

AN UNGOVERNABLE FORCE? FOOD NOT BOMBS, HOMELESS ACTIVISM  
AND POLITICS IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1988-1995

by

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## An Abstract of the Dissertation of

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ACTIVISM AND POLITICS IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1988-1995

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This study examines the interaction between two anarchist support groups for the homeless, Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails, and the city of San Francisco between 1988 and 1995. Food Not Bombs provides free meals in public spaces and protests government and corporate policies that harm the poor and homeless. Homes Not Jails is a sister group of Food Not Bombs that opens up unused houses and government buildings to provide housing for homeless residents.

During the period 1988-1995, two mayors, progressive Art Agnos (1988-1991) and conservative Frank Jordan (1992-1995), mass-arrested members of Food Not Bombs for distributing food in city parks without a permit, handing out over 1,000 arrest and citations to members of the group in that eight year period. While squatting would seem to be a graver offense than distributing free food, Homes Not Jails was treated far more leniently by city officials during the Jordan administrations. I trace the difference in

treatment of the two groups to the fact that Food Not Bombs engages in anarchist direct action in public space, while Homes Not Jails does so in private residences. The public nature of Food Not Bombs made them a visible threat to order to both Agnos and Jordan and one they had to confront and stop.

While both mayoral administrations persecuted Food Not Bombs, they treated the organization in different ways, which derived from different conceptions of the cause of homelessness. Agnos saw homelessness as a result of structural inequalities and economic conditions and viewed state welfare programs as the only way to address the problem. In response to Food Not Bombs he tried to incorporate them into the broader charity apparatus of the state, and when that failed he used the police to force them into “negotiated management” with the city. Jordan saw homelessness as a criminal and public safety problem and wanted to use the police to clean and reclaim the city for wealthier residents and tourists. Jordan saw Food Not Bombs as a threat to public order and tried to use his police force to exclude the group from public space.

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## CHAPTER I

### UNDERSTANDING URBAN REGIMES, HOMELESS POLITICS AND ACTIVISM IN AMERICAN CITIES

On a late afternoon in October of 2009 in San Francisco's United Nations Plaza street vendors are closing down their shopping carts, packing their goods, and getting ready to go home. The plaza is filled with trucks, boxes, tables, and around thirty homeless people, who are either sleeping on the grass or arguing on concrete makeshift benches.<sup>1</sup> In the background the gold domed city hall glistens, in stark contrast to the destitute sitting on the wet grass. Around nightfall four people show up on bikes carting plastic buckets of soup and a large black plastic bag filled with two-day old bread and bagels. Even with the street vendors clogging much of the square, a queue forms of about thirty-five homeless folks, traveler punks, and local activists. "John,"<sup>2</sup> an off-again on-again homeless man, hands out a small flier about the organization Food Not Bombs, while on the concrete slab next to which the group has set up their soup, salad, and utensils lies a pile of activist "zines" and fliers. Of the people serving soup today, most are relatively new to the Bay Area. For instance "Jane" is a transplant from Oregon who has been serving food for the last three years on Tuesdays in U.N. Plaza. She has a huge "dessert first!" patch on her jacket (figure 1) parodying not only Food Not Bombs'

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<sup>1</sup> There once were real benches in the park but Mayor Willie Brown decided to remove them as way to force the homeless from the plaza through "environmental" engineering. Without benches most people—homeless and not—have to find concrete ledges or the moist grass to sit on.

<sup>2</sup> For those who have not given me permission to use their real names, I will use pseudonyms to protect their identity. Pseudonyms will always be in quotes.

iconoclastic image of a fist clenching a carrot (figure 2) but also Earth First!, the radical direct-action environmental group.



**Figure 1: Dessert First Logo**



**Figure 2: Food Not Bombs Logo**

Today's food serving, much like every serving since 1999, goes on without a hitch.<sup>3</sup> The closest scenario comes to a police interaction is when a "sergeant" with the local Salvation Army, dressed in faux military attire, asks the food servers what church they are with. He walks away dumbfounded after hearing the servers express that "we"

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<sup>3</sup> The last time the police in San Francisco harassed Food Not Bombs was a few months before the 2000 mayoral election. According to longtime Food Not Bombs activist Chris Crass, the outcry from the peace, animal rights, religious, and homeless rights groups in the city was enormous and within a day all charges were dropped.

are not with any church but are serving food as a protest to militarism, unjust gentrification, and the city's hostility towards the homeless.

From 1988 to 1996, Food Not Bombs' food servings were not nearly as quiet. During that period over a thousand Food Not Bombs activists were arrested or cited for distributing food without a permit, violating a court injunction, or resisting arrest. At certain public feedings, rows of riot cops would line up around tables (figures 3-4) counting the number of people fed. After 25 people were fed, the maximum number of people allowed without a permit, the police would arrest the servers, throw the food away and confiscate the group's table, magazines, and banners. Humorous stories abound of Food Not Bombs activists jumping into the Civic Center fountain to avoid being arrested and ladling soup knee-deep in water, just outside the reach of an enraged officer.<sup>4</sup> The arrests and claims of harassment came to a head in 1995, following the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the United Nations in San Francisco, when Amnesty International classified Food Not Bombs arrestees as "prisoners of conscience."


The present study looks at the acts of resistance by the homeless community and their radical allies in Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails, and uses their actions as a means of highlighting the impact of grassroots, radical activism on urban politics. The study asks why a supposedly liberal city has gone to such great lengths to harass an activist group serving vegetarian food to homeless people. In a country that, according to Loïc Wacquant (2009), services the poor and needy through a "charity state," it would

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<sup>4</sup> The fountain has since been removed, and signs are posted throughout the Civic Center claiming "distributing food without a permit is forbidden." Both the fountain removal and the placing of the signs were done in response to the actions of Food Not Bombs.

seem that Food Not Bombs would be recognized as another charity organization filling a niche. Instead, Food Not Bombs has been treated as a hostile enemy, and has faced arbitrary and routine harassment by the police, illegal surveillance, and arrest. I argue that Food Not Bombs—by engaging in direct action, by striving to empower the homeless, and by evincing a resolute vision and spirit—lays bare the contradictions and injustice associated with San Francisco urban politics.

This chapter first provides an introduction into contemporary anarchism, followed by a brief history and account of Food Not Bombs. Third, it examines liberal, neoconservative, and anarchist responses to homelessness. The chapter concludes with an outline of the study.



**Figure 3: Riot Cops in Front of Food Not Bombs Service, 1988**



**Figure 4: Riot Cops at a Food Not Bombs Protest During the UN50th Anniversary**

### 1. Understanding an Anarchistic Conception of Politics

Anarchism is not a concept that can be locked up in a word like a gravestone. It is not a political theory. It is a way of conceiving life, and life...is not something final: it is a stake we must play day after day. (Bonanno 1996)

The WTO protest in Seattle in 1999 was for the media, academics and the average American anarchism's coming-out party. Before Seattle, anarchism was considered a dead, or dying, political ideology more commonly trumpeted on punk rock t-shirts and patches than expressed in the streets. Seattle changed that perception. After Seattle, anarchist activism, and more importantly the anarchists who used black bloc tactics,

dominated media images and discussions.<sup>5</sup> To the media, these anarchists appeared out of nowhere: however anarchism did not reemerge like a phoenix from Emma Goldman's grave, but their presence at Seattle represented over a decade of grassroots organizing throughout the country. Their efforts formed the backbone of contemporary anarchist movements: the 200 known U.S. chapters of Food Not Bombs; the countless community infoshops and collectively run squats; and the extensive direct action networks without which the Battle in Seattle would never have occurred. Seattle was the culmination of the dedicated hard work and advances that occurred within the anarchist network; it showed that anarchists could organize and disrupt politics as usual.

Yet, the images and discussion that followed the 1999 Seattle protest produced a misconception and stereotype that plagues anarchism. Anarchism, in its simplest terms, attempt to maximize individual and community autonomy and liberty; it does not include the mindless chaos, violence, disorder, or destruction that is commonly associated with the term. To maximize autonomy and liberty, anarchists wish to replace state institutions with consensual agreement, a return to spontaneous face-to-face relationships, and a “Do It Yourself” (DIY) ethic that promotes personal and community responsibility and empowerment.

Following the 1999 battle in Seattle anarchism, a political philosophy once thought dead, has become a guiding force within the globalization, environmental, and social justice movements of the United States (Epstein 1991; Graeber 2002; Day 2005; Gordon 2008). The influence of anarchism is seen in the revival of direct action as a

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<sup>5</sup>A black bloc consists of activists dressed in black with faces covered, engaging in prolonged street battles with the police, destruction of corporate owned property, and the “unarrest” of people. Their garb ensures a certain sense of anonymity and also offers a visual statement of solidarity.



political tactic within the environmental movement, in the presence of the black bloc during anti-globalization protests, and in the use of affinity groups and consensus-decision making within the social justice movement.

Contemporary anarchist politics centers around two dominant concepts: (1) elimination of domination and (2) prefigurative politics. Anarchist praxis and organization flows from these two central values, which will be examined next.

#### a. Confronting Domination: Politics Beyond Class

Early radical thinkers, from Marx and Bakunin to Lenin and Kropotkin, viewed economic class as the central category of social life. For Marx and Lenin, it was working class identity that mattered, while Bakunin and Kropotkin saw the general poor (both proletariats and “lumpenproletariats”) as the motivating force for revolutionary change. For most of the 20<sup>th</sup>, and now 21<sup>st</sup> century, Marxists have placed economic class as the central category of life, while anarchists, starting with anarcha feminists Emma Goldman and Voltairine de Cleyre, moved away from a class reductionist politics towards a more holistic understanding of domination. For Goldman and de Cleyre, patriarchy along with classism was part of the logic of domination that anarchists struggled against. By the late 1960s, most anarchists claimed to generally oppose hierarchies, largely due to the influence of Murray Bookchin's book *The Ecology of Freedom* (1982), which argued that the human-caused devastation of the natural world was an epiphenomenal result of hierarchical human relations (Bookchin 1991). This hierarchy includes the domination of men over women, elders over youth, bosses over employees, and masters over slaves.

In more recent decades anarchism has moved away from a discourse of hierarchies toward a language of “confronting domination.” Domination in this sense, expands to other political categories, and envisions coercive power as existing in diffuse multidimensional forms. Within this post structural understanding of power there exists no single issue or root cause of social strife. Instead, there are multitudes of dominating systems to struggle against. The diffuse understanding of domination

is often expressed in reference to a number of overarching “forms”, “systems” or “regimes” of domination—impersonal sets of rules, regulating relationships between people—rules which are not autonomously constituted by those individuals placed within the relationship (including the dominating side. (Gordon 2008: 33)

Here domination is seen as a totality of oppressive norms, codes, and relationships currently existing within a society. The disciplinary power of domination allows for the internalization of political power, which is why people embrace oppressive and dominating actions as normal and natural. This understanding also “draws attention to the multiplicity of partial overlaps between different experiences that are struggled against” (Gordon 2008: 32). This allows for “a multidimensional analysis of oppression,” which is “crucial to any effort to oppose, subvert or offer alternatives to the neoliberal world order” (Day 2005: 184).

Also included in the anarchistic understanding of domination is the idea of “infinite responsibility.” This concept, according to Day “means that as individuals and as groups, we can never allow ourselves to think that we are ‘done,’ that we have identified all of the sites, structures and processes of oppression ‘out there’ and, most crucially, ‘in here,’ inside our own individual and group identities”(Day 2005). By claiming that the list of oppression and sites of domination are radically open, an

anarchistic politics that believes in an “infinite responsibility” allows individuals and groups to name and locate the systems of domination that impact their own lives.

In short, the logic of domination that guides current anarchistic politics argues that a diffuse network of systems of oppression is operating within the current world. This network, much like anarchist organizing principles is centerless, resulting in no obvious location against which to focus resistance. Instead, countless systems of domination exist; the wage system, heteronormativity, patriarchy, white supremacy, and anthropocentrism are represented by many institutions (the church, the state, the “free” market, the family, etc). In this regard, contemporary anarchistic movements struggle against multiple institutions and work to form alternative, liberatory institutions, for all aspects of social, political, and economic life.

#### b. Prefiguring Politics, Dual Power, and Temporary Autonomous Zones

Prefigurative politics is the attempt to live out political desires through present tense actions, where the means of political action also become the ends. Therefore a prefigurative form of politics for people concerned with equality, antiauthoritarianism, protecting the natural world, and smashing patriarchy and the state, would seek actions that express their political desires. They might promote consensus decision-making, rotation of positions, a vegan lifestyle; they also might craft an anti-oppression agreement, and reject electoral politics. Within the prefigurative framework, acting hierarchically in order to create a hierarchy-free world, or using violence to create a nonviolent world, is antithetical to ethical action. In short, to paraphrase the International Workers of the World (I.W.W) slogan, prefigurative politics attempts to

create a new world in the shell of the old; its practitioners are not acting to create a revolution but living as if the revolution has already happened.

Prefigurative politics were seen at the Anti-Globalization protests in Seattle "when protesters chanted 'this is what democracy looks like'." Graeber reminds us that "they meant to be taken literally. In the best tradition of direct action, they not only confronted a certain form of power, exposing its mechanisms and attempting literally to stop it in its tracks: they did it in a way which demonstrated why the kind of social relations on which it is based were unnecessary" (Graeber 2004: 84). According to Day a prefigurative politics also resides with in "RTS [reclaim the streets], IMC [independent media collective], neighbourhood assembly, Social Centre, Food Not Bombs, land and factory occupation—all of these tactics consciously defy the logic of reform/revolution by refusing to work through the state, party, or corporate forms" (Day 2005: 44-45). These organizations and tactics not only create temporary autonomous spaces but because they prefigure the world the activists want to form, they also serve as a form of propaganda by the deed.<sup>6</sup> In fact, they serve as "the most effective form of anarchist propaganda" (Gordon 2008).

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<sup>6</sup> Commonly, propaganda by the deed is associated with acts of violence. This is generally the result of Bakunin and Sorel's influence within anarchist history but is not categorically the case. In general, propaganda by the deed refers to any action that is meant to inspire others to act in a similar way. As an example, consensus decision-making can serve as an example for other groups to follow, and therefore the deed or action itself serves as the form of propaganda.

### c. Anarchist Tactics: Does Direct Action Get the Goods?

The terms “civil disobedience” and “direct action” are generally used as synonyms but in fact are fundamentally different.<sup>7</sup> Civil disobedience is most commonly associated with Henry James Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. At the core of Thoreau’s concept of civil disobedience is the individualistic rejection of an immoral act as an attempt to remove individual culpability. To Thoreau this process was individualistic and the impact of the act was unimportant. For this reason Thoreau rejected collective and organized actions, even though he was aware of the abolitionists and antiwar movement.

For both Gandhi and King, civil disobedience incorporates a strongly collective character; the intended goal of civil disobedience moves away from the desire to purge the sins of the individual to highlighting the injustice and immoral nature of a law or social convention. The Gandhi and King version of civil disobedience as a collective act has become the accepted norm for U.S. activists, partly due to their success in using the tactic and partly due to the strong norm against political violence that exists within the U.S. Following Gandhi and King, civil disobedience can be viewed as an individual or collectively organized act of symbolic resistance intended to highlight the immoral nature of a specific law or social practice, in hopes that the government will address the issue. Inherent in the logic of civil disobedience is the belief that politicians and CEOs, as well as the general public, are concerned with acting morally. For example, civil disobedience against the Bush administration's "wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan presuppose that

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<sup>7</sup> The definitions of the two terms I provide will be the "pure" sense of the term. In real life nothing ever fits with these pure categories. As such, actions or groups should be seen as being "more generally" direct-action or civil disobedience, and actions should be seen to exist within a spectrum.

President Bush and Vice President Cheney did not know their actions were morally reprehensible and assumes that upon realizing this, they would stop the war. Finally, in the case of civil disobedience it is impossible to eliminate a religious element. Thoreau, Gandhi, King, and members of the Catholic Workers, and American Friends (all of which engaged in self-described acts of civil disobedience) were all religious individuals and their discussions of their actions—their reasons for them, and their moral legitimacy—are always interwoven with religious iconography and discourse.

Direct action, on the other hand, emerges from the anarchist movement and was intended to illustrate a direct and unmediated form of political action that was outside the bounds of electoral politics. According to David Graeber in *Direct Action: An Ethnography*

direct action is the insistence, when faced with structures of unjust authority, on acting as if one is already free. One does not solicit the state. One does not even necessarily make a grand gesture of defiance. Insofar as one is capable, one proceeds as if the state does not exist. (Graeber 2008: 201)

Put in other words, direct action is the immediate addressing of a problem through embodied action that occurs outside the institutional channels that does not appeal to the government to solve the problem.

Taking these definitions into account, the sit-ins that occurred during the 1960s civil rights movement would serve as an example of civil disobedience. The actions were coordinated events intended to highlight the immoral and unjust nature of Jim Crow segregation. Their intended goal was to pressure the Federal government to intervene in southern segregation and promote equal access to housing, work, and the right to vote. On the other hand, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense campaign of police

monitoring can be seen as a form of direct action. They followed police officers, often with visible loaded guns and dressed in leather militaristic looking uniforms as a way of directly stopping police harassment in their neighborhoods they placed their bodies in the way of police officers. The goal here was not to get the Federal or state governments involved in monitoring the officers but rather to embody some form of community control and autonomy.

In general, anarchist direct action can be put into one of two categories: defensive-destructive versus creative. The first category would include: tree-sit campaigns in the Cascadian forests, the blockade of the Olympia harbor by antiwar activists in Washington State, the burning of a biotech laboratory at a Midwest school and the assassination of a political or business leader. All of these actions can be seen as either obstructing an ongoing action or an attempt to subvert an established institution. The destructive and obstructivist actions by anarchistic groups have received the vast majority of academic and media attention, as highlighted by the mainstream media reporting at the Seattle protests in 1999. These actions are highly visible, actively confront state and corporate power, and because of this they are more noticeable by the media.

The creative forms of direct action, on the other hand, commonly go unreported. Most of these actions are not openly visible, often require investigation to find, and often do not openly confront the state.<sup>8</sup> These constructive forms of direct action are the “dual

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<sup>8</sup>This does not mean that the constructive forms of direct action never come into conflict with state concerns or actions. Oftentimes when constructive direct action leads to conflict, that conflict is instigated by the state.

power” institutions constructed by anarchists to encroach and weaken the power of the current state. One example is the countless anarchist "Free Schools" throughout the country that feature skill sharing and educational experiences outside of institutionalized educational spaces.

In short, what the media picks up on are the "emergent" moments of anarchistic movements. What gets forgotten are the "submerged" periods (Melucci 1989), the times and places where constructive anarchistic project are developed and implemented. The constructive aspects of anarchistic direct action easily get swept into the background of urban spaces, into the cracks in the pavement and empty warehouses where resistance is nourished. Instead, the media focus on anarchistic "riots," the AIDS die-in, the obstructivist bicyclists of critical mass, and the tree-sits and arsons by eco anarchists in the Pacific Northwest.

#### d. Anarchist Organizing: Networks and Affinity Groups

Anarchist groups promote a network structure for macro scale organizing and the "affinity group" model for the micro level. Organizing in such a way maximizes individual autonomy, and promotes empowerment and the decentralization of power and tactics. Jeff Juris in *Networking Futures: The movements against corporate globalization* (2008) provides an in-depth description of network organizing through ethnographic accounts of the formation and maintenance of the Peoples' Global Action (PGA), World Social Forum (WSF), and the network structure found in the Streets of Genoa.<sup>9</sup> Juris

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<sup>9</sup> Genoa, Italy, was the site of one of the largest G8 protests in 2001. Genoa became well known, not only because of the hundreds of thousands of protesters, but also because of the violence committed by Italian police. Genoa was the location of the first protest death, as Italian police shot and killed anti-capitalist protester Carlo Giuliani.



sees the logic of networks played on three different levels: technologically, organizationally, and normatively. The technological component refers to developments, like the Internet, which allow for communication to be conducted over long distances. These technological changes have decentralized communication systems, freed the flow of information, and limited the power of "gatekeepers." Technological networks are not unique to anarchistic movements, though they have been successfully used by anarchistic groups to coordinate political actions. In this regard, Juris claims that anarchistic groups are "using the networking tools and logic of contemporary global capitalism to challenge global capitalism itself" (Juris 2008: 2). Every tool is a weapon if it is held right.

In discussing the organizational component of networks, Juris quotes at length the Russian anarchist Voline, who during the Russian revolution called for a network organization versus the top-down dictatorial structure of Lenin. Voline wrote,

the principle of organization must not issue from a center created in advance to capture the whole and impose itself upon it but on the contrary, it must come from all sides to create nodes of coordination, natural centers to serve all these points. (Juris 2008: 10)

The foundational components of network organizing include decentering of power, rejection of hegemonic politics, and creation of nodes and nodules which serve as entrance points into the network. In practice:

Networking logic has given rise to what many activists in Spain and Catalonia refer to as "a new way of doing politics." By this they mean more of organizing involving horizontal coordination among autonomous groups, grassroots participation, consensus decision making, and the free and open exchange of information . . . The objective becomes enhanced "connectivity" and horizontal expansion by articulating diverse movements within flexible, decentralized information structures that facilitate transnational coordination and communication. (Juris 2008: 14)

This method can be compared to the "command-oriented logic of traditional parties and unions" which "involves recruiting new members, developing unified strategies, pursuing political hegemony, and organizing through representative structures" (Juris 2008: 14). In short, network organizing has no center and instead decentralizes power to a series of nodes. These nodes serve as entrance points into the network and generally maintain a strong sense of autonomy. Deleuze and Guattari defined this form of structure as rhizomatic (referencing to the diffuse root structure of grasses).

Finally, the normative component of anarchistic networking makes it radically different from corporate, governmental, and reactionary networks. "Networks are not inherently democratic or egalitarian, and they may be used for divergent ends," Juris points out, "the differences among these networks are related not so much to the technologies or forms as to the norms: their guiding values and goals" (Juris 2008: 17). The norms associated with anarchistic networking are: autonomy, direct action, direct democracy, and federations (Juris 2008: 15). These norms are key values associated with anarchistic politics.

If the macro scale is defined by a network mode of organizing, the affinity group is the central organizing principle of anarchistic micro politics. The affinity group model has been influential in U.S. activism since the 1970s when the antinuclear movement, learning from the successful organizing by Spanish anarchists during their civil war, embraced the concept. The affinity group is "autonomous, communal and directly democratic" and, according to Bookchin, "combines revolutionary theory with revolutionary lifestyle in its everyday behavior. It creates a free space in which revolutionaries can remake themselves individually, and also as social beings" (Bookchin

1971: 221, italics in original). In short, an affinity group is a small collective, no larger than fifteen people, who share a common vision and tactical repertoire. The smallness of the affinity group is meant to promote direct democracy, limit marginalization, and maximize effectiveness, while maintaining respect for difference and autonomy. In addition, the small size allows affinity groups to resist police and intelligence infiltration because of the strong connections between members and the difficulty of joining an already existent affinity group. Even when police do infiltrate an affinity group “there is no central apparatus to provide the infiltrator with an overview of the movement as a whole” (Bookchin 1971: 222). The size of the affinity group also limits free riding, as that problem typically gets worse as the collective size increases (Olson 1965).

The logic of affinity is, as Day mentions, similar to Gilles Deleuze's understanding of "becoming minor," the idea that people need to conceive of ways of thinking that are "minor" and non majoritarian. The logic of affinity then is about rejecting integration, remaining autonomous, and rejecting colonization. In this respect, "thinking outside the logic of integration, being a minority does not appear as a reason to attempt a hegemonic reversal of one's relationship to the majority. Rather it motivates the construction of spaces that are more fully majoritarian" (Day 2005: 206). This idea of "becoming minor" is foundational to the anti hegemonic politics found within anarchistic politics.

Overall, what we see with contemporary anarchism is a marked and drastic shift from the classical anarchism of Kropotkin, Bakunin, and Goldman. This new anarchism is more concerned with engaging in a prefigurative form of politics, in constructing

alternative institutions instead of organizing for popular revolution, and in constructing a horizontal and pluralist politics instead of a hegemonic one. Without a proper discussion of contemporary anarchism and its evolution over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, observers would be confused as to what form of political Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails represent. These groups are situated within the discourse of anarchism and an ideal representation of contemporary anarchist politics, but can easily be seen as a “new social movements,” which can drastically alter an analysis and interpretation of the group’s actions.

## 2. Feeding the Revolution? A Short history of Food Not Bombs:

Food Not Bombs emerged from the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s when peace and community activists from the Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook in New England organized a bake sale to raise legal funds for Brian Feigenbaum, an activist charged with assaulting an officer during a May 24, 1981 political protest. The activists dressed as generals and sold pastries on Boston streets claiming the donated money was going to fund new military equipment (McHenry and Butler 2005).<sup>10</sup> Though not many brownies were sold, the group realized that combining food and street theater brought attention to their cause. After Brian's release, the group organized a mock 1930s soup kitchen in front of the First National Bank of Boston shareholders’ meeting.<sup>11</sup> The mock soup kitchen became a real soup kitchen as at least fifty homeless and hungry people

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<sup>10</sup> They would always carry a banner that stated "I'm waiting for the day when schools get all the money they need and the Air Force has to hold a bake sale for a bomber."

<sup>11</sup> Many of the shareholders were responsible for funding the Seabrook plan.

stopped by for food and to protest the shareholders' involvement in nuclear power (McHenry and Butler 1992; McHenry and Butler 2005). By the end of that action, Food Not Bombs had been formed, though at the time no one knew it.

Following the shareholders' action, members of the group began squatting in a house on Harvard Street and soliciting food donations from health food stores. The group collected distressed food<sup>12</sup> daily and provided it to Rose's Place, a battered women's shelter, as well as to drug rehab clinics, homeless service groups, immigrant rights organizations, and other progressive and left-wing service organizations. Every Monday in Harvard Square they would provide a vegan meal for all who were hungry, while also distributing literature about military interventions, nuclear weapons, and social and military policy (McHenry and Butler 2005).

During this period Food Not Bombs was active in the local peace movement. They helped organize both the June 12, 1982, "March for Nuclear Disarmament" in New York City, and the "Free Concert for Nuclear Disarmament" in May of 1982 in Boston. They also worked closely with the Cambridge City Hall in organizing antinuclear "days of action" in conjunction with the anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Abbey Hoffman put Food Not Bombs into his book, *Steal This Pee-Test*, for their Boston "Pee Party" protest against the escalation of the War on Drugs and its impact on the poor.<sup>13</sup> Food Not Bombs even sullied America's favorite pastime by protesting

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<sup>12</sup> Distressed food is food that can no longer be sold in a grocery store but that is still fine for human consumption. Most places, throw distressed produce away and many Food Not Bombs chapters "dumpster" the food—illegally going through stores' garbage dumpsters for thrown away distressed food.

<sup>13</sup> For this event, Food Not Bombs got hundreds of people to pee into drug testing containers and mail them to the White House.

the city's mistreatment of the homeless by distributing free food in front of Fenway park during in the 1986 Major League Baseball play offs (McHenry and Butler 2005).

The second era of Food Not Bombs started in late 1987 when co-founder Keith McHenry moved to San Francisco. Shortly after moving, McHenry organized a San Francisco Food Not Bombs chapter, which began serving food on the corner of Haight and Stanton, near the edge of Golden Gate Park, on December 27, 1987. The San Francisco chapter of Food Not Bombs was the third in the country (following Boston and Washington, DC) but within a few months became the most well-known chapter and began publishing The Food Not Bombs Menu, which still serves as the organization's newsletter. The menu mainly detailed the police harassment of Food Not Bombs activists in San Francisco but also provided space for tactical and philosophic debates within the movement, and provided information on how to start a chapter. Over the last decade Food Not Bombs has experienced rapid growth, expanding from the three chapters noted above in 1988 to over four hundred chapters today (including chapters on every continent except Antarctica) (Crass).

Unlike many of the "new social movements" of the 1970s and '80s, Food Not Bombs was not a single-issue organization. Though the group formed out of the peace and disarmament movements, the group was never easily categorized as such. Instead they were actively involved in multiple movements and struggles—from homelessness and peace to animal rights and radical environmentalism. Food Not Bombs thus follows what sociologist Richard Day (2005) calls "the newest social movements." These new movements reject single issue focus, and hegemonic politics, and embrace "groundless solidarity." Hence Food Not Bombs works to help the homeless and squatters; provide

food for striking unions and immigrant rights groups, and support for political prisoners, environmental and animal rights activists, anti-gentrification efforts, and anti-globalization actions.

According to co-founders Keith McHenry and C.T. Bulter,

Globally, we continue to spend more time and resources developing, using, and threatening to use weapons of massive human and planetary destruction than on nurturing and celebrating life. By spending this money on bombs instead of food, our government perpetuates and exacerbates poverty's violence by not providing food for everyone in need (McHenry and Butler 1992: 72)

By viewing hunger and poverty as connected with militarism and a culture of violence,

Food Not Bombs contends that various forms of oppression are intimately connected.

For instance, according to an early San Francisco Food Not Bombs flier,

Because... FOOD is a RIGHT not a privilege! Because there is enough food for everyone to eat! Because SCARCITY is a patriarchal LIE! Because a woman should not have to USE HER BODY to get a meal, or have a place to sleep! Because when we are hungry or homeless we have the RIGHT to get what we need by panning, busking or squatting! Because POVERTY is a form of VIOLENCE not necessary or natural! Because capitalism makes food a source of profit not a source of nutrition! BECAUSE FOOD GROWS ON TREES. Because we need COMMUNITY CONTROL. Because we need HOMES NOT JAILS! Because we need....FOOD NOT BOMBS. (Figure 5)

Within these statements, Food Not Bombs articulates an analysis of power relations that connect hunger, war, patriarchy, capitalism, homelessness, and violence to the same source. For many in Food Not Bombs it is the state and capitalism that have commodified food, objectified women, and punished the poor. This anarchistic politics thrived within the early years of Food Not Bombs but the ideology was not explicitly part of the group's identity until the San Francisco Chapter popularized the connection. This was most succinctly stated by Chris Crass, a Food Not Bombs organizer from 1993-2000,

in "Non-Violence and Anarchism." In this article, Crass argues that the principles of Food Not Bombs (nonviolence, consensus, and direct action) are all explicitly anarchist principles. This article was widely circulated and has become influential in Food Not Bombs and anarchist circles.

The world produces enough food to feed everyone, if distributed equally. In fact, 46 billion pounds of food are discarded in this country each year. Estimates indicate that only 4 billion pounds of food would be required to end hunger in America. Food Not Bombs collects this surplus food before it reaches the dumpsters and distributes it directly to the hungry, outdoors in a public, non-institutional setting.



Because... **FOOD** is a **RIGHT** not a *privilege* ! Because there is enough food for everyone to eat ! Because **SCARCITY** is a patriarchal **LIE** ! Because a woman should not have to use her body to get a meal, or to have a place to sleep ! Because when we are hungry or homeless we have the **RIGHT** to get what we need by panning, busking or squatting ! Because **POVERTY** is a form of **VIOLENCE** NOT necessary or natural ! Because *capitalism makes food* a source of profit not a source of *nutrition* ! Because **Food Grows On Trees**. Because we need **COMMUNITY NOT CONTROL** ! Because we need **HOMES NOT JAILS** ! Because we need...

**Food Not Bombs**

## 1998 Food Not Bombs Calendar

IMPORTANT FACTS & DATES IN THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO REPRESSION • PHOTOS • QUOTES • ART

A FOOD NOT BOMBS MENU • 3145 GEARY BLVD. #12 • SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94118 • 1-800-884-1136



**Figure 5: Food Not Bombs Flier, 1998**

As discussed earlier, one of the central goals of contemporary anarchy is direct action, one form of which involves the creation of alternative institutions that, according to the International Workers of the World, create "a new world in the shell of the old." Butler and McHenry express this vision in this way,



Food Not Bombs is an organization devoted to developing positive personal, political, and economic alternatives. Revolutionaries are often depicted as working to overthrow the government by any means necessary. Food Not Bombs groups in general do not have the time or resources to attack, tear down, and overthrow existing death culture. However, not spending our time trying to overthrow the existing power structure does not mean never struggling with it. By simply exerting our basic right to free speech and association, we challenge the power elite, and they will try to stop us from focusing on what needs to be done. We want to create new alternatives and life-affirming structures from the ground up. We want to replace the culture of death with a culture 'Plumbers not bombs,' 'Day-care Not Bombs,' and 'Health Care Not Bombs (McHenry and Butler 1992: 72).

