EXPLAINING REAGAN’S OBSESSION WITH NICARAGUA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
EMILY HOFMANN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Department of Political Science  
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts 
 
May 2023 
 
 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Emily Hofmann for the degree of Bachelor of Arts  
in the Department of Political Science to be taken June 2023 
 
 
Title:  Explaining Reagan’s Obsession with Nicaragua  
 
 
 
Approved:   Jane Cramer, Ph.D.   
Primary Thesis Advisor 
 
Scholars argue that Reagan was obsessed with Nicaragua, but the nature of this obsession 
is a matter of debate. The purpose of this study is to explain the true causes of President Ronald 
Reagan’s obsession with Nicaragua. This research was derived through process tracing of 
declassified documents, campaign papers, presidential speeches, news reports, and scholarly 
analyses. This study finds that Reagan’s focus on Nicaragua was of his own making, and not a 
manipulation by his advisors as some contend. This study also argues that Reagan’s obsession 
was to control his public perception. This obsession was the driving force behind U.S. 
intervention in the region and Reagan was completely aware and approved of all activities in 
Nicaragua. His obsession remained prominent after Reagan’s re-election as he was unwilling to 
be characterized by the public and the Soviet Union as a weak leader who allowed an anti-
religious, communist government to take power so close to the American border.  
  
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Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost I would like to thank my parents for their continued love and support 
in all of my endeavors. This journey has been an incredible experience and I would like to thank 
my advisors Jane Cramer and Anita Chari for their feedback and guidance throughout this 
project as this research would not have been possible without their time and willingness to work 
with me. I would especially like to thank my editor, Melissa Morgan, for her all of her help.   
 
  
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Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 5 
Chapter 2: The Start Of Conflict In Nicaragua 9 
Chapter 3: Reagan’s Domestic Political Strategy To Hide His Obsession 12 
Chapter 4: Nicaragua’s Relationship With The Soviet Union 23 
Chapter 5: Reagan Uses Soviet Communism To Hide His Obsession 25 
Chapter 6: Reagan’s Obsession After Re-Election 30 
Chapter 7: Reagan’s Use Of Plausible Deniability To Frame His Underlings 32 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 41 
Bibliography 43 
 
 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “If such a story gets out, we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House 
until we find out who did it,” stated President Reagan in a top secret meeting on June 25, 1984 
while discussing the implications of covert actions in Nicaragua.1 Scholars continue to debate the 
true nature of Ronald Reagan’s obsession with Nicaragua throughout his presidency as his 
reasons for intervention do not match the reality of the conflict. Some like Richard Pipes and 
Martin Anderson argue that Reagan was manipulated by his advisors and they were the driving 
force behind intervention in Central America.2 Others like Jeane Kirkpatrick argue that he was 
out of touch with his administration and that Reagan became obsessed as he believed he was 
genuinely combatting a Soviet Communist threat.3 This study finds that Reagan was not 
specifically obsessed with stopping the spread of the ideology and control of the Nicaraguan 
Sandinista regime as a Soviet threat as a there is not enough credible evidence to validate that 
Soviet influence was at all present after 1981. Reagan was actually obsessed with appearing 
strong in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the American people. This caused him to ensure that 
the anti-Sandinista, Contra movement would continue as Reagan thought the removal of 
Sandinista leadership from the Nicaraguan government would be the ultimate display of strength. 
Reagan’s fear of impeachment shaped his actions from the start of his administration so that his 
obsession would not be exposed. He chose to hide his obsession by allowing his underlings to 
 
1 NSC Minutes. “NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, ‘Subject: Central America,’ June 25, 1984.” 
National Security Archive, 25 June 1984, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/22302-01-nsc-national-security-
planning-group-minutes.  
2 Petersen, Tore T. “Ronald Reagan: Leadership Style And Foreign Policy.” Transactions of the Historical Society 
of Ghana, no. 8 (2004): 136–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406711. 
3 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. “Marxist Totalitarianism in Our Hemisphere: Nicaragua.” World Affairs 170, no. 2 (2007): 
89–95. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672797. 
 
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appear to make decisions without his approval so that he could later invoke the policy of 
plausible deniability. Through process tracing of declassified documents, campaign papers, 
presidential speeches, news reports, and scholarly analyses, this study argues that Reagan’s 
desire to control his public perception was the main reason for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua 
and that he had complete awareness of all activities in the region.  
 Reagan’s insatiable need to appear strong fueled his actions in Nicaragua. Jimmy 
Carter’s policies in Nicaragua had caused the United States to look weak to the Soviet Union and 
Reagan refused to be portrayed in a similar manner.4 This thesis finds that Reagan’s interest in 
Nicaragua originated from the public attack by religious leaders, led by the Maryknoll Sisters, 
before his inauguration in December 1980. Reagan could not allow himself be portrayed as 
condoning human rights violations or as sacrilegious. He was compelled to address the specific 
claims made against him, but he needed to frame his response in such a way as to not alienate the 
conservative Christian base who had just elected him.5 Through a combination of chance and 
circumstance, a conflict had already started that would allow Reagan to achieve his strategic 
goals in both foreign and domestic politics.6 His answer to this attack was to discredit the 
authors, specifically the Maryknoll nuns. By attacking their religious commitment, Reagan 
provided the justification for his supporters to find fault in the Maryknoll Sisters’ credibility and 
the arguments they publicly proposed. Reagan hoped to distance himself from their critiques as 
 
4 DeYoung, Karen, and Washington Post Foreign Service; Contributing to this story were Washington Post foreign 
correspondent Christopher Dickey in El Salv. “ El Salvador: Where Reagan Draws the Line.” The Washington Post, 
March 9, 1981. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/03/09/el-salvador-where-reagan-draws-the-
line/b63052cd-91a9-42df-b924-3f87b99d5d24/.  
5 Clergy and Laity Concerned. “Text of Religious Leaders’ Human Rights Statement; Dear President-Elect 
Reagan,.” The New York Times, December 18, 1980. 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1980/12/18/111837766.html?pageNumber=49.  
6 DeYoung, Where Reagan Draws the Line. 
 
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he wanted to continue providing aid to the U.S.-backed government of El Salvador to uphold 
their control. Reagan originally claimed he was concerned about the spread of the Nicaraguan 
Sandinista’s ideology, Liberation Theology, to El Salvador. He chose to provide aid to the 
Contra (anti-Sandinista) army and to the government of El Salvador to help guard against the 
possibility of the Sandinistas gaining more control in the region. Over time Reagan’s obsession 
to showcase his strength became apparent when his policy shifted to attempt to remove the 
Sandinistas from the Nicaraguan government completely.  
In his first major foreign policy initiative on February 19, 1981, Reagan claimed that the 
Sandinistas had received military aid from the Soviet Union and their ally, Cuba.7 While no 
evidence was found to support Reagan’s statement that military equipment was shipped from the 
Soviet Union, this was the start of the justification that allowed him to continue his actions and 
policies in Central America by framing the Sandinistas as a Soviet Communist threat. Reagan 
would publicly voice the need to combat Soviet influence in Nicaragua incessantly throughout 
his presidency. His Christian and conservative Republican bases had a well-known hatred for 
communism. Reagan was able to expand his support for re-election in 1984 by also aligning the 
critics of his Central American policy with communism. “It was from that steamy, little-known 
Central American republic that Reagan would send a message to Moscow.”8 Reagan’s obsession 
continued after re-election as he had just spent years advocating against the Sandinistas and 
refused to be perceived as taking a more lenient approach with his policies. 
 
