

- Current CO2 emissions will cause major, and perhaps irreversible, impacts.
- Getting emissions to 80% of current levels by 2100 requires reducing emissions by 1.8% per year.
- But emissions are *increasing* by 2.4% per year.
- Emissions result from three major "drivers" identified in IPAT (or Kaya) Identity: (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; Kaya and Yokobori, 1997)


Impact = Population * Affluence * Technology

I = P * A * T	Annual growth rate	Influence of each driver	
	(1996-2006)	on CO2 emissions	
Impact (<i>desired</i>	\downarrow -1.8% per year	80% <i>decrease</i> by ~2100	
CO2 emissions)			
Impact (<i>actual</i>	↑ 2.4% per year	100% <i>increase</i> by ~2040	
CO2 emissions)			
Population	↑ 1.3% per year	100% <i>increase</i> by ~2065	
(# of people)			
Affluence	↑ 1.8% per year	100% <i>increase</i> by ~2050	
(\$GDP/person)			
Economic growth	↑ 3.1% per year	100% <i>increase</i> by ~2035	
(\$GDP: P*A)			
Technology	\downarrow -0.7% per year	50% <i>decrease</i> by ~2110	
(CO2/\$GDP)			

Population and affluence drive CO2 emissions but are not open for political discussion

- Global GDP of 3.1% per year reflects 1.3% from population and 1.8% from affluence.
- Population considered as *inappropriate* for government to limit.
- Affluence (income) growth considered as *undesirable* for government to limit.

Obstacles to International Cooperation on Climate Change Ronald B. Mitchell with Kelly O'Brien



"Technological" solutions dominate debate but are not enough

•	Technology already helps reduce emissions	
	by 0.7% per year but this is not enough.	•
•	Stabilizing emissions growth due to	
	population and affluence requires	٠
	technology improvements of 3.1% per year.	

•	Reducing emissions by 80% of current levels
	by 2100 requires another 1.8% per year, a
	total of 4.9% per year.

High and *sustained* technological improvements are unlikely.

Pa	ast technological improvements go unused or	
	ave "perverse" effects:	Str
	Driving 55 vs. 75 mph reduces CO2	•
	emissions and gas costs by 20%.	

The "Paperless Office"? North American paper use *per capita* has grown 25% since 1981.

Political institutions: why they won't work

- *Knowledge*: Contested whether climate change is likely.
- *Norms*: Contested whether averting climate change is desirable.
- *Incentives*: large costs with uncertain and future benefits. Beneficiaries are from other countries and future generations.
- Strategic interactions: international cooperation requires cooperation but not all states are concerned.
- *Implementation*: monitoring is challenging and sanctions for violations are unlikely and ineffective.
- ructural disadvantages of political institutions: Discourse of politics is interests but
- addressing climate change seems to run counter to our interests.
- People expect democratic governments to reflect their values not influence them.

Value-based institutions: why they might work

Conclusions

- mix."

Sources

Ehrlich, P.R., Holdren, J.P., 1971. Impact of population growth. *Science* 171, 1212-1217. Kaya, Y., Yokobori, K., 1997. Environment, energy, and economy: strategies for *sustainable development*. United Nations University Press, Tokyo; New York.

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Structural advantages of value-based institutions: Discourse of religion and other value-based institutions is values and "right and wrong." People expect religious institutions to guide and inform their values.

People *sacrifice* more and are more *altruistic* in value-based institutions.

Religions *do and can* influence population and consumption choices.

Technology alone will not be enough to stop climate change.

Population and affluence must be "in the

Political institutions are unlikely to address population and affluence.

Value-based institutions may do so and deserve more research attention.