Wickstrand 1
“Russian Heroes, French Zombies”:
Diplomatic Tensions Between Great Powers in
the Central African Republic
An Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Presented to the Department of Global Studies at the University of Oregon
Justin Wickstrand
June 2023
Wickstrand 2
Wickstrand 3
CONTENTS
Abstract 4
Acknowledgements 5
Introduction 6
Section I - Background 12
French Intervention in Africa: From Postwar to Present 12
“Red Fingerprints”: Soviet Engagement in Cold War Africa 22
Section II - Contemporary Dynamics in the Central African Republic 26
Mode One: Soft Power - Media and Information 28
A. Russian Strategy and State-Sponsored Media 28
B. Russia v. France in the Information Landscape 36
Mode Two: Hard Power - Bilateral Relations with the Central African Republic 61
A. Security Cooperation 63
B. Economic Links 65
C. Political Allyship and Conventional Diplomacy 67
Section III - Concluding Thoughts 72
Works Cited 75
Wickstrand 4
Abstract
This honors thesis examines the respective approaches of diplomatic engagement by
Russia and France in the Central African Republic (CAR). Given the present competition
between great powers on the African continent, much of the current discourse on this topic has a
tendency to view this competition as a reemergence of the Cold War struggle over the “Third
World,” specifically that which occurred in Africa. This thesis seeks to add to the present
discourse by arguing that the notion of a Cold War redux in Africa is a reductionist approach that
neglects the domestic priorities that are the veritable catalysts behind Russian and French
engagement with Africa, specifically in the Central African Republic.
The central aim of this project has been to analyze the motives and modes driving
Russian and French engagement with the nation of the Central African Republic. By beginning
with the historical background of France and the Soviet Union’s diplomatic engagement with
Africa, I contextualize their patterns of diplomatic outreach and posit that the respective foreign
policy legacies of the two powers contribute to their ability to act on the African continent today.
Following this, I analyze the contemporary modes of engagement by France and Russia in the
Central African Republic and evaluate the ways in which this has impacted their bilateral
relationships with the CAR.
By using a multimedia approach to primary source analysis in both English and French, I
have been able to evaluate a wide-range of sources that contribute to the broader understanding
of how diplomacy is being conducted on the African continent using the tools of the twenty-first
century.
Wickstrand 5
Acknowledgements
To my parents and grandparents, who have afforded me the privilege of higher education and
given me a gift I can only repay by dedicating my life in service to those who have been given
less than me.
Wickstrand 6
On the fifteenth of December 2022, forty seven troops from a logistical support unit of
the French Army boarded a C-130 transporter aircraft and departed from Bangui Airport in the
capital of the Central African Republic (CAR). The departure of this last contingent of French
troops marked the final withdrawal of the French military in CAR, which had maintained a
presence in the capital city since late 2013 under its most recent security venture, Operation
Sangaris, an African-led coalition dispatched to disarm militias involved in sectarian violence
following a 2012 coup by muslim opposition forces.1 Prior to the 2013 intervention, various
French administrations had previously dispatched military forces six times since CAR achieved
independence in 1960, often serving as the country’s powerbroker and guarantor of nation-wide
stability in a country plagued by civil strife and conflict. In 2016, then President François
Hollande announced the official end of Operation Sangaris, but a small residual force remained
in the capital to provide logistical support. Outside CAR, Paris has operated in a similar capacity
in over a dozen former colonies known as the Françafrique, a bloc that has connected France
and the francophone African states through diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships
since the independence decade of the 1960s.
In the post-colonial era, France has largely retained its role as regional hegemon in
francophone countries, yet shifting geopolitical tides are threatening French primacy in the
region. More specifically, Russia has cultivated ties with a variety of African nations in a bid to
expand its geopolitical standing in the face of its growing diplomatic isolation. While the case of
a Russian push into Africa is not a novel development, the context in which the Putin regime is
1 Maj. Rémy Hémez, “Operation Sangaris: A Case Study in Limited Military Intervention,” Military Review, US
Army, November-December2016,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-21/Garrett-Military-Diversity-1.p
df.
Wickstrand 7
expanding its influence in the region has complicated the relationships of African nations with
France.
With CAR, the Putin regime began cultivating ties with current President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra at a 2017 meeting between the Central African President and
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. Consequently, Russia used its power on the UN Security
Council to partially lift an arms embargo and began selling light arms to CAR.2 In addition to
arms, instructors and soldiers from the Wagner Group - a military contracting firm funded by
Putin confidant Yevgeny Prigozhin - were sent to the country. During the first ever Russia-Africa
Summit held in October 2019, CAR reached an agreement that further established Russian ties
within its domestic security architecture by having Wagner forces operate in the field with the
army and had advisors collaborating directly with President Touadéra.3 It was a consequence of
the expanding influence of Russia in Central African affairs, particularly in the security domain,
that France decided to withdraw its last remaining contingent of troops. The French sentiment
towards Russia’s newly outsized influence was most pointedly seen in a statement on the
withdrawal by regional commander of the French forces Gen. Francois-Xavier Mabin, who said,
“In 2021, when the presence of the private military company Wagner was increasingly intrusive
in the country, France considered that the conditions were no longer met for us to continue
working for the Central African armed forces.”4 While the subsequent security vacuum created
by the French departure is still developing, it has enabled a further expansion of the Wagner
Group’s presence and enhanced the mercenary group’s capacity to operate unimpeded by French
influence, opening the door for more explicit bilateral relations between CAR and Russia.
2 Bram Posthumus, “The Curious Case of Russia in Africa,” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2022.
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/5/20/the-curious-case-of-russias-romance-in-central-african-republic
3 Ibid.
4 “Fin de la présence militaire française en Centrafrique,” Rédaction Africanews, December 15, 2022.
https://fr.africanews.com/2022/12/15/fin-de-la-presence-militaire-francaise-en-centrafrique/
Wickstrand 8
In the build up to and during its war against Ukraine, the Russian Federation has greatly
intensified efforts to win African allies for both strategic cooperation and on the international
stage. On the regional scale, with CAR for instance, the Kremlin has stimulated bilateral
relations through the sale of arms, the promise of infrastructure projects contracted with private
Russian firms, and through the mercenary Wagner group with its poorly-hidden ties to the
Kremlin. On the international stage, it appears that this initiative has produced tangible results
much to the satisfaction of Vladimir Putin. In the table below, we can see a general ambivalence
amongst African nations towards certain Russian actions in Ukraine.
From this, we can surmise that while some African nations will at times condemn Russia’s
actions in Ukraine, the views of these nations are by no means monolithic, nor are they willing to
write off the Putin regime entirely for hopes of potential cooperation.
In contemporary geopolitics, outsized influence such as the ability to sway an entire
continent’s UN voting record is a key modality of soft power projection currently being
administered by the Putin regime. With this same mode of thinking, much of the discourse
surrounding current geopolitical competition in Africa is often framed along the lines of a “New
Wickstrand 9
Cold War.” Adherents of this notion would highlight the nature of the current geopolitical
dynamics, similar to the Cold War struggle between the USSR and US wherein the two great
powers attempted to reconstruct polities, economies, and societies of the Global South in their
own image and likeness.5 As such, the contemporary domestic contexts of the powers that we
will examine - France and Russia - have specific circumstances that must be explained. Within
Russia, hierarchy of power begins with Vladimir Putin controlling the reigns of power and
closely resembles that of a feudal court: beneath Putin, the court is populated by elites who curry
favor with their patron by pursuing and protecting his interests in exchange for their vast wealth
and privileged positions within Russian society.6 Consequently, it is elites like the
aforementioned Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin who have wielded the influence
bestowed on them by Putin to help achieve the Kremlin’s goals in Africa and the CAR. The
domestic concerns that underpin the French Republic’s Africa policy mainly revolve around the
preservation of her prestige as a key player in global affairs, maintaining access to key resources,
combating extremist violence, and maintaining regional stability.
However, in the present day’s increasingly multipolar global order, a framing à la Cold
War redux is a reductionist approach. Instead of the current discourse which tends to focus on the
resurfacing of Cold War or imperialist competition, Russia’s thrust into the Central African
Republic and surrounding regions should be viewed as a fundamental component to a strategy
that seeks to carve out a new bloc of non-democratic regimes with which it can engage in
economic, security, and political partnerships as a means of ensuring regime durability in the
face of global competition and western sanctions. One function of this bloc is that it would
5 Alessandro Iandolo, Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955-1968, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2022), 7.
6 Nathaniel Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group,” The
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.
Wickstrand 10
provide a new network in which Russia can export its domestic clientelist system, wherein the
Russian elites are given immense wealth and influence in exchange for their patronage to the
Putin regime. The paper will examine the modes in which it is pursuing these goals as well as the
factors which limit them. Given that Russia is not operating in a historical vacuum, it is
necessary for this paper to incorporate an analysis of the French position in that CAR as well,
given France’s historical ties to the country and surrounding region. Similar to the Russian
insecurity of its declining geopolitical standing, so too is France, the hegemon in Africa for much
of the twentieth century, concerned with its own ability to maintain its relevance in Africa amidst
a growing tide of anti-French sentiment on the continent. The French position in the CAR has
sharply declined in the last decade, and the dichotomy between waning French authority and
growing Russian influence must be explored together. The focus of this paper will be a
comparative examination of French and Russian foreign policies towards the Central African
Republic. This analysis will primarily focus on the modes in which the Kremlin seeks to
engineer a favorable political landscape in the CAR, which will by proxy facilitate a further
extension of Russia’s ability to project power throughout the surrounding region. Given this, the
modes in which France seeks to preserve its footing will be of secondary concern, serving mainly
as an alternative lens through which we can view Russia’s intrusion into the region. Particular
concern will be given to the two country’s respective domestic contexts and priorities that govern
their foreign policies.
First, this paper will examine the engagements of France and the Soviet Union in order to
first examine the historical patterns of French and Russian intervention in the region, namely
through the modes of political partnerships, economic initiatives, and security practices. It will
then turn to the contemporary modes of soft power being leveraged by France and Russia in the
Wickstrand 11
realms of traditional media and social media. Finally, it will explore the role of hard power in the
Central African Republic and assess how bilateral relations have strengthened or deteriorated
with Russia and France.
Wickstrand 12
Section I: French Intervention in Africa From Postwar to Present
As the Iron Curtain fell over Europe and western powers strategized over how to counter the
Soviet threat, the question of how to handle the African continent prompted heated debate. In a
1953 article in Foreign Affairs, French General Goislard de Monsabert wrote,
If tomorrow there should be another war, North Africa would resume its same all-important rôle, derived from the
fact of its central position at the spot where the Mediterranean and African facades of the European and African
continents meet. Without North Africa, Europe cannot breathe and cannot act unless it be to retreat. An essential
condition to the acquisition of strategic supremacy. The real frontier of Europe, then, is the ancient Roman limes
bordering the Sahara. From Casablanca to Berlin, from Kiel to Gabés,, everything interlocks, and because it does the
whole area constitutes a single and indivisible theater of war.7
At the time of General Monsabert’s article, much of Africa was still under French colonial
control. Yet even after the African independence decade of the 1960s, the French foreign policy
towards its former colonies was still driven by the domineering attitudes expressed in
Monsabert’s Foreign Affairs article. As Africa became a major theater of Cold War competition,
France’s enduring paternalistic view of the continent became systematized into her foreign
policy. Similarly, the architects of the European Economic Community, which would become the
European Union, were ever cognizant that the project of European integration, and therefore
European security, was intrinsically linked to Europe’s capacity to control Africa. On this, the
scholars Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson note that, “efforts to unify Europe systematically
coincide with efforts to stabilize, reform, and reinvent the colonial system in Africa.”8 That
7 General de Monsabert, “North Africa in Atlantic Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 31, no. 3 (1953): 418–26.
https://doi.org/10.2307/20030975.
8 Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, "Introduction: The Past that Europe Forgot," in Eurafrica: The Untold History of
European Integration and Colonialism, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 7.
Wickstrand 13
France played a key role in the “Eurafrica” project, further illustrates the commonalities between
France’s ability to intervene in Africa and French security and prosperity.
In order to understand the present conditions in CAR and local discourse surrounding
France’s presence in the country, we must first look at the French foreign policy evolution.
French efforts at diplomatic outreach will be examined in three modes - political partnerships,
economic initiatives, and security practices. In doing so, we will be able to better delineate the
historical methods of intervention in Africa by France and later, the Soviet Union.
