"La Revoluci6n dentro de la Revoluci6n: 11 The Cuban 
Hip-Hop Movement and the State 
Race, Marginality and Institutionalization 
By Miles Rooklyn 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Clark Honors College 
At the University of Oregon 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
For the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts 
June 2009 
ii 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Miles Rooklyn for the degree of Bachelor arts 
In the Department of Romance Languages to be taken June 13, 2009 
Title: "La Revoluci6n dentro de la Revoluci6n:" the Cuban Hip-Hop Movement and 
the State-Race, Marginality and Institutionalization. 
Approved: 
Cuban hip-hop is unique when compared to hip-hop around the world: it is an 
institutionalized art form, receiving promotional support, production equipment 
and concert space directly from the Cuban government. In this essay I explore how 
and why this relationship between Cuban hip-hop artists and the Cuban 
government came to be. I relate the history and development of Cuban hip-hop to 
show how it came to be a highly politicized musical form in the Afro-Cuban 
community, then present the motives both Cuban rappers and government 
officials had for forming an alliance. I then discuss how the Cuban hip-hop 
movement was effected by institutionalization, considering both positive and 
negative effects, and concluding with an evaluation of the Cuban hip-hop 
movement's current status and direction in relation to its origins as a grassroots 
political musical form. 
iii 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Tania Triana for her guidance in 
the preparation of this manuscript and for the generosity she showed in providing 
me with the rare primary materials I would make use of in my analysis. Without 
her support, this project would have been impossible. I would also like to warmly 
thank Dr. Robert Davis and Dr. Francis Cogan for showing me encouragement and 
support from the very beginning. Their words of wisdom in the early stages of this 
project gave me the confidence I would need to carry it to completion. And lastly, I 
would like to thank my parents, Kim and Dale Rooklyn, whose loving support 
knows no bounds. 
IV 
Table of Contents 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION .. ............ ......................................................................... :. ....... 1 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE SPECIAL PERIOD OF THE 1990s .................. 4 
III. CUBAN HIP-HOP'S EMERGENCE AND ITS CONSOLIDATION AS A 
MOVEMENT ........................................................ .................................. ......... 12 
IV. TEMAS SOC/ALES: HIP-HOP'S SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ...... ..................... 27 
V. NATIONALIZATION OF THE HIP-HOP MOVEMENT ....................... ............ 42 
VI . CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... ................. ..... ... .................. 62 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......... ......................................................... ... .................... ..... 65 
INTRODUCTION 
From its humble beginnings in the housing projects of the South Bronx in the 
1970s, hip-hop has grown into a globalized musical genre and culture. Alleyways in 
Spain explode with the cryptic lettering of graffiti, South Koreans breakdance on public 
plazas in Seoul, and in Paris French rappers rhyme over break beats scratched on tum 
tables. Hip-hop, although originally imported from the U.S.A. , can no longer be 
considered only American music. Hip-hop aficionados often identify themselves as 
members of the "hip-hop nation," a transnational global culture united by style and 
music . Some theories of globalization suggest that transnational cultural flows such as 
hip hop, which have the capability of redefining individuals' cultural identity, "lead to 
increasing obsolescence of the territorially-bounded nation-state ." 1 As culture is 
globalized, modem citizens looks less and less to the nation to which they belong to 
form their cultural identity, drawing from imported or transnational culture in order to 
define who they are. For the nation state, this can become a problem: democratic ideas 
in China become "threats to its own control over ideas of nationhood and peoplehood ... " 
western lifestyles represented on television in the Middle East and Asia "completely 
overwhelm and undermine the rhetoric of national politics."2 According to theory then, 
globalization and nationalism seem to be mutually exclusive phenomena. 
That being so, it is logical to assume that hip-hop would be entirely 
incompatible with nationalist interests. This, however, is not the case in Cuba. Cuban 
hip-hop defies theories of globalization by bolstering nationalism and strengthening 
1 Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent 1 : Cuban arts, state power, and the making of 
new revolutionary cultures. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) 
2 Appadurai , Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." 
Public Culture 2(2): 1-24, quoted in Fernandes (2006). 
2 
Cuban solidarity in their national identity. This partly has to do with the alliance that 
hip-hop has been able to form with the Cuban state: hip-hop is institutionalized in Cuba, 
receiving logistical , technical and promotional support from the government while 
rappers support the aims and ideologies of the Cuban revolution in their critiques of 
global capitalism and consumerism. Hip-hop has its own government agency in Cuba: 
la Agencia Cubana de Rap (ACR, Cuban Agency of Rap). Heavy state involvement is 
surely the most unique aspect of Cuban hip-hop and has played a key role in enabling 
Cuban hip-hop to grow into one of the most vibrant hip-hop scenes in Latin America. 
It is curious how a musical style imported from Cuba's ideological archenemy 
could have been assimilated so successfully into Cuban national culture and promoted 
by the state in such a short period of time.3 Hip-hop began to leak into the Cuban isle in 
the 1980s, and in the early 1990s, the first Cuban rap groups began to perform 
infonnally at house parties and on street corners in Havana. By 2002, two separate state 
institutions had taken hip-hop under their auspices, and Cuban rappers were performing 
on stages all around Cuba and Latin America. 
Yet while the state provides rappers with the means to produce and perform 
their music, some refer to hip-hop ' s institutional status as a gilded cage, enabling 
rappers while at the same time limiting their creative license. Rap took root in Cuba in 
the displaced Afro-Cuban communities of Havana who felt the hardships brought on by 
the economic crisis of the 1990s (referred to in Cuba as the "Special Period") more 
acutely than most other (white) Cubans. Rap, for the Afro-Cuban community, was 
3 Baker, Geoffrey . 2005. " jl-lip I-lop, Revoluci6n 1 Nationalizing Rap in Cuba." 
Ethnomusicology vol. 49, no. 3, Fall , 369 
3 
"resistance music" in the sense that it enabled marginalized Afro-Cubans to carve out a 
political niche in which they could express their frustrations with the shortcomings of 
the revolution and critique the gaps between government rhetoric and the lived realities 
of the new economic policies of the Special Period. These rapped critiques often 
contrasted sharply with what government officials were claiming in their public 
speeches, especially concerning the matter of race. Once institutionalized, however, 
Cuban rap ' s voice of resistance would encounter clear limits. Only rappers that did not 
veer too far from the party line would qualify for government support- those rappers 
whom the government perceived as "subversive" to state ideology would find 
themselves denied support and would thus discover it was much more difficult to make 
and perform their music. 
Some scholars argue that hip-hop's institutionalization in Cuba has been a 
process of co-optation-or an appropriation of hip-hop's political power-meant to 
benefit state interests, while others assert that institutionalization has been a natural, 
entirely benign occurrence, fo1ming the next logical step in hip-hop's growth on the 
island. In this paper, I intend to explore how and why Cuban hip-hop developed from 
its beginnings as a grassroots Afro-Cuban phenomenon into a national, institutionalized 
art form in Cuba. To do this I will provide an account of the historical context out of 
which Cuban hip-hop emerged, then describe how a marginalized class of young Afro-
Cubans were able to adopt hip-hop as a means by which to re-create community, 
explore racial identity, revisit their cultural heritage and counteract the marginalization 
they were experienced in Cuban society. Hip-hop created the space for a political 
4 
forum in which the young Afro-Cuban community could critique the gaps between 
government rhetoric and their lived experience, thus politicizing rappers' role in Cuban 
communities. After establishing Cuban hip-hop's development into a popular, political 
form of expression, I will relate how and why the Cuban state became involved with 
Cuban hip-hop politically with the double intention of fostering its growth while 
limiting its potential to destabilize the revolution's ideological monopoly through its 
countervailing voice. 
Historical Context: the Special Period of the 1990s 
ln order to make some sense of the contradictory and ambiguous relationship 
between the Cuban hip-hop movement and state institutions, it is important that I begin 
to tell Cuban hip-hop's story from the beginning. Hip-hop emerged in Cuba as a 
politicized musical art form amidst the drastic economic and social changes that took 
place on the island during the Special Period of the 1990s. Fidel Castro used the term 
"Periodo especial en tiempo de paz" ("Special Period in a Time of Peace") in June of 
1990 to refer to the period of economic crisis and extreme hardship Cuba faced 
following the withdrawal of support by the Soviet Union.4 Trade with the USSR had 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of all Cuban trade, all of which virtually disappeared 
overnight, causing the Cuban gross domestic product to plummet by nearly one-third, 
4 Alexander I. Gray and Antoni Kapcia, eds. , The Changing Dynamic of Cuban Civil 
Society. Gainesvil le: University Press of Florida, 2008, 4 
5 
personal consumption and employment to decline rapidly and the black market and 
emigration to escalate markedly. 5 
In response to the sudden economic crisis, Cuban officials declared a state of 
emergency in which austerity measures were rapidly enforced so as to maintain the 
egalitarian division of the now scarce resources remaining on the island. Blackouts 
became a daily routine, rations were reduced, and public transportation service was cut 
down to below the third of what it was before the Special Period.6 Further complicating 
Cuba's dire situation, the United States government tightened the trade embargo in the 
hopes of providing the last squeeze needed to strangle Castro ' s weakened regime.7 
However, Cuba endured. Life during the Special Period was very similar to wartime 
conditions; while the population weathered extreme scarcity the regime maintained 
morale by appealing to the people's sense of nationalism and revolutionary commitment 
while struggling to adapt to the harsh new economic climate.8 
The Special Period did not only require that the general populace make 
sacrifices in order to maintain the revolution during such times of crisis. The new 
economy forced Cuban leaders to make ideological sacrifices in the realm of politics, 
putting " ideology aside while searching out immediate solutions to urgent problems."9 
In order to survive, the Cuban state relaxed its strict socialist ideology to include a 
mixed economy that allowed some private entrepreneurial business, joint ventures in 
5 Gray and Kapcia (2008) , 4 
6 Azicri , Max. Cuba Today and Tomorrow: Reinventing Socialism. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2000, 75 
7 Eckstein , Susan. " Dollarization and its Discontents in the Post-Soviet Era" in A Contemporary Cuba 
Reader Eds. Phillip Brenner et al. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008) 179 
8 Azicri (2000) 75 
9 Gray and Kapcia 2008 , 4 
6 
tourism, participation in the capitalist global economy, and permitted foreign currency 
like the U.S. do llar to be held and exchanged as legal tender for the first time under the 
revolutionary government. These changes were made reluctantly, as the consequences 
of such shifts in pol icy contradicted the socialist direction towards which the previous 
policies were aimed. The new economic policies opened a space for increasing 
economic inequality in a population that was used to egalitarianism. A high-ranking 
government official was quoted in 1993 saying, "This will create differences among 
people, greater than what we have now and greater than we are used to having since the 
revolution ... [T]he inequality or privilege that can be created are realities we must 
allow." I 0 
The most striking example of how Cuba ' s new economic policy provoked 
inequalities to resurface in Cuban society was the legalization of the United States 
dollar. The Cuban government legalized the holding of foreign currency in order to 
bring much needed capital onto the island and resuscitate Cuba's economy. As 
government rations began to thin, dollars quickly became an essential solution to 
solving Cubans ' daily needs. The acquisition of goods and services as well as social 
influence and importance hinged on Cubans ' individual purchasing power, which was 
directly related to their level of access to American dollars.II A rift began to divide 
Cuban society along a distinct dollar line: on one side, those who had access to dollars 
and on the other, those who did not. Those who had limited access to dollars could turn 
1°F uente, Alejandro de la. A Nation/or all: Race, Equality, and politics in twentieth 
centwy Cuba. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) 317. 
11 Gray and Kapcia (2008) 5 
7 
only to the government for support in their daily needs and saw their standard of living 
diminish as government resources dwindled. Increasingly, Cubans were forced to rely 
on the informal economy in order to satisfy any desires beyond their most basic of 
needs . 
Alejandro de la Fuente argues that these changes in the economy have had 
various racially-differentiated effects as black Cubans have not had the same access as 
whites to the areas of the economy that see a steady flow of dollars. In many ways, the 
dividing line of the dollar was drawn across racial lines. One of the main ways in which 
Cubans acquire hard currency is through family remittances, or money that Cuban 
immi grants living in the United States have been able to send back to family still living 
on the island. Remittances accounted for about $800 million in 1997, providing an 
essential boost to the Cuban economy. However, the benefits that remittances bestowed 
upon the Cuban economy were not distributed evenly among its citizens. According to a 
1990 census, 83 .5 percent of Cuban immigrants living in the United States identified 
themselves as white .12 That means that, if we assume that the remittances went to the 
same racial group as the sender, about $680 million out of the $800 million that arrived 
on the island annually ended up in white hands. 13 If we extrapolate these numbers to 
cover the Cuban population, per capita remittances would amount to about $85 per year 
among whites while the comparable figure among blacks would be less than half this 
amount. 14 Because the Cuban diaspora is predominantly white, white Cubans benefit 
12 Fuente (2001) 319. 
13 Fuente (2001) 319 
14 Fuente (2001) 319 
8 
the most from family remittances. Non-white Cubans find themselves at a distinct 
disadvantage from the start because they lack similar direct connections to United States 
dollars. 
The racial inequity of family remittances occur because white Cuban immigrants 
make up the majority of people that can send money back to their families on the island 
from their homes in the United States, not because of any racially discriminatory 
practices or ideology. However, racist ideology would come to be a major obstacle for 
Afro-Cubans who attempted to access dollars by other means. Because black Cubans 
have such limited access to dollars through remittances, their opportunities to 
participate in the dollar economy are reduced to the competitive tourist sector, the most 
dynamic and lucrative in the Cuban economy. 15 Even the highest paying jobs provided 
by the state were dwarfed when they are compared to the income of Cubans who have 
direct access to the tourist industry: 
A heait surgeon paid in pesos would have a lower salary and live a more 
difficult life than a tourism worker. .. A good salary in Cuba could go as high as 
five hundred to six hundred pesos a month, which would be worth between 
fourteen and twenty-six dollars. Over a week, four or five one-dollar tips per day 
could match or even surpass a high pesos salary. 16 
Because of the economic opportunity they represented, jobs in the tourism sector 
became the most coveted of any in Cuba. Max Azicri notes, "Doctors, teachers, 
engineers, and other professionals have become bellboys and chambermaids earning 
dollar tips instead of working in their professions and receiving salaries in pesos." 17 De 
15 Fuente (200 l) 3 19 
16 Azicri (2000) 74 
17 Azicri (2000) 74. 
9 
la Fuente points out that black Cubans should have had privileged access to the tourist 
sector because of their formidable presence in the services sector, comprising a 
significant proportion of the labor force employed in hotels, restaurants, and similar 
services: "of those employed in 'services,' 38 percent, according to the 1981 census, 
were black or mulatto- a percentage slightly above blacks and mulattoes ' population 
share. " 18 However, when the tourist sector began to expand during the Special Period, 
non-white Cubans became drastically underrepresented in the industry , finding it 
increasing ly difficult to secure employment therein.19 Ron Howell writes that despite 
the new opportunities blacks benefited from since the revolution in 1959, "It is curious, 
then, to enter the Melia Santiago, eastern Cuba's first five-star hotel , and find that none 
of the employees in the lobby is black."20 Black and white Cubans alike received 
comparable education and opportunities for work in state industries, yet in the most 
lucrative sector of the economy they were denied access. 
