THE CONUNDRUMS OF NARRATIVE: CERVANTES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

CRÓNICAS DE INDIAS

by

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DISSESATION ABSTRACT

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My intellectual interests span the Atlantic and are anchored in early modern narrative. Balancing original research, literary analysis and humanist literary criticism, my dissertation, “The Conundrums of Narrative: Cervantes in the Context of the *Crónicas de Indias*” attempts to bring a fresh understanding on the reciprocal relationship between emerging discourses of the New World and Spain—in particular, the kinds of narrative that coalesce into the (early) modern novel and the equally complex and imaginative forms of narrative on display in the *Crónicas de Indias*. My inquiry takes up key sixteenth-century historiographical accounts of the Americas which include Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s *Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias* and Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la nueva España*. I deploy these texts, which problematize the relationship of history to ‘poetry’ (a category which for early moderns included imaginative prose), to shed new light on the narrative strategies employed in *Don Quixote* and the *Persiles*. Along the way, I argue that the significant role that memory and mnemonics play in Cervantes’s imitation of literary models contributes to the epistemological and narratological concerns produced by the New World encounter, and I examine the use of memory in the construction of textual authority. For example: the first portion of my dissertation analyzes the writings of Juan
Luis Vives (1492-1540) as a means to explore the humanist thinking on the writing of history. Vives’ contribution to the practice and rhetoric of history allows me to examine difficulties and paradoxes posed by the interplay of history and poetry in Cervantes.
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To my family
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A veces no es necesario que comprendan al Don, al Don y su mundo. Ni amando ni luchando ni creando arte. Basta con que le dejen hacerlo. Basta con que le dejen intentar hacerlo. Es suficiente con que le den esa libertad de locos extraños, de enfermos sanos. Invariablemente a su lado, nosotros caminaremos siempre rumbo a esos lugares honorables. Ya que el Don, es decir nosotros, la especia humana, siempre ocuparemos un lugar insobornable en su memoria, en su gloria y sobre todo, en su ser mismo.

From one aficionado to another¹

The rich narrative practices of those, who through travel, discovery and sacrifice, experienced firsthand an enticing new reality speak to the merits of what I see as Cervantes’ own play of literary and nonliterary spaces. Accordingly, I found in both my primary and secondary readings a myriad of intriguing and at times paradoxical findings that I believed through close reading and careful selection could be arranged in such a way as to highlight the narrative strategies employed by the New World chronicles as they made their way through the humanist debates on the qualities both appropriate and consistent with the writing of history, and whose innovative ideas come into play in the literary creations of Cervantes.

¹ Cited and modified from in the opinión section of El País with the following information: “D.F.” publicado en el mundo por C.R.V. con fecha de 10/29/2014. The original citation follows: A veces no es necesario que nos comprendan. Ni amando ni toreando ni creando arte. Basta con que nos dejen hacerlo. Basta con que nos dejen intentar hacerlo. Es suficiente con que nos den esa libertad de locos extraños, de enfermos sanos. Nosotros caminaremos siempre rumbo esos lugares circulares. El toreo siempre ocupará un lugar insobornable en nuestros corazones.
Indeed, Cervantes begins his prologue of *Novelas Exemplares* attempting to “excuse” himself from the ritual of actually writing it. The reason he gives is simple: his prior attempt did not go as well as he had hoped in the *Quixote*. Yet, what seems a reasonable response, shortly thereafter reveals itself for what it truly is: a notice to the reader that what lies before her is novel: an ingenious stringing together of previous literary endeavors in what amounts to life: life to his creatures, life to his worlds, and life to his readers who as welcomed participants exist “idly” tangled amid Cervantes’ labyrinth of fictions, truths and delight.

Yet such novelty in the works of Cervantes does not preclude a playful recognition of the past. In fact, despite his satirical critique in his own ability and desire to offer his readers in the *Quixote* a “plain and bare, unadorned” prologue in similar fashion to that of Bernal Díaz some sixty years earlier in his *Historia verdadera*, the transformation of Alonso Quijano would suggest Cervantes’ fondness for, if not an admiration of, the past. Yet, the materialization of Quijano’s transformation into a knight

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2 Cervantes begins the prologue to *Novelas ejemplares* stating: “Quisiera yo, si fuera posible, lector amantísimo, excusarme de escribir este prólogo, porque no me fué tan bien con el que puse en mi *Don Quijote*, que quedase con gana de segundar con éste” (769).

3 Cervantes begins the prologue to the *Quijote* in burlesque fashion, asking his “Desocupado lector” to believe what he says (Prologue, 1031).

4 Cervantes states in his prologue to part one: “Solo quisiera dártela monda y desnuda, sin el ornamento de prólogo, ni de la innumerabilidad y catálogo de los acostumbrados sonetos, epigramas y elogios que al principio de los libros suelen ponerse” (1032).

5 Indeed, Cervantes prologue share many similarities to Bernal’s preface to his *Historia verdadera* where Bernal states: Notando estado como los muy afamados coronistas antes que comiencen a escribir sus historias hacen primero su prólogo y preámbulo con razones y retórica muy subida para dar luz y crédito a sus razones [Concluding that] yo, como no soy latino, no me atrevo a hacer preámbulo ni prólogo dello…yo lo escribiré, con el ayuda de Dios, muy llanamente, sin torcer a una parte ni a otra” (1).
errant does not happen instantaneously, but rather through a process that while difficult to
assess with regard to the lead-up from a life of lucid passivity to one of action and
delirium, can be measured in the names and objects which shadowed Don Quixote’s
transformative appearance.

Chapter I of part one begins with a description into the everyday life of our
impoverished *hidalgo* Alonso Quijano, who keeps prominently displayed on his shelf a
“lance and ancient shield” and whose diet consists in the most humble of meals: hash,
eggs and lentils etc. (I, i 19).6 The little he did have, he sold to satisfy his insatiable
appetite of books. Not just any books, but those to do with those “most perfect knights,”
and above all, “the sole, the first, the only” Amadís of Gaula (I, xxv 193). Indeed, more
than anyone else, it is Amadís who would have Alonso Quijano (i.e. Don Quixote) rise
from the comfort of his reading chair and “travel the world” making right what was
wrong by the “valor of his arm” (I, i 22). Yet, to do so required that he become, as did his
glorious predecessor, a knight errant. And it is in this desire that I began to appreciate the
innovativeness of Cervantes’ literary creation.7

In the spirit of Juan Luis Vives, who looked to the achievements of antiquity not
as “enanos en hombros de gigantes,” but as equals, Cervantes, as many renaissance

6 Limited to the introduction I am citing Edith Grossman’s translation of *Don Quixote.*

7 I employ the term “innovative” as a means to describe Cervantes’ discovery of
subjectivity- that is, novelistic subjectivity. As I address in following chapters there exist
fundamental differences between Cervantes’ literary creations and the writings of the
cronistas, whose interest (among a number of reasons) lies in the science of rhetoric/
compelling or persuasive speech (i.e. the art of rhetoric). Thus, the “literariness” between
part one and two, which is thematized in part two, demonstrates a fundamental difference
from *crónicas de las indias,* which respond to the science of rhetoric and whose writings
do not create conceits of novelistic subjectivity.
humanists before him, breaks free from such notions “…because all of it [The Quixote]” as he states “is an invective against books of chivalry, which Aristotle never thought of, and St. Basil never mentioned, and Cicero never saw” (Prologue, 8).\(^8\) Confronted with the seemingly new, be it the discovery of a new continent such as we see in Francisco de Oviedo’s treatment of Pliny in his Sumario, or a new literary space such as we find in the Quixote, the contributions of the past while useful, begin to relinquish its authority to the experiences of the present.\(^9\) This is certainly observed in the transformation of Alonso Quijano.

In his quest to become a knight errant, Alonso must resuscitate the armor of his great-grandfather, now “stained with rust and covered with mildew” piled and forgotten in a corner of his home (I, i 22). Much time has passed since the height of Spain’s imperial expedition and territorial expansion. And of the more notable pieces that Alonso

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\(^8\) Indeed, Cervantes as did several Renaissance humanists in the generation preceding the publication of Don Quixote broke with what they viewed as medieval anachronism.

\(^9\) In fact, Cervantes’ treatment of the past seems to at times resemble the grotesqueness to which Luis de Góngora’s or even María de Zaya y Sotomayor’s (to just mention a couple) portray the hyperbolic idealization of the female figure. While, it is not my attention here to discuss the merits of these authors or their works, I would suggest that “Mientras por competir con tu cabello” in particular, be read as a reaction if not critique towards the ideal splendor of the past. This is especially visible in the first verse following the \textit{volta} in which the woman, in what would seem a blissful and chaotic climax, not only loses herself, but her identity as well, becoming the very product of man’s muddled desires, that is, simply a heap of body parts: “goza cuello, cabello, labio y frente.” In “La inocencia castigada,” María de Zaya’s is more explicit in her critique, describing in the most hideous of ways the body parts of a newly freed women imprisoned for six year in a space just big enough to have her fit standing up. Her face now scared “desde los ojos hasta la barba” from crying and her once beautiful hair now as “white” as “snow” infested with insects (152). Her remains made up of “huesos” and of “carne comida hasta los muslos de llegas y gusanos” the result of sitting for so many years in her own excrement. I offer these powerful examples as a means to introduce Cervantes’ own description of certain objects found around Alonso Quijano’s house which speak to his satirical dealings with the past.
must contend with is a partial headpiece missing its full sallet (Prologue, 22). To remedy this we are told that Alonso ingeniously engineers one out of pasteboard which, as expected, fails to “withstand a blow he took with his sword” (22, ii 2). The metaphor Cervantes makes here is clear: Alonso looks towards an idealized past that, while foreign and to some extent disregarded in his day, allows him to surpass the mediocrity of not only his improvised life, but as reflected in the materials used to repair his “fine sallet,” the decadence of present day Spain (I, i 22). This scene stands as the true beginning of Alonso Quijano’s physical transformation and intellectual transcendence.\(^\text{10}\) From here begins the arduous task of selection and naming. A faithful follower of his readings, Alonso begins to reconstruct a new life by way, as we are told, his “memory and imagination” (I, i 22). With references of knights errant before him, Alonso takes his reader on a journey to a renewed reality that begins with the transcendence of his nag, is followed by his self-anointment as Don Quixote de la Mancha, and comes to fruition by the “discovery” of his idealized “lady-love;” in a process that as we are told, would take precisely twelve days to complete.\(^\text{11}\) In each step of the way, Alonso surpasses the mundane of a “sane” world and embraces that which Cervantes’ contemporaries seemed to increasingly detest. Rather than question the achievements of his ancestors, he

\(^{10}\) As I argue in the beginning of chapter two, I use the expression “intellectual transcendence” here to describe what I see as Don Quixote’s repeated awareness and rationalization as to the dividing line between two competing worlds, that is, the literary reality of Alonso Quijano as an impoverished Hidalgo and the literary world of chivalric romances that is adopted by his new persona, Don Quixote. This awareness allows Don Quixote to impose his will according to the occasion.

\(^{11}\) The narrator in chapter one of part I explains the process of Quijano’s transformation in great detail. While knighthood is bestowed upon him in chapter three, Quijano chooses his own name in chapter one: “Puesto nombre y tan a su gusto, a su caballo, quiso ponerse a sí mismo, y en este pensamiento duró otros ocho días, y al cabo se vino a llamar Don Quijote” (I, i 1039).
satirically returns to them time and again to escape a world inhabited by sick horses, gluttonous sidekicks and beautiful peasant girls who unlike those idealized virgins, labored for survival. This is the origin of Alonso Quijano’s insanity; one in which according to Aristotle (as alluded to by Cervantes), derives from his inability, an old man by the standard of his day, to “stamp” in his now dried-up brain, memories that would allow him to differentiate his life from the lives of his literary counterparts.12

It is here where the novelty of the Quixote lies. Cervantes takes his readers back in time to a nameless place that, as the narrative takes pains to make clear, never existed: could not exist --except in the unreliable mind of a “weathered”-faced, “gaunt” man who shared an uncanny resemblance to that of his “step-father,” that is, Cervantes himself. 13 A man who as we are told in his prologue of Novelas ejemplares, likewise suffered from the very same debilitating illness, which fomented by the innate fear of the unknown, survives among mortals without cure: leaving as it were in its final stages a: […] rostro

12 Aristotle writes: “The process of movement stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal” (Aristotles 450a 609) Metaphorically speaking, the survival of such an image is determined by the surface to which it is imprinted upon, for as Aristotle notes: “…just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water…the requisite impression is not implanted at all” (450b, 609). In using this analogy, Aristotle compares age to memory, in which: “…both very young and very old persons are defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former because of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay…so that in the case of the former the image does not remain in the soul, while on the latter it is not imprinted at all” (450b, 609). Aristotle likens Plato’s description of what is to be considered ideal as being not too “soft” and not too “hard,” found in those men of age not too “quick” and not to “slow,” for the “the former are too moist, the latter too hard” (450b, 609). Cervantes alludes to this idea in chapter one of part I when describing the reason behind Don Quixote’s loss of discernment: “él [Don Quixote] se enfrascó tanto en su lectura…y así, del poco dormir y del mucho leer, se le secó el cerebro, de manera que vino a perder el juicio” (I, i 1038 emphasis mine).

13 Cervantes affirms in his prologue that: “aunque parezco padre, soy padrastro de Don Quixote” (1032).
aguileño…frente lisa…las barbas de plata…los dientes ni menudos ni crecidos…y esos mal acondicionados y peor puestos, el cuerpo…algo cargado de espaldas y no muy ligero de pies (769). Indeed, as I discuss in chapter three, memory plays a fundamental role in Cervantes’ literary creations. As the previous examples suggest, Cervantes treatment of memory introduces a level of ambiguity, which speak to the playfulness and innovative approach that he gives to his literary endeavors.

Spain’s rise as an imperial power generated an abundance of textual material that contributed to Cervantes’ literary creations: a body of work that is often referred to as crónicas. In the following chapters, my examination of these texts allows me to take a closer look at Cervantes’ play of literary and non-literary spaces, which at times seem to mimic rather closely the narrative strategies observed in the writing of these types of texts. Thus, balancing original research, literary analysis and humanist literary criticism, my dissertation, attempts to bring a fresh understanding on what I see as a reciprocal relationship between emerging discourses of the New World and Spain –in particular, the kinds of narrative that coalesce into the (early) modern novel and the equally complex and imaginative forms of narrative on display in the crónicas de indias. My inquiry takes up two key sixteenth-century historiographical accounts of the Americas which include: Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias and Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s Historia verdadera de la conquista de la nueva España. I deploy these texts, which problematize the relationship of history to ‘poetry’ (a category which for early moderns included imaginative prose), to shed new light on the narrative strategies employed in Don Quixote and the Persiles. Along the way, I argue that the significant role that memory and mnemonics plays in Cervantes’ imitation of literary models
contributes to the epistemological and narratological concerns that are brought to light by the New World encounter, and I examine the use of memory in the construction of textual authority.

Chapter two, “Historical Representation in the Spanish Tradition” examines by way of *De ratione dicendi* and *De Diciplinis*, the ideas of Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540), who as one of the most influential humanists of his time gives context to my subsequent analysis of Bernal Díaz and Fernández de Oviedo. In so doing, I incorporate primarily the ideas of István Bejczy, Peter Mack, and Carlos G Noreña, all of whom have written extensively on the subject. My analysis of Vives’ *De Causis corruptarum atrium* allows me to explore Vives’ unique notions of progress, which lead him to re-examine the contributions and value of previous generations. These ideas resurface time and again in the writings of Bernal Díaz and Oviedo, and as I demonstrate are not lost in the literary creations of Cervantes. The second portion of this chapter focuses on what Sarah Beckjord has called the “the properly narrative framework” of Vives’ work, in which I highlight the many challenges faced by the “ideal historian” who must grapple with new situations and unexpected problems that seem to find no clear classical model to follow. The polemic nature of history, as Beckjord’s analysis of Vives suggests, often seems to go against the importance that these two men give to the value of a first-hand account. For Vives, as Beckjord explains “…the model inquirer is a humanist sage, a sort of ‘terrestrial divinity’ who possesses almost supernatural powers to discern the meaning of events beyond his experience and to represent them as if directly perceived” (5). Indeed, in presenting the many challenges that arise between historical and fictional discourses, Beckjord demonstrates how these were not limited to “rhetorical and philosophical
treatises,” but also included “historical narratives” such as the two I have chosen to examine (20). In a playful manner, these ideas find their way into Cervantes’ fictional works. Accordingly, my interest in the classical tradition (as interpreted by Vives) in relation to my selection of the New World crónicas, will present an opportunity in the following chapters to further discuss just how Cervantes in his two longer fictional works (i.e. the Quixote and the Persiles) “absorb[ed] and repli[ed]” (term used by Diana De Armas Wilson) to the narrative of discovery and conquest (370).

Chapter three “Cervantes by way of The Crónicas de Indias” picks up where chapter two leaves off, examining to what degree and in what ways the chronicles of the Indies influenced the writing of Cervantes, in particular the Quixote and to a lesser extent the Persiles. As a secondary – but important concern— I address the issue of genre, a phenomenon which as I demonstrate is “informed” by the New World.14 Moreover, this chapter will look to issues of truth and reliability, an important concern for sixteenth-century writers which will offer further insight into the duality between history and poetry (i.e. fiction) in the Quixote.

My focus will follow a line of investigation that includes the contributions of critics such as Stelio Cro who explores the role and influences of the crónicas de indias in the writings of Cervantes, given as Cro explains, that: “Ambos aspectos están relacionados a cierta tradición crítica que desde hace tiempo ha estudiado la obra de Cervantes…” (6). The probable familiarity of Cervantes with the New World, either by “…sus lecturas de las crónicas o poemas que trataron el tema, sea por sus conversaciones

14 Diana De Armas Wilson affirms that, “Spain’s New World enterprise, in short, informed both Cervantes’s personal history and his writing projects. There is no doubt that he was familiar with some of the Chronicles of the Indies” (369). With the help of De Armas Wilson I expand on the idea in chapter three.
con los que volvían de sus viajes a las Indias,” leads Cro to examine the possible “consecuencias” that such knowledge and “prestamos” may have had on Cervantes’ theory of the novel (14). For her part, Diana de Armas Wilson raises the need for a more “spatial understanding” of Cervantes’ longer fictional works, suggesting that: “Both novels [the Quixote and the Persiles] were stimulated, far more than criticism has acknowledged, by the geographical excitement of a New World” (366).

Following both De Armas Wilson’s and Cro’s approach, it is clear that Cervantes’ creation of the what is now described as the modern novel, is inevitably connected to the writings of the New World, “…whose discourses were codified into genres, sub-genres, or mixed genres” all of which would find their way into the writings of Cervantes, including as alluded to earlier, the romances of chivalry (370).15 And while, it is difficult to measure the impact of these romances on the American enterprise, as De Armas Wilson notes, it can be said that “they were deeply implicated in it” (371). Indeed, a case in point and one that De Armas Wilson brings to light in her analysis is the now quite recognizable description of Bernal Diaz on entering the great city of Tenochtitlan (i.e. Mexico City): “These great towns and cues and building rising from the water, all made of stone, seemed like an enchanted vision from the tale of Amadis” (Cite in De Armas Wilson, 371). De Armas Wilson’s ideas on the “rise of Cervantes’ novel,” seems to fit well within Claudio Guillén’s discussion on the spatial processes surrounding the rise of

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15 De Armas includes in her list of genres and sub-genres the “epic and Ovidian poetry, the ancient Graeco-Latin novel, Mennippean satire, proverbs, the Italian novella, topographical legends, the books of chivalry, criminal autobiography, critical treatises, allegorical masques, and closet dramas.” Adding as she goes on to state: “…four kinds of literature that have pointed to alliances with Spain’s New World colonies [which] found their way into his novels: the books of chivalry, the utopias, the colonial war epic, and American ethnohistory” (370).
a new genre in which he underscores the realization that through much of what is known as the Golden Age, the “Spanish novel…enjoyed exceptional conditions for influence and propagation…this initial ‘space’- the dimensions of a publishing world-coincided with the mercantile support for the Hispanic conquest and colonization of America” (141).

Yet, as Guillén concludes, the reception of Lazarillo (and some fifty years later Guzman de Alfarache), “…was second to the main development: the surge of popularity of the model, the pattern, the genre, which they sustained not singly but conjointly” (142-143).

It is within this “spatial” literary landscape that I, with the help of these scholars, explore the narrative boundaries of history and fiction: a concern that is often discussed in Cervantes’ works.

Chapter four, “Memory and Authority in Oviedo’s Sumario and Cervantes’ Don Quixote and the Persiles” as the title suggests, examines Cervantes’ use of memory in the construction of textual authority. Following chapter three, the focus remains Don Quixote; however, I also discuss the Persiles when appropriate. My inquiry, which includes Oviedo’s the Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias, a key sixteenth-century historiographical account of the “New” world that problematizes the relationship of history versus poetry, focuses on two important elements: memory (mnemonics, devices for establishing the reliability of a narrative and therefore its narrator-author) and exemplarity (especially in relation to authoritative Classical models). Accordingly, this chapter sheds new light into the conundrum of history and poetry (fiction) in post-encounter Spanish discourse. The significant role that memory and mnemonics play in Cervantes’ imitation of literary models as mentioned previously, allows in the chapters
that follow a closer look into the epistemological and narratological concerns that are shaped to some extent by the crónicas of New World.

Frederick De Armas has suggested that Cervantes’ “compositional style,” involved: “…the retentive memory as a storehouse or inventory of images and ideas that would enable him to produce his own textual construction through ingenio or wit” (15). Among the many examples observed in the Quixote, De Armas points to Don Quixote’s library as a clear example: a space that allows our knight through mnemonic retrieval to “imprint in his memory the deeds of chivalric heroes” (644). As De Armas reminds us: “Since ancient times, the memory was imagined as a tabula, a wax tablet, a canvas, a blank surface on which memories could be written” (644). Don Quixote’s memory allows him to transpose the physical and present world with a literary reality that is repeatedly awakened from the past (Egido, 102). He does so, by identifying and imposing both loci and images of the past, with what he perceives in the present (101). Hence, memory acts as a filter that allows Don Quixote to negotiate between his literary life as Alonso Quijano the impoverished hidalgo and his new literary reality in-the-making as knight errant: product of his insidious readings of chivalric romances. Accordingly, (as discussed in chapter three), Don Quixote’s madness is the result of an over-stimulated imagination that “rematado ya su juicio” culminated “...en el más extraño pensamiento que jamás dio loco en el mundo, y fue que le pareció convenible y necesario, así para el aumento de su honra como para el servicio de su república, hacerse caballero andante” (I, i 1038).16 While, Alonso Quijano’s desire to become a knight errant seems to suggest that

16 Grossman’s translation of this moment does not seem to capture Cervantes’ intention here, which I believe leaves room to question if Alonso Quijano truly loses his mind. Grossman writes in place of “rematado ya su juicio”: “When his mind was completely
he has gone mad, the reader must not overlook that his insanity is at times one of
convenience (as alluded to in the previous citation). Don Quixote does not lose his mind,
but rather his ability to judge between what Americo Castro was first to describe as a
“realidad ocilante,” that is, the competing literary worlds of Alonso Quijano and Don
Quixote.17

In order to more clearly understand just what the art of memory was in the past
and the purposes it served, this chapter also examines closely the contributions of the
English historian Francis Yates (1899-1981) (Hutton, 30). Yates explains that as part of
the art of rhetoric, it was the art of memory that “…travelled down through the European
tradition in which it was never forgotten, or not forgotten until comparatively modern
times, that those infallible guides in all human activities, the ancients, had laid down rules
and precepts for improving the memory” (2). Patrick Hutton in highlighting Yates’ own
findings notes that spanning more than 2,000 years of cultural transformations, “change
[In the art of memory] was visible in the purposes for which the art was used…these
oscillated between two theories of knowledge, one derived from Aristotle and the other
from Plato…” in which the art of memory “…was a way to establish correspondences
gone.” I have thus chosen to cite Cervantes’ directly and will continue to do so in the
coming chapters.

17 While several characters who interact with Don Quixote find him mad, the narrator of
this story does not confirm this explicitly. He suggests rather that his desires and
perceptions are the product of both sleep deprivation and of old age: “En resolución, él se
enfrascó tanto en su lectura, que se le pasaban las noches leyendo de claro en claro, y los
días de turbio en turbio; y así, del poco dormir, y del mucho leer, se le secó el cerebro de
manera que vino a perder el juicio” (I, ii 1038) The loss of judgement as the narrator goes
on to explain manifests itself in Don Quixote’s inability, or perhaps desire to blend his
previous reality with his new persona as knight errant: “Llenósele la fantasía de todo
aquello que leía en los libros…y asentósele de tal modo en la imaginación que era verdad
toda aquella máquina de aquellas soñadas invenciones que leía, que para él no había otra
historia más cierta en el mundo. Decía él que el Cid Ruy Díaz había sido muy buen
caballero, pero que no tenía que ver con el caballero de la Ardiente Espada” (I, i 1038).
between the microcosm of the mind’s images and the macrocosm of the ideal universe, which were believed to be congruent structures” (30-31).

The role of the mnemonist therefore was highly valued: “Not only did he practice a skill but he also assumed a priestly status as an interpreter of the nature of reality” (31). In fact, as Antonio Sánchez Jiménez notes in paraphrasing Fernando Rodríguez de la Flor, during the Middle Ages, memoria was considered a fundamental element of prudentia, in which as Mary Carruthers further explains (265): “Trained memory (memoria) is ‘one of the conditions required for prudence,’ and integral or enabling part of the virtue…Albertus Magnus quotes Cicero to the effect that the parts of prudence are memory, intellect, and foresight, corresponding to the three tenses (Carruthers 69-70). Moreover, De Armas, who also looks to Yates, notes that the mnemonic faculty was considered of greater importance than the imagination, for “…it held many of the functions that would later be thought of as imagination” (14). Indeed, as Carruther further explains, “…whereas now geniuses are said to have creative imagination which they express in intricate reasoning and original discovery, in earlier times they were said to have richly retentive memories, which they expressed in intricate reasoning and original discovery” (Cite in De Armas, 15), demonstrating the manner in which, “…it was memory that combined these pieces of information-become-experience into what we call ‘ideas,’ what they were more likely to call ‘judgments” (Cite in De Armas, 15). As I turn my attention to Oviedo in this chapter, these ideas prove essential in understanding the structure and reliability of his Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias.

Chapter five, “Memory, Don Quixote and The Novelistic Qualities of Bernal Diaz’ Historia verdadera,” surveys the nature of historiography by examining a number
of problems specific to the writing of history. These include: the role of memory, function of detail, importance of fame, the question of authorship, and the representation of historical and non-historical figures. In addition, I once more turn my attention to problems that arise with regard to the narrative distance and perspective, which as Sarah Beckjord has noted in her own investigation into the workings of Bernal Díaz, not only allow a bird’s eye view into the minds of others, exemplified in modern works of fiction, but also afford further exploration on the importance of memory in the writing process (8).

There are several features which make Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera stand out among the other crónicas of his time. One of the most prominent among these is Bernal Díaz’ decision to appeal directly to his “curious reader,” a gesture that would break with the more conventional practice of his day. It would also suggest possible motives which inspired Bernal Díaz to write his history in light of his more “gifted” contemporaries who as we see with Francisco López de Gómara had not only beat him to it, but whose popularity and acceptance made it difficult if not impossible to unseat. Yet Bernal Díaz’ quest consisted of something more. Something more to do with fairness than anything else: a belief that there was more to the story, and that more was owed, which heard among the whisperings of a confession:18 “Yo, Bernal Díaz del Castillo…como testigo de vista,” spoke of truth, humility, and penance (Prologue, 65).

Yet the manner in which Bernal Díaz chose from memory to disclose his most intimate experiences alongside historic events has driven several contemporary critics to

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18 Saenz de Santa Marí́a has suggested that the transparent nature of Bernal Díaz’ expression compensates for his plain spoken style (133). He likens Bernal Díaz’ dialogue with his reader to that of a confession (see chapter 2).
compare his work to the modern novel. Similar to Cervantes’ Cide Hamete, Bernal Díaz’ “seeming inability to omit details” as Anthony J. Cacardi has suggested, and his resourceful treatment of the other participants in the conquest, as observed in Bernal Díaz’ treatment of “nosotros,” do seem to describe a memory that is immersed in what Oswald Estrada describes as “diversos afectos narrativos inseparables de la novela” (54, emphasis Estrada). Some time ago now, Carlos Fuentes took this idea a step further in his assertion that Bernal Díaz is Latin America’s, “primer novelista” (71), “…el novelista de algo por descubrir” (73), who writes “…una épica angustiada, una novela esencial” (75), a product of Bernal Díaz’ “memoria moderna del novelista” (80). However, in an attempt to address the nature of such claims, I also look in this chapter to scholars who find such conclusions problematic. A case in point, is Roberto González Echevarría who in adopting “a bifocal reading,” explores more closely not only contemporary notions of truth and fiction as it relates to Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera and the novel, but also those that allow for a “Renaissance perspective” as well, one that incorporates the “expressive possibilities” of the historian during this time (12).

While each chapter draws its own conclusions, they remain interconnected by two general concerns which speak to the contribution of this project. My selection of Bernal Díaz and Fernández Oviedo from among the other cronistas was informed by their direct participation in the New World, be it as an “appointed supervisor of the smelting of gold of Terra Firme” as was the case of Oviedo or Bernal Díaz, who as a faithful foot-soldier would not only participate in, but help write a firsthand account of the conquest alongside his captain, Hernán Cortés. Alongside this unique feature, these two men also demonstrate in their work an extraordinary memory, one which would allow them to
recollect the most trivial details, either on matters of natural and social history of the Indies as is the case with Oviedo, or on the “batallas y encuentros” (CCXII, 473-485), which were to be had against the various indigenous populations Bernal Díaz encountered along the way. Indeed, it is their memory that sets them apart from the other cronistas, and memory that gives structure to their narratives. Arguably, the same can be said about the Quixote and the Persiles.

From the start, an address to the issue of memory is fundamental to the novel’s structure. Memory stands as both the physical as well as metaphysical component which not only creates, but transforms Don Quixote’s perception of reality, and to a greater extent those he encounters along the way. This would include both his literary followers (after the publication of part one), and of course his little less than half a century long “idle readers” of who he mentions in his prologue. In fact, the novel begins with a narrator unable or perhaps more accurately, unwilling to remember Don Quixote’s place of residency: “En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo lugar no quiero acordarme” (1037). The ambiguity of this statement serves as both an invitation and notice to the reader, who as participants must use their own judgement as to what or who to believe as the adventures of Don Quixote pass through the memories of each intermediary. Likewise, in the Persiles we are confronted with an endless chattering of voices, all competing for the reader’s attention as they make their way through the twists and turns of their respective adventures. As their stories become intertwined with one another, Cervantes take full advantage of mnemonic cues, which allows not only his characters to follow the “narrative thread,” but also his readers as well (Egido, 623).
Finally, it is my hope that following this line of investigation will offer further insight into just how these three writers, each with his own story to tell, speak to the interwoven nature of history, literature, and fiction, all of which, as E.C. Riley has suggested, can be perhaps better understood as, “…an attempt to map out some sort of coastline between the terra firma of History and the horizonless ocean of Poetry” (11).
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE SPANISH HUMANIST TRADITION:

JUAN LUIS VIVES

This chapter examines the ideas of Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540), one of the most influential humanists of northern Europe, and his contribution to historical studies (Bejczy, 69). The first portion of my analysis will incorporate the ideas of Istvan Bejczy, Peter Mack, and Carlos G. Noreña, who have written extensively on the subject. By way of De ratione dicendi and De Diciplinis this chapter will explore Vives’ ideas on the “nature of history” (69). Along this line, I will also explore Vives’ historical ideas (Bejczy, 70). The second part of this chapter is dedicated to Sarah Beckjord’s thoughtful insights regarding the challenging nature of historical narration (5). Let me begin my analysis of Vives with a look at his ideas concerning the notion of progress, which will offer much needed context (in the following chapters) to my examination into the

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19 For the purposes of greater accessibility and completeness into the published treatises of Juan Luis Vives, I have chosen as my primary source the first Castilian translation of his completed works by Lorenzo Riber of the Real Academia (Madrid 1947-48).

20 Indeed, Vives conception of history, as has also been argued by Santiago Montero Díaz in his invaluable work, “La doctrina de la historia en los tratadistas españoles del Siglo de Oro,” affirms the “unity” of mankind and thus his “universality” as the “protagonist of history” in which (9): “Ciencia y arte, vida política y social, no son sino aspectos a través de los cuales se realiza el hombre. De una manera profunda, lo que Vives procura hallar en esa amplificación del contenido propio de la Historia es la esencia misma del hombre, su intimidad operante en el despliegue de los tiempos” (10). Behind such an argument we observe the identity of man throughout the ages that Vives speaks of in his treaties (8): “…la unidad profunda de la Historia, respondiendo así a su formación humanista y cristiana. Esta unidad deriva, ante todo, de la permanente identidad del hombre a través de las edades y los pueblos. La esencia humana es una y universal. De ahí arranca también la universalidad de la Historia” (8-9).

21 My thinking and inquiries into the narrative strategies observed in the crónicas de Indias has been strongly influenced and informed by Sara Beckjord.
narrative practices employed by the New World chronicles that are consistent with the writing of history, and whose ideas and strategies appear in the literary works of Cervantes.

*De causis corruptarum atrium* explores the reason behind the tendency of “all arts” to “degenerate” throughout history (Bejczy, 70). In so doing he praises the beauty of all disciplines, highlighting their practical applications, explaining that (Bejczy, 70):

[…]

no hay en la vida cosa más bella ni más excelente que el cultivo de los ingenios, cultivo formado por el conjunto de aquellas disciplines que nos separan de la manera de vida de las fieras salvajes y nos restituyen a nuestra condición de hombre y nos elevan a Dios mismo” (Praef. 340).22

While Vives is careful to underscore his admiration for those writers, “consagrados por los siglos,” whose industry and diligence helped pave the way for their successors (Praef., 341), Vives is firm in his belief that for there to be further cultural progress, a reexamination of ancient civilization is needed (Bejczy, 71): “…es mucho más conveniente para el progreso de la cultura aplicar la crítica a los escritos de los grandes autores, que descansar perezosamente en la sola autoridad y aceptar sistemáticamente todo cuanto nos proporciona la fe ajena” (Praef., 341). Because nature according to Vives remains the same, it is through the accumulation of knowledge that we gain a greater understanding of life (Bejczy, 74):

22 Accordingly, Vives outlines to underlining objects: the first “…hacerlo con tal claridad y lucidez, que pudiera fácilmente ser entendido y retenido lo que fuere diciendo” and second: “[el] tratado debía tener congruencia con la naturaleza de las cosas a tratar, hasta donde me fuera posible, porque el ingenio que a ellas se aplicara, a medida que lo estudiaba y adelantaba en su conocimiento, hallase algún sabor y complacencia y de ahí resultase un mayor fruto en quien se consagrarse a aprenderlas…[dándoles]…un carácter práctico, porque los ingenio sintieran aliciente por esos estudios ennoblecedores (Praef., 340).
La naturaleza, que es la misma, es a sí misma siempre igual, y no raras veces, como por acumulación de fuerzas, se revela más vigente y más potente, como es razón que creamos que debe de serlo ahora ayudada y fortalecida con una robustez que poco a poco fué acrecentando con el discurso de tantos siglos (Praef., 341). 23

Vives reinforces his idea of progress by questioning the unrivaled authority afforded to the ancients in a series of inquiries: “¿Qué más? ¿Por ventura el mismo Aristóteles no se atrevió a descuajar las opiniones de sus antecesores? Y a nosotros, ¿nos estarán vedados el libre examen y la crítica honrada y franca?” (342). Vives concludes translating Seneca who states: “Aquellos que antes que nosotros promovieron esos estudios, no son nuestros amos, sino nuestros guías” (342). Through this type of argumentation, Vives liberates the accessibility of truth, and perhaps more importantly, confers greater authority on the contributions of future generations: “La verdad es accesible a todos y no está aún ocupada completamente. Muy mucha parte de ella quedó reservada a los venideros” (342).

According to Vives, the human arts are never final. The temporal process of historical “mutual supplementation”, as Carlos G. Noreña has described it, consists of “…an unbroken, continuous, and social process, from a modest start toward a goal which is never reached, but is always envisioned and sought” (150). This is clearly evident in the writing of Vives who affirms:

Jamás en consecuencia fueron las artes ni perfectas, ni puras, ni aun en su propio origen. La creencia contraria es una ceguera y una debilidad del ánimo enorgulloso y pagado de sí. Pero, con todo, no deja de ser cierto que, gracias a esos soberanos ingenios, ayudados de la experiencia y el estudio, las artes se levantaron y se llevaron de principios harto modestos a una determinada grandeza, por manera

23 Vives concludes his thought with an enthusiastic: “¡Cuán ancha puerta de acceso a todas las disciplinas nos abren los descubrimientos de los siglos anteriores y una tan continuada experiencia? (Praef., 341).
Vives’s “commitment to the evolution of human thought” breaks with the more commonly accepted picture of a Renaissance fascinated by the unparalleled achievements of classical antiquity (Noreña 152). While Vives viewed history as a “progressive movement,” ancient culture was for “him a product of a youthful and immature world” (151). This idea is reiterated time and again in the preface of De Disciplinis:

No está tan agotada todavía ni tan desjugada la Naturaleza, que ya no dé a luz cosa semejante a los primeros siglos… ¡Cuán ancha puerta de acceso a todas las disciplinas nos abren los descubrimientos de los siglos anteriores y una tan continuada experiencia! Tan ello es así, que parece que nosotros podemos…opinar, en general, de las cosas de la vida y de la Naturaleza, mejor que Aristóteles, Platón u otro cualquiera de los antiguos, después de tan larga y constante observación de las cosas inmediatas y de las remotas que en su tiempo, por su fresca novedad, más les producían maravilla que no les acarreaban conocimiento (Praef., 341-342).

According to Vives, further human insight into nature rests on the accumulated observation of each generation. This idea further illustrates Vives’s non-adherence to the “dichotomy omnipresent in Renaissance humanism,” between as Bejczy describes it, “the splendor of ancient civilization and its downfall in the Middle Ages” (71).

Chapter two of De Disciplinis explains how the arts originated and the role they play in human understanding of nature (70):

Paréceme que yo debo decir no sólo cómo las artes decayeron,…sino también cómo en sus mismos orígenes, por decirlo así, cómo en las propias manos de los que les daban forma se torcieron y se depravaron. De esta manera quedarán más al descubierto todas las corruptelas no solamente de los modernos, sino también de los antiguos (1.1, 350).

While this passage supports Bejczy’s basic argument that Vives believed the arts to be defect from their beginning and to some extent Noreña’s belief in the uniformed nature of
ancient thought, Vives is careful not to downplay the fundamental role of ancient philosophers: “…los cuales somos deudores de los principios de las artes… [Y]… de quienes proclamamos en voz bien alta haber aprendido el cultivo del ingenio y toda humanidad” (1.1, 350). Indeed, if the decay in scholarship during the Middle Ages, as Bejczy argues, was mainly the consequence of its “erroneous beginnings,” it was then only natural that the impure sources of antiquity, those of which as Vives affirms, “…inficionaron de limo y de cieno el mismo manantial… [Never again]…fluyeron de él limpios y cristalinos arroyuelos” (1.1, 350). Again, throughout De Disciplinis this idea is continually revisited.

The corrupted beginnings of the arts amid a nature that is both constant and perfect, is perhaps best explained by the “variedad de necesidades,” that human intellect or “ingenio,” must contend with, and from which, “La material, las fuerzas las utilidades de todas estas artes, fueron puestas en la naturaleza, por Dios Su Hacedor soberano; pero con hartas dificultades, el ingenio humano, destituido de luces y de fuerzas, penetra en ellas” (1.1, 347). The fundamental cause for this, according to Vives, was greed and pride, those seduced “por grandes recompensas,” which included monetary gain, fame, and both a private and public influence, which prevented many, (including Greeks, Romans, and medieval Christians), from acknowledging their own failings, and from fully appreciating the achievements of others (Bejczy 71). According to Vives, it was

24 Vives states: “Con todo, en una sola cosa fué indulgente para con el su autor y su príncipe, y es que, al paso que el hombre se creó por su culpa tanta variedad de necedades, Dios le dejó un instrumento para alejárselas: la vivaz agudeza de un ingenio que de suyo es muy activo. De ahí nacieron los inventos humanos todos” (1.1, 343).

25 Later in the chapter Vives connects the defective beginnings of the arts to Greece, the mother of all disciplines as he states, arguing that the implicit desire for glory and wealth
through diligence and practice of these arts that such an ideal intellect could be reached (72): “El ingenio es el inventor de todas las artes y disciplinas, provisto y dotado de acumen y destreza; pero, con todo, auxiliares suyos muy activos son la diligencia y la práctica” (1.1, 348).26 Indeed, applying diligence and practice, Vives argued that “… se le abren perspectivas que antes le estaban hurtadas y ocultas, como ocurre con los que andan caminos y navegan mares” (1.1, 348). As a result, “La diligencia o es apremiada por la necesidad, o seducida por el deleite, o cautivada por la admiración de la grandeza, o de la hermosura del objeto” (1.1, 349). It is from these flawed beginnings that Vives believes the arts were born (Bejczy, 74).27

Vives’s ideas of progress are important in understanding his “conception of intellectual history” (Bejczy, 74). This becomes especially clear when considering the apparent inadequacies found in ancient scholarship that Vives proposes. For Vives, progress is gained through the collected learning of each generation and not from one can be traced back to those towns and nations which “incentivized” such practices. This would include Egypt where, “…la aplicación de las matemáticas, cuya afición fomentábase con premios y con honores. Y con efecto, cada uno quiere sobresalir y ser honrado. Para conseguirlo, entrégase a aquel que dijo que el honor alimenta las artes” (1.1, 349).

26 Vives goes on to state: “Mediante la diligencia va más lejos y, gracias a ese avance, se le abren perspectivas que antes le estaban hurtadas y ocultas, como ocurre con los que andan caminos y navegan mares” (1.1, 348).

27 Vives states: “Jamás en consecuencia fueron las artes ni perfectas, ni puras, no aun en su propio origen” (1.1, 350). However, within this imperfection, the value of the arts offered greater access and understanding of Nature: ‘Pero, con todo, no deja de ser cierto que, gracias a esos soberanos ingenios, ayudados de la experiencia y el estudio, las artes se levantaron y se llevaron de principios harto modestos a una determinada grandeza, por manera que ya no fué de todo punto difícil acrecentar lo hallado y hacer ulteriores descubrimientos. También esto permitió la enmienda de muchas cosas que no habían sido debidamente observadas en sus orígenes y labradas con primor las que lo habían sido toscamente, e ilustradas las que no alcanzaran la suficiente claridad” (1.1, 350).
individual: “No puede un individuo sólo llevar a perfección lo que apenas ciento hacer podrían” (1.5, 366). Therefore, it is the responsibility of every new generation to learn from previous mistakes, with the objective to exceed the level achieved by ancient scholarship (Bejczy, 74); not as “…enanos en hombros de gigantes,”, but as equals, who share not only in the love of truth, but whose relentless study and spirited focus form the bases of equality of all generations: “…todos tenemos la misma estatura, y aun diré que nosotros nos encaramamos más arriba gracias al bien que nos hicieron, siempre que haya en nosotros lo que en ellos hubo; a saber: estudio, concentración de espiritu, desvelo, amor de la verdad” (1.5, 368); for as Vives affirms, “La verdad es accesibles a todos y no está aún ocupada completamente. Muy mucho parte de ella quedó reservada a los venideros” (De disciplinis, Praef., 342). This begs the question of whether Vives believed that truth could ever be completely accessible to humans (Bejczy, 76).

Returning to De tradendis disciplinis, Vives suggests that humans are unable to fully grasp perfection (76), for, “…más que sea del dominio de los sentidos que no baste a ejercitar y fatigar por larguísimo tiempo a muchos ingenios” (II, 1.6, 546). The physical reality of this is made clear by the ever increasing amount of books, “…que han ido creciendo hasta el infinito, por sus autores respectivos anotando sus observaciones personales o copilando lo que otros habían publicado” (II, 1.6, 546). However, in the

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28 Vives repeatedly emphasises the authority of the new generation, while questioning the learning of previous ones, since: “…los modernos preceptistas, que, desconfiados de sí mismos, pensaron ser imperdonable sacrilegio apartarse del sentir de los antiguos,” including theologians such as, “Santo Tomás, a Escoto, a Ocam, a Holcot, a Gregorio de Rimini, a Pedro Haliacense,” among others (1.5, 367). Vives goes on to state, “Ni nosotros somos enanos ni fueron ellos gigantes; todos tenemos la misma estatura y aún diré que nosotros nos encaramamos más arriba gracias al bien que nos hicieron” (1.6, 368).
same work, Vives seems to contradict himself, affirming that perfection of the disciplines (Bejczy, 76): “…está en la posibilidad de la Naturaleza y en el ingenio de los hombres” (II 1.3, 535). Because, “Todo lo que ahora está en las artes, estuvo antes en la Naturaleza,” those who would later be called inventors, were simply men that had discovered something previously hidden (II, 1.2, 532). Therefore, perfection can only be reached through the cultivation of the arts, which progresses through the successive generational achievements of civilization. Moreover, all inquiries must have an ultimate purpose of being (Bejczy, 76): “Todo nuestro conocimiento viene a ser una cierta inspección,” in which “…el alma atiende a la memoria de lo pasado o dirige sus miradas escrutadoras a algún fin, respecto del cual si recoge alguna normas universales llamase arte” (II, 1.2, 531). And it is with this definition of art that Vives concludes by saying, “El arte es una facultad con un finalidad cierta y terminada, pues todo arte lo primero que se propone es un fin adonde se dirige, adonde apunta…actúa además en una materia, de la cual proviene el fin” (II, 1.2, 533).

Therefore, humankind’s passion for knowledge is mediated by reflecting on the end result (76): “…cual iba a ser la meta de un correr tan desalado y tan ansioso y cual el premio de un trabajo tan continuo” (II, 1.2, 530). However, because humans are not capable of answering this question on his own, they must turn to God for guidance and instruction (II, 1.2, 530). This idea once again, substantiates the claim that the pursuit of humans, finds its completion or “end” in God (76): “No existe otra perfección humana, puesto que, en fin de cuentas, la perfección consiste en que cada cual alcance el fin para que fué creado…para la participación de la eternidad y de su divina naturaleza” (II, 1.2 531). Indeed, as Bejczy explains, Vives’s affirmation that humans are capable of
understanding perfection, affirms Vives’ belief that truth is within “human reach” (76):

“God had implanted the subject matter and the possibility of all scholarly disciplines into nature, giving humans the instrument of their intellect in order to penetrate into them” (76). Therefore, both “the arts and sciences were…not an imperfect imitation of nature…but part of nature itself” (76). As we find in Vives’s following interrogation, the victory of humankind, whose perfection lies in nature, resides in her search for knowledge:

¿Qué miseria más grande que la de que ese animal por excelencia no busque ni desee más que lo que está subordinado a los sentidos, que no pueden tener realización en la vida…? Hermosísima y trascendental cuestión…Por eso tuvimos necesidad de Dios, que no solamente nos enseñase el camino para llegar a él, sino que como por la mano guíase al flaco y expuesto a una caída repentina (II, 1.2, 530).

Yet because the ancients, according to Vives, “discovered” the disciplines, he believed that they, the disciplines, did not change; rather, “human insight” into them underwent metamorphoses (76-77). Bejczy proposes that for Vives, “…discourse could reveal or obscure the truth, but not create or modify it” (77). We will revisit this idea in the coming chapters as I examine more closely Bernal Díaz’ and Oviedo’s reliance on, and desire of surpassing classical models. However, for now suffice it to say, as Bejczy notes, Vives believed that because, “…the traditions of scholarship were determined by historical circumstances…Without historical knowledge, one could not therefore properly understand past attempts at disclosing the truth” (77). As noted by Bejczy, Vives writes in his De causis:

Comencemos por decir que, ignorantes de la cronología y la Historia, no consideran lo que en cada uno de los escritores más es de considerar: tiempo en que vivió, cuál fué su autoridad, cómo escribió, cuál fué su estilo, cuál su lenguaje, si está convencido de lo que dice, si introduce variedad de interlocutores y a cuál de ellos le hace manifestar su sentir, dónde lo manifiesta, cuándo, en qué
The understanding of progress as continuous and incremental process is fundamental to understanding the value Vives gives to history. As observed in De tradendis disciplinis, history is without equal (77): “…no sé cómo es que puede parecer que la Historia aventaja a todas, pues ella sola engendra, cría a sus pechos, acrecienta y perfecciona a tantas otras” (5.1, 649). Moreover, the accumulated experiences of others, “…del conocimiento de los hechos de vieja recordación que se llaman historia,” allows the writer of history to transcend both time and space as though it were an act of magic allowing us to assist, “…a los hechos pasados como los sucesos actuales y que podamos explotarlos como nuestros” (5.1, 647).²⁹ Vives believed the “advancement of learning” was contingent on the “permanent communication with previous generations of scholars, and thus with the past” (Bejczy, 78). Therefore history, as Bejczy notes, “…is no longer primarily understood as political or military res gestae, but as the adventure of the human intellect, comprising all human thought since the first scholarly discoveries…he [Vives] presents history as a storehouse from which all sorts of lessons should be taken” (78).³⁰ Accordingly, Vives’s belief that history was the “source of all wisdom,” led to his

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²⁹ In connection with this quote, Vives goes on to explain the intrinsically magical powers of history: “Donde hay historia, esta convierte a los niños en ancianos; donde no está la historia, de los ancianos hace niños, puesto que la historia es testigo de los tiempos y luz de la verdad, como fué por los más sabios varones definida” (II, 5.1, 647 emphasis Vives).

³⁰ Bejczy points to several citations of Cicero’s remarks in his analysis (see footnotes, P. 78).
assertion that it be studied as “a coherent whole” (79). This idea warrants the following
description of Humanism and its assertion of universal historiography by Santiago
Montero Díaz:

El encanto narrativo de Heródoto, la penetración de Tucídides, el acerado
racionalismo de Polibio, la ejemplaridad de Tácito: todas las grandes virtudes de
los historiadores clásicos pudieron ser, en mayor o menor medida, aprovechadas
por los escritores del Renacimiento [en que] también sirvió de mucho la herencia
medieval. Los últimos siglos del medioevo habían producido una espléndida
historiografía. La vieja idea providencialista cristiana, que había abocado a la
concepción rigurosa de una Historia universal propiamente dicha, inspiraba a la
mayor parte de los historiadores occidentales. Pero, al mismo tiempo, la
renovación del espíritu europeo, iniciada desde el siglo XII y vertiginosamente
acentuada en las centurias siguientes, había producido una historiografía llena de
matics, sensible al paisaje y al carácter de los hombres, abundante en retratos,
precupada por las causas profundas de los hechos. La conjunción de ambas
tendencias, clásica y medieval, constituye en el Renacimiento un género histórico
nuevo, floreciente y genial. Es la obra de Humanismo (5-6).

Whereas De diciplinis promotes the humanist admiration for the cultural inheritance of
antiquity, Vives’ belief that history was in a constant state of “degradation,” led to the
conclusion that, “Only by devoting its energies to God can humanity turn the tide and
achieve the good” (Bejczy 81). As I outline in chapter four, Vives’ notion of progress
certainly plays a fundamental role in the narrative strategies employed by Bernal Díaz

31 Bejczy notes: “Vives’s treaties contain a long catalog of recommendable historians that
includes many authors, both medieval and modern, who had written on medieval history”
(79). This is notably different from other humanists (79): “…they either disregarded
medieval history and historiography for its lack of classical greatness, or embraced them
as a part of their glorious national past. For Vives, however, medieval history was a
component of the intellectual heritage of humanity which had to be known in its entirety”
(Bejczy 79).

32 Indeed, as Bejczy suggests: “His [Vives] historically oriented mind made him elaborate
the idea of permanent decline to a narrative that contradicted the opening chapters of De
Diciplinis, which was written from an entirely different starting point: the humanist
admiration (heavily though Vives qualified it) for the cultural inheritance of antiquity”
(81).
and Fernandez de Oviedo as they seek to balance ancient authority and their reliance to classical texts with their own experiences as eyewitnesses to the New World; the significance of which is not lost on Cervantes (I discuss this point in chapter three), who time and again in the *Quijote* summons previous texts and authorities only to later transform them into something new.

**Juan Luis Vives and the *Crónicas de Indias***

The ideas regarding the progress of the arts and the centrality of the historian developed in Bejczy’s reading of Vives prepares us to consider Vives’ views of narrative. As might be imagined, these views are complicated by Vives ambivalence regarding “language as a medium for conveying truth” (Beckjord, 23). Sarah Beckjord has discussed Vives’ views on historical representation:

[...:] his [Vives] interpretation of the Augustinian notion of the historian as part researcher and part prophet, while in some ways a site of self-contradiction, is one that is richly suggestive, because it encapsulates problems concerning the writing of history that continues to interest scholars today (23).

Vives’s “contribution to the method and rhetoric of history” as Beckjord notes, will allow us to examine “problems” that arise with regard to Vives’ expectations placed on the historian and historical narrative, in which (25):

His [Vives’] notion of an ideal historical narrative as seeking a mirrorlike objectivity congruent with the norms of probability and of Christian belief has its sources in Augustine and place a heavy burden on the historian. For Vives, the model inquirer is a humanist sage, a sort of terrestrial divinity who possesses almost supernatural powers to discern the meaning of events beyond his experience and to represent them as if directly perceived (5).

In the *City of God*, Augustine discusses the enhanced qualities shared by the sacred historian, in which as he states (16):
[...] the very disagreement of historians with one another affords us good reason for trusting, in preference to the rest, the authority who does not clash with the inspired record which we possess. Moreover, the citizens of the irreligious city...read authors of the profoundest erudition, and see no reason for rejecting the authority of any of them... and they cannot discover whom they ought particularly to trust. In contrast we can place our reliance on the inspired history belonging to our religion... (XVIII, 40, 815).

Whereas secular historians did not have the capacity to record historical events that were complete and likeminded, men of faith (Beckjord, 16):

[...] to whom the Holy Spirit unquestionably revealed matters...may have written sometimes as men engaged in historical research, sometimes as prophets under divine inspiration. And the two kinds of writing were so distinct that it was decided that the first kind should be attributed to the writers themselves, while the other kind was to be ascribed, as we might say, to God speaking through them. Thus one sort was concerned with the development of knowledge; the other with the establishment of religious authority; and the canon was carefully guarded as bearing this authority (XVIII, 39, 813).

Augustine’s depiction of the “sacred historian,” as Beckjord explains, points to the “epistemological concerns...of writing history” (Beckjord, 16). Because Augustine’s sacred historian is seen as an “inspired seer,” he sees history as not only the “pursuit of historical knowledge,” but also “revelation” (17). Yet, whereas Augustine believed pagan accounts to be limited to the point of view of those who wrote them, and thus required divine intervention, in Luis Cabrera de Cordoba’s (1559-1623) treatise De historia: para entenderla y escribirla, (1611), this belief looses validity (18).

In his treaty on the norms of writing history, Cabrera de Cordoba the historian no longer required mystical aptitudes (18). In its place, he proposes that “it is the reader who...increases his awareness through the careful study of historical texts,” (18). Indeed, as the following example demonstrates, Cabrera de Cordoba was skeptical of a history that tended to overlook the natural limitations of man:
Si la brevedad de la vida y la misma razón permitiera que un hombre viviera muchos siglos y anduviese muchas provincias y considerase lo que ay en todas y en qué consiste la fuerza y poder y lo que se avía seguido en bien o en mal de cada cosa, caso o negocio de cada príncipe o particular en hecho y consejo, ¿Quién no diría ser gran consejero? ¿Quién su parecer no tendría por oráculo en las determinaciones y respuestas consultado? Lo que niega la naturaleza, da la historia, pues los que la saben parece que han vivido muchos siglos, visto todas las regiones, hallándose en todos los públicos consejos y presentes a todo lo acaecido, notándolo y juzgándolo con cuidado (40-41).

Cabrera de Córdoba believed history to be the “…narración de verdades por hombre sabio para enseñar a bien vivir” (Cite in Montero Díaz, 27). He divides history between the divine and the human; further subdividing the two between the sacred and the ecclesiastic, and the natural and moral respectively (Montero Díaz, 27). As Santiago Montero Díaz notes, natural history was conceived by Cabrera de Córdoba, “…como la que escribieron de los animales y plantas Aristóteles y Plinio” (Cite in Montero Díaz, 27). Therefore, more than history, as Montero Díaz concludes, “…es una disciplina afín a las ciencias de la naturaleza, cosa que no se oculta a nuestro autor cuando en cierto modo la contrapone al género-más amplio-de la historia humana, al decir (27): ‘…la divina enseña religión; la humana, prudencia; la natural, ciencia, y todas deleitan’ (27).³³ Cabrera de Córdoba’s desire to describe the discursive norms of history is more clearly understood returning once more to our discussion of Juan Luis Vives.

³³ The purpose of history in Cabrera de Cordoba’s view, consisted not in writing things down so as not to forget them, rather “…para que enseñen a vivir con la Experiencia…El fin de la Historia es la utilidad pública” (Montero Díaz, 28). Cabrera de Córdoba goes on to state that, “El que mira la Historia de los antiguos tiempos atentamente y lo que enseñan guarda, tiene luz para las cosas futuras, pues una misma manera de mundo es todo” (Montero Díaz, 28).
In chapter five of *De Diciplinis*, Vives, who repeatedly cites Cicero’s definition of history as the “witness of time,” and “the light of truth,” states:\(^{34}\)

Las experiencias ajenas apréndanse del conocimiento de los hechos de vieja recordación que se llaman *historia*. Ella hace como arte de magia que nos parezca que asistimos a los hechos pasados como a los sucesos actuales y que podamos explotarlos como nuestros (5.1, 647).

Vives’ objective and cumulative pursuit of past truth, in which he creates for the reader the illusion of a firsthand view of history, even when not physically witnessed, enacts “…a gesture that is not just extraordinary but seemingly divine” in which:\(^{35}\)

[…] the notion of the privileged or unnatural perspective of the historian is problematic…In Vives’s description of the theory and practice of historical writing, one finds interesting paradox of the unnatural, fantastic narrative stance of the narrator of history posited as a sign of the reliability or objectivity of the narrative” (Beckjord, 18-19).