The passing of the “Law of 23 June 1956,” or Loi-Cadre, was undoubtedly a major
turning point in the political partnerships between France and her overseas colonial territories in
Africa. Realizing the momentum of the African independence movements, French leaders at the
time carefully leveraged their relationships with African elites in order to maintain control in
their former colonies despite their nominal independence. The 1956 law passed by the French
National Assembly transferred a number of administrative powers away from Paris into the
hands of elected territorial governments in African colonies.9 In theory, the Loi-Cadre marked a
shift in France’s approach towards Africa that seemingly indicated a newfound respect for
African sovereignty, but in practice the law pointed more to the evolution of the colonial state.
On this evolution, the scholar Tony Chafer has placed the Loi-Cadre within the wider context of
an “emerging convergence of interests between French governing élites and African political
leaders for the transfer of power to Africans,” and has identified these shared interests as the
“defeat of the nationalist movement and the generation of a series of post-colonial collaborating
regimes.”10 In doing so, Chafer describes this as effectively being a “dual process of
9 “France: The ‘Loi-Cadre’ of June 23, 1956,” Internet History Sourcebooks: Modern History, Fordham University,
https://sourcebooks.web.fordham.edu/mod/1956-loicadre.asp.
10 Tony Chafer, “Zero Hour Approaches,” in Francophone Africa at Fifty, ed. Tony Chafer and Alexander Keese
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 16.
Wickstrand 14
consolidation and dissolution,” wherein the French government was alleviated from the cost of
administering and maintaining its colonial territories by ostensibly conceding the point of
African sovereignty, yet still retained the clientelist networks that allowed France to indirectly
govern in the post-colonial era.
In what would later become the Central African Republic, the effects of the Loi-Cadre
carried with it the promise of unprecedented regional influence. The new legal framework
allowed for the election of “great councils'' to preside over the two federal amalgamations of
French West Africa (FWA) and French Equatorial Africa (FEA), of which the territory of
Oubangui-Chari was a part of.11 An emerging politician from this territory, Barthélémy Boganda,
was elected as head of the FEA with the ambition of transforming his region into a united
territory under the name of the Central African Republic.12 Although Boganda’s dreams of a
singular, unified Central Africa fell short, his native territory of Oubangui-Chari assumed the
title of his proposed confederation and the Central African Republic was founded as a member of
the French Union at the end of 1958. Yet only three months later, on March 29, 1959, Boganda
was killed under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash rumored to be orchestrated by local
French businessman and the French Secret Service.13 Following his death, Boganda was briefly
succeeded by socialist academic Abel Goumba. However, Goumba was suspected by the local
French commercial and administrative communities, and even the Paris-based Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, to be too radical. Instead, the French chose to propel David Dacko, a former
deputy in Boganda’s cabinet, to fulfill the role of President.14 Once in power, Dacko turned to
11 Peter Baxter, “France in Centrafrique: From Bokassa and Operation Barracuda to the Days of EUFOR,”
(Pinetown, South Africa: Helion, 2019), 13.
12 Ibid.
13 “Barthélémy Bogand,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed June 4, 2023
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Barthelemy-Boganda.
14 Peter Baxter, “France in Centrafrique.”
Wickstrand 15
increasingly autocratic measures to extend his term in office. Through intimidation tactics with
his private militia and the backing of French troops, when CAR gained independence on August
13, 1960, Dacko was elected to the presidency and soon after arrested Goumba and his
supporters.15
Thus began a continuing trend in CAR towards political instability and violence as a
means of political consolidation and control. In brief, the following forty years of political
history in the Central African Republic has been defined by coups and takeovers, ranging in the
extent of bloodshed with which they occurred but consistent in their frequency. Since 1960,
France has intervened militarily seven times in CAR.16 Throughout the continent, the regularity
with which France meddles in the affairs of her former colonies through military force has served
as a rallying cry for anti-French actors. For some at the local level, the living memory of French
intervention and disregard for African sovereignty is a powerful ethos that, at present, is being
exploited by Russian forces.
While the economic and political networks established by French officials following the
loi-cadre pointed to a shift towards quasi-autonomous, federal systems of governance, many of
the African elites in former French colonies sought to assert the power of their individual
territories, and instead adopted a rather nationalist stance. This dichotomy led to enduring
tensions as the French sought to impose their economic might through slanted networks of
financial exchange. During the independence decade of the 1960s, President De Gaulle adopted
the decidedly neocolonial model of the Françafrique, which assumed that France, despite the
abandonment of the colonies, should retain the exclusive right to develop African resources and
15Eric Young, "Dacko, David," In Encyclopedia of Africa. : Oxford University Press, 2010.
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-1130.
16 Cynthia Glock, “Can the Central African Republic Carry On Without France?” RUSI Journal 162, no. 6, (Jan
2018): 29.
Wickstrand 16
markets.17 A key component of France’s policy of economic engagement with the françafrique
has been centered on continued access to the natural resources that underpin a wide-range of
sectors in the domestic economy.
To ensure the efficient exchange of products and economic unity between Paris and her
former colonies, the De Gaulle administration created the CFA Franc, a shared currency to
enable economic exchange. The adoption of the currency by the 15 participating African states
came with two significant provisions. The first was that member states were required to place
65% of their foreign exchange reserves in the French Treasury, and the second was that France
was given veto power over the monetary policy of the countries in the union.18 In practice, the
Union was divided into two zones - the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
and the Economic Community of Central African Countries (ECOCAS), which includes the
Central African Republic. By creating cooperative financial institutions slanted in favor of
France, De Gaulle helped facilitate economic exchange in the françafrique to bolster the
domestic French economy at the expense of its former colonies.
The central mode of economic exchange between France and the françafrique dealt with
key resources for French industry and security. In many ways, the domestic French economy has
been built upon the large-scale extraction of natural resources from the African continent. One
such resource, uranium, has become a central component in French energy security. Although the
continent provides a vast array of other natural resources, uranium is a case in point because its
use has widespread ramifications on the domestic operations of French society. Since France’s
first nuclear power plant came online in the 1960s, the nuclear industry has supplied the nation
17 Nikolay Medushevskiy and Alisa Shishkina, “Modern French Policy on the African Continent: Transformations of
a Françafrique Model,”Journal of Asian and African studies (Leiden) 57, no. 6 (2022): 1145.
18 Ibid, 1146.
Wickstrand 17
with over seventy percent of its energy.19 The African continent has been critical to France’s long
standing policy of energy security, and since decolonization France has relied on its ties with
African states to fuel their policy of strategic energy sufficiency. The institutional mechanisms in
place for France have enabled it to mine and develop uranium deposits in countries like Niger,
Gabon, and the Central African Republic. Spurred by state policy, the French private sector has
been incentivized to operate in these former colonies to extract, refine, and utilize African
uranium to the benefit of France and detriment to her former colonies. This “privileged
relationship” of France has hindered uranium-rich African states to develop their own nuclear
capacities as codified in a variety of unequal treaties. The Accords de Défense, for instance,
stipulates that the “strategic raw materials” of certain francophone African states must be made
readily available to France and restricted to third countries, as required by the “interests of
common defense.”20
Moving eastward to the CAR, a similarly exploitative economic policy has also been
pursued by France in both energy and trade. All explorations of Uranium have been tightly
controlled by French public and private interests, which limited the CAR’s ability to promote
itself as a hub for nuclear investment to states outside of France. In addition to its role as an
exclusive uranium supplier to France, CAR has also been structurally limited by dependency on
French trade and investment. The unfavorable nature of this exchange can be seen in 1987
figures which show that France accepted a mere 16.8% of CAR exports while supplying the
nation with 52.4% of its imports.21
19 “Nuclear Power Plants Generated 68% of France’s Electricity in 2021,” US Energy Information Administration,
January 23, 2023,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55259#:~:text=Although%20France's%20first%20commercial%2
0nuclear,significant%20share%20of%20France's%20electricity.
20 Guy Martin, “Uranium: A Case-Study in Franco-African Relations,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 27,
no. 4 (1989): 632. http://www.jstor.org/stable/161112.
21 Ibid, 637.
Wickstrand 18
Since decolonization, however, the economic interests of Paris have not been the main
driver of French policy towards Africa. Rather, it has been France’s security policy that has
driven many of the initiatives undertaken by the presidential administrations in the Fifth
Republic. Many scholars have highlighted the preeminence of upholding French overseas
prestige over economic influence. In his book French Power in Africa, the scholar John Chipman
points to the primacy of French military reach over economic considerations, writing,
By and large, the struggle to hang on to overseas territories had little to do with economic considerations. For French
relations with Africa, the political concepts of overseas power always overrode theories of economic necessity, just
as the range and use of military power, which reflected political interests, was far out of proportion to the degree and
importance of French economic interests in Africa.22
In the context of the postcolonial period, and more expressly in the struggle over the
“Third World” during the Cold War, the central component of French foreign policy towards
Africa was based on the retention of French hegemony on the continent. Accordingly, the use of
military force and other forms of hard power have been flexed by all French presidents since
decolonization in order to achieve favorable outcomes in line with French strategic interests.
This section will highlight the themes and motives behind key interventions throughout the
Françafrique from the postcolonial Cold War era. It will then turn to more recent events,
specifically in the Central African Republic, in order to understand the continuities between
postcolonial and post-Cold War French military intervention.
By the time of the postcolonial era, the rhetoric of France’s mission civilisatrice had been
transformed into that of special or “privileged” relationship in which France was obliged to act in
a paternalistic manner to and to underwrite the development of her former colonies out of
necessity for their survival. Simultaneously, an alternative truism existed in that France,
desperate to retain relevance in a newly bipolar world, also “needed” Africa to promote its
22 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1989), 188.
Wickstrand 19
interests, grandeur, and security.23 In many ways, the rhetoric that emerged surrounding French
military intervention in this era illustrates the anxieties and paranoia the De Gaulle
administration felt. As De Gaulle argued,
To give up co-operation would be equivalent to disavowing our role with regard to the evolution which carried
people of Africa so much… to develop in their turn, without delivering themselves to one or the other of two
hegemonies which divide the World…Why thus would France, which is itself in full expansion, keep away from a
movement for which its traditional genius is largely the pillar on which depend, ultimately, the peace and fate of the
world?24
Thus, the twin-track approach of using their former colonies and allies as bulwarks against both
Soviet encroachment and their own declining international prestige came to function as the
dominant paradigm for roughly thirty years of French postcolonial security policy. Accordingly,
France’s ideological and pragmatic aversion to the spread of communism in Africa were
manifested in interventions that demonstrate the catalyzing nature of grand narratives behind
military intervention.
One essential instance of a grand-narrative driven intervention is the case of Zaire. In
1977 and 1978, rebel forces from neighboring Angola invaded a southern province. The French
responded to both instances of Angolan incursions into the south of Zaire with military action,
largely prompted by fears that the presence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel were part of
a larger communism plot to destabilize the region.25 Despite the fact that Zaire was never a
French colony, the nation’s status as a French client-state at the time led Embassy staff to believe
that a leftist regime would “increase the possibilities for penetration of outside influences hostile
to the west,” and endanger more moderate regimes in surrounding countries.26
23 Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Aldershot,
England: Ashgate, 2008), 62.
24 Pascal Chaigneau, La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique, (Paris: CHEAM, 1984), 20.
25 Nathaniel K. Powell, “Battling Instability? The Recurring Logic of French Military Interventions in Africa,”
African security 10, no. 1 (2017): 52
26 Ibid.
Wickstrand 20
The 1970s are an essential period for examining the motives behind Franco-African
security policy because it established the precedent of military intervention on the basis of
France’s obligation to counter instability. Under President d’Estaing (1974-1981), French
security itself was explicitly linked to that of Africa. The army chief of staff under d’Estaing,
General Guy Méry, wrote in 1978 that, “No one can deny that in Africa there is a climate of
instability to which we cannot remain indifferent,” for reasons of both “security and
responsibility.”27 The precise basis of the reasoning behind security and responsibility was
because of geographical proximity, the presence of vast numbers of French nationals on the
continent, the importance of maritime routes linking raw material production to French markets,
and of course, the special responsibility France had because of its historical links on the
continent.28 Stability, for French presidents ordering intervention throughout the postcolonial era,
was largely a practice of upholding the status quo. With a legal permission structure in the form
of defense agreements signed by many former colonies, France was largely free to intervene on
its own terms, usually by coming to the defense of sitting political regimes which had established
relationships with Paris. Within the framework of military cooperation agreements, signatory
African states were permitted to call upon France for assistance in both cases of foreign
encroachment as well issues of domestic stability.29
One of the provisions tied to cooperation agreements was the ability for France to
construct military bases in order to retain a permanent presence on the continent, which gives
credence to the strategic landscape component of French postcolonial security policy. With
numerous military bases dispersed around sub-Saharan Africa, France created a security network
conducive to power projection and the upholding of its military prestige. On this basis, France
27 Ibid, 51.
28 Ibid.
29 Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism, 60.
