A Taxonomy of Evils: Expanding On Hannah Arendt’s Conceptions  
of Evil to Identify Four Variations 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
by 
SHEALYN MILLAY 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
A THESIS 
  
Presented to the Department of Philosophy  
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts  
 
June 2024 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Shealyn Millay for the degree of Bachelor of Arts 
in the Department of Philosophy to be taken June 2024 
  
  
Title: A Taxonomy of Evils: Expanding on Hannah Arendt’s Conceptions of Evil  
to Identify Four Variations 
  
 
Approved:   Steven Brence, Ph.D.          
       Primary Thesis Advisor 
 
Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism examines the rise of Nazism and 
Stalinism and explores the mechanics of totalitarian movements. She believed that evil in the 
conventional sense could not describe certain horrors. Conventional evil can be understood in 
human terms, as it often involves a human desire and uses people for some end (without regard 
for morality). However, the evils of the Holocaust, for example, were marked by a lack of 
humanity and impossible to understand in human terms. She applies the term “radical evil,” a 
Kantian term that she uses to describe the deliberate—yet purposeless—rendering of humans as 
superfluous.  
In a later work, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, she changes 
her definition of evil, introducing what she calls “the banality of evil.” Unlike radical evil, banal 
evil is hyper-rational, yet thoughtlessly intertwined within bureaucratic systems. It occurs when a 
system is working toward an evil end, and the people within the system don’t see themselves as 
responsible for evil because they are only doing their job. While she may describe Hitler with 
radical evil, many of the administrators and officials under Hitler may not have harbored 
antisemitic hatred, but participated in genocide out of dull, bureaucratic duty. While Arendt 
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spoke as if there could only be one definition of evil, changing her conception from radical to 
banal, this paper will argue that they each describe different phenomena and can exist 
simultaneously.  
Additionally, this paper will argue that there is another, previously undefined form of 
evil, which will be called frenzied evil. While radical evil is thoughtful yet irrational, and while 
banal evil is rational but thoughtless, frenzied evil is irrational and thoughtless. During his rise to 
power, Hitler used his speaking skills to drive people into a furious frenzy. Events like the 
Kristallnacht contained an impulsive and impassioned hatred that was likely, for some 
participants, devoid of critical thinking. In total, this paper will argue for four categories of evil: 
conventional, radical, banal, and frenzied.  
 
 
  
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Acknowledgements 
First off, I want to thank my Primary Thesis Advisor, Dr. Steven Brence. I took my first 
class with him during my first year of college, in which he introduced me to Hannah Arendt’s 
work. Since then, I’ve taken at least one philosophy class with him each year, and he is largely 
responsible for expanding my interest in philosophy. 
I would also like to thank the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Barbara 
Muraca and Dr. Lisa Wolverton. Professor Muraca introduced me to 19th Century philosophy in 
her PHIL312 class, and then greatly helped me out by joining my thesis committee as a 
secondary reader late in the thesis process. Professor Wolverton has also acted as my CHC 
advisor and has always been kind and helpful as I’ve struggled to navigate the school’s systems.  
 Lastly, I’d like to thank my mom and sister for patiently reading and re-reading my 40+ 
pages of philosophy writing as I finalized my thesis. Both are busy women, yet never 
complained when I asked them for help. They have been instrumental both in the development of 
my thesis, and in the development of myself in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
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Table of Contents 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………….……………………………6 
Radical Evil and Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
Totalitarianism……….……………………..10 
The Banality of Evil and Eichmann in Jerusalem……………………………………………….17 
Frenzied Evil……………………………………………………………………………………..24 
Potential Objections……………………………………………………….……………………..41 
Concluding Thoughts……..………………………………………………….…………………..44 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..47 
 
  
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“But the women had further scores to settle. They prowled round him, nostrils flaring, sizing him 
up like she-wolves. Each of them was trying to think of some terrible deed, some savage act of 
vengeance, which might relieve their pent-up fury.” 
(Zola 370). 
 
 
 
 
“His mother was the first to attack him, initiating as priestess the bloody rite. He threw the 
headband from his hair, so that the wretched Agaue might recognize him and stay her murderous 
hands. Touching her cheek, he spoke these words: ‘Mother, it is I, your son, Pentheus, whom you 
bore in the house of Echion! O Mother, pity me, and do not kill your son because of my 
offences!’ But Agaue, foaming at the mouth and rolling distorted eyes, her senses gone, was in 
the grip of Bacchus and deaf to his entreaties.”  
(Euripides 157). 
 
 
 
  
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Introduction 
Hannah Arendt was particularly qualified to write on the subject of evil. She studied 
under Martin Heidegger, obtained her PhD under Karl Jaspers, and became an established 
contributor to discussions of philosophy and Jewish relations. However, her experience was not 
just academic, but also firsthand. She lived through both World Wars, she was a German Jew 
who fled from the Nazis, and then she witnessed the totalitarianism of Communist Russia and 
lived well into the Cold War. 
She drew from her experiences to craft her philosophical work, writing extensively about 
different conceptions of evil. The conventional understanding of evil involves a sense of harmful 
selfishness; taking advantage of others or exploiting them. Examples of behaviors that fall under 
this category include those prohibited by the Ten Commandments, which include theft, adultery, 
and murder. However, Arendt didn’t think this conception of evil could describe the horrors of 
the Holocaust. In 1951 she wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she analyzed Nazi 
Germany and Communist Russia to shed light on the nature of totalitarianism. A key aspect of 
this book is Arendt’s exploration of the Kantian term “Radical Evil.” She uses this term to 
describe the depths of depravity and the unprecedented cruelty that was witnessed during these 
totalitarian regimes. While both conventional evil and radical evil are deliberate, they differ in 
that radical evil doesn’t have a purpose or use people toward any end. It annihilates people for no 
reason, treating them as if they were useless, or superfluous. 
However, Arendt later expanded upon her understanding of evil in her book Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Adolf Eichmann was a Nazi official who had fled 
after the war, only to be caught in Argentina by an Israeli intelligence team. He was brought 
back to Israel to stand trial for participating in the Nazi government and extermination of Jews. 
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Arendt attended this trial as a journalist, and her report on it sparked significant controversy. 
Arendt was shocked at how unintelligent, boring, and unoriginal Eichmann was. She described 
him as a “joiner,” who just wanted to be a part of something and have a purpose afforded to him. 
He ended up joining the Nazi party, not out of passion for the Nazi cause, but almost by accident 
as he was looking for something to do. He spoke in cliches, seemed unable to formulate original 
thoughts, and a psychologist claimed that he was perfectly “normal.” Eichmann contributed to 
the Nazi movement and the extermination of Jews, but he was apparently not evil in the same 
way a serial killer or Hitler was; he even claimed to harbor no ill feelings toward Jews. This 
phenomenon led Arendt to change her definition of evil from being radical to banal. Banal evil 
describes people who are caught up in a system and don’t feel responsible for the atrocities that 
the system as a whole perpetrates. They feel that they are just doing their job, or doing what they 
are told, and are totally estranged from the evil they are participating in. They may be rational, 
performing their job with efficiency and precision, but they are also thoughtless regarding the 
morality and the greater effects of their actions. 
Arendt largely replaced her earlier conception of radical evil with her conception of banal 
evil, but I think this was a mistake. I think that the two conceptions are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather coexisted during the Nazi era. Furthermore, I think that there were examples of clearly 
horrific and evil things in Nazi Germany that don’t fit into the categories of conventional, 
radical, or banal evil, but belong to a fourth category which has been previously undefined. 
Hitler was renowned for his public speaking skills and ability to drive crowds into a frenzy. 
Germans who felt humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles were passionate and eager to participate 
in Hitler’s vision, and they supported him with almost religious zeal. As Hitler blamed “the 
Jews” for many of Germany’s problems, millions became furiously enraged, despite the 
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ridiculousness of the notion that Jews were a unified collective that had conspired against the 
German people. Hitler was able to bring people into an impassioned frenzy, in which he could 
direct the emotions of the crowd as he willed. As they became increasingly stirred up, they 
participated in violent attacks against Jews, with the Kristallnacht being a particularly famous 
example. While these attacks are clearly evil, no singular notion of “evil” can accurately or fully 
represent the complexity of motives and behaviors that went into them. They were the product of 
a variety of individuals participating in a variety of different ways. For example, Nazi officials 
who spread propaganda and misinformation regarding Jews were deliberately conspiring to enact 
genocide against them. However, there were many Nazis who participated in the violent 
outbursts who would likely be considered psychologically normal and who were not strategically 
organizing the pogroms. They may have become wrapped up in Nazi propaganda, becoming 
increasingly frustrated and angry until there was an explosion of violence.  
While some, like Hitler, deliberately acted upon their irrational hatred for Jews, and 
others, like Eichmann, participated in the Holocaust without thinking themselves responsible for 
the tragedy, a third group seems to have been carried away by an impassioned, excited 
movement in which they were both thoughtless regarding the morality of their actions and 
irrational regarding their end goal. Driven by economic and political frustration, as well as the 
enmeshed self-affirmation of their group, many Germans directly attacked Jews without an 
understanding of why or what they hoped to achieve. There are other examples, in literature and 
in history, that contain similar phenomena. By finding instances of frenzied violence within these 
examples, and by comparing them to the conventional, radical, and banal conceptions of evil, it 
becomes clear that they best fit under a fourth category. 
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 This paper will begin by describing radical and banal evil from Hannah Arendt’s The 
Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. While 
conventional evil will be acknowledged for context, it is older and more commonly understood, 
so most of the analysis will be on Arendt’s two conceptions. Besides Arendt's books themselves, 
I will use a variety of sources that provide examples of her conceptions of evil in the real world 
or in literature. I will then argue for the simultaneous existence of conventional, radical, and 
banal evil, and then explore instances of evil that do not fit into any of the aforementioned 
categories. Following these examples, I will attempt to clarify and summarize the argument, as 
well as address potential counter-arguments. Lastly, I will discuss potential future applications of 
this expansion upon Arendt's conceptions of evil, and I will discuss areas that can be researched 
further. In total, this project will show that through analyzing the Nazi movement, Hannah 
Arendt identified two forms of evil that are distinct from the conventional understanding, one of 
which she calls radical evil, which involves the deliberate rendering of humans as superfluous, 
and another which she calls banal evil, marked by thoughtlessness and a sense of bureaucratic 
duty. However, there is a fourth form of evil which is present in literature and throughout history 
and is defined by frenzied, thoughtless, and passionate violence. 
 
