WORDS IN THE WORLD: THE PLACE OF LITERATURE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

by

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A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of English and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2010
University of Oregon Graduate School

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Title:

"Words in the World: The Place of Literature in Early Modern England"

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An Abstract of the Dissertation of

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Title: WORDS IN THE WORLD: THE PLACE OF LITERATURE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

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"Words in the World" details the ways that the place of rhetoric and literature in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries changes in response to the transition from natural philosophy to Cartesian mechanism. In so doing, it also offers a constructive challenge to today's environmental literary criticism, challenging environmental literary critics' preoccupation with themes of nature and, by extension, with representational language. Reading authors from Thomas More to Philip Sidney and Ben Jonson through changes in physics, cartography, botany, and zoology, "Words in the World" argues that literature occupies an increasingly separate place from the real world. "Place" in this context refers to spatiotemporal dimensions, taxonomic affiliations, and the relationships between literature and the physical world. George Puttenham's Artes of English Poesie (1589), for instance, limits the way that rhetoric is part of the world to the ways that it can be numbered (meter, rhyme scheme, and so forth); metaphor and other tropes, however, are
duplicitous. In contrast, for an earlier era of natural philosophers, tropes were the grammar of the universe. "Words in the World" culminates with Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621/1651), in which the product of literature's split from the physical world is literary melancholy. Turning to today's environmental literary criticism, the dissertation thus historicizes ecocriticism's nostalgic melancholy for the extratextual physical world. Indeed, Early Modern authors' inquiries into the place of literature and the relationships between that place and the physical world in terms of literary forms and structures, suggests the importance of ecoformalism to Early Modern scholarship. In particular, this dissertation argues that Early Modern authors treat literary structures as types of performative language. This dissertation revises the standard histories of Early Modern developments in rhetoric and of the literary text, and it provides new insight into the materiality of literary form.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express sincere appreciation for my advisor, Prof. Lisa Myobun Freinkel, whose unflagging faith kept me going when all else failed. I would also like to thank the members of my defense committee, Professors George Rowe, Bill Rossi, and Ted Toadvine, for carefully reading this dissertation and for providing insightful feedback. Thanks are also due to the English Faculty and Department Staff for years of support, assistance, and kind collegiality. In particular, thanks to my colleague M. Bennet Smith for our thoughtful exchanges. Special thanks to Dr. Britta Spann for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript and for her eternal patience with my prose. This dissertation was supported in part by a fellowship from the Oregon Humanities Center.

I am eternally grateful to my family and friends whose love, support, and generosity were essential to my success at the University of Oregon. Special thanks with love to B.L.S. and J. D. L.
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CHAPTER I
FINDING THE PLACE OF LITERATURE

In his *Defense of Poesy* (1579/1595), Phillip Sidney describes poesy as "an imaginative groundplat of a profitable inuention" (G1v). The metaphor of poesy as a section of ground speaks to the sixteenth-century interest in the "place" of literature. I do not use this term without due consideration: the word "place" surfaces in a wide range of Early Modern discourses. Social structures, for instance, place individuals according to the body politic and cosmology, which includes the celestial spheres and the Great Chain of Being. The field of medicine places individuals as well; as Gail Kern Paster notes, the Medieval and Early Modern humoral system locates individuals in relation to each other, and along a social scale, through materialized vapors and spoken words.¹ Recent critical inquiries into Early Modern bodies, theater, and drama are also, fundamentally, inquiries into place. Place has social, celestial, humoral, theatrical, cartographic, geographical, and cosmological dimensions.

Place is also fundamentally linguistic. In logic, the *topoi* are the basic categories by which one might define one's subject, the "heuristic for discovering things to say about a subject" (*Silva*). Logical *topoi* help thinkers discover the categories of truth that could

¹ See Paster's *Humoring the Body* (2004).
be asserted of any subject. Roman oratory draws on these and loci communes, the commonplaces or categories of things that one might say about a subject. As a mnemonic device, orators would imagine a place -- garden, house, room -- and locate the parts of the oration systematically to features of the place. When speaking, the orator would mentally walk about in his "memory place." As Thomas Wilson notes in his Arte of Rhetoric (1553/1587), "a place is called any roume, apt to receiue thinges" (217). For the Early Modern writer of poesy, commonplaces were literal books to note wise sayings, examples, parables, and the like. In writing, the commonplaces were the virtually infinite sources upon which authors could draw to illustrate an argument. Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy (1621/1651), for instance, offers many hundreds of pages of authoritative observations on melancholy. Rhetoricians also note the place of metaphor; Quintilian, for instance, observes that metaphor is when a word is in a place to which it does not properly belong. And writers such as Thomas More are interested in the place of literature, in Utopia's "no place" or "happy place." Place, then, is a fundamental category for Early Modern thinkers.

But place is not just a general topic of concern in Early Modern England. Its manifestations across the sciences, social sciences, and rhetoric are all intertwining and mutually defining. This dissertation provides an account of these relationships, of Early Modern place. In particular, this dissertation addresses the lack of critical scholarship on

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2 Thomas Wilson notes the following "places" about "a man's life": "The Realm, The Shire, The towne, The Parentes, The Auncesters" as well as "The birth and infancie. The childhood. The stripling age, or Springtide. The mannes state. The old age. The tyme of his departure or death." "Whether the persone be a man, or a woman." Etc.
the relationship between changing scientific views and the ways that literature has a place and takes place. Ecocritic Ursula Heise, writing in a different context, observes that the proliferation of the internet and other communication technologies has transformed our sense of place. In *Sense of Place and Sense of Planet* (2008), she notes that the increase in internet communities produces a sense of place that is unyoked from the constraints of physical location: one's sense of place includes virtual communities. Although Heise focuses exclusively on the technological changes of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, her observations are suggestive for earlier periods. Specifically, the sixteenth century witnessed the development of new technology that enabled the mass proliferation of the printed book. As we shall see, this sixteenth-century development in media technology creates conditions for an analogous modification of the sense of place. Early Modern thinkers deliberate the ways that rhetoric, figure, fiction, theater/drama, and the literary text have place and take place. This dissertation considers the trajectory of these inquiries from Thomas More to Philip Sidney, George Puttenham, Ben Jonson, and ultimately Robert Burton. Ultimately, these authors deliberate the place of trope, a rhetorical figure that depends upon change in meaning. For Classical and Early Modern authors, trope figures literary language that "turns" against itself ("to trope" means "to turn") in an instance of self-difference. This literary self-difference changes from taking place in a Naturalist universe to violating the terms of a Cartesian universe of extended space.

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3 Figure is often divided into trope and scheme (figures that work through changes in word order, parallelism, syntax, and the like).
In the last twenty or thirty years of literary criticism, studies of place have been a subsidiary of ecocriticism. At its heart, ecocriticism investigates nature and the environment. Although it is easy to assume that "environment" is synonymous with "nature," ecocritics emphasize that the environment is more than just wilderness and that it is not simply opposed to culture. Studies of recent periods offer critiques such as "urban ecocriticism," which broadens the concept of environment to include "cultivated and built landscapes" (Armbruster and Wallace 4). In terms of Early Modern literature, critics Ken Hiltner and Raymond Williams illustrate the ideological dimensions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century pastoral. More broadly, literary ecologists treating Early Modern literature have illuminated the ways that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century concepts of nature and the environment respond to new developments such as mass mining (Paradise Lost), deforestation and enclosure (Marvell), and an urban landscape desperately in need of waste management (Bartholomew Fair and The Alchemist, for example). However, Early Modern studies have not fully appreciated the insights ecocriticism can offer. Ecocritics' inquiries into place have only recently gained notice from Early Modern scholars. In the last several years, critics writing about the Early Modern period have demonstrated a renewed interest in cartography, geography, and the environment. But critical attention has yet to account for the ways that scientific changes in the period affect rhetorical and literary theory; since Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses (1969, The Order of Things), there has not been a sustained inquiry

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4 Urban ecocriticism includes, for example, Michael Bennett's and David W. Teague's The Nature of Cities: Ecocriticism and Urban Environments (1999).
into the relationship between science and rhetoric in the Early Modern period. Moreover, Early Modern developments in science and rhetoric have not yet been fully integrated into the theories of place ecocritics offer. (Foucault provides a very basic sketch of science and rhetoric but does not consider "place"; this dissertation problematizes his limited definition of similitudes and considers in detail how changes in the sciences affects a breadth of literary developments, including fiction, drama/theater, figure, and literature as a genre of language.) As we shall see in the chapters to follow, the Early Modern environment even goes so far as to include rhetorical figures insofar as those figures are subject to theories of place.

For Early Modern writers, the term “place” calls attention to the verb form of environment: to environ. (The term “environ” was first used in Wycliff’s *Holy Bible* (1382), *OED*). Environing presupposes a subject and center of experience, and it is along these lines that ecocritics define senses of place. Lawrence Buell, an influential ecocritic, suggests, that place is where abstract space acquires meaning through interaction. This “meaning” is a function of personal experience and is the fundamental quality of place. 

[S]pace as against place connotes geometrical or topographical abstraction, whereas place is “space to which meaning has been ascribed” (Carter, Donald, and Squires1993: xii). Places are “centers of felt value” (Tuan 1977: 4), “discrete if ‘elastic’ areas in which settings for the
constitution of social relations are located and with which people can identify” (Agnew 1993: 263). (FE 63)  

As evident from the quote above, theories of place have an extensive history. What environmental critics bring to discussions of place in the social sciences is an emphasis on science and bioregion. Buell concludes that, for ecocritics, place includes personal “imagined descriptive or symbolic structure,” “social construction,” and “ecology” (“Insurgency” 703). But what place means for Early Modern writers in particular is unclear; it depends, in part, on historically specific understandings of what it means for something to take place and how the scientifically-defined world has place. Writers like Thomas More, Phillip Sidney, and George Puttenham investigate the possibility that language -- more specifically figure, rhetoric, and fiction -- takes place. That is, it is an

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5 Buell is careful to note that bioregionalism is not a “species of environmental determinism” (Future 83) and to differentiate it from “regional traditionalism,” which can produce xenophobia and the like (66-68).

6 Although theorists such as Yi-Fu Tuan have long emphasized people’s connections to particular locations, ecocriticism’s “most distinctive contribution to the taxonomy of place-scales” is its contribution of “the concept of bioregion,” or geographical localities carved out by watersheds, geological formations, and the like. Theories of place are vital to ecocritics because place provides the ground for grassroots activism. For literary ecologists, place blends bioregion with physical and emotional connection, and this connection is an opportunity to inspire social change.

7 Ecocritics like Buell hope to determine “how the sense of place can be kept alert and sensitive” (Environmental Imagination 261) in the belief that place connection, the meaningfulness and value each person finds in his or her particular bioregion(s), is more likely to stimulate environmental activism than a global approach, as seen in the NIMBY phenomenon. Conversely, ecocritics argue that the destruction of connections to local places is fundamentally responsible for environmental catastrophe and psychic alienation alike. Technological “progress” or “domination empties human life of the significance it derived from living in and with nature and alienates individuals and communities from their rootedness in place” (Heise 507).
event, an example of literary performance. In contrast to (and preceding) J.L. Austin's theories of performative utterances, Early Modern thinkers consider rhetorical structures such as metaphor, trope, figure, and fiction to have a performative dimension in a way that Austin specifically precludes. Defining performative, illocutionary utterances such as promises and bets, Austin observes that performatives do not obtain in poetry. One condition of a performative utterance is that it "must be spoken seriously [... ] must not be joking, for example, for writing a poem" (9). Austin speaks to a particular dimension of performative language, but it is not the only one. Early Modern authors consider, through the metaphor of theater, the ways that rhetorical figures and literary structures take place; via these authors, this dissertation suggests ways to think of literary and rhetorical structures as instances of performative language. In considering how these structures take place, I invoke a sense of linguistic performativity distinct from Austin's sense of the term. Instead, I draw on Early Modern authors' reflections on their own writing practices. Thomas More and other early writers suggest that literary structures take place as the coincidence of opposites, as difference. Later writers such as Philip Sidney and Ben Jonson examine what will come to be called Austinian performatives and discover that they fail to obtain in literary texts. Jonson suggests that literature, specifically the commodified literary text, takes the form of what we would call "misfires" of and "unhappiness" in Austinian performatives. Nonetheless, the literary text remains a kind of contract between the author and his audience, a contract whose futurity prevents it from ever being fulfilled. The Austinian performative takes place
now; the sixteenth- and seventeenth century rhetorical performative also takes place, but for Jonson and Sidney, that place is always in the future.

The spatiotemporal, geographical, and cosmological dimensions of the place of literature shift from an "earlier" sense that this place happened; rhetorical structures took place in terms of the cosmological relationships between distant entities. Rhetoricians such as Thomas Wilson and Henry Peacham invoke Natural philosophy when explaining that metaphor is the language out of which God carves the universe. In my fourth chapter, George Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesy* (1589) illustrates the changes to rhetoric and theories of trope that Cartesian mechanism works by means of its definition in mathematic terms. In a radical shift from his predecessors, Puttenham posits that rhetoric is part of the physical world only insofar as it can be measured; he introduces rhyme, meter, and the like as rhetoric's "numerositie." Against rhetorical numerosity, Puttenham describes trope as "duplicitous." The rhetorical structure of the world, the place of trope and rhetoric, becomes lies, equivocation, and fiction.

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8 Here I should note that when I talk about the distinction between sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ways of thinking, between Natural philosophy and Cartesian mechanism, and between earlier and later perspectives, I am making a somewhat arbitrary chronological judgment. I simply use the term to refer to general shifts in ways of thinking about the physical world, and its relationship to literature. Similarly, when I use the term Early Modern, I am talking about the period in the history of ideas roughly between 1500 and the-mid seventeenth-century, specifically how those ideas manifest in England and in tandem with ideas of the vernacular and a national literary tradition. The term "Early Modern" is not without its own problems. In recent critical discourse the term has come to emphasize the ways the period looks forward to modernity. I want to stress that it also looks "backwards," "earlier," and to the other ways of thinking that do not gain precedence with mechanism. I use the term Early Modern to cover nearly two hundred centuries of writing in England and in response to developments on the continent.
My fourth chapter outlines how the place of rhetoric changes along with scientific theories. Ecocriticism encourages critics working with Early Modern literature to situate texts in relationship to contemporary scientific theories. Perhaps the most significant insight ecocriticism brings to the early modern period, in addition to the many ways that the period negotiates themes and images of nature, is Edward Casey's work with space and place. In his *Fate of Place* (1996) and "How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time" (1996), Casey argues that from the classical period to the present day, local place gives way to homogeneous, extended space. Casey identifies the sixteenth century as the "critical turning point in the debate between space and place" (129), even though "the full ascendancy of space over place does not happen until the publication of Newton's *Mathematical Principles of Natural philosophy*" (1687). As Casey notes, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopt measurable, three-dimensional space; it is pure homogeneous extension and detachable from the physical substances that give it dimension. Such space ultimately finds its expression in the Cartesian grid (126). Space is an abstracted field of extension in which bodies just happen to exist.9 Place, on the other hand, is local, experiential, and particular. For Casey, the distinction between

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9 If space is infinite, it can't be made of (qualitative) places; "some other factor must account for such things as distance and extension, indeed anything purely quantitative that refuses to be pinned down to place" (134). Cf. Pierre Gassendi's belief that "spatial dimensionality is [...] strict measurability" (139). Not only is space empty of things (cf. Giordanno Bruno et al.) "but of place itself." According to the new physics, space is something self-sufficient and wholly independent of what is in space, including particular places. Space is thus "an emancipated concept, divested of all inherent differentiations or forces" (139, qtg. Jammer *Concepts of Space* 90). "Modern mechanism has two ultimate terms: extension and motion," which equal "sheer quantifiability" of the heavens (137).
place and space is particularly important because the ethos of space is environmentally
destructive whereas attending to place encourages care for one's biosphere. For Early
Modern studies of literature, Casey's insights suggest that changes in physical theories
underwrite the sense of place of literature and the relationship between literature and the
world. The shift to Cartesian mechanism and a universe of pure extension reduces the
ways literature can have a place in the world and take place. Puttenham's Arte reveals
that numeric scientism effectively dislocates trope -- and by extension, rhetorical figures -
- from the physical world.

Puttenham characterizes trope as duplicitous, fictional, and lying. Philip Sidney,
however, does not equate fiction and lies; he explores the place of poesy after it has been
separated from the space of the physical world. For Sidney, the place of poesy is always
the place of fiction, to which questions of falsity and verity do not apply. Poesy doesn't
lie, Sidney declares famously in his Defense, because it "nothing affirmeth." Poesy
describes a nether world in which imaginative ideas can be entertained with absolute
freedom precisely because of the categorical distinction between poesy and the real
world. The place of poesy is, for Sidney, hygienically distinct from the world. However,
as we see in chapter five, Sidney's progenitor Thomas More is not so certain that his
rhetorical world is entirely distinct from the present one he inhabits. For More, the place
of fiction is structured like irony: a linguistic fold in the real world. The linguistic fold
takes many forms in sixteenth century thinking. Rhetoric has a long tradition of seeing
this fold in terms of figure, specifically trope. Irony and metaphor are two ways that
literary language folds against itself. For More, irony takes place. More and Sidney
narrate the trajectory of *coincidentia oppositorum*, the coincidence of opposites that, for Late Medieval thinkers such as Nicholas of Cusa, produces an experience of the real, Divine presence. Irony is a case of language that takes place precisely because it turns against itself. Like Peacham's and Wilson's metaphor, More's irony identifies self-difference with literary structures' taking place.

When talking about literary structures and rhetorical figures, I refer to those structural elements of literature beyond the straightforward meaning an utterance might convey. Austin calls this language-of-meaning constative language. It is in opposition to constatives that Austin defines his performatives. New Critics are another group of thinkers who focus on linguistic structures that exceed the constative function. In an attempt to return focus to literary structures, William Wimsatt, Monroe Beardsley, I.A. Richards, and Cleanth Brooks specify that literature is more than what it says, than how it can be paraphrased. Early Modern inquiries into rhetorical structures help to reveal what New Critics get right: the performative dimension of structures like metaphor. When outlining metaphor, poetry, and other specifically literary structures, New Critics and other theorists of metaphor emphasize that it is a kind of tension and that metaphors and poems are as much about what they *do* as what they say. Early Modern authors such as Thomas More would be very comfortable with Brooks' definition of literature in terms of "ironic structure," of the ways it self-consciously asserts its difference from common speech ("Irony as a Principle of Structure"). What joins New Critics and Early Modern rhetoricians is a sense that literary structures are, in part, what they *do*. Both groups advocate what might be called "ecoformalism," an investigation of the ways that literary
forms and structures shape the environment of a text. As we shall see, ecoformalism is an inquiry into the ways that literary and rhetorical forms take place.

Ecocriticism is not, as a whole, preoccupied with performative language. In fact, my second chapter demonstrates the degree to which ecocritics focus on representative and persuasive language to the exclusion of other kinds of language. Ecocritics' methodology of investigating themes and images of nature is well-known, but the consequence of this myopic focus has not yet been appreciated fully. I contend that, by focusing on linguistic content, on what texts say about nature through themes and images, ecocritics perpetuate the very human/nonhuman binary they hope to overcome. Given that representations are always spatiotemporally distant from what they seek to represent, ecocritics presume a text/world binary. But, in my third chapter, I draw attention to a branch of ecocriticism that considers explicitly the relationship between text and world. Ecoformalists such as Angus Fletcher, Timothy Morton, and Robert Watson concentrate on the ways that rhetorical and literary forms and structures constitute the phenomenological experience of a text and the environment the text generates. When ecocritics turn from themes and images to literary form, they discover ways the text can be said to take place. By contrast, they also suggest that the text/world binary produces a kind of literary melancholia, a nostalgia for the nature that a text elides. Timothy Morton's *Ecology Without Nature* (2007), for instance, observes that the phenomenology of Romantic and nature writing posits a nostalgic distance between text and world. He concludes that the text/world dualism is necessary and advocates a melancholic "dark ecology," but other ecoformalist inquiries challenge Morton's conclusion. In specific,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a French phenomenologist, suggests that "first-order language" (language that takes place and has not yet ossified into deterministic meaning) is a phenomenological experience of the "flesh of the world," everything visible and invisible that constitutes the world. Merleau-Ponty provides the figure of the chiasm, a self-different fold in the flesh of the world that seems to suggest the division between subject and object but ultimately demonstrates the connectedness of all of nature. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasm illustrates the linguistic folds that Early Modern thinkers deliberate: More through irony, Sidney through fiction, Puttenham through trope, and Jonson through theater.

Written a century after More's *Utopia*, Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair* (1614) considers how literature takes place once rhetoric and poesy become commodified literary texts. In my sixth chapter, Jonson highlights how Early Modern inquiries into the ways rhetoric and poesy take place draw upon theories of theater. For More, theater highlights the ways that irony can be said to take place in the real world. For Sidney, theater brackets fiction from the real world; only a child would mistake the stage for reality, Sidney mocks. For Jonson, theater and the literary text are defined, in part, by the ways they take place on the market as an economic commodity. Theater, drama, and the potentially published text is, for Jonson, an explicit investigation of the performative dimensions of literature. What Jonson uncovers is that the text works like a kind of contract: specifically, a *de futuro* contract or contract whose fulfillment lies, eternally, in the future. For Jonson, this discovery is an anxious one. As the author, Jonson attempts to control his text through the Induction that prefaces the play, a reading of the Articles of
Agreement between author and audience.\textsuperscript{10} However, the Articles fail to contain the text. Just as all of the Austinian performatives in the text misfire or are otherwise misdirected, so, too, Jonson discovers that the literary text, the play his audience receives in whatever form, is fundamentally beyond his control. \textit{Bartholomew Fair} concludes by reaffirming the Austinian definition of literature as that in which performatives fail to obtain, but the failures are, for Jonson (and Austin's biographer Feldman) dramatic. For Jonson, literature is theatrical in that it ultimately fails to take place; its place is eternally deferred into the future, the future of the printed drama.

These chapters bring to light the degree to which Early Modern conversations about rhetoric, poesy, literature, fiction, and theater/drama define the relationship between language and the world. Fundamental to inquiries into Early Modern literary places is period-specific science, beginning with natural philosophy and only gradually transitioning to Cartesian mechanism and ultimately to the mathematical universe of Newton, Sprat, and other scientists in the Revolution. It is this mathematical universe that ecocritics (and Morton) inherit: a universe in which the text is perpetually severed from the world. As the coda demonstrates, the categorical distinction between text and world produces the literary melancholy that ecocritics inherit. But before this worldview solidifies, sixteenth-century thinkers inquire into the ways that literature and rhetoric take place in the world. This dissertation maps the place of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century rhetoric by drawing on ecoformalism. At the same time, it offers a vision of

\textsuperscript{10} Curiously, Jonson does not include \textit{Bartholomew Fair} in his 1616 Folio; it is printed first in 1631 (Gossett).
Ecoformalism defined as the formal analysis of the relationship between literary text and the world as this relationship shifts over time and across context. Integrating spatiotemporal, rhetorical, and scientific notions of place, this dissertation examines the ways that geography, cartography, rhetoric, biology, zoology, and the physical world come together a uniquely Early Modern notion of place; in particular, these fields chart the ways the rhetorical figures and literary structures can be said to take place. As for literary studies, this inquiry is, in large, a generic one. As rhetoric becomes poesy becomes literature, its place shifts from being in the world to nothing more than the Elysian fields of fiction; finally, it is nothing more than another item on the market, a "profitable invention" (Sidney ibid). As Lefebvre observes, place becomes product.\footnote{La production de l'espace (The Production of Space), 1974.}
CHAPTER II
READING ECOCRITICISM: THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

My Early Modern colleagues often ask me "what, exactly, is ecocriticism?" They have the general sense that ecocritics explicate nature imagery but suspect that such an uncomplicated characterization must be inaccurate. My colleagues are both right and wrong. The "nature" that ecocritics investigate is not self-evident; much of what Lawrence Buell calls "second-wave" ecocriticism deconstructs terms such as "nature" and "human," which "first-wave" ecocritics adopt unproblematically. However, while it renovates the first-wave by troubling human/non-human and culture/nature binaries, second-wave ecocriticism nonetheless reproduces assumptions that have constrained the field from the beginning: for the most part, ecocritics treat language -- and literature -- as representational and normative. That is, regardless of the degree to which ecocritics deconstruct images and themes of nature (however defined), ecocriticism largely remains preoccupied with those representations and the environmental ethics they record and promote. Literary critics are skeptical of ecocriticism because critics have been examining nature imagery for hundreds of years.

12 Of course, the terms "first-" and "second-wave" ecocriticism are themselves oversimplifications; both approaches have been in evidence since the beginning of the ecocritical movement. Nevertheless, the mid-1990's did see a transition from an ecocriticism primarily concerned with the application of science to literature to an ecocriticism preoccupied with the ideology encoded in themes and images of nature.
EcoCriticism illuminates the beliefs about nature that have resulted in our current environmental crisis; to this end, its ethical and philosophical inquiries alone validate the ecocritical project. But ecocritics' challenge to the human/non-human binary remains incomplete; because representations refer to an extratextual world, ecocritics tend to assume a categorical distinction between literature and the environment. Ecocritics fail to critique thoroughly the partitioning of human from non-human when they neglect to explore the possibility that language and literature are of the world rather than separate from it. Representations of nature are, by definition, spatially and temporally distinct from the natural world they seek to represent. They describe past events with varying degrees of accuracy, exist in commodified texts estranged from their means of production, offer a "fictional" world different from the actual, physical world, or look forward to a possible future.¹³

The separation of literary text from the physical world coalesces in the seventeenth century with the event of the so-called Scientific Revolution. The categorical distinctions between literature and language and the world are a product of sixteenth century inquiries into rhetoric, fiction, poesy, and the literary text as such. Harry Berger Jr. and William Egginton, for instance, note that these frames contribute to a growing sense of fiction and drama as literary genres. They also produce the division between literature and the world that ecocritics assume. As we shall see in the chapters to follow, the relationships between the environment and literature that ecocritics take for granted

are historically situated. In particular, they develop in tandem with economic, scientific, and linguistic changes that take place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Developments in capitalism and *juris prudence*, for instance, structure changing notions of contracts and thus shape new understandings of how language performs. Early Modern definitions of genre, fiction, drama, and performative language shape the distinctly modern, ecocritical separation of literature from the world that we have inherited. In examining the mutually influential structures of fiction, literary commodification, and performative language/contract theory, Early Modern authors offer a kind of ecoformalism: they debate the ways that words are in the world, and they define the place of literature. 14 Modern scholars can help rectify ecocritics' general inattention to literature as a structure of language, and a sharpened focus on the world, the environment, and place helps Early Modern scholars to become conscious of the ways that theories of rhetoric inquire into performative language, phenomenology, and the scientific status of language as a literal (and real) force in the world. 15

DEFINING ECOCRITICISM

Cheryll Glotfelty, co-editor of the field's first anthology, the *Ecocriticism Reader* (1996), offers an appealing vision of "literary ecology" when she defines it as the study of

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14 "Ecoformalism" is Scott Knickerbocker's term. I learned it from him during our time together at the University of Oregon, 2003-2007.

15 Note that the modern distinction between "metaphoric" and "literal" language solidifies in the sixteenth and particularly the seventeenth centuries as "literal" comes to mean "real" and "metaphoric" to mean "figurative, fictional."
"the relationship between literature and the environment" (xviii). This early definition suggests that eco-literary critics reflect on the many ways that literature and the environment are mutually defining. Unfortunately, Glotfelty herself fails to recognize the consequences of the word "literature." She ignores the formal distinction between literature (language in a literary context) and sheerly communicative language. Unfortunately, ecocritics rarely think explicitly about the many possible relationships between text and world. Glotfelty sets the stage for this limited interpretation of her otherwise suggestive definition when she clarifies that ecocritics ask questions like "How is nature represented?" "What role does physical setting play?" and "Are the values expressed in this play consistent with ecological wisdom?" Like most ecocritics, Glotfelty concentrates on descriptions of the physical world and the ethics texts promote, on, in other words, representational and normative language. She and traditional ecocritics neglect to consider literature as a unique genre of language. And for these critics, fiction is monolithic: it merely represents one thing or another, intended or otherwise.

But Early Modern inquiries into rhetoric, poesy, fiction, and literature deliberate the degree to which these forms of language are performative. Early Modern language takes place. It does so metaphorically, figuratively, but not in a way that necessarily distinguishes these terms from the real world. Language is still part of the world for Early Modern thinkers, and it is part of the world because it is literary. Language, literature, and the world relate to one another.\textsuperscript{16} It is only by attending to these

\textsuperscript{16} I define the formal terms "language" and "literature" later in this chapter.
relationships that ecocriticism can be said to include distinctly literary criticism. In order

to move forward, environmental literary theorists must reexamine their methodology. It

is only by turning to the critical task Glotfelty suggests that literary ecology can establish

itself as a viable theory of literature as such. Environmental literary theorists must

examine critically the many possible relationships between literature and the physical

world, and they must account for the term "literature" in historically specific

environmental terms. In doing so, they will find that Early Modern rhetorical discussions

challenge and define what it means to be a product and a commodity, debate whether

fiction is "unreal" ("unreal" in the sense that performativity does not obtain), and

highlight the future into which the text, as a form of contract, looks.

In 1978, William Rueckert introduces the term "ecocriticism" in his examination

of metaphor. Currently, ecocriticism includes a broad spectrum of disciplines. Ecocritics

might work with the geography of space, the inequities produced and perpetuated by

environmental policies and pollution, the philosophical and ethical implications of

Heideggers' and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the cognitive and biological

mechanisms behind language and literature, or the ways that language manifests across

biological and zoological boundaries; ecocriticism now serves as an umbrella term for

interdisciplinary environmental inquiry with an activist agenda. Glottfelty's term

"literary ecology" dates at least to Joseph Meeker's introduction of the term in 1974, and

it names the branch of ecocriticism housed in departments of literature. First-wave

literary ecologists praise literature that evinces ecological morals and biological truths;

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17 Cf. Buell *FE* (138).
they include critics such as Jonathan Bate, Glen Love, Karl Kroeber and Gabriel Egan. Tristan Sipley observes that the first wave is occupied with a particular kind of content -- the nature "out there" as described by science\(^{18}\) -- and its method is generally laudatory, tending towards what Michael Cohen calls the "praise song school." For instance, Bate waxes poetic about the ways that Wordsworth's poems emphasize the biologically defined physical world in his *Romantic Ecology* (1991), and Kroeber extols the lessons that scientific theories impart to literary criticism in his *Ecological Literary Criticism* (1994).

In contrast to the first-wave preoccupation with the physical (as scientific) world, the second-wave interrogates the ways that "nature" is always structured culturally. Although not a self-identified ecocritic, Henri Lefebvre epitomizes the field's primary assumption that "(social) space is a (social) product."\(^{19}\) Second-wave ecocritics examine the social dimensions of nature and critique the environmental consequences of Western thought. There is no "out there" for second-wavers, Sipley observes.\(^{20}\) Praise is replaced by "the ruthless criticism of everything that exists" (Marx). Second-wavers like William Cronon, Donna Haraway, Annette Kolodny, David W. Teague, Raymond Williams, and Louise H. Westling reveal that concepts such as "wilderness," "pastoral," and "human" are all fraught with ideological baggage, that the environment is feminized and women are degraded when the environment and nature are corrupted, and that the term

\(^{18}\) As noted to me in a personal email, April 2010.

\(^{19}\) *The Production of Space* (1974).

\(^{20}\) Sipley email.
"environment" includes built environments such as farms and cities. Seeking to broaden the field from early preoccupations with ecology and to disclose the critical, and thus activist, turn the field has taken, Buell proposes to rename the field "environmental criticism." Indeed, critic Simon Estok distinguishes the field from previous critical inquires into representations of nature by its explicitly activist dimension ("Introduction" and elsewhere).

This chapter interrogates typical first- and second-wave ecocriticism. It calls attention to the fact that, across the board, ecocritics treat language as representative and normative: for the most part, they ignore the formal elements of literature. And the field of Early Modern studies, in which ecocriticism has been less prominent than in studies of the Romantic period and the twentieth century, does not challenge mainstream ecocriticism. The Early Modern period has yet to leave its distinct mark on ecocriticism. Currently, ecocritical readings of Early Modern and Medieval texts fail to highlight the historically-specific assumptions of the field. Ecocritical readings of Early Modern texts reproduce the same assumptions in readings of texts from later periods. In fact, because the period has only a few ecocritical critiques, the Early Modern period offers a clear cross section of ecocriticism as a whole. A survey of Early Modern ecocritical studies highlights the field's failure to engage systematically with the qualities that distinguish literature from other types of written texts. Following the ecocritical disinterest in literature as such, Early Modern literary ecologists focus on representative language at the expense of literary forms and structures. But, as we shall see, sixteenth-century rhetoricians' investigations into the place of literature, into what it means for literature to
have and/or take place, reveal the historical negotiations that produce the representative language that ecocritics presume.

By "literary forms and structures," I refer to the dimensions of literature with which New Critics are preoccupied. For New Critics such as W.K. Wimsatt, Monroe Beardsley, I.A. Richards, and Cleanth Brooks, the "poetic" or "literary" dimension of a text is that which exceeds representational content. Although New Criticism has been criticized (and rightly so) for its inattention to the cultural contexts that shape, and privilege, literary forms, it nonetheless provides a clear lens for Early Modern literature; indeed, Early Modern literary critics have been turning to revised versions of New Criticism for the past five years or more. "New Formalism," as Marjorie Levinson calls it, speaks to Early Modern literature because both define literature in terms of irony. Famously, I.A. Richards characterizes literary language as "ironic," a definition that speaks to, for example, Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516). Recent scholars such as Levinson are propelling a socially conscious version of New Criticism to the theoretical mainstream. Following suit, this dissertation demonstrates that a historically-grounded attention to form and literary tradition is also, for Early Modern authors, an inquiry into the environment or place of literature. (This "of" is both possessive and prepositional.) As Early Modern thinkers come to distinguish categorically between

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21 See Marjorie Levinson's "What is New Formalism?"

22 As we shall see in chapter five, irony has a long history of defining the environmental dimensions of literature.

23 See *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924).
literature and the environment, literature no longer takes place. Early Modern rhetoricians consider linguistic performativity in more than Austinian (J.L.) terms; literary structures take place even though they do not satisfy the conditions of a performative utterance. This dissertation uncovers an alternative narrative of linguistic performativity that depends upon the frame of literature, a frame Austin specifically discounts. As rhetorical structures take place, they suggest ways to think about literature in environmental terms.

As subsequent chapters will show, the distinction between language and the environment gains new currency around the turn of the seventeenth century. In its broadest strokes, this dissertation historicizes the distinction between literature and the physical world, a distinction that ecocritics simply assume. One corollary of focusing exclusively on representational language is that the world becomes, by definition, extratextual. Even the rare occasions when ecocritics are attentive to the contingent nature of the relationship between text and environment, such as when Lawrence Buell proposes three models of reciprocity between text and physical world, are tainted by the theory’s fundamental concentration on representative language. Representative language, and the fundamental distinction between text and world it assumes, resigns ecocritics to mourning the insufficiency of the text. In the coda of this dissertation, I find that this grieving, an ecocritical melancholy for the physical world, is a product of the distinction between literature and world. Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621, 1654) laments the real, physical world of anatomy missing from language, especially from literature. As critical emphasis shifts from what literary structures do to what literature says, literary
performatives vanish. Literature might talk about places in the world, but it does not take place. The ways that literature exceeds questions of verity emphasizes the degree to which literature is fictional rather than performative. The text no longer happens in the world, Burton discovers, although it promises to. As we shall see by recourse to Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair* (1614), the newly commodified literary text is structured like a *de futuro* promise, a promise never fulfilled, and forever mourned as absent from the word.

**FAMILIAR TERRITORY**

My colleagues in Early Modern literary studies are most likely familiar with the second-wave approach: examining the ways that Early Modern concepts of nature influenced by race, gender, class, colonialization etc. For instance, Sylvia Bowerbank’s *Speaking For Nature: Women and Ecologies of Early Modern England* (2004) details the contributions Early Modern and Enlightenment women authors make to ecological thought and practice. Carefully attending to the many categories (such as class) that intersect for each of her authors, Bowerbank emphasizes that “the ‘nature’ they spoke for was inevitably constrained and entangled in the contradictory values and interests that gave rise to imperialism, not only over nature but also over various peoples and lands around the world” (4). For instance, Bowerbank notes that Lady Margaret Cavendish’s lament for a lost connection with nature is informed by the demise of a purely aristocratic claim to forests (which, during the Early Modern period, are increasingly “designated for the production of timber and other forest products” 14-16). Bowerbank’s brand of "ecofeminism" contrasts with earlier ecofeminism, such as that of Bill Phillips, who
argues that Cavendish demonstrates women’s "inherent" connection with nature and resistance to male domination.\textsuperscript{24} Phillips echoes the sentiments of Carolyn Merchant, perhaps the most well-known Early Modern ecocritic. Merchant argues that women -- traditionally associated with nature and sources of knowledge -- suffer from increased commodification and domination following the Cartesian shift to a mechanistic conception of nature. These three ecofeminists demonstrate the category's range, and yet all offer "an important corrective" to the first-wave tendency to valorize uncritically scientific theory, theories which some ecofeminists suggest to reinscribe the "correlation between the history of institutionalized patriarchy and human domination of the nonhuman" (Buell \textit{Future} 19).\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} Sophisticated ecofeminist critiques such as Bowerbank's have “been held back by the overstated anti-rationalism and gynocentric dualism of radical ecofeminism,” of which Phillips and Merchant are examples (Garrard 176-77). Ecofeminism must be careful not to exchange one hierarchy for another or resort to essentializing statements (24-25). Rather than asserting that women \textit{are} closer to nature, for instance, ecofeminism is most successful when it investigates the purposes to which such an ideology has been put and when it attends to complex historical particulars. Greg Garrard’s treatment of ecofeminism, although brief, nonetheless remains one of its best critiques. Garrard argues that the usefulness of the practice is vexed; when given over to "irrationalism and essentialism" there are "serious limitations" to ecofeminism. However, more nuanced ecofeminists “bring to bear social and philosophical insights that give the position far greater depth, scope and rigor” (27). For instance, ecofeminists have provided “sharp critiques” of population problems as well as of “globalization, free trade, and ‘international ‘development’.”

\textsuperscript{25} The "starting point" for ecofeminism is "[a]n analysis of the interrelated dominations of nature-- psyche and sexuality, human oppression, and nonhuman nature -- and the historic position of women in relation to those forms of domination " (Gaard and Murphy 3, qtg. Ynestra King 117). The term “eco-feminism” is as old as “literary ecology,” Françoise D’Eaubonne having coined the term “ecological feminism” in 1974 (Bowerbank 2).
Fewer ecocritics have written about Early Modern texts than about Romantic and twentieth-century texts, yet the Early Modern period is nonetheless subject to the full range of literary ecology. For instance, the second-wave's fundamental critique of the first-wave's praise of scientism provides the basis for Merchant's *Death of Nature* (1980).\(^{26}\) And Bowerbank epitomizes the second-wave approach when she stresses that factors like race, economic status, class, and nationality inform her reading of the ways that Early Modern nature is gendered.\(^{27}\) For instance, Bowerbank draws on Marxist critic

\(^{26}\) Robert Watson's recent *Back to Nature* (2007) offers another kind of critique of scientism when he argues that the similes in Shakespeare's *As You Like It* speak to a wider, scientific crisis over the epistemological failure to know the world in itself without recourse to comparisons and likenesses.

\(^{27}\) Bowerbank joins the ranks of ecofeminists such as Annette Kolodny and Louise H. Westling (both of whom explore the history of American colonization, development and pastoral in light of the fundamental metaphor of nature-as-woman). This metaphor, Kolodny argues "is probably America's oldest and most cherished fantasy: a daily reality of harmony between man and nature based on the experience of the land as essentially feminine" (4). William Cronon asserts that the very concept of wilderness is colonized by vested interests. In modern parlance, it is freighted with (American) nationalistic sentiment (76-79). Not only is wilderness commodified and sold to tourists, but the concept of "the wild frontier" reproduces concepts of democracy, individuality, and American national identity. It is marked by class (trips into the "wilderness" require leisure and money), gender (the individual, conquering male), ablebodiedness (one can hardly scale a cliff in a wheelchair), and race (it erases the history of native peoples' presence).

Although Cronon is interested particularly in the American notion of wilderness, his observation that concepts supposing a purity of nature are nonetheless inflected by cultural values is instructive for literary critics treating any era or genre. In terms of the Early Modern period, we would do well to remember, for instance, that "the forest' referred to land under a peculiar and elaborate structure of governance" (Bowerbank 14). It almost exclusively denominated hunting preserves open only to royalty and aristocrats; as one critic has argued, the Early Modern forest "was a political structure that pitted the people against the king." Moreover, it was not unpopulated; unlawful trespassers might include "rude mechanicals," thieves, and peasants who may have infiltrated them in order to seek shelter from the law or to collect woodstuffs or food (ever pressing needs given the increase in enclosures).
Raymond Williams, who unpacks the ideological baggage of the pastoral. Among other things, Williams reveals that the Early Modern pastoral serves as a carrier of upper-class values and that it obscures the brutality of pre-capitalist structures and oppressive practices in the countryside (see esp. 13-54). Inquiries into capitalism and commodification draw on ecocritical inquiries into colonization and exploitation of resources, concerns that provide the basis for Ken Hiltner's Milton and Ecology (2003). And Lara Bovilsky's, Scott J. Bryson's, and Carolyn Merchant's inquiries into what it means to be "human" in the Early Modern period highlight second-wave interests in animality and "post-human discourse." For instance, Bovilsky's current manuscript project explores the boundaries of the Early Modern notion of what it means to be human; in part, she contrasts Descartes' concept of a non-human machine with emotional "robots" such as Spenser's false Florimel. In another vein, Gail Kern Paster argument

Finally, we might recall that forests in Early Modern England had been selectively farmed since the Medieval period. See Oliver Rackham's Trees and Woodland in the British Landscape.

Early Modern scholars might be particularly interested in Williams' observation that the British Renaissance edits out the conflicts present in classical pastoral (such as harsh weather and small farmers' displacement) (18); consider, for instance, the Early Modern "country house poem," of which Jonson's "To Penshurst" provides a clear example. Both workers and hard work vanish as partridges, carp, and eels march themselves onto the dining table (29-38), and grateful peasants lay gifts of food and nubile daughters at the door "to salute" the aristocratic "lord, and lady" (49-50). The aristocracy and landed classes also co-opt the pastoral when, in Restoration comedy, the opposition between the corrupt city and the innocent country elides oppressive practices in the country and the ways the city draws its very sustenance from the countryside (46-54). Williams finds less mystification in the pastoral poems of Marvell and Pope insofar as they are more likely to look at actual landscapes in all their particulars, but they are frightened nonetheless with the developing Protestant work ethic. Cf. Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization.
that the Early Modern belief that both human and animal bodies were comprised of humors troubles the distinction between the two and looks forward to Westling's reading of Derrida's "animot posthumanism" ("MC"). The Early Modern foci of ecocriticism

Ecocritics emphasize that the cultural division between animal and human serves to justify human superiority and exploitation of the nonhuman. Such polarization facilitates exploitation of humans as well. For instance, Simon Estok argues that the increasingly well-defined distinction between human and nonhuman permits the exploitation of bestialized humans, of animals, of and the natural world, an exploitation that increases rapidly during the Early Modern period. Bestialization "positions the Other outside of the human sphere and into the discursively deadened world of resources" ("Conceptualizing the Other" 894).

Westling observes that "post-human discourse" follows two forms: the first is "Techno or Cyborg Posthumanism" such as that developed by Donna Haraway, who "opens the prospect of escape from bodily limitations" ("Posthuman" 29) through a recognition of our cyborg natures and a rejection of the technology/nature dualism (cf. Garrard 146). Haraway suggests that humans' dependence on technology results in their having "cyborg natures" and that the boundaries between the physical and the non-physical are complicated by our reliance on, for example, microelectronic machines. Bovilsky's work on the ways that Early Modem "robots" define what it means to be human extends Harawys' work to the Early Modern period. But for all the esteem in which ecocritics hold her, Haraway's technological arguments are peripheral to the ecocritical project, which remains largely preoccupied with the physical world. Westling finds Haraway's emphasis on humans' virtual natures to be politically problematic because "escap[ing]" the body "does nothing to address the dilemmas posed by a threatened environment, but instead implies that we can escape involvement in the rhythms of growth and decay in the biosphere" (30).

The much more common form of "post-human discourse" might be called "Animot Posthumanism" in honor of Jacques Derrida's use of the term to signal the "bewildering range of beings and states" (31). As Westling describes it, Animot Posthumanism "helps to define the human place within the ecosystem by interrogating or erasing the boundary that has been assumed to set our species apart from the rest of the living community" (30). In addition to emphasizing that humans are themselves animals, Animot Posthumanism arises as a philosophical implication of ecology's underscoring of the fact that humans are intricately connected with nonhuman animals, plants, and other participants in their ecosystems. Their mutually informing participation in such ecosystems is understood to "eras[e] the boundary" between human and nonhuman.