7 Kaiser, Robert G., and Washington Post Staff Writer; Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post Foreign Service 
contributed to this report. Lewis H. Diuguid. “White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty.” The Washington Post, June 9, 
1981. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/06/09/white-paper-on-el-salvador-is-faulty/e17adfa2-
3763-42b4-a1f6-1c641ecfd72f/.  
8 DeYoung, Where Reagan Draws the Line. 
7 
 
 
Reagan’s underlings helped him justify his policies in Central America by creating 
documentation and false chronologies to support the idea of Soviet influence long after aid had 
diminished.9 Because his advisors’ reports helped to frame the Sandinistas as anti-religious, 
Soviet allies, they became integral to preventing the exposure of his obsession. By publishing 
reports where his advisors appeared to make decisions without presidential approval, Reagan 
was allowed to rely on the use of plausible deniability. Reagan’s fear of impeachment, if his 
obsession were to be discovered, controlled his actions for his entire presidency. Section one will 
outline Reagan’s framing of the conflict in Nicaragua, section two will show that Soviet 
influence was minimal from the start and had completely dissipated by late 1981, and section 
three will explain that Reagan’s underlings were acting according to his will to avoid his 
potential impeachment. These three sections will prove that Reagan went to extreme lengths to 
hide his obsession with appearing strong to the Soviet Union and to the American public.  
 
9 Booth, John A., The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1982), 138-144. 
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Chapter 2: The Start Of Conflict In Nicaragua 
Reagan’s public opinion of the Sandinista’s ideology and intentions was drastically 
different than his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. General Somoza took power in Nicaragua on June 
9, 1936 and had been supported by the U.S. from that point on.10 In 1961, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) was created with the goal of making a socialist state. They 
were a Marxist-Leninist organization inspired by the Cuban revolution, and were formed in 
opposition to the Somoza regime.11 In 1974, the Somoza government had declared a state of 
siege in light of attacks from the Sandinistas.12 By the time Carter was inaugurated in 1977, the 
state of siege had not been lifted and throughout the three year period, Somoza’s human rights 
violations had increased as his government acted more aggressively to end the uprising. The 
synthesis of the losses of the Vietnam War and international pressure to address Somoza’s harsh 
tactics caused Carter to cut off aid to the Somoza government in 1977. When Somoza lifted the 
state of siege later in 1977, Carter resumed aid to Nicaragua’s government as he believed 
Somoza was changing his policies.13 By the summer of 1978, the Broad Opposition Front (FOA) 
was formed including moderates and the more intense Sandinistas who continued their battle 
against the Somoza leadership. Because Carter believed that Somoza’s government had 
improved their human rights violations, he thought that sending aid to support Somoza, not the 
recently created FOA, was in the best interest of the United States. However, this opinion 
 
10 Cavendish, Richard. “General Somoza Takes over Nicaragua.” History Today, June 2011. 
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/general-somoza-takes-over-nicaragua.  
11 Booth, The Nicaraguan Revolution 138-144.  
12 “Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs.” Nicaragua and Iran Timeline.” Brown University, 2019. 
https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php.  
13 Shaw, Terri. “Nicaragua Lifts State of Siege.” The Washington Post, September 20, 1977. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/09/20/nicaragua-lifts-state-of-siege/5634d76e-834e-4a82-
891f-696dda4f751d/.  
9 
 
 
changed in early 1979 when the Somoza government refused to accept mediations to settle 
conflict.14 Carter subsequently reduced aid in February of 1979 but chose not to stop all support 
because he did not want to completely sever the relationship between the U.S. and Nicaragua and 
wanted the conflict to end.   
Carter made the U.S. look weak to the Soviet Union by changing his loyalties between 
the Somoza Nicaraguan leadership and the Sandinistas. Unlike Reagan, Carter viewed the 
Sandinistas as the cure to Somoza’s human rights violations when they took control of the 
Nicaraguan government on July 19, 1979. Carter believed the Sandinistas would be a better 
alternative than the Somoza leadership after almost two decades of conflict between the two 
groups, but his opinion would shift again over the following year. “The Sandinista victory in 
Nicaragua became ground zero for containing communist threats in the western hemisphere.”15 
Carter promptly sent $99 million in aid to the Sandinistas in July 1979 hoping their leadership 
would become pro-U.S. However, by early 1980, it became clear to Washington officials that the 
Sandinistas had radical views that could also be potentially problematic.16 As a result, Carter 
approved resistance forces in Nicaragua with the intention of organizing forces and providing 
propaganda to pressure the Sandinistas. These forces would be supported by the CIA, but Carter 
did not approve of any military action against the Sandinistas in hope that they would cooperate 
and change their positions. Carter’s ultimate goal to keep peace in Nicaragua caused his shifts in 
opinion about which leadership to support so that the U.S. could maintain a positive relationship 
 
14 Goshko, John M. “U.S. Retaliates against Somoza, U.S. Cuts Back Aid to Nicaragua.” The Washington Post, 
February 9, 1979. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/02/09/us-retaliates-against-somoza-cuts-
back-aidus-cuts-back-aid-to-nicaragua/0dedf7f9-6dbc-401c-9101-e5c4479d19e1/.  
15 LeoGrande, William M. “The United States and Nicaragua,” in Nicaragua: The First Five Years, ed. Thomas W. 
Walker (New York: Praeger, 1985), 426-427. 
16 Brown University, Nicaragua and Iran Timeline. 
10 
 
 
with whoever was in control. These shifts caused Carter to be depicted as a weak leader who also 
failed to actually address human rights violations.17 
 
17 DeYoung, Where Reagan Draws the Line. 
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 Chapter 3: Reagan’s Domestic Political Strategy To Hide His Obsession 
The following section will explain that Reagan intervened in Nicaragua for domestic 
political purposes as he needed to fulfill his insatiable desire to be perceived as a strong leader. 
Reagan stole Carter’s religious base in 1980 and needed the public to view him as the devout 
Christian that he had presented himself to be throughout his campaign. Because Reagan was not 
actually religious, his judgement was clouded by the threat of losing such a large constituency if 
this were to be exposed. When Reagan was publicly attacked in December 1980, one month after 
he had been elected, his religious credibility and the support of his conservative Christian base 
were threatened. The authors of the published letter questioned whether Reagan could be viewed 
as a true Christian if he failed to address human rights violations and if he would have shifting 
policies like Carter had. Reagan viewed the conflict in Nicaragua as the perfect opportunity to 
secure his base’s support while proving that he was a credible religious leader whose policies 
were based on Christian values and should be followed without question. Reagan’s obsession 
grew as he was determined to contradict the religious leaders who attacked him and to prove that 
he was a strong leader who did not falter like his predecessor. By silencing the critiques of those 
opposed to his Central American policies by claiming that they were anti-religious political 
activists, Reagan could earn justification from his religious base that his polices were in their 
best interests. With his constituents' support, Reagan would be capable of immediate intervention 
in Central America once he was sworn in as president. Reagan’s obsession is outlined as follows 
as he maneuvered to become an enticing candidate to conservatives, in his response to the public 
attack that threatened his constituency, in his lack of religious devotion in his response, and how 
he tied Soviet communism to anti-religious activities to justify continued intervention in 
Nicaragua.  
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Reagan worked tirelessly to be perceived as a deeply religious man throughout his 
political career and in doing so, he was able to steal Jimmy Carter’s religious vote in the 1980 
presidential election.18 The socially conservative, white evangelical movement was sparked 
during Carter’s administration but they disapproved of his shifting policies, especially those in 
Central America.19 Reagan was the ideal candidate for white evangelical voters as he advocated 
for limited government and argued against communism.20 Reagan’s upbringing in the church 
helped him to appeal to Carter’s base as he had a deep understanding of what these individuals 
believed and wanted to hear.21  
 Because Reagan’s mother Nelle had such a close personal relationship with their 
minister, Ben Cleaver, Reagan had spent years learning the best strategies to draw on one’s 
religious values. Nelle Reagan was a deeply religious woman who had encouraged Reagan to 
engage in as many church activities as possible.22 She served as a Sunday school teacher for 
many years and often asked Reagan to host events for their church, the Dixon Disciples of 
Christ. Nelle and Ben provided Reagan with public speaking training at a young age through his 
participation in Church activities, often with acting holding a central role. These factors allowed 
Reagan to fit right in with the conservative Republicans. With religious ideology present 
throughout his campaign rhetoric and promises, Reagan successfully captured two-thirds of 
Carter’s white evangelical voters in the 1980 election. It would later become apparent that 
Reagan was not as religious as he claimed to be and when he was publicly attacked by religious 
 