  
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Radical Evil and Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism 
In Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, she often refers to radical evil. This 
term may sound familiar, as Immanuel Kant coined it in 1793 in his Religion Within the Bounds 
of Reason Alone. In the conventional sense, evil is taken to represent a type of selfishness; an 
individual puts their own desires above those of others and is willing to do harm against others to 
satisfy themselves. This is the conception of evil prohibited by the Ten Commandments of The 
Bible. Evil actions like murder, theft, adultery, etc. each express negative consequences that 
come from someone fulfilling their desires at the expense of others. However, there are examples 
of evil that aren’t defined by selfishness. Sometimes, evil actions are committed for seemingly 
no good reason, and they are hard to understand. Kant identified this problem and labeled 
nonsensical evil as radical evil. For Kant, radical evil was an innate inclination toward evil that is 
inherent in human beings. He wrote  
“The depravity of human nature, then, is not so much to be called badness, if this word is 
taken in its strict sense, namely, as a disposition (subjective principle of maxims) to adopt 
the bad, as bad, into one's maxims as a spring (for that is devilish); but rather perversity 
of heart, which, on account of the result, is also called a bad heart.” (Kant 30-31). 
He is claiming that the definition of “badness” as a disposition to adopt evil into one’s guiding 
principles does not account for the depths of moral corruption. Essentially, badness is not just the 
inclusion of evil into one’s maxims, but the perversion and corruption of morality itself. 
 Hannah Arendt applies radical evil to the Nazis, because the horrors they committed 
cannot be explained through the conventional understanding of evil. Amos Elon writes in his 
introduction to Penguin Classics’ edition of Eichmann in Jerusalem that “in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism [Arendt] still held on to a Kantian notion of radical evil, the evil that, under the 
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Nazis, corrupted the basis of moral law, exploded legal categories, and defied human judgment” 
(Elon xiii). The Nazis were not acting according to selfish desire; the evil actions of the Nazis 
were coming from a motive that is impossible to describe with reason. For example, it seems 
impossible to understand or find any rational substance in Hitler’s ramblings against Jews in 
Mein Kampf. Films like Schindler’s List and The Pianist, which try to display the cruelty done 
against Jews in concentration camps, are in part so shocking because the violence is senseless 
and purposeless. There are many war films with equal violence and gore, but they are not as 
psychologically troubling as the concentration camp movies because there is a reason, or 
objective behind the violence. Like war, the aforementioned crimes described in the Ten 
Commandments can be understood in that there was a reason for them – regardless of how 
questionable that reason is. This is what distinguishes conventional evil from the radical evil of 
the Holocaust. 
Arendt used the term “radical evil,” and effectively applied it to the Nazi phenomenon, 
however Arendt did not actually mean to use the term in the exact sense that Kant used it. 
Although Kant’s definition largely fits Arendt’s usage, and understanding Kant’s definition of 
radical evil provides context for Arendt’s work, Arendt makes a crucial distinction. In his 
Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, Richard Bernstein examines what exactly Arendt 
meant by “radical evil.” He writes that: 
“Arendt indicates that her understanding of radical evil is quite different from Kant’s. 
Consider … what she says in her all too brief reference to Kant. ‘Kant, the only 
philosopher who, in the word he coined for it, at least may have suspected the existence 
of this evil even though he immediately rationalized it in the concept of a perverted ill 
will that could be explained by comprehensible motives’ … it is clear that Arendt does not 
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think that Kant grasped what she intends by radical evil. Kant’s analysis is based on the 
presupposition that there are comprehensible motives that can explain radical evil. But 
this is precisely what Arendt is calling into question” (Bernstein 143).  
Essentially, Arendt believes Kant’s conception of radical evil is too charitable and too mild. Kant 
still thinks radical evil can be understood in human terms, as he tries to describe it as a 
“perversity of heart.” The “heart” is something that we can understand, and Kant attempts to 
build off our understanding of the heart by defining radical evil as an alteration of it. 
Additionally, this description of radical evil treats it as if it is a human quality; although it may 
be a perverted human quality, it is still a human quality. This is made especially clear when Kant 
describes this evil as “the depravity of human nature.” Arendt will continue to describe radical 
evil as an absence, or reduction of human nature rather than a depravity of human nature. 
 Shortly after she claims that Kant’s conception of radical evil falls short, Arendt delves 
into her own definition. She writes that “radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in 
which all men have become equally superfluous … the Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be sure that 
their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of 
overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are … a 
warning” (Arendt, Origins 459). Radical evil can not be explained as an aspect of humanity 
because its end is to diminish and erase humanity; to treat humans as if they have no value. 
Ironically, the totalitarian regimes that produced radical evil were founded upon the principle 
that “everything is possible.” They embraced an aura of forward momentum; of pushing 
humanity to become more than what it was. The Nazis, for example, sought the propagation and 
expansion of an Aryan master race, superior to all others. However as they claimed to be pushing 
humanity to become more than it was, in reality they made it less than it was. Arendt writes that 
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“What totalitarian ideologies therefore aim at is not the transformation of the outside 
world or the transmutation of society, but the transformation of human nature itself. The 
concentration camps are the laboratories where changes in human nature are tested … 
Human nature as such is at stake, and even though it seems that these experiments 
succeed not in changing man but only in destroying him” (Arendt, Origins 458-459). 
The organized, mechanical destruction of life within the concentration camps left no room for 
any aspect of humanity. The purposelessness of the entire situation was particularly 
dehumanizing; people were treated as if they were useless, or superfluous. In her December 17, 
1946 letter to her friend and mentor Karl Jaspers, Arendt provides an example of how humans 
were treated as superfluous. “There is a difference between a man who sets out to murder his old 
aunt and people who, without considering the economic usefulness of their actions at all (the 
deportations were very damaging to the war effort), built factories to produce corpses” 
(Bernstein 148-149). Essentially, the mass murder did not serve any purpose; while murdering 
someone for a particular end is bad enough, the murder of Jews served no end. The Nazis 
enacted this genocide for no good reason and it resulted in no benefit, perhaps even doing harm 
to the German economy if Arendt is correct in her assertion that the deportations were damaging 
to the war effort. In this way, although radical evil is deliberate, it is also totally irrational.  
 In his exploration of the exact nature of Hannah Arendt’s conception of radical evil, 
Bernstein speaks about the irony of how the slogan “everything is possible” became identified 
with a movement that reduced humanity rather than expanded it.  
“Arendt’s own thinking was deeply affected by the traumatic experience of witnessing 
what had seemed to be impossible - that an unprecedented totalitarian movement could 
arise whose ideology was based on the principle that ‘everything is possible,’ including 
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the transformation of the human species into something less than human … the specter 
that haunted Arendt, the specter of totalitarianism, was one in which human beings would 
become superfluous, and even the concept of humanity itself would be obliterated” 
(Bernstein 147).  
To relate this back to Kant, it is clear that Arendt’s conception of radical evil bears a 
fundamental distinction from Kant’s conception. Kant tried to rationalize radical evil by 
explaining it in human terms and by relating it to aspects of humanity that are understandable. 
But for Arendt, this form of evil is impossible to rationalize and impossible to connect to any 
form of humanity. Arendt understood radical evil to be against humanity; to “transform the 
human species into something less than human;” to treat people as “superfluous” and enact the 
“obliteration” of humanity. Radical evil is purposeless, as it does not seek to use human lives for 
any purpose, but rather destroys them for no real reason at all. By treating people as if they are 
purposeless, useless, and superfluous, radical evil dehumanizes them. 
 As will be discussed in the next section, Arendt built upon her understanding of 
purposelessness as a key component of evil to define the banality of evil, which is an entirely 
new form of evil that is distinct from radical evil. When Arendt formed this new conception of 
evil she seemingly abandoned radical evil. Upon finishing Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt 
sparked controversy and backlash, which I will explore in more detail later. Gershom Scholem, a 
Jewish scholar, wrote a scathing letter to Arendt in which he criticized her description of the 
banality of evil as trivializing the Holocaust. In response, Arendt wrote a letter that affirmed her 
stance on the banality of evil while forsaking radical evil. She replied:  
“You are quite right: I changed my mind and no longer speak of ‘radical evil’ … it is 
indeed my opinion now that evil is never ‘radical,’ that it is only extreme, and that it 
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possesses neither depth nor demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole 
world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is ‘thought-defying,’ as 
I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it 
concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its ‘banality.’” 
(Bernstein 138). 
Arendt seems to have changed her mind and her understanding of evil seems to have evolved. 
She built upon the connection between evil and purposelessness and redescribed it as a lack of 
depth. Rather than focusing on irrationality, as she did with radical evil, she focused on 
thoughtlessness. In this way she appears to have left radical evil in the past, claiming that she no 
longer speaks of it. Bernstein affirmed this in his analysis, arguing that “Arendt not only rejects 
Nazis as ‘insane’ monsters … she emphatically states that ‘one cannot extract any diabolical or 
demonic profundity from Eichmann.’” (Bernstein 142-143). Eichmann was an apparently 
regular, boring bureaucrat, and many Nazis were likely psychologically normal people who 
harbored no demonic, ideologically-grounded hatred toward Jews. While he was a rational 
creature in that he could organize and manage things, he gave no thought to the ultimate ends of 
his actions. Arendt inferred from this that evil is as shallow and thoughtless as Eichmann was, 
and that evil is not dependent on any satanic or demonic traits. 
 While Arendt’s description of the banality of evil accurately explains many aspects of the 
Nazi movement and world history in general, I don’t think the legitimacy of banal evil replaces 
that of radical evil; I think that the radical evil explained in The Origins of Totalitarianism and 
the banal evil in Eichmann in Jerusalem coexisted in the Nazi movement. Arendt claims that 
“evil is never radical,” but I don’t think she provides any justification for this. Her description of 
Eichmann is certainly not radical evil, and so I agree that there is a category for the form of evil 
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espoused by Eichmann and the bureaucratic aspects of Nazi Germany. However, Arendt offers 
no evidence that radical evil doesn’t exist, and I think there are many real examples of it. 
Eichmann may have never personally killed a Jew, and he was not personally leading them into 
killing machines, but there were many Nazis who were. SS troops who tortured and antagonized 
Jews like in the depictions from The Pianist and Schindler’s list certainly existed. Hitler’s 
deliberate hatred of Jews was not banal. I would thus argue that banal evil does not replace 
radical evil, but is rather a separate category of evil that coexists with radical evil. 
 