By engaging in direct action Food Not Bombs addresses homelessness not by petitioning the state to do the job but by doing it themselves. Food Not Bombs has thus become one of the most important organizations within the contemporary anarchist movement. The group is at the forefront of creating alternative institutions to capitalism and providing a means for addressing a pressing social problem—hunger and homelessness—while providing the space needed to empower marginalized groups.<sup>14</sup>

Overall then, Food Not Bombs is a group that is structured into autonomous chapters. Each chapter makes decisions through consensus voting. The goal of the group is to collect and distribute free vegan meals for all who are hungry to enjoy. The group frames homelessness and hunger as connected to militarism, capitalism, and systems of oppression.

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<sup>14</sup> Empowerment of the homeless and the downtrodden is associated with anarchism's concern with what Marx called the lumpenproletariat. To Marx, the beggars, drug users, prostitutes and gutter dwellers are not an important political class. In fact, they are easily bought and sold and commonly used to weaken the power of the working class. In contrast with Marx, Bakunin saw the lumpenproletariats, from vagabonds to rural peasants, as being central to any revolutionary project. To Bakunin, these folks have less to lose with the destruction of the social order. Likewise, Kropotkin saw this category of people as having to practice "mutual aid" in order to survive. The role lumpenproletariats within anarchist politics and the role of the homeless and poor as revolutionary actors will be discussed in future chapters.

### 3. Contrasting Theories on Homelessness: Liberal Understanding, Neoconservative, and Anarchistic Reactions

Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails represent a unique perspective on homelessness. Their anarchist perspective differs from liberal, conservative, and even socialist and Marxist accounts of homelessness. In general, the cause of homelessness is either seen as structural or individual. The structural account for homelessness is commonly associated with liberal and socialist accounts, while the individualist accounts are purported by conservatives. Gustav Landauer used an allegory to help understand the unique perspective that anarchism takes. Landauer asks us to imagine a town that gets rain and sunshine. The socialist (and liberal) answer is to construct an enormous roof that will protect the town from the rain, but also will keep out the sun. This is a purely structural solution, as it looks to “solve the problem” for everyone, but does so by denying agency and liberty. In addition, we can see the conservative approach to the rain weather being, that people who can, should purchase their own individual umbrella’s to use. If one cannot afford an umbrella then they must get wet. Landauer, in explaining the anarchist community socialist solution to the problem writes:

For us anarchist socialists both solutions appear ridiculous. Neither do we want to force all individuals under a common roof nor do we want to end up in fistfights over umbrellas. When it is useful, we can share a common roof—as long as it can be removed when it is not useful. At the same time, all individuals can have their own umbrellas, as long as they know how to handle them. And with regard to those want to get wet—well, we will not force them to stay dry. (Landauer 2010: 71, italics added)

The most important line, for us now, is the last one “and with regards to those who want to get wet—well, we will not force them to stay dry.” Food Not Bombs in effect, argues that homelessness is caused by structural conditions that are inherent to capitalism, but they also realize that some people choose to be homeless, and that choice should be accepted and supported. All people, homeless and wealthy alike, should stay dry if they desire, but should also have the freedom to get wet if they so choose.

a. Liberal and Conservative perspective on homelessness:

The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the street, and to steal their bread. -Anatole France, *The Red Lily*

During the 1980s the “plight” of the homeless in the United States gained a central place within media and public discussions. On one side of the debate, urban liberals argued that the policies of the Reagan administration, most notably the defunding of HUD and Section 8 housing and the closing of mental health clinics throughout the country, led to a rapid increase in homeless populations. The liberal response to homelessness starts from an understanding of homelessness as being structural in nature (table 1). The way to address the homelessness problem then is to form state-run social welfare programs. These programs are intended to offset the negative impacts of global economic factors and free-market housing costs, and provide a basic safety net for the mentally and physically ill. In this respect the homeless should be entitled access to government services and programs, from homeless shelters (where available) to food stamps and other welfare programs, but only at the cost of agency and freedom. Within

this view, the only solution to institutionalized homelessness is through further institutionalization.

On the other side of the debate, urban neoconservatives saw homelessness as an individual choice in which able-bodied people choose sloth and alcoholism over employment (table 1). This view proposed that the rise in homelessness was the result of a cultural shift during the 1960s. In the '60s hedonism and laziness reigned supreme, and destructive and immoral behavior such as drug use and alcoholism became socially tolerable. Simultaneously the increased influence of the welfare state under President Johnson's "Great Society" coddled the poor and lazy. In this regard, homelessness was the result of the weakening of morals and individual dependence on welfare provisions. Hence the way to address the homelessness problem was to reinstitute a strong moral code by banning "asocial" behaviors, policing those who break these laws, and by cutting social services.

In reality, what makes issues of homelessness so complicated is that both perspectives coexist within the social construction of categorizing the homeless as either "deserving" or "undeserving." Those that are deemed deserving are institutionalized into the system and taken care of, albeit poorly, while those deemed "bad" are punished for being unwilling or unable to conform to societal norms. Kim Hopper sees rectifying "the tension between providing sanctuary for the helpless and disciplining the unruly (Hopper 1987: 163)" as being the core issue. Significant differences do exist between conservative and liberal regimes, but when it comes to homelessness policy. On the ground, both the liberal and neoconservative practices must work in tandem and coexist within society's charitable institutions. Therefore we see police sweeps in San Francisco

under the liberal Agnos administration (1988-1991) and attempts to connect the homeless with shelters and mental health services under the conservative Jordan administration (1992-1995).

**Table 1: Liberal and Conservative Perspectives on Homelessness**

Political Approach	Source of homelessness problem	Solution to homelessness problem
Neoconservative	Homelessness is the result of poor choices or moral failing (sloth, laziness)	Punish asocial behavior that harms society. Make the choice of being homeless more costly by decreasing the benefits and increasing the punishment.
Liberal	Homelessness is worsened by structural forces, both economic and political.	Provide programs to counter the structural problems of homelessness- examples include lack of affordable housing, lack of medical and mental care, lack of job training, etc.

b. Towards an Anarchistic Answer to Homelessness:

In most urban politics debates the homeless are seen as part of the natural urban environment, like trees in the forests and grass on the prairie, and not as part of the political community. Thus the homeless are a politically, economically and socially marginalized group. Leonard Feldman and Kathleen Arnold both claim that the political marginalization of the homeless is connected to their inability to house themselves

(Arnold 2004; Feldman 2004). Feldman and Arnold argue that private life is located within the house. Without a house the homeless must live their private life within the public sphere. This brings homo economicus, the bane of republican virtue for Hannah Arendt, in to the public realm, thus destroying the separation between private and public. For this reason, the homeless must be excluded from public view and pushed into the private realm.

In order to purge the homeless from the public realm, they are denied political power or agency. Wilson and Kelling calls this the broken window. They see homeless transgressions as the result of individual failings and therefore address homelessness as a police enforcement issue, while not confronting the structural causes (Kelling and Wilson 1982). Conversely, the liberal perspective denies agency both as a cause of homelessness and as a solution to it. Many homeless do in fact enjoy the freedom and liberty of being nomadic, while many others actively choose to remain on the streets over life within the confining space of missions and emergency shelters. While this perspective correctly points out the structural and institutional impacts on homelessness, it does not allow a space where those who live in the streets or shelters can exercise control over their life.

The promotion of homeless agency and empowerment through grassroots organizing is central to what this study calls the anarchist perspective on homelessness. As an example of anarchist homelessness politics, Talmadge Wright in *Out of Place* provides a detailed analysis of two homeless encampments: the Student Homeless Alliance in San Jose, and Tranquility City in Chicago. Both cases are examples of individual and community empowerment that resisted the imposed political and spatial order created by city governments and neoliberal economic politics (Wright 1997).

According to Wright, self-organized homeless camps and grassroots homeless activism provide the homeless with the agency that they otherwise are denied. Similarly Jeff Ferrell in *Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchism* (2001) sees the homeless (as well as squatters, buskers, and graffiti artists) as modern day wobblies.<sup>15</sup> These discarded figures of urban life create a vibrant community imbued with democratic zeal, without top-down planning or representative structures, and while constantly being harassed by the police and private security officials (Ferrell 2001).

Overall, the anarchist perspective on homelessness follows the logic of Peter Kropotkin on solving the social problem of prisons. In his influential article “Prisons and Their Moral Influence on Prisoners” Kropotkin claimed that,

What prisoners have not found today in society is a helping hand, simple and friendly, which would aid them from childhood to develop the higher faculties of their mind and souls. . . . But these superior faculties of the mind and heart cannot be exercised by a person deprived of liberty, if he never has much of a choice. . . . Human fraternity and liberty are the only correctives to apply to those diseases of the human organism which lead to so called crime. (Kropotkin 1978: 233, italics added)

He contends that abolishing prisons, redistributing wealth and housing, and encouraging the creation of self-empowered communities and individual liberty is the only practical solution to crime and poverty generally. In this regard community and liberty are the solution: they empower individuals, and provide the development of social skills and mental faculties.

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<sup>15</sup> The Wobblies are the popular name given to members of the International Workers of the World, an anarcho syndicalist union from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. The organization was known for rejecting all political involvement, including bargaining with bosses. Instead, the union used direct action, commonly in the form of work slowdowns and economic sabotage, to press their demands.

Overall the anarchistic perspective views homelessness as a source of freedom and liberty. It views the homeless figure as a social nomad, resistor to state power and desiring a society that does not harass but instead enables and supports homelessness. This perspective views homelessness as an artificial problem, created not by the homeless but by the liberal society that fears and wishes to ostracize and marginalize them. Therefore the anarchist view claims that anti-homelessness laws need to be rescinded, private property and capitalism abolished and the homeless, poor, and marginalized need be given a “right to the city” that allows geographic and political space, to organize and empower one another (Lefebvre, Kofman et al. 1996; Mitchell 2003).

**Table 2: Anarchistic Perspective on homelessness**

Political Approach	Source of homelessness problem	Solution to homelessness problem
Anarchist	Rooted in society’s attempt to construct a disciplinary and regulated society. Anti-homelessness laws create the problem not the homeless	Remove laws that punish the homeless and provide the space for homeless communities to self-empower themselves

#### 4. Road Map to the Dissertation:

This study presents a street level view in an attempt to understand the workings of homelessness politics in San Francisco, urban political regimes, and the nature of direct action from the bottom up. The central question that guides this study is: Why did the liberal Agnos and the conservative Jordan administrations in San Francisco harass and arrest a group of individuals that distributed vegetarian food to the homeless but not church groups that did the same thing?



At the heart of this chapter is an appeal to social scientists to pay attention to anarchist politics. This appeal is especially pertinent today as anarchism has overtaken state-socialism on the radical left. In the wake of the 1999 Seattle WTO protest and the tear gas residue of the most recent G20 and FTAA protests, anarchists have shown that they are a force in shaping 21<sup>st</sup> century politics. In addition, Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails represent a form of anarchistic politics that is normally not discussed. The third chapter looks at the role that Food Not Bomb and homeless activism had in unraveling the urban liberal regime of Art Agnos, and will highlight contradictions within that regime, and urban liberalism more generally. Central to the chapter is a discussion of three major political battles that occurred in San Francisco between 1988 and 1992. First was the fight between the Cole Valley Improvement Association and the Haight Neighborhood Council and Food Not Bombs over the “soul of the Haight.” This fight for the Haight pitted two sides of the Agnos liberal coalition against one another: urban developers, business interests and middle class voters on one side, and the poor, marginalized, and nonwhite on the other. The tension between these two organizations increased with Food Not Bombs’ feeding of homeless people on the corner of Haight and Stanton streets every Monday. The Cole Valley Improvement Association argued that bringing hundreds of homeless people to the center of the Haight district put the neighborhood’s security at risk and negatively impacted businesses and housing prices. The Haight Association on the other hand, argued that the feedings provided a much needed social service for the community and argued that the Haight historically has been a place for the marginalized in society to live. The Agnos administration’s response was

to placate both sides; but after failing to successfully negotiate with Food Not Bombs the mayor came to support the Cole Valley Improvement Association.

Secondly I will discuss the way that health permits were used by the city as a pretense to both arrest and regulate the group. The permit issue shows the importance of institutionalization within the liberal political regime and highlights the ways in which permits have been used, especially under a “negotiated management” paradigm, for protest management. Finally, I will look at the Agnos administration’s reaction to a tent city protest in July of 1990. At first Mayor Agnos refused to arrest or harass the tent city protestors, but after three weeks and a continued sense of social disorder the Agnos administration cracked down, harshly, on the protestors. In this crackdown a large number of people were arrested, a court injunction was filed against Food Not Bombs, and the Agnos administration shifted its way of dealing with the homeless and poor. Previously, Agnos had told the homeless that, unless they blocked public space or built permanent structures, he would not harass or arrest them. The tent city protest marked a shift in his policy as Agnos attempted to walk the tightrope between urban liberal support of social welfare and neoconservative concerns with public order.

In chapter four, I look at the role that Food Not Bombs played in resisting the Matrix Quality of Life programs that were central to the Jordan administration’s anti-homeless campaign. At the core of these policies are the marginalizing of the homeless and poor, the formation and maintenance of urban order through zero-tolerance policing and “broken windows” management, and a punitive approach towards the homeless. To confront each of these issues through direct action Food Not Bombs, kept the homeless in view; stressed the police and jail systems by limiting their ability to “promote urban

order,” and kept the issue of housing and homelessness policies in the public sphere. I contend that Food Not Bombs played a central role, by denying Mayor Jordan the ability silence the homeless in the 1996 election of Willie Brown.

In chapter five, the final chapter, I shift direction, moving to Homes Not Jails, a San Francisco squatters rights group that comprised activists from Food Not Bombs and the San Francisco Tenants Association. Homes Not Jails illegally opens up unused houses and government buildings in San Francisco, providing a space for the homeless to sleep. During the years of the Jordan administration the organization opened up well over one hundred buildings, a few to which they almost gained legal title, and two government buildings. This chapter highlights the role of public-space management in the urban neoconservative policies of Jordan. In this case, squatting, something that is much more illegal than feeding the homeless was not as forcefully policed as Food Not Bombs. In fact, Homes Not Jails, while effective in providing people a place to stay, was unable to garner media support, or bring the issue of vacant houses and the lack of affordable housing to the public. In chapter five I contend that the private nature of squatting, though a direct resistance to city policy, was not as public a threat to the Jordan administration as was Food Not Bombs.

## CHAPTER II

### FROM SMASHING WINDOWS TO FREE VEGAN SOUP: ANARCHISM, ANTAGONISTIC POLITICS, AND THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION

What interests me more, at this moment, are the reasons why a community of mostly secular middle-class, TV-literate individuals [Northwest Anarchists] would subscribe to a world vision more commonly held by crypto-survivalist freaks who live off the grid in log cabins, hew wood and draw water, and engage in prayerful shoot-outs with the FBI. (David Samuels, "Notes from the Underground: Among the radicals of the Pacific Northwest," *Harpers Magazine*, Nov. 1999)

Social movement scholars have been looking in the wrong place and at the wrong subjects, examining institutional politics and pacified political subjects. In today's sociopolitical milieu the focus needs to shift to the zealous, militant, and radical movements. These often overlooked movements provide more accurate insight into the nature of politics. Focusing exclusively at included and compromising movements misses the "friend/enemy" "We/they" dynamic that lies at the heart of politics. This antagonistic relationship between collectives is intentionally limited, pacified, and excluded from liberal political spaces because a true friend/enemy distinction removes consensus, moderation, and compromise from possible political outcomes.

This study argue against looking at only moderate social movements and further argues that contemporary anarchism, compared to other political movements, provides the key to studying and understanding raw politics. Since the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of anarchism are revolutionary and inherently anti-liberal and anti-compromise. At the heart of the anarchist project are dual power institutions,

which seek to form “a new world in the shell of the old.” These institutions are inherently conflictual, attempting to hollow out the dominant political and social institutions and replace them with revolutionarily new ones. Anarchism, compared to radical right-wing populism and many other zealous and militant politics, is also radically democratic—internally using a consensus decision-making process—and seeks to increase, not restrict, democratic involvement and access. Hence anarchism provides insight into the limitations of liberal political processes by highlighting (a) the contradictory nature of liberal exclusion/inclusion while (b) providing a positive example of an inherently antagonistic form of democratic participation that maintains a “friend/enemy” distinction while not turning to the authoritarianism and antidemocratic politics of Carl Schmidt.

The next section will examine the current social movement and state institutional literature, argues that social movement scholars are looking in the wrong place and at the wrong actors. This section will be followed by a discussion of anarchist dual power, which is a central component of the contemporary anarchist project. I contend that this project provides a valuable insight into understanding the relationship between “autonomous” political attempts and state institutions and regulations. The final section claims that analyzing antagonistic relationships is central to understanding the limitations and contradictions of liberal political institutions. I contend that anarchist politics forces these contradictions and limitations to the fore.

# 1. Looking in the Wrong Places and At the Wrong Subjects:

The legacy of William Kornhauser's *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959) still profoundly impacts the way that academics, media, and the general population view militant activism. Kornhauser's book, one of the central social movement texts for the 1950s and 1960s, argued that activism is a pathology and that those who engage in activism do so because of emotional instability, broken families, asocial disorders, and a general desire for hooliganism (Kornhauser 1959). The rise of "the social movement society" during the 1960s ultimately discredited Kornhauser's hypothesis, as civil rights and antiwar activists appeared to be well educated, well adjusted, and more socially involved than their peers. Yet this myth continues for those movements and groups that exist outside the political mainstream.

The opening quote for this chapter illustrates the deviance theme that is still a common misconception of militant activism and political zealotry, most notably with respect to anarchist activism. The motto comes from a *Harpers Magazine* article commenting on the 1999 World Trade Organization protest in Seattle. In the *Harpers* article, Samuels reports interviews with anarchists in Eugene, Oregon, whom he lambasts for ruining the anti-WTO protest. The movement, he concluded, was filled with asocial, drug addicted, depressed, and angry social deviants. He claimed that their existence at the margins of society, combined with their deviances, had led them to lash out against mainstream society by destroying banks and name brand clothing stores as a cathartic reaction to the consumer culture that they cannot otherwise escape (Samuels 1999). Similarly a *Time Magazine* article on the WTO protest titled, "Anarchists Lead Seattle into Chaos." The article spent pages trying to understand the anarchists but in the end

dismissed the entire movement as consisting of "thousands of mostly young activists populating hundreds of mostly tiny splinter groups espousing dozens of mostly socialist critiques of the capitalist machine"(Krantz 1999). This small movement, according to Time, was hypocritical, overly violent, and fringe. Despite their hostility to the anarchist presence in Seattle, Time had to ask, "Is Anarchism the face of 21st century activism?" Not surprisingly, their answer was "no."

Many movement scholars share the social deviant view of Samuels and Krantz. David Meyers, in *The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America* (2007), argues that militant activists—such as John Brown, Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), and abortion clinic bombers—are the result of the open nature of social movements. While he reminds the reader that "social movements are not primarily the work of the psychologically troubled and socially maladjusted" he says "it's also important to recognize that mentally unbalanced people [i.e., certain militants] may also be engaged by the rhetoric of promise and social change and may take on the mantle of a social movement to justify their own activities" (Meyer 2007: 57). To Meyers these militant figures are the "anomic" and "radical flank" to more acceptable and traditional movements. By connecting anarchists, ecoradicals, militant black nationalists, and religious fundamentalists to the figures of John Brown, Theodore Kaczynski, and abortion clinic bombers, Meyers rehashes the social deviant myth of Kornhauser and in doing so discredits and marginalizes all attempts to perform, and therefore study, politics outside accepted boundaries.

In a related vein, Charles Tilly and other resource mobilization theorists argue that anarchist politics are theoretically underdeveloped and tactically ineffective. To these social movement theorists, anarchists are not social deviants, drug addicts, or asocial losers, but intellectually sophomoric. To Tilly, anarchistic politics can at best be viewed as sporadic actions (Tilly 2006), predicated on his belief that contention politics is a statist project; winning means wielding state power (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). Likewise, Hobsbawm, who otherwise viewed "primitive rebels" in a positive light, contends that ludditic responses to looms and digger responses to serfdom represent simplistic responses to the emergence of complex social relations. In his analysis, the Luddites, aware that new mechanical looms would destroy the current socioeconomic relations and significantly alter their material conditions, lashed out against the looms, and not the bourgeois class (Hobsbawm 1965).<sup>16</sup>

The conception of anarchist politics as sophomoric echoes the views of Marx and Engels. Engels, for instance, in "Versus the Anarchists" and "On Authority" lays out a fundamental critique of anarchist politics:

either the anti-authoritarians don't know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve reaction. (Marx, Engels et al. 1978: 733)

For Marx, Engels, and most statist-Communists following them, anarchism's rejection of political action (party politics, political programs, and collective bargaining)

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<sup>16</sup> This analysis of the Luddites is very similar to the one constructed by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto. The version done by Hobsbawm is given added empirical depth and has, since his writings, become one of the dominant accounts of the Luddites. The other dominant account of them comes from the radical environmental movement, which has defined them as a proto environmental group that used sabotage to stop the destruction of their social and economic lives, while confronting the push towards modernization.



for the realm of the social and the economic (general strikes, direct action, communes) was predicated on a simplistic world view and a failure to understand the true workings of the world. Because of this, anarchism was a Utopian project at best, and a reactionary, petty bourgeois project at worst. Needless to say, the history of Marxist-Leninism during the 20th century (purges, gulags, and imperialism) might undermine the Marxist critique of anarchism as being either reactionary or Utopian.<sup>17</sup>

Contrary to the views of Krantz, Samuels, Tilly, Marx, and Meyers, a handful of social movement scholars have come to view anarchist as well as “zealous,” and “mob” politics in a constructive light. First, Joel Olson (Olson 2007; Olson 2009) in both “The Freshness of Fanaticism: The Abolitionist Defense of Zealotry” and “Friends and Enemies, Slaves and Masters: Fanaticism, Wendell Phillips and the Limits of Democratic Theory” argues that zealous politics can, if the conditions are correct, promote the expansion of democratic rights. For example, William Lloyd Garrison and his zealous followers polarized the debate over abolition by effectively eliminating the “middle group” that had no opinion. In this regard, zealotry should be viewed as a political strategy because the democratic potential of zealous politics is found within the inner working and nature of the group. For instance, William Lloyd Garrison’s followers were all militant zealots fighting for abolition but they were also radical democrats. They allowed for political debate, often debating their enemies in public settings; they organized their groups and meetings along democratic lines, and allowed anyone to join—from blacks and women to even proslavery agitators. The strategy of zealousness

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<sup>17</sup> Early anarchists from Proudhon to Bakunin informed Marx and other members of the international that an authoritarian and centralized state form of socialism would lead to increased misery and horrors.

forced people to make a decision and choose their side. This effectively ended a political debate by polarizing the issue and forcing a confrontation (Olson 2007).<sup>18</sup>

Likewise, Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward argue that the constitutive power of the people, when unmediated from political representation, have been the central source of political change and progressive development in American history. Mass gatherings and mobs have altered American politics through active disruptions of social, economic, and political relationships. Piven states that "the disruption of particular social relations reverberates widely in a densely interconnected society, creating conflict and polarization which may undermine authority and fragment governing coalitions, threatening the power base of particular state-based elite" (Piven 2006: 38-39). Piven and Cloward give multiple examples of ways in which mob actions (riots, insurrections) and organized resistance (American revolutionists, abolitionists, labor organizers, and civil rights activists) have expanded democracy and equality by disrupting everyday politics and social relations (Piven and Cloward 1979; Piven 2006).

Finally, Francesca Polletta (2002) and Barbara Epstein (1996) view the decision-making structure of anarchistic and new left politics as being political in itself. Polletta argues that a direct democratic meeting structure, as seen by certain elements within the civil rights, organized labor, and peace movements, is an experiment, though not always positive, in radical democracy (Polletta 2002). Barbara Epstein, in a similar vein, argues that the prefigurative politics that emerged in the antinuclear movement in the 1970s represented a cultural and political shift for social movements. In Epstein's view, the

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<sup>18</sup> This is not to say that all zealous, fanatical, or militant politics are democratic. For instance, neo-Nazi groups in Arizona and Al Qaida internationally are examples of zealous and fanatical organizations that, for all practical consideration, cannot be viewed as expanding democratic rights. In fact, both these groups are concerned with radically curtailing rights and protecting current systems of privilege.

development of a prefigurative politics within leftist social movements was the result of Quaker concerns with consensus decision-making, combined with an anarchist desire for direct action. The mixture was fully developed within the Abalone alliance, a group that engaged in site occupations and direct action against a proposed nuclear power plant in California. This group, which had a large contingent of anarchist-feminists, combined consensus and direct action in such a way that the process of organizing itself became a political act; the activists created, "a new world" within the occupied nuclear site, showing through their practice that alternative worlds are possible (Epstein 1991).

This brief discussion regarding social movement academics' conception of anarchist politics points to a central issue within the social movement literature: What counts as significant political change, and which groups and movements are worthy case studies? The literature proposes two ways of answering this question. The more orthodox view argues that a successful movement alters the distribution of material resources and political power often by shifting policy and promoting supportive politicians. As an example, Meyer views a successful movement as one that becomes institutionalized within the governmental system, thus providing the movement constant access to decision-making processes and an open channel for lobbying politicians (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Meyer 2005).

This perspective is also promoted by Andrew McFarland's in his article on "Theories of American Politics," in *Social Movements and American Political Institutions* (1998). McFarland argues that current social movement theory embraces a post pluralist account of power:

post-pluralism rejects elite theory but accepts collective action theory and its positing of the difficulty of organizing political groups on an equal basis. As such post-pluralism acknowledges that the appearance of sub-governments or iron-triangles is an inherent problem in American politics. (McFarland 1998: 12)

In other words, pluralism exists in some facets of politics, such as issue framing, pushing new candidates into office, and generally getting topics onto an agenda, but in regard to issues such as iron triangles, the elite theory of power is more prevalent. It is not surprising, taking this as the starting assumption, that the majority of work looking at social movement and state interactions in political science views a movement as successful when it can change official policy through traditional means; policy pressure, involvement at the table, electoral change, etc. This concern for understanding “iron triangles” in political science social movement work has to do with an understanding of social movements as being mainly interested in altering and being involved in public policy. For the most part, this is true, as many social movement organizations—from the Sierra Club to Focus on the Family—are centrally concerned with altering and shaping policy. A myopic analysis of social movement and state relationships that are solely concerned with this issue mischaracterizes all movements for social change as being involved in policy and compromise politics. In reality, defining these groups as the norm excludes the more militant groups from serious consideration since their antagonist politics places non-state actors in direct and confrontational relations with state institutions. Within this perspective anarchist politics and disruptive politics in general are in a precarious position. How can a movement that rejects the realm of institutional politics impact policy or work to elect supportive politicians? If they do impact politics, how is their influence measured?

Those with an institutional perspective generally argue that successful social movements can: (1) elect a supportive candidate into office, (2) change the views and opinions of current politicians, or (3) alter public opinion on a topic, or introduce a topic onto the political agenda. This view holds that political change happens through shifts in representational structures and that protest movements' place pressure on elected officials to address a certain issue. Thus groups that appear to be mass-supported tend to have more impact on elected officials than groups that are small but passionate. Even Piven and Olson, both of whom attribute political agency to radical and militant politics, argues that success can be measured by studying only institutional change. This narrow definition of "success" includes only material resource allocation and access to government sponsored positions of power. For Piven, the masses, through their unmediated actions, can disrupt the social order and create new openings for democracy. These openings are closed when the disruption ends by an encroachment on those gains by governing elites. Olson views politics as an antagonistic venture in which two sides, through their actions, struggle for dominance. The winner of the battle gains power over societal institutions.

All in all, U.S. academics are prone to study those movements and groups that exist within the bounds of liberal politics, such as interest groups and pressure movements, the atypical non-electoral mass movements, or insurgencies that radically disrupt the political system. When this conception of political success is used to measure a movement, the importance of autonomous projects, consciousness-raising groups, and smaller non-electoral movements becomes marginalized and forgotten in "the dustbin of

history." Of course, countless smaller, autonomous and non-electoral, movements, as well as instances of insurrection that did not transform the cultural consciousness or shatter the political consensus, nonetheless have impacted political systems, provided experimental spaces for democracy and identity formation, and provided material resources and services for marginalized and subaltern communities.

The "new social movement" theorists, who embrace a post-structural and constructivist framework, often promote a cultural perspective. Alberto Melucci, one of the most influential new social movement writers, agrees with those just discussed regarding a focus on the allocation and distribution of resources, but, due to the importance of language and cultural codes within the post-Fordist world, argues that struggles over culture and meaning are central to postmodern social change (Melucci 1996). In this regard, alter-globalization movements can be viewed as successful, not because they have gained influence within government agencies or had their policies embraced, but because their critique of neoliberal free trade has permeated segments of mainstream culture. To complicate matters, Melucci argues that one cannot simply analyze "shifts in code" on a nationwide or worldwide scale. The control of coding behavior, even in small communities or subcultures, should be viewed as a positive transition. In this regard, Melucci sees the Italian youth movement, from the social center to the squat scene, as being a relative success (Melucci 1989). Melucci sees the militant youth movement as redefining the norms that guide Italian youth culture, increasing the

importance of environmental sustainability, labor rights, feminism, queer rights, and direct democracy.<sup>19</sup>

New social movement writers have mostly dealt with the ways in which political action are instrumental in the forging of individual and collective identities. Movements such as the women's movements, environmental movement, youth culture movements, as well as the queer rights and evangelical movements have all come to be powerful forces within American politics by forging a unique collective identity. In some ways, the greatest success for movements during the last twenty years has come with creating new identities which by their very existence alter the field of politics, placing previously unasked questions front and center. For example, James Jasper in *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (1999) looks at the creation of emotional attachment to an issue by the way moral rectitude gets expressed through political action, and how moral political action is essential to the development of certain activist identities (Jasper 1997). In his other work, most notably on the animal rights movement and his edited volume *Passionate Politics*, Jasper claims that not only the issues that movements raise but the emotional and moral response they garner determines their political success (Jasper and Poulsen 1993; Jasper 1998).

Contemporary anarchist movements, unlike the new social movements above, are resistant and radical movements that are working to destroy and overturn the current order. While it might not be revolutionary in the same way that 19<sup>th</sup> century anarchism,

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<sup>19</sup> Both Barbara Epstein and Francesca Polletta who were discussed earlier are followers of Melucci and the new social movement work. To both of them, internalized politics and radical democratic practice are examples of "challenging codes" and a means of providing individuals the autonomous power to regulate the institutions that control their lives.

contemporary anarchists are instead trying to create “a new world in the shell of the old.” This new world is, as Landauer claims largely about creating a new culture, and constructing new norms, but it is also about organizing counter-institutions that produce and distribute resources. New social movement scholars, by emphasizing cultural conditions only, misses the importance of anarchist counter-institutions in confronting and resisting capitalist and state hegemony.

Those who do not view politics as exclusively situated within institutional and representational spaces view the impact of political change that occurs within everyday life. Here success is not predicated solely on actively working within the state, but includes a view of the world as a network, web, or rhizome. Within a network, changes at any node reverberate through the system. This means that not only are the actions of politicians and business leaders important, but the actions of all, including commonly marginalized voices. Thus everyday acts of resistance, as described by De Certeau or illustrated by Katsiaficas must be viewed as political and potentially successful (Certeau 1984; Katsiaficas 1997).

In effect, those studying radical and autonomous politics<sup>20</sup> are pushing against the dominant perspectives. As I have shown, the majority of social movement scholars have

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<sup>20</sup> I am using autonomous politics in the way that autonomous Marxists do. Autonomous Marxists consider autonomous politics to be attempts to engage in political organizing “autonomous” from dominant politics institutions—be they state, party, or union centered. Instead of being connected to an established form of politics, autonomous politics attempts to create “alternative” institutions that are separated from the dominant ones. For most autonomous Marxists this is seen in attempts to form democratically run squats or businesses or in the democratic autonomous zones in Chiapas, Mexico. In effect, autonomous Marxism borrows Cornelius Castoriadis’ understanding of autonomy. To Castoriadis, autonomous institutions are ones that are directly created and decided on by the people who are impacted by that decision. To Castoriadis this means that I, and the rest of us who are impacted by the institution, have real democratic control over that institution. His work is inherently opposed to mediated political relationships and he argues against institutions that have gained their own agency. Non-autonomous institutions, to Castoriadis, become controlling and repressive to those who are governed by them.



a skeptical (at best) or hostile (at worst) perspective regarding radical political movements. Likewise, they tend to have a statist perspective, often viewing political change as occurring exclusively within the realm of institutionalized and accepted politics. Those political movements that struggle within the social realm of life and not merely the political sphere are often discounted. For the same reason, those movements that do not seek, and often outright reject, power and institutionalized roles are glossed over.

