One striking feature of poetry is its ability to lend itself to discussions of something else. For example, the distance which now separates us from the high modernity of the post-romantic, technologized twentieth century permits us to observe that much of the scholarship and criticism that emerged during that time on figures such as García de la Vega, Luis de Góngora and Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz spoke, openly or covertly, to contemporary historical, political and ideological conditions. In Allen Grossman’s words, “line-forms, and verse forms in general, are fundamentally discussable as mediations of relationships, as rules and orders of polités” (283). But while discussions about verse and line forms often refer to debates and controversies about politics, it is also the case that discourses of poetry and discourses of modernity have been closely bound together for nearly as long as the concept of modernity has existed. From Hegel, Weber, Heidegger, and on through Foucault, some of the most influential accounts of modernity take recourse in a language of poetry and prose. Indeed, when we look across the broad spectrum of texts in which writers from ancient times through the present have contemplated the modern, one particular narrative emerges regularly as a sort of ‘origin story’. This is the narrative of dispensing with the mythopoetic in favor of the intellect. In these accounts, reason and scientific method displace the oral transmission of received wisdom as mechanisms by which truth was delivered to humankind. This narrative is not born of a particular historical period; rather, it plays a role in discourses of modernity where and whenever modern formations are striving to gain hegemony within the social imaginary. Perhaps that is not surprising, given the powerful constitutive role which moderns attribute to the other. In point of fact, it might be said that the “poetic,” perennially cast as the other of the modern, exercises its greatest generative force—the force of poiesis, with which the terms poesía and poema are associated in so many treatises—within the modern imagination.

In the pages that follow I will focus on iterations of the modern origin story as I trace the stages by which primordial powers associated with poetry are deployed to anchor a “new” modernity in Spain and the Americas. I will also demonstrate that by the late baroque poetry loses that power as modern institutions gain primacy over poetic energies. It is my contention here that for late-sixteenth and early seventeenth-century writers, the narrative of poetry’s subordination exercised a certain kind of daemonic force that was drawn from associations with prophecy and the divine that were invoked as much as they were suppressed, subordinated or excluded in their accounts. By the end of the seventeenth century, extra-rational poetic powers played a diminished role in discourses of poetry, which (paradoxically, perhaps) now reflected the increased acceptance of the legitimacy and the explanatory power of modern knowledge, as that knowledge was anchored in institutions, as opposed to in the divine. Arguably, when the Spanish polymath ecclesiastic Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606-82) described poetry as having developed from the art of Musaeus to the art of Parnassus, he was reflecting on precisely that epistemological transformation: the relocation of truth from the cosmos to a lofty mountaintop populated by august worthies arranged in hierarchical ranks.

In tracing the route from Musaeus to Parnassus, the following sonnet by Hernando de Acuña (1514-1580) provides a useful point of departure. The poem provides a clear
illustration of the defense of modern mechanisms of thought (reason) and modern actions (Spanish imperialism in the Americas), as these defenses were supported by the idea of poetry in the incipient stages of Spanish modernity:

_Cuando era nuevo el mundo y producía_

gentes, como salvajes, indiscretas,
y el cielo dio furor a los poetas

_y el canto con que el vulgo los seguía,

fingieron dios a Amor, y que tenía_

por armas fuego, red, arco y saetas,_

porque las fieras gentes no sujetas

se allanasen al trato y compañía;