  
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The Banality of Evil and Eichmann in Jerusalem 
The first known description of evil as “banal” comes from an early exchange between 
Arendt and her mentor, Jaspers. Arendt had sent him a copy of The Origins of Totalitarianism 
and he had been concerned that her discussion of radical evil mythologized it, thus providing it 
with a sense of greatness. He wrote:  
“You say that what the Nazis did cannot be comprehended as “Crime” - I’m not 
altogether comfortable with your view, because a guilt that goes beyond all criminal guilt 
inevitably takes on a streak of “greatness” - of satanic greatness - which is, for me, as 
inappropriate for the Nazis as all the talk about the “demonic” element in Hitler and so 
forth. It seems to me that we have to see those things in their total banality, in their 
prosaic triviality, because that’s what truly characterizes them. Bacteria can cause 
epidemics that wipe out nations, but they remain merely bacteria.” (Bernstein 148). 
Despite the clear connection, Arendt didn’t adopt the term “banality of evil” until over a decade 
later. Her exploration of the banality of evil started with the capture of Adolf Eichmann.  
Eichmann was a Nazi bureaucrat who had fled after World War Two to hide in 
Argentina. In 1960, he was captured by the Israeli secret service and abducted to Israel to stand 
trial for his participation in the Holocaust. Arendt was working for The New Yorker at the time 
and requested to travel to Jerusalem and report on it. “She felt she simply had to attend the trial, 
she owed it to herself as a social critic, displaced person, witness, and survivor. She had never 
seen a Nazi butcher like Eichmann, she wrote to the Rockefeller Foundation, and this was 
probably her only chance” (Elon xi-xii). Interestingly, her expectation of what the “Nazi 
butcher” would be like may not have fit her early expectations. 
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Witnessing Eichmann’s trial caused Arendt to fundamentally change her understanding 
of evil. Before, she had been at risk, Jaspers feared, of “glorifying” and thus empowering it. 
Afterward, she treated evil with much less awe and respect. “Evil, as she saw it, need not be 
committed only by demonic monsters but – with disastrous effect – by morons and imbeciles as 
well” (Elon xi). Adolf Eichmann was responsible for this fundamental shift in Arendt’s 
philosophy because he participated in the Holocaust, yet he was also thoughtless and 
unremarkable. Far from being a maniacal serial killer, he was deemed to be completely 
psychologically normal. “Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him ‘normal’ – ‘more normal, 
at any rate, than I am after having examined him,’ one was said to have exclaimed, while another 
had found his whole psychological outlook … was ‘not only normal but most desirable’” 
(Arendt, Eichmann 25-26). While he was thought to be normal from a psychological standpoint, 
listening to his life story showed him to be below average, even pathetic, from an intellectual 
standpoint. He had done poorly in school, and was said to have “not exactly been the most hard-
working pupil–or, one may add, the most gifted” (Arendt, Eichmann 28). He also seemed to be 
constantly caught making little lies, embellishing details about his accomplishments to make 
himself seem more interesting or remarkable than he was (such as falsely claiming that he spoke 
Hebrew and Yiddish) (Arendt, Eichmann 28-29). He had worked a variety of run-of-the-mill 
jobs, such as a position as a salesman for the Vacuum Oil Company, from which he was later 
fired (Arendt, Eichmann 29). He bounced from occupation to occupation to the point that Arendt 
labeled him a ‘joiner;’ he was easily swept into a movement, regardless of what the movement 
stood for. When he eventually joined the S.S, it was not because of any conviction or belief, but 
rather a sense of boredom. “Kaltenbrunner had said to him: ‘Why not join the S.S?’ and he had 
replied, ‘Why not?’ That was how it happened, and that was about all there was to it” (Arendt, 
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Eichmann 33). He sought the prescriptive purpose afforded by a group, and struggled to find 
purpose that wasn’t given to him. His greatest regret upon learning of Germany’s defeat was: “I 
sensed I would have to live a leaderless and difficult individual life, I would receive no directives 
from anybody, no orders or commands would any longer be issued to me, no pertinent 
ordinances would be there to consult -- in brief, a life never known lay before me” (Arendt, 
Eichmann 32).  
Arendt did not expect a “Nazi butcher” like Eichmann to lead such a boring and 
purposeless life. She may have been further surprised to learn that, by all immediate accounts, 
Eichmann had never killed anyone or maintained any kind of maniacal hatred toward Jews. In 
the beginning of the trial he claimed that “With the killing of Jews I had nothing to do. I never 
killed a Jew, or a non-Jew, for that matter – I never killed any human being. I never gave an 
order to kill either a Jew or a non-Jew; I just did not do it.” (Arendt, Eichmann 22). The 
prosecution tried to connect him to murder or to directly ordering the extermination of Jews, and 
they came close, presenting a piece of paper that had “Eichmann proposes shooting” scribbled on 
it, but Arendt saw many reasons to doubt the authenticity and/or significance of this evidence, 
and Eichmann’s involvement was never proven (Arendt, Eichmann 22-23). For the most part, 
Eichmann’s role in the Nazi bureaucracy was a logistical one. He seemed to view this as some 
kind of moral shield such that he was part of something bigger than him, in which he was 
following orders and only responsible for his immediate contribution rather than the system’s 
end goals. Absolving himself of responsibility this way was extremely effective in that he was 
able to participate in horrendous crimes without flinching. This was even the case when his 
personal relationships were concerned. When some of Eichmann’s Jewish friends were targeted 
by his party, he was somehow unable to help. Upon hearing that one of his acquaintances had 
20 
 
