PUZZLING OVER
POSSESSION:
COMMENTS ON
DISSOCIATION ARTICLES
ON POSSESSION
Adam Crabtree, Ph.D.
Adam Crabtree, Ph.D., is a Supervisory Therapist at the Centre
for Training in Psychotherapy in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
For reprints write Adam Crabtree, Ph.D., Centre for Training
in Psychotherapy, 316 Dupont Street, Toronto, Ontario.
ABSTRACT
Comments on the preceding papers on possession are made from a
clinical/historical point of view. A definition of `possession "is pro-
posed based on a phenomenological approach. Categories of posses-
sion likely to be encountered by North American clinicians are list-
ed and commented on. The proposed DSM-IVdiagnosis of possession
is viewed as promising, but the present formulation is considered to
be weak. Coon's call for interdisciplinary communication and coop-
eration is seconded. Acceptance of the new diagnostic category is
supported despite the fact that some may misuse its recognition.
Evaluations of the dangers of exorcism applied to MPD cases made
by Fraser and Bowman are appreciated. Bowman's total rejection
of any consideration of exorcism in work with dissociative patients
is questioned. Begelman 's sortie into the depths beyond phenomenology
is accorded praise.
The articles on possession published here provide a
glimpse into a dimly lit corner of human experience. One
could respond to them from any number of critical per-
spectives: theological, philosophical, metapsychological,
anthropological - to name some. Mine will be limited to
the clinical, with a historical slant.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
What of possession is today clinician likely to encounter
in a North American context? That question cannot be
answered until the terms of reference are clarified. The first
term to be tackled is "possession." Possession seems to be
one of those words that is taken for granted. It need not be
explained because everyone knows what it means. In the
present articles, none of the authors give their definition of
what they mean by possession. Coons comes closest when
he recounts the proposed DSM-IVdiagnosis referring to pos-
session as "a conviction that the individual has been taken
over by a spirit, power, deity, or other person." I am not sure
if Coons himself accepts the definition, but in any case it
seems inadequate. In all of the articles, the relationship between
possession and dissociation is discussed, but I do not see
how similarities and distinctions can be worked out without
defining possession more precisely.
It seems to me that the best mode of definition for a
clinical syndrome is the phenomenological. There is enough
material available to do this, because the historical litera-
ture of possession is vast, and many contemporary therapists
have their own first-hand experiences to contribute.
As is pointed out by Coons and Begelman, in some cul-
tures possession is an accepted or even sought-after social
event. This kind of possession provides very useful compar-
isons for the clinician, but is not the type likely to be encoun-
tered in the consulting room. I would like to concentrate
on involuntary possession, possession that is perceived as
undesirable by the victim and his culture.
To define possession as a"conviction," as theDSMNpro-
posal does, may be useful in that very confined context, but
for the present discussion, a broader approach is needed.
To define possession as a conviction is to sidestep the fact
that there is an experience which the conviction is about -
an experience which precedes the conviction about the expe-
rience. That is why another way of defining possession must
be found.
Here is a working definition: possession is the experi-
ence of being taken over by some outside intelligent entity.
"Experience," because it is a subjective event. "Outside,"
because the person interprets the experience as an invasion
by an external being. "Entity," because the possessed per-
son experiences the intruder as having a self-contained exis-
tence. "Intelligent," because the entity seems to actwith some
kind of purpose, plan, or thought.
This definition of possession is meant to be purely phe-
nomenological. It does not imply that the possessed indi-
vidual experience contains an adequate explanation for
what is really going on. It may very well turn out that the
person presenting these symptoms is merely suffering from
some kind of mental disorder. It may even turn out that no
one is ever really invaded by an outside entity. These are
issues that go beyond the phenomenological and must be
kept separate from it.
This definition of possession is not, however, complete.
It does not tell the clinician enough. What needs to be fur-
ther clarified is the phenomenology of "being taken over,"
and that, I am afraid, is no easy task. In the literature, "taken
over" is frequently interpreted as the total replacement of
the normal personality by the invading entity. However, that
narrow view is not considered to be adequate by anthro-
pologists, theologians, or psychotherapists because it fails
to embrace enough of the data.
