Constructions of Identity and War: A Reciprocal Relationship in Former Yugoslavia Taylor Ginieczki*, Political Science and Global Studies

This article investigates the reciprocal relationship between identity and conflict, focusing the inquiry on the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the resulting Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. A brief history of nationalist sentiment under communist rule in Yugoslavia is first displayed to contextualize the scope of research. The focus then shifts to how constructions of ethnonationalist identity became the basis of brutal ethnic conflict. Identity as the root of conflict is first discussed theoretically from an international relations perspective, citing the breakdown of a multinational state and the subsequent security dilemma. It is then grounded empirically in real-world evidence, illustrating how power imbalances between the republics and powerful ethnonationalist rhetoric led the region to war. The research then transitions to the secondary and complementary component of the thesis: how conflict shapes identity. The discussion cites incongruent narratives of war among the former republics as well as the tarnished international image of former Yugoslavia. Through a display of relevant evidence and literature, this argument strives to illustrate the power of identity in conflict, unity, and the nation. Further research could address how the weaponization of ethnicity could be avoided and reversed in favor of a stronger sense of collective identity around shared sociopolitical values and ideals.


INTRODUCTION
In academic studies of the relationship between war and the construction of identity, the violent breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is at the forefront of the literature. A geographically expansive, culturally diverse, and politically non-aligned federation that existed from 1918 to 1991, the SFRY mirrors the entire Balkans in its identity as a geopolitical crossroads of culture, history, and politics (United Nations Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [UN-ICTY], 2017). However, the former country of Yugoslavia has a unique history of ethnonational conflict following the collapse of a multinational state; organized political division, propagated by the nationalist rhetoric of powerful political leaders, eroded the concept of a common Yugoslav identity, fueled fear and mistrust between ethnic groups, and accelerated the collapse of the union (UN-ICTY, 2017). The wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo throughout the 1990s were consequences of these opposing nationalist movements, and they demonstrate the central role that constructions of national identity played in the conflicts that took place during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s (McConnell, 2017). This paper will hence explore how identity constructions in Yugoslavia shaped this era of conflict in the 1990s, as well as how these conflicts, in turn, were shaped by identity. With a timeline of inquiry from the beginning of the federation in 1918 to the end of the Yugoslav Wars at the turn of the twenty-first century, this essay will strive to analyze relevant research and reach a meaningful conclusion about the power of identity in national agendas.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA
It is necessary to first outline the role of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, which was an experiment in a multinational state. It comprised six republics, each with their own national identity: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia (UN-ICTY, 2017). The communist political party, in power in Yugoslavia from 1918-1991, recognized the ethnonational diversity of the Yugoslav demographic, but the predominant belief among party leaders was that equalityba ed licie a d c i hege ld all a i ali e i , a e, a d fi all di i i h a a li ical f ce i h je a di i g li ical abili a d ec ic de el e (Sek li e al., 1994, . 83). I h , a ha ed li ical age da, societal modernization, and supranational identity were expected to weaken nationalism.
Despite these expectations, the political and economic rivalries that eventually arose between the Yugoslav republics intensified rather than lessened nationalist feeli g (Sek li e al., 1994, . 83). The central government weakened while militant nationalism grew, and organized political di i i a f eled b a i ali he ic f leade like Sl b da Mil e i , h ed hi promises made to fellow Serbs into ac i ha ca ed bl d a d i (UN-ICTY, 2017& Bozic, 1992. These influences eroded the concept of a common Yugoslav identity, fueled fear and mistrust between ethnic groups, and accelerated the collapse of the union. By the early 1990s, the Yugoslav experiment saw open hostility and warfare among the South Slavs, marking the start of a l g decade f a (Sek li e al., 1994, . 83). F c e , he f ll i g i age (Figure 1) illustrate the geopolitical changes that took place from 1991 to 2008 in the former Yugoslavia (UN-ICTY, 2017).  (Wilmer, 2002, p. 8). This era of political violence and the nationalism that f eled i c e ali e hi e a e ea ch f c : h ide i b gh he Y g la Wa fruition, and then how these conflicts shaped identity construction in turn. 3. IDENTITY CAUSING WAR

THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
Regarding the question of how identity becomes divisive in a multinational state when federal leadership dissolves, scholarship from an international relations perspective supplies structural, macro-level insights. For this reason, theories on ethnic conflict will first be explored. Posen (1993) e Y g la ia b eakd f de a d he c e e i le ce e i i e he security dilemma, a model in realist theory that explains how proximate groups of people under conditions of anarchy suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security (national, political, human, or otherwise). His work supports the notion that when a multiethnic state breaks down, its ethnic subgroups see other identities as offensive threats, resulting in division, mistrust, and eventual violence.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To follow this theoretical line of reasoning, strong empirical evidence supports that the Yugoslav Wars were predominantly the consequences of the rise of conflicting nationalist movements and identities (McConnell, 2017). Ethnic nationalism had always been present in the Yugoslav federation, but it was kept under control while the communist dictator Joseph Broz (Tito) was in power. After his death in 1980, however, there was neither a method nor a framework for resolution in place, and cross-national conflicts became everyday occurrences (Bozic, 1992). In short, ethnic conflicts based on identity were bubbling to the surface and altering inter-ethnic relations. Rising Croat bitterness against Belgrade is a distinct example of how political tensions beca e eali ed (B ic, 1992). The C a e ce i f Se bia a a e al a e f eled e h ic division, and the exacerbated power imbalance between Serbia and the other republics eventually beca e a f cal i f he Y g la Wa . Addi i all , a I la ic a e i i B ia a d He eg i a e e e ed de g a hic cha ge ha affec ed e h ic bala ce a d f he destabilized social attitudes (Bozic, 1992, p. 51 Bozic (1992, p. 51). Each of these societal changes that arose after the collapse of Yugoslavia can be seen as a consequence of ethnic tension as well as a catalyst for the ethnic conflicts that followed.
Moreover, the nationalist rhetoric of Slobodan Mil e i , he Se bia leade cha ged i h a crimes and genocide at the turn of the twenty-first century, is a strong indication of identity as the ba i f a i ali a d a . Mil e i , he -called B che f he Balka , a i f propaganda campaigns that emphasized alleged injustices against Serbs and portrayed them as victims of the rest of Yugoslavia (Bozic, 1992, p. 72  ided he Se b-dominated Yugoslav army with a cause to fight, and they consequently started a war in Croatia (Bozic, 1992, p. 118). This is a strong example of how identity can cause conflict as perceptions of ethnic superiority fueled these nationalist military campaigns. This historical event, which is widely accepted as a conse e ce f Se bia de i e f C a ia e i ha a edl i habi ed b a Se bia aj i , a ked he begi i g f a l g a d agicall e al a (B ic, 1992, . 72). P i e a al f he Y g la c flic ai ai that the civil war ha a ed i 1991 a la gel he l gical c e f Mil e i ed policies, and this is evidence that identity-based ethnonationalist rhetoric was a major force of conflict in the Yugoslav Wars.

INCONGRUENT NARRATIVE
As this paper has shown, perceptions of identity and nationalism can become weaponized, purposefully or passively, to incite conflict between ethnic groups and tear down multinational states. However, the relationship between identity and conflict is not one-sided; it is dialectical. Identity construction and war shape each other, and this section will illustrate how the latter influenced the former during the Yugoslav Wars. particularly true in the case of Croats and Serbs, who adamantly blame each other for the brutal ethnic violence that took place and maintain strongly opposing perspectives regarding the cause of the conflicts. The mutually exclusive nature of the respective views put forth by Croatia and Serbia is further indicated in their contrasting collective narratives, their antipodal holidays to commemorate war events, and their ethnicity-tailored history textbooks, to give a few examples (Baranovicé, 2001). Each of these three listed elements is a component of identity construction that changed following the war, supporting how the conflicts of the 1990s shaped national identity-building.
Additionally, Slovenia has been largely excluded from the conceptualization of Yugoslavia and even from the entire Balkans region, and their national identity construction reflects a desire for distance from the other former republics a case study that provides more insight into how war ha e ide i (B k ic, 2005). Sl e ia i le i he Y g la Wa a ed he c most of the destruction that happened elsewhere, and the country consequently gained significant cultural and political clout on the global stage for this ostensible display of wartime restraint (B k ic, 2005). B k ic (2005) ( a i , 2004, . 396). The e e a le are clear indications of how Slovenia actively strove to create its own narrative of peace and civility in order to escape association with the Yugoslav Wars. In summary, both Slove ia internationally granted and internally created self-image of civility in the wake of the conflicts of the 1990s demonstrate how war is formative in identity construction.