been sent to a concentration camp, Eichmann went to meet him. After listening to his friend’s 
woes, he responded “Look, I really cannot help you, because according to the orders from the 
Reichsführer nobody can get you out” (Arendt, Eichmann 51). Being removed from the physical 
killing enabled Eichmann to feel like he had no responsibility for any of it, to the point that he 
was so enmeshed with the genocidal bureaucracy that he could not muster any autonomy even 
when the lives of his friends were at stake. 
 In total, banal evil is a systematized evil in which the individual participant feels 
exonerated because they only feel responsible for their immediate contribution, rather than the 
system’s end goals. The Holocaust was the product of Eichmann, his superiors, his inferiors, 
soldiers, train drivers, engineers – it was broken up into so many components that each person 
felt they could deny responsibility. If Eichmann had reflected on the greater implications of his 
actions, he may have realized that his actions were wrong. But thoughtlessness is a crucial aspect 
of banal evil. On an individual level, evil requires malintent; active, bad thoughts. At an 
institutional level, however, evil requires no thoughts; thoughtlessness. This was reflected in the 
way Eichmann spoke. Arendt realized that he was unable to offer any critiques or original ideas, 
so he instead spoke in a jargon of clichés he didn’t understand. “Officialese became his language 
because he was genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché” (Arendt, 
Eichmann 48). Even when speaking about horrific war crimes, Eichmann’s words were 
somehow shrouded in insignificance and banality. In fact, the Nazis had a policy of subjecting 
sensitive topics to “language rules,” which were ways of watering down unpleasant words. “All 
correspondence referring to the matter was subject to rigid ‘language rules,’ and, except in the 
reports from the Einsatzgruppen, it is rare to find documents in which such bald words as 
‘extermination,’ ‘liquidation,’ or ‘killing’ occur” (Arendt, Eichmann 85). Eichmann’s habit of 
21 
 
speaking in cliches, saying words yet somehow saying nothing at all, or using cliches that he 
didn’t really understand the true meaning of, must have been helpful here. Arendt continues, 
providing examples of the “language rules” in practice. “The prescribed code names for killing 
were ‘final solution,’ ‘evacuation,’ and ‘special treatment;’ deportation …received the names of 
‘resettlement’ and ‘labor in the East’” (Arendt, Eichmann 85). It seems that not only was 
Eichmann shielded from physical killing by his place in the system, likely in an office far away 
from the killing chambers, but he was also shielded from any allusion to or acknowledgement of 
the crimes he was committing. Furthermore, Eichmann was not only shielded from allusion to 
murder and genocide, but his use of cliches and his adoption of the language rules protected 
others from the discomfort of having to face the product of their actions. It seems like the entire 
evil system was designed to keep people focused on the work immediately in front of them, and 
not on the greater ramifications of their work. Eichmann’s inability to think and speak even 
appear to have protected him from the discomfort of his own death. After he was sentenced to 
hang based on his obedience, and by extension support, of the genocidal system, he did not lose 
his composure, and spoke of his own death in “officialise.” He may not have even understood 
what was happening, as he once again began speaking in cliches and contradicting himself.  
“He was in complete command of himself, nay, he was more: he was completely himself. 
Nothing could have demonstrated this more convincingly than the grotesque silliness of 
his last words. He began by stating emphatically that he was a Gottgläubiger, to express 
in common Nazi fashion that he was no Christian and did not believe in life after death. 
He then proceeded: ‘After a short while, gentleman, we shall meet again. Such is the fate 
of all men. Long live Germany, long live Argentina, long live Austria. I shall not forget 
them.’ In the face of death, he had found the cliche used in funeral oratory … It was as 
22 
 
though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long course in human 
wickedness had taught us – the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying 
banality of evil.” (Arendt, Eichmann 252). 
As it turns out, Eichmann may have been more anti-semitic and conscious of his crimes 
than Arendt believed. Tape recordings of Eichmann, which were not available during his trial, 
showed a very different story than that of Eichmann in Jerusalem. The New York Times 
described the tapes and their implications, writing that:  
“Eichmann went to the gallows insisting that he was a mere functionary following orders, 
denying responsibility for the crimes of which he had been found guilty. Describing 
himself as a small cog in the state apparatus who was in charge of train schedules, his 
professed mediocrity gave rise to the philosopher Hannah Arendt’s theory of the banality 
of evil … [but the tapes expose] Eichmann’s visceral, ideological antisemitism, his zeal 
for hunting down Jews and his role in the mechanics of mass murder” (Kershner).  
It’s possible that Eichmann was trying to sell himself as pathetic and thoughtless in an attempt to 
garner sympathy, and that his performance (along with the absence of these tapes) convinced 
Arendt of his mediocrity.  
One might wonder if Arendt’s misdiagnosis of Eichmann’s character would result in a 
misdiagnosis of evil as banal. I don’t, however, think that this new evidence changes anything 
regarding the core of Arendt’s argument. Even if Eichmann does not perfectly fit the definition 
of banal evil, there are many who do; the concept of the banality of evil is not undone by the 
possibility of Eichmann being a bad example. There were many others besides Eichmann who 
participated in the Nazi bureaucratic machine, and there were very few who openly resisted. 
Germans were not genetically predisposed to be more cruel than people of other nations (there 
23 
 
were, of course, those who engaged in gratuitous cruelty and who would fall under the umbrella 
of radical evil), and yet most were in some way complicit in constructing death factories. 
Arendt’s diagnosis was an accurate representation of the many normal people who thoughtlessly 
and guiltlessly contributed to the Holocaust. 
 
 
  
24 
 
Frenzied Evil 
 So far, this paper has argued for the existence of both the radical evil Arendt developed in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, as well as the banal evil she later committed to with Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. It has been argued that despite the fact that Arendt replaced her conception of radical 
evil with that of banal evil, radical evil was still prevalent in Nazi Germany, and it has also been 
argued that despite Eichmann being more anti-semitic than was initially believed, banal evil is 
still a prevalent form of evil. However, there are examples of an evil both in Nazi Germany and 
throughout the world that does not fit into either the conventional, radical, or banal categories. 
This indicates that there is a fourth form of evil. 
Although Arendt never identified another form of evil, Eichmann in Jerusalem does 
describe some scenarios that don’t seem to fit the overarching theme of the book. For example, 
she writes about an interesting situation in Romania in which some Romanians killed Jews with 
such ferocious zeal that even the Nazis were opposed to it. The Nazi bureaucracy, in typical 
banal evil fashion, preferred an orderly and systematized approach to eliminating Jews. They 
witnessed riots and pogroms in Romania that were too wild and passionate to them. “In Rumania 
even the S.S were taken aback, and occasionally frightened, by the horrors of old-fashioned, 
spontaneous pogroms on a gigantic scale; they often intervened to save Jews from sheer 
butchery, so that the killing could be done in what, according to them, was a civilized way” 
(Arendt, Eichmann 190). The cruelty done by these Romanians was, even in the eyes of Nazis, 
totally insane. On its face, it may seem like the radical evil described in Arendt’s The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, as it was certainly more radical than the banal evil of Nazi Germany.  
“Deportation Rumanian style consisted in herding five thousand people into freight cars 
and letting them die there of suffocation while the train traveled through the countryside 
25 
 
without plan or aim for days on end … Also, the horrors of the Rumanian concentration 
camps, which were established and run by the Rumanians themselves … were more 
elaborate and more atrocious than anything we know of in Germany … The Germans 
were horrified, and everybody intervened” (Arendt, Eichmann 191-192). 
The unparalleled cruelty of these Romanians was clearly at odds with the bureaucratic, 
systematized destruction of life championed by the Nazi bureaucracy. This level of cruelty, 
coupled with the excitement and zeal of riots and pogroms, do not bear the markings of banal 
evil; it appears to be something different.  
 It prima facie seems like these Romanians had a deeper hatred toward Jews than the 
Nazis did. Indeed, Arendt writes that there was a long history of antisemitism in Romania 
(Arendt, Eichmann 190). However, after shocking the Germans with their horrific violence, 
some Romanians completely changed their attitude and embraced emigration as a solution to the 
“Jewish problem,” rather than liquidation. This was a result of economic incentive:  
“The Rumanians suddenly did an about-face … What the Germans had not taken into 
account was that … side by side with the massacres, there had sprung up a flourishing 
business in exemption sales, in which … it had discovered that one could sell Jews 
abroad for hard currency, so the Rumanians became the most fervent adherents of Jewish 
emigration” (Arendt, Eichmann 193). 
Their reasons for embracing emigration and opposing murder were not noble; this was clearly 
still evil. However, it is clearly distinct from radical evil. These Romanians were using the Jews 
toward a specific end. Radical evil requires that human life is destroyed for no reason; that 
human beings are rendered superfluous. Many Nazis, as discussed earlier, murdered Jews even 
when doing so was detrimental to the economy/war effort. This was a key aspect of radical evil. 
26 
 