18 Riley, Knott. “Lyn Nofziger Oral History.” Miller Center, University of Virginia, March 13, 2023. 
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/lyn-nofziger-oral-history.  
19 Haberman, Clyde. “Religion and Right-Wing Politics: How Evangelicals Reshaped Elections.” The New York 
Times, October 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/religion-politics-evangelicals.html.  
20 Haberman, How Evangelicals Reshaped Elections. 
21 Vaughn, Stephen. “ The Moral Inheritance of a President: Reagan and the Dixon Disciples of Christ.” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1995): 109–127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551378. 
22 Vaughn, Reagan and the Dixon Disciples, 109-127. 
13 
 
 
leaders in December 1980, he risked being exposed as a president who made false campaign 
promises. 
 It is imperative to evaluate Reagan’s pre-election claims to gain a proper understanding 
of the shift in his attitude toward religious leaders working abroad. Reagan first mentioned his 
concern over those in service abroad in his “A Strategy for Peace in the ‘80s” speech on October 
19, 1980. Reagan stated, “We can restore pride and effectiveness in our foreign policy 
establishment by putting an end to the kidnapping and murder of our public servants in service 
abroad.”23 Reagan reiterated this the night before he was elected to his first term as president on 
November 3, 1980. In that speech, he stressed America’s commitment to aiding those who were 
persecuted or alone in foreign states.24 “For those who seek the right to self-determination 
without interference from foreign powers, tonight let us speak for them. For those who suffer 
from social or religious discrimination, for those who are victims of police states or government 
induced torture or terror…Tonight let us speak for them.” Reagan clearly expressed his desire to 
support individuals facing injustices throughout the world on both October 19, and November 3, 
1980, but his actions would quickly contradict those claims after he was publicly criticized by 
religious leaders even before he was inaugurated.  
Reagan believed that he could achieve his goal of appearing strong if he immediately 
intervened in Nicaragua. This caused him to discredit those who questioned his future policies in 
Central America, specifically the Maryknoll Sisters. These nuns were members of a Catholic 
organization, based in El Salvador, who had witnessed firsthand the human rights violations that 
 
23 Reagan, Ronald. “Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan ‘A Strategy for Peace in the '80s.’” The 
American Presidency Project, October 19, 1980. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/televised-address-
governor-ronald-reagan-strategy-for-peace-the-80s. 
24 Reagan, Ronald “Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America.’” Ronald Reagan Presidential Archive, November 
3, 1980. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/election-eve-address-vision-america.  
14 
 
 
continued to occur in U.S. allied countries following Carter’s maneuvering in the region. The 
Maryknoll Sisters of St. Dominic was founded in 1912 by Mother Mary Joseph Rogers and is 
based in Ossining, New York.25 The Maryknoll Sisters became the first order of Catholic nuns in 
the United States focused on foreign service after receiving approval from the Vatican in 1920.26 
They were committed to prioritizing the poor, voicing instances of injustice, and advocating for 
basic human rights. On December 2, 1980, two Maryknoll Sisters were returning from a 
Maryknoll gathering in Nicaragua. They were met at the airport in El Salvador by another nun 
and a lay missionary. On their drive home they were kidnapped, raped, and murdered by 
members of the Salvadoran National Guard.  
 Reagan was publicly attacked even before he was inaugurated as President. With the 
understanding that the previous administration, under President Carter, had changed their 
alliances with Nicaraguan leadership to best suit U.S. interests, the Maryknoll Sisters wrote to 
President-elect Reagan on December 17, 1980 in the hope that he would act differently in 
Central America. Seventy-two religious leaders representing eight colleges and eighteen 
religious denominations, including the Maryknoll Sisters, published an open letter to President-
elect Ronald Reagan in the New York Times as a result of the murders of their fellow nuns. They 
claimed his decision not to speak out on events in the Central American region would be viewed 
as support of such repression.27 The authors stated that there was increasing evidence that 
military governments were characterizing Reagan’s election as a “green light” for the 
 
25 Maryknoll Sisters. “Mother Mary Joseph Our Foundress.” Maryknoll Sisters, March 12, 2018. 
https://www.maryknollsisters.org/about-us/our-foundress/.  
26 Maryknoll Sisters. “Martyrdom in El Salvador.” Maryknoll Sisters, December 7, 2022. 
https://www.maryknollsisters.org/40thanniversary/.  
27 Mooney, Mark. “A Group of Religious Leaders Warned President-Elect Ronald Reagan... - UPI Archives.” UPI, 
December 17, 1980. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1980/12/17/A-group-of-religious-leaders-warned-President-
elect-Ronald-Reagan/7808345877200/.  
15 
 
 
suppression of opposing views and for further imprisonment, torture, and murder in countries 
that were allied with and supported by the United States.28 At the end of the open letter, the 
authors asked Reagan to take responsibility by speaking out against these inhumane acts.  
 This letter posed a particular threat to Reagan’s base as the authors aligned themselves 
with those who had just elected Reagan while simultaneously questioning if he was a weak 
leader who would allow atrocities so close to the American border. “From your record and stands 
we judge that you would not condone such erosion of democratic rights, nor would the great 
majority of those Americans who elected you…”29 They then specifically mentioned the 
religious groups, and the greater American population as a whole, who should be furious about 
the ongoing problems in Central America. “These crimes against humanity outrage every value 
that we hold dear as Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Jew - yes, as Americans. Now is 
the time and yours the responsibility.” This letter served as the starting point of Reagan’s shift to 
the defensive as it was delivered on such a large platform, undoubtedly viewed by his supporters, 
thereby requiring him to address the situation so that he would not appear weak or sacrilegious. 
 These public critiques in December 1980 called Reagan’s character and his core values 
into question. The attributes that the nuns questioned were important to his supporters and he 
could not afford to alienate his base even before he was inaugurated. Reagan came into office 
with the intention of intervening in Nicaragua to appear strong by defeating the Sandinistas, and 
he needed conservative Christian support from the start of his presidency to justify the immediate 
implementation of his Central American policies. He feared the loss of their support so quickly 
 
28 Clergy and Laity Concerned, Open Letter to Reagan. 
29 Clergy and Laity Concerned, Open Letter to Reagan. 
16 
 
 
after being elected because he realized he would be unable to intervene and appear strong if his 
base questioned his motivations.  
 The number of religious individuals in America had increased greatly in the years 
before Reagan was elected and he framed his response to the public attack in a manner that 
would appeal to their values not only to gain their support, but out of fear of having so many 
constituents turn against him.30 An article by the Washington Post shows just how much these 
bases had grown in size throughout the period, alluding to the potential disaster that could have 
occurred for the administration had Reagan approached Nicaragua differently. “The previous two 
decades had witnessed an explosion in the number of self-identified Evangelical Christians. The 
number of Americans who identified as ‘born again’ increased from 24 percent in 1963 to nearly 
40 percent in 1978. While mainstream church membership dropped between 1965 and 1980, the 
number of Southern Baptists grew from 10.8 million to 13.6 million.”31 With such a massive 
number of religious voters in the American population, Reagan could not allow his intentions in 
Central America or the nature of his religious devotion to be subject to skepticism.32  
Because of their standing as nuns, it was difficult for the administration to portray the 
Maryknoll Sisters as atheistic Communists.33 After the open letter was published, a divide began 
to grow among Catholics in the United States. Reagan and the conservative Catholics in his 
administration felt the nuns should be held responsible for the murder of their sisters as they 
 
