TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS: TRENDS, EFFECTS, AND DETERMINANTS by NINO SITCHINAVA A DISSERATION Presented to the Department of Economics and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 2008 11 University of Oregon Graduate School Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by: Nino Sitchinava Title: "Trade in Intermediate Goods: Trends, Effects, and Determinants" This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in the Department of Economics by: Bruce Blonigen, Co-Chairperson, Economics Ronald Davies, Co-Chairperson, Economics Glen Waddell, Member, Economics Michael Pangburn, Outside Member, Decision Sciences and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean of the Graduate School for the University of Oregon. June 14, 2008 Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon Libraries. © 2008 Nino Sitchinava 111 in the Department of Economics Nino Sitchinava An Abstract of the Dissertation of for the degree of to be taken IV Doctor of Philosophy June 2008 Title: TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS: TRENDS, EFFECTS, AND DETERMINANTS Approved: Bruce A. Blonigen, Co-Chair Approved: _ Ronald B. Davies, Co-Chair A large number of studies search for stylized facts on the rapid growth, impact, and determinants of international outsourcing of production. The analyses of these studies are considerably constrained by limitations in the international trade data, which do not differentiate between trade in intermediate and finished goods. I improve on these data and develop a trade dataset that draws a clear distinction between trade in intermediate and finished goods. I use new data to provide an integrated view of the importance of U.S. global production sharing. I assess the magnitude and nature of global production sharing, explore its impact on growing U.S. manufacturing wage inequality, and examine the forces driving the location and volume of this trade. My findings indicate that the composition of trade has not changed as previously speculated and that trade in intermediate inputs is just as prevalent as trade in consumer goods. Additionally, my results indicate that the impact of foreign offshoring of intermediate inputs on the growing wage gap in U.S. manufacturing industries is larger than previously estimated. Lastly, I show that quality of contracting environment and thickness of input supplier markets are important factors for the location and extent of trade in specialized inputs. v VI CURRICULUM VITAE NAME OF AUTHOR: Nino Sitchinava GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: University of Oregon, Eugene, OR Whitworth University, Spokane, WA DEGREES AWARDED: Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, Spring 2008, University of Oregon Master of Science in Economics, May 2005, University of Oregon Bachelor of Arts in Economics and International Business, May 2002, Whitworth University AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Microeconomics, Econometrics, Industrial Organization, International Economics PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Oregon, 2003-2008 Independent Course Instructor Introduction to Econometrics, Spring, Fall 2007, Spring 2008 Issues in Industrial Organization, Spring, Fall 2006 Principles of Microeconomics, Summer 2005, Winter 2006 Teaching Assistant Principles of Economics, Principles of Microeconomics, Money and Banking, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Issues in Developing Economies, Introduction to Econometrics Vll Research Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Oregon and Institute for Water Resources U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2005 Research assistantship under direction of Wesley W. Wilson Foundation for Russian American Economic Cooperation, Seattle, WA, 2002- 2003 GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS: Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2003-present Graduate School Research Award, University of Oregon, 2006-2007 Kleinsorge Research Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2006 PUBLICATrONS: Sitchinava, Nino, Mark Burton, and Wesley Wilson, "Heterogeneous Products, Demanders, and Elasticities," Transportation Research Part E, Invited Revision, 2008. Vlll ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professors Bruce Blonigen and Ron Davies for their guidance, insights, and assistance throughout the many stages of this project. Additionally, I thank Christina Steiger, Glen Waddell, Michael Pangburn, and Kelii Haraguchi for useful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author. MOHM pO)J;HTeJUIM, ryrre IT IllaJIHKy. To my parents, Gulya and Shalik. IX Chapter I. INTRODUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 x II. STRUCTURE OF U.S.TRADE 4 11.1 Introduction 4 ILlI Existing Measures of Global Production Sharing 8 ILlL1 Trade in Parts and Components 8 II.IL2 Input-Output Tables and Trade 10 11.11.3 Other Measures 12 11.11.4 Key Implications 12 11.111 Data Description 13 II.IIL1 Dataset Construction and Sources 13 II.III.2 New Data Versus Old Measures 17 ILlV Magnitudes, Composition, and Cyclica1ity 20 ILlV.1 Overall Magnitudes 20 II.IV.2 Commodity Composition 21 ILIV.3 Cyclicality 23 ILV International Specialization of Production 25 ILV 1 Across-Product Specialization by Import Share 26 II.V.2 Across-Product Specialization by Product Share 29 II.V.3 Within-Product Specialization by Unit Values 33 II.VI Conclusion 36 III. OUTSOURCING, TECHNOLOGY, AND U.S. WAGE INEQUALITy..... 37 111.1 Introduction 37 IILII Old and New Evidence of Wage Inequality..................................... 42 IILlII Empirical Methodology 45 IILlV Data and Descriptive Statistics 50 IILV Results 56 IILV.1 Preliminary Regression 57 IILV.2 Stage 1 59 IILV.3 Stage 2 64 Xl Chapter Page IlLVI Sensitivity Analysis 67 IlLVII Conclusion 67 IV. CONTRACTS, MARKET THICKNESS AND OUTSOURCING 70 IV.I Introduction 70 IV.II The Model 74 IV.ILI Model Set-Up 74 IV.II.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis 79 IV.III Empirical Methodology and Data Description 82 IV.IILI Specification 83 IV.m.2 Data Sources and Variable Definitions 85 IV.IV Results 88 IV.IV.l Trade in Intermediate Inputs 89 IV.IV.2 Comparison with Non-Intermediate Imports 92 IV.V Conclusion 96 V. CONCLUSION 97 APPENDICES 100 A. MARKET STRUCTURE INDEX OF HTS IMPORTS 100 B. FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER II 117 C. DATA APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III........................................................... 135 D. FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER III............................................. 142 E. TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV......................................................................... 152 BIBLIOGRAPHY 159 xu LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page B.l. Comparison ofNew and Old Data ofTrade in Intermediate Inputs 118 B.2. U.S. Manufacturing Imports by Category, 1989-2004 119 B.3. U.S. Imports by 3-digit NAICS Industry, 1989-2004 120 D.l. U.S. Wage Inequality, 1963-2005 142 Xlll LIST OF TABLES Table Page A. 1. Market Structure ofImports from the BEA Import-Matrix 103 A.2. Hypothetical Example of Market Structure 109 A.3. Import-Matrix Weights vs. My Weights 110 AA. Types and Frequency ofHTS Clusters 111 B.l. Breakdown ofImports by Utilization Weights, 1989-2004 122 B.2. U.S. Imports Relative Importance, 1989-2004 123 B.3. U.S. Top 10 Industry Imports 124 BA. Pro-Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Imports 125 B.S. List of Sample Countries 126 B.6. U.S. Import Value Market Share by Region, 1989-2004 127 B.7. Largest Gains in Market Share, 1989-2004 128 B.8. Product Penetration by Region, 1989-2004 129 B.9. Largest Gains in Product Penetration by Country, 1989-2004 130 B.I0. Decomposed Import Growth by Region, 1989-2004 131 B.ll. Product Shares by Source Country Income Levels, 1989-2004 132 B.12. Regression of Unit Values on Income, 1989-2004 133 B.13. Regression of Unit Values on Income by Select Industries, 1989-2004.... 134 C.l. Selected Services 141 D.l. Summary Statistics of]\Jon-Structural Variables 143 D.2. Summary Statistics for Structural Variables 144 D.3. Consistency of Data with Equation (IlIA) 145 DA. Stage I - Original Feenstra and Hanson (1999) Specification 147 D.5. Stage I - Full Specification 148 D.6. Stage I - Decomposed Dependent Variable (Refined Measure) 149 D.7. Stage I - Final Specification (Refined Measure) 150 D.8. Stage II - (Refined Measure) 151 E.l. Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 152 E.2. Correlation Matrix ofInteraction Terms . 153 E.3. Sample Countries 154 EA. Contracts and Market Thickness . 155 XIV Table Page E.5. Sensitivity Results 156 E.6. Comparison ofImport Patterns 157 E.7. Comparison ofImport Patterns By Utilization Rates 158 1CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION U.S. trade has increased dramatically over the last four decades, with the export share of GDP doubling and the import share nearly tripling since the 1970s. Various evidence suggests that much of this increase stems from the explosive growth in international outsourcing of intermediate inputs production and finished goods assembly. The rapid widening of the wage gap that happened concurrently with these developments drew the attention of politicians and popular press to the potentially adverse affects of global production sharing. In response, many trade economists have been concerned with various aspects of such overseas production arrangements, mainly: 1) their relative importance, 2) their impact on home economies, and 3) their determinants. Unfortunately, data constraints have hampered progress and it is well understood that the available measures of offshoring do not accurately reflect the true nature and/or impact of global production sharing. Furthermore, the mixed evidence suggested by these measures neither justifies nor dismisses the fear of outsourcing projected by the popular press. In my dissertation I offer a fresh perspective on international outsourcing and the three issues troubling trade economists. I accomplish this goal by first addressing the primary shortcoming of the literature - the unavailability of data on global production 2sharing. With this in mind, I construct data on trade in intennediate goods, which is integral for gauging the value of international outsourcing. The technical documentation of this dataset is provided in Appendix A. Beginning with Chapter II of the dissertation, I employ the new data on intennediate inputs to provide unique insights into the magnitude and the nature of global production sharing. Next, I utilize this knowledge to examine the impact of international outsourdng on U.S. manufactming wage inequality during 1989-2004, which I describe in Chapter III. Finally, in Chapter IV, I explore the detel111inants of global production sharing, with a particular focus on institutions, input supplier markets, and specific investment. Throughout my analyses, I use trade in final goods as a benchmark for assessing the relative importance of trade in intennediate goods. This comparison offers a novel perspective on the relevance of trends, effects, and determinants of outsourcing and highlights one of the contributions of my research. The new data and my analyses uncover a wealth of unique findings on the nature and effects of international outsourcing. In Chapter II, I find that contrary to the common perception, the composition of u.s. impOlis remained relatively constant, with imports of intennediate and consumer goods each comprising roughly a third of u.s. imports during the 1990s and 2000s. Trade in inputs is largely vetiically differentiated, with superior varieties produced in high-income countlies. In Chapter III, I find that international outsourcing is a one of the main drivers of the growing wage gap during the 1990s and that these findings are largely obscured if one uses the old proxies of outsourcing. In Chapter IV, I reveal that input supplying countries with good quality of legal systems and thick supplier markets specialize in the production of inputs that are more specialized. The key finding of my work is that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the patterns of trade in intennediate goods are qualitatively different from trade in finished goods. However, the impact of the two forces on the U.S. economy is very different. 3 4CHAPTER II STRUCTURE OF U.S. TRADE 11.1. Introduction Various evidence indicates that the rapid growth in trade over the last several decades is driven, to a large extent, by a dramatic increase in the offshoring of intennediate inputs production and finished goods assembly. A number of studies search for stylized facts on the magnitude and nature of such overseas production arrangements. However, the results of these studies are considerably constrained by the fact that intemational trade data do not make a clear distinction between trade in intermediate and finished goods. In light of the ongoing political debate on the potentially adverse effects of offshoring on the already shrinking workforce of U.S. manufacturing, the need for such distinction continues to be relevant. This chapter provides an analysis of the patterns of global production sharing, made possible by newly constructed dataset that isolates intennediate goods and a portion of finished goods assembly from total U.S. trade flows. Previous literature circumvented the absence of data on international outsourcing, by relying on two key measures of trade in inte1l11ediate goods. The first measure isolates trade in intermediate goods by focusing on goods described as "parts of' or "components of'. Another measure relies on a crude assumption that economy-wide trade can proxy 5for trade in intermediate goods. It is commonly believed, however, that these measures provide an incomplete or inaccurate view of international outsourcing. Thus, the first measure neglects a vast array of other intern1ediate inputs, e.g., engines, semiconductors, etc, which do not contain "parts" or "components" in their descriptions. In this chapter, I show that it underestimates trade in intermediates by more than three-fold. The second measure allows noise in the estimates of imported inputs, which may impute a potentially large bias when used in a regression analysis. Finally, since the data on trade in finished goods do not exist either, previous studies are not able to estimate the importance of global production sharing relative to other trade. Using the three measures, previous studies' findings are limited to observing a dramatic growth in trade in intem1ediate goods and reorientation to include a larger number of non-traditional trading partners. In this chapter I use a unique dataset of trade in intermediate goods that offers considerable improvements over the previous measures of such trade. First, this dataset is meticulously derived from detailed U.S. trade data, which span over 200 countries and sixteen years. Second, the detivation is based on clearly defined physical and stage-of- processing characteristics of the goods, which include both "parts", "components", and a vast range of other intennediate goods. Third, goods are further decomposed into their estimated end-use demand, so as to not confuse intermediate goods used in manufacturing with repair components purchased by consumers. Finally, unlike the other measures, the new data allow for the direct comparison of the i.ntermediate goods trade with trade in finished goods. 6I utilize the new data on intern1ediate goods to provide a unique view on the structure of the U.S. global production sharing. My contributions dramatically expand the findings of the prior literature. First, I explore the overall trends in the U.S. trade in intermediate goods with respect to overall magnitudes, commodity composition, and cyclical behavior. My findings indicate that contrary to the common speculation, the composition of trade, when measured by import volume shares, has changed little over the period of 1989-2004. However, the content of intermediate inputs in U.S. imports is higher than previously thought and is similar in magnitude to that of consumer goods. Thus, manufacturing materials comprise roughly a third of total U.S. import volumes, while over 70% of products imported in the U.S. are purchased to some extent by U.S. manufacturing for use as intennediates. Next I find that while the commodity composition of materials impor1s remained relatively constant over time, material imports are rapidly gaining imp011ance relative to U.S. output in a number of key industries. For example, the impor1s of computer and electronics, primary metals, and electrical equipment materials imp011s more than doubled relative to U.S. output, constituting 23%, 30%, and 15% of output of respective industries in 2004. Finally, my findings provide reasonable evidence to suggest that imports of manufacturing intermediates are more prone to fluctuations in business cycles, than imports of consumer goods. Next, I use data on materials imports to put to test two alternative predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade. The theory implies that countries with different relative endowments specialize in either distinct sets of products or distinct varieties of ver1ically differentiated products. To examine whether countries specialize in distinct sets 7of materials products, I group countries in regions and income categories that may better reflect endowments distributions across U.S. trading partners. I then check whether some U.S. materials imports and products are sourced predominantly from specific regionlincome groups. Similar to previous studies of total trade pattel11s, I find little evidence of across-product specialization for trade in intellnediates. Next I use data on detailed unit values of materials imports to proxy for differences in vertical characteristics of differentiated products. Using standard panel estimation techniques, I find a positive relationship between unit values and countries' per capita GDP. This result implies that countries use their skill/capital endowment advantage, proxied by higher per capita GDP, to produce vertically superior varieties. The approach taken to identify within-product specialization of trade is complementary to that of Schott (2004). Schott (2004) sets out to test the two predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade using detailed U.S. impOlis unit values for 1972-1994. He finds a positive relationship between countries' endowments and U.S. import unit values. My analysis is different from that of Schott in that I examine the extent ofintemational specialization for U.S. imports ofintennediate inputs and for a more recent period of 1989 to 2004. Additionally, I examine specialization patterns across selected industries, durable and non-durable manufacturing, and total manufacturing impOlis. Compared to Schott's results for 1980s, my estimates indicate that the importance of within-product specialization increased substantially in the 1990s. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section II.II documents the relevant existing empirical research. Section II. III provides a detailed description of my 8dataset. Section II.IV establishes some stylized facts on trade in intermediate goods. Section II.V explores international specialization of production. Section II.VI concludes. 11.11. Existing Measures of Global Production Sharing A number of studies attempt to establish stylized facts on the extent of global production sharing in the forn1 of international outsourcing of manufactUling or processing of inteffi1ediate inputs and assembly of finished goods. Until recently, however, data constraints have prevented researchers from gauging the full scope of international outsourcing, as the existing trade data do not differentiate between trade in intermediate and finished goods. Consequently, previous research resOlis to crude estimates of such trade of which three measures stand out the most: 1) trade in parts and components, 2) proxies based on input-output relationships; and 3) other, i.e. processing trade. It is commonly believed, however, that these estimates either capture only a subset oftrade in intermediate inputs, are limited to only a number of countries, and/or fail to capture the true magnitude of trade altogether. Nevertheless, the explosive growth of outsourcing during the recent decades suggested by these estimates convey the growing importance of global production sharing. In the survey below I investigate the current approaches to decomposing intemational trade into relevant components, the results of these efforts, and their limitations. 11.11. J Trade in Parts and Components The most common approach to assess the trade in intem1ediate inputs or global production sharing is to look at trade in parts and components. This approach was 9pioneered by Yeats (2001), who brought attention to the changes in the SITe system of trade classification, which greatly expanded the number of product groups identified as "parts" and "components". One limitation of this approach is that the coverage of these items is mostly limited to the machinery and transport equipment sector of trade (SITe 7). Another shortcoming is that this approach limits intennediate trade only to that containing "parts of' or "components of' in the product description. Thus, stylized facts derived from this approach largely discount global production sharing of other vital manufacturing sectors, e.g. computers and electronics, and omit a large array of other processed inputs in machinery and transpOli equipment sector, e.g. internal combustion engines (Kaminski and Ng 2005). Despite these shortcomings, previous investigation of trade in parts and components provide some indication of the patterns and explosive growth of global production sharing. Thus, studies suggest that, while cross-border fragmentation of production initially began as North-North trade, it is rapidly transitioning into trade between the developed and developing countries. For example, in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the U.S. and Japan were the largest exporters of transport and machinery components and parts in the world, both in total dollar value and as a share of their total exports, where a large portion of this trade took place between these countries (Yeats 2001). However, the U.S. and Japariese shares of total world exports of parts and components declined from 22% and 16% in 1987 to 16% and 11 % in 2003, respectively, while East Asia's share grew from 8% in 1987 to 25% in 2003 (Kimura et al. 2007). A similar upward trend has been documented for the transition economies of Central 10 Europe (Kaminski and Ng 2005). The recipients of parts and components expOlis of East Asia and Central Europe are not only North America, Japan, and Western Europe, but also an increasing number oflow and middle-income countries (Yeats 2001; Kimura et al. 2007). II.!!.2 Input-Output Tables and Trade An alternative approach to estimating trade in intermediate goods combines data on total impOlis with data from input-output tables to determine the extent of an industry's purchases of intennediate inputs from overseas suppliers. This measure was originally proposed by Feenstra & Hanson (1996) and, for each industry i, is constructed as follows: I ~[ . ~~o~ '1 .i....J purchases of intern!. inputsiH . J . , ) J dom.output)+lInportsJ -exports j (11.1) where subscript} refers to an industry supplying input} to industry i, where i,j = J, ...N. Each product tern1 in equation (II.1) is interpreted as industry i's estimate of imported material inputs from industry j. The measure in equation (II. 1) is generally represented as a share of industry i's total expenditure on non-energy intennediates to arrive at industry imported input share. Equation (II.1) uses thejth supplier's total import share in total domestic supply to estimate how much of the ith sector's input purchases are due to imports. The underlying assumption that total import share is a reasonable proxy for estimating the import share of intennediate inputs may be flawed. At high levels of supplier industry aggregation at This formula first appears in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), but has been originally used by the BEA in construction of imported input purchases for the Import Matrices. 