Wickstrand 21
sent military troops to intervene in Mauritania (1977-78), Chad (1978-1980), the Central African
Republic (1979), and twice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, in both
1977 and 1978.30
While the scope of this research does not allow us to view French intervention in these
states on a tactical level, the actions of French troops on a local level are relevant insofar as it
may explain the reasons behind the anti-French sentiment pervading Africa today. In the Central
African Republic today, the presence of UN peacekeeping forces has yielded little results
towards stabilizing the country. Moreover, a Russian-sponsored disinformation campaign has
described the MINUSCA presence as under the control of France, which also falsely claims that
France seeks to perpetuate conflict by funding armed rebel groups. The depiction of France as a
puppet-master in CAR is a particularly poignant message that has gained momentum in the local
discourse. Through Russian influence, Central African citizens are increasingly reminded of their
nation’s history of exploitation at the hands of France and, given Russia’s lacking colonial
legacy, are more prone to view Russia more favorably.
30 Ibid, 62.
Wickstrand 22
“Red Fingerprints” - Soviet Engagement in Cold War Africa
The living memory of the Soviet Union, and now Russia’s involvement in Africa draws a
sharp contrast from that of France. Having never been involved in the slave trade, scramble for
Africa, violent phases of decolonization, nor involvement with the exploitative postcolonial
networks that continue to pervade many African nations, local populations that did engage with
the USSR tend to view their past involvement much more favorably. Contrary to the French
position, Soviet engagement with nationalist movements and development assistance programs
have helped portray the USSR as an empowering ally who pursued equal partnerships on a
bilateral basis. Regardless of the validity of these claims that are often highlighted by
Kremlin-backed news agencies, it is true that by the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991,
more than 50,000 Africans had studied in Soviet universities and military and technical institutes
and at least another 200,000 Africans had received Soviet training on African soil.31
The relative brevity of the Soviet Union’s engagement with Africa in comparison to
France means that this report will not detail as extensively the facets of Soviet foreign policy
towards Africa as it did the French. Instead, the forthcoming section will aim to highlight the
disparities between Franco-African relations and Soviet-African relations by focusing on the
aspects of the latter that bolster and shape the current dynamics between Russia and Africa.
On security, the Soviet Union’s participation in the nationalist liberation movements that
occurred throughout the continent has contributed to Russia’s generally positive perception. In
both Angola and Ethiopia, the USSR played a major role in shaping the course of their respective
movements, sharing common-cause with their anti-imperialist motives. The Soviets, of course,
also had a vested interest in waging proxy wars with the western backed opponents of the
31 “Russia’s Return to Africa,” Atlantic Council, J. Peter Pham, March 14, 2014
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/russia-s-return-to-africa/.
Wickstrand 23
liberation movements and gave substantial material support to secure favorable outcomes. By
some estimates, Soviet and Cuban military aid to the MPLA of Angola totaled roughly $250
million, in addition to over 11,000 military advisors and a plethora of different armaments.32
These vast sums of security-based material aid indicate the views of Soviet leaders on the
importance of strong ties in Africa. Unlike the French, the Soviet Union’s support of nationalist
groups generated a positive public perception in the African countries that received Soviet
military aid. In essence, it established the views that the French supported the status quo to
preserve their privileged position throughout Africa, while the Soviets were in favor of African
independence and self-determination. These concepts remain strikingly similar to the
Kremlin-espoused narrative surrounding Russian involvement in Africa today. The analyst Sarah
McArthur has succinctly described this Kremlin narrative surrounding new Russian military
cooperation in Africa as, “an emphasis on the right of sovereign states to choose their own allies,
they insinuate that the French reaction is merely the disgruntlement of a neo-colonial power
which is losing its privileged position in Francophone African politics.”33 The remarkable
continuity between the messaging of security cooperation by the Soviet Union and Russia
respectively helps explain in part, the acceptance of Russian military support by African states
with former Soviet ties.
On economic aid and cooperation, the Soviet Union was especially focused on assistance
that would deepen bilateral ties, and hoped that through financial linkages, firmer political
connections could be established to further wage cold war against the capitalist west. In other
words, Soviet economic aid served as a function of the Soviet network of allies in the “Third
32 Christopher Stevens, “The Soviet Union and Angola,” African Affairs 75, no. 299 (April 1976): 144.
33 Sarah McArthur, “France To Pull Military Support In Central African Republic Amidst Disputes Over Ties With
Russia,” OWP, October 25, 2022,
https://theowp.org/france-to-pull-military-support-in-central-african-republic-amidst-disputes-over-ties-with-russia/.
Wickstrand 24
World.” From 1954 to 1956 for instance, Soviet economic assistance totaled $271 million across
14 states and focused on capacity building projects in the realms of transportation, mechanized
agriculture, irrigation, as well industrial and power projects.”34 While the breadth and focus on
capacity-building projects is markedly different from the economic cooperation of France with
Africa, the Soviet Union maintained a similar transactionalist approach with regards to its
investments as France did. For instance, the criteria in which Soviet aid was directed stemmed
from three criteria: the strategic importance of the individual African state, the potentiality for
that African state to provide them with raw materials, or to be a good market for the Soviet
Union to export their goods, and the significance of influence from the West in the region.35
Essentially, the USSR deemed the high cost of its investment in Africa to be worth the price of
admission to compete with the western nations who had long-standing ties on the continent.
As investment stimulated political cooperation, the Soviets believed that strong economic
ties would help catalyze African states on the march towards socialism. To generate further
goodwill among the citizens of the African states they cooperated with, the Soviet Union
invested heavily in human capital by assisting, “about 500 thousand specialists and skilled
African workers were trained, including 170 thousand directly during the construction and
operation of facilities, when Soviet engineers, technicians and workers transferred their
experience and knowledge to local citizens working side by side with them.”36 The sheer scale of
technical assistance and training conducted by the Soviet Union is a key factor that separates
Soviet involvement in Africa from that of France. Because of the Soviet Union’s investments in
major economic projects and in human development, Russia is able to capitalize off of the
34 Colin W Lawson, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa," African Affairs 87, no. 349 (1988), 502-503.
35 Oye Ogunbadejo, "Soviet Policies in Africa," African Affairs 79, no. 316 (1980), 299.
36 Rachel Fink, “France and the Soviet Union: Intervention in Africa Post-Colonialism,” (Thesis, Wittenberg
University, 2020), 38.
Wickstrand 25
positive associations in the living memory of the USSR in Africa. As will be shown, through
disinformation campaigns conducted by Moscow, the Russian Federation seeks to project its
current projects in Africa as similar to those done by the Soviet Union. In doing so, Russia
displays a key divergence from the historical legacy of France which has contributed to the Putin
regime’s growing ties on the African continent.
Wickstrand 26
Section II - Contemporary Dynamics in the Central African Republic
Thus far, this project has endeavored to delineate the respective approaches of French and
Soviet policy towards Africa in the postcolonial, Cold War era. We can see that, in the realm of
diplomacy, economics, and security, the approaches of the two great powers on the continent
created lasting memories in the societies of the African states in which they acted, and these
memories inform the ability of France and Africa to cooperate with the nations of Africa today.
With the case of the Central African Republic, the common thread of political instability and
weak institutions has created a political context that is easily susceptible to foreign influence. In
the 2010s, the highly limited capacity of the CAR government to deal with conflict within its
borders meant that the leaders of the country turned to France for assistance.
In late 2012, then president of the CAR François Bozizé requested international support
to subdue a Muslim rebel movement known as the Séléka. The Séléka rebel group stemmed from
the northern, Muslim-majority region of the country and had advanced towards the
Catholic-majority south, and by March of 2013 had deposed Bozizé and installed the country’s
first Muslim president.37 Several months later, violent conflict broke out between the Muslim
Séléka and Christian militias known as Anti-Balakas. By then, the United Nations and France
began voicing concerns of potential genocide, as raised in a special report written by Adama
Dieng, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.38 In December 2013 the UN
Security Council voted unanimously on the authorization of military force to minimize sectarian
violence and restore political order to the country and subsequently established the “African Led
37 “Conflict in the Central African Republic,” Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed
May 14, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic.
38 “The Statement of Under Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Adama Dieng, on
the Human Rights and Humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic,” Adama Dieng, United Nations
Security Council, November 1, 2013,
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/our-work/Doc.4_2013-11-1.SAPG%20Statement%20at%20A
rria%20Meeting%20of%20the%20UNSC%20on%20CAR.pdf.
Wickstrand 27
International Support Mission in the CAR,” or MISCA.39 After the successful disarmament of
rebel forces and militia groups, the MISCA coalition gave way to the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR, or MINUSCA. This new
stabilization phase of operation in CAR, however, has widely fallen short of the expectations of
both the international community and domestic CAR actors alike. International observers have
noted that despite the peacekeeping force’s size of 10,000 plus soldiers, social tensions remain
and security is yet to be restored, as locals have accused the force of inertia and decried it as
ineffective.40 Yet there are other forces at play which contribute to an increasingly hostile attitude
towards western, especially French, intervention.
Today, it is Vladimir Putin’s supranational apparatus of military, technical, and
propaganda networks that help to disseminate an ardently anti-Western message to facilitate the
Russian Federation’s push onto the African continent. This is a rather novel development, as,
only within the last decade or so, has the Kremlin indicated an interest in its former theater of
Cold War competition.
“As History attests, Russia turns to Africa only in times of crisis or of rivalry with the
West. Putin is no exception,” reads a report on Russo-African relations by the Atlantic Council.41
The resurgent African component of the Kremlin’s twenty-first century foreign policy is an
indication of how the Putin regime seeks to buttress itself from the onslaught of sanctions,
condemnations, and, perhaps most importantly, financial downturn stemming from its illegal
moves in Ukraine. The following section will thus examine the modes and limits of how
39 “Resolution 2127 (2013),” United Nations Security Council, December 5, 2013,
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/594/43/PDF/N1359443.pdf?OpenElement.
40 Cynthia Glock, “Can the Central African Republic Carry On Without France?” RUSI Journal 162, no. 6, (Jan
2018): 31.
41 Abdelhak Bassou, “Military Relations Between Russia and Africa, Before and After the War in Ukraine,” Atlantic
Council, February 2023, https://issuu.com/atlanticcouncil/docs/military_relations_between_russia_and_africa_befo.
Wickstrand 28
Vladimir Putin’s Russia has infiltrated the CAR. It will contrast the Russian approach to that of
France, the historical partner of the Central African Republic, by explicating France’s recent
foreign policy approach vis-à-vis that of Russia in the two realms of information and security.
Subsequently, we will be able to see how the systems in place to facilitate Russia’s thrust into the
CAR and wider region closely mirror the previously mentioned feudal-like clientelist system that
exists at home in Russia. In essence, the Putin regime seeks to replicate its own domestic system
of patronage abroad in order to create a network of alliances with African states, and the two
modes with which it seeks to accomplish this are disinformation campaigns and security-based
cooperation.
