Straton: Philosophy of Religion

Parts I - V
STUDY GUIDE:

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by

George Douglas Straton

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6. Conclusions: Where does human reason discover the logos of existence?

* The following upgrade through Chapter 15, is fully complete. Typically, but in this "Part VI" could be used for additional scope and interest. Topics 1 - 4 are completed, but are not in this copy.
Part I

Terms and Method in Philosophy of Religion
Chapter One
What is Religion?

Initial Definition of Terms.

To give a reasoned account of religion it is appropriate to begin with certain introductory verbal clarifications. The groups of terms which are most relevant initially to our discussion are:

"Experience", "Fact", and "Value".

"Religion" and "Religious Experience".

"Science" and "Philosophy".


How may we provisionally define these terms in order to use them hereafter as tools of discussion? We consider the first ten of these words in the present chapter, and the last three in Chapter Two. At the outset we would do well to consider Brightman's definition of definition:

"Before definitions are proposed, it should be made clear that all definitions are attempts to describe or point out fundamental facts of experience or fundamental theoretical concepts. They are therefore to be regarded as hypotheses subject to correction...Definitions are not dogmas or embalmed truths. They are guides to investigation."

Experience. It is often said that experience is the way to truth and that experience must be of fact. But like most of the terms we encounter in a discussion such as this the words experience and fact as commonly used have several meanings, which we are obliged to distinguish, if we are to proceed with clarity and order. Extreme empiricism limits the word "experience" to the most rudimentary physical

sense experiences -- immediate sight, hearing, taste, etc. But plainly the English word experience has in common usage covered more than raw sensation. In addition to sensation, experience refers to types of happenings to persons other than merely sensory in the above simplest way. It includes the world of inner subjective happenings -- our "feelings" of pleasure, pain, emotions, rational thoughts, and awareness of values. We often use such expressions as "that dream was a terrible experience last night" or "our climb up the Middle Sister yesterday was a wonderful one". The connotations of such uses of the term experience far exceed its barest physical or sensate meaning. Brightman defined experience as "all that is at any time present in consciousness" (APR 3). Possibly the most inclusive definition would be to say: an experience is any event that modifies a conscious being consciously. This might be a flat, sensory event that puts us in touch with the objective world around us in some bare uninterpreted way. It could be a far reaching scientific analysis of the atomic nature of matter, which is never directly sensed. It could be an inner subjective event that acquaints us with our own inner natures. It could be an event of the widest interchange of ourselves with the world which leaves us with a sense of moral or aesthetic value.

The basic problem of science as well as philosophy and religion is to discover experiences that are recurring, common, or universal with men; so that we may come to distinguish between "objective experience" and experiences which are merely subjective features of emotions or imagination. Presently we will consider the tests of such objective experiences or "truths".

Reflecting the classic distinction of Immanuel Kant, but by no means implying any unbridgeable gulf or irreconcilable conflict between the two, it is helpful for purposes of analysis to distinguish between: (1) Scientific experience and (2) Extra-scientific experience.
"By scientific experience", Brightman writes, "is meant experience as described and explained by the sciences... It is necessary, however, for any philosophical investigation to include in its data nonscientific experience. By nonscientific experience is meant neither unscientific experience nor poor science, but rather all human experience which is not science. It includes all of our actual everyday consciousness, all our sense experiences, our feelings and desires, our imaginations and many of our beliefs; it includes all of our thoughts, with the exception of those which arise in the course of scientific investigation (APR 9).

Scientific experience commonly means our cognitive or descriptive experience of the world. In order to satisfy our first elementary level or curiosity, we are motivated by the desire to know what is before us, and possibly how the object before us may work or the event take place or come to be. Thus we may say that the Middle Sister is now looming above us: it is composed of a reddish rock and soil, is inhabited by several species of large black ants, and stands some 1100 feet high above sea level. We may also ask how it got there and plunge as deeply as we may into the descriptions of historical or formative geology. Accordingly, thus far we are thinking in terms of two classic objective sciences -- geology and biology. But this kind of experience does not exhaust our experience of the Middle Sister.

There is extra-scientific experience, which concerns values. This order of experience arises in our deeper curiosity about why there is the event and issues in knowledge of some purposive meaning, use, or "good", practical, aesthetic, or ethical that the object or event may have. As commonly phrased, the world seems to be one of "fact" and "value". (The word "fact" is used for the moment in the limited sense of an object of descriptive science apart from its factors of value). Accordingly, we may say that the Middle Sister is beautiful in the pink glow of the early morning sun, or that its watershed constitutes a primary source of water for the inhabitants of the upper Willamette Valley (a statement of value as well as fact), or that it is a desirable recreation and climbing area. In sum thus far we have indicated: -
scientific experience: which is factual, descriptive, "cognitive" --
gives the "what" and/or the "how" of a thing or process.

and

extra-scientific experience: which is "evaluative" -- concerns the "why" and
the "wherefore", the purpose, use or "good" of a thing
or process, its value meaning, or meanings.

Descriptive scientific experience is at the center of a wider range of value
experience, to which we may now well give the over-all classic name "moral experience",
("Moral" is here used to indicate the entire realm of value):

Moral Experience

the realm of valuation --
the full world of moral
awareness and value reality.

Scientific Experience

the realm of cognition, of
descriptive fact apart from
value

We shall see how religion arises in extra-scientific or full moral experience.
Religion is concern about values.

We should emphasize that the above analysis does not imply, any more than Kant
himself did, a rigid division between the two realms of experience. To make such a
distinction for practical purposes, however, does help us to begin our study of
religion. The realm of value and the realm of science are, of course, not incommensurate orders of experience. Our ultimate purpose is to suggest an inclusive definition of experience. The following points indicate some fundamental relations between scientific and extra-scientific experience:
(1) Interest in values frequently precedes, and is the motivating force behind, discovery of scientific fact -- the why sometimes, and perhaps typically, comes first, and issues in the what and the how. Edison's discovery of the electric light illustrates how a sense of value, the need for such a light, produces the scientific article. Conversely we must acknowledge the reverse process, that descriptive or scientific information or experience frequently suggests use, purpose, or value. Watt's observation of steam pressure in his famous tea kettle suggested its use in powering machinery. Psychologically speaking, awareness of scientific information and awareness of value often go together, no doubt because the scientific thinker is also a personal being inevitably interested in value.

(2) The implication of what has just been said may be taken deeper, by pointing out that the rules of logic or right reasoning apply to both realms of knowledge, to both facts and values. An inclusive rational perspective, which brings into focus and explains the psychological connection above mentioned, or, in slightly other terms, the same coherent reason often perceives fact and value in one synoptic grasp of insight. The fact of atomic energy and how to release it, when once known, enlarges immediately into the idea of a number of possible uses, evil and good, to which it may be put. Scientific information and facts are hardly, if ever, stillborn, without the life of value or potential value pulsing in them. This is probably true because knowledge itself is a value. There is joy and satisfaction in the discovery of truth at whatever level or range. This is what Tycho meant, after his discovery of the elliptical nature of the planetary orbits, when he exclaimed that he was thinking God's thoughts after him. Knowledge and truth are values because they are the living content of consciousness, which knows itself to be an intrinsic and possibly a supreme value. This statement discloses a third point.
(3) A primary way to see the relationship between the two realms of scientific fact and value, is to recognize that high in the order of cosmic process and fact there stands our own biological and psychological or self-conscious beings, which contribute value to, or discover it in, the world, making valuation a distinctive and real part of the higher levels of interaction and process. If men are the projectors of value upon the world, or the perceivers of value in the world, or the creators of value from more elementary interacting process of the world, we ourselves are part of the world process; valuation, then, as our most distinctive activity is a part of the total process of the objective, scientific world.

So much, then, for a preliminary consideration of the meaning of "experience" in its various ranges. We have yet to define, somewhat more precisely than we have thus far implied, two further terms, "fact" and "value", prior to coming to "religion".

**Fact.** What has just been said about experience may be transposed to apply to fact. Most simply we often think of the word "fact" as applying to some object or process that is directly or sentiently known or observed. But the meaning of "fact" is, of course, wider than this. We frequently speak of such things as "atoms" as "facts" or the second law of thermodynamics (the law of entropy), but neither of these are directly known through immediate sensory observation. Furthermore, the realm of fact must include the factors of subjective, psychological or personal life as well as those of external, non-personal event. My imaginary vision of a blue rose is a fact, a personal psychological fact, though it may not be an objective fact anywhere in nature's kingdom of flowers. The "blue rose", however, is an experience within the larger fact of conscious process or imagination itself, which is just as much a real fact of our world as nature's flowers are -- though a different order of fact. If religion deals with the interior realm of values and the dimension
of personal consciousness that discerns values, religion belongs to the realm of fact as now inclusively defined. Moreover, as we may begin to discern an objective reality in or behind the universe, with the qualities of intelligence and love, to which we may assign the traditional name God, then religion which stands for awareness of, and devotion to God, would be factual in the most objective and cosmic sense, as well as factual in the inner psychological sense described above. Eventually we will consider the possibility of religion as fact in this widest meaning.

Value. Up to this point we have employed the term value, but must now define it somewhat more carefully. It is not our intention in this introductory chapter to enter upon a full or exhaustive philosophy of value. Whether values are entirely subjective, totally objective, or partially subjective and objective, as resultant emergents of interactive processes; whether they are "absolute" or "relative"; whether they are products of merely finite, human psychological process, or in some wider and deeper way primordially cosmic and universally objective in a trans-human divine sustainer of values -- to indicate some answers to these questions in terms of major theories of value -- is rather the problem of our study as a whole. In any case, an initial, working definition must start with the conscious subject.

On Defining "Value"

We previously said that an experience is any event which modifies a conscious being consciously. A value is a conscious being's feeling of joy, approval, or satisfaction regarding something of which he is consciously aware or experiences; or, a value as an experience which modifies a conscious being in a direction of joy approval, or satisfaction. An experience of value carries a conscious being from a sense of lack or need to a sense of fulfillment and completion, according to his
nature or the possibilities of his nature. Implied in value experience are the relations that tie a conscious being to his world. Accordingly, values are the qualities of the relations of individuals and things. This would include values at all ranges of quality from physical properties and experiences to intellectual, moral, and aesthetic properties and qualities and the possibility of quality. Values are the actualized ideas of good, or the realized descriptions of good for individuals and the relationships between individuals that best maintain and enhance them.

This concept of value would include John Dewey's important distinction between mere subjective enjoyment and true value as enjoyment understood in its relations, "in its connections and interactions" and consequences (The Quest for Certainty, Capricorn Books, Putnam's Sons, N.Y. 1960, p. 260).

Though we sometimes speak of physical objects as having "values" of their own, we should really say that they have "properties" or "qualities" of color, shape, etc., leaving the word "value" for reference to the conscious experience of living beings--only living beings can experience or have "value".

The origin of value lies in consciousness, and as we mentioned above, consciousness has a sense of its own intrinsic value. Consciousness is a mode of energy, and among all observable energies, it believes itself to be the most potent and wondrous. All conscious beings share this first primary sense of value of conscious awareness itself, and in sharing a value that is the same for all share something universal. We have the feeling that if we permit consciousness to search its own nature, we may discover other realms of value, perhaps all value, or at least significant avenues of experience that may lead us to value. Consciousness is the father of primary values that gives all other values possibility and life. As the structure of
consciousness begins to be disclosed, a realm of values, common for all personal conscious beings, relative to their health and joy is disclosed. For example the central function of consciousness is to think, and to think logically and well, or truly. Accordingly in this realization we have all the values of knowledge, scientific procedure and truth coming to light. Further, a conscious life cannot fulfill its own deepest meaning and potentiality of being, apart from the recognition of other conscious life as existing too, and as desiring fulfillment and completion of being. Were there actually only one conscious life in existence, it would long for another such life as itself to love, with which it might have fellowship. Thus consciousness points to the whole realm of ethical values, the prime one of which is the value of love. One further example of consciousness as an origin of value lies in sense values. They arise in the intercourse of conscious life with physical nature, and closely related to our sense values are the aesthetic values of beauty. Moreover, the sameness of most sense values, and many beauty values, and therefore a further idea of a universal quality in values, inheres in value experience at the sensory and aesthetic levels. We all more or less experience the same "blue" of the sky, the same "scent" of the rose, the same "song" of the bird, and most of us stand in awe at the loveliness of Mt. Hood in the sunrise.

To summarize thus far, we have noted that main types of values, knowledge value, ethical value, sensory and aesthetic value seem inherent to the structure and nature of the higher consciousness of our human kind. Furthermore, such values seem "objective" or "universal" to the extent that all such consciousness characteristically or normally feels the need for these values, and strives to experience them. As food is to the bodies of men such values are the sustenance of the minds and emotions of men.
Commonly religion or religious value has meant that a conscious being in some most important or quintessential way is carried from a sense of lack or need to a sense of fulfillment and completion. We pass now to our main immediate task of a definition of religion.

Religion: its universal form. We have said that religion has to do with value. We are ready now to define the word religion, in its generalized meaning, as devotion to whatever is regarded as supreme in value. Let us illustrate from the history of religions various types of objects to which supreme value or meaning has been assigned. We shall then point up our definition more precisely by examining the term devotion, the emotional and psychological element in religion at the root of the ideas of supreme value. Ideas of supreme value constitute the intellectual and philosophic apex of religion.

In ancient Egypt the sun was worshipped as the supreme deity, Ra. It was considered the object of supreme value in the world because so many essential things appeared to be derived from, or dependent upon it -- light, warmth, energy-imparting nourishment for crops. Without these things the dwellers of the Nile valley realized they could not survive. What could be more objective, mysterious, creative, or beautiful than the radiant orbe of the great sun? It seemed to be to the Egyptians the central focus of the universe, the very source of life and good, the father of being, the all-seeing eye. How natural, then, from the primitive standpoint, to worship the sun. The temples of the Egyptians and those of other sun cultures, for example the Inca civilization in South America, were often oriented to the movement of the solar disk, so that worship performed in the sanctuaries would center upon
the sun's light as it poured into the colonnades and chambers. The temple to Amon-
Ra at Karnak in Egypt is the world's most notable example of such a sun temple.

An analogy to the aesthetic side of Egyptian sun worship may be observed in
modern forms of religious emotion that seem to rise no higher than worship or admir-
ation of beauty and artistic value, found either in the splendor of nature's beauty
itself, or in the created arts of the human intellect. Music, poetry, and sunset
glory have been gods for us sometime.

The ancient Canaanites, into whose land the Hebrews moved, after the liberation
from Egypt, worshipped the forces of agricultural and animal fertility. The attention
of these people focused on the mysterious and marvelous generative power in plants,
cattle, and human beings as the source of life and sustenance; to them it seemed
to be that which was of universal importance. They believed that the gods of ferti-
licity, or the baals, should be worshipped in manners appropriate to their functions.
Accordingly, the rites often centered in magical sexual ceremonies performed within
the precincts of the high places or shrines. Human sacrifice in the form of infant
immolation to various baals was another way thought fitting to appease the gods of
fertility. Practically speaking, the emphasis on sex in rite and ceremony constitu-
ted for these people a worship of sexual vitality itself. One of the great accomp-
lishments of the Hebrew prophets was to lift the civilization away from these crude
forms of religious belief and worship. Aphrodite or Venus in ancient Greece and
Rome was adored as the goddess of passion and love. In India the fertility theme
has been prominent in some of the phallac cults of Shakti, consort of Shiva and
goddess of generative or sex-energy.

Not only in ancient times or in primitive areas, but in the sophisticated society
of our own time and place passion is sometimes elevated to place of supreme value,
and, practically speaking, constitutes deity.
With the primitive Arunta of Australia religion and rite center in the appeasement of the spirits of the Kangaroo species who are responsible for keeping the species fertile. The reason for this form of totemic cult is that this animal constitutes the main food supply for these people. Their survival seems absolutely dependent upon the survival of the Kangaroo. In a manner of speaking, the Kangaroo spirit has become the object of supreme value to the Arunta and represents the divine for them. Thus accompanying the fertility theme in religion is that of economic and material values, typified by food supply.

In sophisticated society money has symbolized the supreme value of possessions. The true prophets of God in all societies have warned against the worship of "Mammon", that is to say, possessions, wealth, and material success. This is the kind of idolatry into which a competitive, commercial and industrial civilization like our own is prone to fall.

What has been said of the Egyptian Ra, or the fertility Baals, or the Arunta Kangaroo spirits is typical for all ancient or primitive polytheistic deities and idolatries. To the primitive mind, each god represents some seemingly indispensable function in nature, stands for some object or process that appears to be of supreme value. Many of the gods, of course, in polytheistic cultures stand for the terrible or the evil side of nature and existence. Shiva in India, for example, represents in part such destructive processes as disease and calamity. Certain forms of worship associated particularly with his spouse Kali, the terrible, are designed to symbolize appeasement of the powers behind the dis-values or the evil side of experience. The Zoroastrians believed that all evil was ultimately subsumed in one transcendent Satanic Deity, Ahriman, the rival of Mazda, the supreme God of truth, justice and the good. In spite of this dualism of rivalry between the cosmic Spirit of Evil
and the cosmic Spirit of Good, Zoroastrianism (in the modern world represented by the Parsis of India) has been one of history's highest ethical religions, and is basically monotheistic. The ultimate triumph of Mazda over Ahriman is believed to be certain.

Bear in mind our initial, working definition of religion, as devotion to whatever is regarded as supreme in value. In our principal effort at present to define the universal characteristics of all religion, and religious emotion, we move to another high form. The supreme value for original Buddhism, and that which prevails as the basic way of thought for the Hinayana group in Buddhism today, was the triumph over suffering and pain, and freedom from the desire and longing for individualized or personalized existence as such, which, for Buddhist thought, constituted the locus of pain. Thus Buddhism exalted the idea of Nirvana, or the final "state" of release, where personality, the main factor of our painful finite human condition, would be left behind. Buddhism elevated psychological knowledge as the instrument or way of such release. It believed that a true psychological theory would disclose the non-unity or non-existence of the individual soul. The meditative process, designed to bring this realization about, became itself central in the scheme of values. By the proper exercise of one's own resident psychological powers one could come to "understand" Nirvana, and by this form of intellectual identification, achieve release into it. Practically speaking in both Buddhism, and the main related philosophic Hindu cults of Vedanta and Sankhya, the value of impersonality, or the impersonal, symbolized by Nirvana or Brahman, rather than the western value of personality, was made supreme. In these partially world-denying, life-denying, and pessimistic religious systems, "salvation" was spelled out in terms of a denial of bodily and psychic individuality.
The above discussion of the psychologically oriented Buddhist faith, reminds us of the religious philosophies that have tended to put man himself as a whole, his society and history, in some terms or other, in the place of supreme value.

The critical naturalism of John Dewey, like that of the 19th century French positivist, August Comte, rested on the premise that man's scientific thinking and the system of values that liberal critical intelligence can conceive, and make actual, in the real world of scientific, artistic and social, humanitarian achievement, represent the highest order of natural process. According to this system, human ideals in the best sense of western, liberal, democratic, humane values, are what is best, truest, and supreme, and are designated by Dewey as "God", or "the divine". Comte classically referred to humanity as itself "le grand'etre" the great or divine being. The present-day Ethical Culture Society in America is a sectarian expression of this religious admiration of the scientific, artistic, ethical imagination of man himself as supreme. In this way of thought man's ability to conceive and achieve values -- democracy, peace, love and good will -- is the supreme value and highest order of natural process. This type of "scientific" or critical naturalism does not look beyond or above man, his society or history, for a trans-human source or sustainer of values. Somewhat more precisely, for Dewey God meant the ideal becoming actual. (In a later chapter we consider this system at considerable length.)

A further illustration of supreme value, to which many men are responding with religious zeal and devotion, is found in another branch of the movement which considers finite humanity, or human society and history, as the supreme order of being, process, and value. The communist faith of Karl Marx and his Russian and
Chinese heirs represents, in acute form, the elevation of "society" to the place of God and supreme value. As a matter of fact, any totalitarian order does this. Totalitarian philosophy claims that all good comes from organized society, at the apex of which is the political state, ruled by a single dictator or a small oligarchy. The general truth that man would perish without social organization; that he could not attain any high culture, if he did not have the permanent institutions and instruments of organized society, is made the only truth, and the supreme value, beneath which all other are subsummed, and from which they are derived. Official communism is atheistic and non-religious; yet actually, in psychological content, it is highly religious. We must term it, however, a secular religion, which emphasizes human effort alone, scientific achievement, and material progress as the ultimate form of activity or natural process, and therefore the final locus of value in the world. Contemporary history has shown that Communism is a possible universal form of religion. It is now contending with all other forms of historical religion for supremacy. The religious form of Communism psychologically is born out in those aspects of communist culture which strikingly resemble important phases of the traditional religions. It is often pointed out that Communism has its infallible creed or dogma: namely its "dialectical materialism," viz., its materialistic or economic way of interpreting human life and history, as centering in, and determined mainly by, the hunger in our stomachs. It has a Bible or inerrant Scripture: Das Capital of Marx, the Old Testament of the cult; while the writings of Lenin have become its New Testament canon. It has had its prophets, Marx, Engles, and Lenin. Marx was a kind of original law giver for the system, like Moses for the Judeo-Christian religion; and, like Moses, Marx wanted to lead his children, the laboring masses of the world, out of the bondage of capitalist society and slavery. Until his death Joseph Stalin was Communism's high priest. Communism has its "eschatology" or dogmatic view of the
outcome of future history in the concept of the necessary and inevitable proletarian revolution and ultimate communist or sovietized society, which will constitute the solution to the problem of evil. Traditional religious eschatologies have thought in terms of a final cosmic or world deliverance from all evil. Communism's church or community of the faithful is its Party, which in communist countries has a very elite membership, resembling "closed communion." The fanatical zeal of many of its followers reveals the absoluteness of its faith. For example, a young Chinese convert to Communism wrote his former Christian teacher, at a Christian mission, in the following way:

"...I am no longer the former man you knew. Apart from my body which is the same, my whole mind and thought have changed. I have become a new man...a loyal believer of Marx-Leninism...I shall never live for myself alone, but for the masses...In this new teaching I have found unimagined blessing and happiness. I am very sorry that I must inform you that I no longer believe in God, nor worship him. I can no longer address you as a religious brother, but I send my revolutionary love." (From D. E. Trueblood, Christian Century Pulpit, Feb. 52).

The Hebrews came to believe that the supreme values are really persons themselves, whose inter-personal relations we call society. There is something in individuality or personality as such that suggested to them what is highest in "meaning" or "value," and also probably deepest in being. They recognized that persons, in behalf of whose wellbeing society exists, are the superior order of reality and value, and that society has no reality and being of its own outside human persons. Men are the locus of society. At the bottom of this scheme of evaluation, which gives to it its ultimate truth and power, the Hebrews believed they sensed a personal source of existence as such, or a trans-human, but personal Divine Reality. He is the fountain of the humane values considered necessary, if human life is to live on the highest personal, political, and cultural plane. The personalization of Ultimate Reality was not new or unique with the Hebrews. There was the personality of deity in polytheism; and aspects of a high, personalistic and ethical monotheism are found in other religious
cultures, e.g. in Zoroastrianism and Islam specifically, in Platonism, and in certain
tendencies in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The Hebrews, however, took
personalism to its apex of thought in ancient times.

We have now probably sufficiently illustrated various conceptions of supreme
value -- the intellectual heart of religion. Let us summarize the meaning of
religion in an over-all way that may bring out more fully its psychological in re-
lation to its intellectual side. Accordingly we return to the phrase "religious
devotion" and find that it has a three-fold content:

(1) Hocking defines "feeling" as "a name for whatever in consciousness, deeper
than explicit thought is able to give a bent to conduct". (The Meaning of God in
Human Experience, Yale, 1912, p. 33). Taking this definition of feeling, religion is
wholehearted feeling for, and commitment to, some value considered as truly best,
highest, worthiest, in contrast to all other values. Thus religion is a supreme
emotional commitment at the range of deepest subjective feeling. Implicit, however,
in this "emotional center" of religion there is rational content; devotion itself
has rational vision: for our intense feelings always desire to be justified by
some ultimate "reason" or "reasons". We therefore pass to a higher level of meaning
of devotion resident in the idea of a scheme of value as truly best.

(2) Accordingly, religious devotion is belief -- belief in the accepted value
as truly real and supreme in being, process, power, and reality, in comparison to
all other processes, powers, or values. In the related terms of Brighman, to whose
analysis we are greatly indebted, it is "devotion toward a power or powers believed
to originate, increase, and conserve" such value (APR 17). To this we would add
that the value focused on in religion is regarded as the essential life and process
itself of such power; in other words, the idea of the power cannot be separated from
the idea of the value, as if the value were one thing and its source or cause another.
Values apart from their originating and sustaining powers or energies would be disem Bodied and unreal ghosts.

This stage of our definition of religion refers to its intellectual, or philosophical content in the realm of ideas and theory (recall our many illustrations above) regarding the relation of some designated "supreme value" to primary or essential world process -- radiant solar energy, sexual vitality, release from pain and suffering, human history and social harmony, or personality itself. Religion in fullest sense implies that our supreme value is equivalent to the highest process or being that we can find, or assign to, the world as a whole. The third thing religious devotion means is:

(3) Expression of this commitment and belief in private thought, or meditation; or in public worship; and in practical conduct or program, of some personal or social kind. In sum, religion is commitment, belief, and conduct; or feeling, ideas, and action. Let us now put out two terms together

Religious experience. We may regard religion and religious experience as synonymous expressions, and accordingly may summarize their meaning. When we discern or assign some supreme value or meaning to the world and attempt to relate ourselves emotionally, intellectually, and actively or practically to it, we have "religious experience", or living faith. Religion or religious experience, as thus far defined in its general or universal, psychological form, does not mean, of course, that the Hebrew-Christian God has been found or is worshipped. As we have seen, there can be different ideas of supreme value to which devotion is rendered. Our task from here on is to attempt to isolate and describe some evaluation of our world which will in fact be the truest or highest system of value. If this is achieved in some measure,
and we commit ourselves to this system, then we shall stand on the threshold of "having" true religious experience. Did the Hebrews think in highest and truest way about value when they found supreme value in personal life, and believed that the source of this value lay in a supreme Personal Life that could only be defined as Author of the world and as Saving Love?

At this stage we may suggest a brief definition of salvation. Frequently highest in the conception of religious experience is the idea that the source of value is itself active, and approaches the worshipper as a "reality" that "comes to life", to lift it and enrich it, in brief, to "save it". Our understanding of salvation as a process will not be complete until we discuss at more length in later chapters the problem of evil in the world.

Philosophy and Science. A good way to understand philosophic method is to compare it with science. In order to do this we must first suggest the two meanings of philosophy that are in considerable conflict today. They are the newer analytical and positivistic type of philosophy and the more traditional, rationalistic or metaphysical type. Sometimes the difference is stated as a more "scientific" philosophy in contrast to a more "speculative" philosophy. This distinction is misleading, however, since it implies a certain bias on the part of the school that claims to have "scientific" philosophy as to what constitutes "science". It must be acknowledged, however, that it is a contrast between a secular type of philosophy and a more religious type. In any case, the two interpretations may be indicated as follows:

(a) Philosophy as an analysis of language and logic. This is the narrower view, the first view above mentioned. It believes that philosophy has primarily a limited but highly specialized role as the "science of sciences". This means that philosophy's main task is to clarify logical method and apply it to the critical
analysis of language, particularly as it bears on the concepts and assumptions of the sciences. Philosophy may succeed in relating the various technical sciences and thus organize and systematize all scientific knowledge. In this role philosophy tends to be equated with semantics, or the study of words and their meanings. In its worst light, philosophy, from once being the queen of the sciences, descends to becoming a sort of chamber maid to them. A broader, more fruitful, and also a more traditional view of philosophy follows:

(b) Philosophy as a metaphysical interpretation of the world as a whole. This view believes that philosophy is inclusive synopsis in depth. It tries to understand, in so far as humanly possible, the ultimate nature and meaning of the universe as a whole, the total setting for life, so that life's true meaning, values, and destiny may be understood. It attempts to integrate human knowledge in order to discover what is true being, deepest process, highest purpose, and permanent value. While including the function of critical analysis above described as part of its discipline, philosophy's role as evaluation is stressed. In this view philosophy is systematic coherence (we discuss the coherence criterion of truth later on). Philosophy retains its status as queen, or science of sciences, but in a more comprehensive sense than the positivistic understanding of science.

According to the above second view there is a real and valuable distinction between laboratory science and philosophy. They are not in conflict, but the former recognizes its own specialized function and scope, limited to analysis and quantitative techniques, and grants that the latter is legitimately concerned with wider meanings and values. It will be helpful to summarize what we have here said by contrasting science with philosophy in parallel columns, in a way similar to an excellent discussion by Harold H. Titus (LIP p. 115f, Living Issues in Philosophy, 2nd Edition, American Book Company, 1953, p. 115f).
Science

The sciences deal with restricted, specialized fields; have been characteristically delimited and exclusive of other phases of culture.

Science is mainly descriptive; emphasizes analysis into parts and measurement by quantitative, mathematical standards, according to precise rules of observation and experiment; relies traditionally on sense experience as origin of knowledge; is extrospective.

Science aims to understand the how or causal workings of nature on the physical plane for the purpose of predicting and controlling her processes; drives for objectivity by attempting to ignore the personal factor and concerns of value; interested in the mechanics of process; yields the technical means of survival for the good life.

Philosophy

Philosophy attempts to understand all experience, is more comprehensive; tries to relate the discoveries of the specific sciences to religion, morals, and the arts.

Philosophy is synoptic or synthetic, comprehending wholes in addition to parts; is prescriptive, qualitative, or evaluative in its approach rather than merely quantitative; relies characteristically on rational reflection, on the thinking process itself as a frame of knowledge; is introspective.

Philosophy aims to understand the why of things in addition to the how, their deeper nature, purposes, and meanings; to relate, criticize, and coordinate all areas of knowledge, experience, and culture for the highest human good; interested in personality and values and the subjective phases of process and reality; suggests the best ends to which means may be put. In the words of Brightman, philosophy "attempts to give a reasoned account of experience as a whole" (APR 20).

John Dewey's school of Critical Naturalism widens the meaning of science to include many of the values pertaining traditionally to philosophy, as suggested in the right-hand list above. Actually philosophy includes science as one of its special disciplines; empirical science would be part of a true philosophy of nature.

Philosophy of Religion. Brightman with inimitable precision wrote "Philosophy of religion is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion ... the truth of religious beliefs" (APR 22). We look presently into the method of philosophy
of religion as "rational interpretation" in considering the meaning of "reason" in broadest sense, the criteria of "truth", and the relation of reason as a whole to religion.

Theology now-a-days usually means a method of inquiry that relies on a particular historical religious tradition, as its ultimate source of information. For example, there can be Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish, Christian, Catholic or Protestant types of "theology". Theology is mainly interested in expounding the content of a special religious tradition, clarifying its presuppositions and analyzing its relevance to life as a whole. "For theology, the historical beliefs of the theologian's own religious community are the primary sources" (Brightman APR 24). According to the preceding definition of philosophy, theology, or theologies would be branches of philosophy of religion. For some thinkers, however, "theology" is a completely independent, authoritative discipline separate from science or philosophy, resting on an authoritative revelation which is presumed to be radically different from philosophy, philosophy of religion, or natural theology. (Barth).

The term "natural theology" has had the special connotation of "an investigation of the problem of God based on reason and experience, without recourse to the authority of any special revelation" (Ib. 23). "Natural theology" is akin, therefore, in spirit to general philosophy of religion.

Faith. The English word "faith" has many meanings. There are first the commonplace meanings: "faith" is understood to mean sometimes belief without knowledge; or acceptance of authority uncritically; or as equivalent to credulity, or wishful thinking. This obviously is the barest or leanest meaning of the word. In another commonplace way faith stands for the general hope or confidence that life on the
practical plane means well and will turn out well. This is often based on a profounder philosophic understanding of faith, to which we now proceed.

Harris Franklin Rall has aptly defined the idea of faith on its deeper philosophic level as "confidence in our world as meaningful and in our experience as trustworthy" (Christianity, An Inquiry into Its Nature and Truth, Schribners, 1941, p. 212f). In slightly other terms, if a person has "faith" he has confidence in the orderliness and intelligibility of our world. This general philosophical meaning of faith comes to light at one level when we think of "scientific faith", or the basic elements of intellectual trust that natural scientists exercise, which motivate their investigation of nature. As Rall again phrases it, scientific faith is the basic confidence of the scientist "that the world is not mad", or ultimately irrational. The positive expressions of this faith are often pointed out as the scientist's confidence in the unity of nature, leading to the idea of her orderliness or law-abiding character; and his belief in the trustworthiness of the senses, and in the adequacy of his rational powers of investigation, which organize sense data into rationally integrated experience or knowledge. A further level of the idea of faith as "confidence in our world as meaningful and trustworthy" is the valuational and religious aspect of faith.

Religious faith has to do with the moral properties of our world. Again in the phraseology of Rall, it is confidence "that the world is not bad", but has ultimate "moral" meaning, purpose, orderliness or rationality. It is the belief that existence and process are essentially "good" (Western religions); or at least that world process is capable of an outcome that is good (Eastern religions). Common to all the great religions of the world is the fundamental belief that there is moral process; that the world is a place of moral order, regularity, and dependability, analogous to the
concept in science that it is a physical order of regularity and dependability. In various terms the great religions have believed that "moral law" founds existence and process. For example, there was the concept of "Maat" in ancient Egyptian religion; respectively the concept of "The Good", of "Noira" or Fate, and of "Natural Law"/for Plato, the great dramatists, and the Stoics in Greek culture; the Hindu-Buddhist concept of "Karma"; the Chinese (Confucian and Taoist) concepts of "Heaven" and its "Tao"; the Hebrew, Zoroastrian, and Islamic concept of the "Will of God" -- all of these have been various ways of referring to the existence or reality of a moral law or principle that underlies and governs existence. (Surprisingly in their concrete content or practical moral maxims, all of these systems are astonishingly similar). These various concepts of moral order gave existence a basic meaningfulness; they endowed the world with permanent goodness, and life with opportunity.

Faith in its general psychological meaning (compare the general psychological form of religion previously reviewed) has, according to Rall, the following elements: insight that discerns some meaning or value in our world; trust that is willing to surrender to the claims of that meaning; loyalty that endeavors to express this meaning or this truth in life and action. This would describe the general form of faith anywhere found in human experience: Nazi faith, Communist faith, scientific faith, specific religious faiths, Christian, Buddhist, etc. Returning to traditional religious faith, once again we summarize in Rall's succinct words: "Religion postulates a fundamental meaning and goodness in the cosmos, and asserts that as man discerns this and responds in confidence and loyalty, he will attain the highest personal well-being" (Ib).
The distinctive tenets of Hebrew-Christian faith are the following: (1) The physical world is good, not evil (compare with Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, and Islam and contrast with some emphases in Hinduism-Buddhism). (2) Man is a free, spiritual being, in some degree transcendent to physical nature, "something different from the causal or biological machine" (Hocking, Types of Philosophy, Scribners, 1939). The essence of man's freedom is rational, moral responsibility. (3) That finite individuality or personality is the meaning and purpose of existence and process; or that the universe is an order of ends, purposes, and values devoted to the existence and well-being of individual life. (Contrast Buddhism, which believes that man is essentially non-unity and that the illusion of our individuality is the basic cause of desire and thence of striving and of evil). (4) That love is the secret of life and its surest means of fulfillment and happiness; the ultimate moral law or principle. (An emphasis on love is also found in many other religious systems). (5) That the supreme significance of personality and love on the finite plane derives from their ultimate significance on the cosmic plane, or in reality as a whole — i.e. that God, or the ultimate ground or origin of existence and process as a whole is self-giving Personal Love.

Christian faith involves ideas particularly about the significance of Jesus: That the moral meaning of life and the power of love have been fully disclosed in him. Accordingly we suggest the main views of Christianity as being: (1) The belief that Jesus was the Christ, or the disclosure of moral personality at its highest. His life, teachings, death, and resurrection disclose personality in some ultimate way, i.e. disclose or reveal God. Once again in the words of Rall, the significance of Jesus, to Christians, is that he shows "what God is and what man is to be" (Ib. 89). (2) Christians commonly rely on the New Testament teaching for information
about the life of Jesus and for inspiration to lead the religious or Christian life themselves. (3) Prominent in Christian faith is the concept that the Christian tradition, church, or institution constitutes an indispensable fellowship for Christians, the mystical "Body of Christ", apart from which inspiration will die. (4) Finally the full meaning of "faith" as personal experience of "God in Christ", to use the words of St. Paul, points to the ultimate mystical character of Christianity.

A statement of "Jewish Faith" in our times would be hard to compress into a few lines -- as it is difficult to attempt the same for "Christian Faith". There are many Christian groups representing various views and at least three major branches of modern Judaism. Perhaps, however, the over-all spirit or outlook, or "faith" of Judaism in our times may be adequately suggested in the following statements from Conservative Judaism -- the middle group between traditional "Orthodoxy" and "Reform". Simon Greenberg writes of Judaism as:

"being more than a system of abstract universal ethical data, but an all-embracing comprehensive way of life, should seek to express itself in all forms of literature and art and communal organization, as well as Festivals, Sabbaths, Holy Days, daily ritual and synagogue."*

And Robert Gordis says:

"Our goal is loyalty to an evolving law, which is the will of God as revealed through the experience of Israel."**

We conclude this resume of various meanings of faith with a statement from a wise colleague, pointing out the reliance of faith itself on the critical faculty.

"Faith is always in tension within the individual dogging him with the very possibility of the truth of its denial. Thus faith is open and demands the utmost critical faculty."


Alfred Bloom, 1962.
Chapter Two
What is Reason?
Its Use in Philosophy of Religion

This chapter attempts to clarify the method of insight, "reasoning", or "experience" that we employ in order to deal with the problems of the philosophy of religion. We have alleged that reason is relevant to religion, that it has a role to play in religion, and that the rational analysis of religion is important, legitimate and proper. We have now to define more clearly what we mean by "reason" as we use it in this study. Furthermore, since the function of reason is to arrive at "truth", we must also define the meaning of that term or idea, and as we proceed suggest what is meant by the expression "religious truth". In endeavoring, however, to discuss such large questions as "What is truth?", or "What is reason?" we will obviously consider some of the central problems of philosophical method. Our immediate task, then, is to raise the question: What is "reason" in its largest sense, or the "criterion" of truth, and what is the application of such reason or criterion to religion and the problems of philosophy of religion?

What is Reason?

Rationalism. One of the major premises of this study is that religion is "rational", and we trust that the presentation may be an example of "rationalism" in the best sense of that word. The term rationalism need not have a bad connotation, such as impiety or atheism. True, some non-theists or atheists, e.g. some of the philosophers of the French Revolution, emphasized reason. In France at that time "the goddess of reason" symbolized the atheistic movement or aspect of the French Revolution.
But other great rationalists, notably St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and numberless others have been avowed theists. Also much of the mode of discourse in the Bible -- Old and New Testaments -- is quite "rational" or "logical" in structure and implication -- a point which it is not our purpose to elaborate here.*

Reason = its levels of meaning. There are many dimensions of reason, that is, of thought understood as "rational process". One primary rational function is the power of abstract classification of experiences into universal categories or types. Two apples suggest "two-ness", which can be applied as an "abstract idea" to many twos, actual and theoretical. Another primary rational function is the process of thinking with logical precision, leading to deductive and inductive inference. A third even more basic function of "reason", presupposed in the power of abstraction and in logical thought, is the power itself to think at all, or to attend at will, or freely, to the problems of life; to think about experiences, about rational propositions (which assertive judgments, A is B, formulate) in order to test their internal and external implications and coherency. We here point, of course, to reason's own self-transcending power, or its "dialectical" ability, its power to judge judgments, expressing the intrinsic life of "free spirit". Most fully understood in its own highest self awareness, reason is whole-discerning, synoptic insight.

In largest sense, then, reason is coherent judging. It is our coming to awareness of beings, and their processes, and relationships in the universe. It is the ability, and achievement, of relating ideas and experiences logically and coherently into a unity of conscious awareness. Reason is synoptic understanding or

* See L. Harold DeWolf's discussion of this theme in The Religious Revolt Against Reason, Harper, 1949, esp. p. 133-5; and our subsequent appendix on irrationalistic criticisms of reason in religion and replies.
"empirical coherence" (P.A. Bertocci IPR Ch. 3). Experience in broadest meaning is
but careful, refined reasoning about life and the world in which we live. And by
"refined" we mean reasoning that pays attention to all areas of experience, and is
thus truly "empirical" by being inclusive. We must now indicate more carefully what
coherent judging or reason is by discussing the idea of truth, its definition and
criteria. In so doing we hope to arrive at a fuller understanding of terms already
introduced. It is difficult to advance in an understanding of any of our terms
separately without enlarging our understanding of all of them together.

