The standard narrative on public health posits a transition in most American cities during the final third of the nineteenth century from politicized, ad hoc, and sanitation-based responses to professionalized, institutionalized, and bacteriological-based public health. While that transition certainly did take place, it did not take place smoothly or instantaneously, and many American cities went through periods of adjustment that few scholars have addressed. This essay examines the realities of how public health functioned on the ground during this formative and transitional era by looking at the town of Wheeling, West Virginia during the decade of the 1880s.

Contrary to what people might expect, especially given the central and controversial role of public health in contemporary American society, relatively little research has been done on the history of public health in the United States. The public health movement at its inception in the last half of the 19th century is especially difficult to study because of its extremely localized nature—although the Marine Hospital Service (the forerunner of the United States Public Health Service) was founded in 1870, healthcare functioned primarily at the local rather than national level. In the first half of the century, until the formation of municipal and state boards of health, cities and towns largely employed an ad hoc policy in response to the imminent threat of epidemic—towns appointed provisional boards of health that were charged with imposing quarantines and other safeguards for the duration of an outbreak, and were dismantled shortly after.1 The sheer size of the United States as well as regional differences in disease environments (malaria, hookworm, and pellagra in the South, for example) worked to ensure the localized nature of public health.2
Given the standard of living in America today, it's hard to imagine the sanitary conditions and prevalence of disease that was the norm in 19th century America. Until 1900, when most large cities banned them from public places, domestic animals roamed the streets freely and often were simply abandoned to rot after they died. In New York City, journalist and social reformer Jacob Riis reported 170 live and 72 dead babies found in the streets in one year in the 1880s. Coupled with heaps of garbage and industrial factories and slaughterhouses, the picture painted of 19th century urban American life is a far cry from our contemporary experience informed by sanitation and germ theory. In addition to horrendous sanitary conditions, epidemics of typhoid, diphtheria, consumption (tuberculosis), scarlet fever, yellow fever, and smallpox periodically swept whole cities and regions, and losing a child to one of these diseases was a common, almost universal experience.

Medicine as an occupation in America in the 1800s was not considered a profession, but rather employed any who wished to practice it. Physicians in America prior to the mid to late 19th century were neither licensed nor regulated in any way. In the spirit of Jacksonian Democracy and individualism, various sects within the medical field existed which subscribed to different theories of medical doctrine and remedies. While sects like Hydropathy, Homeopathy, Eclecticism, and Chiropractics all played a vibrant role in 19th century medicine and medical discourse, most practicing doctors considered themselves “regular” physicians. “Regular” physicians' ideas about health and disease were based on humoral theory, derived from the ancient Greeks, which envisioned the body in a constant state of balance or imbalance, influenced by internal
as well as external factors like water, air, food, perspiration, respiration, and excretion. Humoral theory asserted that these factors must be kept in a constant state of balance in order for the body to be healthy.\(^6\)

The American public health movement that arose in the mid 19\(^{th}\) century had its origins in Great Britain. Sanitary reform in England was largely spurred by the epidemics of Asiatic cholera that struck the country in the 1830s and 40s and brought the sanitation issue to the attention of the upper classes.\(^7\) In the United States, yellow fever epidemics in the South in the 1850s as well as the high incidence of sickness and disease during the Civil War contributed to the establishment of permanent municipal and state boards of health often fraught with internal politics in the latter half of the 19\(^{th}\) century, as well as philanthropic organizations concerned with the welfare of the poor.\(^8\) By the 1880s and 90s, therefore, sanitary science and public health were in the process of becoming institutionalized and professionalized as state boards of health began to impose regulations. Furthermore, the new developments of the bacteriological revolution heralded by the discoveries of Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur in the 1870s began to drastically transform the conceptualization of disease causation and health.\(^9\) Instead of humoral theory, microorganisms arose as the principal cause of disease, and Western medicine came to be based on laboratory science where these microorganisms could be examined and studied. Many of the organisms responsible for the most fatal diseases in America were identified during the 1880s, whereby antitoxins and vaccines were created to combat them.\(^{10}\)

The drastic transformation from humoral theory as the prevailing medical
ideology to germ theory in the last two decades of the 19th century represents one of the most profound paradigm shifts in Western history. While humoral theory served as the fundamental basis for understanding health and disease since the time of Hippocrates, germ theory essentially succeeded in turning this 2100 year old theory completely on its head.

In addition to being an extremely significant time in the development of medical ideology, the Reconstruction and immediate post-Reconstruction era was an amazingly formative period in American history. In attempting to reconstruct itself in the aftermath of the Civil War, this period witnessed social, political, and economic developments whose legacies endure to the present day. The depression of 1873 (which witnessed more months of negative economic growth than the Great Depression of the 1930s), along with the economic organization that went into financing the Civil War, contributed to the rise of the modern corporation as we know it. The Congressional or “Radical” Reconstruction's idealistic efforts to create a biracial society in the South gradually fell by the wayside as white supremacist, Democratic governments reclaimed power in Southern states and institutionalized political terrorism against African Americans became the norm in the 1870s. As the Republican party in power increasingly favored the interests of corporations, a series of court cases in the 1880s reinterpreted civil rights legislation to essentially protect the interests of big business. Interpretations of these same court cases served to form the legal basis for social legislation like the Jim Crow laws (legislation enforcing racial segregation), which were enacted in Southern states from the 1880s until 1965.
Besides these economic, legal, and social trends, other shifts and transformations occurred during this era which had a hand in establishing and shaping the systems under which our society still operates. The move from an antebellum agrarian form of production to an industrial, corporate mode of production resulted in accelerated urbanization as well as a host of developments designed to make the country more industrially efficient and organized. For example, as efficiency in production became increasingly important, people became more attuned to time—after the Civil War there was an explosion in the production of watches and clocks, and the four standard U.S. time zones were established in 1883. Public education became a major issue as well during this era, as this period saw the beginning of modern, secular education.\textsuperscript{11}

Studying public health in a period during which so many fundamental organizational aspects of modern American life were founded lends this study certain significance—in addition to a shift in medical ideology, the very structure and organization of American life was undergoing immense change. Studying public health in the 1880s, therefore, is a reflection of and an inquiry into both of these simultaneous and profound historical transformations.

In the 1880s, Wheeling was a mid-sized, industrial city typical of the United States. In the 1860 census, Wheeling was ranked the 65\textsuperscript{th} largest city in the United States with a population of 14,083, thirty-one of whom were slaves.\textsuperscript{12} By 1890, the city’s population had increased more than twofold to 37,565 according to the census printed in the \textit{Intelligencer}. Wheeling's location as a port city on the Ohio River brought
relative prosperity to the city, along with a fairly healthy commercial base.\textsuperscript{13} During the Civil War, Wheeling was connected to two railroads, and was ranked 56\textsuperscript{th} in manufacturing in 1860.\textsuperscript{14} In terms of its political history, Wheeling served as the headquarters for the anti-secessionist movement in Western Virginia during the Civil War, and acted as the first capital of the new state of West Virginia, formed when the Wheeling convention repudiated the ordinance of secession in 1861.\textsuperscript{15} In its geographical location, therefore, Wheeling was somewhat unique—as a Union border city located in the South, Northern and Southern sentiments and ideas inevitably fused together, resulting in a relatively moderate political atmosphere for the era.\textsuperscript{16}

As well as being a politically moderate, industrial city, events occurred in Wheeling in the last two decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century that make it a particularly compelling place to study in terms of public health. In 1891, after a long-standing feud, a prominent doctor named Dr. Garrison murdered another doctor, Dr. Baird, in broad daylight in the center of town. An examination of the circumstances leading up to this event indicates that politics and debates surrounding public health, whether personal or ideological, were alive and well in Wheeling in the 1880s. In the context of these local events and influences, the use of Wheeling as a case study acts as an example to shed some light on the practical realities of public health on the ground in the 1880s.

Wheeling’s local government consisted of a bicameral city council composed of the First Branch and the Second Branch. As agents of the local government, the members of the Committee on Health as well as the Health Officer were elected to two year terms by a joint session of both branches of the council, rather than by the general
public. Elections for city committee members and officers were held in the first week of January every odd year in the 1880s (1881, 1883, 1885, etc.). From 1879 until the beginning of 1881, Dr. T.O. Edwards acted as Health Officer, from 1885-1887 the position went to Dr. George I. Garrison, from 1887-1889 Dr. Robert Reed served the post, and from 1889-1891 Garrison again served as Health Officer.

The process of the institutionalization of public health was an incredibly tumultuous one in Wheeling, and the question of how to delegate authority was not easily resolved. Especially as new scientific discoveries and principles emerged, physicians increasingly viewed themselves as an educated elite charged with the task of acting as the guardians of the public health. While these physicians were all committed to sanitation and the principles of scientific medicine, they were hardly unified.

Different approaches to public health issues, an intense political milieu, and strong personalities resulted in numerous internal power struggles and a local Health Committee that gained a reputation for ineffective policy and constant quarrelling. Furthermore, the issue of the regulation of the medical marketplace and profession underwent a constant push and pull throughout the 1880s. “Regular” physicians like those in Wheeling sought to narrow the medical profession through national and state legislation aimed at regulating licensing and raising educational standards and qualifications.

The Health Officer of Wheeling issued a yearly report to the public, published in the *Intelligencer* in the beginning of January titled, “Mortality Statistics for the City of Wheeling for the Year ___”. Health Officer Edwards’ report for the events of 1879
listed overall mortality statistics for the city, documented every recorded cause of death, and categorized the statistics in terms of age, ward, nativity, social status (single, widowed, etc.), and month of death. The release of public health records to the public as well as the classification of these statistics into different social categories demonstrated an effort to recognize general patterns or discrepancies in mortality across different groups, while simultaneously informing and educating the public about these patterns. This showed a sort of affinity between the ideas of health and societal circumstances that suggested a certain level of concern or at least curiosity as to the relationship between the two.

This concern with differences in mortality rates between various groups was further explored in the report by a section following the statistics in which Health Officer Edwards offered explanations for some of the discrepancies. For example, Edwards attributed the high death rate in the Wheeling’s Fourth Ward to an outbreak of Diphtheria. Edwards’ report also provided health tips for Wheeling’s citizens to help prevent the spread of disease, and alerted them to upcoming city health inspections and sanitary requirements as well as health notices from the National Board of Health. For example, the report stated, “By an Ordinance of the City, property holders are allowed, during the next three months, to have their Privy vaults cleaned by the cheap bucket and cart method, after that the more expensive odorless system must be used. All should therefore take advantage of this time, before the spring inspection of the city forces them to do this work”.17 This showed that there was a certain amount of compulsion of the general public to comply with sanitary measures and standards, regulated by city
sanitary inspections, as well as certain public services provided by the city to allow and encourage citizens to act in accordance with such standards. In addition to yearly mortality statistics, Edwards also issued a report of monthly mortality statistics in a similar format.

Furthermore, a comparison of these yearly mortality reports for the city of Wheeling throughout the decade of the 1880s yields a hint as to the changes of the medical field in this period of time concerning the identification and classification of disease and illness. For example, while Health Officer Edwards’ mortality report for 1879 listed seventeen different illnesses under “Cause of Death”, Health Officer Reed’s mortality report for 1887 listed a whopping 86 illnesses a mere eight years later. While this was surely partially a product of a growing population (more people naturally translated into a greater number of deaths and greater variety of causes of death) it also suggested developments in the understanding of sickness and a greater differentiation of illnesses on the part of the larger scientific medical community.
The events that occurred at the beginning of the 1880s were an omen of the troubles that would plague Wheeling for the rest of the decade. In the first four months of 1880, Wheeling experienced simultaneous epidemics of measles and typhoid. While the initial arrival and spread of both diseases was reported in the *Intelligencer* as no more than a series of matter of fact statements in the “Brief Mention” section, betraying the commonplace and routine nature of such epidemics, the greater public issues surrounding the spread of these diseases within the city itself were given considerably more attention.

In the first week of January, for example, an article titled “Measles in the Schools” expressed the concerns of the parents of the children who attended a certain school in the Fourth Ward that the janitor’s sick child would infect the whole school’s population with measles. Their obvious concern over the contagious nature of disease was acknowledged by the doctor assigned to inspect the school, although he approached the incident with a wholly nonchalant air. The article stated, “The Doctor did not seem to attach much importance to the situation. He could not tell, he said, whether the other children were likely to capture the measles or not. Some people contracted disease a good deal quicker than others, and he did not know whether the children out there were of the quick catching kind or not. Anyhow, measles did not amount to much usually with children”. While the community of the Fourth Ward was clearly distressed at the prospect of the spread of measles throughout the school, the doctor more or less dismissed the issue as he deemed it impossible to predict a certain child’s susceptibility to disease, and, therefore, essentially impossible to prevent the contraction of illness.
The article went on to describe the school building as well as the entire Fourth Ward as generally unhealthy and lacking in proper sanitary measures, and appointed a sanitary commission to investigate. The school, however, remained open and functioning as usual. A follow up article on January 9th stated that the School Board Commissioners found the school perfectly sanitary and conducive to good health, and the issue was resolved.

As measles and typhoid continued to ravage the city of Wheeling during the following months, however, the city’s muddy streets came under attack as a major facilitator in the spread of disease. In the first week of March, Health Officer Edwards attributed the large death rate in his February mortality report to measles, and visited Pittsburgh to see the city’s new Belgian style pavements, which he concluded would help with Wheeling’s excessively muddy streets. On April 7th, the Intelligencer urged the city’s residents to clean nearby alleyways and yards, reminding them of the previous year’s diphtheria epidemic. On April 8th, an article reported that the residents of the Eighth Ward were growing angry over the presence of stagnant pools of water and demanded their removal, as they largely blamed the standing water for the presence of typhoid fever.

In response to complaints from residents as well as the growing death rate from measles and typhoid in the first week of April (28 deaths from measles and 8 from typhoid fever), the Committee on Health held a special meeting on the night of April 8th to create a plan to improve Wheeling’s sanitation to halt the spread of the epidemic. During the proceedings of the meeting, the committee recommended the appointment of
a sanitary inspector for each ward of the city who would be responsible for making
house calls to all residences in the ward and reporting on the sanitary conditions to
Health Officer Edwards. The committee went on to urge the general populace of
Wheeling to ensure the sanitary conditions of their homes and surroundings as a civic
duty. The article complained, “It is a lamentable fact that people will not as a rule keep
their houses and surroundings clean, unless forced to do so. No matter how good a
condition some people may keep their houses in, if their neighbor is filthy, the danger
lurks. It is a duty that every citizen owes, not only to himself and family, but to the
community at large, to see that his and his neighbor’s premises are clean and free from
contamination of every kind”. The committee stressed that fighting the spread of
disease ultimately came down to the individuals in the community, and lamented the
lack of personal initiative and education on sanitary matters which in turn necessitated
forced health inspections. The committee also demanded that the city provide better
sewerage and drainage in the most affected wards (the Fourth and Eighth).

As a follow-up to the meeting of the committee, a public advertisement titled
“Health Notice” was issued in the *Intelligencer* on April 10th by Health Officer
Edwards, alerting Wheeling’s residents to the imminent sanitary inspection of the city,
and mandating “owners, agents, and tenants” to clean their buildings of decaying food
and animals, filth, ash heaps, and to clean privy vaults and ensure their satisfactory
drainage. After nine days, the *Intelligencer* reported that typhoid and measles were
finally abating, tallying 56 deaths from the two diseases thus far in the month of April.
A day later, typhoid fever was successfully confined to the first, fourth, and seventh wards of the city, and the mortality rates of the two diseases decreased thereafter.

In this case, the mandatory city sanitary inspection performed by the newly hired sanitary inspectors seemed to have had a major hand in conquering the dual epidemics. The alarmingly high death rate in March caused the city’s Committee on Health to react, which it did with a high degree of success. However, this was also telling of the way in which public health policy and sanitation operated in everyday life. While the April sanitary inspections ultimately succeeded in halting the spread of disease, it took an epidemic in the first place for the public health authorities to mandate their creation and implementation. Rather than holding permanent inspections to safeguard against the constant threat of disease, the inspections were established only as a temporary response to an already present and serious outbreak, illustrating a largely improvisational method employed in combating epidemics.

The response to the epidemics at the beginning of the 1880s centered largely on addressing the lack of sanitation that was becoming increasingly problematic due to a growing population. The question of how to maintain standards of sanitation in public space in Wheeling during the decade centered on the removal of waste. While citizens and reporters alike made many cracks in the Intelligencer about the unsafe condition of city streets in 1880 due to copious amounts of what amounted to slimy garbage, this excess of refuse quickly became the paramount health issue of the decade, exacerbated by the population growth that Wheeling experienced during the same time. City health officials visited neighboring cities in 1880 to view alternate styles of street pavement,
and Wheeling’s streets and privy vaults were cleaned by independent contractors who were hired by the city.20

The question of exactly how and where to dispose of the city’s waste prompted the city’s largest scale effort of the 1880s to promote sanitation. Toward the close of 1886, the Committee on Health led by Health Officer Garrison spearheaded an attack on Wheeling’s filthy streets by engineering and convincing the city council to pass an ordinance that approved the building of a garbage crematory on the top of Wheeling Hill, constructed by a contractor named Mr. Smith for a total cost of over $2,500. Fraught with a myriad of issues from the start, the crematory would become the prime subject of the Health Committee’s meetings and dealings through the end of the decade and beyond.

From its inception, the crematory ordinance was a controversial one. In an article titled, “The New Crematory and its Management Cause” that ran in the Intelligencer on January 15, 1887, city council members debated the relative merits and demerits of the ordinance. Councilman Tracy moved to postpone the consideration of the ordinance, stating that the ordinance was so crude that it would require a countless number of amendments before it would be suitable for passage. Furthermore, Mr. Tracy claimed, the proposed ordinance in its current state would create an unfair monopoly over its management. The article recounted:

Mr. Tracy referred to the time in 1876 when Harry Smith and one or two others were given practically a monopoly over the business and the howl that that action of Council occasioned. In 1880 that objectionable ordinance was changed; now, Mr. Tracy stated, the crematory ordinance under consideration,
proposed granting a few almost as large a monopoly as that enjoyed by Smith years before; it was provided that iron tanks, patent pumps, on which royalties would be charged, and other expensive appliances must be used, all of which would crowd out the poorer haulers.²¹

This objection to the ordinance on the grounds of creating unfair control over the market for garbage hauling and disposal was indicative of the contemporary general climate of suspicion towards monopolies, and showcased the practical business concerns that arose in the implementation of public health policy.

Despite the protestations of Mr. Tracy, the Second Branch passed the ordinance, albeit “in such a mangled condition that it is doubtful Dr. Garrison will recognize it”.²² This reference to Dr. Garrison suggested that it was Garrison who authored the preliminary version of the ordinance. While the Second Branch imposed various amendments and cut whole sections out of the ordinance, it still awaited passage by the First Branch while the crematory stood “idle on the hill waiting for a practical ordinance to govern its management”.²³ Therefore, while Mr. Smith had nearly completed construction on the crematory, council debates over how exactly to run it would prevent its actual usage. On January 26th, the Intelligencer reported that during the last session of the retiring council, the crematory ordinance was passed and Henry Serig was elected Crematory Superintendent.

As his last deed as acting Health Officer in 1887, Garrison issued the city mortality statistics report for the year of 1886. In addition to the standard tally of deaths, cause of death, and vital statistics, Garrison closed the report with a lengthy description of the condition of the city’s water supply and an appeal to Council and the public to
remedy the situation. Garrison declared of the city’s drinking water, “The present supply is so foul that there is no mistaking its pollution. It is drawn from the Ohio river above the foot of Eight street, and below the sewer outfalls of the First Ward, of which there are four, which drain all that portion of the First Ward that lies above Seventh street, and which drains from the Hospital and its buildings”. Garrison continued to explain that the injurious contents of the sewers drained into the river and subsequently into the mouths of the city’s inhabitants, endangering the health of the community, and encouraging the spread of an epidemic.

In the first week of February, 1887, a joint caucus of the council’s two branches held elections for new council committee members and officers. The Intelligencer identified three primary candidates for the position of Health Officer, and gave a brief profile of each one: “The candidates are Dr. T.O. Edwards, a gentleman who filled the office for four years, and who had an opportunity to carefully study its wants and gain much valuable experience; Dr. J. W. McCoy, a well-known physician of the Eighth Ward, who has given much attention to sanitary matters, and Dr. Robert Reed, a clever young gentleman who came here recently from Pennsylvania”. The Intelligencer did not endorse one candidate over the others, and made no mention of individual campaigning during the election process. On February 1st, Dr. Reed was announced as the new Health Officer along with the rest of the incoming city officers. While the Intelligencer stated that there were “vexations and wrangles” over some of the offices, the elections went smoothly and no major mishaps occurred. This election was also notable in relation to Dr. Garrison. Despite his lead role in the construction of the
garbage crematory, and proposing a real and tangible solution to the unsanitary condition of the city streets (at least in theory), not only was he not reelected, he was not even seriously considered as a candidate. While there were many possible reasons for this that did not necessarily indicate negative views toward Garrison, the city council opted for a new Health Officer.

When the new members of the city committees were named a day later, a dispute over a spot on the Health Committee pointed to the intense politics involved in appointing committees. After the new committee member names had been read, a man named Charley Miller was shocked to learn that he had not been appointed to the Committee on Health. The *Intelligencer* reported:

Charley Miller, after the report had been adopted and sent to the First Branch for concurrence, realized that he was not a member of the Committee on Health and that Dr. Ulrich had been substituted on the Committee from the First Ward in his place. Miller was a member of the committee that made up the committees and there was something dark about this that he could not understand. He made quite a scene over it and accused the chair of partisanship in ordering him to desist in his remarks.  

The substitution of the prominent city physician Dr. Ulrich for Miller struck the latter as sour and politically motivated. Whether justified or not, Miller’s accusation of the chair of partisanship in handling the suspicious appointment revealed the ubiquitous presence of national political affiliation even in a local election for the Committee on Health.

With the inauguration of the newly elected council members and officers, the Committee on Health’s attention turned once more to the garbage crematory. It did not take long for the new council to discover a host of severe issues with the actions of the
previous council in relation to the recently constructed building. In the process of preparing for a practical test of the new institution, the members of the council realized the near impossibility of hauling tons of garbage to the crematory on account of the deplorable condition of the road to Wheeling Hill. While Health Officer Reed had been gathering all sorts of things with which to test the furnace (namely 200 barrels of garbage and a dead horse), an article on February 28th explained:

The great difficulty encountered is in getting any one to haul up the hill. The road is in terrible condition, it being almost impossible to drive over it even in a light wagon without becoming stalled, except when it is frozen. The bad condition of this road has prevented the completion of the crematory for at least six weeks. It is ineligibly situated and will cause no end of complaint and cursing from those compelled to haul to it.

In spite of the terrible state of the road, the crematory was tested successfully on schedule at the end of February. In reporting on the test, Dr. Ulrich wrote a letter to the editor of the *Intelligencer* in which he provided a detailed explanation of the chemical processes involved in burning trash, and described the functioning of the furnace as “entirely odorless” and a “perfect success”. Although the crematory itself appeared to be in perfect working order, Dr. Ulrich deemed it virtually unusable due to the terrible condition of the road. He conjectured that the reason that the “gentlemen who had the management of the affair” (referring to Garrison and the old members of council) had chosen the top of the hill for the location of the crematory was because it was sufficiently removed from the city so as to avoid complaints from citizens about the unpleasant odors it would likely emit. Now that it had been shown to be completely odorless, Ulrich asserted, the crematory should be moved to a more accessible location.
as it would cost an estimated $700 to move it, half as much as it would cost to construct an entirely new structure.

The official preliminary test of the furnace heralded the emergence of a new central debate in the crematory debacle and a struggle between the Health Committee and the City Council over its relocation. After the February 28th test, the Committee on Health promptly requested that the City Council appoint a special committee to oversee the relocation of the crematory. This matter was complicated by contradictory accounts on the test which contributed to disagreements over a suitable location for the furnace. For example, in response to Dr. Ulrich’s report on the test, residents living on Wheeling Hill insisted that contrary to what Ulrich claimed in his letter, the crematory produced a “very sickening odor which renders the entire neighborhood almost uninhabitable”.

However, while the Committee on Health unanimously agreed that moving the crematory was the only viable option for its practical use, the City Council proved considerably more difficult to convince. As the Committee on Health could not act without the authorization of the council, frustrations abounded among members of the committee as a power struggle developed between the two bodies—just as promptly as the Health Committee proposed a resolution to council to move the crematory, the Second Branch wasted no time in rejecting it.

At a March 11th meeting of the Committee on Health, the City Council again refused to appoint a special committee to oversee the relocation of the furnace, “apparently being disgusted with the entire crematory business and willing for it to
remain perched up on Wheeling hill”. However, although the Council tired of debating over the crematory, members of the Health Committee stressed that the entire undertaking would be in vain if the building remained where it was. As the Intelligencer griped, “In case Council does not authorize the removal of the furnace, the expression of one Councilman, that ‘four thousand dollars has been spent to burn a horse’ will be quite apropos”.

The final test of the crematory on March 21st yielded similar results to the first—while the furnace seemed to be in impeccable working order, hauling garbage up the hill took nearly half a day. Although Health Officer Reed had invited the entirety of the Council to attend the test and so witness the hardship presented by the location of the furnace, the Second Branch yet again refused to authorize the removal of the furnace by a vote of 8 in favor to 17 against. After explaining to the Council the exorbitant fees that would result from regularly hauling tons of trash up a muddy mountain, the resolution for the Council to select a new site for the crematory was reconsidered and finally begrudgingly passed. The job of finding another spot to dump the unsightly and allegedly malodorous garbage crematory, however, would prove to be no easy task.

As an inevitable result of so exasperating and avoidable a problem as the faulty location of the crematory, the new Committee of Health expressed its frustrations over fixing a mess that it had had no hand in creating. In an article that appeared on March 30, 1887, the Intelligencer sympathized with the Committee, explaining:
This committee has had more work to attend to than any other committee of the new Council and it has nearly all been work of a very perplexing and disagreeable nature, brought about by the building of the new garbage and night soil crematory and the short-sighted policy shown by the former Health Committee and Council, in locating the same on top of Wheeling hill, a point that is almost inaccessible for a team hauling anything like a load. To say that the persons who located the crematory where it is and who voted to have it built there, have been cordially cussed by those of the new Council who have had anything to do with it, is putting it mildly.\textsuperscript{36}

While the crematory remained on Wheeling hill, the Committee on Health was well aware that no practical use could come of it. Although several prospective sites around the city were named as possible alternatives (Caldwell’s run, the mouth of the Coal run, the “bottoms” near the Hempfield tunnel next to a slaughterhouse, out on the peninsula) they were all rejected for various reasons (bad roads, slippery soil and possible obstruction of a potential B. & O. railroad route, objections from the neighbors, and distance respectively). Although Dr. Ulrich proposed a site on a creek bank between an oil refinery and the gas works’ storage tank, he was called to attend to a patient before the vote took place. On account of his absence, the measure failed to pass by a vote of three to two.