The Early Modern period is particularly fruitful for investigations into humanity and animality. Merchant and Bryson argue that, increasingly, humans have defined themselves in opposition to nature (which includes animals and the body), and that the
suggest ecocriticism's connections with recent critical interests in Early Modern materiality. Early Modern ecocriticism fulfills the six topics Greg Garrard identifies with ecocriticism in his primer *Ecocriticism* (2004): pastoral, wilderness, apocalypse, dwelling, animals, and the future/utopia. However, the one kind of Early Modern "material" language upon which ecocritics fail to comment is performative language, both in the Austinian sense (oaths, judgments, etc.) and in the context of Early Modern thinkers' interest in theater and drama as a developing genre. Ecocritics' inattention to performative language suggests that the theory is not yet fully developed in its relevance for Early Modern literature. Standard Early Modern scholars such as Steven Greenblatt, Stanley Fish, Northrop Frye, and Jonas Barish emphasize that the Early Moderns are preoccupied with linguistic performativity. Greenblatt, Fish, and Barish consider how linguistic performances shape and reflect human subjects and how theater maps on to "real life," and Northrop Frye distinguishes between different types of Early Modern literature based on their performative dimensions.\(^\text{30}\)

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Scientific Revolution slowly resignified terms such as "animal" and "beast" in opposition to the human, whereas earlier such terms included the human (Bryson 45-46). Interestingly, Early Modern physicians' understanding that all organic bodies are comprised of humors looks forward to Westling's animot posthumanism. Gail Kern Paster, for instance, observes that the humoral makeup that both humans and animals share renders both open to mutual influence; moreover, Paster argues that shifting humors result in dynamic subject positions for both humans and nonhumans, positions that modern critiques of anthropocentrism (including Paster's own) advocate ("Melancholy Cats").

THE WORLD OF THE WORD

Both first- and second-wave theorists champion literary realism. First-wavers endorse literature that provides accurate representations of biological, ecological, and other scientific facts and laws. Second-wavers expand realistic representations of nature to include rhetoric and figuration, which can express personal experiences of nature realistically. But, even though first- and second-wavers define literary realism differently, they both focus on themes and images of nature. Because they focus on representational language, language that does something has no place in environmental literary criticism. (And, as we shall see, when literature does something then it takes place.)

The emphasis on representational language undermines the field's goal of overturning the culture/nature binary. Representational language assumes an extratextual world to which it then refers. Unfortunately, even the few ecologists who theorize explicitly about language focus monocularly on representative language, a fixation that hampers the development of the field. In the final analysis, its methodology keeps literary ecology from being a viable theory of literature rather than a subsidiary of history or science. Granted, it is unreasonable to critique the field for failing to offer something never explicitly part of its activist mission. But ecocritics' shortsightedness frustrates the

31 A noteworthy exception to this rule is the burgeoning field of ecodrama. As we shall see later in this chapter, the earliest forays into ecodrama still reproduce the field's fixation on nature themes. However, more recent works are more sophisticated in that they consider the ways that theatrical pieces produce a sense of space. Subsequent chapters' emphases on the developments of drama suggest that, insofar as ecodrama is concerned with performative, productive language, a sound environmental literary theory will need to engage ecodrama.
contributions the field could make to the study of literature. Because literary ecologists limit their attention to textual content, they never have the opportunity to uncover the ways that literature might be continuous with the physical world. In other words, they miss the ways that literature might be said to have an environment or to environ. As we shall see, the very division between text and world that ecocritics assume takes shape during the seventeenth century. The ecocritical fixation on representative language develops in the later part of the Early Modern period, and it develops against a theory of literature that concentrates on the ways figures take place and on the ways literature can be said to have a place. Early Modern studies can enrich ecocriticism by returning attention to rhetorical theories alternative to the representational model.

From early on, however, ecocritics have prized literature grounded in a modern notion of scientific realism. Glen Love, perhaps the most prolific first-wave theorist, conflates scientific and literary realism. His Past President's Address at the 1998 meeting of the Western Literature Association titled “Revaluing Nature: Toward an Ecological Literary Criticism” challenges English scholars to account for the environmental movement in their criticism. Love argues that literary critics ought to train more rigorously in evolutionary biology (rather than the “arcane fields of physics,” the language of which is presumably less realistic) to foster a better understanding of what constitutes good literature (“Science, Anti-Science” 74). This argument exemplifies the first-wave's "call for greater scientistic literacy"; first-wavers "commend the scientific method’s ability to describe natural laws, and [...] look to science as a corrective to

32 Cf. William Howarth’s “Some Principles of Ecocriticism.”
critical subjectivism and cultural relativism” (Buell FE 18). For Love and other first-wavers, scientific methodologies and truths ground responsible texts, which represent the world faithfully. Love argues that scientific training provides literary critics with two important interpretive tools: it helps them to acknowledge and understand our interrelatedness with the nonhuman world, and it provides the means by which to judge the success of a text. For Love, science (specifically evolutionary biology) provides truths by which to determine accuracy of content and standards against which to judge a text’s style.

Although Love is a literary critic insofar as he offers readings of literary texts, his theory suggests that he is not invested in literature as a genre. Love argues that literature is like ecology in that “[l]iterature involves interrelationships” (“Ecocriticism and Science” 561). However, not all “interrelationships” are of interest to Love; for one, Love is not talking about the intertextuality that poststructuralists emphasize. Rather, Love argues that ecological awareness enhances and expands our sense of interrelationships to encompass nonhuman as well as human contexts. Ecological thinking about literature requires us to take the nonhuman world as seriously as previous modes of criticism have taken the human realm of society and culture. That, it seems to me, is ecocriticism’s greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity.

Ecocritics will be better readers of texts, Love argues, because their “ecological” point of view will attune them to the nonhuman dimensions of a text. Ecology’s emphasis on
interrelatedness requires that ecocritics attend to nonhuman characters and resist reducing the physical world as represented in a text to mere landscape or setting.\textsuperscript{33}

However, the ways that authors represent the nonhuman world are not all equally valid for Love. He insists that "realistic" texts are the most legitimate; thus, Love argues that ecocritics should renovate the canon. Literary representations of the natural world that depart from the strict technical accuracy scientific methodology demands are the deplorable effect of critics' and authors' preference for theory over reality ("Science, Anti-Science" 70). Literature's interdisciplinarity with science demands a return to "literary realism," which Love understands not as the stylistic development of the nineteenth century, but rather in terms of the transparent, unambiguous, literal language of scientific discourse. Love presumes that a scientific style of writing provides the most uninhibited access to the actual world, a world best known through scientific methodology: "the biological sciences [are] not just another social construction. Rather, they are the necessary basis for a joining of literature with what has proven itself to be our best human means for discovering how the world works" (PE 8). Love argues that texts that are "realistic" in style and content are committed to developing our understanding of the real world and thus demonstrate superior "ecological relevance," the benchmark by which Love evaluates a text's value.

On one hand, Love appears to engage literary form as well as textual content because he argues for a particular kind of writing style. However, the realism with which

\textsuperscript{33} Love presumes, of course, that critical attention has not been focused on the nonhuman dimensions of a text before their recuperation by ecocriticism.
Love is concerned is more about communicating information than stylistics. Love focuses on language that can be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity; like other ecocritics, he prefers "realism" because it tells the "truth" about nature (or our experiences of nature, as second-wave ecocritics qualify). (As we shall see in chapter five, Philip Sidney stresses that poesy is not concerned with questions of truth.) Style matters for Love only to the degree to which it allows the natural world to shine through on its own terms. Ultimately, it is not literary form that interests Love but the content that form facilitates. He limits literature to the ideas it "stores" and "transports." That is, he reduces style to representational content. Love illustrates the first-wave's methodology of focusing on content at expense of theories of literary form (which I shall treat in more detail shortly). The content with which Love is concerned is extratextual: science reveals truths about the physical world outside of the text. Moreover, the texts most likely to exhibit the literary realism Love privileges would be scientific treatises rather than literary texts. Literary texts are problematic because they multiply the distance between text and world; scientific treatises, however, come close to eliminating this distance by framing truths about nature as constant laws and as mathematical expressions. Literary forms as such are beyond the pale of Love's ecocritical purview.

34 For instance, he reduces the pastoral to "a testament to our instinctive or mythic sense of ourselves as creatures of natural origins, those who must return periodically to the earth for the rootholds of sanity somehow denied us by civilization" ("Revaluing Nature" 231) and rejects pastoral conventions overall when he argues that the superior "western version of the pastoral may be said to reverse the characteristic pattern of entry and return so that it is the green world which asserts its greater significance" (235). As was the case with realism, it is the content that the Western pastoral facilitates, rather than its conventions or structure, with which Love is interested.
Like the first-wave that Love exemplifies, the second-wave is also reducible to a primary interest in representational accuracy. However, in the case of the second-wavers, the experience of the physical world is the closest we get to that world. Knowledge remains mediated by, among other things, literary form. Unlike the first-wave, second-wavers begin with the assumption that language mediates experience and thus that we can never get to the physical world itself. The second-wave acknowledges that texts reproduce nature in many ways, and these representations can take a multitude of forms. Therefore, they value rhetorical devices and figurative language because they help convey worldly experiences. But, for all the second-wave critiques scientific transparency, it simply broadens considerations of how language can represent the physical world and our experiences of it. It remains preoccupied with the representational dimensions of texts (including the ways rhetoric represents the world) in a continual effort to get to the physical world behind and outside the text. The lack that first- and second-wave ecocritics identify with language is its fundamental separation from the physical world.  

For second-wavers, rhetoric, style, and genre become legitimate areas of investigation because they encode our many relationships with nature; thus, explicating literary forms can expose our assumptions about nature. Metaphors and other figures reveal the ways that gender, race, class, and so forth shape conceptions of nature. Style, rhetoric, figures, and other literary devices speak to a particular way of experiencing the

35 As we see in chapters six and seven, Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair* and Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* suggest that the division between language, literature and the world produces a melancholic desire to return to nature.
world, an experience located either in the past (as recall) or the future (the ethics ecocritics hope to instill). Contemporary nature writing, for instance, is predicated on the personal experience of nature; it usually entails a “nonfiction prose essay describing a first-person narrator’s efforts to establish an intensely felt emotional connection with the natural world” (D. Phillips 185). For the most part, nature writing displays the triadic structure “excursion, epiphany, recollection.” Dana Phillips points up the spatiotemporal distance, and difference, between literature and the physical world. The text records or promotes the subjective experiences we have with the world, and its tools include metaphor and other figures. Experience may call for language that is more than simply literal. No longer do ecocritics privilege the strict, technical accuracy that first-wave ecocritics prefer. Buell concludes that first-wavers probably “narrow [their] sights overmuch” when they focus exclusively on “dense, accurate representations of actual natural environments” (Buell Future 40) because the realities of our lived relationships with the world may be captured best by figurative language. Since “a ‘lifelike rendering of an elk is too restrictive,’ [. . . and it discloses] no more than the surface particularities of a single creature” (Buell qtg. Silko 85), Buell commends figurative language (32-29). Second-wave ecocritics consider nature writers like David Abrams and Annie Dillard -- who have effusive, emotional styles and draw on thick, sensual imagery -- “realistically” to represent deep, intimate connections with a nature more complex than the physical world scientific laws give us.

Although they reclaim rhetoric and literary form as important fields of inquiry and valid methods of representing a physical world defined in terms of its experience, second-
wave ecocritics nonetheless perpetuate the first wave's preoccupation with representational language. Texts record our relationships with the environment -- relationships shaped by cultural assumptions -- in their rhetorical and formal dimensions. For second-wave ecocritics, literary form plays an old role in a new guise. Stylistics and formal devices are tools for transmitting and representing experiences of nature. Authors can use figurative language to illustrate their experiences, and a text's rhetorical dimension records (unconsciously or otherwise) the fundamental beliefs that shape our experience of the world. If first-wavers discount literary form in favor of scientific description, the second-wave reduces literary form to content, to the ideology it suggests. Literary ecologists examine form and stylistics for their ideational content -- for the ways they shape themes and images of nature to ideological ends, eco-friendly or otherwise. In second-wave ecocriticism, literature continues to be limited to its representational and normative functions, and literary form is simply one more carrier of content.

But literary form, New Critics teach us, is precisely the ways that literature is more than its paraphrasable "point." When I argue that literary ecologists ignore literary and rhetorical forms and structures, I refer to the literary, poetic "value" that W.K. Wimsatt identifies with the excess to a text's "moral" or "message." Wimsatt notes that it is possible to name certain formal levels of expression which, though intimately bound up with and deriving their value only from their relations to the stated meanings, are not yet parts of this meaning in the sense that they always add to it or in their absence distract from it. Under this head come the various forms of syntactic and phonetic support of statement (the
parisosis and paromoeosis of Aristotle), to some extent the intimations of what is called prose rhythm, and, for certain kinds of writing and within limits, even correctness of diction -- much, in short, though not all, of what is commonly thought of as "style." (93)

Style, Wimsatt observes, names the "formal level" of a text, one that exceeds textual "meaning." Although the two are intimately interrelated, Wimsatt nonetheless argues for "separable poetic and moral values." (By "moral," Wimsatt refers to the message or meaning of a text, to "the moral of the tale.") Texts remain responsible for their messages, but Wimsatt emphasizes the dimensions that exceed these messages; the ways a text is more than the information it attempts to communicate is the "poetic value" of a text.

Whereas the "moral value" of a text is concerned with true and false statements, with information, the "poetic value" is performative in the sense that it does something. New Critics regularly describe literary forms and rhetorical structures in terms of movement and change, interplay and events. I.A. Richards, for instance, notes that poetic language is characterized by a tension between vehicle and tenor; with it, one "utters not one meaning but a movement among meanings" (48). Scientific language, on the other hand, is concerned exclusively with meaning and should be as static as possible.

Accepting the distinction between scientific and poetic language that Love (among others) evokes, Richards characterizes the former in terms of its "technicalized and rigid speech," its use of words that "mean the same whatever other words they are put with" or that fluctuate only slightly along conventional lines (48). Literal language is the domain
of scientific language alone (120), and in it "we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle" (119). It is this scientific language that Love seeks; meaning surpassing that which is transparent is a problem that Love hopes to solve. Only by reducing the language-ness of language can literary texts demonstrate their worth and allay language’s ability to distance us from a scientifically determined reality. For Love, scientific style trumps literary (or “poetic”) style, or, rather, it folds it into its own project by reducing those elements that are distinctly poetic to mere content.

Thus, when Love argues that literature should represent nature more scientifically, he argues that literature ought to relinquish the formal qualities that make it more than a vehicle for ideational content: the very qualities that distinguish literature from scientific writing. And although second-wave theorists welcome inquiry into what Wimsatt calls the "formal level," they do so in order to determine the "moral value" of the text's "poetic value." Literary ecologists across the board seem to ignore the most basic lesson of New Criticism: that literature cannot be reduced to its paraphrasable meaning. Of course, I am not suggesting that New Criticism simply replace ecocriticism. Each can provide a corrective for the other; properly understood, environmental literary criticism calls attention to the historical and environmental dimensions of what New Critics call literary form. Environmental literary criticism calls for a historically-specific account of the relationships between literary structures and the physical world. Ecoformalism offers a corrective to ecocriticism's general disinterest in poetics and literary form. Moreover, it

36 Note that Love does admit the existence of specifically literary styles, unlike, as we shall see, the evolutionary literary critics he both inspires and idolizes -- Joseph Carroll and Robert Storey.
offers new insight into Early Modern discussions of rhetoric and literary forms by examining how these discussions both shape and are shaped by environmental concerns such as theories of science. As we shall see, Early Modern thinkers negotiate the place of rhetoric and the ways that literary structures take place in the world.

EARLY MODERN VENTURES

Although mainstream ecocriticism concentrates on Romantic and later texts, it has engaged Early Modern texts since Joseph Meeker's *Comedy of Survival* (1974). Ecocriticism is also making inroads into Medieval studies. Unfortunately, even though these earlier periods present very different views of the natural world, they are subject to the same ecocritical methodology as later periods. Book-length eco-Renaissance texts include Raymond Williams classic *Country and the City* (1973), Ken Hiltner's *Milton and Ecology* (2003), Sylvia Bowerbank's *Speaking for Nature* (2004), Gabriel Egan's *Green Shakespeare* (2006), and Robert Watson's *Back to Nature* (2007). Of these, *Green Shakespeare* is the best example of both first- and second-wave approaches. Egan emphasizes the truths ecology reveals at the same time that he exposes the ways that Early Modern notions of nature reflect cultural ideology. Egan argues that Shakespeare's texts exemplify current ecological principles such as feedback loops, micro- and macrocosmic correspondences in fractals, cybernetics, and systems theories.

*Green Shakespeare* illustrates the advantages and the limits of first- and second-wave theories. Egan's emphasis on representational language -- "I believe in truth," he
has said to me\textsuperscript{37} -- results in his assumption that the "best" pieces of literature are those that evince what we now consider scientific truth. Although Shakespeare's works sometimes display the flawed attitudes that have led to the current environmental crisis, they also look forward to modern ecological law. Egan emphasizes ecological law more strongly than do most of his second-wave colleagues, but \textit{Green Shakespeare} simply makes explicit what is implicit in mainstream literary ecology: the task of the literary critic is to investigate themes, images, and ideas of nature (textual content, in other words); and textual ethics are related directly to modern scientific theories and ecologically sound values.\textsuperscript{38}

Egan prefaces his readings of Shakespeare's plays with an examination of two scientific principles: systems feedback and the micro-/macrocosmic correspondence of fractals. Egan emphasizes these two principles because, according to him, they provide scientific proof for the ecological values of interconnection, unity, and harmony. Egan reads cybernetics and systems theory to break down the distinction between organic and mechanic systems; he suggests that such a revelation is a useful corrective to Cartesian and Enlightenment mechanism, which he blames (along with capitalist and Marxist beliefs in unlimited resources) for the current environmental crisis (15-16). Egan notes

\textsuperscript{37}In personal conversation following his presentation at the Shakespeare Society of America Conference, March 2008.

\textsuperscript{38}Second-wavers might resist association with scientific theories given that they critique the first-wave for privileging scientific definitions of the world to exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, second-wavers are like first-wavers in that both consistently privilege and promote concepts and values they identify as ecological or environmentally sound. Egan's emphasis on ecology simply makes explicit the scientism at the heart of second-wave critiques.
that fractal dynamics evince a micro-macrocosmic relationship, and thus he concludes that Elizabethan science is right in that it develops a “system of alleged correspondences between the celestial bodies, social relations, and human biology” (25, re. E.W. Tillard's *The Elizabethan World Picture*). Ecocritics often dismiss the Early Modern period because of its (supposedly non-eco-friendly) Cartesian dualism,39 so Egan delights in recuperating Early Modern politics. This is the force of his argument: although the Early Modern period does not have the advantage of our superior (that is, "right") scientific theories, it is nonetheless informed by a similar ideology,40 thus, it can help us understand

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39 See Westling’s “Literature, the Environment, and the Question of the Posthuman,” Tartar’s “Collective Subjectivity and Postmodern Ecology,” and Elder’s *Imagining the Earth* among many others. However, the supposition that Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment science result in environmental degradation is far from self-evident and not necessarily accurate. Scientific laws and the ways humans use those laws to justify social practices are separate and distinct issues. For instance, Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” has been used to justify eugenics as well as critiques of class systems. In another of her overlooked yet insightful arguments, Kate Soper emphasizes that Cartesian dualism is not necessarily less “eco-friendly” than non-dualism.

It is difficult to see why ‘humanists’ should necessarily be indifferent to the fate of non-human nature, or prove incapable of advancing its cause. Nor does there seem any reason to suppose that naturalism will guarantee good human relations or necessarily help to mitigate ecologically damaging forms of social exploitation. [...] Both the dualist and the anti-dualist may be equally sensitive to the cruelties or malpractices that may be justified on the bases of their respective positions.

(175)

Moreover, Soper suggests that the assumption that humans need to “do” something about an “environmental problem” assumes a certain measure of Cartesian dualism; “[u]nless human beings are differentiated from other organic and inorganic forms of being, they can be made no more liable for their effects on the eco-system than can any other species, and it would make no more sense to call on them to desist from ‘destroying’ nature than to call upon cats to stop killing birds” (160).

40 Egan notes that,

Although he would not, of course, have used these terms, Shakespeare’s plays show an abiding interest in what we now identify as positive- and negative-feedback loops, cellular structures, the uses and abuses of analogies between
contemporary problems, and it can illustrate appropriate environmental values. Egan argues that Shakespeare’s plays are right insofar as they presage modern scientific findings such as feedback loops and cellular structures (51), “relevant” (51) when they reveal the roots of current environmental problems and test how alternate environmental attitudes might play out, and "useful" (4) because they promote the ethics that the natural world dictates (ethics like interconnection and harmony).

Egan’s argument is limited in that it restricts the utility of texts to their embodiment of modern day scientific principles and laws. First, if the usefulness of texts is limited to the degree to which they demonstrate modern theories of science, then the majority of the English corpus is worthless. Most of the culturally significant texts from the Bible to Shakespeare to Virginia Woolf, from Beowulf to the Brontës to Sherman Alexie become largely irrelevant or "childish" (51), at least those parts of the text that do not clearly evidence current theories of science. Offering another version of Love’s "literary realism," Egan prioritizes science and limits the critical purview to the ways that texts correspond with the physical world. Literature is reduced to nothing other than one means among many of propagating desired (or evolutionarily inevitable) content. Egan hamstrings literary theorists by overlooking the unique skills literary critics offer to the academy; assuming that science teaches literature (and not the other way around), he transforms the field into an extraneous subsidiary of science departments. He admits as much when he notes that Early Modern "plays dramatize the contesting notions of nature and social order, and in the available models for community. Characters in Shakespeare display an interest in aspects of this natural world that are relevant for us, and if we take that interest seriously we find that there is nothing childlike or naïve about their concerns. (51)"
and invite us to consider why the antagonists choose to articulate their positions in relation to them" (16); Egan limits the environmentality of Early Modern texts to the ways they "dramatize," that is represent, environmental themes. As we shall see in the chapters to follow, however, Early Modern drama is fundamentally concerned with place, and literature taking place, over and above any explicit concerns about themes and images of nature. The very literary structures that exceed the "[un]childlike" (51) Early Modern concern with scientific theory and what Wimsatt calls "moral value" are part of the world in terms of having place and taking place.

In addition to ignoring the structural ways that literary form (as distinct from representations and "dramatiz[ations]") is part of the physical world, Egan also ignores the scientific lessons of the past four hundred years. Given that science changes so rapidly, Egan runs the risk of dating, and thus nullifying, his claims. Some would argue that developments in ecology have already done so. Many of the ecological values that ecocritics (including Egan) stress are outdated: they are based on science from the 1940s and 50s. As Dana Phillips notes, "[t]he values to which ecology dedicated itself early on -- especially balance, harmony, unity, and economy -- are now seen as more or less unscientific" (Phillips 42, cf. Carrard 57, D. Phillips 42-82). In particular, Garrard emphasizes that "the notion of ‘balance’ in ecosystems is scientifically problematic, and ecologists no longer assert that biological diversity is necessarily linked to stability" (27).

We should also note that Egan’s theories do not straightforwardly map on to the most recent developments in scientific thinking about the world: quantum physics. Modern
quantum physics describe the world in terms of "probabilities" and even "charm," qualities that have no name in ecology.

Beyond Egan's problematic science, ecological "values" do not transfer straightforwardly from ecology to literature. Phillips and Garrard remind us that ecological terms are metaphors. As Phillips demonstrates, in their inception such ecological principles were analogies, “rhetorical models” rather than physical laws or principles (44, 55-60). We can use words like “unity” and “complexity” to talk about physical processes, but the words should not be confused with the scientifically defined processes themselves. Ecology provides metaphors for ethics, but these ethics are no more "scientific" for the metaphors they employ. This is the paradox of ecocritics' dismissal of literary form; by failing to engage with metaphor and other literary forms, ecocritics actually overlook one way that literature is part of the world: metaphors take place. In the final analysis, although ecocritics hope to find an extrahuman (and thus objective) source for ethics, the suggestion that science dictates appropriate ethics is simply unscientific.

41 "Charm" is one of six types of quarks, whose "flavors" also include up, down, strange, top, and bottom. See Quarks and Leptons by Francis Halzen and Alan D. Martin.

42 Such ethics are not moral in the pejorative sense, but simply right (that is, scientifically accurate and evolutionarily beneficial). Ecocritics suggest that scientific theories offer ethics free from human prejudices. For instance, Karl Kroeber argues that his "ecological literary criticism” is more socially responsible than formalism and historicism (e.g.), both of which are at odds with natural law insofar as they are preoccupied with abstraction, antagonism, isolation, and "power over" (1-2). Kroeber assumes his ethics are ideologically neutral and scientific; like Wordsworth, Kroeber chastises the uninformed critic “not because he is ideologically evil or mistaken but because he has made himself discordant with the elemental rhythms by which humans adapt to nature’s beneficence” (11). Ecocritics generally suppose that the ethics they
In misguidedly applying outdated, metaphoric principles from a branch of science to literature, Egan ignores the ways that form and different fields of inquiry shape the scientific truths they "discover." One field does not translate simply to another. For instance, while fractals may demonstrate that the microcosm reproduces the macrocosm, this correspondence fails to apply in other fields, most notably in physics and biology. Modern science is currently unable to elucidate connections between physics at the quantum (subatomic) level and at the Newtonian (macro) level. Similarly,

derive from ecology are self-evidently right and beyond the realms of human politics and responsibility. Consider, for instance, Love's desire to integrate science into the humanities as a corrective to interested ideologies; it is the "best means we have for freeing ourselves from dogma, prejudice, and error" ("Science, Anti-Science" 70).

43 Scientific principles have not been proven to be related to human ethics in any way. Perhaps Dana Phillip's legendary crankiness on this point arises, in part, from the fact that he is having to repeat what scientists from Albert Einstein to Stephen J. Gould have been saying for decades: scientific law cannot provide the basis for human systems of ethics. Even Kate Soper's ecocritical standard What is Nature? is the victim of selective readings that overlook her claim that nature "does not tell us what is desirable in the way of comportment toward it" (159). Phillips notes that even Donald Worster, an environmental historian whose penchant for ecology has led to his popularity among ecocritics, "has had to admit that ecology provides us 'with no model of development for human society to emulate'" (Phillips 143, qtg. Worster 720 [sic]). This is not to say that we don't need a renewed environmental ethic -- the fact that the US White House was still suppressing scientific information on global warming in 2007 (according to Senator Barbara Boxer) demonstrates the enormity of the crisis now facing us. However, the nature revealed by scientific law need not be the source for that ethic; "just because we desperately need to develop an environmental ethic does not mean that we need to see the environment as an ethical entity in its own right" (143). In fact, it is mistaken to divorce those values from their human roots and locate them in a prepolitical nature; to jettison ethics from the human realm is to relinquish our responsibility for developing sound environmental ethics. A more responsible attitude towards the natural world will have to come from our own difficult decisions and ethical quandaries.
insurmountable distinctions apply between the organismic and subcellular levels. The identity fractals may exhibit at the micro- and macrocosmic levels does not necessarily prove micro- and macro-correspondences across the fields. Different kinds of science produce different forms of knowledge.

Indeed, the fundamental problem with the close readings in *Green Shakespeare* is that they fail to attend to the differences that form and methods of inquiry introduce. Consider, for instance, Egan’s reading of *Coriolanus*. Egan distinguishes between the individual, familial, and social levels operating in this play, and his discussion of the characters’ manipulation of the metaphor of the body politic reveals shifting relationships complicated by class and other vested interests. Further, he observes that the play asks questions similar to those modern biologists ask about the motivation for altruism. But his argument loses its footing when Egan equates *Coriolanus*’ thematics with current theories of genetic reproduction. Rather than treating the relationship between the two as metaphorical, as different ways of inquiring into "reproduction," Egan simply identifies them. This leads him to suggest, for example, that the “characters express the wish to impart their genes to the future” (56). Egan quickly recovers, noting that, in the Early Modern period, “genetic” concerns would be considered in terms of “dynastic” ambitions. Nonetheless, his argument continues to assume a straightforwardly equivalent relationship between the kind of replication with which *Coriolanus* is concerned and

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44 I thank Dr. J. Mathew Watson at the Gregor Mendel Institute in Vienna for clarification on these points in email communication in 2008.
current theories of genetics. Egan forgets that what it means for genes to reproduce and that the kinds of reproduction of interest to characters in Early Modern texts are entirely different. For instance, Early Modern inquiries into reproduction are fraught with questions of religion and morality, property, textual production, and even the relationship between the physical and ideal realms.

In fact, the differences between these kinds of reproduction are formal. Early Modern authors are sharply attuned to the literary figures they use when considering the complex and contradictory forms of reproduction. Shakespeare's sonnets, for instance, develop a tension between physical, textual, and ideal reproduction, all of which are linked with the poet's disillusionment with the poetic form he borrows from Petrarch. When Shakespeare's poet remarks to his beloved, in sonnet 56, that "you live in this" (14), he suggests that his poem provides a truer, more lasting reproduction of the young man than would biological reproduction, and he identifies the young man, his "you," with an ideal form that can continue to live in poetry (whereas a physical body is not present in the verse in the same way). But the fact that the best description of the young man is to say "you alone are you" (84.2) suggests that textual reproduction somehow distorts the ideal that the poet identifies as the essence of the young man. Shakespeare's distinction between different kinds of reproduction demonstrates that it is oversimplistic to reduce Early Modern reproduction to biology like Egan does. The sonnets emphasize the differences introduced by form and the way those differences

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45 To his credit, Egan does take into account factors such as class when considering genetic success.
become meaningful. In particular, they draw attention to the tradition of fascination with form in which they participate. Shakespeare’s sonnets would be one casualty of a literary theory that defines textual value by its correspondence to the scientific truths of the twenty-first century. Thus, when Egan reduces Coriolanus’ “message” to an invective against “the absurdity that ensues when soldierly concern for reputation overrides the genetic imperative” to reproduce (56), he is unable to address Shakespeare’s insight that the form reproduction takes radically alters what reproduction means and how it means, what it does and its dimensions of truth.

To my knowledge, only two Early Modern ecocritics attempt to move beyond content and provide a reading of literary forms and structures: Joseph Meeker and Robert Watson. Watson’s recent Back to Nature historicizes the ecocritical turn to nature (and away from words) in scientific developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although Watson does not engage with ecocriticism in detail, this dissertation expands his general observation that sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers increasingly turn to the physical world as an extralinguistic source of truth. This dissertation poses the question: what is the relationship between the word and the world, their structure, in the sixteenth century, the relationship that leads to the seventeenth-century effects that Watson proposes. Meeker offers a more sustained inquiry into literary forms (genre in

46 Watson argues that the preoccupation with similes in As You Like It speaks to the period’s concern that the only way to know something was to liken it. Watson provides a useful overview of epistemological changes in the so-called Scientific Revolution, but he does not offer a sustained inquiry into rhetorical forms and the various relationships they have with the physical world over the years. This dissertation seeks to flesh out this field of inquiry.
specific); unfortunately, he too defines form in terms of its content. Meeker argues that Early Modern comedies are more consistent with ecological values than are tragedies. He defines the comedic structure in terms of “loss of equilibrium and its recovery” (25), complexity, flexibility, and community networks. For Meeker, such facets are suggestive of ecological values. In contrast, “the tragic tradition in literature and the disastrous misuse of the world’s resources both rest upon some of the same philosophical ideas” of unmovable idealism, the supremacy of the individual, and man’s superiority over nature (59). However, the structures Meeker identifies as comedic are just as present in tragedy. In his Poetics, Aristotle notes the same characteristics of tragedy that Meeker does for comedy. Aristotle emphasizes in tragedy the importance of unity (VIII) and complexity (X), and his requirements that the audience should pity the characters as well as learn from them promote community values (XIII). Of course, there are important differences between Meeker and Aristotle, such as Meeker’s aversion to strong feeling (23). Nonetheless, what is clear is that the general structures with which Meeker is concerned are not unique to comedy. We could just as easily interpret rhyme to confer unity and balance, but I suspect that Meeker would not suggest that Skelton’s doggerel is more ecological and therefore better than Milton’s blank verse. What is ultimately important to Meeker is not the form that comedy takes but its content, the supposed ecological values the text demonstrates.
THE NATURE OF WITHDRAWL: ENVIRONMENTAL MIMESIS

Lawrence Buell explicitly considers the relationship between text and word and provides a productive investigation of the performative dimension of language. This investigation takes place in the context of what has been referred to as the "Mimesis Wars" between Lawrence Buell and Dana Phillips.47 Buell and Phillips consider which kind of mimesis Buell refers to when he notes in "The Ecocritical Insurgency" (NLH 1999) that we are in need of "environmental mimesis: [...] a critical practice that operates from a bidirectionality, imagining texts as gesturing outward toward the material world not withstanding their constitution as linguistic, ideological, and cultural artifacts" (705). Phillips argues that Buell's term "mimesis" refers to 1:1 correspondence between text and world that the text is world. Phillips castigates Buell because such correspondence is mere wishful thinking (The Truth of Ecology, 2003). Buell replies in The Future of Environmental Criticism (2005) that he makes no such claim and that, of course, by "mimesis" he means that a text must have "environmental referentiality" (32). What is at issue in this debate is the relationship between text and world; both Phillips and Buell are anxious to establish a distance between text and world, a relationship of referentiality.

Although Buell and Philips and Peacham use the term "mimesis" to emphasize a distinction between text and world, both Plato and Aristotle use the term to relate text and world. Plato and Aristotle believe that mimesis depends upon a frame between world and text; for Aristotle mimesis is suggestive of dramas and tragedy, reflections on the world that are cathartic to participants (Physics). For Plato, actors of tragedy produce mimesis,

the only difference between acting and the real world being that the former is not concerned with statements of truth (*Ion*). Although critics often counterpose Plato's inspired *mimesis* with Aristotle's reflective one, the two both define *mimesis* in relationship to drama, to performances. Plato and Aristotle agree that *mimesis* takes place, but it is precisely this possibility that both Buell and Phillips foreclose when they emphasize that texts merely refer to the environment.

In emphasizing that language represents the environment, and our experiences of it, literary ecologists necessarily separate the two. For literary ecologists, literature points to a world perennially outside the text and to experiences prior to the text. The text and the world are spatially and temporally distinct. Dana Phillips argues that the text/world binary is a necessary consequence of limiting language to its representational function.

"[O]nce we accept that our language is essentially representational, we inevitably make this mistake," that to be "in touch with language" is to be "out of touch with 'the object-world'" (167). When defined as representational, language is part of a reflective process that gets in the way of an immediate encounter with the world that exists outside of the texts. Of course, texts can promote more "eco-friendly" approaches to the world.

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48 Distinguishing himself from mainstream ecocritics, Phillips argues that “[o]ur access to language and our access to the world are the same: we cannot lose the world and keep language.” How Phillips intends that similarity is unclear; he justifies his claim with “evolutionary history and scientific practices,” suggesting that because Phillips understands language to have an evolutionary basis, because it helps us to “manage[] the world,” he concludes that language is not distinct from the physical world. In this way, Phillips offers a new manifestation of the first-wave’s insight that language is grounded in biological processes. However, he does not develop a more complex understanding of the connections between language and the environment than the fact that the two are mutually informative according to evolutionary biology.
and can help to convince the unenlightened to become environmental activists. Nonetheless, "promoting" and "convincing" remain distinct from actual encounters with nature; important investigations into the ideology of "nature" notwithstanding, one suspects that ecocritics would prefer readers to put down their books, leave their air conditioned offices, and go for a hike. As Heise observes, ecocritics treat language and texts "initially [...] as mediating tools," but ultimately as "little more than obstacles" to an authentic encounter with nature ("Hitchhiker" 512).

When considering the relationship between word and world, ecocritics Philips and Buell emphasize that the former refers to the latter and deny the possibility that literature takes place in the world; this thinking develops in the sixteenth century and in distinction to the classical understanding that the text is a kind of event, a drama. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, theories of drama are crucial to understanding a more intimate relationship between text and world than reflection. Sixteenth century thinkers suggest that texts take place like drama (theater) takes place: they operate within a frame that suspends some rules of the physical world but not others. In particular, they follow economic rules but trouble performative utterances. Buell and Phillips prefer Aristotelian mimesis but fail to consider the dramatic way that Platonic and Aristotelian mimeses are both linguistic performances. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, an ecoformalist investigation of Early Modern theories of rhetoric reveals an understanding that rhetorical figures and literature do something. Because literary performatives are excluded from J.L. Austin's performative utterance, Early Modern ecoformalism expands our understanding of what performative language looks like.
Early Modern Studies speaks to the field of ecodrama in that it considers the ways that literary language is performative. Lawrence Buell defines ecodrama as that which "scripts environmental encounter and embeddedness" (47); the plays that Buell cites as examples of ecodrama, plays by Ibsen, Soyinka, and Walcott, all dramatize environmental crises. Ecodramatists might also consider the ways that dramatic works call attention to the physical space in which they are produced and the environmental consequences of production materials. This dissertation offers another way to think of ecodrama. What we find is that theater is the lens by which sixteenth-century rhetoricians inquire into the spatiotemporality of poesy or literature. Drama, I argue, characterizes the place of rhetoric because the form of rhetoric is a performative one. Buell suggests that all plays are ecological, not just those that deal with themes and images of nature. But performative language applies to more than just plays; this dissertation suggests that, at least for the sixteenth century, literature as a whole takes place in ecological terms.

Buell intends his remarks on ecodrama to clarify one of three models "for thinking about the reciprocity between text and environment: as rhetoric, as performance, and as world-making" (Future 45). As Buell develops them, all three reduce to representation. However, of all ecocritics Buell comes closest to formulating an environmental literary theory that attends to the dramatic dimensions of a literary text.

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49 Buell notes that ecodrama is not limited just to those “that directly thematize environmental issues”; since “[d]ramatic performance always requires and reproduces physical environments,” Buell notes that all plays contain an environmental dimension (48).
His remarks clarify where an ecoformalism attentive to dramatic frames and performative language must begin.

Buell's first model, "rhetoric," is an apt title for the representational and normative forms of language that we have already identified with the ecocritical project. By analyzing textual rhetoric, the ecocritic can identify the degree to which a text adequately represents the facts as well as the text's "vision of the good" (50). This "good" is what I have been calling the "normative" dimension of language, the environmental ethics ecocritics promote.50 Promoting good also characterizes "performance," Buell's second model of the relationship between language and the world. For Buell, a performative text is one that has real-world effects, such as a non-fiction activist testimonial (46-47). This is simply another version of normative language.51 As we have seen, "ecodrama" is another example of the performative model. As Buell develops it, ecodrama is performative simply because it happens to be a particular genre (a drama). Buell's third model, world-making, also assumes representational language

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50 In this sense, language both "represents the world" but also "positions us in relation to the rest of the world" (45, qtg. Brown and Herndl 215). The "position" about which Buell (and Brown and Herndl) speak can be characterized as ideological or in terms of our ethical stances on the world -- in short, as our relationships with it. As Buell develops it, the rhetorical relationship between language and the environment is consistent with the representational relationship between literature and the environment that we have been investigating thus far; literature "represents the facts," contains an ideological dimension that records beliefs about the world and promotes ethical beliefs about the world.

51 Testimonials report previous experiences, explain points of view, and, ideally, change the ways that minds think about nature.
insofar as Buell defines world-making in terms of utopias and the like; such texts create a consistent sense of the world.

For all that he proposes three distinct models of the relationship between language and the world, Buell concludes that "[t]he writing process itself [...] does not equate with the moment of discovery as the writers experienced it; but the rhetorical energy points backward to the prior experiences of discovery" (E/ 262). Spatially, the world is outside of a text which can only hope to represent it with increasing accuracy. Temporally, texts come after the world which, as Buell points out above, occurs "prior" to writing. The world and its experience are distinct from -- and more authentic than -- their representations. The role of a nature writer, then, is "to keep alive the sense of the 'undiscovered country of the nearby'" (qtg. Mitchell 9) -- to point most efficiently to the world outside of the text, and to provoke a sense of desire to experience that world first hand. The most important work an eco-friendly text can hope to do is to inspire readers to "engage with the world" outside of the text (Buell WE 2). As nothing more than collections of representations, literary texts simply reproduce the supposed distance from the world that ecocritics then critique and claim to work to overcome.

And yet Buell's survey of potential relationships between text and environment includes the seeds from which will grow an ecoformalist reading of the environments of literary texts. In its original context Buell's third model, "world making," reveals how the literary text can be said to have a place in the world. Angus Fletcher's "environment-poem" suggests that the environment of a poem includes all of the relationships that
poem develops. These relationships are environmental, Fletcher argues, because they take place. The "environment poem" is a literary text's performative dimensions. When we examine Early Modern rhetoric, we discover a theory of performative language distinct from -- and, indeed, a necessary precursor of -- J.L. Austin's. Austin does not acknowledge literature (such as poetry) to generate performative utterances (9). Nonetheless, as we shall see, Early Modern rhetoricians negotiate structures that take place, and, in detailing the production of this place in terms of drama, they emphasize the performative nature of figures and literature. Early Modern theories of theater and drama interweave with those of place.

The few ecoformalist arguments that exist, such as Timothy Morton's *Ecology without Nature* (2007), turn to the ways that literary forms establish structural effects such as "ambiance" and "atmosphere." Although he does not acknowledge his debt to Fletcher, Timothy Morton argues that these are two ways that texts "make" a world. For

52 Unfortunately, Buell reduces the relationships Fletcher postulates to those between the characters in the text, characters that include the setting and all the flora and fauna that "belong or don't belong" (50 qtg. Fletcher 122-28). As Buell describes it, the reader "enter[s] into" an environment-poem, not in the sense of "readerly 'identification' with the 'world' of the text," but insofar as "[t]he poem is itself to be taken as a world" (50). More than plot, characters, and setting, this "world" includes the "aggregate relationships between all participants." Buell interprets Fletcher's "environment-poem" to produce a particular kind of reader response: the reader appreciates the ecology or relationships the text offers. Buell reduces the environment poem to a particular kind of content: the representations of ecological relationships. For him, the environment poem demonstrates that "the environment can also be figured as that which constitutes the discourse that constitutes it." As Buell uses it here, "figure" is opposed dialectically to literal, as applies to the physical world. Buell concludes that the environment poem demonstrates that the environment and physical world inform the relationships that the poem contains; the text is "accurate." Buell uses Fletcher's concept of the environment poem to demonstrate that all texts are embroiled in environmental contexts, contexts which disrupt authors' and readers' claims to control.
Morton, however, these structural effects are predicated on dialectic opposition, including an opposition between world and text. These structural effects signal "text" not "world." Morton argues that textual phenomenology depends upon this fundamental difference. For him, the irresolvable division between text and world characterizes "dark ecology," an ecology not afraid, Morton argues, to embrace the fundamental fact of dualism. Morton's "dark enjoyment" speaks to the literary melancholia of the seventeenth century, a melancholy that arises from the dualistic, categorical distinction between word and world.

The dualism Morton posits is the inheritance of seventeenth-century developments; what sixteenth-century thinkers offer, on the other hand, is a way to think about phenomenological relationship in terms of difference, not necessarily dualism. This difference-within-a-unity is the defining characteristic of metaphor, irony, and other rhetorical figures and literary structures (such as fiction). Ecocritical favorite Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a figure called the chiasm as an example of this difference; for Merleau-Ponty, this difference characterizes the chiasmic utterance as a phenomenological one. When properly understood, Merleau-Ponty provides a way to talk about figures as something that take place and fiction as a kind of place. For instance, Thomas More's *Utopia* suggests that irony (a chiasmic figure) characterizes the place of fiction. Ecoformalism considers the ways that chiasmistic language is literary language and how rhetorical figures, as chiasms, take place in the world. The differences between text and world that first- and second-wave ecocritics identify need not necessarily locate the two in dialectic opposition. Merleau-Ponty's figure chiasmus can
help us to think about how sixteenth-century figures such as irony can be characterized as instantaneous difference, can take place in the world even though they are structured according to a fundamental difference from that world. Difference, Merleau-Ponty helps us to understand, need not be dualistic and need not result in literary melancholy, even though this is the tradition that ecocritics inherit.
CHAPTER III
DIFFERENTIATING ECOFORMALISM

As we have seen, the first and second waves of ecocriticism focus on themes and images of nature and thus are preoccupied with representational language. Subsequently, mainstream literary ecologists assume a categorical distinction between the text and the physical world. There are, however, alternative traditions within ecocriticism that explicitly engage connections between text and world. These include a methodology grounded in evolutionary biology and one grounded in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The first considers the biological origins of language, and the second interrogates the experience of language. Both investigate ways that language is in the world rather than spatiotemporally distinct from it. The first clarifies the ways that the physical world shapes our language through evolutionary biology. Unfortunately, it has little to tell us about the formal structures of literature other than to remark that art permits our big brains to hypothesize. The second details the experience of language as an event that takes place in the world; regrettably, the literary ecologists who work with Merleau-Ponty focus on pre-linguistic experiences. They detail the "pre-rational" experience of what Merleau-Ponty calls the "flesh of the world." But Merleau-Ponty does not exclude language or literature from his phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty, certain kinds of utterances (like works of literature) call attention to their phenomenological experience.
The phenomenology of these speech acts derives from the degree to which they exceed pre-determined, "canned" meaning.

