LOSS OF
"BACKGROUND":
A PERCEPTUAL
THEORY
OF DISSOCIATION
Don Beere, Ph.D.
Don Beere, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of Clinical Training
in the Department of Psychology at Central Michigan
University, in Mount Pleasant, Michigan.
For reprints write Don Beere, Ph.D. Psychology Department,
Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859.
ABSTRACT
The present theory explains how specific dissociative reactions arise
for the first time during a traumatic experience. During dissocia-
tion, according to this theory, the perceptual background associated
with perception is lost or altered, creating "dysfunctional perceptu-
al organization" (Fine, 1988). Dissociative symptomatology maps
one to one with the background components of perceptual experience.
The hypothesized psychological mechanism leading to the loss of or
change in perception and, thus, to a change in background during
trauma, is perception focused on the threat. Focused perception lead-
ing to changes in background can occur spontaneously or inten-
tionally. Specific dissociative reactions hypothetically link to specif-
ic traumatic precipitants.
Ross (1989) writes that "[t]he field [of dissociation] lacks
an adequate theory or model" (p. 65). Similarly, Putnam
(1989) writes that "[a] lthough a number of theories or mod-
els exist that attempt to account for the genesis of one spe-
cific form [of dissociative disorder] , MPD, no theory has attempt-
ed to account for the range of forms that traumatically induced
dissociative disorders can take" (p. 23). This paper begins
the formulation of such a theory by consideringhow dissoci-
ation occurs. More specifically, the present theory attempts
to explain how, during a traumatic experience, the initial
specific dissociative reaction arises. Once trauma bound reac-
tions are understood, their enduring as dissociative symp-
toms following trauma can be established.
The Approach Taken in this Paper
This paper follows a phenomenologically-oriented
method of argumentation and grants conclusions developed
through phenomenological philosophy. To make the remain-
der of the paper more accessible to the phenomenological
novice, an orientation to this approach will follow, terms will
be defined and, then, the logical steps set forth in this paper
will be summarized.
From the phenomenological point of view, human expe-
rience is a living process and presents itself as a synthesized
whole. Abstractions, from the phenomenological point of
view, must be based on experience as it is experienced. The
abstract and the specific, or the conceptual and the con-
crete, can never be separated. This approach begins with
specific experiences that will open up as general concepts
and, finally, leads to an interweaving of the abstract and the
concrete.
Experience is always the starting point. Phenomenological
language attempts to remain faithful to experience as expe-
rienced and can often lead to awkward and unusual "Ian-
guaging." A few concepts clarified now will help with later
word usage. From a phenomenological point of view, the
world is not an objective reality. The world is inherently sub-
jective: people "live" in different subjective worlds-for exam-
ple, some live in a hopeful world while others live in a hos-
tile one. This implies that the consensually granted "objective"
world is a subjectively generated "construct." Thus, the phe-
nomenological term "lived-world" communicates not only
the inherently subjective nature of the experienced world
but the active way each person constitutes that world in con-
sciousness and lives it. Additionally, an "objective stimulus"
cannot be established phenomenologically because even a
pinpoint of light, a concrete sense datum, used in a classic
perception experiment possesses meaning for the experi-
mental subject. A " pinpoint of light in the overall experi-
mental context" is filled with meaning and cannot be stripped
of the subjective way it is experienced. To point out the sig-
nificance of context in establishing meaning, a similar pin-
point of light might be a star at night. Both pinpoints of light,
" objectively" the same, are experienced differently. To dis-
cuss anything requires isolating it conceptually; phe-
nomenologically, however, experience remains whole. It is
a living person, who brings his or her "unique lived-world"
to the experiment and sees the pinpoint of light.
Definitions
A distinction needs to be made between a dissociative
style of functioning leading to the diagnosis of a dissociative
disorder and the experience of discrete dissociative reac-
tions during a trauma.Dissociative experience is defined as the
experience of any dissociation-like experiences such as those
described in the D.SM-III-R(1987) or the SCID-D (Steinberg,
165
DISSOCIATION, Val. VIII. No, 3, September 1993
A PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF DISSOCIATION
1993). Experiencing one  s body as unreal is a dissociative
experience. Dissociative reaction is defined as a dissociative
experience during and in response to a trauma. Thus, expe-
riencing one s body as unreal during an earthquake would
be a dissociative reaction.Dissociative symptom is defined as
an enduring or repeated dissociative experience when no
apparent external trauma is occurring. Experiencing ones
body as unreal day to day when there are no external trau-
mas is a dissociative symptom. The literature asserts that trau-
ma is the cause of dissociative symptom (Putnam, 1989; Ross,
1989).
Overview of Fundamental Concepts from a
Phenomenological Perspective
This theory will explain dissociation initially occurring
during trauma. Later in this section, the discussion will start
from the familiar dissociative symptoms which are known to
the clinician, and then evolve to the experience which pre-
cedes those symptoms, dissociative reactions, These disso-
ciative reactions link conceptually to dissociative symptoms
through how those symptoms cluster into perceptual cate-
gories.