The racial inequity in the tourist sector was so apparent that many refer to it as 
the "tourist apartheid." Certain designated "tourist zones" were off limits to Cubans 
who were not employed in tourism. The sanctity of such zones was enforced by Cuban 
police, who would exercise their power to arrest anyone who had trespassed into them. 
To do so, police regularly engaged in thinly veiled racial profiling based on the concept 
of "peligrosidad social " ("social dangerousness"), officially a crime in Cuba vaguely 
18 Fuente (200 I) 319 
19 Fuente (200 l) 319 
20 Howell, Ron. "Tourism rev iving racism in Cuba." Chicago Tribune May 18, 200 I. 
http ://www.cubanet.org/CNews/yO 1/may0 I/I Se I .htm 
defined as any behavior judged to be "against the norms of socialist morality."21 
Alejandro de la Fuente asserts that such a "crime" was "essentially identified with the 
conduct of Blacks, and particularly young Blacks."22 
It would seem then that the state also had become actively involved in racist 
practices and contributed directly to the ongoing marginalization that black Cubans 
began to face in the Special Period. Yet while the fast-growing income gap brought 
about by Cuba' s new economic policies polarized Cuban society and had clear racially-
differentiated effects, these racial consequences were by no means the intention of the 
policies themselves. Fidel Castro made the goal of ending racial discrimination in Cuba 
one of the central pi liars of the revolutionary project shortly after the success of the 
revolution in 1959.23 However, despite the success of desegregating and integrating 
schools, public institutions, recreational centers and employment in the 1960s, the 
revolutionary government was unable to completely eradicate racial ideology from the 
island. Prejudices and racial stereotypes continued to perpetuate themselves in the 
private sector, influencing social relations among friends, neighbors, coworkers and 
family members.24 When the new economic policies of the Special Period opened up 
the possibility for a more competitive economy made up of private entrepreneurships, 
the racial prejudices that had always lain just beyond the reach of Cuba' s "color-blind" 
government regulation began to reflect themselves in the new economy through racial 
21 Wunderlich, Annelise. "Cuban Hip-hop: Making Space for New Voices of 
Dissent." In The Vinyl Ain 't Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture, ed. 
by Dipannita Basu and Sidney J. Lemelle (London: Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006) 171. 
http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/yOl /mayO 1/ l Se l .htm 
22 Fuente (200 l) 320 
23 Fuente (200 I) 263 . 
24 Fuente (200 I) 322. 
11 
discrimination, creating major obstacles for Afro-Cubans attempting to access the dollar 
economy. Alejandro de la Fuente argues that the underrepresentation of blacks in 
tourism can be explained by a racism prevalent in Cuba's culture, not government 
policy itself: 
... the underrepresentation of blacks in tourism cannot be explained as a function 
of structural conditions. It is, rather, a function of the pervasiveness of a racial 
ideology that portrays blacks as lazy, inefficient, dirty, ugly, and prone to 
criminal activities. In times of scarcity and growing competition for resources, 
this raci st ideology has been used to justify the exclusion of Afro-Cubans from 
the benefits of the most attractive sector of Cuba' s economy.25 
Race in Cuba is defined not only by phenotypical features (skin color, facial structure) 
but by a number of social and cultural factors as well, such as education and class.26 In 
popular Cuban thought, two individuals with the same skin tone but different socio-
cultural and educational backgrounds could easily be placed into two distinct racial 
categories. These racist ideas and stereotypes had existed in Cuba since long before the 
revolution but did not get in the way of the socialist egalitarianism that Cuba had 
achieved in the 1980s. Through government regulation blacks and whites alike were 
given equal opportunities in the public sphere; while racist ideology persisted in the 
private sphere, government institutions that pervaded all sectors of public life operated 
according to revolutionary ideology, negating discriminatory practices by imposing 
institutional egalitarianism. However, as state institutions began to relax their control 
over the Cuban public, racism in Cuba began to make itself more apparent as capitalism 
25 Fuente (200 I) 322 
26 Fuente (200 I) 308 
12 
crept onto the island through the dollar economy, allowing personal prejudices once 
again to influence the opportunities available in the Cuban community and workforce. 
The government policy and rhetoric of the time seem ironic and out of touch 
when placed alongside the new racial discrepancies growing in Cuban society. The fact 
that Afro-Cubans were disproportionately affected by the economic crisis went largely 
unacknowledged by the Cuban government, which had long since labeled racism and 
discrimination as problems "so lved" by the Cuban revolution in 1959. Cuba, officials 
insisted, was a ·'color-blind" society- as early as 1962 revolutionary authorities began 
claiming that the revolution had succeeded in eradicating racial discrimination from the 
island .27 In support of this claim, they pointed to the desegregated schools, hospitals, 
and public areas as well as the equal opportunities for employment all Cubans received. 
Their goal was to create a "color-blind" society, and they claimed that they had 
succeeded. In pursuit of that ideal , the revolution made an attempt to eliminate from the 
public sector all distinctions based on race. Along with the exclusive clubs of the 
bourgeoisie, the Cuban government shut down all black clubs, unions and press that 
identified themselves as such, as they were thought to highlight racial divisions.28 
Although the government' s intentions in doing so were in good faith according to their 
socialist ideals, the erasure of racial distinctions altogether would come to be a sword 
that cut both ways, especially during the Special Period. 
By claiming that they had eliminated racial discrimination, revolutionary 
authorities had closed the case, so to speak, on racism in Cuba-it became a thing of the 
27 Fuente (200 I) 279 
28 Fuente (2001) 373. 
13 
past. Race disappeared from public debate. Any public mention of racism that did not 
center on Cuba' s success in the area was considered unpatriotic as it implied that the 
revolution had regressed. Thus, the Afro-Cubans affected by the racism that began to 
creep onto the island in the 1990s found themselves politically powerless to speak out 
about racial di scrimination; for one, because of the dismantling of black institutions, 
they had no means by which to organize themselves in order to fight the increasing 
marginali zation they faced economically and socially; secondly, the government 
considered any notion of race to be "anti-Cuban" and so would not acknowledge 
racially-defined voices . Officially, black Cubans did not exist. This racial blindness 
onl y led to a promulgation of racist ideologies and discrimination in Cuban society. 
I li storian Alejandro de la Fuente writes, "the revival of racism and racially 
di scriminatory practices in the Special Period has led to growing resentment and 
resistance in the black population, which suddenly finds itself in a hostile environment 
without the political and organizational tools to fight against it." 29 This frustration 
would find its outlet in hip-hop, an art form and culture that would enable Afro-Cubans 
to reclaim their cultural identity and find political voice. 
Cuban Hip-Hop's Emergence and its Consolidation as a Movement 
Hip-hop ' s emergence in Cuba was not yet another instance of a popular 
American trend finding its way onto the island, such as jazz, be-bop, and rock. Hip-hop 
music, dance and graffiti had leaked onto the island since the early 1980s, sparking the 
29 Fuente (200 I ) 329 
14 
interest of some Cubans for its novelty, yet hip-hop as a culture and movement 
materialized in Cuba as a "local response to experiences of displacement and relocation, 
as well as impoverislunent and discrimination" that Afro-Cubans were subjected to 
during the Special Period. 30 Hip-hop became an avenue through which disaffected 
Afro-Cubans could counteract what seemed to be their growing marginalization in the 
revolutionary project. In the same vein, many Afro-Cubans sought ways to re-vitalize 
their connection to their cultural heritage through ties to the African diaspora: African 
religious practices such as abakua and santeria, enabled Afro-Cubans to form a 
community based on shared heritage and experience while counteracting the Cuban 
government's attempt to erase racial distinctions. Yet while African spirituality created 
community space as well as formed a distinct set of shared beliefs and values for Afro-
Cubans, it was hip-hop that would take back the politically assertive voice of which 
Afro-Cubans had been deprived. Rap would become the radical medium that would 
cany the voice of black Cuban youth. 
The sounds of American hip-hop first arrived in Cuba over radio waves 
broadcast by Miami radio stations WEDR 99 Jams and WHQT Hot 105 in the 1980s.31 
Antennas in Alamar, a housing project just outside Havana, would reachjust high 
enough to catch the stations ' signals. Alamar would become the center for the Cuban 
hip-hop movement. Rap also found its way into Cuba through cassettes and vinyl that 
3°F ernandes (2006) 361 
3 1 Olavania, Margot. " Rap and Revolution: Hip-Hop Comes to Cuba." In A 
Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc ., 2007), 369. 
15 
visiting emigrees would bring back to Cuba from the United States.32 Cubans would 
hear artists like Run DMC, Public Enemy and KRS-One- African American artists that 
were openly proud of their blackness, which they would express aggressively and, 
especially in the case of Public Enemy, militantly. Young black Cubans identified with 
arti sts such as these whom they perceived to be part of an oppressed class of African 
Americans, unjustly discriminated against in the white supremacist, capitalistic 
American empire. Now that black Cubans themselves were beginning to feel like an 
oppressed class of their own, they perceived American rappers' message and aggressive 
posturing as expressions of their own dissent against oppression, their own frustrations 
with injusti ce and inequality. 
American hip-hop ai1ists would become role models for black Cuban youth 
during the Special Period. The obvious black pride of American rappers opened up a 
new way for Afro-Cubans to think of their skin tone; no longer was it merely a sign of 
inferiority and criminality but a prestigious endowment, a marker of identity that 
stretched far beyond Cuba's borders to include all members of the African diaspora. In 
the words of Chuck D of Public Enemy, "the black man can be just as intelligent as he 
is strong . . . . we're not third-world people, we're first-world people ; we're the original 
people [o f the earth]. "33 That idea of black prestige would not only appeal to 
impoveri shed and marginalized Afro-Cubans, it would light the fire under a cultural 
32 Suj atha, Fernandes . " Island Paradise , Revolutionmy Utopia or Hustl er's Haven? 
Consum eri sm and Sociali sm in Contemporary Cuban Rap." In Journal of Latin American 
C ultural Studies, Vol. 12.3 (2003) 360 
33 Do the Rig ht Th ing, DVD, Directed by Spike Lee. I 989, Hollywood, CA: Universa l Studios. 
16 
movement of Afro-Cubans who-as a community-participated in the re-creation and 
redefinition of their cultural identity. 
Black Cubans began to express their newfound racial pride through imitating the 
American artists they admired. The 'Afro' hairstyle as well as dreadlocks came into 
fashion along with baggy pants, oversized shirts, hooded sweatshirts and baseball and 
stocking caps. Even puffy winter jackets that rappers such as Method Man would wear 
on chilly New York streets found their way into Afro-Cuban fashion, despite the 
tropical climate. Cuban rap audiences also adopted American slang, such as "aight" 
and ·'muthufucka. "3.J By dressing and speaking in such a unique way, Afro-Cubans 
made a profound political statement: their clothing styles showed defiance to the 
dominant culture and highlighted their identity as black, distinguishing themselves as a 
group. Sujatha Fernandez writes how state officials recognized the subversive 
possibilities of Afro-Cubans' style of dress: 
In his article in El Habanero, Pita (1999) derided rappers for wearing hats, long 
pants and stocking caps in a hot climate not suitable to such apparel. However, 
more at stake than the matter of a climactic suitability, were the associations of 
the clothing with a culture and society forbidden to young Cubans .... young 
Cubans seek to break down exclusive boundaries erected by a cold war climate 
by dressing in the attire of the "enemy."35 
The "enemy" that Fernandes refers to is of course the United States, yet black Cubans 
did not intend to dress like Americans; rather, they intended to dress as members of hip-
hop culture, marking themselves as members of the African diaspora, of which hip-hop 
was a vibrant expression. The geographical location of hip-hop's beginnings had 
34 Fernandes, Sujatha. "Fear of a Black Nation: Local Rappers , Transnational 
Crossings, and State Power in Contemporary Cuba." Cuba Represent! (Durham: Duke 
University Press , 2006) 600. 
35 Fernandes (2006), 600 
17 
nothing to do with Afro-Cubans' adoption of hip-hop style but rather everything to do 
with the fact that hip-hop culture transcended national boundaries to include the 
oppressed and impoverished around the world, united through an artistic movement. 
Through imitation of the styles of African-American rappers, Afro-Cubans reclaimed 
pride in their iden tity as Afi'o-Cubans in a racist society that claimed to have 
transcended race. 
Clo thing and hairstyles were important expressions of internationalized hip-hop 
cu lture, yet it was hip-hop music that was able to bring the Afro-Cuban community 
together to share in a new, creative way of expressing their blackness. In the late 1980s 
and earl y 1990s Cubans would be exposed to some rap in public (government-
sponsorcd) venues such as dance clubs or neighborhood cultural centers, which would 
play the occasional popular commercial hit, but hip-hop could hardly have been said to 
be in the mainstream in Cuba at that time.36 Hip-hop music was dispersed through 
in forma l networks or, in other words, the underground. Resources were limited: because 
of the U.S. trade embargo, Cubans wouldn't have been able to buy rap CDs from the 
US even if they could have afforded it. The rap albums that circulated through Cuba 
were precious commodities that were pirated, copied and bootlegged. Because of its 
scarcity, devoted hip-hop fans would congregate in private social gatherings known as 
bonches in order to hear the latest imported rap . There in the house parties of the 
bonches, a hip-hop community began to gain momentum as hip-hop lovers would 
36 Hernandez, Deborah Pacini and Garofalo, Reebee. "The emergence of rap Cubano : 
an hi storica l perspective." In Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. Ed. 
Bennett, Andy, Stan Hawkins , and Sheila Whiteley. (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Co. 2005) 91. 
18 
gather to share music and share ideas. As one author puts it, "these bonches can be 
considered the seeds of today ' s Cuban rap community. "37 
Besides acting as centers for the dissemination hip-hop music, the bonches acted 
as important social space for Afro-Cubans who had become alienated from the usual 
spaces for socialization such as bars and clubs after the adoption of the dollar economy 
in Cuba. Since the dollar had found its way into Cuban markets, many clubs and music 
venues shifted their attention away from ordinary local audiences so as to cater to 
foreign audiences or local elites who could afford the dollar-only entry fee and drink 
prices. Afro-Cubans who had no access to dollars simply could no longer afford to 
participate in Cuba' s nightlife. Ethnomusicologist Geoffrey Baker writes, "much of 
Havana ' s nightlife takes place in venues from which most Cubans are barred by door 
policy or by economic constraints, and young people are often reduced to sitting on the 
Malec6n, watching the world go by."38 The bonches, which were akin to house parties, 
became the only economically feasible option many Cubans had for socialization. The 
new economic climate of the Special Period had robbed the majority of Afro-Cubans of 
social space, yet through hip-hop they were able to recreate their own spaces for 
socialization, counteracting their spatial and social marginalization. 
