EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:
FRAMES AND POWER IN POLITICS
by
STEVEN BARRY ROTHMAN
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Department ofPolitical Science
and the Graduate School ofthe University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements
for the degree of
Doctor ofPhilosophy
September 2009
11
University of Oregon Graduate School
Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by:
Steven Rothman
Title:
"Explaining the International Agenda: Frames and Power in Politics"
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for
the degree in the Department ofPolitical Science by:
Ronald Mitchell, Chairperson, Political Science
Craig Parsons, Member, Political Science
Lars Skalnes, Member, Political Science
Jean Stockard, Outside Member, Planning Public Policy & Mgmt
and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean ofthe Graduate
School for the University of Oregon.
September 5, 2009
Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University ofOregon
Libraries.
111
An Abstract ofthe Dissertation of
Steven B. Rothman for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy
in the Department ofPolitical Science to be taken September 2009
Title: EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: FRAMES AND POWER IN
POLITICS
Approved:
Ronald B. Mitchell
The use ofrhetoric to frame policy issues often influences the amount ofattention
countries pay to international issues and the level ofsupport for those issues. Often,
domestic and international actors present different descriptions ofpolicy issues in order to
advance their own views and change the international agenda. Despite frequent attempts to
change the international agenda and the importance ofagendas for policy formation, our
understanding ofthe factors that contribute to why particular issues get international
attention is limited. This project develops a theoretical understanding ofthe development
ofthe international agenda, how issues on that agenda are framed, and why agendas change
over time. The project contributes to international relations theory by understanding the
factors responsible for increasing attention to issues, and the factors that influence how
states define the problems on the international agenda that may eventually become part of
international treaties and organizations. The project redefines agendas through a
IV
constructivist approach where individuals interpret real phenomena through frames.
Rhetoric's influence on agenda changes described in this project also demonstrates a
mechanism through which the soft power ofattraction changes international outcomes.
The project takes a positivist approach to analyzing constructivist and realist causes of
agenda changes. The project tests specific implications ofthese theories ofinternational
agenda development and issue framing by examining the case ofinternational efforts to
address whaling. The project demonstrates the importance ofpolarity in enabling changes
in attention from security to non-security issues and the importance ofrhetoric in causing
changes in issue frames.
v
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Steven Barry Rothman
PLACE OF BIRTH: Buffalo, New York
DATE OF BIRTH: May 14,1977
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
University ofDelaware, Newark, Delaware
DEGREES AWARDED:
Doctor ofPhilosophy, Political Science, September 2009, University of Oregon
Master of Science, Political Science, 2006, University ofOregon
Bachelor ofArts, Political Science and Economics, 1999, University ofDelaware
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
International Relations
Research Design and Methodology
Decision Making
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Instructor, University ofOregon, Eugene, 2007-2009
Research Assistant, University ofOregon, Eugene, 2007-2008
Teaching Assistant, University of Oregon, Eugene, 2006-2008
Research Project Manager, Ronald B. Mitchell, Eugene, Oregon 2004-2007
Program Coordinator and Academic Advisor, Office ofInternational Affairs,
University of Oregon, Eugene, 2004
VI
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Rozanne Enerson Junker Scholarship Award, University of Oregon, 2007, 2008
Charles A. Reed Graduate Fellowship Award, University of Oregon, 2008
John L. and Naomi M. Luvaas Fellowship in Arts and Sciences, University of
Oregon, 2006-2007
Institute on Qualitative Research Methods Fellowship, University ofOregon,
2006
PUBLICATIONS:
Duggan, E., & Rothman, S. B. (2008, Feb 3). Peak oil: Will we see it coming? Register
Guard, p. B3,
Rothman, S. B. (2008). Comparatively evaluating potential dissertation and thesis
projects. PS: Political Science & Politics, 41(2),367-369.
Rothman, S. B. (2007). Understanding data quality through reliability: A comparison of
data reliability assessment from three treaty datasets. International Studies
Review, 9(3),437-456.
Mitchell, R. B., & Rothman, S. B. (2007). International agreement coding manual:
Formatted for coders, trainers, and trainees (version 1.0). from
http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/CodingManual.Vl.pdf
VB
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project benefited from the extremely valuable assistance and advice from my
dissertation committee: Ronald Mitchell, Lars Skalnes, Craig Parsons, Jean Stockard, and
Bob O'Brien. I would specifically like to thank Jean Stockard for her generosity and
flexibility. I am especially grateful to Ronald Mitchell for his tolerance, patience,
constant engagement, rapid responses, and valuable critical feedback to improve all my
work and advancement in academia. I would not have been as successful without Ron's
instrumental feedback and willingness to serve as my mentor, critic, and advisor. I also
appreciate the help John Orbell has provided, his always valuable support, and advice on
navigating the complexities of academia.
Various conference panelists and anonymous reviewers provided important
feedback for this project. I appreciate assistance from the presenters at the Institute on
Qualitative Research Methods, Frank Alcock, Jennifer Bailey, Elizabeth Bloodgood,
Michael Cairo, Charli Carpenter, Charles Chester, Anne Marie Clark, Michael Dyer,
Charlotte Epstein, Christopher Gore, William Muck, Kate O'Neill, MJ Peterson, Jack
Porter, Stuart Shulman, Joshua Stapel, DG Webster, Inger Weibust, others on the GEP 
ED listserv, and the graduate students and faculty at the University of Oregon.
I would also like to give gratitude to my family who have listened to my
monologues on frames and constructions with skepticism and helped me clarify my
argumentation. Finally, I express my deepest appreciation to Reiko, without whom I
V111
would have never had the strength and will to complete this project, for all her sacrifices
and assistance to make this project possible.
In Memory ofNathan Rothman
IX
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Why Is the International Agenda Important? 6
Why Are Frames and Non-State Actors Important? 14
Project Methodology...... 16
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND ISSUE
FRAMES 25
What Is the International Agenda? ." 26
Defining Issue Importance 32
J\Jumber of States 33
Strength ofStates 35
Depth of Concern 36
What Is an Issue? 39
What Are Frames? 42
Frame Types: Umecognized, Contested, and Dominant.... 46
What Is the Content of Frames? 50
Conclusions 58
III. CAUSES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 60
Why Does the International Agenda Change? 62
Material Causes of Changes in the International Agenda 63
Issue Importance and State Interest 64
Power Distribution and Contestation and Dominance over the
International Agenda 68
Rhetorical Causes of Changes in the International Agenda 71
Blame and Causal Characteristics 73
Victimization and Consequence Characteristics 74
International Exposure 76
Chapter
Rhetoric Content ..
Strategic Use ofRhetoric and Rhetorical Entrepreneurs ..
Conclusions .
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: ISSUE
EMERGENCE .
International Attention to Whaling .
On and Offthe Agenda (1500 - 1944) ..
Sustained Interest in Whaling (1944 - 2008) .
Material Hypotheses .
Security Issues Dominate the International Agenda .
Non-Material Hypotheses .
Naming and Blaming .
Naming and Victimization .
Timing and Magnitude ..
Conclusions .
V. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: FRAME
CHANGES .
International Whaling Frames .
Whaling Exploitation Frame .
Whaling Management Frame ..
Whaling Preservation Frame .
Material Hypotheses .
Non-Material Hypotheses .
Exposure .
Connections to Discourse and Culture .
Completeness .
Rh t . 1M . l' S .
e onca anlpu atIon trategles ..
Conclusions .
Xl
Page
83
88
103
108
109
110
118
118
121
125
126
136
139
143
146
146
148
154
158
161
164
165
170
174
176
179
xu
Chapter Page
VI. SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS 182
Contributions to International Agenda Research........................................ 183
Understanding Changes in the International Agenda 187
Changes in Issue Attention on the Agenda 187
Changes in Frames 190
Rhetoric as a Mechanism of Soft Power Influence 195
Some Caveats ofthis Project 199
After the Moratorium 202
Further Questions...................................................................................... 205
APPEl\TDICES 210
A. NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DATA 210
B. GOOGLE NEWS SEARCH DATA . 225
REFERENCES 227
Xlll
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Issue Concept Diagram 52
2. International Whaling Commission Membership 119
3. States and Whaling in the New York Times 130
4. Country Specific Blame Sparklines (1920-1946, 2 year intervals) 131
5. Percentage of Country Blame in the New York Times 134
6. Country Specific Blame Spark1ines (1970-1980, 2 year intervals) 135
7. Whaling Quotas and the Moratorium 161
XIV
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Sample Illustration ofDominant Frames in International Politics .. 48
2. Examples of Causes and Consequences ofthe 2003 Iraq War 56
3. Summary ofAgenda Changes for Whaling 120
4. World Power Polarity and the International Agenda 123
5. Frame Changes in Whaling 148
6. Whaling Contestation and Polarity 162
7. Frequency of Whaling Articles in the New York Times by Decade 211
8. New York Times Article Data 211
9. Codes for Non-State Actors ofInterest in New Yark Times Text 224
10. Google News Search Article Count (1920-] 946, 2-Year Intervals)........... 225
11. Google News Search Article Count (1970-1980, 2-Year Intervals)........... 226
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What accounts for the emergence of some issues on the international agenda and
not others? Why does a given issue emerge when it does, rather than earlier or later?
What accounts for changes in perceptions ofan issue on the international agenda? At any
time, a large number ofinternational issues compete for attention from governments,
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations or advocacy groups.
We see news ofdeclining polar bear populations, potential water shortages, conflict in
Afghanistan, genocide in Sudan, North Korea nuclear tests, and many other issues.
Sometimes these issues attract a great deal of attention from advocacy groups,
international organizations, or states, and other times these issues are virtually ignored by
one or all ofthese actors. Before 1970, the international community paid very little
attention to issues ofenvironmental protection, yet today, it is one ofthe more prominent
issues on the international agenda with approximately 961 international treaties, ofwhich
approximately 76% were created after 1970 (Mitchell, 2003a). Violence in Burundi
between Rutu and Tutsi in 1972 received very little attention from the international
community, but similar violence between Rutu and Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 received
worldwide attention eventually leading to a declaration of genocide and the formation of
an international criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the violence.
Even when issues appear on the agenda, actors may perceive them very
differently. In 2003, the United States and the Coalition ofthe Willing invaded Iraq with
2
the intention ofchanging the regime and ousting sitting head ofstate, Saddam Hussein.
Much ofthe world looked at the events leading up to the second Iraq conflict in 2003
with very different eyes. The United States saw a rogue regime, frequently defying
international sanctions and resolutions placed by the UN prohibiting weapons ofmass
destruction. Some European states saw a weak Iraqi regime in need ofmore time to
demonstrate its willingness to abide by rules ofthe international community. The
account by the United States changed several times as descriptions moved from a state
developing weapons ofmass destruction, to a state that had the potential for weapons of
mass destruction, and eventually to an oppressive regime. Sometimes, as in the case of
Iraq, perceptions ofthe issue change over time or differ between actors. Other times
actors might agree on perceptions ofinternational issues but differ in their attention to
such issues.
This project seeks to understand the factors responsible for changes in the
international agenda. Two aspects ofthe international agenda require explanation: issue
importance and issue perception. To explain issue importance and issue emergence this
project uses variables such as polarity and concern over security and the use ofrhetoric to
influence perceived issue importance. These variables are rooted in materialist and
constructivist theories from international relations combined with theories from the social
movement literature.
As part ofunderstanding why issues become part ofthe international agenda, this
project seeks to understand the influence ofrhetoric and words on the international
3
agenda. Can words influence state interest in international issues, creating interest or
increasing importance ofissues? Can words influence perceptions ofissues on the
international agenda? Under what conditions might words successfully change issue
perception or issue importance for states? The project tests theories ofrhetorical
influence on the international agenda through changes in frames by examining both
material and non-material variables on the case of efforts to address whaling from the
1500s through 2008.
This project shows that both material and non-material variables influence the
international agenda in different ways. Material factors better explain changes in issue
emergence on the international agenda and the ebb and flow of attention toward
international issues over time. Whaling emerged on the international agenda when it
involved security concerns for states or when states were under less threat in a bipolar or
unipolar international system. Polarity acts as an enabling cause, allowing non-security
issues to emerge onto the international agenda when larger states provide some security
to smaller states. Non-material, rhetorical, variables influence the perception of issues on
the international agenda more than material factors. The perception ofwhaling
transitioned twice in the periods between 1930 and 1946 and between 1970 and 1982.
Some factors that contribute to perception change involve international exposure ofthe
rhetoric, connections to a broader culture or discourse, and the particular rhetorical
manipulation strategies used by international actors.
4
The project proceeds in the rest ofthe introduction chapter to describe why
international issue emergence is an important area ofstudy because of its role in
generating international policy and international treaties. The chapter also reviews
research by other scholars attempting to understand international agenda formation and
describes the differences between this project and other research. The introduction
describes the project's methodological approach and the use of"frames" as a perspective
toward gaining insight into issue perceptions.
After the introduction, Chapter II defines the international agenda in terms ofboth
issue attention and issue perceptions. The chapter utilizes definitions from research on
domestic agendas, constructivism, and the social movement research on frames to
develop a new definition ofthe international agenda and measurement ofchanges in the
agenda. To summarize the chapter briefly, the international agenda is defined by issues
ofsome concern to more than one state. This concern is measured by the number of
states, the strength ofthose states, and the depth oftheir concern for the issue. Issues
consist ofcomplex interpretations ofreality and constructed perceptions by different
actors. This project refers to these perceptions as frames. Frames highlight or hide
specific characteristics ofthe issue, which can influence policies proposed and accepted
for addressing the international issue. Therefore, the international agenda consists of
issues that states perceive as important and their perceptions ofthose issues. Changes on
the international agenda can occur through changes in either aspect ofthe international
agenda.
5
Chapter III discuses the theoretical causes of changes in the international agenda.
The chapter divides these causes into material and non-material influences just as one
might divide international relations theory more generally into realist and constructivist
theories (Copeland, 2000; Sterling-Folker, 2002).1 The realist causes involve state
security and polarity in determining the importance of different issues on the international
agenda. Realist factors theoretically influence the degree of contestation over frames
(issue perception) and issue attention (issue emergence). Non-material factors, based on
the influence ofrhetoric, theoretically increase issue attention by blaming states or
describing them as victims. Non-material factors can also influence the perception of
issues through international exposure, connections to a broader discourse and culture, and
by containing a complete issue frame. Finally, different strategies of rhetoric
manipulation may influence the acceptability ofpolicy prescriptions and influence issue
importance.
Chapter IV and Chapter V empirically analyze the theoretical causes developed in
Chapter III on the case of whaling between 1500 and 2008. The two chapters divide the
empirical analysis based on the two potential changes in the dependent variable. Chapter
IV examines theoretical causes of issue attention; issue emergence and change of issue
importance on the agenda. In particular, Chapter IV analyzes the influence ofpolarity on
security concerns for states relative to non-security issues and the influence ofrhetoric on
1 Scholars have divided international relations theories in a variety ofways including the one used
in this chapter. (See Carlsnaes, Simmons, & Risse-Kappen, 2002; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001; Viotti &
Kauppi, 1999).
6
issue attention. Chapter V examines the influence ofpolarity on frame contestation and
rhetoric, international exposure, connections to discourse, and rhetoric completeness on
changes in frames (issue perception). Chapters V and VI do not attempt to explain all the
changes that occurred in regards to the whaling issue. Instead, these chapters focus only
on aspects relevant to the theoretically derived hypotheses tested in those chapters.
Chapter VI concludes the dissertation by summarizing the primary observations in the
dissertation and identifying extension ofthis research to other areas of international
relations.
WHY IS THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA IMPORTANT?
As part ofthe public policy process, getting an issue on the agenda is the first step
toward generating public or international law. The process ofdefining a problem or an
international issue is an important part ofthe policy making process. Although there are
a number ofways to define the steps in the policy making process, it can generally be
grouped into four stages: (1) agenda-setting and problem defining; (2) policy formation;
(3) polity implementation; (4) policy review and assessment (1. E. Anderson, 2006;
Kingdon, 2003, pp. 2-3). In the first stage, the issue must gain enough attention to
warrant the expense and time ofdeveloping policy alternatives in the second stage. Only
when an issue has become part of the agenda can policy makers begin generating possible
policies to address the issue. In the second stage, states create policies through
negotiations among which actors choose a policy through voting or other decision 
making process. The perception ofthe issue directly influences the content ofthe
7
policies fonnulated in the second stage.
2
The third stage involves the provision of
material resources in order to move the policy plan into action. Sometimes this involves
the provision ofmoney or personnel who act on the policy generated in stage 2. Finally,
stage 4 ofthe policy process involves policy assessment, where actors may audit the
effects of a policy in order to determine the success or failure.
A large number ofscholars have documented the relative effectiveness of
different institutions and treaty designs in stage 4 (Bernauer, 1995; Grundmann, 1998; R.
O. Keohane & Levy, 1996; Mitchell, 2002, 2003c; O. R. Young, 1999; O. R. Young &
Levy, 1999). There is less much less research on why issues become important for
international actors. This first step in the policy making process is under-researched in
international environmental politics research (Clark, Jager, & van Eijndhoven, 2001) and
international relations theory more generally (Livingston, 1992, p. 313).
Many studies in agenda-setting in environmental politics consist of case studies
that explain the emergence of a particular issue on the international agenda without
systematic theoretically based examinations of issue development. Examples ofthese
case studies involve efforts ofcooperation between East and West Europe (Darst, 2001),
protection ofthe ozone layer (Parson, 1993), international fisheries management
(Peterson, 1993), or pesticides management in developing countries (Paarlberg, 1993).
These studies set out to understand the dimensions ofregulation and management of a
2 See also Jervis (1976) and Suh (2005) on the importance of perception for international politics
outside ofenvironmental politics.
8
particular set of international issues. Although issue development is an important part of
the story for each issue, these studies do not examine the causes of issue development and
agenda formation systematically, because the studies do not focus on understanding
agenda formation specifically.
Because agenda formation and problem defining occur in the first stage ofpolicy
formation, the first stage naturally affects the subsequent policy stages. In the most basic
sense, if an issue does not appear on the agenda, then policy makers cannot formulate
policies in the second stage and cannot implement policies in the third. Many issues
discussed by international actors never become part ofthe international agenda, and we
often do not hear of such issues unless they become part ofthe agenda. For example,
several years before the adoption of conferences and treaties on landmines, protection of
child soldiers, and protection of whales, advocates discussed these issues without much,
if any, involvement from states. Some issues, such as banning landmine use were
discussed among private actors and non-governmental actors before states began to pay
attention to the issue (Cameron, Lawson, & Tomlin, 1998).
Public choice scholars have a long history of documenting the importance of
agenda-setting for determining outcomes through game theoretic and other analyses
leading one scholar to label agenda control, "the supreme instrument ofpower"
(Schattschneider, 1975). At the heart ofthis research, Arrow first developed an
understanding ofhow different agendas can produce multiple outcomes given specific
voting rules and specific preferences among the voters (1963). Depending on the pairing
9
of agenda items when votes occur, multiple outcomes are possible. Those who control
the items on the agenda can control the outcome ofpolicy formation in certain settings.
Agenda-setting in Arrow's study amounts to deciding which policies appear on the
agenda, and where they appear in the voting structure. Whoever controls the formation
ofthe voting agenda can control the outcomes ofthose votes ifthey have some
understanding ofthe general preferences ofthe voting population. The importance of
setting the agenda for influencing the outcomes expanded in the public choice literature
through work by other scholars. The long tradition ofthis scholarship demonstrated that
outcomes could be manipulated through the agenda-setting process (McKelvey, 1976), by
introducing amendments onto legislation (Enelow, 1981), and manipulation under
different institutional rules (Riker, 1986).
Other scholars highlight the importance ofinternational agendas. There are a
large number of international institutions which have some policy making power that can
influence states, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Trade
Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and others. All ofthese
organizations have internal rules regarding who may be present at meetings, who may
speak, and when issues may be brought up to the institution. Some ofthese organizations
have rules that allow any member to speak on any topic, such as the General Assembly of
the United Nations, designed primarily as a forum for communication between nations.
Others may severely limit those who may speak at the meetings, such as the United
Nations Security Council.
10
Some scholars have examined agenda-setting in these formal international
institutions. Joachim (2007), for example, examines the formation ofthe UN agenda on
gender and reproductive rights, and the role ofNGO's in moving gender and reproductive
rights to the center ofthe UN agenda. Joachim shows the importance ofnon 
governmental organizations (NGO's) and advocacy groups to strategically frame their
issue in order to increase attention to women's rights within the UN. Joachim identifies
factors that are important to influencing the UN agenda, such as access to influential
actors within the UN that can help alter the institutional agenda. Carpenter also examines
agenda-setting within the context of formal institutions, such as within the UN (2003), or
within an advocacy group (2005, 2007). Carpenter shows the importance of strategic
framing for agendas within advocacy groups or within institutional contexts, highlighting
the influence of advocacy groups over the institutional agenda, rather than a focus on
NGD's. Scholars have examined agenda-setting and power within the new European
institutions (Peter, 2003; Tsebelis, 1997). Given the structure ofthe European Union
(EU) decision-making process, scholars attempt to understand the influences of different
offices over agendas within the EU, such as the rotating presidency and the European
Parliament. Finally, scholars have examined the international agenda as a foreign policy
agenda within the domestic US political system (Wood & Peake, 1998). A number of
studies have been done examining policy agenda-setting within the US institutional
context and Wood adds to the studies of agenda formation for the US foreign policy
agenda. Wood describes the importance ofpresidential power to influence the agenda,
11
but also the importance ofmedia and international factors out ofthe control ofUnited
States actors.
. These studies all describe the importance ofagenda-setting power for
international relations theory as they focus on particular actors or international
institutions. Although all ofthese research studies produce valuable theory toward
understanding agenda-setting within international institutional contexts, none have
attempted to understand the processes of agenda-setting directly without a formal
international institutional agenda to proxy the place ofthe international agenda. These
previous studies point out the importance offraming, focusing events, international
power distribution, and the media for the development ofinternational agendas, but focus
primarily within formal institutions. In addition, several ofthese studies focus
particularly on specific international actors, such as NGO's (Joachim, 2007) or advocacy
groups (Carpenter, 2007). Rather than focusing on particular actors in the international
system, this project examines the resources that influence the international agenda. Any
actor with the available resources can potentially use these resources to influence the
agenda, whether they are states, NGO's, or advocacy groups. Some actors may have
more available resources than other actors, so focusing on the variables in this project
allows scholars to extrapolate to actor influence in other research.
Some ofthese studies, such as the EU studies primarily focus on formal agenda 
setting power, such as the right to set procedural agendas or the structure ofissue
appearance on the agenda (Pollack, 1997). While the formal agenda-setting powers are
12
important for understanding how issues become part ofthe international agenda, so are
the informal agenda-setting powers that describe the ability to frame issues differently.
Several studies described above, including those by Carpenter and Joachim incorporate
these informal powers. The discussions on informal agenda-setting resemble what has
also been called the prenegotiation stage of international treaty formation, where actors
define the problem and come to a common understanding before policies are discussed
(Stein, 1989). The prenegotiation stage, as defined by Stein, begins after the issue has
become important for states, and thus has already become part ofthe international
agenda. Young defines the prenegotiation stage similarly to agenda formation, as "the
process through which an issue initially finds its way onto the international agenda, gets
defined or framed... and reaches a sufficiently prominent place on the agenda to justify...
explicit negotiations" (0. Young, 1994, p. 83). Young's definition ofprenegotiation
resembles the use ofagenda formation described in this project, although the definition
differs slightly, described later in Chapter II.
Another study examines the specific issue movement from seemingly no frame to
one that describes an issue as a "global environmental risk" (Schreurs, Clark, Dickson, &
Jager, 2001). The study documents the changes in issue attention and definition ofthe
problem, two dimensions ofthe agenda (discussed in Chapter II), for three environmental
issues: acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate change. The study maintains the centrality
of science for all three cases and asks when the cases might become important for policy
makers due to the influence ofthe environmental threat and other variables (Schreurs et
13
al.,2001). Other studies as well, maintain the central authority ofscientific information
as truth in formulations ofthe international agenda or the reason behind the importance of
a particular issue (Crane, 1993; Levy, 1993). Although science may be an important
aspect ofissue defining or agenda formation, reification ofscientific information neglects
the importance ofmanipulations ofscientific information based on the scope conditions
and uncertainty. Ignoring the potential for manipulation of scientific information leaves a
gap in the literature regarding the ability ofinternational actors to influence the agenda
through rhetorical manipulations.
This project adds to this previous work in several ways. First, this project takes a
broader perspective in looking at international issue emergence from a theoretical
perspective before examining empirical cases. In general, the studies above take a data 
centered inductive approach to understanding issue emergence and problem defining.
This project examines the theories that may influence the international agenda and derive
hypotheses first before they are examined in the context ofan empirical case.
Second, this project does not assume the truth ofscience like many studies in
environmental politics including those above (in particular, Social Learning Group,
2001). Scientific information is manipulable, just as other information, and is defined by
scope conditions and differing levels ofuncertainty. Since actors may manipulate
scientific information in attempts to change the international agenda, this project does not
privy one type ofinformation or manipulation over others.
14
Third, this project contributes to international relations research by examining a
case with sufficient variation in agenda and problem definition to determine the influence
ofdifferent variables over time. In the case studies discussed above, the variation
consists ofa single change in the dependent variable - the issue moves onto the
international agenda with a specific frame (in particular, Carpenter, 2007; Joachim,
2007). In the global environmental risk study, the three issues examined do not exhibit
enough variation between them to discern the causes ofagenda attention (Schreurs et aI.,
2001). Instead, the three issues all exhibit similar variation in attention. The issue
emerge onto the agenda at similar times, suggesting a single cause or issue linkages to
make them essentially a single case (Schreurs et aI., 2001).
WHY ARE FRAMES AND NON-STATE ACTORS IMPORTANT?
In addition to the importance of agendas for the creation ofpolicies, non-state
actors have greater access to international policy using non-material resources in the
agenda-setting stage. Non-state actors have much greater influence over international
politics when non-military or monetary resources may influence outcomes. Non-state
actors, such as advocacy groups, may strategically present information, use media
resources, create grass-roots movements, and use domestic institutions to influence the
international agenda (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Politicians, advocates, and those in the
news media pay a great deal ofattention to the words they use when describing
international events and opinions. Politicians offer carefully crafted speeches to the
public, prepared by hired speechwriters and authors. Countries sometimes even hire
15
public relations firms to present positive images oftheir country abroad (Manheim &
Albritton, 1982).
There are a number of cases where advocates, scholars, or politicians attempt to
change the way we think about issues in international politics through rhetoric,
symbolism, images, and protests. International relations work in this area is relatively
new and challenges the realist paradigm that does not rely on constructivist international
relations theory. In order to understand how words or ideas may shape outcomes, we
must start with the constructivist perspective ofinternational politics.
Under a constructivist view, non-material factors, such as ideas, words, norms,
and identities can influence outcomes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Some variants of
constructivism assume there are no objective facts in our social world and perhaps
extending to the physical world as well (Zehfuss, 2002), while other forms assume the
presence of both material and non-material factors (Hacking, 1999; Wendt, 1995). This
project takes the perspective that there are real objective events in the world, yet non 
material factors, such as ideas and identities, cloud our understanding ofthose events.
Furthermore, the project takes the position that these ideas and identities can change, thus
changing the perceptions and understandings ofthe world. Different actors in the
international system often contest and argue about these ideas, which constitute the
interpretation ofthe real world. Therefore, rhetoric, as part ofthis contestation, becomes
a tool for change in international politics.
16
Research on the manipulation ofideas through rhetoric has been the subject ofa
large body ofresearch outside international relations scholarship. Research on the
development of social movements, media influence over politics, and even psychological
studies on decision-making have made the influence of rhetoric a centerpiece of their
work. Much ofthis work refers to the act ofusing rhetoric to change outcomes as
"framing," where individuals describe real events in ways to manipulate how others think
about those events (Goffman, 1974). Although this project abandons the use ofthe word
"framing" in order to distinguish the frame (what is believed) from the rhetoric (the tool
to change what people believe), research on framing provides a wealth of literature
applicable to understanding the influence ofrhetoric on international politics. Chapter II
defines frames in much more detail.
This project contributes to the literature on agenda-setting theories by showing the
value of using frames as a perspective from which we can understand the influence of
rhetoric and ideas in international relations. The project develops theory in Chapters II
and III based on research from social movements and framing, but adapted to the
international environment rather than domestic social movements.
PROJECT METHODOLOGY
One of the difficulties with conducting research into a relatively new or
unexplored area ofinternational politics, such as international agenda formation, involves
the lack of quantified data for analysis. Without enough data, some methodological
approaches become extremely difficult or impossible. Without sufficient data,
17
quantitative statistical methodologies require the creation ofa large data set. Creating a
large data-set properly (one that is reliable and valid) requires significant resources in
both time and money (Rothman, 2007). Many times creating large-n data sets are beyond
the means ofa single researcher for a new project.
In order to conduct research on the international agenda in this project using
quantitative large-n statistical analyses, a significant amount ofdata are required. First,
the project needs data to describe the issue, attention to the issue (number of states, depth
ofstate interest, and strength of states) over time for a given population ofissues. In
addition, this project would require data on the dominant interpretation (frame) and the
changes in the frames over time for each issue. A dataset for this project would consist of
each row or case defined by an issue/year. The dependent variable measurement consists
ofattention to the issue and the frame, resulting in two dependent variables. Each of
which contains three parts identifying the dimensions ofthe dependent variable. It is not
clear how one would combine these three dimensions into a single quantity for analysis,
which could create six potential dependent variables. In addition, each independent
variable consists ofpolarity, available from other scholars, and rhetoric, which requires
textual analysis. The simplest form oftextual analysis simply counts words or texts,
which this project uses to develop some quantified data on the rhetoric used before
changes in frames and issue attention. The use ofnewspapers to evaluate issue attention
fits well with general policy attention to issues (Schreurs et al., 2001). In addition, the
attention discovered in a single news source may be very similar across different major
18
newspapers in different countries. This project utilizes the New Yark Times as a proxy
for major international newspapers. Although papers may vary in content at a precise
level ofcontent analysis, general issue attention may be similar across different
international papers (Schreurs et aI., 2001). In addition, New York Times articles are
available earlier than most other newspapers extending back as early as 1851.
However, frames are not simply the quantity ofwords, but an interpretation of
some real phenomenon. This interpretation requires more than counting. Creating
reliable and valid data using good measurement procedures requires substantial
resources, and high reliability for texts may require repeated revisions ofcoding
procedures. Some observations are inherently difficult to measure and may never
achieve even a moderate level ofreliability. Finally, as discovered through this research,
issue attention and frames do not change each year. Because changes do not occur often,
even with a large number of issue/year rows most years resemble the previous year and
result in little variation within each issue. This means data for a large number ofissues
are needed in order to conduct quantitative statistical analyses.
To avoid the difficulty of conducting quantitative statistical analysis on agenda
changes and the quantification offrames, this project relies on qualitative methods with
some quantification when possible and appropriate. Without the appropriate amount of
data, researchers utilize qualitative methods, with tools to work with a small number of
observations. The rejection ofquantitative methods does not imply that these methods
19
are not without merit, but only that they are inappropriate where a large data set is not
present.
Qualitative methods provide several benefits for this project. First, these methods
allow for studying a small number of cases, so substantial resources are not needed for
the creation oflarge datasets. Qualitative analyses are used from single case studies
(Bennett, 2004) to medium case studies (Ragin, 1987). Second, qualitative methods
allow for interpretations ofdiscourse and texts that are more difficult under requirements
of quantification (Weimer, 1998). Although the system for creating data in this project
uses an "expert" coding system (Rothman, 2007), such that data are created by the
researcher only, expert coding allows for greater validity and expert interpretation ofthe
data potentially sacrificing some reliability. Third, qualitative methodologies allow
greater attention to the details ofspecific cases. While quantitative measurements may
lose some information when moving from non-numerical information to quantified
information, qualitative methodologies allow for textual data without losing as much
information in the quantification process (Mitchell & Rothman, 2006).
Both quantitative and qualitative methods permit a positivist approach, such that
they are concerned with causal theories and hypotheses testing (Lin, 1998). In a desire to
generalize theories beyond this project, the project takes a positivist approach to
understanding the influence of both material and non-material factors on the international
agenda. Taking a positivist approach to understanding the influence ofrhetoric on ideas
and the international agenda allows us to develop theories and hypotheses and to test
20
those on a case in international politics. Starting from hypotheses improves the
generalizability ofthe study by allowing testing ofthe theory and hypotheses on a variety
ofcases. Although the qualitative case-study approach utilized in this paper makes the
generalizability ofthe empirical results limited, the methods do not limit the potential to
test the theories and hypotheses on other cases.
As argued by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) qualitative research and
quantitative research do not require substantially different methodologies given a
positivist perspective. The differences between qualitative and quantitative research
essentially involve the type ofdata available - data that are quantifiable or data that are
not. This research project uses qualitative data primarily because no quantitative
indicators are available for this new area ofstudy in international agendas, and the
hypotheses are tested using positivist approach.
This project follows the general guidelines proposed by King, et ai. in the
development of a research project and the application ofresearch methods. A good
research project, they suggest, should pose an important question and make a contribution
that can be verified and tested in repeated research (King et aI., 1994, p. 15).3 The ability
to repeat research by providing explicit identification of source materials and testable
hypotheses is a vital part ofthe research process to developing new knowledge (King,
1995). Repetition is the only way to verify results, and is highly valued in scientific
3 Also see Van Evera (1997) for similar criteria from an alternate perspective.
21
research. Thus, this study explicitly describes information on the location and source of
data when possible to accommodate possible replication or extensions ofthis study.
This project attempts to understand the causes ofchanges in the international
agenda. Causality is both contested philosophically and pragmatically in terms ofhow
we can best infer causal relationships. Since causality can only be inferred from
observation rather than observed directly (Beebee, 2006; King et aI., 1994, p. 79; Punch,
2005), some research tools must be used to move from observation to causal inference.
On one side ofthe spectrum, experiments provide the best conditions to infer causation.
In ideal experiments, only one independent variable changes, and any changes observed
in the dependent variable are inferred to result from changes in the independent variable.
Because all conditions are controlled and nothing changes except for the independent
variable, any changes in the dependent variable must be due to the changes in the
independent variable. Experiments for social phenomena or historical phenomena are
difficult and sometimes impossible. Since experiments are not always possible, other
methods have developed to help infer causation.
The research methods used in this project utilize temporal precedence and
correlational connections between the changes in the dependent variables and
independent variables. Correlation and temporal precedence provide one method of
suggesting causal relationships between variables (Brady & Seawright, 2004). Showing
that two variables change together in ways predicted by hypotheses suggests possible
causal connections between those variables. In addition, this project uses the
22
counterfactual approach to determine the influence of independent variable changes on
dependent variable changes. The counterfactual approach helps to illustrate causal
connections by describing the dependent variable if changes in the independent variable
were different. Counterfactual analysis allows us to examine whether changes in the
independent variables necessarily lead to changes in the dependent variables (Brady &
Seawright, 2004). Chapters IV and V use both correlational and counterfactual
approaches in evaluating hypotheses under discussion.
Environmental politics is used for this study primarily because there is more
variation possible for issue attention and agenda changes in environmental politics than in
other issue areas. Where security issues tend to maintain a higher place on the
international agenda (e.g. Morgenthau, 1948), security most likely produces a narrow
variance of state attention. Human rights and issues ofwomen and gender are more
recent additions to the international agenda (Joachim, 2007), which means there is less
variation ofstate attention. Environmental issues, however, have a longer history ofstate
attention, and this attention varies greatly over the history of environmental politics.
Therefore, environmental politics provides issues with a longer history in international
politics and the potential for a wider band ofvariation than human rights or security
Issues.
Case selection is important in any case-study research because biases are more
likely when not selecting cases randomly or when selecting an entire population of cases
for analysis. The case selected for this research project does not constitute a "crucial
23
case," such as a least likely or most likely case for testing of a single theory (Bennett,
2004, p. 29). Instead, the whaling case provides an example case in environmental
politics with significant variation on both issue attention and frame changes. Few
environmental issues have undergone as much change in the frames for the issue as the
case of whaling. Therefore, whaling provides enough variation for testing the non 
material and material influences on the agenda. Whaling may be more susceptible to
rhetorical manipulation than other security issues, but it is not clear how whaling may be
an easier or harder case out ofthe population ofenvironmental cases. Because whaling
contains more variation in state attention to issue and frame changes, and acts as an
example for other environmental issues, this project tests theories on the case ofwhaling.
There is no clear indication that whaling is a unique case in environmental politics.
