

MILITARY INFLUENCE TACTICS: LESSONS LEARNED IN IRAQ AND  
AFGHANISTAN

by

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## THESIS ABSTRACT

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For most influence attempts in everyday life, success makes life easier and failure is a disappointment, not a tragedy. When U.S. soldiers deployed overseas attempt to influence civilians, however, success can save lives and failure can be deadly. Along with the high stakes consequences of influence attempts, soldiers face the challenges of bridging differences in language, culture, beliefs, and agendas.

The current study examined cross-cultural influence attempts made by deployed soldiers, contributing to existing influence research by examining influence attempts in a complex and challenging wartime environment. Survey data from 228 military personnel with deployment experience to Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that empathy, respect, prior relationships, and familiarity with influence targets predicted success. Five influence technique clusters emerged, and use of technique clusters involving resources and positive feelings were more successful than negative tactics.

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To the people who have had the greatest influence on me: my family.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Influence .....	2
Influence Techniques .....	2
Influence Attempts in Different Cultures .....	4
Military and Culture.....	7
The Role of Culture in Military Operations.....	7
Cultural Training.....	9
Current Study .....	11
Research Questions.....	11
II. METHODS.....	12
Participants.....	12
Design .....	13
Measures .....	14
III. RESULTS .....	17
Predicting Success and Failure .....	17
Influence Technique Clusters .....	19
Technique Clusters and Ratings of Success.....	21
IV. DISCUSSION.....	25
Predictors of Success and Failure .....	25

Chapter	Page
Influence Techniques .....	26
Limitations and Future Research .....	27
Military Application of Results .....	28
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) .....	29
Conclusion .....	30
APPENDICES .....	30
A. SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES .....	31
B. EXAMPLE OF ROUND ONE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS .....	34
C. EXAMPLE OF ROUND TWO QUESTION SET FOR SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS IN IRAQ .....	35
REFERENCES CITED.....	45

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Technique Cluster Use for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts .....	22
2. Technique Clusters for Successful Influence Attempts .....	23
3. Technique Clusters for Unsuccessful Influence Attempts .....	24
A1.Average Use of Influence Tactics Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan .....	33

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. 16 Influence Techniques and Descriptions.....	15
2. Factor Loadings for 16 Influence Techniques Ever Used .....	20
3. Correlation Matrix for Influence Clusters Ever Used.....	21
A1. Correlation for Empathy, Respect, Prior Relationships, and Understanding .....	31
A2. Regression for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts .....	31
A3. Mean Frequencies of Influence Tactic Use for Low and High Ratings .....	32
A4. ANOVA for Successful Factor Clusters .....	32
A5. ANOVA for Unsuccessful Factor Clusters.....	33

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Influence is a part of everyday life, and we often try to influence others without even realizing it. For most ordinary influence attempts, success makes life easier and failure is a disappointment, not a tragedy. When influence attempts are made by U.S. soldiers deployed overseas, however, success can save lives and failure can be deadly. Influence attempts to change anti-American beliefs, increase cooperation, and decrease resentment towards a centralized Iraq government, attacks against U.S. Forces, violence, and improvised explosive device (IED) placement all can potentially save lives if successful.

In addition to high stakes, influence attempts of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have additional challenges compared to everyday attempts of civilians. Deployed soldiers trying to influence civilians most likely have differences in language, culture, beliefs, and appearance; typically only one is wearing a uniform and carrying a weapon while the other is unarmed and in civilian clothes, and agendas. Compared to the influence attempts studied most often in the influence literature (Branzei, 2002; Higgins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Leong, Bond, & Fu, 2006), soldiers have both an increased motivation to succeed in their influence attempts combined with greater complexity and more challenges.

Influence research rarely tackles the challenges of understanding influence in this type of complex environment, and there is little research on influence in different cultures (Branzei, 2002, p. 205). One meta-analysis by Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) on influence tactics and work outcomes between 1973 and 2000 examined 31 studies.

However, over this 27 year span, only two of these were conducted outside the United States, and both were in India (Higgins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003). Additionally, while there was limited cultural diversity between studies, there was even less emphasis and analysis on cross-cultural influence within studies.

Elements of cultural psychology, influence, war, and military training must be integrated to improve our understanding of the challenges and relative effectiveness of different approaches for deployed soldiers who are attempting to influence culturally different local populations. The study reported here attempts to broaden the scope of the existing influence literature by looking at cross-cultural influence attempts of soldiers in a deployed environment. It also aims to provide practical recommendations regarding influence for military members operating in these environments. Based on surveys of soldiers who have interacted with local populations while deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the study assesses what features of influence attempts predict failure or success.

## **Influence**

It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded.

Frederick Kagan (2003).

**Influence techniques.** Capturing and categorizing the ways in which individuals influence others has resulted in a wide range of classifications ranging from a single technique to more than 160 (Rhoads, 2007). Currently, there is no consensus on which of the many taxonomies is the most useful (Toon, 2002, p. 33) in assessing variation in influence attempts.

An example of very broad categories is positive versus negative techniques. A more refined taxonomy is Cialdini's (1993, p. 1) six "weapons of influence" used as sales and marketing techniques: Reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. Yukl and Tracey (1992) identify nine influence techniques; rational explanations, inspirational appeal, consultation, ingratiation, exchange, personal appeal, coalitions, legitimation, and pressure. Moving on to more elaborate taxonomies, Levine and Wheelless (1990) created a list of 53 compliance tactics by reviewing the work of nine previously published taxonomies. Addressing even more subtle nuances is Rhoads's (2007) list of over 160 influence techniques.

In between the extreme poles of influence technique classification is Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) famous study of 16 influence techniques, which is the model for analysis in the current study. In Marwell and Schmitt's study, 608 college students indicated their likelihood of using each of the 16 techniques for each of four scenarios. A factor analysis using oblique varimax rotation led to categorization of the 16 techniques into five factors; rewarding activity, punishing activity, expertise, activation of impersonal commitments, and activation of personal commitments. Examples of techniques that fit the five factors: Promise: If you comply, I will reward you (Rewarding factor); Threat: If you do not comply, I will punish you (Punishing factor); Positive Expertise: If you comply you will be rewarded because of "the nature of things" (Expertise factor); Positive Self-feeling: You will feel better about yourself if you comply (Impersonal commitments factor); and Altruism: I need your compliance very badly, so do it for me (Personal commitments factor).

This set of influence tactics was selected for use in the current study because the total number of tactics, 16, was not too overwhelming and complex. Because participants had varying levels of education and many did not have psychological or influence training, it was important to present techniques that were clear and concise, and (with some updating of the wording) the description of the 16 techniques and how they differed from each other was easy to grasp. Using 16 techniques also offered a good balance of variation between techniques, potential for meaningful clustering, and a survey that was not too long.

**Influence attempts in different cultures.** Influence is inherently social because it requires an influencer and a target. Most influence research to date, however, focuses on influencers and targets such as supervisors and subordinates or marketing within the United States. Many of these studies focus on activities which are “almost always initiated through some form of face-to-face negotiations” (Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994, p. 73). Studies with a cross-cultural design typically compare the results of influence attempts in different countries, among influencers and targets who are within the same culture.

