years, the party’s official view of Roo- sevelt had changed so radically that the CP was acting in many respects as a junior partner within the New Deal coalition.” (Schrecker, 1998, p.14). This unprecedented recognition of leftist poli- tics by the federal government eventually led to a greater backlash by the right. As the embrace of labor unions and their ties to left-wing groups gained prominence, Mc- Carthy and his acolytes homed in on progressive policies as one of the main aggressors of com- munism, and led to substantial efforts to tie the two together. Given that McCarthyism and con- servatism were predicated upon individualism and “personal freedoms,” policies that were seen as leveling the playing field were framed as “losses of freedom” for others (Michaels, 2017).This prompted a coordinated, large-scale effort to cast these policies in a negative light, and portray them as precursors to, or even evidence of, communism. “A central theme of the barrage of mes- sages (financed by substantial resources) dedicated to scuttling President Roosevelt’s New Deal and later President Truman’s Fair Deal was that the programs associated with them were all linked to socialism and through socialism to communism and through communism to the loss of freedom for Americans” (Michaels, 2017, pp. 5-6). These sorts of faulty connections have per- sisted in political discourse and serve to confuse citizens about the nature of many government program that aim to provide material and fiscal support to the public. 32 Public Health Public health efforts like vaccinations were also cast as a method to brainwash the American public to be sympathetic to communism (Rovere, 1959). McCarthy accused officials at the Pub- lic Health Service of conspiring to use vaccines and fluoride to “deaden” the minds of the Amer- ican public and make them susceptible to communist sympathies. Similarly, across-the-board improvements and emphasis on public health matters were strongly opposed by McCarthy and his followers, as they were seen as “egalitarian measures” (Muntaner & Gomez, 2002). These measures were antithetical to the Social Darwinist mindset that was a crucial foundation of anti- communist and pro-capitalist mindsets (Michaels, 2017). McCarthy adherent Robert Taft de- scribed New Deal amendments to healthcare to be “the most socialistic measure this Congress has ever had.” The concepts of “personal freedom” and “personal choice” were mobilized to con- trast the status quo healthcare policy with one characterized by government “interference” Michaels (2017). Not only were public healthcare measures cast as an affront to “personal freedoms,” they were also portrayed as an effort to stymie private enterprises. In turn, corporate entities, anti- communists and other stakeholders that would be adversely impacted by public healthcare policy banded together, utilizing red-baiting tactics as their primary weaponry (Michaels, 2017). To fur- ther this example, the board of the American Medical Association (AMA) included a minority of conservative members that sought to advance their agenda, which was primarily to profit from pharmaceutical drugs. The AMA and the vocal minority of the board emphasized a potential slippery-slope where the “socialization” of the healthcare industry could cascade into the realms of every other profession, too (Michaels, 2017). By strategically and successfully establishing 33 themselves on the boards of democratically organized professional associations, like the AMA, those with views similar to McCarthy were able to have an outsized impact on both the framing of public health policy, and the editorialization of policy, itself (Michaels, 2017). These efforts proved successful, as large-scale public healthcare policy implementations would not come to fruition again until the Obama presidency some 60 years later. This practice of systematically infiltrating the boards of prominent policy-shaping organiza- tions, like conservatives did with the AMA, is not unlike what McCarthy had accused other groups of doing to elicit communist sympathies and action. In fact, this practice of projection became a common theme for conservative groups during this Red Scare period and extended to virtually every type of political body (Michaels, 2017). Education Academics and the education system were also said to be agents of communism, and officials in the field were said to all share the goal of further brainwashing American children. In dis- cussing UNESCO (the UN’s education and children’s focused branch), McCarthy adherent Joe Wood, representative from Idaho, exclaimed “Communism is merely one of the instruments used by the real conspirators to frighten us into surrendering our national sovereignty to a world government in which we will be hopelessly out numbered and outvoted, just as we are now in the United Nations” (Michaels, 2017, p.186). Extensive propaganda campaigns were made to connect public education to communism, and many of the previously mentioned frames, like “communism as public health threat were recy- cled, as Figure 1 illustrates. 34 Figure 1. Red Scare education propaganda These propaganda pieces showcased a tangible threat representing communism, as in the work above, as well as sensationally describing the exact threat, as in the piece, too. Just as McCarthyist politicians had coalesced on the boards of organizations dealing with pub- lic health, so, too, did they on education commissions, as well. Organizations like the Indiana Textbook Commission (a board tasked with approving books and other curriculum in public schools) became battlegrounds in the fight against the supposed threat of communism. In 1953, McCarthyist board member Ida White singled out the book Robin Hood as one that promoted communist ideals, and sought to have it banned from public school curricula (Michaels, 2017). In an effort to ban the book, White claimed to the rest of the commission, “There is now a Communist directive in education now to stress the story of Robin Hood. They want to stress it because he robbed the rich and gave it to the poor. That’s the Communist line. It’s just a smearing of law and order and anything that disrupts law and order is their meat” (Michaels, 2017, p. 186). 