_después, viniendo a más razón los hombres,

los que fueron más sabios y constantes_

_al Amor figuraron niño y ciego,

para mostrar que déj y destos hombres_

les viene por herencia a los amantes_

simpleza, ceguedad, desasosiego._

Ostensibly a light entertainment, an example of courtly _sprezzatura_, this poem might be paraphrased: ‘In the old days when the world was new, people were in thrall to the love god; later men came to reason and understood that love is infantile and makes one blind and restless’. However, on closer examination, this sonnet presents an account of the onset of Spanish modernity both in thought and in action. From line nine, the world undergoes a fundamental shift as the relationships between nature and humanity are recast from a “savage” natural state into regimes more aligned with a modern perspective. For example, time is reorganized from the unspecific ‘past’ into a progressive chronology: “Después” (line nine) establishes a clear separation between the timeless era “cuando era nuevo el mundo,” in which people danced to the frenzied songs of their poets and their pagan gods, and the age that arrives after it, the age of wise and steadfast men (“sabios y constantes,” line ten). This latter age extends to the speaker’s present, since the verb “venir” (line thirteen) appears in the present tense. The significance of the threshold between the two halves of the poem becomes evident when we observe how, as the prior era is replaced, the god associated with the natural impulse is transfigured and powerful Eros becomes a mere child. His transformation represents a disabling blow dealt by reason to myth: the onset of modernity entails the demystification of the powers of nature, as rational analysis and scholarship divide its force into distinct classes and categories which can then be mastered by new mechanisms of knowledge --in this instance, the Christian Humanist knowledge of classical mythology. Once armed with this knowledge, and once supported by a _weltanschauung_ that conforms to it, moderns “expose” archaic error (such as perceiving erotic appetite as overwhelming) and provide an image --the _putto_-- by which to persuade the public that desire is infantile.
A dark side of Acuña’s sonnet is revealed when we consider that it represents the operations of this power/knowledge paradigm on historical and ontological levels, as well as on philosophical ones. The “nuevo...mundo” depicted in line one refers to both an unspecified prehistory of the age of reason and --clearly-- the “new” world, and the poem would appear to present an oblique defense of the moral legitimacy of Spanish actions in Americas (perhaps alluding to the Las Casas –Sepulveda debates of 1550-51). In both areas --the philosophical and the political-- Acuña’s depiction of the liberating impact of modern knowledge is intertwined with a narrative of the delimitation of the scope and the authority of poetry. This might appear most clearly in the shift from the notion of poetry as the product of “figurar” (line five) into that of “figuir” (in line eleven). An erudite sixteenth- or seventeenth-century reader would have understood fingir/figurar as a distinction between a primitive art of inspiration and the science of rhetoric that was being promoted by humanist reformers of language. Note, however, that Acuña’s sonnet represents an ambivalence about poetry. This ambivalence is ubiquitous in early discourses of modernity, which simultaneously declare the prior order to have been superceded and draw on it to reinforce the authority of the present. What distinguishes this poem as the product of “early” early modern thought, I would argue, is the degree to which the overpowering poetic imagination --the daemonic canto-- is both set in the past and available to the present, albeit in mediated forms. The maddening songs that plague the “savages” in the first half of the poem continue to stir restively in the poem’s rhythmic last line, with its final word “desasosiego.” Acuña’s sonnet thus broaches some of the central preoccupations for Spanish early moderns: to what extent could contemporary utterances be secured in the social imaginary by modern practices? To what extent would the explanatory and demystifying powers of reason, and the analytic methods that structured the sciences and gave them their leverage over the mysteries of nature, assure their permanence? And to what extent did modern practices require support from sources that lay outside the domain of rational thought, sources such as a poetry infused with the divine --the poetry of Musaeus?

Another way of posing these questions is to inquire whether the narrative of the subjection of poetry to reason is itself a myth. Impossible to verify, this narrative --the modern origin story-- does not wield a modern kind of authority: it is not supported by science and does not answer to analysis. Rather, it is mobilized and endorsed by moderns as they seek to affirm the priority and the privilege assigned to reason over other ways of engaging with the world; and its acceptance relies on a covenant of belief.

That this historical, political and conceptual threshold was also the juncture at which lyric poetry attained a new prominence among erudite writers and philosophers of language makes sense. The lyric was a minor kind of poetry; in the sixteenth century it was less a genre than a variety of forms whose nature and purpose fueled considerable discussion and debate --hence the preponderance of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century versificatorias famously lamented by Luis Alfonso de Carvallo (1571-1635). The variability and flexibility of lyric poetry made it a useful discourse on the threshold of modernity, where it might be argued that it served as a sort of “patch” or stopgap as an old episteme gave way to the new. Furthermore, the principal text through which authority was conferred on lyric poetry, Horace’s Epistola ad pisones, provided important fuel for the modern myth of myth. The appeal of the Epistola can be explained by a number of factors, not least of which was the mid-sixteenth century cultivation of comparisons between the monarchic state and Augustan Rome. But Horace also appealed to self-consciously modern thinkers for his urbane cosmopolitanism and his circumspection regarding the great poetry

of the past. A poetry tailored to Horace’s specifications would not seek to disclose divine and cosmic truths. Horace observed that most of his contemporaries could not attain the heights of Homer or the composers of the great Greek odes. He counseled the Pisos to work in more modest poetry to assure a greater degree of success. Primarily, they should train themselves in the use of the proper verse forms and cultivate decorum and wit.