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DISSOCIATION. Ll, VI, 1. December 1993
CRABTREE
It is useful to make a distinction between possession in
which the victim remains aware of what is happening while
it happens and possession in which victim has no subsequent
memory of events. Anthropologically, these two types have
been labelled "lucid " possession and "somnambulistic" pos-
session (Oesterreich,1974, pp. 26-90). Psychologically, they
could be called "co-conscious" and "amnesic" possession.
As soon as one admits "lucid" possession, the issue becomes
more complex. Here the co-conscious victim may have par-
tial control over thoughts or actions during the possession
experience. Possession now is beginning to look like a phe-
nomenon that admits of degrees. The victim can be "taken
over" so completely that no vestige of his or her normal per-
sonality is operative. Or the victim can be "taken over" less
dramatically, so that while the body is under the control of
the intruder, the victim consciousness of events remains.
Or the victim can be "taken over " even less completely, so
that some vestige of control of the body remains. Or the vic-
tim can be taken over principally on the mental level, so that
while the body remains in the victim control, the mind is
invaded by foreign thoughts, desires, and impulses. The notion
that there are degrees of possession follows naturally from
the data. This was recognized by Yap (1960) who, in his clas-
sical study of the possession syndrome, attempted to define
grades of possession, as did Allison twentyyears later (Allison
Schwarz, 1980; Allison, 1985).
This way of viewing the matter corresponds well with tra-
ditional thinking. In spiritualist literature, a distinction is
made between "spirit possession" and "spirit obsession"
(Peebles, 1904). In the former, control of the body is lost to
the possessor. In the latter the individualsmind is besieged
by the invading entity, but control of the body is retained
(see Thalbourne, 1982, pp. 47 54; and Shepard, 1978, Vol.
2, p. 655). However, as it turned out, spiritualists found that
the boundaries between possession and obsession were often
difficult to establish, and the distinction between the two
states could not generally be adhered to in practice.
Clinicians encounter possession mostly in complex,
nuanced forms. While possession involving complete per-
sonality replacement may be common among some cultur-
al groups, it is not usual in the population of North American
therapy clients. Here clinicians see possession cases exhibit-
ing various degrees of control, a spectrum of intensity from
inner harassment to total loss of personality.
There follows a list of the types of involuntary posses-
sion that today psychotherapist may encounter. I would
like to emphasize once more that this is a phenomenologi-
cal, not metaphysical, categorization.
The first three categories involve simple possession:
1. Demon possession with total displacement of the
victim s personality by an entity that claims to be an
evil spirit. This category includes those rare instances
of so-called diabolical possession accompanied by
bizarre physical and physiological phenomena.
2. Demon possession lacking complete displacement
of the victim personality and characterized by inner
voices (sometimes with a sense that the entity is lodged
in a particular area of the body).
3. Spirit possession, in which the victim is invaded by
a human spirit, usually of a deceased person, again
without total displacement of the victim's person-
ality.
The next two categories involve a combination of posses-
sion and multiple personality:
4. Multiple personality disorder cases in which one (or
more) of the personalities is ostensibly a discarnate
human spirit, with a separate life history.
5. Multiple personality disorder cases in which one (or
more) of the personalities is ostensibly a non-human
spirit or demon, frequently having taken possession
of the victim during ritual abuse.
Comments on the categories:
1. In our culture, these cases are uncommon. Diabolical
possession is especially rare, although striking; well-
documented instances can be found (Vogel, 1935;
Summers, 1966; Nicola, 1974; Oesterreich, 1974;
Martin, 1976; Pelton, 1977; Brittle, 1980; Goodman,
1988; and Naegeli-Osjord, 1988).
2. In 1911, Edward Mayer published a case of "demon
possession" characterized by an inner voice that
attacked the victim and claimed to be a demon. Other
workers describe a similar phenomenon (e.g., Van
Dusen, 1972, 1974). I have myself encountered a
number of cases of individuals who suffered inner
torment of this kind. Frequently they began at a spe-
cific point in time (often during a ouija board ses-
sion) and continued without respite for many years.
The late Professor Hans Bender, considered
Germany leading parapsychologist in the 1960s
and 1970s, told me that he had seen like cases. It is
important to differentiate these cases from schizophre-
nia. For that reason I would like to limit this cate-
gory to those who exhibit no thought disorder or
delusions of reference, who remain functional in
their lives, who do not respond to medication
geared to schizophrenia, and whose only gross
symptom is the voices.
3. For instances of this kind of possession and approach-
es to treatment see Bull (1932), McAI1 (1982),
Crabtree (1985), and Fiore (1987).