The evolutionary biology approach (along with its offspring cognitive linguistics) and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology provide a basic understanding of what it means to talk about the materiality of language. Both ground the materiality of language in the human body, although Robert Storey and Joseph Carroll disagree as to whether literature is a distinct genre of language. Carroll discusses literature in terms of art in general whereas Storey argues that "literature" means a linguistic text, regardless of whether comic book or nonsense rhymes (114). The two agree, however, that the functions of literature include communication, pleasure, ratiocination, and so forth. In the literary analyses they produce, Carroll and Storey dismiss literary form as, for instance, simply one more way humans take pleasure. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, talks about literature as a part of "first-order language." "First-order" is distinct from "second-order" language in that the latter is primarily communicative (in terms of strict meaning) and the former is an experience of oneself in and through language. Although Merleau-Ponty does not go into depth on the ways literature constitutes a specific kind of first-order experience, he clarifies how literary structure is part of first-language. Merleau-Ponty works through the phenomenology of difference in a figure he calls the chiasm. Merleau-Ponty uses the figure of the right and left hands touching to illustrate chiasm:

53 Or "mind," as Merleau-Ponty denominates the brain/body/awareness nexus.
My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it -- my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand only its outer covering.  

Merleau-Ponty notes that the experiencing consciousness is restricted to only one hand at a time. This limited perspective, however, does not preclude the two from being of the same flesh; “this hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand touching [. . .] is not an ontological void, a non-being; it is spanned by the total being of my body and by that of the world” (148). The two hands belong to the same body, and the experiencing consciousness can pass over from one hand into the other. Chiasmic language, language that folds against itself in an experience of difference (although not ultimately duality, Merleau-Ponty insists) is literary language.  

Not only does this fold characterize the phenomenology of literary structure, but it also helps to explain how, for early modern scholars, literature can be part of the world and yet different from it at the same time. Properly read, Merleau-Ponty provides a way for talking about literary structure without being trapped in the melancholic literature/world dualism.

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54 Such folds of linguistic non-identity include, for example, irony, metaphor, and fiction. Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm is different from the rhetorical figure "chiasmus," which is the repetition of ideas or grammatical structure in reverse order. For Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm figures the phenomenological experience of difference within a unified structure.
Reading the generic dimensions of literature, and the ways that literature constitutes a genre itself, for what they have to say about notions of the environment and place is called ecoformalism. Ecoformalism is a distinct thread of ecocriticism because it moves beyond the representational and normative language on which the first- and second-waves focus. Ecoformalists are the few ecocritics who treat the formal elements of literature. Sadly, ecoformalists such as Angus Fletcher and Timothy Morton have received insufficient attention from their ecocritical colleagues, largely because the observations they make about poetic forms do not translate easily into commentary on themes of nature. Nonetheless, Fletcher and Morton reveal the relevance of literary forms and structures to environmental studies; as we shall see, these structures create the place of literature, and they provide a new way to talk about performative language. Detailing the ways that literary structures frame the world of the text, Fletcher’s and Morton’s arguments make evident that these structures take place as they make place. Ecoformalism, then, is fundamentally concerned with the ways that structures of literature establish the place of the text and how that place relates to the "physical world" and "first world." I use the term "place" literally, as do Early Modern authors. In the sixteenth century, the term signals social class and mobility, rhetorical invention, tropes, and the experiencing body. It is a key concept for early modern rhetoricians, who work out the performative dimensions of literature by considering how literature takes or makes place. By the seventeenth century, place has become product, and rhetoricians work to define the newly developing commodity. The very literary structures ecoformalists inherit coalesce in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
As we explore the Early Modern place of literature, we see that the relationships Morton and Fletcher propose are historically specific. Morton in particular is a direct descendant of the Scientific Revolution, which demands a categorical distinction between literary language and the scientifically-defined world. Although Morton's "Ambient Poetics" offers an example of an inquiry into the structural effects of the literary text, his conclusion that these effects prove a text/world dualism is misconceived. Phenomenology, Morton argues, is predicated on a fundamental distinction between subject and object; thus, the experience of literary structures indicates a text/world binary. Morton advocates "dark ecology," a "dark enjoyment" of the inescapably dualistic nature of experience. The dualism in which Morton is mired is arguably the product of the seventeenth century, but it is hardly uncontested in the Early Modern Period. The problem is that Morton misreads Merleau-Ponty to suggest that dualism is necessary. When we return to Merleau-Ponty, however, we see that he describes the markedly nondualistic phenomenology of sixteenth-century rhetoric. In the Early Modern period, we find that, for a time, literary structures are part of the world because they take place. They derive from an internal difference, from irony, Thomas More and I.A. Richards will say, and yet they do not necessitate a text/world binary.

More speaks to a history of looking at literature as a fold in the real, a "no place" in this "best place." This fold is an example of Merleau-Ponty's chiasm; it instantiates difference, but this difference is contained within a unity. As we shall see in chapters four through six, this fold comes to signal fiction, and, eventually, also a (failed or incomplete) contract by the end of the Early Modern Period. Difference grows into the
dualism Morton assumes. By the Scientific Revolution, linguistic difference becomes duality; literature is displaced from the physical world of science, and ecocritics (such as Morton) inherit this condition. But the text/world binary is not necessary; instead, sixteenth century texts suggest that literature has a place in the world; it takes place through figures of self-difference, such as irony and metaphor. In the earlier part of the period, these figures are structured like Merleau-Ponty's chiasm. At least in the sixteenth century, ecoformalism is concerned with a kind of performativity, of literature taking place.

THE BIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

In the mid-1990s, Joseph Carroll and Robert Storey publish book-length inquiries into the ways that evolutionary biology shapes literature. They draw on biology, biogenetics, and cognitive psychology as they explain how literature serves evolutionary functions. Although they do not call themselves ecocritics, Storey and Carroll influence first-wave ecocritics like Glen Love, who finds that their work "affirms" the "thesis that Darwinian evolutionary biology offers the most defensible basis for literary theory" ("Science, Anti-Science 76). Carrolí and Storey illustrate one way that science can illuminate linguistics and studies of literature: biology and cognitive science trace the ways that certain linguistic structures have biological bases. Cognitive psychologists like
Mark Johnson observe, for instance, that metaphors based in bodily experience structure abstract ideas.\textsuperscript{55}

Carroll situates literary biology in opposition to poststructuralism. In *Evolution and Literary Theory* (1995), Joseph Carroll argues that “knowledge is a biological phenomenon, that literature is a form of knowledge, and that literature is thus itself a biological phenomenon” (1). The evolutionary basis for literature means, for Carroll, that “literary works reflect and articulate the vital motives and interests of human beings as living organisms” (3); “realistic” and “symbolic” works serve different cognitive needs (131). Likewise, Storey’s *Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation* (1996) attacks poststructuralism. For Storey, a literary criticism grounded in evolutionary biology is

\begin{quote}
a turning away from the strained ingenuities, the political sophistries, the uncritical obeisances to fashionable authority that now corrupt the practices of the profession, and a turning toward a conception of literary production and appreciation as “acts [. . .] of a human brain in a human body in a human environment which that brain must make intelligible if it is to survive.”
\end{quote}

(xvi, qtg. Turner vii-viii)

The literary “act” in which Storey is the most invested is narrative, which he identifies as a “pancultural and transhistorical” biological trait (103). Narrative performs a number of

\textsuperscript{55} See, for instance, *Metaphors We Live By*, co-authored with George Lakoff. Lakoff and Johnson argue that associations such as up with "good" and down with "bad" are based in bodily experiences: falling down is bad and being able to look up and see is good. Thus phrases like an "upswing" in hiring and a "downturn" in the economy.
useful functions: it “make[s] intelligible” the world by filtering and ordering sensory data, and the narratives we tell ourselves provide the materials that “concatenate” into what we call the “self” (92). What is most interesting to Storey is that written narratives are a “making special” of evolutionarily beneficial activities (such as reflection) in order to reinforce them (106). Storey is particularly attentive to the differences between types of narrative. He argues that tragedy “is a meditation on the destructive effects of [...] ambivalences” or “biogenetic antagonisms” produced between and among oppositions such as male and female, kin and non-kin, and the like. Comedy, on the other hand, “exploits those ambivalences as a source of incongruity, inviting the spectator to take pleasure in Homo’s own paradoxical allegiances” (103). In other words, tragedy explores the ways that our biology fails us and comedy laughs at the unexpected ways our biology encourages cross-pollination.  

For Carroll and Storey, the means by which critics interrogate literature are the same as those by which scientists interpret the world. Text and world, however, are not mutually illuminating; although science can tell us about literature, literature and its criticism have little to say to scientists. When Storey writes that “it’s not that criticism, or literature, ever needed a conceptual universe of its own, but that each is explicable only in terms of the natural world that the human being shares with the rest of terrestrial phenomena” (xvii), he argues that evolutionary biology provides sufficient explanatory

56 Here, Storey stands on the shoulders of Joseph Meeker, whose Comedy of Survival argues that comedy relies upon stable environmental ethics and tragedy illustrates poor ecological ethics. Unfortunately, Meeker’s description of Aristotelian comedy could pertain just as easily to Aristotelian tragedy, and so the distinction he makes between the two is unsound.
power for the existence and details of literature and its criticism. Ultimately, evolutionary biologists reveal the deep structures that literary texts only intuit: “only a Darwinian conception of the evolved and adapted character of the human mind can provide an understanding of a human nature that is sufficiently profound and incisive to correspond with the intuitive understanding embodied in the literary tradition” (Carroll “Deep Structures” 165). Carroll and Storey conclude that evolutionary biology accounts for everything that happens in a text and propose that the field offers the best methodology for literary analysis.

From this standpoint, the form that knowledge (or pleasure, or imagination) comes in does not contribute anything unique or require a distinctive explanatory apparatus. One would be mistaken to talk about “literary form” as if it were meaningful beyond the observations science might make of it. Indeed, Storey argues that “literature’ should be understood not simply as a canon (or anti-canon) of ‘great’ (or ‘interesting’) verbal works. It includes nonsense rhymes and fairy tales, popular song lyrics and supermarket novels, TV scripts and comic books” (114). 57 To call all these things literary ignores the roles that literary tradition and cultural capital play in close readings; for instance, literary critics read sonnets quite differently from comic books and movies. A literary theory founded on evolutionary biology folds literature and literary form into a more general account of verbal work: communicating information, producing pleasure,

[^57]: Here, Storey establishes himself as an anti-elitist whose theories apply to all verbal and written works. One need not argue that one is better than the other, but Storey makes it impossible to talk about the differences between literature and everyday speech (however slight the distinction between the two), which are precisely differences of form.
and testing possibilities. The readings Storey offers reflect his disinterest in literary forms. Using current genetic theories to explain characters’ motivations, Storey details Iris Murdoch’s examinations of altruism and morality in *A Fairly Honorable Defeat*.

Given that a specifically literary form does not exist for Storey, it is perhaps unsurprising that he passes over stylistics, structure, and figurative language, focusing solely on plot; the absence of attention to these literary qualities conveys that evolutionary biology has little to say about the forms, structures, and conventions of Murdoch’s text.

This is not to say that evolutionary biologists reduce all language to representations of the physical world. Storey and Carroll do recognize forms of language other than representative ones; biology permits a spectrum of functions that language and literature might fulfill. Representation, art, performance, and play are all possible. However, a literary theory grounded in evolutionary biology cannot explain the specifics of formal changes over the centuries. First, the methodology of evolutionary biology is to state that what exists is possible because of environmentally determined genetics. It can describe and justify the things that exist, but it cannot theorize about them. Evolutionary biology has little to say, for instance, to Donne’s "To His Mistress Going to Bed" other than to observe the biological motivations for sexual and poetic urges. Second, evolutionary biology is concerned with such a grand scale that it is unable to accommodate historically specific manifestations of literature and language that take place over, say, decades or even years. As Richard Dawkins remarks in *The Selfish Gene*, human genetics have remained relatively unchanged for at least 10,000 years,
whereas cultural memes change much more frequently.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, a literary criticism grounded in evolutionary biology is rather limited; it can only comment on the ways that texts fulfill general and millennia-old biological impulses.

Evolutionary biology may explain the existence of literature, but it has little to say about specific formal issues, particularly because literary form and the conversations about it change over short periods of time. And we ought not to be surprised that the intricate details of literary form remain beyond the scope of evolutionary biology’s interest. That evolutionary biology and ecology both deal with averages as well as enormous spans of time suggests that they may not be the best ways to approach formal specifics. If everything that happens in a text is reduced to a particular biological function, evolutionary literary theory will remain uninterested in the differences in which literature trades.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58} A meme is a unit of cultural ideas. Like genes, memes suffer a kind of natural selection, evolution, hybridization, mutation, and the like. Memes "evolve" as quickly as culture does. For instance, "going green" is a popular meme today.

\textsuperscript{59} For instance, what would a literary theory based in evolutionary biology have to say about these lines from Andrew Marvell’s “The Garden” (1681 posth.): “Annihilating all that's made / To a green thought in a green shade” (55-56)? Are comments on the complex metaphor "green thought in a green shade" reduced to observing that pleasure arises because we are hard-wired to enjoy excess or the regularity of meter and rhyme, observations which could just as easily be applied to Skelton’s doggerel or vulgar limericks? Does Storey’s theory consider that, although the meter could be the same in both lines, content shifts the stresses in the second line to “green”? And what would it tell us about the lines’ tension between meter, literal meaning, and parts of speech? Tension and its relief may reflect biologically grounded physiological responses, but what about the specific kinds of tension generated here or the history of ideas and poetic histories in which Donne and Marvell participate? Other than to note, like Mark Jonson and George Lakoff, that abstract metaphors are based on concrete ones generated from bodily experiences, what would Storey and Carroll have to say about the long tradition exploring how metaphor works?
ECOPHENOMENOLOGY

A literary theory grounded in evolutionary biology is useful, however, to the degree that it recalls the bodies that produce language and literature. Evolutionary biology is only one of many recent lines of inquiry into the speaking body. As Gail Kern Paster reminds us, historicists emphasize that these bodies are, in part, shaped by sociocultural forces at the level of decade, year, and minute. The very feelings these bodies experience are, to some degree, culturally grounded. Consider, for instance, the physical expressions we call manners. Norbert Elias charts the development of manners in the Medieval through Early Modern periods, and he observes that class-based manners increasingly constrain the body's expressions, both gaseous and verbal. Such observations are useful insofar as they particularize the Early Modern body, but neither Paster's nor Elias' work speaks to theories of literature (as opposed to language); the verbal expressions the Early Modern body expels belong to the general realm of language rather than the particularized category of literature.

Perhaps the most promising branch of ecocriticism investigating the relationship between embodiment and literature is ecophenomenology, a metaphysical version of cognitive psychology. Ecophenomenology grows from the work of twentieth-century continental philosophers Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as the earlier Jakob von Uexküll (who is interested primarily in animals' "interpretations" of their environment).\(^{60}\) Ecophenomenology finds its fullest expression in Merleau-Ponty,

\(^{60}\) Von Uexküll argues that each animal's *umwelt* is composed of the particular parts of the environment that matter to him. A dog, for instance, has quite a different world than would a tick.
although a few ecocritics praise Heidegger for his work on "dwelling" and caretaking.⁶¹ Merleau-Ponty argues that experience is the starting point of knowledge, and his studies of the role that embodiment plays in key concepts such as language, identity, and time help to particularize ecocritics' vision of human/nonhuman interconnections. Merleau-Ponty's concept the "flesh of the world" (Visible 130-55) provides "a way of envisioning the physical interrelatedness of body and habitat" (Heise 511). The flesh of the world is the worldly fabric comprised of all that is reality. Merleau-Ponty argues that this "flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance," but rather is the very "element" of Being (139), which encompasses the visible and invisible of the world. This unified plenum bolsters the ecocritical challenge to traditional dualisms such as human/nature, mind/body, and human/animal. As Merleau-Ponty asks, "where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?" (138). Ecocritics use Merleau-Ponty’s careful scientific and philosophical work to critique anthropocentrism and to detail the experiential qualities of the connections between human and nonhuman; 

⁶¹ Some ecophenomenologists make use of Heidegger’s insistence on the responsibility of humans to be “shepherds,” to allow non-human animals and nature to express themselves fully (Heidegger 245): “Martin Heidegger’s notion of ‘dwelling’ as part of human essence and as a form of existence that allows other forms of being to manifest themselves [. . .] has been interpreted as proto-environmentalist by some” (Heise “Hitchhiker” 511). Moreover, Heidegger’s environmental politics are largely consistent with ecocritics’; Heidegger “combines a poetic awe before Earth’s being with a savage deconstruction of the death-denying project of world mastery that we are taught to call progress” (Garrard 30). Ecocritics welcome Heidegger’s environmental message and read him to challenge human/nature and body/mind binaries (Heise, Westling “Posthuman” 34). However, Heidegger’s questionable political affiliations and his displacement of the human/nature binary onto a human/animal binary make Heidegger a problematic figure for ecocritics. For instance, Louise H. Westling notes “Heidegger’s recoiling from human animality” when he carefully distinguishes the human “world” from the non-human “Earth” (“Posthuman” 33, cf. Garrard 31).
for instance, they deploy Merleau-Ponty's concept of the "chiasm" to explain why such connections may not be immediately obvious, why we have historically distinguished between human and nonhuman as well as between mind and body. When it is fully appreciated, Merleau-Ponty's chiasm actually dismisses ecocritics' insistence on the text/world dualism; the chiasm illustrates the self-difference that characterizes rhetorical figures, the same self-difference that, for Early Modern authors, characterizes the literary fold of the world against itself through such structures as irony, metaphor, figure, and fiction.

Unfortunately, a number of ecocritics misread Merleau-Ponty's insistence that bodily experience is the ground of knowledge and that pre-reflective experience precedes reflection, using his claims as the basis for arguments that differentiate experience from, and privilege it over, language.62 Said ecocritics define language as rational and reflective and thus suppose that it is distinct from the pre-reflective interconnection with the world we have by virtue of our embodiment. Consider, for instance, phenomenologist David Abram's description of his body's response to "the mute solicitation of another being" (a bowl) as a "silent conversation," a "mute dialogue that unfolds far below my verbal awareness -- and often, even, independent of my verbal awareness" (52). Abram playfully uses terms like "conversation" and "dialogue" to suggest a method of engagement that is actually beyond human language;63 he

62 Merleau-Ponty characterizes the distinction between the two as a formal distinction; thus time is non-continuous between the two.

63 Dana Phillips seems to miss the figurative humor of this line, its reaction against spoken language, when he uses it to suggest that "phenomenology involves a stunning
emphasizes the pre-linguistic as a marker of the authenticity of his relationship with the bowl, a relationship free from a congealed symbolic system. Abram suggests that such experiences take place pre-rationally, pre-linguistically, and that texts can only recount them lyrically with the goal of stimulating similar future non-linguistic experiences in readers.  

But as we shall see, ecocritics like Abram misread Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to reject language in favor of pre-rational experience.

However, there are a few ecocritics who call attention to Merleau-Ponty’s examinations of the ways that communication is an embodied experience of the flesh of the world. For instance, biosemiotician Timo Maran emphasizes Merleau-Ponty’s insight that the “flesh of the world” is essentially communicative; he argues that all creaturely interactions consist of questions, inquiries, and responses. This communication is extrahuman; it includes humans but is not limited to human language. (In his indifference to contradictions; otherwise it’s very hard to understand how one could speak seriously about ‘carrying on a continual dialogue’ with things located outside of the realm of one’s ‘verbal awareness’” (214).

Dana Phillips, in particular, finds such approaches frustrating because he reads them to eliminate the need of literary critic insofar as critiques of phenomenological texts would deny the truth of their experiences: “the reader is to approach the nature writing text in the same phenomenological and anthropological frame of mind in which its author has approached the world, or run the risk of trespassing on its “being’” (231). In other words, Philips complains that phenomenological criticism isn’t possible. This chapter hopes to demonstrate that Phillips is too narrow in his understanding of what phenomenology has to offer to literary theory, largely because he fails to distinguish between a phenomenological piece of literature and the phenomenology of language of which literary critics might make use.

See Ted Toadvine’s “Limits of the Flesh: The Role of Reflection in David Abram’s Ecophenomenology” for a critique of Abram’s mistake of defining language exclusively in terms of (second-order) reflection and meaning.
consideration of nonhuman animality, Maran follows in von Uexküll's footsteps.)

Communication is, at its heart, potentially a phenomenological experience bridging the
human and nonhuman. Ecocritic Leonard Scigaj, for instance, draws attention to
interspecial communication in Pattiann Rogers' poem "The Mad Linguist." Rogers
writes that "[t]he language of pines and poplars [. . .] is 'a network / of ever-smaller
branches spreading outward'''; Scigaj reads Rogers as emphasizing that language "is not
limited to the phonetics speech of humans. Rogers seems to be extending beyond human
speech" as a way to suggest the intimate dialogue of human and nonhuman that
constitutes the expressive flesh of the world, the phenomenological union of the human
and nonhuman (Scigaj 336-37). Ecocritic Louise H. Westling focuses on animal rather
than plant communication; she summarizes Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as follows:

Merleau-Ponty writes of "the 'deep world of untamed perception' (1973: 118) [that]
e.xists in a 'whole series of layers of wild being' around us which is intertwined with our
embodied selves and is the source of meaning (1973: 117-8, see also Wolfe 2003: 3)"
("Posthuman" 39). Westling concludes that "Merleau-Ponty call[s] for a reawakening to
the world around us, that requires listening to the other voices that we have forgotten to
hear, voices that arise in what we may have formerly assumed to be silences." Although
Westling allows that human language is part of the "wholeness" that is the flesh of the
world ("Virginia Woolf" 869), her reading of Virginia Woolf's Between the Acts
underscores the specifically nonhuman language that characterizes the expressiveness of
the flesh of the world. For instance, her highlighting of Woolf's description "From cow
after cow came the same yearning bellow. The whole world was filled with dumb
yearning. It was the primeval voice sounding loud in the ear of the present moment” (866, qtg. Woolf 126) suggests that the “primeval voice” open “to the whole of the natural world” does not speak human language. The line Westling cites foreshadows Miss La Trobe’s epiphany at the end of the text when she communes with nature specifically by leaving human words behind: “words rose above the intolerably laden dumb oxen plodding through the mud. Words without meaning -- wonderful words” (191). The “words” Miss La Trobe relishes are more than human; they speak even to the “dumb oxen.” For Westling, Merleau-Ponty’s connection between the human and nonhuman is most important; her goal is to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between humans and animals and the multitude of ways that humans and animals communicate with one another.66 Although they do not discount the existence of literature, Woolf, Westling, and Rogers highlight the ways that expressiveness supereceeds human language; thus, they fundamentally are unconcerned with Merleau-Ponty’s insights into literature.

Nonetheless, the experiential dimension of human language and its subsequent product, the literary text, are primary preoccupations of Merleau-Ponty. When Scigaj observes that, in addition to delighting in extrahuman language, Rogers’ poems suggest “that poetic perception is an active process of synthesizing the visible into language” and record her drive “to find the right word to complete the encounter” (345), he points up the ways that Roger is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s belief that speech “accomplishes thought” (Phenomenology 207). For Merleau-Ponty, the act of speaking can be the

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66 See, for instance, Westling’s "Darwin in Arcadia: Brute Being and the Human Animal Dance from Gilgamesh to Virginia Woolf."
appropriate fulfillment of an experiential act; language can be an experience just as extrahuman language and any other type of experience can. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty offers a vision of language in which it is not representational but rather, as experience, part of the phenomenological world. And, as we shall see below, Merleau-Ponty contends that literary language is often experiential.

Merleau-Ponty notes that different forms of language are experienced in different ways. What he calls “first-order language” grows from our embodiment in the world: “the body ‘survives with and in language and narrative, partly because language’s physicality extends the phenomenal world’s physicality’” (Westling “Virginia Woolf” 856-57, qtg. Doyle 45-46). But Merleau-Ponty understands language to be more than an "extension" of our embodiment in the physical world. Language is one way our embodiment comes to be. For Merleau-Ponty, the word itself has meaning in the same way that the world does. He distinguishes himself from empiricists, who argue that speech is a mechanical association and that “the meaning of words is considered to be given with the stimuli or with the states of consciousness which it is simply a matter of naming” (Phenomenology 203). He also sets himself aside from intellectualists, who believe that a word is an arbitrary thing that stands in for a thought, that “it is thought which has a meaning, the word remaining an empty container” (205). In contrast, Merleau-Ponty argues that “speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it” (207). The silent speech that we call thought “is not a

67 For Merleau-Ponty, human language arises from the striving for expression that characterizes the “flesh of the world”; such striving is fulfilled by the word but not reducible to it.
representation" (209) but rather the emergence of meaning that is "accomplish[ed]" in the word. The word has meaning not as a jug has water, but rather as a jug has a shape; the word means. Merleau-Ponty's first-order language is an alternative to the representative language ecocritics assume. It does not simply refer to predetermined meaning but rather brings meaning into existence. First-order language is not representational; in this sense, first-order language encompasses the dimensions of literature that exceed representation, that are more than about simply communicating meaning. Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes that first-order language is performative, although not necessarily in the Austinian sense of making a promise or passing a judgment. Instead, it is a "coming into being"; it takes place. It is this performativity of the first-order of language that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes. (We will return later to the structure of this type of performative language, a structure Merleau-Ponty thematizes through the chiasm as "what it is not itself" Phenomenology 372.)

68 In a similar way, our experience of the world reveals it to be meaningful.

The passing of sensory givens before our eyes or under our hands is, as it were, a language which teaches itself, and in which the meaning is secreted by the very structure of the signs, and this is why it literally can be said that our senses question things and that things reply to them. ‘The sensible appearance is what reveals (kundgibt), and expresses as such what it is not itself.’ We understand the thing as we understand a new kind of behaviour, not, that is, through any intellectual operation of subsumption, but by taking up on our own account the mode of existence with the observable signs adumbrate before us. A form of behaviour outlines a certain manner of treating the world. (Phenomenology 372)

Here, Merleau-Ponty is emphatically literal in his description of our relationship to the world as one of question and answer. And the answer we receive in our experience of the “sensory givens” of the world is a meaning that inheres in the things we sense; those things do not represent meaning, but rather are meaningful. And our experiences do not reflect such meaning but rather instantiate it. We can understand “the thing and the natural world” only by taking up their attitudes, their “mode[s] of existence.”
Although the term "first order expression" suggests its primacy, Merleau-Ponty finds that it tends to be overshadowed by “second order expression” (207, fn. 4). Language quickly ossifies into predetermined meanings, into the representational language that figures so largely for ecocritics. Second order language, Merleau-Ponty observes, “makes up the general run of empirical language.” It draws on sedimented meanings that “demand from us no real effort of expression and will demand from our hearers no effort of comprehension” (213-14). Such speech appears to refer to preexisting concepts that overshadow its experience.69 Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between the “spoken word,” which refers to preexisting concepts, and the “speaking word” (229), which happens in the moment of its expression, its being taken up by the body. The speaking word

is the one in which the significant intention is coming into being. Here existence is polarized into a certain ‘significance’ [sens, meaning or direction, rather than signification or literary representation] which cannot be defined in terms of any natural object. (229, brackets in orig.)

The “speaking word” is a present “coming into being”; it is not the past-future of representation, but rather “a certain style of being” (213) in the present world; it must be inhabited in order to be realized.

The word is then indistinguishable from the attitude which it induces, and it is only when its presence is prolonged that it appears in the guise of an

69 Out of such sedimented language, however, we construct new, authentic expressions through “coherent deformations,” or shifts in usage, construction, and the like.
external image and its meaning as a thought. Words have a physiognomy because we adapt towards them, as towards each person, a certain form of behaviour which makes its complete appearance the moment each word is given. (274)

Before "prolong[ation]" or repetition reduces the word to a concept, first-order language is an experience of position, an "attitude." (Later we will see how metaphor satisfies the condition of taking up an attitude.) Such "authentic speech" (207, fn. 4) integrates the verbal and the intellectual with the bodily senses as a total experience. All words have this possibility; “[w]e find here, beneath the conceptual meaning of words, an existential meaning which is not only rendered by them, but which inhabits them, and is inseparable from them” (212). In second order expression, however, this “existential meaning,” the experience of the word, falls into the background as the word represents “ready-made meanings” (213).

Like J.L. Austin, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between language concerned primarily with communication and language that takes place. For Austin, the distinction is between constative and performative language. The former correlates with Merleau-Ponty's second-order language; both consist of sedimented meaning. For both, the latter exceeds representational content. And like J.L. Austin's behavatives, Merleau-Ponty's first-order language is something the body takes up as an attitude. However, Merleau-Ponty has a far broader understanding of the ways that language is performative than does Austin. Austin limits performative utterances to things like promises, bets, and

70 Austin defines behavatives as adopting an attitude such as in the phrase “I apologize.”
verdicts. Each of these is performative in the sense that a first-person speaker performs an act. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, does not so limit his definition of performative language. He opens up the possibility that all utterances can have a performative dimension, not just those that fulfill the conditions necessary for the speaker to make a promise or give a verdict. First-order language can be any type of utterance provided that it calls attention to its phenomenology rather than to the determinate meaning it conveys.

Merleau-Ponty's first-order language applies to a larger cross section of language than Austin's performative does because it applies to texts, not just spoken utterances. Although Merleau-Ponty is not explicit on this point, he suggests that works of literature exemplify first-order language. That Merleau-Ponty uses "a novel, poem, picture, or musical work" to illustrate forms of the body-as-becoming rather than the body (or text)-as-object (Phenomenology 175) points up the privileged role that he assigns to the literary text as an instance of authentic speech. His suggestion that literary structures are somehow more amenable to phenomenology than non-literary structures should turn ecocritics' attention to literature as such. And the Early Modern period is a particularly fruitful time to begin such inquiries; debates about the qualities of literature as literature are at the forefront as the literary text as a commodity overcomes courtly poesy. Thomas More, for instance, deliberates on the difference between what Merleau-Ponty calls "all these many commonplace utterances, [for which] we possess within ourselves ready-made meanings" (213) and works of literature. For More's Utopia, one way that literature signals that it is an "authentic utterance," that it cannot be reduced to "superficial meaning" and "representation," is through irony; irony is a linguistic fold of
the world against itself because it revises its claims about the world at the same time it speaks them.  

Merleau-Ponty observes that works of art, including literature, "sing the world newly (217). By this, he suggests that literature, as a work of art, materializes in the world. For Early Modern authors, literature emerges (in part) performatively. As we shall see in chapters five and six, there is a reason why theories of literature so often deploy language from drama and theater. As Early Modern authors work out the ways that literature is a distinct species of language, they bring to light the ways that literature takes place. And as More's *Utopia* suggests, the place that literature takes is equivocal; it is both a "no place" and "best place." Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm is particularly apt because it speaks to the unity in difference that characterizes the place of Early Modern literature, the way that Early Modern literature is performatively. His phenomenology of literature, of first-order language, emphasizes the ways that Early Modern literature takes place and that it is not only a collection of representations of the world. Experience need not be non-linguistic. This is the insight of cognitive psychology and Paster's work with humors: we do not break through language to a prior, truer body. Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is something about the form of literature (as distinct from language) that makes the work of art happen in addition to whatever (second-order) meanings it might invoke and accrue.

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71 As the following chapters demonstrate, "linguistic folds" refer to rhetorical figures and literary structures that offer a coincidence of difference or non-self-identity. The term "fold" points to the fact that the difference isn't temporal but rather takes place instantaneously.
Ecocritics like David Abrams who typify experience as necessarily non-linguistic misread Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of first-order language. We should also be careful not to allow Merleau-Ponty’s insights into nonhuman communication to conceal the fact that human language can be an experiential event as well. Unfortunately, the field of ecophenomenology largely reproduces the “topics-based” approach I critique in chapter two; ecophenomenologists invoke Merleau-Ponty’s notions of intertwining and embodiness to justify the value of a particular text or passage. Similarly, literary critics drawing on cognitive science often focus on the ways that figures derive from biologically grounded cognitive drives. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty’s linguistic phenomenology provides an important contribution to ecocritical studies in that it offers a unique understanding of the relationship between literature and the physical world. Literature, as defined by its formal (literary and poetic) dimensions, can be something that happens in the phenomenal world. To put it another way, literary structures take place.

THE PLACE OF ECOFORMALISM

Of the three critics who explicitly interrogate literary form (Angus Fletcher, Timothy Morton, and Robert Watson), only Watson speaks directly the Early Modern period. Watson argues that the similes in Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* reveal anxiety that the only way to know something is to liken it. Subsequently, Watson argues, there was a
widespread turn to nature as the source of truth.\(^72\) In essence, the world, not the word, became the source of truth.\(^73\) Watson argues that, in the Early Modern period, truth "departed on its amazing modern itinerary [...] from meaning to matter" (20), from language to the physical world. Such an epistemological shift informs, for instance, Bacon's claim that language is one of the four "idols" that muddy our perception of reality. *Back to Nature* historicizes ecocritics' preoccupation with nature at the expense of literature. However, other than a brief mention in the introduction, ecocriticism is not a primary focus of this text, and Watson does little to develop the implications of his argument for environmental literary theory. He does not clarify how earlier periods might have challenged ecocritics' emphasis on representational language. Watson appears to limit words to "meaning," and thus he fails to engage simile as a structure (rather than simply a carrier of meaning, a comparison). But his work does suggest that inquiries into models of the relationship between literature and the physical world should begin with the earlier periods of English literary history and must attune to the ways that rhetorical structures do more than carry meaning. Sadly, Watson flirts with ecocriticism only to fail to engage it as a theory and interrogate how his argument about Early Modern simile asks ecocritics to consider literature and rhetorical structures in their own right.

\(^72\) Watson identifies "urbanization, capitalism, new technologies, and the Protestant Reformation" as the primary causes of the developing "nostalgia for unmediated contact with the world of nature" (5).

\(^73\) The humanist emphases on context and historicity "expose the internal referentiality and historical instability of any verbal system, a recognition that refutes any lingering hope that words will directly reflect things" (15).
Fletcher and Morton, on the other hand, explicitly engage ecocritical theory. They suggest that literary forms and structures constitute events in terms of taking place. They focus on the ways that texts structure their experience. In *A New Theory For American Poetry* (2006), Fletcher argues that the "environment poem" establishes a sense of boundary and horizon, the "eternal return" and "continuous reemergence of order" from chaos (8), that it blends active and passive voice into the "middle voice" such that the boundaries between subject and object are blurred, that it fits disparate elements into a unified whole in a movement called "rendering," and so forth. For Fletcher, poetry is the privileged form because the reader is more involved in poetry than prose, which is more likely to devolve into "factual reference" (176). Nonetheless, Fletcher appreciates Montaigne's "Of Experience," for instance, because it "meditate[s] on the field of interactions between many inhabitants" of the world (139). An environment poem does not "represent" the world; rather, it is an experiential unity characterized by ambiance, shifting horizons, interaction, and coherence among inconsistency. Fletcher suggests that the poetic structure to which he refers is particularly consistent with the physical world; it shares key structures. Unlike Meeker, who also focuses on literary structures (genre), Fletcher is not making an argument about ethics. Instead, he calls attention to the ways that texts structure their phenomenology. The environment poem enacts an environment insofar as it provides a sense of horizon and consistency as well as a centralized identity.

74 Fletcher asserts that the "[i]ncompleteness theorem of Kurt Gödel [...] models the way a true environment-poem holds together." "Either the poem is complete or consistent, but it cannot be both of these. The complete, or as I would say, the coherent environment poem is necessarily inconsistent at some point, and for this reason it coheres" (11).
The environment poem (noun) environs (verb). In this sense, Fletcher illustrates one way that a literary text can be performative: it structures its experience. For Fletcher, the environment poem is not “thematic” but rather is an emotive experience; reading an environment poem means “living through an event” (136). Fletcher suggests that ecocritics should revise their definition of environment to include the phenomenology of literary texts, and he argues that poetic structures are the field on which this phenomenology takes place.

Timothy Morton's *Ecology Without Nature* (2007) offers many of the same arguments as Fletcher’s work. Morton details "ambient poetics," techniques that “encode the literal space of [texts’] inscription” (3). Ambient poetics includes "rendering" (a sense of consistency), "medial" or phatic dimensions (including “the page on which the words were written or the graphics out of which they were comprised” 37), “tone,” the “Aeolian” (or “sense of processes continuing without an author” 41), words’ “timbral” sound (“rather than [...] symbolic meaning” 39), and the “re-mark” (a structural element that splits foreground from background, the text from the surrounding natural world). These dimensions of ambient poetics constitute nature writing’s structure over and above the content the text offers. Morton argues that his critique is an aesthetic one.75 He notes that, "[i]nstead of talking about content -- software and wetware -- I explore the realm of

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75 Morton insists on formal analysis because it is only by critiquing the aesthetic dimensions of the text that we can see past the claims for unity with nature that nature writing supposes.
form" (28). By form, Morton refers to the ways that nature writing establishes itself as a coherent object (or unity), the ambient poetics it generates.

But, Morton argues, this unity is pure fantasy. "Ecomimesis," or the literary drive to get outside of the text into the world (through such strategies as "as I write" the snow falls, etc.) only betrays the fundamental dualism of text and world. For Morton, the supposed split is fundamentally necessary for text and world because, without it, neither would exist. "[W]hat we are really dealing with is the idea of medium, split into two aspects (foreground and background)" (48). This duality between self and nature, between real and fantasy, between text and world is, Morton argues, inescapable. He concludes that "the dissolution of inside and outside is strictly impossible"; in other words, "nature writing is a dense chiasmus" (70). That is, the text and the world remain distinct because experience is predicated on difference, a difference Morton names "dualism." Morton assumes that this dualism constitutes a fundamental, categorical breach between text and world, and he goes on to detail the experiential structures of that

76 The use of the term "unity" here highlights the ways that I find ecological terms useful: "unity" and other ecological "values" can apply to literary structures, but not in the moral sense, and they are not tied to "scientifically justified" content.

77 Because ambient poetics produces an experience of the world, "it is supposed not just to describe, but also to provide a working model for a dissolving of the difference between subject and object, a dualism seen as the fundamental philosophical reason for human beings' description of the environment" (63-64).

78 Morton uses the term ecomimesis in the sense Dana Phillips uses the term; he derides nature writing for its alleged pretense to be in contact with the physical world.
breach. Morton encourages ecocritics not to mourn or attempt to recover nature but rather to accept the fact of this duality. Morton calls this approach "dark ecology": the appreciation of the duality between text and world (and between self and world) and the recognition that the nature we engage is always a fantasy. "Dark ecology [...] is a perverse, melancholy, irreducible otherness" (151).

In support of his claim for the fundamental dualism between self and nature, Morton invokes Merleau-Ponty's idea of the "chiasm." However, Morton misunderstands the term. Merleau-Ponty explicitly argues that the chiasm names difference but not duality, yet Morton takes Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm to signal an insurmountable dualism. Morton notes that the chiasm is "an intertwining of what is sensed with the one who is sensing," but "chiasmus doesn't solve anything, because in order to work, both terms must be preserved even as they are cancelled at another level" (69). That is, Morton understands the chiasm to depend upon a subject/object dualism. However, Merleau-Ponty actually uses the term chiasm to explain how the apparent difference between seer and seen, between two hands shaking, is unraveled by the unified plenum of the flesh of the world. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasm suggests that otherness is a quality of an experienced unity. Just as a handshake is reversible, what counts as "sentient" and "sensible" in any given interaction is determined entirely by perspective. Thus, although difference characterizes the contact between hands, or

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79 This "duality" is what vexes ecocritics the most about Morton; see, for instance, Janet Fiskio's recent review of *Ecology Without Nature* in *ISLE*. Paradoxically, even though ecocritics perpetuate the text/world distinction, they resent Morton's claim that human/nature duality is an inescapable fact of life.
between the seer and the seen, Merleau-Ponty suggests the inadvisability of using such consciousness to determine categorical boundaries.

The "total being" that is the flesh of a body, and of the world, is possible "as soon as we no longer make belongingness to one same 'consciousness' the primordial definition of sensibility, and as soon as we understand it as the return of the visible upon itself" (Merleau-Ponty Visible 142). Consciousness does not define identity, so a sense of difference does not necessarily indicate duality. The "return of the visible upon itself" is a fold in the plenum that is the world, a fold that allows the plenum to experience itself; the flesh of the world is a "texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself" (146). That is, the "fold" or "return" is necessary because it produces the sense of difference required for experience; but this sense of difference, the "chiasm," does not require duality.

[T]his distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is synonymous with it. It is that the thickness of flesh between seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility and for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication. (135)

For Merleau-Ponty, the flesh of the world is "thick" with chiasm; the world belongs to the visible and sensible only insofar as it sees and touches as it is seen and touched, insofar as it returns upon itself. The chiasm is constitutive of the experience that is the flesh of the world, by which it comes to know itself through distinct consciousnesses.
Without difference, without the thickness of the fold, Merleau-Ponty suggests, there would be no experience at all, but thickness does not preclude identity and unity.

Literature has a long history as a structure of difference. Morton offers us one vision, but strict dualism summarizes neither Merleau-Ponty nor Early Modern literature. As we shall see, Merleau-Ponty provides a much more appropriate theory for Renaissance literature than his heir, Morton. In the following chapters, I explore the ways that difference and internal contradiction are historical qualities characterizing literature. For instance, the Medieval and Early Modern notion of coincidentia oppositorum (the coincidence of opposites) figures, for Thomas More, as the internal difference of irony. Early Modern literature has a sense of internal difference in rhetorical equivocation, fiction, and the commodity of literature. This remainder of this dissertation inquires into the historical dimensions of literary difference, beginning first with the "self-different" rhetorical figure of metaphor. But difference is not the same as duality. By definition, coincidentia oppositorum is a unified event. And as we shall see in chapter four, certain rhetorical structures (tropes) name the chiasms, the folds in the cosmos Natural Philosophers explain through qualities such as "likeness." The chapters that follow diagnose and detail the various relationships between linguistic difference and

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80 Early Modern critics may be familiar with the distinction between the physical world and the literary ones through Henry Berger Jr.'s analysis of the Early Modern division between the first world of the author, the second world of the text, and the green world that is to the second world what the second is to the first. Berger does not examine the phenoemenology or particular structural events that constitute these frames, so Morton's observations illustrate one way we might approach the Early Modern period.
the real world. Among other things, we find that differences need not be categorical. Early Modern rhetoricians explore the idea that figures and literary structures take place. This dissertation corrects the dualism between text and nature that ecocritics assume by illuminating the place of literature as detailed by Early Modern authors.

As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Early Modern English literature challenges the division between world and text Morton requires in his "dark ecology." Among other things, Early Modern literature can help us understand Morton's melancholy. The duality Morton identifies with literature solidifies in the so-called Scientific Revolution. Ultimately, ecocriticism descends from the Scientific Revolution and assumes the very duality that it denies Morton. The world/literature dualism is born of the historical conditions in turmoil in Early Modern England. Ultimately, as we shall see in the coda, this split, the duality between text and world, generates the literary melancholia that colonizes both the literary text in the seventeenth century and Morton's dark ecology. Literary melancholy is the product of the split between text and world. Melancholy takes the place of nature.

THE ECOPHENOMENOLOGY OF METAPHOR

Two early and often overlooked ecocritical essays venture into the ecophenomenology of poetics and metaphor: William Rueckert's "Literature and Ecology: an Experiment in Ecocriticism" (1976) and Neil Evernden's "Beyond Ecology: Self, Place, and the pathetic Fallacy" (1996). The former observes self-evidently that "a poem is stored energy," and the second takes a brief detour from public space planning
into the ways that metaphor satisfies the fundamental conditions of place. These essays consider the ways that literary forms are performative (as "energy") or take place. Angus Fletcher refers to this literary performativity when he claims to investigate "the being and becoming of things," a being he identifies with Jakobsonian metonymy (10). For Fletcher, metonymy is the "locating figure" whereas metaphor is the "classifying figure," so metonymy is the privileged figure. We will return later to the ways that classifying is an issue of place for Robert Burton and to the place long associated with metaphor. The salient point here is that each of these authors identify figures with a kind of performative language -- language that is performative by being literary, not by making a promise or apology or other Austinian performative utterance. By investigating rhetorical forms and literary structures, ecoformalists identify a way to talk about performative language other than in a strictly Austinian sense. These authors find that rhetorical figures take place.

Figures take place by discharging a kind of energy. Fletcher surmises that the energy can be described as a wave. He quotes Erik Gunderson's observation in *The Handy Physics Answer Book* (1999) that "a wave is a traveling disturbance that moves energy from one location to another without transferring matter" (147). For Fletcher, these waves are evident in Walt Whitman's "undulant forms" (9). These critics agree that poetic energy takes place in the form of rhetorical forms, particularly tropes (the division of figure that depends upon changes in meaning, the most familiar examples being metaphor and metonymy). The energy that rhetorical figures demonstrate is of primary concern to each of the ecoformalists considered here. In chapter four, we discover how energy, long associated with trope, migrates to from rhetoric to the physical world;
chapter four narrates the history in which metaphorical energy becomes categorically distinct from real and literal energies.\textsuperscript{81}

Literature is, unfortunately, a secondary concern for William Rueckert; he overlooks the provocative statements he makes about form and concludes that literature is merely a vessel and conduit for the energy that arises from poets' creativity: "in literature, all energy comes from the creative imagination. It does not come from language, because language is only one (among many) vehicles for the storing of creative energy" (109). Although Rueckert ultimately fails to fulfill the promise of his speculations because he does not offer a fuller theory of metaphor (i.e., what it means to say that "a poem has energy"), his lyricism is nonetheless provocative. Rueckert's claim that "a poem is stored energy, a formal turbulence, a living thing, a swirl in the flow" (108) speaks to the sense that poems seem full of life, like they do have a sort of energy about them, an energy that arises in ways that literary works do more than convey meaning. Rueckert suggests that poems (by which he means literature in general) are more about what they do than what they say.