The next section begins by considering two issues con-
nected with dissociation: 1) dissociation as a result of trau-
ma; and 2) dissociative symptoms and dissociative reactions
as perceptual experiences. These perceptual experiences clus-
ter in categories which will later be defined as background
- I, mind, body, world and time.
The ensuing section considers perception phe-
nomenologically and reveals that, although perception of
figure-ground is both a dissociative and associative process,
it does not adequately explain dissociative reactions. Alterations
of the most basic organization of "normal" perception will
be shown to underlie the form of dissociative reactions: name-
ly, the ever-present background components (I, mind, body,
world, and time) are lost or degraded. Each background
component maps one to one to the perceptual categories
associated with dissociative disorders.
The subsequent section develops an understanding of
the dissociative process by exploring three experiential sit-
uations. In the case of a sudden and intense stimulus, per-
ception fixes on the "stimulus" while background percep-
tion drops out. In a second example, a startling "percept"
need not be "objectively" loud or painful, but can be sub-
jectively of such significance as to be startling. In a third
example, background can also drop out when stimulation
does not change (as in immobilization). Therefore, trau-
matic threat rivets perception such that background is lost
or changed and the person reacts dissociatively. Meaning
and the emotional significance of the situation contribute
to riveting perception on a threat.
In the final section, the perceptual process of focusing
on traumatic threat generates predictions about what kind
of traumatic situation might evoke a particular dissociative
reaction. For instance, derealization which is a change in
the perception of the world would be driven by perception
focusing away from the world and drawn to another stimu-
lus - for example, physical pain. On the other hand, deper-
sonalization which is a change in the perception of one
self would derive from perception focusing away from the
self and toward some other percept - for example, a threat
in the world.
1) Dissociation and Trauma
All of the dissociative disorders have as precursors trau-
ma or extreme psychosocial stress 1987; Putnam,
1989; Ross, 1989), and it is assumed that a dissociative dis-
order itself occurs in response to trauma. The assumption
that dissociative experiencesstem from trauma requires empir-
ical demonstration. " If we accept the observation that many
dissociative reactions have their origin as an adaptive response
to overwhelming trauma, then we can inquire into why one
form of dissociative reaction occurs (or is chosen) over anoth-
er form for a particular traumatic precipitant" (Putnam, 1989,
p. 23). Putnam asks why a particular dissociative reaction
occurs in response to a particular traumatic situation. The
present theory begins to answer this question. One might
start by looking for regularities in dissociative experience.
Such regularities can be found in the specific categories of
perceptual experience which comprise dissociative symptoms.
2) Dissociative Reactions and Dissociative Symptoms as
Perceptual Experience
Although this theory focuses on dissociative reactions
during trauma and not dissociative symptoms, eventually a
comprehensive theory of dissociation will need to adequately
explain how dissociative reactions link to dissociative symp-
toms. The author assumes that dissociative symptoms are dis-
sociative reactions which have persisted post-trauma.
Consequently, considering dissociative symptoms defines
implicitly the relevant domains for considering dissociative
reactions. As detailed in the following paragraph, dissocia-
tive symptoms are perceptual experiences. The author
assumes that dissociative symptomatic perceptual experiences
were originally dissociative perceptual reactions during trau-
ma. The perceptual characteristics of dissociative symptoms,
therefore, establish what specific perceptual experiences (in
other words, perceptual dissociative reactions) need to be
examined during trauma.
This paragraph summarizes the kinds of dissociative per-
ceptual experiences which occur as symptoms (according to
theDSM-III-R, 1987) . Psychogenic amnesia involves some kind
of memory loss. Amnesia is included here for completeness
but will be excluded from the theory since amnesia is an out-
come of trauma and not a perceptual experience at the time
of trauma. Psychogenic fugue entails a loss of or change in
identity, while multiple personality disorder involves multi-
ple identities, usually with amnesias across some personali-
166
DISSOCIATION,No. 3.
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ties. Depersonalization disorder entails feeling unreal, expe-
riencing one body or extremities as changing size, perceiving
one body from outside or anesthetic, experiencing oneself
as mechanical or in a dream, and not controlling body or
speech. During derealization, perception changes so that
the external world appears unreal, the shape or size of objects
changes and others might be perceived as dead or mechan-
ical. As well, the experience of time commonly changes. People
have the subjective sense that it is difficult to remember or
find recollection slowed. These symptoms are ego-dystonic
and reality testing remains intact.
Considering this list of symptoms, two conclusions are
pertinent to the present paper: 1) all dissociative symptoms
(except amnesia) are perceptual experiences; 2) the per-
ceptual changes cluster in the following domains: identity,
mind, world, body, and time. Therefore, perception of iden-
tity,mind, world, body, and time establish the kinds of dis-
sociative perceptual reactions that need to be considered to
develop a theory of dissociation during trauma.