An example is Leong, Bond, and Fu’s (2006) study of influence tactic selection. They looked at 488 managers in the U.S. and three Chinese societies. The targets of influence were upward, downward, and lateral and varied by power differential. They found that nurturing, gentle persuasion, comprised of “ingratiation tactics and persuasion” with “reason or fact” (p. 104) was perceived to be more effective for American managers while Mainland Chinese found this to be the least effective. Also, there were no cultural differences for the rated effectiveness of contingent control

techniques “comprised tactics involving the use of contingent punishment, exchange of benefits, collegial support and assertiveness” (Leong, Bond, & Fu’s, 2006, p. 104). The effectiveness of these techniques, however, are based on between country comparisons, not cross-cultural comparisons.

Another cross-cultural study examined influence attempts of 223 MBA students from the U.S., Romania, and Japan, and found cultural values were related to choice of influence tactic (Branzei, 2002). In this study, influence attempts were aimed at achieving organizational goals. Participants read four scenarios describing interactions between “individuals from different national cultures within a specific organizational context” and indicated their preference for nine different influence tactics (Branzei, 2002, p. 207). Using a MANCOVA, they found that national culture was correlated with influence tactic preference. After controlling for cultural value dimensions, preferences for the use of three of nine tactics-- ingratiation, exchange, and legitimation--significantly differed between countries. Americans preferred to use rational tactics, inspirational appeals, and consultation, respectively, similar to the tactic preference of Japanese participants, but not Romanians. While respondents’ culture was measured, cross-cultural differences between the influencer and target were not considered. Influence tactic preferences of Americans in specific organizational contexts are difficult to apply to cross-cultural military contexts when cross-cultural interactions between participants and targets of influence are not assessed.

As these examples illustrate, most cross-cultural influence studies do not directly investigate influence attempts between two people from different cultures. Instead the comparison is whether the tendency to favor some influence tactics over others varies

based on the culture or nationality of the person making the influence attempts. Whether these choices (and the outcomes of these choices) might be affected by differences between influencers and targets' social and cultural backgrounds tends to be overlooked. Hence it is difficult to know to what extent the findings would generalize to cross-cultural interactions between soldiers and civilians.

Many studies in business attempting to assess the role of cross-cultural negotiations examine separate cultures' influence and negotiation styles, then compare and contrast national techniques and style approaches (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). One example is a case study by Abu-Nimer (1996) looking at Western (Ohio) and Middle Eastern (Israel) procedures for resolving disputes. These negotiations were performed in separate countries by culturally similar negotiators, and then compared across cultures. Differences between cultures included balancing versus changing power relationships, groups versus individual negotiation focus, interventions based on differing social norms and values, potential for future interactions, and the use of third party interveners (Abu-Nimer, 1996). This comparison of negotiation techniques between cultures, while informative, may not be applicable to understanding the cultural interaction present if individuals from Ohio and Israel attempt to negotiate.

Another example of comparing cultures without cross-cultural interaction used 700 business people from the United States, Canada (both Anglophone and Francophone), Mexico, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Taiwan, China, and Korea (Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994). Participant pairs attempted to increase joint profit in 30 minutes, and results suggests the degree to which both negotiators and partners utilized problem-solving approaches that impacted

joint profit across cultural groups. However, these differences do not address the styles and successfulness of cross-cultural interactions.

Graham's (1985) study of cross-cultural sales negotiations of 98 Japanese and American participants living in the United States is one example where different cultural interactions were present. For pairs composed of either two Americans, two Japanese, or one American and one Japanese participant for cross-cultural negotiations, results indicated that cultural composition did not directly affect negotiation outcomes, but was correlated with bargaining strategies; for cross-cultural negotiations, strategies were rated more representational (Graham, 1985, p. 141-142).

### **Military and Culture**

Knowledge of culture goes well beyond not shaking with your left hand, or not showing the bottoms of your feet. For example, if you chase a terrorist into a building, you must knock before entering. Our soldiers now do this. It sounds ludicrous, but if you don't knock, and as a result you see a woman uncovered (maybe just her face) you could capture your terrorist but create several new ones. A husband or brother or both may feel obliged to take revenge for the insult, to restore family honor, regardless of their political beliefs.  
Richard Muller (2004)

**The role of culture in military operations.** Although the literature on culture does not agree upon a single definition of culture, it can be conceptualized as a shared way of life with common goals, beliefs, attitudes, language, and modes of action (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). In cross-cultural influence attempts, culture may play a role in language differences, perceptions, expectations, trust, and ultimately success. Hajjar (2010) defines cross-culturally competent soldiers as having the “knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral repertoire and skill sets that military members require to accomplish all given tasks and missions involving cultural diversity” (p.249).

Although the U.S. military operates in many culturally different regions, the importance of cultural competent soldiers is a relatively new concept. Shay's (1994) interviews with U.S. soldiers who fought in the Vietnam War revealed that many viewed Vietnamese as the enemy, vermin, unfeeling automata, incapable of any competencies worthy of notice, and primitive. They went to war "ignorant" of Vietnamese culture, and their misinterpretation of cultural events often helped strengthen their stereotypes (Shay, 1994, p.106).

When U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, there was no emphasis on cultural training (Komarow, 2004). Due to this oversight, flawed cultural assumptions at both the strategic and tactical levels led to problems for military operations (Hajjar, 2010; Watkins, 2007). Soldiers "often pointed with their index fingers, patted down women for weapons and failed to recognize sacred sites — all behavioral blunders in Iraq — and often found themselves at a loss when it came to interacting with locals" (Hajjar, 2010; Watkins, 2007, p. 2). These mistakes could contribute not only to poor perception of the U.S. military, but also be counterproductive in accomplishing missions because of a lack of support of local Iraqis.

As incidents related to cultural misunderstandings or lack of regional knowledge increased and were amplified in the media, the need for cultural training became unmistakable. The military began describing culturally competent soldiers as a "force multiplier", increasing the capabilities of the 'force' and the likelihood of mission accomplishment, rather than "an embarrassment which may result in costly mistakes" (Lewis, 2006, p. 2). Another recent publication asserts that the "ability to understand and appreciate the role and impact of culture on policy and strategy is increasingly seen as a

critical strategic thinking skill” (Kim, 2009, p. vii). Cultural competence is described as a new way of thinking about problems and finding effective solutions for deployed soldiers, a process which needs to be taught, understood, and practiced (Daniel, 2010). Soldiers moving through a village on foot, questioning locals about a recent event, or attending a village meeting are all routine situations involving cross-cultural interaction that could potentially escalate to violence over cultural misunderstandings.

The current view on the cultural competency in soldiers suggests that cross-cultural understanding can help forge relationships and settle disputes. For deployed soldiers, cultural competency may improve the ability to conduct operations and achieve objectives without the use of force. Culturally competent soldiers who also understand influence techniques should be more effective communicators, which should increase the likelihood of mission success. The “more competent a Soldier is in understanding self and foe in terms of customs, language and culture, the better the Soldier is able to accomplish the mission” (Lewis, 2006, p. 1). Along with knowing local and regional history or language, the ability to anticipate how individuals will respond in the context of their values, norms, and society can help shape communication (Abu-Nimer, 1996) and should improve the chances of obtaining cooperation.

