

NATIONALISM AND ISLANDS DISPUTE IN THE EAST CHINA SEA

by

MAKOTO KUROKAWA

A THESIS

Presented to the Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science

June 2017

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Makoto Kurokawa

Title: Nationalism and Islands Dispute in the East China Sea

This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science degree in the Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program by:

Tuong Vu	Chair
Erik Girvan	Member

and

Scott L. Pratt	Dean of the Graduate School
----------------	-----------------------------

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded June 2017

© 2017 Makoto Kurokawa

THESIS ABSTRACT

Makoto Kurokawa

Master of Science

Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program

June 2017

Title: Nationalism and Islands Dispute in the East China Sea

China and Japan have claimed sovereignty of tiny, inhabitant islands in the East China Sea for a long time. This paper attempts to analyze this territorial dispute from the conflict transformation perspective to seek a peaceful end. I believe that Nationalism plays a key role and interferes to resolve the dispute by international conflict resolution methods. To prove the influence of the nationalism on the dispute, I conducted a survey to measure individual's nationalistic attributions and inquire attitudes toward the islands dispute of Chinese and Japanese. The survey result shows that a majority of the both Chinese and Japanese participants having a strong individual nationalistic attribution support their nation's sovereignty over the islands. Moreover, a majority of the Chinese and Japanese having a weak individual nationalistic attribution do not support their nations' sovereignty rather take different positions regarding to the islands dispute.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Makoto Kurokawa

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene
Waseda University, Tokyo

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Science, Conflict and Dispute Resolution, 2017, University of Oregon
Master of Law, American Law, 2016, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Laws, Law and Society, 2013, Waseda University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

International Conflict Resolution
Political Psychology
International Law
America Law

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Judicial Interpreter, Oregon State Court, 2017

Graduate Teaching Fellow, East Asian Language Department, University of Oregon, 2014-2015, 2016-2017

Cultural Liaison Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Services, University of Oregon, 2014-2016

Intern, Consular Office of Japan in Portland, 2016

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Taiwan Fellow, Nationalism and the islands dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan, National Taiwan University, 2017 to present

Global Corner Award, The Office of International Affairs, University of Oregon, 2016-2017

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Vu and Girvan for their assistance in the preparation of this project. I thank are due to Professor Vu, whose familiarity with the international relation in East Asia was helpful during examining the islands dispute. I also thank Professor Girvan whose familiarity with the Social Psychology to analyze psychological issues causing the islands dispute between China and Japan.

For my mother, grandmother, and aunt, who are supporting my study abroad from
Japan and my grandfather who passed away during this research

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION OF THE ISLANDS DISPUTE.....	1
II. ARGUMENTS.....	6
China.....	6
Japan.....	18
III. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	25
Nationalism.....	26
Social Identity Theory.....	32
Collective Memory.....	37
Application for Chinese and Japanese.....	39
IV. SURVEY.....	43
Describe the Sample.....	43
Research Question.....	44
Main Hypothesis.....	50
Results.....	51
Chinese population.....	51
Analysis.....	55
Japanese population.....	55
Analysis.....	59
V. DISCUSSION.....	61
VI. CONCLUSION.....	68

Chapter	Page
APPENDICES	77
A. ARGUMENTS 1403-1663 & 1885-2016.....	77
B. SURVEY DISTRIBUTION.....	79
C. SURVEY FOR CHINESE PARTICIPANTS SECTION 3	80
D. SURVEY FOR JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS SECTION 3	82
E. SURVEY FOR SECTION 4	84
F. RULES OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONALISTIC ATTRIBUTION	85
REFERENCES CITED.....	87

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION OF THE ISLANDS DESPUTE

A territorial issue of tiny, inhabitant islands in the East China Sea should be concluded in the near future. China and Japan have claimed their own sovereignty over the islands for a long time. Since the sovereignty is a negotiable interest, I will call the territorial issue the islands dispute (Burton, 1996). This paper attempts to analyze the islands dispute from the conflict transformation perspective. I believe that a key to transform the dispute is to understand nationalistic attribution among Chinese and Japanese based on a World War II (WWII) history of China and Japan behind the islands dispute.

China states, “Diaoyu Dao, which is the islands’ name in Chinese, are China’s inherent territory, and Japan grabbed Diaoyu Dao from China” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Meanwhile, the Japanese government insists that these islands, which they named the Senkaku Islands, are under the valid control of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon international law. Therefore, the Japanese government believes “there is no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).”

Felstiner et al. (1980) describes a process of raising a dispute as, “Experiences become grievances, grievances become disputes, and disputes take various shapes, follow particular dispute processing paths (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, 1980-1981, p.631).” The territorial issue became the islands dispute in the 1970’s, when Taiwan, not China, sent a diplomatic note to Japan to declare that Taiwan had the sovereignty of the islands for the first time. Under the Nixon administration, the U.S. government contemplated returning the islands to Japanese administration.¹ To challenge this policy, Taiwan claimed its own sovereignty. This incident incited nationalistic sensation among Taiwanese, and they broke through Japan’s territorial waters and landed on the islands. Nixon urged Taiwan and Japan to resolve the islands dispute peacefully at the tripartite committee meeting in Soule. However, China was outraged that Taiwan was invited to the meeting as a legitimate government entity. Therefore, although Japan proposed a joint-development plan of the islands at the meeting, it was not successfully implemented. Right after that, China challenged the Japanese sovereignty over the islands for the first time.

Experiences and grievances must have existed as causes of the islands dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan. For Taiwan, the islands dispute always links to a matter as the international legitimacy of Taiwan (Yu, 2015). A history

¹ After the end of the WWII, the U.S. occupied Japan and placed the islands under the U.S. military administration, but acknowledged Japanese ownership of the islands.

between China and Taiwan exists as the experiences and grievances to have grown up to become the islands dispute. Although it is important to analyze the history and relationship between China and Taiwan to understand the whole picture of the islands dispute, this paper will focus on only the relationship between China and Japan.

Conflict or dispute can be positive and socially productive in our society.

Simmel (1964) states, “Conflict is...designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties (p.3).” Thus, conflict or dispute can strengthen a unity of two different entities. Coser (1956) also points out that conflicts can incite social change and increase group unity. He writes, “Conflict can have stabilizing and integrative functions for the relationship. It enables social structures to read just by eliminating sources of dissatisfaction and eliminating the courses for disassociation (Coser, 1956, p. 154).”

However, a conflict or dispute does not always bring positive influences on our society. It can disrupt a human’s relationship or a country itself. It has to be concluded to incite social change and increase group unity. To conclude the dispute in the positive and constructive way, it has to be “transformed (Lederach, 2015).”

Conflict Transformation is a new perspective of the conflict or dispute, suggested by Lederach. The term “transformation” includes a nuance of seeking a

constructive change (Lederach, 2015, p.4). “Resolution” implies “finding a solution to a problem (Lederach, 2015, p.29).” When we attempt to “resolve” the conflict or dispute, “we seek a conclusion (Lederach, 2015, p.29).” On the other hand, the idea of the “transformation” encapsulates not only how to end an undesired situation but also what and how to build a desired situation.

For the islands dispute, China and Japan should seek the transformation rather than the resolution. China and Japan have a significant past relationships and history. Moreover, they clearly have a significant future relationship. The narrowness of resolution approaches may solve the sovereignty issue but miss the greater potential for constructive change for the relationship between China and Japan (Lederach, 2015, p.69).

The conflict transformation starts from analyzing the bigger picture of relationships and patterns within which the problem rises. The big picture consists of three components the presenting situation, the horizon of the future, and the development of change processes (Lederach, 2015, p.34). The presenting situation is the connection between the present and the past (Lederach, 2015, p.35). As a first step, we have to recognize, understand, and redress historical relationship between China and Japan. Lederach (2015) suggests that the past is where the energy of the dispute is produced and calls the place as “the epicenter (p.31).” This Lederach’s suggestion

links to the Felstiner (1980)'s explanation that experiences become grievance and grievance become dispute.

As a second component, we should set an ideal China-Japan relationship in the future. This goal will guide the energy of the dispute for a right direction. To support this guidance, we should design change processes (Lederach, 2015 pp.36-37).

To address the islands dispute, this paper will focus on the first component. I believe that there are only few studies to understand the epicenter of the islands dispute thoroughly. To conclude the islands dispute, I would like to start from the first component in this paper and suggest some ideas of the second and third components for future studies.

CHAPTER II

ARGUMENTS

China

Historical records. China mainly argues based on historical records (Drifte, 2013). China disagrees that Japan first discovered the islands and declared the sovereignty under the international law. China offers the following historical records and argues that China is the first country to discover the islands and named them as Diaoyu Dao. The oldest record is a book, “Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng Xiang Song)”, which recorded that Chinese voyagers regularly passed the Diaoyu Dao from 1403 to 1424. The book was published during the reign of Emperor Wanli from 1573 to 1620. Now, the copy of the book is housed in the Bodleian library of Oxford University. China argues that this book shows that China has already discovered the islands at the latest in 1424 and considered them as the China’s property (China Internet Information Center, Voyage with a Tail Wind, 2014). Therefore, China insists that Japan’s main argument of the *terra nullius* (Brownlie, 1990)² is invalid.

To support China’s first discovery of the islands, China also shows records

² *Terra nullius*, i.e. new land, for example a volcanic islands, territory abandoned by the former sovereign, or territory not possessed by a political community satisfying the criteria of statehood.

written by Chen Kan who is an imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu in 1534. He stated in the records, “Disoyu Yu, Huangmao Yu, Chi Yu, so many islands unfolded before my eyes. Then, Kume Mountain, which is, now, known as the Kumejima island governed by Japan, came into sight; that is where the land of Ryukyu begins. The Ryukyuans on my ship started singing and dancing excitedly, because they knew that they had finally returned to their homes (China Internet Information Center, Records of the Imperial Title-Conferring Envoys to Ryukyu, 2014).” China insists that this record also strengthens the China’s argument that the islands were not recognized as parts of Ryukyu (Kerr, 1953)³ but China in the 15th century.

Another book which is called “A Mirror of Japan (Ri Ben Yi Jian)” reveals that the islands were under Taiwan’s sovereignty. The book was written by Zheng Shungong who was dispatched by the Ming court to study in Japan in 1556. He recorded a roadmap from Fujian to Japan in this book. The roadmap illustrates that “Diaoyu Yu (Diaoyu Dai) is Xiaodong’s affiliated island.” “Xiaodong” was another name of Taiwan at that time. Therefore, China says that this record shows that the islands were under Taiwan’s sovereignty (China Internet Information Center, 2014).

China also offers other two historical records to support its argument. Both of

³ Until Japan incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom (current Okinawa prefecture) in 1872, the Ryukyu Kingdom was not governed by Japan.

them were recorded in 1561. First, Guo Rulin, who was the imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu, described in the records that “the first day of May on the lunar calendar, we passed Diaoyu Yu. And on the third day of May in the lunar calendar, we arrived at Chi Yu, which separates China and Ryukyu. The following day, we saw Kume Mountain (China Internet Information Center, 2014).”

China states that this passage implies that the Chi Yu was considered as the border between China and Ryukyu at that time, so the Diaoyu Dai was a part of China.

Second, a Chinese geographer, Zheng Ruozeng, wrote “An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian) (China Internet Information Center, 2014).”

The first volume of the book illustrates “A Map of Fujian’s Coastal Mountains and Islands (Fujian Yan Hai Shan Sha Tu).” The map includes Diaoyu Dao as the islands under China’s jurisdiction at that time.