Such paradoxes found in Vives’s works, is perhaps best explained by Victor Frankl, who states in his treatment of *El antijovio* de Jimenez de Quesada (Ediciones cultura hispánica, 1963):

Siempre se ha considerado la “verdad histórica” como coincidencia del juicio, es decir, de la narración, con la “cosa”, con la “realidad”; pero la determinación de la “cosa” que debe ser reproducida o expresada por el relato, cambia de cultura en cultura, de época en época. La “realidad” histórica y, por consiguiente, la “verdad” histórica no es una y la misma para todos los de cultura y en una época; son los sujetos, de los cuales depende la configuración del objeto (36).

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\(^{34}\) Vives in chapter five of *De Diciplinis* cites Cicero, who states: “La historia es- dice- testigo de los tiempos, luz de la verdad, vida de la memoria, maestro de la vida, pregonera de la antigüedad” (1.5, 418). This citation is also partially repeated several times throughout *De diciplinis*, particularly the first line (1.5, 418) & (II 5.1, 647).

\(^{35}\) In using such terms I align myself to Beckjord in following Kristeller’s sixteenth-century use of the term *humanist* as a means to describe the “professor or teacher or scholar” of the humanities [including] grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy” (Cite in Beckjord 18).
In coming to such a conclusion, Frankl traces the myriad of conceptions that exist in, “la verdad histórica,” in which, “…se encuentran diferentes corrientes ideológicas, entrañando cada una de estas su propia interpretación de ‘verdad’” (33). Frankl begins with a brief explanation relating the concept of “truth” with that of “reality” (33). In so doing, he offers a summary of Aristotle’s views to assert that, “…la ‘realidad’ puede ser la realidad empírica, la realidad de la cosa individual, accesible a nuestros sentidos, o ella puede ser la realidad metafísica, la realidad inteligible, del núcleo general presente y activo en cada cosa, la ‘forma’, interior o ‘entelequia’ de la misma” (33). Of course, Frankl draws such distinctions from Aristotle’s *Poetics*, which teaches that at the heart of every “artistic or literary” endeavor is “mimesis”; that is (34):

36 The criteria of historical truth that coexisted and that are borrowed from different spiritual attitudes, according to Frankl, can be categorized as following: the authority of eyewitness experience, developed by the historians of Classical antiquity and reinterpreted in the Renaissance, in which the historic ‘truth’ signifies, “el recuerdo fiel, la copia narrativa del hecho individual-concreto, que aparece en su forma más pura en la reproducción de lo ‘visto y vivido’ por el autor mismo de la experience respecta” (34); second, the idea of the historian as an inspired decipher of an occult spiritual reality who are, “dotados de una visión ‘poética’, a saber, la realidad de los valores ideales que orientan las acciones de un héroe, apareciendo en esta concepción, como descubridor de esta ‘verdad’, el ‘historiador-poeta’ (37); third, describes as an archaic, pre- Renaissance value placed in chivalric codes, such as the notion of *fama* in which, “el reconocimiento del ‘nimbo’ que rodea o ‘debe’ rodear, en la opinión humana, ciertas personas o acciones… apareciendo, en esta concepción, como verdadero objeto de la ‘verdad’ histórica una realidad más sutil, más sublime, más espiritual, que la realidad bruta de los ‘hechos’, a saber, la ‘aureola’ de la ‘fama’(38); and fourth, the medieval thinking in the tradition of Augustine, renovated by the Counter- Reformation, which emphasized history’s role as evidence of God’s will on earth in which we observe, “la comprensión de la actividad de Dios en la Historia y la referencia inevitable, consciente o no, de los actos humanos a Dios, es decir, el reconocimiento del fondo teológico del acaecer histórico” (38). According to Frankl, this final idea can be interpreted three different ways: “…como continua conducción por Dios de los destinos humanos; como continuo ‘agon’ entre las potencias divinas y satánicas, y como suposición de la inminencia de la
 [...] la ‘imitación,’ de la realidad, la repetición de la cosa con los medios específicos del arte respectivo o de la literatura; pero que la ‘realidad’, la ‘cosa’, el objeto de la imitación artística, o literaria, pertenece a dos órdenes diferentes de lo existente, a saber, el orden empírico de las cosas individuales y el orden inteligible de las cosas generales, pudiendo ser, por ejemplo, el objeto de una representación artística o literaria un hombre individual, con todos los rasgos contingentes de su existencia concreta, o el hombre en general, con los rasgos necesarios correspondientes a su esencia metafísica (34).37

Indeed, we are reminded once more that Aristotle wrote that “the historian narrates events that have actually happened, whereas the poet writes about things that might possible occur,”38 concluding that “poetry…is more philosophic and more significant than history, for poetry is more concerned with the universal, and history more with the individual”(IX, 17).39 However, Cabrera de Córdoba suggests that the exemplary nature of history does not only concern the historian, but also the will of God and that of his

irrupción de lo divino en el mundo temporal, de la inminencia de una transformación mesiánico- escatológica, del acaecer histórico” (38).

37 Frankl bases his explanation on L. Russo’s “La Poetica di Aristotle” in “Promlemi di metodo critic”, which states: “Nella Poetica aristotelica coesiste dunque la doppia concezione del’arte come mimesi idealizzatrice della realtà, e quella del’arte-specchio di questa realtà” (Cite in Frankl 74).

38 Aristotle goes on to explain the differences between the two: “By the universal I mean what sort of man turns out to say or do what sort of thing according to probability or necessity- this being the goal poetry aims at, although it gives individual names to the characters whose actions are imitated. By the individual I mean a statement telling, for example, ‘what Alcibiades did or experienced’ (IX, 17). Basing his analysis on The Arabian Nights, Tzvetan Todorov in Poetics of Prose offers an excellent discussion on the thinking behind the notion of verisimilitude.

39 O. B. Hardison explains: “If the poet introduces fiction into a narrative based on an historical source, he is clearly modifying history; if he makes up his plot, he is acting independently of history. The poet thus has three alternatives. He can discover his pattern in history, he can modify history, or he can compose fictions” (290).
Therefore, as Montero Díaz explains, the independence, dignity and liberty of expression are required conditions of this science in which, as Carrera Cordoba (who Montero Díaz cites), states (28): “Ánima de la Historia es la verdad” (28). Indeed the “legislators of history,” (name first given to writers of rhetorical discourse and cited by Beckjord, “…commonly expressed in philosophical terms the notion of the superiority of history over poetry due to its ability to communicate truth, and moralists and rhetoricians frequently made their point by comparing the virtues of history to the vices of fiction” (Beckjord, 20). Yet, as will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, no longer limited to “rhetorical and philosophical treatise,” the dividing line between historical and fictional discourse remained problematic as they made their way into the historical narratives of the New World (i.e. chronicles), such as we see in Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s *Sumario* (1526) and Bernal Díaz de Castillo’s *Historia verdadera* (1584) (20).

The superiority of such historians, “endowed,” as Montero Díaz has described them, with “prodigious flexibility” to deal with unforeseen challenges: “…superan constantemente los modos fijados por los retóricos” (7). Such vivacity and inventiveness, also

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41 Montero Díaz emphasis this point comparing the historiography of the Golden Age to the humanist rhetorical requirements; “Pretender que nuestra historiografía del Sigo de Oro, pensada y escrita al compás de los acontecimientos, movible, varia y siempre personalísima, pudiera encuadrarse en las normas fijadas por los preceptistas sería tanto como pretender que la realidad dramática de Lope de Vega, Calderón o Rajas pudieran...
highlighted in Frankl’s assessment of the Spanish historiography, which he refers to as the “Golden Age” (“pensada y escrita al compás de los acontecimientos”) (38), alludes to a continued preoccupation with narrative, which Beckjord summarizes accordingly:

[…] the nature of the ‘truth’ represented (whether literal or allegorical), the qualities and perceptive abilities of the narrator (whether a direct witness or a judge of reports, possessing a vision that is wise and inspired, or limited in scope), and the credibility of the narrative both in relation to the ‘facts’ (as regards their verisimilitude and consistency with the divine plan) and to the literary or narrative style in which it is written (20).

Such concerns can be best understood in the writings of Vives, whose, “…case against ‘lying’ fictions are paralleled by an effort to describe the norms and characteristics of ‘truthful’ historical narration” (21). William Nelson has noted that, “In the Renaissance times, fictional narrative was said to be time wasting, vain, childish, trifling, frivolous, delightful, recreative, and ‘salacious’ … The humanist effort to prove that the profession of letters was indispensable to the health of civilization and to the proper conduct of states and individuals gave special emphasis to the idea that literary entertainment for its own sake was a prostitution of a most noble art” (56 - 59). A Renaissance resolution to this problem, as Nelson notes, depended in establishing the usefulness or “admirable substance,” of poetry “…to delight even if only, in order to instruct” (59, emphasis Nelson). Nelson further explains:

42 Beckjord offers a substantial bibliography on the subject beginning with B.W. Ife, in Reading and Fiction, in which he states (20): “Attacks on imaginative literature in sixteenth century Spain have been much anthologized but not always well understood. Undoubtedly one of the major barriers to understanding had been the very virulence of the terms in which they are expressed, and the tendency to dismiss the arguments as overstated and narrow- minded, particularly when so many of the criticism come from churchmen.” (Ife 12; see footnotes 20).
If the tale was to serve as an effective lure, it must be told well enough to capture and hold the attention of the audience. But the proper relationship between the author and his audience required a mutual understanding that the story was neither history told ‘for true’ nor childish confusion of make-believe with real, but a transparent device calculated to appeal to a less-than-serious aspect of human nature (59).

To this effect, Vives looks to the problematic nature of probability and verisimilitude in highlighting the process of writing history; a critical debate that as Beckjord explains, “…exemplifies the sort of blurring of boundaries considered to be characteristic of this period” (Beckjord, 24).43

Vives begins book two, chapter five of De causis corruptarum atrium, with an attempt at establishing proper distinction between history, fiction and legal rhetoric (Beckjord, 25). His desire is made explicit from the onset of chapter 5, which begins by judging the etymology of the Greek root for history, istorein (to see): “…como si el historiador estuviere viendo lo que escribe” (2.5, 418). He contrasts this definition of the ideal historian as a direct eyewitness, citing Cicero’s own idea of history as, “…una serie

43 Nelson proposes that, “Separation from history set invented story in competition with history as to its value for mankind. The historian’s credential were patent, and they were supported by such impressive testimony as Cicero’s endlessly repeated phrase, ‘History bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tiding of ancients days.’ It offered the painful lessons of the past for the painless instruction of the present. And above all it was light upon reality, not the mirage of imagination” (49). Nelson goes on to summarizes Renaissance defenders of poetry as those who, “followed medieval precedent in proposing that fiction, like ancient myth and Biblical parable, was a rhetorical device for expressing moral, religious, or historical truths, useful because it was delightful and memorable and because the difficulty of extracting its meaning enhanced the value of the meaning….They added compatible defenses drawn from Plato and Aristotle which asserted that fictional creation represented ideas or universal or human types rather than individuals, imitations philosophically more true than the particularity to which history was bound. Or fiction was taken to show the truth of the world as it might be and should be, a rational world in which virtue was rewarded and vice punished and therefore a world more ‘real’ than the foolish one of the historians” (49-50).
de hechos realizados en una época alejada de nuestro recuerdo” (2.5, 418). As Vives notes, there lies an inherent contradiction between these two versions of history; “…de tal manera que lo que Tito Livio escribe de las guerras púnicas, para los primeros no es historia; y lo que es contemporáneo, no es historia para Cicerón” (2.5, 418). He mitigates to a certain extent these differences defending Cicero’s claim that, “La Historia es testigo de los tiempos, luz de la verdad, vida de la memoria, maestro de la vida pregonera de la antigüedad” (2.5, 418). This leads Vives to conclude that history is not only that which is witnessed, but contemplated and verified (2.5, 418). In fact, Vives strongly criticizes Homer, Hesiod, among other Greek poets “for having misunderstood their ‘proper’ function” to uphold the “truth” (Beckjord, 25):

[…] su depravación primera consistió en que con los hechos verdaderos mezclasen mentiras, inicialmente los poetas, que, no persiguiendo sino el solaz de los oyentes y un grato cosquilleo de los oídos, sólo anduvieron en pos de lo que produjera deleite. Y... desconfiaron de alcanzar ese objetivo con la verdad sincera y genuina amalgamaron en un revoltijo verdades y falsedades y aun las verdades mismas las torcieron y desfiguraron, cuando creyeron que de este modo iban a tener mayor aceptación o causar más grande maravilla. A ese efecto, abusaron de figuras, metáforas, alegorías, anfibologías, sinonimias, semejanzas de cosas o de nombres. De un hombre que se llamase Tuaro (toro) dijeron que era un toro real;...de una lanza larga decían que llegaba al cielo… y así fueron hiperbolizando desaforadamente (2.5, 418, emphasis mine).

According to Vives, while some poets tended to exaggerate the truth, or lied, as a means to maintain the interest of their readers, others did so, simply out of ignorance (Beckjord, 25). This led to repeated errors that with time resulted in a veil of impenetrable darkness:

Paulatinamente, el error, pasado como de mano en mano, y confirmado por reiteración y el tiempo, hizo que la verdad escondida y envuelta en tantos velos no pudo ser descubierta ni revelada por los escritores….Añadieron las confusión de nombres…Ello hizo que los hechos hazañosos de unos se atribuyeran a los otros (2.5, 419).
These errors included not only “names and places,” but as Beckjord notes, also calendars; the absence of a reliable record of time only served to further obscure the chronology of events (25).  

Vives’ assessment included those who “based their work on unreliable sources,” including, but not limited to: “rumors, personal letters, and funeral orations, leaving a legacy of figural language and factual errors to subsequent generations,” in which “...research nor revelation would be sufficient to reverse the poetic distortions of historical fact endemic to the early Greek poetic traditions” (25).  

While, as Beckjord notes, later Greek authors, (including Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus), began to view history as a means of obtaining “praise,” another important reason that propelled the

44 As I demonstrate in the following chapter, chronology plays an important role as well in the Quijote, such as we find in the chronological reenactment of Don Quixote’s encounter with the cave of Montesinos.

45 This critic includes imprecise enumeration of years that led to ridiculous lies: “Donde unos cuentan sesenta años, otros cuentan sesenta mil...como en los anuarios egipcios y caldeos, donde aquellas gentes mentían con impávido descaro” (2.5, 419).

46 Vives writes: “Otros lanzanse a mentir despreocupadamente, porque no buscan la verdad donde debe buscarse, sino que la recogen de lugares donde hallarla es rareza suma, a saber; de rumores que se disiparon, de cartas, que se escribían cuando los sucesos se verificaban, en las cuales un amigo hace a su amigo noticioso, no de lo que pasó en realidad, sino de lo que el oyó” (2.5, 420). Further ahead Vives states: “Tito Livio demuestra que muchos historiadores que se documentaron en las oraciones fúnebres dieron falsedades por verdades y adulaciones por hechos” (2.5, 420).
Greeks to lie and justify the use of those lies, was patriotism (25): “…su exaltado patriotism, que los llevó a pensar que iban a aumentar la grandeza de su patria si la encarecían con la grandeza de las mentiras y por este servicio merecerían bien de ellas” (2.5, 420). Vives further describes their apparent disregard for truth, explaining: “Así que cuando la realidad no les proporcionaba materia adecuada, ellos la crearon descomunal, inédita, inmensa, estupenda, maravillosa, y en ella ejecutaron copiosamente aquella su fuerza nativa de creación y de expresión” (2.5, 420).47 Full of poetic hyperboles that are fomented by both personal interest and national agendas, Vives puts forth a harsh assessment of “ancient historical record” that point to distortions of the truth (Beckjord, 26).

Vives did not limit his criticism to Greek authors in his pursuit of truth; he also turned his attention to Christian hagiography (26). Immediately following his assessment of ancient historians, Vives blames deviances from historic truth by the historian’s “blind devotion,” which acts to diminish the exemplary lives of moral individuales (26): “¡Oh que gran vergüenza es para nosotros, cristianos, que los hechos esclarecidos de nuestros santos no hayan sido encomendados a la posteridad con más verdad y mayor lima, así para su noticia como para la imitación de tan soberanas virtudes…!” (2.6, 423).

Furthermore, Vives was weary of including an excess of insignificant details, which tended to overshadow the more important aspects of human life (26). According to Vives, 47 In his strong critic of historians who are driven by patriotic agendas, Vives includes modern nation states; “Los franceses escriben la historia de Francia, los italianos, la de Italia; los españoles, la de España…y cada cual la suya, por ganar la aprobación del país respectivo…[el historiador]…no pone la mira en la verdad objetiva, sino en la mayor gloria de aquella nación…Necios que no entienden que eso no es escribir historia, sino defender el honor comprometido de aquel pueblo; tarea de abogado, no de historiador “ (2.6, 423).
history that is full of such “bagatelas y fruslerías” consist of endless digressions that only
serve to distract from its more important purposes that include moral as well as
exemplary acts, since (26): “Prudencia, de allí no podrás sacar ninguna; no interpolan
discursos sabrosos de leer; no exponen con agudeza su propio sentir; no dan sabios
avisos” (2.6, 424). In a playful manner, the excessive inclusion of trivial detail is brought
to light in the Quijote as well, yet unlike Vives, the narrator of the Quijote praises Cide
Hamete (its presumed author) for his diligence and fortitude in bringing to light what
other historian choose to ignore: “Pinta los pensamientos, descubre las imaginaciones,
responde a las tácitas, aclara las dudas, resuelve los argumentos; finalmente, los átomos
del más curioso deseo manifiesta. ¡Oh autor celeberrimo!” (II, xi 1407).48

Indeed, Vives believed that history should present an opportunity to enrich the
soul (Beckjord, 26). As such history should include, “…topics of peace and examples of
reason, moderation, and Christian piety” (26). Conversely, history should not be used to
imitate barbaric tendencies of the past, such as “narratives of revenge and war” (26).
While, “the traditional fare of history,” Vives sees no intrinsic value in the need to
propagate such destructive desires; a path which will only make the reader (26),
“…desear aquella sangrienta infamia que oye ser tan celebrada y enaltecida” (2.6, 421).
The tendency of such historians to do so demonstrates their lack of judgment and mastery
of aesthetic eloquence (Beckjord, 27). This is especially true of those historians “who fail
to intersperse their own commentary and opinion into the narration of events” (27). Vives

48 As I make mention in chapter four, this citation is also important when considering
Vives’ repeated emphasis that the historian “illuminate” historical events by
commentating on their significance.
closes his criticism of modern historians with a general assessment as to their capabilities as writers:

Pero nuestros autores, en aquel su latín presunto, tiene un estilo sordidísimo o, mejor, no tienen ningún estilo…Y si escriben en su lengua vernacular, tienen su elocución un color uniforme y gris hasta el aburrimiento y una añadadura monótona sin sal, sin gracia, sin aseo, por manera que apenas puede entretener al lector el espacio de media hora (2.6 424).

In fact, those who do spend energy reading these books do so out of curiosity, and they are the same readers who according to Vives, “…prefieren leer libros manifestamente mendaces, atiborrados de meras bagatelas, por algún agrado que acoso tenga su estilo, como los españoles Amadís y Florisanto; los franceses Lancelot y la Tabla Redonda y el italiano Rolando” (2.5 424). The same books we find in Don Quixote’s library and whose distortions on reality lead to his transformation as knight errant.

Beckjord notes how it is precisely “the lack of appealing historical” prose that led to the heightened popularity of chivalric romances (Beckjord, 27):

[…] his [Vives’] concern for grounding an educational program on history (rather than on evasive fictional works) stems from a desire to develop a pedagogy able to match the crises of his time, which included violent strife in the context of religious divisions and of Spanish imperialist expansion, moral issues of which he was painfully aware (27).

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this idea is especially important with regards to the dilemma presented by the New World: a new flora and fauna, which brought to the fore narrative as well as descriptive problems that are best understood within the expressive possibilities available to the historian during this period (González Echevarría, 12). We must keep in mind that the rise of Spain as an imperial power generated an abundance of textual material that problematizes the relationship of history and
imaginative prose. Cervantes takes full advantage of this in his novel which mimics rather closely the narrative strategies observed in the writing of history, and speak to Vives’ dislike of “lying” genres such as chivalric romances that he sees as having little if no redeeming value. Yet, in his praise of history in both De tradendis disciplinis as well as De ratione dicendi, Vives presents guidelines for writing history that at times introduces a level of ambiguity in which as Beckjord explains:

[…] although he [Vives] considers history to be distinct from fiction in content and intent, the historian may borrow from the techniques of fiction to foster exemplarity and indeed may be required to do so, not just to remain alive and meaningful to readers, but to reach any audience at all (Beckjord, 29).

However, Peter Mack notes in his critical assessment of De ratione dicendi, that Vives defines history:

[…] as a setting out of things that have happened and as an image and mirror of things past. Then history is divided into classes according to subjects that include (e.g. private matters of individuals, public affairs of individuals, public affairs of many, events of a people, single or multiple aspects) (Mack, 88).

Indeed, as Mack explains, Vives is explicit that the following classes should all serve the historian to narrate, “aquellos sucesos que ayuden a ordenar la vida y puedan mejorar a los lectores, evitando que la narración se disipe y se consuma en vanidades y en bagatelas” (3.3, 781). According to Vives’ assessment, there are various types of narration (i.e. those that persuade, explain or retain the interest of the reader/listener) (Mack, 88); each serving a specific purpose according to their intended end or goal (88). Moreover, these various types of narration are often mixed. Vives proposes narration that seeks to instruct and be truthful in content (88). If the end goal is to persuade it must be probable, while narrative for the purpose of entertainment or retaining the audience’s
attention has greater freedom (3.2, 780). However, the main objective of history is to remain historically truthful to the event (Mack, 88). Vives repeated emphasis in the importance of truth in history is reflected in his decision to make it the first law that historians must use to measure their narrative (88). Indeed, as Mack notes, “Some histories have to be truthful in every word; others must be truthful in general terms but may add words, sentences, or oration to create belief or to communicate pleasure” (88).49 In all cases, Vives emphasizes framing the subject in such a way as to highlight what is exemplary (88). In fact, as Frankl notes, selecting what is most useful to the reader, while disregarding frivolous generalities when writing history, results in a unique “tripartisan” conception of historical truth (126):

Accordingly, the historian must select those events that allow for the development of “prudence and good behavior” (Mack, 88): “Llamo principales a los hechos que demuestran más prudencia o mayor moralidad” (3.3, 782). And in order to “increase the

49 Vives offers several examples in his guidelines that must be applied to any kind of history. See Di ratione dicendi (3.3, 781-782).
reader’s prudence, the historian should consider in detail causes, plans and things that were concealed at the time” (Mack, 88).

Moreover, in book 5 of De tradendis disciplinis, Vives turns his attention to human experience: “La experiencia o es una conquista nuestra personal adquirida por nuestra actuación, o es una adquisición ajena” (5.1, 647). Further on, Vives declares that:

Aparte de que proporcionar un goce muy grande, es increíble su utilidad, no solamente para la vida sino para todas las artes. Hasta qué punto deleita y recrea el espíritu humano, lo dan a entender las consejas y fabulillas de las Viejas, que escuchamos con atención y contentamiento, no más que por que alguna apariencia de historia (5. 1 647).

While pointing to the enjoyment one receives in hearing the experiences of others, Vives also points to the importance of selecting unusual or admirable events that work to increase the reader’s (or listener’s) attention (Beckjord, 28). In fact, Vives asks:

¿Quién no abre sus oídos y no levanta su espíritu, si oye referir algún hecho insólito, grande, admirable, hermoso, heroico, algún dicho arrogante y osado de que andan llenas las historias? Es de ver cómo algunos, mientras leen u oyen alguna narración, con frecuencia falsa, se mueren del deseo de saber más, se olvidan de comer, beber y dormir y se sobreponen a estas necesidades de su organismo mientras no han averiguado el desenlace y ven resuelta la intriga (5.1, 647).

Vives expounds on this idea further in book 2 of De ratione dicendi, ascribing it, as Beckjord notes, “…to the psychological sensation of listening to or reading stories” (28). In fact, Vives states:

[…] nos conmueven los casos ajenos como los percances propios, y nosotros nos ponemos en su lugar…Así es que las descripciones de los bienes y de los males ajenos, como ocurre en las narraciones históricas, afectan nuestra sensibilidad. Por otra parte, en aquellas otras que sabemos novelescas, nos regocijamos, reímos, lloramos, esperamos, tememos, odiamos, simpatizamos, nos enojamos y ello contenta mayor vivacidad si se nos ponen delante de los ojos con tal vigor gráfico, que creemos no ser aquello una relación, sino una realidad viva, por manera que ya no nos mueven solamente los afectos ajenos, sino las mismas.
The power of “vivid narrative” to not only “elicit an emotional response,” but to persuade the reader speaks to what Beckjord sees as Vives’ repeated attempt to advocate for the use of techniques of fiction (Beckjord 28-29):

By presenting events as if perceived (‘a scene made real’), fictive narrative prompts the reader to identify with imaginary characters, and even to experience imaginary pain. It is the possibility of this intense psychological identification with, or vicarious experience of, the fate and emotions of others that makes narrative such an important concern for Vives (29).

Indeed, Vives’ description on the power of fiction to not only persuade the reader, but in so doing, to represent “true’ and exemplary events and figures,” seems to go against his own expressed disdain for poetic language and tropes observed earlier, in which:

[…] although he considers history to be distinct from fiction in content and intent, the historian may borrow from the techniques of fiction to foster exemplarity and indeed may be required to do so, not just to remain alive and meaningful to readers, but to reach any audience at all (29).

Up to this point, we have examined Vives’ unique ideas of progress, which leads him to re-examine the contributions and value of previous generations. These ideas resurface repeatedly in the writings of Bernal Díaz and Oviedo, and are parodied in the literary creations of Cervantes. Accordingly, Vives seemingly paradoxical stand on poetic language as a means of persuasion presents many challenges for the ideal historian, in particular those of the New World, who must confront situations that are unprecedented and thus have no clear model to follow. Vives’ ideas present a potential moral dilemma for the historian, who must select only that which is deemed necessary and useful. To
better understand this final point let me now turn to the source of Vives’ critique of
fiction, Plato’s Republic.

B.W. Ife (who Beckjord notes in her analysis) considers both the “moral” as well
as “metaphysical” aspects against the use of fiction, each consisting of two arguments
(24):

The moral aspect concerns the way literature a) sets bad examples and b)
encourages vicarious experience. The metaphysical aspect involves the
objection that c) fiction is a counterfeit form of reality and d) the existence
of convincing fictions undermines the authority of truth (24).

While, Ife separates these aspects in his analysis for purposes of clarity, he is quick to
note that these are not “mutually exclusive,” and indeed “often intersect” (24). Plato’s
belief that literature sets “bad examples,” by causing its audience to experience
“vicarious experience” that they might otherwise never have had the opportunity to do so,
points to ways in which the notion of mimesis is used in the Republic (30). Apart from
being an “active representation,” in which, “…it is the representation and not the object
represented that is the direct object of the verb mimesthai” (Ife, 30), Plato reduces art “to
a form of realism characterized above all by fidelity to a model” (37). The restrictive
nature of this definition limits the artist’s impression of things solely to their appearances,
leaving its real nature untouched (37): “The artist’s job is to reproduce his original as
faithfully as possible…Quality in art, then, is a simple matter of measurement, in each
particular case, of the distance between the image and the original it represents” (37).
These two arguments, which form the bases of Plato’s initial critic on “the metaphysical
legitimacy of this art” carries two important consequences (37). First, “because art object
is a copy of an original or model”, the artist has no other motive than to deceive his
audience (37). Second, because “the model is always truer, more ‘real’, than the copy, and because the art object is defined… in terms of its relationship with something else—the ‘original’, or ‘model’, art is flawed…incapable of giving anything other than an impoverished image of reality” (38). Vives addresses these concerns, as Beckjord explains, arguing that the narrative of history is superior to fiction, since it “…is both veridical and able to channel the powerful psychological experience of narrative to virtuous or morally useful ends” (Beckjord, 29-30). Nelson asserts this idea in his analysis of Vives dialogue entitled, “Truth Dressed Up, or of Poetic License: To What Extent Poets May Be Permitted to Vary from the Truth,”50 in which he concludes that for Vives,

[...] while the author is required to observe, more or less respectfully, whatever is known or generally accepted about the past, the less substantial that knowledge the greater the permissible admixture of invention. The way opens, therefore, for fiction set in the far away or long ago to take the form of history without pretending to be history, to present itself as a work of the imagination (48).

Of course, to do so would require prudence: a source of judgement and experience, which as Vives states, served to combat “…el piloto y el timón en la tempestad de las pasiones” (5.1 645). 51 In fact, as mentioned earlier in our discussion of progress, history allows

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50 Beckjord points to Vives’s dialogue La verdad embadurnada (Vertias Fucata 1522), for a more complete discussion of the problematic nature of poetry in Plato’s Republic, and also Nelson’s comments in Fact or Fiction, 45-48, (See footnotes 30).

51 As noted by Beckjord, Vives “distinguishes between two kinds of prudence, that of the flesh and that of the human soul (30 Footnotes): “…la prudencia tiene dos partes o direcciones; una de estas, dado que la prudencia tenga puestas todas sus miras sobre las pasiones…y esto es aquella bellaquería aquella astucia que las Sagradas Letras denominan prudencia de la carne porque se aficionó a lo que la carne codicia. La otra parte es la que refiere a mejorar su alma y la de los otros todas sus obras y todos sus pensamientos para mejorarse a sí mismo y a los otros” (II, 5.1, 646). Vives also offers a
man to magically transcend the physical limitations of the individual by learning from the experiences of others, in which, “Las experiencias ajenas apréndense del conocimiento de los hechos de vieja recordación que se llaman historia. Ella hace como arte de magia que nos parezca que asistimos a los hechos pasados como a los sucesos actuales y que podamos explotarlos como nuestros” (5.1 647 emphasis Vives). Therefore, Vives views prudence as a sort of foretelling, in which as he states, “…según declara el viejo afórmiso: A quien conjeturare atinadamente, acátalos como al vidente más lince” (5.1 646 emphasis Vives). Here, as Beckjord notes, Vives no longer attaches the concept of “soothsayer” to the poet, but rather to the prudent historian, in which: “History appears to have taken over in Vives’s model the central place accorded memory in many medieval rhetorical systems as described by Mary Carruthers” (Beckjord, 30). As such, Vives viewed this faculty as a means “to refining human judgment” (Beckjord, 31).

Vives begins book 2 of De anima et vita explaining that humankind’s aspiration towards good, which he calls “voluntad,” or foresight can only function alongside the faculty of intellect, which to be useful must be stored in the faculty of memory: “…un cierto receptáculo o almacén, en donde al presentarse los nuevos, recondiese los
anteriores como en tesoro de objetos actualmente ausentes, para reproducirlos y sacarlos cuando la oportunidad lo pidiere” (1.2, 1182). However, the intellect of humans has two motives or “estimativas,” which differentiate him from animals. Whereas both the human and animal “…se conducen al bien y al mal,” it is human’s second “estimativa” that orients her towards that which is true or false, in which the path of the individual, “…se bifurca y toman distinta dirección la razón especulativa, cuyo fin es la verdad, y la razón práctica, cuyo fin es el bien” (1.2, 1193). While the first of these two paths is limited to the here and now, the second as Vives explains: “Transcende a la voluntad” (1.2 1193). Accordingly, the human soul in accordance with the ideas set forth by Cicero, has three functions, or as Vives goes on to clarify “…facultades, o fuerzas, u oficios, o potencias y partes” (1,2, 1182): memory, foresight or “voluntad,” and intellect. Vives likens these three functions to the image of the Holy Trinity in which: “A seguida vemos que compara entre sí las cosas que ha conocido, que de ellas pasa a otras y luego que ha hecho todo esto, ve y juzga lo que es verdadero y lo que es falso, lo que es bueno y lo que es malo” (1.2, 1183). And it is these three faculties that belong to the rational soul, that is “…voluntad, inteligencia, mente; y bajo la mente, la simple inteligencia, la reflexión, el recuerdo, la comparación, el razonamiento, la censura o juicio y la atención” (1.2, 1183). Of these faculties the intellect acts as a first receptor of things both seen and unseen in

52 Vives offers further explanation of this process in the previous paragraph explaining that: “Las facultades,…están dispuestas para actuar…La facultad del ojo es ver no uno u otro color ni de esta o estotra manera, sino muda y simplemente. Consideramos doble la inteligencia, pues existe como facultad general en todo el universo y como una función particular de la misma. Observemos que la inteligencia humana conoce aquello que viene de fuera y que conserva como en una cajita las cosas entendidas para tomarlas de nuevo en el momento oportuno; este volver a tomar, esta recuperación se llama reflexión, y de ahí se pasa al recuerdo” (1.2, 1183).
which: “…si este objeto está presente, la imaginación recibe la figura misma que se ofrece a los sentidos; si está ausente el objeto, cuando de él en alguna conservación se hace memoria,…la fantasía sugiere su forma tomando de la memoria” (1.2, 1184).

However, if the senses are not able or capable of envisioning something or someone, it is the mind “…quien lo infiere con la razón y la fantasía quien inventa su imagen tomada de las cosas que ya conoce” (1.2 1184 emphasis mine).  

Vives underscores the importance of the “image’ (imago, pictura, speculum)” as the most effective means of capturing the past (Beckjord, 32). He likens the image to, “…la tabla que un pintor iluminó” (1.2, 1185) insisting that, “Como es preciso que sea espejo de los tiempos, si [el historiador] refiere falsedades, el espejo será falso y devolverá una imagen que no habrá recibido. Tampoco será verídica la imagen si fuere mayor o menor que la realidad; quiero decir, si el historiador, adrede, deprime el suceso o lo encarece” (3.3, 781). Vives explains that history, “Es como la pintura, la imagen o el espejo de las cosas pasadas. Así como se cuentan las cosas pretéritas, también las venideras” (3.3, 780). To this effect, Beckjord notes how Vives was “drawing in part on classical conceptions” in his description of history:

[...] which represented historiography as analogous to visual representation in that in it the past is displayed as coexisting simultaneously with the present…Much like a painter trained in perspective and anatomy, the ideal historian should shape the events in his narrative in such a way as to preserve their proper proportions and to create the illusion of a direct perception of events (32- 33).  

53 Vives likens such things as those which cannot be inferred about to God or angels, and other realities or corporal things that have never been seen before such as places and animals (1.2, 1184).

54 For more information of history as a “visual spectacle in Livy and the classical rhetorical tradition” Beckjord suggests referring to “Feldherr, Spectacle and Society, 4-5; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, book 4, chap. 2” (33 Footnotes).
However, as observed in the previous citation of Vives, historical representation must not only reflect the past, it must also offer insight (33).

It is at this point that Vives turns his discussion to reason in which:

Recibida ya aquella primera y sencilla imagen, que ha entrado por las puertas de los sentidos, la fantasía añade a ella otras representaciones y formas de las cualidades y actos que se perciben mediante los sentidos mismos. Luego se allega la razón y compara aquellos elementos entre sí, los clasifica debidamente, que son estos o aquellos, que hacen tal cosa o tal otra, o al revés (1.2, 1191).

In order for reason to express “…la cualidad de una cosa o lo que hace, sino que es o no es,” it must transform a mere coincidence (“accidente”) into one of substance (1.2 1191). Vives calls this process “discursos,” explaining that:

No puede la fantasía figurarse imagen alguna que no sea de las cosas que adquirió con el concurso de los sentidos…Mas la razón pasa tan de vuelo por aquellas imágenes, que no concibe en sí ninguna absolutamente o tan ligeramente, que parece que no es ninguna. Nada toma de los accidentes particulares; por eso mira a lo lejos y se aparta cuanto puede de lo que vio (1.2, 1192).

In fact, Vives makes explicit that without the use of fantasy, reason cannot function at all, since as he explains:

[...] la razón utiliza también fantasmas, aunque sin mezclarse con ellas. Así que el sentido sirve a la imaginación y ésta a la fantasía, la cual a su vez sirve al entendimiento y a la reflexión, y la reflexión al recuerdo, el recuerdo a la comparación y ésta a la razón en último término. El sentido es una como mirada de la sombra, la fantasía, o la imaginación lo es de la imagen; la inteligencia, del cuerpo; la razón, de la forma y de las fuerzas (1.2, 1192 emphasis Vives).

The main feature of this double “estimativa,” which directs man towards what is good and what is true is prudence: “La meta de la razón contemplativa es la verdad, y la de la razón práctica es el bien. Esta razón segunda forma juicio de la comparación de lo verdadero y lo bueno;…nuestro juicio se detiene, vacila, se para, se revoca” (1.2, 1193-
Moreover, for prudence to be obtained science and art alone are not enough, it is attained through experience itself, which as discussed earlier, includes memory and recollection (1.2, 1193).

The ability to both judge and illuminate events witnessed by the historian, make such “pictorial” analogies challenging; as Beckjord explains, “The use of visual metaphors would seem to suggest the importance of direct observation, and yet there is no mention of actual witnessing as a prerequisite for the conscientious chronicler” (33). Indeed, Vives imagines the ideal historical narrator as an unlimited eyewitness, able to decipher the most hidden affairs (33):

Para que la prudencia salga con mayor relieve, explíquense las causas y los consejos y los resultados, y si en el negocio hubiere algo oculto o arcano, revélese, pues ello realza más la prudencia que los sucesos de todos conocidos. Por lo demás, así como dijimos que para la descripción lo preferible era poner toda la cosa debajo de los ojos, así también en la Historia el ideal es que el historiador proponga el desarrollo histórico, como si se contemplare desde una atalaya (3.3, 783-83).

Vives here is implying that the historian at times be required to evoke mystical powers (Beckjord, 33). Accordingly, he does not require his ideal historian to have been physically present, only that he, “…re-create the narrative perspective imaginatively from his investigations” (34). Yet, such concepts are routinely contested in the writings of several cronistas and play a fundamental role in the Quijote. In fact, the idea of presenting the past as if directly witnessed, even when the historian is not physically present, is a notion that is repeatedly contested in the writings of Gonzalo Fernández de

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55 Vives in De anima et vita defines judgement as, “…una censura, es decir, la aprobación y desaprobación de la razón, o sea el discurso y sus conclusiones, que está en la mente como una cierta o norma o como el fiel de la balanza” (1.2, 1198-9).
Oviedo and Bernal Díaz del Castillo (among other chroniclers of the New World) (34); each of whom, as Víctor Frankl explains:

[…] encuentra la idea de la verdad histórica de lo ‘visto y vivido’ en las Crónicas de los historiadores de las Indias; en parte por razón de la situación de éstos, de actores, y testigos en la conservación de la verdad de sus acciones a los escritores eruditos europeos quienes, apoyándose en un saber meramente libresco y teórico respecto a la Conquista y en un estilo culto, describieron defectuosamente los hechos transoceánicos, y en parte, tal vez, en virtud del tradicional ‘verismo’ de la literatura española y del influjo de la tradición de Tucidides y Polibio (84).

While, subsequent chapters, (in particular chapter five) will further address the importance of first-hand experience in the chronicles of the New World, for now it is worth noting that both Oviedo and to a certain extent Bernal Díaz, shared in their underlying rejection of historiography produced remotely without “vital contact” as described by Frankl above (85). Such is the case of Peter Martyr, author of De orbe novo (1526-1530), whom Oviedo (in particular) extensively criticizes in his Sumario de la Natural historia de las Indias (85). In a similar manner, Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España is presented in continuous opposition against another work, namely Francisco López de Gómara’s Conquista de México (96). To describe this ideological opposition, Frankl suggests a new type of historiography in the writings of Bernal Díaz: “Historia de refutación,” that is:

[…] destinada no sólo a retener un trozo de realidad escrita, por consiguiente, no sólo en vista de la imagen del hecho en cuanto tal, sino también con miras a otra interpretación del mismo, hasta tal punto que toda la exposición histórica aparece orientada en la explosión del adversario (96).

Frankl’s idea has its source in Ramón Iglesia’s assessment of Bernal Díaz’s, Historia verdadero, where he states (96):

Insístase más en el cotejo de los textos de Bernal y Gómara, y quizá se encuentre que éste le prestó a aquél un precioso servicio, ayudándole a dar forma a su obra,
a distribuir los capítulos, etc…. Creo que Gómara no sólo estimuló a Bernal, sino que le sirvió de pauta en su relato (Cite in Frankl, 96).

The attributes given to Vives’ ideal historian, who must not only narrate events as if present, but as if “se contemplare desde una atalaya (3.3, 783-83), speaks to what we find in Bernal’s *Historia verdadadera*. Anticipating Cide Hamete of the *Quijote*, who as we have seen not only “Pinta los argumentos,” (II, xl 1407), but in so doing, “aclara las dudas [y] resuelve los argumentos,” (II, xl 1407), Bernal in his role as a firsthand witness to the conquest, from time to time also transgresses his own stated limitations. A case in point and one that I examine at some length in chapter five, occurs amid his detailed account of the first spoken exchange between Cortés and Moctezuma. Here Bernal captures a remarkable glimpse into the inner workings of the Aztec leader (Estrada, 105). As I demonstrate in the following chapter, while the ideas of Vives are repeatedly contested by several *cronistas*, including the two I have selected to analyze, their repeated transgressions of such limitations seem to support Vives’ notions and requirements of historical narrative and the ideal historian. And it is precisely this idea which Cervantes parodies in the *Quijote* among his multiple intermediaries.

Returning to our discussion on the importance that Vives gives to chronology, he states in *De ratione dicendi*: “…cuando se narran hechos de muchos pueblos o de uno sólo en varios pasajes, de un suceso se ha de pasar a otro, atendiendo más a la sucesión cronológica que a la situación geográfica” (3.3, 783). As Beckjord notes, Vives’s explanation on chronology is preceded in *De Diciplinis*, where he paraphrases the esteemed Terencio Varrón, “autor…doctor y diligente,” who suggests: “…para la luz de la Historia no hay cosa tan a propósito como una exacta cronología,” adding, “Antes de
las Olimpiadas todo estaba revuelto y oscuro, porque no había ninguna distinción de
tiempos de hechos señalada por determinados signos que hicieran el oficio como de
estrellas fijas” (1.5, 419). This lead to “chaotic confusión,” the result of which, “…los
viejos sistemas de pesos y medidas con dificultad pueden reducirse a los nuestros por su
gran variedad; lo que aún por la misma causa ocurre con los actuales” (1.5, 419).56 Vives
believed it was fundamental that history be limited to “important facts,” that is, as Frankl
explains (121):

[…] mediante una visión amplia que comprende sectores mayores del acontecer
histórico y las articulaciones y subdivisiones del mismo, con lo cual se abre la
posibilidad de distinguir lo ‘importante’, de la ‘substancia’, del acontecer, lleva
lóxicamente al postulado de circunscribir las articulaciones dentro del curso total
de la Historia y de aclarar las mutuas relaciones de las mismas mediante una
cronología universal, sobre el esquema de la cual se perfila la amplitud de la
eficacia de los hechos ‘importantes’ y se destaque la ‘sustancia’ del acontecer
(121).

The arrangement of events has two possibilities: first to reflect the order of nature found
in the realization of time and place, in which, “…o seguimos los sucesos paso a paso,
como acontecieron, o introducimos una tercera persona que los cuenta” (3.3, 783);
second, to reflect an “artistic order” (Beckjord, 34).57 Whereas natural chronology

56 The result of such confusion according to Vives, transcended to, “un límite
ridículo…Donde unos cuentan sesenta años, otros cuentan sesenta mil; donde unos cien,
otros doscientos mil” (1.5, 419). This citation is followed by astrological examples as
well.

57 Vives offers two examples of this in his explanation of what constitutes an artistic
order, stating, “Este es el orden que diríamos artístico saber: la interferencia de una
propiedad inexistente, verbigracia: “Cesar, temeroso de la acusación, pues había
perjudicado a Bíbulo en el consulado y a Catón y a Domicio, recurrió a las armas. Otro
ejemplo: Pablo era recibido con poco entusiasmo por las iglesias, porque sabían que
había algún tiempo acosado a los cristianos con una fiera persecución, y recelaban un
ardid de quien había sido tan hostil al nombre cristiano. La primera narración es del
historiador, y es directa” (3.3, 783 emphasis Vives).
reflects the real world, the “artistic order,” more aligned to epic poetry as Beckjord further explains, allows greater freedom to “deviate” from the “natural chronological order” of historical narrative in order “to reflect aesthetic priorities and designs…” (34). Vives notes: “Y puesto que el historiador escribe de cosas que pasan como pasan en flujo perpetuo las aguas de un río, la oración no sea periódica ni retorcida, ni violenta, ni pugnaz, sino tendida y fluyente y espaciosa, que parezca que corre parejas con los mismos sucesos” (3.3, 786). Indeed, if the artistic chronology is applied to historical narrative, the historian may run the risk that it, “…stand out as illogical or contrived in the same way that false arguments, lies, and exaggerations in language tend to manifest themselves as improbable or out of proportion” (Beckjord, 34). Natural chronology therefore, is seen as more adept at transmitting historical truth in which: “If historical truth is what is most ‘congruent’ with nature, it can be approached through the instrument of probability” (34). This is idea is fundamental to our understanding of verisimilitude not only in the crónicas, but also in the Quijote. As I discuss in chapter five, just as Cide Hamete would have his reader decide for himself if what Don Quixote saw in the cave of Montesinos should be taken as the truth, a lie, or something in between, Bernal often empowers his reader to judge for themselves as to the true version of events.

Vives begins chapter four of De ratione dicendi, proposing that probability may serve to deceive the reality of things, in which, “…algunas veces determinadas falsedades tienen más visos de probabilidad que ciertas verdades, yerro que nace no de las mismas cosas, sino de nuestro juicio torcido” (3.4, 788). In order to combat this error, historic narration must be verisimilar: “Por esto es que la narración no solamente debe ser verídica, cosa que para la realidad ya bastaría, sino que debe ser verosímil con respecto a
Here again, Vives returns to the importance of an accurate chronology, one that reflects the “natural order,” (Beckjord, 34): “…por lo cual parece que lo posterior nace de lo primero, por orden de causalidad, como el hijo del padre, de lugar o tiempo, como el día de hoy del de ayer” (3.4, 788). It is precisely from this “natural pattern” that we are able to decipher verisimilitude: “…porque todas las cosas manan con cierta dependencia y nexo, no solamente según naturaleza, sino, según arte, que no es más que una imitación de la Naturaleza” (3.4, 788). In order to strengthen verisimilitude, Vives suggests using certain key words and expressions for purposes of clarification (35):

El asentimiento puede ser precavido y cauto, con alguna mezcla de duda: Pienso, opino, creo…cuando el ánimo se adhiere a la prueba no con tal firmeza que esté del todo seguro que no pueda ser de otra manera…[mientras que]…Asiéntese firmemente, seguramente, sin ningún asomo de duda, cuando se dice: Sé, he averiguado (979 Empahsis Vives).58

However, as alluded to earlier, Vives also appears to advocate that particular histories incorporate the use of fiction to not only provide an approximation of the truth, but also to manipulate the way the truth is received by the reader (Beckjord, 29). While, Vives is clear to point out the various and often contradictory purposes between history and fiction, Vives aligns himself with the opinion of Quintilian who compares history to that of a prose poem (36): “No sin razón dice Quintiliano que la Historia no anda muy lejos de los poetas, y viene a ser como un poema suelto” (3.3 786).

In his criticism of modern historians in De Causis corruptarum artium, Vives explains it is not enough just to record events in a truthful manner, it must include, as

58 Vives suggests the use of certain words that help ilucidate improbable events (Beckjord, 35). See Del intrumento de la probabilidad, 980.
Frankl alluded to early, only ‘important’ facts, those which demonstrate prudence and the moral commentary, from which the author may illuminate the narrative; judiciously recommending exemplary acts and condemning reprehensible ones (121): “Para que la prudencia salga con mayor relieve, explíquense las causas y los consejos y los resultados, y si en el negocio hubiere algo oculto o arcano, revélese, pues ellos realza más los sucesos de todos conocidos” (3.3, 782). Thus while the historical narrator must represent events as if directly witnessed, (“a mirror of time” a “painting” or “image of truth” of past events), the judgment exercised upon them should be the historian’s own.59 Moreover, Vives suggests that when it is not “plausible” for the author to transmit the truth effectively, it is permissible to resort to “lenguaje figurado” or to present her view in the voice of another character (3.3, 785). However, Mack notes that “The commentator should observe moderation and take from other subjects only what is useful and illuminating” (90). This would include a style suitable to the “subject-matter” with brief commentaries interspersed “to assist the reader in grasping the structure of the text and remembering it” (90).60 In other words, digressions must not only aid the comprehension of the reader, but must also help to maintain the reader’s attention while promoting exemplariness: “Interpondrá el historiador, cuando bien le pareciere, su criterio personal por recomendar a los lectores las obras ejemplares, y, en cambio, condene y execre las

59 As Frankle explains in El antijovio, (121-137), this is a fundamental aspect of Vives’s philosophy of history.

60 To this end, Vives states: “Las cosas que refiere el historiador ni se han de aumentar ni se han de amenguar con palabras, sino que se han de dejar a su propio volumen especifico. Esto es lo que Salustio,… llamó igualar las palabras a los hechos, mientras no escalen la altura del coturno las truculencias y los temas sin pretensión degeneren en sordideces…” (3.3, 786).
fechorías implacablemente” (3.3, 784). An acceptable example of a useful disgression would intail: “…descripciones de ciudades, comarcas, montes, ríos, que contribuyen mucho a la mejor inteligencia de los hechos” (3.3, 784).61 Hence, Vives’s ideas on what constitutes truthful historical writing exceeds the classical belief in the absolute objectivity of historical narrative by introducing as Frankl’s following summary explains, three important concepts which conform to the “new spirit” of the Renaissance (122):

[…] primero, la distinción radical entre lo ‘substancial’ y lo insignificante, y la correspondiente orientación de la historiografía hacia el establecimiento de lo ‘importante’. De lo ‘esencial’ y aun de lo general; segundo, la aclaración de los medios aptos para la fijación y delimitación de los hechos ‘importantes’ que componen la historia auténtica, ante todo del principio cronológico, estrechamente vinculado al principio causal; y tercero, la estipulación del principio de la ‘originalidad’ de la labor historiográfica, el postulado de la propia investigación de la realidad histórica, en sustitución del mero trabajo de compilación de textos elaborados por otros autores (122-23).

The historiographical ideas of Vives were present in Spain throughout the sixteenth century (134). Vives viewed history as a means to communicate only that which was deemed “important”, which accordingly, required historians to have a clear epistemological conscientiousness of historical work (134). As such, history’s role was to reflect, in an objective manner, only the most essential events of the past (134). The

61 Vives defends his opinión on his readings of Cicero, who in his second book of Orador states: “La construcción y estructuración de la Historia se cifran en la material y en la forma. La lógica de los hechos reclama el orden de los tiempos, la descripción de regiones y quiere, además, puesto que en las cosas grandes y dignas de recordación, lo primero a que se tiene es a los planes y luego a los hechos y, por fin, los resultados, y por lo que se refiere a los planes, cuáles merecen la aprobación del escritor, y por lo que hace a los hechos, no solamente debe declarar lo que se hizo o se dijo, sino también cómo, y cuando se trata del resultado, hanse de explicar todas sus causas, de casualidad, de sabiduría, de temeridad, y de los hombres que son sus actores no solamente las obras, sino también quien descolló por su fama o por su nombre y explicar la naturaleza y vida de cada uno. Esto es lo que dice Marco Tulio” (3.3, 784).
difficulties raised by Vives resurface continually in authors such as Pedro de Rhua and Sebastían Fox Morcillo (among others), who believed in the unlimited obligation of historiography to remain truthful (134). In fact, Frankl notes that as a professor of Humanities, Rhua was a faithful follower of Vives, who in his letters to P. Antonio Guevara, criticizes the careless treatment of historical reality (Frankl, 134). Frankl further notes how in his third letter, Rhua clearly explains the thesis of “la verdad absoluta, universal y objetiva,” as the exclusive aim of history, in which the historian:

[...] ama la verdad y la diga libremente, sin amor, temor, odio, avaricia, ambición, misericordia, vergüenza; en fin, ha de ser huésped sin patria, sin rey, sin ley ninguna; diligente en saber examinar la verdad, semejante a un espejo claro que cuales formas y objetos rescribe, tales los representa (Cite in Frankl, 134).

A more conclusive example (and one that Frankl also includes in his analysis) of Vives’s influence is observed in Morcillo’s *De historiae institutione* (1557). In his dialogued treaty, Morcillo emphatically stresses the obligation of historiography to limit itself to the truth (135):

Todo debe contarse, aunque sea áspero, duro e inameno: el historiador no tiene opción para escoger las cosas; no puede omitir ni pasar en silencio nada que sea digno de saberse, por más que favorezca a nuestros adversarios, por más que nos sea molesto y peligroso, por más que nos parezca enfadoso y pobre (Cite in Frankl 135).

Morcillo seems to once more echo the doctrine of Vives concerning the obligation of historiography to preserve only what is “important”, or in his own words, as that which is deemed “digno de saberse” (Cite in Frankl, 135).

Vives’s contributions to the writing of history as has been outlined in this chapter, has allowed us to examine important distinctions between historical and fictional discourse; those which speak to the problematic nature of narrative perspective and
reliability in Spain during the height of the sixteenth century (Beckjord, 39). Accordingly, it is within this context, that we are able to better appreciate what Beckjord has described as the “humanists’ high standards and expectations for historical narrative and the historian that the early chroniclers of the Indies inscribed their work and endeavored to grapple with the challenging material of the New World” (4). My examination on the classical tradition as interpreted by Vives, in relation to the crónicas, will present in my third chapter (as mentioned previously) an opportunity to discuss how Cervantes’ Don Quixote and the Persiles “obsorb[ed] and repli[ed] to the enterprise of the Indies” (De Armas Wilson, 370).
CHAPTER III
THE CRÓNICAS DE INDIAS BY WAY OF CERVANTES

This chapter explores the impact of the crónicas de Indias on the writings of Cervantes, in particular Don Quixote de la Mancha and to a lesser extent the Persiles. As a secondary --but important concern-- I address the issue of genre, a phenomenon which as I demonstrate is both “informed” and “complicated” by the New World. Moreover, I examine issues of truth and reliability, an important concern for sixteenth-century writers, which will offer further insight into the duality between history and poetry (i.e. fiction) in the Quixote. Along these lines I will address the nature of verisimilitude in Cervantes and its relationship to the crónicas, which as I demonstrate not only speak to Cervantes’ familiarity, but are informed by these types of texts. Accordingly, this chapter surveys the contributions of several contemporary scholars whose work has allowed me to understand the ways in which Cervantes’ literary creations are connected to the New World.

An appropriate place to begin our exploration of Cervantes’ connection to the New World is at the birthplace of his creation: “En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo lugar no quiero acordarme” (I, i 1037). A mythical space void of name, a site that perhaps best reflects Alonso Quijano’s own intellectual wanderings through a multitude of realities, each consecrated with an individual identity: Don Quixote de la Mancha, el Caballero de la Triste Figura, el Caballero de los Leones, etc., eventually culminating in Alonso Quijano el Bueno, at the end of Part 2 (Aladro, 38). Indeed, as José Ortega y Gasset poignantly asserted: “Se olvida demasiado que el hombre es imposible sin imaginación, sin inventarse una figura de vida, de idear el personaje que va a ser. El hombre es
novelista de sí mismo, original o plagiario” (Cite in Aladro, 38). It is this intellectual curiosity and prowess, which as a reader allows Quijano to transform reality into the impossible:

Puesto nombre, y tan de su gusto a su caballo, quiso ponérsele a sí mismo, y en este pensamiento duró otros ocho días, y al cabo se vino a llamar Don Quijote […] Pero, acordándose que el valeroso Amadís no sólo se había contentado con llamarse Amadís a secas, sino que añadió el nombre de su reino y patria, por hacerla famosa, se llamó Amadís de Gaula, así quiso, como buen caballero, añadir al suyo el nombre de la suya y llamarse Don Quijote de la Mancha (I, i 1039).

However, Alonso Quijano’s desire and subsequent act of transforming the validity of his existence and the objects that are to be found in it, bring to light irresolvable problems between these two competing worlds, for as E.C. Riley explains:

Don Quixote is trying to turn life into art while it is yet being lived, which cannot be done because art, and idealistic art more than any, means selection, and it is impossible to select every scrap of one’s experience. Life is one thing and art is another, but just what the difference is was the problem that baffled and fascinated Cervantes (37).

The reader of the Quixote confronts this dual reality from the opening pages of chapter one. Here the narrator offers insight into Alonso Quijano’s move from a life of lucid passivity towards one of action and delirium:

Es, pues de saber, que este sobredicho hidalgo, los ratos que estaba ocioso-que eran los más del año-, se daba a leer libros de caballerías[…] En resolución, él se enfrascó tanto en su lectura, que se le pasaban las noches leyendo de claro en claro, y los días de turbio en turbio; y así, del poco dormir y del mucho leer se le secó el celebro, de manera que vino a perder el juicio […] y asentósele de tal modo en la imaginación que era verdad toda aquella máquina de aquellas soñadas invenciones que leía, que para él no había otra historia más cierta en el mundo (I, i 1038).