11 which these measures are commonly constructed, total imports and total domestic supply encompass imports and output of both intermediate and non-intennediate goods. Then the the import share in domestic supply of all goods used in the numerator of equation (ILl) may in fact over or underestimate the impOli share in domestic supply of only intennediate goods. As a result, the measurement error introduced in equation (II.l) may be potentially very large. I discuss the extent of the measurement error in the next section. A number of studies use the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) measure of imported intemlediates to determine the extent and characteristics of vertical fragmentation of production(e.g. Campa and Goldberg 1997; Feenstra and Hanson 1999,2001). Their findings indicate that the use of imported intermediates has increased in many industrial countries since the 1970s. For example, U.S. impOlied intennediate inputs, expressed as a share of total non-energy intennediates purchases, nearly doubled from 6.5% in 1972 to 11.6% in 1990. On the other hand, Canada and Japan are shown to outsource over 20% of their total materials purchases to overseas suppliers in the 1980s and early 1990s (Campa and Goldberg 1997; Feenstra and Hanson 1999,2001). Additionally, the value of imported intermediates embodied in expOlied goods are shown to have accounted for 30% of the growth in the overall export GDP share between 1970 and 1990 and that it grew by about 40% between 1970 and 1995 for ten OECD countries when measured relative to exports (Hummels et al. 2001,2003). 12 11.11. 3 Other Measures The two measures described above are the primary measures of trade in intennediate goods used in the literature. There are a number of studies, which focus on a subset of trade in inte1111ediates, which involves intennediate goods that are imported (exported) for processing and later are exported (imported) back to the country of origin. To measure "processing trade", studies either examine trade under special tariff provisions, which exempt inputs imported for processing from custom duties, or proxy for such trade by looking at the imported intermediate input content of exports. 2 These measures are heavily limited in the scope of their country, commodity, and year coverages (Feenstra et a1. 1998, Chen et al 2005). Additionally, with the wide-spread adoption of free trade agreements, some special tariff provision are becoming obsolete (Yeats 2001). For example, U.S. processing reimports declined from 12.2% in 1990 to 8.5% in 1995, where much of the decline is likely to be attributable to the producers' failure to claim the tariff provisions after the introduction ofNAFTA (USITC 1996; Feenstra et a1. 1998). Il.Jl.4 Key Implications The country, sector, and commodity-level restrictions and shOJi time-spans that characterize the current data used to estimate the extent of global production sharing considerably limit the information that is available to us about the current state of global production sharing. The studies that use these data are able to identify only two primary 2 For studies of "processing trade" under special tariff provision see USITC (1996); Feenstra et al. (I 998), Egger & Egger (2005), Swenson (2005). For studies of proxies of "processing trade" see Hummels et al (2001), Yi (2003), Chen et al. (2005) 13 trends of trade in intennediate goods. These trends characterize, for the most pmi, only trade in the machinery and transportation equipment sectors. First, they show that trade in intennediate goods increased dramatically over the past several decades, specifically, dUling the 1980s and 1990s. Second, there is an increasing reOlientation of the developed countries' trade in inten11ediate goods away from their traditional Western suppliers. In this chapter I expand our understanding of the extent and characteristics of U.S. trade in intennediate goods by relying on new data on trade in intennediate goods. These data significantly improve on the measures of trade discussed above in that they span sixteen years, a comprehensive set of imported manufacturing commodities, and over 200 U.S. trading partners. Using these data, I uncover new dimensions of global production sharing in regards to the magnitude and composition of trade, the characteristics of source countries and commodities. 11.111. Data Description This chapter exploits a new dataset, which links a recently constructed Market Structure Index ofHTS Imports (Imports Index) with data on detailed U.S. import transactions. I discuss the dataset construction and sources and compare the new data to existing measure of trade in intennediate goods below. 11.JJI.l Dataset Construction and Sources The Imports Index classifies detailed U.S. manufacturing imports into manufacturing materials, non-manufacturing supplies, capital goods, and consumer 14 goods. The Imports Index is constructed from a number of official government sources. The first is a dataset of all U.S. manufacturing import products classified according to the ten-digit coding of the Hannonized Tariff System of the United States (HTS), and maintained by the U.S. International Trade Commission. These data cover all manufacturing products that crossed into the U.S. between 1989 and 2004 inclusive. The detailed descriptions of HTS products identify the physical characteristic of products and their stages of processing, or the related industry that has use for the good. These descriptions allowed me to classify imported products by their final destination markets, e.g. manufacturing materials. Nevertheless, a large share of products are implied to serve multiple final destination markets, i.e. manufacturing materials and consumer goods. I verify the accuracy of the implied final destination markets against three existing indexes of U.S. domestic and imported production. The first index is the Federal Research Board (FRB) Market Structure of Industrial Production Index, which classifies detailed domestic industrial production into manufacturing input, non-manufacturing input, capital, and consumer end-use markets. The second source is the BLS Stage of Processing Index, which classifies the detailed manufacturing commodities into various stages of processing, i.e. crudes, intermediates, consumer goods, and capital goods. The final data sources are the BEA Imp0l1 Matrix and Input-Output table for 1997, which provide data on imported and domestic input purchases by industry. I use the input purchases data from the BEA Import Matrix to assign relative importance weights to the HTS imports that serve multiple markets. (See Appendix A for full description of the imp0l1s index and its methods of construction.) 15 As the result of these effOlis, the Impolis Index classifies impoli products by four final destination markets: manufacturing materials, non-manufacturing supplies, capital goods, and consumer goods. Manufacturing materials consist of (1) goods that are incorporated into final goods produced by a manufacturing industry and (2) those that are used during the production of final goods3• The first category of materials incorporates intennediate inputs into non-durable manufactming, e~g., flour, vegetable oils, wood pulp, wood logs, industrial chemicals, plastics, and textiles, and materials for durable manufacturing, e.g., metal mill products and parts and components of machinery and equipments. The second category of materials are intennediate inputs that complement the production of final goods, e.g., processed fuel and lubricants, packaging materials, some administrative supplies, and others. Non-mam!facturing supplies are defined as inputs into the non-manufactming sector; i.e., construction, agriculture, utilities, and other industries. For example, construction supplies include building lumber, plywood, millwork, glass, plumbing fixtures, etc, while agricultural supplies consist of feeds, processed fuels, machinery repair parts, etc. Capital investment goods consist of products that are used to manufacture or transport other goods in the manufacturing sector and include goods, such as machine tools for cutting and stamping metals, other specialized machinery (such as fa1111 machinery and textile machinery), heavy trucks, ships, and boats. In addition, this grouping includes non-manufacturing industry and non-defense related government 3 Intermediate goods are also commonly referred to as industrial materials or just materials (FRS). 16 products, such as computers, office furniture, and heating equipment, that are used in the operation of businesses. Defense-related government investment such as military weapons and transportation equipment are also included in this category. Finally, consumer goods are defined as nondurable goods and durable goods purchased by consumers and defense- and non-defense related government supplies4• Examples of these goods include such nondurable items as foods, children's apparel, prescription drugs, gasoline, home heating oil, and residential electric power and durable items as passenger cars, light trucks, household appliances, and home electronic equipment, to name a few. On the other hand, examples of defense and non-defense related government supplies include ammunition, repair paI1s for military equipment and machinery, education-related products, office supplies, and repair pm1s for non-military equipment and machinery owned by the government. As noted above, a large p0l1ion of the la-digit HTS products are classified as serving multiple final destination markets. Table B.l illustrates the shares of imported manufacturing materials and consumer goods according to their assigned utilization weights. Thus, Columns I, II, and lII, refer to those imp0l1ed materials, which have final destination market weights of at least 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. As can be seen, only 16% of manufacturing materials products, which comprise roughly 23% of total materials imp0l1 volumes, are used by U.S. manufacturing alone. However, over 60% of materials products, which comprise roughly 84% of total materials import volumes, are utilized 4 Consumer nondurables consist of items with a shelf life ofless than three years and that are ready for final demand. Consumer durable goods include products that have it much longer shelflife than nondurables (SOP). 17 predominantly as manufacturing materials (rate of utilization is larger than 50%). On the other hand, less than 0.5% of consumer goods serve the consumer markets alone. The figures for consumer goods imports show, that consumer goods are generally also classified as non-manufacturing suppliers (e.g., paper), capital investment goods (e.g., computers), and/or manufacturing materials (e.g. tires). In this chapter, I place my focus on trends in U.S. trade in manufacturing materials, but contrast them with the trends of trade in consumer goods. As I reveal in the following section, the two types of trade components represent the largest share of the U.S. imports. I link the ImpOlis Index to detailed U.S. trade transactions from Feenstra (2002) and U.S. Census (2005) to derive data on import volumes of intermediate and non-intemlediate goods for the period of 1989-2004. I then use these data to derive stylized facts of the trade in intennediate goods, with a particular focus on differences across region and industries. For industry-level statistics, I aggregate data up to 3-digit industry classification according to the North American Indushial Classification System (NAICS). While NAICS was not introduced until 1997, the U.S. Census provides a NAICS-HTS concordance for HTS codes going as far back as 1989. Next, I compare the new data on inputs trade with the previously used measures of such trade and reveal potentially severe measurement elTors in the old measures. 11.111.2. New Data Versus Old Measures In my comparison of new and old data on offshoring of intermediate inputs, I focus on the measure of trade in intermediates defined by "parts" and "components" 18 descriptions, and the measure of imported inputs originally proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). These measures are described in Sections lULl and lUL2, respectively. Figure B.I illustrates the differences between the new data on imports of intermediate goods and the old data on imports of goods labeled as "parts" and "components". The classification of "parts" and "components" was kindly provided by Schott (2004), and includes a selection of 1989-2001 ten-digit HS codes, which contain these words in their description. As can be seen, the differences between the two measures are very distinct and large. The volume of U.S. trade in "parts" and "components" underestimates by more than three times the total volume of trade in intermediate goods. Next, I tum my attention to the second measure of import of intennediate inputs originally proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and shown in equation (II. I ). This measure is useful for assessing the extent to which each domestic industry impOlis intennediate inputs, which is not identified in raw imports data. As discussed in section lLII.2, equation (11.1) employs an industry's total import share in totaJdomestic supply to proxy for the industry's share of imports of inputs in the domestic supply of inputs. If for some industries, the total import share includes data on both intem1ediate and non- intennediate goods, the measure of imported inputs in equation (II. 1) may be driven by variation in the import share ofnon-intennediates. Using the new data on imports of intennediate goods, I am able to refine the original measure and derive imported inputs of each industry i as: 19 ~ l .. . ] interm. imports (II 2) L. jJurchasesof znterm. znputs j ·r . .. !. l'j / znterm. dam. output j +mterm. Imports j - znterm. exports} where as before SUbSCliptj refers to an industry from which industry i purchases its intennediate inputs, where iJ = 1, ...N. The measure in equation (II.2) differs from the original measure of imported inputs by the right tem1 of the numerator, where the total impOli share is replaced by import share of intennediate inputs. To anive at the two measures of imported inputs, I combine data on imports with data on inputs purchases. The inputs purchases are obtained from U.S. input-output tables provided by the BEA. The industries in input-output tables are classified on the three- digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) basis during 1989-1996 and four-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) basis during 1997-2004. I aggregate the imports data up to three-digit SIC and four-digit NAICS industries, using the HS-SIC and HS-NAICS concordances provided by U.S. Census. I then calculate the original and the refined measures of imported inputs in equations (ILl) and(II.2), respectively, and express them as shares in total non-energy materials purchases. Figure B.2 illustrates the movements in manufacturing weighted averages of imported input shares during 1989-2004, where the discontinuity in the graphs identifies the switch from SIC to NAICS. The differences between the two measures are distinct, although not as large as those shown for the first measure of trade in "parts" and "component". The differences are most pronounced when examining on a detailed industry level, not reported here. 20 In summary, the comparison of the new data on trade in intermediate goods with the previously used measures of such trade suppOlis the literature's suspicions on the accuracy ofthe old measures. II.IV. Magnitudes~ Composition~ and Cyclicality In this section, I characterize U.S. imports of manufacturing materials along several dimensions. First, I examine the overall magnitudes of such trade over the period of 1989-2004, with a focus on import volumes, number of traded products, and their respective growth rates. Next, I examine the composition of materials trade by industry and highlight recent trends of primary traded commodities. Finally, I identify a distinct pro-cyclical behavior of U.S. materials imports, which is distinguished fi'om that of other components of U.S. trade. ll.lVl Overall Magnitudes The relative composition of trade is speculated to have changed over time in favor of intenl1ediate goods. Figure B.2 utilizes the new data to reveal the relative composition of U.S. imports during 1989-2004. The imports of materials and consumer goods appear to maintain a roughly similar volume and growth during 1989-2000. The early 2000s saw the trends in the two types of trade diverge, wherein materials imports declined, while consumer goods imports continued to grow roughly at the same rate. Table B.2 shows that materials imports nearly tripled in size, from 131.7 in 1989 to 351.9 billion U.S. dollars in 2004, which corresponds to roughly a third and 29% oftotal imports in 1989 and 2004, respectively. Additionally, the economic significance of materials trade 21 continued to grow, as the share of materials imports relative to total manufacturing output increased from 4.8% to 8.4%. The composition of imported products also changed little over time. Table B.2 shows that the number of products used as manufacturing materials increased from 8497 in 1989 to 10615 in 2004. However, their share in total import products increased only from 71.2% to 73.9%, respectively. The number of import products used as manufacturing materials grew roughly at an average rate of 1.5% per year, slightly ahead of the 1.2% growth of consumer products. These findings indicate that, contrary to the common speculation, the composition of trade, when measured by import volume shares, has changed little over the period of 1989 to 2004. However, the content of intermediate inputs in U.S. imports is higher than previously thought and is similar in magnitude to that of consumer goods. Il.lV.2 Commodity Composition In this section I examine which commodities are ofplimary importance for trade in manufacturing matelials and whether their relative standing has changed over time, both with respect to other commodity imports and U.S. domestic output. First, I illustrate the relative imp011ance of materials imports in U.S. imports by three-digit NAICS commodities. Figure B.3 shows that materials imports comprise a significant share of most major imported commodities. Exceptions to these are Food/Beverage/Tobacco (311 & 312), Apparel & Leather, & Allied (315 & 316), Printing (323), Fumiture (337), and 22 Miscellaneous (339) industries, which tend to to be non-manufacturing supplies- or consumer goods-heavy. In Table B.3 I report statistics of market shares of top commodities of materials and consumer goods imports in their respective total imports. The commodity composition of materials imports remained relatively constant during 1989-2004, with computers and electronics and transportation equipment commodities topping the list. Additionally, computer and electronics matelials imports are the only category of imp011s that show a significant growth in market share, from 19% of total materials import in 1989 to 24% in 2004. In the consumer goods markets, the composition of imports has also remained relatively stable over time. The apparel, leather and related products and transportation equipment imp011s remain the most heavily demanded consumer goods from overseas, although their market shares declined by 4% and 3% during 1989-2004. On the other hand, the market share of consumer chemicals more than tripled in magnitude, from 4% of total consumer goods import in 1989 to 13% by 2004. Furthel111ore, it appears that the relative importance of materials and consumer goods with respect to U.S. output has increased significantly for many 3-digit NAICS commodities. For example, materials imports of computer and electronics, primary metals, electrical equipment, machinery, and fabricated metal products have roughly doubled their share in U.S. output of the respective industries during 1989-2004. These trends are even more pronounced for consumer goods imports. For example, apparel, leather and related consumer goods imp011 share grew from 50% of U.S. output in 1989 to a striking 258% of the output in 2004. 23 The key point to take away from these initial findings is that the commodity composition of materials imports remained relatively constant over time, with the exception of the computer and electronics industry which gained further dominance as a leading source of materials imports. Despite relatively little change in their composition, however, material imports in most commodity groupings have increased significantly relative to U.S. output, with some industries more than doubling their relative share. I1.1V3 Cyclicality The period of 1989 to 2004 covered in my sample contains the longest U.S. business cycles ever recorded. According to the NBER's Business Cycles Dating Committee, the 1991-2001 business cycles lasted for 128 months, when measured from trough to trough (NBER). Figures B.2 and B.3 illustrate the volatility of imports over time. It seems that U.S. material imports are perhaps more volatile with respect to fluctuations in the U.S. economy than imports of consumer goods. For example, during the troughs of 1991 and 2001, materials imports grew at negative rate of 1.49% and 12.51 %, respectively. During the same years, however, imports of consumer goods experiences a positive a positive rate of 1.41 % and a negative rate of 0.54%, respectively. The correlations and simple regression analyses shown in Table B.4 shed some light on the sources of imports volatility. In these tables, I use real U.S. sectoral output and real GDP as measures of manufacturing-wide and economy-wide business cycles. Output data is obtained from the BEA and covers 18 three-digit NAICS industries. The correlations shown in Table BA reveal that U.S. imports of intermediates are more 24 correlated with fluctuations in the manufacturing output, rather than economy-wide fluctuations. The opposite is true, however, for imports of consumer goods. To explore this issue more rigorously, I proceed to estimate the elasticity of the response of impOlis to business cycle fluctuations, as .d In (Imports g .il) == f3 0+ f3 1.d In (Output if) + f3 2 Mat g *.d In (Output il ) +E g .il , (IL2) where Imports g.il are imports of materials or consumer goods, deflated by the CPI deflator, sourced from industry i at time t, Output il is real output of U.S. industry i, and Mat g is a variable that takes a value of 1 if imports are manufacturing materials and 0 otherwise. Column I ofTable BA reports the estimated elasticity of response of imports to output fluctuations. The coefficient on the materials dummy interaction is positive and statistically significant, indicating that changes in materials impOlis are more elastic with respect to changes in business cycle fluctuations, relative to changes in consumer goods. In Column II, I include changes in national GOP instead of the sectoral output. The coefficient on the materials dummy interaction is statistically insignificant in this specification. The findings described above provide evidence to suggest that imports of manufacturing intermediates are more prone to fluctuations in U.S. manufacturing rather than economy-wide business cycles, and more so than impOlis of consumer goods. This is consistent with what is known about the firms' response to business cycles, where 25 industries forecast changes in demand by slashing of their inventories in times of recessions and increasing them during recovery. ILV. International Specialization of Production In this section of the chapter, I use data on materials import to put to test two alternative predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade. The theory implies that countries with different relative endowments specialize in either distinct sets of products or distinct varieties of vertically differentiated products. Thus, the first prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory would imply, for example, that the labor-abundant Philippines export labor-intensive apparel, labor and capital abundant Ireland exports labor- and capital-intensive chemicals, while capital abundant Japan focuses on capital-intensive machinery. On the other hand, given the same set of countries and a hypothetical product, such as a television set, the second prediction would imply that Philippines exports televisions made with color tubes, Ireland exp011s television sets made with rear- projection, and Japan exports television set made with plasma displays, given their relative endowments and relative sophistication of the television production technologies. To examine whether countries specialize in distinct sets of materials products, I group countries in regions and income categories, that may better reflect endowments distributions across U.S. trading partners. I then check whether some u.s. matelial imports and products are sourced predominantly from particular region/income groups. Similar to previous studies of total trade patterns, I find little evidence of across product