In summary, currently there is no theory of dissociation
and there is no explanation of why particular dissociative
reactions occur in response to particular traumatic precipi-
tants. Traumatic situations are assumed to be the cause of
dissociation. The assumption that dissociative reactions
become dissociative symptoms directs the exploration to ini-
tial dissociative reactions during trauma. Lastly, dissociative
symptoms cluster in specific perceptual domains: identity,
mind, body, world, and time. Examining the impact of trau-
ma on these perceptual domains focuses the inquiry.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO DISSOCIATION
Overview
This section provides a phenomenological perspective
on perception. While perceiving figure/ground can be con-
sidered both dissociative and associative, this conceptualization
does not explain dissociative reactions. Merleau-Ponty (1962)
establishes that all perceptual experience includes percep-
tion of I, mind, body, world, and time --- the same perceptu-
al domains in which dissociative symptoms and dissociative
reactions cluster. These domains are collectively defined as
the perceptual background. Dissociation involves a change
in how background domains are perceived. Additionally, these
background domains have a relationship to dissociative dis-
orders.
Figure-Ground Perception
Fine (1988) asserts that the cognitions evidenced by DIDs
are tied to an underlying dysfunctional perceptual organi-
zation. "I propose that a dysfunctional perceptual organiza-
tion underlies their [MPDs] often disjointed cognitions and
affects and is, therefore, at the origin of their distorted per-
ceptions of reality.... some Gestalt perceptual organizing
principle subtends initially cognition and then affect" (p. 5).
The most elemental Gestalt principle is the organizing of
perception into figure and ground: The figure iswhat is per-
ceived, and the ground surrounds yet recedes "behind" the
figure. An example of this phenomenon is the vase illusion,
an ambiguous drawing which looks either like a vase or like
two faces in profile. When the vase is the figure, the other
parts of the drawing recede behind it; when the two profiles
are the figure the "vase" part recedes behind them. Any "object"
of perception follows this same principle: the sound ofa car,
a tree to the side of the lawn, or an itch on the arm.
Beere (in press), in a more comprehensive exposition
of this theory, has argued that the process of perception is
itself both an associative and dissociative process: a figure is
a meaningful association of perceptual "input" which is, simul-
taneously, dissociated from the ground. Though useful in a
preliminary way to understanding dissociation, this under-
standing does not explain dissociative reactions, such as alter-
ations in body size or experiencing the world as unreal. That
a figure is dissociated from the ground (such as, "body" or
"world") does not explain why this specific figure is experi-
enced dissociatively (for example, the body getting larger or
objects becoming two dimensional). Dissociative percepts
remain figure/ground percepts. Consequently, a different
approach to perception is necessary to explain dissociation.
The next section presents a broad, phenomenological
focus on perception in general, describes how it is inher-
ently organized, and provides the first step in explaining dis-
sociative reactions during trauma.
Changes in Perceptual Organization Underlies
Dissociative Reactions
Everyday experience as well as phenomenological phi-
losophy link invariant perceptual components with figure-
ground perception. Merleau-Ponty persuasively argues for
the primacy of perception in The Phenomenology of Perception
(1962) and proposes the following essential components of
experience.
First, there is always an "I" who "perceives" the "figure"
in a "ground." Second, the "I" always finds itself located in
a "mind." Wherever there is a mind, there is an associated
body; wherever there is an embodied person, there is an
associated mind. Thus, third, "I" am in a body. In phe-
nomenological language, "I am embodied." Fourth, myembod-
iment is in the world. The "world " is not an objective reali-
ty but a subjective one which is meaning-filled and
phenomenologically termed the "lived-world. " Fifth, all
experience, all perception occurs in and over time: the pre-
sent moment comes from a past which leads to a future.
Consider again the vase illusion. A subject in a percep-
tion experiment perceives a vase shifting to profiles and back
again. The experience as experience is ostensibly watching
the illusion. However, this switching of figure and ground
happens in the context of the "background," an integrated
167
DISSOCIATION. Ibl VIM NB. 3.September 1995
A PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF DISSOCIATION
set of perceptual experiences
usually ignored. Describing
the experience of the back-
ground in the first person, "I"
(in this " embodied" " mind" )
watch the vase change into
two profiles. The whole expe- Component Lost
rience occurs in the overall con- or Changed
text of my lived-world, though
it takes place in this particular
laboratory. Time marks out "I "
this experience: I arrived here
a short time ago, saw the vase
a moment ago and see the two Body
profiles now and will leave
later. "I" "take" my "body,"
" mind" and " lived-world" with
me when I leave. From a more
abstract point of view, the sub-
ject identity, mind, body,
lived-world and time continue perceptually as peripheral or
background components of the situation, whether the illu-
sion is perceived as a vase or two faces. The background com-
ponents existed for the subject before the experiment and
will persist after the experiment. On leaving the building
where the experiment took place, I hear the sound of a car,
see a tree to the side of the lawn as I take my first step on the
sidewalk, and feel an itch on my arm. Each new percept (the
sound, the sight and the itch) occurs within the greater con-
text of the background: I, having this mind and this body,
in this lived world, perceive, over time, this sound (car) , then
this sight (tree) and next this sensation (itch). Note that the
background is experientially distinct from the ground which
links to yet recedes behind the perceptual figure. The car
sound (figure) stands out from other sounds (ground); the
tree (figure) stands out from the lawn (ground); and the
itch (figure) stands out from the arm (ground). My aware-
ness centers on the figure, peripherally notes the ground
and ignores the background (I, mind, body, world and time) .