What is Truth?

Both practically and intellectually the largest concern of our historical period
is the concern with "truth". Since ancient time illuminationist, rationalist, empir­
ical, pragmatic, nominalistic and positivistic theories had their say con­
cerning the meaning of truth and knowledge. For communists and totalitarians what is
"true" is what describes the totalitarian ideology and program. In this much their
implication is right, that an important part of truth is human and moral. In the
end truth must be understood in its deepest moral and religious meaning if mankind is
to survive. The following observations attempt to clarify some of the meanings of
truth.

The Definition of Truth and Criteria of Truth. In our opinion, Edgar S.
Brightman rightly distinguished the definition of truth from the various criteria of
truth.* Truth is correctly defined as the correspondence of thought to things, or
idea to reality. This definition, of course, includes not only the "cognitive act"
(Tillich) in which our internal ideas become like, or attempt faithfully to represent,
the reality which they purport to describe, but it also refers to the external reality

itself in its own objective being and nature, the essence of the thing or process described. Accordingly, the definition of truth must point to being itself as well as the judgment that grasps or understands being. Correspondence as the definition of truth is the explanation of what truth is when found or experienced, what we expect to have when we know truth. To say that truth is correspondence, however, does not tell us how we find it, or our method of search and seizure, the way to truth. What method we use to seek truth and establish the correspondence would be our criterion of truth. We consider presently various criteria of truth.

Textbooks in philosophy usually call our attention to the several popular criteria and attempt to evaluate them -- sense experience, authority, reason, intuition, utility, and others. This difference between what truth is as correspondence and the how or way in which truth is sought is like the terminal and the track leading up to the terminal. Which track or route shall we take to get to our destination? Discussions about truth usually concern the problem of criterion, the correct method or way of arriving at truth. The immediate discussion, however, considers chiefly the definition of truth as correspondence, in several meanings and at various levels. The issue of criterion will be considered in due course. Both destination and way to go are important, but we certainly cannot decide on the route until a clear idea of where we want to go is in mind.

Truth as Correspondence. One way to analyze the Anglo-Saxon word "truth" is to commence with its general Latin counterpart, veritas, and consider several English cognates. One derivative of veritas is veracity, the correspondence of our words to things, of our utterance to what is fact. This, of course, is the basic common-place meaning of truth as truthfulness of speech in contrast to an uttered falsehood or lie. Let us simply call this spoken truth. Another term related to veritas is validity.
In a manner of speaking we may define validity as the correspondence of thought to its own rules. Truth has its meaning in the realm of logic, namely, as consistency in thinking, in relating conclusion to premise. This may be designated by its usual name logical truth. In the term verity, however, we come to the central meaning and definition of truth, namely, that already mentioned, the correspondence of our thought or ideas to things, the agreement and conformity of our judgment to the way the world actually is. This is factual truth. (Observe, of course, that veracity, validity, mutually implicated, verity and verity/correctly communicated to others implies both veracity, spoken truth, and validity, logical truth). We shall proceed now to an analysis of factual truth in its broadest sense.

Truth as Verity. When we speak of truth as correspondence of an idea to its object we may think of this relationship on several levels. First is our over-all awareness of the universe as a physical order, and nearest to us in the area of experience on the physical plane is the order of qualities directly apprehended through sensation. This immediate, sentient level of awareness that an organic being has of its world we may term sentient truth. Examples are the experience of the color green, the heaviness of the book in our hands, the pain of disease or accident. Second in experience of truth at the physical level are these more or less pluralistic minutiae pulled together into the larger wholes and gross events of practical existence as it concerns beings of our kind -- the green of the landscape below the airliner in which we are traveling, the pull of gravitation on the ship, the pain we might sustain in the event of a mishap. Many sentient truths are here presently and potentially bound up together in the larger context of practical events. (The level of practical truth is part and parcel of the general field of moral truth discussed below). We come next to the order of "scientific laws" discovered by the refined methods of perception distinctive to the physical sciences -- the physical theory
of color, \( v = c/f \); of gravitation, \( F = \frac{KmN}{d^2} \); Pasteur's discovery of disease bacteria. Let us refer to this as scientific truth. From an introductory standpoint then, so much for verity as it describes the bare "physical order" of our world. This is frequently called the order of fact and that aspect of truth known as cognition apart from valuation. It tells us main what is. We pass now to a fuller and richer level--awareness of the universe as a "moral order", an order of value, which is also fact in largest sense.

Truth in its higher ranges of moral meaning. The whole realm of valuation, ethical and aesthetic, may be generally designated the moral realm. Truth, then, as awareness of our universe as a moral order means apprehension of our world as bearing an order of life and as implying the existence of relationships or "laws" between such lives that would make for their well-being and harmony. The discovery of human nature (what man psychologically and ontologically is) and laws that would relate human lives harmoniously and well would be discovery of truth in the moral realm at its ethical center, and represent the correspondence of our thought or ideas to the way the world is at this its highest level or echelon of meaning. Let us call this moral truth (space does not permit analysis here of aesthetic truth in specific sense). An outline of the meanings and levels of truth so far analyzed would appear thus:

Spoken truth: veracity
Logical truth: validity  
Factual truth: verity  
Cognitive:
Sentient truth
Scientific truth
Valuative:
Moral truth.
Moral truth would be "factual" in the largest meaning of the word fact, since the presence of life and its implied laws of harmony are facts. The cognitive realm cannot keep the idea of fact entirely to itself. That idea belongs to the moral realm as well. Would not the outcome of the argument between the subjectivity or objectivity of values be that value has a definite objective status at least in the sense that a certain order of objectivite beings, namely, human beings, do evaluate their world; and that evaluation is an intrinsic and inevitable fact of life? In the realm of truth there must be a true logic of evaluation applied to existence on the personal plane, and it is the task of the higher human sciences to discover it.

Moral truth would include awareness of the ultimate power(s) or being(s) which sustain the universe as a physical and moral order. As such we could call it philosophical, metaphysical or religious truth. Truth on this highest moral and religious level would not only be "intellectual" awareness and assent to the various orders of fact, but also emotional commitment and experience, correspondence with the world by way of intimate participation. Truth as love, for example, cannot be abstractly or objectively ("just intellectually") known. It must be possessed, felt, experienced to be anything at all. As a matter of fact, intellect and emotion on the highest plane are related. For what is more "reasonable" than beauty or more "understanding" than sympathy? The correspondence of life with life in such dynamic relationship, and, in a manner of speaking of each life in religious vision with what is ultimate (in the faith of personal theism, with God) would be experience of moral and religious truth in highest degree.

**Truth as Being and Fulfillment of Process.** We have just described the hierarchy of truths largely in a static way. Put movement, life, and growth into the picture and we arrive at the next stage. When we reach the highest moral and dynamic thinking
about truth, we are reminded of an ancient, standard conception which states the matter possibly in its fullest scope. A line by the medieval schoolman, Robert Grosseteste, gives us the clue: "the true is anything whatever whose being is conformed to its reasons in the eternal Word" (i.e. the Mind of God).* What is meant essentially is that truth is the conformity or correspondence of things to their eternal purposes. In this meaning when we think of truth we think of cosmic process in widest and deepest terms. The idea is that when a process has its outcome, like the growth of a seed into a mature tree, it has arrived as we say at its "true end" or fulfillment. When we say that certain ideals are fulfilled "truly", we employ this final meaning of truth. Not only then, the correspondence of ideas with reality, but the fulfillment of process with the ultimate purposes of reality is what is meant by truth. This correspondence of action to ideals, of things to thought, is the complementary side of our original judgment about the conformity of thought to things, and in a manner of speaking indicates where truth and being are one. Paul Tillich states the ultimate identity of truth as being in a profound way:

"Modern philosophy usually speaks of true and false as qualities of judgments. Judgments can grasp or fail to grasp reality and can, accordingly, be true or false. But... If the question is asked, 'What makes a judgment true?' something must be said about reality itself... The surface must be penetrated, the appearance undercut, the 'depth' must be reached, namely, the ousia, the 'essence' of things, that which gives them the power of being. This is their truth... Truth, therefore, is the essence of things as well as the cognitive act in which their essence is grasped. The term 'truth' is, like the term 'reason', subjective-objective. A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses true being..." (Systematic Theology, Vol. I p. 101-102).

By way of summary we say that first in experience there is sentient truth -- color, sound, and all the qualities that compose the practical world. Then, there is _Selections from Medieval Philosophers_, ed. Richard McKean, Scribners, 1929, Vol II, p. 271-272.
scientific truth or the understanding of relationships in the physical world at a level deeper than the immediacy of sense and quality. Finally, there is moral truth, of which the idea of truth as fulfillment of process is part. Truth in the moral meaning of the term is awareness that the universe supports an order of personal beings, and of the fulfillment of relationships between them that would make for their welfare and harmony. Knowledge is ultimately tested by experience, and truth on its highest moral plane is this felt relationship between personal beings. Deeper than abstract relationships in thought, its scientific meaning, truth represents personal relationships in life, its moral meaning. Truth is not only something that we see with intellectual assent but something which in a sense possesses us and which we live in moral fullness. It is moral process conscious of itself.

The Argument Concerning the Status of Truth

Is Truth Subjective or Objective? We should indicate briefly the major dispute about the ultimate nature and status of truth. The questions may be simply put. Is truth "objective" or "subjective"; is it "absolute" or "relative"? Do we discover truth or do we create it? Considering the various levels of correspondence above described, is truth just an aspect of transient, finite process; or does it have some status in being, in the principles that found and govern process? How one answers these questions will, by and large, determine his position philosophically, that is to say, whether he is generally idealistic or prevailingly pragmatic and naturalistic. Although, there may be some common or middle ground between the two possibilities, the following is a statement of the issues as they have been classically argued.

The subjective view has had other familiar names, such as nominalistic, positivistic, pragmatic. In this view "truth" is but a functional term describing the psychological fact that man can know his world (the older nominalism), and can relate
himself practically and satisfactorily to it (the newer pragmatism). Truth is the way we "name" things within the mind -- it does not refer to anything out in the world itself. The ultimate nature of the world is beyond man's ken; better limit intellectual inquiry to that area about which we can be certain or positively know (scientific positivism). Thinking further of the pragmatic side of this general interpretation, when an idea works, has satisfactory consequences, issues in good results, we may name the idea and the relationship between the organism and environment for which the idea stands "true". A pragmatist like Dewey, who helped to formulate the position in definitive way for our times, gave truth a quasi-objective status temporarily embodied in the dynamic, adjustive relationship of organism to environment in the human media of communication and action.

The idealistic and objective conception is that truth is something permanently real, inclusive of both the mind of man and the world, and constitutes the common ground that makes knowledge of the world possible -- e.g. Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's Active Intellect, Augustine's Veritas, the modern idealist's "Absolute Experience". Truth is not only a psychological, but also a metaphysical and ontological term, symbolic at least of ultimate reality. Without going into the idealistic argument at length here the main points have involved such key words as "objective" and "absolute". Truth is said to be "objective" because two persons can see what is true at the same time. Truth as an experience common to more than one finite mind must be "outside" or "beyond" either such mind, according to St. Augustine. For him the ultimate place of truth is the mind of God. To modern idealists truth is "absolute" because the fact of incomplete human inquiry and all our present, partial knowledge implies a completer truth which we are seeking, which enables us to judge that our

*See our further discussion of John Dewey's philosophy in Chapter Three.
knowledge is partial and imperfect. (Hence, technically speaking, to idealists some kind of "coherent method" will be the correct criterion of truth). The term "absolute" need not mean something merely "logical" and static; it may mean that which is essentially "psychological" and final in power, as, for example, love.* The essential argument within the idealistic fold is between abstract or Platonic idealism and a personalistic or Hebraic idealism. For Augustine the key conception was truth as "power". Truth is an objective power that comes in from "above" to enlarge and save the mind of man. It resides ultimately in the mystery of God's personal being, and the term truth in its highest sense is symbolic of this divine reality and power. Truth is the entering of God's own thought and life into us. It is the medium of communication between the ultimate Personal Being and finite persons: "God hath created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take in His light . . . and He so enlighteneth it of Himself that not only those things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind's eye." **

The Criteria or Tests of Truth

To recapitulate briefly what we have so far said, correspondence as the definition of truth tells what truth would be when found; the criteria tell us how to find truth -- how to compare or conform our ideas with reality. The "criteria" of truth are the "ways of knowing". (We shall see presently that the definition of truth as "correspondence" is "coherent", that is, is a result of the coherence criterion).

* See our further discussion of the term "absolute" as qualified by a personalistic religious philosophy, Chapter Six, Appendix C, p. 251.

** On Psalms CXVIII, Serm. xviii, 4.
I. Ways of Knowing: Initial, Limited Criteria.

We may list these common-place or frequently cited tests of truth in the following groups: (1) various authorities, such as "custom", "public opinion", or family, economic, political, scientific, or ecclesiastical authority; (2) a type of criterion that we shall call intuition, also popularly called sometimes "instinct" or "feeling"; (3) sensation or sense experience; and (4) utility, or the general usefulness we find in truth judgments. Let us deal with each of these "initial" criteria at sufficient length to understand and evaluate them. The problem of knowledge is to get the ideas in our mind to correspond with the facts of our world. Each of these criteria may help us do so to some extent or degree.

1. Authority or testimony of others is one of the first channels through which knowledge comes to the growing person. In addition to handling the world and experimenting with his own fingers, the child soon begins to ask questions of its parents. Their answers stand as truth for it.

   The value of authority is self evident. Children cannot learn everything for themselves; neither can adults. Consequently we rely on our various authorities, parents, doctors, ministers, carpenters, technical experts of all kinds. Laymen have to accept the word of the pharmacist about the prescription he sells them. To deny the role of authority or rebel against it, when it is adequate, is immaturity. In our quest for truth we should always consider the wise experience of others, whereby we often avoid the toil and trouble of finding things out for ourselves the hard way. The main sense in which the Bible may be an "authority" is as a record of accumulated moral and religious wisdom. When, however, we come to see "wisdom" in some authority we imply that we are testing such an authority by a standard lying beyond it.
The limitations of authority, if relied on as sole source of knowledge, are manifest. (a) There are dangers in blind faith. Faith should be a vision, and vision implies personal experience. We have seen in our day how uninlightened faiths of all kinds lead to fanaticism -- Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia. (b) There is the tendency of authority to become frozen into unyielding orthodoxies, which hamper change and progress. (c) What do we do when "authorities" disagree with each other? (d) Exclusive reliance on authority would encourage intellectual laziness on the part of him who rests (or sleeps!) in an authority.

For example, if we have been brought up in the tradition that looks to the Bible as an authoritative guide to, let us say, moral life, this means, by its own proclamation, that we should test its insights by reason and moral conscience. We read in Isaiah where that prophet, in the name of God, said to the people of Judah, "Come now let us reason together" (1:18); or in Luke where Jesus appealed to the moral conscience of his hearers in the words, "And why do you not judge for yourselves what is right". (12:57) Implied in all worthy authorities is some ultimate rational appeal that gives them force and sanction.

2. Intuition is sometimes called the way of immediate insight. It is the way young people know they are in love, and the way the religious mystic believes he is certain of the presence of God. Intuition is direct apprehension transcending sense perception and conscious reasoning. It is direct insight into the totality of a situation.*

Examples of intuition. (a) Sometimes sense experience itself is called an "intuition", since it is a kind of direct or immediate insight. I cannot argue, reason, or dispute about the whiteness of the cloud I am now looking at -- the color

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is there, unmistakable, immediately. If we prefer to sense experience as intuition, it is our basic intuition that there is existence or being. If, however, it is better to reserve the term intuition for a third kind of immediate, non-sentient or non-rational experience, as the initial definition above suggests, at least the directness and certainty of sense experience has been a standard analogy of what we may mean by intuition in other possible realms of experience. A true intuition should have a kind of vividness or absoluteness like vision, hearing, or touch. Are there any such intuitional experiences?

(b) The axioms of mathematics or of logic have often been called intuitional truths. How do I know that twice two is four, or that I have rightly connected the conclusion with the premises of a logical argument? If A is B, and B is C, then A is C, the general form of the syllogism. Once I know the first premise that A is B, I know at once, without delay of thought, that anything related to B must also be related to A. The conclusions evolve as an immediate whole of insight. (We note presently the dispute among logicians as to whether reasoning is "wholistic" or "chain"). The feats of mathematical prodigies who can instantly add long columns of figures, or factor large numbers, seemingly without knowing quite how they do it, are spectacular examples of "mathematical intuition".

(c) Do we recognize values by intuition? Possibly an all-inclusive intuition is the sense of personal being -- my own and others -- as supreme in value, and if supreme in value possibly supreme in type of being. Related to this is our sense of ethical value, and possible basic intuitions about right and wrong. The possible fundamental intuition of the supremacy of personal life in value and being leads to the further "intuitions" that murder, or abuse of the weak and helpless is wicked. Are there fundamental aesthetic intuitions? Why is a rose immediately beautiful to most people? An ultimate possibility of intuition would be whether men have an imme-
direct knowledge of a supreme source and sustainer of values, God? The problem of intuition as a possible channel or criterion of knowledge and truth is closely related to the idea of "a priori" reason, which we consider presently. At our moments of deepest reflection about the matter we have the feeling that intuition, if it is sometimes a valid channel or test of truth, is not anti-rational or trans-rational, but profoundly "rational".

The rational function and limits of intuition. Our deepest feelings are often our truest judgments. A mathematician or a scientist has a hunch about the solution of his problem, and often the hunch, or intuition, proves true.

But feelings and hunches are notorious deceivers too. How often we have had a so called intuition or feeling of certainty that has turned out wrong! We may have a feeling of absolute certainty that we are proceeding north, while driving along an unfamiliar road at night, only to look up and find the north star in a completely different place above the countryside than we had supposed! We should be wary of unattached intuitions, unexamined intuitions that are not sufficiently or coherently related to other possible channels or tests of knowledge. Indeed, intuitions when valid may be "the outcome of subconscious induction or deduction". Harold Titus puts the matter well where he continues, "Intuition seems to presuppose and to be affected by our previous experience and thought". At least, so it often seems with intuition. An auto mechanic's hunch or "intuition" as to what's wrong with my car, after I describe to him the trouble I am having with it, is based on his general knowledge of cars, previously learned. The solution to a difficult problem often "pops into our mind", as we say, but usually only after thinking at length about it. At least we are certain that intuition, judging from our many wrong intuitions, must not be used alone, but must be controlled by reason and the senses. Very often intuition is the

certainty that reasoning or sense experience have been right. We turn now to this
second mentioned popular way of knowledge.

(3) Immediate sense experience. One narrower meaning of the term empiricism
is the view that knowledge is equivalent to sensation. In English philosophy Hobbes,
Locke, and Hume tried to develop a philosophy of knowledge based exclusively on raw
sense experience. The difficulties they admittedly encountered makes the reading of
a flat, sensory criterion
the would-be, arch empiricists intensely interesting. Some difficulties may
be briefly summarized: (a) Simple sense experience would not take us very far in the
scientific quest. All the profounder concepts, or "laws", of science are of phenomena
not directly sensed. For example, no one has ever "seen" an atom, though to observe
the trace of an electronic particle or its path in vaporization chamber is possible.
Is the second law of thermodynamics (that the heat energy of the universe is constant-
ly diminishing) ever directly sensed by sights, sounds, or tactile pressure?
(b) Raw sensations conflict, or present what is known to be "appearance". A stick
which is actually straight "looks" bent in water. The earth "feels" stationary; the
sun "appears" to move. (c) From the moral side, sense empiricism, if taken as the
sole criterion of truth, would tend to make material values, or sensed values, para-
mount.* But the range of human enjoyments often transcends simple, discrete sensations.
These criticisms will suffice to point out the weakness of an oversimplified empiricism.

Empiricism should really mean, as we have already suggested, a full, adequate,
or comprehensive type experience, part of which might be sense experience. Such
broader, rational empiricism realizes in a negative way, first, that the senses give us
only a disorganized mass of physical perceptions. Such bare sense data as a falling
apple, its weight, tides rising, the motion of the planet Mars must be organized or

*Cp. Titus, op cit. p. 194
integrated by rational reflection into the mathematical formula of gravitation as Isaac Newton began to understand it ($F = \frac{GMm}{d^2}$). On the positive side, rational empiricism recognizes that the mind is in some sense an active power, and that scientific knowledge is forthcoming only from rationally "controlled observations and experiments"*, and from rational reflection. Scientific knowledge, as we understand it today, is rationally organized experience. Empiricism should not mean sense experience alone, but inclusive experience. Rational empiricism, or empirical reason, in fullest meaning is inclusive coherent judging.

By summary let us evaluate the criteria of truth we have so far studied, criteria which we have called popular or commonplace because reliance is so often put upon them. Authority, custom, public opinion are not perfect guides to truth because they often conflict, and are frequently wrong. Instinct, feeling, or intuition remain too vague for guides unless illuminated by other criteria. Sense experiences are often in conflict, and by themselves are not complete or penetrating enough tests of truth, although on their level they yield a specific and important kind of truth. These criteria are sometimes (or partially), satisfactory, but they are limited; and are often misleading, if relied on exclusively. These popular types of criteria are obviously dependent upon further criteria, or on a more comprehensive or inclusive criterion. Each of these criteria may be helpful, if used circumspectly, and are seen in some larger rational context. We turn next to a further, subtle type of criterion, often cited.

4. Utility. The pragmatic theory of truth (pragma, a thing done, business) in various forms underlies much scientific, and positivistic thinking. It has been

* Ibid.
the sophisticated way to speak of much sensate and narrow empiricist epistemology. There are two levels of meaning to this criterion. It may mean: that is true which (1) has satisfactory consequences or practical results, referring mainly to the desires and purposes of men; or (2) can be "experimentally" verified, thus yielding not only moral but scientific and, supposedly, even religious truth. The second is the fuller statement of pragmatism. Its advocates claim that the pragmatic criterion is the real criterion of science. Moreover some see it as the cardinal method of religion itself. After all, our real assurance about God seems to come as a result of experimental approach, in the usefulness, for example, we find in answered prayer. At once the reader will detect a subtlety and an appeal in this way to find truth. Indeed, placed in a larger context it is a valid criterion. But apart from this larger setting it is misleading and subject to criticism.

(a) Its relativity appears as one difficulty. What are "satisfactory" or "practical results"? This question is particularly pertinent on the moral level. What satisfies one man or group may not others. Some higher standard is therefore needed to judge when results are satisfactory, such as the nature of man as a whole, or of the physical world, or perhaps even the will of God. To which order of consequences are we appealing as pragmatists: (1) personal consequences, (2) social consequences, (3) some even more universal or cosmic set of consequences, satisfactory to the laws of nature and life in general? Presumably on the practical, moral level it is consequences that are "good" for human life. But this implies that we know first what is good for life; logically the definition of "good" has to precede action before we can tell whether results are good or not. Similarly, on the level of science itself, often "hypothesis" or basic definitions -- direct, tentative judgments as to the truth -- have to precede experiment, in order to tell whether "results" "verify" the claims of scientific theory. Indeed, experiment, action,
results do often verify hypotheses, but results are such because of the nature of the thing experimented with. Beneath the confusion of the relativities that an over-simplified pragmatism involves, in science as well as in morals, the nature of the subject-matter being investigated is the real standard, the nature of the atom itself, for example, in physical theory, or of human nature in ethical theory. We have seen that truth in its fullest meaning refers to being, and it is standards of, or in being which we ultimately wish to find. The experimental or pragmatic approach may be considered part of a wider method of discovering ultimate qualities of being.

(b) For another thing some truth is not useful. Of what practical use is the astronomical truth that Alpha Centauri, the nearest star is a double star? Conceivably this fact may have some "practical" value someday, but the illustration serves to point out that often good uses follow information rather than the other way. Are uses, then, our one and only standard of truth? What about orders of "moral truth" that bear upon the future, that are not now in use but should be? For example, that some degree of real world government (more than we now have in the United Nations) is necessary if we are ever going to have peace on earth?

(c) Hocking suggests a psychological difficulty with pragmatism. Psychologically "belief is the reference of the mind to an object assumed real, independent, objective. The suspicion of subjectivity therefore destroys belief."*

The value of the pragmatic theory appears in its larger context. In the words of Harold Titus, what it is trying to say is that "beliefs that are true tend to work or prove or test themselves in the long run."**

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** Titus, op cit. p. 230
As Hocking suggests, a negative pragmatism is correct: no belief which is not true will work in the long run.

"The logical error of pragmatism may be stated as a "false conversion" of "All true propositions work" into "All propositions that work are true" ... No proposition which does not work is true. Thus a negative pragmatism is of use in detecting the presence of error.*

Pragmatism also has a valuable insight in reminding us that truth finding is an active effort. Truth finding is often a dynamic disclosure in process. Again we refer to Hocking's trenchant discussion of pragmatism:

"Pragmatism ... has called attention to the fact that truth is an enterprise which requires active effort, not passive waiting to be convinced. The surgeon, not knowing whether an operation will save a life, will never find out by "suspending judgment": he must adopt a working hypothesis, and act on it. Only we must distinguish between the will to reach truth, and the will to decide truth. Our decision does not make the truth true.

Again, it has called attention to the fact that there is a great region of the world which is unfinished and plastic, and where our action changes the facts. Treating a man as if he were an enemy may make him an enemy; treating him as a friend may make him such.**

What is the larger context of understanding about "truth", of pragmatism is a part? We repeat, in order to know what are good or true results for a thing or a manipulation we have to know the nature of that thing or process for which the results are said to be good or satisfactory. But to know the nature of a thing requires a coherent examination of it and its relation to the world as a whole, in so far as possible. This leads us, we believe, to the most comprehensive criterion of truth, coherence.

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* Hocking, op cit. p. 164
** Ib. p. 171
Reason as Criterion:
Initial Stage--Logical Consistency

We must digress into a rather technical level of discussion at this point in order finally to bring out the full meaning of reason as the criterion of truth. We consider here for the introductory student the meaning of several different terms and ideas in elementary logic; these are various aspects of what we mean initially by "reason". Traditionally as a process of inference reason has been analyzed in two ways, as "deductive" and as "inductive".

1. Reason as deductive and "a priori". A deductive process of reasoning proceeds from a universal principle to a particular case:

\[
\begin{align*}
  & M & P \\
  & \text{All men are mortal} \\
  S & M \\
  & \text{Socrates is a man} \\
  & S & P \\
  & \text{Therefore, Socrates is mortal}
\end{align*}
\]

The above is called a categorical syllogism, the terms of which are usually indicated by \( S \), \( P \), and \( M \) -- \( S \) for subject, \( P \) for predicate, and \( M \) for the middle term. The three propositions are called respectively major and minor premises, and the conclusion. This is a basic form of logical thinking (there are, of course, other forms of inference).**

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* Recall our earlier general discussion of the various levels of meaning when thought is directed inward upon itself, or considers itself as "rational process", p. 28.

** Consult any standard textbook on logic, e.g. D. S. Robinson, op cit., pp. 155f.
There are two main problems of deductive reasoning. First, is the premise from which one starts true in fact? It is easy to see how chains of syllogistic reasoning can be perfectly valid logically, but nonsense factually. This suggests that our premises should be factually founded, if truth is to be obtained by deductive reasoning. (Of course there is the further problem, what is meant by "fact"? Recall our previous discussion in Chapter One).

Second, does pure deductive (or analytical) reason ever bring to light new knowledge beyond what is already implied in the premise? There is a long-standing dispute between logicians as to whether logical inference is merely "analytic", that is, whether it gives only what is already implied in the premises and therefore no really new knowledge; or whether it is "synthetic", that is, yields new knowledge. Our general experience that there is novelty in inference would suggest that synthetic reasoning is possible, or is a meaningful way to describe some deductive inference. This writer sides with those who believe that new meaning can come to light in deductive inference, and not merely repetition of identically the same meaning. Ewing illustrates this possibility in the following ways:

Take an argument such as--Montreal is to the north of New York, New York is to the north of Washington, therefore Montreal is to the north of Washington. If the view I am discussing is true, the conclusion is part of the premises. But it is not part of either premise by itself, otherwise both premises would not be needed. So the only way in which it could be part of both together would be if it were divisible into two propositions one of which was part of the first and the other part of the second. I defy anybody to divide it in this way... The proposition 'Socrates was a philosopher' certainly entails the proposition 'if Socrates had measles some philosophers have had measles', but it cannot be that the second proposition is included in the first. For the first proposition certainly does not include the notion of measles.**

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* The students attention is here called to an analysis of this point by A. C. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, Macmillan, 1951, Chap. 2, esp. p. 30-36, "The 'A Priori' and the Empirical".

** Ibid, p. 32-33
In any case, practically speaking, deductive reason certainly does make possible new applications of the truth, which we illustrate farther on.

**A priori reason.** Deductive reason has been the traditional ally of *a priori*. (We discuss *a priori* reason at this place because of its importance in our later arguments for the existence of God. The most significant and inclusive argument for God may be *a priori*). Is there any *a priori* knowledge, or knowledge based on "pure reason", as Kant called it, which does not come from sense experience? Kant defined an *a priori* judgment (or truth) as one that is "universal" and "necessary". Ewing defines *a priori* knowledge as "knowledge we can obtain simply by thinking" (Ib. 26). Sometimes *a priori* insights are called original categories of the mind or of thought itself. The *a priori*, then, has the connotation of universality, necessity, self-evidence, and innateness. The child, of course, is not born with a full awareness of *a priori* truth (if there be such); but he may be born with a capacity to come to recognize such truth in mature, reflective life. Examples of possible *a priori* truths would be related to examples of intuition (discussed previously).

(a) The **principles** of **logic** are sometimes cited as valid examples of "*a priori* reason". These principles are often called the "laws of thought". First, there is the **principle of identity**, which means that one must stick to the meaning of terms as originally defined or used in an argument, if the argument is to be valid. Second, there is the **principle of contradiction**, or positively expressed, the law of **consistency**, which means that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true, or in more general sense that one's conclusion must be consistent with one's premises, as our syllogism about Socrates above illustrates. Pure logical inference seems to be a basic type of *a priori* reason, and at this level *a priori* would be the same as "deductive" reasoning.
Third, there is the law of **sufficient reason** -- the rationalist's main dictum -- that there must be some rational explanation or cause for every happening. Liebnitz made famous the saying that there must be some "sufficient reason" for things as they are or take place in the universe. Sufficient reason refers simply to the **basic intuition** that truth is discoverable. Even the acts of a mad-man, which take place in one sense without "reason" or for no reason, would fall ultimately under the principle of sufficient reason in the form of a rational explanation of madness itself, that is, why rationality and mentality on the finite plane sometimes break down. Some of the basic rational postulates of natural science rest on the principle of sufficient reason: notably, science's principle or belief in the orderliness, stability, regularity of nature; science's principle of cognition, or that nature is knowable; and the scientific principle of simplicity or parsimony, that -- among rival hypotheses -- the "simpler" explanation of a given phenomenon is the valid one.

To illustrate the commitment of one noted scientist to the principle of sufficient reason, we cite J. Robert Oppenheimer. In an article describing the complexity of concepts employed in atomic physics he concludes:

> In particle physics we may have to accept an arbitrary, complicated, not very orderly set of facts, without seeing behind them the harmony in terms of which they might be understood. It is the special faith and dedication of our profession that we will not lightly concede such a defeat. ("Adventures of the Mind 7: The Mystery of Matter", Saturday Evening Post, July 5, 1958.)

The above laws of thought seem, indeed, to govern all logical thinking, discourse, meaningful communication, and science. As such they seem **a priori**, that is, "prior" or foundational to any possible experience.

Related to logic, of course, are the axioms and theorems of mathematics and geometry, and the deductive modes of reasoning characteristic of these formal sciences. Their principles and procedures are often times regarded as our best examples of **formal a priori reasoning**. Beyond the laws of logic and of mathematics, are there further cases of a priori reason?
(b) Ideas of reality. Kant called "space" and "time" basic forms of existence. That is, he said, we cannot think of anything in our sort of physical world/existing without these "dimensions". The problem of whether space and time in some ultimate sense are "absolute" or not, as Kant assumed, is irrelevant at this place. What their ultimate nature and status is we need not know. That objects, however, in our sort of real world must have a spacial spread and a temporal duration, in order to exist in a physical way, is certainly true, and a truth that seems "universal" and "necessary".

Consider next the category of "substance", that is, that every quality needs "something" in which to inhere. Can we think of the red of a rose without the "red" inhereing on something? This "something" philosophers have called substance. We have just referred to substance as physical or material substrate. It has long been in controversy as to whether I know myself as a "spiritual substance" in which my thoughts inhere or go on (note the following paragraph on the category of the self and the discussion of theories of mind in our later chapter). The concept of substance must be filled with dynamic meaning; it must be relieved of a kind of blank inertness which it has had in former times. In recent years, due to the impact of modern science on philosophical thought, the concept or category of "energy" has tended to take the place of the older concept of substance. Of course, how can there be "energy" or energetic movement unless there is "something" to move, or be moved, or have activity. The concept of energy without substance is an unreal, abstract ghost of a notion; as, no doubt, the concept of substance as an inert lumpishness underlying things is unreal.

The idea of energy suggests the a priori category of "causality". In classic formulation this meant that every effect must have a cause, or an adequate cause (or sufficient reason). The following is one way to suggest the a priori nature of our
idea of causality: would we ever raise the question, What causes the leaf that I am now looking at to move? and conclude, 'the wind is the cause of its motion', unless the causal interest or causal inquiry, in a word, the idea of causality were there prior to our experience of the moving leaf? Squirrels see leaves moving all the time, but it is doubtful if any of them ever ask about the cause. In original nature they lack the causal interest, just as by such a nature we possess it at the outset. Man's desire to examine his world scientifically implies the causal a priori, at least in the sense above described. It does not necessarily tell us what the causes are; but it does establish our confidence that there are "causes", that is, rational or understandable connections, and it encourages our search to find them.

In the concept of the "self" the category of substance, at least in one form, is made dynamic, and the category of causality, at least in one form, is made purposeful. We have already referred to the "intuition of the self". May we now say, knowledge of the self a priori? Augustine's and Descartes' a priori analysis of the self as thinking-energy, in spite of the attempts to disvalue it, still remains one of the best examples of a priori reason about a type of reality. Both of these philosophers argued that the self can never doubt or deny its own "reality", because affirms one's existence, the very attempt to do so, i.e. to doubts one's existence, at least as a form of thinking energy. To doubt or deny, is to think, and to think is to be conscious or self-conscious. Therefore the attempt to doubt one's conscious existence as thinking-energy is contradictory. Cogito, ergo sum, Descartes said. It should probably be acknowledged that so far this argument may have but a formal value, since one never actually doubts his existence. But at least on a formal plane it illustrates a universal and necessary, i.e. an a priori truth. There are, however, deeper implications, as Descartes was quick to notice in his Meditations, where he proceeds from knowledge of self to knowledge of God -- we consider the fundamental a priori argument for God later in our study. In any case, thus far, in awareness of the self as
thinking energy, in comparison to all other observable energies, the self possesses an intimation of its own superiority in value, and possibly in being. We treat at greater length in a subsequent chapter the idea of the "reality" of the self.

(c) Ideas of value. Recall our discussion in Chapter One concerning the discovery of value in the consciousness of self, and the earlier point in this chapter dealing with the intuation of value. Highest moral values seem "necessary" and "universal", i.e. *a priori*. Immanuel Kant argued this point as one of his chief contributions to philosophy. Consider the subsuming Hebraic moral law of reverence or respect for persons -- what the ethical commandments of Moses and Jesus add up to. Rational reflection would tell us that no finite life of our kind could get along happily and well without applying this principle in one's relationships with others; and experience will quickly test it, if one doubts its nature as "universal" and "necessary" truth. We return, in a subsequent chapter, to the problem of moral value in our discussion of the moral argument for God.

What is the relation of *a priori* reasoning to intuition? *A priori* knowledge would not only be certain fundamental intuitions themselves, but also the attempt to reason about them. If intuition is immediate insight or feeling, *a priori* reason would examine such insights reflectively for internal consistency with themselves and with other areas of knowledge and experience. *A priori* reason is intuition in a self-reflective and critical mood. Arguments for human freedom, for example, will be an apt illustration of *a priori* reflection about a possible basic "intuition". (Again we refer the reader to later discussion for elaboration of this point.)

We suggest that if there is immaterial or trans-material being or truths, such as the self, moral laws, or God, it is reasonable to suppose that they would best be apprehended by a trans-sensory mode of knowledge, that is, by *a priori* reason. Bordon Parker Bowne once said that it would take *a priori* knowledge to rule out the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. Ewing has ably summarized the nature and general
function of the a priori in the following passage:

"The possibility of metaphysics depends on a priori knowledge, for our experience is quite inadequate to enable us to make on merely empirical grounds any sweeping generalisations of the kind the metaphysician desires. The term a priori covers both self-evident propositions, i.e. those which are seen to be true in their own right and those which are derived by inference from propositions themselves self-evident." (FQP 30).

In closing this discussion of the a priori we should clarify a point which is often the source of much confusion. Does a priori knowledge mean that it stands temporally prior to experience? In the following statement Paul Tillich throws considerable light on the status of a priori concepts in relation to "experience". Speaking of basic "ontological concepts" (recall our examples in paragraph "b" above) as a priori, he says:

"Ontological concepts are a priori in the strict sense of the world. They determine the nature of experience. They are present whenever something is experienced. A priori does not mean that ontological concepts are known prior to experience. They should not be attacked as if this were meant. On the contrary, they are products of a critical analysis of experience."

(ST Vol I. 166).

(For discussion of the relation of moral concepts, a priori, as awakened by experience see "Appendix B" to Chapter Six, Section 3, "The Moral Argument for God".

2. Reason as inductive and "scientific". This mode of reason proceeds from particular cases to the universal principle:

Men A, B, C, and D, are observed to die.

Therefore, all men are mortal.

The rule of this type of syllogism is that if you affirm the antecedent you may affirm the consequent (or the other valid mood; if you deny the consequent you must deny the antecedent). The hypothetical syllogism does not exhaust the meaning of inductive inference. However, evaluating it as a primary form of such inference, .....

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Inductive reason and scientific procedure are closely associated with another variety of syllogism called the hypothetical. It has the basic form, if X, then Y. Stated in the form of the hypothetical syllogism the above inductive line of reasoning would be:

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{Antecedent} & \text{Consequent} \\
\text{If men A, B, C, and D, die, then all men are mortal} & \\
\text{A, B, C, and D, are observed to die} & \\
\text{Therefore, all men are mortal.} & \\
\end{array}
\]

The rule of this type of syllogism is that if you affirm the antecedent you may affirm the consequent (or the other valid mood: if you deny the consequent you must deny the antecedent). The hypothetical syllogism does not exhaust the meaning of inductive inference. However, evaluating it as a primary form of such inference, D. S. Robinson, in *The Principles of Reasoning* (3rd ed), writes:
The method of hypothesis is a striking expression of the extent to which hypothetical reasoning enters into the procedure of scientific research" (p. 170)

The main problem of inductive reason is the question about going from "some" cases to "all" cases. May there not be exceptions? This has been called the "inductive leap". (The sections in textbooks of logic devoted to induction are discussions in detail of how the inductive leap is justified from the practical point of view). In any case, the hypothetical or tentative nature of inductive science is evident.

The relation between deduction and induction. Both forms of reason play a vital part in science and man's quest for truth. Mathematics has been the deductive "science" par excellence, and the mathematical formulation of principles has been the ideal of "natural" or inductive science. On the technical side Robinson writes:

"...a warning must be given against being misled by the statement that induction is the reverse of deduction. The two ways of proceeding are not antagonistic, but supplementary. Deduction is really present in all inductive inference in the form of some covert assumption as to the nature of the real world." (Ib. p. 205).

Let us suggest the relation of deductive to inductive reason. After certain facts become known through observation, deduction is frequently employed in the discovery of new theoretical knowledge, as, for example, in the mathematical discovery of Neptune's and Pluto's existence, the two outermost planets, before they were actually observed through a telescope. Another arresting example was Einstein's deduction that light would be bent in a gravitational field before Eddington proved the point by observation, during an eclipse of the sun. The light of a star as it passed across the darkened sun's disk, was observed to be displaced from its true

*D. Appleton-Century Company, 1947
** Ib.
position in the sky, evidently by the gravitational pull of the sun on the star's light. Deduction is used extensively in engineering or technological application of the theories of "pure science". Just how to build a suspension bridge, for example, given the formula for gravitation or the tensile strength of steel is in large part a deductive problem, which is worked out on the engineer's drawing board.