If Garrison was not directly mentioned in the Intelligencer as the object of blame, being the former Health Officer, he was certainly implicated. As the participant in or even engineer of such “short-sighted policy”, he certainly failed to gain any favor from his colleagues who made up the new Committee on Health, and indeed left them with a multitude of troubles as their inheritance. In addition to the legacy of the bothersome crematory in the realm of local government, Garrison’s actions displayed an arrogance that could very well have made him unpopular for personal reasons.
At a meeting held on March 8th, for example, the Committee on Health reported a bill for 15 dollars that Garrison had charged to the Committee for personally monogrammed envelopes. A section of the Health Committee meeting transcript reprinted in the *Intelligencer* read: “Included in the bills of this committee was one for $15 for 500 Government stamped envelopes ordered by Dr. G. I. Garrison on January 25th, two days before the city election. He had his card as Health Officer printed on them, expecting, evidently, to be reelected. Dr. Reed, the new Health Officer, has been authorized to get ‘stickers’ to paste over Garrison’s name.” Garrison’s audacity in assuming the certainty of his reelection enough to preorder personalized envelopes bordered on ridiculous.

By this point, the Committee on Health was becoming desperate. Not only would the current garbage hauling contracts expire on April 1st, but a new law titled “Baird’s pure-water bill” would go into effect on the first of May, prohibiting the dumping of “garbage, offal or dead carcasses in any running river or stream.” Although this law was certainly intended to prevent further pollution of Wheeling’s water supply and improve the sanitary condition of the city, it meant that citizens would have to find a way dispose of their trash by other means. Furthermore, while the crematory could have provided the city with just such an alternative, as long as it remained on top of Wheeling Hill it was completely useless. Therefore, while both Garrison’s crematory and Baird’s water law were intended to promote sanitation, in actuality they had the combined effect of leaving Wheeling’s citizens with limited options as to where they could lawfully and realistically dispose of their trash.
Despite the desperate state of the Health Committee, debates over whether or not to move the crematory continued in a remarkably protracted manner even under substantial evidence to support its relocation—for example, the Council discovered that the crematory was built on an “eighteen-inch vein of coal” that would likely crumble under the heat generated by the furnace, rendering the structure’s foundation unsound. In a subsequent meeting, however, the Council considered moving the crematory to a spot on the creek by the gas works, but a “howl” from residents of the Fourth Ward combined with the discovery that this ground was not actually city property killed the motion. A vote on a new location was postponed until the following session amidst grumbling from Council members. As the April 6th article stated, “The committee is thoroughly tired of the entire business and as soon as possible will get the matter settled and the garbage contracts made for the coming year”.

In addition to its awful location, the crematory suffered from several structural defects which hindered its practical use. For example, an iron shed that was to cover the crematory had a defective wall and faulty doors due to a gross miscalculation of dimensions by Mr. Smith, and bridges would have to be built to facilitate the dumping process. The *Intelligencer* warned of the impending predicament that would result from the delays in the crematory’s completion:

Before the furnaces can be put into use bridges will have to be built so that carts can be backed up and their contents dumped directly into the hoppers, and these have not yet been ordered. Monday the law goes into effect forbidding the dumping of offal into the river; what will then be done with the city’s refuse is a vexed question. The crematory cannot be used for some time to come.
While the Council as well as the *Intelligencer* realized and proclaimed the potential disaster that could arise from the combination of the unfinished crematory and the enactment of Baird’s pure-water law, the City Council and the Health Committee failed to come up with a solution. Furthermore, as problems continued to crop up with the crematory, questions of its structural integrity as well as the soundness of the deal with Mr. Smith began to arise. In a May 24th article titled, “Bad for the Public Health”, the *Intelligencer* told of the crematory’s many defects and warned of the imminent danger to public health posed by its unfinished state and Baird’s water law. The article began:

The Health Department is another division of the municipal government that is in a bad shape; this is occasioned by the unfinished condition of that everlasting topic of discussion, the garbage and night soil crematory. The iron building constructed over it has no vent holes in the roof for the escape of hot air as called for in the plans nor has the ‘telegraph’ been put up for lifting the 1000-pound lids to the furnaces. This is work that should have been done by Mr. M. V. Smith, the Pittsburgh engineer, who contracted for both the furnaces and the shed, and the Committee on Health has made up its mind that it shall be done before the building is paid for; but Mr. Smith is in Philadelphia now and will not be back here till about June 1.42

In light of his glaring miscalculation of dimensions in constructing the iron shed (it would have cut into the wall of the crematory) and his failure to build the shed according to the plans that he himself drew, Mr. Smith seemed a shoddy business partner at best, and his absence further stalled the completion of the crematory.

The article went on to report that the state of affairs of garbage disposal had worsened after the enactment of the “Baird pure-water law” more than three weeks prior. Referencing the new law, the article explained:
The crematory is not finished, and it is becoming a serious question, especially as the warm weather continues, what is to be done, not only with kitchen garbage, but with the contents of the vaults which are now more than ever in need of cleaning. So long as the vaults remain uncleaned, and the garbage accumulates, the public health is greatly endangered. As it is now, the crematory is not in a condition to be used, and dumping in the river is forbidden by law. This matter was discussed in all its bearings at a meeting of the Committee on Health held at the Public Building last night, but no solution was arrived at. Something should be done, however, and speedily, else the situation will soon become alarming. Already considerable talk among citizens has been created by the existing state of affairs, and it will increase the longer it is allowed to exist.43

The accumulation of garbage that had already begun during the month of May would only worsen if allowed to continue, and could contribute to an unhealthy disease environment especially in the approaching summer months. This public concern over the potential health threat that could be posed from a mass accumulation of garbage and indeed the crematory ordinance and Baird’s water law all exhibited the shift in the focus of public health policy from earlier impromptu responsive methods to preventative policy. Both the crematory ordinance and Baird’s water law were legislative measures meant to deter the emergence of widespread diseases before they arose. These acts were also illustrative of the new focus on sanitary regulations that became paramount in the 1880s as the correct way to prevent and deal with disease. In this respect, Garrison and Baird had much in common—they had both spearheaded major policies to improve Wheeling’s sanitation. Unfortunately, and quite ironically, due to short-sighted planning on the part of the city’s policymakers and officials, the combination of these policies engineered by Garrison and Baird would drastically exacerbate Wheeling’s already undesirable garbage situation.
The following week on May 31\textsuperscript{st}, the crematory was nearly destroyed by heavy winds despite previous claims that once finished it would “take a cyclone to blow it away”.\textsuperscript{44} In response, councilmen bolted the shoddily built shed down with iron rods, and bemoaned the fact that the structure was clearly not built according to Mr. Smith’s proposal. Although a previous article reported that Mr. Smith would be back in town on June 1\textsuperscript{st}, there was still no sign of him by the end of the month, and he had failed to respond to several of Health Officer Reed’s letters. In the meantime, as garbage had slowly started to accumulate in the streets on account of Baird’s water law and the defective crematory, Dr. Reed began to oversee the dumping of refuse collected from city streets and privy vaults in the countryside.\textsuperscript{45}

In the midst of the garbage debacle, two scandals broke out in July of 1887 involving Wheeling’s medical community and the State Board of Health. In an article that ran on July 15\textsuperscript{th} titled “A Slander on Wheeling”, the \textit{Intelligencer} stated that a report describing the city’s horrendous typhoid mortality rate and sanitary condition had reached the State Board of Health. At its annual meeting at Charleston, the Board adopted a resolution which the \textit{Intelligencer} reprinted:

\begin{quote}
Whereas, a report that is believed to be authentic has reached the state Board of Health of West Virginia, that the water supply and general sanitary condition of the city of Wheeling is in the most reprehensible and alarming condition, and Whereas, The percentage of sickness and mortality from typhoid fever is unequalled in any city in the United States and surpassed by but few cities in the world, therefore Resolved, that the Secretary of this Board be directed to visit as soon as convenient the city of Wheeling and make or cause to be made a thorough investigation of the condition of the water supply and general sanitary condition of the city, and make such recommendations to the city authorities as the exigencies of the case demand, and to report his action to this Board.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}
While this was the only information released to the press (the Board refused to release the name of the informant), the *Intelligencer* expressed outrage that the State Board did not exercise more discretion in publicly insulting the reputation of Wheeling, the chief commercial city in West Virginia, and declared the whole thing a gross exaggeration.

In assigning blame for the report, the *Intelligencer* very blatantly printed only one very clear accusation: “One gentleman, who has given the subject of Wheeling’s water supply some attention, wanted to know who the author was; that the Board did not make public. Continuing, he said: ‘I suppose Garrison is the originator of it, and why would it not have been as easy for him to have done the thing quietly if he wanted to do it, instead of going about it in a way to unnecessarily alarm people?’”  

While the *Intelligencer* did not identify any other Wheeling resident quoted or referenced in the article by name (instead referring to them as “gentlemen”), there was nothing ambiguous about the decision to print Garrison’s name in the context of being the guilty party. It would make sense for the unnamed accuser to be Baird (Baird was a member of the Water Board and had run for the position of city Water Clerk earlier that year), however, in his later statements in the testimony of his trial Garrison stated that he and Baird had had an incredibly close friendship until the summer of 1888.

Indeed, although the report was offensive to many citizens, it was especially insulting to Wheeling’s medical community. As the resident educated medical elite, it was the responsibility of a city’s physicians to regulate the general community in public health matters. By painting such an unsanitary portrait of Wheeling, therefore, the city’s doctors were naturally partially incriminated in allowing such an unhealthy environment
to exist. The report’s implication was that Wheeling’s doctors had effectively failed in their duties. If Garrison was indeed the author of the report, in bypassing his fellow doctors and going straight to the State Board of Health, he succeeded in essentially throwing his colleagues under the bus.

By reporting on the ills of Wheeling’s health in such a dramatic manner, two possible theories concerning Garrison’s motives and, therefore, Garrison’s personality, emerged—while it is believable to envision a career-driven, rather selfish individual eager for professional prominence, one can also imagine him as a physician who honestly believed that his actions were for the greater public good, viewing himself as a righteous and solitary soldier in the fight against disease.

While both interpretations were possible, an evaluation of Garrison’s motives began to lean more towards the first description when considering that the report’s claims were not only exaggerated but virtually unfounded. The *Intelligencer* related Health Officer Reed’s evaluation of the report:

A few minutes hurried conversation of the matter was had with Health Officer Reed, one of whose distinguishing characteristics is an inclination to be modest and retiring, and who aims to avoid anything like notoriety. At the same time he is a hard-working, conscientious official. He said: ‘The resolution leads one to have a very much exaggerated idea as to the sanitary condition of city and its mortality, especially the second ‘whereas.’ A point is made in that that is not true. In April, May and June, only five deaths resulting from typhoid fever took place in this city, and one of those cases was Dr. Garrison’s brother, who was brought from Martin’s Ferry to the Hospital after he had become very sick. So there were really but four deaths from fever—two in April and two in June. And this rate, I think, is a fair average one for the year.’
The article’s prefacing the account with a description of Reed as “modest” almost seemed to be an apology for his calm assessment of the matter that was conspicuously free of outrage or accusations. The specific mention of Garrison again, however, seemed to be no mistake (it was certainly not patently necessary). Although it was not outright proof that he had authored the report, the personal connection that Garrison had to typhoid in the recent months could very well have rendered him vengeful, especially depending on the circumstances surrounding the death which remained undisclosed to the press. This certainly seemed to corroborate the anonymous accusation and serve as evidence for Garrison’s culpability.

Upon comparing Wheeling’s mortality rate from the month of May to those of other towns and cities along the Ohio River, Health Officer Reed found that “a large majority indicated a worse sanitary state of affairs than is to be found in any part of this city”. Furthermore, a comparison of the same statistics with those gathered from cities all over the country showed that in “only a few cases” was a city in a better sanitary condition than Wheeling. After matching Wheeling up to nearly 200 cities and towns all over the United States, Reed declared the report’s description of Wheeling as one of the unhealthiest cities in the country to be “manifestly false”, although he acknowledged the poor state of the city’s water supply.

The Intelligencer never confirmed Garrison as the author of the report, and Garrison never publicly defended himself against the allegations. Although it was customary to defend oneself in the face of public defamation, Garrison’s failure to do so
may have been an indication of his guilt, or it could have just been part of his personality. Likewise, the identity of the accuser was never revealed in the newspaper.

The next day, the *Intelligencer* printed an article titled “A Complete Refutation.—‘Figures Will Not Lie,’ while Some Individuals Will and Do”. In the article, Health Officer Reed identified Wheeling’s average number of deaths for the month of May to be 49 (only four above the average for the first six months of 1887), which translated to a rate of 18.86 per 1,000 people.  

Dr. Reed then continued:

A mortality statement for May, 1887, from seventy-four cities and large towns of the United States, shows 29 with a higher percentage than that of Wheeling and a great number of the remaining ones show a percentage but little less. A like statement from fifty-six cities and large towns in England, gives fifty-three with a higher percentage. And of sixty-eight cities and towns of continental Europe not one has a lower death rate for May as Wheeling. According to Dr. Reed’s usage of comparative statistics, the report’s declaration of Wheeling’s typhoid mortality rate as one of the worst in the world was absolutely ludicrous and patently fictitious. Therefore, not only had the author of the report purposefully called public attention to Wheeling’s terrible sanitary condition for no apparent reason, he had based the report on evidence that was clearly and outrageously untrue. In light of the faulty nature of the facts cited in the report, the whole affair took on a rather malicious undertone especially in relation to Wheeling’s medical community. Regardless of Garrison’s provable guilt in the matter, the fact that he was accused so openly and confidently in the press by one of his peers was an important clue to his personality as well as his relationship with the city’s other doctors.
Although this incident featuring the all but official implication of Garrison was no doubt a grave insult to the entirety of the city’s medical profession, it was dwarfed by the subsequent events of July 1887. A mere three days after the initial article about the slanderous report ran in the *Intelligencer*, Garrison was again pitted against the rest of the city’s medical profession. On July 18, 1887, an article appeared in the *Intelligencer* titled “The Governor and the State Board of Health”. The article, consisting of a lengthy column on the second page of the newspaper, denounced West Virginia’s Governor Wilson for violating the law in his recent appointment of Dr. Garrison to the State Board of Health. The article began with a history of the West Virginia State Board of Health and its dealings with various governors:

The Act of March 8, 1881, creating the State Board of Health, was a progressive step on the part of the Legislature and of the medical profession, which had urged it. The act was so well drawn to meet its object and so well served its purpose under competent administration, that it became a model for other States. Nothing that has ever been done has given the medical profession of West Virginia so high a standing, throughout the country.\textsuperscript{53}

The article continued to state that Governor Jackson had been “in sympathy with the act” and acted in accordance with its statutes. In 1882, the Board added two members due to the creation of the Fourth Congressional District. While Governor Jackson had been favorable to the goals and existence of the Board, the article stated that Governor Wilson had been hostile to the Board from his inauguration, consistently refusing to approve bills of the Secretary until he was forced to do so. In his latest defiance of the law, Governor Wilson failed to appoint any physicians to the State Board of Health in June of 1886 and finally appointed Garrison, who was clearly ineligible to serve on the Board under the provisions of the law. The article reported:
The act says: ‘On the first day of June, 1882, and every second year thereafter, or as soon after said day as practicable, the Governor shall appoint two members of said Board for the term of four years.’ Governor Jackson appointed members in 1882 and 1884 as the law directed; but Governor Wilson refused to obey the law and let June, 1886, pass without making any appointments for the six places vacant by the expiration of the terms of six members. Now the Governor wakes up enough to make an appointment which is in open violation of a clearly worded provision of the law. The act says that a member of the State Board of Health ‘shall have practiced medicine for not less than twelve years continuously.’ Under this provision Dr. Garrison, of this city, recently appointed, is clearly ineligible, no matter what his professional qualifications may be. The Governor is a lawyer, and so is the Attorney General, at whose instance this appointment was made. They both knew better, and the wonder is that, with the law staring them in the face, they did not do better. Twenty-nine physicians of Wheeling—almost the entire medical profession of this city—protested against this appointment of one of their own number. The State Medical Association, in session at White Sulphur Springs, denounced it. The appointment of a physician who is not eligible, is an insult to the profession, for it is as much as to say that all who were eligible under the law not one could be found in the district of sufficient professional standing to justify his appointment. In this view the appointment is utterly indefensible, and the physicians who have, with remarkable unanimity, expressed their indignation, have shown regard for the Board which the Governor seems incapable of appreciating. There are 1,360 registered physicians in West Virginia, and the Governor and the Attorney General will be likely to hear later from them.54

The laws defining the necessary requirements for a doctor to be considered a candidate for membership to the State Board of Health were clearly designed to limit the participation to what the medical profession deemed “qualified” physicians. By barring anyone who failed to meet these requirements, the medical community of West Virginia worked together to elevate the status of their occupation by increasing its exclusivity. The uproar caused by Garrison’s appointment was testament to how seriously these restrictions were taken by the medical community—favoring Garrison as a candidate for membership to the Board over every other legally eligible physician for such a prominent position was massively insulting to Garrison’s colleagues. Rather than
supporting him, Wheeling’s doctors felt absolutely no unity with Garrison, evidenced by the fact that virtually all of them protested his appointment.

This jurisdictional battle between the physicians of Wheeling and the governor was par for the course in the late 1880s. Just as the city’s medical community balked at the thought of Secretary Harris of the State Board of Health butting into the sanitary affairs of their city on account of a faulty report, they abhorred Governor Wilson’s blatant dismissal of their rules. By taking power into his own hands, Governor Wilson essentially succeeded in making himself an enemy of the entirety of the state’s medical profession.

Just as the *Intelligencer* prophesied, the other 1,360 registered physicians living in West Virginia wasted no time in making their opinions heard on the matter of Wilson’s appointment. In a July 21st article titled “A Severe Arraignment”, after making sure to declare the bipartisan nature of complaints against Garrison’s appointment, the *Intelligencer* reported on several resolutions adopted by the State Board of Health concerning Governor Wilson:

*Whereas, We regard it of the utmost importance that this Board should be so constituted as to command the respect and support of the profession whose efforts created it, and whose interests and welfare are so largely committed to its care, and Whereas, we are assured that in the recent appointment to the vacancy of the Board in the First District, the letter and the spirit of the law were violated, and that the character of the appointment in other respects is not such as the profession have a right to expect, in consideration of the dignity and responsibilities of the office. Resolved, That the action of the Governor in making this appointment merits our unqualified disapproval; and that we most earnestly and respectfully call upon him to assist us, by his official acts, to maintain and uphold the law in its spirit and integrity.*
This embittered power struggle between the Governor and West Virginia’s doctors illustrated the intensely political nature of public health during this period of time. While Governor Wilson may have had ample power in state politics, as far as the physicians of the West Virginia were concerned, he was by all means subordinate to the State Board of Health in matters of public health.

While the article doubted the plausibility of Governor Wilson retracting his appointment, it commended the physicians of West Virginia for “a desire to save the State Board of Health from being dragged down to serve the purpose of politicians.” The issues at stake, therefore, were twofold. Not only was Garrison’s appointment a challenge to the authority of the State Board of Health, it would also have degraded the Board’s quality as Garrison was unfit to serve. Furthermore, the claim that this action was engineered to “serve the purpose of politicians” implied some foul play. Although the article made no specific accusations, such a conclusion was easy to reach considering that Wilson chose Garrison over an abundance of other doctors who were perfectly qualified under the law. The question then became, why Garrison?

Again as the Intelligencer predicted, Governor Wilson did not withdraw his appointment but instead issued a defense of his actions. In response to the resolutions passed by the State Board of Health, Wilson argued that they were poorly founded. Although the resolutions did not divulge the specific reasons behind the objection to Dr. Garrison, Governor Wilson stated that he “has learned that they are: 1st, that he has not practiced medicine the required length of time (12 years) before the appointment; 2d,
that he received his diploma after one course of lectures instead of two at a medical college.” The article continued:

The Governor then quotes the law concerning the State Board of Health, its appointment, etc., and then says: ‘From the evidence before me, and of which I have no doubt, Dr. Garrison had been practicing medicine for six years before the passage of the Act of 1881, but was not at that time a graduate of a medical college. In June, 1881, he appeared before the State Board of Health, was duly examined, and thereupon a certificate was issued.’ This certificate the Governor quotes and he continues: ‘From 1881 until the present time he has continued the practice of his profession in the City of Wheeling, making in all more than twelve years before his appointment. The first objection therefore is not well founded. The second objection is not based on legal grounds; for the law requires no particular number of lecture courses for graduation, but simply that the appointee shall be a graduate of a reputable medical college.’ The circumstances of Dr. Garrison’s graduation, familiar to all who are interested, are gone into at length”.

The scrutiny under which Garrison’s professional and educational background was placed as a result of the outrage over his appointment was again evidence for how stringently the licensed medical community followed these rules. The question then became one of interpretation—according to Wilson’s analysis, Garrison was eligible under the tenets of the law. According to many of the licensed doctors of West Virginia, however, who created these laws and clearly followed them to the book, Wilson’s justification of Garrison’s appointment was based on qualifications that were fudged at best. For example, the fact that the “circumstances of Dr. Garrison’s graduation” were “familiar to all who are interested” suggested that they had been a previous point of contention or had at least merited some sort of notoriety.

Wilson concluded that in light of this analysis he was sure the resolutions were passed on “incorrect information”, and lauded Garrison as a “self-made man” who had
overcome “obstacles, jealousies, and rivalries” to succeed.\textsuperscript{59} The Governor closed by expressing his utmost respect for the Medical Society of West Virginia, stating of the institution, “It has within it many of our best men. This case will suggest to it the propriety and justice of those who have representations to make concerning the members of the profession, to make them openly, after notice to the parties concerned, that they may have the opportunity to be heard”.\textsuperscript{60} Although Wilson made a show of respect, it was clear that he had no intention of honoring the Society’s wishes.

Furthermore, if Garrison had been practicing medicine for six years by 1881, it meant that he would have reached the 12 year mark by 1887. This detail brought even more attention to the glaring fact that Wilson failed to appoint someone in 1886—not only was the governor late a full year in fulfilling his duties according to the law, he then appointed someone who hadn’t been practicing for a long enough time to be eligible until that very year (and even then, debatably). In these circumstances, it seemed improbable that Wilson would just happen to choose the less qualified Garrison over the multitude of other legitimately eligible physicians without some sort of incentive, whether political or otherwise. It was, again, never confirmed in the \textit{Intelligencer} whether or not there was some sort of political motivation behind Wilson’s appointment. Meanwhile, Garrison became a member of the West Virginia State Board of Health and kept conspicuously quiet during the debate over his eligibility.

Despite the lofty talk by the state Board of Health, the drive for the regulation of the medical marketplace as seen in the uproar over Garrison’s appointment was not universally supported even within the medical community. An article published in \textit{The
Intelligencer in 1888 titled “Editor’s Back Stairs—The Interesting Views of the Late Dr. J. G. Holland”, explored the relative merits and demerits of the regulation and professionalization of medicine as a discipline, questioning the superiority of the formal medical profession. The author criticized professionalized physicians for denouncing doctors and home remedies as “quacks” when, in reality, many such treatments had been shown to be extremely effective. The author of the article pointed out:

If an ulcer is found upon one’s arm, and is cured by some dear soul of a grandmother, outside of the code, it will be pronounced by the medical profession an ulcer of little importance. But if treated under the code, causing sleepless nights for a month, with the scientific treatment, plasters, washes, dosing with morphine, arsenic, and other vile substances, given to prevent blood poisoning or deaden pain, and yet the ulcer becomes malignant, and amputation is made necessary at last, to save life, yet all done according to the ‘isms’ of the medical code, this is much more gratifying to the medical profession, and adds more dignity to that distinguished order than to be cured by the dear old grandmother’s remedy.

While a home remedy could be successful against an illness, a treatment issued from a formal physician could easily be proved less helpful and more painful, yet would still hold greater legitimacy in the profession’s view. This uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the medical profession as compared to home treatments questioned the value of formalized medicine’s rigid medical protocol and education as well as the medical profession’s perceived superiority. The author continued to question why physicians condemned the trumpeting of effective home cures through rampant newspaper advertisements as dishonorable, while they themselves “climb the editor’s back stairs at 2 oclock in the morning” to secure a place for their name in the paper for saving a certain patient. This hypocrisy on the part of formally educated physicians and their refusal to acknowledge medicine performed “outside the code” as valid regardless of its
actual success suggested a desire to further the authority of their profession, as well as the belief in themselves as an educated elite.

In May of 1888, the national Medical Association held a meeting in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the physician members made it a point to denounce “quackery”, as well as medical journals that sold advertising space to “quacks and humbugs”. In response to this, the Intelligencer told a story in the following day’s issue about a licensed doctor who practiced on the street. When authorities arrested the man for practicing sans license, he showed his diploma and explained that, “when he was a good doctor he starved; now that he was a quack he was getting rich.”

While this story seemed like a mere amusing anecdote, it was telling of some of the deeper dynamics of how public health not only functioned but was in the process of transforming as well. In the spirit of regulating the medical marketplace, for example, this story showed that practicing without a license had become a punishable offense, at least in certain places. More importantly, however, was the fact that this legitimate, licensed physician chose to practice on the street as a “quack” for financial reasons. This naturally begged the question—why? As the number of “real” doctors decreased due to licensing regulations, their fees likely increased. Coupled with the somewhat questionable superiority of their treatments as compared with home remedies, quacks could very well have provided a means of access to cheaper medicines that were often just as effective as visiting a “regular” physician. In fact, an advertisement for a medicine called Warner’s Safe Cure in the April 13, 1889 issue of the Intelligencer titled “About Doctor’s Bills” offered rising and often exorbitant doctors’ fees as a
reason to invest instead in less expensive but reliable and well-tested remedies like Warner’s.65

The debate among “regular” physicians themselves as to their own superiority over other medical sects was exemplified in a bill that a group of regular physicians brought to the Massachusetts state legislature in 1889. On April 6, 1889, the Intelligencer reprinted an article titled “Medical Monopoly Not Wanted”, that had originally appeared in the Boston Globe on February 6th of that year. The proposed bill sought to prohibit “under penalty of fine and imprisonment” the practice of medicine by any person other than regular physicians. The article argued that such a bill should not be allowed to pass as it was an invasion of the personal liberty not only of other medical practitioners, but of the patient.