4. The "Doris Fischer " case of multiple personality
(Hyslop, 1917; F. Prince, 1916, 1917, 1923; F. Prince
& Hyslop, 1915 illustrates this condition. William
McDougall interpreted the "Miss Beauchamp" case
of Morton Prince (1905) in this fashion (McDougall,
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DISSOCIATION. Vol. VI. 1. December 1993
PUZZLING OVER POSSESSION
1907; see Kenny, 1981) . Most recently, Ralph Allison
has published accounts of multiple personality dis-
order in which one personality claimed to be a dis-
carnate human spirit with a separate life history
(Allison, 1985; Allison Schwarz, 1980).
5. Instances of ostensible demons that have been intro-
jected into multiples during ritual abuse seem to be
showing up with increasing frequency in psy-
chotherapeutic encounters (Spenser, 1989; Friesen,
1991; Mayer, 1991; Fraser, 1993).
These categories of possession will be useful to clinicians
insofar as they actually correspond to the way possession
cases present. I would be interested to know how accurate-
ly they summarize the clinical experiences of readers.
DIAGNOSIS OF POSSESSION
It is one thing to set down a phenomenology of invol-
untary possession and quite another to come up with satis-
factory diagnostic criteria for the proposed DSM-IV. In his
article, Philip Coons turns his attention to that task and makes
awelcome contribution. Coons states that he does not intend
to provide an exhaustive review of possession and its differ-
ential diagnosis, but rather to offer guidelines for under-
standing the similarities and differences between possession
and dissociation and distinguish normal from abnormal.
It is gratifying to see that the DSM-IV task force is con-
sidering possession as a diagnostic category. It is not sur-
prising that the World Health Organization has already added
the possession syndrome to its official classification of men-
tal disorders (ICD-10).As witnessed by theAlma Ma declara-
tion of 1962, the WHO for many years has promoted research
and training in non-Western medical practice and has been
ready to recognize views of disease and health care not accept-
able to mainstream Western medical tradition. That the
American Psychiatric Association would consider a diagno-
sis of possession shows that clinical encounters with this syn-
drome are being taken more seriously.
At this point it seems that the APA could go one step
beyond the approach taken by the ICD-10, as described by
Coons. The ICD-10 has apparently limited the diagnosis of
possession to cases of loss of identity and awareness. As stat-
ed above, I believe that this is too narrow a perspective. The
DSM-IVcould frame the criteria for diagnosis in terms more
in keeping with what clinicians actually encounter.
A proposed DSM-IV criterion for possession - "a con-
viction that the individual has been taken over by a spirit,
power, deity, or other person" - has strengths and weak-
nesses. A strength is thatit can be interpreted to include
something less than total loss of identity, since, as discussed
above, "taken over" may be given a broad interpretation. A
weakness derives from the use of the word "conviction." Is
the conviction that of the disordered person? If it is (and
this seems the only viable reading of the phrase), just when
does that conviction begin? The phrase reads "a conviction
that the individual has been taken over." This indicates that
the conviction follows the experience of something. That
experience is then interpreted as "being taken over." If the
conviction is formed after the person has the disordered
experience, then what is the experience itself? Is not the
experience that precedes the conviction a necessary part of
the diagnosis? In the diagnosis of multiple personality dis-
order, there is no mention of "conviction" or "belief" or any-
thing like that. It talks about" the existence within the per-
son of two or more distinct personalities. " It refers to a
psychological reality that precedes the individual judgment
about that reality. I realize that there is a special difficulty
here: that the diagnosis cannot make a statement about the
objective existence of the ostensibly possessing entity. But I
do not think that the proposed solution to the difficulty can
work.
Another weakness in the proposed diagnosis of posses-
sion is that it does not really say enough to help the clini-
cian know what to look for. Of particular concern is that it
provides no basis for differentiating between the various kinds
of possessions that might be encountered.
Coons takes pains to differentiate between pathological
possession and culturally supported possession. That dis-
tinction is useful to know, but will seldom need to be applied.
What a clinician is more likely to have to ponder are dis-
tinctions within the category of psychopathological posses-
sion. A good example is the distinction between spirit pos-
session and demon possession. This distinction is not merely
a quibble. Spirit possession and demon possession manifest
in quite different ways, and treatment should take those dif-
ferences into account. Also, in my experience, treatment of
ostensible spirit possession tends to get positive results more
often and more quickly than does treatment of ostensible
demon possession. It seems that others who have worked
therapeutically with possession, such as Allison and
Schwarz(1980) and Fiore (1987) have also found it useful
to discriminate between types of psychopathological pos-
session.