China shows another record that the Chi Yu was the border between China and Ryukyu in 1579, and the Daoyu Dao was under the Chinese sovereignty. Its record was made by Xiao Chongye who is the imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu. He states, “It took us 30 days to arrive at Huangmao Islet. And on the first day of lunar May, we passed Diaoyu Yu and two days later, we arrived at Chi Yu, which sits at the border between China and Ryukyu. The next day, we saw Kume Mountain. (China Internet Information Center, 2014)”

In 1606, Xia Ziyang, who is also the imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu, wrote in his records that “in the afternoon, we passed Diaoyu Yu (i.e., Daoyu Dao). The next day, we arrived at Huangwei Yu. That night, the wind roared, making the waves surge over the helm...when the water flows from Hei Shui back to Cang Shui, it enters Chinese territory (China Internet Information Center, 2014).” China also shows this record as one of the historical record to prove that the islands are China’s sovereignty. As the most recent historical record, China also shows the records written by Zhang Xueli who was also the imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu in 1663. He stated in his records, “The color of the water becomes different, dark blue. The boatman told me we were entering the ocean. Instantly, a white line spans from the south to north. The boatman told me the line is the border line separating China from foreign land (China Internet Information Center, 2014).”

All of the eight historical records would support that China has already discovered the islands and considered the islands under the Chinese sovereignty during the 14th to 15th centuries. Five of the records were made by the imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu. Ryukyu was an independent kingdom of Japan until 1879 (Okinawa prefectural board of education, 2014). So, it was not a part of Japan during the 14th and 15th centuries. The Ryukyu kingdom was

established at the beginning of the 15th century and had a special relationship with China. The Ryukyu had to pay tributes to China, and China recognized the Ryukyu as an independent country. Therefore, many governmental officials traveled for a diplomatic purpose between China and the Ryukyu kingdom. So, there remain many records.

Treaty of Shimonoseki. Secondly, China also argues that Japan took advantage of its power gained by the Sino-Japanese war to incorporate the islands into Japan's sovereignty. The Sino-Japanese war, which started on August 1, 1894 was concluded on April 17, 1895 by signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008). Although western countries predicted that strong Chinese forces could easily win this war, Japan defeated China. As a consequence, China had to sign the unequal treaty with Japan. Following the Simonoseki Treaty, China had to cede the entire island of Taiwan and all of its affiliated islands in 1895. Although the treaty does not clearly mention about the Diaoyu Dao, China interprets that the treaty of Shimonoseki included the Diaoyu Dao in "its affiliated islands." China argues that since Japan unfairly established the Simonoseki Treaty, Japan cannot claim its sovereignty based on it.

However, Japan disagrees with this point because Japan insists that "the Senkaku Islands are an 'inherent' part of the territory of Japan (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Japan, 2012).” Thus, Japan does not consider that Japan obtained the islands by the winning of the Sino-Japanese war. About this point, Drifte (2013) supports Japan’s assertion in his article stating that “strictly speaking, the incorporation by the Meiji (Japan) government is not related to the Shimonoseki Treaty (Drifte, 2013).” Moreover, the treaty does not clearly mention the islands. The treaty only says, “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon; - (b) The island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said islands of Formosa (Article II) (Taiwan Documents Project, 2017).”

In response, China argues that this wording applies also to the disputed islands because they considered them as parts of Taiwan (Drifte, 2013). The wording in the Treaty of Shimonoseki is too vague to decide if China had to cede the disputed islands by the consequence of the Sino-Japanese war.

Returning the islands to China by losing WWII. As a third main argument, China insists that Japan returned the Diaoyu Dao to China in accordance with legally recognized documents, such as the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, and Japanese Instrument of Surrender at the end of the WWII (China Internet Information Center, 2014).

To understand this argument precisely, we have to review the post-WWII history. Those documents, the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, and Japanese Instrument of Surrender, did not define the Japan's postwar territory. The San Francisco Peace Treaty legally defined the Japan's postwar territory. And, Japan argues that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include the Senkaku Islands as the territory that Japan renounced under Article II. Under the treaty, the Senkaku Islands were placed under the U.S. administration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012). Then, in 1972, the U.S. returned the Senkaku Islands to Japan with Okinawa. However, China was not invited to the international conference to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty because of the Chinese civil war and the controversy over the governmental legitimacy of Taiwan. So, China did not participate to the discussion to define the Japan's postwar territory.

China describes this incident of expanding the U.S. jurisdiction to the islands and reverting the islands administration to Japan as being illegal and has expressed strong opposition until now.

China concludes the following:

Any unilateral step taken by Japan regarding Diaoyu Dao will not change the fact that it belongs to China. China's position on Diaoyu Dao has been clear and consistent. China will firmly defend its national sovereignty and

territorial integrity. China's resolve to uphold agreements made after the global anti-fascist war will not be shaken by any force. China has confidence and ability to stand up to Japan's illegal acts, which have ignored historical facts and international legal principles. Yet, China remains dedicated to safeguarding and maintaining regional peace and order (China Internet Information Center, 2014).

Although the China's statement gives us an impression that China has consistently kept insisting its sovereignty over the islands, it is only recently that China declared the sovereignty over the islands. As indicated in chapter I, Taiwan challenged the Japan's sovereignty over the islands earlier than China in 1970 (Yu, 2015). Before 1970, neither China nor Taiwan had claimed sovereignty over them. On December 3, 1970, China claimed that the islands were parts of China for the first time. However, when China claimed the sovereignty, China did not have a strong interest on the islands' sovereignty. Rather, China was offended that Taiwan was invited to the tripartite committee meeting. To oppose the agreement of developing the islands by Taiwan and Japan together in the meeting, China claimed the sovereignty over the islands.

In 1972, China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations, and in 1978, they concluded the Peace and Friendship Treaty. Japan insists that Japan has clearly

indicated to China Japan's position that Japan never recognized the existence of an issue to be solve on the territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands during the negotiations on the Peace and Friendship treaty in 1978. However, China did not oppose Japan's position at that time. About this point, Drifte (2013) argues that China did not disagree with Japan's position, but China and Japan agreed upon "shelving the islands issue (Mondai o tanaage ni suru, 問題を棚上げにする in Japanese) (Magosaki, 2012)," ⁴albeit not in writing or in any public or legal form. The former Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai refused to discuss the islands issue by replying, "Let's discuss it another time." The record of the refusal was omitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan because the negotiation also included the apology about the past Japan's action by the former Prime Minister Tanaka. The government considered that it was too sensitive for Japan, so it omitted the fact from the records. However, in 2000, Hashimoto Hiroshi, who was the head of China Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan at that time revealed the fact in his interview (Drifte, 2013). Although it is impossible to know what the Prime Ministers discussed in the negotiations, the point is that China did not insist the sovereignty over the islands

⁴ "Shelving the islands issue" meant that both China and Japan acknowledged that they insisted their sovereignty over the islands. If they brought up and attempted to resolve the issue, the collision by armed force could have been occurred. In order to make the collision not happened, they postponed discussing the issue. At that time, China agreed Japan's administration over the islands, but did not agree the Japan's sovereignty.

during this negotiable opportunity and had not taken any prominent actions until 2008.

On December 7, 2008, two Chinese government vessels hovered and drifted inside the sea surrounding the islands for about nine hours. This was the first time that Japan observed the Chinese government vessels in that area. The Japanese government considered this incident as “the intrusion into Japan’s territorial sea with the clear intention of violating the sovereignty of Japan attempting to change the status quo through force or coercion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017).”

Two years after the first “intrusion” into the Japan’s territorial sea surrounding the islands, no Chinese vessel was found in both the territorial and “contiguous seas (Wakatsuki, 2016)⁵”. However, on September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat had collided with two Japanese patrol boats by a Japanese coast guard. Although no injuries were reported, this incident has intensified the political tension between China and Japan. The Japanese coast guard arrested the captain of the Chinese fishing boat after repeatedly ignoring requests to leave the area (Boat collisions spark Japan-China diplomatic row, 2010). The Foreign Ministry of China said about this incident, “China has repeated its claim to the Diaoyu islands and urged Japanese patrol boat in the area against any ‘so-called law enforcement activities or

⁵ The contiguous sea is “an area stretching 24 nautical miles out from the edge of territorial waters.”

any actions that would jeopardize Chinese fishing boats or Chinese people.” On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry of Japan considers this incident as “a collision of a Chinese fishing boat into Japan coast guard patrol vessels in Japan’s territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017).”

In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan reported that the twenty four Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea. No Chinese vessels were found in the territorial sea. Although the total number of the Chinese vessels entering into the contiguous and territorial seas in 2011 was fourteen, the number was dramatically increased in 2012. In December, 2012, the 124 Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea, and the 21 vessels were found in territorial sea. The reason why China actively behaved in 2012 is because of the two incidents among the islands issue in Japan.

In April, 2012, Ishihara Shintaro, the right-wing Governor of Tokyo declared his intention to have his local government buy some of the islands from its private Japanese owner (Lah, 2012). To avoid strengthening a tension between China and Japan, the Japanese national government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda at that time bought them in September, 2012. The 122 Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea and the 19 of the vessels were found in the territorial sea next month after the event. In December, China commented, “Japan’s administrative control over

the Senkaku Islands now no longer existed (Drifte, 2013).” Some Chinese also conducted a demonstration against Japan and destroyed Japanese stores in China.

From 2013 to 2015, China has actively behaved in the seas. In 2013, the 739 Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea and the 88 of them were found in the territorial sea. In 2014, the number of the Chinese vessels entering into the contiguous sea was 748, and the ones entering into the territorial sea was 88. In 2015, the 743 Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea, and the 95 Chinese vessels were found in the territorial sea.

On June 9, 2016, a Chinese naval ship entered the waters contiguous to the Senkaku islands (Stashwick, 2016). Before this incident, Japan found only Chinese coast guard ships in the seas, so it was the first time that the Chinese naval ship was found. Since Russian military ships were also detected in the contiguous zone on June 8, the Chinese ship may have been reacting to the Russian vessel’s movement. About one week after finding the Chinese naval ship in the contiguous sea, Japan found the two Chinese spy ships in the contiguous sea of the islands of Kagoshima prefecture and Okinawa prefecture.

Summary of China’s argument. As I illustrated above, China offers the historical records in the 14th and 15th centuries to support that China has already found the islands and declared the sovereignty at that time. Moreover, China opposes to the

U.S.'s action to occupy and return the islands to Japan after the WWII. China also thinks that the Treaty of Shimonoseki should be unenforceable because Japan abused its power to “steal” the islands or, even though the treat is valid, Japan would have already returned the islands to China because of losing the WWII.

Japan

Argument based on the international law. China mainly claims the sovereignty based on the historical records in the 14th and 15th centuries whereas Japan claims the sovereignty based on the international law (Drifte, 2013). A country can publicly claim sovereignty over uninhabited islands if the county finds them for the first time (*Terra nullius*) (Brownlie, 1990)⁶. Japan insists that the government conducted the surveys of the islands several times from 1885 (Hane, 2012)⁷ and

⁶ Effective occupation is commonly related to extension of sovereignty to *terra nullius*. To prove possession by states and manifestations of sovereignty legally more potent than those of the other claimant or claimants, the states can obtain sovereignty over the terra nullius by the effective occupation.

⁷ The MOFA of Japan claims that the government conducted the surveys of the Senkaku islands several times with Okinawa prefecture. As a result, the government carefully confirmed that the islands were the *terra nullius*, and Sino (China) did not administrate the islands. Then, the government decided building a sign of the Japanese sovereignty and officially integrating the islands into Japan. About this explanation, Hane argues that it is not historically accurate because this description misses that the issue of the islands was always discussed as the sovereignty of Okinawa, and Japan has suggested to recognize the Chinese sovereignty over Ryukyu (Okinawa) which is included the Senkaku islands. Instead of agreeing upon the China's sovereignty, China should have recognized the same right to commerce for Japanese as the one which western merchants had in China at that time. However, the suggestion was never become a treaty because of some criticism by Chinese governmental officers and

concluded that the islands were uninhabited and Sino (China) did not govern them.