Mode One: Soft Power - Media and Information
A. Russian Strategy and State-Sponsored Media
The exportation of Russian media onto the African continent is an explicit exercise in soft
power. The Kremlin has simultaneously, and skillfully, leveraged its domestic media outlets to
reach a broad swath of Africans through the use of both traditional and social media. In an
interview following the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russian author and current
Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexei Vasiliev
was quoted saying, “Africa is largely unaware of Russia, since African media mainly consumes
Western sources and then replicates them. And all the fake news, the Russophobia and
anti-Russian propaganda spread by the Western media, are repeated in the African media.”42
The narrative espoused by Vasiliev is one that has been proven to appeal to many
Africans. It is a narrative with which they can identify - that traditional western forces, in this
case the media, have deliberately manipulated the population to further their agenda. The
42 Peter Fabricus, “Russia Starts a New Chapter in Africa,” The Daily Maverick, October 29, 2019,
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-29-russia-starts-a-new-chapter-in-africa/
Wickstrand 29
Russian solution to this shared Russo-African grievance has been to play on its rhetorical support
for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states - just as the
Soviet Union supposedly did - a line that they have spread widely through state-sponsored
agencies like Sputnik and RT.43 Perhaps more potently, however, are the local African media
outlets who receive financial support in exchange for pushing a pro-Russia narrative. In CAR,
the contemporary media landscape typifies the state of the country’s journalistic polarization.
The situation is clear - outlets that receive financial support from Russian actors overwhelmingly
propagate a pro-Kremlin narrative while those that do not are free to offer more objective
reporting.44
43 Cayley Clifford and Steven Gruzd, “Russian and African Media: Exercising Soft Power,” South African Institute
of International Affairs, February 2022, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40121.
44 The image was derived from a non-public report conducted by Code for Africa, a technology and journalism
nonprofit that seeks to counteract digital disinformation in Africa. Article citation:
“Friend or foe? How the Central African Republic’s media reports on Russia,” ANCIR iLab, January 12,
2022,https://medium.com/african-c-i-r/friend-or-foe-how-the-central-african-republics-media-reports-on-russia-9c64
96729de7
Wickstrand 30
For a case study of this phenomenon, we will look to two outlets on opposite ends of the
spectrum shown above - Ndjoni Sango and Corbeau News Centrafricain - to examine their
varying slants while reporting the same story. In this case, the respective local outlets are
reporting on a situation that describes a massive payment of state-funds to the Russian Wagner
Mercenary Group which conducts anti-insurgent activities and provides protection services to the
CAR President and his allies. In the headlines
alone, we can see that the two news sites offer
starkly different opinions on the story:
←(Ndjoni Sango) CAR: Wagner Financing Case,
Prime Minister Denounces Misinformation45
(Corbeau News) Central African
Republic: The Cases of 400 Million
Francs to Wagner: Government Tries to
Manipulate Public Opinion46 →
45 “RCA: affaire d’un financement au Wagner, la primature dénonce une désinformation,” Erick Ngaba, Ndjoni
Sango, trans. Justin Wickstrand, April 30, 2023,
https://ndjonisango.com/2023/04/30/rca-affaire-dun-financement-au-wagner-la-primature-denonce-une-desinformati
on/.
46 “Centrafrique : affaires des 400 millions FCFA de Wagner : le gouvernement tente de manipuler l’opinion,” Gisele
Moloma, Corbeau News, trans. Justin Wickstrand, May 1, 2023,
41https://corbeaunews-centrafrique.org/centrafrique-affaires-des-400-millions-fcfa-de-wagner-le-gouvernement-tente
-de-manipuler-lopinion/
Wickstrand 31
On headlines, the contrast in tone is evident - the pro-Russia outlet Ndjoni Sango has labeled the
discourse surrounding massive payments to Wagner as misinformation, while the outlet which is
less favorable to Russia decries the situation as a case of state-sponsored information contortion.
Moreover, we can see that the cover images displayed by the respective outlets present dissimilar
tones. While Ndjoni Sango - the outlet favorable to Russia - uses a well-lit, standard photo of the
Prime Minister, Corbeau News uses an image with reduced saturation to convey an ominous
mood to match the negative tone of the headline. At this point, a comparative textual analysis of
the two articles would be presented. However, at the time of this writing the Ndjoni Sango
website has been suspended for reasons unknown to the author. At least in the case of the
Corbeau News article, the language of the text is quite charged, as the author accuses the
government minister of embezzlement and the government as a whole of trying to manipulate
public opinion. While the case of these contrasting articles is limited in scope, it provides a
useful proxy to understanding the contemporary media landscape of the CAR - namely, that
reporting is distorted by the financial intervention of Russia and that the most critical sources of
information for the local population are now mired in a greater geopolitical battle to win over the
hearts and minds of Africans.
The Putin regime undoubtedly relishes in the utility of having local news outlets at its
disposal to disseminate pro-Russian information because It offers plausible deniability if accused
of foreign interference. Moreover, the backing of local news outlets conveys a sense of
legitimacy to the local population in that the voices espousing a Kremlin-friendly narrative are
themselves native Africans. But the true utility of having a favorable image on the continent is
more implicit. The Kremlin’s exporting of Russian media networks, combined with its
partnerships with local news agencies can be seen as part of its grand strategic push onto the
Wickstrand 32
continent. As the analyst Joseph Siegle writes, “Africa, with its weak governments, abundant
natural resources, colonial legacies, proximity to Europe, and fifty-four votes at the United
Nations General Assembly, provides Russia an easy and attractive theater where it can advance
its interests with limited financial or political costs.”47 For President Putin and the Russian
intelligence apparatus, operating in ways that limit financial or political costs is their modus
operandi. The covert influence operations that have been conducted by the Kremlin globally -
and are currently being conducted in CAR and across Africa - are the key components of
expanding Russian influence. By empowering African voices in a bottom up approach - albeit
through financial incentive - Moscow is able to confer a sense of legitimacy upon itself in the
eyes of African governments. Thus, through the low cost ventures of backing local media outlets,
Russia is gradually gaining access to the weak African governments and myriad tangible benefits
such as natural resources and UN votes.
But on a continent where more than half of the population is under twenty five, the battle
for hearts and minds takes place not just in the ivory towers of government nor at the ink-stained
desks of local reporters. Instead, in the twenty-first century, the battle is fought perhaps most
nefariously, behind keyboards and touchscreens - using memes, videos, and hashtags in what can
be essentially described as social-media information warfare.
On the Russian side, digital influence campaigns are conducted on both the regional and
local level. The Kremlin has carefully curated a network of self-styled “Pan-Africanist
influencers” who serve as mouthpieces to promote the Russian Federation’s goals of establishing
greater linkages with Africa. On a global scale, the Kremlin has deployed this network to push
47 Joseph Siegle, “Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability,” in Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and
Statecraft Assesment,” ed. Graeme P. Herd, George C. Marshall Center, 2021,
https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach-security-and-statecraft-a
ssessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and.
Wickstrand 33
anti-Western narratives to justify its invasion of Ukraine in addition to its actions in Africa. One
operative in this network, a French-Beninese man named Kémi Séba, spoke at a Russia-Africa
Youth Forum and justified Russia’s actions in Ukraine as a response to NATO’s “encircling” and
“arming of former Soviet republics… in the same way the West destroyed and dismantled
Africa.”48 Moreover, the Kremlin has played on its non-colonial legacy to propel its digital reach
onto the continent, as seen in comments by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who spoke at the
Russia-Africa Youth forum,
“We are united by the rejection of the so-called ‘rules-based order’ that the former colonial powers are
imposing on the world. Russia greatly appreciates the fact that despite unprecedented and crude pressure, our
African friends, like the overwhelming majority of the international community, have not joined the anti-Russia
sanctions but continue developing dialogue and cooperation with us.”49
On a more regional scale, Séba and his confidant Nathalie Yamb, who has styled herself
as “La Dame de Sochi,” have emphasized deepening ties with Russia and have called for the
removal of French and Western influence across the Sahel while encouraging more Kremlin
influence.50 Séba and Yamb, who have 1.1 million and 541,000 followers on instagram
respectively, are corroborated by official social media channels of the Russian government on
Facebook and Twitter. In the images below, the official Facebook account of the Russian
Ambassador to the CAR is seen admonishing two local news outlets, Africa Intelligence and
Corbeau News, the latter being the newspaper with less-favorable views towards Russia used in
the headline case study above. Some key lines from the Facebook post read as,
“The Russian Embassy in CAR is already accustomed to lies peddled by some newspaper, such as
«Corbeau News» ... Without providing arguments against Russian policy, the two tabloids decided to give a low
blow. We know who’s behind it. We know those outside forces that are adverse to Russia. This animosity is due to
48 “Yevgeniy Prighozin’s Africa-Wide Disinformation Campaign,” US Department of State, November 4, 2022,
https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/.
49 “Russia is Using African Influencers to Spread Its Lies on Twitter.” Coda. Accessed March 15, 2023.
https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/wagner-africa-disinformation-ukraine/
50 US Department of State, “Disinformation Campaign.”
Wickstrand 34
their envy for Russia, which has always fought against neocolonialism, while these forces have been ready to resort
to the most despicable practices to overthrow regimes in Africa that they disliked. Nevertheless, we are sure that the
forces of good will vanquish the forces of evil embodied in the newspapers “Corbeau News'' and “Africa
Intelligence.”51
The post was then followed by this image
and the hashtag #FakeNews. The language
of this posting is a case in point of the
themes of Russian information influence in
the CAR. First, it establishes the
anti-Russian news agencies as habitual
liars and untrustworthy outlets. Next, in
saying “We know who’s behind it,” the
text alludes to western, probably French
interference in CAR media to outline the
anti-Russian news sources as illegitimate.
Following this, the post mentions Russia’s history of fighting neocolonialism as a way to express
solidarity with the CAR citizens who seek to distance themselves from the influence of France.
The last line is particularly concerning, and uses language that is typically associated with calls
to violence. By casting the anti-Russian outlets as “forces of evil” who will be “vanquished,” the
Russian ambassador escalates the stakes and conditions of criticizing Russia’s actions in the
CAR.
51 Russian Ambassador to the Central African Republic, “The Russian Embassy in CAR is already accustomed to
lies peddled by some newspapers,” Facebook, May 15, 2021,
https://www.facebook.com/247247705769244/posts/1094565284370811.
Wickstrand 35
Lastly, at the end of the Russian Ambassador to CAR’s Facebook tirade, he links a picture of this
image followed by the #FakeNews. It is important to note this weaponization of the “Fake
News” by the Russians. By casting doubt on the factual accuracy of news outlets who are critical
of them, the Russians not only denigrate their opponents, but they also inflict a corrosive
influence on the broader media landscape that causes individuals to be uncertain of all other
information they hear. In doing so, Russia may be countering the accusations of nefarious online
conduct in the short-term, but this mode of operation may be limited by the erosion of trust that
the “Fake News” narrative inflicts on news media as a whole.
Wickstrand 36
B. Russia v. France in the Information Landscape
Unlike the novel influence of Russia in the African media landscape, the origins of France’s role
in African mass media can be traced back to the 1890s. With a publication called Le Petit
Journal, stories about the exploration of West Africa were filled with tales about courageous
white expeditionaries who encountered human sacrifices, slave roundups, and secret societies.52
By peaking the interest of domestic French audiences with exotic stories, this stimulated an
interest in other stories of French conquest that coincided with the real time consolidation of
African territories.53 Moreover, the themes of these stories depicted the French civilizing mission
as a mutually beneficial endeavor that would bring stability to savage Africa and prosperity and
prestige for France.54 As France consolidated its colonial empire in Africa, the role of the media
became a mode of soft power that highlighted the benefits of France’s presence to African
audiences themselves. The media environment of contemporary francophone Africa is a remnant
of its colonial past, and French organizations like TV5Monde, Radio France International, and
France24 are able to reach millions of Africans every day through radio, news articles, and
television programming. Yet with recent cooperative agreements by Russian state media with
African news outlets, and the growing influence of pro-Russian social media networks, French
media and information hegemony has come into conflict with these new forces.
In terms of continental influence, the increased collaboration of the Russian Federation
with African news outlets serves to espouse the benefits of Russo-African alliances, which poses
a challenge to French media primacy on the continent. In the CAR border country of Cameroon,
52 Richard Smith, “A Popular View of Imperialism: The French Mass Press and the Conquest of West Africa,”
Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 5 (1980): 51.
53 Ibid, 52.
54 Ibid.
Wickstrand 37
when Afrique Média, the nation’s largest news outlet, partnered with Russian state news agency
RT it released a news banner which read “The end of the West’s misleading propaganda.”
Yet the most clear instance of direct confrontation between Russian and French
information actors is in the sphere of social media. According to reports by Facebook as well as
the Stanford Internet Observatory, both France and Russia had created networks of fake social
media accounts designed to promote their image and interests while simultaneously disparaging
the other. Despite similar modes of operation, the respective French and Russian social media
influence networks differed in their origin. On the Russian side, the operatives spearheading the
disinformation campaign in CAR were found to have had links to the Internet Research Agency
(IRA), a digital propaganda organization funded by Wagner Group head and Putin ally Yevgeniy
Prighozin. Conversely, as noted by the Stanford investigation, French social media operatives
were not found to have ties to the government but the military.