These Romanians, however, completely halted the genocide as soon as they realized it was not 
ideal from an economic perspective. They used Jews toward a particular end, which means the 
Jews were not rendered superfluous and thus not victims of radical evil. It would seem that the 
hatred of Jews in Romania was more superficial than the hatred of Jews in Nazi Germany; the 
Nazi’s hatred withstood economic inconvenience, while the Romanian’s did not. This begs the 
question: why were these Romanians so much more violent if their hatred was not as organized 
or resilient as that of the Nazi’s? 
The situation in Romania overlaps with some of the previously discussed forms of evil, 
but it also has distinctions. The marketization of Jewish emigration could be explained as the 
classical, conventional evil. As was discussed earlier, the evil that is prohibited by the Ten 
Commandments involves using others toward some end while harming them or violating some 
principle. In Romania, the Jews were being used as a source of money. Emigration may seem 
like a better alternative to mass murder, but it was exploitative and selfish, and thus fits the 
description of conventional evil. The riots and pogroms might also be connected to conventional 
evil, as the rioters may have used the Jews as an outlet for their frustration. The situation in 
Romania also bears some similarities to banal evil, as those involved in chaotic and frenzied 
killing may be acting thoughtlessly, just as Eichmann was thoughtless. However, it was clearly 
incompatible with banal evil because some Nazis viewed the pogroms as too wild and 
impassioned, which is not consistent with banality. Some Romanians also did not appear to be 
deeply committed to the killings; as soon as there was an economic opportunity, they abandoned 
massacre and adopted Emigration. This means there is also a distinction between the situation in 
Romania and radical evil, as radical evil perseveres even in the face of economic disadvantage 
(as was the case with the Nazi concentration camps). The violence of these Romanians was 
27 
 
noncommittal, but extreme. It was not grounded in substantive hatred because it was short-lived 
and quickly abandoned. It was not an entrenched, goal-oriented process of making humans 
superfluous, but something wild, impulsive, and frenzied. 
It may be the case that the Romanians who became fervent supporters of emigration were 
different from the Romanians who were involved in the pogroms (for example Romanian 
officials may have pursued exemption sales while other citizens were attacking their Jewish 
neighbors). This would complicate the matter, although Arendt refers to both those involved in 
the pogroms and those involved in exemption sales as "Rumanians,” which would imply that 
they were the same. Even if it was just certain officials who were in support of emigration, they 
still appear to have changed their mind from initially endorsing the pogroms, and they were 
largely able to stop the pogroms from happening. Regardless, this situation opens questions 
regarding where frenzied violence would fit into the previously described categories of evil.  
Further examples can provide a more accurate account of this phenomenon. For example, 
although the Nazi’s organized effort to murder Jews was incompatible with the hectic style seen 
in Romania, Germany had previously experienced similar frenzied behavior. During Hitler’s rise 
to power Nazi rallies were known to be massive and exciting. Strong feelings brought about from 
the historical context, such as national pride, anger over the Treaty of Versailles, hatred toward 
Jews etc., combined to leave the German population extremely emotional (The Popularity of the 
Nazis). Hitler’s public speaking skills drove crowds into a frenzy, so that they were obsessively 
and dogmatically in support of his vision. News articles from the time were particularly alarmed 
by the energy level of these rallies, such as a New York Times article from 1938 titled: 
“NAZI FRENZY GRIPS HUGE LINZ CROWD; Three Hours of Cheering Keep Throng 
Agitated Until Hitler Arrives PLANES DROP LEAFLETS Upper Austrian Leaders Join 
28 
 
Broadcasts– Pledge Their Loyalty to ‘One Reich’ Crowds Shout Themselves Hoarse 
NAZI BANNER AND HITLER’S NEW CABINET MEMBERS IN VIENNA” (“Nazi 
Frenzy Grips Huge Linz Crowd”). 
This excitement does not appear consistent with the dull, thoughtless obedience of those under 
the banality of evil. While banal evil requires a lack of substantive feelings, the feelings of these 
crowds were overflowing. However, even though the Nazi frenzy is different from the banality 
of evil, it was still evil. Unlike the impassioned crowds of, say, a music festival (or at least most 
music festivals), the impassioned Nazi crowds were a catalyst for injustice and violence. 
 The Nazis’ overflowing emotions resulted in more than frenzied rallies; they also 
contributed to frenzied riots. The same year as the previously referenced rally took place, the 
Nazi’s energy boiled over, resulting in Kristallnacht. Ernst Vom Rath, a German noble and Nazi 
member, was assassinated by a Jewish teenager whose family had been deported by Hitler’s 
government. Nazis, already hateful due to rampant antisemitism and Nazi propaganda, snapped 
and began attacking Jews, their shops, and their synagogues. Another New York Times article 
from 1938 described the event:  
“The News of the Death of Ernst Vom Rath in Paris was the signal for a reign of terror 
for the Jewish community in Munich, which began with the wrecking of shops during the 
night and continued with incendiarism during the morning and wholesale arrests and 
notices of expulsion during the day” (“Jews are Ordered to Leave Munich”). 
This type of violence is distinct from the banal violence often seen in concentration camps. A 
riot is, by definition, short-lived. It is an outburst of extreme agitation and violence that goes 
away as soon as the riot calms down. Although there are many examples of spontaneous, ruthless 
violence in concentration camps, much of the violence in that context was consistent and 
29 
 
methodical. While the Nazis’ hatred toward Jews was prevalent throughout Hitler’s reign, its 
form seems to have largely shifted from pogrom to concentration camp; frenzied to banal. The 
antisemitism seen in Romania also seems to have shifted, going from a frenzied sort of evil to the 
conventional, exploitative form. There is an understanding of the radical evil and banality of evil, 
as Arendt wrote books on them. Conventional evil has been understood for much longer, since as 
was mentioned earlier, it is central to the Bible. Although the frenzied violence seen in pogroms 
is clearly distinct from the conventional, radical, and banal forms, it lacks the same 
acknowledgement and discussion that they have had.  
 This paper has shown examples of frenzied violence from Nazi Germany, but discovering 
its exact nature and the conditions that lead to it requires looking elsewhere. Namely, this paper 
will examine Euripides’ play “The Bacchae,” as well as other historical examples from before 
the Nazi era. “The Bacchae,” despite being a fictional play, displays a disturbing aspect of 
humanity that may be reflective of the real world. Dionysus, the Greek God of such things as 
wine, festivals, religious ecstasy, and insanity, plans to appear before the city of Thebes as a God 
and establish a cult of followers. He drives the women of the city mad and leads them into the 
mountains. Reports from the mountain begin to reach the city of the women behaving strangely, 
doing things like braiding snakes into their hair and suckling animals. Some herdsmen attempt to 
capture one of the women, but the women enter a frenzy and attack the men’s cattle, ripping 
them apart with their bare hands. Still in their furious frenzy, they plunder villages and steal 
resources and children. Pentheus, a man from the city whose mother was among the maddened 
women, is convinced by Dionysus to go spy on them. Pentheus hides in a tree, but Dionysus then 
exposes his location to the crazed women, and in their furious frenzy they rip him apart. 
Pentheus’ mother, Agave, then triumphantly brings her son’s head back to the city and proudly 
30 
 