Having said that, it is also the case that the Epístola furnished an important source for early modern elaborations of the myth of myth. One section of the text that garnered particular attention is the passage in which Horace presents Orpheus and Amphion as the two ancient figures for the archaic civilizing power of poetry:

A los hombres feroces
El sacro Orféo, Intérprete divino,
Separó con lo dulce de sus voces
Del estado brutal en que vivían,
Siendo uno de otro bárbaro asesino:
Y por tales acciones
Tódos le atribuían
Que domó fieros tigres y leones.
Del mismo modo los Tebanos muros
Edificó Anfión, que con los sones
Del acorde instrumento
Tras sí llevaba los peñascos duros,
Dóctiles al poder del blando acento.
Entónces la mejor sabiduría
Era la que prudente discernía
Ya del público bien el bien privado,
O ya del lo profano lo sagrado...

Horace himself set Orphic power firmly in the past (“Entonces, line 882). In treatises by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers, however, Orphic power is reanimated, albeit in a modern manner. For example, Carvallo’s 1602 Cisne de Apolo is a colloquy in which two speakers, Carvallo (a disciple) and Zoilo (a skeptic) receive teachings from Lectura about the nature and purpose of poetry. Partway through the text, Carvallo introduces the mythic scene of the transformation of indecent savages through the interventions of reason. To a certain extent, his account resembles the one depicted in Acuña’s sonnet; however, whereas for Acuña divine song is a source of seductive confusion, a confusion which must be corrected through rational demystification (figurar substituted for fingir), Carvallo draws on Horace’s myth of Orpheus to present divine music as a civilizing force. This difference speaks to the philosophical circumstances in which Carvallo composed his text, a point to which I will return:

los hombres por el pecado vinieron a las tinieblas de la ignorancia dieron en vivir sin ley, sin rey, sin Dios, razón ni concierto, vagando por los campos y haciendo sus habitaciones en cuevas, como brutos animales. No tenían rastro de religión, ni conocimiento de Dios, ni había amistades, ni casamientos, ni se sabía discernir lo bueno de lo malo, ni castigar delictos. Todo lo que se trabajaba era a fuerza de brazos, por faltar la industria del entendimiento. Cada uno procuraba sólo aquello que para su posada era menester, y viendo acabarse el día se entristecían, y viendo otro día amanecer se holgaban como con otro sol...Y estando tan necesitados de razón, vino del cielo la poesía a enseñarlo todo, porque ésa enseñó doméñar los...
cuellos de los animales, a escudriñar las causas, a poner las cosas en orden. Y con la suavidad de su canto de que imos [sic] tratando, se ayudó el fiero vulgo, y allí estaban amontonados, hasta que les enseñaban las justas leyes y costumbres y los provechos particulares y comunes, y cuánto valga más la traza que las fuerzas, y qué reverencia se debe a los padres y patria, y lo que cumple haber imperio. Y la política vida ablandó aquellos pechos rústicos y endurecidos, con la suavidad de los versos y el artificio de decir...Y esto propio sintió Horacio cuando dice que Orfeo, sagrado intérprete de los Dioses, apartó los silvestres hombres de comerse unos a otros, y por esto se dice que amansaba los tigres con su canto. Y Afión, por esta razón, se dijo que con su música tráfa los materiales necesarios para hacer los muros de Tebas, y dice más, que la poesía era ciencia que enseñaba a distinguir lo publico de lo particular, y lo sagrado de lo profano, y a edificar ciudades y dar leyes para su gobierno. (165-168)