35 This claim and this line of reasoning was not unlike red-baiting claims that became pervasive in other areas, like public health. This provided a consistency in messaging against perceived communist plots. While this specific effort did not ultimately come to fruition, these sorts of claims gained at least a measure of legitimacy, as prominent politicians, like then Indiana Gover- nor George Craig, echoed White’s claims, saying, “Communists have gone to work to twist the meaning of the Robin Hood legend” (Eschner, 2017). Just as there had been solidarity on the right regarding issues like censorship and book ban- ning in public schools, this incident helped galvanize those on the left to push back. In solidarity with protestors, reporters like Elmer Davis, who was the former head of The Office of War In- formation for the US government during World War II, claimed this type of censorship repre- sented a “general attack not only on schools and colleges and libraries, on teachers and text- books, but on all people who think and write ... in short, on the freedom of the mind” (Fried, 1991, p. 29). Specifically resulting from the push to ban Robin Hood, “The Green Feather Movement” arose in response to demands for censorship, as college students, primarily in Indi- ana, wore dyed green feathers and buttons in support of both the literature and academic freedom (Eschner, 2017). While the movement made a modest impact on the issues of book banning in public schools, academic freedom hung in the balance. Much like public K-12 schools were seen as battlegrounds against the supposed threat of communism, so, too, were public universities during the era of McCarthyism. While Robin Hood was one of the primary targets for censorship in public schools, works that emphasized social and political issues like Civil Disobedience by Thoreau and the Invisible Man by Ellison also came into the crosshairs (Eschner, 2017). However, books were not the only allegedly dangerous 36 artifacts on campus. College professors were targeted as communists and were accused of using their positions to spread communist ideology. While anti-communist tendencies had existed in academia during the late 1930s (Schrecker, 1986), the era of McCarthyism saw a renewed interest by conservatives to quell any communist activities on campuses from professors and students alike. As Schrecker (1986) points out, left- wing activity on college campuses, overall, did not boast the same numbers of supporters as right-wing groups during this time. For example, while leftist student groups at Harvard were comprised of roughly 100 members, opposition right-wing groups boasted nearly 400 members. Initially, student groups and their activities were the targets of anti-communist scrutiny, rather than individuals (Schrecker, 1986), and these efforts proved effective. Administrators at colleges and universities felt pressure from government officials, especially those who worked at publicly funded institutions, and took it upon themselves to bar leftist student groups from activity on campus, like the American Youth for Democracy (Schrecker, 1986), which fervent anti-commu- nist J.Edgar Hoover had personally singled out. One such strategy was for institutions to keep an up-to-date list of members belonging to these sorts of organizations, and it had a significant de- terring effect (Schrecker, 1986). Students in these groups pointed out the nature of the lists as being soft threats and as jeopardizing the personal security of its members, but many acquiesced under the pressure. 37 Figure 2. Anti-academic Red Scare propaganda The concept of free speech did not always apply to alleged communists on campus during this time. Speakers invited to campuses faced intense scrutiny, and some were barred altogether. Publicly funded institutions tended to be the most restrictive for outside speakers. Generally, smaller institutions, heavily dependent upon public funding, compared to larger schools with a more substantial donor base, were even more restrictive, disallowing anyone that could be re- motely construed as a communist or communist sympathizer from speaking on campus (Schrecker, 1986). For example, the American Legion had pressured Ohio State University into disinviting speaker Dr. Harold Rugg from campus, as the Legion disagreed with portions of an economics textbook he wrote an edited (Schrecker, 1986). Just as with other sectors of work and life, the right often recycled frames in an effort to make tangible the struggle between the “American way of life” and alternatives proposed by the left. For example, one right-wing politician, speaking to the board of Queen’s College evoked a reli- gious frame to contrast the ideology of the “communist” professors and the campus’ status quo: 38 “Un-American groups and the professors who tolerate them must go. Queens is a god-fearing community and those that don't see eye to eye with us have no place in our midst. We want our students taught "Queens style" or not at all” (Schrecker, 1986, p.86). This rhetoric has not van- ished from political discourse, with many of these same attacks levied at academia by the Trump administration in 2025. Ultimately, while there were small contingents of self-proclaimed communist student groups on college campuses, professors and other faculty members with communist sympathies faced more extreme scrutiny and were forced to shield their beliefs and disengage from political activi- ty altogether (Schrecker, 1986, p.85). Due to this pressure, faculty members at institutions often assumed an outsized role in quelling supposed communist activity, taking it upon themselves to remove charters for student groups to appease administrators who felt pressure from politicians (Schrecker, 1986). The HUAC grilled accused professors for their alleged involvements with communist groups and