The article then detailed a paper that regular physician Dr. Holt wrote and presented at the Massachusetts Medico-Legal Society, denouncing the superiority complex of his colleagues in the medical profession. Dr. Holt cited the Robinson cases, in which several regular physicians were convicted of fatally poisoning patients as a treatment while noting the cause of death as diseases such as meningitis, as evidence of the ignorance, irresponsibility, and fallibility that regular physicians were equally as prone to as doctors of other medical sects. The article continued to attack the notion that regular physicians were better than those of other medical creeds, declaring:

Not so long ago a Globe reporter called upon ten ‘regular’ physicians on the same day, and described his symptoms in exactly the same language to each. The ten physicians informed him that he was suffering from ten different diseases and gave him ten different prescriptions, each utterly inconsistent with
the others. The implied claim that there is any certainty in ‘regular’ medicine as at present practiced, is absurd…We know of scores of cases, and so does the reader, where doctors have treated the wrong disease. Every method to prolong life should be utilized, and the regular medical profession should be the first to welcome it instead of encompassing themselves in self-conceit and bigotry, doctoring symptoms instead of disease, and sending their patients to the cemetery, poisoned with drugs, but on the death certificate that they died from typhoid fever, meningitis, pneumonia, or some equally foreign cause.

This condemnation of regular physicians argued that contrary to their projected authority, their self assured diagnoses and therapies were little more than guesswork. According to the article, the notion that regular physicians, who represented but one faction of many of medical practitioners, should have complete control over the entire medical marketplace was a ludicrous idea. The description of bumbling but self-proclaimed superior physicians would more or less be dramatically reenacted two years later in 1891 by Garrison and the rest of Wheeling’s physicians in an argument over the diagnosis of a smallpox case.

A month after the debate over Garrison’s appointment to the State Board of Health died down, the report of undisclosed authorship that had been sent to the State Board of Health in July resurfaced after Secretary Harris visited the city on August 11th as a result of the Board’s resolution calling for an investigation the claims. On September 15th, the Intelligencer published a letter that Dr. Harris wrote to the city authorities detailing his observations and recommendations concerning Wheeling’s water supply and general state of health. Harris opened the letter by stating that the city’s excessive death rate from typhoid was due to the water supply, and pointed out two specific causes of contamination. The first was that the “point of intake of the water” was past the point that a large segment of the city’s population resided as well as
where the City Hospital, several factories, laundries, horse and cow stables were located, all of whose sewage was emptied into the Ohio River above the pumping station. The second was the direction of drainage at low tide of a town across the river called Martin’s Ferry.

While Harris stated that the fact that Wheeling’s water supply was contaminated could be “taken for granted”, he offered several solutions to rectify the situation. Harris’s first suggestion was to move the drinking water pump to a spot on the river above the point of contamination. While the present pump had been installed “many years ago when the city was much smaller”, the population had since grown, and with it, the amount of sewage, necessitating the relocation of the pump. Harris also recommended installing an “intercepting sewer” as well as a water filtration system, although Harris admitted the latter would be costly and its results doubtful as there had yet to be invented a large-scale filtration system that had proven to “remove the germs of disease and make unhealthy water healthy”.

In addressing the issue of typhoid, Dr. Harris described the current scientific beliefs on the nature of the disease, and identified thorough sanitation as the best solution. Harris explained of Wheeling Creek:

The effluvia from the various sources along this stream are not healthy; and if not productive of typhoid fever are capable of producing other disease, or by depressing the vital powers will lessen their ability to resist attacks of disease not directly produced by them. It is now the general belief of the medical profession that typhoid fever can not originate without the presence of a specific germ, and we find that the sanitary relation of typhoid fever is filth. In privies, in cess pools, in filthy drains, in polluted air, earth and water typhoid fever finds its peculiar culture grounds. There the germs grow and multiply ready to invade the
sanctuary of life at the first fitting opportunity. In cities where sanitation is enforced there will be found the minimum of cases; where sanitation is neglected typhoid prevails.67

Dr. Harris’s explanation of the science of typhoid illustrated the understanding that one of the state’s preeminent physicians had of germ theory, as well as its connection to sanitation as the prime solution to the spread of disease.

The whole of Dr. Harris’s report demonstrated how public health needs and policies were forced to respond to the population growth of the 1880s. While West Virginia’s population increased by a margin of 40% from 1870-1880 according to a June 6th article, a census taken in 1890 showed that Wheeling’s population nearly doubled from 1870-1890 (Wheeling’s population was 19,280 in 1870, 30,737 in 1880, and 37,565 in 1890).68 While previous means of dealing with garbage were adequate for the past populations involved, these systems were overwhelmed by the increase of people that occurred in the 1880s and the increase in waste that went along with it. Both the construction of the crematory as well as Harris’s proposed solutions to Wheeling’s contaminated water supply were created as responses to the changing public health needs necessitated by population growth.

Comically enough, although he criticized Wheeling’s management of the water supply, Harris praised the city on its crematory, saying, “I must congratulate Wheeling on the solution of the vexed question, ‘What is to be done with the garbage?’ I think the crematory solved the question. Its work is perfect, though the present method of handling the material are crude and imperfect”.69 To anyone familiar with the crematory debacle, calling the process “crude and imperfect” was a gross understatement of the
building’s problems. Harris closed his letter by announcing that he hoped that his suggestions “may relieve your city from a large amount of sickness and mortality from a preventable disease, whose source, if not in filth, is thereby preserved and propagated”. While this letter contained several pertinent and reasonable suggestions meant to improve Wheeling’s water supply, the act of a state official essentially visiting to fix the city’s public health problems implied that the work of resident physicians had been inadequate. Equally insulting was Harris’s lecture on the importance of sanitation, which suggested that the city’s doctors were ignorant to the connection between proper sanitary measures and the prevention of disease.

The Intelligencer shared in the embarrassment—the same day Harris’s letter ran in the press, the Intelligencer printed an article titled “An Inexcusable Injustice to the City”, defending Wheeling’s reputation. Although Health Officer Reed had used city statistics to disprove the statement that “The percentage of sickness and mortality from typhoid fever is reported to be unequaled in any city of the United States and surpassed by but few cities in the world” two months prior to his visit, Harris still opened his letter stating that exact statement as fact. The article condemned Harris for acting on information that had been proven false and urged city officials to act against these statements “in justice to themselves and their constituents”. The article continued:

If it was surprising that the State Board of Health should put on record in its proceedings and send broadcast a statement injurious to Wheeling and easily disproven, what shall we say of the representative of that Board, who having spent several days here with ample opportunity to ascertain the truth, writes: ‘It is reported that the mortality from this cause has been very great for a number of years past and is progressively increasing from year to year?’ Who reports this? Does not Dr. Harris know it is not a credible report? Did he go to any trouble to
inform himself of the true state of the case? If not, why not? There was a time several years ago, when for a limited period Wheeling’s death rate from typhoid fever was alarming. At that time there was an epidemic of this disease. Since that time the mortality here from typhoid fever has compared favorably with that of other cities of this country. No person with due regard for truth will attempt to gainsay this.⁷²

The conflicting information presented by Dr. Harris and the city showed the ambiguity of truth involved in the usage and interpretation of statistics. While the first nameless report as well as Dr. Harris’s were based on information that the rest of the city deemed false, it showed how statistics regarding public health could be used as a tool for political maneuvering. It also spoke to the value of the practice of collecting monthly and annual mortality statistics which Wheeling’s Health Officers had begun to do at least by 1880—not only were they useful in terms of fighting disease, but also in defending the reputation of their city and profession against false information.

To add to the jurisdictional battles between the State Board of Health and Wheeling’s physicians, sometime in the latter half of 1887 an Ohio County Board of Health was created with a Dr. E.C. Meyers as President. At an October meeting of the Board of County Commissioners, Meyers presented a letter whose object was clearly to persuade the members of the board to grant him a high salary. In his note, Meyers described the many important and honorable duties of the health officer and the vast responsibilities of the newly created county boards of health. Meyers explained:

GENTLEMEN: As you are no doubt aware that it is your duty to fix the salary of the County Health Officer, I thought it would not be out of place to call the attention of those members of the Board of Commissioners who have not been able to investigate the subject to some of the important duties and responsibilities which the local health boards have been obligated to perform. The general health of a community, and the sanitary condition of the cities and
towns therein, has a direct influence on its commercial growth, and upon the prosperity and advancement of the people in every way. It is in view of this fact that our State Legislature at its last meeting saw fit to enact a law establishing local boards of health in each county in the State.\textsuperscript{73}

Meyers continued by describing at length the duties of the county health boards, referencing the prevention of the introduction and spread of contagious and contagious diseases, the investigation of the cause of endemic diseases, enforcement of quarantines, inspection of disease travel, inspection of buildings, maintenance and improvement of water supplies, and the prevention of “adulterated foods and diseased meats” from the marketplace. Meyers also mentioned the recent appearance of cholera on the east coast of the United States, and reminded the members of the board that “thousands have perished from this dread scourge” both in Europe and in past domestic epidemics.

In closing, Meyers identified Ohio County as the most important in the state, and assured the board that he was alerting them to these matters “because I feel sure that if the citizens of Ohio county are to receive the benefits intended in the enactment of this law, and if these local Boards of Health are to be a success and a benefit throughout this State and this country, much of that success will be due to the liberality and support of the honorable Boards of Commissioners existing in their separate counties”.\textsuperscript{74}

Although he expressed his desire for the county citizens to receive their deserved benefits from the law, he opened his letter by specifically mentioning the question of his personal salary. By arguing that the success of a state, both commercial and otherwise, was dependent on the health of its people, Meyers worked to elevate his position in esteem and importance. This theme was clearly in line with the goals of the greater medical profession in the 1880s—from the strict laws limiting the eligibility of doctors
to membership in the State Board of Health to the creation of a doctor’s registry, physicians sought to raise the exclusivity of their profession, and, therefore, its elite status.

Due to her position on the Ohio River, Wheeling’s vibrant and important industrial role in West Virginia’s economy made the health of her citizens especially important to the entire state’s economic success. Wheeling’s health was especially important because her proximity to the Ohio River not only brought trade, but disease. By linking commercial viability with health and sanitation as well as casually scaring the board with the mention of the prospect of a cholera epidemic, Meyers impressed upon the commissioners the dire importance of funding for the local Ohio County Board of Health.

As its first act published in the Intelligencer, the County Board of Health issued a notice to “physicians, coroners, undertakers, ministers, &c.” regarding the collection of mortality statistics as mandated by “sections 24, 25, 26, and 27 of Chapter 64, Acts of 1887”, or the Harris Vital Statistics Law. The notice provided a full copy of the four sections, the first two of which pertained specifically to the duties of attending physicians. Section 24 stated:

It shall be the duty of all physicians and accoucheurs in this State to register their names and post office address with the clerk of the county wherein they reside; and said physicians and accoucheurs and accouchese, shall be required, under a penalty of ten dollars, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State, at the suit of the county clerk, to report to the clerk of the county court, within thirty days from the occurrence, all births and deaths which may come under their supervision, with a certificate of the cause of death and such co-relative facts as the board may require in the blank forms to be
furnished as hereafter provided; and they shall receive from the county the sum of twenty-five cents for every such report made to the clerk of the county court.⁷⁶

The fact that this law applied to all the doctors in the entire state of West Virginia confirmed that these laws were not crafted by the County Board of Health but by the State Board of Health, headed by, of course, Harris. The act of creating county boards of health to function as intermediaries between the State Board of Health and local public apparatuses represented an effort to centralize public health power and standardize procedures like the collection of vital statistics at the state level. This act illustrated the trajectory that the establishment of official public health organizations underwent in the 1880s—while only local health committees and boards had existed in 1880, by 1881 the West Virginia State Board of Health was created, followed by the formation of county boards of health by the close of 1887. The increased power of these central authorities over local health committees was bound to cause tension.

Sure enough, it did not take long for debates to arise not only over the Section 24 physician’s registry, but over the proper place of the County Board of Health in managing Wheeling’s public health affairs. At a meeting of the Health Committee on October 31⁴ᵗʰ, committee members met with the County Board of Health in order to “define the powers of the Committee on Health and Health Officers and the Board of Health”.⁷⁷ The question was also given to Wheeling’s Prosecuting Attorney and City Solicitor so that they could study the recent Health Law and “devise how the city and county authorities may work together without clashing, for the general good of the community”.⁷⁸
As for the Harris Vital Statistics Law, opinions varied. An article titled “The Doctors’ Registry. A Good Law which is Faulty in some Details” appeared in the *Intelligencer* on November 3rd, citing items of both praise and contention in the law. While the article stated that most older doctors “look upon the law as ‘foolishness’, and generally frankly say so when they register”, younger doctors tended to praise the law for making important information available to the general public. Among the specific objections against the bill were the cost it would incur upon the county as well as the fact that the physician or midwife would earn a sum of 25 cents for each birth or death reported while the clerk of the Board would receive a mere two cents. As the *Intelligencer* protested, “The one-sidedness of this provision is manifest. Each birth or death costs the county, out of whose treasury the fee is paid, at least 27 cents”. This cost for every reported birth or death seemed excessive considering, for example, that admission to a production of Aladdin in January 1888 cost a mere 50 or 75 cents. The fact that 25 of the 27 cents went straight to the doctor seemed unfairly weighted in the favor of physicians.

Furthermore, the article objected, the book in which the physicians were to register was “rather complicated, having about ten columns in which must be entered certain particulars”. These “particulars” consisted of: “date of registration; name; school of practice; residence and post office address; age; nativity; years in practice in all and number of years in practice in West Virginia; date of certification of State Board of Health and on what grounds issued; whether by diploma or examination or on account of ten years practice in the State; date of filing certificates and so forth”.

Vaguely reminiscent of the scrutiny that Garrison’s professional and educational history underwent in the aftermath of his contentious appointment, this registry was clearly meant to keep tabs on all the licensed physicians in the state. In fact, the *Intelligencer* then dropped another hint that very well could have been a reference to Garrison—after describing the range of age, date of diploma, and years of practice of the doctors who had so far registered, the article added an extra sentence which read, “One physician began to practice on a certificate in ’81, and afterward attended a medical college, obtaining a diploma this year.”83 This, the only individual case that the article mentioned specifically in any sort of detail, bore an uncanny resemblance to Garrison’s personal history. Garrison had in fact been certified by the State Board of Health in 1881, and, considering previous ambiguous references to the circumstances of his graduation, could very well have been the unidentified doctor the article referred to.

A week after the Prosecuting Attorney and City Solicitor had been charged with the task of studying the new health law, their verdict was reported during a meeting of the county commissioners. After examining the new law, Prosecutor Jordan stated that he “believed under the law the County Board of Health had no jurisdiction over the territory embraced within the city limits, as the city charter gave the Council control of all such matters. He reported also that while the law required the Board to provide for the payment of the County Physician an annual salary, there was no provision for any compensation to the other members of the Board except for their actual expenses.”84

In light of this legal insight, Solicitor Caldwell proposed a resolution reporting an ordinance that would make the Committee on Health a City Board of Health with the
Health Officer as its executive officer. While this name change seemed rather pointless, the *Intelligencer* explained, “It is desired to do this so that the city ordinances shall be in conformity with the State health law, and more particularly so that the newly appointed County Board of Health will not have cause to step in and exercise a supervision over the sanitary condition of things as it has threatened to do”.85 By simply changing the word “Committee” to “Board”, therefore, Wheeling’s city Committee on Health would retain jurisdiction from the County Board of Health over its own public health and save the city from further insulting interventions by higher medical authorities.

The *Intelligencer* wholeheartedly agreed with Caldwell’s resolution. A November 28th article titled “A City Board of Health” explained the advantages of the proposal:

The city of Wheeling being entirely competent to look after her own health, and as there is no good reason why the city should now burden the county with new responsibilities in this regard, the disposition, so far as it has been ascertained, is to keep this responsibility and authority in the hands of the city. The question having been raised that this cannot be done because the city has no Board of Health baptized with the name, the Committee on Ordinances has been instructed to report an ordinance removing that ground of quibble. The proposition is to constitute the Health Officer and the Health Committee a City Board of Health.86

These territorial disputes demonstrated the prominence of hierarchical power struggles within public health. The ability of a city to manage its own general health became a matter of honor, especially for Wheeling’s physicians and city officials. Through changing the name, therefore, Wheeling’s Committee would remain exactly the same in form and function but would comply with the health law by calling itself a “Board” and thereby gain all the corresponding legal powers.
In the middle of these negotiations, the County Board of Health was abruptly disbanded. In a December 6th article titled “A Sudden Termination to the Supposed Existence of the Ohio County Board of Health”, a letter was published from Wheeling City Prosecutor to the Board of County Commissioners revealing a legal flaw in the County Health Board’s existence. Jordan referenced section 6 of chapter 64 of the Acts of 1887 which provided that, “it shall be the duty of the County Court to nominate and the State Board of Health to appoint in each of the counties of the State three intelligent and discreet persons residing therein, two of whom shall be citizens and one a physician qualified to practice medicine under the provisions of this chapter, etc.”. While Jordan found that Drs. Meyers and Robinson and Michael Stein were nominated by the County Court on September 5, 1887, they had not been officially appointed by the State Board of Health, whose last meeting had been held on July 11th. Although Harris had independently issued a certificate of appointment to the three men, he had no legal right to do so. Since the three members of the County Health Board had not technically been legally appointed, therefore, Jordan declared any of their actions under the name of the County Board of Health “illegal and void”.

As to whether or not Wheeling’s Health Committee was legally a board in function, Jordan explained, “The city of Wheeling by virtue of its corporate authority is vested with all the power and authority to attend to the health of its citizens within its corporate limits, and by virtue of that authority has elected a Health Officer and appointed a Committee on Health, thus making to all intents and purposes a Board of Health for the city of Wheeling”. If Wheeling did indeed have a board of health,
Jordan argued that the County Board would have no legal jurisdiction to act within city limits. In justifying his conclusion, the Prosecutor cited chapter 64 of the Acts of 1887 which stated, “When any town, city or village has a Board of Health of its own the jurisdiction of the local board so appointed shall not extend thereto”. In his analysis of the Acts of 1887 as well as the circumstances of the County Health Board’s appointment, Jordan succeeded not only in temporarily killing the Board but effectively banishing it from meddling in Wheeling’s health affairs in the future.

At the next council meeting the Intelligencer reported that the First Branch voted in accord with the Second to adopt the resolution changing Wheeling’s Committee on Health into a Board of Health. The article described the county as “violently opposed” to the resolution because it would bar them from operating in Wheeling—indeed, Meyers and Robinson had appeared at an early November meeting of the Committee on Health and had caused “quite a controversy as to which body was to look after the city’s health”, threatening to take the matter to court. The article also vehemently rejected the Register’s (the other major daily Wheeling newspaper) attempt to find political meaning in the case.

While this legal power struggle between the City and County Committee and Board of Health unfolded in the last two months of 1887, parallel events once again saw the crematory rear its ugly head. In early November, the Intelligencer reported that the Superintendent of the Crematory (Henry Serig) had discovered that the entire vein of coal upon which the furnace was built was quite literally on fire, evidenced by the ample amounts of smoke that rose from small holes in the ground. While the article
agreed that this made the crematory’s foundation unstable at best, its only piece of sage advice on the matter was to “wait and see”.

In addition to, and partially on account of, the crematory’s physical defects, the council began to question the soundness of the contracts with Mr. Smith and the Pittsburgh Bridge Company (the contractor for the iron shed). After an inordinately confusing meeting with a representative of the bridge company named Mr. Garlinghouse involving conflicting information and structural plans for the crematory as well as numerous stray fees, the City Council concluded that it was unknown whether the contract for the iron shed had been made with Smith or the company. Naturally, the blame for this miscommunication was placed on Garrison and the previous Health Committee. As one Committee member remarked, “there seemed to have been something loose about the manner in which the building had been contracted for; whether the blame for this was to be attached to the former Health Officer, Dr. Garrison, or to the former committee, he had not been able to learn”. Garrison was summoned at the next meeting, and the matter was resolved with ample confusion.

It was not long before Garrison exercised his power in enforcing the new health laws known as the “Harris Health bill” as a new member of the State Board of Health. A December 20th article titled “A Physician in Jail” reported that Garrison had charged a man named Mr. Glover with violating Section 14 of the State law stipulating the regulations for the practice of medicine in West Virginia. This particular section of the law stated:
If any person shall advertise or announce himself in writing, printing or otherwise, as a practitioner of medicine or surgery, or offer to cure or treat disease by any method, without first having registered regularly as a physician, or obtained a license and paid therefore a special tax of $50 for every month or fraction of a month he may intend to practice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be subject to a heavy fine.  

Garrison argued that Glover had violated the law by putting up a sign in front of his office announcing himself as a doctor, and had also treated cases of hemorrhoids, all while failing to register. Glover protested that he did not claim to be a physician but could cure hemorrhoids, and had put up a sign when he moved to Wheeling so his former patients from the towns across the river could find him. Garrison countered that Glover had but one unpredictable method of curing hemorrhoids and that “he [Garrison] disliked to molest him, but his operations had become a cause of general complaint, and he was obliged to enforce the law as it is made his duty to”.  

Glover was thrown into jail at $500 bail with a hearing scheduled for the next day.

The laws encompassed in the “Harris Health bill” were an effort to exclude people from practicing medicine excepting those that the institutionalized regular physicians deemed qualified. Physicians who failed to register were committing a crime as their practice could be injurious. Furthermore, they were taking business away from registered doctors. As a new member of the State Board of Health, Garrison saw it as his duty to protect the general public from doctors who failed to register, although Garrison’s rigid adherence to the new health legislation was a little ironic considering the questionable legality under which he was appointed to the State Board of Health.
During the final meeting of the Health Committee in 1887, the members agreed to revise and overhaul the garbage ordinance, appointed a sub-committee to decide upon a new location for the crematory, worked out a compromise with Mr. Smith and the Bridge Company concerning payment for the “famous iron shed”, and unanimously recommended the passage of the ordinance making the Health Committee a Health Board.96

The issue of the legality of a local city Board of Health occupied the first two months of 1888. According to the controversial ordinance, the new board would consist of the members of the Committee on Health as well as the Health Officer (Reed). At a City Council meeting on January 24th, the council members debated the value of adopting the ordinance. The article that ran in the Intelligencer on January 25th stated, “It was discovered, by the way, that the Committee on Health was already styled a Board of Health in the old ordinance book. Accordingly, the new ordinance does not create a Board, but simply confers upon it the right to do certain things as laid down in the recently passed State law. This being the case, Mr. Gruse could see no necessity for the new ordinance as he thought the State law sufficient to meet all the city’s needs”.97

In the same issue of the paper, the Intelligencer poked fun at the bitter, drawn-out debate over the technical legal details of the city public health apparatus as a disagreement that turned out to be completely unnecessary. In a little blurb, the Intelligencer jibed, “The City Board of Health has had a legal existence all this time, has it? When we look back over the debate as to the powers of the Council Committee on Health, and the acrimonious dispute as to whether it was constructively a Board of
Health within the meaning of the law, it seems funny, doesn’t it?” While the fact that the Committee on Health was technically already formed in the manner of a board rendered the argument over a board’s legality irrelevant, the fact that the dispute was so serious showed the intense kind of politics that were involved over the power and organization of Wheeling’s local public health agency.

While many reports insisted on the validity of the Wheeling city Board of Health, its legality was still a fuzzy issue at the state level. Reporting on the monthly meeting of the Board of County Commissioners, the *Intelligencer* ran a letter from Ohio County Health Officer Dr. E.C. Meyers, who had received a letter from Dr. Harris, the Secretary of the West Virginia State Board of Health. In his letter, Dr. Meyers relayed the message from Dr. Harris that the actions involving the Local County Board of Health had been approved by the State Board of Health, settling the issue of its legality. However, Meyers still questioned the validity of the City Board of Health. Dr. Meyers explained of the county (“local”) and city boards of health respectively:

This I suppose settles the question as to the *legality* of the existence of the Local Board of Health, unless our *brilliant* Prosecuting Attorney can find some other technicality which can be used as an obstructive measure. The City Council, contrary to one of the city ordinances, has transformed its Committee on Health into a Board of Health. The legality of this action has not yet been determined. The mere fact that they are not enforcing the law in regard to registration of vital statistics, the report of contagious diseases, etc., is either an admission that they question their own legal existence, or else they intend to allow the law to remain inoperative.

The fact that Dr. Meyers was dubious as to the legitimate existence of the city board of health in part due to its failure to comply with state law concerning the duties of a “board” of health, provided an idea as to the differences between a Wheeling committee
versus board. If the City Board of Health was valid, Meyers argued, it should and would be enforcing state law which mandated that such board take certain actions regarding public health (registration of vital statistics, etc.). Therefore, while the actions of the Committee on Health were locally managed, a Board of Health was legally obligated to perform certain specific functions under state law. Meyers’ letter, therefore, essentially acted as somewhat of a slap on the wrist—if the City Board of Health was truly a board, it had better start acting as one. Furthermore, the rhetoric laced with sarcasm and disdain that Meyers employed (“our brilliant Prosecuting Attorney”) exemplified how bitter this debate was even at the county level.

In the April 16, 1888 issue of the *Intelligencer*, Health Officer Reed included part of the text of the city garbage ordinance in an effort to promote better public understanding of and compliance with the law to thereby save the city air from “contamination from decaying vegetable matter”. In including sections 3, 5, 8, and 9 of the ordinance, Reed reiterated responsibilities of both residents (“householders must provide suitable and water-tight receptacles for holding garbage and offal”) as well as garbage collectors (garbage would be collected once a week during the winter months, twice a week in the spring and fall, and six times a week in the summer—failure to collect was a punishable offense). Furthermore, Section 8 of the ordinance declared it illegal to litter any substance that could become a menace to public health. Reed paraphrased, “it shall be unlawful to deposit garbage or any other material which may become offensive upon any street, alley or yard, or on creek or river bank”.
The system of garbage collection that had been established involved selling contracts to individuals, each of whom was responsible for collecting the garbage from one of five districts. These garbage collectors would then ferry their district’s garbage to an unsightly crematory at the highest point in the city called Wheeling Hill, where the accumulated trash was burned.

This system was by far the most costly undertaking of any measure taken by the Wheeling Board of Health. In the Annual Statement of Expenditures for the Wheeling City Health Department for the year of 1887, seven out of 22 entries for expenses were directly spent on garbage removal and the crematory (brickwork at Crematory, Crematory payment in full, Bridge at Crematory, Keeper of Crematory, Assistant Keeper of Crematory, Office at Crematory, Plumbing, Gas Pipe, etc. at Crematory, and Removal of Garbage). Out of the entire list of health expenses, the single most costly entry by far was the Removal of Garbage for $3,059.79 in contrast to Health Officer Reed’s salary for the entire year at $585.72, Advertising and Printing at $287.44, and the hiring of Health Inspectors at $285.25. Combined with the six other entries directly relating to garbage and the crematory, the cost of this system of trash disposal dwarfed all other health expenses combined. In fact, out of the $7,495.45 total spent on public health for the whole year, $6,287.71 of it was spent on the garbage system.