The concept of a poem as stored energy (as active, alive, and generative, rather than as inert, as a kind of corpse upon which one performs an autopsy, or as an art object one takes possession of, or as an antagonist -- a knot of meanings -- one must overcome) frees one from a variety of critical tyrannies, most notably, perhaps, that of pure hermeneutics, the

\textsuperscript{81} We should remember that the distinction between metaphorical and literal statements is also historically specific. As chapter four demonstrates, the distinction depends in part upon developments within the field of natural philosophy.
transformation of this stored creative energy directly into a set of coherent meanings. What a poem is saying is probably always less important than what it is doing and how -- in the deep sense -- it coheres. (110)

Rueckert echoes an important New Critical insight here: the text is energetic insofar as it exceeds content, it does rather than says, and it is performative rather than representative. That is, metaphor's energy derives from its formal structure. The literary and rhetorical structures that take place, that demonstrate energy, are performative in quite a different way than Austin's performative utterance. In contrast to J.L. Austin's observation that the first-person speaker grounds the illocutionary act, ecoformalists identify figure as the seat of what it means for literature to take place. Chapters four through seven investigate the ways that literary structures are themselves performative because they demonstrate energy. We see that Early Modern authors investigate performative language through theories of how theater takes place.

Neil Evernden demonstrates that ecoformalists' inquiries into metaphor take up the sense of place. Metaphor, he observes, depends upon a sense of place. In the chapters following, we discover the history of the place called metaphor. For Evernden, having a sense of place locates the structure of metaphor in the physical world. Editors Cheryl Glotfelty and Harold Fromm pair Rueckert's "Literature and Ecology" with Evernden's "Beyond Ecology." "Beyond Ecology" reads like a typical ecocritical treatise: it emphasizes that literature illustrates key ecological values such as
interconnectedness. As evidence of the ways that ecological systems challenge strict boundaries, Evernden cites the cichlid, a fish that viciously defends its territory during mating season (97). The usually docile fish, Evernden observes, acts "as if he is as big as his territory." The fish's sense of place expands beyond the cluster of data points localized within his skin. He concludes that the territory, not the skin, defines the fish's "self." The fish's territoriality illustrates the "sensation" of having a sense of place, a sensation that, for instance, motivates the homing pigeon and distinguishes between tourist and resident (100). Part of what the fish is is his sense of place.

The remainder of Evernden's essay details the implications that "sense of place" has for public planning. But he also remarks that the sense of place that pertains to a fish also obtains in metaphor. He argues that metaphor, too, draws on senses of place.

All the metaphorical properties so favored by poets make perfect sense: the Pathetic Fallacy is a fallacy only to the ego clencher. Metaphoric language is an indicator of "place" -- an indication that the speaker has a place, feels part of a place. (101)

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82 Evernden argues that humans are deeply interrelated with their environments; "rather than a subject-object relationship in which the observer parades before the supposedly beautiful view, we have instead a process, an interaction between the viewer and the viewed" (97). For him, this insight is important because it challenges "strictly formalist view[s] of aesthetics" (96).

83 For Evernden, it is necessary to appreciate the felt "sense of place" when planning public spaces; "environmentalism without aesthetics is merely regional planning," he concludes (103).
Evernden is not the first, and certainly not the last, critic to remark that metaphors interpolate certain subject positions. But his contribution to ecoformalism is his recognition that literary structures such as metaphor depend on senses of place. As we will see in my fourth and fifth chapters, rhetoricians have long investigated metaphor in terms of place. For instance, classical authors define metaphor as a word that is out of place; for these authors metaphor invokes, as it violates, senses of place.

Ecoformalism, as Evernden, Rueckert, and Fletcher practice it, invokes the key discoveries of New Criticism: the performative, energy-laden dimensions of literary and rhetorical structures. For instance, Evernden notes that a homing pigeon navigates by "correct[ing] the tension it feels when it finds itself 'out of context'" (100). Being in place and out of place depends, he suggests, on a sense of "tension." The place of metaphor is characterized by tension, and this tension constitutes the energy of metaphor. Formal discussions of metaphor regularly stress its tension and energy. Rhetorician Wayne Booth, for instance, equates energy with the ways that metaphors exceed their content; "more is communicated than the words literally say. What the more is cannot be easily described. Aristotle and others called it energy," which is "not mainly a question of cognitive content" (52). More than content, metaphors have energy, what Wheelwright and Rueckert call "life." Energetic "tension" is a common descriptor for

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84 For instance, in Ted Cohen's argument that metaphors encompass more than cognitive content, he observes that metaphors cultivate intimacy; they invoke shared assumptions about language and the world. Wayne Booth concurs; he emphasizes that "to understand a metaphor is by its very nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist or to reject him, and that is simultaneously to decide whether to be shaped in the shape the metaphor requires or to resist" (63). Cohen and Booth both emphasize the structures of metaphor rather than metaphor's propositional content.
what metaphor does. Wimsatt, for instance, observes that metaphor requires a “tension,” a “problem” (128).85

The energy of metaphor derives from its tension, which is a product of the constitutive difference that defines metaphor. As Richard Klein observes in "Straight Lines and Arabesques: Metaphors of Metaphor" (1970), metaphors assert both that A=B and A≠B. Klein concludes that metaphor is internally contradictory and characterized by a ceaseless movement by which it strives to overcome itself. New Critics in particular emphasize that metaphors create tension by asserting a union in difference. I. A. Richards notes that “when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction” (93); metaphor happens “when we put together in a sudden and striking fashion two things belonging to very different orders of experience” (124) and create “tension” (125). W.K. Wimsatt notes that metaphor requires a "copresence of likeness and difference" (127).86 For him, "the difference between its parts” (159), a difference he calls "chiasmus," "save[s] the physical quality of words” (166). (Wimsatt's "chiasmus" carries a different emphasis than Merleau-Ponty's; for Wimsatt, the term emphasizes distance and difference, the self-difference that metaphor never overcomes.) Although there are significant differences between critics’ accounts of metaphor, such as the

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85 Wimsatt notes that "dead metaphors" such as the mouth of a river relax this tension because they are so common place.

86 Wimsatt extends this quality to rhyme as well; he notes that rhyme is most effective when it juxtaposes things that are quite different in connotation, denotation, verbal form (e.g. part of speech), and so forth.
distinctions between interactive and tensive theories, the energy producing self-difference of New Critical metaphor offers one way ecocritics might inquire into the place of literature. Theorists of metaphor join Rueckert and Evernden in stressing the performative dimensions of literary and rhetorical structures. Metaphoricians stress that metaphor is more than just meaning: it both "takes place" and depends upon a violation of place; it is constituted by phenomenological difference and distance, and therefore has energy.

This dissertation brings to light how New Criticism can contribute to ecoformalism. By returning focus to the non-representational dimensions of texts, methodologies that attend to form (as New Criticism did) help correct ecocritics' predilection for linguistic content. Ecoformalism offers a material, historically-grounded lesson in the development of literature qua literature. In a strange twist of fate, New Critics such Wimsatt and Richards, who do not take into account the historical periods in which texts are written, join emphatically material ecocritics like Rueckert and Evernden in emphasizing the energy of rhetorical structure (specifically the structure we call metaphor). Although the ecocritics ultimately return to the ways that texts distribute ecologically sound content, they nonetheless offer insight into the phenomenology of the very literary structures with which New Critics are concerned. It is this literary place that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theories of rhetoric and literature negotiate.
CHAPTER IV

THE PHYSICS OF RHETORIC IN PUTTENHAM'S ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE

For Early Modern thinkers, folds in the fabric of the world are, in part, linguistic; they explore cosmological chiasms via inquiries into language, particularly rhetorical figures and fiction.⁸⁷ "To trope" means "to turn," and as we shall see, natural philosophers understand the universe to be structured by rhetorical figures such as metaphor, metonymy, metalepsis, and the like.⁸⁸ These figures name the chiasmatic relationship between otherwise distant, different entities. For instance, Early Moderns believe that the moon affects wolves because of a "sympathy" they share, because of likeness in quality; although they appear to be quite different and distant entities, wolves and the moon are related metaphorically (metaphor is not yet opposed to reality). Metaphor is, in this case, a kind of chiasm: it names the kind of fold in the world presumed by the qualitative relationship between wolves and moon. Later rhetoricians such as George Puttenham, however, attempt to disambiguate the folds that rhetorical figures name from the physical world; to this end, Puttenham redefines figure as something that is duplicitous and that is in contrast to a physical world of pure,

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⁸⁷ By "chiasm," I refer to the figure as Merleau-Ponty uses it, not to the rhetorical figure chiasmus, which indicates a phrase with parallel (but reversed) structure ("It is easy to learn chess, but to master chess is difficult.").

⁸⁸ Metonymy is a kind of metaphor by which one refers to a thing by one of its attributes ("We await word from the crown"). Metalepsis is another kind of metaphor; it refers to a thing by reference to something remotely connected with it ("lead foot").
uninterrupted extension. The fold or doubleness metaphor becomes synonymous with lying and trickery. Puttenham’s reconceived definition of figure draws on changes in natural philosophy. The transition from natural philosophy to Cartesian mechanism establishes a categorical distinction between figure and the physical world that is based in part on limiting chiasmus to rhetoric. When the universe is defined in terms of extension rather than of sympathies, the folds that tropes name no longer exist in the physical world. An extended field is numerically regular and can have no folds. Tropes are no longer the "forces" that obtain between distant entities. What we call "force" and "energy" transfer from trope to physical impact. As late-sixteenth and seventeenth century rhetoricians redefine figure and trope, then, they dismiss chiasm (force at a distance) as purely linguistic and not real; tropological chiasm differs from the straightforward extension in space that the universe demonstrates.

MATERIALIZING FIGURE

In a short article, Margreta de Grazia observes that “if sensible properties constitute thingness” (231), then “a word is a thing in the sixteenth but a nonthing in the seventeenth century” (234). She draws on the fact that George Puttenham and other early modern rhetoricians use terms such as “weight” to describe meter, figures, amplification and the like. De Grazia concludes that, by the time of the Scientific Revolution, words have been emptied of their “thingness” so that they can better “give a clear representation of things” (231). However, given that we continue to remark on the "weight" of an argument and the "clarity" of prose, it remains unclear what, exactly, is unique about
Early Modern rhetoric for de Grazia. Moreover, her claim is less straightforward than it first appears: are we to understand that, for the Early Modern period, "words are things" in the sense that apples and trees are things, in the sense that gravity is a thing, or in the sense that theories of gravitation are things? Indeed, when we return Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589) to its historical context, we find that the kind of "thing" that words are is precisely what is under negotiation.

Puttenham writes during a time when natural philosophy is transitioning into Cartesian mechanism and the branches of science we now recognize. Renaissance naturalism can best be described as a carry-over from Medieval mysticism and alchemy; its latest mainstream expressions are in Harvey Gilbert’s *De Magnete* (1600) and in Jean Baptiste Von Helmont’s work with magnetism and medicine (spanning several decades until his death in 1644) (Westfall 25-30). Renaissance naturalists understand the cosmos to be an animate system of mutually influential bodies whose behaviors result either from bodies seeking their proper place or union with the whole or from the “sympathetic” attraction or “antipathetic” repulsion that occurs between bodies or between a body and the place it occupies. The belief that sympathies existed between astrological and terrestrial bodies reveals the assumption fundamental to Renaissance naturalism: the connection of all parts of the universe. As Allen G. Debus explains, “the general acceptance of the macrocosm and the microcosm along with the great chain of being gave credence to the acceptance of correspondences existing everywhere between the celestial and sublunary worlds,” as well as between entities in the same sphere (12). All entities have an "animate spirit" that desires union, participates in friendships, and seeks to
restore proper order. “In Renaissance Naturalism, mind and matter, spirit and body, were not considered as separate entities; the ultimate reality in every body was its active principle, which partook at least to some extent of the characteristics of mind or spirit” (Westfall 31). Magnetism, for instance, names the motion exhibited by disjoined bodies seeking union, and the free fall of heavy bodies is a result of their seeking their natural place at the center of the universe.

The most popular and noteworthy scientific texts published in sixteenth century England hearken back to the classical universe as filtered through medieval scholars; natural philosophers largely assume a Ptolomaic, geocentric universe (although none of the illustrations of the spheres include equant circles) whose motions are the effects of “attractions,” “repulsions,” and numerological or qualitative “correspondences.” Although most texts include some basic algebra and geometry, they mostly draw on logic and reasoning to describe the natural world, and they refer difficult, theoretical questions to the “authorities”: Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Ptolomy, Proclus, Orontius, and Johannes de Sacrobosco. English natural philosophers make use of geometry, algebra, mechanism, and mysticism in often theoretically inconsistent ways. For instance, in his Castel of Knowledge (1556), Robert Recorde characterizes the surface tension of water in terms of geometrical desire: “the partes of water dooth all wayes couette [the] rounde forme” of spherical perfection (137). Aside from the few English natural philosophers who provide original theoretical inquiries (William Gilbert, William Harvey, and arguably Thomas

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89 Thomas Digges’ appendix provides the only image of a heliocentric universe among the texts here surveyed.
Digges), most are less concerned with the theoretical consistency of the natural laws behind observable phenomena than with explicating the practical applications of those phenomena. Henry Janowitz observes that about "ninety percent [of science texts in England] was in the vernacular" (79); thus there was a great wealth of practical primers for the lay person and journeyman who had little hope of attending university. Texts such as Salysburye’s *Description of the Sphere* (1550), Anthony Ascham’s *A Lytle Treatyse of Astronomye* (1552), Recorde’s *Castle of Knowledge* (1556, 1593), William Fulke’s *Goodly Gallerye* (1563), John Maplet’s *Diall of Destiny* (1581) are comprised largely of definitions and predictions. Preoccupied with practical applications for the lay person, natural science texts published in English between 1550 and 1600 mostly define (terminology, concepts, and procedures) and predict (they include tables and charts that indicate tides, good days for bloodletting, and for planting; they also calculate zodiac signs based on degrees of latitude, and so forth).

Descriptions of such phenomena frequently evince the animism that characterizes Renaissance naturalism. For instance, attraction indicates friendship, and repulsion signifies enmity. Digges characterizes gravity as “affection” (n.p. [13]), and the mutually influential relationship between the Earth and moon as an “alliance” (n.p. [6]). Similarly, Maplet notes that astrology is possible because of the “concord or common fellowship of the seuen Planets” (1r). Planets such as Saturn, Jupiter, and Mercury are in “concord” and are “friends” (4r); their “atonement, or agreement” results from their “lyke Nature, Quality, Substance, might, or powre.” Saturn’s “enemies,” on the other hand, include Mars and Venus, planets that cause “[g]reate contencion” (4r). At the turn of the
seventeenth century, Johannes Kepler blends the language of Renaissance naturalism with musical terminology to describe the ratios between the five Platonic solids (the cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron, and octahedron), ratios which he identifies as literally harmonic; the variations of a planet’s orbit, and the relationships between planetary orbits, demonstrate musical harmonies and dissonance. That planetary orbits demonstrate harmonic ratios suggests “genetic kinship” and “marriage” between the Platonic solids (171-74) as well as between the planets themselves (204). The dissonance Kepler identifies between Mars (f sharp), Venus (e flat), and Jupiter (d) arises from Venus’ marital bias; “this difficulty is caused by the wedding of the Earth and Venus,” a wedding that leads Venus to draw so close to her husband that she disrupts the heavenly harmonics.

More practical than theoretical, English scientists mostly treat “attractions” and “correspondences” as self-explanatory and unproblematic. Such terms simply name the causes of celestial and terrestrial movements and inform a universe understood as an interpenetrating system of what we would now call forces. Whereas we post-Newtonians understand these forces independently of the bodies in which they manifest, naturalists understand forces such as gravity and magnetism in terms of bodies' shared qualities. Consider, for instance, Thomas Digges’ description of gravity in his “Addition” to his father Leonard’s Prognostication (1555/1576). Digges writes that

Gravity is nothing els but a certaine proclivity or natural coueting of partes to be coupled with the whole, which by diuine providence of the Creator
of all is given and impressed into the partes, that they should restore
themselves into their unity and integrity, concurryng in spherical fourme.

(n.p. [13])

The “partes” to which Digges refers are bits of earth; it is a natural law, Digges asserts,
for elementary particles to join together into the unity God established. “Unity” (and a
spherical one at that) is the natural state of elemental earth; bodies of earth “cocyte” one
another because God’s law dictates that parts seek the whole. Thus heavy objects must
have earth in them; they fall to the ground because they seek to be unified with it: “things
[..] naturally fall downward being of earthy nature” (n.p. [11]). The “natural place” of
earth is at the center of the universe, and since “nothing can be more repugnant to the
forme and ordinaunce of the world, then that thinges natural y should be out of their
natural place,” earth seeks its union at the center of the universe (n.p. [12]). Whereas the
heaviest element, earth, seeks the center, lighter elements such as fire and air flee the
center and create concentric spheres around earth. “To ayre and fyre, in regard to their
lightnes, [their natural motion is] upward and from the center” (n.p. [8]). Those things
that rise from the earth must contain fire or air; they “by firye force are carried upward”
(n.p. [11]). Differences in what we would now call gravity, specific gravity, and weight
were a consequence of the relative heaviness of the four elements. In contrast to
Newton’s revolutionary hypothesis that all bodies have gravity, sixteenth century
scientists like Digges understand gravity to be synonymous with the phenomenon of
heavy bodies’ free fall; it describes the motion of particles of earth, and, to a lesser
degree, particles of water, as each particle seeks to join its fellows in a sphere. Levity, on the other hand, names the quality of light bodies. Earth is not simply a certain kind of particle; rather, it is a substance that has the tendency to move towards the center of the universe and to join in spherical union with other pieces of earth.

As with gravity, naturalists’ conception of magnetism results from the attraction between entities' shared qualities. In the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon argues that “the Load stone could attract Iron” because the stone and iron “concurre and agree in Nature, for the conformitie and likenesse of their Natures” (56). Three hundred years later, William Fulke notes in his Goodly Gallerye (1563) that the magnet has a “natural vertue [. . .] to drawe iron,” a virtue that exists “by a similitude of nature, and such an appetite, as is male and the female” (70v). Both Bacon and Fulke attribute the force of magnetism to likeness in qualitative natures; as John Maplet notes in The Diall of Destiny (1581), “agreement [of bodies] is in like nature, quality, substance” (4). "Similitudes" and discordances between naturalist entities rely on qualitative (not quantitative) relationships, and these similitudes constitute fundamental structures of the animate cosmos. For Digges and his colleagues, forces such as gravity and magnetism are the product of three factors: attraction and repulsion, the desire for an originary unity, and the

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90 Due to his endorsement of the Copernican, heliocentric system, Thomas Digges’ understanding of the natural location of earth is actually a good deal more complex than his colleagues’. He notes that, since the Earth is not the center of the universe, the natural place of earth is in the fourth sphere. He also considers the possibility that there exist multiple centers towards which earth gravitates, and thus prefigures Newton’s discovery that gravity is a property of all bodies (3-4, 8).
“natural place” of distinct elements. The ways an entity moves and the relationships it has are part of the definition of that entity.91

The likenesses and similitudes that inform Natural Philosophy lead Michel Foucault to argue that sixteenth-century epistemology is one of similitude and the seventeenth-century one of difference. In *The Order of Things* (*Les mots et les choses*, 1969), Foucault observes that sixteenth-century philosophers seek out likenesses in order to understand phenomena in the natural world whereas seventeenth-century philosophers and scientists increasingly seek to differentiate between entities (a differentiation facilitated by the development of dictionaries, botanical classifications, etc.). Foucault identifies four kinds of similitudes: *convenientia*, *aemulatio*, *analogy*, and *sympathy*. Foucault's thoughts on similitudes accurately describe the interconnected, animate universe of Renaissance naturalists. Although *The Order of Things* does not recognize it, the four forms of Foucault's similitude are different kinds of trope. *Convenientia* is the similitude introduced by spatial proximity; it is this likeness-by-proximity that both metonymy and synecdoche name.92 *Aemulatio*, on the other hand, is "a resemblance that needs no contact"; it "has been freed from the law of place and is able to function,

91 Cosmological entities are defined according to their relationships and narrative history as well. For instance, in John Maplet's *Diall of Destiny* (1581), Maplet defines the planets according to their celestial paths, mythological history, effects on people and animals and other planets, signs, and so forth.

92 The figure of metonymy refers to one thing by its attributes or things closely associated with it. Two of Puttenham's examples include calling love "Venus" and "thy hands, they made thee rich," in which hands signify labor (191). Synecdoche names a whole by its parts or vice versa, such as referring to fifty head of cattle (where the head is only a part of the whole).
without motion, from a distance" (19). The tropes metaphor and metalepsis both assert likeness between distinct entities, and catechresis, in particular, emphasizes this
distance.\footnote{Metaphor, of course, draws two things into relationship. With metalepsis, one refers to another thing with which it is only remotely related. Puttenham's example emphasizes the distance between the two; "\textit{Woe worth the mountain that mast bear / Which was the first causer of all my care,}" Medea is reported to lament, of the birthplace of those ships' masts that brought Jason to her (193). Finally, catechresis refers to metaphors that exist because of a lexical hole: one term signifies something that's not "proper" to it; that catechresis is regularly described in terms of words occupying improper "places" (Quintilian et al.) points up the fact that distance is the fundamental component of catechresis. We will return to the "place" of metaphor in chapter five.}

Foucault's analogy "superimposes" convenientia and aemulatio; in doing so, it recognizes both the distance between entities and the degree to which one is immanent in the other. The sixteenth-century understanding of allegory depends upon precisely this relationship; allegory speaks both to a difference between levels and their fundamental connection.\footnote{Commonly, allegory is defined as an extended metaphor. Foucault's definition of \textit{analogy} points up the fundamental quality of sixteenth-century Protestant takes on allegory: the inherence of a distant (Biblical) world in the present one.}

Finally, sympathy, the form of resemblance in which "no path has been determined in advance, no distance laid down, no links prescribed" (23), describes both the category of trope in itself and, depending on one's definition, metaphor, the fundamental trope.\footnote{As a category, tropes refer to a wide variety of relationships; what holds this set together is that the relationships are all assertions of "similitude" (as Foucault defines it, a definition that exceeds the claims that simile makes) or of some kind of connection. Contemporary inquiries into metaphor, including Northrop Frye's and Armin Burkhardt's, reveal that metaphors work on a wide range of levels. Burkhardt, for instance, notes the "mixed" metaphor (such as Noam Chomsky's "colorless green ideas sleeping furiously").} Indeed, as we shall see below, sixteenth-century theories of metaphor were sufficiently complex and broad to categorize metaphor as \textit{sympathy}.\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{}}}}}}}}}
Although Foucault argues that sympathies and antipathies characterize a secondary, derivative human experience of the universe, naturalists understand these likenesses to inhere in the cosmos itself. That is, naturalists do not just think that the world-is-known according to similitudes; rather, the cosmos is a system of relationships based on sympathies and qualitative likenesses. And these likenesses are tropological. Tropes inhere in the naturalist cosmos in the form of relationships between entities.

The cosmological relationships tropes define are precisely those to which Merleau-Ponty's chiasm speaks. The entities they involve -- be they planets, particles of earth, or wolves -- are distant and yet alike; they have an identity that bridges the distance between them. For natural philosophers, trope names the relationship of qualitative likeness in spite of distance. Metaphor offers two terms, or the similarity of at least two cosmological entities, but undercuts the distance implied by dualism. The cosmological relationships tropes name are precisely those we now discuss in terms of force: gravity, magnetism, and so forth. Tropes literally have force: the force that joins (at least two) distinct entities existing at some distance apart from one another. It is worth noting that both "energy" and "force" describe rhetorical features hundreds of years before naming phenomena in physics (OED). Tropes name the tensive force shared by spatiotemporally

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96 Actually, in a sense, naturalists do see likeness in the universe as the foundation of epistemology; according to Peacham, God puts metaphors in the universe so that humans can understand. But for Peacham and natural philosophy, there remains a likeness between the world-as-known and the world-in-itself, a linguistic (tropological) likeness. The tropological world is still the real world.
distinct entities. This is Merleau-Ponty's chiasm: tension within different parts of the same "thing," within the trope as a unit. Tropes name the forces in a cosmos modeled on qualitative relationships, on "likeness." The cosmos of the natural philosopher is ordered by tropological forces between things, such that these things cannot be defined without reference to the forces (and unity) to which it belongs. Whereas Cartesian mechanists posit a billiard ball universe in which the impact of entities is the only possible force between objects, natural philosophers understand the cosmos to be ordered by tropes, by a multitude of literary forces between entities.

The idea that trope links remote things in the cosmos is a theory of rhetoric as much as it is a physical and cosmological one. Or rather, theories of rhetoric, at this point in time, were also theories about how the world worked. We can see this in sixteenth-century vernacular rhetorical treatises informed by naturalism. Certain sixteenth-century rhetoricians show a greater predilection for Renaissance naturalism than others. Thomas Wilson and Harry Peacham, for instance, regularly draw on naturalist terminology. In his *Art of Rhetorique* (1553, 1585), Wilson observes the "marriage" of the firmament and the earth and characterizes the figure "contradition" as a "repugnancy" between terms (96). Peacham, in his *Garden of Eloquence* (1577, 1593), states that "metonimia" (metonym)...

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97 The particular vision of trope invoked here, the "tensive" metaphor, appears in Paul Ricoeur's *The Rule of Metaphor* and Phillip Ellis Wheelwright's *Metaphor and Reality*. For both authors, metaphor does not compare or blend two things or ideas; rather, it names the tension generated by two things that attract one another yet are apart. The focus is not on the "meaning" of the metaphor so much as on what it does and how it is. Such theories are indebted to New Criticism for their emphasis on the force, tension, and event/phenomenon that is metaphor.
speaks to the "conveniencie" of things "nigh knit together" (19). Peacham makes explicit the naturalist belief that tropes inhere in the physical world. In the midst of a long passage distinguishing various kinds of metaphor (i.e., metaphors from man to beast, from the four elements, from men to God, and so forth), he embarks on a cosmological lesson. He observes that

so infinite and incomprehensible is the nature of Almighty God, and mans capacitie of so small a compasse, that no one attribute of God can be conceiued by mans weake understanding without the helpe of earthly images and naturall propertie well knowne to man, and therefore forasmuch as mans eye cannot behold inuisible vertues, nor his understanding able to apprehend the incomprehensible wisedome: Almighty God of his goodnesse hath descried him selfe by the most excellent and euident letters and characters imprinted most liuely in his creatures, not only by such as are somewhat secret, but also and most chiefly by such as are evident and manifest to mans understanding and knowledge. (12)

Metaphors that apply "earthy images and natural property well knowne to man" to God, Peacham argues, provide access to otherwise "infinite and incomprehensible" attributes

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98 Translating Erasmus' exhortation to a young man to marry, Wilson calls attention to the many "marriages" in the natural world. Wilson reminds his audience that Pliny observes "both Male and Female, in all things that the earth yeeldeth," including stones and the "Skie or Firmament, that is euer stirring with continuall moouing: Doth it not plaie the part of a housband, while it passeth up the earth, the mother of all things, and make it fruitfull with casting seede?" (48).
of God. For instance, Peacham notes the metaphoric descriptions of God as "father" and "shepherd" indicate his "loue and tender compassion" as well as "dayly providence and careful custodie of his people" (12-13). Metaphors such as "God the father" do not simply compare human fathers and God, then, but actually inhere in the world as the "letters and characters" that reveal God's truth.

Metaphor draws relationships between entities distant from one another in space as well as those whose distinctness is a categorical one. Peacham, as well as many of his classical predecessors, takes as self-evident the ways that metaphors assert connections between entities "not proper" to one another (3); categories of metaphor include: "man" and his "senses," "from the mind to the bodie," "from man to the brute creature," "from things without life to things having a life," "from the foure Elements," and such (4-13). The copia of Peacham's categories and examples gestures towards an infinitude of possible metaphoric connections across all levels of distinction. Peacham's metaphor is as remarkably versatile as Foucault's sympathy. What Peacham's Garden reveals is that metaphoric sympathies are part of the world; they constitute the fundamental "truths" of "God's nature," and these truths are relational in character. Foucault would have us read Peacham's description of metaphor to indicate a larger sixteenth-century epistemology of similitude, but for Peacham the naturalist cosmology is a tropological one. Distinct entities share "qualitative likenesses" that produce the cosmological events we now call "forces." These likenesses are the fundamental truths, the "invisible vertues," written into God's nature. Naturalists inhabit a physical world literally structured by tropological
relationships. "Words are things" not as apples are things, but as gravity and magentism are things; tropes express the forces and interconnections between entities.

The sixteenth-century shift from what historians call Renaissance naturalism to Cartesian mechanism redefines physical thing-ness in terms of measurability. Whereas for Renaissance naturalists, rhetorical figures like metaphor and synecdoche inhere in the natural world in the form of relationships between entities, mechanists dismiss the relationships these figures name as occultish forces at a distance. Mechanists limit contact to direct impact between entities defined in terms of their extension in Cartesian space. The fundamental quality of this extension is its quantity; Cartesian quiddity is, at its core, measurable. Although this narrative of competing visions of cosmological quiddity reductively proposes two distinct world views, it nonetheless offers insight into the role rhetoric plays in the period's visions of the physical world. By rejecting forces at a distance, Cartesian mechanism dislocates trope from the physical world. Instead, rhetoric is only part of the physical world to the extent that it can be numbered. Rhetoricians and scientists become preoccupied with meter, rhyme, synonym and homonym, and schemes (figures that involve changes in word order and syntax). When we return to Puttenham's text, we find that he rejects the naturalist understanding that trope resides in the physical world; he limits rhetorical quiddity to the ways that rhetoric can be numbered, to its "proportions" (meter, rhythm, and rhyme scheme, etc.). Far from

99 "Force at a distance" refers to influences exerted by distant entities, in contrast to direct impact, which mechanism requires. Such a force might include the attraction of like to like, an attraction that, for Renaissance naturalists, accounts for the movement of earth towards earth (a motion we now attribute to gravity).
offering an alternative vision of the quiddity of language as de Grazia argues, then, Puttenham actually looks forward to the non-thingness of seventeenth-century rhetoric. This chapter's inquiry into Puttenham's *Arte* offers a narrative of the severance of rhetoric from the world that was codified by the so-called Scientific Revolution. Concurrent changes in the fields of rhetoric and physics solidify a distinction between the two, ultimately decreasing the literal (or rather "real") force and energy of rhetoric and its tropes.

MECHANIZING RHETORIC

It is not surprising that de Grazia draws on Puttenham when she investigates Early Modern rhetoric. Puttenham's *Arte* is the most popular rhetorical treatise of the period for literary scholars because it is the first original English rhetoric. Indeed, its differences from other rhetorical treatises of the period -- such as Peacham's and Wilson's, both of which parrot the classical tradition -- mark the *Arte* as a significant text in its own right. Puttenham is particularly interested in developing a uniquely English literary tradition; he evaluates forefathers Chaucer and Wyatt, argues for the use of the vernacular, and generally updates classical expectations for new, modern demands. One way Puttenham distinguishes himself from his classical predecessors is by using a different system of categorization. For instance, Puttenham rejects the classical division of "figure" into "trope" (a "derivation from the ordinary or principle signification of a word," *Silva*) and

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100 Steven Shapin reminds us that the "Scientific Revolution never happened" (1) insofar as it was neither a discrete event (or series of events) nor a sudden transformation in thinking; I use the term as a convenient short hand.
"scheme" (a "derivation from the ordinary arrangement of words"), substituting instead the tripartite structure of "figures auricular," "figures sensible," and "figures sententious." Puttenham also offers an entirely new category of poesie: "Proportions Poeticall." In this section, he defines and characterizes the right use of stanza, meter, rhyme, rhyme scheme, and shape poems. Puttenham is the first among his colleagues to devote an entire book to this new category, and it constitutes a full third of his treatise.

Like his naturalistic colleagues, Puttenham assumes that natural philosophy and rhetoric intertwine. However, scientific theories make their appearance exclusively in his Book II, "On Proportions Poeticall." These proportions, absent from classical treatises, detail the ways that verse can be numbered. Puttenham's emphasis on the scientific nature of rhetorical "proportions" suggests that his treatise bears the traces of nascent mechanism. Indeed, he notes that the terms *scientificke* and *mechanical/* are

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101 I describe the evolution of "rhetoric" to "poesie" and ultimately to "literature" in chapters five and six.

102 Puttenham explains that all components of the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music), as well as theology and rhetoric, are interrelated insofar as they are concerned with "proportion."

It is said by such as profess the Mathematicall sciences, that all things stand by proportion, and that without it nothing could stand to be good or beautiful. The Doctors of our Theologie to the same effect, but in other terms say: that God made the world by number, measure and weight: some for weight say tune [. . .]. (78)

Here, the reversal between the "good and beautiful" of the "Mathematicall sciences" and the "number, measure and weight" that "Doctors of out Theologie" discover in the natural world reveals the degree to which Puttenham understands God's world to be informed by mathematical regularities; that is, physical things are numerical. Math, theology, philosophy, music, rhetoric, arithmetic and geometry: all treat "proportion guided of the things that haue conveniencie [conveniency]," that are "near" one another insofar as their similarity permits proportional -- that is, numerical -- comparison (78-79).
synonyms (158). Puttenham's mechanism and insistence on a numerically-defined universe leads Puttenham to rethink figures, particularly trope. Cartesian mechanists understand the universe in terms of pure extension; there is no room for "folds" in the fabric of the universe, no such thing as force at a distance. Such folds and chiasms become, for Puttenham, purely literary, mere trope. He dismisses trope from the real universe using numeric terms; he writes off metaphor for its "doubleness" and "duplicitie." Trope does not clarify the physical world but instead "deceives" the mind. The numeric terms by which he rejects trope imply that it violates a numerically defined mechanical universe. In particular, we shall see that, for Puttenham, trope is inconsistent with the mechanistic law that prohibits two objects from occupying the same space at the same time. As a consequence of this law, which is predicated on a physical world defined by extension, the tropological force that unifies otherwise discrete objects -- the energy of trope -- becomes exclusively mental (rather than physical). Puttenham's Arte thus speaks to the increasingly separate trajectories of rhetorical and the physical worlds; this separation ultimately is codified by the developments of the Scientific Revolution.

Whereas Peacham and Wilson concentrate their inquiries into the natural world in their sections on figure, Puttenham's explorations of physical law arise in the section treating those parts of rhetoric that can be numbered (weighed, counted, timed): its "proportions."\(^{103}\) His scientifically defined universe is characterized by quantity rather than quality; indeed, he specifies that "God made the world by number, measure and

\(^{103}\) In this sense, Puttenham looks forward to Johannes Kepler's preoccupation with the "harmonies" between planets and the ratios that describe the universe.
weight" (78). It is in this emphasis on number as the fundamental measure of the physical world that mechanism shows its influence on the Arte.\textsuperscript{104} As science historian Allen Debus notes, mechanism is one means by which mathematics, or number, colonizes the natural world (8-9). To quote Descartes, the "laws of mechanics, which are the same as laws of nature" (31), describe a world of extension in which number is the fundamental measure. There can be no fold in the field of extension. It is numerically impossible. As Puttenham brings mechanism and extension to the rhetorical world, trope comes to indicate a "duplicitous," merely linguistic category of speech rather than a tensive fold in the real world.

Puttenham's interests in science come to the forefront in his mathematical Book II "On Proportions Poetical." Invoking the contemporary theory of gravity, he explains:

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\textsuperscript{104} Granted, mathematics had been a tool for understanding the cosmos and rhetoric for well over a thousand years. Geometry, for instance, expresses the relationships between heavenly spheres. Johannes Kepler, writing at the turn of the seventeenth century, is best known for his preoccupation with the numeric "harmonies" exhibited by the variations of a planet's orbit and the relationships between planetary orbits. His interest in the "harmonies" between geometric ratios arises from his belief that quantitative harmony is the purest expression of God (Holton 349). Indeed, Kepler observes that "God's reasons" are geometric (Harmonies 221). But the development of what would become Cartesian mechanism reconfigures the mathematically described world in a way that diminishes the local relationships fundamental to Renaissance naturalism. Galileo's and Kepler's scientific "advancements" make long strides in replacing an animate system with a mechanical, heliocentric system that cannot conceive of force at a distance. Kepler, for instance, explicitly rejects naturalism when his second edition of Mysterium Cosmographicum (1621) replaces the "anima motrix" (animistic soul) of his first edition (1596) with "vis" (force). He also applies celestial mechanics to the earth, universalizing mathematical rules. Most notably, Galileo's unique approach of treating motion separately from entities disallows the qualities that were the explanatory forces for naturalism's force at a distance.
To that which was highest lift up and most eleuate or shrillest in the eare, they [the Greeks] gaue the name of the sharpe accent, to the lowest and most base because it seemed to fall downe rather than to rise up, they gaue the name of the heauy accent [. . .]. Then because every thing that by nature fals doen [down] is said heauy, and whatsoeuer naturally mounts upward is said light, it gaue occasion to say that there were diversities in the motion of the voice, as swift and slow, which motion also presupposes tyme.

(91-92)

In this segment, Puttenham does not debate the scientific theories as to why gravity works; in a passage naturalistic for its emphasis on qualities ("heauy," "light"), he simply remarks that the human voice follows the same principles of movement as physical objects. Betraying his mechanistic tendencies, however, are Puttenham's emphases on the numeric qualities of "accent" -- weight, speed, and time. His treatment of rhythm is also preoccupied with number: he underscores the weight and speed of what he calls "measure" and "numerositie" (90-91). Rhythm is "high or low, or sharpe or flat, or swift or slow" (90-91). In fact, the rhetorical sense of "numerositie" begins with Puttenham's Arte (OED 1).

When we return to the passage on which de Grazia bases her argument that sixteenth-century words are palpable (and therefore, she argues, "things"), we discover that the "palpability" she identifies derives from rhetoric's numeric qualities. In the passage, Puttenham treats rhetoric as palpable, as a sensible entity in the physical world, only insofar as it is an object of measure. Puttenham notes that "iust and reasonable
measure” produces a persuasive tale; he concludes that “the minde [is] no lesse
vanquished with large loade of speech, than the limes [limbs] are with heauie burden”
(207). De Grazia reads the "heauie burden" of a "large loade of speech" to signal the
quiddity of sixteenth-century words. But Puttenham does not suggest the palpability of
words in toto; rather, weighty words are those that have "measure." (By "measure,"
Puttenham refers most immediately to decorum, but this moral concept is enmeshed in
theories of meter and mathematics.105) De Grazia is right to observe that Puttenham
illustrates a tradition in which "words are things," but this tradition is distinct from the
earlier, figurative tradition to which Peacham and Wilson speak. The Arte specifically
rejects those rhetorical components (e.g. trope) that, for Peacham and Wilson, constitute a
meaningful inherence of rhetoric in the world; only those rhetorical dimensions that have
"numerositie" are part of Puttenham's mechanistic world. For him, words are things, that
is, they follow physical law, only to the degree that they can be measured. His
conception of words (or their proportions) as palpable things of nature derives from their
numerical properties, their weight and speed. Rather than offering an alternative to
seventeenth century views on linguistic quiddity, as de Grazia claims, Puttenham
represents an important step in the separation of rhetoric (which would come to be
limited to figure with the spread of Ramism) from the "real" world.106

105 See M. Bennet Smith's unpublished dissertation "Disparate Measures: Poetry, Value,
and Form in Early Modern England."

106 Frenchman Petrus Ramus renovated the fields of logic and rhetoric by moving three of
the five classical categories of rhetoric (invention, disposition, and memory) to logic
and limiting rhetoric to elocution (primarily figure) and pronunciation. Ramus
Puttenham's self-declared "mechanicall" science, which manifests for him as a new attention to "proportion," shapes his treatment of trope. He emphasizes that trope is a departure from reality rather than fundamental to its processes. For him, trope is violent, dark, and dishonest. In specific, metaphor is "guilefull and abusing," and allegory is "a duplicitie of meaning or dissimulation vnder couert [covert] darke intendments" (166). Metaphor, the epitome of trope, holds a special place in his loathing; it is "not [...] naturall" (189), but a "wresting" together of two distinct meanings. The sympathetic attraction that naturalist trope names becomes, for Puttenham, a kind of violence. He finds trope fundamentally "improper" because it is deceptive by nature; it is "occupied of purpose to deceiue the minde, drawing it from plainnesse and simplicitie to a certain doublenesse" (166). His emphasis on metaphor's "darkness" and obscurity reveals a fundamental difference between his metaphor and Wilson’s and Peacham’s. Puttenham’s metaphor conceals the truth whereas Peacham and Wilson emphasize the ability of trope to reveal the created world. Peacham observes that, because nature is populated by things "resembl[ing]" one another, trope is a means by which "matters are well expressed, their meanings more largely uttered"; sometimes, without trope, the poet "could not declare the nature of the thing so well" (2). Tropes make "visible" the truths in God’s Book of Nature; without tropes, we could not observe

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107 Tropes and other "gileful" figures are the choice tools of Machivellian, conniving courtiers, "scholemen," and other rhetorically-gifted dissemblers.
the truth of the universe. Like Peacham, Wilson notes that tropes can lend clarity
where literal language cannot. He observes that, in some cases, “the whole matter
seemeth by similitude to be opened” (156 [misnumbered; 174]). For naturalists,
metaphor produces a “large[r]” understanding; it “open[s]” the “nature” of a thing. But
Puttenham’s trope, on the other hand, merely “darken[s]” reality; Puttenham’s trope is
equivocal, ambiguous, and duplicitious.

The specific language by which Puttenham condemns figure and trope -- his
accusations of their "doubleness" and "duplicity" -- suggests that that the fundamental
problem with trope is that it troubles numeric consistency. He beseeches his readers to
construct decorous figures by “keeping measure” (167); he commends the "poetical
science" above the "foul indecencie or disproportion" of hack poets. But as much as
Puttenham desires a measured metaphor that keeps proportion with the physical world, he
accepts the impossibility of such a venture. He urges that metaphors not be used in
venues concerned with truth, such as, in his example, a court of law. Metaphors,
"illusions to the minde, and wresters of vpright iudgement, [...] make the iudges
affectioned," and they are as improper "as if a carpenter before he began to square his
timber would make his squire [square?] crooked" (166). In this simile, the reality with

108 Peacham and Wilson remark that figures help us to know the world. This is not to say
that similitudes are merely epistemological tools. Rather, they are the very
"characters" of the cosmos. Similitudes help us to read the cosmos because it is
fundamentally linguistic.

109 Although, by necessity, Puttenham’s treatise includes a wealth of “acceptable” figures,
these too become figures of “vice” if they are used incorrectly (and there is a plethora
of ways to misuse them).
which a judge should be concerned is the timber and the metaphor the crooked carpenter's tool. The problem with the square is not simply that it is crooked and therefore unable to measure properly. Because the square is the tool against which mismeasure is to be identified, the very basis for measure fails in metaphor. "True" and "false" no longer apply when the tool to gauge verity, the ideal yardstick that defines all other yardsticks as being the proper length, is out of measure. It is not simply that trope is numerically irregular in terms of being "crooked" or "false," then; Puttenham suggests that trope violates rhetorical mechanism by destabilizing the numerical system itself.

Puttenham's preoccupation with metaphor's "violence," as suggested by his remark that metaphors "wrest" the mind, helps to clarify how trope violates a mechanistic, numeric universe: it asserts force at a distance and links two distant, separate entities. He regularly emphasizes figures' violence. For instance, he tells the story of an Orator from Egypt who convinced the multitude to commit suicide "by the force of perswasion: and if perswasions were not very violent, to the minde of man it could not have wrought so strange an effect" (153). Puttenham figures the "violent" "force of persuasion" as a literal chain; Hercules, he notes, reported seeing "figured a lustie old man with a long chayne tyed by one end at his tong, by the other end a the peoples eares, who stood a farre of [off] and seemed fastned to his tong, as who would say, by force of his perswasions" (154). The example of Hercules is not unique to Puttenham's treatise; Wilson includes it as well, and the story has classical roots. Wilson notes the story in the preface to his Arte titled "ELOQUENCE FIRST giuen by God, and after lost by man, and last repayred, by God againe": "Hercules, being a man of great
wisedome, had all men lincked together by the eares in a chain, to drawe them and leade them euon as he lusted” (n.p.). The most significant difference between Wilson's and Puttenham's versions is that Wilson emphasizes the divine nature of eloquence whereas Puttenham stresses its violence. Specifically, Puttenham emphasizes that eloquent violence bridges the distance that should otherwise keep men safe from harm. Both Wilson and Puttenham characterize Hercules' voice as a "chain," but Puttenham specifies that it links men "who stood a farre of [off]." The violence that characterizes elocutio (which is primarily figure) is a product of figure's ability to violate the mechanical law that prohibits force at a distance. Descartes, we must remember, restricts force to direct contact or impact. There is no such thing as force at a distance. Gravity, for instance, was determined by vortexes of particles surrounding a celestial entity; and Descartes explains magnetism as the effect of tiny screw holes threaded one way or the other, thus accepting different "threaded" charges. In a mechanistic world, force requires direct impact by particles whereas for Renaissance naturalists, qualitative forces produced folds in the fabric of the cosmos.