**Cultural training.** Despite the military’s statements about the importance of cultural competence, overall, cultural training to increase soldiers’ ability to live and perform in culturally diverse environments is not widespread. Prior to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has spent most of its time “honing its lethal capabilities” which has left it “lacking the knowledge, skills, and trained personnel to shape the operational environment with non-lethal means such as information operations” (Rogers,

2005, p. iii). Developing and integrating this non-lethal, cultural training is an ongoing process.

The emphasis and intensity of cultural training varies throughout the military. Only specific career fields, such as Special Forces, Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs, Military Information Support, and attachés, emphasize cultural competence (Hajjar, 2010; Lewis, 2006). While these specialties' missions focus specifically on cross-cultural interaction, all deployed soldiers may encounter these situations while deployed. The training most soldiers receive varies based on location of deployment, availability of training material, emphasis by commanders, and time restraints prior to deployment, some as little as two to four hours, and most often only resulting in a "tourist level" of cultural competence (Lewis, 2006, p. 3; Troop, 2006).

One Department of Defense funded study on cultural competence attempted to identify general psychological variables of military cross-cultural influence, as well as environmental features specific to military mission performance (Ross, 2008). Interview data from nine Army officer and enlisted males revealed empathy (understanding other peoples' feelings), interpersonal skills (attitude and communication skills), mental models (perspective taking), and willingness to engage/openness to experience were important for mission success in cross-cultural, deployed interactions.

My research expands on the findings of the Ross 2008 interviews of the nine male Army personnel to look at a much larger sample of men and women from multiple services. . It also examines specific mission or task success in the form of influence attempts. The study is meant to be part of the "next generation of social influence research" (Crano & Prislin, 2006, p. 354).

## **Current Study**

The goal of the current study is to apply both influence and cross-cultural research to the context of soldiers interacting with culturally different populations while deployed. Specifically, I am interested in exploring whether influence technique choice and aspects of culture (including cultural training) contribute to the relative success of influence attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## **Research Questions**

1. Does cultural training predict ratings of influence success?
2. Do any other cultural variables predict the perceived success of influence attempts?
3. Does the choice of influence technique predict the perceived success of influence attempts?

## CHAPTER II

### METHODS

#### Participants

Criterion for participation in the survey included U.S. military service, deployment experience to Iraq and/or Afghanistan, and multiple face to face interactions with host country civilians. Participants were recruited through postings on social networking websites, emails to known military member contacts, write ups in military journals, and flyers. Additionally, National Guard members in Oregon and Colorado were offered a \$200 donation to each of their Emergency Relief Funds if 50 qualified National Guard members from their respective states completed the survey.

There were 253 individuals who started the survey, 228 of which qualified for participation by having face to face interactions with civilians while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Of qualified participants, 119 (52%) completed the survey, and 109 (48%) completed part of the survey and were included in some analyses.

For the 228 qualified participants, there were 187 males (82%) and 32 females. Seventy-four percent (169) served in the Army, along with 39 Air Force, 13 Marines, 7 Navy military members. There were 95 National Guard members, 92 Active Duty, 29 Reservists. Deployment experience history included 136 members deployed to Iraq, 53 deployed to Afghanistan, and 39 with deployment experience to both Iraq and Afghanistan. For all influence attempts, 95% (337 of 356) were made during or after 2001, with only six occurring during 2000 or earlier and 13 responses of I don't know/classified.

## **Design**

Data were collected using an anonymous online survey. Participants were current and former military members with deployment experience to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both for past or current operations. They were recruited using flyers, email, social networking websites (such as Facebook), and social networking.

There were two sets of questions in the survey, demographic questions and questions related to two separate influence attempts. Participants were instructed not to provide classified information, and an 'I don't know/classified' response was included for each content question.

During the survey, participants were instructed at the beginning of each influence section, that

we are interested in your interactions with civilians while deployed. In particular, we are interested in situations in which you tried to influence the attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs of [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians. For example, you may have tried to increase reporting of suspicious behavior to local authorities, promote positive attitudes toward US soldiers, or decrease the frequency of children throwing stones at soldiers. Think of the time you were most successful in influencing one or more [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians.

They were asked to think of two influence attempts, one generally successful and one generally less successful for Iraq, Afghanistan, or both depending on deployment experience. For individuals deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan, the order of country questions, Iraq and Afghanistan, was counterbalanced. Hence those deployed to one

country reported on two influence attempts; those deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan reported on four influence attempts.

### **Measures**

Questions were asked about language skills, cultural knowledge and training, empathy and respect toward cultural differences, and time spent in country. Many of these are extensions of the cross-cultural competence factors found in Ross's (2008) interview data from deployed soldiers. Individuals rated themselves on empathy, language ability and cultural knowledge, respect (openness), and prior relationships (experience).

Influence techniques from Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) study were used to assess ways in which soldiers attempted to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of civilians. The wording used for the 16 influence techniques developed was updated in places for easier comprehension, and each was followed by a description (Table 1).

Participants were asked to identify which techniques were used for each influence attempt. Additionally, they were asked to identify which techniques they had ever used in each country, Iraq or Afghanistan. To assess the relative successfulness of influence attempts and techniques, participants rated each influence attempt on a scale from 1 (not at all successful) to 10 (extremely successful). Participants deployed to only Iraq or Afghanistan had two ratings of success, one for the relatively successful attempt and one for the relatively unsuccessful attempt. Participants deployed to both countries reported on four influence attempts and thus made four ratings of success. With gaps in the overlap between cross-cultural and influence bodies of literature, there was no existing

survey which covered cross-cultural influence attempts of deployed soldiers. Therefore, data collection was divided into two rounds.

Table 1.

*16 Influence Techniques and Descriptions*

<b>Technique</b>	<b>Description</b>
Reward	If you comply, I will reward you
Punishment	If you don't comply, I will punish you
Debt	You owe me compliance because of past favors
Gift	Give gift, then make request
Liking	Be nice so target will want to comply with your request
Pleading	I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me
Aversive Stimulation	Punish until they comply with your request
Moral Appeal	You are immoral if you do not comply
Positive Self-feeling	You will feel better about yourself if you comply
Negative Self-feeling	You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply
Positive Expertise	If you comply, good things will happen to you
Negative Expertise	If you don't comply, bad things will happen to you
Positive Traits	A good person would comply
Negative Traits	A bad person would not comply
Positive Esteem	People you care about will think better of you if you comply
Negative Esteem	People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply

The first round had open ended and multiple choice questions about cross-cultural influence attempts (see Appendix B). These responses were used to establish a baseline of potential scenarios for cross-cultural influence attempts in deployed environments because these categories could not be developed solely on existing literature. This information was used to create multiple choice categories for the round two survey.

There were six main questions that response sets were created for:

1. What attitude/belief were you trying to change?
2. What behavior were you trying to change?
3. For this influence attempts, check all techniques/approaches you used:

4. What evidence helped you evaluate how successful your influence attempt was?
5. What aspects of the situation were favorable and/or unfavorable to your influence attempt?
6. What cultural factors played an important role in your influence attempt?