On January 14, 1895, the government officially decided to nationalize the islands as parts of the Japanese territory (Kakugi kettei, 閣議決定 in Japanese) and claimed the sovereignty to the world. Therefore, “there is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016).”

Treaty of Shimonoseki and After the WWII. To refute the China’s arguments about the Shimonoseki Treaty and the declarations at the end of the WWII, Japan emphasizes that the islands were not nationalized by the winning of the Sino-Japanese war and the Shimonoseki Treaty. Moreover, Japan did not renounce the sovereignty of the islands under the article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Rather, Japan legally obtained the islands, based on the international law.

Furthermore, Japan claims that China had not opposed Japan’s administration over the islands for about eighty years from 1895 to 1970. For instance,

recovering a relationship between Russia and China during the negotiation. Thus, Hane emphasized that the reason why Japan obtained the sovereignty of the islands was because China did not sign the agreement. If we know the fact, the statement by the MOFA of Japan seems to want to hide the fact of the Japan’s suggestion of renouncing Okinawa with the Senkaku islands. Moreover, Shaw (1999) argues that “documents clearly show that there were no such survey (p.84).”

a world map made by China in 1960 shows that the islands are the Japanese territories (Kenei, 2012). Even after claiming the sovereignty in 1970, China had not conducted any action to insist the sovereignty until 2008. However, China suddenly has strongly claimed the sovereignty after finding potential petroleum resources. So, Japan criticizes this China's illegitimate motivation to enjoy the resources by claiming the islands sovereignty.

No “shelving” agreement. Some scholars consider that China and Japan agreed upon shelving the issues in 1970's. However, the current Japanese government seems to refuse the existence of the “shelving” agreement because it clearly states that “there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.”

It would be hard to prove whether or not the “shelving” agreement existed. Until when the former Prime Minister Noda declared to purchase the islands from the private owner in 2012, the issue was not visible. After the purchase by the Japanese government. The former Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao made a statement and implied that China interpreted that Japan changed the “rule of the game” of this islands dispute which has been followed for 40 years (Kenei, 2012).” For China, it might have had to defend its own position to prevent losing an opportunity to insist the sovereignty over the islands.

It should be pointed out that at least there were two misunderstandings between China and Japan among the incident in 2012. First, the former Prime Minister Noda decided to purchase the islands in order to prevent the escalation of the islands dispute. However, despite of his intension, China considered the purchase by the national Japanese government as breaking the “shelving” agreement. As a consequence, the islands dispute was escalated. Second, many Japanese think that China has started claiming the sovereignty because of the potential petroleum resources (Hane, 2012). However, from the Chinese perspective, the purchase by the Japanese government might push China to insist the sovereignty to protect China’s national benefits. Although the potential petroleum resources would have been a part of reasons why China has started strongly claiming the sovereignty, it was not the only decisive reason. However, unfortunately, many Japanese recognize China’s resource interest as an only reason because Japanese media has emphasized it.

Against China’s “invasion.” Many Chinese vessels have been entering into the territorial and contiguous seas of the islands from 2008. Japan considers that the Chinese vessels’ behaviors show a political message that China does not keep silence anymore about the Japan’s administration of the islands (Chuugoku gunkann ga sennyuu, 2016). To reply the messages, Japan insists its own position regarding the islands sovereignty by the three main tactics; (i) diplomatic criticism (ii) adding the

islands dispute on history textbooks used at junior high and high schools (iii)

increasing national security power in Okinawa and strengthening a self-defense force and a bond with the U.S.

If you visit the official web site managed by the MOFA of Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016), you could find the Japan's claim and other supporting information in twelve languages. The web site was updated on April 13, 2016. As I wrote above, the position of the Japanese government is that "there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015)."

In 2014, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology in Japan (MEXT) announced to revise teaching guidelines and textbooks and encourage teachers to teach their students that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan (McCurry, 2014). Textbooks used in 2014 did not mention the islands dispute. The former Minister of the MEXT said, "It is natural for a country to teach its children about the government's positions and integral parts of its own territory (McCurry, 2014)." To react on this incident, a spokeswoman at the Chinese foreign ministry told, "We once more urge Japan to respect historic realities, stop provocations and teach the younger generation a correct historical perspective (McCurry, 2014)."

The MEXT is no longer a stranger to diplomatic controversy (Pollmann,

2015). The teaching guidelines and textbooks have applied to not only history but also geography and civic classes at junior high and high schools since April 2016.

Textbook publishers do not have an obligation to follow the guideline from the MEXT. However, public schools are required to be used the textbooks approved by the MEXT, so if the publishers do not comply with this request from the MEXT, they might lose the approval and could not sell the textbooks to the public schools anymore (Pollmann, 2015).

This revision of the textbooks broke a historical stance of avoidance of teaching the controversial issues in Japanese schools. Many teachers at the junior high and high schools have not usually spent time to teach the controversial issues, such as a history of the WWII. This tendency was established because of regrettable experiences during the WWII. Japan had carefully protected a school independency of influences by the government and religions. However, the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe desires “to ditch ‘masochistic’ appraisals of the country’s wartime history, promote its territorial claims, and instill feelings of patriotism among school children (McCurry, 2014).” His desires influenced on the revision of the school textbooks and teaching guidelines. Some people criticize that the Prime Minister’s desires will mean omitting the descriptions of wartime atrocities, such as comfort women and the Nanking massacre.

On March 29, 2016, Japan approved the largest defense budget (\$44 billion) (Spitzer, 2016). On the same day, new laws went into effect, which allows the Japanese self-defense force to use its power for a collective defense purpose⁸. According to the Prime Minister Abe, “the security environment surrounding our country is increasingly severe. ... In a world where no nation can protect themselves by themselves alone, this legislation will help prevent wars.” Increasing severity of the security environment surrounding our country indicates nuclear and missile development by North Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016) and China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims in the East China Sea. On March 27, 2016, Japan opened a new radar surveillance base near the islands. Chinese authorities criticized this incident. China also continues a low-level program of confronting Japanese ships and aircraft near the islands. A majority of Chinese armed forces, which is the world’s largest standing military, are mainly used for aggressive campaigns to assert territorial claims in the South and East China Sea (China says military spending increase to be smallest in six years, 2016). (Appendix A)

⁸ Collective defense force: Under the Self-Defense Forces Act, article 76(2), the prime minister can order to mobilize a part of or a whole self-defense under the situations below when he/she considers that it is necessary to protect national security. In this case, he/she has to get approved by the congress under the law of armed attack situation.

(2) A situation where an armed attack happened against a country which Japan has an intimate relationship, the armed attack threatened an independency of Japan, and an obvious danger which invades life, freedom, and a right to pursue happiness of Japanese is recognized (Jietai-hou, 2016).

CHAPTER III

LITERTURE REVIEW

After China claimed its sovereignty in 1970 to the international society for the first time, both China and Japan have insisted on demonstrating their sovereignty to the world in various ways. Especially since Japan found that Chinese vessels entered to the sea around the islands in 2008, Japanese government has adapted more contentious way to insist the sovereignty year by year. China has kept sending more vessels to the sea around the islands. It would be true that the reason why this islands dispute has escalated is because the location of the islands are important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and lie near potential oil and gas reserves, and are strategically significant position for the military between the U.S. and China (How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties, 2014). However, this paper suggests another key factor to explain the reason of the escalation: The islands are a symbol of national power for China and Japan. Not only because of resources or locational importance but also their national prides will be hurt if they lose their control over the islands. This national pride is held by individual Chinese and Japanese as a part of their identity. This paper will call such identity as individual nationalistic attribution.

In this chapter, I will review a theory of Nationalism, Social Identity Theory, and Collective Memory to support my assertion. Each theory is from different

academic discipline - political science, psychology, and conflict and dispute resolution
- but all of them focus on an individual self in a context of social groups. The three theories agree upon that people are influenced by a society to which they belong and have a collective (national) identity.

Nationalism. Nationalism is primarily a political principle, but some scholars explain it from a perspective of the social psychology. Druckman (1994) states that “although granting that nationalism is a political, economic, and sociological phenomenon, it becomes a social-psychological phenomenon to the extent that individuals develop attitudes about their own and other nations (p.44).” Such attitudes express the individual people’s feelings toward their own and other nations and their sense of loyalty to their own country. “These feeling of attachment are at the heart of nationalism.” (Druckman, 1994, p.40) Strong attachments to their nation encourages individuals and groups to act hostilely toward their perceived enemy such as dehumanizing the members of outgroup.

Not all strong attachments to a nation show negative feeling toward other nations. (Druckman, 1994, p.46) Druckman suggested that we must first consider the importance of group loyalty to the individuals in the group to understand a condition which one group generates negative or hostile feelings toward other groups.
(Druckman, 1994, p.44) Loyalty is an emotion toward the group to which individuals

belong. Important loyalty can become a part of their identity through a grouping process. Loyalty to a certain group also strengthens a person's identity and her sense of belonging to the group.

The grouping is essential for people because the groups can satisfy their human needs, such as self-protection and self-transcendence. (Druckman, 1994, p.44)

This grouping process has also common aspects with the ways by which an individual relates to her nation. When people sentimentally attach to the homeland, they are motivated to help their country, and gain a sense of identity and self-esteem through their national identification, the nation becomes a part of their identity.

Theories of cognitive development suggest that as individuals move from a self- to other-orientation, they also begin to distinguish among the others, becoming more attached and sympathetic to some and more critical and detached from others. (Druckman, 1994, p.45) Therefore, the groups which they belong to through birth or through early experience have an impact on which they deem to be ingroup and which outgroup. Moreover, these perceptions of ingroup and outgroup can be transferred to the larger system such as nation.

Feshbach and his colleagues (Feshbach, 1987, 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) researched the relationship between positive feelings toward one's own group and negative feeling toward others. Their research revealed two factors

about attitudes toward one's own and other countries. One factor focused on feelings about one's own country. It is labeled as "patriotism." Another factor involved feelings of national superiority and a need for national power and dominance. It is named as "nationalism." Nationalism is associated more with a competitive or militaristic approach to the world, whereas, Patriotism with a more cooperative or peaceful approach to the world.

Adorno, et al. (1950) also notes a difference between a healthy patriotic love of one's own country, not associated with prejudice against outgroups, and an ethnocentric patriotism (like nationalism) which was associated with such prejudice. Duckitt (1989) similarly indicated that ethnocentric patriotism was associated with insecure group identifications, and patriotism was related to secure group identifications.

From a different perspective of interpreting the difference between nationalism and patriotism, it also can be interpreted that nationalism is merely a more complex form of the patriotism. Thus, patriotism is a readiness to sacrifice for the nation, but nationalism is the readiness to sacrifice for the nation plus exclusion of others. Nationalism suggests that loyalty is not only feelings associated with a group but also images of what in-group and out-group are like.

Kelman (1997) provides another approach for interpreting nationalism and

patriotism from the perspective of social psychology. He argues that people still keep seeing the nation-state as the primary factor of human dignity in the modern world.

These people's perception is rooted in nationalist ideology. And, this nationalist ideology draws heavily on patriotism as the source of trust and support for the state.

According to his definitions, patriotism is an ideology, or attitude and beliefs, which refer to individuals' attachment and loyalty to their nation and country.