The problem is that trope works at a distance by collapsing that distance in what I have been calling a fold. Or, rather, tropes name folds in the world that disregard

110 Similarly, Henry Peacham notes that, through amplification, the Orator prevaille[s] much in the drawing the mindes of his hearers to his owen will and affection: he may winde them from their former opinions, and quite alter the former state of their mindes, he may moue them to be of his side, to holde with him, to be led by him [. . .] and finally to be subject to the power of his speech whither soeuer it tendeth. (121)

As with Wilson's Hercules, Peacham's Orator "draw[s]" his listeners; unlike Puttenham's, Peacham's persuasion is not "violent"; rather it "moue[s]," "holde[s]" and "le[a]d[s]" men.
distance. When we accept that distant planets affect one another through naturalist "sympathies" and "attractions," we must reconsider what "distance" means since it does not seem to obtain in a world defined by sympathies. On one hand, planets are distant from one another, but on another hand, their qualitative connections eliminate distance and challenge the notion that such planets are discrete. At the same time that figures violate the mechanist elimination of force at a distance, then, they also violate the law that prohibits two discrete entities from occupying the same place at the same time.111 Puttenham's treatment of synonym plays out the implications of the physical law prohibiting coincident entities on figure. For Puttenham, synonym is the only "proper" figure because all other figures wrench words from their proper places and superimpose them. Puttenham notes that the term "mechanicall [...] answereth" the word "scientifique [...]", which no word could have done so properly, for when hee ["th'author in this present treatise"] spake of all artificers which rest either in science or in handy craft, it followed necessarilie that scientifique should be coupled with mechanicall: or else neither of both to have been allowed, but in their places" (158). Only synonyms share the same "place"; all other figures draw together words that have their own, separate places. Proper synonyms (rather than "inkhome" -- foreign or intellectually presumptuous -- ones) literally are the same thing in that they do not require separate places. (We will return to ways Early Modern authors work out the places of rhetoric and literature in chapter five.) In his treatment of sinonimia, Puttenham notes that synonyms have "one

111 Cf. Edward Casey (FP 152) on Descartes' contributions to the theory of coincident entities.
effect" and one meaning (223). Puttenham anglicizes the Greek term as "the Figure of store" "because plenty of one manner of thing in our vulgar language we call so"; synonyms "are in sense all one." Puttenham condenses the multitude, the "plenty" of synonyms, into a singular "one." And this "one" constitutes the only "proper" figure because it does not violate the law restricting different entities (words, concepts) to their individual places.

It is not simply that metaphor is "crooked," then, because even crookedness can be measured. Rather, Puttenham's Arte suggests that trope disrupts mechanistic numbering systems altogether in that it introduces a kind of "doubleness." Tropological "doubleness" is not the concrete, countable metric doubleness that produces an iamb, spondee, or any other kind of "proportion poetical"; rather, the "doubleness" of trope is its "duplicity": the ability of trope to bring together different, distant things, to say multiple things at the same time, to lie and tell the truth at the same time, to turn language against itself. For Puttenham, tropological "doubleness" signals linguistic equivocation, which is dialectically opposed to the physical world of pure extension.

For all of its scientific, mathematical claims, Book II has a peculiar ending: two fables about linguistic equivocation and ambiguity. In the first tale, Polemon accepts a royal reward for his services to the King; in the second, the Rattlemouse (or bat) escapes being drawn into the war between the fowls and four-footed beasts by being a convincing orator. The tales reveal Puttenham's unease about the duplicity of language, specifically
the linguistic capacity for equivocation.112 Both Polemon and the Rattlemouse succeed because of the slipperiness of language, because they master the linguistic "trick" of equivocation.

The Rattlemouse escapes from having to take sides in the war between the four-footed beasts and the birds by claiming the opposite allegiance requested of him; he both "excused himselfe for that he was a foule and flew with winges," and he "said he was a foure footed beast" (148). The bat appears to be a warm-blooded mammal at the same time that he flies like a bird, and his ability to say two apparently mutually exclusive but equally true things (that he is a bird and that he is a beast) allows him to trick his companions and escape battle. Here, equivocation arises because categorical distinctions meant to distinguish between beasts (with no left-over) fail to obtain.113 Thus the bat avoids his duty.

In the second story, Polemon interprets an oracle to mean that his daughter will find favor with the King; he sends her to court and is rewarded. Puttenham notes, however, that "hosoeuer [howsoever] the oracle had been construed, he could not have receiued blame nor discredit by the success, for euery wais [ways] it would have proued [proved] true" (147). Because the oracle equivocates -- that is, it can be interpreted a

112 These stories, examples of what Marcy L. North has identified as Puttenham’s repeated bids for patronage, can be interpreted to establish his rhetorical mastery. But these stories are also consistently anxious about linguistic equivocation.

113 In the coda of this dissertation, we will return to the ways that categorization changes in Early Modern rhetoric, logic, botany, and zoology affect the ways that language works in the world, or out of it.
number of mutually exclusive ways -- it offers a number of mutually exclusive truths and yet claims to tell the truth.

Your best way to worke -- and marke my words well,

Not money: nor many,

Nor any: but any,

Not weemen [women], but weemen beare the bell (147)

This cryptic remark could be interpreted to mean that not many will find favor with the king, nor just anyone, but one of the multitude might (not "weemen" but a woman), or maybe "any" woman might. This interpretive multiplicity covers all possible outcomes.

The oracle calls attention to the multiplicity and numeric inconsistency at the heart of Puttenham's sense of tropological equivocation.\textsuperscript{114} The oracle's indeterminacy is specifically a numeric one -- it is unclear how many women, or which one, will find favor with the king. Moreover, the oracle's specific figures call attention to the numerical flux that marks Puttenham-esque equivocation. \textit{Aphaeresis} (omitting the first letter) changes "many" to "any"; \textit{antisthecon} (substituting letters) changes "money" to "many"; and \textit{epanalespsis} (repetition) produces the second "any" (whose referent is different from the first). The oracle's equivocation is coded as the failure of quantities to solidify into determinate numbers; this failure results from the instabilities that the passage's figures introduce.

\textsuperscript{114} The oracle is a fine example of the "darkness" the characterizes Puttenham's trope. Indeed, "Enigma" ("the riddle") is a means by which "we dissemble againe vnder couert and darke speeches" (198).
In his treatment of the figure *antanaclasis*, or "the rebound," Puttenham attempts to explain equivocation in mechanistic terms; the ways he fails clarify how tropological equivocation violates his science. *Antanaclasis* is the "repetition of a word or phrase whose meaning changes in the second instance" (*Silva*). As such, equivocation is a form of homonym. As an example, Puttenham offers: "To pray for you ever I cannot refuse, / To pray upon you I should you much abuse" (216). Figural equivocation lies truly; it prays at the same time that it prays [preys]. Puttenham explains *antanaclasis* thus: the rebound "allud[es] to the tennis ball, which being smitten with the racket rebounded back againe [. . . ]; this [figure] playeth with one word written all alike but carrying diuers senses" (216). The tennis ball (word) changes its trajectory (meaning) as it deflects off another object (word, syntax); by this definition, the multiple sense of "pray" is entirely unproblematic -- meaning simply changes over time. But Puttenham's confusing statement that *antanaclasis* is "one word written all alike" reveals his difficulty adapting equivocation to the numeric system that underlies mechanism. "Alike" suggests a comparison of at least two terms, but his metaphor offers only "one word" (or ball). This

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115 Note that, because spelling had not yet been regularized (it would be some years before the creation of the first English dictionary), spelling "prey" as "pray" is not a mistake.

116 Such religious connotations can only remind Puttenham's readers of the damnable Jesuits lying truly in order to protect their own. As Christopher Devlin illustrates in *The Life of Robert Southwell: poet and martyr* (1956), some Catholics were instructed to use equivocation when questioned about hiding priests in their homes in order to escape having to sin and tell a lie.

117 As spelling becomes standardized in the seventeenth century, this change in meaning is reflected in a difference in spelling: the homonym becomes a homophone. This transition also reflects the shift from an oral to a written culture.
definition is numerically inconsistent; Puttenham's metaphor explains equivocation as a single word that travels through time, but "alike" reveals the multiplicity this trajectory attempts to hide at the same time that "one word" resists such temporalization. The word means two (or more) things at the same time, but Puttenham tries to excuse this equivocation with a temporal example. The temporal arc by which Puttenham attempts to regularize equivocal duplicity into straightforward singularity helps us to understand equivocation's doubleness as a problem of temporality -- that is, such temporality is missing from an equivocal statement. Unfortunately for Puttenham, equivocation offers multiple meanings at the same time; indeed, the only way that the oracle becomes unequivocal is with the passage of time that reveals, or, more precisely, constitutes the oracle's truth. The duplicity of tropological equivocation, it appears, is not simply that tropes lie; rather, tropes exhibit "doubleness," violate the numeric terms of the physical world, to the extent that they equivocate by locating two (or more) things in the same place at the same time through a distance-bridging force.

(DIS-)COUNTING THE FORCE OF FIGURE

The "force" of figure is not simply a pun on the violence Puttenham identifies with figure. Rather, it speaks to the real energy that naturalist tropes possess (by virtue of chiasmatic relationships) and to the "metaphoric," merely imaginary energy trope has for Puttenham. For Renaissance naturalists, forces between entities are structured tropologically. For Puttenham, the force of trope is limited to its persuasive power and to the violence it does to otherwise discrete, different things. There is a long history of
talking about trope in terms of force and energy. Before the term "energy" migrated into physics in the nineteenth century to name "the power of doing work possessed by a body in virtue of the stresses which result from its position relatively to other bodies" (OED 6), energy referred to the "force or vigor" of rhetorical expressions (1). For Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and later writers, *enargia* is the "vivid," "animate" "actuality" produced by rhetorical figures.

Traditionally, *enargia* is associated with sight; it refers to the lively, visual descriptions that figures (especially metaphors) can produce. It is not to be confused with *energia*, "a general term referring to the 'energy' or vigor of an expression" (Silva). The difference between *energia* and *enargia* is twofold: *enargia* has stronger visual associations and an attendant emphasis on actuality. Aristotle regularly uses the term *enarges* (e)nargh/v) to signal vividness (Poetics 1462a, 1455a) and explicit, clear activity (Nicomachean Ethics 1095a, 1097b, 1145b, 1173a, 1179a). In the Odyssey, Homer invokes *enargia* when describing the awesome appearance of gods, such as when Athena appears to Penelope (4.841, 8.77). This vivid visuality signals animate actuality; Aristotle notes that the objects in Homer's metaphors, "appear to be alive because they are moving [e]nergou=nta]" (Rhetoric III.xi.3).118 Hundreds of years later, such energetic actuality is a primary goal of Tudor rhetoricians. Although English rhetoricians rarely use the term, critics remark nonetheless that *enargia* is "the supreme excellence of

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118 Aristotle cites examples such as "[the spears] were set in the ground, longing to gorge themselves with flesh" (II. 11.574) and "eager, the spear point darted through his chest" (II. 15.541) (Rhetoric III.xi.3). All translations of Greek texts in this chapter are Britta Spann's.
Elizabethan dramatists” (Doran 242) and praise Spenser, Sidney, and Dryden, among others, for their poetic and prosaic enargia (Thompson, Dundas, and Benson respectively). English rhetoricians such as Peacham, Wilson, Sidney, and Puttenham regularly use enargic qualities such as light, color, and motion when describing tropes. Italian Giraldi Cinthio exemplifies the early modern emphasis on the visual nature of enargia when he remarks in his sixteenth century Discorso intorno al comporre dei romani that enargia “[resides] in putting the thing clearly and effectively before the reader’s eyes” (135). Consistently, rhetorical energy or enargia signals vivid liveliness and animate actuality; it is the power of figures to make an image seem to appear in front of us. Enargia names the degree to which trope is actual, an actuality to which bodily senses testify.

From Aristotle onward, enargia characterizes a vibrant, vivid, figural image that seems to take place before our eyes. The energy of a text is a function of the rhetorical relationships its figures name; enargia makes a scene so actual that readers bear witness to it with their senses. Puttenham, however, transposes enargia and its cousin energia, a curiosity that has long plagued critics. For him, the near-homophones enargia and energia, which crystalize tropological equivocation, figure trope's departure from the mechanistic world and its relocation in a distinctly mental one. In essence, Puttenham

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119 Early modern rhetoricians are far more likely to emphasize the visual components of enargia than are their classical counterparts, a change I attribute to the shift from an oral to written culture.

120 The distinction that I draw here between the material and mental worlds, and elsewhere between the physical and social worlds, should not be taken to ignore the long critical history that troubles such categorical divisions.
associates the energy of trope with mental activity in explicit opposition to bodily experience, effectively removing tropological energy from the physical world and instead identifying it as a product of cognition and of meaning. Not only does his transposition speak to the division between body and mind upon which Descartes would so famously insist, but it also speaks to a consequence of his dislocating figure from the physical world: the energy generated by equivocation and named by trope no longer signals a personal experience of rhetorical presence; instead, it indicates merely an intellectual engagement with meaningful words.

In contrast to his classical predecessors, Puttenham shifts enargia to scheme and energia to trope. At first, it seems that he merely transposes enargia with its cousin energia. Energia (e)ne/rgeia) is a classical term for lively writing in general; it is not specific to figures and does not denote visuality. Puttenham describes enargic figures as those that "satisfie and delight th’eare." Energia, on the other hand, characterizes those figures "inwardly working a stirre to the mind" (155). Mistakingly identifying enargia with the ear, rather than the eye, seems to be a small oversight. Claud A. Thompson observes that “there is some confusion and conflation of the two terms in later [Early Modern] rhetoricians and critics,” and so he implies that Puttenham simply exemplifies the Early Modern “conflation” of the two terms (24).

However, Puttenham does not merely switch the two terms; his treatment of energia and enargia newly emphasizes distinctions between bodily senses and between physical and mental work. Unlike classical rhetoricians, who divide figures between schemes and tropes, Puttenham classifies figures as either enargic or energetic. Near the
beginning of Book III, he observes that “ornament Poeticall is of two sortes” (155); one sort of figure serves
to satisfie and delight th'eare onely by a goodly outward shew [show] set vpon the matter with wordes, and speaches smoothly and tunably running, another by certaine intendments or sense of such wordes and speeches inwardly working a stirre to the mind: that first qualitie [figure] the Greeks called Enargia of this word argos, because it giueth a glorious luster and light. This latter [figure] they called Energia of ergon, because it wrought with a strong and virtuous operation.

Energic and enargic figures are divided further into three categories. Some figures "serue [serve] th'eare onely, some serue the conceit onely, and not th'eare," and a third category serves both the ear and the "conceit" (or "minde.") For Puttenham, enargia stimulates the ear and the eye; these he calls “auricular figures.” Energia, in contrast, characterizes those figures that affect the mind -- "figures sensible" (that affect the mind only) and “figures sententious” (that affect both the mind and the ear). By and large, Puttenham classifies schemes as auricular figures and tropes as figures sensible and figures sententious, although he does include a few more complicated schemes in the category of figures sententious. As energic, tropes are primarily mental.

For Puttenham, schemes are the "actual" figures the body registers; schemes alone belong to the physical world, the world of mechanistic science. He reiterates the actuality of schemes by describing them in numeric, mechanistic terms. He alleges that the ancients called schemes "numerositie," and he classifies schemes according to different
kinds of "proportions" including "tune and harmonie and meter" (173), "order" (175), "repetition, and iteration" (183). That his numeric schemes are enargic is consistent with his sense that only those poetic proportions that can be numbered reside in the "actual" world described by physical laws. The "numerositie" of schemes locates them in the world of physical, mechanistic objects that alone evince sensory qualities -- enargic aliveness. The rhetorical objects that count are those which are sensible, palpable.

Weight, speed, the motion of pictures: these alone are measured as things in the world. No longer consisting of enargic liveliness and the vividness of actual encounters, Puttenham's trope is markedly distant from the physical world. Tropes are energic, and he defines energia in terms of mental work, of thought. By classifying tropes under energia and limiting sensory experience to enargia, Puttenham eliminates the sensory valence of trope and makes it a figure of the "conceit" or "minde" (155). Trope's (actual) sense has become its (meaning) sense. For him, tropological equivocation no longer figures the actual force that appears at the relational intersection of otherwise distant entities (and between humans and texts); rather, tropes have energia or a general sense of "efficacy" because of the mental work they stimulate.

Although it appears to be a small transposition of a single vowel, Puttenham's treatment of energia and enargia speaks to the mechanistic science that structures his rhetoric. The energy of trope, the force it constitutes, becomes mental. No longer a tension and relationship, trope is reduced to meaning (and a troubled, equivocal meaning

121 Thus, we can see that the distance between the physical and mental worlds, develops in new ways with the shift to Renaissance mechanism.
at that). Trope is not actual in a phenomenological way but rather in a strictly intellectual way. For earlier rhetoricians, the force of trope includes the fundamental relationships between entities, relationships based on an inherent likeness that acts regardless of distance. The unity or relationship of the cosmological entities obtained even though the entities were distant. Metaphor was a statement of unity within distance and difference. With Puttenham and numeric mechanism, however, distant things remain distant and disjointed. Metaphor might "force" them together through comparison, but otherwise the two are distinct entities. The force between them is no longer actual; it is merely figural. As the universe is defined as extension that can be plotted on a Cartesian graph, distant entities no longer have a unifying force; impact is the only force permissible in the Cartesian universe. The universe is defined according to numeric plots, points on a grid. It can be measured. Figure, however, cannot. It is inherently crooked, duplicitous. It doubles the world back upon itself in a "comparison" (metaphor) that is, by definition, improper (more on this later). Parts of rhetoric can be counted: meter, rhythm and the like evince the numeric regularity that describes Puttenham's mechanistic world. But figure becomes the merely linguistic doubling of equivocation. (In chapters five and six, we trace out the implications of the increasing identification of equivocation with lying and fiction.) The chiasm, the fold that depends upon identity in distance, cannot obtain in a universe defined as pure extension.

Philip Sidney, the only English rhetorician besides Puttenham who uses the term explicitly, characterizes enargia as a force; he notes that "certaine swelling phrases" demonstrate "forciblenesse or Energia" (I3r). Such force and energy had long indicated
the "actuality" of trope, figure, and even rhetoric itself. But the shift from natural philosophy to mechanism limits what is actual to what is measurable. Trope becomes unnatural and deceitful because it evinces two forces eliminated by mechanistic science: force at a distance and the tensive energy of two things occupying the same space at the same time, an energy produced by equivocation. (Curiously, Early Modern understandings of metaphor and other tropes in terms of force and energy help to clarify what was right about New Criticism; both I.A. Richards and William Wimsatt, for example, understand metaphor to create "tension.") Puttenham shifts the actuality of rhetoric from trope to proportions (scheme, meter, and so on), to those things that can be numbered. The rhetorical objects that count are those that are sensible, palpable, measurable. Puttenham's rejection of trope and the energy it figures from the physical world is consistent with mechanistic philosophy's gradual disassociation of matter from movement, forces, and relationships (particles have no inherent force or relationship with each other; they simply react to the impact of other anonymous particles). As movement is no longer an essential part of the cosmological entity, the tensions and forces trope names become merely figurative.

Puttenham's rejection of trope and its energy from the physical world is consistent with mechanistic philosophy's gradual disassociation of matter from movement, forces,
and relationships. For Renaissance naturalists, "matter" is bound up in systems of
tropological influences and relationships that account for cosmological movement. For
Puttenham's colleagues, "words are things" to the extent that tropological structures
inhere in the physical world. But for Puttenham, "a word is a thing" insofar as accent,
meter, rhyme, and scheme are things that follow mechanistic, numeric laws. Rather than
presenting an alternative to seventeenth-century ways of thinking about language
linguistic quiddity, then, Puttenham actually looks forward to the linguistic changes de
Grazia locates in the seventeenth century. By the second half of the seventeenth century,
language is, ideally, a transparent reflection of an extralinguistic world. As Foucault
notes, "instead of existing as the material writing of things, [language] was to find its area
of being restricted to the general organization of representative signs" (42). Robert
Watson's recent Back to Nature provides one narrative of the turn away from words and
to the world; he argues that, in the Early Modern period, truth "departed on its amazing
modern itinerary [...] from meaning to matter" (20), from language to the physical
world. Indeed, the scientifically defined physical world becomes a source of truth in
new ways in the seventeenth century. Watson's inquiry into linguistic meaning and his

123 Galileo argues that bodies are indifferent to motion and thus separates "motion from
the essential nature of bodies" (Westfall 19); Descartes, and eventually Robert Boyle,
characterize mechanical philosophy as an investigation into matter and motion, two
separate things.

124 Such an epistemological shift informs, for instance, Francis Bacon's claim that
language is one of the four "idols" that muddy our perception of reality. Watson
identifies a number of agents responsible for this shift: "[U]rbanization, capitalism,
new technologies, and the Protestant Reformation each contributed to anxieties about
mediation and the lost sensual past" and "focused and magnified" "nostalgia for
unmediated contact with the world of nature" (5).
emphasis on epistemology lead him to assume a distinction between "language and the physical world"; but we have seen here that sixteenth-century words are more complex than mere carriers of truth or meaning. Certain linguistic structures -- tropes -- inhere in the world as the forceful, energetic relationships between distinct entities. Such tropological force is actual for earlier rhetoricians; it is the life of the universe. But with the mechanistic emphasis on "counting," on seeking numerical and meaningful equivalences, tropes become mental representations, preoccupied with meaning, and distinct from the actual world. The "trope" or "doubleness" of seventeenth-century language is the degree to which it reflects the world. As a mirror, language is distinct from that which it reflects -- the physical world. Language reflects a billiard ball world of extension and impact, but that "reflection" is not governed by rules of physics. No longer part of the physical world, language loses its quiddity by the time of the Scientific Revolution, a movement that not only sought to eliminate synonyms and homonyms, to standardize spelling, and to regularize dictionaries, but also worked to establish a universal language untainted by connotation (cf. Sprat's *History of the Royal Society*, 1667). This seventeenth-century tradition, which dissolves "the profound kinship of language with the world" (Foucault 43), grounds modern day ecocritical assumptions about the relationship between language and the world, an assumption that Watson and de Grazia duplicate.

125 As Shakespeare's Hamlet notes, drama "holds the mirror up to nature" (3.2.20).
CHAPTER V

THE GEOGRAPHY OF FICTION FROM MORE'S UTOPIA TO SIDNEY'S DEFENSE OF POESY

Thomas More's Utopia (1516/1518) is a problem for many reasons. In her introduction to Three Modern Utopias (1999), Susan Bruce asks: Why does Utopia try to convince its readers of its truth? Why present ideals in fictional narrative? (xi) Michael McKeon notes of Utopia a fundamental "uncertainty about how to separate 'fact' from 'fiction,' 'true lives,' from 'romance,' 'history' from 'literature'" (Bruce xv, McKeon 20-22). And Stephen Greenblatt reads Utopia to emphasize the self-contradictions More is forced to live out as a courtier negotiating deadly political situations (Self-Fashioning, 1980).

Indeed, the text calls attention to its own problematics. Not least of which is Hythloday's praise of Utopia's "few laws" (195), which is subsequently by details such as the fact that Utopians' clothing and table places are all legislated. The message of the book is equally confounding: which opinions are we supposed to think are More's own, and, if Utopia utterly fails to describe the free society More desires, then what are the solutions for the social problems the text so poignantly diagnoses?

For Utopia, these problems are also rhetorical; the primary figures in the text are irony and litotes. Both of these figures are an example of language "turning" against itself (recall that "to trope" also means "to turn"). Each says -- or does -- something more than what it says constatively. The text folds over on itself in a declaration of self-
difference. The names in *Utopia* highlight the self-difference of irony; the More in the book is not the author exactly, "Hythloday" means speaker of nonsense, the Abraxa River is the river "without water," and so forth. Each name is an example of crystallized irony: self-contradiction. For *Utopia*, self-contradiction is ultimately a question of ficticity; irony is the means by which More diagnoses fiction. By fiction, however, More does not mean something unreal. Steven Greenblatt observes that, since he too had to act roles in his life, "the category of the real merges with that of the fictive" (31) for More. *Utopia* provides an early look at the developing genre that would come to be called prose fiction. The text's inquiry into irony reveals that fiction is not unreal; it takes place through rhetorical figures of self-difference like irony.

The text explicitly inquires into the place of *Utopia*; the very name of the book suggests that the text is "no place" or maybe "the best place." The letters appended to some of the early editions continue the joke and examine the place of *Utopia* (and Utopia) in geographic terms. Writing to Thomas Lupset, William Budé remarks that "I personally, however, have made investigation and discerned for certain that Utopia lies outside the limits of the known world. Undoubtedly it is one of the Fortunate Isles, perhaps close to the Elysian Fields, for More himself testifies that Hythlodaeus has not yet stated its position by giving its definite bearings" (13).

126 Budé's reference to the Elysian Fields emphasizes the myth-like place of Utopia; but Budé also notes that Utopia

126 This letter appears in the March 1518 (Basel) edition of the text. This edition "appears to be the last edition in which More is likely ever to have a direct hand" (Surtz clxxxvii). For more on the editions and the epistolary apparatus associated with each, see Edward Surtz' "Editions of Utopia" in the Yale.
should appear on a map and in the world to which "definite bearings" apply. It does not, however, because More is unsure of the coordinates. Giles remarks that "More's difficulty about the geographical position of the island" is due to a whisper and cough having interrupted the dialogue in which this information is conveyed (23). The ways that fiction, as irony, engages geography and cartography are emphatically linguistic, and problematically so, as the interrupting whisper (an obsfucating utterance) illustrates.

Peter Giles' letter to Busleyden also highlights the geographical tradition in which Utopia -- and Utopia -- appear(s). The geography of Utopia (and Utopia) typify Medieval cartography. Not only do the two maps included with the text exemplify the early map style (see Appendices A and B), but the text also adheres to the conventions of Medieval cartography. As D. K. Smith notes in The Cartographic Imagination in Early Modern England (2008), even local maps in the Medieval tradition were organized according to narrative; for example, they suggest itineraries: both the itinerary the cartographer himself followed and itineraries that the viewer might follow when visiting places of interest. Medieval maps of this sort depict the places on the itinerary (or in a travelogue) without regard for scale; destinations are depicted as close together when, in fact, they might be quite far apart. Utopia illustrates the cartographic techniques of the Medieval tradition by emphasizing proximity and the narrative that links together places.

127 This letter accompanies from the 1516 (Louvain) edition onward (ibid. clxxiii).

128 This tradition is not monolithic, nor is it exclusively Medieval. However, for sake of simplicity here, I treat the Medieval tradition of T-O and local mapping practices. This style offers a counterpoint to the "New Geography" that develops around the turn of the seventeenth-century.
In contrast, Philip Sidney's *Defense of Poesy* (1579/1595) maps the world of poesy (Sidney's term for literate, courtly writing) according to the New Geography. Around the turn of the seventeenth-century, New Geographers assume extended space plotted on a newly invented Mercator projection map, a flat map of the globe useful for navigators because its straight lines of constant course create a grid on which individual points in the world can be plotted. What is at stake in the difference between these two cartographic methodologies is the relationship of prose fiction and poesy to the world. Medieval cartographers understand maps as narratives, as journeys that take place; the map draws the viewer into a narrative in which he or she participates. But the New Geographer's emphasis on pure extended space carefully isolates poesy from the "real world." Plotting space according to a Cartesian grid, the new maps are devoid of narrative, of things taking place. Rather, the Cartesian grid offers a timeless slice of mathematically defined positions.

The place that More and Sidney map out is a literary one. In this period, as narrative is separated from the physical world (because it does not have a location chartable in that world) -- as it becomes fictionalized -- its place, and thus the place of figure, is called into question. For previous authors, figure takes place because words are out of place: when we recognize that words are not in their proper places (as in metaphor), we know that something (figure) is happening. But there is no longer a place for figure in the world when narrative is written out of it. Narrative is a defining quality of figure; as Patricia Parker notes, there is a story about how the metaphoric word came to occupy a place not its own. This story might be of an interloper, a lacking word
(catachresis), a qualitative relationship between entities, and so forth. For More, it is imperative that narrative have a place in the world because if it does not, then irony -- the fundamental figure of *Utopia* -- cannot exist and, without irony, the text's call for social change does not obtain. Narrative provides the elements that create the internal contradiction we call irony. When the text folds back against itself in irony, it invites judgment: the internal difference created by irony requires the reader to take up a position in relation to the material. Like Medieval maps, which situate their geography in relationship to the map viewer (who is also enmeshed in the narrative world the map traces), *Utopia* hails the reader and solicits his judgment. This judgment is a necessary condition for social change, More’s primary concern. Irony provides a means of drawing attention to social problems; as readers, we know that *Utopia* offers elicits social commentary because the text is ironic. So, for More, preserving the place of irony is paramount because as cartographic practices eliminate narrative from the physical world, they eliminate the basis for making judgments on that world. Without narrative, the world no longer calls for judgment through irony, and thus the primary mechanism for social change vanishes. When fiction and narrative are no longer part of the world, no longer means for mapping that world, then they can no longer affect that world. Only if narrative takes place does it invite judgment (including the judgment of something being out of place, like metaphor).

Sidney plays out the failure of fiction/narrative to enact change in the world in terms of failed performatives. When narrative and fiction are completely separated from the physical world, then they are no longer performative and thus are no longer the
engines of social change: fiction cannot affect the world if it does not have a place in it. Men who read the text can bring about changes, but the text itself is no longer performative. Indeed, it is precisely this point that Sidney emphasizes in the Defense; as we see below, he notes that the writer, not the text, “conjures” the audience. Poesy, Sidney emphasizes, is not real: it does not take place, nor does it have a place in the actual, physical world; it is limited to the realm of fiction. Questions of falsity and verity do not apply to poesy; therefore, the world of poesy is not the world of historians. It is foreign, always distant, and straightforwardly delineated against the place of the real world. Poesy is, Sidney observes, a "passporte" between foreign countries. But these countries, the worlds of the historian and of the poet, do not occupy the same map. The strict spatiotemporal extension of the New Geographer is unconcerned with narrative and prohibits the coincidence of opposites (or of cosmological entities). In the Defense, the presence of opposing viewpoints does not produce a coincidence of opposites; rather these different ideas simply reflect that anything is possible in poesy. Although Ron Levao argues that Sidney's poesy is like More's ficta because both are ironic, a re-reading of Sidney reveals none of the tension of More's irony. The opposing opinions Sidney offers are not ironic, do not create a coincidence of opposites. Rather, Sidney's poesy is a homogeneous space of sheer possibility. Anything could happen, but nothing does. Among other things, Sidney's commentary on conjuring emphasizes that language is not performative; ultimately Sidney demonstrates that poesy cannot conjure and that

129 We will return to the differences between ficta and fiction below.
performative utterances are off poesy's map. Whereas, for More, _ficta_ take place, for Sidney, poesy does not.

PLOTTING IRONY

In *Literary Fat Ladies* (1987), Patricia Parker details what she calls "the metaphorical plot." For Parker, the term plot encompasses the wide range of associations metaphor encompasses. Classically, metaphor is spatialized insofar as it signals a word that occupies a place other than its own. It is also temporalized in the sense that it involves a narrative of an alien word displacing a local one. Out of place, metaphor invokes nostalgia for a retreat back to Eden, a garden plot of originary meaning. Finally, it also seems to plot against the reader to the extent that it interpolates specific subject positions.

The etymology of metaphor denotes movement from a place near by. The Greek word meta/fora is comprised of a prefix meaning “beyond” or “over” and a root verb meaning “to carry”; similarly, *translatio*, the Latin equivalent of the word “metaphor,” means “to carry across.” Metaphor travels through nearby territories, revealing their boundaries by transgressing them. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle defines metaphor as "the application of a strange [a]llo/triou] name either transferred [e]pifora/] from the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy" (1457b). Aristotle emphasizes the "strangeness" of

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130 Cf. Northrop Frye, who argues that metaphor suggests a "return" back to an idealized (Edenic), more primary (more "real") place (*AC* 124).
metaphor; he praises metaphor in the *Rhetoric* because it lends "a foreign air" (3.2.3.). Metaphor should come from nearby, but it is nonetheless alien to the place it occupies.

But the distance metaphor covers is constrained by a sense of decorum and propriety. Because metaphor appears in a place to which it does not belong, it must be careful to attend to local conventions. Aristotle emphasizes that metaphors must "observe due proportion; otherwise there will be lack of propriety" (3.2.9). Similarly, the *ad Herennium* cautions that metaphor must have good manners because it incorporates new places. Like Cicero (*de Oratore* 27.92), the *ad Herennium* remarks that "metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a kindred thing, and not seem like an indiscriminate, reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike thing [translationem pudendem [. . .] esse oportere, ut cum ratione in consimilem rem transeat, ne sine dilectu temere et cupide videatur in dissimilem transcurrisse]" (4.34.45).

The spatialization of metaphor is clearest in metaphor's failure, its "precipitate leap"; the need for metaphorical "restraint" only emphasizes the distance a metaphor not bound by decorum could cover.

Decorum delineates the place of metaphor, the rhetorical figure in which something is out of place. For Cicero, the "self-different" place of Aristotle's metaphor

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131 J. H. Freese cautions that the word *xe/nov*, translated here literally as "foreign," is difficult to render when it describes writing style. The word does not have the negative connotations that "foreign" and "alien" sometimes carry in English. Richard C. Jebb renders it as "distinctive" in his translation of *Rhetoric*.

132 The mathematical sense of the Aristotelian metaphor is grounded in ratios, harmonies, proportions; these mathematics speak to natural philosophers' preference for a mathematics of relationships rather than discrete measurement. See, for instance, Kepler's work with musical ratios in the *Harmony*.
applies to trope in general. Cicero remarks that "the man of perfect eloquence should, then, in my opinion possess not only the faculty of fluent and copious speech which is his proper province, but should also acquire that neighboring borderland science of logic" (32.113). Eloquence, one of the five divisions of rhetoric and the one that governs figures of speech, has its own proper place. And this place is defined by reference to what is nearby: the field of logic. For Cicero, proximity gauges the quality of figure and rhetoric. Like his classical predecessors, George Puttenham observes that figures denote words that are out of place. He asserts that either two words are synonyms "or els neither of both to haue been allowed, but in their places" (158). All figures are fundamentally indecorous; all words should be in "their own place," but none are when figurative. All figures (save synonym) violate the physical laws that define what comes to be called Cartesian space: the law prohibiting coincident entities (no two things can be in the same space at the same time) and the law prohibiting coincident locations (nothing can occupy two different places at the same time). Only synonym treats words properly; because the words say the same thing, they are the same thing and are thus permitted to occupy the same place.

133 According to classical tradition, rhetoric is divided into inventio, disposito, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio. Because rhetorical invention is like logical invention in that both use "places," topoi, to obtain their material, rhetorical invention seems to describe the same world logic defines. But when inventio migrates to logic with Ramus (a sixteenth-century French philosopher), rhetoric is reduced to "mere" ornamentation (elocutio, and memoria, serving diminished functions in a society depending upon books. Cf. Walter Ong, Ramus.

134 The neighbor logic, however, plays the ultimate "alien" by colonizing inventio and rendering rhetoric merely ornamental.
Because figures are, for Puttenham, out of place by definition, rhetorical proximity becomes less about the place of words than about foreign countries and languages. Illustrating the means by which a courtier chooses between synonyms, Puttenham remarks that even though the word “Maior-domo [is] borrowed of the Spaniard and Italian and therefore new and not vsuall,” it is still preferable to the English term because it is customary “to them that are acquainted with the affaires of Court” (158). The decorum that defines the proper word is a specifically social, courtly decorum rather than a purely linguistic one. The foreignness of figures, Puttenham suggests, stems from geopolitical reasons rather than from a place proper to rhetoric. Preachers, scholars, secretaries, merchants, and travelers introduce "inkehorne termes" and the "straunge termes of other languages" into English. Decorum is a function of national (rather than rhetorical) expectations. “Maistre d'hostell" might be permitted in France, but it is not the preferred term in England or Italy.

Puttenham turns the indecorous coincidence of opposites, or self-difference, of figure into duplicity and lying. The self-difference that, for him, is trope or figure and that, for Aristotle, is metaphor, is, for More, irony. And it is fiction. More takes a complex view on the place of rhetoric as marked by decorum and context as self-different; this place is both irony -- an instantaneous self-difference that can be said to take place -- and narrative -- a spatiotemporal dimension that takes place over time (the story). Irony takes place. It is also structured like place: it has a narrative and connects with other nearby places. The place of irony is spatiotemporalized through narrative; this is consistent with Patricia Parker's observation that, as alien, metaphor comes with a
narrative of how it came to be in a place to which it does not belong. So, too, *Utopia* demonstrates the scale on which irony can take place by extending it throughout the narrative. This extended irony, or coincidence of difference, for More, characterizes fiction.

More, of course, does not use the term "fiction"; writing in Latin, More refers to the fictitious elements of his tale as "ficta" (248.5). *Ficta*, according to CT Lewis' standard *Latin Dictionary*, have a history (stretching back through Terence) throughout which they maintain the sense of deceit that continues in modern day connotations of fiction, particularly in political contexts. Translators regularly translate More's "ficta" as "fiction," but this translation misses the complex ways that More defines the relationships between *ficta*, fiction, and irony. Exploring the place (or "no place") of *ficta*, More participates in a lengthy discussion that stretches back through Nicholas of Cusanus, Ockham, and St. Augustine to its roots in classical philosophy. Ron Levao's *Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions* (1985), the authoritative work on Early Modern fiction, traces the transition from *ficta*, or mental constructs, to fiction both in terms of fiction as "lying" and as a distinct genre. This transition occurs because sixteenth-century readers secularize *ficta* by rejecting earlier assumptions that mental fictions provide access to the Divine. That is, whereas *ficta* are "real" in the sense that they offer an experience of Godhead, fiction is dialectically opposed to reality. In particular, Levao focuses on fifteenth-century German theologian and philosopher Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), who considers the experience of *coincidentia oppositorum* (the coincidence of opposites) to be the primary method by which one might witness the ineffable Divine. For Cusanus,
coincidentia oppositorum is a product of ficta, which are often mathematical, logical, or rhetorical in nature. Even poetry is a kind of fictum. But by the end of the sixteenth-century, ficta has become fiction: coincidentia oppositorum becomes part of an entirely different classification of things outside the physical world. For Cusanus, ficta produces an experience and provides access to the Divine, which is far more real and true than the physical world. For Puttenham and his Italian contemporaries, on the other hand, fiction is "make believe"; it is, in essence, nothing but lies. As the sixteenth century progresses, the philosophical and theological benefits of ficta disappear, and the narrative structure of fiction is all that remains. The account of fiction that Levao narrates has three points that are particularly relevant to this chapter: first, internal contradiction or equivocation, which Puttenham associates with figure, also characterizes Levao's account of the developing sense of fiction. Self-contradiction, figured in Utopia as irony, marks the place of fiction. Second, the coincidence of opposites becomes temporalized as fictional narrative. Utopia reads like a travelogue, like an itinerary. As such, it is an example of the Medieval T-O maps (whereas Sidney's Defense, we will see below, exemplifies New Geography cartography instead). Third, fiction and coincidentia oppositorum take place. More traces this place through decorum as he remarks on context. More notes that his life is, too, a series of roles dependent upon courtly context. More's fiction is not entirely "not real" because it belongs to the world of events, performances, and occurrences.

For Cusanus, ficta produce a coincidence of opposites. Coincidence happens. In particular, it happens as an experience of God, who contains all opposites. Mental thought experiments (especially mathematical ones) can produce an experience of the
ineffable because God contains all opposites (Levao 20). Unlike Abelard and Ockham, for whom *ficta* are always more "real" than poetic fiction (even through they draw analogies between the inherent structure of intellection and artistry, 60-61), for Cusanus, poetry is a kind of *ficta*, and *ficta* are poetic; the process of reason is no less creative than the work poets do. Both poetry and philosophy "promote the invention of forms of intelligibility, neither strictly true nor false" (Levao 86). Poetry and philosophy are equally valuable insofar as they can surpass the present world of fact and make contact with Divinity through the use of *ficta*. Levao concludes that Cusanus "read[s] all forms of human cognition as kinds of poetic making" (86). For Cusanus, Levao observes, the divine access *ficta* provide is an inherently poetic process; both poesie and its *ficta* generate valuable "act[s] of apprehension" that reach beyond the fallen world towards God. Insofar as poetry and literature produce the coincidence of opposites, they take place as an instance of *ficta*.

However, by the end of the sixteenth century, *ficta* and the coincidence of opposites are little more than fiction and explicitly are not part of the actual world described by scientific processes. As "not-true," sixteenth-century fiction becomes "verisimilitude" and "lying"; ultimately, fiction is not real (Levao 121). The anxiety that *Orlando Furioso* (1516) produced with its flying dragons and trips to the moon is indicative of the concern that fiction-making has loosened its tethers on theological and philosophical truths as well as on productive moralism. By the end of the sixteenth century, authors like Lodovico Castelvetro, Jacopo Mazzoni, and Torquato Tasso no longer justify *ficta* for their allegorical revelation. Tasso explicitly rejects the theological
underpinnings that medieval theorists use to justify ficta; he argues that poetry can't be purely fictive (or it wouldn't move us) and that it shouldn't treat the "sacred or unalterable" (129). That which moves us, Tasso assumes, must be real; therefore unalloyed fiction is useless. In contrast to the productive, divine experiences of Cusanus' ficta, fiction is, for Tasso, an obstacle to the practical uses of poetry. Levao suggests that Tasso's increased interest in regulating poetry, such as his insistence that it maintain "unity," reflects a mounting anxiety that poetry -- particularly its fictive dimensions -- is out of control (130); no longer self-regulating, fiction requires stringent social restrictions. The sixteenth century ends with the concern that fiction, identified with poesy (as Sidney defines it, below), is more dangerous than useful. The Renaissance shift from verity to utility, and the period's anxiety about the purely fictive nature of poesie (and the poetic nature of fiction), leads Levao to conclude that the Renaissance sees "an increasing awareness of the mind's power and freedom to create fictional worlds that outstrips its ability to justify them" (132).

The self-contradiction of ficta manifests in Utopia in two ways: first, across the narrative as an irony of "judgement," and second, through the irony of names. The biggest joke of the book hinges on the fact that Utopia, a no-place or best place, is fictional. More claims to describe a real place; he just can't remember the coordinates (and neither can anyone else). If truth be told, More's attention to the fictional nature of the book is strangely overdetermined. Not content to rely on the name of the place and the name of his interlocutor to signal the ficticity of Utopia, the letters More appends to the text repeatedly raise the question of its location, challenge an unnamed reader for
being so stupid as not to believe Utopia is real, and debate its location. More establishes that the text is fictional through irony. In a letter to Peter Giles appended to the 1517 (Paris) and 1518 (Basel) editions, More begins his letter by acknowledging a criticism already known to you, made by an unusually sharp person who put this dilemma about our Utopia: If the facts are reported as true [si res vt vera], I see some rather absurd [subabsurda] elements in them, but if as fictitious [sin ficta], then I find More's finished judgment wanted in some matters. (249)

This letter offers two options: either the text is true and absurd, or if it is fictitious, then More should have been more judicious. We have already noted one way that judgment seems lacking in Utopia: the opinions in the text are often at odds with data presented. For instance, just after a story in which Hythloday describes greedy, immoral, favor-currying priests, he refers to "some abbots, though otherwise holy men, who are not satisfied with the annual revenues and Profits which their predecessors used to derive from their estates," and so they enclose and develop church properties (67). "Otherwise holy" indeed; here Hythloday offers a pious "judgment" or opinion on clergymen, a judgment they clearly do not deserve. He goes on to condemn enclosure as the fundamental problem with English society, and the seat of poverty (64-71). Such contradictions between the judgment the text offers and the details the narrative includes mark the text as fiction, as suspect, as non-self-identical.

135 The letters appended to each edition change; consult the Yale edition for specific notes. The letter in which More declares that, if the work was fictional, he would have indicated it in some way accompanied the 1517 (Paris) and 1518 (Basel) editions.
Mimicking this methodology, More overtly praises the reader's critical acumen, but his response reveals that More actually thinks this reader is a dolt. He writes

Now when he doubts whether Utopia is real or fictitious, then I find his finished judgment wanting. I do not pretend that if I had determined to write about the commonwealth and had remembered such a story as I have recounted, I should have perhaps shrunk from a fiction whereby the truth, as if smeared with honey, might a littler more pleasantly slide into men's minds. But I should certainly have tempered the fiction so that, if I wanted to abuse the ignorance of common folk, I should have prefixed some indications at least for the more learned to see through our purpose. Thus, if I had done nothing else than impose names on ruler, river, city, and island such as might suggest to the more learned that the island was nowhere, the city a phantom, the river without water, and the ruler without a people, it would not have been hard to do and would have been much wittier than what I actually did. Unless the faithfulness of an historian had been binding on me, I am not so stupid to have preferred to use those barbarous and meaningless names, Utopia, Andyrus, Amaurotum, and Ademus. (251)

Although More's "if" ("si" 250.6) suggests that he did not so warn his readers (and thus that the text is not fictional, that More is "a historian" rather than a creative writer), the passage actually details one strategy by which More reveals the text's ficticity: irony and self-contradiction. He does those things he claims not to have done; the stupid,
meaningless names indicate both an attempt at historical realism (the names could only be real life) and fiction (the names might not be meaningless).