At the same time, it is dangerous to fetishize autonomous politics, as many anarchist activists tend to do. If theorists like Giorgio Agamben are correct, and I believe that he is, then there is very little space (geographically, biologically or politically) that exists outside the regulatory power of the state or free market (Agamben 1995; Agamben 2005).<sup>21</sup> In this regard, living in communes or squats or engaging in non-capitalist economic relationships (free schools, free stores, and bartering) are not actually autonomous from state and corporate power but rest within and counter to them. Instead of viewing these institutions and living arrangements as “autonomous,” we can see them as “dual power” institutions (discussed in the next section) that attempt to “create a new

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<sup>21</sup> Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer* contends that in the modern age the state of exception has become the norm. In addition, in the rise of biopower, the power and ability to govern basic functions of life—from birth and death statistics to control and regulation of infection disease—has provided the state the power to regulate all aspects of life. Because of this, there are no legal bounds to what is, or is not, expectable and there is no place outside the functioning of power. Even the figures most commonly associated as outside of the state—refugees—are interwoven with their role as a sacred class needed to ensure the in-group of the political community. What is important to me here is the enclosure of the political realm. I agree with Agamben that the political space has become nearly monopolized by the state and corporate powers of today. I would temper Agamben and resist his desire to absolutize the power of the state. While I do believe that currently all aspects of life are governed, or governable, I do not believe that the state or corporations succeeded in doing so. His absolutist and omnipotent understanding of sovereignty and power wrongly leaves no spaces for resistance. There are spaces and acts of resistance, not autonomous from the political but found deep within it, within struggles over hegemony and control that exist within the field of the political.

world in the shell of the old.”<sup>22</sup> Understanding that neither these actions nor any actions are truly autonomous from the political allows for an analysis of radical politics that takes into account the inherently antagonistic and revolutionary nature of the project.

In effect, there is no space outside the political and no legitimate space within that allows for radical change. Most social movement theorists have looked at “established” and liberal political movements to understand the dynamic of social change. Looking at these groups can provide insight into the political process, as they explain how the game works when the players follow the rules (or protest the rules in expected ways), but the rules are set up to pacify political processes and limit any chance for radical change. In fact, the political game is structured to neutralize and institutionalize any and all movements that push for radical change. In exchange for inclusion into the political processes these groups need to moderate their political stances and pacify their actions. For this reason, social movement scholars should spend less time looking in government buildings and nonprofit headquarters and more time looking at the streets, parks, collectively-owned businesses, and abandoned buildings. These are the sites of study that provide transformative insight. To understand the potential impact of radical change one has to look for a different type of politics—politics that is not pacified, mediated, regulated, or contained. In short, we need to look more closely at the contemporary

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<sup>22</sup> The desire to understand counter culture spaces as autonomous is rooted in an anti political opinion that one can “opt out” of society. Not many political theorists, especially autonomous Marxists, take this perspective seriously but it does have a large following among activists and activist historians and theorists. Most notably, Hakim Bey in *Temporary Autonomous Zones* argues that revolution is no longer possible and that all that can be done is creating short lived, spontaneous, revolutionary movements. These temporary spaces are liberatory, hedonistic spaces that exist until the state notices them. This inherently passive politics avoids conflict and political organizing, and instead is rooted in a desire to experience pleasure without a fear of government repression or the difficulties associated with political struggle. I would argue against calls for temporary autonomous zones and instead push for dual power institutions. Dual power institutions should strive for all people to be autonomous.

anarchist movement. This cannot be done, as long as we embrace current social movement definitions of success and importance that are intimately tied to statecraft and policy. This overemphasis on state policy has marginalized and hidden anarchist politics from academics eyes. Instead we need to understand and study anarchism on its own terms, looking at what their goals are, and understanding the relationship between their political institutions and state and corporate institutions.

## 2. Dual Power and the Contemporary Anarchist Project

What can be made of the contemporary anarchist project? From chapter one we know that contemporary anarchists are resistant to domination in all its forms, practicing resistance through a prefigurative politics in which they create the world they wish to live in; and they believe in direct action, an embodied form of politics that places the power for change within them, unmediated from representative politics. When all the political and tactical components of anarchistic politics are combined, what emerges is a politics that is resistant not only to the state but also to capitalism, hierarchies, and domination. At the heart of this anarchist project are two programs: dual power and insurrection(Olson 2009).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>“Insurrection” refers to militant and conflictual actions against dominant institutions, from state agencies to corporate spaces. Insurrectionary claims have their roots in the anarchist concept of propaganda by the deed, where actions are a better form of propaganda than words and pamphlets. As I have mentioned earlier, propaganda by the deed is not inherently violent since dual power institutions can be seen as examples of it as well. Nevertheless, insurrectionary strategies often hold that a brick through the window, or an arson at a luxury housing development, can “break the spell” that currently makes people spectators in their own life. Breaking this spell through spontaneous actions can open people's eyes, making revolutionary action and resistance seem possible. The goal is to inspire others to actively resist the state.

Insurrection is an inherent part of a revolutionary politics that expects a confrontation with the state, assuming that those in positions of power will not willingly and peacefully concede their power and privilege. In this regard, insurrectionary acts can be used to defend dual power systems, as has been the

Originally the concept of dual power emerged from Lenin's analysis of the February Revolution (Russia, 1917). In this period, the Bolshevik and provisional governments both existed, claimed legitimacy and authority, and provided needed government services. In Lenin's understanding of the term, the alternative Bolshevik counterinstitution was a breeding ground for socialists to organize and successfully hollow out existing state institutions, allowing the revolution to succeed. According to Christopher Day from the North American Anarchist Federation, *Love and Rage*,

in the broadest sense of the term, dual power refers to a situation in which a) parallel structures of governance have been created that exist side-by-side with old official state structures and that b) these alternative structures compete with the state structures for power and for the allegiance of the people and that c) the old state is unable to crush these alternative structures, at least for a period of time (Day 2003: 18).

In other words, a dual power strategy attempts to form alternative institutions that compete with current institutions. The goal of dual power is provide an alternative space of governance.

The strategy of dual power is attractive to anarchists, encouraging them to form alternative anti-capitalist institutions rooted in a radical form of democratic participation, to challenge the dominant liberal and capitalist states. Anarchist Brian Dominick, in his article "An Introduction to Dual Power Strategy," lays out the anarchist application of dual power. He contends that:

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case throughout Europe where anarchist riots have halted the eviction of squatters. They also can be offensive strikes against institutions and organizations that activists disagree with, such as the actions by the Earth and Animal Liberation Fronts. In reality though, insurrectionary actions are not central to this project and in many ways have received too much discussion space.

the dual power consists of alternative institutions which provide for the needs of the community, both material and social, including food, clothing, housing, health care, communication, energy, transportation, educational opportunities and political organization. The dual power is necessarily autonomous from, and competitive with, the dominant system, seeking to encroach upon the latter's domain, and, eventually, to replace it. (Dominick 2002)

In this regard, he follows the views of 1920 German anarchist Gustav Landauer, who in *For Socialism*, argued that the state is not a material object but an expression of human relationships. These relationships cement themselves as “institutions” and that, instead of trying to “smash the state,” which was the goal and desire of Bakunin, anarchists should work to forge alternative institutions. These institutions needed to reflect the beliefs, desires, and goals of freedom, liberty, egalitarianism, and democracy (Landauer 1978). It would be a mistake to view Landauer's statement against “smashing the state” to be tantamount to turning alternative and counter institutions into passive vehicles that promote radical pluralism and democracy but only in the fringes and cracks of society. Joel Olson in “The Problem of Infoshops and Insurrections: US anarchism, movement building and racial orders” makes this mistake. He contends that infoshops serve as the core example of anarchist dual power organizing, and he contends that this strategy is a passive one in which neither political organizing nor conflict is promoted.<sup>24</sup> Olson faults

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<sup>24</sup> Olson defines an infoshop as “a space where people can learn about radical ideas, where radicals can meet other radicals, and where political work (such as meetings, public forums, fundraisers, etc) can get done. . . . building free spaces inspires others to spontaneously create their own, spreading ‘counter institutions’ throughout society to the point where they become so numerous that they overwhelm the powers that be” Olson, J. (2009). *The Problem with Infoshops and Insurrection: US anarchism, movement building, and the racial order. Contemporary Anarchist Studies*. R. Amster, A. Deleon, L. A. Fernandez, A. I. Nocella and D. Shannon. New York, Routledge.

the infoshop strategy and not the nature of modern activism with pacifying radical politics.

Unlike Olson, I believe that anarchist reactions to government repression—from the 1960s through today—have made them moderate their institutions and practices. For instance, many radical environmental groups toned down their rhetoric following the government crackdown on “revolutionary environmentalists” in 2006. I believe that this desire to avoid government repression and police scrutiny has made infoshops become non-confrontational spaces. Still, not all infoshops are non-confrontational. For instance, in Denver before the Republican National Conference in 2006, the police and federal officials cracked down on protest coordinating centers which included cooperative housing associations, churches, and local infoshops. These infoshops had been central to organizing the “unwelcoming protests” that were planned around this conference.

In effect, political agency and contingency are essential to understanding any political situation, including anarchist politics. Organized, confrontational counter-institutions succeed due to a complex mixture of political prowess, hard work, and luck. Thus, Olson should blame the organizers of infoshops and not the strategy itself for being passive. His analysis misses the fact that core of “dual power” is about a conflict between the alternative institutions and the dominant institutions of the state since “dual power is offensive in a very subversive sense: it seeks to encroach slowly yet fully the domain of those in authority, the status quo” (Dominick 2002). This encroachment must turn to conflict when counter and alternative institutions step on the toes of official institutions, as occurred with community policing by the Black Panthers in Oakland, or the public feedings done by Food Not Bombs in San Francisco and other U.S. cities.

In effect, dual power serves as the constructive side of the “direct action” coin. Even the infoshops that Joel Olson laments serve as important spaces for direct democracy to play out, as organizing collectives often use consensus decision-making and also serve as material foundations for anarchist groups—from Food Not Bombs to CopWatch—to organize and hold meetings. They also serve as spaces for radical education, often providing access to free or low-cost, radical books and zines. This strategy cannot be defined as passive or defensive. What marks anarchist dual power systems as different from more reactionary dual power institutions (e.g., the Catholic Church and the Mafia) is the inherently revolutionary and conflictual nature of anarchist politics. This conflictual, no-compromising, revolutionary stance is what makes anarchistic politics unique from others

### 3. Anarchism and Antagonistic Politics:

Anarchism is an inherently conflictual and radical political philosophy that rejects the fundamental principles that guide liberal politics and representative systems of democracy. According to Chantal Mouffe “a democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries” and therefore certain groups need to be excluded from participation within the political field (Mouffe 2005: 120). Liberal political regimes work to forge a consensus within a given ethico-political framework for making political decisions. The goal of this consensus is to ensure moderation and compromise, and maintenance of political order. Because of this, liberal democrats find political extremes dangerous, as militants, fanatics, and zealots are unwilling to compromise their positions or accept the legitimacy of any outcome

considered immoral by their standards, no matter what the process might have been.

For Joel Olson, the desire for moderation and pacified politics lies at the theoretical core for deliberative and agonist theorists.

For instance, deliberative theory requires participants to “respect the opposing position to the point of being open to the possibility of being converted to it,” which is something that anarchist, radical abolitionist, anti-abortion activists would be unwilling to do.

Radical abolitionists would have scoffed at the notion that they and the slaves should be open to the possibility that master could be right to argue that slavery reflects the “natural” relationship between white and Black persons. . . . Slaves and abolitionists cannot agree with masters, pro-lifers cannot come to a consensus with “murders,” friends cannot come to a consensus with enemies. (Olson 2007: 86)

Instead deliberate democrats have to exclude the extremes from the process of deliberations and allow only those who agree to a certain framework.

Agonist democrats also conform to an ethico-political framework for politics. The agonist democrats, most notably Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig, criticize deliberative democratic tradition for missing the inherently conflictual nature of politics. According to Mouffe

One of the shortcomings of the deliberative approach is that, by postulating the availability of a public sphere where power would have been eliminated and where a rational consensus could be realized, this model of democratic politics is unable to acknowledge the dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values entails and its ineradicable character. (Mouffe 2000: 13)

Thus agonist democrats wish to construct political systems that allow for such conflict and dissensus. This is done by altering the Schmidtian political concept of the enemy to



that of the adversary. “An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared political adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality” (Mouffe 2000: 15). Of course, this move from enemy to adversary works for only those who conform to the ethico-political framework of liberal politics (Olson 2009).

For both the deliberative and agonist democrats, a liberal ethico-political framework is needed to determine who is acceptable as a legitimate member of the political community. The exclusion of those who reject the framework is a means of moderating and pacifying the political sphere. When only those who share philosophic ideals or are willing to compromise are allowed, the results of democratic practice are radically constrained. The problem occurs when excluded groups force themselves into the political sphere. According to Olson:

when disputing parties employ competing ethico-political frameworks and when at least one party has no desire to compromise needed to construct a common framework, then the horizons of deliberation and agonism have been reached. This is the realm of intractable conflict, in which the objective is not to build consensus or create 'friendly enemies' but to defeat one's opponent and to install one's framework as the 'common sense' of a society. (Olson 2009: 94)

Of course, anarchism is an inherently anti-liberal philosophy that questions the foundations of the liberal polity—from the sacred right of private property to the legitimacy of representational politics. Likewise, anarchists are unwilling to compromise. Anarchism is revolutionary and inherent conflictual. The International Workers of the World, better known as the wobblies, typified this radical militancy. As a “fighting” union consisting of unskilled laborers (mostly immigrant and nonwhite) the wobblies

engaged in confrontational direct action against the bosses and state institutions. In their free speech fights in Spokane, Washington in 1908, the wobblies resisted the city's ban on public political speech by setting up soap boxes on street corners and had "speakers." They then organized jail solidarity actions, singing, chanting, and obstructing the "wheels of justice." Uncompromising in their views and their beliefs the wobblies shut down the Spokane jails, forced the city to pay absurd amounts to house them, and finally defeated the ban, all without ever lobbying political leaders or voting.<sup>25</sup>

In addition, the International Workers of the World was not willing to compromise with bosses. The group was unwilling to give up any of its ideals for increased wages or better working conditions. Trading the ability to push for the abolition of capitalism and the state in exchange for slightly higher wages seemed immoral. In effect, anarchists refuse to compromise their ideals, are unwilling to treat government institutions as legitimate, and deny equal consideration to the opinions and needs of bosses, landlords, and politicians who do not side with them. Much like the ardent abolitionists in Olson's work, anarchists find political moderation, pacified politics, and compromise as means to prop up and support illegitimate policies.

The anarchist commitment to building direct democratic and egalitarian counter institutions makes them unique from other militant and zealous movements in that they promote a radically democratic form of antagonistic politics. This antagonistic politics does not reject the enemy/friend dynamic associated with a Schmidtian analysis of politics, but instead embraces it. Anarchists groups construct a powerful and clearly

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<sup>25</sup> The wobblies demonstrate a clear example of how the conflictual nature of anarchist politics does not have to be inherently violent and can occur through nonviolent direct action.

defined group of “friends” (anarchist activists, allies, marginalized groups) and “enemies” (members and supporters of statist and corporate institutions and agendas) and attempts to force these groupings into direct conflict. For instance, the wobblies forged a powerful “enemy/friend” relationship between workers and bosses. This intense relationship made compromise and moderation politics impossible and conflict a necessity. The wobblies might not have won every fight, or even the majority of the fights, but even against insurmountable odds they never put down their fists or quit.

Anarchist politics provides a unique window into understanding the limitations and bounds of liberal democratic politics. Conflict between anarchist dual power institutions and the state reveals how the state responds to excluded collective forces and shows the contradictions between liberal claims of inclusion and the violent and often illegal methods used to force exclusion. How do state institutions address these excluded groups? Central to this analysis is the inherently antagonistic nature of politics, something that is commonly obfuscated in U.S. politics.


How will liberal political institutions deal with anarchists occupying public space and refusing to see their institutions or representatives as legitimate? How can liberal institutions negotiate with a group that fundamentally disagrees with their ethico-political framework? What happens when one side of a debate refuses to compromise or see their enemy as an adversary? What happens when enemies struggle over issues in which their differences are intractable? These questions will be addressed in the remaining chapters.

### CHAPTER III

#### **UNMAKING CONTRADICTIONS: FOOD NOT BOMBS, ART AGNOS, AND THE POLITICS OF HOMELESSNESS IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1988-1991**

On a wall in the office of the San Francisco Coalition for the Homeless is a poster that says “How Many People Do You Need to Start a Revolution? There are 15,000 homeless people in San Francisco. Is That Enough?” (see image 6). Of course, revolutions can require fewer people, especially if they have money! In San Francisco a small cadre of pro business and pro development liberals have dominated urban politics and radically altered the inherited environment. From the 1970s on, the city of San Francisco shifted from a working-class, shipping, and manufacturing city into a playground for corporate CEOs, business executives, and tourists. The construction of the city as a space of consumption was a revolution—it shattered the local and physical bonds that made city neighborhoods unique; it displaced thousands of poor, non-white, and immigrant families, and it created radical income inequality. Like urban development in most American cities, the wealth generated via housing and corporate development was funded by taxpayers and built on the backs of the poor. For instance, from 1975 to 1985 more than seventy-five thousand affordable rental units were turned into condominiums or commercial space (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 327) for the consumptive use of middle-class and wealthy households, while taxpayer money was used to incentivize developers. Of course, the lost low-income houses were never rebuilt and their former residents had to move out of the city or live on the streets.

Both revolutions and prairie fires can be started by small flares. One such flare occurred in December of 1987 when Keith McHenry and some friends began collecting produce from grocery stores and with a small sum of money from the Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council began providing free meals on the corner of Haight and Stanyan, right near the entrance to Golden Gate Park. Within a year of starting up the San Francisco chapter of Food Not Bombs, the group had become the most visible opposition to the city's war against the homeless and poor. Food Not Bombs stoked the elites' fear of the homeless, who knew that the 15,000 sleeping in cars, parks, shelters, and friends houses were more than enough for a revolution. What had been keeping the homeless and poor from shaping the city themselves were their institutionalized disempowerment and the denial of their basic civil, citizen, and human rights. Food Not Bombs questioned the legitimacy of their exclusion and provided a venue for the homeless to be empowered.



**Figure 6: Poster on the Wall at the SFCOH Office**

This chapter looks at the impact of Food Not Bombs in resisting Art Agnos's mayoral administration. During this period (1988-1991) the group was front-and-center on debates over homelessness, use of public space, and food safety permits. In this chapter I contend that through their antagonistic politics and protest, Food Not Bombs exposed the limits of liberalism within the Agnos administration, highlighting the contradictions inherent in liberal politics, and helped unravel his political coalition. I contend that there were two fundamental contradictions to urban liberalism that Food Not Bombs gnawed open: Institutional inclusion versus political exclusion, and consumer growth versus social and economic justice.

This chapter will begin with a brief overview of urban liberalism, followed by a short look at Art Agnos and his administration's politics and policy. This will be followed by a detailed narrative explaining the relationship between Food Not Bombs and the Agnos administration, and an examination of the contradictions within urban liberalism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how Food Not Bombs' actions brought these contradictions to the fore.

### 1. Understanding Urban Liberalism

Urban liberalism is the urban application of welfare liberal policies and politics and has been defined as a "political philosophy of many post-war cities that combined entrepreneurial economic development strategies, personal rehabilitation and social work approaches to social problems, and a tolerance of social difference in the form of broad support for civil liberties" (Vitale 2008: 54). At the core of welfare liberalism is the

promotion of equality of opportunity, endorsement of diversity as a value in-and-of itself, the development of a social safety net to ensure a minimum quality of life, as well as belief that the state should be involved in developing and directing the economy (Green and Rodman 1964). Urban welfare reforms were dominant in the postwar era largely due to the influx of federal money under the New Deal and Great Society programs. Likewise, welfare liberalism was associated with stabilizing the political community by providing social services and support which mitigated social unrest and placated radical politics (Piven and Cloward 1971).

In the practice of applying welfare liberal principles to the urban environment, minor privileges and resources were given to the poor, while the vast majority of urban policies promoted corporate expansion and, especially since the 1970s, the development of a consumer-based urban landscape for the benefit of tourists and corporate interests. In urban environments the commodified city was manufactured through the development of corporate office space, convention centers, and sports complexes, and by providing substantial tax breaks, economic incentives, and zoning changes to encourage economic growth. Many of these concessions were made for pragmatic reasons: urban leaders needed to raise city tax dollars to fund programs and services that they desired. Of course, urban mayors and city officials promoted a trickle-down economic policy designed to turn the city into a haven for wealthy individuals, in hopes that the pennies and crumbs that fell from them would be enough for the poor to fend off starvation and deprivation. In other words, the liberal economic vision was

... that economic growth will benefit everyone in the form of increased employment, wages, and tax revenues, according to the familiar mantra 'a rising tide lifts all boats.'...In sum, they encouraged the transformation of the economy from a manufacturing to a finance and corporate base (Vitale 2008: 62)

Using the power of the state to develop the corporate city, urban liberal politicians promoted policies that exacerbated housing shortages and unemployment, while also contradicting their commitments to democratic rights, civil liberties, and social diversity.

The crises facing urban spaces in the 1980s and 1990s, while not entirely the fault of urban liberal policies, were exacerbated by them, for three main reasons. I argue that, first, while urban liberal regimes in New York and San Francisco radically expanded the amount of office space during the 1970s; they did almost nothing to increase the supply of low-income housing in their cities. In fact, a large portion of the new high-rise office buildings came at the expense of low-income housing. In San Francisco, the Yerba Buena Center and the A-1 and A-2 urban developments in the Mission district expanded office space but at the expense of over ten thousand low-income apartments and single occupancy rooms.<sup>26</sup> Those lost low-income units were never rebuilt and the middle-class condos that replaced them are heavily responsible for the increase in rental costs in San Francisco. For example, in San Francisco, in 2001, the median two-bedroom apartment cost \$2,752 a month, which according to the National Low Income Housing Coalition meant that a San Francisco worker would need to make \$28 an hour to afford a two bedroom apartment (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 325), compared to \$1,400 a month in 1990.

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<sup>26</sup> The Yerba Buena Center and the A-1 and A-2 redevelopment plans of the 1970s radically altered the landscape of the city. These two plans changed the Mission-district community by displacing thousands of Filipino and other immigrant communities in order to build a new business center and shopping area. During the 1970s these plans were front and center in the struggle over gentrification in the city.



Second, when cities changed the tax code to support corporate headquarters and financial capitalism they reduced the resources available to address issues of income inequality and unemployment (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002; Vitale 2008; Wacquant 2009). The belief was that by attracting business, more jobs and wealth would be created, and the taxes on this wealth would provide the city with more resources. However, this did not happen in San Francisco, and the tax incentives rather served as a way for the city to funnel funds to developers and businesses. Art Agnos, for instance, in 1988 developed a comprehensive homelessness proposal that attempted to create affordable housing, provide mental health care, and job training. Agnos intended to move the city away from a failed emergency shelter system with his “Beyond Shelters” program. The plan aimed to develop city-funded housing and apartments to serve as “halfway houses” for the homeless, and also sought to drastically expand the work-training and drug-alcohol rehabilitation programs and expand the city’s mental health services. However, the ambitious plan never became a reality due to financial shortfalls. While it was falling apart, Agnos was lobbying the city to fund a new baseball stadium for the San Francisco Giants and was providing tax exemptions for corporations such as Pacific Gas and Electric and Bank of America.

Finally, urban liberal regimes exacerbated economic problems by intensifying a shift away from a manufacturing-based economy. The shift created an increase in unemployment and underemployment, a marked decrease in real wages, and increased vulnerability and instability for workers. The new, post-Fordist—or post manufacturing and post factory—economy has received extensive discussion in recent years for its

impacts on weakening local autonomy and increasing the dominance of transnational global capital. For instance, Manuel Castells argues in *The Power of Identity* (1996) that the insecurity of post-Fordist economics has led to the rise of both Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world and the militia movement in the United States. In both cases, reactionary right-wing responses emerged from the breakdown of state power, the instability of world markets, and expansion of cultural exchanges (Castells 1996). Meanwhile, Hardt and Negri (2000) have seen the economic shift that started in the 1980s as creating an opening for the democratic, egalitarian, and diverse politics of the “the multitude” (Hardt and Negri 2000; Hardt and Negri 2005). Overall, Hardt and Negri and Castells represent different sides of the same coin, as the political changes of post-Fordism have promoted “radical” political movements.<sup>27</sup> The economic shift fed a current of anxiety that intensified during the 1980s and 1990s within most developed countries, explaining the shift rightward among the electorate and the rise of the revanchist city<sup>28</sup> (Smith 1996; Wacquant 2009: 4). This anxiety was made worse in cities such as San Francisco, which intentionally promoted financial capitalism.

In short, urban liberalism promoted economic policies that exacerbated the housing crisis, often drastically increasing rental and housing prices, radically curtailing the amount of money in city coffers by providing deep and lasting tax cuts and loopholes for businesses, and accelerating the shift away from a manufacturing to a consumer and service-based economy, which fed into already existing anxieties and fears. In effect,

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<sup>27</sup> In modern parlance, the “tea party” movement in the United States and the anarchist riots in Greece have gained influence partly due to the destabilizing effects of this economic shift.

<sup>28</sup> Neil Smith uses the phrase “revanchist” city to refer to city policies punish the poor and nonwhite for “stealing” the city away from white middle-class residents. His archetype example is New York City under Rudy Giuliani.

rents and costs went up, salaries went down, and the government safety net that was designed to help those who “fell through the cracks” was too tattered and ripped to provide any form of protection.

Liberalism also found itself mired in policies that went against its core values and ideals. For instance, one core value of urban liberalism was diversity and inclusion. Yet, under urban liberal regimes in New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, the process of gentrification was perfected and mobilized against the poor. In San Francisco, the south of Mission district—a working-class Latino and Filipino community for decades—was “revitalized” into a “safer,” and more “respectable” neighborhood (i.e., white and middle class). This revitalization was partially funded by the federal government, which under President Carter used federal funds to revitalize dilapidated and slum neighborhoods.

It is also the case that mayors were placed into a difficult situation in the late 1980s, with federal funds drying up and the urban tax base decreasing as rent and property value plummeted. Many looked to gentrification projects as a means of revitalizing a city’s image, increasing revenue sources, and expanding their own political scope and influence (since successful big city mayors have the potential to rise up the political ladder). In urban centers the poor, non-white, and homelessness communities need to be displaced in order for gentrification projects to succeed. If not, young urban professionals would not feel safe moving into their new \$300,000 lofts, and upscale retailers—from Nordstrom to Whole Foods—would think twice about opening their new stores.

Urban liberal policies also ran into a quandary over the level of democratic participation they could allow in the political process. In general, urban liberal economic and development policy relied heavily on the policy inputs of "experts" such as urban planners and economists, which limited the impact of local residents in shaping policy. This approach tended to form antidemocratic politics in which urban development plans, taxes, and zoning code were imposed on localities without public input. For instance, New York City Mayor Koch placed an emergency shelter program in a lower-income neighborhood in Harlem without listening to community groups' counter proposals (Vitale 2008). Likewise the City of San Francisco funded development programs in neighborhoods, such as the Mission District, without listening to the desires of the local residents. The residents of the Mission, strong supporters of the democratic machine in San Francisco, almost universally opposed the plan but were unable to stop the destruction of their homes and their forced relocation (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002). In many instances reliance on elites for policy making worked to undermine an urban liberal coalition as communities felt neglected and either shifted parties or cooled their support for such a coalition (Vitale 2008).

Overall, the urban liberal economic vision looked to remake the urban center into a corporate, financial, and tourist space. For much of postwar history this vision meshed with cities' need to provide social services because the vision was molded together by a mortar of federal dollars. Without the resources to adequately fund both corporate development and social programs, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, and other cities cut social services budgets in hopes that economic development would bring in more resources, increase job prospects, and "raise all boats." When this vision of success did

not materialize, urban centers faced a drastic increase in homelessness, unemployment, and income inequality. Unable to address social problems through state services, and unwilling to crack down on economic crimes (prostitution, drug use, vagrancy, public intoxication, etc.), mayors such as Art Agnos in San Francisco were caught between the end of postwar urban liberalism and the rise of Neoconservatism.

## 2. The Outsider Mayor: Art Agnos

Art Agnos, a former California Assembly member, entered the 1987 San Francisco mayoral campaign as the most progressive and liberal candidate in the race. Prior to the campaign Agnos endorsed a controversial slow-growth ballot initiative, Proposition M, which proposed to radically slow urban development in San Francisco. He was also a champion of labor, who had worked in the California Assembly to find money for public employee unions, and a supporter of women's and gay rights. His campaign style was progressive as well: he used grassroots organizing and wrote and distributed a twenty-two page booklet titled "Getting Things Done: Visions and Goals for San Francisco" to get his "program" for the city out to the people. An observer, Richard Deleon, Agnos appealed directly to the three segments of the political left in San Francisco. For social liberals he called for expanding affirmative action, protecting women's and gay rights, expanding funds for affordable housing, establishing rent control and job creation programs, and addressing the city's homelessness problem by expanding shelter and housing. For environmentalists Agnos promoted expanding parks and green space in the city, and opposed commercial development of the city's wharf and

piers. Finally, for populists, he promoted district elections and public involvement in city affairs, promoted small business, and respected neighborhood and community diversity and culture (DeLeon 1992: 91).

Agnos became mayor of San Francisco following ten years of strongly pro-growth development under the previous mayor, Diane Feinstein. In fact, by the mid 1980s San Francisco was considered one of the most thoroughly gentrified cities in the country. For instance, the number of single occupancy hotel rooms was cut nearly in half from 1975 to 1988, while the number of upscale hotel rooms nearly doubled (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 368). Agnos also inherited a large budget shortfall (\$172 million) which drastically lowered the amount of money available to fund his programs (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 256). Even though these problems were not his doing, Agnos was never able to deflect blame. He was called by San Francisco Examiner columnist Bill Mandel “the Velcro mayor” since everything stuck to him, even things that were not his doing.

Still, many of the problems he faced were of his own making; by 1991 his actions as mayor contradicted most of his campaign pledges and the goals he set in 1988. For instance, Agnos entered as the slow-growth candidate, yet in his four-year term he pushed two enormous pro-growth campaigns. The first, and most shocking, was his baseball stadium development proposal. Proposition P, which failed, would have cost the city \$200 million through direct funding and tax incentives in order to keep the Giants in San Francisco. The plan would give the Giants 12.5 acres of land in the China Basin district, and would exempt the franchise from three million dollars a year in taxes for ten years

(DeLeon 1992: 107-122). For Agnos, keeping the San Francisco Giants was essential to San Francisco maintaining its world-class city status. Additionally, the proposal was seen as a sure-fire way to economically revive the China Basin district, which had gone into decay as the economy shifted from heavy industry towards service. With this proposal Agnos faced opposition from his own coalition, which he accused of being “anti-growth” and “anti-business.”

Agnos also pushed for the development and “revitalization” of the city’s wharf and piers, something he had in fact actively campaigned against. In 1989 he put Michael Huertz, the former port authority director for New York City, in charge of the San Francisco port authority. Huertz, with Agnos’s backing, opened up piers #24-26 for development. The piers were sought after by developers since the port authority was exempt from the slow development conditions in the Proposition M initiative which the city had recently passed and that Agnos endorsed. In the end, the Agnos Administration brokered a deal to build a fifty-four million dollar hotel on the pier, which would be partially funded and supported with city money and tax incentives. Opponents to the hotel, and former members of Agnos’s coalition, pushed to stop the development with Proposition H. In the end Agnos again lost to the slow-growth advocates as Proposition H passed. However, he was able to open up piers 30-32 for a cruise line to set up a sailing center and a hotel across the street, since that development required no city money or tax-based incentives. In the end, Agnos’s support of Proposition P and pier development ruined his reputation as a slow growth advocate. He also rejected

democratic involvement in either process, instead opting to engage in backroom deals and negotiations, which his campaign had argued against (DeLeon 1992: 123-133).

In the area of affordable housing Agnos also sent a mixed message. Prior to his term as Mayor, he was known as a strong advocate of affordable housing and government-funded housing developments. As a candidate, he had campaigned to increase the number of affordable houses and rooms in San Francisco, and also campaigned in support of rent control. When he took office, he appointed David Gilmore as Housing Director. Gilmore was a respected public housing advocate who had successfully improved Boston's affordable housing. While the city had little money to spend on expanding affordable housing, Gilmore was able to make the city's programs more cost effective and efficient. In addition, Agnos was also seen as masterful in increasing the city's Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funding after the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989.<sup>29</sup> Even so, during the Agnos Administration housing and rental costs increased, pricing many low-income city residents into precarious living spaces.