Amid the boundless hours of solitude, Don Quixote’s madness is the result of an over-stimulated imagination that “rematado ya su juicio” culminates “…en el más extraño
pensamiento que jamás dio loco en el mundo, y fué que le pareció conveniente y necesario, así para el aumento de su honra como para el servicio de su república, hacerse caballero andante” (I, i 1038). Alonso Quijano’s imagination necessitates that he become a knight errant. However, to do so means he must also create a world that accommodates his new status (Aladro, 41). Jorge Aladro, who cites José Antonio Maravall and Juan Ignacio Ferreras respectively, notes that, “…las cosas son los medios que nos permiten vivir de una u otra forma, trazarnos uno y otro programa de existencia. Y las cosas, tal como se dan en su tiempo, no permiten a don Quijote realizar su proyecto de vida, de figura humana. Tiene, pues que transmutarlas en otras para cumplir su destino” (41). While Ignacio Ferreras in refering to Don Quixote suggests that reality is always objective in principle (Aladro, 41), “…se deforma o transforma antes los nuevos ojos que la ven; esta deformación o transformación es así una con-formación o re-formación, puesto que el protagonista, que es voluntad y es acción, intenta que su personalidad, que su intramundo, coincida con la realidad que le rodea” (Cite in Aladro 41). Along these lines, Juan Luis Vives, who Aladro also cites as an authoritative example of humanist thinking, proposed in his treatise *De anima et vita*:

Así como en las funciones de nutrición reconocemos que hay órganos para recibir los alimentos, para contenerlos, elaborarlos y para distribuirlos y aplicarlos, así también en el alma, tanto del hombre como de los animales, existe una facultad que consiste en recibir las imágenes, impresas en los sentidos, y que por esto se llama imaginativa; hay otra facultad que sirve para retenerlas, y es la memoria; hay una tercera que sirve para perfeccionarlas, la fantasía, y por fin, la que las distribuye según su ascenso o disenso, y el la estimativa…la función imaginativa en el alma hace las veces de los ojos en el cuerpo, a saber; recibe imágenes mediante la vista, y hay una especie de vaso con abertura que las conserva; la fantasía, finalmente, reúne y separa aquellos datos que, aislados y simples, reviviera la imaginación (I, x 1171).
If as Vives suggests, the “imaginative soul” is the recipient of what the senses perceive, (stored in memory), while fantasy serves to perfect images received by the soul, then, as Jorge Aladro explains in comparing visual distortions suffered by both Christopher Columbus and Don Quixote (42): “No son los sentidos los que engañan a Don Quijote y a Colón, ellos ‘ven’, pero ajustan y transforman lo que ven; es en el paso de lo sensorial a lo anímico donde las imágenes que perciben resultan totalmente distorsionadas” (42). Accordingly, Aladro suggests that Don Quixote and to some extent Columbus, share the same “dementia” of reading: …no ven la realidad, la leen. Miran la vida con los ojos de la literatura y tratarán de vivir o ver según los modelos literarios” (45). Indeed, Don Quixote’s altered reality serves to defend the truthfulness of what is read in books; readings, as Michel Foucault suggests, that are repeatedly consulted along their respective adventures: “…a fin de saber qué hacer y qué decir y qué signos darse a sí mismo[s] y a los otros para demostrar que tiene[n] la misma naturaleza que el texto del que ha surgido” (Cite in Aladro 45). Indeed, the continual metamorphoses of Don Quixote’s perceived realities are perhaps better appreciated by Anthony Cascardi’s discussion on the use of image and myth which, as he suggests, speak to the philosophical concerns that arise between the image and truth in the Quijote” (599).

Cascardi’s analysis offers insight into the “apparent contradictions” against the use of images in the Platonic dialogues (602):

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62 In his study “Don Quixote y Cristóbal Colón o la sinrazón de la realidad”, Jorge Aladro compares the abundance of similarities between Columbus and the literary personality of Don Quixote, which include motives for their respective actions in the world and how what they perceive suffers from a continual process of recreation. In doing so, Aladro highlights a number of surprising parallels between the shared spirit of Don Quixote and Columbus.

63 This quote is found in Aladro 45.
It is not simply because poets create images that they are marginalized from the ideal state: the problem is rather with those who make false images, and it is the makers of images that distort or degrade the truth who are thought to be unworthy of a place in the ideal state (602).

According to Cascardi, “This is the perspective associated with prudence:” the ability to distinguish between true and false signs (602). Cascardi identifies this as a key preoccupation in the *Quixote*, highlighting the widely-referenced episode of the cave of Montesinos in *Don Quixote*, in which the narrator turns to his “prudent reader” for a decision as to the validity of Don Quixote’s experiences in the cave (602): “…sin afirmarla por falsa o verdadera, la escribo. Tú, lector, pues eres prudente, juzga lo que te pareciere” (II, xxiv 1355). As Cascardi explains, images are essential for our understanding of truth, given that: “It is necessary to make judgments about images, but it is only through them that we can know the truth” (602).64

Don Quixote grounds and to some extent re-creates his notion of reality from images filtered through the literary models of chivalric romances (Aladro, 45), that is, as Aladro notes in his investigation, those exalted figures of the knights errant such as *Amadís de Gaula*, one of the first to profess this way of life, or *Don Bliánis* who in the opinion of the priest “…tiene necesidad de un poco de ruibarbo para purgar la demasiada cólera suya” (I, vi 1053). We can also add to this list the names of *Tirante el Blanco*,

64 As Cascardi explains, because “the ability… of judgment [was] not easily cultivated…the suppression of images…has… been at the heart of modern thinking” (603), in which: “Beginning with Descartes, modern philosophy has shunned prudence in favor of responses to myth that are iconoclastic in that they have sought the elimination of images from the discourses of truth, i.e. from philosophy and from the mathematical sciences. This is the fantasy that Descartes explores when he rejects both ‘fables’ and ‘histories’ and when he censures the imagination” (603).
“…un tesoro de contento y una mina de pasatiempos” (I, vi 1053); and *Palmerín de Inglaterra*, “…las razones, cortesanas y claras, que guardan y miran el decoro del que habla con mucha propiedy y entendimiento” (I, vi 1053). In fact, not only Don Quixote, but also those closest to him (the priest and barber) demonstrate an extraordinary ability of recollection. A case in point and one I speak of at some length in chapter five is observed in chapter XLIX of part one, in which in defense of knight errantry Don Quixote offers an exhaustive list of its most famous actors, both literary as well as historic.

Indeed, Don Quixote’s failure to distinguish between the two worlds brings us back to the origin of his presumed insanity, that is “…del poco dormir y del mucho leer, se le secó el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio,” and at which point he would begin to blur the lines of fiction and reality: “[Pues] Decía el que el Cid Ruy Díaz había sido muy buen caballero, pero que no tenía que ver con el Caballero de la Ardiente Espada” (I, i 1038). Indeed, because Don Quixote constructs his reality from these readings (among the others) the reader is led to believe that Don Quixote loses his ability to distinguish between characters real or imaginary in nature (45). Carlos Fuentes, who Aladro cites, suggests that: “…la identificación de lo imaginario con lo imaginario remite a Don Quijote a la lectura. Don Quijote viene de la lectura y a ella va: Don Quijote es el embajador de la lectura. Y para él, no es realidad la que se cruza entre sus empresas y la verdad: son los encantadores que conoce por sus lecturas” (Cite in Aladro, 46). This idea in particular leads Aladro to conclude that human reason yields to the authority of the literary world from which Don Quixote would exclaim (46), “…yo imagino que todo lo que digo es así, sin que sobre ni falte nada, y píntola en mi imaginación como la deseo”
(Cite in Aladro, 46). And while I agree with Aladro who suggests that: “Don Quijote tiene que metamorrear la realidad, leyéndola, para cumplir su destino” (46), Don Quixote’s statement above also suggests a consciousness as to the dividing line between two literary worlds, that is, the literary reality of Alonso Quijano and the literary world of books that is adopted by his new persona, Don Quixote. This awareness allows Don Quixote to impose his will according to the occasion.

A case in point comes to fruition in chapter XXV of part one when Don Quixote decides to follow the lead of Amadís de Gaula, who he considers:

[…] uno de los más perfectos caballeros andantes...el único, el señor de todos cuantos hubo en su tiempo en el mundo [Concluding that]... el caballero andante que más le imitare estará más cerca de alcanzar la perfección de la caballería (1129).

In explaining his intentions, Don Quixote tells Sancho that: “…una de las cosas en que más este caballero [Amadís] mostró su prudencia, valor, valentía, sufrimiento, firmeza y amor, fué cuando se retiró, desdeñado de la señora Oriana, a hacer penitencia en la Pena Pobre” (I, xxv 1129). Accordingly, finding himself in the Sierra Morena, Don Quixote believes that: “…estos lugares son tan acomodados para semejantes efectos no hay para que se deje pasar la ocasión que ahora con tanta comodidad me ofrece sus guedejas” (I, xxv 1129). Therefore, Don Quixote, decides to “…imitar a Amadís, haciendo aquí del desesperado, del sandio y del furioso, por imitar juntamente al valiente don Roldán…de cuyo pesadumbre se volvió loco” (I, xxv 1129). However, Don Quijote is mindful of the excessive nature of Roldán’s actions, including when he: “arrancó los árboles, enturbió las aguas de las claras fuentes, mató pastores, destruyó ganados, abrasó chozas, derribó casas, arrastró yeguas, y hizo otras cien mil insolencias” (I, vxx 1129). Such observations
on the part of Don Quixote, in which he demonstrates the ability to negotiate between
two competing worlds (i.e. the literary reality of Quijano vs. the literary reality of Don
Quixote), has him decide instead to follow what he considers the more prudent response
of Amadís:

[…] y puesto que yo no pienso imitar a Roldán…haré el bosquejo, como mejor
pudiere, en las que me pareciere ser más esenciales. Y podrá ser que viniese a
contentarme con sola la imitación de Amadís, que sin hacer locuras de daño, sino
de lloros y sentimientos alcanzó tanta fama como el que más (I, xxv 1129).

As this scene would suggest, the desire of Don Quixote to follow the footsteps of his
literary counterparts, in which, as Aladro notes, human reason yields to the authority of
the literary, comprises only part of the story. Time and again Don Quixote demonstrates
not only free will in his decision making, and thus an independence from what he has
read, but also a consciousness of both worlds that seems to dispute his condition as
someone detached from reality. In fact, Don Quixote further ahead affirms his awareness
and dominion over these competing worlds when he states to Sancho: “Loco soy, loco he
de ser hasta tanto que tú [Sancho] vuelvas con la respuesta de una carta que contigo
pienso enviar a mi señora Dulcinea; y si fuere tal cual a mi fe se le debe, acabarse a mi
sandez y mi penitencia; y si fuera contrario, seré loco de veras” (I, xxv 1129-30). While
such reasoning on the part of Don Quixote confirms Aladro’s idea that “Don Quijote
tiene que metamorser la realidad, leyéndola, para cumplir su destino,” it would be
prudent of us, the readers of the Quixote, to question the degree and understanding of
Don Quixote’s insanity, and thus his cognizance as to his literary surroundings. Likewise,
as Vives’ earlier citation suggests, it is Don Quixote’s vision that plays a fundamental
role in the conceptual realization and representation of his world; one that can perhaps be
better appreciated by examining Don Quixote’s encounter with Ginés de Pasamonte.
Roberto González Echevarría explains that *Don Quixote* is a novel of various optical points of view, (“la visión y de las visiones de su protagonista”) from which, “Numerosas aventuras comienzan cuando el hidalgo y su escudero ven acercarse a alguien o algo, y culminan cuando cada uno ve una cosa diferente” (297). Unlike so many other physical ailments suffered by Don Quixote (as is more fully discussed in chapter five), his vision remains untarnished throughout the novel. In fact, throughout his tireless adventures, Don Quixote enjoys a landscape that is mostly full of clear skies and bright sunny days (298).\(^65\) This ideal environment facilitates, and to some extent, demonstrates Cervantes’ desire to challenge several of his own theories, those to do in particular with “…la óptica, la refracción, y la anatomía del aparato visual humano” (298)\(^66\). This speaks to the problem of dialect between interlocutors from which we can observe Cervantes’ interest in the effects that such physical abnormalities have on the character’s perception of one another (299):

Los ojos son las ventanas del alma, según el lugar común, y mirarse en el neoplatonismo era una forma de hacer que las almas se comunicaran. Pero cuando se trata de bizcos, de tuertos, de personajes con ojos hundidos o demasiado juntos…las ventanas están empañadas de modo sumamente sugestivo, si bien no precisamente encantador. Lo defforme y su representación son un desafío a la mimesis, y a los modelos ideales de la estética renacentista que el barroco revisa, mejor, re-forma (299).

\(^{65}\) González notes that “Llueve solo una vez en la novela y el agua hace que brille tanto la bacia que el barbero se ha puesto en la cabeza a falta de mejor resguardo, que el caballero cree que se trata del famoso yelmo de Mambrino” (298).

\(^{66}\) González clarifies that his approach does not intend to undermine previous rhetorical concepts surrounding this issue, explaining that: “No concede privilegio a esta aproximación en contra de conceptos ya fraguados en figuras retóricas- Mirada y visto como conjunto de opiniones, punto de vista, proyección del ser, manera de ser, perspectivismo, y otros lugares comunes que estos conceptos concitan, sobre todo en referencia a Cervantes- sino para regresar al origen de éstos” (298).
Moreover, Cervantes treatment of perception (as observed in the physical ailment of Ginés), also points to the emergence of scientific and technological discoveries (299): “Cervantes ya no es partícipe de toda la teología de la visión y de la vista de origen medieval, aunque retiene algunas nociones de ésta...sino un anuncio de problemas que la mejor percepción facilitada por la ciencia habría de suscitar” (299). Indeed, it is noteworthy to mention that Cervantes lived through a period in which the field of optics enjoyed important advancements that included, among others: the lens, the telescope and eyeglasses (300). Yet, with these technological advancements human sight remained not only limited, but hampered by, “…las restricciones congénitas o accidentales del aparato visual humano, inclusive la de la visión binocular (el tener dos ojos)” (300).

The recurring figure of Ginés de Pasamonte and his desire to write a novel about his own life, introduces the modern writer who must break with the classical tradition (302).67 Indeed, the story that Ginés intends to write is of his own life, a true account

67 González Echevarría notes that Ginés is competing at a time when new genres such as the Picaresque (part one) and theater (part two) are emerging in Spain (302). The connection that is observed between the modern author and his literary creation Ginés, perhaps suggests Cervantes’ own self-view, one that González Echeverría reminds us (302): 67 “Hay que recalcar la función autorial de Ginés y la posibilidad de que sea un autorretrato por lo que sugiere sobre el acto de representación” (302). Indeed, Gonzalez Echeverría in describing the intimate relationship between Cervantes and his creation points to the prisoner’s melancholic reply of Don Quixote, who compliments him as being a “hábil” fellow (302): “Y desdichado;...porque siempre las desdichas persiguen al buen ingenio” (I, xxii 1115). A second example offered by González Echeverría comes earlier in chapter VI of part one in which the priest, who on examining Don Quixote’s collection of books, declares the author of La Galatea, his “grande amigo mío,” who unfortunately is, “más versado en desdichas que en versos” (I, vi 1054). González Echeverría’s suggestion seems more plausible if we consider that Cervantes in his prologue of part one of the Quijote affirms his likeness to his character Don Quixote in his prologue stating that: “aunque parezco padre, soy padrastro de Don Quixote” (1032). I discuss this further in chapter three. I would also like to add that I coincide with Claudio Guillén in speaking of “genres as formal models, as the core of the theoretical endeavor called poetics” (131-132).
limited to “…verdades, y que son verdades tan lindas y tan donosas, que no pueden haber mentiras que se le igualen (I, xxii 1115). Of course, the paradox of such an undertaking as Ruth Snodgrass El Saffar rightfully notes, is that Ginés is his own protagonist (177). Consequently, as Ginés himself admits to Don Quixote, it is not possible for him to finish his autobiography (177): “Como puede estar acabado [His book]…si aún no está acabada mi vida” (I, xxii 1115). Ginés’s rebuke of Don Quixote’s inquiry resides in not having the ability to conclude his work since, as Snodgrass explains, “…there is no natural stopping point in life from which it is legitimate to turn and recreate artificial former actions” (167). As is the case with Lazarillo, whose work Ginés presumes to surpass (“…que en mal año para Lazarillo de Tormes y para todos cuantos de aquel género se han escrito o escribieren”) (I, xxii 1115), it is both “artificial and inconclusive” since in the process of writing it, Gines’s real life continues (Snodgrass, 167). As a result, “The compromise must be either an unfinished book as in Gines’ case, or an unreliable story, as in Cide Hamete’s case” (177). Along these lines, Claudio Guillén suggests that “…the supposed proximity to ‘life’ of the autobiographer is exacted at a very high cost: that of formlessness—and perhaps, as a consequence, of meaninglessness. Any life that is narrated by its own subject must remain incomplete and fail to achieve artistic unity or, very simply, the status of art” (156). According to Guillén’s basic argument, the “narrative form” requires a “second” or ‘third’ person expressing a consciousness that is extrinsic to the sequence of events” (156). As a result, the narrator’s limited point of view (or with

68 Guillén raises the question: “Should Ginés (if this is his name) the writer be more honest than Ginés the thief?” (156). Guillen proposes that the reader should not only “ask himself this question,” but also he must “interpret in his own way the facts” explaining that: “La vida de Ginés de Pasamonte is presented by its author, with the commissary’s consent, as a truthful autobiography” (156).
regard to Gonzalez Echeverría’s argument “visión”) stands in stark contrast to that of history (156). Therefore, as Guillén concludes, “…it is one of the ironies of Cervantes that Don Quixote, as told by Arabic chronicler Cide Hamete Benengeli, apparently emulates the structural and presentational virtues of history” (156). Guillén explains:

The saturation of the picaresque with the narrator’s individual and willfully limited point of view is most remote from history. And it is one of the ironies of Cervantes that Don Quixote, as told by the Arabic chronicler Cide Hamete Benengeli, apparently emulates the structural and presentation virtues of history. It seems to me, to a large extent, that it actually does; and that this is an irony one cannot afford to take too lightly. The novel as it emerges in the sixteenth century, after the great Florentine historians and the chroniclers of the conquest of America, owes much to this crucial rapprochement between literature and history—to the organization and detailed recreation and tolerant understanding of the concrete wealth of experience by a “third” person (emphasis Guillén, 156).

Returning to González Echevarría’s discussion, the figure of Ginés and that of his perceptive abilities allows us to revisit the dualistic problem between “history” and “poetry,” in which: “Tras todos estos, venía un hombre de muy buen parecer, de edad de treinta años, sino que al mirar metía el un ojo en el otro un poco” (I, xxxii 1114). It is clear from this description that Ginés is cross-eyed (301). Although otherwise healthy, his physical impediment creates a double perception of reality that can be described as (304):

“…monocular y convergente, hace que no pueda percibir con nitidez la realidad y que por lo tanto esté condenado a representarla sesgado por los ángulos conflictivos de sus ejes visuales” (304). Indeed, as Gonzalez Echeverría’s explains, his is an “innate and internal perspectivism,”69 one that to a certain extent encapsulates what Americo Castro

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69 According to González the “perspectivismo en Cervantes” consisted of, “…la visión unitaria, armónica, no conflictiva, de cada individuo, que a su vez se eleva a una opinión y hasta a un modo de ser”- concluding that- “Cada uno ve las cosas de manera diferente y la verdad vendría entonces a ser la suma y síntesis de las varias visiones en conflicto” (304)
described as (304): “El mundo [From which] Cervantes se resuelve en puntos de vista” (88). González Echeverría’s argument corroborates this idea, affirming that Ginés’s “bizquera” may be called the “modern condition of artistic or literary vision,” that is (304): “…doble, no convergente, distorsionante, generadora de anamorfosis, porque depende del movimiento de un ojo que ve independientemente del otro,” therefore, appearing as a, “…modelo nuevo de un ser conflictivo en sí, capaz de ver simultáneamente en profundidad y proximidad, como en un diálogo de miradas interior a sí mismo que no llega a resolverse” (304).

Indeed, in describing Ginés’ double vision, González Echeverría a bit further ahead points to the same episode with the galley slaves (305). This time, as an impediment which ironically allows him to escape the guard’s retribution (305):

Ayudó Sancho, por su parte, a la soltura de Ginés de Pasamonte, que fué el primero que saltó en la campaña libre y desembarazado, y, arremetiendo al comisario caído, le quitó la espada y la escopeta, con la cual, apuntando al uno y señalando al otro, sin dispararla jamás, no quedó guarda en todo el campo, porque se fueron huyendo, así de la escopeta de Pasamonte como de las muchas pedradas que los ya sueltos galeotes les tiraban (I, xxii 1116).71

It is clear that Ginés’ double vision gives him an advantage over the guards (González Echeverría, 305). Yet, while able to simultaneously brandish and aim different weapons with each eye working independently from one another, the mutual independence of Ginés’ eyes would also suggest the possibility of conflicting intentions (305). Such is the

70 Basing himself on Castro’s *El pensamiento de Cervantes*, Claudio Guillén explains this idea in his chapter on metaphor and perspective (pp. 283-371), as: “the external world in Don Quixote” consisting of, “a many faceted ‘prism’ that only subjectivity can interpret and endow with meaning; human situations, basically problematic, cannot be judged ‘from above’ but rather from the points of view of individual lives” (350).

71 Gonzales Echeverría further note the significance of Gines disobeying the wishes of Don Quixote that he return to Toboso, reaffirms the independence of each eye (305).
case when Ginés, refusing to go to El Toboso at the behest of Don Quixote (305):

“…hizo del ojo a los compañeros, y apartándose aparte, comenzaron a llover tantas piedras sobre Don Quijote, que no se daba manos a cubrirse con la rodela” (I, xxii 1117).

While, as González Echeverría suggests, had it not been for his physical ailment the wink could have been taken as an innocent gesture, he believes that because each eye acts independently from one another, “El guiño constituye una intención parcial y solapada como todas las suyas. El lenguaje de los ojos de Ginés es el del engaño y la duplicidad, como es lo que ve a través de ellos, y de seguro lo que ha escrito en el prolijo tomo en que cuenta su vida” (305): a reaffirmation of sorts that while one eye directs itself toward the end of his life, the other, remains focused on the present (305): “Su mirada estrábica no permite que converjan esas visiones, por lo tanto el libro jamás podrá ser acabado y seguirá suspendido para siempre entre esas dos distancias no coincidentes” (306).

Further ahead in part II of *Don Quixote*, Ginés passes himself off as having only one functional eye (306). To accomplish this, Ginés covers part of his face so as to avoid being recognized (306): “Olvidábaseme de decir como el tal maese Pedro traía cubierto el ojo izquierdo y casi medio carrillo con un parche de tafetán verde, señal que todo aquel lado debía de estar enfermo” (II, xxv 1360). In veiling his condition, Ginés has not only limited his visual field, but as González Echeverría notes, in so doing has lost

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72 While the identity of Maese Pedro is not revealed to Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, in the beginning of chapter XXVII the author affirms (later to be paraphrased by the translator) Cid Hamet’s oath as chronicler: “…como católico cristiano siendo el moro, como sin duda lo era, no quiso decir otra cosa sino que así como el católico cristiano cuando jura, jura, o debe jurar, verdad, y decir la en lo que dijere, así él la decía, como si jurara como cristiano católico…especialmente en decir quién era maese Pedro...bien se acordará el que hubiere leído la primera parte desta historia, de aquel Ginés de Pasamonte, a quien, entre otros galeotes, dio libertad don Quijote en Sierra Morena....”(II, 27).
depth perception, and thus perspective (306). However, Ginés self-afflicted impairment does not only concern perception of reality, but how reality itself is expressed (305).

While having the use of one eye would seem to rid Ginés of the “ambiguity of binocular vision,” in order for him to look straight ahead he must physically turn his head (308). González Echeverría suggests that this action creates an un-natural movement in which: “…como en el caso de la bizquiera, el defecto visual fuerza a un movimiento en el punto de mira que no puede ser el ideal, fijo, centralizante, capaz de armonizar la perspectiva y, al crear la illusión de profundidad, ser ‘realista” (308).73 In order to better understand in what sense we can speak of “realism” in Cervantes, it is useful to note what the author himself has said on the subject.

In his analysis of Cervantes’ connection to the New World, Stelio Cro points to our esteemed author’s tercet of Viaje del Parnaso, in which he states: “Yo, que siempre trabajo y me desvelo por parecer que tengo de poeta / la gracia que no quiso darme el cielo” (Cite in Cro, 16). And in part four he goes on to state (Cro, 16): “Yo soy aquél que en la invención excede / a muchos, y, al que falta en esta parte, / es fuerza que su fama falta quede” (Cite in Cro, 16). Accordingly, (again as noted by Cro) in his beginning description of dreams in part six, Cervantes offers a clear definition on his view of realism, explaining that (16): “Palpable vi…mas no sé si lo escriba, / que a las cosas que tienen de imposibles / siempre mi pluma se ha mostrado esquiva; / las que tienen vislumbre de posibles, / de luces, de suaves y de ciertas, / explican mis borrones apacibles. / Nunca a disparidad abre las puertas / mi corto ingenio, y hállalas contino / de

73 In his analysis of Sancho’s flight on Clavileño, Cascardi also highlights a shift in perspective, concluding that: "... there is no perspective from which we can grasp the whole of reality "(610).
par en par la consonancia abiertas” (Cite in Cro, 16). As Cro suggests in his analysis of these three verses, Cervantes, takes pride in his remarkable gift of invention, which, while fond of things “possible,” remains critical of things that were “impossible.” (16) Cro believes that to arrive at such a concept of realism in Cervantes, one must take into account “…su propia definición de ‘invención,’ since as he goes on to explain, “…la misma idea de ‘invención’ excluye la imitación. Lo que Cervantes debió entender como ‘invención’ podría ser también ‘originalidad’, en el sentido de ‘novedad’” (16) Cro further notes how Cervantes explains this final idea as consisting of, “borrones apacibles,” possessing “vislumbre de posibles, / de luces, de suaves y de ciertas” (Cite in Cro 16).74

Viewed in this manner, (and returning once more to the analysis of González Echeverría), the figure of Ginés represents the modern writer, who competing with the emergence of a new genre (i.e. the picaresque and comedy) must break with the classical tradition (306): “Ginés no es únicamente autor de una autobiografía picaresca, sino [In his role as puppeteer] autor de comedias” (306). Indeed, either as a cross-eyed or one-eyed character, as González Echeverría concludes, Ginés physical optical reality reflects the modern writer who because “no lee a derechas,” is unable to (306):

[…] configurar una visión que no sea la atravesada por ángulos no–convergentes de la mirada;…Si el origen de la visión es ya doble, la ironía es congénita y la representación tiene que reflejar ese punto móvil y múltiple desde donde se mira. La literatura ha de ser el esfuerzo, cuyo fin será siempre postergado pero no clausurado, por lograr una reconciliación de visiones, por torcidas que sean nuestras miradas y ‘fosca’ nuestra vista (309).

In Chapter XXI of part one, amid the polemic discussion that soon ensues around Sancho’s discovered object, we observe this “double” vision González Echeverría speaks of. What for Don Quixote appears as Mambrino’s helmet is for the Barber a simple tool

74 I am quoting Cervantes from Cro page 16.
of his trade: the basin (Bandera, 167). Cesáreo Bandera argues that such confusion is the
direct result of an “intensified discord” between the two realities that is never fully
resolved, in which (167): “…el objeto de toda discordia es siempre el mismo; separar la
realidad de la ficción, lo que es de lo que no es. No obstante, es la discordia misma la que
borra la línea divisoria entre realidad y ficción tanto más completamente cuanto mayor es
la intensidad del conflicto” (167). Of course what comes next substantiates to a certain
extent Bandera’s claim: a truly violent confrontation, in which (167): “…todo era llantos,
voces, gritos, confusiones, temores, sobresaltos, desgracias, cuchilladas, mojicones,
palos, coces y efusión de sangre” (I, 1241). This scene leads Banderas to suggest that:
“Al nivel de las apariencias no hay problema, todo es cuestión de pareceres, de puntos de
vista, de perspectivas, etc.,” concluding that at the heart of the matter is the nature of the
object itself (167):

El conflicto surge porque está en juego el ser de la cosa, porque tan pronto como
entre en juego la cuestión sobre el ser, surge la incompatibilidad y la situación
está abocada a la violencia…y viceversa: es la violencia la que ‘esencializa’ el
conflicto, la que lo convierte en algo esencial. A la hora de la verdad se acaban las
tolerancias. La hora de la verdad es siempre una hora violenta (167).

The distinction between the basin and Mambrino’s helmet is illusory, in both instances as
Bandera explains (167): “La ficción ‘se traslada’ a la realidad en la misma medida en
que la realidad se ficcionaliza por obra de la violencia” (168). And it is this final idea that
leads Bandera to conclude that: “…el Quijote se nos revela como un monumental
baciyelmo, no bacia ni yelmo o bacia y yelmo todo a un tiempo; oscilan en su interior la
afirmación y la negación, intercambiando sus respectivas posiciones sin coincidir jamás
en el mismo punto, siempre iguales e incompatibles” (168). This vacillating effect and
the ensuing frustration caused by the object itself returns us one more to the ideas of
Américo Castro who identified this phenomena as: “la realidad oscilante” (80). Castro, in underlining the dualism between reality and fantasy notes that this is not a unique stylistic feature of Òñixote, but one that reoccurs in other writings of Cervantes (46):

Considerar la poesía como una disciplina de docencia, siquiera fuera del aspecto ‘universal’ o idealizado de la realidad, es consecuencia necesaria de la reacción contra la poesía renacentista del arte por el arte…La poesía, como conjunto de ciencias, respondía, de una parte, a la idea renacentista de no separar la erudición del genio; de otra, al propósito didáctico y moralizador de la Contrarreforma, dentro de la cual ha de ser situado Cervantes (46).

In keeping with the interpretation of Castro and the poetic theories of the sixteenth century, Cro believes that Cervantes expresses his conception of historical sources, such as the chronicles of the Indies (20): “…en la misma manera en que había tratado la tradición literaria culta del renacimiento en el Quijote. Las crónicas de Indias le dieron a Cervantes la oportunidad de imaginar lugares nuevos e inusitados” (20-21), while responding to, as Castro who Cro cites, affirms, “…a diversas exigencias que simultáneamente laboraban su espíritu; en primer lugar, darles el gusto de echar a volar la fantasía, placer literario para el de orden eminente” (Castro, 44). In the words of Banderas, “Hacer que la ficción se estrelle contra la realidad es hacer que la realidad se estrelle contra la ficción” in which, “…don Quijote interrumpe y altera la interna coherencia de ese mundo de ventas y molinos exactamente en la misma medida que Cervantes interrumpe y altera la interna coherencia de ese otro poblado de gigantes, misteriosos castillos y selvas encantadas” (163). It is with this final idea that we may

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75 Cervantes in the Persiles demonstrates this dualism, affirming in the beginning of chapter XIV of the third book: “La historia, la poesía y la pintura simbolizan entre sí y se parecen tanto, que cuando escribes historia, pintas, y cuando pintas, compones. No siempre va en un mismo peso la historia, ni la pintura pinta cosas grandes y magníficas, ni la poesía conversa siempre por los cielos. Bajezas admite la historia; la pintura, hierbas y retamas en sus cuadros; y la poesía, tal vez se realza catando cosas humildes” (III, 14).
begin to connect the “discovery’, conquest and the exploration of the New World to the literary undertakings of Cervantes.

In much the same way that Don Quixote deliberately reconstructs reality to fit within the confines of a literary world, so too did the chroniclers, who, as Aladro, citing Consuelo Varela explains, ventured to an undiscovered world (47):

Colón descubre un mundo nuevo. Ahora bien, él no acepta la realidad de este mundo tal como le viene dada, sino que como es natural, la acomoda a unos conocimientos previos y a un criterio propio, desde el que procede a su interpretación. Este enfoque subjetivo de la realidad se refleja de manera muy clara en algo tan elemental como las palabras con que describe lo que ve, o mejor dicho, lo que cree ver. Existe, en efecto, un claro desajuste entre la capacidad cognoscitiva y el mundo circundante, que tiene por consecuencia, según es sabido, que Colón oiga cantar el ruiseñor o vea mastines y branchetes en unas islas en las que jamás han existido (Cite in Aladro 47-48).

While Alonso Quijano seeks to be made a knight errant to restore the old order of chivalry and the Genoese sailor identifies as a pioneer who seeks the impossible of reaching new lands, Aladro notes that both men were “picados[s]’ de la misma ‘mania,’” that is, both men share an intellectual curiosity that allows them to interpret what they see to what they read (46); a process that Aladro has named “ficcionalizador-indentificador:” 76 in which, “Colón se autoconviene de su realidad por la autoridad que le otorgan los libros, los cuales nunca se equivocan, especialmente si son bíblicos, y unidos a la agregada autoridad de los Padres de la Iglesia” (48). 77 We observe this idea in

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76 Aladro borrows these terms of Huarte de San Juan in defining the “ingenio” of Don Quixote (46). Beatriz Pastor offers a thoughtful discussion on the books that Columbus may have read, substantiating to some extent, Aladro’s process described above. (*Discurso narrativo de la conquista de América*. Cuba: Casa de Las Américas, 1983).

77 To this effect, Columbus reliance on his readings is observed throughout the letters he wrote Aladro 47): “Entendió también que lexos de allí avía hombres de un ojo y otros con hoçicos de perros que comían hombres, y que en tomando uno lo degollavan y le bevían
Columbus’s third expedition as he attempts through reason to prove what lay before him was a continent and not an island (48):

Y a confirmaçion de dezir qu’el agua sea poca y que’el cubierto del mundo d’ella sea poco, al respecto de lo que se dezía por abtordan de tolomeo y de sus secaçes, a esto trae una abtordan de Esdrás, y del terçio libro suyo, adonde dize que, de siete partes del mundo, las seis son descubiertas e la una es cubierta de agua; la cual autoridad es aprobada por santos, los cuales dan autoridad al terçio y cuarto libro de Esdrás, ansí como es Sant Agustín y Sant Ambrosio en su Examerón (Cite in Aladro, 48).

Similar to the literary figure of Don Quixote, Columbus suffers from an imagination influenced by readings that include among others, Pedro de Ailly, the travels of Marco Polo, and Plinio (46). Not only do these readings prove influential to Columbus’s interpretation of what he perceives, but they also reflect an eagerness to “re-discover” a reality where such images could be found (47). A more famous passage of this desire, and one Aladro examines, is observed through Columbus’s reference to Pedro de Ailly’s (Imago mundi) assumption that earthly paradise is located in a hot region south of the equator (49): “Concluyendo, dize el Almirante que bien dixerón los sacros theológos y los sabios philósofos que el Paraíso Terrenal este en el fin de Oriente, porque es lugar temperadíssimo. Así que aquellas tierras que agora él avía descubierto, es – dize él- el fin del Oriente (jueves, 21 de febrero 1493)” (Cite in Aladro, 49). As Aladro notes, the encounter on arrival at the mouth of the Orinoco and the light skin color of its inhabitants requires Columbus to make a decision between two vying alternatives (46): “la empírica…explorer el nuevo y desconocido fenómeno, o encerrarse en su camarote y
buscar la explicación en sus habituales autoridades librescas” (49). Columbus chooses the latter grounding his explanation, as Aladro’s following citation reveals, on Scripture and the Imago mundi, in which he confirms in his now famous passage (49):

Y siempre leí que’el mundo, tierra y agua hera espérico, y que las autoridades y experiencias que Ptolomeo y todos los otros escrivieron d’este sitio devan y amostravan por ello…Agora vi tanta disformidad como ya dixe;…hallé que no hera redondo en la forma que escriven, salvo que’es de la forma de una pera que sea toda muy redonda, salvo allí donde tiene el pezón, que allí tiene más alto, o como quien tiene una pelota muy redonda y en un lugar d’ella fuese como una teta de mugger allí puesta, y qu’esta parte d’este pezón sea la más alta e más propinca al cielo, y que’ésta sea debajo de la línea equinçial y en esta mar Oçeano en fin de oriente (llamo yo fin de oriente donde acaba toda la tierra e islas) (Cite in Aladro 49).

And atop the mountain of Ailly (“allí donde tiene el pezón”) where the four biblical rivers come together Columbus is certain to find earthly paradise (49):

La Sacra Escriptura testifica que Nuestro Señor hizo el Paraiso Terrenal y en él puso el Árbol de la Vida, y d’él sale una fuente de donde resulta en este mundo cuatro ríos principales: Ganges en Yndia, Tigris y Eufrates en Armenia, los cuales apartan la Siria y hacen la Mesopotamia y van a tener en Persia, y el Nilo, que naze en Etiopia y va en la mar en Alexandría”, further ahead affirming: “Grandes indicios son éstos del Paraiso Terrenal, porqu’el sitio es conforme a la opinión d’estos santos e sacros teólogos y ansimesmo las señales son muy conformes, que ajamás lei ni oí que tanta cantidad de agua dulce fuese así dentro e vezina con la salada, y en ello ayuda asimesmo la suavísima tenperançia (Cite in Aladro, 49).

In order to comprehend the new realities that lay before him, Columbus would not only interpret, but also verify the topological cues of the physical world through the literary prism of his imagination (50): “Desde el momento mismo del descubrimiento, Colón no dedicó sus facultades a ver y a conocer la realidad concreta del Nuevo Mundo sino a seleccionar e interpretar cada uno de sus elementos de modo que le fuera posible identificar las tierras recién descubiertas con el modelo imaginario de las que estaba
destinado a descubrir” (Beatriz Pastor cite in Aladro, 50). Yet, as is the case with Don Quixote (i.e. his experience caged on top of an oxcart; an important episode which is more fully analyzed in chapter five), there are moments when literary models do not allow Columbus to overcome the material impediments that “reality” presents along the way (50). In his second expedition, Columbus not sure if Cuba is an island or part of the mainland, orders all those at his side to swear by his conviction that (50):

[...] ciertamente no tenía duda que fuese la tierra-firme y no isla; [With] pena de diez mil maravedís por cada vez que lo que dijere cada uno que después en ningún tiempo el contrario dijese de lo agora diría, e cortada la lengua; y si fuese grumete o persona de tal suerte, que le daría cien azotes y le cortaría la lengua’ (‘Juramento sobre Cuba’, junio de 1494) (Cite in Aladro, 50).

Jorge Aladro suggests that when literary sources do not adequately represent the unknown, Columbus imposes the “palabra-ley” which through a “volutarismo determinista,” allows him to transgress shortcomings that literary models may present when imposed on reality (50):

Los contratiempos, burlas, pedradas, sus propios errores-consecuencia de una lectura mística de textos donde lector y libro se transforman en una sola entidad ficcionalizadora del mundo-no serán impedimento alguno, sino todo lo contrario, para que Don Quijote y Colón perseveren en su proyecto vital. Su constancia, su agustiniano ‘volo ut intelligam’, el voluntarismo en su ideal son superiores a las adversidades de la realidad (Aladro, 52 emphasis his).78

78 Aladro suggestion is preceded by two examples taken from the work of Columbus, in which faith acts as a driving force with destiny (52): “San pedro cuando saltó en la mar andovo sobr’ella en cuanto la fee fue firme. Quien toviera tanta fee como un grano de paniso le obedecerán las montañas” (“Carta a los Reyes”, Cadiz o Sevilla 1501 qtd. In Aladro 52). M. Eliade who Aladro cites following the verse chosen as the basis for Columbus (Marcos, XI, 22-24) states that “la fe, en ese contexto, como asimismo en muchos otros, significa la emancipación absoluta de toda especia de ‘ley’ natural y, por tanto, la más alta libertad que el hombre puede imaginar: la de intervenir en el estatuto ontológico mismo del universo”. “Levantate y échate en el mar, y no dudare en su corazón más creyere que se hará cuanto dijere; todo le será hecho’ (Marcos, XI, 22-24). Mircea Eliade. El mito del eterno retorno. Madrid: Alianza, 1972, p. 148” (52).
Stephen Gilman, in asserting Cervantes’ essential contribution to the modern novel suggests, “Like Columbus, without knowing exactly what it was Cervantes had set foot on a new continent later to be called the novel” (184). Indeed, Cervantes motivation towards, and eventual refusal of passage to the new continent of America manifested itself in his creative writing projects.

While Cervantes’ own adversities in life have been well-catalogued, it is worth briefly noting his aspirations of travel to the New World, which will offer insight as I embark on a discussion of the Cervantine novel. As is well documented, following his return in November 1580 from “captivity as a prisoner of war in an Algerian baño (dungeon),” Cervantes, as a “maimed veteran,” dedicated himself to his literary projects (De Armas Wilson 368). In the months that followed, as María Antonia Garcés explains, he would commit his time to “…legal endeavors to prove his services to the crown attest to his ransom and release from captivity” (127). It was during this time (December 1581) that while in Portugal Cervantes planned his first voyage to the New World (127). A year later, Cervantes would draft a letter dated February 17, 1582 to (127):

[...] the illustrious Lord Antonio de Eraso, member of the council of Indies, at Lisbon,’ thanking him for his support while lamenting his misfortune: ‘El oficio que pedía no se provee por su Magestad y así es forzoso que aguarde a la caravela de aviso [de las Indias] por ver si tray alguno de alguna vacante que todas las que acá avía están ya proveyadas” (Cite in Garcés 128).

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79 Garcés’s *Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive’s Tale*, highlights Cervantes’s trip to Portugal and ensuing mission to Oran undertaken for Philip II between May and June 1581, which is substantiated by: “Astrana Marin, III: 142- 43; Sliwa, 120- 22; Canavaggio, *Cervantes*, 98-103” (127).
However, as Garcés notes, in spite of Eraso’s support, Cervantes was unable to attain a post in the Indies (128). In May 21, 1590 Cervantes would once more request consideration for one of several posts advertised as vacant in the Indies, only to be eventually denied (De Armas Wilson 368-69). These posts included: “…the comptrollership of the New Kingdom of Granada [present-day Colombia], the governorship of the province of Soconusco in Guatemala, the post of account of galleys at Catagena de Indias, or that of magistrate of the city of La Paz” (368). Cervantes’ final appeal is rejected on June 6, 1590 (369). With all “colonial prospects now closed to Cervantes,” and still fresh in his mind the suffering endured during his five years of captivity, his remaining years in Spain would coincide with an intense literary activity the result of which is the creation of Don Quixote and the Persiles (369):

Cervantes evidently wanted to share in that same destiny. It is scarcely accidental that his great novels appeared at the close of Spain’s age of discovery and exploration. These novels arose, much as the ancient novel arose in the Mediterranean, from a multilingual imperial culture, from the massive relocation of languages and cultures taking place as Cervantes wrote. As cultural forms, his novels are engaged in a dialogue with a great ensemble of lived and fictional practices that we now call Spanish colonialism (De Armas Wilson, 20).

Yet, as Stelio Cro proposes, Cervantes did not imitate the material coming from the New World, rather: “…este fue filtrado por la sensibilidad de Cervantes […] la asimilación del material de Indias debe considerarse también teniendo en cuenta la constante preocupación de Cervantes por la verosimilitud y por la doble perspectiva de la realidad y fantasía común en Cervantes y el material de Indias” (24). Indeed, comparing the seemingly improbable, but true occurrences of the New World allows us to better understand the nature of verisimilitude in Cervantes.
In Chapter 16 of book three of the *Persiles*, Cervantes offers his notion of competing perspectives and verisimilitude: “Cosas y casos suceden en el mundo, que si la imaginación, antes de suceder, pudiera hacer que así sucedieran, no acertara a trazarlos; y así muchos por la raridad con que acontecen, pasan plaza de apócrifos y no son tenidos por tan verdaderos como lo son (383). Cervantes’ attraction for, and his subsequent unsuccessful attempt to travel to the Indies as has been outlined with the help of Diana de Armas Wilson and María Antonia Garcés, speaks to what Irving A. Leonard sees as an eagerness on the part of the conquerors to read the great chivalric romances so beloved by Don Quixote. A case in point is Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s account of Hernan Cortéz’s arrival at Tenochtitlan (Today Mexico City) in his highly read *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España*:

[…] y desde que vimos tantas ciudades y villas pobladas en el agua, y en tierra firme otras grandes poblaciones,…nos quedamos admirados, y decíamos que parecía a las cosas de encantamiento que cuentan en el libro de Amadís, por las grandes torres y cues y edificios que tenían dentro en el agua y todos de cal y canto, y aun algunos de nuestros soldados decían que si aquello que aquí, si era sueños. Y no es de maravillar que yo aquí lo escriba desta manera, porque hay mucho que ponderar en ello, que no sé cómo lo cuente: ver cosas nunca oídas, ni vistas, ni aun soñadas, como vimos (LXXXVII, 310-11).

In fact, Diana De Armas Wilson has noted that critics have described the conquest of the Indies as a “chivalric enterprise,” going as far (as is the case with of William H. Prescott who she cites) as to characterize the conquest as “ocean chivalry” (Prescott Cite in De Armas Wilson, 371):

The books of chivalry had an enormous impact on Cervantes’s age, both in Europe and America. One and the same genre gave to the conquistadores’ their delirious dreams of El Dorado; to Spanish cartographers, American place names like ‘California’ and ‘Patagonia’; to the New World chroniclers, a ‘lying’ genre against which to defend their own ‘true histories’; to Cervantes, an exhausted
Indeed, while the New World enterprise resonates in the literary creations of Cervantes, De Armas Wilson believes that if we are to better appreciate the influence of the crónicas de Indias in these texts, what is required is a more “spatial understanding” (366): “Both novels were stimulated, far more than criticism has acknowledged, by the geographical excitement of a New World” (366). In constructing such an argument, De Armas Wilson points to Mikhail Bakhtin who, “…saw ancient novelistic discourse as developing on the margins of the Hellenistic world” (367), that is to say: “…on the boundary line between cultures and languages” thus creating a genre, based on a new polyglot consciousness (Bakhtin cite in De Armas Wilson, 367). This renewed “cultural and creative consciousness” would result in new relationships between language and its object, that is, the real world, in which (Bakhtin, 12):

Words and language began to have a different feel to them; objectively they ceased to be what they had once been…and this is fraught with enormous consequences for all the already completed genres that had been formed during eras of closed and deaf monoglossia. In contrast to other major genres, the novel emerged and matured precisely when intense activation of external and internal polyglossia was at the peak of its activity; this is its native element. The novel could therefore assume leadership in the process of developing and renewing literature in its linguistic and stylistic dimension (12).

In his attempt to define the basic structural characteristics of the novel as “a genre-in-the-making” Bakhtin proposes three “fundamental characteristics” that differentiate the

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80 De Armas Wilson notes that “Cervantes’s novels are also pervaded by this kind of consciousness emerging from the ‘Babel’ of Algiers as well as from the ‘bar-bar’ of the Indies” (367). De Amras also refers to Hegyi’s essay “Algerian Babel Reflected in Persiles,” in Ingeniosa Invención: Essays on Golden Age Spanish Literature for Geoffrey L. Stagg in Honor of His Eighty-fifth Birthday, ed. Ellen Anderson and Amy Williamsen (Newwardk, DE: Juan de la Cuesta Press, 1999), pp. 225-39” (Footnotes 374).
novel from other genres in the following manner (11): First “…its stylistic three-
dimensionality, which is linked with the multi-language consciousness realized in the
novel” (11); second, “…the radical change it effects in the temporal coordinates of the
literary image” (11); third “…the new zone opened by the novel for structuring literary
images, namely, the zone of maximal contact with the present (with the contemporary
reality) in all its openendedness” (11).\textsuperscript{81} All three of these characteristics are the direct
result of an emerging European civilization from “…a socially isolated and culturally
deaf semipatriarchal society, and its entrance into international and interlingual contacts
and relationships” (11).\textsuperscript{82}

The reader of \textit{Don Quixote} observes these differing perspectives in Cervantes’
translator, who in a little less than two months, would translate the satchel of papers
written in Arabic:

\begin{quote}
Apartéme luego con el morisco por el claustro de la iglesia mayor, y roguéle me
volviese aquellos cartapacios, todos los que trataran de Don Quijote, en lengua
castellana, sin quitarles ni añadirles nada…y por no dejar la mano tan buen
hallazgo, le traje a mi casa, donde en poco más de mes y medio la tradujo toda” (I,
ix 1062).
\end{quote}

The art of translation, as De Armas Wilson explains, involves movements between
“places, cultures and even empires… [And] In the most prescient moments of novelizing,
translation involves movements between Europe and America,” acting as the main
instrument of “…transcultural European communication during the humanist recovery of

\textsuperscript{81} See Michael McKeon’s \textit{The Origin of the English Novel} for more information on the
unique status as the \textit{modern} genre of the novel (pp. 1-24).

\textsuperscript{82} Bakhtin in his article “From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse” in the present
volume investigates further the first “stylistic peculiarity of the novel;” the one linked
with the multi- language consciousness, particularly of the Indies (11-12).
antiquity, translations—whether of Homer, Virgil, or Heliodorus” (18). While intermittent in *Don Quixote*, as De Armas Wilson goes on to explain “…this polyglot consciousness increases dramatically in the *Persiles*, whose characters speak in and translate from, a dozen different tongues: Spanish and Portuguese, English, French, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Valencian, *a lengua aljamiada* (texts written in Spanish but in Arabic characters), and *a lengua bárbara* (a ‘barbaric’ language that requires and interpreter)” (367, emphasis De Armas Wilson). In fact, the *Persiles* explicitly identifies itself as a translation: “…en esta traducción, que lo es, se quita por prolija, y por cosa en muchas partes referida y ventilada, y se viene a la verdad del caso” (II, 159). Moreover, Cervantes incorporates “American loan words from Caribbean, Mexican, or Peruvian Languages (Taino or Nahuatl or Aymara)” (De Armas Wilson, 367); a process that as De Armas Wilson notes, Bakhtin has named “hybridization” consisting of two or more “linguistic consciousness within a single concrete utterance” (Bakhtin cite in De Armas, 367). Yet, perhaps Cervantes’ familiarity with the chronicles of the New World can

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83 In her own study, De Armas Wilson uses the word “hybridity” to describe the “mix[ing]” of “Spanish and native American languages in Cervantes’s novels—a term that jostles at present with a large cluster of related, and highly contested concepts, e.g., syncretism, bastardy, in-betweenness, mongrelization, transculturation, and heterogeneity” (367). As De Armas Wilson explains, “Some Latin American scholars… are returning to Bakhtin, claiming that his analysis of the novel as a hybrid formation could provide ‘a fertile field’ for the development of hybridity by colonial studies” (367). De Armas Wilson’s assessment as she notes is based on Rita de Grandis’s “Incursiones en torno a hibridación: una propuesta para discusión. De la mediación lingüística de Bajtin a la mediación simbólica de Conclini,” in *Memorias de JALLA Tucumán 1995* (Tucumán, Argentina: Proyecto ‘Tucumán en los Andes,’ 1997). I: 292–94” (See footnotes 375).
more clearly be appreciated adopting, as suggested by Cro, a chronological point of
view.\textsuperscript{84}

De hecho, muchos de estos relatos, crónicas o poemas de la conquista, habían sido
publicados más de ochenta años antes de que Cervantes publicara su primera
novela, \textit{La Galeata}, en 1585. Otras referencias cervantinas indican que Cervantes
conoció algunos poetas cuyos trabajos, hoy perdidos, pudieron llegarle en forma
manuscrita. Desde el ‘Canto de Caliope’, incluido en \textit{La Galatea}, hasta \textit{El viaje
del Parnaso}, Cervantes se refiere a estos poetas (7).

Cro constructs his argument by demonstrating similarities not only between the \textit{Persiles}
and Garcilaso de la Vega’s \textit{Comentarios reales}, but also with other accounts of the
Indies, affirming: “Las referencias a los sacrificios humanos, a los mares esparcidos de
islas, a la abundancia de perlas y oro, al comercio intenso de esclavos y a la piratería son
claros indicios, si no exclusivos, de las analogías con el material de Indias” (13).

Accordingly, De Armas Wilson explains that in order for Cervantes to have written \textit{El
rufián dichoso}, he must have read Fray Agustín Dávila Padilla’s 1596 history of the
Dominican missionary order in Mexico (369). This play repeatedly demonstrates
Cervantes’ awareness of the dangers found in New World, which include: “…haunting
references to an American ‘hurricane’ (‘huracán’), to the dangerous transatlantic voyages
to ‘Bermuda,’ and to Florida as the ‘killer of a thousand bodies’” (369). While our
understanding as to what documents of the New World Cervantes read or had access to is

\textsuperscript{84} Armas De Wilson notes that, “Over a dozen major contributors to the vast protocol-
from Amerigo Vespucci (c. 1507) to Inca Garcilaso (1609)- published accounts of the
New World before and during Cervantes’s lifetime and, as recent inventories of
peninsular libraries show us, most of these accounts were available to him as a reader,
some in multiple editions and continuations” (369). Cro, who supports this idea, notes
that those critics who have argued in favor of such connection do so on the authority of
Rodolfo Schevill and Adolfo Bonilla and not on a textual comparison of these texts (6).
\textsuperscript{84} Cro believes this is the reason that in more recent years some critics have rejected the
premise that Cervantes read texts generated from the New World encounter (6).
unclear, De Armas Wilson believes they may have included everything from “…memos and letters to theological debates and papal bulls, to literary genres such as essays, epics, and comedias” (369).85

Such familiarity with the textual production of the New World in the works of Cervantes speaks to what Anthony Grafton, who De Armas cites, sees as a decisive cultural insurgency (21): “Between 1550 and 1660 Western thinkers ceased to believe that they could find all important truths in ancient books” (Cite in De Armas Wilson 21). This is nowhere better displayed than in the prologue of Don Quixote’s part one. As noted by De Armas Wilson, the prologue sets out challenging the truth found in those ancient, “…sentencias de Aristóteles, de Platón y de toda la caterva de filósofos, que adiran a los leyentes y tienen a sus autores por hombres leídos, eruditos y elocuentes…,” deciding instead that his creation remain buried in:

[...] sus archivos en la Mancha, hasta que el cielo depare quien le adorne de tantas cosas como le faltan; porque yo me hallo incapaz de remediarlas, por mi insuficiencia y pocas letras, y porque naturalmente soy poltrón y perezoso de

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85 Walter Mignolo has referred to the family of crónicas de indias as “una masa de textos” united by the “descubrimiento y la conquista de la India,” in which as Hart further explains: “…escindida según una línea divisoria, borrosa a veces, entre formaciones discursivas (historia, ciencia, literatura, etc.) que integran dinámicamente tipos discursivos, como la relación, la carta, el diarios, etc.” (504). De Armas Wilson lists by name these texts, that is those which Cervantes would have access to, which included: “Américo Vespucci’s Lettera and his Mundus Novus (c. 1505); Peter Martyr’s De Orbe Novo (1511, 1516, and 1530); Hernán Cortés’s Letters from Mexico (1522, 1533, and 1525); Francisco de Jerez’s True Account of the Conquest of Peru (1534); Fernández de Oviedo’s General and Natural History of the Indies (Part 1, 1535); Lopez de Gómora’s General History of the Indies (1552); Cieza de Leon’s Chronicle of Peru (Part One) (1553); Bartolomé de las Casas’s Very Brief Account of the destruction of the Indies (1553); Agustín de Zárate’s History of the Discovery and Conquest of Peru (1555); Diego Fernández, el Palatino’s First and Second Part of the History of Peru (1571); José de Acosta’s Natural and Moral History of the Indies (1590); Antonio de Herrera’s General History of the Deeds of the Castilians in the Indies (1601-15); and, finally, Inca Garcilaso de la Vega’s La Florida (1605) and his Royal Commentaries of the Incas, Part 1 (1609)” (26).
Recalling chapter two, these lines seem to echo the ideas of Juan Luis Vives, who reinforcing his notion of progress questioned the unrivaled authority afforded to the ancients; instead choosing to confide greater authority to the contribution of future generations, explaining that: ‘La verdad es accessible a todos y no está aún ocupada completamente. Muy mucha parte de ella quedó reservada a los venideros” (1.1, 342). Indeed, Cervantes was at the edge of something new that while, “mediated through the conventions of ancient Greek novels and early modern books of chivalry” (De Armas Wilson, 21), as we observe in Cervantes’ prologue, “…nunca se acordó Aristóteles, ni dijo nada San Basilio, ni alcanzó Cicerón” (24). While, Vives believed that the task of every new generation was to surpass the level achieved by ancient scholarship: not as “enanos en hombres de gigantes” but as equals (1.6 368), the unique quality of Cervantes’ undertaking, as De Armas Wilson explains, lies in that “his novel responds to the discourse of real-world events, both at home and in Spain’s ultramarine empire” (21).

As we have seen up to this point, De Armas Wilson and Cro’s approach to Cervantes' novel is closely linked to the “expansion” of the New World; a relationship

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86 As discussed in chapter one with the aid of Bejzy and Mack, Vives repeatedly emphasized the wisdom and authority of each generation, while questioning previous ones: “….los modernos preceptistas, que, desconfiados de sí mismos, pensaron ser imperdonable sacrilegio apartarse del sentir de los antiguos” (1.5, 367); further ahead stating, “Ni nosotros somos enanos ni fueron ellos gigantes; todos tenemos la misma estatura y aun diré que nosotros nos encaramamos más arriba gracias al bien que nos hicieron” (1.6, 367).
which demonstrates Cervantes’ use of various generic forms (370).\(^8\) And while Cervantes chose to refer to his work as a “historia” rather than a “novel,” we must keep in mind, as Bruce Wardropper explains (1): “…that he is fooling us: *Don Quixote* may be a romance, or a novel, or a story, but it is certainly not a history [that is]… a story masquerading as history, with a work claiming to be historically true within its external framework of fiction” (1). However, the distinction between history and poetry, as E. C. Riley explains, is really a generic question, one that is in continual state of flux: “To try to reduce a genre to the characteristics of a single model is futile; it is necessarily a collection of works…A genre…must be understood as capable of accommodating not only works that conform closely to type, but also those which exploit its possibilities, and even some which try to subvert it” (11-12).

Moreover, for several humanists, and in particular for Juan Luis Vives, history “becomes a supreme discipline, overshadowing--at least in theory--not just poetry, but even moral philosophy” in that, “it becomes a vehicle for teaching not just singular events but universal truths” (Beckjord, 4). While during the early 16th century the importance of distinguishing truth from fiction began to gain popularity among scholars, the two remained unsettled, in that (Riley, 164):

> Historians insouciantly spiced their histories with legend and fable or even deliberately fictionalized them. Writers of fiction continued the old tradition of asserting that the story they told was true (*adtestatio rei visae*) to impress and

\(^8\) According to De Armas Wilson these included the “epic and Ovidian poetry, the ancient Greco-Latin novel, Mennippean satire, proverbs, the Italian novella, topographical legends, the books of chivalry, criminal autobiography, critical treatises, allegorical masques, and closet dramas” (De Armas 370). In addition, Cervantes “also internalized a number of genres precipitated by, or affiliated with the matter of America. At least four kinds of literature that have pointed alliances with Spain’s New World colonies found their way into his novels: the books of chivalry, the utopias, the colonial war epic, and American ethnohistory” (370).
move their readers—a device evidently springing from the ancient idea of epic as
designed to commemorate the deeds of famous men: the singer claimed that the
deeds were true and revealed to him by the Muses (164).