The background is ever-present, yet seldom noticed. Like
lights being on in a room, the background is taken for grant-
ed and not given much notice until it changes.
These five components comprise a framework for per-
ceptual experience and, this underlying organization of per-
ceptual experience as figure-ground-background is taken for
granted. The term " background, " as distinct from ground, defines
ever-present components of the perceptual framework. Experience
generally presents itself whole: I, having this mind, in this
body, in this world, all of which are in time, perceive this fig-
ure in this ground.
What is figure, ground and background can interchange.
Thus, I could focus perception on the passage of time, sen-
sations in my body or how I experience myself. Each focus
yields a unique figure (a temporal one, a bodily one or a
168
Fugue; Multiple Personality Disorder
Depersonalization; Amnesia
Depersonalization (Disembodiment)
Derealization
Changes in experienced time (Detemporalization)
mental one). The rest of the background, however, remains
constant. Perceiving figures in any one of the background
components does not change how that component is per-
ceived. For example, perceiving a chair in a room (a specif-
ic percept in the world) does not change the basic sense of
this occurring in my lived-world.
Recognizing the presence of the background in perception
clarifies what happens during dissociation. Components of
the background are lost or lose their constancy. People deper-
sonalize and lose the "I"who perceives, or lose "their minds."
People derealize and lose the reality of their body or of the
surrounding world. People lose time. In other words,during
dissociation, the background is lost or loses constancy. The lived-
integration of the perceptual organization, figure-ground-
background, constitutes meaningful lived-experience and
the rupture of this lived-integration makes dissociative expe-
rience bizarre. This might be what Fine (1988) is referring
to with the phrase "dysfunctional perceptual organization":
The perceptual background, which establishes the mean-
ingful context for a percept, is lost, and the usual way per-
ception is organized into figure-ground-background becomes
dysfunctional. Specific dysfunctional ways of perceiving the
background link directly to different dissociative reactions
and symptoms.
Dissociative reactions and symptomatology map one to
one with changes in perception of the background compo-
nents of experience. (See Table 1.) Amnestic disorders will
not be considered in this paper since memory loss occurs
after and not during the traumatic situation. Fugue and
Dissociative Identity Disorder both involve alterations in iden-
tity; the "I" component of the background is lost or changed.
Depersonalization disorders pertain to unusual mental expe-
rience; the "mind" aspect of the background is lost or changed.
The person might feel unreal or as if in a dream. Depersonali-
Mind
World
Time
TABLE 1
Relationship Between Loss of or Change in the Specific Component of the
Perceptual Background and Dissociative Diagnosis
Dissociative Disorder
DISSOCW170N. Vol. VIll. No. 3.5eptemher 1995
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zation also can stem from disembodiment or alterations in
perception of the body, another component of the back-
ground. The body, for example, might seem to change size.
Disembodiment has not been differentiated from "mental"
dissociative experiences (DSM111-R, 1987) and, thus, is con-
sidered depersonalization within the usual nosological sys-
tem. Derealization involves alterations in perception of the
world, yet another background component. The world, for
example, might appear unreal or objects might become larg-
er or smaller than usual. Changes in the experience of time
are frequent companions to dissociative disorders and reac-
tions; time is the last component of the background. Time
can, for example, slow down or speed up.
In summary, the perceptual background includes all the
elements which eventually become dissociative reactions and
dissociative symptoms. Amnesia, a post hoc"symptom," has
been excluded since the theory cannot explain an experi-
ence occurring post-trauma which is, in addition, non-per-
ceptual. The perceptual background, therefore, has a strong
connection with dissociative reactions and dissociative symp-
toms. Loss of or change in background, however engendered,
leads to a dissociative experience (reaction or symptom).
The next section will focus on how the perceptual process
during trauma constitutes experience in this dissociated fash-
ion.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
OF THE DISSOCIATIVE PROCESS
Overview
It would seem that, as Fine (1988) has observed, disso-
ciation does indeed relate to some kind of dysfunctional per-
ceptual organization and this dysfunction pertains to a loss
of or change in perception of the background. During trau-
ma, perception focuses on the threat, blocks out background
components and, thus, evokes dissociative experience. The
next three sections discuss specific experiential situations
which can lead to loss of background: 1) a sudden, intense
stimulus, 2) significance of the stimulus as subjective threat,
and 3) no change in stimulation.
1) A Sudden, Intense Stimulus
Ordinary experience flows. It continually shifts and
changes. Many dissociative experiences freeze time. An
intense, sudden stimulus, such as an explosion, a flash of
light or a sudden pain freezes time and"dissociates" the per-
cept. The sudden, intense stimulus interrupts the smooth
flow of experience and immediately "glues" perception to
the stimulus. Only the stimulus is in awareness at that
moment. The explosion momentarily fills awareness. The
context is temporarily lost: for a short time, perception of
the body or the sense of self might be lost. The startling and
intense stimulus is split off experientially from the ordinary
flow of perceptual experience. The passive voice is appro-
priate here since the experience is that perception is "pulled"
to the stimulus, instead of intentionally focusing to it.
It is as if the intense focus on the sudden stimulus leads
to a consequent and reflexive loss of perception of the back-
ground. An exclusive and narrow perception of a figure
becomes a paradigm for how background is lost.