In order to understand the purposes to which poetry and the myth of Orpheus are deployed in Caravallo's text, it is helpful to know that this historia appears in a section of the dialogue which has opened with an exchange on style. Early in the discussion, Lectura admonishes, “Porque las palabras de adorno y cumplimiento político suelen ser enfadasas a los que sólo como tú procuran saber, te quiero sin ellas responder a tu pregunta” (163, my emphasis). She is not true to this promise, here or elsewhere in the colloquy; Lectura’s loquaciousness and Zoilo’s reactions to it are sources of humor in this lively text. But their differences in fact connote two distinct worldviews. Zoilo represents a mode of knowing which is falling out of fashion at the opening of the seventeenth century, the Renaissance Humanism based on “razón, Antigüedad, autoridad y costumbre” (89). In contrast, Lectura gives voice to a new kind of Humanism --mannerism-- which is based in the successful deployment of dazzling displays of *sententia*. The brilliance was as crucial as the wide spectrum of learning on which mannerist writers drew; for them, style as an essential linguistic tool, and rhetoric was a science, since the proper use of *eloquentia* strengthened the capacities of language to transcend mere saber and achieve conocimiento. And thus in the *Cisne*, Lectura's eloquence permits her to gain access to subtleties which remain out of reach for Zoilo. For example, Zoilo and Lectura are equally suspicious of the imagination. In an earlier section of the text, they have discussed the dangerous possibility that poets might tell lies. However, Zoilo cannot advance beyond the traps set by misleading images (“No sé, por cierto, siendo fingir tu oficio, cómo se pueden escapar de mentirosos,” 103). In contrast, Lectura draws on St. Augustine and maintains that the imagination can be deployed to capture and unlock hidden knowledge, if it is treated with the appropriate science: “Fingir o imaginar dirás que es su oficio, y no mentir....Si el fingir fuese sin su limitación y concierto, no puedo negar que sería mentir; mas, cuando es conforme a cierta orden y limitación, no es mentir, antes es loable oficio de Poeta” (103). It is through this line of argument that Orphic poetry emerges as a science: limitación y concierto, the properties of Orphic music, keep the imagination honest; they infuse poetry with reason and allow poets to transmit knowledge that lies beyond their direct experience, leading “savages” to, “distinguir lo publico de lo particular, y lo sagrado de lo profano, y a edificar ciudades y dar leyes” (168).

To return to the opening claim in this essay, then, the *Cisne de Apolo* presents a debate about poetry that is in fact a debate about something else, the contest between two approaches to the quest for truth: old versus new visions of the cosmos; Zoilo’s Renaissance Humanist suspicion of fabulas versus Lectura’s equal and opposite belief in the access to
conocimiento that is afforded to humankind by the God-given gifts of signs and the means to interpret those signs. 11

And yet as witty and confident as the interventions by Lectura are, Carvallo does not represent her mode of grasping the world as enjoying universal acceptance. One interlocutor (the character Carvallo) adopts her point of view, won over, in effect, by her “palabras de adorno y cumplimiento” (163). The other resists. Zoilo inhabits the text as a figure for the cultural skepticism about mannerist defenses of fabula, and it is for this reason, I would argue, that Carvallo turns to poetry itself --by this I mean not only to the authority of Horace and Augustine, but to what I proposed before as poiesis, the residual daemonic powers that inhere within the myth of Orpheus, even in the early seventeenth century. Positioned on the threshold of the baroque, the poetics of Carvallo is, in the final analysis (and returning to the language of Caramuel), a poetics of Musaeus. And it is at this point instructive to contrast Carvallo's text with the Epistolas of Caramuel, texts which, roughly half a century after the Cisne, once again draw in the narrative I have been referring to as the origin story of modernity, the “before” and “after” of humankind’s interpellation by reason:

Los hombres desde el principio del mundo comenzaron a formar metros y ritmos bajo el ímpetu de la naturaleza; posteriormente, por medio de la reflexión, examinaron con ingenio los mismos períodos que habían compuesto sin artificio; por último, invocando el auxilio de la aritmética y de la música, a las cuales está subordinada la poética, dieron preceptos, esto es, abrieron las sendas infalibles que van desde Museo hasta el Parnaso.” (340)