Nationalism is an ideology of any movement toward the establishment of a new nation-state. Nationalism provides a justification for the existence or creation of a state. It also entitles the nation-state to the support of its members in establishing and maintaining the state's independence, integrity, and effective functioning.

The centrality of the nation-state in the global system creates a dynamic tendency to transform patriotism into nationalism. It is most likely to occur when members of an ethnic or national group come to see the establishment of a state of their own as the proper response to a sense of grievance and oppression, to a historical opportunity, or both. The reverse relationship holds also true universally. Existing nation-states and movements directed toward establishment of such a state characteristically rely on patriotism as a major source of legitimacy, or popular support, and of member loyalty. The nationalist movements utilize patriotic sentiments to instill nationalist ideology in the population. In effect, nationalism

appropriates people's attachment and loyalty to the country as a basis for their attachment and loyalty to the state.

Kelman (1997) illustrates the group loyalty possessed by nationalist as national identity. When people start seeing themselves as constituting a unique and identifiable entity, they have acquired a sense of national identity (Kelman, 1997). National identity forms a system of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations, which are shared by group members. National identity becomes incorporated in an individual's personal identity through various processes of social influence.

Adoption of the specific elements of national identity may also affect individuals' personal self-definition by contributing to their worldview (Kelman, 1997). It typically contains beliefs and values relating to the meaning of human existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, and the definition of the ideal personality. These are rooted in the group's historical experiences and reflected and elaborated in its documents, traditions, and institutional forms. Such beliefs and values influence the way these individuals view the world and their own place in it and the way they conceive their relationship to the environment (Kelman, 1997).

The adoption of elements of national identity involves acquiring some substantive knowledge of the historical and cultural context of its beliefs and values.

They must see these beliefs and values as personally meaningful to them and somehow translate them into concrete practice in their daily lives (Kelman, 1997).

Although Kelman (1997) did not elaborate if national identity must contain negative attitudes toward outgroups, since he considers that the patriotism is a source of the nationalist ideology, national identity would include not only the positive attitude toward ingroups (patriotism) but also the negative attitude toward outgroups (nationalism or ethnocentric patriotism).

Kelman (1997) also states that in the modern world, national consciousness finds it as the most powerful political expression in the nation-state. People look to the nation-state to represent their national identity and protect their rights and interests. Nationalist people seek to express the national identity of its people in an independent nation or state.

This national consciousness can be a powerful source of unity and political legitimacy for the state. Therefore, political leaders attempt to create a national consciousness with boundaries of the political system. If the political leaders succeed, then the attachment and loyalty to the nation-state and the patriotic sentiments can be utilized by the state as a source of legitimacy, of citizens' support or its policies, and of citizens' willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of these policies.

In addition to Nationalism, the Social Identity Theory provides details about

when the individuals tend to show positive attitude toward ingroup and negative attitude toward outgroups.

Social Identity Theory. The Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses on “the group in the individual” and assumes that parts of the people’s self-concept are defined by social groups to which we belong (Treppe, 2006). The theory was proposed by Henri Tajfel at the beginning of the 1970s in the U.K (Hogg & Burke, 2006). As a Polish Jew in Europe during the WWII, he had experienced the Holocaust and the postwar relocation of displaced Europeans, so he had a personal passion to understand prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. (Hogg & Bruke, 2006) He believed that society can make individuals follow certain behaviors.

The social identity approach is one of the most influential theories of group processes and intergroup relations. (Hornsey, 2008) This approach has redefined how we think about numerous group-mediated phenomena and extended the confines of social psychology (Hornsey, 2008). Tajfel and his colleagues established the ideas of the SIT by an experimental paradigm, which is called “minimal group paradigm.” In the experiments, participants were allocated into groups on the basis of meaningless criteria (Tajfel, Billig, bundy, & Flament, 1971). After having been told their group membership, they had to allocate points to members of their own group (the “ingroup”) and to members of the other group (the “outgroup”). There was no

interaction among group members and they even did not know who else was in their group. The groups did not have any history and future outside the laboratory. No individual participants could get any personal benefits by allocating the point to the ingroup.

Even so, the participants tended to give more points to members of the ingroup than to members of the outgroup. Thus, even these minimal conditions led the members to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group. They tried to maximize the difference of rewards between in-group and out-group, whereas maximizing their own ingroup profit was less important to them (Trepte, 2006). This result cannot be explained by traditional theories of intergroup relations, which explain collective phenomena in terms of isolated individual processes or interpersonal interaction alone (Hogg, 2006). In order to explain this phenomenon, Tajfel (1971) and his colleagues formalized SIT.

Tajfel and Turner argue that human interaction ranges on a spectrum from being purely interpersonal to purely intergroup. A purely interpersonal interaction involves people relating entirely as individuals without awareness of social categories. A purely intergroup interaction is one in which people relate entirely as representatives of their groups. Sliding from the interpersonal to the intergroup end of the spectrum impacts how people see themselves and each other (Hornsey, 2008).

The mere process of making a distinction between “us and them” can change how people see members of the outgroups. When this category distinction is salient, people enhance similarities within the ingroup and differences among the outgroup (Hornsey, 2008). The categorization also can change how people see themselves. By categorization, people activate a different level of self-concepts. At the purely interpersonal end of the spectrum, a person’s self-concept is defined as “personal identity”, which is distinct from other individuals. At the purely intergroup end of the spectrum, the person’s self-concept as “social identity,” which derived from social categories to which she belongs. Tajfel defined the social identity as “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership (Tajfel, 1972).” The people who share the same social identity have the same definition of who they are, what attributes they have, and how they relate to and differ from people who are in the outgroup (Hogg, 2006). Although people have many social and personal identities, in any given situation, only one (or some selected) identity becomes psychologically important and is used to govern behavior (Hogg, 2006).

The reason why people are motivated by competitive intergroup behavior is a desire for a positive and secure self-concept (Hornsey, 2008). To obtain a positive social identity, group members are motivated to think and behave to achieve or

maintain a positive distinctiveness between the ingroup and outgroup.

After Tajfel died in 1982, Turner and his colleagues sought to refine the SIT (Hornsey, 2008). They established a new and separate theory, “Self-Categorization Theory (SCT).” Though, the SCI and SCT share the same assumptions and methods. Proponents of both SIT and SCT argue that “social psychology must acknowledge the functional interdependence of mind and mental processes (Turner & Reynolds, 2011).” People live in a social structured system which has group-based regulations of perception, cognition, and conduct. The group-based norms affect people’s minds. The distinction between personal identity and social identity which is based on a group behavior is the shared idea of both SCI and SCT.

A core purpose of the SIT was to explain reasons why people discriminated in the minimal group paradigm, but the SCT addressed a different question, “Why did the people identify with the minimal groups and act in ways that the identity mattered to them? (Turner & Reynolds, 2011, p.401)” The SCT argued that people internalize social identity with their emotion and valued into the self. Through this internalization process, they compare themselves with other groups, and their motivation for positive distinction can produce a favor for the intergroup. The SIT also explained the self as the spectrum of the interpersonal and intergroup ends, but the SCT described it as the continuum. Therefore, Turner could recognize that people could act as both an

individual and a group member.

Turner reformed the personal-social identity distinction as the three levels of self-categorization: the superordinate category of the self as human being or human identity (distinguish from other animals), the intermediate level of the self as a member of a social ingroup as defined against other groups of humans (social identity), and the subordinate level of personal self-categorizations based on interpersonal comparisons (personal identity) (Hornsey, 2008). Contextual factors and current goals, needs, and purposes of a person determine which identity (personal identity, social identity, or human identity) emerges.

Furthermore, Turner proposed a theory of group behaviors in terms of an “identity mechanism (Turner & Reynolds, 2011).” One is that, he assumed, if people define themselves and others as members of the same category, they would self-stereotype to see themselves as more similar than others in a different group. The process is referred as “depersonalization.” When a category becomes salient, people see themselves and members of other categories as less individuals. The notion of the depersonalization support many group processes, such as cohesion, influence, conformity, and leadership. Through the process of the depersonalization, the group identity defines not only what the group member is but also what kinds of attitudes, emotions, and behaviors are appropriate in a certain context as a group member. The

information from what is crucial and appropriate to think, feel, and act as a ingroup member. People who highly identify themselves as a member of the ingroup highly internalize the norms and values of the ingroup into themselves. Therefore, this implicit shared expectation of agreement among the ingroup members can obstacle to change opinions and attitudes toward the outgroup. The categorization also can explain a phenomenon of group polarization, which is that people tend to shift their individual opinions to their ingroup's favor.

The problems of the in-group favoritism can be overcome by transforming intergroup behaviors into harmonious intragroup behaviors (Hogg, 2006).

Re-categorizing a social identity seems to be effective to overcome the problem, but it is difficult to achieve because people have strong attachment to their original groups.

Theoretically, for a social group having stronger power than its out-group, if its member can recognize a common ingroup identity with the outgroup (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), the transformation could be occurred. For a social group having weaker power than its out-group, its members can overcome the in-group favoritism by recognizing that the members of the out-group are parts of themselves (Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002).

Collective Memory. Collective memory is a significant construct to consider a long history of conflict (Tint, 2010). The processes of remembering

incidents can occur in a social domain. Thus, neither individual nor group memory can independently exist in our society. Each society can have more than one collective memory. Many memories can exist in a society which has many groups or culture. Memory is not produced by a passive process. Rather, both individuals and societies select their remembrances, based on their current needs, beliefs, and goals (as cited in Tint, 2010,). Moreover, the processes of constructing a memory are consistent in a society. For instance, a politicization of memory tends to offer political and cultural aims of a society (as cited in Tint, 2010). .

Memory also strongly connects to narrative, commemoration, identity, and emotions (Tint, 2010). Conflicts are seen as a narrative consisting of collective memory (as cited in Tint, 2010). Through commemoration, such as acknowledging, honoring, and recycling events of pasts, a social group interprets and established perception of the events as collective memory. Through this cultivating process, people “chose traumas and glories (as cited in Tint, 2010).” Furthermore, many cultural groups create national narratives to accomplish political aims at that time (as cited in Tint, 2010) . Thus, the events of the past are selected, omitted, fabricated, exaggerated, and embellished through the process of creating collective memory (as cited in Tint, 2010). Collective memory is not only memories which are passed down but also values, emotions, and beliefs in a certain society (Tint, 2010). Moreover, a

political leader of groups strongly influences on these selection, omission, fabrication, exaggeration, and embellishment. It is important to recognize that collective memory being shared by a group is not necessary historical fact, and rather the collective memory may create their reality. To challenge or oppose to the process of creating the collective memory, providing counter memory can be useful (as cited in Tint, 2010). The counter memory may be able to make the master commemorative narrative less influential for the group. Providing the outgroup's perspective of the incident and creating a new story together would allow the parties unlock themselves from the past to the present and future (Tint, 2010).

Collective memory is the most important means to develop social identity (Tint, 2010). As Tint points out in her article by referring to the Social Identity Theory, the memory informs the social identity and also is informed by the social identity. When a group experiences some threat to its group identity, commemoration becomes an important tool to preserve their nationalistic sentiment. Or, for a political reason, the process of cultivating a collective memory is utilized to strength a sense of nationalism and social identity (as cited in Tint, 2010). Collective memory can either enhance or weaken social or national identity in social groups.

Application for Chinese and Japanese. Chinese and Japanese have a national identity as a member of China or Japan. A degree and type of the national

identity would be varied depending on individuals. In some conditions, the identity produces a negative attitude toward outgroup (nationalism or ethnocentric patriotism).

This paper calls this negative individual attitude toward outgroup as the individual nationalistic attribution.