Not only was this system incredibly costly, it came with its fair share of problems and controversies. For example, there were frequent disputes over who would be awarded the garbage collecting contracts complete with allegations of a “Garbage Trust”, and on March 28, 1888, the Intelligencer reported that a wind storm had
completely wrecked the crematory shed, which then had to be rebuilt. This structural
instability was ongoing—a year later in March of 1889, The Committee on Health
approved over a hundred dollars’ worth of repairs to the crematory. The members
deprecated to commit even more funds, although sorely needed, as they believed that the
crematory would collapse anyway in a year or two at most.

A year later, the Health Committee was still fighting the same structural battles
with the crematory, both physical and systematic. In a March 1889 article, three
members of the committee proposed three different plans for the collection of garbage,
as the effectiveness of the existing system was beginning to be widely questioned.
While one member favored keeping the current contracting system, another suggested
hiring men and carts by the day, and Health Officer Garrison proposed that the city
should buy its own carts and perform the function itself. The Council ultimately agreed
to keep the current system, but increase the number of districts from five to eight. These
different plans showcased the practical issues that local governments and agencies
inevitably had to face when dealing with public health. The questions of how to finance
a task such as garbage collection and to what extent the state should take complete
control of such functions were serious considerations that the Wheeling Committee on
Health routinely grappled with.

A mere three weeks later, the Council realized that practically no garbage was
being collected anywhere in the city due to fraudulent contracts, contractors who failed
to pay their bonds, and contractors who simply decided that they did not want the
responsibility anymore after the fact. Consequently, trash had been left to rot in the
streets, while angry citizens lodged ample complaints against the Committee on Health, the very agency that had created the ordinance on garbage in the first place. In response to this chaos, the Committee pledged to reissue the contracts, but the disorganization inherent in the system had become all too apparent. As the *Intelligencer* grumbled, “The garbage question has been a farce for several years past, but it was never more so than now.”

Four days later the Health Committee supervised the re-letting of all of the garbage contracts in an effort to render the system more efficient. Problems persisted, however, along with complaints from the community. An article in the May 3rd issue of the *Intelligencer* reported that the city was paying the new garbage contractors considerably more money than the previous year, yet the service was still failing, prompting 40 complaints to Health Officer Garrison in one day. In light of the exorbitant cost of the garbage contracts, the *Intelligencer* argued that the system should be close to perfect, and that it was incumbent upon the Health Committee to ensure its proper implementation.

As the ultimate responsibility for this garbage removal system lay with the city Health Committee, Health Officer Garrison frequently fell under attack regarding the issue. In fact, opposition to Garrison as the Health Officer surfaced periodically throughout 1889, starting with his election in February of that year. The extent of the coverage in the *Intelligencer* of the election for Health Officer spanned a mere two sentences which read, “For Health Officer, Mr. Wilkie named G.I. Garrison, who formerly held the position, and Mr. Robinson nominated Dr. R. J. Reed, the incumbent.
Garrison got there, but several, as they thought of the caucus, did not vote enthusiastically". The fact that several members of the committee did not vote “enthusiastically” for Garrison implied that there was some degree of opposition to his appointment as the Health Officer (unsurprising given the events of 1887), which did not bode well for future disagreements regarding public health.

These disagreements, both personal and ideological, came to the fore throughout 1889 and 1890, especially regarding the garbage issue, and several meetings occurred during which impassioned Committee members had to be silenced or subdued. During a Committee meeting in late March, for example, Mr. Harrell questioned Garrison’s suitability for the position of Health Officer on account of a disagreement over Garrison’s report on a sum of bills to be paid. The Intelligencer described Harrell as starting a debate that “was beginning to turn on Health Officer Garrison’s fitness for the office when President Gruse called a halt to the proceedings…” This personal, public attack on Dr. Garrison as the Health Officer was subdued only when the president of the entire Council intervened to prevent the dispute from spiraling out of control.

On May 9th, in an article titled “The Council Committee Combs the Health Officer’s Hair”, other members of the Health Committee expressed their frustration when Garrison failed to show up for a Committee meeting with some important papers. The undercurrent of irritation on the part of both the members of the Health Committee as well as Dr. Garrison is apparent in the Intelligencer’s prose. In describing the incident, the article recounted:
One contractor telephoned to Dr. Garrison to ascertain why one of his papers, wanted by the committee, was not before it. The Doctor replied that it was at his office in North Wheeling and if the man wanted it he could go after it. Several members of the committee wanted to know why Dr. Garrison was not in attendance on the committee, and cussed when no one could answer the question. Chairman Campbell read the riot act and combed Dr. Garrison in a somewhat flowery manner. He said it was evident that Dr. Garrison did not propose to have any garbage collected till he could have it done according to his new ideas. The tension present in this account of the meeting was near palpable. Not only did Health Officer Garrison fail to attend a scheduled meeting of the committee he presided over, he refused to provide his colleagues with the information necessary to conduct the meeting when contacted. In response to this blatant rebuffing, the members of the Committee became sufficiently rowdy so as to prompt a “reading of the riot act” from Dr. Campbell and a criticism of Dr. Garrison, portraying him as stubborn and inflexible and partially blaming him for the garbage debacle.

This was the first incident of many involving personal hostility between Chairman Campbell and Dr. Garrison—a mere five days later in front of a special meeting of the Committee on Health, Campbell officially charged Garrison with swearing at him over the telephone and thereby insulting the entire Committee. In relating the episode, Chairman Campbell delivered a speech he addressed to the “Honorable Members of the Committee on Health”, which the Intelligencer printed in full. In his speech, Campbell cited a May 8th meeting of the Committee during which the members had agreed on a resolution directing the chairman (Campbell) to sign licenses for several applicants who had been approved. Campbell narrated while the audience reportedly listened “in dead silence”:
In fulfilling your commands I called up the Health Officer by telephone, and before I could explain my business with him, he began a torrent of abuses and blasphemies and curses, and using such vile epithets as no gentleman would use to any one. Such epithets as these characterized his foul language: ‘You G—d—n liar,’ ‘You G—d—n sneak,” and ‘You G—d—n — —,” and many others too numerous to mention. After taking this abuse I then inquired of him if he would do as the committee requested. He replied: ‘I will not examine the night soil licenses, and if the committee wants me to do anything in the hereafter, they will have to ask for it in writing’.  

The purported aggressions that Campbell described in his speech portrayed Garrison as unreasonable, hotheaded, and incredibly uncooperative with the Committee’s decision. Campbell then demanded “reparations” for undergoing such maltreatment while attempting to fulfill his duties as Committee Chairman, and called a “sub-committee” to be appointed to investigate the incident. In a sharp response to Campbell’s demand for the creation of such a committee, Garrison countered with a crack at the old debate over whether the committee was technically a committee or a board of health. The article stated:

Dr. Garrison asked whether the gentlemen were sitting as a committee or a board. Mr. Hadlich answered that as they were appointed as a committee he presumed they were sitting as such. Dr. Garrison said that by ordinance the committee was a Board of Health, and that he was a member of such board, and that as such a member he wanted to amend Dr. Campbell’s motion substituting Dr. Campbell for the sub-committee. Mr. Hadlich looked as though he would be willing to give three dollars to be out of the place he was in, and decided that Dr. Garrison had no right to make any motions.

By referencing the long standing legal debate as to whether the city health apparatus was a committee or a board, Garrison succeeded in craftily poking fun at the entire Committee and making the audience feel ill at ease, as evidenced by the article’s description of Mr. Hadlich. The special meeting ended with the decision that the whole
Committee would investigate the charges against Dr. Garrison. While Campbell called four people to testify on his behalf, Garrison “did not care to call any witnesses”.

This episode, along with the special meeting that was called to resolve it, illustrated the personalized nature that local public health could assume, and was testament to how antagonistic these everyday proceedings could become. While at a certain level these arguments seemed to be purely personal, a major component to these conflicts clearly related to local public health issues and policies. In his public criticism of Garrison at the May 9th meeting, Campbell cited Garrison’s determination to do things according to his “new ideas” as hindering the effectiveness of the implementation of the garbage system, alluding to an ideological disagreement regarding the best way to execute the city garbage ordinance (in addition to Garrison’s unexplained absence from the meeting). These “new ideas” that Campbell mentioned could be a reference to Garrison’s proposal to repeal the garbage ordinance and transfer the authority on the issue to the Board of Public Works, an opinion he formally voiced two days later in a letter to the mayor and the committee. In the second incident, while Garrison did not mention a particular reason why he refused to look over the night soil licenses, his adamant refusal, whether for personal or professional reasons, affected the way in which public health functioned in Wheeling. The charges that Campbell brought against Garrison were dropped three days later, because the committee simply had not bothered to investigate the accusations.

Despite the allegations of obstinate and malicious behavior lodged against him by his own Health Committee, Garrison was very proactive in writing articles, letters,
organizing conventions, and compiling reports about health and sanitation. He helped organize a sanitary convention in Wheeling along with the State Board of Health in April 1889, played an active role emphasizing the importance of safe drinking water and participating in sanitary tours in the aftermath of the Johnstown flood, and frequently wrote letters to the Wheeling City Council and the public stressing the urgency of the garbage situation.

On April 17th, for example, the Intelligencer announced that a sanitary convention would be held the following week for the purpose of Health Officer Garrison to meet with the two members of the State Board of Health for Wheeling’s Congressional as well as County Board of Health head Dr. E.C. Meyers in order to scrutinize those who wanted to obtain a license to practice medicine from the State Board of Health. In addition to dealing with licenses, the convention invited anyone who was interested in hygiene and sanitation issues to attend and engage in a kind of community conversation. The article stated, “It is not the purpose to any long, dry scientific essays or addresses, but instead to discuss in a plain, homely fashion, plain, homely facts. Such lively topics as the disposal of garbage and water supply will be brought up and discussed”. The article went on to identify the city garbage collection system as an institution in dire need of community deliberation and reform, and declared that Dr. Garrison would discuss the cause of the city’s high death rate from typhoid that occurred in the first three months of the year.

On the day on which the sanitary convention was to be held, an article about the meeting announced the various papers that would be discussed by different local
The day following the sanitary convention, the Intelligencer ran a lengthy article detailing the night’s proceedings and reviewing the medical articles that had been presented. The article remarked that the general public could have been better represented considering that a major goal of the conference was to bring awareness to sanitary issues in the practical hope of bettering the public health of the whole community. After the convention selected a temporary chairman and secretary to handle the proceedings, the featured papers were read as well as lectures by various doctors on such topics as ventilation in homes and public buildings, the danger of eating too much, the need for milk regulations in order to prevent typhoid, and the question of where Wheeling’s water supply base should be located. The convention lasted for two and a half hours (8-10:30 PM), and the Intelligencer lauded it as an admirable effort to create a discourse on public health issues that would hopefully lead to some viable solutions.

The overwhelming emphasis placed by the physicians at the convention on sanitation showed how the medical profession conceptualized the underlying causes of and, in turn, solutions to public health issues in the 1880s. Sanitary issues reflected in the titles of the various papers and lectures read at the convention were at the fore of public health concerns for the doctors involved in the formal state and local health apparatuses. Furthermore, as upholding sanitary standards both involved and affected
every citizen of a community, physicians realized that part of the solution to the issue of sanitation was the education of the general public to its importance. The calling of this convention was, therefore, representative of how physicians viewed themselves in relation to the general public, as well as how they perceived their role in society—doctors were an educated, elite sector of society, and their duty as such was to inform the ignorant masses of proper sanitary behavior lest they endanger public welfare. Furthermore, in framing compliance with sanitary standards as a moral responsibility, these doctors assumed some degree of higher moral ground by default.

Garrison persisted in his quest for sanitary reform by writing two letters addressed to the Mayor and the City Council concerning the garbage issue in mid May. In the first, he suggested that the garbage ordinance be rescinded, and that the Board of Public Works rather than the Health Department should hold the authority for garbage collection and disposal (Campbell’s reference to “new ideas”). In the second, Garrison lamented the “unprecedented” sanitary condition of Wheeling due to the ineffective garbage system, and urged the City Council to address the problem immediately before the city fell victim to an epidemic in the summer months. In the same article, the Council resolved to look into creating a separate City Sanitary Department. Therefore, the decision as to which city institution should have the formal authority over the most pressing local public health issue was a major component and source of contention involved in the garbage debate.

This series of meetings following the election of Dr. George Garrison as Health Officer from February through May 1889 would frame the nature of the Wheeling
public health climate and debate over the garbage question for the next year and a half. While Garrison continued to confidently put forth his definite ideas regarding the actions that should be taken regarding local public health issues, persistent animosity from committee members and constant tension among the city’s doctors characterized Wheeling’s public health climate through 1890.

In mid June of 1889, the Intelligencer ran an extensive expose of the garbage collection system. The article, titled “Dangers to the Health of the Community in the Present Inadequate Provision for Removal of Garbage”, spanned several pages and detailed in full the major components and causes of the problem, as well as the steps needed to be taken to improve the system and alleviate the ongoing issue. In tandem with the emphasis on sanitation throughout the 1880s as the proper response to public health concerns, the article stressed the importance of governing a city in accordance with the teachings of sanitary science. While in theory Wheeling’s garbage ordinance and collection system was implemented to uphold this sanitary ideal, the actual system failed to function effectively in practice. As the article stated:

The importance of cleanliness is theoretically recognized by everybody in this day; but the practical observance of the precepts laid down by sanitary science, and confirmed by experience and common sense, is too often neglected. Wheeling has from time to time recognized the desirability of keeping the city free from disease-breeding filth, but so far this recognition is more formal than real- more theoretical than practical. There are on the ordinance books provisions which aim at cleanliness, but these, if faithfully enforced, would be inadequate, and as a matter of fact are not enforced, mainly for the reason that they are impracticable. Council has from time to time ordained and enacted that certain things shall be done, and then provided means for doing these things which are so far from commensurate with the things to be done as to be farcical.112
In effectively calling the City Council’s ordinances a farce as far as the practical provision of the resources necessary to carry such measures out, the *Intelligencer* identified the primary problem as a defective system rather than the garbage collectors themselves or Health Officer Garrison. In analyzing the technicalities of the “scavenger system”, the article pointed out that in order for the ordinance (which required each house in the city’s five garbage districts to be visited either once a week or once daily depending on the season) to be fully carried out, each of the five garbage contractors would have to visit Wheeling’s 6,000 homes daily in the summer months, averaging out to 100 houses an hour, or six houses every ten minutes for each contractor. Not only was this feat clearly physically impossible for a mere five men, it did not even take into account the time needed to haul the collected trash to the crematory. Furthermore, several of the contractors lacked adequate supplies to effectively collect and cart the garbage, and the crematory itself was not large enough to dispose of the entirety of the city’s amassed waste.

In exposing the garbage system as a sham of efficiency, the *Intelligencer* placed the bulk of the blame on the City Council for creating an ordinance that it subsequently failed to back with sufficient funds and resources, essentially guaranteeing its failure. While Garrison (who had argued to repeal the garbage ordinance) continued to be inundated with complaints from community members, the *Intelligencer* defended him as an honest servant to the public, with a genuine concern for the health of the community. In interviewing “the faithful and efficient City Health Officer” about the “evils” of the garbage system, Garrison stated that the issue had been so thoroughly
picked over and understood that he had little new to add on the subject. Garrison confirmed the defectiveness of the system based on his own observation of filth in the streets on his rounds as Health Officer, and verified the danger to public health that such waste posed. In reference to vegetable matter, Garrison explained that under “favorable conditions, as regards moisture and temperature” such matter would undergo a “putrefactive process, resulting in the formation of a specific poison, which, by its reception, or that of the micro-organisms which produce it, in the living body, produces certain forms of fever”. He continued to lament the thought of unsuspecting citizens inhaling “foul odors” and “noxious gases” from the “exhalations from accumulated pits of fecal matter and heaps of decaying garbage”, fumes that contributed to the city’s unhealthy disease environment.

Considering the perceived substantial threat to public health that such inconspicuous “exhalations” presented, Garrison urged the compliance with sanitary standards as a moral obligation. Echoing a theme of the Sanitary Convention held earlier in 1889, Garrison identified the city public health apparatus as responsible for enacting measures to keep the ignorant masses in check and inform them about the dangers of certain activities to the community. Garrison explained in the article:

Is it not the duty of the proper authorities to interfere in these matters? Nay, is it not imperative that such laws should be enacted and rigidly enforced as shall rid the city of its contaminating filth? Scattered among the masses are people who do know, and fully realize the consequences of this criminal neglect...who yet are compelled to breathe the surrounding atmosphere, filled with its poison, unless they cease forever to breathe, as very many do, dying of some filth disease.
In light of the criminality and the danger to the general public assigned to the act of failing to clear garbage away, many citizens in Wheeling took garbage disposal into their own hands as a response to the city’s failed system. Several residents explained that they routinely burned or buried their own trash since they had yet to be visited by a garbage collector, while others described joining forces to dig a neighborhood garbage pit, carting their trash to another part of town or to the crematory, or even dumping their garbage in the river in violation of “Baird’s Pure Water Law”.

Under a sub-heading of the expose titled “A Source of Special Danger”, the *Intelligencer* described a practice common among the residents of the South side of the city—feeding trash to cows as a method of garbage disposal. The health risks of “swill fed milk”, the article explained, were well known in the sanitary science community, and had prompted its banning from the market by several states. While the article substantiated this assertion by pointing out that the districts in Wheeling with the most cows were consistently the unhealthiest wards in the city according to health records, the provision of the garbage service in these areas was incredibly insubstantial.

As the *Intelligencer*’s expose succeeded in demonstrating, Wheeling’s “scavenger” system of garbage collection was in obvious need of major reform. Not only was the failed system contributing to a significant threat to the city’s communal health, it was an unjust burden on taxpayers who continued to finance the often non-existent implementation of an utterly ineffective public health ordinance while often spending extra money to get the job done themselves. In order to alleviate these glaring inadequacies of the “scavenger” system, the *Intelligencer* called for the building of a
new crematory to better serve the South end of the city as well as a new road to the existing crematory. Most important, however, was the article’s adamant insistence of the understanding and implementation of an effective garbage system as a preventative measure towards epidemics. The article described the failure of the community to acknowledge the effectiveness of preventative measures against disease as a hindrance to the enactment of important public health policy:

One thing that weakens the public estimation of the importance of this matter, and other sanitary safeguards, is that nobody can prove that a preventative prevents. When one locks his stable and his horse is not stolen, he thinks it would in all probability have escaped with the thief with the door unlocked. But one night the horse is stolen, and thereafter the man always locks the stable door. It is the part of wise judgment for others to profit from his experience and lock their doors before their horses are also stolen. So it is wise in a community to protect the public health before an epidemic comes. It is to be hoped that the scourge of disease will not wake Wheeling people to the importance of protection against conditions which induce disease, or at least make it more malignant… To leave the public health without proper protection is as if a man neglected to lock his stable because his horse was not taken, while all the time the thieves are entering and carrying off his oats.116

This line of reasoning demonstrated a significant shift from the modus operandi in 1880. While public health authorities waited to deal with typhoid and measles after they had already become epidemics in the spring of 1880, the main importance of a well functioning garbage system in 1889 was to prevent such diseases from ever reaching the point of being epidemics. Rather than primarily interacting with disease as an almost impromptu combative response to an already present danger, public health officials began to emphasize the implementation of preventative measures by the end of the decade.
Despite the *Intelligencer*’s expose and the call for reform, Health Officer Garrison continued to be inundated with complaints concerning the garbage system, and thus felt compelled to personally defend himself against the blame for the ineffective scavenger service. In a letter to the editor, Garrison gave several examples of the kind of letters he received on a daily basis: “The garbage man takes the garbage away from No. ___ street, only once a week”, “Please have the garbage cart call at my place and remove the garbage”, “The garbage will brede sicknis and death,” etc.\(^{117}\) While Garrison assured that he did not mind receiving the complaints, he objected to being blamed for “evils” that he claimed he was “almost totally powerless to remedy”.\(^{118}\)

He then reiterated the provisions of the garbage ordinance and the official responsibilities of the garbage collectors, and lamented the impunity with which they neglected their duties. Garrison stated of the garbage men, “The trouble is that these men know that the Health Officer has been made practically to understand that he must not interfere with them. The people who complain of the non-removal of garbage, as a rule, do not care to appear as witnesses in police court, and so the garbage contractor is assured against prosecution for violation of the law, hence he gathers only when, how and for whom his caprices dictate”.\(^{119}\) In explaining that the contractors were aware that he “had been made practically to understand” not to get in the way, Garrison hinted that this order had come from another source of authority—most likely the City Council or the Committee on Health. By professing his helplessness to regulate the behavior of the collectors on account of these orders, Garrison essentially implicated the rest of the Health Committee as the guilty party. Therefore, while the creation of a city public
health apparatus was specifically meant to facilitate the implementation of health policies in a more effective way, this quarrel illustrated how the internal politics of such local public health boards could interfere and actually hinder the effective execution of public health legislation.

Furthermore, Garrison pointed out that none of the citizens who made these complaints ever appeared as witnesses in police court, thereby rendering themselves complicit to the irresponsible actions of the garbage contractors. By implicating not only the rest of the Health Committee but the general public as well in the perpetuation of the faulty system, Garrison attempted to displace some of the blame that had been placed on his shoulders. As Garrison portrayed himself, he was actively fighting for the best interests of the community, but he was only one man, and could only do so much considering the multitude of forces against him.

The next day, the *Intelligencer* published a letter that Garrison wrote to the City Council once again urging for the construction of a new crematory. Although the Council had approved the resolution for a new crematory and had even selected a site for the new building, construction had yet to start. To bolster his argument and stress the urgency of the situation, Garrison presented a number of statistics that he had collected himself on the number of barrels of waste that had not been removed since the beginning of the year. While the Second Branch of the Council approved new appropriations for the construction of the crematory, the resolution did not pass in the First Branch, preventing its official adoption. In a short commentary the next day (July
11th) the *Intelligencer* bemoaned the failure of the First Branch to pass the measure and affirmed the public’s support for Health Officer Garrison’s call for immediate construction. The *Intelligencer* stated of Wheeling’s citizens, “The people are neither so ignorant nor so indifferent that they are willing to allow the present condition to continue through the summer”. While public health authorities saw themselves as an educated elite charged with protecting the uneducated masses, the *Intelligencer*’s assertion of the public’s awareness of the issues and the public health threat it posed as well as their opposition to the committee’s present system, challenged the assumed authority of this elite group.

The public’s support of Garrison and confrontation of the Council was again brought to the fore two weeks later when the *Intelligencer* published an article titled, “The City Health Officer to the City Council”. The article’s opening statements expressed the public’s frustration over the inaction of the council concerning the garbage problem due to internal politics:

> It is to be supposed that the City Council chose for City Health Officer a man in whom it had confidence and for whose views it had respect. If the Health Officer has forfeited that confidence and respect he should be replaced by another to whose urgent and intelligent appeals in behalf of the public welfare and in the strict line of his duty Council will give heed.

In this opening paragraph, the *Intelligencer* criticized the City Council for its failure to act on the recommendations of its own Health Officer, who had presumably been elected under the understanding that he was suitable for the job (although that assumption is clearly controversial given the hesitance with which some members of the
council voted for Garrison). The Council’s failure to move past its internal politics and disagreement with its own health officer in order to fix the pressing problem of the garbage system had become a topic of public knowledge, frustration, and criticism, as it ultimately affected the well-being of the whole community. As the article defended Garrison’s views and actions, the article effectively acted as a full-blown condemnation of the actions, or rather inactions, of the council.

The same day as the Intelligencer reprimanded the Council, yet another letter from Garrison to the Council was published. The letter, which was read to the Second Branch at the previous night’s meeting, reminded the Council that the excess dumping of refuse on the countryside was not only dangerous to public health, but could result in the County Board of Health’s revocation of the city’s right to do so. Furthermore, as Garrison explained that the dumping of city waste on the countryside’s farmland could contaminate the city’s food source, he urged that this practice was only hurting Wheeling’s citizens.

In response to these harsh public criticisms, Chairman Campbell took it upon himself to publicly defend the Health Committee at the City Council meeting two days later, which the Intelligencer covered in a lengthy article on July 26th. Although Garrison was present for the first half of the meeting, he excused himself before Campbell’s speech, saying he had a prior engagement at 8 PM. After exclaiming that he was “sorry that the Health Officer had left, as he had some things to say concerning his actions”, Campbell declared that he was sick of reading daily of the complaints received
by Garrison about the Health Committee in the local newspaper as well as the derisive commentary of the editorial columns.\textsuperscript{122} Campbell attacked these criticisms as vague, unjust and unfounded, and accused Dr. Garrison of unfairly turning public opinion against the rest of the committee. Campbell stated that rather than reporting directly to the Health Committee, Garrison chose to inform the newspapers of his information, making it impossible for the members of the committee to react effectively to the vague descriptions of complaints.

Campbell insisted that the committee had done the best that anyone could have in their position, and objected to an editorial that had been published earlier that week comparing Wheeling’s June death rate unfavorably with other cities. Campbell deemed it “one of the most unfair things toward the city of Wheeling that had been published” and pointed out that Wheeling had only been compared to cities with lower rather than higher death rates, making the city look bad.\textsuperscript{123} After all, Campbell asked, how long had it been since Wheeling had had an epidemic?

As a solution to the committee’s misunderstandings with Garrison, Campbell proposed two resolutions. The first would require the Health Officer to present a weekly tabulated statement to the Health Committee of the total number of complaints received with specifics like name and residence included. If such a report was furnished, Campbell stated, he would pledge to do his very best to alleviate the complaints. The other resolution called on Garrison to present the ritual statistics of Wheeling for the last eight years in order to show that Wheeling was not “such a deadly town” and to prove that the city’s new pavement had improved the mortality rate. In responding to the
opinion proffered by some that the current Committee should resign for failure to cooperate with the Health Officer, Campbell asked what more the Committee on Health could do—they had passed money for a new crematory and had selected a site. The fault lay with the Council for refusing to pass the necessary funds and ordinances.