Reason as Criterion:

Completed Stage—Rational Coherence

Reason as synoptic understanding, or full rational coherence, means initially formal or logical consistency as just discussed. Our judgments must fit together without contradiction. But coherence is more than a matter of formal logic, or technical logical consistency. Recall that the technical problem of logic is whether our premises and axioms, with which we start a train of reasoning, are true? Accordingly coherent judging in full meaning must have "factual", or "empirical", or inclusive consistency and mean the agreement of a logical judgment with the entire environmental situation. Some writers* use the expression "empirical coherence" to emphasize the "empirical", viz, the observational side of coherent judging, as well as its purely logical, and (as we would say) its possible a priori dimensions. In any case coherence is rationally organized experience.

In a succinct turn or speech, Brightman caught the spirit or meaning of coherence when he wrote, "Consistency is the absence of contradiction; coherence is the presence of relation"(APR 190). To see into the whole order of fact and being as far as we can, and relate their parts without contradiction, is the over-all method, way or

* Peter Anthony Bertocci: Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Prentice-Hall, 1951, Chap. 3.

** A Philosophy of Religion, op. cit.
criterion or truth. Harris Franklin Rall well expresses the spirit of coherence in describing "reason" as "the power of insight or intuition, which sees the whole of things and perceives their meaning" (C 217)*. Rational coherence, or synoptic understanding, is the experience of looking at the whole as if from a higher perspective.

To illustrate, the sun appears to rise and to move about the earth; so the judgment was for millennia. But this apparent relation of earth to sun is from an earth-bound standpoint:

![Diagram of sun and earth]

Rise, however, in imagination, above the earth; look at the solar system as whole as if from a point above it in space, and the true relationship of earth and sun and the various motions of the planets become clear.

Coherent judging is judging from the standpoint of the whole. In sum, Georgia Harkness defines coherence with exquisite simplicity: "A statement is true, if it is self-consistent throughout, and is consistent with all the information procurable in relation to it."**

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Appendix A

Further Illustrations of Coherence

Science. We continue our astronomical example in order to show how coherence is the real method of science, and makes possible scientific advance. Our problem then concerns how man's knowledge of the nature of the solar system, and of certain facts of gravitation, has grown:

(1) The ancient geocentric, Ptolemaic theory (2nd century A.D.) was based on the sun's apparent motion, and the apparent retrograde motions of the planets.

(2) Copernicus (1473-1543) explained these phenomena by his helio-centric theory (suggested also in ancient times by Aristarchus of Samos) and, as we mentioned previously, as if from a higher perspective above the solar system, so that the whole could be seen at once. Ptolemy's theory was too earth-bound.

(3) Tycho (1546-1601) and Kepler (1571-1630) after painstaking observations concluded that the orbits of the planets were ellipses rather than circles as Copernicus had believed; they found that planets moved faster as they swung nearer to the sun, situated at one of the foci of the ellipse; and that their radii as drawn from the planet to the sun swept over equal areas in equal times.

(4) Galileo (1564-1642) at about the same time was finding that objects of unequal weight fall at the same rate, and actually observed the Copernican universe (for example, moons revolving around Jupiter) for the first time with a telescope.

(5) Newton (1642-1727) making his own observations and utilizing the information of his predecessors effectively collated data "2", "3", and "4" into $F = \frac{GMm}{d^2}$, the formula which stood for gravitation until Einstein modified it in our own times.

(6) Einstein's (1879-1955) still more general formulation of gravitation in terms of relativity explained certain discrepancies in the predicted motion of the planet Mercury which Newtonian theory could not explain, as well as widen our
knowledge of gravitation to include other matters, such as the deflection of a ray of light in a gravitational field, or the slower vibration of an atom in such a field. Newton's conception of gravitation seems to be a special, limited case of Einstein's theory of relativity.

We see coherence working in these steps as a process that corrects older views, includes more facts, relates in a broader way. Summarizing about it we may say it is characterized by four governing principles: it is logical, factual, relational, and inclusive. A coherent judgment (1) must be logical; it must be self-consistent inwardly. The Copernican judgment about the solar system is a more self-consistent or logical (if by logical we here mean simple) one than the Ptolemaic. (2) It must be factual: consistent with all facts in so far as we can decide what "fact" is. The Copernican theory explains the observed facts better, such as the planets' apparent "backward" motions, or the sun's "rising". (3) It must be relational: consistent with other propositions, facts, parts of experience held as true by the mind applying this criterion. Einstein's picture, derived essentially from the Copernican scheme, relates many diverse facts of physics and astronomy, such as those we have just mentioned. (4) It must be inclusive: must look at all details from the point of view of the whole as if from a higher aspect. We suggested how the Copernican perspective is from "above" as if looking down at the solar system.

Sense Experience. How can we "explain" sense-experience -- e.g. our experience of the color "green"? In other words, how may we talk "rationally" about this form of "awareness", beyond the point where we simply assert, or emote, 'I see green!'? (Immediate senses are sometimes cited as forms of "truth" that do not fit the coherence criterion, but are rather examples of intuitive knowledge, for discussion of which see criticisms below.) We may analyze our experience of "green" in these four significant judgments, which are levels of understanding about its nature and status:
(1) There is the Common-sense judgment: the color green is in the leaf -- a quality external to the observer.

(2) The scientific judgment: the color green is produced by sunlight passing through chlorophyl, and is a light phenomenon; it can be measured in terms of wave length. Green is not strictly "in" the leaf but is an effect of a certain type of light, passing between leaf and eye.

(3) The psychological judgment: "green" in an interpretation that the eye makes, a quality that it gives to that particular wave length of light; a "meaning". Hence, it may be argued with some justification that the color is in the mind, a subjective phenomenon.

(4) The philosophic, coherent, or synoptic judgment: the color green is an emergent, a new reality, created or brought into being by the interplay of "mind" and environment; it is really objective, "in the object", but only while the object is being observed. It is also "in" or "due to" the mind. If this conclusion is right, every aspect of theories "1" through "3" is maintained, but seen from the inclusive, that is, the coherent, point of view.

A practical illustration: what is the truth about a man whom we happen to see staggering down the street? Our immediate judgment might be that he is a drunkard. In a further investigation, however, through inquiry with friends, we learn that he is a "spastic", victim of cerebral palsy. The sense experience, our observation of the ambulatory difficulties of both spastic and a possible drunkard are constant. Our wider coherent judgment, however, corrects the meaning of the phenomenon. We might even broaden our coherent inquiry into a third, larger sphere of information if we investigate the medical facts about cerebral palsy, with a view to learning how the condition might be corrected (good results: pragmatism) and the person helped to regain control of muscles and win a normal life. In this practical illustration we see how coherence brings us to the verge of "moral judgment", and so we turn to a few illustrations along that line.

*Where $\lambda$ stands for the color quality; $c$ the velocity of light; and $f$ the frequency or "wave length" of the radiation phenomenon being considered.
Value or moral truth. Is not coherence the method whereby we come to know value or moral truth, make value judgments? For one thing, the knowledge by which we come to know other minds than our own and recognize the supreme value of personality seems to be knowledge based on coherent judging. In this process we seem effectively to put together or synthesize all the motions, actions, words, and achievements of another human being and conclude that he is a "person", something like ourselves. Beyond this we see nature in her history putting forth energies to the seeming end of creating numerous such "persons", and we conclude that this must be the, or at least one, supreme end or value. Second, in the field of moral law, if personal being is supreme, then the idea of respect for such being coherently follows as a fundamental insight. The principle and experience of love itself, whereby lives become related, suggests the coherent nature of moral judging. Third, beauty. To discern beauty we have to see the whole in a coherent judgment. It is more the total sunset that strikes us as beautiful rather than any one cloud or ray of light or stray feather. At least we get the full effect of beauty by observing the whole coherently, simultaneously, synoptically. Even our attempt to come to appreciate certain forms of "surrealistic art" must be made on a coherent basis. Dali's paintings at first may strike one as grotesque, ugly. But when the excellence of technique, or the wild dash of colors are taken in, as we attempt to see the picture as a whole, for some observers, at least, beauty appears.
Appendix B
Criticisms of Coherence

The critics of the coherence criterion claim that it is faulty, or an incomplete criterion, for three main reasons: (1) that it implies that we must know all truth before we can know any truth; (2) that it is a variable standard and itself does not escape the relativity with which it charges pragmatism; (3) that some truth judgments are non-coherent, thus leaving an area uncovered by the coherence criterion, but explained rather by simple "correspondence". Let us consider each of these criticisms at some length.

(1) Must we know all truth before we can know any truth? Some judgments may be absolutely true here and now, though the whole of truth remain unknown as a whole. The way of truth is like a path up a mountain, which we have to date only partially ascended. As we go up, turning and looking out at the horizon, we see farther and farther into the realm of truth, although the higher we go some truth still lies beyond the horizon. Absolute Truth would be the vista at the top of the mountain, as God must see the world. Actually our metaphysical mountain, as far as our finite or limited abilities to climb are concerned, may have no literal "top" for us. God's infinite transcendence alone is the condition for a knowledge of all truth. Whether in an after life we are permitted this vision is an entirely academic question. As far as we are presently concerned there would be a difference between absolute truths and Absolute Truth. No one but God experiences the latter, although we do experience the former in varying ways. If Absolute Truth would be an understanding of the world from God's perspective, absolute truths would be those relatively certain judgments of sentience, science, and morality upon which we can base life practically. They are "the truths" as far as we can see. That I now see this green of this leaf is an
"absolute truth" on the sentient level of experience. Indeed, what "green" is in the infinite detail of relationships as God sees things may be beyond my capacity to fathom, perhaps beyond all human capacity forever to comprehend. But that it is "absolute" in its proximate, practical sense -- that we can declare. Similarly with other "practical" judgments—that twice two is four, that personal being is supreme in value, that government should be by the consent of the governed, etc. (See our later discussion of these far-reaching moral judgments, and our eventual modification of the expression "Absolute Truth", Chapter 6.)

(2) Is coherence viable in a relativistic manner? The question is pointed at the way coherence "changes" or "supplants" one judgment for, presumably, a newer more inclusive one. The attitude of coherence is always that of the open mind. It knows that subsequent, larger truth may correct present smaller judgments. This frequently is not a correction by cancellation so much as by reformulation, by seeing the aspects of an older theory which are good and true, and including them in the newer point of view. Where absolute denial of former views is sometimes necessary, the newer coherent judgment simply denotes the former as incoherent, false or as error. One important, coherent judgment about our universe would be that errors are possible, which on the coherence theory would mean incoherent judgments. Considering this tricky problem, coherence would endeavor to take in all the facts. The main one of powers of Judgment. Further, coherence would try to understand why freedom these is the freedom and finiteness -- but the growing character -- of our own/ and finiteness such as our own is "good" or "best" for us. This question can be in a measure answered, though admittedly it takes us into the deepest of metaphysical waters, namely, the question why God has created the world as He has.* Therefore, endeavoring to answer these questions as judgment that would decide that some "incoherent" clearly and as fully as we can, it would indeed be a "coherent"/judgments are possible. In fact, if the later were not possible, there would be no freedom or finite

*Pursued at length in our discussion of evil, p. 56.
world as we know it, as Bowne and others have thoughtfully pointed out. (We touch
again upon the nature of coherence in our section of evaluation at the end
of this chapter.)

(We reserve for a later section of this study a more extensive analysis of the
problem, or meaning of error, Chapter 6, Section 4. Suffice for the moment to mention
one or two important distinctions. In depth the problem involves the question, What
is the relation between "truth" and "being"? We have already gained some insight into
this problem earlier in this chapter. Truth is a relation, a dynamic, interactive pro-
cess that connects orders of being, that is connects sentient, thinking beings with
the world in which they live. When the connection is coherently made, the sentient,
thinking being (and possibly the world as a whole itself) is modified, is raised to a
new level of interactivity, emerging process, and reality. For example, that my aware-
ness of certain light vibrations at this moment may bring "green" into being suggests
that truth, at least on this sentient level, is being. Could I speak of moral inter-
relatedness, truth in its very highest meaning, in a similar way, that is, as constitu-
in this aspect of moral truth, and truth in this degree, as a relation connecting two persons,
makes each more in being, or "more truly being" than they were prior to this relation-
ship. But we must grant that the problem of truth's relation to being is a most dif-
ficult one to understand. Now briefly for error, error is the incoherent connection
or relation of ideas. When we say that error "exists" we simply mean that there is a
wrong such connection. We do not mean that error exists as a positive, creative con-
nection making new and grander "being" such as those suggested immediately above. In
fact error diminishes or distorts such being. The ideas that are erroneously connected
in the experience of error -- and it is not an "experience" until the error is dis-
covered and admitted! -- may be themselves being or a form or degree of being).
(3) Is some truth judgment trans-coherent thus revealing an area of truth not covered by the coherence criterion, and consequently the limitations of this criterion? Sometimes sense experiences themselves (recall our previous discussion) or some other a priori or intuitive judgments, such as those of memory, or that twice two is four, or that I exist, are cited as examples of trans-coherent, or immediately "correspondent", truth. Ewing argues that coherence needs to be supplemented with "experience", that is, truth propositions based on sheer "correspondence".

He says:

... but ... 'coherence with experience' really means 'coherence with propositions based on experience', so that we have now admitted a second set of propositions not themselves based on coherence but on the mere fact that we can see them to correspond to our experience. The coherence criterion cannot without being thus supplemented by the correspondence criterion ever do justice to the empirical element in our knowledge." (FQP p 63)

"... there are two elements in knowledge and true belief to both of which it is essential to give an adequate place in our philosophy, (1) active construction and systematizing by the mind (i.e. coherence). (2) an objectively given basis independent of the first element and the foundation of its work". (FQP p 66)

Ewing thus claims that the criterion of truth is a dual one, "coherence with experience", (Ib. p 63) and by "experience" he means sheer, unanalyzable "correspondence" of ideas to the way things are.

The reply to this thoughtful criticism might be that it contains a misapprehension of the full meaning or spirit of "coherence". Coherence is in depth a synoptic experience that "feels" relationship intuitively if it cannot always "see" relationship abstractly. Are not the above examples of so-called trans-coherent knowledge actually coherences on some such deeper level of conscious awareness? Sense experiences are greatly complex, rather than simple. It is never "green" in the abstract that I perceive, detached from the idea of "leaf", with its shape, state of motion or rest, distance, height, etc, etc. -- but always a complex of ideas that coherently relate to each other. Gestalt psychology has fairly successfully demonstrated how
we observe complex sentient objects as unified wholes. Sense experience, particularly, as giving knowledge of an outside world, is, as Brightman reminds us, a coherent judgment: we interpret the sense pressures that impinge upon our sensory organs as coming from truly objective sources because we know (coherently?) that we do not initiate them. The experience or the fulfillment of the judgment in its terminal sense, that there is indeed an objective world out there (thus revealing the irrationality of solipsism), is an experience of "correspondence" as we have already argued; correspondence is the definition of truth when found; coherence is its criterion or way to go. To turn to memory: simple immediate judgments of memory -- that I was sitting at the typewriter here yesterday -- have a coherent element. Indeed, is not its essential nature one of coherence? Memory judgments relate former time with the present as in a coherent whole; it is precisely coherence that seems to make memory and a sane self possible. What about the judgment "twice two is four"? Again, it seems to the present writer that the fitting together of the quantative propositions of mathematical logic is a cardinal example of coherent judging. At least it would certainly be incoherent to say that twice two is five! Finally, what about the intuitive experience, I exist? Is this so unanalytical and simple that it is above, or prior to, coherent judgment? A reply in defense of the "coherence" of even this judgment might be to ask, Do we not really conclude that we exist for a number of factors that coherently coalesce in the truth of this judgment -- our thought for one thing (as Descartes argued), our bodies for another, our relations to our world for a third, etc? Self-experience is a near infinite one in its complexity. At least one of the main problems of mental health, to speak of this dimension, is to attempt to "integrate", or make the self "coherent".

With these criticisms to caution us, and our attempts above at reply to encourage us, let us summarize the value of the coherence criterion.
Value of the Coherence Criterion

(1) Coherence is "pragmatic" and "empirical" in the widest meaning of these terms. It is a mandate to examine all of the evidence that lies at hand and to be guided by "experience".

(2) Coherence suggests that truth is a social fund -- that truth far exceeds individual capacity, and that we use the stored wisdom of the past and the investigations of our colleagues, as well as our own, for our own special inquiries. (Thus coherence makes place for adequate authority.)

(3) Coherence is "dialectical", the capacity by which we may stand off and look at any judgment whatever in order to estimate its truth or falsity. Coherence constantly corrects itself as new knowledge is discovered. As we have already mentioned, it is par excellence the criterion of the open mind (contrary to what is sometimes said about it). It makes room for unsuspected elements -- it is able to transcend itself. It accepts as its own law, criticism and growth; it does not necessarily arrive, nay ever, at a closed system. Coherence itself guards against a too dogmatic rationalism. It recognizes that there are incoherencies in life and existence, and makes place for a faith that can carry on in spite of these. Coherence is affirmative, positive, but humble.

(4) Does coherence have any metaphysical implications? Suffused with the spirit of harmony and oneness, it does suggest the view that the universe is ultimately "harmony" or "oneness", at least from the standpoint of the moral and of value. It is the religious point of view in its rational mood. Its faith is that there is no permanent disruption of the good purpose of existence, and it tends to look for a providential watchcare. In its fullest sense it guards against the idea of the "block universe" or extreme monism ontologically, which it is sometimes accused of supporting. Coherent insight discerns that a truly moral universe would have finite,
free parts; diversity; many aspects; even the possibility of conflict. Coherence implies a creative pluralism rather than a monolithic monism. It may be "idealistic", however, in the basic sense that it believes in the dominance of "spirit" in the universe.

Coherence suggests further metaphysical implications. We have already seen how it makes belief in an objective world possible; sensations must mean what they say of an outer world, if our perspective is coherent and true. It makes belief in mind possible: there must be some active agency, some energy to receive sensations and interpret them in an orderly way. It suggests that, if the objective world and the mind get together effectively, there cannot be a complete disparity or duality between them; that there is community of existence in which they both share, and perhaps in part both create. It perceives reality primarily as concrete processes, life, individuals, rather than as abstract universals or ideas, though the latter may be one form of reality among others. Coherence recognizes the value of using universal ideas in the process of analysis as the short-hand which helps us to understand entities and relationships, from atoms, to persons, to societies, and, in a transcending dimension, possibly the reality of God.

Coherence and faith. Faith is the arc that completes the circle of synoptic judgment. Our experience is fragmentary, rationally, emotionally, sentiently. Faith is the further rational interpolation that finishes the picture of our world:
Faith is the coherent feeling that our world is ultimately orderly, meaningful, rational, and personal. Coherence supports religion. Religious faith is essentially the belief in the goodness and adequacy of God, in brief, in His reasonableness, understanding, and love. These characteristics are attributed to Him on the basis of a synoptic judgment about the Divine nature. If He were less than these, His being would be incoherent morally and He would not be the adequate object of worship that we suppose Him to be.

**Coherence and the idea of revelation.** Given the theistic conception of the universe, the idea of "revelation" or a divine self-disclosure has rational, coherent meaning. If there is Personal Deity, God would seek to disclose Himself to men as part of his highest relationship to the creation for which He is responsible (the other aspect would be His relationship as saving power, summed in the idea of salvation considered at the end of our discussion on Man). But when God acts "revelationally" such self-disclosure would stand at once as rationally coherent with the rest of human experience and knowledge, if it is to be a meaningful revelation. If revelation is divine initiative, it must also be human receptivity; if a divine reality acts from above and beyond, man must receive within a human understanding, which is enlarged and deepened by the revelational experience. Accordingly, a coherence criterion of truth would suggest that revelation is essentially disclosure of truth itself, a deepening of reason, an enlargement of experience. We experience new truth as that which "dawns" or seems to "break in" upon the mind -- suggesting a transcendent action from above. We do not seize truth; it is given. Yet we cannot receive it unless we are prepared. We have to search and analyze and think, before truth will disclose itself. This is the side of the process for which we are responsible. Revelation is communion with God not dictation from Him. Divine revelation and human discovery "are thus different aspects of one process" (Fall C 155).
Einstein's discovery of $E=mc^2$ was revelation in the scientific sphere; Hosea's discovery (in the midst of his tragic domestic experience of an unfaithful wife) that God is love was revelation in the moral and more typically "religious" sphere. All revelation may be said to be objective in the sense that it comes through experience. That is to say, life has its impact upon us which eventually discloses ultimate values and may suggest their source in ultimate Personal Being. The Old Testament prophets believed that the channel of revelation, through which the divine spoke to man, is moral reason or insight, tested and borne out by experience.

We conclude this chapter with a definition of "religious truth", and bring to a close our preliminary, definitional work regarding the relation of reason to religion.

"Religious truth" would be the correspondence of our thought to ultimate realms of value, that is, awareness of truly highest value, and of the power or powers that sustain and increase it; and the ultimate feeling or full experience of ourselves as being in positive relationship to it personally.

As we now proceed to our larger work of considering the ideas of, and the arguments for, God; the problem of evil; the religious ideas of man as spiritual being; the meaning of prayer and immortality and other problems, we may well bear with us the summarizing words of Brightman regarding the relevance and use of reason in religion:

"...Belief in a theistic God is an assertion of a metaphysically coherent universe, a universe organized by rational purpose for the realization of rational value" (APR 191).

"A religious belief can be verified only by its relation to the system of our beliefs as a whole which have the marks of consistency with one another and with experience" (Ib. 121).
Part II

The Idea of God - Various Conceptions
**Chapter Three**

**Major Conceptions of God:**

**God as Impersonal Being**

Fundamental alternatives in thinking about the term "God." We agree with Edgar S. Brightman, who wrote that "The definition of the religious object is...the fundamental problem of religion" (APR 133). In our terms of the preceding chapter we might add that the definition of the source of value, and its status in the universe, is the fundamental problem of religion.

One basic way to define deity would be to say that God is source and conserver of value. Whatever is the ultimate source and conserver of values would be "God" or "Deity." However, though this undoubtedly seems to be a possible general definition, it is just an introductory step; we must hasten to fill this abstract form with further content. For example, man himself might be regarded as the "ultimate source and conserver of values," in which case we would have the critical naturalistic conception of deity of John Dewey and others. Or there may be the conception that there is something beyond man in the universe of which is the source and principle/conversation of value. Such thinking issues at once into the more traditional idea of God as truly objective reality, principle, or power present in the universe whether man were here or not. Accordingly, from this more traditional standpoint Brightman gives as a fundamental definition: "God is the objective source and conserver of value" (italics mine) (APR 134).

Another fundamental definition along traditional lines was that of St. Augustine, who wrote that God would be whatever in the universe is "more excellent than," or above, or superior to, man and his finite...
Augustine found that "truth" is that which is more excellent or superior to man's mind; accordingly, he defined truth itself as "God."

On these fundamental levels of thinking there is, of course, the problem of defining "value," which would finally condition our conception of deity. Recall our earlier initial attempts at defining this term. Integral to the problem of value is whether "personality" is "value," and to what degree? In conclusion, then, our initial definition, given above, that God is source and conserver of value, suggests at least two great watersheds of thinking about deity that are fundamental and crucial:

1. Whether deity is entirely a human subjective terminological principle, on the one hand; or whether the term refers to a truly objective, cosmic principle, power, or being of some kind on the other; and

2. Whether personality as value must necessarily or not enter into the concept of deity: whether God is an impersonal principle or personal being.

Historically, there has been a third issue of basic importance in thinking about deity as referring to a value making and sustaining principle: namely, whether values are ultimately unified in some single sustaining source, or unitary principle of reality; or whether the universe of values remains plural, i.e., whether deity is one or many, the issue between polytheism and monothelism or other cosmic monisms.

The classic Hebraic and western conception has been that God is objective, unitary, personal Being.* In the history of philosophic

*This statement would be modified, of course, in the case of certain classic philosophers such as Aristotle or Plotinus.
thought, however, there have been conceptions of God as objective but impersonal (the tendency of eastern religions), and also conceptions of the divine as personal but many (polytheisms, east and west). It seems simplest to analyze the conceptions of God first in terms of the classic issue between personality or impersonality in God, considering as we proceed, when it systematically arises, the use of the term "God" for a purely subjective principle. Similarly, we shall in due course consider polytheism as the earlier form of the personalistic idea of deity.

Our concern first and basically for the personality problem as we consider the meanings of the term "God" may perhaps be best stated thus:

The problem of the "existence" or reality of God and the problem of the "personality" of God are two levels of the same problem. Practically speaking for men, God would not "exist" unless He were "personal;" that is, unless He were a Being, Level, or Order of Reality, or a dynamical process, movement, or "Spirit" within reality, who is trans-human, though possibly inclusive of the human, and in his essential "life" is conscious good will or love.

Accordingly, we view the larger tasks of this work as endeavoring to reply to the question: does reason or experience test the "presence" or "reality" of God as thus defined? In the meanwhile, with this initial clarification of several fundamental notions or problems, we proceed to the following analysis and evaluation of major concepts of God.
Conceptions of God as Impersonal

Conceptions of God in the impersonal mood have included several fundamental avenues of thinking, all of which are related and all of which contain significant insights. These several approaches or emphases are: God as necessary minimal "unity," as the full "whole" of reality, as cosmic "process" or integrative activity leading to natural formation and values, and as abstract form and value itself.

I. God as Primitive Cosmic "Unity"

1. It is possible to think of God as the minimal principle of integration, or primitive cosmic unity, without which there could be no relationship, connections, order, or areas of coherence of any kind in our world. We cannot conceive of a world such as ours is, with its vast stretches of actually realized order, if its basic "factors" are completely disparate, unrelated, or unorganizable, i.e. if it is based on "absolute plurality." (We will note the expansion of this theme later as basic to the positive argument for God.)

The non-theistic personalist, John McTaggart, admitted that it is possible to define God as we have just suggested, i.e. in such an attenuated, impersonal way that the argument about his "existence" becomes trivial. As McTaggart discussed it in his famous critical work, Some Dogmas of Religion (p. 186), we may stop somewhere short of the radically pluralistic conception of the universe as "a mere aggregate, or a mere chaos." In that case we may say that "God" is the minimal "unity" of the world, i.e. the simplest bond of relation that obviously holds the elements or atoms (or whatever the ultimate factors may be)
together in the most primitive level of integration. Affirmation of God's existence, then, in this abstract sense, would pass without comment. "If the word is used in this sense," says McTaggart, "everyone, except absolute sceptics or the most extreme pluralists must be said to believe that a God exists." (ibid.). We must agree, of course, with McTaggart that the further problem, from the standpoint of western theology and "common language," is to ask whether God is "a being who is personal, supreme, and good" (The Nature of Existence, vol. II, p. 176).

Let us try to diagram McTaggart's "God" in the following way:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
X \quad Y \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[X \quad \text{The minimal bond or order necessary in order to have a world of all which some, say, may call "God".}
\]

**Evaluation.** A criticism of this view from the religious side would be that it gives only the barest "metaphysical" kind of God, hardly an adequate object of devotion and worship. From the logical side we would need to define clearly what we mean by such "minimal integration," and finally, from the empirical side, examine whether the world were actually limited to such minimal structure. For one thing, if by "minimal integration" we mean the barest way by which "electrons" or other primitive factors cohere to form the elements, the world is obviously integrated in far more complex degrees than just that. There are vast reaches of molecular, organic, mental and personal integration.

The upper levels of psychic integration may suggest what the full nature of cosmic integration is. In any case, from the idea of God as the minimal unity, we may proceed to the opposite possibility of God as the maximal whole. Accordingly, we move to what we will here call "pantheistic" ideas of God.
II. Conceptions of God as the Whole of Reality

Such mood in thinking about deity is sometimes called the "pantheistic" view. (Traditionally, the total immanence of Deity in the world and the idea of its impersonality have characterized pantheistic thinking—note presently our further definition of pantheism). But we must bear in mind, before criticizing pantheism, that there are two main types, a narrower and a larger, a naive and a more profound view. The first view is more of a theoretical possibility than one seriously held by thoughtfully philosophic people. In so far as it may be held, however—and we find an approximation to it in certain primitive concepts of God—we may term it popular, naive, or undiscriminating pantheism. Another view we shall call philosophical pantheism. In our present development, then, these constitute our second and third major views of God.

2. The lower pantheism would understand God to be the universal immanent principle of animation or "life" that informs all nature. In this view "God" and "nature" are equivalent, but it is nature with a small "n". That is to say, all things without distinction derive from a universal "life force." God, as the impersonal vital force, is immediately and without subtilty literally everywhere in phenomena. In such terms, the divine is equally present in nature's surfaces as in her depths. Touch this tree and you touch God. When we hear people say, "Oh, God is simply nature," we have the mood of the lower pantheism. Referring to our illustration, this mood seems to be saying that the term and idea "tree" exhausts the meaning of the term and idea "God."
Such view would be like ancient animism if reconstructed into an impersonal monism. That is, instead of separate personal "spirits" inhabiting each and every object of nature, as with primitive animism, the spirits are blended into one impersonal life principle, something like the primitive idea of "mana." In Polynesian thought mana is a kind of all-pervading, supernatural atmosphere, the basic potency that inhabits objects, natural processes, and persons, and gives to them whatever quality seems extraordinary or remarkable. The pantheistic idea of mana, in which the primitive person stands in great awe, seems to be a universal concept among primitives, having parallel terms in various aboriginal cultures, such as "orenda," "manitou," and "wakanda."

The popular level of Hindu thought among the Indian masses may in substance approximate the "pantheism" above described; Brahman, the impersonal, absolute whole of being, is manifest in every nook and cranny of nature, in all lesser gods and goddesses of the popular Hindu polytheism, in all living creatures, and in inanimate objects.

**Evaluation.** No doubt the religious type of mind may sometimes find itself in such a pantheistic mood, when an undiscriminating theology of vitalism and immanence, such as this, seems to be the simplest theoretical possibility, the easiest way out of the problem of how to think of God. But can we seriously accept such a view? Is it true that all things are, in such an indiscriminate and literal way, "God"--the object of supreme value and devotion: this particle of dust, the cobra with its venom, the North Star in its remote "coldness," a burst of hydrogen energy as it obliterates a city, Hitler's criminal madness? Can our thinking rise no higher in a discrimination of values and in an understanding of supreme value, or
in comprehension of a possible objective source and sustainer of supreme value which is itself supreme discriminator of value? Naive pantheism suggests a total lack of discrimination of value. As a student of mine once said, "you must go deeper than the bark for contact with God."* Is such a primitive pantheism a challenging alternative to a scientific world view without God, based on philosophical materialism? Actually, with the great so-called pantheistic literature east and west, the Upanishads, Spinoza's Ethic, Wordsworth's poems, there is always a profundity that exceeds the lower pantheism just described. We turn to this more serious interpretation of the divine.

3. Philosophic or higher Pantheism. In this mode of thinking about deity God is the metaphysical Whole, profounder in its ultimate depth and reality than any finite part or phenomenon of "nature" as we, through sensation, perceive her. God is Nature with a capital "N." To put ourselves in the mood of philosophical pantheism we must attempt to distinguish between surface "nature," or bare "physical nature," and the deeper metaphysical world. Surface nature would be only that aspect which we finite, sensory beings know, whereas the "metaphysical world" would be that vast increment over and beyond our finite perception, which we do not and perhaps may never entirely know or fully experience or understand. Philosophic pantheism thinks of God as "immanent" in, or identified with, this larger metaphysical world, i.e. with Nature in broadest and profoundest depth. The Divine is more in its all-inclusive reality than any superficial part

*Louise Simon, Spring, 1959.
or phenomenon that may be sentiently and limitedly perceived; though, of course, the sentient level of reality is an aspect, or "mode," of God, as Spinoza would have said. The concept of Brahman in philosophic Vedantic Hinduism, Plotinus's One, the Taoists' Tao, Spinoza's Substance, Hegel's Absolute Reason, Bradley's Absolute Experience or Feeling, even Herbert Spencer's Unknowable Source of all being, may be regarded as representative interpretations of the ultimate Whole that transcends finite distinctions. Let us try to suggest by a diagram the difference between the two kinds of pantheism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naive pantheism</th>
<th>Philosophical pantheism</th>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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</table>

Several distinguishing characteristics or types of this profounder pantheism should be noted:

1. All of these systems agree that all finite things are aspects, parts, or modes of the Absolute Being, no one of which fully expresses or exhausts its Nature. God is the maximal principle of eternal and abiding wholeness and obviously we finite observers cannot be acquainted with the Whole in all of its ramifying relations and processes.

2. With some thinkers the quality of abstract "reason," or of "feeling," or of "striving will" is the most distinctive thing to say about the ultimate nature of the Whole, e.g. as
respectively, with Spinoza or Hegel, or with Bradley or Schopenhauer.

3. With others, the deepest nature of the Absolute transcends reason, or will, or any other finite "mode." Brahman in Vedanta Hinduism, or the Tao in Taoism, transcends anything that can be said or known about it. Plotinus expressly placed his One, and F.H. Bradley ultimately his Absolute, beyond intellectual description, though Bradley said "feeling" came nearer to expressing the nature of the Absolute than any other finite experience.

4. In some systems (and here we depart from the strict pantheistic idea, in the view of this writer) the insight is that the Absolute is Personal Being, more like the traditional idealism of Ramanuja, 11th century A.D. Hindu philosopher, or the modern American idealists, Josiah Royce and Borden Parker Bowne.

5. In many of these systems human "society" is the highest expression of the Absolute on the plane of finite life and history.

6. In some of these higher pantheisms, as for example the tendency in Hinduism, the finite material aspect of the world, with its main quality of many separate individual things, is regarded as illusory, "unreal appearance"; or at least ultimately unreal though perhaps for the here and now temporarily "real." Since Brahman, the absolute Whole of being, is absolute unitary Spirit, how can there be in the long run many material individual things?

7. Also characteristic of Vedanta Hinduism is the idea
that finite selves are but expressions of the one absolute "Self" or Life of Brahman. The following paragraphs from The Bhagavad Gita, the most popular Hindu Scripture, and from Sankara, greatest medieval interpreter of orthodox Hinduism (9th century A.D.), illustrate many of the general characteristics of philosophic pantheism. Following these selections from Hindu thought we quote F.H. Bradley's now classic passages on the nature of the Absolute, in which he denies personality to ultimate Being and Reality.
The Bhagavad Gita on Brahman

(Most popular Hindu Scripture, 2nd Century A.D.)

The personified Ultimate in the form of the god

Krishna speaks:

"I am the source of the forthgoing of the whole universe and likewise the place of its dissolving. There is naught whatsoever higher than I... All this is threaded on me, as rows of pearls on a string.

"I am the sapidity in waters... the radiance in moon and sun... the word of power in all the Vedas, sound in either, and virility in men... the life in all beings am I... not I in them, but they in me.

"All this world... this divine illusion of mine, caused by the qualities, is hard to pierce; they who come to me, they cross over this illusion." (Robt. D. Ballou, The Bible of the World, p. 93.)

"The man who casts off all desires and walks without desire, with no thought of a Mine and of an I, comes unto peace.

This is the state of abiding in Brahma, O son of Pritha. He that has come therein is not confounded; if even at his last hours he dwell in it, he passes to extinction in Brahma!" (Hindu Scriptures, ed. Nicol Macinol, p. 235.)
Sankara on Brahman

(Sankara, orthodox Hindu philosopher, 788-820 A.D.,
This selection was taken from Hartshorne and Reese:
Philosophers Speak of God, Univ. of Chicago Press,
1953, p. 170ff.)

"Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers,
whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom,
exists...Brahman as the eternal subject...(the inward Self) is never
an object, and...the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of
knowledge, etc....is fictitiously created....That same Highest
Brahman constitutes—as we know from passages such as 'that art thou'—
the real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature, i.e.
that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting conditions,
is not its real nature....the True, the Real, the Self, whose nature is
pure intelligence...knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable,
 eternal Cognition...lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one
with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is
unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such passages as
'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman!...There is
only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition,
and who....manifests himself in various ways...A man may, in the dark,
mistake a piece of rope for a snake, and run away from it, frightened
and trembling; thereupon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid,
it is only a rope, not a snake'; and he may then dismiss the fear
caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the
presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the
rope being a snake, made no difference whatever in the rope itself.
Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nesience makes it appear different... As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist, as some do \textit{e.g.} the Sankhya Hindus\footnote{In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert)—so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman... the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen... Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but does not really become so; and just as the ether, although imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble, although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled with water in which the sun's light is reflected; thus the Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt by that part of him which is called the individual soul.} on a plurality of Selves....

"In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert)—so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman... the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen... Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but does not really become so; and just as the ether, although imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble, although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled with water in which the sun's light is reflected; thus the Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt by that part of him which is called the individual soul."
Sankara on Knowledge of Brahman

(From Robert D. Ballou, The Bible of the World, p. 141-2)

"The spirit is smothered, as it were, by ignorance, but so soon as ignorance is destroyed, spirit shines forth, like the sun when released from clouds. After the soul, afflicted by ignorance, has been purified by knowledge, knowledge disappears, as the seed or berry of the Kataka after it has purified water.

"Like an image in a dream the world is troubled by love, hatred, and other poisons. So long as the dream lasts, the image appears to be real; but on awaking it vanishes.

"The world appears real, as an oyster-shell appears to be silver; but only so long as the Brahman remains unknown, he who is above all, and invisible. That Being, true, intelligent, comprehends within itself every variety of being, penetrating and permeating all as a thread which strings together beads.

"In consequence of possessing divers attributes, the supreme existence appears manifold, but when the attributes are annihilated, unity is restored....

"All that belongs to the body (must be considered) as the product of ignorance... 'I am Brahman. Because I am distinct from body, I experience neither birth, old age, decrepitude, nor extinction, and detached from organs of sense, I have no longer any connection with their objects, such as sound.

"This conception, 'I am Brahman itself,' incessantly entertained, disperses the hallucinations born of ignorance, as medicine disperses sickness."
"Seated in a desert place, exempt from passion, master of his senses, let man represent to himself this spirit, one and infinite, without allowing his thoughts to stray elsewhere.

"Considering the visible universe as annihilated in spirit, let a man, pure through intelligence, constantly contemplate the One Spirit, as he might contemplate luminous ether.

"The Yogin, possessing perfect discernment, contemplates all things as subsisting in himself, and thus, by the eye of knowledge, discovers that all is the One Spirit. He knows that all this movable world is spirit or that beyond spirit there is nothing; as all varieties of vase are clay, so all things he sees are spirit."
F. H. Bradley on the Absolute

(Francis Herbert Bradley, 1846-1924, took Hegelian "absolute idealism" to its high water mark in England toward an impersonalistic interpretation of Ultimate Reality. We here quote his works Appearance and Reality and Truth and Reality.)

"...In its general character Reality is present in knowledge and truth...But this general character of Reality is not Reality itself...Truth...cannot be intellectually transcended. To fill in its conditions would be to pass into a whole beyond mere intellect. (AR 547).

"Reality for me...is one individual Experience...a higher unity above our immediate experience...above all ideality and relations...above thought and will and aesthetic perception.... Such a whole is Reality, and as against this whole, truth is merely ideal....It is Reality appearing and expressing itself in that onesided way which we call ideal (TR 343).

"Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself (AR 137).

"And Reality is...the sole perfect realization of spirit... Reality is spiritual. There is a great saying of Hegel's...and one which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with something not very different, something perhaps more certainly the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there is not, and cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real. (AR 552'.)
"The absolute holds all possible content in an individual experience where no contradiction can exist (AR 147).

"Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity. To suppose the universe plural is therefore to contradict oneself and, after all, to suppose that it is one. Add one world to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each the finite appearance of a higher and single Reality...

"We have an idea of this unity which, to some extent, is positive...(AR 519-20).

"Are we then to assert that the Absolute consists of souls?...
The Absolute would not consist of souls. Such a phrase implies a mode of union which we cannot regard as ultimate. It suggests that in the Absolute finite centers are maintained and respected, and that we may consider them, as such, to persist and to be merely ordered and arranged. But not like this (we have seen) is the final destiny and last truth of things. We have a re-arrangement not merely of things but of their internal elements. We have an all-pervasive transformation with a re-blending of all material. And we can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things, when the things, as such, are there transmuted and have lost their individual natures...

"Once give up your finite and mutable person, and you have parted with everything which, for you, makes personality important... For me it is sufficient to know, on one side, that the Absolute is not a finite person. Whether, on the other side, personality in an eviscerated remnant of sense can be applied to it, is a question
intellectually unimportant and practically trifling.

"With regard to the personality of the Absolute we must guard against two-sided errors. The Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true. And yet in these denials we may be falling into worse mistakes...But it is better in this connection to call it super-personal (AR 529-533).