This proj ect breaks new ground in research into international relations theory and
agenda formation. To date, few researchers have examined the causes of international
issue emergence or changes in frames for issues on the agenda. The project develops a
definition ofthe international agenda and testable hypotheses to engage in positivist
research on the causes of changes in the agenda over time. These are tested on the case
ofwhaling, which constitutes a case with the potential for both material and non-material
influences on the international agenda. Whaling also provides greater variation on the
agenda than other cases in environmental politics.
To reiterate, researching new areas ofstudy in any field is a difficult process
because researchers must develop new concepts, sometimes create new data, generate
24
testable theories and hypotheses, and test these hypotheses on empirical cases. This
project does all ofthese for a single case, which may make the conclusions ofthe
empirical analysis less generalizable than a larger case study. The hypotheses are created
with an eye toward generalization and testing in other areas ofinternational politics.
Although the empirical conclusions may lack some generalization, the theories developed
are widely applicable and testable outside of whaling and environmental politics.
Increased testing ofthese theories can refine the conclusions and determine the extent to
which there are differences between security, environmental, and economic issues as well
as influences from non-state actors and rhetoric on frames and the international agenda.
25
CHAPTER II
CONCEPTUALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND ISSUE FRAMES
At any given time, there are a large number ofagendas in the international
system. Agendas exist within international organizations, advocacy networks,
international scientific and professional organizations, national governments (foreign
policy agendas), and the international system itself. To understand international agenda
formation for this project, we must understand what the international agenda looks like
compared to the many agendas existing in the international system. Is the international
agenda a conglomeration ofthe national foreign policy agendas of all the states? Is the
international agenda simply the lJN General Assembly agenda? How will this project
consider the agendas oflarge international organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the World Bank, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, or the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)? Does the international agenda combine
the agendas of all these international organizations? Developing common definitions and
concepts are an important first step for any research project (Goertz, 2005). Because this
project explores a new theoretical area of international relations, this chapter begins by
defining the important terms ofthe project and the dependent variable.
This chapter distinguishes the international agenda from other agendas within the
international system and domestic agendas by developing a definition ofthe international
agenda unique to international relations. The chapter provides and initial framework
from which we can begin to discuss changes to, and the causes ofthe international
26
agenda in later chapters. The definition ofan "international agenda" used in this work
parallels definitions ofagendas for domestic actors, as defined by scholars studying US
politics; however, the international agenda distinguishes itself from the domestic agenda
by the informal nature ofthe international agenda and the lack offormal institutional
rules within which the agenda forms.
This chapter begins by defining the international agenda as distinct from agendas
ofinternational institutions and of domestic politics. Then, this chapter develops
definitions for the issues on the international agenda and the frames by which actors
relate to those issues.
WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA?
To develop the definition ofthe international agenda, this project relies heavily on
the definition ofa domestic agenda, altered to fit the international environment. For this
project, the international agenda consists ofthose issues to which multiple states are
paying serious attention at a given time (see Livingston, 1992, pp. 314, for a similar
definition). The research on domestic agendas describes the existence ofat least five
agendas: policy, media, public, systemic, and the decision agenda (Birkland, 1997;
Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Kingdon, 2003; Manheim & Albritton, 1982; Stone, 1989).
The media and public agendas are not ofinterest for this project because they deal with
issues ofinterest to the media and the public, respectively, rather than policy makers.
The policy agenda refers to issues of interest to policy makers, which in the case ofthis
project are not politicians, but states. From scholars ofUS agenda studies, a policy
27
agenda consists ofa "list ofsubjects or problems to which governmental officials... are
paying serious attention at any given time" (Kingdon, 2003, 3). The policy agenda
consists ofany issues that have a minimal level ofimportance for government officials.
The policy agenda is a subset ofthe systemic agenda (Birkland, 1997), which consists of
all the issues that might enter the policy agenda. We cannot know the entire content of
the systemic agenda, because we cannot know all the potential issues at any given time.
4
Finally, the decision agenda consists of all issues for which government officials act on
at a given time (Birkland, 1997). For international relations, the decision agenda is
difficult to define because there are no institutional voting rules for decision-making as
there are in domestic politics. Therefore, this project uses the policy agenda as the
agenda ofinterest as defined above.
At the center of international relations, states are the primary policy makers.
Since the creation ofsovereignty and the state system with the Treaty of Westphalia,
states dominate policy and treaty making.
5
Treaties are the central means by which states
create policy at the international level, and international treaties primarily define the
content ofinternational law. Therefore, the actors that make international laws - treaties
- are the policy actors ofinterest for this project. In addition, this project assumes the",
international system is anarchic (see Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979), without a higher
4 Note that the possibility principle may be used to create a population ofpotential issues, although
it was not used in this project (See Mahoney & Goertz, 2004).
5 Note that states are not the only governments that make agreements internationally (Shin,
Unpublished), but cases ofnon-state treaties are relatively rare.
28
governing body than state governments.
6
This does not mean that the international
system is without any rules or norms (see Bull, 1977). The rules ofanarchy and
sovereignty, for example, create a partial structure to the international system even ifthe
structure may change overtime (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Krasner, 1999).
States are the primary actors that make international laws and treaties. The
international agenda does not consist ofissues of interest to government officials, as the
domestic research on agendas suggests, but to states. Although domestic government
officials maintain the monopoly over governance in the United States, for example,
international politics do not have strong formalized institutional constraints to determine
the likely policy-making actors. More informally, the international norms ofstate-
centered treaty-making dominate international politics. Therefore, states are the central
policy makers in the international system making them the central actors in the definition
ofan international agenda.
The international agenda as described above differs from several other
examinations ofinternational agenda-setting by other scholars. Research on international
agendas is very limited, but several scholars have examined some form ofinternational
agenda formation. Carpenter (2007) examines the creation ofan international human
rights advocacy agenda in regards to an international issue, namely violence against men
6 The European Union (EU) is the primary exception. The EU governance structure only applies
to countries that bind themselves to the rules through ratification or accession process, however. Therefore,
the states are first to have the choice of whether or not to join the EU and make themselves subject to the
rules created within the EU governing structure.
29
and women. In her research, the agenda examined constitutes an institutional agenda ofa
particular international organization, with internal rules and governance, rather than the
international agenda described in this project? Joachim (2007) examines the formation
ofthe UN agenda in regards to gender violence and reproductive rights. Joachim's
research presents an interesting possibility that the UN agenda approximates the
international agenda. The UN, like other institutions, however, poses a problem for
research on international agendas that differs from research at the domestic level. In
research involving US domestic politics, for example, examinations ofagendas can rely
on formalized Congressional agenda documents that detail the issues that can be
addressed on the floor ofthe House or Senate (Kingdon, 2003). The policy agenda
examined in domestic research is the product ofa number ofvariables ofinterest, making
the formal documents a reasonable proxy for the US policy agenda. In international
institutions, however, agendas develop very differently. At institutional meetings and
conferences, the agenda often consists ofany topic any ofthe member nations wish to
address. At the UN General Assembly, this policy is explicit, in order to provide a venue
for open dialogue and communication. Therefore, any issue can become part ofthe UN
agenda if a single country wishes it to be so. This poses a problem for research in this
project because it leaves the international agenda as an almost infinite set ofissues that
move on and offthe agenda continuously. Research on the international agenda using the
7 Carpenter and other scholars may not intend to examine international agendas similarly to this
project. Therefore, commenting on the research is not a critique ofthe research but only provides a
discussion ofher work and others that deal with international agendas in some form.
30
UN or other institutional agendas as a proxy requires differentiating between the many
smaller issues that are frequently placed on the agenda but have very little interest from
more than the one state who placed the item on the agenda.
A second problem emerges when considering the use ofthe UN as a proxy for the
international agenda. The UN is not the only large international institution. There are a
number oflarge international institutions, for which there are more members than the
UN. For example, FIFA is one ofthe largest international institutions with more
members than the UN. In addition to large organizations, such as FIFA, other
organizations are arguably as powerful or more powerful than the UN. The WTO and the
EU are both smaller organizations (in terms ofmember countries) but have more
powerful influences on global trade. The existence ofmultiple institutions, with different
institutional rules, memberships, and power, makes choosing one ofthem to represent the
international agenda problematic. Anyone or all ofthem potentially could proxy the
international agenda. Rather than rely on institutions as proxies for convenience when
measuring the international agenda, this project develops the measurement of
international agendas from the original definition so as not to rely on a proxy, which
increases the validity ofthe measured concept.
8
Although it is possible to discuss agendas for other actors in the international
system, such as international organizations (Joachim, 2007), advocacy networks
(Carpenter, 2007), or the media (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), this project is most concerned
g See Adcock and Collier (2001) for more information on concept validity.
31
with the international state agenda. For the reasons discussed above, this project uses the
term international agenda to refer to issues ofconcern to states rather than other actors in
the international system.
It is also important to discuss the elimination ofthe term "problem" from the
defmition ofthe international agenda. Not all issues on the international agenda must
constitute a "problem" for states. Whether an issue is a problem or not entirely depends
on the perspective ofthe actor and whether the issue provides costs or benefits in their
view. Some states may receive positive consequences from whaling while other states
receive negative consequences from whaling. States who receive positive gains from
whaling may not perceive whaling as a "problem." The problem for these states may
involve the anti-whaling advocates rather than whaling. Much more discussion on
frames takes place later in Chapter III; however, for now it is important to recognize that
issues on the agenda do not always constitute problems for all the states who take an
interest in that issue. Therefore, this project uses the term "issue" rather than "problem,"
because some issues on the agenda may not appear as problems at all.
Finally, we must ask ourselves what constitutes "serious attention" for an issue in
the international arena. Does a letter written to the General-Secretary ofthe UN by the
Democratic People's Republic ofKorea regarding racism against Koreans living in Japan
signify the introduction ofJapanese racism onto the international agenda (DPRK, 2007)?
Is something more required before we consider this issue part ofthe agenda? How
should we define the issue ofracism to Koreans in Japan? Does the issue include racism
32
in the public sphere, the private sphere, or both? To answer these types of questions, we
must understand how to recognize an international issue and what constitutes serious
attention from states.
The section below describes three dimensions that represent the value ofan
issue's importance when it appears on the international agenda: the number ofstates
attending to the issue, the strength ofthe states attending to the issue, and the depth of
attention to the issue. These three dimensions defme the range of attention that can occur
for issues on the agenda, which allows an examination ofwhen issues take low
(unimportant) places on the international agenda and when issues take high (important)
places on the agenda. In other words, they describe the "seriousness" of attention given
by states. Following the discussion on issue importance, the rest ofthe chapter defines
other concepts important for understanding international agendas, particularly the
concepts of an issue and frames.
DEFINING ISSUE IMPORTANCE
When an issue appears on the international agenda, we can measure its
importance on the agenda using three criteria: the number ofstates attending to an issue,
the strength ofstates concerned, and the depth oftheir concern. The goal of identifying
attention to an issue is to identify the extent to which states value the issue. Rhetoric
alone cannot determine the degree ofan issue's importance for states because states can
(and often do) suggest all issues are important in order to placate domestic and
international criticism. Many states, for example, say that climate change, poverty, or
33
violence against women are important issues for them, but this alone does not help
identify the level ofconcern for the issue. Therefore, the three criteria described above
approximate measurements of issue importance to gauge the degree of interest in a
particular issue at a particular time.
Number of States
The number of states paying attention to any particular issue varies across issues
and time. Previous discussions of international issues typically describe issues that
involve two countries (bilateral) or more than two countries (multilateral) (e.g., Barkin,
2004; Mansfield & Milner, 1999; Tomlin, 1989). Although this characterization of
international issues distinguishes between the smallest grouping ofcountries around an
issue and all other groupings, the distinction misses the important variation that exists
between "two" countries and "many" countries. The number ofcountries involved in an
issue varies between two and the number of countries in the international system at a
particular time.
At one extreme, an issue may gamer attention from all the states in the
international system. Whether a country is in favor ofreducing greenhouse gasses or not,
almost every state in the international system participates to a degree in discussion on
global climate change. For example, when we examine international climate treaties very
34
few countries, if any, refuse to sign such treaties.
9
The issl:le of global climate change,
therefore, maintains a position on one extreme for internationalized attention. At the
opposite extreme, an issue with attention from only two states maintains the lowest level
of internationalization. By definition, international issues must concern more than one
country.1O Issues concerned with factors internal to a specific country without interest
from other countries cannot maintain a position on the international agenda. The concern
over equal rights for African Americans during the 1960's and 1970's in the United
States concerns the domestic population within the country; therefore, it belongs on the
domestic agenda. If other countries took an interest in African American rights in the
United States, the issue could become part ofthe international agenda. This movement
from domestic to international agendas requires attention from more than one state.
Other non-state actors, such as cities, NGO's or advocacy networks may maintain some
attention toward issues, but this does not mean that the issue holds a place on the
. . 1 d 11
mternatlOna agen a.
To summarize, the number ofstates is an important measure to understand an
issue's place on the international agenda. First, in order for an issue to appear on the
international agenda, it must have interest from more than one state. This, by definition,
9 Since this discussion involves "attention" to issues and not state policy change treaty signatures
suggest attention and ratification is not required. Discussions ofdepth ofattention to an issue are addressed
later in this section.
10 This follows the same logic presented by Mitchell in defining international agreements
(Mitchell,2003b)
11 These actors may attempt to place their issues on the international agenda, and this is discussed
in Chapter III.
35
makes the issue ofinternational attention and on the international agenda. If an issue
concerns only one state, this issue may be part ofthe domestic agenda for that state;
however, unless other states take interest, it does not gain a place on the international
agenda. In addition, issues promoted by advocacy groups or other non-state actors may
exist on the agendas ofthose organizations, but they do not necessarily exist on the
international agenda. This makes the international agenda distinct from the other agendas
that occur within the international and domestic systems. Finally, the number of states
helps measure the extent ofworld concern for a particular issue. When more states
become involved with an issue, we can say that the issue is gaining greater attention from
the world. Issues with attention from ten states tend to be higher on the agenda than
issues with attention from five states. This does not mean that those individual states do
not have a greater perceived importance for those issues. Violence in Rwanda may be the
most important issue for Rwanda, but this does not make it the most important issue on
the international agenda. This leads into other aspects ofmeasuring the seriousness of
attention both in terms ofstrength ofstate and depth ofconcern.
Strength of States
Not only do the number ofstates demonstrate one factor of issue importance, but
the strength ofthe states that take interest in an issue also help identify the seriousness of
attention. When states that are larger and more powerful take an interest in an issue, the
issue gains a higher place on the international agenda, because the interest ofthe larger
more powerful states gives the issue greater importance. For example, it seems odd to
36
suggest that an issue of concern to the United States and Russia (2 states) is not as
important on the international agenda as an issue concerning Paraguay, Chile, and
Argentina (3 states). When two ofthe largest countries in the world take interest in an
issue, the issue gains value on the international agenda, because powerful states constitute
a greater interest in the issue than smaller states.
The strength of states is important for understanding the degree of interest for
international issues by taking into account the differences that exist among states. Not all
states have the same power/strength in the international system, because they do not
control the same amount ofresources. However, just as it is difficult to justify making an
issue that concerns three smaller states more important on the agenda than an issue that
concerns two ofthe largest states in the international system, describing an issue that
concerns 30 smaller states as less important than an issue that concerns two larger states
also seems somewhat problematic. The strength ofmore powerful/stronger states does
not necessarily outweigh a large number of small states. Both the number of states and
the strength of states can make issues relatively higher or lower on the international
agenda. Therefore, this project considers both when determining relative position on the
agenda of multiple issues.
Depth of Concern
In addition to the number and strength, states attach varying depth, or
"seriousness," to international issues. Some issues, such as the DPRK concern over
possible Japanese racism toward Koreans living in Japan, warrant enough attention to
37
send a letter to the UN General-Secretary. Other issues, such as international commercial
whaling, climate change, or nuclear weapons proliferation generate greater concern for
states resulting in conferences, treaties, or formal international organizations. Greater
resource expenditure from a group ofnations indicates greater importance ofthe issue for
those states. For example, treaty ratification generally requires greater resources than
treaty signature, although the costs ultimately depend on the type of government in the
state. In general, however, ratification makes a treaty binding in international law and
domestic law. Signatures are generally symbolic and only occur during the open
signature period when a treaty opens for signature. Since ratification is a stronger bind
for the state, it signifies greater costs in domestic political discussions as well as audience
costs. Audience costs refer to the cost ofreneging on a promise (Fearon, 1994), or in this
case a binding international agreement. Ratification oftreaties suggests greater concern
than treaty signatures, which in tum suggests greater concern than an international
conference or no action by the states. One recent example of such costs to potential
violations of international treaties occurred in the United States when CIA operatives
may have violated international treaties on the use oftorture in interrogations. 12 This
generates a continuum from no concern over an issue, visible by no action, to very
serious concern, visible by actions such as sponsoring conferences or ratifying treaties.
12 The legalities of the conduct are complex and involve issues such as whether the terrorists
should be considered prisoners ofwar and thus subject to international treaties. These complexities will not
be discussed here.
38
The costs expended to a particular issue may also increase for other reasons than
the degree ofinterest in a particular issue. Some issues may require greater expenditures
to fix than other issues and thus raise the costs to states. Regardless ofthe costs ofthe
particular issue, however, states are more likely to incur higher costs for issues that are
more important. The problem also occurs for issues that may be very important for
states, but have insignificant costs associated with the international issue. The measure
of costs associated with the issue, therefore, may not always reflect the actual depth of
importance for the state. Despite this imperfection, measures of cost associated with a
particular issue reasonably approximate the depth ofinterest by states. In combination
with the other indicators, we can get a general sense ofthe relative importance ofvarious
issues or changes in the importance ofa particular issue over time.
To conclude, the international agenda consists ofthose issues to which multiple
states are paying serious attention at a given time. The value ofissue importance on the
agenda reflects the amount of attention from states. This project uses three criteria for
indicating the amount ofattention from states. The number ofstates tells how wide or
narrow states attend to the issue. The strength of states provides an indication ofthe
amount ofresources that states could dedicate toward the issue by representing the
resources ofthe states that attend to the issue. The level ofresource expenditure in time
and money indicate the depth ofattention to an issue. Together these three indicators
provide an indication ofthe extent to which a particular issue maintains a high or low
39
position on the international agenda and allows us to examine relative differences
between issues and changes in a single issue's attention over time.
The three dimensions of attention to issues generate a nuanced measure ofthe
international agenda that allows considerable variation between issues. Issues do not
appear only "on" or "off' the international agenda, but also appear relative to one another
in their degree ofimportance while on the agenda. It is important to recognize when
issues become part ofthe international agenda, but it is also important to examine when
issues move up or down the level ofimportance on the agenda. The only way to examine
such changes is to generate definitions that allow variation among the relative positions
ofissues on the international agenda.
WHAT IS AN ISSUE?
The previous section, in the course ofdefining international agendas, spends some
time discussing issues on the agenda. To this point, the discussion focused on the agenda
rather than the issues on those agendas, which is where this chapter now turns. An issue
on the international agenda consists of a description of a phenomenon, combined
with a frame around which different actors relate to that phenomenon. The
international agenda does not only consist of a given issue, but also the way states relate
to that issue. In other words, there are two parts to the international agenda: the issue's
attention level and the definition ofthat issue. Discussions ofagendas are incomplete
without a discussion ofhow the issues are defined while on the agenda.
40
One definition of an agenda item suggests "a defined problem, a set ofalternative
solutions, and an attached level of salience" (Livingston, 1992, p. 315). This definition
conflates the phenomenon that exists in the world observed by international actors and
the actors' frames that help define the relationship to that phenomenon. The way actors
define issues on agendas is an important aspect ofdescribing agendas. Although this
project may be the first to use frames to describe the problem definition of agenda items,
other scholars have also defined international attention as both the definition and issue
attention (Schreurs et aI., 2001). This project defines issues in a way to separate the real
world events observed and the observation and interpretation ofthose events.
A phenomenon is central to defining any issue, on or offthe international agenda.
The phenomenon consists ofa real event that an actor observes and describes. The
observation is separate from the phenomenon because the observation incorporates some
interpretive elements when describing the phenomenon. We cannot have an issue
without observing something about the world. For example, we have issues involving the
world's food supply, continued violence in the Middle East region, improving human
rights for women and other discriminated groups, and many more. All ofthese issues
begin with some phenomenon in the world. We observe that some people in the world do
not have food. We observe that there has been violence almost continuously in the
Middle East region since WWII. We observe that women do not have equal status with
men in a variety ofareas. It is hard to imagine any issue that we have today that does not
begin with an observation about the world.
41
What does this description ofthe phenomenon look like and where might it come
from? The observation may come from a variety ofindividuals in society. Physical
scientists, for example, observe a great deal about our world and describe this
information in a wide variety ofjournals, newspapers, and magazines. The discovery of
new information often generates new issues by describing phenomena. Scientists'
discovery of low levels of ozone, that came to be described as an ozone "hole," in the
earth's atmosphere became a central phenomena eventually leading to an international
treaty regulating substances that contributed to the formation ofthe "hole" (Haas, 1992;
Litfin, 1994). Without the influence of scientific knowledge, we would not have
observed the destruction ofthe ozone layer in the atmosphere. Thus, the ozone layer
issue would never have become part ofthe international agenda. In other words,
scientific observations or descriptions ofphenomena are a necessary part ofdefining an
issue. Social scientists also observe a great deal about our world. Social scientists often
make observations about the world, such as the distribution ofwealth and knowledge
between various regions (e.g. between the developed and the developing world) or groups
ofindividuals (e.g. between women and men). Without these observations as well, we
would not have issues involving human rights or global poverty. Rather than our
physical environment, these observations regarding the distribution ofwealth and rights
involve our social environment.
Identification and description ofphenomena do not only come from scientists.
Any number of actors, individuals, NGO's, advocacy groups, governments, scientists,
42
authors, reporters, and news outlets observe and describe phenomena. These actors may
often describe a phenomenon based on incomplete or imperfect information. Sometimes
the descriptions may not be true and sometimes they may be complete fabrications or
manipulations ofinformation. Even attempts at accurately observing social or physical
phenomena become difficult, because no observations will be without some form of
measurement error or uncertainty (Rothman, 2006). In addition, scope conditions help to
define the content of all observations ofphenomena, such as the time and space ofthe
observation. Accurate depictions of the same event, ifpossible, could differ based on the
length of time or the space in which one observes the phenomenon. If someone observes
one glacier over one year, he or she may see the glacier expand. A different individual
observing five glaciers over 30 years may see glaciers retract. Because ofthe potential
for error, uncertainty, and varying scope conditions with any observation, we can never
be certain ofthe truth ofany description ofphenomena. An international issue is defined
by the combination of a description and a frame that relates the phenomena to other
actors in the international system. The existence ofuncertainty, potential inaccuracy in
observation, and varying scope conditions, allows for manipulation or changes in the
descriptions and understanding ofthe phenomena through changes in the frame, which
the next section describes in more detail.
WHAT ARE FRAMES?
As discussed, both phenomena and the frame define issues that may become part
ofthe international agenda. A frame describes the relationship between actors and
43
the phenomena described above (Goffman, 1974, p. 1). The frame provides a context
for the issue and a way to interpret or understand the phenomenon. Without a frame, the
phenomenon has no meaning for individuals because there is no connection between it
and those individuals. Just like frames ofphotographs or paintings may highlight certain
colors or textures and obscure imperfections or unsightly areas ofa picture, frames
around issues highlight some parts ofthe description ofthe phenomena and obscure
others. Frames playa central role in manipulation of outcomes and agendas by
manipulating the perceived causes, consequences, and prescriptions ofphenomena.
When frames highlight or obscure different real characteristics ofthe phenomenon,
actors' relationships toward the phenomenon change making it more or less salient and
change the response toward the issue. Chapter III discusses the details ofthe causes of
frame changes and influences on issue attention. Because ofthe central importance of
frames for the studying of international agenda formation, it is important to define frames
in a way that assists in understanding the differences among frames and changes that
might occur for frames.
Frames are never right or wrong about issues. As understood through the social
constructivist perspective, all real events are understood through ideas (Hacking, 1999).
This perspective does not view ideas all the way down, but only part way down. There
are real events in the world, but frames always mitigate our interpretation and
understanding ofreal world phenomena (Goffman, 1974). Phenomena observed in the
world have real causes and real effects. Sometimes these causes and effects are known
44
and sometimes they are unknown. For instance, in the case ofthe environment, there are
many causes of climate change, most ofwhich scientists know despite some debate over
the relative magnitude ofthese causes. The effects of climate change, however, are
relatively unknown. There are some conjectures and projections about changes in sea
level, vegetation, and weather patterns, but effects of climate on human psychology and
sociology, for example are still relatively unknown.
Frames are the lenses through which humans interpret and understand the real
phenomena and its causes and effects. Sometimes frames focus on a particular set of
causes or effects; sometimes they focus on a single cause or effect. Frames can also
emphasize the magnitude of effects (either small or large). These frames are ideas about
reality, not reality. Therefore, they are constructions, within the realm of social
constructivism.
Since frames identify the relationship between a phenomenon and individuals,
frames influence the way those individuals react and respond to the phenomenon or what
policy individuals may prescribe. The frame identifies, for example, whether the
phenomenon has any relevance to an observer. The frame may identify whether the actor
is a cause of the phenomenon, or whether the phenomenon affects the actor in some way
by it. Ifsomeone observes an image of a whale being slaughtered, for example, the
observer may frame this as an image offishing for food or other resources. A different
person, seeing the same image, may frame the image as a violation of international law or
a violation oftheir morals to protect other species.
--------------_.__.._-------_.
45
Different frames allow for differentiation among interpretations ofobserved
events and different prescriptions to observed problems. For example, the international
community might define the violence in Darfur region ofSudan as an international
problem because of the deaths of large numbers ofpeople. However, how the states
define and understand the events, for example, defming events as a civil war versus a
genocide, partially determines both responsibility for dealing with the problem and what
strategies states might use to stop the violence (Cushman, 2000). Frames define how
actors think about a particular set offacts, and therefore, are vital for influencing how
actors conduct their behavior toward those facts.
To summarize, frames describe the relationship between a phenomenon and an
individual, or in the case ofthis project, a state. A frame is a function ofthe individual
and the phenomenon, describing the relationship between the two. Frames are
constructions as discussed earlier, but do not need to be part ofa social collective to take
form. When a phenomenon couples with a frame, it becomes an issue that might emerge
onto the international agenda. Whether or not the issue becomes part ofthe international
agenda depends on a number of factors discussed in Chapter III.
Frames exist for individual actors, but actors also may share the same frame when
it becomes socially accepted or dominates other frames. At other times, frames may vary
for different actors. These frames can co-exist when they are not in contestation or when
the frames do not interfere with one another. Multiple frames may imply that states
should not take any action on an issue even ifthe frames vary slightly as to the
46
description of a phenomenon. States may see violence within a state as an insurgency or
a civil war, where the prescriptive policy ofboth views involves inaction. When frames
are not consistent with each other, some actors may challenge others on the legitimacy of
a frame, making that frame contested. The next section discusses frame dominance and
contestation in more detail.
FRAME TYPES: UNRECOGNIZED, CONTESTED, AND DOA1INANT
There are two types offrames, contested or dominant. Dominant frames are those
shared by states in the international system, such that states agree on how to define a
particular phenomenon. Each state's frame may be slightly different from others in the
case of dominant frames, but the frames do not differ enough to cause conflict among the
states.
When a frame is dominant, it does not mean that all states behavior is consistent
with that dominant frame. Although we might assume a dominant interpretation of state
boundaries such that states do not act within the borders of other states, not all state
behavior is consistent with this dominant understanding. Some states act purposefully
within the borders ofother states covertly or overtly invade the other state's territory. It
is most often the case where a dominant frame exists that state behavior can be ruled as
"illegal," as contrary to international law or norms.
Dominant frames may be recognized or unrecognized in the international system.
Unrecognized frames occur when there is no explicit rhetoric or discussion ofa particular
issue and states act "naturally" in regards to the issue. What is normal or natural for the
47
states for a given issue may mean that the states pay no attention to the issue or that there
is no contestation ofthe issue, so there is no need to explicitly define their own frame for
the issue.
The implicit nature ofthe unrecognized frame resembles approaches to discourse
analysis (Howarth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000) as well as internalized norms
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Discourse analysis suggests that
sometimes actors within a dominant discourse cannot recognize that discourse because
they act within the commonly understood roles and norms. Internalized norms, as well,
create implicit recognition ofthe normalcy oftheir actions. Internalized norms do not
require any explicit discussion, but states obey them because the norms describe the
"natural" way to act. The unrecognized frame also presents actors with a frame that
actors do not question, but recognize as the "natural" way to act, similar to a common
discourse or internalized norms.
Dominant frames may also occur as recognized when states agree on a frame
through explicit discussions or treaty making. These periods ofrecognized, dominant
frames often occur after a frame is challenged by another actor in the international
system, because the challenge requires that states explicitly defend or identify their own
frame. Table 1 illustrates the differences between unrecognized and recognized frames
for several issues. Many times, we cannot view an unrecognized frame without reference
to a foil- a recognized frame after actors explicitly discuss an issue or the issue becomes
part ofthe international agenda.
48
Table 1.
Sample Illustration ofDominant Frames in International Politics
Issue
Whaling
Landmines
C02
Emissions
Violence in
Sudan
Unrecognized Frames
Killing whales is good for the
economy - whalers should kill
whales
Use of landmines in combat is
good for protecting troops and
winning wars - states should use
landmines
Improving the economy through
production is valuable, and C02
is a byproduct ofthis process  
pollution is acceptable
Sudanese violence is a domestic
civil war - no intervention is
warranted
Recognized Frames
Killing whales results in extinction
ofwhales - whalers should not kill
whales
Use of landmines in combat
inflicts harm on individuals long
after wars end - states should not
use landmines.
C02 emissions causes irreparable
harm to the environnlent  
pollution is not acceptable
Sudanese violence consists of
genocidal behavior - intervention
is required
Issue frames may become dominant for long or short periods and may move
between recognized and unrecognized frames. When a frame becomes dominant, states
may stop discussing the issue explicitly, because states internalized the norm or it became
part ofthe larger discourse. Thus, these dominant recognized frames sometimes become
internalized, making them unrecognized once again.
In addition, appearance ofa dominant frame for a particular issue does not mean
all states maintain similar frames. Some actors may maintain different frames than the
dominant frame, but the differing frame has little or no support from other actors. Actors
with different frames may attempt to change the frame to change international attention
to the issue. Some states may maintain different frames than the dominant frame as well.
Some states, for example may have no interest in an international issue, ignoring the
49
phenomenon. When frames are not conflicting, the differences may not create conflict or
interfere with the dominance of a particular frame.
Dominant frames may also become contested frames when actors attempt to
change the dominant understanding of an issue. During times of discussion, when states
explicitly express their frames and other actors challenge such frames, the frames become
contested. When states or other actors in the international system challenge a frame,
states must often clarify and elucidate their frame of phenomena. Sometimes these
frames conflict and create competition between states and other international actors for
dominance oftheir particular frame so the policies to address the issue coincide with their
own view.
The contestation over frames may involve only part ofa frame because frames are
often complex. For example, many states agree that human activity contributes to
climate change, as evidenced by the large numbers ofstates who participated in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Although states generally agree on the
causes of climate change in human activity, international actors may significantly
disagree on the blame for future climate change, such as disputes between developed and
the developing nations (Adger, Paavola, Huq, & Mace, 2006; Schneider & Mitchell,
2001). States appear to agree on the dominant frame for at least part ofthe frame
suggesting that humans cause climate change but differ on the responsibility between
developing and developed countries.
50
Because different actors can relate to issues in different ways, all issues have
many potential frames available. For example, before the second Iraq war actors
maintained at least two clear frames: containment and regime change. The Bush
administration claimed that the only way to solve the continued problems with the Iraqi
government involved regime change policy. Others in the world community suggested
that the previous containment policies ofIraq and weapons inspections could solve the
problem involving possible Iraqi development ofweapons ofmass destruction (Kinsella,
2007). These events did not lead to a clear consensus among the international actors as
the United States maintained the Coalition ofthe Willing with considerable opposition
from other states, such as France. In this case, states maintained different frames around
Iraq's defiance ofUN resolutions and the solution to the defiance.
To reiterate, issues are defined as the phenomenon plus a corresponding frame.
Sometimes actors present alternative frames contesting the frame of an issue when it is
part ofthe international agenda. Other times actors may agree on the frame or a part of
the frame for issues on the international agenda. Since actors may agree on a part ofthe
frame rather than the whole frame, it is useful to delineate the different parts of a frame.
The next section describes frame characteristics that can define the content ofa frame,
which helps us understand how frames change or become contested.
WHAT IS THE CONTENT OFFRAMES?
Just like the color and material of a picture frame accentuate, highlight, or hide
some content around a picture, issue frames do the same. All frames must rely on real
51
phenomena, although the frame itself is a construction. Just as frames around pictures
cannot change the picture itself, issue frames cannot change the phenomenon, only
highlight or obscure. As noted in the previous section, issues may have different
characteristics that allow more differentiation among frames for a particular issue. This
project develops a typology ofthree characteristics that define the content offrames: the
causes ofthe phenomenon (causal characteristics), the consequences (consequence
characteristics), and the policy suggestions (prescriptive characteristics).
These three characteristics map well onto other descriptions offrame
characteristics. Some social movement research defines frames as containing a
diagnostic element, a solution, and a call to arms (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). Other
scholars identify the causes, impacts, and potential solutions as the content ofan
environmental problem (Schreurs et aI., 2001). Schreaurs goes further to describe how
these three rather simplistic categories accommodate all aspects ofan issue frame. This
project's use ofthese three characteristics, therefore, resembles the use ofcharacteristics
in other work.
Not all issue frames contain explicit descriptions ofall the characteristics;
however, the frame may contain implicit characteristics even when international actors do
not state them explicitly. In addition, the characteristics are sometimes related or
constricting to other characteristics. These characteristics are not independent or causal,
but mutually defining and constraining.
52
The rest ofthis section describes the three characteristics in more detail. The
section describes each characteristic in relation to one another as well as the content that
defines each characteristic. As Figure 1 shows in the issue concept diagram, real causes
and real consequences connect to a real phenomenon. As discussed earlier, individuals
observe and frame this real phenomenon. The frame is constrained by the real causes and
consequences ofthe phenomenon, but higWights or obscures different aspects ofthe real
causes and consequences.
Figure 1.
Issue Concept Diagram
Real Causes
>
Real
Consequences
Consequence
Characteristics
Causal
Characteristics
,..------.....?~,..------....
Interpretations ofthe
true causes and
consequences define
observers' frames.
'---------"
Prescriptive
Characteristics
Prescriptive characteristics may derive from interpretations of the
causal and consequence characteristics.
One characteristic ofa frame describes the causes ofthe phenomenon. The causal
characteristic answers questions about where the phenomenon comes from and what
factors contribute to its existence. The causes ofthe phenomenon are important for
53
determining whether the issue can become part ofthe international agenda. For example,
some scholars argue that issues can only become part ofthe agenda when they are seen as
caused by human action (Stone, 1989). However, this project assumes the causal
characteristic has more than two values (caused by humans/not caused by humans). The
cause can involve any number ofvalues, one ofwhich could be human action, which
may, make the issue more likely to become part ofthe agenda (discussed more in Chapter
III). States, a non-governmental group, nature, a divine origin, or other values can
become part ofthe causal characteristic within an issue frame.
There may be a large number ofreal causes ofthe phenomenon ofan issue and
the causal characteristic highlights some ofthose causes as well as their relative
importance. Causal characteristics may identify only one cause of a phenomenon, but
this implicitly suggests that the cause identified is more important than any other real
causes ofthe phenomenon. Sometimes the causal characteristic will identify particular
actors or states as part ofthe causes ofthe phenomenon, which would make those actors
perpetrators. This allows for the formation of blame, which may raise the interest of
those states. Other times, the causal characteristic may identify non-actors as the primary
causes of a phenomenon. Chapter III discusses the effects ofdifferent causal
characteristics on the agenda.
Climate change provides an interesting example for examining causal
characteristics because of the large number of causes presented in relation to raising
world temperatures. Around the phenomenon ofrising world temperatures (global
-------- -_._----
54
warming or climate change) the causal characteristic may describe one or more ofthe
many potential causes: solar output, the distance between the Earth and the Sun,
Interstellar dust, volcanic emissions, surface reflectivity, atmospheric chemistry
(including the contributors to C02 emissions, such as factories, cars, etc), and perhaps
others. Actors may emphasize some ofthese factors over others within the causal
characteristics, suggesting differential levels ofimportance. Different international actors
may emphasize different causal consequences in order to change the international agenda
or the dominant frame around rising world temperatures.