sympathies. Faculty members who did not engage with the investigations by evoking their 5th Amendment rights were generally let go by their respective institutions (Schrecker, 1986). While roughly 100 professors were cut loose across the nation, hundreds, if not thousands, more saw their academic careers stymied or ruined by being placed on blacklists (Aby, 2009). The very threat of being blacklisted had a chilling effect amongst professors and students alike. Both routinely engaged in censoring or “sanitizing” their own work, in an effort to not make themselves a target due to the topics they researched (Aby, 2009). Work that could be con- strued as critical of capitalism or the practice of McCarthyism itself was suppressed (Aby, 2009). A considerable lack of support was exhibited towards professors and academic freedom by ad- 39 ministrators, as well as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Instead, to “protect the reputation” of the institutions and their respective departments, as well as redirect attention elsewhere, administrators capitulated to investigators and self-policed and censored faculty from a variety of ranks, often prior to a formal investigation (Aby, 2009). Similarly, the AAUP, which had promised to work on behalf of faculty to report incidents of censorship and violations of academic freedom, had taken a backseat and allowed censorship, as well as purging of potentially “dangerous” faculty (Aby, 2009). Applicable to virtually every industry and institu- tion charged with harboring communists, the Panopticon nature of the academy had a significant negative impact on both the practices and morale of faculty members. According to Columbia professor Dr. C. Wright Mills, a priori self-censorship became more prevalent in the academy, as he explained, “The real restraints are not so much the external prohibitions as control of the in- surgent by the agreements of the academic gentleman” (Aby, 2009, p.122). Entertainment and the arts as communism McCarthyism had a particular stranglehold on the entertainment industry during the second Red Scare, as well. Just as blacklisting was a prevalent tool of deterrence and censorship in acad- emia, the Hollywood blacklist worked to pressure entertainers and producers from using talent with suspected communist ties, and as means of self-censorship so that “controversial” material was not released (Gordon, 1999). The HUAC had already been investigating alleged communists within the entertainment industry for several years, until 1950, when more public claims were made against entertainers. Frightened by both the prospect of communist ideology seeping onto the airwaves and the potential loss of revenue, studio heads, like Walt Disney, framed producers as communist, as the threat of a strike was immanent in 1941 (Ceplair & Englund, 2003). Disney 40 believed “communist agitation” was the primary factor in the discontent of the striking workers, which prompted local politicians to open their own probes into this alleged communist influence (Ceplair, & Englund, 2003). The conflation of communism and other entities in Hollywood did not stop at striking labor unions. Attention from anti-communists also turned toward Jewish entertainers and producers, as well (Horne, 2006). Soon, communism and the connection to Judaism became increasingly prevalent in the communist witch hunt, as far-right Los Angeles based politician George Smith remarked, “alien-minded Russian Jews” were said to have infiltrated the industry (Horne, 2006). While those enmeshed with Hollywood had been staunchly and publicly anti-fascist in the decades prior, especially during Hitler’s rise to prominence (Ross, 2007), these proclamations would eventually lead to suspicions levied against the most politically active in the industry. When Hitler and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin signed a non-aggression pact in 1939, the line sepa- rating communism and anti-Nazi-ism faded in the imaginations of those who feared that the communist momentum building in Eastern Europe would spread overseas via the silver screen (Ross, 2007). Commissions and groups influenced by anti-Semitic individuals, such as Joseph Breen, head of the Production Code Administration (PCA) and later involved with the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (most commonly recognized as the MPAA) gained considerable influence (Ross, 2007). The PCA was a method of self-censorship itself, as it was comprised of studio heads and other producers that sought to regulate the content of mo- tion pictures. The PCA’s stated purpose was that “Theatrical motion pictures . . . are primarily to be regarded as Entertainment," and that “history, institutions, prominent people and citizenry of other nations shall be represented fairly” (Doherty, 1999). That said, the PCA, under the influ- 41 ence of Breen, shifted its focus towards Jewish studio owners and producers. In his mind, ac- tivism, had no place on the screen, and sought to scuttle the production and distribution of any film that could be construed as “sympathetic to Jews” (Ross, 2007, p. 13). Jewish individuals in Hollywood, as Breen claimed were “simply a rotten bunch of vile people with no respect for anything beyond the making of money” and were trying “to capture the screen of the United States for Communistic propaganda purposes” (Vaughn, 1994). Breen’s efforts at the PCA were successful, as anti-Nazi films that were not considered biographical in nature were shut down for several years, at least into the 1940s (Ross, 2007). Thus, the connection between Jews and com- munism in Hollywood, while dubious, gained significant political traction, and persists to this day. Claims such as Disney’s only further fueled the fire of anti-communists in their pursuit of supposed subversives in the industry. In 1946, The Hollywood Reporter published a list of sup- posed communists in Hollywood, which attracted the attention of federal anti-communist inves- tigators into the named individuals. Spearheaded by future US president Richard Nixon, the HUAC conducted hearings featuring Disney and future US president Ronald Reagan (then an actor and president of the Screen Actor’s Guild) to testify that both actors and unionized mem- bers of production teams were using their posts to spread communism. Not long thereafter, in 1950, publications like Red Channels, produced by staunch anti-communist group “Counterat- tack,” and backed by prominent politicians and think-tanks like the John Birch Society sought to highlight the potential risk of Communists in the entertainment industry using their mediums as propaganda to promote communist ideals. 