The round two survey contained only multiple choice questions to help increase the completion rate by decreasing the amount of time needed to complete the survey (see Appendix C). To increase participation, the National Guard donation incentive was used during the second round of data collection. Army National Guard units in both Colorado and Oregon were contacted to participate in the survey and instructed that \$200 would be donated to their Emergency Relief Fund from the Groups and War Lab at the University of Oregon if 50 qualified National Guard members from their respective states completed the survey, or \$100 if at least 25 qualified participants completed the survey. These changes helped increase both participation and completion rate from 38% (41 of 107) in round one to 65% (78 of 121) in round two.

## CHAPTER III

### RESULTS

#### **Predicting Success and Failure**

In this study, we examined which variables and technique choices may contribute to the relative success or failure of influence attempts of deployed soldiers. Multiple regressions were run to examine the impact of 14 variables on the perceived success of influence attempts (10 point Likert-scale). Predictors included soldier demographics (gender, age at deployment), training types (cultural, civil affairs, military information support operations/MISO, and special forces), influence target (friendliness towards troops, individual or group, familiarity, and prior relationships), general cultural variables (empathy, respect, understanding local culture), and total time in country.

The number of participants for each analysis varies. For some analyses, there are a smaller number of participants' responses examined because of missing data, as well as analyses specifically designed to look at only round 2 data. Additionally, for some tests, data provided from individuals deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan are counted twice to account for their experiences in each country.

Participant ratings of influence attempt success were gathered for both successful and unsuccessful attempts. The mean success rating on a scale from 1 (not at all successful) to 10 (extremely successful) was 6.47 ( $SD = 1.99$ ) for the relatively successful attempts, and 3.99 ( $SD = 2.01$ ) for the relatively unsuccessful attempts. A paired samples t-test showed a significant difference in mean ratings of successful and unsuccessful influence attempts ( $t [131] = 11.15, p < .001$ ).

Two regressions were run to determine if deployment experience was correlated with ratings of success for either successful or unsuccessful influence attempts. Country of deployment, Iraq, Afghanistan, or both, did not significantly predict ratings of success for successful ( $F(1,161) = .50, p = .48$ ) or unsuccessful ( $F(1,130) = .01, p = .94$ ) attempts. Thus, influence attempts across all deployment experiences were combined.

Separate regressions were run for successful and unsuccessful influence attempts using the variables listed in the first paragraph as predictors. Because two influence attempts were discussed, the characteristics of these situations (e.g., target of influence, familiarity, and time in country) may vary between the attempts. Empathy and respect were strongly correlated with success ratings for both sets of influence attempts, the relatively successful ( $r = .61, p < .001$ ) and relatively unsuccessful ( $r = .71, p < .001$ ) attempts (Table A1).

In order to simplify the final interpretation of the variables and resolve issues of multicollinearity, empathy and respect were averaged and a new variable was created.

A reduced model of regression which included the average between reported empathy and respect ( $\beta = .39, p < .001$ ), and familiarity ( $\beta = .24, p = .01$ ) significantly predicted influence attempt success ratings for the relatively successful attempts ( $F(2, 106) = 14.21, p < .001$ ; Table A2). As empathy/respect, and familiarity increase, successfulness of influence attempt ratings also increase. Inclusion of the other variables failed to explain a significantly greater amount of variance beyond the reduced model ( $\Delta R^2 = .07, p = .66$ ).

A regression for the relatively unsuccessful influence attempt ratings produced a reduced model of empathy/ respect ( $\beta = .26, p = .02$ ) and prior relationships ( $\beta = .25, p =$

.02), which significantly predicted unsuccessful influence attempt success ratings ( $F(2, 79) = 5.89, p = .004$ ). As the average of empathy and respect and ratings of prior relationships increase, ratings of relative success increased (Table A2).

As with the first regression, adding the remaining variables failed to improve on the reduced model ( $\Delta R^2 = .07, p = .89$ ). Because the combined empathy and respect variable was substantially correlated with prior relationships ( $r = .53, p < .001$ ) and understanding local culture ( $r = .70, p < .001$ ), residuals were used for the variables of prior relationships and understanding local culture in order to simplify the final interpretation of the factors and resolve issues of multicollinearity (Table A1).

### **Influence Technique Clusters**

A factor analysis was performed on the 16 influence techniques reportedly ever used in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to define groupings. Using principal component analysis and an oblique promax rotation on the 16 influence techniques resulted in five factors which explained 61.62% of the variance in the model. The other/none of the above/classified option was excluded for three reasons. It was rarely used, by nature difficult to interpret, and including this option tended to split some of the influence techniques among factors. Figure A1 shows the frequency of technique choices ever used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The five clusters that emerged were negative techniques (negative traits, moral appeal, negative esteem, negative expertise), power differential techniques (aversive stimulation, pleading, punishment, negative self-feeling), positive traits (positive expertise, positive traits), resource techniques (gift, reward, liking, debt), and positive feeling (positive esteem, positive self-feeling). Table 2 shows these factor groupings, and

following Gorsuch's (1983) guidelines, scores below .30 were excluded. Techniques in all five factors loaded at .40 or above. Of the 16 items, three are potentially problematic due to loading on a secondary factor with less than .10 difference from its main factor. Negative expertise in the negative factor also moderately loads on positive traits, negative self-feeling in the power differential factor also moderately loads on the negative factor, and debt in the resources factor also moderately loads on the negative factor (Table 2).

Table 3 shows the correlation between factors. There were three pairs with correlations higher than .35; factors three and four ( $r = .36$ ), factors one and five ( $r = .36$ ), factors one and two ( $r = .35$ ). Two factor pairs, three and five ( $r = .04$ ) and four and five ( $r = .03$ ), have correlations less than .05.

Table 2.

*Factor Loadings: for Promax Rotation for 16 Influence Techniques Ever Used*

	<b>Factors</b>				
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Negative Traits	.915				
Moral Appeal	.678				
Negative Esteem	.473		.325		
Negative Expertise	.434	.391			
Aversive Stimulation		.797			
Pleading		.670			
Punishment		.621	.342		-.426
Negative Self-feeling	.352	.435			
Positive Expertise			.903		
Positive Traits	.366		.634		
Gift				.867	
Reward			.314	.567	
Liking				.545	
Debt	.344			.379	
Positive Esteem					.843
Positive Self-feeling			.303		.687

Table 3.

*Correlation Matrix for Influence Technique Clusters Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1</b>	-	.350	.326	.249	.356
<b>2</b>		-	.269	.265	.207
<b>3</b>			-	.357	.036
<b>4</b>				-	.032
<b>5</b>					-

*Note.* Repeated correlation values excluded

**Technique Clusters and Ratings of Success**

The technique clusters defined by the factor analysis groupings of techniques ever used was applied to the techniques specifically used in successful and unsuccessful influence attempts. An average factor score was computed for each of the five factors based on the number of items endorsed divided by the total possible number of techniques for each factor. This calculation was completed for both successful and unsuccessful influence attempts, resulting in five cluster scores for each influence type. These factor cluster scores were used to determine relationships between factor type and successfulness.