2) Subjective Threat
"Intensity" neednot equate to "objectively" loud, bright,
or painful. A childwho respects and loves both parents would
experience a parent passionate, though clothed embrace
with an unknown lover, intensely and subjectively disturb-
ing. This situation could be experienced subjectively as an
"explosion," similar to a sudden and intense stimulus.
Perception will engage a situation, then, based on its signif-
icance to the perceiver.
3) No Change in Stimulation
Dissociation of the body or the dissolving of perception
of the world, for example, can occur when the stimulus does
not change. To perceive frequently requires changing stim-
ulus input. Thus, while driving long distances, when I do not
move my arms, they disappear as percepts. When I move
them or tighten the muscles, my arms reappear as percepts.
Clients sometimes actively work to immobilize the body or
to look at one spot, and, thus, to dissolve the perception of
the body or of the visual world. This experiential situation
points out that dissociation does not solely result from an
automatic response to trauma but can also be consciously
engendered by restricting perception and, thus, blocking
out the background.
Synthesis
The previous discussion can be synthesized to yield two
paradigms: 1) a general paradigm for dissociation and 2) a
specific paradigm for trauma-induced dissociation.
1) General Paradigm for Dissociation
Three issues are salient from the earlier sections. First,
a sudden and intense figure can intrude into and dominate
perception. Second, the significance of a figure to the per-
ceiver can be emotionally charged and impact the individ-
ual much like a sudden and intense figure. Third, an exclu-
sive and narrow focus of perception can exclude background
perception and lead to dissociative experience. In all cases,
dissociation occurs since the figure becomes an exclusive focus and
the background fades or changes. This, then, is the
for dissociation.
2) Specific Paradigm for Traumatic Dissociation
Many traumas possess the characteristic of being sud-
den, intense and, by definition, subjectively threatening. When
an event possesses these characteristics, perception focuses
on the sudden threat and background components are not
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DlSSOCLLTION, Vol. VIII, No. . September 1995
A PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF DISSOCIATION
perceived. In other words, loss of background is a plausible
consequence of a sudden, traumatic threat. Clearly the trau-
ma need not be "objectively" intense or sudden.What is nec-
essary to elicit a trauma-induced dissociative reaction is a threat of
sufficient severity to engage perception so that background compo-
nents are lost. If perception in a traumatic situation is riveted to a
threat, then the threat becomes an exclusive focus of perception and
the background fades or changes.This, then, isthe specific paradigm
for a dissociative reaction during trauma.
Based on the perceptual process leading to trauma-evoked
dissociative reactions, different kinds of traumatic conditions
can be linked to specific dissociative reactions. The follow-
ing section clarifies those connections and makes specific
predictions about which dissociative reactions arise from spe-
cific traumatic situations.
HYPOTHETICAL PRECIPITANTS OF
DISSOCIATIVE REACTIONS
The perceptual process which leads to the loss ofor change
in background components during trauma is a focused per-
ception on what is threatening.In a traumatic situation, when
the locus of threat is in one domain of the background, that domain
is NOT perceived dissociatively; it would not be subject to a disso-
ciative reaction. In a traumatic situation, background domains which
do not contain a threat might be blocked out; background domains
which do not contain threats are likely to manifest dissociative reac-
tions. However, there are violations of this general principle
which will be discussed later. The following sections discuss
characteristics of dissociative reactions: 1) complexity and
psychological demand, 2) frequency of dissociative reaction,
3) detemporalization, 4) derealization, 5) depersonalization,
6) disembodiment, and 7) loss of or change in identity.
1) Complexity and Psychological Demand
An alter personality, while dissociative, is a psychologi-
cally complex event that probably did not occur from a sin-
gle trauma nor without substantial preparatory experience
and psychological mediation. An alteration in time involves
changes in the perception of sequences of events as they
occur, a more immediate response which would seem to require
less complex psychological processing than that required
for alter creation. These two kinds of dissociative reactions
are at the extreme in terms of complexity: creating the alter
is very complex while changes in time are less complex. This
speaks to relative complexity. It does not suggest that changes
in the experience of time are not complex experiences. In
addition, these two kinds of dissociative reaction are at the
extreme in terms of what they demand psychologically from
the traumatized individual; creating the alter demands more
psychologically, while changes in time demand less. The author
hypothesizes that more severe trauma will evoke the most
complex dissociative reactions; they place greater psycho-
logical demands on the victim.
170
2) Frequency of Dissociative Reaction
The field of dissociation needs an exploratory study of
the precise kinds of dissociative reactions people report, what
kinds of trauma precipitate what kinds of dissociative reac-
tions, and what kinds of dissociative reactions cluster togeth-
er. The author hypothesizes that, in a random sampleof dis-
sociative reactions occurring in the general population, the
more complex and psychologically demanding symptoms
will occur less frequently, and the less complex and psycho-
logically demanding symptoms will occur more frequently.