There are thus two ways that More figures the fiction of the text through irony: first, fiction takes place across narrative, and second, it can take place instantaneously like in a name. In terms of the temporal and spatial narrative of fiction, *Utopia* has both a vertical axis (instantaneous irony; the coincidence of opposites in a name) and a horizontal axis (irony is revealed over the course of a narrative). Both are consistent with Levao's account. *Coincidentia oppositorum* is both the instantaneous effect of logical paradoxes and the narrative over which the *ficta* are constructed. For *Utopia*, the text's narrative offers the raw materials that constitute context (and thus decorum), from which irony (self-contradiction) is diagnosed. When Hythloday and More consider the place ("locus") of Hythloday's philosophy, they debate whether a decorous place for Hythloday's beliefs exists in the context at hand: a courtly society. Hythloday argues that he will not betray himself and moderate his beliefs; "there is no room [locus] for philosophy with rulers" (99). Like *Utopia* (and Utopia), philosophy has "no place."

However, More-the-character observes that it is merely evidence of good taste for Hythloday to say things he may not mean; he should moderate his philosophy to fit the context in which he finds himself.

"Right," I declared, "that is true -- not for this academic philosophy [*philosophia scholastica*] which thinks that everything is suitable to every place [*locum*]. But there is another philosophy, more practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself to the play [*fabula*] at hand,
and performs its role neatly and appropriately \textit{[cum decoro]}. This is the philosophy which you must employ. Otherwise we have the situation in which a comedy of Plautus is being performed and the household slaves are making trivial jokes at one another and then you come on the stage in a philosopher's attire and recite the passage from the \textit{Octavia} where Seneca is disputing with Nero. Would it not have been preferable to take a part without words than by reciting something inappropriate to make a hodgepodge of comedy and tragedy? You would have spoiled and upset the actual play by bringing in irrelevant matter -- even if your contribution would have been superior in itself. (99).

Hythloday's interest in the proper \textit{locus} or place for his philosophy assumes an answer shaped in the form of decorum.\footnote{Logan and Adams' Cambridge edition notes that More's (the character's) "position is informed by the rhetorical and ethical doctrine of \textit{decorum}, propriety of words and actions" (34 fn.77).} The place of decorum, More-the-Character suggests, is in the roles one plays. In this passage, role playing and theater figure decorum, which determines the right "places" for speaking the right things. More's treatment of decorum is grounded in an assumption that words have proper places. Hythloday's position, More suggests, is indecorous insofar as it violates social order, like mixing the trivial jokes of household slaves with a passage from \textit{Octavia}. The theatrical metaphor More offers has two readings. First, it suggests that Hythloday believes that his philosophy is as grand as \textit{Octavia}, a play in the lofty mode of tragedy. The court, by comparison, is made up of a bunch of Plautine fools and lechers. In this reading, More is sympathetic to Hythloday's
problem; presumably, More appreciates intelligent philosophy and good rhetoric.

Second, the metaphor could mean that Hythloday’s philosophy is as ridiculous as a Senecan speech would be in one of Plautus’ plays. In this reading, More thinks Hythloday something of a fool, unable to judge context.

Hythloday and More debate whether fiction is appropriate for the situation. Decorum might call for honesty, or it might call for role playing, shifting from Seneca to a Plautine character. This role, the “place” into which Hythloday and More inquire, is also fiction. Is there ever a place for lying, for fiction, for modifying one’s viewpoints to fit the context? More is also asking if there is ever a place for irony, for the performance of Octavia as an ironic counterpoint to a Plautine comedy. Based on context, the only role available is a fictional one, one that takes an ironic stance on the Plautine debacle: he can either adopt the role of Seneca, an ironic juxtaposition to the salacious comedy, or he can play a Plautine character ironically: he can become a coincidenta oppositorum, a philosopher acting the fool. And yet, irony and fiction are defined as those things that are out of place — irony as contradiction and fiction because Hythloday is supposedly a moral person. The irony of irony is that it has place (though it is diagnosed by being out of place). As a kind of irony, a recognizable departure from proper/non-fictional places, fiction takes place by transgressing place.137 Because irony intrudes into a place not its own, it and the fiction it reveals are, for More, the best examples of the alien self-difference classicists treat as trope and metaphor.

137 The Yale edition notes that More’s irony derives from a context he and his audience share: "this kind of irony depends not on any express hint but on a secret and shared sympathy of reader and author" (clii).
For Stephen Greenblatt, the discussion of Hythloday's social responsibility is particularly telling of More's own lived experience as a courtier forced to adapt to wildly incongruous situations. Greenblatt argues that More experienced his own life as a series of roles; he observes that "the historical More is a narrative fiction" (31). What Greenblatt means here is that More lives his life as fiction to the degree that he experiences it as a narrative of a series of roles he adopts to fit the situation in which he finds himself. In this sense, Greenblatt suggests that fiction, at least for More, may not be categorically opposed to the actual world. Fiction includes More's experience of his life, one structured by decorum and thus revealed to be ironic and self-contradictory. (We will return to the trope of *theatricum mundi*, the theater of the world and life as a series of roles, in chapter six.) The correct fictional role for each moment is determined by context and decorum; ultimately, the roles are a function of the place in which the actor finds himself. These roles are "fictional," Greenblatt suggests, because they are self-contradictory; Greenblatt notes, for instance, that the deeply private, religious, and ascetic More had to attend deeply lavish spectacles in his official capacity. Greenblatt concludes that as decorum forced More to take on self-contradictory roles, More's is an historical narrative.

The geography traced by narrative is a primary concern of Medieval cartographers. Consider the T-O map (see Appendix C). Asia forms the continent at the top, with Europe and Africa the two continents below. The rivers that split the continents

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138 For instance, More was in the unfortunate position of having to live in the Tower (prison for aristocrats) because, as a staunch Catholic, he refused to take the First Succession Act (1533) denigrating the Pope and Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon.
form a T, which is surrounded by the O of the world's oceans. The T-O map is less about geographical accuracy than the biblical narrative it illustrates. Asia is at the top of the map because it is in the East, and East is the direction of Paradise; Paradise is located at the "top" of a T-O map. Demons, dragons, and other hellish creatures, on the other hand, often colonize the lower regions (Sanford 8, Smith 3-4). Jerusalem, of course, is the navel of the world (Sanford 5). As D. K. Smith notes in *The Cartographic Imagination in Early Modern England* (2008), the "primary function [of Medieval maps] is not to measure space, but to impose on the template of the physical world a constant reminder and organizational outline of the events of Christian history" (2). Local maps represent buildings "in relationship to their fundamental purpose and imagined significance" rather than to scale. For example, the "Cityview of Wells," drawn by Thomas Chaundler in the early 1460s, pictures an enormous central church with tiny buildings around the wall (5). Even maps for pilgrims, who arguably depended most on representational accuracy, "reduced the route to an imagined straight line" to a series of local sites. That is, mapped places include narrative, history. For instance, the maps included in the 1516 and 1518 editions of *Utopia* (see Appendices A and B) include a gigantic boat roughly 25% the size of Utopia (Hythloday's transportation), and a circular river the eye travels in clockwork direction from the fount of the river Anydrus to the mouth of the river at the ocean. The irony of the river's name (meaning "without water") is highlighted by the repetition of the name on the banks of the river. Another example of the narrative dimensions of the Medieval map appears on the 1518 map, which includes along its bottom frame the characters Hythloday, Giles, and More (who are far larger than the
buildings the map illustrates) pointing at Utopia. And because the viewer pieces together the pieces of the picture into a story, his eye literally traveling the course of the river, the viewer of the Medieval map is an active participant in the mapped narrative.

The ways of thinking about space that ground Medieval cartography shape the verbal narrative of the text. For instance, Hythloday describes his stops along the way to Utopia, and he defines places in relationship to those nearby. For instance, the Macarians are a "people not very far distant from Utopia [non longe admodum absunt ab Vtopia]" (97). The place and the people are defined by proximity to nearby countries, rather than in terms of latitude. So too is Utopia. Hythloday reaches Utopia by traveling through a series of nearby countries; we can infer a general region where Utopia might be located (it is many days' travel from Calcutta), but Hythloday forgets to report "in what part [parte] of the new world Utopia lies" (43). Hythloday locates Utopia and other countries in relationship to their neighbors. These relationships are emphatically linguistic. For instance, Utopians scorn those who fail to observe treaties, linguistic markers that both establish and emphasize local relationships; it is as though these men “divided by the light interval of a hill or a river were joined by no bond of nature” (199). The Utopians' mockery suggests that these landmarks are less signs of absolute difference than natural features that highlight peoples' social and geographical nearness.

Just as Utopia is located with reference to the places nearby and the journey Hythloday took to get there, so too the places in the "second world" of the text arise through a linear narrative from one place to the next. For instance, More-the-Character details the business that leads him to Antwerp, his trip to church, meeting Giles outside of
the church, walking with Giles to meet Hythloday, walking together to More's house, sitting in the garden to talk, going inside to eat, and then returning to the garden. The places in *Utopia* are contextual; they are located in relationship to other places nearby. This emphasis on context, on local and near-by places, that characterized Medieval geography is strikingly parallel to classical understandings of the place of metaphor. For instance, Wilson and Peacham, whose works are classical in origin and style, for instance, treat metaphoric decorum through a geography of context; when appropriate, they "passe ouer such words as are at hand" and, instead, use "a word translated." Metaphor is nearby; although not immediately "at hand," a metaphor that is "farre fetcht" is an "abuse" (Peacham 14). The geographies of metaphor and Utopia are spatialized according to context, to the places near by. The horizontal axis of narrative provides the context necessary to identify when something is not in the right place, like Hythloday's conclusion that there are few laws in Utopia. More draws on context, the horizontal axis of narrative, to create irony and locate fiction.

In addition to this horizontal axis of the ironic place of fiction, there is also a vertical axis in which time is not a factor. The "coincidence of opposites" takes place instantaneously as a coincidence. In this sense, irony seems to collapse the distance narrative entails. Although irony requires narrative for discovery, the temporal extension of narrative is not necessary for irony itself; as we read the narrative, we learn that Hythloday's claim that there are few laws in Utopia is retroactively ironic *in the very moment he speaks it*. The tension of irony is generated, in part, between its vertical and horizontal axis. The fact that, for *Utopia*, irony collapses temporal extension is apparent
in the text's obsession with ironic names. We have already observed that names such as Utopia and Abraxas, More and Hythloday, are ironic. They are different than what they claim to be at the same time they claim to be. These names are instances of the co incidence of difference. The name "Utopia" signifies both a literary text about a city and the city itself, and both a city and a no place, and a no place and a happy place, all at the same time. So, too, the name "More" signifies both a person and a fictional character at the same time. Indeed, More's audience would have been particularly sensitive to the irony of the name "More" given the recent publication of Erasmus' Praise of Folly (1511), whose Latinized Greek title Moriae Encomium could also be interpreted to mean "Praise of More." (Critics generally agree that this "More" refers to Thomas More, Erasmus' good friend.) The point here is that, as Utopia deploys them, names such as "Utopia" and "More" are self-contradictory in the manner of the coincidence of opposites, a coincidence that is, by definition, atemporal. The coincidence of opposites in ironic names constitutes a "no place" in which self-contradiction is atemporal, although it requires conventions of decorum and attention to local rules for its recognition. In More's Utopia, the place of rhetoric, as crafted through considerations such as decorum, is produced by the instantaneous event of coincidentia oppositorum. That is, irony and the fiction it indicates take place. Not only does the narrative of the place of irony suggest the contradictory nature of lived roles; it is also performative in terms of being a coincidence of opposites to which Levao brings out attention. This "coincidence" collapses the narrative into one performative moment of disjuncture. Although the narrative spatializes the place of fiction, "coincidence," irony, and self-contradictory
names localize fiction as something that takes place in an instantaneous event of irony. Like metaphor, irony depends upon tension: the tension of words meaning other than what they say, the tension of meaning spread across words distant from one another and yet happening instantaneously in a "coincidence" of opposites or difference. Its very structure -- as ironic instantly and across time -- enacts the same coincidence as the story.

FROM PLACE TO SPACE

Edward Casey observes a shift from place to space in the broadest structural levels of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century physics. Casey argues that the fifteenth-century breaks with Scholasticism and rejects Aristotle's “where” (*pou*), one of ten metaphysical categories to be considered alongside “relation,” “quality,” etc. “Where Aristotle took for granted the power of place -- a special noncausal power found in its containing character, its qualitative differentiation, its heterogeneity as a medium, and its ainsotropy of direction -- Western philosophers and scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries assume that places are merely momentary subdivisions of a universal space quantitatively determined in its natural homogeneity” (*FP134*). One of the most obvious contributions to the developing enthusiasm for space is the Cartesian grid.139 Sixteenth and seventeenth

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139 Casey claims that Descartes is “on the verge of discovering an intrinsic property of place” (158) although he fails. Descartes offers three corrolaries of space: 1. “The world, though not strictly infinite in extension, is indefinitely extended” (154), 2. “No vacuum or void can possibly exist” (155), and 3. “Place is a subordinate feature of matter and space” (156). In Newton, place survives somewhat (in terms of “absolute” and “relative” place) but it hasn’t “agency” or “power.” Newton performs a “triple reduction” of place: 1. “in its relative character, it is nothing but a means of measurement” (143), 2. “he subsumes place under space by making it (much in the manner of Bruno) ‘a part of space’” (144), yet 3. “on the other hand, Newton collapses
century space is measurable, and three-dimensional; it is pure homogeneous extension and detachable from the physical substances that give it dimension. Such space ultimately finds its expression in the Cartesian grid (126). Space is abstract, homogeneous extension in which bodies just happen to exist. Place, on the other hand, is experiential, particular, and delimited according to proximity. And as we see above, cartography mirrors the changes in physics, by shifting from mapping places (local areas defined by narrative) to spaces (discrete and contained political units as seen from without).

These radically different scientific ways of understanding place and space shape the place of rhetoric, fiction, and poesy. We have already examined how Medieval cartography shapes the place of fiction the *Utopia* describes: it offers a narrative of proximate locations. Around the turn of the seventeenth-century, cartographic practices shift. Places are mapped to scale -- place became homogeneous space, Edward Casey might say -- and in relation to one another instead of sharing a narrative with the viewer of the map. This New Geography arises because of many changes such as the "rediscovery of Ptolemy's classical exposition of geography and map projection" in the fifteenth place into body: the place of a body is none other than the totality of the places of the parts of that body and is thus 'internal' to this body" (144).

140 If space is infinite, it can't be made of (qualitative) places; "some other factor must account for such things as distance and extension, indeed anything sheerly quantitative that refuses to be pinned down to place" (134). Cf. Pierre Gassendi's belief that "spatial dimensionality is [...] strict measurability" (139). Not only is space empty of things (cf. Giordanno Bruno et al.) "but of place itself." According to the new physics, space is something self-sufficient and wholly independent of what is in space, including particular places. Space is thus "an emancipated concept, divested of all inherent differentiations or forces" (139, qtg. Jammer *Concepts of Space* 90). "Modern mechanism has two ultimate terms: extension and motion" which equals "sheer quantifiability" of the heavens (137).
century (Klein "Tamburlaine" 143), the need to include the New World on world maps, and the humanist "shift from the sacred to the secular" (Sanford 9). New Geography privileges representational accuracy; "the growing expectation was that 'the objects in the world to be mapped are real and objective, and that they enjoy an existence independent of the cartographer'" or pilgrims making a journey (Smith 8, qtg. Harley 4). Rather than being oriented around its viewer and through narrative, the early modern map offers a bird's eye view; "[t]he invisible body in front of the map is recast as the omniscient, all-seeing observer, but in the image itself the body no longer plays a constitutive part."141 The early modern map is divorced from narrative and history and instead offers an image of timeless, measurable accuracy.142 The champions of the New Geography include sixteenth century Flemish cartographers Abraham Ortelius and Gerard Mercator. Ortelius is recognized as the author of the first modern atlas (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum 1570), and Mercator developed what we now call the Mercator Projection Map, a flat grid showing nautical routes as lines of constant course.

Bernhard Klein's "Imaginary Journeys: Spenser, Drayton, and the poetics of national space" illustrates these changing cartographic practices by contrasting William Harrison's Historicall Description of the Island of Britayne (1577) and William Camden's

141 In contrast to Jerusalem as the "navel" of the medieval map, there is no center to the early modern map. Indeed, the need to include the New World and the "transition in science and understanding from a Ptolemaic geocentric universe to a Copernical heliocentric universe further called centers into question" (Sanford 9).

142 Cartography is yet another field in which mathematics triumphs; Smith notes the increasingly "widespread belief that space could be measured, represented and manipulated with mathematical precision" (11).
Britannia (1586), the "two most substantial national chorographies to be written in the latter half of the sixteenth century" (206). Harrison's Description blends the medieval approach with sixteenth-century innovations. The purpose of the Description is to narrate the history of the island, and it does so by bringing together a huge number of resources. In a manner following medieval models, Harrison prefaces each section with a relevant topography. Klein observes that the text as a whole "is organised around an account of England's rivers, a dominant descriptive convention in the chorographical tradition" (207). Within the sections dictated by rivers, Harrison further clarifies his subject "through a loose sequence of thematic sections: 'of cities and towns,' 'of palaces belonging to the prince,' 'of the building and furniture of our houses,' 'of provisions made for the poore,'" and so forth. These sections are organized according to narrative rather than an objective, detatched series. Harrison's Description is patterned like an itinerary; as such, its spatial structure is generated by "exploring space through movement and operative action" (208). Modern "mapmindedness" (P.D.A. Harvey) makes it difficult for us to imagine an era in which individuals did not see the world in panoramic view, but the Description illustrates the earlier way of seeing the world. Rather than presenting a unified nation whose geographical shape is the central focus, the Description focuses on heterogeneous, local experiences of place. The landscape is marked by travel, history, and use; it is not a unified island from a bird's eye view. (Christopher Saxton's Atlas of England and Wales, published a year after Harrison's Description, offers the first view of the country as a unified whole.)
Camden's *Britannia* diverges sharply from Harrison's *Description*. *Britannia* belongs to the order of *seeing* rather than *going*. The county, not navigable rivers, is the "central unit of chorographical description" (Klein 208). As Camden moves through each county in a systematic fashion, he shapes the country as a political unit. History remains a fundamental part of the *Britannia*, although Camden "streamlines" this "information into the celebration of a landscape shaped by successive generations of the leading families in the gentry" (209). As Camden narrates the soil quality and "places of antiquity," he focuses on "'what Dukes likewise or Earles have been in ech one since the Norman Conquest'" (citing Camden 182). For Klein, Camden's emphasis on ruling families gives his topography the "stability of a political order and allows its translation into the static coixistence of individual plots on the imaginary place surface of cartographic projection." In otherwords, Camden's Britain appears to be a "static," unified political state as viewed from a disembodied point above. The effect of Camden's methodology is that Britain appears to be a unified geographical and political unit as viewed from the outside, rather than as traveled from within and experienced locally, as it is in Harrison's *Description*.

These two different kinds of maps -- the medieval T-O map of place and the early modern external perspective of extended space -- suggest two different geographies of rhetoric. Aristotle and Cicero concentrate on local places as experienced from within in terms of boundary violation. Puttenham, on the other hand, treats figure as a broad category characterized by the same universalizing rule. The distinction between Puttenham and his classical sources becomes even more clear in light of the ways that his
contemporary colleagues make use of classical material. Henry Peacham and Thomas Wilson use similar terminology as Aristotle and Cicero; when discussing metaphor, they emphasize what is near at hand and local decorum. They also draw on the tradition of talking about metaphor in terms of *topoi* or places, categories from which one might draw comparisons. These places are organized as a series of stops through which one travels. For Peacham and Wilson, rhetorical place is conceived in terms of narrative. This narrative gives rhetoric the spatiotemporal specificity Casey calls place. For Puttenham, on the other hand, figure occupies a general space characterized by violation of the physical law prohibiting coincident entities. As we see in chapter three, this is the same space as fiction for Puttenham. Figure, and by extension fiction, occupy a homogenous space distinct from the physical world. Figure and fiction are off the map.

Puttenham's *Arte* is in the same vein as Camden's *Britannia*. Like Britain, proper language is a homogeneous lump grounded in a unified geopolitical nation. And the space that metaphor and other figures occupy is homologically fictional. "Foreign" language is emphatically geopolitical. Continuing to define "inkehorne termes," Puttenham defines "proper" language in broad nationalistic terms and in contrast to improper, "foreign" language driven into linguistic boarderlands. The large, discrete, static countries to which Puttenham refers suggest the kind of expansive topographical and political maps developed in the late sixteenth century. They are emphatically visual - - as viewed from without -- rather than something through which a rhetorician would travel.

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143 We will return to *topoi*, the places of invention, in the coda.
This part [idioms] in our maker or Poet must be heedily looked vnto, that it be naturall, pure, and the most usuall of all his countrey: and for the safe purpose rather that which is spoken in the king's Court, or in the good townes and Cities within the land, than in the marches [marshes] and frontiers, or in port townes, where straungers haunt for traffike sake, or yet in Universities where Schollers use much passeish affectation of words out of the primitiu e languages, or finally, in any vplandish village or corner or a Realme where is no resort but of poore rusticall or vn ciudad people. Our maker therefore at these dayes shall not follow Piers plowman nor Gower nor Lydgate nor yet Chaucer, for their language is now out of vse with vs: neither shall he take [talk] in the temes of Northern-men, such as they use in dayly talke, whether they be noble men or gentlemen, or of their best clarkes all is a matter: nor in effect any speech vsed beyond the riuer of Trent, though no man can dery but that theirs is the purer English Saxon at this day, yet it is not so Courtly nor so currant as our Southerne English is, no more is the far Western mans speech [appropriate]. (156-57).

Here, I quote Puttenham at length to emphasize his sense of England as country oriented around a central (although southern) London. Puttenham passes over the "marches and frontiers," the "corner[s]" of the realm, as well as outlying counties because they introduce difference into an otherwise unified language. Puttenham writes off the very

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144 In the section directly following Puttenham's remarks on proper English language, Puttenham discusses "stile" which is likewise a unified composite rather than a series
nearby geographical features that would define a place. Instead, Puttenham treats England as one country in extended geographical space. The geography Puttenham offers in this passage is that of a whole, centralized political unit; he rejects the local "colors" that distort this unit in favor of a homogenized nation. Puttenham's linguistic sense of England is of a country viewed in its totality. Moreover, Puttenham seeks to isolate his country against the foreign intrusions of travelers and university men. His England is not one that is "trafficke[d]"; instead, it is still, static. At the same time that Puttenham reduces the experiential sense of moving through place, he also rejects the narrative of moving through time; Puttenham's England, and his sense of proper language, is the eternal here and now (rather than the days of Chaucer).

Against "proper" language, Puttenham posits figures, "abuses or rather trespasses in speech, because they passe the ordinary limits of common utterance" (166). Metaphor, for instance, is "an inversion of sense by transport." Puttenham retains the terminology of "transport" common to his classical predecessors' descriptions of metaphor, but his characterization of proper language as a unified, common country under "[un]common" assault gives metaphor quite a different flavor. The "ferraine" (foreign) metaphor emphatically is not a local transgression as it is in Aristotle; rather, for Puttenham, it is a general, external attack on a spatialized national language. Metaphor and other figures are isolated in foreign countries (such as France and Italy), countries whose attempts to trespass on English soil solidify the sense of a unified England rather than emphasize its
permeable boundaries. Puttenham's England rejects variations, the noteworthy places in an itinerary, in the name of national unity. The effect of Puttenham's cartography is to isolate figure in a bounded, externalized area emphatically distinct from "proper" English. Figurative place becomes a generalized rhetorical space, and this space is located outside of the "real" here and now.

THE SPACE OF POESY

Sidney, like Puttenham, treats poesy in terms of space. Sidney's poesy is a homogenous extension of pure fiction; there are no local places dictated by decorum. Certainly, some authors write trash, Sidney concedes, but this is a fault of the man, not poesy. In contrast to place-based narrative, context and irony, the space of Sidney's fiction is featureless other than a couple of ground rules: 1. poesy is not about what is but about what might be, 2, poesy is categorically distinct from the real world of Sidney's England, and 3. performative utterances do not pertain. These three rules apply to the realm of fiction, of ultimate possibility (though never reality). Save these basic rules, fiction is, for Sidney, an extended space of possibility, equally able to accommodate whatever fiction happens to appear. This space can accommodate so-called contradictory statements and other linguistic self-differences without problem; because fiction is always in the future and includes everything that is possible, there is no tension or irony in Sidney's poesy. Sidney's poesy neither takes place nor has a place; rather, it is a generalized space as Casey describes it. It is the pure expansion of possibility. Sidney's poesy maps more readily onto the New Geography than the Old. Presumably, poesy has
narrative as More's *ficta* do. The difference is that Sidney's narrative fails to produce a coincidence or other performative utterances. Instead, the *Defense* suggests that the author grounds linguistic performativity of, among other things, defending and apologizing. Poesy does not take place nor does it have a place of its own. Rather, it is simply the pure extended space of possibility.

Sidney's *Defense* responds to Stephen Gosson's *The Shoole [School] of Abuse* (1579), which Gosson dedicates to Sidney. Gosson argues that theater encourages immoral behavior in its audience members; Sidney's response makes a broader argument about poesy in general. In chapter five, we will consider in more detail how theater figures linguistic performativity more generally in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions of poesy. Here, the more salient point is that Gosson frames his inquiry in geographic terms, and Sidney responds in the same. Gosson complains that theater (or poesy) violates carefully delineated geopolitical boundaries. Sidney, on the other hand, describes poesy as a passport to foreign countries, countries which remain distant and whose boundaries appear eternal. Even though Sidney portrays poesy as a gateway to real places such as Turkey and Thebes, poesy is nonetheless wholly separate from the physical world. Responding directly to Gosson, Sidney exasperatedly complains "[w]hat childe is there, that coming to a play, and seeing *Thebes* written in great letters vpon an old doore, doth beleue [believe] that it is *Thebes*?" (G1r). For Sidney, there is no productive equivocation contained in the name Thebes; the name is not ironic. It simply refers to a place from long ago, a place clearly not in the real world of the child in the theater.
In his *Shoole*, Gosson echoes Plato's condemnation of poets as liars and seducers from virtue. As Gosson sees it, the fundamental flaw with theater is that it authorizes licentiousness. Gosson characterizes theater as a play house, in which "euery wanton and is Paramour, euerye man and his Mistresse, euery John & his Joane, euery knaue & his queane" conduct their illicit buisiness (C2r); these immoral individuals are like unto "wormes whê they dare not nestle in the bescod [peasecod] at home, find refuge abroade." Gosson describes theater as foreign and immoral. Space is polarized into "us" and "them," although the two slide together uncomfortably. Not welcome in the small, closed peapod that is the "home" territory, profligate bawds travel "abroad" to undertake their filthy deeds. One of the most striking features of Gosson's *Shoole* is the consistency with which Gosson characterizes literature, reading, and theater in terms of breaking geographical boundaries. For instance, Gosson condemns reading as "a iorney [journey] to fetch learning beyonde the fielde" (A5v).145

Although immorality is "out there," it still invades "in here." Gosson likens theater to an army demolishing city walls. Gosson warns that women who attend the theater "haue already made [them] selues assaultable, & yelded [their] Cities to be sacked" (F2v). Individuals visit theater, and theater visits the real world, seducing attendees. For Gosson, the problem is that theater is not carefully distinguished from the

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145 Human faculties break cosmological, as well as geographical boundaries. Whereas "Fire and Ayre mount upwawres, [and] Earth and Water sinke downe, and euery insensible body els, neuer rests til it bring it selfe to his owne home," human "sense, reason, wit, and vnderstanding" violate the natural order; they "are everlasting, passing our bounds, going beyond our limites, neuer keeping our selues within compass, nor once looking after the place from whence we came" (D1v-D2r).
"home" world; theater is invasive and contaminating. The question is not how figure, metaphor, or irony take place in the real world. The question is how can we keep theater further at bay?

Gosson offers his text as a hygenic and safe "conduit" for information otherwise located in the dangerous realm of theater. Gosson cites the maxim that "Euripides holds not him onely a foole, that being well at home, wil gadde abroad: y hath a conduit within doore, & fetcheth water without" (B6r). Gosson condemns those who would travel out rather than accept a hygienic conduit of information. The home place, "within doore," is the real world theater invades all too easily. The text Gosson offers is a safe alternative that keeps immoral theater at a distance. Not all books work like theater and infringe on the homespace; Gosson's text provides a safe medium. And insofar as Gosson's text is generic, we could say it is a combination of literary theory and school-primer. In his "Dedicatory" and "Letter to the Reader," Gosson notes that "The Schoole which I builde, is narrowe" (3v). For Gosson, proper language is a small and delimited place. Gosson translates the classical emphasis on the movement of metaphor into bodily journeys of those who return from dangerous territories. Gosson hopes to "pull" misled "mindes from such studies, drawe [their] feete from such places" (np [2]) as theater offers. Gosson preaches "let us but shut vppe our eares to Poets, Pipers, and Players, pull our feete backe from resorte to Theaters, and turne away our eyes from beholding of vanitie" (D3r). Turning away from theater and reading in general is, for Gosson, a turn towards a virtuous, properly delimited, local place. In contrast to his "narrowe" space, Gosson characterizes theater as a "large field to walke in" (A1r), an external space through which
one journeys, morally threatening in its theatrical actuality. And the movement through space in returning home has nothing to do with metaphor or figure; rather, it is the return from the fantasy of a separation between theater and the real world and recognition that theater is part of the world, morally. Cartographically, Gosson's description shuts down the journey, the narrative abroad; instead, it advocates a decorous, nontheatrical "here." The performativity of theater is not due to a coincidence of opposites, nor does Gosson discuss metaphor, figure, or irony. There is simply one world that contains everything, one expanse of experience (thus the problem with theater).

Sidney's *Defense* responds to Gosson's *Shoole* point by point and in Gosson's terms. Sidney agrees that poesy is foreign, and like Gosson, he treats rhetorical foreignness in terms of a moralized geopolitical context. Neither author interrogates the kind of rhetorical foreignness of interest to Peacham, More, Quintilian, and Aristotle, a productive foreignness causing a self-different rhetorical figure to emerge. No, poesy never is in the now. It has narrative, but this is merely the narrative of a story, an imaginative exercise. Poesy is forever in the future, the possible.

Poesy occupies a temporally different universe. Perhaps the most famous remark in Sidney's *Defense* is that the poet "nothing affirmeth, and therefore neuer lieth: for as I take it, to lie is to affirme that to bee true, which is false [... the poet does] not labor[] to tel you what is or is not, but what should or should not be" (G1r). The historian, Sidney notes, is tied "to the particular truth of things" (D1v). Not so poesy, which concerns itself with what "should" and "could" be. Sidney emphasizes this temporal difference when highlighting different verb conjugations and moods that apply to the poetic world rather
than the historical one. He writes that poets "borrow nothing of what is, hath bin, or shall be, but range onely reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be" (C2v). Unlike the real world, the world of verity and falsity with which the historian is concerned, poesy operates through modal verbs; poesy is not concerned with what is, was, or will be but rather with what could and should be. Sidney underscores the verb-al difference between the poetic and historical worlds; two additional times in this relatively brief treatise, Sidney notes that poesy considers a thing "as it should be" not "as it was" (D3r), not with "what they did [...] what they had done, [...] and what they would doo" (Fl v). When Sidney distinguishes between the different structures of the physical world and the poetic one, between verity and possibility, he repeatedly emphasizes their different temporal structures, structures which locate the two in two entirely different universes. Its unique temporal dimension of poesy is one way that poesy is categorically distinct from the real world. Deploying modal verbs, poesy is different and distant from the physical world of truth. The world of poesy is distant and distinct from Sidney's historical world. The world historians treat is structured differently than poesy, which exists as a general space of possibility.

Sidney emphasizes the categorical distinction between text and real world in his suggestion that poesy is essentially foreign. Famously, Sidney describes poesie like a passport. Philosophers and historiographers could not delight and instruct the common person, Sidney argues,

if they had not taken a great pasport of Poetry, wich in all nations at this day where learning flourisheth not, is plaine to be seeene: an all which, they
haue some feeling of Poetry. In *Turkey*, besides their lawgiuing Diuines, they haue no other writers but Poets. In our nieghbor Countrey *Ireland*, where truly learning goes verie bare, yet are there Poets held in a deuout eruerence. Euen among the most barbarous and simple *Indians*, where no writing is, yet haue they their Poets. (B3r)

Citing this passage, Roland Green notes Sidney's is a "fiction of embassy."146 For Green, embassy suggests contact between the home land and foreign ones, and thus concludes that Sidney's poesy is markedly material and "real." Taken in the context of Sidney's debate with Gosson, however, Sidney's language takes on a different valence. In contrast to Gosson, Sidney argues that *all* poesy can be a carefully regulated linguistic document like a passport. It does permit travel to foreign places, to such barbarous countries as Turkey and Ireland, but it does not bring these countries home. Turkey, Ireland, and the New World all remain distant, geopolitical entities on an eternalizing Mercator map. Each country occupies its designated space, and there is no possibility of those spaces moving. Boundaries might change, but Sidney is relatively unconcerned with this face. Linguistic foreignness is not intrusive; like the countries on a map in the new style, each place remains static, distinct, and hygenically external.

One reason that the real-world and poesy do not occupy the same map is that performative language does not apply in poesy. Sidney highlights this fact with his

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146 In contrast to Puttenham's "fiction of immanence." Hopefully, the previous chapter is sufficient ammunition for my suggestion the Greene seriously misreads Puttenham. Indeed, the examples Green cites tend to be classical examples which Puttenham lifts from his sources, rather than the innovative sections Puttenham offers.
discussion of conjuration. He notes that "the Poet neuer maketh any Circles about your imaginatiō, to coniure you to beleeeue for true, what he writeth" (Glr). Here, Sidney emphasizes the distinction between poets and magicians, a distinction that, Deborah Willis notes, often fails to obtain between the sixteenth-century stage and the magic circle (140). In this passage, Sidney emphasizes the difference between make believe and the real world; "conjuring" is a speech act that does not obtain in poesy. But in a fit of seeming self-contradiction, Sidney concludes the text by remarking "I conjure you all that have had the euill [evil] luck to read this inck-wasting toy of mine, euen in the name of the nine Muses, no more to scorn the sacred misteries of Poesie" (K1v). This conjuration clearly is magical in form as it invokes the powers of the Muses and refers to "sacred misteries." The apparent contradiction between Sidney's claim that poet does not conjure and his claim that he explicitly seeks to conjure his audience appears to suggest a paradox, but this is not so. Sidney clarifies that he is the one who conjures, not poesy. The author is the one who performs, not poesy.

The Defense is suggestive of Austinian utterances in that it claims that poesy neither lies nor tells the truth. The kind of "fiction" that characterizes poesy is not the fiction of lies. Sidney mocks those who would criticize Æsop for lying; even though "he telleth them not for true, he lieth not" (Glr). Instead, poesy is fiction because it is imaginative; it is concerned with what is possible or can be thought of but not what is or

147 See her article "Magic and Witchcraft" in A Companion to Renaissance Drama. For an excellent example of a sixteenth-century inquiry into the relationship between the stage and the magic circle, see Marlowe's The Tragicall History of Doctor Faustus (ca. 1589-1593).
ever was. Only the human speaker can lie (or conjure); the lie is distinct from fiction because lies presume the intention to deceive (an intention that calls attention to the speaking subject) whereas fiction simply signifies something possible.

Here, Sidney sounds like Austin, who similarly notes that questions of verity and falsity do not apply to performatives because performative language does something. But Sidney and Austin agree that performative utterances do not include poesy. Unlike Austin, Sidney notes that there is poetic kind of language concerned with neither truth nor lies. This is the language of the future, the possible. But this possible is never here, never a coincidence, a figure taking place. For the *Defense*, the coincidence of opposites does not create the place of poesie; it merely indicates the fictionality of a text. The apparent contradiction of poesy that both does and does not conjure does not cause a self-different figure to arise. Rather, the contradictory claims are attributable the space of possibility that is poesy. Nonetheless, he power behind the linguistic performative of conjuration lies solely with the poet; "I conjure you," Sidney writes (emphasis mine). Sidney's repetition, flawed as it is, calls attention to the author, the "maker" (as he reminds us).

This space of poesy is expansive. The *Defense* regularly stresses the freedom the creative poet enjoys. Sidney notes that the Poet is "not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her [Nature's] gifts, but freely ranging within the Zodiac of his owne wit" (C1r). Here, the figure of the Zodiac works two ways. First, it establishes the world of poesy as a kind of nature; indeed, Sidney notes that "Poetrie [...] hath the most conueniencie to nature" (E2r). By conveniency, Sidney uses the terminology of natural
philosophers for "likeness in kind" and suggests that poetry is "like" nature, in this case, by being unique. Unlike the natural philosophers, only the poet "doth grown in effect into an other nature" (B4v); poesey is the only "Art deliuered vnto mankind that hath not the workes of nature for his principall object." Poesy exceeds the restraints of the real world. In fact, it offers nearly infinite possibilities. Sidney treats poesy as something that looks outward rather than hem in. Poesy offers a view on an infinite universe. Sidney notes that poesy "goe beyond them [history and philosophy] both [...] not only for hauing his scope as far as far beyond any of these, as eternitie exceedeth a moment" (C4v-D1r). The "moment" invokes historical specificity; poesy, however, has no moments; it just extends into "eternitie."  

As Sidney puts it a few pages later, Poets have "all fro Dante his heue [heaven] to his hell" (D4r). Here, Sidney invokes Dante's journey as a marker of the breadth of poesy's vastness. However, the journey here does not suggest a medieval geography. His traveler does not walk through the circles; rather, Sidney refers to the breadth of space over which the journey can (possibly) take place. This is a "flat field" approach to fiction. Like Cartesian extended space, the eternally possible place of poesy is pure, featureless extension. Poesy is fiction, is the generic space of genre. Any internal difference is dismissed as a necessary effect of the fact that, in the possible anything is

148 CF. Sidney's take on the relationship between the general and the universal. (E3v) Sidney says that, in addition to "decipher him [Poet] by his workes," he "will examine his parts"; "parts, kindes, or Species" include Tragicall, Comical, Tragicomical, "wholesome Iambick, who rubbes the galled mind" (E4r), Comedy, Lyricke = "height of heavens" (F1r); "kindes," "formes" (F2v); "seuered dissections" (F3r).
can happen. Like the maps of New Geographers, at the turn of the seventeenth century, Sidney's space of fiction appears from a birds' eye view. Countries appear timelessly distinct from one another. And traveling from one place to another does not suggest that the places are "nearby"; indeed, it is poesy's very distance that delights Sidney. For Sidney's poesy, this cartographic shift reflects the careful boundaries he draws between poesy and the world of the historians.

With Sidney's *Defense* the literary fold now has a place (called poesy), carefully isolated from the real world precisely because the text is not performative. Sidney treats fiction like a generic expanse, as the space of possibility. Not only does fiction have place, it doesn't even take place. The *Defense* does not cohere as an ironic tension nor do performative utterances pertain to poesy. Mirroring changes in cartographic practices, the place of Sidney's fiction is carefully delimited, spatial, and timeless. Instead of irony taking place, Sidney's fiction is located in the limitless expanse of space structured as "fiction." Poesy does not produce coincidence, and is thus is not performative; it does not take place. The multitude of observations Sidney offers, some in contradiction, does not provide the context for a literary performative. Rather, for Sidney, contradictory statements are simply par for the course because the future, as possible, includes everything that can be thought. Sidney inherits the traditional association of self-difference with fiction, although for Sidney, the frame of fiction neatly separates it from the real world. For Sidney, fiction is demarcated clearly from the world, and its self-contradiction is no longer performative.
Like More, Sidney offers a text full of contradictions. For instance, Levao calls attention to the fact that Aristotle provides the material for Sidney's most famous claim, "that poetry is more philosophical than history," in the same text that mocks and ridicules philosophers (143). For Levao, the effect of the contradictory points of view that the Defense offers is similar to that of the Utopia; Levao argues that the text is self-contradictory (148-52), ironic, and that "his poetic fictions are likewise the result of a coincidence of opposites" (148). But what would be contradictory or ironic statements for More are simply a series of the infinite possibilities of the space of fiction for Sidney. Unlike the difference irony holds in tension, these contradictory statements they simply indicate the wide range that fiction might take.

Unlike More's irony, Sidney's generalized, metaphoric poesy encompasses difference without producing an incidence of coincidentia oppositorum. Sidney works through the phenomenon of coincidentia oppositorum through the relationship between general and specific. He offers at least two opinions on the importance of particular examples to the general point being made. On one hand, Sidney complains that philosophers are too preoccupied with "definitions, diuitions [divisions], distinctions" (C4r); later, he claims proudly to examine the "parts, kindes, or Species" of poesy (E3v). Not only does Sidney thoroughly defend poesy from Gosson's accusations by considering the specific virtues and shortfalls of all genres of poesy (from tragedy and comedy to heroic and lyric), but he also notes that poesy offers more particulars than does history; it provides the "passionate describing of passions, the nmany particularities of battles which no man could affirme, or if that be denied me, long Orations put in the
mouthes of great Kings and Captains, which it is certaine they neuer pronounced" (B2v-B3r).

The multiplicity of opinions Sidney offers on the relative values of species and genera leads Levao to conclude that, like the *Utopia*, the *Defense* offers a series of mutually exclusive roles. Emphasizing the contradictory nature of the wealth of points of view Sidney offers, Levao concludes that "[h]e presents us with 'something for everyone'" (151). For Levao, the effect of the contradictory points of view that the *Defense* offers is similar to that of the *Utopia*; Levao argues that the text is self-contradictory (148-52), ironic, and that "his poetic fictions are likewise the result of a coincidence of opposites" (148). Levao identifies a number of places in which Sidney seems to contradict himself. For instance, Levao calls attention to the fact that Aristotle provides the material for Sidney's most famous claim, "that poetry is more philosophical than history," in the same text that mocks and ridicules philosophers (143).

But for all that Sidney's text includes contradictory statements as does More's, there is an important difference: poesy does not take place in the world in the *Defense*. In particular, as Sidney develops it, fiction is distinct from irony. The *Defense* is not ironic as is *Utopia*; it does not suppose that its points of view take place at the same time, coincide, or constitute a narrative that will ultimately reveal textual irony. Rather, Sidney writes off such contradiction as simply the condition of poesy belonging to the realm of the possible. Possibilities are often mutually exclusive, such as the different possible things Kings and Captains might have said. And yet, they do not happen at the same time or from the same people. As such, a coincidence of opposites (or difference) does not
take place in terms of fiction. Moreover, other utterances that could be considered peformative, like Austin's performative utterances, are explicitly not the product of poesy but rather the author himself. Poesy is not performative; it does not take place; it is never now or here.

Sidney eliminates performativity, figures taking place, from poesy. He notes that poesy is a "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically" (C1v). This metaphor is not an occasion for tension, a self-different figure taking place. For Sidney, a metaphoric claim is simply one to which questions of truth and verity do not apply. Poesy "will neuer giue the lie to the things not Affirmatiuely, but allegorically and figuratiuely written" (G1v). The terms metaphor, allegory, figure, and poesy refer to a kind of writing distinct from literal writing. It is in this moment that we see "metaphoric" opposed to the real world rather than something that takes place in that world. By metaphoric, allegorically, and figuratively Sidney refers to the generic structure of fiction. All figures are subject to the same totalizing rules that define poesy. Sidney lists a number of figures, including the figure of repetition (I3v), similitudes (I3v-I4v), and superlatives (K2r). None is privileged, not even metaphor; they do not take place, nor do they occasion the coincidence of entities. They all simply follow the same general rules that apply to fiction: they are non-performative, what could be but not what is, and distinct from the real world. As metaphoric, poesy is unlike -- and segregated from -- the historical, literal world to which questions of truth apply.
LITERATURE: THE FUTURE OF POESY

No literary work from the early modern period is explicitly as interested in the place of rhetoric and literature as Thomas More's *Utopia*. Increased publication contributes to a sense of the literary text as text -- as commodity, product, and entity -- early modern authors are anxious to define literary places and their relationship to the scientifically-defined physical world. But whereas irony takes place in *Utopia*, poesy in general is distinct from the real world. With Sidney's *Defense*, the literary fold is a general expanse called poesy, carefully isolated from the real world precisely because the text is not performative. Sidney emphasizes this point with his remarks on conjuration. The text, he notes, does not conjure; poesy is not performative. But the author, Sidney, is; he concludes the *Defense* emphasizing that conjuration, and apologizing or defending, is a product of the author, not poesy or fiction. Thus the author function is important for the *Defense* in a way it is not for *Utopia*; the author becomes the ground of linguistic performances. The geography of poesy is homogeneous, pure extension of a limited set of rules. The particulars of poesy are mere examples, not occasions, instances, or coincidence. Sidney's place of fiction, the separate space created by a fold in the real, sets the stage for sixteenth-century discussions of the place of literature. Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair*, for instance, returns literature to the world from which Sidney separates it, but purely as a commodity. As Jonson demonstrates, literature comes to be defined as that to which performative, Austinian utterances do not apply. Jonson addresses most explicitly the changes to the place of literature due to mass publication, rising literature, and developing technology.
CHAPTER VI

STAGING LITERARY CONTRACTS IN JONSON'S BARTHOLOMEW FAIR

Sidney's use of conjuration to emphasize the illocutionary power of the author speaks to a general trend for Early Modern authors to consider the relationship between oaths and promises and the literary text. Sidney's poesy, at least at the time he wrote it, was for a privileged coterie of aristocrats. Publication certainly happened, but that was not the ultimate goal like it was for Ben Jonson and his generation. Jonson's First Folio (1616) was one of the first whose editing and publishing was controlled exclusively by the author. Plays generally belonged to the playhouse, but Jonson himself gathered together his plays, at times making extensive revisions, and putting them to press "not a line, or syllable' [...] changed 'from the simplicity of the first Copy'" (Butler 3). By fashioning himself an author and authorizing the publication of his texts, commodities for the newly literate population, critic Martin Butler notes, "Jonson seizes on the ability of print to empower the author, validating himself as sovereign voice by controlling the minutest details of textual production, and conferring legitimacy and identity upon himself as writer by virtue of his controlling interest in his text" (1). Jonson works out authorial identity through recourse to illocutionary utterances, like Sidney. For instance, Jonson's Bartholomew Fair (1614) begins with the Scrivener reading the Articles of Agreement between author and audience. Curiously, Jonson does not include
Bartholomew Fair in his 1616 Folio; presumably, something about the play did not fit right with the product Jonson decided to offer the public.