To examine this relationship, cluster average scores were also used in two regressions for ratings of success in relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful influence attempts. None of the five factors were significant predictors of variance in ratings of success for successful ( $F(5, 99) = 1.137, p = .346$ ) or unsuccessful influence attempts ( $F(5, 77) = .551, p = .737$ ). It is important to note, however, that because ratings of success were only collected for extreme ends, successful and unsuccessful, and not the entire spectrum of influence attempts, it is difficult to assume a similar relationship for

moderately successful influence attempts. Thus, a regression may not offer a complete explanation of relationships in this data.

Looking into these relationships further, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each factor cluster to assess differences in frequency of use between successful and unsuccessful influence attempts. The first factor cluster (negative techniques) was used significantly more in unsuccessful influence attempts than in successful attempts ( $F(1,86) = 19.43, p < .001$ ) (Figure 1). This was also true for power differential techniques ( $F(1,86) = 16.34, p < .001$ ). In contrast resources ( $F(1,86) = 6.46, p = .01$ ), and positive feelings ( $F(1,86) = 1.75, p = .19$ ) clusters were used significantly more often in successful attempts than in unsuccessful attempts. The only cluster that did not differ significantly in usage was positive traits ( $F(1,86) = 3.56, p = .06$ ) (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Influence Technique Cluster Use for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts

Note. \*Significant differences at the  $p < .05$  level

Next, I wanted to examine if these differences in technique use between successful and unsuccessful attempts could be seen within each type of attempt. Ratings of success during influence attempts were divided into unsuccessful (ratings one to five) and successful (ratings of six to 10) for both attempt types.

For successful influence attempts, a 2 x 5 ANOVA of successful technique clusters and coded successfulness category revealed that positive feelings ( $F(1,103) = 7.45, p = .01$ ), significantly differed between more successful (6 to 10) and less successful (1 to 5) ratings (Table A3). Figure 2 shows that for successful attempts rated six or above, techniques in the positive feeling cluster were used more than for techniques rated five or below. The other factors, negative traits ( $F(1,103) = .02, p = .88$ ), power differential ( $F(1,103) = .07, p = .79$ ), positive traits ( $F(1,103) = .20, p = .66$ ), and resources ( $F(1,103) = 0.0, p = .99$ ) did not differ significantly between the two categories.




Figure 2. Technique Clusters for Successful Influence Attempts

For unsuccessful influence attempts, a 2x5 ANOVA of successful technique clusters and coded successfulness revealed the resource factor ( $F(1,81) = 4.80, p = .03$ ), significantly differed between successful (6 to 10) and unsuccessful (1 to 5) ratings (Table A5). Figure 3 shows that in unsuccessful attempts rated five or below, techniques in the resource cluster were used less often than those rated six or above. The other factors, negative traits ( $F(1,81) = 1.75, p = .19$ ), power differential ( $F(1,81) = .36, p = .55$ ), positive traits ( $F(1,81) = .001, p = .98$ ), and positive feelings ( $F(1,81) = 2.40, p = .13$ ) clusters did not differ significantly. Although use of techniques in the positive feelings cluster did not differ significantly between successful and unsuccessful ratings for relatively less successful influence attempts, a similar trend was found to successful influence attempts with less reported use in unsuccessful influence attempts and increased use in successful attempts.




Figure 3. Technique Clusters for Unsuccessful Influence Attempts

## CHAPTER IV

### DISCUSSION

Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.  
Robert M. Gates (2007)

#### **Predictors of Success and Failure**

Among the measured variables, only empathy/respect, familiarity, and prior relationships significantly predicted the rated success of influence attempts. The averaged empathy/respect variable significantly predicted success ratings in both relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful attempts. Familiarity significantly predicted success ratings only with reportedly successful influence attempts, and prior relationships predicted relative success only with reportedly unsuccessful attempts.

These results support Ross's (2008) findings from military member interviews describing cross-cultural situations. Ross (2008) found interpersonal skills, including rapport building, empathy, perspective taking, and openness to experience as critical elements of cross-cultural competence, with perspective taking being the most important factor.

Ross's elements can be combined into two variables, relationship building (interpersonal skills and openness to experience) and general personality traits (empathy and perspective taking), and compared to combined significant factors of relationship building (prior relationship and familiarity) and general personality traits (empathy and respect). Using these combined variables, general personality traits emerge in both studies as the most vital element of cross-cultural interactions, significant for both successful and unsuccessful influence attempts, and most commonly mentioned in

interviews (Ross, 2008). Additionally, elements of relationship building were found to be the second most important aspect in cross-cultural competence (Ross, 2008), as well as the only significant factors other than empathy and respect as correlated to ratings of influence success.

### **Influence Techniques**

The five influence technique clusters that emerged, negative techniques (negative traits, moral appeal, negative esteem, negative expertise), power differential techniques (aversive stimulation, pleading, punishment, negative self-feeling), positive traits (positive expertise, positive traits), resource techniques (gift, reward, liking, debt), and positive feeling (positive esteem, positive self-feeling) fit into conceptually logical categories. These categories, however, are different from Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) original grouping. They found clusters of rewarding activity (gift, liking, reward), punishing activity (punishment, aversive stimulation), expertise (positive and negative expertise), activation of impersonal commitment (positive and negative self-feeling, positive and negative traits, positive and negative esteem, moral appeal), and activation of personal commitments (pleading, negative esteem, debt, negative traits).

These differences in technique clustering may be linked to two variations in data collection: influence scenarios and likelihood of use. First, the scenarios for assessing likelihood of technique use in Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) study were provided by the researchers and only have four different types of relationships; supervisor/employee, parent/child, college roommates, and a door-to-door salesman/potential customer. In three of the four scenarios, all except the door-to-door salesmen, a fairly high degree of similarity and familiarity can be assumed. Supervisor and employees embody the same

values and ideals of the company they work for and have a high degree of interaction. Parents raise children to mirror their values and see each other daily. College roommates are both pursuing higher education and also see each other frequently. The only situation in which there is likely a low degree of similarity and familiarity is a door-to-door salesman and a potential customer. Additionally, culture is not addressed in this study.

The second reason for differences in technique clustering may come from assessment of technique use. Marwell and Schmitt (1967) ask participants about likelihood of technique use in future interactions, while this study asked for techniques already used. Prediction of future behavior, used in Marwell and Schmitt's study is similar to the theory of planned behavior, which postulates that certain motivational factors lead to intention which in turn leads to behavior choice (Ajzen, 1991). While this theory has merit, past behavior has been shown to be a better predictor of future behavior (Wong & Mullen, 2009). Thus, this study presumably represents a more likely set of behavior clusters.

### **Limitations and Future Research**

Although past behavior is a more reliable predictor of future behavior than intentions, a retrospective study of events, some of which happened 10 years ago, may still be problematic. Influence attempts should be studied shortly after they are made, during debriefing sessions when troops return to base after a mission, for the most reliable reporting.

Another limitation of this study is the use of single item measures for some of the variables potentially contributing to influence attempt success. Because there are so many aspects of a situation which may impact influence success, but so little literature on

influence attempts of deployed soldiers, a wide range of variables were assessed at a superficial level. This framework can shape future research questions about military influence attempts.

One final shortcoming to note is the type of influence attempt delivery assessed. Only face to face influence was examined, but there are many other mediums available for exerting influence. Written posters, television commercials, or a combination of influence types may be combined.