presents it to her husband, Pentheus’ father. He is horrified, and then Agave’s madness begins to 
wane and she becomes aware of what she has done. She becomes emotionally devastated and 
regretful of her actions. The play ends on this note, emphasizing the tragedy of the situation 
(Euripides 161).  
 The parallels between this story and the pogroms of World War Two are striking. 
Dionysus drove the women into a frenzy so he could easily steer their destructive power for his 
own purposes. One could say this is similar to Nazi Germany, with Hitler bringing some 
Germans into a frenzy so that he could use them to enact his antisemitic, imperialist ends. In both 
situations the maddened people were full of violent rage, but they were not thinking clearly or 
measuring their actions carefully (of course, there were Nazis who were thinking clearly and 
who would fall under the umbrella of one of the previously discussed forms of evil, but the 
analogy to “The Bacchae” applies to those who may have been wrapped up in the Nazi 
movement under frenzied conditions). In both cases there was a thoughtlessness reminiscent of 
Arendt’s banality of evil, yet in this case the lack of critical thoughts is replaced with furious, 
chaotic passion and energy. 
 There are many examples in literature and throughout history of a group of angry, fearful 
people getting riled up and laying blame upon an innocent population. People in this state seem 
capable of doing terrible things, even when they would not act so violently under normal 
conditions. Emile Zola’s Germinal comes to mind, in which impoverished women from a coal-
mining town are so angry over the injustice they suffer that they seize the local shopkeeper (a 
bourgeoisie), cut off his body parts, and display them on a stick (Zola 370-371). A more in-depth 
historical example comes from the early persecution of Christians in Pagan Europe. Similarly to 
the Jews who suffered under Nazis, these Christians were a religious group who were accused of 
31 
 
things that they weren’t responsible for. While Christians were also persecuted by Jews, 
Muslims, and other Christians at various points in history, such conflicts were the result of 
political or ideological differences, and were often deliberate and planned-out. The persecution 
of Christians by Pagans, however, was much less organized and much more spontaneous. 
Attacks were often sporadic and local, with Christians being “always subject to oppression and at 
risk of open persecution” (Bernard 120). Pagans were upset that calamities or natural disasters 
would occur at the same time as Christians moved in. They became resentful and hateful and 
blamed the Christians for their suffering. Examples include the Great Fire of Rome and the 
Antonine Plague. The Great Fire of Rome took place in year 64, and resulted in the majority of 
the city burning. The Christians had recently entered the city, and were blamed for the 
catastrophe, which resulted in one of the first persecutions against them (Lynch 83). Later, 
during the late 100s, the Antonine plague devastated the entire Roman empire. Once again, 
Christians were blamed for the pandemic and persecuted for it. There was of course no causal 
link, but there was speculation that the Christians were angering the Pagan Gods through their 
refusal to make sacrifices to them, thus resulting in punishments brought against the entire 
population of Europeans. “At the time, there was a general opinion that, because of the 
Christians’ disregard for the Roman gods, all kinds of misfortunes and cataclysms occurred … 
the plague could be explained by the wrath of the gods upon the Romans due to Christians” 
(Lukashenko 49). The persecutions that came after these natural disasters were often quite bad, 
with Christians being forced to sacrifice to the gods in order to appease them, or be killed (Lynch 
79). 
 Relating this back to the Holocaust, the situations are strikingly similar. These early 
Christians made up a marginalized religious group that was blamed for disasters and hardship 
32 
 
that they weren’t responsible for. The Jews of the Nazi era were also a marginalized religious 
group that was blamed for problems they weren’t (and could not have been) responsible for, such 
as the economic hardship Germany was experiencing. In both cases, this frustration built up until 
a problem (like the burning of Rome, or the assassination of Ernst Vom Rath) pushed people 
over the edge and resulted in an explosion of violence. Instigators, like Roman emperors or Nazi 
officials were more deliberately involved, propagating misinformation and encouraging violence 
against the persecuted groups. The efforts of these instigators may have resulted in some of the 
perpetrators becoming furious and impassioned so that they were not thinking clearly or fairly. 
These conditions eventually could have led them to lose control of themselves, so that rather than 
thinking critically about the situation, they let their hatred explode. 
 While not identical, the story told in Euripides’ “The Bacchae” and the persecution of 
early Christians by Pagans bear similarities. Comparing these accounts of frenzied violence to 
the pogroms of Nazi Germany and Romania reveal a source of violence, or form of evil, that was 
not previously identified by Arendt. While she acknowledged evil in the conventional sense of 
the word, and developed a concept of radical evil and later of banal evil, she did not describe a 
category that accounts for rash, thoughtless, chaotic violence. This paper will define such a 
category as frenzied evil, identifying several preconditions, characteristics, and potential 
consequences of it. 
 To start, frenzied evil occurs mostly in large groups. It may be possible for a mentally 
“healthy” individual to be driven into a blind rage where they commit thoughtless violence, but it 
seems like the most frequent, intense occurrences are in large groups. This is similar to the 
banality of evil, in that a characteristic of banal evil is the excuse that one is just following 
orders; that they are enmeshed in a larger system they feel exonerates their personal 
33 
 
responsibility by providing a buffer between them and the system’s evil ends. Unlike banal evil, 
however, frenzied evil is impassioned; while banal evil depends on a system to reduce feelings of 
empathy or responsibility so that its members can do evil without feeling moral repercussions, a 
group engaging in frenzied evil feeds upon itself, creating a short-circuit of hateful passion. The 
group forms a gestalt, in which the hatred and energy of the group is greater than the sum of 
individual hatred and energy. The individual takes in the urgency and fury around them, which 
emboldens them and leads them to express more urgency and fury. This creates a feedback loop, 
in which everyone gets increasingly riled up and out of control. Additionally, there is a sense of 
security, or safety in numbers, which makes the group feel invincible. The actions of the 
individual are affirmed by the actions of the group; that individuals don’t feel like they are doing 
anything wrong because they have the approval and endorsement of everyone around them. All 
of these factors can contribute to riots, pogroms, massacres, etc. exploding in severity over 
disproportionately small triggers. The Jews in Munich had nothing to do with the assassination 
of Ernst Vom Rath – such a diverse and widespread group cannot act with a united individual 
agency. Similarly, the early Christians were not responsible for the plague or the fires. However, 
each group was treated as if they shared a collective agency, which happened in part because the 
feedback loop of the mob’s emotions created a short circuit, or meltdown, in which their hatred 
and frustration overwhelmed their capacity for thought and reason so that they lost their grip on 
reality.  
 Frenzied evil often results from triggers (like the fires or the Ernst Vom Rath 
assassination), but there may also be a precondition that sets the conditions for an eventual 
explosion of violence. In the previous examples, this precondition took the form of an underlying 
social frustration that is often propagated by a demagogue. Most Germans had suffered greatly as 
34 
 
a result of economic hardship, and they may have wanted someone to blame. Similarly, the 
Roman Pagans had always been skeptical of the Christians and frequently blamed problems like 
crop failures, sickness, or other forms of misfortune on them. “The Bacchae” is a rare example in 
which there was no apparent underlying frustration, as the women were driven mad by frenzy-
inducing Dionysus, but most real world examples do not depend on the act of a God and are the 
result of fear, resentment, suffering, or other real-world problems. There can, however, be an 
instigator that takes advantage of the frustration and contributes to the build up of resentment or 
the trigger that causes it to boil over. These would be Hitler and the Nazi propagandists for 
Germany, and Roman emperors who often publicly accused Christians for natural disasters 
(Nero for the fires, Aurelius for the plague). Even “The Bacchae” had an instigator (Dionysus), 
although he relied on supernatural powers rather than underlying social frustration. With that 
exception in mind, these instigators build upon a feeling of injustice, and direct people’s 
resentment toward another group. In feeling injustice, people feel like they have been wronged 
and thus may even feel they are acting defensively when they lash out, when in reality they are 
the perpetrators; they imagine they are bringing justice, but in reality they are causing injustice 
by attacking innocent people. 
 Of course, if those engaging in frenzied violence thought objectively and clearly about 
what they were doing, they would quickly realize there was no basis for it. While an instigator 
(such as Dionysus or Hitler) may seek to fulfill some purpose by encouraging frenzied violence, 
those who are swept into the frenzy do so without a clear understanding of how or what they will 
achieve. They may have some vague notion of purpose – Nazis supposedly believed the Jews 
were an autonomous collective seeking to exploit them – but such reasons are baseless and 
ridiculous. However, these Nazis were still able to act according to such ridiculous reasons 
35 
 