Ultimately, Jonson's Bartholomew Fair suggests that the place of literature is like a failed performative utterance, Austin style. Bartholomew Fair fails to take place, to support performative utterances, because it works like a *de futuro* contract, a contract to be redeemed in the future. But the future never arrives for Bartholomew Fair. Of course, the play is performed, and on October 31, 1614 for the first time. But the play also has a history as a literary product, a carefully regulated commodity controlled by the author, a novelty in Jonson's time. So for Jonson, the place of the literary text reflects a history of commodification and marketing as an object of art, entertainment, and reading pleasure. Whereas Sidney focuses on the distance between poesy and the real world, Jonson returns the text to the world as an object on the capitalist market. The consequences, for Jonson, are serious. The "value" of the play will fluctuate with the market. The Articles attempt to control this problem; they are largely preoccupied with establishing the rules by which a playgoer or reader can pass judgment on the play. These judgments are what Austin calls "verdicative"; they include things like the decisions of a judge such as finding someone guilty. But these judgments are troubled by the fact that they're never complete. The Articles long for a well-behaved fellow who "will swear Jeronimo or Andoronicus are the best plays yet" (109-10) some twenty-years later. Of course, such steadfastness bespeaks a "virtuous and staid ignorance" (113); the author appreciates him because "Such a one the author knows where to find him" (114-15). In this bit of irony, the Articles reveal both a longing for "steadfast" value and a dismissal of those who don't
change their minds over time. The judgments the Articles long for stretch out over time and remain constant. But for *Bartholomew Fair*, the problem of contracts, judgments, warrants, marriage licenses, and other performative documents is that they degenerate over time: they are misplaced, stolen, restructured, and radically different than intended. The temporal dimension of literary texts renders them problematic in terms of performatives.

Like More, Jonson equates "judgment" with the place of the play. For More, we should remember, the unnamed literary critic who condemns his fiction finds More's judgment somewhat wanting. But is the judgment on the play that Jonson seeks to secure. For *Bartholomew Fair*, judgment works like decorum to locate the place of the text and of the author. The problem is that the place of the text is never fully complete, it never quite culminates into a performative. Rather, the text is structured like contract whose future conditions have not yet been fulfilled. In *Bartholomew Fair*, illocutionary utterances fail for two reasons: first, as *de futuro* contracts, they are never complete (like Shakespeare, Jonson frames such contracts in marital terms). Second, written documents attesting to these promises (or themselves serving as the promise) always go awry; these documents are stolen, lost, re-written, and re-acted. Jonson interrogates these written contracts through the names attached to them, the names that guarantee promises. Jonson problematizes a dimension of the illocutionary act that Austin takes for granted: that the promiser and promisee remain the same over time. For *Bartholomew Fair*, this is not the case, at least in terms of the performative dimension of the literary commodity. Anyone can pick up the text at the same price, resell it, give it away, lose it, and so forth.
The problem of time for the performative dimension of the place of the commodified text is a linguistic matter. Promises and oaths, *Bartholomew Fair* suggests, rest on names, on the people who underwrite them. But names, for *Bartholomew Fair*, are also puns. The characters turn each others' names into jokes, into puns based on equivocation and the multiplicity of meaning. Names are puns, but names also guarantee oaths. If these names are indeterminate, than the oaths, the performatives these names guarantee, go awry. The one name that the plays and oaths reference that remains secure is the author's. Jonson capitalizes on Sidney's suggestion that the author, rather than his poesy, can conjure. It is the author, ultimately, to which performative utterances and literary texts refer. Unfortunately, while Jonson remains responsible for text, for the linguistic contract he offers, the fulfillment of that contract, in the figure of readerly/audience judgment, remains forever in the future.

*THEATRUM MUNDI: PLAYING THE WORLD*

Jonson's inquiry into the performative dimension of theater as a way to reflect on the relationship between text and world is one step in a larger movement. *Theatrum mundi* is the doctrine of the "theater of the world." In general, from the classical period on, it assumed a structural binary between "this world" and "the golden world," be it the world of the gods, Christian truth, or the inner self. For Early Modern thinkers, *theatrum mundi* opposed this world with the ideal (Shakespeare), contrast irony with communicative meaning (More), and bifurcated the theater into 1. the roles humans play, 2. a space distinct from the "first world" of the author and audience (Sidney). Sidney
divides *theatricum mundi* between this world and that (fictional, linguistic) one. Harry Berger Jr. famously observes that a "second frame" develops in the Early Modern period, a secondary level of fiction. Berger offers a second layer after the theatrical split in the world William Egginton observes in *How the World Became a Stage* (2002). Egginton argues that, in terms of dramatic productions, late Medieval plays realized a distinction in the space of the stage and that off the stage. Early Morality and Cycle Plays took place with local actors or incorporated the town space into the plays, but increasingly ironic performances frame the theatrical space; that is, theater takes place inside of a socially-negotiated frame, and its differences from the real world included things like irony (Chaucer), representation (of something in the "first world"), suspended performative utterances, roles we play (More), Bakhtin's *carnival*, and so forth. This first world/play world binary, *theatricum mundi* takes on a third split in the Early Modern period, Berger observes. Plays, fiction, and other pieces of literature can have a "green world" to the second world. Examples include Shakespeare's *Midsummer Night's Dream* (ca. 1594) and *As You Like It* (1599); both plays have a "green world" to which characters in the second world escape. Berger remarks that characters slip into the green world to problem solve, work through solutions, take on new possibilities not ordinarily found in the first or second worlds (i.e., Bottom becoming an ass). He concludes that the second world / green world relationship is instructive of the possibilities of the first world / second world relationship.

Sidney's *Defense* offers a different perspective on Berger's "green world." Sidney draws on the figure of *theatrum mundi* strictly to emphasize the difference between the
first and second worlds precisely because the second world has a more fluid relationship with the green world. Things that happen in stories, in magical places like Utopia, Thebes, and the fairy world, might cross over into the second world, but, for Sidney, both are categorically different from the real world, the first world. Sidney emphasizes the roles that men play precisely to distinguish them from the second/green worlds, from poesy. The frame that "Theebes" over the stage door establishes straightforwardly demarcates the fictional world of poesy from the real world of the child. The figure of \textit{theatrum mundi} emphasizes, for Sidney, the divergence of the real world from whatever happens in poesy. It is against these traditions -- Sidney's emphatic separation of the play world/world of poesy from roles in the real world and Shakespeare's use of \textit{theatricum mundi} to diagnose the dimensions of personal identity -- that Jonson poses \textit{Bartholomew Fair}, a play that begs to be situated in relationship to Bartholomew Fair, the historical market that took place in Smithfield, every August 24 for hundreds of years, and in relationship to Bartholomew, a character in the play.

The Stoic and Christian doctrines of \textit{theatrum mundi} respond to earlier Classical notions on the theater of the world. Larry W. Riggs notes that Plato counterposes \textit{theatrum mundi} against the higher world of the Ideal. For classical authors, the conceit suggests that the trials and tribulations we face are orchestrated for the entertainment of the gods. Later, Christian thinkers "associate theatrical seeming with delusion and with desire for transitory objects" (266). For Medieval Christians, \textit{theatrum mundi} refers to the allegorical relationship between biblical truths and the physical world. The "theater" of the world is the fact that it mirrors the eternal, Biblical one. This world, however, is
fallen. The theater of the world is the world of vanity, of the mundane, of the roles humans play in their social relationships. At stake for Medieval Christians was the ways this world reflected the higher world: well or poorly. Plays during this time period such as Cycle Plays enact Biblical stories understood to allegorize the present circumstances. During the same period, Morality Plays dramatize the general struggles the fallen man undergoes. For instance, The Castel of Perseuence [Perserverance] and Everyman, for instance, had generalized characters such as Vice, Virtue, Sloth, Forgiveness, Christian Charity, Everyman, and the like. Local characters would play parts in plays that took place in town or even as a journey through own.

In contrast to the "sense of immediacy" of Cycle Plays and Morality Plays, William Egginton notes the development of what he calls a "theatrical" experience of space. Or, rather, he details how the meanings of theatrical change in Late Medieval and Early Modern periods. In How the World Became A Stage (2003), Egginton argues that the structure of reality develops a separable "frame," which distinguishes the theatrical performance from daily life. These frames separate "this space" from "that space," actor from audience, the play world and the real world, and ultimately, Egginton argues, word from thing. Such a frame also distinguished the inner world from the outer world, the man from the player. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century thinkers consistently investigate identity through the figure of theatrum mundi. Fifteenth century philosopher Pico della Mirandola, for instance, celebrates men's "chameleon nature," their ability to try on new roles, because it allows men to move up the chain of being and become more like
Desiderius Erasmus, roughly Mirandola's contemporary, also delights in the **theatrum mundi**; but for Erasmus the fact that men play roles makes the world a kind of comedy.

what is all this life but a kind of comedy, wherein men walk up and down in one another's disguises and act their respective parts, till the property-man brings them back to the attiring house. And yet he often orders a different dress, and makes him that came but just now off in the robes of a king put on the rags of a beggar. Thus are all things represented by counterfeit, and yet without this there was no living. (44)

In this metaphor, man's life is nothing more than a series of "disguises," of "respective parts" he plays. Man continues to play his part until God, "the property-man," orders a change in fortune (and attending change in costume) or calls him home for good. For Erasmus, the pleasure of such "counterfeit[ing]" outweighs its "falsity." Even more, the fact that life is nothing but such a comedy suggests that there is no option but to "counterfeit." For Erasmus, shifts in character are not only divinely ordained (or the effect of Fortune), but are simply a fact of life, the life of **theatrum mundi**. As we have

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149 “Beasts as soon as they are born (so says Lucilius) bring with them from their mother’s womb all they will ever possess. Spiritual beings, either from the beginning or soon thereafter, become what they are to be for ever and ever. On man when he came into life the Father conferred the seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of life. Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear in him their own fruit. If they be vegetative, he will be like a plant. If sensitive, he will become brutish. If rational, he will grow into a heavenly being. If intellectual he will be an angel and the son of God. [...] Who would not admire this our chameleon? [...] Man has no semblance that is inborn and is his very own but many that are external and foreign to him.” *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1486).
seen, More agrees with his friend Erasmus; he also notes that life is like a series of roles. And as Greenblatt reminds us, More had to take on a number of, sometimes contradictory, roles in order to negotiate the difficult political atmosphere in which he found himself. For More, these roles are not as fun and funny as Erasmus suggests. For all that the world is a play, for More that play is deadly serious.

*Theatrum mundi* is, for Early modern playwrights and poets, an issue of identity. The theater of the world suggests an internal self whose acts comprise the theater of the real world. The theater or role playing enacted in the world was that of an interiorized subject. For Pico dell Mirandola, Desiderius Erasmus, and Thomas More the fact that men change roles does not present an ontological problem. Neither does it for Ben Jonson, who commends his own poesy for its clarity and realism. Jonson staunchly believes in an essential self beyond all theatrical change. In his "Epistle to Katherine" (1616) he notes

> Because that [which] studies spectacles, and shows,
> And after varied, as fresh objects goes,
> Giddy with change, and therefore cannot see
> Right, the way: yet must your comfort be
> Your conscience, and not wonder, if none asks
> For truth’s complexion, where they all wear masks.
> [. . .]

> Let them on powders, oils, and paintings, spend,
> Till that no usurer, nor his bawds dare lend
 Them, or their officers: and no man know,
Whether it be a face they wear or no
[...]
Madam, be bold to use this truest glass:
Wherein, your form, you still the same shall find;
Because it cannot change, nor such a mind.

(65-70, 77-80, 121-23)

Katherine, Jonson suggests, has "truth's complexion," a true self unsullied by cosmetics. This self "cannot change," and because Jonson's poetry rejects "spectacles, and shows," it can be her "truest glass." Some poets, Jonson insinuates, paint her "theatrically," "spectacularly," and other than she is; but Jonson's poetry is unique in that it accurately represents her.

This faithfulness in the constant self beneath the costumes is not consistent across Jonson's colleagues, however. Montaigne welcomes such shows. He claims that he comes to know his true self only by being an actor.

"And if no one reads me, have I wasted my time, entertaining myself for so many idle hours with such useful and agreeable thoughts? In modeling this figure upon myself, I have had to fashion and compose myself so often to bring myself out, that the model itself has to some extent grown firm and taken shape. Painting myself for others, I have painted my inward self with colors clearer than my original ones. I have no more made my book than my book has made me.
For Montaigne, the expression of thoughts reveals the thinking self. In "painting [himself] for others," Montaigne reveals his "inward self." Life cannot be anything but theatrical, and this theater is the discovery of an authentic self because the self is a performance. Montaigne suggests that theatrics and role playing are the only access we have to an otherwise unknowable "authentic self." Montaigne's optimism about the creative and epistemological consequences of the theatrical self is absent in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*. Jaques offers a standard interpretation of the trope, remarking that

> All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players:
> They have their exits and their entrances;
> And one man in his time plays many parts[.]

(1.7.139-42)

For Jaques, *theatrum mundi* signifies the changes of fate and the ultimate triviality of our lives. The "last scene" of each life "is second childishness and mere oblivion, / Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything" (165-66). For Early Modern writers, *theatrum mundi* figures personal identity, the relationship between inside and outside, and the ways we all "act" (linguistically and otherwise). The Early Modern uptake of *theatrum mundi* stressed its insights into personal identity, in a world increasingly identified with role playing.

Sidney acknowledges the theatrical world into which men find themselves thrust, the role-playing they perform working through daily social interactions. Real life is, as
Sidney notes, a series of "parts." Sidney's use of the figure of *theatrum mundi* emphasizes the reflective distance between the actual and poetic worlds, a distance that permits moral instruction. He notes that "[A] busie louing Courtier, and a hartlesse threatening Thraso; a selfe-wise seeming Schoolemaister, a wry transformed Traueller: these if we saw walke in Stage names, which we plaie naturally, therein were delightfull laughter, and teaching delightfulness" (I2v). (We will return below to the relationship for Sidney between names and theater.) Although "we play naturally" the roles that we condemn in plays, seeing these "in Stage names" allows us to laugh at ourselves. Reading poesy is like "in a glasse see[ing] his own filthinesse" (E3r). When reflecting on one's own behavior, one can make a "judgment" (like the one lacking in *Utopia*, according to the "sharp" reader) and choose not to occupy that role. Or at least to feel distant enough from that role not to identify with it. When men "seeth these men [players] play their parts" (E4v) they can decide they don't want to "dance the same measure." For Sidney, theater figures the decorum men observe when they make moral choices. Sidney notes that poesy is like theater in that "if euill men come to the stage, they ever goe out (as the Tragedie writer answered [...] so manicked as they little animate folks to follow them" (D4v). Reflecting on theater, then, allows one to make choices about the roles one plays in life. When Sidney notes above that "we plaie naturally," he accepts that men play roles in their lives, roles modeled on theatrical ones. Sidney paints everyday, actual life as role-playing. We also see role playing in the playhouse, but in a more distant way, through a frame that permits reflection. The theater constitutes an imaginative space. If poesy has the power to dissuade, then it also offers the ability to
imagine. This is the right use of poesy, given that things are named for the good things they offer. Sidney notes that poesy instructs men to behave well, and it is according to this that we know poesy to be beneficial "vpon the right vse, ech thing receiues his title" (G2v). And the name or "title" poesy signals its beneficence to and its distance from the real world.

Sidney emphasizes that stories in plays offer men opportunities to reflect upon their various virtues and vices. However, the fairy world of the play is markedly distinct from the first world. The worlds have different structures, rules that pertain in one but not the other. For instance, Sidney notes that the two worlds differ in how names work. Historians, Sidney notes, are tied to honesty when using names. History is concerned the "particular" man, and consider "whether Alcibiades did or suffered this or that" (D3r). Names tie historians to truthful particulars about the individual carrying the name. The second world of poesy, however, uses names to indicate general types. Poets are concerned with the "universall wayes what is fit to be said or done, either in likelihood or necessitie, which the Poesie considereth in his imposed names"; in poesy, names signal virtues and other "universal" things; they are not limited to a particular individual. The historian is concerned with "the true Cyrus" (D3r), but the poet works "not onely to make a Cyrus, which had been but a particular excellency as nature might haue done, but to bestow a Cyrus vpon the world to make many Cyrusses" (C1r). The conceit here is that he historian describes the historical personage Cyrus whereas the poet creates a man for all nations, a man who will inspire others to be like him. The name Cyrus works differently for the historian and the poet. Questions of falsity and verity apply to the
historical Cyrus, but not to the poetical one. Rather, names in poesy signal certain types or characters from whom we can learn lessons. Considering Medea, "the Terentian Gnato, and our Chawcers Pander," Sidney notes that "we now vse their names to signifie their Trades" (D2r). That is, the names signify a certain kind of behavior. Whereas, for More's Utopia, the name crystallizes the ironic utterance in which ficta come into contact with the real world, Sidney observations on that the different ways names function in "history" and in "poesy" serve to distinguish between the real world and poesy.

Sidney's Defense draws on the conceit of theatrum mundi to emphasize the distance between the real (first) world and the poetic (second) one. Although he agrees with his colleagues that men play roles, he nonetheless distinguishes between this kind of role playing and the kind that poesy offers. Sidney bifurcates theater into the roles men play and the dramatic performance of a set piece on stage or a piece of poesy. For Sidney, theater isn't just one mode among many types of poesy. Rather, because it is performative, it is the ultimate figure for exploring the ways that poesy does -- and does not -- take place. Poesy, Sidney notes, never takes place except insofar as it is framed like Thebes; not even a child imagines that the frame between the world of poesy and the real world ever breaks down. Theater, Sidney observes, Theater, he suggests, is hygienically distant from the real world in which men must act. Sidney certainly answers Gosson on his own terms (theater), but the long history of the frame separating theater from the real world, a frame that includes things like different ways names work and the suspension of some kinds of performative utterances, helps Sidney to emphasize the clear-cut distinction between theater and the real world.
Theatrical frame has, Sidney notes, been negotiated through rules like preserving the unities. Unfortunately, Sidney observes, most contemporary playes are "faultie both in place and time, the two necessarie Companions of all corporall actions. For where the Stage should alway represent but one place, and the uttermost time presupposed in it, should bee both by Aristotle's precept, and common reason, but one day" (H4r). Here, Sidney notes that "corporall actions," those in the physical world, must be accompanied by the "Companions" place and time. But in theater it is always possible to suggest one moves through space or time in a in a way that marks the text as fictional. One might reject the unities for precisely this reason; naysayers "ask "how then shall we set foorth a storie, which contains both many places, and many times? And do they not know that a Tragidie is tied to the lawes of Poesie and not of Historie: [...] many things may be told which cannot be shewed" (H4v). The problem facing directors, Sidney notes, is the difficulty unity causes to stories that cross both time and space. The solution to this problem, Sidney suggests, is to rely on "reporting" rather than "representing" (11r). The narrator may speak of Peru, for instance, "But in action, I cannot represent it without Pacolets Horse," a mythically swift horse whose appearance would only draw attention to the fiction that is theater. Theater can reduce its fictional appearance by "reporting" what it cannot represent by adhering to the unities. The "corporall" world is marked by the unity of time and place whereas the play world is not necessarily so since it can represent fictions.

Playwrights should observe the unities, but this is only because they don't have to, because there are other options, because the unities are not a given like they are in the
real world. The theater of Sidney's poesie is spatially distant from the actual world insofar as it reflects on that world. This distance is the precondition for change. And the difference between the two is that poesy precludes any poet from truly observing the unities; as we have seen, performatives and names don't work the same way in theater, in the performative dimension of poesy, as they do in the real world. The poet may conjure, apologize, and defend; these are roles he takes on. But the joke of poesy-as-theater is that performative language is suspended in poesy. For Sidney, theater figures the ways that poesy is, and is not, performative.

CONTRACTING PERFORMANCE

It is against this history of theatrum mundi that Jonson offers his play Bartholomew Fair. Jonson has available the figure of theater as the roles we play in life, as an inquiry into interiority and what is called "the Early Modern Subject," and as the difference between the real world and poesy. The ways that theater / performative language fail is, for Jonson, the diagnostic condition of literature. Situating his Folio in relationship to the book-buying public, Jonson explicitly engages the defining characteristics of a literary commodity, of a text of literature. In distinct counterpoint to Sidney's emphasis on the geographical distinction between poesy and the real world, Jonson brings literature back into the real world but as product. For Jonson, the literary text is marked for publication, and publication under the author's name. So, for Jonson, theatrum mundi figures the way that the text plays on the market. Its place in the world is as a linguistic commodity and a failed de futuro contract. Or, rather than failed, a
contract that depends upon some additional completion in the future (like a betrothal). The literary product is, Jonson discovers, structured like a contract whose fulfillment is ever deferred. *Theatrum mundi* is the system of trade, of economic exchange, of a literary text, a marketable commodity, goods underwritten by the author. As a *de futuro* contract, literature never takes place, although it promises to do so.

Jonson turns the figure of *theatricum mundi* on the developments in mercantile capitalism. Theater and economics together work out ways of representation and judging value. For critic Jean-Christophe Agnew, whose *Worlds Apart* (1986) remains the authoritative text on the mutually influential developments of theater and the market in the Early Modern period, sixteenth century *theatrum mundi* refers to the developing world of. The theater of the world, Agnew argues, was capitalism; "The deepened resonance between commerciality and theatricality transformed the ancient Stoic and Christian doctrine metaphor of the *theatrum mundi* from a simple, otherworldly statement on human vanity into a complex, secular commentary on the commodity world" (12). Agnew argues that the sixteenth-century "commodity world" is theatrical in the sense that theater figures the many "exchanges" that take place on the market. In particular, theater draws on marketplace for ways of thinking about representation; Agnew notes that "the English stage developed formal, narrative, and thematic conventions that effectively reproduced representational strategies and difficulties of the marketplace" (12). On the market, strategies of representation would include justifying the value of the commodity and drawing up legally binding contracts, for instance. And in the playhouse, the play is the commodity being exchanged. The play is the representation of the process of
representation itself, which then becomes a product on the market to be sold for fair value.

Like *Utopia*, *Bartholomew Fair* is also interested in its cousin Bartholomew Fair, a place in the world where people go about their daily business. The fact that the Fair is the Fair calls attention to the ways that some places are structured with different rules; because the Fair was outside the city limits, it had different laws than inside the city limits; for instance, Smithfield was the site for executions and animal slaughter.

Literary performatives in the Early Modern Period have been interrogated most substantially by Gail Kern Paster; Paster notes that the game of "vapors" in *Bartholomew Fair* speaks to the emphatically material negotiation of masculine identity. Critical attention to *Bartholomew Fair* tends to emphasize the text's inquiry into identity, into making and breaking distinctions. One way the play looks into identity in linguistic terms is through puns. Puns turn words against themselves instantaneously. "Vapors" comes to mean so much that it ends up meaning nothing at all. The way words can mean different things at the same time through pun signals a witty author, *Bartholomew Fair* suggests. His interest in establishing the place of the author leads Jonson to consider the importance of naming. Unlike Sidney for whom names are static and determinate identities in the world of history and simply suggestive for the world of poesy, Jonson inquires into names through oaths and promises. *Bartholomew Fair* is overflowing with future conditionals (If x, I would y) and oaths ("by 'r Lady). These oaths go horribly awry, though. Revision means a marriage license endorses marriage between two people not intended to marry, a warrant to do (whatever Troubleall wants) ends up authorizing
an unintended transfer of property (the ward Grace), and the judgment Overdo passes on
the Fair is disrupted by his wife's violation of the peace (vomiting drunkenly). Both
written and spoken contracts (and oaths) fail to take place properly. The Induction of the
play, in which the Scrivener reads the Articles of Agreement between author and
audience, attempts to establish the rules of the economic contract that is the purchase of
Bartholomew Fair and its delivery. This Agreement reveals, however, how much the
author cannot control. Bartholomew Fair characterizes the indeterminate part of the play
in terms of place. In particular, the introduction reveals that the author cannot fix the
place of the audience (seats) or the judgments it makes about the play. For Bartholomew
Fair, literary decorum signifies the play's judgment or value. But the final judgment
never comes. The play as a literary commodity is structured like a failed de futuro
contract or oath; as Henri Levebvre observes in The Production of Space (1974), "(social)
space is a (social) product."

The difficulties in summarizing Bartholomew Fair reflect the play's thematic
interests. The action in Bartholomew Fair is largely verbal sparring, puns, and witty
retorts. Bartholomew Fair is Jonson’s last great comedy of humours. Like other
comedies of the period, the play diagnoses the divisive forces which undermine social
cohesion, forces which this play identifies as religious and class pretensions as well as
judicial blindness. The characters in Bartholomew Fair are dominated by humours, or
ruling passions, which results in the characters being somewhat two-dimensional types,
such as the impulsive aristocrat (Cokes), the hypocritical Puritan (Busy), the overzealous
judge (Overdo), and the chronically angry, self-important Wasp. Three groups -- one
headed by Puritan Zeal-of-the-Land Busy, another of social gallants, and a third attending the infantile aristocrat Bartholomew Cokes -- visit Bartholomew Fair to take part of its pleasures. Justice Overdo also attends the fair in disguise in order to witness firsthand the enormities that take place there. The center around which the action revolves is Ursula’s booth, a booth where fairgoers buy pig, beer and tobacco, play the quarrelsome language game “vapors,” as well as use the privy pot and visit prostitutes behind a curtain. The end of the play finds the characters gathered in a playhouse to watch Littlewit’s adaptation of *Hero and Leander*. Overdo interrupts to accuse the fairgoers of atrocities, but his poor reading leads to mistakes like identifying his wife as a prostitute. The marriage license and warrant are responsible for negotiations which resolve the tensions in the play. Quarlous obtains both the warrant through pretense, and he and Winwife arrange for the theft of the marriage license; together, these result in Winwife's betrothal to Grace and Quarlous' making money off the whole endeavor. The play ends with Overdo's and Zeal Busy's changes of heart, and the company adjourns to Overdo's house for supper.

The Jonsonian critic who focuses most on the performativity of language and linguistic materiality in *Bartholomew Fair* is Gail Kern Paster. Paster argues that the game of "vapors" the men play at Ursula's booth is a material negotiation of masculine identity (*Humoring the Body*).\(^{150}\) In their cups, the attendants at Ursula's pig-stall regularly contradict one another and act generally disagreeable; this practice is referred to

\(^{150}\) See, in particular, chapter four, "Belching Quarrels."
...as "vapors." For instance, in full-blown game of vapors in 4.4, Winwife, Quarlous, Wasp, and other cranky fellows argue over the right to "have a vapor" or disagree with those around him. Knockem responds to Winwife's complaint that he is not proud of the place (the booth) with the question "Are you in vapours, sir?" (2.5.49-54); and he refers to a "quarrel" as "foul vapours" (88-89). Although Moon calf, among others, tries to pacify the feisty crowd, pleading with Knockem "For the honour of our booth, none o' your vapours here" (56-57), Ursula insists that the men have a right "to be i' their vapours" (59). Returning humoral theory to literary analysis, Paster reminds us that the vapors are the hot air that a humoral body expresses. "Vapor is a liquid but especially the living fluids of plant and animal bodies" (237, cf. OED 1 and 2a); according to medical treatises of the time, such as Elyot's Castel of Helth (1536) vapors rise up through the body and their proper expression is necessary to regulate mental, emotional, and physical health. For Paster, the humoral means of masculine identity demonstrates the materiality of social negotiations and the social dimension of material expression. Throughout her recent publications, Paster's project is to explore the intersection between linguistic and material worlds in the sixteenth century. In her introduction to Reading the Early

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151 For instance, Paster notes that, by the 1590s, the term "humors" signify “whims” or “manners” which indicate gender and class privilege and thus distinguish a subject from those around him (261). Paster argues that the game of vapors in Bartholomew Fair is a means by which men establish their identities, assert themselves against their companions, and thus establish a social or relational position. Paster concludes that vapors' and humors' expression in a social context renders material what we now, mistakenly see, as allegorical -- the physical impact of words. "The properly deferential servant," she argues, "feels the subjection required of his place" (211); and that place is defined, in part, by one's verbal expressions, one's "vapors"; social place is, in part, structured by the "humoral right of way" (220).
Modern Passions (2004), for instance, Paster argues that humors are a nexus of body/language. They are not "internal objects" or "bodily states" but "an ecology or transaction" (18). Along with Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Paster argues that "the very language of physiology [...] helps us to determine phenomenology" (16). We moderns need to "literalize these locations that we have long presumed to be figurative" (16) such as "hot blood." In this sense, Paster argues for the materiality of words.

The performativity of language Paster reveals is the ability of verbal, humoral expressions, physiologically to shape the individuals who speak, desire to speak, or hear them. She returns our attention to the Galenic context of early modern thinkers' thoughts on speech. (Galen popularized humoral theory in second-century Rome, and was an authority well through the period under consideration there.) But while Galen (through Paster) emphasizes the materiality of speech, neither have much to say about written words. Nor about figures of speech other than Paster's general observation that their use encodes assumptions about class. What Paster does help us to see is that the performative dimension of language -- including identity formation -- is material in a physical sense. The game of vapors requires its participants to take up identities in

152 The oral tradition, while nonetheless ubiquitous, faded during the sixteenth century with the rapid increase of literacy and the shift of oratory to letters. Residual orality aside, Paster's observations on the degree to which the text's physical performance in the world is a function of the fact that it is spoken out loud through the medium of air fail to provide a theory of the written text. In the newly commodified "literary" (as distinct from rhetorical/poetic) "product" (as distinct from spoken language and the sixteenth century musings we call poesie), the medium of transmission is quite different: the text itself.
relationship to one another and through language; in this sense, one might characterize
the speech in *Bartholomew Fair* as performative, theatrical, and material.

If we return to the game of vapors, we also discover a way to read the witty banter
as commentary on linguistic equivocation. In particular, the game depends on the ability
of "vapors" to mean virtually anything. The rules of the game are quite simple; as the
stage directions define them, “each man is to oppose the last man that spoke, whether it
concerned him or no” (143). Each man playing the game of vapors “fight[s] for himself”
(95-96), he emphatically establishes his difference from those around him. But at the
same time, these differences are purely contextual; the men must listen to their fellow
quarrelers and adapt their claims correspondingly.

*Knockem:* To what do you say nay, sir?

[...]

*Wasp:* to anything, whatsoever it is, so long as I do not like it.

*Whit:* Pardon me, little man, dou musht like it a little.

*Cutting:* No, he must not like it at all, sir; there you are i’ the wrong.

(4.4.30-35)

These men react to one another and the positions they take up depend upon those already
established; their opposition links them together and holds them in tension with one
another. Not only are the men's identity under negotiation here; so too the word vapor's.
Consider, for instance, the movement in the game in which the characters debate whether
the character Wasp “utters a sufficient vapour” (4.4.53), whether he “has sense” when he
What is at issue in this debate is what stance to take on vapors -- whether they are "sufficient," "sweet," or "stink[y]" --, whether a quality is necessary, and whether it extends to future instances. But the only way to make any kind of sense of the debate is to compare lines word for word in order to see where each man departs from his fellows, what specific point each man takes issue with in order to establish his own unique position on the nature of "vapors." The game of vapors strips language of its content and down to its structure; it is pure relationality.

The game of vapors points to the play's rhetorical figures, the most common being puns and similes. The word "vapor" has so many possible meanings -- from argument to opinion to individualism to air -- that it simply signals the author of that meaning, the individual who holds the opinion. The wordplay in the game of vapors...
exemplify the ways puns work in the play, puns being perhaps the most frequent rhetorical figure in *Bartholomew Fair*. Puns demonstrate the "wit" of the author of the speech. The play begins with Master Littlewit, proctor, discussing the marriage license for Cokes and Grace, and his particular talent for word play. Littlewit jokes "Bartholomew upon Bartholomew!" (1.1.8), Bartholomew Cokes receiving the license on the day the Bartholomew Fair takes place. Littlewit chuckles at his word play, and he continues in the same vein. He notes that he (himself) is "one o' the prettiest wits o' Paul's, the Little wit of London (so thou art called)" (12-13). Drawing on rhymes and puns, Littlewit establishes his identity (his name) in his ability to be witty, as a "pretty wit." A few lines later, Littlewit boasts that he is so good at manipulating words that he can "make a Jack of thee instead of a John. (There I am again, la!)" (18-19). "Jack" is a nickname for "John," and John is Littlewit's first name; in this passage, then, Littlewit identifies his creative power with the ability to make himself through puns and witty language. Like vapors, the word "Littlewit" becomes so overdetermined that it is both everything (Littlewit is the sole author of the play at this point, and the only author in the play) and nothing (the witty remarks and puns are nothing more than hot air).

The first scene of *Bartholomew Fair* consists almost entirely of word play punning on names. Littlewit repeats his wife's name (Win) both to emphasize that he directs his speech at her ("good morrow, Win" 1.1.20) and his ability to make jokes (he thanks his good "fortune to win him such a Win" 1.1.32). After this joke, Littlewit laughs at himself "(There I am again!)" Littlewit identifies himself with the puns he makes on names.
I do feel conceits coming upon me, more than I am able to turn tongue to.  
A pox o' these pretenders to wit, your Three Cranes, Mitre, and Mermaid men! Not a corn or true salt nor a grain of right mustard amongst them all.  
They may stand for places or so, again' the next witfall. (32-37)

Littlewit's "conceits," the puns and figures he uses, assumes Littlewit as an authorial presence. These figures are made possible by the fact that they are written down, that *Bartholomew Fair* is a printed text. The capitalization in "Win" helps signal the pun John makes on his wife's name, and the capitalization in "Three Cranes, Mitre, and Mermaid" indicate that they are both the names of and animal images for local taverns (Gosset 45, fn). Moreover, capitalization and commas, which are printed not oral figures, indicates the puns Littlewit makes. Littlewit claims to be better to those who pretend "to wit" (that is, those who pretend to be witty) and to those who pretend in general, for example the men from London taverns. 

Across the acts, *Bartholomew Fair* plays on names relentlessly. The "name" and "names" occur over 40 times (without a single occurrence of the word as a verb, curiously). The effect is two-fold. First, names highlight the identity of the author, both as a speaker (an identifiable individual) and a writer (as signaled by puns, punctuations). Names distinguish individuals from one another. "Win" is named "Win-the-Fight," a

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153 This latter sense is OED "wit" (vI) II.10.b (archaic) "that is to say, namely."

154 It is not just names upon which the characters in *Bartholomew Fair* pun. After Littlewit's introductory remarks, for instance, Winwife jokes that "None i' the earth" live up to Win's example (1.2.11); Littlewit, he observes "ha' the garden" wherein his "delicates" (delights, delicacies, wife) grow (12-13). "A wife here with a strawberry breath, cherry lips, apricot cheeks, and a soft velvet head like a melicotton" (13-15).
name that signals her Puritan upbringing rather than the local busybody "Winnifred" (1.3.128-29). Cokes also jokes about his name; he announces that he will show Grace his fair, so named "because of Bartholomew; you know my name is Bartholomew and Bartholomew Fair" (1.5.67-69). Cokes capitalizes on his name again later in act four, when he laments "Bartholomew Fair, quoth he! An ever any Bartholomew had that luck in 't that I have had, I'll be martyred for him, and in Smithfield too" (4.3.70-73). Having had his pocket picked twice and even losing his sword, coat, and hat, Bartholomew claims that the Fair isn't fair at all. He's had no "luck" in it. In fact, neither have many others; Cokes' reference to the martyrs of Bartholomew Fair would remind the audience both of the assassination of French Hugenots on St. Bartholomew's Day in 1692 and of the Protestants that Queen Mary burned in Smithfield during her reign (Gosset 136 fn). In each of these instances, the speaker establishes himself to be a witty speaker; he points to himself by playing word games with names. Punning on names demonstrates a wit, an author, in the equivocation of language, the ability of words to mean multiple things, to be self-different.

Win's virtues are the "delicates" in Littlewit's garden; so too is her velvet cap, the "Velvet head!" (18) that occasioned Littlewife's jokes a scene earlier (1.1.20-27). In this exchange, puns, word play, and metaphors come together in Winwife's defense of himself as a man in whom there's "no harm" (1.2.10). Puns and word games help Littlewit, Winwife, and Win to distinguish themselves as wits, as witty. The emphasis on names in the early puns of the play emphasize that puns and other rhetorical figures establish identity. As Quarlous emphasizes to Winwife, Ursula's identity is a function of her rhetorical figures. "I find by her similes she wanes apace" (2.5.133), Quarlous notes in an attempt to prove to Winwife that Ursula is calming down. It is through her similes Quarlous identifies Ursula. In Bartholomew Fair, rhetorical figures (specifically word play) point to the author, perform an identity.
That puns and wit emphasize the speaking character is consistent with the critical reading of *Bartholomew Fair* as concerned with individuation and identity. For instance, James Robinson argues that the people who attend Bartholomew Fair must learn the lesson that they all share a basic "animal nature," including the needs for food, drink, sex, and urination. George Rowe agrees that the play is an investigation into identity although he extends identity more broadly than Robinson; Rowe finds that the play is unusual because the distinctions Jonson so avidly seeks in his other works fail to obtain in *Bartholomew Fair*. Puns, then, speak both to the play's interest in individuation -- the speaking wit -- and failure of linguistic individuation -- the effect of the word "vapors" meaning practically anything.

Vapors, and puns, point to the witty author. The author takes place through self-different, ironic, equivocal language. And yet, the names (or identities) of these speaking wits also become puns; the supposedly unequivocal moniker becomes, for *Bartholomew Fair*, simply another opportunity for punning. The ability to pun on names, and the linguistic self-difference to which puns point in *Bartholomew Fair*, has significant consequences for the play's version of performative language. People's names arise at two key points in *Bartholomew Fair*: first, they are a source of puns, second, they underwrite oaths, promises, and contracts. The names that are supposed to guarantee identity become, in the play's treatment of oaths and contracts, just as exchangeable as puns. *Bartholomew Fair* discovers that names work like puns: they are exchangeable. All of the written contracts in the play go awry in some fashion or another as the names on those contracts change over time. The fact of exchange structures the text as a whole.
Words and names are changed through punning. The linguistic exchange to which punning -- particularly punning names -- refers also infects oaths, promises, and contracts in *Bartholomew Fair*. Ultimately, as we shall see below, the way that these contracts fail indicates the performative dimension of the literary commodity. Jonson's *theatrum mundi* is the failed (or incomplete) performance, the unfulfilled contract, of the literary text.

Other than puns, names come up in *Bartholomew Fair* most often as mild oaths. In his first lines on stage, Overdo begins his story pledging to "justice's name, and the King's, and for the commonwealth!" (2.1.1-2). After stating his purpose -- to be a better judge by donning a disguise and finding out corruptions and "enormities" for himself -- Overdo closes his oath to uphold justice with the same invocation: "And as I began, so I'll end: in justice's name, and the King's, and for the commonwealth" (1.2.48-50). As a character, Overdo embodies the power of the name to underwrite performative statements. When under siege from local personalities, Mistress Overdo repeats (drunkenly) "in Master Overdo's name I charge you" (4.4.151) and "I thank you, honest friends, in behalf o' the Crown, and the peace, and in Master Overdo's name, for suppressing enormities" (176-78). These oaths serve to bolster the validity of Mistress Overdo's statements; the name justifies the promises. The name guarantees the performativity of the oath.

*Bartholomew Fair* emphasizes the authorizing name of oaths in the form of Justice Overdo's warrant. Local madman Troubleall intrudes into the play action periodically to demand whether characters possess a "warrant" or permission for their
actions. He himself seeks a warrant signed by Overdo; having been stung by the hand of justice in the past, he refuses to do so much as make water without the Judge's permission (much to his wife's distress; see 4.2). Troubleall continually demands of other characters to see warrants from Judge Overdo -- "show it me" (4.6.154). Justice Overdo, "glad to hear my name is [his] terror" (2.2.73), gives Troubleall a blank warrant; he authorizes whatever Troubleall needs to do in the future. Unfortunately, the Troubleall to whom Overdo gives the warrant is actually a disguised Quarlous, who uses the warrant to claim Grace as his own ward (rather than Overdo's) and thus have the right to her property upon her marriage. As a character, Troubleall draws attention to the troublesome fact that the contracts authorized with a signature fail to perform as intended in this play. The play offers several examples of contracts of names that go awry: the wedding license, Overdo's warrant, the contract by which Quarlous and Winwife determine who between them would marry Grace, the play itself (which is framed by the Acts of Agreement), and the puppet play that takes *Hero and Leander* radically awry.

Each of the contracts in the play (more about the Induction shortly) "misfires" or is "unhappy" in some way. As J.L. Austin defines it, a performative utterance is "infelicitious" or void when it "misfires." Misfires arise when any of conditions A through B are not met.

A1) the conventional procedure must exist, A2) the persons involved must be appropriate, B1) the procedure must be executed by all parties correctly, B2) and completely, Γ1) when appropriate, the person must have
the implied internal feelings and so intend to conduct themselves further, and \( \Gamma_2 \) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (15)

In contrast to the infelicitous misfires indicated by the Latin alphabet, violations of the Greek alphabet (here \( \Gamma \)) result in "abuses": "insincerity," "bad faith," and "lying." When \( A \) or \( B \) are unfulfilled, the performative is null and void; the contract fails to be fulfilled. When \( \Gamma \) is unfulfilled, the contract is fulfilled but badly, incorrectly, uncontrollably.

*Bartholomew Fair* demonstrates both. Characters make promises that they intend to keep and do keep, they intend to keep promises but are unable to (misfire), and have shifty intention while promising such that the completion of the contract is inconsistent with its declared intention and does something that the author does not intend it to do. In *Bartholomew Fair*, the contract or "motion" by which Quarlous, Winwife, and Grace determine Grace's husband is both felicitous and happy (although Quarlous himself is unhappy that he loses). The marriage license shifts from a happy to an unhappy contract when the names are rubbed out, and the text suggests that the license is an "insincere" contract insofar as Cokes fails to do what is necessary to keep up his part of the bargain (he loses Grace partly by his inability to keep anything and partly by his sheer inability to pay attention to anyone other than himself).

For Cokes, the inability to follow through on his promise is the fundamental cause of his undoing. The wedding license illustrates one kind of performative utterance -- and signed contract -- that was at issue in Early Modern England: the marriage vow. The temporal problematics of the marital "will" surfaces in a number of literary works. Shakespeare's sonnet 113, for instance, notes that "The world will wail thee, like a
makeless wife; / The world will be thy widow and still weep" (4-5). In line 4, the Poet remarks on the way that "will" plays out in marriage. In the sixteenth century, individuals could still marry one another without the intermediary of a priest; a "handfast," agreement to be married, or consummation all signaled the marriage. But the problem with the world "will" when considered in a marriage contract is that it may also refer to the future; "I will marry you" could mean either "I am now marrying you," or "I will marry you at some time in the future." In sonnet 113, the Poet laments that the young man never fulfills his "will" and the (promised) wife remains "makeless." The temporal problematics of the "will" is important to church officials because they want to sanction as many unions as possible, and it is also important to the aristocratic system because it is invested in keeping genealogies tidy and inheritances in line, and thus far more likely to insist that "will" referred to an as-yet-unfulfilled marriage; thus the dalliance of the nobleman with the local milkmaid need not necessarily disrupt the lineage. But the "will" of marriage is only one of many de futuro contracts of interest to Early Modern thinkers. The notion of credit, for instance, depends upon promises being fulfilled in the future. In fact, the Early Modern marriage contract is also an economic one, including the transfer of inheritances, dowries, and so forth.