### **Military Application of Results**

In predicting ratings of influence success, of notable importance is the lack of impact of cultural, civil affairs, MISO, and special forces training. It is important to note that while these types of training did not predict the success of influence attempts in this study, they are clearly important to military operations. The focus of cultural, civil affairs, and special forces training is not influence, and most likely not tailored to teaching cross-cultural communication and influence skills. However, if this training is expected to produce culturally competent soldiers skilled at influencing civilians, aspects of training may need to be modified to address or improve these skills.

For soldiers trained in any area, it is important to have the training and skills to successfully manage cross-cultural situations. Even when these situations are not central to a career field, the situations soldiers face while deployed are dynamic, and soldiers must understand how and when to use both lethal and non-lethal tools (Daniel, 2010). Developing 'non-lethal' military capabilities (Rogers, 2005, p. iii) involves not only providing training, but ensuring that training is effective.

## **Military Information Support Operations (MISO)**

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.  
attributed to Winston Churchill

The objective of MISO is to change the behavior of specific foreign populations in order to support mission objectives. However, this type of training was not significantly correlated with ratings of influence attempt success. This may be due in part to differences in culture or the specific type of influence assessed in this study, face to face.

The lack of significance may also be linked to a deficit in feedback for these types of influence operations. The goal of MISO to influence a specific change in behavior, however, assessing the effectiveness of influence attempts is challenging because of the difficulties in both assessing changes in behavior and attributing these changes to MISO. The “ability to predict, recognize, and measure” the effects of MISO “in some meaningful way and provide convincing evidence that [MISO] caused effects, or these were significantly influenced by non-kinetic [MISO] actions” is one of the biggest challenges of MISO (Perry, 2008, p. 9). Understanding what types of influence attempts work, and which ones don’t, is essential to duplicate positive results and avoid unsuccessful ones (Perry, 2008).

Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilian populations is often one of many military missions, which is lead by MISO and performed by troops at the tactical level. This type of operation is crucial because of its non-kinetic approach; it minimizes violence and potential loss of human life as a means of mission success. However, MISO has been criticized because of its lack of measures of effectiveness (MOE), discredited, and thus underutilized by commanders (Perry, 2008). A lack of resources when planning

and in assessment (Perry, 2008) and the nature of the military operations make MOE difficult to determine. The availability of intelligence information, manpower, and time are often scarce. Additionally, the nature of non-kinetic operations means effects are not always immediate and obvious, such as when dropping a bomb. MISO operations require equal resources both to influence as well as to assess effectiveness, however, once the effect is produced, it is essential to follow up with well designed MOE.

### **Conclusion**

This study attempted to link multiple branches of research; influence, cross-cultural, and military. Future research should continue to study influence and culture in military operations. This environment is not only unique, but advances in research which benefit soldiers can also potentially save lives. Furthermore, in studying influence attempts, different types of message delivery beyond just face to face need to be studied. Interpretation and commitment to influence attempts with different message delivery, such as a radio commercial or poster, may greatly impact success. Finally, since influence is not necessarily comprised of a single attempt, but many interactions and techniques, it needs to be studied throughout the process to better assess situational factors contributing to the successfulness of attempts for each interactions.

**APPENDIX A**

**SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES**

Table A1.

*Correlation table for Empathy, Respect, Prior Relationships, and Understanding Local Culture for Successful and Unsuccessful influence attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan*

	Empathy	Respect	Relationships	Culture
<b>Empathy</b>				
Successful	-	.608**	.351**	.539**
Unsuccessful		.710**	.463**	.631**
<b>Respect</b>				
Successful	-	-	.344**	.595**
Unsuccessful			.528**	.683**
<b>Relationships</b>				
Successful	-	-	-	.497**
Unsuccessful				.550**

*Note.* \*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table A2.

*Regression Table for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts*

	B	Std. Error	$\beta$	Sig
<b>Successful</b>				
Empathy/Respect	.40	.09	.39	.00
Familiarity	.39	.14	.24	.01
<b>Unsuccessful</b>				
Empathy	.21	.09	.26	.02
Prior Relationships	.19	.08	.25	.02

Table A3.

*Mean frequencies of Influence Tactic Use for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts for Low (1-5) and High (6-10) Ratings*

	<b>N</b>	<b>Negative</b>	<b>Power</b>	<b>Positive</b>	<b>Resources</b>	<b>Positive</b>
			<b>Difference</b>	<b>Traits</b>		<b>Feelings</b>
<b>Successful</b>						
<b>Low (1-5)</b>	33	.03 (.08)	.05 (.17)	.24 (.38)	.26 (.25)	.14 (.29)*
<b>High (6-10)</b>	72	.03 (.08)	.05 (.19)	.28 (.37)	.26 (.26)	.38 (.04)*
<b>All</b>	105	.03 (.08)	.05 (.18)	.27 (.37)	.26 (.25)	.27 (.35)
<b>Unsuccessful</b>						
<b>Low (1-5)</b>	63	.11 (.18)	.13 (.21)	.22 (.36)	.24 (.27)*	.14 (.32)
<b>High (6-10)</b>	20	.05 (.10)	.10 (.15)	.23 (.38)	.10 (.17)*	.28 (.38)
<b>All</b>	87	.09 (.17)	.12 (.20)	.21 (.35)	.20 (.26)	.17 (.33)

*Note.* \*Significant difference at the  $p < .05$  level, standard deviation in parenthesis

Table A4.

*ANOVA for Successful Factor Clusters*

		<b>Sum of</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
		<b>Squares</b>		<b>Square</b>		
<b>Negative</b>	Between Groups	.000	1	.000	.022	.881
	Within Groups	.664	103	.006		
	Total	.664	104			
<b>Power</b>	Between Groups	.001	1	.001	.072	.789
	Within Groups	1.424	103	.014		
	Total	1.425	104			
<b>Positive</b>	Between Groups	.028	1	.028	.201	.655
	Within Groups	14.505	103	.141		
	Total	14.533	104			
<b>Resources</b>	Between Groups	.000	1	.000	.000	.991
	Within Groups	6.557	103	.064		
	Total	6.557	104			
<b>Positive</b>	Between Groups	.878	1	.878	7.451	.007
	Within Groups	12.136	103	.118		
	Total	13.014	104			

Table A5.

*ANOVA for Unsuccessful Factor Clusters*

		<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Negative</b>	Between Groups	.050	1	.050	1.754	.189
	Within Groups	2.289	81	.028		
	Total	2.339	82			
<b>Power Difference</b>	Between Groups	.015	1	.015	.359	.551
	Within Groups	3.282	81	.041		
	Total	3.297	82			
<b>Positive Traits</b>	Between Groups	.000	1	.000	.001	.976
	Within Groups	10.626	81	.131		
	Total	10.627	82			
<b>Resources</b>	Between Groups	.306	1	.306	4.799	.031
	Within Groups	5.171	81	.064		
	Total	5.477	82			
<b>Positive Feelings</b>	Between Groups	.265	1	.265	2.399	.125
	Within Groups	8.952	81	.111		
	Total	9.217	82			




Figure A1. Average Use of Influence Tactics Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan

## **APPENDIX B**

### **EXAMPLE OF ROUND ONE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS**

Q1 What attitude/belief were you trying to change?