The music played in the bonches was primarily American rap. The hip-hop beat 
was infectious yet, for the majority of the crowd, the lyrics were unintelligible. 
However, this did not stop Cubans from memorizing entire songs in phonetic English.39 
37 Hernandez and Garofalo 2005, 91 
38 Baker, Geoffrey" ' La Ha ban a que no conoces" : Cuban rap and the social 
construction of urban space. " Ethnomusicology Forum, 15:2 (2006), 221. 
39 Triana, Tania, personal communication 3/ 18/09 
19 
Although the words themselves did not address Cuban reality (many of them were from 
the ri sing American trend of gangster rap and certainly not even remotely close to 
Cuban revolutionary values), the mere act of rapping itself was a political statement. It 
was an act of defiance to the dominant cultural norm, an expression of dissent without 
words. challenging the status quo. 
Rap's growing popularity in the early 1990s coincided with the growing trend of 
··gangsta rap .. in the United States. Rap artists such as 2Pac, the Notorious B.I.G. , Ice 
Cube. Snoop Dogg and Dr. Dre were some of the most popular American imports; hip-
hop fans cited the energeti c, heavy beats, the rhythmic cadence of its lyrics and the 
assertive posture of the rappers as the most appealing aspects of the music .40 Yet when 
researchers Deborah Pacini Hernandez and Reebee Garofalo commented that those very 
art ists were among some of the most criticized for their violent messages, misogyny and 
materialism, their correspondents were surprised and confessed that they did not 
understand the lyrics. 41 Cuban hip-hop artists would borrow the stylistic elements of 
hip-hop from their American counterparts, but would adapt the lyrical content of rap to 
their own purposes, which stand out in marked contrast to the direction of mainstream 
American hip-hop in the 1990s. 
Gradually, the imitation of American styles gave way to Cubans using rap 
creatively as a vehicle to express their own points of view and engage with their own 
local realities. Informal underground shows that featured a number of groups, or penas, 
began to sprout up around the island. These small concerts, besides providing 
40 Hernandez and Garofa lo 2005, 98 
41 Hernandez and Garofalo 2005 , 98 
20 
opportunities for socialization, also created spaces for public debate.42 Baker quotes an 
Afro-Cuban in the mid-1990s: "We have no places to meet where we can argue and 
discuss these problems [principally racism]. And there's no motivation to create a kind 
of center that is attractive to people and where serious topics can be discussed."43 This 
hole in public debate would be filled by rap; bonches became a public forum in which 
Afro-Cubans could discuss issues such as racism, police harassment, tourism, and 
sexual exploitation- all issues that Afro-Cubans had to deal with from day to day yet 
were never discussed in the public realm. 
Eventually, the popularity of bonches outgrew the small spaces in which they 
began. House parties would often attract hundreds of people, spilling out into the street 
and attracting the attention of the police, who would sometimes use their batons to 
break up the pa11ies.44 In 1994, the then would-be DJ, Adalberto Jimenez, was able to 
obtain a public space for regular hip-hop gatherings, called the local de la mofza (the 
place for mofza). -15 In Cuba, moifo is used to refer to rap in general; rappers and fans of 
rap alike refer to themselves as mofzeros. 46 La mofza would charge a small admissions 
fee in pesos and would sell drinks, making for an affordable social club that would cater 
almost exclusively to local hip-hop aficionados; la mona was never publicized.47 In 
providing an affordable public space in which to regularly socialize, la mofza became a 
42 Baker 2006, 223 
43 Baker 2006, 234 
44 See Baker 2006, 241 
45 Hernandez Deborah Pacini and Garofalo, Reebee. " Hip Hop in Havana: Rap, Race, 
and National Identity in Contemporary Cuba." In Journal of Popular Music Studies Vol. 11-12, 
I August 1999, 23 
46 Hernandez and Garofalo 1999, 23 
47 Hernandez and Garofalo 1999, 23 
21 
refuge for the many Cubans marginalized by the many Havana clubs who chose to cater 
uniquely to those who had access to dollars. 
By 1994, hip-hop had gained a substantial following in Havana, yet it remained 
a grassroots. underground phenomena that continued to be marginalized in the 
periphery of the public eye despite its devoted following. It began to outgrow the small 
private gatherings of its beginnings, yet there seemed little in the way of public space, 
equipment or logistical support needed to take Cuban hip-hop to the next level. Rodolfo 
Rensoli. a university trained cultural worker who had experience organizing rock 
concerts in the late 1980s. saw hip-hop's potential in Cuba and came up with the radical 
idea or organizing a rap festival in Havana. He founded a collective of rappers called 
Grupo Uno (Group One) with the idea of forming a nucleus for a growing mass of 
rappers and promoting their work wherever possible- that is, in the precious little space 
they had at the time ."'8 A large event such as a festival would help hip-hop secure 
legitimate status on the island . 
However, because of his experiences with rock, he realized that to ensure that 
the festival was a success he would have to organize the festival in such a way as to 
distance hip-hop from the political pitfalls that had beset rock before it.49 Cuban rock, 
also an underground cultural phenomena inspired by imported American music, had 
been subject to censure and much criticism when it first attempted to establish itself in 
Cuba because of its association with what was referred to as "diversionismo ideologico " 
48 " Renso!i habiafundado el GRUPO UNO con el proposito de nuclear una creciente masa de raperos y 
promover su trabajo a/Ii dondefuera poss ible; es decir, en muy pocos espacios entonces ." Torres, 
Robe,1o Zurbano. 2003. Se Buscan: Textos urgentes para sonidos hambrientos (siete notas de viaje sabre 
e l hip hop cubano en Ios diez aiios del Festival de Rap de la Habana). Movimientos #3 
49 Hernandez-Garofalo ( 1998), 95 
22 
("ideological diversionism"); rock was thought to bring with it "capitalist influences, 
deviances of all sorts, physical and moral."50 Rock carried with it the stigma of "the 
enemy" of the north- it was seen as American music, and its importation into Cuba as 
American cultural imperialism, which earned state officials' scorn. Rock's general anti-
authoritarian stance was perceived by the government as a threat, and its lack of a 
coherent message or project made it impossible to assimilate into revolutionary 
ideology. Hence, rock earned official denouncement because government officials 
perceived it as anti-revolutionary. Rock failed to participate in the Cuban revolution and 
represented a rebellion (however incoherent, unfocused and diverse its messages may 
have been) that could not be brought into step with the party line. For those reasons, 
Cuban officials declined to support the budding geme in any way. Between the mid-
I 970s and the late 1980s, Cuban rock nearly died of attrition due to a long-standing lack 
of institutional suppo1i. 51 
At first glance in the early 1990s, rap seemed as if it were in a similar situation 
as rock because it was an influential import of American culture, and therefore state 
officials eyed it with suspicion. However, hip-hop did not cany with it the same stigma 
as rock since Cubans associated hip-hop more closely with the oppressed class of 
African-Americans rather than with the United States itself. The revolutionary 
government had a long history of solidarity with the civil rights movement in the United 
States and frequently boasted that Cuban society had progressed past its American 
50 Hernandez and Garofalo (2005) 96 
5 1 Lopez, Humberto Manduley. " Rock in Cuba: History of a wayward son." South 
Atlantic Quarterly, Winter '97, 96: I , 135 
23 
counterpart in eradicating institutional racism from the country. 52 Rensoli and the other 
organizers of Grupo Uno could see parallels between hip-hop and revolutionary 
ideology; both Cuba and American hip-hop artists were rebels of a certain sense-hip-
hop within American society, and Cuba a rebel at the international level. Rensoli saw 
Cuban rock flounder because the Cuban gover1U11ent had failed to find common ground 
with the genre; in political terms, rock was not perceived as an ally-Cuban officials 
labe led it an enemy and refused to support it. Without government support, rock did 
not have the resources it needed to survive and flourish. In a socialist society in which 
the government controls virtually all of the resources on the island, Rensoli knew that if 
hip-hop were to find its place in Cuba and fulfill its potential, a working relationship 
with the government would be the first thing that needed to be established. 
Rensoli took the idea for a rap festival to officials from the Asociaci6n 
f-f ermanos Saiz (AHS), an institution for young artistic talent in Cuba that forms a 
branch of the Union de Juventud Comunista (Youth Communist Organization). Rensoli 
hoped that by establishing a tie with a government institution and securing official 
recognition, hip-hop would more easily achieve a legitimately visible status on the 
island. The AHS agreed to support the rap Festival, and granted permission for the use 
of the conce1i space while promising to supply the necessary amplification equipment 
as well as provide promotional and logistical support. With official endorsement, 
Rensoli and Grupo Uno were able to move ahead with the support they needed in order 
to organize a full-scale public concert in the Havana suburbs. 
52 De la Fuente, 363 
24 
In the summer of 1995 when Cuban hip-hop's enormous potential would be 
realized as rappers from across Havana came together for the first Festival de Rap 
Cubano held, fittingly, in Alamar, the birthplace of Cuban hip-hop. Although officially 
endorsed, the promised state support turned out to be lackluster: "[Grupo Uno] was not 
given much to work with in terms of equipment, logistical support, or publicity. The 
amplification equipment made available to them was inadequate for the venue (a large 
concrete open-air theatre) and the festival was given little media attention."53 However, 
despite the lack of promotion, news of the festival was able to travel quickly through 
informal channels, such as word-of-mouth from bonche to bonche, and the festival was 
a great success. Hundreds of Cubans came from across Havana to see the festival and 
sec Cubans take on the role of MC* that they had beforehand only admired in American 
rappers. For many in the audience, the Festival de Rap provided the opportunity to see, 
for the first time, rap coming out of the speakers in their mother-tongue, addressing 
issues that reflected the local realities and hardships that they could relate to. 
The rap festival took the crucial first step in transforming Cuban hip-hop from 
its previously marginalized status as a grassroots phenomena into a legitimate, 
nationally recognized art form. Only after the rap festival in 1995 does it make sense to 
begin to talk about Cuban hip-hop as a movement. Before, the hip-hop in Cuba was 
largely an imitation of American styles adapted to the Cuban context. Ariel Fernandez, 
rap producer and founder of the Cuban hip-hop magazine entitled Movimientos 
53 Hernandez and Garofalo (2005), 96 
• MC stands for "master of ceremonies," yet is also term that has commonly been used in hip-hop to refer 
to rappers. 
25 
(Movements), says that up until the moment in which such a public space was provided, 
there was no real movement of rappers, only individuals improvising or "freestyling" in 
parks, on street corners or in private gatherings such as the bone hes. 54 The Cuban rap 
groups writing their own music were few and far between, and many were hardly aware 
of each other's existence. Yet when all the hip-hop fans in Havana were able to come 
together in a single public venue for the first time, everything changed. The Havana 
lcsti va l was truly the "crystallizing moment"55 in Cuban hip-hop: Ruben Marin of 
Primera Base commented, " [En el Festival] nos dimos cuenta de que no estabamos 
solos, que existian muchos grupos de rap ... se cre6 una relaci6n bienfuerte con el 
j)lihlico ,. c rat the festival] we realized that we weren't alone, that there were in fact 
many rap groups ... a strong relationship with the public grew [out of the experience)." 
The l lavana festival united the many smaller pockets of hip-hop culture around Havana 
that had previously remained relatively isolated from one another; while only able to 
congregate in small private dwellings or in the small private venue of la Mona, hip-hop 
fans were never able to see the full scope of hip-hop 's growing popularity in Cuba. 
Indeed, it was surely a powerful moment for the many Afro-Cubans who came together 
for the first rap festival, uniting with a group of peers who experienced the same 
struo-o- les and had the same interests and passion for hip-hop as they , witnessing 
t:,i:, 
themselves joined by hip-hop as a cultural collective for the first time. 
54 Fernandes (2003), 580 
55 Hernandez and Garofalo (2005), 96 
26 
The Festival was promoted as a contest that would showcase local talent. 56 Top 
honors went to Primera Base for their song "Jgual que tu," an ode to Malcolm X that 
established a clear connection to the oppressed minority of blacks in the United States. 
Their song provides a poignant example of how hip-hop was able to change Afro-
Cubans' conception of blackness and reclaim pride in their cultural heritage. Primera 
Base express their desire to follow in the footsteps of the black leader Malcolm X: 
Quisiera ser un negro igua/ que tu 
( 'on esa gran virtue/ 
Esa gran virtud que todo exige 
Q11isiera ser un negro coma fli 
J;ran lider, ser grande. 
l want to be black just like you 
With that great power 
That great power that commands everything 
A great Ie a de r, a great be m· g. 57 
The association of blackness with "great power" was not a common idea in 
Cuba at the time, when black skin was considered a disadvantage. Yet the inspiring 
historical figure Malcolm X served as a counter-example to the widespread racial 
ideology in Cuba that represented blacks as lazy, ugly , second-rate citizens through his 
demonstration that blacks were capable of affecting social change. Primera Base 
admire Malcolm X for fighting to defend his racial identity in a hostile, discriminatory 
environment-a reality that many Afro-Cubans had begun to experience during the 
Special Period: 
56 Pacini Hernandez and Garofalo, 95 
57 Trans. Miles Rooklyn (2009) 
27 
Dijiste: basta ya de ser discriminado. 
Y asi luchaste y tomaste lajusticia par tus mcinos. 
Par eso hoy le sigo con gran plenitud, 
Y 111 e honorarfa  ser un negro, 
Un negro igual que tu. 58 
You said: enough with being discriminated 
And so you fought and took justice into your own hands 
And so I follow you to the fullest 
And I would be honored to be a black man 
A black man the same as you. 59 ' 
The rappers of Primera Base are inspired by Malcolm X because of his fight for 
racial justice. They see themselves as continuing his work by living his example. Their 
black sk in becomes an honor because it is connected to Malcolm X's legacy- their 
Afro-Cuban racial identity becomes a prestigious symbol of power when co1mected to 
revolutionary black leaders such as Malcolm X. In this way, Primera Base contribute to 
a rc-dcl'inition of Afro-Cuban identity by claiming a new, revolutionary ideal that serves 
as an alternative to the white public figures which had previously dominated the 
represen tation of Cuban culture. Rather than continuing as obedient, race-less citizens, 
Primera Base express their wish to carve out their own self-determinacy by becoming 
black leaders themselves. And as MCs captivating the attention of hundreds of Afro-
Cubans during the first Havana rap festival, Primera Base 's dream of themselves 
becomino influential black leaders seemed to fulfill itself; they led the way in Cuban 
0 
hip-hop 's first foray into a legitimate, national phenomenon that sought to reclaim black 
cultural identity. 
