The papers on possession published in this issue of *Dissociation* go back to a plan to identify representative positions on the subject and publish them jointly. Dr. Richard Kluft was, as is his customary style, enthusiastic and supportive about the project. We were, however, only partially successful in realizing our goal. Originally, we had planned to include a spokesperson from the "healing ministry" point of view, someone who believed in the reality of spirit intrusions. We designated one of the most articulate contributors in this tradition, and he agreed to prepare a principal paper for us. Unfortunately, due to pressures from other commitments, he was forced to drop out of the project at a point in time too late for us to recruit a replacement. Our consolation is that we have representation of this point of view among our discussants. All three of them have substantial contributions to make, as the reader will undoubtedly see. We are also consoled by the fact that widespread interest in the subject of possession may spur discussion of the contributions by scholars who not only have sustained an abiding interest in the theme, but who also have important things to say.

And no wonder! There are few topics enlivened by such a confluence of interests: cultural, philosophical, theological, historical, psychiatric, psychological, anthropological, and — as is apparent from recent medieval and Renaissance studies — legal. There is an amazing richness and diversity to the possession heritage around the globe, aside from certain problems it poses. Indeed, to place the clinical dimension of issues raised by possession at the forefront of consideration downplays another of its features. This is, as one anthropologist puts it, an aspect of consciousness available as a "psychobiological capacity to all societies." (Bourguignon, 1973, p. 11). In many of them, ritual forms of possession are at the center of cultural life and identification. It is only the minority condition of unwanted or idiosyncratic possessions that is referred to the clinical practitioner, exorcist, or shaman for treatment.

Several of the contributors speak about the necessity for collegiality and humility in discussions about possession. This theme is no accident. Indeed, a similar spirit currently pervades historical scholarship. It seeks to rectify the excesses of outlook bequeathed us by nineteenth century commentators. Many of the latter permitted their anti-clericalism to obscure the complexity of a subject matter. The newer approach by historians of early modern America and Europe is most apparent in contemporary analyses of older allegations of witchcraft and Satanism. It behooves clinicians and other health professionals to consult this impressive modern literature before assuming our own in-house discussions of ritual abuse circa 1980 and thereafter are highly original or definitive.

We welcome future contributions to the subject of possession from the readership.

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**REFERENCE**

POSSESSION:
INTERDISCIPLINARY
ROOTS

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ABSTRACT

Possession states have a remarkably broad transcultural distribution, and mirror the influence of a range of social variables. Encompassing a variety of individual patterns, as a class they virtually confound attempts at "reduction" to pathological conditions or forms of dissociation like multiple personality disorder. Paradoxes exist in both the naturalistic and supernaturalistic approaches to possession. Commentators in both traditions may misconceive the nature of the connection between explanatory schema and treatment packages, while contemporary exorcists may underestimate trends of skepticism about their practices evident in honored theological traditions. Exorcisms are not precluded on "scientific" grounds. Treatment strategies for culture-bound syndromes may have to accommodate to the meanings those who experience them attribute to their plights.

INTRODUCTION

Sciences, whether fledgling or advanced, strive to extend their purview through concepts unifying diverse aspects of reality. The bent is viewed as salutary when it establishes commonalities underlying otherwise disparate phenomena. When it denudes cherished beliefs of their time-honored meanings, it may be perceived as merciless reductionism. One offshoot of the drive is the theory that spirit possession is a form of dissociation, probably multiple personality disorder (MPD). Parallels between the two are unmistakable (Kenny, 1981), despite differences distinguishing them. One such difference would be presumed to be an invasion by a discarnate spirit or spirits, rather than the existence of alternate human identities or personality states. The contrast here also spawns clashes between hotly contested explanatory paradigms involving the fundamental nature of our world.

Not all slants on possession and dissociation mobilize party loyalties. Some take the neutral ground. For example, we may, without ulterior reductionist motive, construe possession states and dissociative disorders to be simply different taxonomic categories. Such theory-neutral decisions have always been available for classificatory purposes. They cut across commitments to broader paradigms. For example, the diagnostic terms possession state and trance/possession syndrome can be applied aseptically to patterns different from those routinely classified as MPD.