Q2 What behavior were you trying to change?

Q3 Please describe what you did during this influence attempt. Describe the details of the setting and include any details you think were relevant, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

Q4 What evidence made you think your influence attempt was successful?

Q5 What aspects of the situation (political announcements, needs of the population, cultural knowledge, etc), of your actions, or recent events contributed to the success of the influence attempt?

Q6 What aspects of the situation, your actions, or other recent events made the influence attempt difficult or less successful?

Q7 What aspects of the local culture played the most important role in your influence attempt?

## APPENDIX C

### EXAMPLE OF ROUND TWO QUESTION SET FOR SUCCESSFUL

#### INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS IN IRAQ

Q1 Share your military expertise! Please take this survey if:

1. You have deployed to Iraq and/or Afghanistan AND
  2. During your deployment you had multiple face-to-face interactions with civilians
- The purpose of the project is to extract lessons learned for cultural deployment training and influence attempts abroad.

This survey is for Capt Andrea Wolfe's Masters thesis research with the Psychology of War lab at the University of Oregon. It should take most people between 15 and 25 minutes to complete depending on whether they deployed to one country or both  
Researchers: Andrea Wolfe, Capt, USAF & Dr. Holly Arrow, Department of Psychology, University of Oregon.

Contact [awolfe3\[at\]uoregon.edu](mailto:awolfe3@uoregon.edu) & [harrow \[at\]uoregon.edu](mailto:harrow@uoregon.edu) (replace "at" with @)

- Yes, continue (1)
- No, I do not want to take the survey at this time (2)

Q2 You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Capt Andrea Wolfe under the supervision of Dr. Holly Arrow, from the University of Oregon, Department of Psychology. The goal of the present study is to investigate the experience of US military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thank you for helping us with our research.

If you decide to participate, you will be completing a questionnaire online. It should take most people about 15-25 minutes. Your participation can aid us in understanding US soldier's experience with influence attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan and can potentially lead to a better understanding of how group dynamics affect the performance and satisfaction of members.

Your participation is voluntary and all data collected in this experiment will be anonymous, both to researchers and your chain of command, and will provide no way of identifying you or your computer. You are free to stop answering the questions and quit at any time.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact Capt Andrea Wolfe at [awolfe3@uoregon.edu](mailto:awolfe3@uoregon.edu).

If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact the Office for Protection of Human Subjects, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, (541) 346-2510. The views expressed in this survey are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

- Yes, start the survey (1)
- No, I do not want to take the survey at this time (2)

Q3 Have you deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and attempted to influence (either formally or informally) the attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors of the local population?

- Iraq only (1)
- Afghanistan only (2)
- Iraq and Afghanistan (3)
- No deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan (5)
- I did not have face to face contact with local populations while deployed (4)

Q4 What is/was your branch of service?

- Army (1)
- Marines (2)
- Navy (3)
- Air Force (4)

Q5 Provide your primary military specialty code for your most recent deployment.

- MOS (1) \_\_\_\_\_

Q6 During your most recent deployment, were you in the National Guard, Reserves, or Active Duty?

- National Guard (1)
- Reserves (2)
- Active Duty (3)

Q7 If you have ever served in the National Guard, which state? \_\_\_\_\_

Q8 During your most recent deployment, what was your rank? \_\_\_\_\_

Q9 Gender

- Male (1)
- Female (2)

Q10 Age

- 18 - 24 (1)
- 25 - 29 (2)
- 30 - 34 (3)
- 35 - 39 (4)
- 40 - 44 (5)
- 45 or older (6)

Q11 Have you received training in any of the following areas? (select all that apply)

- Psychological Operations (PSYOP) (1)
- Civil Affairs (CA) (2)
- Special Forces (3)
- None of the above (4)

Q12 Have you received any cultural training such as cross-cultural communication training, cultural negotiations training, cultural briefings, etc?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q13 Was the cultural training aimed at:

- Iraq (1)
- Afghanistan (2)
- Iraq and Afghanistan (3)
- South Asia or Middle Eastern regions (4)
- Other region (5)
- General cultural training (6)

Q14 Briefly describe the cultural training(s) you received.

Q15 Next, we are interested in your interactions with civilians while deployed. In particular, we are interested in situations in which you tried to influence the attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs of Iraqi civilians. For example, you may have tried to increase reporting of suspicious behavior to local authorities, promote positive attitudes toward US soldiers, or decrease the frequency of children throwing stones at soldiers. Think of the time you were most successful in influencing one or more Iraqi civilians. Select the province in which this occurred:

<input type="radio"/> I don't know/classified (1)	<input type="radio"/> Arbil (7)	<input type="radio"/> Dhi Qar (13)
<input type="radio"/> Al-Anbar (2)	<input type="radio"/> As-Sulaymaniyah (8)	<input type="radio"/> Karbala' (14)
<input type="radio"/> Al-Basrah (3)	<input type="radio"/> At-Ta'mim (9)	<input type="radio"/> Maysan (15)
<input type="radio"/> Al-Muthanna (4)	<input type="radio"/> Babil (10)	<input type="radio"/> Ninawa (16)
<input type="radio"/> Al-Qadisiyah (5)	<input type="radio"/> Baghdad (11)	<input type="radio"/> Salah ad-Din (17)
<input type="radio"/> An-Najaf (6)	<input type="radio"/> Dahuk (12)	<input type="radio"/> Wasit (18)

Q16 Did the influence attempt take place in an urban or rural setting?

- I don't know/classified (1)
- Urban (2)
- Rural (3)

Q17 What year did the influence attempt take place?

<input type="radio"/> I don't know/classified (23)	<input type="radio"/> 1995 (7)	<input type="radio"/> 2003 (15)
<input type="radio"/> Before 1990 (1)	<input type="radio"/> 1996 (8)	<input type="radio"/> 2004 (16)
<input type="radio"/> 1990 (2)	<input type="radio"/> 1997 (9)	<input type="radio"/> 2005 (17)
<input type="radio"/> 1991 (3)	<input type="radio"/> 1998 (10)	<input type="radio"/> 2006 (18)
<input type="radio"/> 1992 (4)	<input type="radio"/> 1999 (11)	<input type="radio"/> 2007 (19)
<input type="radio"/> 1993 (5)	<input type="radio"/> 2000 (12)	<input type="radio"/> 2008 (20)
<input type="radio"/> 1994 (6)	<input type="radio"/> 2001 (13)	<input type="radio"/> 2009 (21)
	<input type="radio"/> 2002 (14)	<input type="radio"/> 2010 (22)

Q18 What month did the influence attempt take place?

- January - March (1)
- April - June (2)
- July - September (3)
- October - December (4)

Q19 How much total time had you spent in Iraq at the time of the influence attempt?

\_\_\_\_\_ Years (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ Months (2)

Q20 How friendly or hostile were Iraqi civilians at the time of the influence attempt?

- Very friendly toward US soldiers (1)
- Somewhat friendly toward US soldiers (2)
- Mixed or neutral toward US soldiers (3)
- Somewhat hostile toward US soldiers (4)
- Very hostile toward US soldiers (5)

Q21 Who were you trying to influence?