"A person...to me must be finite, or must cease to be personal (TR 449).

"I refer to the 'personality' of God and the 'immortality' of the soul. I shall assume here, rightly or wrongly, that a personal God is not the ultimate truth about the universe, and in that ultimate truth would be included and superseded by something higher than personality. A God that can say to himself 'I' as against you and me, is not in my judgment defensible as the last and complete truth for metaphysics...(TR 432).

"...I cannot accept a personal God as an ultimate truth...The highest Reality so far as I can see, must be super-personal (TR 436).

"A doctrine such as the personality of God may be true, as giving in an imperfect and incorrect manner a most essential feature of reality which cannot as well be given otherwise. And the doctrine may be necessary, perhaps, as being for a certain vital purpose the best idea that we can conceive, and the supreme belief on which we have to act. But, however this may be, if we go further and take personality as being the last word about the Universe, we fall, in my opinion, into serious error (TR 451).

"The absolute for me cannot be God of traditional faith and religion, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite
will. When you begin to worship the Absolute, you in that moment have transformed it. It has become something forthwith which is less than the Universe...TI(R428).

We here pause in our consideration of the higher pantheism for a clearer definition of this term as we will use it in this study. The word pantheism as describing an idea of God has possibly three main elements: (1) the idea of God as "everywhere;" or (2) as totally immanent (Hartshorne and Reese in Philosophers Speak of God); and (3) the main meaning in which we intend to use the term hereafter—any conception of God as the whole of reality which tends to deny personality to the whole. (Accordingly, Josiah Royce is not a "pantheist," as he is sometimes labeled, but a theist, as is the Hindu Ramanuja. We reserve to a later place the clarification of the term theism as referring to the personalistic idea of God.)

Concerning the idea of God's "immanence," we should recall that the higher philosophical pantheisms just mentioned consider the Absolute or ultimate Whole of Being as always more than any known finite aspect of the world. With these systems, therefore, it is clearer to say that the world is immanent in the Absolute Being, rather than the other way, as indeed we heard the Bhagavad-Gita announce. As the philosophical pantheist might state it, "What we know about God is limited; but God is not limited to what we know." Thus a profound reverence, born of our ignorance, before the Great Whole of Being, is always present in the finer side of the pantheistic outlook.

Evaluation. Our discussion has just brought out that some idealisms may be called pantheistic, if their conception of the
Whole is impersonalistic. The criticisms of pantheisms and such idealisms, then, are similar. The main questions that may be raised about pantheism are the following:

1. **What value and freedom do finite individuals have when merged with the Whole?** Eastern pantheistic religions tend to lose sight of the significance of the individual, of individuality and personality.

2. **What about evil?** Are all distinctions of good and bad, all value, lost in such pantheistic Whole or Absolute? Some of the classic scriptures just quoted suggest this. Is there a connection between some of the traditional, practical apathy toward concrete evils, such as the caste system in India, and its pantheistic philosophy? (We know, of course, that Hindus themselves have criticized caste; and it is the fact today that it is not recognized legally in India.)

3. **If the ultimate Whole is trans-personal and unknowable in any finite terms, we cannot establish any personal religious attitude toward it.** One cannot pray or have fellowship with the impersonality of the Whole, as Bradley quite rightly pointed out. The personal "God" of human religion, Bradley declared, has only a symbolical function: "God" as the object of religion is the imaginary focal point of man's highest form of social integration. He concluded that individual religious consciousness, involving the conception of a personal God, is a finite example of "appearance," "mere illusion" and not reality (TR L34). The mysticism of the east tends to bear out Bradley's logical analysis at this point. Hinduism in its advanced mystical disciplines (e.g. the discipline of the Yagin), and particularly early Buddhism, emphasized the flight from personality
as the way of salvation, the getting beyond individual life, bodily and psychic, back to the whole of Brahman or to the absolute "emptiness" of Nirvana. Accordingly, from two of the scriptures we hear the Yogan say:

"The Yogan in the highest meditation is void within and without like a pot in the world-space. He is also, like a pot in the ocean, full within and without...he should give up personal thoughts. He should abandon all thoughts subjective and objective. The external universe is created by our thoughts, as also the imaginary world...A Yogi in highest meditation...does not know himself and others" (Ballou 114)

"...union (or Yoga) is achieved through the subjugation of the psychic nature...These are the difficulty-producing hinderances: avidya (ignorance), the sense of personality, desire, hate and the sense of attachment...When the chitta (mind stuff) becomes absorbed in that which is the reality (or idea embodied in the form), and is unaware of separateness or the personal self, this is contemplation or Samadhi." (Ballou 116-9)

4. In so far as pantheism identifies God with the world substance or process, emphasizing the divine "immanence" at the expense of a possible "transcendent" aspect, the tendency is to relate God, without adequate distinction of values, too closely with human life, imperfect human decisions, history, and institutions. For example, Hegel blandly wrote that 19th century Prussian society was the highest expression of the Divine Life! A related problem with historic pantheisms and "nature religions" has been their tendency to limit the divine to the procreative process of life, as is characteristic of fertility cults ancient and modern. Again the case of India at the level of some of
In sum the main problem with philosophic pantheisms seems to lie in an ill-defined concept of "God as the 'Whole." No doubt the concept of God as the Whole is a fruitful one, if we mean mainly God's power or will which is in control of the whole, from the standpoint of an ultimate realization of value. The divine "wholeness" and "control" must have essentially a moral meaning, to the effect that evil shall not ultimately prevail, but that good shall. And if the main meaning of God's wholeness is moral, this would at once leave place for finite freedom and decision as being a provision of the ultimate moral wholeness of God. For if God is "morally whole," he would desire freedom in his finite creatures, not a pre-determined nature in them. If God is morally whole he would approach his free creatures on the basis of love, the free persuasive power of intellectual values and ideals, and in terms of free, personal fellowship and communion. And he would have established a world order conducive to such free and moral relationships, i.e. be, and keep himself, duly transcendent by his own moral self-limitation. Along this avenue of insight, the concept of God as the "whole" is fruitful. In sum, if God is the "whole" we must conceive this "wholeness" in moral, rather than in substantive or ontological terms, or too immanentist terms.

If God is thought of as the "whole" we must not be confused by too mechanical or quantitative understanding of his wholeness. We do not have to think of God's private being, in the most intimate reaches of his selfhood, as extending, in a spacial metaphor, throughout the whole as air fills a room, any more than our own highest or deepest psychic life need be identified with every aspect of the bodily
organism. We are not totally our own livers or toenails! Some of God's being may be in the part; but we cannot say without confusion that all of his being lodges in any one finite part. There may remain an innermost or a highest, personal aspect of God that transcends any and all of the parts—alogically as we ourselves in our own innermost personal selfhood seem to transcend any and all our bodily parts, though at the level of our voluntary action we can control many of them. As Brightman wisely states in a discussion on mysticism, "monism" need not be "identified with pantheism," but may "be taken to mean the view that a unitary spirit of good controls the universe" (APR 171). This discussion, of course, brings us to the edge of our human knowledge as to just how spirit relates to nature, and we reserve for a later place in our study a fuller discussion of how we believe the Divine Spirit does relate. It must suffice here to conclude that the concept of God's moral wholeness is intimately implied in the concept of the divine "Personality;" for how could there be "moral wholeness" without self-conscious being constituting such wholeness? And the idea of the Personality of God is precisely the point at which many philosophical pantheisms seem most confused.

There is a slightly different way of stating the criticism of God's immanence in the world. Ultimately philosophic pantheism is subject to the same criticism as naive pantheism. The concept of immanence is the authentic and predominating mood of classic pantheism. Even though the farther reaches of Deity are "beyond" what we may know of nature, beyond any finite, individual "mode," nevertheless the point of classic pantheism seems to be that nature, even that phenomenal aspect of her which we do know, is absolutely necessary to the being of God. Without nature as we know her there could not be "God"—she is,
as she is, an intimate and necessary expression of his life and being. A more discriminating theology, however, may conceive the possibility that, were nature here or not, God still might be, in some transcendent and private aspect of his being. Such aspect of God would harbor good that is yet unrealized by nature and finite process, or good that judges the evil in finite nature and process. Pantheistic theology makes God captive to the world (and to its evil)—e.g., Shiva on his destructive side; whereas a more theistic theology conceives the world to be the child of God, growing into likeness of the Father, whom the Father creates, loves, cherishes, suffers for, and hopes for, even chastens. In a pantheistic theology God is totally dependent upon the world; in a theistic view, the world is dependent on a free and moral, Creative Father.

Central to the conscience of pantheism, of course, is the problem of the world's evil. In the same mood in which it thinks of every finite thing as a necessary emanation of Brahman it shrinks away from the moral implication of this affirmation and tends to deny any reality to the world. Classic pantheism is caught between the extremes of believing that the world is real on the one hand (Śāṅkhya—extreme dualism), and that of denying that the world is real in any sense at all on the other (extreme Vedānta, or monism). This unstable tension results from the undiscriminating philosophy of immanence.

To do justice to all aspects of our problem here, in behalf of an integral theism, it is probably better to say that nature is an "intimate and necessary expression" of God's creative love, and its power. Thus, such a theism may be disposed to say, indeed with pantheism, that the world of manifested form is, or may be, a continuing and eternal realization of the divine moral intent. In this sense, therefore, God is never without his world, as the posit of his moral will—but to say
that he is "never without his world" is not to say that he must be identified totally with his world, in the sense of an exhaustive, ontological, or immanentist monism.

Later on in our reconstruction of the problem of God's relation to the world, we will use pantheism's immanent idea, but it will be less rigid, more open—indeed open and dynamic as are the conceptions of energy and spirit, which we there employ.
Conceptions of God as Cosmic Process

There have been forms of philosophy which have thought of the ultimate, or absolute, like pantheism, as primarily an immanent principle, but have regarded it as dynamic, striving force, rather than as static or perfected being. One of these systems is that of the 19th century philosopher Schopenhauer, who conceived the ultimate principle in terms of a sub-personal, cosmic will, a desiring or striving life-force. Here we use the term in connection with Schopenhauer, we might say that desire, or will, at the heart of all life. This mute, cosmic impulse, or "world will" has its highest expression in man's life of rational reflection, in "ideas," said Schopenhauer. But as finite life endeavors to express the cosmic will it does so imperfectly, it meets with conflict and frustration and ends in pessimism. Hence the aim of life, or life's wisdom, should be, according to Schopenhauer, to overcome desire, that is, essentially to deny life's primal impulse. (We observe, of course, that Schopenhauer's philosophy here reminds us of Buddhistic thinking.)

The dynamism of Schopenhauer's brand of pantheism, however, points to the philosophies which have stressed cosmic or evolutionary process as giving the best clue to the idea of God or Deity. With this reference then to 19th and 20th century vitalisms (in which we would include, in addition to Schopenhauer's, the thought of Nietzsche and of the early Bergson, each of whom presented a related form of the idea of the ultimate as vitality itself), we pass next to consideration of two evolutionary naturalisms that have been prominent in our time. They are highly articulate efforts to reconstruct the conception of God in terms of scientific pragmatism and optimistic humanism. Why we
classify them as impersonalistic conceptions will be made clear by the following discussion.

Somewhat more precisely than our above title, we should say that we are about to describe conceptions of God on the impersonal plane, which focus initial interest upon the integrative, or evolutionary process of nature, with its outcome in values. Although we believe that the two systems described below are impersonalistic conceptions, the reader should bear in mind that there are also theistic or personalistic views of God as cosmic process, or types of theistic naturalism. We mention these in due time. From the frequently abstract and mystical concept, God as the Whole of Being, which we studied in pantheism, we now move to what would be called by its adherents a very concrete and "scientific" view.

1. The conception of Critical Naturalism (Naturalistic Humanism): God as the human aspiration for ideal values. In this view the source and sum of values is found in our finite human, personal and social experience. God is man's idealizing imagination, the human aspiration for the good, the true, and the beautiful. The good would be concretely defined as all democratic and humane values: political democracy, respect for individuality in the process of justice, international order, world peace and government, economic well-being, racial harmony and equality, physical and mental health, education, love, veracity, honesty, and above and integrating all, "scientific intelligence."
These ideal values are conceived as subjective "projections" within man's mind. Our ideals are "projections" in the sense that they are constructions of human rational imagination as it anticipates future good and seeks its realization, and thus seem to be beyond, and other than, what we now are. Accordingly, the traditional idea of "God" as an objective reality is explained in this psychological way. "God" would be "objective" for critical naturalism only in the sense that our ideal values are as yet unrealized in time and space, out before us, or ahead, or "beyond" us, as it were; whereas actually "God" has only a psychological, subjective meaning in man's mind. The term "God" refers to a true psychological function, and as such has psychological status, but is not an objective or ontological, cosmic reality outside of man. Such a subjective concept of God the 19th century European philosophers Feuerbach and Compte, and in our own time the American John Dewey, have presented to the modern mind. It is undoubtedly a major alternative, and challenge to traditional idealisms and theisms. This system is "impersonalistic" because it conceives that human life, which is capable of knowing and foreseeing values, has arisen out of a non-conscious or impersonal process of nature. The sole seat and locus of value is the human mind. Beyond or outside the human mind there is no "value" anywhere in the universe; if man were not here there would be no "values."

This point of view is, of course, opposite to traditional personalistic theism, which has held that, whatever his more intimate relations with human life may be, "God" is to be conceived as cosmically objective or real. After attempting to diagram this philosophy of religion in the following way, we quote from John Dewey's A Common Faith.
"...the word 'God'...denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions. Does the unification have a claim upon our attitude and conduct because it is already, apart from us, in realized existence, or because of its own inherent meaning and value? Suppose for the moment that the word 'God' means the ideal ends that at a given time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take on unity. If we make this supposition, the issue will stand out clearly in contrast with the doctrine of religions that 'God' designates some kind of Being having prior and therefore non-ideal existence....

"...the idea of God, or, to avoid misleading conceptions,...the idea of the divine...is...one of the ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God, or of the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces and conditions—including man and human association—that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals.
They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God"....

"There exist concretely and experimentally goods—the values of art in all its forms, of knowledge, of effort and of rest after striving, of education and fellowship, of friendship and love, of growth in mind and body. These goods are there and yet they are relatively embryonic.... A clear and intense conception of a union of ideal ends with actual conditions is capable of arousing steady [religious] emotion." (ACF 42,50-51)

This quotation reveals that for Dewey God is cosmic process at that highest level of activity in which men realize, or achieve, their "ideal" values. Because of its general force and vigor Naturalism seems undoubtedly to be for modern Western man a major alternative to the Judeo-Christian-Platonic idealist way of understanding the universe which, in general terms (and with a few exceptions), was the predominant philosophy in the West until modern times. If this evaluation of Critical Naturalism is correct, we should now examine it more fully as a philosophy, in order to understand the background that leads up to the "religious apex" of this philosophy of John Dewey. After a general analysis, we shall evaluate the major metaphysical premises of this philosophy, ending with its treatment of value, wherein lies its concept of "God."

By way of introduction we should mention that, historically, there have come to be three major forms of naturalism: one, classic materialism of the 19th century and prior; two, critical naturalism of the 20th century, based upon, but by no means identical to, classic
materialism; and three, metaphysical and theistic naturalism. The systems of Juan Christian Smuts, Henry Nelson Wieman, C. Lloyd Morgan, S. Alexander, Alfred North Whitehead, John Elof Bodin, Lecomte du Nouy, and Teilhard De Chardin may be cited as eloquent representatives of metaphysical naturalism, ranging from non-theistic to theistic varieties.

The new naturalism implies in part its criticism of the older "reductive" materialism. By way of introductory comment, the principal emphasis and concepts of this newer position are:

(a) Its stress of the terms "organism" and "life" rather than "mechanism," recognizing that an organism with its self-motion and teleological characteristics is not a "mechanism" as a watch or an automobile is. It accepts organic and teleological categories as basic in the description of reality, or at least certain levels of reality on the animal and human plane.

(b) Possibly secondly in importance and stemming from what has just been said, critical naturalism stresses the qualitative world of values in all its forms, which the human type of organism perceives and cherishes. Whereas values were a problem in the older materialism, critical naturalism takes values seriously. Values, it says, are at least temporarily real, significant aspects of the world. Instead of reducing all things to the plane of non-living matter or energy, as the older materialism did, critical naturalism raises the interpretation of reality to the level of finite life and mind with the special significance that such mind gives to things in its valuing response. Therefore, such values as freedom, love, democracy, aesthetic experiences, etc., are cherished.
(c) This system is critical, however, in another direction. It is critical of all and sundry attempts to develop a "depth" metaphysics. It is mainly non-metaphysical and positivistic. It would say that the materialist "metaphysics" of the older sort was misguided, because it attempted to say, rather dogmatically, what "ultimate reality" is. And for the same reason it says that idealistic or supernaturalistic "metaphysics" is misguided. As to what are ultimate beings and causes critical naturalism remains noncommittal, agnostic if not sceptical. Its main attitude is "pragmatic": "What good does so called metaphysical knowledge do us?" it asks. Critical naturalism does not think it necessary or profitable to inquire into the nature of ultimate reality. It feels that metaphysical "substances," "miracles" or "powers" beyond nature are not necessary for an explanation of nature. It relies on experience in its outward scientific sense. It attempts to limit its terms and concepts to those of natural science, of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the sociological sciences. The role of philosophy, rather than to delve into the problem of ultimate being, is to define clearly the terms current in the positive sciences, and attempt to relate and integrate scientific knowledge on the widest front for the highest human good. In its criticism of metaphysics the spirit of Comte pervades modern naturalism, and the various sectarian movements within naturalism, such as "logical positivism," "analytic philosophy," and "existentialism." Modern naturalism is the system of Aristotle shorn of its metaphysical commitments, that is, Aristotle's concepts of the Active or Cosmic Intellect and the principle of Cosmic teleology in "God" the Unmoved Mover. Let us summarize this kind of naturalism in contrast to the older materialism by using parallel columns:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19th Century Materialism</th>
<th>20th Century Naturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was a metaphysical theory and dogmatic, said definitely what ultimate reality is, i.e. material atoms or energies.</td>
<td>Non-metaphysical and positivistic, unwilling to say definitely what ultimate reality is—metaphysical speculation fruitless, if not erroneous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of over-simplification: committed the reductive or genetic fallacy and was too monistic.</td>
<td>World is complex; the qualitative levels are real and significant; more pluralistic emphasis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms: matter, motion, mechanism, force.</td>
<td>Terms: events, qualities, relations, process, interaction, organism, life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Nature&quot; tended to mean only inorganic matter in motion: no place for value in its scheme.</td>
<td>&quot;Nature&quot; includes the entire complexity of the world: living beings, persons, values, as well as lower material forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterministic and mechanistic: no room for purpose.</td>
<td>Purpose and freedom on the human level is stressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tended to disregard significance of human values: no place for religion. Tended toward agnosticism and atheism.</td>
<td>Takes values seriously: in some forms makes place for religion as highest human emotion. &quot;God&quot; defined as the human aspiration for ideal values (Dewey) or in some systems the tendency of nature to bring into being and support values (Whitehead, Wieman, etc.—see below on metaphysical and religious naturalism).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
"Science" limited to the natural sciences.

"Science" is broadened to include the sciences of humanity: sociology, psychology, ethics, history, etc.

As for the older or 19th century materialism which critical naturalism has replaced, Sir William Dawpier, historian of science, writes of the demise of the former in the following terms:

"...The old materialism is dead, and even the electrons, which for a time replaced particles of matter, have become but disembodied ghosts, mere wave-forms. They are not even waves in our familiar space, or in Maxwell's aether, but in a four dimensional space-time, which our minds cannot picture in comprehensible terms.

...Thus matter, which seemed so familiar, resistant and eternal to nineteenth-century materialists, has become incredibly complex; it is scattered as minute electrons in the vast empty spaces of atoms, or as wave-groups which somehow pervade the whole of them, and, moreover, is vanishing into radiation, even from our Sun alone at the rate of 250 million tons a minute." (History of Science 3rd edition, p. 470-1)

John Dewey's philosophy. We are now prepared to explain in some detail the philosophy of critical naturalism as it considers the basic issues of being, change or process, truth and value. As vehicle for this task we use the system of the late John Dewey, who, in terms of worldwide influence, has been an outstanding representative of critical naturalism.

Being. The basic ontological category is that of "nature," with a small "n." Nature, however, is not necessarily a single being.

No one factor of nature, as experience reveals it to us, is to be taken
as a metaphysical ultimate or absolute. This system wants to get away from metaphysical ultimates and absolutes. Rather multifarious facts are present to form the qualitative (or real) world of our experience on both the common-place and scientific levels. The only "nature" allowed is the observed nature of many forces, energies, processes, events, interactions, and qualities. The naturalistic view of being is a pluralistic view. In fact, rather than to speak of "being," it is perhaps more in keeping with the spirit of the new naturalism to speak of "beings." Indeed, lest the very word being or beings implies something ultimate and absolute in the sense of the older metaphysics, it is probably best in the long run to revert to "event," as a term with less metaphysical freightage than "being." Some main events, then, that naturalism perceives going on in our universe are the following:

Events that physics and chemistry describe, such as electronic, magnetic, gravitational, radiational, etc.

Vital events, such as organic species living and striving with environment in order to survive and evolve; the experience of color, or pain, etc.

Psychological events, such as imagining, reasoning, remembering, loving, etc.

Sociological and historic events, such as New York City, the invasion of Normandy, Harvard College in session in 1966, etc.

Activity and process. As our last paragraph suggests, critical naturalists speak more of activities and processes than they do of kinds of being. This point of critical naturalism follows in the tradition of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus. In this philosophy nature is conceived as activity and process more than
anything else. The activities and processes are interacting and "striving." The kinds of "beings" or objects we have in the world are the results of immediate adjustment or equilibrium of stresses arising in the course of nature's interacting energies. These results may be called "events" or "qualities." Thus water is the event or quality of equilibrium resulting from the interaction of Hydrogen and Oxygen, which in their turn at their atomic stage are the result of interacting electronic and protonic energies. Further examples of reality as interacting processes are: vision is the equilibrium resulting from the interaction of an eye with its environment (indeed this implies the entire evolutionary history of the organism or species as it has interacted with the environment in such a way as to yield organs of vision as a result); mental qualities, for example, "reason" or abstract thinking is a practical kind of adjustment that life on the human plane makes as it interacts with environment; a human society represents still another kind of equilibrium. Atoms, water, vision, reasoning, a society, and so on are functions of nature's interacting energies in various phases. Critical Naturalists wish to avoid the notion of "levels," or super-ordinate "stages," or echelons of being, as descriptive of reality, elsewhere suggested in this study. They prefer to say that nature's activities proceed on one plane, fearing apparently that a doctrine of levels might commit them to some of the fallacies of the older metaphysics. (Y.H. Krikorian, et. al. Naturalism and the Human Spirit, Columbia Univ. Press, 1941, p. 284-5).

We summarize the naturalistic account of truth and value, and its account of mind, from which the problems of truth and value arise, as follows: "intelligence" is a derivative, functional phenomenon which
has arisen as the result of life's interaction with the environment. It is a tool or instrument, developed to a high degree of perfection in the struggles for survival in one of nature's primate species. It has a pragmatic origin. Thus the qualities of, or the content of intelligence—mathematical ideas, moral conceptions, sentient and aesthetic experiences—are conceived only in an instrumental way. When the interaction of life with environment ceases, "mind," and its content of "truth" and "values" will cease to exist. However, while mind, truth, and values do exist as functional qualities they are temporarily "real" and significant. But "mind," or "consciousness," or "personality," has no permanent reality. In fact, it is wiser to avoid noun-words such as "consciousness" or "mind" as descriptive of these phases of natural functioning. These noun terms suggest metaphysical substantiveness, and this is precisely what should be omitted from consideration. It is better to employ the functional terms of thinking, perceiving, willing, in referring to an organism's awareness of its environment and its own existence. If the terms "mind" or "consciousness" are sometimes used in a noun sense, it is strictly a symbolic use—the poetic license that is allowed within the system. "Mind" has a quasi-objective existence or embodiment in the strictly human "universe of discourse," that is, in the various media of social interactivity. Of these media human speech or language is primary. Speech is as much a natural energy as any other. Nature comes to flower, as it were, in human "discourse." The thistle blossom suggests a kind of diagram for Dewey's system:
From the side of the environment...

The use of stream of energies as a system of events.

From the side of the organism...
Human society in its best sense of free democracy, the cultural forms of art and religion, etc., is nature in its highest fulfillment. At this level the word "science" takes on its widest human meaning. "Science" stands ultimately for those sociological disciplines that will relate men harmoniously and well. We have seen that even the term "God" may enter the system at this level. According to John Dewey "God" is the symbolic term standing for the highest human values or ideal aspirations. God is a subjective, psychological factor. As naturalism speaks of God in these terms and sees value in religion as highest human emotion it may be designated "religious humanism."

Criticism. We will center our critique on critical naturalism's philosophy of "man" and "mind." Naturalism insists that "metaphysical" questions (the problem of ultimate beings, causes, meanings, or purposes) need not be included in a mature philosophy. But if this is true, then it is strange that man finds all the "metaphysical" questions at the very heart of his life of inquiry: Where did the world, where did life come from? What is mind and consciousness? What is the meaning of life—the purpose of existence? Is there some over-all plan, an all-wise and all-able Being or Power who presides over it? Can we avoid metaphysical questions? In the ethical field, take the problem: on what standard should we base conduct? The general reply of the pragmatic naturalists is "success at living." But to define "success" we must first define what "living best" means, and also whose success? But this involves the questions of "what life is, what man is? Our ethics (our conception of human duties and conduct) will undoubtedly differ as we make different replies to the question, What is man? But this
question is "metaphysical" in the old-fashioned sense, for it involves the issues of whether man is free, what his relation to the world of nature may be, to a possible Supreme Being, the status of his personal consciousness, etc. It is intrinsic to the life of consciousness to raise the question whether it itself is something ultimate and permanent, in contrast to the non-conscious flux in the midst of which naturalism assumes consciousness arises as an impermanent quality of interacting material forces. A strange anomaly indeed that a non-conscious nature produces a creature who can sit in judgment upon the very process that has brought it forth. According to naturalism personal consciousness is but a derived, caused, and passing quality, while personal consciousness itself fondly hopes that it may be the primordial, causal, and permanent quality, or at least related to what is fundamentally or cosmically causal and permanent.

The form of critical naturalism just discussed is a sophisticated materialism. Indeed it is critical of the old reductive materialism on the one hand, and of idealistic or supernaturalistic "transcendentalism" on the other. It believes that it can maintain a middle position, the assumption that nature is capable of producing conscious life and values as her chief pride and glory, without grounding conscious life and values in anything more than pre-conscious "material" flux. The chief problem is that an immanent capacity of some sort on nature's part for conscious life and values is assumed. The main question, then, asked of critical naturalism is the one asked of the old materialism: how can the motion (or interaction) of non-conscious forces (or events) produce consciousness? To say that "matter" (or with the newer naturalism, that "events," "qualities," and "relations"), the non-conscious forces of nature, are endowed with potential consciousness or the possibility of
of consciousness seems very nearly, again in the words of Sir William Dampier, to be "an assumption of the very thing to be explained, a restatement of the problem at issue." (History of Science, op. cit. p. 206.)

The point of ultimate ambiguity with Dewey is that he does not clarify what the "roots," "the natural conditions," or "something" in nature is that gives rise to, or makes value possible, when man appears; he does not explain what constitutes the seat, conditions, status, or nature of value at the stage of cosmic process prior to, or below, the coming of man and his imaginative faculties. (A Common Faith, Yale 1934, p. 148; Intelligence in the Modern World, ed. Joseph Ratner, Random House, 1939, p. 104.) In the controversy concerning whether Dewey became a "theist" or not, succeeding the publication of his work A Common Faith, Corliss Lamont clarified the point in the negative by concluding that "...Dewey believed that the cosmos as a whole is neutral towards human aims and values." ("New Light on Dewey's Common Faith," Journal of Philosophy, Jan. 5, 1961, p. 23.)

The critical naturalist insists that consciousness or mind must be analyzed in an "empirical" or "scientific" manner and that mind can be thoroughly or completely explained by the "experimental" approach. (Krikorian, NES, op. cit., Ch. 11) But the question then arises, can all aspects of mind be so analyzed? Elsewhere in this study we suggest that certain elements of "mind" seem to elude, or defy, any other kind of analysis than an introspective or a priori one. This would contradict the main critical naturalist assumption that mind is totally subject to empirical analysis. For example, to review the matter briefly, the whole of our inner life is basically private. Our experience of ideation or thought, of self-transcendence and freedom, of feeling and emotion, (if others get to know about these things at all) are a report of the subject about himself. Would a chemical analysis of the brain ever
reveal the "blue rose" we have from time to time in this discussion imagined, or disclose or quantify one's thought of love for another? To say that these subjective experiences can have objective or behavioral manifestations or correlates is another problem. Indeed I can paint the blue rose, thus revealing to a psychological observer the artistic bent and character of my mind and personality; or I can solve a problem of ballistics by writing the equations on a blackboard and thus reveal to him my interest in physics. Or I can reveal that I was undecided which way to turn while I am driving my car, and thus disclose my freedom. By noting carefully the behavioral correlates of mind, psychological science can indeed say much about mind and predict much about it. But to say that these behavioral manifestations are mind and consciousness is to confuse effect with a cause, a derived level of interrelation, process, and being with a possible prior, originating level of process and being.

To summarize these main difficulties of critical naturalism:
(1) It arbitrarily rules out ultimate metaphysical questions as of little or no value. Yet these are the issues man is most concerned about.
(2) It begs the question and is basically contradictory in assuming that man's valuing consciousness is a natural product of a non-conscious nature. (3) It arbitrarily rules out an introspective method of studying consciousness or mind. Yet the main content of mind can be known only introspectively. (4) This system of thought leaves us with a "relativity of values," since it believes that there is no objective, cosmic standard of value beyond man. If it says that "man" is the standard, we raise the question "What is man?", or "What about or in the nature of man must necessarily lead to the humane valuing that Critical Naturalists desire?" Whose valuation is highest or best? Communists are just as sure of their ideals and "values" as westerners. A true philosophy
must distinguish between "ideals" as just any imaginary thought or fancy, and ideals as descriptive of the true good, constituted by objective and universal relations, as indeed Dewey himself affirmed in the significant quotation previously given. Why are the cherished values of the Critical Naturalist, of "love," "respect for personality," "democracy," etc., supreme? What gives them their authority and ultimacy? Do we not indeed have to look for a standard in man, but in man perhaps because in the man-producing universe as a whole, in a prior and permanent way? Would not lack of faith in a cosmic support of such values tend to cut the nerve of assurance about values and accordingly interest in values? Such was indeed the trend, at least for a while, in the "logical-positivistic" branch of naturalism, in A.J. Ayer and his followers, where they expressly ruled value thinking out as "illegitimate."

**Dualism vs. non-dualism as alleged crux of the controversy.**

Materialists and critical naturalists chide theistic naturalists and idealists for advocating "dualism"—that some kind of sharp, unnatural and unwarranted contrast or conflict exists in the latter thinking between "nature" and an alleged "supernature," between matter on the one hand and mind or spirit on the other. But is the real issue that of "dualism" vs. "non-dualism?" On their side, disavowing dualism, yet seeing the need for making place for mind, spirit, consciousness, personality, and value in the scheme of things, the higher materialists or critical naturalists believe they solve the problem by saying that nature, in certain types of interaction, is or can be "minded"—mind is explained in terms of "nature." (We have already suggested that this seems to "beg the question," to assume what we wish to prove).

On their side, however, are theistic naturalists and idealists incorrigible dualists (assuming that dualism is irrational or bad)?
Their general reply is that they avoid dualism in a better, more coherent way, and beg the question less than do critical naturalists. Their formula is essentially that mind can be embodied—nature is explained by mind, that is, either as a direct manifestation, or at least as the derived, or indirect, work of mind. They look to the traits of mind observable in nature, i.e. what seem to be her numerous purposive and intelligible structures, for a strong empirical support of their position. The over-all point of view of philosophies flowing from the idealistic and theistic traditions is that it is easier to explain nature—that is to say, more empirically coherent—in terms of purpose and mind than mind in terms of non-mental "nature."

We turn now to a variety of metaphysical naturalism, which we may term semi-theistic. While being consciously founded upon Dewey's main form of critical naturalism and "scientific empiricism," it takes a significant step beyond the system just described, in holding that values have a truly objective and cosmic source in nature herself as a whole, below, or out beyond, man. It is not fully "theistic" or "personalistic" because personality is denied to this objective source of value. The system, however, which we are about to review, does stand at the next level of thinking about deity, nearer to a full theistic idea. One further general comment before we proceed, the main difference between critical naturalism and metaphysical or theistic naturalisms is that the former denies a cosmic or trans-human support for values, while the latter affirm in various ways such a support. Their similarity lies in their naturalistic or "scientific" terminology and in their general empirical approach. For many philosophers metaphysical or theistic naturalism seems a wise compromise between, on the one hand, traditional forms of idealism, or dualism, and, on the other, materialism
and critical naturalism. Accordingly, in our present stage of thinking about deity as cosmic process, but still in the impersonal mood, we proceed to our fifth significant definition of God.

5. God as the objective tendency of nature to produce and support values; or as Henry Nelson Wieman speaks of this view: "God is that structure which sustains, promotes and constitutes supreme value" (in Religious Realism, ed. D.C. Macintosh, Macmillan, 1931, p. 155). Wieman subsumes his view of God under the terminology "Creative Event" or "Creative Good" of nature herself (The Source of Human Good, 1945). We may term this form of metaphysical naturalism semi-theistic, because it stops short of full personalistic theism, while at the same time it affirms a metaphysically objective source and status of values. We continue our description: the evolutionary process itself as a whole is interpreted teleologically and optimistically, that is, as containing an immanent "prupose" which realizes itself in new and higher forms of "creative good." God is the tendency in nature to produce and increase emergent values as new wholes of integrated structure. God is the principle of nature's certain growth or integration toward value. Nature is sure to integrate or emerge into new and higher wholes or forms of being, such as is found in human life, which can know and realize values. Nature guarantees that evaluating creatures like ourselves will come to be, and that the ideals they achieve will be the humane, democratic values common in western Judeo-Christian liberal society.

Brightman, commenting on the emergent evolution of Wieman and Alexander, says, "They differ from humanism /Critical Naturalism/ in their metaphysical objectivity. God is objectively real...and no
mere rationalization of subjective striving" (APR 156). In order to understand the full force of this position we discuss two terms, the concepts of "emergence" and "wholism," emphasized by two emergentistic naturalists, writing in the earlier part of our century, C. Lloyd Morgan and Juan Christian Smuts.

The concept of emergence was popularized in the well-known publication by Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (1923). His classic statement was:

"We live in a world in which there seems to be an orderly sequence of events. It is the business of science, and of a philosophy which keeps in touch with science, to describe the course of events in this or that instance of their occurrence, and to discover the plan on which they proceed. Evolution, in the broad sense of the word, is the name we give to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events.

"But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to present, from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought. But in the physical world emergence is no less exemplified in the advent of each new kind of atom, and of each new kind of molecule. It is beyond the wit of man to number the instances of emergence. But if nothing new emerges—if there be only regrouping of pre-existing events and nothing more—then there is no emergent evolution...." (EE 1-2.)

"...One starts, let us say, with electrons and the like; one sees in the atom a higher complex; one sees in the molecule a yet higher complex; one sees in a quartz-crystal, along its line of advance, a still more complex entity; and one sees in an organism, along its line of advance, a still more complex..."
an entity with the different kind of complexity spoken of as vital integration...." (EE 12)

We amplify: an emergent is something novel; it is a new unforeseen quality or value; it is not just a "resultant", as might be foreseen or anticipated lying at the end of a mathematical summation. It represents a jump "up" to a new level of being or energy, a wider or higher synthesis. Hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water. Neither of these original elements have the properties or characteristics of water. Hydrogen burns fiercely and oxygen causes things to burn; whereas water quenches fire. The compound, $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ seems a newer, "higher" whole, or integrated unity, with new and unpredictable (?) properties or "values." (Indeed, the combining of hydrogen and oxygen into water may stand as an analogy of the origin of all value. Values have their origin and initial meaning in the properties of the emergent wholes that describe the integrative or evolutionary process of nature.).

Hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and a few other "life elements" combine to make the marvelous creative synthesis which is "life." Life is an emergent energy with peculiar properties: namely those of growth, reproduction, repair, spontaneity of action and reaction relative to environment, having the capacity of transforming exterior inorganic energies into sensory experiences and values, giving life forms awareness of their environment and accordingly some command or freedom over it. At this latter level of interactivity, organic process--for example, vision capacity--interacts with a certain type of cosmic radiation (or ray of "light") to produce color and "sight," experiences which are essentially emergent wholes, brought into being by the interaction of certain energies or forces. Similarly, other sense values are created as emergents, or emerge into being.
Finally, life in its highest synthesis of mind or rational personality constitutes a supreme type of emergent whole. It comes to be as the higher synthesis of physical energies; it emerges from forces interacting within the brain, and between the brain and the outer environment, along the synapses of the sensory receptors. The peculiar quality of mind as emergent activity has been its own life of thought and reasoning; its capacity for abstract thinking, for having ideas, exercising imagination and forethought; conceiving or being aware of "values," and promulgating plans and proposing purposes in order to bring the future under a command of realized value, in the form of truth, beauty, and love experience.

The "holism" concept of the late General Smuts, South African premier, emphasized the achievement of the emergentistic process of nature in bringing into being new and higher functioning wholes (Holism and Evolution, 1926). This classic essay is an alternative way to state the emergentistic philosophy. The cardinal fact which Smuts cites is "the synthetic tendency of the universe" (H Ev), the tendency of the world throughout its various levels to come and to stay together. With this as the observed or empirical basis of his thought he postulates a metaphysical principle, Holism, which he claims underlies this tendency. He wrote:

"...Holism...underlies the synthetic tendency in the universe, and is the principle which makes for the origin and progress of wholes in the universe....This whole-making or holistic tendency is fundamental in nature...it has a well-marked ascertainable character, and....Evolution is nothing but the gradual development and stratification of progressive

*From the Greek Holos, whole, entire.
series of wholes, stretching from the inorganic beginnings to the highest levels of spiritual creation." (ME, p.v) 

Like our description of the emergent process presented above, examples of the wholistic process which describes the natural process, follow: first, on the organic level, smaller energy centers or events (electrons, protons, neutrons, positrons, etc.) integrate into atoms; atoms into more complex units, or molecules, inorganic and organic. Second, on the

*Smuts continued with illustrative examples:
"The newt forms a new leg in the place of the severed limb. The plant supplies the place of the severed branch with another. The regeneration may be effected from different organs. Thus if the crystalline lens is removed from the eye of a Triton, the iris will regenerate a new lens, although the lens and the iris in this case have been evolved from quite different parts. Numerous similar curious facts of restoration could be mentioned. The broken whole in organic nature restores itself or is restored by the undamaged parts. The cells of the remaining parts set themselves the novel task of restoring the missing parts. The power to do this varies with various plants or animals, and varies also with the different parts in the same plant or animal. Generally one may say that the more highly differentiated and specialized an organism or a cell is, the smaller is its plasticity, or the power of the remaining cells to restore the whole in case of injury or mutilation. But the fact that the power exists in numerous cases is a proof that not only can the cells through reproduction build up the original organism according to its specific type, but also that when this type is damaged, the remaining cells or some of them can restore it, and recomplete the whole... The
organic level, holism causes the various ranges of organic, living substances to emerge. The cell is an area of holism; the germ cells integrate or wholize into the various organs of the body. Each of the major organs, and the body altogether, are greater functioning wholes than separate cells. Thirdly, there are the psychic, mental, spiritual, moral, and aesthetic levels of holism. The ultimate world of holism, according to Smuts, is expressed in human personality, and the system of human values that human personality creates and looks out upon, including

very nature of the cells is to function as parts of a whole, and when the whole is broken down, an unusual extra task automatically arises for them to restore the breach, and their dormant powers are aroused to action.

"The aspect of co-ordination or subordination of parts to the whole is also most significantly illustrated by the phenomena of reproduction.... For in reproduction the cell or the organism clearly appears to look beyond itself, its functions become transcendent, as far as it is itself concerned; its efforts and energies are bent on objects and purposes beyond itself. In fact, in reproduction the cell or the organism bears clear testimony to the fact that it is not itself alone, and that it is part of a larger whole of life towards the fulfillment of which its most fundamental functions are directed....Here more than anywhere else the importance of the whole as an operative factor appears, not merely the immediate whole or individual organism, but also the transcendent whole or the type which has to be reproduced and maintained at all costs. (HE, p. 80-82).
the wider social and institutional wholes where values are preserved.