58 Primera Base. 2003. Igual que tu. Movimientos #3 . 
59 Trans. Rooklyn (2009) 
28 
Echoing Primera Base's expression of black pride, the group Amenaza would 
also rap about their racial identity in the 1997 festival. However, rather than tackling 
the issue indirectly by praising fights against racism in the United States, Amenaza 
would point their lyrics at the reality of racism in Cuba. In their more direct social 
critiq ue. Amenaza would be pioneers at the vanguard of the hip-hop movement: their 
song ··Ochu,•c5n Cr1cado'' would be the first publicly performed song to directly discuss 
the matter of racial difference in Cuba. 60 The song describes the rappers' experience of 
being mixed-race in Cuba: 
Ta111hie11 soy congo, tambien.fui esclavo 
Twnhien .rnji-o por ellos que el racismo no ha acabado 
Soy rumha Yon,hu Andavo y no acabo hasta ver lo mio multiplicado 
no ves soy pinto, ochuw3n cruzao 
negro coma el danz6n y el son cubano 
negro co1110 es/a mano 
negro como mi hennano 
negro como Mwnfa . 
y negro como mucho blancos mas 1, quien lo diria? 
y no me cuentas, desafia, raza mia 
Dijeron negro, pero a mi no me contaron 
Dijeron bfanco, p ero en ese clan no me aceptaron. 
Dijeron tantas cosas, soy el ser que nadie quiso, 
Lo negro con lo b!anco 
iEl grilo de un mestizo! 
I am also congo, I was also a slave 
My hope also suffers fo r them because racism hasn' t ended 
I am rumba Yoruba Andavo 
And I won ' t be done until I see what ' s mine multiplied 
Can' t you see I' m colored, an octaroon mix 
Black like the Cuban danz6n and the son 
Black like thi s hand 
Black like my brother 
Black like Mumia 
And Black like lots of whites, but who could tell? 
60 Hernandez and Garofalo ( I 999) 30 
29 
And you don ' t count me, stand up, my race 
They said black, but they didn't count me 
They sad white, but their clan wouldn' t accept me 
They said many things, I'm the one nobody wanted 
Black with white, 
The cry of a mestizo! 61 
/\ s 111esti.:o.,1mtilattoes of varying degrees, Amenaza describes their first-person 
c.\perience or being caught between black and white racial lines- an alienating, 
unstable space. /\mcnaza associate themselves with distinctly African roots, expressing 
their connection \\'ith Africa ("conga") and the history of slavery. Here, slavery is not 
an abstraction that C.\i s ts in some distant sphere ; it is a lived experience for the rappers, 
f'o r \\·horn "raci sm hasn't ended." Indeed, this passage in its entirety adequately 
c.\presses /\mcnaza ·s sentiment that racism is still present in Cuban society. They also 
compare themselves to the musical forms of danz6n and son, genres celebrated as 
"national symbol s or a harmonized, racially-transculturated Cuban cultural heritage 
given their syncreti zed fusion of African and European musical elements,"62 thus 
highlighting the blackness of their mixed racial heritage. However, despite the 
association with their black heritage, they are overlooked and do not find their way into 
any racial category. This experience of alienation defies the "hegemonic discourses of 
mes/ i.:aje as a stable, historically harmonious, race-neutral core of the Cuban social 
body. "63 Instead, Arnenaza depict Cuban society as still divided along distinct racial 
lines between which the racial ideal of the mestizo falls unnoticed. 
' 
6 1 Trans. Hern andez and Garofalo ( 1999) 
61 Perry, M. " Los Rapcros : Rap, Race , and Social Transfonnation in Contemporary 
Cuba ... PhD di ss ., Univers ity of Texas at Austin , 2004, 175 
6' Perry (200-l) 173 
30 
Temas Socia/es: Hip-hop's social responsibility 
The song "Ochav6n Cruzado" showed how the hip-hop movement could not 
only enable a marginalized social group to recuperate cultural space, but could truly 
become revolutionary as well through the political nature of its lyrical expressions. In 
rront of thousands of fans , Amenaza addressed an issue that had been absent from 
onicial public discourse for nearly thi11y years . In demanding that racism be 
reexamined in Cuban society , Amenaza pushed Cuban hip-hop into politics; hip-hop 
became a mode or protest, pointing out the gap between the Revolution's promises and 
the lived realities that Cubans faced. Cuban rappers, in following Amenaza's example, 
began to use their lyrical expression as an instrument for addressing and critiquing the 
social ills that many experienced, but few ever heard about in public. 
Cuban rappers were well aware of their new social responsibility as leaders in 
the new political forum which hip-hop provided. Ethnomusicologists Deborah Pacini 
I lernandez and Rcebec Garofalo write, "the rappers with whom we spoke were 
unanimous in expressing their belief that rap lyrics should be socially relevant and 
constructive.··6-1 Lyrics were not to be taken lightly and were to be used for a good 
purpose; they were indeed a powerful means by which to convey a message. It was 
important that rap lyrics remain in dialogue with Cuban society, expressing local needs 
and conditions of the communities out of which they came. The hip-hop movement in 
Cuba was much more than an aesthetic revolution: rappers felt that their lyrics had the 
power to educate the public and initiate social change. Indeed, the social change that 
64 Hernandez and Garofalo (200 I) 30 
31 
hip-hop catalyzed was immediately visible in the surge of popularity that hip-hop 
enjoyed after the first rap festival. Soon there appeared a following of young Afro-
Cubans who related to rappers' socially conscious message which "articulated the 
fru strations, concerns and aspirations of black youth"65 during the Special Period. The 
soc ial change hip-hop was capable of had already begun to manifest itself in _the 
growing crowds of Afro-Cubans in the audience at the festival all raising their fists in 
uni son. sho,,ing their allegiance to , and participation in, the Cuban hip-hop movement. 
Rapping became a political act in itself; it was much more than a means by 
whi ch to escape the difficult daily struggles many Cubans faced- it was a tool Cubans 
co uld usc to engage those realities and express their ideas and feelings about them 
within the hip-hop community . As one of Annelise Wunderlich' s interviewees noted, 
-- thi s music is not for dancing. It ' s for listening .. . And for Cubans, believe me, it takes 
a lot to keep us from dancing."66 What keeps Cubans from dancing is the fact that the 
rapper on stage has something to say that is worth paying attention to, and responding 
to, whether that response is a shout of approval , a hand in the air, or an improvised 
rhyme during or after the show. 
In Cuban hip-hop, the beat of the music is secondary to the message that the 
rapper puts fo rth through his or her lyrics. The importance of eloquent rap lyrics is 
illustrated by their contrast with the impoverished beats or baselines that would 
65 Fuente, Alejandro de la, "The New Afro-Cuban Cultural Movement and the Debate on 
Race in Contemporary Cuba," Journal of Latin American Studies no. 40 (2008) , 3 
66 Wunderlich (2005) 167 
32 
accompany them. Most backing tracks were initially quite minimal due to 
technological constraints: 
fR appers 1b egan to develop their craft by fashioning Cuban rhymes over 
primitive backing tracks recorded on cassettes, which were usually lifted off 
U.S. rap recordings. These background tapes, however, could be produced only 
at great personal and financial sacrifice , because of the scarcity of even the most 
basic recording equipment. For its first song, for example, one group paid a 
producer $30. which represented the better part of a month ' s wages, for a single 
three-and-a-half minute backing track. 67 
Under such limitations, Cuban rap had little going for it besides its message, which was 
all the more highlighted by the lack of "groove" in its musicality. Geoffrey Baker writes 
that such 'underground ' rap is designed to block a dance response, to force listeners into 
an intellectual mode oC reception ... it is a physical stimulus to wake up to the 
di sjunctions between appearances and reality described in lyrics-'stop moving your 
ass and your mind wi ll follow', one might say. "68 Here, rapper Gersom Pineda 
emphasizes that his lyrics are not simply empty filler, but that they carry great 
significance and power: 
No es bla, bla, bla, 
Es labia, sentimienlo y tabla 
El hip hop no es el grito de la moda en tu puerta 
No es unjuego hermano, 
Rapear no se usa coma el pantal6n cuatro puertas 
Oue sa/ura las tiendas de nuestra isla, 
Esto es sentimiento y labia de punteria, 
Que acierta contra tantas realidades. 69 
It's not 'blah, blah, blah,' 
It's a sharp tongue, feeling and drums 
Hip-hop is not a trendy shout at your door 
67 Hernandez and Garofa lo (2005) 97 
~ Baker(2006)240 
69 Pineda, Gersom. Sentimiento y Labia. 2003. Movimientos #2 
33 
It -s not a game, brother 
Rap isn't used like the cargo pants 
That fill up our island's stores 
It' s feeling and carefully aimed words 
That hit many realities. 
Pineda defines rap as '·a sharp tongue, feeling and drums" that deal with serious, 
concrete .. rea lities.' · as opposed to a senseless rambling that takes little skill to master. 
I !i s \\'Ords. he says, should not be taken lightly, for they are well aimed and hit their 
mark in society. Rather than the typical trivial melodrama of a salsa song describing a 
broken heart. rap is relevant in a whole new way; it addresses both the good and bad of 
Cuhc1n reality. often in very specific, severe ways. For Pineda, rap cannot be likened to 
·· /a 11wda. •• or a fashionable trend , because it is serious business, not a game. He 
contrasts rap with cargo pants, an American fashion trend that has invaded Cuba, to 
show that Cuban hip-hop is much more than an empty reproduction of an American 
style; rather, it deals with Cuban experience and is aimed at Cuban reality. 
The stage and the microphone would become the black Cuban's podium with 
which he \Vould address his public and discuss the social ills that plagued society. 
Rapper Pando of the group Amenaza raps about the social power that rap has given him 
to break out of hi s socially-defined role as a marginalized member of society ; he also 
points out how rap has been able to unite the Afro-Cuban community: 
Ahora. ;,coma pretendo ser un elemento menos? 
Si lengo el poder de reproducir con rimas todo lo que tengo dentro, 
Asi que atento. inclusive se lo que hacer con mi pafabra. 
Porque le necesito para ser quien soy 
Y lli. que necesitas I o que yo m1.s mo le d oy. 10 
70 /\menaza , 2003. Ochav6n Cruzado. Movimientos #3 
34 
N_ow, how could I expect to be another nobody? 
11 l have the power to reproduce with rhymes all that I have inside 
So li sten up, I al so know what to do with my words. ' 
Because I need you for me to be who I am 
J\nd you. you need what I give to you. 7 1 
In the \'erses above. Pando illustrates how rap, because it has given him the power to 
c.\ press himself through rhyme, has elevated him to a status beyond that of the common 
--nobody.·· I !ere. I follow Alan West-Duran's translation of the word elemento (in other 
tc .\ ts) as --nobody:· as clement may refer to nature ' s four elements but can also carry 
\\'ith it a ncgati\'e connotation as in " bad element." 72 When taken from within the 
conte.\t or the song in its entirety , Pando clearly refers to the experience of embodying 
the role or a ·'bad element"' in society." The status of "bad element," of being a 
delinquent always under suspicion and considered inferior, is a label which Afro-
Cubans had been subjected to , whether subtly or overtly, in popular Cuban ideology for 
years. even after the Cuban govenm1ent had abolished institutional racism. Ilip-hop, in 
giving Pando a voice , has allowed him to break out of the limitations applied to him by 
soc ietal stereotypes and redefine himself as a mestizo on his own terms and through his 
own personal expression. In "Listen up, I also know what to do with my words," Pando 
invites hi s audience to accompany him in his act of self-redefinition and acknowledges 
the power hi s lyrics carry as well as Pando's ability to wield them; they are aimed with 
a purpose that includes the whole collective. His lyrical expression is aimed at the 
formation of a community rather than an expression of dominance over his audience or 
7 1 Tran . Rookl yn (2009) 
72 West-Duran. Alan. 2004. Rap ' s Diasporic Dialogues Cuba 's Redefinition of Blackness. 
Journal of Popular Music Studies. 16.1: 4-39, 24 
35 
against a common enemy: " I need you fo r me to be who I am / And you, you need what 
l give to yo u." The rapper sees himse lf as part of the Afro-Cuban community while the 
1\rro-Cuban audience sees itse lf in the rapper onstage. The rapper represents and 
e:-; presses the shared sentiments of the community while the audience li stens to and 
affirms the soc ia l critiques the rapper offers, fo rming a reciprocal continuity between 
rap per and audience in w hi ch the communi ty as a whole participates the process of 
rcdc lining themselves culturall y. 
Whi le rappers ce rta inly contributed to a redefinition of Afro-Cuban identity by 
c:-;p rcss ing themselves befo re the ir audiences , that redefinition was not a one-
dime nsiona l a l"fa ir- pe rlo rmances wo uld rarely consist entirely of monologues. Rather, 
rap /7e11os we re pc rlo rmances in which the lines dividing performer and audience were 
constantl y blurred. bridged by constant inte rchange and dialogue. While one group 
wo uld perfo rm . the other groups in the line-up would participate as members of the 
aud ience or co llaborate with another group on stage. In this way , at each concert a 
var iety of diffe rent points of view would be expressed and heard. Baker describes how 
the im prov isational aspect of hip-hop contributed to making rap concerts into 
discussions: 
This bluning of the perfo rmer/audience di stinction is increased by the 
freestyling that often occurs during or after performances, allowing those who 
have not played a part in the fo rmal concert to join in, rather like a jazz jam 
sess ion. Rappers ta lk to each other and to the audience between songs, during 
change-overs between groups, in freestyles both on and off the stage, and in 
conversati ons before, during and after the performance. Concerts are thus places 
of ex tensive multi-directional communication: it is precisely [a place] to discuss, 
rather than simply to listen ... 73 
73 Baker (2006) 223 -4 
36 
Rap venues provided a much needed social space for the Afro-Cuban community that 
\\·as not only a place to hear social criticism and calls for political redress from the 
rappers on s tage but was also a place to express oneself and discuss such issues with 
neighbors. friend s and countrymen regardless of whether one was a rapper or not. The 
hip-hop community centered around the social critiques that rappers espoused, inspiring 
politically charged debate that moved beyond the stage. 
Through the participatory community dialogue that rap fostered in Cuba, Hip-
hop became much more than simply an art form: Cubans used hip-hop to create a forum 
in \,hich frustrated citizens could speak out against public ills and hear the frustrations 
or others as well. In thi s way, by creating a public symposium for expressing ideas and 
cri ti<..jues. Cuban hip-hop began to discover its political edge. In discussing Cuban hip-
hop ·s political !"unction, Alan West-Duran writes, "Chuck D [once commented] that 
• Rap is black people· s CNN_- l n Cuba, where the media is state controlled and heavily 
censored. rap ... is not only African-Cubans' CNN, but every Cuban 's CNN."74 Hip-
hop circumvented state propaganda and would speak directly with the public, 
add ress ino realities that would never make the news or find their way into politicians ' 
::;, 
speeches. Much more than a musical genre, it was a source of information, a sounding 
board for soc ial commentary that flowed freely through the streets of marginalized 
housing projects. 