specialization for trade in intelmediates. Next I use data on detailed unit values of 26 materials imports to proxy for differences in vertical characteristics of differentiated products. Using standard panel estimation techniques, I find a positive relationship between unit values and countries' per capita GDP. This result implies that countries use their skill/capital endowment advantage, proxied by higher per capita GDP, to produce vertically superior varieties. Other studies testing the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory find scant evidence in favor of endowment-driven trade at either the industry level (e.g., Bowen et al. 1987, and Trefler 1995) or detailed product level (Schott 2004). On the other hand, Schott (2004) perfoTI11s an empirical test of the second prediction on detailed U.S. impOlis unit values during 1972-1994 and finds a positive relationship between countries' endowments and U.S. import unit values. The approach taken in this section is complementary to that of Schott (2004). My analysis is different from that of Schott, in that I examine the extent of international specialization for U.S. imports of intermediate inputs and for a more recent period of 1989 to 2004. Additionally, I contrast the extent of intemational specialization of trade in intennediate goods to that of trade in consumer goods. Finally, I examine specialization patterns across selected commodities, i.e., computer and electronics, transportation equipment, chemicals, machinery, and electrical equipment, durable and non-durable products, and as a whole. II. Vi Across-Product Specialization by Jmport Share In an attempt to reveal trends in specialization across materials products, I first explore the impOli shares of U.S. trading partners across products. Large asymmetries in 27 impOli shares across products should serve as a sign for across-product specialization. I find these asymmetries to be prevalent in some materials producing industries more than others, pointing to some across-product specialization in materials trade. At the same time, however, I find little suppOli of specialization across consumer goods products. To facilitate the comparison of trading partners, I make use of the country-region assignments provided in Table B.S. Three aspects of how countries are assigned to regions deserve mention. First, Latin America includes all of the countries of Central and South America, excluding Mexico. Second, I define ASEAN as its current 10 member countriesand includes South Korea & Bhutan. Third, OECD comprises of its 18 founding members, excluding Canada and the U.S., and includes the more recent members Finland, Australia, and New Zealand. I exclude Mexico, Canada, and Japan from OECD, as I intend to keep them as independent categories. Additionally, I define China as China (mainland), Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. Finally, the OTHER category consists of the remaining countries. The resulting set of countries is intended to capture regions, according to a more unifoll11 mix of wageslincome levels and common cultural characteristics. The Other category serves as an exception, since it groups high- income Israel with low income India. Table B.6 reports the U.S. market share of U.S. major trading partners in te1111S of import value by industry, for the first and last years of the sample. A partner's market share by industry is calculated as the sum of U.S. imports from that industry and region as a share of U.S. total imports within the industry. At first glance, it appears that more than half of U.S. imports of intermediate goods is supplied by the world's most developed 28 economies, Canada, Japan, and OECD, although this share decreased from 70% in 1989 to 51 % of total manufacturing impOlis in 2004. The less developed Mexico and China are the primary source countries gaining from the loss of the market share of the traditional partners. The market shares of Mexico and China are roughly equal and, when combined, increased from 12% in 1989 to 26% of total U.S. manufacturing imports in 2004. These trends come in contrast to those of consumer goods. First of all, Canada, Japan and GECD demand a much smaller share of U.S. impOlis of consumer goods that is only 50% in 1989 and 42% in 2004. All of the loss in the combined market share, in fact, stems only from Japan. Furthermore, Mexico barely competes with China for a share in U.S. imports, sourcing 8% and 25% of total U.S. materials imports in 2004, respectively. In the end, nearly 50% of consumer goods are sourced from China and OECD, and these countries appear stable in their positions as equal leaders. At second glance, Table B.6 reveals some heterogeneity in market shares of trading partners of materials across industries. For example, it appears that imports of nondurable intennediates are heavily concentrated in the hands of Canada and GECD. Both of these countries are U.S. leading sources of chemicals matelials during 1989-2004. In durable manufacturing, Japan and OECD continue to supply the U.S. with the majority of machinery intermediates, while neighboring China and ASEAN are taking the leading positions in sourcing computer and electronics paIis and components. By 2004, Mexico takes the lead in the U.S. imports market of electrical equipment materials. At the same time, however, transportation equipment intermediates are sourced roughly equally from Canada, Japan, Mexico, and GEeD. In summary, these findings suggest that 29 across-product specialization is more prevalent in some materials producing industries than others. The patterns of specialization of materials imports are quite different from those of consumer goods. With the exception of the transportation equipment, China and OECD appear to dominate the market of both durable and nondurable consumer goods impOlis. Furthennore, OECD's leadership continues to grow at the expense ofASEAN countries and China's leadership at the expense of Japan in the nondurable and durable consumer goods markets, respectively. To shed more light on the U.S.'s most dynamic trading partners, Table B.7 reports the countries with top ten absolute changes in imports market share between 1989-2004. China and Mexico top the lists in both materials and consumer goods imports. II. V2 Across-Product Specialization by Product Share I examine intemational specialization across materials products further by exploring differences in import product penetration of U.S. trading pminers. Each cell in Table B.8 reports the percentage of products in each industry imported in the U.S. from a region. Regional penetration is 100% if every product in the industry is sourced from at least one country in the region and 0% if no country in the region sources any of the industry's products to the U.S. One would expect that product penetration should not be high by each region, since each region should specialize in a set of goods. 30 As indicated in Table B.8 intermediate imports product penetration by OECD is over 90% and by other countries/regions is between 40% and 80% during 1989 and 2004. The same pattern emerges for product penetration of consumer goods imports. However, both Japan and OECD have experienced slight declines in the product penetration between 1989 and 2004, while the less developed U.S. trading partners are seeing an increase in their product penetration. Table B.9 ranks countries with the biggest absolute gains in penetration between 1989 and 2004. The same countries that had the highest absolute change in market share top the list for highest absolute change in product penetration. The high product penetration of countries/regions reported in Table B.8 poses fmiher evidence against the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that countries specialize in a distinct mix of products (Schott 2004). Increases in import market share occur through increasing imports of incumbent products and an increase in the number of products imported. I decompose growth in imports of intermediate goods into those parts that are attributable to growth of imports of the continuously produced goods (intensive margin) and growth of imports from the entry and exist of new products (extensive margin). Table B.1 0 shows the results of the decomposition growth of U.S. impOlis from each source country/region for overall manufacturing and by industry. In contrast to previous tables in this section, I use eight- digit HS codes rather than ten-digit HS codes in the decomposition. This is due to the fact that the HS code classification has undergone many revisions over the period of 1989-2004 due to both methodological and tariff schedules changes, which may assign the same commodities different HS codes. In my experience of dealing with the HS 31 codes, these changes are reflected primarily in the last two digits of the ten-digit HS codes. Thus, restricting attention to eight-digit HS product codes may circumvent the discrepancies in the HS classification over time at least partially. As indicated in Table B.1 0, the relative contribution of the extensive versus intensive margins varies across industries and import types. The extensive margin is significantly more important for computer and electronics industry across both intennediate and consumer goods import growth. On the other hand the extensive margin is more important for intermediate goods impOlis and intensive margin is more important for consumer goods imports of electrical equipment industry. The reverse is true in the machinery sector. All in all, however, it is the intensive margin that is relatively more important in the growth of imports of intermediate and consumer goods. The message of the discussion above is relatively clear: when trade is divided into thousands of products, there is little evidence over time of endowment-related specialization across products for both intennediate and consumer goods when looking at largest trading countries/regions with the U.S. As a final test against across product specialization, I follow Schott (2004) and break countries into relative income cohorts to examine the share of products sourced from low-, middle-, high-income countries at the same time. Income levels are commonly used as an indicator of level of endowments, i.e. skill and capital, with low and high income levels representing less skilllcapital and more skilllcapital endowments, respectively. A large share of products sourced fi:om low and high income countries levels at the same time should serve as the final test against across product-driven specialization. 32 I use per capita GNI (pcGNI) data from World Bank classification to group countries in relative income cohorts. I also show whether results are sensitive to the use of alternative relative classifications of income levels, e.g. low income countries are defIned if country income is below 40% income percentile relative to world income distribution. Next, I classify imported products according to the source country income classification. Low (L), Middle (M), and High (H) products originate solely in low-, solely in middle-, or solely in high-income countries, respectively. Products are Low and Middle (LM) or Middle and High (MH) if they are sourced simultaneously from at least one country of each type. Finally, a product is Low, Middle, and High (LMH) if it is sourced from at least one low and at least one high-income country. I exclude China from the analysis, as its inclusion significantly inflates the contribution oflow income countries. Table B.11 reports product share by source country income groupings according to various income breakdowns. The share of import products sourced hom only high- income countries and the share of import products sourced from both middle and high income countries is diminishing during 1989-2004. At the same time, however, the share of import products sourced simultaneously from at least one low and one high-income country is increasing rapidly during 1989-2004. As a further robustness check, I exclude LMH products sourced from just one low-wage country, which are indicated by a star in Table B.11. The fact that the share of products sourced from the LMH countries increases regardless of the income breakdowns is remarkable, as mentioned in Schott (2004) for total U.S. imports. ------.- .._----- 33 The results presented in this section offer compelling evidence against intemationa1 specialization across products during 1989 and 2004. II. V 3. Within-'Product Specialization by Unit Values I now tum my attention to the altemative prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the importance of within-production specialization. To test the prediction, I examine whether there is a positive relationship between unit values of U.S. imports of intermediates and source country per capital GDP. Unit values are measured as import volumes divided by import quantity. I use real per capita GDP from the World Development Indicators (2007). Following Schott (2004), I regress log unit values of U.S. imports ofmanufacturing materials on source country log per capita GDP across ten-digit HS products, source country, and year for all manufacturing imports during 1989-2004. 10g( uvg.) =(X g +(XI +(X/" + [3 *log (GDPpcCI )+ Eg . C1 (IlA) where uv gCI is unit value of materials or consumer goods, sourced from country c in year t, GDPpc CI is country CiS real per capital GDP in year t, and (Xg, (XI' and (X/" are product, year, and region fixed effects. In an altemative specification, I pool the unit values for materials and consumer goods, and regress equation (II.4) with an interaction term of the consumer goods dummy with per capita GDP. The latter allows me to gauge whether the extent of intemationa1 specialization within materials products is different from the extent of specialization within consumer goods products. I estimate these 34 differences for selected industries, as well as non-durable and durable manufacturing imports. The results in Table B.12 Column I show that unit values of U.S. imports materials are positively and significantly related to countries' per capita GDP. The coefficient in Column I implies that 10% increase in per capita GDP is associated with 1.3% increase in unit values of imported materials. Columns II-IV restrict the sample to only those products, that are used more than 25%, 50%, 75% as manufacturing materials. The estimates in these subsamples are of the expected signs and significant, and are larger than the ones in the full sample. This evidence is indicative of the fact that as materials become more specialized, intemational specialization along vertical dimensions in fact increase. Finally, Column V reduces that sample to only those products that are sourced simultaneously from at least one low income and one high income country. The coefficients remain unchanged from that of full sample. Next I break up the sample into non-durable and durable manufacturing materials as shown in Table B.12. Additionally, I include unit values of consumer goods and use a dummy variable to gauge whether there is a statistically significant difference between the effect of per capita GDP on unit values of materials and that of consumer goods. The coefficients in the regressions on each sample are still positive and statistically significant, however the effect diminishes as the sample gets smaller. This comes in contrast to the increasing effect found in the full sample. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference ofthe effect of per capital GDP on unit values of 35 consumer goods, which in fact increases as products' utilization by final destination markets is more concentrated. Finally, 1 break the sample up further into selected industries, and estimate (IlA) on each industry products samples, as reported in Table B.l3. Chemicals manufacturing exhibits the largest coefficient of any of the selected industries and industry groupings, implying that intemational specialization across vertical dimensions is greatest for chemicals, compared to other industry groups. The changes in the coefficients with the extent of utilization of chemical materials are also intuitive. When chemicals imports are predominantly used by u.s. manufacturing (measured by more than 75% utilization rate in Column IV), these imports include primarily crudely processed chemicals, which tend to exhibit a lower degree of vertical differentiation. This implies a lower intemational specialization across the vertical dimension and is reflected by a smaller estimate of the effect of GDP on unit values in Column IV, relative to other columns. On the other hand, chemicals imports used heavily by consumer markets (measured by more than 75% utilization rate in Column IV), refer to consumer pharmaceuticals, which generally exhibit a large degree of vertical differentiation. Thus, as the rate of utilization increases, differences in the effects of GDP on unit values of chemical materials and unit values of consumer goods also increase, as shown by the estimate on the consumer dummy. The pattems of the effects of GDP on selected durable industries are also intuitive and opposite of those for chemicals. Thus, intemational specialization in varieties of machinery, computers, and electrical equipment materials becomes more pronounced as 36 inputs become more specialized and customized in nature, reflected by higher rates of utilization in Column III. The evidence linking unit values and income presented in this section supports an old trade theory interpretation of U.S. trade. The results are consistent with endowment- abundant countries using their relative endowments to manufacture vertically distinct varieties that use those endowments more intensively. II.VI. Conclusion Previous attempts to shed light on the nature of trade in intennediate inputs have been largely constrained by the fact that trade data do not differentiate between trade in intel111ediate and finished goods. In this chapter, I introduce a newly constructed dataset that clearly distinguishes between U.S. imports of manufacturing materials, consumer goods, and others, during 1989-2004. With these data in hand, previous findings on the nature of trade in intennediate inputs can be confinned, revised, and added to. Using the new data, I reveal that the magnitude of U.S. trade in intennediate goods is larger than previously thought, averaging roughly a third of total U.S. import during 1989-2004. Furthennore, imports of intennediates exhibit sharp pro-cyclical tendencies, which are distinguished from those of other imports components. Finally, I find that while inputs are largely vertically differentiated, with superior vaIieties produced in high-income countries, the within-production specialization is in fact more pronounced for trade in consumer goods. 37 CHAPTER III OUTSOURCING, TECHNOLOGY, AND U.S. WAGE INEQUALITY I. Introduction It has been well documented that U.S. wage inequality rose dramatically during the 1980s, when the wages of both the most skilled and moderately skilled workers increased and the wages of least skilled workers dropped. A large literature spans the debate on the detenninants of this rise in the wage inequality. A common consensus points to the on-going growth of the demand for high-skilled workers, of which skill- biased technical change (SBTC) and international trade are the often cited sources. While much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of the effect of SBTC on wages, the evidence for the impact of trade on wages is mixed. Only one U.S. study finds robust estimates of the effect of international trade, specifically, trade in intern1ediate inputs, on the 1980s wage inequality, and many others arrive at inconclusive evidence of the effects oftrade.5 Surprisingly, the literature has focused almost exclusively on data from the late 1970s and the 1980s. The few studies that have examined this issue using data from the 1990s find mixed evidence on the overall patterns of wage inequality during this period 5 See Feenstra and Hanson (2003) for the survey of trade's impact on wages. --------_ ... ----_. 38 and merely speculate on its detenninants. 6 At the same time, there is growing evidence to suggest that both technology and trade gained further prevalence during the 1990s and early 2000s, as finns finally learned to reap the full benefits of the computer revolution and established extended networks with the low-wage countries. Prior literature examining the effect of trade on wage inequality has two shortcomings that this chapter will focus on. First, virtually all previous papers have focused on the period of the late 1970s and 1980s, with no work examining the 1990s and 2000s. This seems primarily due to the fact that the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Productivity Database used for these studies ends in 1996. Nevertheless, there is a general perception in the literature that the growth in wage inequality has subsided. This calls into question how strongly trade forces may be affecting the U.S. skilled-unskilled wage gap, since evidence suggests that the 1990s and 2000s saw a dynamic growth of trade. 1 find that this perception regarding the fall in the wage gap within U.S. manufacturing to be false. I document a significant rise in wage inequality in 1990s and a decline in the 2000s, which closely corresponds to the movements of trade in intennediate inputs over the same period. A second signifIcant shortcoming of the previous literature is its measurement of impOIied intennediate inputs, i.e. materials offshoring. Given available data, previous literature has used input-output relationships to detern1ine the extent of a sector's intem1ediate inputs purchases from an input supplier. Then the suppliers' total imports share in the U.S. supply is used to estimate how much of the sector's input purchases are 6 See the survey in Autor et al. (forthcoming 2008) and Lemiuex (2007). 39 due to imports. Thus, it is assumed that total import share is a good proxy for estimating inputs import share. As shown in Appendix A of this chapter, this assumption introduces significant measurement error. I address these shortcomings in the following fashion. First, I update the NBER Productivity Database through the year 2005. Using these data, I first document that while the gap between skilled and unskilled workers continued to rise during the 1990s, it fell significantly after 2000. Next, I use standard data construction techniques and empirical specifications utilized in product-price literature to estimate the effect of trade on the skilled-unskilled wage gap for this later period (1989-2005) and find a significant effect of materials offshoring on the wage gap. However, this effect is not robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of trade and computerization, which calls into question the validity of previous findings; e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1999) who find that materials offshoring explains up to 25% of the rise in the skilled-unskilled wage gap for their earlier sample covering the years, 1979-1990. I then turn to recently constructed trade data on U.S. imports ofintennediate goods to develop a refined measure of materials offshoring. Using the refined measure, I find a very large and robust effect of offshOling on the skilled-unskilled wage gap of 1989-1996 and a large, albeit insignificant, effect on wages of 1997-2004. Fmihennore, offshoring of business services appears to playa large role in the widening of the wage gap during 1989-1996, although services offshOling contributes to the closing of the gap during 1997-2004. 40 Other findings indicate that one must take caution in interpreting all technological change as skill-biased. I find that computer adoption contributed significantly to the lise in the skilled-unskilled wage gap during 1989-1996, by increasing the non-production wages and decreasing, albeit statistically insignificantly, the production wages. On the other hand, the estimates show that office equipment diffusion has a overall neutral effect on relative wages, while other high-tech technological change is biased towards the unskilled during 1997-2004. Additionally, the failure to identify the effect of computers on the wage gap of 1997-2004 may be indicative of the diminishing role of computer technologies in U.S. manufacturing. This work is paIi of the growing theoretical and empirical debate on the effects of technology and international trade on the increase in the relative demand for skill. A plethora of studies document a striking conelation between the adoption of computer- based technologies and the increased use of college-educated labor within detailed industries and finns andacross plants within industries. 