30 Gillon, Steven." Perspective | Reagan Tied Republicans to White Christians and Now the Party Is Trapped.” The 
Washington Post, March 22, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/22/reagan-tied-republicans-
white-christians-now-party-is-trapped/.  
31 Gillon, Reagan Tied Republicans to Christians. 
32 Huezo, Stephanie M. “The Murdered Churchwomen in El Salvador.” Origins, December 2020. 
https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/murdered-churchwomen-el-salvador?language_content_entity=en.  
33 Dodson, Michael and Nuzzi O’Shaughnessy, Laura. Nicaragua’s Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political 
Struggle (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). 
17 
 
 
were “bad Catholics” and served as political activists rather than religious figures.34 Progressive 
Catholics, on the other hand, viewed the murders as an opportunity to protest and call for the 
removal of aid to U.S. allies that supported such acts of violence.35 Reagan chose to use this 
divide among Catholics to spark conservative support for his policies while working to minimize 
the protest movements.36 “While the anti-communist New Right wanted to politically isolate the 
Sandinistas, conservative Catholics also wanted to do so for religious reasons. For conservative 
Catholics, Central America was integral to ‘determining the church’s future direction.’”37 The 
Maryknoll Sisters served as the perfect villain in his battle against the supposedly communist 
Sandinistas, helping to validate his policies in Central America while securing support from this 
religious base. Ultimately this prevented Reagan’s obsession with appearing strong from 
becoming apparent in his public motivations for intervention.   
 Reagan had to address the situation discussed in the open letter to have the necessary 
support to be an effective president but needed to do so in a manner that maintained his religious 
and political credibility. His base had core values that were violated by the crimes in Central 
America and Reagan was concerned that his supporters might side with the authors of the open 
letter and their claims. Reagan argued that he wanted to continue to provide aid to the 
government of El Salvador as soon as he came into office in 1981 to prevent the Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas from gaining greater control in the U.S.-supported nation.38 This directly 
 
34 Turek, Lauren. “H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-43 on Reagan’s Gun-Toting Nuns.” H-Diplo, June 7, 2021. 
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/7807090/h-diplo-roundtable-xxii-43-reagan%E2%80%99s-gun-
toting-nuns.  
35 Dodson, Nicaragua’s Other Revolution. 
36 Haberman, How Evangelicals Reshaped Elections. 
37 Keely, Theresa. “H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-43 on Reagan’s Gun-Toting Nuns.” H-Diplo, June 7, 2021. 
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/7807090/h-diplo-roundtable-xxii-43-reagan%E2%80%99s-gun-
toting-nuns. 
38 Kornbluh, Peter, and Malcolm Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., National Security Archive Documents Reader, 1993, 33-41. 
18 
 
 
contradicted the concerns outlined by the Maryknoll Sisters and religious leaders as they wanted 
to stop aid to El Salvador until the human rights violations had been addressed.39 Because the 
Maryknoll Sisters persisted in questioning Reagan’s actions in the region after he was 
inaugurated, Reagan centered his policy in Central America to hide his obsession and combat 
their critiques.40 Reagan refused to allow himself to be perceived as not being committed to his 
religious beliefs or as weak by allowing such acts of violence to occur. His answer was to 
attempt to discredit the nuns. Reagan was comfortable criticizing the Maryknoll Sisters in this 
manner because he was actually not the devout Christian that he attempted to portray. Reagan 
and his administration engaged with the Maryknoll Sisters in the press well into his second term 
in office, displaying the influence their group had on Reagan’s obsession with his public 
perception.41  
 Reagan’s lack of religious commitment could not be discovered without the risk of 
being viewed as an untrustworthy leader who was willing to change public perception to meet 
his goals. Although Reagan was elected by a conservative, religious majority, he was not 
actually very religious himself. However, Reagan needed this base to believe he was religious so 
that he could appeal to their values in his intervention to hide his obsession with appearing 
strong. Despite growing up in a religious household, Reagan often maintained his religious 
responsibilities out of obligation.42 His facade to appear to be religious began early in Reagan’s 
life as an attempt to please his mother, Nelle Reagan and their minister Ben Cleaver. A friend of 
 
39 Clergy and Laity Concerned, Open Letter to Reagan. 
40 Keely, Roundtable on Reagan's Nuns. 
41 Ames, Lynne. “ The View from: The Cloister at Maryknoll; Behind the Walls, Silence Is Golden.” The New York 
Times, March 26, 1989. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/26/nyregion/the-view-from-the-cloister-at-maryknoll-
behind-the-walls-silence-is.html.  
42 Vaughn, Reagan and the Dixon Disciples, 78. 
19 
 
 
the family reported that Reagan might not have been as committed to the Dixon Disciple’s 
doctrine as he appeared to be. “Reagan, himself, admitted that he spent more time in the Dixon 
church looking at his fiancé than listening to the sermons.”43 Reagan used his understanding of 
the religious base to frame himself in a way that would allow his supporters to have faith in his 
policies.  
 The influence of astrology was present throughout the Reagan administration proving 
that Reagan was not as religious as he claimed to be. His lack of commitment to the religious 
values he campaigned on became apparent when he spoke out against the Maryknoll Sisters. 
Reagan attempted to discredit not only their personal values but also their religious credibility so 
that his intentions would not be questioned. If he could distance the Maryknoll Sisters from his 
religious base, their critiques would become irrelevant and Reagan could create policy to 
intervene in Nicaragua without opposition as soon as he was inaugurated. Reagan’s pattern of 
distancing himself from religion in his personal life continued throughout his time in office. In 
fact, once Reagan had been elected president for his first term, he had to work diligently to hide 
any actions that would have been perceived as sacrilegious, specifically relating to his approval 
of Nancy’s astrologer. Following the assassination attempt on the President on March 30, 1981, 
Nancy Reagan claimed to have turned to astrology for comfort but instances of astrological 
influence appear as early as 1967 when Reagan was elected as Governor of California.44 Nancy 
argued that she used her relationship with her astrologer, Joan Quigley, as a crutch in the 
uncertain time after the President was shot, but after one to two years their communication had 
 
43 Vaughn, Reagan and the Dixon Disciples, 84-89. 
44 Cannon, Lou. “Astrologers Used by First Lady, Regan Book Says.” The Washington Post, May 3, 1988. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/05/03/astrologers-used-by-first-lady-regan-book-
says/1940492b-a6a6-4190-8347-3da1d27d62d1/.  
20 
 
 
become a habit.45 The presence of astrology dating as far back as Reagan’s time as Governor 
helps to illustrate the inconsistencies in Nancy’s story. This further proves their dedication to 
preserving the secret of their lack of religious dedication. 
 By supporting his wife’s belief in astrology and allowing his schedule to be dictated by 
it, Reagan was actively going against the values of his conservative, religious base. Evidence 
later arose that Nancy had worked closely with a member of Reagan’s administration, Michael 
Deaver, to coordinate the scheduling of the President’s activities according to the advice of her 
astrologer.46 Chief of Staff James Baker stated, “It was months before Nancy told her husband 
what she was up to. As in most things, he indulged her. ‘If it makes you feel better, go ahead and 
do it,’ Reagan said. ‘But it might look a little odd if it ever came out.’”47 This was one of the 
most closely held secrets of the administration with no reporting on the matter until Reagan 
neared the end of his Presidency.48 He needed to keep the public from gaining access to such 
sensitive information so that they would not question his legitimacy and intentions.  
 Reagan was obsessed with showing his strength by supporting the fight against the 
Sandinistas and the Soviet communist threat he claimed they represented. By supporting the 
government in El Salvador and the anti-Sandinista army, the Nicaraguan Contras, he hoped to 
minimize Sandinista influence in the region. However, Reagan changed his policies in the build-
up to his bid for re-election as he no longer believed that stopping the Sandinistas from gaining 
further control would be an adequate approach to appearing strong.49 Reagan then became 
 