One way of addressing increases in housing and rental prices was through rent control, which Agnos advocated in his mayoral campaign and which he had the power to push through between 1989 and 1990. In both years progressive and left elements in San Francisco—notably the San Francisco Tenants Union and the Harvey Milk Democratic Club—proposed a “4:7” plan, which would have limited rental increases for current tenants to 4% a year and limit rental increase for new tenants to 7%. The Agnos

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<sup>29</sup> The earthquake further eroded the city's stock of affordable and low-income housing, and even though Agnos was effective in getting HUD funds for redevelopment, the number of housing units lost was greater than the number rebuilt.



Administration actively opposed this plan, calling it too extreme. Agnos stated that he would support a “10:20” plan, but he never actively campaigned for the idea. His unwillingness to support the 4:7 plan and equal unwillingness to invest political capital to ensure the passage of his more conservative 10:20 plan ensured the demise of any rent control program in San Francisco during this tenure (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 352-355).

Agnos had also campaigned to provide a pro-active solution to homelessness in San Francisco. In 1989 he released a “Beyond Shelter” proposal designed to move the city away from the shelter system towards developing and expanding low-income housing. This was an attempt to address what the Agnos administration saw as the “root cause” of homelessness by expanding job training, mental health services, and addiction programs. In the end, the program was seen more as a “wish list” more than an actual proposal. The only aspect of the program that was implemented was, ironically, the development of two new shelters. Even while doing little to address the issue, Agnos engaged in many punitive campaigns against the homeless. In 1988 he revived a 1972 city ordinance against “car camping” in an attempt to remove homeless people from the Haight district. He also revived a forgotten nineteenth-century city ordinance against “lodging,” (known as section 647[i]), which made lounging with “gear” illegal. Under this ordinance if you fell asleep while using blankets or sleeping bags you could be cited and arrested for illegally “lodging” in public. Finally, Agnos began using the police to sweep city parks of homeless following the opening of the new homeless shelters. He had ordered the police to not sweep the homeless from city parks until the shelters were

open, since he thought it was unfair to arrest people when they had nowhere else to go.

The shelters could house only 400 of the estimated 1,000 homeless sleeping in the city's parks. Where Agnos expected those additional 600 people to go was not addressed.

(Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 378)

In Richard DeLeon's view Agnos had neither the patience nor the power to enact his progressive agenda. Instead of listening to and working with the city's grassroots sectors,

Agnos followed what he perceived as the path of least resistance in pursuing his agenda. It was easier for him to promote a few huge developments as a way to create jobs and increase revenues, for example, than it was to nurture a small business economy more consistent with his neighborhood preservation and slow growth goals. (DeLeon 1992: 159)

Many of Agnos's progressive supporters "viewed Agnos as a bait-and-switch political con artist who got himself elected as a slow-growth progressive but then governed the city as a pro-growth liberal" (DeLeon 1992: 158). The breakdown of Agnos's coalition was obvious in 1991 when two candidates from the left ran against his bid for reelection, Angela Alioto and Richard Hongisto, neither of whom even endorsed Agnos in his run-off election against former police chief and conservative Frank Jordan. In the end, the progressive and left elements of San Francisco saw the former chief of police and pro-business, pro-development candidate as no worse than Art Agnos, their former "golden boy."

In the end, Agnos had the difficult task of keeping together a diverse coalition that included slow-growth advocates, labor unions, and downtown businesses. It was on the

issues of homelessness and affordable housing that the most amount of stress was placed on his coalition. In this case, business owners and land owners wanted the administration to take a strong stance against the homeless, clean up the streets, and use City money to encourage the migration of wealthier residents. At the same time, those in his coalition that supported social justice, believed in economic and political equality, and environmental protection, wanted his administration to take the opposite approach. They wanted the Mayor to building affordable housing, not gentrifying lofts, increase social services for the poor and needy, and slow down the redevelopment of open-spaces and downtown districts. As we shall see, Food Not Bombs was important at highlighting the contradictory claims of the Agnos administration. In addition, the group forced Agnos to make a strong, public, stance on these issues, even though he would have preferred to have done so in closed door meetings.

### 3. From Permits to “Camp Agnos”: Food Not Bombs, Agnos, and Antagonistic Politics

As noted previously the San Francisco chapter of Food Not Bombs started in December of 1987 when Keith McHenry, a recent émigré from Boston to the city, organized public meals near Golden Gate Park. The group, with help from the Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council, started providing free meals every Monday. These meals consisted largely of rice, beans, and bread, served from plastic buckets into makeshift bowls and cups. The food, nutritious and vegetarian, was free.

On July 11, 1988, the group placed themselves on the city's radar by applying for a parks permit, so they could legally distribute the food in Golden Gate Park (see table 3). Around the same time, the Cole-Valley Improvement Association, a group of business owners and developers in the Haight, began pressuring the City of San Francisco to stop the group's activities. The association argued that the group was attracting the wrong type of people to the neighborhood—the homeless, poor, and transient—which resulted in a profoundly negative impact on the “quality” of life within the Haight. Shortly after the Cole-Valley Improvement Association started opposing the group feedings, the City denied the organization a park permit. Starting on August 15, 1988, police began mass-arresting members of the group, confiscating their equipment and literature, and donating their food to local churches.<sup>30</sup> By the end of the day the City had sent fourteen police officers to arrest nine people for “distributing food without a permit,” which was an infraction, rather than a mere misdemeanor.<sup>31</sup> When asked about the Food Not Bombs arrests, police spokesman Jerry Senkir stated, “This appears to be more of a political statement than a program to feed the hungry. We cannot allow them to take over the park” (Gordon 1988).

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<sup>30</sup> This is the first time in Food Not Bombs' history that activists were arrested for distributing food. The Boston and D.C. chapters had at the time never been arrested. This became a sign of things to come, as many cities during the 1990s and 2000s have targeted Food Not Bombs activists for arrests—from Las Vegas to Tampa, Florida, and Des Moines.

<sup>31</sup> The Cole-Valley Improvement Association also pushed the Agnos Administration to enforce a 1972 City ordinance against car camping. The association saw the large number of homeless and hippy car campers as a threat to their housing values and business success. During the same time that the City was harassing Food Not Bombs, they were also harassing, ticketing, and towing car campers from the Haight. Not surprisingly, many of the car campers were strong supporters of Food Not Bombs and comprised a large number of the homeless who came to the group's feedings.

**Table 3: Chronology of Permits Issued to Food Not Bombs (FNB).**

Date	Permit Issue
12/27/87	FNB starts feeding homeless in San Francisco parks
07/11/88	FNB requests a permit from the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department
08/15/88	45 riot police arrest nine volunteers for serving free food in Golden Gate Park
08/27/88	29 people arrested for serving free food in Golden Gate Park
09/01/88	52 people arrested for serving free food in Golden Gate Park
09/09/88	Mayor Agnos issues the first permit (a 60 day temporary permit) to FNB to serve free food in Golden Gate Park after two days of direct negotiations.
02/01/89	Parks Service issues a second temporary permit for FNB feedings in Golden Gate Park
07/21/89	City files an injunction against serving free food without proper permits, during a homeless tent city in Civic Center.
09/11/89	The Health Department issues FNB its first health permit for feeding at Golden Gate Park
02/01/90	Recreation and Parks, Fire, and Health Departments provide FNB a permit to serve food at the Civic Center
07/06/90	The Recreation and Parks Commission passes a law making it significantly more difficult for anyone to be issued a permit to distribute free food outdoors, FNB loses its parks permit
01/25/91	Keith McHenry (FNB cofounder) is served with contempt papers for breaking a court injunction prohibiting food distribution activities
02/14/91	The City asks that McHenry serve 40 days in jail for violation of court order
03/22/91	Judges dismiss the injunction charges

On August 29, 1988, twenty-nine activists were arrested after an impromptu rally down Haight Street. Members of the Cole-Valley Improvement association watched as the police confiscated the fliers, pots and pans, and the food, and arrested the members of the group. Unwittingly, the developers' and businesses' actions backfired as the media attention to the arrests made this small ragtag group a magnet for young radicals, and made the group's name known throughout the city.

Within a month the “antagonism” between the City and the group came to a head on Labor Day when two hundred people went to Golden Gate Park to eat, while around sixty activists lined up to serve food, and approximately fifty police in riot gear blocked the table. The riot cops counted twenty served meals, the legal number allowed before breaking permit restrictions, and then began arresting people. An activist would scoop a bowl of food and hand it to a hungry person. The police would then handcuff and arrest that activist. Echoing the spirit of the 1909 wobblies’ free-speech fights in Spokane, a new person would take up the ladle and serve another bowl of food before promptly being arrested. This process continued until all fifty-four activists had been arrested, which garnered national news attention from the New York Times, CNN, and others. This differs from traditional civil disobedience, in the attitude and reasoning that was behind the action. The group was not attempting to get arrested to get media attention or to highlight the injustice of the law banning the distribution of food, instead the group did not believe that the city and the police had any legitimate right to stop them from feeding the poor, and so they were going to feed them, no matter what the consequences.

For over a year this permit battle continued between Food Not Bombs, the police, and the Agnos Administration. At one point a “cease fire” was declared in which the City claimed it would cease arresting the activists in exchange for the activists’ willingness to negotiate about location. According to Bob Prentice, then City coordinator for homeless programs, the Mayor’s office did not “want to be in a position of arresting people because they’re giving good food to hungry people” (Gordon 1988). The “cease fire” happened right after the Labor Day arrests, on September 8, when members of Food Not Bombs,

the ACLU, the Police Department, and the City sat down to negotiate a solution to the problem. On September 9, an agreement was made between the two parties, but only after tensions were raised after Keith McHenry was detained by police for posting a Food Not Bombs flier in the Haight district. McHenry felt that the arrest was a form of harassment by the City and showed the City's unwillingness to follow through on its promises. Even so, in a press conference on September 9, 1988, Agnos explained to reporters the negotiated agreement between Food Not Bombs and the City.

Under the terms of the agreement, Food Not Bombs would move its distribution activities a few blocks away to Stanyan and Page, and go through the process of securing permits from the Parks and Health departments. The City would provide a sixty-day temporary permit, waive the \$400 fee for a permit, and drop all charges against Food Not Bombs activists. Agnos stated that "in enforcing the law, we don't want to create a remedy that is [more] work than the problem" and that "we must develop a policy for this kind of program, where people can be fed with dignity and in privacy" (Halstuk 1988). Interestingly, Agnos seemed more concerned with the public aspect of the feeding than with the health and safety issue, as noted in his insistence on "privacy." This subtlety might explain why tabling materials were confiscated and the food was donated to local church homeless shelters. If the city was concerned about food safety in a public setting, why would they stipulate that unused food be donated to be used elsewhere?

Though Food Not Bombs secured a temporary permit on September 10, 1988, the debate and politics surrounding a permanent permit was not finished (see Table 3). A few months after the first permit was issued, the Parks Service changed its laws regarding

permitting. The meeting to discuss the new permit requirements drew over 300 people, the vast majority showing their support for Food Not Bombs. This turnout broke the attendance record for a Parks and Recreation meeting (Whitting 1989). The new law strengthened the sanitation rules requiring tables, sanitary metal containers, and hand-washing stations. Even despite the stricter rules, the City gave the group a permit to feed at Golden Gate Park on September 11, 1989—almost a year after negotiations began.

Regarding the issue of permits Keith McHenry and C.T. Butler later wrote:

From the government's point of view, a permit is something it can take away whenever it wants (remember the Indian treaties?). Because of this, we strongly recommend that you not contact the local government. The revolution needs no permits. (McHenry and Butler 1992: 30)

Throughout his administration Agnos, and after him his successor Frank Jordan, argued that Food Not Bombs was hostile to City processes and unwilling to follow the required steps to receive a food distribution permit. The City contended that the group was asking for “special” treatment that would exempt them from the permit process that applied to other applicants. Although the group was hostile to the idea of getting a permit, often arguing that feeding people and performing other good deeds should not require government approval, out of pragmatism they group applied for a parks permit for until 1990 when they gave up on the process. Over that time period Food Not Bombs was given permits on a handful of occasions, only to have those permits later rescinded.

Before the permit issue was solved, Food Not Bombs and the Agnos Administration began a battle over use of Civic Center Park. On June 28, 1989, protestors from Food Not Bombs and members of the homeless community occupied Civic Center Park, in front of San Francisco City Hall, with a “tent city” and 24-hour soup kitchen.



The tent city was filled with a mix of homeless people, political activists, and bored youth. The central slogan of the tent city, later called Camp Agnos, was “we’re tired, we’re hungry, we don’t like the government” (Edmondson 2000: 48). Homeless activists were there to protest the failure of the Agnos Administration to address the issue of homelessness and affordable housing within the city. Unlike mainstream homeless organizations, the activists decided to take action into their own hands, creating a public spectacle in front of City Hall.

In the preceding months to the tent city, the Agnos Administration had promised the homeless that his Beyond Shelters program would take effect, increasing the services and support that they needed. He asked the homeless to give him some slack until that program was underway. In the meantime, he promised the homeless that he would not be harassed swept out of the city parks, since the city services were woefully underfunded. In early June, the Board of Supervisors pressured Agnos to clean up the city parks and streets, and forced him to officially state his position on homeless encampments. In a letter sent to the inhabitants of city parks he stated that:

tents and other permanent structures are not allowed: Personal property in excess of what can be carried, such as couches and mattresses which interfere with others right to the use of the park is not allowed; accumulation of garbage, urinating, defecating, lighting fires, and the unauthorized use of city electricity is prohibited (Bodovitz 1989).

After the letter was sent the police started ticketing homeless people and disposing of their belongings.

The tent city provided a massive spectacle in the center of the city. Agnos attempted to ignore the mass of people sleeping in front of his workplace, but on July

11th the Agnos Administration arranged a “town hall” meeting on homelessness and invited members from “Camp Agnos” to speak. At that meeting, thirteen homeless people addressed the Mayor’s office about what they desired from him. Included in their wish list were public bathrooms, storage lockers, public showers, affordable housing, medical centers, detoxification centers, and other government services. Most of the homeless encampment’s demands were included in Agnos’s Beyond Shelters plan, which had just recently come out but had yet to start up operation. Even though his plan had yet to take effect, and he had all but admitted the city services were underdeveloped, the Agnos Administration openly opposed any changes that would make the encampment more permanent. The Mayor’s office agreed to allow people to cover themselves at night to protect against the cold, but allowed nothing else (Bodovitz 1989).

The failure of the town hall meeting between Agnos and the tent city occupants was obvious the next day when Food Not Bombs members occupied the Mayor’s office and demanded immediate action to help the city’s homeless. The office occupation angered the Administration; afterwards Agnos refused to meet with any representative from “Camp Agnos” and began arresting tent city protestors generally, not only Food Not Bombs activists. By the end of the over three-week occupation, approximately twenty people were arrested, including four for distributing food without a permit.

During the three-week occupation of the Civic Center, the Mayor’s office filed a law suit against Food Not Bombs. Assistant City attorney George Riley explained that “all the City is attempting to do is enforce minimum safety standards. . . . We don't seek to enjoin any expressive activities” (Bodovitz and Miyasato 1989). In reply, Food Not Bombs lawyers argued unsuccessfully that their feedings were a protected form of

political speech.<sup>32</sup> The courts disagreed and provided the City with a court injunction against the group. Once the court injunction was implemented, feeding people in the Civic Center became a misdemeanor. After the tent city, Food Not Bombs continued to feed in the Civic Center and sporadically the City would charge an activist with breaking the injunction. The harassment served as a deterrent for some activists; provided an easy way for the police to remove the group from public space, confiscating their literature, tables, and pots; and generally increased the cost of activism.

In February 1990, the court injunction against Food Not Bombs ended when the Parks departments provided the group with all the permits needed to provide food in public space. This legal position for Food Not Bombs was short-lived though, as on July 19, 1990, the City again strengthened the minimum requirements to obtain a food distribution permit. This was followed by a series of contentions and well attended meeting on the new change in the permitting procedure. Food Not Bombs argued that the strengthening of the law was done to deter the group from legally distributing food, while the city contended that it wanted to ensure that any food distributed in public was safe to consume. No matter what the reasoning for strengthening the law, the impact was that Food Not Bombs lost its permit and once again was serving food illegally.

Starting in 1991, Food Not bombs began to actively oppose the city's enforcement of 647(i), the nineteenth century anti-lodging ordinance. Former Food Not Bombs activist Richard Edmondson describes his first Food Not Bombs meeting and action in which the group planned to engage in civil disobedience against the ordinance.

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<sup>32</sup> This statement goes a long with the anarchist conception of direct action and propaganda by the deed, in that actions serve as a form of political speech.

In Edmondson's account about forty people showed up, had a short meeting, and then laid down in UN Plaza, covering themselves with blankets, each receiving a ticket for illegally lodging (Edmondson 2000: 56-61). During the year that Agnos enforced 647(i), hundreds of homeless "lodgers" were ticketed for breaking the law and on a regular basis Food Not Bombs activists would join them. Overall though the City continued to enforce the ordinance on behalf of the Convention and Visitor's Bureau (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002: 378).

Finally, an altercation occurred between Food Not Bombs activists and city officials and police officers on March 22, 1991. According to the San Francisco Chronicle:

City hall looked like a riot zone briefly yesterday morning after a plainclothes police officer had his gun snatched during a melee after the arrest of Keith McHenry, leader of Food Not Bombs, a group of anarchist food distributors.

McHenry was leaving a fourth floor courtroom after contempt charges against him were dismissed, when officers arrested him on a traffic warrant. As he was being led away in handcuffs, McHenry began shouting incitements to his followers, according to police.

McHenry's lawyer, Sarge Holtzman, said the trouble began when a police officer pushed McHenry on the way down a stairwell.

At that point about three dozen of the Food Not Bombs group engaged in a shoving match in which a patrol officer was roughed up and a plainclothes officer had his service pistol snatched by someone in the crowd. (Markell 1991)

The story in the Chronicle was heavily contested by Food Not Bombs activists and shortly after the incident Keith McHenry's wife Andrea McHenry wrote a letter to the editor, though this was never published. She mentioned that the officer to whom the pistol was attributed was not present in the altercation and that no one during the melee noticed a gun being taken. In addition, she noted that

the traffic warrant that McHenry was being “arrested” on had already been overturned by a judge (Edmondson 2000: 71).

Overall, to review, three central battles took place between Mayor Agnos and Food Not Bombs from 1988 to 1991. The first was the struggle over permits which started in the Haight district and continued through the tent city protests in the Civic Center. The issue of permits still remains an issue as the group twenty years later, does not yet have the required permits to feed people in public. The second was the tent city battle of 1990 that highlighted the political and tactical difference between Food Not Bombs and other members of the homeless activism community. While other groups, most notably the Homeless Taskforce and the San Francisco Coalition for the Homeless, wanted dialogue and negotiations with the Mayor, Food Not Bombs occupied his office and refused to agree to his terms. Finally, throughout 1991 Food Not Bombs actively resisted the City’s enforcement of 647(i), the anti-lodging law, by engaging in civil disobedience. While the anti-lodging law received little media attention, the enforcement nonetheless represents the draconian policies of the City’s supposedly progressive mayor.

Overall, throughout the Agnos Administration, from 1988 through 1991, Food Not Bombs and the mayor were in conflict. The tensions and frustration between the City and the group was exemplified by the media reporting of the supposed “riot” on March 22, 1991. The “riot” occurred after the police arrested Keith McHenry for a warrant that had already been dismissed. The San Francisco

Chronicle highlighted the police harassment of the group, yet portrayed the group's militancy and unwillingness to acquiesce to authority. Throughout this time, the best word to describe the relationship between the City and Food Not Bombs is antagonistic.

#### 4. Contradiction within Urban Liberalism:

In light of the history presented above, a complex sequencing emerges that highlight tensions with urban liberalism in San Francisco. On the one hand, the Agnos Administration attempted to incorporate Food Not Bombs into the larger charity state<sup>33</sup> by forcing them to obtain permits, house their programs in accepted locations (church basements), and to limit the group's political agitation. On the other hand, the City repeatedly changed the rules regarding permits, often rescinding permits the City had previously issued, and arrested, harassed, and ticketed members of the group even during official "cease fires." In effect, the Agnos Administration first tried to include the group within the charity apparatus of the state and then attempted to exclude the group.

In the end, the administration's policies at repression failed. Food Not Bombs resisted the arrests and confiscation of their materials, and gained support through media exposure. The coverage allowed Food Not Bombs to shape the debate around homelessness and hunger in San Francisco highlighting the hypocrisies and contradictions within the Agnos Administration. Two central contradictions within urban

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<sup>33</sup> The charity state refers to the collection of private, public, and religious organizations that provide charity services. The charity state is strong within the United States, largely due to the historical lack of state sponsored welfare programs. Even though most charity in the United States is administered by private entities—mostly churches—these services are well established and regulated by the state. In fact, I contend that traditional charity groups are an extension of the state, providing the social service protections generally expected through the state.

liberalism came to the fore via the direct action tactics of Food Not Bombs. The first was Mayor Agnos's desire to include Food Not Bombs into a state sponsored charity role and his aggressive actions to forcibly exclude the group from practical strategies. While the second was Agnos's stated desire to expand and strengthen the city's social services programs which was contradicted by his actions to expand corporate and retail spaces at the expense of affordable housing, social services and other programs.

a. The Desire for Political Inclusion and the Process of Forced Exclusion

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the rights and privileges associated with citizenship under liberalism obtain their value only in relation to excluded and disenfranchised groups. The exclusionary component of liberal politics was a central issue to the Nazi German theorist Carl Schmidt whose book *On the Political* argued that liberalism and democracy are unable to happily coexist, since democracy requires radical inclusion while liberalism requires exclusion. According to Schmidt, liberalism removes the fundamental quality of politics from the political realm—that of the enemy/friend distinction. Within liberal politics that enemy/friend relationship becomes a competitor relationship, which is rooted in economic calculations between business owners who seek to “best” their competitor but not necessarily destroy them. Competitors may respect each other and be willing to compromise and negotiate in order to better their respective situations. Just as a company will make a deal with a rival in order to maximize profits, under liberalism classes and political organizations are willing to compromise and negotiate with their competitor to advance their agenda. This aggregate form of

democratic politics employs a market logic that obfuscates the true nature of political action, defined within the friend/enemy relationship.

Even in the more deliberative and agonistic democratic traditions, the enemy/friend relationship is attacked for instigating political instability and serving as a precursor to fascism, ethnic conflicts, and civil war. As was mentioned in the last chapter, deliberativists require a democratic politics in which all participants are willing to listen to each other and, at least in principle, are willing to be persuaded to accept the other's position. Agonists, on the other hand, claim to maintain the conflictual nature of Schmidt's political analysis but desire to moderate and pacify the conflict, in order to ensure political stability and limit the possibility of political violence and extremism. They do so by changing the enemy into an adversary. The adversary is someone with whom you have a conflict or fight, but you simultaneously treat with respect and admiration (Mouffe 2000).

As with all market-based logics, the competitor norm in liberal politics must be enforced and regulated by the state. In order to ensure stability, the state needs to exclude those individuals and groups that are unwilling to accept the competitive political relationship. This is done by marginalizing them through concerted political pressure, as when the media describes radical groups as "fringe," "crazy," or "extreme" rather than investigating and examining the groups' claims and positions. For instance, following the protests in Seattle in 1999, many commentators—from Michael Moore on the left to



Pat Buchanan on the right<sup>34</sup>—condemned anarchists for ruining the protest. In this case, protesting was deemed acceptable, as was civil disobedience that blocked intersections, but the smashing of chain-store windows was not. In effect, to Moore and Buchanan (and everyone in between), the limits of acceptability end with a brick in a hand. Once it becomes a projectile, the activist has transgressed from acceptable to unacceptable. Setting the bounds of acceptability thus becomes the central policing issue for democratic politics. In the United States, the state regulates democratic spaces so that political parties struggle and compete for “market share.” When groups engage in politics beyond the accepted bounds of liberal politics the state can use police power of the state to enforce, to a disproportionate degree, laws and regulations. When “legitimate” police power fails, the illegal use of police power can repress an organization, as happened to the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in the 1970s and the wobblies in the early 20th century.

The reverse side of liberal political exclusion is the effort by liberal and capitalist intuitions to recuperate political opposition and resistance. Recuperation refers to the way that the “spectacle”—Debord’s name for the totality of consumer capitalist institutions (the market, state, and culture)—incorporates and assimilates ideas and movements that are resistant to it. It does this by turning ideas and movements into a commodity. Upon being commodified, any resistant practice loses its revolutionary character and instead becomes another consumer object to be bought, consumed, and

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<sup>34</sup> These two figures are chosen as an example since both strongly disagree with the World Trade Organization and free trade, and both are seen as being on the farthest limits of accepted politics discourse.

regulated via market mechanisms. An example of this is the punk rock movement of the late 1970s. While originally seen, by some, as a threat to social order, within a few years punk had devolved into a music and fashion style. While many punks remained politically active, overall the musical movement ceased to be revolutionary. This desire to recuperate is, according to Debord, an inherent component of contemporary capitalist relations and is essential to consumer capitalism (Debord 1967). Since consumer capitalism requires the commodification and consumption of everyday occurrences and practices, social movements, culture, and especially rebellion become a product to be bought and sold (Marcus 1989). In effect, “turning rebellion into money,” as the punk band The Clash most astutely noted, is the process by which liberal consumer society pacifies and moderates rebellion and resistance.

In addition, political institutions and the state commonly use the power of inclusion as a means of moderating a group’s political stance. Certain provision within welfare policy in the United States, for instance, can be seen as a means of pacifying and moderating the political positions and desires of the American poor (Piven and Cloward 1971; Piven and Cloward 1979). In effect, welfare and government assistance moderates people’s willingness to be politically disruptive, since felony or other criminal convictions, beyond simply creating disharmony with a frontline provider, can threaten the minimal security and protection that social services provide. Pragmatically, political organizations also use access to decision-making as a motivator to moderate political action. Since most groups are seeking to influence policy, giving them a place at the table is an effective means to moderate their behavior. It is generally understood that a

seat at the decision-making table comes with strings attached, commonly described in activist circles as “selling out.”

The inclusion of formally excluded groups is the central goal of “negotiated management,” the dominant protest-policing methodology in the post-1960s era. Negotiated management looks to create formal and informal ties between police and protest groups. This process is most commonly done through a lengthy permitting process, in which representatives from the police force and members of an activist group organizing a protest sit down and negotiate time, place, and the restrictions for protest.<sup>35</sup> The police rely on communication as a means of collecting information about the protestors, allowing the police to tailor the protest (the location, size, etc) to better ensure social control and stability. In addition, they commonly provide concessions. In fact, “When they properly apply the model, police offer movement leaders concessions in exchange for an agreement to self-police and to outline the scale, route, and timing of demonstrations (Fernandez 2008: 13). Thus negotiated management seeks to incorporate and institutionalize protestors, a generally excluded group, into the process as a means of pacifying and regulating their actions. Negotiated management also helps to categorize protestors as “good” or “bad,” with good protestors being those who are willing to negotiate and the bad protestors as the ones who are unwilling to do so (Fernandez 2008; Lovell 2009). This has led many criminologists to criticize that negotiated management is

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<sup>35</sup> It could also be argued that permits are “permission” from the sovereign. Permission is granted only when the conditions are beneficial for the sovereign. Some organizations understand that it is always easier to ask for forgiveness than gain permission.

not a positive development in protest policing but instead is a merely nefarious form of social control and repression.

Some criminologists have noted that negotiated management tends to break down in connection with “transgressive” groups, or groups that are unwilling or unable to negotiate with police agencies. The “Miami model”<sup>36</sup> is the most well-known policing method to deal with large-scale transgressive protest. This model uses militarized policing techniques, with an emphasis on extreme and unmatched force; it maximizes the number of police officers available to ensure control through preemptive strikes against groups and individuals, and policing sweeps. It also acts to remove as many protestors from the protesting area as possible, regardless of the legality of that action. The Miami model can be seen as a return to the “escalated force” model that dominated policing strategy from the 1880s to the 1960s, or as an example of the militarization of police in the post-9/11 world. I contend that this model is an example of how police respond to groups and movements that are unwilling to moderate or compromise their position, and a direct example of the failure of “negotiated management” to deal with contemporary anarchist politics.

In the case of Food Not Bombs and the Agnos Administration, both forced exclusion and coercive attempts at inclusion were used. The permit contestation was the central means in which Mayor Agnos attempted to institutionalize and incorporate the

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<sup>36</sup> The Miami-model was the policing model used by the Miami-Dade police department during the Free Trade Agreement for the America’s (FTAA) protests in 2003. Activist and civil liberties groups accused the police department of escalating their tactics and using excessive force in dealing with protestors. The police department claimed such provisions were needed to ensure public safety in the face of such a large-scale anarchist protest.

group into the larger response to homelessness. The lack of a permit justified police harassment in August and September of 1988, which forced a negotiation between representatives of Food Not Bombs and the San Francisco Police Department and Mayor's Office. The object of the cease-fire meeting was to instigate the process of "negotiated management" and to concede certain grounds—most notably the fee for applying for a permit—in order to get the group to accept a location shift (away from a central tourist area and a gentrifying location in the Haight) and to put limitations on the food that the group could serve and potentially a moderating of their political stance.

The location change seemed to be the City's main concern. Police officer Lt. Holder stated, "If they're truly concerned with feeding the people, there is a better place for it" (Gordon 1988). The "better place," according to the City, was in a church warehouse at Stanyon and Page. These places were "in-place" while the more tourist and business centered location was "out-of-place." When homelessness is "out of place," City and government officials treat the problem as a public health and public order issue (Wright 1997). Of course, Food Not Bombs was always hostile to the idea of changing the location. When the idea of moving was first brought up to Keith McHenry, he stated "We are going to continue doing this until we have ended hunger and poverty—that's going to take a while" (Gordon 1988). Unwillingness to move and unwillingness to compromise the organizations position made for an obvious political debate. One of the group's main opponents, Therese Gaus from the Cole-Valley Improvement Association, stated "It [the public's feedings] creates a situation that is likely to embarrass the mayor" (Gordon 1988).

While the location shift was a priority for the City, the group's politics was always front and center in the debate. John Meehan, a coordinator for the Haight-Ashbury food program, asked, "which is more important—feeding people or politics? Humility is much needed here. The focus should be on feeding the hungry, not politics" (Gordon 1988). Bob Prentice revealed the City's position on Food Not Bombs most clearly when he stated that: "Keith [McHenry] doesn't just serve food. There's an educational component to it. Keith doesn't necessarily acknowledge the authority of this state. I have a certain appreciation for his vision, but at what point do you engage in conflict?" (Whitting 1989). The fact that the Mayor's office realized that the group did not recognize the authority of the state is important; there is a direct connection between McHenry's unwillingness to accept the authority of the state and his willingness to engage in conflict. Conversely, the case can be made that City Hall engages in conflict when someone does not accept their authority.

Of course, Food Not Bombs agreed that politics was central to their action. The group claimed that serving free food should not require a permit. According to McHenry, "anybody who's got food should be able to feed anybody who's hungry" (Gordon 1988) and "it's the same thing as regulating Christmas presents" (Whitting 1989). In addition, he mentioned during the tent city protest that "this is people sharing free food with their friends. Under no circumstances would a health permit be necessary. We will never stop feeding people" (Johnson 1989).

If the process of forced inclusion is seen through the permitting practice, then forced exclusion is seen through the police arrests and the City's response to the tent city

action. In fact, the first arrests and citations issued by the San Francisco police, on August 15, 1988, can be analyzed as an act of forced exclusion. On that day, the police officers, directed by Mayor Agnos, cited the group for distributing food without a permit. Why the police decided to go after Food Not Bombs, a radical group that had submitted paperwork for a permit, was not officially stated.<sup>37</sup> The evidence presented here strongly suggests that they were targeted because of their political message and their confrontational tactics. Otherwise, why did the City not harass church groups that regularly handed out free food to homeless people throughout Golden Gate Park? I contend that the original arrests, especially the escalating use of riot police to line the park feedings, served as a symbol of state power, while the confiscation of political materials, food, and serving utensils and bowls was meant to increase the costs of political action and persuade the group to either accept forced inclusion and moderation or to cease acting. The double standard in the City's actions lies in the fact that the food, after being confiscated because the group did not have the requisite food and health permits, was given to local churches to distribute to the homeless. Any health concern for the homeless—especially in San Francisco which has more homeless deaths per capita than any other major city in United States—is instead a state concern over the political message and tactics of a group.

The police response to the 24-hour soup kitchen at the tent city is also an example of the attempted exclusion of the group from the political sphere. During the action,

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<sup>37</sup> The group originally filed paper work thinking that they would get the permit with almost no work. Since then, McHenry has constantly stated that asking for the permit was the biggest mistake that the San Francisco chapter of Food Not Bombs has done. He has since, always recommended against asking for permits.