It would be tempting to refer to a figure-ground reversal between Caramuel's text and Carvallo's, were that metaphor not so inappropriate to a passage so devoid of image. What emerges clearly in Caramuel's writings, as in other writings on poetry from the late baroque period --and what distinguishes the imaginary of the late baroque from the one in which Carvallo operates-- is a world that is structured in the terms most conventionally associated with modernity: the rationalist, self-reflective subject; his or her mastery of nature through recourse to the knowledges. For this reason, it is appropriate to speak of humankind’s “interpellation”: Caramuel’s later poets are clearly the self-reflexive subjects of modern reason. His views shaped by his rationalist Caramuel argues for the priority of poetry among the sciences, but he does so in a style that connotes history more than it does poetry, and he relates the reform of the archaic art through the application of modern sciences: arithmetic and a kind of music that is distinct from primordial canto. As a result, poetry is not "poetic" in Epistola I, or in versions of the narrative composed by later writers such as Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1676-1764) or Ignacio de Luzán (1702-54). Perhaps more precisely, poetry is not mythopoetic, in the sense imagined by Acuña and by Carvallo. In contrast to these early writers' ambivalence about the world-making power of canto and the truth-claims of science, late baroque and eighteenth-century thinkers look quizzically at myths and songs which have been stripped of their world-making force. Thus Feijóo understands poetry, not on its own terms, but through the frame of History: “Si la Lira de los dos Orfeo, y Anfión no fuera, sería el hombre una fiera sin morada, ley, ni Dios. Ni otra cosa nos persuaden algunas narraciones de la prodigiosa influencia de la Música para refrenar las pasiones más violentas, que leemos en las Historias” (Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas 30). A similar sense informs Luzán’s discussions in La poética o reglas de la poesía en general y de sus principales especies (1737). Unlike Caramuel or Feijóo, Luzán does not eschew fabula
(referred to in the below passage as "ficción"). However, he demonstrates a modern perspective on myth, nonetheless:12

Homero llenó todos sus poemas de semejantes mentiras aparentes, tanto, que hasta los mismos gentiles le censuraron que hubiese atribuido a sus dioses no sólo pasiones, sino aún vicios humanos. Sin embargo, los eruditos descubren muchas verdades escondidas y envueltas en sus ficciones.

This view enables Luzán to present a concise, commonsense interpretation of Horace’s lines:

los milagros de Orfeo y de Anfión, que al son de sus liras movían las peñas y las selvas, eran todas ficciones, no mentiras; porque, aunque en lo exterior tenían visos de serlo, encerraban en sí y figuraban verdades de provechosa enseñanza...y los prodigios de éstos tan diestros y músicos, Orfeo y Anfión, eran símbolo claro de la fuerza que tiene la elocuencia para mover hasta los más feroces ánimos y los más empedernidos corazones. Y así, discurriendo por todas las fábulas, ninguna se hallará que no se refiera indirectamente a alguna verdad.

To travel along the route from Museo hasta Parnaso is to take away Garcilaso’s nymphs’ shuttles and looms and subject them to master’s examinations in rhetoric, squaring off the piedras relucientes de sus moradas and building in their place the marble edifice of Spanish neoclassical criticism. While these metaphors come from Garcilaso, it is Luzán’s commentary on Lope which might best capture the difference between pre-modern and modern poetry, from the eighteenth-century scholar’s point of view:

fue desgracia que alcanzase una edad en que aún no había hecho grandes progresos la buena crítica, esto es, el arte de juzgar rectamente de las obras del entendimiento y de la imaginación...Lope no es un modelo para imitado, sino un inmenso depósito de donde saldrá rico de preciosidades poéticas quien entre a elegir con discernimiento y gusto.13