Chinese and Japanese having a strong individual nationalistic attribution would support their own nation's sovereignty and oppose to the other's. Japanese having a strong individual nationalistic attribution would tend to favor Japan as an ingroup. In terms of the islands dispute, the Japanese evaluate Japan by comparing China as an outgroup. To strive for a positive social identity as a Japanese in the world, they are motivated to think and behave to achieve or maintain a positive distinctiveness between Japan (the ingroup) and China (the outgroup). Chinese who have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would think and behave to achieve a positive distinctiveness between China and Japan because of the same reason. Furthermore, those who have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would be difficult to support the outgroup's sovereignty, because both of Japan and China clearly are insisting their own sovereignty. Thus, both of them strive for the exclusive sovereignty. The members who has the strong individual nationalistic attribution would support to their ingroup's position.

To transform the islands dispute, it is also important to recognize that the

individual nationalistic attribution is originated from the WWII history. For Chinese, the historical humiliation by the Japan's invasion as a collective memory has established the China's individual nationalistic attribution. For Japanese, their individual nationalistic attribution has been constructed by responding the China's critiques.

Based on this hypothesis, I also assume that Chinese would show stronger individual nationalistic identity than Japanese population because China has experienced national humiliation by Japan during the WWII. This sense of grievance is not just an old history for Chinese. This history is still passed down from one generation to other generations in China as a vivid memory. Chinese would see insisting on sovereignty over the islands as the proper response to a sense of grievance and oppression. Therefore, Chinese would show stronger individualistic attribution than Japanese.

Similarly, the Japanese nationalistic sensation against China has been raised by reacting to the Chinese nationalism. The fact that Japan is still perceived as one of the WWII perpetrators by China has created the social identity as Japanese. A Japan desire is that although Japan made the biggest mistake about ninety years ago, Japan wants to be seen as a totally different country from the one during the WWII by the world. The current Prime Minister Abe publicly conveyed this message to the world

in his speech (Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe apologetic over WWII, but says next generation not obliged, 2015). Prime Minister Abe expressed a regret and the utmost grief over the WWII and apologized Japan's aggression. However, he also stated that "We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize (Abe, 2015)." Therefore, China's criticism or concern based on the WWII history would bother the Japanese identity.

CHAPTER IV

SURVEY

Describe the Sample

The survey was distributed to two different groups. The first group was Chinese and Japanese students and faculty who at University of Oregon (Group 1). The second group was Chinese and Japanese who could comprehend English to respond the survey via the Amazonmechanical turk⁹ (Group 2).

At the stage of distributing the surveys, I did not set clear definitions of Chinese and Japanese. I primarily distributed the survey for those who probably have either Chinese or Japanese nationality. In total, 62 surveys were randomly distributed to potential Chinese survey candidates (22 of them are from the group 1, and 40 of them are from the group 2.). I received 36 answers (22 were the first group, and 14 are the second group), and 30 are qualified participants to the survey as a Chinese. To select the qualified candidates, I excluded 7 candidates who have not lived in China more than five years, did not have the Chinese nationality, and did not write a Chinese city as a hometown. Taiwanese is also excluded from the analysis. Taiwanese could indicate their identification in the section 1 by answering the question of “choosing

⁹ <https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome>

nationality.” In the total 30 qualified participants, there was only one participant to indicate that “I am a Taiwanese.”

36 surveys were randomly distributed to potential Japanese candidates. 21 of them were sent to the group 1, and 15 of them were sent to the group 2. I received 33 answers (21 are from the group 1, and 12 were from the group 2), and 25 are the qualified participants to the survey as a Japanese. I excluded 8 candidates who have not lived in Japan more than five years, did not have the Japanese nationality, and did not write a Japanese city as a hometown. (Appendix B)

Research Question

The main purpose of the survey is to discover how the individual nationalistic attribution influences on an individual attitude toward the islands dispute. Section 3 and section4 in the survey tested the question. The section 3 of the survey consists of the four sub questions. The section measured the participants’ degrees of nationalistic attribution. The section 4 asks their opinion about the islands conflict. By combining the two results of the two sections, the result would reveal how the individual nationalistic attribution related to the attitudes toward the islands dispute. The hypothesis will be explained below.

The four sub questions in the Section 3: Measure the participants'

individual nationalistic attribution. The four sub questions in the Section 3 measured the participants' individual nationalistic attributions. These questions are based on the theory of the collective memory. I chose the four historical incidents as an important tool of cultivating the collective memory among Chinese. Of course, China has more than fifty ethnicities, so it has more than one collective memory. However, in terms of the relationship with Japan, the most significant historical trauma for China is Japan's invasion before and during WWII. This historical incident is conveyed as a narrative from old generation to young generation and a seed of Chinese collective memory which can either enhance or weaken their social or national identity as a Chinese. Therefore, to measure each participant's nationalistic attribution (i.e. a degree of the social identity), I chose (1) Japan invading China before and during the World War II and (2) the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident as measurements. The Nanking incident is a historical incident that in 1937, the Japanese army forces murdered people including both soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of Nanking (or Nanjing). There is a huge controversy between China and Japan about how many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed by the Japanese army forces (Askew, 2002).

Furthermore, (3) the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese prime Ministers

and cabinet members, and (4) Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks can also measure the nationalistic attribution of the Chinese population. The visitation of the Yasukuni shrine relates to the history of WWII. The Yasukuni shrine is a Japanese Shinto's shrine to commemorate and honor dead people who served for wars since 1879. The shrine enshrines war criminals of WWII (Yasukuni Shrine, 2017). Therefore, China protests the visitation by Japanese prime Ministers and cabinet members. As I wrote in Chapter I, the Japanese government reacted on China's argument over the island sovereignty by revising teaching guidelines and textbooks and encouraging teachers to teach their students that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan in 2014 (See Chapter I). Chinese strongly opposed to the corrected description in the school textbooks. Therefore, I also chose these two relatively recent events as a measurement. (Appendix C)

For the Japanese population, it is little hard to find their collective memory in terms of a relationship with China. WWII is definitely the biggest historical trauma for the Japanese, but it is more important collective memory in terms of a relationship with the U.S. rather than China because Japan perceives itself as a loser or perpetrator and like a victim in certain incidents during the war, such as dropping the two atomic bombs. In terms of the relationship with China, Japan is an invader, and China is a victim. Furthermore, since education about WWII in Japan generally focus on

incidents with the U.S, many Japanese have been passed stronger memory of the war with the U.S. rather than China. Therefore, the history of the WWII itself is not a direct collective memory to create the social identity as Japanese when we talk about the relationship with China.

For Japanese participants, the survey asked their feelings about (1) What China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the World War II, (2) the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident, (3) What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet member, and (4) What China says about description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks. The Japanese collective memory is consist of China's criticism about the WWII invasion, the Nanking incident, the visitation of the Yasukuni, and recent Japanese government's tactic to insist the sovereignty of the islands. (Appendix D)

The participants chose the most accurate feelings from "Highly Comfortable", "Comfortable", "Neutral", "Rarely comfortable", "Highly uncomfortable", "Indifference", or "Unknown."

The participants who have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would be likely to choose the answers of "Highly uncomfortable" and "Uncomfortable" in the section 3. On the other hand, people having a weak nationalistic attribution would

be likely to choose the answers of “Comfortable”, or “Highly comfortable”.

Participants who chose “neutral” means that they have neither strong nor weak nationalistic attributions regarding to the selected historical incidents. Those who chose the answer of “unknown” or “indifference” cannot be measured their nationalistic attribution from the prepared questions.

Each participant received a score based on their responses in the section 3.

The scores were calculated by following equation;

$$\text{Score} = \text{“Score of sub question 1 + Score of sub question 2 + Score of sub question 3 + Score of sub question 4”}$$

The scores were calculated by “Highly Comfortable” as -2, “Comfortable” as -1, “Neutral,” “Indifference,” and “Unknown” as 0, “Uncomfortable” as 1, “Highly Uncomfortable” as 2. For instance, if a Chinese participant chose “Highly Comfortable” for sub question 1 (Japan invading China before and during the World War II), “Unknown” for sub question 2 (the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident as measurements.), “Highly Uncomfortable” for sub question 3 (the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet member) and “Uncomfortable” for sub question 4 (the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks), the

participant's score would be calculated by " $-2 + 0 + 2 + 1 = 1$." Thus, the participant's score is 1 and has a strong nationalistic attribution.

The Section 4: Opinions about the islands dispute. In the section 4, the two questions the participants' attitudes toward the islands dispute. The first question asked, "Based on your knowledge, which country governs the islands?" This question simply asked how the participants perceive current situation of the islands. The second question asked, "which country should govern the islands?" They could demonstrate their opinions about the issues. By combination of the two questions, the survey could accurately reveal each participant's understanding and opinion of the dispute. For instance, some participants might think that although the islands are governed by Japan by their understanding, they think that no country should govern them. I could obtain both of the information.

For the two questions in the section 4, the participants could chose "China", "Japan", "Other/Other option", or "No country should govern the islands." If the participants chose the answer of "China", they would have answered the sub questions; "Why do you think that China should govern the islands?", "Why do you think that Japan should not govern the islands?", and "Why do you think that China insists upon its sovereignty over the islands?" If the participants chose the answer of

“Japan”, they would have answered the sub questions; “Why do you think that Japan should govern the islands?”, “Why do you think that China should not govern the islands?”, and “Why do you think that Japan insists upon its sovereignty over the islands?” The participants chose the answer of “Other/Other option” would explain their opinions after that. And, those who chose the answer of “No country should govern the islands” would also provide the reason why they chose the answer.

(Appendix E)

By comparing the data of the section 3 and section 4, the survey will reveal the relationship between the individual nationalistic attitudes and the attitudes toward the islands dispute.

Main Hypothesis

I hypothesized that the participants showing the strong individual nationalistic attribution in the section 3 would be likely to support their country’s sovereignty and oppose to another country’s sovereignty in the section 4. Therefore, the participants indicating the strong individual nationalistic attribution in the section 3 would be likely to choose their own national country (If China is the national country, the person would answer that China should govern the islands.) in the question of “Which country should govern the islands?” If this hypothesis is correct,

the result would suggest that the individual nationalistic attribution (social identity or national identity) among Chinese and Japanese is the energy of the islands dispute, thus, “the epicenter (Lederach, 2003)” of the dispute. So, it is necessary to address the epicenter to transform the dispute into a positive future.

Results- Chinese population

There are 28 qualified results of the Chinese population. In the 28 participants, the 27 participants agreed upon participating to this study after reading an instruction. The only one participant disagreed upon participating to the study after reading the instruction. The instruction describes that a purpose of the study is to research about the islands dispute between China and Japan. The participants were selected because they were assumed that they were from China. And, the survey is confidential and voluntary participation and identifies who the researcher is.

Individual Nationalistic Attribution (Appendix F)

Japan invading China before and during the WWII. 5 Chinese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 14 Chinese participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about the Japan invading China before and during the WWII. 5 people chose the “Neutral”, and 2 people chose the “Indifference.” Only 3 people

chose the “Comfortable” about this topic, and there was nobody to choose the “Highly Comfortable” or “Unknown” about the topic.

The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident. 13 Chinese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 8 Chinese participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident. 3 people selected the “Neutral”, and only 2 people chose the “Comfortable” about this issue. 2 people chose the “indifference,” and there was no participant to choose the “Highly Comfortable” or “Unknown.”

The visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 8 people chose the “Uncomfortable” and 6 Chinese chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” about the issue of the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 7 people selected the “Neutral” and one person chose the “Indifference.” There is only one person who selected “Comfortable” or “Highly Comfortable.” 2 people chose “Unknown” about this issue.

Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks. About this topic of the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks, 10 Chinese chose the “Neutral.” 6 people chose the “Rarely Comfortable

(= Uncomfortable)” and 6 people chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” about this issue.

One person chose the “Indifference,” and four people chose the “Unknown” about this issue.

Combination between individual nationalistic attribution and individuals’ attitudes (Section 3 &4)

The participant having the strongest individual nationalistic attribution’s score was 8 in the 28 participants (K). The participant having the weakest individual nationalistic attribution’s score was -3 (X). The mean of the score is 3.0. K’s answer of the section 4 is “China.” The K also replied that China governs the islands now, based on his/her knowledge. However, X’s answer of the section 4 is also “China. The X also replied that China governs the islands now, based on his/her knowledge.

The 21 participants (72%) got the score above 0 (Strong Individual Nationalistic Attribution). In the 21, 13 participants (62%) supported the China’s sovereignty over the islands. 2 participants (10%) thought that “No country should govern the islands.” Other 2 participants (10%) chose the “other/other option.” One of the 2 participants wrote, “I don't know enough about Diaoyu Island and the history of its ownership to answer this question.” Another participant wrote, “No opinion on it.” 4 people (20%) supported the Japan’s sovereignty. All of them provided the reasons of their attitudes. Two of them said the reason why they supported the Japan’s

sovereignty is because “Historically, Japan has governed the islands.” The reason why they did not support the China’s sovereignty is because “The islands were stolen by China.” However, both of them did not know why Japan insists the islands sovereignty. Other two supported the Japan’s sovereignty because “International law supports Japanese sovereignty.” The one chose the reason why he/she does not support the China’s sovereignty is because “The islands were stolen by China.” For the same question, the another answered that “Chinese statements are unreasonable.” Both of them had no idea why Japan insists the sovereignty over the islands.

The 7 participants (25%) got the score below or equal 0 (Weak Individual Nationalistic Attribution). In the 7, 3 participants (43%) chose “No country should govern the islands.” One participant (14%) supported the Japan’s sovereignty. Two (29%) chose “Other/Other option.” The one wrote “I’m indifferent.” The other person wrote “both should have a piece (of the islands).” Only one participant (14%) supported the China’s sovereignty. The person chose the reason why they supported the China’s sovereignty is because “International law supports Chinese sovereignty.” The one chose the reason why the person does not support the Japan’s sovereignty is because “Japan invaded China in the past.” The person does not have any ideas of why China insisted upon the sovereignty over the islands. (Appendix F)

Analysis

The majority of the participants having the strong individual nationalistic attribution support the Chinese sovereignty (62%). Only 20 % of the participants showing the strong individual nationalistic attribution support the Japanese sovereignty. This result supports the hypothesis. Moreover, the majority of the people having the weak individual nationalistic attribution chose the attitude toward the islands dispute other than supporting the Chinese sovereignty (86%). However, 14% of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution support the Chinese sovereignty. In order to analyze those who did not support the hypothesis, I will review other factors which might control their results.

Results- Japanese population

There are 25 qualified results of the Japanese population. In the 25 participants, all of the participants agreed upon participating to this study after reading the instruction. The 25 participants indicate that their nationality is Japan, and the 2 participants indicate that their nationality is the United States of America.

Individual Nationalistic Attribution (Appendix F)

What China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the WWII. 8 Japanese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 5 Japanese

participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about what China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the WWII. 6 people chose the “Neutral”, and 1 person chose the “Indifference.” Only 2 people chose the “Comfortable” about this topic, and there was nobody to choose the “Highly Comfortable.” There were 3 people “Unknown” about the topic.

The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident. 10 Japanese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 4 participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident. 6 people selected the “Neutral”, and only 1 person chose either the “Highly Comfortable” or “Comfortable” about this issue each. 1 person chose the “indifference,” and there were 2 participants to choose the “Unknown.”

What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 5 Japanese chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 9 people chose the “Comfortable” about the issue of the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 6 people selected the “Neutral” and no one chose the “Indifference.” There were 3

people who selected “Comfortable,” and no one chose the “Highly Comfortable. One person chose “Unknown” about this issue.

Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks.

About this topic of the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks, 8 Japanese chose the “Highly Uncomfortable.” 7 people chose the “Rarely Comfortable (= Uncomfortable)” and 7 people chose the “Neutral” about this issue. No one chose the “Indifference,” and 2 people chose the “Unknown” about this issue.

To analyze the participants’ individual nationalistic attribution, each participant received a score by the same calculation as the Chinese population received.

Combination between individual nationalistic attribution and individuals’ attitudes (Section 3 &4)

The two participants got the highest score of the individual nationalistic attribution (8) in the 25 participants (A and I). The lowest score of the individual nationalistic attribution was -2 in the 25 participants. (S) The mean of the score is 3.2. The participant A chose in the section4 “Other/Other option.” The person wrote, “Because they should share the natural resources.” A also replied that it is impossible to say which country governs the islands under the current situation, based on his/her knowledge. I’s answer of the section 4 is “Japan.” The participant I also replied that

Japan governs the islands under the current situation, based on his/her knowledge.

The participant S's answer of the section 4 is China. The S replied that Japan governs the islands under the current situation.

The 18 participants (72%) got the score above 0 (Strong Individual Nationalistic Attribution). In the 18, 12 participants (67%) supported the Japan's sovereignty over the islands. 2 participants (11%) thought that "No country should govern the islands." The other 3 participants (17%) chose the "other/other option." The two of them provided his/her opinion. The one stated that "Because they should share the natural resources." The another stated that "both China and Japan should govern (the islands) together."

Only one (6%) Japanese participant showing the strong nationalistic attribution supports the Chinese sovereignty. The person provided the reasons why China should govern the islands and Japan should not govern the islands is because "Historically, China has governed the islands." And, the reason why Japan should not govern the islands is because "Japan invaded China in the past." However, the person did not have any ideas why China insists upon its sovereignty over the islands.

The 7 participants (28%) got the score below or equal 0 (Weak Individual Nationalistic Attribution). In the 7 participants, 4 participants (57%) chose "No

country should govern the islands.” 2 participants (29%) supported the Japan’s sovereignty. Only one (14%) participant supported the China’s sovereignty, and no one chose “other/other options.” The 2 participants supporting the Japan’s sovereignty provided the reason. Two participants chose that the reason why Japan should govern the islands is because international law supports Japanese sovereignty. And, one of them chose that China should not govern the islands because Chinese statements are unreasonable. Another one chose, “Historically, Japan has governed the islands” and “the islands were stolen by China. 2 of the 4 participants having the attitude that no country should govern the islands provided the reasons. One participant wrote, “I believe no country should govern the islands. I think it is the fairest option for everyone that both countries can use the islands without issues. The other stated, “The option leads to be equal.”

Analysis

The majority of the participants having the strong individual nationalistic attribution support the Japanese sovereignty (67%). Only 11 % of the participants having strong individual nationalistic support the Chinese sovereignty. This result supports the hypothesis. Moreover, the majority of the people having the weak individual nationalistic attribution chose the attitude toward the islands dispute other

than supporting the Japanese sovereignty (71%). However, 29 % of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution supported the Japanese sovereignty. I will review other factors which might control the results which do not support the hypothesis.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Validity of the Hypothesis.

Both of the Chinese and Japanese population showed that the majority of the participants having the strong individual nationalistic attribution support their nation's sovereignty. (Chinese: 72% and Japanese: 67%) For the Chinese participants, only 20 % of the strong individual nationalistic attribution supported the Japanese sovereignty. For the Japanese participants, only 6% of the strong individual nationalistic participants supported the Chinese sovereignty.

Moreover, both of the Chinese and Japanese population showed that the majority of the participants having the weak individual nationalistic attribution chose the attitude toward the islands dispute other than supporting their nation's sovereignty. (Chinese: 86% and Japanese: 71%) For the Chinese participants, only 14 % of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution support the Chinese sovereignty. For the Japanese population, 29 % of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution supported the Japanese sovereignty.

Overall, the results of the survey support the main hypothesis that the participants showing the strong individual nationalistic attribution are likely to

support their national country's sovereignty and oppose to the other country's sovereignty. The result of the study suggests that the individual nationalistic attribution (i.e., social identity or national identity) among Chinese and Japanese contributes the islands dispute, which is also called "the epicenter (Lederach, 2015)" of the dispute. It should be addressed to transform the dispute.

The other hypothesis that Chinese population would have stronger individual nationalistic attribution than Japanese one seems to be wrong. If comparing between Chinese and Japanese population having a strong individual nationalistic attribution, the result does not show any differences. (Both Chinese and Japanese: 72%) Moreover, the mean of the score of the individual nationalistic attribution shows that the Japanese population is slightly higher than the Chinese one. (The mean of the score of the individual nationalistic attribution, Chinese: 3.0, Japanese: 3.2) This result indicates that the national identity of Japanese population is as strong as or stronger than the Chinese one. The Japanese national identity in terms of the islands dispute is formed by responding the criticism from China. Since China has started actively insisting its sovereignty from 2008, to reply the movement, Japanese individual nationalistic attribution would have been getting strong.

Before discussing potential methods of addressing the individual nationalistic

attribution, I would like to highlight the participants who did not support the hypothesis.

The four Chinese participants showed the strong individual nationalistic attribution but supported the Japanese sovereignty (O, P, T, and W). Participant P chose “unknown” for the two questions for measuring the individual nationalistic attribution in the section 3. The four questions which I prepared might not be appropriate to measure the P’s nationalistic attribution. Moreover, although P indicated that he or she is from 24 to 26 years old, P wrote that he/she lived in China for 29 years. Since the data is inconsistent, the P’s date’s credibility is questionable.

Participant T chose three neutral for the four questions in the section 3. Thus, although T is categorized as a strong individual nationalist by the calculation, T might not have that strong nationalistic attribution. Therefore, it is still consistent with the hypothesis that T supports the Japanese sovereignty. Moreover, it would be arguable that the participant W is considered as Chinese because W has never lived in China and wrote his/her hometown as Florida in the U.S. I used the W’s result because W was identified as Chinese in the first question. However, the W’s identification might be different from who I targeted in this survey.

Participant O is connection to China questionable to be considered as Chinese because although O wrote a Chinese city as O’s hometown, O only lived in

China for five years. It can be considered that O's national identity is a different type from other candidates who lived more than half of their life in China.

One Japanese participant showed the strong individual nationalistic attribution but supported the Chinese sovereignty (Q). The reason for the inconsistency would be also because Q is knowledgeable of the islands dispute. Q holds the doctoral degree in Asian studies. Q also holds the bachelor degree in Chinese. Thus, even though Q has the strong nationalistic attribution, Q might have a different reason why Q supports the China's sovereignty, for instance, Q learned the strong evidence to support the China's sovereignty in Q's studies.

The two Japanese participant showed the weak individual nationalistic attribution but supported the Japanese sovereignty (B and R). Both of the participants chose the neutral or indifference more than two for the answers for the section 3. Thus, it might be difficult to measure their nationalistic attribution by the four prepared questions. For instance, since participant B chose the neutral for all of the four questions, B might not be a weak individual nationalist so as R choosing the neutral for the three questions.

Discussion

There are some shortcomings of this survey. First, it would be arguable whether or not the four incidents, i.e., the Japan's WWII invasion, the controversy of

the Nanking incident, the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by the Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members, and the controversy of the descriptions of the islands dispute in Japanese textbooks, can appropriately measure the individual nationalistic attribution for both of Chinese and Japanese participants. It would be a crucial to conduct further research about consists of Chinese and Japanese national identity in terms of the islands dispute. Then, the survey questions will be able to measure the individual nationalistic attribution more accurately. Second, the equation of calculating the individual nationalistic attribution needs to be reformed. I defined “indifference” as which the questions cannot measure the nationalistic attribution, but it was unclear the meaning of the word for the participants. I also excluded “unknown” from the calculation, but the “unknown” might represent the weak nationalistic attribution. The method of scoring the individual nationalistic attribution needs to be improved.