The following day, both the *Intelligencer* and Garrison responded to Dr. Campbell’s long-winded defense. In an editorial, the *Intelligencer* called Campbell’s citation of mortality statistics completely irrelevant, and accused him of obscuring the real question at hand. The article asked, “What do Dr. Campbell’s statistics prove? And what does he aim to prove by them? He aims to show, he says, that ‘Wheeling is not such a deadly town to live in as some people would have us believe.’ It is desirable to educate the people in the line of sanitary progress. Wheeling should never be satisfied until her death rate is among the lowest.” 124 The article continued by saying that harping on the fact that some cities had higher death rates does nothing to improve Wheeling’s situation. The Health Committee needed to work proactively to educate the people and implement preventative measures rather than “persuading people that so long as there are cities less healthy, Wheeling is healthy enough.” 125

In Dr. Garrison’s letter to the editor published the same day, he assured that he had absolutely no intention of ignoring the Committee on Health. Rather, Garrison explained, he had started his term by reporting all complaints to the Committee, who simply grew tired of hearing them as the year continued and the grievances mounted. Furthermore, Garrison explained that when he had tried to enforce penalties against the garbage contractors for violating the ordinance, the Committee simply had the fines
revoked and so the contractors continued to act with impunity. Garrison maintained that the real problem with the ordinance was the system of contracting, which he had opposed from the very beginning. He had received 83 complaints from residents concerning the garbage system in March, and 464 in April, “all of which the chairman had knowledge from the reports submitted to the committee by me”.

As the Committee offered no constructive response, citizens largely stopped complaining and Garrison stopped tabulating reports. In response to Campbell’s accusations, however, Garrison proffered a long, albeit incomplete, list of complaints reported for the month of June complete with full addresses.

Garrison then pointed to the unreliable and misleading nature of the statistics Campbell referenced. For example, while Campbell had mentioned Pasadena as a city with a healthy environment but an appalling death rate, he had failed to take into account the number of sick people who flock to Pasadena as a health resort but inevitably die, thereby inflating the death rate of the town. As for Campbell’s desire to show that Wheeling’s relatively new pavement had lessened the city’s mortality rate, Garrison quipped, “It is only the people who live along the line of improved streets who get the benefit. But what shall we say of the thousands of dwellers upon back streets and alleys, where the garbage runs riot, is allowed to accumulate, rotting and saturating the soil, and poisoning the atmosphere with the dreadful effluvia that arise from it”.

Rather than singing the praises of incomplete victories, Dr. Garrison argued that the whole of the committee’s attention should be focused on improving sanitary conditions.
Garrison then continued by giving Dr. Campbell a public schooling in the teachings of germ theory. Garrison wrote:

Perhaps the INTELLIGENCER did not quote the Doctor correctly in the statement: ‘He asked how long it had been since there had been anything like an epidemic of diphtheria, scarlet fever or any other disease, that has its origin in the unwholesome sanitary condition of the community.’ If correctly, I beg to remind the Doctor that modern science teaches that diseases breed after their kind, and that diphtheria and scarlet fever do not arise from filth, but depend upon a specific germ for their origin, while they are simply made more malignant by unsanitary surroundings. It has been the good fortune of this city to escape visitation of the diseases named for several years. But let the disease once be planted in certain localities in this city and it will sweep all before it like a conflagration.  

By correcting Campbell on his understanding of science, Garrison argued that the Committee had been operating under false, antiquated information. Diseases did not simply just arise from filth as Campbell suggested, but were caused by a specific germ that could easily arrive in Wheeling at any minute and potentially decimate the population. Remarking on the absence of a recent epidemic would only lull the public into a false sense of security that would do more harm than good. In fact, as he retorted to Campbell’s calm and confident question concerning epidemics, Garrison stated that one death from diphtheria had been reported in the vicinity of Wheeling that very day. This fact shed some doubt on Campbell’s confident statements, and cast an ominous tone on the whole proceedings.

Furthermore, Garrison’s correction of Campbell’s scientific knowledge illustrated the importance that education had attained in the professional medical community. The battle that Garrison initiated had clear implications—whoever knew more about germ theory and modern science was the more qualified physician, showing
the professional power that could be derived from modern scientific knowledge in the late 1880s.

This argument between Campbell and Garrison was not only one fueled by personal annoyance or enmity, but by different approaches in how to respond to a situation as a public health authority. While Campbell balked at the nature of what he saw as Garrison’s alarmist stance, Garrison focused not on what Wheeling had done right, but what Wheeling could do better. From the city’s mortality statistics to the benefits of the new pavement, Campbell sought to show Wheeling in a positive light, which Garrison warned was not only unproductive but actually harmful to the improvement of public health. Instead of proving how their measures had improved things thereby self-glorifying themselves as doctors and public officials, the Health Officer was wholly focused on further improvements. While other doctors saw him as an alarmist, therefore, Garrison saw himself as a realist.

These different approaches to being a public health servant caused natural friction. While on one hand Campbell and the Committee felt personally attacked by Garrison’s denunciation of the garbage system and the city death rate, Garrison felt helpless and unsupported by an apathetic, passive council on the other. Garrison’s frustration with the lethargic Health Committee was evident among the concluding paragraphs of his letter. After lamenting the failure of the city to implement preventative medicine in past instances, Garrison wrote, “Every man, therefore, who stands in the relation to the public health should feel his awful responsibility, and strive to perform honestly and conscientiously the duties of his office, lest the blood of
innocents be upon his hands‖. This loaded language essentially implicating public health officials who neglected their duties as murderers was clearly meant as a wake-up call to the members of the Health Committee. It was easy to see how this would backfire on Garrison, however, considering the insulting and offensive tone that this statement would undoubtedly have coming from a colleague.

Following Garrison’s portentous account of the reported death from diphtheria, an article appeared in the Intelligencer on August 1st titled “Inviting an Epidemic”. The article reported that the Board of County Commissioners had met and prohibited the practice of hauling garbage from Wheeling to the countryside on account of the sickness and two deaths that the accumulated refuse had caused in the area slightly north of the city. The Intelligencer warned that without this outlet for Wheeling’s trash and the speedy erection of a new crematory, the city’s garbage would likely accumulate within city limits “spreading pestilence and death among the citizens of Wheeling instead of among those in the country”.130

Meanwhile, Campbell and Garrison continued to call each other names. At a “model” meeting, while the rest of the Committee members observed with disgust, “Dr. Campbell called Dr. Garrison pet names and catechized him in a way meant to be severe, and Dr. Garrison impeached Dr. Campbell’s veracity” for the better part of an hour.131 In response to the first resolution that Campbell had proposed suggesting that the Health Officer draw up a weekly table of complaints, Garrison prepared a massive report of specific complaints including over 1,400 residences where the garbage service was reported to be atrocious. Not only did the Health Committee refuse to receive
Garrison’s report, they refused to pay the stenographer the $7 she was owed for typing it up. At the next City Council meeting, city officials denounced the Health Committee while backing up Garrison “in the course he has been pursuing, which has been the cause of several interesting conflicts between him and the committee”. A letter from Mayor Seabright was read endorsing the construction of a new crematory, Campbell’s dual resolutions concerning Garrison were dropped, and the Council ordered the stenographer to be paid. As the article described, “The Health Committee got the worst of it all through the performance, while Dr. Garrison came off without a scratch and with flying colors”.133

In referring to the communication from Garrison as a “performance”, the *Intelligencer* endowed the Health Officer with a certain theatrical quality that began to characterize the dealings of the Health Committee. By this time, the meetings of the Health Committee were nothing if not entertaining. In an August 15th article titled “Another Exhibition”, the *Intelligencer* recounted, “The Council Committee on Health gave another one of their rich, rare entertainments last evening. The audience was a small but appreciative one, being limited to two newspaper reporters, but they had fun enough for a hundred”.134 The whole meeting consisted of a heated argument between Garrison and the rest of the Committee over the particulars of privy vault regulations. As the *Intelligencer* described, their debate, “varied as it usually is with Shakespearian quotations from one member, pointed and startling explosions from another, and semi-occasional wanderings from the subject matter from still another member, is quite interesting”.135 The fact that the Health Committee was likened to a comedic play in the
press at a time when there was talk of an impending epidemic was at once laughable and horrifying. While the Health Committee was supposed to be the competent authority on which the citizens could depend in times of need, the perpetuation of personal hostility and pettiness had turned it into the laughing stock of the town. For all their dignified and elite talk, Garrison’s Health Committee had proved themselves to be entirely ineffectual.

The outlandish way in which the Health Committee conducted itself became still more troubling as the city’s trash continued to amass and the death rate from diphtheria started to rise. An October 11th article titled “Pestilential Filth” began, “The diphtheria scourge in North Wheeling is slowly but surely assuming the proportion of an epidemic, and that there is good and sufficient cause for alarm, no one who is conversant with the facts can deny”. The article reported that there were at present 20 cases of diphtheria and that seven deaths had occurred since the disease first emerged. The Intelligencer explained that the filthy state of the First ward as well as the intermingling of children in school were the prime contributors to the spread of the disease. The article explained, “According to the best medical theories, diphtheria germs, when brought into contact with the human system in connection with the gases given off by putrifying filth, become very much more virulent, and are more likely to take a firm hold and prove fatal”. In accordance with this theory, the article confirmed that diphtheria had originated and spread in the foulest parts of the city, namely the First ward located in North Wheeling.
Garrison and an *Intelligencer* reporter toured the northern section of the city to witness the filth for themselves. The article described the repugnant state of the First Ward, “All along Coal street the same conditions exist. The vaults are nearly all filled to a level with the ground, and in many places the earth is banked up to prevent the contents from running off in a liquid state. The earth seems saturated with filth, and the odor given off by the vaults and their contents is horrible”. The article continued to describe another residence at which “a stream of filth, which should be sewage, is allowed to run in a paved gutter to the street. This gutter carried not only the ordinary waste water from the house but the liquid filth which oozes through the earth from a high ground vault”. At yet another residence, Garrison witnessed a system where “the household waste from three tenements flows through a wooden sewer and paved gutter under a kitchen to an improperly constructed sink, where all the solid particles of filth gather, turn green, then black, and finally, when rotten enough to lose their solid texture, pass through the perforated sink bottom to the sewer”. These descriptions of the utter filth in the First Ward featuring human waste seeping from the ground provided an image of what life materially resembled in the streets of Wheeling as well as concrete examples of the obscenely unsanitary situation the Health Committee was up against.

In addition to horrifying descriptions of North Wheeling, a schoolteacher reported that children with visible diphtheria symptoms had been attending school. Garrison asserted that Washington School should be closed immediately until all signs of the disease had passed, and advised parents from letting their children come mingle with
others on the street. The article also called attention to Section 7 of an ordinance titled “Health Officer, and Registration of Deaths and Burials” which stated that it was the duty of every physician to report every case of a contagious disease that he or she was aware of. Failure to do so within 12 hours would result in a fee from $1 to $30 for every offense. Considering that another city ordinance identified diphtheria as one of the “formidable contagious diseases”, the article stated that the regulations stipulated under Section 7 seem to have been “entirely disregarded under the medical fraternity”. 141

Since Wheeling’s medical community had failed to uphold such ordinances, the *Intelligencer* argued:

The present emergency again calls attention to the necessity of establishing a city sanitary department, which shall have immediate and full control of all matters pertaining to the public health; a board of three persons outside of Council, established on a plan similar to the existing boards controlling other less important interests of the city. The people are demanding some better system in the matter of removing filth and protecting the public health. 142

As the Committee on Health and the City Council had failed to implement the necessary sanitary measures to adequately protect the city from an epidemic, the *Intelligencer* called for an entirely new sanitary department that would be able to act independently of the City Council. The Health Department had failed Wheeling—the city’s citizens tired of the council and Health Committee’s constant internal disagreements that came at the expense of any sort of productive action for the public’s benefit. The article closed by imploring the public to take diphtheria seriously, and provided a detailed description of how the disease was communicated as well as instructions for recovering victims not to attend church, school, or public gathering until cleared by a physician.
In response to the cases of diphtheria and the outrage of the *Intelligencer*, the Committee on Health stopped arguing and agreed in a rare collaboration between Garrison and Campbell to close Washington School in the First Ward until the Committee judged it safe to reopen. Garrison then stated that Section 7 of the ordinance pertaining to the registration of deaths and burials was a “dead letter” and questioned whether the city’s physicians were even aware of its existence. Another member of the Committee countered that it was the Health Officer’s duty to enforce the ordinance, which Garrison denied on account that the ordinance did not say so, and furthermore, that it would be an injustice to the city’s doctors to enforce such a dead law. The Committee agreed to publicize the section of the ordinance in question and resolved to begin its enforcement. While the members of the Health Committee thus continued to play the blame game, it was reported that the crematory was broken, and would be out of commission until the next Thursday.¹⁴³

Upon taking a tour of Washington School, Dr. Garrison prepared a comprehensive table documenting all of cases and deaths of diphtheria that had been reported thus far. According to Garrison’s collected statistics, there had so far been more deaths in the First Ward than there were in the whole city in 1888. He advised that the school be closed for two weeks, and the rooms “be subjected to strong sulphur vapors for several hours, and then currents of fresh air for several days”.¹⁴⁴ In accordance with the recommendation of the Health Committee, Washington School was closed indefinitely (excepting the graduating class) after much debate and opposition from some members of the Wheeling School Board.¹⁴⁵ This incident shows the
ascendancy that public health issues had reached by the end of the 1880s. The threat of an epidemic succeeded in trumping all other concerns, including the immediate education of Wheeling’s children.

While the city’s collective anxiety mounted from the rising diphtheria death toll, the saga of Garrison and the crematory dragged on. At a November meeting, the City Council received a petition from the night soil men protesting their mistreatment by Health Officer Garrison. The Council appointed a committee of five men to investigate the charges. While many aspects of the crematory and garbage ordinance had proven to be counter-productive and a source of constant contention among the city officials and citizens, Garrison delivered a speech at the Ohio State Sanitary Convention titled “Garbage and Night Soil Crematories from a Practical and Financial Standpoint”. Although one might expect his speech to be littered with the complaints and bickering that Wheeling’s own furnace had spawned, Garrison had nothing but praise for garbage crematories. Garrison explained:

Until within a few years it was thought sufficient for the disposal of city waste, to discharge it into the water courses; and that system has been practiced so long and universally that our rivers are little less than vast sewers for conveying to the sea all offal of whatever character, from the cities and towns that line their shores. From these filth burdened sources must a supply of water for domestic purposes be drawn.

While chemical treatment, irrigation, and usage as manure in the countryside had all been tried as alternatives to dumping waste in running water, they had all been proven to be ineffective and impractical. To relieve the nation’s rivers and streams from the pollution of the approximate 1,090 pounds of night soil each person produced in a year
on average, Garrison argued for the widespread usage of crematories in big cities
throughout the country. In supporting his argument, Garrison used Wheeling’s
crematory as an example, recounting its history from its erection in response to
complaints from the citizens of Bellaire (a neighboring town down the river) protesting
the disposal of waste into the river, to describing the mechanics of the crematory’s
operation and the materials it burned. Over the two years that the crematory had stood
trial, Garrison declared that it had shown that the furnace could consume 1,784 barrels
of night soil (each barrel equaled 40 gallons, six barrels equaled a ton), 384 loads of
garbage, and 13 horses, and 41 dogs in a month.

Furthermore, Garrison argued, the crematory had proven to be cost effective—
while the cost of removing the contents of “cess pools” had been $1 per barrel of 40
gallons before the crematory, it was now only 75 cents. Although the Garrison stated
that there “is as yet no apparent saving from a ‘dollars and cents’ view in the cost of
removing garbage”, he projected that if 12,000 barrels of night soil were removed
yearly for ten years, a city would save $12,520 with the use of a crematory.

While the facts he presented painted an especially rosy picture of Wheeling’s
crematory, Garrison failed to mention that the structure had nearly been destroyed by
heavy winds, and that its management had been nothing short of a nightmare. Indeed,
Garrison had been accused of maltreatment by Wheeling’s garbage men mere days
before he delivered his speech. Furthermore, Wheeling’s cardinal mistake in placing the
crematory atop a virtually unreachable location as well as the flaws in the garbage
contracting system had greatly hindered the furnace’s usage. While Garrison sang the
praises of crematories, his own city’s example had shown mixed results—building a crematory was a flawless plan in theory, but its implementation wrought with city politics and cumbersome fees and details impaired its functionality in practice.

In addition to the complaints lodged against Garrison by the night soil haulers, Drs. Baird and Wilson presented a memo protesting the enforcement of the ordinance requiring physicians to report all contagious diseases at a November 26th Council meeting. Garrison read a paper defending his actions on the matter, and the Council considered a resolution to subject the health laws of the city to a complete revision. As the *Intelligencer* groused in conclusion, “When doctors disagree, there’s a picnic all around”.

In response to complaints against him by the garbage men, Garrison issued yet another array of statistics pertaining to the garbage service. In his compilation of figures, Garrison found that the garbage service had improved from 1888 to 1889 (while 1,448 garbage loads were hauled in 1888, 1,944 loads were hauled in 1889), and that there were many unjust inequalities regarding the individual contracts of the garbage men. For example, although the contractor for the First District had the shortest distance to haul, he received the third highest fee per load on average of the five districts. Furthermore, while the contractors for the first and fifth districts were brothers and used but one horse and cart to clear both districts on alternate days, they received the third highest and highest fee per load on average of all the districts. Garrison argued for the immediate reorganization of this patently inefficient and counter-intuitive system.
While further debates produced only a rehash of the issues with the crematory, the last Council meeting of the year generated concrete regulations pertaining to the prevention of contagious disease. In three sections, Wheeling’s Board of Education passed provisions to limit the danger of epidemics spreading through the schools. Section One mandated that children exhibiting symptoms of diphtheria would not be permitted to attend school until a certificate was signed by a physician and a permit issued by the school Superintendent, and Section Two stated that upon receiving word of the existence of a contagious disease in any family in the school district, the Superintendent would inform the Principal, who would make sure to ban all children of the afflicted family from attending school. Section Three provided that any child who had not been vaccinated would not be allowed to attend “any public school of this district”. This response was not only meant to curb the spread of the current outbreak of diphtheria, but was intended to prevent contagious diseases from spreading in the future. The enactment of permanent preventative legislation such as this rather than temporary fixes as a response to disease started to characterize the late 1880s, and distinguished it from the beginning of the decade.

In addition to diphtheria, Wheeling’s citizens also suffered from an outbreak of influenza in December 1889 as part of a worldwide epidemic of “La Grippe”. Although the number of diphtheria cases gradually declined and the outbreak trailed off before it had reached the status of a full blown epidemic, the ordeal had served as a grave warning. The heaps of garbage that had amassed in the city on account of the Health Committee and City Council’s failure to adequately deal with the crematory had
facilitated the spread of diphtheria. The two years that city officials spent trying to deal (ineffectively) with garbage laws had finally taken their toll—the city had nearly suffered a full-blown epidemic. The fact that the School Board passed resolutions calling for permanent legislation barring children who displayed signs of a contagious disease from school showed the growing precedence that public health had over other, potentially conflicting interests, and illustrated the preventative policy that had come to the fore.

January 1890 kicked off with the Health Officer’s annual report. True to his realist attitude towards public health, Garrison’s described that report as showing “what was done and what was left undone” in 1889. In alignment with Section 12 of the city ordinance which stated that the Health Officer must publish a report compiling statistics from the previous year in each daily newspaper in the first week of January, Garrison prepared a statement that dwarfed the annual reports of years past in length and detail. Garrison reported that the city’s mortality rate for the year of 1889 was 16.2 per 1,000 people, which was very low considering the unsanitary condition of the city. Upon analyzing the death rates of the city’s different wards throughout the 1880s, Garrison found that the death rate of the 8th Ward was consistently considerably higher than any other ward. To remedy the overabundance of stagnant pools of water present, Garrison called for the establishment of a grade from the hill to the river to ensure proper drainage as well as paved streets in the 8th Ward. Garrison saw the inequity in mortality rates as a complete injustice—all citizens were entitled to equal access to a healthy environment.
In the next section of the report, Garrison lamented the inability of the public and city officials to see the merit of funding preventative measures. Garrison stated:

The practical business man gives freely when called upon when he can see that it averts danger, or relieves suffering. But the sturdy citizen whose robust health places him above danger from epidemic disease will talk largely about the cost of sanitary measures (if he be in Council) and question the necessity for him to give of the funds of which he is the custodian, to prevent disease, while he may contribute freely from his own purse to those already suffering from misfortune or disease. This is not because he does not want to do right but because he does not know how. The only way to induce a change of base in such a person is to show him that the money profit to the community in saving life and health is as great as is the successful venture in business…

Garrison made a worthy point—spending money to prevent potential danger rather than to alleviate a problem could seem counter-productive. In this speech, however, Garrison’s superiority complex shone through loud and clear—while he was educated enough to understand the benefit of funding sanitary measures, his ignorant peers and fellow citizens were not quite sophisticated enough to comprehend its advantage. In Garrison’s eyes it was lucky that he was there to educate them, and, for all intents and purposes, tell them what to do. Conversely, it would be easy to see how this diatribe would have appeared incredibly condescending to Garrison’s colleagues in the medical profession as well as city officials.

In an effort to prove the tangible profit that would come from investing in preventative public health measures, Garrison explained that the death of an individual represented a loss of income to the community. He went farther in arguing that the value of a human life was roughly equal to $1,000 and, therefore, that the death of a person could be translated directly into a concrete monetary loss to the whole
community. For example, while reducing the mortality rate of a city by 1/1000 would seem insignificant, if a town of 35,000 people saved 35 lives it would be saving $35,000 in the process. By appealing to the practical financial benefits and the drive for commercial prosperity rather than sentimentality, Garrison hoped to convince lawmakers and the public alike to invest in healthcare.

As for the city’s general nuisances to the public health, Garrison argued for the reduction in cost of cleaning privy vaults and the enforcement of the garbage ordinance. In relation to garbage men shirking their duties, Garrison suggested that either the Board of Public Works or the Health Officer should have full control of the men appointed to remove garbage. While 537 more loads of garbage had been removed in 1889 than in the same period of 1888, the system was still far from perfect. In a review of the city’s general sanitary state, Garrison stated, “I believe there is not a single city the size of Wheeling that pays so little attention to things pertaining to public health”. After a brief description of the cess-pools, sewage, rotten garbage, and animal guts that plagued the city, Garrison stated that he was “hopeful, with better understanding of affairs in this department, the results of next year’s labor will be far more satisfactory”.

Although Garrison seemed genuine in his fight to improve public health, his tendency to criticize along with his conceited manner made for an especially abrasive combination. In another episode of the Health Officer’s unpredictable nature, at the first Health Committee meeting of the year, a citizen named Dan Ritchie lodged a formal complaint against Garrison accusing him of refusing to grant Ritchie a permit to clean a
vault for no apparent reason. While this incident seemed petty and insignificant, the mounting of such grievances against the Health Officer throughout the year greatly added to the already present hostility.

In February of 1890 a new dilemma arose that pitted the interests of business and public health against each other. On February 5th, the members of the Health Committee convened to make a personal investigation into two causes of public complaint in East Wheeling: the hide house of the Wheeling Butchers’ Association and Samuel Elder’s Soap Manufactory. Residents of the neighborhood had been complaining of terrible smells emanating from the two buildings, and had called for their inspection. The task of determining whether or not these two establishments constituted a nuisance to the public health, of course, fell to the Committee on Health.¹⁵⁵

To kick off the investigation, at its next meeting the Committee on Health summoned witnesses from the East Wheeling neighborhood to present personal testimony against the Butchers’ Association and Mr. Elder. The Intelligencer printed ten of these brief testimonials in its coverage of the meeting, six of which were from women, and all of which described the effects of the rank odors emitted by the buildings. A woman named Mrs. Cline professed, “I cannot have doors or windows open when they are rendering. I live eight doors away. Elder’s soap factory is an annoyance”.¹⁵⁶ A Mrs. Sheffler recounted, “Live below the hide house and it smells very bad. The smell is terrible. Soap factory is bad but no worse than the hide house. Just lately since the tallow rendering commenced it smells bad”.¹⁵⁷ From a Mr. Smith,
“Pass it every day and smells like cooking a dead hog. I work in glass house, and smell it whenever I am at home.”\textsuperscript{158} After complaints from citizens were heard, President Hoffman of the Butchers’ Association explained the machinery used in the building to the Health Committee. Although it was clear that the buildings smelled rank, did they really represent a threat to the public health? At the end of the hearings, the Committee voted to recommend to the Council the refusal of the Butchers’ Association petition to render tallow at the hide house in question.

This matter was not free from debate, however. At the next City Council meeting, along with the majority report recommending the denial of the Butchers’ Association’s petition, a minority report signed by three members of the Health Committee was presented recommending that the petition be granted. The backers of the minority report argued that “the hide house and tallow rendering factory is no more a nuisance than Elder’s soap factory and other similarly unsavory places, which operate in the city, and that it would be a hardship to the Butchers’ Association to close their place and at the same time allow other bad smelling places exist”\textsuperscript{159} Mr. Arkle, one of the authors of the minority report, said that he had lived in Wheeling for almost 50 years, and couldn’t remember a time when the smell of tallow rendering was absent from the city. The\textit{Intelligencer} reported of Mr. Arkle, “He then eulogized the butchers as hard-working, frugal men who have invested their money in tax-paying property instead of sending it away for investment”\textsuperscript{160} The authors of the minority report maintained that the hide house did not constitute any more of a nuisance than many other city institutions—until all such establishments were subject to the same rules, it
was unfair to shut down the hide house. Furthermore, the butchers were bringing industry and commercial prosperity to Wheeling.

On the other side of this argument, backers of the majority report retorted that the hide house was in violation of the law (although they did not specify how). In response to the arguments of the minority report, Garrison stated that he agreed—while the hide house was undoubtedly a nuisance and should be removed, so should other offensive institutions. Among those he suggested for removal, Garrison listed four other hide houses and soap factories including Mr. Elder’s. As a compromise, the Council agreed to refer the matter of these buildings to the Committee on Health for further investigation to be reported on in the first Council meeting in April.

In mid-February, amidst the squabble over the “stink houses”, the crematory was toured by Mr. Christian and Mr. Grimes of the Health Committee of Richmond. In order to determine the relative merit of erecting a crematory in their own city, the two men visited Wheeling in order to examine the Health Department’s statistics concerning the amount of substances removed and burned and gain some insight into how the furnace functioned. Christian and Grimes explained that the citizens of Richmond had been hauling their refuse to the country to be used as fertilizer, but the resulting sickness and death from the excess of waste had prompted complaints and law suits from farmers. After examining Wheeling’s crematory, the two men stated that they would ardently recommend its adoption to the Richmond City Council.161
The tale of Richmond’s garbage problems bore a strong resemblance to those of Wheeling. While Wheeling had originally built the crematory in 1886 as a solution to river pollution and complaints from the people of Bellaire, the latter part of 1889 saw events almost identical to those that occurred in Richmond—Wheeling’s refuse was hauled to the country where it caused an outbreak of diphtheria, causing the practice to be banned. These near identical stories from the two cities demonstrate that the problem of garbage disposal was not in any way unique to Wheeling. Rather, the city’s early erection of a crematory worthy of replication by other cities (at least in structure if not in management) rendered it a pioneer in the arena of trash disposal.