On the other hand, we may regard possession and multiplicity as contrasting interpretations of the same data-base, dubbing this slant the Double Aspect Picture (DAP). The DAP is the view that diagnoses of possession and MPD are based upon the same database. In other words, the separate diagnoses refer to the same substratum, but represent different interpretations of it. Under it, possession has a home in a broader religious or supernaturalistic outlook. It embraces such concepts as discarnate entity, spirit, demon, exorcism, and the like. MPD, on the other hand, relies on scientific concepts such as dissociation, alters, ego-states, and psychotherapy. If the DAP specifies that the concepts represent separate theories about the same data, reductionism takes the further step of disqualifying one of the interpretations. The step taken is not an inconsequential one. A reductionist may grant the presence of a "demonic" alter with the qualification that it is not a real demon, but only a dissociated ego-state presenting as such.

Selfhood

As concepts, possession and multiplicity embody different slants on individuation. In the dissociative disorder, the self is split or fragmented; in possession, the body is shared. The semblance of fragmentation of self in possession is an artifact of the invasion of the truly alien other, but in dissociation, it is due to the splitting of one. In other words, in MPD, alters, however separable, are still considered aspects of one individual. Possession, on the other hand, is presumed to involve more than one entity. Furthermore, these conceptual differences have been historically coupled with contrasting treatment packages. In MPD, separate or conflicting ego-states (alters) are usually integrated psychotherapeutically; in possession, alien spirits are extruded or exorcised (Goodwin, Hill, & Attias, 1990) when not accommodated as an aspect of cultural life (Lewis, 1971). Since the contrast between treatment approaches is a palpable one, exorcists and psychotherapists have often been at loggerheads over strategies of remediation. Be that as it may, reductionism may be
doomed for other reasons. Telling differences between features of possession states and MPD may cause the DAP model to founder.

CROSS-CULTURAL FINDINGS

Possession has a broader conceptual sprawl than multiplicity. Because of this, there are no invariant psychological components in possession states permitting inclusion under multiplicity. Even if the common denominator existed, the category could not be a clinical one. Many possession states, by virtue of their integral function in cultural or tribal life, their role in communal ritual, and the socially binding functions they serve around the world, cannot be classified as pathological (Herskovitz, 1955; Ward, 1980). In addition, some possessions do not meet criteria of dissociation, because they are not dissociative phenomena. This is shown by cultures in which they occur in the virtual absence of a trance state, and in the context of alterations of capacity or physical condition rather than consciousness (Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977; Wijesinghe, Dissayake, & Mendis, 1976). Such cases appear to involve "possession" as purely cognitive overlays in non-dissociative patterns. In Sri Lanka, for example, Sinhalese communities often diagnose possession on the basis of such symptoms as headache, fever, or gastrointestinal distress, conditions that they attribute to spiritual intrusion (Obeyesekere, 1970; Kapferer, 1983).

Oesterreich (1966) believed a majority of possessions do not involve alterations of consciousness, a criterion of dissociation. His estimate of non-dissociative possessions may have been exaggerated. Bourguignon, in a comprehensive survey of 488 societies, cites 34, or only seven per cent of them, in which possessions are believed to occur in the virtual absence of trance-states or other dissociative patterns (Bourguignon, 1973). For her, possession unaccompanied by trance-state (T), trance-state without possession (T), and trance/possession state (TP) can be documented anthropologically as discrete. In line with the second of these variations, Spencer (1965) cited protracted trance-states in the Samburu nomads of Kenya. These states are not attributed by the Samburu to spirits or mystical forces, but to stress reactions. A similar ideology characterizes the approach of the Abelams of New Guinea to warriors who become extremely agitated and engage in uncontrollable violence (Lewis, 1971).

Divergent interpretations of possession states may co-exist within the same culture. A fifteenth century example is the dancing manias which swept Europe in the wake of the Black Death (White, 1955; Aston, 1968). In the Low Countries, the mania was attributed to demon possession. In Spain and Italy, it was perceived naturally as due to the bite of the tarantula — hence the origin of the term tarantella (Sigerist, 1943; Rosen, 1968; Lewis, 1971). One sometimes gets the impression that treatment specialists who are convinced they deal with MPD alters and spirits or demons — sometimes in the same patient — are not "culture-controlled" (Lhermitte, 1963; Allison, 1980; Peck, 1983; Crabtree, 1985; Friesen, 1991). These practitioners, like the patients they treat, seem to straddle two "cultures": one developed in a technocracy, and one hearkening back to centuries-old traditions.