However, as Riley further explains, the need to more precisely distinguish between fact
and fiction was increasingly becoming an issue during this time (164):

Considerable nervousness about the subject becomes apparent, for a religious
crisis had meanwhile split Christendom, and false-or ‘wrong’- ideas had bloodily
proved themselves dangerous. Printed books speeded up the circulation of ideas
and literature moved into closer contact with the lives of the common people
(164).

In fact, print not only contributed to, but as Michael McKeon has suggested, strengthened
“a ‘objective’ standard of truth”, and thus “an ‘historical’ standard of truth of historicity”
(46). This is especially true with regard to narrative in which: “…the verifying potential
of print is so powerful that the historicity of the act of publication itself could seem to
supplant, and to affirm, the historicity of that information which print putatively exists
only to mediate” (McKeon, 46).88

The increased “dissemination” of both secular knowledge and entertainment
afforded by print, had such an impact on everyday life that Irving Leonard has described
it as having an almost “revolutionary nature:” “Leer ya no constituyó un privilegio

88 McKeon suggests that in the seventeenth century: “the standard of defense against the
charge of ‘newness’ was still the claim to be renewing or reforming the old. But the
unprecedented (and unavoidable) experience of preserving the old in permanent, printed
records enforced sensitivity to, and an acceptance of, the undeniable newness that
distinguished the present from the past. This transformation in attitudes toward the new is
reflected in the seventeenth-century development of ‘news’ as a significant if ambiguous
conceptual category, and of journalism as a popular if eclectic professional activity” from
which, “…the old claim that a story is ‘strange but true’ subtly modulates into something
more like the paradoxical formula ‘strange, therefore true.’ The fact of ‘strangeness’ or
‘newness’ ceases, that is, to be a liability to empirical truth-telling, and becomes instead
an attestation in its support,” See *The Origins of the English Novel* (pp. 45-52).
especial de una pequeña minoría capacitada para adquirir copias manuscritas, sino que se transforma súbitamente en una oportunidad democrática para todas las clases, estimulando con ello un nivel más elevado de alfabetismo” (27). Indeed, one of the first popular literatures to be produced during this time was *Amadís de Gaula* (1508) (27). Leonard highlights the fact that this book (among the others) could not but inspire men and women of all ages to imitate (29): with its medieval notions of chivalry, “enchanted” and “mysterious” islands populated by hidden treasures and “strange inhabitants,” while encompassing, in the words of Leonard, “…un atractivo héroe y de una bella heroína con quienes los lectores de ambos sexos pueden identificarse (29). Nonetheless, our more immediate interest is the connection this work provoked in the textual production of those who traveled abroad to the New World (29).

Leonard argues that it was in the imagination of the “conquerors” of “skin and bone” that these books seemed to have their greatest effect (30-31): “Aparte de la tediosa repetición de los mismo combates y aventuras, había algunos rasgos comunes en estos sabrosos cuentos, que parecían otorgar un aire de realismo a los míticos caballeros de que se ocupaban” (31). Accordingly, Bruce Wardropper, in tracing the origins of the modern novel to historiography, believes it would have been impossible for the earliest chroniclers to “entirely suppress their imaginations” in that:

> It is the tragedy of historiography that the historian can never operate on a purely factual or intellectual plane: he imagines motives; he imagines conversations; he imagines what his sources neglect to tell him. To a greater or lesser degree all history merely pretends to be history. And now, in the later Renaissance, we have a new factor: some works of fiction, such as *Lazarillo de Tormes* and *Don Quijote*, also pretend to be history (4).

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89 See Leonard (pp. 30-35).
Of course, this idea would assume a stable past, which typically eludes the historian. And while, it would be impossible to fully measure the influence that this literature had on the reading public, an effort can be made to establish a connection between its affects, and the desire to discover unchartered lands in the New World; a correlation that Leonard sees as originating in (36): “…la juventud del Renacimiento español [que] se sentía estimulada hacia heroicas acciones por esos relatos que glorificaban al guerrero como prototipo de su cultura” (36).

If, as Leonard suggests, the scroll and the manuscript were the repositories and magical transmitters of hidden knowledge (“…de los recónditos secretos de la naturaleza y de un poder milagroso”), accessible only to a small minority capable of deciphering its hieroglyphics, the advent of the press weakened its fortress of exclusion empowering the individual, who no longer limited to the oral transmission of fable and mystery (40):

[…] podía entregarse devotamente a una experiencia activa y solitaria: activa porque convertía en imágenes vivas lo que figuraba en letra muerta, y solitaria porque podía solazarse con las historias en el retiro de su propia habitación, sin que presencias inoportunas le impidiesen echar a volar su imaginación e identificarse con los héroes (40).

In fact, Leonard suggests that such was the “aura” of “authority and mystery” of these “written pages” that it gave these books of chivalry an almost “hypnotic” element (40):

Predispuestos por la aceptación de los milagros de su fe religiosa, por la poesía y el mito de la Edad Media y por las crónicas de las fabulosas hazañas de sus ancestros en sus luchas contra los invasores sarracenos, los españoles absorbieron las exuberantes creaciones de los escritores con una credulidad y una convicción tan espontaneas que parecen imposible a una mentalidad moderna (40).

Indeed, the popular mentality of the time, filled with “incongruent” “realities,” “fables” and “reveries”, was prone to further manipulation by writers of chivalry whose use of
certain literary “tricks” allowed them to strengthen their claim to true history (41).

Certainly, much of their work adopted the outward appearance of historical scholarship (41).

In fact, the topos of the lost manuscript was yet another attempt to conceal the true nature of their undertakings (41). They were frequently presented as a “translated” or “amended” works written in foreign tongues (41). This practice as Leonard further explains would give these works an element of verisimilitude that would be difficult to contest (41). The practice of inserting the discovered manuscript was widespread in the literary world of chivalry (42):

Semejantes reconocimientos figuraban por lo general en el prefacio de las novelas, advirtiendo a veces que el autor o un conocido suyo habían tenido la suerte de dar con un antiguo memorial durante sus viajes por remotos rincones del mundo. Era usual argumentar que el valioso original se había descubierto en un oculto y misterioso sitio, o bien que el autor lo atesoraba, después de haberlo descifrado a fuerza de desvelos; tal es el caso de las primeras novelas del género, incluso el *Caballero Cifar* y el *Tirant lo Blanch* (42).

Indeed, the topos of the lost manuscript as referred to by McKeon, is encountered in chapter VIII of part one in the *Quijote*. Here Cervantes offers his own take on this attribute so common in chivalric literature, explaining amid Cervantes battle against the Biscayan that the “history” of Don Quixote was owed to the manuscript written by the hand of the Arab historian Cide Hamete, who (273): “…deja pendiente el autor de esta historia…disculpándolse que no halló más escrito de estas hazañas de Don Quijote, de las que deja referidas” (I, viii 1060). Yet, incredulous that “…los ingenios de la Mancha, que no tuviesen en sus archivos o en sus escritorios algunos papeles que deste famoso caballero tratasen,” the narrator soon thereafter finds them in the possession of a young merchant man of Toledo whose “cartapacios” and “papeles viejos” proved to contain the
“Historia de Don Quijote de la Mancha, escrita por Cide Hamete Benegeli, historiador arábigo” (I, ix 1061). While this new discovery would fill the “lacuna” left behind (similar to Amadís of Gaula) Cervantes appears to criticize “the incredibility of romance in part by criticizing its tendency to authenticate itself through the easy invocation of historical antiquity…” (McKeon, 273) not, as the discovery itself would imply, to question the occurrence of such events, but rather at “…the more genealogical species of historical authority on which medieval romances often relied” (274). Of course we observe just this in the comparison the narrator makes with his own adventure of the discovered manuscript:

Don Quijote de la Mancha, luz y espejo de la caballería Manchega…Digo, pues,…es digno maestro gallardo Quijote de continuas y memorables alabanzas, y aun a mí no se me deben negar, por el trabajo y diligencia que puse en buscar el fin desta agradable historia (I, ix 1061).

The narrator ends part one with the announcement that he has met with:

[…] un antiguo médico que tenía en su poder una caja de plomo, que, según él dijo, se había hallado en los cimientos derribados de una antigua ermita que se renovaba; en la cual caja se habían hallado unos pergaminos escritos con letras góticas, pero en versos castellanos, que contenían muchas de sus hazañas y daba noticia…[Yo which the reader is asked as is the custom of judicious people]…crédito…a los libros de caballerías, que tan válidos andan por el mundo (I, lii 1268-69).

As McKeon suggests, the reverence given to “ancient manuscripts” can be compared to Don Quixote’s “worship of ancient romance” (274).

Yet, in addition to Cervantes’ “primitive and self-reflexive critique” of the romance reliance on ancient authority, the epistemology of part one also offers something absolutely new (274). McKeon notes how “Cervantes’s friend reminds him with respect to the traditional methods of authentication” that:

100
Hence, *Don Quixote*, in which “the fiction of antiquity is consistently exploited,” is not simply a “self-critical chivalric romance”, but as McKeon concludes, an “autonomous antiromance,” in which, “the aura of circumstantial history that surrounds this preposterous knight, truly ‘of no very ancient date,’ deepens with each succeeding chapter” (274-75). This idea becomes increasingly apparent as the claim “to antiquity is itself subjected to ridicule;” personified in Cide Hamete and the translator, who in shedding their “early romance factitiousness and to function more like skeptical historians, exercising a considerable acuity in exposing, on the basis of internal evidence, ‘Apocryphal’ passages that have crept into the text” (275).

Indeed, left to the margins of Cide Hamete’s translated text, Chapter XXIV of part two begins with a disclaimer to the reader (275):

No me puedo dar a entender, ni me puedo persuadir, que el valeroso Don Quijote le pasase puntualmente todo lo que en el antecedente capítulo queda escrito: la razón es que todas las aventuras hasta aquí sucedidas han sido contingibles y verisímiles; pero esta de esta cueva no le hallo entrada alguna para tenerla por verdadera, por ir tan fuera de los términos razonables….Por otra parte, considero que él [Don Quixote] la contó y la dijo con todas las circunstancias dichas, y que no pudo fabricar en tan breve espacio tan gran máquina de disparates; y si esta aventura parece apócrifa, yo no tengo la culpa; y así, sin afirmarla por falsa o verdadera, la escribo. Tú, lector, pues eres prudente, juzga lo que te pareciere que yo no debo ni puedo más;… (1355).

While I discuss further these ideas in chapter five, it is worth mentioning here that Cide Hamete, who questions the veracity of events witnessed by Don Quixote in the Cave of Montesinos, insists on leaving it to the reader to decide what is to be believed or not.
believed. This exercise, in which as McKeon notes “the comparative technique of textual scholarship” is practiced, is also apparent shortly before the printing of part two with the publication of Alonso Fernandez de Avellaneda’s own version of *Don Quixote* (275). McKeon believes such attempt by Avellaneda to continue the adventures of Don Quixote allowed Cervantes, “…the opportunity to assert the face-to-face historical truth of his characters by imitating the comparative methods of critical history” (275). In fact, as Riley suggests, Avellaneda provides Cervantes another opportunity to once more address the issue of history and fiction, and thus, “…to turn a critical matter into matter for the novel” (214) We observe just this in the prologue of part two when Cervantes restrains himself from “venganzas, riñas y vituperios” against “el autor del Segundo Don Quijote,” self-assured that the true history will be revealed by his characters (535). In fact, not only must Don Quixote and Sancho “contend with false knights, spurious Merlins, bogus duennas, convicts disguised as puppet-masters, lackeys substituted for champions, and Dulcineas transformed and enchanted, but now with simulacra of their very selves” (Riley, 215). This is also observed in Don Quixote’s welcomed arrival to Barcelona (McKeon, 275); “…no el falso, no el ficticio, no el apócrifo que en falsas historias estos días nos han mostrados, sino el verdadero, el legal y el fiel que nos describió Cide Hamete Benengeli, flor de los historiadores” (II, lxi 1484-85). However, it is in the chapter LIX of part one, during Don Quixote’s and Sancho’s confrontation with errors found in Avellaneda’s version, that we find the most conclusive proof of what McKeon refers to as their own “experiential authenticity” (McKeon, 275).

Indeed, pleased by what they were hearing, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza leave their respective readers (275) “…admirados de ver la mezcla que había hecho de su
discreción y de su locura y verdaderamente creyeron que estos eran los verdaderos Don Quijote y Sancho, y no los que describía su autor aragonés” (II, lix 1477). This assertion is further reinforced by one of the guests at the Inn, whose loyalty to the Moorish autor is affirmed (275): “...y si fuese posible, se había de mandar que ninguno fuera osado a tratar de las cosas del gran Don Quijote, si no fuese Cide Hamete su primer autor” (II, lix 1477). The internalization of part one and the version of it left in the memory of Cervantes’ characters, which according to McKeon, are the “empiricist and objectivist implications of the comparative method,” draws him to conclude that, “...it is as if the bogus authentications of the discovered manuscript topos are definitively replaced by the discovery of the printed book. And the significance of that discovery, although resounding, is far from clear; this is also the moment at which empiricism begins its slide into extreme skepticism” (275-76). While both printed document and memory serve as authentic sources that mirror one another closely, they present “competing versions of true history” which leads Sancho and Don Quixote to question “...how anyone could possibly have known all of this,” unless they were endowed with some magical power of discernment (276): “Yo te aseguro, Sancho-dijo Don Quijote-, que debe de ser algún sabio encantador el autor de nuestra historia; que a los tales no se les encubre nada de lo que quieren escribir...,” to which Sancho replies, “...si era sabio y encantador, pues (según dice el bachiller Sanson Carrasco, que así se llama el que dicho tengo) que el autor de la historia se llama Cide Hamete Berenjena” (II, ii 1281). Earlier in part one, Don Quixote explains to Sancho that the exemplary knight-errant must (276):

90 Martin de Riquer of Editor Junventud’s edition of Don Quijote reminds us that the name Benengeli signifies berenjena (See footnote on page 557).
andar por el mundo, como en aprobación, buscando las aventuras, para que, acabando algunas, se cobre nombre y fama tal, que cuando se fuere a la corte de algún gran monarca ya sea el caballero conocido por sus obras; y que, apenas le hayan visto entrar los muchachos por la puerta de la ciudad, cuando todos le sigan y rodeen… (I, xxi 1109).

As McKeon notes, “This traditional view of fame, as the laborious and time consuming process of Word-of-mouth communication is exploded by the Discovery that Part I is in print…” (276), which leaves Don Quixote:

Pensativo…no se podía persuadir a que tal historia hubiese, pues aún no estaba enjuta en la cuchilla de su espada la sangre de los enemigos que había muerto, y ya querían que anduviesen en estampa sus altas caballerías. Con todo eso, imaginó que algún sabio, o ya amigo o enemigo, por arte de encantamiento las habrá dado a la estampa (II, iii 1281).

While, the association between printing and magic is never fully resolved,91 the result of this human technological advancement “secularizes word-of-mouth fame not only by expediting the process,” as suggested but McKeon:

[...] but also by objectifying the product…the printed book is subject to close examination and exact replication in a way that storytelling and even manuscripts are not, publication tends to suppress standards of judgment that depend heavily on the context and circumstances of presentation, and to encourage criteria that appear appropriate to a discrete and empirically apprehensible thing (276).

Indeed, directing his attention to Sampson Carrasco in Chapter III of part one, Don Quixote acknowledges that it is quite common for (276), “…los que tenían méritamente grajeada y alcanzada gran fama por sus escritos, en dándolos a la estampa la perdieron

91 Perhaps Don Quixote’s familiarity with this “technological advancement” as McKeon notes, allows him to recognize for what it is rather than giving it secret or enchanted powers (276). This idea is observed on his visit to the printing house in Barcelona, where (276): “vio tirar en una parte, corregir en otra, componer en ésta, enmendar en aquella, y, finalmente, toda aquella maquina que en las emprentas grandes se muestra” (II, lxii, 996).
del todo, o la menoscabaron en algo” (II, iii 1284). To which Carrasco replies: “La causa
de eso es…que como las obras impresas se miran despacio. Fácilmente se ven sus faltas,
y tanto más se escudriñan cuanto es mayor la fama del que las compuso” (II, iii 1284).
Moreover, as McKeon concludes, such accessibility of published work intensifies “the
problematic status of ‘details’ and ‘digressions,’” in which “the quantitative completeness
becomes correspondingly acute” (276).92

In his attempt to clarify the appropriate function of “details” and digressions,”
Cervantes, in a burlesque manner, insinuates that Cide Hamete is a historian who
meticulously (puntualidades) imitates chivalric romances (Riley, 126):

Cide Hamete Benengeli fué historiador muy curioso y muy puntual en todas las
cosas, y échase bien de ver, pues las que quedan referidas, con ser tan mínimas y
tan rateras, no las quiso pasar en silencio; de donde podrán tomar ejemplo los
historiadores graves, que nos cuentan las acciones tan corta y sucintamente, que
apenas nos llegan a los labios, dejándose en el tintero, ya por descuido, por
malicia o ignorancia, lo más sustancial de la obra. ¡Bien haya mil veces el autor
de Tablante de Ricamonte, y aquel del otro libro donde se cuenta los hechos del
conde Tomillas, y con qué puntualidad lo describen todo! (I, xvi 1085).

E. C. Riley, in his analysis of the central role afforded to Cide Hamete highlights the
“ironic attitude” demonstrated by Cervantes to the, “over- stuffed novels of chivalry” of
which he compares to the likeness of the “Renaissance to medieval art” (126):

Art does not make its effect by overwhelming with sheer weight of detail. Mere abundance is no substitute for harmonious forms. So, in prose
fiction, the accumulation of detail does not do duty for verisimilitude,93

92 An example of this occurs in the same chapter in which Don Quixote is made aware
that: “Una de las tachas que ponen a la tal historia…es que su autor puso en ella una
novella intitulada El curioso impertinente: no por mala no por mal razonada sino por no
ser de aquel lugar, ni tiene que ver con la historia de su merced del señor don Quijote”
(II, iii).

93 E.C Riley believes that Quixote harmonizes two different concepts surrounding
verisimilitude: the first to do with: “…invention [that] should not conflict with intelligent
While, as Riley notes, it may not be possible to sum up entirely his views on the unity of the novel, it can be said that Cervantes was conscious of the need to “mold the variety of experience” into what Riley has suggested is “…a coherent artistic form that satisfies the intelligence without sacrificing the pleasures that variety produces” (129-130). Moreover, it is important to note the importance that Cide Hamete is to the artistic unity so prevalent in the Italian 16th century; a preoccupation that is made explicit in the opening of chapter XLIV (130): “…y así en esta segunda parte no quiso injerir novelas sueltas ni pegadizas, sino algunos episodios que lo pareciesen, nacidos de los mismos sucesos que la verdad ofrece, y aun éstos, limitadamente y con solas las palabras que bastan a declararlos” (II, xlv 1420). Therefore, as Riley concludes, while “The episode is separable from the main action in so far as it is complete in itself, but it must be born naturally and convincingly out of the main action,” and be limited in length (130).94 This is observed in the actions taken by Cide Hamete who states:

Dicen quien el propio original de esta historia se lee que llegando Cide Hamete a escribir este capítulo, no le tradujo su intérprete como él le había escrito, que fué un modo de queja que tuvo el moro de sí mismo, por haber tomado entre manos una historia tan seca y tan limitada como ésta de Don Quijote, por parecerle que siempre había de hablar de él y de Sancho, sin osar extenderse a otras digresiones.

94 See E. C. Riley for a more complete explanation (pp.116-31).

man’s apprehension of reality, in which there is much that may be taken as certain…and in which there are things that are dubious, such as forms of the supernatural.” while on the other hand, “…the invention should correspond to an ideal world- picture composed on paralogical principles…In this the supernatural occupies a place no different from that in the previous interpretation. The division between these two types of verisimilitude, which… involves a division of styles, may be seen all through his novels in different forms” (198).
Cide Hamete’s character points to Cervantes’ concern over the role of the author, who as Ruth Snodgrass explains: “…must exist on two different temporal planes: that of his actual physical existence, and that of his projected, imagined story” (166). For his part Riley suggests that, “Cervantes’ repeated use of intermediaries was undoubtedly made with a keen awareness of the advantages of authorial detachment…,” in which Cide Hamete, who “occupies a peculiar position in Don Quixote…is at once peripheral to the story and central to the book. He stands between the real author and the story and between the story and the reader…He is narrator, intermediary, and, in his own right and his own way, a character” (Riley, 206-07). Of course, the role of Cide Hamete as an “historian,” brings us back to Aristotle and questions concerning the respective role and limitations of poetry and history. In fact, chroniclers cannot know the inner thoughts of their subjects, yet as Ruth Snodgrass explains, “Despite extreme uncertainties about the sources for the ‘original’ manuscript and…no direct contact with his ‘historical’ characters, he [Cide Hamete] is allowed intimate contact with his characters’ thoughts and even reports on them when they thought themselves to be utterly alone” (165). Along these lines, Alban K. Forcione suggests the presence of Cide Hamete, “…is a resumption of one of the conventions of chivalric romance, the repeated assertion by the narrator that the subject matter of his work is historical and is recorded as such” (155). In the same
manner that “Don Quijote is a parody of the chivalric hero…Cide Hamete is similarly a parody of the chronicler of old, be it Turpin, Maestro Elisabat, or simply the historia, and their descendants in the false chroniclers of the sixteenth century” (156).

However, as the narrator tells us in the opening of chapter XL, the readers of this history are indebted to Cide Hamete because, in a manner "Real y verdadermente", he offers the most complete and intimate details: "...por la curiosidad que tuvo en contarnos las semínimas de ella, sin dejar cosa, por menuda que fuese, que no la sacase a luz distintamente. Pinta los pensamientos, descubre las imaginaciones, responde a las tácitas, aclara las dudas, resuelve los argumentos: finalmente los átomos del más curioso deseo manifiesta” (II, xl 1407). As historian, Cide Hamete is limited to what he sees: he is a faithful witness that: “...cannot know the secret thoughts of their subjects-unless, of course, they happen also to be magicians” (Riley, 211). Yet, as Riley further explains, while Cide Hamete shares traits associated with that of a magician and a poet, we shouldn’t diminish the importance of his role as an historian (212):

The persistent reminders of history...direct attention towards the substratum of historical fact, which must underlie what imaginatively ‘could be’, in Cervantes’s conception of prose fiction. As chronicler, Benengeli has a duty towards the truth of history. As sorcerer he knows those hidden things that go beyond the historical evidence, things that are the poet’s province. He works therefore in a terrain encompassing both history and poetry. In other words, Benengeli stands for the novelist, who is part historian, part poet (212).

By presenting Cide Hamete as an historian, “muy puntual en todas las cosas” (I, xvi 1085), “flor de los historiadores” (II, lxi 1485), and a “fidedigno autor de esta nueva y jamás vista historia” (I, lii 1268), Cervantes demonstrates “the obligation of the novelist has towards history” (Riley, 212). Yet as this history reveals, he is also a Moor (212), “...y de los moros no se podía esperar verdad alguna, porque todos son embelecadores,
falsarios y quimeristas” (II, iii 1281); for it is, “…muy propio de los de aquella nación ser mentirosos” (I, ix 1062). To contest this idea Cide Hamete believes it necessary to swear “como católico cristiano…,” attempting to convey that as such “…cuando jura, jura, o debe jurar, verdad, y decirla en lo que dijere, así él la decía, como si jurara como cristiano católico” (II, xxvii 1367). While, we may question the seriousness of such a statement, and in fact should, this sort of double-talk leads Riley to conclude that he is no ordinary historian but a comic paradox, in which, “By discrediting him because he is a Moor he makes it plain that the novel is not something to be believed literally. By treating him as an enchanter he recognized the novelist’s right to operate in extra-historical regions. He makes us sensible of the nature of truth in the novel and of the novel’s fictional quality” (212).

The three different accounts that have been discussed thus far with the help of McKeon and Riley, which include, Avellaneda’s sequel (of which will be discussed further in chapter five), Don Quixote’s own idealized description, and Cide Hamete’s history point to an infinite number of possible “versions, interpretations, points of view” (Riley, 219). In fact, Cervantes continually reminds his reader of just this. At the end of Sancho’s description of what he saw blindfolded and mounted alongside Don Quixote on the famous Clavineño, the duchesses warns him not to rely too heavily on his limited perception:

Sancho amigo, mirad lo que decis; que, a lo que parece vos no vistes la Tierra, sino los hombres que andaban sobre ella: y está claro que si la Tierra os pareció como un grano de mostaza y cada hombre como una avellana, un hombre solo había de cubrir toda la Tierra… [Adding]… que por un ladito no se ve el todo de lo que se mira” (II, xli 1413).
Perhaps as Riley suggests, the only way to perceive “the whole of an object” simultaneously is with the use of mirrors (220): “Italian Renaissance painters knew that the mirror image produces a curiously heightened effect of reality; so did Velasquez [and]…The extra dimension attained in Don Quixote is achieved by the literary equivalent of this” (220). Moreover, the notion that it is because of human’s limited perception that people see “the same things differently” is a recurring theme in Don Quixote in which, “The book is full of double or even multiple versions of the same event, recounted, referred to or merely inerable” (Riley, 158).

This reoccurring idea is most clearly observed in Don Quixote’s confrontation with the lion in chapter XVII of part two (158). Here Cervantes offers three versions of the same event (158). The first of these three versions derives from the narrator whose comic account of the lion’s indifferent behavior stifles any heroic illusion that such action may have garnered for our knight:

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\text{Lo primero que hizo fué revolverse en la jaula, donde venía echado, y tender la garra, y desperezarse todo; abrió luego la boca y bostezó muy despacio, y con casi dos palmos de lengua que sacó fuera se despolvoreó los ojos y se lavó el rostro; hecho esto, sacó la cabeza fuera de la jaula y miró a todas partes con los ojos hechos brasas, vista y ademán para poner espanto a la misma temeridad…Pero el generoso león, más comedido que arrogante, no haciendo caso de niñerías ni de bravatas,…volvió las espaldas y enseñó sus traseras partes a Don Quijote, y con gran flema y remanso se volvió a echar en la jaula (1329).}
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The tone of this account stands in stark contrast to Don Quixote’s, who, in addressing the keeper, offers his own interpretation of events allegedly void of embellishment: “…como tú abriste al león, yo le esperé, el no salió, le volví a esperar, volví a no salir y volvíóse a acostar. No debo más, y encantos afuera, Dios ayude a la razón y a la verdad, y a la verdadera caballería…” (II, xvii, 1329-30). While it appears that both accounts seem to
communicate in a faithful manner the events that were to unfold that day, the tone has shifted from one of absurdity to one of bravery and moral conviction. The final account is that of the keepers, whose impatience with Don Quixote—as well as his monetary reward—leads to not only an interpretation of the fact, but also of history itself that elevates the valor of Don Quixote’s status to that of legend: “…acobardado, no quiso ni osó salir de la jaula, puesto que había tenido un buen espacio abierta la puerta de la jaula” (II, xvii, 1330).95

As we have seen, Cervantes’ familiarity with not only the romances of chivalry, but also stories of the discovery and conquest, as argued in particular by Diana de Armas Wilson, Stelio Cro, Bruce Wardropper, and E.C. Riley respectfully, encapsulated problems associated with verisimilitude and differing perspectives of reality. Along with the “falsifying of history” came important changes for the historian who adopted a more active role with phrases such as, “y asi era la verdad” that would allow him to influence his reader’s decision making (Wardropper, 10). Certainly, as Don Quixote attests to, Cervantes understood this important and complex change, for as Wardropper explains: “He [Cervantes] invents a pseudo-historian whose credibility is alternately impugned and defended. And this pseudo-historian plays a part in the novel second only to those of the protagonist, Don Quixote and Sancho” (10). And it is this heightened complexity of the historian’s role, which brings us back once more to De Armas Wilson’s suggestion that we incorporate “a more spatial understanding” of Cervantes’ achievement in light of the geographical novelty that was the “new” and unexplored world of the Indies (366).

Certainly, as De Armas Wilson explains in her own analysis, Don Quixote demonstrates

95 For more examples of the importance of point of view consisting of multiple versions of the same event and their affects, see Riley’s Don Quixote (pp149-165).
this spatial understanding as “he sails down the river Ebro” in his “enchanted boat,” lecturing Sancho on the “various...entities known to contemporary mariners and cartographers” who had set sail to the Indies mapping the possessions of Philip II (3-4):

“Haz, Sancho, la averiguación ...tú no sabes qué cosa sean coluros, líneas, paralelos, zodiacos, clínicas, polos, solsticios, equinocíos, planetas, signos, puntos, medidas, de que se compone la esfera celeste y terrestre” (II, xxix 1374).96 The same “cartographic impulse” is reaffirmed further ahead, when atop Rocinante, Don Quixote becomes entangled in a web of green nets, which he would later learn were used as part of a “simulated Arcadia” (De Armas Wilson, 4). Directing himself to a young maiden who had asked, (so as to save the netting) that Don Quixote go no further, Don Quixote assures her: “...si como estas redes, que deben de ocupar algún pequeño espacio, ocupara toda la redondez de la tierra, buscara yo nuevos mundos por do pasar sin romperlas” (II, lviii 1472). These examples demonstrate not only Don Quixote’s spatial awareness, but also his fascination “to seek out new worlds” both literary and historic (De Armas Wilson, 4). In so doing, the reader is offered an enriched understanding into the ways Cervantes’ literary creations, in particular Don Quixote and the Persiles, “absorb and reply...to the conquest and colonization of the Indies” (4). Indeed, as Wardropper suggests, Cervantes as both “historian’ and novelist...was less dogmatic” over the “rationalization” and “organization” (words used by Wardropper) of history, less persuaded that such delimitations between truth and fiction or “truth and error” were

96 In explaining to Sancho the expansion of the Spanish territories, Don Quixote alludes to the importance and reliance of these new technologies: “Sabrás, Sancho, que los españoles y los que se embarcan en Cádiz para ir a la Indias Orientales, una de las señales que tienen para entender que han pasado la línea equinoccial que te he dicho, es que a todos los que van en el navio se les mueren los piojos, sin que les quede ninguno, no en todo el bajel le hallarán, si le pesan a oro” (1374).
attainable (5): “[For] Don Quixote does not disentangle the story from the history, [rather]…it points its telescope at the ill-defined frontier itself” (5). Again, we are reminded that Cervantes relegates such concerns to his readers, who must reach their own conclusions (5): “Tú, lector, pues eres prudente, juzga lo que te pareciere” (II, xxiv 1355). To a certain extent this is what Juan Luis Vives had suggested with regards to historical representation, that is, the obligation of the historian to not only offer a truthful account of events, but to offer insight (Beckjord, 39). Indeed, Sarah Beckjord reminds us that for Vives,…it is not enough just to record events in an exact fashion… For history to teach prudence, the moral commentary of the author must illuminate the narrative…Thus, while the ideal historical narrator should represent events as if directly witnessed… the judgment exercised upon them should be the historian’s own” (36).

In making “his story pass for history,” Wardropper proposes that Cervantes did not only “achieve verisimilitude” (in neo-Aristotelian terms) but “much more…he has obliterated the dividing-line between the actual and the potential, the real and the

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97 Wardropper explains: “This awareness of the ill-defined frontier between history and story, between truth and lie, between reality and fiction is what constitutes Cervantes’ Don Quixote, is what constitutes the novel as distinct from the romance. The novel is the most self-conscious, the most introverted of literary genres. Unlike the Alexandrian romance, it is sensitive to its origins in historiography and aware of the need to handle its claim to historical accuracy with massive doses of irony” (5).

98 This phrase is made by Cid Hamete Benengeli, who in doing so, questions the authenticity of Don Quixote’s testimony over what actually occurred in the cave of Montesinos (II, 24 1355). Cascardi refering to this episode, highlights the innate contradiction of Plato’s own argument concerning the use of images: an argument that Cascardi believes Cervantes not only was aware of, but also gave importance to, in which, “The task of philosophy is…to find perspective from which we can distinguish true images from false ones. This perspective is associated with prudence” (602). Indeed, Cervantes refers to it when addressing the reader, who must judge (“juzgar”) for himself if what Don Quixote saw was true false or something in between (602).
imaginary, the historical and the fictional the true and the false” (Wardropper, 6).

Accordingly, I agree with Alban Forcione: Cervantes knew that “behind the…central issue of Renaissance literary theorizing” over the need for truth, was a more pressing problem: “the nature of truth itself,” in which, “Like his greatest contemporaries he knew that neither of the traditional sources of truth, faith and reason, was entirely adequate as a source of order in the variegated and intractable province of human experience” (339-40). And it is this heightened appreciation of both “experience” and “rational argument” that gives birth to the modern novel (344): a process that Forcione describes as, “…a drama of disengagement as the new literary form breaks free from the strictures which ages had created” (344).

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99 Bruce Wardropper proposes that: “The problems entailed in writing prose fiction are themselves admirable subjects for prose fiction. The prosaic mode supplies a ready-made allegory for the moral dilemma of man, who must live in a world where the boundaries between truth and falsehood are imprecise” (4).

100 As Forcione notes in his conclusion, Cervantes’s ideas on relativism have been examined by several writers including, Ortega, Castro, Casalduero, and Spitzer (343). However, Forcione believes that Cervantes’s “dialogue with classicism and his ultimately anticlassical stance, must be seen in the fundamental context which they have illuminated. It is… that classicism, in asking the right questions about the artistic undertaking, was, like Cervantes’ classicist par excellence, the Canon of Toledo, somewhat shortsighted in looking for the answers” (343), since as Forcione explains, “Underlying its edifice were certain fundamental assumptions which it never called into question- that the universe is indeed well-ordered, that human reality can be reduced to a finite number of abstractions, that man’s ethical life can be guided by unambiguous principles, and that, through reason, the mind can comprehend and communicate the universal order. Coupled with such faith in reason and truth was its distrust of the ‘lower’ faculties and all art which indulged the fantasy and the emotions” (343).

101 Alban Forcione suggests that because Cervantes along with the neo-Aristotelian writers / intellectuals “shared a belief that art must deal responsibly with truth and the conventional popular literature had failed to meet this responsibility. Against the common enemy, literary genres which cast human experience in the molds of the wish-fulfillment dream, disregard the limitations which reason discovers everywhere in experience, and in
as Jorge Luis Borges once suggested, “a secret, nostalgic farewell” to the pastoral novel and the novel of chivalry (among other generic forms), is rather their reaffirmation and renewal within the self-conscious prism of the modern novel. An elusive space of contact between the physical and the imaginative, between what is perceived and what is presumed in memory: the skin of humanity which acts to preserve the mortal frailty of both worlds.

effect decline to make a meaningful statement about reality, Cervantes could join with the classicists in a united front” (339).

102 Francisco Ayala suggests a similar idea stating: “…el nuevo arte de hacer novelas introducido por Cervantes, la revolución que el llevó a cabo, no está basada en eliminar y hacer tabla rasa, sino al contrario, en utilizar, absorber y transformar todos los elementos de la tradición literaria de que disponía, para obtener así un producto de superior riqueza” (596).
CHAPTER IV

MEMORY AND AUTHORITY IN OVIEDO’S SUMARIO AND CERVANTES’ DON QUIXOTE AND THE PERSILES

This chapter examines Cervantes’ use of memory in the construction of textual authority. The focus remains Don Quixote; however, I also discuss the Persiles. My inquiry—which includes Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias, a key sixteenth-century historiographical account of the “New” world, a crónica that problematizes the relationship of history versus poetry—focuses on two important elements: memory (mnemonics, devices for establishing the reliability of a narrative and therefore its narrator-author) and exemplarity (especially in relation to authoritative Classical models). My selection of Oviedo is not only informed by his direct participation in the New World, but his demonstrated ability to recollect the most insignificant details on matters of natural and social history of the Indies, which point to a reliance of the mnemonic treatise. Similarly, and by means of parody, the art of memory is observed in the Quixote and the Persiles. Reminiscent of Oviedo, I demonstrate how Cervantes’ extraordinary ability to remember with such detail came from his knowledge of such treatise. Accordingly, this chapter sheds new light into the conundrum of history and poetry (fiction) in post-encounter Spanish discourse. The significant role that memory and mnemonics play in Cervantes’ imitation of literary models allows for further discussion on the epistemological and narratological concerns that arise in these texts.103

103 My thinking in this chapter has been strongly influenced and informed by Sara Beckjord, in particular Pp. 1-13.
As I argue at the conclusion of chapter three, it is *in memory* that Miguel de Cervantes and Don Quixote alike lived and perished, the former as a maimed prisoner of war who, confined to “…una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento y donde todo triste ruido hace su habitación” (Prologue, 1031), would recreate the most fertile of spaces suitable for the conception of life “…la amenidad de los campos, la serenidad de los cielos, el murmurar de las fuentes, la quietud del espíritu,” from which, “…las musas más estériles se muestren fecundas y ofrezcan partos al mundo que le colmen de maravilla y de contento” (1031); while, the latter, a “stepchild” fashioned at the whim of his reluctant master, is reborn time and again against “an extraordinarily original symphony”\(^{104}\) of generic modes, each vindicated by the memory of the reader, who in bringing Cervantes’ creation to life, inadvertently condemns him to death.\(^{105}\) Certainly, it is this value placed on memory that Jean Cassou speaks of in his admiration of Cervantes:

> He [Cervantes] was certainly (as he himself boasted)\(^{106}\) a rare inventor who outdid all his colleagues on Parnassus in imagination. But this

\(^{104}\) Jean Cassou uses this expression in discussing the “genius” of Cervantes in his self-proclaimed role as a “rare inventor”, concluding that: “…the admirable thing about Cervantes is that he has brought together all these varied modes in his work without omission, and, with an emphasis that is all his own, he has blended them into an extraordinarily original symphony. Cervantes is both a rare inventor and a complete symbol of his century” (24).

\(^{105}\) As I discuss further in chapter four, in light of Alonso Avellaneda’s apocryphal *Quijote*, and in order to authenticate the “real” Don Quixote to his readers, Cervantes chooses to end his life: thus assuring the veracity of his character against other attempted imitations.

\(^{106}\) Indeed, Cervantes “describes himself as a ‘rare inventor’ and further on declaims” (9): “I who surpass all in invention” (Cite in Cassou, 9). In fact, Cervantes is quite “confident” of his ingenuity for invention, exclaiming in one of his comedies, “Oh, imagination…which reaches the most impossible things” (cite in Cassou, 9). Cassou believes this to be Cervantes’ “instrument of joy” in which: “This free use of the
imagination, recaptured by reality, set out to contrive forms, to place solid objects against a vast blue sky similar to the one the great Andalusian painter was to depict later in Madrid, and finally to make human beings talk to other human beings. And all this after the manner of the surest and wisest of professions: as a poet who understands the subtleties of language, the appropriateness of terms, the elegance of rhythms and word order, the impact and enhancement of a word well placed, the word that gives light and shade, that touches the reader’s skin, rings in his ear, comes back to his tongue, tucks itself into his memory and takes root there (26-27).

It is this memory born in solitude that allows Cervantes and Don Quixote to transcend time and space, and in so doing, respond to the human plight of preserving that which by its very nature is mutable. Indeed, as Jorge Luis Borges suggests: “Somos nuestra memoria, / somos ese quimérico museo de formas inconstantes, / ese montón de espejos rotos” (Cambridge, 45-47). Accordingly, it is memory that immortalizes Cervantes and Don Quixote, creator and creation alike, memory that acts as the “balm” of humanity, the magical antidote to the decay of both body and soul that once administered lessons the heavy burden of our mortal frailty. Perhaps this is what is behind Don Quixote’s attempt to alleviate Sancho’s anguish over his partially severed ear at the hands of the Biscayan: “Es un bálsamo…con el cual no hay que tener temor a la muerte, no hay que pensar morir de herida alguna” (I, x 1064). A recipe whose secret ingredients are safely stored “en la memoria” of Don Quixote’s battered body:

Y así, cuando yo le haga y te le dé, no tienes más que hacer sino que, cuando vieres, que en alguna batalla me han partido por medio del cuerpo --como muchas veces suele acontecer--, bonitamente la parte del cuerpo

imagination, which the idealist Renaissance, with its golden precepts, its flights of fancy, employed as an educational force, was to be turned by Cervantes into an instrument of joy” (9) Further ahead Cassou proposes that: “…it becomes in his work an intellectual means toward his evaluation of truth. He declares that the world is not really what it seems on the whole, for each man views it individually, with the power to embellish and enhance what he sees according to his personal vision” (9).
que hubiere caído en el suelo, y con mucha sutiliza, antes que la sangre se hiele, la pondrás sobre la otra mitad que quedare en la silla, advirtiendo de encajarlo igualmente y al justo. Luego me darás a beber solos dos tragos del bálsamo que he dicho, y verásme quedar más sano que una manzana (I, x 1064).

Memory plays a primordial role in Cervantes’ literary creations. It is from memory that an idle life of a country man by the name of Alonso Quijano is transformed into a proactive knight errant who must die in order that he be born anew. It is this man of heroic proportions that transforms a literary reality into one that is lived, for as Aurora Egido notes: “Don Quijote muestra la lucha entre la imitación de los modelos y la búsqueda de nuevas aventuras que lo convertirán a sí mismo en sujeto imitable” (41). However, the transition from a life of general passivity to one of action comes at a very high price. The transition from Alonso Quijano, the passive and insatiable reader of romances, to Don Quixote, their personified actor, is fatally flawed since he gets further and further away, “…del pretérito literario para adaptarse a lo inmediato. Ese alejamiento al final se convierte en una renuncia del futuro y de la aventura posible, lo que le conducirá inevitablemente a la inacción y a la muerte” (40). Yet, if as Aristotle says, memory corresponds to the past and not to the future, the death of Don Quixote marks a rebirth: that of Alonso Quijano el Bueno. Unlike Don Quixote, Quijano shares common traits with Cervantes’ “idle reader” of whom he speaks of in his prologue. His obsession with romances of chivalry has him “neglect his estate” and throw down his book to draw (Parrinder, 23): “…mano a la espada y and[ar] a cuchilladas con las paredes” (I, v 1050). Indeed, seemingly unable to distinguish between opposing realities, or as Patrick Parrinder proposes, “…between inner and outer reality, between the matter of fiction and
the matter of history” (24), Alonso Quijano at the end of his illustrious and now-forgotten adventures finds himself bedridden and disillusioned awaiting death. Void of such illusions, the source of his presumed insanity, he is, at the end of it all: “Libre y claro, sin las sombras caliginosas de la ignorancia, que sobre él me puserion mi amarga y continua leyenda de los detestables libros de las caballerías” (II, lxxiv 1051). It is memory that infused life into Don Quixote and as we will see, memory that condemned him to death. And in so doing, makes a weathered, face-gaunt, dried up middle-aged gentleman all the more real and all the more crazy to those around him, his “idle readers” to whom Quijano, now perhaps more accurately described as a man of no-memory, affirms:

[…] no había sido mi vida tan mala que dejase renombre de loco, que, puesto que lo he sido, no quería confirmar esta verdad en mi muerte. Llámame, amiga, a mis buenos amigos: el cura, al bachiller Sansón Carrasco y a maese Nicolás, el barbero, que quiero confesarme y hacer mi testamento….Y o fuí loco, y ya soy cuerdo; fuí Don Quijote de la Mancha, y soy ahora, como he dicho, Alonso Quijano el Bueno. Pueda con vuesas mercedes mi arrepentimiento y mi verdad volverme a la estimación que de mí se tenía, y prosiga adelante el señor escribano (II, lxxiv 1521-22).

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107 Parrinder’s “Memory, Interiority, and the History of the Novel” proposes that “…the novel as a genre, through its developing concern with interiority, typically exposes the fault lines in historical narrative and has done so since its origins” (24). To defend his argument as he states, Parrinder compares Don Quixote to Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) (24).

108 Indeed, Alonso Quijano el Bueno rejects both the life and persona he had created as Don Quixote. The result of which, is a profound disillusionment, and what I see as a loss of purpose and meaning for life. A life, as I argue in chapter four that is created through memory and desire.
This final act, in which Quijano expresses a sense of repulsion towards his former self, closely resembles the feelings and actions of his silvered-bearded, hunched-back stepfather who in asking for forgiveness for creating such an “ugly stepchild,” distances himself from the scrutiny of his readers, who “en tu casa, donde eres señor della” must judge for themselves whether Don Quixote: “fuera el más hermoso, el más gallardo y más discreto que pudiera imaginar,” or rather, as Cervantes’ seems to suggest, “…un hijo seco, avellanado, antojadizo y lleno de pensamientos varios y nunca imaginados de otro alguno, bien como quien se engendró en una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento y donde todo triste ruido hace su habitación” (Prologue, 1031).

Of course, the importance of memory and its various manifestations plays a paramount role in the Persiles as well. As Aurora Egido, who has written extensively on the subject explains:

Detrás de todo relato se esconde inexorablemente la memoria, aunque ésta aparezca bajo especies diversas…desde las voces del bárbaro Coriscurbo al final de unos héroes que alargaron su felicidad con la vista de sus bisnietos, hay una relación continuada de su pretérita historia, enmarañada con otras muchas que los distintos narradores van contando. Nada nuevo, si comparamos tales ejercicios combinatorios con los previamente ensayados por la novela pastoril o por la bizantina, si fuera porque el Persiles funde sabiamente el proceso de la memoria con el de la propia invención literaria (621).

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109 This self-description of Cervantes is found in the prologue to his Exemplary Novels, which shares similar features with his character Don Quixote: “Este que veis aquí, de rostro aguileño, frente lisa y desembarazada, de alegres ojos y de nariz corva, aunque bien proporcionada; las barbas de plata, que no ha veinte años que fueron de oro; los bigotes grandes, la boca pequeña, los dientes ni menudos ni crecidos, porque no tiene sino seis, y esos mal acondicionados y peor puestos, porque no tienen correspondencia los unos con los otros; el cuerpo entre dos extremos, no grande ni pequeño; la color viva, antes blanca y morena; algo cargado de espaldas y no muy ligero de pies” (XI).
Indeed, memory as in the case of *Don Quixote*, reconstructs the past by way of locating:

“… lugares, tiempos y personas y trae, en definitiva, al presente todo lo que supuestamente aconteció *in illo tempore*” (621). Hence, to remember is to recreate the most “memorable characteristics” of an event or experience in the present (Fine, 813). Not as an exact replica, but rather, as Ruth Fine reminds us, as “una caracterización de los eventos…El pasado es representado en el presente actual, cobrando ambos—pasado y presente—a partir de este proceso, una nueva significación” (813). This exercise manifest throughout the *Persiles* in the remarks of the main narrator and verified, as Egido explains, in the mnemonic art practiced by the individual characters who also become their own narrators, is inserted in the context of Byzantine history which begins *in medias res* (Egidio, 622):

[... a constantes vueltas al pasado, a cambios en el uso de la persona verbal y a numerosas digresiones narrativas. La técnica, nada extraña a otros géneros, como los ya mencionados, conlleva todas las marcas de la oralidad y así no faltan ni el cansancio en la memorización ni el relevo en el recuento de una historia…También se producen retenciones que obligan luego a reanudar el camino abandonado (622).]

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110 Egido explains that, “Desde el punto de vista estructural la memoria se integra…en la técnica consagrada por Heliodoro, como rezaba los preliminares traducidos en la versión española que encomiaban la singluar disposición de Etiopica (637): “[…] porque comienza en la mitad de la Historia, como hacen los poetas heróicos, lo cual causa, de *prima facie*, una gran admiración a los lectores, y les egendra un apasionado deseo de oir y entender el comienzo, y todavía los atrae también con la ingeniosa lección de su cuento, que no entienden lo que han leído en el comienzo del primer libro, hasta que ven el fin del quinto; y cuando allí han llegado, aún les queda mayor deseo de ver el fin, que antes tenían de ver el principio. De suerte que siempre el entendimiento queda suspenso hasta que viene a la conclusión” (Lxxx- lxxxi; Egido 638).

111 Egido cites Juan Velázquez de Azevedo in *El fenix de Minerva y el arte de memoria*, (Juan González, Madrid, 1626, f. 42), on the fundamental bases of the “arte memorativa” that all things be told from the beginning: “La mejor disposición para referir un suceso, o historia, es el progreso de cómo sucedió comenzando siempre en todo, desde el principio, que esta guía, además de escusar la perturbación, causa que no se olvide nada” (622, see footnotes).
As in *Don Quixote*, this enterprise requires an audience, not only that of the literary characters who populate Cervantes’ texts, but also the readers who, “metido[s] en tales laberintos” are aided along with the help of mnemonic cues (623). In fact, as Egido, who cites Juan Bautista Avelle-Arce explains, the art of writing in the *Persiles* is a “constant variation” in the application of memory (623): “…casi inagotable malabarismo de intermediarios entre el texto y el lector que se da en el *Quijote*” (Cite in Egido, 623-24).

Similar to what is observed in *Quixote* between the translator and the historian Cide Hamete as discussed in chapter three, Cervantes in the *Persiles* denounces his translator, who seems to know (624): “más de enamorado que de historiador” (159). In so doing, Cervantes once more questions the very veracity, (“la verdad del caso”) of such stories which must endure a barrage of scrutiny and interpretation as they pass from ear to ear (624): “…el poder de la memoria libre de todo narrador viene frenado no sólo por la presencia de traductores o historiadores del caso, sino por cuantos lo escuchen y estén en disposición de discrepar respeto de la versión recibida. El juego se hace interminable y el lector implícito en el texto también tiene su parte en él” (624). In a cyclical sense, memories are continuously renewed in a process that as Arnaldo who in speaking with Auristela in the *Persiles* attests, occasions “silence” and “oblivion” (624):

> Las desgracias que has pasado, hermosa Auristela, te habrán llevado de la memoria las que tenías en obligación de acordarte dellas, entre las cuales querría que hubiesen borrado della a mi mismo, que con sola la imaginación de pensar que algún tiempo, he estado en ella, viviría contento, pues no puede haber olvido de aquello de quien no se ha tenido acuerdo. El olvido presente cae sobre la memoria del acordo pasado (127).
Indeed, this beautiful quote demonstrates how the memories of Auristela are not only
transformed and to a certain extent transgressed by the experiences of the present, but
how these memories are connected to and are transposed by the memories of Arnaldo
who is content with the idea of having existed, albeit briefly in the memory of his
beloved.

From these initial considerations on the importance of memory in Cervantes’
literary creations, in particular *Don Quixote* and the *Persiles*, what is to follow is a brief
overview of the notion of memory and its historical trajectory from antiquity into the 16th
century. Accordingly, we will uncover the various techniques used to both “augment”
and “manipulate” human discernment of knowledge: a process perhaps best summarized
by Fernando R. De la Flor, who states (13): “Memorizar sería producir reproduciendo ver
y proyectar. Leer y recordar para siempre, en su orden, aquello leído. En el hombre
interior se ha formado una imagen invertida: un hombre contiene a un hombre que
escribe-pero en otro alfabeto-lo que ve el primer hombre” (13). This line of investigation
will allow me to examine Oviedo’s reliance on mnemonics treatise in order to reconstruct
from memory his findings in the *Sumario*, and further ahead to examine Cervantes’ own
playful incorporation of memory as seen in both the *Quijote* and the *Persiles*.

As Mary Carruthers explains, beginning with the:

[…] earliest writers…memory is the central feature of knowledge -- its
very basis-- whether through ‘recollection’ (as for Plato) or as the agent
building ‘experience’ (as for Aristotle)... [in which] …books are
themselves memorial cues and aids, and memory is most like a book, a
written page or a wax tablet upon which something is written (16).
While Plato does not offer a systematic discussion on mental images, he does allude to this phenomenon in *Theaetetus* (16):

[…] we have in our souls a block of wax, larger in one person, smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier in another: in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, while in some it is of the proper consistency… We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember among the things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our perceptions and thought and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings. Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not know (191 d,e).

We also find a similar allusion in *Philebus*, where in speaking metaphorically of a “craftman” or “painter” to the soul, Plato’s skepticism on the reliability of visual perception is discussed: “… when a person takes his judgments and assertions directly from sight or any other sense-perception and then views the images he has formed inside himself, corresponding to those judgments and assertions… are not the true judgments and assertions true, and the pictures of the false ones false?” (39 b, c). Yet, as we observe in Cicero’s *Partitiones oratoriae*, the act of writing does not supplant memory; rather the process of writing acts as a space upon which something is written (Carruthers, 16):

[Memory… is in a manner the twin sister of written speech *litteratura* and is completely similar *persimilis* to it, [though] in a dissimilar medium. For just as script consists of marks indicating letters and of the material on which those marks are imprinted, so the structure of memory, like a wax tablet, employs places *loci* and in these gathers together [collocate] images like letters (Cite in Carruthers 16).

In a passage well-known in the Middle Ages, the metaphor of memory as a written surface is also found in Aristotle’s treatise *De memoria et reminiscencia* (16). In
this instance, “memory is a mental picture (phantasm; Latin *simulacrum* or *imago*) [in which] (16): “The process of movement stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal” (Aristotle, 450a-b, 609). Metaphorically speaking, the survival of such an image is determined by the surface to which it is imprinted upon, for as Aristotle notes: “…just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water…the requisite impression is not implanted at all” (450b, 609). In using this analogy, Aristotle looks at the significance that age has on memory, in which: “…both very young and very old persons are defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former because of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay…so that in the case of the former the image does not remain in the soul, while on the latter it is not imprinted at all” (450b, 609). Aristotle likens Plato’s description of what is to be considered ideal as being not too “soft” and not too “hard,” found in those men of age not too “quick” and not to “slow,” for the “the former are too moist, the latter too hard” (450b, 609).

The “impression” or “picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness: that is, while one and the same, it is both of these” (450b, 610); it can be contemplated “as a picture, or as a likeness” of that which was perceived in memory (450b, 610). Hence, the image conceived from “within us” is either “the object of contemplation or an image”, or “relative to something else” (450b 610). However, when it is “relative to something else e.g., as its likeness,” it acts as a reminder, that is “a mnemonic token” (450b, 610). As a result of the binary nature of memory, that is

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112 Aristotle illustrates this point with the following example incorporating the use of his metaphors in describing memory: “…just as when one contemplates the painting in the picture as being a likeness, and without having… seen the actual Coriscus, contemplates
between the object that is contemplated and the image that is created, there are instances when we “doubt whether the case is or is not of memory,” such as when we encounter “a sudden idea” or “recollect” something heard or seen (451a, 610). All of which Aristotle explains as consisting of a “change in point of view”, “from contemplating a mental object in itself” to regarding it as “relative to something else” (451a, 610). It is here that Aristotle mentions the explicit purpose of mnemonic exercise in preserving memory, which as he states: “…implies nothing else than the frequent contemplation of something as a likeness, and not as something out of relation” (451a, 611).

Francis Yates (1899- 1981), the celebrated English historian, identifies the technique of artificial memory with the Greek poet Simonides of Ceos (ca. 556- 408 B.C.)- underlining the relation that exists between places and images (Hutton, 30). The art of memory as articulated by Cicero in his De oratore, which comprises the five parts of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio)\(^\text{113}\) explains that:

\[
\text{[…] persons desiring to train this faculty (of memory) must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall imply the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the letter written on it (Cite in Yates 2.)}
\]

it as a likeness of Coriscus, and in that case the experience involved in this contemplation of it is different from what one has when he contemplates it simply as a painted figure—of the objects in the soul, the one…presents itself simply as a thought, but the other…just because, as in the painting, it is a likeness, presents itself as a reminder” (450b-51a, 610).

\(^\text{113}\) Cicero, in De invention, defines these five parts as follows (Yates, 9): “Invention is the excoqitation of true things (res), or things similar to truth to render one’s cause plausible; disposition is the arrangement in order of the things thus discovered; elocution is the accommodation of suitable words to the invented (things); memory is the firm perception in the soul of things and words; pronunciation is the moderating of the voice and body to suit the dignity of the things and words” (Cite in Yates 8-9).
Alongside Cicero’s description of the classical mnemonic are two others: the anonymous Ad. C. Herennium libri IV, and the other found in Quintilian’s Insitutio (2). Each of these texts on the history of the classical art of memory holds that the “art belonged to rhetoric as a technique by which the orator could improve” both the length of his speeches and the accuracy of his memory (2). Indeed, as part of “the art of rhetoric,” it was this “art of memory [that]…travelled down through the European tradition in which it was never forgotten, or not forgotten until comparatively modern times, that those infallible guides in all human activities, the ancients, had laid down rules and precepts for improving the memory” (2). However, Yates is quick to note that while “the classical art is based on mnemotechnic principles,” Cicero underscored that “Simonides’ invention of the art of memory rested, not only on…order,” but rather on the “sight” among the other senses, explaining (4):

> It has been sagaciously discerned by Simonides or else discovered by some other person, that the most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, but that the keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, and that consequently perceptions received by the ears or by reflection can be most easily retained if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes (Cite in Yates 4).

The selection of a place (locus) consisted typically of a physical structure, an architectonic design that would allow the knowledge to be remembered and easily situated such as in a “house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like,” (Ad Herennium, III xvi 29). And it is those uninhabited or “solitary” places that are the most effective in forming one’s memory (Yates, 6-7). However over time, these spaces would often reach proportions grander in size, such as a palace or a theater. In fact, among the Italian Neoplatonic philosophers Yates points to Giulio Camillo’s memory theater in
which, “…all human experience was played out on an imaginary stage” (Hutten 31).

Camillo’s all-conceiving architectural design made quite an impression with his contemporaries, especially Viglius Zuichemus, who after meeting with Camillo and seeing firsthand the unusually large model of the Theatre, would write to Erasmus explaining his extraordinary find (Yates, 131):\footnote{As Yates explains, Camillo had constructed an actual model for this Theater in which: “The object was thus clearly more than a small model; it was a building large enough to be entered by at least two people at once; Viglius and Camillo were in it together” (131).}

The work is of wood marked with many images, and full of little boxes; there are various orders and grades in it. He gives a place to each individual figure and ornament, and he showed me such a mass of papers that, though I always heard that Cicero was the fountain of richest eloquence, scarcely would I have thought that one author could contain so much or that so many volumes could be pieced together out of his writings. I wrote to you before the name of the author who is called Julius Camillus….When I asked him concerning the meaning of his work, its place and results- speaking religiously and as though stupefied by the miraculous of the thing- he threw before me some papers, and recited them so that he expressed the numbers, clauses, and all the artifices of the Italian style…He calls this theatre of his by many names, saying now that it is a built or constructed mind and soul, and now that it is a windowed one. He pretends that all things that the human mind can conceive and which we cannot see with the corporeal eye, after being collected together by diligent meditation may be expressed by certain corporeal signs in such a way that the beholder may at once perceive with his eyes everything that is otherwise hidden in the depths of the human mind. And it is because of this corporal looking that he calls it a theatre (Cite in Yates 131-32).