Agnos had taken a relatively quiet stance against the tent city protests. He had sent a letter to the homeless informing them that only permanent structures and trash would be removed from the park and that people would not be arrested for sleeping there. The letter carried a political cost, as members of the Board of Supervisors began to accuse Agnos of not working to address and fix something that was becoming a black eye on the city (Bodovitz 1989). However, on the first day of the 24-hour soup kitchen, the Mayor's office filed a court injunction against Food Not Bombs, trying to stop them from feeding without a permit in the Civic Center (Bodovitz and Miyasato 1989). Early on, the city arrested members of Food Not Bombs but left the other homeless campers alone (Johnson 1989). Only after the injunction was officially upheld did Agnos order a sweep of the Civic Center arresting Food Not Bombs activists and the remaining homeless protesters. Agnos and his administration targeted Food Not Bombs and not the other homeless organizations that were involved in the tent city protest. He could also have targeted members of the San Francisco Coalition on the Homeless or the Homeless Taskforce, a group of homeless activists who helped start the tent city. Both the Coalition on the Homeless and the Homeless Taskforce regularly sat down and negotiated with the Administration over homelessness policy. Instead of negotiating with the Mayor on homelessness policy, members of Food Not Bombs occupied his office chanting "housing not harassment" (Edmondson 2000: 48). One member of the group, Max Ventura, called out to Agnos stating "Agnos, why don't you come out and talk to people? You're sitting back comfy in your office. You don't want to come out and take the flak" (Bodovitz 1989). This difference in tactics spurred a different reaction from the City.



The City's court injunction was a legal way to sanitize the tent city of Food Not Bombs' presence. This had the effect, either intentionally or not, of excluding the most radical group within San Francisco's homeless movement. The odds are, the City saw Food Not Bombs as a threat to the maintenance of public order, since whenever they confiscated the food from the tent-city tensions would escalate, as the homeless residents got angry over having their meals stolen from them. With City Hall seeing the tent city as "a very violent ugly incident" that had the potential to "make San Francisco look like Tiananmen Square" (Bodovitz 1989),<sup>38</sup> the city wanted to exclude the most radical and instigating aspect of the homeless community from the public sphere. With the arrests of Food Not Bombs activists, the city worked to split the homeless community. The tactic worked as members of the Homeless Taskforce started to resent the presence of Food Not Bombs, which they felt dominated the media. The city ostracized and excluded Food Not Bombs to some degree; by the end of the tent city other homeless organizations moved away, leaving the tent city relatively unoccupied when the final court injunction against Food Not Bombs was released (Bodovitz and Miyasato 1989).

Since Food Not Bombs was not willing to compromise, moderate their stance, or negotiate in good faith with the state, the state used the police to harass the organization—arresting and citing them for a small infraction that countless other organizations and individuals break on a daily basis. In addition, the City succeeded in getting a court injunction banning Food Not Bombs from the Civic Center. The

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<sup>38</sup> Food Not Bombs was aware of the Tiananmen Square message and played it up, bringing an enormous lady liberty holding a carrot, (the food not bombs symbol to the kitchen.

injunction was meant to exclude the group from a precariously situated tent city; an arrangement which the City feared could get out of hand. The City also used the court injunction as a means of dividing the group from its allies, who came to see the group as doing more harm than good for the homeless movement.

In addition to exclusion, I argue that liberal and capitalist institutions also have a need to forcibly include and recuperate movements and struggles that work in opposition to them. For cultural groups this is accomplished through the commodification of the counter culture values and ideas which, once commodified, are forced into the market which regulates and pacifies them. For political movements and organizations, the state uses access to limited power, as a gate to concessions in order to get groups to accept regulatory constraints. For example, the police use of “negotiated management” uses the permit process to instigate a dialogue with an opposition group. The police then use concessions and permits as an incentive to get the groups to accept regulations on the time, manner, and content of their actions, and often look to groups to police themselves (Fernandez 2008).

Food Not Bombs, through their direct-action feeding of the homeless and their unwillingness to negotiate with government officials, forced Agnos to act aggressively and hastily. In doing so, his actions highlighted the normally hidden contradictory nature of urban liberal politics. By refusing the logic of permits, Food Not Bombs highlighted the way that permits are used to control and forcibly include radical movements into the regulatory confines of the state. At the same time, the group’s militant actions—from office occupations, tent city and direct-action feeding of the homeless and hungry—

highlighted the tactics used by the state to exclude and harass movements that do not accept the norms and guidelines of accepted politics or respect the authority of political Administrations. By both including and excluding the group, the City can be seen as trying to force Food Not Bombs into a politics of bare life, in which it is both excluded from the political sphere and included under heavy regulation and controlled by the power of the state.

#### b. Economic Growth versus Social and Economic Justice

If the last section presented a fundamental contradiction within the liberal political project—a need to exclude those who threaten the liberal political sphere clashing in the case of San Francisco with a desire to radically include. This section examines a fundamental problem of contemporary liberalism: the desire to provide a social welfare net to protect the most vulnerable members of the political community, which is in conflict with the desire to promote urban economic growth. For most of the post-war era this contradiction was moderated in urban areas by large sums of federal money. For instance, during the 1970s and early 1980s San Francisco engaged in massive programs to expand corporate spaces (convention centers, office buildings) and tourist attractions (museums, upscale dining, hotels, etc.) while also funding welfare, homeless shelters, and other social services. This double expansion was allowable, partly due to the economic boom of the postwar era, and also due to millions of federal dollars directed towards San Francisco through HUD and other federal programs. With the 1980s presidency of Ronald Reagan the era of federally funded urban development came to an

end, and the fundamental contradiction between corporate, middle-class, and tourist interests and the needs of the poor, nonwhite, and homeless came to the fore in San Francisco and other cities.

San Francisco, unlike most of the nation's urban spaces, was largely gentrified prior to the 1980s. According to a survey of gentrification in the early 1980s San Francisco was listed as the most gentrified urban space nationwide (Legates and Hartman 1986), allowing researchers to look at San Francisco to forecast the impact of increased gentrification on nonwhite communities. The first major wave of gentrification in San Francisco, during the 1970s, was mostly centered on "revitalizing" working-class white neighborhoods and immigrant communities (Hartman, Carnochan et al. 2002). By the late 1980s, after nearly two decades of pro-growth and pro-gentrification activity little remained of San Francisco that had not been "revitalized," leaving little space where the city's poor could live.

Gentrification, according to Neil Smith and Peter Williams "connotes a process which operates in the residential housing market. It refers to the rehabilitation of working-class and derelict housing and the consequent transformation of an area into a middle-class neighborhood" (Smith and Williams 1986: 1-2). At first, during the 1960s through the 1980s, the research into gentrification analyzed it purely as a market and consumer process; in which gentrification emerged as rent gaps grew to the point where the redevelopment of urban centers became lucrative. But during the 1990s the research shifted and began looking at the ways in which cities and corporate interests work together to construct urban spaces. In this newer research gentrification has shifted from

an apolitical economic process to an intentional political program (Castells 1977; Zukin 1991; DeLeon 1992; Smith 1996; Davis 1998; Castells and Susser 2002; Mitchell 2003; Gibson 2004; Amster 2008).

This wave of gentrification swept over major cities across the country during the 1980s as global markets put pressure on urban areas to redefine themselves. Most cities attempted to develop into consumer spaces and corporate headquarters, providing corporate tax breaks and increasing the investment of city money in urban redevelopment plans. This form of redevelopment sought to increase the local tax base by creating a wealthier upper class city. The “spectacular cities” developed in the 1980s needed to pacify and exclude the most visible poor from downtown areas, as commodified or “Disneyfied” spaces require an unnatural form of sanitized space to ensure tourist safety and comfort (Zukin 1991; Gibson 2004).

In effect, gentrification can be seen as an attempt by local political elites to find an urban niche for their city within the global world; Cleveland is seen as a sports city, while San Francisco a cultural center, and Las Vegas an “anything goes” entertainment venue. While the ways in which cities have decided to gentrify has differed according to location and potential, the one common thread appears to be the desire to do so. According to David Harvey, this is largely a calculated response to financial capital accumulation. Harvey claims that gentrification and urban development have been a means of overcoming the problem of capital accumulation. In effect, capitalists accrue so much wealth they run the risk of overproducing their markets (Harvey 2008). As an

historical example, during Napoleon's reign, Georges-Eugene launched a massive public works plan in Paris in 1853 in response to the urban unrest that occurred in 1848, using taxpayer money to fund massive development schemes in order to provide new outlets for capital.<sup>39</sup>

Henri Lefebvre, who began theoretical research on urban space following the urban uprising in Paris in 1968, contends that in capitalist production space itself becomes a commodity and is in fact constructed and manufactured (Lefebvre, Kofman et al. 1996; Lefebvre 2000; Lefebvre 2003; Lefebvre 2009). In this new era space has both use and exchange value, and like other commodities within capitalism; the market looks to maximize only the exchange value. Thus consumers "use space as one uses a machine" (Lefebvre 2009: 188). The state has a central role in maximizing the flow and production of space. To Lefebvre:

the state uses space in such a way that it ensures its control of places, its strict hierarchy, the homogeneity of the whole, and the segregation of the parts. It is thus an administratively controlled and even a policed space. The hierarchy of spaces corresponds to that of social classes, and if there exists ghettos for all classes, those of the working class are merely more isolated than those of others. (Lefebvre 2009: 188)

Thus a complex interplay between market forces and state action is needed to construct and manufacture space in the contemporary world.

Timothy Gibson, in *Securing the Spectacular City: The Politics of Revitalization and Homelessness in Downtown Seattle* (2004) explains how the construction and maintenance of a city around exchange value occurred in Seattle. As he sees it the City

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<sup>39</sup> Gentrification, which radically alters a city's landscape, also radically alters the social movement and social relations within the city.

of Seattle actively used its powers (taxation, police, and direct funding) to convert downtown Seattle into a consumer space. In doing so, Seattle increasingly criminalized and policed actions that weakened the location's exchange value and soured the consumptive quality of the area. The development of the urban core, that is associate with urban gentrification cost taxpayers—through funding development plans and providing tax incentives—and directly harms poorer communities that have to relocate as rental costs price people out of their homes (Gibson 2004). Not only were the poor hurt by Seattle's urban development plans, but the most precariously poor members of the community—the homeless—were banished from the inner corridor through the relocation of homeless services and the development and enforcement of anti-homeless laws. The homeless were deemed an unwanted part of the urban landscape—a group of individuals who lowered the exchange value of space because they made upper and middle class consumers feel uncomfortable and unsafe.

Finally, Neil Smith, in *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* (1996), looks at the process of gentrification in New York City during the 1980s and early 1990s. He argues that gentrification follows the logic of frontier expansionism—using phrases such as: “the urban frontier” and “urban pioneers.” Urban politics thus is centered in “pacifying” and controlling the wildness of the urban environment, in much the same way that the “wild west” frontier was controlled through exclusion, genocide, and ecocide. But unlike the wild west this urban frontier is filled with the homeless, the poor, and nonwhites who all appear to threaten the safety and value of the urban environment (Smith 1996). In Smith's analysis, city administrations

need to take an active role in policing and controlling the frontier to ensure the stability and security needed to gentrify. For instance, New York Mayor Ed Koch, a liberal Democrat, used the police and the regulating power of the city to clear the homeless, punks, and youth out of Tompkins Square Park in the East Village.

The East Village was an up-and-coming middle-class neighborhood in the late 1980s and the “defacto homeless shelter” quality of the park was hurting housing prices and scaring away possible renters and owners. Of course, it was not just middle-class “yuppies” that were at fault but landowners and bankers who saw the East Village as a sure-fire investment. To Smith, these economic and financial interests provided the original impetus for gentrifying the area.

I argue the process of gentrification is central to political program in all major contemporary cities, as the process is promoted by both liberal and conservative regimes. I focus here on Agnos, since gentrification, which displaces the poor and requires the policing of the homeless, went against his stated goals and desires of creating affordable housing and providing government support and services for marginal communities. One can name many reasons for Agnos’s to push gentrification—from the need to increase the local tax-base to the need to keep business interests within his coalition but in doing so he directly contradicted his desire to promote social and economic justice, since programs that increase rent and housing prices also price out the people he wanted to help. Food Not Bombs, as well as the San Francisco Coalition of the Homeless, put pressure on his administration for spending so little on social services and homelessness while pushing



for City funding of a new baseball stadium, City- supported redevelopment of the piers, and support for corporate business in San Francisco.

Food Not Bombs confronted the Administration on its attempts to gentrify the Haight. As noted earlier, starting in late December in 1987, Food Not Bombs began public feedings for the hungry and homeless on the corner of Haight and Stanyan, near an entrance to Golden Gate Park. Within a few months the Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council gave Food Not Bombs a \$1,000 to purchase rice, beans, and other staples, and became a strong ally for the group in opposing the City's policies against the homeless. The Cole Valley Improvement Association, a business and homeowners association for the Haight, began complaining to the city and police. The Cole Valley Improvement Association took the name Cole-Valley, one of the historic parts of the Haight to distance themselves from the "hippie" and counter-culture association that the Haight gained in the 1960s. The groups wanted to "revitalize" the area, clean it up, make it safe for families to once again raise children in the area, and claimed that Food Not Bombs was bringing in undesirables into the neighborhood. According to Theresa Gaus, a spokeswoman for the Cole Valley Improvement Association stated that "The more free food we give away in the Haight the more problems we have. This is liberalism gone bad" (Gordon 1988). What also was an example of "liberalism gone bad" was the city's restraint against citing "car campers" for sleeping in their cars. In the months prior to the police harassment of Food Not Bombs city officials, with full support from the Cole Valley Improvement Association, started ticketing car campers in the Haight. The Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council, on the other hand, viewed the homeless and car campers

in the Haight as members of their community. They also viewed the homeless as in need, and the feeding was a much needed social service. They wanted to protect the Haight against gentrification and rising rental costs.

In this regard, Food Not Bombs became a central player in what the Chronicle referred to as “A Fight for the Soul of the Haight” (Whitting 1988). On one side were middle-class families, businesses, and developers, while the other consisted of aging hippies, leftists, the homeless and racial minorities. The Cole Valley Improvement Association compared the Food Not Bombs arrests to the Tompkins Park riots that had happened only a month earlier.

The Tompkins Square Park incident and the arrests of Food Not Bombs members were eerily similar. In both instances business and home owner associations placed pressure on city officials to crack down on homelessness in their neighborhood. In both instances these associations claimed that the “social services” provided in their community—the feedings in San Francisco and the impromptu homeless shelters in the East Village—negatively impacted the community by lowering housing values and making the neighborhood unsafe for families. In addition, in both instances the homeless and “counter culture” folks were categorized as unsafe invaders of the community, not members of it. This “other-ing” of park and car camping residents and the denial of their political agency and citizenship is central to the gentrifying process. Much as the frontiersman viewed the indigenous peoples, the Cole Valley Improvement Association viewed the car campers and the homeless as a dangerous part of the environment that had to be removed in order to make life “civilized.”

The connection can be made between the arrests to clean up Tompkins Square Park triggered by Gaus's reference to "liberalism gone bad," and the Food Not Bombs arrests triggered by the united efforts of the Cole-Valley Improvement Association. While Gaus mistakenly saw "bleeding hearts" as the problem and the eviction of campers as a move in the right direction, the real tension was between social services and economic justice. Not surprisingly, the Cole Valley Improvement Association, with its larger budget and political influence, had the power to move City Hall and the police. The Association's ability to force the arrests of Food Not Bombs activists and their probable impact on getting the car camping law enforced, indicates that the City valued their opinion above others. Agnos gave special attention, energy, and political capital to development issues—China Basin, pier revitalization, opposition to rent control, support of large corporate interests—which left some of his other plans, most notably his Beyond Shelters plan underfunded. While this plan gained national attention, and Agnos rode its popularity in HUD under President Clinton, without adequate funding and political commitment it remained unimplemented.

## 5. Conclusion: Understandings the Contradictions

In this chapter I have argued the existence of two fundamental, contradictory aspects of urban liberalism that Food Not Bombs and homeless activism helped to expose in San Francisco. These contradictions existed in previous periods but were obfuscated by the large amounts of federal funding and the general economic boom that existed in the postwar and pre-Reagan era. With the drastic cuts in federal funding and the

economic depression that gripped urban areas in the 1980s, urban political regimes were unable to escape these contradictions and maintain their governing coalitions. In San Francisco these contradictions were pushed to the front and ripped open by Food Not Bombs and other poor peoples' movements openly confronting the mayor and pushing his ambivalent stance into the public arena.

Using permits as both a carrot and the justification for the stick, the Agnos Administration tried to forcibly include Food Not Bombs within the confines of the charity state. This effort to recuperate the movement is an inherent part of liberal and capitalist systems, as both require the inclusion and pacification of the external other. At the same time liberalism needs to exclude those groups and movements that fundamentally question its legitimacy. In this case, the City realized that a group of anarchist homeless activists was unlikely to accept the Administration's offer of inclusion and realized that the group adamantly rejected the governments' authority. The City then acted to exclude the group from the political process and removed them from public space—as the Tent City actions. In effect, when faced with anarchist activism, urban liberalism had to deal with a contradictory tension—the need to include and recuperate movements and the need to exclude those who threaten their legitimacy.<sup>40</sup>

Food Not Bombs also forced the process of gentrification into the local political debate by highlighting the actions of the Agnos Administration to clean up the Haight.

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<sup>40</sup> A similar tension was noted by Michael Rogin in *Ronald Reagan: The Movie* (1987) when he discussed the dual treatment of Native Americans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by the United States government. He noted that the United States government treated the indigenous as both children and as a threat to civilization. This led to a paradoxical and confusing policy in which the government tried to educate and civilize indigenous people and exterminate them at the same time

The same contradiction that Rogin saw in the liberal treatment of Native Americans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was expressed in the treatment of Food Not Bombs in San Francisco in the 1980s and 1990s

By confronting the City's attempts to "colonize" the Haight for land developers and business interests, Food Not Bombs shed light on the contradiction between Agnos's attempts to satiate business interests and his claim to support the interests of the poor and downtrodden.

Overall, while Agnos took many missteps as a mayor, for many reasons—some of his own making and others well beyond his control—Food Not Bombs helped facilitate the breakdown of his political coalition. They did this by bringing urban liberal contradictions to the center of the political debate, causing Agnos to declare where he stood. Much like William Lloyd Garrison and the radical abolitionists before the Civil War, Food Not Bombs made fence-sitting a painful and politically unfeasible position. Agnos had to choose whether he supported the corporate and tourist interests or economic and social justice.

This chapter highlighted Food Not Bombs' role in defining the inherent contradictions within urban liberal politics. The next chapter looks at how Food Not Bombs directly confronts the stated desires of a neoconservative politics. In addition, the chapter will examine the role that public space and social order plays in the maintenance of urban regimes. This is something not adequately addressed in the field political science.

## CHAPTER IV

### **CONFRONTING ORDER, AND RESISTING THE REVANCHIST CITY: FOOD NOT BOMBS, HOMELESS ACTIVISM, AND THE JORDAN ADMINISTRATION, 1992-1995**

This chapter examines homeless politics in San Francisco during Jordan's tenure as mayor (1992-1995). Jordan, a registered Democrat, was San Francisco's most conservative mayor in forty years. Jordan's main policy goal was to improve the "quality of life" of everyday San Franciscans by cracking down on disorder by "cleaning" up the streets and domesticating urban space. Referring to himself as the "Citizen Mayor" and the representative of real San Franciscans, Jordan promoted policies to reclaim the City back from homeless residents who had "stolen" it. Food Not Bombs confronted Mayor Jordan in his attempts to marginalize and exclude the homeless and to sanitize public spaces of their presence. By the end of his term, in 1995, Food Not Bombs and Mayor Jordan were sworn enemies, with each constantly attacking and harassing the other.

While never ceasing to be nonviolent, Food Not Bombs received considerable government repression. In total, over 700 arrests and citations were given to Food Not Bombs activists under Jordan's reign, while massive speculation existed that the Mayor's office was illegally surveilling Keith McHenry and other major figures within the group. The repression was considered so bad that Amnesty International wrote to the Mayor's office in October of 1994 seeking information about the City's treatment of the group, stating:

Amnesty International is concerned that the Food Not Bombs activists may have been targeted on account of their beliefs and effectively prohibited from exercising their right to freedom of expression, assembly, and the right to impart information. If this were found to be the case, the City of San Francisco would be in breach of international law and Amnesty International would adopt those imprisoned as “Prisoners of Conscience” and work for their unconditional release. (Amnesty International 1994)

While Amnesty International never claimed Food Not Bombs activists as prisoners of conscience, they criticized the City for using excessive police force.

In confronting the public order policies of the Jordan Administration, Food Not Bombs showed that manufacturing, regulating, and policing of public space is an essential component of a repressive urban regime and that Food Not Bombs—uniquely and confrontationally—resisted the Mayor by reclaiming public space for public use. By reclaiming public space from Jordan, Food Not Bombs undermined his Administration and helped to ensure his electoral failure in 1995.

In this chapter, I will first provide theoretical background on what constitutes a neoconservative urban regime, followed by a narrative describing Frank Jordan’s actions as Mayor and Food Not Bombs’ resistance to his policies. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the importance of public space and reclaiming of the commons.

### 1. Understanding Neoconservative Urban Regimes

Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani is the political figure most commonly associated with an urban neoconservatism, with his “tough on crime” and “social order” politics. Though Giuliani became the public face of “quality of life” urban politics,

it was San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan who first implemented these policies with his Matrix Quality of Life Program in 1993 (Vitale 2001). The core of urban neoconservatism is quality of life policies, free-market housing mechanisms, and a punitive approach to social problems.

The concept of “quality of life” has gone through marked shifts in American political culture since the end of World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s the concept was associated with New Deal and Great Societies social welfare programs, which by promoting social services increased quality of life for the poor. By the end of the 1980s the term meant “quality of life” of homeowners, renters, and tourists who feared homeless people, delinquent youth, and gang members living and “loitering” in “their” parks and public spaces. According to Giuliani,

Quality of life is a process, not a destination. It’s a way of living, not a goal....if people don’t see improvements in their individual lives, if they have to put with incivility and disrespect for their rights every day, they will remain basically pessimistic about the future of the City, even if overall crime is dramatically down. But if a sense of tangible improvement reaches millions of lives, and millions of people understand that the City cares more about their annoyances and is working hard to protect their rights, then more and more people begin to feel the true optimism of the City, and the City is moving in the right direction. We begin to feel that together, we all have a stake in the City. This is what the idea of a civil society is all about. (Vitale 2008: 29)

Giuliani connects “quality of life” to a sense of optimism, concepts of individual rights (the rights commonly of businesses, tourists and middle-class voters), and a yearning for order and civility. In effect, the central question is whose quality of life is important? Is it tourists, business owners, and middle-class residents? Or is it the quality of life of the dispossessed, the poor, and the marginal?



Neoconservative urban mayors, in an attempt to address quality of life management, turned to James Q. Wilson and George L. Kellings'<sup>41</sup> Atlantic Monthly article called "Broken Windows" (Kelling and Wilson 1982). Kellings and Wilson contend that the goal of policing should be the "fixing of broken windows" by stopping small acts of public disorder (Kelling and Coles 1996). To do this, police are needed to root out antisocial behavior and promote social order, irrespective of civil liberties and civil rights. Within this process the central goal of the police is to maintain order rather than promote justice. Thus it is not the percentage of convicted criminals that is important but cleaning the streets and creating the image of stability. This connects well to the general conservative political concern with social order and stability, as seen through Edmund Burke's fear of radical change during the France Revolution (Burke and Clark 2001) and Richard Bork's concern with social decay, and our moral slouching towards Gomorrah (Bork 1996).

Wilson and Kellings explain the core of their broken-windows policy by stating that at:

. . . the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in rundown ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing (Kelling and Wilson 1982).

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<sup>41</sup> George Kellings was also a member of the Manhattan institute, a right-wing think tank that promoted free-market economics with a "tough on crime" approach. The think tank has been a strong supporter of the war on drugs, obscenity laws, the curtailing of welfare and food stamp programs, and the lowering of income and property taxes.

In a city like San Francisco, then, homelessness and panhandling are seen as cues to the community that no one cares about maintenance of the social order and thus conditions become a signal to criminals that they will not be arrested for breaking the law. In this regard, the homeless are the broken windows that need fixing.<sup>42</sup> Since, conservatives also view people as being imperfectable and homelessness as a choice, broken window's adherents saw punitive actions against the homeless as the only solution capable of "fixing" the problem. Unlike the urban liberal approach to poverty and homelessness—which looks to the state to provide social services—neoconservative urban policy wanted to increase the costs associated with making poor choices. "Fixing of broken windows," especially in relation to homelessness, was about displacing and marginalizing the homeless.

To remedy homelessness the broken windows theory calls for increasing police presence on the street, creation of community-based enforcement, the passage of more punitive laws, and a zero-tolerance stance. The purpose of increasing police presence on the streets is twofold. First, since much of the crime targeted by broken-windows enforcement is not reported, the only way for the crimes to be noticed is if the police actively search for them. For this reason nearly half of all citations to the homeless during Jordan's term were for public intoxication, a crime that is easily noticeable by the police but is rarely reported (McGarry 2008: 244). Second, having police on the street is a signal to both criminals and the neighborhood that people are vigilant in protecting

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<sup>42</sup> Understanding people as "broken" and in need of "fixing" plays a prevalent role in Frank Jordan's policies on homelessness and poverty.

public order. This approach requires a return to community-based policing, which rests heavily on foot patrols, because

. . . residents of the foot patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars. (Kelling and Wilson 1982)

Increased police presence on the street should lower crime, according to the broken windows theory, because small crimes that normally go undetected would be stopped and the visual presence of the police officer is a warning sign to criminals and a boon to local residents' morale. With local residents thus empowered, they would self-police their neighborhoods and work with the police to create social order.

To promote social order in the ways that the broken-windows theory calls for, most cities have to pass new laws or creatively enforce old ones. As will be discussed in detail later, in San Francisco Jordan passed two ballot initiatives against panhandling, one banning "aggressive panhandling" and the other creating a 30-foot barrier around ATMs, but failed to get a third, which would have banned obstructing the sidewalk during business hours. Similarly, Giuliani passed laws banning "squeegee men" and passed laws increasing the punishment for panhandling, sleeping in public, and other "quality of life" crimes.

With this collection of laws in place, the police are able to use a zero tolerance approach, citing every instance of law breaking—from jaywalking and sleeping in public

to prostitution and vandalism. As stated earlier, what mattered was not how many convictions the police could get, but that visible law breakers were taken off the street. Most homeless people charged with Matrix crimes had their charges dropped, as there was not enough evidence to convict. In New York under Giuliani's first term the City saw significantly more arrests than crimes reported to the police (Wacquant 2009: 260). This discrepancy between crimes reported and arrests made, as well as the low conviction rate, highlight both mayors' concern with order over justice.

In short, "quality of life" policing is centered on the belief that small infractions of the law, when publicly visible and left unaddressed will create social disorder. Fixing them requires boarding up the broken windows and covering up the social graffiti. Thus if a community sees fewer homeless people in their neighborhood, less graffiti on their walls, and more cops on their streets, they will tend to believe that the neighborhood is safer, even if crime statistics do not agree. To enhance public image, "quality of life" policing is used to stop the most visible forms of crime.

Kelling and Coles in *Fixing Broken Windows* (1996) claim three major quality of life enforcement successes: New York City, Baltimore, and San Francisco (Kelling and Coles 1996). In all three locations, Kelling and Coles argue that by cutting down on petty crime, the cities were able to restore order. Their view has become dominant in urban politics, as more and more cities turn to broken-windows enforcement—from Chicago and Seattle to Los Angeles and Miami.

Sociologist and criminologist Loïc Wacquant disagrees with the broken-windows explanation, providing four alternative hypotheses for why crime dropped in New York from 1993-2000. First, he argues that unprecedented economic growth in the 1990s

decreased the number of crimes committed. Second, that drastic shifts occurred within the illegal drug industry as dealers and gangs created truces and demand for crack decreased. Third, the number of 18 to 24 year olds, the age demographic most commonly correlated with crime, decreased during the 1990s. Fourth, crime rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s were abnormally high, and over time crime rates regress towards the mean (Wacquant 2009: 255-259). Additionally, crime actually began decreased earlier in the 1990s, a time when both New York and San Francisco were governed by urban liberal regimes.

In conclusion, quality of life management requires passing laws that criminalize categories of people, most noticeably the homeless. By criminalizing basic human activities performed in public, quality of life management effectively criminalizes the homeless (Amster 2003; Mitchell 2003; Amster 2008; Mitchell and Heynen 2009). In San Francisco broken windows enforcement changed the City's political goals. Under urban liberalism, the City had been trying to fight homelessness; under neoconservative administrations City fought the homeless. Since the neoconservative agenda also includes a decrease in social services for the homeless and a reduction in government involvement in low-income housing, these urban regimes effectively marginalize and silence the homeless population.

At the same time, quality of life management can easily be seen as discriminatory toward non-whites, who are more likely associated with drugs, delinquency, and crime, and therefore further scrutinized by the state. Thus Wacquant argues that quality of life policing, in practice,

. . . is fundamentally discriminatory in that it rests on an equivalence between behaving outside the norm and being an outlaw, and it targets neighborhoods and populations suspected beforehand, if not held guilty on principle, of moral deficiencies, nay legal offenses” (Wacquant 2009: 268).

Overall, then, neoconservative urban political regimes are centrally concerned with maintaining social order. In many cities urban neoconservatives have accomplished this by targeting certain categories of crimes (sleeping in public, drug dealing, and vandalism) associated with categories of people (the homeless, black men, and youth). The goal of the tactic was to marginalize and remove these figures from the public eye. Free of these "dangerous" categories of people, the public space could be sanitized and domesticated. This domesticated space, according to Neil Smith (1996), was essential to the surge in urban gentrification during the 1990s as urban space was tamed and made safe for the return of middle-class residents (Smith 1996). Thus, as we will see, the policies promoted by neoconservatives are inherently revanchist, in that they try to reclaim quality of life for a certain group of people who feel that their city had been stolen from them.

## 2. Mayor Frank Jordan, The MATRIX Quality of Life Program, General Assistance Reform, and Homeless Resistance

### a. Context for the Jordan Administration's Actions

Frank Jordan, who had been Agnos's first chief of police, was elected in 1991 in part out of the City's frustration over Art Agnos's failure to adequately address homelessness and crime. Agnos had high ambitions, trying to move the City away from a

shelter system towards developing affordable housing. His plans never came to fruition because of budget shortfalls. The lack of funds was partially the result of his administration's policy of funding corporate and tourist industries and gentrification of the City. Most notably, to most San Franciscans, Agnos failed to adequately address homelessness by allowing streets and parks to be taken over by homeless people and their supporters, especially during the Camp Agnos tent-city protest in 1990. In response to the lack of perceived order, Jordan ran as the "tough on crime" political outsider candidate in 1991, and won with 52% of the vote in a run-off election. Jordan vowed to be the "Citizen Mayor" who was going to retake the City for all San Franciscans.<sup>43</sup>

Central to crafting Jordan's policies regarding homelessness and social order was Kent Sims, Jordan's first Economic and Redevelopment director and the former president of The Economic Development Corporation (EDC), a nonprofit think-tank that represented San Francisco business and tourism interests. Sims, an economist by professional training, wrote multiple opinion pieces as one of Jordan's advisors during the election campaign, the most important titled "Homeless Problem (Sims 1991)." This states that San Francisco had become a magnet City for homeless people and the only way to fix the problem was to stop the flow of homeless immigrants. San Francisco was a magnet for the poor because of the City's population density, which supports panhandling, and because of the City's liberal attitude and strong social service programs.

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<sup>43</sup> Frank Jordan, the citizen mayor, was not a mayor for all citizens. In fact, he commonly portrayed himself as representing real San Franciscans, not the homeless and homeless activists, who were not true San Franciscans. In addition, he commonly referred to the homeless as being immigrants to the city. He also claimed that the majority of the homeless residents of the City were mentally ill or addicted to drugs and alcohol and therefore were not rational, intelligent and involved citizens. In effect, one can describe Jordan as expressing Leonard Feldman's central claim in *Citizens Without Shelters*, which is: one cannot be a citizen without access to one's own private shelter.

To change the City's magnetic appeal to homeless people, Sims argued that the City needed to "lower the visibility" of the homeless, whose visual presence harms business and deters tourists from visiting the City; strongly enforce prohibitions on sleeping, drinking, and urinating in public; and decrease the quality and availability of the City's social services (McGarry 2008: 165). By changing the discussion towards the inward flow of undesirable populations, Sims was able to deflect discussion away from the structural and institutional reasons for homelessness in San Francisco—from lack of affordable housing to the decreasing salaries for most of the City's work force.