Consequence characteristics involve the effects ofthe phenomenon. Questions of
consequence may involve which actors (human or non-human) might be affected, how
those actors are affected, and in what period those effects might take place. On one
dimension, the consequence characteristic identifies whom the phenomenon affects.
Given that these characteristics identify the rela;tionship between international actors and
the phenomenon, the consequence characteristic identifies the phenomenon's effects on
particular actors. Sometimes the consequence characteristic may suggest that a
phenomenon affects a particular set ofstates in a particular region. The ozone layer hole,
for example was interpreted to greatly affect states in the southern hemisphere such as
Australia, while the consequences for northern hemisphere states were negligible.
Just as the causes of the phenomenon may create blame, the consequences of
effects create victims or beneficiaries (depending ifthe effects are negative or positive).
Benford discusses this framing as "diagnostic" where frame content identifies the victims
55
of an injustice (Benford & Snow, 2000, 615). Of course, it is equally plausible to identify
beneficiaries, which the concept of consequence characteristics can incorporate. In
addition, just as Stone (1989) identifies causes as human or non-human, non-humans can
also receive negative or positive effects from a phenomenon. 'Frames developed around
phenomena ofthe natural world often begin with the consequences for nature when
human consequences occur indirectly. The effects of climate change, for example, often
start with rising sea changes and weather changes as the initial consequences. These
changes then become phenomena for subsequent consequence characteristics of a frame
describing effects for humans (e.g., see Diamond, 2005; Homer-Dixon, 1994).
The consequence frame may also identify how the phenomenon affects actors.
The consequences ofthe US invasion ofIraq may affect some states positively, while
other states may be negatively affected. For example, one ofthe recipients ofremoving
Saddam Hussein from power could be the Iranian government because a long-time
enemy was no longer in power and the resulting difficulty to secure Iraq required great
expenditures by the US (a second potential enemy). On the other hand, countries with
strong relations with Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule, such as France and China may
receive negative effects from the invasion. Table 2 presents an example ofthe causes and
consequences ofthe 2003 Iraq war. The case ofthe Iraq war illustrates multiple potential
causes and consequences ofthe phenomenon that actors could emphasize as part of
causal or consequence characteristics.
56
Finally, the consequence characteristic may suggest the time frame ofthe effects.
Some phenomena affect states in the short term over the course ofa few years or less,
while other phenomena create effects in the long term, requiring ten or more years to
generate. Actors may emphasize the effects ofrising sea levels, for example, on different
states at different points in the future. Coastal and low-lying states are most likely to be
affected in the short term, within the next 50 years or so, while interior or elevated states
may be affected in the long term due to changing weather patterns and rain resulting from
the higher seas. The consequence characteristic identifies questions about the effects of
the phenomenon, how they affect different actors, and when those effects may occur.
Table 2.
Causes
Examples ofCauses and Consequences ofthe 2003 Iraq War
Description of a
Phenomenon Consequences
??????????????????????????????>00 "." ?????????????? _ _.
Ideological or personality
reasons within the US
Administration.
Failure of containment
policy in Iraq
......................................................., .
Iraq's desire for increased
weaponry
I
IThe US~ndthe Coalition
?.. ,,???????..??????????????? ..???????1 ofthe Willing invade Iraq
US Desire for oil access in 2003.
Removed an Oppressive
Regime
Stopped the production of
weapons ofmass
destruction in Iraq
. Increased USp~'~'~~~~~"i~'"
I the Middle East
Create a democratic
government in the Middle
East
Note. Derived from reading and interpretation by Kinsella (2007), various news sources, and reports on the
Iraq war.
The third frame characteristic involves prescriptive factors. Prescription
characteristics describe the policy choices associated with a phenomenon. These policy
57
alternatives describe ways to mitigate the consequences ofphenomenon by addressing
the causes ofthe issue described within the causal characteristics. The policy alternatives
may also describe ways to increase the effects ofthe phenomenon or prolong the
observed facts, ifthe consequence characteristic defines the effects positively as a benefit
rather than a problem needing a solution. This approach differs from some scholars who
identify "solutions" as the only responses described within a frame (Benford & Snow,
2000).
In October 2007, spokesperson for the Whitehouse, Dana Perino, described the
health benefits ofglobal warming. She stated that the number ofpeople who die ofcold 
related issues will not be as great as the climate warms ("White House Defends," 2007).
Ifa government administration adopted this consequence characteristic, the government
may take prescriptive characteristics that continue to raise global temperatures or at least
take no action concerning increasing temperatures. Ofcourse, other climate experts
denounced such positive effects as minor in comparison to the much greater negative
consequences ofclimate warming. This consequence characteristic implies greater
efforts to stop climate change.
The prescriptive characteristics directly relate to both the consequence
characteristics and the causal characteristics. The consequence characteristics suggest
whether and which policy options are appropriate based on whether the consequences are
positive, negative, or negligible. The prescriptive characteristics also relate to causal
characteristics. In order to create policies for a phenomenon, the prescriptive
58
characteristics usually need to address the causes. Ifcauses directly relate to negative
consequences, prescription characteristics would most likely describe reductions in or
interference with the cause.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter began by describing the international agenda as a list ofissues to
which states are paying serious attention at any given time. This definition was adapted
from the definition used by US politics scholars examining domestic agendas. This
definition reflects the role ofpolicy makers in international relations (states) and their
policy agenda rather than other agendas, such as those in international organizations. The
chapter defined issues that may appear on the international agenda using the social
constructivist perspective where real phenomena are interpreted through frames. Frames
describe the relationship between the observer and the observed. The frames identify
three issue characteristics: causes, consequences, and prescriptive characteristics.
To summarize the process ofinternational agenda-setting, before an issue can
become part ofthe international agenda, someone or some group observes and describes
a phenomenon in the world. Different actors (or just the observer) can develop one or
more frames around this phenomenon, which highlight, expand, exclude, or exaggerate
some characteristics ofthe phenomenon. When the phenomenon combines with a frame,
it becomes a potential issue for the international agenda. Because ofthe potential for
multiple frames, actors and advocates may compete with each other in order to make
their frame or interpretation dominant over others to guide future behavior or other
59
characteristics ofthe frame. The issue can emerge onto the international agenda and
move up, down, or offthe agenda due to a number of factors including presentation of
alternative frames and changes in the dominant frame (discussed in Chapter III).
Understanding frames, how states and other actors relate to phenomena, is vital
for both understanding the agenda and understanding how the agenda may change. New
frames introduced by states or other international actors, ifadopted, can change the
meaning ofthe phenomenon for states. This change in meaning can alter how states
perceive the importance or their relationship to the phenomenon (e.g. from perpetrator or
victim to bystander). Some actors may intentionally challenge frames and attempt to
manipulate them in order to achieve different policy outcomes. These actions are a vital
part ofsetting the international agenda, which Chapter III discusses in detail. Chapter III .
examines the concepts of setting the agenda and the use ofrhetoric to change issue
attention and frames. Up to this point, the discussion has focused primarily on describing
the international agenda and issues, but the next chapter describes how the international
agenda and issues can change and who and what might facilitate such changes.
60
CHAPTER III
CAUSES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
Chapter II described the international policy agenda in this project and frames that
describe issues. Chapter II essentially answered the "what" questions in terms of
international agendas. The project now turns to the "why" questions of international
agendas. Why do international agendas change? Why do issues appear on the
international agenda or vanish from it? Why do they move up or down in importance on
the agenda? Why do issue frames change? This chapter examines how agendas and
frames change, why issues become part ofthe international agenda, and why changes
occur when they do.
Changes in the international agenda occur when an issue moves on or offthe
agenda or when the issue becomes more or less important for states on the agenda. The
movement up and down the agenda reflects the interest ofthe number of states, the type
of states, and the depth ofinvolvement ofthese states, as described in Chapter II. The
agenda also changes when issue content changes. Ifthe content ofthe dominant frame
changes for a particular issue, the international agenda changes because the issue content
appearing on the agenda has changed.
This chapter divides the causes of agenda changes into two primary categories
based on the theoretical divisions in international relations literature. The first category
of causes involves the material causes of change. These material causes of change
primarily rely on realist theoretical dependence on military power distributions in the
61
international systems and the assumption that security is most important for states. The
second category of causes involves the non-material variables. These variables rely on a
constructivist perspective. The non-material factors rely on the use ofrhetoric to change
the international agenda and frames, with intervening conditions such as international
exposure ofthe rhetoric and the content ofthe rhetoric making it easier or more difficult
for the rhetoric to create change in the international agenda. These two categories of
variables parallel an important division in international relations theory between the
constructivist and non-constructivist causes of changes in international politics.
This chapter adds to the agenda descriptions from Chapter II by theorizing the
causes for issue emergence onto the international agenda and changes in issue frames.
Chapter IV closely examines this theory on the case of international efforts to address
whaling and the agenda changes with particular attention to the variables discussed in this
project. The discussion below does not attempt to draw out which ofthe variables are
most important or most likely to generate changes in the international agenda. Instead,
this chapter describes the potential influences on the international agenda and develops
hypotheses, which Chapter IV and Chapter V test through empirical analysis. This
analysis resembles a standard positivist approach to hypothesis development and testing,
which starts with theory and tests the theories using empirical information (see Chapter I
and King et aI., 1994).
This chapter begins below with a discussion on the causes of agenda changes due
to the influence ofmaterial variables. The discussion then moves through the non-
62
material variable causes of changes in the international agenda. In brief, the material
causes of agenda changes involve the distribution ofpower in the international system
and the primary interest of states. According to realist theory, states are primarily
concerned with their own security in relation to threats posed by other states in the
international system. Issues become important for states when they involve state security
or changes in power. The nonmaterial causes begin with a discussion ofrhetoric as a
primary driving force behind changes in international agendas. The discussion centers on
how rhetoric influences international agendas by changing the issue frame. The non 
material section continues by describing how exposure and the content ofthe rhetoric can
hinder or promote the ability ofthe rhetoric to influence the international agenda.
Finally, the section concludes with a discussion ofhow actors in the international system
can use rhetoric strategically to change the international agenda without falsifying,
fabricating, or lying about the issue. This final section discusses how manipulation
strategies influence the acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics as part ofthe
dominant frame. Chapters IV and V then test the hypotheses generated in this chapter on
the case of international efforts to address whaling.
WHY DOES THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA CHANGE?
This section examines why issues move on and offthe agenda as well as why the
content ofthe issue frame changes. Influences on the international agenda are grouped
into two categories that also correspond to the larger debate in international relations
between realist and non-realist theories. The two categories include the material and the
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non-material causes. Each category contains several variables and hypotheses described
in detail below.
MATERIAL CA USES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
As discussed earlier, formal institutions create the potential for influence through
manipulation ofplacement of agenda items (see Arrow, 1963; Downs, 1957; McKelvey,
1976; Shepsle, 1979). In the international system, the power to control the agenda lies,
according to realist logic, with states. States possess the most military and economic
control ofthe system relative to others and are the primary actors responsible for
cooperation and conflict in the international system.
Realism frequently relies on the distribution ofpower among the states in the
international system to determine the extent to which states will conflict or cooperate and
the stability ofthe international system (Waltz, 1979). Based on realist logic, we can
infer that different distributions ofpower will change the international agenda. In
addition, realists assume that security is the most important issue for states in the
international system (Morgenthau, 1948). Non-security interests, such as environmental,
economic, or those regarding human rights become less important on the international
agenda. The next section examines these two primary realist assumptions in detail
regarding their potential influence on the international agenda.
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Issue Importance and State Interest
Material Hypothesis 1: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are
more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the
international agenda.
Realist theory begins with the assumption that the international system is
anarchic, where states are unable to secure themselves from other states through an
overarching governing body (Carr, 1956; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). Unlike in
domestic political settings where states (police, military, etc.) maintain power over
constituents, no institution above national governments maintains a monopoly on the use
of force. Domestic governments can maintain security and order within their boundaries
by controlling the use oflegitimate violence, such as the use ofpolice or military within
the domestic borders. Because the existence of anarchy in the international system does
not provide for stable state security, security is the first priority for states at all times.
When security issues are compared to other issues, such as economic or environmental
issues, security issues always take priority (Morgenthau, 1948). This does not mean that
environmental issues or economic issues never appear on the agenda. This logic suggests
that when there is a security threat on the agenda, it is going to take priority over other
issues. Other issues are only likely to appear on the agenda when states are secure.
The best way to provide security according to realists is through military power
(Morgenthau, 1948). One ofthe best ways to achieve greater military strength is through
economic resources. Therefore, economic issues are the second most important types of
65
issues for international actors. Economic power can often become military power in the
long term as economic resources can purchase the means to manufacture military
resources or can purchase those resources directly. Therefore, economic issues are often
less important than security issues, but more important than other issues that are less
likely to lead to more military power and security.
Finally, other issues may appear on the international agendas with less importance
than economic or security issue. These issues may involve benefits to states beyond
security and economic prosperity. Human rights is sometimes seen as a type of luxury
good, that can only be addressed by states once they have established security from other
states. Therefore, these issues are always less important on the international agenda than
security and economic issues.
It is important to note the potential blurring between the material and non-material
influences when distinguishing between security and non-security issues when we
consider how rhetoric changes the frame for states from a non-security issue to a security
one. Ifwe assume that states and actors only understand reality through their own ideas,
then the understanding ofwhether an issue involves state security or not is dependent on
those ideas. In general, realist theories do not assume a strong difference between the
reality ofthe world and the ability ofactors to understand that reality, as constructivism
does. Ifstates have a "real" security interest in an issue, it is more likely to become part
ofthe agenda and take a higher priority than other issues. Ifthe issue becomes part ofthe
agenda because the frame changes due to rhetoric, then the rhetoric becomes the driving
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influence on the international agenda. The later part ofthis chapter takes up the
importance ofrhetorical influences on the international agenda. Rhetoric may influence
the perception of an issue -- whether it is a security issue or not - and thus influence
whether the issue appears higher or lower on the agenda. It is important to keep in mind
that realists assume an objective observation of state security is possible, while
constructivist theorists generally assume that only an interpretation of state security is
possible.
Material Hypothesis la: Unipolar systems create stability and security allowing
other issues to increase in priority or emerge onto the international agenda.
Realists define three types of international power distributions: unipolar, bipolar,
and multipolar. Unipolar systems are defined by a single dominant state that has larger
resources than other states in the international system.
13
Bipolar systems are
characterized by two large powers that together maintain a preponderance ofpower,
where other states in the international system have significantly less power. Multipolar
systems describe systems with more than two powerful states.
A unipolar system provides a potential exception to the higher importance of
security on the international agenda. In a unipolar system, or a region with a hegemonic
power, the international agenda may contain issues other than security issues because the
13 Some definitions ofunipolarity suggest that the hegemon must have more power than the
combination ofall other states in order to be a true hegemon. Given that this is unlikely to occur,
unipolarity is defined by a system where a single state has a preponderance ofpower (Ikenberry, 2001, p.
27) that makes it very costly and difficult for other states to counter this large state.
67
dominant state creates stability and reduces security concerns. Under a hegemonic
system, non-security issues may increase in importance because the hegemon provides
some stability to the international system. With a single large state with enough power to
dominate the international system, other states may feel more secure under the protection
ofthis large state (see Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001; Kindleberger, 1986; Lake, 1993). Under
these circumstances, states may attend to other issues, making it more likely for non 
security issues to increase their importance on the international agenda.
Material Hypothesis 1b: Bipolar systems create an agenda dominated by security
issues with some opportunity for non-security issues to increase importance.
In bipolar systems, consistency of interaction is provided by the power rivalry
between the two larger states in the international system (Waltz, 1979). Two large states
engage in long-term rivalry such that they are most concerned with changes in relative
power between them. This stability generates some opportunity for non-security issues to
emerge onto the international agenda, but it most likely will not involve the two larger
powers. Because the international system is relatively stable, association with larger
states can provide smaller states with some security. Among these states, non-security
issues may become part ofthe international agenda.
Although the two powers create a consistent rivalry because security expectations
are relatively clear, the two larger states do not always provide security for all smaller
states in the international system. Sometimes in this system, the major powers provide
some security to their allies. However, given that security cannot always be guaranteed
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because ofthe potential for buck-passing when a powerful state attends to the security of
another state (see Elman, 2004), security issues will most likely still dominate the
international agenda. In sum, most likely security issues will dominate the international
system, but at times, non-security issues may appear on the agenda for smaller states
when security is provided by one ofthe major powers.
Material Hypothesis 1c: Multipolar systems are least likely to allow non-security
issues to emerge or to dominate the international agenda.
Multipolar systems provide the least security for states because alliance patterns
shift quickly, and there is little consistency or stability in the international system (Waltz,
1979). In a multipolar system, there are no states large enough to provide security for
other states in the international system. States achieve security through balancing and
allying with other states against more powerful enemies. In this system, where alliances
are short-lived and other states cannot provide security, security issues dominate the
international agenda, and there is very little room for non-security issues to appear.
Unlike in the bipolar system, where the two large states may provide some security for
smaller allies, in the multipolar system alliances are more fleeting creating additional
security concerns.
Power Distribution and Contestation and Dominance over the International Agenda
Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration ofpower in one state (unipolarity) results in
little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged
69
contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived
contestation.
In a system with a single dominating power, the dominant power should have
primary influence over international outcomes. Since the dominant state maintains a
preponderance ofpower and control in the international system, other states should not
have the ability to influence the international agenda. Ifa state challenges the agenda of
the dominant state, given the importance and dominance ofpower the dominant state will
be able to resist any challenges. If all states know that the dominant state can resist
challenges to change the agenda, it is unlikely that weaker states will be willing to pay
any costs ofchallenging the dominant state. Challenges take place only when the
challenging state has a chance of success. This resembles the game theoretical model
describing the Chain-Store Paradox (see Ordeshook, 1986, pp. 451-462). In the
hegemonic case, the agenda is relatively uncontested.
Bipolar systems are characterized by rivalry between the two dominant powers in
the system. Since there are only two dominating powers in these systems, security
concerns for both powers involve the threat from the other power. Under these
circumstances, each state's desired agenda involves containing the opposing state while
potentially expanding the state's own power resources. When there are two states with
relatively equal power, either can gain an advantage over the other with a small increase
in relative power. Therefore, power concerns are even greater than under the bipolar
system, where small increases in power ofa smaller states may not be very meaningful of
70
a larger state. Because small changes in relative power between the two large states may
have large implications for domination ofone state over the other, security concerns take
a heightened importance.
Because any increase in power, no matter how small, creates an advantage, two
large powers are likely to compete over all resources including control over the agenda.
Under these circumstances, we expect a highly contested agenda because any increase in
power (even on the agenda) by one ofthe two states gives that state an important
advantage. If one ofthe states becomes interested in an issue, it is very likely that the
rivalry between the states causes the other state to become interested in the issue also. If
both states are not interested in the issue, the issue may appear as a less important issue
for smaller states because the two most powerful nations are not interested. In general,
however, the bipolar system suggests that the two dominant states will contest the frames
for longer periods than in the unipolar system.
Multipolar systems are characterized by instability, intense competition between
states and short-lived cooperation and alliances (Waltz, 1979). The intense competition
in a multipolar system and great instability leads to an agenda that is also highly
contested. However, because ofthe rapid changes in alliance patterns in order to contain
increases in power of many states, contestation over frames is likely to be short lived for
any particular issue.
No single state can dominate and force issues onto the international agenda for
other states in a multipolar system. States continue to be concerned about security, as
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described above, but security issues change rapidly. States are not likely to maintain
prolonged interest in a single issue because the security interests will change just as
alliances change quickly. Due to the variety of interests of states and their relatively
equal power resources, no single state can impose a dominant agenda among other states.
Therefore, the agenda is more highly contested and transient than during unipolar or
bipolar systems.
RHETORICAL CA USES OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
In addition to the material interests of states, rhetoric can also influence the
international agenda. Rhetoric influences the agenda by changing the understanding of
the phenomena by changing the frame. By changing the frame, the issue may become
more or less important for states. Any number ofinternational actors can manipulate the
agenda through rhetoric, including governments and non-state actors, such as non 
governmental organizations and advocacy groups. This section discusses the
mechanisms by which rhetoric might change the agenda followed by the use ofstrategic
purposeful manipulation.
Factors characteristic ofthe actors propagating the rhetoric and the content ofthe
rhetoric can promote or interfere with the ability ofrhetoric to change a frame. Some
actors are better able to communicate their rhetoric through the media, and some rhetoric
is more likely to be accepted than other rhetoric. Since much ofthe information
propagated in the world occurs through the media, increased or decreased media
exposure can influence the potential for frame changes. Other forums for information
-----------------_ ...._._--_.-
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exchange can become important for propagating rhetoric, as well, such as conferences,
international organizations like the UN, and other informal venues, such as summits or
meetings ofheads of state.
Rhetoric is most likely to influence the frame ofthe issue, which in turn will
change the way states attend to the issue. Changing the frame entails changing the way
states understand their relationship to the phenomenon. As discussed earlier, the frame
identifies how actors relate to the phenomenon observed. Rhetoric can change this
understanding by emphasizing different actors or characteristics ofa frame in forums,
media, or other international outlets. Various factors could enhance the ability ofrhetoric
to change the frame for international issues. Media exposure, connections to focusing
events, the completeness ofthe frame, and the connection to a broader culture or
discourse may increase the influence ofrhetoric on the international agenda. In addition,
when rhetoric emphasizes a particular state as the perpetrator or the victim of a particular
phenomenon, that state may be more likely to attend to the issue. In general, rhetoric
propagated through the international system, that is complete, and connected to a broader
discourse is more likely to become content ofthe dominant frame for an issue on the
international agenda The next section discusses the importance ofrhetoric for influencing
frames and the issue placement on the international agenda in more detail. Following this
discussion, the text describes the influence ofintervening factors in increasing or
decreasing the effectiveness of rhetoric.
73
Blame and Causal Characteristics
Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators
makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue
to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.
Different causal characteristics emphasize different types ofactors by assigning
blame to those actors. When rhetoric implies the involvement ofa particular
international actor, the international actor becomes intimately involved with the issue.
Instead of acting as a bystander for the issue, blame makes it very difficult or impossible
for states to remain neutral in relation to the issue (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Sprinz &
Vaahtoranta, 1994).
Many issues do not necessarily begin as state centered because they involve actors
other than states in the characteristics ofthe frame as the causes and consequences.
Violence in many countries in the world often begins as private actor violence. For
example, violence in central African countries has been described in many accounts as
"ethnic violence" or "tribal violence," which leaves out the state or other international
actors in the rhetoric (see, for example, Bowen, 1996). Violence between Tutsis and
Hutus was often described in these terms before the Rwandan genocide (Power, 2002).
In other cases ofviolence, the term "civil war" is used rather than other potential terms,
such as genocide for extreme violent behavior (Cushman, 2000). When states are named
part ofthe rhetoric, there is an increased chance that the state named must respond in
some way.
74
Naming and shaming, for example, has become part ofthe mechanism for
changing state behavior in response to human rights treaties (e.g. Hafner-Burton, 2008).
When rhetoric "names" a state as the perpetrator or cause ofa phenomenon, the state
becomes part ofthe issue whether that state government wishes to be part ofthe issue or
not. In these cases, the state may have to pay some attention to the issue, even ifthe
state's goal is to contest the rhetoric and present counter rhetoric.
Naming a state in rhetoric does not automatically mean that the issue linked to the
rhetoric automatically becomes part ofthe international agenda. States may still ignore
the issue and the rhetoric. Rhetoric may also fail ifstates do not accept it as part ofthe
frame, it does not propagate through the media, or it does not relate closely enough to the
real phenomenon. These particular aspects ofrhetoric success and failure are discussed
later. However, in general, rhetoric that emphasizes or names states as the perpetrators or
causes are more likely to become part ofthe international agenda or increase in
importance ofthat issue for those states named.
Victimization and Consequence Characteristics
Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or
beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances
for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the
agenda.
A similar logic holds true for consequence characteristics offrames.
Victimization ofstates creates the same effect as blame, whether welcomed by the state
75
or not. States named in rhetoric as victims or beneficiaries of a phenomenon become part
ofthe issue and may have to attend to the issue in some way. When states are
emphasized or named in rhetoric as receiving positive or negative consequences from a
phenomenon, rather than other domestic or international actors, the issue is more likely to
become part ofthe international agenda and important for those states. The consequence
characteristics identify the victims ofthe phenomenon in the causal story (Stone, 1989).
Identification ofthe victims as a particular state is likely to increase attention to the issue
for that state, thus increasing its position on the agenda or placement on the agenda.
Non-material Hypothesis 3: Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences or
consequences of a greater magnitude is more likely to increase attention to issues.
Consequence characteristics also may describe time and degree of costs or
benefits ofthe phenomenon. Some rhetoric when describing a phenomenon may
describe the magnitude of effects as well as a description ofwhen those effects may
occur. Rhetoric used to describe these characteristics of a frame may influence states to
treat issues more importantly when states perceive them to have greater magnitude
consequences over a shorter time than other issues. The larger the consequences and the
nearer the time to effects, the more likely the issue will become part ofthe agenda.
Issues described with dire consequences within the next 10 years are more likely to
appear on the agenda and become of greater importance important than issues described
as dire consequences likely to occur in 100 years. This is due to the general tendency to
favor the short term cognitively (Johnson, 2004; Shermer, 2008; Slovic, 2000), and
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political emphasis on the short term due to political pressures. Humans have a tendency
to favor short term thinking over long-term thinking due to our evolutionary history and
cognitive development (see Johnson, 2004). This creates a heightened importance on
issues described with short-term consequences. Politicians, as well, generally focus on
the short-term gains in order to satisfy current constituents and to remain in power. Thus,
this suggests increased importance for frames that emphasize short-term consequences
with greater magnitude ofeffects.
International Exposure
Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely
it is to influence perceptions ofthe phenomenon.
One way to make rhetoric more effective in changing frames, is through media
exposure or exposure at international forums. Popularizing a particular rhetorical
description increases the effects ofthe rhetoric on frames and the influence on states.
When rhetoric moves from an outlying understanding ofa phenomenon to a common
understanding popularized and normalized by international media, the rhetoric's force
Increases.
Popularizing a particular beliefor rhetoric can make it more difficult to act
contrary to that belief, similar to the way norms in society make it more difficult to act
counter to those norms (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998). When a particular frame or rhetoric
is "normal" or dominant, then other rhetoric or understanding that runs counter to the
dominant rhetoric becomes more difficult to sustain. Exposure ofrhetoric to a wide
77
audience can be one way for rhetoric to gain traction. By repeating the same
understanding in multiple outlets, the rhetoric may change the understanding over long
periods. Numerous studies examine media exposure and preference formation over both
short-tern and long-term considerations that document effects on preferences from
repeated exposure and media content (for example, Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Kellstedt,
2000; Pan & Kosicki, 1996; Worden et aI., 1996). Although not everyone may adopt or
accept the rhetoric, repetition and exposure in the media make it more likely.
Media and international forums appear in research regarding agenda-setting
because ofthe influence on public perceptions (Joachim, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998;
Kingdon, 2003; Manheim & Albritton, 1982). Simply repeating any news story that
mentions a particular issue does not influence public opinion as much as the actual
content ofthose stories and the opinions expressed in those news stories (Peter, 2003).
Precisely for this reason, this project deals with rhetoric exposure and rhetoric content
(discussed later in this chapter). Forums or places ofpublication where actors present
issue frames influence international attention to the issues through influencing the
characteristics ofthe dominant frame and the rhetoric that is part ofthat frame. The
media and other forums for international communication serve as intermediates in the
introduction ofnew rhetoric that may be consistent with frames or contesting those
frames (Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001). The more exposure particular rhetoric has in
international communication forums, such as the media, the more likely it is that the
rhetoric becomes part offrames, thus influencing international attention to issues.
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Media, International Organizations, andAcademics
There are three primary ways rhetoric propagates at the international level: the
media, international forums, and academic journals. The media, often referred to as the
mass media, consist of all the new and old forms ofmedia seen today, including the print
media, TV, and radio, as well as web-logs (blogs), email lists, and web communication
(Merriam-Webster, 2009). The media serve to communicate information to the public
and to government officials, although all forms ofmedia do not always present issues.
Some scholars and pundits have comment on the biases in media today and the
importance ofthose biases for public opinions (for example, see Groseclose & Milyo,
2003). Traditional media sources have generally attempted to be somewhat more
impartial in their presentation ofthe news (Schramm, 1988), yet choice ofstories may
still influence the international agenda. With the advent ofnew media sources,
increasingly normative reports and claims are presented (A. Anderson, 1997; Barendt,
1998). Media is an important source ofpotential influences on frames and changes in the
international agenda.
International forums consist primarily ofinternational organizations designed for
the express purpose ofproviding a venue for international actors to express their views on
any issue. Such forums exist regarding economic issues, legal issues, and political issues,
like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and
the United Nations (UN), respectively. These institutions act as forums because many
international actors can present their views on a particular issue within the mandate ofthe
79
organization. Some ofthese forums are open to all actors, such as the ICC, where any
actor can make a claim against another. Other organizations, such as the UN are limited
primarily to states (although non-state actors are often informally involved in
discussions). Actors that present rhetoric at these international forums, whether
intentional or not, have the potential to influence international frames and the agenda.
Academic journals are also an important source ofrhetoric that may change
frames for states. Although propagation is limited to a more elite audience, elite public
opinion can be influential in changing the understanding ofissues (for example, Karol,
2009). In addition, academics, previously regarded as objective researchers, have
recently been increasingly accused ofbiased in classrooms (Kelly-Woessner & M., 2006;
Pipes, 2005) potentially spreading rhetoric to change frames. Most literature on agenda
formation does not examine academic journals; however, much ofthe work ofacademics
introduces new rhetoric or new understandings ofissues for policy makers. One clear
example comes from the potential connections between climate change and violence.
Researchers have engaged in a debate, not only over whether there is a strong empirical
basis for connecting climate change and violence (Diamond, 2005; Homer-Dixon, 1994;
Myers, 1993), but whether re-defining climate change as a "security" issue helps or hurts
the environment (Deudney, 1990; Levy, 1995; Najam, 1995; Saad, 1995). Academic
research often presents rhetoric that may change the frames ofinternational issues, and
thus must be considered for our understanding ofchanges in the international agenda.
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Regardless ofwhether the media, the forums, or academics are biased or
objective, their infonnation and propagation ofthe information increases chances of
rhetoric influence on frames. Motivations behind the presentation ofrhetoric do not
influence how the rhetoric may change issue perceptions and frames.
Given the ability ofmedia, international forums, and academic sources to spread
rhetoric around the globe quickly, rhetoric found in these sources can change the
perceptions of individuals and elites. Changes in perceptions of frame characteristics
shared widely, can influence state interest in particular issues by making those states part
ofthe frames, as described earlier. Therefore, the more that similar rhetoric propagates
through the media, international forums, and via academic sources, the more likely the
rhetoric will become part of a frame. Whether the propagation ofrhetoric is done
intentionally to manipulate state interest and frames or whether it is done unintentionally,
actors who present rhetoric consistently and widely in media and other outlets can change
the importance ofissues, whether an issue appears on the agenda, and the content of
frame for an issue for particular international actors.
Rhetoric and Focusing Event Linkages
Non-material Hypothesis 4a: Rhetoric that links focusing events with a
phenomenon and issue frame is more likely to gain attention in the media, increasing
exposure.
In addition to propagating rhetoric, linking rhetoric to large events that gain the
interest ofthe media can increase media exposure and increase the likelihood that the
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rhetoric influences frame characteristics and the agenda. Scholars often refer to these
large events that gain media attention in the literature on agenda development as
"focusing events." Focusing events are events that expose a particular issue to a wider
audience through media involvement (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 94-95). Large scale and rare
events create increased media exposure because they create shock and interest among the
media audience. Rhetoric linked to focusing events will get increased exposure to a large
population because the focusing event creates increased interest and exposure among the
media.
There are several different kinds offocusing events. Some focusing events
involve science surrounding a particular problem that confirms or disconfirms previous
information or provides new information. Other focusing events involve non-natural
large-scale events (mass-murders, missile tests) or natural disasters (the Bali Tsunami).
Focusing events have the ability to attract media exposure because they are often rare,
large, and unexpected events (Birkland, 1997,30-31), similar to what has been called a
"black swan" (Taleb, 2007). The black swan refers to events unexpected, large, and rare.
Scientific discoveries or those that improve on previous knowledge act as
focusing events ifthe media increase attention to the event. One such case is the
discovery ofthe ozone layer hole (Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994), where scientific knowledge
created a focusing event around which the media began broadcasting stories ofthis new
knowledge. Other examples offocusing events that have occurred in recent times include
the fall ofthe Soviet Union, the destruction ofthe Berlin Wall, Hurricane Katrina, the
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World Trade Center attack, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. These events occurred
generally without warning, created a large impact, attracted wide media attention, and
occurred rarely, if they occurred more than once.
14
The occurrence ofa large-scale event alone does not create changes in the
international agenda. The most important aspect of focusing events is the linkage with
rhetoric and frame characteristics to cause changes in the agenda. Focusing events alone
are large-scale rare events that generate public interest. When actors link these large-
scale events with rhetoric and to a particular issue, that issue and rhetoric gain increased
attention. An example ofa failed attempt to link rhetoric and a focusing event involves
Hurricane Katrina. The Taiwan News reported that, "New Orleans may go down in
history as the first major city... to be lost to the process of global warming." In Hong
Kong's Ta: Kung Pao newspaper, reports described Katrina as a "warning by God over
President Bush's reactionary behavior on the Kyoto Protocol." Newspapers in Australia
and El Salvador also made similar links between climate change and Katrina. The
Palestinian press even linked Katrina with the War in Iraq.IS Linking large focusing
events to issue rhetoric helps propagate rhetoric throughout the media. In this case, the
rhetoric associating Katrina with climate change may have increased attention to climate
change for a short time. The rhetoric linking climate change and hurricane Katrina failed
14 Note that focusing events are difficult to measure absent media attention, which makes the
influence of focusing events without linkages, somewhat tautological.
15 All quotations and newspaper information taken from a report from BBC News ("Press awe at
Katrina aftermath," 2005).
83
to maintain interest because the media increased reporting that particular weather events
are difficult, perhaps impossible, to attribute to climate changes. Therefore, the linkages
between Katrina and the climate acted not only to propagate information about climate
change, but doubled the exposure of climate change rhetoric as new scientific
information de-linked Katrina from climate change.
Rhetoric Content
The content ofthe rhetoric propagated through the international system can hinder
or accelerate the degree to which the rhetoric becomes accepted by actors in the
international system, and states, which can change the international agenda. This section
groups the influence of content ofrhetoric over agendas into two categories:
completeness and resonance. Completeness ofrhetoric occurs when the rhetoric satisfies
the curiosity ofthose who are listening to or reading the rhetoric. Complete descriptions
offrame characteristics in the rhetoric answer questions about the phenomenon that
otherwise might make the rhetoric more difficult to believe. Resonance ofrhetoric
occurs when the rhetoric fits within a broader discourse and culture ofthe individual
receiving the rhetoric. Individuals, groups, and states may have different cultures and
broader discourses to which rhetoric mayor may conflict. When the rhetoric conflicts
with common practices and beliefs, it becomes more difficult for people with those
practices and beliefs to accept the rhetoric and change their frames. The sections below
address both ofthese intervening variables more closely.
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Completeness andAudience Reception
Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story including all
three frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the
intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.
In Chapter II, the definition offrames described three frame characteristics,
causes, consequences, and prescriptions. Frames do not need to contain all these
characteristics, however, complete rhetorical stories contain all three parts, leaving the
audience with few questions.
Social movement research discusses rhetoric a great deal in terms of motivating
individuals in overcoming collective action problems (Benford & Snow, 2000; Tarrow,
1998).16 One ofthe causes ofadoption ofrhetoric that can overcome collective action
problems comes from the completeness ofthe rhetoric in describing the phenomenon for
the group (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, &
Benford, 1986).
The most complete rhetoric describes the phenomenon without leaving the
audience curious about the answers to other questions. I? Since this project identified
three primary characteristics of frames, a complete frame would contain content for all
three characteristics. Rhetoric that may take the place or change a frame can contain any
16 Note in most social movement literature, they refer to propagation ofrhetoric as "framing"
whereas this project attempts to separate more clearly the act of using rhetoric (an independent variable)
and the frame (a dependent variable).
17 Van Evera (1997) uses a similar definition to describe the completeness oftheories.
85
or all ofthe characteristics. Complete rhetoric contains descriptions of all three
characteristics of an issue's frame.