Coons points out that as the discussion of possession
evolves certain questions arise: who is qualified to discern
possession, what professional works with that type of sub-
ject, what is an effective working relationship, and what tech-
niques are truly effective? I find this to be an excellent for-
mulation of the issues. I also agree wholeheartedly with his
statement that such questions can only be solved in an atmo-
sphere of openness and cooperation.
One last point about diagnosis relates to comments made
by Fraser in his article on exorcism rituals. He says that this
new diagnostic category is being considered to accommo-
date experiences in other cultures. He expresses concern
that its inclusion in the DSM-IVwill be viewed in North America
as an acceptance of the reality of possession and could lead
to a rise in the number of exorcism rituals performed on
dissociative state disorders. I would like to say first of all that
if the accommodation of non-North American cultures is
the only reason for considering this new diagnosis, that is a
pity. The fact is that North American clinicians are encoun-
tering cases that present phenomenologically as possession.
While I agree that the clinician must first look to a disso-
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ciative explanation, that may not always be adequate. I believe
that the inclusion of this new diagnosis should be made pure-
ly in terms of North American needs. With regard to Fraser
concern that the new diagnosis will be used by some prac-
titioners in an abusive way, I do not believe that is sufficient
reason to exclude it. If the category is clinically accurate and
useful, it should be approved.
TREATMENT BY EXORCISM
While some of us are cautiously asking whether posses-
sion is a legitimate syndrome, whether it should be count-
ed among the mental disorders, and how it relates to disso-
ciation, there are those who boldly judge it to be part of the
everyday reality of human life. Some even believe that demon
possession is the true explanation of multiple personality
disorder and are ready to apply religious rites of exorcism
wherever that disorder is found. The articles by George Fraser
and Elizabeth Bowman bear sad witness to the results that
can occur.
Fraser summary of the issues at stake is excellent. Before
commenting on them, I would like to take exception to one
point he makes. Speaking about the age-old belief that spir-
its can possess people, Fraser states that contemporary clin-
icians "are probably the first generation of therapists to know
the actual nature of these supposed possessing entities." This
phrase seems to indicate that he has made up his mind about
the metaphysical status of all cases of possession. Yet in the
rest of the article, he takes a more moderate and tentative
stance on the issue of the possible reality of possession. I do
not believe that clinicians are in a position to make a final
judgment about the existence of spirits or their ability to
possess individuals, and I do not think such a judgment has
a place at this stage of the discussion of the data. Besides,
contemporary therapists are not the first to recognize that
ostensible possessing entities may be dissociated ego states.
Janet (1889, 1894) , Myers (1903) , and many others were say-
ing the same thing long ago.
The heart of Fraser article is the negative effects of
exorcism performed on multiple personality patients. His
description of cases is very informative, and the "observa-
tions" he makes about the use of exorcism with MPD are
exhaustive and most valuable. Fraser "cautions to poten-
tial exorcists" should serve as the guidelines for any future
use, and his sensitive and balanced approach to the clinical
issues leaves little to be desired.
Bowman article deals with some of the same issues. Her
study of fifteen female MPD patients who had felt or been
told they were possessed and who underwent some type of
exorcism gives us a clear and dramatic picture of the results
that exorcism can produce. The damage done to these indi-
viduals was in many cases extensive and long lasting, with
sequelae similar to those described by Fraser.