Sims expanded on the opinion piece when he became director for Economic and Urban Development under Jordan. In 1992 his department wrote and published a report on "Homelessness in San Francisco" (MOEPD 1992). The report echoed many of Sims's original points but added more. His department claimed that the homeless, by interfering with street traffic, scaring away tourists, and keeping consumers from going to stores cost the City nearly \$120 million per year in lost sales tax (McGarry 2008: 178). Because of this Sims argued, the homeless were in fact hurting themselves since that money could have been spent to provide better social services. The report reiterated the importance of decreasing the flow of homeless people into the City and called for the policing of quality-of-life crimes that were currently on the books, as well as making government social services harder to obtain, with more strings attached. He expanded on his sociological claim that the majority of homeless people are unable to help themselves because of mental health and addiction problems, and because of this the City must deny them agency and political involvement and treat them in a more paternal manner. The report stated that a "fundamental problem with our City policy . . . has been that it reflects



principally the interests of social services agencies and homeless advocates—rather than the needs and concerns of the larger non-homeless community of business and residents, and a realistic assessment of the needs of homeless people themselves” (McGarry 2008: 179). Sims wanted to decrease the role of social service agencies and homeless nongovernmental organizations from the process to ensure “the larger non-homeless community” more say in policymaking.

In effect, Sims felt that the homeless and poor needed to be prodded to make the “right” decisions; they should not be coddled and they should not be asked what they wanted. This required a massive police operation to enforce quality of life laws and clear away public space to ensure the success of business. According to the report:

Currently our City has a self proclaimed reputation as a sanctuary for for [sic] anyone who does not fit in elsewhere. We should make clear that our tolerance does not extend to those who come here principally for a welfare livelihood. We need to develop the reputation of a tough, not an easy place to be homeless (McGarry 2008: 180, *Italics Added*).

For his entire term as mayor Jordan was consistently concerned with erasing San Francisco’s “magnet” reputation and with sanitizing public space—for the benefit of businesses and tourists. Unlike other members in the administration—including the carousel of homeless coordinators (five in four years)—Sims played a fundamental role in defining and developing Mayor Jordan’s homelessness programs.

b. Vans and Helping Hands// Mayor Jordan's Homelessness Policies:1992-August 1993

While Mayor Jordan was elected largely to address homelessness in the City, the first year and a half of his administration was unfocused. During this period Jordan put forward two homelessness related programs: The Van Outreach Program and Project Helping Hand.

The Van Outreach Program first appeared in an internal report in spring of 1992. According to The Chronicle the proposed was an “attempt to fulfill Jordan’s campaign pledge to remove homeless people from the streets in a humane manner” (Chung 1992). In reality the program was designed to send social workers, nurses, and police officers out in vans to patrol business and tourist areas and confront homeless people and provide them with social service and medical treatment (both physical and mental). The van program sought to “round up street people voluntarily,” as the vans could also provide rides and referrals to homeless shelters and services (Chung 1992). Most important, the Van Outreach Proposal was meant to rid high traffic business and tourist centers of homeless residents. “It is vital,” the program statement explains, “that the number of homeless be reduced in these areas in order to promote a clean and safe environment for tourist shoppers, and the business community” (McGarry 2008: 174). This concern with protecting the appearance of consumer areas drove Jordan’s analysis of how to address the homeless.

But, the Jordan administration encountered significant problems in coordinating the Van Outreach Program. First, the social service agencies—most

notably Larry Cruz, the administration's first Homelessness Coordinator—were hostile to the program (McGarry 2008: 175). Cruz, a supporter of Art Agnos who believed in expanding social services, claimed that the plan was a media spectacle, since the proposed programs already existed, albeit without police officers working alongside social workers. Second, the amount of funding needed to create the new van program was extremely high, largely due to the inclusion of register nurses and police in the operation. In the end, the program was reduced to a single outreach van for the Mobile Assistance Patrol, without an officer or a nurse on board.

The other homelessness program promoted by the Mayor's office during the first half of his term was "Project Helping Hand," an Orwellian-named program that was designed to decrease panhandling in heavy foot-traffic areas. Project Helping Hand consisted of two programs. The first, almost entirely funded by local merchant groups and an organization called San Franciscans for Responsible Government, placed fliers around town depicting an open hand receiving coins crossed out. The goal was to discourage tourists from giving money to panhandlers.

The second part of Project Helping Hand was a ballot initiative, Proposition J, intended to outlaw "aggressive panhandling." Aggressive panhandling, according to the proposition, was "aggressive and coercive behavior that falls short of robbery, battery, or assault, which is criminal violation" that "infringes on citizens' rights, hurts business owners, and harms tourism"

(McGarry 2008: 188). The proposition was intended to strengthen the power of the police to cite and possibly arrest homeless people within certain areas.

Jordan's ballot initiative was the first one placed by a mayor in three mayoral terms, as neither Mayors Feinstein nor Agnos had used the ballot system. Jordan was forced to use the ballot system due to the hostility of liberal organizations to his policies. The Board of Supervisors opposed Proposition J and on August 11, 1992, passed a ballot argument against Proposition J, as did the ACLU, San Francisco Coalition for the Homeless, and even the Democratic Party of San Francisco (of which Jordan was a member). On the other side, the Proposition was strongly supported by the business community, the Chamber of Commerce, the Hotel Council of San Francisco, the San Francisco Republican Party, and even some unions. In the end the initiative passed with an overwhelming 55% of the vote in a heavily attended election (McGarry 2008: 192-193).<sup>44</sup>

In the end, the Jordan Administration saw the passage of J as a sign that the citizens of San Francisco wanted a more proactive approach to cleaning and clearing the City streets of homeless people. The administration used this voter mandate to construct one of the most punitive anti-homeless policies in the country, the Matrix Quality of Life Program, in August of 1993. Overall, the first year and a half of Jordan's term saw him developing policies on homelessness and public space. According to Jim Lazarus, the Mayor's chief of staff in 1992,

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<sup>44</sup> The 1992 election was peculiar. The citizens of San Francisco passed Proposition J, banning aggressive panhandling, but also passed Proposition H, a rent-control bill, and elected leftist Angela Alioto as head of the Board of Supervisors. For these reasons one cannot read the 1992 election as a move to the right.

the ballot initiative “sets a tone that. . . [w]e are not encouraging you to sleep in our doorways” (McGarry 2008: 196). By 1993, with the tone set, a war was in the making.

c. Revanchism By the Bay: The Matrix Quality of Life Program’s and General Assistance Reform

Voters elected Jordan because he said he would do something about anti-social spongers who flout the law, break the rules and degrade the quality of city life. It took a while, but with the dawn of Matrix, the mayor has finally begun to deliver – Deborah Saunders “Civility Not Crime” (Saunders 1993)

The Matrix Quality of Life Program was the culmination of Frank Jordan’s homelessness planning. On paper, the Matrix plan was a multidepartmental strategy, combining the police, housing, and social service departments in a concerted effort to “clean up” the streets in San Francisco and promote social order. According to Mayor Jordan it was “a multi-departmental city effort to help people living on the streets obtain shelter and other services (such as psychiatric and drug and alcohol treatment), while at the same time protecting the general public from certain offenses committed in public” (Gardner and Lindstrom 1997: 110). In reality, however it was a police operation, which was characterized as “the most systematic, far-reaching criminal justice strategy ever devised by a San Francisco government (perhaps by any American municipal government) to control its ever-increasing homeless population” (Gardner and Lindstrom 1997: 98).

The Matrix program enforced zero-tolerance “quality of life” laws concerning: lodging in public, trespassing, public inebriation, willful and malicious obstruction,

public consumption of alcohol, obstructing a sidewalk, remaining on private or business property, urinating or defecating in public, possession of a shopping cart, soliciting on or near a highway, sleeping in vehicles on the street, sleeping in public, erecting tents or structures in parks, obstructing a sidewalk with an object, and aggressive panhandling (Gardner and Lindstrom 1997: 97).<sup>45</sup> In the 15 months that the plan was enforced, approximately 39,000 citations or arrests were given, with nearly 50% for public intoxication (McGarry 2008: 232). In effect nearly 40,000 citations and arrests were made in a City that has, on average, 10,000 homeless residents—i.e., on average, nearly four citations or arrests for each homeless resident in San Francisco during this fifteen month period. The cost to the City was nearly \$10 million, including jail time and district attorney costs. Additionally, the citations and arrests cost the homeless community approximately \$3 million in penalties, an excessively large sum for a segment of the population shackled by extreme poverty (Gardner and Lindstrom 1997: 108).

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<sup>45</sup> In accord with court mandates, the City of San Francisco argued that the laws criminalized certain behaviors and not categories of people. Chief of Police Anthony Ribera, echoing this claim, stated “we cannot allow people who are defying the law to run rampant over our streets. . . . The law is for everybody.” The editorial board for The San Francisco Chronicle concurred: “we are not targeting the homeless—we are targeting certain kinds of violations” (Lynch: 1993).

This statement echoes the famed line by Anatole France, “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the street, and to steal their bread.” Of course, critics of the Matrix program argued, in the press and in court, that the new enforcement criminalized being homeless as, by definition, the homeless have nowhere other than public space to sleep, eat, and drink. The move towards redefining anti-homeless laws by “activity” (i.e., sleeping in public and drinking in public) instead of by category of people (i.e., anti-vagrancy laws) emerged in the 1990s as a legal loophole in overcoming the court decision in *Pottinger v. Miami*.

In ruling on the Matrix plan Federal Judge Jensen from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Joyce v. San Francisco*, ruled in favor of the City, claiming that since San Francisco made sleeping in parks illegal only from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., it was not unconstitutional. This is because the homeless could sleep during daytime hours, and anything short of a 24-hour ban on sleeping in public is constitutional. Overall, further appeal by the ACLU in *Joyce v. San Francisco* was ended in 1995 when Mayor Willie Brown ended the Matrix program, making the issue legally moot.

The Matrix program had its start in a December 1992 police program that was designed to use “community policing” and neighborhood involvement to address serious crimes—burglaries, theft, and assault. In August 1993, Mayor Jordan, in conjunction with Police Chief Anthony Ribera, decided to expand the program to include homelessness and Quality of Life crimes in high-traffic business and tourist areas of San Francisco—most notably in and around Civic Center Park and UN Plaza. That month the plan was quietly implemented in the Tenderloin and Civic Center on a temporary basis. After that, the Mayor and police chief proclaimed Matrix a success and decided to expand the program to include most major tourist and business sectors of the City.

During the first three months of Matrix being solely a police operation, the Mayor’s office expanded the program to include social service and housing agencies, but, the social service arm was left woefully underfunded. According to a San Francisco Weekly report in 1995, Matrix fully funded only seven social workers to do housing and alcohol treatment outreach. Those seven social workers directed a little over 200 people to housing or drug referral programs in a six-month period, while nearly 22,000 people were cited for a criminal offense (Cothran 1995). Social service benefits did not, overall, increase with the Matrix plan. For instance alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs actually saw a decrease in clientele. Discussing the decrease in substance abuse referrals, Frank Spinelli of McMillan Drop In Center was quoted as saying “I get a sense that police are being instructed to make arrests rather than offer detox options” (Granahl and Taylor 1994).

Even despite the woefully limited social service component to the program, the Mayor commonly framed Matrix as an “outreach” program.<sup>46</sup> The San Francisco Weekly, in an article about the social service record of the Matrix plan, stated:

No one is faulting the outreach teams for their dismal record. In addition to Matrix, the city hosts some 20 outreach programs—most run by nonprofits—and they all face the same harsh reality: The number of homeless so overwhelms the city's bulwark of low-income housing, shelter and clinical services that street outreach is, at best, an exercise in wishful thinking. What irks advocates for the poor is that Jordan is bundling liberal programs developed long before he was elected and calling the amalgam "Matrix" in order to perpetuate the illusion that the homeless are well cared for. Rather than build a more effective system of government assistance, the mayor and supervisors have cut social service budgets every year since 1992. (Cothran 1995)

The statistics make clear the reality of Matrix, which Jordan appealed to existing social services as proof that the Matrix program was not entirely about police powers, in reality social service programs were not expanded, in fact, he cut funding for those services every year he was Mayor. Further, Jordan made social workers' jobs harder by forcing them to work more closely with the police.

In the summer of 1995, he expanded the Matrix program under Matrix II, a plan to extend the current enforcement to the City's parks in outlying neighborhoods. This expansion occurred for two reasons. First, the Mayor had been coming under political

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<sup>46</sup> Tangentially related, in August and September the Mayor also proposed that the police start confiscating shopping carts from the homeless. In exchange for the shopping carts the City was planning to provide homeless residents with free duffle bags, donated by downtown businesses, and as many garbage bags as they needed.<sup>46</sup> The belief was that cart removal would clean up the streets and save grocery stores thousands of dollars a year (Lynch 1993).

But the cart plan came in for almost unanimous condemnation. Even columnist and pro-Matrix conservative Debra Saunders criticized the Mayor's plan. She claimed, “The guys with shopping carts aren't the reason you avoid the cable car turnaround. Why pick on these guys?” (Saunders 1993)

In the end the Mayor toned down the rhetoric on shopping carts, asking grocery stores to increase their security instead.



pressure, mostly from conservative developers and neighborhood associations, because the homeless were being dislocated from commercial districts and relocating to residential neighborhoods. The increase in homelessness within typically wealthy, white, and family-friendly neighborhoods threatened his political coalition (King and Bowman 1994). Second, on August 19, 1995, a police dog was fatally shot and a police officer and three homeless park residents were wounded by a homeless gunman residing in Golden Gate Park. After the shooting, the Mayor announced that the City would strictly enforce a 10 p.m. ban on sleeping in city parks and the 500 to 1,000 residents of Golden Gate Park, in particular, would have to find a different place to sleep (Delgado 1995; Levy 1995; Rojas and Pimentel 1995; Staff 1995).

The Jordan's Administration also used the ballot system to expand its revanchist policies against the homeless and poor. In general, Jordan used the ballot system to promote his political agenda, largely due to the large opposition he faced on the Board of Supervisors. During his four years as mayor his Administration wrote and sponsored ten ballot initiatives, five of which dealt with homelessness and poverty issues. Of these five initiatives, four passed, most with overwhelming (more than 55%) support. These ballot initiatives included a 1992 aggressive panhandling ban (Proposition J), a general assistance reform initiative in 1993 (Proposition V), an ATM boundary law in 1994 (Proposition J), a 1994 ban on obstructing a sidewalk (Proposition M), and a Mandatory Rent Payment Plan in 1994 (Proposition N) (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Homelessness and Poverty Related Ballot Initiatives**

Proposition	Year	Goal	% Yes
J	1992	Ban Aggressive Panhandling	55%
V	1993	Drastic Welfare Reform	61%
J	1994	ATM Boundary	58%
M	1994	Ban Obstructing a Sidewalk	49%
N	1994	Mandatory Rent Payment Plan	51%

Three of these ballot initiatives dealt directly with “quality of life” management—both the 1992 and the 1994 Proposition J and Proposition M, while the other two—Proposition V and Proposition N—were reforms of general-assistance. Of the three quality of life policies, Proposition M was the most draconian, and was defeated. That law would have made obstructing a sidewalk by either laying or sitting, during business hours, a ticketable offense. This ballot initiative, unlike both Proposition Js, did not seem to address a serious concern and was instead seen as a business-friendly initiative. In the end, the initiative was defeated 49% to 51%. Both Proposition Js, on the other hand, passed with significant support, 55% and 58% respectively. The 1992 initiative, which was part of Project Helping Hand, made aggressive panhandling illegal. The 1994 Proposition J created a 30-foot buffer around ATMs in which it was illegal to loiter or panhandle (Lynch 1993).

The two general assistance reform initiatives—Proposition V and Proposition N—addressed access to general assistance funds. Proposition V, which passed with 61% of the vote, drastically reformed the general assistance procedure, most notably by mandating the fingerprinting of recipients. The City saw fingerprinting as a way to quickly check criminal records of assistance recipients, giving authorities access to records in San Francisco and surrounding cities. The plan was to root out general

assistance frauds who came to San Francisco to get money but who really lived elsewhere. To further this goal, Proposition V made it harder to get general assistance benefits in San Francisco, requiring a 15-day proof of residence within the City, and creating new ways to drop people from general assistance. The initiative was predicted to save the City up to \$1.2 million annually in general assistance benefits, but costs associated with implementing it made the real dollar amount significantly lower (McGarry 2008: 282-283). In the wake of Proposition V, only 200 people either dropped out or were dropped from receiving general assistance.

The second general assistance benefits-related program was the Mandatory Rent Payment Plan, or Proposition N. Proposition N required all homeless general assistance recipients to accept an open SRO hotel room if one was available. This plan was an alteration of the long-running Volunteer Rent Payment Plan, which allowed homeless residents in the City to decide if they wanted to accept an SRO in exchange for part of their monthly benefits. With the passage of this initiative, homeless residents would be mandated to accept a SRO room and would mandatorily have that room's cost deducted from their monthly benefits. On average, that would lower a person's monthly stipend from approximately \$345 a month to about \$65. Typically the rooms were in slum conditions below code and owned by absentee landlords. In addition, even though the SRO hotels tended to be clustered in certain neighborhoods (the Tenderloin and Hunter's Point), homeless residents had no control over which part of the City they would live in. In effect, many homeless residents placed into the system refused the unacceptable housing arrangement. In doing so they still had their general assistance money cut, but

receiving no tangible benefits for doing so. In the years prior to the passage of Proposition N, many of the City sponsored SRO hotels had been cited for code violations (Levy 1994).

The Mandatory Rent Payment Plan not only helped the City to recupe the costs associated with housing homeless residents; it was also intended to decrease the money available for homeless general assistance recipients to spend on alcohol and drugs. Echoing Kent Sims, Jordan asserted that large amounts of general assistance money were being spent on drugs and alcohol, which went hand in hand with the Administration's claim that the majority of homeless were on the streets because of addiction problems. The Jordan Administration argued that it was foolish to allow people, who are either addicts or mentally ill, to have free reign on spending their own money.

The stated object of the Matrix program and general assistance reforms, according to the Jordan Administration, was to take back the City for middle-class residents, businesses, and tourists. According to The San Francisco Chronicle, "Jordan is seeking nothing less than to toughen a city that he claims has been taken advantage of." Jordan aid Bill Wunderman stated, "We are not turning our backs on the needy. But people are tired of seeing things in this city go downhill, and there are certain things we won't accept anymore" (McGarry 2008: 276).<sup>47</sup> A Mayor's aid told The Chronicle, "Public patience has worn out. . . . We want to take back the parks, automatic teller machines, alleys, the streets, our plazas, our playgrounds for all citizens" (McGarry 2008: 277).

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<sup>47</sup> Jordan's ballot plans, especially his general assistance reforms, also highlight the biopolitical nature of contemporary politics. With these reforms, Jordan claimed that the homeless and poor should not be viewed as having any form of political agency and instead should be regulated in much the same way that cities regulate public health and order problems. By viewing people as something to be contained to ensure the free flow of the economy, Jordan's policies illustrate the ways in which city governments, and not just the federal and state government, engage in a biopolitics.

This reclaiming of space was an attempt to create the appearance of order and take back the city from the poor and homeless who had “stolen” it from its rightful owners. This revanchist policy by City Hall was intended to alter San Francisco’s reputation as a homeless magnet city and make Not-In-My-Back-Yard a citywide policy. The program was partially successful in displacing San Francisco’s homeless population, especially from central business and tourist locale, as cities such as Berkley and Oakland saw increases in their homeless populations. Police Lt. Dennis Martel said regarding displacement of the homeless: “If people are now finding they can’t do whatever they want here, and that makes them uncomfortable, then that is good news” (Lynch 1993). Still, some wealthier sections of the City also saw a significant increase in homeless residents as did the City’s parks.

In the end, homeless numbers did not decrease under Jordan’s tenure as Mayor; and in most neighborhoods homelessness got worse, as people were displaced from downtown into outlying residential neighborhoods. By the end of Jordan’s term, homelessness was still the number one issue on voters’ minds, as it had been in 1991. Jordan’s electoral loss in 1995 was largely a result of his failure to effectively address homelessness in the City.

d. Resistance by the Homeless to Homelessness Policies

Over 6,000 hot meals served for free, not one health complain. Over 450 arrests for serving free food, not one conviction – Food Not Bombs Flier, September 1993 (McGarry 2008: 248)

While sources like the Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and San Francisco Chronicle columnist Debra Saunders supported the Matrix plan, as did many San Francisco voters as evidenced by the ballot success that Frank Jordan enjoyed during his term, the entire political left in San Francisco opposed the plan. Most notably, Jordan was resisted by Food Not Bombs, the San Francisco Coalition for the Homeless, and Religious Witness, an interfaith alliance that formed to oppose the Matrix plan. While the Coalition on the Homeless and Religious Witness received more positive coverage in the larger San Francisco papers, it was Food Not Bombs that pushed the homeless rights movements and their constant protests and actions in ways that most frustrated the Mayor's administration.

By the time Jordan took office, Food Not Bombs had established itself as one of the most important homeless service groups in the City. By August 1993 the group had more than 75 regular members and was serving over 500 meals a day, making them the fourth largest food service organization in San Francisco, all without excepting government funding, paid staff, or fixed office or cooking space. During Jordan's term the group organized meal services twice a day in either Civic Center Park or UN Plaza, and every Monday in Golden Gate Park, for a total of 15 meals a week. In addition to their daily meal services, which took them in front of City Hall and in the heart of the financial district, the group shouted down the mayor at his public press conferences, organized a tent-city occupation of UN plaza during the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United

Nations, organized massive protests in Golden Gate Park against the expansion of Matrix in 1995, and protested in front of the Mayor's home. During Jordan's four years, more than 700 arrests and citations were handed out to Food Not Bombs activists; Keith McHenry nearly faced life in prison for a third-strikes violation (which would have made McHenry the first white person sent to prison for life under California's "three strikes" law); the group convinced a state judge to overturn the City's injunction against the group's public feedings;<sup>48</sup> and even Amnesty International and the ACLU came to the group's defense. At the end of Jordan's term, the San Francisco Chronicle asked every candidate in an early Mayoral debate what they would do about Food Not Bombs. Of the five major candidates at the time, only Jordan stated that he would continue to arrest them for distributing food without a permit.

Going back to the early time in the Jordan Administration, before the development of the Matrix plan, Food Not Bombs actively opposed the City's homelessness policies—most notably the City's constant arresting and citing of homeless people for public order issues. The group's feedings in high traffic and public spaces gave constant witness to police harassment of the homeless. Food Not Bombs never let down its guard after Jordan's election. In fact, Jordan's harsh language against the homeless only motivated the group to become more militant and active. Energized, the group increased its meal service from once a day to fifteen times a week. Not only did they expand their service but they moved most of their meal services to Civic Center

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<sup>48</sup> It was ruled that the City was unfairly enforcing the ban on serving food in public because they were not doing the same to other organizations or individuals. For instance, Mayor Frank Jordan in 1995 had a campaign event "Franks with Frank" in which he gave out free hot dogs to his supporters. Much like Food Not Bombs, Jordan never got a permit to serve the food, yet he was not cited or arrested for breaking the ban.

Park, the location most targeted by the police. Early on the Jordan administration did not harass Food Not Bombs. McHenry told a reporter, “We don’t get arrested for serving free food anymore”(Brazil 1993). Even though McHenry and Food Not Bombs activists were no longer getting arrested, the City did not sit back. Jordan asked the court system for another injunction against the group’s public feedings in Civic Center Park. As before, the courts complied with the Administration’s request, making public feedings by the group a misdemeanor (breaking a court injunction) and not a mere citation (distributing food without a permit). And as before, the group was not deterred; even with a court injunction against them the group served meals daily in Civic Center Park.

The group was also one of the most active voices against the Matrix program from its start in August of 1993. Speaking out against police actions, and communicating with homeless residents in the Civic Center about their experiences, the group began coordinating protests early in September of 1993 in public opposition to the Matrix plan, which they were prepared to continue indefinitely. On September 16, 1993, two weeks after Jordan publicly endorsed the Matrix plan, the group organized a protest and meal service in Civic Center Park. During the protest Food Not Bombs members and others coming to get free food pelted the police with bagels as they confiscated the soup and other food that the group had brought out. During this protest four Food Not Bombs activists were arrested, and shortly following the protest Angela Alioto, the most left-leaning member of the Board of Supervisor brought forward a proposal to decriminalize Food Not Bombs feedings, but the proposal was defeated (Chronicle Reporter 1993).




A bigger protest was organized by Food Not Bombs on September 29, 1993. During the protest hundreds of activists and homeless residents congregated in Civic Center Park. This protest occurred after a month of police harassment and arrests. The protest culminated in the arrest of 35 people, and this set the tone for the remaining year and a half of the Jordan Administration as Food Not Bombs and the City both strengthened their stances. Food Not Bombs again pelted the police with bagels and chanted “Food Not Cops.” One Food Not Bombs activist, Terry Mullan, explained “We’re just defending our food table and we are not going to make it easy for them to take us away” (Lynch 1993). Police Commander Dennis Martel, the officer in charge of orchestrating the Matrix Plan, replied, “This rally had nothing to do with the homeless. It was a planned demonstration....for publicity” (Lynch 1993). Echoing his predecessor Art Agnos, Frank Jordan asserted, “Keith McHenry is welcome to serve food legally anywhere the law permits. If the intent is to feed the poor by legal means, there are ways to accomplish that goal” (Lynch 1993). During the Matrix years the group was harassed nearly daily by the police. Although people were not arrested every day, there was always an imminent threat of arrest, confiscation of resources (tables, bowls, containers, pamphlets, cars, etc.), or other forms of harassment. The daily harassment of the group prompted Amnesty International in 1994 to contact the Mayor’s office. Though Amnesty International never formed a campaign to support Food Not Bombs activists, their public condemnation of the City’s actions gave a major boost to the group.

In addition to organizing meals multiple times a day, Food Not Bombs began organizing actions to disrupt the Mayor’s actions and discredit his administration.

Targeting the Matrix plan, members of the group began attending the Mayor's public press conferences, shouting down the Mayor, carrying protest signs, and in general disrupting the events. These actions demonstrated that the "Citizen Mayor's" actions were not popular and that he was unable to establish order, even at his own events. Similarly, the group protested Jordan's campaign events during his 1995 reelection bid. The group would set up tables in front of campaign dinner spots, for instance, with signs and fliers highlighting the Mayor's record on homelessness, housing, and the like. The group also protested in front of the Mayor's house (Lynch 1993; Lehrman 1995). At the first rally on October 10, 1993, over 200 people gathered in front of the house. Twenty-one people were arrested as the group banged drums, jeered the mayor, and made a ruckus. The protestors threatened to turn his front yard into a tent city, but after the arrests they backed down on that demand and disbanded (Lynch 1993). The large number of protesters who followed Jordan around was mockingly illustrated by San Francisco Chronicle cartoonist Phil Frank (figure 7). Here the cartoonist targets the Mayor's plan to put suicide phones on the Golden Gate Bridge and highlights the Mayor's constant harassment with the line "There's no one picketing me here or yelling at me, nothing but the soothing lapping of the beckoning blue waters" (Frank 1993).

**ARLEY** Phil Frank



**Figure 7: Frank Jordan Cartoon**

A humorous action occurred when Food Not Bombs member Keith McHenry attempted to remove Frank Jordan's name from the Mayor's office door. In the process the Mayor's aide contacted the City Hall police. The police chased McHenry from the Mayor's door throughout the entire City Hall, until McHenry barricaded himself inside the office of Board of Supervisor Hallinan's office. The police finally entered through the window in order to detain and arrest McHenry, on the way out of the building screamed "Police State, Police State" (Levy 1993).

The largest action that Food Not Bombs organized was a weeklong action to counter the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the United Nation's, which started on June 25, 1995. During the week Food Not Bombs and other groups organized a tent-city occupation of UN Plaza and a 24-hour soup kitchen, as well as daily protests and street occupations. The protest coincided with a City festival celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and highlighting ongoing human rights abuses in San Francisco and the United States more generally. While hundreds of groups

protested the UN celebration—with topics ranging from AIDS and war to Tibet and Bosnia, the San Francisco police stated: “The one group that has been causing the most trouble this weekend is Food Not Bombs and, in my opinion, they would be the likeliest source of a problem” (Delgado 1995).

In anticipation of the protest, Food Not Bombs put out a call to action, and expanded the protest to a national Food Not Bombs gathering. Activists from nearly 40 chapters of Food Not Bombs—from Seattle to San Diego and Berkeley to Boston—came to provide support. This reinforcement to the already large activist-base of Food Not Bombs allowed the group to maintain the soup kitchen and tent city even with daily police arrests and confiscations. In the first two nights alone sixty-one Food Not Bombs activists were arrested for blocking an intersection and resisting arrest, 9 more for distributing food without a permit, and 12 more in a concurrent action at the Presidio. Overall, the police and Food Not Bombs played a weeklong cat-and-mouse game in which “day after day, in violation of city health ordinances, the activists smuggled bagels, soup and fruit into the plaza to feed the city’s homeless. And day after day, the cops tried to prevent the food distribution, arresting numerous people in the process” (Delgado 1995). By the end of the weekend-long action, the police appeared frustrated with arresting Food Not Bombs activists. Police Sergeant Rene Laprevotte told *The Chronicle*, “We’ve been about 75 percent successful in intercepting the food before it’s distributed. But to me it’s just not worth the hassle. If they just let (Food Not Bombs) distribute their stuff, nine out of ten people wouldn’t eat it. It’s really crummy food” (Delgado 1995). This was not the first time that police officers mentioned frustration at

carrying out the Mayor's orders. For instance, one anonymous police officer told The San Francisco Chronicle:

Citing these people is not a normal thing. It's done, but is not a regular part of our duties. But we are gearing up for UN50 and we are specifically being told to do it now. . . . A lot of us don't like going out citing somebody for being within 500 feet of a stupid off- ramp, but if you're told to do it, you do it. I think we all would rather not be involved in Matrix. We think it is a political thing, and we would rather not get involved in somebody's political career. (Johnson 1995)

However, the majority of police officers were interested in maintaining order during the UN50 protests. Lt. Larry Barsetti, one of the officers in charge of maintaining order during the protest, stated that "If we had a plane, we'd use it, too. We're looking for anything that would disrupt civil order" (Delgado 1995).

A few months after the UN50 protests, in August of 1995, Food Not Bombs actively confronted the Mayor's attempts to expand the Matrix program. The group was significantly involved in organizing a series of large homeless protests in Golden Gate Park. The August 28<sup>th</sup> protest in the Park was a "sleep in," in which homeless residents and political activists laid down in the park after nightfall and, flaunting the law, camped in the open and enmasse. These protests occurred as the Mayor called for park residents to be evicted. The massive scale of the protests kept the police from sweeping the parks for two days. Finally, early on August 30, 1995, Mayor Jordan sent the police into Golden Gate Park. The following day homeless residents of the park and members of Food Not Bombs organized and protested in front of the Mayor's house. Egg Allen, one of the homeless protestors, speaking out against the Mayor's plan asked, "why is it that

he wants people living in Golden Gate Park to move back onto the streets? With the cuts he is making (in services), people won't even be able to sleep in doorways” (Lehrman 1995). The Mayor did not go out and talk to the protestors, who at that point had become a daily part of his reality. Instead he told the press, "They're saying the people have every right to camp anywhere they want, to take over our parks. It's something I won't allow” (Hatfield, Glover et al. 1995).

In short, from 1993 onward Food Not Bombs was a gadfly for the Mayor's office. The group remained constantly in the public eye and forced the Mayor to address issues of homelessness, even when he did not want to. They refused to back down or weaken their protest, even after receiving over 700 citations and arrests. The City was never able to keep Food Not Bombs in check. The group never missed a meal service, never missed a protest, and never missed an opportunity to confront the Mayor. By the end of Jordan's four-year term Food Not Bombs had become something of a cause célèbre with thousands of active supporters in the Bay Area, including the punk band Green Day, which played a benefit concert to help cover Food Not Bombs' legal fees. Internationally, the press from San Francisco helped expand and galvanize the movement. In 1992 Food Not Bombs had roughly 40 chapters in the United States; by 1995 that number had grown to nearly 100, including chapters throughout Western Europe and South America (Crass).

Frank Jordan lost his reelection bid to Willie Brown, with homelessness once again being the City's number-one issue. Brown had successfully campaigned to end the Matrix program and return to a more progressive solution to homelessness. Four years

after butting Art Agnos out of office for his failure to address homelessness, Frank Jordan lost on the same issue.