These modern philosophical expressions, emergence and wholism, remind us in part of Aristotle's word "Actuality," which meant essentially the principle of material, cosmic integration toward form, as above described. "Actuality" is an old, standard, and, as far as it goes, a challenging and doubtless true description of basic process (see our later discussion on Aristotle). Ultimate reality is indeed in part the principle of "integration." Unlike Morgan in his works on emergence, Smuts, in Holism and Evolution, did not refer to the term "God" as the ultimate description or explanation of process. For Smuts, although there are wider social and institutional wholes where human values are preserved, there is no all-inclusive Cosmic Whole beyone or prior to human personality and the institutional values it creates. There is no primordial Unity or trans-human Whole to the world, to which one might assign the idea of cosmic Consciousness or Mind. To Smuts there is finite "holism" as a natural or cosmic process at work primordially in nature, prior to the arrival of man, and coming to highest expression in him and his civilization. Smuts does not explain why there is the principle of holism. Apparently he wished to remain strictly an "empirical observer," uncommitted to further metaphysical speculation. He simply sees holism as the principle immanent in the facts and describes it. He does not ask why the universe is directed toward wholizing itself in its various ways, and supremely in personality--except vaguely to say that the coming of finite minds like our own answers the general appetite of cosmic process for greater wholistic organization.

As left with Smuts, Holism is itself an abstract, impersonal term or force, in a class with Bergson's Elan Vital (at an early stage of
Bergson's philosophy) or Schopenhauer's unconscious Will, the driving force within nature. Using the term as a clue for a more theistic point of view, however, Holism may become (though not for Holism and Evolution) a significant part of the evidence of a Cosmic Purpose and a Cosmic Mind that such purpose implies, as indeed Morgan and other cosmic theists have so conceived reality. Our immediate purpose, however, in presenting this background in the concepts of emergence and wholism has been to set the stage for a presentation of Wieman.

Wieman uses the term "God" as descriptive ultimately of the cosmic process that emerges into new and higher wholes of value,* but he does not advance to a full theistic concept of Cosmic Purpose or a personal Cosmic Mind. His thought arrives rather, we would say, at the stage of "cosmic purpose" with a small "p." We quote from Wieman's classic essay, The Source of Human Good, as a powerful description of the concept of deity we are here endeavoring to analyze: Based firmly on Dewey's Critical Naturalism or empiricism, Wieman goes beyond Dewey in attributing trans-human cosmic "purpose" to nature's integration, emergence, or wholizing toward values.

* Morgan exceeds Wieman in pressing toward a concept of God which is Theistic or personalistic: Life, Mind, and Spirit, p. 306-313, esp. 311.
...There is an order which is coercive, determinate, and antecedent to all that man may do or seek or know, setting limits to knowledge, to truth, and to all that may happen. It is the order of the existing world as created to date, plus the order of creative energy as it operates in the world, plus the range of relevant possibility as determined by this structure of creative energy and the world with which it must work (196).

"The richest and highest values sought and found by religion and morals are interpreted as structured events and their possibilities....

...There is one respect, being naturalists, in which we depart from both traditions: we ignore the transcendental affirmation in the Jewish Christian tradition of a creative God who not only works in history but resides beyond history. The only creative God we recognize is the creative event itself. So also we ignore the transcendental affirmation in the Greek Christian tradition of the reality of Forms of value, uncreated and eternal, having causal efficacy to constrain the shape of things without themselves being events at all. The only forms of value we recognize are produced by the creative event....

Thus the active God derived from the Jewish tradition and the Forms derived from the Greek tradition are both brought down into the world of time, space, and matter and are there identified as events displaying a definite structure with possibilities....
"The transcendental must be ignored, except as an imaginative construction of the human mind. (7-8)

"When good increases, a process of reorganization is going on, generating new meanings, integrating them with the old, endowing each event as it occurs with a wider range of reference, molding the life of man into a more deeply unified totality of meaning....

"...The creative event reorganizes the mind and transforms its appreciable world without the qualities of the creative event being themselves discriminated and distinguished from the newly emergent meaning. (56-57)

"Widening and deepening community between those who participate in the total creative event is the final stage in creative good....

"...The creative event is one that brings forth in the human mind, in society and history, and in the appreciable world a new structure of interrelatedness, whereby events are discriminated and related in a manner not before possible. It is a structure whereby some events derive from other events, through meaningful connection with them, an abundance of quality that events could not have had without this new creation. (64-65)

"...The creative event, together with every one of the subevents... are emergings, integratings, expandings, deepenings, that is, they are not accomplished facts....are events in process....happenings in transit... always a new structure, whereby some events are more widely and richly related in meaningful connections.

"The human problem is to shape human conduct and all other conditions so that the creative event can be released to produce maximum good." (68-69)
"...If we cannot go along with the creative process, we shall suffer the fate which other cultures and civilizations have suffered when they reached a like limit in their capacity for further creative transformation. (74)

"The creative event is supra-human, not in the sense that it works outside of human life, but in the sense that it creates the good of the world in a way that man cannot do. Man cannot even approximate the work of the creative event. He would not come any closer to it if his powers were magnified to infinity, because the infinite increase of his ability would have to be the consequence of the prior working of the creative event. (76)

"...The primary demand which the creative event makes upon man is that he give himself over to it to be transformed in any way that it may require. (78)

"An examination of creative good will reveal the reason for this insistent need of religious devotion to think of God as a person, while at the same time demonstrating that the source of human good cannot be a person, but is much more....

"...Since creative good at the level where it saves and transforms human personality always works in the form of interaction between persons, we must deal with persons to deal with it....

"From all this we conclude that the mythical symbol of person or personality may be indispensable for the practice of worship and personal devotion to the creative power, this need arising out of the very nature of creative action and so demonstrating that the creative event is the actual reality when this symbol is used most effectively in personal commitment of faith. This symbol may be required even by those who know through intellectual analysis that a person is always a creature and that
therefore personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator.

"...The real source of human good is neither transcendental nor a person." (266-268)

(From Wieman, "Is There a God? A Conversation" (Between Max Otto, D.C. Macintosh, and H. N. Wieman Willett, Clark, 1932)

"God is superhuman, but not supernatural. (11)

"God is that interaction between individuals, groups, and ages which generates and promotes the greatest possible mutuality of good. (13)

"I deny personality to God, not by subtraction but by addition. God functions so vastly and so importantly that it is confusing and unintelligible to attribute personality to God." (48)

We cannot enter here upon a full exposition and appreciation of Henry Nelson Wieman as a major American philosopher of religion. In what follows, however, we will attempt to paraphrase the main substance of his thought and conclude with a brief criticism.

Wieman believes that "there is an order antecedent to man," working toward emergent wholes, or "new structures of interrelatedness," on every level of nature: inorganic, organic, mental-moral, social-spiritual (The Source of Human Good). These emergent wholes are the seats and reality of all values. The supreme emergent wholes or values have their seats in man's self-conscious personal life or experience, sentient and aesthetic, scientific and philosophic, moral, social, and religious. This order of emergent wholes and values defines the very structure, meaning, and seeming "intent" of process or evolution itself. It is accordingly objective and cosmic; that is trans-human, more than human, though it comes
to fullest expression in the human realization of true values—i.e., those of the Graeco-Hebrew-Christian tradition, the humane and democratic West, and any other human values of other traditions. It is perilous for man not to perceive and heed this structured order of the world-in-process. Individuals, groups, and generations will be judged by the "Creative Event" according to whether they perceive and heed. If they will perceive and heed they will experience joy, fulfillment, happiness, and social harmony; if they do not perceive and heed, they will be ignored by the Creative Event and abide in misery, frustration, strife, and death. The Creative Event will deliver its opportunity to others more responsive to its demands. The Creative Event is not itself self-conscious, Cosmic Mind or Person, like the God of traditional theism. It is rather an impersonal value-moral structure (?) immanent in nature, an impersonal "moral law" (letting "moral" define all realms of value, including the value of knowledge). Or, if it is not to be defined as "structure," which may connote a too definite, antecedently existing Form or Forms of being (an idealism which Wieman would probably disclaim), then perhaps it is more correct to say that the ultimate which Wieman means is the potentiality of nature to have such value-moral structure.

As a psychologist of religion, in addition to his being a note-worthy philosopher of religion, perhaps no one in our time has more profoundly described the operation or reality of the "creative event" or of "creative interchange" (Man's Ultimate Commitment) or of "God" in terms of deepest psychological or social experience than has Wieman. To speak in traditional terms, he has described something of what the "Holy Spirit" of God indeed is. He accomplishes this in his descriptions of "the sub-events" in The Source of Human Good (and repeated in variant forms elsewhere in his
writings) that operate in bringing into being human good.

Take any creative human interchange or relationship: the teacher-student relationship in the learning and knowledge experience; creative conversation between friends; college friendships; creative communion in faithful marriage; the inspiration of beauty in artistic or aesthetic interchange, e.g. as we listen to the works of a great composer through the intermediation of the musicians; scientists working together in special, technical fellowships in their endeavor to make a moon rocket that will carry men to that world—all these types of interchange may be described in several levels of creativity or unfolding awareness. First is the awareness of new qualitative meaning on such inter-personal relationships. Second is the feeling of expansion, growth, or enrichment of one's own person in the relationship. Third is the deepening or enriching of the meanings in the world about the participants. Fourth is the deepening of the sense of community or fellowship or society between the persons so engaged—subsumed under the experience of "love." Here we have indeed a classic description of the presence and working of the "Spirit" of "God immanent" in life, in deepest psychological sensitivity, when life opens itself to the creative good that is existence.

Evaluation. This philosophy of religion seems in unstable equilibrium between a frank, non-theistic naturalism such as Dewey's and personalistic theisms, in connection with the concepts of purpose and of personality as supreme value. (1) Vizerman's "creative event" seems to be a cosmic purpose of a sub-personal, sub-conscious kind. But the question may be raised, how can there be "purpose" which is less than "personal," without conscious intention or personal mind to entertain and realize "purpose." If true values and the true good are permanently increased as cosmic
intention, would not this require a self-conscious personal conceiver and
conserver as well as an "increaser" of value, working on some totally
immanent and sub-conscious plane? In our own finite experience, we know
that values do not often come to be as a chance product of blind groping,
but rather we experience them most often by careful foreordination and
intelligent planning on our part. Could their standing or "purposiveness"
on the cosmic scale be any less wide awake, intelligent, or personal, if
it is true that the cosmos at large is busy intending and creating value? In
Wieman's system God is too immanent, too much within the process, really
to see where it is going, and that it may eventually arrive at the expected
destination of human good. Do we not need a concept of God as not only
in the process, but also behind or before, and in front of, or at the head
of process, as its eternal conscious foreseer, foreordainer, and guide?
(At later places in our study we endeavor to solve the problem of divine
"foreordination" and cosmic "freedom" or evolutionary process.)
(2) Finally, as with all cosmically impersonalistic systems, which yet
recognize "personality" as supreme value on the finite scale, we may
ask, Why does personality have such status or value on our plane, if it
lacks backing in some terms similar to our own on the cosmic plane?
The great idealisms have affirmed that we need not only growth and increase of value in the world, but that for this process to take place, and for its outcome to be in some measure assured, we need an eternal cosmic source and standard of value, a cosmic awareness of the forms and structures that embody value. We need a "place," "being," or "Mind," that in some way "oversees" the ordering of structure into value. With this suggestion we come to our sixth significant conception of God.

Not all idealisms are personalistic. We have already discussed eastern pantheisms and Bradley's philosophy as impersonalistic forms of idealism. Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies were types of abstract idealism. In our opinion they may be classified as semi-personalistic, without having the full value of personalistic idealism, or theism, as we shall define that term shortly. Nevertheless, their concept of Ultimate Reality or "God" is a classic, standard possibility which has its timeless appeal. (We include Aristotle's philosophy along with Plato's as "idealism," if we give that term its general definition of a philosophy which believes in an eternal order of truth, value, and form, according to which the world process is structured.)

In the viewpoint implied in this book God is, at least, what Plato and Aristotle say he is on the side of his creating or forming cosmic energy. We place Plato and Aristotle, however, on the negative side of the Personalistic watershed of thinking about deity. Perhaps we do them an injustice; others may prefer to relate them to the positive side of that watershed. In any case, we mean to do them no irreverence. It is probably correct to say that there are elements of personalistic theism in
Plato and Aristotle, but a "theism" which would be characteristically Greek rather than Hebraic.

Modern critical naturalists share with theists the intellectual ancestry of Plato and Aristotle, particularly on the side of the humanism of these ancient philosophers; theists claim them particularly on the side of their idealism. To the outline of their thoughts here presented we add the main substance of their cosmic philosophy in their own words in subsequent quotations.

6. For Plato and Aristotle God is the abstract structure of truth, value and form over-arching and inspiring cosmic process. "God" or Ultimate Reality is the system of ideal truths, values, laws and forms of being, regarded as eternal, objective realities beyond man's mind, and "above" finite process (Plato), or existing as the immanent, subsisting patterns for that process (Aristotle). Our description continues: God is the impersonal order of Truth, Beauty, and Good, conceived as objective, metaphysical, spiritual (immaterial) "Ideas" or "Forms"; the eternal forms of being that structure world process. Men in his intellectual and moral life can know, share, or participate in the ideas or forms, as does nature, in so far as her individualities, and processes, reflect or express them.

Plato and Aristotle would accept -- indeed, after Parmenides, they were the authors in Western thought of -- the "objective" or "idealistic" concept of "truth" described in our previous chapter. Truth was to them not only the correspondence of thought to things and of thought to its own rules of right reason (truth in its double faceted psychological sense); but also truth meant or had a cosmic reference and dimension, i.e. it was correspondence or conformity of things or natural processes to the laws and forms of thought, or reason,

* The Platonic and Aristotelian terms were "idea" and "eidos".
These diagrams are based mainly on the Cosmologies suggested by Plato's *Timaeus* dialogue and Aristotle's twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*. In the *Timaeus* Plato presents us with three coordinate, eternal principles, matter, the realm of Ideas with the Good, and God. In the *Parmenides* dialogue, however, he speculates that the "ideas" may in truth be unified within the Divine mind itself (see our later quotation p. ). Aristotle suggests two eternal principles: matter—as—informed and God. Accordingly we have:

![Plato's Cosmology](image)

Embodied individuals are appearances; abstract universals (ideas) are the realities. Man's spiritual part or soul reflects or shares, participates in the Ideas in so far as he has knowledge. God, or the "Demiourgos" (*Timaeus*), originally looked to the Ideas and brought order out of the primeval, material "receptical" or chaos. Thus God is the principle of creativity, organization, or conformity that gets matter into ordered form or law, which we call nature.
Ideas/forms/universals are embodied in individual objects (in nature). Reality is matter-in-formed, growing, developing through various levels of integration in fulfillment of her highest potentialities or ideal forms, which are known in the life of God. God is the focalpoint of pure truth or form, the ideal Actuality (Entelecheia), or Ultimate Principle of Formation, toward which all things move, or conform, as by desire (erōs)*: God is the Unmoved Mover. It remains a question in the interpretation of Aristotle as to whether God is aware of his world, and accordingly whether He is fully personal.

We unify and summarize, for Plato and Aristotle, God or the Divine is the eternal principle of formation, integration, or actuality ordering creation according to rational law:

--- overarching process as the eternal Ideas (Plato)
--- immanent in process as the eternal Forms (Aristotle), though God himself as pure spirit is transcendent to the process He influences.

* In the Metaphysics Aristotle uses forms of "erōs" (or love) and other terms for desire, to express the striving of natural formations toward the perfection of forms as God perceives them in the ideal. In the Symposium, Plato had discussed the role of "erōs" or desiring love in a similar manner, as it pertains to the striving of the human soul toward perfection in the Good, the True and Beautiful.
Any common-place process of evolution or natural integration would illustrate the work of supreme Actuality and its presence in the universe: the whole of the evolutionary process striving to "Actualize" itself in the coming to be of beings of higher rational personality; the growth of an acorn into a oak; the expansion and integration of two little cells of the zygote into the marvelous complexity of the whole foetus and its human brain, filled with the potential personality of a Shakespeare or a Lincoln. The fact and process of "Actuality" as the purposive principle of nature's phylogenetic and ontogenetic "evolution" transpires under our very eyes daily in countless expressions, as creative Spirit informs and organizes reality according to rational "Ideas". Aristotle used the expression entelecheia translated (through the Latin) "actuality" to describe that process that seemed to be leading things into their final, "actual", or completed form. As he looked out at nature at the evidence of this process, it spoke to him of supreme purposiveness and intelligence. Whatever else God may be he is certainly the supreme Actualizing principle of process. We now quote (and we trust without too much distortion by removal from their original context) major passages of Plato and Aristotle on Ultimate Reality and God.

Plato on Ultimate Reality:

The Ideas, their Divinity, and God

"Socrates proceeded: ...I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect -- for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly' ... (Phaedo - J (Sml 208)."
"...the mind, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things... the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs... knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them... we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being. (Timaeus - H (RH 188-90).

"And have we not a right to say in his defense, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being -- that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is appearance only, but will go on -- the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he has attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with every being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge, and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail. (Republic - J(Sml 239).

"For he...whose mind is fixed upon true being... is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself ....And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows... no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern...

"And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God. (Republic, Ib. 254-5).
"And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each... The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen... (Republic, Ib. 265)

"And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind...

"And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only....

"Now that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of the good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth... and, as light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher....

"You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?... In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power... (Republic, Ib. 267-8)

"The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away... of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthil. It is such as I will describe... There abides the very being with which true
knowledge is concerned; the colorless, formless, intangible, essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge... rejoices at beholding reality, and... gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad... she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and... the other true existences [or ideas]. (Phaedrus - JSmith 291-2).

"...ideas:... beauty, goodness, justice, holiness and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. (Phaedo, Ib. 173).

"...we...are going to discourse of the nature of the universe... The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect... was the world... always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body... the father and maker of this universe... must have looked to the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must... be a copy of something... God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order.... the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and number... .God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good (Timaeus, Ib. 391-3, ll15).
"If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path... The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. (Laws, X, Ib. p. 434, 442).

"Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest? ...Yes. And if there be such a things as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?... Certainly. (Parmenides, Ib. 369).

"...God...is...one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image...is... perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not.... (Republic Ib. 82-6)

Aristotle on God
(From Book XII of the Metaphysics)

"Nothing...is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change...There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality...without matter...eternal...actuality is prior...there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.... The final cause...produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved... The first mover...exists of necessity; and in so far as it exist by necessity, its mode of being is good... On such a principle...depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is life, such as the best which we enjoy... And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself.....the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a
better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also
belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality;
and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say there­
fore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration
continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God... Those who suppose...
that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning... are wrong
in their opinion... It is clear then from what has been said that there is a
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It
has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is with­
out part and indivisible... But it has also been shown that it is impassive and
unalterable... The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems... thought
is held to be the most divine of things... it must be of itself that the divine
thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a
thinking on thinking... Since... thought and the object of thought are not diffe­
rent in the case of things that have no matter, the divine thought and its object
will be the same... throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for
its object.

"We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe
contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by
itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does;
for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter
for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him. And all things are
ordered together somehow, but not all alike -- both fishes and fowls and plants;
and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but
they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end... (RM:IA 282-293)

Evaluation of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of God.

To begin with, two basic things might be asked of Plato and Aristotle on
the side of their thought that seems to emphasize abstract or impersonal, but
objective Truth as Ultimate Reality: (1) Can the realm of "truth" or "Ideas", or a
cosmic intelligence or purposiveness, be "abstract", that is, without seat and
and focus in a "personal mind"? Here is the basic question we asked of the Platonic-Aristotelian idealism. It is like the question asked, but on a higher plane, of reductive, impersonalistic naturalism: can there be "purpose" in subconscious process? For Aristotle and Plato the inquiry is, can there be "purpose" in an abstract impersonal Cosmic Truth or "Intellect" — a Truth and Intellect that would not know of its own existence and power? Actually, of course, Plato and Aristotle realized this problem themselves, and solved it by introducing some element of Personality, that is, a supreme cosmic forethought and self-conscious purposiveness into their systems of reality. Plato accomplished this in his principle of deity or "demiurge" in the Timaeus; Aristotle by saying that God was at least conscious of himself as the focal point of all rational truth and form, that God's activity was "thinking on thinking" — i.e., self-conscious.

(2) Further, we ask the same question of Plato that we do of all value systems that regard "personality" as supreme in value and being on the finite plane, yet may deny it reality on the cosmic plane. To put the question in his language or thought form, let us consider the "idea of man", one of the transcendent ideas that govern a significant stream of process or development in the natural world: if there is the Idea of man, that is, of self-conscious, intelligent and moral life in the realm of Ideas and ultimate Truth, would not this personalize that realm? — like a leaven, in the figure of Royce, which must inevitably leaven the entire loaf?

(3) To continue our criticism, it has sometimes been held that the Platonic-Aristotelian God is too "impassive and unalterable", to use Aristotle's own words; that the sum of the Greek idea was God as static, abstract "perfection"; a frozen logical essence, which may account for natural structure and order, but is hardly an object of fellowship for man. Such a criticism may be to some extent justified as we ponder the preceding quotations, possibly more justified in Aristotle's case than in Plato's. Certainly the concept of God as outgoing and down-going, as self-giving and serving love, as Chesed and Agape, as in the
Old and New Testament pictures, is foreign to the Greek concept of deity. It might be said that this is precisely one of the central points at which the Greek idea of God may fall short of full "Personality" as we define Divine Personality presently, and as the Hebrews knew God.

(4) The trouble with platonic abstractionism is that it cannot successfully derive our factually individualized world of physical objects processes and personal presences; it cannot account for the common fact or experience of individuality. Plato himself acknowledged this in the dialogue Parmenides, which is devoted to a criticism of his own system. Accordingly Platonism results in a "dualism" for which it has traditionally been famous, between a world of particular realities in their material aspect and a realm of universal ideas or of mind. Aristotle solved this problem by placing the Forms within nature from the outset. Our conclusion is that a purely abstract way of thinking of ultimate reality must be modified; will must come to be regarded as significant in the cosmic scheme as "intellect" or "ideas". Indeed, can you have intellect or ideas without will; can you have mind without personality? We need some kind of metaphysics that will actually account for concrete things, and in a measure describe processes of individuation. In the search for an adequate conception of God, Royce's words challenge the searcher, as he considered Platonic "realism" but moved on to a more personalistic concept of reality:

"The world of validity is indeed, in its ultimate constitution, the eternal world. It seems to us so far a very impersonal world and a very cold and unemotional realm, - the very opposite of that of the mystic. Before we are done with it we shall find it in fact the most personal and living of worlds. Just now it appears to us a realm of bodiless universal meanings. Erelong we shall discover that it is a realm of individuals, whose unity is in One Individual, and that theory means, in this eternal world, not theory, but Will and Life". (WI, vol. I. 222)
Historical note continued. Recall our previous mention of the large
influence that Plato's and Aristotle's thought had on Judaeo-Christian
civilization. Persons in the history of philosophy who have taken
the impersonalistic implication of Plato's and Aristotle's thought and have
developed systems which we have given the general name "abstract idealism" (or
points of view closely allied to it, such as modern "absolute idealism") have been
Averroes, medieval Arabic philosopher who utilized Aristotle; Spinoza, Hegel,
Bernard Bosanquet, George Santayana, and Nicolai Hartmann. These men have tended
to believe that impersonal mind or abstract logical or "immortal essences"
(Santayana) constitute the basis of reality.

On the other side, however, early Christian theologians like Clement and
Origin of Alexandria, and especially St. Augustine developed the personalistic
implications of Plato, adapting his idealism to Hebrew-Christian modes of belief
regarding deity. We have observed that St. Thomas did this in distinctive
fashion for Aristotle. Some of the early Renaissance philosophers were
Christian Platonists, notably Ficino and Patrizzi; Pomponazzi followed Aristotle.
In the modern world Josiah Royce's system, which we may term Personalistic
Absolute Idealism, is possibly the most ambitious, conscious attempt in our time
to personalize the Platonic outlook. Other modern personalistic idealists
would be closely related to Plato in their general belief that ultimate reality
is "spirit" and "truth" in some form -- for example, Berkeley, Kant, Bowne.
We have already mentioned Whitehead and Goodin as types of modern "naturalistic"
philosophers who are also theists, who consciously follow Plato as their
main ancient inspiration from the Greek tradition.
CHAPTER FOUR

Conceptions Of God Continued:

God As Personal Source Of Truth And Being

V. Sub-Monotheistic Conceptions

We mention the following two personalistic conceptions of deity for their historical significance.

7. Polytheism. "God as personified particular value" (Brightman). We illustrate this view from classic Greek, civic religion. Zeus represented such natural forces or moral values as storm, justice, "moiré", which was fate or destiny, etc. Athena was the goddess of civic spirit or virtue. Ares was the goddess of war and savage lust. Apollo the god of wisdom and prophecy. Aphrodite was the goddess of beauty and love. Demeter was the goddess of growing crops and grain; her Roman counterpart was Ceres, from which our English words cereal and ceremonial are derived.

"Animism" was the earlier phase of polytheism, and is found among primitive groups today; it is the belief that individual natural objects, a tree, a particular stone or stream, a mountain are inhabited or "animated" by a personal living spirit or deity, maligned or benevolent.

From the ancient or primitive points of view the rationale of polytheism may be understood. In pre-scientific ages and with sub-scientific societies, the average, unphilosophical person, would look at the universe as mainly a plural order, with many seeming absolute facts or forces, which could not otherwise be explained except by attributing their origin to a specific and separate supernatural "personality". Particularly would this kind of solution occur to the primitive mentality as the conflicting forces of nature and life were observed.
or experienced. For example, Isis-Osiris represented the verdant, benigned forces of vegetable fertility and growth along the Nile river. Opposed to these was Set, god of the blasting sand storm that raged out of the desert from time to time, destroying the precious crops of the Nile, upon which the people depended. In India today Shiva, on one side of his make-up, represents the generative principle of nature on her constructive benigned side; whereas Kali, a sp of Shiva, sometimes represents evil, disease, calamity or the destructive forces or side of nature. To the ancient mind diseases were caused by evil spirits or demons, a theme familiar in the New Testament.

The difficulty with polytheism, of course, is its belief that the universe is founded in many conflicting forces, as represented by animistic spirits, or waring Olymbian deities (Homer's Iliad).

Ancient polytheisms, though many of them were gross in thought and practice, were not without their moral value. The gods represented virtues as well as vices. Polytheism is a simplistic intellectual system. To the simple ancient mind it solved much of the problem of existence, particularly the problem of evil. In polytheism each ill in life is attributed to some specific demon or evil spirit. The universe is grounded in many conflicting forces represented by the pagan deities; therefore the existence of evil and suffering would not give rise to any grave intellectual problem. Rather, with diverse supernatural powers regarded as the causes of things, conflict and pain would be expected, as was the frequent and common lot of ancient and primitive men. From the perspective of a profounder moral coherence, however, it is no doubt just to condemn these systems as naive and superstitious. If the universe is founded ultimately upon disparate plural forces, better assign such forces an impersonal or sub-personal status, than to animate them with the capricious intentions of gods. (On page 399 in Chapter we discuss, from an ultimate rational standpoint, why there cannot be more than one creative God).
8. Henotheism or monolatry. "God as personified national spirit" (Brightman); or the belief in the existence of many gods but the worship and service of only one.

It is highly probable that this was the religion of ancient Israel between the time of Moses and the great writing prophets. "Yahweh" was the national deity that delivered the children of Israel from Egypt, and, on one side of his role, went before them as the "Lord of Hosts", or the god that brought them victory against their enemies, the Canaanites, whose land they were invading. In his other role, of course, Yahweh was regarded as source of the great Commandments, which stood as the fountain of Hebrew moral and social organization thereafter. But there are many indications in the earlier books of the Old Testament that the Hebrews of that time believed that "other gods" had at least theoretical existence for other people, although such gods had no influence or command over Israel. We cannot here go into the history of the struggle of ancient Israel with polytheistic belief as reflected in the literature of the Old Testament. Hebrew history, however, rose away from the polytheistic-henotheistic point of view to a pure ethical monotheism. Monotheism conceived of Yahweh as Lord of all peoples and nations, whose righteous will was the source of all moral truth and justice and whose love and concern went out to all men and races. This, of course, became the message of the great, universalistic ethical prophets, particularly Jeremiah, II Isaiah, and the author of the book of Jonah. A "henotheistic" strain, however, lingered in the thinking of narrower nationalistic groups in Israel down to the New Testament times: namely, the concept that the Jews were Yahweh's specially favored people and that He was special God to them, though other men might be His children on a less favored basis.

In our own day a demonic type of henotheism appeared in the religion of Nazism in Hitler's Germany. Hitler and the Nazi philosophers claimed that the German race was God's favored people, and that Hitler was his special messiah,
to lead them in military conquest of their neighbors. Non-Germans were regarded as inferior and fit subjects for slavery. At the same time in Japan Shintoism was used in a similar way by the totalitarian government, as a religious sanction for Japanese superior race ideas and to justify aggression upon other peoples. Anthropologically speaking, of course, superior race theories are erroneous. Henotheistic concepts of deity are simply wrong. The highest message of the Old Testament is that all men are equally God's children and subjects of the divine love and watchcare. The 8th to the 6th century B.C. ethical prophets proclaimed this; the teachings of great Rabbis like Hillel in the inter-testamental period announced it, and the Christian movement aimed to restore the universalistic outlook wherever a narrow nationalistic point of view in Israel had overshadowed it.

IV. Monotheistic Conceptions

9. The great historic monotheisms, Judaico-Christian, Zoroastrian, and Islamic, proclaimed that God is supreme Personal Creator or Source of the world; He is First Cause and Designing Intelligence of the world; and is presently active in sustaining value in personal life and history.

There were, of course, monotheistic developments in other than these near-eastern religious cultures. The philosophic or rational "monisms" of Hinduism, advanced Mahayana Buddhism, Ancient and Medieval Confucianism, and the Greek Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies (just reviewed) are significant, universal expressions of the general advance of human culture toward the "monotheistic" idea.

The Upanishads, early scriptures of the Hindus (c. 6th century B.C.) stressed the unity of God, and in some of these writings Deity or Brahman was described as Purusha or Personal Spirit. Recall, however, that in others of
these writings he is depicted as a totality of being that transcends what we ordinarily mean by 'conscious personality'. Though the question has remained open in scholarly opinion, many expressions in the Analects of Confucius and in the Golden Mean, attributed in part to Tsesze (Confucius' Grandson), referring to "Heaven" and its "moral law" or Tao, suggest that Heaven was conceived as a Supreme Personal Presence to these early Confucians. Though Lao Tzu (6th century B.C. father of Taoism) generally depicted the "Tao" in impersonalistic terms he nevertheless stressed forgiving love as the ultimate virtue, reflective of the Tao. Mo Tzu, 5th century critic of Confucianism, spoke of God as "Universal love". In such ways these other ancient Chinese sages were like the Confucian, profoundly monotheistic in the tendency of their thought. In the medieval orient Ramanuja, (11th century A.D. Hindu) expressly described Brahman in a way that suggests personal life and self-consciousness. In early medieval Buddhism the Lotus Sutra describes the universal Buddha Spirit as a saving personal presence to all who will believe, and as one who occupies the place of supreme or near-supreme Deity, short of ultimate Nirvana. Chu Hsi, the 12th century A.D. Confucian "Aquinas", taught that the ultimate reality behind things was the Great Reason.

Of course, we have noted significant differences between some of these philosophical monisms of the orient and of Greece, and highest Hebraic monotheism. We have already observed the chief difference to be the prevailing idea of divine impersonality among major groups of the orient, in contrast to that of the divine personality in the occident. As we have observed, however, it is significant that in some of the non-Hebraic cultures highly influential personalistic or monotheistic schools arose. In addition to Ramanuja in India and Plato or Aristotle in Greece, as outstanding examples of movements in non-Hebraic cultures toward monotheistic thinking, we should mention the Stoics in Greece, who developed a virtual monotheistic concept of deity. Cleanthes' famous Hymn to Zeus is a beautiful expression of Stoic "theism". For classic culture, the ideal of ultimate reality as One Being reached its apogee in middle Roman
times in the philosophy of Plotinus. The ultimate Being or One, however, which Plotinus described was decidedly a trans-rational and trans-personal principle.

In addition to the emphasis on the unity of Ultimate Reality all of these monisms and monotheisms had another all-important feature in common, namely their general ethical outlook. Socrates and Amos would have thought eye-to-eye about certain fundamental matters of morality, as a comparison of the first book of the *Republic* or the dialogue *Gorgias* with the *Book of Amos* would quickly reveal. The concrete content of "moral law", which in all of these systems was regarded as being supported by an ultimate trans-human reality was astonishingly similar. The last five of Moses Commandments (the particularly Ethical Commandments) effectively reflect the basic moral rules of all these cultures. These rules, similar the world over, pertained to the sanctity of truth, of life, of personal possessions, sexual self-discipline, and the sin of avarice.

Historic monotheism rises to its highest expression in the Old and New Testaments in the general concept of God as saving Love (Chesed and Agape). In the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures the Idea of Self-giving Love becomes the central meaning of the Divine Personality. As we have just observed, many of the scriptures of the other great religious cultures move in this direction and attain the concept of God as Love. This is the more remarkable because of the metaphysical impersonalism underlying a good deal of the oriental view. Some of these systems have developed a strong ethic of dynamic love, in spite of the problematic nature of selfhood and personality in their psychologies and metaphysics. The Hebrew-Christian scriptures assume that there is an indissolual

* Sir Charles Eliot, authority on the Indian systems, believes that the Buddhist "metta", or love, is equivalent to the New Testament Agape (H & E p216). See also the profound discussion of the Buddhist scholar, Hajime Nakamura, on "metta" as self-giving love, K.W. Morgan: The Path of the Buddha, 386-87; and our discussion in manuscript, "The Personality of God", p. on the idea of serving-love or "Agape" in the other world faiths, Hinduism, Buddhism, the Chinese Confucian and Taoist system and in Sufi Islam.
relation between the idea of love and that of 'person', and bring this psychology or metaphysics to its very apogee of thought.**

Zoroastrianism and Islam are equal with the Old Testament religion in their ethical outlook and in their profound analyses of human nature. They are similar in their belief in man's transcendent freedom, and in sin as lying in malice of will or spirit (rather than residing in the passions of the body, as was emphasized in Greek and Oriental dualism). These non-Hebraic monotheisms, however, were overburdened (as was the earlier concept in the Old Testament itself) with the idea of God as principally a stern law-giver and sovereign judge, beneath whom men are fearful subjects. The full concept of God as loving Father, and the possibility of men as confident sons come to light in highest Old Testament prophecy and constitutes the central message of the New Testament. (Zoroastrianism is noted particularly for its vertical cosmic dualism, or the idea of a transcendent personal Spirit of Evil, Ahriman, as opposed to Mazda, the supreme God of the Good -- see our further description in chapter on evil)

Finally it should be mentioned that in Islamic culture the Sufi mystics made the concept of love key to the understanding of Allah and of human ethics, developing what was implied in the Koran's theory of Allah's mercy.

Modern western philosophical theisms derive partially from the historic monotheism of the Old and New Testaments and partially from Greek Idealism. Before proceeding to a full definition of theism and of God as Personality, however, we should note in passing one further historic type of monotheism in the west, namely Deism in its classic 18th century form.

10. In **Deism** God was conceived as transcendent First Cause, or original creative Intelligence, needed to explain the presence of the world,

**Classic Biblical passages on God as moral Personality or Moral Intelligence and Love: Ps 103; 139; Hosea 6:1-6; 11:1-4; II Isaiah 40; 53; Jer 31; Mt 5-7; Lk 10: 25-37; 15: 1-32; Jn 11:1-15; 1st Jn 3-4.
but not now actively related to it. In this philosophy man gains awareness of the existence of Deity by reasoning from the order and perfection of nature.

Predominantly an 18th century phenomenon in Western Europe, it influenced some of the Fathers of the American Revolution, such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. Thomas Paine, English emigrant and pamphleteer of the American Revolution formulated Deism in a book highly critical of Christianity and traditional religion. His *Age of Reason* is a classic Deistic document. In spite of its polemics against traditional religion, Paine captured the main spirit and outlook of Deism in eloquent way when he wrote in that work:

"It is only in the Creation that all our ideas and conceptions of a Word of God can unite. The creation speaketh an universal language, independently of human speech or human language, multiplied and various as they be. It is an ever-existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it cannot be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it cannot be altered; it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will of man whether it shall be published or not; it publishes itself from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to all nations and to all worlds; and this Word of God reveals to man all that is necessary for man to know of God.

Do we want to contemplate his power? We see it in the unchangeable order by which the incomprehensible whole is governed.

Do we want to contemplate his munificence? We see it in the abundance with which he fills the earth. Do we want to contemplate his mercy? We see it in his not withholding that abundance even from the unthankful. In fine, do we want to know what God is? Search not

**In 18th century England and France names associated with Deistic thought were Thomas Morgan, Thomas Chubb, Thomas Woolston, Matthew Tindal, Voltaire, and Rousseau.**
the book called the Scripture, which any human hand might make, but the Scripture called the Creation."

Behind Paine and the Deists was a century of Newtonian physics and metaphysics. Newtonianism looked at the world of nature as a great machine, perfect in every detail, which the creator had originally fashioned and put in motion just as a mechanic would build and start a machine. In this philosophy, what was thought to be the mechanical order and perfection of Nature was the greatest argument for a Supreme Artificer of Nature.

Central to Deism was the dualism between God as transcendent Spirit on the one hand, and the world machine on the other. Corollaries to this Deistic conception would be the irrelevance of personal, petitionary prayer (would God intervene in the perfectly pre-determined operation of the world machine, in order to answer anyone's prayer?); and the impossibility of miracle, or a supernatural intervention or disruption of such world machine.

The subsequent histories of natural science; of philosophy; and of modern, historical Biblical research and criticism, on its constructive side (which did not reach its full force as a movement until the late 19th century) have all revealed the shallowness of much of Paine's type of polemics against traditional theology. His eloquence, however, did restore to the concept of Deity a dignity which was lacking in some phases of the popular religious belief of his time.*

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*Brightman has called attention to the resemblance between the 20th century Barthian concept of God as the Wholly Other and Deism. Barthianism, however, is not 18th century Deism; for God breaks through to "speak" to man in the awesome mystery of the Hebrew-Christian Scripture or "Word." (Paine would have scorned such a notion as this!) To the present writer, the Barthian "Wholly Other" concept of Deity reminds us in many respects of
Modern philosophical theism. God is personal conscious Mind or
Spirit, whose "being," or whose "work," is present both in nature and in
values. Another way to state the view would be to say that the ultimate and
eternal energy of the universe is personal, Loving Will. Such a definition
would include the possibility that God is not only "immanent" in his world,
but also "transcendent" to it, that is to say, transcendent to what we,
from the standpoint of our finite experience or vision, may know of
the world. The ultimate problem of God's relation to the world, whether as
totally immanent, partially immanent, or totally other and transcendent, seems
a secondary one to us.

Vedanta' Hinduism's impersonal Brahman, Bradley's Absolute, Plotinus' One, or
Lao-tzu's Tao. Barth modified his earlier position on God as "Wholly Other,"
and Deistic theologies as a whole (if Barthianism is such) would be the
simple coherent judgment that if God reveals himself at all, there must be some
common ground between his divine and our human experience, which the classic
Deists themselves acknowledged in accepting human reason as medium of the
knowledge of God. If He were "Wholly Other", we would not, nor could not,
know Him at all, indeed as the great trans-rational monisms have said
(Vedanta, Plotinus, Bradley). Or from the classic Deistic side, if God
speaks to man through "nature," we must include all of nature, including
man, human nature and reason, and philosophy; and finally historic
religions themselves as possible media of the divine "Word."
Some modern interpreters define "theism" as the concept of God as "totally transcendent," and "pantheism" as the idea of God as "totally immanent," reserving a new term, "panentheism," as expressing the modern (and probably correct) belief that God is partially immanent, but also partially transcendent to the world of our possible experience (so Hartshorne and Reese in Philosophers Speak of God). To the present writer the main issue is whether God is personal or impersonal. "Theism" as a term should be reserved for the affirmation that God is personality, whatever his ultimate relation to the world may be. We delimit the term "pantheism" to mean those concepts of deity as the impersonal Whole of Being. "Panentheism" may be used, if desired, to express belief in the partial immanence of God.