The order of the frequency of dissociative reactions (Table
2) has, in part, been established empirically (Beere, 1992 
1993). Clearly, the hypothesized frequencies are preliminary
and subject to empirical validation. A sample of 189 college
students (70 males, 109 females, and 10 gender unknown;
average age-19.3) reported having experienced one or
more traumas (81 reported one trauma, 47 reported two
traumas, 20 reported three traumas, and 41 reported four
or more traumas) . Students reported whether they had expe-
rienced 15 specific dissociative reactions during trauma. The
percentage of students reporting a particular category of dis-
sociative reaction is listed in Table 2. The results are con-
sistent with the predictions made by the theory. The remain-
der of this section presents the theoretical explanation for
the ordering of the dissociative reactions and connects that
explanation to the obtained frequencies.
Disembodiment or changes in the experience of the body
during trauma are reported least frequently (12%). Since
the body is a stable and consistent source of perceptual input,
it is a perceptual "constant" resistant to change. To experi-
ence a change in the size or shape of the body requires a
marked alteration in perceptual processing. Greater "force"
is needed to alter perception of the body than perception
of the mind which is more fluid - especially when the body
is active and not immobilized or passive.
The frequency that traumatized subjects report dereal-
ization or changes in perception of the world (24%) ranks
between disembodiment (12%) and depersonalization or
alterations in the experience of the mind (36%). The world
is a source of consistent and reliable sensory input. Body-
related perception in comparison to world-related percep-
tion does not involve the processing of inconsistencies like
those found in world-related perception. Perception of the
"world," in contrast to perception of "mind," would remain
more stable or resistant to change. Continual processing of
the incongruities inherent in perception of the world result
in size and color constancy. For example, shadowed colors
(say of the carpet) tend to be seen as the same as unshad-
owed colors (say of shadowed areas of the carpet) despite
differences in hue. As a further example, close and distant
telephone poles are perceived as the same height despite
marked differences in the length of their "stimulus sources."
Distant objects which stimulate small areas of the retina are
perceived equal in size to objects which stimulate larger areas.
DISSOCIATION. Vol. VIII.No. 3,September 1995
BEERE
TABLE 2
Hypothetical Characteristics of Traumatic Precipitants Evoking Specific Dissociative Reactions
Complexity/
Demand
Percent
Subjects
Reporting
Dissociative
Reaction or
Symptomatology
Background
Component
Lost/Changed
Most
12%
23%
MPD or Fugue
Disembodiment
Detemporalization
Loss of or change
in the " I" : Alter self
Loss of or change
in body
Time stops
Moderate 24%
33%
36%
Derealization
Detemporalization
Depersonalization
Loss of or change
in world
Time speeds up
Loss of or change
in mind
Least 45%
57%
Detemporalization Time loss
Time slows
171
Perceptual
Focus
1. Horrifying acts (possibly forced)
2. Horrifying intentions
1. Anticipated bodily injury
2. Anticipated trauma
3. Immobilization
4. Massive external threat
5. Startling, intense pain
Startling (sudden, intense) trauma
1. Startling (sudden, intense)
trauma
2. Exclusive perception of the mind;
strong emotion
3. Bodily pain
Non-specificand non-startling threat
1. Strong emotions
2. Bodily pain
3. World threat
4. Anticipated (world) threat
Not explained by this theory -
associated with amnesia
Trauma extends over time;
anticipation of trauma
DISSOCIATION, Vol. VIII,1No.3. Septrmber 1995
A PERCEPTUAL THEORYOF DISSOCIATION
Perception of the world involves the active processing of incon-
gruities which results in perceived regularities. In phe-
nomenological language, this perceptual process points to
the constituting character of consciousness - experience is
constructed (constituted) in consciousness. World-related
perception, though experientially consistent, involves the
continual processing of inconsistencies. The empirical rank-
ing of body-related dissociative reactions as less frequent,
world-related dissociative reactions as next most frequent,
and mind-related dissociative reactions as more frequent makes
sense after considering what is involved in perceiving each
background domain. The results accord with the basic logic
of the theory.
3) Detemporalization
Detemporalization (see Table 2) is not unitary, in con-
trast to the expectations of the author, and will be discussed
before the other dissociative reactions. Time speeding up
and stopping require additional explanatory steps. Preliminary
data (Beere, 1992 1993) indicate that time stopping occurs
least frequently (23% of the subjects report this dissociative
reaction during trauma) while time speeding up was more
frequent (33% of the subjects report this dissociative reac-
tion). Time loss was even more frequent (45% of the sub-
jects report this dissociative reaction), and time slowing was
most frequent (57% of the subjects report this dissociative
reaction). Making the assumption that these changes in the
experience of time are statistically independent, a chi square
comparing their frequency (chi square=52.16, df=3, p-.000)
indicates that their rate of occurrence is significantly differ-
ent. The author assumes that the kind of detemporalization
is a function of the kind of trauma.
"Time" cannot be considered a simple background
dimension. The remainder of this section explains how the
experience of time shifts according to this theory: first, gen-
eral comments on the passage of time, next time slowing,
then time speeding up, time stopping, and lastly, time loss.