because another aspect of frenzied evil is a lack of critical thinking. This is yet another similarity 
to banal evil, which requires thoughtlessness so the perpetrator isn’t consciously opposed to the 
evil at hand. In a frenzied evil situation, the groupthink of the crowd and the overwhelming 
passions override thought so that people aren’t thinking clearly. Rather than rigorously 
examining the purpose of their actions and what they hope to achieve, they lose their capacity to 
think and reason, or they suppress such a capacity and allow their rage to direct their actions. 
This is a distinction from radical evil, which involves a perpetrator who is more thoughtful in 
their actions. Hitler, for example, published a manifesto (Mein Kampf) largely filled with hatred 
toward Jews, and then actively engaged in spreading misinformation and propaganda about the 
Jews to foster widespread antisemitism. Hitler’s actions were deliberate, but the majority of 
Germans were not publishing manifestos or actively trying to cultivate hatred and violence, and 
yet they were susceptible to the propaganda and anger around them. As their frustration and 
feelings of victimhood continued to build up, they likely thought less and less critically about the 
situation, until a trigger enabled their rage to take control of them. 
 This loss of critical thinking isn’t permanent, and as perpetrators of frenzied evil regain 
control of their senses they might feel regret. Sometimes the remorse is instantly felt, like in 
“The Bacchae.” After the mother rips her son apart and presents his head to her husband, the 
madness wanes and she regains control of herself. She begins to understand the magnitude of the 
tragedy and is horrified at what she had done. In the case of Nazi Germany, however, the 
persecution of Jews under Nazis continued for years after Kristallnacht. There may have been 
Germans who felt immediate regret after seeing the destruction caused by Kristallnacht, but the 
fact that Jews were persecuted for many years afterward shows that there was not a wide-spread 
condemnation of violent bigotry. There was also no documented guilt following the persecution 
36 
 
of Christians in Pagan Rome, but the fact that the entire region converted to Christianity shortly 
thereafter indicates that there was a widespread change in sentiment. In any case, the violence 
that comes from frenzied evil is short lived, so be it from fatigue, remorse, or some other factor, 
it dies down as the furious passions begin to subside. The fact that the violence can die out so 
quickly suggests that it was not grounded in any kind of reasonable cause, and that those 
involved may not have been deeply committed to it. In this way, subsequent remorse could be an 
indicator of frenzied evil having taken place, although it certainly is not a necessary condition. 
For someone that stays consistent in their hatred, this does not apply; they may very well be 
deeply committed to their cause, and they may be thoughtfully entrenched in their position. But, 
once again, I would argue that these individuals do not belong in the category of frenzied evil (or 
at least this specific behavior does not). 
 Lastly, an important characteristic of frenzied evil is that something terrible has to occur. 
People can be driven into a frenzy over myriad things. People may be driven indo a Dionysian 
frenzy at some festival or other event in which individuals become enmeshed with the passions 
around them. But if these passions are not those of rage, hate, or frustration, and they do not 
drive people to commit atrocities, then these scenarios are not evil; the evil comes from violence 
done against those who have done nothing wrong. Frenzied evil is unjust because a group 
thoughtlessly and hatefully attacks others for no good reason. Nazis who were otherwise normal 
yet got caught up in an antisemitic movement and committed atrocities were doing evil because 
the Jews (as a collective group) were not responsible for whatever assassinations or economic 
hardship was creating frustration. The distinction between a frenzied mob that has no negative 
consequences and a frenzied mob that persecutes an innocent group is akin to a generic 
bureaucracy that does nothing particularly bad versus the banal system of death that Eichmann 
37 
 
worked in. A bureaucracy is banal, but it is not evil until it does evil things. In this way, frenzied 
and banal evil are distinct from radical and conventional evil. Frenzied and banal evil involve 
thoughtlessness, which implies that they aren’t acknowledging the moral implications of their 
actions. This makes it easier to ground the “evil” aspect in the result; there are certainly those 
who thoughtlessly participate in a bureaucracy, yet are not contributing to any horrific ends. 
Radical and conventional evil, however, suggest an awareness of immorality. As such, it is easier 
to tie the “evil” aspect to the motive, rather than to the outcome. This is not to say that those 
involved in banal or frenzied evil are not responsible for their actions, while those involved in 
the conventional or radical evils are responsible. It is also not to say that some forms of evil are 
better or worse than others. Discussions involving the degrees of responsibility or badness are 
complicated and escape the scope of this project, but could provide an intriguing continuation.  
 In total, frenzied evil occurs under conditions in which there is a group that creates a 
passionate gestalt, the group has been subject to underlying social frustrations (which is often 
propagated by a demagogue), their frustration takes ahold of them and they don’t think critically, 
and the consequences of their actions are something terrible and unjust. There also may be 
instances of regret being felt after violence has occurred. While examples of frenzied evil may 
differ from each other, they often fall between these parameters. While frenzied evil can overlap 
with other forms, there are enough differences for it to have its own category. While frenzied and 
banal evil both depend on thoughtlessness, for example, frenzied evil is wild, chaotic, and 
passionate, and as was the case in Romania, this made it incompatible with the structured, 
organized killing system of banal evil. Frenzied evil is also distinct from radical evil, since it is 
often spontaneous and thoughtless, and does not involve consistent, deliberate rendering of 
humans as superfluous. Those who engage in frenzied evil may feel like they are acting out of 
38 
 
self defense against those that have been bringing them hardship. They may be taking out their 
anger on an innocent group, but if they are using an innocent people to blow off steam, or if they 
believe that their attacks will eliminate their problems, then they are using the persecuted group 
to some end; whether it be to solve a problem or quell their rage, they are not engaged in radical 
evil because they are not trying to render people as superfluous. This may seem more similar to 
conventional evil, although the conventional evil also implies an awareness of immorality, while 
frenzied evil does not. Also, even if frenzied evil is based upon a frustration or suspicion that 
people are causing them problems, when it is in action it is thoughtless and wild. It is not in the 
same category as things like adultery and theft, which are more deliberate and do not require 
group energy. Those involved in frenzied evil use others for a particular end, but simultaneously, 
they are not deliberate or thoughtful. Frenzied evil occurs under certain conditions, some of 
which overlap with other forms of evil, but many of which do not. 
Conventional Evil Radical Evil Banal Evil Frenzied Evil 
- Deliberate - Deliberate - Thoughtless - Thoughtless 
- Rational - Irrational - Rational - Irrational 
  - Unimpassioned - Impassioned 
- Uses people for - Renders humans - Renders humans - Uses people for 
some end superfluous superfluous some end 
 
 
 In many cases, these categories overlap in the same event, or even in the same individual. 
For example, someone espousing banal evil can rationally pursue some insane end that has been 
assigned by someone espousing radical evil. Radical evil is the elimination of people for no 
reason, and perseveres even when it is irrational (the continuation of concentration camps even 
though they were economically damaging). Eichmann, however, was rational in that he was 
doing logistical calculations to enable the concentration camps. In this way, rational people can 
39 
 
serve and enact an irrational end. The previously provided examples of frenzied evil all also 
involved other forms. Kristallnacht, for example, was in many ways planned and organized by 
Nazi officials. While those running through the streets may have been acting according to 
frenzied evil, this in part occurred as a result of the propaganda and misinformation provided by 
Hitler (radical evil) and the plotting of Eichmann-like figures (banal evil). On an individual level, 
someone like Eichmann could get wrapped up in a bureaucracy in which they contribute to evil 
ends, and then also get wrapped up in a riot or some similar outburst of violence in which they 
lose sense of themselves. Eichmann certainly seemed weak-willed and thoughtless enough to 
participate in both scenarios.  
 
  
40 
 
Complications and Potential Objections 
One critique of this discussion could take the form of questioning the very concept of 
evil. One may find the concept of evil to lack substance and distract from the root causes of 
issues by blanketing them with a vague and absolute term. For example, John Dewey, a 
pragmatist, preferred to analyze the world not in terms of good or evil, but in terms of what 
works and doesn’t work.  
“I have indeed attempted analysis, rather than either a condemnation of evils of present 
society or a recommendation of fixed ends and ideals for their cure. For I think that 
serious minds are pretty well agreed as to both evils and ideals – as long as both are taken 
in general terms. Condemnation is too often only a way of displaying superiority; it 
speaks from outside the scene; it discloses symptoms but not causes. It is impotent to 
produce; it can only reproduce its own kind.” (Dewey 147).  
Essentially, reducing complex phenomena as good or evil puts an end to any meaningful 
examination of their cause. Simply condemning something as evil, for example, does nothing to 
address the root cause of said evil, and is thus unproductive toward preventing it from happening 
again. As a result, discussions of good and evil are not serious discussions; they are juvenile and 
simplistic, and fail to enact meaningful change. A better option would be to treat evil like a 
disease; something which has symptoms and causes and can be diagnosed. This perspective 
enables investigation and education, and could more effectively reduce the amount of tragedy in 
the world.  
 A response to this concern could be that breaking evil down into categories is, despite 
still using the term “evil,” a productive form of analysis similar to what Dewey was advocating 
for. Arendt, for example, compared evil to a fungus that thoughtlessly spreads and obliterates. 
41 
 