42 Virtually no topic was off limits for Red Channels in their supposed links to the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, as evidenced by this excerpt from the publication “With radios in most American homes and with approximately 5 million TV sets in use, the Communist Party USA now rely more on radio and TV than on the press and motion pictures as "belts" to transmit pro- Sovietism to the American public” (Red Channels, 1950, p.2). Though dubious in its claims, Red Channels had a substantial impact on proceedings against supposed communists. The publication went on to claim that these individuals and studios on their subsequent list were either arms of Communist parties themselves or were financially supported by them. Inter- estingly, in the publication, the term “Communist” was frequently substituted with “Red Fascists.” In fact, the publication’s self-stated purpose was to “articulate anti-Communists are blacklisted and smeared with that venomous intensity which is characteristic of Red Fascists alone” (Red Channels, 1950, p.6). These incorrectly named “Red Fascists” were published in the pamphlet, totaling more than 150 accused, drawing from dubious sources (Gordon, 1999). Just as with other professions, Red Channel’s blacklist had a profound impact in terms of destroying the careers of those listed. Those who refused to testify before the HUAC’s inquiry were charged with contempt of Congress and faced prison time. Beyond the legal ramifications, those who were on the unofficial blacklists struggled to find work thereafter and were discredited in many of their current and previous productions. Studios would continue to engage in their own self- censorship and shifted focus towards producing more “patriotic” and pro-American films. Ulti- mately, both the soft and hard power wielded by the right and their related commissions were able to, at least for a time, transform the entertainment industry and shape it to their own liking in the name of anti-communism. 43 Decline of the Second Red Scare Eventually, McCarthyism fell out of favor with both his own peers and the public. A few key events and institutional shifts in the mid 1950s turned the tide against McCarthy and his Com- munist witch hunt. For example, some of the entertainers blacklisted from Hollywood fought back, and in court, won the right to sue those who falsely accused them for personal and profes- sional damage caused by their accusations (Faulk, 1963). Other significant decisions from the Supreme Court in the mid and late 1950s also spelled the end for McCarthy. One professor purged from their institution during McCarthy’s anti-Communist witch hunt brought their case to the Supreme Court to argue that they could not be fired for evoking their 5th Amendment right to both remain silent and not incriminate themselves. The Supreme Court agreed that exercising the right to free oneself from self-incrimination was not the same as a tacit admission of guilt, and reaffirmed 5th Amendment rights in these circumstances (Fried, 1991). Similarly, the Supreme Court sided with plaintiffs that argued that the 1st Amendment should protect passive political activity, and that freedom of association is a protected practice under the amendment (Fried, 1991). This decision reaffirming the right to free association harkens back to the roots of McCarthy- ism success. One of the hallmarks of McCarthyism, the Red Scares, and “wars” on virtually any subject is the concept of guilt by association. In the years leading up to full-fledged McCarthy- ism, guilt by association was essentially codified, as then president Harry Truman decreed Exec- utive Order 9835, known as the Loyalty Order, to ensure the trustworthiness of government em- ployees and officials. The order declared that “disloyalty” was constituted by “Membership in, 44 affiliation with or sympathetic association with any organization determined by the attorney gen- eral to be totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or advocating or approving the forceful denial of constitutional rights to other persons or seeking to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means” (Executive Order 9835, Part III, Item 3). As seen in purges of academic faculty and entertainers, among others, the very act of associat- ing with a perceptually dangerous party or idea was often enough to cause significant harm to the accused. Individuals were asked, under oath, as to whether they were either members of the Communist Party or if they were affiliated with members, which carried the same weight as be- longing to the Party. Ceplair (2008) explains that while many of the hallmarks of what we think of as McCarthyism — guilt-by-association, indiscriminate collecting of names, irresponsible ac- cusations, and badgering of witnesses (p.216) — are not unique to McCarthyism, and instead had been practiced routinely in prior Red Scare periods. Therefore, as these features are common practices, they could be indicative another Red Scares. Synthesis of frames In the years leading up to McCarthyism and Red Scare inflammation, familiar conditions pre- cluded the extraordinary rise and mainstreaming of anti-communist sentiment. First, a coales- cence of media, business, and political elites, at least nominally from both major political parties, rallied against changing geopolitical conditions and/or comprehensive legislation packages helped facilitate this coordinated