The passage of time. The background is peripherally perceived
and "tracked" coincidentwith figure-ground perception. There
is, as it were, a certain base rate amount of perceptual "infor-
mation" continually monitored which constitutes the "nor-
mal" experience of time for an individual. Experienced time
involves tracking ongoing perceptual changes in the figure,
ground and background. For example, I sit quietly watch-
ing the river (visual figure). I note the river  s flow and the
ripples on the surface (visual figure) and hear the burble
from unseen rocks downstream (auditory world background) .
Periodically, I swallow, shift my position slightly and some-
times notice my breath and my eyes (body background). I
am non-verbally aware that I feel at peace (mind background) .
Occasionally a marshy smell (olfactory world background)
comes with a breeze I feel against my left cheek (world and
body background). Though relatively static, "watching the
172
river" involves a plethora of changing percepts in figure,
ground and background. Tracking these changing percepts
generates the experience of time-that "watching the river"
took place over time.
Time slowing. What happens when time slows? According to
this theory, time slows (see Table 2) if perceptual input is
limited to the figure. If an anticipated threat in the world
becomes the perceptual focus, then the background com-
ponents are perceived less focally or not at all. Taking the
extreme situation to make the point, if all perceptual input
stems from the threat, none comes from the background.
Since the experience of the "normal" passage of time involves
tracking perceptual input from figure, ground and back-
ground, perceiving only the threat "expands" or "slows" the
subjective experience. There is, in effect, "less" happening
perceptually over the same "objective time" and, thus, time
is experienced more slowly. Before the accident, for exam-
ple, while visually tracking the oncoming car (perception
focusing on threat in the world), time slows down. Since
restricting the focus of perception is, according to this the-
ory, the cause of dissociative reactions in general, time slow-
ing should be the most frequent time-related dissociative
reaction. This is supported by the data.
Time speeding up. Time speeds up (see Table 2) when the
threatening situation demands attentive perception to all
aspects of the perceptual context: figure, ground, and back-
ground. In this situation, there is more perceptual input than
usual (thoughts, sensations, sights, sounds, and so on) and,
as a result, "more" is happening perceptually during the same
"objective time period" and, thus, experienced time seems
faster. This is described in Table 2 as "non-specific and non-
startling threat." In other words, the threat is not focused
and requires wide and attentive deployment of perception.
As an example, an adequate but not outstanding piano stu-
dent, who comes from a competitive family of professional
musicians, finds that time moves fast during his piano lessons
with a demanding and critical teacher. The student must pay
close attention to all aspects of the situation (thoughts, body,
the piano visually and auditorially, the score, and the teach-
er swords and non-verbal cues). As a result, "more is hap-
pening" than usual and time speeds up.
Time stopping. In contrast, the theory predicts that time stops
(see Table 2) with a sudden and intense trauma. Even though
a startling trauma will lead to a sharp perceptual focus on
the threat, it momentarily freezes time. Since experienced
time involves tracking changing perceptual input, time
would stop when perception of " input" does not change.
This occurs when a sudden and startling trauma affixes per-
ception to the threat. In other words, the suddenness of the
trauma interrupts the natural flow of perception and leads
to the experience that time stops.
DISSOCLIT ION, Vol.VIII, No. 3.Seplenber l ll5
BEERE
Loss of time. Loss of time (see Table 2) is yet to be explained
adequately, in part because it involves amnesia for prior expe-
rience. The present theory does not attempt to explain amne-
sia.
4) Derealization
Derealization, loss of or change in the world background
(see Table 2) , would occur when perception focuses on non-
world components. The rationale derives from the more gen-
eral explanation of how dissociative reactions occur at the
time of a trauma. If perception focuses on bodily pain, it will
lead to loss of or change in the other background compo-
nents and, thus, lead to changes in the world-related back-
ground or derealization. Similarly, exclusive focus on "inter-
nal" events (such as strong emotions) would lead to
derealization.
A different kind of explanation is required to explain
why a startling trauma leads to derealization. Although this
appears to violate the general paradigm, the analysis leads
to the same conclusion: that background is lost or degrad-
ed. Perception fixes on the startling figure. In this situation
even though perception focuses on the world, other aspects
of the world are lost or changed since perception focuses
narrowly on the threat. Consequently, even though the threat
is in the world, the background characteristics of the world
are lost, leading to derealization.
5) Depersonalization
According to the theory, depersonalization (see Table
2) requires perceptual focus on body or world which will
exclude mind aspects of the background. Intense physical
pain (that has not been " numbed out" ) would focus per-
ception on the body, leading to depersonalization. Strong
emotions are experienced as physical sensations in the body;
to experience the emotion, perception focuses on the emo-
tions and this leads to depersonalization. Lastly, if a threat
appears in the world, perception focuses on the threat, lead-
ing to depersonalization.
6) Disembodiment
Disembodiment (see Table 2) requires focusing perception
away from the body. Consequently a massive external threat
will focus perception on the world. The rationale for the use
of the adjective "massive" is to distinguish this threat from
that evoking depersonalization. According to the theory, dis-
embodiment requires a trauma of greater severity than that
required for depersonalization. Furthermore, in contrast to
actual bodily injury, which is not theoretically linked to dis-
embodiment, anticipating bodily injury is linked theoreti-
cally to disembodiment. Repeating the logic once again, being
injured would focus perception on the body, while antici-
pating that injury would focus perception on the upcoming
injurious situation which focuses perception away from the
body. As discussed earlier, limiting bodily input through immo-
bilization would lead to disembodiment.