As one member of the rap group Obsesi6n noted, " the important thing about rap 
is communicating. The art is in how to say something- well said- that the world 
74 West-Duran (2004) 14 
37 
needs."75 For these reasons, hip-hop fans in Cuba were willing to lend rappers a careful 
car as they actively addressed the ills that plagued Cuban society, such as prostitution, 
rising individualism , the negative effects of tourism, and racial discrimination. As an 
example of a group or rappers whose lyrics embody the idea of social themes, the all 
female, se lf-defined feminist group, Las Krudas, use their lyrics to critique the 
machi smo and mi sogy ny prevalent in Cuba, unwaveringly seeking to advance "a 
l'cminist age nda in which they seek to politicize the social and economic reality of being 
black and lcmale in Cuba ." 76 In their song "Vamo' a veneer la dificultad," ("We are 
go ing to overcome the difficulty' ') Las Krudas make clear their political intentions: 
scxofeminino. sicmpre relegado 
pero las Knulus el mo/de han quebrado 
vmno • a veneer la dificultad77 
Feminine sex. a lways relegated 
but the Krudas have broken the mold 
we arc go ing to overcome the difficulty78 
Like their male rapper counterparts, Las Krudas have claimed their position as 
the vanbn uards oC a movement towards social change, claiming that they have "broken 
the mold" and have the capability to lead women to victory over injustice. The Krudas 
center their lyrical expression around the experience of the black woman and seek to 
rai se awareness about sexism and gender discrimination in Cuba. Their name, Las 
Krudas means in Enolish '·the raw ones." Their name has a double meaning: it was 
• b 
75 Pacini-Hernandez and Garofalo ( 1999), 30 . . . . . 
7u A1-mste ad, R onn1•.  2007 . " Growino"'  the Size of the Black Woman: Femm1st Act1v1sm m 
Havana Hip Hop.' ' NWSA Journal 19 (1): 106-117 
77 Las Krudas. 2003 . C ube ns i. A1ovimientos #2 
78 Trans. Rooklyn (2009) 
38 
initially chosen to signify the group's adherence to vegetarianism,79 yet it also refers to 
their unadulterated , direct, " raw" style of conveying their message which "refuses 
conform to patriarchal gendered prescriptions of Cuban women as passive, male-gaze 
oriented ohjects.··SO In the following excerpt from the song "Eres bella " (You are 
Bcautirul). their direct style of social critique is illustrated clearly: 
,\ !alclita )' mochista sociedad que contamina 
,\ 'o fwy rucisnw 'l 
} •. coiio. 
}' 110.rntrm· c111e /71111/o 'l En el mismo escal6n 
No hay ,·erdaclera rewJ/uci6n sin mujeres. 
Wicked and macho society that corrupts 
Is there no raci sm? 
/\nd . shit. 
What about us? Still on the same rung 
There is no rea l revolution without women. 81 
Las Krudas pull no punches as they critique the sexist society in which they live. Their 
lyr ics embody soc ial critiques and are meant to inspire revolution against social 
oppression and play a crucial part in bringing women into the fold of the hip-hop 
movement. not merely to form another part of it but to use hip-hop as a means to 
advance their own feminist agenda. 
Through providing a platform for marginalized communities to voice social 
grieva nces and social critiques, hip-hop enabled those groups which beforehand had 
e:-.: isted in the periphery of island politics to carve out a niche for themselves in a 
political climate that had previously tried to deny the fact that they existed as a 
79 Peny (2004) , 264 
80 Perry (2004), 264 
8 1 Trans. Marc Peny (2004) 
39 
constituency. This was particularly true for young Afro-Cubans, who made up the 
majority of hip-hop fans. The "color-blind" government rhetoric had sought to erase all 
racial distinctions following the revolution, abolishing all black institutions and 
organizations with the intention of eliminating all public racial distinctions and 
differences. 1l owcvcr, such racial egalitarian policy had come to exist only 
bureaucratically in sta te institutions and prevented the government from acknowledging 
the racism that had resurfaced in Cuban society during the Special Period. Racist 
ideology still persisted in C uban society, yet the Afro-Cubans who were its victims had 
few means to demand civil justice and rectify their situation; since race had been 
deemed •' irrelevant" in Cuba, the Cuban state saw no reason to acknowledge blacks as a 
group that was affected differently than any other Cuban. The hip-hop movement was 
large ly a reaction to the lack of politica l representation to which Afro-Cubans were 
condemned. I I ere. Rodo lfo Rensoli speaks of the essentially Afro-Cuban nature of the 
hip-hop movement: 
Basicamente es un movimiento de Los marginados, en sentido general. Pero es 
ta111h ie11 1111 movimiento negro. ;,Porqwi le digo esto? No es un secreto para 
nadie. popularmente, que hay muy pocasfiguras negras que representan 
socialmente al ser Cubano- tanto en lasfimciones politicas como las funcion es 
artfsticas ... En ese sentt. do  es un movz.m z.e nto negro. s2 
Basica lly. it is a movement of the marginalized, in a general sense. But it is also 
a black movement. Why do I say this? It is not a secret among the public that 
there are very few black public figures that represent the Cuban people-
whether in political offices as in arts administration .. . In that sense, it is a black 
movement. 83 
82 Bacallao, Ricardo, and Elvira Rodriguez Puet1o. 2006. Short radiography of hip hop in . 
Cuba, The maji-maji readings. The black perspective, v. l. [s. I.]: Baca llao en Puerto Ftlms. 
83 Trans. Rookl yn (2009) 
40 
The Cuban hip-hop movement created its own leaders that would represent the part of 
Cuba that had been condemned to public invisibility, that is, black Cuba. Hip-hop 
culture became a movement in Cuba as the Afro-Cuban community came together to 
counteract the ir increas ing marginalization in the public sphere and reclaim cultural 
space through fo rg ing their own cultural representatives in Cuban rappers . 
J\menaza •s  ··CJchav6n Cruzado" stirred up a significant amount of controversy 
after it was performed at the Rap festival in 1997 as it had openly challenged the official 
cla im that racial differences were non-existent in Cuba.8-1 While race and racism were 
sure ly top ics brought up in private discussions, they were conspicuously absent, and 
even discouraged from finding their way into public discourse. And so, while it was one 
thing for a Cuban you th o r mixed-race to write the line "[soy] negro coma Mumia," it is 
a different matter to stand on stage before three thousand of his peers and proclaim over 
a microphone ••if.rny / negro coma Mumia!." 85 Here, the ability of hip-hop to serve as a 
medium of political ex pression becomes evident. 
In ·'Ochcn'<>n Cruzado," Amenaza paved the way for other rappers to begin more 
directly to approac h the deli cate issue of race re lations in Cuba. The most illustrative 
example of how C uban rappers have been able to use their lyrics to express the 
disjunction between the revo lutionary government's egalitarian ideal and the actual 
lived rea lities of those affected by racism's prevalence on the island, is the song 
·'Tengo'" ("I have '·), by Hermanos de Causa. Alejandro de la Fuente notes that "Tengo" 
is '·one of the best-known and most important songs produced by the whole rap 
84 Hernandez and Garofa lo ( 1999) 35 
85 Perry (2004) 177 
41 
movement on the island since its creation."86 This was most likely because the song 
was extremely effective in communicating young Afro-Cubans' visceral reaction to the 
revolutionary government" s claim to have eradicated racism from the island. The song 
is a play on Nicolas Guillen' s poem of the same title, which was written in 1964. 
Guillcn ' s poem expresses the euphoria and optimism felt by the Afro-Cuban population 
following the desegregation of Cuban institutions and public spaces. Through the 
abundant repetition of the word '·tengo" ("I have"), Guillen lists the achievements that 
the revolution made in stri ving towards racial equality: 
Tengo. vamos a ver, 
Que ya aprendi o leer. 
a cantor. 
Tengo que ya ctprendi a escribir 
Ya pensar 
rareir. 
Tengo c1ue ya tengo 
Doncle trnhajar )' ganar 
l"o que me tengo que comer 
Tengo , 1•amos u ver. 
Tengo lo que tenfa q11e tener. 
I have, let" s see, 
That I have learnt to read, 
To count, 
I have that I have learnt to write 
And to think 
And to laugh 
I have that I have 
A place to work 
And earn 
What I need to eat 
I have, let 's see, 
. 87 
What was com111g to me. 
86 Fuente (2008) 3 
87 Trans. Sujatha Fernandes (2006) 
42 
Through the repetition of tengo ("I have"), Guillen optimistically compares the 
accomplishments or the revolution with what came before it. It is a simple and 
illustrati,·e example of the Revolution's success. It is also required reading in Cuban 
secondary schools . Hcrmanos de Causa borrow Guillen's title and sample his use of 
--rengo. •• yet do not share his optimistic appraisal of the revolution. As part of a young 
generation of Cuban s, 1 lermanos de Causa do not remember the momentous changes of 
the I % Os and find it difficult to relate to Guillen's optimism when faced with the 
realities 01· the Special Period . Nearly forty years later, Hermanos de Causa recycle 
C,uillcn· s poem to create an ironic, anachronistic juxtaposition that starkly highlights the 
di ssonance between the promises of full citizenship in an egalitarian socialist polity and 
the lived l'rustrations or the revolution's unacknowledged shortcomings. In contrast to 
the positive tone or Gui! !en 's '·Tengo," Hermanos de Causa use the repetition of the title 
ironica ll y to refer to what they do nor have or, rather, what they have in theory yet see 
. . 88 
none ol lor themselves : 
Tengo unu hcmdera. un escudo, un tocororo 
'f'umhien una palmera, un mapa sin tesoro 
'/'engo mpiraciones sin tener lo que hace fa/ta 
Tengo 111e1s o menos la medida exacta 
( 'n,nica compact a 
Polemica que impacta 
Pusan /os mfos y fa situaci6n sigue intacta 
El riempo no perdona 
Preco..., -L1ntale a La Habana 
011e ahorita esta en la Iona 
An adie le importa nada 
Tengo una raza oscura y discriminada 
Teno-a una jornada que me exige y no me da nada 
Ten;o rantas cosas que no puedo ni tocarlas 
88 West-Duran (2004) 21 
43 
Tengo insta!aciones que no puedo ni pisarlas 
Tengo !1bertad entre parentesis de hierro 
!'engo tantos derechos sin provechos que me encierro 
Tcngo lo que tengo sin tener lo que he tenido 
Got a flag , coat of arms, a tocororo 
Got a palm tree, a map without treasure 
Got aspirations without having what I need 
I have (more or less) the true measure 
Compact chronicle 
Polemics that impact 
Y cars go by. things sti 11 the same 
Time shows no mercy or shame 
.lust ask Havana, again 
Against the ropes in pain 
Nobody cares about jack 
Discriminated ·cause I'm black 
Got a job with big demands and no pay 
Got so much that I can ' t touch 
Got all these places 1 can ' t go in 
Got freedom in a parenthesis of steel 
Got so many rights I don't enjoy that I'm better off alone 
Got what I have without having what I have89 
ln the first line, rapper Zoandris of Hermanos de Causa sets the context of the song by 
referring to the national symbols of Cuba: the flag, the coat of arms, the national bird 
and a palm tree. These symbols take on an empty quality in the song, for their charm is 
negated by the fact that the map does not lead to treasure. Poetically, the lack of 
treasure can be read as a lack of hope, and adds to Zoandris' disillusioned tone. In the 
third line, ·'tengo aspiracioncs sin tener lo que /wee falta " ("Got aspirations without 
having what I need") Zoandris expresses his frustrations at the limitations and 
shortcomings he faces in Cuban society, which is portrayed throughout the rest of the 
verse in an increasingly pessimistic light. Zoandris' sense of disillusionment with the 
89 Trans. Alan West-Duran (2004) 
44 
Cuban state is most clear in the lines "polemica que impacta / pasan fos anos y fa 
situaci6n sigue intacta " ("polemics that impact, the years pass and things still the 
same .. ) which point to the hypocrisy of government rhetoric that seeks to reinforce the 
idea that the revolution has progressed and continues to improve society for the better. 
Zoand ri s docs not sec any cause for optimism regarding revolutionary advancement. 
Rather. he portrays Havana as --against the ropes in pain" and relates to a litany of 
Cuba· s problems: raci sm, hard work poorly compensated, consumer goods and venues 
beyo nd the budget o r C ubans but available to tourists , and the theoretical possession of 
ri ghts but little chance to exercise their benefits. 90 One line sums up Hermanos de 
Causa •s  appraisa l or their citi zenship: "Tengo libertad entre parentesis de hierro " ("I've 
got freedom in a parenthesis of steel") . The freedom that the artists believe themselves 
due is cu t short by soc ietal limitations that transform the idea of "libertad " into a 
parenthet ica l abs tracti on that is uttered as an aside- a whisper almost- made as a 
tangenti a l rclc rcncc to the concept, removed from Hermanos de Causa' s lived 
experience. The ··freedom'' provided by the revolution is merely a new form of 
impri sonment. 
The effo rts of rap artists to raise awareness about the realities of racism in Cuba 
have not been without results. Indeed, rappers, alongside other artists and intellectuals, 
have proved quite successful in raising awareness about the existing problems of racism 
in Cuban society. Today in Cuba, government officials have acknowledged rappers ' 
critiques and have again begun to debate and discuss the racial di sparities that exist in 
90 West-Duran (2004) 23 
45 
Cuban society. Even Fidel Castro himself has reverse d l1 1· s stance on the i· ssue to admi·t  
that racial di llerences sti l I characterize Cuban so c1•e  t y. 91 D e Ia  F•  uente wri•t es, ' ·, ln a 
country where this problem did not officially exist just a few years ago- as late as 1997 
Fidel Castro was still say ing publicly that ·the Revolution [had] officially eliminated 
racial di sc rimination· Crom the island- this is no small achievement."92 
Nationalization of the Hip-I lop Movement 
Under a political reg ime that does not guarantee freedom of expression or 
association. one may wonder how such critical debate could be allowed in the art of the 
public sphere . While certainly not all criticism is tolerated, constructive criticism is 
encouraged. For Cuba, the revolution is not a fixed project, but an open one, a 
participatory process that is open to creativity and suggestion. Fidel Castro has repeated 
the maxim "within the revolution, everything goes,"93 meaning that projects, while 
perhaps critical. can sti ll be considered va luable as long as they contribute to the 
ongoing project of the Cuban state- building a soc ia li st, utopian society. Abel Prieto, 
the Minister of Culture in C uba, has said that ' ·if you eliminate spaces of discussion, 
people begin a double Ii re. Discussion and debate always clear the atmosphere, even 
thouoh there have not been answers for all the questions."94 Artists as well as the public 
i::, 
can then participate active ly and critically in the Cuban revolutionary project without 
having to conform blindly to a strict ideal. However, if one's project does not include 
9 1 Fuente (2008), I 0 
92 Fuente (2008), 9 J ,0 1961 
93 Castro , Fidel. '"Palabras a los intelectuales." Speech , Havana, Cuba, une-' ' • 
9~ Fernandes (2006). 4 I 
46 
the specific sociali st utopia that the government aims for , or seems, by the government, 
to criticize the project itself rather than constructively point out its deficiencies, artists 
can he subject to censure. Geoffrey Baker writes, " Cuban rappers, too , expose the gap 
bet\\'cen official di scourses and lived experience: broadly speaking, this criticism is 
acceptable as long as it is the go;J that is criticized rather than the discourses 
themsch·es.· ·''' The key \\"Ord in Fidel's maxim is ' ·within the revolution, everything." 