effort (Michaels, 2017). For example, precipitating McCarthy- ism and the Second Red Scare, the New Deal became a rallying point for corporate and conserv- ative interests. Michaels (2017) details how influentials, such as the DuPont family, began heavi- 45 ly subsidizing conservative interest groups opposed to the New Deal like the American Liberty League. This practice led to a snowball effect, as an “educational crusade” was waged by con- servative groups like the National Association for the Preservation of Free Enterprise and the Foundation for Economic Education to push back on policies that worked to help lower classes, like subsidized housing, unemployment benefits, civil rights fortifications, and increased federal spending on healthcare. According to Michaels (2017), the central theme in messaging across groups with similar aims, was to link these policies with socialism. Socialism was said to in- evitably lead to communism, and ultimately, the loss of freedoms for Americans (p.6). The logic, here, is rooted in the then decades old worldview from Yale professor William Sumner that indi- vidual liberty and civil institutions are incompatible (Michaels, 2017). In this zero-sum concep- tion, institutions only exist to stifle an individual from prosperity and potential, as when an insti- tution mandates that others are allocated more resources, they must be taken from another. Therefore, with business institutions standing to lose the most via taxation to pay for these broad programs, they “sold the idea of free enterprise as the ‘American Way of Life’” to the American public, through an extensive propaganda network campaign (Michaels, 2017, p.5). This American way of life was juxtaposed to a communist way of life, which was character- ized by conservative groups as controlling and with substantial restrictions on freedom. The theme of freedom versus control became central in every policy argument, whether it was applic- able or not. This shaky logic led these groups to double-down and concoct linkages between pol- icy for the public good, communism, and the loss of freedom. For example, socialized medicine was characterized by not only control over one’s body by the state, but as a means of revolution itself. Michaels (2017) points to the New York State Bar, working in conjunction with the Amer- 46 ican Medical Association, to publish false statements, purportedly by Vladimir Lenin (who they called the “God of Communists”), proclaiming that socialized medicine was the keystone to a socialist state. These blatantly false claims and messaging style, nonetheless, were extremely ef- fective in curtailing the public’s support of New Deal-style policies, particularly healthcare, from 58% to just 36% over three years (Michaels, 2017). The common themes and framing of “control versus freedom” and an “American Way of Life” proved to be extraordinarily salient and relat- able to the American public, which persists to this day. Of course, there cannot be an “American Way of Life” without other ways of life. Another common theme in Red Scare messaging is a fear of others that will disrupt this way of life. Just as the KKK’s concept of “racial Capitalism” was central to the First Red Scare, racial and ethnic tensions were exploited during the Second Red Scare, especially during and in the wake of World War II (Michaels, 2017). In this case, the central theme of “Nativism” focused on the idea that certain ethnicities had natural hierarchical positions than others, and that those native to a land would know how to use that hierarchy best to uphold the values of that society. Cultural values are given primacy, in this conception, and intermingling of varying cultural values posed a threat to the predominant national cultural landscape (Bergquist, 1986). Therefore, this line of thinking necessitated the idea that ethnic tensions were the bedrock of social issues in a society where resources were scarce (Bergquist, 1986). If there was no scarcity in a society, ethnic con- flicts presumably would not exist, and a peaceful coexistence of ideas and lifestyles would be more possible. Thus, scarcity and ethnic tensions were necessary conditions to maintaining the status quo. Exacerbating these tensions became a pressing issue for anti-communists, as they could then appeal to the public that they were the only ones that could keep them safe from po- 47 tential turmoil (Michaels, 2017). Immigrants and minority groups in America have often been scapegoats for issues over the course of its history, specifically, in times of supposed peril (Roth- schild, 2009). The language used to describe leftists and immigrants share many parallels, and tend to use dehumanizing terms (Schrecker, 1998). For example, both communists and immigrants have been called “rats,” “termites,” and “scum” (Schrecker, 1998, pp.47-48) by state officials and the media. A prevailing belief, especially during the clearly defined Red Scare periods, was that im- migrants were the harbingers of communism, itself, making immigrants and communism almost interchangeable. Then president Woodrow Wilson further stoked the flames of civil unrest, claiming that “hyphenated Americans” posed a significant threat as they had “Poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life” and were “such creatures of passion, dis- loyalty and anarchy” that they must be “crushed out” (Kennedy, 2004). Taking direction from statements like these, then Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer echoed these sentiments and noted that the Department of Justice’s inquiry “into the ultraradical movement during the course of the last year has clearly indicated that fully 90 per cent of the communist and anarchist agita- tion is traceable to aliens.” Of course, these claims were largely unfounded (Schrecker, 1998). Nonetheless, this sentiment led to what are known as the “Palmer Raids,” whereby thousands of immigrants were arrested, nationwide, under the suspicion of communist activity, and hundreds were deported. Another common theme uniting