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“What resources do we have to understand the world around us?” N. Katherine Hayles poses this question at the opening of her study of the threshold of digital culture (3). Johanna Drucker also addresses the twenty-first century as a threshold, one at which new relationships are being imagined between graphesis (the types of knowledge that can be created by images) and mathesis (the types of knowledge that can be created by means of mathematics-based analysis deriving from Cartesian method).14 Arguably, the paths opened for poetry when reason was first imagined as intervening to civilize divinely–inspired canto (a civilizing process that is conflated, for the writers discussed here, with modernization), travel across a threshold of similar significance, as the world-making power of poetry is drained and myth loses its explanatory force.15 If this view appears nostalgic, it is not intended to be so. Resources emerge during the early modern period that form the matrix that yields the disciplines and practices of the scholarship we perform today. These resources are not only conceptual, in the form of the regime of the scholarly disciplines; they are material: the expanding dissemination of books in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the consolidation of the concept of the canon, Parnassos populated by the worthy names of Castilian verse. It would be lax (particularly in this volume) to fail to take the canon into account as crucial historical and cultural phenomenon, one that gathered momentum in tandem with the diffusion of the Parnassus metaphor. As Ignacio
García Aguilar has pointed out, the discourse of the canon was well established in Spain in the late baroque, but it came to a new prominence in the eighteenth century with the preparation of first national literary histories and the rise of the term Siglo de Oro (15).

The quality and the nuance of the scholarship performed in recent years by members of the PASO research group who have worked on the subject of the late baroque and the canon leaves little to add here on this topic, except to call attention, perhaps, to a minor name which may invite further investigation as an figure for the intersection of canon and myth. The Theban Amphion, who in treatises on poetry is frequently paired with Orpheus, may have served some early modern writers as a figure for the poetic canon. The longstanding critical prejudices which have favored poesía over verso and content over the physical object of the book, have privileged Orpheus, both as a figure for elaboration within the poetic tradition and as an object of philosophical and critical inquiry. It remains to be seen if the present shifting cultural imaginary finds new significance for other ancient “first poets.” Of the four most conventionally designated --Museaus, Linus, Amphion and Orpheus-- Museaus is conventionally associated with the first divine song (the attribution drawn on by Caramuel); Linus, slain by Hercules, was associated with funeral songs; and Orpheus, as we have seen, is represented by Horace as the poet who brings morals to humanity; he is also associated with the power to transcend death.16 The myth of Amphion recounts that he played the lyre so sweetly that stones moved into place of their own accord to build the walls of Thebes. In the hands of at least one early modern writer, this myth is understood in terms of the canon, with poems serving as the stones that form the bulwarks of culture. This poem is the Discurso en loor de la poesía (1602), an anonymous work, sung and ostensibly penned by “Clarinda,” a member of the lettered Limeñan elite. As with other treatises examined in these pages, the Discurso presents a discourse on poetry that speaks to a different aim. The text is, in the words of Alicia Colombí Monguíó, a “carta de ciudadanía del humanismo sudamericano,”17 and makes the case for the legitimacy and the significance of Spain’s criollo subjects (y sujetas; Colombí Monguíó nos llama la atención al discurso femenista que subtiende el poema) and their city of letters. In commencing her argument, which will present a comprehensive canon of poets from the ancient, biblical, Peninsular and American traditions, Clarinda invokes,

aquella lira con que d’el Averno
Orfeo libertó su dulce esposa
suspendiendo las furias d’el infierno.
La celebre armonía milagrosa
d’aquel cuyo testudo pudo tanto,
que dio muralla a Tebas la famosa. (4-9)

This opening might be overlooked as conventional --indeed, it is conventional-- were it not for her return to Amphion when she arrives at her celebration of the poets of the Americas. But when the ninfas del sur help her sing of her fellow Peruvian poets, Clarinda writes:

...sabe la Indiana
America muy bien, como es don Diego
honor de la poesía Castellana.
Con gran recelo a tu esplendor me llego
Luis Pérez Ángel, norma de discretos
porque soy mariposa, y temo el fuego.
Fabrican tus romances, y sonetos
(como los de Anfion un tiempo a Tebas)

In the *Discurso*, poetry secures culture, not only through its capacities to capture and transmit truth, not only for the morals it conveys, but in its material aspect. Clarinda proposes that great poems, piled one on top of the other, will secure the permanence of Arica in a transatlantic cultural memory. While her position as an erudite *criolla* in Peru might make her especially attuned to the issue of canon-building, and perhaps an especially astute reader of figures associated with the walls of culture, the interpretation of Amphion offered by Clarinda suggests that further research into this figure may yield a new dimension to the ways in which the canon featured in early modern Spanish visions of the route from Museaus to Parnassus.
Works Cited