Castro lini shcs hi s sentence: ··against the revolution, nothing."96 Voices shouting from 
the outside represL·nt a threat to the revolution's ideological stability and need either to 
be brought into line \\ith the revolution or silenced in order to preserve solidarity on the 
island. and . in any case. could not be tolerated. 
t\nnel isc Wunderlich describes the lyrics of a popular, politically outspoken 
group. /\n('rnimo ( 'onse_jo. as --edgy, I but notes] getting too edgy could end their 
careers. ··'17 There arc indeed very serious limits to what can and caimot be said. 
Another politically oriented group, Mano Armada (Armed Hand) took their social 
critici sms too Lir in the 2003 rap festival when one of their members mounted the stage 
with a bed sheet di splaying the words ·'denuncia social " ("social denouncement") , 
pref•a ci•n g a pcrl•o rmance t 11 at wou Id pus h th e envelope of what could be considered 
··constructin~ cnt•1 c•1 s•1 11 . •• Int1 1 c song h e ti1 en per·1r' ormed , Papa J-Iurnbertico directly 
addressed the po Ii ce present at the show: 
O\'e 111. conrigo 111is1110. contigo, . 
Q•u e en pee 110 111e cI  e;•a s un m• s I a nte,  no te tengo m1edo, 
9' Baker (2005) 377 
96 Castro ( 1961) 
97 Wunderli ch (2005) I 68 
47 
No _m e i,n timicla.  tu vestimenta azul P m 
- e l cw. g o que tengas 
Cl/ .a.  , 1111 no cle•;as cle serA 1  . 
 1111 i o-110rc. t d l 
0 • 111 e, a e ante, es toy a ' tu disposici6n 
p1,1 C:.!a !or o lo q. ue.  C/Weray•  mi<·-' m anos con t.u s esposas, • 
Afomwne en 111 ;od1clo camic5n aue 
• 1 yo, yo no me cal/are,' . 
Po/iciu. /Jo/iciu. /1 1110 eres mi amio-o 
Para laj1n·e11!11cl c11hana er es el p;o~ castigo98 
I Icy yo u. with yo u yo urse lf, with you 
You don't g in~ ~nc an in sta nt or peace, [but] I ' m not afraid of you 
_Your g ree n_u rnlorm d_oes n·t intimidate m e nor the authority you have 
'. 0 me you re s till an _ignoramus. come on, I'm at your disposition. 
Squeeze my hand s with yo ur cuffs all you want 
I ,oad me in yuur l"uck ing truc k but L l will not ; hut up. 
Po li ccm ~111 . pol icema n. you arc not my fr iend 
For C uban youth yo u · re the worst punishmedt. 
1:or so opL'11ly c ha lleng ing state authority fi gures, Papa Humbertico earned 
himself a dangerous rep utati o n: .. , , think I'm o ne of the rappers heading the black list,"' 
said Papn I lumhc rti co i11 a n intervi ew J\FP journalist Laura Bonilla.99 He has since been 
banned from se,·cra l I lm·,rna c lubs nnd radio stations, who told him, quotes Papa 
I lumhcrti co. ··,w /J/ledo ;wner eslo porque me bota n, porque me meta en candela 
(prohle11w.,T100 c- 1 can't pl ay thi s because they' ll kick me out, because I wi ll get in 
tro ubl e." ) GO\ crnmcnt suppo rt has been contingent upon a project' s adherence to 
revolutionary ideo logy a nd princ iples; club owners did not wish to be affiliated with the 
dissident vo ice tha t Papa f Iumbertico came to represent. The Cuban governm ent also 
98 Vincent. Mouricio. :200:2. ··C l ·ra p cubano sabe a descontento." El Pais. 2 1 Aug. _ 
http ://w\\'w.c lpa is .com/arti c ul o/op ini on/CUBA/RAP/CUBANO/SABE/DESCO NTENTO/elpep1 
opi/2002082 1e lpcpiop i_ 8/Tes/ _, 
99 Bonilla, Laura . :2 00 7. -- 1l i p hop. mcdio para hacer ' la revo luc 1on dentro de la 
rcvolucion· en C uba ... la.fomada 14 Ja n. . 
· /7007/0 J/  14; · dex phJJ?section=espectacu los&art 1cle=a I On I esp 
http ://w\\'w.1ornada .unam.mx - 111 - • 
100 Quoted in Boni Il a· (200 7) 
48 
wishes to allay Papa I lumbertico ' s association ·th c b . .:- · · · 
w1 u a. many 1ore1gn Journalists who 
attended the eYcnt in 2003 later described Papa I-Itl m b ert ·1 co , s message as " ant1· -
rcvolutionary" and used Papa I-lumbertico as their example to describe Cuban hip-hop 
as -- nc\\' \·. . mg uard or anti-government protest in socialist Cuba." 101 Papa Humbertico 
llatly denied that he \\as an anti-revolucionario (anti-revolutionary) and felt that the 
press had mi s represented hi s relationship to the Cuban government after the concert in 
200] !'or. later in the so ng_ he raps, "Amo mi bandera, aqui naci y aqui me van a 
entamr se_'t!,11u1 ;medes es1c11 · cle que tengo bien claro el concepto de la !'evolucion 
rnhonu es/01 · co 11 csto. /Jl'f'O no conli[;o. [policia] " ("I love my flag , I was born here 
and here I \\·i 11 he buried / yo u can be sure that I know quite well the concept of the 
Cuban re\·o luti o11 / I ·m \\ ith it, but not with you , [policeman]"). Nevertheless, Cuban 
government officials did not want to attract the type of publicity that would show the 
Cuban people to he anything but united in their revolutionary aim and make it 
extremel y di l'licult. i r not imposs ible, for groups like Mano Armada to perform their act 
on international stages . Pa pa Humbertico was invited to perform in Mexico at an annual 
competit ion in 2005 yet. a t the las t minute, his exit visa was lifted without 
explanat ion. 1112 By so openly denouncing the Cuban police- a very clear representation 
of Cuban state autho rity- Papa Humbertico's performance epitomized rap 's potential to 
fo rm a defiant. di ss ident voice in Cuban society. Government officials did not want 
l lumbcrtico •5  raps to come to represent the Cuban hip-hop movement as contrary to the 
revolution and so denied him support. 
101 Perry (200-1) 2 
102 See Bonilla (200 7) 
49 
Cuban state oC!icials recorrnized that hip hop h a d th 0 - e po t en1 · 1 ..: ia to 1orm a very 
real threat to the state 's monopoly on public discourse and ideology. Cuban hip-hop 
culture. De la Fuente explains, was ·'a politicization and mobilization that [was] not tied 
to the state or party ideology" and functioned as a countervailing voice. 103 Officials 
representing the one-party Cuban government wished to maintain exclusive control of 
Cuban politic s and so began to draw Cuban rappers in from "the outside" in order to 
maintain a uni lied polity. /\riel Fernandez affirms that the Cuban state had to recognize 
the Cuban rap mo\·ement -- politically. culturally , and musically , because imagine if this 
whole mass ol"young people were in opposition to the revolution, if all of these people 
did not !eel empowered by the revolution, how would they feel?" 104 For Fernandez, the 
government brought hip-hop into the fold because in not receiving government support, 
they felt abandoned and di sempowered by the state. The state had turned a blind eye to 
the resurgence or raci st practices in C uban society and declined to address the grave 
issue unti I they were forced to by Cuban rappers, who brought such problems out of 
their state of invi s ibility . Marginali zed Afro-Cubans indeed felt empowered by the hip-
hop revoluti on. ,\-hich won them back cultural space and political clout while 
reevaluatinu. and redefining their racial identity in Cuba. State officials sought to tap 
into the enthusiasm rap inspired so as to convert Cuban hip-hop ' s potentially 
destabili zing energy into political fuel that would benefit the state. 
103 Fuente (2008) I 7 
104 Quoted in Fernandes (2006) 594 
50 
Official s recogni zed rap as a "roadmap to tl1 e h earts an d mm· d  s of a young 
generation o r Cuhans·· 105 which had become increas 1• ng ly  d. ~ 1senc h ante d wi·t  I1  t h e 
rernlution and it s promi ses. While the Cuban state initially regarded hip-hop as an 
imported fad . the socially relevant lyrics that rappers began to perform on public stages 
led Mini ster oi"Culture /\bel Prieto, in 1999, to declare rap to be "an authentic 
e\press ion o l"Cuhanness ... adding ... it' s time we nationalize rap," meaning that Cuban 
rappers should come under the auspices of state representation, the same as other 
rrokss iona l ( 'uha11 mu sicians (all of whom are employed by the state)_ 1°6 The 
: l.l·ociaci11 11 I la111111111s .C..:ai::: (/\I IS). the youth organization that had helped sponsor the 
lirst rap k sti\ ,ti in ] ()9 5. became the central institution to which rappers would go to 
request concert sp,1ce. li g hting. audio and publicity for the shows they wished to 
pcrl 'trnn l lmlcr the direction of /\I IS official Ariel Fernandez, twelve rap groups were 
able to co me to get her in I lavana and record the first compilation of Cuban rap for 
overseas di stribution. '/'he C' uhan Hip Hop Aflstars Vol. I. 107 Rap gained more 
vi sibility in Cuba due to s tate representation and support and the three years following 
rap' s nationali /.ation \Vere a boom time for the genre. The state responded by allotting 
more fund s to the annua l hip-hop festival , opening up more public venues for regular 
hip-hop performances and. in 2002, founding the Agencia Cubana de Rap (ACR. 
Agency o r C uban Rap) as well as creating a magazine dedicated to chronicling and 
10' Wunderlich (2005) 168 
106 l lcrn andcz and Garofalo (:WOO) 42 
1mBakcr (2005) 370 
51 
pro moting Cuban hip-hop entitl ed Movimientos .·  L a R evz·s  ta  C u b ana d e H.z p 1u1 op 
(Movement : the Cuban I [ip Ho p Magazine) _i os 
a ti ona li za ti on secured rap' s legitimacy on the island, and many proponents of 
the hip-hop movement felt that the hip-hop revolution had taken a great step forward. 
Indeed. many raprers who rece ived institutional backing were more than happy to 
accept the tec hni ca l and pro mo tio nal suppo rt the institutions offered them. Ruben 
Marin o r Primera l~ ase sa id . "' La Age11ciafi1e alga que deseamos siempre las raperos, 
1111 s11eiio hecho n:uliclud· c ·The Agency was something us rappers always wished for , a 
dream come true.-- ) Joli One o r the ma in a ims o f the ACR was "to commercialize the 
gro ups in its ca ta loguc.-- 110 /\I tho ugh the commercial aim of the ACR seems to 
contradi ct many rappers· anti-consumeri st message, Geoffrey Baker points out that the 
/\ge ncy was " the outco me o f' nego ti ati ons in which leading rap groups, in many cases 
fru stra ted a t the ir lack o r comme rci a l success. played a key role ." 111 Leading rap 
gro ups wanted a chance to show the world the ir music, and a govenunent institution 
dedicated to that end was rounded. ln 2002 the ACR took on an elite group of rappers 
as pro fess io na l empl oyees with the intention of promoting the ir music commercially for 
the international marke t. 11 2 T he prec io us fe w groups who have been able to sign with 
the AC R have been oive n the chance to showcase the ir abilities profess ionally, working 
t::, 
108 Baker (2005) 3 70 . 
109 Cordero, Tani a. 2003. " Pers istir en Prim era Base ." Movim ientos #3, trans. Miles 
Rookl yn (2009) 
110 Baker (2005) 39-1, quo ted from !lfovi111ien1os I, back cover. 
111 Baker (2005) 393 
52 
with professional production equipment d t . 
, an rave 1mg to shows both within and outside 
of Cuba's borders. 
In providin° the opportu 111· tY  t 0 o move b eyond bootlegged cassette deck backino 
b 
tracks and record in a profess ional studio , the ACR opene d a new d oor o f poss1·b d· 1· ty for 
Cuban rappers: by shov.,; ing their professional ability in the studio they could attract the 
attention ora foreiu0 n record label and --make 1·t bi.a" b 0 y la n dm. g a recor d d ea 1.  ACR 
rapper Papo Record alludes to that dream: 
f fo, , IL' cunro 111w /Je11a, mm1ana day una gira 
J>usmlo </lliffo ,·iu/w· 
I Joy 11110.,· cienros por 1111 temcr, ma11ana 
{ ·11os 111iles /){JI. 1111 clisco. 
Today I s ing in a pe11u. tomorrow I ' ll 
travel around the country, 
and the day al'tcr tomorrow I want to travel abroad. 
Today a few hundred for a song 
Tomorrow seve ral thousand for a record. 113 
For talented artists. rap pnJ,·ided not only a means by which to engage the difficult 
,vorld around them but also the fantasy of escaping it all together as well. The group 
i\mcnaza. which would later change its name to Los Orishas (The Spirits), was signed 
by a rrcnch record label in 1999 and moved off the island to Paris to make their first 
record. A lo Cuhcmo. which was an international hit. Many rappers regard the Orishas 
as one of Cuban rap· s great success stories, while others criticize them for 
compromising their socially conscious raps for commercial interests and "selling out. .. 
But regardless of one ·s perspective on the Orishas' commercial success, the 
promotional support now available to rappers through the state since 2002 set many an 
11 3 Fernandes (2006) 60 I 
53 
imagination alight with dreams of sianing the d eaI  ti1 at  wou Id a ta k'e  one to a new li· fe 
outside of impoverished Cuba. 