Another challenge to the DAP is that its assumed parallelism between naturalistic and supernaturalistic categories breaks down. For example, a pattern of behavior may be classified as pseudo-possession because it does not meet criteria fixed by certain theological traditions. However, this may not affect its status as a dissociative pattern within a medical or naturalistic tradition (i.e., not all pseudo-possessions are factitious disorders).

The historically epidemic character of certain possessions, as manifested by the European dancing manias and the group possessions of cloistered seventeenth century French nuns (Huxley, 1952; Robbins, 1959) also undermines the DAP. While MPD may run in families, it has not been observed to develop as an immediate effect of modeling, affecting fifty or eighty nuns in short order. Such was the case in the Rome possessions of 1554 and the Lyons possessions of 1687 (Robbins, 1959).

Ritual Control

Forms of possession world-wide may be distinguished by the degree to which they are subject to ritual control. This refers to the regulation of a possession by a host and the community. One can distinguish the individual, unpredictable, and culturally pathological forms of possession from the valued, institutionally-based, and morally conformist type. The distinction corresponds to the one drawn by Lewis (1969; 1971) in the anthropological literature as between peripheral and central cult possessions.

Degree of ritual control is yet another challenge for the DAP. A regular feature of such dissociative disorders as MPD is their unpredictable switching. Possession states, on the other hand, run a gamut from cases of sudden onset to those in which spirit intrusions are ceremonially scheduled and terminated like clockwork. In our own country, ritual possessions in such groups as Pentecostal and Charismatic sects (Nichol, 1971; Ward & Beaubrun, 1981; Goodman, 1988), and early Quaker and Shaker communities (Brathwaite, 1955), were an accepted and valued feature of religious life.

The form of possession known as mediumship or channeling had a preeminent place in the nineteenth century revival of Spiritualism (Cadwallader, 1911; Cumberland, 1918; Brandon, 1984; Coon, 1992). Biblical reference to this sort of possessed state actually predated references to the demonic possessions of the Synoptic Gospels. The woman of Endor, arguably misidentified for centuries as a witch (Parrinder, 1958; Scot, 1972), operated as a channeler through whom the ghost of Samuel was raised at the request of King Saul. Later theologians, like St. Augustine, were intent on denouncing such black arts as necromancy. Accordingly, he interpreted the Endor channeling to have been engineered by a demon masquerading as the prophet (Lea, 1957).

Impact of Acculturation

The role of culture in both possession and dissociation may have been underestimated (Meekel, 1935-36; Boisen,
1939; Kiev, 1961; Leon, 1972-73; Akhtar, 1988). The most dramatic presentation of dissociative disorder, multiple personality disorder (MPD), is often traced to an early pattern of physical or sexual trauma in tandem with a biological component correlated with high hypnotizability (Braun, 1986; Putnam, 1989). On the assumption these two variables are internationally distributed, a question arises about the reported lower incidence of MPD in many Third World countries (Yap, 1960; Freed & Freed, 1964; Teja, Khanna, & Subramanyam, 1970; Varma, Srivastava & Sahay, 1970; Adityanjee, Raju, & Khandelwal, 1989; Saxena & Prasad, 1989; Takahashi, 1990). It could transpire that a third variable, culturation, affects the final form a behavioral presentation takes when other etiological factors obtain. If so, currently posited causal conditions of MPD may be necessary, not sufficient, to produce the disorder. In line with this, the lower incidence of MPD in the Third World may not be simply an artifact of differences in diagnostic practices. Conceivably, the disparity might well reflect a higher proportion of possessions, as a function of transformations introduced by culture. Furthermore, the traumatic origins of MPD may not parallel an analogous etiology for possession states transculturally. Many of these states appear to originate in societal patterns confounding any such attribution. Kluit (1984, 1991) has made similar observations.

Another hypothesis, put forth by Downs, Dahmer and Battle (1990) and Adityanjee, Raju and Khandelwal (1989), is that possession states are diagnosed more frequently in Asia because they are lumped together under MPD in western countries. Varma, Bouri and Wig (1981), on the occasion of one of the rare diagnoses of MPD in India, speculated that the expression of personal identity disturbance is spirit possession in societies in which polytheism and beliefs in reincarnation hold sway, whereas MPD may be the favored manifestation in Western cultures in which deliberate role-playing is reinforced.