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1 For an expanded discussion of these views and their relationship to Spanish cultural production, see Cascardi and Middlebrook, ix-xv.
2 Christopher Braider reviews the trajectory within early modern philosophy of a related, if slightly different, ”origin story.” See Cascardi and Middlebrook 43-66.
3 In his Epistola 1. See below.
4 I also discuss this poem in *Imperial Lyric*, 25-28.
5 For a further exploration of this clash of knowledges, see Mignolo, 29-67.
6 See Vega and Esteve.
7 In the introduction to *Unrequited Conquests*, Roland Greene has argued that lyric poetry was positioned to expose ”the ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses” of authority in the early modern period, and that early modern lyric should thus be understood as playing a crucial role in the transformation of not only social relationships, but ”the scope of the world” in the sixteenth century (1-8).
8 “De parto estaba todo un monte; y luego / Qué vino a dar a luz? Un ratoncillo. / ¡O! ¡cuánto mas juicioso, mas sencillo / Es el principio del Poeta Griego! (Iriarte 305-308).
9 “El que de lidiar bien no se gloria, / No va al Campo de Marte; / Y el que ignora con qué arte / Pelota, disco y trompo se manejan, / Se abstiene de jugar, por si mtejan / Con risas insolentes / Su poca habilidad los concurrentes.” (Iriarte, 841-847).
10 See my discussion of this text in Cascardi and Middlebrook 3-17.

In a series of illuminating articles on the late baroque, Pedro Ruiz Pérez has summarized the ambivalent attitudes of early modern writers, observing “un menosprecio de la poesía lírica que tiene en el síntoma de las defensas y reivindicaciones su constatación más sólida,” and noting that this discourse intensified over the course of the seventeenth century, in “una estrecha relación con dos procesos determinantes en el cambio de mentalidad: las defensas del carácter liberal de las artes...y los nuevos paradigmas en el modelo educativo y la figura humana resultante. Sobre todo en esta última línea, el ars y la exercitatio aquieren una relevancia creciente” (“Genero y autores,” 274).

Fejióo launches virulent attacks on fiction and fábula: “Creo que bien lejos de ser la ficción de la esencia de la Poesía, ni aún es perfección accidental: sin temeridad se puede decir que es corrupción suya. Fúndolo en que los antiquísimos Poetas, Padres de la Poesía ó fundadores del Arte, no tuvieron por objeto, ni mezclaron en sus versos Fábulas. Lino, que comúnmente se supone el más antiguo de todos, dice Diógenes Laerio que escribió la Creación del Mundo: del curso de los Astros: de la producción de animales y plantas. Orfeo, y Anfión, por testimonio de Horacio, cantaron Instrucciones Religiosas, Morales, y Políticas, con que redujeron los hombres de la feroz barbarie en que vivían, a una sociedad racional y honesta. De aquí vino la fábula de amansar con la Lira Tigres, y Leones, y atraer las piedras. Y es muy de notar, que después de exponernos esto Horacio, añade, que este fue el fundamento del honor que se dio a los Poetas, y a sus versos.”

Quoted in Miguel y Canuto, 35.

See SpecLab.

Two recent essays by Anthony J. Cascardi are relevant to this discussion. See “Image and Iconoclasm in Don Quijote,” and “Orphic Fictions.”

On the spectrum of meanings attached to Orpheus in the early modern period, see Nelson.


Antonio Cornejo Polar includes in his critical edition of the “Discurso” a guide to the men and women mentioned in the Discurso in his critical edition. Little is known of Perez Ángel. Dávalos was born in Spain, emigrated to the New World and married his wealthy and lettered wife, doña Francisca de Briviesca y Arellano (Colombi-Monguió, Petrarquismo Peruano, 58-71). He was a central figure in the Peruvian ciudad letrada, and the author of the Miscelánea Austral (1602).

On the criollo ambivalence regarding Spanish letters, see Mazzotti, as well as the classic essay by Rama.