For sociologists, the completeness ofrhetoric has been described as incorporating
three primary core aspects ofa frame: "(1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social
life as problematic ... (2) a proposed solution ... (3) a call to arms or rationale for
engaging in ameliorative or corrective action" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). The
three parts of rhetoric described map well onto the characteristics of frames described in
this project. The diagnostic framing is the identification of an issue as a problem and the
formation of causation or blame. The proposed solution maps well onto the prescriptive
characteristics defined in this project. This describes the potential policy options to
address the phenomenon. The third part ofcomplete rhetoric described in sociology also
maps well onto the consequence characteristics of a frame. The call to arms or a reason
for engaging in action must describe some reason that the issue needs attention. This call
to arms describes a consequence, either moral or otherwise, to suggest that the issue is a
problem and requires attention. Therefore, what sociologists have determined as a
complete story for their research fits well within the definitions offrames and rhetoric in
this project. A complete rhetorical statement describing an issue contains causal,
consequence, and prescriptive characteristics.
Complete rhetoric is more likely to be accepted than rhetoric that does not
communicate some characteristic ofthe frame. Ifrhetoric does not answer all the
questions for the audience, they may be less inclined to accept the rhetoric as a
86
description ofthe phenomenon. Therefore, the content ofthe rhetoric can influence the
acceptability ofthat rhetoric into the dominant frame.
Rhetorical Resonance
Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set ofcultural
beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to
influence the international agenda.
When rhetoric is consistent with current cultural practices and beliefs ofthe
audience, the rhetoric may resonate more so the audience becomes more likely to accept
the rhetoric and change their frame. The resonance, connections between the audience
and the rhetoric, increases the more the audience can identify the themes and ideas within
that rhetoric. Scholars describe this type of consistency as an "alignment" process by
which strategic individuals attempt to align their rhetoric with the culture and larger
discourse oftheir audience (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et aI., 1986). The alignment
process involves strategic behavior, which the chapter discusses later. However,
connections between the rhetoric and the larger culture or discourse remain an important
source of increasing the ability ofrhetoric to influence frames.
Different countries and groups ofpeople subscribe to a larger set ofbeliefs about
the world, set in their cultural or historical identity. Sometimes rhetoric presented to an
audience connects with the larger cultural beliefs associated with a broader discourse.
For example, during the Cold War issue frames consistent with the rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union were more likely to resonate with actors involved in
87
the Cold War. Discussions of going into space and to the moon in terms of a rivalry
between these two spheres for dominance were more likely to resonate than discussing
the issue as important research to improve scientific knowledge. Given the general
increase in human rights discussions globally in recent years, an example of a larger
discourse, issue frames consistent with the discussion of"rights" may be more likely to
resonate with a global audience. For example, rhetoric describing water shortages as an
individual's "rights to fresh water" may resonate with the broader discourse on human
rights rather than describing the number of individuals who suffer without water.
The potential for individuals to reject or question rhetoric or information that is
inconsistent with their own cultural and individual beliefs also presents itself in
psychological research on cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance makes it more
difficult for individuals to accept information when the information does not fit within
their current understandings ofthe world (Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985). When rhetoric
presented does not fit with the current cultural practices and larger discourse ofthe
audience, it becomes less likely to be accepted.
To reiterate, frames that are more complete and are consistent with current belief
systems and cultural practices of a people are more likely to be adopted by those people.
Therefore, frames that incorporate causal, consequence, and prescriptive characteristics
and are consistent with a larger discourse or culture are more likely to become the
dominant frame for a particular action.
88
Strategic Use ofRhetoric and Rhetorical Entrepreneurs
Throughout the previous discussions on how rhetoric influences frames, the
project has skirted any discussion of strategic use ofrhetoric and the manipulation of
rhetoric for particular goals. Often described as "framing" in much ofthe literature/
8
actors can direct rhetoric at specific targets, states, or populations, just as marketing
campaigns target specific groups ofpeople with rhetoric by controlling the place, time,
and content ofadvertisements. This project describes actors who engage in using rhetoric
strategically as "rhetorical entrepreneurs." They are rhetorical entrepreneurs because
they attempt to use rhetoric to change the ideas and behavior ofother actors. Many times
the rhetorical entrepreneurs must create new language or new ways to describe
phenomena to generate the outcomes they desire.
19
Rhetorical entrepreneurs strategically change frames to serve particular purposes
oftheir institutional or personal agendas. Many actors in international relations act
politically for their own benefit or goals. In these cases, the use of rhetoric and
manipulation offrames occurs through rational purposeful action on the part of
international actors.
It is important to consider all actors who may use rhetoric to change frames.
States, NGO's, advocacy groups, academic organizations, scientific groups, and others
18 The term "framing" causes confusion between the noun form of"frame" and the verb or noun
form of"framing." This project, therefore, uses "frame" for a description ofthe perception ofan issue and
strategic use ofrhetoric as the act of"framing."
19 See Luntz (2007) for an interesting set ofexamples on strategic framing for US political
changes in public opinion by a sophisticated rhetorical entrepreneur.
89
may attempt to change frames through strategic use ofrhetoric. The rise ofNGO's and
other actors' ability to influence the international agenda is an important change in the
international system that was once only dominated by states (Simmons & Oudraat, 2001).
Although the importance ofstate power over all that occurs in the international system
has eroded somewhat, states continue to maintain an important influence on international
outcomes. In addition to traditional state powers through military force, states may also
adopt to use strategies currently used by NGO's and other non-state actors. State
politicians may generate particular definitions or frames in order to garner domestic
support for a particular international action, like beating the war drum. For example, the
United States explicitly avoided using the term, "genocide," to describe Rwanda during
the Clinton administration so that the US could avoid actions there (Power, 2002).
Rhetorically manipulating the definition ofthe violence in Rwanda as internal, political,
or civil war, changed the relationship between the United States and the violence (the
frame). NGO's may generate strategic rhetoric in order to generate attention to particular
issues, increase membership in their organization, or increase funding for the
organization. For example, some organizations purposefully frame international violence
in terms ofviolence against women and children (ignoring violence against men) to
generate increased contributions and support for their organization (Carpenter, 2007).
The description above does not imply that states are only accepting rhetoric
manipulation from others without implementing their own manipulative efforts. It is
entirely possible and likely that states or other international actors have particular goals in
90
regards to a phenomenon and attempt to manipulate the perception ofothers in order to
control the international agenda. Any international actor can be a rhetorical entrepreneur
if they engage in strategic use ofrhetoric to manipulate the international agenda.
Strategically placing rhetoric to manipulate the international agenda is an
important aspect ofhow the agenda works and how non-state actors can influence
international outcomes (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Simmons & Oudraat, 2001, p. 667).
Although there are various strategies to manipulate rhetoric based on some knowledge of
the real causes and consequences ofthe phenomenon, it is not clear which of these
strategies may work best under different circumstances. Instead ofaddressing which
strategies work best, which is not apparent from the strategies themselves, the rest ofthis
chapter describes how manipulation can occur in rhetorical frame manipulation and the
influence ofthese manipulations on the international agenda. In order to have a complete
understanding how rhetoric can influence frames we must have some understanding of
how actors might manipulate rhetoric to achieve their own goals with the international
agenda.
This section proceeds with a discussion ofthree strategies for rhetorical
manipulation offrame characteristics: manipulation ofthe scope ofphenomena,
manipulation between frame characteristics, and manipulation within characteristics.
Manipulation ofthe phenomena scope describes changes in the description ofthe
phenomena or the data representing the observation. Presenting data with slightly
different images or rhetoric can change part ofthe issue frame. Between frame
91
characteristics, manipulation involves changing emphasis in the rhetoric from one ofthe
frame characteristics to another (e.g. shifting focus from causes to consequences).
Within frame characteristics, manipulation involves changing emphasis in the rhetoric
between the content ofa single part ofthe characteristics. For example, emphasizing one
cause ofthe phenomenon over another cause. It is important to note that the
manipulations described below do not include complete fabrications ofreality. The
manipulations are all based on some description ofthe real phenomenon, the causes, or
the consequences. They are possible because ofthe uncertainty in our understanding of
the real world, described in Chapter II ofthis project.
Phenomena Scope Manipulation
Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations ofthe phenomena scope change the
audience acceptability offrame characteristics.
Frames with some relevance to the observed phenomenon are more likely to be
accepted by actors than frames describing fabrications or lies in regards to the
phenomenon. Rhetorical entrepreneurs, however, can manipulate the scope ofthe
phenomenon in order to manipulate the acceptability offrame characteristics.
Manipulation of data or the presentation ofdata can make characteristics seem more or
less truthful, making them more or less acceptable to audiences.
Rhetorical entrepreneurs can manipulate the scope ofthe phenomena through
changes in data presentation. Data presentations depend on time, spatial dimensions, and
uncertainty ofthe data. Information and data always involves time as an element of
92
description ofthat data. When we look at descriptive data describing some aspect ofthe
social or physical environment, we must define the time as a scope condition ofthe data
presented. Rhetorical entrepreneurs may present data at a single point in time, over a
year, over ten years, or over a thousand years. Each presentation ofthe data may reveal
different information about the trends or the phenomenon.
Climate change data, for example, is sometimes manipulated through changing
the data time horizon. When climate data are taken for the past 10 to 20 years, scientists
point to a cooling trend (Keenlyside, Latif, Jungclaus, Komblueh, & Roeckner, 2008), for
which anti-climate change activists use to emphasize their goals of changing the
understanding of climate dynamics. On the other hand, when scientists examine the
changes in temperature over a span ofa I50-year period, climate data suggests a recent
warming trend (Black, 2008). Ifthe data are looked at over hundreds ofthousands of
years, the temperature ofthe earth becomes cyclical with cooling and warming periods
(Brook, 2008). Different views ofthe same data create different views of the trends for
the phenomenon.
Manipulating the presentation ofdata changes the acceptability of frame
characteristics. In the climate example above, if data are presented over hundreds of
thousands ofyears, carbon dioxide, methane, and the temperature ofthe earth all become
cyclical. Since humans have been contributing to atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide
for only a very short part ofthe presentation, attributing changes in climate to human
action becomes less acceptable. It is impossible for changes in the temperature to be
93
caused by humans if one considers temperature changes that occur 100,000 years ago or
more. Ifdata are presented based on the past 150 years, the rise in carbon dioxide
coincides with the rise in use offossil fuels by humans and the description ofhumans as
causes ofthe current increase in carbon dioxide becomes easier to accept.
Manipulation ofthe spatial dimension ofpresenting the phenomenon can also
influence the audience's perception ofthe phenomena. Similar to changing the period for
which data are presented, changing the place where the data were acquired can
manipulate the acceptability offrame characteristics. Manipulation ofpresentation on the
spatial dimension amounts to limiting presentation to a particular area. Examining
climate changes on the North Pole may present different information than climate
changes over New York City, or averaging the temperature ofover 7000 10cations?O
When describing glacier changes, focusing on a particular glacier can lead to descriptions
of glacier expansion (Hewitt, 2005). Examination ofthe average changes of glaciers
around the world glacial changes can lead to descriptions of glacial ice thinning (UNEP).
If the presentation ofdata suggests glaciers are increasing, it becomes difficult to accept
climate temperature increases as a cause because increases in temperature suggest a
decrease in glaciers. Therefore, changes in the presentation ofthe phenomenon in terms
ofthe spatial dimension also influences the likelihood of acceptance of associated frame
characteristics.
20 For a sample ofsuch climate measures see Silver (2008, p. 8).
94
There are other ways to manipulate the presentation ofdata as well. Different
measurement tools will create different presentations ofsimilar information. When
trying to understand the distribution ofpower in the international system, for example,
scholars may use different tools to measure differences in power. Measuring power using
coal consumption during before the Second World War may document one type ofpower
distribution among states, while measuring power in terms ofpopulation (as militaries
depended considerably on population numbers), or nuclear capabilities, may show
different descriptions ofthe power distribution. When one takes the data per capita, yet
another distribution ofpower among countries may appear.
In a more recent example, the Chinese government manipulated the presentation
of gold medal winnings at the 2008 Olympics. The Chinese viewed the medal counts by
associating the country with the most gold medals as the country in first place, placing
the United States second (Economist, 2008). When the data are presented in terms ofthe
total number ofmedals, the United States takes first place, while China takes second.
Yet, another representation emerges when the data are examined per capita.
21
Given this
presentation, the country with the highest value on our scale becomes Jamaica (l.48
medals per capita), followed by Bahrain, Estonia, New Zealand, Slovakia, and Australia.
The United States has only 0.09 medals per person and China has only 0.03 medals per
21 A per capita measure ofgold medal count is not an arbitrary measure. Given that a country's
population influence the number ofpeople from which athletes are selected, per capita data on medal
winnings is advocated by some smaller countries to measure success in the Olympic games.
95
person (Economist, 2008). Clearly, these different measures of Olympic success result in
different indications ofthe most successful countries.
Since frame characteristics are associated with the phenomenon, the presentation
ofthe phenomenon and the data makes the frame characteristics more or less acceptable
to audiences. Changing the time or spatial measurement ofthe phenomenon changes the
description and thus how the frame characteristics.
Manipulation Between Frame Characteristics
Manipulation Hypothesis 2: Manipulations between frame characteristics changes
the importance ofthe issue on the agenda.
Rhetorical entrepreneurs may attempt to manipulate policy outcomes by
emphasizing different characteristics ofan issue (causal, consequence, or prescriptive).
Since each characteristic may focus on different actors or suggest varying levels of
importance, rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to focus attention on one particular
characteristic to influence the importance ofthe issue for states.
In the case of climate change, ifthe causal characteristics of a frame focus on
large developed nations, and the consequence characteristics focus on negative effects for
smaller developing nations, smaller nations have an incentive to reduce climate change
and gain protection from the negative effects. Ifthese smaller nations emphasize the
negative consequences of climate change in rhetoric propagated in the media, it may be
less likely to increase attention to climate change than emphasizing rhetoric blaming
larger developed nations for causing climate change. Emphasizing larger nations as
96
causes for climate change, rather than the negative effects on smaller states, increases the
attention from the larger states. Whether or not these larger states become actively
involved in reducing greenhouse gasses, they must address in someway their
responsibility and discuss the climate change issue - placing it on the international
agenda or higher on the international agenda. In the above example, the smaller states
may either use rhetoric to emphasize their own negative consequences or emphasize
blame on larger nations.
Rhetoric entrepreneurs emphasize different frame characteristics through media,
forums, protests, and other forms ofcommunication. As discussed earlier, the more
exposure the rhetoric receives, the more likely it will influence outcomes. In order for
rhetoric to develop, however, rhetorical entrepreneurs must present their rhetoric to states
or individuals who can accept the rhetoric as their frame. Therefore, actor created
rhetoric is an important part of the development ofdominant frames for a particular
population.
Emphasis on one element ofthe issue frame can change the importance ofthe
issue for different states in the international system. By using rhetoric that one particular
group ofstates are responsible for a problem, those states generally have a greater chance
ofresponding and placing the issue higher on their agenda, whether or not they actually
partake in actions to solve the problem. Emphasis between elements of a frame,
therefore, has the potential to strategically manipulate frames to increase or decrease
97
attention for different states in the international system depending on the goals ofthe
rhetoric entrepreneurs.
Because there are multiple characteristics offrames, it is not necessary to
fabricate evidence or frame characteristics. In the above example, both the blame on
larger countries and the negative consequences to smaller nations may be true
representations ofreal causes and consequences ofclimate change. Thus, actors can
manipulate agendas by emphasizing different characteristics ofa frame, which are based
on the real causes and consequences of a phenomenon.
Manipulation Within Frame Characteristics
Manipulation Hypothesis 3: Manipulations within frame characteristics changes
the acceptability ofprescription characteristics.
Frame characteristics also contain within them different potential content, which
actors may manipulate to achieve their advocacy goals. Within causal, prescriptive, and
consequence characteristics, emphasizing different content in rhetoric can result in
changes offrames. Rhetorical entrepreneurs may manipulate the content of each
characteristic through emphasis on different variables or different levels ofuncertainty.
The sections below discuss different types ofmanipulation that may occur through
emphasis within frame characteristics. The first section discusses the use of strategic
rhetoric to emphasize different characteristics within frames based on the inherent
uncertainty in understanding the real causes and consequences ofphenomena to influence
the acceptable prescriptions available. The second section discusses emphasis on
98
different causal pathways followed by a discussion on emphasis of different causes when
multiple causes are present. All ofthese manipulations change the acceptability of
prescriptions because causes and consequences directly relate to policies.
Uncertainty
Manipulation Hypothesis 3a: Emphasizing uncertainty increases delay before
prescriptive action or increases the likelihood that policies prescribed search for more
data and research.
Uncertainty is endemic in scientific research because causality cannot be directly
observed or proven, but simply inferred (Brady & Seawright, 2004). This inherent
uncertainty allows individuals to create multiple interpretations ofthe evidence or to use
only information that supports their particular view (Jasanoff, 1995). As any
econometrics textbook will attest, models designed to predict the future become
increasingly uncertain as projections move further away from the available data.
Psychologists also document the difficulty and often inaccuracies of future
prediction among political pundits (Tetlock, 2005), highlighting the increased uncertainty
as one moves from data to prediction. For example, climate models contain a great deal
ofuncertainty as to the potential impact ofC02 emissions on global temperatures
(Houghton & IPCC Working Group I, 2001). This uncertainty allows advocates on one
side ofthe debate or the other to emphasize extreme possibilities within the range of
uncertainty of climate models. Advocates ofclimate change, for example, may
emphasize large increases in global temperatures and see changes, while economic
99
advocates may emphasize much smaller changes in temperatures. Both emphases do not
contradict the findings of climate scientists, but instead focus on different projections
because ofthe large uncertainty ofC02 impacts on the environment. Climate scientists,
while trying to be transparent in their estimates, list different scenarios under which their
predictions are modeled (Team-6, 2009). These scenarios estimate different level of
environmental concern, different levels oftechnological improvement, and different
levels of economic development, for example. Rhetoric entrepreneurs may utilize one of
the models over others because the model emphasizes particular elements within an issue
characteristic.
Rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to manipulate outcomes by emphasizing the
uncertainty in scientific research itself or the different levels ofuncertainty for different
variables within each frame element. By emphasizing uncertainty within causal
characteristics, rhetorical entrepreneurs seek to increase delay in creation and formation
ofprescriptive policies. Emphasizing information uncertainty suggests that policies
should focus on conducting more scientific research to reduce the uncertainty. In climate
change discussions, uncertainty often becomes a point ofcontention because many actors
suggest that scientific predictions are too wide without greater certainty. By emphasizing
the uncertainty of climate models, rhetorical entrepreneurs attempt to prolong delay
before generating policy to deal with the effects ofcarbon in the atmosphere. This delay
may also allow advocates against reducing greenhouse gas emissions time to formulate
100
new presentations ofdata and research, manipulation of the phenomenon scope, to back
up their own claims on other aspects of a frame.
Causal Variables
Manipulation Hypothesis 3b: Emphasizing different causal variables changes the
acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics.
In addition to emphasis on varying levels ofuncertainty, rhetorical entrepreneurs
also manipulate outcomes through emphasis on different variables within causal or
consequence characteristics. Rhetorical entrepreneurs place emphasis on one causal
pathway over another when there are multiple causal pathways that lead to the same
outcome, described as equifinality (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). Equifinality occurs when
there are multiple sufficient conditions that may lead to the same consequence. Each
pathway emphasizes a different set of intervening variables and processes that occur as
the cause influences the effect. Different causal pathways contain different sets of
intervening variables that can be emphasized within a frame.
By emphasizing different causal pathways, or particular variables within one of
the pathways, rhetorical entrepreneurs change the acceptability ofprescriptive policies
that address the causal variables. For example, as previously stated, some scholars
suggest that environmental degradation could lead to increased interstate conflict
(Homer-Dixon, 1994). Environmental pollution, causing a water shortage, could lead to
conflict via more than one potential path. In one path, lack ofwater displaces
individuals, who become refugees that cross borders and create conflict between
101
neighboring states. On another path, a state with limited water resources may try to
extract resources from a neighbor generating increased inter-state conflict. Both
pathways begin with water pollution and shortages and end with interstate conflict, but
differ on the path from the independent to the dependent variable. Each path suggests
different policy solutions, either dealing with mediation between states or dealing with
accommodations for a population ofrefugees. Therefore, the existence ofequifinality
provides an avenue through which rhetorical entrepreneurs manipulate within frame
characteristics to emphasize one or the other causal pathway and change the potential
solutions available to the international community.
Manipulation may also occur through emphasis on different variables within issue
characteristics. This manipulation is possible because almost all phenomena have
multiple causes, consequences, and policy prescriptions. Because the world is incredibly
complex, we often simplify the number ofcauses, consequences, and policy options (see
Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; Johnson, 2004). Rhetorical entrepreneurs may
emphasize a subset ofthe causes in order to advocate particular blame or solutions. For
example, when examining the causes ofclimate change many international advocates
focus on the influence ofhuman made carbon emissions in the atmosphere as a primary
cause. Other scientists, however, have also emphasized the importance ofcloud cover,
sunspots, and other natural factors in determinations ofthe earth's climate. It is true that
many factors influence the temperature ofthe Earth and that all the factors
simultaneously are at work influencing Earth's temperature. Because ofthe presence ofa
102
large number of causes, rhetorical entrepreneurs emphasize some ofthe causes over
others to influence the potential solutions. If advocates successfully define international
climate change as primarily the result ofnaturally occurring changes in the sun and other
factors, human responsibility becomes limited, in that our actions cannot mitigate
changes. On the other hand, ifother advocates successfully frame climate change as a
problem primarily resulting from human contribution of carbon to the atmosphere, then
the solution lies in a reduction ofC02 emissions.2
2
The discussion ofhow rhetoric
influences frame preceded this section on manipulation strategies. The important point
here is how manipulation takes place through the presence ofmultiple causes,
consequences, and prescriptions within each issue characteristic.
The presence ofuncertainty, equifinality, and multiple-causes allows a variety of
rhetoric to emerge that maintains consistency with available data and information. The
rhetoric may not reflect the scientific consensus ofcausal factors, pathways, or average
values in cases ofuncertainty, but the rhetoric may still accurately present descriptions of
the phenomenon within the limits of our knowledge. Frames that are not based on some
real information, fabrications, may become part offrame characteristics, but would be
difficult to sustain under some scrutiny. Therefore, frames will not usually consist of
fabrications or lies disassociated from current knowledge.
22 This logic closely resembles Stone's (1989) understanding ofcausal stories and manipulation
between natural causes and human-made causes.
103
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter began with the "why" questions about changes in the international
agenda. Why does the international agenda change? Why do issues emerge onto the
agenda at some times and not others? Why do the frames for issues change? The chapter
then moved through two logics ofexplanation: one that depends on material forces and
one that depends on non-material forces.
Material causes of changes in the agenda come from realist theories in
international relations that describe the importance ofsecurity and relative power
distributions. Because security is the most important motivator, non-security issues are
only likely to appear on the agenda when state security is provided by another state. The
provision ofsecurity differs depending on the distribution of international power.
Unipolar systems are likely to provide the greatest security for states, bipolar systems
may provide some security, and multipolar systems are least likely to provide security.
Therefore, non-security issues are most likely to emerge in unipolar systems and least
likely under multipolar systems.
Non-material influences on issue attention involve rhetorical descriptions ofstates
as causes or consequences. Rhetoric is an important part of changing the international
agenda through changing the frame characteristics of an issue. When states are
rhetorically placed as part ofthe blame ofthe phenomenon or the consequences ofthe
phenomenon, they are more likely to pay attention to the issue. Therefore, the issue
increases in importance on the international agenda for those states. Sometimes states do
104
not wish to attend to an issue, but must pay some lip service because rhetorical
entrepreneurs describe the states as part ofthe cause or consequence characteristics. In
addition, describing more imminent effects or larger effects can increase attention to
issues by creating a greater sense of crisis and emphasis on the short-term. By describing
phenomena in terms ofshort-term large-scale consequences, the issue is more likely to
become of greater importance on the international agenda.
In addition to influencing issue attention, material and non-material variables can
also influence the frame. Material variables, in terms ofpolarity, are most likely to
influence the degree of contestation over issue frames. Under unipolar systems,
contestation is likely to be non-existent or very short lived because ofthe dominating
power ofthe hegemon. Similar to a chain-store game theoretic model, actors are not
likely to challenge the dominant interpretation of an issue. Bipolar systems prolong
contestation because any small change in power distribution between the two large
powers can be a great advantage to one ofthe states. Since competition between these
states is intense, the countries are likely to engage in competition for longer periods over
control offrames on the international agenda. Under multipolar systems, alliance
patterns suggest short-lived attention to issues but some competition between the states
over power. Therefore, we expect contestation to be high, but shorter than in the bipolar
system.
Non-material factors also influence the content offrames on the agenda. The
exposure ofrhetoric, the content ofrhetoric, and the particular manipulation strategies
105
implemented can influence the changes in frames or the acceptability offrames.
Exposure ofrhetoric to a wide audience or those who control a state through the media,
international forums, and academic sources can increase the influence ofrhetoric to
change the frame of an issue. The more exposure and repetition a similar rhetoric
achieves, the more likely it can influence the international agenda. Focusing events often
increase international exposure when linked with particular rhetoric and issues. These
large-scale, rare events alone do not attract interest to an issue and change the agenda.
Only when rhetorical entrepreneurs link these events to issues through rhetoric can the
events influence the international agenda.
In addition to the importance ofinternational exposure for the rhetoric, the
content ofthe rhetoric may also affect the tendency to adopt the rhetoric as part ofa
frame characteristic. Rhetoric that is more complete and that is associated with a larger
discourse creates greater salience and a greater chance of acceptance by audiences.
Rhetoric that leaves few questions unanswered creates a more complete story that
becomes more believable by audiences, which generates a higher resonance. In addition,
rhetoric connected to an audience's particular culture or broader understanding ofthe
world (a larger discourse) can increase the resonance between the audience and the
rhetoric. These factors help to increase the ability ofrhetoric to inf1uence the
international agenda and frames.
Rhetorical entrepreneurs act as strategic actors who use rhetoric to influence
international outcomes through the influence offrames and agendas. Rhetorical
106
entrepreneurs manipulate frames through scope conditions, different issue characteristics,
or different parts within an issue characteristic. Changing scope conditions changes the
acceptability or believability of other issue characteristics because they become more or
less connected with what appears to be the phenomenon data. Emphasis on different
issue characteristics may change emphasis from one characteristic to another, such as
from blame to consequences. By emphasizing one or the other, states associated with the
emphasized characteristics are more likely to attend to the issue. Finally, emphasis on
different parts within issue characteristics changes the acceptability of prescriptive
characteristics. Since prescriptions are associated with causes and consequences,
manipulating emphasis on the causes and consequences ofthe frame influences the
acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics for the issue.
This chapter was organized around the two primary influences over international
agendas: material and non-material. Although this is a useful way to organize the
theories because it resembles the primary theoretical distinctions made in international
relations theory, this conclusion and the following chapters takes a slightly different
approach. Chapters IV and V present an empirical analysis ofthe causes of agenda
changes in the case of international attempts to address whaling. These two chapters
together analyze the influences of material and non-material variables over the changes in
frames and issue attention for the case of international efforts to address whaling. This
current chapter did not present a test ofthe theories or a definitive answer as to whether
agendas change due to material or non-material variables. The chapter sets up potential
107
tests ofthe different causes of agendas through the development ofhypotheses. The
following two chapters explicitly test these hypotheses. Chapter IV analyzes the
influences on issue attention based on material and non-material factors that resembles
the organization in this concluding section. Chapter V analyzes the influences on frames
based on material and non-material factors.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: ISSUE EMERGENCE
There are two factors that describe changes in the international agenda, as
discussed in Chapter II. The fIrst concerns international attention to the issue. The
international agenda consists ofissues that move up and down or on and offthe
international agenda. The second factor ofthe international agenda is the content ofthe
issue frame. The frame describes the relationship between the phenomenon and
international actors. Chapter IV analyzes the fIrst ofthese two parts to changes in the
international agenda regarding attention toward whaling. Chapter V analyzes changes in
issue frames for the same case. Each chapter analyzes the relevant hypotheses from
Chapter III that relate to changes in issue placement on the agenda or changes in the
frame.
This chapter fIrst describes the changes in attention to whaling by states,
signifying movement up or down and on or offthe international agenda. Subsequently,
the chapter analyzes the material and non-material hypotheses relevant to explaining
changes in the dependent variable ofattention changes. These hypotheses describe
polarity and the importance ofsecurity issues over others on the agenda, and rhetoric
involving blaming, victimization, timing, and the magnitude ofconsequences ofthe
phenomenon. The chapter demonstrates for the case ofwhaling that security issues
dominate non-sec.urity issues most in multipolar systems and to a lesser extent in bipolar
and unipolar systems. In addition, the chapter shows that the evidence ofnon-material
109
rhetorical influences ofblame and victimization on agendas does not support the
hypotheses. Evidence ofrhetorical crisis making in terms ofthe timing and magnitude of
the effects are also unsupported by this research.
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO WHALING
Since the earliest days ofwhaling, the practice has involved a large number of
actors including individuals, local municipalities, state governments, corporations, non 
governmental organizations, and advocacy groups, as well as international governmental
organizations. This chapter describes the changes of attention to whaling and analyzes
the causes of changes in terms ofthe hypotheses developed earlier.
Whaling appeared on and offthe agenda in two primary stages. The first stage
was characterized by sporadic attention to international whaling where the issue appeared
on and offthe agenda from the 1500s through 1944. The second stage ofwhaling from
1945 through the present has been characterized by a long-term sustained interest in
whaling and greater depth ofconcern and greater number of states concerned with the
issue. The sustained attention to whaling continues on the international agenda today.
Within each broader stage, more subtle changes in international attention occur as the
issue moves on and offthe agenda during the first stage, and as the specific country
attention changes as well as the depth of attention in the second stage.
The chapter seeks to answer a number of questions regarding changes between
each stage ofthe international environmental agenda for whaling. Why did states
become involved and interested in whaling sporadically during the first stage? What
110
made states gain and lose interest in whaling during this period? Why did states increase
attention in the second stage and spread to a large number ofstates with increasing
depth?
The rest ofthis chapter answers these questions through close examination ofthe
whaling industry from approximately 1500 through today. A number ofimportant causal
factors influence the changes in the international agenda. Primarily, the analysis shows
the influence ofmaterial factors on the changes that occurred in attention to whaling,
while the hypotheses describing non-material influences receive mixed support. Lack of
support does not mean the hypotheses are incorrect, but the analysis does not provide
enough evidence to support these hypotheses.
Although this section describes the character ofthe new frame in two static stages
with more nuanced changes within each stage, the primary interest ofthis dissertation is
to explain the changes in the agenda. The international agenda is dynamic and changing,
but the categories provide useful reference points to document important changes that
occurred in international attention. Although this dissertation groups the stages into
boxes, these boxes often merge and flow from one to another often blurring the borders
between these stages.
ONAND OFF THE AGENDA (1500 - 1944)
In order to understand the appearance ofwhaling on the agenda, it is first
important to understand the basic history ofwhaling beginning approximately in the
1500's. The earliest practice ofhunting whales most likely occurred with the Norse
111
populations; however, scholars know very little about the history ofthe Norse and their
relationship with whales. The best indications ofwhaling during this time come from
documents describing family feuds over whale carcasses rather than descriptions ofthe
hunt (Ellis, 1991,40). Some scholars speculate that the Norse engaged in whaling
because the waters frequented by Norse were highly populated with a number ofwhale
species as well as other obscure passages in historical texts referring to creatures and
words that may be references to whales (Ellis, 1991,39). The subsequent Basque
whaling, however, is better documented and where most accounts of systematic whaling
begin.
The Basque population, generally occupying areas along the Bay ofBiscay in
what is now France and Spain, most likely were the earliest modem and systematic
whalers (Ellis, 1991,42). Evidence has been found ofwhale hunts on several Basque
communities found along the coast (Ellis, 1991,46). In addition to hunting along the
coasts, the Basques eventually ventured further out from the Bay ofBiscay as the Right
whale disappeared from the Bay ofBiscay.23 Whaling continued for the Basques as they
moved north and out ofthe Bay ofBiscay to areas of Labrador, Newfoundland, Ireland,
Iceland, Greenland, and Spitsbergen (Ellis, 1991,47). Although not a clear end to the
Basque whaling, whaling began to blend with British and Dutch whaling in the late 16
th
23 It is not clear whether the whales were driven from the Bay ofBiscay by the Basques or hunted
to decreased numbers. Markam (1882) suggests that only a few whales were taken each year by each
village and could not force the whales into extinction.
112
Century after the destruction ofthe Spanish Armada meant little protection for fishing
vessels far from coastal waters.
During the earliest encounters with whales, whalers engaged mostly along the
coastal waters oftheir homes. Most ofthe villages and communities along the coastal
waters were autonomous regions, and there was little intervention in the whaling
practices by the Spanish or other larger empires.
24
This illustrates the lack ofbroader
international attention to whaling during the early years of Basque whaling in the first
stage. In addition, the Basque whaling practices suggested a desire to exploit the
resources as much as possible as they chased the whales out oftheir own safer
community in the Bay ofBiscay into the larger open ocean. Although later unprotected
by the Spanish, the Basque whalers continued to take whales in cooperation with vessels
from Dutch and British communities.
25
Government interests primarily involved religion
and warfare before the Peace ofWestphalia in 1648 at the end ofThirty Years War.
These empires, generally fighting for control over the religion in Europe, did not attend to
whaling as fighting generally dominated their interests.
After 1648, we can begin to discuss the potential emergence ofwhaling on the
international agenda more easily because there are for the first time, sovereign nation-
states in the world system. Between the 1i
h
century and the early 20
th
century involves
24 The governing bodies during this time in Europe were not yet considered sovereign states as
generally established by the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, the term empire is used to describe the
governments.
25 Although this project references the Dutch and the British as the location from which whalers
came from, it does not imply that the governments were involved in whaling.
113
an international interest in whaling only in times where governments came in conflict
over whaling in the same areas, or where they conflicted in war and wished to control a
potentially important resource for combat. These introductions of whaling onto the
international agenda appears at sporadic intervals occurring when whaling appears as a
cause of security problems for states, while diminishing when conflict demands attention
away from whaling.
One ofthe earliest occasions where whaling emerged onto the international
agenda occurred over dominance ofthe seas around Spitsbergen, an island in the north
Atlantic between Greenland and Europe. The conflict occurred between the emerging
British and Dutch whalers after the decline ofBasque whaling. Leading into the 1600s,
Basque whaling declined due to the loss ofprotection by the defeat ofthe Spanish
Armada. The loss ofthe Spanish Armada in 1588 meant that Basque vessels could not
enjoy protection far from shore, which made whaling in the Northern Atlantic much more
treacherous. The end ofthe Basque dominance in whaling, however, meant the
emergence ofBritish and Dutch whalers around the seas in the Northern Atlantic,
including around the island of Spitsbergen.
The British commissioned the Muscovy Company to begin whaling the area in the
North Atlantic that fIrst met with failure by the ice and diffIcult conditions there (Ellis,
1991, 57). Despite these initial losses, the British sent more vessels to the area with
Basque whalers and harpooners in their employ. These vessels, despite competition from
other vessels ofDutch and German origin were able to secure enough whale to fill their
114
cargo areas (Ellis, 1991, 57). Competition grew between the Dutch and British whalers
as both sides' governments claimed monopoly rights over the seas around Spitsbergen
Island. Conflicts erupted between the sides, where ships were destroyed, and whale oil,
bone, and baleen were stolen initially by the British and subsequently by the Dutch
around 1615 (Francis, 1990, pp. 34-35). Increasingly conflictual, the British and the
Dutch began arming their whaling vessels or sending warships to protect their vessels
while operating around the seas. Given the difficulty ofwhaling while at perpetual
conflict, the British and the Dutch negotiated an agreement to divide the fisheries around
Spitsbergen, giving the Dutch the northern areas and the British the southern ones (Ellis,
1991,57; Francis, 1990, p. 35). After the agreement, the British and the Dutch appeared
to have discontinued their discussions on whaling.
Later, the British and the Americans nearly clashed over whaling as well, but the
American Revolutionary War interrupted interest in whaling and prevented its emergence
on the international agenda. During the 1700's, the British continued to expand their
whaling efforts, as did the American colonists. The American and British whalers
generally maintained separate areas ofoperation, but the Americans gradually
encroached on the British whaling grounds (Francis, 1990, p. 61). The British, fearful of
increased American whaling overtaking the British fleet, issued new rules in 1765 for all
whalers, which caused some inconvenience for the Americans and kept them away from
the British grounds (Francis, 1990, p. 61). Because the American colonists were under
British rule, they were subject to British laws involving whale catch. This does not
115
clearly constitute whaling entering the international agenda because America was
technically part ofthe British Empire, and the countries were not involved in negotiations
or attention toward whaling at this time, although whaling clearly had the attention ofthe
British government. During the American Revolutionary War, the whaling ships from
the American colonists were converted for war-fighting against the British, and whaling
by the Americans stopped for approximately 3 years (Francis, 1990, pp. 62-63). The
British whaling effort fell off dramatically as well, because the ships were needed for
logistics in carrying troops and supplies to aid the British armies fighting on the
American continent (Ellis, 1991, 71).