**Sex-linked Factors**

Investigators (Ward, 1980; Walker, 1981) have linked the incidence of possession to social disenfranchisement. Cross-culturally, women seem to be more vulnerable to possession than men. Ward (1980) has referenced women’s need for “prestige elevation” in male-dominated societies. This appears to be true for populations as diverse as the Luo women of Kenya (Whisson, 1964), the Kamba women of east Africa (Lindblom, 1920), Somali women (Lewis, 1969), Swahili women, and ZAR possessions across broad stretches of Moslem Africa (Messing, 1958), as it was for the Ursuline nuns of France in the seventeenth century. In the last named case, the development of newer social roles commanding attention from male exorcists and church officials was implicit in the demonic possessions of the nuns (Huxley, 1952). Groups of women in the sixteenth century took to preaching while possessed, a revered role ordinarily reserved for men (Walker, 1981). Finally, in the widely known case of a French demoniac, Marthe Brossier, the afflicted girl had earlier cut off her hair, fugued, and cross-dressed as a male (Walker & Dickerman, 1991). For many woman innovators from Joan of Arc to the French novelist George Sand, the donning of mannish attire heralded their assumption of cultural roles considered male prerogatives.

The stamp of culture on possession is also suggested by the obvious influence of prevailing belief systems (Littlewood & Lipkedge, 1985). Possessions tend to disappear as ideas about spirits diminish, especially in industrial societies. They increase in number in regions “where they are once more taken seriously by persons in authority” (Oesterreich, 1986, pp. 194-195). Psychoanalysts like Greenon (1974) and Challman (1974) have held that the attractiveness of exorcism lies in its ability to enable us to “delude” ourselves that we are innocent victims of invading forces which can take the rap for impulses we wish to disown. However, externalization of responsibility is but one possible element in a complicated cultural strand. Moreover, it figures prominently in the dynamics of MPD, where there is ordinarily no presumption about spiritual intrusions.

**POSSESSION IN EUROPEAN HISTORY**

In European history, possession had for centuries been attributed to witchcraft, an overriding social concern (Hansen, 1900, 1901; Trevor-Roper, 1956; Lea, 1957; Thomas, 1971; Midelfort, 1972; Russell, 1972; Cohn, 1975; Monter, 1976; Klaits, 1985). De-escalation of the witch-craze saw a corresponding reduction in the number of reported demonic possessions. The Salem “possessions” of 1692 evaporated at the point allegations of witchcraft lost momentum because they were directed toward increasing numbers of socially prominent Puritans, rather than the downtrodden (Starkey, 1969; Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974; Demos, 1982; Karlson, 1987; Godbeer, 1992).

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the number of European possessions was influenced by geography, era, and socioreligious climate. The events across the ocean in Salem Village (Mather, 1693) took place against a backdrop of social upheaval, one instance of which was the reversion of the Bay Colony charter and the reinstatement of the hegemony of the Church of England (Hansen, 1969).

During the same time-frame, demonic possessions and suspected cases of witchcraft increased in countries like England, France, Switzerland, and Germany at moments in their history when religious factionalism between Catholics and Protestants disrupted national life. In England, accession of the Tudor line under Henry VIII signaled an outbreak of violence against Catholic exorcists. Across the channel in France, open warfare between Catholics and French Protestants, or Huguenots, was the order of the day, and was dramatized in campaigns of persecution (Hautot, 1990). Barnett (1965) has pointed out that Catholic Ireland was virtually witchcraft-free during periods that the panic raged elsewhere, possibly because of the absence of social upheaval sparked by religious disension. The same was true after a time in Spain. In this monarchy, prevailing ecclesiastical uniformity and a preoccupation with rooting out the infidel (Atkinson, 1960; Peters, 1989; Elliott, 1990) had brought witch-burnings to an abrupt halt after the reports of Alonso
de Salazar Frías, inquisitor of the Logroño tribunal, were sent to Madrid in 1614, (Henningsen, 1969, 1980; Baroja, 1971). Out of 4,000 cases brought to trial in Spain between 1550 and 1750, only eleven witches were sentenced to be executed by burning. Of these, only six were actually burned, since five were burned in effigy (Henningsen, 1980).