Although the ailments of the crematory and the Health Committee’s comedy routine had nearly disappeared from the news for the first two months of 1890, they returned in full force for the spring season. At a March meeting of the Health Committee, crematory Superintendent Henry Serig reported that only 153 barrels of night soil had been burned since the beginning of the year compared to the 1,000 barrels that it was estimated could be burned in the same amount of time. The culprits, once again, were the impassable crematory road and the garbage men. While the former had been all but abandoned by the Council and the Health Committee as a topic of discussion, the latter still represented one of the cardinal points of contention between Health Officer Garrison and the rest of the Committee. An editorial published in the Intelligencer on March 27th stated of the situation:

The contractors seemed to understand that the terms of the contract required them to draw their pay regularly and cart away a little garbage when they had nothing else to do. Where efforts have been made by the Health Officer to
compel them to do their duty they have been able to laugh at him or to swear at
him according to their humor, knowing that no regulations would be enforced
against them. Why this has been so is one of the remarkable things for which no
reasonable explanation can be found. Politics has something to do with it, but
the people will not accept this instead of the removal of disease-breeding
offal.\textsuperscript{163}

The \textit{Intelligencer} clearly sided with the Health Officer’s attempt to reign in the garbage
men—while politics were inevitable in the dealings of city committees, the welfare of
the community should transcend petty annoyances and personal dislikes. Furthermore,
this description of the public ridicule that Garrison was subjected to with complete
impunity by men who were theoretically under his control shed some light on the
everyday interactions of people involved in public health. Whether a garbage man, a
permit holder to clean a privy vault, or the city Health Officer, these public health
positions and the interactions between them all involved the distribution of power,
authority, and control. Rather than obey the Health Officer, the Health Committee had
ensured that the garbage men could literally laugh in Garrison’s face with no threat of
retribution. While some of the garbage men had lodged complaints against Garrison for
mistreatment, therefore, it was evident that they were not necessarily mere innocent
victims of his abuses.

The mutual frustration evident between Garrison and the rest of the Health
Committee continued to grow over minor annoyances during their next few meetings in
the month of April. In an article titled “Lively Session, As Usual—The Health
Committee Can Always Be Depended On for Fun”, the \textit{Intelligencer} reported on yet
another entertaining assembly in which Garrison’s actions caused a stir. While the
Health Committee had received a bill from a newspaper for publishing the Health
Office’s annual report that was ten times more expensive than past bills for the same service, Garrison’s real offense involved a bill of only two dollars. The article recounted:

But the thing that paralyzed the committee as a whole and left the members gasping was a bill of $2 sent in by Dr. Garrison for a year’s subscription to *The Annals of Hygiene* for his office. Some of the members waxed profane over this and the sarcasm was a foot thick all over the room. Dr. Campbell thumped the table and grew eloquent as he discoursed of brass and nerve. The bill was dropped with a dull thud.¹⁶⁴

While Garrison lamented the failure of the strapped-for-cash Health Committee to invest in preventative sanitation legislation, he somehow found the nerve to charge the committee for a personal journal subscription.

The frustration that Garrison’s self-entitled, condescending attitude incited was palpable, and was again exhibited at a committee meeting held on April 18th. The *Intelligencer*’s coverage of the especially preposterous meeting in an article titled “Health Committee Séance” narrated:

Health Officer Garrison was not present, but some night soil haulers were introduced to occupy the time usually allotted to that official, and the show went on uninterrupted. The programme consisted of “Imitation of Sleep,” by Mr. Pollock, “Puns,” by Mr. Farrell, “Silence,” by Mr. Zarnitz, “Harangue,” by Solicitor White, “Tabled Resolutions,” by Mr. Hadlich, and “Earnest Effort,” by Chairman Campbell. The night soil haulers were allowed to open the performance. They told that Ike Smith has an order to clean a vault at a house which has no number, but which is designated as ‘corner Baltimore and Twelfth streets,’ and that Dr. Garrison refuses to grant a permit because the ordinance says the application must give ‘street and number.’ Ike Smith don’t care particularly about the matter, except that he fears the vault may overflow before Council provides a number for the house.¹⁶⁵
This particular incident illustrated Garrison’s stubbornness in upholding rules regulating sanitation, even when such rules made no sense in a given situation. While Garrison was a stickler for rules and ordinances, his refusal to be flexible in such a trifling matter was counter-productive, and actually hampered sanitation efforts in this case. Another night soil hauler told the Health Committee that Garrison “made him stay up in the morning after a hard night’s work, to get his next day’s permits, and that he is not allowed to walk on the velvet carpet of the Doctor’s office, but is forced to stand out in the rain until his permits are prepared” 166. The image of Garrison guarding his velvet carpet against a night hauler who had been working all night was condescending and almost cruel. Although Garrison was not at the meeting, Mr. Arkle suggested that Garrison attend all meetings, saying, “If we are to have a fight let’s have it and be done,” to which Mr. Farrell agreed, “I don’t mind a fight, but I dislike a series of them” 167.

At its next meeting, the Health Committee recommended an amendment to the ordinance concerning the Health Officer that would require Garrison or another person appointed by the Committee to be present in his office to receive and record complaints, issue permits to remove night soil and clean out privies from the hours of 4-5 PM. As Arkle, Farrell, and Campbell were completing the amendment, an Intelligencer reporter watching the spectacle related, “About this time Dr. Campbell noticed signs of restiveness on the part of some gentlemen, and to prevent any escapes he got up and locked the door. When a little later Mr. Farrell got off—‘O wad some power the giftie
gie us, To see oursels as ithers see us’—a reporter volunteered the information that the newspapers had been trying to do this for six months’.”  

As the meeting progressed, the Committee members repeated their arguments over whether the Butchers’ Association hide house, Elder’s soap house, and the other buildings in question were really nuisances, and called a vote to decide whether the City Sergeant should enforce all ordinances against nuisances. The *Intelligencer* provided the transcript of the proceedings of the vote:

Mr. Miller—‗I call the ayes and noes on it. There’s too much room for trouble. If a man has a petty spite against another...’  
Mr. Farrell—‘I’ll assist you.’  
Mr. Pollock—‘I’m with you.’  
The Chairman—‘Call the roll.’  
Mr. Farrell—‘Onery, twoery, ickery, ann—there’s only a few of us left.’  

After proceeding to bet stogies on Mr. Arkle’s ability to get 200 signatures on a petition to “hang Rev. Brother McClure”, the remaining committee members deliberated on yet another variation of a resolution on the matter of nuisances. The *Intelligencer* recounted: “Chairman Campbell—‘write me down.’ Mr. Pollock—‘An ass?’ The Chairman—‘We’ve got seven of ‘em here.’ The committee then adopted a motion by Mr. Pollock, to ‘go home.’” Before dispersing, Mr. Farrell lashed out at the reporters present for “making the committee ridiculous”, and threatened to resort to closed door sessions.

Although some of the dialogue recorded in the article was surely the *Intelligencer’s* invention, this full-blown public mockery showed the extent to which the Health Committee had lost all respect. While the committee met regularly and held
sessions that lasted for hours, they consistently failed to accomplish anything substantial. By endowing the committee with its own especially animated discourse, the *Intelligencer* effectively argued that the members might as well be betting stogies on bogus petitions and voting on pointless resolutions for all they had to show for their meetings. Any task, no matter how simple (like “going home”), necessitated a formal motion, usually followed by endless debates.

By this time, even the members of the Health Committee were beginning to tire of their own bickering. Absences from meetings combined with constant disagreements and referral of decisions and ordinances by the Council back to the Health Committee made for incredibly protracted decision-making and arguments that dragged on for months and then years. To add to the Council’s frustration over Garrison’s abrasive eccentricities, the Health Officer had issued a yet another gloom and doom quarterly mortality report proclaiming Wheeling’s terrible death rate, polluted water supply, and generally bad sanitary condition. In his April 5th report, Garrison included statistics comparing the annual mortality rates of cities all over the world. Of the 53 international cities that Garrison listed, only eight had a higher annual death rate than Wheeling’s 31/1000 mortality rate for the quarter ending at the close of March.  

Meanwhile, the dispute over the city nuisances raged on. During another debate over the “stink factories” at an April 28th meeting, the Committee received more testimony from citizens concerning the rank odors produced by the hide house and soap factories. While residents described “a hundred thousand” green flies flocking to their houses during the hours of soap boiling, Mr. Elder retorted that the real cause of this
was the unsanitary condition of their own houses. Both contingents presented signed petitions supporting their side, and Garrison again identified all the buildings in question as nuisances, and called for their immediate removal. As an aside, testimony was also heard at the meeting from privy vault cleaner George Ritchie, whom Garrison had arrested after Ritchie had accidently burst the door of a vault causing refuse to pour over the ground. Although Ritchie claimed that he had done his best to clean it up, he had been fined in Police Court and his license had been forfeited. Ritchie appealed the case and it was referred to a higher court.\textsuperscript{172}

In July, the State Board of Health held their annual meeting at Charleston, West Virginia. In their proceedings, it was reported that 57 people had been admitted to the practice in the state during the year. Of the 57, nine had been admitted upon examination by the State Board, and 48 had been admitted with diplomas from medical colleges. In the same vein of regulating the education and quality of the profession, the members of West Virginia’s State Board of Health adopted the following resolutions, at the request of the Illinois State Board of Health:

\begin{quote}
Whereas, the growing importance of the careful preparation of medical students for entering upon the responsible positions of physicians and surgeons, and as a means of protecting the citizens of West Virginia against the ignorant practice of quacks and to encourage and fasten the laudable efforts of reputable medical schools and colleges to raise the standard of medical education, therefore, \\
\textit{Resolved}, That this board earnestly recommends that all medical schools and colleges require attendance upon three full courses of lectures, besides satisfactory evidence of preparatory education, attested by diploma or certificate from a reputable medical college, academy or high school, and a certificate from a regular physician as to a full course of professional study, as requisites for graduation.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}
While the year of 1887 had seen the enactment of the Harris Health laws complete with a doctors’ registry, this 1890 resolution showed the gradual building of concrete legislation favoring established regular physicians and elevating their status.

Furthermore, it is worthy to note that according to these new standards Garrison, who completed not three courses of lectures but one, would not even qualify as a graduate of a medical college in the eyes of the very institution of which he was a member. While his colleagues had protested Garrison’s appointment to the State Board of Health in the summer of 1887 on the grounds that he had completed only one course of lectures rather than two, it seemed ironic that Garrison was now helping to pass legislation that would have excluded another with his same level of education from the profession (let alone the State Board of Health). While the State Board of Health proclaimed that the purpose of the law was the altruistic protection the people of West Virginia from harmful quacks, it had the handy side effect of boosting the power and prestige of the physicians who drafted it.

In addition to passing the resolution regulating education, the members of the State Board of Health turned their attention specifically to Wheeling’s water supply, resolving:

WHEREAS, It is well known that the point of in-take for the waterworks of the City of Wheeling is below the outlet of many sewers; and, WHEREAS, This is believed to be a prolific source of disease and death to the inhabitants of the city; therefore be it Resolved, That, in the interest of the lives and health of the people of the city, the in-take for the said waterworks should be removed to a point above all immediate sources of sewerage contamination, and that the State Board of West Virginia urge upon the municipal authorities of Wheeling to immediately take the necessary steps to secure the above important change.
Although the city’s water supply had been a topic of concern for years and this very solution suggested multiple times, the location of the waterworks had not changed. When the local public health authorities proved themselves ineffective, therefore, the higher power of the State Board of Health could step in and urge a local Health Committee to action. Considering his actions in previous years, it was not unlikely that Garrison had something to do with this particular resolution.

This supposition is corroborated by Garrison’s interactions with the County Board of Health later in July. At a July 29th meeting of the county board, after requesting a hearing by the Board, Garrison addressed the members with a characteristically long winded speech describing Wheeling’s unsanitary condition in great detail. Garrison began, “Never before in the history of this city has there been greater need for activity upon the part of all those who are charged with the conservation of the life and the health of her people than now”. Garrison continued by citing the horrific accumulation of garbage, drainage from the city of Fulton of animal carcasses, stagnant pools of water, overflowing privies, and a terribly polluted water supply. Garrison stated that this deadly combination of disease breeding factors was not new to the city of Wheeling, and had been promoting the spread of typhoid fever in Wheeling for many years—from January 1873 to December 31, 1889, the city had suffered an average of 37 deaths per year from typhoid. Garrison continued by proclaiming that “the year 1890 is destined to be a memorable one in the history of mortality of this city”, and stated that the number of deaths from typhoid fever for the first half of 1890 was 115, compared to 53 for the whole of 1889.
Garrison argued that in analyzing a city’s quality of water and its corresponding typhoid mortality rate, it was evident that a good water supply equaled fewer deaths from typhoid. Garrison identified Wheeling’s situation as “sufficiently alarming”, and requested the County Board of Health to “take such steps as in your judgment will best favor immediate improvement of our water supply”. Drs. Meyers and Howard both supported Garrison’s opinion, and the members adopted a resolution inviting the Wheeling City Health Committee and Health Officer to hold a joint meeting with the County Board of Health on August 20th to “consider ways and means of preventing the spread of typhoid fever”.

In examining Garrison’s actions and opinions compared to those of his colleagues within the city of Wheeling, there arose an unmistakable recurring theme. While the other members of the Committee on Health preferred to focus on the favorable aspects of the city’s health and asserted their competence over managing its affairs, Garrison had no qualms over presenting Wheeling’s sanitary situation as terribly as he saw it and inciting action to combat it by whatever means necessary. In bypassing his fellow city colleagues and actually asking the county health institution to step in, Garrison was acting in direct opposition to the wishes of the rest of Wheeling’s doctors who had fought so hard to keep the County Board of Health out of the city’s health affairs at the end of 1887. In examining the discourse surrounding the efforts of the 1887 Committee on Health to change its name to a “Board of Health”, the purpose was essentially to prevent the County Board of Health from doing exactly what Garrison asked it to do in 1890—to interfere in the city’s public health issues. On the other
hand, however, when presented with a Health Committee that directly opposed so many of his efforts, Garrison probably saw no other choice. In light of this speech to the County Board of Health, therefore, it was easy to imagine that Garrison could have also turned the attention of the State Board of Health to Wheeling’s water supply in a similar manner.

Throughout the summer, Garrison’s extensive monologues bemoaning the typhoid death rate and filthy state of the city continued and the rift between the rest of the Health Committee and the Health Officer widened and became even more personal. In considering the budget for the coming year, the Health Committee complained that the printing and preparing of statistics had cost far too much and “occupied entirely too much space” in the past year, and the members appropriated half the sum for inspecting privy vaults than the previous year on account of the inspectors’ idleness. In July, Health Officer Garrison appeared before the City Council and voiced his opposition to the reduced provisions for privy inspections in the Health Committee budget. He also asked the Council to pay a $126 bill for inspecting vaults that the Health Committee had refused to recommend should be paid. In explanation, Garrison claimed that the Health Committee had “hampered him in his work”, and specifically named Campbell and Farrell as the prime offenders. In explaining the poor garbage service, Garrison stated that the crematory road had been entirely impassable the previous winter and the work of hauling trash to the crematory simply could not be done.

These disagreements over the Health Committee budget and the slinging of public personal accusations and insults heightened over the months of August and
September. In Garrison’s quarterly report published in the *Intelligencer* on August 15th, he reiterated the statistics on the city’s typhoid mortality rate that he had presented to the County Board of Health with the addition of some sentimental flair. Garrison wrote:

Fifty-five deaths from typhoid fever in three months! Fifty-five persons, after various periods of struggle and suffering, have one by one succumbed. Fifty-five lives, with all the possibilities of a glorious future before them, have been sacrificed, and fifty-five families plunged into the deepest sorrow; in fifty-five homes fathers, mothers, wives, husbands, brothers, sisters—all mourn for ‘The sound of a voice that is still, and the touch of a vanished hand.’ I have no desire to cast blame, or even to ask who is to blame for this calamity; although, if a druggist or a railway watchman were to cause the death of fifty-five persons, some notice would be taken and some public inquiry would follow. My wish is simply to draw public attention to the fact, so that, if possible, some efficient supervision and control may be exercised over the water supply and other causative agencies, and that other families may be spared the anguish which has befallen so many in this city.  

While Garrison claimed that he had “no desire to cast blame”, this passage purposefully led the reader to do exactly that. While Garrison was surely sincerely distressed by the death rate from a standpoint of the sorrow that it caused Wheeling’s families, this excerpt of his report dealt a clever hand. By first drawing on the painful aspects of death and then leading the reader to the causative agencies of Wheeling’s high death rate, he asked the question, why is this so? Garrison prompted the reader to conclude that the members of the Health Committee had failed to fix the city’s polluted water supply, and, like druggists or railway watchmen, were culpable of causing death and should be punished accordingly. The surreptitious purpose of Garrison’s speech, therefore, was basically to incite public outrage against the failings of the Health Committee.

To remedy Wheeling’s many sanitary woes, Garrison called for the removal of the water works and the installation of a filtering plant to purify the city’s drinking
water, the replacement or abandonment of all privies in favor of modern water closets, and the provision for systematic house-to-house sanitary inspection. He also called attention to the fact that the garbage service had actually worsened from 1889 to 1890 both in terms of total cost and the number of loads removed.

During an August 26th meeting of the Committee on Health, it was discovered that $240 had already been paid for inspecting vaults while the budget had only allotted $200. In addition to this troublesome inconsistency, Mr. Arkle called attention to the fact that Garrison had charged a widow washerwoman a dollar for a death certificate. After the document was found to be incorrect, Garrison charged her another dollar for a corrected certificate. Mr. Arkle argued that these certificates “are made on the time the city pays the health officer $1,000 a year for, and are written on the city’s paper with the city’s pen and ink”, and that charging citizens (especially poor washerwomen) a dollar for a death certificate was far too expensive. The committee called for and passed a motion mandating the free issuance of death certificates by the Health Officer, although this motion was later discovered to be in conflict with the duties described in the Health Officer ordinance and was abandoned. This incident displayed one of Garrison’s inconsistencies—while he proclaimed himself as a servant of the people, rather than making something like procuring a death certificate freely accessible to anyone, he discouraged its practice by charging money for it.

In line with his presentation to the County Board of Health, Garrison made a similar presentation to Wheeling’s City Council that sparked yet another intense personal feud between the Health Officer and Chairman Campbell. While his August
quarterly mortality report had displayed some sense of discretion, Garrison abandoned the façade of politeness in favor of a direct public challenge. In his letter to the city council, Garrison began by attributing the aversion of disaster to the elements. Garrison thanked the cool and rainy weather for doing more in “correcting and abating dangerous nuisances than we were able to do for ourselves”, and called upon the council to start taking sanitary precautions and preventative measures to prepare for the next summer.\(^\text{182}\) Garrison stressed the importance of the strict enforcement of hygienic rules and regulations “to the letter”, and stated that it was the “paramount duty” of the Health Department to ensure their obedience by each citizen.

The passage that followed left no room for ambiguity in accusation or blame. Garrison wrote:

This city, unfortunately, has no sanitary department. It has a Committee on Health, it is true, but the chairman of that committee in failing to distinguish between his duties as a public officer and his personal prejudices has hampered your Health Officer in the discharge of the duties of his office, to the detriment of the people whom he represents. The money appropriated by the Committee on Health in the spring was insufficient for a proper inspection of the city. As a consequence, I have been unable to accomplish as much as should have been accomplished.\(^\text{183}\)

While Garrison explained that while the city should have at least four sanitary inspectors, he had been appointed a mere two men to do the job, one of whom had quit on account of late payments.

In the face of the rising mortality rate and sorrow amongst Wheeling’s citizens, Garrison continued, the legal control over public health matters lay with the City Council. However, Garrison explained:
Ignorance of the dangers of the violation of the laws of health, and the blind jealousy and spite of those who should be foremost in the work of public sanitation, induce antagonism, where knowledge and appreciation of the evils sought to be controlled would meet with ready acquiescence. Yesterday it was reported to this office that six cases of typhoid fever existed on a single square in this city, and that an alley running between the two streets which enclosed the square was full of pestilential filth. Last night beheld the spectacle of the Chairman of the Committee on Health and his co-adjutor, Mr. Farrell, endeavoring to stop from the work of inspection the single remaining man in my employ. The result of such a course has been, as it can never fail to be, a loss of valuable lives to the community.¹⁸⁴

This example of Campbell and Farrell actively halting the work of a sanitary inspector worked to directly incriminate them as at least partially responsible for the disease-breeding environment of the city and the deaths it created. While Campbell was not going out and murdering people, Garrison argued that his actions preventing sanitation were killing people nonetheless. In the Health Officer’s estimation, the inaction that the Committee on Health had displayed in preventing Garrison from doing his job was criminal. The Health Officer continued in thanking the press for siding with him and celebrated the fact that although the newspapers could not legislate, they could teach and warn the public. While Campbell attacked the press for making the Health Committee look ridiculous, Garrison applauded it for spreading knowledge and truth.

Garrison continued by recommending the installation of a sewer system to drain every lot in the city, and blamed Campbell and Farrell for refusing to provide sufficient funding for adequate sanitary inspection. Garrison stated that proper inspection took time as well as skill, and complained, “Money is spent freely in every other department, but only two hundred dollars can be allowed ‘to be wasted’ upon the public health, according to the calculations of Dr. Campbell and Peter Ferrell, which is less than half a
cent per annum for each person in the community”. Money was a big source of frustration for both sides—while Garrison complained about inadequate appropriations for inspection, the Health Committee opposed the Health Officer’s constant incurring of small but unnecessary (and often personal) expenses.

The following day, the Intelligencer ran an article pledging its support for Health Officer Garrison and suggesting the reorganization of the Health Committee. In explaining its reasoning behind siding with Garrison the Intelligencer noted:

On that side lies the public interest, for it is the Health Officer, not the Health Committee, that is trying to do something in a sanitary way for the city. His way or his personality may be offensive to the members of the Health Committee… It is a mistake to place a physician at the head of the Health Committee, for it is next to impossible to find two physicians who will let slip so good an opportunity to get into a row. The Chairman of the Health Committee should be an intelligent layman, and the broader man the better.

By this time, the Health Committee had proven itself so notoriously internally quarrelsome that the Intelligencer actually suggested changing its make-up to include fewer doctors for the sake of efficiency.

As one might expect, it did not take Chairman Campbell long to reply to the attacks against him. On August 29th, the Health Committee convened to discuss the condition of a particular sewer. After solutions to the faulty sewer were proposed and regular Committee business was concluded, Campbell took the stand and reread Garrison’s communication to the City Council at its last meeting, and proceeded to make a scene. The article recounted:
Dr. Campbell called Mr. Pollock to the chair, and proceeded to make a speech such as has hardly ever been heard in Council or at any committee meeting. He began by saying that Dr. Garrison had taken advantage of his absence from the city at other times to present communications to Council, containing vilifications of himself, and had furnished copies to the newspaper to insure their publication. He said the Doctor had not the manhood to present the last communication in the First Branch, where he and Mr. Farrell could hear it read and answer its charges, but had sent it to the Second, where he knew it could not be heard by either of them and could not be seen by them till it appeared in the newspapers from copies specially prepared by the author to insure its publication. He used the words coward and sneak with great freedom for a man of his size, and raked the Health Officer’s actions from first to last...

While Garrison’s tactics in his personal attacks were sneaky and cowardly, denying his victims a chance to defend themselves, Campbell argued further that Garrison was exaggerating the unsanitary situation purely to vilify the Committee and elevate his own image and arguments. In regards to Garrison’s statements that “typhoid fever and cholera infantum are almost epidemic”, Campbell retorted:

‘I have taken the trouble to telephone to respectable physicians from Benwood to Bridgeport, men who have practice, and take care of the sick of the town, and who know what diseases are in existence in their city; men whose words are as good as their bonds, and they, without exception asserted that zymotic diseases are far less prevalent than usual and that cholera infantum and typhoid fever are not in existence to an alarming rate.’ He said that the doctors had said that the city is quite as healthy as ever before, and openly charged that the Health Officer was exaggerating the condition of the city for the purpose of strengthening his position in the health department.

Although Campbell did not mention any of these “respectable physicians” specifically by name, stating that the rest of the medical profession agreed with his opinion served to back up his argument against Garrison—by purposefully exaggerating the unhealthy state of the city, the Health Officer endeavored to vilify the Health Committee and promote his professional and popular image in the process.
In response to these charges, Garrison wrote a letter to the editor of the *Intelligencer* that was published on the first of September. In defense of his actions, Garrison explained that his choice to present his communication to the Second Branch was purely practical, and accused Campbell of misleading the citizens of Wheeling. Garrison began:

SIR—In reply to the remarks of Dr. J. A. Campbell before the Health Committee, a portion of which have been published in your columns, permit me to offer the following: All communications that have been presented to Council by me have been presented without regard to the presence or absence of the Chairman of the Committee on Health. The two communications of which he particularly complains contained recommendations for the expenditure of money, and in accordance with the rule that all measures requiring the expenditure of money must originate in the Second Branch, they had to be presented there. Is it possible that Dr. Campbell has served two years in Council without learning this? The charge that I did not want him or Mr. Farrell to hear the papers read and answer the charges falls of its own weight since he added that I prepared copies for publication in the daily papers, where they would be sure to see and have an opportunity to reply if they so desired. In criticizing him and Mr. Farrell, I have shown them such courtesies as their actions demanded. In my communications to them officially, I have accorded them the respect due to the official positions which they occupy. His attempt to show that there is less sickness at the present time than usual, was a silly effort to hoodwink the people. Garrison continued to reiterate the city’s mortality rate and the need for the city council to prepare for the coming year. He also denied the accusations of purposely vilifying the other members of the Health Committee, saying, “My cause is that of public health; in my endeavors to serve that cause I have been constantly hampered by the Chairman of the Health Committee and Mr. Farrell, one of its members”.

Once again, this display of yet another public argument between Garrison and Campbell raised serious questions as to the Health Officer’s intents and motivations.
While Campbell and his colleagues accused Garrison of exaggerating the situation for personal benefit, Garrison in turn purported that Campbell was “hoodwinking” the citizens of Wheeling. Again, while Garrison certainly could have been sincere in his intense desire to preserve public health, he simultaneously succeeded in hailing himself as a bringer of truth and defender of the public in the face of dangerous, misleading information.