By our definition ofthe international agenda, whaling could not technically
appear on the international agenda because the American colonies were subject to the
British authorities. Therefore, it became an important domestic issue for the British, but
did not appear on the international agenda. Ifthe American colony were a state, whaling
would not have appeared on the international agenda regardless because ofthe relative
increase in importance ofwar between the British and the American colonists. The
security concerns ofthese states outweighed the importance ofwhaling.
Through subsequent years ofthe French Revolution, French hostilities against
Britain, and the war of 1812, whalers largely operated without interference from
governments. They faced many problems whaling under the conditions ofconflict
between these nations. Whalers often had to move their operations to avoid conflict and
116
sometimes suffered losses to their fleets at the hands ofthe warring countries (Francis,
1990, ch. 4).
After World War I, whaling again appeared on the international agenda,
beginning with a conference between the United States and Canada as part of a
conference on American-Canadian Fisheries in 1918 (Birnie, 1985, p. 105). The
conference on fisheries stated only that an international conference should be established
after the end of World War I (1918, p. 39). Whaling was not an explicit topic ofthe
conference, but appeared in a statement as part ofdiscussions on cooperation over
fisheries on the American-Canadian border.
The next tinle whaling appeared on the agenda occurred during the earliest
conferences specifically about whaling in the 1930s. Although state attention to whaling
previously consisted of more muted state action, state attention in the early 1930s
consisted ofthe first whaling conferences and the creation of international treaties. This
demonstrates greater depth of attention than earlier. Discussions in 1929 in the League of
Nations involved discussions over regulating all international resources, but in particular
to whaling, which had no international treaty at the time (Birnie, 1985, p. 111). In 1931,
the Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling opened for signature signifying a deeper
attention to whaling in the international community. Ratified by the required eight states,
the treaty entered into force in 1935. The total number ofsignatories to the treaty
amounted to 26 states, showing a significant increase in countries interested in whaling
before WWI, where no multilateral treaty was created, and only a limited number of
117
states paid attention to whaling. The 1931 Convention was followed by the 1937
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, a meeting to institute a protocol
in 1938,26 and an informal meeting in 1939 (Birnie, 1985, pp. 126-127). The succession
of several conferences and meetings on whaling confirm the importance ofthe issue on
the international agenda from 1930 until the beginning of World War II.
World War II resulted in no state attention to whaling between the period of 1939
and 1945. Not only did states lose interest in whaling because ofthe increased fighting in
Europe and in Asia, but the number ofwhalers in operation also declined. In the 1941-
1942 season, no whalers were able to partake in high seas whaling because ofthe war
(Birnie, 1985). States conducted no international conferences or attention to whaling
during the war. Therefore, whaling moved offthe agenda in favor of security concerns
involving World War II. Whaling again became part ofthe international agenda toward
the end ofthe war with a conference beginning in 1944.
Whaling generally appeared sporadically during the first stage between the
earliest whaling in 1500 through 1944. Although this is a long period ofhistory, much of
the time, whalers operated autonomously from governments. In a few instances, whaling
took a place on the international agenda. This occurred primarily in 1615 between the
Dutch and the British and between the British and the Americans around 1765. These
two cases of issue emergence suggest a very limited attention to whaling before 1930.
26 The 1937 agreement was extended by the protocol in 1938. Many provisions in the 1937
agreement and the protocol limit their applicability to the next immediate whaling season. These
provisions expire without subsequent agreement, not formally established again until 1944.
118
From 1930 to 1939, states increased attention to whaling by more states and increased
depth by international treaty formation.
SUSTAINED INTERESTIN WHALING (1944 - 2008)
From 1944 to 1970, whaling became a more permanent part ofthe international
agenda with the creation ofthe International Whaling Commission and yearly meetings
from 1949 through today. The fIrst signifIcant meeting after the importance ofwhaling
waned in World War II occurred in 1944 between Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Eire (Ireland) (Birnie,
1985, p. 131). Subsequent agreements extended after the war and set up the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1946. These early institutions set up an institutional
structure that allowed states to attend to the whaling after the end of World War II, if
states wished. Since there were provisions to allow states to enter the IWC or leave the
IWC with proper notice, the number ofstates maintaining a membership in the IWC
makes a good proxy for attention to whaling after 1946.
MATERIAL HYPOTHESES
The primary material hypotheses associated with issue attention describe the
relative importance of security issues over other issues. This initial hypothesis is further
developed into three parts based on the polarity in the international system. The
following sections describe these hypotheses briefly, review the changes in the
international agenda, and then evaluate the hypotheses based on changes relative
119
importance between security and non-security issues taking into account international
polarity.
Figure 2
International Whaling Commission Membership
60 --- -.-- -.-- -- - - - .
50 .L.._ _. ?..........??....-...........?_.--_._.....?.................- --..............................?_ --.?...- - - ---?.-.?.. -.-.....?-..- ..-.- -.---- ,r-
30 --------?----???-?-?????????-?--??----?-----------1-
70-'------------------------------------c~-
80
20
10 .;.., .
0 ????..?r????????
????????????????v?????v?????,??????
!Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl 0 N
""
<D !Xl
""
III III III III III <D <D W <D <D
" " " "
"
!Xl a:> !Xl !Xl !Xl 0'1 0'1 01 0'1 01 0 0 0 0 0
O'l O'l O'l O'l 01 01 01 01 O'l CJ\ O'l O'l 0'1 O'l O'l O'l O'l 0'1 O'l 01 0'1 0'1 O'l O'l CJ\ O'l 0 0 0 0 0
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... N N N N N
Note. Data taken from the International Whaling Commission.
In addition to a sustained interest in whaling from 1944, IWC membership
(Figure 2) shows two clear periods ofmembership expansion. From approximately 1974
to 1982 and again from 2000 to 2008, the number ofcountries interested in whaling
increased as membership in the IWC increased during these years. This signifies an
increase in attention to whaling as part ofthe international agenda.
120
Table 3.
Summary ofAgenda Changes for Whaling
Stage Years International Agenda
1930 - 1939
1500s - 1930
Stage 1
On and Offthe
Agenda
Sporadic and Short-lived Attention
1615, attention by British and Dutch
1765, near-attention by British and Americans
1918, American-Canadian Fisheries Conference
1929, League ofNations interest in marine resources
; ;...............................................................................................?..?......................................................................................................................................
Increased Attention by Whaling States
1931 and 1937 Conventions on Regulation of
Whaling
1938 Protocol Meeting
1939 Informal Conference
1939-1944
(WWII)
No Attention to Whaling
1944 - 1974
Stage 2
Sustained
Attention
Sustained Attention by Whaling and Ex-Whaling
States
Yearly conferences and the IWC from 1946
;???:???:=?????:?????..???????..? ???????.. ??1? :??............... . .
1974 - 2000 Sustained Attention by Whaling, Ex-Whaling, and
Non-Whaling States
Increase in membership until 1982 Moratorium
:.................................................................................. . .
2000 - 2008 Whaling Interest Expansion
Increase membership nations from 2000
To reiterate, there are generally two stages ofwhaling on the international agenda
with several transitions during these stages (summarized in Table 3). In the first stage,
whaling appeared on and offthe agenda several times. The period is characterized by
non-sustained interest in the international agenda by a small number ofstates in the
international system. Between 1500 and 1930, there are only four cases of appearance on
the international agenda. Between 1930 and 1939, there is increased attention in whaling
characterized by greater depth of attention and the creation of international conferences
121
and treaties. During World War II, states paid no attention to whaling. The second stage
begins at the end ofWorld War II and continues to today where there is a sustained
interest in whaling, with two changes in attention when the number of states interested in
whaling expands. The expansion occurs once beginning in 1974 and again beginning in
2000. Since this project attempts to understand the causes ofthe changes in the
international agenda, the changes described here in the attention to whaling over time are
evaluated by examining the hypotheses relevant to changes ofinternational issue
attention in the next section.
SECURITYISSUES DOMINATE THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
Material Hypothesis 1: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are
more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the
international agenda.
The primary hypothesis regarding material influences on agenda describes the
importance of security issues over other issues on the international agenda. Although this
study is not a comparative analysis, where we could compare security issues to non 
security issues and determine the relative importance, we can still examine whether our
case is consistent with the emergence ofsecurity issues on the agenda. Security issues
should be more likely to emerge on the international agenda and take the place of an
environmental issue, such as whaling. When whaling appears as a security threat, we
expect whaling to become part ofthe international agenda. When the issue is no longer a
security threat, we expect whaling to become less important or move offthe international
122
agenda. In a unipolar system, we expect security to be less of a concern for states based
on hegemonic stability theory. In unipolar systems, therefore, we expect that whaling
might appear on the international agenda more frequently or higher because security is
less of a concern. In bipolar systems, we expect security to be a greater concern given
the rivalry between the two large powers. Therefore, we expect less attention to whaling
than to other security issues. Finally, in multipolar systems, security is the greatest
concern because of multiple large powers and changing alliances. We expect in the
multipolar system that whaling would rarely appears on the international agenda and
security issues would overtake whaling frequently.
As described in the first section ofthis chapter summarized in Table 3, there are
two stages of the agenda in regards to whaling. The first stage is characterized by
whaling moving on and offthe international agenda, while the second stage is
characterized by sustained attention. More subtle changes occur within each stage in
regards to the depth ofattention and the number of states attending to the issue. To
determine the application ofthe hypotheses described above, this section examines the
extent to which polarity variables coincide with the international agenda and how well
changes in polarity correlate with changes in the international agenda.
Between the 1500s and 1945, multipolarity dominates the international system.
27
Although different states change relative power positions during this time, multipolarity
27 Polarity information is all taken from Thompson (1986) unless otherwise noted in the text or
citations.
123
persists for most ofthis period. From approximately 1945 to 1991, the international
system is characterized by bipolarity with the Untied States and the Soviet Union as the
two primary global powers. After 1991, with the collapse ofthe Soviet Union and the
destruction ofthe Berlin Wall, scholars sometimes have classified the international
system as a unipolar system with the United States as the only global power (Kapstein &
Mastanduno, 1999; Mastanduno, 1997; Wohlforth, 1999). Table 4 provides a summary
ofpolarity during the periods of interest for this project in comparison to the stages ofthe
agenda in regards to whaling.
Table 4.
World Power Polarity and the International Agenda
Stage Years International Agenda Polarity
1500 - 1930
Sporadic and Short-lived Attention;~~tiPOlar
Stage 1
..........................." ..,............" ........................." .......................,.........................................,....?
On and Off
1930 - 1939 Increased Attention by Whaling Sta ltipolar
........,.................................... ................
the Agenda
1939-1944 No Attention to Whaling Multipolar
(WWII)
.,.,..... ..",.........,.....................................
1944 - 1974 Sustained Attention by Whaling and Ex- Bipolar
Stage 2
Whaling States
." ....................,..........,..........".............................
Sustained 1974 -2000 Sustained Attention by Whaling, Ex- Bipolar and
Attention Whaling, and Non-Whaling States Unipolar
............
2000 - 2008 Whaling Interest Expansion Unipolar
Note. Polanty mformatlOn taken from Thompson (1986).
During the first stage ofthe agenda, whaling appeared on the agenda sporadically
and for short time periods. Generally, during this time, the attention to whaling was
relatively shallow and bilateral. Only during the time from 1930 to 1939 did states begin
to take a deeper and multilateral interest in whaling. This time is also characterized as a
124
multipolar system. The rare and the sporadic short-lived attention suggest that the data
are consistent with the material hypotheses. When the attention to whaling on the agenda
shifts from stage 1 to stage 2, where sustained international attention and a deeper
attention to whaling begins, the system changes from a multipolar system to a bipolar
system. This is also consistent with the hypotheses because changes in polarity
correspond to changes in the international agenda. Bipolar and unipolar systems make it
more likely that a non-security issue gains attention from states. Although unipolarity
creates the conditions most likely for non-security issues to emerge on the agenda,
bipolarity also provides space for non-security issues because ofsecurity provided within
the global powers' spheres ofinfluence. Materialist conditions may account for the
increased attention in 2000 after the system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar one,
where states joining may not have a need for security concerns and could attend to non 
security issues such as whaling.
The primary hypothesis for materialist factors also suggests that security will
dominate the agenda overall and take precedence over non-security issues. Based on a
broader look at the international agenda for whaling, it is clear that at least in one period,
the security concerns for states took whaling offthe agenda in favor of security issues. In
the 1930's, when states developed a deeper and increasing attentiveness to whaling, the
Second World War interrupted this trend and took whaling offthe agenda until the end of
the war. Therefore, this shows a time where security trumped a non-security issue on the
international agenda, which the materialist hypothesis suggests.
125
The materialist accounts fail to explain several aspects ofchanges in the
international agenda, however. Materialist variables fail to explain why, beginning in the
1930s, states took a deeper interest in whaling and began toward a sustained interest that
eventually developed after the Second World War. Because this occurred during a
multipolar system, we would expect attention to remain short lived and shallow as
interest had been before 1930. In addition, materialist conditions fail to explain the
expansion of interest in whaling during the 1970s when polarity does not shift
correspondingly with the agenda. Overall, materialism can account for some ofthe
variation observed on the dependent variable in terms of state attention to issues, but not
all the variation. Thus, materials conditions, or those based on realist logic provide a
relatively good explanation for changes in the international agenda, but fail to explain all
the changes seen in international attention.
NON-MATERIAL HYPOTHESES
There are three primary hypotheses involving non-material variables that may
cause changes in issue attention on the international agenda. These non-material
hypotheses involve the use of rhetoric to influence the attention of states for whaling.
Blame, victimization, and descriptions ofthe timing and magnitude of effects ofthe
phenomenon can influence attention to issues in the international agenda. These three
hypotheses are described briefly below in addition to reviewing changes in the
international agenda before evaluating whether each hypothesis explains the changes in
126
the agenda. The case study does not explain all aspects ofchanges in whaling, but
focuses exclusively on information relevant to the hypotheses tested.
NAMING AND BLAMING
Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators
makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue
to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.
Ifrhetoric changes from identification ofnon-states to states as the perpetrators of
whaling, we would expect increased attention from states. Whaling would become part
ofthe agenda or ofincreased importance when the rhetoric places blame on states. As
discussed earlier, there are two primary stages ofthe international agenda for whaling.
The first stage has limited and sporadic attention, while the second stage has sustained
attention to whaling and an increasing number ofstates and depth ofattention. We
expect whaling to increase in attention after a period ofrhetoric describing states as the
cause ofwhaling making them directly part ofthe issue frame.
During the earliest whaling periods, there is little rhetoric from the early 1500s to
1900 describing the causes of whaling destruction as blamed on states. However, it is
instructive to examine briefly some descriptions ofthe causes ofwhale changes before
the 1920s, which is discussed below when blame on states increased. Generally, during
,
these early years, humans were not considered an important cause ofchanges for marine
lif~.Although there is little research on whales in particular during these early years,
some information on fisheries provides a proxy for how society related to marine life.
127
United States and Britain created a group ofscientists in 1864 to examine the
population and effects ofhuman action on fish in the oceans. In particular, questions as
to whether certain types offishing, such as bottom trawling, where fishers drag nets along
the ocean floor, reduced fish populations. The results ofthese studies suggested that
humans were not a cause of fishery population declines and influence was negligible.
The scientific commission concluded that the effects ofhuman fishing were not
significant compared to the effects ofpredatory species in the oceans (luda, 1996, p. 21).
Continued scientific inquiry by the United States attempted to increase information about
the quantity offish-stocks in the oceans. Often these studies suggested the need for
greater data on fisheries, but some also commented on the decline offish stocks in
specific areas (luda, 1996). Because ofthe uncertainty in these studies and the number of
somewhat contradictory studies presented - fish stocks in one region declined but not in
another (luda, 1996, p. 29) - scientific information presented during these early years on
fishing were uncertain or showing negligible influence ofhumans on fish stocks.
Although this does not apply directly to whales because the studies did not include
whales, the information provides some sense ofhow society viewed ocean life generally.
Most reports did not attribute lower fish stocks to human consumption. When reports
attributed lower fish stocks to human consumption, the reports also described the high
uncertainty and the need for more data.
Given the early perception associating non-human activity with the decimation of
ocean life, increasing blame on states presents a clear change in the blame for whaling
128
population declines in rhetoric. The primary states involved in whaling in 1939 at a
conference for whaling included Germany, Britain, Japan, Norway, and the United States
with Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa as observers (Ellis, 1991, p. 388).
These states constitute the states that had an interest in whaling at the beginning ofthe
transition to the second stage. In 1944, the beginning of sustained international attention
to whaling began with a Conference by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Birnie, 1985, p. 131). Evidence of
increasing rhetorical blame for states before the increase in attention by these nations
suggests a possible connection between the blame and attention to whaling.
Evidence ofrhetoric blame is developed through an examination ofnews articles
from the New York Times and Google News Search. New York Times archives searches
through the earliest printed newspapers headlines from 1851. Google News covers years
and newspapers authorized by news media owners. There is no indication from Google
on their coverage, although when searching for news, coverage extends back into the
1800's. As an example, searching "New Zealand" and "Whaling," between 1840 and
1850, generates results from the New York Times, The New Zealand Gazette and
Wellington Spectator, the New Zealand Spectator, Nelson Examiner, The Courier,
Sydney Morning Herald, and others. Although coverage depends on the cooperation of
newspaper companies, it appears fairly wide for the period under consideration in this
study. The searches used for both the New York Times and Google News look for
articles that describe whaling with the country associating the country with whaling
----------_..- ---_._._.-
129
actions. This serves as only a proxy measurement for blame. The data are available in
the appendix.
Beginning in approximately 1880, the causes of whaling began to shift from
companies and individuals to states. Before this year, newspapers often reported catch
and oil produced attributed to companies and cities that had large numbers of whalers.
After 1880, however, a larger percentage of whaling articles began to describe whale
catches along side specific country names rather than the companies who operated the
vessels. Figure 3 illustrates that the newspapers reported country names associated with
whaling more beginning in the 1880's. The large increase in countries described in the
1860 consists solely of descriptions of "America" and whaling, while later increases
contain multiple country names. The increase in rhetoric associating "America" with
whaling is an outlier resulting from the American Civil War ending in 1865. The large
increase in "America" as part ofthe rhetoric most likely occurred because of a strong
northern emphasis on a central government during the Civil War.
One peak of blame for states occurred in 1910 (3 of 12), 20 years before interest
in whaling began to increase. This peak amounts to 25% ofthe whaling articles
published during this time. This evidence is not decisive, but provides some indication
that blame increased for states leading into the changes in international attention to
whaling. For example, in 1854 a report ofthe arrival ofwhaling vessels blends the
rhetoric between states and local governments. The article describes the arrival of
whalers from New-Bedford along side descriptions of arrivals of ships from Japan
130
("George Law," 1854). The rhetoric changes during the late l800s and early 1900s to
one that references only countries. In 1903, rhetoric in the newspaper compares sizes of
whaling industries between Newfoundland, the United States, and Great Britain
("Whaling fleet ofthe banks," 1903). This rhetoric becomes greater again as articles
increase their use of states as the proxy for whalers. In 1912, an article describes the
potential for international regulation because of"the slaughter ofwhales by the
Canadians, the Japanese, and Others" ("Closed season for whales," 1912).
Figure 3.
States andW~9lingin_th_e_M_e_w__}';_o_r_k_T_'_?m_e_s _
---_._--_._-_._-------_._ ... _----_.,..--~
-+--+------------
20.00%
30.00%
10.00%? ---
15.00%
25.00% -j---+----t----------..,.----
5.00% +--+--------t-------"I'----------------------------;
0.00% 1.------"----.-- ,--'---,---..L--,----,---,----c------,-------,-------,------r---,----,-------,------,---i
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
35.00% -j-----+-+------
40.00"/0 -j--_---j'!--'"LLL .---"--'l"-L.:::I ----c
45.00% T-------- - -- -.-..---- ---.-----.-. . -.-.-.-.---- -.- .
Note. N = 371.
More specifically, we can examine the extent to which media described specific
states before changes in whaling attention by those states. Google News Search
generates a list and count of all news articles given a specific search term, including a
timeline ofthe articles. For the purpose ofthis project, the search terms consist of
131
"whaling" and the country name for each two-year period. Figure 4 shows Sparklines for
the countries ofinterest between the years 1920 and 1946 in two-year intervals.
28
The
countries are arranged in an order to illustrate commonalities among the peaks in news
articles mentioned in particular years. The peaks for the countries near the top ofthe
figure occur in 1928, while peaks for countries at the bottom occur between 1936 and
1938.
Figure 4.
Country Specific Blame Sparklines (1920-1946,2 year intervals)
Country Sparkline (1920 - 1946) Peak (year) Avg/year (n)
.....Q.~~~~~~;>~=??????~????~?}~.5???f.}.~~.~~.????????.?????~.~;~.I~~9.J)??????
Australia???/~"_---.lI.?O??~J~L~~(???)
New Zealand.//"'??,?,~~Q?~~1J4~QO??}
Britain.. . .. ...??O?~~2J~:7(4~?)
C
s
anahda
Af
..<;~:.~~~..~.-.-/ 3373?(J992268?????)~?~7{~?~?).
outnca:-:-'?~?:?~1.Jg~JQ??
g~E~~Y.,,//'--"'???(L?}~1.J4~4(}?42
~~P~?.?~(}?}~}}?~9(4}?2
Ireland???.?/~..??7~::..~17 (1938) 4.3 (111)
Note. Data compiled by author from Google News Search as described in the text.
'Canada peaked in 1926, but the number ofarticles remained the same for the following two-year period at
37 in 1928.
Figure 4 indicates that New Zealand, Australia, Norway, the US, Canada, and
Britain were associated with whaling to a greater extend peaking around 1928. In 1944,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, and Britain all showed increased
28 Sparklines are small graphs in order to present data side-by-side without placing the data in one
graph where information may be obscured and the Y-axis may vary considerably. See Tufte (2006) for
more information on Sparklines.
132
interest in whaling at the end ofthe war and as a start to sustained interest thereafter. All
ofthese states show peaks around 1928, suggesting a potential relationship between
previous blame ofwhaling and the increased interest later on. Although the US did not
participate in the 1944 conference, the US participated deeply in whaling after 1944 as
part ofthe whaling agreement in 1946. South Africa shows a less pronounced peak
blame for whaling as the general number ofreferences for whaling trends downward over
time. Ireland does not have a large number ofarticles mentioning the country on average
and does not present any clear peaks.
Overall, there is some indication that attribution ofwhaling to states rather than
other actors could have contributed to the increased attention ofstates during the early
1900's. In addition, measurement for specific countries indicates the potential for
influence of blame and later interest in international whaling. The time distance between
blame and interest in international whaling appears to be approximately 40 years. This
lag time makes some sense given that rhetoric in the news may take some time before
states need to respond during the 1940's as opposed to the rapid communication
occurring recently.
We can also examine the increase in attention to whaling in 1974 and whether this
occurs due to increase in blame among states. In 1974, non-whaling countries become
increasingly part ofthe International Whaling Commission signifying a change in issue
attention as illustrated previously in Figure 2. Therefore, we can examine rhetoric before
133
1974 to determine ifa change occurred in the country blame as an indication that rhetoric
blame changes caused the changes in country attention.
The dynamics ofcountry blame in the news, however, are slightly more complex
than simply assigning blame to many more states. Blame became more focused on fewer
states between 1950 and 1980. The blame rhetoric shifted from a larger number of states,
which were previously engaged in whaling, to a smaller number of states in the 1970s. In
the data seen in Figure 5, a number ofcountries appeared next to whaling information or
data during the 1950's, but this declined significantly in the 1970s and 1980s to seven or
fewer states.
During the changes between 1960 and 1980, anti-whaling activists, originating
with Greenpeace, focused blame through their rhetoric, photos, and actions on only two
primary countries: The Soviet Union and Australia. Actions by Greenpeace focused
almost exclusively on Soviet Whalers (Day, 1987), while other organizations focused on
Australian whalers (Day, 1987, p. 17). The more limited focus ofblame on fewer
countries coincided with actual numbers of whales caught during those years. For
example, during the 1969-1970 season, approximately 83.7% ofthe whales caught were
caught by Japan and the Soviet Union (Ishida, 2000b). In the 1959-1960 season, Japan
and the Soviet Union caught approximately 47.6% ofthe total number of whales (Ishida,
2000a). This alone seems to provide some evidence against the hypothesis above
because increasing blame and country attention to whaling do not coincide. We would
134
expect based on the hypothesis that decreased blame would make those states less
interested in whaling than when they were part ofthe blame rhetoric and frame.
Figure 5.
Percentage o/Country Blame in the New York Times
1,...-------------------?--------
0.9 -/------------------.---------
0.8 -/-------
0.7 -/-------
0.6
0.5
0/1
0.3
0.2
0.1
OFORMER SOVIET
UNION
OUNITED STATES
lilllUNlTED KINGDOM
IlI:lPERU
IINORWAY
IINEW ZEAU\NO
I."l NETHERLANDS
jgJAPAN
E!llCELAND
f2GERNANY
oCANADA
1950
Note. N=165.
1960 1970 1900 1990
Ifwe expect states to gain interest when blamed in rhetoric, we would expect
them to lose interest when not blamed in the rhetoric. It appears, however, that there was
a large increase in attention to the issue of whaling during the 1970s in particular as a
large number ofnations joined the IWC and engaged the whaling issue. Therefore, the
blame rhetoric cannot explain why states became more interested in the issue during the
1970s.
135
In 1979, new countries entering the IWC consisted ofSweden, Seychelles, Peru,
Chile, and Spain. In examining the relationship between naming these countries in news
and their membership, evidence suggests a reversed causal direction. Membership in the
IWC most likely influenced the appearance ofthese countries in the news media rather
than their appearance increasing their interest in whaling. For example, examining
Sweden, Seychelles, Peru, Chile, and Spain, which joined the IWC in 1979, it is clear that
the number ofarticles describing these countries as part ofwhaling all rose after 1978.
Figure 6.
Country Specific Blame Sparklines (1970-1980, 2 year intervals)
Country Sparkline (1970 - 1980) Peak (year) Avg/year (n)
?~Yl?h~U~~..,<~..........??........ ....?C1.?7?)....):.?.(l~)
Sweden.I~Ll??9.}}.~4(4D
Peru 22 6.8
Chile. .17(J2~9.1?:~((?~)..
~p(~Al?_.. ,.' ........?}(I??Ql?:QC?(?2
Note. Data compiled by author from Google News Search as described in the text.
Figure 6 illustrates how these countries all gained increased association with
whaling after joining the IWC, and there is much less indication that these states were
blamed in rhetoric before joining. In addition, the average number of articles per year for
each state is too low to make an adequate suggestion that naming these countries as part
ofwhaling caused them to take an increased interest in whaling.
To summarize briefly, before 1930, the primary causes as discussed in news
articles involved non-state actors. Rhetoric implying cause with states increased
beginning in the 1920s, peaking for many countries in 1928. These changes, along with
136
the changes in international interest in whaling in 1944 seem to coincide, given an 18 
year lag between the rhetoric and the changes in the agenda. In the second primary
change occurring in 1974, there is little indication that rhetoric focusing on blame caused
changes in the interest ofstates because the media focused blame on fewer states. This
leaves mixed results for this section and the hypothesis on whether blame in rhetoric
causes increased attention for states. It appears that there may be some connection
between the two, but a tentative one. It is important to note that nationalization of
whaling companies could explain the increase in description ofstates as the cause of
whaling as opposed to individual ships. This does not appear to be the case with whaling,
however, as whaling companies seem to persist as private actors. Some subsidies have
grown for whaling nations currently, such as Japan, but this does not amount to a
significant amount ofnationalization in the industry.
NAMING AND VICTIMIZATION
Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or
beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances
for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the
agenda.
In addition to blame, rhetoric emphasizing different consequences of whaling can
change state involvement in the issue. Non-material hypothesis 2 suggests that rhetoric
identifying states as part ofthe effects ofthe observed phenomenon makes those states
more interested in the issue.
137
During the first stage, where whaling was associated only sporadically with the
security of states, there is little evidence available on the communication and rhetoric
propagated about the consequences of whaling. The behavior ofstates suggests that only
in the cases where the consequences ofwhaling interfered with their security, they
became interested in whaling; however, there is no rhetoric to associate with the changes
in their understanding ofthe consequences in particular to whales. On the contrary, the
only evidence we have from the period consists ofdescriptions of conflict between the
nations' governments before they became involved and attempted to stop such conflict to
resume whaling practices (see Ellis, 1991).
In the 1930's, however, the League ofNations and the international conventions
in 1930s begin to present rhetoric in regards to the consequence of whaling in terms of
marine resources. In these records, effects of whaling are not associated with specific
states. During the changes between the first and second stages with an increase in
attention for whaling among states, the rhetoric does not point to the consequences of
whaling for states in any great degree. Instead, much ofthe rhetoric describes the
consequences of whaling in terms of a more general decline ofthe whaling industry and
economic difficulties. This implies some consequences for whaling states because those
states will lose some economic resources or growth. However, the rhetoric does not
explicitly identify countries that would suffer from continued whaling.
Consequences ofwhaling did not focus on states, but on non-state negative
effects. One description, from the whalers themselves, describes how their whaling
138
actions have led to a decline in the profitability ofwhaling (Epstein, 2008; Stoett, 1997).
In this description, whaling itself has led to the decline in profitability because the
number ofwhales has declined and time and resources needed to catch each whale has
increased. Companies established rules to control whaling between 1932 and 1936, not
part ofinternational treaties, as additional evidence of the association between whaling
and economic decline. The agreements between companies established a quota system,
where each company could sell their quota amounts to other countries, which was based
on the amount of oil produced from whales - the origin ofthe Blue Whale Unit (Birnie,
1985, p. 120). These inter-company agreements suggest that whaling was a cause of
economic problems for these companies and some management could prevent these
losses. There is little indication that the economic problems were associated with states,
thus the consequences were not generally associated with states.
During the changes ofattention to whaling beginning in 1970, with the increase in
state attention to the whaling issue, the primary rhetoric described the consequences of
whaling, again, not in terms of states. The primary source ofrhetoric during the 1970s
came from anti-whaling activists. Anti-whaling activists associated whaling with the
destruction ofan intelligent being part ofour common resource rather than as economic
decline or explicitly with states (Day, 1987). The rhetoric discussed whaling as a moral
bad rather than an economic bad, neither ofwhich discuss states explicitly receiving
negative or positive consequences from whaling.
139
Despite the lack of explicit reference to states receiving consequences from
whaling, there may be implied consequences for states in both the cases of rhetoric
described above. In the first case, negative economic consequences of whaling can be
implicitly associated with states because companies associated with a state suffer
consequences, therefore employment may decline as well as taxes paid by the company.
In the second case, when whaling causes the destruction of a resource owned by the
world, this may imply involvement by not only whaling countries, but also non-whaling
countries. However, since the hypotheses outlined previously describe the influence of
rhetoric on state action in terms ofnaming those states, the hypothesis is not supported
given the evidence from the whaling case. Stretching the data to implied consequences to
states may increase support for the hypotheses, but would require alterations ofthe
hypotheses to include implied meanings. This does not mean that the hypothesis is
incorrect, but simply that the reason for increase in attention is not attributable to rhetoric
focused on states consequences. There does not appear to be any clear rhetoric
describing states as suffering consequences ofwhaling.
TIMING AND MAGNITUDE
In addition to blaming and victimization, the third influence ofnon-material
factors is through rhetorical emphasis on short-term and greater magnitude effects.
Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences and those that emphasize increases in
magnitude of effects are more likely to generate attention from states than less extreme
rhetoric. This project describes rhetoric increasing the magnitude of effects and the
140
short-term consequences as crisis making. Increasing the magnitude of effects or the
proximity ofthose effects increases the sense of crisis because consequences become
more acute.
A primary source for information regarding the magnitude ofeffects and the
timing ofthose effects comes from the scientific community. During the early years of
whaling, very little science concerned the number or the rate at which whale numbers
declined. Instead, much ofthe early research involved identification and description of
whaling species. In some cases, scientists identified species ofwhales only after those
whales were already being hunted to extinction (see Ellis, 1991, pp. 371-374; Francis,
1990,p.215).
Earliest appearances ofrhetoric regarding the degree and timing of disappearance
ofwhales comes from the International Council for the Exploration ofthe Sea (ICES),
which was started by an informal agreement in 1902 (Birnie, 1985, p. 107), leading to a
formalized convention, signed in 1964 (CICES, 1964). ICES primary research involved
declining stocks offish and seals during most ofthe earlier years until approximately
1927 (Birnie, 1985, p. 108). ICES did not directly conduct research on population
numbers, however. ICES primary contribution consisted ofgenerating measurement
techniques and describing the urgency for increased research and uniform policies for
measurement. ICES also helped draft the 1931 Convention on the Regulation ofWhaling
(Birnie, 1985, p. 109).
141
Part ofthe suggested ICES policies involved collection of data on catch
information from the various countries involved in whaling. One publicized study (not
conducted by ICES) examined the potential destruction ofwhaling populations in the
future and was published in 1928 (Juda, 1996, p. 69). Despite these reports, the League
ofNations was instructed in 1929 that decline in whaling populations would be "self 
correcting" because complete extermination would not occur once whaling declined
enough to make it not profitable to whalers (Juda, 1996, p. 69). Therefore, although the
hypothesis suggests that rhetoric increasing the magnitude of effects or crises results in
increased attention, the existence offew reports and contradictions between the reports
makes this hypothesis difficult to test. Although ICES was an important part ofthe
development oftreaties and the policies within those treaties involving whaling, there
was very little research or rhetoric on the rate at which whales were declining or the
magnitude of effects of whaling.
Although there are conflicting reports early in whaling, crisis-making rhetoric
increased during the 1950s and after. During the 1950s, as research on whale populations
began to catch up with whaling practices, some researchers increasingly described the
need for lower quotas or a cessation ofwhaling in order to preserve stocks for the future.
These reports by the Scientific Committee ofthe IWC, suggested for example before the
1959 meeting ofthe IWC, that the quota set by the IWC of 14,500 Blue Whale Units was
too high (T0nnessen & Johnsen, 1982, p. 587). This rhetoric had greater emphasis after
the appointment ofthe Committee ofThree in 1960, who were scientists involved in
142
population research (Aron, 2001, p. 108). The rhetoric increased toward crisis conditions
in 1962, when the Scientific Committee stated that, "immediate action by the commission
was critical for the protection ofwhale stocks, particularly the blue, humpback, and fin
whales" (Aron, 2001, p. 109).
Although the recommendations by the Committee ofThree were not always
adopted by the Scientific Committee, the suggestions that some stocks ofwhale were
being destroyed rapidly by whaling practices increased the urgency ofwhale depletion
for those species. Researchers increasingly urged the IWC that whale stocks for some
species required immediate attention in order to protect those stocks because ofthe
extensive whaling practices during previous years (Francis, 1990, p. 220). These
suggestions amounted to increasing the sense of crisis in regards to the effects ofwhaling
on the whale populations. We expect, based on an increase in the urgency ofwhaling
effects on whale populations that state interest would increase during this time.
Although scientific information may have been a contributor to changing policies
and quotas in the IWC (quota levels for species) as well as possibly the emergence ofthe
anti-whaling advocacy movement in the early 1970s, there does not appear to be an
increase in state attention to whaling because ofthe increased urgency presented by the
scientists during the 1950's. As previously noted in Figure 2, the increase in attention to
whaling began in 1970 as new members joined the IWC. Between 1950 and 1970, there
is no noticeable change in membership in the IWC, although membership fluctuates
143
slightly. The increase in urgency, although not an influence on state attention, may have
indirectly influenced state attention through the anti-whaling movement.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter began by describing the changes in attention to whaling from 1500
through 2008. Attention to whaling changed over two stages during this time. In the first
stage, states paid sporadic and short-lived attention to whaling. The first stage occurred
from the earliest whaling to 1944. The transition to the second stage, however, might
have begun as early as 1930 when states began to formalize their interest in whaling,
suggesting a deeper and more sustained interest. This deeper and sustained interest in
whaling, however, begins clearly at the end World War II in 1944. Between 1944, and
2008, states maintained a deeper and sustained interest as the number of states attending
to whaling increased twice during this period: once in 1974 and again in 2000.