7 In contrast, the evidence of the impact of trade on the demand for skill is much more conf1ic.ting. 8 A number of studies argue that a constant trade to GDP ratio, increasing product prices ofleast-skilled industries, and within-industry changes in labor composition of developed countries are indicative of a relatively minor role of trade in the prediction of relative wages.9 Proponents of trade effects, on the other hand, retaliate by pointing to a rising trade to 7 Katz and Autor (1999) summarize this literature. 8 See Feenstra and Hanson (2003) survey of the literature on trade and wages. 9 See Kfilgman (1995) for a discussion of relative magnitudes of trade; Slaughter (2000) for a discussion ofliterature on relative-price changes; and Bel111an et al. (1994) on within vs. between industry lsbor shift. 41 value-added ratio, growing relative domestic prices, and aggregation issues of industry- level data on labor composition. Furthem10re, recent studies argue that the growing share of trade in intennediate inputs may shift the relative demand for skill in the same manner as SBTC does (Feenstra and Hanson 1999,2003). Recently, however, these findings have been called into question, as the alleged decline in relative wages during 1990s does not appear to coincide with the dynamic growth of technology and trade of the1990s (e.g., Card and DiNardo 2002). One of the contributions of this work is to attempt to shed more light on the roles of technology and trade in the changing nature of wage inequality of the 1990s and 2000s. In addition to the contribution discussed above, this work also contributes to the methodology of the product-price literature (see Slaughter 1999). There are only a handful of other studies on underlying factors causing changes in prices and productivity, which then are linked to wage changes. These studies find mixed contributions of trade- related forces, i.e. materials offshoring, trade barriers, and transportation costs, on U.S. wage changes of the 1970s and 1980s (Feenstra arid Harlson 1999,Haske1 and Slaughter 2003). I contribute to their methods by using more recent data for 1989-2004 and exploring a broader set of causal factors, which include more refined measures of trade. The chapter is organized as follows. Section III.II documents relative wages during 1989-2005. Section III.III presents empirical methodology. Section III.IV describes data. Section III.V presents empirical results. Section III.VI discusses sensitivity analysis and section III.VII concludes. 42 IILII. Old and New Evidence of Wage Inequality The rapid growth of US. wage inequality of 1980s has been well documented within both U.S. manufacturing and for the U.S. as a whole. While no papers have analyzed trends in wage inequality within U.S. manufacturing during 1990s and 2000s due to data limitations, a few studies have examined the growth in relative wages using U.S.-wide micro data. These studies find conf1icting evidence, suggesting a changing nature of the 1990s US. wage inequality, which may not correspond to the dynamic growth of trade and SBTC that occurred during the same period. In this section, I use new industry-level data to document movements of wage inequality within U.S. manufacturing over the period of 1989-2005. The new data show a significant rise in wage inequality in the 1990s and a decline in the 2000s, which correspond to the pattems of trade and SBTC referenced in the literature (e.g., Autor et al. 2003; Feenstra and Hanson 2003). Prior studies of wage inequality rely on two primary datasets, the eamings data of workers from all U.S. industries compiled in Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the wages of workers in U.S. manufacturing available through the NBER Productivity Database (NBER PD). During the 1980s, these data show a significant rise in wage inequality. According to the CPS data, between 1979 and 1989, the real wages of workers with sixteen or more years of education rose by 3.4%, of full-time workers with twelve years of education fell by 13.4%, and of workers with less than twelve years of education fell by 20.2%.10 Within U.S. manufactUling alone, the total wages of nonproduction lOA detailed discussion of basic facts concerning wage movements in the U.S. during 1980s is provided in Katz and Autar (1999). 43 workers relative to production workers rose by an average of 0.72% per year over the period of 1979-1990 (Feenstra and Hanson 1999).11 The early 2000s saw a rise in the studies of wage inequality of 1990s, which paint a mixed picture ofthe changing nature of U.S. wage inequality and the sources of these changes. For example, Card and DiNardo (2002) explore CPS data and find no noticeable change in wage inequality between 1988 and 2000. This finding leads them to question the validity ofthe previously estimated effects that SBTC and trade forces have on wage inequality during 1980s. On the other hand, Autor et a1. (forthcoming 2008) use similar data for 1989-2005 to show polarization in wages, where the wages in very low and very high skill occupations increased, while those in moderately skilled occupations contracted. 12 No papers document the wage inequality of 1990s and 2000s for the U.S. manufacturing, as NBER PD data ends in 1996. In order to illustrate the trends in U.S. manufacturing wage inequality over the period of 1989-2005, I expand the NBER PD from 1997 to 2005 (see Appendix A for data and methods description). I use the wages of nonproduction and production workers, which are often used as proxies of skilled and unskilled labor wages, to construct a measure of wage inequality.J3 I follow the literature to define this measure as log of the ratio of nonproduction wages per worker to production wages, where real wages denote 11 In the wage literature, nonproduction and production workers are commonly used to proxy for skilled and unskilled workers in manufacturing. 12 According to Autor et a1. (Forthcoming) the rising wage inequality in the lower half of wage distribution was an event confined to the 1980s. 13 Nonproduction wages are constructed as total nonproduction wages divided by total nonproduction worker employment, whereas production wages are constructed as total production wages divided by total production hours worked. Data on total nonproduction hours worked is not available. 44 wages per worker. 14 Figure D.l plots 1963-2005 wage inequality for the entire U.S. manufacturing and as industries' average, where weights for the latter are constructed as shares of the industry wage bill in total manufacturing shipments. As can be seen, wage inequality slowly declined from the late 1960s through the 1970s, and began to increase during the 1980s. Perhaps the most rapid widening of the wage gap can be observed during the 1990s, when it was also the most steady. Wage inequality decreased dramatically during the 2001-2002 U.S. recession and fluctuated during the recovery years that followed. Table D.1 provides more detail on the growth of workers' wages over the last three decades. During the period of 1979-1990 covered in most previous studies, the wages of production workers and nonproduction workers increased at an average 4.99% and 5.42% per year, such that the relative nonproduction wage rose by an average 0.43% per year. During 1989-1996 covered in this chapter, production and nonproduction wages increased at an average 2.67% and 3.78% per year, respectively, leading to a marked rise in the relative wages of 1.11 % per year. Although both wages continued to grow during 1997-2005, the average annual decline in relative wages of this period amounted to 0.74%, much of which occurred during 2001-2002. 14 This is a common measure of wage inequality in labor economics studies. e.g. Autor et al. (Forthcoming); Card and DiNardo (2002); etc. Other measures of wage inequality have been used in the past. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Haskel and Slaughter (200 I. 2003), and others employ the ratio of total nonproduction wages to total production wages, which estimates wage inequality in nominal terms. I find little difference in my measure and this measure of wage inequality. 45 JlLIII. Empirical Methodology The empirical studies estimating the effect of trade and technology on wage inequality have typically used a methodology derived from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (SS theorem), which links product price changes to changes in factor prices, under zero-profit conditions. IS This methodology relies on the production side of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which considers an economy with multiple sectors of different factor intensities and factors with complete mobility across sectors 16. In this framework, aggregate demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers is horizontal and aggregate relative labor supply is upward sloping J7 . The aggregate relative labor demand is horizontal since a change in the demanded quantity of skilled (unskilled) labor can potentially be absorbed by a change in output in an unskilled (skilled) sector, and thus may be independent of relative wages l8 . Relative wages, in tum, are detennined by product prices and/or productivity under zero profit conditions, which in tum are driven by exogenous forces, i.e. trade or technological innovation. When changes in exogenous forces alter intersectoral profitability, relative wages change to restore zero profits, factors flow to other sectors, and the relative aggregate demand curve shifts. 15 Deardorff (1994) surveys all statements of the SS Theorem that have appeared during the past 50-plus years. One of the statements is the following: "For any vector of goods price changes, the accompanying vector of factor price changes will be positively correlated with the factor intensity- weighted averages of the goods price changes." 16 This is different from labor studies which assume that factors are immobile (HaskeI 1999). 17 Note, that the relative demand curve in each sector is still downward-sloping, while the aggregate demand curve is flat. 18 This is the so-called Rybczynski effect (Rybczynski. 1957) 46 This process can be formalized by supposing that the economy, which in this case is U.S. manufactudng, produces J different traded goods, associated with J industries. Each industry employs some combination ofJ primary factors and M intermediate inputs. Under constant returns to scale technology, zero profit conditions for industry i can be written as P,= L PmiGm'+ L wjiaji mEM jEJ where P, is the domestic price of one unit of output, Pml is the unit cost of mth (IlL1 ) intermediate input, G m' is the quantity of rnth input required for production of one unit of output, w;; is the unit cost ofjth primary-factor, and aji is the quantity ofjth factor required for production of one unit of output. Totally differentiating to express everything in instantaneous changes and allowing for changes in the technology of production, equation (III.1) can be rewritten as "v·, L" ° "P· = w··--TFPI Jf .11 , , jEJ (IlL2) where p/A= P,- L P"miOmi is change in value-added prices, TFP,=- Lit jiBji is the IJlE 114 jEJ primal measure of total factor productivity, and Bml and Bji are the cost shares of intern1ediate inputs and primal factors in total costs of industry i, respectively. Since all factors are mobile across sectors, changes in wages of primary factors can be assumed to be equal across sectors. Then the existing differences between the industry wage changes and the manufacturing-wide changes are assumed to arise from 47 the variations in factor qualities across sectors 19. Expressing industry wage changes in equation (III.2) as differentials from manufacturing-wide changes, I obtain p;A= L v..'j8 j;-TFP;+ L (li'j;-v..'J8ji, jEJ jEJ (III. 3) .- where W j is the effective manufacturing-wide wage change of primary factor} and Wji- i1~j is industry i's wage change differential of}th primary factor. I combine industry wage differentials with changes in TFP and refer to them as changes in effective TFP, such that Li In p;;A +Li In ETFP;, =L Li In Wj ~ (8 jil-l +8 j J , JEJ (IlIA) where instantaneous changes are expressed in first-log-difference and primary factor cost shares are averaged over two peliods. Equation (IlIA) shows how manufacturing-wide factor prices adjust to changes in value-added product prices andlor effective productivity to restore zero profits in all sectors. This equation captures the wage adjustments to shifts in aggregate relative labor demand described above. Value-added price andlor effective productivity increases in a sector tend to raise (reduce) the relative wages of factors employed relatively intensively (unintensively) in that sector, where intensity is defined by ~ (8ji,_, +8ji,) . Note, that productivity changes can be factor-biased or factor- neutral, as long there are changes in net productivity (or by duality net costs), which raises sectoral profitability and so necessitates wage changes2o . 19 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999) discussion on pg. 911. 20 This is different from labor studies focus, where only factor-biased teclmica1 change affects wages since it changes the relative productivity of factors within a sector. See Haskel (1999) for discussion. 48 In the framework discussed above, value-added prices and effective productivity changes are assumed to be exogenous. In a large country-setting, however, prices and productivity changes are detennined by domestic and foreign forces. To model the endogeneity of prices and productivity changes, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) developed a two-stage procedure, in the first stage changes in prices and productivity are regressed on exogenous factors, which are then linked to changes in wages. I {onow this procedure, as described it below. In the first-stage, I regress changes in value-added price and effective productivity on a set of J( causal factors, which are hypothesized to drive thes~ changes over time: (IlLS) where zi/a is the kth causal variable, :Y k is a coefficient on kth causal variable, and 17 '1 IS a disturbance tenn that captures all other shocks to the value-added price and productivity, which are assumed Olihogonal to Zi/,/' Changes in a causal factor can affect changes in either only value-added prices, or both value-added prices and effective productivity. In addition to its direct effect on both prices and productivity changes, LJ Z Ikl can affect price changes indirectly through its impact on productivity changes, which are "passed through" to product prices (Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Krugman 2000).21 Assuming a 100% pass-through rate, effective productivity changes are neutral if one finds ;Y k equal to zero. 21 The latter result stems from the fact that productivity changes distort equilibrium in the goods market, by shifting goods supply, which in tum affect product prices (Haske I 1999). These changes in goods supply are possible either because the country in question is large in world markets or because the productivity shocks are common across countries (Krugman 2000) 49 Given the results ofthe first-stage regression (IlLS), one can decompose the total change in value-added prices and effective productivity into those components due to each structural variable, namely y k6 Z ilk. These decomposed changes, when individually regressed on the primary factor cost-shares, yield coefficients interpreted as predicted factor price changes due to that structural component. The second-stage regressions for each structural variable k is expressed as: Yk 6z ikr= L Ojk~(eir-l+eir)+Uil(/. jE.! (III.6) The coefficients 0 jk obtained from these regressions can be seen as the economy-wide change in the price ofjth primary factor that would have OCCUlTed ifthe change in kth structural variable had been the only source of changes in prices and effective productivity. Only a handful of studies have used the two-stage procedure to identify causal factors of changes in prices and productivity and link them to wages. These studies find . mixed contributions of trade-related variables, i.e., foreign outsourcing of materials, trade barriers, transpOliation costs, and changes in international product prices, on U.S., U.K., and Mexico's wages. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) find that a rise in foreign outsourcing of materials accounts for 15%-25% of the rise in U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s. On the other hand, Haskel and Slaughter (2003) fail to identify a significant impact of other trade-related variables on U.S. wages of the 1970s and 1980s, although stronger results are found for U.K. and Mexico's wages (Haskel and Slaughter 2001; Robertson 2004). A number of studies have also looked at the effect of technology on 50 wage inequality, where both factor-biased, i.e. skilled-biased technological change (SBTC), and sector-biased technological changes are considered. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) find that SBTC due to office equipment and computer investment explain over 35% of the rising U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s. On the other hand, industry innovation contributed the most to the increase in the skilled-unskilled U.K. wage gap during 1996-1990 (Haskel and Slaughter 2003). I contribute to their methods by using most recent data for 1989-2004 and exploring a broader set of trade- and technological change-related factors. ilLIV. Data and Descriptive Statistics I apply the estimation technique described in the previous section to U.S. manufacturing industries for the period of 1989-2004. This sample period encompasses the changing nature of the U.S. wage inequality debated in the literature, which occuHed after 1989, when the wage inequality either polarized (Autor et. al. FOlihcoming) or substantially declined (Card and DiNardo 2002). One feature of the sample is that the data are classified under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) during 1989-1996 and North America Industrial Classification System (NAICS) during 1997-2004. This forces me to split the sample along the classifications distinction and run the estimation separately on each of the subsamples. While working with shorter time-series is less ideal, this approach circumvents the differences in the definition of manufacturing embedded in the classifications.22 It is impOliant to note that most industry-level studies 22 Other than the classifications differences, I have reasons to believe that the subsamples are roughly similar, in that they contain equal time-series panels of eight years and both encompass recession and post-recession recovery periods. 51 of the U.S. wage dispersion span the period of no later than early 1990s, thus I am able to go far later than the existing literature. The data for prices, total factor productivity, and cost shares are obtained from the Bartelsman and Gray (1996) NBER PD for the period of 1989-1996 and the extended PD for the period of 1997-2004, which I constructed for the purposes of this chapter (see Appendix A for description of the extended PD). The descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table D.1, which also includes the data for 1979-1990 used in most previous studies as a basis of comparison. As shown in Table D.1, the period of 1997-2004 experienced the slowest growth in total factor productivity and value-added prices compared to the prior periods. Services appear to have gained more prominence by early 2000s. Now I turn to data description of trade and technology-related causal factors. The trade-related variables that I identify include offshoring of materials, offshoring of selected business services, and finished goods imports openness. The set of technology- related variables consists of computer, office equipment, and other high-tech capital shares. To measure offshoring of materials, I rely on standard construction methods, originally proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), and an alternative method, which refines the original formula by utilizing new and previously unavailable data on trade in intermediate goods. To arrive at the original measure of offshoring, I combine data on total imports with data on inputs purchases. The data on U.S. imports for the 52 period of 1989-2004 come from Feenstra (2002) and the Census Bureau. The inputs purchases are obtained from U.S. Input-Output tables provided by the BEA. For each industry i, the original measure of materials offshoring is constructed as follows: 23 "\' r ., 'I imports £....; l purchases of znterm. In]Jut.\'ij ·r . j I " dam. output j+ll17ports j -exports jI ' , Total Nonenergy Interm. Purchases; (III.7) ----------- where subscript} refers to an industry supplying input} to industry i, where i,j = 1, ... N. Each product tenn in the numerator of equation (IIL7) is interpreted as industry i's estimate of imported material inputs from industry j. Then equation (III.7) represents an industry's share of total imported intennediate inputs in the industry's total expenditure on non-energy intennediates. This measure is commonly refelTed to as a broad measure of materials offshoring. One can obtain a nalTOW measure of offshoring, by restricting attention to only those inputs that are purchased from the same two-digit SIC industry or three-digit NAICS industry as the good being produced. 24 1 will include the nalTOW measure of offshoring and the difference between the broad and narrow measures as separate variables in my estimation. When averaged over all industries, the original measure of offshOling, defined nan-owly and as a difference, increased at an average 0.29% and 0.23% per year during 1989-1996, and declined at an average 0.19% and 0.13% per year during 1997-2004, respectively, as is apparent in Table 0.2. 23 This formula first appears in Feenstra and I-Ianson (1996), but has been originally used by the BEA in construction of imported input purchases for the Import Matrices. 24 The narrow measure is assumed to capture the precise definition of foreign outsourcing, which refers to the contracting out to overseas suppliers those production activities that can be done within a company (Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1999). 53 The original measure of materials offshoring suffers from potentially serious measurement enor. The measurement error arises from the inclusion of economy-wide import share to proxy for imports of intennediate goods. Since the total imports share consists of goods unrelated to intel111ediate inputs, the levels and changes of the offshoring measures are over or underestimated by the levels and variation of the share of the unrelated goods (see Chapter II). Therefore, the inclusion of the original offshoring measure as an explanatory variable may bias coefficient estimates. In this chapter, I make use of unique data on imports of intennediate goods to refine the cunently used measure of materials offshoring. These data are made possible as a result of a recently constructed Market Structure Index of HTS ImpOlis (the ImpOlis Index), which classifies imports into intermediate and finished goods (See Appendix A). I combine the Imports Index with detailed imports data obtained from Feenstra (2002) and the Census Bureau for 1989-2001 and 2002-2004, respectively, to derive impOlis of intel111ediate goods. 25 These are then incorporated into the following modified version of original measure of offshoring: '" [ . . ] interm. imports. .LJ purchases of znterm. in uts ·1 . " '. I i . . P 1/ mterl17. c!O!17. output; + Il1term.lmports; -lI1term. exports; Tota! Nonenergy Jnterm. Purchases; (III. 8) where subscript} refers to an industry from which industry i purchases its intennediate inputs, where i,j = 1, ... N. This refined measure of offshoring differs from the original measure by the right term of the numerator, where I use the share of imports of 25 The imports ofintennediate goods include imports of parts, components, and raw materials, as well as final goods assemblies tbat go through the domestic industries before they enter the retail markets. These data provide a near perfect estimate of imports of goods subject to otfshoring, in that they exclude imports of otfshored assemblies of final goods, which enter the U.S. retail markets directly. 