45 Linge, Mary Kay. “How Ronald Reagan’s Wife Nancy Let Her Astrologer Control the Presidency.” New York 
Post, October 18, 2021. https://nypost.com/article/ronald-reagans-wife-nancy-astrologer-joan-quigley/. 
46 Linge, Nancy’s Astrologer Controls the Presidency. 
47 Linge, Nancy’s Astrologer Controls the Presidency. 
48 Cannon, Astrologers Used by First Lady. 
49 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 47. 
21 
 
 
obsessed with fundamentally removing the Sandinistas from power in the Nicaraguan 
government to prevent being categorized as weak, like Carter had been.50 Reagan was so 
determined to continue supporting the anti-Sandinista army that he persisted in his argument that 
Soviet influence was present in the region.51 Reagan’s base, and the majority of the American 
public, felt deep hatred for the Soviet Union and for communism as a whole.52 Despite the fact 
that Soviet influence was minimal from the start, his base's hatred allowed him to use the illusion 
of Soviet influence to continue sending aid.53 By connecting the anti-religious actions of the 
Sandinistas with the proposed threat of Soviet communism, Reagan was able to appeal to the 
more liberal Christians and conservatives who might have otherwise been opposed to his 
intervention. After re-election, this study finds that Reagan refused to regress in his policies by 
permitting the Sandinistas to remain in control as he had just spent years stressing the importance 
of defeating them and not allowing their ideology so close to the American border.54 The 
following section will describe how Reagan tried to satisfy his obsession as he modified his 
policies to justify his attempt to remove the Sandinistas from power, despite Congressional 
sanctions barring these actions.55 
 
50 Schwartz, Thomas, Donaghy, Aaron, Johns, Andrew, Maar, Henry, Teague, Aileen. “Diplo Roundtable XXIV-1 
on Donaghy. The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy.” H, H-Diplo Round Table 
XXIV-1, Sept. 6, 2022. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10684614/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiv-1-
donaghy%C2%A0-second-cold-war-carter-reagan.  
51 Reagan, Cuba and Central America. 
52 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 28. 
53 Edelman, Marc. “Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations and the Contra War.” International Journal on World Peace 5, no. 3 
(1988): 45–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20751268. 
54 Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America.” Ronald Reagan Library, 
May 9, 1984. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-policy-central-america. 
55 Hayes, Andrew W. “The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference.” Columbia Law Review 88, no. 7 
(1988): 1534–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122739. 
22 
 
 
Chapter 4: Nicaragua’s Relationship With The Soviet Union 
 While Reagan argued that the Soviet Union was helping the Sandinistas by providing 
aid and troops through Cuban forces, there has been no clear indication of direct Soviet military 
aid to Nicaragua. This supports the idea that Reagan framed the conflict in a manner that would 
allow for his continued intervention to aid the anti-Sandinista movement so he that would appear 
strong. It was not in the best interest of the Soviet Union to divert military aid to the Nicaraguan 
government while facing hostile relations with the United States. The majority of information 
provided by Soviet analysts prior to 1979 argued that Nicaragua was one of the locations in 
Central America (if not the location) where U.S. domination was the strongest.56 The Soviet 
Union recognized the Sandinista government of Nicaragua on July 20, 1979, and developed 
official diplomatic relations by the end of 1979.57 "There was only one trade deal reported to 
have occurred, taking place in January 1980 for the sale of Nicaraguan coffee in exchange for 
unspecified Soviet technical assistance.”58 The Soviet Union provided humanitarian assistance in 
the form of medical supplies and children’s food to the Sandinistas on two separate occasions, in 
August 1979 and March 1981, but was cautious in promising economic aid.59 “Soon after, the 
most important aid received by Nicaragua from the Soviet Union was an emergency fund for the 
purchase of machinery, industrial equipment, agriculture supplies, the use of a Soviet repair shop 
to service the Atlantic Coast fishing fleet, and several million doses of various vaccines.”60 This 
 
56 Edelman, Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations. 72-73. 
57 Prevost, Gary. “The FSLN as Ruling Party, in Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua,” ed. Thomas W. 
Walker. Westview Press, 1991, 102-103. 
58 Collins, Joseph. “What Difference Could A Revolution Make? Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua.” Food 
First, 1986, 50-52. 
59 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of state, “Developing Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations,” June 24, 
1981, 1-4. 
60 Collins, The New Nicaragua, 50-52. 
23 
 
 
study corroborates the notion that there is not credible evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union 
provided direct military aid to the Sandinistas. Although the Sandinistas did obtain hardware 
manufactured in the Soviet Union, the shipment of military weaponry and subsequent materials 
through third countries had declined significantly by late January 1981.61  
 
61 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during 
the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 249-256. 
 
24 
 
 
Chapter 5: Reagan Uses Soviet Communism To Hide His Obsession 
 Reagan’s claims that Soviet communism was present in Nicaragua began in his first 
initiative relating to foreign policy published on February 19, 1981, in his attempt to provide 
documentation that justified his immediate intervention.62 In this white paper, Reagan aligned his 
religious critics with what he described as an impending Soviet Communist threat. Reagan 
specifically argued that Cuba had been involved in guiding the Sandinistas, and that the Soviet 
Union had in turn directly provided arms to Nicaragua.63 The Washington Post highlighted 
Reagan’s false statements and found no evidence to support Reagan’s white paper. While there is 
proof that the Sandinistas desired a relationship with the Soviet Union when they developed 
diplomatic relations in 1979, the Soviet Union was not directly involved in providing military 
aid.64  
 Just six weeks after his February initiative, in March 1981, Reagan issued a report 
calling for increased covert action in Central America.65 President Reagan took part in an 
interview on March 3, 1981, with Evening News Anchor Walter Cronkite on the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) explaining U.S. intentions in Central America. Reagan now claimed 
that the Soviet Union was not directly providing aid, but rather they were displaying their 
influence by acting through Cuba. Throughout this interview, Reagan addressed concerns about 
the spread of Soviet communism and drew direct connections between Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. Reagan stated, “The parallel would be that without actually using Soviet troops, in 
effect, the Soviets are, you might say, trying to do the same thing in El Salvador that they did in 
 
62 Kaiser and DeYoung, White Paper is Faulty. 
63 Kaiser and DeYoung, White Paper is Faulty. 
64 Edelman, Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations, 84-86. 
65 LeoGrande, The United States and Nicaragua, 428. 
25 
 
 
Afghanistan, but by using proxy troops through Cuba and guerillas.”66 It is important to note that 
while Soviet intervention was actively taking place in Afghanistan throughout the entirety of his 
presidency, Reagan ignored the implications of Soviet influence in this region and appeared to 
treat Nicaragua as a much more pressing matter.67 This helps highlight his obsession with 
appearing strong as he used the conflict from the start of his presidency in Nicaragua to 
showcase his strength, when he could have combatted a genuine Soviet threat if he had shaped 
his policies around Afghanistan rather than Nicaragua. His pattern of altering public perception 
about the actions of the Sandinistas in Central America would become especially prominent in 
the build up to his re-election. Reagan created routes to ensure his support would continue and he 
would achieve his goal of defeating the Sandinistas and appearing strong.68 
 Reagan’s obsession with his positive public portrayal over continued intervention was 
growing in his first term in office. He knew he must be viewed by his bases as properly 
addressing their concerns by reaffirming his policies. Reagan created a number of policies in his 
National Security Decision Directives between 1981 and 1983 to further his goal of prohibiting 
the Sandinistas from gaining access to greater control and resources. The National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD-17) signed by President Reagan on January 4, 1982, explained that 
U.S. Policy would focus on assisting in the defeat of the rebellion in El Salvador, and would 
oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua, and other nations to provide weapons, outside troops, 
 