Those dreams were nourished by the support Cuban institutions provided to 
rappers. which was ins trumental in the development and solidification of hip-hop as a 
legitimate art form on the is land. The rap scene in Cuba by far outstrips that in other 
Latin American countries. and the state must be given at least some credit for this. 11 4 
State institutions provided concert space. promotional support and production 
equ ipml.'.nt to early Cuban rappers. enabling them to begin their careers. The 
government also sponsored the first rap festival in Havana, el Festival de Rap Cubano, 
which cllcctivcly catalyzed Cuban hip-hop 's crystallization as a movement. Cuban hip-
hop O\\'cs a great debt to the institutions that have lent them resources and promotion, 
for the vibrant scene that hip-hoppers enjoy today in Cuba would not exist without 
government backing. 
Yet although institutional support met the needs of many rappers and helped the 
Cuban hip-hop movement take huge strides in its development, the institutionalization 
of the genre was also i ntcnded to meet the political needs of the Cuban state itself. 
Cuban officials recogni zed the political power that hip-hop displayed and feared that the 
movement would veer onto a course divergent with revolutionary ideology and weaken 
the state 's political hegemony. Cuban officials knew that it is easier to impress 
conformity when there are no competing points of view-hip-hop was increasingly 
beginning to open Cubans' eyes to alternative ways of assessing Cuban society and the 
114 Baker (2005) 3 72 
54 
revolution during the Special Period. The state institutions served as a way to guide the 
development or the hip-hop movement in a direction most beneficial to the state. They 
sought to uccomplish this through prioritizing "the creation of a leadership of rappers 
loyal to the re\·olution.·· 11 5 Orlicials desired that the rest of the rap community would 
folio\,. an elite group or institutionalized leaders who would support the government by 
creating constructi\ e criticism in their raps rather than dismantling critiques. In this 
" ·ay . the institutions de<licated to hip-hop could exercise a subtle form of censorship 
through se lectin g to promote only artists loyal to the revolution while letting those that 
have the potential or rocking the boat fall by the wayside. Such a leadership of rappers 
" ·as intended to inspire a form of self-censorship in which rappers would tailor their 
lyrics to lit "hat the ;\CR \\as looking for, avoiding topics or styles that they knew 
\H)uld ollend and nega te their chances at receiving airtime, or a spot at an upcoming 
show. Success ,\as clearly defined as a possibility only achievable through adherence 
to the Cuban renllution . 
The /\I IS took control of the annual rap festival in Alamar in 2000 and 
completely replaced the fe stival 's leadership with its own representatives, dissolving 
Grupo Uno. the group responsible for founding the event. 11 6 The AHS would have the 
unique po"·er to decide who got to perform in the festivals and who did not. One of the 
main critiques leveled at the AHS is the perceived lack of democracy in the selection 
process. By consolidating the power to approve which performances would appear in 
public_ the Al JS introduced direct state censorship into the hip-hop movement's 
11 5 Fernandes (2005) 59--1 
11 6 Bacallao (2006) 
55 
equation. For example when co f c • . 
' rnpe mg 1or a spot m the lineup at the 2000 festival, the 
group r rec I lolc C!~.! .ro was asked to ex P1 a m•  th e mean m• g of thei. r name in a television 
interview: 
The:v  sai. d that besides the obvious pun (free 11ole -- f-ll··J O 1 -- bl ac kb ean ) , 1· t was 
calling lor a spa~~ \\·l:cre all black people could be free. This got a little too 
close to the sens itive IS~ue of racism in a context where revolutionary 
di scoursc _h~,s_d ec~ared it to be a non-issue. Free Hole Negro was not part of the 
l111e-up ol arti s ts leatured in the festival that year. 11 7 
Cuba already \\as supposedly (oflicially) a place where all black people could be free. 
13y pointing out that this goal had yet to be achieved , Free Hole Nearo rocked the boat 
b ' 
so to spcal,; . and earned the dismissal of those selecting the artists for the festival. Their 
message \\'a s scc11 as potentially subversive, and it was not given the opportunity to be 
perlcmned . 
Cuban rappers were well aware that there were lines that could not be crossed. 
To step too for 0\ er the party line would be to offend the institution that has enabled 
them to perform. so rappers were careful to remind their audience, amid their social 
critiques. that they were not against the revolution. To return to the example of 
l-lermanos de Causa· s "'Tengo," when he recycled Gui lien ' s poem of the same title- an 
iconic representation of the revolution's success- into a critique of the supposed gains 
of the rc\'olution. they create a powerful statement that called into question much of 
what had been assumed about racism in Cuba. lt would seem at first glance that such a 
song could be con sidered anti-revolutionary. However, in the second verse of the song, 
Hermanos de Causa reaffirm their loyalty to the central tenets of the Cuban state's anti-
117 Olavarria (200 7) J 71 
56 
consumerist philosophy by critiquina m t • 1 1 . o a ena va u es, consumerism, and social 
indifference . 11 8 
FJ.  hecho de que te,w"" as mas no le h•a c e ser ma1. or que yo 
U rec11rso le' du f)Osibilidades 
,N o ,c o11fi111clos /ener mas con tener cualidades ... 
A/us q11e .rn(icienre sientes que no tienes mas 
.\/us I/Ill' 111/1~-/,o.\· fi enes pero Cfllieres mas y mas 
A!,e 11rru.,· nic'.·'· li : nes mcis quieres y siempre mas querras 
.\!1e11rn1s 111us 111 fl'ngus mcis ricliculo seras . 
.lu111iis e11 re11deuis c1uc lener no es cuesti6n de ser 
Sino c11esri1>11 de 111w gesti<5n q11e tienes un nivel 
,\ ·o re11go ru11ro ;>ero implantofe en mi proceder 
f 'on111e _1·0 rc11,!.',o lo c111e lenia que tener. 
The Lict that yo u kivc more docsn 't make you better than me 
The reso urce it g ives you possibilities 
1)011 ·1 co 111 ·use hm·ing more with having qualities 
I . I 
i\ lore than enough you feel you don ' t have more 
You have more than many but you want more and more 
The lllore yo u ha\·e the more you want and you'll always want more 
The more yo u ha ve the more ridiculous you'll be 
You· 11 ne\ er understand that having is not the same as being 
But rather an effort to show that you have a class 
I don · 1 ha\·c much but I instill faith in my actions 
Because I have what I had to have had. 11 9 
Geoffrey Baker argues tha t .. hip-hop was allowed to prosper in Cuba because it could 
be talked about ·producti ve ly.'' ·120 By aligning themselves with state ideology, 
Hermanos de Causa assure that their raps would be politically "productive·' and deserve 
to be supported and hea rd . This is not to say that their espousal of gove rnment rhetoric 
is a purely diplomatic move, for Hermanos de Causa as well as many other rap groups 
11 8 West-Duran (2004) 23 
11 9 Trans. Rooklyn (2009) 
1m Baker(2005)382 
57 
are sincere when they critique olobal capitali·sn1 and o pi.a 1•s e th e c u b an revo 1u t1· on. 
However. the decision to mix crit1·que w1" tl 1 prai•s e was an i· ntenti· onal one . I-Iermanos de 
Causa did not wi sh to set themselves at odds with the government completely but 
instead chose to point out the deficiencies in government policy and appeal to the state 
to live up to the egalitarianism promised by its socialist ideolooy while reaffirmina 
bl b 
their allegiance to the tenets of the revolution. ln this way , they remind state official s 
whose s ide they arc on (and so avoid forms of direct censorship). 
State censorship took on many forms in relation to hip-hop. yet rarely was 
exerted in a direct. antagoni stic fashion . Rather, censorship was exercised more subtly 
through institutional deci s ions about how rappers were selected and supp011ed. These 
deci sions \\·ere directly related to the perceived political "productivity" of rappers ' 
messages. and by 110\\·. have constrained the freedom of rappers to choose their own 
political direction as well as that of the movement. The institutional support that has 
allowed hip-hop to llourish in Cuba has come at the price of apart of the movement ' s 
autonom y. Rappers have been enabled by state institutions at the same time as they 
haYe been limited by them . Sujatha Fernandes writes, "Rather than giving the rap 
movement cultural and political autonomy, the AHS seeks to encourage a relationship 
of dependency. whereby rappers must appeal to state institutions for the funds and 
permi ss ion to do their work.',1 2 1 If the only way rappers can make their music is to 
appeal to the state for the necessary support, then state institutions can effectively define 
C u ba n I1 ·1 p-11 op t I1 roug h c I1 0 os1•11 oo  to support only that which serves the state; they have 
121 Fernandes (2006) 598 
58 
the final \VOrd on what gets produced and what do es no t . su ccess on t I1 e 1· s Ia n d 1· s a 
state-concocted phenomenon. After its institutionalization, the Cuban hip-hop 
movement lost much of its ability to define itself politically because its dependency 
upon state institutions limited its ability to step outside of the lines defined by state 
interest. 
Nc\crthclcss . the presence or the AHS or ACR has rarely been considered a 
purely rn i.rnipulati\·c . controlling presence. Instead, one of Cuban rappers ' main 
compla ints regarding the institutions have been pointed at the failure of the institutions 
to li\·e up to their c:-.:pecta tions in terms of promotion and organization.122 AHS ' s self-
dcl"ined goal is -- tu encourage the media to make it their first priority to promote the best 
Cuban rap today .·· 12 ' yet mp has hardly found its way into the mainstream Cuban media . 
When it docs shm,· up on Cuban news networks it is usually always casted in a 
controvers ial I ight. and rarely as a legitimate Cuban art form. 124 In 2003, a year after 
the /\CR ·s inception . onl y two of the ten artists employed therein had been able to 
rel ease compact di scs. 125 Al so , in organizing the 2003 festival of rap, organizers 
decided to split the tcs tiva l between two different venues: " the first is 25 minutes east of 
I lavana: the second is in the extreme West part of the city. Given the transportation 
pro blem s in Cuba. thi s represents a major obstacle for most Cubans. " 126 Needless to 
say. such logistical problems had a negative effect on the public perception of the most 
impoi1ant ra p concert of the year. Although the Cuban state has accepted hip-hop, such 
122 BaJ... cr (2005) 393 
m Interview \\'ilh /\lpicli o /\lonso, Bacallao (2006) 
124 Fern andes (2006) 593 
12' Fern andes (2006) 59-1 
12<· West-Du nin (200-1 ) I 0 
59 
log isti ca l constraints and lag in expected per ..o rn1a nee s t an d 1 1 ar d s seem to m·  d.1 cate 
·'acceptance with an undercurrent of containment, of making sure that things do not 
grow muc 1 •• I 27 1 . 
The most drasti c change that institutionalization has brought about in Cuban 
ra p- and the mos t criti c ized- is the creation of a ri ft that cuts through a rap scene 
prev iously united in it s homogene ity of opportunity (or lack thereof). Rapper Papo 
Reco rd commented in an interv iew. ··creo que la unidad entre Los raperos es 
e11om1£'11 1£'11/£' /)()hre. Fsta es la limitacion mas grande y danina def rap cubano "128 (I 
believe that the unity between ra ppers is enormously poor. This is the greatest and most 
da mag ing limit<.1 ti o n o r C uban rap"). The ACR divided a previously unified hip-hop 
scene into two camps: the profess ional, state employed rappers and the amateur, 
··undergro und·· rappe rs. A ri e l Fernandez e lucidates the main differences between 
--u nde rgro und·' and "commercia l" rap be low: 
I Undergro und ra ppers I maintain an orthodox and radical stance along the lines 
o r the ori g ins o r the genre and they di stance themselves from whatever 
poss ibility o r rus io n fo r its commerciali zation; [and second,] they focus much 
more on ;_i n integra ti on of politi call y committed lyri cs with the social context .. . 
J Commerc ia l groups l incorporate popular Cuban rhythms in order to be more 
acce pted, ac hieve a uthentic ity, and become commerci a ll y viable. 129 
for unde rground rap pers, rap is in a musical category of its own- to cross ove r with 
othe r oenres such as traditi ona l Cuban music wo uld be to contaminate its essentia l 
b 
politi ca l fun cti on o f e ngaging socia l realiti es through remas sociales. Commercially 
ori ented ra ppers conside r rap to be on par w ith other genres of popular music and 
127 West-Duran (2004) 11 .. 
128 Petinuad. Jorge . 2003 . Interview w ith Papo Record, ·' Yo no cn 11co al que es 
co111111 e;cial, •• ,\ fo ,·i111ien10s #4 
124 Quoted in Fernandes . (2006) 582 
60 
consider the political content of their lyrics to be merely part of the aesthetic and not the 
definin:°:,  l'cature. Many comme1·c1·a1 rappers h ave b egun to cross over to what has long 
been considered the darks ide in underground hip-hop circles: reggaeton, a genre 
ubiquitous in Latin America characterized by its heavy dance beat and its lyrics 
celebrating sc:-: and party ing. that is, the polar opposite of underground rap in Cuba. 
Reggue/(>11. ho,,·e, ·cr. is much more commercially viable than hip-hop and more easily 
so ld to yo ung Ii stencrs. Ra ppers who have begun to experiment with the genre attract 
the deri s ion 01 · nearl y e,·cry underground rapper, who accuse them of selling out, 
watering dO\vn their social critici sm in order to make themselves more available to the 
internati onal market. 
Commerci a l rap draws upon other genres besides reggaeton in order to reach 
larger audiences and make their music more popularly successful. The Orishas were the 
first group to beg in mixing the ir music with Cuban salsa and are still the most 
commerciall y success ful g roup to come out of Cuba. This commercial adaptation of rap 
has not been limited only to C uban rap ' s musicality, but has also included rap 's political 
message as well. Geoffrey Baker points out that the group An6nimo Consejo 
epitomi zes the --rormula for success" in Cuban hip-hop with their characteristic slogan 
'• Hip hop , Revoluci6n!'" ' ·in that it appeals in equal measures to government officials 
and to forei gn hip hop aficionados." 130 Many rappers have attempted to copy the 
successful formula because they know it will increase their chances of being noticed 
and supported by the state , which in turn would increase their chances of international 
130 Baker (2005) 3 81 
61 
recognition. Many criticize the ACR for inspiring a commercialization of rap 's political 
message - increasingly, rappers began to compromise their direct social critiques in 
order to se ll their music . Political rap became trendy, losing much of its significance: 
one member of An6nimo Conse_jo remarks, '·many of them today keep saying 'Hip hop, 
Revo lucion 1• yet they can't read a book by Che or Malcolm X." 131 The insubstantial 
reproduction or Cuban hip-hop ·s political edge is limiting the Cuban hip-hop 
movement's ability to de line itself politically ; hip-hop· s political aspect became, for 
many rappers. something to be so ld to the government rather than a politically assertive 
statement. Some rappers, such as the group SBS (Sensational Boys of the Street) have 
eschewed po litically oriented lyrics altogether to gravitate towards music strictly made 
for dancing. winning them wide popularity and commercial success on the island (and 
the sco rn 01· countless underground groups). 