Third, I distributed the survey for the students at University of Oregon. Thus, they have already spent some times in the U.S. This study abroad experience might affect their attitude toward the islands dispute and the China-Japan relationship. Moreover, some participants through the AmazonTurk might not be qualified for this survey. Although some of them identified themselves Chinese or Japanese, they indicated that their nationalities are neither Chinese nor Japanese or they do not have

any living experiences in the country. It has to be re-considered that how people's nationality in terms of the national identity should be determined. One might be able to argue that we should respect people's subjective identification. Even though objectively, some of them should not be decided only by their governmental nationality and their living experiences in the country. In some cases, we should respect their subjective identification, too. However, in that case, their nationalistic attribution might be different from people whose subjective identification is the same as objective identification (such as I have a Japanese nationality and identify myself as Japanese.)

The survey also failed to ask the participants' feelings when they answered the survey. Their feelings at that time might affect their answers of the survey. Overall, to obtain the more accurate data, individual interviews might have been conducted.

However, at least, this study shows that the individual nationalistic attribution based on the WWII history between China and Japan has some relationship to the individual attitudes toward the islands dispute. The participants feeling some degree of the uncomfortableness about the Japan's invasion to China before and during the WWII, the Nanking incident, and the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members tend to support their nation's sovereignty.

Moreover, the fourth question of Section 3 shows an interesting result. Only 38% of the Chinese population showed “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable” for the factor, which is the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks, whereas, 63% of the Japanese population showed “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable.” For the Japanese participants, the feeling about the description of the textbooks about the islands dispute showed the highest percentage of the uncomfortableness, but for the Chinese population, the feeling about the Nanking incident showed the highest percentage of the uncomfortableness. (Chinese: 76% chose “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable”, Japanese: 56 % chose “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable.”) This result indicates that the factors of the nationalistic attribution would be different between Chinese and Japanese population. For Chinese, the Nanking incident would be one of the strongest national memory to consist of their national identity in terms of the islands dispute. For Japanese, the islands dispute itself would strongly contribute to establish their national identity. The older historical incident influences on forming the Chinese national identity whereas the latest islands dispute effects on the Japanese national identity.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

There exist some international procedures to resolve a territorial dispute between nations. The three possible methods - International Court of Justice (ICJ), Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and conciliation - may bring the end of the islands dispute between China and Japan. However, all of these methods have disadvantages when applied to the dispute.

International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The United Nation (U.N.) Charter envisions that disputes of a legal nature involving states would normally be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ has heard many cases regarding to the extent of maritime jurisdiction, but it has made a decision only for 14 cases (Center, 2010). Although the ICJ can hear a case of the islands dispute between China and Japan, there are several difficulties to use the ICJ for the dispute.

Frist, Japan insists that “there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016).” In general, at least a filing party recognizes that there is a case with other parties, so the party files a law suit to court. Initiating the ICJ procedure by Japan might conflicts

with the current Japan's position because if Japan files a law suit to the ICJ, the world would recognize that Japan considers that there is a territorial issue between China and Japan. China also does not seem to be motivated to file this case to the ICJ. China clearly denied participating to the similar territorial dispute case filed by the Philippines to the PCA. We can assume that China is not willing to use the current international court procedures to resolve territorial disputes in the East and South China seas.

Secondly, although ICJ decisions have the force of law, they are not always fully respected by parties. There is no enforcement mechanism (Center, 2010). Although the U.N. Security Council can discuss about its non-compliance, China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Thus, if the ICJ's decision about the islands dispute does not favor China, it would be hard to force China to comply with the ICJ decision. If no enforcement is available, the dispute will not be resolved in the real world.

Thirdly, the ICJ reviews nine types of factors regarding adjudicating territorial claims: treaty law, geography, economy, culture effective control, history, *uti possidetis juris*, elitism, and ideology. In these nine factors, only the three of them have consistently been considered as a basis for decisions by the ICJ: treaties, recognized historical boundaries (*uti possidetis juris*), and evidence of effective

control (Center, 2010). About the islands dispute between China and Japan, the ICJ would review San Francisco Peace Treaty, China's historical records, Japan's claim of *terra nullius*, and recent maritime activities by Chinese vessels. Although China would bring Shimonoseki treaty and other legal documents at the end of WWII as evidences, Japan would oppose the evidence as irrelevant. The ICJ will make a decision based on these arguments, but the ICJ cannot address the issue of nationalistic attribution. Thus, since the ICJ only can decide which country has a legally recognized claim based on the treaty, historical boundaries, and evidence of effective control, the ICJ cannot reconcile the psychological issue of the nationalistic attribution between Chinese and Japanese. If the ICJ makes a decision, either Chinese or Japanese would experience a feeling of losing. This feeling would strengthen their members' nationalistic attribution. As a consequence, although the ICJ decided which country governs the islands, it would enhance a status competition between China and Japan. Although the ICJ may be able to provide a resolution in front of the court, it would be hard to assist the two nations to transform to the peaceful and corporative future.

Moreover, according to the statute of the ICJ (International Court of Justice, 2017), only states may be parties in cases before the Court (Chapter II, Article 34-1). Taiwan is not a U.N. member state (United Nations, 2017). Therefore, although Taiwan is

claiming its sovereignty over the islands, the ICJ cannot resolve the dispute with all stakeholders and hear Taiwan's claim as a party.

Due to the complexity of the islands dispute, the ICJ would be unlikely to bring a peaceful outcome about this issue.

Arbitration

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental body with a membership of over 100 states in The Hague, the Netherlands. It was founded by treaties in 1899 and 1907. The PCA offers arbitrations including territorial cases between states and between states and nonstate actors (Center, 2010). Although Taiwan is not a state of the PCA, the PCA can hear the Taiwan's argument as a party to the arbitration (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2017).

It would be useful to compare a case between the Philippines and China from 2013 to 2019 to think about the possibility of using the PCA for the islands dispute in East China Sea. In 2013, the Philippines brought its claim of the sovereignty over islands of the South China Sea against China to the PCA (Hunt, 2016). China has refused to participate in the case, but under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention), the PCA judged that it had a jurisdiction over the dispute. The Convention states, "An arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to decide a matter presented to it, even if a party chooses

not to participate in the proceedings or to make a formal objection (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2015).”

Although China has repeatedly stated that “it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016),” China published its position paper on the South China Sea arbitration in 2014. The PCA treated the position paper as effectively constituting a plea concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 2015. On July 12 2016, the PCA concluded that “to the extent China has historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished in the Convention (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016).” “There was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016).” The PCA concluded that the Chinese argument has no legal basis to claim historical rights to resources within the sea (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016).

However, China refused to accept the ruling. On the contrary, China installed significant weapons systems on the artificial islands in the South China Sea (Phillips, 2016). This Chinese action was reported by a U.S. think tank on November 23, 2016 after the announcement by the PCA. The Philippines’ current president, Rodrigo Duterte, commented on this report that “I will demand that they go out of my country (Philippines to ‘set aside’ South China Sea tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on

Beijing, 2016).” However, he also told reporters, “There is nothing that we can do about that now, whether or not it is being done for purposes of further militarizing these facilities that they have put up (Philippines to ‘set aside’ South China Sea tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on Beijing, 2016).” He further commented that he would continue to pursue peaceful means. Thus, although the PCA decided that China does not have any rights over the claimed lands and area in the South China Sea, there is no effective enforcement on China. The PCA could not fully resolve the dispute between Philippines and China even though the former spent about 6 years to obtain ruling in its favor. We can easily assume that the similar situation would take place if Japan takes the islands dispute in the East China Sea to the PCA. Therefore, the PCA is unlikely to resolve the dispute as the ICJ.

Other dispute resolution methods such as conciliation

As other dispute resolution methods, we can consider the possibility of conciliation between China, Taiwan, and Japan. The conciliation can be happened by various ways such as having a non-stake third party to facilitate a dialogue between the three nations. However, it would be hard to find a completely impartial third party having an enough authority to convince China, Taiwan, and Japan to reach a peaceful agreement. Moreover, it is unlikely to desire the conciliation solely by the three nations.

These international methods are too early to be applied the islands dispute because China and Japan do not have the intention to resolve the dispute cooperately. The transformation has to be occurred between China and Japan before using the ICJ, the PCA, or conciliation. All the methods require a cooperative attitude toward resolving disputes. The nationalistic attribution interrupts to lead China and Japan to have the corporative attitude. To effectively use these methods in the future, as the survey suggested, we need to find a way to release Chinese and Japanese from their nationalistic attribution. This releasing process can transform the islands dispute between China and Japan.

How can we make Chinese and Japanese individual's nationalistic attribution less influential on choosing an attitude toward the islands dispute? Hogg (2006) suggests that if its members of a group are aware that they are playing in the same team with the outgroup, the transformation may occurred (Hogg, 2006). In the relationship between China and Japan, there would be no large power difference. It is true that China would be economically much stronger than Japan if simply comparing GDP¹⁰ (The World Bank, 2015), but both are among the largest economic powers in the world. In addition, China and Japan do not compete against each other economically, but they are dependent each other. So, it would not be crucial to define which country

¹⁰ China's GDP is \$11,064,665 and . Japan's is \$4,383,076.

is more and less powerful in the relationship. Rather, the much more significant point is that both of China and Japan have to recognize that they are playing for the same team and are parts of themselves. More concretely, to overcome the in-group favoritism, it is crucial to emphasize that China and Japan are playing for Asia as the same group and are parts of Asia.

However, this idea might suggest a different direction from that which both Chinese and Japanese governments want to move toward. It is obvious that the Japanese government under the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe maintains a policy of focusing on keeping or improving a relationship with the U.S. rather than China. After announcing the result of the U.S. presidential election, the Japanese prime minister flew to New York to schedule a meeting with U.S. president elected Donald Trump, immediately (Miller, 2017). The prime minister must have thought that it was his government's first priority to establish a personal relationship with the new U.S. president to reaffirm that the U.S. would join Japan to defend the Senkaku Islands (Miller, 2017). Thus, it is clear that as a strong ally of the U.S., the Japanese government is going to oppose to China's claim regarding the islands dispute.

Addressing the collective memory of WWII might be the second option to release Chinese and Japanese from the nationalistic attribution. The theory of collective memory suggests that providing counter memory can be help to challenge

or oppose to the process of creating the collective memory (Tint, 2010). It would be painful for both Chinese and Japanese, but we have to learn each other's narrative of the WWII's history and create a new story of WWII together to unlock ourselves from the past to the present and future. This co-learning can be implemented from the academic level, such as an international conference and co-research project with Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese researchers.


As a conclusion, I would like to add the China-Japan islands dispute as one of the topics for the field of the conflict and dispute resolution. I hope this paper will open a peaceful discussion about the topic to lead a bright future for new generations.