Following a thorough investigation by Facebook officials and a subsequent report by the
Stanford Internet Observatory and Graphika Analytics titled, “More-Troll Combat: French and
Russian Influence Operations Go Head to Head Targeting Audiences in Africa,” Facebook
removed over 100 accounts of both French and Russian origin operating in the CAR. Therefore,
unless otherwise specified, the images provided for analysis below will all originate from the
Stanford-Graphika report as they are now removed from the platform.
By returning to our analytical framework of modes and limits, we may evaluate the ways
in which French and Russian actors conducted their respective information operations and
discern the extent to which these methods facilitated the goals of promoting image and interests.
As highlighted by the Stanford Internet Observatory-Facebook report, the Prigozhin-backed
disinformation campaign was conducted according to several themes. First, pro-Russian actors
Wickstrand 38
clearly and consistently commented on electoral politics in CAR. In the run up to the nation’s
December 2020 election, incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadera, who established
close ties with the Kremlin during the latter half of his first term, was the clear focus of posts by
Russian assets who aimed to enhance his political standing. Moreover, there was also a focus on
attacking Touadera’s primary challenger, François Bozizé. The anti-Bozizé postings were
intended to characterize him as a close ally to France. In the images below, we can see the
pointed images used to denigrate Bozizé. On the left, the caption refers to Bozizé as a “monster,”
and the illustration on the right pointedly refers to him as having close relations with the Macron
administration in Paris, making a pun on Bozizé’s name and the French “bisou,” or kiss.55
55 “More-Troll Combat: French and Russian Influence Operations Go Head to Head Targeting Audiences in Africa,”
Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory, December 2020,
https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_stanford_report_more_troll_kombat.pdf.
Wickstrand 39
Another thematic mode of operation for Russian assets was the positive portrayal of
Russia. This was done primarily through highlighting instances of cooperation between the
Russian and CAR governments especially in cases of military cooperation. In the post above, one
Russian operator posing as a CAR citizen praised Russia’s shipment of armored vehicles,
comparing them to crocodiles and noting that they are “strong and powerful, ready to face armed
rebel groups!”
Wickstrand 40
In another instance, a Russian-asset posted about a likely fabricated story involving a “Russian
soldier,” i.e. Wagner mercenary, who helped a local woman with her housework and helped to
purchase her groceries while asking nothing in return.56
This mode of social media activity serves to highlight allyship between CAR and Russia on a
macro and micro scale. By highlighting cases of military cooperation, as well as friendly local
interaction, the Russian operation sought to underpin its presence in the country by being a force
for good with both the CAR government and citizenry.
While highlighting positive cooperation is a critical component in the Russia-CAR
information campaign, the negative portrayal of the French and UN presence in the country is an
equally important mode of operation. It is with this mode that the falsehoods peddled by
Russian-assets become more outlandish as illustrated in the images seen below. Here, we can see
three Facebook posts which serve to undermine the UN presence in CAR as illegitimate and
manipulated by France. There is also a post that derides French troops as rapists and thugs,
accusing them of drugging and raping young women. In responses to these accusations, Russian
56 “More-Troll Combat,” Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory.
Wickstrand 41
assets and authentic CAR accounts alike showed elevated hostility, with one post calling for
revenge against the French troops.
On the theme of UN intervention, it is noteworthy that Russian-assets were deliberate in
how they framed their blaming of France. Above, the two posts on the right describe the UN
Security Council as being manipulated by France with respect to their policy towards CAR, with
one post describing France as having done so in order to make the country a “living hell.” There
was also a calculated effort to inculpate France for the actions of the UN peacekeeping operation
MINUSCA, which itself is an Africa-led coalition. This demonstrates a mode of intentionality
and understanding of the minutiae of international security policies on behalf of the Russian
operatives, who were careful not to alienate potential African allies involved with the coalition.
In a striking post about the presence of MINUSCA forces, a photo of a doctored report on
official UN letter paper claimed that the UN mission is entirely controlled by France, who is
Wickstrand 42
using the presence of MINUSCA as a cover to fund and arm rebel forces. The doctored report
also claimed that France’s sale of arms to rebel militias is in exchange for “money, diamonds,
gold, or organs.”
Wickstrand 43
Lastly, video has become a key medium in which Russian operatives distribute
propaganda and disinformation throughout the region. This format has been cause for alarm
amongst African and Western intelligence officials because it enhances the reach of
disinformation to illiterate audiences.57 In a striking example widely-circulated online, an
animated video depicts Wagner as a heroic force that defends against the West, specifically
France. In the video, which was obtained by a twitter account with the username
“alleyesonwagner” a self-described accountability project on the Wagner mercenary group, we
can discern several telling themes. First, the depiction of France.
57 Elian Peltier, Adam Satariano, and Lynsey Chutel, “How Putin Became a Hero on African TV,” The New York
Times, April 18, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/13/world/africa/russia-africa-disinformation.html.
Wickstrand 44
In the screencaptures above, the French are explicitly shown to be forces of evil. The use of
menacing creatures like the serpent and hordes of zombies characterize the French as having a
parasitic and destructive presence, with the presidential palace being the residence of a
stereotypically villainous leader. In the video, as the zombies approach the Malian soldier, they
announce in a monotone and sinister tone, “We are the demons of Macron, now this is our
country.” This French presence is starkly contrasted by the incoming of a Wagner mercenary,
who heroically parachutes into
the battle and provides
ammunition to the Malian
soldier until the French zombies
are destroyed. After thanking
each other for their friendship,
the Malian and Wagner allies
then turn to assist a soldier in
Burkina Faso, who fights off and
destroys the French serpent without assistance. He then turns to the Malian and Wagner soldiers
and proclaims that the neighboring Ivory Coast is in dire need, as the three join forces and drive
off to render assistance.
Wickstrand 45
Before evaluating the French information warfare campaign, let us return to the modes of
the Russian operation. It has been shown that there were three key themes that underline the
social media activity of Russian operatives: commentary on the 2020 presidential campaign with
favorable coverage towards the incumbent who was favored by the Kremlin, the highlighting of
instances of cooperation on both inter-governmental and intra-personal scales, and a staunchly
antagonistic portrayal of France and the presence of UN forces. While the modes of this
disinformation campaign are novel in the context of Russia’s engagement with Africa in the
twenty first century, and the dynamic nature of the contemporary political-diplomatic landscape
in CAR makes it difficult to discern the long-term ramifications of waging such a campaign,
there are limits to this operation that will likely manifest over time. On this, the analyst Joseph
Siegle has commented that Russia is solely pursuing transactional interests and is increasingly
seen as a “partner of last resort.”58 As the Putin regime continues its push into CAR and the
surrounding region, the inherently destabilizing nature of its presence will potentially undermine
the longevity of the alliances it seeks to build. As African states grapple with the impact of
widespread disinformation surrounding their elections and security situation, the already low
levels of trust in governments and institutions will continue to wane. If these actions by Russia
are left unchecked by the western allies of African nations, the Russian narrative will likely
prevail and African nations will be convinced of the necessity of turning away from their western
allies. By consequence, African nations that follow this path will be left with Russia as a
veritable “partner of last resort.” In essence, this will make it difficult for these same nations to
cooperate with powers in the Global North outside of Russia, and African leaders may be left
with sparse options with which to expand their diplomatic ties and economies. In other words,
they may be forced to return to the same systems of patronage and subservience that underscored
58 Siegle, “Russia and Africa.”
Wickstrand 46
their previous colonial relationships, but this time it will not be with the great powers of the
West, but instead under a new banner - Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation.
Although the underlying goal of France’s disinformation campaign in the CAR is to
dissuade the population from viewing Russia favorably, the modes of operation with which
France conducted this operation greatly parallel that of Russia. There were two primary themes
in which France conducted its operation in the CAR, namely, through the negative portrayal of
Russian actions in the country and through highlighting cases that presented France in a positive
light. As with the Russian operation, there was also a similar reliance on video. One key
divergence from the parallels of the French and Russian campaigns, however, was that
pro-French actors would at times adopt a more defensive and responsive posture, and would
occasionally point out specific accounts or news outlets which were known to spread
disinformation. While this may have been an attempt to counter the Russian online narrative, it
can also be seen as an implicit indication that French social media operatives were cognizant of
the greater reach that Russian assets possessed on social media platforms and were actively
seeking to counter this.
Wickstrand 47
On the theme of Russia’s presence in CAR, the pro-French social media network was
keen to depict the Russian presence as a form of neo-colonialism. In the posts below, French
operatives highlighted the Wagner Group’s mining of the CAR’s mineral resources, primarily
gold and diamonds.
Wickstrand 48
Outside of neocolonialist rhetoric, French actors also portrayed the Wagner mercenaries
as fueling insurrection and committing crimes. Moreover, other posts that specifically mentioned
the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prighozin, generated the highest engagement out of all
other social media activity. In these posts, French operatives suggested that Prigozhin was behind
a disinformation campaign in the run up to the CAR’s presidential election as he had done during
the 2016 US presidential campaign. It is noteworthy that these posts were by far the most
widely-shared out of all other French activity in the CAR.
Wickstrand 49
The French operation further sought to develop its anti-Russian counter-narrative by
creating doctored images to hyperbolize the negative aspects of the Russian presence. The goal
of this mode of activity was another
method of overtly characterizing
Wagner forces as exploitative and
violent. In one image by a CAR social
media asset, an armed Wagner
mercenary is seen overlooking a gold
mining operation. Yet, as the Stanford
Internet Observatory report noted, the
image of the miner itself is from the
Congo, and the armed Wagner soldier
has been photoshopped into the picture,
and the post even uses a hashtag that
references slavery.
Wickstrand 50
Additionally, another post falsely depicts a massive influx of Wagner troops, with a caption that
describes how “a thousand Russian mercenaries have secretly arrived in Bangui.” However, the
photo had been repurposed and doctored, as the original image is of the arrival of Russian
medics on a military plane in Kyrgyzstan.
Wickstrand 51
Another mode in which the French sought to pursue their counter-narrative was by highlighting
exposed instances of Russian disinformation.
In these posts, pro-French actors emphasized verified reports of the Russian disinformation
campaign exposed by Facebook investigations. In the image on the left, the cartoon Russian is
depicted as angry, drunkenly shaking a bottle of vodka, and overlaid with Soviet iconography
like the Red Star as well as the Hammer and Sickle. On the right, one French operative identifies
three news outlets promoting Russian propaganda. Note, the middle outlet, Ndjoni Sango, is the
same outlet that spread the Pro-Russian narrative discussed previously with regards to a news
story about the misappropriation of state funds being paid to the Wagner Group.
Wickstrand 52
With regards to the medium of video, the French operation created several animations
that showed a hostile portrayal of the Russian presence. Unlike the Wagner video, however, the
animation created by French operatives were not aimed at promoting friendship between France
and Africa, but instead aimed at presenting the Russian presence in CAR as negative.
Here, we see a Russian soldier attacking a CAR citizen, while a commander looks on. Although
this video has since been removed from YouTube and this image is the only available screen
capture, the Stanford Report notes the onlooking commander as saying, “We are SEWA Security
Services. Are we here to help the people of CAR?” SEWA is a known associate of Prighozin’s
Wagner Group.59 Made in the same crude style as the Pro-Wagner video, this piece of French
59 “More-Troll Combat,” Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory.
Wickstrand 53
disinformation is another instance of visual instead of textual propaganda, aimed at enhancing
the French operation’s reach. However, user engagement with the French videos was far less
than that of the Russian propaganda animations.
Conversely, the other mode in which the French conducted their information campaign
was by positively portraying French cooperation. However, in this case the French operation was
highly limited. As the presence of French actors on the ground in CAR was miniscule at the
time, the assets of the broader French information campaign were more targeted towards
outreach in Mali and the Sahel, where the French were more
actively engaged. The single post provided about
French-CAR cooperation, pertains to the sharing of material
aid and personal protective equipment during the COVID-19
pandemic. However, all other social media postings by
non-state actors aimed at promoting the image of France
were directed towards Mali.