- Single individual (1)
- Multiple individuals (2)
- Particular group (3)
- General population (4)

Q22 Did the individual have a leadership role, and if so, what was it?

- No (1)
- Yes (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q23 What was the gender of the individual you were trying to influence?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)

Q24 What ethnic group(s) did the individual belong to (check all that apply)?

- I don't know/classified (1)
- Sunni (2)
- Shi'a (3)
- Kurd (4)
- Other (5)

Q25 How familiar were you with the individual you were trying to influence?

- Not at all familiar (1)
- Slightly familiar (2)
- Somewhat familiar (3)
- Moderately familiar (4)
- Extremely familiar (5)

Q26 What was the age of the individual you were trying to influence?

- 18 and under (1)
- 19 - 29 (2)
- 30 - 39 (3)
- 40 - 49 (4)
- 50 and older (5)
- I don't know (6)

Q27 What was the native language of the individual you were trying to influence?

- Arabic (1)
- Kurdish (2)
- Turkish (3)
- I don't know / Other (4)

Q28 How proficient in this language were you at the time of the influence attempt?

- 1. No ability whatsoever in the language (1)
- 2. Able to operate in only a very limited capacity (2)
- 3. Able to satisfy immediate needs (3)
- 4. Able to satisfy most survival needs, minimum courtesy requirements, and limited social demands (4)
- 5. Able to satisfy most survival needs and limited work requirements (5)
- 6. Able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements (6)
- 7. Able to satisfy most work requirements (7)
- 8. Able to speak the language accurately and participate effectively in most conversations (8)
- 9. Able to speak with a great deal of fluency, grammatical accuracy, precision of vocabulary (9)
- 10. Able to speak like an educated native speaker (10)
- Not applicable (11)

Q29 Did you use a translator to communicate?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q30 The primary focus of the influence attempt was:

- Attitudes / beliefs (1)
- Behaviors (2)
- Both attitudes/beliefs and behaviors (3)

Q31 MOST SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE: Iraq What attitude/belief were you trying to change?

- Positive/negative attitude toward US troops/United States in general (1)
- US government/troops are there to help versus invaders who will never leave (2)
- Effectiveness/trustworthiness of Iraqi government/leaders/police (3)
- Attitudes toward other tribes/communities in Iraq (4)
- Belief in the future/potential of Iraq (5)
- Attitudes toward women, including US and local women, education of girls, etc (6)
- Belief in Al-Qaeda statements/propaganda (7)
- Attitudes/beliefs concerning specific practical issues in the community such as building infrastructure, local priorities, etc (8)
- Other/none of the above/classified (9)

Q32 What behavior were you trying to change?

- Cooperation with/support of US forces (1)
- Cooperation with/support of Iraqi authorities/government (2)
- Voting in elections (3)
- Rioting/looting/fighting with other people/groups (4)
- Supporting Taliban/insurgents (5)
- Reporting IEDs, suspicious activity, sharing useful information, etc (6)
- Other/none of the above/classified (7)

Q33 For this successful influence attempt, check all techniques/approaches you used:

- Reward: If you comply, I will reward you (1)
- Punishment: If you don't comply, I will punish you (2)
- Debt: You owe me compliance because of past favors (7)
- Gift: Give gift, then make request (6)
- Liking: Be nice so target will want to comply with your request (5)
- Pleading: I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me (14)
- Aversive Stimulation: Punish until they comply with your request (8)
- Moral Appeal: You are immoral if you do not comply (9)
- Positive Self-feeling: You will feel better about yourself if you comply (10)
- Negative Self-feeling: You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply (11)
- Positive Expertise: If you comply, good things will happen to you (3)
- Negative Expertise: If you don't comply, bad things will happen to you (4)
- Positive Traits: A good person would comply (12)
- Negative Traits: A bad person would not comply (13)
- Positive Esteem: People you care about will think better of you if you comply (15)
- Negative Esteem: People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply (16)
- Other/none of the above/classified (17)

Q34 On a scale from 1 to 10, rate how successful your influence attempt was.

- 1 Not at all successful (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- Extremely successful 10 (10)

Q35 What evidence helped you evaluate how successful your influence attempt was?

- Directly observed a change/no change in behavior (1)
- Person/people involved directly expressed different/unchanged beliefs/attitudes (2)
- Reports/data from US/allied personnel (3)
- Told by local person/people about the impact of your influence attempt (4)
- Official data/news reports, including statistics about voting, survey data, school enrollment, etc (5)
- Other/none of the above/classified (6)

Q36 What aspects of the situation were favorable and/or unfavorable to your influence attempt? Check all that apply:

	+ Favorable (1)	- Unfavorable (2)
Level of conflict among local groups (1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Availability/skill of translators in relevant language (2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your own knowledge about local culture (3)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Specific US action/failure to act in local area (4)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other recent events/developments in the local area (5)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General US policy in country/region (6)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Recent actions/failure to act by local government/leadership/police (7)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Recent events in the country/region generally (8)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other/none of the above/classified (9)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q37 Rate how important empathy (understanding other peoples feelings) was in your influence attempt.

- 1 Not at all important (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- Extremely important 10 (10)

Q38 Rate how important showing respect was in your influence attempt.

- 1 Not at all important (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- Extremely important 10 (10)

Q39 How important were prior relationships with the person or people you were trying to influence?

- 1 Not at all important (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- Extremely important 10 (10)

Q40 How important was understanding of the local culture for your influence attempt?

- 1 Not at all important (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- Extremely important 10 (10)

Q41 What cultural factors played an important role in your influence attempt? Check all that apply:

- Respecting, acknowledging, and being open to cultural differences (8)
- Basic differences between US and Iraqi culture (7)
- Differences between tribes, religious groups, such as the differences between Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurds (1)
- Religious practices, such as prayer times, dietary restrictions, Ramadan, etc (4)
- Gender roles, such as favoritism for boys over girls (2)
- Importance of saving face, maintaining, honor, national pride (11)
- Importance of family (3)
- How business is conducted, such as negotiation styles or the use of bribes (5)
- Power of individuals to make changes versus reliance on God/Allah (12)
- How authority and leadership status are determined in local culture (6)
- Cultural conception of time, such as sense of urgency, punctuality, etc (10)
- Other/none of the above/classified (9)

Q42 Check all of the influence techniques you used while deployed to Iraq:

- Reward: If you comply, I will reward you (1)
- Punishment: If you don't comply, I will punish you (2)
- Debt: You owe me compliance because of past favors (7)
- Gift: Give gift, then make request (6)
- Liking: Be nice so target will want to comply with your request (5)
- Pleading: I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me (14)
- Aversive Stimulation: Punish until they comply with your request (8)
- Moral Appeal: You are immoral if you do not comply (9)
- Positive Self-feeling: You will feel better about yourself if you comply (10)
- Negative Self-feeling: You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply (11)
- Positive Expertise: If you comply, good things will happen to you (3)
- Negative Expertise: If you don't comply, bad things will happen to you (4)
- Positive Traits: A good person would comply (12)
- Negative Traits: A bad person would not comply (13)
- Positive Esteem: People you care about will think better of you if you comply (15)
- Negative Esteem: People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply (16)
- None of the above while deployed to Iraq (17)

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