Major perspectives of theism. First, classic dualistic theism has emphasized God's transcendence to the world. In this view, God would be the "Creator" of the world of matter and nature, but not himself involved in his world by way of any "immanence" of his own being (what Hartshorne and Reese call "theism"). Is this the Old Testament Concept? Is it the view of Plato (if he be regarded as a personalist)? There may indeed be emphasis on "dualism", or on "transcendence", in the classic or older theism of the church. In the theology of the Jewish-Christian tradition we encounter the idea that God created the world ex nihilo, or out of nothing.* (We examine this possibility and an alternative to it in our next chapter, when we discuss the cosmological argument). No idea would stress the transcendent, divine power any more effectively than that of a creation ex nihilo. Descartes' system, of course, is the most clear-cut dualistic philosophy of the western world.

*Ex. q. 2 Mac: 7:28; (Prov. 8:22f.); St. Thomas Aquinas ST g. l6, art l,2.
A second type of theism, stressing the divine immanence, has derived its inspiration from, and often expresses itself in the idiom of, science, empiricism, and the naturalistic tradition. Thus, naturalistic theism takes the world of natural process "realistically", that is, as being in some way necessary to God, and sometimes refers to the world of nature as God's body. Whitehead's philosophy of "Organism" is perhaps the most notable instance of naturalistic theism of this kind. Also, the emergent-istic evolutionary theisms, already mentioned, of C. Lloyd Morgan, Samuel Alexander, and John Elof Boodin, represent similar trends of thinking.

Third, idealistic theism typically describes God in the characteristic method and idiom of philosophical rationalism and idealism, which has held that "thought" or "reason" rather than "matter" and "sensory experience" are the best clues to an understanding of existence. Such theisms have tended to stress the "absoluteness" of God as over against the "reality" or "independency" of nature. Ramamuja in medieval India presented a theistic concept of Brahman in these terms. In the west George Berkeley, 18th century philosopher, and in modern America, Borden Parker Bowne, whose thought follows the Berkeleyan personalism, and his student Edgar S. Brightman, represent one development within idealistic theism. Josiah Royce, whose views root in part, Hegelian absolute realism, and his student William Ernest Hocking, have been notable representatives of a further type of idealist theism. If nature is not entirely a "phenomenal appearance", she is best to be conceived somehow as an eternal or continuing expression of God's direct, energizing will, "as being an order of organization of the experience of God" (Brightman APR 226).

What we above just called "naturalistic" and "idealistic" theisms cannot, of course, be rigidly distinguished. Representatives of both "schools" would overlap a great deal in their thinking. It is mainly a characteristic "method", empirical and "scientific" on the one hand, and
rationalistic and "a priori" on the other where a major line of demarcation can perhaps be traced between the above-mentioned representatives of these types of theism. However, such descriptive terminology has to be made with great concern to caution. The "idealists" are often brilliantly and staunchly "empirical" in many of their insights and utterances; whereas the "naturalists" and "empiricists" among theists are often quite "idealistic" in their descriptions of reality as spiritual process. Whereas Bowne, in general, thought that God transcends time in his own being, Brightman, student of Bowne, is a temporalist in his view of the divine nature. Frederick Tennant strives in his great work, Philosophical Theology, to be the "empiricist par-excellence in theology, but the outcome of his theological labors basically reflect Kant's phenomenalism and idealism.

A fourth way to indicate major types of theism in our time, cutting across all of the views just mentioned, centers on the problem of evil, and how it is solved from within a theistic standpoint. Some views hold to the adequacy or "absoluteness" of both God's power and his goodness in his fundamental relation to his world; other views, while stressing the adequacy of God's moral character or his goodness, have defined that God must be "finite" in his power. (Our later chapter examines each of these approaches to the problem of evil.)
The Idea of God as Person or Personality

The substance of the Hebraic idea of God as personal or Personality is fourfold. According to the implications of Old and New Testament, God is, or has:

- Self-conscious life or self-consciousness,
- Consciousness of his world,
- Love, or yearning outreach toward his world (Chesed and Agape), and
- Power to deal with the world's problems, as Lord of Nature and Lord of History.

Within the perspective of the Hebrew meaning, no concept of God will be fully personalistic, unless it includes these four, major phases of moral personality. Self-consciousness is indeed the basic logical meaning of "personality." But metaphysically, and semantically, can "self-consciousness" have meaning as some kind of psychological state existing by itself, separate or isolated from any necessary reference to "an other" or "the other", that is, to a world or environment conceived as in some degree outlying or beyond the self which is conscious? Apparently Aristotle answered this question in the affirmative so far as his concept of God went; for, though giving to his God self-consciousness he seemed to deny to Him consciousness of His world. Accordingly, in comparison to the fullest Hebraic sense (and possibly in terms of the only metaphysical, psychological, and moral sense conceivable) Aristotle's concept of God was only partially personal. Plato's God was conscious of his world, but (at least in the Timaeus) seemed subordinate to the Ideas, or the Forms of truth and being, which stood as the impersonal archetypes of world structure. Further, the idea of Agape was lacking to both Plato's and Aristotle's concept of God (eros, rather, was the prominent theme in the Greek concept of love).

The Hebrew-Christian concept of God as Personal centers in the idea of Chesed or Agape. This idea adequately states the "perfection" of God as
Personality. "Personality," as mere self-consciousness without love, would be demonic. As for God's power in dealing with the problems of the world, we may adopt either one of two alternative points of view. These are that God's power is either absolutely or totally adequate (recall our above reference to "theistic absolutism"), or God's power is partially but increasingly adequate ("theistic finitism").

Simplifying the above discussion, perhaps we may say that the concept of God as Moral Personality includes two major aspects: intelligence and love. (We will not argue further here the possibility of subsuming intelligence in itself in love, though this possibility may occur to the reader). Our larger task, then, in the next (and in succeeding chapters) is to attempt to set forth types of reasoning concerning God's existence or reality as trans-human Intelligence and Love, if we are to prove His existence as "Personal" or "Personality." Our general method of "proof" will be the larger one of "empirical" or "rational coherence" as previously defined. The problem of the "existence" or reality of God and the problem of the "personality" of God are two levels of the same problem. Practically speaking, for men religiously, God would not "exist" unless He were "personal"; that is, unless He were a Being, Level, or Order of Reality, or a dynamical process, movement, or "Spirit" within reality, who is trans-human, though possibly inclusive of the human, and in his essential "life" is conscious good will or love.

Before we enter upon this larger task, however, the following summary of the major concepts of God here discussed may occur to the reader. After the full analysis just completed in this chapter the reader may find the following outline a helpful simplification. We head this lest with an attitude toward "God" and theistic belief heretofore not specifically mentioned.
A Summary of Major Ideas Concerning Deity

First, atheistic and agnostic: (1) The affirmation that there is no "God," that the world is meaningless from the standpoint of permanent value sustained by a trans-human reality; or (2) the affirmation that the word "God" stands for the incomprehensible, ultimate "power" or "powers" within or behind nature and the universe as a whole, but that this possible ultimate unity, power or powers cannot be known in human, rational terms. There may be "God" in some terms but we cannot know, and accordingly suspend judgment.

Second, the affirmation that the word "God" stands as a symbol of man's growing ideals and their realization in historic process. God as a purely subjective, psychological principle, the point of view of "humanism" or critical naturalism.

Third, the affirmation that God is the mute striving of vital process (the desiring principle), manifest in nature's evolutionary ramifications—the point of view of the lower vitalisms, e.g., Schopenhauer.

Fourth, the affirmation that God is the objective principle of "order" and "integration" found in nature and her evolutionary processes: (1) in the minimal sense of McTaggart, viz. God as the minimal principle of order necessary to account for the vagrant and stray patches of "order" or integration which we do in fact find; or (2) in the maximal sense of Aristotle and many others, including many modern metaphysical naturalists, that God is the full principle of integrative "Actuality" immanent in or, in some way guiding, nature along paths of form, purpose and value. Contemporary emergentistic and evolutionary theisms: Wieman to Morgan to Whitehead.

Fifth, the affirmation that God is the objective order of Ideas, eternal values, abstract truth, or impersonal archetypes or laws of physical and moral structure that underlie or overarch process: "Platonism".

Sixth, the affirmation that God is the ultimate, ineffable Whole of Reality various idealisms, philosophical pantheisms, and mysticisms, especially eastern.
Sephth, the affirmation that God is Ultimate Personality, or Personal Cosmic Mind, with elements of the above views included, especially four, five, and six. This is the belief found, or suggested in, the major, historic monotheistic religions of the world, and possibly comes to highest expression in the Hebrew-Christian system.

Classic Illustrative Quotations on the Personality of God

It is fitting to conclude this chapter with the affirmations of representative theists concerning the Personality of God. These statements bring out the basic meaning of Personality in God as outlined previously. Surely Paul Tillich is in considerable historical error where he writes in Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (p. ) that the concept of the Personality of God is an historically late, 19th century concept originating with Kant! It is indeed rather an ancient concept coming to one of its major fruitions in Kant. The principal theme in the Biblical idea of the Divine Nature is God as moral intelligence or Love, i.e. as self-conscious moral personality. Such passages as those referred to in the note below certainly bear out this judgment relative to the Biblical concept of Deity; they affirm (or seem to affirm, as their basic implication) the ultimate of personality in value, and root this conception in ultimate reality or God, as the author and sustainer of being. Beyond the Biblical personalistic concept of God there are, of course, many authorities from whom we might quote. We select the following six for their generally recognized greatness as theologians or philosophers, one ancient, and five modern. These quotations are not selected

* Representative Biblical passages on God as Moral Personality or Moral Intelligence and Love: Ps. 103, 139; Hosea 6:4-6; 11:1-4; Jer. 31; II Isaiah 40:53; Matt 5-7; Lk 10:25-37; 15:1-32; John 14-15; 1st Jhn 3-4.
as full representative arguments for God as personal—the question of argument we reserve for detail in our next chapter—but they are chosen as classic statements or affirmations of the Personality of God to contrast with the several major types of impersonalistic views of Deity presented earlier. Note the basic contrast in several of these passages with Platonic "abstractionism", commencing with St. Augustine's familiar personalization of Platonism in the idea of God as the Personal Source of Truth. (Many further passages could be cited from Augustine indicating Veritas as dynamic Personal Consciousness, or Cosmic Intelligence and Love as previously defined; we quote Augustine again at length in our discussion of major arguments for the existence of such God).

St. Augustine


"It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists.... These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels,—all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as
though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another
thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to
Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could
understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed
are to be. (City of God, VIII, 5,6)

"And hence, since without doubt we place the Creator above things created,
we must needs confess that the Creator both lives in the highest sense, and
perceives and understands all things, and that he cannot die, nor suffer decay,
or be changed; and that He is not a body, but a spirit, of all the most power­
ful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed. (On the Trinity
XV, 4).

"I call upon Thee, O God, the Truth, in whom, by whom, and through whom
those things are true which are true in every respect.

God the Wisdom...

God, the true and highest life, in whom and by whom and through whom those
things live which anywhere live truly and supremely.

God, the Beatitudes, in whom and by whom and through whom all things are
happy which anywhere are happy.

God, the Good and the Beautiful...

God, the intelligible light, in whom and by whom and through whom those
things intelligibly shine which anywhere intelligibly shine.

God, whose kingdom is a whole universe of which the senses have no know­
ledge.

God, from whom to depart is to die, to whom to return is to be restored to
life, in whom to dwell is to live. (Soliloquies I, i, 3).

"But the true Father is true of Himself, for He begat the Truth. It is
one thing to say, That man is true, for he has taken in the truth: it is
another, God is true, for He begat the Truth. See then how God is true,—not
by participating in, but by generating the Truth. (On the Gospel of St. John
Tractate XXXIX).
"Behold and see, if thou canst, O soul... God is truth... in such a way as the heart sees, when it is said, He is truth. Ask not what is truth; for immediately the darkness of corporeal images and the clouds of phantasms will put themselves in the way, and will disturb that calm which at the first twinkling shone forth to thee, when I said truth. See that thou remainest, if thou canst, in that first twinkling with which thou art dazzled, as it were, by a flash, when it is said to thee, Truth. (Trinity VIII, 2).

"Let no one say, I do not know what I love. Let him love his brother, and he will love the same love. For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother: clearly known more, because more present; known more, because more within him; known more because more certain. Embrace the love of God, and by love embrace God. That is love itself, which associates together all good angels and all the servants of God by the bond of sanctity, and joins together us and them mutually with ourselves, and joins us subordinately to Himself. In proportion, therefore, as we are healed from the swelling of pride, in such proportion are we more filled with love; and with what is he full, who is full of love, except with God? Well, but you will say, I see love, and, as far as I am able, I gaze upon it with my mind, and I believe the Scripture, saying, that 'God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God'. ...so love also loves indeed itself, but except it love itself as loving something, it loves itself not at love. What therefore does love love, except that which we love with love? But this, to begin from that which is nearest to us, is our brother... the Apostle John... placed the perfection of righteousness in the love of our brother... intends God to be understood in brotherly love itself... declares sufficiently and plainly, that this same brotherly love itself... is set forth by so great authority, not only to be from God, but also to be God. When, we love our brother from love, we love our brother from God... Therefore we love God and our neighbor from one and the same love; but we love God for the sake of God, and ourselves and our neighbor for the sake of God. (Trinity VIII, 8)
"The love of God comes first in the order of enjoining, but the love of our neighbor first in the order of doing...Because thou dost not yet see God, thou dost earn the seeing of Him by loving thy neighbor. By loving thy neighbor thou purgest thine eyes for the seeing of God...Love, therefore, thy neighbor; and behold that in thee whereby thou loveth thy neighbor; there wilt thou see, as thou mayest, God. (On the Gospel of John XVII, 8).

Morgan, Whitehead, Boodin

(Three philosophical naturalists on the Personality of God.

In what sense and to what degree these men may be designated "naturalists" has already been explained. C. Lloyd Morgan, British philosopher, b. d. Alfred North Whitehead, British-American philosopher, teacher at Harvard from 1924 to 1938, b. d. John Elof Boodin, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, b. d.).
We live in a world in which there seems to be an orderly sequence of events. It is the business of science, and of a philosophy which keeps in touch with science, to describe the course of events in this or that instance of their occurrence, and to discover the plan on which they proceed. Evolution, in the broad sense of the word, is the name we give to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events.

But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to present, from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of each new kind of atom, and of each new kind of molecule. It is beyond the wit of man to number the instances of emergence. But if nothing new emerge -- if there be only regrouping of pre-existing events and nothing more -- then there is no emergent evolution.... (Emergent Evolution, 1-2)

"....One starts, let us say, with electrons and the like; one sees in the atom a higher complex; one sees in the molecule a yet higher complex; one sees in a quartz-crystal, along its line of advance, a still more complex entity; and one sees in an organism, along its line of advance, an entity with the different kind of complexity spoken of as vital integration.... All qualities are emergent within the pyramid of nature. Life and mind in no sense act into it, or any part of it, from without -- from some disparate order of being.... (Emergent Evolution, 12-14)

"....This, for me, leads upwards towards God, as directive Activity within a scheme which aims at constructive consistency.... God, as being, is
the nisus of the universe pressing onwards to levels as yet unattained; or, as I should prefer to say, is the Nisus directive of the course of events.... the crucial question arises whether, and if so in what sense, such an ideal is veritably Real... *(Emergent Evolution, 33-34)*

"The net result of the considerations adduced in the foregoing section is that the prefix 'super' and the word 'beyond' may from the point of view of emergent evolution be applied to any stage of emergence as contrasted with the precedent stage. The molecular stage is super-atomic; the crystal or colloidal stage is super-molecular; and so on....But all stages fall within the rational order of the cosmos in our comprehensive sense; and for us this rational order is, in spiritual regard, not other than Divine Purpose. For us Divine Purpose is inclusive of all advance -- physical, vital, mental, social, and in spiritual regard. Could we but reach the acknowledged limit there would be no 'super' beyond it...."

"In Divine Purpose as I conceive it... quite central and essential is Substantial Unity. It is here, as elsewhere, that I am monistic to the core. For if there be any validity in my concept of substance, it entails the renunciation au fond of all radical dualism or pluralism. These concepts lend themselves, no doubt, to dramatic mythology...."

"...when I say that... God is Spiritual Substance, it will no doubt be said that I leap from the impersonality of Divine Purpose to the personality of God."

"With the concept of God as personal most of us have started in our early years as an initial assumption. For many of us there has followed careful weighing of relevant criticism. Some of us still accept Divine Personality under acknowledgment. But it does not follow that the concept under acknowledgment is in all respects the same as the earlier concept..."
under initial assumption. Is the concept of the physical world, which the
man of science bids us accept, just the same as that of the boy when first
he enters the laboratory?

"How comes it...that our individual enjoyment is also personal, that
our individual reference is shared by many persons? In evolutionary regard
it just is so. We accept what we find in natural piety'. But if we regard
the whole evolutionary process as a manifestation of Divine Purpose, it is in
us as persons that Divine Personality is revealed. Through expansion of
thought in spiritual regard we reach out towards, though we are unable to
grasp, the limiting concept of personality. If we be persons and more than
individual selves, it is in religious regard through the all-embracing
Personality of God.

"Revert to possession by mind. Truth, beauty, and goodness are possessed
by each individual self of enjoyment as the centre from which reference goes
forth. But when they are not thus possessed in some temporal sequence of
mental processes -- mine, yours, or another's -- do they suverse and drop
out of being? Perhaps so. But may they not be temporal manifestations of
values which in spiritual regard are eternal? In the attitude of acknowledgment
I believe that they are so. The 'are' is comprehensive at the unattainable
limit of the timeless. And the Timeless and Eternal is the I AM towards
which we reach out in spiritual regard. Thus truth, beauty, and goodness --
rational, aesthetic, and ethical values -- are raised to a higher status
for those in whom the spiritual attitude is supervenient, since they have
their ultimate being in God....

"I know full well that, with respect to much that I have said...I shall
be charged with mysticism. So be it. In discussing emergent evolution I was
faced by problems many and various. In spiritual regard I am faced by mystery.
And in presence of mystery, the spiritual attitude, if monistic, cannot as I
think be other than mystic...." (Life, Mind, and Spirit, 306-313)
"Thus the whole (natural) process... requires a definite entity (God), already actual among the formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into the definite process of the temporal world... God, who is the ground antecedent to transition, must include all possibilities of physical value conceptually, thereby holding the ideal forms apart in equal, conceptual realization of knowledge. Thus, as concepts, they are grasped together in the synthesis of omniscience... God... is complete in the sense that his vision determines every possibility of value. Such a complete vision coordinates and adjusts every detail... This ideal world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of God himself. Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms... God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good... Every event on its finer side introduces God into the world... The power by which God sustains the world is the power of himself as the ideal... The world lives by its incarnation of God in itself... He transcends the temporal world... The abstract forms are thus the link between God and the actual world... God is that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial as to our own interests. He is that element in life in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond facts of existence to values of existence. He is that element in virtue of which our purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others... He is the binding element in the world. The consciousness which is individual in us, is universal in him: love which is partial in us is all-embracing in him... The passage of time is the journey of the world towards the gathering of new ideas into actual fact... The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future. There remain the inexhaustible realm of abstract forms, and creativity,
with its shifting character ever determined afresh by its own creatures, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend. (Religion in the Making, p. 152-160.)

"...the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The primordial side of his nature is eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious... The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature... the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts... The consequent side originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious..." (Process and Reality, p. 521-24.)
John Elof Boodin

"God must be conceived as a reality beyond material incarnation—a pure spiritual level, expressing itself through matter and becoming known to us through this expression. The higher level in the advance of life does not merely emerge from below, but implies a stimulus from beyond and the creative response of the finite to this stimulus. The order, beauty, and love of the highest level must radiate through all the levels even to inorganic matter and its evolution. For it is to the highest level in the cosmos that the lower levels owe their order...God is not to be conceived merely as the highest level of evolution, but as an independent life. This life permeates and envelops all that is in space and time. God is not dependent upon the process in space and time, but is the field within which the process moves. All order depends in the last analysis upon the structure of this divine field. But this depends upon nothing. It is self-contained in its perfection—the perfect symphony—though its creative love goes out to all. Through the genius of this soul of the whole, the constancy of levels and the equilibrium within the whole is guaranteed....The divine must not be conceived as an impersonal field; it suffuses the cosmos as soul, as creative intelligence. God's life, it is true, cannot be characterized as personal in our imperfect sense—limited as we are by our material evolution—but it cannot be less, rather must it be inconceivably higher than what we mean by personality.... (God, p. 44-5)

"If we think of the cosmos as a living whole, what we call empty space may be the soul of the whole—all-pervasive spirit in which the transmitted patterns of energy are immanent and directed to their proper target. At any rate, to one who conceives the cosmos as a living whole space has lost its terror....Space is really the divine presence....If we conceive space as the universal matrix of order, then corpuscular matter becomes the amorphous plural material, with its indeterminacy and inertia, but also plasticity to
be ordered in the lattice-work of space. If, however, we recognize the facts of change and emergence everywhere, we cannot suppose that space is a stereotyped order....This structure must be a hierarchical dynamic structure.... containing in itself all the patterns and hierarchies of patterns of all possible integrations from the atom to creative genius...steering the material conditions towards structure and everywhere contributing such structure as the readiness of the individual and the ensemble of conditions permit whether H₂O or a human personality...(God, 85, 147)

ROYCE, BOWNE, BRIGHTMAN

(Three philosophical idealists on the Personality of God. Royce, 1855-1916, reached his fame as a teacher at Harvard from 1882 to 1916. Bowne, 1847-1910, was the noted teacher of Philosophy at Boston University from 1876 to his death. Brightman, to , inherited Bowne's chair at Boston. Bowne and Brightman derived the main substance of their thought from Berkeleyan personalistic idealism; whereas Royce stood more in the absolutistic, Hegelian tradition of Idealism.)
Josiah Royce

(In the following way Royce believes that he successfully refutes Mr. Bradley's Impersonal Absolute.)

"The Absolute therefore must not merely be A, but experience itself, as possessing the character of A. It is, for instance, 'above relations' (according to Mr. Bradley). If this is a fact, and if this statement is true of the Absolute, then the Absolute must experience that it is above relations. For Mr. Bradley's definition of Reality must not, like the mystical Absolute, merely ignore the relations as illusion. It must experience their 'transformations' as a fact, -- and as its own fact. Or, again, the Absolute is that in which thought has been 'taken up' and 'transformed', so that it is no longer 'mere thought'. Well, this too is to be a fact.... The Absolute, then, experiences itself as the absorber and transmitter of thought. Or, yet again...'personality'...Well, this transcendence of personality is a fact....Hence, the fact that the Absolute transcends personality is a fact that the Absolute itself experiences as its own fact....

"The Absolute...is above the Self, and any form of mere self-hood (according to Bradley). The fact that it is thus above selfhood is something 'not other than experience'; but is wholly experience, and is the Absolute Experience itself. In fine, then, the Absolute, in Mr. Bradley's view, knows itself so well--experiences so fully its own nature--that it sees itself to be no Self, but to be a self-absorber...aware of itself in the end, as something in which there is no real Self to be aware of....But if the Absolute is all these things, it can be so only in case it experiences itself as the possessor of these characters. Yet all the concrete self-possession of the Absolute remains something above Self; and apparently the Absolute thus knows itself to be, as a Self, quite out of its own sight!"
"Now...we know, at all events, that...Mr. Bradley's Absolute is a self-representative system...And we know, therefore, that the Absolute, despite all Mr. Bradley's objections to the Self, escapes from selfhood and from all that selfhood implies, or even transcends selfhood, only by remaining to the end a Self. In other words, it really escapes from selfhood only by experiencing as its own, this its own escape. This consequence is clear." (The World and The Individual, vol. I, p. 551-2).

"We are free, upon the basis of the general argument of these lectures, to assert that the Absolute is no absorber and transmitter, but an explicit possessor and knower of an infinite wealth of organized individual facts,—the facts, namely, of the Absolute Life and Selfhood" (Ib. p. 587)

"What our...conception asserts is that God's life, for God's life we must now call this absolute fulfillment which our...Conception defines, sees the one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose by virtue of all the ideas of all the individual selves, and of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this instant to be." (Ib. 426-27)

"...In brief, then, the foregoing conception of God undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not pantheistic. It is not the conception of any Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of a Universal Substance, in whose law ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore....I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is...identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy. (The Conception of God, p. 49-50)."
First principles themselves must be founded in the nature of the infinite. Just as what is real is founded in the infinite, so also what is true is founded in it. In our finite experience we find ourselves working under a system of laws and principles which condition us, and which all our acts must obey. And these laws are not of our making, but rule us even against our will. Under this experience there grows up the notion of a realm of impalpable and invisible laws, to which all reality is subject. We think of them as ruling over being, and not as founded in being. And thus first principles particularly are conceived as a kind of bottomless necessity, which depend on nothing for their validity, and which would exist if all reality were away. But the untenability of this view is palpable. Laws of every sort, thought-laws among the rest, are never anything but expressions of the nature of being. Reality, by being what it is and not something else, founds all activity and all law.

It is necessary to the thought of any agent that it have some definite way of working. Without this the thought vanishes and the agent is nothing. This mode, or law, of action, however, is not imposed from without; but is simply an expression of what the being is.  

The question of divine limitation, then, really concerns God's relation to those necessities of reason, or eternal truths. Is he conditioned by them or superior to them? If we should assume a realm of truth to exist apart from being, it could have no effect in being unless we should further assume an interaction between it and being. But this would make truth a thing, and would compel the assumption of another being deeper than both truth and reality to mediate their interaction. At this point we fall an easy prey to our own abstractions. A law of nature is never the antecedent, but the consequence of reality. The real is first and only, and being what it is, its
laws result as a consequence, or, rather are but expressions of what the things are. Truth is never anything more than an expression of the necessary relations of ideas, or of the way in which reason universally proceeds. As such, it is nothing apart from the mind or antecedent to it, but is simply an expression of the mental nature. There is no realm of truth apart from the world-ground. This dependence may be conceived in two ways. Truth may be viewed as founded in the nature of the world-ground, or as a creature of volition. We object to the statement either that God makes truth, or that he recognizes it as something independent of himself. He is rather its source and foundation; and it, in turn, is the fixed mode of his procedure. The basal fact is a thought activity, and reflection shows that this has certain forms. However, they do not rule intellect, but only express what intellect is. (Theism, p. 191-96)

"Unless, then, appearances are unusually deceitful...it is plain that man is no impotent annex to a self-sufficient mechanical system, but is rather a very significant factor in cosmic ongoings, at least in terrestrial regions. He is an inhabitant of the invisible world, and projects his thought and life on the great space and time screen which we call nature. But naturalism, in its sense bondage, misses all this, and seeks for man in the picture world of space images, where, in the nature of the case, he can never be. With this initial blunder, man becomes less and less in the system, first a phenomenon, then an 'epiphenomenon', and finally he tends to disappear altogether. Meanwhile matter and motion go on integrating and dissipating as per schedule, and $\frac{3}{2}MV^2$ remains a constant quantity. The whole history of thought contains no more grotesque inversion of reason.

"A world of persons with a Supreme Person at its head is the conception to which we come as the result of our critical reflections. (Personalism, p. 277)
"...the notion of an impersonal spirit...too, is more easily said than understood...We conclude that if the world-ground be intelligent and rational, it must also be conscious and personal. (Theism, p. 157)

"The objections to affirming a Supreme Person are largely verbal. Many of them are directed against a literal anthropomorphism. This, of course, is a man of straw. Man himself in his essential personality is as unpicturable and formless as God. (Personalism p. 264)
Edgar Sheffield Brightman

"God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence, there is in God's very nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given. The evils of life and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it.

"This definition may be put more concisely in the following terms:

"God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature.

"This definition makes God much more limited than does traditional theism, yet much less limited than does any form of dualism which contrasts God with matter or with any being in the universe which originated independently of God. (The Problem of God, Abingdon, 1930, p. 113-114)

"...the traditional theistic idea of God has been what we may call absolutistic. That is, for St. Augustine, for St. Thomas, for Descartes, for Kant, and for many modern philosophers the fundamental attributes of the divine Person have been omnipotence, omniscience, eternity or timelessness, and infinity, as well as perfect goodness...But...the attributes of power,
timelessness, and infinity need to be reconsidered. We first show why an empirical approach to God can no longer be satisfied with the assertion that God is timeless....

"The thesis to be defended is that the God of religion, from everlasting to everlasting, is a temporal being. Indeed, it may be said that all reality, all experience, whether human or divine, is a temporally moving present. Nothing real is a nunc stans. Activity, change, duration are the essence of the real. The real endures; the real changes; the real grows. God is the real or at least the most significant part of the real.

"...Eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity. With Heraclitus we may assert that all things change except the Logos of change. That there is constant change is the testimony of both experience and of science. That the changes in experience conform to law is the testimony of rational thought. Reason finds evidence of eternal form which the changes never violate.

"...At any rate, Kant held, and experience testifies, that time is essential to our inner life as space is not. We can have experiences to which space is not relevant; but time is the universal warp and woof of every experience. Now, if God is a real being, he must stand in real relations to our temporal experience. He must be the ground and explanation of our time, and events in our time must make a difference to him. The temporal character of the self points to the temporal character of God."

(Person and Reality, The Ronald Press Company, 1958, p. 322-324)
Addendum on the Concept of God as "Spirit"

Nels F.S. Ferre has been a very influential theologian of the American scene in the mid-twentieth century. Currently, Professor Ferre is in the process of clarifying his noteworthy life-long commentary on the New Testament conception of God as Agape. In a provocative essay entitled "Beyond Substance and Process" he states that "God is not a spiritual Personality but personal Spirit".* Ferre believes that "Personality" is too "substantive" in its connotations as the term best descriptive of God. Rather he says that we must clarify theology by conceiving God as "Spirit" or "personal Spirit."—(And we are here reminded of Martin Buber). Ferre believes that we cannot conceive God in too substantive a fashion, because "substance" has connoted things, entities, and persons in their exclusive, over-againstness to other things, entities, or persons; whereas, God is all inclusive, creative, dynamic Spirit suffusing the Universe. On the other hand, he says, if we go too far along the way of a process philosophy, and identify God too closely with process, we are obviously making Him too immanent in particular flux and really no more than natural evolution. Accordingly, he writes, "If God is substance, he is an entity in terms of a Supreme Being, alongside and among other things"; and again "...if God is conceived of either as substance or as personality, in the sense of an exclusive independent entity, he cannot be present and absent at the same time. He is either present or absent or we sin against the law of excluded middle."** On the other hand, "If God is an aspect of process, oppositely he possesses no transcending aseity."***

Therefore Ferre believes that the essential N.T. description of God as "Spirit" is the mediating and transcending term we need--transcending the

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** Ibid., p. 167, 169
*** Ibid., p. 167
substantive, "personality", but not the adjectival, "personal," as terms approximately attributed to God. Most eloquently he writes -- and here we recall some of the insight of the late Josiah Royce -- "God as Spirit...is that reality who, focussed as a purposive totality, is in this sense a distinctive entity and yet present in and with all distinctions as their inner identity. God is also all-inclusive, the only ultimate reality. He is both personal subject, as such limiting his power and freedom for the sake of the reality and the freedom of creation, and yet also the co-subject of all subjects, indeed, the co-presence of all creation in some sense... if God is Spirit and trans-personal, in the full sense that he can at the same time be both personal and impersonal or non-personal in himself, then he can remain self-same and yet create that which is other and be present with such creation for the sake of its reality and privacy, yes, for the sake of its genuine freedom, impersonally or in grades of the personal according to the need of the creation or the stage of history... As personality God has external relations and his relation to the world must be one basically of incarnation; as Spirit, God becomes basically the identity and inner reality of all; and yet as personal, he maintains external relations with regard to his own self-being, his own self-sufficiency, his own aseity. 

We will not attempt to evaluate in detail these complex statements. No doubt it is wise for theology to consider Ferre's suggestion and employ the term "Spirit" in referring to God, rather more than the term "personality." Spirit is indeed a hallowed, suggestive, and "orthodox" term which may well be emphasized by theism. We submit, however, that "spirit" can be a very cloudy, vague, vaporous term signifying little, unless carefully defined. When we think of "spirit" in quintessential sense we usually mean the thinking, evaluating, and purposing mind of personal beings or persons. Does not "personality" therefore

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come back into the picture as the more transcending or inclusive category? Personality best defines or exemplifies "spirit". We would say that in the above discussion Ferre delimits the expression "personality" too much. If, however, we may use it in a more expansive sense, so that it does not have an offensive exclusiveness or separateness, as Ferre alleges, but rather a liberating inlifting inclusiveness, then surely it is our best term for the description of God. For the cardinal virtue of the truly big or generous "person" is always his inclusive "spirit", that is, his breadth of understanding, his toleration, his generousity, and creativeness, his loving servicableness. God has such attributes in supreme degree, and accordingly moral "personality" at its best on our plane, would by no means be the least valuable term or category attributable to God—indeed we maintain it is the highest or best term attributable to God. In conclusion, let us use Ferre's phraseology God as "personal Spirit"—but let us capitalize the whole expression into God as "Personal Spirit". It is then equivalent to our "Personality of God" usage. I think it only a variation of words, not of ideas.

In speaking to the world today from the sense of value of the Judaeo-Christian system, the greatest issue is whether God is "Personality" or "Impersonality". I think for simplicity and clarity we have to use "Personality" in the debate, and defend it. In the privacy of theological talk, perhaps we can substitute "personal Spirit". But the main issue remains, Is God self-conscious Life?—at least in the primary dimension of His multidimensional Being, nature, or Reality? If self-conscious, then the most appropriate word is "personality", whatever other subtlety we may then have to say is true of God.
Differences in the idea of God center mainly in two questions: (1) How does one account for form, law, rational structure, and value in the universe as to their basic place or status, and how form and value relate to process or becoming? And (2) there is the question of whether conscious personality is supreme or not in value and in process. Accordingly we have the great systems of thought about Deity, eastern and western, ancient and modern:

Pantheism (e.g. Hinduism)

God as the undifferentiated Whole of Being

Problems: 1. The principles of individuality and personality are denied value and reality. But then how/why do finite individual forms appear in the finite part -- how do specific forms and values arise out of an ultimately undifferentiated Being?

2. The problem of "good" and "evil". If such Being is "beyond" good and evil?

Critical Naturalism

(e.g. J. Dewey)

Form and value are constructs of men's imagination:

Problems: 1. How do personal, conscious life and values come from impersonal, non-conscious, non-value process? How do forms appear from formless process?

2. The problem of the relativity of values,

Semi-theistic, or Sub-personalistic Naturalisms (e.g. H.W. Wieman)

Form and value are inherent in emergent process; an impersonal "purposive" movement toward form and value:

Problems: How can "cosmic purpose" be sub-personal; how/why does "integration", "emergence", "whelism" take place?

Sub-Monistic Conceptions of Deity

Polytheism

Mensetheism

Problems: 1. The exact relation of the Divine Mind to the world of nature and process?

2. To the human mind and its freedom?

3. The problem of "imperfections" or "evils" in process?

Modern Personalistic Theisms

(Idealistic and Naturalistic)

Form and value as the personal, conscious, moral purposes or thoughts of Cosmic Mind", "Person", or "Consciousness":

Problems: How can the world's apparent purposive integration, emergence, wholizing into a finite personal order explained.
Part III

Major Arguments for God
"Empirical" reasoning concerning the existence or reality of God refers to a method, a mood, or a mode of insight and experience based on general observation of world facts objective or external to the self (the sentient and intelligent powers of the self, with which we make the observations, of course, being assumed).

Before we proceed, however, to examine in detail the empirical type arguments, as the main interest of this chapter, we will look first at the idea of "proof", and secondly present an introductory resume of all the arguments for God as to the typical method and aims of each.

In science, as well as in philosophy, the quest for truth involves the idea of proof for the statements and judgments made purporting to be descriptions of reality. "Logical proof" is of course correct deduction from premises already given. "Empirical proof" is a wider sort of proof which we have previously described as empirical coherence, p. 56 (Chapter 2).

To put the matter in slightly different words, but with the same result, I believe, we say with Trueblood that proof is "cumulative" or converging lines of evidence." "Proof" is the limit to which accumulative evidence approaches. "Evidence" here may be understood as any of the legitimate tests of truth so far considered. Trueblood's able summary of the idea and problem of proof may be repeated with profit here:

"...The necessity of cumulative evidence...applies to everything we know in the realm of matters of fact. It applies to evidence for the existence of God, to evidence for the existence of atoms, to evidence for the existence of historical characters". (LB p. 42)
The sum effect of the following arguments for God may be considered "proof" in this open sense. No one of these arguments may be definitive or "apodictic" in certainty by itself. Some of them may be stronger than others. But altogether they may point in a similar direction, with God as a focal limit, and with enough incompleteness in the case of each vector for the spark of faith, of necessity, to make its leap.

Classification of the Arguments for God

as to general method and aims

I. Typically "rational," that is to say, detached, or "objective," "logical" type arguments—as William Newton Clarke wrote, arguments "from the intellectual starting point" (OCT 105):

A. Empirical arguments: based on the existence of the world as a whole and its process. In reasoning about the God the empirical mood looks at
Argument. Adumbrated in Plato's moral idealism, and implied in the Hebraic Old Testament Prophetic thought, the basic logical form of the argument was crystalized by St. Augustine. Elaborations of phases and details of this argument are found in St. Anselm, Descartes, Kant in his moral reasoning, Josiah Royce, William Ernest Hocking, Charles Hartshorne, and many others. (Gr. ontos: being; that is, the argument through which we may know directly and intimately something of the "being" of God).

II. The Religious or psychological type arguments, or the typically "committed" or "emotional" argument. As Clarke says we may approach the problem of theism "from the religious starting-point" (Ib 118).

5. Perhaps most simply described it is the discovery of Mind in the universe through the experience of moral "salvation". The mystics, prophets, seers, and devout of all cultures have tended to know of God first in this way. In his Varieties of Religious Experience the modern American philosopher William James gave a classic description of "salvational experience" in its general or universal form. Within Christian theology more specifically Douglas Clyde Macintosh, the late noted Yale theologian, spent a lifetime in the analysis of the ideas of "conversion", and of "religious" or "Christian experience," or the experience of God. His now classic work, Theology as an Empirical Science was devoted to this theme. We shall utilize both of these sources to explain this "religious" argument for God.

None of the above divisions should be regarded as fixed or impassible from one to another. Indeed quite the opposite seems true; all of the above so-called arguments for God are profoundly related. None can be discussed without implying many of the others. The "religious argument" is by no means illogical or "unreasonable." All of these arguments taken together may constitute phases of a full, rationally coherent insight concerning God.
The full weight of the empirical arguments probably rests on profound a priori factors, as Kant quite rightly, but critically, discovered. In our following discussion we attempt to point out what rational, or a priori premises lie behind each argument. In the view of this writer, the possible discovery of the ultimate subjectivity of any or all of these arguments, far from leading to their destruction or invalidity, leads probably to their establishment on the profoundest basis. If, in the depths of our subjectivity, any or all of them help us to stand in some measure face to face with ultimate reality and God, so that our own subjectivity is awakened, as it were, by the presence of an unmistakable and overwhelming objectivity, to use the time-honored analogy, as the eye is cleaved, but quickened and fulfilled, in its mission and destiny by light; so if any of these arguments bring us into a vividness of experience and reality in like manner, they are arguments, or rather we should say, experience of God indeed.

Needless to say there has been great dispute in the history of western philosophy regarding the validity of these arguments. Some critical thinkers have rejected all of them, and this not only among materialists and naturalists, but Christian theologians too, Paul Tillich being a notable present day example. Others have accepted the "empirical" arguments but decline to see significance in the "a priori" patterns of reasoning. The view of this writer is that all of these arguments are profoundly significant when sufficiently appreciated, and that all of them rest no doubt upon a priori depths that are their real validity. At any rate, we shall attempt to indicate more fully what is here implied by the analysis, or rather the coherent synopsis, of the arguments.
Empirical Reasons for Belief in God

1. The Causal Argument

In its initial mood this argument is "empirical"; it first looks out at the world and permits the presence of the world as a whole to suggest a train of reasoning about causality. The objective confrontation of the self by the world is the starting-point. In depth, however, this argument deals with the logical implications involved in the idea of causality. As Clarke has said it is the "discovery of Mind in the universe through the idea of cause." Accordingly it seems in depth essentially a priori, as the subsequent discussion will attempt to clarify; it rests ultimately on logical, axiomatic insights.