Keeping in mind the analytical framework of modes
and limits, it is here that the French operation was most
tangibly limited. The simple fact that French assets were
more utilized in Mali, the country where France had a much
larger presence than in the CAR, explains in part the reason
that Russian social media engagement in the CAR was
greater than it was for the French operation. As seen in the
Wickstrand 54
graphs, the French operation was conducted in CAR on a much smaller scale, both in terms of
the assets dedicated to the country as well as the number of followers their respective accounts
had. Here, we can see that the
follower account of Russian assets
far outweighed the French.60
However, this can be explained in
large part by the scale of operation
by both countries in CAR. Simply,
Russia was dedicating far more
operational capacity to its campaign
in the CAR than in any other country, whereas with France, operational capacity was far more
limited.
60 “More-Troll Combat,” Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory.
Wickstrand 55
Lastly, it is necessary to look at instances where French and Russian assets interacted
with one another. In terms of their respective modes of operation, French and Russian accounts
displayed similar levels of antagonism toward one another through the forms of memes, videos,
and explicit comments. Consistent on both sides of the influence operation was that they posed
as locals, often stealing photos to use as their profile pictures to carry a sense of authenticity. In
the case of direct engagement with each other, video posts and the subsequent replies to those
videos, seem to be the most pointed mode for analyzing how both sides conducted their
operations. In this YouTube screen capture, we can see an animation styled for children,
depicting Russian and CAR national animals as they hold their country flags together in
harmony.61 The video is narrated in French by a child-like voice and discusses the friendship
between the lion (CAR) and bear (Russia) as they defend each other from hyenas.
61 “LionBear,” Улыбаемся Машем, YouTube, July 18, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCZ0YSyWVhk.
Wickstrand 56
In the now-deleted English version of the
video, there is an additional frame omitted
in the French version that explicitly shows
the hyenas to be American and French.62
While the video itself is certainly telling
of the image Russian social media
operatives wished to project with regards
to its relationship with CAR, the response
of a French operative is equally revealing. In this screen capture, we can see an account under
the alias “Martin Kossipé,” who was later discovered to be a member of the French military
posing as a native of CAR. In his
response to the original
Wagner-produced animation, he
admonishes the post as “Russian
propaganda” that uses “very
powerful subliminal messaging
techniques aimed at altering
judgment and influencing the
opinion of the youngest.” In a
post about the same video several
months later, he described the
animation as a “Soviet brainwashing method.”
62 “More-Troll Combat,” Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory.
Wickstrand 57
Having evaluated the respective French and Russian approaches to targeting information
and public opinion in the digital sphere, we will now turn to another mode of analysis - how
France and Russia exercise hard power in the CAR. Before continuing with an analysis of this
second mode, however, it is essential that we revisit this paper’s thesis.
My thesis argues that Russia’s activity in the Central African Republic is a component of
a strategy that seeks to carve out a new bloc of African states with which it can engage in
economic, security, and political partnerships as a means of ensuring regime durability in the
face of global competition and western sanctions. If this is to be the case, then the answer to the
question of “Why CAR in particular?” must be reemphasized. As has been shown, the Central
African Republic is a chronically weak state, mired by decades of instability, and, since 2013, a
de facto civil war. Following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the Putin regime indicated
a resurgent interest in the African continent after a nearly two decade hiatus, and began engaging
in bilateral relations with a variety of African nations largely on the basis of military cooperation.
More important than security agreements, however, are the capabilities that an alliance with the
Russian military affords. As seen in the Syrian Civil War, the Russian military - in defiance of
the western counterterrorism coalition and the rest of the international community - proved itself
to be capable of turning the tide in favor of a president on the brink of collapse.63 Consequently,
the African response to this can be most pointedly seen in the fact that since 2015, Russia has
signed over 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states.64 Now, we can
begin to see why, in the case of CAR President Francois Archange Touadera - the leader of a
state facing intense civil conflict in a historically coup-friendly climate - would turn to Russia.
63 Abdelhak Bassou, “Military Relations Between Russia and Africa, Before and After the War in Ukraine,” Atlantic
Council, February 2023, https://issuu.com/atlanticcouncil/docs/military_relations_between_russia_and_africa_befo.
64 Jakob Hedenskog, “Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa,” FOI Swedish Defense Research
Agency, accessed June 1, 2023,
https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604#:~:text=Since%202015%2C%20Russia%20has%20sign
ed,a%20permanent%20Russian%20military%20base.
Wickstrand 58
Thus, the perception of Russia as a harbinger of stability has facilitated the expansion of its
cooperation with African leaders.
Despite the contingent of official Russian military advisers, by and large it is not the
Russian armed forces that operate on African soil, but the privately owned Wagner Group, whose
chief financier is Yevgeniy Prighozin, a patron of the Putin regime. The Wagner Group can be
defined as a semi-state actor, characterized by its opaquely defined relationship with the Russian
state, but still with undeniable links to the Kremlin given Prighozin’s ties to President Putin.65
The function of the Wagner Group operating in place of the Russian military in Africa is a
critical mode of the Russian strategy on two levels. First, it provides the Kremlin with the
plausible deniability of a legitimate armed Russian presence expanding onto the African
continent. Secondly, it is an inexpensive mode of conducting a security policy, as Wagner
services are far less costly than sending and maintaining a traditional armed force. In terms of
what the Kremlin sees in CAR as a client, instability works in some ways to its advantage.
Essentially, CAR’s leaders are desperate for a solution to persistent armed conflict and views
Russian cooperation as a means to an end, a fact which Moscow happily agrees. Second, the
country’s vast natural resources provide a means for the Kremlin to outsource its expansion into
the country through individuals like Prighozin on the cheap. Lastly, the CARs centralized
geographic position means that it can serve as a launchpad for other expansionary moves it may
take in the future.
With this information, the Russian interest in the CAR becomes more clear. Simply put,
the utility of the Wagner Group is that it is low-risk and inexpensive. It offers a way of
conducting foreign policy by-proxy, the cost of which is shouldered by Prighozin, who in turn
65 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of The Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet
Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019), 182.
Wickstrand 59
receives massive contracts for Wagner Services as well as permission to conduct mining
operations of the CARs vast reserves of gold and diamonds. As a result of the goodwill
generated by Wagner’s service to the government of CAR - which include protection services
and counterinsurgency operations - the Touadera administration has continued to strengthen
official bilateral ties with Moscow.
In the case of the Wagner Group and the CAR, all roads lead back to Putin. Yevgeniy
Prighozin’s enrichment from Wagner’s contracts with President Touadera’s administration as
well as his access to gold and diamond mines in CAR is a clear instance of the domestic
clientelist system of patronage between Putin and his oligarchs at work outside of Russia. But it
is not that the Putin regime merely seeks to export this system outside of Russia for the exclusive
benefit of the oligarchs, rather, it seeks to replicate this network of clientelism with the CAR
president and other African leaders to pursue Putin’s geopolitical goals alongside shared
interests.
The role of France in this paper has been to serve as a counterweight to the actions of
Russia. Examining the French role in Africa alongside that of Russia is a useful analytical tool
for two reasons. First, it serves as a reference point for examining the modes of influence exerted
by a power with deep historical ties and a colonial legacy, France, juxtaposed to a power whose
presence on the continent is comparatively shorter and whose historical involvement is generally
perceived as positive by most Africans. Second, it serves as a function of comparing two
fundamentally different states who are experiencing some strikingly similar phenomenon on the
world stage. For France, though the nation remains bolstered by strong alliances and plays a
leading role in global diplomacy, many countries in its former sphere of influence are slowly
drifting away towards new actors, such as Russia, who offer a strikingly different view of the
Wickstrand 60
future and a strong break with the past. Conversely, it is Russia who has become markedly
isolated on the global stage following its illegal invasion of Ukraine, and has in turn seen a sharp
reduction in its ability to wield clout on the global stage, unlike France for instance. As a result
of this reduction in global political clout, unlike that which, say, France possesses, the Russian
Federation has shifted its sights to a more regional scale and chosen to operate within the former
dominion of France. In other words, Russia has bolstered its efforts towards capitalizing on the
shifting diplomatic ties of African nations away from France to counter its receding geopolitical
standing.
In the following section, we will examine the way in which Russia has exercised hard
power and engaged in its bilateral relationship with the Central African Republic. Through this,
we will discern the modes of engagement that Russia has utilized and gain an understanding of
how these modes have facilitated or limited the Kremlin’s foothold in the CAR. We will also
examine the modes that the French have used to maintain their waning relevance in the country,
in order to compare how the respective French and Russian approaches to their bilateral
relationships with the CAR are indicative of the broader developments in their country’s
geopolitical standing.
Wickstrand 61
Mode Two: Hard Power - Bilateral Relations with the Central African Republic
Since the 2013 outbreak of civil war in CAR, the nation remains deeply unstable and in a
precarious state of order. Today, the government wields little power outside the capital of Bangui,
where most of the population resides, as roughly three-quarters of the nation’s territory is under
the control of armed rebel groups.66 Although the United States and France retain embassies in
Bangui, aid from both countries has dwindled in recent years in tandem with growing
anti-western sentiments among the local population. Even as a large UN peacekeeping force
remains in the country, since the 2017 meeting between President Touadera and President Putin,
Moscow has rapidly established a firm relationship with Bangui and exported arms as well as the
Wagner Group to consolidate its presence in-country.
The bilateral relationship between the CAR and Russia is primarily conducted on the
basis of security through the use of Wagner mercenaries. Described by the scholar Kimberly
Marten as “Russia’s shadow army’s state-run structure,” Wagner has been deployed in a mutually
beneficial way that enables the Kremlin to achieve its expansionary goals while also serving as a
linchpin in the CAR’s fight to win back territory from rebel groups. Additionally, President
Touadera is believed to have Wagner troops within his presidential guard, as well as Russian
advisers who enjoy close connections with key government ministers.67
On an operational level, the mode of Wagner serves to advance several goals of the
Kremlin. First, both the presence and actions of Wagner underscore a key theme of Russia’s push
into Africa, specifically, francophone African nations. As was noted in this paper’s
disinformation section, one essential mode of the Russian disinformation campaign was the
66 Pauline Bax, “Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic,” International Crisis Group, December 3, 2021,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic.
67 Nathalia Dukhan, “Central African Republic: Ground Zero for Russian Influence in Central Africa,” Atlantic
Council, October 2020,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26688.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Acdfb54b8d5160eab9baf4a1fe3e0a9af&ab_s
egments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.
Wickstrand 62
negative portrayal of France, which was a successful source of disinformation content in the
domain of soft power. The key mode of Wagner’s operation has been that it serves as a
counterweight to the UN presence in terms of hard power, engaging in higher-risk
counterinsurgency activities that showcase Wagner as strong and France as feckless.
While in CAR, the Wagner Group has engaged in aggressive combat missions aimed at
displacing and eliminating contingents of rebel groups, and these actions have, despite vocal
concerns from international observers, been largely portrayed as positive to the people of the
Central African Republic. Through large disinformation campaigns conducted by Russian actors
on traditional and social media, as well as with approval from the government, Wagner Forces
are often promoted as champions of peace and security in CAR.68 Conversely, the same
disinformation operatives that promote Wagner also espouse rhetoric that portrays the French
and UN forces that have operated in the country for years as corrupt, weak, and ineffective -
mired in the red-tape of large organizations like the UN.
For its services, the Wagner Group is compensated in a way that not only enriches private
individuals like its founder Yevgeniy Prighozin, but also in a way that deepens the bilateral ties
between CAR and Russia. In exchange for Wagner services, Prigozhin has been awarded access
to the country’s diamond and gold mines, which are believed to generate an estimated $1 billion
worth of resources per year.69 Moreover, these mining concessions also exempt Wagner from
paying taxes on the resources it extracts, and through similar agreements, CAR has outsourced
its customs process and allowed Wagner to industrialize mines to generate further revenue.70 Due
68 Roman Asgarov, “Private Military Company in the Russian Manner: the Wagner Group and Business on the
Blood in the Central African Republic,” Turkish Journal of Policy Studies, no. 37, September 2021,
https://www.ulusam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Private-Military-Company-in-the-Russian-Manner-the-Wag
ner-Group-and-Business-on-the-Blood-in-the-Central-African-Republic.pdf.