The material hypothesis examines the degree to which security dominates the
international agenda relative to other issues on the agenda. Security issues are more
likely to appear on the agenda than other issues and security issues are more likely appear
higher on the agenda than non-security issues. The evidence analyzed in this chapter
generally supports this hypothesis. Security concerns for states seem to dominate the
international agenda and security issues can trump non-security issue attention as
occurred when World War II dominated over whaling. Materialist variable changes fail
to account for increased attention during the 1970s and the deeper interest beginning in
144
1944. However, security provided by the two dominant states may partially explain the
increasing interest in 1944.
Three primary non-material hypotheses were examined to explain the changes
that occurred in attention to whaling. Some rhetoric implying the cause ofthe destruction
of whales with states emerged in 1928, approximately 18 years before a change in
whaling interest in 1944. The emergence and repetition ofrhetoric in the media blaming
states before the change in attention demonstrates a potential relationship between the
rhetoric and the changes in attention. Before the changes in 1974, however, there is little
indication that rhetoric blaming states led to changes in the agenda. The rhetoric
describing the cause ofwhaling became more focused on fewer states, but the number of
states interested in whaling increased. Although tIns does not support the hypothesis in
general, the increased focusing on fewer states may have increased attention indirectly if
this focused on a controversial or imp0l1ant state. This is not directly examined in this
project, however.
The second hypothesis examined involves rhetoric describing consequences ofthe
phenomenon associated with states. When states are associated with the consequences of
the phenomenon, states are more likely to become interested in the issue. In the
examination ofrhetoric regarding the consequences ofwhaling for states, the evidence
only implies consequences for states without explicit statements. Rhetoric present during
the first shift in attention to whaling describes the negative economic consequences of
whaling. For the changes in 1974, rhetoric described the consequences of whaling as the
145
destruction of a resource owned by the world. Both imply consequences for states, but
do not suggest state consequences explicitly. In the first case, states with economic
interests may suffer negative consequences. In the second case, states with an interest in
common marine resources may suffer negative consequences. However, in both cases,
explicit rhetoric does not appear involving the consequences for states. This neither
supports nor dismisses the hypothesis because no clear change in the independent
variable occurs.
The third hypothesis examined involves crisis-making rhetoric that describes
changes in the magnitude ofeffects or changes in the time to effects. There was little
rhetoric describing the magnitude of effects ofwhaling or increased urgency ofthe issue
for changes occurring in whaling attention from the first to the second stage. Some new
rhetoric emerged during the 1950s on the increased urgency ofattending to whaling;
however, no change occurred during the time in terms of state attention to whaling.
Overall, the material causes of agenda changes seem to hold up well given the
evidence presented from the case of whaling. The non-material causes show mixed
results in their influence over issue attention for whaling. The next chapter continues the
empirical examination ofwhaling by looking directly at frame changes rather than
attention changes.
146
CHAPTER V
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS WHALING: FRAME CHANGES
Chapter IV examined the changes in the international agenda regarding issue
attention. This chapter examines the second part ofthe international agenda that involves
changes in the whaling frame. The chapter proceeds to describe the changes on the
international agenda regarding the whaling frame over the period from 1500 to 2008.
After which, the chapter discusses and analyzes the changes in the frames in regards to
the material and non-material hypotheses relevant to frames developed in Chapter III.
These hypotheses involve polarity and the degree of contestation over frames, media
exposure and focusing events, and connections to a broader discourse or culture. In
addition, the chapter examines strategies for rhetorical manipulation, primarily
concerning changes in scope, and the effects on frames.
INTERNATIONAL WHALING FRAMES
Before describing the frames, it is important to recognize that the years attached
to changes in frames described below are harder to identify than in the previous chapter
regarding issue attention. Since the changes that occur in the frame is a bit fuzzier than
issue attention, the different periods are a rougher estimate than the years described in
changes ofwhaling on or off the agenda. In the description ofthe frame changes, the
dates associated with the dominant frame represent clear dominance ofa frame after a
147
period ofcontestation. Although the frame may have become dominant earlier, the dates
used suggest clear dominance based on the evidence.
To summarize the changes in the frame briefly, there are three general changes in
the dominant frame regarding the relationship between states and whales. During the
first frame, governments are largely not involved in whaling, as was shown earlier in
discussions of whaling attention, but we can understand the frame as the dominant
understanding ofwhaling in relation to non-state actors. For this first stage, the whaling
frame is generally umecognized by states, as they are not paying much attention to the
issue. The first dominant frame describes companies and individuals as primary causes
of whaling, which produces economic prosperity and luxury goods. The goals of any
policies during this period attempt to increase efficiency of whaling and improve the
quality and quantity ofwhale products.
After this first stage, a period of contestation over the frame begins around 1920,
although the actual year is difficult to specify. Beginning in approximately 1945, a
second dominant frame emerges describing states as the cause of whaling resulting in
economic prosperity, food, and concern about the demise ofthe whaling industry. Policy
proposals involve international management ofwhaling by states. Following the second
frame, a period of contestation occurs beginning in 1970. After the period of
contestation, a new dominant frame emerges in 1982. This new frame suggests that
whaling results in destruction ofwhales and policies involve cessation ofwhaling. Table
5 summarizes these changes, and the next section describes them in additional detail.
148
Table 5.
Frame Changes in Whaling
Dominant Frame
Time Causes Consequences Prescriptions
Economic
prosperity and
1uxury goods
1500s - early 1920s : Companies
and
individuals
I Increase efficiency,
Iquality, and quantity of
I whale products; reduce
I piracy; prevent conflict
I between whaling
, I companies
....................................................................................................................~?? ? ???????????????mm .
1920s - 1940s I Period of Greater Contestation
....................................................................~- ".............. . .
1939-1945 i World War II
1945 - 1970 States Economic Managed whaling
prosperity, food,
demise of
whaling industry
.............................................................
1970-1982 Period of Greater Contestation
..................... ..........................,........
1982 - 2009 States Destruction of Whaling moratorium
whale
populations
WHALING EXPLOITATION FRAME
The first dominant frame appeared unrecognized by states during the period from
earliest whaling to approximately the 1920s. During this period of over 400 years, the
interpretation ofthe relationship between people and marine resources implies the
whaling frame, rather than explicitly described by states. The frame is characterized
primarily by the idea that these resources should be exploited like other marine resources,
and these resources will renew themselves over time (Stoett, 1997,28). The discussion
below describes this relationship by referencing documents and actions between humans
and whales over this 400-year period. Since international actors do not explicitly
149
describe the frame because state attention is sporadic during this period, we must derive
the frame by examining the actions and words of actors that may not explicitly identify
the frame.
Individuals believed whales should be exploited since the earliest whaling as
evidenced by documents discussing whales and their uses. The practice of consuming
whales may have been around for over 150,000 years as archeological studies have found
remnants of used whale parts (Rutherford, 2007), most likely from beached whales (Ellis,
1991, 37). The practice of going into the water and whaling has most likely been part of
society since approximately the 1i
h
century, when people moved from consuming and
using beached whales to the practice ofhunting whales along the coastlines (Ellis,
1991,38-9; Stoett, 1997, p. 152).
In early descriptions ofwhales, they were often referred to as human adversaries,
for example, as "monstrous creatures... armed with most terrible, sharpe, and cutting
teeth" (Pliny the Elder, 79 AD, Quoted in Ellis 1991,35). We can also see some
indication ofthe relationship between people and whales from Bible texts. In the Bible,
we see references to "Leviathan," which some have suggested as a reference to whales.
In Job, for example, the text describes rousing a "Leviathan" (Bible, Job 3.8) and pulling
"in the leviathan with a fishhook" (Bible, Job 41.1). These earliest references in the
Bible, describing what is likely a whale as a "leviathan" emphasizes the large and
powerful nature ofthe creature. Although this early reference may be considered a
whale, scholars also have suggested the creation may be a crocodile or some other large
150
powerful creature. In the story ofJonah, the term "fish" is used to describe the animal
that swallows Jonah, equated with the whale (Ellis, 1991,34). News articles also
reinforced the exploitation frame by continuing to describe whales as "fish" or
"monsters" (e.g. "Whale hunting ofto-day," 1900).
In all, these texts illustrate the starting point ofan adversarial, exploitative, and
mysterious relationship between humans and whales. This adversarial and exploitative
frame develops further since the 1500, which is described below in terms ofthe causal,
consequences, and prescriptive characteristics offrames.
One way to examine the frame involves examining news presentations as a proxy
for common rhetoric regarding an issue. This project uses a sample ofNew York Times
articles between 1851 and 1920 to interpret the dominant frame during the first stage.
29
The examination of the news by the New York Times during this period suggests a frame
defined by unrestricted whaling and competition among the whalers for capturing the
most whale products possible. By examining a sample of articles from the New York
Times before 1930, it is clear that the most common view ofwhaling is that ofthe use of
whale products for economic goods.
In terms of blame for whaling during this early frame, most articles do not
reference states when describing those responsible for whale catches. For example, the
29 The articles examined are listed in the Appendix. No formal coding system was used to analyze
the frame content ofthe articles. Instead, the author read and interpreted the articles to understand the
frame content. Although there is no clear indication ofreliability because ofthe methods used, repetition
ofthe process is possible by other scholars to determine the extent to which repeated measurements would
reveal similar results, See also Hopf(2002) for similar methods.
151
articles reference the whalers from "New Bedford" or "Nantucket," or reference to
specific vessels, such as Milo, Callao, or Cassia ("George Law," 1854; Arrival of
whaling vessels," 1855). This early frame involves primarily "whalers" as the cause of
the destruction ofthe whales. It is rare in these New York Times articles to reference a
country or a state. In most ofthe articles, references refer to either whaling companies or
cities that are synonymous with whalers because ofthe large number of whalers who live
in the port towns.
The primary exception to referencing non-state actors occurs during the 1860's
where a large number of articles reference "America" when discussing whaling involving
companies or cities within the United States. It drops off immediately to zero right after
this period, however, with no mention of other countries or ofAmerica during the rest of
this early frame before the 1930's. The reason for this large increase in discussion of
America during the 1860's coincides with the start and end ofthe American Civil War
between 1861 and 1865. During this time, the whaling frame does not involve countries.
Instead, the use ofthe word "America" in the articles signifies the importance ofthe
United States as a single country as opposed to the north and south. The use of
"America" does not directly relate to whaling. The number of references to country
specific names, therefore, remains at zero until approximately the 1890's.
The second part ofthe first frame around whaling defines whales and whale
products as an economic resource. The consequence ofwhaling provides economic
152
prosperity and luxury goods. This suggests a positive association with whaling in that the
killing ofwhales provides benefits for society.
The first indication ofthis frame involves the numerous articles that describe
whale catch, products produced, and the value ofthose goods quantitatively rather than
the number of whales killed. This is clear by the numerous mentions ofwhalebone, oil
produced, or whale catch with prices and profits of different actors (for an example, see
"George Law," 1854; E.g. "Whaling news -- Marine disasters," 1855). During this early
period, whales were implicitly framed as an important economic commodity. When
normative statements are used in the articles, the authors describe a low catch as a "poor
season," and a high catch as a "good season" ("Whale hunting ofto-day," 1900).
Sometimes these articles reported the catch and oil produced relatively between the
vessels as apparent competition between the different whaling vessels. All these
statements confirm that the primary frame during this period was one where people use
whales for the production of economic resources.
In addition, when whaling emerged onto the international agenda during this first
frame, the interaction between states suggests the strategic importance ofwhaling
resources. Whale products were widely used and important for economic development
and industrialization. Ellis suggests that whale oil during the 1800s resembled other
strategic goods today, such as gold, diamonds, or petroleum oil (Ellis, 1991,55). This
adds to the evidence suggesting the importance ofwhaling consequences benefiting states
through economic growth and industrialization.
153
Prescriptive characteristics ofthe first frame involve policies that attempt to
increase the efficiency ofwhaling and the quality and quantity of goods produced. States
did not implement many direct policies involving whaling, however, we can derive the
implicit prescriptive characteristics ofthe frame through examination oftechnological
advancements achieved during this period and the general goals for whalers.
A number oftechnological improvements occurred during the 1800s to make
whaling more efficient and improve the quantity and quality ofwhale products. The
earliest improvements involved processing whale fat into oil for use in products such as
lighting and eventually soaps. Inventions and innovations included placing try-works
(the process for producing oil from whale blubber) on ships and placing those ships near
the whale stocks. The processing offats into oils required stability, which made it
difficult to put the try-works on the whaling vessels on the open ocean (Ellis, 1991). A
second important invention concerned the ability to bring whales on board ships through
an opening at the stern ofthe vessels (Ellis, 1991, pp. 310-311). Before this, the whales
had to be cut up in the water or brought to port for processing. Later inventions included
the creation ofgrenade harpoons (Ellis, 1991, p. 325), factory ships (Ellis, 1991, p. 342),
and using airplane spotters (Ellis, 1991, p. 314; T0nnessen & Johnsen, 1982chs. 1-2).
The trajectory oftechnology and innovation was clear. The primary prescription
associated with whaling involved improvement in whaling practices to kill whales faster,
in greater quantities, and to create whale products more efficiently.
154
WHALING MANAGEMEm FRAME
Beginning in approximately 1920, the previously dominant frame becomes
contested, and in 1945, a new dominant frame emerges. The second dominant frame
describes states as the primary cause ofwhaling rather than as previously identified with
companies, cities, and individual vessels. In addition, the consequences ofwhaling
changed slightly in the new frame to suggest that whaling results in the potential demise
ofthe whaling industry. The new dominant frame qualifies exploitation with the idea
that unrestricted whaling results in the long-term destruction of whales and economic
loss. This results in a prescriptive frame involving the management ofwhaling. Whaling
management mitigates the destruction ofwhales because of overexploitation.
The first change in the whaling frame begins to occur in 1890 and continues to
World War II. During this period, a transition takes place between identification of
whaling with cities and whaling vessels to states. As described in an earlier chapter,
Figure 3 shows the number of articles referring to states as a percentage oftotal articles
about whaling over time. The change from whalers to countries importantly signifies the
change of frame ofresponsibility from cities and companies to states. States become
increasingly associated for taking whales within the causal characteristic of the frame.
Beginning in approximately 1944, articles in the New Yark Times refer primarily to
countries rather than individual whaling vessels or companies. The dominant frame
changes from blaming non-state actors to state actors beginning after World War II.
155
The salient consequences ofwhaling changed slightly from the previous frame to
include a description that whaling could result in economic loss through the demise ofthe
whaling industry. Previously, the consequence ofwhaling was not directly associated
with the destruction of whale populations as people considered it an infinitely renewable
resource. In this new frame, unrestricted whaling was associated with a decline in the
industry. The effects ofwhaling involved primarily a decrease in price of oil products
and potential collapse ofthe entire industry.
After the 1930-31 seasons ofunprecedented whale catch and oil production, many
in the industry began to suggest that whaling might cause a collapse in the whaling
industry. For example, in 1932, some involved in the whaling industry commented, "no
one unconnected financially with the business ofwhaling can possibly approve ofthe
present methods ofunrestricted slaughter" (Quoted in Francis, 1990, p. 206). In 1929,
Norwegian whalers helped pass the Norwegian Whaling Act, or An Act to Regulate the
Capture ofBaleen Whales, to regulate the capture ofwhales and essentially eliminate the
hunt ofthe right whale, the population ofwhich had been destroyed by Norwegian
whalers. The government in Norway recognized that unrestricted whaling resulted in
economic decline and destruction ofthe population ofwhales. The legislation attempted
to control whaling by licensing whalers and restricting non-licensed whalers (T0nnessen
& Johnsen, 1982, p. 362). This initial legislation attempt begins to demonstrate the
change in understanding about the consequences ofwhaling. The dominant
156
understanding ofwhaling suggested that the accepted umestricted whaling produced
negative economic consequences (Peterson, 1992) and a reduction in whale stocks.
In the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the preamble
says "the history ofwhaling has seen overfishing of one area after another and of one
species ofwhale after another" (ICRW, 1946). The treaty identifies clearly the dominant
understanding ofthe consequence of whaling in terms of destruction of whale species.
This important idea that umestricted regulation results in an unsustainable whaling
industry continues through new amendments and protocols ofthe 1946 treaty until the
next frame change in the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, the evidence demonstrates that the
new dominant frame transitioned in the 1930s and dominated after 1946. Whaling, once
attributed to non-state actors and considered economically beneficial, transformed to
blame states and overfishing, which resulted in economic decline and the destruction of
some whale species.
Prescriptive characteristics ofthe frame for whaling involve a species-specific
quota system based on the oil produced for whales and the use ofmultilateral
international treaties for regulation ofwhaling. The first change that takes place is the
emphasis and reliance on multilateral international treaties rather than bilateral regulation
or reliance on market mechanisms or non-state actors to control their catch. Before 1930,
multinational cooperation and treaties were not generally considered to address
international whaling. Most ofthe prescriptions before 1930 consisted ofmarket
mechanisms or domestic politics, regulations, and incentive systems for supporting
157
whaling. The use ofmultilateral international treaties appeared in 1931 and continued
thereafter as the primary means through which governments attended to whaling.
Multilateral treaties and conferences continued through the 1930s and into World War II.
After the war, multilateral international cooperation increased in addressing whaling
further with the creation ofthe 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of
Whaling. The use ofinternational treaties to regulate whaling became the dominant
understanding of solutions to the consequences ofwhaling.
Within these treaties, the dominant means through which regulation would occur
to solve the perceived whaling problem involved limits on the number and type ofwhales
that could be caught. The 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling
states that the goal ofthe treaty is to "secure the prosperity ofthe whaling industry and,
for that purpose, to maintain the stock ofwhales" (IARW, 1937). Later treaties, in 1946,
describe the goal ofregulation to obtain "optimum level ofwhale stocks as rapidly as
possible" (ICRW, 1946). The optimum level ofwhale stocks was suggested to allow a
yield ofwhales that sustains the fishery for the long-term interest ofthe industry. These
treaties and subsequent meetings from the IWC set up a quota system ofmanagement to
reduce the number ofwhales caught. These quotas applied to specific species rather than
to all whales together. Although the exact number ofwhales nations were entitled to
catch may have been disputed in meetings at the International Whaling Commission, the
use ofthe quota system continued until the next frame change beginning in the 1970s.
158
Therefore, the prescriptive characteristics ofthe second dominant frame involved
the use ofmultilateral international treaties and a quota system, which limited the catch
of specific whale species. In the shift from the first to the second dominant frame, states
became important causes ofwhaling rather than individual vessels ofcompanies. In
addition, no negative consequences were associated with the first frame. In the second
frame, consequence characteristics described the negative consequences ofwhaling in
both the decline of economic prosperity and the declining populations ofwhales.
WHALING PRESERVATIONFRAME
The whaling frame changes a third time during the 1970's and 1980's when the
prescriptive characteristics changed from management to a cessation ofwhaling. The
causes ofthe destruction ofthe whales remained primarily defined as states. The
consequence characteristics changed slightly because the positive economic gains from
whaling were largely eliminated from the frame.
In terms of causal characteristics ofthe frame, states remained as the cause
described in the frame. States continued in news and other outlets as the central actors
responsible for whaling. The number ofstates responsible for whaling declined in the
media, which coincided with the number of states engaged in whaling during the time. In
the 1969-70 season, at the beginning ofthe third change in frames, the USSR and Japan
captured 18,336 and 17,047 whales respectively, while the total catch of whales was
approximately 42,254 (Ishida, 2000b). The number ofwhales caught by 11 other nations
amounted to less than 20% ofthe total whales caught, making their catch relatively
159
insignificant. Rhetoric and symbolism in this third frame, therefore, focused primarily on
Japan, the USSR, and to a lesser extent other nations (see Day, 1987).
Changes in the consequence characteristics of whaling for the third dominant
frame began to suggest that whaling removes an important intelligent creature from
nature. Instead ofprimary economic benefits or costs, whaling caused the destruction of
a species. Removal ofthe economic component and increasing the moral component of
whaling makes up the primary change ofthe consequence characteristics for the third
frame. Much behavior that was once completely accepted, like military use ofwhales for
target practice, became normatively unacceptable in changes moving toward the third
frame (Epstein, 2008; Stoett, 1997, p. 143). Killing whales today has generally become
unacceptable for most countries.
The primary change for prescriptive characteristics in the third frame describes
whales as one group rather than individual species as well as a reliance on cessation
rather than a quota system. Prescriptions continue to rely on international treaties to
govern whaling practices, but the policies used to control whaling change from
individually specified quotas on specific species to a one-size fits-all model of cessation
ofwhaling for all species.
Early indications ofthis new frame are seen in the United Nations unanimous (52 
0) vote to generate a la-year ban on whaling in 1972, and the moratorium established by
the IWC in 1981, which went into effect in 1986. The moratorium on all whaling
illustrated the primary prescription grouping all whales together and instituting a
160
cessation on all whaling practices. Although the moratorium was suggested first in 1972,
it took place slowly over the years as quotas became lower. These quotas eventually led
to the moratorium when the International Whaling Commission passed an amendment in
1982, taking effect in the 1986 whaling season creating a moratorium on killing whales
of any kind (ICRW Amendments to the Schedule, 1982). This moratorium has lasted
through 2009, although there is an increasing chance of lifting the moratorium in the near
future, which the concluding chapter discusses explicitly. Figure 7 illustrates the decline
in quotas during the management period to the eventual moratorium on whaling during
the Conservationist period. Despite the fact that some whales, such as the Minke have
good recovery rates and are smaller than other whales (Stoett, 1997), the general
moratorium applied to all whales for their protection. The "preservationist" perspective
de-emphasizes the importance ofeconomic benefits and whether a whale can recover
from killing as the Minke is better able to do, and emphasizes the importance of
preserving a natural creature, which may have high intelligence.
The changes in the prescriptive characteristics illustrate the policies implemented
did not discriminate between different species of whales. Despite the fact that some
whales have faster recovery rates than others, differentiated whaling quotas (even ifset at
zero) were no longer part ofthe prescriptive characteristics ofthe frame. The
moratorium differs from previous practices offinding an optimal yield for whales in
order to create a sustainable yield in the long term.
161
Figure 7.
Whaling Quotas and the Moratorium
20000?,.------------------------------, 45000
18000
16000
40000
35000
10000
6000
4000
14000 j........................ . :..:.... ???????l???????????????????????????????????????????????? .........?"'...................................................................................... I
30000 III
i 12000 25000 i
': 10000 ?1???????????????????????????????????????????????? \........................................... .. . .""......... I~
~mooo~
g. 8000~~~...................~I;,
15000 0'
2000 +--------------------'.!!!!!'S;;::::---------\--'1 5000
o .J-,.. --,-_-.--,.-.,.....,..-_-__-~-_-__-f!l..eJ. 0
~~~~~~~~0~~~@~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Quota BWU - Quota Whales
Note. Data from Stoett (1997).
MATERIAL HYPOTHESES
Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration ofpower in one state (unipolarity) results in
little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged
contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived
contestation.
The material hypothesis concerning changes in frames suggests that changes in
conditions ofpolarity alter the likelihood and type of contestation over frames. In order
for frames to change, alternative frames must be presented in rhetoric, where the old
frame becomes contested with an alternative understanding, As stated earlier, in cases of
unipolarity, contestation becomes less likely because a single hegemon controls the
international system and the frame for issues. In bipolar systems, contestation is likely to
162
become prolonged due to the rivalry between the two great powers and their relatively
similar amounts ofpower. In multipolar systems, contestation over issue frames is likely
to be short-lived because ofthe shifting alliance patterns and shifting concerns for states
in multipolar systems.
The two periods ofgreater frame contestation occur between 1920-1945 and
between 1970-1982. In the first period, before 1945, the international system resembles a
multipolar one (Thompson, 1986). During the second period, between 1970-1982, the
international system resembles a bipolar one with the United States and the Soviet Union
as the primary global powers (Thompson, 1986). Table 6 summarizes the relationship
between polarity and contestation.
Table 6.
Whaling Contestation andPolarity
Years Polarity Contestation
World War II
Little Contestation
Greater contestation
Little Contestation
Greater Contestation
1500s - early 1920s Multipolarity
1920s - 1940s Multipolarity
1939-1945 Transitory
1945 - 1970 Bipolarity
1970 - 1982 Bipolarity
1982 - 2009 Bipolarity and Unipolarity (1991t Little Contestation
,---
Note. Polarity data taken from Thompson (1986).
a1991 is used to place a date on the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, although decline may have started earlier
with the first signal occurring at the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989.
The first important thing to note about the relationship between polarity and
contestation is that polarity does not change consistently with the changes that occurred
in the international whaling agenda. In particular, the change in 1991 from a generally
163
bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union to a system dominated
solely by the United States does not coincide with a change in contestation. This change
occurred in the middle of one of the periods ofcontestation where the issue frame did not
change and there was little contestation. In other words, the independent variable
changed without a change in the dependent variable. This suggests that changes in
polarity are not sufficient to change the international agenda or that the effect is too weak
to create a change.
In addition to the change in the polarity that is not reflected in the degree of
contestation, there are also changes in contestation without a change in polarity. This
occurs twice, when the frame becomes contested in the 1920s and again when the frame
becomes contested in the 1970s. Both ofthese changes, from little contestation to greater
contestation, occur when there is no clear change in international system polarity.
In most ofthe period from 1500 through the 1900s, we see very little interest in
whaling. When the issue appeared on the international agenda, states or other
international actors did not contest the dominant frame. All actors saw the issue similarly
during this period. Whales were considered an economic resource for exploitation
through efficient and productive means. The frame about whaling during this time did
not change much until the 1920s and 1930s, when the frame changed in two ways. First,
states became the primary causes of whaling rather than the emphasis on companies or
individuals. Second, whaling consequences were seen as causing some negative
economIC consequences.
164
There is no clear connection between polarity and the emergence of greater
contestation ofthe issue frame during the 1920s. Ifpolarity were responsible for the
degree ofcontestation, we would expect contestation to occur throughout the period, but
it did not. Other factors must explain the change in the frame the increase in contestation
that occurred in the 1920s.
The second period of contestation occurred during the 1970s as the whaling frame
changed from destruction ofan economic resource to a frame describing the destruction
of an important animal species. Again, there is no indication that polarity explains
contestation emerging in the 1970s since states did not contest the issue since the end of
World War II.
The evidence presented, therefore, is inconsistent with the hypotheses developed
in regards to the connection between polarity and the degree ofcontestation. There is
also no indication that the period ofcontestation during bipolarity is any longer than the
contestation during multipolarity given the dates above. Therefore, the evidence
presented does not support hypotheses on material influences ofchanges in contestation.
This does not definitively rule out the influence ofpolarity on contestation, but it does not
provide evidence in support ofthe hypotheses in the case ofwhaling.
NON-MATERIAL HYPOTHESES
In general, rhetoric propagated through the international system with high
exposure that is complete and connected to a broader discourse is more likely to become
part ofthe dominant agenda. The non-material factors, such as exposure, completeness,
165
and connections to a broader discourse change the likelihood ofthe rhetoric becoming
part ofthe dominant frame. Table 5 previously summarized the changes in the content of
the dominant frame, and the section below reviews this information during the analysis.
EXPOSURE
Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely
it influences perceptions ofthe phenomenon.
Increases in media exposure and the use offocusing events to link rhetoric to
large scale events in order to increase media attention were an important part ofthe
rhetoric presented before frame changes in the third stage. In the first stage, where states
were interested in whaling only sporadically, we have limited knowledge ofthe media
exposure and focusing events connected to rhetoric during that time. Although we have
information regarding the rhetoric presented internationally, the degree ofmedia or
international exposure is undetermined. For the second change from little focus to a
management focus, there is again limited knowledge on media exposure and focusing
events linked to rhetoric. Changes from a management frame to a preservation frame,
however, coincide with large media exposure and linkages to large focusing events. In
additionto media exposure, rhetoric also received much greater exposure in international
forums such as in the UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) and within the
IWC.
The UNCHE provided a good opportunity to explore policies for whaling that
might not have been acceptable to the whaling countries in the IWC. The UNCHE was
166
the first major conference on environmental issues held at the intemationa11eve1, in 1972
in Stockholm from June 5-16. The conference provided a venue for the attendees, over
113 states, and numerous other organizations to discuss the global environment (UNEP,
1972). The Stockholm Conference provided a venue for the large number of
environmental NGO's present to communicate with state policy makers (Epstein, 2008,
p. 110), thus providing exposure to their ideas. NGO's, such as Project Jonah and the
Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, which activists created specifically to stop
whaling, attended the Stockholm Conference and established connections with policy
makers. It was also at the Stockholm conference where the moratorium policy gained
exposure after the conference adopted the policy.
In the IWC, as well, the number of organizations with observer status increased
dramatically during the period before the moratorium became part ofthe dominant frame.
In 1969, only 10 observers were present at the IWC meeting, and only five were non 
governmental individuals or groups. However, in 1982,59 observers were present at the
IWC meeting when the moratorium passed (Ellis, 1991, p. 442). The increase in the
number of observer nations, individuals, and non-governmental organizations again
provided access for the spread ofthe anti-whaling rhetoric.
Non-material Hypothesis 4a: Rhetoric that links focusing events with a
phenomenon and issue framei~smore likely to gain attention in the media, increasing
exposure.
167
The primary exposure occurred not through international forums, as much as
through media outlets coupled with focusing events. As discussed in Chapter III, rhetoric
that links focusing events with a phenomenon and issue frame is more likely to gain
attention in the media, increasing exposure (Non-material Hypothesis 4a). In the case of
whaling, the anti-whaling activists were able to create the dramatic and unexpected
events, film and document them, and link them with their own rhetoric on anti-whaling to
gain increased media attention.
The most dramatic focusing event linked with the rhetoric ofanti-whalers came in
1975 when a small number of Greenpeace activists attempted to interfere with Russian
whalers. Often described as a moment between "David and Goliath," the comparatively
small inflatable Zodiac boats positioned themselves between the much larger whaling
vessel and the target whales (Day, 1987; Ellis, 1991, p. 438). Captured on video, the
encounter was presented throughout media on almost every US television network and
even in outlets in Canada, Europe, and Japan (Ellis, 1991, p. 445). Walter Cronkite's
report on the whalers was hailed as a huge accomplishment, placing the anti-whaler's
images with those ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis, Apollo 11's moon landing, the Kennedy
assassination, and other major world events (Day, 1987; Epstein, 2008). With the focus
on the conflict between the whalers and the Russians getting considerable media
attention, the anti-whaler message was presented around the world. It is important to
note as well, that during this same period, other organizations, such as the Sea Shepherd,
were engaged in preventing Australian whaling but received much less media attention
168
(Day, 1987, p. 17). The reason for differing media attention may lie in the ability to
present rhetoric in the context of a larger discourse and culture, discussed later.
Greenpeace and other activists purposefully orchestrated these events to gain
attention from the media. Greenpeace, for example, planned on confronting whaling
ships while the IWC conference was ongoing in order to maximize the amount ofmedia
coverage oftheir encounter (Ellis, 1991, p. 444; Francis, 1990, p. Ch. 12). The activists
fully understood the power of dramatic events to help present their message in the media.
Other events also gained attention, such as protests at the IWC and putting an inflatable
whale in the Japanese delegation's room during the conference (Day, 1987). In Australia,
the media were made aware ofattempts by activists to interfere with coastal whaling.
The media arrived earlier than the activists, and whaling advocates showed the media the
benefits ofwhaling. During the encounters, however, which caught more drama and
media attention than demonstrations ofthe benefits ofwhaling, the activists failed each
time to prevent killing ofwhales. Despite their failures in stopping the whaling, they
successfully received greater media attention and presenting their anti-whaling messages
on a larger scale (Ellis, 1991, p. 447).
In 1974, images ofwhales as an important ecological or environmental resource
(not economic) emerged in the media. Greenpeace managed to capture images ofa
Russian whaling vessel attempting to harpoon and capture a sperm whale over the head
ofa Greenpeace activist. While Greenpeace filmed these images, one activist managed
to climb aboard the floating whale in an attempt to prevent the Russians from taking the
169
kill (Day, 1987; Epstein, 2008,97). Flipper, the movie, was released in 1963, where
dolphins were first popularized due to both their willingness to perform for the camera
and their friendly demeanor (Ellis, 1991,435). Following the movie release, the
television show, along with other works, such as The Day ofthe Dolphin, presented
dolphins as intelligent creatures, learning English, or assisting humans with various tasks.
These presentations illustrate the changes ofthe new dominant frame emerging in the
1980s.
The introduction ofwhales into popular movies and literature coincided with the
introduction ofscientific discoveries ofthe potential destruction ofwhales as well as
discoveries ofwhales' song and abilities to communicate. In 1966, an article in Scientific
American described the potential for the destruction ofthe whales ifwhaling continued at
the same pace. The article described the extent to which whales were being taken by
various whaling countries despite the quotas and the involvement ofthe IWC, created to
manage the taking ofwhales to sustainable levels (McVay, 1966). Scientific estimates of
the decimation ofthe population ofwhales also appeared through (at least initially) a
three-person scientific committee commissioned by the IWC. After three years of
research, an impartial committee
30
reported that the blue whale and the humpback whale
were in danger of extinction in the Antarctic whaling grounds (McVay, 1966). The
30 The scientific committee members were not from member countries and were not whale
specialists. They were specialists in population dynamics and other fields related to understanding whale
population.
170
media accounts ofwhaling illustrate some ofthe newer descriptions ofhow whales were
framed beginning in the 1960's, which continue for the most part through today.
In the news media, the number ofarticles describing the value of whales as a
species increases after the 1960's and 1970's through today. Given the much greater
attention to the anti-whaling rhetoric by the media and the drama created by the activists
themselves, we would expect this rhetoric to become a greater part ofthe dominant
frame. Based on our understanding ofthe dominant frame changes and the coinciding
media exposure ofthe anti-whaler rhetoric, the evidence supports the hypothesis
connecting international exposure and frames.
CONNECTIONS TO DISCOURSE AND CULTURE
Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set ofcultural
beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to
influence the international agenda.
As discussed in Chapter III, rhetoric is more likely to become part ofthe
dominant frame when it connects to a larger discourse or culture. Rhetoric presented
before the first change in frames coincided with broader discourse and culture on the
management of common resources as well as a greater reliance on states for regulation.
In addition, rhetoric presented between the management and the conservationist frames
resonated with a broader discourse and culture in terms ofthe Cold War rivalries and in
terms ofthe larger environmental movements.
171
During the changes from the exploitation frame to the conservation frame, a large
amount ofrhetoric involved the importance ofstates in regulating marine resources. For
example, the Norwegian effort to regulate whaling in 1927 was largely unsuccessful,
which led them to adopt the view that management ofwhaling requires international
policies because whales migrate between areas of control. National control systems for
whaling were ineffective since areas under the control of states were not the areas used
for whaling purposes generally (Birnie, 1985, pp. 118-124). In addition, the timing of
this first change in frame came about after an increase in regulation of other marine
species, such as fur seals in 1911.
In 1924, the Committee ofExperts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law (appointed by the League ofNations) issued a report stressing the
importance ofmultilateral comprehensive agreements to avoid problems with regulating
migrating species (Birnie, 1985, p. 111). The report suggested that ad hoc agreements
were not able to deal with the problems ofmigratory species, and states should consider
the oceans as a common area ofregulation. This report and the work ofthe League of
Nations did not directly address whaling at that time, but it provides a context in which
the regulation ofwhaling by states through multilateral international agreements may
have become more acceptable as part ofthis broader change in international culture.
The culture emerging around the end ofthe First World War suggested greater.
involvement from states in the prevention ofinternational conflict and management of
international affairs. Although there were treaties between nations before the First World
172
War, the League ofNations was a very ambitious attempt to implement a form ofworld
governance to prevent further large interstate wars. Mitchell documents less than 10
multilateral environmental agreements between 1878 and 1900, increasing to 20 between
1901 and 1942. This further increases to approximately 30 between 1943 and 1952
(Ishida, 2000b; Mitchell, 2002-2009). This broader dependence on states to govern
international affairs, rather than the previous, might makes right approach signified the
start of a cultural shift in understanding international affairs. Greater reliance on states
for international regulation coincided with the rhetoric describing the need for states to
address the issue of regulating whaling.
During the 1970s, the broader environmental movement and discourse took a
greater role internationally and domestically. A large number of international treaties
formed during this period and before the whaling moratorium in the 1980s. For example,
the CITES treaty providing guidelines on the protection of endangered species was
created in 1973, the Convention on Wetlands ofInternational Importance was created in
1971, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Dumping was created in 1972, and a
large number of other international environmental agreements were created during the
formation ofthe environmental movement. These agreements and the rise in
environmental groups worldwide generated a larger culture for environmental protection
during the 1960s and early 1970s.