Ironically, expressions of the Catholic/Protestant antagonism were clashes over possession. In the seventeenth century, French exorcisms played a strategic role for orthodoxy. They were spectacular events, notorious for their theatrics, and staged for thousands of spectators. At Loudun alone, seven thousand people were reportedly in attendance at public exorcisms (Österreich, 1966, p. 103). The propagandistic value of the spectacles was not lost on the Huguenots, who had renounced exorcisms and the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist as remnants of Catholic superstition. “Successful” exorcisms using holy wafers drove the partisan point home more eloquently than did lengthy treatises in defense of the faith. Walker (1981) indicates that the staged French exorcisms effectively drove thousands into the confessional. These parishioners feared that their secret sins, festering because they had yet to be absolved, would be made public by demons before these were completely exorcised. Consequently, the parishioners arranged for private absolution before all their dirty linen was aired.

Pseudo-possessions

For European Catholics, a snag in the polemical warfare against Reformationists was the troublesome profusion of pseudo-possessions, many of which were the product of outright fraudulence (Robbins, 1959). When exposed as fraudulent, even “effective” exorcisms seemed to have mocked the pretensions of Catholic ritual. Fraudulent cases prompted theologians to develop more stringent criteria for true possession. In this atmosphere, the seventeenth century landscape was peppered with the fulminations of bishops and archbishops, like Clement Augustus of Cologne, who inveighed against a generation of venal and maverick exorcists whose avarice drove them to see devils everywhere (Lea, 1957, p. 1055). As a result, criteria for authentic signs of demon possession lessened in number. In a pastoral letter of 1669, the bishop of Pomerania, having grown incensed with the carnival aspect of the office of exorcist, threatened excommunication of priests initiating wildcat efforts at exorcism prior to obtaining permission from him (Lea, 1957, p. 1055). Felix Joseph Huber de Wavrans, Bishop of Ypres, likewise castigated the charlatanism of exorcists a century after the Loudun possessions (Lea, 1957, p. 1055).

Unmasked pseudo-possessions were exposed in cases like those of John Darrell, a Protestant exorcist convicted of assisting people in rehearsing how to act possessed (Thomas, 1971). Countless pseudo-possessions were investigated and exposed by James I of England, translator of the Bible, and himself a prominent demonologist of his day. Pseudo-possessions, whether or not a result of charlatanism, increased in seventeenth century Europe to a point at which their rhetorical value to Catholicism was nearly overshadowed by a widespread atmosphere of mendacity and hucksterism.

Today, the reticence of diocesan officials to approve exorcisms willy-nilly mirrors the skepticism of forebears in whose age it was common knowledge that fools rushed in where angels feared to tread.

A related phenomenon that challenged the appearance of legitimacy was that exorcisms could drag on interminably — sometimes for years. In some cases, demons would reappear after presumably effective extrusions, deflating erstwhile triumphant exorcists.

More stringent criteria of possession were formulated in the context of the above-mentioned concerns. Among these were revulsion to sacred objects, paranormal knowledge, paranormal strength, and paranormal linguistic ability. The latter capability was often illustrated by a competence in a foreign language or dialect presumably unknown to the host. Prior to the development of these criteria, the nature of demonic signs tended to shift over time in accord with the thinking and beliefs of the day. A Rouen treatise of 1644 listed eleven such signs, whereas Père Esprit de Bosroger (Robbins, 1959) and Michael Dalton in his 1627 treatise, Guide to Jurymen (Robbins, 1959) listed seven. Francesco-Maria Guazzo, in his Compendium Maleficarum (Guazzo, 1988), developed a group of forty-seven signs.

There are, of course, other dramatic signs of possession which, while not classical, were understood to meet a test of stringency. Some examples include: several basso voices that emerged from a teenager who was not visibly articulating the words (Vogel, 1935); mysterious stenches that came from nowhere (Goodman, 1988); having spun on one’s back like a top (Summers, 1956); and having levitated (Fielding-Ould, 1919; Thurston, 1952, 1955; Rogo, 1982; Crabtree, 1985; Noll, 1990).

Criteria of spirit possession that plead the most plausible case for supernaturalism survive the test of time only because they appear to be impervious to naturalistic explanation over very long periods of time — sometimes centuries. They have often failed to survive the progress of medical science. Because of this, they have decreased in number. In earlier epochs, disorders exotic for the age are perhaps now diagnosable as epilepsy or conversion disorder (Temkin, 1945). They were probably viewed as instances of possession at the time (Kemp & Williams, 1987). Alliotriphagy, or the vomiting of strange objects, had a significant and recurring place in the past as a symptom of possession. It appears to be on the wane in modern reports of possession.