Such descriptions derive in one way or another from the Ad Herennium. In fact, as Yates notes, every Ars memorativa treatise, “…with its rules for ‘places’ and rules for ‘images’ its discussion of ‘memory for things’ and ‘memory for words,” in one way or another, repeats these ideas if not the words themselves (6). Because of its historic importance, Yates dedicates a considerable amount of space in her book to the content of the memory section in Ad Herennium, “emulating” as she states the “brisk style of the
author” who following a brief discussion on the artificial versus natural nature of memory states (6):

Those who know the letters of the alphabet can...write out what is dictated to them and read aloud what they have written. Likewise, those who have learned mnemonics can set in backgrounds what they have heard, and from these backgrounds deliver it by memory. For the backgrounds are very much like a wax of tablets or papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the script, and the delivery is like the reading (III, xvii 30).

Because of their importance in the process of memorization, the need for “a large number of backgrounds” is needed to assure that an equally “large number of images” are preserved (III, vii 30). The order of such backgrounds is also of great concern for our author, who explains that: “…it [is] obligatory to have these backgrounds in a series, so that we may never by confusion in their order be prevented from following the images-proceeding from any background we wish, whatsoever its place in the series, and whether we go forwards or backwards…” (III, xvii 30). Yet, for one to have such a large number of backgrounds, it is necessary that he enjoy a “large experience” (III, xix 32). If this is not the case, a good imagination is required:

For the imagination can embrace any region whatsoever and in it at will fashion and construct the setting of some background... [In other words]...in our imagination create a region for ourselves and obtain the most serviceable distribution of appropriate backgrounds” (III, xix 32).

We will revisit this final idea further ahead in our analysis of the Quijote, however, for now we will take our anonymous writer’s advice and turn our attention to the theory of images (Yates, 9).  

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115 As earlier noted by Yates, the writer of the Ad Herennium moves quite quickly, seemingly jumping from topic to topic with phrases such as: “On the subject of
The transition at this point in the *Ad Herennium* towards a discussion of images seems rather abrupt. The writer explains that “there are two kinds of images, one of ‘things’ (res), and the other for ‘words’ (verba)” in which (Cite in Yates, 9): “Likenesses of matter are formed when we enlist images that present a general view of the matter with which we are dealing; likenesses of words are established when the record of each single noun or appellative is kept by an image” (III, xx 34). Hence, “things’ are…the subject matter of the speech; [while] ‘words’ are the language in which that subject matter is clothed… the first kind of artificial memory is *memoria rerum*; the second kind is *memoria verborum*” (Yates, 9). From here, the writer of the *Ad Herennium*, in which Yates describes as “…the most curious and surprising passages in the treatise, namely the psychological reasons in choosing mnemonic images” (9), explains that while “…some images are strong and sharp and suitable for awakening recollection” others are “…so weak and feeble as hardly to succeed in stimulating memory (III, xxi 35). It is backgrounds enough has been said; let me now turn to the theory of images” (III, xix, 32).

116 The writer of the *Ad Herennium* further explains that: “Now nature herself teaches us what we should do. When we see in everyday life things that are petty, ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to remember them, because the mind is not being stirred by anything novel or marvelous. But if we see or hear something exceptionally base, dishonorable, extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable, that we are likely to remember a long time. Accordingly, things immediate to our eye or ear we commonly forget; incidents of our childhood we often remember best. Nor could this be so for any other reason than that ordinary things easily slip from the memory while the striking and novel stay longer in mind. A sunrise, the sun’s course, a sunset, are marvelous to no one because they occur daily. But solar eclipses are a source of wonder because they occur seldom, and indeed are more marvelous than lunar eclipses, because these are more frequent. Thus nature shows that she is not aroused by the common, ordinary event, but is moved by a new or striking occurrence. Let art, then, imitate nature, find what she desires, and follow as she directs. For in invention nature is never last, education never first; rather the beginnings of things arise from natural talent, and the ends are reached by discipline…We ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest in the
therefore suggested that one chooses images that are “striking and novel” and that “adhere longest in the memory” (III, xxi 35-37).

As we have observed up to this point, every *Ars memorativa* treatise in one way or another emphasized the importance of spatial ordering and the supremacy of sight over the other senses in the practice of artificial memory (Yates, 6). Furthermore, beginning with their origins in Greece in the fifth century B.C., to their Renaissance revival during the advent of printing, the techniques of the art of memory did not suffer drastic changes (Hutton, 30). Patrick Hutton, in highlighting Yates’ findings, notes that spanning more than 2,000 years of cultural transformations, “change [in classical mnemonic tradition] was visible in the purposes for which the art was used…these oscillated between two theories of knowledge, one derived from Aristotle and the other from Plato…” (30), in which as he explains:

In the Aristotelian tradition, the art of memory was merely instrumental. Aristotle taught that knowledge is derived from sense experience and that a mnemonic system is to be judged by its practical capacity to fix knowledge in images that heighten sense perception. Whether mnemonic memory. And we shall do so if we establish likenesses as striking as possible; if we set up images that are not many or vague, but doing something; if we assign to them exceptional beauty or singular ugliness; if we dress some of them with crowns or purple cloaks, for example, so that the likeness may be more distinct to us; or if we somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint, so that its form is more striking, or by assigning certain comic effects to our images, for that, too, will ensure our remembering them more readily. The things we easily remember when they are real we likewise remember without difficulty when they are figments, if they have been carefully delineated. But this will be essential- again and again to run over rapidly in the mind all the original background in order to refresh the images” (III, xxii, 35-37). Yates cites this quote in its entirety as well (10).

As Yates notes, the writer of the *Ad Herennium* offers several examples of such images. All of which seem to suggest that in choosing the appropriate image, the writer was thinking of the human figure (10): “We shall picture the man in question as lying ill in bed…And we shall place the defendant at the bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, and in his left tablets, and on the fourth finger a ram’s testicles” (III, xx, 33).
images possessed any correspondence of meaning to the ideas to be conveyed was irrelevant... in the Platonic tradition, however, the powers of memory were judged more substantive... Plato taught that mnemonic images were directly expressive of a transcendental reality... [In which]...the value of a mnemonic image was directly tied to the ideal reality that it was empowered to represent (31).

Therefore, as Hutton concludes, the art of memory “was a way to establish correspondences between the microcosm of the mind’s images and the macrocosm of the ideal universe, which were believed to be congruent structures” (31). Unlike Aristotle, Plato believed:

[...] that there is acknowledge not derived from sense impressions [but rather]...latent in our memories...forms or moulds of the Ideas, of the realities which the soul knew before its descent here below [And that] true knowledge consists in fitting the imprints from sense impressions on to the mould or imprint of the higher reality of which the things here below are reflections (Yates, 36).

Both the Phaedo and the Phaedrus develop:

[...] the theme that knowledge of the truth and of the soul consists in remembering [that us] in the recollection of the Ideas once seen by all souls of which all earthly things are confused copies. All knowledge and all learning are an attempt to recollect the realities, the collecting into a unity of the many perceptions of the senses through their correspondences with the realities (36- 37).

And it is he who keeps his memory close to these realities that, “...stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine:” always keeping as close as possible, “...those realities by being close to which the gods are divine. A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be” (Plato, Phaedrus 249 c,d). However, the capacity to remember these things correctly is left to the extraordinary mind, to the “madman” who:

[...] gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below... [For] ...Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are startled when they see an image of what they saw up there. Then they are
beside themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they cannot fully grasp what it is that they are seeing (Phaedrus, 249 d- 250 b).

Therefore, the role of the mnemonist, as Hutton concludes, “…took on added importance. Not only did he practice a skill but he also assumed a priestly status as an interpreter of the nature of reality” (31).

Following the Ad Herennium and the writings of Cicero, the medievalists believed memory played an important role in the process of reading and writing (Jiménez, 265). In fact, as Antonio Sánchez Jiménez notes in citing Fernando Rodríguez de la Flor, during the Middle Ages, memoria was considered an “integral” component of prudentia (265).

Mary Carruthers, who Jiménez cites, reminds us that:

Trained memory (memoria) is ‘one of the conditions required for prudence,’ and integral or enabling part of the virtue…Albertus Magnus quotes Cicero to the effect that the parts of prudence are memory, intellect, and foresight, corresponding to the three tenses (Carruthers, 69- 70).

Indeed, Jimenez notes that the artificial memory served an essential role in the humanist education, in which (265): “La memoria constituía una técnica requerida en el orador e indispensable para el proceso de lectura y composición literaria” (Jiménez, 265).

Moreover, Fredrick De Armas, who cites Yates, notes that the mnemonic faculty was considered of greater importance than the imagination, for “…it held many of the functions that would later be thought of as imagination” (14). This is certainly evidenced in the writings of Aristotle, whose belief in “the rational soul” which he viewed as comprised of “reason, memory, and will,” differentiated humans from animals (14- 15).

Indeed, as Mary Carruthers explains, (cited previously) “…whereas now geniuses are said to have creative imagination which they express in intricate reasoning and original
discovery, in earlier times they were said to have richly retentive memories, which they expressed in intricate reasoning and original discovery…” (Cite in De Armas 15), demonstrating the manner in which, “…it was memory that combined these pieces of information-become-experience into what we call ‘ideas,’ what they were more likely to call ‘judgments’ (Cite in De Armas 15). Indeed, as De Armas demonstrates with the help of Carruthers, the importance of the imagination did not come to fruition until the Renaissance (De Armas, 15).118

Further ahead, we will revisit the importance of memory and imagination in Don Quixote. However, at this time I would like to turn our focus to memory and mnemonics as two important devices in establishing the reliability of narrative and exemplarity. By way of Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias, I will examine the use of memory in the construction of textual authority. My aim is to demonstrate that memory problematizes the relationship of history to poetry; to identify this historical problem should shed new light on the narrative strategies employed in Don Quixote and the Persiles.

Oviedo’s Sumario, which first appeared in Toledo in 1526, serves as a vivid example of the mnemonic faculty (Jimenez, 263). As I discuss further ahead, Oviedo’s purpose for writing the Sumario is as he states: “…traer a la memoria de vuestra majestad lo que he visto en vuestro imperio occidental de las Indias” (47). Oviedo does so with the belief that such information is not only desirable, but also necessary for good governance:

118 De Armas notes Juan Huarte de San Juan’s (who Cervantes “used to develop Don Quixote’s psychology”) esteem for the imagination is quite apparent (15). “For Huarte, ‘…human mental ability or ingenio excelled in three categories: imagination, judgment, and memory. A superabundance of heat (choler) would create a strong imagination capable of producing poets, artists, inventors, and such, depending on the degree of excess’ (Heiple 1991, 124)” (Cite in De Armas 216, see footnotes).
an idea that I will come back to in the coming pages as I explore in more depth the reasons behind Oviedo’s work. I also would like to add that along with Bernal Díaz, who I discuss at length in chapter five, Oviedo demonstrates an uncanny ability to recall from memory his findings as an eyewitness to the New World. As I will demonstrate, this is a feature that Cervantes exploits in several of his literary characters such as Cide Hamete. Indeed, as Oviedo explains, the *Sumario* is the product of his memory:

> […] tengo aparte escrito todo lo que he podido comprender y notar de las cosas de Indias; y porque todo aquello está en la ciudad de Santo Domingo de la isla Española, donde tengo mi casa y asiento y mujer e hijos, y aquí no traje ni hay de esta escritura más de lo que en la memoria está y puedo de ella aquí recoger (48).

Jiménez, who examines the possible motives of Oviedo in using mnemonic techniques in the *Sumario*, criticizes what he sees as a lack of serious examination into, “…la feliz o portentosa memoria del cronista (Miranda 1950, 49; Ballesteros 1986, 37; O’ Gorman 1979, 53)”: arguing that, “Este silencio y el menosprecio de la crítica se debe a una falta de comprensión de la importancia que la memoria y la mnemotecnia tenían en la retórica medieval y renacentista,” in which “Estos métodos pueden haber influido sobre la estructura y espíritu de la obra” (263).

In an attempt to emphasize the importance of memory and the use of mnemonics in Oviedo’s works, Jiménez looks for any indication of a mnemonic organization (263). Accordingly, Jiménez investigates possible motives for the use of such techniques, and consequently, the stylistic influence that they may have played in his works (263-64). Indeed, Jiménez believes that Oviedo’s often loosely quoted citations speak to his reliance on the technics of mnemonics in which (266): “El historiador español almacenaba sus lecturas en la memoria, las reorganizaba allí mismo, y luego las
recordaba, a menudo imperfectamente, cuando escribía” (266). However, he is quick to note that, “En el *Sumario* no encontramos ningún ejemplo de citas trastocadas, porque Oviedo no presenta ninguna cita directa. Sin embargo, estas alteraciones sí que ocurren con frecuencia en otras obras de Oviedo” (266). Moreover, the *Sumario* follows a basic mnemonic structure (266): “…la serie de loci ordenados donde el autor puede guardar las imágenes que quiere recordar más tarde” (266). Nonetheless, “Oviedo no usa ni el sistema arquitectónico recomendado por el *Ad Herennium* ni la estructura numérica o alfabética tan popular durante la Edad Media” (266). Instead, he opts for a more geographic structure, or as Enrique Álvarez López (who Jiménez cites) has coined it, “biogeographical” path (Cite in Merrim, 170).119 This geographic structure allows Oviedo to describe the phenomena of each country in visiting order, which, as Jiménez in citing Stephanie Merrim notes, adheres to the taxonomy of Pliny’s *Natural History* (266). Oviedo acknowledges this adherence proclaiming that he went about his work “imitando al mismo [Plinio]” (Cite in Jiménez 266); a reference that as Jiménez suggests, points toward the art of memory (266): “Plinio era perfectamente consciente de la importancia de la mnemotecnia, pues su *Historia* se preocupa de ella precisamente en la persona de su supuesto inventor, el griego Simonides, a quien Plinio describe creando el arte” (Jiménez, 266).120 The art of memory, which influenced the peculiar structure of Pliny’s work, leads Merrim to suggest that (266): “The *Natural History* furnished Oviedo with a formal model and a theoretical justification for that model compatible with his own thinking,”

119 Jiménez draws his citation of Álvarez López from Stephanie Merrim (1989, p. 170).

120 Jiménez bases this information on the findings of Yates. As Pliny states, the art of memory “…was invented by Simonides Melicus and perfected (consummate) by Metrodorus of Scepsis who could repeat what he had heard in the very same words” (Cit. in Yates, 41).
that on the one hand would speak to “Oviedo’s problems of writing the New World”
while on the other hand, allow him to “pursue what may well have been his own
inclinations towards novelty, the marvelous, miscellanea, and fidelity to nature” (Merrim,
175).

Moreover, the geographic accuracy with which the *Sumario* was written is further
evidence of a structure in *loci* (Jiménez, 266) --geographic reasoning that Manuel
Ballesteros sees as both logical and coherent (266). Yet, according to Jiménez, the
*Sumario* offers much more than a sound structure, Oviedo’s work demonstrates an
extraordinary ability to memorize in great detail vast geographical locations (266):

Y hasta allí [Tierra Firme] se navegan novecientas leguas desde las islas
de Canaria, o más; y de allí hasta llegar a la ciudad de Santo Domingo,
que es en la isla Española, hay ciento y cincuenta leguas; así que desde
España hasta allí hay mil y trescientas leguas; pero como se navegan bien,
se andan mil y quinientas y más (Cite in Jiménez, 267).121

Indeed, the meticulousness with which Oviedo recounts the geographic locations
of these places points to the use of a “mnemonic system” in which as Jiménez explains:

“La geografía de las regiones (‘camino y navegación’) constituye los *loci* en que Oviedo
almacenó sus recuerdos y que le sirven como modelo estructurador al escribir la obra”
(267). Also apparent is the mnemonic character of the information presented that is both
pictorial and visual in nature (267):

121 As Jiménez notes, every time Oviedo describes a new place, he offers detailed
accounts of the distances as if he were composing a mental map (267): “La isla Española
tiene de longitude, desde la punta de Higuey hasta el cabo del Tiburón, más de ciento y
cincuenta leguas; y de latitud, desde la costa o playa de la Navidad, que es norte, hasta el
cabo de Lobos, que es de la banda del sur, cincuenta leguas. Está la propia ciudad en diez
y nueve grados a la parte del mediódia” (Cite in Jiménez).
Tiene la hechura de la cabeza como león o onza, pero gruesa, y ella y todo el cuerpo y brazos pintado de manchas negras y juntas unas con otras, perfiladas de color bermejas, que hacen una hermosa labor o concierto de pintura; en el lomo y a la par de él mayores esta manchas, y disminuyéndose hacia el vientre y brazos y cabeza (Cite in Jiménez 267).  

The importance of the pictorial and visual elements in Oviedo’s representations is quite evident in this citation in which: “…para evocar al tigre Oviedo usa un vocabulario específicamente pictórico: el cuerpo del tigre está ‘pintado,’ y hace ‘una hermosa labor o concierto de pintura” (Jiménez, 267). Indeed, the plasticity of these descriptions as Jiménez notes make them ideal images to be stored in loci (268). 

In addition to the visual emphasis, the descriptions in Sumario reveal the nature of their “extreme character” (268): a feature that is proposed by all the arts of memory (Jiménez 268). Indeed, José Miranda (who Jiménez cites) states that the "…forma sencilla y expresiva de la redacción de la obra permite una rápida asimilación en la mente de las ‘imágenes y representación’” (Cite in Jiménez, 268); while accordingly, Stephanie Merrim who Jiménez also cites, underlines the “grotesque”, and the “macabre” in Oviedo’s descriptions of the natural world (173): “…which also contains dark negative elements such as hideous cacti and, elsewhere in the Sumario, venomous snakes and pestiferous insects” (173). Indeed, throughout his work, as Jiménez outlines in great detail, Oviedo describes the atrocities and oddities that were to be found in the New

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122 Jiménez offers analysis of this citation substantiating the pictorial and visual nature of Oviedo’s description, explaining that, “Este logrado pasaje subraya la importancia de la forma (‘hechura’ ‘gruesa’) y el color (‘manchas negras’ ‘de color bermejas’), que Oviedo describe con delicados matices: las manchas se difuminan y hacen menores según avanzan desde el lomo hacia el vientre… Estos términos demuestran la importancia de lo visual en las representaciones del autor, que también podemos comprobar en cualquier otro pasaje en que Oviedo retrate animales o cosas” (267).
World, such as human sacrifices and the inhabitants of a community living in trees, respectfully (Jiménez, 268):

[… en la provincia de Abrayme, que es en la dicha Castilla de Oro, y por allí cerca, hay muchos pueblos de indios puestos sobre árboles, y encima de ellos tienen sus casas moradas, y hechas sendas cámaras, en que viven con sus mujeres y hijos, y por el árbol arriba sube una mujer con su hijo en brazos como si fuese por la tierra llana…y debajo todo el terreno es paludes de agua baja (Cite in Jiménez 268).

Oviedo paints a mnemonic landscape “en la provincial de Abrayme” in which to deposit his memories (Jiménez 268). In other words, this geographical space allows Oviedo to deposit and later recall with the use of mnemonics, his memories of this particular encounter with the indigenous community (268).

Yet, the mnemonic presence in Sumario serves a more practical purpose as well (269): to aid in the memory of author and reader alike, since as he explains (269) “…la cosa que más conserva y sostiene las obras de natura en memoria de los mortales, son las historias y libros en que se hallan escritas (Cite in Jiménez 269). As we have seen up to this point with the help of Antonio Sánchez Jiménez’s thoughtful analysis, Oviedo’s reliance on his own geographical experience of the New World highlights both the visual nature and mnemonic structure of the Sumario (Jiménez, 269). However, Jeremy Paden, in pointing to the abundance of information that is encountered within its 86 chapters, including detailed “geographic, zoological, botanical, and ethnographic observations regarding the Indies,” believes that the “the problem of memory” in the Sumario (as

123 Indeed, the practical utility of incorporating a precise mnemonic structure by which Oviedo is able to deposit images of “extreme,” “extravagant” or even sensual character, serves several purposes including as Jiménez suggest: “…para afectar la memoria del emperador, y escoge muchas por su especial atractivo particular para el región lector, conocido por su debilidad hacia los placeres de la Buena mesa” (270).
detailed by Jiménez), is not limited to its composition, but rather includes problems that are hermeneutical as well as ideological in nature (206-07).

Indeed, Paden notes that by conceptualizing the “relationship between memory and history,” the Sumario’s prologue emphasizes the importance of memoria (205). Oviedo’s memory allows him to distinguish his work from the other accounts of the New World (205). His superior memory, of which he makes mention, is the product of his acute ability to observe and understand his natural surroundings, qualities he believes are required in an historian (205):

[…] aunque en algunas de ellas, [Previous accounts] o en todas, hayan hablado la verdad los que a estas partes vienen a negociar o entender en otras cosas que de más interés les puedan ser; los cuales quitan de la memorial las cosas de esta calidad, porque con menos atención las miran y consideran que él que por natural inclinación, como yo, ha deseado saberlas, y por la obra ha puesto los ojos en ellas. Questa sumario no contradirá lo que, como he dicho, más extensamente tengo escrito (48).

While Oviedo acknowledges that truth can be found in previous accounts, he questions the motives of such authors, whose greed impaired their memories (205-6). Indeed, as Jeremy Paden explains:

An understanding of memory as the willed, purposeful engagement of the soul underwrites his argument against these other, unnamed writers whose accounts are the by-product of their financial interests. Oviedo, on the other hand, presents himself as one who consciously attended to the task of recording New World reality (206).

Furthermore, Oviedo’s “natural inclination” allows him to separate his work from those who came before him (206). His predisposition for such matters comes from his aspiration to know the realities of this “new world” (‘deseado saberlas’) (206); a commitment that as Paden notes, is demonstrated time and again by his patience and
meticulous observations (“puesto los ojos en ellas”) (206). 124 Jeremy Paden further explains:

According to his argument, previous authors’ lack of natural disposition allows for their other preoccupations (which being economic in nature are tainted by self-interest) to erase from their memory the details that Oviedo will bring to light. Oviedo believes that because of his disinterested and purposeful study of these new lands his memory will not be impeded by pecuniary interests. Thus, his account will not only be more complete but also better aid the emperor in the governing and economic exploitation of these new territories (206, emphasis Paden).

Paden notes how Oviedo’s theoretical discussion (Prologue) centers on the value he places on history, which is intrinsically connected to the process of writing and memory (207): “And to the extent that the Sumario is a natural history—thus bound to questions relating to the composition of history…a confrontation between personal and cultural memory” in which memory is:

[...] both the problem and the legitimating claim of the text; it involves the composition of the book, the epistemological and hermeneutical problems of understanding and writing about the New World, the authority of the witness vis-à-vis authority figures such as Pliny, the difficulty of naming the flora, fauna, and cultural practices of the New World inhabitants, and even the use value of Oviedo’s history (207). 125

124 Paden notes that the claim “puesto los ojos en ellas,” is “… more about the deliberateness with which he took on the task of natural historian than necessarily his status as eyewitness. According to his argument, previous authors’ lack of natural disposition allows for their other preoccupations (which being economic in nature are tainted by self-interest) to erase from their memory the details that Oviedo will bring to light. Oviedo believes that because of his disinterested and purposeful study of these new lands his memory will not be impeded by pecuniary interests. Thus, his account will not only be more complete but also better aid the emperor in the governing and economic exploitation of these new territories” (206).

125 “The definition of memory” up through the eighteenth century, as Paden explains, has its bases in Aristotle’s De Anima, “which understands memory to be one of the soul’s four main faculties” (207). Paden follows this trajectory explaining that: “Albertus Magnus’s De Anima asserts that there are five inner faculties: common sense, imagination, fantasy, estimation and memory (Lewis 1967, 162). Aquinas, on the other
In returning to the prologue of *Sumario*, Oviedo explains (as previously observed) the primary purpose of his work: “Imitando al mismo [Pliny] quiero yo, en esta breve suma, traer a la real memoria de vuestra majestad lo que he visto en vuestro imperio occidental de las Indias, islas y tierra- firme del mar Océano, donde ha doce años” (47). The purpose of Oviedo in bringing to the Emperor’s attention his testimony of the New World so that he may “store it in his memory…assumes a connection between memory, understanding, and good governance,” for “History, written memory, serves as witness; it points the way to the truth; history instructs” (Paden 210). Indeed, Carruthers explains (210):

126 Paden, who analyzes the various meanings behind Oviedo’s use of “traer a la memoria” notes that in Antonio de Guevara’s *Prólogo general* of *Reloj de principes, a speculum principis* (1529), he writes: “[L]os Buenos y curiosos príncipes han de tener siempre en la memorial las cosas buenas que leyeren y han de traer de la memorial las injurias que les hizieren” (28; Paden 209). “Throughout the *Reloj*, “tener en la memoria” is used several times, “always” as explains Paden with “…the same sense of having, holding, or keeping in mind,” which can be seen as “a form of constant recollection” (209). Likewise the following phrase, “traer en la memoria” is also used in its various forms: “Traygamos a la memoria algún exemplo y verán ser verdad lo que digo” (Cite in 209). According to Paden, “traer a la memoria” can be compared to “let us reflect or meditate upon,” or even ‘let us consider or look at again.” And as Paden concludes from this and other passages that incorporate in one way or another, the phrase “traer a la memoria,” its meaning is clearly related to memory (209).

127 As Paden notes in his analysis on memory, we observe “a similar understanding of memory in Bartolomé de las Casa’s “argument a few decades later in the prologue to the *Brevisima relación de la descturcción de las Indias*” that is the “connection between memory, understanding, and good governance” (210).
Prudence, the ability to make judgments in a present context about both present and future matters, is founded upon *memoria*... Therefore, to say that memory is the matrix within which humans perceive present and future is also to say that both present and future, in human time, are mediated by the past. But ‘the past,’ in this analysis, is not itself something, but rather a memory, a representing of what no longer exists as itself but only in its memorial traces (193). 128

As a result, memory plays an essential role in the king’s ability to prudently govern the emerging territories of the New World (Paden, 210). Simply stated, in order that the king is able to reign over his growing empire, he must not only know the intricacies of their existence, but he must also retain this information in his memory (210). Certainly, this understanding of memory was shared by Oviedo who opens his *Dedicatoria* stating (211):

La cosa que más conserva y sostiene las obras de natura en la memoria de los mortales, son las historias y libros en que se hallan escritas; y aquellas por más verdaderas y auténticas se estiman; que por vista de ojos el comedido entendimiento del hombre que por el mundo ha andado se ocupó en escribirlas, y dijo lo que pudo ver y entendió de semejantes materias. Esta fué la opinión de Plinio, el cual, mejor que otro autor en lo que toca a la natural historia, en treinta y siete libros, en un volumen dirigido a Vespasiano, emperador, escribió; y como prudente historial, lo que oyó, dijo a quién, y lo que leyó, atribuye a los autores que antes que él lo notaron; y lo que él vio, como testigo de vista, acumuló en la sobredicha su historia (47).

Alexandre Coello de la Rosa’s, who Paden cites, explains that history for Oviedo (211), “…estaba conceptualizada, según el parecer de Oviedo, como la mejor herramienta para ayudar al Emperador Carlos V a gobernar [con] sabiduría y promover una visión mesiánica de la obligación moral de los españoles de extender el evangeli en el Nuevo

128 As we have seen previously, the basic affirmation that “memory remains, by its nature, of the past” refers to the “medieval Aristotelian (and Augustinian) psychology” (Carruthers, 193).
Mundo” (Cite in Paden, 211). Nevertheless, Paden notes how the attribution to Pliny (which he argues is misplaced)\(^\text{129}\) serves not only as Oviedo’s primary “rhetorical model,” but also “fulfills the imitative demands of the humanist community for which he writes” (211).\(^\text{130}\) Yet, while Oviedo’s “reference to Pliny's *Natural History*” allows him to a certain extent to “claim Rome’s imperial legacy for Spain” while “providing a loosely organized encyclopedic model to follow,” the act of using the canon is problematic, since as Paden explains—"Pliny's *orbis terrarum* only included the Roman world, a world already known and cataloged" (211-212).\(^\text{131}\) Consequentially, Oviedo is limited to a textual model that is antiquated, and because of this, ill-equipped to describe the realities of the New World (212). Finding no classical text as a legitimate source, the decision of Oviedo to accentuate the experience of Pliny over that of his own, served as a

\(^{129}\) See footnotes page 223, number 16.

\(^{130}\) Paden maintains that “the attribution to Pliny” are “erroneous” affirming that: "Although Pliny does dedicate a chapter or so of his *Natural History* to memory, it never establishes any relationship between the writing of histories and memory. Pliny wonders at the invention of memory and recounts several stories of people Possessing prodigious memories. He Also Discusses memory as an artifice That Can be trained and disciplined through the use of mnemonic devices "(Coleman, 60-62; 211). Paden believes that “Oviedo’s definition of history as the maidservant of memory” speaks more to “the relationship established by Isidore of Seville between memory and writing” (211) as observed in the *Estimologias*, in which “the bishop defines writing as an invention created to” (211): “preserve the memory of things, for in order That They May not fall into oblivion. They are tethered by means of letters, for with Such a variety of things, it would be impossible to learn them all by hearsay, and it would be no easy task to retain them in the memory "(Mignolo, 138; 211). However, and contrary to Paden, Andrew I. Prieto reaffirms the relationship between “history and memory from Pliny's epistolary preface” that "[Oviedo] was not misquoting Pliny's discussion of memory in Book 7 of the *Naturalis Historia*, as Jeremy Paden states in his otherwise thoughtful article" (343).

\(^{131}\) Paden notes that Randel (1994): “...discusses how concepts from classical geography, such as *orbis terrarum* and *oeconomus*- terms that refer to the known / inhabited world- are redefined and reanimated by Renaissance humanism and ‘the discovery of America” (223, see footnotes).
means to not only reinforce, but to validate his own authority as an eye-witness to the natural phenomenon of the Indies (212).

Recent critics, such as Rolena Adorno, have demonstrated the fundamental role that “Authority and the notions of evidence and testimony” were to “the historiographical and the juridical traditions” in which:

Erudite works…are exemplary and novel because they draw the traditions together, relying on ancient authority and contemporary eyewitness testimony. The discursive encounter of Spain and America was characterized by the conjunction of history and law, the confluence of historical authority and juridical testimony. In that fluid zone there was room for movement, and distinctions blurred (Adorno, 228).

However, Anthony Pagden proposes that Oviedo only looked to Pliny as a “guide” and not a source of authority in the Sumario, since the reality described by Oviedo had no context in Naturalis Historia (55): "Under such conditions, authority could only be guaranteed (if at all) by an appeal to the authorial voice. It is the ‘I’ who has seen what no other being has seen, who alone is capable of giving credibility to the text” (55).132

As a prudent historian, Oviedo believed Pliny worked with “three types of memory object” as observed in the following examples that Paden highlights in his analysis (212): “oral, first-person reports (‘lo que oyó, dijo a quién’), written texts (‘y lo que leyó, atribuye a los autores que antes que él lo notaron’), and personal experiential

132 Oviedo’s role as witness to the novelties of the Americas that Pagden describes, seems to fit well within Emile Beneveniste’s investigation into the origin of the Latin word religio and the term for superstition: as between superstes ‘survivor’, ‘witnesse’ and superstitionus ‘diviner’ (516). Tracing the etymological evolution of these two terms, Beneveniste highlights the difference between superstes and testis, concluding that: “Etymologically testis means the one who attends as the ‘third’ person at an affair in which two persons are interested; and this conception goes back to the Indo-European community. . . . But superstes describes the witness as the one ‘who’ has his being beyond, a witness in virtue of his surviving, or as ‘the one who stands over the matter’, who was present at it” (526).
memory (‘y lo que él vio, como testigo de vista, acumuló en la sobre dicha su historia’)

(212). Since each method proposed by Pliny depended in one way or another on the integrity of the eye-witness and his testimony, he included this category in his “humanist historical methodology” (Paden, 212). However, as has been noted previously, Oviedo had strategically questioned the integrity of previous reports because their stories were not (as in his case), “the product of a willful engagement to memory” (212); leaving as it were, himself as the only viable witness/authority (212).\footnote{Several studies have demonstrated the contradictory nature of the Sumario, since as Paden explains Oviedo is quick to incorporate both “written and oral reports” in his Historia. See “Myers (1990; 1991), 1995), Bolaños (1995), and Beckjord (2001)” (Paden, in footnotes p. 223).}

[Oviedo] simultaneous affirmation and negation of classical authority redefines the task of the historian in such a way that it turns Oviedo’s 12 years in the New World into part of his fidelity to Plinian historiographical methodology. It allows Oviedo to appease his cultural, textual memory while remaining faithful to his personal memory by defining history no longer as fidelity to the world described by authority but as the faithful testimony given by the comedido entendimiento (212).\footnote{Paden offers an excellent discussion on the “works of nature” in the Sumario (“las obras de la natura”), which reinforces the fact that the Sumario is a natural history. However, as Paden further notes, this assumption ignores other possibilities: “Every critic that examines the treatment of natural history in Oviedo’s writings, from Antonello Gerbi (1985), through Stephanie Merrim (1989) and Myers (1993), to Coello de la Rosa (2002), has argued that for Oviedo, as with all early modern writers, remembering the works of nature carries with it religious and moral implications…[concluding that]…The ostensible function…is to remind the reader that salvation depends on an allegorical or spiritualizing hermeneutics of the book of nature, an understanding in which memory, or remembrance, calls one back to God” (213-214). However, according to Paden, the “nautical inclusio” creates other possibilities “than simply a site for religious meditation” in which once more Oviedo is thought to break from tradition (214): “When discussing matter of navigation to and from the Indies the Spaniard signals the worthlessness of Ptolemaic cosmography and classical cartography…What is more, rather than triumphantly returning to Seville and closing the narrative, the book ends by proposing Panama as the place where ships from Spain meet ships from the spice regions. This last chapter reminds the king of the economic benefit that “este imperio occidental de estas Indias de vuestra majestad” has provided the crown and promises more voyages and lands to be discovered, explored, and exploited” (214). According to Paden, it is this final...}
By the early sixteenth century, Isidore of Seville’s assertion that “writing, memory, and history” were interconnected had become widely accepted (214). A civilized culture required an “alphabetic writing system” in which (214): “Writing as proof of civilization was central to the question of the rationality of the native peoples in the debates surrounding the humanity of the Indians” (214). However, while historians came to the New World with “a concept of historiography inherited by the Roman and humanist traditions,” Walter D. Mignolo proposes, “…they found themselves in a situation more akin to Herodotus and Thucydides than to Livy or Biondo” (137). In fact, Mignolo explains that because the concept of history is created alongside the written alphabet itself, the indigenous peoples’ lack of it (a central and persistent concern during “conclusion [that] clearly signals the transformation of traditional Christian meditation on nature from devotional contemplation to economic speculation” (214).

135 Mignolo explains that the: “Roman historians (such as Livy and Tacitus) and Italian humanist historians (such as Bruno and Biondo) shared a deep sense of the past based on the storage of written records that distinguishes them from Greek Historians, for whom writing history was more related to the written report of the investigation of current events than with the reconstruction of the past based on written records. Contrary to Roman historians, humanist historians had an image of the rise and fall of the Roman Empire at the same time that a perspective on the ten centuries elapsed from its fall to their present days. New World historians were deprived of such a perspective on the past. The stories they were telling and they knew well began in 1492. A deep sense of the past, paradoxically, did not belong to them who wrote history but those who the Spanish doubted had history because they did not have writing” (137). Mignolo concludes by also highlighting an important difference between Herodotus and Livy and Tacitus in which the “…latter two writers were living in a society in which alphabetic writing and graphic record keeping constituted part of the society itself. Herodotus and Thucydides, instead, lived in a society in which records were still kept in the body’s memory and transmitted orally. Cicero’s definition of history, based on the Roman experience, became the standard definition during the European Renaissance and was often repeated by historians of the New World: esse testem temporum, vitae magistram, vitam memoriae, veritatis lucen et vetustatis nuntian (witness of time, model of life, life of memory, light of truth, and messenger of antiquity)” (135-136).
the sixteenth century) was thought to not only limit their ability to construct “coherent narratives,” but to have a history at all (127). The idea is best observed in the following opinion of Juan de Torquemada who Mignolo cites in his analysis (127):

One of the things which causes the most confusion in a republic and which greatly perplexes those who wish to discuss its causes, is the lack of precision with which they consider their history; for if history is an account of events which are true and actually happened and those who witnessed them and learned about them neglected to preserve the memory of them, it will require an effort to write them down after they happened, and he who wishes to do so will grope in the dark when he tries, for he may spend his life collecting the version which he is told only to find that at the end of it he still has not unravelled the truth. This (or something like this) is what happens in this history of New Spain, for just as the ancient inhabitants did not have letters, or were even familiar with them, so they neither left records of their history (Mignolo 128; his emphasis).

The concept of history proposed by Torquemada, as Mignolo explains, denotes:

[...] the dominant Ciceronian definition of it, which was forged on the experience of alphabetically written narratives accomplished by Greek and Roman historians based on the experience of alphabetically written narrative achieved by Greek and Roman historians as well as rhetorical legacy of imperial Rome (and Ciceronian and Quintilian) (128).

Indeed, “It was the belief in the accurate preservation of memory and the glorification of the past by means of alphabetic writing that resulted in a powerful complicity between the power of the letter and the authority of history” (129). Such “philosophy of language and writing” led to the belief that the Spanish were much more capable of writing the history of the indigenous people than they were of themselves (129). Even Bartolomé de las Casas as Mignolo notes, who had a long history of defending the “intelligence and humanity” of the indigenous peoples acknowledged that their status as “illiterates” alluded to their barbarism (129): "The second class of barbarians are those who lack a literary language [qui literali semone carent] which corresponds to their maternal
idiomatic language, as Latin is to us, and thus know how to express what they think” (Cite in Mignolo, 129). Therefore, language and writing played a central role in debates questioning the “rationality” and “humanity” of the indigenous populations (Paden, 214). A belief that Oviedo, driven by his own interests, shared (214): “His censure of Indian memory practices brings to light his own assumptions about the need for memory to reside in written history in order to morally guide the reader and aid the ruler in governing” (214-15).

In fact, Stephanie Merrim who Paden cites, contends that the Sumario (215): “…effectively turned knowledge into a valuable unit of exchange in the conquest of America. Oviedo…leaves his mark on the early writings of America as the first to constitute the conquest of the New World first and foremost as an intellectual enterprise” (191). We observe this idea in the conclusion to Oviedo’s Sumario: “…tan apartadas y diferentes de todas las otras historias de esta calidad, que por ser sin comparación esta materia, y tan peregrina, tengo por muy bien empleadas mis vigilias, y el tiempo y trabajos que me ha costado ver y notar estas cosas” (178). And it is through the understanding of “knowledge as a commodity” that Oviedo is able to validate the novelty of his work, in which: “Oviedo’s relationship to the past is a complex dialectic between cultural memory, or tradition, and the personal experience of novelty” (Paden, 216).

For his part, Antonello Gerbi demonstrates clearly Oviedo’s complex relationship to antiquity which underscores his ideological notion of “oneness” (Paden, 216): “…the Indies are ‘new’ only inasmuch as they were unknown to the ancients…he [Oviedo] quotes Latin authors to prove the essential consubstantial oneness of the New World and
the most ancient antiquity” (263). Gerbi concludes by suggesting that the Renaissance’s desire for “harmony” and “totality” is best articulated “…in this immense embrace, linking phenomena separated by fifteen centuries of history and one hundred degrees of longitude” (264). The New World serves as the final piece to an all-inclusive reality of the world as seen through the eyes of Oviedo (262):

[… the mainland of these Indies is another half of the world, as big as or perhaps bigger than Asia, Africa, and Europe: and…all the land of the universe is divided into two parts, and…one is the one the ancients called Asia and Africa and Europe…and the other part or half of the world is this one of our Indies (Cite in Gerbi, 262).

Indeed, as Gerbi explains, this new and novel world “Discovered by the Old” creates “an awareness of the totality” of the inhabitable planet, in turn making it “more conscious of itself” (263). Yet, Gerbi notes that Nature for Oviedo cannot be divided into categories of “newer” or “older” since there can only be one and “God created the world in a single stroke” (264). Accordingly, Oviedo states: “…it is no less older a land in its creation, nor more modern [in its] people than those inventors named above” (Cite in Gerbi, 264).

The seemingly problematic nature of Oviedo’s relation to ancient authority, particular to the figure of Pliny, is mediated by his universal world view. In this sense as Paden believes, Oviedo in his role as a natural historian, approaches the New World as a humanist, in which the: “Classical natural history served as both cognitive model for the

136 Gerbi explains that: “For Oviedo, as earlier for Vespucci, the Indies are ‘new’ only inasmuch as they were unknown to the ancients. This may not be any special merit, but it is no defect either, no stigma of barbaric inferiority, no ‘eccentricity’ as compared with the Europocentric Graeco- Latin world. Oviedo’s attitude to classical antiquity is complex and influenced by his anti-roman patriotism, his much-regretted weakness in Latin, and his scorn for tradition when direct experience is possible” (263). Likewise as Gerbi explains further ahead, “If he quotes the ancients it is to make the things of the Indies more easily believable, to show that they are possible, that in fact they are in the nature of things, that they are not at all in contradiction with Pliny’s science” (263).
classification and organization of New World reality and rhetorical model for composition (Paden, 216). In fact, Nancy Stuever, who Paden cites, argues that notwithstanding Oviedo’s reliance on classical texts, he viewed “rhetorical imitation” as a means of “surpassing… creating something different and better” (Cite in Paden 216). And while within this attempt, the humanist writer remained bound to it (Cite in Paden, 217): these “rhetorical strategies” allowed Oviedo both a greater independence from the “Old World,” and a way “to vindicate the authority of the eyewitness,” that is experience over “textual authority” (Paden, 217). Whereas well established analogies remained essential in describing the new flora and fauna (217): “Oviedo must rely on his personal experience of encountering a geography, a nature, and a native culture (archived in his own memory) that contradict his cultural memory (archived in the classical works of natural history)” (217). Kathleen A. Myers, in referencing Thomas Greene’s essay on Renaissance imitation, summarizes in the following manner his “double process of discovery,” with regard to Oviedo’s “dialectical strategy” (526): 

137 The debate into Oviedo humanism is ongoing. Paden offers in his footnotes a few references which speak to this point including Beckjord (2001, 54-60) (224). Indeed, Paden, who paraphrases Grafton, notes that while Oviedo “corresponded with humanists in Italy and Spain and esteemed the work of Erasmus, “humanist accused other humanist of not being humanist” (224).

138 Paden offers an extensive bibliography of works dedicated to this topic which includes: “Merrim (1989), Padgen (1993), and Myers (1993), Beckjord (2001)” (224) Each one “mark[ing] a… shift in Oviedian criticism” from a focus centered on “whether Oviedo was a Renaissance man in full” to one of “rhetoric and epistemology,” examining as Paden explains: “the importance of the rhetoric of novelty and the status of the eyewitness for the constitution of Oviedo’s authorial ‘I” (224).

139 In discussing the notion of “a double process of discovery” Greene explains that: “Just as heuristic imitation involves a passage from one semiotic universe to another, so dialectic imitation, when it truly engages two eras or two civilizations at a profound level, involves a conflict between two mundi signifiicantes” (46).
While at times moving toward a dialectical strategy, in which the author engages fully the past and the present, Oviedo’s practice tends to be more heuristic, an attempt to bridge the gap, to use his writing as a “double process of discovery” of self and other. Oviedo singles out Pliny’s text as a primary model and sets out to modernize it and surpass it. The Spanish chronicler’s modifications include the seemingly infinite and expanding New World phenomena and events. By including further references to Pliny in the manuscript, Oviedo at once acknowledges Pliny’s work and revises it, adding more information to the ancient’s *Natural History* and rending his own *Historia general y natural* more useful than that of his model. In this case, the imitation of texts complements the imitation of nature; both generally strive toward a method of writing history based on a new sense of the authority of experience (526-27).

Oviedo’s repeated reference to Pliny’s text and his desire or perhaps need to “modernize it and surpass it,” speaks to Oviedo’s innovativeness. His novel approach to ancient authority and reliance on classical texts will allow us to once more return to our discussion of *Don Quixote* and the *Persiles*. In what lies ahead, I will compare Oviedo’s approach to Cervantes’ own rhetorical strategies on memory, mnemonics, and imitation of literary models.

As discussed in chapter three, Cervantes, mindful of his actions, would summon previous texts and authorities only to later transform them into something new. Accordingly, Francisco Ayala in his analysis of Cervantes’ *Novelas ejemplares*, suggests that:

La actitud fundamental de su autor [Cervantes] frente a la actividad literaria, una actitud de rigor creativo que le hace, no sólo repugnar las formas ya establecidas, sino incluso evitar la repetición de aquellas otras que él mismo acaba de acuñar en el tratamiento de un tema dado (596).

Ayala affirms once more the idea that as a novelist, Cervantes was likewise a discoverer of new and uncharted territories, who by his own ingenuity would incite a “revolution” able to, “...absorber y transformar todos los elementos de la tradición literaria de que
disponía, para obtener así un producto de superior riqueza” (596). Certainly, this is what we observe in Cervantes’ prologue to *Novelas ejemplares*, in which he assertively proclaims:

> A esto se aplicó mi ingenio, por aquí me llevó mi inclinación, y más que me doy a entender (y es así) que yo soy el primero que he novelado en lengua castellana; que las muchas novelas que en ella andan impresas, todas son traducidas de lenguas extranjeras, y estas son más propias, no imitadas ni hurtadas: mi ingenio las engendró y las parió mi pluma, y van creciendo en los brazos de la estampa (770).

Cervantes’ literary creations derive from a conceptualization that facilitates a new way to address the reality of the world: for as Cervantes affirms in his Prologue, he is not only the first to have “novelado” in Castilian, but unlike those who came before him, he does so using his own words and “ingenio…no imitadas ni hurtadas” (770). In so doing, the *Novelas ejemplares* presents “la realidad del mundo moral” as problematic (Ayala, 594). As Cervantes tells his readers in *Viaje del Parnaso* that (594): “Yo he abierto en mis *Novelas* un camino por do la lengua castellana puede mostrar con propiedad un desatino” (Cite in Ayala 595). Ayala notes that Cervantes leaves the lesson to be found in *Novelas ejemplares* to his reader, explaining in his Prologue that “…por no alargar este sujeto, quizás te mostrará el sabroso y honesto fruto que se podría sacar, así de todas [las novelas] juntas como de cada una de por sí” (770). With no clear lesson to be had, and in much the same way as presented in *Don Quixote*, Cervantes delegates such tasks to the prudent reader who must determine for himself what is deemed wholesome and honest,
“…sin daño del alma ni del cuerpo, porque los ejercicios honestos y agradables antes aprovechan que dañan” (770). Indeed as Ayala explains:

[…] no se trata de una lección obvia, de una enseñanza patente, en la tradición de los castigos y documentos, de los ejemplos medievales, sino de algo que requiere interpretación, y por cierto una interpretación que se deja al cuidado del lector…Lo que hace de la novelística cervantina una verdadera creación, y lo distingue de cualquier otro novelar de su tiempo…constituye un escrutinio de la vida humana en busca de su sentido inmanente, en lugar de referirla a un patrón dado ya desde fuera (594).

This presumably simple shift in focus as Ayala suggests, represents a radical literary revolution (594). Its incorporation of literary models transforms them into a product that constitutes a “superior riqueza” (596), in which:

La diversidad entre ellas [narrativas] …debiera entenderse como un resultado de la actitud fundamental de su autor frente a la actividad literaria, una actitud de rigor creativo que le hace, no sólo repugnar las formas ya establecidas, sino incluso evitar la repetición de aquellas otras que él mismo acaba de acunar en el tratamiento de un tema dado…[Concluding once more that] No olvidemos que su caso [Cervantes] no es el de un novelista más…sino de un descubridor de territorios nuevos y todavía nunca hollados, donde su inventiva podía desplegarse de mil maneras (596).

140 As discussed in chapter 2, Cervantes proposes something similar in DQ. Chapter XXIV of part II Cid Hamete (written in the margins) cautions his reader as to how to interprete Don Quixote’s account of events deep in the Cave of Montesinos: “No me puedo dar a entender, ni me puedo persuadir, que el valeroso Don Quijote le pasase puntualmente todo lo que en el antecedente capítulo queda escrito: la razón es que todas las aventuras hasta aquí sucedidas han sido contingibles y verisímiles; pero esta de esta cueva no le hallo entrada alguna para tenerla por verdadera, por ir tan fuera de los términos razonables….Por otra parte, considero que él [Don Quixote] la contó y la dijo con todas las circunstancias dichas, y que no pudo fabricar en tan breve espacio tan gran máquina de disparates; y si esta aventura parece apócrifa, yo no tengo la culpa; y así, sin afirmarla por falsa o verdadera, la escribo. Tú, lector, pues eres prudente, juzga lo que te pareciere que yo no debo ni puedo más;…” (II, xxiv 1355).
It is from these seemingly “dispersed” and “incompatible” techniques of composition that culminated in the creation of *Don Quixote* (596). An idea that warrants the following explanation from Ayala:

La realidad ha sido abordada en ellas [Works of art] desde una multitud de ángulos distintos, es decir, partiendo de la visión y elaboración a que los distintos ‘géneros’ la habían sometido:…Y con esto se logra proyectar una imagen polifacética de la vida humana, que escapa a cualquier encuadre y se afirma siempre de nuevo como impredecible, reapareciendo por detrás de cada particular configuración literaria. Haber conseguido esto poniendo a contribución precisamente los clichés literarios es el toque de la genialidad cervantina. Su obra está cargada de sutiles alusiones librescas, y en la vida de sus personajes entra por mucho la experiencia del contar y los varios estilos de cuento. No pretenden ser ajenos a la tradición literaria, sino que la asumen y, al hacerse cargo de ella, la rebasan (597).141

In order to better understand the contours of Ayala’s argument, it is best to begin with a general consideration of how memory and mnemonics contribute to the central role of imitation (*imitatio*) in Renaissance poetics, in particular for Cervantes, who as Fredrick De Armas explains, “…would have been most concerned with the retentive memory as a storehouse or inventory of images and ideas that would enable him to produce his own textual constructions through *ingenio* or wit” (15, emphasis De Armas).

The practice of mnemonics would allow Cervantes to remember after many years the “multiple patterns and images of the architects and painters of the Italian Renaissance” (15). De Armas notes that:

While *La Galatea* was written only a decade after his Italian sojourn, *Don Quixote*, Part I, was written some thirty years after his visit to the Vatican and other Italian churches and palaces. Finally, Cervantes’ detailed

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141 Ayala’s distinction and “elaboration” of genres found in the DQ include among others: “el ‘realismo’ de la línea Celestina- Lazarillo, la novela de caballerías y la pastoral, la de aventuras y morisca, la italiana, el cuento de origen oriental, Homero y Virgilio, el poema heróico-burlesco, el teatro romano y el español contemporáneo” (597).
evocation of Rome in the *Persiles y Sigismunda* was penned forty years after his Italian visit (15).

As with Oviedo, Cervantes’ extraordinary ability to remember with such detail came from his knowledge and use of the mnemonic treatise in which (15): “One must be careful to form one’s images securely and distinctly in the first place, and by repetition and practice ensure that they are in ‘long-term’ memory” (Carruthers, 61 emphasis hers). Indeed, as discussed earlier, De Armas notes here that the *Ad Herennium* presents “two kinds of memory: one natural, and the other the product of art. The natural memory is that memory which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. The artificial memory is that memory which is strengthened by a kind of training and system of discipline” (207, 3.16.28).142 De Armas suggests that Cervantes must have been familiar with ancient arts of memory, which would include the *Ad Herennium* (28):

[...] In the textual museum of his works, *La Numanica* and *La Galatea*, Cervantes places images of strong mnemonic power. Be they canvases of war and exhortation to battle as in his epic tragedy or images of erotic play in his pastoral, Cervantes always places them in strategic locations as required in the treatises on artificial memory (28).

Developing a series of connections between Giovan Battista (Giambattista) della Porta (1535-1615) and Cervantes, De Armas elucidates the interplay between memory, word and image in the works of Cervantes, in which, beginning with *La Numancia* and including *Don Quixote*: “These texts are peopled by characters whose memories seem to

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142 Once more we are reminded in *Ad Herennium* that while artificial memory “…is strengthened by a kind of training and system of discipline” even those who are endowed with an exceptional natural memory “is often like this artificial memory, and this artificial memory, in its turn, retains and develops the natural advantages by a method of discipline. Thus the natural memory must be strengthened by discipline so as to become exceptional, and, on the other hand, this memory provided by discipline requires natural ability” (207, 3.16.29).
be sites for anxiety” (633). Indeed as he goes on to explain further ahead in his investigation: “Della Porta’s presentation of artificial mnemonics together with his emphasis on loci in which to exhibit image, had a strong impact on Cervantes” (635), in particular in Don Quixote where by memory is not only “disparage[ed]” but used “as a trigger for the action” (640). Indeed, as discussed earlier, the novel begins, “En un lugar de la Mancha de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme” (I, i 1037). Our narrator is someone who seems either not interested or simply incapable of remembering the past (641). The result of which, leaves Quijano “look[ing] for instruction in his library and later seeks experience in his chivalric adventures” (641). In this instance, the library reflects not only a place of refuge from which to create “a memorable present and future,” but also, “…the collectionism and museum building technique of his times” (641). To this end, as William Engel, who De Armas cites in his own analysis, demonstrates how libraries and in particular personal libraries such as that of Don Quixote were also viewed as memory theaters (De Armas, 641). Such is the case for example, with Montaigne’s tower room in which “the visible structure of the library” allowed him with a “single glance” to see his entire collection (Engel, 101-02). In fact, Engel notes how Montaigne’s description of his

143 While Cervantes does not refer to Della Porta, De Armas believes “Cervantes would have heard of him” during his travels in Italy from 1569 to 1575 [since] he [Cervantes] was well aware of the humanistic milieu of Naples, referring to Telesio, another famous humanist and poet from Naples, in his Galatea. During the period Cervantes spent in Naples, Della Porta was composing plays. His Turca (1572) focuses on the Islamic corsairs of the Mediterranean and their abduction of Europeans to Algiers and may have served as model for Cervantes’ plays on captivity” (634).

144 De Armas who notes “that more than half of the tomes” found in Cervantes’ library “are not romances of chivalry,” cites Daniel Eisenberg who highlights the fact that (641): “There are 27 titles commented on specifically, out of the more than 300 books which Don Quijote had in his library” (Cite in De Armas, 641).
personal library seems to follow closely “the construction of an artificial memory system” (101):

At home I betake me somewhat the oftner to my library, whence all at once I command and survay all my housholde; It is seated in the chief entrie of my house, thence I behold me my garden, my base court, my yard, and looke even into most of my house (Cite in Engel, 102).

“Roman Quintilian observed” (Engel, 102):

The first thought is placed, as it were in the forecourt; the second, let us say, in the living-room; the remainder are placed in due order all round the impluvium…all these places are visited in turn and the various deposits are demanded from their custodians, as the sight of each recalls respective details (Cite in Engel, 103).

Engel’s comparison of both these men demonstrates that images retraced through a known structure enabled the two to “deposit and later retrieve bits of information” (Engel, 102). However, Montaigne takes it a step further. From the center of his library (memory palace), Montaigne takes his reader on a visual tour describing as he goes along what he sees (102). Both the design of his library and “disposition of his books within it” allow Montaigne to “…take in all of his volumes at a single glance; and, perhaps in gazing upon one of the ‘five racks’ of his books he would remember some anecdote or tale that would inspire him to rise, walk to the shelf, and ‘turne over and ransacke, now one booke and now another’ (103).145 The description of Montaigne’s library, as Engel demonstrates quite clearly in his analysis, “aim[s] to the decorum advocated by classical

145 In this quote Engel cites Montaigne’s description of his library “palace” as he states: “…on the third storie of a tower. The lovermost is my Chapell: the second is a chamber with other lodgings, where I often lie, because I would be alone…My thoughts are prone to sleepe, if I sit long. My minde goes not alone as if {legges} did move it. Those that study without bookes, are all in the same case. The forme of it is round, and hath no flat side, but what serveth for my table and chaire: In which bending or circling manner, at one looke it offreth me the full sight of all my books, set round about upon shelves or desks, five racks one upon another” (Cite in Engel 102).
memory arts” in which both “sententiae and exempla…functioned like spurs to his further invention and composition” (103). We confront a similar scenario with Don Quixote’s library.

Similar to Montaigne’s tower room, the structure of Don Quixote’s library together with the emphasis on loci plays an important role (De Armas, 644). De Armas notes how in chapter VII of part one, the priest and barber decide not only to burn several of Don Quixote’s books, but also to physically conceal the library from him entirely (644): “Uno de los remedios que el cura y el barbero dieron, por entonces, para el mal de su amigo, fue que le murasen y tapiasen el aposento de los libros, porque cuando se levantase no los hallase’ (1055). By their actions it would seem that Don Quixote’s ability to “imprint in his memory the deeds of chivalric heroes” would come to an end (De Armas, 644). In place of a familiar refuge where Quixote could replenish his mind with images of valiant men and adventure, he is left but with a blank wall: an empty space which, according to the ideas set forth by Aristotle (among others), would indicate “the absence of memories” (644). Indeed as has been discussed previously throughout this chapter, De Armas reminds us once more that, “Since ancient times, the memory was imagined as a tabula, a wax tablet, a canvas, a blank surface on which memories could be written (644).146 Therefore, both the priest and barber believe that “by replacing the entrance to the library with a blank tabula… Don Quixote’s memory will remain equally

146 As noted by Carruthers, “Cicero writes about the relationship of writing to memory” in Partitiones oratoriae in which he states: “[M]emory… is in a manner the twin sister of written speech [litteratura] and is completely similar [persimilis] to it, [though] in a dissimilar medium. For just as script consists of marks indicating letters and of the material on which these marks are imprinted, so the structure of memory, like a wax, employs places [loci] and in these gathers together collocate] images like letters” (Cite in Carruthers 16).
blank (644). And just as an untouched wax tablet, a life of action and delirium would return once more to a lucid existence of general passivity.