### 3. The Left Coast Revanchist City: Frank Jordan, Food Not Bombs, and the Struggle over Political Space

Attacks on affirmative action and immigration policy, street violence against gays and homeless people, feminist bashing and public campaigns against political correctness and multiculturalism were the most visible vehicle of this reaction. In short, the 1990s have witnessed the emergence of what we can think of as the revanchist city—(Smith 1996: 45)

Neil Smith, in his groundbreaking book on gentrification, *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* argues that the wave of gentrification in the 1980s turned into the revanchist urban politics of the 1990s. By revanchist, Smith refers to:

a political movement that formed in France in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Angered by the increased liberalism of the Second Republic, the ignominious defeat of Bismarck, and the last straw—the Paris Commune (1870-1871), in which the Paris working class vanquished the defeated government of Napoleon III and held the city for months—the revanchists organized a movement of revenge and reaction against both the working class and the discredited royalty. . . . It was a right-wing movement built on populist nationalism and devoted to a vengeful and reactionary retaking of the country. (Smith 1996: 45)

According to Smith, the modern revanchist movement is comprised of middle-class white City residents who feel that, due to urban liberal politics from the New Deal to Ronald Reagan, their cities have been stolen from them. They've been stolen by minorities, gays and lesbians, immigrant groups, and the homeless. The

revanchists sought to take back the City through reactionary policies that would punish those perceived to be the thieves.

The rise of revanchist policies in the 1990s, according to Smith, represents a shift and change in gentrification policy. While the 1980s saw City officials using City money to fund gentrification efforts, the 1990s approach was to use the police and social services agencies to make the urban environment pro-business. This shift was accomplished by punishing those who hurt business—the poor, the nonwhite, and the homeless.

Frank Jordan can be seen as one of the first revanchist mayors in the United States. The self-described “Citizen Mayor” wanted to represent “all San Franciscans” and not “social workers” and “homeless activists.” In effect, Jordan defined himself as representing those voices and interests that had been shut out of City Hall since the rise of urban liberalism in the 1960s. His goal was to reclaim the City for these “original” San Franciscans, who had been pushed by homeless residents out off the parks, tourist areas, and sidewalks. The homeless, to Jordan, represented a group of addicted and mentally ill folks who were invading the City from outside (the “flow” problem) and needed to be punished for engaging in antisocial behavior. Revanchism was at the root of Jordan’s homelessness policy, which cut social services, increased police harassment, and decreased the already limited autonomy and agency of homeless residents.

Jordan’s revanchism was built on neoconservative “broken windows” policing. Much like Giuliani in New York, Jordan dealt with homelessness and social problems through by using the police and targeting categories of people



who are defined as a burden on the City. The goal was to decrease the amount of money spent on social services, sanitize the public space of social deviants and signs of disorder, and reclaim the City with a vengeance. Jordan rejected the structural or institutional causes of homelessness, arguing that homelessness was largely the fault of individuals. Thus the City needed to punish those who made bad choices that affected others. Jordan saw the homeless and their allies as the “enemy.”

Revanchist politics are inherently conflictual, drawing on an enemy/friend distinction. Food Not Bombs and the rest of the homeless community viewed Jordan as their sworn enemy as well. Both sides solidified their stance—with Jordan refusing to back down on Matrix, and Food Not Bombs refusing to move to less traffic locations. Neither side was willing to compromise. Food Not Bombs attacked Jordan at every opportunity. Jordan likewise viewed Food Not Bombs as an enemy and a threat to public order.

Control of space drove Jordan’s urban policies According to Henri Lefebvre, book *The Production of Space* reinvigorated the field of political geography in the 1970s, consumer capitalism constructs and manufactures space by categorizing and constructing meaning to a space. In this respect “not only has capitalism laid hold of pre-existing space, of the Earth, but it also tends to produce a space of its own” (Lefebvre 2000: 326). This new economy of space, defined as “contradictory space” by Lefebvre, uses space to maximize exchange value. In this process “The entirety of space must be endowed with exchange value. And

exchange value implies interchangeability” (Lefebvre 2000: 337). Contradictory space needs uniformity, as consumer exchange is best suited when commodities can be seen as similar and economic markets are centralized. Not all spaces are created equal. In fact, certain spaces are inherently constructed as being “less than” others. An inherent “unequal development” of space renders tourist and business “centers” as economically most valuable and “peripheral” space economically depressed. Thus certain areas and types of space are given higher exchange values, irrespective of their “use value.” This push towards the creation of consumer space is addressed in Naomi Klein’s book *No Logo*, which studied the corporatization and privatization of space and the resistance to it (Klein 2000).

Frank Jordan pushed to construct safe, sanitized, commercial tourist spaces, most notably in the Civic Center, along the pier, and in upscale downtown districts. These spaces were maintained by a large police presence, since the homeless, understandably, congregated in the tourist areas of the City and slept in the green spaces. As the Matrix plan expanded—from the Civic Center and tourist areas to all neighborhoods and city parks—Frank Jordan began to create a new San Francisco. His program redefined public space as being for tourists and housed residents, in effect banishing the homeless from the City.

Still, the homeless community resisted Jordan’s attempts to sanitize the City of their presence, and with the help of Food Not Bombs they worked to forge their own space within the City and reclaim the commons back from commercial interests. The struggle between the lower classes and the revanchist segments of a

City is discussed by Don Mitchell in *The Right to the City*. He examines the ways in which the homeless and masses fight to reclaim space from City elites who claim that space for corporate interests (Mitchell 2003). Much like Smith's discussion of Tompkins Square (Smith 1996), Mitchell examines the struggle for control of Peoples Park during the early 1990s, when the University of California tried to clean that space of homeless residents who had claimed the park as their own. In Mitchell's work, controlling space is central for resistant movements.

The controlling and claiming of public space was also important to Food Not Bombs' success in undermining the Jordan Administration's attempts to regulate and control space. During the Jordan years Food Not Bombs fought a daily battle to maintain the ability to distribute food in public space, a fight which most conflictual in the high-profile Civic Center and UN Plaza. From September 1993, when Matrix was first expanded, to December 1995, the City regularly arrested and harassed Food Not Bombs activists for distributing food. The goal was to remove their presence, and the homeless residents they attracted, from these public spaces. Even so the group never missed a meal service and was always present in the Civic Center and UN plaza. The group served as a constant nuisance to City officials and showed the City's limitation in forging political order.

The group's occupation of UN plaza during the important UN50 events demonstrated their ability to take over and control space, even in the face of intense police presence. This weeklong occupation, late in Jordan's term, served

as his “Camp Agnos,” illustrating his inability to maintain public order and regulate and control of public space. While Food Not Bombs’ reclaiming of public space was only temporary in this instance, it was a reminder to the Mayor and City at large that no one has a monopoly over public space.

Reclaiming of the commons is key to anarchist politics, according to Chris Eahlam *Anarchism and the City: Revolution and Counter-revolution in Barcelona 1889-1937*. He focuses on the struggle in Spain between Fascist forces over public space. The importance of public space for anarchist politics is its promotion of democratic assemblies and direct involvement by the community. During the Spanish Civil War Barcelona’s public parks served as an agora for debate, a kitchen for community meals, and a barrack for military planning and discussion (Eahlam 2010). Likewise, anarchistic urban revolts in the 20<sup>th</sup> century—from Paris in 1968 to Greece in 2008—have been organized around direct assemblies and have made reclaiming the commons for public use a central goal of their revolt.

In effect, Food Not Bombs, attempted to shatter the division between public and private. Reclaiming the commons was not just about creating a common space for all to enjoy but about making common space a communal space, a space for the development of politics, friendships, and lives. By making public space a location where meals are eaten, assemblies held, and bonds created, the division between public and private is also weakened. In Bernardo Bertolucci’s 2003 movie *The Dreamers*, one scene examines the lives of an American and two French students as their lives slip toward depression and

suicide during the Paris uprising in 1968. In the end their lives are saved when someone throws a rock through their window, bringing them into the public uprising that was happening just outside their apartment. The rock shattered the division between public and private and brought them out into the streets (Bertolucci 2003). Turning the broken-window metaphor on its head, *The Dreamers* shows that “breaking the spell,” as black blockers call the shattering of windows during protests, also breaks open the isolating boundaries of atomized private life, exposing an exciting world on the other side. In the film narrative, the broken window does not show the degeneration of the social body, but is an expression of a radical desire to shatter the old bonds of society and forge new ones.

By combining direct action, noncompromising politics, and a push to reclaim public space in tourist and commercial areas, Food Not Bombs directly undermined Jordan’s attempts to enforce the appearance of order. This desire for order is central to broken-windows enforcement and the neoconservative urban political program. The Jordan Administration always highlighted its beautification efforts and the decreased crime rate within the City. Jordan sent the message that the revanchists had retaken the City; Food Not Bombs’ massive public protests and actions directly contradicted the Mayor’s claims.

Food Not Bombs forced a continual discussion about homelessness, often on their terms, making homelessness the front and center in San Francisco politics, by framing the issue as “why is the mayor arresting people for feeding

the homeless,” Food Not Bombs highlighted the revanchist policies of Jordan, in a city named after Saint Francis and known for its compassion and tolerance. Food Not Bombs’ ability to frame Matrix and homelessness in San Francisco highlighted the Mayor’s inability to control much of anything.

#### 4. Conclusion: An Ungovernable Force?

Frank Jordan took office attempting to govern and pacify a city known for its radical activism and complex politics. Being a former chief of police, Jordan, used the tools he understood, police tactics. But these tactics failed, even though 40,000 quality of life citations were issued and over 700 homeless activists were arrested under his watch. Even with such draconian actions he was never able to pacify or control the City and never created the law-and-order utopia he desired. Instead, Jordan’s zealous enforcement of the law gave moral strength to those who resisted it. By arresting people who were feeding the homeless, Jordan was seen as a cruel and uncaring leader who wanted to punish the poor. Even within the police department, many officers balked at having to cite or arrest people for drinking and sleeping in public while larger crimes—murder, rape, and assault—went unsolved.

In the end Jordan failed to create order and solve the homelessness problem. At the root of his failure was his hard-headed commitment to addressing a social problem through coercion and force. Homeless has never been entirely about choice and should not be viewed as a public-order problem. Homelessness results from the deprivations inherent to capitalism, which has only been intensified under the neoliberal governance of the 1980s and ‘90s. As an extreme form of poverty, homelessness cannot be solved

with a truncheon or with laws banning sleeping in public. Jordan attempted to “solve” homelessness in the City by making homelessness illegal. Like the cliché slogan, “When guns are outlawed, only the outlaws will have guns,” outlawing homelessness does not make it go away, it just pushes it further into the margins of society. Food Not Bombs resisted that marginalization of the homeless. The group intentionally placed homelessness in the public eye and forced City residents to see that homelessness was not going away, as the Mayor had hoped. In the end San Franciscans lacked the anger and had too much social conscience to continue supporting openly revanchist policies.<sup>49</sup>

The next chapter looks at the City’s response to the squatters in the anarchist group Homes Not Jails. Interestingly, squatting, an illegal act, received little attention from Frank Jordan, who spent his resources confronting the visible homeless. The chapter will further examine the importance of public space and public order for Jordan by contrasting his treatment of Homes Not Jails with his treatment of Food Not Bombs.

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<sup>49</sup> In New York City, on the other hand, Giuliani was able to create the semblance of public order, and got the voters to get behind his revanchist policies. There are many reasons for this: Higher crime rates in New York City made citizens more afraid and more willing to accept his policies; San Francisco is a much more liberal and progressive city than New York; organized resistance against Giuliani was unable to directly confront the Mayor and control the media framing of homelessness and poverty; finally Giuliani was a much more skilled politician than Jordan, and therefore able to forge a lasting and stable political coalition. Whatever the reason, Giuliani succeeded in sanitizing and regulating public space, something that Jordan was never able to do.

## CHAPTER V

### BOLT CUTTERS, SOUP, AND THE POLITICS OF EXPROPRIATION

For them to say that we steal their unused property, while they speculate on the rental market, is criminal. They steal when they charge us rent, as opposed to us stealing when we squat. We should not ask whether it is a crime to “steal” a piece of property, but whether it’s a crime to charge rent. —Jeremy Graham, activist with Homes Not Jails

The last two chapters have looked at the San Francisco police and mayoral response to Food Not Bombs. Under the mayoral administrations of both Art Agnos (1988-1991) and Frank Jordan (1992-1995), Food Not Bombs activists were targeted by police for distributing food in public without a permit. This chapter shifts focus to the City’s response to Homes Not Jails. Homes Not Jails is a squatting group that opens up unused apartments and houses for the homeless to occupy. Urban squatting is the occupation of a vacant house in an urban area by people who do not have legal ownership of that building.

As context, the last chapter detailed the relationship between Mayor Jordan, a conservative democrat who promoted a revanchist quality of life policy that attempted to retake the City from homeless community and Food Not Bombs. In the process forty thousand citations or arrests were issued to homeless residents of the City; general assistance and social service funds were drastically cut or redirected; and the City attempted to clean and sanitize the parks and commercial and tourist spaces of homeless residents. In addition, the City arrested or cited activists with Food Not Bombs over 700 times for aiding the City’s homeless community with food and solidarity.



In sharp contrast, Homes Not Jails received only moderate attention from Mayor Jordan, even though over the four-year period of his tenure Homes Not Jails opened up hundreds of unused buildings, and housed up to 500 residents illegally on a single night. These covert squats serve as the backbone of Homes Not Jails, demanding most of their energies and efforts. These covert and private squats, unlike the public actions of Food Not Bombs, were dealt with by City officials as a civil and not a criminal issue. For this reason this chapter highlights the way that the Jordan administration dealt with a group that was engaging in radical, anarchist politics in the private sector.

I contend that there are two major reasons for the deferential treatment between Homes Not Jails and Food Not Bombs under Mayor Jordan. First, I contend that since Jordan was concerned with issues of public order, squatting—an inherently private action—was not seen as a threat. In sharp contrast, Food Not Bombs was constantly harassed in its attempts to reclaim the commons and public space. In a sense Homes Not Jails helped the Mayor by removing the visible homeless from public streets and parks by placing them into squats. Second, I contend that Jordan’s “free-market” oriented housing policy was not threatened, and was actually strengthened by the squatters’ actions, because Homes Not Jails promoted “sweat equity” to improve and clean up otherwise abandoned housing which would have continued to exist as an eye-sore and a “broken window” to the local neighborhood. Thus their actions invariably raised the value of the houses they squatted and improved the quality of the neighborhood

This chapter begins with a brief history of Homes Not Jails, including a short list of the group’s actions and major squats during this time period. Next is a discussion of

academic research regarding squatting. Finally, I will discuss why Homes Not Jail and Food Not Bombs were treated in such markedly different ways by City officials.

### 1. Homes Not Jails

We teach people how to use a crowbar to pop open a door, how to get in different kinds of windows, how to use a bread knife to flip the lock latch on a window, how to re-key locks. The number of people who have learned the skills has to be in the hundreds, if not over a thousand people. - Jeremy Graham, Homes Not Jails activist (Corr 1999)

In the mid 1990s San Francisco had an estimated 6,500 unused houses or apartments—enough to house the entire homeless population of the city (Steinberg 1994). With so many unused rooms and houses, Homes Not Jails became the first formal squatting organizing in the City. The group was formed in November of 1992 following a film showing sponsored by Food Not Bombs. During the movie, which detailed a squatting campaign in Philadelphia, Keith McHenry from Food Not Bombs and Ted Gullickson from the San Francisco Tenants Union, an organization that provides practical and legal advice for renters, decided to take action. Their plan was to open up an abandoned homeless shelter at 90 Golden Gate, whose owner was intentionally keeping the building empty. After the film showing, the 30 other people in attendance joined McHenry and Gullickson, and the first Homes Not Jails meeting and squat started. That first squat housed five homeless residents for nearly two months, until the residents were evicted on January 3, 1993 (Corr 1999: 23). Homes Not Jails engages in two types of actions: covert squatting and public occupations

#### a. Covert Squatting

. The covert squats are “meant to assert propertied rights for the homeless, specifically through the doctrine of ‘adverse possession,’ which recognizes the ‘highest and best use of property’ and under stringent conditions makes possible the legalization of squatting” (Roy 2003: 480). Under adverse possession, squatters need to show that they have openly and intentionally been squatting a building for at least five years, pay back taxes owed on that property, and show proof that they have improved the building. If the building was not occupied, even for one night, or if a judge feels that the squatters had not been ideal neighbors, then the adverse possession claim is lost. As of today, Homes Not Jails has been unable to take over any building titles through adverse possession, though they came very close in 1999, when they paid the back rent on a squat on Page Street that squatters had been occupying for six years (Wilson 1999). In the end, the judge ruled against the group’s claim.

In creating their covert squats, Homes Not Jails begins by scouting an area, looking for vacant houses, researching who owns the building and whether any plans are in place to renovate or demolish the building. The group compiles a list of squat-able buildings and then, at least once a week, members of the group go around the City and breaking into houses. When they break in, the group looks for signs of people living there or work being done on the building—from mail or newspapers to paint or trash. If a building seems to be vacant, the activists do some cleanup, change the locks, and wait a week to see if anyone has noticed their presence. If everything checks out they move homeless residents into the building.

All Homes Not Jails squats have three rules: First, there will be no violence against other residents of the squat, or against the police when they evict; second, there will be no alcohol or drug use within the squat; and third, all squats will be run using a consensus form of decision making, and all residents must be involved the process. In addition, each squat runs on a principle of “sweat equity.” Sweat equity means that:

in lieu of rent, HNJ expects all squatters to clean, paint, and even make structural improvements to their squats, both covert and public. . . . through sweat equity, homeless people live more comfortably, improve housing values, exchange construction skills, and emphasize the responsibility attended to any right to housing. Sweat equity works well for the many homeless people who are skilled workers but are unemployed, unfairly evicted, or victim to some other structural inequity. For the significant proportion of homeless people who struggle with substance abuse or mental illness, sweat equity offers additional benefits. ‘Sweat equity gives people the opportunity to participate in a common project and create an extended family in which homeless people a place to heal. (Corr 1999: 21)

Sweat equity has a long history, as it was used by frontier homesteaders, is currently used by Habitat for Humanity, and is common in squatting villages in the third world (Roy 2003).

One expression of Homes Not Jails policy of sweat equity appears in a draft proposal to the City in 1998, when they nearly gained legal title for the property at 3250 17<sup>th</sup> Street, an unused house that was owned by the Federal government. Under the Homes Not Jails plan, residents of the building would pay 30% of their income, rather than a set amount, for rent and then work on the house for five hours a week on average. In exchange for the sweat equity, residents would gain 1% of the estimated value of the house per year, which would be given to them in a lump sum when they left the house (Corr 1999: 23). Thus if I were to live in one of their low-income housing cooperatives

making \$356 a month from General Assistance, I would pay \$107 a month in rent and work on the house for five hours a week. If I lived at the house, valued at \$300,000, for two years, when I left to live on my own I would have \$6,000 saved up as a nest egg. Under this plan, the formerly homeless resident would live at a rate significantly lower than the City's SRO hotels, create a community, actively gain skills, improve the City's housing infrastructure, and build a savings. The group never implemented this plan though, since it depended on their gaining legal title to a building.

Overall, Homes Not Jails has opened up hundreds of covert squats throughout San Francisco. On average from 1992 through 1997, Homes Not Jails sent scouting groups each week, opening up somewhere between 700 and 800 buildings in total. According to Andres Carr, at their peak Homes Not Jails was housing up to 500 people a night in their squats. While most of the covert squats lasted less than a month, a handful lasted entire years. For instance, one squat at 850 Hayes Street lasted for two years. The group was nearly successful at gaining legal title on the building until it mysteriously burned down, after the landowner failed to evict the squatters. Another building, which was successfully squatted from 1994 to 1999, was nearly awarded to the group, after they had successfully paid the property's \$5,000 back taxes and formed a legal non-profit to administer the building (Wilson 1999). The City government, then headed by Mayor Willie Brown, fought the group and ended up selling the property and giving the money to the former homeowner's sister.

Overall, the group's covert squats received little attention from the police. This does not mean that members of the group were not arrested for squatting. During a five

year period three activists were arrested for trespassing, breaking, and entering.

According to Homes Not Jails activist Jeremy Graham, at one squat the police came up to the squatters and said, “We have to see somebody leave. Then we don’t care what happens. If we get another call later on, we are not necessarily going to come back” (Corr 1999: 26-27). In another instance, Graham recounts how the cops informed the squatters, “We won’t act unless we get complaints from the property owners. We are not really going to try and prosecute people for trying to house themselves” (Corr 1999: 26). This attitude stands in stark contrast with the attitude of the police towards Food Not Bombs which was being regularly arrested for providing free food in public spaces. This once again highlights the discrepancy between sanctions over private and public actions.

Though the police generally took a lax approach to the group this does not mean that the police and the City endorsed, or even supported, the actions of Homes Not Jails. For instance, shortly following the publicized eviction of the first Homes Not Jails squat, Mayor Jordan stated:

We just cannot allow people to walk into any vacant building and just take it over as a homeless encampment. These are private buildings. . . and if the [owners] ask us to remove people, we try to do so. There are health hazards involved here. There are public safety issues if someone comes into a building and starts a fire. (Quoted in Corr 1999: 27)

The Mayor’s comments do two things. The first, they reveal his Administration’s disdain for squatters, claiming that they are illegally occupying a house, depriving someone else of their property and turning it into a “housing encampment.”

Following from this, he reiterates his general stance on the homeless, that they are mentally ill and drug addicted, and therefore pose a threat to start a fire or engage in other anti-social behaviors. Second, and more important, Jordan claims that

squatting is a civil and private matter between the squatters and the landowners, and not a criminal issue. This stance differs drastically from his stance against Food Not Bombs, for which he organized a police campaign to stop.

#### b. Public Occupations

Jordan's response was different for public occupations. The public squats are meant to garner media attention to their cause and to highlight that even in San Francisco there are vacant houses that could be used to house homeless residents. These public occupations brought attention to the large number of unoccupied houses in the City, put pressure on the City government to enforce housing rights laws, and condemn both slumlords and landlords who intentionally kept houses empty for speculative financial reasons.

Homes Not Jails organized its first public action on Thanksgiving Day, 1992. In that action members of Homes Not Jails occupied a vacant property at 250 Taylor Street owned by Robert Imhoff, a well known developer in the City. In addition, the house was across the street from Glide Memorial Church, the location of the largest Thanksgiving homeless feed in the City. Homes Not Jails knew that the media would attend Thanksgivings dinner, and realized that by occupying the building across the street, the group could get valuable media attention at no cost. That first public occupation culminated in four arrests, brought also significant media attention to the lack of affordable housing in San Francisco.

The group planned a public occupation every Thanksgiving and Christmas

Day. The hope was that:

By having actions on Thanksgiving and Christmas, we hope to change the way people view the homeless. The image of homeless people one sees in the media on almost every other day is of people who deserve what they get, people who have only themselves to blame, people who are dirty, don't take care of themselves, and use drugs. You can't give them money because they'll just waste it all. On Thanksgiving and Christmas, you see families and the deserving poor, pathetic, helpless, passive, and grateful for their bowl of soup... What we've tried to project is an image of people denied the resources needed to take care of themselves. People who are angry, competent, capable, and, if necessary, people willing to take extreme actions and be arrested and go to jail, if need be. (Quoted in Corr 1999: 28)

From 1992 to 1998 the group organized a total of 26 public takeovers, and at these events 242 people were arrested, with most (nearly 200) being arrested during an occupation of the military housing in the Presidio in protest of City plans to demolish the housing in 1997 (Corr 1999). Most Homes Not Jails activists had their charges dropped, but the City did spend \$100,000 attempting to convict four activists for trespassing, and breaking and entering after the Thanksgiving 1993 action.<sup>50</sup> Ultimately even those activists had their charges dropped.

These public occupations served an important role for the group, getting them media attention, and positioning them as an important part of the housing movement in the City. For instance, in 1995 Homes Not Jails teamed up with Board of Supervisor member Angela Alioto to draft an affordable housing bill, which would give the City the power to take unrented buildings to house the homeless, made adverse possession easier

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<sup>50</sup> There is an intense irony in the City spending \$100,000 in an attempt to convict four activists for occupying a house when that money could have been spent housing a very large number of homeless residents.



to attain, and give added protections for squatters. The bill never passed the Board of Supervisors but showed the close ties that the group developed with established members of City government, something that Food Not Bombs achieved.<sup>51</sup>

The group also sought out government owned buildings. Most importantly, the group looked for federally owned property, applying pressure to both City and federal agencies to follow article V of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (1987) which stated that “all surplus , excess, under-utilized, and unutilized” federal property be used to house the homeless. The law was designed to force the Federal government to use its vacant and unused buildings for housing the homeless but rarely, if ever, does the government do so. Homes Not Jails thought that occupying federally owned buildings would put pressure on the government to do so or at least that it would force the courts to make a ruling on the law.

The problem for Homes Not Jails was finding unused government owned buildings in San Francisco. The first federally owned squat the group did was on Presidents Day in 1993. The group squatted a building at 1211 Polk Street that was seized by the Federal government after the house was raided for tax fraud, methamphetamine production, and child pornography, and was left vacant for four years. Early on in the occupation the group organized a meeting with a Federal marshal, who was intrigued by the group’s claim, and held off the City eviction of the squatters until he could get the

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<sup>51</sup> Food Not Bombs did have support, at times, on the Board of Supervisors, most notably with Angela Alioto, but they never worked with Board members in drafting legislation, and were never invited to speak at Board meetings. Homes Not Jails both helped draft legislation and was allowed space to talk. Part of this is the result of the involvement of Ted Gullickson, from the San Francisco Tenant Union’s. Gullickson was a well known figure in the housing rights movement and was well connected with the more liberal elements of San Francisco politics.

matter settled with his superiors. After much negotiation the Federal government agreed to sell the building to the City of San Francisco for \$77,000, well below market price, if the City would use it as a half-way house for at risk-youth. All Mayor Jordan had to do was sign a letter of intent and the process would have begun, but he refused to do so, and instead arrested the squatters. Homes Not Jails attempted to re-squat the building two more times over the year, both times being evicted quickly by the police. Finally the building was sold at auction, for over \$300,000, to a developer who quickly resold the building for nearly \$350,000.<sup>52</sup>

The group also targeted land owned by the California Transit Authority since, California law SB-120 (1993) “authorized Caltrans to lease airspace or other property acquired for highway purposes in San Francisco to a public agency for purpose of an emergency shelter or feeding program for \$1 a month, in addition to an annual administrative fee of \$500 or the amount necessary to cover Caltrans’ actual cost.” In this vein the group occupied 66 Berry Street, a house owned by Caltrans. The occupation brought attention to SB-120 and to the proposed Giant’s baseball stadium, which was planned to be built next to that property. Though the squatters claimed that the house should be rented out, Caltrans argued that the land was “excess property” and was therefore exempt from the law, though Caltrans stated that it would sell the building to the City for market value. The Board of Supervisors, as well as Homes Not Jails activists, supported this plan, but Jordan refused to purchase the building.

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<sup>52</sup> The other major federal land occupation by the group was done in 1996 and 1997 when the group occupied the Presidio military base. The base was being closed and the City planed to tearing down the 900 houses on the base to develop them into up-scale housing. The group protested this plan, arguing instead that the 900 houses should be used as affordable low-income housing. The public occupations by the group, and Religious Witness, ended up being successful, as the housing units were turned into low-income housing.

c. Homes Not Jails: Concluding statements

Overall, the City paid very little attention to covert squatters from Homes Not Jails, whose actions were viewed as a private and civil problem. These squats and houses were left alone, unless the landowner called the police to have the residents evicted. These covert squats allowed Homes Not Jails to house a significant number of homeless people and, in doing so,

attempted to create self-managed communities by entrusting homeless people with responsibility under the worst conditions. That trust has helped teach the responsibility and social skills needed to escape the forest of individual failures for a path of goals, work, and achievement, whether through political organization or parting from HNJ and beginning a new life. (Corr 1999: 36)

As Corr points out, Homes Not Jails showed that homeless residents in the City could get along, organize together and take care of a house. According to Gullickson:

What most inspired me was the massive transformation in people's lives. They got jobs by being able to finally stabilize their lives. People who moved in with shopping carts full of stuff, who had to get in line for shelter and scrounge around for food and General Assistance, finally find a place where they could take a shower, cook their own meal, leave their belongings, and go out and apply for jobs. (Quoted in Corr 1999: 23)

Many of the homeless squatters showed the community that they had skills to share—from carpentry and painting to electrical work, and that if given an opportunity they could change their lives.

## 2. Direct Action and the Expropriation of Dwellings: Background Theory on Squatting

While squatting historically has been a way to create what Nik Heynen and Don Mitchell call geography of survival<sup>53</sup> (Mitchell and Heynen 2009; Heynen 2010), not many theorists or academics paid much attention to the practice until the rise of the autonomous Marxist movements throughout Europe in the 1970s and 80s (Katsiaficas 1997; Wright 2002; El Kholi, Lotringer et al. 2007). Autonomous Marxists claimed autonomy from parties, unions, and orthodox Marxism, and wanted to create alternative societies in the cracks and abandoned spaces of society at large (Wright 2002). Unlike orthodox Marxism, autonomous Marxism is much more in line with anarchist theory, working to empower the lumpenproletariats well as the worker, the student, and the artist. Autonomous Marxists became the militant squatters defined the term: dressed in dirty all-black clothing, wearing doc martin boots, and scaring the sensibilities of Europe's middle-class residents. This represents only one of two major ways that squatting has been used, according to Hans Pruijt. First, squatting can be used as one of many tactics within a larger housing movement, which looks to maximize the number of affordable housing. Second, described above, squatting can refer to genuine squatting movement where squatting is both the end and the means).

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<sup>53</sup> Geographies of survival are places that the disposed and marginalized form to engage in acts, often illegally, that are needed for their survival. In this study, Food Not Bombs is forming a space, the public feedings, in which a needed act (eating) is done. Likewise, squatting is an act of survival in which a homeless person illegally takes over a house in order to get access to shelter.

Squatting as a tactic for the housing movement is commonly seen in United States, especially on the East coast, largely due to legal and cultural aspects of the United States that make squatters' movements hard to establish. Squatting is only one of many tactics that can be used to accomplish the goals of a housing movement, as it can also use rent strikes, legislation, and even purchasing of housing. As an example, the Association for Community Organizations for Reform Now, or ACORN, in 1985 squatted 25 buildings in Brooklyn with relative success, as the City handed over 58 abandoned buildings to ACORN and Mutual Housing Association to run as low-income housing.<sup>54</sup> However, the City handed over the buildings on at the condition that ACORN would refrain from using squatting as a tactic in the future (Pruijt 2003: 141). This willingness to compromise makes sense; housing movement are more willing to be co-opted by government institutions since they are using squatting as a means of gaining access to affordable housing.

The squatters' movement, on the other hand, views squatting as an end in itself. The goal of the squatters' movement is to create a culture and community around squatting. In this regard,

squatting itself is at the centre. It is a community of squatters who cooperate when new buildings are squatted and in the defense against evictions. Organization is bottom-up and network structured. There is little formal organization; informal leadership exists, however. . . . There is a do-it-yourself ethic and an ideology of self-determination. (Pruijt 2003: 143)

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<sup>54</sup> Of all the major cities in United States, New York City is the most "squat friendly" environment, since the City has an absurdly high rental costs and a large number of vacant housing units. However, the City tried to change this act during the 1980s and 1990s New York City intentionally destroyed large numbers of their vacant housing stock in what many feel was an attempt to decrease their vacancy rate and raise the rental price of units.

In effect, squatters' movements tend to embrace a form of radical politics that George Katsiaficas refers to as "autonomous" politics. Katsiaficas in *The Subversion of Politics* examines the European autonomous movement—which consists of radical leftist's who are autonomous of political parties, unions, and the state—which used squatting as one of their central political acts. In Katsiaficas' narrative of German, Dutch, and Italian autonomous movements, the squats played a radicalizing role in the community. Living in the squats radicalized the youth, through everyday experiences with direct democracy, direct action, and through constant police struggles. In effect "living behind barricades became a way of life for many squatters, the illegality of their everyday lives radicalized their attitude towards the state and hardened their own feelings of self-importance" (Katsiaficas 1997: 91).<sup>55</sup> Overall this movement consisted of mostly radical middle-class youth, artists, and punks who embraced a radical anti-capitalist politics centered on a do-it-yourself philosophy.<sup>56</sup> According to Richard Day in *Gramsci is Dead*, squatters' movements should not be viewed as "drop-out" movements looking to remove themselves from society. Squatting is often a way to free up one's time to engage in other forms of political action and activism, since the squatters no longer need to work to pay rent (Day 2005: 21).