NATURALISTIC V. SUPERNATURALISTIC EXPLANATION

The idea that “gaps” or loopholes in naturalistic accounts make them incomplete, or vulnerable to supernaturalistic explanation, is probably as old as recorded history. The imagined “incompleteness” of naturalism at many historical junctures has been emphasized in order to reinstitute or reinforce a sense of religious awe or wonderment (Brooke, 1991). The undercurrent was especially pronounced in the wake of the Copernican, Darwinian, and Freudian revolutions. These ideological depredations in effect dethroned us from
the exalted position in the universe central to older western religious concepts. Decades of the mid-nineteenth century's popularizing of Darwin’s evolutionary theory also spawned the birth of Spiritualism (Coon, 1992), possibly as a reaction to a prevailing mood of scientism. It is small wonder that escalation of fears about demons, sorcerers, and witches coincided in time not with periods of religion's hegemony, like the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages, but with the Renaissance. The latter witnessed a revival of pagan studies and the birth of experimental science and humanism.

The figure of the magician in European history was one steeped in the lore of occult arts (Neusner, Frerichs, & Flesher, 1989). The magician’s "heretical" flirtation with demonic power was infiltrated by strains of genuinely scientific methods and goals. Distrust of early scientific procedures by religious orthodoxy was probably exacerbated by their perceived association with heretical pursuits or interests. Magicians tended often to exculpate themselves from charges of sorcery by circulating the view that high magic relied only on the natural laws implicit in God's handiwork, nature. Many of them, like Paracelsus (Sigerist, 1941; Pachter, 1951), insisted that what orthodoxy perceived as the occult or diabolical was at bottom the "miraculous" intrinsic to the natural order of things.

**Medicalization and Secularization**

Recently, tensions between a psychiatric/naturalistic approach to possession states (Ehrenwald, 1975; Cupit, 1976; Trethowan, 1976; Fraser, 1991) and supernaturalism or truncated versions of it (Lhermitte, 1963; Finch, 1975; Rodewyck, 1975; Allison & Schwartz, 1980; Peck, 1983; Crabtree, 1985; Maurey, 1988; Friesen, 1991) are apparent in the clinical literature. Proponents of the latter approach, like their historical forebears, believe that possession states pose irresolvable problems for a one-sided naturalism. As Noll has described them, these specialists promote forms of treatment combining the psychological and the occult. Noll goes on to indicate that, "...the vast majority of mainstream psychiatrists and psychologists do not believe in spirits or spirit possession...this overwhelming majority would not recommend exorcism under any circumstances" (Noll, 1990, p. 179).

The paradigm clash (Kuhn, 1962) between naturalists and supernaturalists reflects tensions in a culture between secular and religious frames of reference. All the same, spokespersons in separate camps frequently gloss over paradoxes inherent in their respective postures. For example, Trethowan’s cautionary medical stance toward exorcism seems to contaminate metaphysical issues with those pertaining to treatment efficacy or harm:

> If such symptoms and behavior are not recognized for what they are, i.e., due to mental subnormality, the sufferers may not only fall into the wrong hands but be subjected to inappropriate treatment, including exorcism. The misguided application of such procedures may amount to frank mismanagement and can have dire results. (Trethowan, 1976, p. 127)

Despite Trethowan's admonition, the existence of demons and spirits is hardly a "scientific" issue to begin with. Accordingly, it is questionable whether supernaturalism is impugned by confirming "mental subnormality." Such a view may confuse independent realms of discourse: the naturalistic and the supernaturalistic. Scientists have the tools to evaluate whether exorcism are empirically effective; they are in no position to determine what occult forces may or may not be at work.

If Trethowan’s caveat is intended as a flat discouragement of exorcisms world-wide, he would appear to favor psychiatric co-optation of the treatment of possession states. Should the stance be rooted principally in allegiance to therapeutic goals and benefits, how is it justified prior to confirmation from comparative studies? Perhaps "frank mismanagement" is a verdict Trethowan feels is inescapable, considering the metaphysical underpinnings of exorcism. However, the latter may actually be unrelated to issues of efficacy, just as clinical improvement in psychotherapy may be unrelated to theories from which it is thought to have sprung (Grünbbaum, 1984, 1986a, 1986b). In any case, preemption of alternative practices in advance of obtaining cross-cultural outcome data is hardly inspired by "scientific" canons.