Aside from more personal accusations of cowardice and treachery, the argument fundamentally centered on the question of whether or not the city was sufficiently healthy. While Campbell used the opinions of his colleagues to assert his opinion that it was, Garrison used a whole host of statistics to support his stance that the city was in constant danger from disease. These different ideas and conceptions of what truly constituted a healthy city arose from different interpretations and led to serious public battles that polarized public opinion. So, who was right? Was Garrison truly altruistic in his actions or did he mainly have an eye on professional superstardom? Was Campbell correct in his accusation that Garrison was exaggerating the dire sanitary condition of the city for personal benefit? Or were Campbell and the rest of the Health Committee truly as apathetic and useless as Garrison reported?

After the bitter row between Campbell and Garrison petered out, the Health Committee once again turned its attention to the ailing crematory. While the furnace once again needed repairing, the complaints continued to mount and Health Officer Garrison issued a copy of four sections of the garbage ordinance that were printed in the *Intelligencer* on September 9th in an article titled “Cut this Out and Paste it in Your
Hat”. The sections that Garrison included outlined the provisions for garbage collection as well as the responsibilities of garbage contractor Conrad, calling attention to the violations of the ordinance by the garbage men. Complaints against the garbage contractors numbered in the hundreds and told tales of collectors laughing at pleas from citizens begging them to take their garbage, and of men driving through the streets leaking barrels of refuse onto the ground.191

In an article titled “The Mayor and the Garbage Men”, the Intelligencer stated that although the garbage men were required to remove waste from every residence once a day in September under the penalty of a fine for every violation, their neglect to perform their job had been “notorious” throughout the summer. The article criticized, “The contractor seems to have understood that he had a friend at court. At all events he collected more money than garbage”.192 While Garrison had accused the members of the Health Committee for failing to enforce the ordinance, blame soon fell upon Mayor Seabright as well for failing to adequately punish the offender. While citizens convened in court to testify against garbage contractor Conrad in 13 cases (all brought by Garrison), the mayor imposed fines in only five cases, and “apologized to the garbage man by reminding him that he had always stood by him, even dismissing cases brought him, and concluded his remarkable performance by refusing to hear the other 8 cases”.193

Outraged by the Mayor’s leniency, Garrison wrote yet another letter to the City Council entreating it to call an appeal of the hearing. Under the provisions of the garbage ordinance, Garrison argued that Conrad’s contract should have been forfeited
long ago for his failure to effectively remove the city’s garbage. Furthermore, the
alleged stories of leaking carts were another violation of Section Three of the ordinance,
which mandated watertight carts so as to prevent such leakage. Garrison stated of
Conrad, “All of his several agreements he has violated. He has failed to provide himself
with the necessary carts and wagons, but hires a few men and carts by the day. He has
not now nor has he had at any time a sufficient number of horses and carts to remove
garbage and offal as provided by the ordinance.” Garrison proceeded by issuing
seven more warrants for Conrad the next day, charging him with gross neglect.

In response to Garrison’s barrage of cases against garbage contractor Conrad,
Mayor Seabright continued to dismiss the vast majority, only prompting Garrison to call
for appeals and issue yet more warrants. At the next Council meeting, true to form,
Garrison wrote up a typewritten report that spanned nearly two pages detailing the
Mayor’s actions in court. Furthermore, Garrison declared that he had hired a lawyer,
Honorable J.B. Sommerville, to prosecute the cases and asked the Council to authorize
a sum of $50 dollars compensation for Sommerville’s services. After debating whether
the Health Officer had the authority to independently hire an attorney, the Council’s
Second Branch finally agreed to pay the bill by a vote of eight to seven. In the First
Branch, however, Mayor Seabright made a speech defending himself, Campbell
declared that the employment of a lawyer was patently unnecessary, and the members
voted not to pay the bill by a vote of nine to two. At the close of council’s meeting,
Conrad explained that he had not been able to remove the garbage due to the fact that
the crematory was broken, and asked for a remittance of the fines. A Council member accused him of lying, and the Council unanimously declined Conrad’s request.  

As tensions rose between Garrison and his fellow city officials, an incident on the morning of September 24th witnessed a departure from any semblance of public decorum. While one might have expected a physical fight between Garrison and Campbell from the extensive coverage of their incredibly personal and bitter argument in the press, the incident involved Dr. Baird. As the Intelligencer related in an article titled, “Lively Punishment”, Garrison and Baird happened to pass each other in an outer office of the Public Building, after which things became hostile. The article stated:

As they passed, Dr. Baird said in an undertone, loud enough to be heard by Dr. Garrison, ‘You black son of a—.’ Dr. Garrison turned and told Dr. Baird that he did not want him to speak to him in such a way, and told him further that he could only use his tongue in vilifying and slandering others. Dr. Baird then reiterated his epithet and said, ‘You were sired by a nigger and damned by a—,’ at the same time striking a blow which glanced across Dr. Garrison’s chest. Garrison was quick with his blows and before anyone could come to Baird’s rescue, had cut his eye, badly, and bruised it till it became discolored and swollen.

The Lieutenant and Chief of Police separated the two doctors and Baird was taken to the Water Board office. After his eye was bandaged, although he had clearly gotten the worst of the fight, Baird attempted to find Garrison and assault him again. While the police stopped him from physically attacking Garrison, “Dr. Baird was allowed to stand just outside the railing and curse and threaten him. Baird repeatedly reiterated a threat to kill Garrison, and made assertions concerning Dr. Garrison and his antecedents too vile to be repeated”. Baird was finally removed from the scene by his son, and warrants were issued for both of them. In explanation of the cause of the fight, the article simply
stated, “For some time Baird and Garrison have not been on speaking terms, and Baird’s rude way of breaking the silence left the other no choice but prompt and vigorous resentment. Public sentiment showed itself in an almost continued ovation to Dr. Garrison at his office and as he passed along the street.” The next morning, the doctors were taken to Police Court where Garrison was fined $10 and Baird, $5. Considering the minimal exposure of personal or professional conflict between Garrison and Baird in the *Intelligencer* in the few years leading up to 1890, this incident was telling of the extent to which Garrison was a controversial individual. While Campbell and Garrison’s heated arguments had been well publicized, they only represented one disagreement. Although Baird’s assault on Garrison seemed to come out of the blue judging from the coverage of the *Intelligencer*, it was indicative of the fact that plenty was happening outside the periphery of the press’s narrative. While there was relatively little in the *Intelligencer* preceding the incident to predict this episode, these two doctors clearly had a history of an argument so severe and intense that it merited death threats. Although the paper would report nothing concerning the argument between Garrison and Baird for the next five months, it would come to a tragic head in March of 1891.

In the remaining three months of 1890, the City Council and the Health Committee mainly dealt with the routine business of paying bills and discussing minor items of concern. On October 10th Garrison released the third of his whopping quarterly reports encompassing vital statistics and one of his famous monologues. Since the first of January 1890 through the end of September, Garrison tabulated 717 deaths, 244 of
which were from preventable diseases. While the average number of annual deaths from typhoid for the 18 years prior to 1890 was 34, in 1890 it had already reached 128. To account for this, Garrison pointed to the water supply and the lack of a suitable depository for garbage within the city limits. The Health Officer attacked the tendency of his fellow citizen to see the dangers of disease as a removed threat. Garrison explained:

Military statistics show that it takes several hundred musket shots to kill one soldier in battle. That is the average of danger. But the fact is, also, that one shot is enough to kill a soldier when it hits him. That is what may happen to anyone. The grand fact, however, is that hundreds of thousands will certainly be killed in every engagement of any consequence. That is the aggregate of danger, corresponding to the aggregate of danger from our infected water, earth, air, milk, etc. The mental peculiarity that makes a man a sanitarian, is to care something for the needless deaths of fifty thousand fellow men, even though they take place in fifty thousand places and in 365 days. It is not expected or desired to make individuals look for death in every drink of unpurified water or breath of foul air. Sanitary science in its most appalling revelations, suggests no such thing, seeks no such thing. It seeks to interest individuals in the danger and in the protection of the aggregate population, to whom these avoidable public evils meant fifty thousand deaths a year, though one of them may probably not be yours, mine, or his.201

While the chance of dying of disease was relatively small for one individual, Garrison argued, there was always a chance. In the Health Officer’s eyes, the fact that 50,000 deaths each year were from preventable diseases and therefore entirely unnecessary left every logical person with no choice but to work to remedy it with the implementation of complete sanitary reform. The frustrations present throughout Garrison’s seemingly endless letters to Council and higher public health authorities and his monologues to the general public were palpable. While the Health Officer tried every tactic he could think of to motivate his fellow citizens into giving sanitation the attention it deserved, he was
disappointed time and time again. In an ominous statement of prediction, Garrison also mentioned the importance of vaccination, stating that it had been four years since smallpox had been seen in Wheeling and that “the season at which we may expect a visitation is upon us”.

As for the rest of 1890, little of note was reported pertaining to public health. In the last two months of the year, five anonymous citizens had an argument about the science of water filtration in the pages of the *Intelligencer*, and Garrison spoke to Smith about contracting another crematory for $800, and to the Hyat Pure Water Company about the possible installation of a water filtration system in Wheeling.

Nevertheless, by the end of 1890 tensions had markedly heightened. While previous arguments had been confined to the swapping of harsh diatribes at Council meetings and in the press, September 1890 saw the disagreement of Garrison and Baird come to blows. This incident bestowed a new severity upon the often humorous rows of the town doctors, signaled just how hostile the atmosphere had become, and heralded its further deterioration.

Garrison was at the center of one final controversy in the first two months of 1891 for which he received a fair amount of public mockery. In accordance with Garrison’s prediction in his October quarterly report, on January 13, 1891 the *Intelligencer* reported that a smallpox case had come to Wheeling from a boat on the Ohio River. A fifteen year old boy named William Williamson employed as a cabin boy on a steamer named Matt F. Allen had begun to show symptoms of the illness and was
issued a leave from the boat in order to obtain treatment for what his captain diagnosed as an “itching skin disease”. Williamson visited Dr. Ulrich, who examined the boy and declared the case smallpox and sent him to Dr. Garrison’s office with strict instructions to avoid people as much as possible on the way. Garrison took Williamson to the third floor of his building, “opened the window on him”, and called Mayor Seabright, President Gruse of the First Branch of Council, Dr. Campbell, and Dr. Meyers to consult on the proper course of action in dealing with the patient.  

As a family was discovered to be living in the city’s “pest house”, Garrison stationed the teenager in a tent in part of the Peninsular cemetery grounds after making sure that Council agreed to pay the bills. The article described Garrison’s strict arrangements for the quarantine of Williamson, stating, “Arrangements have been made for food to be carried by Downey [the smallpox nurse appointed to attend to Williamson] and the patient in wooden vessels which will be burned as soon as used. Nothing will be brought away from the tent. Even the tin-buckets, in which coffee and the like are to be carried, will be destroyed”. Garrison then reiterated the importance for every citizen to be vaccinated against smallpox, and offered vaccinations free of charge to those who could not afford them. Dr. Meyers of the County Board of Health issued a quarantine of the Matt F. Allen steamboat, prohibiting the ship from docking anywhere in Ohio County, and the Intelligencer reassured the public that the disease would surely be contained due to these actions by the authorities.

Unsurprisingly, the alleged smallpox case caused quite a stir. While some expressed doubt that Williamson actually had smallpox on the grounds that he was
entirely too cheerful to be suffering from the disease, the fact that both Dr. Ulrich and Health Officer Garrison had made the same diagnosis seemed a fairly conclusive result for most citizens. While Williamson endured his quarantine with nurse Downy in good spirits, the rest of the city lined up at Dr. Garrison’s office to be vaccinated to no avail—there was no “fresh or reliable virus” in town, and the doctors of the city spent the day frantically sending telegraphs to obtain more vaccine. In order to inhibit the spread of the disease on a bigger scale, Garrison advised all the counties along the Ohio River to close their ports to the Allen steamboat.²⁰⁵

Although both Garrison and Ulrich had agreed that the case was indeed smallpox, their diagnosis soon came into question when some of their colleagues examined Williamson upon the request of Captain Kimble from the steamboat. As a preface to a January 15th article titled “Not Smallpox At All—A Ridiculous Sequel to the Scare of Monday,” the Intelligencer reported, “Three physicians of Wheeling, after a careful examination, have declared our ‘small-pox patient’ not suffering from the dread disease. Other physicians were of the opinion that it was a case of small-pox. It is not the first time that doctors have disagreed”.²⁰⁶ The three “leading” doctors, Jepson, Pipes, and Stathers, wrote to Captain Kimble stating that they had examined Williamson and had told Health Officer Garrison that the case was not smallpox, and Dr. Pipes offered to let Williamson sleep at his house. After hearing the diagnosis of his three colleagues, Garrison “persisted in the declaration that the disease was smallpox, and said that it was his duty to continue to care for the patient and protect the public from contagion”²⁰⁷.
While this disagreement caused “a good deal of amusement”, the *Intelligencer* insisted that it was sobered by the serious aspects of the case. While Dr. Jepson pointed out that at least Ulrich and Garrison had erred on the side of public safety, the *Intelligencer* countered, “the circulation of stories that smallpox prevails here, and the needless severity of the treatment of the boy are bad, and the expense to which the city was needlessly put is another item”. The dilemma that this smallpox case presented, therefore, was a losing situation for Health Officer Garrison. If he had not judged the case to be smallpox, he took the risk of Williamson spreading the disease and causing an epidemic, for which Garrison and Ulrich would inevitably take the fall. If Garrison diagnosed the boy with smallpox and took the maximum precautions, however, there was a chance that Williamson would not actually have smallpox, and Garrison would be blamed for the unnecessary expenses and harsh quarantine methods taken. Garrison soon found himself in the latter situation, worsened by the fact that his credibility as a doctor was now also at stake.

Realizing his culpability in the fiasco, Dr. Ulrich wrote a letter to the editor of the *Intelligencer* attempting to absolve himself from guilt. Ulrich began, “SIR:—As there have been some reflections made, indirectly, on my conduct and on my diagnostic skill in regard to the case of smallpox now in quarantine under the care of the City Health Officer, I desire to say a word or two in my vindication”. Ulrich proceeded to describe his examination of Williamson, stating that his hands were covered in “papillae and vesicles”, the first and second stages of the disease. At that point, Ulrich stated that he had sent Williamson to Garrison along with a note that Ulrich asserted was
purposefully ambivalent so as to not influence Dr. Garrison’s decision. Although Ulrich said that stood by his original diagnosis, he stated, “I do not wish to reply to the ill-bred assertion made by one physician, that I don’t know smallpox when I see it, but will simply say that I went through one of the most fearful epidemics of smallpox that has been known in modern times, in the city of Louisville, K.y., seventeen or eighteen years ago, and ought to know something about it”.210

Ulrich’s and Garrison’s professional reputations as credible and knowledgeable physicians were on the line. Ulrich’s faulty diagnosis could identify him as a poor doctor, and his note was clearly meant to separate himself from the decision that ultimately placed Williamson under quarantine. In further defense of his actions, Ulrich asked the public:

The regulations by which I am guided distinctly say that expenses of marines who are subjected to quarantine by the city authorities will not be paid out of the marine fund. Our hospital will not take them. Now, what could I do? Quarantine him at my own expense and treat him? No sane person would expect this of me. Why, it would swallow up my whole year’s salary, besides ruining my practice for a time. Even if I had been in doubt as to the nature of the disease, was I to run the risk of contaminating the entire community by placing him in the hospital or permitting him to run at large? 211

The predicament that Garrison and Ulrich found themselves in was part and parcel of holding positions as city officials and being forced to make close judgments. To clear himself of responsibility, Ulrich argued that the decision had ultimately fallen to the Health Officer. Once again, therefore, it was Garrison who was the main subject of controversy.
Even in light of the conflicting diagnoses, all school aged children in Wheeling were notified that they must be vaccinated. While the city’s doctors argued over the case, the quarantined Allen steamboat tried to find a place along the Ohio River to land, being met in some cities with men with guns “ready to shoot” if the steamboat attempted to dock. The Allen finally managed to land at the Pittsburgh Coal Works, and the captain claimed that the “smallpox case” was merely a case of bad itch. The militant way that people defended their towns against a boat possibly carrying smallpox showed the intense fear that people harbored towards epidemics of contagious diseases. Furthermore, this incident also illustrated the relative infrequency of a smallpox case by the 1880s. A diagnosis like smallpox did not happen every day—it was an event closely monitored not only by Wheeling, but by all the towns along the Ohio River.

By the next day, the quarantine on the steamer was lifted by the County Health Board. As hundreds of children waited in the hallways of Garrison’s office to be vaccinated against smallpox, the *Intelligencer* argued that if nothing else, the smallpox scare had succeeded in launching the city’s first wide scale vaccination campaign in over ten years. With the restrictions on his boat removed, Captain Kimple returned to Wheeling to recover his cabin boy and bring a damage suit for the loss to the boat from the unnecessary quarantine. William Williamson Sr. also threatened a law suit to secure the release his son from the harsh conditions of the cemetery, explaining that the boy had had a recurring skin condition since childhood which periodically arose and left him bedridden for short periods of time. Williamson Sr. explained, “The boy has often been confined to his house with exactly the same symptoms, though never ill”. Even
considering the prevailing opinion that Williamson did not in fact have smallpox, Garrison kept strict observance of the quarantine, refusing Williamson’s father permission to visit his son and charging Captain Kimple $5 for going to the cemetery. Garrison also refused to let Drs. Jepson, Pipes, and Stathers visit Williamson’s tent without him.

The Health Officer’s excessive controlling measures exemplified the difference between him and his colleagues in viewing public health situations, and sparked tempers for obvious reasons. While at this point, the number of physicians who thought Williamson did not have smallpox outnumbered those who did (which was, for all intents and purposes, Garrison), the Health Officer insisted on maintaining what he no doubt saw as an absolutely necessary preventative, precautionary measure. To others, Garrison’s exercise of control was almost authoritarian. As Health Officer, he placed himself as supreme dictator of correct sanitary protocol, refusing to listen to the conflicting opinions of his fellow physicians even when they outnumbered his own.

On account of his mulish refusal to allow Williamson Sr. to visit his son, Garrison was taken to court on a writ of habeas corpus for the unlawful detention of Williamson Jr. The patient’s father explained that his son was a minor and had been mistakenly diagnosed with smallpox by Dr. Garrison, who had “confined him and has since kept him a close prisoner in a tent in or near the Peninsular Cemetery, in Ohio county, W. Va.” The article continued, “It is further averred that the said boy has not the smallpox and has at no time had it, and that he is illegally restrained of his liberty,
and that the complainant, the father of said boy, who has the right to his custody, is illegally kept therefrom”.

The court case effectively polarized the entirety of Wheeling’s medical community into opposing sides. While Mr. Williamson summoned Drs. Jepson, Pipes, Stathers, Reed Baird (not to be confused with George Baird Jr.), Schwinn, Campbell, Birney, Dickey, Frissell, Stifel, and Wilson as witnesses, Garrison responded by filing a list of witness that included nearly every other physician in Wheeling, two councilmen, and the United States Surveyor of Port Faris.

This row over a diagnosis of smallpox as well as the questionable legal authority of Garrison to keep Williamson Jr. in quarantine demonstrated not only Garrison’s forceful dogmatic approach to public health, but highlighted the intense disunity of the medical profession during this time period. While doctors worked to label themselves as elite and highly educated, this incident blatantly displayed the reality that physicians were not all-knowing—in fact, many citizens in Wheeling as well as Captain Kimple had correctly diagnosed the patient with an itching skin disease based on the fact that he didn’t display any signs of extreme discomfort and was entirely too cheerful to have smallpox. Garrison’s quick diagnosis of the disease and his imposition of such a strict and harsh quarantine only served to reinforce his image as a near fanatical alarmist.

The smallpox debacle came at an inopportune time for Dr. Garrison—the city elections were held a mere two weeks after he was taken to court. Although Garrison ran as the incumbent for the position of Health Officer in the election for city offices,
the position went to Dr. P. T. Shearer. His nemeses, Campbell and Farrell, remained on the Health Committee. Furthermore, Garrison lost the bid to provide medical attendance to prisoners at the county jail to Dr. McCoy following a discussion “in which Dr. Garrison’s alleged case of smallpox at the Peninsular Cemetery was made to figure pro and con”. 215 His behavior during the smallpox had clearly damaged his reputation, and even served as evidence to deny him a county contract.

The downward spiral of Garrison’s professional life reached its ultimate nadir on Saturday March 7, 1891. In a March 9th article titled “A Deplorable Affair—The Sad Outcome of an Old Feud”, the Intelligencer reported that Dr. Garrison had shot and killed Dr. Baird in the middle of town. The Intelligencer related the story:

Dr. George Baird was shot by Dr. George I. Garrison, on Eleventh street between Main and Market, shortly after 10 o’clock Saturday forenoon, and died in less than twenty minutes. Two shots were fired, both taking effect, the first in the breast, which caused death, and the second entering by the right ear and coming out under the left eye, not, however, piercing the brain. Accounts of the homicide differ in detail. All that is known beyond dispute is that Dr. Garrison passed down Eleventh street on the north sidewalk just as Dr. Baird alighted from his buggy. Some words were exchanged, and Dr. Garrison fired. After the first shot Dr. Baird turned to go toward Prager’s wall paper store, about twenty feet distant, when Dr. Garrison fired again. Dr. Baird entered Prager’s place, saying he had been shot. He sat down in a chair near the window. A young woman employed in the store offered to send for somebody, but the Doctor declined, saying he was not seriously injured. Shortly he remarked that he better move away from the window so as not to attract attention, and he took up his chair and walked to the rear of the store, again sitting down. He stated that Dr. Garrison had shot him. Afterward he lay down on an improvised table, complaining of feeling sick, and in few minutes expired, before the physicians who had been telephone[d] for could reach him. 216

While the most minor details would be debated during the trial to determine if Garrison had reasonable cause to shoot, the basic facts of the story were above dispute. After
shooting Baird, Garrison had walked down the street and turned himself in to the Sheriff’s office where he was taken into custody and put in jail. In “reliable but indirect” information obtained by the Intelligencer, Garrison recounted his side of the story. He stated that on Saturday morning he had boarded an electric car and had gotten off at Eleventh Street and started walking toward the market house. While Garrison explained that he usually did all he could to avoid Dr. Baird on account of his tendency to assault him with “vile epithets”, in this particular incident he had seen Dr. Baird too late to avoid him. Although he attempted to pass Baird quickly to avoid conflict, Baird proffered his typical insult and Garrison explained:

I thought to myself, Great God! Must I go through life forever with my head bent down like a sneak? I resolved to remonstrate with him, and I turned and said: ‘Doctor, you must stop calling me that!’ Dr. Baird only repeated the remark when I said, ‘Doctor, you must take that back!’ He responded, ‘You niggerfied s— of a b—, I don’t have to take anything back! You— of a—, I’ll blow your head off!’ As he said this, he put his hand to his left hip pocket. I supposed he meant to carry out his threat, often repeated in the past, to kill me, and I fired.217

The news of the murder spread throughout the town with “marvelous rapidity” and as people crowded into Dr. Baird’s house to pay their sympathies, the physicians of Wheeling gathered to remember the life of their late colleague, lauding his character, amenable nature, and contributions to the community.

In providing context to the case, the Intelligencer wrote a profile of the individual men involved in the tragedy as well as their relationship until the shooting. Dr. Baird was born in Washington, Pennsylvania in 1829, and graduated from Washington College in 1847. He studied medicine at Jefferson Medical College in
Philadelphia graduating in 1852, after which he married and had six children (one of whom, Dr. Reed Baird, was also a practicing physician in Wheeling in the 1880s). Baird had served as the Mayor of Wheeling, a member of the first City Board of Public Works, and a member of the City Water Board. He was, at the time of his death, one of Wheeling’s oldest physicians at the age of 62. While the *Intelligencer* described Baird as “energetic, impulsive, warm hearted and generous”, he had also made many bitter enemies.

Dr. Garrison was born in West Liberty, West Virginia in 1851. He went to the State Normal School, where he studied medicine under Dr. Hukill, began to practice medicine in 1875, and moved to Wheeling in 1881. After having practiced in Wheeling for awhile, he took a supplementary course at the Jefferson Medical College. In 1887 he was appointed to the State Board of Health, and served as city Health Officer twice. Although the *Intelligencer* stated that Garrison was “ambitious, self-willed”, and a “man of good impulses”, like Dr. Baird, he had also made a host of enemies in Wheeling. While Baird was clearly one of such enemies by 1891, the two were not always on such poor terms. The article explained of Garrison’s relationship with Baird, “When he first came to Wheeling he had no stauncher nor warmer friend than Dr. Baird, and his friendship was that of active character which was characteristic of the man. In the face of opposition Dr. Baird fought for him. Suddenly they quarreled, the facts not being known to the public. Since that they have been bitter foes”.218
The article continued to state that while the quarrel was known to the good friends of both doctors, it became public knowledge following their scuffle in the city gas office in September of the previous year, after which they both started to carry revolvers. Not only did Baird barrage Garrison publicly with constant insults throughout the remaining fall and winter of 1890 and 1891, Garrison believed that he was also the mastermind behind a series of enormously obscene and offensive anonymous letters that he received in the mail.

During the two weeks immediately following the murder, the coroner released his official verdict that Baird died of two gunshot wounds fired by Dr. George I. Garrison. Baird’s funeral was held and attended by hundreds, his eulogy lauding him as a “man of the people”, while city officials decided whether Garrison would be granted a preliminary trial.219

After discussion with Garrison’s attorney, a preliminary hearing was held on March 24th. Two witnesses were called for the prosecution to describe what they saw, and Dr. Wilson, who had performed Baird’s autopsy, confirmed that the victim had died from a hemorrhage caused by the first bullet to the chest. The defense summoned no witnesses, and the official hearing was scheduled for May 4th.

The trial opened on May 4th to a massive audience. The article covering the opening day of the hearing pronounced, “There was probably never an action at law before the Circuit Court of Ohio county that stirred up more general interest than the trial of Dr. George I. Garrison begun in Part II before Judge Campbell yesterday
The first week of the trial commenced with a search for suitable, unbiased jury members. Over a period of five days, the attorneys for the prosecution and defense examined one by one 20 panels of potential jurors before a crowded courtroom. Despite calling hundreds of men to the stand, the vast majority expressed prejudice in the case and were excused, or were otherwise hard of hearing and dismissed. By the 12th of May, a suitable jury of 12 was found, and the prosecution and defense began their arguments.