Finally, as with a startling external trauma, startling and
intense pain, so long as it does not physiologically become
numb, will violate the general paradigm for dissociation yet
lead to dissociation. The rationale is identical to that made
for external trauma. Perception focuses exclusively on the
pain and perception of the body-background is lost or degrad-
ed.
7) Loss of or Change in the "I"
From the author perspective, this is the most specula-
tive aspect of the theory and is not entirely consistent with
the overall formulation previously presented since it does
not involve background. The question to be answered is "What
are the circumstances which force the loss of identity and
the creation of a second?" The hypothetical answer to this
question (see Table 2) is that real world events put the per-
son in a situation in which actions must be taken yet "can-
not" be performed by the current self. Preliminary support
comes from research on switching (Beere, 1992a) . Thus, hor-
rifying acts, totally inconsistent with ones current identity,
would lead to an alter self. Note that "horrifying" is defined
by the self-concept. Thus, someone diagnosed with fugue
finds spontaneity a necessity yet the prior identity cannot
express those needs and impulses and finds them horrify-
ing. The author believes that many children who become
DID are forced to act in ways that are totally identity-discrepant;
to engage in identity-discrepant actions requires a new iden-
tity. Finally, it is unclear to the author whether action is nec-
essary for a change in identity or whether intentions which
are horrifyingly self-discrepant are sufficient to evoke a change
in identity.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Traumatic situations are seldom as clear-cut as the pre-
sent theory postulates. Most real life traumas will involve a
profusion of events leading to a dissociative reaction. The
present theory attempts to differentiate aspects of that com-
plex response. In general, then, traumatic dissociative reac-
tions will be mixed across background domains.
The prior analysis clarifies four conceptual distinctions
necessary to develop a comprehensive theory of dissociation:
1) perception, 2) identity, 3) memory, and 4) emotion. How
these four issues differentiate and interrelate is not clear.
1) Perception. As emphasized in the present theory, dissoci-
ation can be an immediate perceptual reaction to trauma.
The immediate perceptual response needs to be differenti-
ated from and, then, connected to dissociative symptoms.
What are the interrelationships between dissociative reac-
tions, dissociative symptoms, and dissociative defenses?
2) Identity. Although the present theory posits an explana-
173
DISSOCIATIO\,1'01,1711, No.. September 1915
A PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF DISSOCIATION
Lion for alterations in identity (such as alter personalities),
it is apparent that identity and immediate perceptual reac-
tions are different kinds of psychological processes. The cre-
ation of new identities and dissociative perceptual reactions
seem to be different psychological phenomena and, thus,
require different explanations.
3) Memory. An apparent omission in this theory pertains to
alterations of memory. Amnesia is a major diagnostic symp-
tom for dissociative disorders. Amnesia, however, is a post
hoc symptom which follows a trauma. The present. theory
attempts to explain dissociative reactions during trauma. What
particular dissociative reactions during trauma, what char-
acteristics of the trauma itself and what personal character-
istics of the traumatized individual link to amnestic seque--
lae? How do the changes in perceptual organization,
particularly loss of background components, relate to hyper-
mnesia and amnesia in particular?
4) Emotions.The role of emotions is ambiguous. Emotions
involve simultaneously cognition (mental), physiological reac-
tions (bodily), and interpreted external events (world) . Are
emotions simply an aspect of an individuals response to trau-
ma which also evokes the dissociative reaction?
This theory posits that a dissociative reaction is the result
of narrow perceptual focusing during trauma. Consequently,
the dissociative reaction during trauma does not function
as a psychological defense. Although this conclusion appears
inconsistent with current thinking about dissociation, the
theory pertains to reactions and not symptoms. We still must
address many questions. How do those reactions become
integrated as a dissociative style of functioning? How does
dissociation become a defense? What are the circumstances,
either of the trauma or the individual, that are associated
with dissociative reactions persisting after the trauma and
becoming symptoms? How does this kind of perceptual learn-
ing come about? How do dissociative reactions, emotion,
and amnesia interrelate? What are the conditions associat-
ed with either learning or not learning a dissociative style of
perceiving?
The theory appears to have merit as a preliminary con-
ceptualization of dissociation during trauma, but requires
evidence for substantiation and elaboration. It should be
apparent also that this theory does not purport to explain
all dissociative phenomena. Initially, the theory focuses nar-
rowly on dissociative reactions during trauma. However, the
hypothesized mechanism, a narrowing of perception which
affects perception of the background, can be extended to
non-traumatic situations such as intentional dissociation and
dissociation during positive situations. Nonetheless, it is not
the purpose of the author to explain all dissociative phe-
nomena with this theory. The theory will undoubtedly need
to be modified, clarified and extended as evidence is gath-
ered. Hopefully, in appealing to both experience and evi-
174
dence, the theory can initiate a more focused and differen-
tiated grounding of dissociation. 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author thanks Catherine Fine, Ph.D., for her invaluable edi-
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nomenologists."
DISSOCIATION. Vol. VIII. No. 3. September 1995