APPENDIX A

ARGUMENTS

1403-1663

China's arguments



Japan's arguments



Arguments 1885-2016*

China's arguments*

1895† First claim sovereignty of the islands to the international society†

1945† End of WWII†

1951† San Francisco Peace Treaty†

1970† Taiwan, then China first claim sovereignty of the islands to the international society†

1978† Peace and Friendship Treaty†

2008† 2 Chinese vessels†

2010† 24 Chinese vessels†

2011† Collision Chinese fishing boat with 2 Japanese patrol boats†

2012† 14 Chinese vessels†

2013† 827 vessels†

2014† 836 vessels†

2015† 838 vessels†

* MOFA = Ministry of Foreign affair of Japan†

**MEXT = Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology†

1885† Survey†

1895† Nationalized the islands (not Treaty of Shimomoseki)†

1945† End of WWII†

1951† San Francisco Peace Treaty†

1970† Taiwan, then China first claim sovereignty of the islands to the international society†

1972† U.S. returning the islands to Japan†

1978†

2008†

2010†

2011†

2012† MOFA* of Japan's website showing the Japanese sovereignty of the islands.†

2013† Japan opened a new radar surveillance†


2014† Approval the largest defense budget + New law of the Japanese self-defense force†

2015† MEXT** revised teaching guidelines and textbooks†

2016†

Japan's arguments†

Japan's administration without oppositions†



APPENDIX B

SURVEY DISTRIBUTION

	Chinese	Japanese
Total	62	36
Group 1 (University of Oregon)	22 (Answer 22)	21 (Answer 21)
Group 2 (Amazonmechanical turk)	40 (Answer 14)	15 (Answer 12)
Qualified	28	25
Excluded	6 (Taiwanese 1)	8
Agreed	27	0
Disagreed	1	0

APPENDIX C

SURVEY FOR CHINESE PARTICIPANTS

Section 3 Please choose your attitude about the following incidents. (①~④)

① Japan invading China before and during the World War II

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

② The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident*

*Nanking incident in 1937, the Japanese army force murdered people including soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of Nanking (or Nanjing).

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

③the visits to the Yasukuni shrine* by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members

*Yasukuni Shrine: The shrine is located in Tokyo, Japan. The shrine is dedicated to Japanese soldiers and servicemen who died fighting on behalf of the Emperor of Japan in the last 150 years. The shrine is at the center of an international controversy by honoring war criminals convicted by a post World War II court including 14 Class A war criminals.

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

④Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Rarely comfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

APPENDIX D

SURVEY FOR JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS

Section 3 Please choose your attitude about the following incidents. (①~④)

① What China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the World War II

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

② the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident*

*Nanking incident in 1937, the Japanese army force murdered people including soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of Nanking (or Nanjing).

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

- ③ What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine* by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet member

*Yasukuni Shrine: The shrine is located in Tokyo, Japan. The shrine is dedicated to Japanese soldiers and servicemen who died fighting on behalf of the Emperor of Japan in the last 150 years. The shrine is at the center of an international controversy by honoring war criminals convicted by a post World War II court including 14 Class A war criminals.

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Uncomfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

- ④ What China says about description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese

history textbooks

- High comfortable
- Comfortable
- Neutral
- Rarely comfortable
- Highly uncomfortable
- Indifference
- Unknown about the incident

APPENDIX E

SURVEY FOR SECTION 4

Section 4

Thank you for doing the survey. You are almost done!

Based on your knowledge, which country governs the islands?

Select one answer.

China

Japan

It is difficult to say which country governs the islands under the current situation.

Other

Which country should govern the islands?

China

Japan


Other/Other option

No country should govern the islands.


APPENDIX F

RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONALISTIC ATTRIBUTION


(1) Japan invading China before and during the WWII




(2) The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident



(3) The visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members



(4) The description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks



REFERENCES CITED

- Abe, S. (2015). Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 22(2), 102-105.
- Askew, D. (2002). The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends. *electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies*.
- Boat collisions spark Japan-China diplomatic row. (2010, September 8). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522>
- Brownlie, I., & Baker, K. (1973). *Principles of public international law* (Vol. 1, pp. 26-27). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Burton, J. W. (1996). *Conflict resolution: Its language and processes*. Scarecrow Press.
- Center, C. (2010). *Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts: Sources, Situations, Scenarios, and Suggestions*. mimeo, Carter Center.
- China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian). Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630540.htm
- China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. A Mirror of Japan (Ri Ben Yi Jian). Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630579.htm
- China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Basic Facts on Diaoyu Dao. Retrieved from <http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/>
- China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Records of the Imperial Title-Confering Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu) in1534. Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630585.htm
- China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Records of the Imperial Title-Confering Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu)

in 1561. Retrieved from
http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630538.htm

China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Records of the Imperial Title-Confering Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu) in 1579.
Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630534.htm

China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Records of the Imperial Title-Confering Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu) in 1606.
Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630527.htm

China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Records of the Imperial Title-Confering Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu) in 1663.
Retrieved from http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/25/content_34648798.htm

China Internet Information Center. (2014). Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China. Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng Xiang Song). Retrieved from
http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34630589.htm

China says military spending increase to be smallest in six years. (2016, May 5). *the japan times*.
Retrieved from
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/05/asia-pacific/china-says-military-spending-increase-to-be-smallest-in-six-years/#.WQ1wjPmGO72>

Chuugoku gunkann ga sennyuu (中国軍艦が潜入). (2016, June 15). “Ryoukai” “Setsuzoku suiiki” de kinnchou (「領海」「接続水域」で緊張), *Nihon keizai shinbun*.
Retrieved from
<http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZZO03455790Q6A610C1000000/>

Coser, L. A. (1956). *The functions of social conflict* (Vol. 9). Routledge.

Drifte, R. (2013). The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: Between The Materialization of the " China Threat" And Japan" Reversing the Outcome of World War II"?. *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, (32), 9.

- Druckman, D. (1994). Nationalism, patriotism, and group loyalty: A social psychological perspective. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(Supplement 1), 43-68.
- Felstiner, W. L., Abel, R. L., & Sarat, A. (1980). The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... *Law and society review*, 631-654.
- Hane, J. (2012). Senkaku mondai ni naizai suru houriteki mujun , *Sekai, November*, 116-118, 112.
- Hogg, M. A., & Burke, P. J. (2006). Contemporary social psychological theories. *Contemporary social psychological theories*.
- Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(1), 204-222.
- Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(2), 242-256.
- How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties. (2014, November, 10). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>
- Hunt, K. (2016, July 12). Philippines vs. China: Court to rule on South China Sea fight. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/11/asia/philippines-china-south-china-sea-hague-ruling/>
- International Court of Justice. (2017, May 3). *Statute of the International Court of Justice*. Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2#CHAPTER_II
- Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe apologetic over WWII, but says next generation not obliged. (2015, August 15), the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). Retrieved from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-14/japan-pm-apologetic-but-says-next-generation-not-obliged/6699392>.

- Jietai-hou (自衛隊法, Self-Defense Force Act) (2016), Article 76(2). Retrieved from <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html>
- Kelman, H. C. (1997). Nationalism, patriotism, and national identity: Social-psychological dimensions. In D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), *Patriotism in the life of individuals and nations*.
- Kenei, S. (2012). Chuugoku gawa kara mita “Senkaku mondai.” *Sekai*, November, 103-104. 108
- Kerr, G. H. (1953). *Ryukyu Kingdom and Province Before 1945*. National Academies.
- Lah, K. (2012). Japan official pushes to buy disputed islands. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/12/world/japan-island-dispute/index.html>
- Lederach, J. (2015). *Little book of conflict transformation: Clear articulation of the guiding principles by a pioneer in the field*. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc..
- Magosaki, U. (2012). Senkaku mondai nihon no go kai. *Sekai*, November, 87-89
- McCurry, J. (2014, January 28). Japan: teachers to call Senkaku and Takeshima islands Japanese territory, *theguardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/japan-teachers-call-senkaku-takeshima-island-japanese-territory>
- Miller, J. Z. (2017, February 11). Japan’s Prime Minister Showed the Way to President Trump’s Heart: Flattery, *TIME*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/4667744/donald-trump-shinzo-abe-flattery/>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China. (2012, September 10). Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t968188.shtml
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2012, November). Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省) Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/fact_sheet.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016, April). Japanese Territory. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省) Retrieved from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016, April 27). Japan's Security / Peace & Stability of the International Community, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省) Retrieved from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, April). Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省) Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html

Okinawa prefectural board of education (沖縄県教育委員会) (2014, June). Okinawa's history and culture (沖縄の歴史と文化). Retrieved from <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/edu/bunkazai/bunkakesho/hogo/rekishi/rekishi-029.html>

Otto, B. (2016, July 26). U.S. to Support Talks in South China Sea Dispute. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-asks-u-s-to-back-china-philippine-talks-1469511072>

Page, J, & Moss, T. (2016, July 11). South china sea ruling puts Beijing in a corner. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-china-sea-ruling-puts-beijing-in-a-corner-1468365807>

Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2015, October 29). Press release. Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China. Retrieved from <https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1503>

Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016, July 12). Press release. The South China Sea Arbitration. Retrieved from <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-R>

elease-No-11-English.pdf

Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2017, May 3). *Member States*. Retrieved from <https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/member-states/>

Philippines to 'set aside' South China Sea tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on Beijing. (2016, December 17) theguardian.

Retrieved from

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/17/philippines-to-set-aside-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-to-avoid-imposing-on-beijing>

Phillips, T. (2016, December 15). Image show 'significant' Chinese weapons systems in South China Sea. theguardian.

Retrieved from

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/images-show-significant-chinese-weapons-systems-in-south-china-sea>

Pollmann, M. (2015, April 8). Why Japan's textbook controversy is getting worse, *The Diplomat*.

Retrieved from

<http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/why-japans-textbook-controversy-is-getting-worse/>

Sino-Japanese War. (2008, December). In Encyclopedia Britannica, *online*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/event/Sino-Japanese-War-1894-1895>

Shaw, H. Y. (1999). The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute: its history and an analysis of the ownership claims of the PRC, ROC, and Japan. *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, 1999(3), 1.

Simmel, G. (1964). *Conflict: Translated by Kurt H. Wolff. The Web of Group-affiliations. Translated by Reinhard Bendix,(by) Georg Simmel. With a Foreword by Everett C. Hugues*. Free Press.

Spitzer, K. (2016, March 29). Japan approves record-high budget, focusing on defense, economic recovery. *USA TODAY*,

Retrieved from

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/29/japan-government-defense-budget-economic-recovery/82376314/>

- Stashwick, S. (2016, June 13). That Chinese Frigate in the Senkakus was a bad move for China. *The Diplomat*.
Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/that-chinese-frigate-in-the-senkakus-was-a-bad-move-for-china/>
- Taiwan Documents Project (TDP). (2017, May). Treaty of Shimonoseki. Retrieved from <http://www.taiwanbasic.com/treaties/Shimonoseki.htm>
- Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European journal of social psychology*, 1(2), 149-178.
- The World Bank. (2015). GDP ranking.
Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>
- Tint, B. (2010). History, memory, and intractable conflict. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 27(3), 239-256.
- Trepte, S. (2006). Social identity theory. *Psychology of entertainment*, 255, 271.
- Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2011). Self-categorization theory. *Handbook of theories in social psychology*, 2, 399-417.
- United Nations. (2017, May 3) United Nations. Member States. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/#goto>
- Wakatsuki, Y. (2016, June 9). Japan: Chinese ship sailing close to disputed islands 'heightens tensions.' *CNN*.
Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/08/asia/japan-china-diaoyu-senkaku/>
- Wright, S. C., Aron, A., & Tropp, L. R. (2002). Including others (and groups) in the self. *The social self: Cognitive, interpersonal, and intergroup perspectives*, 343-364.
- Yasukuni Shrine. (2017, May 3). About Yasukuni Shrine, History. Retrieved from <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/index.html>
- Yu, M. (2015, August 6). Taiwan's First President Ignites Firestorm with Claim That Disputed Islands Belong to Japan. *Washington Times*.

Retrieved from

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/6/inside-china-lee-teng-hui-taiwan-s-former-president/>