54 intermediate goods in the domestic supply of intermediate goods in place of the share of total imports in the total domestic supply. Comparing the original with the refined measure of offshoring, there appear to be considerable differences between the measures, as shown in Table D.2. Another trade-related causal factor considered in this chapter is offshoring of services, which has recently attracted much interest in both academic and popular press circles. The services subject to offshoring commonly include information technology services; professional, scientific, and technical services; and administrative and support services (Amiti and Wei 2006). The construction of the measure follows the same formula as shown in equation (111.8), where intermediate inputs are now replaced with inputs of selected services. The data for services inputs and services imports come from the BLS input-output tables and are described in Appendix A. As shown in Table D.2, offshoring of services grew substantially in 1989-1996, with an average change of 0.04% or roughly a ten percent growth of the average level of 0.42%. During 1997-2004, however, the average growth of services offshoring was relatively stagnant. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), I expect to find positive effects of materials offshoring on changes in value-added prices and effective productivity in the first-stage and the skilled-unskilled wage gap in the second-stage. Offshoring of services is likely to have a similar effect in the first-stage, if imported services stir the technology of production away from nonproduction workers in a productivity enhancing manner. This then should lead to a negative impact of services offshoring on the skilled-unskilled wage gap in the second-stage. However, if offshoring of services is merely an alternative 55 to domestically outsourced services, then one should find a price reducing and negative effect of services offshoring in the first stage. The skilled-unskilled wage gap will increase (decrease) if sectors experiencing declining product prices are skilled-intensive (unskilled-intensive). The measure of openness to imports of finished goods is constructed as the finished goods imports to industry value-added ratio. During 1989-1996 imports of finished goods constituted an average of 29.89% of industry value-added, while by 1997-2004 this percentage went up to 47.16%. Competition arising from imports of finished goods is expected to put a downward pressure on domestic product prices across all sectors of the economy in the first stage estimation. The skilled-unskilled wage gap will increase (decrease) if the sectors experiencing declining product prices are skilled- intensive (unskilled-intensive). Finally, the technology-related variables are constructed from three measures of high-technology capital stock; i.e., (l) computers, 2) office, computing, and accounting machinery (office equipment); and (3) communications equipment; science and engineering instruments; and photocopy and related equipment (other high-tech equipment).26 Combining these capital stock measures with "ex post" and "ex ante" user costs yields "ex post" and "ex ante" measure of services rendered by office equipment, computer, and other high-tech capital, or in other words, the opportunity cost of capital 26 Previous literature incorporated investment in computer capital in the studies of the 1980s wages (Autor & Katz 1998, Feenstra and Hanson 1999, 2003). During the 1990s, these data were compiled only during 2002-2004, which makes it impossible to incorporate computer investment in this chapter. However, the inclusion of the computer services share variable should reasonably proxy for the impact of computerization on productivity, prices, and wages. 56 possession (Berndt and Morrison 1995, 1997; Feenstra and Hanson 1999).27 I express these measures as shares in total capital services and use the first-difference of the "ex post" capital shares as the primary technology-related explanatory variables. I check the robustness of the results to the "ex ante" measures in the sensitivity analysis. The data for the construction of the technology variables are courtesy of the BLS and more detailed discussion of the construction methods can be found in Appendix A. As shown in Table D.2, the computer share increased continuously throughout the sample period. At the same time, office equipment share steadily declined, while other high-tech share rose during 1989-1996 and declined during 1997-2004. Previous studies found the technological change attributable to high-tech equipment diffusion as productivity enhancing and ski]]-biased (Berndt and Morrison 1995, 1997; Feenstra and Hanson 1999). I test the robustness of these findings in the section below. III.V. Results The estimation is performed over 458 U.S. manufacturing industries at the four- digit SIC level for the period of 1989-1996 and 473 six-digit NAICS industries for the period of 1997-2004. I utilize two methods of variable construction. The first method uses variables expressed as differences over 1989-1996 and 1997-2004 periods, divided by the number of years in each period to obtain annualized differences. The estimation then reduces to a cross-sectional analysis, which is common in the product-price 27 The ex post user costs reflect the internal rate of return in each industry and capital gains on each asset, and the ex ante user costs reflect a "safe" rate of return (the Moody rate of Baa bonds) and excludes the capital gains on each asset. Feenstra and I·Janson (1999) comment that ex ante measures might be prefeITed because they do not reflect the capital gains on the assets and the internal rates of return in the industry. 57 literature and is motivated by the log-run nature of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and is often used to circumvent the limited availability of yearly data (Haskel and Slaughter 2001). I contrast the results from the "annualized differences" estimation to those where vmiables are expressed as first-differences. Estimation is then perfol1ned using panel estimation techniques with fixed effects to control for year-specific unobservables. As will become apparent, the differences in the magnitudes of estimates from the two methods are considerable. These differences arise from the fact that the first-difference estimation captures both industry trends in the data and the time-series variation around these trends. On the other hand, the annualized differencing approach weeds out the time- series variation by construction and evaluate the coefficients based on industry trends alone. Thus, the additional noise captured by the first-di fferences estimation should yield smaller coefficients, which could potentially be interpreted as short-run estimates. Then the larger estimates from the annualized differences estimation could be evaluated as long-run effects. 111. Vi. Preliminary Regression Before tuming to estimating the two-stage procedure of linking price changes to wage changes, I check the consistency of equation (4) against the data. Table D.3, part b) presents the regressions of changes in value-added prices plus effective productivity on the average cost shares of production and non-prOduction workers and capital. Regressions are run for changes in variables measured as annualized differences and first- 58 differences, as discussed above. The estimated coefficients can be compared with the annual average changes in the prices of these primary factors shown in Table D.3, part a). Similar to the results reported in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) for the 1980s, the estimated coefficients are extremely close to the actual factor price changes and the regressions fit nearly perfectly. The wage of nonproduction labor rises faster than production labor during 1989-1996, indicating an increase in wage inequality, and slower during 1997-2004, indicating a decrease in wage inequality. In Table D.3, Part c) I examine whether changes in value-added prices, changes in effective TFP or both are responsible for the increase in the skilled-unskilled wage gap during 1989-1996 and the decline in the wage gap during 1997-2004. Taking the differences between the predicted coefficients on non-production and production cost shares, it appears that changes in prices are concentrated in the unskill-intensive sectors in both periods, as they result in a relative decrease of the skilled-unskilled wage gap. On the other hand, changes in the effective productivity are concentrated in the skill- intensive sectors, as they result in the relative increase in the wage gap during both periods. 28 This contradicts the findings of Leamer (1998) who finds that both changes in prices and changes in productivity were concentrated in the skill-intensive sectors of U.S. manufacturing during 1980s. 28 Leamer (1998) runs similar regressions, but use changes in prices and changes in TFP to predict factor price changes for the U.S. during 1981-1991. He finds that both changes in prices and productivity are skilled-labor intensive. I rerun the regressions in Table 3, part c) using the same dependent variables, and find similar results to Table 3, part c), except that changes in TFP in fact decrease the skilled- unskilled wage gap during 1997-2004. 59 The results of these regressions are robust to the inclusion of market power controls, i.e. output/capital ratios and market concentration measures, and to the exclusion of the computer industry. The results of Table D.3 solidify theoretical predictions of the SS theorem of the link between prices and productivity and wages. 111 V2. Stage 1 In this section, I report the first stage estimation results of the two-stage procedure, where I regress changes in value-added prices plus effective productivity on trade- and technology-related causal factors. The key variables of interest are the measures of outsourcing of intermediate goods in equations (III.7) and (III. 8). As it will become apparent, these measures which are comparable to those used in the existing literature produce coefficients of varying magnitudes and significance, where the estimates on the refined measure are more robust to various specifications. There are four estimation issues to be addressed. First, while the dependent variable is available only at a highly disaggregated level, the SBTC variables are available only at two-digit SIC level and three-digit NAICS levels in the respective periods, and the outsourcing variables are available only at three-digit SIC and four-digit NAICS levels. I cluster the errors at the most aggregated groups to avoid the possibility that errors are correlated within the more aggregated industry groups (Moulton 1986; Feenstra and Hanson 1999). Second, since the dependent variables in the second-stage regressions embody the same estimated coefficients, the standard errors of the second- stage coefficient estimates need to be corrected.29 I follow the steps outlined in Dumont et 29 If not corrected, the second-stage regressions provide conditional estimates of the residuals that 60 al. (2005) to correct the standard elTors of the second-stage estimation.'o Third, if industries are not perfectly competitive then the measure of total factor productivity is biased because the capital share includes pure profits. I include the log change in the output-capital ratio as a regressor to absorb the market power effect (Domowitz et al. 1988; Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Haskel and Slaughter 2001,2003). Finally, caution needs to be taken in comparing the coefficients from the 1989-1996 and 1997-1996 data samples, due to differences in SIC and NAICS classification during the respective periods. These classification vary considerably in their definition of U.S. manufacturing, and thus may change the behavior of manufacturing-specific variables across the two periods. Table DA presents estimation results from the first-stage regression using the original specification proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), which includes only materials offshoring and high-tech capital shares, excluding the computer share. Columns 1-IV contrast estimates for original (I & III) and refined (II & IV) measures of offshoring, where variables are constructed either via annualized differences or first-differences methods using the 1989-1996 data sample. Similarly, Columns V-VIII present estimates for the period off 1997-2004. As mentioned earlier, I include year fixed effects in the estimation with first-differenced variables to account for time-varying unobservables. incorporate the additional variance of the residuals from the first-stage estimation. To test the significance of the second-stage coefficients, unconditional estimates of the standard en-ors accounting for this additional variance have to be computed. 30 Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999) propose a correction procedure which has been disputed in most recent work by Dumont et al. (2005), since the correction does not require that the computed variances are positive and may impose a negative bias on the standard errors. The procedure developed by Dumont et al. (2005), in turn, does guarantee positive variances of the second-stage estimates. 61 As is apparent from Table D.4, the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients are relatively robust to various specifications within each period. On the other hand, the magnitudes of the estimates vary considerably across specifications and sample periods. The most striking differences in magnitudes appear across annualized differences and first differences specifications, in particular for estimates on materials offshoring. These differences persist when year fixed effects are excluded from the first- differences estimation, not shown in Table D.4, although an F-test confirms the necessity of year fixed effects. Additionally, the negative sign on the office equipment share comes in contrast to the findings of Feenstra and Hanson (1999). The general lack of significance of the impact of offshoring measures during 1997-2004 is troubling. In Table D.5 I present results of specifications with a full set of causal factors. The inclusion of other controls reveals the severity of the measurement error introduced in the original measure of materials offshoring. Unlike the estimates on the refined measure, the estimates on the original measure become insignificant in all specifications and shrink in magnitudes compared to those in Table D.4. As a result of such poor performance, I turn my focus to the specifications using the refined measure of materials offshoring of Columns II, IV, VI, and VIII. Turning to trade-related causal factors first, the estimates on these factors come through with mixed signs and significance. The effect of materials offshoring, per refined measure, changes across time. While offshoring, defined as a difference of broad and narrow measures, drives the growth in changes in value-added prices and effective productivity during 1989-1996, it is the narrow measure of offshoring (within closely- 62 related industries) that appears to have a significant effect during 1997-2004. Furthermore the effect of materials offshoring changes to negative, albeit very small, in the first-difference estimation of Column VIII. Services offshoring appears to have a negative impact on changes in value-added prices and effective productivity during 1989-1996, and positive effect during 1997-2004. Openness to finished goods has a very small and insignificant coefficient. In order to make sense of the result in Table D.S, I find it useful to separate the dependent variable in the first-stage estimation into its respective components. Table D.6 shows independent regressions of changes in value-added prices and changes in effective productivity on causal factors. The first-differences specifications reveal a consistent picture, where trade-related variables, with the exception of services offshoring in the 1997-2004 sample, increase productivity and reduce prices. This is consistent with prior expectations that trade-driven market competition puts a downward pressure on prices and production-related inefficiencies in the short-run. In the long-run, expressed by annualized differences, however, the results are less consistent. Thus, materials otIshoring appears to mostly increase both prices and productivity, services offshoring appears to decrease productivity with mixed effect on prices, and openness to impOlis has mixed effects on both prices and productivity across the two sample periods. The latter results may indicate perhaps that it is hard to predict a consistent impact of trade on prices and productivity when too many things are at play, e.g.. , contracting and expansion of sectors, restructuring of production technologies, etc. 63 Next I tum attention to the effects of technology-related causal factors on changes in value-added prices and effective productivity, as shown in Table D.S. The inclusion of the computer share in the 1989-1996 specifications considerably affects the magnitudes, signs, and significance of the coefficients on other technology-related variables compared to those in Table DA. The estimates on the computer share are, in tum, large and highly significant. However, the effect of computers goes away by 1997-2004, while office equipment and other high-tech capital shares retain their signs and significance. These results may be indicative of a changing role of computer technologies in U.S. manufacturing. While the computer revolution of late 1980s-early 1990s changed the technology of production in a productivity enhancing manner during 1989-1996, the Internet revolution ofthe late 1990s and early 2000s may in fact have introduced little change to the existing manufacturing processes. On the other hand, by the late 1990s, advances in computerization may have penetrated other high-tech technologies leading to higher productivity gains, shown by the estimates on other high-tech share in Columns V- VIII. These interpretations are also confirmed by larger productivity gains from other high-tech capital share and lower productivity gains from computer share of Table D.6. Under zero-profit conditions, these estimated changes in value-added prices and effective productivity can be linked to changes in factor prices. In Table D.7 I rerun the regressions, only retaining those causal factors that had a non-neutral impact on the dependent variable in the full specification of Table D.6. Only significant coefficients signal actual changes in prices and productivity, which will then mandate changes in factor prices under the zero profit condition (Slaughter 2000).As can be seen, the 64 coefficients on the remaining trade- and technology-related variables are robust to these changes. I use these final specifications in the second-stage analysis discussed below. III V3. Stage 2 Before turning to the second stage of the estimation procedure, I first decompose the dependent variables ofthe first-stage regressions from Table D.7 into those components due to each causal factor. I then use these components as dependent variables in the second-stage regressions. The second stage regressions are run without a constant and are weighted by the average industry shipment in total manufacturing shipments. The standard errors are corrected using the Dumont et al. (2005) correction procedure, as discussed above. The results of the second-stage estimation are presented in Table D.8. Consider, first, the changes in value-added product price plus effective productivity due to technological change and induced changes in factor prices. It appears that upgrading of computer capital is the only technical change variable that is skill-biased, that is it leads to a negative, albeit insignificant, change in production wages and a positive large change in the non-production wages during 1989-2004. In contrast, the office equipment share raises both the production and nonproduction wages in relatively equal amounts, while other high-tech share increases production wages and decrease non-production wages during 1997-2004. Taking the difference between the predicted changes in the nonproduction and production wages due to computerization, the relative wage of nonproduction labor increased by an astounding average 1.725% per year measured in 65 the long-run, and 1.058% per year, measured in the shOli-run. In contrast, other high-tech share is responsible for an average 0.310% per year decline in relative wages measured in the long run, and 0.221 % per year decline measured in the short-run during 1997-2004. The estimates of Table D.8 can, in fact, be compared with the actual increase in relative non-production wages. Recall, that the average annual change in log non- production and log production real wages is 3.839% and 2.666% during 1989-1996 measured by annualized differences and 3.784% and 2.668% measured by first differences, as reported in Table D.3, Pmi a). The difference between these figures provides the actual increase in the relative wages of nonproduction to prod.uction workers of 1.173 % and 1.116% per year, respectively over 1989-1996. Thus, computerization can individually account for over 147% and 95%, respective of the differencing approaches, of the observed annual increase in the relative wage of nonproduction labor during 1989-1996. During 1997-2004, the actual relative nonproduction wages declined by 0.256%, when measured in annualized differences, and 0.265%, when measured in first differences. Then the high-tech equipment diffusion explains over 119% and 85% of the actual decline in relative non-production wages, respectively, during 1997-2004. Next, I consider the predicted changes in relative nonproduction wages due to changes in trade-related variables. Using the above approach of comparing the predicted wage changes to the actual wage changes, the changes in product price plus productivity due to materials offshoring explain 51 % of wage changes, when measured in annualized differences, and 7% of wage changes when measured in first-differences, during 1989-1996. Materials offshoring fails to impact wages in a significant way during 66 1997-2004. At the same time, however, services offshoring has a strikingly large positive effect on the skilled-unskilled wage gap during 1989-1996, yet a large negative effect on the wage gap during 1997-2004. These findings are contradictory to each other and leave me puzzled, since the service offshoring comprise a very small percentage of total services outsourcing over the period of 1989-2004. In summary, I find a very strong link between trade and technological change and relative wages. This link, however is highly sensitive to the nature of the trade and technology forces in play and the time period under inspection. I find a very strong and robust effect of materials offshoring on the skilled-unskilled wage gap during 1989-1996, but its effect during 1997-2004 appears to be statistically insignificant. Similarly, computerization is found to be the main driver of the relative wage inequality during the first half of the period, whereas other technological change plays the main role in determining wages during 1997-2004. Furthermore, one must be careful in considering all technological change as skill-biased. I find that other high-tech diffusion significantly raises wages of the unskilled and in fact lowers wages of the skilled dming 1997-2004. These findings may be indicative of the diminishing role of computers in U.S. manufacturing, and a growing role of computerization of other high-tech equipment which works to enhance the productivity of the unskilled, thus raising their relative wages. The large role of services offshOling in both raising the skilled-unskilled wage gap during 1989-1996 and then reducing it during 1997-2004 is surprising due to its relatively low prevalence in manufacturing. 