leftists and immigrants are that they “pose a threat to national security.” As alluded to before, an “American way of life” necessitates other ways of life, and any affront to the American way has historically been framed as a threat to “national security” 48 (Schrecker, 1998). National security threats can include individuals and groups both foreign and domestic, and ties back to the idea that alternative ways of life are “un-American.” Under the guise of national security protections, loyalty oaths, as referenced prior in Truman’s Executive Order, were weaponized even further during the McCarthyism era. These oaths, administered to those in civil service positions, even considered non-work activities deemed “un-American” to be “not consistent with the interests of national security” (Schrecker, 1998, p.296). Therefore, merely existing in the United States as an immigrant or minority group member became a dan- gerous affair, and the hysteria surrounding immigrants could inflame at any time at the whims of government officials and the media. One of the primary methods of stoking these tensions was to tie immigrants to labor move- ments that threatened corporate and business interests, which conservatives argued constituted this “American way of life.” While American industry in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was dominated by those who had been in the country for several generations, looking to cut costs, business owners initially encouraged the arrival of European immigrants to increase the labor force and drive the overall cost of production down (Michaels, 2017). Immigrants tended to assume these low-paying and dangerous occupations, such as in the rail and steel industries, as they had few other prospects. As a result, the existing labor force lamented their loss of wages or jobs, altogether. Primed by politicians and the media to focus their scorn away from factory owners and industry barons for this economic strife, anti-immigrant sentiment had now shifted to labor, pitting the working classes against one another. Given that there was already pre-existing sentiments tying immigrants and labor movements to communism, dating back at least to the Haymarket Affair, these themes were already familiar in the public consciousness and persisted 49 (Michaels, 2017). As labor unions grew out of this unrest, business owners argued that this col- lectivist mindset was both “un-American” and a dangerous portal into communism (Michaels, 2017). Dichotomous logic was applied in these instances, and the message against dissent to- wards the status quo was simple;“The underlying message was that to be pro-employer was American; to be pro-employee was un-American” (Michaels, 2017, p.21) Figure 3. Anti-immigrant Red Scare propaganda This theme is malleable, as it applied to nationals from virtually any country other than Amer- ica (Figure 3 above). Accordingly, perceptually dangerous ideas from any foreign national could be tied back to communism, in an effort to discredit them. Foreigners and domestic minority groups were both almost equally treated with contempt dur- ing these periods. African-Americans, who began to more fervently protest against their discrim- ination after their returns from World War II, shifted into focus as a potential domestic threat (Michaels, 2017). As social norms and mores progressed through the early and mid 20th cen- turies, clear instances of racism became less publicly acceptable, but the sentiment still remained and was repackaged under different guises. For racists and anti-Semites, the second Red Scare 50 presented a valuable opportunity to express their hatred without as much public scorn, as Matsu- da (1998) notes, “Just at the moment when overt racism-and anti-Semitism-was becoming pub- licly illegitimate, anti-communism was becoming patriotic” (p.22). Anti-communist groups tied African-Americans to communism, with the idea that they were more susceptible to anti-Ameri- can influence as they became more discontent with their treatment. Rather than acknowledging the material conditions for this discontent of the African-American public, anti-communists ran news headlines that alleged that communists were using African-Americans as pawns to foment revolution in the US by intentionally stoking these inflammations (Michaels, 2017). By tying African-Americans and their struggles with communism, anti-communists were successfully able to couch debates around civil rights (which would threaten the status quo) into debates over communism and the potential destruction of the American social fabric (Schrecker, 1998). These sorts of connections led to more crackdowns on any perceived dissent amongst minority groups. For example, African-Americans routinely faced dismissal, at far greater rates than their white counterparts, from civil service jobs as the result of the HUAC’s loyalty investigations (Schreck- er, 2004). Not only were African-Americans firmly in the crosshairs of anti-communists during this time, so, too, were Asian-Americans. World War II had shown a existing hostility from the US government towards Japanese-Americans, as thousands were sent to internment camps or de- ported, with the rationale being that they could pose a national security risk due to potential loy- alty to Imperial Japan. Similar sentiments would soon be transferred to Chinese-Americans, as well. Beginning in 1949 and continuing through the McCarthyist era, China was in the midst of a communist revolution and American intelligence agencies were concerned about its supporters 51 embracing similar elements in enclaves across the country (Schrecker, 1998). The revolution in China, spearheaded by Mao Zedong, led to the ousting of non-communists, which included the some of the most wealthy Chinese citizens moving to Taiwan, and some to the United States. Taiwan then considered itself its own separate entity from China, and attempted to maintain posi- tive relations with the United States. Thus, Taiwan was viewed by the US government as a buffer to China, who they