69 “Wagner Group’s Mining Operations Help Russia Evade Sanction,” Africa Defense Forum, May 2, 2023,
https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-evade-sanctions/.
70 Ibid.
Wickstrand 63
to Wagner’s status as a semi-state organization, material concessions and policies that enhance
greater cooperation between the CAR government and Wagner can also be viewed as a tacit
agreement towards extending ties with the Kremlin. In this sense, Moscow has a dual mode of
furthering bilateral relations with CAR - that which it does with Wagner, and that which it does
with its official state staff through conventional engagement in three primary modes - security
cooperation, expanding economic links, and political allyship.
Security cooperation outside of Wagner and through the official channels of the Russian
state’s military is the first mode of the Kremlin’s Africa strategy. The cornerstone of Moscow’s
strategy to strengthen its position in the CAR is its “security export mechanism,” a term coined
by the scholar Sergey Sukhankin to describe Russia’s use of security-related services as a means
of becoming a stakeholder in strategically important countries plagued by military-political
instability.71 The key elements of this mechanism are the sale of arms and military training,
mainly in the field counter-terrorism and anti-insurgency tactics.72 Russia’s formal military and
technical training of members of African militaries is another way that links the Russian military
to various militaries across Africa, providing them ongoing access to mid- and senior-level
African military officers throughout their careers.73 At present, the CAR hosts nearly two
thousand “military instructors,” who train and equip members of the police force in addition to
the military.74 On the scale of national militaries, especially those in a massive country like the
Central African Republic, it is reasonable to assume that even a few thousand Russian or Wagner
71 Sergey Sukhankin, “The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for
Africa,” The Jamestown Foundation, January 10, 2020,
https://jamestown.org/program/the-hybrid-role-of-russian-mercenaries-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-moscows-scramble-f
or-africa/#_edn30.
72 Ibid.
73 Siegle, “Russia and Africa.”
74 Nathaniel Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group,” The
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.
Wickstrand 64
soldiers is insufficient to have any substantive impact on the security situation. But as the analyst
Joseph Siegle comments on the presence of Russian and Wagner soldiers, “While limited in
numbers, these programs provide Russia a platform to impart its interpretation of civil-military
relations within the continent.”75 The practice of “imparting [Russia’s] interpretation of
civil-military relations,” can be seen as a systematic mode of influence on security cooperation
with potentially far-reaching implications. Simply put, if Russian and Central African troops
share similar views on the function of the military in relation to government and policy, then
there is an increased likelihood of extrajudicial actions as well as the potential interpretation that
the government is a function of the military, as opposed to the inverse interpretation that exists in
democratic societies. If we step outside of CAR, we can see that this problematic link has already
manifested in Mali, where several officers involved in the country’s 2020 coup had recently
returned from training in Russia.76
At the end of 2022, France officially withdrew the last of its military presence in the
CAR as a response to the growing ties between Bangui and Moscow.77 Despite the continued
presence of MINUSCA forces, the end of France’s own military presence has facilitated further
cooperation between the CAR and Russia, as the French military presence can no longer serve as
an obstacle between the official channels between CAR and Russian elites. As noted by the
analyst Dr. Arielle Fosting, this represents a “downgrading of traditional French power in the
CAR.”78 That France was willing to cut its losses and disembark from military cooperation with
75 Siegle, “Russia and Africa.”
76 Ibid.
77 “Last French troops leave Central African Republic amid closer Bangui-Moscow ties,” France 24, December 15,
2022,
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221215-last-french-troops-leave-central-african-republic-amid-closer-bangui-
moscow-ties.
78 Dr. Arielle Georgette Djoufan Fotsing, “Russia’s Game of Influence in the Reconfiguration of Military
Cooperation in the Central African Republic,” Nkafu Policy Institute, November 9, 2022,
https://nkafu.org/russias-game-of-influence-in-the-reconfiguration-of-military-cooperation-in-the-car/
Wickstrand 65
a long-time ally is indicative of France’s own changing priorities in the security landscape of
sub-Saharan Africa, and, consequently, enables Russia to establish firmer connections with
Bangui.
The establishment of economic links between Russia and CAR is the second mode that
has been used to facilitate the two countries’ bilateral relationship. To understand how these
financial linkages underpin Russia’s relationship with the CAR, we must first look at the
Kremlin’s broader strategy of economic engagement with the African continent. According to
the Stockholm International Peace Institute, by 2012-2016 Russia had become the largest
supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 35 per cent of arms exports to the region, accounting
for nearly one-fifth of its total trade volume on the continent.79 At the first ever Russia-Africa
Summit of 2019 in Sochi, President Putin outlined several avenues for economic cooperation. He
began by stating that Russia’s trade with Africa had doubled since 2014 to 2019, noting that
Russia is gradually working to diversify its exports, while also highlighting the success of
Russian firms in the areas of mineral extraction, energy, and gas.80 In reality, however, the fine
print of Russo-African economic cooperation illustrates a strikingly uneven portfolio. A report
by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies demonstrates several telling figures:81
1. Russia accounts for less than 1 percent of global Foreign Direct Investment in
Africa
2. Russian exports to Africa are 7 times the level of African exports to Russia
3. Over 70 percent of all Russian trade with Africa is concentrated in just four
countries- Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa
4. Since 2018, the total volume of Russian trade has dropped 30 percent in aggregate
79 Jakob Hedenskog, “Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa.”
80 Vladimir Putin, “Russia-Africa Summit,” The Kremlin, President of Russia, October 24, 2019,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893.
81 Joseph Siegle, “Decoding Russia’s Economic Engagements in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies,
January 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/decoding-russia-economic-engagements-africa/.
Wickstrand 66
Russian financial ties with CAR specifically have already been touched on, and are
largely conducted on a “weapons for natural resources” basis. In exchange for the security
services conducted by Wagner as well as the training that instructors provide to the CAR army
and police force, the CAR has licensed mining operations of gold and diamonds to several
Prigozhin-linked shell companies.82 While the mineral wealth generated from these mines
undoubtedly enriches the Wagner founder, an investigation by the Africa Defense Forum has
found that gold and diamonds have been smuggled into loosely regulated mineral markets in the
Middle East, converted into cash, and laundered back to the Russian treasury as a way of
circumventing sanctions.83 From this, we can see the economic utility of security cooperation, as
natural resources provided by the CAR in exchange for Russian security assistance have been
used to pay for the services of private actors like Prighozin who provides Wagner troops, in
addition to providing Russia with funds to combat western sanctions.
As with the mode of security, French economic cooperation with the Central African
Republic is another mode in which we can see a decline in bilateral cooperation between the two
nations. According to data provided by the Observatory for Economic Complexity, an MIT trade
data tracker, exports between the two countries have mutually declined at a steady rate since
1995. France, who offers a diversified export portfolio, has decreased its exports from $77.5
million in 1995 to $39.9 million in 2021, at an annualized rate of decline of 2.52 percent.84 For
the CAR, bilateral economic ties have decreased even more drastically, at an annualized rate of
5.2 percent, from $25.8 million in 1995 to $6.42 million in 2021.85 The simple fact that bilateral
82 Africa Defense Forum, “Wagner Group’s Mining Operations Help Russia Evade Sanction.”
83 Ibid.
84 “France/Central Africa,” Observatory for Economic Complexity, accessed June 7, 2023,
https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/fra/partner/caf.
85 Ibid.
Wickstrand 67
cooperation between the two countries has decreased across several modes of cooperation helps
explain the growing ties between CAR and Russia.
Through the mode of economic cooperation with CAR and the broader continent, Russia
is able to tout a growing network of allies and partners. Regardless of the actual dollar values of
Moscow’s economic dealings on the continent, the essential factor of this cooperation is that
Russia can claim that it maintains vibrant ties with a wide circle of nations despite its ridicule at
the hands of the west.86 The Kremlin can peddle a narrative that, from Cairo to Cape Town, even
in the face of international isolation and western sanctions regimes, the Russian Federation has
emerged with new partners who share common cause with being marginalized by the west and
together will be a potent force in a new multipolar world order.
Before the Kremlin narrative of multipolarity and robust alliances with African nations
can be fully realized, Russia is tasked with being a key partner in stabilizing the African states it
seeks to partner with. To do so, Moscow has utilized a third mode of cooperation in the form of
political allyship and diplomacy with the leaders of the African states it wishes to engage with.
In the case of the Central African Republic, an alliance with President Touadera has been firmly
established through both official and unofficial channels with the Russian state and the Wagner
group respectively. A series of leaked documents obtained by the London-based Dossier Center,
an investigative unit funded by exiled businessman and Kremlin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsk
show “the scale of Prigozhin-linked recent operations in Africa, and Moscow’s ambition to turn
the region into a strategic hub.”87
86 Siegel, “Decoding Russia’s Economic Engagements in Africa.”
87 Luke Harding and Jason Burke, “Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert Influence in Africa,” The
Guardian, June 11, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa
.
Wickstrand 68
The image below is a version of the leaked document translated by The Guardian, and reveals
the extent of Russia’s operational activity in the CAR.88 Here, we can see the principle goals
underlying the Russian mode of
political allyship in the form of
what many scholars have deemed
as “elite-based diplomacy.” In the
document above, the principle
goal in the domain of political
allyship is outlined as “replace
national assembly representatives
and [the] foreign minister, who
are oriented towards France.”
This is a pointed demonstration of
how Russia is conducting its
top-down approach in the CAR.
Having successfully courted President Touadera, Moscow is now seeking to further implant itself
in the country by manufacturing a pro-Russian political environment in the form of
congressional representatives and cabinet-level ministers to pursue its agenda and pivot CAR
away from France.
Today, the mode of political allyship for France in the Central African Republic has been
greatly limited by the ever-expanding influence of Moscow. The current French President
Emmanuel Macron has been active in trying to reform France’s image and restructure her
participation on the continent. Under Macron, the most novel element of the French mode of
88 Ibid.
Wickstrand 69
political allyship is that it aiming to expand cooperation with nonstate actors.89 As the analyst
Corentin Cohen notes, “Macron has been keen to embrace African business and artistic elites
that could help to shape governance in Africa beyond political parties and governments
that the French government and African citizens alike all too often see as unreliable.”90 Unlike
Russia, the Macron administration is greatly concerned with projecting a way of coexistence
between France and Africa on equal terms, rooted in the values of democracy and stability.
Consequently, this may also explain the reason for France’s near absence in the Central African
Republic, especially compared to other former colonies. Macron is known for his active role in
foreign policy and frequent visits to the continent. In early 2023, Macron embarked on a tour of
central Africa to promote “renewed partnerships” and a desire to move away from the idea of
Africa as the “French backyard.”91 Now in his second term, Macron has visited 25 African
nations. Pointedly, the president is yet to visit the Central African Republic. Moreover, CAR now
receives the lowest amount of FDI from France out of all aid-receiving African nations.
Although France retains its embassy in the capital Bangui, the withdrawal of the French military
presence, record-low levels of aid and foreign direct investment, and Macron’s negligence
towards the Touadera administration has been both a response to and cause of the CARs turn
towards Russia. The images below demonstrate these facts.
89 Corentin Cohen, “Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June
2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Cohen_FranceAfrica_Policy_v4.pdf.
90 Ibid.
91 Lise Lesigne, “Le Voyage d’Emmanuel Macron en Afrique Centrale,” Institut Française des Relations
Internationales, May 10, 2023,
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lesigne_antil_macron_afrique-centrale_2023.pdf.
Wickstrand 70
Wickstrand 71
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too does Vladimir Putin relish in the fact that France has
seemingly created one through its absence in the CAR under Macron. France’s mode of political
allyship in the CAR, or lack thereof, has no doubt enabled Russia’s growing ties with the
country. As the Kremlin seeks to further deepen its bilateral relationship with Bangui, it will
continue to do so if the present circumstances of French negligence in the country persist.
By coopting the elites of CAR’s political system, Russia is able to operate more
autonomously, cementing its foothold in the country on advantageous terms. The dynamics
between the two countries are structurally slanted towards Russia - in exchange for inexpensive
services to the CAR government, Russian nationals are able to enrich themselves off of mining
contracts and arms sales to undercut the impact of western sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
Moreover, through its alliances, the clientelist system of patronage that denotes the relationship
of Russian elites to Putin is being constructed in the CAR and throughout Africa by way of the
Russian model of elite-based diplomacy. The relationship between President Touadera and the
Kremlin is the most pointed example of this, as Russia has coopted the Central African president
by supplying offering him security guarantees in exchange for systematic influence. Under the
facade of engaging in bilateral relations, the Putin regime is also able to project power and
peddle its core narrative - that it is successfully insulating itself from attacks by the west, and that
it remains a great power on the world stage because of its ability to build alliances with other
nations.