Desp ite the emergence of a commercial trend in Cuban hip-hop, many groups 
remained uncompromi sing ly ' ·underground," favoring ·'rap duro," rap with pointed 
soc ial critiques that dare to push the envelop of the acceptable. The more 
fundamentalist. '·underground" rappers reject commercialism and prefer to stay true to 
their role as the mouthpieces of the marginalized in Cuban society, pointing out the 
injustices they see on the island. In the verses below, the group Los Aldeanos (the 
Villagers) responds to the growing tide of political/commercial groups that choose to 
adopt An6nimo Consejo's slogan of '•hip-hop, revoluci6n! " 
A qui no todo es "hip hop, revoluci6n " c~mo parece 
Con /os MCs que se creen duros que es/an mas_flo;os que SBS 
13 1 Quoted in Baker (2005) 382 
62 
l ---I 
i\/.1 1chos son los r111e •s· in raz6n g1"i·1an " revo f uc,·o , n ,, 
l: 11 coda u 111ci6 11. iKnoran su profesi6n verdadera 
I !ere it· s not a ll ·•hip hop, revolution" like it seems 
\\'i th thosc I\ lCs who think they ·re tough but who ' re limper than SBS 132 
1-- - 1 
There a rc many \Yho fo r no reason cry " revo lution" 
In c ,·ery song. but they don ' t know the ir true profession 133 
By ·· true prn lcss ion ,"· Los Aldeanos refe r to the original status rappers he ld as 
the rcp rescnta ti,·cs or the marg ina li zed . That rol e now seems increasingly displaced by 
commercia l ra p. o ,·c rshado,vcd in the public consciousness by the visibility of 
commcrc ia li :1.ed rappers. 
/\ !tho ugh 11 0 1 0 11 th e /\C R' s roster, Los Aldeanos continue to produce their rap 
d 11ro out o r their homes. di s tributing the ir music by hand on homemade CD's. 134 To 
orga ni/.e per fo rmances. they appeal to the AHS, the institution which takes under its 
wing the gro ups tha t do not co mprise the list of elite rappers supported by the ACR, 
prov iding log isti ca l suppo rt fo r organizing concerts yet lacking the funding to provide 
rappers with sa la ri es or production equipment. While the aim of the ACR is to 
commerc ia l i7.e the g roups tha t comprise its roster, the AHS defines a different rol e for 
itse lf: ··explorar /os ni,·e!es 111c1s audaces y revolucionarios de un arte de vanguardia" 135 
(to ex plore the most audac ious and revolutionary levels of a vanguard art) . Claudia 
Espos ito . an AHS o ffi c ia l explains further, " [la A HS promueve] un arte dentro de la 
13 ~ BS is a co mm crc inll y ori e nted hip-hop g roup that was one of the first to mix hip•hop with traditi ona l 
Cuban mu sic. 
111 Baker (2005) 38 1 . 
111 Nei l, Morgan. 2007. "C uba n ra ppe r: Fig ht the injustice." CNN April 11 . 
http) /ww w.cn n.com/2007 / W O RLD/americas/04/ I I /c uba .rapper/ index.htm l?iref=newssearch 
m Bonill a (2007) 
63 
re,·olucion. clentrv de sus postuladospoliticos" 136 ([ti1 e AI-IS promotes ] an art w1· thm·  t h e 
revolution. ,vithin its political principles") . The AHS recogrn•z es h'1 p-h op , s po 11· t•1 ca 1 
function as a ,·anguard art, and supports socially conscious rappers in their efforts to 
participate in the re,·olution. promoting critical reflection on Cuban social reality and 
protecting rap from commercializing influences while the ACR retains 
commerciali/.ation as its main goal. 
Some ,,riters have depicted the instituti onaii zat ion of Cuban hip-hop as an effort 
to --exert I state I in 11 uence m ·er rap." 137 Indeed, the Cuban state has appropriated much 
nl' the Cuban rap mm·ernent's ability to define itself by usurping the movement 's 
leadership position s. attempting to establish rappers' dependency upon it as the sole 
pro,·ider 01· materials and concert space, and exercising subtle forms of censorship. 
1l o\\'ever. state co-optation cannot be reduced to a story of elite manipulation. Firstly, 
nationali/.ation ,,·as necess::i ry for the movement to grow and was nothing out of the 
ordinary ("all culture is nationali zed in Cuba'.138). Many rappers within the movement 
welcomed nationalization for they knew that it would lead to greater opportunities to 
produce and perform their music , as well as to legitimi ze the geme. In this way, state 
i11\'olvement ,,·as advocated for from the beginning. rather than simply imposed from 
the top down. Also. the idea of an intentional state co-optation is problematic given the 
fact that the institutions charged with the overseeing of rap have widely divergent 
agendas regarding the direction of the genre. The ACR seeks to promote rap as a 
116 Bonilla (2007) 
117 Neill (2007) 
138 Baker (2005) 396 
64 
commercia l venture while the AHS supports rappe rs ' an t·1 -commerc1· a1  stance an d see k s 
to protect them from commercial influences . These d"1 spara te  i•n tenti•o ns regar d.m g rap 
make it imposs ible to talk about state co-optation as a process carried out intentionally 
by a mono Ii thi c state . cvcrtheless, the incorporation of rap artists into state 
institutio ns too k. mvay much of Cuban hip-hop ' s political edge, for it ceased to have a 
political mice or it s m, n that could set itself at odds with official discourses. The 
politica l voice that Cuban hip-hop displayed in the late 1990s was undermined by the 
appropriation o r the Cuban hip-ho p movement" s leadership positions by government 
appointees as "cl I as the formation of a divis ion within the hip-hop community between 
commercial and amateur rappers. No longer of a unified community, the Cuban hip-
hop 111 ovc111ent strugg les to formulate a coherent definition of itself. Ruben Marin of 
Primera Hase says. '"toclm·fa no somos un genera, porque nosfajamos demasiado entre 
nosotros mi.1·11w.1· _\ ' eso nos clehilira·· 139 (" we are still not a genre because we fight too 
much amongst oursel ves and this weakens us" ). Indeed, "the official announcement of 
the 2005 lcstiva l states that ·the central objective of the competition will be the search 
for a national identity for the movement. " ' 140 According to journalist Marc Lacey, the 
2005 lcstiva l m:1s a fl o p and was cancelled the following year without an explanation. 
It would sec 111 then that the C uban hip-hop movement has begun to eschew notions of 
leader hip s ince the Cuban government began to meddle in the genre. The group 
J\n6nimo Conscjo. one of the most popular hip-hop groups in Cuba, display a banner 
that proclaims "'i Anarquia verde ya!" ("green anarchy now! ") Perhaps now that 
139 Cordero (2003). interview with Primera Base. 
1~ Baker(2005)374 
65 
leadership is chan-g-- ing hands at the highest level of c u b an government, C u b an h.1 p-
hop •s  political voice will once again find itself in the foreground as new ideas fi ll 
public debate. 
J\l'tcr it s institutionali zation , it is difficult to continue to talk about Cuban hip-
hop as a .. mm·cmcnt. " Movement implies unified direction and coherent vision both of 
' 
,,·hich arc now l:1cking in Cuban hip-hop. l lip-hop continues to be a vehicle for social 
critique for many rappers, mos t of which are underground, yel the original politically 
asserti\"l:. radical stance that electrified the crowd at the first Havana rap festival in 1995 
has been packaged and sold both to the institutions which support rappers on the island 
and to the international market abroad. Radical social critiques are still abundant at 
underground hip-hop shows, yet Baker points out that "observations directed internally 
towards the rap movement tend to engage audiences ' attention as much as externally 
directed social critiqucs.' ' 14 1 The hip-hop movement, now lacking unity, has turned to 
infi ghting- no one seems able to agree upon what the Cuban hip-hop movement is, or 
in what direction it is going. 
It would seem then that the co-optation of Cuban hip-hop is complete. The 
movement has been stripped of its independent leadership, divided into two 
fundamentally disagreeing camps, and obliged to supplicate government institutions for 
the permiss ion and support needed to perform their music . However, Cuban hip-hop 
arti sts do not define themselves as government employees, nor are they completely 
dependent on government institutions to support them in their quest to get their music 
14 1 Baker (2006) 226 
66 
heard. Cuban hip-hop artists are able to reach beyor1d Cuba's b or d ers m·  or d er t o acqui·r e 
the eq uipment. l'unding. and insp iration that in Cuba they find lacking. Such 
transnational tic s haYc been present in Cuban hip-hop since its beginnings on the island. 
1).1 /\dalbcrto. the founder ol"thc local de la J\lfona, took advantage of his connections 
abroad to garner .. the most extensive and up-to date rap collection in Havana," 142 which 
he shared " ·ith all the patron s of' hi s club. C uban hip-hop 's beoinninos of course were 
b b ' ' 
the product or those transnational tics. The best example of a tie that Cuban hip-hop 
has been able to est;.1hlish with the world beyond C uba's shores is its connection with 
the !~lad: August collccti , ·c. an organization that seeks to "draw connections between 
radical black acti, ·ism and hip-hop culture." 143 Black August has organized fundraising 
concerts in Ne\\ York. the hcnclits or which have been distributed to Cuban hip-hop 
artists so th ;.1t they may he ab le to continue to make their activist music even while the 
g<)\'crnmcnt has declined to offer them support. In this way, Cuban hip-hop artists are 
able to take ad,·;.rntagc or alternative possibilities presented by transnational connections 
and a\·oid \\·holcsalc co-optation by the Cuban state. 144 
Conclusions 
Rap is di stinguished in Cuba from other popular art forms by its political 
asscrti\'C stance. I lip-hop emerged in Cuba as a response to experiences of displacement 
and marginali za tion felt in the Afro-Cuban community during the Special Period. Afro-
Cubans were more acutely affected by the drastic economic changes that took place on 
11 ~ I lcrnanclc1: and Garofalo ( 1999) 23 
11 1 Fernandes (2006) 5 8 I 
111 Fernandes (2006) 604 
67 
the island in the early I 990s, yet found themselves deprived of a political voice that 
they could have used to speak out and draw attention to their dire situation which was 
' 
largely ignored by government officials. The Afro-Cuban community found their 
political voice through hip-hop. Hip-hop became a gravitational center for marginalized 
/\fro-Cubans. providing an alternative to popular (negative) Cuban conceptions of 
blackness. thereby creating affordable spaces for socialization, and a forum to discuss 
social ills and injustices prevalent in Cuban society. ln coming together within the Afro-
Cuhan community. hip-hop artists were successful in raising public awareness about the 
unacknowledged racism that continued to plague the island. Through hip-hop, the 
/\fro-Cuban community mobilized itself politically, independently from the Cuban 
state the Cuhan hip-hop movement was its own entity and did not necessarily align 
itself \\'ith gc)\'crnmcnt ideology. Hip-hop was the tool with which marginalized Afro-
Cuhans \\'ere able to carve out their own political niche in Cuba when previously they 
had been ignored as a constituency. 
Cuban state officials recognized the political potential that the hip-hop 
movement had displayed, and responded by reaching out to the movement through 
promises of institutional support. Institutional support accomplished two things: one, it 
enabled Cuban hip-hop to develop into the most vibrant hip-hop scene in Latin America 
and , two. it brought the Cuban hip-hop movement into the government fold; rappers, no 
longer only independent artists, became dependent on government institutions for the 
capacity to produce and perform their music. Now with state officials occupying the 
positions of leadership within the hip-hop movement such as event organizers and 
68 
spokespeople. the Cuban hip-hop movement 110 longe r h as th e agency to 1·d  ent1· fy · 1t se lf 
politically on its own terms: successful and popular rappers are selected by the state, 
and these rappers arc only those who were deemed by state officials to be positive 
proponents or the Cuban revolution. Those rappers who were deemed subversive to 
government ideology often find their attempts to perform their music- both locally and 
internationally- undermined by state officials. However, Cuban hip-hop has resisted 
complete state co-optation by maintaining ties to international hip-hop culture, which 
has allo\\'ed it the autonomy to transcend the confines of the govenunent standard. 
Looking to the l'uturc, Cuban hip-hop may find itself at the edge of yet another 
major change in the course of its development. There has recently been speculation that 
the austere. unl"ricndl y relations between Cuba and the United States are at a political 
turning point. Recentl y, Vice President Joe Biden affirmed that "over the next decade 
and sooner there is likely to be. and needs to be, changes in the relationship between 
Cuba and the lJnitcd States." 145 President Barack Obama has already lifted traveling 
restrictions that previously denied Cuban emigrees the rights to travel to see their 
families more than once a year. If the long-standing political enmity between the 
United States and Cuba continues to thaw, it is possible that we may soon see the harsh 
economic restrictions that have been in place since the Cold War loosen. This could 
lead to expanded access to Cuba for American tourists and American business interests, 
as well as new market possibilities for rappers who wish to become professionals by 
14 5 c ave , D an d 1:_: _s  c h m1· dt , (-?009) ·'Obama to Loosen Restrictionson Policy with Cuba." 
April 7. 2009, The New York Tim es, Available at: 0 
http ://www .nytimes.com/2009/04/05/world/americas/05cuba.html?_ r= 1& scp= I &sq=obama 1/o20 
cuban%20cmbargo&st=cse 
69 
selling their music. It is difficult to predict exactly what will happen to the direction of 
Cuban hip-hop i r Americans should be granted access to the island, but it is very 
possible that Cuban hip-hop could experience a resurgence in popularity as rappers 
begin to !ind other avenues of support in American companies, thus able to reach larger 
audiences. This could lead to a greater commercialization of rap music in Cuba, but it 
will also loose n rappers Crom the political limitations they faced under the Cuban 
censure they arc subject to as members of state institutions. No longer dependent on 
Cuban institutions for support , their critiques could become more pointed without 
having to ,,·01-ry about losing their spot on an island record label's roster; an expansion 
or foreign interests in C uba could lead to expanded political freedoms for rappers, even 
v,:hile commercial , ·iability becomes the main aim of their projects. Whatever the case, 
Cuban hip-hop continues to be shaped by the social and economic circumstances that 
surround it. Shou ld these circumstances change in the coming years, Cuban hip-hop 
will take on a new direction as it finds new ways to engage social reality both inside 
Cuba and beyond its borders, carrying the Cuban hip-hop revolution's voice into the 
globa l izcd 21st century . In the words of Obsesi6n, 
Gue se sepan de Tokio hasta La Habana, 
E- sta es mi fo. rma de h acer nn1,s 1. ca cu b ana. 146 
Know it from Tokyo to Havana, 
This is how I make Cuban music. 
146 Ob • • "U t ' 1 de cosas" EGREM 2000. Fu ll lyrics available at: ses 1011 . n 111 011 01 • ' kl (?009) 
http ://www. la1·1· n·b 1·1 la.cu b awe b .cu /2002/1167 _ aa""o sto/1608 _ 67 •h tml Trans. M. Roo ' yn -
70 
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