66 Office of the Historian. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign 
Policy.” U.S. Department of State, n.d. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01/d33.  
67 Knapp, Alyssa. “Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989).” “Burning with a deadly heat”: Newshour coverage of the Hot 
Wars of the Cold War, n.d. https://americanarchive.org/exhibits/newshour-cold-war/afghanistan.  
68 Maddux, Thomas R., and Edward A. Lynch. “Maddux on Lynch, ‘The Cold War’s Last Battlefield: Reagan, the 
Soviets, and Central America.’” H-Diplo, May 2012. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/reviews/30400/maddux-
lynch-cold-wars-last-battlefield-reagan-soviets-and-central.  
26 
 
 
trained subversives, or arms and military supplies for the Sandinistas.69 By June of 1982 Reagan 
had announced the “Reagan Doctrine” further establishing aid for democratization in countries 
that were engaged in socialist revolutions.70 The idea that Reagan was intervening to stop the 
spread of arms and ideology from Nicaragua to El Salvador was at the center of his policy in 
1981 and 1982.71 
 Reagan changed his policy by the end of 1982 when he shifted from interdicting arms 
to calling for a change in government to gain support for his re-election. Byrne, in his review of 
the Reagan’s policies, highlights the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-59) that was 
published on October 5, 1982.72 In this directive, Reagan’s policies called for Sandinista 
withdrawal with the intention to use U.S. forces to engage and repel their units.73 Reagan knew 
his conservative religious bases had severe animosity toward the Soviet Union and would not 
support their control so close to the American border. His framing of the Sandinistas as a Soviet 
communist threat allowed him to advocate for the change in government in Nicaragua. Reagan’s 
subsequent policies continued to display his concerns about Soviet influence on the Sandinistas. 
By November 1982, Reagan had released another National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 
71) where he explicitly stated that the U.S. would use its influence to promote the development 
of democratic institutions and human rights to facilitate U.S. public support for closer 
relationships with the involved governments.74 Reagan hoped to paint his intervention in a 
 
69 Reagan, Ronald. “NSDD 17: National Security Decision Directive on Cuba and Central America. ”NSDD 17-
National Security Decision Directives, January 4, 1982. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-17.pdf.  
70 Brown University, Nicaragua and Iran Timeline. 
71 Reagan, Ronald. “NSDD 59: Cuba and Central America .” NSDD 59 - National Security Decision Directives - 
Reagan Administration, October 5, 1982. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-59.pdf.  
72 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 52. 
73 Reagan, Cuba and Central America. 
74 Reagan, Ronald. “NSSD 71: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis.” National 
Security Decision Directives, November 30, 1982. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-71.pdf.  
27 
 
 
positive light by pushing the idea that he was instilling democracy in the region, thereby 
satisfying his obsession to appear powerful by continuing to justify the support of the anti-
Sandinista army.75 
 Shortly after announcing his re-election campaign in 1984, President Reagan addressed 
the nation regarding Central America where he enhanced his argument when he stated that 
Nicaragua should be treated in a manner consistent with other Soviet allies, such as Cuba. This 
was a deliberate misdirection as there was not credible evidence to prove the existence of Soviet 
communism in the region after January 1981.76 In this address, Reagan explained “The issue of 
our effort to promote democracy and economic well-being in the face of Cuban and Nicaraguan 
aggression, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, is definitely not about plans to send American 
troops into combat in Central America.”77 While it is true that Reagan did not have any intention 
of sending American troops to Nicaragua, by 1984 he had already constructed pathways to send 
aid, weapons, and training without public knowledge. Reagan chose to speak directly to his 
conservative base by stating, “San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas than Houston is to 
Washington, D.C. It’s at our doorstep, and it’s become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet 
Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the empire.”78 Reagan 
wanted to unite his Catholic and conservative bases through their hatred of communism and the 
Soviet Union so that they would support his re-election and refrain from questioning his policies, 
which would have exposed his obsession as the true reason for intervention.79 
 
75 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal. 
76 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 
77 Reagan, Address on Central America. 
78 Reagan, Address on Central America. 
79 Turek, Gun-Toting Nuns. 
28 
 
 
 Reagan continued to align Soviet influence with violence and anti-religious actions to 
expand the number of his supporters and to prove that he was the best candidate for re-election 
because he could provide assurance that he was committed to tackling the threat in Nicaragua. In 
the same speech delivered in 1984 on Central America, Reagan pointed out what he believed to 
be significant moral crises that he claimed were ongoing throughout the region. “In the 
meantime, there has been an attempt to wipe out an entire culture, the Miskito Indians, thousands 
of whom have been slaughtered or herded into detention camps, where they have been starved 
and abused. Their villages, churches, and crops have been burned.”80 Yet, this was in complete 
opposition to Reagan’s vicious attack against the Maryknoll Sisters when they spoke out against 
clear human rights violations in Nicaragua because their perspective did not fit Reagan’s agenda.  
 
80 Reagan, Address on Central America. 
 
29 
 
 
Chapter 6: Reagan’s Obsession After Re-Election 
 Reagan’s obsession continued after his re-election because he had so heavily advocated 
his unwillingness to accept Sandinista rule and would not allow himself to be perceived as weak 
by regressing in his policies from the previous term. Because Reagan’s obsession with appearing 
powerful in the eyes of his supporters and the Soviet Union had not been accomplished as he had 
not yet defeated the Sandinistas, he understood that he must maintain his Central American 
policies until this could be achieved. Reagan knew that he would have been perceived as weak, 
as Carter had been, if he changed his Central American policy to allow for leniency to the 
Sandinista regime.81 Reagan would have been unable to validate his previous actions and claims 
surrounding Nicaragua if he stopped supporting the anti-Sandinista army, the Contras, after he 
had secured re-election. Other scholars support this idea in their review of Reagan’s foreign 
policy stating, “Policies can develop constituencies and a momentum that make it very difficult 
to change course.”82 Reagan continued to push these policies in 1985, explaining the importance 
of continuing to provide U.S. support to thwart the Sandinistas.83 Reagan wanted to confirm his 
perceived strength, so he persisted in creating the illusion of needing to defeat the Soviet 
influence in Nicaragua. These findings are supported by the arguments Reagan makes in his 
address to the nation on March 16, 1986. Reagan expressed that the danger of Soviet influence 
would only continue to grow if the U.S. did not take action. “Using Nicaragua as a base, the 
Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and 
 
81 Schwartz, The Second Cold War  
82 Schwartz, The Second Cold War. 
83 Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua.” Ronald Reagan Library, March 16, 1986. 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-situation-nicaragua.  
30 
 
 
South America.”84 Reagan further justified his actions in Nicaragua by claiming that he was 
acting in the best interest of the United States to ensure their dominance over the Soviet Union.85 
 