(1) The main idea of the cosmological argument. At its empirical starting-point the argument may think of world causation (i.e. what causes existence and process as a whole) in terms of the modern evolutionary idea of unfolding, that "one existing thing has unfolded out of another" (Clarke, Ib. 110). Or, if the terminology "unfolding" seems to commit us initially too much to a pre-formationist type of philosophy of evolution (see our later discussion of this point), perhaps we should refer more simply to the evolutionary fact of integration and emergence of cosmic energies into various forms of individuality, from sub-atomic entities to finite persons. This then is our initial observation. Resting on it our reasoning follows. Let us start with the most complex object of present evolutionary development, man, or more specifically, you or me, the cosmic origin of which we wish to explain. We have, then, a series of causal terms, or thinking about causal terms, of the following kind; reading from right to left:
As we proceed from the right and read left, through these terms, A, B, C, etc., we enter successively deeper, or wider, or more inclusive stages of causation under the evolutionary idea of unfolding or integration.

One of the typical or traditional points of the cosmological argument is that we get into, or have assumed, an infinite regression of terms, unless we posit an Absolute Original Cause, or Originating "Will," an "absolute origination," with ultimate constructive power, suggesting all-sufficient Intelligence and Purpose (and possibly even good will or love—see our later point). In discussing the cosmological argument in its simplest terms, as to whether all the various 'motions' of the universe can be explained under the idea of mechanical impact preceding mechanical

*E.g. As now postulated: hydrogen instability and other factors in the structure and processes of the DNA molecule. Given mutation, "natural selection" is part of the explanatory principle here—see our later discussion, p. , on the purposive interpretation of "natural selection."
impact*--in our above picture in terms of B's impingement on A, and C's on B, etc.--Plato stated the spirit or main question of the argument at an early stage in Western thought, when he wrote, "How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? (Laws X) He concluded that only the "self-moving" principle or thing, namely "soul" or "mind", could stop such a regress and explain the series. Along this same line in William Newton Clark's apt summary we have the central mood of the argument stated in its timeless appeal:

"...The need of originating power cannot be evaded by claiming that one existing thing has been unfolded out of another....This power of unfolding was somehow originated and imparted and this was absolute origination....Absolute origination implies some sufficient inventive and creative energy" (Ib. 110).

In other words, the cosmological argument points to the idea of "power," resident in, or behind, the process described as "evolution," "unfolding," or "integration." In the observance of the presence of things, the "power" of being underlying the individuating and integrating process is the term in which thought inevitably lodges. The argument on its profoundest level alleges that reasoning backwards in time the mind arrives at the idea of ultimate power as stopping the regress--with the connotations of supreme adequacy or intelligence, and purposiveness, inherent in the notion of "ultimate power". If causal thinking aims at full "explanation", it cannot rest with bare sequential and regressive "description" of finite factors ever receding behind finite factors, ad infinitum. Causal reasoning (at least along the cosmic dimension), if we puruse it seriously and conclusively, expands outward and upward to a highest and most inclusive category or necessity of thought, namely Supreme Creative Mind.

*See our discussion of the various meanings of the term "mechanism" or "mechanical", as we review the teleological argument, p. .
William Temple has stated the mood of the cosmological argument precisely:

"...Reality is first presented as Process... We are therefore led to enquire whether Purpose can be the governing principle of the world-process. It has, at least, this advantage as a candidate for that function; it is a principle of explanation which itself requires no further explanation. All other types of explanation set new problems; of every other answer to the question Why? we ask Why? again. But Intelligent Purpose is self-explanatory. When we have traced an occurrence to the Purpose of an intelligent being, we are satisfied. And this is natural enough, for in such a case Mind has referred the occurrence to itself as cause". (Nature, Man, and God, Macmillan, 1935, p. 219-220).

Main premise of the cosmological argument. One a priori basis of the cosmological argument has come to light: it is that infinite regress violates the law of thought frequently called the principle of "sufficient reason", or which we might alternatively term "adequate explanation" or "adequate causality". Is the law of sufficient reason true? The student has to decide this for himself, and on it much of the validity of the causal argument rests. In its defense we would say, the law of sufficient reason seems to be the basic incentive for all logical or scientific investigation of our world. The hunger for rational or sufficient explanation or causality seems innate in man as constituting the very substance and meaning of his intelligence as a whole.

We will not here enter into a full treatise on the idea or meaning of "causality". Suffice it to say that a cosmological argument does indeed rest on a "coherency" or "idealist" conception of causality and truth, as insight into an "inferential whole or implicative system"; rather than on a radically empiricist or positivist view of cause as only observed connection or sequence (Hume).


**See next page for footnote.
Ernest Nagel's discussion of causality in The Structure of Science (1961) implies (to us) a coherency philosophy of causality where he suggests that "causality" is "a maxim for inquiry rather than a statement with a definite empirical content", p 320. (p. 315-324 for full discussion).

In the essay "The Case for Atheism" (in The Problems of Philosophy, ed by Alston and Branit, Allyn & Bacon, 1967, p. 82f), Nagel poses a criticism of the cosmological argument in the following statement: "But if God can be self-caused, why cannot the world be self-caused? We reply: How can the world be as "self-caused" be explained without using teleological terms? We challenge the critic to explain the world as a "self-caused" system without using the teleological language (and the thinking behind it) which he wishes to rule out. To say the world is at some point "self-caused" is to say that there is a teleological principle in it! If you say that the world is throughout a "mechanism" (and mean what you say), and also is "self-caused", then, it seems that you are saying that it is some kind of perpetual motion machine. Point to a case of something in the world that is self-caused, and do you not point to something teleological? The burden of the analytic (or mechanist) critic here is to point to something "self-caused" that is not teleological (that is, an attempt to explain it in totally mechanical terms, totally free of teleological implications. Plato's original insight in Laws X was that this just cannot be done!

To the argument which endeavors to refute theism at this point, to the effect that the human mind does accept without perturbation or scandal the idea of "infinite regress," as e.g., in a mathematical series:

\[ a^n = 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 \]

and that therefore there is no reason for not accepting "infinite regress" in cosmological thinking, we reply: "Regress" in an infinite mathematical series is an abstract static notion, useful in the limited purposes of mathematics; whereas the series of causalities of nature, OR the universe, are concrete and dynamic, are actual "motions" (Plato) or processes; for which we are seeking full, sufficient, or coherent explanation. Whereas in pure mathematics it seems an axiom of thought that the mind may indeed think in terms of infinite serieses, it seems equally an axiom of thought that where the concrete cosmic process as a whole is considered, thought leads inevitably to the idea of "ultimate power" and "purposiveness". That indefinite recession seems allowed in one type of thinking, does not mean that it is the necessary or most suitable type of thinking in other problems or experience.
The sum of this initial and basic stage of the cosmological argument is that if we are interested in full "explanation" or full "intelligibility", we are led to Cosmic Intelligence or Purposiveness as highest explanatory principle. Others have stated this main substance of the argument well:

"Let me, then, now try to bring out what I conceive to be the essential truth which the cosmological argument, when rightly stated, establishes. The gist of the argument may be expressed thus: Acknowledging, as we cannot help doing, the existence of a world of nature, we are logically driven to acknowledge that there is a real existence beyond nature, unless, indeed, we are prepared to rest in an ultimate inexplicability, and to relinquish the attempt to frame an intelligent conception of nature at all." (G. Dawes Hicks, The Philosophical Bases of Theism, New York, Macmillan, 1937, p. 180. Quoted in David E. Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1957, p. 92.)

"The dependence meant in the argument has nothing to do with succession in time. What is really meant is that our knowledge of any event in Nature is not complete until we know the full reason for the event. So long as you only know that A is so because B is so, but cannot tell why B is so, your knowledge is incomplete. It only becomes complete when you are in a position to say that ultimately A is so because Z is so, Z being something which is its own raison d'être, and therefore such that it would be senseless to ask why Z is so." (A.E. Taylor, quoted in: William P. Alston, ed., Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, New York, 1963, p. 41.)

Of course, the sceptic may reply that he is not thus interested, that the universe is too problematic to him to really care about "ultimate explanations." We are at this level deep in a priori suppositions anyway, he may say, and far from the empirical field. For the sceptic, therefore, of course the alternative is that the universe is unintelligible.*

Alternative ways of interpreting the idea of God as Original or "First Cause." The argument leaves us with three possible conceptions of the relation of God/"First Cause", that is as Ultimate Cosmic Intelligence, Adequate Power, or Purpose:

(a) As transcendent First Cause in a temporal sense, with creation ex nihilo, the classic popular Hebrew-Christian view:

(b) As first Cause in the sense that God is the continuing or sustaining intelligence and purposive Ground of existence. Such a view may not be incompatible with the idea of the eternity of nature and the organized material world. This is the concept of God in his "causal" relation to the world as continuing efficient causality:

(c) God as First or Prior Cause in the sense of Formal or Final Causality only, as the "Unmoved Mover" (Aristotle); the world grows into the Divine Forms by desire:

At this point a fundamental confusion regarding the idea of "First Cause," to which the argument points, frequently crops up. The question is raised, perhaps the argument does carry us to the notion of a "First Cause," but why stop here? Who made the "First Cause," who made God? Doesn't the possibility of thinking in terms of infinite regress return on this highest level itself, to destroy our argument after all? Our reply is, "First Cause" means "beyond which there is no other"—this is what the argument has meant.
in its conclusion—hence it would be quite illogical to ask who made, or what was the cause, of the "First Cause." If we have arrived at the idea of "First Cause, implied, of course, is the self-sufficiency or "ultimacy" of such cause in itself—traditionally described as the aseity, or self-existence or self-explaining nature of the very idea, "God." *

A thesis of this study will be that God's causal relation to the world is probably best understood as a combination of possibilities b and c above. He is immanent, "material," or "efficient" causality throughout the levels of lower nature, prior to the appearance of finite freedom. His influence upon the world at that level becomes one of "final" causality through the spiritual power of ideal values and truths to inspire and guide the life of freedom.*


See also Alvin Plantinga in the same volume, p. 125f, on the positive side of the argument, esp. on the illegitimacy or absurdity of the question "Who made God?" To ask "who made God?" is, says Plantinga, like asking "why are all vacuums empty?". All vacuums are empty by definition of a "vacuum". Likewise by definition or conceptualization in a cosmological argument, "God" means the self-explaining, originating power without further antecedents — this is what "God" means. Therefore, it is illogical or redundant thinking to raise questions about "antecedents". (See also our further discussion, already indicated, on page 319).

These points we amplify at a later stage of our discussion in the chapter on God's relation to the world.
Further aspects of the cosmological argument. We have just considered the type of causal reasoning that seems to disclose an ultimate category of thought, namely, the idea of Absolute Originating Power, with the implication that such power is organizingly adequate or "Intelligent," and morally adequate or "Purposive." Absolute Power is, of course, one of the primal notions of Deity, and if the ideas of intelligence and purpose seem implicated in this original concept, then we have stated the main substance of the cosmological argument and discussion might rest here. There are, however, three further categories, related to the preceding, that causal thinking suggests, each of which seems ultimate, and may open to the reader further depths to the cosmological argument. They are the concept of Ultimate or Unconditioned Being, Ultimate or Eternal Order, and Ultimate or Absolute Love. In the history of thought the cosmological argument is frequently stated in terms of the first of these further concepts.

a. The derivation of the concept of Necessary, Unconditioned, or Eternal Being was in one instance formulated in classic way by St. Thomas. It rests on the ex nihilo nil fit principle: the a priori axiom of thought that out of nothing nothing comes. St. Thomas stated the reasoning as follows:

Assume that..."at one time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to exist only through something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore...there must exist something the existence of which is necessary...Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their
The validity of Thomas's argument, just presented, may seem heightened as we focus upon it, or personalize it by considering the central form of existence for us personally, namely, that of the self. It would then be stated (much as Descartes in his *Meditations* and John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* analyzed it) in the following way: I am, I know that I exist. Further I know that I did not cause myself, but that some other great power or cause or being is responsible for me. And in the idea that I did not produce myself, or that I am a conditioned or contingent being, there is the implication of my cosmic cause as the Unconditioned Being. It is other and greater than I because it produced me, and seems ultimate, absolute, or unconditioned because it produced all the conditions that produced me. It is greater than me because it produced the possibility of the mighty species that produced me, and behind or deeper than that, the possibility, in the basal cosmic conditions as a whole, for finite life to be. Further, this unconditioned being cannot be "mere nature," understood in some reductive, or merely mechanical, purposeless, and mindless sense. For nature, understood in that sense, would also be conditioned being, with one part depending upon and relating to another, and we would fall into Plato's infinite regress problem again.

Neither can our category of unconditioned being mean the trans-experientiable Whole of nature, but still as less than purposive, intelligent, or less than personal; for we never experience the alleged unconditioned whole of a mindless, mechanical, or purposeless nature. What we actually experience of nature are her conditioned, interrelated, interdependent parts, or nature as

contingent. But how do we rise from this mass of contingency to the idea of Unconditioned or non-contingent Being? How, indeed, unless the idea be given by God, the unconditioned Himself? In such vein some have pressed the cosmological argument and find its deepest significance. At any rate, this first aspect of causal reasoning may leave us with the alternative as to the relation of such Divine Causality to the world: If what we call nature is basically mindless and mechanical, non-purposive and non-personal, then the unconditioned Being of whom the argument speaks and within whose presence its logic may bring us, is not "nature" but is a trans-natural Being, or, in the traditional, positive language, a super-natural Being.

On the other hand, however, we have pointed to the possibility that nature is itself, in its depth and ultimate wholeness, this very unconditioned, enabling Being and Intelligent Power. Either point of view is acceptable to an intelligent theism. In either case, the only "unconditional" or absolute reality we ever seem to experience, from our finite standpoint, are factors of mind and spirit: truth, logical thought, rational will and freedom, love. The cosmological argument, then, at this level may reveal such intellectual and moral values as the primal or original qualities, and these are what the religious instinct has immemorially said relate us to God. Let us look at yet another a priori facet of the cosmological argument.
b. The derivation of the concept of Eternal Order, or that the world
could not possibly come by chance,* is suggested by the following analysis. First
what do we mean when we say that the world might possibly have come "by chance"?
Do we mean by chance the random motions and the random contact of some kind of
elemental units or particles? We have to begin an argument with some concept;
let us begin with this one: the root idea in the concept of nature as "mechanical" or mindless. To assume that the primordial particles or units or energy
quanta could, in finite or infinite time, arrange themselves by chance contact
into this present order of nature presupposes that the particles have the
capacity or potentiality for order already. And this order is implied at three
necessary places or stages.

(I). Each particle must be determinate, that is possess a "character",
or be a "law" or an "order" within and of itself. If such hypothetical particle
inside itself were in a state of perpetual flux and change, no combination of
such particles would at any instant hold; in other words, this present order
of the world could never arise. There must be some constant, a determinate,
stable character of the particles themselves. We must posit law, or order, in
the system at the start. We see that rational, meaningful constancy must stand
at the very beginning.

(II). Further, there must not only be rational constancy or order
within the particles, but also rational connection or order between the
particles. If they are to cohere into an order at some future time, they must
be related in some fundamental rational way. Again relationship or rational
unity is assumed from the beginning; the basic factor of order is given.

(III) Add to this the third level of "order implied in the very
power of orderly integration and formation which we do in fact find throughout
numerous streams of organization and individuation, building and leading up to

*See also our latter addendum on the semantics of "chance", p. 197-99.
highest cosmic integration on the finite plane in man, and the concept of original order, integral to the very meaning of what we perceive, seems to theistic faith, overwhelming. (Viewing evolution as a whole we are encouraged to move beyond MacTaggart, p. 45, in our concept of "order").

The result is that you cannot start or continue the world conceived as beginning with an indeterminate mass of particles (or energies) in chaos. The hypothesis breaks down on rational grounds. There is, we believe, but one other hypothesis -- namely, that order, rational unity, and not chaos is the original factor and the continuing constructive factor. Moreover, this cannot be the barest, ragged, minimal patchwork of order (the plane where McTaggart leaves the concept of deity), but order sufficient to account for the actual, elaborate, "vertical" integration that we find as the larger fact of our world, which culminates, on the finite plane, in man.

c. The category of Ultimate or Absolute Love, as a further "attribute" of Unconditioned Being and Power, is possibly derived in the following way. Do we not, within our own self-conscious individuality, have an experience of Absolute Love -- willing (or conditioning) existence in its highest form? For, in order that individuality exist at all, Ultimate Reality, or the Source from which we have come, must in its fundamental character be utterly forth-going from itself, self-giving, must be Love for establishing the conditions of our finite life and freedom. In the principle of our own individuality or personality we seem to possess an insight, if we search it out, about love on its cosmic side. But when we think of love we think of some personal activity as its source which the felt presence of love always means. It is possible to say, from one point of view at least, that the intimation of Ultimate Love, which our very existence calls to mind, implies the Personal Activity which founds that love. Such is the cosmological argument perhaps at its deepest range. George Holmes Huxley, though writing from the standpoint of a radical personalistic pluralism which I would not wish to espouse in all respects, once stated this point most beautifully which we are here endeavoring to make.
"The true love wherewith God loves other spirits; is not the outpouring upon them of graces which are the unearned gift of his miraculous power; it is the love, on the contrary, which holds the individuality, the personal initiative, of its object sacred...

"Love...now has its adequate definition: it is the alldirecting intelligence which includes in its recognition a world of beings accorded free and seen as sacred, -- the primary and supreme act of intelligence, which is the source of all other intelligence, and whose object is that universal circle of spirits...The City of God" (The Limits of Evolution 257, 361)

Similarly the personalistic poet of the 19th century, Walt Whitman wrote:

Immense have been the preparations for me,
Faithful and friendly the arms that have help'd me.

Cycles ferried my cradle, roving and roving like cheerful boatmen,
For room to me stars kept aside in their own rings,
They sent influences to look after what was to hold me,

Before I was born out of my mother generations guided me.
My embryo has never been torpid, nothing could overlay it.
For it the nebula cohered to an orb,
The long strata piled to rest it on,
Vast vegetables gave it sustenance,
Monstrous sauroids transported it in their mouths and de-

posited it with care

All forces have been steadily employ'd to complete and delight me;
Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul;

In sum what has the cosmological argument done for us thus far?

It has given us four fundamental categories or ideas of "God", or the "divine". The unfolding, integration, or evolution of things suggests *Origination*

"Absolute Organization", Creative Energy, or Ultimate Power. Existence itself suggests unconditioned, or Eternal Being. The organization and orderly processes of what exists suggests ultimate, or Original Order. Awareness of myself as existing suggests absolute or Primal Love.

We have seen that some axioms or premises involved in the argument are: "impossibility of infinite regress", or "sufficient cause", and "out of nothing nothing comes". To attack the argument these premises must be shown to be invalid.

* Oxford Book of American Verse, p. 343-344
Kant's critique of the cosmological argument.

We have observed that in a number of respects this argument is deeply a priori. Kant's type of criticism is often cited as conclusive—along with his criticisms of two other classic arguments, the teleological and the ontological. Let us array his criticism (which centers on one point) of all of these arguments so that it will not trouble us further.

To paraphrase Kant, metaphysical, speculative ideas, such as those of the cosmological argument—using our own terms above, the ideas of ultimate Power, Being, Order, and Love—are simply ideas in our finite minds. How do we know they refer to anything outside the human mind? The fallacy in the argument, said Kant, is that we make an unwarranted leap from a subjective notion within our own heads to an alleged reality, God, outside us.

Kant's analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the two so called empirical arguments for God, the cosmological and the teleological, are really a priori, that the "ontological argument" lay at the base of them, was in some ways correct; and he pressed that all three should be thrown out of court together, on the score that they were only talking about subjective notions in their reference to First Cause, Cosmic Purpose and Perfect Being. The mere idea of God, in such terms, within our own finite minds does not guarantee their real counterpart in highest objectivity in the cosmos.

Actually, however, it is easy to see that this was nothing more, in
effect, than an arbitrary denial that "ideas" can refer to "reality"—essentially a nominalist criticism of a Platonic and idealistic view of things. We may dispute with Kant by holding to the entirely possible and quite obvious position that ideas—at least many of them—do refer to reality, or in a measure reflect and participate in reality. This seems indeed the larger, coherent truth both in reason and in experience. Many ideas assert their own truth and we must go by them. For example, our ideas of space, time, and causality (and Kant himself admitted this!); our ideas of food, friends, of health; of an education—these can come to have their counterparts in reality. Our ideas of mathematics and logic and of scientific theory do in numerous instances fit the world that they believe they describe. The sense of our own freedom and many of our senses of moral value have objective counterparts in many instances in the persons and ideas of other human beings, and in the relationship between human beings.

If it is true that many ideas of lesser importance reflect and indicate reality, why may not it be possible, or all the more true of the idea of God, that is to say, of the source and foundation of being, the most important idea of all? Kant recognized his earlier mistake involved in his denial of the validity of the ontological type arguments for God, by his own reconstruction of such an argument in profound moral terms, which we later examine. In the Critique of Judgment he also reconstructed the teleological argument in moral terms.

Speaking of the ontological argument particularly but in a way which would be true of all our arguments under consideration the following comment of A. Seth Pringle-Pattison: formulates the larger perspective in which Kant's original criticism may be rebutted:
"...This fundamental confidence of reason in itself is just what the ontological argument is really labouring to express -- the confidence, namely, that thought, when implication in thought expresses a similar implication in reality... Fundamentally, it is the conviction that 'the best we think, or can think, must be'...."

"Admittedly, however, such... transcends the empirical reality of man's own nature or of the factual world around him...." (The Idea of God, 240-241)

Similarly D.E. Trueblood has expressed the point:

"The fact that we know with the mind does not mean that we cannot know what is outside the mind." (Philosophy of Religion, Harper, 1959, p. 37)

We devote the next few pages to classic statements of the argument from cause, on ancient, one early medieyal, one early modern, and one contemporary.
Plato on the Causal Argument

(Book X, The Laws. In the expression "They", with which the following passage begins, Plato probably alludes to the atomistic materialists or followers of Democritus. The expression "art" has the general meaning of design or purpose; and by "soul" Plato means the principle of intelligence.)

"Athenian. They say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order, -- earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, -- they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them -- of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but...by nature and chance only...does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? These he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards...... I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generations and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first.... Nearly all of them, my friends, seems to be ignorant
of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. ... some things are in motion and others at rest.

"Cleinias. I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others...."

"Ath. I mean this: when one thing changes another and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of self-moving principle?

"Ole. Very true, I quite agree.

"Ath. Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to ourselves; -- If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?

"Cleinias. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves.

"Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among
things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and
that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second...

"Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving
power life?

"Ath. I do....And when we see soul in anything, must we not do
the same -- must we not admit that this is life? ...And what is the
definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can we conceive of any other
than that which has been already given -- the motion which can move itself?

"Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the
self-moving is the same with that which has the name soul?

"Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there
is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and
moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be,...the source of
change and motion in all things?

"Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of all motion,
has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

"Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by
reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being
in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by
any lower number which you may prefer?

"Cle. Exactly.

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"Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be
prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great
and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the
first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind....If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path...
The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it...." (J/Sm1 422f)

St. Augustine on the Idea of Cause

"Indeed the power of the Creator and His omnipotent and all-swaying strength is for each and every creature the cause of its continued existence; and if this strength were at any time to cease from directing the things which have been created, at one and the same time both their species would cease to be and their whole nature would perish. Since we are other than He, we are not in Him for any other reason except that He caused it, and this is His work, whereby He contains all things... And by this disposition, 'in Him we live and move, and are'... (P/AS - De Gen. ad litt IV xxii).

Descartes on the Idea of Cause

"Thus from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider
with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew...so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason.

"All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself, if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future...if such power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself.

"Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I call God, and am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and thus since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea of God within me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing... (Meditation III, SmI 122-3).

"And when I consider that I doubt, that is to say, that I am an incomplete and dependent being, the idea of a being that is complete and independent, that is of God, presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and clearness -- and from the fact alone that this idea is found in me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly that God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of my life--that I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more evidence and certitude." (Meditation IV, 127)
William Newton Clarke on the Causal Argument

(Im. N. Clarke, 1841-1912, was an outstanding professor of Christian theology at Colgate-Rochester Seminary, between 1870 and his retirement). The following passage was taken from his widely influential book, An Outline of Christian Theology, Charles Scribners Sons, 1898).

"The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the idea of cause.

"In the natural use of our powers we advance from simple observation to the assertion of cause for that which we observe. To do this is to act upon one of the first necessities of our minds. As soon as man begins to think, he assumes that everything has its cause; and later thought results in placing this primitive assumption among the universal certainties. All science rests upon it. It stands as an axiom that every effect has an adequate cause. Hence, when we observe ourselves and the things around us, near and far, we naturally begin to inquire what caused these objects of our observation.

"We naturally assume and assert our own existence, and the recognition of real existence outside of ourselves comes next; and when we have assumed that we and the universe exist, we next wish to know what caused us and the universe to exist. We did not make ourselves, and the things that we behold, mutable though magnificent, bear the marks not of original but of dependent existence. Somehow existence has been caused; the existence that we discover must have some ground; some power must have caused it to be, and to be as it is....

"We naturally assert that origin implies an originating power. Absolute origination implies some sufficient inventive and creative energy."
Whatever has had a beginning has been begun by some adequate force. Nor can the need of originating power be evaded by claiming that one existing thing has been unfolded out of another. Changes in the form of things—as the change from seed to fruit, or from caterpillar to butterfly—are not accounted for by saying that the power of unfolding has somehow been stored in the germ. The storing of such power in germs is not so simple a matter. This power of unfolding was somehow originated and imparted, and this was absolute origination. All that has been originated, in whatever manner it may have reached its present state, has been originated by some adequate power. And the whole universe has been originated.

"Concerning the universe, there are only two possibilities. Either it has at some time begun to exist, or it has never begun to exist, but is without beginning, and has always existed.

"Take the former, which is the ordinary hypothesis, and say that the universe did at some time absolutely begin to exist. Then it is necessary to affirm that it was brought into being by some adequate antecedent power. Just as we are compelled to assert a cause for each separate thing or occurrence, so necessity is upon us to affirm a cause for the sum-total of all that ever had a beginning; and if the universe has had a beginning there must be a First Cause, sufficient for the producing of all that exists or has existed or is to exist, with all its power of unfolding and all its significance.

"Even if we accept the latter hypothesis, and say that the universe has never had a beginning, but has always existed, and always been passing through an unbegun and endless round of change, still we must assign to it a cause. We are relieved of the necessity of asserting a cause antecedent in time, but not of the necessity of asserting an underlying and determining cause. Beneath the material form and movement and variety,
and back of the process of unfolding by which the universe has come to be what it is, we are compelled to affirm that there is some cause for its being such a universe as it is, and a cause for its existing at all. If the universe is eternal, we still have to inquire how there came to be an eternal universe. If the universe is ever changing and unfolding, we ask how there came to be an ever-changing and unfolding universe, and by what the character and direction of its endless movement is determined. A cause still underlies it.

"If we wish to know the nature of the cause that originated and gave character to the universe, we must examine the universe as an effect, and judge what manner of cause would be adequate to it. When we do this, we are compelled to say that, the universe being what it is, the cause can have been nothing but a Mind. The universe, as we have seen, bears the impress of a Mind, for it can be understood by minds. The only adequate cause for a universe that bears the impress of a mind is a Mind, -- antecedent in time if the universe has had a beginning, and eternally giving character to it if it has not....

"This is substantially the cosmological argument for the existence of God... In the production of the things that we see, there must have been a Mind adequate to devising them, and a will adequate to carrying the conception into effect. But these are qualities of a self-conscious and self-directing intelligence such as we name a Personal Spirit.

"This is not an argument that has force in the childhood of thought but grows less cogent with the advance of knowledge. The vaster the sum of matter and motion, force and life, spirit and meaning, that we discover in existence, the more urgent the necessity of recognising
some adequate source, spiritual, intelligent, and purposeful, from which it has proceeded. The universe as known to the scientist demands God for its cause far more urgently than did the heavens and the earth as known to the patriarch or the psalmist. The earliest assumption of human thought, that an adequate producing power is implied in the existence of what we see, is also the testimony of the visible universe, with its immeasurable vastness and its infinite variety. Nothing is more certain than that science, in its maturity, will affirm one spiritual cause for the universe.

"It should be added that in this argument we observe at once the validity and the limitation of the argument from effect to cause. The process of inferring cause for anything that exists is perfectly valid, but it must stop somewhere. Back of all causation that we can trace there must be one source, -- one uncaused cause, -- and this can be nothing else than a Mind. Here is mystery to us; but nothing can be conceived as self-existing, except a Mind great enough to cause all other existence. If our search for cause cannot rest here, it can rest nowhere" (p. 109-113)
2. The Argument from Purpose or Design

Clark has classically phrased this approach as "The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the presence of ends in the universe". If the cosmological argument looks backward along process toward origins, the teleological argument looks at the present functioning of process as it suggests development and a future. It is another phase of causal reasoning, making inquiry into the cause of formative processes in detail and their apparent purposiveness. It is that aspect of causal thinking which discovers particularly the category of Ultimate Purpose.

The general statement or mood of the teleological argument is as follows: 'We note the development and integration of being into a personal and moral world; this seems the outstanding fact of existence and process. The levels or orders of cosmic purpose that the teleologist finds are the following four:

(1) The fitness of environment for life. First, there is the general universal fact that nature has "life" elements, Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, which are fit for seats of life, and which exist on a cosmic scale in vast abundance throughout the galaxies. This would be the profoundest level of seeming "fitness" of the cosmic environment as a whole for life. Second, we might add to this such local seeming examples of fitness as the intricate chemical balance of sea-water, where life first appeared on this planet, and without which life would be impossible. The late noted Harvard chemist L. J. Henderson in his well-known work The Fitness of the Environment, though not committing himself to a theistic explanation, discusses in great detail examples of environmental "fitness" and concludes in the following memorable way:
There is, in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due cause uniquely favorable to the organic mechanism. These are no mere accidents; an explanation is to seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand. (Italics ours) (The Fitness of Environment, New York, 1913, 1958, p. 276).

"For undeniably two things which are related together in a complex manner by reciprocal fitness can make up in a very real sense a unit... In human affairs such a unit arises only from effective operation of purpose" (Ib. 279).

Such facts as these suggest that the cosmic preparation as a whole and biological evolution are intimately related, seemingly as one continuous process. In the eyes of faith such remarkable facts of provision seem a positive "prevision".

(2) The adaptiveness of life to environment: to the teleologist a further provision appears in the process of variation at the level of the genes and their mutation, a provision which makes possible a free adaptiveness of life to changing conditions of environment, so that life can to the most favorable forms. (We study this phase of the argument in some detail shortly).

(3) The actual appearing or arrival of personal life in man, potential with highest valuational or moral meaning and possibility -- often called the "upward trend of evolution". To say the same thing in another way: there are the over-adaptations of "value", intellectual, aesthetic, and moral in man's case, which suggests that evolution is a spiritual development, or has purposive spiritual meaning. (This point also we consider further presently). p. 167.

(h) A further and probably the most significant point is that the "mechanical" aspects themselves of our world have their deeper purposive, or teleological "meanings".

For example, the arm is a machine, a lever and fulcrum, but this pure machine is instrumental to the purposes of the whole man. The mechanisms of existence
The fact of evolution is hardly any longer under dispute among philosophers of religion. Modern investigation into the origin of species has called man's attention to the general fact of life's adaptability to the conditions of environment, which has made for change, growth, development, or "evolution" of animal forms.

**Major theories of evolution.** This adaptability to environment, or "apparent purpose", has been explained in several different ways during the history of modern evolutionary thought. The first of these was the theory of "conscious purpose" on the part of the individual animal, which was set forth by Chevalier de Lamarck (1744-1829). The illustration of the evolution of the giraffe, according to this theory, is commonplace. The idea was that an early horse-like animal was forced by its natural enemies, drought, or some other environmental change to migrate into a semi-arid region where food grew only in trees. Accordingly, the individuals of this species began stretching upward by conscious endeavor in order to secure food, and thus, in the course of generations, by the principle of the "inheritance of acquired characteristics" developed the long neck of the present-day giraffe.

The main objection to this theory is that it placed too much emphasis on the role of environment as a factor of evolutionary change. It did not consider the organic factors in depth within the bodies and germ cells of animals, where the ultimate possibilities of change lie. How "Characteristics" were "acquired" and how "transmitted" was never really clarified. A. Weissman (1834-1914) discovered that the germ cells are the same in the parent and the offspring—i.e., not affected by the habits of the organism—disproving Lamarck's essential
point. Apparently a correct theory of evolution should take into account, not only environmental factors, but a subjective, or organic principle of change, within the germ cells of individuals. This the modern theory does, and it begins with Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in his epochal book, *The Origin of Species*, first published in 1859. Present day evolutionary theory is based not only on Darwin but also on Mendel's (1822-1884) genetical work, and on that of Hugo De Vries who discovered the principle that the characteristics of germ cells sometimes suddenly change by abrupt "mutations". Geneticists now realize that small "variations", somewhat as Darwin originally thought, as well as larger or abrupt mutations, are also responsible in part for evolutionary change. The term "mutation" has been applied to several types of changes, such as those in the "chromosomes, or other heredity particle which have a permanent effect on the genotype"; as well as the individual "point mutations" of the genes."

What Darwin said about evolution. The concluding paragraphs of Darwin's *Origin of Species* summarizes the principles or "causes" of evolution as he thought of them in his day. He wrote that there are several major laws that must be taken into account if we are to explain the origin of species. These principles are:

1. Growth
2. Inheritance (implying reproduction)
3. Variability
4. Struggle for existence
5. Natural selection

Observe that the first three principles refer to powers or capacities within life itself, that is, centering in the germ cells, or what we today call the genes. (Mendel published an account of his genetical experiments, which pointed to the existence of genes, in 1866). Though Darwin recognized the factors of "growth", "inheritance", and "variability" as being of primary importance, equal to those of the struggle for existence, and natural selection did not explain or describe variation and inheritance in detail. He did observe that no offspring are exactly alike, and spoke of the gradual accumulation of small variations, as ultimately responsible for evolutionary changes. This, of course, was surface description rather than a depth analysis or "explanation" of one of the major factors in evolutionary change. Darwin recognized this limitation of his study and admitted that his book aimed mainly to describe or explain only the last two principles, namely from the historical perspective, it can be said that the struggle for existence and natural selection. Mendel* and De Vries added to Darwin's epochal discovery the theoretical ingredients pertaining to inheritance and mutation essential to modern evolutionary thought. In Darwin's own mind

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*Published an account of his genetical experiments in 1866 which pointed to the existence of Genes. De Vries published his research on mutations in 1901.
the organic factors in depth, i.e., those of growth, inheritance, and variability, were as important as the last two principles, or those of struggle and selection. A casual reading, however, of the *Origin of Species* might suggest that Darwin emphasized the last two, "mechanical" factors, i.e., those concerning the relation of the animal form to its environment—at the expense of the first three "life" factors. Such mis-reading of Darwin came to be the popular interpretation. Finally, in the conclusion to Darwin's book we find that he believed in Cosmic Purpose in the sense of divine Creation as a first cause. God, for Darwin, originally established the present laws of growth, inheritance, variability, etc. These work themselves out in the evolutionary history of life. His stirring last sentence seems to suggest that God is not in the process but is behind the process. In Darwin's theology we have the idea of a transcendent purpose, not an immanent purpose, and God is "Déistic" in quality. We quote Darwin's eloquent conclusion to the *Origin of Species* Sixth and Last edition 1872:

"Authors of the highest eminence seem to be fully satisfied with the view that each species has been independently created. To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the individual. When I view all beings not as special creations, but as the lineal descendents of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled... As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendents of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.

"It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence
of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved."

(The Origin of Species, E.P. Dutton, 1942, p. 462-463.)

As contemporary thought views the matter, prepared to summarize the processes that make for evolutionary change.* They are:

A. The process of genetic mutation (De Vries' contribution) adding new variety of genes to the gene pool of an animal population.

B. Sexual reproduction bringing these genes into new combination according to the laws of inheritance (Mendel), observed as trait differences in offspring.

C. Natural selection (Darwin's emphasis) favoring gene combination suited to a given environment. The geneticists Dunn and Dobzhansky write of the relationship of these processes:

D. Geographical isolation

"Mutation is the origin of an hereditary trait which did not exist at all in the parents of the mutant. Suddenly, among many normal offspring, a single individual is born with some unexpected trait, which is then transmitted to the offspring of that individual. Precisely why mutations occur in man or in other organisms we do not know as yet. Mutations appear more frequently in the offspring of individuals treated with X rays, high temperature, and some chemicals. But mutations also occur without any treatments. For all we know, they just happen.... the occurrence of mutations is regarded in modern biology as the fountainhead of all evolution. In every generation, the process of mutation adds a variety of genes to the gene pool. Next, sexual reproduction and Mendelian recombination bring these genes into new combinations. And finally, natural selection is the great thresher, which separates the grain from the chaff. You may also liken organic evolution to the process of manufacture. Mutation supplies the raw materials, while sexual reproduction, Mendelian recombination, and natural selection accomplish the manufacturing process itself. **

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**Ibid. pp. 76-78
We have briefly reviewed the history of evolutionary science in modern times preparatory to our consideration of the teleological argument. At the heart of that argument is the semantical problem involving the meaning of the two terms stressed by each side in the dispute between theists and non-theists—namely mechanism and purpose. Theists use the term "purpose" to describe natural process in its ultimate totality of meaning. In the dialogue with non-theists the counter term "mechanism" or "mechanical" is often posed against "purpose" as the better description of our world's processes.

To engage the dialogue, then, we put the question to the critic of purpose first, What do mechanistically inclined philosophers mean by "mechanism", when they say nature's relationships and processes can be explained "mechanically", more clearly than they can be accounted for "teleologically" or by "purpose"? On the other hand, what do theistically disposed philosophers mean when they allege that nature contains "purpose" over and beyond her mechanical structures and movements? The critical point in the interpretation of evolution lodges here.

**Mechanism or Purpose?**

Idealist and theistic philosophy has claimed that the linear, integrated, or compound development of evolutionary process can ultimately be explained only in terms of "purposive causality". This premise stated negatively is that such process cannot be explained in terms of "mechanical causality". To attack this premise involves an analysis of the meanings of the terms "purposive" and "mechanical", and the critic of theism would have to show that the category or ideal of purpose is meaningless or unclear, and that "mechanical" is the more meaningful or sufficient explanation. What, then, are several alternative meanings of the expression "mechanical"? Do these meanings explain process as we perceive it? If they are examined and found wanting, our alternative is to explain process in terms of purpose, and to define as carefully as we can what we mean by this term or idea.
First, if we mean by "mechanical" simply the logical exclusion that what is "mechanical" operates by non-purpose, and continue to say that the universe is founded on mechanical principles, we have, of course, by semantical tour de force, arbitrarily ruled out the possibility of purpose in the origin and process of things, and nothing more can be said; except, perhaps, to point out the many purposive operations which we find as empirical facts, such as human and animal purposes. How do such purposive processes arise within, or out of, a universe defined as totally non-purposive? Indeed, this first level of discussion arouses the question, Can any mechanism be without its purpose? To this question we are inclined to reply in the negative, since any mechanism, if it be formed or rational, would have its "purpose" immanent in its function. The purpose of a printing press is to produce newspapers, or perhaps novels. True mechanism cannot be defined without purpose. We shall return to this initial point later on.

Second, by "mechanical" we might mean impact, or that the motion of a system X is caused by the impingement upon it of an external system Y, (two billiard balls hitting each other). Plato reminded us, in his remarkable Book X of The Laws, that such a concept, as an attempted explanation of world causality as a whole, involves us in an infinite regress of thought. As Plato conceived the problem, if System X is defined as non-self-moving, and system Y, and likewise system Z, be so defined, then we must, in our regression of thought eventually come to some antecedent system which is self-moving, or a purposively moving system, if we are to stop the regress. Actually many types of motions in the universe are non-mechanical in the over-simplified sense of "impact! Especially is this true with organic motions, which go on by powers that act internally, as whole, field structures, and by apparent purposes. We mentioned previously the growth of the zygote into the complete organism as illustrative of such a whole forming process. Indeed physical science, in its attempt to explain even atomic and sub-atomic processes, has generally abandoned mechanical models of impact, and irreducible gross masses impinging on each other.

Third, let us define mechanical, for the moment, as motion caused by the
built-in, inherent structure of an operating system; as we say that an automobile runs or functions in one, or only one way, determined by the explosion in the motor, the kinds, relations and rotation of its wheels and gears, etc. We perceive at once that our universe, with its growth, development, change in process and direction, the coming of new and different, and unforeseen systems of integration, function and form, eludes mechanical description in this sense.