Within this context, the whaling rhetoric resonates more highly because it also
adopts the language of environmental protection ofthe whales. One ofthe goals
t
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associated with the anti-whaling movement was the desire to equate whaling with a
broader conservationist trend and the increase in attention to endangered species and their
protection (Ellis, 1991, p. 437; Epstein, 2008, p. 204 and Ch. 205). The global trend
toward greater attention to the environment as population increased and industrialization
took hold in more countries created a larger context within which the whaling treaties
resonated highly.
In addition to the connection with a wider discourse and culture of environmental
protection, rhetoric propagated and resonated with the United States and the west when
linked with the broader context ofthe Cold War (Epstein, 2008). Although it is not clear
that Greenpeace specifically targeted Russian vessels because ofthe connection to Cold
War rivalries/
1
the connection with the broader conflict between the US (generally a
non-whaler) and the USSR (a whaler) pushed the rhetoric into the media spotlight. The
media, for example, gave much less coverage to similar attempts to stop whaling in other
parts ofthe world or against other western countries, such as Australia?2 It is difficult to
know whether the media coverage ofthe Russian conflict with anti-whalers comes from
connection to the larger Cold War rivalries or ifthe attention was caused by the greater
31 There have been several mentions that Greenpeace specifically target the Soviet Union by some
scholars such as Epstein (2008), but Day (1987) does not describe such intent in his detailed history ofthe
anti-whaling activism. In addition, Weyler's history of the Greenpeace movement, including the whale
campaign, describes the encounter resulting primarily from a desire to confront "the whalers" not the
Russian whalers (See Weyler, 2004, 212, 226,261-265).
32 Day (1987) describes such efforts, but they do not appear frequently in international news
sources. Google News Search results in no results for "Greenpeace, Australia, whale" or "Zodiac
Australia, Whale" searched on May 6, 2009.
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drama brought out with the Russians. Despite this difficulty, the connection with a
broader discourse in the Cold War and the environmental movement most likely had
some influence in the greater resonance during the 1960s and 1970s.
Rhetoric connected to a broader culture appears to become part ofthe frame for
whaling as it appeared before the changes in the agenda. This does not suggest that all
rhetoric that tied to a broader discourse necessarily becomes part ofthe international
agenda. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that rhetoric connected with a
broader discourse is more likely to become part ofthe dominant frame. In addition,
rhetoric not tied to the culture did not appear as part ofthe dominant frame.
caMPLETENESS
Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story with all three
frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the
intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.
The presentation ofcomplete stories including causes, consequences, and
prescriptions are more likely to become part ofthe dominant frame. In order to examine
this hypothesis, it is necessary to examine rhetoric presented before the frame changes
that illustrate differing completeness. Before the change in the first frame, the rhetoric
presented describes states as the primary party responsible for whaling. The rhetoric also
describes the consequences of whaling in terms ofeconomic decline and a quota system
for management. Although both parts ofthe rhetoric became part ofthe dominant frame,
the parts did not appear together. Since they did not appear together, the rhetoric
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presented only focused on one characteristic ofthe frame at a time. The rhetoric
presented before the changes in the fIrst frame, therefore, was not complete as described
in the hypothesis. Despite the lack ofcompleteness, the rhetoric became part ofthe
dominant frame. This does not present decisive evidence because there are no alternative
more complete stories to compare.
In the second change ofthe frame, from management to conservation whaling,
rhetoric by the anti-whaling activists described the primary causes ofwhaling, the
negative consequences of whaling and a desire for cessation of whaling as a policy
prescription (Day, 1987). Anti-whaling activists created a complete story around whaling
suggesting that particular states, such as Japan, Norway, and Russia were responsible for
whaling, that whaling caused the destruction of an important mammal without economic
consequences, and advocated for a complete stoppage of whaling. Therefore, in the
changes for the third frame, the rhetoric appeared more complete than competing rhetoric
by whalers. Whaling rhetoric during these changes suggested only that whales provided
valuable economic resources (Ellis, 1991, p. 447). The whalers focused their rhetoric on
the economic and material benefIts ofwhaling rather than a complete story ofwhaling.
In this case, the rhetoric with a complete story seems to have become part ofthe
dominant frame over the competing rhetoric without a complete story. This supports the
general hypothesis that rhetoric that is more complete is more likely to become part ofthe
frame.
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RHETORICAL MANIPULATION STRATEGIES
There are three rhetorical strategies discussed in Chapter III that can change the
outcomes for international agendas and frames. Altering the scope ofthe description of
the phenomenon can alter the acceptability ofrhetoric as part ofthe frame. Emphasizing
different characteristics ofa frame can change the attention to the issue on the
international agenda. Finally, emphasizing different causes or effects within the frame
characteristics can alter the acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics. In all three cases,
the best test ofthe hypotheses would involve multiple manipulations that occur for the
same issue to determine how these changes affect the dependent variable. Unfortunately
for the case under consideration, there are no clear alternative rhetoric strategies
presented for the changes in frames.
The best example ofwithin frame emphasis would show different actors
emphasizing different causes or effects within the causal or consequence elements and
compare their effects on acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics. This type of
manipulation did not appear explicitly in the case ofwhaling. For emphasis between
frame characteristics, again, the best test ofthe hypothesis would occur between two sets
ofrhetoric that emphasize different sets ofcharacteristics and the changes in effects on
issue attention. The case ofwhaling does not provide such data, but Chapter III provides
examples outside the case ofwhaling for both manipulation strategies.
In the changes from the second to the third dominant frames, a bit ofrhetorical
scope manipulations took place by whaling activists. Although testing the hypothesis for
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scope manipulation ideally would have at least two sets ofrhetoric, discussing whether
the scope manipulations in whaling are consistent with outcomes can help to determine
support for the hypothesis.
Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations ofthe phenomena scope change the
audience acceptability of frame characteristics.
Manipulating the scope ofthe phenomenon can change the acceptability ofthe
rhetoric presented in terms ofblame and consequence characteristics for the audience.
For whaling, the presentation ofinformation changed dramatically between the earlier
presentations ofstatistics on whale catch and oil produced to stories ofindividual whale
catchers and their methods to hunt specific whales. In most newspaper articles before the
1800's whaling was presented as statistics in terms ofthe number and amount ofwhales
caught. Most ofthese statistics involved the resources gained by the whalers, because the
emphasis was placed on the economic benefit ofwhales. In the new rhetoric presented
by the anti-whaling advocates, individual stories were documented and presented to the
media ofa single vessel catching, butchering, and producing whale products. The
description ofthe phenomenon was presented differently with the scope focused on each
whaling vessel rather than on the entire global scope ofthe number of whales and
products produced.
In addition, anti-whalers broadened the scope by changing individual species of
whales into a single set of"whales." By putting all whales together into a single group,
the new rhetoric contrasted claims by the IWC and whaling states, that management
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requires different policies for each type ofwhale because their population dynamics
differ. Instead, the new scope created greater acceptability ofa stoppage in whaling
because "whales" made a single threatened group rather than only some ofthe species of
whale. This scope manipulation is still in contention today where some countries, like
Japan, seek to increase the allowable catch for whalers with larger populations in an
attempt to separate species and consider their populations individually.
During the IWC meetings, states resisted moratoriums early on, because they
sought management conducted on a species by species basis. Moratorium language
started with the UNCHE in 1972, where participants called for moratorium. The IWC
emphasized that the goal ofthe IWC was management and suggested that an across the
board moratorium is not a management policy, because it does not treat different whale
populations individually (Birnie, 1985, p. 422; Francis, 1990, p. 230). By grouping all
whales under a single category with rhetoric such as "save the whales" rather than "save
the blue whale" or other individual whales, the acceptability of a general moratorium
became greater. Under differentiation, the idea ofstopping all whaling seemed
unnecessary because some species were adequately populated and were not in danger of
extinction.
In summary, the manipulations ofthe scope conditions appear to have changed
the acceptability ofprescriptive characteristics. As scope conditions changed the focus
from a large number ofstatistically numerical whales to stories ofindividual whales, the
new consequence characteristic may have become more acceptable. This new
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consequence characteristic described whaling, not as affecting economies, but as
affecting a living mammal, that deserves some rights and protections. In addition, by
expanding the scope ofwhales from individual species to all species of whales, a
moratorium becomes more acceptable. When whales are thought about in terms of
individual species, a large moratorium banning all whaling seems inappropriate because
the moratorium is not focused on each species individually. However, by considering all
whale species as one group of "whales" the one policy of a comprehensive moratorium
becomes more acceptable.
CONCLUSIONS
There are three dominating frames during the history ofwhaling. The actions and
texts before 1920 imply the first frame, but the frame is not explicitly stated. During this
first period, the frame described the consequences ofwhaling to produce positive
economic gains. The primary cause, as described in the media, involves non-state actors,
such as individual vessels or companies. Policies involving whaling during this time
attempt to increase the efficiency ofwhaling or the quantity and quality of goods
produced. The second frame, beginning around 1944, suggests states as the primary
cause ofwhaling rather than non-state actors. In addition, the frame adds a negative
consequence that unrestricted whaling may cause negative economic consequences due to
flooding the market with whale products. The primary prescription involves management
and some control over the number and type ofwhales caught primarily involving a
system ofwhale quotas. The third frame describes states as the primary cause again, but
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changes the consequence ofwhaling to the destruction ofan important mammal, while
removing the positive economic consequences. The primary prescriptive characteristics
ofthe third frame involve cessation of all whaling practices.
The evidence presented for the material hypothesis that polarity influences the
degree of contestation for franles does not support the hypothesis. The amount of
contestation over frames appears to be relatively unrelated to international power
dynamics, and needs to be accounted by other variables. Although not explicitly tested in
this research, the degree of contestation is most likely associated with the ability of actors
to present new rhetoric, challenging older frames. Contestation, therefore, is most likely
actor driven and determined by the extent to which rhetoric by actors successfully enters
international forums and media outlets. This is somewhat related to media exposure of
frames, but the degree of contestation in regards to media exposure is not directly tested
in this project.
Non-material hypotheses developed in Chapter III describe how exposure and
connections to a broader discourse affect the whether rhetoric becomes part ofthe frame.
Exposure in the media seems to increase the likelihood that rhetoric becomes part ofthe
frame, and focusing events linked to the rhetoric increases media exposure as
demonstrated in Greenpeace activities in 1974. In addition, connections to a broader
discourse are also consistent with the rhetoric that becomes the frame. Rhetoric that
appears to be connected to a broader culture and discourse becomes part ofthe dominant
frame. In addition, the completeness ofthe rhetoric also appears to influence the
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likelihood ofrhetoric becoming part ofthe international frame. At least for the formation
ofthe third frame, the differences between the completeness ofthe anti-whaling rhetoric
and the rhetoric from whalers suggest the success of a more complete story, supporting
the hypothesis.
Finally, the strategy ofmanipulating the scope ofthe phenomenon was examined
as to its effect on the acceptability of frame characteristics. Although there are no
comparative studies in this project, scope manipulations in the 1970's seem consistent
with the hypothesis that changes can affect frame characteristic acceptability. By
describing whales as a single group rather than differentiated species, the acceptability of
a moratorium may have increased.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS
This project set out to understand the formation and changes that can occur in the
international agenda and why those changes occur. Studying the international agenda is
vital for our understanding ofthe formation of policies and treaties in the international
system, primarily because problem definition and agenda formation are the first steps in
policy creation processes. If issues do not become part ofthe international agenda, states
cannot formulate or implement policies or treaties. The content and frame ofissues on
the international agenda change the content ofthe policies and treaties created. As
political scientists, ifwe are to understand the formation ofinternational governmental
organizations, the formation of international treaties, and the content ofthose treaties, it is
necessary to understand the agenda-setting stage ofpolicy formation.
In addition to the importance ofagendas for policy creation, this research also
illustrates the importance of constructions and frames as interpretations ofinternational
issues that are fluid and susceptible to change. It is not the real costs and benefits in
international affairs that define issues but perceptions ofthose costs and benefits, that is,
their social construction. The research does not suggest that material power distributions
have no influence over international outcomes, but that both power distributions and the
content offrames are important for changes in international policy, thus incorporating
both constructivist and realist elements to international relations theory.
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As policy practitioners or policy advocates, understanding how the agenda
becomes formed, how issues become part ofthe international agenda, and how content of
the frames is created and changed, allows an avenue of influence into international
politics. The use ofrhetoric to manipulate the international agenda allows non-state
actors and others without significant military resources greater influence over
international outcomes. This adds to the expanding literature on non-state actor influence
over international political outcomes and the importance of advocacy groups.
Manipulation ofthe problem definition or the agenda may have tremendous influences on
policy outcomes. Studies in game theory, public choice theory, and social movements
reveal that changes in agendas and frames can result in any possible outcome desired by
individuals who control the agenda. Agenda control and control over the words used to
describe issues can amount to a great amount ofpower in international politics.
The research contained within this project, therefore, benefits scholars of
international politics, policy practitioners, and advocates of international policy. The
research provides insights into the workings ofthe international agenda formation and
change in international politics and the manipulation and rhetorical tactics for changing
the content of issue frames.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL AGENDA RESEARCH
In particular, Chapter II identified and defined concepts for developing a new
understanding ofthe international agenda outside the context offormal international
organizations or domestic institutional contexts. The international system has its own
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rules and norms, such as the general rule ofanarchy and the norm of sovereignty. The
international system has some structure although no governance above states. A series of
norms and consistent interaction establishes a constructed set ofinternational standards
for behavior (Bull, 1977), within which the international agenda develops and changes.
Thus, the agenda described in this paper exists within the implied international rules and
norms ofthe international system rather than any particular set of formal institutional
setting, such as the UN or the WTO. The international agenda differs from agendas
within these formal institutions because ofthe different sets ofrules operating in the
international system than in formal institutions. The rules operating in the international
system are also more fluid and subject to change by state action, such as the influence of
state behavior on sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). The norms that set the international
system apart from other institutions are more easily changed or ignored because there are
no governments or organizations above states to enforce violations ofthe norms of
international politics. This makes the study of international agendas different from
studying domestic or formal institutional agendas.
Chapter II defined the international agenda as a list ofissues to which multiple
states are paying serious attention at a given time. Variation in the agenda can occur in
the number of states paying attention to an issue, which describes when an issue moves in
relation to other issues on the agenda. The greater the number of states and the greater
the seriousness of attention ofthose states may vary between issues making some issues
higher or lower on the agenda than others. Seriousness ofstate attention varies with the
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amount ofresources expended on a particular issue for that state. Differences ofthe
number of states attending to an issue, the strength ofthose states, and the depth oftheir
attention define the relative importance ofissues, or seriousness of attention, on the
international agenda.
This project also describes a new approach to understanding agendas more
generally by adding a constructivist perspective developed from research on social
movements to our understanding of agendas. The constructivism employed in this
research comes from a "soft constructivist" approach (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996), based
on Wendt's (1999) vision of international politics or Hacking's (1999) vision of social
constructivism. The soft constructivist approach assumes there are ontological truths
about the world, but epistemologically, we cannot know these truths. This project uses
frames to understand the relationship between observers and real phenomena observed.
Issues that appear on agendas emerge not from real facts in the world, but interpretations
ofthose facts - the frame.
Frames consist ofthe interpretation of causes, the consequences, and the
prescriptions for the phenomenon. Just as a picture frame may emphasize or obscure
some parts of a painting or photograph, an issue frame emphasizes or obscures different
characteristics ofthe real phenomenon. Real phenomena have a number of causes,
consequences and possible policy prescriptions, but the frame identifies a subset ofthe
characteristics in existence. A dominant frame occurs when most ofthe states that attend
to an issue adopt a similar perspective or definition ofthat issue. Not all states must
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agree on the dominant frame or on exactly the same definition for the frame to become
dominant. Dominant frames are sometimes unrecognized or internalized such that states
do not explicitly discuss them. Other times they are reinforced through discussion or
reference to formalized rules. Contested frames are those where no dominant frame
exists because actors debate the definition and meaning of a phenomenon. Contestation
can exist indefinitely when actors cannot agree on a single interpretation ofthe event.
The use offrames and frame dominance to understand interpretations ofissues on the
agenda is applicable beyond international agenda research to domestic agenda research as
well.
Frames are important for understanding changes in the agenda because frames
may change over time although an issue's place in terms ofimportance may not change.
In other words, how actors understand an issue may change, which changes the agenda
because it changes how an issue on the agenda is defined. This research makes such
implicit interpretations explicitly part ofthe agenda and an obj ect ofstudy. Chapter II
defined two aspects important to the international agenda: attention and frames. Both the
international attention to issues and the way those issues are interpreted by actors are
important sources ofvariation on the international agenda.
The project describes the importance ofboth states and non-state actors for
changing the international agenda. Rather than privileging one group or another (such as
much ofthe division between realist and liberalist international relations theory), the
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project shows the influence ofpower on issue attention and non-state actors influence
over issue frames.
UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
In addition to the contributions to theoretical work on agendas described above,
this project also develops hypotheses to describe the variables responsible for changes in
attention to international issues and the interpretation ofthose issues. The hypotheses
apply to two parts ofthe international agenda: changes in attention and changes in
frames. These variables include both material factors and non-material factors that may
influence constructed frames and attention. Few studies have examined the causes of
changes ofsocial constructions through a positivist framework as advocated by Wendt
(1999) and Keohane (2000), unlike this project. This study examines influences over the
constructed frames using explicit hypotheses developed in Chapter III and tested in
chapters IV and V, which are summarized below.
Changes in Issue Attention on the Agenda
Changes to issue attention for whaling on the international agenda first occurred
in the 1930s when nations increased attention to whaling. In 1939, this attention declined
in favor ofthe Second World War. In 1944, this interest increased once again among
states to a more long-term, deeper, and a sustained interest in whaling. Attention then
increased again in 1974 as more states became interested in whaling. Hypotheses
concerning changes ofissue attention - movement on and offthe agenda or change in
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relative issue importance - consist ofthe domination ofsecurity issues on the agenda and
rhetoric that names and blames states, victimizes states, or increases the magnitude and
temporal proximity to consequences.
Material Hypothesis I: Security issues are more important on the agenda and are
more likely to emerge onto the agenda than economic issues or other issues on the
international agenda.
Based on the evidence from whaling, consistent with the hypothesis developed in
Chapter III, security issues seem to dominate the international agenda most in a
multipolar system. Whaling only becomes part ofthe international agenda ancillary to
security and the safety ofships during multipolar systems, but may emerge onto the
agenda independent ofsecurity concerns in bipolar and unipolar systems where larger
states provide some security and stability. Polarity fails to account directly for why
whaling gathered greater attention in the 1970's as opposed to any other time, because
polarity does not change near or before the 1970s. However, the bipolar system enabled
an increased attention to non-whaling issues. Therefore, polarity acts as an enabler to
create the opportunities for non-security issues to emerge onto theagenda rather than a
direct cause of increased attention to whaling. In multipolar systems, non-security issues
are much less likely to emerge than security issues relative to bipolar and unipolar
systems.
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Non-material Hypothesis 1: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the perpetrators
makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances for the issue
to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the agenda.
Evidence supporting the influence ofblame on issue attention comes from the
increase in state blame beginning in 1928. Increased rhetoric blaming states can be
associated with an increase in state attention during the 1930s and sustained attention in
1946. The evidence does not support the hypothesis, because as attention increased for
whaling in the 1970s, blame became more focused, and attention increased.
Non-material Hypothesis 2: Rhetoric that emphasizes states as the victims or
beneficiaries makes those states more likely to attend to the issue, increasing the chances
for the issue to emerge onto the international agenda or increase its position on the
agenda.
Little rhetoric explicitly described the consequences of whaling in terms ofstates.
The primary consequences as described during the early part ofthe frame was positive
economic growth, but not generally associated with states. During the second stage,
rhetoric described the consequences associated with economic decline in addition to
decreases in whaling populations. In the third stage, explicit rhetoric described the
consequences of whaling in terms ofdeclining whaling populations. In none ofthese
stages does the rhetoric explicitly attribute consequences of whaling for states.
Therefore, this study cannot directly test this hypothesis.
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Non-material Hypothesis 3: Rhetoric that emphasizes short-term consequences or
consequences of a greater magnitude is more likely to increase attention to issues.
Rhetoric describing increases in the urgency to attend to whaling or increases in
the magnitude ofeffects emerged in the 1950s from scientific studies. This rhetoric,
however, did not seem to influence the attention to issues because there was no
discernable change in issue attention as it was already part ofthe international agenda
with sustained state interest. It is possible that such rhetoric influenced the exact quotas
used during the 1950s to control whaling, but this does not constitute change in the
international agenda.
Changes in Frames
The second part ofthe dependent variable examined in this study involves
changes in the frame of an issue on the international agenda. The dominant frame
changes after World War II, preceded by a period of contestation between 1930 and
1945. The frame changes again in 1982 after a period of contestation from 1970 to 1982.
The first dominant frame described the responsibility ofwhaling with fishers and
companies that produced economic growth and products. The primary policy for fishers
during this time involved increasing the efficiency ofwhaling and the quality and
quantity ofwhale products.
The second frame changes the responsibility from individuals and companies to
states. The frame also describes the consequences ofwhaling in terms of economic loss
without control over the supply ofwhale goods. During this second frame, the primary
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prescriptions involve quotas over the quantity ofwhales caught. The third frame
describes the consequences of whaling in terms ofthe destruction ofall whales and not in
terms ofeconomic consequences. The primary prescriptions ofthis third frame involve a
cessation ofwhaling.
Material Hypothesis 2: Concentration ofpower in one state (unipolarity) results in
little contestation, concentration in two states (bipolarity) results in prolonged
contestation, concentration in multiple states (multipolarity) results in short lived
contestation.
Polarity does not appear to explain the degree ofcontestation in the frame for the
case ofwhaling. Contestation occurs irrespective ofthe changes in polarity.
Contestation occurred during periods ofmultipolarity and bipolarity, although there was
little contestation in unipolarity. There is no indication that the period ofcontestation
was longer during bipolarity than multipolarity. There is less contestation apparently
during the period ofunipolarity. Since there has not yet been a period ofincreased
contestation since the emergence ofunipolarity, however, this alone does not support the
hypothesis.
Non-material Hypothesis 4: The more exposure rhetoric receives, the more likely
it influences perceptions ofthe phenomenon.
Media play an important part in propagating rhetoric through the international
system and to various international actors. Media often provide increased exposure to
rhetoric accompanying large-scale events, known as focusing events. Focusing events
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alone do not change the international agenda, but coupling these events with rhetoric can
help propagate the rhetoric, changing frames, and the international agenda. In the case of
whaling, increased exposure ofstate blame during the first change of frames and
increased exposure ofthe anti-whaling rhetoric in the second frame (linked with focusing
events) coincides with this rhetoric becoming part ofthe dominant whaling frames.
Evidence from rhetoric and media exposure during the history ofwhaling frames
supports the hypothesis for rhetoric exposure.
Non-material Hypothesis 5: Rhetoric that includes a complete story with all three
frame characteristics leaves fewer questions and is more likely to be accepted by the
intended audience, which increases the chances for influencing the international agenda.
The content ofrhetoric affects the degree to which the rhetoric is acceptable to
audiences. When the rhetoric tells a complete story and connects to a broader discourse
or culture ofthe audience, the rhetoric is more likely to become part ofthe dominant
frame as it has a greater connection to the audience. The only case where we see
competing rhetoric in regards to a particular frame involves the change from the second
to the third dominant frame. In the rhetoric prior to this frame change, the anti-whaling
activists presented a more complete story including characteristics of causes,
consequences, and prescriptions, than the story presented by whalers, which focused on
the economic benefits ofwhaling. The fact that the anti-whaler rhetoric became part of
the subsequent dominant frame suggests some support for the hypothesis on the influence
ofcompleteness over which rhetoric becomes part ofthe dominant frame.
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Non-material Hypothesis 6: Rhetoric consistent with a broader set ofcultural
beliefs or discourse is more likely to be accepted by actors increasing the chance to
influence the international agenda.
Rhetoric connected to a broader discourse in the 1930s, connecting blame on
states with a broader culture ofincreasing internationalization of issues coincided with
the rhetoric's emergence into the dominant frame. In addition, rhetoric connected to the
broader environmental movement in the 1970s coincided with that rhetoric becoming part
ofthe dominant frame. The evidence in the whaling case, therefore, supports the
hypothesis that rhetoric connected to a broader discourse and culture is more likely to
become part ofthe dominant frame.
Manipulation Hypothesis 1: Manipulations ofthe phenomena scope change the
audience acceptability of frame characteristics.
Chapter III also discussed three ways entrepreneurs might manipulate rhetoric in
order to achieve particular goals in changing frames and the acceptable policy
prescriptions to deal with international issues. Given that most advocacy groups or states
seek to influence policies, this section is particularly valuable for such groups. The most
valuable aspect ofthe discussion of strategic manipulation comes from the understanding
that all the manipulations are based on real observations. None are based on lies or
falsifying data. Each manipulation or description presents a different view ofthe "truth"
just as different individuals can have different views of a car accident and present widely
different stories. This makes these manipulations somewhat more legitimate in terms of
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policy options since they are not explicit lies or falsifications. Manipulating the
description ofthe phenomenon in terms of spatial or temporal scope affects the
acceptability ofthe frames by making the frames more or less related to the phenomenon.
Manipulations that emphasize the causes or the consequences can change the importance
of the issue for states because it may emphasize particular states in different parts ofthe
frame. Manipulation within each characteristic can affect the acceptability ofpolicy
prescriptions.
In the whaling case, this project only analyzed scope manipulations due to lack of
clear evidence showing manipulations between frame characteristics or within frame
characteristics. The evidence from whaling suggests that manipulations ofthe scope
conditions appear to have changed the acceptability offrame characteristics. Changing
the scope conditions from species differentiation to species conglomeration, made single
policy prescriptions more acceptable to address whaling. The moratorium on whaling
became more acceptable because activists successfully grouped whales into a single
category rather than subdivided into species and subjected to species-specific quotas.
Overall, there are mixed results for the different hypotheses examined in this
study. Material factors seem more oriented toward influencing state attention to issues
and allowing non-security issues to emerge on the international agenda. Non-material
factors seem more appropriately oriented toward changing the dominant understanding or
frame for issues in international relations. Therefore, where rhetoric may be able to
influence the dominant understanding of issues, it may be less able to change attention to
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issues on the international agenda through manipulation ofthat rhetoric. Instead, rhetoric
is better able to change the acceptable prescriptions by modifying the causes and
consequences of international issues.
RHETORIC AS A MECHANISM OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE
The influence over issue frames presented in this study describes a form ofsoft
power not commonly examined in much ofthe literature on soft power resources. The
term "soft power" has increasingly made its way into the discourse ofinternational
relations research. Types ofpower have appeared in various writings throughout
international relations, including in the earliest realist writings, where attempts were
made to discount the importance ofnorms, morality, and world opinion as forms of
power (Carr, 1956; Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 235-280).
At a basic level, power is the ability for one actor to influence the actions of
another actor that would not have occurred otherwise (Dahl, 1957). For international
relations scholars, this means that when actor A in the international system can influence
the actions of actor B in ways that actor B would not have done otherwise, the first actor
can be said to possess some amount ofpower over the second actor given the particular
situation. Power has been part of international relations studies since the earliest political
writings by Thucydides (1954) and Machiavelli (1935), and it remains perhaps the most
important and least understood concepts in international relations (Baldwin, 2002, p.
177).
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Soft power has been added to the list offorms ofpower for international actors
more recently (Nye, 1990). Soft power has been described increasingly in international
politics as the power of attraction, an alternative to the traditional understanding ofpower
in terms ofcarrots and sticks (Nye, 2006). Nye divides the differences between hard and
soft power in terms ofwhether the intent is to coerce or to attract. Hard powers, he
suggests, are those that attempt to coerce individuals, such that military force and
economic sanctions can be used for coercion (Nye, 2006). Economic wealth can be an
inducement when others change their behavior because ofthe desire to be wealthy rather
than some use ofmoney by a larger state to coerce actions (Nye, 2006). Attraction as the
third form ofpower, in Nye's definition, lacks a clear explanation ofresources used to
change the behavior ofothers. Nye's conception of soft power primarily consists ofthe
policy to attract others. He describes it as "the attractiveness of a country's culture,
political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of
others, our soft power is enhanced" (Nye, 2004, p. x). The definition ofsoft power
through attraction by use ofculture, political values, and foreign policies, is incomplete
without the importance of communication ofthose ideas. Therefore, this project's use of
rhetoric as an influence on frames and issue attention is an important part to explaining
the potential use ofsoft power -- attraction to policies - through communication ofthose
policies internationally.
In Nye's concept of soft power, the resources useful for attraction are culture,
political ideals, and policies. The problem with these resources is that alone, they have
197
no connection between the actor yielding power and the target. Policies and culture can
exist throughout the world in isolation without affecting other states. One way to
implement the use ofideas and cultures as power is to develop particular communication
strategies for policy explanations. Therefore, the resource associated with soft power
involves rhetoric and symbols that communicate culture and ideas that mayor may not be
attractive.
Nye makes frequent reference to rival soft power users, such as Osama bin Laden,
because he is able to attract individuals to his cause. The rhetoric, however, is vital to the
attraction of ideas and culture of Osama bin Laden. Western policies toward the Middle
East may be framed entirely as western encroachment and negative consequences by
j ihadists to attract individuals toward the use ofviolence against the west. Policies ofthe
United States could also be framed, as the US government attempted to do after the
second Iraqi war, as freeing individuals from oppressive governments. In the perspective
under this project, both are potential dominant frames of US policies, and the use of
rhetoric and media can influence which becomes dominant for specific individuals.
The use of discourse and symbols as the tools ofattraction is an important avenue
to utilizing soft power. When we move to understanding soft power in the use of
discourse and rhetoric, however, we move slightly away from the importance of culture
and ideas as the place where rhetoric comes from. Entrepreneurs manipulate rhetoric
based on real observations in order to change perception ofthe world, our frames. By
changing the frames for an audience, the audience may act in ways they did not intend.
198
This mechanism becomes somewhat slippery, because rhetoric and frame changes
essentially change the interest ofthe actor. For example, ifthe interests ofthe United
States suggest managed whaling, but rhetoric and symbols change the understanding such
that the United States becomes interested in protecting whales, rhetoric has changed the
interest ofthe United States. Has the United States done something that it would not
have otherwise done because ofthe rhetoric? Ifthe rhetoric changes the interests ofa
state or other actor, then this rhetoric fits the definition originally used above - power is
the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. Under this perspective,
individuals act in a world where arguments and rhetoric can change the way actors
understand the world, changing interests and actions (Kratochwil, 1989; Risse, 2000).
Therefore, the use ofrhetoric and controlling the discourse or conveyance ofideas
becomes the mechanism through which soft power can be utilized. Of course, this is not
completely new, as diplomacy and rhetoric have long been part offoreign policy
resources. The above describes not a new form ofpower, but a new way to understand
soft power in light ofthe work in this project on the use ofrhetoric to change outcomes in
international politics.
It is also important to adopt terminology to recognize the different types ofpower
available to international actors, states, or non-state rather than relying on antiquated
realist meanings. In most instances, references to "power" refer to military strength in
international politics. By adopting the clarification of"harder power" and "softer
powers," communication between realist and non-realist scholars may become easier
199
because ofa common use oftenns. These tenns also reflect more precisely the type of
power discussed in different research projects.
This dissertation begins to develop a theory ofthe mechanisms by which Nye's
notion ofattraction operates. The project suggests that attraction operates through the
application ofrhetoric to communicate the legitimacy ofpolicies, cultures, and ideas. It
is easy to understand how force can be used to compel others to do something and how
payments can be made for services. Police, for example, use force to compel criminals to
obey. We all use money to get others to do actions that they would not do otherwise in
services and at work. Our understanding ofthe uses ofsoft power in creation and
manipulation ofinternational politics has been much more limited.
At least one soft power resource involves the content ofrhetoric and the use of
media to propagate that rhetoric. Some countries have seen the importance ofrhetoric
and changing the frame around their country and hired public relations or media finns,
such as the country ofGeorgia (Bogardus, 2009). After successes using imagery and
rhetoric in the 1970s with several international advocacy campaigns, Greenpeace
established its own public relations section. The use ofrhetoric as a mechanism by which
international actors can attract others is an important addition to studies in soft power.
SOME CAVEATS OF THIS PROJECT
Although the results in this research project are suggestive ofthe forces behind
international agenda changes in both attention and frames, the results need further testing
to determine whether the results generalize to other environmental cases or cases outside
200
environmental politics. Single case studies face greater challenges in demonstrating
causation because many variables are not held constant and coincidence ofvalues on the
dependent and independent values may suggest a connection, but need further testing to
demonstrate causation.
First, in regards to influence ofrhetoric on issue attention and frame changes, the
historical whaling case does not allow adequate examination ofvariation for different
rhetoric that did not become part ofthe international agenda. There is not enough
competing rhetoric presented internationally to compare against the successful rhetoric in
order to test whether some frame characteristics makes other rhetoric more acceptable.
When examining rhetoric manipulation strategies, there is no counter-evidence of
strategies that were not successful. In order to determine which rhetoric became part of
the frame, we would ideally have multiple sources ofdifferent rhetoric, some ofwhich
become part ofthe frames and some that do not. Unfortunately, in this case, there is little
alternative rhetoric to those documented within the study. Therefore, the correlations or
coincidence ofthe rhetoric with changes in frames is suggestive ofcausation, but needs
further testing to determine whether the rhetoric is driving the cause.
A second issue related to understanding causation is the lack ofvariable controls
in a single case study. Whaling allows for study into agenda and frame changes easily
because the history ofwhaling allows easy grouping into temporal periods described
earlier. However, it also allows a large number ofvariables to potentially interfere with
or overpower the variables ofinterest in this study. One primary variable that this project
--------------_._.__._-
201
does not hold constant is the domestic institutional context of each nation that became
concerned with whaling. It is clear that domestic political contexts can influence
international policy (Frieden & Martin, 2001; Hiscox, 2002; Moravcsik, 1998).
Domestic institutions may influence the degree to which states pay attention to issues and
the frames states maintain for issues on the agenda. This influence may come
domestically through interest groups and activists (DeSombre, 2000). It may also be the
case that international advocates influence domestic advocates and interest groups
(Putnam, 1988). The potential for domestic institutional influences on the international
agenda needs to be examined further to determine how rhetoric relates to domestic
institutions and advocacy groups.
Another variable not controlled in this study is the level and speed of
communication changing over time. As each frame changed for whaling, communication
became easier and faster (Schramm, 1988). The changes in communication could be
responsible for much ofthe changes observed in the influence and appearance ofrhetoric
between the first stage and the third stage. This is similar to having more data available
during the later period and much less data in the earlier period. The correlation between
the rhetoric and the broader discourse may be a spurious relationship where the primary
driving factor is associated with the increase in quantity and speed of communication.
Another issue in this project involves the connection between the broader
discourse and the rhetoric seen. Instead ofthe theory presented in this project that the
connection to a broader discourse helps rhetoric become part ofthe international frame,
202
the broader discourse may encourage rhetoric similar to that discourse - effectively
reversing the causal direction. In particular, rhetoric that describes states as the blame for
whaling beginning in the 1920's and the association with a broader discourse could have
a reversed causal direction. The increase in focus on states and international treaties may
have prompted individuals and the media to present whaling as a state issue identifying
the states responsible for whaling rather than individual vessels. This potential causal
reversal needs further study in future analysis.
AFTER THE MORATORIUM
Although the third frame presented in this project has dominated since the 1980's,
some nations continue to hunt whales, such as Japan, Norway, and aboriginal
communities. In a recent push, whaling states may overturn the 1982 moratorium in
favor ofmore regulated whaling as opposed to the frequent "scientific" killings (Brown,
2009). Although the preservation frame is clearly dominant since the 1980's, a minority
ofstates continues to push for alternative frames and contest the moratorium.
Although this research and many accounts of international whaling end with the
moratorium on whales in 1987, the issue has continued be part ofthe international
agenda. To many in the international system, the international whaling issue appeared to
have been solved with the moratorium; however, whaling states continue to contest the
international frame on a conservation ofwhales, thus maintaining some space on the
international agenda for the whaling issue. In particular, Japan and Norway have
continued to advocate for their right to whale, and have taken advantage ofthe provision
203
for scientific whaling to continue to hunt whales, many ofwhich end up in the Japanese
food supply. Their claims to whaling primarily rest on the abundance ofMinke whales,
sovereignty rights, and food security (Epstein, 2008, p. 231). Organizations, such as the
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission,33 advocate for "optimum utilization ofthe
living resources ofthe sea" by attempting to alter the dominant frame (NAMMCO, 1992).