Wickstrand 72
Section III - Concluding Thoughts
In concluding this paper, let us return to where it began. As the French government
withdrew its last contingent of military forces from the Central African Republic, virtually all
scholars and media outlets characterized the French withdrawal as a marked example of the end
of French primacy in the CAR, and in turn, an indication that the period of France as the
hegemon of its former colonies is ending. Moreover, scholarly work and media reports alike
have pointed to the fact that Russia’s expanding influence in the CAR and throughout the
African continent is proof-positive of the Putin regime’s increasingly offensive measures of
countering the western attempts to weaken Moscow following its full scale invasion of Ukraine.
As such, the underlying assumption of much of the literature on Russia in Africa seemingly
points to inevitability, that Russia is bound to achieve its sought-after expansion against the
desires of the west, a view that is in line with the messianic paradigm that has underscored much
of the last two centuries of Russia’s self-perception in geopolitics. Indeed, this author has also
grappled with avoiding the allure of the Kremlin’s mystique.
But in turning to the past, specifically through the examination of the legacy of French
postcolonial diplomacy with Africa, we can already begin to see cracks in the foundation of
Vladimir Putin’s grand strategy. In many ways, the role of France in postcolonial Africa is
similar to that of contemporary Russia. The modes in which France controlled the vestiges of its
colonial network through economic and security agreements in many ways mirrors the
modern-day agreements between Putin’s Russia and the African states it has allied itself with.
The elite-based diplomacy that underscore postcolonial French and contemporary Russian
foreign policy are emblematic of the narrow view that insulated leaders often see the world
through - that the ability to wield power begins and ends from the top-down.
Wickstrand 73
As a consequence, this paradigm points towards a direction that future scholarly work on
this topic should focus on in order to portray a more holistic view of the African political
landscape with regards to Franco-Russian competition. Namely, this paper opens many avenues
for examining the role of non-state actors within the evolving dynamics of power struggles on
the African continent. As has been shown, the level of influence wielded by social media is of
primary concern for any state that wishes to extend its effective control on a country or region. In
future literature, scholars could look to examine the tangible, local impacts of social media
campaigns waged by foreign powers in Africa in order to discern the malleability of public
opinion and the connectivity of online relationships between state and nonstate actors. Other
avenues for future work could lead to comparative examinations about the relevance of
traditional print or television media in relation to digital content as a way of delineating the
importance of different mediums for waging campaigns on influence. In essence, the relevance
of applying the analysis of this thesis may provide greater insight into the relationship of soft
power and bilateral relations between countries in the Global North and countries in Africa.
By evaluating the continuities and changes in the way France and Russia sought to garner
influence and control on the African continent in the past and the present, we have seen how
changing domestic priorities and contexts have informed the success of this cooperation. In other
words, by viewing the past and present as such, a story begins to emerge. It is a story, essentially,
of how in the 21st century, a great power in decline - Russia - might save itself from the brink.
On the other hand, it is also a story of how another great power seeks to retain its own relevance
on the global stage - France - amidst competition from a desperate force with little to lose and
everything to gain. Although there is little that is certain in the upcoming chapters of this story,
the emergence of Africa as a global force of its own has already begun, and the decisions that
Wickstrand 74
individual African states will make regarding their allegiances to foreign powers will shape the
future of global cooperation, and global competition.
Wickstrand 75
Works Cited
Asgarov, Roman. "Private Military Company in the Russian Manner: the Wagner Group and
Business on the Blood in the Central African Republic." Turkish Journal of Policy
Studies, no. 37 (September 2021): 1-38.
"Barthélémy Bogand." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed June 4, 2023.
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Barthelemy-Boganda.
Bassou, Abdelhak. "Military Relations Between Russia and Africa, Before and After the War in
Ukraine." Atlantic Council, February 2023. Accessed June 12, 2023.
https://issuu.com/atlanticcouncil/docs/military_relations_between_russia_and_africa_bef
o.
Bax, Pauline. "Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic." International Crisis Group,
December 3, 2021.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influenc
e-central-african-republic.
Baxter, Peter. France in Centrafrique: From Bokassa and Operation Barracuda to the Days of
EUFOR. Pinetown, South Africa: Helion, 2019.
Chafer, Tony. "Zero Hour Approaches." In Francophone Africa at Fifty, edited by Tony Chafer
and Alexander Keese, 1–16. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013.
Chaigneau, Pascal. La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique. Paris: CHEAM, 1984.
Charbonneau, Bruno. France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.
Chipman, John. French Power in Africa. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1989.
Clifford, Cayley, and Steven Gruzd. “Russian and African Media: Exercising Soft Power.”
South African Institute of International Affairs, February 2022.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40121.
Cohen, Corentin. “Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 2022.
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Cohen_FranceAfrica_Policy_v4.pdf.
Wickstrand 76
"Conflict in the Central African Republic." Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign
Relations. Accessed May 14, 2023.
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic.
Djoufan Fotsing, Dr. Arielle Georgette. “Russia’s Game of Influence in the Reconfiguration of
Military Cooperation in the Central African Republic.” Nkafu Policy Institute, November
9, 2022.
https://nkafu.org/russias-game-of-influence-in-the-reconfiguration-of-military-cooperatio
n-in-the-car/.
Dukhan, Nathalia. "Central African Republic: Ground Zero for Russian Influence in Central
Africa." Atlantic Council, October 2020.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26688.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Acdfb54b8d5160e
ab9baf4a1fe3e0a9af&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.
Fabricus, Peter. "Russia Starts a New Chapter in Africa." The Daily Maverick, October 29,
2019.
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-29-russia-starts-a-new-chapter-in-africa
“Fin de la présence militaire française en Centrafrique.” Rédaction Africanews, December 15,
2022. https://fr.africanews.com/2022/12/15/fin-de-la-presence-militaire-francaise
Fink, Rachel. "France and the Soviet Union: Intervention in Africa Post-Colonialism." Thesis,
Wittenberg University, 2020.
“France: The ‘Loi-Cadre’ of June 23, 1956.” Internet History Sourcebooks: Modern History.
Fordham University. https://sourcebooks.web.fordham.edu/mod/1956-loicadre.asp.
"Friend or foe? How the Central African Republic’s media reports on Russia." ANCIR iLab,
January 12, 2022.
https://medium.com/african-c-i-r/friend-or-foe-how-the-central-african-republics-media-reports-
on-russia-9c6496729de7.
General de Monsabert. "North Africa in Atlantic Strategy." Foreign Affairs 31, no. 3 (1953):
418–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030975.
Glock, Cynthia. “Can the Central African Republic Carry On Without France?” RUSI Journal
162, no. 6 (Jan 2018): 28-36.
Wickstrand 77
Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. "Introduction: The Past that Europe Forgot." In Eurafrica: The
Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, 1–16. Bloomsbury Academic,
2014.
Harding, Luke, and Jason Burke. "Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Effort to Exert Influence
in Africa." The Guardian, June 11, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-
to-exert-influence-in-africa.
Hedenskog, Jakob. "Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa." FOI Swedish
Defense Research Agency. Accessed June 1, 2023.
https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604#:~:text=Since%202015%2C
%20Russia%20has%20signed,a%20permanent%20Russian%20military%20base.
Hémez, Maj. Rémy. "Operation Sangaris: A Case Study in Limited Military Intervention."
Military Review, US Army, November-December 2016.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-21/Gar
rett-Military-Diversity-1.pdf.
Iandolo, Alessandro. Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali,
1955-1968. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022.
"Last French troops leave Central African Republic amid closer Bangui-Moscow ties." France
24, December 15, 2022.
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221215-last-french-troops-leave-central-african-re
public-amid-closer-bangui-moscow-ties.
Lawson, Colin W. "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa." African Affairs 87, no. 349 (1988):
501-518.
"LionBear." Улыбаемся Машем, YouTube, July 18, 2019.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCZ0YSyWVhk.
Marten, Kimberly. "Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of The Wagner
Group." Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.
Martin, Guy. "Uranium: A Case-Study in Franco-African Relations." The Journal of Modern
African Studies 27, no. 4 (1989): 625-640. http://www.jstor.org/stable/161112.
Wickstrand 78
McArthur, Sarah. "France To Pull Military Support In Central African Republic Amidst
Disputes Over Ties With Russia." OWP, October 25, 2022.
https://theowp.org/france-to-pull-military-support-in-central-african-republic-amidst-disp
utes-over-ties-with-russia/.
Medushevskiy, Nikolay, and Alisa Shishkina. "Modern French Policy on the African Continent:
Transformations of a Françafrique Model." Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden)
57, no. 6 (2022): 1141-1157.
"More-Troll Combat: French and Russian Influence Operations Go Head to Head Targeting
Audiences in Africa." Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory, December 2020.
https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_stanford_report_more_troll_kombat.
pdf.
"Nuclear Power Plants Generated 68% of France’s Electricity in 2021." US Energy Information
Administration, January 23, 2023.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55259#:~:text=Although%20France's%
20first%20commercial%20nuclear,significant%20share%20of%20France's%20electricity
.
Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Soviet Policies in Africa." African Affairs 79, no. 316 (1980): 297-325.
Peltier, Elian, Adam Satariano, and Lynsey Chutel. “How Putin Became a Hero on African TV.”
The New York Times, April 18, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/13/world/africa/russia-africa-disinformation.html.
Posthumus, Bram. “The Curious Case of Russia in Africa.” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2022.
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/5/20/the-curious-case-of-russias-romance-in-ce
ntral-african-republic.
Powell, Nathaniel K. "Battling Instability? The Recurring Logic of French Military
Interventions in Africa." African Security 10, no. 1 (2017): 47-72.
Putin, Vladimir. "Russia-Africa Summit." The Kremlin, President of Russia, October 24, 2019.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893.
"RCA: affaire d’un financement au Wagner, la primature dénonce une désinformation." Erick
Ngaba, Ndjoni Sango, trans. Justin Wickstrand, April 30, 2023.
https://ndjonisango.com/2023/04/30/rca-affaire-dun-financement-au-wagner-la-primature
-denonce-une-desinformation/.
Wickstrand 79
"Resolution 2127 (2013)." United Nations Security Council, December 5, 2013.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/594/43/PDF/N1359443.pdf?Op
enElement.
Reynolds, Nathaniel. "Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the
Wagner Group." The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2019.
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.
"Russia’s Return to Africa." Atlantic Council. J. Peter Pham, March 14, 2014.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/russia-s-return-to-africa/.
Siegle, Joseph. "Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability." In Russia’s Global
Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment, edited by Graeme P. Herd. George C.
Marshall Center, 2021.
https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reac
h-security-and-statecraft-assessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-an
d.
Smith, Richard. "A Popular View of Imperialism: The French Mass Press and the Conquest of
West Africa." Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 5
(1980): 51-57.
Stevens, Christopher. “The Soviet Union and Angola.” African Affairs 75, no. 299 (April 1976):
137-151.
Sukhankin, Sergey. "The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in
Moscow’s Scramble for Africa." The Jamestown Foundation, January 10, 2020.
https://jamestown.org/program/the-hybrid-role-of-russian-mercenaries-pmcs-and-irregula
rs-in-moscows-scramble-for-africa/#_edn30.
"The Statement of Under Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr.
Adama Dieng, on the Human Rights and Humanitarian situation in the Central African
Republic." Adama Dieng, United Nations Security Council, November 1, 2013.
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/our-work/Doc.4_2013-11-1.SAPG
%20Statement%20at%20Arria%20Meeting%20of%20the%20UNSC%20on%20CAR.pd
f.
Wickstrand 80
"Wagner Group’s Mining Operations Help Russia Evade Sanctions." Africa Defense Forum,
May 2, 2023.
https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-eva
de-sanctions/.
"Yevgeniy Prighozin’s Africa-Wide Disinformation Campaign." US Department of State,
November 4, 2022.
https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinfo
rmation-campaign/.
Young, Eric. "Dacko, David." In Encyclopedia of Africa, edited by Colin W Lawson, 1130.
Oxford University Press, 2010.
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-97801953
37709-e-1130.