The "dire results" of exorcisms predicted by Trethowan may represent a selective focus on unsuccessful outcomes, the putative basis for the cautionary stance. A case in point is the death of Anneliese Michel at the hands of two exorcists in Germany (Goodman, 1981). The case was judged by a European court as "mislabeled," as are the occasional suicides of patients who, through happenstance, seek relief from exorcists (Fraser, 1991). Oddly, there is little acknowledgement that the sword cuts both ways. Suicides of MPD patients under psychiatric or psychological supervision (Kluft, 1992) are rarely conceived as advertising the "dire consequences" of secularization. Nor are numerous deaths under the surgeon’s knife widely regarded as the price we pay for renouncing demonology! This is not to plead the advantage of a Renaissance mind-set, but only to call attention to the one-sidedness of certain critiques, which inevitably boomerang.

One can only conclude that blanket professional decrees against exorcisms prior to determining their comparative efficacy in particular ethnological circumstances may simply be the expression of parochial sentiment. Furthermore, professional renunciation of supernaturalistic thinking is curiously half-hearted. Rarely is it parlayed into a comprehensive critique of religious belief in general — for reasons that are as logically inconsistent as they are politically obvious. Indeed, professional endorsements of tame forms of religious persuasion as the epitome of mental health and adjustment are legion (Pattison, 1969). Yet in centuries past, and to some extent nowadays, the reality of demonic powers for the religious subculture is wedded to theism. Belief in the existence of the forces of evil was once deemed an essential ingredient of orthodoxy. Because of this, disbelief in the Devil and his minions manifestly savored of heresy in yesteryear. Today, devotional life among many Christian, Judaic, and Islamic sects can forfeit dualism without jeopardizing faith.
in the first place.

A knottier philosophical issue centers on the problem of ultimately differentiating between true possession and dissociation. In other words, if coinciding naturalistic and supernaturalistic perspectives on the same substratum or database exist, what operations would validate one slant over the other? Such a question itself implies the availability of metatheoretical rules permitting this kind of determination. There may be none. Because of this, the very parameters of discourse are murky. Perhaps supernaturalistic explanation cannot be conceived as jockeying with naturalistic explanation in an arena for which commensurate conceptual standards take the measure of both (Brooke, 1991). Some such incommensurability of explanatory status is suggested by the aforementioned failure to rule out “true possession” by confirming “mental subnormality.” As Weinberg (1992) has observed, the inconsistency between scientific theories and supernaturalistic schema may not be so much a matter of logic as it is of temperament. Because of this, it may be misleading to assume we could resolve the existential mystery only providing we obtain the required data. Accordingly, a generation of treatment specialists familiar with MPD have thrown caution to the winds and have deliberated over what “empirical” criteria can be relied on to differentiate dissociative states from authentic spirit intrusions. Their guiding presupposition is that the actual data, in contrast to the incommensurable schema brought to bear on slicing them, are metaphysically transparent. Limitations of space preclude a fuller exploration of the intricacies of this issue. At any rate, describing the form taken by exorcism rites is essentially a historical or anthropological task, while investigating their efficacy in alleviating “possessions” a psychological or methodological one. Exploring the conceptual paradoxes of demonology is a philosophical or theological undertaking.

Historically, perceived tensions between naturalistic and demonological explanation often manifested as a clash between schema presumably accounting for a diverse range of phenomena. During the Renaissance, physicians typically deferred to clerics when it came to treating conditions they felt defied understanding through natural law or categories of Galenic medicine. Capitulation to demonology at such junctures strengthened the view that there were conditions naturalistic medicine would be forever debarrled from explaining. Far from being an impartial assessment of certain blights, the capitulation merely rubber-stamped a demonological mind-set. A Florentine statute of 1349 forbade physicians to consult with seriously ill patients before the patients had confessed to their sins (Park, 1985, p. 50).

The very notion of a naturalistic scheme also embraces anomalies that resist explanation because of prevailing ignorance of etiology. Consigning puzzling conditions to the purview of demonology on the basis of their rarity or unusual features amounted to precluding the possibility of undiscovered natural laws equal to the task of explanation. The move belied the fact that Renaissance medicine was already in the side pocket of supernaturalism — even before explanation got off the ground. Estes (1983) has argued that Renaissance medicine, far from allaying witch-panics, was a prime mover in their European efflorescence. He has hypothesized that the figure of the witch was itself the byproduct of the drive to explain mysterious “witch diseases,” not the other way around. The diseases (with possession in the forefront of consideration) were conditions conceived of as having a diabolical origin, due to their refractoriness to ordinary medical treatment. The Renaissance tradition survives for treatment specialists convinced that features of trance/possession states virtually preclude naturalistic explanations.