felt they had to appease to an extent so that they did not fall under more So- viet influence. In this case, Taiwan represented “freedom” and China “communism.” Since most “Chinatowns” and enclaves in America were primarily under the sphere of influ- ence of the exiled former leader Chang Kai-Shek, at this point, intelligence officials used these connections to their advantage in the anti-communist hunt (Schrecker, 1998). Not only did they coordinate with pro-Taiwan Chinese language newspapers to produce more anti-communist arti- cles and propaganda, they also cracked down on newspapers that were viewed as pro-commu- nist. Schrecker (1998) notes that the federal government’s position was that these newspapers were “nothing more than a mouthpiece for Communist China in this country” (p.377), not unlike rhetoric used in contemporary times. Using a new but seldomly enforced law against any busi- ness dealings or transactions with mainland China, the US federal government attempted to pros- ecute newspapers that they claimed facilitated these dealings, by advertising for banks in a thin- ly-veiled effort to suppress the press from promoting pro-communist material (Schrecker, 1998). Just as the Palmer Raids did, the crusade against supposed Chinese Communist sympathizers in- volved deportations, as well. These crackdowns on dissenting opinions in both the Chinese- American public and press once again proved effective, and the US government’s rule with an 52 iron fist became standard towards critique, and “even peace became a dangerous issue” (Schrecker, 1998, p.377). A final prominent theme across Red Scare rhetoric centered on religion. As nations trying to implement communism tended to adopt an atheistic position as part of a necessary condition for its system, the United States officials sought to contrast “godless” communists against the Christ- ian and god-fearing American society. This dichotomy entrenched itself in every discussion about communism . In the lead up to the passage of the New Deal, conservative religious leaders connected themselves to the business world, and insisted that an overarching welfare state would be encroaching on God’s territory (Michaels, 2017). Specifically, these influential religious fig- ures argued that a system in which the government took on more of a caretaker role to its popu- lace was, in effect, “playing God,” and that those who supported a welfare state were really sup- porting a “false idol” (Michaels, 2017). In this case, the “false idol” was any program of the New Deal that leaned towards collectivism and social good, as individualism was said to mirror one’s relationship with God (Michaels, 2017) Just as conservative Christians claimed that social programs were an affront to God and Christianity, to McCarthy and those with similar views, any critique of the American system, government, way of life, or even themselves as attacks on the Christian faith (Roberts-Miller, 2020). While some McCarthyist tactics drew the ire of religious individuals during the 1950s, many Christians in the United States felt compelled to back the anti-communist sentiment, as the presented alternative was atheism (Ericksen, 1990). McCarthy’s background as a practicing Catholic generated some debate in the larger Christian community as to whether he spoke on their behalf, but his stated goals were enough to generally unify both Protestants and Catholics in 53 their support (Ericksen, 1990). Similarly, McCarthy was successfully able to connect his concept of patriotism as “consistent with God’s will” (Ericksen, 1990, p.46), and that the United States represented a model for “God’s Kingdom,” an idea that had existed since Puritans first set foot on the continent. In accord, America and its institutions were framed as “good” — as they were the will of God — and communism, its nations and apparatuses that were diametrically opposed to God’s will, were framed as “evil” (Ericksen, 1990). Religion, specifically Christianity, was all the rage in 1950s America, with surveys suggest- ing 99% of the public expressing a belief in god, and 83% believing that the Bible was the ex- plicit “word of God” (Michaels, 2017, p.187). In accord, atheism was particularly frowned upon, as a similar study revealed that atheists were the third most hated group in the nation, only be- hind the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis — and neck and neck with communists (Gibson, 2008). This virtually equal disdain for both atheists and communists underlines the point that the two groups were intrinsically linked during this time. This rhetorical tactic proved effective, as it was salient to virtually every American, and little argument needed to be presented to get the public on the side of anti-communists. Rhetorical Tactics McCarthy and his ilk were particularly successful during the Second Red Scare due to the contextual reasons listed in the previous section. However, the method in which these themes were presented played a significant role in their successes, as well, as they relied on timeless rhetorical tactics. First, McCarthy would often present these themes as explicitly dichotomous choices without nuance (Roberts-Miller, 2020). As referenced in the previous section, the di- chotomy of “good versus evil” was employed in several contexts, and were concepts virtually 54 anyone would be familiar with. These binary choices allowed McCarthy and his proponents to table debates on the substantive matters, and instead led detractors to have to justify their posi- tion as “good,” as opposed to “evil,” which would be difficult to qualify within the context of debate (Townsend, 1997). While good and evil are wholly subjective terms, other dichotomous pairs with more (relatively) fixed terms were also presented to the public as McCarthy pressed for support, just as America was framed as “Godly” and communism as “Godless.” Just as Godly became a synonym for “good” and “Godless” for “evil,” Savage (2012) notes that the socially constructed consciousness and memory of the American