INTERNATIONAL IMAGE
The second way in which the Yugoslav Wars impacted Southern Slavic identity involves the altered international reputation of Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole. The international community (as well much of the former Yugoslavia itself) largely agrees that the violence, wars, and ethnic cleansing that took place were characterized by disturbing acts of horror, brutality, and genocide (Wilmer, 2002). This perception has created a negative image of the region overall, depicting the modern republics as places of danger and instability. Yugoslavia became

i c ea i gl a cia ed i h bl d a d i le ce [ca i g] i di id al h c ld ide if he el e i h he Balka
feel g il f i le ce a ell ( a i , 2004, . 39).
This overwhelmingly negative shift in how the Balkans were viewed by the world evidently instilled collective feelings of shame, despite the incongruent narratives within the former Yugoslavia about which republic or ethnic subgroup was responsible for the violence. This essay highlights this duality regional guilt existing alongside ethnic-divided narratives as a testament to the power of war in shaping human identity. Victims, perpetrators, and proximate bystanders alike, although rarely divided along such clean lines in the chaos of war, felt the impact of war on their national and personal identities regardless of their role. Identifying with the region was enough to generate guilt, regardless of their individual nationality or ethnicity. This a cia i be ee he Balka egi a d c llec i e gd i g alig i h e ide ce f a i (2004, . 402, 397)  Thi e ible deci i be ee c ec i g ci ili ed E e ag a i g i h he a age Balka a e represents how Balkan countries and subsequently, the identities they contain are seen as the starting point with Europe as the end-goal. In deciding between Europeanization and Balkanization, the former option has been unquestionably chosen by Croatia and Slovenia, the two Balkan countries with identities and norms that closely resemble Europe (Subotic, 2011, p. 309) a d h e edia eg la l label he Balka a he i e f he i e a i al e i e ( a i , 2004, . 391, 404). C a ia a d Sl e ia a e al he l f e Y g la republics to have become members of the European Union (Communication Department of the European Commission, 2020), representing their rejection of the Balkans. Both countries symbolically choose Europe over the rest of their region as a consequence of how the Yugoslav Wars characterized Balkan identity, illuminating the formative role of war in national identity construction.
A display of qualities associated with these two respective regions is found in the image below f a i (2004, . 403), i led O he e a d I e ali (Table 1).  (Hall, 2001, . 326). In short, both the international and the Balkan community support that the Yugoslav Wars tainted the international reputation of the entire Balkan region. The wars symbolically separated the Balkans from the rest of Europe and consequently galvanized some of the former Yugoslav republics into choosing a European political trajectory and national identity, which demonstrates the capacity of conflict to profoundly change identity construction.

CONCLUSION
This exploration of the role of identity in the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia has shown considerable support for identity as the basis of brutal ethnic conflict. A brief history of nationalist sentiments and movements during and immediately following the rule of Tito was first described to contextualize the research focus. Then, foundational processes in which identity can lead to war were studied theoretically from an international relations perspective and illustrated empirically as real-world conflicts that stemmed from ethnic differences. The ways in which war impacts identity were further discussed using discrepant narratives from the 1990s that still carry weight in the present, and the international image of the former Yugoslavia, from the perspective of both the former Yugoslavs and the rest of the world, was analyzed.
Through illuminating how organized political division and nationalism delegitimized the common Yugoslav identity in favor of specific ethnonational ones, this paper has delved into the dynamic relationship between ethnic-group identity and the basis of conflict in the region. Y g la ia l g history of internal warfare, selective nationalist unity across borders, ethnicity- based power disparities, and violent ethnic subgroups resulted in the rise of nationalism and precipitated the violence that followed. These conflicts then led to contradictory political histories, a damaged reputation of the region, and negative self-perceptions within the former Yugoslav republics.
This exploration of identity and conflict has therefore illustrated the power of identity in conflict, unity, and the role of the self in the nation, which are wholly essential topics in the study of peace and war. Further research should focus on how the weaponization of ethnicity could be avoided and reversed. There are also gaps in the literature about how animosity could be replaced by a stronger sense of collective identity potentially revolving around shared values and ideals. The violence that occurred upon the collapse of Yugoslavia should serve as an example of how a multinational state can devolve into chaos and destruction without direction, and it is the job of b h he gl bal acade ic c i a d he ld g ea e lea f hi agic e a f war and better pursue the human mission of peace-building.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Galen Martin of the University of Oregon Global (International) Studies department for his useful guidance on the direction and scope of this research. His advice was especially invaluable in clarifying the historical scope and background of this paper, and his support and engagement was greatly appreciated. I also thank D . Ja e C a e f he U i e i f O eg P li ical Scie ce de a e f i i i g research interests, and I am so grateful for her continued guidance in the field of international relations. I would like to thank Professor Will Johnson for supporting my interest in the Balkan region as the University of Oregon study abroad program advisor for peace and conflict studies in the Balkans. Lastly, the members of my in-class research group, many of whom had traveled to former Yugoslavia, were also incredibly helpful in sharing their experiences, resources, and feedback to better inform my work.