67 III.VI. Sensitivity Analysis There are a number of points worth noting about my estimation in Tables DA-D.8. First of all it may be argued that the computer industry has experienced an unusual productivity growth over the past decades and should be excluded from the industry-level analysis (Leamer 1998, Feenstra and Hanson 1999). I rerun the estimation without the computer industry and find that the coefficients are not qualitatively different from the ones presented in Tables DA-D.8. Another potential concern that may arise is that trade and technology regressors in the first-stage estimation may be endogenously determined with value-added prices and productivity. I follow the previous literature in assuming that they are exogenous. Additionally, I check that the estimation is not sensitive to the weights employed in the analysis, by using employment and wage bill weights. The results are qualitatively the same. Furthermore, one may argue that both value added prices and cost shares need to be deflated by appropriate deflators to net out inflationary forces over 1989-2004. I rerun the estimation, using manufacturing wide producer price indexes to deflate product prices and wages, and find no significant changes in coefficient estimates. Finally, I check the sensitivity of the results using the alternative ex ante measures of technological change variables. The results are not qualitatively different and are available 011 request. III.VII. Conclusion This study is the first study of the impact of trade and technology on U.S. wages of 1990s. Using recently available data on industry statistics, I am able to document a 68 near-continuous growth in the 1990s wage inequality within the U.S. manufacturing, where by some measures, the wage gap is growing more rapidly than that recorded in 1980s. I use these data to contribute to the on-going debate of the effects of trade and technology on U.S. wages. My findings indicate that the relative contribution of trade is sensitive to the data and the type of variables used in the estimation. My preliminary estimation indicates that the standard measure of offshoring of mateli aIs, proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) and commonly used in the literature, suffers from severe measurement errors that prohibit the estimation of the impact of trade in intemlediate inputs on the wage dispersion of the 1990s. I address this issue by developing an improved measure of materials offshoring, which remarkably improves the perfonnances of offshoring and other vmiables across all specifications. FUlihennore, various trade-related variables have radically different effects on U.S. wage inequality of 1989-1996 and 1997-2004. Thus, I find that trade in intennediate inputs contribute dramatically to the increase in the wage inequality during 1989-1996 and 1997-2004, although the effect dUling the latter period is insignificant. On the other hand, trade in services inputs either raises or reduces the demand for skilled workers, and these effect are strikingly large. Looking at the technology-related variables, I find that computelization remains the most appropriate measure of skill-biased technological change as it adversely affects the demand for the unskilled and positively impacts the demand for skilled labor. However, this effect could only be estimated in the 1989-1996 sample, as the extent of computerization failed to have a non-neutral effect on productivity during 1997-2004. 69 Furthem10re, the changes in the share of other high-tech capital, i.e., communications equipment, photocopy equipment and various scientific and engineering instlUments, in fact, are found to increase wages of production workers and decrease wages of nonprodllction workers during 1997-2004. In summary, I find much support for the hypothesis that both trade and technology are some of the factors responsible for the growing wage gap during the 1990s. A different type of technological change, in turn, is responsible for the declining gap during the 2000s. 70 CHAPTER IV CONTRACTS, MARKET THICK1~ESSAND OUTSOURCING IV.I. Introduction There is a growing theoretical1iterature on the determinants of the extent and location of offshoring of intennediates' production (Grossman and Helpman 2002, 2005, Antras 2003, 2005). These models are built on the transaction costs and property rights literature, paliicularly because of the necessity of relationship specific investment (RSI) and the presence of incomplete contracts. Thus, the production of specialized inputs, tailored to the specific needs of a final goods producer, requires a specific investment fi'om the supplier. Because of contract incompleteness, final goods producers fear being held up and choose locations of outsourcing where the probability of hold up is the lowest. All in all, these models show that the location of outsourcing is sensitive to market thickness, quality oflegal systems, and extent ofrequired specificity of investment. SU11)risingly, the existing empirical studies of outsourcing strategies fail to take the theoretical predictions described above into consideration all together. These studies model the determinants of the location and extent of outsourcing by exploring heterogeneities in countries' production costs, e.g. wages, trade costs, transportation cost, 71 etc. Furthennore, due to the limited availability of data, a large share of their analyses considers the particular case of an industry or firm. 31 There are a number of empirical studies in the trade literature, however, which draw on the implications of the incomplete contracts literature to model the quality of legal systems as a source of comparative advantage in trade of final goods (e.g., Levchenko 2007 and Nunn 2007). These studies assume that final goods producing sectors, which require RSI from their input suppliers, rely on countries' legal systems more than others. As such, they empirically show that countries with superior legal systems specialize in exports of the final goods that are more institutionally-dependent in nature. To my knowledge, no empirical study considers the detenninant role of market thickness on trade or outsourcing activities. In this chapter of the dissertation I present the first empirical test of the detenninants of international outsourcing described in models of incomplete contracts of Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005) and Antras (2003, 2005). I evaluate the role of the quality of legal systems, specific investment, and market thickness in the location and extent of U.S. intemational outsourcing of intermediate inputs, while controlling for other country-level and industry level characteristics. While my focus is on the outsourcing strategy of the U.S., I improve on the data-constrained analyses of the existing studies by exploring a large cross-section of industries and countries which source intermediate inputs to the U.S. This is made possible due to a recently constructed comprehensive dataset of u.s. offshoring of intennediate inputs, which spans imports sourced £1'om over 270 industries and over 170 countries. This study is the first study to test the impact of 31 See Ginl1a and Gi:irg (2004) for the United Kingdom (U.K.) manufacturing industries, Swenson (2004) for the United States (U.S.), Kimura (2001) and Tomiura (2005) for Japanese manufacturing firms and Holl (2007) and Diaz-Mora and Triguero (2007) for the Spanish economy. 72 market thickness on trade data and also the first to analyze the detenninants of U.S. trade in intennediate inputs. Finally, I evaluate whether the detenninants of the location of source countries and the extent ofD.S. international outsourcing are different than those of U.S. imports of final goods. As such, this paper is the first to quantify whether outsourcing is just a fonn of trade or a qualitatively different phenomenon all together. In the first section of the chapter, I present a partial equilibrium model of the detenninants of the location of outsourcing and derive a number of testable hypotheses. This model is in spirit of the general equilibrium model of outsourcing proposed by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The model incorporates three essential features of a modem outsourcing strategy. First, final-goods producers in the North must search for input suppliers either in the North or South with the expertise that allows them to produce specialized inputs. Second, they must convince the potential suppliers in a region to customize products for their own specific needs. Lastly, final goods producers must induce the necessary investment in customization in an environment with incomplete contracting in both the North and South. In a partial equilibrium setting, where outsourcing happens in both the North and South, improvements in the quality of the contracting environment and/or market thickness affect the probability for each specialized final good producer of fInding a suitable partner and successfully engaging in a contractual relationship. Since the expected profits of each specialized final producer depend on the profitability of matching, the improvements in contracting environment and/or market thickness in a country increase the prevalence of outsourcing in that country. 73 The central implication of the model is that differences in the quality of legal systems and the thickness of input supplier markets are important determinants of international outsourcing of inputs which require RSI. I test this prediction with the recently constructed data on u.s. import of intermediate inputs by country, which I disaggregate by six-digit industry in accordance with the Bureau of Labor Analysis 1-0 classification. I use a factor content of trade methodology, originally developed by Romalis (2004), and recently used by Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) to test the institutional content of trade. The latter two studies test whether countries that have good quality of institutions capture larger shares of U. S. imports of final goods that exhibit institutional dependence. This chapter takes this specification and augments it with variation in industry-level measure of dependence of inputs on RSI and country level measures of legal system quality and market thickness. The two main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, I find that the cross- country differences in the quality of contracting environment and market thickness are just as important in determining the location and extent of U.S. international outsourcing as factor endowments. Second, I find that the quality of contracting environment explains more of the patterns of trade in intermediate inputs, relative to patterns of trade in final goods. However, the opposite is true for market thickness and factor endowments. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section IVII describes the theoretical model. Section IVIII explains the empirical methodology and the data. Section IVV presents results. Section IVVI concludes. 74 IV.II. The Model In this section I develop a number of testable hypothesis of the detenninants of outsourcing within the context of a partial equilibrium model. This model borrows heavily from the general equilibrium model of outsourcing proposed by Grossman and Helpman (2005). IVJJ.l Model Set-Up Since outsourcing may include both domestic and international outsourcing, consider a setting with two countries, North and South. There are two types of consumer goods, a homogeneous good z and a differentiated good yO,Z), where YO'z) represents the j-th variety of a continuum of varieties of an I-type good. The I-type good is associated with point Ion the circumference of a unit circle. Consumers in both countries share identical preferences and view the varieties of the good y as differentiated. Letting z and yO. I) be consumption of the homogeneous good and the j-th variety of the I-type differentiated good, preferences of the representative consumer are of the form, I iii I) .Ii U=ZI-illf f y(j,l)"djdl]" , 0<()(,f)<1 o 0 where fl (I) is the endogenously detennined measure of varieties of the I-type (IV 1) differentiated good. Consumers allocate an optimal share /3 of their spending on the differentiated goods. The elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties of good y is f = II (1- ()() . 75 There are two types of producers: final-goods producers and suppliers of intennediate inputs. Northern and Southern final producers ofthe homogeneous good z may enter their respective markets and incur the cost of Wi per unit of output, where Wi is the wage rate in country i and i=N, S. On the other hand, only the NOlihern final producers have the know-how to produce any varieties of good y. Such a finn must bear a fixed cost of product design and development, wNIn' where w N is the NOlihern wage rate and In is the fixed labor requirement. Additionally, the Northem final producer needs one unit of a specialized input per unit of output, the production of which they must contract out to a local or overseas input supplier. The entry of an input supplier in country i requires investment in expertise and equipment, which I refer to as a production know-how, the cost of which is w' /:/1 , where i=N, S. Due to high relative costs of entry, only a limited number of suppliers, 11/ U;/I) , enter a given market and each supplier serves multiple final producers in equilibrium.12 A supplier's know-how is represented by a point on the unit circle, spaced at an equal distance 1/ m' from the next supplier's know-how. Final producers do not know the exact location of the supplier's know-how on the circle, but consider the nearest supplier to be at a random distance x from the producer's own production technology know-how, where x follows a uniforn1 distribution on the [0,1/2 mil interval. Finally, any supplier must develop a prototype before it can produce the customized inputs needed by a particular final producer. The full cost of this investment, Cim' i 32 1 assume that Cil':" <0 . For simplicity, 111 is assumed to be a continuous variable. 76 w' J/ x, varies directly with the distance in expeliise. Furthennore, the input supplier's compensation for the investment and the actual induced investment are subject to negotiation and depend on the nature of the contracting environment in country i. Once the prototype is completed, input suppliers employ one unit of local labor per unit of output. The setting is one of incomplete contracts in both North and South. In particular, I assume that in country i, an outside pmiy can verify a fraction y' 0 (IV 12) 81 6 Vi 4 Q( 1- y' '[1 + r5 m' f:,,] > < 0 -- -- m ---- or 6/:/1 1-Q( l-Y'-~(y'J2 r5 r;" m' where y'.1777J# J.iP.iP NAICSJ13&314· i~le Mills&"ftl:l1od ~ ,4' ,~' ,,," # i ,,,, #' ,#Tn-~ ........__.._. _.-.__.._--_.-.~--_.<----~--" /' NAICS:I!2·Pa~ .._.._~ ..........--.o..-"""" 4_..._·-J,,··-·-_·······.I.·· " '--'-- _j/ '---.---'---- ...$' 4:>.j ...i i ....J. ..i, ,$--'; *~;'-~~--';'-:f i " fb"g "~ j.~ NAIC5315 &316·App.rcl &lealher/l. Allied !'j 1il ). ••••"' , ,.0. ~~j ",--' iSt~·- ~ ..- -:b- ,=' -t' ••• '=............. ~~~;#~#~~~~~##~J / ~._.~A, , ,;//'.·y~ .//"-~ _~ • .4(,,,11 .... ...... .. ~ ~ ... t.-_· ...., f~ Jr....- .... ....... ~,/ ,/ NAJCS3" /10 J12-Fcod 11. E\eYeralle& TDbII= ..__ ....,,_.~ ........-o-.....-,.J./ ".::..~:::.t.:; ...:t.~=:::::::::::.~=..--::::~~~~""-"--"'.-' ~ '"~~ ~ ~~ "" --- M!lll!rT~ls lmpDl1.!l --""_•• OJlllUmer Goods rmpo -- I:v,.n~%pliesImports -- CapllaIGoa15lmpo~ r== MlItl!mlls Impcrls ----4----- ea,w~Gcod.5lmportsll=:=- 8usines8Suppl~1Tnports -- ~itt.lGooo:hlmp;:lftJ L:" MmerialslmpDlt5 ----...-- Cooillmer~...._-- eusllt9'lS,qllllleslmiM!. - Clpb1Goo1ls.Im~ \ MllleriallJ!i'l1~ Cauluml!J~&lmporbl....- ···~t'»5up""ieslmpor3 --CaJJol\31Goot!,lmpol't:J o1,f' ...#' ,.- ....- ,"U'," ;,"i #'ii J,..... ##">7 ~ NAICSJ26·plllstit:5e;Rubber J .' /_.:=~:::~~:.~::: I=;rialSlmports --.0._ C005~1IlIGoodslmport!ll ~- 8uSlness5ll;1ph~lmports - Cap~alGc;odslm<:orts r=;:;lll,rmp;ll't! ._-o."-ConllU~eT~ ............ Busino!!Ss Sup~;".lmpclfb ~- ClIpiC!l GaldslmpoltJ ~ MlIIl!lilllslmpOo1s c-' N o Figure B.3: U.S. Imports by 3-digit NAICS Industry, 1989-2004 (Cont.) Durable Manufacturing , __ __ _.. 1)))J;)}JJ;,J;;; NAtCS 321 - Wood "-~'-~->< NAJcsm·~'Y ~~ ~~nM~~Suppl... lmporlll -CapilalGoa::!lI~ ~#~~#~~#~~~$#~~# ~: ~i~~t ,,*~ ::ciC:;:C=;~~;;-:~-=:::~~~~~-=:~~ ~'miXf'l!! .l--CoIlSUmer~lm~ =::ElusinN Supplies lmpcW. --- c"pillll Goo:b 1m.,.:>? NAICS332·Fot:ll1l::lll..dMobl ...........-_...-,../ I~;~::=::. ...I"" ,$ $" .f:'''' , 4''' ./ "·-."i NAICS 331 • PnmBry "'!!\ill -', ,........-...-.......,. ~ .. ....--~ - -. 1--- MMerilllslmparl' -4.----- Ca>!unwGoodslmport<.:' ::.__._. Bo.:sine-.Suppr",,'mF':uls -.~aJIGoodslmiXf'l!!_ 2 NAICS 321· NDTVTl""~lIjtMineml / E M:ll~rialr. ImpC>'l!l - ConsuIMr Gocdllmpcr1l! ••m __•• Busin""'ll$Jpplfllllmports - C-'Jp;t11GcodslmpcllU; ~- i:18X":C".<~;~~:l: . 'i'-I"""#' ..~* 'f'''' ./('''.:,.Il-.$.... .# ,of>'> ...#' ,#.#' ...i ..'" ...... , if /.-~~_=::~:'::-~); " ,/"' - ...--- .--....~ E~:::~=~~~~ =:=- ~;~;;=;,=j ~ NAICSJ39.Mi$::ll!Il"neou~ -", .... . " ...,;"._..K /' ,.,.--,---~_.--,,--~ .-' ~-'-"--'''=---f'''--a=--'~ ..~~ ..i ..i ~ ii ,J,~ "';'7i; i J 4"i.#' ..# g .'•:i:j~ i~, / ..../ / /' ~ ~1~/'............ ..-- ..........._.....-....,.,-- ...-.__.-..-,---" oJft;=::"(fr~~~~,~;-;i;~: ~A.lCS3315· Tr:lMp:lrtstion Equipmenl ..ol>" ..# ..~" $'''' ~.:, .:IN ...$,'; i'~--';7'l ~l~"'~~ ,/.,.~--~~' _yr_.K ...._n(; ,fI' ..J ............."'.. $'.;,i,.,..;i ..i.ii ..#~ g § ~ ,', ".." '\ / _ ..--..." '00" ~':1=~==~~~~:7:,~:::~:.::~:::~<~~-:: g Mal~i1ll1lmpDl1s Qln~m~ ~- Busrts I .--M9\l!rill1slrniXf'l!!~ -.-....... c;g,""marGoods~•.• BllSlness Sup~ias Impcm -- Capital Goods lm.,.:>rt'I I ....... N ....... Table B.l Breakdown of Imports by Utilization Weights, 1989-2004 122 u.s. Materials Imports Products Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 1989 73 63 40 16 2004 74 64- 40 16 U.S. Consumer Goods Imports Products Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 1989 52 45 35 0 2004 49 42 33 0 25% 91 89 25% 91 91 Volume 50% 75% 84 57 80 52 Volume 50% 75% 84 58 85 62 100% 25 21 100"10 o 1 Note: The columns show the share of products (import volumes) in total products (total import volumes) by each category, that have more than 25%, 50%, 75%,100% utilization rate as intermediate or consumer goods. Table B.2: U.S. Imports Relative Importance, 1989-2004 US. Materials Imports Volume Products Year $ %~ ShM ShY # %~ ShM 1989 131.7 7.2 33.0 4.8 8497 1.5 71.2 2004 351.9 7.2 29.1 8.4 10615 1.5 73.9 US. Consumer Goods hnports Volume Products Year $ %~ ShM ShY # %~ ShM 1989 133.7 8.3 33.5 4.9 9921 1.2 83.1 2004 435.2 8.3 35.9 10.3 11792 1.2 82.1 US. Total Imports Volume Products Year $ %~ ShY # %~ 1989 399.1 7.9 14.6 11932 1.3 2004 1210.8 7.9 28.8 14366 1.3 Note: Imports are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. The % fJ. refers to average annual growth. The Sh M refers to import share in total manufacturing imports and Sh Y refers to import share in total manufacturing output. # refers to the number of distinct import products. 123 Table B.3: U.S. Top 10 Industry Imports u.s. Materials Imports 1989 2004 NAICS Description ShM ShY NAICS Description ShM ShY 334 Computer & electronics 19 10 334 Computer & electronics 24 23 336 Transportation equipment 18 6 336 Transportation equipment 16 9 331 Primal)' metals 17 16 331 Primal)' metals 15 30 325 Chemical products 8 4 325 Chemical products 10 7 322 Paper products 7 8 333 MachineI)' 6 8 333 MachineI)' 5 4 332 Fabricated metal products 5 7 332 Fabricated metal products 4 3 335 Elec. eq., appl., & compnts 4 15 335 Elec. eq., appl., & compnts 3 5 322 Paper products 4 9 326 Plastics & rubber products 3 4 321 Wood products 3 11 313 Textile mills & products 3 5 326 Plastics & rubber products 3 6 U.S. Consumer Goods Imports 1989 2004 NAICS Description ShM ShY NAICS Description ShM ShY 315 Apparel, leather & allied 25 50 315 Apparel, leather & allied 21 258 336 Transportation equipment 22 7 336 Transportation equipment 19 12 334 Computer & electronics 13 7 325 Chemical products 13 11 339 Miscellaneous 13 26 339 Miscellaneous 12 39 311 Food, beverage & tobacco 7 2 334 Computer & electronics 12 14 325 Chemical products 4 2 311 Food, beverage & tobacco 6 4 324 Petroleum & coal products 4 4 324 Petroleum & coal products 4 5 335 Elec. eq., appl., & compnts 3 5 335 Elec. eq., appl., & compnts 3 15 333 MachineI)' 2 1 337 Furniture & related prod. 3 18 313 Textile mills & products 1 3 313 Textile mills & products 2 12 Note: Sh M refers to materials/consumer goods import share in total materials/consumer goods imports and Sh Y refers to materials/consumer goods import share in industry output. 124 Table B.4: Pro-Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Imports Correlations ~ Materials ~ Cons umer Imports Imports 125 ~ Output ~GDP 0.48 0.26 0.20 0.35 Dependent Variable: ALn (Imports) I II ~ Ln (Output) 0.127* ** [0.031] X Materials Dummy 0.071*** [0.039] ~ Ln (GOP) 0.054* ** [0.007] X Materials Dummy 0.000 [0.009] ObselVations Number ofYears Number of Industries R-squared 540 15 18 0.11 540 15 18 0.20 Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Dependent variable is first-difference of natural log of U.S. imports of intermediate inputs and consumer goods. Sample data contain U.S. imports from three-digit NAICS industries for 1990-2004. Imports are deflated by CPI. GDP and Output are measured in chained 2000 dollars. 126 Table B.5:List of Sample Countries ASEAN SWEDEN EAST GERMANY LITHUANIA SOUTH YEMEN BRUNEI & BHUT AN SWITZERLAND ECUADOR MACEDONIA SRI LANKA CAMBODIA UK EGYPT MADAGASCAR ST. KITTS-NEVIS INDONESIA EL SALVADOR MALAWI ST. PIERRE & MIQ. SOUTH KOREA OWER EQUATORIAL GUINIMALI SUDAN LAOS AFGANISTAN ESTON1A MALTA SURINAME MALAYSIA ALBANIA ETHIOPIA MAURITANIA SYRIA MYANMAR ALGERIA FALKLAND ISLS. MAURITIUS TAJIKISTAN PHILIPPINES ANGOLA FIJI MONGOLA TANZANIA SINGAPORE ARGENTINA FORM. YUGOSLAV. MOROCCO TOGO THAILAND ARMENIA FRENCH GUIANA MOZAMBIQUE TRINIDAD & TOB. VIETNAM ARUBA & N. ANT. GABON NEPAL TUNISIA CANADA AZERBAIJAN GAMBIA NEW CALEDONIA TURKEY BAHAMAS GEORGIA NICARAGUA T URKMENIST AN CHINA BAHRAIN GHANA NIGER US OUTL. ISLS. CHINA (MAINLAND)BANGLADESH GIBRALTAR NIGERIA UGANDA HONG KONG BARBADOS GREENLAND NORTH KOREA UKRAINE MACAU BELARUS GUADELOUPE OMAN U. A. EMIRATES TAIWAN BELIZE GUATEMALA PAKISTAN URUGUAY JAPAN BENIN GUINEA PANAMA USSR BERMUDA GUINEA-BISSAU P. N.GUINEA UZBEKIST MEXICO BOLIVIA GUYANA PARAGUAY VENEZUELA BOSNIA-HERZEG. HAITI PERU YEMEN ARAB REP. OEeD BRAZIL HONDURAS POLAND ZAIRE AUSTRAL BULGARIA HUNGARY PUERTO RICO ZAMBIA AUSTRIA BURKINA INDIA QATAR ZIMBABWE BELGIUM BURUNDI IRAN R. OF MOLDOVA DENMARK CAMEROON IRAQ REUNION FINLAND C. AFRIC. REP. ISRAEL ROMANIA FRANCE CHAD IVORY COAST RUSSIA GERMAN CHILE JAMAICA RWANDA GREECE COLOMBIA JORDON SAMOA ICELAND CONGO KAZAKHSTAN SAUDI ARABIA IRELAND COST A RICA KENYA SENEGAL ITALY CROATIA KIRIBATI SERBIA & MONT. LUXEMBURG CUBA KUWAIT SEYCHELLES NET HERLANDS CYPRUS KYRGYZST AN SIERRA LEONE NEW ZEALAND CZECH REPUBLIC LATVIA SLOVAKIA NORWAY CZECHOSLOVAKIA LEBANON SLOVENIA PORTUGAL DJIBOUTI LIBERIA SOMALIA SPAIN DOMINICAN REP. LIBYA SOUTH AFRICA Table B.6: u.s. Import Value Market Share by Region, 1989-2004 us. Materials ImJDrts Canada CHINA Japan Mexico ASEAN OECD OTHER - IndustJY 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 Chemicals (325) 21 24 3 6 13 9 4 5 2 5 48 38 9 13 MachineJY (333) 11 10 3 7 28 23 3 12 3 3 45 39 6 7 Compo & EIec. (334) 7 5 12 30 35 11 7 11 27 30 10 9 2 3 Electric. Equip. (335) 11 9 11 17 28 12 19 32 5 6 22 20 4 4 Transp. Equip. (336) 32 25 2 5 27 18 10 24 2 3 25 22 2 4 Nondurable Manuf. 35 31 5 9 8 6 3 5 6 6 29 28 14 15 Durable Manu£ 23 18 6 16 24 11 7 14 9 12 23 18 7 12 Total Manu£ 26 21 6 14 19 10 6 12 8 10 25 20 9 13 US. Consumer Goo~ ImJDrts Canada CHINA Japan Mexico ASEAN OECD OTHER -- IndustJY 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 Chemicals (325) 9 7 2 2 14 6 2 2 1 2 63 76 9 5 MachineJY (333) 10 6 7 33 43 22 4 11 8 7 25 18 4 2 Comp. & Elec. (334) 3 1 15 37 43 12 11 19 22 21 5 8 0 1 Electric. Equip. (335) 5 6 36 50 16 4 8 15 15 9 17 12 3 2 Transp. Equip. (336) 28 28 2 3 43 26 3 10 4 7 20 25 1 2 Nondurable Manu£ 5 8 26 21 3 2 3 6 19 10 23 32 21 22 Durable Manu£ 13 12 15 28 33 14 5 10 11 11 18 17 5 8 Total Manu£ 10 10 20 25 20 8 4 8 14 10 20 24 12 14 Note: Figures express import shares of each country/region in total U.S. imports by the specified industry and year. Rows add up to 100 per year. CHINA refers to mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. The six country groupings are mutually exclusive. ........ tv --J 128 Table B.7: Largest Gains in Market Share, 1989-2004 u.s. :Materials Imports U.S. Consumer Goods Imports Country :Market Share Ails. b. %b. Country :Market Share Ails. b. %b. 1989 2004 1989 2004 China 1.01 10.27 9.26 919 China 5.88 21.18 15.30 260 Mexico 6.04 11.70 5.66 94 Mexico 4.26 8.27 4.01 94 Russia 0.00 1.65 1.65 N/A Ireland 0.41 3.94 3.53 866 Malaysia 1.47 2.86 1.39 94 Gennany 4.12 5.09 0.97 24 Ireland 0.33 1.13 0.80 247 Vietnam 0.00 0.88 0.88 N/A India 0.39 0.85 0.46 119 Israel 1.29 1.98 0.68 53 Thailand 0.65 1.10 0.45 70 Indonesia 0.68 1.26 0.58 85 S. Korea 3.21 3.56 0.35 11 Honduras 0.09 0.66 0.57 637 Philippines 0.65 0.99 0.34 53 UK 2.66 3.21 0.55 21 Peru 0.21 0.54 0.33 158 India 1.65 2.15 0.51 31 Note: Here China refers to only mainland China. Percentage changes are not available if a country's share of U.S. imports in 1989 was zero. Table B.8: Product Penetration by Region, 1989-2004 u.s. Materials ImJXlrts Canada CillNA Japan Mexico ASEAN OECD OTHER Industry 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 Chemicals (325) 60 56 35 74 74 65 31 36 23 39 97 93 45 69 Machinery (333) 94 94 79 89 95 93 59 74 66 82 99 99 66 87 Comp. & Elec. (334) 78 75 94 95 94 90 68 72 86 86 97 94 65 75 Electric. Equip. (335) 83 85 89 95 94 88 69 77 78 85 99 97 64 81 Transp. Equip. (336) 92 91 79 91 86 88 68 75 66 80 98 97 59 84 Nondurable Manuf 59 60 46 66 59 49 30 41 39 49 93 89 49 69 Durable Manuf 85 83 73 86 85 78 56 65 65 73 96 95 59 78 Total Manuf 70 69 57 75 70 61 41 51 50 60 94 92 54 73 U.S. Consumer Good<; ImJXlrts Canada CillNA Japan Mexico ASEAN OEeD OTHER Industry 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 1989 2004 Chemicals (325) 59 55 35 74 73 64 30 35 23 37 96 93 47 69 Machinery (333) 91 92 79 92 93 87 50 64 62 74 98 99 60 82 Comp. & Elec. (334) 65 68 89 93 87 86 51 62 76 79 97 96 56 73 Electric. Equip. (335) 85 86 91 97 95 87 70 78 82 90 99 98 65 83 Transp. Equip. (336) 85 84 72 76 82 81 60 60 63 72 100 98 59 75 Nondurable Manuf 58 62 60 74 55 48 32 46 51 58 92 90 55 74 Durable Manuf 80 81 82 90 84 76 56 65 71 77 96 96 63 80 Total Manuf 66 68 67 80 65 58 40 53 58 65 93 92 58 76 Note: Figures express import product shares of each country/region in total U.S. import products by the specified industry and year. A product is included in the share if it is imported in the U.S. by at least one country in the region. CHINA refers to mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. The six country groupings are mutually exclusive. ....... N \0 Table B.9: Largest Gains in Product Penetration by Country, 1989-2004 US. Materials Imports US. Consumer Goods Imports Country Market Share Ails. /1 %/1 Country Market Share Ails. /1 %/1 -~--~~ 1989 2004 1989 2004 ---~--~--~--~----~-- China 34 70 37 108 China 45 76 32 71 Mexico 19 44 24 127 Mexico 22 49 26 116 Russia 6 20 14 223 Ireland 10 25 15 141 Malaysia 8 20 12 143 Gennany 14 27 13 94 Ireland 17 28 12 69 Vietnam 6 19 13 212 India 6 17 11 175 Israel 24 36 13 53 Thailand 41 51 10 25 Indonesia 40 53 12 31 S. Korea 7 17 10 129 Honduras 7 20 12 164 Philippines 11 21 9 83 U.K 33 44 11 34 Peru 31 40 9 30 India 15 23 8 56 Note: Here China refers only to mainland China. 130 132 Table B.ll: Product Shares by Source Country Income Levels, 1989-2004 u.s. Materials hnports Income Breakdown H M L LMH MH LM 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- World Bank 22 15 0 0 29 50 48 33 0 0 World Bank* 22 15 0 0 10 17 48 33 0 0 L<40th, 40th::;M<60t\ 60thSH 34 30 0 0 0 0 38 55 27 14 0 0 L<40t\ 40th SM<60t\ 60th$H* 34 30 0 0 0 0 18 25 27 14 0 0 L<30th , 30th:SM<70th , 70thSH 28 21 0 0 31 50 41 28 0 0 L<30'h, 30thSM<70'h, 70th :SH* 28 21 0 0 11 16 41 28 0 0 L<30th, 3Oth:SM<90th , 90th$H 6 7 3 4 0 0 30 49 60 39 L<30'h, 30thsM<90th , 9Oth :SH* 6 7 3 4 0 0 11 16 60 39 L<20t\ 20th:SM<80th , 80tl'SH 18 15 2 2 0 0 7 9 73 74 0 0 L<20th, 20th :SM<80th , 80th$H* 18 15 2 2 0 0 1 2 73 74 0 0 U.S. Cons umer Goods Imports Income Breakdown H M L LMH MH LM 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- 19892004- WDB Breakdown 20 13 0 0 36 57 43 28 0 0 WDB Breakdown * 20 13 0 0 16 27 43 28 0 0 L<40th, 40th:SM<60th , 60th$H 31 25 0 0 0 46 62 23 12 0 0 L<40th, 40thSM<60th , 60th :SH* 31 25 0 0 0 25 35 23 12 0 0 L<30'\ 30th:SM<70th, 70'hSH 26 18 0 0 37 57 36 24 0 0 L<30th, 30th:SM<70t\ 70th$H* 26 18 0 0 17 27 36 24 0 0 L<30t\ 30tl1SM<90th , 90'h:SH 5 5 5 4 0 0 36 56 53 33 2 L<30t\ 30thSM<90tl1 , 90th$H* 5 5 5 4 0 0 17 26 53 33 2 L<20tl', 20th:SM<80th, 80th:SH 16 13 2 2 0 0 12 17 70 68 0 0 L<20th, 20th:SM<80tl" 80th$H* 16 13 2 2 0 0 4 8 70 68 0 0 Note: Figures express import product shares by countries grouped into income levels. T he income level breakdown follows the one indicated in the first column, where number refer to percentiles and H - high income, M-middle income, L -low income countries. LMH products originate simultaneously from at least one low- or one high-income countries. MH products originate from at least one middle- and one high-income countries. LM products originate from at least one low-income and one middle-income countries. The six source country groupings are mutually exclusive. • refers to an extra restriction in the construction of LMH products, where products which originate from only one low-income country are dropped. 133 Table B.12: Regression of Unit Values on Income, 1989-2004 Dependent Variable: Log(Unit Values) All 25% 50% 75% LMH I II III IV V Total Manufacturing 1..0g(Real GDPpc) 0.171 *** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.186*** 0.170*** [0.032] [0.035] [0.036] [0.034] [0.032] Obs. 1628940 1203789 1003836 650399 1535165 Null. OfProducts 14082 10533 9123 5625 10727 R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 Non-Durable Manufacturing Log(Real GDPpc) 0.171*** 0.157*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.169*** [0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.032] [0.026] X Cons umer Dummy 0.002*** 0.019*** 0.071*** 0.061 *** 0.002*** [0.000] [0.007] [0.022] [0.021 ] [0.000] Obs. 2300591 1558263 1413440 1098902 2184750 Null. OfProducts 12410 12196 11241 7795 9624 R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.11 Durable Manufacturing Log(Real GDPpc) 0.170*** 0.163*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.170*** [0.041 ] [0.044] [0.047] [0.049] [0.042] X Consumer Dummy 0.000* 0.016 0.044* 0.029 0.000* [0.000] [0.011] [0.026] [0.035] [0.000] Obs. 1575327 887844 699630 466340 1518529 Null. OfProducts 6872 6020 4961 3478 5667 R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 Units of observation are product-country-year. Unit Values data comes from Feenstra (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau (2004), real per capita GDP are from WDI (2007), Consumer dummy takes a value of I if a product is a consumer goods, and zero otherwise. Each regression includes product and year fixed effects, as well as regional dummies (see Table B.5 for description of regional breakdown). Columns II-IV restrict the sample to only those products that have more than 25%,50%,75% use, respectively, as intermediates or consumer goods. Column V restricts the sample to only those products that are sourced simultaneously from one low- and one high income country, where income breakdown follows World Bank classification. Robust standard errors adjusted for source country clustering are noted below coefficients. Results for fixed effects and constant are suppressed. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1 percent,S percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table B.B: Regression of Unit Values on Income by Select Industries, 1989-2004 Dependent Variable: Log(Unit Values) All 25% 50% 75% LMH I II III IV V Chemicals .Manufacturing Log(Real GDppc) 0.235*** 0.239*** 0.237* ** 0.209* ** 0.235* ** [0.041] [0.044] [0.045] [0.044] [0.040] X Consumer Dummy -0.000* -0.006 0.046* 0.054* -0.000* [0.000] [0.019] [0.024] [0.033] [0.000] Machinery.Manufacturing Log(ReaIODPpc) 0.174*** 0.148** 0.168* ** 0.217*** 0.176*** [0.062] [0.057] [0.063] [0.078] [0.062] X Cons umer Dummy 0.000 0.052 0.040 -0.268*** 0.000 [0.000] [0.072] [0.091] [0.099] [0.000] Computers and Electronics Manufacturing Log(Real ODPpc) 0.146*** 0.156* ** 0.161* ** 0.158*** 0.146* ** [0.042] [0.054] [0.055] [0.055] [0.042] X Consumer Dummy 0.000 -0.025 -0.039 -0.036 0.000 [0.000] [0.044] [0.047] [0.049] [0.000] Electrical Equip./Appliances Manufacturing Log(ReaIODPpc) 0.139** 0.150* * 0.147** 0.199* * 0.139* * [0.061] [0.064] [0.065] [0.091] [0.061] X Consumer Dummy 0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.099 0.000 [0.000] [0.003] [0.041] [0.075] [0.000] Transportation Equipment .Manufacturing Log(Real GDppc) 0.172*** 0.148** 0.147** 0.146* ** 0.175*** [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] [0.038] [0.061] X Consumer Dummy 0.000 0.077 0.086* 0.116** 0.000 [0.000] [0.047] [0.049] [0.045] [0.000] Units of observation are product-country-year. Unit Values data comes from Feenstra (2002) and U.S. Census Bureau (2004), real per capita GDP are from WDI (2007), Consumer dummy takes a value of I if a product is a consumer goods, and zero otherwise. Each regression includes product and year fixed effects, as well as regional dummies (see Table 8.5 for description of regional breakdown). Columns II-IV restrict the sample to only those products that have more than 25%,50%,75% use, respectively, as intermediates or consumer goods. Column V restricts the sample to only those products that are sourced simultaneously from one low- and one high income country, where income breakdown follows World Bank classification. Robust standard errors adjusted for source country clustering are noted below coefficients. Results for fixed effects and constant are suppressed. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the I percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 134 135 APPENDIX C DATA APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III c.l. Productivity Database Extension Most of the data used in construction of the non-structural variables are obtained from the NBER Productivity Database (PD). The NBER PD extends as far as 1996 on 1987 SIC basis and incorporates data on shipments, employments, materials, inventory, energy, investment, capital stock, deflators, and TFP measures for 458 industries. Since my analysis goes as far as 2004, I extend the NBER PD following the methodology outlined in Bartelsman and Grey (1996). I describe the construction of each of the variables of the PD extension and the data issues encountered on the way below. The final PD extension spans 1997-2005 and in addition to the NBER PD variables, includes two versions of output price deflators, cost of selected services, and services deflators for 473 six-digit NAICS industries. C. J. J Industry Statistics Data on shipments, employment, materials, inventory, energy, and investment come from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, which are currently available for 1997-2005 and can be downloaded from the Census website. I have identified two issues with the ASM data. First, while the industlies in the1997-2001 ASM data follow six-digit NAICS, the industries in the 2002-2005 data follow NAICS-based code which aggregates some six-digit NAICS industries into two to five grouped Census-defined industry code. In order to break down the Census-code industries data into data for each of the embedded six-digit NAICS industries, I aggregate the data from 2001 ASM into the corresponding Census code industries. Then, for each industry statistic of six-digit NAICS industries in 2001, I calculate its share in the respective aggregated industry statistic of the corresponding Census-code industry of 2001. These shares are then used to impute the six-digit NAICS industry data from the Census-code industry data in 2002-2005. Since energy data is available as total energy, fuel and electricity purchases, I first break down fuel and electricity and then aggregate these to create the broken down total energy purchases. The break-down method for investment, which is subdivided into structures and equipment investment, is slightly different. I first used the method described above to obtain total investment for the six-digit NAICS industries. The broken down structures and equipment investment are constructed by applying the shares of equipment and structures of the corresponding Census-code industry in its total investment for 2002-2005 to the broken down total investment for the six-digit NAICS 136 industries within the Census-code. Thus, I assume that the six-digit NAICS industries embedded in the Census-code industry invest in structures and equipment in the same proportions as the overarching Census-code industry. I justify this method by noting that since investment in structures and equipment takes place in discrete amounts, one cannot assume that propOliions of 2001 will hold up during 2002-2005. The second issue is similar to the one experienced by Bmielsman and Gray (1996), where some industries in the ASM data have missing information due to the disclosure reasons. I were able to approach the issue in two ways. For some missing observations of six-digit NAICS industries, I were able to subtract the existing data for other six-digit NAICS from the data of the overarching five-digit NAICS industries. If data for five-digit NAICS were not disclosed, I used the same method to first obtain the missing five-digit NAICS data from the overarching four-digit NAICS data. This method took care of all the missing observations but the ones due to energy and investment, where multiple industries within a five-digit NAICS would have missing infonnation. I remedied this issue by first obtaining the aggregated data for the multiple industries with missing observations by the method of subtraction the existing data of six-digit NAICS from five-digit NAICS. Then the aggregated data was broken down for total energy, fuel, and electricity, by the average shares of these variables in the aggregated data of the nearby years, for which full data was available. The aggregated data for investment, equipment, and structures, was broken down by the share of the aggregated equipment and structures in the aggregated total investment of the same years. Once again, I did not use the data from the nearby years for the investment variables, since investment of one year does not have to follow the investment pattems of the previous year. C l. 2 Shipment Price Deflators In the NBER PD, output price deflators data come from the BEA shipments price deflator data. While the BEA produces the shipment price deflators for 1997-2005, the data come with a disclaimer about the lack of precision in the data. This is true because the BEA basis its shipment price deflator data on the BLS producer price index data for each six- digit NAICS industry, where 130 observations are missing for some industries and years. Since the changes in product prices are integral to the two-stage estimation, upon consulting the BLS, I construct my own output price deflators from the producer price indexes. I replace the missing observations with the related commodity price indexes or conveliing the existing SIC indexes into NAICS. While the differences between my deflators and BEA deflators is notable, the TFP calculations using each of the defl ators yield near identical values. The PD extension includes my version of the output price deflators as the default prices, and the BEA shipment price deflators as alternative prices. Cl.3 Materials Deflators Materials deflators are constructed for each industry as the sum of materials supplying industry PPI's weighted by the share of material purchases from that supplying industry in total matelial purchased of the purchasing industry. The wei ghts are 0 btained 137 from the 1997 input-output tables, since this the only benchmark input-output table available to date. The 2002 benchmark input-output tables have been released as of the writing of this dissertation. The six-digit NAICS materials include materials from manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, where the latter includes agriculture, logging, mining and utilities. The BLS does not post PPI's for the agriculture industry. Having consulted the BLS staff, I average out the price indices of the commodities produced by each six-digit NAICS agriculture industry. While the BLS staff had provided us with the BLS commodity code - NAICS mapping, the concordance does not contain relative importance weights for multiple commodity codes mapped in the one NAICS industry. As the result, the constructed agricultural PPI's are the equally weighted average of commodity price indexes, provided by the BLS. There were a number of six-digit NAICS, for which some commodities had missing price indexes either partially or entireli9 . A small number ofNAICS had no commodity price index data, which I excluded from the material deflator calculations6o . One drawback of the material deflator construction method described above, which is outlined in Bartelsman and Grey (1996), is that thePPI data does not contain changes in the shipment and retail margin prices. This implies that the materials deflator data does not reflect the actual price changes experienced by the materials purchasing industries. C 1.4 Services Deflators Services deflators are constructed for each industry as the sum of services supplying industry PPI's weighted by the share of services purchases from that supplying industry in total services purchases of the purchasing industry. The weights are obtained from the 1997 input-output table, since this is the only benchmark input-output table available to date. I restrict services to only those related to the infonnation services (NAICS 5112, 518, 514); professional scientific support services (NAICS 5411-5119); and administrative and suppOli services (NAICS 5614). PPls are available for only a limited number of these services (5112, 518, 514, 5411, 5412, 5413, and 5418). Services deflators are not available in the NBER PD and could not be constructed for years prior to 1997. C 1.5 Capital Stock and Investment Deflators As described in the NBER Productivity Database, the staIiing point for the process of creating real capital stock series is a set ofless aggregated industry capital stock estimates. I use PRB 4-digit NAICS net capital stocks as the basis for my 6-digit NAICS estimates 61 • The PRB 4-digit net capital stock data are based on 4-digit 59 These NArCS codes and their respective commodity codes are listed as follows: 111199:01220415; 111320:01110107; 111334:01110225; 111335:01190105; 111339:01110206; 114111:02230102, 02230103,02230134,02230135; 114112:02230503,02230504 60 The following NArCS do not have a commodity code mapping, which prevents us from constructing PP1 data: 111160, 111136,1114,111910,111930,111991, 11199R, 112111,112130,111234,112420, 112511,112512,112519,112910, 112920, 112930,112990,114119,113110, ]13220,2213,230320 6] r thank Jaim Stevens of FRB for providing me with these da ta 138 investment series for plant, equipment, and software of the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, and the 1997 industry-asset type investment flow matrix, producer durable equipment deflators, and a table of mean service lives by asset type from the BEA. The 4-digit data are convelied to the 6-digit level by assuming that the industry- asset type flows are the same for all 6-digit industries within a 4-digit. With this assumption in mind, I are able to use the FRB 4-digit data on real and nominal investment by asset type (structures, equipment, software) and create investment deflators, which I use to create real investment at 6-digit NAICS level. The initial 6-digit real capital stocks for 1997 are created using the ratio of 6-digit to 4-digit real (net capital) from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. I construct the implied "depreciation" from the 4-digit capital stock and and real investment data by using Kit=( 1-8i) Kit-l+li to. Now I can successively add real investment in equipment and structures and subtract the "depreciation" to create real net capital stocks from 1997-2005. C.2 Non-Structural Variables C2.1 Factor Cost-Shares I calculate factor cost-shares by dividing payment to each factor by the value of shipments, in nominal terms. The factor cost-share of services cannot be derived from the ASM data. I assume that six-digit NAICS industries have the same share of services costs as the over-arching four-digit NAICS. The data for the latter comes from the BLS input- output tables for 1997-2004, which are provided on four-digit NAICS levels. The services cost-shares for years prior to 1997 are obtained at three-digit SIC level from the BLS input-output table for 1989-1996. C2.2 ractor Prices I proxy prices of unskilled and skilled labor by the ratio of production and nonproduction wages to the number of production and nonproduction workers employed, respectively. The price of capital is calculated by dividing the payments to capital in each industry (which equals value of shipments less payments to labor and materials) by the quantity of capital. In the specifications where services are netted out from value added prices and TFP calculations, payments to services are also netted out from the payments to capital. Materials, energy, and services price deflators are used to calculate log change in the respective prices. C2.3 Value-added product prices The log change value-added product price is measured by the formula provided in the text, ,6 ln p ;/1 == 1,6 In p il - h(r il - I + I' il) , ,6 In p;;' J ,where r ii-I and r il are the materials cost-shares of industry i= 1, ... , N, averaged over the two periods and ,6 In p%' is the change in log price of intennediates. The product price data comes from the output deflator data, and tIle price of intermediates comes from the materials deflator data from the NBER PD and PD extension An altemative specification of value-added prices is the 139 . change in log product price net of the average cost-share weighted change in log price of intennediates and services. C.2.4 Primal TFP Primal total factor productivity is constructed as the difference in the growth of value added (log change) and cost-share weighted growth of primary factors (log change). The value-added is calculated as the growth in real shipments (log change) minus the average cost-share weighted growth in real materials payments (log change). In the alternative specification ofTFP net of services, the growth of value-added is constructed as the growth of real shipments net of weighted growth of real materials and services payments. C.3 Structural Variables C.3. J Technology The data I use for technology variables, i.e., office equipment share, other high- technology share, and computer share, have been supplied to us by Randal Kinoshita of BLS. These data are available in 2000 constant dollars and distinguish capital by asset type for 1948-2002 on 2-digit SIC level and 1987-2005 on 3-digit NAICS level. Berndt and Morrison (1995) define high-technology capital to include office, computing, and accounting machinery; communications equipment; science and engineering instruments; and photocopy and related equipment. This definition of high- technology capital does not incorporate computers. The data currently available to us breaks assets up slightly differently. On SIC level, the high-technology capital is broken up into the following: office, computing, and accounting machinery (asset 14) and communications equipment (asset 16) had stayed the same, while instruments category is broken up into photocopy and related equipment (asset 27); medical equipment and related (28); electromedical (29); and other medical (30). On NAICS level, the high-tech capital is broken up into the following: office and accounting machinery (asset 4); communications equipment (6), photocopying and related equipment (26); medical equipment and related equipment (27); electromedical instruments (28); nonmedical instruments (29). Similarly to Berndt and Morrison (1995), I separate high-technology capital into office equipment (SIC asset 14 and NAICS asset 4), and other high-tech capital. I also define computer capital to include SIC assets 32-42 and NAICS assets 33-43, which is not considered in Berndt and Morrison (1995). To calculate the technology shares, I first calculate the capital services incurred from each type of high technology capital (office equipment, computer, and other high- tech capital) by summing the production of the productive stock of assets and the assets' user costs over all assets in each type of high-technology capital. I then divide the office equipment, computer, and other high-tech capital services by the total productive stock services, obtained using the same method. I use two measures of use costs, ex post and ex ante user costs. Ex post use cost (or internal rental plice) is provided by BLS and are 140 calculated as in Hall and Jorgenson (1967), and reflect the internal rate of return in each industry and capital gains on each asset. On the other hand, ex ante use cost used by Berndt and Monison (1995) reflect a "safe" rate ofreturn and excludes capital gains on each asset. The "safe" rate of return is measured by Moody's Baa Corporate Bond rate, which I obtain from St. Louise FRB on monthly basis and average out to get the annual rate. A practical problem arises when capital income in national accounts (gross operating surplus) becomes negative or assets undergo a very high revaluation. In such cases, the measured rental prices using internal rate of return may also become negative, which is theoretically inconsistent. One way of eliminating such negative rental prices is to employ an extemal rate of return. Following Harper, Berndt and Wood (1989) I take a constant rate at 3.5%, which is the difference between nominal discount rate and inflation rates in the US as calculated by Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) (see Harper et a1. 