public allows for other pairs (whether inherently binary or not) to represent what is American and what is not. This col- lective memory rooted in the birth of the country anchors the idea that America, at its inception, was a utopia founded upon Godly principles and in God’s vision, and outside influence has only served to dismantle this utopia (Savage, 2012). Thus, freedom and liberty have come to represent values that were opposed to the supposed tyrannical rule of the English government when Amer- ica was its colony, and thus, have become synonymous with America itself. This allowed for, and still allows for, the binary choices like “freedom or control” to be salient for the American pub- lic, even when not pertinent in the given context, such as with taxation or healthcare. This pop- ulist rhetorical tactic of “looking backward” (Savage, 2012) creates a vision of the future that is both scary and drifting further away, in this case, from this intended utopia, while the past is revered and a place that should be returned to by undoing societal progress. Following this binary mode of thought, perhaps the most vital strategy McCarthy and other Red Scare proponents utilized is fear of the other. The simple binary choice of “us versus them” entrenched the idea that outsiders were an inherent danger to the in group and to one’s self. 55 “Them,” in this case, was and still remains, an amorphous entity that can be molded to fit virtual- ly any context. McCarthyist rhetoric heavily leaned into the idea that “us” were “true” Ameri- cans, and “them” was anyone who potentially threatened “us” and their way of life. Even American citizens could be “them” when it was rhetorically convenient, and pitted citi- zens against one another for political expedience. During World War II, the Japanese-American internment camps were justified by simply referring to this group as “the Japanese,” rather than acknowledging this group’s adopted, or even native homeland, and the shared nationality with the rest of its citizens (Coyle & Nagler, 2021). The distancing of “us” from “them” not only served the purpose of legitimizing the perpetration of violence towards “them,” it also allowed for “them” to remain mysterious and capable of harming or disrupting “us” at any given point. This rhetorical tactic is easily identifiable in political discourse in the 2020s, as cries of “they are taking our jobs” or “they want to take over our cities” are as frequent (if not more) than substan- tive policy discussion. The “them” could also be more insidious than seemingly innocuous. For example, supposed communists and its sympathizers were often labeled simply as “Reds” in reference to the flag of both the Soviet Union and the usage of the color in communist symbology. The euphemism of “Reds” could be anyone from anywhere, in this context, and served to further dehumanize those slapped with this label. Propaganda used during this time (featured in the previous section) warned of “Reds on campus” and “Reds in Hollywood,” priming the public to fear their peers, for they could be the enemy McCarthy warned about. After all, these separate time periods in discussion are referred to as “Red Scares,” meaning the “Reds” are not bound by a location nor time, and serve as a malleable boogeyman for any given subject. 56 Dehumanizing accused communists allowed for their objectification and subjection to os- tracism and violence to be more palatable to the masses and created a justification for the “us” group to be the purveyors of violence towards “them” (Coyle & Nagel, 2021). Further, dehuman- izing language in McCarthyist rhetoric also served to delegitimize the plight that these popula- tions faced, as well as their allies who called attention to their issues (Matsuda, 1998), and legit- imized the imagined fears of the “us” group. While the “them” group is dehumanized, a key to McCarthyist and populist rhetoric, is crafting a victimhood complex (Homolar & Lofflmann, 2021), whereby the enemy group are reduced to objects of fear and the “us” group must be pro- tected from them. This peculiar dynamic where the enemy is both dangerous yet subservient and the “us” is both a beacon of perfection and simultaneously precarious in status and in need of validation informs each grievance is often a successful rhetorical tactic, and one that is prom- inent in Red Scare periods. Consistency in themes and frames Another reason McCarthyism and Red Scare language resonated with the American public was that no new frames or themes were invented (Roberts-Miller, 2020). Capitalism and com- munism had already been viewed dichotomously dating back to Marx and Engels. Since this frame and dichotomy was already familiar to the American public, McCarthy, instead, pandered to those with pre-existing fears, rather than working to convert skeptics (Roberts-Miller, 2020, p.462). As Roberts-Miller (2020) further explains, populists and demagogues try to intensify and proliferate these rifts, rather than create new ones. For example, religious sectarianism had al- ready been a hot-button issue in early to mid-20th Century America, with Catholics and Protes- tants promoting differing values. While proliferating this rift was not necessarily politically ex- 57 pedient in the context of the Red Scare, contrasting the Christian faith, which was ever-present in America, with the atheism of communist states, allowed for a salient frame to help explain as- pects of politics that the general public may not have otherwise understood or sided with. While not an exhaustive list of the rhetorical devices and tactics McCarthy and his ilk used during the Red Scares, these included themes and devices are imperative to understanding cur- rent political discourse surrounding the fear of not only left-wing politics, but fear of the other, as well. The themes in this provided a basis for the qualitative inductive analysis of tweets in this study, and helped to properly contextualize the important language that otherwise may have gone unnoticed. Nadirs  There have also bee