However, as De Armas notes in his analysis, this was not to be the case. Both the priest and barber fail to fully comprehend the ability of Don Quixote to recall from memory the literary adventures in his books of chivalry (644). De Armas believes the only way to explain Don Quixote’s abilities of recollection is to believe that he “practiced the artificial art of mnemonics” in which (644): “The blank wall in his study will trigger a more intense process of recollection in the knight” (644). Along these lines, Aurora Egido, who De Armas cites, suggests that: “La memoria andante de don Quijote es tan ponderosa que las imágenes que percibe y los lugares por los que transita pasan a identificarse inmediatamente en ella con los lugares e imágenes que guardaba en su mente (Cite in De Armas, 644-45). While, hidden from sight behind a brick wall, the physical structure of the library no longer exists; however the mnemonic images remain active in Don Quixote’s mind: “After all, the mental images are copies or paintings of what is remembered, after such images pass through faculties such as the phantasia and imaginativa where they are changed and combined” (644). 147 We encounter something similar in the Persiles.

147 De Armas is paraphrasing James F. Burke in this citation. Mary Carruthers in her essay entitled, “How to Make Composition” offers a diagram (p. 18), of brain functions describing the multiply “activities involved in thinking,” which are comprised of “compartments linked to one another by channels” (17). The process begins with “impressions [which] are received by various senses in the sensus communis or fantasia, located in the forward part of the brain” (18). From there, the different “sense impressions,” as Carruthers explains, are united mentally by “the image-forming ability, imaginatio or vis formalis, the ability to form an image from sensory data” in which “raw sense data were thought to be transformed by the actions of both fantasia (fantasy) and vis formalis (the power of making forms) into images having formal properties that are perceptible and useful to human thought” (18-19). In her explanation Carruthers also
Indeed, in her analysis of memory and narrative in the Persiles, Aurora Egido explains how memory is used to reconstruct the past, and in so doing create *in illo tempore* what was lived by the characters who as participants become narrators of their respective stories (621). An “exercise” in the art of mnemonics that is consistently “verified” along the way (621):

A veces surge el recuerdo a requerimiento de otros, como hacen el mancebo y la doncella entre las tablas del navío, o Arnaldo, a petición del gobernador y de la mujer bárbara, remontándose a su origen, oficio y costumbre (p. 62), o aún con más pelos y señales, Antonio, el bárbaro español que da cuenta de su nacimiento, educación y crianza, o más tarde Mauricio (p. 111) (622).

Moreover, the readers themselves affect the verisimilitude of these stories and how they are received (622):

Capítulos enteros se presentan con el epígrafe de alguien como Rutilio ‘da cuenta de su vida’. La memoria de algunos narradores omniscientes que, como en una ocasión, pueden traer sin quebrantos un soneto entero y recitarlo en coro (p. 96) es, por otra parte, discutidos en las voces de quienes escuchan y critican lo oído…Hay, sin embargo, una exaltación del recuerdo absoluto y sin fisuras, capaz de reconstruir hasta el más mínimo detalle (623).

Indeed, Egido points to the character of Manuel de Sosa Coitino, who mesmerized by the words spoken of a young beautiful girl by her father would declare: “Estas palabras todas me quedaron en la memoria y en el alma impresas de tal manera, que no me han olvidado, ni se me olvidarán en tanto que la vida me durare” (100).

notes “The Aristotelian criterion of similitude, ‘likeness’ must be understood in this context- mental images have ‘likeness’ not as exact duplication, but in the way that a schematic drawing can be said to be ‘like’ the object it represents” (19). We must also note, that “the resulting mental image was considered to be composed of input from all five of the senses. In the context of thinking, the Latin word *imago* at this time was not limited solely to the visual sense, though it is also true that the visual was regarded as the primary instrument of knowing for most people” (19).
However, in underscoring the importance of memory with regard to the characters who narrate their own lives, Egido also looks to the readers themselves, who “metido en tales laberintos, necesita muchas veces de ayuda-memorias que no le impidan perder el hilo narrativo;” in what only can be seen as the continued practice of mnemonics (623). Given that everything in the *Persiles* is told and retold through recollection, it also highlights the practice of selection (630): “…el narrador debe eludir historias ya contadas para evitar repeticiones (p. 453) y omitir todo aquello que no es de sustancia para su objetivo. Pero, por otro lado, la memoria es también delatora y sirve para reconstruir hechos, con técnicas no exentas de ironía” (630). We are reminded of such, in the beginning of book 3, chapter 10 with the “insignes” students posing as captives (630):

Las peregrinaciones largas siempre traen consigo diversos acontecimientos y, como a diversidad se compone de cosas diferentes, es forzoso que los casos sean. Bien no lo muestra esta historia, cuyos acontecimientos nos cortan su hilo, poniéndonos en duda donde será bien anudarle; porque no todas las cosas que suceden son buenas para contadas, y podrían pasar sin serlo y sin quedar menoscabada la historia; acciones hay que, por grandes, deben de callarse, y otras que, por bajas, no deben decirse; puesto que es excelencia de la historia, que cualquiera cosa que en ella se escribía puede pasar al sabor de la verdad que trae consigo; lo que no tiene la fábula, a quien conviene guisar sus acciones con tanta puntualidad y gusto, y con tanta verisimilitud, que a despecho y pesar de la mentira, que hace disonancia en el entendimiento, forme una verdadera armonía (342- 343).

In adopting techniques of memory in oral narrative, as Egido goes on to explain, Cervantes incorporates the use of places and images as described by the classical art of memory (630). As is to be expected, topography plays an important role, in particular: “…más en la erudición que en el conocimiento directo… [For]…Cervantes crea lugares sobre el mapa de la escritura, partiendo de unos conocimientos librescos que apoyan su veracidad” (631). Indeed, we are reminded of such in the *Persiles* (631):
[…] las lecciones de los libros muchas veces hacen más cierta experiencia de las cosas, que no las tienen los mismos que las han visto, a causa que el que ve con atención, repara una y muchas veces en lo que va leyendo, y el que mira sin ella, no repara en nada, y con esto excede a la lección la vista (328).

However, Egido is also quick to note that:

Toda la novela se apoya en la pintura del lugar, tal y como la retórica sugería en el Initium a re, previa a la disposición de las figuras que entran en escena…Los lugares connotan además un simbolismo alegórico y evolutivo que, como la propia geografía, les hace ser mucho más que marco en el que operan los personajes (631-32).

A case in point, and one that Egido notes, is the house of Hipólita, which serves as a museum of famous paintings (632):

Abrieron la sala, y a lo que después Periandro dijo, estaba la más bien aderezada que pudiese tener algún príncipe rico y curioso en el mundo. Parrasio, Polignoto, Apeles, Ceuxis, y Timantes…acompañados de los del devotó Rafael de Urbino y de los del divino Micael Ángelo:…Los edificios reales, los alcázares soberbios, los templos magníficos y las pinturas valientes…prendas en efeto, contra quien el tiempo apresura sus alas y apresta su carrera, como émulas suyas, que a su despecho están mostrando la magnificencia de los pasados siglos (Cervantes, 445).

In addition to architectural references in the Persiles, painted images also serve as a means to not only guide, but also hold the both reader’s attention and that of its multiple narrators (Egido, 632). 148 Nowhere else does this become more apparent than Periandro’s request that a canvas, big enough to depict the most significant events of his life, be painted. Not only are the pilgrims (p. 344) able to narrate their past adventures, but as Egido notes, also the reader of the Persiles who must make her way through the twists and turns of what at times seems a narrative lost in chaos (633):

148 As Egido notes, these include the garden, cave, shrine, and palace among others (633).
A un lado pinto la Isla Bárbara ardiendo en llamas, y allí junto la isla de la prisión, y un poco más desviado, la balsa o enmaderamiento donde le halló Arnaldo cuando le llevó a su navío; en otra parte estaba la Isla Nevada, donde el enamorado portugués perdió la vista; luego la nave que los soldados de Arnaldo taladraron; allí junto pintó la división del esquife y de la barca… (Cervantes, 281).149

Periandro’s decision to re-create his life encounters allow the pilgrim narrators and readers alike enjoy the many benefits that such visual images have to offer. Egido notes that among the more important functions include: a synthesis of past experiences that can be expanded upon with words (p. 279), graphic testimony and the perseverance of fame perpetuated in the memory of the beholder (p. 342), and the ability to easily transport such an object of remembrance (p. 420) (634-35). All of which as Egido explains, reduces the pilgrimage to “pilgrim aphorisms” (635):

[...] libro dentro del Persiles, o Historia peregrine sacada de diversos autores (pp.416- 419), vemos hasta qué punto las fuerzas centrífugas y centrípetas desarrollan a lo largo de la obra un doble juego de reducción o ampliación hecho en base de cuadros comentados o sentencias breves que el lector, sin embargo, ha ido viendo confirmadas por extenso en el transcurso de la acción. El aforismo constituye…la reducción de los trabajos de los protagonistas a esquemas mnemotécnicos que resumen éticamente y consentenciosidad el valor de su peregrinar y de sus hazañas (635).

Concluding that:

Memoria…corre a la par que la propia obra en su decurso. Y es en este punto donde el Persiles se muestra en clara continuidad con el Quijote, habida cuenta de que allí se despliegan por extenso los efectos de una memoria artística, es decir, literaria, que el héroe desea seguir en su propia

149 Cervantes use of static places and images to bring to life that which resides in memory is quite frequent throughout the Persiles, as observed in the following desire of a pilgrim chapter VI of book 3: “Bien quisiera yo, si fuera posible, sacarla de la imaginación, donde la tengo fija, y pintárosla delante de la vista, para que, comprehendiéndola, viérades la mucha razón que tengo de alabárosla; pero esta es carga para otro ingenio, no tan estrecho como el mío. En el rico palacio de Madrid, morada de los reyes, en una galeria, está retratada esta fiesta con la puntualidad posible” (314).
vida. Por otro lado, cada narrador es en Los trabajos arábito de su propia
historia contada, recrea gracias a la memoria natural y a la inventiva…El
lienzo-comedia-libro de aforismos del Persiles articula los sucesos
dejando memoria de ellos, estimación y fama de unos peregrinos cuyos
pasos se hacen sincronías al propio discursar del libro (p. 452) (635-36).

We encounter a similar event at the end of part I of Don Quixote. Sancho, who on
returning to his home, offers to his wife a summary of his experiences at the side of Don
Quixote (Egido, 118): “Sélo yo de experiencia, porque de algunas ha salido manteado, y
de otras molido; pero con todo eso, es linda cosa esperar los sucesos atravesando montes,
escudriñando selvas, pisando penas, visitando castillos, alojando en ventas a toda
discrición, sin pagar ofrecido sea el diablo el maravedí” (I, lii 1268).150

Yet, unlike Periandro who dictates his exploits to the painter from memory, the
pilgrims masquerading as captives of war are quickly confronted by an incredulous
mayor who, having been a prisoner himself in Argel (the town that they speak of), is
quite reluctant to believe their story. Lacking firsthand knowledge of historical events
depicted on the painted canvas (details that would have allowed them to reconstruct the
true nature of each depiction painted on the canvas and thus reconstruct a more
"harmonious" story), the captives are left no other choice but to confess (634):

¿Es posible que ha de querer el señor alcalde que seamos ricos de
memoria, siendo tan pobres de dinero, y que por una niñería que no
importa tres arditas, quiera quitar la honra a dos tan insignes estudiantes
como nosotros, y juntamente quitar a su Majestad dos valientes soldados,
que ibamos a esas Italias y a esos Flandes a romper, a destrozar, a herir y a
matar los enemigos de la santa fe católica que topáramos?...no somos
cautivos, sino estudiantes de Salamanca, y en la mitad y en lo mejor de

150 Of course, unlike the painted canvas, Cervantes does not offer a mnemonic summary
of events, but rather as Egido notes, a “series” of “referential accounts” from natural
memory in which “Quedan asi recordadas las acciones al modo novelístico, sin el
metismo de los tratados de la memoria artificial tradicionales” (Egido 118).
nuestros estudios, nos vino gana de ver mundo y de saber a qué sabía la vida de la guerra como sabíamos el gusto de la vida de la paz (347).

The appearance of these men and their deceitful claim of being captives in Argel contradict the nature of the canvas itself, and its claim as an accurate representation of history (634). As a result, the reader is once more confronted by the tenuous relation between truth and fiction and the role of verisimilitude (634). An idea that is communicated repeatedly throughout the Persiles:

Cosas y casos suceden en el mundo, que si la imaginación, antes de suceder, pudiera hacer que así sucedieran, no acertará a trazarlos; y así muchos por la raridad con que acontecen, pasan plaza de apócrifos, y no son tenidos por tan verdaderos como lo son; y así es menester que les ayuden juramentos, o a lo menos el buen crédito de quien los cuenta; aunque yo digo que mejor sería no contarlos (391).

While a few pages later in Chapter 10 of Book 3 we are told that: “…no todas las acciones verosímiles ni probables se han de contar en las historias, porque si no se les da crédito pierden de su valor; pero al historiador no le conviene más de decir la verdad, parézcalo o no lo parezca” (395). Indeed, Egido notes that while the paintings like the words used to describe them can be manipulated by their respective narrators, “de ello no depende su verdad” (634). Such is the case with the students, whose narrative, (though considered a bit long winded), would save them from the wrath of justice: “…que este mancebo ha hablado bien, aunque ha hablado mucho y que no solamente no tengo de consentir que los azoten, sino que los tengo de llevar a mi casa y ayudarles” (349); to which the other Mayor would argue “No, quiero que vayan…a la mía, donde les quiero dar una licencia de las cosas de Argel, tal que de aquí adelante ninguno les coja en mal latín, en cuanto a su fingida historia” (349- 350). Such was the delight of both mayors
that one would go as far as to ask Periandro if there was another painted canvas from
which to make believe what is known to be a lie: “¿Vosotros, señores peregrinos, traéis
algún lienzo que enseñarnos? ¿Traéis otra historia que hacernos creer por verdadera,
aunque la haya compuesto la misma mentira?” (350). We are reminded here by the words
of Juan Luis Vives who argued in his *De institutione feminae christianae*:

> Y ya que se pusieron a contar, ¿Qué placer puede hallarse en la narración
de unas aventuras que tan neciamente fingen y donde mienten tan
descaradamente? El uno mató él sólo veinte hombres; el otro mató treinta;
el otro, traspassado con seiscientas heridas y ya dejado por muerto, el día
siguiente se incorpora de súbito y, restituido a su salud y a sus fuerzas, en
combate singular derriba a dos gigantes, y del peligroso trance sale
cargado de oro, de plata, de sedas y de joyas que apenas las llevaría un
galeón. ¿Qué locura no es tomar placer con estas necedades? (1.5, 1003).

The idea that pleasure is derived through verisimilitude depends, according to E. C.
Riley, “…upon the establishment of a special rapport with the reader, upon a delicate
adjustment of the writer’s persuasiveness to the reader’s receptiveness” (182). And this
idea is shared by Cervantes, who in *the Quijote* states (182):

> […] tanto la mentira es mayor cuanto más parece verdadera, y tanto más
agra da cuanto tiene más de lo dudoso y posible. Hanse de casar las fábulas
mentirosas con el entendimiento de los que lasleyeren, escribiéndose de
suerte que facilitando los imposibles, allanando las grandezas,
suspendiendo los ánimos, admiren, suspendan, alborocen y entretengan (I,
xlvii 1251).

We find a similar idea in the *Persiles*, which further clarifies the importance that such
relationships entail between what is “possible” and what is to be considered “doubtful”
(Riley 183): “…conviene guisar sus acciones con tanta puntualidad y gusto, y con tanta
verisimilitud, que a despecho y pesar de la mentira, que hace disonancia en el
entendimiento, forme una verdadera armonía” (343). Yet as Riley suggests, rather than
reject the “extraordinary” for fear that it may disinterest the reader and thus be disregarded as simply lies, Cervantes’ ideas of verisimilitude grants him the freedom to search out the “strange” and marvelous and present it as possible, and in so doing “…make them acceptable to the reader… a harmonious relationship… established between the mind of the reader and the events related” (Riley, 183). Indeed, as Egido notes, Cervantes engages memory in the *Persiles* through a myriad of theoretical approaches including among others: unity, decorum, erudition and of course verisimilitude (637).

Yet, unlike Aristotle and Cicero, Cervantes seemed less constrained by the idea that memory belongs to the past, preferring instead to treat memory as a “sustrato fundamental substratum de la vida” in which: “Pasado, presente y futuro se dinamizan y alcanzan sentido gracias a ella, además de lograr trascendencia en el ámbito de las acciones humanas” (638). Be it through the voice of Arnold, who recapitulates what has been said and done, or Rutilio who summarizes their entire journey from the island to Rome, Cervantes incorporates the art of memory with its use of *loci* and *images* in such a way as to facilitate the reader’s ability to follow the action (637). Likewise, the use of paintings in the *Persiles*, be they painted canvases or paintings of priceless treasures stored in Hipólita’s house, brings us back to the use of mnemonics techniques that rely on architectural structures (637). Yet, in addition to paintings found in museums, we also come across “…tablas preparadas para pintarse en ellas los personajes ilustres que estaban por venir, especialmente lo que habían de ser en los venideros siglos poetas famosos” (440-441).
Similar to the priest and barber’s desire that Don Quixote’s memory be left blank, Cervantes seems to suggest that the writer’s memory of the Persiles will likewise be left blank: leaving room for future generations of readers to decide who will carry forward the poet’s torch. As a result, Cervantes creates a “paragón” between:

[...] los museos de pintura y los de la fama literaria, como es ese museo del porvenir ya mencionado, nos muestra la sinonimia entre poesía y pintura con la que juega constantemente el autor, aunque mostrando a la vez la diferencia entre ambas. La memoria va…ligada con la fama que los artistas alcanzan sobrepasando así las fronteras de la muerte, porque la memoria lleva el sello de la inmortalidad (Egido, 637).

An aspiration that is confirmed in the Sierra Morena as Don Quixote imitates from memory the actions of knights errant before him (Riley 62): “Digo asimismo que, cuando algún pintor quiere salir famoso en su arte, procura imitar los originales de los más únicos pintores que sabe; y esta misma regla corre por todos los más oficios o ejercicios de cuenta que sirven para adorno de las repúblicas” (I, xxv 1129).

Timothy Hampton in noting the exemplarity use of memory in the Quixote, explains that the “humanist model of pedagogy”, which promoted history as a means to action, relied uniquely on “cultivating the memory” in which (255), “To draw lessons from the past the students first had to hold past deeds present in the mind,” concluding that “…the cultivated humanist… was to keep the narratives of ancient history before him at all times” (255). Hampton points to Don Quixote’s liberation of the galley slaves for such a case. Here we observe how Don Quixote’s memory leads “him from ‘palabra’ to ‘obra’” (255):

Todo lo cual se me representa a mí, ahora en la memoria, de manera que me está diciendo, persuadiendo y aun forzando, que muestre con vosotros el efecto para que el Cielo me arrojó al mundo, y me hizo profesar en él la
orden de caballería que profeso, y el voto que en ella hace de favorecer a los menesterosos y opresos de los mayores (I, xxii 1115-16).

It is Don Quixote’s memories of previous knights errant that leave him with little other choice than to free the galley slaves (256). In so doing, this scene, “…periodically dramatizes a reader’s attempt to apply ethical precepts to present action. This problem of application is developed with dizzying complexity…” (256). Indeed, following the scene of the galley slaves, Don Quixote and Sancho escape the king’s “fuerza” by heading to the Sierra Morena (256). On their arrival, the reader is once more confronted by the central role that memory plays in the *Quixote* (256):

[…] al cual, como [Don Quixote] entró por aquellas montañas, se le alegró el corazón, pareciéndole aquellos lugares acomodados para las aventuras que buscaba. Reducíansele a la memoria los maravillosos acaecimientos que en semejantes soledades y asperezas habían sucedido a caballeros andantes” (I, xxiii 1118).

What Don Quixote sees is transformed by what he has read and which survives in his memory: acting as a type of “lens” through which (256): “…the landscape itself is transformed into a simulacrum of a literary text. The topography mimes literary topology [in which] the famous mountains themselves become the nameless ‘soledad’ of romance adventure” (256). Thus, “memory is the faculty that links language and action, *palabra* and *obra*” in which, “Not only does it activate the imitation of models in the exemplar theory of history but it is also responsible for the most powerful domination of present by past” (258).

Hampton’s consideration of how, as he states the “acts of reading and writing in the Renaissance relate to ancient culture,” point to the importance of Renaissance poetics (3). The idea as Hampton argues, of “art as imitation, as the reworking of ancient textual
models, there lies a theory of reading” (4). Terence Cave, as Hampton notes, affirms that: “…imitation as a theory of writing contributes to a change in habits of reading. If venerable texts are to be fragmented and eventually transformed by the process of rewriting, it becomes visibly less necessary to regard them as closed and authoritative wholes” (Cite in Hampton, 4). However, Hampton suggests this limited understanding of imitatio, does not explain the whole story, since (4): “…the texts of the Renaissance stress the importance of their relationships to their readers [aspiring] to provide the reader with a variety of options for possible action in the world” (4). The central “rhetorical technique” in humanist discussions of exemplarity is to persuade the behavior of the reader (4). Therefore, texts become “public artifacts” or “documents” which depict (5): “…the relationship between models of actions from the past and readers in the present…marked by transformations in the public space addressed” (5). Indeed, Hampton explains that:

[…] changes in the representations of exemplary figures can be seen as symptoms of political and ideological struggles that demand new figurations of the self…embodied in the heroic model held up as an image

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151 Hampton offers various examples to illustrate his point on “the relationship to the reader” who is given “a variety of options” to act, explaining that: “They educate the faculty of judgment and seek to influence behavior within a specific social sphere. They aim to move readers to various types of moral and political behavior. And the representation of exemplary figures from history is a principal rhetorical technique in this process of shaping the reader” (4). In order to make his point, Hampton goes on to cite Petrarch, who “in a letter to Giovanni Colonna” explains, “Nothing moves me like the examples of famous men” (4). As Hampton explains, Petrarch believed “the deeds of the illustrious ancients combine ‘pleasure’ and ‘authority’ (‘cum delectation insit autoritas’): highlighting the moment when “heroism” becomes “rhetoric- a deliberative rhetoric intended to provoke action.” An idea that reinforces the “humanist discussion of exemplarity [where] it is common to note how exemplars ‘inflame’ the reader, how they ‘incite’ or ‘animate’ him to imitate them” (4-5).
to the reader, [which] in turn act dialectically to produce new discursive modes for representing virtue and, ultimately, new literary forms (5).152

To some extent “exemplarity, then, shifts the problem of imitation… in the Renaissance” from one of “writing” to one of “reading” in which (5):

The exemplary figure in the Renaissance text can be of antiquity and engages the reader in a dialogue with the past, a dialogue to be played out-sometimes clumsily…Through their depiction of exemplar Renaissance texts project the problems of what is today called ‘reader-response’ criticism, into the domain of social practice and ideology. The representation of the exemplary figure constitutes the moment in the Renaissance text at which the matter of ancient history becomes rhetoric (5).

While subject to various interpretations, “the imitation of literary models” in Renaissance poetic theory maintained a privileged position (Riley, 61). Yet as E.C. Riley notes, while having few antagonists, (including Castevetro in Italy and Francisco de Barreda in Spain of who he makes mention), the practice of imitation was “…distinguished from literary robbery and pilfering, and prescribed for general inspiration and the formation of style” (61). Thus, writers were instructed to imitate only that which was deemed both

152 Claudio Guillen underscores the fact that through the sixteenth century, the “Spanish novel or any Spanish text enjoyed exceptional conditions of influence and propagation (141). This initial "space," (referring to the newly formed publishing world), “coincided with the mercantile support for the Hispanic conquest and colonization of America” (141). However, as Guillen goes on to explain, the “acceptance” of Lazarillo (and fifty years after Guzman de Alfarache), “was second to the main development: "the surge of popularity of the model, the pattern, the genre, which they sustained not singly but conjointly” (142-43). These impacts in which “a norm is transgressed dialectically (and assimilated) by another, or a genre by a counter-genre, constitute one of the main ways in which a literary model acts upon a writer…Since the early nineteenth century and the breakdown of normative systems of poetics, the subject has become more and more a province of historical scholarship. Thus one neglects the equally historical fact that the life of poetic norms and models has involved above all the poets, the dramatists, and the storytellers themselves” (147).
“excellent” and “appropriate” (61-62). However, the confusion caused by such vagueness in standards was not without its repercussions:

The doctrine undoubtedly sanctified tradition in the worst sense, encouraging the ungifted to extremes of servility. On the other hand, it also sanctified tradition in the best sense, ensuring a fixed high standard, encouraging emulation, and, since it was capable of a liberal interpretation, never standing in the way of original genius (61-62).

The “compatibility of this doctrine” as Riley notes, is observed in Cervantes’ Novelas ejemplares (62). Unabashed, Cervantes affirms in his prologue: “Esto digo que es el rostro del autor de La Galatea y de Don Quijote de la Mancha, y del que hizo el Viaje del Parnaso, a imitación del de César Caporal Perusino;” to later conclude as observed previously: “…yo soy el primero que he novelado en lengua castellana;…mi ingenio las engendró y las parió mi pluma…” (770).

While perhaps “liberal” in his interpretation as Riley suggests, it is clear that Cervantes was a disciple of such doctrine (Riley, 62). Again, we are reminded of the words spoken by Don Quixote, who in the Sierra Morena assumes the imitation of a knight errant (62). Yet, always alert to the risks of “excess” and “abuse” that such a doctrine could entail, Cervantes criticized the process of haphazardly borrowing, insisting instead that it should “serve the writer’s purpose” (62-63). Indeed, Cervantes illustrates this point during Don Quixote’s discussion on the “commemorative verses” recited at Altisidora’s fake funeral, in which he states (64): “Por cierto…que vuesa merced tiene extremada voz; pero lo que cantó no me parece que fué muy a propósito; porque ¿qué tienen que ver las estancias de Garcilaso con la muerte de esta señora?” (II, lxx 1512). To which the musician answers: “No se maraville vuesa merced de eso…que ya entre los intonsos poetas de nuestra edad se usa que cada uno escriba como quisiere, y hurte de
Cervantes presents something similar in the Persiles (Riley, 63). In Book 3 of Chapter 2, the reader is confronted with a poet, whose work it was to recondition plays from the past (63):

“...venía así para enmendar y remendar comedias viejas, como para hacerlas de nuevo;”

a profession that as we see was not highly regarded: “...ejercicio más ingenioso que honrado y más de trabajo que de provecho” (284). Of course, the same poet, or “moderno y nuevo autor de nuevos y esquisitos libros” (419), would later reappear comically asking people to collectively contribute to writing his book for him in which (63): “...a costa ajena quiero sacar un libro a luz, cuyo trabajo sea, como he dicho, ajeno, y el provecho mío” (416). There are many more examples throughout the writings of Cervantes that testify to his unyielding dislike of what Riley refers to as the practice of “indiscriminate borrowing” (63).

Indeed, Cervantes’ precept of the imitation of models, as Riley demonstrates in his analysis, is clearly observed time and again in Don Quixote’s thoughts and actions as he summons his chivalric heroes of the past (64-65). This process, which entails the act of recollection, is particularly true with regards to Amadís, who he deems most worthy of imitation: “Sancho, que sepas que el famoso Amadís de Gaula fué uno de los más perfectos caballeros andantes. No he dicho bien fué uno: fué él sólo, el primero, el único, el señor de todos cuantos hubo en su tiempo en el mundo” (I, xxv 1129 emphasis

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153 Of course, there is also the matter of Alonso Avellaneda’s apocryphal Quixote which must be considered within these views that Cervantes expresses in part two of his own, the is “true” version of the Quixote. I dedicate a significant portion to this issue in chapter four. However, it is important here to note that Avellaneda presents Cervantes with an opportunity to demonstrate the ramifications of such indiscriminate borrowing which speak to issues of reality, truth, verisimilitude.
Cervantes). What makes Amadís a formidable figure in the mind of Don Quixote and thus worthy of imitation is his ability to set aside the alienable imperfections of man, while exalting only that what is considered truly ideal: “…pintándolo ni descubriéndolo como ellos fueron, sino como habían de ser, para quedar ejemplo a los venideros hombre de sus virtudes.” (I, xxv 1129). The “perfection” of Amadís, this exalted figure that was and would remain till the end Don Quixote’s foremost obsession, acts as his true, “…norte, el lucero, el sol de los valientes y enamorados caballeros, a quien debemos de imitar todos aquellos que debajo de la bandera de amor y de la caballería militamos;” for, as Don Quixote would passionately affirm, he was the path through which all those who, “…le imitare estará más cerca de alcanzar la perfección de la caballería” (I, xxv 1129). And so, “…imitando a Ulises, en cuya persona y trabajos nos pinta Homero un retrato vivo de prudencia y de sufrimiento; como también nos mostró Virgilio, en persona de Eneas,” so to Don Quixote paints by selection of his actions the ideal canvas of Amadís’s irreproachable “…prudencia, valor, valentía, sufrimiento, firmeza y amor” (I, xxv 1129). In this instance, Don Quixote brings to life his work through action, “liv[ing] literature” as “…not only the hero of his own story but also, in so far as he can control events, its author” (Riley 64). 154 While not always in command of the outcome, (as observed by the mishaps encountered in the adventure of the galley slaves), Don Quixote echoes the

154 Indeed, as Riley explains, Don Quixote deliberately selects the method to his madness, painstakingly choosing as his model between Amadís or Roland, while: “He savours the name ‘Beltenebro’ like an artist, and he is activated by several considerations that are, among other things, artistic. The project is, for once, suited to his abilities. It will be easier to imitate Amadís in this than in splitting giants in two, beheading serpents, slaying dragons, routing armies, wrecking fleets, and breaking spells, he observes…he carefully selects the site of his first formal oration, composes his letter, insists that Sancho witness part of his performance, and, in chapter 26, after further deliberation on the choice of a model, settles finally for Amadís and gets on with his business. The whole procedure has rightly been called that of a littérateur and almost a ‘transposition of art’” (65-66).
views of his creator, who as Riley in citing Agustin de Rojas notes (64): “No small praise is due to the man who knows how to make good use of what he steals and which is to the purpose of his subject” (Riley 64).

While literary texts reveal Cervantes’ playfulness and dominion of *imitatio* and *auctoritas*, Don Quixote as noted by De Armas underlines the “artist’s freedom” that seems to “resist...the urge to imitate other texts or even visual representations” (De Armas, 29). Likewise Egido presents a similar argument in suggesting that Cervantes does not follow a particular model, but rather: “…selecciona, según la ocasión y el lugar, tratando además de emularlos en un ejemplar ejercicio de imitación compuesta” (103). Similar to Leonardo da Vinci’s affirmation that “One must never imitate the manner of another, because as an artist he will be called the grandchild and not the son of Nature” (Thomas Greene, 44), the prologue to part I of Don Quixote clearly demonstrates by way of parody the inherent dangers in relying too heavily on textual authority (29):

[…] salgo ahora, con todos mis años a cuestas, con una leyenda seca como un esparto, ajena de invención, manguada de estilo, pobre de conceptos y falta de toda erudición y doctrina; sin acotaciones en la márgenes y sin anotaciones en el fin del libro, como veo que están otros libros, aunque sean fabulosos y profanes, tan llenos de sentencias de Aristóteles, de Platón y de toda la caterva de filósofos, que admiran a los leyentes y tienen a sus autores por hombres leídos, eruditos y elocuentes? ¡Pues qué

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155 As Riley notes, both “imitation” and “invention” sound almost incompatible. In fact, there is no really clear distinction between them in sixteenth-century theory. Tasso…finds that ‘imitation and invention are one and the same thing as far as the plot is convened” (185; Riley 58). “The rhetorical word ‘invention’ and ‘invention’ sound almost incompatible…there is no really clear distinction between them in sixteenth-century theory…The rhetorical word *inventio* is often used with little or no discrimination from imitation, *fictio*, and *fabula*. It means primarily the finding of material for the work; *dispositio* meaning primarily its selection and arrangement, though the distinction between the two is far from clear” (58). Riley notes that: “Vives says [that] ‘invention’ is principally the task for the author’s *prudentia*, which is a combination of his *ingenium*, *memoria*, *judicium*, and *usus rerum*. The main emphasis is generally placed on the first of these combined faculties…” (59).
cuanndo citan la Divina Escritura! No dirán sino que son unos Santos Tomases y otros doctores de la Iglesia; guardando en esto un decoro tan ingenioso, que en un renglón han pintado un enamorado distraído y en otro hacen un sermoncico cristiano, que es un contento y un regalo oírle o leerle…yo determino que el señor Don Quijote se quede sepultado en sus archivos en la Mancha, hasta que el Cielo depare quien le adorne de tantas cosas como le faltan; porque yo me hallo incapaz de remediarlas, por mi insuficiencia y pocas letras, y porque naturalmente soy poltrón y perezoso de andarme buscando autores que digan lo que yo me sé decir sin ellos (Prologue, 1032).

Likewise, and perhaps reminiscent of Cervantes own words observed in the previous quote, “the text also questions Don Quixote’s quest of authority,” for as De Armas notes:

[…] the knight goes mad because he not only read too much but he lends full authority to what he reads-and the world and its authorities as texts no longer provide proof of their truth….Not only is chivalric ‘authority’ at fault; in his madness, Don Quixote also envisions epic models (seeming a mad Ajax in the battle of the sheep) only to be humiliated (30).

Indeed, Michel Foucault, who De Armas cites in his analysis, suggests that the repeated debacles of Don Quixote emerge from the fact that (30):

[…] it is his task to recreate the epic, though by a reverse process: the epic recounted (or claimed to recount) real exploits, offering them to our memory; Don Quixote, on the other hand, must endow with reality the signs-without-content of the narrative. His adventures will be… a diligent search over the entire surface of the earth (Cite in De Armas, 30).

Yet, De Armas is not entirely convinced by such an assessment. Instead, he points to the “instability of the novel” itself, one which allows a reading of the Quixote that “supports notions of classical authority”, including among others the (30):

Homeric epics, Virgil, Apuleius, Plutarch, Pythagoras [in which]…the text and its multiple narrators may be mocking its hero simply because he is unable to follow authorities that are appropriate for his status, situation in
life, and concerns. In breaking with decorum and the order of the cosmos, the hero fails to emulate the ‘order of the world’ (30). 156

Indeed, as De Armas concludes: “What the characters show within the text is what the text itself does with its models. Although the *Quixote* incorporates scores of genres and points to a dizzying abundance of models, it conjures them up in an attempt to transform or escape them” (30). 157 And as such, it is memory that allows Don Quixote to mold what he perceives in reality to what he has read: a process which as we have seen, relied directly on Don Quixote’s ability of recollection. Yet, there are moments in Don Quixote’s life which exceed that of the literary world (Egido, 116). In these moments we find Don Quixote struggling to find an appropriate model to follow: one that would allow both invention and memory to harmoniously coexist (116).

Such is the case when at the hands of the priest and barber, Don Quixote deceived and imprisoned behind an oxcart, finds himself questioning the very veracity of his situation (116): “Muchas y muy graves historias he yo leído de caballeros andantes; pero jamás he leído, ni visto, ni oído, que a los caballeros encantados los lleven desta manera… ¡viva Dios que no me pone en confusión!” (I, xlvi 1247). Indeed, Don Quixote’s “confusion” is the result of a rupture, or as Egido suggests, a “theoretical

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156 As Ignacio Lopez states “During the Renaissance, *decorum* referred to the sacrifice of accuracy regarding historical details to gain in effectiveness, but the theologian, men of letters, and the hierarchy of the Church” the significance of *decorum*, became subjugated to “the semantic influence of ‘decency’ in which, as Ignacio Lopez notes in citing Javier Portus Perez: “The artist and the writer were thus compelled to ‘amend’ the so-called ‘errors’ to which strict historical fidelity could fall prey, because it was accepted, art could- and should- perfect nature” (104).

157 De Armas mentions by name many varieties of literature in his description including “the epic and the chivalric, Italian frescoes and manuscript drawings” to mention a few (32).
transgression” of models produced between Don Quixote’s own aspirations of “grandeur” and the “vulgarity” imposed upon him by his disguised friends (116): “…porque siempre los suelen llevar por los aires, con extraña ligereza, encerrados en alguna parda y escura nube, o en algún carro de fuego, o ya sobre algún hipogrifo u otra bestia semejante” (I, xlvii 1247). In this instance, Don Quixote’s memory does not allow him to adapt to the reality imposed by others (117). This or something like this is what we find in the burning of his library at the hands of the priest (Lic. Pedro Pérez) and the barber (Maese Nicolás) (103). There, amidst the plundering and fire of Don Quixotes’ most cherished treasures, and despite its physical annihilation, the burnt remains survive: archived in the “living memory of Don Quixote” (Egido, 103 Translation mine).158

Indeed, as Egido reminds us, because memory for the rhetoricians consisted in the “retention” and organization of “matter” and “words:” “Don Quijote refleje en sus actos no sólo las hazañas caballerescas, sino los aspectos elocutivos de tales narraciones, imitándolos reiteradamente en su vida práctica, tras un proceso de síntesis y selección” (99). Consequentially, the power of Don Quixote’s memory allows him to transpose the physical and present world with a literary reality that is repeatedly awakened from the past (102). Of course, this is accomplished without the negative effects of what Egido describes as a “temporal aberration” (102). Don Quixote infuses his memories with reality (102). In so doing as Egido explains, he identifies instantaneously both loci and images of the past with “perceptions” experienced in the present (102). Therefore, Don Quixote:

158 I return to this important episode in chapter four with a comparison to Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera.
No se trata,…de que el proceso de percepción de realidad sufra una tergiversación posterior en la imaginativa, sino que ésta actúe sobre el presente en una permanente adulteración de lo percibido, por obra y gracia de la omnipresente memoria y del ejercicio de la fantasía (102).

Hence, memory acts as a “filter,” between “...la percepción sensitiva y la imaginativa, obligándola a representar lo recordado y no aquello que captan los sentidos en el momento present” (102). This idea is explicitly expressed in Don Quixote’s very first outing as a knight errant, where we are told (102):

[… y como a nuestro aventurero todo cuanto pensaba, veía o imaginaba le parecía ser hecho y pasar al modo de lo que había leído, luego que vio la venta se le representó que era un castillo con sus cuatro torres, y chapiteles de luciente plata, sin faltarle su puente levadizo y honda cava, con todos aquellos adherentes que semejantes castillos se pintan (I, ii, 1041).

The power of Don Quixote’s memory not only resides in his sight perception, but all senses of the human body (Egido, 102). Of course, there are many more examples such as the episode of the windmills (I, vii) that demonstrate how “images of memory superimpose themselves” on reality in such a way as to alter if not all together “blind the imaginative senses” of Don Quixote (104, Translation mine). The shared common senses which differentiate the past, present, future seem not to function in Don Quixote (103). He is unable to distinguish new images from old ones, new experiences from those which are stored in his memory (103-4). And here is where we encounter Don Quixote’s problem (104): “Don Quijote,…no es capaz de discriminar el tiempo, identificando… el pasado de sus lecturas con las percepciones presentes, pues la memoria tiene como objeto
el pasado y don Quijote la proyecta hacia el futuro o la actualiza sin apenas fisuras” (104-05).159

In conclusion, the value of memory (particularly in the Middle Ages), resided in “recollection or memoria,” which, “…was analyzed as a variety of investigation, the invention and recreation of knowledge and mind (Carruthers, 16).160 In order to obtain such power, it was necessary to create mental structures such as palaces, libraries, museums, theatres etc. (16). These structures in turn required “basic principles of memory training” (16) In other words: “…the need for divisio, the need to make a clear, distinct location for each piece of memorized content, and the need to mark items uniquely for secure recollection” (16). Indeed, ancient theory, (expressed in detail in Aristotle’s De memoria et reminiscencia) argued that memory was considered the result of “sensory perception,” and therefore, as the “product of an animated body,” in which: "To be useful for invention, particularly memories must be retrievable instantly and securely." (17).

Accordingly, as Jiménez explains, the mnemonic character of Sumario with its “geographic structure” and detailed descriptions point to the fact that it was written from memory by means of a mnemonic system. It also offers insight as to Oviedo’s possible objectives in writing it (271): “Oviedo pretendía imprimir de modo duradero un modelo

159 As discussed in chapter two, Don Quixote adapts to each occasion by conscience selection.

160 As Mary Carruthers explains: “The Latin word inventio has given rise to two separate words in modern English. One is our word ‘invention,’ meaning the ‘creation of something new’… and invention as in “inventory” (16). The first of these two consist in “either ideas or material objects including art, music and literature,” while the second refers to an orderly “storage of diverse materials” in which “Inventoried materials are counted and placed in locations within an overall structure that allows any item to be retrieved easily and at once” (16).
pacific, basada en una población estable y mercantil” (271). Indeed, as Jiménez demonstrates clearly, Oviedo’s use of mnemonics also corresponds to the “…íntima relación que en la época se veía entre la memoria y la virtud de la prudencia” (271). For his part, Andrés I. Prieto notes how “Oviedo present[s] himself to the Emperor as an ideal” witness of the Indies (345). Indeed, in his repeated attempt to highlight those virtues which set him apart from other eyewitnesses (in particular his gift of memory), Oviedo “shift[s] the emphasis from Plinian learning to experience,” (345). Consequentially, the appeal of the Sumario points to Oviedo’s extraordinary ability of recollection, in which once again memory assumes an essential role (345). In fact, memory in the Sumario restructures “the epistemological…field of knowledge,” whose “authority and legitimacy” required when discussing nature, “…shifts its location from the European cultural tradition to the new and fundamentally non-textual experience of the American periphery” (345). Indeed, as Prieto further explains, both “knowledge and authority” in the Sumario, are “placed…in the Colonial periphery, claiming precedence over the works written in Spain by armchair scholars” (346):

In contrast to Pliny’s project, the Sumario was not intended as a reference book, since its aim was not to present a collection of already known facts, but instead to present new facts and knowledge about a hitherto unexplored part of the world. These facets were presented as experience, and experience internalized and expressed as memories that could then be transmitted to the memory of the reader (346).

161 As Beckjord notes, Oviedo highlights the need to take into account geographical rather than chronological references to events: “No mire en esta discusión cual va puesto primero; porque yo, continuando con mis libros la costa, irán en algunas partes los modernos antes que los que en tiempo los preceden” (Cite in Beckjord 75). However, Beckjord argues that the method of following “coastlines rather than chronology only adds to the innumerable repetitions and redundancies occasioned by his labyrinthine endeavor” (75).
Hence, as Prieto concludes, the manner in which memory is deployed in the *Sumario* points to “the constitution of two different narratives,” the first “refers to Oviedo’s memories of his own American experience, the source of his authority and knowledge,” while the second, refers to the reader, whose memory it is assumed will be stamped with the new and unfolding realities of the Indies (346).

Following what has been outlined to this point of Gonzalo Fernández Oviedo’s *Sumario* and our selection of Cervantes’ literary works, particularly *Don Quixote* and the *Persiles*, it has been demonstrated how the art of memory was an important technique from antiquity up through the Renaissance. With the onset of the age of discovery, the models of classical antiquity were no longer suitable to describe the flora and fauna of a seemingly new world. As a result, the concept history remained ambiguous at best (Paden, 221). Yet, as Oviedo’s model attest to, the new emphasis of the sixteenth century placed on “experience and observation” which aimed at arriving at an objective truth or verifiable fact, to some degree failed, in that (221): “…the allure of intelligibility and purpose that cultural memory provides trumps the hard task of observation” (221) However, as Paden further explains, while Oviedo acts to diminish classical authority, his project remains bound to it, that is it, “…allows Oviedo to make sense of the world” (221). Similarly, and by means of parody, this is what is observed in *Don Quixote*. 
As we have seen with the help of Frederick De Armas and Timothy Hampton, memory plays a fundamental role in the transformation of Alonso Quijano, the insatiable reader, and Don Quixote the knight errant of action and delirium, in which:

Very much like the burning of Don Quixote’s library in the sixth chapter, the novel itself is formed from the dying embers of previous texts, pictures, authorities. From the textual ashes of a myriad of forms rises something new. Although accepting the notion of origin, it strives for originality (De Armas, 31).

Viewed in this manner, the madness of Don Quixote as Bruce Wardropper argues, is best described as a product of his “failure to discriminate between history and story” (prose fiction) in which: “It is not so much the reading of too many books of chivalry that drives him mad; it is the misreading, the misinterpretation of them that causes his insanity” (6). Again, an idea that is alluded to in Don Quixote: “…así, del poco dormir y del mucho leer

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162 In using the word “real”, I am once more referring to the episode of penance in the Sierra Morena in which Don Quixote demonstrates how what he perceives is the product of what he has read.

163 Observed in the citation is a temporal process that seems to align itself well within Claudio Guillen discussion on genre and the creation of a “diametrically opposed counterculture” in which he plants the question: “how does literature, in addition, traverse space? Is one of these dimensions a condition of the other?” (135). To demonstrate the following, Guillen introduces the career of Lazarillo de Tormes, which coincided evidently with “the birth of the picaresque narrative-- a crucial step, in turn, in the rise of the modern novel- will draw us into the orbit of the theory of genres” (136). Of course the success of Cervantes’ Don Quixote marked the fall Guzmán de Añarache, a “best seller” that “would not reappear until 1615, in Milan” (146). Indeed Guillen explains that: “If what most of these bibliographical data seem to indicate is the rise of a new genre, then an important consequence of this rise was the emergence of a diametrically opposed masterpiece, which itself was able to serve as seed for a ‘counter-genre’….On the editorial and literary levels, Cervantes’ seminal novel was an inspired response to the challenge of the new born picaresque genre” (146).
se le secó el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio (I, i 1038). As a result, I agree with both Frederick De Armas Wilson and Bruce Wardropper. Images stored in memory engender a fracture with reality of the moment, which must continue its evolutionary cycle. Accordingly, death is their reunification or reintegration with such reality that since its temporal materialization remained cloaked in appearances of a transformative nature. While both Oviedo and Cervantes use memory to not only interpret, but to recreate the flora and fauna of a new world, the death of Don Quixote marks the culmination of all forms, both real and imaginative. More than simply a question of cosmetics, the rupture immortalized between the passively lucid existence of Alonso Quijano, and his antithesis, the now famous knight errant Don Quixote of action and delirium, endure. Yet, while Don Quixote was to free himself of memory with his death, the same is not true of his readers who time and again are summoned to leave the comforts of home and follow in his poetic renewal. For as Montaigne’s tower room or Camillo’s theatre before him reveal, Cervantes understood that to see everything there is to see at a glance, is to dust away the residue and bear witness to our presence.

164 I would like to reiterate here (I speak to this in chapter two) that the “madness” of Don Quixote, which Bruce Wardropper sees as the inability to discriminate between opposing worlds is really a question of degree. Don Quixote is constantly negotiating the realities and limitations that define each world: to do so requires that he participate and be conscience of both worlds simultaneously. Of course, the quote I chose from the Quixote also points to physical exhaustion which results from getting no sleep: the immediate culprit of Don Quixote’s inability to distinguish real from friction- again within Cervantes’ literary creation.
CHAPTER V
MEMORY, DON QUIXOTE AND THE NOVELISTIC QUALITIES OF BERNAL DÍAZ’ HISTORIA VERDADERA

In an attempt to more fully appreciate the innovative literary expression of Cervantes within the context of the Crónicas de Indias, the previous chapters have afforded both an historical as well as a geographical understanding of his work. Accordingly, by connecting my previous discussion to Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s Historia verdadera de la conquista de la nueva España, this final chapter examines the nature of historiography by examining a number of problems specific to the writing of history. These include: the role of memory, the functions of detail, importance of fame, the relationship that emerge between writers and their texts, and the representation of historical and non-historical figures. In addition, I once more turn my attention to problems that arise with regard to narrative “distance” and “perspective,” which as Sarah Beckjord has noted in her own investigation into the workings of Bernal Díaz, not only allow a bird’s eye view into the minds of others, exemplified in modern works of fiction, but also afford further exploration on the importance of memory in the process of writing (5).

While it is true that Bernal Díaz did not write a novel, his “seeming inability to omit details,” as Anthony J. Cascardi has suggested, and the manner in which he discloses his most intimate experiences alongside historic events, give evidence for a memory that is immersed, as Oswaldo Estrada explains (202), “…en diversos afectos
narrativos inseparables de la novela” (54, emphasis Estrada). This idea in particular has driven several contemporary critics to view Bernal Díaz’ work as a novelistic form, in which (29): “…por momentos nos parece…que su memoria tiene mucho en común con la de un novelista moderno que maneja un punto de vista omnisciente sobre acciones simultáneas, y que sabe cuándo detenerse en una caracterización, en el detalle más mínimo, el chisme y humor” (Estrada, 29). A clear case in point is Carlos Fuentes’s essay entitled, “La épica vacilante de Bernal Díaz del Castillo,” found in his book Valiente mundo nuevo (1990). While, there have been many gains made by Colonial and Post-Colonial criticism in recent years, Fuentes’, (who is writing on the early side of an emerging Colonial consciousness), book highlights the postmodern perspective, which as Beckjord explains “assumes[s] no difference between historical and fictional texts” (132).

Fuentes writes:

Tiene [Bernal Díaz] un pie en Europa y otro en América y llena el vacío dramático entre los dos mundos de una manera literaria y peculiarmente moderna. Hace, en efecto, lo que Marcel Proust hizo recordando el pasado…Busca el tiempo perdido: es nuestro primer novelista. Y el tiempo perdido es…un tiempo que sólo se puede recuperar como un minuto liberado del orden del tiempo: liberado por la palabra en la página….Bernal, como Proust, ha vivido ya lo que va a contar, pero debe dar la impresión de que lo que cuenta está ocurriendo al ser escrito: la vida fue vivida, el libro ha de ser descubierto (72-73, emphasis original).

165 Cascardi suggests that: “The novel…in its very formlessness a literary approximation to the flow of human life, and in Bernal’s chronicle the life of the past flows or overflows, from one chapter to the next with no sense that life, aligned to the written word, can be limited by the strictures of narration…as he relates the past he endows it with the momentum of present experience…The structure of Bernal’s chronicle is determined by the nearly infinite and seemingly formless space of memory” (203-04). Sarah Beckjord also references and explains how both Cascardi in his “Chronicle” (199-200) and Cortínez (among others mentioned) describe to some extent the Historia verdadera’s commonalities with the modern novel, including the “temporal distance and discordance between the young hero and the aging narrator, a distance that earns the narrative a modern quality” (132, see footnotes).
The process of writing allows Bernal Díaz to reconstruct the past as if present; a technique which as Beckjord, who cites Fuentes notes, makes Bernal Díaz’ treatment of historical figures “individuos concretos, no guerreros alegóricos,” that is to say, “…no pueden ni deben ser confundidos con otros individuos o con seres genéricos” (80, emphasis Fuentes). Yet, irrespective of Bernal Díaz’ power of discernment, Verónica Cortínez points to the selection process itself, which not only creates “distance” between him and his experiences alongside Cortés, but also presents contradictions that confuse his readers (64). Bernal Díaz writes:

Y porque yo estoy harto de escribir batallas, y más cansado y herido estaba de me hallar en ellas, y a los lectores les parecerá prolijidad recitarlas tantas veces: ya he dicho que no puede ser menos, porque en noventa y tres días siempre batallábamos a la continua; mas desde aquí adelante, si lo pudiese excusar, non lo traería tanto a la memoria en esta relación (II, clii 97 emphasis original).

Indeed, as Cortínez notes, Bernal Díaz’ strategy goes beyond recounting the historic encounters with the indigenous peoples to include not only events that he deems worthy of mention, but also those he prefers to omit from the record (Cortínez, 65): “¿Para qué gasto yo tantas palabras de lo que vendían en aquella gran plaza? Porque es para no acabar tan presto de contar por menudo todas las cosas…” (I, xci 331). Moreover, there are moments in Bernal Díaz’ history where he seems to undermine his own authority, such as when he complains about the challenging nature of his endeavor (65): “…y si no lo dijere tan al natural como era, no se maravillen, porque en aquel tiempo tenía otro pensamiento de entender en lo que traíamos entre manos, que era en lo militar y lo que mi capitán Cortés me mandaba, y no en hacer relaciones” (I, xci 336). Indeed, Cortínez
suggests that it is this confusion throughout the *Historia verdadera* that sets it apart from his contemporary counterparts (65). Further ahead we will return to these ideas as we begin to situate Bernal Díaz’s work within the humanist historiographical model of the 16th century. However, before moving forward with differing perspectives, it is important to understand just what Fuentes had in mind in his assertions that Bernal Díaz: “Es nuestro primer novelista” (71), “…el novelista de algo por descubrir” (73), who writes “…una épica angustiada, una novela esencial” (75): product of Bernal Díaz’ “…memoria moderna del novelista” (80). To better understand Fuentes’ claims perhaps requires that we take, as Roberto González Echevarría has suggested, “a bifocal reading”: one that will allow both a “Renaissance perspective,” as well as a more contemporary look into the notions of truth and fiction as it relates to Bernal Díaz’ *Historia verdadera* and the novel (10). Let me begin by giving some much needed context to Fuentes general characterizations of the *Historia verdadera* as a “novel.” With regard to the “generic problems” that arise when discussing the *Historia verdadera*, Fuentes explains:

[...] creo que toda gran obra literaria—y la de Bernal lo es—es no sólo un diálogo con el mundo, sino consigo misma. Hay obras que nacen cantando su propia gestación, contemplándose y debatiéndose a sí mismas. Cervantes funda la novela moderna porque pone en tela de juicio todos los géneros, los compendia en la aventura quijotesca y (en las palabras de Claudio Guillén) hacen que los géneros…dialoguen entre sí, generando la inmensa dinámica de la novela

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166 As discussed further ahead, González Echevarría, Mignolo, as well as Zamora also share this view.

167 González Echeverría’s in his essay, “Humanismo, retórica y las crónicas de la conquista,” argues against the notion that the *crónicas* should be considered literature: “La función de las crónicas en la tradición literaria hispanoamericana, cuyo inicio…es el Romanticismo- es la de ser Origen. El desempeño de esa función determina nuestra lectura de esos textos. Si la literatura hispanoamericana existe, las crónicas que son su origen tienen ya que ser literatura. Las crónicas mismas, sin embargo, se regían por criterios muy distintos en lo referente a lo literario” (10).
Incorporating the ideas of Ortega y Gasset and Michail Bakhtin, Fuentes argues that the novel and the epic are “justamente lo contrario,” (Ortega y Gasset), in that the latter deals with the past “…de un mundo que fue y concluyó,” while the novel, according to Bakhtin, “…es la operación literaria fundada en la novedad….Refleja las tendencias de un nuevo mundo que aún se está haciendo” (76, emphasis Fuentes). Yet, Fuentes also includes in his analysis Hegel’s idea that: “…la épica es el acto humano que perturba la tranquilidad del ser y su integridad mítica: una especie de arañazo que nos empuja fuera del mundo paterno, lejos del hogar mítico y nos envía a la guerra de Troya y los viajes de Ulises: la épica es el accidente que hiere a la esencia mítica” (76, emphasis Fuentes). Contrary to Ortega y Gasset, Simone Weil, (whom Fuentes also cites in his argument), suggests that the Iliad is an unfinished movement (“movimiento inconcluso”), whose “…mensaje moral espera cumplirse en nuestro propio tiempo. No es un poema pasado, sino por venir” (76, emphasis Fuentes). From these general arguments, Fuentes concludes that if we are to accept both Ortega y Gasset’s and Bakhtin’s philosophical premise, Bernal Díaz’ work is best described as an “epic in movement,” (“épica en movimiento”) for in essence Bernal Díaz writes: “…una novela épica, con tanto movimiento y novedad como la épica según Hegel y Simone Weil, y con tanta novedad y dinamismo como la novela según Bajtín y Ortega” (77). As such, Fuentes’ description into the novelty of the novel (“novedad novelesca”) within the confines of the epic offers further insight toward the generic dialogue that is at play in Bernal Díaz’ Historia Verdadera: a book as Fuentes explains which is also a:
[…] crónica, historia verdadera, biografía, autobiografía, memoria, novela de caballería violentamente trasladada a la realidad, y canto narrativo proclamando su propia, novedosa gestación. *Otra vez, como Cervantes, pero antes que Cervantes y nuevamente a partir de Cervantes, el diálogo genérico ocupa un lugar en el libro de Bernal*” (77, emphasis mine).

Indeed, in his attempt to better understand the natural complexity of time and space in Bernal Díaz’ work, Fuentes adopts Giambattista Vico’s philosophical concept of an “inclusive” and predominately humanistic nature of history in which (32):

[…] sólo podemos conocer lo que nosotros mismos hemos hecho; la historia es nuestra propia fabricación; debemos conocerla porque es nuestra y porque debemos continuar haciéndola y recordándola. Si somos creadores de la historia, mantenerla es nuestro deber (32).

Vico believed that human nature consisted in not one, but rather a variety of realties that while in a state of constant transformation are historically connected, and as such, conserve the cultural creations of its own history (“las creaciones culturales de la propia historia”) (32):

Los hombres y las mujeres hacen su propia historia y lo primero que hacen es su lenguaje y, en seguida, basados en el lenguaje, sus mitos, y luego sus obras de arte, sus costumbres, leyes, maneras de comer, modas, organizaciones políticas, códigos sexuales, deportes, sistemas educativos, todo ello, dice Vico, en flujo perpetuo, todo ello siendo siempre” (32).168

As Fuentes explains, Vico’s world is one “no…externo a los acontecimientos, sino que vive en ellos, en la sustancia misma de la historia…la historia no es un progreso ininterrumpido, sino un movimiento en espiral, en el que los progresos alternan con

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168 Defying the Eurocentric tendencies of his time, Vico states: “En la noche de espesas tinieblas que encubre las más remotas antigüedades…brilla la luz eternal y jamás menguante de una verdad incontrovertible: el mundo de la sociedad civil ha sido creado por los hombres, y sus principios, por lo tanto, han de encontrarse en las modificaciones de nuestra propia mente humana” (Fuentes, 33).
factores recurrentes, muchos de ellos negativamente regresivos” (34-35). Fuentes’ concept of history (adopted from Vico), consists of an endless dialogue of historical periods within a single and prolonged narration similar to that of the novel (31-32): “La novela es instrumento del diálogo en el sentido más amplio: no sólo diálogo entre personajes sino entre lenguajes, géneros, fuerzas sociales, periodos históricos distantes y contiguos” (37). We will return to these ideas further ahead. However, let us now turn to what Bernal Díaz himself had to say regarding his work.