TREATMENT ENTAILMENTS

Goodman (1988) has declared that rigidities on the ontological issue are premature, since we must remain in the dark about the reality of spiritual beings. However, the practical implications for remediation of possession states may be quite unrelated to the resolution of such theological dilemmas (Mackarness, 1974). In terms of treatment philosophy, any overall program rejecting exorcism out of hand may rest upon confusion. It is not the mistake of confusing possession as dissociation, but the error of supposing that the choice of treatment approach presupposes a metaphysical position on the part of the practitioner, or depends on the resolution of theological issues. When it comes to treatment effectiveness, perhaps the question of the actual existence of the spirit in the host “drops out of consideration as irrelevant” (Wittgenstein, 1953). Maybe the particular form an intervention should take hinges on factors anthropologically weightier than the private convictions of the specialist. Perhaps it is the web of cultural and subcultural meanings perceived by the host as integral to the condition that is paramount.

Janet evidently perceived the therapeutic relevance of implicit meanings for the host (Österreich, 1966). He was successful in curing a “possessed” individual, Achille, who was refractory to treatment prior to being seen by him. Without incorporating the belief-system of the host, Janet adopted an ingenious strategy. It involved enlisting the aid of the invading “devil” to develop a somnambulistic state in the patient conducive to yielding significant etiological information. In other words, Janet’s approach involved the appropriation of an exorcist role. The latter not only granted the reality of the invading demon, it appealed to his vanity as well to get results! It may be pointed out that Janet’s ruse can also be construed as a strategy in keeping with other naturalistically-inspired maneuvers with MPD patients. However, this concedes that naturalism can encompass the appropriation of a repertoire of exorcist role-facsimiles. If so, exorcisms cannot be precluded on naturalistic grounds.

Is there a basis for therapeutic approaches maximizing a perceived congruence for the host between treatment and spiritual plight? Perhaps such interventions are even more compelling when it comes to possessions with an impregnated meaning for certain native-American, African-American, Hispanic, and Fundamentalist communities in our own country, not to mention Third World citizens. In these communities, the aforementioned notion of “culture-control” may be more marked than in other diverse ethnological contexts. Accordingly, for such groups, possession states can be
likened to “culture-bound syndromes” (Simons & Hughes, 1985). While the comparative effectiveness of any form of treatment must remain an empirical issue, prejudging its character could be tantamount to ignoring culturally prefigured recipes for the correct approach (Torrey, 1986; Csordas, 1987). Moreover, there is a vast difference between holding, as did Fenichel (1955) and Freud (1959), that concepts germane to a scientific framework can be applied in explaining the efficacy of ethnocentric, tribal, or religious approaches to treatment, and positing the futility of all such interventions because they do not constitute “applications” of scientific principles. If the mandate is to relieve suffering, does the metaphysics of the practitioner dictate the form of an intervention, or merely color the explanatory concepts brought to bear on why it proves effective (Begelman, 1977)?

Ironically, perhaps the conviction on the part of Noll’s (Noll, 1990) naturalistic practitioners that exorcisms must prove ineffective is itself but an article of faith, not a deduction from a philosophy of science. Alternatively, and as Tarantelli (Lea, 1957, p. 1445) declared, successful exorcisms hardly prove the reality of powers they are used to extrude. Should demonic agency be illusory, exorcisms in particular cases might still be the most effective way to remediate. A sizable task lies ahead in identifying criteria for the wisdom of such interventions in contexts of attenuated “culture control.”

Any way one slices the cake, the empirical picture on treatment efficacy is mixed. Many exorcisms, like the one undertaken on Anneliese Michel (Goodman, 1981) are lengthy, traumatic, or unsuccessful, whereas others are remarkably successful. Giel, Gezahgen, and van Luijk (1968) and Torrey (1986) report the case of an Ethiopian exorcist, Abba Wolde Tensae. He kept records of brief and successful exorcisms totalling a million over a fourteen-year period. However, the failure of exorcism in given cases no more undermines the pragmatic utility of the practice in other cases than does the failure to integrate in professional settings impugn psychotherapy in the treatment of MPD.

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