1989 or Erumban 2004, pg 13). Thus I substitute internal rate of return in rental price fommla (13) with a 3.5. Note that the 3.5 rate of return is assumed to be a real rate ofretum (net of capital gains). C3.2 Outsourcing and Import Openness The construction of these measures of outsourcing and import openness follows the descriptions provided in Appendix AA and A.5. The data for the measures come from the BLS input-output tables, U.S. impOlis from Feenstra (2000) and the Census Bureau, and the Market Classification of HTS Imports provided in this appendix. Foreign services outsourcing is constructed using the services inputs and impOlis infonnation from the BLS input-output tables. The services are limited to infonnation; professional, scientific, and technical; and administrative and suppOli services. The corresponding NAICS and SIC industries are provided in the Table C.l. 141 Table C.l: Selected Services Services Break-Down on 2002 NAICS-oosis InfOrmation Software publishers 5112 Internet and other 518 I Professional, scientific, and technical services Legal 5411 Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, & payroll 5412 Architectura~ engineering, & related 5413 Specialized design 5414 Computer systems design & related 5415 Managerrent, scientific, & technical cons ulting 5416 Scientific research & developrrent 5417 Advertising 5418 Other professional, scientific, & technical 5419 Administrative and support Business support services 5614 Services Break-Down on 1987 SIC- oosis 81 872, 89 871 737 874 873 731 732, 733, 738 InfOrmation; professional, scientific, and technical services; administrative and support Legal Accounting, auditing, & related Engineering, architectural, & related Computer, data processing, & related Managen-ent & public relations Research & testing Advertising Miscellaneous business 'Note, that this 2002 NAICS translates to 514 1997 NAICS Price data found for 51 12,518,5411,5412,5413,5418 only 142 APPENDIXD FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER III Figure D.l: U.S. Wage Inequality, 1963-2005 200519691963 :, (j) OJ ~ "0 o N '- . 0..""'- --OJOJ cu S I "0 ' et .,...- I c ':l~ JL,--~_-----',----------,-----,-----_-,--, --,-----i-,-----,---------,- 1~5 1%1 1%7 1~3 1~n~9 - - Manuf. Sector (SIC) --9-S- Manuf. Sector (NAICS) - - Manuf. Ind. Wt. Avg. (SIC) - .....""'- Manuf. Ind. Wt. Avg. (NAICS Table D.l: Summary Statistics of Non-Structural Variables 1979- 1990 1989- 1996 1997-2004 Average Annual Average Annual Average Annual (percent) change (percent) change (percent) change Change in log factor prices Production labor 4.99 2.67 3.02 Nonproduction labor 5.42 3.78 2.76 Capital 3.98 2.91 0.27 Materials 3.29 0.88 1.66 Energy 3.31 2.00 4.55 Selected Services 2.62 Factor cost-shares: Production labor 13.41 -0.18 12.03 -0.17 11.44 -0.12 Nonproduction labor 10.66 0.01 10.14 -0.15 8.91 0.01 Capital 32.06 0.33 35.12 0.32 38.30 0.25 Materials 53.41 -0.06 52.95 -0.02 50.55 -0.08 Energy 2.45 -0.01 1.86 -0.02 1.83 0.03 Selected Services 2.53 0.02 4.38 0.19 Change in productivity Primal TFP 0.80 0.70 0.43 PrimaIETFP 0.78 0.68 0.40 Change in product prices Value-added 1.53 0.67 0.12 Note: Both averages and changes are weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments, except changes in log primary factor prices, which are weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing payments to that factor. All variables are computed over 452 four-digit SIC industries in 1979-1988 and 1989-1996 and 472 six-digit industries in 1997-2004. The data come from the NBER PD (Bartelsman and Gray 1996) and the PD extension of it for 1997-2005 based on the data from Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Federal Reserve Board, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 143 144 Table D.2:Summary Statistics for Structural Variables 1979-1990 1990- 1996 1998-2004 Average Annual Average Annual Average Annual (percent) change (percent) change (percent) change Trade Materials Offihoring Original measure (Br) 14.98 0.52 15.73 -0,32 Original measure (Nr) 7.64 0.29 8,35 -0.19 Original measure (Br- Nr) 7,34 0.23 7,38 -0.13 Refilled measure (Br) 14.56 0.46 17.54 -0.06 Refilled measure (Nr) 7.68 0.23 9.71 -0.02 Refilled measure (Br- Nr) 6.88 0.23 7.84 -0.04 Services Offihoring Selected Business Services 0.42 0.04 0.51 0.0003 Openness to Imports Finished Goods hnportslVA 29.89 0.87 47.16 4.61 Technology With Ex Post User Costs Computer Share 4.75 0,32 7.17 0.16 12.20 0.48 Office :Equipment Share 0.83 -0.05 0.45 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 Other Hi-Tech Share 4.01 0.20 5.12 0.03 4.76 -0.1 I With Ex Ante User Costs Computer Share 2.87 0.23 5.14 0.19 9.67 0.48 Office :Equipment Share 0.48 -0.03 0,33 -0.01 0.08 -0.D2 Other Hi-Tech Share 3.01 0.18 4,32 0.07 4.23 -0.08 Note: Both averages and changes are weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments. All variables are com puted over 453 four-digit SIC industries in 1989- I996 and 473 six-digit industries in 1997-2004. T he data come from the BLS input-output tables and Ray Roshita of BLS. Table D.3: Consistency of Data with Equation (111.4) a) Descriptive Statistics: Mean Changes in Log Factor Prices 145 1989-1996 Annualized Diff. First Diff. 1997-2004 Annualized Diff. First Diff. Production labor Nonproduction labor Capital 2.666 3.839 2.900 2.668 3.784 2.771 3.025 2.769 0.418 3.022 2.758 0.274 b) Regression of .1 p~A +.1 ETFP j on primary factor cost shares 1989-1996 1997-2004 Annualized Diff First Diff. Annualized Diff. First Diff. Prod. Cost Share 2.631*** 2.667*** 3.010*** 3.032*** [0.022] [0.013] [0.015] [0.012] Non-Prod. Cost Share 3.689*** 3.644*** 2.777*** 2.744*** [0.172] [0.161] [0.040] [0.025] Capital Cost Share 2.941*** 2.798*** 0.422*** 0.275* ** [0.030] [0.029] [0.008] [0.005] Obs ervations 458 3206 473 3311 R-squared 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments. Table D.3: Consistency of Data with Equation (4) (Cont.) c) Regression of L1 P ~A and L1 ETFP i on primary factor cost shares 1989-19% 1997-2004 Annualized Diff. First Diff. Annualized Diff. First Diff. L1 VA L1 VA VA L1 VAPi L1ETFPi Pi L1ETFPi L1 Pi L1 ETFP j Pi L1ETFPi Prod. Cost Share 11.516 -8.885 10.317** -7.650* 4.986 -1.976 5.099* -2.067 [9.095] [9.110] [4.396] [4.397] [6256] [6.251] [2.956] [2.953] Non-Prod. Cost Share -4.037 7.725 -0.970 4.614 -2.713 5.490 -6.781 * 9.525*** [8.659] [8.684] [3.715] [3.719] [4.834] [4.828] [3.675] [3.672] Capital Cost Share -0.482 3.423 -0.628 3.426 -0204 0.626 0.601 -0.325 [2.757] [2.765] [2.087] [2.087] [2.529] [2.524] [1.395] [1.393] Observations 458 458 3206 3206 473 473 3311 3311 R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments. ........ +:. 0"1 Table D.4. Stage I - Original Feenstra and Hanson (1999) Specification 1989-1996 1997-2004 Annualized Difference First Difference Annualized Difference First Difference Original Refmed Original Refmed Original Refmed Original Refined Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure II III IV V VI VII VIII Trade Materials Offsh. (Nr) 0.067 -0.021 0.016 0.000 0.136 0.135 0.002 -0.001 [0.083] [0.077] [0.012] [0.017] [0.151] [0.184] [0.003] [0.001] Materials Offsh. (Br-Nr) 0.440** 0.533* 0.081* 0.061* 0.133 0.296 0.001 0.010* [0.208] [0.263] [0.046] [0.030] [0.348] [0.218] [0.007] [0.005] Technology Office Equip. Share -3.820* -4.835** -3.337** -3.476** -2.903** -2.975*** -1.749*** -1.754*** [2.095] [2.277] [1.530] [1.595] [1.067] [0.799] [0.569] [0.557] Other Hi-Tech Share -0.322 -0.415 -0.251 -0.262 0.440** 0.560*** 0.332* 0.334* [0.386] [0.423] [0.325] [0.333] [0.186] [0.193] [0.163] [0.164] Other Controls Year Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Constant 1.I67*** 1.I50*** 1.038*** 1.020** * 0.554*** 0.542*** 0.476*** 0.476*** [0.113] [0.137] [0.151] [0.161] [0.072] [0.045] [0.069] [0.069] Observations 458 458 3206 3206 473 473 3311 3311 R2 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.Q7 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.08 Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heterosckedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit SIC industries for 1989-1996 and three-digit NAICS industries for 1997-2004. Variables expressed as annualized differences are constructed as differences over end-years of each period, divided by the number of years in the period. Variables expressed as first-difference are constructed as differences over year I and 1-1. Regressions are weighted by an average industry share of the manufacturing shipments. ..... .j:>. -...l Table D 5. Stage I - Full Specification 1989-1996 1997-2004 Annualized Difference First Difference Annualized Difference First Difference Original Refilled Original Refilled Original Refilled Original Refilled Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure II III IV V VI VII VIII Trade Materials Offsh. (Nr) -0.030 -0.030 0.010 0.001 0.153 0.361 ** -0.004 -0.004*** [0.066] [0.044] [0.010] [0.015] [0.174] [0.137] [0.005] [0.001] Materials Offsh. (Br-Nr) 0.260 0.510** 0.066 0.057* 0.071 0.103 -0.007 0.006 [0.171] [0.186] [0.039] [0.031] [0.339] [0.162] [0.008] [0.006] Services Offsh. -17.100* * -17.263* * -0.993*** -1.039* ** -0.115 5.932** 0.755 0.686 [6.834] [6.136] [0.276] [0.281] [2.493] [2.341] [0.676] [0.639] Import Openness 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] Technology Office Equip. Share 0.004 -0.129 -1.848 -1.914 -2.438* * -2.300* ** -1.710*** -1.714*** [2.798] [2.827] [1.519] [1.527] [0.903] [0.701] [0.545] [0.534] Other Hi-Tech Share -0.358 -0.424 -0.280 -0.285 0.372* 0.491 *** 0.326* 0.326* [0.310] [0.283] [0.289] [0.290] [0.191] [0.159] [0.171] [0.171] Computer Share 0.567* 0.603** 0.323* ** 0.330*** 0.085 0.077 0.013 0.015 [0.281] [0.242] [0.103] [0.101] [0.088] [0.074] [0.028] [0.027] Other Controls Market Power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Observations 458 458 3206 3206 473 473 3311 3311 R2 0.33 0.36 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.09 0.09 Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heterosckedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit SIC industries for 1989-1996 and three-digit NAICS industries for 1997-2004. Variables expressed as annualized differences are constructed as differences over end-years of each period, divided by the number of years in the period Variables expressed as first-difference are constructed as differences over year (and (-1. Regressions are weighted by an average industry share of the manufacturing shipments. ....... +:>. 00 Table D.6: Stage I - Decomposed Dependent Variable (Refined Measure) 1989-1996 1997-2004 Annualized Difference First Difference Annualized Difference First Difference L1 VA L1ETFPi L1 VA L1ETFPi L1 VA L1ETFPi L1 VA L1ETFPiPi Pi Pi Pi I II III IV V VI VII VII Trade Materials Offsh. (Nr) -1.603*** 1.573* ** -0.008 0.009 0.093 0.268 -0.175 0.171 [0.404] [0.424] [0.153] [0.147] [1.204] [1.250] [0.113] [0.114] Materials Offsh. (Br-Nr) 0.070 0.440 -0.698* 0.755* 0.403 -0.300 -0.356 0.362 [0.846] [0.789] [0.390] [0.395] [1.032] [1.078] [0.339] [0.344] Services Offsh. -8.693 -8.570 -3.014 1.975 155.304*** -149.372*** 81.825*** -81.139*** [24.890] [23.649] [7.457] [7.396] [23.045] [22.050] [10.553] [10.104] Import Openness 0.Ql5 -0.015 -0.019 0.019 -0.012** 0.011** -0.003 0.003 [0.031] [0.031] [0.012] [0.012] [0,(106] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] Technology Office Equip. Share 3.183 -3.312 2.686 -4.600 1.943 -4.243 -3.457 1.742 [10.265] [9.614] [7.123] [6.231] [3.401] [3.484] [3.004] [3.222] Other Hi-Tech Share -2.301 * 1.877* 0.912 -1.197 -1.225 1.716 -1.178 1.505 [1.133] [0.912] [1.667] [1.426] [1.632] [1.625] [1.219] [1.264] Computer Share 0.112 0.491 -0.324 0.654 -0.099 0.176 0.349 -0.334 [0.615] [0.519] [0.561] [0.491] [0.342] [0.369] [0.245] [0.249] Other Controls Market Power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Obs ervations 458 458 3206 3206 473 473 3311 3311 R2 0.72 0.73 0.22 0.23 0.43 0.42 0.15 0.14 Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heterosckedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit SIC industries for 1989-1996 and three-digit NAICS industries for 1997-2004. Variables expressed as annualized differences are constructed as differences over end-years of each period, divided by the number of years in the period. Variables expressed as first-difference are constructed as differences over year I and I-I. Regressions are weighted by an average industry share of the manufacturing shipments. ...... .j::. \0 Table D.7. Stage I - Final Specification (Refined Measure) 1989-1996 1989-1996 Annualized First Annualized First Difference Difference Difference Difference II III IV Trade Materials Offsh. (Nr)1 0.390** -0.003* ** [0.178] [0.001] Materials Offsh. (Br-Nr)2 0.433** 0.056* [0.164] [0.028] Services Outs. -16.158** -1.086* ** 6.120* * [6.933] [0.344] [2.751] Technology Office Equip. Share -2.394* ** -1.722*** [0.650] [0.549] Other Hi-Tech Share 0.484* ** 0.327* [0.154] [0.166] Computer Share 0.668*** 0.373* ** [0.166] [0.067] Other Controls Market Power Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Constant 1.774*** 1.209*** 0.526** * 0.476*** [0.222] [0.090] [0.040] [0.068] Observations 458 3206 473 3311 R2 0.33 0.12 0.28 0.09 Note: ,., Materials Offshoring measures are constructed using the refined formula. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heterosckedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit SIC industries for 1989-1996 and three-digit NAICS industries for 1997-2004. Variables expressed as annualized differences are constructed as differences over end-years of each period, divided by the number of years in the period. Variables expressed as first-difference are constructed as differences over year I and I-I. Regressions are weighted by an average industry share of the manufacturing shipments. 150 151 Table D.8: Stage II - (Refined Measure) Dependent Variable:,1ln pVA +,1ln ETFP explained by causal variables I I 1989-1996 1997-2004 Materials Services Computer Materials Service Office OtherOffsh. Equip. Hi-Tech (Br-Nr) Offsh. Share Offsh. (Nr) Offsh. Share Share Annualized Difference Prod. Cost Share 0.305* * -2.413*** -0.237 -0.119 0.182 0.243* * 0.270*** [0.122] [0.288] [0.326] [0.161] [0.125] [0.110] [0.073] Non-Prod. Cost Share 0.898*** 0.546 1.488** 0.066 -0.159 0.234*** -0.040 [0.224] [0.499] [0.656] [0.242] [0.169] [0.090] [0.095] Capital Cost Share 0.013 -1.131*** 0.137 -0.028 -0.002 0.122*** -0.221 *** [0.044] [0.146] [0.132] [0.052] [0.035] [0.022] [0.030] Observations 458 458 458 473 473 473 473 R2 0.59 0.86 0.36 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.61 Net Coefficientl 0.593*** 2.959*** 1.725*** 0.185 -0.341 ** -0.009 -0.310*** [0.180) [00407) [0.518) [0.206) [0.149) [0.100) [0.085) First Difference Prod. Cost Share 0.031 -0.172*** -0.112 0.001 0.198*** 0.160* ** [0.025] [0.034] [0.105] [0.008] [0.041 ] [0.023] Non-Prod. Cost Share 0.113* * -0.004 0.946*** -0.005 0.174*** -0.061 * [0.058] [0.052] [0.202] [0.014] [0.038] [0.032] Capital Cost Share 0.005 -0.062*** 0.041 0.001 0.079* ** -0.139* ** [0.007] [0.015] [0.034] [0.002] [0.010] [0.009] Observations 3206 3206 3206 3311 3311 3311 R2 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.44 0.50 Net Coefficientl 0.082* 0.168*** 1.058*** -0.006 -0.024 -0.221 *** [0.045) [0.044] [0.161) [0.011) [0.040) [0.028) Note: 'Net coefficient refers to the difference between the coefficients on non-production and production cost shares. Coefficient estimates used to construct the dependent variable for 1989-1996 and 1997-2004 are those from respective columns of Table 6. Standard errors are in brackets and are adjusted using Dumont et al. (2005) method described in the text. All regressions are weighted by an average industry share of total manufacturing shipments. APPENDIXE TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV Table E.!: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Contractual Dependence 0.72 0.26 0.02 1.00 Skill Dependence 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.28 Capital Dependence 0.66 0.10 0.41 0.95 GDP (in $bill.) 176.18 514.38 0.26 4607.76 Labor Supply (in $mill.) 20.38 77.42 0.14 716.91 Contracts Quality 0.53 0.21 O.ll 0.97 Ln Human Capital/Worker 0.58 0.29 0.07 1.21 Ln Physical Capital/Worker 9.22 1.60 5.76 11.59 152 153 Table E.2: Correlation Matrix of Interaction Terms I II ill N V VI VII I (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 1.00 II (Contr. Dep.) * (In GDP) 0.72 1.00 ill (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality)*(1n GDP) 0.83 0.92 1.00 N (Contr. Dep.) * (In Lab. Supply) 0.21 0.70 0.48 1.00 V (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality)*(1n Lab. Supp.) 0.45 0.83 0.75 0.89 1.00 VI (Skill Dep.) * (In Skill Endow.) 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.09 0.26 1.00 VII (Cap. Dep.) * (In Cap. Endow.) 0.22 0.29 0.38 -0.12 0.08 0.13 1.00 Table E.3: Sample Countries 154 North AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM/LUX. CANADA DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY HONG KONG ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY JAPAN NETHERLANDS NORWAY SINGAPORE SWEDEN SWITZERLAND U.K. South ALGERIA ANGOLA ARGENTINA BENIN BANGLADESH BOLIVIA BRAZIL BURKINA FASO BURUNDI CAMEROON CHAD CHILE CHINA COLOMBIA CONGO COST ARICA CYPRUS C. AFRICAN REP. ECUADOR EGYPT FIJI GABON GAMBIA GHANA GREECE GUATMALA GUINEA GUYANA GUINEA BISSAU HAITI HONDURAS HUNGARY INDIA INDONESIA IVORY COAST JAMAICA JORDON KENYA AUSTRALIA MADAGAS MALAWI MALAYSIA MALI MALTA MAURITN MEXICO MOROCCO MOZAMBQ MRITIUS NEW GUINEA NEW ZEALAND NICARAGA NIGER NIGERIA OMAN PAKISTAN PANAMA PARAGUA PERU PHILLIPINES POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA RWANDA SALVADR SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SIERRA LEONE SPAIN SRI LANKA SUDAN SURINAM SYRIA S. FRICA TANZANIA THAILAND TOGO TRINIDAD TUNISIA TURKEY UGANDA URUGUAY VENEZUELA YEMEN YUGOSLAV ZAIRE ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE 155 Table E.4: Contracts and Market Thickness II III IV V (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.161*** 0.117*** 0.163*** 0.042 0.182*** [0.026] [0.034] [0.026] [0.054] [0.037] (Contr. Dep.) * (In GOP) 0.063** -0.021 [0.026] [0.063] (Contr. Dep.) * (In Lab. Supp.) 0.060*** 0.096* [0.019] [0.057] (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Qual.) * (In GOP) 0.129 [0.087] (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Qual.) * (In Lab. Supp.) -0.040 [0.061 ] (Skill Dep.) * (In Skill Endow.) 0.110** * 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.108*** [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] (Cap. Dep.) * (In Cap. Endow.) 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.172*** 0.185*** 0.172*** [0.041 ] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] Constant -0.252*** 1.217*** 1.098*** -0.450*** 0.671 *** [0.070] [0.087] [0.095] [0.126] [0.149] Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 29484 29484 29484 29484 29484 Number of Industries 273 273 273 273 273 Number ofCountries 108 108 108 108 108 R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 Note: T he regressions are estimates of (IV I 6) and (IV I 7). The dependent variable is the natural log ofD.S. imports of intermediate inputs sourced from industry i of country c. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors clustered around countries in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and I % levels. Table E.5: Sensitivity Results II III IV V VI VII (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.168*** 0.366*** 0.118*** 0.178* ** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.201*** [0.042] [0.052] [0.036] [0.035] [0.026] [0.023] [0.027] (Contr. Dep.) * (In Lab. Supply) 0.062*** 0.222*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.056*** 0.043** 0.081*** [0.019] [0.031] [0.025] [0.023] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] (Skill Dep.) * (In Skill Endow.) -0.044 0.320*** 0.003 0.195*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.101*** [0.029] [0.057] [0.026] [0.038] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] (Cap. Dep.) * (In Cap. Endow.) 0.102* 0.206* 0.122** 0.240*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.170*** [0.057] [0.108] [0.053] [0.074] [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] (Contr. Dep.) * (In Skill Endow.) 0.010 [0.035] (Contr. Dep.) * (In Cap. Endow.) -0.070 [0.051 ] (Skill Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.240*** [0.040] (Cap. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.119** [0.058] Constant -0.483*** -2.362*** 1.337** * -1.420*** 0.501*** 1.008*** 0.787*** [0.131] [0.493] [0.144] [0.221] [0.100] [0.105] [0.108] Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Restrictions None Non-Zero South No Africa No China No S.E. Asia Outlier Ind. Observations 29484 11984 24024 20748 29211 27846 27324 Number ofIndustries 273 273 273 273 273 273 253 Number ofCountries 108 108 88 76 107 102 108 R-squared 0.69 0.65 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.69 Note: T he regressions are estimates of (IV.16). T he dependent variable is the natural log of U.S. imports of intermediate inputs sourced from industry i of country c. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors clustered around countries in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and I% levels. ,...... VI 0\ 157 Table E.6: Comparison of Import Patterns Dependent Variable Intenrediates Non- Total TotalIntenrediates II III IV (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.163*** 0.206*** 0.161*** 0.256*** [0.026] [0.017] [0.018] [0.025] (Contr. Dep.) * (in Lab. Supp.) 0.060*** 0.02 -0.005 0.044** [0.019] [0.014] [0.013] [0.020] (Skill Dep.) * (in Skill Endow.) 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.093*** [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] (Cap. Dep.) * (in Cap. Endow.) 0.172*** 0.204*** 0.187*** 0.260*** [0.041] [0.044] [0.041] [0.044] Constant 1.098*** 1.835*** 1.056*** 0.600*** [0.095] [0.098] [0.086] [0.115] Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Restrictions No No No No Observations 29484 32724 34020 34020 Number ofIndustries 273 303 315 315 Number ofCountries 108 108 108 108 R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 Note: The regressions are estiImtes of(16). The dependent variables in Columns I and II are U.S. imports ofintenrediate goods and non-intenrediate goods, respectively. Columns III and IVare total U.S. imports. The Contract Dependence variable is constructed differently in each column, as described in the text. All dependent variable are expressed as the natural log ofimports sourced from industry i ofcountry c. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors clustered around countries in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% levels. ~Table E.7: Comparison of Import Patterns By Utilization Rates All 25%::; 50%::; 75%::; -- II III N V VI VII VIII (Contr. Dep.) * (Contr. Quality) 0.I02*** 0.237*** 0.142*** 0.I03*** 0.152*** 0.134*** 0.167*** 0.182*** [0.019] [0.029] [0.027] [0.032] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028] [0.03 I] X Materials Dunnny -0.024* ** -0.029*** 0.048*** 0.052** 0.059*** 0.071*** 0.095*** 0.113*** [0.009] [O.OIO] [0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.029] (Contr. Dep.) * (In Lab. Supply) 0.008 0.063** 0.043* 0.048 0.055*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.145* ** [0.022] [0.025] [0.022] [0.032] [0.020] [0.029] [0.020] [0.032] X Materials Dunnny -0.022** -0.030** -0.039** -0.050** -0.042*** -0.054** -0.050** -0.060** [O.OIO] [0.012] [0.015] [0.020] [0.016] [0.023] [0.020] [0.028] (Skill Dep.) * (In Skill Endow.) 0.050*** 0.104*** 0.129*** 0.153*** 0.143*** 0.180*** 0.150*** 0.202*** [0.018] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.026] [0.029] X Materials Dunnny -0.014* -0.029*** -0.072*** -0.098*** -0.138*** -0.179* ** -0.158* ** -0.198*** [0.008] [0.009] [0.015] [0.018] [0.021] [0.025] [0.024] [0.029] (Cap. Dep.) * (In Cap. Endow.) 0.051*** 0.220*** 0.114*** 0.064 0.I07*** 0.095* 0.119*** 0.120** [0.019] [0.044] [0.043] [0.051] [0.040] [0.048] [0.041] [0.049] X Materials Dunnny -0.021 *** -0.027*** -0.119*** -0.151*** -0.112** * -0.151*** -0.157*** -0.198*** [0.006] [0.008] [0.017] [0.021] [0.018] [0.024] [0.023] [0.029] Constant -0.597*** -0.233*** -0.740*** -0.158* -0.618*** -0.394*** -1.115*** 0.017 [0.064] [0.083] [0.121] [0.092] [0.115] [0.120] [0.076] [0.088] Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Restricted No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Observations 62208 56376 53292 38915 49541 31672 46568 29607 R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.48 Note: T he regressions are estimates of (IY.16). T he dependent variables are drawn from pooled samples of U.S. imports of intermediates and non-intermediates, expressed as the natural log of imports sourced from industry i of country c. 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