84 Reagan, Address on Nicaraguan Situation. 
85 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 98-101. 
 
31 
 
 
Chapter 7: Reagan’s Use Of Plausible Deniability To Frame His Underlings 
 When the covert actions taken on behalf of President Reagan were exposed, his 
administration attempted to enact “plausible deniability” by promoting the idea that his advisors 
were the cause of any criminal activity and Reagan could not possibly be personally invested in 
Nicaragua. With the understanding that Reagan held the primary interest in Nicaragua and was 
willing to go to extreme lengths to ensure aid was delivered, this study finds that to fuel his 
obsession, Reagan called for support on terms that were not entirely truthful so that he could 
continue his intervention in Nicaragua. Reagan appealed to his supporters by focusing on a topic 
that he knew they would not be able to ignore, Soviet communism, hiding his true motive to 
defeat the Sandinistas and appear strong. This thesis argues that Reagan’s underlings were in fact 
operating on the wishes of the President as it was impossible for Reagan to show his involvement 
without the threat of impeachment. The following section will explore the specific ways 
Reagan’s underlings created a paper trail and false timelines for plausible deniability.  
 It is possible to theorize that Reagan’s advisors played a significant role in shaping his 
perspective about the importance of intervention in Nicaragua, causing Reagan to believe the 
problem required more attention that it actually needed. Scholars have also proposed that Reagan 
was either out of touch with his administration or was subject to the will of those closest to him, 
and cited Reagan’s claims that he could not recall information about the routes taken to aid the 
anti-Sandinista Contras.86 While Reagan’s underlings were responsible for facilitating the 
shipments of aid to the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua, they were acting according to the 
 
86 Fujii, George. “Diplo Roundtable XVII, 17 on Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of 
Presidential Power.” H-Diplo, March 16, 2016. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/116436/h-diplo-
roundtable-xvii-17-iran-contra-reagan%E2%80%99s-scandal-and.  
32 
 
 
President’s wishes.87 After careful evaluation of speeches, primary, and secondary sources it is 
clear to see that Reagan was the driving force behind the desire to continue supporting the Contra 
army, even when told that these acts would be characterized as illegal.88 Comparing public and 
private accounts of Reagan’s actions with the illicit behavior of his administration helps to 
display that his underlings were following Reagan’s orders.  
 The actions of Oliver North, Robert McFarlane, and William Casey are outlined to 
show that Reagan’s policies dictated their decisions. Oliver North was a key figure in forming 
the bank accounts to receive funding for the Contra army and remained a close advisor to the 
president until the affair was exposed. Oliver North’s behavior and documentation is evaluated to 
display that while North was partially responsible for keeping Reagan informed about the 
conflict in Nicaragua, he was fulfilling the president’s requests in his covert actions. North 
cannot be held responsible for fostering Reagan’s obsession.89 In November 1986, North was 
dismissed by President Reagan as he, “Helped created false and misleading chronologies about 
the Reagan administration’s secret arms sales to Iran.”90 Reagan chose to dismiss North and 
allowed him to take the blame rather than risk personal exposure and possible impeachment. 
While Congressional investigations in 1986 led to North’s dismissal, his 1988 indictment for 
conspiracy to defraud the government shows that his formulation of inaccurate chronologies 
began well before his interactions with Iran. North was convicted in 1989 after being found 
 
87 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 98-101. 
88 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 98-101. 
89 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 202-204. 
90 Shin, Annys. “When Oliver North Avoided Prison Time for His Role in the Iran-Contra Scandal.” The 
Washington Post, June 27, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/when-oliver-north-avoided-
prison-time-for-his-role-in-the-iran-contra-scandal/2018/06/22/c327bc6e-634c-11e8-99d2-
0d678ec08c2f_story.html.  
33 
 
 
guilty of destroying evidence and obstructing Congressional investigations.91 Because Reagan’s 
administration had accounted for the possibility of investigations into their illegal actions and 
documentation, Congress was unable to discover enough credible evidence to prove the 
president’s direct involvement in impeachable activities. 
 Robert McFarlane was Reagan’s National Security Advisor and was later named 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. McFarlane was born on July 12, 1937 in 
Washington, D.C. and served President Reagan from 1983 to 1985. McFarlane had a deep 
understanding of events in Nicaragua and was fully aware of the actions performed by members 
of the National Security Council (NSC). Robert McFarlane attempted to commit suicide in 1987, 
under suspicion of his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair, and pleaded guilty to four 
misdemeanors of withholding information from Congress before being pardoned by President 
George Bush in 1992.92 William J. Casey was born on March 13th, 1913 in Elmhurst, Queens, 
New York and was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for President Reagan 
between 1981 and 1987 and was directly involved in covert operations in Nicaragua.93 Casey 
was forced to resign in January 1987 when he discovered he had a brain tumor. He died later that 
year, in May 1987.  
Before it is possible to analyze the specific ways Reagan’s advisors supported his Central 
American policies with their false documentation, it is important to note the nature of these 
materials. North often conducted “shredding parties” where he disposed of sensitive or illicit 
 
91 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. "Oliver North". Encyclopedia Britannica, Oct. 3, 2022, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Oliver-North. 
92 Brown University (author omitted). “Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor .” Understanding the Iran-
Contra Affairs - the Legal Aftermath, 
https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-mcfarlane.php.  
93 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. "William J. Casey". Encyclopedia Britannica, May. 2, 2022, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-J-Casey.  
34 
 
 
files that might be used later to prove the administration’s involvement or wrongdoing.94 
Fortunately, some of the documents were closely monitored as part of the National Security 
Council’s protocol for classified documents. North’s deception was found when an investigator 
noticed the incorrect headings on a file from 1985. The heading had not been in use until 1986, 
alerting them to North’s forgeries. The following is an account of major events where Reagan’s 
underlings both alluded to the idea of continued Soviet influence in the region, and that they 
were making decisions without presidential approval.  
1981  
On December 4th, 1981, President Reagan signed an executive order stating that the CIA 
would be in charge of covert operations unless he dictated otherwise. By allowing the CIA to 
have apparent control over secret operations, Reagan was capable of claiming that he was not 
completely aware of all actions that they performed.  
1982- 1983 
The period between June of 1982 and October 1983 provides insight into the routes 
Reagan’s advisors took to create public support of current Central American policies. In June 
1982, Walter Raymond, Jr. was transferred from the CIA to the NSC but spoke with Casey about 
his intentions before accepting the new position. Casey approved of Raymond’s goal to create a 
“public diplomacy” capability that would allow the U.S. government to “wage the war of ideas.” 
Raymond would be promoted to special assistant to the president holding the responsibility of 
 
94 North, Oliver. “NSC, Memorandum from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane, ‘Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan 
Resistance," March 16, 1985 (Original and Altered Versions).” NSC, Memorandum from Oliver North to Robert 
McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," March 16, 1985 (Original and Altered Versions) | 
National Security Archive, National Security Archive , 1985, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16589-document-
01-nsc-memorandum-oliver-north.  
 
35 
 
 
public diplomacy affairs and director of international communication at the NSC on June 3, 
1983. One month later, on July 1, 1983, NSC advisor William Clark sent “Public Diplomacy 
(Central America)” to U.S. intelligence agencies claiming that the President expressed his 
concern to increase the understanding and support of the administration’s policies in both Central 
America and the United States. By early August 1983, William Casey had met with public 
relations experts in the push orchestrated by the CIA and the White House to, “Strive for the 
creation of a genuinely bipartisan, centrist structure to generate public support around the issue 
of Central America.”95 This corroborates Reagan’s change in policy and rhetoric to further 
bolster support. Robert McFarlane became the assistant to the president for National Security 
Affairs (NSA) on October 17, 1983 and would play a dominant role in creating false 
chronologies.  
1984 
 On June 25, 1984, the National Security Planning Group held a meeting where Casey 
appeared to validate the presence of a Soviet threat but the sources used by the advisors to come 
to this conclusion are unknown and not included.96 Casey estimated that there were 
approximately seven to eight thousand Cuban troops in Nicaragua at the time of the meeting and 
claimed that forty-five Nicaraguan pilots trained in the Soviet bloc had returned to Nicaragua. 
Casey’s information provided a perspective as to the pressure felt by Ronald Reagan in the 
period when he formed his public opinions for the best approach to the given issue. In this same 
June 25th meeting, Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated, “We need to hold Congress 
 