As one of the most celebrated witnesses to the conquest of Mexico, Bernal Díaz defends the veracity of his account by highlighting the lack of “elocuencia y retórica,” to be found in his writings, limiting himself as he states strictly to: “…lo que yo oí y me hallé en ello peleando, como buen testigo de vista” (Preface, 1). Bernal Díaz does so in a manner not befitting those “…muy afamados coronistas [que] hacen primero su prólogo y preámbulo con razones y retórica muy subida para dar luz y crédito a sus razones,” but rather, in a manner perhaps more expected of a faithful foot soldier to the Crown: “…muy llanamente, sin torcer a una parte ni a otra” (1).169 However, as Saenz de Santa María has suggested, the transparent nature in which Bernal Díaz’ expresses himself more than compensates for his plain spoken style (133). In fact, Santa María likens Bernal Díaz’ dialogue with his reader to that of a confesion: “…en [una] larga conversación se está confesando ante nosotros…por la extrema sencillez de su artificio literario. Y sin embargo, no podríamos decir que éste falte. No hay gramática, falta retórica, pero abunda sentido humano e intuición estética” (133). Indeed, in highlighting Bernal Díaz’ “sense of human presence,” Anthony J. Cascardi points to his “unifying

perspective…guided entirely by his own vision, which shifts focus with gaze of his memory, and which brings all that it sees into the foreground” (206). Yet, above all what sets him apart from the other coronistas is his experience, in which: “…ningún capitán ni soldado pasó a esta Nueva España tres veces arreo, unas tras otras como yo; por manera que soy el más antiguo descubridor y conquistador que ha habido ni hay…” (I, i 6).170

No longer a strapping young twenty-four year old, Bernal Díaz tells his story as an old man more than a half century removed from his time spent alongside Cortés. While the exact moment when he began writing his memoirs is not known, we do know from Alonso de Zorita’s writings that he must have begun his undertaking no later than 1555 at the age of sixty (Leon-Portilla, 9 in Historia verdadera).171 His work would take him more than thirty years to complete (9). Yet, having lost his two most valued senses which accompanied his storied adventures, at his mature age Bernal Díaz turned to his lucid memory to reconstruct a history that once belonged to him: “…porque soy viejo de más de ochenta y cuatro años y he perdido la vista y el oír, y por mi ventura no tengo otra riqueza que dejar a mis hijos y descendientes, salvo ésta mi verdadera y notable relación”

170 This citation comes from the following edition: Conquista de la Nueva España. Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1933.

171 Alonso de Zorita who, as Leon-Portilla notes in his introduction of the Historia verdadera, was in Guatemala from 1553-1557 and was included among the new oidores (members of the Audiencia) wrote that: “Bernal Díaz del Castillo, vecino de Guatemala…, fue conquistador; me dijo, estando yo por oidor de la Real Audiencia de los Confines que reside en la ciudad de Santiago de Guatemala, que escribía la historia de aquella tierra y me mostró parte de lo que tenía escrito; no sé si la acabó, ni si ha salido a luz (Historia de la Nueva España, edición de Manuel Serrano y Sanz, Madrid, 1909, p 23)” (Cite in León-Portilla’s introduction to Historia verdadera, see footnotes p. 10).
As such, Cascardi suggests that Bernal Díaz’ history, “…is formed from the slow decay of the impressions that accompany actual experience, and from their simultaneous reconstruction in the memory, through numerous retellings” (200).

Bernal Díaz’ extraordinary memory, which serves as the narrative structure of the Historia verdadera, at times seems filled with the most insignificant details (Cascardi, 202): “Y más digo, que como ahora los tengo en la mente y sentido memoria, que supiera pintar y esculpir sus cuerpos y figuras y talles y meneos, y rostros y facciones” (II, ccvi, 447-53). In fact, Bernal Díaz dedicates entire chapters methodically listing and describing not only his, “batallas y encuentros” (II, ccxii, 473-484), but also, as the chapter title states, “…las estaturas y proporciones y edades que tuvieron ciertos capitanes valerosos y fuertes soldados” (II, ccvi 447). This has led several critics to highlight Bernal Díaz’ lack of what Cervantes will call discreción, or the ability to select between the more important memories and those better left out of his account. While a man able to remember yesterday as if it were today, (“…porque a manera de decir, ayer pasó lo que verán en mi historia” (Prologue, 65), Cascardi proposes that “Bernal…lacks the gift of great selective talent; he can seem to forget nothing” (203). Cascardi (as does Verónica Cortínez in her book Memoria original de Bernal Díaz Del Castillo, which adopts a more comprehensive understanding of bernaldino discourse), compares Bernal Díaz’ memory to Jorge Luis Borges’ Ireneo Funes, whose memory is likened to that of a garbage heap (“vaciadero de basuras”) (203). Similar to Funes, Bernal Díaz’ aptitude for...
remembering everything limited his ability to distinguish between them, and thus select (Cascardi, 203). Ramón Iglesias, who Verónica Cortínez cites in her work, proposed a similar idea in that it, “La Verdadera Historia fue creciendo desmesuradamente porque Bernal no era capaz de seleccionar entre sus recuerdos, y puesto a relatar la conquista tuvo que decirlo todo” (Cite in Cortínez, 64). Such is the force of Bernal’s ability to remember that as Cascardi proposes, it allowed Bernal to “…reunite memory with experience as one…he was able to superimpose the past on the present as if nothing had ever dissociated the two” (203). Carlos Fuentes presents a similar idea in describing Bernal’s narrative “genius” as consisting of the implementation of: “…los poderes de la memoria; evocar los hechos al tiempo que preserva su frescura” (79).174

While nearly his entire account revolves around the events that occurred between 1517 -1521, Bernal Diaz’ memory indeed demonstrates an extraordinary attention to detail (Perpeyra, IX): an idea that Carlos Perpeyra expounds in his prologue of Historia verdadera (IX).175

Sin propósitos de disertación, al azar de sus recuerdos, habla de agricultura, de minería, de construcciones civiles y religiosas, de viajes, de comercio, de administración y de costumbres. A él debemos la descripción de las ciudades y

174 William H. Prescott, who Hebert Cerwin cites in his book, Bernal Díaz Historian of the Conquest, states the following with regard to Bernal Díaz’ ability to remember the most insignificant detail, echoing the ideas of Fuentes and Cascardi: “It may seem extraordinary, that after so long an interval, the incidents of his campaigns should have been so freshly remembered. But we must consider that they were of the most strange and romantic character well fitted to make an impression on a young and susceptible imagination. They had probably been rehearsed by the veteran again and again to his family and friends, until every passage of the war were as familiar to his mind as the ‘Tale of Troy’ to the Greek rhapsodist, or the interminable adventures of Sir Lancelot or Sir Gawain to the Norman minstrel. The throwing of his narrative into the form of chronicle was but repeating it once more” (Cite in Cerwin 173 emphasis mine).

175 The citation of Bernal Díaz comes from the following edition: Conquista de la Nueva España. Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1933.
villas pobladas por los aztecas en el agua, la de la calzada, tan derecha y por nivel, que iba a Méjico, la de las grandes torres, cúes y edificios, cosas que le parecían de encantamiento, y a todos sus companeros como vistas entre sueños. A él hay que referirse para muchas de las mas peregrinas observaciones que tenemos sobre la civilización precortesiana, así como para los pasos iniciales de las nuevas fundaciones. El sembró los primeros naranjos que dieron fruto en las costas de la Nueva España, El quebró el hierro que se empleaba para marcar esclavos, y su acto fué aplaudido por el benemérito gobernante D. Sebastián Ramírez de Fuenleal (Introduction, IX).176

Indeed, the overabundant appearance of details and the clarity to recall them seems at times to erase the more than fifty years that separate Bernal Díaz with his past. However, Bernal Díaz’ reliance of detail also brings to light questions regarding their appropriate function. As María E. Mayer explains, “…el concepto y la función del ‘detalle’ estaba siendo objeto de una revisión y ésta acarreaba problemas de diverso tipo: no solo narratológico…sino también: retórico, de poética, histórica, metodológico, etc.” (95). In fact, Cortínez describes Bernal Díaz’ fondness for, and inclusion of “trivial” details as deriving from a sense of nostalgia in which: “Si él no las escribiera, él lo sabe, esas cosas desaparecerían” (19); a feeling that is best observed in Bernal’s obsession with accuracy as demonstrated by his numerous revisions.

176 Bernal Díaz’ account of the first oranges planted in the New World really underscores the extremes to which he employs the use of detail in his rhetorical strategies: “También quiero decir como yo sembré unas pepitas de naranjas junto a otras casas de ídolos, y fue desta manera: que cómo había muchos mosquitos e aquel río, fuíme a dormir a una casa alta de ídolos, e allí junto a aquella casa sembré siete u ocho pepitas de naranjas que había traído de Cuba, e nacieron muy bien; parece ser que los papas de aquellos ídolos les pusieron defensa para que no las comiesen hormigas, e las regaban e limpiaban desque vieron que eran plantas diferentes de las suyas. He traído aquí esto a la memoria para que se sepa que éstos fueron los primeros naranjos que se plantaron en la Nueva-España” (I, xvi, 104-05 emphasis original). This citation is from the edition: Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España. Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Historia 16, 1985.
From the time he began writing his history to the day of his death, Bernal made
the most seemingly insignificant, “painstaking corrections” to his manuscript (Cerwin,
175). And as Cerwin’s collection of random examples taken from Bernal Díaz’ history
demonstrates, his obsession to detail was extraordinary (175):

When writing about a certain battle he [Bernal] had said: ‘…and here they killed
two of our soldiers and wounded more than twenty.’ He crossed out ‘two’ and
substituted ‘one’; he scratched out ‘more than twenty’ and wrote in ‘twelve.’ On
another page he changed ‘that day they killed five soldiers’ to read ‘ten or twelve
soldiers.’ Again: ‘…and they gave such great battle they killed four soldiers to
read ‘eight or ten soldiers’ and changed the number of wounds to three instead of
two. ‘They kill three soldiers and one horse,’ he reduced to read ‘two soldiers.’
He first called the religious figures in the native temples gods, then made careful
changes throughout the manuscript so that the word ‘gods’ does not appear, but is
replaced instead with ‘idols.’ Names and places have often been changed, as was
even the color of a horse. In a single chapter, capítulo cxlv of the Guatemala
manuscript, there are more than 159 corrections and additions (175- 176,
emphasis Cerwin).

What we may conclude from this is that Bernal recognized the value of his undertaking
(176); his account held both the promise of praise, and judgement not only for Bernal
Díaz himself, but the soldiers themselves at his side (176):

Y si no basta lo bien que ya he dicho y propuesto de nuestra conquista, quiero
decir que miren las personas sabias y leidas ésta mi relación desde el principio
hasta el cabo, y verán que en ningunas escrituras en el mundo, ni en hechos
hazañosos humanos, ha habido hombres que más reinos y señoríos hayan
ganados, como nosotros los verdaderos conquistadores, para nuestro rey y señor,
y entre los fuertes conquistadores mis compañeros, puesto que los hombres muy
esforzados, a mí me tenían en la cuenta dellos, y el más antiguo de todos; y digo
otra vez que yo, yo, yo lo digo tantas veces, que yo soy el más antiguo y he
servido como muy buen soldado a su majestad (II, ccx 463 emphasis original).
Of course Bernal’s emphasis of “yo” serves to construct a rhetorical position, a voice that will succeed in creating verisimilar accounts of experience that will persuade his reader of the injustice that has been committed against him and his men:

[… y dígalo con tristeza de mi corazón, porque me veo pobre y muy viejo, una hija por casar, y los hijos varones ya grandes y con barbas, y otros por criar, y no puedo ir a Castilla antes su majestad para representarle cosas cumplideras a su real servicio, y también para que me haga mercedes, pues se me deben bien debidas” (II, ccx 463-64).

While Bernal’s emphatic “I” is contingent to the events witnessed it also points the subjectivity of such truth, since as González Echevarría reminds us, the events recounted in the Historia verdadera happened to Bernal Díaz (22):

Si la historia se ocupaba de los momentos culminantes, de los movimientos políticos y militares de más relieve, la relación de hechos, dado su carácter legal, narra incidentes de la vida cotidiana; no pretende reflejar una verdad trascendental que extrae de los hechos que narra, sino que es parte de esos hechos, de la realidad misma que relata, de ahí su valor antropológico e histórico, en el sentido moderno de la palabra. Pero de ahí también su valor literario posible, también en un sentido moderno. Lo que es una fórmula legal apartada en todo punto de la poética histórica se convierte en relato minucioso de una vida en su transcurrir individual y social específico, así como de los problemas que ésta presenta al ser narrada (23).

Similar to what we find in the prologue of Lazarillo de Tormes, González Echevarría believes that Bernal’s repeated and “fragmented” use of “yos” correspond to moments of “autoconocimiento o ingenuidad,” (23). Bernal Díaz is not only witness to his own life, (as is the case with Lazarillo), but also a “participant” to the history that he narrates (“participante de la historia que narra”) (23). In comparing more specifically the relation between Lazarillo and Bernal Díaz to the role of Don Quixote, who as protagonist goes about inventing his own novel of chivalry (“protagonista de la novela de caballería que va inventando”), González Echevarría concludes that:
En este sentido sí anticipan las crónicas la problemática de la novela moderna, que gira en torno al deseo de hacerse aparecer como un texto no literario. La historia llevaba a la poética; la relación, a lo literario. La escisión no se hará nítida sino hasta el siglo XVIII, como ha demostrado Foucault, y como era sabido ya por todo lector de la *Estética*, de Croce (23).

González Echevarría’s ideas present an opportunity to examine more closely just how this “desire” to resemble a non-literary text manifests itself in the *Quijote*.

In chapter VIII of part two, Don Quixote mentions by name Hernán Cortés and the New World when speaking of, as Sancho Panza states: “esa leyenda o historia…” of their adventures through La Mancha as knight errant and squire respectively (1297). Indeed with the publication of their recent adventures through La Mancha, Don Quixote and Sancho enjoyed a newfound fame among their readers, one which would rival that of others, both literary and historical. However, the publication of the *Quijote* also brought with it concern over the truthfulness to which they were portrayed:

[…] y así, temo que en aquella historia que dicen que anda impresa de mis hazañas, si por ventura ha sido su autor algún sabio mi enemigo, habrá puesto unas cosas por otras, mezclando con su verdad mil mentiras, divirtiéndose a contar otras acciones fuera de lo que requiere la continuación de una verdadera historia (1297).

A bit further ahead, we see the origin of Don Quixote’s apprehension. He expresses to Sancho: “…que el deseo de alcanzar fama es activa en gran manera,” offering among his many examples (both literary and historical) the Spanish expedition to the Indies, in which in rhetorical fashion he asks Sancho: “… ¿quién barrenó los navíos y dejó en seco y aislados los valerosos españoles guiados por el cortesísimo Cortés en el Nuevo Mundo?” He concludes that:

Todas estas y otras grandes y diferentes hazañas son, fueron y serán obra de la fama, que los mortales desean como premio y parte de la inmortalidad que sus
famosos hechos merecen, puesto que los cristianos, católicos y andantes caballeros más hacemos de atender a la gloria de los siglos venideros, que es eterna en las regiones etéreas y celestes, que al vanidad de la fama que en este presente y acabable siglo se alcanza; la cual fama, por mucho que dure, en fin se ha de acabar con el mismo mundo, que tiene su fin señalado (II, viii 1299).

These words resonate with what we see in the writings of other cronistas of the New World, in particular Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (as discussed in chapter four) and Bernal Díaz del Castillo. In fact, Bernal Díaz states in his Historia verdadera: “Y más me prometió la buena fama, que por su parte lo pondrá con voz muy clara a do quiera que se hallare. Y demás de lo que ella declara, que mi historia si se imprime, cuando la vean e oigan, la darán fe verdadera, y oscurecerá las lisonjas de los pasados” (II, cxx 466).

Bernal Díaz’ pursuit of compensation is more than a recognition of his life and the lives of all those who fought with Cortés. It is also “fame,” which, in a manner similar to the concerns Don Quixote expresses as he relishes the notoriety to be gained by his published feats, drives Bernal Díaz to write his story. While there are several allusions to the New World in Cervantes’ Don Quixote, there exist important narrative commonalities as well between the the novel and Bernal Díaz’ account, including the use of detail as a rhetorical technique to present to their respective readers the artifice of an un tarnished, that is, firsthand account.

177 Cortínez speaks to this point explaining that Bernal Díaz’ pursuit of fame reveals the extreme nature of his dual personality, in which: “...la huella del viejo soldado de quien nadie tiene noticia y la figura del antiguo conquistador que merece renombre y eterna fama...Su nombre [Bernal Díaz] ni siquiera aparece en las listas de conquistadores que se enviaban al Consejo de Indias para el reparto de beneficios, y las crónicas de la conquista de México suelen ignorarlo” (139). Cortínez mentions by name chroniclers who exclude all reference to Bernal Díaz’ participation in the conquest, which among the more prominent include: “...Las Casas, Cortés, Oviedo, Francisco Cervantes de Salazar, fray Bernardino de Sahagún y por supuesto, el tríángulo de Gómara, Illescas y Giovio, cuyo olvido de los soldados es combatido de modo explícito en la Historia verdadera” (140).
As we have seen up to this point, Bernal Díaz’ extraordinary ability to recall the most insignificant details from the past as if present, shares similarities with Cervantes’ Cide Hamete. Indeed, the presumed author of the Quixote expresses his own affinity to detail as the quintessential component for any serious rendition of history:

Real y verdaderamente, todos los que gustan de semejantes historia como ésta, deben de mostrarse agradecidos a Cide Hamete, su autor, primero, por la curiosidad que tuvo en contarnos las semínimas de ella, sin dejar cosa, por menuda que fuese, que no la sacase a luz distintamente, pinta los pensamientos, descubre las imaginaciones, responde a las tácitas, aclara las dudas, resuelve los argumentos; finalmente, los átomos del más curioso deseo manifiesta (II, xl 1407). 178

In fact, earlier in the Quixote, Don Quixote expresses the importance of these traits in his description of what constitutes a good historian, especially when it comes to recounting his own exploits: “Pues en verdad que en sólo manifestar mis pensamientos, mis suspiros, mis lágrimas, mis buenos deseos y mis acometimientos pudiera hacer un volumen mayor…,” all of which must be included when attempting to write history, being that: “La historia es como cosa sagrada; porque ha de ser verdadera, y donde está la verdad, está Dios, en cuanto a verdad; pero hay algunos que así componen y arrojan libros de sí como si fuesen buñuelos” (II, iii, 1284). The sacredness to which Don Quixote attributes truth to history is a notion that as we may recall, is shared by Bernal Díaz as well, who in

178 Cide Hamet’s propensity for detail is noted time and again throughout Don Quixote. Indeed, in the same manner that Bernal Díaz’s extraordinary memory allows him to recall the most insignificant detail decades removed from his time alongside Cortés, Cervantes bestows upon his author, that is Cide Hamete, an incredible propensity for detail: “Fuera de que Cide Hamete Benengeli fué historiador muy curioso y muy puntual en todas las cosas, y échase bien de ver, pues las que quedan referidas, con ser tan mínimas y tan raras, no las quiso pasar en silencio; de donde podrán tomar ejemplo los historiadores graves, que nos cuentan las acciones tan corta y sucintamente, que apenas nos llegan a los labios, dejándose en el tintero, ya por descuido, por malicia o ignorancia, los más sustancial de la obras” (I xvi, 1085).
his prologue to *Historia verdadera* states: “...más lo que yo oí y me hallé en ello
peleando, como buen testigo de vista, yo escribiré, con el ayuda de Dios, muy
llanamente, sin torcer a una parte ni a otra” (Prologue, 1).179 Indeed, the use of detail and
its importance to truth is manifested, and shares similarities between the descriptive
tendencies of Bernal Díaz and his literary counterpart Cide Hamete.

In chapter XXXVII of part one, Cide Hamete offers a somewhat Bernalesque
description of a traveler and his entourage as he enters the inn visited by Don Quixote
and his squire Sancho Panza in which as Cide Hamete states:

[...] en su traje mostraba ser Cristiano, recién venido de tierra de moros, porque
venía vestido con una casaca de paño azul, corta de faldas, con medias mangas y
sin cuello...traía unos borceguíes datilados y un alfanje morisco, puesto en un
tahalí que le atravesaba el pecho. Entró luego tras él, encima de un jumento, una
mujer a la morisca vestida, cubierto el rostro con una toca en la cabeza; traía un
bonetillo de brocado, y vestía una almalafa, que desde los hombros a los pies la
cubría. Era el hombre de robusto y agraciado talle, su edad de poco más de
cuarenta años, algo moreno de rostro, largo de bigotes y la barba muy bien
puesta; en resolución: él mostraba en su apariencia que, si estuviera bien vestido,
le juzgaran por persona de calidad y bien nacida (I, xxxvii 1202-03, emphasis
mine).

We can compare the abundance of detail to be found in this depiction with that of Bernal
Díaz, who with a “human presence” as previously described by Anthony J. Cascardi, sets
out describing the love and “gravity:” to be found in “the facial expressions” of
Montezuma (206):

*Sería* el gran Moctezuma de edad de hasta cuarenta años, y de buena estatura y
bien proporcionado, e cenceño e pocas carnes, y la color no muy moreno, sino
propia color y matiz de indio, y traía los cabellos no muy largos, sino cuanto le
cubrían las orejas, e pocas barbas, prietas y bien puestas e ralas, y el rostro algo
largo e alegre, los ojos de buena manera, e mostraba en su persona el mirar por un
cabo amor, e cuando era menester gravedad (, xci 322 emphasis original).

179 The citation of Bernal Díaz comes from the following edition: *Conquista de la Nueva
What for Santo María is a “lengthy conversation” that takes the form of an intimate “confesión,” Cortínez sees as a complete absence of structure, yet not one void of merit: “...Bernal nos asombra por la ausencia de conjunciones y adverbios que marquen la subordinación” (202). In addition, Verónica Cortínez explains the manner in which (201-202):

Al describir a Cortés, Bernal empieza por la cabeza y desciende lentamente, como si pensara en voz alta, hasta llegar a las piernas. En la cabeza encuentra ciertos defectos (de hecho, un defecto tras otro), pero lo que cuenta son los ojos...Después, como la cabeza, las piernas no son perfectas, pero también se redimen con lo más importante, el uso que de ellas hacía Cortéz: ‘algo estevado’ conduce de modo casi inevitable a ‘buen jinete’, y de ahí a ‘diestro de todas armas’, y de ahí al resto de esa cláusula, el clímax rítmico y poderoso (203).

While as Cortínez indicates, Bernal’s description of Montezuma is shaped by a memory more than half a century removed from his encounter with the Aztec leader, it is nonetheless remarkable the similarities that are to be found between the two descriptions, in particular that of the man last in entering the inn (emphasized), and Bernal Díaz’ systematically descending description of Montezuma. As Cortínez suggests in her assessment of Bernal, both writers begin their respective portrayal of these two men in similar fashion: beginning at the head and “slowly” descending the body only to end with a general assessment as to their respective disposition (203). Yet, while Bernal Díaz limits to a larger extent his account to “lo que oí y me hallé en ella peleando, como buen testigo

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180 In her analysis on the structure of Bernal Díaz’ *Historia*, Cortínez demonstrates the absence of words including: “though as,” “because,” “for example,” “so,” and “then,” (202).
de vista” (Prologue, 1), Cide Hamete seems to have taken the liberty that Juan Luis Vives speaks of in *De ratione dicendi*, in which he imagines the ideal historical narrator as an unlimited eyewitness, able to decipher the most hidden affairs:

Para que la prudencia salga con mayor relieve, explíquense las causas y los consejos y los resultados, y si en el negocio hubiere algo oculto o arcano, revélese, pues ello realza más la prudencia que los sucesos de todos conocidos. Por lo demás, así como dijimos que para la descripción lo preferible era poner toda la cosa debajo de los ojos, así también en la Historia el ideal es que el historiador proponga el desarrollo histórico, como si se contemplare desde una atalaya (3.3, 783- 83).

Anticipating Cide Hamete, who not only “Pinta los pensamientos, descubre las imaginaciones” but in so doing “aclara las dudas [y] resuelve los argumentos,” (II, xl 1407), Vives requires that the historian narrate as if present, as a “supernatural” witness who can both see from a distance and penetrate the “occult” meanings of an event (Beckjord, 5). Yet, while mindful of his limitations as a firsthand witness to the conquest, from time to time Bernal Díaz also transgresses his own stated limitations. A case in point occurs amid his detailed account of the first spoken exchange between Cortés and Montezuma. It is here where we observe Bernal Díaz follow Vives’ notion of a supernatural witness, in which as Oswaldo Estrada has noted: “Aunque no sea realista que el emperador utilice vocablos en latín u otros propios del uso español, Bernal logra internarnos en la conciencia de Moctezuma” (106). Unlike any other indigenous figure, the space and freedom afforded to Montezuma and his beliefs is without precedence (105):

Señor Malinche: muy bien tengo entendido vuestras pláticas y razonamientos antes de ahora, que a mis criados, sobre vuestro Dios, les dijistes en el arenal, y

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181 The citation of Bernal Díaz comes from the following edition: *Conquista de la Nueva España*. Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1933.
eso de la cruz, y todas las cosas que en los pueblos por donde habéis venido habéis predicado; no os hemos respondido a cosa ninguna dellas porque desde abinicio acá adoramos nuestros dioses y los tenemos por buenos, e así deben ser los vuestros, e no os curéis más al presente de nos hablar dellos; y en eso de la creación del mundo, así lo tenemos nosotros creído muchos tiempos pasados; e a esta causa tenemos por cierto que sois los que nuestros antecesores nos dijeron que vendrían de adonde sale el sol, e a ese vuestro gran rey yo le soy en cargo y le daré de lo que tuviere; porque, como dicho tengo otra vez, bien ha dos años tengo noticia de capitanes que vinieron con navíos por donde vosotros venistéis, y decían que eran criados dese vuestro gran rey. Querría saber si sois todos unos

Further ahead, Bernal captures a remarkable glimpse into the inner workings of the Aztec leader. Indeed, while laughing, Montezuma explains to Cortés (along with the others present at the time), of the confusion surrounding his divine status (105):

Y luego el Montezuma dijo riendo porque en todo era muy regocijado en su hablar de gran señor: ‘Malínche: bien sé que te han dicho esos de Tlascala, con quien tanta amistad habéis tomado, que yo: que soy como dios o teule, que cuanto hay en mis casas es todo oro e plata y piedras ricas; bien tengo conocido que como sois entendidos, y que no creíais y lo teníais por burla; lo que ahora, señor Malínche, veis: mi cuerpo de hueso y de carne como los vuestros, mis casas y palacios de piedra y madera y cal; de ser yo gran rey, sí soy, y tener riquezas de mis antecesores, sí tengo; mas no las locuras y mentiras que de mi os han dicho; así que también lo tendréis por burla, como yo tengo lo de vuestros truenos y relámpagos (XC, 320-21 emphasis mine).

In allowing Montezuma the opportunity to contest his own divinity, Bernal not only offers his reader an intimate portrayal of the Aztec leader, but also, as Estrada explains, “recalca su superioridad”(106). Estrada believes this is yet another novelistic trait, “…calculada de valores internos, enriquecida por una perspectiva que la contrasta y además cuestiona sus bases físicas y espirituales (106). Something similar occurs in the Quixote.

In chapter XLVIII of part one, Don Quixote finds himself caged on top of a cart. Bewildered as to how to relate his predicament in light of other knight errant that came
before him, Don Quixote justifies his imprisonment as yet another act of enchantment:

“Pues así es…que yo voy encantado en esta jaula, por envidia y fraude más es perseguida
de los malos que amada de los buenos” (1249). Regardless of the fact that this experience
stands without precedence in the histories of the knight errant, Don Quixote remains
convinced of his identity, affirming that:

Caballero andante soy, y no aquellos de cuyos nombre jamás la Fama se acordó
para eternizarlos en su memoria, sino de aquellos que, a despecho y pesar de la
misma envidia, y de cuantos magos crió Perisia, bracmanes la India, giniofístas
la Etiopía, han de poner su nombre en el templo de la inmortalidad para de
ejemplo y dechado en los venideros siglos, donde los caballeros andantes vean los
pasos que han de seguir, si quisiéren llegar a la cumbre y alteza honrosa de las
armas (1249).

No longer a simple mortal among men, with his new acquired fame (product of
his recently published adventures), he is by his own esteem, among the greatest
“caballeros andantes” ever to have lived, as proof by his discussion with Sancho: “Pero
dime por tu vida: ¿has leído en historias otro que tenga ni haya tenido más brio en
acometer, más aliento en el perseverar, más destreza en el herir, ni más mana en el
derribar?” (I, x 1064). This is further substantiated time and again by: “…la mala
intención de aquellos a quienes la virtud enfada y la valentía enoja” (I, xlvi 1249) Yet,
while the canon would reinforce such beliefs for his own purposes, Sancho, the ever
incredulous squire, would once again dispel such a notion stating for the record that:

Ahora señores, quiéranme bien o quiéranme mal por lo que dijere, el caso de ello
es que así va encantado mi señor Don Quijote como mi madre: él tiene su entero
juicio, él come y bebe, y hace sus necesidades como los demás hombres, y como
las hacia ayer, antes que le enjaulasen. Siendo esto así, ¿Cómo quieren hacerme a
mí entender que va encantado? Pues yo he oído decir a muchas personas que los
encantados ni comen, ni duermen, ni hablan, y mi amo, si no le van a la mano,
hablará más que treinta procuradores (1249, emphasis mine).
While Bernal Díaz allows Montezuma to challenge the myth of his divinity that had promulgated among other cronistas and to some extent excepted by his “curious readers,” Cervantes uses Sancho to remind his “idle reader” of the vacillating duality that is at work throughout the Quixote. The successfulness to which both men seem to underscore the humanity of their subjects brings us back to the ideas of Juan Luis Vives.

As discussed in chapter two, Vives believed that historic narration must reflect the “image” accurately (Beckjord, 33). Vives likens such images as, “…la tabla que un pintor iluminó” (1.2, 1185). Or to a mirror in which: “Como es preciso que sea espejo de los tiempos, si [el historiador] refiere falsedades, el espejo será falso y devolverá una imagen que no habrá recibido. Tampoco será verídica la imagen si fuere mayor o menor que la realidad; quiero decir, si el historiador, adrede, deprime el suceso o lo encarece” (3.3, 781). Vives explains that history, “Es como la pintura, la imagen o el espejo de las cosas pasadas. Así como se cuentan las cosas pretéritas, también las venideras” (3.3, 780). Vives also insists that historical representations offer insight (Beckjord, 32). It is at this point that Vives turns his discussion to reason, in which:

Recibida ya aquella primera y sencilla imagen, que ha entrado por las puertas de los sentidos, la fantasía añade a ella otras representaciones y formas de las cualidades y actos que se perciben mediante los sentidos mismos. Luego se allega la razón y compara aquellos elementos entre sí, los clasifica debidamente, que son éstos o aquéllos, que hacen tal cosa o tal otra (1.2, 1191).

Reason not only expresses “…la cualidad de una cosa o lo que hace... [But also]... que es o no es,” (1.2 1191). Vives calls this process “discursos,” explaining that:

No puede la fantasía figurarse imagen alguna que no sea de las cosas que adquirió con el concurso de los sentidos…Mas la razón pasa tan de vuelo por aquellas imagine, que no concibe en si ninguna absolutamente o tan ligeramente, que parece que no es ninguna. Nada toma de los accidentes particulares; por eso mira a lo lejos y se aparta cuanto puede de lo que vio (1.2, 1192).
In fact, Vives makes explicit that without the use of fantasy, reason cannot function at all, since as he explains:

[…] la razón utiliza también fantasmas, aunque sin mezclarse con ellas. Así que el sentido sirve a la imaginación y esta a la fantasía, la cual a su vez sirve al entendimiento y a la reflexión, y la reflexión al recuerdo, el recuerdo a la comparación y esta a la razón en último término. El sentido es una como mirada de la sombra, la fantasía, o la imaginación lo es de la imagen; la inteligencia, del cuerpo; la razón, de la forma y de las fuerzas (1.2, 1192 emphasis Vives).

In chapter XLVIII of part one of the Quixote, the priest expresses to the canon his disdain for comedies, in particular those to do with historic events. He likens them to the “nonsense” that are to be found in books of chivalry, explaining: “…porque habiendo de ser la comedia, según le parece a Tulio, espejo de la vida humana, ejemplo de las costumbres e imagen de la verdad, las que ahora se representan son espejos de disparates, ejemplos de necedades e imágenes de lascivia” (1252-53). As we have seen with Cide Hamete, who “pinta los pensamientos,” the connection between history as a mirror or in particular, as a painted reflection is an idea that is repeated often in the Quijote. However, for history to be truthful it must not only be witnessed, and as we have discussed previously “illuminated” (1.2, 1185), it must also be experienced by its author.

In chapter VI of part one, Don Quixote, in alluding to the physical misery one must endure as a knight errant, affirms that:

[…] nosostros, los caballeros andantes verdaderos, al sol, al frío, al aire, a las inclemencias del cielo, de noche y de día, a pie y a caballo, medimos toda la tierra con nuestros mismos pies, y no solamente conocemos los enemigos pintados, sino en su mismo ser, y en todo trance y en toda ocasión los acometemos, sin mirar en niñerías, ni en las leyes de los desafíos” (1291, emphasis mine).
Similarly, Bernal Díaz deploys a rhetoric of experience to lend verisimilitude to his account of the conquest: “…digo y afirmo que lo que en este libro se contiene es muy Verdadero, que como testigo de vista me hallé en todas las batallas y reencuentros de guerra, y no son cuentos viejos que a manera de decir, ayer pasó lo que verán en mi historia, y cómo y cuándo, y de qué manera” (Prologue, 65). Indeed, not only did he participate in the successes that were to be gained as a faithful foot-soldier to the Crown, but he also experienced the suffering that such endeavor entails: “[la] pestilencia[es], de que se nos murieron muchos soldados, y de más desto, todos los más adolecimos, y se nos hacían unas malas llagas en las piernas” (I, 66). And while it is true that unlike Bernal Díaz, the battles that were to be had in the *Quixote* against enchanters, giants, wizards etc., are the doings of Don Quixote’s imagination, (product of his assiduous readings of chivalric romances), the physical aftermath of such fantastical encounters remain nonetheless “verisimilarly” real within the literary world in which he inhabits: for as his niece, who was present on Don Quixote’s first and subsequent return from his endeavors would attest to:

La vez primera nos le volvieron atravesado sobre un jumento, molido a palos. La segunda, vino en un carro de bueyes, metido y encerrado en una jaula, adonde él se daba a entender que estaba encantado; y venía tal el triste, que no le conociera la madre que le parió; flaco, amarillo, los ojo hundidos en los últimos camaranchones del cerebro; que para haberle de volver algún tanto en sí, gasté más de seisientos huevos, como lo sabe Dios y todo el mundo, y mis gallinas, que no me dejarán mentir (II, vii, 1293).

Of course it is no surprise that Bernal Díaz, whose repeated position is that he is telling-it-as-it-is, would disclose to his “curious reader” the most horrific scenes; it would be prudent of us to question the accuracy to which they are given. A case in point is the following citation which speaks to Bernal’s imagination, influenced to some extent
(although clearly not to that of Don Quixote’s) as by his own readings of chivalric romances:\textsuperscript{182}

\[\ldots\] hágoos,…saber que de quinientos cincuenta soldados, que pasamos con Cortés desde la isla de Cuba, no somos vivos en toda la Nueva-España, de todos ellos, hasta este año de 1568 que estoy trasladando esta relación, sino cinco; que todos los demás murieron de sus muertes. Y los sepulcros,… digo que son los vientres de los indios, que los comieron las piernas y muslos, brazos y molinedos, pies y manos; y los demás, fueron sepultados sus vientres, que echaban a los tigres y sierpes y halcones, que en aquel tiempo tenían por grandeza en casas fuertes, y aquellos fueron sus sepulcros y allí están sus blasones (II, ccx 464-65).

As I discussed earlier, the fundamental role of memory observed in Bernal Díaz’ descriptions are shared by Cervantes’ literary creations. While Bernal Díaz’ memory is perhaps without precedence and stands as the narrative structure of \textit{Historia verdadera}, (as previously mentioned), several characters of the \textit{Quixote} also share in a memory that is fundamental to its structure. Memory stands as both the physical as well as metaphysical component which not only creates, but transforms Don Quixote’s perception of reality, and to a greater extent those he encounters along the way. This would include both his literary followers (after the publication of part one), and his more than half-century long “idle readers,” of whom Cervantes speaks of in his prologue. In fact, a curious connection arises between Don Quixote’s lucid memory of chivalric

\textsuperscript{182} The often-cited passage which speaks to this can be found in chapter LXXXVII of the \textit{Historia verdadera}, in which Bernal Díaz compares their arrival to Mexico with the enchantment to be found in the book of \textit{Amadis}: “…y desde que vimos tantas ciudades y villas pobladas en el agua, y en tierra firme otras grandes poblaciones, y aquella calzada tan derecho por nivel como iba a México, nos quedamos admirados, y decíamos que parecía a las cosas y encantamiento que cuentan en el libro de \textit{Amadis}, por las grandes torres y cues y edificios que tenían dentro en el agua, y todas de cal y canto; y aun algunos de nuestros soldados decían que si aquello que aquí si era entre sueños. Y no es de maravillar que yo aquí lo escriba desta manera, porque hay que ponderar mucho en ello, que no sé cómo lo cuente, ver cosas nunca oídas ni vistas y aun soñadas, como vimos” (Volume I, 310-11).
romances, the substance of his presumed insanity, and that of its most ardent critics: the
priest (Lic. Pedro Pérez), and barber (Maese Nicolás).

There is no better proof of Don Quixote’s tremendous ability of recollection than
chapter XLIX of part one, in which in defense of knight errantry he offers an exhaustive
list of its most famous actors: “Porque querer dar a entender a nadie que Amadís no fué
en el mundo, ni todos los otros caballeros aventureros de que están colmada las historias,
será querer persuadir que el sol no alumbra, ni el yelo enfríe, ni la tierra sustenta…”
(1257-58). Of course the list that Don Quixote offers to the cannon is an ingenious
mixture of both literary as well as historic characters of which, “Admirado quedó el
canónigo de oír la mezcla que Don Quijote hacía de verdades y mentiras” (I, xlix 1258).
Don Quixote’s inability to distinguish between the two worlds brings us back to the
origin of his presumed insanity, that is “…del poco dormir y del mucho leer, se le secó el
cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio,” and at which point he would begin to blur
the lines of fiction and reality: “[Pues] Decía él que el Cid Ruy Díaz había sido muy buen
caballero, pero que no tenía que ver con el Caballero de la Ardiente Espada” (I, i 1038).

The negative impact of such readings is not lost on those closest to Alonso
Quijano (i.e Don Quixote), who as a preventative measure take it upon themselves to rid
Don Quixote’s library of such frivolous works. Yet before they can toss them in the fire,
the priest alongside the barber must reinsurance that Don Quixote’s collection of more than
“cien cuerpos de libros grandes, muy bien encuadernados y otros pequeños,” all are
deserving of such a fate (I, vi 1051). It is at this moment that the priest exhibits an
unprecedented familiarity with the storied adventures of knights’ errant, one which more
than rivals that of Don Quixote’s. Indeed, at the behest of the priest, the barber “fuese
dando de aquellos libros uno a uno para ver de qué trataban, pues podía ser hallar algunos que no mereciesen castigo de fuego” (I, vi 1051). Beginning with *Amadís de Gaula*, who as founder of such an ominous genre could not but be condemned, and concluding with *Tirante el Blanco*, the priest as judge, jury and executioner goes about making the case to which ones deserve to be saved or destroyed measured by the qualities of their respective contents. Indeed, as the following two examples attest to, the breadth of the priest knowledge, especially in light of his outspoken disdain for such books is extraordinary: “Este que sigue es *Florismarte de Hircania*- dijo el Barbero,” to which the priest would reply: “Pues a fe que ha de parar presto en el corral, a pesar de su extraño nacimiento y soñadas aventuras; que no da lugar a otra cosa la dureza y sequedad de su estilo. Al corral con él” (I, vi 1052). A bit later, the barber would hand him the *Historia del famoso caballero Tirante el Blanco*, to which the priest would once more reply, this time with an enthusiastic “¡Válgame Dios!” that:

¡Que aquí está *Tirante el Blanco!* Dádmele acá, compadre; que hago cuenta que he hallado en él un tesoro de contento y una mina de pasatiempos. Aquí está don Quirieleisón de Montalbán, valeroso caballero, y su hermano Tomás de Montalbán, y el caballero Fonseca, con la batalla que el valiente de Tirante hizo con el alano, y las agudezas de la doncella Placerdemivida, con los amores y embustes de la viuda Reposada, y la señora Emperatriz enamorada de Hipólito, su escudero. Dígoos verdad, señor compadre, que por su estilo, es este el mejor libro del mundo; aquí come los caballeros y duermen y mueren en sus camas, y hacen testamento antes de su muerte, con otras cosas de que todos los demás libros de este género carecen. Con todo eso, os digo que merecía el que lo compuso, pues no hizo tantas necedades de industria, que le echaran a galeras por todos los días de su vida (I, vi 1052, emphasis mine).

The priest’s knowledge of --in light of his disdain for-- such books foreshadows the canon’s own impressions. And of course, while he states that he is equally appalled by such literature, the canon confesses his own attempt at writing it:

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Yo, al menos- replicó el canónigo-, he tenido cierta tentación de hacer un libro de caballerías, guardando en él todos los puntos que he significado; y sí he de confesar la verdad, tengo escritas más de cien hojas...pero con todo esto, no he proseguido adelante, así por parecerme que hago cosa ajena de mi profesión como por ver que es más el número de los simples que de los prudentes (I, xlvi 1252).

As with Sancho’s description of the authentic Don Quixote, *Tirante el Blanco* seemingly distaste for the hyperbole found in most novels of chivalry saves it from condemnation. Whether it be Montezuma’s self-description or some character in the *Quijote* (i.e. Sancho, the priest or cannon), verisimilitude plays a fundamental role not only for the historian who is to be considered “grave” and “prudente,” but for the reader who is repeatedly summoned to participate in the reconstruction of the past.

Indeed, just as Cide Hamete would have his reader decide for himself if what Don Quixote saw in the cave of Montesinos should be taken as the truth, a lie, or something in between, Bernal Díaz often empowers his “curious readers” to judge for themselves as to the true version of events. In his prologue to *Historia verdadera*, Bernal Díaz states:

“Tengo que acabar de escribir ciertas cosas que faltan, que aún no se han acabado”

(Prologue, 66). Despite his best effort, Bernal cannot account for everything (Estrada, 49). And it is because of this that he invites the reader to share in his narrative experience (49): “Miren los curiosos lectores esto que escribo, si había bien que ponderar en ello” (I, lxxxviii, 313). Instead of directing his attention to the Spanish monarch (as is observed in the majority of *crónicas*), Bernal makes his “curious reader,” an accomplice to his experience in the New World, in which (Estrada 49): “…su voz abre un pórtico discursivo para que sus lectores ingresen a un mundo que en ciertas instancias superará
As noted by Cortínez, Bernal Díaz’ desire for the reader to play an active role reflects his attitude towards his own writing (67). Bernal must contend with the recollection of old memories, but also with the writing process itself (67).

Accordingly, Bernal Díaz often empowers his reader to judge for themselves as to the true version of events. He does so at times by disparaging his adversary. A popular case in point can be observed in Bernal Díaz’ account of Francisco López de Gómora’s apostolic military intervention, in which as he goes on to state:

Aquí es donde dice Francisco López de Gómora (que salió Francisco de Morla en un caballo rucio picado antes que llegase Cortés con los de a caballo, y) que eran los santos apóstoles señor Santiago o señor san Pedro… y pudiera ser que los que dice el Gómara fueran los gloriosos apóstoles señor Santiago o señor san Pedro, e yo, como pecador, no fuese digno de verles; lo que yo entonces vi y conocí fue a Francisco de Morla en un caballo castaño, que venía juntamente con Cortés, que me parece que ahora que lo estoy escribiendo se me representa por estos ojos pecadores toda la guerra, según y de la manera que allí pasamos. Y ya que yo, como indigno pecador, no fuera merecedor de ver a cualquiera de aquellos gloriosos apóstoles, allí en nuestra compañía había sobre cuatrocientos soldados, y Cortés y otros muchos caballeros...y si fuera así como lo dice el Gómara, harto

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183 Estrada highlights the manner in which Bernal Díaz guides his reader through a maze of digressions with phrases that draw them to his narrative such as: “y volviendo a nuestra material’ (I, 4), ‘quiero volver a mi material’ (II, 5), ‘volvamos a nuestro cuento’ (II, 5), ‘dejemos esta plática’ (VI, 13), o simplemente: ‘ya he dicho’ (VII, 14)” (Cite in Estrada, 50). Moreover, when Bernal Díaz has drifted away from the topic at hand, he corrects course with statements such as: “mucho me he detenido en contar cosas viejas, y dirán que por decir una antigüedad dejé de seguir mi relación. Volvamos a ella” (VII, 17 cite in Estrada 50).

184 Indeed Cortinez explains that: […] su [Bernal Díaz] necesidad de entrometerse en la historia que narra para entender, y justificar, las múltiples contradicciones narrativas. Gran parte del interés específico de este ‘memorial’ radica…en la tensión que existe entre estos diferentes propósitos narrativos,” [concluding that] “Lo… ‘notable y digno’ de la Historia verdadera es la incapacidad del narrador de mantenerse fiel a una sola perspectiva. A pesar suyo, Bernal Díaz comprueba que es necesario a ajustar la realidad vivida a las exigencias de la escritura (67).
The insinuation that Bernal Díaz makes here, I believe to be quite clear. In a highly ingenious manner (that is supposedly foreign to his nature), Bernal Díaz has his reader decide who to believe: Gómara, an erudite priest and historian, the product of his days spent in the exclusive confines of privilege, or a forgotten patriot, whose lasting legacy is the blood that he shed on the battle fields of America. As I alluded to earlier, we find a similar scene in the Quixote. Cide Hamete, who while not fully discrediting the testimony of Don Quixote as to what he saw in the cave of Montesinos, does so in an equally suggestive way:

Pues pensar yo que Don Quijote mintiese, siendo el más verdadero hidalgo y el más noble caballero de sus tiempos, no es posible; que no dijera él una mentira si le asaetearan. Por otra parte, considero que él la contó y la dijo con todas las circunstancias dichas, y que no pudo fabricar en tan breve espacio tan gran máquina de disparates; y si esta aventura parece apócrifa, yo no tengo la culpa; y así, sin afirmarla por falsa o por verdadera, la escribo (II, xxiv 1355).

Ultimately, such reasoning on the part of Cide Hamete has him wash his hands of such a seemingly polemic decision, leaving such matters to his reader:

Tú, lector, pues eres prudente juzga lo que te pareciere, que yo no debo ni puedo más, puesto que se tiene por cierto que al tiempo de su fin y muerte dicen que se retractó de ella, y dijo que él la había inventado, por parecerle que convenía y cuadraba bien con las aventuras que había leído en sus historias (1355).

While the reader is left to his own devices as to what to believe, the decision is further complicated by Cide Hamete’s reliance on detail, this time as a means of portraying a chronological reenactment of Don Quixote’s encounter with the cave of Montesinos.
Montesinos: “Las cuatro de la tarde serían, cuando el sol, entre nubes cubierto, con luz escasa y templados rayos, dio lugar a Don Quijote para que sin calor y pesadumbre contase a sus dos clarísimos oyentes lo que en la cueva de Montesinos había visto” (II, xxiv 1350 emphasis mine). And while Don Quixote remains convinced that the duration of his stay deep in the cave seemed to him as consisting of “tres días con sus noches”, explaining that “…porque allá me anocheció y amaneció, y tornó a anochecer y amanecer tres veces; de modo que, a mi cuenta, tres días he estado en aquellas partes remotas y escondidas a la vista nuestra” (II, xxiii 1353), we know from Sancho that in fact his stay in the cave lasted a little more than one hour (“Poco más de una hora”). Of course, on seeing the nonsensicality of Don Quixote’s account, the reader feels obliged to believe Sancho and the cousin who defends his assessment of time. Yet, we mustn’t overlook what Cide Hamete had to say on the matter. In the previous chapter, Cide Hamete recounts in great detail Don Quixote’s journey on entering the mouth of the cave:

Iba Don Quijote dando voces que le diesen soga y más soga, y ellos se la daban poco a poco; y cuando las voces que acanaladas por la cueva salían dejaron de oírse, ya ellos tenían descolgadas las cien brazas de soga, y fueron de parecer de volver a subir a Don Quijote, pues no le podían dar más cuerda. Con todo esto, se detuvieron como media hora, al cabo del cual espacio volvieron a recoger la soga con mucha facilidad y sin peligro alguno, señal que les hizo imaginar que Don

185 The use of detail in the scene is also used as a means to connect previous discussions with regard to the realness of Don Quixote, who as Sancho reminds us time and again, is first and foremost a man: “…él come y bebe, y hace sus necesidades como los demás hombres” (I, xlvii 1249). In order to further complicate the reader’s decisión as to who and what to believe with regard to Don Quixote’s experience in the cave, Sancho asks him if during his time in the cave he had eaten anything, to which the following discussion pursued: “No me he desayunado de bocado- respondió Don Quijote,- ni aun he tenido hambre, ni por pensamiento”/ “Y los encantados, ¿comen?- dijo el primo” / “-No comen- respondió Don Quijote-, ni tienen excrementos mayores; aunque es opinión que les crecen las uñas, las barbas y los cabellos” / “¿Y duermen, por ventura, los encantados, señor?- preguntó Sancho” / “-No, por cierto- respondió Don Quijote; a lo menos, en estos tres días que yo he estado con ellos, ninguno ha pegado el ojo, ni yo tampoco” (II, xxiii 1353).
Quijote se quedaba dentro, y creyéndolo así Sancho, lloraba amargamente y tiraba con mucha prisa por desengancharse (II, xxii 1349).

In Cide Hamete’s account we are told that Don Quixote’s experience in the cave lasted approximately a half hour. This of course contradicts Sancho’s later assessment. And to make things worse, the author goes to great lengths to inform his reader that of the “cien brazas” of rope, in actuality Don Quixote’s only used twenty (the rest went to making a more comfortable place for him to sit): “…pero llegando, a su parecer, a poco más de las ochenta brazas, sintieron peso, de que en extremo se alegraron. Finalmente, a las diez vieron distintamente a Don Quijote…” (II, xxii 1349, emphasis mine). While this information is consistent with both the half hour to one hour assessment, such detail only further complicates an already complicated decision for the reader as to who to believe: the author who swears by his statements as proof of his abundantly detailed reenactment, Sancho and the cousin who remain outside and thus unaffected by the mysterious powers of the enchanted cave, or Don Quixote who is the only one to have actually entered the cave itself. As the distance between all three increases, that is, as we get further from the main actor which is Don Quixote himself toward a more omnipresent view of events, reliability remains flimsy at best. The notion of verisimilitude is certainly at play both here and Bernal Díaz’ early assessment of Gómara’s apostolic intervention, which brings us back once more to the ideas of Juan Luis Vives.

As discussed in chapter two, Vives begins chapter four of De ratione dicendi, proposing that probability may serve to deceive the reality of things, in which, “algunas veces determinadas falsedades tienen más visos de probabilidad que ciertas verdades,
yerro que nace no de las mismas cosas, sino de nuestro juicio torcido” (3.4, 788). To fix this error, Vives underscores the importance of an accurate chronology (Beckjord, 34):

“…por lo cual parece que lo posterior nace de lo primero, por orden de causalidad, como el hijo del padre, de lugar o tiempo, como el día de hoy del de ayer” (3.4, 788). It is precisely from this “natural pattern” that we are able to decipher verisimilitud, “porque todas las cosas manan con cierta dependencia y nexo, no solamente según naturaleza, sino, según arte, que no es más que una imitación de la Naturaleza” (3.4, 788). Indeed, as Beckjord reminds us once more here, Vives believed that: “…true events that appear to exceed probability…the author should present it in a way as to make sense of it, adjusting the truth of the facts to the logical expectations of the reader so that it is both truthful and verisimilar” (Beckjord, 35 emphasis her). While this is certainly made clear in the

**Quixote**, as we have seen, it is also at work in the **Historia verdadera**.

Indeed, Bernal Díaz’ history seems at times to transgress the contemporary lines of what today is considered history and fiction. Accordingly, William Nelson suggests:

The apparently simple distinction between truth and falsehood proves difficult to apply even to the narrative genres…Since even the most scrupulous historian must select, organize, and conjecture, he cannot produce an account which truly represents what happened in the past. The inventor of story, on the other side, is unable to dispense with fact, for his most fantastic fiction must necessarily incorporate correspondences with human experience” (38).187

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186 Indeed, Vives states: “Por esto es que la narración no solamente debe ser verídica, cosa que para la realidad ya bastaría, sino que debe ser verosímil con respecto a nosotros” (3.4, 788).

187 In his analysis behind the meaning of **crónica**, and the confusion that surrounds this corpus of texts, Roberto González Echavarría explains that: “La riqueza de las crónicas se encuentra precisamente en la variedad de formas que surgen de las posibilidades que la retórica de la época ofrecía, y cómo estas se entremezclaban o alteraban según las circunstancias sociales y culturales de cada cronista (16). See “Humanismo, Retórica y las Crónicas de la Conquista” in Isla a su vuelo fugitiva.
Yet while Bernal’s ability to remember and thus select, shares common traits with the omniscient point of view of the modern novelist, his work has more in common with the “humanist precepts” of historical writing than with fiction (Beckjord, 133). Subsequently, I agree with Roberto González Echevarría general assessment that, “La discrepancia entre la realidad, tal y como la ciencia de hoy nos permite percibirla, y las versiones de los cronistas no aproxima esos textos a la ficción ni los aleja necesariamente de la verdad” (13). González’s Echevarría’s argument about the “expressive possibilities” of the historian during this period helps elucidate both the narrative as well as descriptive problems that arise in the crónicas (12):

Si bien el tópico de lo inefable es tan antiguo como la expresión misma, la crítica de las crónicas ha querido ver en ellas un ‘impasse’ lingüístico que obedece más a la ideología postromántica de la crítica que a una problemática renacentista-en el Renacimiento, la mediación es retórica, antes que lingüística (13).

González Echevarría derives much of his argument from Edmundo O’ Gorman in his introduction to the Historia natural y moral de las Indias, who argued against the positivist practice of not respecting the “individuality” and “character” of the crónicas as integral works (13). The relevance of O’ Gorman’s ideas merits the following citation in its entirety as cited from González Echevarría’s work (13):

La predominante actitud de los eruditos del siglo XIX, con respecto a nuestras fuentes históricas, consistente en un saqueo de datos y noticias aprovechables, dio por resultado la elaboración de un tipo de Historia que es ya absolutamente indispensable superar. Ningún método mejor para intentar el correctivo que se apetece, que el de emprender por cuenta propia, desprovistos de aquellas preocupaciones, la lectura por entero, atenta y reposada de esas mismas fuentes. Por otra parte, aquella actitud produjo, con relación a las fuentes mismas, una crítica erudita que puso todo énfasis en la verdad objetiva y originalidad de los datos y noticias, únicos elementos considerados como valiosos. Si no se olvida la orientación general del pensamiento científico de entonces, no puede extrañar que así se olvida la orientación general del pensamiento científico de entonces, no
puede extrañar que así se procediera, y preciso es admitir que los resultados obtenidos forman un aparato crítico de gran interés para el historiador, quien deberá tomarlos como observaciones útiles en los trabajos preparatorios que toda investigación requiere. Pero esta crítica ha tenido, entre otros efectos, la inconsecuencia de proceder a una valorización de las fuentes, y de considerarla como definitiva. Ahora bien, aparte de los muchos reparos doctrinales y de otro tiempo que podrían oponerse, basta pensar en que ese modo de proceder no es ni con mucho tan riguroso como aparece al observador superficial. A poco que se reflexione se caerá en la cuenta de que una valorización establecida sobre la base de la originalidad y verdad de los datos, solamente puede, en el mejor caso, referirse a los datos mismos, pero de ninguna manera debe hacerse extensiva a la fuente considerada en su integridad, como un texto dotado de individualidad y carácter propios. Pensamos en un documento apócrifo, cuyos datos y noticias sean flagrantes falsedades. En la escala valorativa de que se viene hablando, a ese documento se le asignaría el último lugar o bien se vería desechado del todo. Sin embargo, se cometería un grave error, porque hay que ver que una falsificación tiene un valor de primer orden, atento el cúmulo de supuestos que necesariamente implica (6, emphasis mine).

While we cannot ignore, as Beckjord states, that the “…recovery of the chronicles of the Indies has coincided with…the contemporary critique of the value and method of historical studies,” we must keep in mind as she concludes that “…under the umbrella of postmodernism, history as a discipline…can be said to find itself at a point of reversal vis-à-vis the status envisioned for it by the sixteenth-century humanists” (131). Indeed, as González Echevarría’s insightful analysis demonstrates, to understand the “global intention” of the cronista one must take into account “the expressive possibilities of the historian”, that is, the: “…normas retóricas precisas que le asignaban su lugar a los diferentes elementos que componían el texto… [Which would have us]

“…aproximar[nos] a las crónicas consciente de la mediaciones institucionales que la época imponía” (15-16). In coming to such conclusion, González Echevarría challenges the notion that the first chroniclers, confronted with the marvelousness of uncharted
lands, could only revert to their imaginations and thus to lies or “errors” to describe the New World (13). And while González Echevarría does not dispute the use of “mecanismos de represión y sustitución” in those texts, such arguments he believes are “intrinsically romantic,” and therefore completely foreign to the chronicler’s way of thinking (13).