During the course of the trial 44 witnesses were called to the stand over a period of two and a half weeks. Mr. Howard and Captain Dovener acted as the main attorneys for the prosecution, while Colonel Arnett and Mr. Sommerville represented Garrison for the defense. In the state’s opening statements, Howard explained to the jury that there were five possible verdicts (first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, and self defense), and read their definitions. Howard explained that the state proposed to show that Garrison “had malice in his heart against Baird”, and therefore that he had committed first degree murder through the premeditation of his act.

In summarizing the causes for Garrison’s malice against Baird, Howard stated that he proposed to show that:

Dr. Baird, when Dr. Garrison was unable to practice medicine here, kept up his practice while he studied medicine, to show how great friends they were. That Dr. Garrison had named his son George Baird Garrison. He then referred to Garrison trying to have Dr. Baird arrested for misstating a death cause. That Dr. Garrison had threatened to have Dr. Baird prosecuted because he had made out a death certificate giving the cause as sore throat when Dr. Garrison thought it was black diphtheria.
After their brawl in September, Howard explained:

Dr. Garrison’s woes came thick and fast. He lost his position as Health Officer. He lost his county practice, attending the prisoners in the jail, and his practice, much of which he held on account of political preferment, began to drift away. He then referred at length to the Williamson smallpox case, reciting how Dr. Reed Baird had been one of the physicians called to decide the case differently from the diagnosis placed upon it by Dr. Garrison. He told of Dr. Baird having criticised Dr. Garrison’s professional mistake, and cited all these things as having a tendency to enrage and engender the wrath of Dr. Garrison.

While these facts raised by Howard in his opening statements were briefly addressed again during the hearing, they were never disproved. Considering the arguments pertaining to public health that were published in the *Intelligencer* during the later years of the 1880s, these incidents seemed right in line. Garrison’s threat to arrest Baird on account of a misdiagnosis coincided with his notorious harsh inflexibility when it came to medical protocol as well as his tendency to assume the worst. Furthermore, this incident was mildly ironic considering Garrison’s own misdiagnosis in the smallpox case. Although none of these incidents were reported in the *Intelligencer*, it was clear that they had enormously contributed to tensions that had been bubbling below the surface for years.

Howard finished his opening statements with the declaration that Garrison had made death threats toward Baird and that Baird had made no move to attack Garrison or even defend himself on the day of the shooting, simultaneously proving malice on the part of Garrison and disproving any conclusion that Garrison acted out of self defense. As the 44 witnesses took the stand one by one, they generally agreed on the basic facts while disputing the minutest details. For example, while some said the doctors were 20
feet apart when Garrison shot Baird, others said 10. Slight variations on Garrison’s exclamation of “You take that back!” included “Take that back!”, “Will you take it back?” etc. Certain details—Baird’s particular position, his movements, the direction he turned and walked, and whether or not he moved his hands—received the most attention due to their pertinence as to whether or not Baird constituted a physical threat to Garrison at the time of the murder. While witnesses for the prosecution generally avowed that Baird’s hands remained at his sides, Garrison and another witness for the defense asserted that he moved his hand first to the lapel of his coat and then to his hip, as if to reach for his revolver.

As the defense began its case on May 18th, scores of witnesses testified as to the way that Baird hounded Garrison with public threats and insults for months. While the witnesses for the defense described Garrison as a law abiding citizen who only argued over public matters, they told of countless instances when Baird had attacked him with “vile epithets” in public. During the fight in the gas office in September, witnesses testified to hearing Baird say to Garrison, “You were sired by a nigger and damned by a whore; you nigger — — —!” and then again, “you nigger — — —, I’ll kill you yet!” More witnesses testified to hearing Baird insult Garrison from his buggy in the middle of the street, calling him a “black — — —.” In another instance, a witness swore he heard Baird say of Garrison, “I will not be even with that nigger — — — till, “I cut his damned heart out,” or “cut his damned throat”. This standard slur accompanied by the occasional death threat directed at Dr. Garrison from Dr. Baird was heard time and time again on the streets of Wheeling from September to March. In
response to Baird’s constant provocations, witnesses consistently agreed that Garrison ignored him. In turn, on the cross-examination of many witnesses for the defense, Howard used Garrison’s previous rows while he served as Health Officer as evidence for his argumentative nature, referencing Garrison’s swearing at Dr. Campbell and Mr. Ackerman over the phone as well as his legal battles with the night soil haulers.

In addition to the obscenities that he regularly hurled at Garrison, Baird began to refuse to associate with people who were friendly with Garrison and devised schemes to discredit him professionally. A witness named Mr. Hamilton told the jury how he went to see a councilman named Mr. Irwin in order to seek his vote for Dr. Garrison for Health Officer in January. After he had gone to see Mr. Irwin, Dr. Baird told Hamilton that he was “done” with him. In another instance Dr. E.C. Meyers of the County Board of Health testified that during the smallpox episode, Dr. Baird asked him to go see Williamson and make a diagnosis to oppose Garrison’s. The article described of Baird:

He tried to array the witness on the side of those who opposed Dr. Garrison’s diagnosis; witness objected to going, because it was not in his jurisdiction; Dr. Baird said he thought it could be used against the ‘— — —’ for Health Officer, and that he did not think it was smallpox. Some time after that witness had a meeting of the county Health Board, and Dr. Garrison appeared before the meeting and made a statement as to the Wheeling water supply; afterward Dr. Baird met witness and asked why he had allowed that — — — to be present; witness replied that he had no right to exclude him. Dr. Baird asked witness if he thought there was any possibility of getting rid of that — — —. Witness said he thought not, that he supposed Dr. Garrison proposed to remain in Wheeling. Dr. Baird said it would be possible that they would defeat him for health officer and the — — — would starve to death. Dr. Baird said he wished someone would kill him.224
Captain Dovener for the prosecution then asked Meyers who had given the official information of the small pox diagnosis that had prompted him to quarantine the steamboat. After an objection to this question by Colonel Arnett on the grounds of irrelevance, Dovener claimed it was pertinent “‘because we propose to show that he quarantined a case of itch, and I can say so and prove it by two-thirds of the physicians in this city.’ There was then a long wrangle among the attorneys and the Court as to whether the matter was admissible.”

The testimony of Dr. Meyers illustrated just how bitter the feud was. Not only did Baird try to manipulate Meyers into discrediting Garrison professionally for his misdiagnosis of small pox, he actually wished starvation and death upon him. The obvious derision that the prosecution, Baird, and two thirds of Wheeling’s physicians showed regarding Garrison’s mistaken diagnosis and his harsh overreaction to a mere case of itch, reeked of resentment. While Garrison lorded over his medical brethren with his dogmatic approach and strict, at times almost silly, adherence to rules (he was a member of the State Board of Health after all), his superior attitude was entirely discredited by the small pox incident, providing his opposition with ample ammunition.

On the afternoon of May 20th, Garrison himself was finally called to the stand. After giving a brief account of his life, Garrison provided his story of the September brawl, which was basically a reiteration of all that had previously been said about the incident. Garrison continued to tell of numerous occurrences throughout the following months where he had ran into his former friend around town and endured Baird’s
favorite insults, as well as several incidents where Baird deliberately tried to catch Garrison’s bicycle wheel in the wheel of his buggy.226 Although Garrison stated that he did his best to avoid Baird at all costs, their occasional chance meetings were inevitable. On the morning of the murder in the face of Baird’s repeated insults “hissing through his teeth”, Garrison remembered, “All the warnings and threats came to me in an instant, and I thought now’s the time he’s been waiting for”.227 After he saw Baird put his hand on his coat, Garrison remembered drawing his pistol and shooting Baird twice in quick succession.

In explanation of his fear of bodily harm from Baird, Garrison stated that he had received several warnings from townspeople that Baird meant to kill him after which he started carrying a pistol, and that members of Baird’s family had essentially been chaperoning him around town so as to prevent him from quarreling with Garrison. Furthermore, Garrison had received an anonymous letter that he was sure was inspired by Baird, containing such heinous obscenities that it was never read aloud in court. Garrison explained that he had confided in a friend after examining the letter: “I said I had borne these insults for the sake of my family and that I believed he meant to kill me; I said it had to stop and that I would not stand personal violence and that I was prepared for him and would defend myself if I was offered personal violence”.228

After explaining Baird’s many provocations and his own fear leading up to the morning of March 7th, Garrison then related the history of his relationship with Baird, from the beginning of their friendship through its tragic deterioration. During the cross-
examination by Captain Dovener, Garrison confirmed that he and Baird had been
extremely close friends from 1881 until 1888, when things suddenly took a turn. The
transcript of the trial read:

Q.—You attended medical lectures after you came here, did you not?
A.—Yes, Sir.
Q.—Who was the Health Officer while you were at the lectures?
Objected to by Colonel Arnett.
Captain Dovener said he desired to trace that friendship to the point where it was
broken off, and see who forfeited the friendship; who first evinced this hostile
feeling by words or deeds. Colonel Arnett said that the question of who was to
blame in the origin and which was the original aggressor could not affect the
case one jot or tittle. The question whether the friendship broken up years before
was at the instance of one or another could have no weight. The court sustained
the objection.
Q.—When was you elected Health Officer?
A.—In 1885.
Q.—You and Dr. Baird were on friendly terms, were you not?
A.—Yes, sir.
Q.—He supported you, did he not, for Health Officer?
A.—I can’t recall that he did anything for me, but he did nothing against me.
Q.—Who was the next Health Officer?
A.—Dr. Robert J. Reed.
Q.—Did your friendship cease then?
A.—No, sir. A coolness arose in him toward me in the summer of 1888.
Q.—Who was the Health Officer then?
A.—Dr. Robert J. Reed.
Q.—During the time you were Health Officer and were in the city what was
your degree of intimacy between you and Dr. Baird?
A.—Of the most friendly character.
Q.—How often did you meet?
A.—Frequently.
Q.—Were you not friendly?
A.—We were en rapport in everything. We were in the water question together
and built the crematory together; he helped me and I helped him.
Q.—Did Dr. Reed Baird attend lectures after you did?
A.—I don’t know; I think not, I think he was practicing in 1883.
Q.—Reed Baird was your competitor before the Council caucus for Health
Officer, was he not?
A.—At the first election I went to his mother and asked her if Reed was a
candidate, and she said no. The second time, on the morning after the Council
election in 1889, I started out to electioneer. There had been no candidates out because the election was a surprise to every one. Every one expected the council to be Republican, and the Democrats had put no one forward for the place. Coming down Main street I met Dr. George Baird and Dr. L.D. Wilson near where Mr. Jones lives. I said, ‘Gentlemen, I am a candidate for Health Officer, and I want your support.’ Dr. Baird said ‘Yes, we’ll support you.’ Before that he had ceased speaking to me. I had for a long time tried to learn why, and when I would pass him I would nod and try to catch his eye, because I did not want trouble. After I made the fight for the office, Reed Baird then came out; I was surprised, because he’d been a Republican, and I thought it strange for him to make the canvas, because his father was a Democrat.²²⁹

Garrison’s testimony in the trial provided a glimpse into the real political processes involved in public health elections, and helped to form a patchwork of the tensions and irritations that ultimately destroyed a friendship and incited murder. The testimony revealed that Garrison had left Wheeling to take a course of medical lectures presumably while he was Health Officer in 1885 or 1886. Although Dovener was objected to before he was able to obtain a straight answer from Garrison, the line of questioning, in which Dovener was trying to prove the strength of the friendship of the two men, suggested that while Garrison was away attending medical lectures Baird served as Health Officer in his place. This was supported by the information included in Howard’s opening statement that when Garrison had been prohibited from practicing, Baird had kept up Garrison’s medical practice while the latter went away to study. While the two doctors were united throughout the building of the crematory and the issue of the city’s water supply, Garrison remembered that he had felt a “coolness” from Baird in the summer of 1888.

It was impossible to ascertain the exact cause of this—Garrison himself was confused as to the reason for Baird’s sudden change of attitude. From the testimony of
the trial, however, a few distinct events markedly exacerbated the existing tension. In January of 1889, Garrison revealed that he had run against Dr. Baird’s son Dr. Reed Baird for the position of Health Officer. Although Garrison claimed he had no idea of Reed Baird’s candidacy (his name was not even mentioned in the February 6, 1889 issue of the *Intelligencer* as a candidate) Garrison won the election, undoubtedly angering Baird.

Furthermore, the incident that Howard referenced in his opening statement, involving Garrison’s attempt to have Baird arrested for misstating the cause of death on a certificate was almost unbelievably insulting—while Baird had maintained Garrison’s medical practice when he had been forced to take additional medical courses in order to legitimately practice (at Jefferson Medical College, incidentally the same medical school that Baird had gone to), Garrison repaid him by trying to prosecute him for a medical mistake. While Garrison was asked directly by the cross-examiner whether he had gone to Mr. Fee and asked him to issue a warrant for Dr. Baird for his mistake, the defense objected before Garrison could return a straight answer to the question. Not only did Garrison’s action represent a betrayal of a friendship, but the betrayal of a mentor—Baird was substantially older, more experienced, and more educationally qualified as a physician. While Garrison had not even possessed the necessary educational qualifications to practice medicine before he attended additional lectures in 1885, he found the audacity in the following years to prosecute his more experienced colleagues (including one of his closest friends) for professional mistakes. It is no wonder, then, that the rest of Wheeling’s doctors were so quick to jump on his mistake.
in the diagnosis and quarantine of the small pox case in 1891, or why they were so incensed at his appointment to the State Board of Health in 1887.

Garrison’s testimony also illustrated the intensely political nature of local public health elections. While the *Intelligencer* failed to include any coverage on campaigning or electioneering by candidates for city committee offices, Garrison’s story provided some insight as to its role in elections. Furthermore, Garrison’s comment expressing his surprise at Reed Baird’s decision to run on account of his being a Republican exemplified the intensely partisan nature of politics at this time. Indeed, it was an oft-mentioned source of satisfaction to everyone that Garrison and Baird were both Democrats, stripping the case of any possible partisan slant.

As Garrison’s testimony continued, he stated that he was sure Baird’s threats to “blow his black damned head off” were genuine, and he had feared for his life ever since hearing from Dr. Meyers and others that Baird meant to kill him or drive him out of town. On the day he shot Baird, Garrison testified that Baird had put his hand to his breast as though to open up his coat and retrieve a pistol. Garrison swore that as he passed Baird he could hear him following him as if to attack him, which is when he pulled his own pistol and shot Baird twice. Garrison avowed that while he had meant to hit Baird, he had not meant to kill him. In response to charges of malicious intent, Garrison asserted that any feelings of maliciousness were “utterly foreign to any feelings I ever had”, and stated that he acted purely in self defense.
By May 22nd Garrison was taken off the stand, and the attorneys offered their final statements. In his closing remarks, Prosecutor Howard stated there was no question as to whether or not Garrison had committed the murder. Rather, the question that the jury needed to deliberate was whether or not he was justified in doing so. Howard argued that Dr. Baird’s insults had driven him to the point of murder. Howard explained, “Dr. Garrison was smarting under the insults he had received from Dr. Baird and he was then cogitating upon the best means of revenge. We do not deny that Dr. Baird insulted him and said unkind things about him, but that is not justification… The fact is, Dr. Garrison killed Dr. Baird the first time the opportunity was offered. The first time they met face to face, Dr. Baird was killed”.\footnote{Contrary to what Garrison had said, Howard stated that several witnesses had testified that Baird had made no movements with his hands, therefore supporting the prosecution’s stance that there was insufficient proof of the existence of a physical threat substantial enough for Garrison to have acted in self defense. Furthermore, Howard argued, if Garrison’s actions were found justifiable, then the murder of Garrison by Reed Baird would surely be found justifiable on the grounds that Reed Baird was provoked by his father’s murder, as would the killing of Reed Baird by one of Garrison’s brothers on the grounds that his brother was killed—in other words, severe provocation alone did not justify murder.}

On May 26th, Colonel Arnett presented his final statements for the defense to the largest audience in the history of the circuit court. In the course of his concluding remarks, Colonel Arnett argued for Garrison’s acquittal on the grounds that Garrison feared for his life. Arnett explained, “No man in all the world so much deplores the
death of Dr. Baird as Dr. Garrison does. He did not kill Dr. Baird through any malice or because he wanted him to die. It was because he felt that one of them must die; because he wanted to live out the time allotted to him and to remain with his wife and family. While Garrison did his best to avoid Baird and responded to his constant threats and insults by ignoring him, Colonel Arnett argued that Baird was trying to provoke Garrison into attacking him so that Baird could then shoot Garrison and plead self defense. Instead, Garrison was constantly provoked and his life threatened to the point of mortal fear. The one time that Garrison failed in his vigilant avoidance of Baird, he acted in self defense against a man who he was sure meant to kill him. Garrison had pleaded not guilty, and should be acquitted under the law.

After the concluding statements from both sides were heard, the jury was instructed as to its decision: for Garrison to be found guilty the jury must decide that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. For the jury to find that the defendant acted in self defense, it was explained, “Apprehension of danger to justify a homicide ought to be based not alone on surmises; but there ought to be coupled therewith some act on the part of the party, from whom danger was apprehended, evidencing an immediate intention to carry into execution his threats or designs”. In short, insults and perceived danger alone unaccompanied by an “overt act” or “hostile demonstration” at the time of the killing were insufficient grounds to justify murder.

After a day’s deliberation in a trial that had held the city’s attention captive for nearly four weeks, the jury returned their verdict: second degree murder. Everyone,
including the prosecution, was surprised. As the *Intelligencer* marveled, “It was the most unexpected thing that could have taken place, aside from a verdict of murder in the first degree. From the very start, only a few rated the punishment that the jury would inflict upon Dr. Garrison, higher than accompanying the crime of manslaughter. Almost everyone had come to the conclusion that the jury would be unable to agree upon a verdict, and numerous bets were made that the verdict would be acquittal”. Although Garrison’s verdict of second degree murder was punishable by a term of five to twenty years in prison, three days after the jury delivered their sentence, two new witnesses came forward claiming to corroborate the testimony of witness Baker, who had claimed he saw Baird’s hand go to his hip, but who had been impeached as a witness on account of a reputation for exaggeration. In light of the new evidence, Sommerville pledged to appeal the case and get a new trial, a process which undoubtedly took months.

While Garrison’s trial was taking place, the Health Committee proceeded with business as usual under the new Health Officer, Dr. Shearer. In mid March, while Garrison was awaiting his preliminary hearing, the Committee on Health met and engaged once again in their time old argument over a suitable site for the new crematory, and met with Mr. Smith to ascertain a price estimate. Health Officer Shearer released his quarterly report of mortality statistics at the end of March, markedly devoid of a lengthy Garrison-esque treatise.

In a rather poetic coincidence, the crematory caught on fire in the middle of Garrison’s trial. In an article titled “The Crematory Cremated”, the *Intelligencer*
reported that the wood structure that had been erected to cover the crematory had been placed too close to the furnace, and had ignited into a “mass of flames”. The article recounted, “The fire made a magnificent sight in the city, and was watched by hundreds of people”. Therefore, as hundreds watched Garrison’s career go down in flames in the courtroom, so to speak, they simultaneously watched one of his major professional achievements literally burn to the ground. Although the furnace itself wasn’t harmed, the wooden structure had cost $700 to build, and the incident would necessitate yet more funding to fix the notoriously troublesome building. In harmony with its never-ending cycle of constant ailments, the crematory was closed down to allow for the necessary repairs. Even with Garrison out of the picture, therefore, his legacy of the crematory, which one council member had dubbed “Garrison’s monument”, lived on as a symbolic reminder of Garrison’s tumultuous tenure as Health Officer.
Wheeling’s experience in the 1880s with public health illustrated the difficulties that emerged from a public health system in transition. While issues of garbage disposal and the city’s water supply were clearly the two largest public health issues in Wheeling in the last four years of the decade, solutions to these problems were elusive and imperfect in spite of intense debates and attention from the parties involved.

Evidence of a shift towards preventative rather than curative methods can be seen in contrasting the events of 1880 to 1889. While the dual epidemics of measles and typhoid in the first third of 1880 were met with temporary sanitary inspectors to stem the outbreak, Garrison argued in 1890 for the employment of four sanitary inspectors year round for the express purpose of prevention. Furthermore, while the Fourth Ward school remained open during the dual epidemics of 1880, Washington School was closed during the diphtheria scare at the end of 1889 to prevent the outbreak from escalating into an epidemic, illustrating the precedence that public health had taken over other interests.

Although the Intelligencer as well as many of Wheeling’s doctors (Garrison especially) advocated for preventative measures, however, their actual implementation was spotty, protracted, and fraught with practical problems. Although Wheeling had a Committee on Health by 1880, it derived its authority from the City Council, making the issue of funding preventative measures especially a constant battle. While both the crematory and Baird’s pure-water law were enacted with the intent of disease prevention, their effect in tandem was to limit formerly acceptable means of trash
disposal, ultimately resulting in the mass accumulation of trash within the city limits which contributed to a near epidemic of diphtheria by the end of 1889.

The transition to a preventative, institutionalized and bacteriological-based system also raised new conflicts that were formerly a non-issue. For example, the episode in 1890 involving the hide house and the soap factory represented a conflict of interest between business and public health. In the same vein, with the increased priority of public health, businesses considered a health hazard were subject to the protests of the community and of public health officials.

In addition to power struggles between health authorities and business interests, the institutionalization of public health into Boards at varying municipal levels created an internal power struggle between public health authorities themselves. While Wheeling’s own Committee on Health had previously possessed full control over the city’s health issues, the creation of a West Virginia State Board of Health in 1881 and an Ohio County Board of Health in 1887 presented a challenge to the totality of that control, and prompted a fight by Wheeling’s doctors to change their “Committee” on Health to a “Board” in order to legally maintain jurisdiction over their own affairs.

As well as to the jurisdictional battles that the formation of these boards created, they also drafted legislation to rule the state’s medical community (Harris’s Health laws of 1887) and essentially mold the definition of a “physician” by imposing educational standards and regulations.
Garrison’s saga is an incredibly forceful and profound illustration of the political and ideological issues that arose during this era in public health and the upheaval they caused. The circumstances of Garrison’s rise to professional prestige as well as his excessive actions led his colleagues to see him as an unjustified zealot for both the implementation of sanitary measures and the enforcement of the rules created by the medical establishment. While he was certainly knowledgeable, proactive in attempting to improve the city’s sanitary conditions, and prolific in his reports of statistics, he had not paid his dues. Not only had he been forced to gain additional medical education before he could resume his practice in Wheeling, he was then appointed to the West Virginia Board of Health in blatant violation of the establishment’s rules.

While his questionable appointment to the State Board of Health enraged his fellow physicians, demonstrating the clout of the medical profession’s exclusionary laws, it seemed to encourage Garrison to take a strict, dogmatic approach in his newfound responsibility, arresting fellow physicians and garbage contractors as if he were a medical messiah. While Garrison was relatively subdued during his first term as Health Officer, the Intelligencer was littered with his treatises, monologues and reports of his doings after he was appointed to the West Virginia State Board of Health in 1887. His inclination to sidestep the wishes of the rest of Wheeling’s medical community and broadcast Wheeling’s deplorable sanitary state to bodies of higher authority further alienated him from his colleagues by implying their incompetence.

Garrison’s assessment of Wheeling’s health as appalling and the ensuing argument with Campbell that it caused exemplified one of the cardinal questions that
inevitably arose in this era of public health: how much was enough when it came to sanitary reform? In a time period when epidemic disease was simply a fact of American life, what should the new standards for health be, especially considering the gradual propagation of germ theory? With his constant harping on the ills of Wheeling’s unsanitary state, Garrison was essentially arguing for a new definition of healthy and a transformation of the conceptualization of a “normal” death rate. In contrast, Campbell and others labeled Garrison as an alarmist who was deliberately exaggerating the health situation for political purposes. After all, much of Wheeling’s medical community likely thought that Garrison was not qualified to make such a judgment in the first place. Garrison’s and Campbell’s argument also displayed the disunity among the regular physicians of this era. While they may have subscribed to the same general scientific principles, there was a whole spectrum of devotion to sanitary protocol.

While virtually the entirety of the city’s medical profession thought Garrison undeserving of his post on the State Health Board and many made cracks about his unfitness for the position of Health Officer, no one was more incensed by his actions than Dr. Baird. It is impossible to know exactly what caused the split between Garrison and Baird, but a combination of personal and political disagreements and rivalries relating to public health was at the center.

Though homicide was surely a rare outcome of public health disputes, the issues and arguments behind the protracted feud and Baird’s eventual murder were the natural result of the transition to an institutionalized, bacteriological-based system of public health. Although the committal of murder surely represents the extreme end of the
spectrum, it serves as evidence for the exceptionally politicized and turbulent climate that characterized this era of public health.
3 Duffy, 139.
4 Ibid., 180.
5 Ibid.
7 Ellis, 3.
8 Duffy, 100.
9 Ibid., 190.
10 Ibid., 193.
13 Ibid., 3.
14 Ibid., 15.
15 Ibid., 4.
16 Ibid., 16.
17 *Intelligencer*, January 3, 1880.
18 *Intelligencer*, January 7, 1880.
19 *Intelligencer*, April 9, 1880.
20 *Intelligencer*, April 10, 1880.
21 *Intelligencer*, January 15, 1887.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 *Intelligencer*, January 31, 1887.
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31 *Intelligencer*, March 9, 1887.
32 *Intelligencer*, March 12, 1887.
33 Ibid.
34 *Intelligencer*, March 22, 1887.
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36 *Intelligencer* March 30, 1887.
37 *Intelligencer*, March 9, 1887.
38 *Intelligencer*, March 30, 1887.
39 *Intelligencer*, April 2, 1887.
40 *Intelligencer*, April 6, 1887.
41 *Intelligencer*, April 28, 1887.
42 *Intelligencer*, May 24, 1887.
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44 *Intelligencer*, May 7, 1887.
45 *Intelligencer*, June 28, 1887.
46 *Intelligencer*, July 15, 1887.
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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 *Intelligencer*, July 16, 1887.
52 Ibid.
53 *Intelligencer*, July 18, 1887.
54 Ibid.
55 *Intelligencer*, July 21, 1887.
56 Ibid.
57 *Intelligencer*, August 18, 1887.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 *Intelligencer*, January 10, 1888.
62 Ibid.
63 *Intelligencer*, May 11, 1888.
64 *Intelligencer*, May 12, 1888.
65 *Intelligencer*, April 13, 1889.
66 *Intelligencer*, September 15, 1887.
67 Ibid.
68 *Intelligencer*, July 14, 1890.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 *Intelligencer*, September 15, 1887.
72 Ibid.
73 *Intelligencer*, October 4, 1887.
74 Ibid.
75 *Intelligencer*, September 28, 1887.
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77 *Intelligencer*, November 1, 1887.
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93 *Intelligencer*, November 8, 1887.
94 *Intelligencer*, December 20, 1887.
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