95 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 202-204. 
96 NSC Minutes. “NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, ‘Subject: Central America," June 25, 1984.” 
National Security Archive, 25 June 1984, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/22302-01-nsc-national-security-
planning-group-minutes.  
36 
 
 
accountable for not providing the resources needed to defend democracy. We should ask the 
Democrats whether they want a second Cuba.” This supported Reagan’s push against the 
Sandinistas throughout his re-election campaign as his advisors continued to make untrue claims 
about Soviet influence.  
Because Reagan was focused on continuing aid to the Contras by any means necessary, 
but could not be personally implicated, especially in writing, his advisors began to create 
documentation of their routes organizing funds from other sources. It became clear that going to 
outside countries for financial support for the Contras was a punishable offense, as described by 
Secretary of State Shultz on June 25, 1984. By the end of the meeting, President Reagan 
delivered his infamous quote,  “If such a story gets out, we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in 
front of the White House until we find out who did it.” Reagan’s clear understanding of the 
consequences of his illegal activities and his push to continue anyway, shows that he was not 
working to please his advisors but rather cared deeply about achieving his goals regardless of the 
implications.  
1985 
In the memorandum from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane, on March 16, 1985, 
“Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance,” North outlined his recommendations and 
requirements for a speech to be delivered by Reagan on April 2, 1985. North explained that 
Reagan must ask the American public to contribute funds to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters to 
support liberty and democracy in the Americas.97 North appeared to be dictating Reagan’s future 
actions by his supposed instruction to deliver a speech, while evidence has been shown that 
Reagan was in full control. North stated, “The name of one of several existing non-profit 
 
97 North, Fallback Plan for Nicaragua. 
37 
 
 
foundations we have established in the course of the last year will be changed to the Nicaraguan 
Freedom Fund. Several reliable American citizens must be contacted to serve as its corporate 
leadership on its board of directors along with the principle leadership of the Nicaraguan armed 
and unarmed resistance.”98 While this information helps to display the ways in which North 
created paths to hide Reagan’s intentions, it remains clear that he was aligned with the 
president’s wishes by finding specific ways to continue aiding to the anti-Sandinista movement. 
North was clearly very important in the planning that occurred when President Reagan 
attempted to gain public monetary support for the Contras. The casual nature of creating 
organizations without Congressional approval to carry out the wishes of the President displays 
the types of critical, national issues where Oliver North appeared to make decisions or have 
unchecked influence. It is clear that North had full knowledge and awareness of the requirements 
to uphold aid to the Contras, but his decision to seek outside legal counsel is considerably more 
useful to show his involvement in protecting President Reagan. On March 16, 1985, North wrote, 
“Informal contact several months ago with a lawyer sympathetic to our cause indicated that such 
a procedure would be within the limits of the law. Fred Fielding should be asked to conduct a 
very private evaluation of the President’s role in making such a request.”99 North did not include 
any indication as to what the President’s request was, which corroborates the finding that he 
could not implicate Reagan in any way.  
1986 
 
98 North, Fallback Plan for Nicaragua. 
99 Owen, Robert. “Memorandum from ‘TC ’(Robert Owen) to ‘BG ’(Oliver North), ‘Update, ’February 10, 1986.” 
National Security Archive, February 10, 1986. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16592-document-04-
memorandum-tc-robert-owen-bg.  
38 
 
 
 The American public became aware of the connection between the exchange of arms 
for hostages in Iran and the illicit military aid that was sent to the Contra army in Nicaragua on 
November 25, 1986. Attorney General Edward Meese exposed the “diversion memo” written by 
North earlier that spring in 1986, where it was described that residual funds from the sale of U.S. 
weaponry to Iran was sent to support the covert actions in Nicaragua. Reagan was aware of and 
authorized all shipments of arms to Iran and subsequently watched as his underlings spun a cover 
story to prevent him from taking the fall. “It was the need to conceal the illegal November 1985 
shipments, and protect the president from the impeachable offense of knowingly violating the 
law, that created a panic within the administration in November 1986.”100 As the Iran-Contra 
Affair began to come to light, Reagan’s advisors, including Casey, McFarlane, and North, 
formed false chronologies. While this work is not intended to prove that the President had 
specific knowledge of these illegal shipments to Iran, the clear manipulation by Reagan’s 
underlings to distract from the president helps to shed light on their ability to control the public 
perception of Reagan’s involvement.  
1989 
In the Congressional questioning that occurred in 1989, Oliver North claimed that he was 
following the instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, and Deputy National Security Advisor, John Poindexter in 
his illegal activities.101 However, North testified that he believed the President had been aware of 
the diversion, supporting the finding that Reagan was in control of his underlings and they were 
acting upon his wishes. “It was the President’s policy—not an isolated attempt by Oliver North 
 
100 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal. 
101 Liman, Arthur. “Hostile Witness.” The Washington Post, August 16, 1998. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/irancontra/contra3.htm.  
39 
 
 
or Poindexter—to sell arms secretly to Iran and to maintain the Contras despite Congressional 
prohibitions, forming the conclusion that Reagan bears the ultimate responsibility.”102 North 
argued that he was following the advice of fellow members of the administration to attempt to 
offshore some of the blame without placing it on the president.   
 
102 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal. 
 
40 
 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
While scholars have long debated about the causes and origins of Reagan’s obsession 
with Nicaragua, this study finds that Reagan’s obsession stemmed from his ultimate goal of 
being perceived as strong by the Soviet Union and by the American public. Reagan was not 
obsessed with combating the Sandinistas as he proposed, but used this intervention to gain a 
different reputation from his predecessor who had been portrayed as weak for his wavering 
loyalties to Nicaraguan leadership. Reagan went into the Presidency refusing to be categorized as 
a weak leader by the choices he made in Central America after he was publicly attacked by the 
Maryknoll Sisters and other religious figures before his inauguration. He shows his obsession 
with being perceived as strong in four ways. First, this obsession is displayed by his desire to 
hide his lack of religious commitment which would have questioned his moral credibility. 
Second, it is present in his critiques of religious leaders who questioned him, to ensure his 
conservative Christian base supported his policies in Nicaragua. Third, his obsession is clear in 
his portrayal of a lasting Soviet communist threat even after Soviet aid had diminished in order 
to appeal to a wider base who he knew hated the Soviet Union. Lastly, this obsession is proved in 
Reagan’s instructions to his underlings to create a paper trail, where they upheld his public 
claims and appeared to make decisions without his approval to avoid possible impeachment if his 
true intentions were ever to be discovered. Because Reagan had full awareness and approved of 
all activities in Nicaragua, this thesis argues that Reagan’s underlings were acting in the interest 
of the President, not for their own personal goals. If Reagan had regressed in his intervention in 
Nicaragua and changed his policies once he had been re-elected, he would have directly 
contradicted years of statements stressing the importance of combating the threat in Nicaragua. 
This would have painted him in the same negative light as Carter who had changed his policies. 
41 
 
 
This is why Reagan appeared to be obsessed with Nicaragua, when in reality, his obsession was 
derived from his desire to be perceived as a strong leader who had thwarted any impending 
threats. This study helps to display the abuse of power of our leaders in the United States and 
highlights the importance of being skeptical of those with great influence. By focusing on this 
issue, I hope to encourage the next generation of scholars and voters to question their elected 
officials to see if their actions and motivations are honest, and if they are genuinely working in 
the best interest of their constituents. If we create a pattern of holding our leaders accountable, 
we become one step closer to creating a government that is run by the people, for the people. 
 
42 
 
 
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