Evil as a fungus seems similar to evil as a disease. Indeed, Arendt did examine the conditions 
which led to Eichmann participating in the Holocaust, rather than simply condemning him as 
evil. This paper attempts to build upon Arendt’s work by digging into the true essence of evil and 
categorizing it into different subtypes. Rather than simply labeling the Nazis as evil and 
unproductively condemning them, this paper attempts to examine the underlying conditions that 
led to the various forms of violence committed by them. This paper may still use the term “evil,” 
but its project is different from the condemnation Dewy spoke of. Interestingly, Arendt, who 
previously had examined the essence of evil and who was the inspiration for this project, was 
largely criticized for her work. After World War Two, many Israelis obviously condemned the 
Nazis as evil. It’s possible that the horrors they experienced were so extreme that it was 
impossible for them to rationalize. What Dewey would consider as reducing the complexity of 
the situation to a vague notion of evil may have been the only way some Israelis could 
comprehend it. When Arendt studied the exact nature of this evil and defined it in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, many Israeli scholars criticized her. Many of them thought that the Nazis needed to 
be condemned as indescribable monsters, and that rationalizing and analyzing Nazi evil was 
inappropriate. “For the very phrase ‘banality of evil’ was offensive. It seemed to trivialize not 
only what Eichmann had done, but the full horror of the Holocaust” (Bernstein 138). It seems 
like Arendt’s analysis was viewed as contrary to the narrative that Nazis should be reduced to 
evil monsters and that the factors which led to their involvement should not be examined. In 
dissecting the story of Eichmann and trying to determine what drove him to participate in 
genocide, Arendt was accused of making excuses for his behavior when she should be holding 
him accountable. However, Arendt simply did not do this. “It was claimed that Arendt had 
‘exonerated’ Eichmann but ‘condemned’ the Jews. She had done nothing of the sort … She 
42 
 
supported the death sentence as meted out by the court but would have preferred a differently 
formulated verdict” (Elon ix). Essentially, Arendt agreed that Eichmann should be held 
responsible, and she agreed that he was evil. But she wanted to describe what exactly was meant 
by “evil,” which led to her investigation of Eichmann’s story and her formulation of the ‘banality 
of evil.’ Arendt was not simply condemning Nazis and attempting to display moral superiority 
over them, but rather she was attempting analysis similarly to how Dewey suggested.  
The backlash Arendt drew came from those that didn’t want to investigate the matter 
further; those who Dewey would accuse of preventing analysis by assigning a vague and over-
simplified notion of evil. To them, examining the conditions that led to Eichmann’s behavior 
made it seem as if there were other factors, beyond Eichmann’s “badness,” at play. 
Acknowledging such other factors would suggest that it wasn’t entirely Eichmann’s fault, 
because it wasn’t entirely his own doing. This opens up questions regarding responsibility and 
culpability. As was stated earlier, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper – this paper 
is focused on describing the qualitative differences between categories of evil, not on assigning a 
hierarchy of “goodness” or “badness,” and it does not suggest that said categories result in 
differing levels of responsibility. However, it is worth acknowledging these questions and the 
future discussions they can bring. Arendt did discuss her position on responsibility, at least 
briefly. For her, Eichmann was guilty and his execution was appropriate. The fact that he was 
acting according to the banality of evil rather than radical or conventional evil did not make him 
any less responsible. She concluded Eichmann in Jerusalem with her version of a verdict, which 
states:  
“Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it was nothing more than misfortune that 
made you a willing instrument in the organization of mass murder; there still remains the 
43 
 
fact that you have carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder. 
For politics is not like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same. And 
just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the Earth with the 
Jewish people … we find that no one … can be expected to want to share the Earth with 
you.” (Arendt, Eichmann 279). 
Arendt thought it was irrelevant to argue over whether or not Eichmann actually hated Jews. His 
thoughtlessness did not absolve him of responsibility or allow for a reduced punishment. I would 
imagine her opinion of those who thoughtlessly engaged in Kristallnacht would be the same.  
  
44 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 This project, in examining the conditions and consequences that led to various forms of 
evil in Nazi Germany, could also be helpful in understanding modern issues. The most recent 
discussion of Dewey shows why it is important to delve deeper into the term “evil,” to 
understand its components, as well as the different forms it can take. Understanding the Nazi 
phenomenon requires understanding the many factors that brought it about. Analyzing the 
conditions that brought about evil in Nazi Germany will hopefully enable preventing the same 
conditions from occuring again.  
 Unfortunately, frenzied evil has been seen in recent times, albeit in less severe forms. 
During the infamous Jan. 6 riots, a mob, furious over the recent U.S Presidential Election, 
stormed the capitol. Analyzing this event shows concerning similarities to riots during the Nazi 
era. Donald Trump has widely been considered to invoke fear for political support and blame 
immigrants for much of the crime and problems the United States currently faces. After losing 
the election, he claimed it was rigged, and many claimed to believe him. Despite no evidence the 
election was actually rigged, an angry mob invaded the capitol, vandalizing it and beating a 
police officer to death (Healy). Clearly, there were markings of frenzied evil. People who were 
fearful and frustrated got caught up in a passionate group setting, did not think critically or 
acknowledge that there was no evidence in support of their cause, and then acted violently and 
did great harm. 
 Perhaps the most striking connection to frenzied evil, however, was the regret many of 
the rioters felt afterwards. Journalist Michael Kunzelman documented this phenomenon in his 
article for the Associated Press, titled “Capital Rioter’s Tears, Remorse Do Not Spare Them 
From Jail.” While Donald Trump has indignantly and unapologetically faced down the 
45 
 
accusations brought against him, his supporters from the Capitol Riots appear far less committed. 
They also seem to have reacted differently from Eichmann, who rejected the notion that he was 
legally responsible.“Robert Palmer cheered on the violence at the U.S Capitol on Jan. 6 before he 
joined the fray. Screaming obscenities, he hurled a wooden plank and a fire extinguisher at 
police officers trying to ward off the mob. Nearly a year later, Palmer fought back tears when he 
faced the federal judge who sentenced him to more than five years in prison. He said he was 
‘horrified, absolutely devastated,’ at what he had done” (Kunzelman). While the disappointment 
of facing years in prison almost certainly contributed to his tears, the fact remains that Palmer 
was not morally committed enough to consistently maintain his position in the face of the 
consequences. This would imply there was not a significant grounding for his cause – at least not 
significant enough to be worth the punishment. The zeal and excitement he expressed during the 
riots appear to have completely faded, and reality has set in, similarly to how reality set in for the 
mother of Pentheus in Euripides’ “The Bacchae.” Many other rioters expressed similar 
sentiments, such as Michael Daughtry, who said before court “I made one mistake in my life and 
I have immediately taken responsibility for it … I apologize to the court for my indiscretion. But 
does a person not get to make at least one mistake in their entire life?” (Mallin). While there are 
surely those who have stoutly remained in support of their conspiracy theories, and who even in 
the wake of the attack remain deliberately and thoughtfully committed to their position, the fact 
remains that many did not. Many got swept away by the excitement and energy of their 
movement’s hateful and fearful rhetoric, and without allowing clear thinking to inform their 
actions, acted violently without acknowledging the consequences.  
 These events happened four years ago, but there is another election around the corner that 
involves the exact two candidates who ran against each other before Jan 6. The conditions that 
46 
 
gave rise to past violence are being recreated. While this project is important for understanding 
history with greater subtlety, it is even more important in a modern context. Frustration and 
unrest seem to be the norm in America, affecting more than just those in support of Trump. For 
those who are not frustrated, the alternative seems to be apathy – a dangerous situation that could 
allow frustration to explode unchecked. 
 If the source of a violent act is mislabelled, then attempts at repairing it or preventing it 
from happening again will be less effective because they could be missing the actual cause. 
Diagnosing the source of evil accurately is key in knowing how to treat it. For example, 
understanding the banality of evil shows that complex systems can estrange individuals from the 
system’s end, potentially leading “normal” people to engage in evil behavior. This in turn can 
inform how systems are constructed; they can be made to inform individuals of the significance 
of their work rather than treating them like cogs in a machine. Similarly, analyzing frenzied evil 
shows the conditions that make it possible – underlying frustration, group energy, a demagogue, 
etc. so that they are more identifiable. Hopefully, this will help in healing such patterns before 
they develop into something devastating. 
 
  
47 
 
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