In addition, aboriginal communities continue to advocate for their rights to whaling as
part ofa historical cultural practice and population subsistence (Reeves, 2002).
Most whales taken by Japan have come under the provisions of scientific whaling
and most taken by Norway have come under its having opted out ofthe commercial ban
under the IWC rules. Many other whales taken have come by the hands of aboriginal
populations. Since 1985, 12,300 whales were taken under scientific permit (IWC,
2009c), 7,543 whales for aboriginal subsistence (IWC, 2009a), and 19,674 for
commercial purposes under objections to the International Whaling Commission (IWC,
2009b).
Despite the continued claims by Japan to allow controlled, sustainable, whaling of
a limited species, their efforts have not been entirely successful to change the frame
around whaling until very recently. In 2009, there has been a new push to change the
rules ofthe IWC to allow limited whaling ofrecoverable species ofwhale. These
changes, ifimplemented could suggest a return to a management/economic based
33 Membership includes Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.
204
dominant frame as opposed to the preservation frame. As part ofthese changes, the new
agreement will prohibit scientific whaling, which will allow greater control over the
number and type of whales hunted.
These changes in the rules ofthe IWC could be seen through the preservationist
frame without indicating that the frame has changed, however. Given the Japanese
scientific hunt for whales currently, many anti-whalers may prefer better control of the
hunting for scientific purposes by allowing some legal Minke whale hunting. This would
close the scientific loophole in the system, which is largely unregulated. Alternatively,
we may be seeing a shift back to management ofwhale stocks before the moratorium. In
addition to the Japanese, other countries, such as South Korea, have joined in the desire
for whaling rights under the IWC. The signal by South Korea to obtain the right to hunt
whales may be part of a regional policy directed towards competition with the Japanese,
or it may be part ofa broader trend of countries seeking to hunt whales for economic gain
in a sustainable managed environment.
These changes are relatively recent developments at the time this project was
completed. In the future, we may see an increase in the number of states desiring to take
whales for economic reasons in a managed way. Perhaps two frames will develop: one
for states with a desire for preservation maintaining the preservation frame; and another
for states interested in managed whale harvesting, which see whales as an economic
resource.
205
FURTHER QUESTIONS
In addition to the hypotheses and testing them in the case of whaling, a number of
questions remain unresolved and subject to future research. An important possibility
discussed earlier about the influence of speed and quantity of communication over the
influence of rhetoric needs further examination. Increased ability to take part in
international forums, the existence ofportable video cameras, and rapid television
communication allowed easier propagation ofrhetoric around the globe during the 1970s
than in the 1930s. Because communication during the 1800s looked nothing like the
communication possible during the 1970s, the difference in communication may factor
into the ability ofrhetoric to influence the agenda during the 1970s to a much greater
extent than during previous years.
The expansion of communication appears to continue to build toward greater
speed and quantity ofinformation. As new forms of communication become more
prevalent through Web 2.0, will advocacy groups become more influential? Some might
suggest so, but there is an alternate logic as well. Today, anyone with a computer can
create a web log (blog) or other forms of interactive communication to spread
information and rhetoric very broadly almost instantaneously. The spread ofrhetoric and
ideas may make it more difficult than in the 1970's to gamer international attention for a
particular rhetorical claim. This increase in communication quantity and speed may
cause a decline in the ability to change frames because the increase in communication
allows for too much rhetorical competition. Given the large number of individuals and
206
activists engaged in the propagation and strategic manipulation ofrhetoric, the larger
supply has made it more difficult for any particular actor to gain an advantage, increasing
exposure oftheir ideas and rhetoric. Therefore, the growth of communication, while
accelerating the influence during the 1970s, may have led to too much communication
today making rhetoric manipulation more difficult.
Another area ofrhetoric not examined in detail in this study involves the
"securitization" of issues to increase attention to those issues. Securitization involves the
description ofpreviously understood non-security issues as part of national security
(Buzan, Wcever, & Wilde, 1998; Waever, 1995). Changing issues from an environmental
issue, for example, to an issue involving state security, where the consequences ofthe
phenomenon decrease state security may increase the importance ofthat issue. This
allows the incorporation ofsecuritization as a basis for frame changes.
The whaling case was not presented as a security issue in rhetoric as an attempt to
change the frame; however, the influence ofrhetoric to securitize frames deserves future
research. Scholars have already begun discussions on particular issues, such as climate
change and whether those issues have security elements (Deudney, 1990; Homer-Dixon,
1994; Levy, 1995; McNeill, 2005).
A third area of interest for future studies would entail experimental research for
the influence ofrhetoric on belief systems and frames. Although this project does not
examine the influence ofrhetoric at the individual level, policies are ultimately created
and changed by individuals. Therefore, it is important to know, in addition to current
207
work on frames and decisions (e.g. Druckman, 2004; Fox, 1992; Gigerenzer, 1996;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988), how changes in rhetoric might
influence which frames become dominant. Much ofthe research in psychological studies
examines how frames change individual behavior, but to a less extent on which frames
are adopted by individuals and why.34
In addition, it is unclear from the research how different manipulation strategies
compete and are reconciled when positioned in media against each other. When two sets
of rhetoric, equally exposed in the media use different strategies, by emphasizing actor
blame versus victimization, it is not clear which will become dominant and why.
Experiments or other techniques to examine these questions make an interesting
extension ofthis research.
Fourth, this study also did not discuss aboriginal whaling in its analysis.
Aboriginal whaling is an important aspect ofthe whaling story and important for whaling
activists and anti-whaling activists today. This research was primarily concerned with
understanding state interest in whaling and changes in the international agenda rather
than telling the story ofthe history ofwhaling. Scholars can use the theories developed
here to understand the framing and international attention to the case of aboriginal
whaling. There is some indication that native populations attempted to use rhetoric to
influence their ability to continue whaling despite international efforts (See Francis,
1990, pp. 240-242). Although aboriginal whaling is an important part ofthe whaling
34 An exception appears in Whyte (1989).
208
story, it is not an important part ofthe story of changes in the international agenda
regarding whaling. Certainly, it is plausible that banning whaling could be easier without
the rhetoric presented by aboriginal and other whalers today about their legitimate
whaling. The influence ofrhetoric from aboriginal whaling and the ability of aboriginal
communities to maintain differing frames about whaling deserve future study.
Finally, this research has primarily focused on the changing importance ofthe
whaling issue on the agenda, but it does not examine the relative importance ofwhaling
to other issues. Ifthe importance ofwhaling increased during the 1970s, as documented
in this research, this increase may not be as meaningful ifall issues gained increasing
importance during this time. The relative increase between the whaling issue and others
could be zero although we observe an absolute increase in importance. Hypotheses that
examine the relative importance of security versus other issues were also not possible to
test without including other issues in the study. The project also cannot examine the
"crowding out" hypothesis more closely, except in regards to security versus the
environmental issues. The crowding hypothesis suggest that attention to some issues
causes other issues to lose attention with the implication that there is a finite amount of
attention actors provide issues at any given time (Downs, 1972; Schreurs et aI., 2001).
Although this project suggests that crowding must take place since the whaling issue
moves on and offthe agenda, the project also attributes these changes to a variety of
variables not including all the other issues that may take the attention ofstates.
209
Examining relative issue importance on the international agenda will add substantially to
our understanding ofchanges in the international agenda.
210
APPENDIX A
NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DATA
New York Times data were compiled from ProQuest Historical New York Times
Database through the University of Oregon Library database access. Some articles were
eliminated by the author ifthe article's reference to whaling did not involve the mammal.
Sometimes articles used words, such as "whale ofa good time," and other colloquial
phrases. Articles with such text in the titles were eliminated from the population before
any coding or analysis.
All articles were coded by the author, which resembles an "expert" coding
system. A random sample ofarticles was taken from the population ofarticles for each
decade for examination. Table 7 indicates the frequency ofthe total number ofarticles
by decade. Table 8 provides the list ofarticles examined and referencing notes for each
article. Table 8 also contains the codes for country mentions within each New York
Time Article. ISO 2-letter codes are used to denote each country listed. In addition,
several codes are used to denote non-state actors of interest mentioned in the texts. These
are presented in Table 9. Codes ofcountries in the articles do not include country names
when they are used only for geographical reference. Since the intention is to capture
blame, association between the country and the act ofwhaling, statements describing a
whaling vessel offthe coast ofAustralia, for example, are not coded for Australia since
Australia is not associated as a cause ofthe whaling.
Table 7.
Frequency ofWhaling Articles in the New York Times by Decade
211
Decade Start
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Table 8.
Frequency
53
54
115
149
147
111
85
263
260
142
204
165
281
285
192
75
New York Times Article Data
Article Title
(Abridged in Some Cases)
Latest Intelligence
Russian Machine for Killing Whales
Arrival ofWhaling Vessels
Transfer ofthe Whaling Business
Very like a Whale
New-York City
Arrival ofthe Overland Mail
Brooklyn News
The Whale Fishery for 1861
Whaling Intelligence
The Whaling Fleet
Monetary Affairs
San Francisco
The Whale Fishery
American Whales in the North Pacific
The Pacific Coast
Year
1852
1853
1855
1855
1856
1858
1859
1861
1862
1865
1866
1866
1866
1868
1870
1870
Month
08
11
05
08
09
05
01
11
01
09
01
01
04
01
12
12
Start
Day Page
11 2
21 2
29 1
28 4
08 4
01 8
19 1
22 5
08 6
30 1
08 5
31 2
19 5
13 3
16 2
26 5
Country
Appearance
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
US
o
US
US
o
o
US
o
212
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Jonah's Whale 1873 12 08 4 0
A Bark Attacked by a Whale 1874 02 16 2 0
Counterfeiters Arrested 1875 08 05 2 0
The Escaped Fenians 1876 08 21 5 0
Twelve Ships Lost at Sea 1876 10 22 1 0
Whaling News 1877 07 27 5 0
Riding on a Whale's Back 1877 10 07 2 0
Arctic Whaling 1877 11 19 2 0
A Whaleship's Escape 1877 11 26 2 0
The Trade ofDundee 1878 01 06 7 0
The Eothen's Whaling Voyage 1878 06 18 5 0
The Arctic Whaling Fleet 1878 09 10 1 0
Whaling Intelligence 1878 09 14 5 0
A Whale Killed near Riverhead 1878 10 24 2 0
Whale-Fishing at Charleston 1880 01 08 5 0
The Big Whale 1880 04 06 5 0
A Whale Attacks Abark in Mid-Ocean 1881 04 29 3 0
From the Arctic Sea 1881 10 03 1 0
How a Whale Breathes 1882 10 15 12 0
Whaling in the Arctic 1882 11 01 2 0
The Tail and Muscles ofthe Whale 1885 03 01 9 0
The California Whale Fishery 1885 04 04 2 0
Chasing Whales 1885 07 18 5 0
A Whaling Brig Wrecked 1885 08 25 2 0
Amagansett's Big Prize 1886 01 11 8 0
Catch ofthe Whaling Fleet 1886 10 30 3 0
Collision with a Whale 1887 05 13 8 0
First Whale Taken This Year 1888 01 13 3 0
The Catch ofWhales 1888 07 30 1 0
The Flag Again Insulted 1889 02 07 1 0
Sunk onWhale Rock 1889 05 18 5 0
Cut a Whale in Two 1889 10 11 2 0
A Whaling Steamer Lost 1889 11 02 8 0
On the Way to Halifax 1889 11 24 14 0
Esquimaux and Whales 1889 12 30 3 0
Whales Rob Fishermen 1891 11 17 3 0
Offthe Highlands Was a Whale 1894 07 03 8 0
The Exhibited Whale Washed Ashore 1895 05 28 10 0
Even Marines Would Not Believe It 1895 07 14 3 0
After Humpback Whales 1895 11 03 30 0
213
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Disappointed Finders of a Fossil 1895 12 06 10 0
Quogue Watching for a Whale 1896 01 15 1 0
A Whale Hunt OffProvincetown 1896 05 08 3 0
No Whales Like the Old Whales 1896 06 07 5 0
Jonah and the Whale 1897 02 01 3 0
Two Whales Off South Hampton 1897 02 20 1 0
Cutting Up Amagansett's Whale 1897 03 17 4 0
Whales OffLong Island 1897 07 07 1 0
European Edible Oddities 1897 12 12 11 0
Whaling Fleet in Danger 1898 01 03 3 0
The Whale Escaped 1898 01 11 5 0
A Whale OffLong Island 1898 03 10 10 0
Whaling Schooner Had Good Luck 1898 08 21 11 0
Whaling in the Faroes 1898 09 04 15 FR
Sharks and the Dead Whale 1898 11 20 21 0
Big Whale Washed Ashore 1899 09 18 2 0
Baldwin-Ziegler Expedition 1900 12 27 7 0
Whale Sends a Bark to Davy Jones's 1902 04 25 2 0
Locker
Whale Disabled a Ship 1902 05 20 3 0
Whale Bumped into Mine 1904 03 31 2 0
Took Whales for Japanese Ships 1904 04 14 2 0
Roosevelt to M'kinley "a Minnow to a 1904 04 23 5 0
Whale"
Here's a Tale ofa Whale 1905 06 18 7 0
Dead Whale Ashore on Long Beach Bar 1905 07 03 12 0
Life on the Great Ocean 1906 09 08 9 0
Sperm Whale Got Away 1907 03 22 1 0
Polar Expedition Sails 1908 04 13 4 0
In the Wright Aeroplane, Whose Secret 1908 05 17 SM3 NO
Is Carefully Guarded...
Record Catch ofWhales 1908 08 17 5 CAJP
Whale Races Liner 1908 08 26 1 0
Big Whale Drifts Ashore 1909 03 06 1 0
Whales OffNantucket 1909 07 13 1 0
Four Tie at Morris County GolfClub 1910 06 19 S3 0
A Stranded Whale Roped at Arveme 1912 05 20 6 NOGL
Closed Season for Whales 1912 06 30 X7 JP CA US
Dead Whales in Ship's Path 1912 10 20 C5 0
214
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Escaped after a Privateer Burned a 1912 11 24 X20 0
Whaling Fleet
What Happened to Aaron's Whale 1913 04 13 X4 0
Amateur's Picture Hung on the Line 1914 05 10 C5 0
Two Trawlers Sunk 1914 10 31 4 SE
The Fallacy of a Jitney Submarine 1915 09 25 10 0
White Sox Whale Browns 1917 04 21 10 0
Sunday Hits Darwin for 'Nature Faking' 1917 05 25 7 0
Seek U-Boat Bases, Marconi Suggests 1918 06 13 8 0
Seaplanes for Whaling 1920 06 02 12 0
Whale Hits Staten Island 1921 06 25 6 0
45-Ft. Whale at Cape May 1921 09 04 3 0
Sidelights from the London Press 1921 10 16 75 0
Whale and Calf Inshore 1921 12 26 15 0
Notes on Trade and Industry abroad 1922 07 09 38 0
Natal Whaling Industry 1922 08 20 E2 0
Whale Is Sighted Off Southampton 1922 10 14 10 0
There's No Harm in a Whale Shark 1924 03 02 E2 0
Whale and Earthquake 1924 08 03 X14 0
The Wanderer Quits Movies To Hunt 1924 08 18 1 0
Whales Once More
Did Whale or Shark Get Jonah? He Asks 1924 10 27 10 0
A Shrine for the Last Whaling Ship 1925 03 22 91 US
Seeks to Save Whales From 1926 03 31 1 UK
Extermination; Britain Will Send
Experts...
Arctic Whale Hunt for Museum Here 1926 05 11 7 0
British Museum Asks Putnam's Aid 1926 09 01 4 0
British Scientists Seek to Find Whether 1926 10 03 XX7 0
Whale Is Polygamous
Navy's Iron Whale 1927 01 09 XX2 0
Bronxville Boy Seeks New Bedford 1927 03 17 3 0
Whaling
Two Whales at Cape May Keep 1927 04 12 1 0
Mackerel Fishermen in Port
Whales Thrill Lindbergh 1927 06 09 4 0
Big Whale Bumps Destroyer Which 1927 07 10 E8 0
Races Near It at Sea
World Mark Falls in Detroit Regatta 1927 09 07 24 0
215
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Big German Company Will Enter 1927 12 04 El NO GB CL
Whaling; "Factory Ships" Will Make DE
Oil. ..
Whales Still Stage Battles for Wondering 1928 03 04 158 0
Seafarers
Motor Boat Breaks Mark from Albany 1928 04 15 157 0
New Circus Samson on Diet ofWhales 1928 04 16 27 0
Norway Wins in Fight for Antarctic 1928 11 25 E3 GBNO
Whales
Overjoyed to Reach Goal 1928 12 27 1 0
Dead Whale's Long Trip 1929 02 20 5 NO
Byrd Rebroadcast from Antarctica 1929 02 24 3 0
Organizes to Check Slaughter ofWhales 1929 05 20 33 0
Berlin Fliers Wait at Hudson Bay Post 1929 07 07 2 0
A New Point About Whales Disclosed by 1929 08 06 20 0
Captain Irving
Boy Finds Fossil Whale 1929 09 10 22 0
Humpback Whales Numerous in Bay of 1929 10 13 X22 0
Fundy Waters
Scott Survivors Sail for the Antarctic 1929 12 15 9 0
Whaling Fliers Lost in Antarctic Sea 1929 12 31 1 NO
Huge Whaler Here; Crew Lauds Byrd 1930 04 20 22 NO
Byrd Set a Record through Ice Pack 1930 04 21 8 NO
Sea Monster Seen at Newport Is 1930 05 24 3 0
Identified as White Whale
Battle Whale Nine Hours 1930 05 25 21 US
8 Outboard Marks Set at Worcester 1930 05 30 22 0
Lone Arctic Posts Radio Day's Cheer 1930 12 26 16 0
California Scientists Trace Dawn-Age 1931 01 20 17 0
Man
Whaling Ship Here with $1,500,000 Oil 1931 04 19 27 NO
Nets 5-Foot Whale in Chesapeake 1931 04 29 51 0
Biologists Capture Nest ofBaby Eels 1931 07 28 4 0
Ship Sails for Antarctic 1931 10 11 E3 FK
Would Kill Visiting Whale 1931 10 23 48 0
George M. Cohan in a Studio -- 1932 10 02 X5 0
Bothersome Stories -- Mr. Whale's
New...
Explains Whale Deaths 1933 07 04 29 0
216
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Remains ofEarly Eskimo Race Found 1933 09 11 19 0
Near an Alaskan Glacier
Byrd Is Now Due at Little America 1934 01 18 3 0
Ice Pack Vanishes OffBay ofWhales 1934 01 23 8 0
Byrd Ship Returns to Unloading Task 1934 01 26 15 0
Byrd Ship in Peril; Buffeted by Winds 1934 01 28 3 0
Whale Jostled by Bremen at Sea 1934 03 03 15 0
Whale Attacks Vessel, Snaps Propeller 1934 06 23 4 0
Blades
'Miles ofWhales' OffAsbury But Only 1934 06 25 1 0
Fishermen saw Them
Miss Carstairs, Here, Silent on Buying 1934 10 06 17 0
Isle
18th Century Whale Oil To Light Yule 1934 12 23 12 0
Service
Two to Go Whaling OffLong Island 1935 01 18 25 0
Joseph P. Fawell 1935 03 23 16 0
Fight Whales 6 Hours in Florida Waters 1935 03 25 17 0
Arctic Explorer to Seek Whales at 1935 06 15 15 0
Amazon Mouth
Whaling Curb Is Denied 1936 03 05 17 JP, GB, AU
Humpback Whale Cause Of Waikiki 1936 03 15 N3 0
Traffic Jam
Whale Draws Crowds in Brazil 1936 06 14 30 0
Persistent Pleas Held Path to God 1936 08 24 9 0
Science Is Blamed for Moral Chaos 1936 09 07 18 0
Whale Goes 1,000 Miles Up River 1936 09 13 35 0
Bermuda to Revive Whaling 1937 02 24 25 BM
Sea Wolves Kill Seals 1937 04 25 5 0
Ready to Seize Whale Oil Cargo 1937 11 18 18 US NO
Cutter Hunts for Whale In San Francisco 1938 02 08 15 0
Bay
Ecuador Scents Mystery In Carcasses of 1941 09 21 4 0
23 Whales
$12,547 Verdict to Artist 1942 02 21 17 0
James H. Wood 1943 05 27 25 0
Last Whale Harpoon Maker DiesI 1944 02 24 15 0
Capt. Henry Mandley 1944 05 08 19 0
Gay Whale Spouts in Flushing Creek 1944 06 08 23 0
New Whale Ship Uses Radar 1945 10 29 5 0
217
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Wild Life Had Severe War Casulties; Oil 1946 01 28 21 0
Killed Gulls, and Submarines...
Whale Sighted in Sound at 5 A.M., And 1946 10 22 26 0
Blow Me Down, Mates, It's So ...
13 in Whaling Accord 1946 12 03 11 0
Tanker Sets out on Antarctic Trip 1946 12 27 35 NO
Polar Whale Haul Put at $100,000,000 1947 05 05 45 USNOGB
JP SUND
Raft in High Seas Rides Easy and Dry 1947 05 20 27 0
Japan to Ship Whale Oil 1947 12 04 13 0
Youngsters' Garb Shown by Brogan 1948 04 29 26 0
Log ofa Whaleship 1948 06 06 BR5 0
Old Customs House at Sag Harbor To Be 1948 09 10 25 0
Restored, Moved to New Site
Whale Meat Cargo Near Britain 1949 03 20 18 GB
Whale Fishing 1949 11 27 BR14 NO
Scientific Circus Features Animals 1949 12 30 4 0
Books ofthe Times 1950 05 04 40 0
In The Nation 1950 08 17 26 0
One-Pound Whale Shown at Museum 1952 02 27 28 0
Whale Meat Is Tested As a 'Milk' for 1952 10 20 25 0
Babies
Ladd Plans Movie ofa Whaling Trip 1952 11 03 36 0
The Screen in Review 1952 11 24 19 0
Events ofInterest in Shipping World 1953 04 12 S10 0
Two Whales Get Lost in Britain 1953 09 16 13 GB
Copters Popular for Whale Hunts 1953 12 26 21 GBNOJP
Whale That Can't Swim Channel Gives 1954 03 26 23 0
Briton a Weighty Problem
Prehistoric Head ofWhale Is Found 1954 04 25 119 0
Exhibitor to Dispose ofWhale 1954 07 21 30 0
Peru Fines Whale Ships 1954 12 01 9 PE
Sperm Whale's Oil Guards Reservoirs 1955 02 27 30 0
Talks on Whaling Mapped in Moscow 1955 06 19 SII lIAUBR
CADKFR
NLNZNO
SUGB US
ZAPAMX
JP SE IS
ARCLPE
218
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Upstate Leviathan 1955 10 30 BR40 0
Mink Living on Whale Meat 1956 01 05 C76 0
Soviet Skipper Visits U.S. Ship 1956 04 08 23 0
Screen: John Huston and Melville's 1956 07 05 18 0
White Whale
Whales Auditioned 1956 07 22 E9 0
Long Island Museums and Landmarks 1956 09 09 X25 0
Meeting Debates Whale Quota Cut 1957 06 26 45 0
Antarctic Whaling Argeement 1958 08 23 30 II GB NO
JPNL SU
Whale No.2 Due Here 1958 08 29 24 0
Brown Gets Whaling Relics 1958 10 05 62 0
Shipping Events: Whaling Quotas 1959 06 23 66 0
Two Quit Whaling Pact 1959 07 02 52 NL JPNO
Boy's Gift Solves Whale's Identity 1959 07 31 21 0
Indians' Capture ofWhales 1959 09 05 14 0
Science Notes 1959 12 13 Ell 0
Whale-Hunting, California-StyIe 1960 02 07 XX2 0
3
Members ofLamoureux Divide Their 1960 03 06 XII 0
Profits in Fashion ofWhaling Men
Tiny Pale Whale Arrives at Coney 1960 07 08 23 0
Soviet Whaling Expanded 1960 10 14 64 SU
Informality Rules Shops In an Old 1961 08 29 34 0
Whaling Port
Whale Towed to Sea 1961 09 30 16 0
Outsmarting Crocodile and Whale 1961 12 31 BR4 0
Whaling Village Tour 1962 08 19 64 0
Sidelights 1963 07 27 23 JPGB
150 Whales Wash Ashore 1963 12 16 63 0
Sidelights 1964 03 06 42 NOJPND
SU
Early Japanese Get Whales 1964 03 16 62 JP
Last of Wooden Whale Ships May Be 1964 07 13 52 0
Designated Shrine
At Home by the Mizzen 1964 08 09 BR1 0
Letters 1964 12 27 138 0
Whale Found in Hudson Towed to Sea 1964 12 30 33 0
and Blown Up
It Isn't a Carrier, It's a 'Birdfarm' 1965 06 01 5 0
219
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
F.A.O. Calls for Global Rules To Protect 1965 06 30 45 IF
Whale Industry
A Salty New Museum for an Old 1966 05 08 XX4 0
Whaling Town
George F. Salman of Service Corps 1966 06 02 43 PE
Whales Try Mass Suicide in Florida 1966 08 15 28 0
2 Whales Flown Here With Romance in 1967 09 08 46 0
Mind
Antiques: The Charms ofScrimshaw 1969 01 18 28 0
500-Mile Quest for White Whale 1969 04 23 56 0
3 Main Whaling Countries Will Keep 1970 07 01 10 JP SUNO
Antarctic Quota US
Last Call for Whales 1970 07 14 36 JPNO SU
US
Whale and Dolphin Pool Planned 1970 09 15 51 0
Whale Watchers Active on Coast 1971 01 17 80 0
Ban on Whaling Stuns Coast Company 1971 03 07 58 SU JP
Exterminating the Whale 1971 03 28 E14 US JP SU
Resolved: To Save the Whale 1971 07 29 32 US SU JP
11
Fisherwoman Hooks Whale 1971 08 29 54 0
Soviet Fleet Sails Before Pact To Protect 1971 10 08 12 SU JP 11
Whales Is Ratified
End ofAmerican Whaling 1971 12 26 E8 US 11
Whaling Halt Urged in Stockholm 1972 06 10 4 SUNZDE
FRZA VA
PT
Quotas Reduced on Whale Catch 1972 07 01 5 0
Hurt Mother Whale Rescued on Beach 1972 09 26 1 0
With Newborn Calf
Baby Whale Dies After Month In 1972 10 27 82 0
Captivity at Aquarium Here
Reginald B. Hegarty, 66, Whaling 1973 01 20 34 0
Historian, Is Dead
Scientists Find Value In Dead Whale 1973 02 25 97 0
Here
Article 6 -- No Title 1973 10 28 507 0
Letters: A Torch Might Have Saved The 1973 11 11 566 0
Arctic Whales
220
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Boycott of 2 Nations' Goods Asked 1973 11 25 84 JP SU
Because of Whaling
Metropolitan Briefs 1973 12 12 100 0
Pregnant Whale's Fetal Heartbeats Elude 1973 12 28 33 0
Detection
Alaska Whale Killed As Buckley 1974 05 26 44 0
Watches
Ideas &amp; Trends 1974 09 01 138 0
Rare Whale Dies on Beach 1974 09 03 8 0
Metropolitan Briefs 1975 05 08 43 0
Out ofThe Whale 1975 05 11 BR8 0
Books of The Times 1975 07 17 27 0
Metropolitan Briefs 1975 08 06 34 0
New Hope for Whales 1975 08 11 20 JP
Aquarium Displays Its 2 Baby Whales 1975 08 22 33 0
Smaller Whales Are Expected To Be 1975 09 01 18 JPUS
Next Targets ofIndustry
More Dead Fish Found OffShore 1976 07 22 67 0
Folk Programs Sunday At L.I. Whaling 1977 04 01 73 0
Museum
Alaskan Eskimos Angered Over Ban on 1977 10 05 8 0
Hunting of Bowhead Whales
Around the Nation 1977 10 13 18 0
Whaling Group Is Urged to Reverse Cut 1977 11 29 8 JP SU IS
in Quota
Science Watch: Microbe Weaponry 1978 11 14 Cl 0
Mass Panic Is Linked To 56 Whales' 1979 01 14 15 0
Deaths Along Mexican Shore
Big Spectator Sport: Watching the 1979 04 18 A14 0
Whales
Remains of41 Beached Whales Buried 1979 06 26 AI0 0
in Sand Dunes in Oregon
Beached Baby Whale Is Rescued in 1979 09 20 16 0
Oregon
Around the Nation 1980 01 10 A20 0
The Region 1980 02 11 B7 0
Notes Whale-Watching in New England 1980 04 20 XX9 0
Waters
Letters to the Editor 1980 07 13 XX2 0
3
221
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Grand Jury Questioning Eskimos On 1980 10 25 7 0
Killing Endangered Whales
Around the Nation 1980 11 24 A18 0
Gray Whales in Revival Off California 1981 01 31 8 0
Narrative Recalls Deadly Attack by 1981 02 15 26 0
Whale in 1820
Whale-Watcher's Delight: Spume in 1981 05 04 B1 0
Atlantic OffL.I
Ban on Whaling Strains U.S. Relations 1982 07 28 A2 JPUS
With Japan
2 Whales Beach on Cape And One Dies 1982 12 27 A12 0
There
Whaling Protesters Say Chase Followed 1983 07 20 A6 SU 1G II
Incursion in Siberia
A Siberian Sojourn Ends Well for Foes 1983 07 25 A2 SU1R1G
of Whaling
Herter to Whaling Panel 1983 09 01 A3 0
Misinformed Arguments for a Total 1984 02 09 A30 JP US II
Whaling Moratorium
Teen-Agers Find Rare Whale Fossil 1984 06 19 C3 0
In the Whale's Wake 1984 07 22 BR7 0
Japan Suggests a Whaling Limit In 1984 08 02 A8 JP
Attempt to Head OffFull Ban
U.S. Reports Accord With Japan on 1984 11 11 6 JPUS
Whales
Riding Waves, Seeing Drama 1984 12 02 LI34 0
Soviet Icebreaker Is Trying To Rescue 1985 02 24 5 SU
Trapped Whales
Russians Tell Saga ofWhales Rescued 1985 03 12 C3 SU
by an Icebreaker
Using Inflatable Whales to Elucidate 1985 04 29 CIS 0
Economics
Roaming Whale Enlivens the Sound 1985 09 08 CN20 0
Whale Clears a Hurdle For Return to 1985 10 26 8 0
Ocean
Reagan Is Told ofNorwegian Whaling 1986 06 10 A16 N01G
Infractions
Iceland, Voicing Anger, Halts All 1986 07 29 AS IS US
Whaling
222
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Iceland Expresses Anger At U.S. in 1986 07 30 A5 IS
Whale Dispute
Whaling Ships Refloated in Iceland 1986 11 20 A7 0
Soviet Says It Is Giving Up Commercial 1987 05 24 1 SU 1G
Whaling
U.S. Effort to Stop Whaling For 1987 06 23 B8 IS JP US
Research Brings Protest NO
lapan, Defying Protests, Pushes Whaling 1987 08 02 6 JP IS KR
Plan
Increase in Whales Puzzles Scientists 1987 08 16 LI1 0
Whale Expedition Defended 1988 02 19 A6 JPII
'Whale Rescue,' Escape And a Happy 1988 03 08 C18 0
Ending
2 Say Method Averts Need To Kill 1988 05 31 C4 lP US II
Whales for Research
It's Showtime for Baby Whale 1988 09 24 6 0
Whale Trapped in Net Freed 1988 10 24 A13 0
What 3 Whales Did to the Human Heart 1988 11 06 Ell 0
Aquarium Trying to Save a Stranded 1988 12 22 B2 0
Whale
Publishing 1989 06 26 D6 0
Scrimshaw, With No Threat to Whales 1989 08 03 C3 0
Carcasses of23 Gray Whales Wash Up 1990 07 16 A10 0
on Islands in Alaska
Fiction 1991 05 12 BR18 0
Up to Her Elbow in Alligators 1991 12 29 BR7 0
Nothing Wasted but the Whale 1992 02 23 BR26 0
A Whale: Food for Deep Thought, or lust 1992 04 06 A4 JP
Food?
Whale Killed in New Hunt 1992 07 07 A8 NO
Be It a Whale or a Dinosaur, Can LB.M. 1992 09 06 FlO 0
Really Evolve?
The Messy Science ofCetology 1993 02 21 SM4 0
4
For Children 1993 04 02 C31 0
Commission to Save Whales 1993 05 18 C4 NO lP IS
Endangered, Too
Whale Watching 1993 06 06 XXI 0
2
223
Article Title Start Country
(Abridged in Some Cases) Year Month Day Page Appearance
Stray Whale Is Herded Toward Uncertain 1993 08 04 B6 0
Fate
Norwegians Claim Their Whaling Rights 1993 08 07 1 IGNODE
The Minke Whale 1993 08 07 2 0
Imagining a heroine for Hanukkah A tale 1993 12 10 C34 0
offive Hannahs Seeing things...
Fossils Point to a Walking Ancestor of 1994 01 14 A25 0
Whales
A Tribe Sees Hope In Whale Hunting, 1995 06 04 1 0
But U.S. Is Worried
Whales and Boys in Risky Environments 1995 07 19 CI0 0
At Twin Lights, Keeping Memories of 1996 05 12 NB 0
Whale Oil Burning
Central Park Whale Faces Tattered 1997 05 26 27 0
Retirement
Over the Airwaves: All-Whale Radio 1997 10 04 A4 0
Winter Whale-Watching OffBaja 1997 10 19 154 0
Scientists Report Rare Attack by Killer 1997 11 09 26 0
Whales on Sperm Whales
Castoff Whale Washes Up on a New 1997 11 30 CY8 0
Shore
Whale Hunt Protesters Are Arrested by 1998 11 02 A19 IS
Police
Conservationists Who Oppose Tribal 1998 11 26 A40 IS
Whale Hunt Remove Boat
A Boston Firebrand Alienates His Allies 1999 01 23 A9 0
Even as He Saves Whales
Microsoft Hunts Its Whale, the Digital 1999 05 10 Cl 0
Set-Top Box
Family Fare 2000 07 28 E35 0
U.S. to Move Against Japan Over 2000 09 13 A6 JP
Whales
Liberties 2000 11 29 A35 0
Like a Bird, Like a Whale, Like the Wind 2001 05 06 AR22 0
The View From Mystic 2001 07 01 CT2 0
Gray Whales Rebound For West Coast 2002 03 18 A16 0
Ritual
Japan Cuts Whaling Rights For Native 2002 05 25 A4 JP
Peoples ofArctic
Swimming in the Sea ofMemory 2003 06 15 CY3 0
2003 11 10 B3
Start
Year Month Day Page
Article Title
(Abridged in Some Cases)
A Whale Stops By, But Doesn't Stay
Long
Thar She Blows! Researchers Say A New
Species ofWhale Is Found
Table 9.
2003 11 20 A10
224
Country
Appearance
o
JP
Codes for Non-State Actors ofInterest in New York Times Text
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED
IF NATIONS
1G GREENPEACE
IR RAINBOW WARRIERS
11 INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
IS SEA SHEPHARD CONSERVATION GROUP
225
APPENDIXB
GOOGLE NEWS SEARCH DATA
Google News was searched and data were compiled on May 6, 2009. The search
terms involved country names in combination with "whale" to determine the number of
articles describing both the country with the whaling issue in the title. Only news sources
were searched during the process, eliminating other internet sources. Tables 10 and 11
present the data developed for countries used in the project.
Table 10.
Google News Search Article Count (1920-1946, 2-Year Intervals)
Year DE GB JP NO US CA ZA IE NZ AU
1920 17 15 17 7 38 12 26 5 7 18
1922 26 25 19 17 57 15 24 9 19 29
1924 22 27 24 34 81 18 23 9 26 43
1926 38 48 39 93 120 37 19 5 57 67
1928 40 69 34 131 166 37 33 7 88 115
1930 27 53 32 79 115 31 28 14 42 68
1932 21 18 26 33 68 18 19 9 28 46
1934 23 26 32 40 66 9 17 6 23 44
1936 42 35 57 32 80 17 27 7 21 38
1938 67 59 58 53 96 18 20 17 18 28
1940 34 46 24 45 80 11 3 12 8 16
1942 5 19 14 12 34 6 7 7 2 9
1944 12 4640 31 36 23 17 4 26 46
Table 11.
Google News Search Article Count (1970-1980, 2-Year Intervals)
Country 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 total
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 9 9 18
Sweden 4 6 6 2 11 12 41
Peru 11 8 15 7 18 22 81
Chile 9 5 9 7 15 17 62
Spain 7 6 17 14 19 33 96
226
227
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