The marriage contract is a particularly apt figure for the temporally problematic performative. The play begins with Quarlous, Winwife and Littlewit discussing the previous evening's antics. Having drunk a good deal, the men speculate on possible marriage contracts. As the play opens the next morning, Quarlous worries to Quarlous

155 For more on specific changes in Renaissance marriage law, see Subha Mukherji's Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama (2006).
worries to Littlewit "if you have that fearful quality, John, to remember when you are sober, John, what you promise drunk, John, I shall take heed of you, John" (1.3.32-35). Here, Quarlcous' repetition of John's name associates the promise he made with his name, reminding us of the fact that the power of contracts are in the names that underwrite them. Quarlcous specifically hopes that John will not keep his promise, claiming that if John remembers promises made when drunk, he (Quarlous) will be more careful of what he says in the future. That the men were drunk, Quarlcous suggests, nullifies or brackets whatever promises were made and agreements reached. J.L. Austin notes a series of conditions that must be satisfied in order for a performative utterance to be valid and to come off as intended. The situation of drunken promising is both a misfire and abuse. Drunken promises misfire because the men making them must have been heard and have been understood by him to be making a promise. Quarlcous draws on the hope that drunken promises are null and void. The conditions for making a promise recognized as such have not been met. Like the majority of the oaths and name-taking in the play, the promises to which Quarlcous refers fail to meet the initial conditions of following procedure and having the intention to go through with the promise. The first problem is a misfire; the performative simply doesn't mean anything, or at least, it doesn't constitute a performative utterance in the fullest sense of the term. As Austin notes of the misfire, "when the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to invoke is disallowed or is botched" (16). Bartholomew Fair thus describes a space where performatives are suspended according to a social agreement. The spoken oath, in Bartholomew Fair, is
largely a joke, a tool in the game of wits. The failure of this performative points to the
witty author; *theatricum mundi* is the spectacular way that a wit -- an author -- puns.

In general, the mild spoken oaths misfire because the speakers fail to follow up
and fulfill the oaths. Conditional verbs emphasize the future conditions of promises.

Interrogating Edgeworth, whom Quarlous hires to steal the marriage license, Quarlous
inquires "But look you do it now, sirrah, and keep your word, or --." To which
Edgeworth replies "Sir, if I ever break my word with a gentleman, may I never read word
at my need" (3.5.275-78). Here, the two men negotiate the possibility that Edgeworth
will not keep his promise (that he made in the past about the future), and Edgeworth
defends himself with a promise of fidelity based on a future conditional: if Edgeworth
breaks his promise, may he be executed (if the situation comes up). Here, Edgeworth
emphasizes his role as the author of the promise when protesting its sincerity; he is the
"I" who reads "my words." Yet, Edgeworth is actually joking here; both the reader of the
play and Quarlous know Edgeworth's reputation, and that he is not to be trusted.

Grounding the performativity of the oath in the author here does not provide the
 guarantee it professes. We know that, should he be imprisoned for his crimes, Edgeworth
would use all means possible to excuse himself. The particular problem with
Edgeworth's oath here, then, is that the future oath, the guarantee of society, is neither
believable nor achievable at this moment, and so the performative cannot yet be fulfilled.

The modals and future conditionals that fill *Bartholomew Fair* draw out the temporal
dimension of the contracts with which the text is concerned. They highlight the lack of
sincerity of Jonson's characters, a lack that brackets the oaths such that they're not
expected to be performed as they would be in the "first world." These performatives are always in the future, never fulfilled in the present.

The second way that contracts fail in *Bartholomew Fair* is specific to written contracts. The two written contracts in the play -- Grace's marriage license and Overdo's warrant -- are problematic because the names on them change. *Bartholomew Fair* reflects on the assumption Austin merely presumes: the consistent identity of the person/people involved in the performative utterance. Austin assumes that the individuals involved in the initial promise must be the same as those when the promise is "fulfilled" (either completely or continually). He remarks that performatives are in the first person and leaves it at this (61). *Bartholomew Fair*, on the other hand, exchanges characters for one another; the first person changes: Winwife for Cokes on the license, Quarlous for Troubleall on the warrant, and Palamon the word for Winwife the man on the paper Grace holds. The problem with these written contracts is that there is an exchange of names on each. Written contracts, for *Bartholomew Fair*, figure the exchangeability of names, of names for their referents, and ultimately, the exchangeability of products on the market. Quarlous discovers, quite to his dismay, how arbitrarily exchangeable names are, the very names that are supposed to guarantee an oath, underwrite a promise. In this curious episode, Quarlous and Winwife corner Grace away from Cokes and lament his unfitness as a future husband. They offer themselves as surrogates. Grace agrees that Cokes is less than desirable; she bemoans the fact that "rather than to be joked with this bridegroom is appointed me, I would take up any husband, almost upon trust" (4.3.11-13). However, Grace is not so coarse as to propose to accept Quarlous or Winwife
specifically as replacements. She reproves them "I am no she that affects to be quarreled for, or have my name or fortune made the question of men's swords" (3-5). Instead, she makes the men promise to a totally random arbitration.

If you would not give it [the reason for her refusal to accept one over the other] to my modesty, allow it yet to my wit. Give me so much of woman and cunning as not to betray myself impertinently. How can I judge of you so far as to a choice without knowing you more? You are both equal and a like to me yet, and so indifferently affected by me as each of you might be the man if you other were away. For you are reasonable creatures; you have understanding and discourse. And if fate send me an understanding husband, I have no fear at all but mine own manners shall make him a good one. (30-39)

Grace claims that her modesty and manners prohibits her choice between Quarlious and Winwife; here decorum is coded in terms of distinction, specifically between two interchangeable objects. Their names become the simple mark of difference between two things. Grace both claims and refuses to make a "judgement": she establishes that the two are exchangeable but that she cannot discriminate between them. The solution to the problem Grace poses is no less arbitrary than Grace herself is. She asks the two to pick a word, or a name, what you like best -- but of two or three syllables at most -- and the next person that comes this way (because destiny has a high hand in businesses of this nature) I'll demand which of the two worlds
he or she doth approve; and according to that sentence fix my resolution and affection without change. (50-56)

Grace asks the men to choose substitute names or words, which will be distinguished at random by the next passerby (who, it just so happens, is a madman who has trouble navigating any scenario in which he finds himself). The names the men pick serve as their agreement to the "motion" Grace presents (42). Although not their own in terms of signature, the names the men choose (Argalus and Palamon) signal their agreement to the contract. These names indicate their present intention (they agree to a particular method of distinction) as well as a future one (to abide by that distinction). The name itself authorizes the contract, not the referent of that name. The authorizing force behind the performativity, however, gets lost in the potentially infinite exchange of names. The future fulfillment of the promises the names make, however, is unclear, given the arbitrary choice of names. The names that authorize this oath are liberated of individuality and become pure exchangeability. The written contract of a de futuro style promise is, for Bartholomew Fair, radically open to an unknown future in which it will be exchanged.

The surrogate names point up the fact that any man could agree to such a contract; the specificity of the men involved, while of utmost important to the characters, is unimportant in terms of how the contract plays out. One man will win, the other lose, and Grace wed. Any man can hold these contracts and, curiously, they pertain even when transferred from one signer to another. This is the market contract, the promise to buy or provide a certain amount of product in the future, the actually people fulfilling the
obligation being those to whom this contract is traded in the mean time.¹⁵⁶ These contracts can be exchanged so that new men hold them. Although the play emphasizes the degree to which names, signatures, construct binding oaths, the fact that the people who "own" the contracts, who have traded place with the original signers, have the final responsibility for the contract undercuts the inherent power of the name to guarantee an oath. Quarlous calls attention to the apparently meaningless exchange of names when lamenting Troubleall's choice; "Palamon the word, and Winwife the man?"(5.2.37 and 48). The individual name could be any other (under the same circumstances) and the promise the contract records could still maintain. The written contracts in this play go awry in that they perform other than as intended, and yet they still perform (or at least promise to) nonetheless. *Bartholomew Fair* draws attention to the "ridiculous" (Ind. 142) and "preposterous" (157) possibility that names -- and people -- be exchanged for one another in the Induction. In particular, the Articles rebuff any critical attempt to read the text as satire, as referring to one person by the name of another. According to the Scrivener, the author of the play forbids the ridiculous "state-decipherer or politic picklock" who "search[es] out who was meant by the gingerbread woman, who by the hobbyhorse man" and so forth (142-43). The author, by means of the Articles, attempts to forbid those who try to read too much into the play, to see it as a satire, a way to mock individuals through secret names. Ultimately, the author condemns such a practice of switching people and opinions (virtually the same things in this play). And yet, the

¹⁵⁶ Note that this type of contract in its *written* form was a relatively new development in the late sixteenth century. See Luke Wilson's *Theaters of Intention* for more on the ways that changing laws and market conditions frame Early Modern theater.
author's need to make the prohibition highlights the fact that playwrights lambast each other all the time under covert intendments like satire. The anxiety the author shows here over the exchangablity of names, and therefore of men, is all over the Induction. The Induction begins with the Stage-keeper, who excuses the late start of the show and then offers his "judgement" (51) of the play. The play "is like to be a very conceited scury one" (9), the Stage-Keeper opines. The fair does not include a "Kindheart" (dentist), "Nor a juggler with a well-educated ape" (16-17). Indeed, the play fails to live up to the expectations set "in Master Tarlton's time" some thirty-odd years earlier (37). The Book-keeper interrupts the Stage-keeper and throws him off stage, introducing in his place the Scrivener, who reads the

Articles of Agreement, indented, between the spectators or hearers at the Hope on the Bankside, in the county of Surrey, on the one party, and the author of *Bartholomew* Fair in the said place and county, on the other party, the one-and-theireith day of October 1614 and in the twelfth year of the reign of our Soverign Lord, James. (65-71)

The Agreement is rather straightforward. It consists of five main points. First, the audience members "agree to remain in the places their money or friends have put them in" for the duration of the play, which fills the "space of two hours and a half," the author promises them (79-84). Second, the author "depart[s] with his right" and leaves it to the audience members to judge the play according "to their free will of censure," provided that they only judge as much as they paid for (a six-penny seat permits a six-penny
Third, every man must make his own judgement; he may not "censure by contagion" (101) or change his opinion (he must be "fixed and settled in his censure" 103-04). Fourth, the Author stipulates that "how great soever the expectation be, no person here is to expect more than he knows or better ware than a fair will afford, neither to look back to the sword-and-buckler age of Smithfield, but content himself with the present" (117-20). Finally, the articles specify that no one shall look for satire nor censure the play for the play's rough language (138-56). The Articles conclude with the final terms of the performance by which the Articles will be signed and sealed: applause. The Articles joke that, "preposterously," audience members "put to your seals already (which is your money)" the arrangement; now they need only to "add the other part of suffrage, your hands" (157-59).

The Articles bespeak the author's anxiety that the audience members have virtual free reign over the play. The author is limited to the fact that he must produce a play, at Smithfield, for a set period of time. Audience members, on the other hand, are free to be rowdy. The Articles hope to fix them in their seats, but the very anxieties to which the Articles speak invokes the image of a loud, hooting audience, clamoring over seat backs, scoffing at the action on stage. Indeed, the Articles themselves speak to the dirt, smell, and noise of the place. The Articles' attempt to fix the audience "in [their] place[s]" makes physical the anxiety the author has that the audience members will change their opinions over time. The Articles long for a well-behaved fellow who will keep the same

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157 Additional clauses here include that a man may judge for his friends if he paid for their seats, provided that he sees to it that they keep quiet, and the stipulation that a man's judgment "is not to get above his wit" (93).
judgment of a play some twenty years later (109-10). Of course, such steadfastness bespeaks a "virtuous and staid ignorance" (113), the author appreciates him because "Such a one the author knows where to find him" (114-15). This curious expression equates judgment, or opinion about the play, with the place of the author. The ruefulness of this passage, though, reflects the author's recognition that judgment always changes overtime. If judgment of the play is shaped by the decorum, by the text's attention to local circumstances, the literary place decorum delimits is never fully complete for two reasons: first, playgoers may change their minds as circumstances change and theater develops into its newest trend; second, the audience of the text is never determinate and thus the judgment or place of the text remains forever open to future readers. If we treat *Bartholomew Fair* as a printed text that can be reprinted for centuries to come, then the place of the play, the reader's judgment of it, never fully takes place. The "place" of the audience, its identity and opinion changes over time.

As the audience members change, so to do their names and their opinions. But because *Bartholomew Fair* is a commodity on the market, it can be traded infinitely. And because money is both anonymous and the great equalizer, the names on the other end of the contract of exchange should be irrelevant. Given that *Bartholomew Fair* was the first play Jonson wrote after *Catiline* (1611), which was a dismal failure but Jonson's highest hope, the author's attempt to control the audience members' judgments on his play is understandable. But the play's larger interest in contracts and the identity of those who fulfill the contracts asks us to read the Articles as a discourse on the problem of inability of the author to fix the names affixed to the contract that is the text. The exchange of
responsibility in the contracts in the body of the play, Winwife scratching out Cokes' name and replacing it with his own, and the play's emphasis on the ways that contracts are stretched out over time all magnify ten-fold in the Induction, which tries to come to terms with the fact that any man might enter the audience or take up the text and enter into contract with the author at any point in the future.

This exchangeability of names on the contract that is the text of *Bartholomew Fair* is authorized by one significant fact: the play is a product on the economic market. As a product on the market, the play is inherently "legitimate," underwritten by an implicit promise and intent of the fact it had an author. But it can change hands ad nauseum. And just like the purchasers of the product are replaceable and anonymous, so too the product always "misfires" and fails to fulfill authorial intention. The Induction mocks the Stage-keeper's complaints about what the play fails to include by explaining what the play offers instead.

Instead of a little Davy to take toll o' the bawds, the author doth promise a strutting horse-courser, with a leer drunkard [...]. And then for a Kindheart, the tooth drawer, a fine oily pig woman with her tapster to big you welcome, and a consort of roarers for music. A wise Justice of the Peace *meditant*, instead of a juggler with an ape. (121-27)

Here, the Articles note what the play substitutes for the certain qualities and personages the Stage-keeper demands. *Bartholomew Fair* brings the play up-to-date, mocks those who use Latin phrases (such as Overdo), and offers instead a "sweet singer of new
ballads" (128). One must not expect the dead Tarlton or ancient "sword-and-buckler age"; the present *Fair* offers modern equivalents, the going rate on the market.

The Induction insists that the play is a viable product on the market. Appropriately, this claim is consistent with the fair and market ethics, in which systems of equivalents are introduced by barter, exchange, and money economies. The Articles conclude with a plea from the author, who

> Prays you to believe his ware is still the same, else you will make him justly suspect that he that is o loath to look on a baby or an hobby horse here would be glad to take up a commodity of them, at any laughter or loss, in another place. (164-67)

Here, the author condemns those who would mock the "hobby horses" his play offers yet buy them another time in another place. His hobby horse, his play, is no different from the others even though it is on stage. The play is a "commodity," a "ware" on the same market as "a baby or an hobby horse." Here Jonson rejects the frame that distinguishes the play space from the real world. The play is a product just like any other on the capitalist market. And the system of exchange insures that the hobby horse on stage is subject to the same value system as a hobby horse sold in Smithfield or anywhere else. One is no better (or worse) than another simply because it's on stage.

In fact, the author has gone to special lengths to ensure that his ware is just the same as all the others on the market, as the Fair for which his *Fair* is supposed to be exchanged. The Scrivener observes that,
though the Fair be not kept in the same region that some here, perhaps, would have it, yet think that therein the author hat observed a special decorum, the place being as dirty as Smithfield and as stinking every whit. (159-63)

The Hope Theater, having doubled as a bull- and bear-baiting ring (Gurr 120), is likely saturated with stink just like Smithfield, a place teeming with animals executed and dressed on the spot (as well as being a popular site for dueling and public executions). Indeed, the Stage-keeper comes to the stage under the pretext of sweeping off apples from previous bear-baiting episodes, blurring the lines between the play, the place in which it takes place, and the fair world the play claims to represent. In context, the author suggests that, because the Fair has the same bad qualities as the Fair, the audience members get a good deal. For Bartholomew Fair, decorum reflects the kind of deal on the market. Decorum signals a fair trade. This trade returns the text to the world as a physical product on the market, a market that makes the play as open to exchange as husbands, hobby horses, words, and names. And this exchange is infinite. The Articles determine the terms of the exchange, but in so doing cast the play to a market of leveling forces in which exchange is never ceasing. As a contract, then, the literary text is never fulfilled. It looks to the future, but never finally takes place.

The Induction suggests that the text-as-commodity is in the world as a performative failure (or perpetual incompletion). Although the literary text can be traded, and revalued, ad infinitum, its place is still never entirely present. Judgment -- the play's take on decorum -- is infinitely deferred into the future. The play never fully takes place.
Even though the work of literature returns to the physical world in the form of a product and structured as an economic contract, its place is still not in the real world. The puppet play at the end of *Bartholomew Fair* clarifies exactly how the text-as-product relates to the world of the audience. In short, Littlewit updates *Hero and Leander* for modern audiences. Littlewit explains

As for the Hellespont, I imagine our Thames here; and then Leander I make a dyer's son about Puddle Wharf; and Hero a wench o' the Bankside, who going over one morning to old Fish Street, Leander spies her land at Trig stairs, and falls in love with her. Now I do introduce Cupid, having metamorphosed himself into a drawer [tapster], and he strakes Hero in love with a pint of sherry.

*(5.4.122-28)*

This updated version of *Hero and Leander* mocks the tastes of play audiences who prefer trashy city comedies to noble Greek and Roman ones (such as Jonson's *Cataline*). It also calls attention to the fact that, once it leaves the author's hands, it is loose upon the world, transforming in ways over which the author has little control. Like the (absent) printed text of Littlewit's play, the mockery of the Greek classic evokes as it laments the inaccessibility of authorial intention. The play is simply one more product on the market of exchange.\(^{158}\) But this does not mean that the play shares "the unities" with the present

\(^{158}\) And for all of his idiocy, Cokes is the one person to recognize this. Lamenting the loss of the toys he bought from Lantern, Cokes finds their replacements in the play. Hero shall be my fairing; but which of my fairings? Le' me see -- I' faith, my fiddle! And Leander my fiddlestick; then Damon my drum; and
world. The biggest joke of the puppet play is that the puppets transgress the play frame. They beat the puppet master and audience members over the heads, debate (and trounce) Puritain Zeal-of-the-Land Busy, argue with Cokes, and flash the audience. This behavior is, we are to understand, truly bad drama, one that makes a mockery of the profession (and gives dramatists such as Jonson such a bad name). And the puppet play also draws attention to the fact that the audience always takes the literary text out of the author's hands and mangles the contract he wishes to establish.

For Jonson, the second world does not take place, but it has a place in the real world as a product. This product is in the form of a de futuro contract, so it is always deferred; it never takes place. The text is in the real world insofar as it is a product on the market. Like the marriage license whose "length and breadth" Cokes wishes to gaze upon (1.5.39), the text is a physical product. The structure of this product, however, is that of a failed performative. In specific, it is structured like an economic de futuro contract. The futuricity of this contract, however, its iterability and the infinite exchange of names the contract faces, means that the contract is never fulfilled, and the play never finally takes place. Always a "bad deal" for the author, the text is nonetheless a contract for which the author is responsible; his name guarantees the contract that is the literary text on the open market, but the other end of the contract, the patrons, are infinitely exchangeable. After reading the Articles, the Scrivner reveals to the audience that, actually, it has already agreed to the contract he just read. He notes that they have put Pythias my pipe, and the ghost of Dionysius my hobby-horse.

(5.4.133-36)
The other characters in the play mock Cokes for his inability to keep track of his purchases as bad business sense; he is constantly losing money.
their "seals already (which is your money)" to the contract (Ind. 157-58). Now they must "add the other part of suffrage, your hands" (158-59) and clap, welcoming the play. The signature signifying audience members' acceptance of the contracted commodity the author offers is money. The contract that is the play is signed by the author and sealed by the audience and yet, it never takes place, even though the play is performed time and time again. In an analysis of the different epistemologies the play offers, Margaret Tudeau-Clayton argues that only two things are "out of place" in *Bartholomew Fair*: Justice Overdo and humanist education (for which Overdo stands). Tudeau-Clayton argues that humanist learning is deflected into the printed text, where it presumably is "in place." Certainly, given the play's inquiry into individuation, identity, and social place, the play is deeply concerned with being in place and out of place. One thing it cannot do, however, is to take place. And it is this tradition that Austin inherits when he notes, glibly, that performatives simply do not apply in a poem.
CHAPTER VII
"MELANCHOLY FOR THE MATTER"

In a characteristic fit of pique, Cokes seizes upon the idea of visiting Bartholomew Fair. Sensing that his chaperone Wasp is not enthusiastic about the idea, Cokes insists that the visit is predestined; "Numps, I will see it, Numps 'tis decreed. Never be melancholy for the matter" (1.5.89-90). In context, the "matter" about which Wasp is (supposedly) melancholic is the visit to the Fair. However, given that Cokes has just mistaken the (performative) point of the marriage license and demanded to see the "length and the breadth on 't" (1.5.39), Wasp may be melancholy for another matter: for the world in which language is something to be seen, something material with a length and breadth.

The term "melancholy" appears four times in *Bartholomew Fair*. This is not terribly surprising given that the play is preoccupied with the humors, one of which (black bile) is understood to be directly responsible for melancholy. However, melancholy does not appear in the context of humors or the game of vapors in *Bartholomew Fair*. Rather, the term exclusively refers to the inadequacies of language. Mooncalf thinks that Arthur Bradley (Justice Overdo in disguise) must be melancholy because "nobody talks to him" (2.4.61). Likewise, Winwife assumes that Grace must be melancholy because she stands alone, outside the circle of conversation (3.4.69). Melancholy is not only a response to being left out of the conversation; it is also a
function of the lack of words more generally. Observing an obviously uncomfortable Mrs. Overdo, Captain Whit inquires "Art tou melancholy?" (4.4.191-92). Whit's interpretation is reasonable, Mrs. Overdo concedes, given the chaotic "enormities" taking place around them, but Mrs. Overdo's condition is due to another reason, one which she "cannot with modesty speak of" (197). Fortunately for Mrs. Overdo, Whit interprets her embarrassment correctly and helps her find a chamber pot. The sheer physicality of Mrs. Overdo's troubles emphasizes how curious it is that, in a play preoccupied with humors, vapors, and bodily effluvia, melancholia is a linguistic matter, not a bodily one.

There is a long history of literary melancholia. In her classic *The Gendering of Melancholia* (1992), Julia Schiesari historicizes melancholia as a masculinist position that values creative genius while denigrating women's depression. Petrarch, for instance, finds creative inspiration in his unrequited love, and Ficino revises the Saturnine tradition to signal the great, individualistic man who receives the desire to seek truth and the gift of writing from the gods. Thus it is to be expected that an early modern text that examines masculine practices of individuation ("vapors") would consider melancholia. But in Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair*, melancholy suggests a new linguistic problem. It is less interested in melancholy as a principle of individuation in terms of human identity than as an indication of the inadequacy of language. For *Bartholomew Fair*, melancholy signals a linguistic absence, particularly the absence of "matter" in language.

159 All humors have ruling planets, and melancholy's is Saturn. See Schiesari's chapter two for more details.
THE MATTER FOR MELANCHOLY

In his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Robert Burton (1621, 1651)\(^{160}\) considers the possibility that logic is medicinal. At the end of section 1.2.3.2, he asserts "And, therefore, to conclude that which I first intended, to be base by birth, meanly born, is no such disparagement. And thus have I proved what I had to prove" (507). This announcement is no less surprising to Burton's reader than to mine; this starting conclusion comes after a lengthy and meandering tirade, most recently about how the many mental faculties a man might have. In eleven pages, Burton uses logic to persuade men from being melancholy due to poverty or servitude. Emphasizing that he has proven his point, Burton suggests he has cured young men of this malady. And yet, simply because Burton can use logic to prove that poverty need not be a cause of melancholy does not mean that listening to this tirade produces actual medical benefits to the reader's body. In this lengthy text, a common book of every word of wisdom on the subject of melancholy, Burton establishes that melancholia can be a medical condition, a humoral imbalance (1.2.5.2. and the whole section on "particular causes"). And yet, he claims to solve this disease with logic, by proving it wrong. The joke here is that logic and the medicinal body are supposed to belong to two different systems; the medical body might be arranged logically, but logic doesn't work a medicinal cure on a body. Burton invokes the categorical distinction between logic and the body as carelessly as a joke.

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\(^{160}\) Burton's *Anatomy* went through several editions between the first 1621 Folio and the 1651 (post.) edition; for the sake of simplicity and the substantive editorial apparatus, I use the Dell and Jordan-Smith edition (1927) based on the 1651 edition. A full-length scholarly chapter would compare the original 1621 with 1651 editions.
At its broadest, this dissertation inquires into Early Modern methods of categorization that determine relationships between rhetoric and literature and the world, between logic and medicine. Just as these relationships undergo changes in fields we now call physics, cartography, and economics, so too do they shift in the practice of taxonomy itself, particularly as expressed in botany, zoology, and logic. Like cartography, biological and zoological taxonomies lose narrative, their linguistic dimension, in favor of purely visual characteristics and family relationships. As M.M. Slaughter observes in *Universal languages and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth century* (1982), seventeenth-century scientific taxonomies largely emphasize visual characteristics (such as dissections) and abstract the specimen from its context. Sixteenth-century folk taxonomies, on the other hand, include narrative, mythological history, moral and mystical interpretations, emblems, and medicinal uses (see Appendices Di and Dii.) The scientific and logical taxonomic methodologies themselves, Slaughter explains, are stripped of narrative, of time, and of context. Ultimately, these changes facilitate the project of developing a universal language based in Nature's own divisions (Descartes), using self-defined words to define the anatomy and nomenclature of "discrete objects" (43).

Arriving at such a clear categorical distinction as between the medical body and logic, Burton's *Anatomy* reads like a scientific and logical taxonomy. (The difference between the two is that logical taxonomy is, after Ramus, dialectical.) The *Anatomy*
exemplifies the Renaissance encyclopedic tradition. Like Francis Bacon's *The Proficiency of Advancement of Learning* (1605), the *Anatomy* is a compendium of knowledge from across the disciplines. Burton's *Anatomy* progresses by systematically and dialectically dividing the condition of melancholy into its constitutive parts: its symptoms, causes, and cures; its causes natural and supernatural: its primary and secondary natural causes; etc. Burton progresses by division and definition, and he includes tables as visual aids for the categories he employs. This method leads critics such as Karl Josef Höltingen, Walter Ong, and David Renaker to consider Burton as an inheritor of the Ramist tradition. Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) was a French logician who revolutionized logic and rhetoric by shifting *inventio* to logic and definitively reducing rhetoric to ornamentation. For Ramus, dialectic is fundamental to all other curriculum subjects -- even physics and mathematics -- because it provides the method for revealing the truth about the natural world. Burton's dialectical, schematic methodology would, for Ramus, exhibits the truth of nature by including all pertinent details. Logical division systematically treats each category in which nature manifests. As Burton's authorial persona Democritus Jr. remarks, "Proceed now from the parts to the whole or from the whole to [the] parts, and you shall find no other issue, the parts shall be

161 See Samuel G. Wong's "Encyclopedism in *Anatomy of Melancholy*" for a summary of this tradition.

162 Walter Ong characterizes Ramus' dialectic as "a concatenation [...] of definitions and divisions" (188).

163 As with Agricola, for whom rhetoric is only "concerned somehow with ornamentation" (Ong 103), Ramist rhetoric is limited to "the variety of tropes, figures and numbers" and poetry (189). Everything beyond "meaning" is "ornament" (191).
sufficiently dilated" (64). Indeed, prefacing each book is a chart dialectically dividing the condition of melancholy into its constitutive parts: its symptoms, causes, and cures; its causes natural and supernatural; its primary and secondary causes; etc. (see Appendix E).

As thorough as the book and its charts claim to be, however, the Anatomy is more than a little nervous about its methodology. The narrator is concerned both that he says too much and that he says too little. The Anatomy reads like a commonplace book; it includes virtually everything said about melancholy. At the beginning of Part II, Section iii, Member i, the narrator remarks "I shall but repeat what has been done," citing a profusion of sources from Plato to Xeocrates to Boethius to Petrarch to Bernard (491). The Anatomy is 826 pages long in the 1651 edition, and the introductory "Democritus Jr. to the Reader" (nearly 100 pages long) is largely quotations (freely summarized) in Latin; "Democritus" calls it his "Cento," "patchwork." The Anatomy could hardly be more complete. And yet, the narrator is plagued by concerns of "tautological repetitions of all particulars" (70), of "confounded" distinctions (349), that it is "indecorous" for him to address love melancholy (356), and that, "anatomizing this surly humor, my hand [might] slip, as an unskillful prentice I [might] lance to deep, and cut through skin and all at unawares" (104). The Anatomy suggests that something about the taxonomic process is deadly to the body under dissection. Ultimately, the Anatomy discovers that as the infinite process of definition and division continues, and there are as many words as things in the universe, there is still a fundamental deficit to language.

Moreover, like Sidney's Defense, the Anatomy contains a multitude of contradictory opinions. For instance, the poem that prefaces the Anatomy offers two
different kinds of contradictions. First, the concluding couplets of the sestets ascribe mutually-contradictory attributes to melancholy. The couplets discover that nothing is as sweet, sad, sweet, sour, sweet, damn'd, sweet, harsh, sweet, fierce, divine, and damn'd as melancholy. The contradictions in the poem arise from the different dialectical oppositions the poet suggests. Sweet is opposed to sad, but also to sour, damn'd, and so forth, each opposition drawing from a different register (taste, theology, etc.). Second, the poet offers two contradictory truisms: "I'll not change my life with any King" and "I'll change my state with any wretch" (91, 99). The contradiction between these statements are between underlying assumptions; the first remark suggests that the speaker's life is too good to change with a king, and the second suggests that his life is so awful that he'd change places with even a wretch. Whereas *Utopia*'s contradictions indicate an ironic judgment and thus a fictional -- or at least not straightforward -- text, and the *Defense*'s simply indicate the breadth of possibility in a world of poesy, the contradictions in the *Anatomy* are a function of logic and taxonomic practices. As he narrates the anatomy of melancholy, Burton discovers that there is a context for every kind of melancholy; rather than distinguish melancholy, delimit its place, context produces a virtually infinite melancholy.

Melancholy is a universal condition, so it can be incongruous. For instance, Burton notes that poverty can be an antidote to melancholy (507) and also a prophylactic, whereas wealth leads to misery; "They spend their days in wealth, and go suddenly down to Hell" Burton explains (512), and those in Hell are the most miserable of all. And yet, poverty is also a cause of melancholy. Unlike unhappy poverty, "riches gather many
friends; all happiness ebs and flow with his money" (296). Wealth, poverty, and even happiness and unhappiness all fall under the same universalizing category of melancholy. Instead of distinguishing between subjects, methods of classification produce a world in which things are not themselves.

For one, Burton discovers that logic can produce absurd, but consistent, conclusions. For instance, Burton offers 23 pages of observations on the "Misery of Scholars" (259-82) and then, in an effort to cover the full spectrum of observations, proffers ten pages citing copious authorities to the effect that nothing is "so fit and proper to expell Idleness and Melancholy, as that of Study" (453). Taken with Burton's claim that men are scholars (a version of Ramus' claim that men are dialectic) (60), these opposed observations comprise a failed syllogism: all men are scholars, all scholars are melancholy, study cures melancholy.

Burton's goal is to anatomize melancholy. So, he has to figure out the best way to provide a comprehensive compendium. To this end, he compiles everything authorities have said about melancholy. He also uses logical division and dialectic to organize his material and to discover any categories still missing from the discussion, to round out the corners and fill out the holes as it were. He discovers, however, that Ramistic/logical dialectic is not sufficient; there are times when the details do not fall out in strict binaric categories. As David Renaker notes in "Robert Burton and the Ramist Method," the charts Burton provides have dialectic divisions for the first few branches, but then, he "suddenly produces" three, seven, nine, etc. subclasses. "After this, confusion reigns. [...] The attempt to dichotomize everything is in ruins" (212). The chart at the beginning of
Book I (Appendix 5) reveals, for instance, that there are seven "not necessary" natural, outward causes of melancholy. And there are three general, supernatural causes: God (immediately or secondarily), from the devil immediately ("with a digression of the nature of spirits and devils"), and witches/magicians (110). The shift here from dialectic to a more expansive method of categorization reflects a shift from Ramistic logic to the kinds of taxonomies called for by zoology and botany, in which multiple categories obtain: there are several subcategories of monkeys or oak trees.

Although both logic and science claim to define and describe the world, the two methods of classification are incongruous. The first takes a subject and divides it into the categories by which the subject may be defined fully. The second organizes already known details (i.e., species) in relation to one another. The first deconstructs, the second reconstructs. Logical division promises to partition the world into its appropriate categories with nothing left over. However, Burton finds that dialectic doesn't quite work; things that would be categorized as sweet, as opposed to sour, are different than those sweet things that would be opposed to sad things; considering all the possible categories to which every piece of data might belong, the world becomes an overwhelming tangle of interrelatedness that refuses pat dualisms. Frustrated that dialectic does damage to a complex world, Burton worries about having to "rip them [the

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164 Slaughter observes that "just as things are decontextualized and broken down into their parts, so too is language. "The words are objectified and analyzed into their component parts, i.e. their simple elements, and each element is given a distinguishing mark; they are then recomposed into the abstract paradigms of the taxonomic tables and then into artificial words" (10). What used to be a universe of figures, of words in relationship, becomes a world that particulate words can only attempt to represent.
causes of melancholy] all up" into dialectic categories (156). Logial taxonomy assumes that a whole can be cut into a number of discrete parts; a topic can be anatomized according to set categories just as a body can be divided into its organs. But one cannot cut a logical topic too deeply; division, dissection, promises the fullness of definition. A biological body, on the other hand, can be wounded; some divisions are harmful and the whole is not guaranteed to be restored. For Burton, this whole is the natural world, forever the missing center of increasingly copious language.

Whereas logic may progress through dichotomy, biology is more complex, requiring multiple categories (Slaughter 35-37). A biological or zoological taxonomy is comprehensive, but here Burton runs into another problem. Confronted with an immense pool of data, he is unable to create internally consistent categories. Burton notes that "no rule is so general which admits not some exception"; therefore, "custom is all" (200). For Burton, custom or decorum alone can construct the fundamental categories because, with so many exceptions, categories are mere constructions. This is a very real problem facing Early Modern biologists and zoologists. As Peter Fisher observes in "What's in a Hippopotamus? A Problem in Renaissance Taxonomy and Description," taxonomic categories are under reconstruction at the turn of the seventeenth century. The hippopotamus, previously a "fish" like crocodiles and beavers, moves to its "correct" classification as a quadrupedal beast only at the turn of the seventeenth century (194-197). Even though a hippopotamus has clearly identifiable parts -- feet, a specific shape, habitat, size, and need for air -- how those parts fit together to create a unified beast, categorized systematically in relationship to other unified beasts, is unclear.
Custom seems to be the only basis by which to make the judgment necessary to identify the whole that unifies the parts. The problem that Burton discovers is, in part, a problem of the relationship between examples and categories. How does one recognize when one moves from the level of genus and species to individuals, to examples of the category rather than a new division, a new branch of categorization? And after deconstructing melancholy such that everything is potentially melancholic, how does one reconstruct a picture of melancholy as a discrete category available for dissection?

Burton addresses these questions through the trope of a man's style. "Democritus" observes that man is nothing but his style. Emphasizing the encyclopedic nature of the *Anatomy*, Democritus Jr. observes that "We can say nothing but what has been said, the composition and method is ours only" (20). Unique to each author, method or style provides the one, fool-proof means for distinguishing between authors, for identifying the Burtonian "I." Style actually *reveals* the author for who he is; Burton notes that "our style bewrays us" as "hunters find their game by the trace" (21). The "game" in this metaphor is the "I," the subject, and style is its "tracks," the particulars by which we locate the individual subject. By analogy, one ought to be able to identify the "whole," such as a hippopotamus or melancholy, by its style, the way it expresses itself in the world.

Burton's sense that *copia* reveals style, which in turn reveals the "I," is consistent with other Early Modern rhetoricians' treatment of style in terms of authorial identity. Puttenham, for instance, notes that style is the "general" or "universal" that unites many particular words. "Stile is a constant and continual phrase or tenour of speaking and
writing, extending to the whole tale or process of the poeme or historie, and not properly to any piece or member of a tale: but is of words speeches and sentences together" (160). From "words and sentences," the close reader can apprehend the "image of man," his "minde."165

There is a long critical tradition that links literary style with the author's subject position. Morris Croll's observations in the 1930s that the Early Modern transition from the "Ciceronian" to the "Senecan" style of writing occurred in part because the "Senecan" style is better adapted to the immediate, experiencing mind remain the foundation for any investigation into Early Modern style.166 The critical preoccupation with the Early Modern linguistic subject continues to this day. Burton's very style reflects the argument his introduction makes: the author's style is a reflection (Croll), a refraction (Fish), and constitutive of (Fineman, Greenblatt) the writing subject. Recent critics have returned attention to the material effect of reading The Anatomy, and continue to attend to the ways that the subject materializes textual concerns. Mary Ann Lund, for instance,

165 Burton evinces a Puttenhamian, and Cartesian, subject; just as Puttenham notes that "man is but his minde" (161), Descartes observes famously "cogito ergo sum."

166 Joseph Mazzeo calls the "Ciceronian" style the "Asian" one, in order to expand its jurisdiction beyond Cicero. Mazzeo contrasts "Asian" style with the "Attic" one. The "Senecan" style predominates after the seventeenth century; it is characterized by parataxis, a "plain style," "brevity of [...] constructions [and a] resolved and analytic character" (4). Such a style is more appropriate, Senecan authors argue, for vernacular texts, scientific inquiry, and individual experience. Senecan style includes stylistic markers that indicate personal experience, and it is more faithful to the thinking mind. For instance, parataxis works through spontaneous shifts, suggesting a mind in thought; the Senecan style often employs figures of thought (rather than sound), end-linking, and qualification (rather than the carefully balanced incremental progression of ciceronian authors) (Mazzeo 113-115). Critics frequently cite Burton as an example of the "loose" Senecan style (in contrast to Ben Jonson's "curt" Senecan style).
reminds us that Burton intends his text as a palliative for the melancholic. Recent neo-formalist critics continue to detail the historically situated, rhetorical subject. As Sari Kivistö observe in her analysis of the development of Humanist stylistics against Scholastic ones, "[s]tylistic study means unmasking the speaker" (41).^168^ The problem that Burton discovers is that if we identify the man by the linguistic examples we have from him, by the categories by which we can anatomize him, and the taxonomic methods by which we can relate him to other subjects, then man is nothing more than a linguistic entity. As Stanley Fish argues in *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (1972), the center of Burton’s stylistic outpourings is the (missing) subject. The problem is that exhaustive definition and division ultimately fail to produce a coherent subject. (By "subject," I mean the man and melancholy.) And it is not only the human subject that is missing in the *Anatomy*. The natural world, too, is fundamentally absent from the language that purports to represent it.

After reading the *Anatomy*, one expects to be able to answer the simple question "what is melancholy?" The answer, in short, is that melancholy is everything. Discovering that the passions are a seat of melancholy, Burton considers each passion in turn; however, all divisions create melancholy, so the distinctions Burton suggests seem beside the point. Burton discovers that "there is no part [of the body] which does not

^167^ This is Lund’s argument in “Reading and the Cure of Despair in The Anatomy of Melancholy.”

^168^ See her *Epistolae obscurorum viorum* (1515-17) (2002). Kivistö observes that accusations of barbaric, obscene, loquacious, and flattering styles are not limited to writing style alone, but presuppose that such stylistic traits reveal authors’ moral failings, which can be exposed through critical analysis.
include melancholy" (228). In fact, vegetables, cities, and even inanimate entities can be considered melancholic (65). For Burton, there are three problems with this discovery: first, if melancholy means everything, then melancholy means nothing; second, if melancholy means nothing, than language ultimately fails; third, the distance between language and the world to which it is supposed to refer is a melancholic one.

As Burton "anatomizes" melancholy, breaks it down to its categorical bases, taxonomizes every possible atomistic detail, he finds himself ever further away from his (subject) matter. Attempts to get the world into the text, through, for instance, increasingly detailed description and taxonomization, through copia, only emphasize the sheer impossibility of a coterminous language and (real) world. The fundamental division between world and language/text, the Anatomy suggests, produces a universal linguistic melancholy. It is impossible to return from the details and examples he offers to the complete "whole," the "truth" identified with the scientifically defined physical world. The only thing Burton can recreate out of the details he has assembled is a world in which linguistic, taxonomic melancholy infects everything.

Burton diagnoses the separation of the word from the world, the missing world in the word, as a universal and universalizing melancholy. It is this melancholy that the Scientific Revolution codifies with its attempts to develop a universal "language" that bypasses all of the problems of language (such as homonyms; ultimately mathematics is the preferred language of the physical world). And it is this melancholy that Burton inherits in the form of a "dark ecology" and that ecocritics inherit as a nostalgic desire for the world beyond the words.
APPENDIX A

T-O MAP FROM THE *ETYMOLOGIAE* OF ISODORUS, 1472
APPENDIX B

CITYVIEW OF WELLS, THOMAS CHAUNDLER, EARLY 1460S
APPENDIX C

MAP OF UTOPIA, 1516 EDITION
APPENDIX D

MAP OF UTOPIA, 1518 EDITION
APPENDIX E
EXAMPLES OF FOLK TAXONOMY AND SCIENTIFIC TAXONOMY


Concerning Domestic Fowl who Bathe in the Dust -- The Chicken, Male and Female: Terminology; Synonyms; Differentiae of the Genus; The Form and Description of the Rooster and the Hen in their Genus; Anatomical Details; Sex; Sight and Taste; Voice and Song; Lustfulness, Coition, Parturition, Incubation, Generation, Egg-Laying; Rearing and Feeding; Nature, Habits and Character; Magnanimity and Fighting; Sympathy and Antipathy; The Diseases of Chickens; The Method of Catching Chickens; History; Presages; Derivates; Use in the Sacred Rites of the Pagans; Auguries and Prodigies; Mystical Interpretations; Moral Interpretations; Secret Signs (Hieroglyphics); Dreams; Emblems; Riddles; Epitaphs; Apopthegms; Proverbs; Fables; Apologies; Use in Medicine; Injurious Effects of Chickens; Use of the Chicken as Food; Various other Uses of the Chicken; Insignia, Images and Coins.


From a short tapering root, by no means fibrous, spring several stalks about 18 inches long: they straggle over the ground, and are cylindrical in shape and furrowed, becoming gradually white near the root with a slight coating of down, and spreading out into little sprays. The plant has but few leaves, similar to those of *Beta nigra,* except that they are smaller, and supplied with long petioles. The flowers are small, and of greenish yellow. The fruits one can see growing in large numbers close by the root, and from that point they spread along the stalk, at almost every leaf. They are rough and tubercles and separate into three reflexed points. In their cavity, one grain of the shape of an Adonis seed is contained; it is slightly rounded and ends in a point, and is covered with a double layer of reddish membrane, the inner one enclosing a white, farinaceous core.
## APPENDIX F

### SELECTION FROM INTRODUCTORY APPARATUS, BOOK ONE OF

### BURTON’S ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY

**Anatomy of Melancholy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Super-</th>
<th>Natural</th>
<th>General, as Mem. 1.</th>
<th>Outward, or adventitious, which are</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td>Congenitally, inward from</td>
<td>Old age, temperament, Sub. 5.</td>
<td>Necessary, see 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **As from God immediately, or by second cause, Sub. 7.**
- **Or from the devil immediately, with a digression of the nature of apostles and devils, Sub. 6.**
- **Or mediately by Magicians, Witches, Sub. 6.**

Primary as stars, proved by Apheronsus, signs from Physiognomy, Meteopsopy, Chiroscopy, Sub. 4.

### Particular to the three Species. See II.

- **Innate humour, or from distemper of the brain.**
  - A hot brain, corrupted blood in the brain.
  - Excess of Venery, or defect.
  - Aetna, or some pecunious disease.
  - Pains arise from the stomach, &c.

### Outward, or adventitious, which are

- **Contingent inward, attendant, nearest.**

  - Membr. 2.

  - Membr. 3.

### Outward, or adventitious, which are

- **In which the body works on the mind, and this malady is caused by precedent diseases; as agues, put, &c. or temperature insane, Sub. 4.**
- **Or by particular parts distempered, as brain, heart, spleen, liver, Mesenteric, Pylorus, stomach, &c. Sub. 2.**

### Particular to each. See III.

- **Innate humour, or from distemper of the brain.**
  - A hot brain, corrupted blood in the brain.
  - Excess of Venery, or defect.
  - Aetna, or some pecunious disease.
  - Pains arise from the stomach, &c.

### Outward, or adventitious, which are

- **Contingent inward, attendant, nearest.**

  - Membr. 2.

  - Membr. 3.

### Particular to each. See III.

- **As from God immediately, or by second cause, Sub. 7.**
- **Or from the devil immediately, with a digression of the nature of apostles and devils, Sub. 6.**
- **Or mediately by Magicians, Witches, Sub. 6.**

Primary as stars, proved by Apheronsus, signs from Physiognomy, Meteopsopy, Chiroscopy, Sub. 4.

### Particular to the three Species. See II.

- **Innate humour, or from distemper of the brain.**
  - A hot brain, corrupted blood in the brain.
  - Excess of Venery, or defect.
  - Aetna, or some pecunious disease.
  - Pains arise from the stomach, &c.

### Outward, or adventitious, which are

- **Contingent inward, attendant, nearest.**

  - Membr. 2.

  - Membr. 3.
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