The main comment I would like to make about Bowman s
article centers around conclusions reached in her "discus-
sion" section. Her criticism of the exorcisms and the exor-
cists involved, although based solely on the impressions of
the victims, seems to be reasonable. Where I disagree is when
she talks about implications for therapists who consider per-
forming exorcisms on theirMPD patients. She recommends
that therapists never involve themselves in exorcisms of
patients. Although I believe that exorcism should rarely be
considered (and I myself have never used exorcism with a
patient, largely because I have a problem with countering
force with force), I do not believe that such an uncompro-
mising conclusion is justified. It is especially difficult to see
how Bowman conclusion can be defended on the basis of
the data she is reporting. She herself says that" these patients
were all exorcised outside of psychotherapy proper, so their
experiences may be different from those exorcised by ther-
apists who ask consent and approach the topic gently." Since
her data have these limitations, how can she draw conclu-
sions about what should be done in circumstances that she
has not studied? Bowman seems to believe that any thera-
pist who considers exorcism would be doing so to satisfy his
or her own narcissistic needs. Further, she assumes that such
therapistswould have little or no knowledge about how alters
and dissociative symptoms can disappear without being truly
resolved, or realize that demons could be the result of audi-
tory, visual, or sensual hallucinations. Bowman also seems
to believe that these therapists would have no idea that dis-
sociative patients may produce symptoms and phenomena
to please them. My question is this: Why would it be assumed
that any therapist who considers using exorcism withMPD
would be so lacking in knowledge of dissociation and so
blind in regard to basic therapeutic principles? I see no rea-
son to justify this assumption - and certainly not on the
basis of data drawn from exorcisms that occur in non-ther-
apeutic contexts.
BEYOND THE PHENOMENOLOGY
It is my belief that the clinician can diagnose and suc-
cessfully treat possession without taking a stand on the onto-
logical status of possession. My own experience is that in
some cases the diagnosis of possession is the only one that
provides a workable basis for therapy. This occurs in two
types of situations. In the first, the patient has a subjective
experience of possession and other diagnoses are rejected
outright by the patient, so that no working relationship can
be developed outside that provided by a diagnosis of pos-
session. The second is when the patient has a subjective expe-
rience of possession and a lengthy therapy based on a diag-
nosis of dissociative disorder proves fruitless. In both of these
situations a therapist might use a diagnosis similar to that
being proposed for the DSM-IVand proceed to treat the indi-
vidual on that basis. I have done this with some success
(Crabtree, 1985), as have others (Van Dusen, 1972, 1974;
Allison Schwarz, 1980; Fiore, 1987). Such a therapy can
be successfully carried out even if the therapist is not con-
vinced that independent entities have invaded the patient.
In a number of my own possession cases, I was not at all sure
of the independent reality of the possessing spirits.
Yet the issue of the true inner nature of the possession
syndrome is an important one. Begelman article neatly
poses some questions for a discussion of this problem: Are
257
D1550Ct11IUN. Sul. CI, 1, Drumhrr 199';
PUZZLING OVER POSSESSION
we dealing with contrasting interpretations of the same data
base (different perspectives on essentially the same sub-
stratum?) Or is possession qualitatively different from MPD
and related dissociativedisorders? Begelman says thatthose
who answer yes to the first question are adherents of the
Double Aspect Picture (DAP). A therapist who works from
this perspective may accept the presence of a "demon," but
hold that the "demon" is really a dissociated ego state.
Begelman believes that therapists who hold that pos-
session is qualitatively different from MPD or dissociation
seem to "straddle two `cultures one developed in a tech-
nocracy, and one harkening back to centuries-old traditions."
Begelman includes me in this group, and I think that is a
fair assessment. I would just add that in practice I am not
easy to convince that independent entities are at work.
The role of culturation in shaping the forms of posses-
sion and dissociation is perceptively raised by Begelman. His
questions about the influence of cultural factors in the man-
ifestation of MPD are thought-provoking. I have published
elsewhere (Crabtree, 1993) my own speculations that it may
not have been possible for multiple personality to manifest
as a disorder before the proper cultural preparation had
occurred. The part culture plays in determining forms of
possession can be no less profound.
Throughout Begelman article one question repeatedly
comes forward: Is there any way to confidently differentiate
between true possession and dissociation? I agree with him
that this is a philosophical or theological issue, not a clini-
cal or anthropological one. Also, solid conclusions about
the reality of possession cannot be reached on the basis of
political or social problems that result from taking one posi-
tion or the other.
When dealing with "treatment entailments," Begelman
suggests that deciding the ontological status of possession
may not be crucial for good psychotherapy. He refers to "the
error of supposing that the choice of treatment approach-
es presupposes a metaphysical position on the part of the
practitioner," and indicates that the therapist private con-
victions should not necessarily be the deciding factor. If this
is true - and I believe it is - then it is a good thing. I believe
that it will be a long time before some kind of consensus can
be reached about the intrinsic nature of possession, and while
we fret and stew with the problem, patients still need to be
helped. I think that many therapists are capable of putting
aside their personal convictions and responding to that need.

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