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<sup>55</sup>The German autonomous squatters are responsible for developing the "black bloc" tactic which has become central to anarchist mass protest actions.

<sup>56</sup>The autonomous Marxist movement in Europe shares many similarities to the anarchist movement today. Though many autonomists from the 1980s did not refer to themselves as anarchists but as "autonomous Marxists," since the 1990s autonomists have come closer to self-identifying as anarchists. That being said, Antonio Negri, a well-known autonomist Marxist theorist has always refused to call himself an anarchist. In *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri openly state their hostility to anarchism, which they associate with naivety and sporadic acts of violence, even though Negri promotes a stateless form of communism that is anti-authority and anti-hierarchy, and is organized around direct-democracy.

According to Pruijt, squatters' movements, unlike housing movements, are difficult for government agencies to co-opt or institutionalize. This is because squatters' movements are interested in forming a non-capitalist housing arrangement and therefore squat largely due to a political conviction. To highlight the difference, Pruijt compares the early 1980s New York housing movement, typified by ACORN, with the late 1980s Lower East Side squatter movement. In his analysis, ACORN welcomed the opportunity to negotiate with the City and turn squatted houses into non-profit administered affordable housing, while the Lower East Side squatters refused to negotiate with the City, organized mass demonstrations in support of homeless residents in Tompkins Square, and harassed and vandalized gentrifying efforts in the neighborhood. Even without negotiation the squatters gained legal access to some of their squats. For instance ABC No Rio, a squatted social center, was sold to an artist collective for \$1 on the condition that the group raises the \$200,000 that was needed to renovate and bring the building up to code. Though the building was sold, government officials never directly negotiated with squatters but with the artist collective that used the space as a gallery.

In addition, anarchist and other radical theorists have generally argued that squatting is a radical act as it "undermines the singular meaning of home that has come to dominate the American landscape" (Roy 2003: 482) by questioning the legitimacy of private property and undermining the landlord-tenant relationship. Housing issues have been central to anarchist activism. According to Peter Kropotkin, the classical anarchist prince, the root of capitalist exploitation was not surplus value, as Marx stated, but

poverty. To Kropotkin, people sell their labor for a starvation wage only because they need the money in order to survive. Expressing this, Kropotkin writes:

Everywhere you will find that the wealth of the wealthy springs from the poverty of the poor. This is why an anarchist society need not fear the advent of a Rothschild who would settle in its midst. If every member of the community knows that after a few hours of productive toil he will have a right to all the pleasures that civilization procures . . . he will not sell his strength for a starvation wage. No one will volunteer to work for the enrichment of your Rothschild. His gold guineas will be only so many pieces of metal—useful for various purposes, but incapable of breeding more. (Kropotkin 1975: 231)

In other words, Kropotkin claims that if goods and services were distributed to everyone based on need, no one would sell their labor. To equalize and democratize distribution, anarchists have tried to confront capitalism and the state by creating alternative institutions. Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails squarely fit within this counter-institutional framework.

The creation of egalitarian distribution based on need is central to Kropotkin's understanding of revolutionary action. For instance, in *The Conquest of Bread*, Kropotkin discusses the need to organize and distribute, through non-state and non-market mechanisms, goods and services for all to use. He contends that a revolutionary movement will be successful only if it is able to distribute fairly, efficiently, and communally. Kropotkin provides possible examples of how the masses could collectively expropriate food, clothing, and shelter in such a way that hunger and other deprivations do not force the masses back into the exploiting arms of the counter-revolutionaries. While food is essential, it is the expropriation of housing that “contains in germ the social revolution” (Kropotkin 1975: 240). This is because housing and property, unlike food or



clothing, is fundamental to the construction and maintenance of a capitalist society. In other words, the expropriation of housing undermines the foundation of liberal society—the sanctity of private property. In Kropotkin’s account of expropriation of dwellings, a community collectively takes inventory of housing, has a direct assembly to discuss housing, and then starts placing people within houses. Thus, a single person with a three bedroom house would either move to a one-bedroom flat or have two roommates put within his house. Likewise, a family of seven stuffed into a two-bedroom flat would be given a place with more rooms.

Building off Kropotkin’s idea is Colin Ward’s work on anarchist housing and urban planning. Central to his work is the role of squatters, land occupiers, and tenant rights movements who highlight the fact that the masses can—democratically and justly—construct, distribute, and organize their own lives. To Ward, anarchist institutions distribute goods fairly and efficiently, since they are fluid, dynamic, and directly connected to the will and desires of the community. This process is a threat to state bureaucrats who argue that they are needed to ensure that goods are distributed fairly, and equally a threat to free-marketers, who argue that only the market can distribute goods fairly (Ward 1973). In *Housing: An Anarchist Perspective*, Ward contends that “the real triumph of the squatters’ movement, is that it has called the bluff of those who believe in political action. The squatters’ have shown that they can rehabilitate housing more quickly and more effectively than the official system can” (Ward 1976: 34). Katsiaficas promotes a similar view of squatting, arguing that the squatters’ movement, in Germany especially, allowed the creation of a radical

autonomous political movement. This movement confronted racism and classism, and worked to undermine German middle-class understandings of life and politics and being safe, stable, and under control (Katsiaficas 1997).

Countering this anarchist stance on squatting, Ananya Roy provides in “Paradigms of Propertied Citizenship: Transnational Techniques of Analysis” a few warnings for squatters. First, she warns the group from fetishizing “self-help,” which she claims has been used to justify government inaction in poor communities, as governments increasingly look to poor communities to lift themselves up from the bootstraps. In addition, self-help creates a form of “voluntarist” citizenship that justifies the squatters’ actions because of the improvement they provide to the property. As she puts it:

In an era of liberalization, the ideology of sweat equity shifts the burden of coping from the state to the poor, putting into place a ‘voluntarist’ citizenship. As homelessness policies have been dominated by the trope of the undeserving poor, so recent Third World debates have coalesced around the hope of a self-sufficient informal sector capable of Herculean efforts. These are extreme positions on the same discursive continuum of morality and behaviorism, both serving to legitimate state withdrawal from social commitments. (Roy 2003: 481)

In effect, Roy warns against claiming that “sweat equity” and the work of the poor can solve the housing problem. Doing so, in her argument, only provides further justification for the state to withdraw from this the housing dilemma.

Second, Roy contends that

although the doctrine of adverse possession bears the promise of legalizing squatting, of formalizing informality, it requires the ‘open and notorious use’ of property. And yet when squats are open and notorious, they are often quickly ended through evictions. . . . The doctrine requires a process that is impossible to uphold. (Roy 2003: 481)

Thus she warns Homes Not Jails activists from falling into the same evictions and exploitation trap that has plagued much of the Third World. In this process squatters build and develop a neighborhood or house, which they are then forcibly evicted from, and their labor is stolen by absentee landlords who have their land improved at no cost to them.

Finally, Roy worries that Homes Not Jails, as well as other squatters groups, institutes a “tiered” system of housing in which the wealthy get quality housing, while the homeless and poor get substandard housing. Homes Not Jails does this by shifting the right to a safe and sanitary shelter with the right to a shelter, placing the homeless into substandard housing. This raises the question, according to Roy, of “what kind of rights? Full rights? The rights of second-class citizenship?” (Roy 2003: 482).. Of course, Roy also realizes that in many instances the homeless are forced out of squats by cities concerned with “sanitary housing” in which “the right to a sanitary shelter paradoxically superseded the right to a shelter” which “once outside the housing sector, the homeless no longer provoke concern. In being propertyless, they forfeit their right to safe and sanitary shelter” (Roy 2003:475). In an odd move here, Roy worries that Homes Not Jails is creating a tiered housing system, in which the wealthy have sanitary housing and the poor just have shelter, but she also realizes that currently the homeless have no shelter at all. Isn’t some shelter, however unsanitary, potentially better than no shelter at all?

One of her main fears is that Homes Not Jails “maintains the diagnosis of homelessness as a lack of home. What would it mean to replace the term homeless with homeless proletarian? What would shelter activism then look like?”(Roy 2003: 483). I

contend that Homes Not Jails, an offshoot of Food Not Bombs, does not view homelessness as simply being about “not having a home” but about income inequality, poverty, capitalism, and militarism. Anders Carr claims that squatting and land occupation movements

address issues beyond class and the distribution of wealth. They fight for culture and neighborhood, and their challenge to property law portends a recuperación, or recovery movement, to take back home and employment from the governments and corporations that are quickly monopolizing these most essential resources. (Corr 1999: 4)

Corr presents Homes Not Jails and other squatting groups having a much more complex political dimension than Roy claims. Both Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails hold that homelessness is intimately connected with issues of class, race, and gender, and therefore the solution to the problem has to address these root causes. While Roy might be wrong in her claim that Homes Not Jails did not have a more profound analysis of the problems associated with homelessness, she was correct to question the radical nature of the group’s actions.

### 3. Understanding the Differential Treatment of Homes Not Jails?

These anarchist understandings of squatting suggest that squatting is an inherently radical act; it confronts the sanctity of private property and through direct action houses homeless residents. In addition, squatting frees people from the tyranny of rent, allowing them to spend their time working on political activism and the creation of a do-it-yourself culture. The experience of the squatters in Homes Not Jails, especially when compared to the treatment of Food Not Bombs activists during the same time,

questions the validity of the anarchist squatters' claims. If squatting was a radical act, it would have been treated as such by Mayor Jordan, a politician who was chiefly concerned with maintaining, order and was a strong friend to land developers and housing associations. Instead of focusing police attention on Homes Not Jails, Jordan and the San Francisco police department spent their energies arresting Food Not Bombs activists for distributing free food in public. Bringing this point home, in one Homes Not Jails public action, members of Homes Not Jails were not arrested but four people from Food Not Bombs were for handing out food at the protest. This further shows that Jordan was significantly more concerned with Food Not Bombs than he was Homes Not Jails, even though Homes Not Jails was breaking into buildings and illegally housing homeless people within them. I present two key reasons for the deferential treatment of Homes Not Jails and Food Not Bombs.

First, Jordan's driving concern was the creation and maintenance of public order, clearing the streets of the homeless for the sake of business and changing the City's reputation as a "magnet city" for the homeless, as I argue in the last chapter. For this reason, I contend that the covert squatting actions of Homes Not Jails did not bother Jordan nearly as much did the public feedings of Food Not Bomb, since covert squatting is an inherently private matter, and was framed as a civil and not a criminal problem.

The private nature of squatting played, to some degree, into the hands of the Mayor. Since Jordan sought to remove the homeless from public view, without using social services or government aid, Homes Not Jails can be seen as inadvertently supporting Jordan's plan. The group removed up to 500 homeless people a night from the

parks and streets by placing them within private, albeit illegal, squats.<sup>57</sup> This explains why the only times that Jordan or the police spoke out against the group, or mass arrested members of the group, were during public actions or while the group was in the process of trying to gain legal title to a building—such as what happened to squatters who occupied federal or Caltrans property. These public actions received quick reactions from the Administration and an uncompromising stance from the Mayor. One example, discussed earlier, was the Mayors reluctance to accept the Federal government's offer to purchase a building from them for well below market price. This property was in the heart of Jordan's China Basin redevelopment plan, and for this and other reasons, Jordan was hostile to the idea of having a dedicated homeless shelter in that section of town. The question of gentrifying the China Basin district had not been that important in the public media, and the action by Homes Not Jails forced that issue back into the media debate. These public actions questioned the Mayors ability to maintain public order and ensure the protection of private property.

The public squats and public feedings both politicized the private and broke down the division between private and public. Covert squatting did not do this, but instead reinforced the public/private divide, removing the homeless from the public eye and making them no longer a public concern. Public actions, on the other hand, politicized housing, and radically questioned the Mayor's stance against city-funded affordable housing programs.

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<sup>57</sup>While the 500 persons a night for Homes Not Jails might seem relatively small in comparison to the at least 10,000 homeless people in the City, but relatively large to the barely 5,000 beds available through government funded shelters, the number is quit impressive. Overall, at most, Homes Not Jails housed about 10% of the remaining homeless in the City.

Covert squatting nonetheless served an important function, as it allowed the group to house as many people as possible. As mentioned earlier, the group opened up hundreds of covert squats and housed well over a thousand people over a six year period. These are significant numbers regardless of whether or not they drew the ire of Frank Jordan's Administration. In fact, Homes Not Jails can be viewed as a substantial success. One difficulty inherent in anarchist social justice direct action—from Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails to anarchist Free Schools—is the tension between conflicting with the powers to be and the push to provide needed social services, since oftentimes these objectives are mutually exclusive. Food Not Bombs, for instance, had to constantly make decisions regarding which is more important—the arrests, confronting Jordan publicly, and gaining media attention to homeless issues, or feeding as many hungry people as possible. This tension between providing what homeless people urgently need was often mutually exclusive from the groups' ability to disrupt the powers that be. For Homes Not Jails this tension was made even more difficult by the fact that adverse possession laws force the squatting to “open,” which, as Roy notes, makes adverse possession much less likely to occur. Thus, Homes Not Jails had to decide whether providing short-term housing for the homeless was more important than attempting to gain property through openly occupying a location. This all being said, the reaction of Jordan to Homes Not Jails also highlights the fact that covert squatting is not nearly as large a threat to the established order as one might think.

The second key reason for the deferential treatment towards Homes Not Jails is that Homes Not Jails might have been providing benefits (all be it marginal) for housing

values in San Francisco. According to property law scholars Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal in *Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and Protests Improve the Law of Ownership*, the authors contend, counter-intuitively, that property outlaws are essential to solidifying and strengthening property law. They state

Not all disobedience, even the acquisitive variety, need contribute to a sense of widespread disorder that would undermine broader crime-control efforts. An act of illegal appropriation may actually contribute to visible order . . . . A great deal of urban squatting in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s was highly organized and likewise may have worked to displace the preexisting disorder generated by extensive urban abandonment. Urban squatters were fixing broken windows, not breaking them. (Peñalver and Katyal 2010: 133)

In the author's analysis of urban squatting in the United States and elsewhere, squatters do not shatter the image of social and public order but often promote it. Thus, "urban squatters were fixing broken windows, not breaking them" by literally taking abandoned houses and replacing broken windows, painting, and cleaning up the yard. For these reasons, the authors believe that squatters strengthen, not weaken, public order, private property rights, and housing values.

This analysis is also noted by Hans Pruijt who states "under a market-oriented urban regime, improvements made by citizens to run down neighborhoods (for example by fixing up abandoned buildings and chasing drug deals from the streets, or by creating a community garden in an empty lot) can attract property developers" (Pruijt 2003: 148). This is why one of the New York squatters he quoted quipped "squatters are the real storm troopers of gentrification" (Pruijt 2003: 148). Thus by taking abandoned and unused homes and buildings and occupying them, squatters can breathe life into a



neighborhood, decreasing the visible signs of disorder, and actually improve housing values.

In this regard the sweat equity of Homes Not Jails, which is supposed to help homeless people gain access to a building via adverse possession, also makes them easily exploitable. Cities can, as Roy pointed out, create an exploitable relationship between private property owners and squatters. In this relationship the squatters can put a large amount of labor and resources into an abandoned house, drastically improving the buildings value and be evicted before they gain rights under the law. Thus landlords can exploit the labor of the homeless, get tax write-offs for the building, and sell the building for a profit.

Overall, then, the apparent reasons that Frank Jordan did not harass Homes Not Jails to the same degree that he did Food Not Bombs was that covert squatting, an inherently private enterprise, helps remove the most visible homeless from the streets, thus accomplishing Jordan's greatest desire. He sought to hide the homeless from the public—creating a city that was a safe space for middle-class residents, corporations, businesses, and tourists. While Homes Not Jails actually helped Jordan's agenda the group was placed into a precarious situation by being caring and humanitarian, something Jordan refused to be, fixed the broken windows that frustrated the Jordan Administration.

At the same time, the public takeovers highlighted the groups confrontational and antagonistic relationship with the City by applying pressure to address housing issues. In addition, around Thanksgiving and Christmas each year, the group was able refocus issues of housing and the creative actions of the homeless community. Through public

takeovers they, put pressure on Caltrans and the City to follow state and federal law, which mandated that unused government buildings be used to house the homeless. A tension existed between social service and confrontational dimensions of the group. Within this tension the group moved to put more energy and effort into providing housing rather than public protest and outrage.

#### 4. Conclusion

Homes Not Jails was demonstrably successful in opening up squats in San Francisco and providing a powerful and much needed social service. Yet not all anarchist direct action engenders the same state reaction. Homes Not Jails and Food Not Bombs received radically different reactions from the Jordan Administration, even though the groups shared many members and political philosophy. The deferential treatment is due to the public nature of Food Not Bombs and the private nature of Homes Not Jails, further highlighting the importance of public space and the regulation of that space in maintaining a neoconservative broken windows City policy. In this instance, a group of anarchist activists attempted to expropriate private dwellings for private use, and thus did not try to shatter the separation between these two spheres or to directly and confrontationally politicize the issue on a daily basis.

Food Not Bombs, by contrast, blurred the boundaries of public and private by reclaiming public land for public use. This reclaiming of public space directly threatened the Jordan Administration, which cracked down harshly on those who questioned his Administration's control over public space. This separation between public and private is made even clearer by the fact that the police and mayor directly confronted the group

whenever they engaged in public occupations. The harsher reaction from the City towards Food Not Bombs also shows that more than just antagonistic feelings must exist for politics to be pressed to the limits of liberal acceptability. This antagonism has to be made public and it has to be centered on contesting the validity and legitimacy of the opponent. Conversely, Homes Not Jails, while equally an enemy of Frank Jordan, kept its anger and animosity towards him hidden within unoccupied buildings, not in the public parks and streets of San Francisco.

## CHAPTER VI

### DESTROYING URBAN REGIMES AND THE CREATION OF URBAN ANARCHY

“We are going to vote with crowbars,”- Protestor at Homes Not Jails protest July 19, 2010

On July 19, 2010 Homes Not Jails publicly took over the Hotel Sierra, a SRO hotel that has been vacant for the last ten years. The 40 room hotel, was one of the SRO hotels used by Mayor Jordan’s Mandatory Rent Payment Plan. The hotel has remained vacant since, the Board of Supervisors overturned the Mandatory Rent Payment Plan. The public occupation lasted only one day and one night, as police removed the squatters at 10:30 am on July 20th. At the protest, activists carried signs proclaiming “Capitalism is the Crisis”, “Capitalism Kills” and “Demand Housing for Everyone” while activists with Food Not Bombs provided free food in front the occupied building. At the end of the day, seven homeless activists spent the night in the abandoned SRO hotel, while the police waited patiently for the landowners to file paper work to evict (Hernandez 2010). This was the third public occupation by Homes Not Jails this year, as the group has received flourished since the financial meltdown of 2008.

The story of Homes Not Jails recent escapades shows that Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails never went away. The struggle between homeless city residents and their allies, and City Hall has continued in San Francisco under both Mayor Willie Brown (1996-2004) and Gavin Newsome (2004-present). In fact, the highest record number of quality of life citations occurred under Willie Brown’s tenure as Mayor (table 5), even though he officially ended the Matrix program and campaigned on supporting, not

punishing, the homeless. In the end, Brown continued on Jordan's legacy, harassing the homeless on a regular basis, using the police to clear out parks, and using "environmental engineering" to make the city less friendly for the homeless—including removing all the benches in UN Plaza, removing the fountain from the Civic Center, and setting park sprinkler systems to go off between 3 and 4 am.

At the same time, Food Not Bombs disappeared from the public radar under the Brown and Newsome administrations. This does not mean that the group stopped organizing; Food Not Bombs just looked inwards, after growing tired of the constant arrests. Food Not Bombs has since put its energy into feeding as many people as possible and building cross group alliances. At the same time Homes Not Jails became more active under Willie Brown, with the groups orchestrating a massive public occupation of the Presidio officers houses during the summer of 1997.

This chapter will begin with an overview of the entire project, so far. This will be followed by some concluding comments on dual power. Third, is a brief discussion of what Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails tell us about urban anarchy. Finally, I present my concluding thoughts on the project.

**Table 5: Estimate of Quality of Life Citations by SFCOH**

Year	Quality of Life Citations
1993	5,602
1994	11,562
1995	14,276
1996	17,532
1997	15,671
1998	18,590
1999	23,871
2000	17,954
2001	9,134
2002	6,957
2003	7,004

### 1. The Story Just Told

The story of Food Not Bombs and San Francisco highlights important aspects regarding the nature of urban politics, the prospects of anarchist politics, and the limitations of current social movement scholarship to understand contemporary anarchism. The central question throughout this project has been: why did San Francisco, a city famed for its progressive spirit and compassionate character, arrest members of Food Not Bombs for simply giving away free food to hungry people? Within this story both the progressive Mayor, Art Agnos (1988-1991), and his more conservative successor, Frank Jordan (1992-1995), arrested members of Food Not Bombs. I contend that the both mayor's were threatened by the groups' public and antagonistic direct action tactics, since it questioned the legitimacy of their administrations and shook the foundation of their already precariously forged coalitions. In both instances, the anarchist support of the homeless residents conflicted with the mayor's offices solution to the homelessness "problem."

Art Agnos, a progressive democrat, entered office constrained by conflicting political alliances, structural economic changes, and past-budgetary city decisions. That being said, Agnos was interested in forging a new homelessness policy for San Francisco with his “Beyond Shelter’s” plan, which intended to use government social programs to help the homeless through creating affordable housing in the City, expanding mental and health care services, and creating job-training programs. Food Not Bombs, acted outside the established institutional processes that Agnos was using to address homelessness. Agnos attempted to bring the group into these established channels by forcing the group to negotiate with the city through a lengthy permitting process. The “negotiated management” between the City and the group was an attempt by the City to regulate the time, manner, and place of the groups actions. In this process Agnos was centrally concerned with the location of the groups feedings—Haight and Stanyan—which was central to the City’s gentrification plan. By feeding homeless residents of Golden Gate Park put a spot light on the gentrifying plan of Agnos and also pitted two strong supporters of Agnos—the Cole-Valley Improvement Association and The Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Association. The conflict between development interests and slow-growth interests played an important role in shattering the precariously construct coalition that Agnos had forged. Likewise, the tent city protest by Food Not Bombs highlighted the failure of the Agnos to either address the concerns of the homeless or maintain control over public space.

Overall, Food Not Bombs by publicly confronting Agnos’s administration and pitting diverse members of his coalition against each other threatened his political

coalition. The group made it impossible for Agnos to balance the interests of his diverse and conflictual coalition by forcing him to take a hard public stance on issues he would have liked to work out in closed door meetings.

Frank Jordan, a former police chief, saw homelessness as a criminal and social order problem that could only be addressed through aggressive police action. Jordan followed a broken windows enforcement philosophy, expressed with his Matrix Quality of Life program, which viewed visual signs of disorder (such as homelessness) as hurting business interests and promoting crime and social decay. It was also his belief that homelessness in San Francisco was a result of the City's over generous self-service programs and leniency. His administration tried to "fix the broken windows" by stopping the flow of homeless immigrants by cutting social service benefits and strictly enforcing bans on public urination, sleeping, and drinking. The administration placed special attention to tourist and consumer areas of the City, such as Civic Center Park and United Nations Plaza, locations that Food Not Bombs intentionally served meals at twice daily. In addition to the regular meal services by the group, Food Not Bombs was influential in organizing a tent city occupation of UN Plaza during the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. The group also regularly protests and disrupted his press conferences, campaign events, and on a few instance picketed in front of his house.

By reclaiming public space through their meal services, Food Not Bombs directly confronted Mayor Jordan resisting his attempts to clean tourist sections of the City. Their public presence served as a threat to his administration and Jordan used the police to put pressure on the group. During the 15 months of Jordan's Matrix Quality of Life Program,



nearly 700 tickets or arrests were given to Food Not Bombs activists, more than three times as many as was given to the group under Agnos's four years and the first year and a half of Jordan's administration combined.

At the same time that Jordan was mass arresting Food Not Bomb members for providing free food to the hungry, his administration took a lax approach to dealing with Homes Not Jails, a group that was opening up unused building to house the homeless. Jordan, claimed that Homes Not Jails and squatting more generally was a private and civil issue between landlords and unlawful tenants, and not a criminal or public issue. In doing so, Jordan reinforced a strict division between the private actions of Homes Not Jails and the public actions of Food Not Bombs. Since his concern was with public order, he mass arrested Food Not Bombs, and did little to address the squatters in Homes Not Jails, who were actually in some ways helping Jordan by taking some of the most visible homeless residents of the City of the streets.

In effect, both Jordan and Agnos, though having radical different ways of addressing homelessness, saw in Food Not Bombs a threat to their plans. Food Not Bombs rejected the disempowering structural arguments of Agnos, and harassed him regarding his support of big business and tourist industries over his funding of social service program. They also rejected the criminal approach to homelessness that Frank Jordan promoted. In response, Food Not Bombs forged a unique response that combined structural causes—capitalism, militarism, and racism—with a strong support for individual choice and autonomy.

## 2. A New World in the Shell of the Old

Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails both represent the pre-figurative and dual power politics that has become synonymous with contemporary anarchism. These dual power institutions, which make up the bulk of contemporary anarchist activism, attempt to create alternatives to the current social order and, “build a new world, in the shell of the old.” To put it another way, “Anarchy is not about the nationalization of the achievements of the past but about a new people arising from humble beginning in small communities that form in the midst of the old: an inward colonization” (Landauer 2010: 87). For much of the dissertation the role of dual power institutions has been submerged, and even though the concept has guided much of the discussion.

Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails create anarchist institutions addressing hunger and homelessness in a way that is empowering, democratic, and communal. Unlike the state sponsored charity organizations, which use bureaucratic processes to provide services, Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails treat each homeless person as an individual, with the power and right to make decisions and be actively involved in the organizations. For this reason, a large number of activists with both groups were either homeless or formerly homeless residents of the City. In this way Food Not Bomb and Homes Not Jails transcend and radically critique the notion of “charity,” by breaking down any hierarchy or division between the “giver” and the “recipient of aid.” Instead Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails promote a politics of solidarity.

There is an inherent tension within these groups between conflicting with the powers that be and the desire to provide needed social services. For instance, Homes Not

Jails had to decide between providing a space for the homeless to sleep or putting constant political pressure on the Administration through public occupations. In their case, Homes Not Jails chose the former and provided hundreds of people places to stay, helping many empower themselves and get out off the streets for good. Food Not Bombs had to make a similar choice between providing as much food to the hungry as possible, and the desire to confront Agnos and Jordan in their wars against the homeless. Food Not Bombs intentionally chose to be a gadfly and source of public resistance by feeding in contentious location. This decision limited their ability to provide free food, as much what they cooked was confiscated and thrown away by the police, and many activists spent afternoons in prison and not over a pot.

It is important for scholars of social movements to refrain from passing judgment on Homes Not Jails as important as Food Not Bombs. It all matters on how one defines success. It is true that Food Not showed that a small group of radical activists can undermine a political regimes. Homes Not Jails, on the other hand, showed the efficiency and creativity that activists have; housing up to 500 people in unused buildings in a City known for its tight housing and rental markets. In reality both Homes Not Jails and Food Not Bombs showed the power of dual power institutions, they just showed the opposite side of the process. Food Not Bombs showed the power dual power has in confronting political orders and Homes Not Jails showed the power of dual power to effectively and fairly distribute resources

### 3. Towards an Urban Anarchy

Jeff Ferrell in *Tearing Down the Streets: Adventure in Urban Anarchy* (2002) constructs an image of urban anarchy that consists of homeless encampments on the side of the road, buskers' playing music on street corners illegally, runaway youth sitting on a sidewalk in defiance of a law, and graffiti artists tagging their names and creating public art on the walls and overpasses of the City (Ferrell 2001). To him anarchy can be best portrayed by Bakunin's famous claim that "the destructive urge is also a creative one." He portrays urban anarchy as the opposite of the Disneyfied spaces that have come to dominant urban landscapes; dirty, grimy and disorderly. He is wrong to picture urban anarchy as only being about disorder and lawbreaking.

The lesson from Food Not Bombs, Homes Not Jails, and the discussion regarding dual power shows that there is a positive image of urban anarchy that is emerging from the activists on the ground. This positive image is found in the work of Gustav Landauer, the lived experiences of the Zapatista's, and is being expanded daily by the large network of anarchist infoshops, frees schools, Food Not Bombs chapters, and the communally owned radical businesses and houses that dot the urban landscape. This urban anarchy is one that radically shatters the boundaries between public and private; turning parks and public spaces into sites for communal dinners, consensus meetings, and celebratory partying. By making lived experiences political, urban anarchists offer the hopes of a radically inclusive form of democracy, one that does exclude the poor, homeless, and non-white for the advantage of the wealthy residents and tourists. This is a politics of

radical difference, and one that looks to horizontal relations between individuals and groups instead of the vertical, top-down, model that the state uses. This is the politics of an anti-regime; a coalition of equals that does everything they can to ensure that no one group comes to a position of dominance and control.

The urban politics that is being forged by Food Not Bombs and Homes Not Jails, like all anarchist politics, has no blueprint for it and it offers no political programs. That is because it is a politics of the present as “socialism is not end that that requires means. Socialism is action that carries its ends within itself” (Landauer 2010: 201). This is an urban politics of unmediated political action, carried out by embodied actors, not the mediate representative politics that we have come to expect. For this reason, the urban anarchy that is being created can seem as chaotic and disorderly, and destructive, as Ferrell notes, but that is only because we have come to expect sameness and celebrate routine. What needs to be remembered is the routine and sameness we have come to experience, is not devoid of violence and coercion and disorder, it just generally happens to be people we do not see and do not know.

#### 4. Creating Story's of Everyday Resistance

I have spent many years organizing with local chapters of Food Not Bombs. My first experience with the group was in 2000, the year I moved from San Diego to Des Moines for college. Within my first few months there, a friend recommended that we re-start up the Des Moines chapter of Food Not Bombs, which had stopped serving meals a few years prior. Soon Des Moines Food Not Bombs had a handful of other punks and

activists involved in cooking, gleaning produce, and picking up weekly donations.

Each week we would collect vegetable and bulk donations from the local health food store and go over to someone's house, cook food, listen to music, talk politics and theory, and have a great time. Our small ragtag bunch soon became the core organizers in the small, but refreshing, Des Moines radical community—organizing protests against the Free Trade Act of the America's, for the release of death row in-mate Mumia Abu-Jamal, and organizing Des Moines CopWatch to provide support for the City's Black and Latino communities which were experience a large amount of police harassment. Each week we served in the Downtown Nolan Civic Center Park, at first to little fan fare, but after September 11<sup>th</sup>, or presence in the Park angered many, who saw us as "unpatriotic" because of our militant criticism of war, militarism, and economic colonialization. After I had left Des Moines for the Pacific Northwest, the group started to receive harassment from City officials who argued that providing free food in Nolan Park was not allowed without a permit. Luckily for my friends, the Des Moines court system disagreed with the City and as of today you can go to Nolan Park on a Sunday to get a free bowl of soup, pasta, or salad.

This same story has been told in a large number of American and Canadian cities. For instance, Food Not Bombs has butted heads regularly in Las Vegas over feeding on the famed Las Vegas Strip. Likewise, Ventura California has regularly tried to stop Food Not Bombs from feeding people on Venice Beach, and the Orlando Police have arrested members of the group on numerous occasions for feeding homeless residents downtown. Even Canadian City's have come into conflict with Food Not Bombs, as in April 2008, the Toronto City Hall asked Food Not Bombs to stop feeding as there were "negative

impacts of free food distribution in the Civic Square on area businesses” (D’Amato 2008). Finally, in Austin in 2007 FBI Supervisory Senior Resident Agent G. Charles Rasner, at an invited lecture at the University of Texas, claimed that Food Not Bombs was one of the top ten terrorist threats existing in the state of Texas, alongside white supremacist, neo-Nazi organizations, and the Animal and Earth Liberation Front’s (Liz 2006).

This all being said, the occasionally conflicts that flare up between Food Not Bombs activists and City officials garner much of the groups news coverage but there are more important stories, not covered in this dissertation or found in papers; the stories of the daily actions of the more than 400 chapter of Food Not Bombs. Some of these stories are exciting, such as the large number of Food Not Bombs activists that traveled down to New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. In this case, Food Not Bombs was one of the first and largest groups to provide food and support for residents of that devastated city. Some stories are more mundane, such as my experiences eating and talking to homeless veterans, bohemian poets, and even a few former professors turned nomads who could no longer stand the structure and control of the 9 to 5 world. These stories are essential, as they tell the story of how social justice, direct action, and anarchism combine to create a political movement that is dedicated to building community, breaking down hierarchies, and empowering some of the most politically and socially disempowered people in the country—the homeless.

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