Accordingly, González Echevarría explores the chronicler’s “global intentions,” respecting the “various forms” that make up the crónicas: “…un amasijo de textos que van desde la relación hasta la historia, pero que incluye también la carta, el memorial, el comentario y hasta la visitación” (16). In so doing, he takes a closer look at the “confusion” that exists within the corpus of texts, connecting such misperceptions to the men who participated in the conquest and whose lack of preparation for such an

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188 In clarifying the literary contribution/influences in the crónicas, González Echevarría explains in general terms that: “…no podemos dudar de que muchos de los textos aducidos como literarios…son, desde nuestra perspectiva, de indiscutible valor literario. Pero, precisamente, el concepto que tenemos hoy de lo literario, desprovisto de toda preceptiva y atento más a una noción de expresividad, es en extremo amplio y flexible, y podemos hacerlo depender de nuestra reacción como lectores” (15).

189 Indeed, the challenge of classification with regards to the Historia verdadera can be described as being both “problematic” and “ambiguous” at best. Verónica Cortínez in her essay entitled “Yo, Bernal Díaz del Castillo”: ¿Soldado de a pie o idiota sin letras,” summarizes the long, and at times conflicting projectory of generic denominations which have been given to Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera, including: “primera novela de caballaría real de todos los tiempos’, ‘historia’, ‘épica tambaleante’, ‘epopeya’, ‘primera novela hispanoamericana’, ‘poema de romance’, ‘epopeya en prosa’, ‘autobiografía moderna’ y ‘crónica” (62). See Cortínez footnotes (p. 62) for references to each denomination.
undertaking were often questioned (17). In this sense, rather than a “idiota sin letras,” (II, ccxii 473), as Bernal Díaz refers to himself, the Historia verdadera follows the “implícito…historiografía humanista del siglo XVI” with its value on the “aesthetic” qualities of writing history (González Echevarría, 18): an idea which Nancy S. Struever, who González Echevarría cites in his analysis, further develops (18):

Hay una importante suposición sobre el pasado implícita en toda hermenéutica, a saber, que hay coherencia e integración en la intención, en la experiencia del autor seglar o religioso, presente en el fondo de la obra literaria, que va más allá, que trasciende el sentido literal o convencional. Por medio de la erudición gramatical o retórica, el crítico humanista hacía del texto una experiencia cabal y concreta del pasado. De ahí que la intención, el sentido profundo, no sea ni profecía oculta ni maldad pagana; al recobrar la intención, uno recupera una experiencia psicológica comparable al valor histórico objetivo (Cite in González Echevarría, 18).

Hence, Bernal Díaz undertakes the task of retracing his past: “…como el buen piloto lleva la sonda por la mar, descubriendo los bajos cuando siente que los hay, así haré yo en caminar, a la verdad de lo que pasó” (I, xviii 110 emphasis original). And it is in the act of returning to his past that Bernal Díaz validates his present: a process in which as Carlos Fuentes in citing Proust explains: “…el tiempo perdido es…un tiempo que sólo se puede recuperar como un minuto liberado del orden del tiempo: liberado por la palabra en la página” (73). Consequently, Bernal Díaz’ testimony is not only a recognition of a “life lived,” but one that remains to be lived, or as Fuentes goes on to explain, “re-lived:” “…de vivir por primera vez la experiencia recordada como experiencia escrita…el libro ha de ser descubierto” (73). And similar to the relationship between Cervantes and the romances, almost a half century later as Cascardi suggests, Francisco López de Gómara’s history served comparable purposes in that it allowed Bernal to compete “for the privilege of truth and authority” (Cascardi, 199):
Gomara’s text is more than a negative example for Bernal. It is not only representative of the ‘official’ and therefore false version of the conquest; it is at the same time his model, and it is this model and ones like it which Bernal takes as the concordance of his truth. If Gomara’s text in itself lacked validity, and had the elevated style to prove just that, it remained nonetheless an indelible point of reference for Bernal, capable of corroborating the validity of his own account (Cascardi, 199).

Bernal’s insistent reference to and reliance on Gómara, can be better understood by turning our attention briefly to the motives that drew Bernal to write his history. Leon-Portilla, in his introduction to Historia verdadera draws on a long list of critics for such insight. Among the more mentioned is Henry R. Wagner who Leon-Portilla draws from in his summary of possibilities, which include: a rebuke to those who dare forget the sacrifices that Bernal Díaz and the men endured alongside Cortés during the Conquest, (which would include his quest for recognition and fame), to Bernal Díaz’ more personal lifelong pursuit of compensation for services rendered to the Crown (42-46). Yet, as

190 Leon-Portilla mentions by name Henry R. Wagner and Ramón Iglesia-highlighting their respective arguments: “Bernal escribió para hacer esa vigorosa protesta contra quienes lo habían dejado en el olvido, al igual que a otros compañeros suyos también conquistadores y, para subsanar tal negligencia, forjó el relato en que él aparece con tal insistencia” (43). While on the other hand, Leon-Portilla points to Iglesia’s three related essays, which while situating Bernal Díaz’ Historia verdadera within a “new historiographical context,” highlights his motivations of compensation, and Bernal Díaz’ bitter resentment which drove him at times to less than truthful reenactments of past events: “Bernal es hombre bullicioso, insatisfecho, pleiteante. No se da por contento con las recompensas que recibe en premio de sus servicios” (Cite in León-Portilla 44).

191 While, the question of a writer’s motivation is dificult to measure, Leon-Portilla underscores Bernal Díaz’ motivation above all other possibilities as derived primarily from his joy of writing, in which: “Bernal, que comenzó a escribir por lo menos desde la década de los años cincuenta, llegó a ser con el transcurso del tiempo un inveterado narrador, de palabra y con la pluma. Sus cartas lo confirman: ponía de bulto personas y cosas, aducía sus palabras, recreaba diálogos, se complacía en evocar detalles mínimos pero muy reveladores. Significa esto que, si en el comienzo encontró…difícil el escribir, al fin le resultó placentero sentarse, recordar, y pergeñar letras, frases, párrafos y capítulos. Por otra parte, se complacía o le interesaba releer lo que había escrito. Prueba
Cortínez notes, Bernal Díaz’ motivation to write his history also derives from a sense of urgency (18): “…la transcripción de la memoria actúa como posible tabla de salvación…Ante la muerte cercana, esa tentativa de capturar con precisión afectiva un tiempo remoto y un espacio misterioso” (18). Indeed, with his pen in hand, Bernal Díaz seemed to lessen the debilitating effect of time through the process of writing:

[…] miren los curiosos letores con atención ásta mi relación y verán en cuantas batallas y rencuentros de guerra me he hallado desque vine a descubrir, y dos veces estuve asido y engarrafado de muchos indios, mejicanos, con quien en aquella sazón estaba peleando, para me llevar a sacrificar como en aquel instante llevaron otros muchos, mis compañeros, sin otros grandes peligros y trabajos ansi de hambres y sed y infinitas fatigas que suele recrecer a los que semejantes descubrimientos van a hacer en tierras nuevas, lo cual hallerán escripto parte por parte en ésta mi relación (CCVII, 552-53).192

Being but one of a handful of survivors, the urgency to which Bernal Díaz must recount his history lends itself to a chaotic outpouring of scattered details (Cortínez, 16). And his affinity toward detail, as described previously, and the manner in which they are applied, reflect a resolve fomented by an awareness of time: one in which as Cortínez explains: “Lo verídico del texto cede ante un modo de contar que se funda involuntariamente en la fragilidad de la memoria” (16). Yet, while Bernal Díaz’ memory presents inherent limitations, it is Bernal Díaz’ constant reference to, and comparison with other accounts,

192 The citation of Bernal Díaz comes from the following edition: Conquista de la Nueva España. Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1933.
which help combat such deficiencies.\textsuperscript{193} Carmelo Sáenz de Santa María notes in \textit{Historia de una historia}: “…Bernal debe a Gómara mucho más de lo que estaría dispuesto a confesar; no son tantas las ocasiones en que nuestro soldado disiente del capellán de Cortés, y son muchas más las noticias de Gómara que le han ayudado a refrescar la memoria para rehacer su \textit{Historia verdadera}” (121).\textsuperscript{194} Indeed, Bernal Díaz’ deliberate treatment of Gómora becomes further apparent in his description of “La noche triste,” in which the horrors of battle, present yet another opportunity for Bernal Díaz to attack his adversary and by so doing, strengthen his own account:

\begin{quote}
 [...] porque harto teníamos que salvar nuestras vidas, porque estábamos en gran peligro de muerte, según la multitud de mejicanos que sobre nosotros cargaban. \textit{Y todo lo que en aquel caso dice Gómara es burla}, porque ya que quisiera saltar y sustentarse en la lanza, estaba el agua muy honda y no podía llegar al suelo con ella” (CXXVIII, 486 emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

Curiously, Bernal Díaz’ repeated attempts to discredit Gómara, resembles Cervantes’ own dealings with that of his pseudo-author Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda. In fact, Bernal Díaz’ historic account of “La noche triste,” shares commonalities with Cervantes’ literary description of Don Quixote’s own need to escape the clutches of the mob that formed soon after his bout with a village peasant.

\textsuperscript{193} Cortínez notes these deficiencies lead to among other curiosities: errors, inconsistencies, ambiguities and omission (16).

\textsuperscript{194} Santa María goes on to state: “Gómera, bien documentado en Cortés y en otros conquistadores, no consigue realizar una obra perfecta, pero sostiene la comparación con cualquier otro de los historiadores de aquella gesta y no cede precisamente ante la exactitud de Bernal, sino ante su lozano vitalismo” (121).

\textsuperscript{195} The citation of Bernal Díaz comes from the following edition: \textit{Conquista de la Nueva España.} Volumes 1 and 2 Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1933.
Indeed, in his attempt to attack a fellow villager whose mimicking sounds of an ass the man mistakenly takes as an insult, contact is made with poor Sancho Panza:

Y luego, puesta la mano en las narices, comenzó a rebuznar tan reciamente, que todos los cercanos valles retumbaron. Pero uno de los que estaban junto a él, creyendo que hacía burla de ellos, alzó un varapalo que en la mano tenía, y dióle tal golpe con él, que, sin ser poderoso a otra cosa, dió con Sancho Panza en el suelo (II, xxvii 1369-70).

Of course truthful to his nature, Don Quixote cannot ignore this seemingly unprovoked hostility and decides to charge the aggressor only to find himself soon thereafter escaping the fury of the masses, while leaving behind Sancho to his own devices. Cide Hamete describes a scene in which:

[…] fueron tantos los que se pusieron en medio, que no fué posible vengarle; antes, viendo que llovía sobre él un nublado de piedras y que le amenazaban mil encaradas ballestas y no menos cantidad de arcabuces, volvió las riendas a Rocinante, y a todo lo que su galope pudo, se salió de entre ellos, encomendándose de todo corazón a Dios que de aquel peligro le librase, temiendo a cada paso no le entrase alguna bala por las espaldas y saliese al pecho; y a cada punto recogía el aliento, por ver si le faltaba (II, xxvii 1370).

Once safe from the villager’s retaliation, Don Quixote would explain to Sancho the reasoning behind his actions:

[…] porque has de saber Sancho, que la valentía que no se funda sobre la base de la prudencia se llama temeridad, y las hazañas del temerario más se atribuyen a la buena fortuna que a su ánimo. Y así, yo confieso que me he retirado, pero no huido; y en esto he imitado a muchos valientes, que se han guardado para tiempos mejores, y de esto están las historias llenas” (II, xxviii 1370).

While, it would be remiss of me to suggest that Don Quixote is directly alluding to Bernal Díaz’ account of “La noche triste,” or any other account for that matter which deals with the New World endeavor, the following account of Bernal Díaz as to their own
escape of Mexico at the hands of the Aztecs, does share similarities with that of Don Quixote’s:

[…] que por salir de aquellas poblazones, por temor no se tornasen a juntar escuadrones mejicanos, que aun todavía nos daban grita en parte que no podíamos ser señores dellos, y nos tiraban mucha piedra con hondas y vara y fleche hasta que fuimos a otras caserías y pueblo chico, y allí estaba un buen cu y casa fuerte, donde reparamos aquella noche y nos curamos nuestras heridas y estuvimos con más reposo…Y Cortés nos dijo, que pues éramos pocos,… que mirásemos muy bien como Nuestro Señor Jesucristo fue servido de escaparnos con las vidas…y que si otra cosa fuese, la que Dios no permita, que nos han de tornar andar los puños con corazones fuertes y brazos vigorosos, e que para eso fuésemos muy apercibidos y nuestros corredores del campo adelante (CXXVIII, 494 emphasis mine).

While there are important differences between Cervantes’ literary description of Don Quixote’s escape and the historic reenactment of Bernal Díaz and his men, we observe in this comparison Cervantes’ exploration and play of literary and non-literary spaces. This comparison is further appreciated examining Bernal Díaz concept of “visto y vivido,” which not only plays a fundamental role in his incessant ideological opposition to Gómara, but as we have seen, along with his vivid memory and affinity towards detail also forms the bases of his Historia verdadera narrative structure. While respecting generic differences, we can draw many similarities between Bernal Díaz’ and Gómara’s polemic relation to that of Miguel de Cervantes and Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda’s apocryphal Quixote.

The Eye-witness, Truth and Authorship

As with Bernal Díaz, the appearance of Avellaneda’s Quixote, awoken perhaps in Cervantes a desire to set the record straight; a feeling that had continued to gather momentum several years after the successful reception of Don Quixote. In fact, such was Cervantes’ satisfaction with the first publication of his work that as Tom Lathrop notes in
his analysis into the significance of Avellaneda’s work, Cervantes soon thereafter turned
his attention to other literary endeavors such as his *Exemplary novels* (1613) (Lathrop,
132). And if that were not enough to convince his readers that he had little interest in
writing a second part, Cervantes concludes the first part of *Don Quixote* by confessing
the real possibility of not ever knowing what was to be of the knight errant (132):

 [...] puesto que con curiosidad y diligencia ha buscado los hechos que Don Quijote
hizo en su tercera salida, no ha podido hallar noticia de ellas, a lo menos por
escrituras auténticas, sólo la fama ha guardado, en las memorias de la Mancha, que
Don Quijote, la tercera vez que salió de su casa, fué a Zaragoza, donde se halló en
unas famosas justas que en aquella ciudad hicieron (I, lii, 1268).

Yet, what seems as an apparent affront to Cervantes’ desire that Don Quixote’s final days
be best left shrouded in mystery, the arrival and subsequent publication of Avellaneda’s
apocryphal *Quixote*, with its venomous assault, proved too inviting not to allure the re-
emergence of *Don Quixote*: the real history as told by Cervantes himself.

As observed in his prologue, Avellaneda not only attempts to undermine
Cervantes’ authority over that of his creation, but questions both his physical as well as
intellectual fortitude to continue the laborious task of discrediting the distasteful
popularity of chivalric romances:

 [...] y así sale al principio desta Segunda parte de sus hazañas éste, menos
cacareado y agresor de sus lectores que el que a su Primera parte puso Miguel de
Cervantes Saavedra, y más humilde que él que segundó en sus novelas, más
satíricas que ejemplares, si bien no poco ingeniosas. No le parecerán a él lo son
las razones desta historia, que se prosigue con la autoridad que él la comenzó, y
con la copia de fieles relaciones que a su mano llegaron; y digo mano, pues
confiesa de sí que tiene sola una; y hablando tanto de todos, hemos de decir del
que, como soldado tan viejo en años cuanto mozo en brios, tiene más lengua que
manos; pero quéjese de mi trabajo por la ganancia que le quito de su Segunda
parte; pues no podrá...dejar de confesar tenemos ambos un fin, que es desterrar la
perniciosa lección de los vanos libros de caballerías, tan ordinaria en gente rústica
y ociosa (5, emphasis Avellaneda).
Observed in Avellaneda’s attack is a carefully orchestrated attempt to distinguish himself from Cervantes, while all the while insisting, as James Larkin notes, “…that the nature of his imitation seeks to ‘improve’ the demented knight and the faithful squire by turning them into dimensionless puppets in what amounts to a morality play on madness” (249). Indeed, Avellaneda further ahead states (249):

Pero discúlpalos yerros de su Primera parte, en esta material, el haberse escrito entre los de una cárcel; y así no pudo dejar de salir tiznada dellos, no salir menos que quejosa, murmuradora, impaciente y colérica, cual lo están los encarcelados. En algo diferencia esta parte de la primera suya; porque tengo opuesto humor también al suyo; y tan auténtica como ésta, cada cual puede echar por donde le pareciere (7).\textsuperscript{196}

On face value, the attack of Cervantes’ Don Quixote as a means to justify the release and acceptance of Avellaneda’s second part would seems to suggest that Cervantes had fallen victim to such aggressions (246).\textsuperscript{197} Yet, this would ignore not only Cervantes’ status as a successful and prolific writer, but also his own subtle invitation, or as Tom Lathrop describes it, “challenge” to other potential writers who would dare “take up the pen” to

\textsuperscript{196} As Larkin explains in his work, “Avellaneda versus Cervantes: Rival or Unwitting Accomplicant?” the success of any publication was susceptible to imitation and plagiarism (248). However, this was not always seen in the same light as today, but rather as a form of a compliment, a “…testimony that the original was indeed worth imitating” (248). In fact, Avellaneda in his preface cites several examples of this: “…sólo digo que nadie se espante de que salga de diferente autor esta Segunda parte, pues no es nuevo el proseguir una historia diferentes sujetos. ¿Cuántos han hablado de los armores de Angelica y de sus sucesos? Las Arcadias, diferentes, las han escrito” (5-6, emphasis Avellaneda).

\textsuperscript{197} Larkin describes Cervantes as a “wronged” man: “…smarting with anger because his characters have been stolen, his livelihood threatened, and his confidence in himself shaken by an anonymous imposter full of intemperate insults” (246).
continue the adventures of *Don Quixote* (132): “Fosi altro cantera con miglior *plecittio*” (I, lii 1270 emphasis mine). Of course, Avellaneda would not only accept this challenge, but as Lathrop notes, in keeping with the spirit of his “improved” imitation of Cervantes’ work, would himself repeat the same “challenge” at the conclusion of his own version (132): “…los cuales no faltará mejor pluma que los celebre” (XXXVI, 327). Similar to what is seen in Bernal Díaz’ history; Cervantes repeated reference to Avellaneda’s apocryphal *Quixote* allows him to solidify the truthfulness and thus authority of his own “historia.” But to do so requires that Cervantes “place”, and to some extent legitimize, Avellaneda’s *Quixote* within his own “world of literary creation” (Larkin, 250): leaving as it were, the reader to decide once more “the results of this juxtaposition” (250). Let me begin our comparison with Bernal Díaz’ reaction upon learning of Gomara’s history.

Bernal Díaz’ encounter with Gómora’s history marks a pivotal moment in his own retelling of the conquest. How could Bernal Díaz justify the continuation of his own project while confronted with a “superiorly” written history? What would his account offer that a highly educated priest (among the others mentioned as well) could not? Such was the demoralizing effect of this encounter, of this affront to the merit of his undertaking that Bernal Díaz could not but relinquish all hope of ever finishing his own history of the conquest:

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198 By the time Avellaneda’s *Quixote* appeared (1614), Cervantes had published *Novelas ejemplares, Vaije de Parnaso, and Entremeses*, and had fifty-eight chapters already written of the second part of *Don Quixote* (Larkin, 249).

199 As noted by Lathrop, Cervantes’s invitation is a slightly modified verse of Canto 30 of Ariosto’s *Orlando furioso* (132): “Forsi altro cantera con miglior *pectro*” (Cite in Lathrop 132, emphasis mine).
Estando escribiendo en esta relación, acaso vi una historia de buen estilo, la cual se nombra de un Francisco López de Gómara, que habla de las conquistas de México y Nueva-España, y cuando leí su gran retórica, y como mi obra es tan grosera, dejé de escribir en ella, y aun tuve vergüenza que pareciese entre personas notables” (I, xvii 107 emphasis original).

The answer that would allow an old foot soldier of little former education to go head-to-head with a student, priest and scholar, was that Gómara did not witness firsthand the conquest; he was not counted among the men who had stepped foot in the Americas and fought alongside Cortés. And it is because of this that Bernal believed he had simply got it wrong: “…y estando tan perplejo como digo, torné a leer a mirar las razones y pláticas que el Gómara en sus libros escribió, e vi desde el principio y medio hasta el cabo no llevaba buena relación, y va muy contrario de lo que fue e pasó en la Nueva-España” (XVII, 107 emphasis original).200 As a result, Bernal Díaz proceeds to further discredit Gómara, assuming the heroic burden of getting the story right:

[...] le parece a Gómara que place mucho a los oyentes que leen su historia, y no quiso ver ni entender cuando lo escribía que los verdaderos conquistadores y curiosos lectores que saben lo que pasó, claramente le dirán que en su historia en todo lo que escribe se engañó, y si en las demás historias que escribe de otras cosas va del arte del de la Nueva-España, también irá todo errado (XVII, 108 emphasis original).

However, this time instead of the mighty sword in his hand, Bernal Díaz returns to his past glory as an eyewitness “…con la pluma en la mano” (XVII, 110). And it is with a renewed commitment to his reader (“la mera verdad”) that allows Bernal Díaz to “resiste mi rudeza” and leave his indelible mark on the history of the conquest (XVIII, 109 emphasis original).

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200 See chapter XVIII for a detailed (albeit incomplete) account as to which points Bernal Díaz found Gómara to be less than truthfull (pp. 107-110).
Reminiscent of Bernal Díaz’ own reaction to Gómara and his work, in first learning of the second part of apocryphal *Quixote*, Cervantes has the “real” Don Quixote limit his response to seemingly “inconsequential criticisms” (Larkin, 250):

En esto poco que he visto he hallado, tres cosas en este autor dignas de reprehensión. La primera es algunas palabras que he leído en el prólogo; la otra, que el lenguaje es aragonés, porque tal vez escribe sin artículos, y la tercera, que más le confirma por ignorante, es que yerra y se desvía de la verdad en lo más principal de la historia; porque aquí dice que la mujer de Sancho Panza mi escudero se llama Mari Gutiérrez, y no se llama tal, sino Teresa Panza; y quien en esta parte tan principal yerra, bien se podrá temer que yerra en todas las demás de la historia (II, lix 1476).  

The significance of Don Quixote’s reaction (along with Sancho who further ahead we find beside himself to learn that he has been portrayed as a simpleton and a drunk) is that Avellaneda’s (Larkin, 250):

[…] published book exists and can be verified by anyone…it [Avellaneda’s book] has the same kind of reality as any of the chivalric novels which turned Don Quixote’s head. This resemblance is even more striking when the book is compared to the 1605 *Quijote*. *If* *Don Quijote* *is* *a* *book* *about* *books*, and particularly about books of chivalry, Avellaneda cannot be left out of it without destroying the verisimilitude about which Cervantes repeatedly expresses such concern (250).

As a result, Avellaneda inadvertently offers Cervantes the opportunity to yet again add another “…twist to the problem of history and fiction, and to turn a critical matter into

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201 Curiously, Cervantes’ own Don Quixote is notoriously filled with “errors” and “contradictions” as well (Lathrop, XVII). However, rather than this being the product of carelessness on the part of Cervantes’, Tom Lathrop convincingly demonstrates a purposeful connection with the romances that Cervantes was parodying, in which: “Cervantes satirized not only their content but also imitated their careless styles…Far from being a defect in the book, these contradictions are really an integral part of the art of the book” (xvii). See the introduction of *El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha*—Edited and with notes and an index by Tom Lathrop, European Masterpieces, Cervantes & Co, Spanish classics, Number 1.
matter for the novel” (Riley, 214); the product of which is a narrative that is increasingly interconnected with that of Avellaneda’s in such away, as to “…believe that if the spurious sequel had not existed he would have had to invent it” (214). Such is the relation between Cervantes and Avellaneda that as Riley concludes, “The true Part I and the false Part II acquire the importance that true history and false romances had enjoyed earlier in the story…for the course of the narrative and the Knight’s fortunes are decisively altered” (216).

Similar to Bernal, who questioned the reason of continuing his work in light of Gómara’s history, Don Quixote’s initial reaction was one of resignation and dismay:

[Pues]…aunque don Juan quisiera que Don Quijote leyera más del libro, por ver lo que discantaba, no lo pudieron acabar con él, diciendo que él lo daba por leído y lo confirmaba por todo necio, y que no quería, si acaso llegase a noticia de su autor que le había tenido en sus manos, se alegrase con pensar que le había leído” (II, lxx 1477).

Yet, as Bernal Díaz before him, what at first seems a reluctant acknowledgment of Avellaneda’s history, soon thereafter turns into an unyielding desire on the part of Cervantes to reaffirm that his is the “real” Quixote. Rather than following Avellaneda’s lead, Cervantes has Don Quixote divert his path away from Zaragoza and towards Barcelona (Larkin, 251): “Por el mismo caso-respondió Don Quijote-, no pondré los pies en Zaragoza, y así sacaré a la plaza del mundo la mentira dese historiador moderno, y echarán de ver las gentes como yo no soy el Don Quijote que él dice” (II, lxx 1477). With the decision made to forgo Zaragoza and not attend (as did his imposter), the jousts at Zaragoza, Cervantes not only reaffirms Don Quixote’s “independence,” but in so doing, “acknowledge[s] the existence of the apocryphal Quixote as a novelistic force,” marking the path and ultimate demise of Cervantes’ creation (Larkin, 251):

234
By taking his bold and risky step, Cervantes uses Avellaneda’s character to show that Avellaneda has no real understanding of his personages and therefore cannot foresee or control the repercussions of their actions…As the real Quijote eloquently shows, a character who knows who he is, and whose actions support and develop that identity can continue surviving in an essentially hostile environment. Avellaneda’s Quijote, his borrowed identity unsupported by any inner dynamic force, undeniably exists as an ‘historical’ phenomenon, but is novelistically viable only to the extent that Cervantes chooses to make him so (251).

In chapter LXXII of part two, Cervantes defies Avellaneda’s authority to control the destiny of his creations (Riley, 216). It is here, as Larkin explains, that “Cervantes’s commits a theft all of his own by lifting Avellaneda’s Don Álvaro Tarfe out of the apocryphal Quixote and inserting him into Part II (Larkin, 252): “Mira, Sancho: cuando yo hojeé aquel libro de la segunda parte de mi historia, más parece que de pasada topé allí este nombre de don Álvaro Tarfe” (II, lxxii 1516). While Tarfe stands as part of Avellaneda’s “malicious invention,” Cervantes’ acknowledgement of his existence acts to reaffirm the authenticity of his own history, or as Riley notes, “…in an indirect way, the proprietary rights of Quixote’s story” (216-17). By affirming not only the existence of the apocryphal Quixote, but also the character of Álvaro Tarfe, Don Quixote attempts to rid himself of all other imitators:

[…] señor don Álvaro Tarfe, yo soy Don Quijote de la Mancha, el mismo que dice la fama, y no ese desventurado que ha querido usurpar mi nombre y honrarse con mis pensamientos. A vuesa merced suplico, por lo que debe a ser caballero, sea servido de hacer una declaración ante el alcalde de este lugar, de que vuesa merced no me ha visto en todos los días de su vida hasta ahora, y de que yo no soy el Don Quijote impreso en la segunda parte, ni este Sancho Panza mi escudero es aquel que vuesa merced conoció (II, lxxii 1517).

While discrediting Avellaneda’s Quixote as a ‘fantastical’ recreation of his true story, Cervantes not only “borrow[s]” one of its characters, but places him on the same footing
as that of his own literary creations (Larkin, 252). In other words, don Tarfe is the product of both a fictional as well as “real” history, in which: “The friend of the false Quixote, from this moment at least, ‘exists’ as much as do the true Quixote and Sancho” (Riley 216). The response of don Tarfe and his subsequent “official” declaration in the presence of the town’s mayor, reaffirms the validity of the “real” Don Quixote, who in admitting of his previous dealings with Avellanedá’s Quixote (as Sancho’s suspicion would have it), confirmed to have been the business of enchanters:

Eso haré yo de muy buena gana- respondió don Álvaro-, puesto que causa admiración ver dos Don Quijotes y dos Sanchos a un mismo tiempo, tan conformes en los nombres como diferentes en las acciones; u vuelvo a decir y me afirmo que no he visto lo que he visto ni ha pasado por mi lo que ha pasado (II, lxxii 1517 emphasis mine).

The relevance of this encounter between Don Álvaro Tarfe and Don Quixote, and to a larger extend Cervantes and Avellanéda lies in the many similarities we find with Bernal Díaz’ own desire to correct the “errors” and “omissions” of Gómara. By widening the scope of his portrayal to include an endless trail of details and participants of the conquest, Bernal attempts to improve Gomora’s account. Similar to the relationship that exists between Cervantes and Avellanedá literary creations, Bernal is both reliant on and critical of Gomora’s history. In fact, to “improve” Gomora’s account (as Bernal Díaz states in his Historia verdadera) would inherently require this relationship. Indeed, while never denying the existence of Gomara’s history, Bernal Díaz not only questions his motives, but also ability to narrate the events of a world he did not experience firsthand.

202 Don Quixote declares in the same chapter: “…no sé si soy bueno; pero sé decir que no soy el malo; para prueba de lo cual quiero que sepa vuesa merced, mi señor don Álvaro Tarfe, que en todos los días de mi vida no he estado en Zaragoza; antes, por haberme dicho que ese Don Quijote fantástico se había hallado en las justas de esa ciudad, no quise yo entrar en ella…” (II, lxxii 1517 emphasis mine).
Of course, Bernal Díaz does so with an authority that similar to the literary character don Tarfe is assumed by his status as first-person eyewitness. While, the character of don Tarfe, as he appears in the apocryphal Quixote of Avellaneda, is employed by Cervantes (Larkin, 252):

He (don Tarfe) remains Avellaneda’s character, briefly on loan to Cervantes, but long enough to be corrupted by a humanizing truth, and to begin to suspect grave errors in his own perception. By not destroying Don Álvaro, but rather by endowing him with the beginnings of insight, Cervantes with superb adroitness makes clear Avellaneda’s failure to perceive the essential humanity of his personages (252).

Again, Larkin’s argument speaks to what many critics view as the “wronged or insulted author,” who on seeing his “livelihood threatened…attack[s]…by engineering the critical annihilation of his imitator” (246). While Avellaneda’s apocryphal Quixote provides

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203 In his examination of how Bernal Díaz viewed the role of the historian, Robert Brody points to Bernal Díaz’ “eyewitness capacity,” which allowed him to “amend, supplement and correct partial, incomplete and faulty versions of what occurred according to the version recorded by López de Gómara…” as, “…more a matter of completing the historical record than that of substituting one version of history (López de Gómara’s) with his own” (333). This is especially true as we have seen, in light of Bernal Díaz’ repeated reference to the important “role played by the common soldier in the conquest,” which had been ignored (333).

204 Larkin briefly enumerates several examples of this in his analysis which focuses on the scope of Cervantes’ examination of Avellaneda- including but not limited to: “Don Quixote’s visit to the Barcelona print shop in chapter 62,” in which Larkin presents the question, “Why is the first edition still in the hands of the printer when in chapter 59 it appears already published?” Concluding that “True history is never finished, but always being added to or modified, the present is the never-ending continuation of the past”- a subtlety which escapes Avellaneda sensitivity (252), followed by the “bizarre and puzzling incident [which] occurs in chapter 70,” in which the reader is invited to witness the physical destruction of Avellaneda’s book described as “llenos de viento y borra.” Larkin notes that “while the apocryphal Quijote gets distinctly unpleasant treatment, qualitatively its sufferings are not really unique. Even as Cervantes reduces his rival to absurdity, he displays a curious charity in the process. Avellaneda is not without considerable company in the ranks of inept writers, and these unfortunates my well be enduring too extreme a punishment for the wrong reasons” (254). Larkin follows this idea
yet another opportunity for Cervantes to accentuate the problem of history and fiction, the importance of “lo visto y oido,” serves as a means by the historian to convey a truthfulness that is believable to the reader (Frankl, 84). And while this is Bernal Díaz’ primary complaint of Gomara’s history, his approach to this idea, that is, to the fundamental importance of the eye-witness as suggested earlier, is further strengthened by his inclusion of the others who fought alongside him during his time in the Americas.

Indeed, Bernal Díaz’ distaste of a historiography produced by writers who have not seen firsthand or lived the content of their narrative, is echoed time and again by several historians of the conquest (84). As discussed in chapter four, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (Sumario de la Natural Historia de las Indias (1529), General y natural historia de las Indias, (1535- 57), presents a similar idea in his portrayal of what is required in seeking what Victor Frankl refers to as the “historic truth” (Frankl 84-93).

Oviedo writes:

Será…lo que yo escribriere historia verdadera e desviada de todas las fábulas que en este caso otros escriptores, sin verlo, desde España a pie enxuto, han presumido escribir…formando historias más allegadas a buen estilo que a la verdad de la cosa que cuentan; porque ni el ciego sabe determinar colores, ni el ausente assi testificar estas materias, como quien las mira…Conténtese el lector con que lo que yo he visto y experimentado con muchos peligros, lo goza él y sabe sin ninguno....Las cuales (materias de estos libros) no he sacado de dos mil millares de volumines que haya leydo…yo acumulé todo lo que aquí escribo de dos millones de trabajos y nesçessidades e peligros en veynte e dos años e más que ha que veo y experimentto por mi persona estas cosas… (Cite in Frankl, 84-85).

with the story of the incompetent painter who painted “lo que saliere” (VII 291) and is compared to Avellaneda, who by implication is considered a bad artist (254). Larkin cites Riley who explains that: “As long as the author knows what he is doing and where he is going, Cervantes concedes him a good deal of liberty, he is even allowed to perpetrate what would be outrages in other circumstances” (Cite in Larkin, 254).
Oviedo, as does Bernal Díaz, makes clear that his authority is the product of their eyewitness status. Yet, unlike Oviedo, Frankl demonstrates the manner in which Bernal Díaz arrives at the concept of “lo visto y vivido,” (even when he is not present) through his reliance on the concept of “nosotros:” referring to the soldiers who accompanied Cortés and are not mentioned by Gómara (99). Bernal writes in chapter CXXXIX:

> Sepan que hemos tenido por cierto los conquistadores verdaderos que esto (sc. La Historia de orientación cortesiana, de Gómara), que le debieran dar oro a Gómara y otras dádivas porque lo escribiese de esta manera, porque en todas las batallas o reencontros éramos los que sosteníamos a Cortés, y ahora nos aniquila en lo que dice este coronista (Cite in Frankl, 98).

An often cited passage can also be found further head in chapter CCXII (98). Here Bernal Díaz once more envokes the concept of “nosotros” as a means to discredit Gómora (98):

> “Digo en ello, en especial cosas de guerras y batallas y tomas de ciudades, ¿cómo lo pueden loar y escribir, sino solamente los capitanes y soldados que se hallaron en tales guerras juntamente con nosotros?” (Cite in Frankl, 98 emphasis mine). Indeed, Bernal’s notion of “nosotros” achieves what for Oviedo is accomplished by the reliable sources present at the time of the events, which in collaboration with other eyewitness accounts is verified and thus granted equal value to events directly witnessed (85).205 Such concept of social verification for lack of a better word is derived according to Frankl, by the shared European spirit (“espiritualidad europea”) inspired by the Counter Reformation in which (99):206

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205 Oviedo states: “…y lo que yo no oviere visto, direlo por relación de personas fidedignas, no dando en cosa alguna crédito a un solo testigo, sino a muchos, en aquellas cosas que por mi persona no oviere experimentado” (Cite in Frankl, 85).

206 As I mention further ahead, Frankl likens this new sense of coorporation to the hispanic american epic of the conquest in which as he explains: “…también ella nace de
…la oposición contra el individualismo propio del Renacimiento y el consecutivo redescubrimiento del ‘organicismo’ social peculiar de la Alta Edad Media, es decir, de la idea–formulada conceptualmente con la mayor claridad en la Filosofía social tomista, pero expresada plástica y pictóricamente por un sin número de obras de arte de la época- de los ‘grupos’ sociales no constituyen meras sumas de individuos incoherentes entre sí, sino más bien verdadera unidades orgánicas, verdaderos ‘cuerpos’ vivos, respecto a los cuales vale lo dicho por Aristóteles: ‘el todo es antes de la parte’ (99).

Nevertheless, what is of a greater concern to us here is the importance to which Bernal viewed truthfulness attained by the direct (or as we have seen indirect) eyewitness account, which by its very nature would exclude those historians “passively dependent” on the works of others (i.e. Pedro Mártil de Anglería, and Paulo Jovio and Gonzalo de Illescas, etc.) (130). In order to appreciate this idea more fully requires that we once more turn our attention briefly to the ideas of Juan Luis Vives.

As discussed in chapter two, Vives’s “verdad histórica de lo visto y vivido,” that Frankl makes mention of, is derived from the Greek word “isorein,” which introduces the historian as objective eyewitness who can recall the past as if present (122):

[…] que suena ver, como si que él que narra hubiera visto y sido testigo ocular de lo que narra. Es como la pintura, la imagen o el espejo de las cosas pasadas…La primera ley de la historia es que sea verdadera, tanto como pueda conseguirlo el historiador. Como es preciso que sea espejo de los tiempos, si refiere falsedades, el espejo será falso y devolverá una imagen que no habrá recibido. Tampoco será verídica la imagen si fuere mayor o menor que la realidad; quiero decir, si el historiador, adrede, deprime el suceso o lo encarece (3.3, 780-81, emphasis Vives).

207 Further ahead, in place of “suena a ver” Vives states, “la historia tomó…su nombre verbo griego ver” (3.3, 782).
Vives’s ideas of history coincide with his dislike for the “unrestrained practice of literary-stylistic imitation of antiquity,” which Frankl describes as “servile and mechanical” (130).208 While, Vives does so with his eye toward “renewing”, as Frankl notes, “the

208 Underlining the importance of progress, Vives renews the rhetorical expression of Latin by, as Frankl explains: “…matendiéndola en continuo contacto vivo con las realidades del ambiente actual y con la dinámica del espíritu individual del que la produce” (130). Frankl’s following citation of Vives’s ideas on progress demonstrate similarities with Bernal Díaz’s own critic on the eloquence to be found in the well read historian such as Gómora, and the chronicler, who valued experience over mindless and to some extent unfeathered imitation: “Lo que a los comienzos es imitación, poco a poco debe progresar hasta un punto en que ya sea competencia y decidido propósito no sólo de igualar, sino de superar…En este nuestro tiempo, algunos, ridículamente, se cieñen a la imitación simple, y no sólo en las voces de los idiomas griego y latino, cosa está imprescindible, porque esa lenguas, pérdidas para el habla viva, quedaron y se conservan en las obras clásicas de la antigüedad, sino también en la frase, cosa que no es necesaria, puesto que cada cual, con los vocablos y modismos que espigó de la lectura …pues de construir su oración como más se acomode a su genio o según lo exija la materia o lo pidan el tiempo y el lugar….Subordinan su fuerza nativa y su propia originalidad a un canon prefijado…¿Existe, por ventura, servidumbre mayor y aceptada de mejor gana que esta de no atreverse a salirse de las prescripciones de un modelo…aunque el asunto nos lleva a otra parte, y el tiempo y los oyentes y la generosa naturaleza del ingenio nos den continuamente voces de libertad? ¿Cómo han de poder moverse los que tienen que ir fijando el pie en las huellas ajenas, como los niños que juegan en el polvo?…¿Qué gran cruz es, que cadena para los ingenios de estar comprimidos en tan estrechos límites, de tal modo que no pueden dilatarse y mientras atienden a este cuidado solo de no rebasar los límites prescritos, como se alejan de las más útiles verdades, y que ocasión dejan escapar de las manos de hacerse dueños de las disciplinas más fructuosas!…Y en este tan largo y miserable trabajo, que yo ni a mis propios enemigos deseo, cuanto menos aconsejarle a mis amigos, ¿Qué fruto es el que se proponen? ¿Qué utilidad la que sacan de tanto cuidado y tantas vigilias? Hacerse, después de muchos años, no ya émulos de la dicción ciceroniana, sino compiladores indigestos de sus palabras y periodos… Todos esos remedadores y facedores de pastiches y todos aquellos otros que se entregaron al de largo tiempo interrumpido cultivo de las lenguas, pusieron tal cuidado en la elección de las palabras y en el aseo y aliño de la dicción, que si siquiera se dignaban echar una mirada sobre todo cuanto grave y copiosamente se había escrito acerca del conocimiento de la naturaleza de las costumbres públicas y privadas, en parte porque algunos no tuvieron tiempo, tan embelecidos en tomar nota de las palabras y en afeitar la dicción, que no les quedaba un momento para parar mientes en otras cosas, y en parte también por el recelo que tenían de que si ponian mano en escritores no tan atusados, algún contagio se les pegaría de su rustiquez….Además de esto, según ellos, la Retórica debe
rhetorical expression in Latin,” his attitude is important to our understanding of Bernal’s practice of speaking in the name of “nosotros” (Frankl, 100):

[…] la suposición parece insinuarse que Bernal Díaz obedeció, cuando hablaba siempre en nombre de un ‘nosotros’, de la clase baja de la soldadesca conquistadora, no solamente al imperativo de un interés práctico-social, de un interés de grupo dentro de la realidad hispanoamericana…sino además a una sugerencia más sutil y más profunda, derivada de la espiritualidad europea sugerencia cuya transmisión a la mente de Bernal se sustrae a toda determinación concreta: a la sugerencia de una idea peculiar del renovado Medio Evo de la Contrarreforma (que era a la vez un consciente ‘Contrarrenacimiento’), de la idea de la ‘corporación’, del carácter orgánico-unitario del ‘grupo’, reconocible ante todo en las comunidades del pueblo bajo (100).

Bernal Díaz’ treatment of “corporation” in his Historia verdadera is “analogous” to that observed in the epic of the conquest (100). It too, as Frankl suggests, stems from the novelty that is the New World in which (100): “…la épica es la expresión legítima y, en cierto sentido, necesaria, de un pueblo que emigra y encuentra en una tierra nueva su ‘edad heroica” (100). However, as Beckjord proposes in her following example of Historia verdadera, Bernal Díaz’ emphatic insistence of the eyewitness within his treatment of “cooperation,” becomes problematic during those moments in which he goes to great length to reveal the most minimal detail, such as his description into the everyday customs of the Aztec people (Beckjord, 146):

[…] oí decir que le solían guisar carnes de muchachos de poca edad; y como tenía tantas diversidades de guisados y de tantas cosas, no lo echábamos de ver si era de tratar…específicamente de temas políticos. ¿Qué dirán esos que ni aun en sueños vieron esas realidades ni saben en qué mundo, ni siquiera en qué ciudad viven, y mientras continuamente están pensando en aquella antigua Roma, son verdaderos peregrinos en su patria y anacrónicos en su tiempo? Y ni siquiera merecen el calificativo de elocuentes aquellos que, mientras que ponen todo su esfuerzo en decirlo todo con lengua ajena, ellos personalmente se encierran en una mudez absoluta…No importa el idioma; en ruso, en francés, en alemán, en español, hay muchos elocuentes; ni porque las lenguas latinas y griegas sean ricas y estén muy trabajadas, dejará de haber oradores elocuentes en cualquier otro idioma” (Cite in Frankl 131-2).
carne humana y de otras cosas, porque cotidianamente le guisaban gallinas, gallos de papada, faisanes, perdices de la tierra, codornices, patos mansos, y bravos, venado, puerco de la tierra, pajaritos de caña y palomas y liebres y conejos, y muchas maneras de aves e cosas de las que se crían en estas tierras, que son tantas, que no las acabaré de nombrar tan presto; y así miramos en ello. Lo que yo sé es, que desque nuestro capitán le reprendió el sacrificio y de comer carne humana, que desde entonces mandó que no le guisasen tal manjar (I, xci 323 emphasis original).

Moreover, Bernal’s treatment of “cooperation” is further complicated by his insistence in “speak[ing] for his fellow soldiers who have no voice” (Beckjord, 147):

[…] y como yo no fui en esta entrada, por eso digo en esta mi relación: ‘Fueron y esto hicieron y tal les acaeció’; y no digo: ‘Hicimos ni hice, ni en ello me hallé’; mas todo lo que escribe acerca dello pasó al pie de la letra; porque luego se sabe en el real de la manera que en las entradas acaece; y ansi, no se puede quitar ni alargar más de lo que pasó…(II, cxlii 10).

As we have seen with the valuable insight of both Victor Frankl and Sarah Beckjord, the notion of the Historia verdadera as a “collaborative” (undertaking, which from time to time fails to live up with Bernals’ stated limitations), speaks to the imaginatively complex nature of his work (Beckjord, 148). Indeed, the New World brought with it many challenges, including as González Echevarría suggests: “…dilemas que el humanismo europeo sólo logró plantearse en términos abstractos” (24). These were not lost on Cervantes.

As I have attempted to demonstrate, Cervantes’ Cid Hamete in his role as a “sabio encantador,” or Avellaneda’s don Tarfe, (among Cervantes’ other repeated intermediaries), is a playful attempt to capture the essence of these debates surrounding the writing of history. And while Bernal Díaz did not write a novel as some would like us believe, it is also true, as Oswald Estrada notes, the importance of the text as “máximo juez” (43):
[...] las denominaciones y periodizaciones, las terminologías y los neologismos siempre se dan después de los hechos. Cervantes no escribió el Quijote (1605-1615) a sabiendas de que estaba escribiendo la primera novela moderna. Sabía que estaba jugando con todos los géneros que tenía a la mano porque todos le quedaban cortos para su proyecto, pero al publicar su obra no la llamó novela sino historia. Y el Quijote que escribió Cervantes... no es el mismo que leemos hoy porque nuestra mentalidad es distinta, nuestras expectativas otras, nuestras experiencias las de este siglo y no las del Renacimiento (43).

Alongside the men who fought with Cortés, Bernal Díaz experienced firsthand both the anguish and splendor of conquest. Accordingly, by challenging the very authority of his more rhetorically “gifted” contemporaries, Bernal Díaz embraced the very qualities which set him apart, that is, his plain spoken manner and status as both an actor and witness to the expansion of the Spanish empire. And it is precisely this point that Bernal chooses to highlight at the end of his history in his reply to the two “licenciados’,” explaining that “…sabios siempre se pega algo a los idiotas sin letras como yo soy” (II, ccxii 473), to later conclude that in this world:

[…] se suelen alabar uno vecinos a otros las virtudes y bondades que en ellos hay, y no ellos mismos; mas el que no se halló en la guerra, ni lo vio ni lo entendió ¿Cómo lo puede decir? ¿Habíanlo de parlar los pájaros en el tiempo que estábamos en las batallas, que iban volando, o las nubes que pasaban por alto, sino solamente los capitanes y soldados que en ello nos hallamos?” (II, ccxii 476).

And while (perhaps most of all), it is recognition that propels Bernal to write his history, it is the process of writing itself that provided Bernal a better appreciation and understanding of his life and of his life’s work: a legacy that Bernal Díaz was mindful of as he went about with each new stroke of the pen, reliving his past until all that was to be said had been said. In fact, I too would like to believe as Herbert Cerwin suggests that: “Bernal had a good hunch that he was writing, not for his king, not for the Council of the Indies, not for the Spanish people, but for the world…” (211). Bernal Díaz reminds his reader of this time and again: “E han de considerar los curiosos que esto leyeren… que muchas veces, ahora que soy viejo, me paro a considerar las
cosas heroicas que en aquel tiempo pasamos, que me parece las veo presentes. Y digo que
nuestros hechos que no los hacíamos nosotros, sino que venían todos encaminados por Dios” (II,
xcv 353). Indeed, as Cascardi so eloquently states, similar to Cervantes and the romances of
chivalry, in competing for the “privilege of truth and authority,” Bernal Díaz’ intellectual battles
with Gómara, “serves some of the same purposes…both are texts to be rewritten.... [Bernal]
writes not only as Cervantes did, with his pen, but also as Don Quixote did, with his life”
(Cascardi, 199). And while there is more to say on this matter, I would like to conclude
with what Don Quixote has said on the subject of men of arms and letters, which in a
somewhat ironic manner, speak to the historic attributes of both these men:

Al caballero pobre no le queda otro camino para mostrar que es caballero sino el
de la virtud, siendo afable, bien criado, cortés y comedido y oficioso; no soberbio,
no arrogante, no murmurador, y, sobre todo, caritativo;... Dos caminos hay, hijas,
por donde pueden ir los hombres a llegar a ser ricos y honrados: el uno es el de las
letras; otro, el de las armas. Yo tengo más armas que letras y nací, según me
inclino a las armas, así que casi me es forzoso seguir por su camino, y por el
tengo de ir a pesar de todo el mundo, y será en balde cansaros en persuadirme a
que no quiera yo lo que los Cielos quieren, la Fortuna ordena y la Razón pide, y,
sobre todo, mi voluntad desea (II, vii 1292).

209 Cascardi goes on to clarify that: “The Historia verdadera itself becomes Bernal’s
romance, for he is as much a part of it, and it a part of him, as the romances were for the
aberrant hidalgo of La Mancha...Bernal is a man who has conjoined vital and verbal
experience. Unlike the authors of those fictions, [i.e. Don Quixote, Pierre Menard etc.] he
does so without recourse to parody or irony: his is a project neither ingenuous nor trivial,
for it is as serious as the meaning of lived experience itself.

210 Toward the end of his Historia verdadera, Bernal Díaz recapitulates his reasons for
writing it, stating: “Y además de lo que tengo declarado, es bien que aquí haga relación,
para que hay memorable memoria de mi persona y de los muchos y notables servicios
que he hecho a Dios y a Su Majestad y a toda la cristianidad, como hay escripturas y
relaciones de los duques y marqueses y condes y ilustres varones que sirvieron en las
guerras, y también para que mis hijos y nietos y descendientes osen decir con verdad:
‘Estas tierras vino a descubrir y ganar mi padre a su costa, y gastó la hacienda que tenía
en ello, y fue en lo conquistar de los primeros” (CCXII, 582).
Cervantes and Bernal Díaz alike lived and perished as both men of arms and letters: the former, a naval gunner and later a maimed prisoner of war, the latter, a forgotten foot soldier in search of acknowledgment and compensation for services rendered to the Crown. Accordingly, both these men endured a life of great adventure and sacrifice that in their advanced years would inform their respective writings. And while Bernal Díaz, as an eye-witness to the conquest wrote what he “heard” and what he “saw” alongside Cortés, and Cervantes, a new literary space which playfully draws from such histories, their memories served similar albeit different purposes in that it allowed these men the ability to recreate a world that could be verisimilarly accepted by their respective readers: one real, one of fiction, and both the product of human experience and discernment.

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211 Tom Lathrop who describes Cervantes’ role in the Battle of Lepanto as a naval gunner, offers a wonderful summary of Cervantes’ life and works for students in his introduction of El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha (see pages ix-xxxix).
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The innovativeness with which Miguel de Cervantes approached his literary endeavors is better understood by looking into his playful inclusion and selection of both historic and literary material. The openness with which Cervantes not only incorporated, but placed in direct dialogue, a plethora of generic forms has allowed me to explore the narrative complexity of his literary works, which speak to the reciprocal relationship between the (early) modern novel and the complex and imaginative forms of narrative on display in the crónicas de Indias of Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias and Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s Historia verdadera de la conquista de la nueva España. Indeed, Cervantes’ familiarity and affinity to the chronicles, (as perhaps best reflected in his desire to travel to the New World) has allowed me to further examine the humanist debates surrounding the preoccupation of distinguishing truth from fiction. To give context to these debates, I presented the ideas of Juan Luis Vives, in particular those to do with progress and reliability in establishing guidelines for historical narrative.

In questioning the seemingly-unchallenged authority afforded to the ancients, Vives believed that it was the responsibility of every new generation to learn from their previous mistakes, with the objective to exceed the achievements of ancient scholarship. Indeed, Vives affirms that, “La verdad es accesibles a todos y no está aún ocupada completamente. Muy mucho parte de ella quedó reservada a los venideros” (De disciplinis, Praef., 342). This understanding of progress as a continuous and incremental process is fundamental to understanding the value Vives gives to history. History for
Vives stood at the summit of all arts: “…no sé cómo es que puede parecer que la Historia aventaja a todas, pues ella sola engendra, cría a sus pechos, acrecienta y perfecciona a tantas otras” (5.1, 649). It allowed the historian to transcend both time and space as though it were an act of magic, in which:

Las experiencias ajenas apréndanse del conocimiento de los hechos de vieja recordación que se llaman historia. Ella hace como arte de magia que nos parezca que asistimos a los hechos pasados como a los sucesos actuales y que podamos explorarlos como nuestros” (5.1, 647).

Yet, Vives’ objective and cumulative pursuit of past truth, in which he creates for the reader the illusion of a firsthand view of historical events when not physically present, becomes paradoxical when considered within his own stated limitations of the ideal historian. Vives mitigates to a certain extent these differences defending Cicero’s claim that, “La Historia es testigo de los tiempos, luz de la verdad, vida de la memoria, maestro de la vida pregonera de la antigüedad” (2.5, 418). Anticipating Cide Hamete in the Quixote, who not only “Pinta los pensamientos,” but in so doing “alcara las dudas [y] resuelve los argumentos” (II, x1 1407), this line of thought leads Vives to conclude that history is not only that which is witnessed, but also contemplated and verified (2.5, 418).

Accordingly, in his praise of history in both De tradendis disciplinis as well as De ratione dicendi, Vives presents approaches to writing history that at times introduce a level of ambiguity. Vives imagines the ideal historical narrator as an unlimited eyewitness, able to decipher the most hidden affairs. Yet, such concepts are routinely contested in the writings of several cronistas and come into play in the literary creations of Cervantes. It is this heightened complexity of the historian’s role, which brings us back
to Cervantes’ global awareness and fascination with new worlds both literary and historic.\(^\text{212}\)

The significant role that memory and mnemonics play in Cervantes’ imitation of literary models point to epistemological and narratological concerns that are at play in the crónicas de Indias (Beckjord, 2). By way of Oviedo’s Sumario and Bernal Diaz’ Historia verdadera, the previous chapters demonstrate the manner in which memory and textual authority problematize the relationship of history versus poetry. This line of investigation sheds light into the narrative strategies employed in Cervantes. Moreover, the problematic nature of Oviedo’s relation to ancient authority and in particular to Pliny, points to both his reliance on classical texts and “independence” from it (Paden 217).

Indeed, as Nancy Streuver reminds us once more, Oviedo viewed “rhetorical imitation” as a means of “surpassing… creating something different and better” (Cite in Paden 216), by incorporating, as Paden explains, “rhetorical strategies” that would allow Oviedo a way “to vindicate the authority of the eyewitness” (217). Whereas, well established analogies remained essential in describing the new flora and fauna (217): “Oviedo must rely on his personal experience of encountering a geography, a nature, and a native culture (archived in his own memory) that contradict his cultural memory (archived in the classical works of natural history)” (217). This or something similar to this is observed in Cervantes.

While Oviedo acts to diminish classical authority he remains bound to it, since it “allows Oviedo to make sense of the world” (Paden 221). Similarly, and by means of parody, this is what is observed in the Quixote and the Persiles. Reminiscent of Oviedo, I

\(^{212}\) What De Armas Wilson has refered to as “spatial understanding” (3).
have demonstrated how Cervantes’ extraordinary ability to remember with such detail came from his knowledge and use of the mnemonic treatise. In adopting techniques of memory in oral narrative, Cervantes incorporates the use of places and images as described by the classical art of memory (Egido, 630). Cervantes’ awareness of the Ad Herennium along with other ancient arts of memory is quite evident in several of his works. Be it the structure of Don Quixote’s library together with its emphasis on loci or Periandro’s request in the Persiles that a canvas be painted big enough to depict the most significant events of his life, Cervantes reveals a playfulness and dominion of imitatio and auctoritas. As I discuss in chapter four, the parodic nature the Quijote seems at times defy “…the urge to imitate other texts or even visual representations” (De Armas 29). Egido presents a similar finding in suggesting that Cervantes does not follow a particular model, but rather “selecciona, según la occasion y el lugar” (103).

Indeed, while Oviedo and Bernal Díaz reveal a superior memory that contribute to the narrative structure of their respective histories, Cervantes as well as several of his characters share in a memory that is fundamental to its structure. Memory stands as both the physical as well as metaphysical component which not only creates, but transforms Don Quixote’s perception of reality, and to a greater extent those he encounters along the way. This would include both his literary followers (after the publication of part one), and his more than half-century long “idle readers,” of whom Cervantes speaks of in his prologue. It is memory that infused life into Don Quixote and memory that condemned him to death. A memory that is not only “disparage[ed]” time and again but used “as a trigger for the action” (De Armas, 640). And just as Cide Hamete would have his reader decide if what Don Quixote saw in the cave of Montesinos should be taken as the truth, a
lie, or something in between, Bernal often empowers his reader to judge for themselves as to the true version of events and by doing so become participants in the making of his history. He does so by attacking his stated adversary Francisco López de Gómora, whose relationship as we have seen, share many similarities to that of Miguel de Cervantes and Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda’s apocryphal Quixote.

Finally, while it is Cervantes’ “idle reader” who breathes life into his various creations, it remains nonetheless a temporal life that is sustained within the physical pages of a book. Accordingly, it is within the imagination of his reader that Don Quixote is born. And it is the limits of his reader’s imagination born unto his memory, which constructs the temporal confines of Don Quixote’s existence (along with all other literary actors). While at the end of his storied adventures, Don Quixote ceases to exist within Alonso Quijada el Bueno’s memory, it is the memory of the “idle reader” which confirms this truth and remembers it as such. Don Quixote’s optimism lives in the mind of his trusted reader. For he is, was, and will be again that which his memory allows him to be in collaboration with other realities both real and fictitious (i.e. Romance of chivalry, allusions to the New World chronicles, etc.). And it is through the act of imitation that we, the reader validate his existence. Beginning with Cervantes, and continuing through to his reader, Don Quixote’s cycle of life is the manifestation of man’s corporeal incarnation, deterioration, and inescapable demise. Simply put, his reflects a cycle of eternal life within the confines of death. As such, Don Quixote’s mortality is that of his reader who shares in an eternity limited to our understanding of time: a disjointed science which offers the illusion of place, presence and ultimately absence.
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