Or we consider a related concept. If we mean by mechanical something materially structured and machine-like, that operates by superimposed force, like a printing press which works by incoming electricity, many significant operation of the universe are more organic than machine-like in this sense. Many processes are self-operating, self-reproducing, and self-repairing, and apparently purposive. These, of course, are especially the organic processes of life, and, as we move higher up the scale of organic complexity, we move in the direction of greater and greater self-operation, and apparent purposiveness, which reaches its climax in human freedom of will. This fact, of course, necessitates that a fully coherent philosophy -- in addition to mechanism perhaps -- introduce at least the category "organism", suited to explain such phenomena, which the word mechanism as thus defined is unable to do. Even atoms are trans-machine-like in that they have inherent power, rather than super-posed power.

In the fourth place, let us emphasize the idea of determination in our previous attempts to define mechanical. Do we mean by mechanical, then, something "inevitable" or "deterministic"? For example, we may say that a rock must inevitably fall by the force of gravity in an utterly predictable direction or trajectory; as some exterior or superimposed force, or indeed, even some inherent structure, may channel it. We have already called attention to the fact that many beings and processes, notably organic processes, give the appearance of spontaneity, indeterminacy, and freedom. Evolution as fundamental process itself seems fluid and open, and the more it proceeds the more open and unpredictable it seems to become, particularly at the level of man's intellectual and moral development, where gross mechanical analogies break down as explanations of
human nature.

Back of the idea of "determined" or "determination" lies the idea, as we have pointed out, of the given "structure" or "nature" or "order" or "system" that does the determining. The attempt to define mechanical as that which is determined still leaves unresolved the problem of the structure or nature that underlies the determined process. The spirit of inquiry, or sufficient reason, would at this level raise the question, Why this structure and not some other? How came this structure, particularly if it is complicated and wonderful, whether watch, or the DNA molecule of the gene, or living cell, or mutational process? Even if the universe were a vast, gross machine of some kind, like a printing press, and even if freedom could be explained in deterministic, machine-like fashion, as for example, Spinoza attempted, and modern Behaviorists wish to do -- we would still have the fundamental question: Why or what "constitutes" the world machine as a whole in the first place, with its amazing complexity, its pre-determined "foreordination" and its astonishing unfolding, evolving, or integrating power?

Accordingly, to construe mechanism in terms of a deterministic philosophy, while foregoing freedom in the finite parts, would at least, in one direction, point to Deism, or some form of creationist theism. The deists were certainly right in holding that the world, conceived as a system of perfected machinery, implied a transcendent Creative Intelligence. In another direction such a deterministic philosophy might prefer to embrace Spinoza's form of belief in an immanent Absolute mind or "Intelligence" of some kind, that is, in the concept of Ultimate Causality, Substance, or Deity as the absolute "rational structure" itself of the universe. Such a view has been inspired by the "determinism" or "necessity" found in logical processes of thought, or in mathematical reasoning, as our best clue to what we mean by "mechanism" and the world as a mechanical system. Significantly Spinoza chose to write his metaphysical work, *Ethic*, in the form of Euclid's treatise on geometry.
To be sure, there are "logical processes of thought", as well as other psychological determinations, and countless forms of material determination that describe much experience and reality. We would only claim that "mechanism" as thus defined does not totally or exhaustively describe our world.

Fifth, related to the deterministic idea is the possibility that "machine" may mean we "get out" of a system only what is originally "in it" and never anything "new". Mechanism is mathematical summation. For example, a magnet can pull out of a box only the given number of pins which were originally in it. The processes of emergence, however, of material forms of life, and evolution as a whole, do seem to "get out" of the system novel combinations and qualities which, in a more original state, were not present. H$_2$O is different in quality as a higher emergent whole than the original Hydrogen and Oxygen out of which it comes. Life is different in function and quality than the original Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, and Nitrogen from which it emerges. Intelligence, or scientific and moral consciousness, seems a new and higher whole, different from the cells or gray-matter, synapses, and electric currents out of which it comes.

In the sixth place, could we mean by "mechanical" something precisely opposite to determined, but rather a motion which is absolutely "random" or "by chance", "unpredictable", or "disordered"? When people say that evolution, for instance, came "by chance", it is apparently something like this that they have in mind. The "chance" throwing of dice may be said to be "mechanical" in the sense that which side will turn up next is unpredictable or cannot be "purposed". Aside from the realization, of course, that there are the "laws" of probability that govern even the fall of dice, if enough throws are considered, we may observe that the processes of nature -- at least many of them -- are profoundly unmechanical as now defined. Many of them are ordered, structured, predictable. Indeed, if we mean by mechanical a motion which is disordered or irrational, we then by hypothesis forfeit the possibility of rational explanation of our world. We would have to remain philosophical sceptics, and are reminded of problems raised by our first definition.
In conclusion, then, what do we really mean by the expression "machine" or "mechanical motion" or "mechanical process"? Exclusion, impact, inherent structure, superposed force, determination, logical necessity, mathematical summation, randomness or caprice? There are indeed kinds of motion or processes which are mechanical in one, or combinations of, some of the above mentioned ways. Such is, for example, the impact of one billiard ball upon another, or one rock upon another as both tumble down the mountainside. The first loosened rock may inevitably determine the direction and force of the motion of the second rock. The analogy of "mechanism" fits best such gross movements in nature as that suggested by the billiard balls and rocks.

But we have raised the question whether any motions, in the last analysis, have an ultimate or completely sufficient explanation in such terms? There is the billiard cue behind the balls, representing the will of the player, which is the ultimate origin of this kind of mechanical causation. An ant seeking to dig its burrow might have loosened the first rock above. There is the mechanism of lever and fulcrum in the arm and elbow of man, but the origin of motion in the arm must be pushed back into the free will of the owner and user of that appendage. There are certain machine-like or "blind" aspects in the process of natural selection when we think of the given fixedness, or the structure of an environment, and the "inevitability" with which it "kills off" unfavorable mutations, or "enhances", "nourishes" or "preserves" favorable mutations. But such mechanical aspects by no means explain the totality of evolution, either the reason for mutation itself in the first place, or possibly further some positive influence the environment might have, of an ultimately metaphysical and purposive character. We know already that certain forms of rays coming from the side of environment may influence mutation, and therefore possibly the whole course of life's development. Our question is, Can ultimate causality or causalities be reduced to simple machine or machine-like functions and concepts? Many of the deeper processes, functions and beings of the universe seem to transcend description by too simple machine or machine-like analogies. We are inclined then, to turn to
the concept "purpose" and examine it, to see if it be a more adequate descriptive idea for basic processes in our world. At least it has the advantage of describing the appearances better.

The theist takes "purpose" to mean the compound, integrative functions or movements responding to the influence of field structures or forces, to whole patterns or systems, illustrated in a striking way by ontogenetic development or the growth phenomenon. There seems to be evidence also that field structures, or kinds of natural "gestalts" are present and control process at the most elementary levels of nature, in radiation phenomena and within the atom and the atomic nucleus. We leave such issues, of course, to the physicists to clarify further.

Ultimately, the theist understands "purpose" to be process as guided by prevision of future possibilities, by "ideas", or "ideals" or conceptual "forms". He affirms that the total evidence of the world suggests such purposive causality, far more patently than it suggests blind, mechanical causality -- at least, in any of the terms, or combinations of terms above reviewed. That the growth of the cells of the human zygote are governed or "controlled" by an ultimately wholistic, field force, containing in some profound way the "pattern" or plan or "idea" of the man they are destined to be seems the best and simplest, ultimate explanation of this type of natural behavior. The assumption of materialists and mechanists is that explanation by "idea" and "purpose" is less simple than explanation by mechanical analogies. But the theist may reply (and here the argument indeed rests) that purpose is often, for many processes at least, a simpler type of explanation than efforts to explain "mechanically", whatever "mechanical" may mean. What could be simpler than to say "My purpose takes me to Portland tomorrow", as the final type of explanatory principle? There are hosts of mechanical agencies, indeed, that help me to get there, and similar agencies may be found in all of nature's processes; but the ultimate explanation of her process or evolution as a whole seems more simply answered by "purpose" than it does by the infinite regress of thought, that any type of mechanical agency involves. Mechanical agencies are proximate,
intermediary, instrumentalities of the intrinsic, pruposive causality which is our world -- such is the faith of theism. \(\text{or "efficient causality"}\)

We return then to our point earlier raised. Mechanisms itself has its intrinsic pruposive meaning -- since the mechanical features of our world are those enduring factors that make the environment stable and predictable, in which life may learn "to make habitual the most favorable adjustment" (D. C. Macintosh). Thus, may not insight perceive in the mechanisms of our world their translucent meaning as "purpose" -- and accordingly their reality ultimately as idea or "spirit". We look at a chair -- certain sticks of a certain type of wood, shape, or structure, glued together. The "structure" is the "mechanism" of a chair; its use, function, or idea is the "purpose" of the chair (indeed its "soul" to use an old notion of Aristotle). Full knowledge of the chair concerns its prupose; concern with its sticks, and how they are glued and structured is only partial knowledge of it. We observe a whirling piece of complex machinery -- perhaps some piece of farm equipment. We do not know it fully until we know its purpose as a thresher or a binder. Elton Trueblood states the point well:

Even natural selection itself becomes part of the evidence of God's purpose in the world, for it is the means of the shifting out of countless unsatisfactory forms and thus has helped to leave the stage relatively free for the development of those forms of existence which facilitate both the production and appreciation of value.


Aristotle would have stated that the form or idea of oakness is inherent in the acorn, and guides the process of its development into the mature tree as a kind of purposive or intellectual prevision, as that part of nature strove by ero: or desire to fulfill its meaning. Our own conscious purposes seem a legitimate analogy, at least, of the type of "purposiveness" exhibited in the acorn. This is not to affirm naively that an acorn by itself is "self-conscious" and anticipates or consciously strives toward its destiny, the tree, as we perceive and move toward our goals. But an acorn regarded in its total cosmic setting, as expressive of cosmic formation along a specific stream of organic development,
may express, or function as, the word of the Cosmic or Divine Purposiveness proclaiming that acorns and oaks shall be. The acorn by itself is not conscious, but the Creator of the acorn, which embodies the Creator's laws of development, and possibly something of his very being, in its physical energy, may be. We turn now to a more precise statement of the problem of evolution as theism has conceived it.

**Evolution and the Design Argument**

The over-all empirical point of such an argument is that we observe the development and integration of being into a personal and moral world --this seems the larger fact of existence and process. More carefully, the central facts of evolution are two: (1) the adaptiveness of life to environment and (2) the actual appearing or arrival of personal life in man, or the "overadaptations" of intellectual, aesthetic, and moral value. The contemporary teleologist or theist believes that both levels give evidence of a larger Purpose.

The adaptiveness of life to environment. The older teleological argument for God, in the pre-Darwinian days, rested its case on the specific instances of design. The point was made that the remarkable contrivances of nature, particularly on the organic levels, e.g. the advanced animal eye, suggested a Creator of transcendent Intelligence and Purpose.

The development, however, of evolutionary theory since the time of Darwin has pointed out that it is not just one step from such instances of design as the eye to the Creator, as if possibly He made Adam, *de novo*, with his perfected organic features, out of nothing. Rather there are many steps in the process of creation of animal forms, namely, the whole evolutionary history of life. Philosophically the problem of the design argument, in the light of evolution, as Darwin clarified that concept of origins, became the possibility of whether life in some sense does not design itself? In the popular imagination, the natural selection theory was interpreted as "scientifically" explaining origins in purely mechanical terms, to the effect that life "by chance" developed in certain directions to meet the conditions of environment, and that the concept of either immanent or transcendent Purpose which guided the process was not necessary.
Modern genetical science, however, since Mendel, presents the teleologist with an opportunity to clarify the design idea on broader or deeper terms than the older argument knew. Present-day evolutionary theory explains change by the concept of variation by mutation of the genes, with favorable mutations defined by the conditions of a given environment.

Accordingly a modern teleological view of evolution would cite such mutation itself -- this capacity of life at the very deepest level of process to adjust or adapt itself -- as significant evidence of an ultimate spiritual meaning, design, or purpose in or behind our world's evolutionary development. The spiritual meaning inheres in this "free capacity" which makes possible the manifold growth and integration of life in many experimental directions, instanced by all the past and present organic forms. The question of design moves back from specific instances, such as the advanced animal eye, to the marvelous process of mutation itself that occurs in the germ cells and genes which made the development of the eye possible. The central philosophical question involved in the evolutionary idea today, as the teleologist or religious philosopher would raise it, is why does life possess this remarkable capacity for experiment with multifarious mutations, until the most favorable gene combinations, given the environment, are hit and held through countless generations? The environment may, by natural selection determine the preservation of the "favorable combinations", but it does not explain why life experiments with such combinations in the first place. The modern teleological argument focuses attention upon the vast depth and richness of life's capacity to adjust and suggests that this is the major instance of design and purpose. This free experimentation of life -- resulting in the combinations that are most favorable, given the environment in which it seeks to make its way -- is the deepest level of the argument that nature seeks ends and reveals purpose. This general end seeking power theists may cite as the Great Instance of Design, the design for and behind an order of life, its survival and growth by free development in response to environmental requirements. It is in these terms that modern theists believe they discover "a mind in the universe
through the presence o ends in the universe" (William Newton Clark). The following memorable quotations from men of science, frame the issue in the largest light.

Provision for all living things is revealed in phenomena which we know today but which Darwin did not know -- such as the wonders of genes.

So unspeakably tiny are these genes that, if all of them responsible for all living people in the world could be put in one place, there would be less than a thimbleful. Yet these ultramicroscopic genes and their companions, the chromosomes, inhabit every living cell and are the absolute keys to all human, animal and vegetable characteristics. A thimble is a small place in which to put all the individual characteristics of two billions of human beings. However, the facts are beyond question. Well, then -- how do genes lock up all the normal heredity of a multitude of ancestors and preserve the psychology of each in such an infinitely small space?

Here evolution really begins -- at the cell, the entity which holds and carries the genes. How a few million atoms, locked up an ultramicroscopic gene, can absolutely rule all life on earth is an example of profound cunning and provision that could emanate only from a Creative Intelligence; no other hypothesis will serve.

(From Man Does Not Stand Alone, 1962 A. C. Morrison)

'Is there a purpose behind it all, and if a Purpose, A Purposer? Our personal answer' says Sir Arthur Thompson, 'is that when we pass beyond Science to the deeper Why? an d endeavor with all resoluteness to make some 'sense' of the whole, we may reasonably, though of course trans-scientifically, retain the old-fashioned belief in God, which includes a belief in a Divine Purpose in Nature. An all-around or synoptic view leads us, we speak for ourselves, to interpret Nature as an expression of the Divine Will or Purpose. An installment of the growing realization of that Purpose is our fair earth; a richer installment may be looked for in Man and Human Society.

'From the fitness or adaptations that are to be seen everywhere in living creatures, Paley argued directly to a 'Divine Artificer', as from a watch to a watchmaker. But we know now that these adaptations occur in related types in graduated degrees of perfection, and we can give an approximate account of their evolution. Their rise and progress can be accounted for in terms of factors verifiably operative today -- variation, heredity, selection, and isolation. So, if we are inclined in this direction, we modify Paley's argument, and think of the Creator so ordaining the original Order of Nature that out of it there gradually and naturally evolved the well-adapted multitudinous species which we see and admire today. The Creator made things to make themselves, conserving a certain degree of freedom from first to last, so that an occasional outcrop of ugliness is the tax on artistic freedom, just as evil is part of the price of ethical freedom at a higher level.'

We continue with the theistic conception of evolution at the basic level of life's adaptiveness to environment by concluding more carefully about several points, two of them previously mentioned. The processes that make for evolutionary changes are: mutation adding new varieties of genes to the gene pool of an animal population; sexual reproduction, bringing these genes into new combinations according to the laws of inheritance (Mendel's Laws), observed as trait differences in offspring; and natural selection.

Natural selection has been called "the great thresher" -- favoring gene combinations suited to a given environment. Two important things should be said about the idea of natural selection as we review this principle. (1) It is frequently said that natural selection works "negatively", that is to say, to kill off "unfavorable" adaptations. From a philosophical standpoint, however, it is quite as easy or possible to look at it as working "positively", since by it the "favorable" genes are preserved or "nourished". Even though the process of natural selection seems from one point of view "mechanical", this positive aspect of it suggests, in the eyes of faith, a deeper purposive meaning. Recall that the mechanisms of existence may, in their largest light, be seen as instrumental to the purposes of existence. Natural selection is a part of that order of natural law which we may term mechanical, if by mechanical we mean, at least in one sense, utterly dependable in operation. The mechanical aspects of the environment of natural law in which we live are necessary as a stable basis for life, if, to repeat D. C. Macintosh's memorable phrase, living beings are "to learn to make habitual the most favorable adjustment". As previously stated, since life on the finite
plane would be impossible without the mechanical aspects of environment, we may see in such features a purposiveness that gives them their spiritual value or meaning. This we do with "natural selection" as with any other "mechanical" aspect of process.

(2) But more deeply, how far can the semantics that natural selection is a "mechanical process" be pressed? If we mean by mechanical that a process takes place "by chance" -- one of our previous possibilities -- only in the following two ways could it be said that natural selection is a mechanical process (indeed, these two ways are themselves more journalistic speech than scientific). The two are that mating on the animal plane may be thought of as occurring "by chance meeting", and/or that factors of environment may "alter by chance", thus bringing about evolution, that is, a different selection of surviving genes than present in the original animal form.

Integral to natural selection is, of course, the temporally prior level of process which evolutionary theory has clarified as "mutation". Does natural selection, conceived as a mechanical process, mean that mutations take place "by chance"? In current scientific terms, it is often or "spontaneously" said that mutations take place "at random". This is a verbal cover for our present human ignorance as to why they take place, beyond our knowledge of the fact that they do take place.* We do not know what causes mutations; they occur "at random", that is to say, in many directions. Geneticists find that most mutations which they can induce artificially by x-ray or other means are "unfavorable", given the environment. Is the current or "spontaneously" scientific verbalization "at random" the same as the philosophical notion "by chance"? It would be a large philosophical assumption to say that

*Geneticists know that x-rays and chemicals can induce mutation artificially. It has been theorized that some mutation, at least, is "caused" or induced by chemical instability in the components of DNA, and even atomic instability as in the case of Hydrogen bonds in the DNA molecule. See Stebbins, Processes of Organic Evolution, op. cit. p. 27-29; F. W. Stahl, The Mechanics of Inheritance
mutations occur "by chance", if by chance we mean a kind of groundless, unfounded, absolutely capricious activity -- i.e., activity without any further possible explanation, meaning, or rationale, that would escape further logical description or "sufficient reason". Does anything anywhere happen in an absolutely "random" or inexplicable way, altogether eluding rational analysis, man's or God's? We are inclined to accept Leibnitz's principle of "sufficient reason", as the basic law of thought. This would rule out such sceptical possibility regarding fundamental processes in our world. Sufficient reason would say that mutations have some "cause", which we do not yet understand. When we come to understand such cause, then it will be, not "by chance" that they occur; but they will then be seen to occur by the rational law of that cause. To say that they occur by chance would be to give up the possibility of further investigation into the causes of mutation. We agree with Einstein that "by chance" is never a scientific answer. He said "I would never believe in a dice-throwing God".

Indeed, it is better to speak of natural selection, not as a mechanical process, but as a "rational process" -- by which human science means that it can clearly perceive some, at least, of the factors and relationships by which the process of evolutionary selection goes on. If then we best define it as "rational" we have taken the first larger step in understanding it as spiritual. If it is rational, we transcend the idea of the mechanical, at least in terms of the mechanical as groundless caprice.

In any case, the philosophical issues relative to present-day evolutionary theory are these: (1) What causes variation or mutation within the genes? We should note the difference between such terms as "mechanism of change", which would refer to the selective work of the environment.

* See our discussion in an appendix to this chapter on the idea of "chance", p.
vis a vis "favorable mutations", and the process of mutation itself, which refers to the immanent capacity of life. Whether the category "efficient causality" as exhaustive "explanatory principle" or "mechanism" or "mechanical" can be applied at or to that level of process is a critical question. (2) In so far as evolutionary theory takes into account the role of environment, in addition to the mutation of genes, the basic question is: what is "environment" in its fullest reach and meaning? At least the whole mystery of time and space would have to be explored before we could finally say. Purpose may act from the side of environment, as well as possibly in the mutation of the genes, in some ultimate metaphysical way now unknown to physical science. We will return to this point presently.

A further problem concerning the detail of modern evolutionary theory—at least looming large in the popular confusion over this theory—has been the concepts of the struggle for existence (one of Darwin's major principles) and survival of the fittest (the term popularized by Herbert Spencer). When these classic ideas were first intoned in the early days of the evolutionary controversy they seemed to mean, in the popular interpretation, the war of all against all—that biological nature was, throughout her evolutionary history, a rending and bloody process, "red in tooth and claw". Actually, these concepts include the symbiotic or cooperative side of the relationship between animals and species as much as they imply conflict and the predatory side. As it has often been said, the "fittest" are not necessarily the "fightingest". The song bird that can sing the sweetest wins the mate over his rival that cannot perform so well. In man's significant case itself, the chief factor of survival and fitness has been wit and intelligence more than size or brawn. Viewing this aspect of the meaning of struggle and fitness, the geneticists Dunn and Dobzhansky write:
Not even among the animals and planets of the jungle is relentless struggle and bloodshed a necessary price of evolutionary survival and progress. Biologists know that mutual toleration and cooperation are just as ubiquitous in nature as exploitation and predation... Natural selection tends... to promote cooperation, and to minimize competition among organism.

(RES, p. 66-67.)

Finally, to chase the squirrels of "purpose", supposedly running through the branches of evolutionary theory, in some hot empirical fruitless. Like a real squirrel, frequently invisible as it hides behind the tree pursuit is, of course/halfway up, the critic of teleology might say, you just cannot put your hand on "purposes" empirically; they elude you. Are, then, the squirrels of purpose really there? If "empirical" be defined too narrowly, the teleologist, of course, must agree that they are not "there" in some tangible, sensible way.

Doubtless "purpose" is not found at the end of the road of empirical investigation of the lowest key. In terms of such key, it might be as foolish for the modern teleologist to say that "purpose" lodges in the "mystery of mutation", as it was for his great-grandfather to reason from the completed eye immediately to the hand of God as he made Adam. All the intervening evolutionary processes between the initial purpose, if there be such, and the advanced animal eye come between. If the further "causes" of mutation were discovered to be in some "mechanism of change", for example in the instability of the hydrogen atom, as has recently been proposed, the teleologist might be simply further embarrassed—providing theism does not remain alert to the trap of too narrow a conception of "empirical science", and the knowledge process in general, implied in non-theistic views of evolution. Of course, Hydrogen instability, if
it were seen to be the *sine qua non* of evolutionary change, would itself be supreme purpose. To recall our earlier discussion, purposes -- which are after all, spiritual ideas -- cannot be empirically "seen"; they can only be rationally imputed or "known", after, indeed, all the empirical facts and physical appearances are in.

Teleology and purposive philosophy must necessarily be the view of the total or coherent perspective. It is a view from the dimension of value above the simple empirical plane. "Purpose" is a coherent, value mode of insight, essentially non-empirical, if empirical knowledge be narrowly defined as always some kind of "mechanical knowledge", or as gross sensory appearance. If this must necessarily be the meaning of "empirical", purpose is essentially transcending and a *priori* insight. But may we not define the empirical in a broader way than this? Must not empirical itself include the possibility that a total process may bespeak its value and significance? Many ranges of empirical science have in our time disclosed the necessity of viewing things as wholes, rather than as disconnected parts. This would be true of processes as well as of single objects. This is true in the understanding of the atom, of biological matters, and of psychological processes. Gestalten and whole - seeing have come to be an integral part of "empirical science" nowadays. Thus these two methods -- empirical investigation and purposive evaluation -- draw closer together, if, perhaps, they do not completely merge.

T. A. Goudge in a remarkably thoroughgoing study of evolution from the standpoint of critical philosophical analysis, dismisses teleological and purposive views. In a resume, however, of the teleological concept (which he himself criticizes) of pre-human evolution, he admits that "What has to be made intelligible is the fact that it
selection) took place at all". This is indeed the larger issue. Goudge does not speak to it — as indeed what man or "science" can? It is at this level where a coherent, rational faith sees "Cosmic Purpose"; and here the controversy must rest — open, to be sure, for the theist to go his way of interpretation, and the thoughtful non-theist his.

Somewhat like the current alternative theories of radiation phenomena — quantum or wave? — either of which are possible, so far as we are able to judge empirically, so our human understanding of evolution may have to rest with "mechanism" or "purpose" — in so far as we may empirically perceive. We do know from the interior standpoint of our own life, that the "atoms" have purpose at the level of self-conscious organization in our case. Why then may not the atoms, at the obverse height or depth of supreme cosmic order, contain or express or be the media of purpose?

The over-adaptations of value. We now move from the first more technical level of theistic interpretation of evolution, relative to the genes and the idea of mutation, natural selection, and survival, to the larger understanding. Focusing on the arrival of man and the over-adaptations of value, a former student summarized and anticipated the point well: "When we consider that mutations occur entirely at random... it becomes even more remarkable that man, a conscious moral, intelligent being, has come to be out of the many ages of past life. Man is obviously not the result of a series of lucky chances being repeated over and over; the number of chances of getting off on to some other track, or no track at all, are far too great to lead us to suppose that man is the product of caprice."** At this stage of the argument from purpose, the teleologist perceives the adaptation of life to environment beyond the point of

**Alice Clark, Fall 1948 College of Wooster.
minimal subsistence for physical survival, and finds in it, the broader fact of spiritual capacity in man's case, an ultimate indication of purpose in the process of evolution. The sum of the evidence is man's "moral capacity" or fitness. To the teleologist the following development leads up to this appearance of spiritual or moral fitness.

(1) We observe that nature in evolution has gone beyond or risen above the criterion of physical strength (muscle power, size and weight). Man the physical walking has survived. The dinosaurs are extinct. The little mammals, that once cowered in the shadow of those lumbering lizards, are now the rulers of the planet. Further, even in the direction of mammalian evolution, nature did not stop with the great whales, but went on to produce man. Seemingly nature was not interested in physical strength or size alone, but in intellectual strength or power.

(2) Nature has advanced beyond the material criterion of length of life for an individual of a species. The great Redwood trees of California are several thousand years old, but organic evolution did not cease with the Redwoods.

(3) Evolution has complicated itself beyond the criterion of mere numbers of individuals in a species -- again a basic kind of material or quantitative criterion. Bacterial or insect forms of life are far more numerous than higher animals, but nature did not stop with bare quantity. Not life in general, numbers, quantities of individuals alone, but quality of life, and quality of individuality in the higher form of sentient intelligence in man's case has been the result of the process of evolution, and may suggest its aim.

(4) To the theist it seems significant that life in its higher animal forms has complicated itself beyond the criterion of bare physical
stability, in terms of nervous simplicity and the simplicity of life functions. Bacterial and other lower forms of life have lived with simple nervous and functional constitutions for countless eons, and within environments that would be impossible for higher, more complicated forms of life. A paramecium seems quite at home in a puddle of water, with the physical simplicity and stability that makes it possible for a paramecium to live in a puddle. The lower forms of life get along well with the simplest kind of instinctive motor reactions. But why has evolution pushed on toward the vast complexity of man's brain and self-conscious life, with its delicate balance (that can so easily be gotten out of balance!). Evolution has pushed beyond the range of unerring, mechanical instinct, by which life is more stably and simply governed. Mental and psychic evolution has brought freedom of deliberation or rational thought, by which the individual determines its own action on the basis of self-consciousness and personal responsibility. Determination by unerring instinct is far more accurate and certain from the standpoint of a "species' interest" in its survival, than the more exciting abandonment to freedom as in man's case. Why has nature pushed on toward the production of creatures whose actions are in considerable measure self-determined? This ability of self-determination, based on the vast complexity of man's nervous system, is that distinguishes human personality from the nameless individualities of the animal species.

In sum, Henri Bergson asked in his noted volume Creative Evolution, Why has life gone on complicating itself beyond the point of bare subsistence and physical survival in any of these basic material ways: strength, size, and weight, length of life and numbers, or nervous simplicity, with
its consequent functional simplicity and stability? These facts for Bergson rendered a purely mechanical or materialistic interpretation of evolution impossible. Sir William Dampier, English historian of science, put it thus: "Life presses in wherever it can, up to and beyond the limits of subsistence". (History of Science, 3rd ed., p. 345).

In brief, evolution has long since transcended physical or merely material criteria. The result has been not alone something material, but in addition something spiritual. Not just life, but quality of life; not just individuals, in the sense of the countless numbers of a species, but personal life has been the actual outcome of the process. The true significance of evolution is found in the fact that in the course of the ages creatures capable of moral existence and moral growth have come forth. Like any genetical process it seems reasonable to evaluate it by its final outcome. If we define as "spiritual" that which has a moral nature, or the possibility of such a nature, then there has been spiritual possibility, and by virtue of this, spiritual meaning in the process all along, since its outcome is man with his moral-spiritual potentialities. To speak of nature's spiritual possibilities or potentialities seems tantamount to saying that there is spiritual meaning or purpose in her.

Lecomte du Nouy wrote, in Human Destiny, that the coming of a man represents the state where evolution of body may be complete and evolution of mind and moral, or spiritual life begin; where natural process ceases to be determined by glandular secretions and instincts alone, where it ceases to be mechanical and "blind"; but where it becomes self-conscious and free. Man stands at the height of evolution where ends and aims and drives are no longer merely physical -- for food, shelter, for satisfaction
of sex and hunger appetites -- but where effort is made also for spiritual ends, for love and fellowship, for knowledge for its own sake, for beauty; where individuality in the higher psychic form of personality rises in its unique dignity and value out of the generality which is the species.

All of the higher human qualities lie beyond physical survival value:

(1) Abstract knowledge, science, the rational intellect -- animals do not seem to need it, and countless ages of prehistoric men got along without great use of it. That is the survival value, in terms of absolute physical need, of Newton's law of gravity or of the knowledge of the periodic relation of the elements?  

(2) There is the over-adaptation of moral value. Regard for others, of the higher morality, is not necessary for bare survival -- indeed it sometimes requires the sacrifice of one's self. Animals lack awareness of the higher morality. It is, however, a central human fact that men of all creatures cannot survive in any decent human sense without cultivating this capacity for the higher morality. The over-adaptation of moral virtue, in its ultimate sense of regard for others, becomes the absolute criterion of survival in man's case -- if he is to survive on a plane equal to his highest possibilities as man. What is the survival value of Jesus's Sermon on the Mount? Several hundred thousand years of primitive and proto-humans survived before Jesus, or before Moses delivered the Ten Commandments, or Buddha preached the Eight-Fold Path. But life's fitness in man's case has not remained on the bare physical or cave-man level. Life's fitness in man's case has become moral fitness. The theist sees no greater proof than this of the spiritual meaning and purpose of the world. (3) Finally, man's aesthetic or religious sensitivities too seem to be over-adaptations which transcend
physical needs. What, for example, is the physical survival value of
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or Shakespeare's Hamlet or St. Teresa's mysticism?

In sum, evolution is the story of the spiritual integration of our
world, ending in self-conscious personality. This is the over-all fact
which suggests the significance and purpose of the process as a whole.

Our study of God's relation to the material world from the standpoint
of many scientific details, such as those of advanced evolutionary theory,
surely forces theism away from its older transcendentalist notions toward
a theology emphasizing God's immanence. This was powerfully stated by
Th. Dobzhansky where he wrote in *Science Ponders Religion* (ed. Harlow

> It is really strange that so many religious thinkers
> wish to confine God only to the gap left in the series
> of natural events. This makes the whole of nature as
> completely godless as the crudest materialists ever
> pictured it. This is perhaps a consequence of the old
> ascetic view, which held that the natural world is evil
> and corrupt, and that natural man is depraved by Original
> Sin... Scientific knowledge is cumulative; the
> breaches between natural events become fewer and nar-
> rower. This diminishes a God who stands apart from the
> created world; not so the God who includes the Creation
> in His divine being. p. 135 (italics ours)

With this statement, of course, we do not mean to rush headlong into
the embrace of a theology of total immanence, or toward a naive pan-theism
which would declare that the meaning of "deity" is exhausted by the material
world as we superficially know her in sensory experience. See this tree
and we see "God", say a naive pantheism. See this tree and we may behold the
work of God says a profounder theism.*

* See our discussion in the chapter on God's relation to the world on immanence
and transcendence. p. 172

Dobzhansky is no teleologist or advocate of "orthogenesis", nor goes the way of
theism in any definite sense. He appears rather to us a Dewey type humanist, as
judging by his *The Biology of Ultimate Concern*, NewAmerican Library, 1967, and
*Hereditary and the Nature of Man*, Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1964, and "Man Consort
admires the thought of Teilhard de Chardin."
David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779) highlighted for philosophic thought in the west several criticisms of the cosmological-teleological type of argument. Two of the more important of these problems which we have not dealt with heretofore are 1) Hume's allegation that the argument from the apparent purpose and design of nature is mainly one of reasoning from analogy, and is therefore weak; and 2) his allegation that the argument cannot meet the problem of evil. For the moment we may lump these two concerns together to summarize Hume's position.

We should bear in mind that Hume's critical essay attacked the "natural theology" of the Newtonian Age. The principal emphasis of that theology was that the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God can be proved by the design, order and perfection of nature. Though prior to the modern evolutionary controversy, Hume's discussion, by finally focussing on the problem of disorder or evil in nature, was a criticism that has become a continuing, standard type of anti-theistic position, hard to dislodge. In substance, Hume said that you cannot reason from nature and her processes, as we observe them, with their manifest conflicts, imperfections, disharmonies, stresses, pains, and evils, to the idea of the wisdom, goodness, beneficence, or perfection of the ultimate Cause. While concluding his attack, on 18th century Natural Theology, at the problem of evil, he did admit that the presence of good and seeming beneficent purpose in the universe also constituted a problem for the sceptic, and that there was ingenious design everywhere in nature; but yet not sufficient to warrant a successful argument for a Deity of the traditional belief. Hume would only go as far as
to say "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence"*

His criticism of the theistic argument reflected that raised by Lucretius, the Roman materialist, in the first century B.C. Though we may believe Hume overstated the problem of evil, his question is undoubtedly the central issue for theistic faith, and must be adequately met if the latter is to prevail in the debate with materialistic and impersonalistic world views. We attempt a thorough-going analysis of the problem of evil in Chapter * and reserve until that place a more adequate reply to that aspect of Hume's criticism.

We return now to the main purpose of our present context, to list, and to speak to, some of the problems that arise in considering the premises of the teleological argument. All of these premises come to light or are implied in the discussion between Philo and his friends in Hume's dialogue.

1. **Reasoning from analogy.** Philo points out that the argument rests essentially on the premise that "Like effects prove like causes"**- or the argument from analogy. For example, since the intricate structure of a house must necessarily imply the intelligent architect, or the watch (Paley) the intelligent jeweler, so this intricate world "house" or "watch" in which we live surely bespeaks its intelligent Creator.

The theist must grant, of course, that the traditional sentiment in the teleological argument is indeed that of "analogy", and that perhaps the argument is no stronger or weaker than reasoning by analogy can ever be. "Analogical reasoning is...a case of probable inference which depends on fair sampling" (Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, Harcourt, Brace 1934, p. 288) "...analogy gives only a degree of probability rather than that

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** Hume: *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Part V.

In the case of the causality of the world as a whole, if we press reasoning by analogy too far, Hume believes we commit what modern texts in logic refer to as "the fallacy of composition", or reasoning from too small a sample -- in this case human intelligence -- and alleging that an analogous Creative intelligence stands within or behind nature, as the quality or causality of the whole.

Philo asks:

"What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?"

Two points in reply: As Tennant suggests, however, the force of the teleological argument rests, not on reasoning from any one factor by analogy, but on observing, from a wholistic or coherent standpoint, "the conspiration of innumerable causes to produce, by their united and reciprocal action, and to maintain, a general order of nature". (Philosophical Theology, Vol II, Cambridge University Press, 1937, p. 79). Theism would say that Hume really misses the point in his criticism that the argument rests on inflated analogy and the fallacy of composition.

Pressing this line of reply to the modern disciples of Hume who point out that all the teleological argument states is an "impressive analogy between the universe and the products of intelligent foresight,"** theism would say that the mainthrust of the teleological argument is not to call attention to mere analogy, remote or otherwise (though the argument does do this admittedly) -- but to boldly assert or to find the rationality directly inherent in the structures and processes of our world -- e.g. (as we have already discussed) the

* Hume, Dialogues, Part II.

rationality of "natural selection" in evolution; or of "mutation" in evolution; or the rationality of the relation of "entropy" to growth.* In other words, the teleological argument is not an indirect analogical argument alone, reasoning from nature upward to a transcending mind above or beyond nature, but is a rational insight in depth, finding "mind" present in, or reflected in, the "rational structures" and processes themselves of nature, and of matter.

The Humean criticism certainly succeeds at one point: it forces theistic faith to become more immanent in the conception of God than was the case with classic theism. The remaining premises can be stated briefly as main assumption or hypothesis of the argument.

2. Ours is the "best" world suited to free, developmental process. Hume's criticism finally centered on this issue -- the problem of evil -- and, to be sure, this problem must be solved reasonably well, if, in the last analysis, the teleological (or any other theistic) argument is to stand. Accordingly we attempt such a solution in chapter eight.

3. A process is better understood by its total outcome or its final result -- the over-all achievement -- than by simpler or earlier stages. The theist here on his part warns his opponents, in their reductive and mechanistic types of criticisms, against committing the "genetic fallacy" -- or the assumption that origin determines meaning and value, or defines the ultimate nature and significance of process. Here again the justification of the premise rests on the belief that our world must be considered in the light of synoptic, wholistic or coherent reasoning, not alone by analytical reasoning.

4. A fourth premise of the argument, and one which we have already considered at some length is the over-arching or summarizing point that "purpose" is the better term, or more coherent explanation, than is "mechanism", for the basic processes of our world.

* See our appendix on this problem, in reply to another criticism of Watson, p.
Appendix A: "Entropy"

The student may raise at this place a question frequently posed: How would theism or the philosophy of a purposive cosmos speak to the problem of entropy, or the second Law of Thermodynamics, to the effect that the available energy of the universe is running down or being progressively dissipated? As one of the great, universal "mechanical laws" of existence where does "purpose" fit that process? We cite a recent text on physical science to describe it:

"Coal burning in a fireplace warms the air of a room; when the fire goes out, the warmth persists for a little while, but spreads gradually to the walls, to adjoining rooms, to the outside air, and presently is distributed so widely through the surroundings that we can no longer detect it. From any hot object heat flows in like manner to cooler objects about it, spreading indefinitely until it becomes a part of the general molecular motion of earth and atmosphere. From this reservoir of heat we cannot recover even a fraction of the original energy, for a perceptible temperature difference no longer exists. The energy has not disappeared, but it is no longer available for conversion into other forms.

"We may summarize these observations on heat by the statement: In every energy transformation, some of the original energy is always changed into heat energy which is not available for further transformations. This statement is the law of dissipation of energy (called in more erudite circles the second law of thermodynamics). The law is merely a scientific expression of the everyday observations that other forms of energy commonly become heat energy, and that heat spreads out, or is dissipated, into its surroundings.

"So far as we know, this law of the wastage of energy applies quite as universally as the law of conservation of energy. The radiant energy of stars, the mechanical energy of planetary motions, the chemical energy of food, all are being stably changed into the energy of disordered molecular motion. The law seems to imply that the universe in the past had more radiant energy, more chemical energy, more mechanical energy than at present. It seems to imply also that the distant future will bring a time when there is no energy but heat energy, heat energy ever-distributed so that no part of the universe is warmer than another. (Konrad Krauskopf. Fundamentals of Physical Science, McGraw-Hill, 1948, 2nd Ed., p. 142-3).

This concept has been otherwise described as:

"...an evolution toward more and more "probable" states, characterized by an ever-increasing symmetry, a leveling of energy. The universe,

* From the Gr. trope, a turning, or change.
therefore, tends toward an equilibrium where all the dissymmetries existing today will be flattened out, where all motion will have stopped and where total obscurity and absolute cold will reign. Such will be the end of the world--theoretically. (Lecomte du Noüy. Human Destiny, New American Library, Signet Book, 1947, p. 40).

The teleologist cites the presence of a counter-factor to entropy. What the teleologist sees is an organizing "dissymmetry", a constructing process, an evolutionary build-up, to be as characteristic of matter or the world process, as entropy may be; so that you have to say that the world is not only mechanical dissipation of available heat energy (the express point in 2nd law of thermodynamics), but also is organic integration and evolution (which, to be sure, uses entropy to carry out its processes, or "purposes"). Living beings build-up energy in living or vital forms and in psychic forms by the instrumentality of the dissipation of heat energy (entropy). Most significantly, perhaps, at the top of the build-up is the phenomenon of "mind". "Mind", with its organizing, purposing power and activity is indeed connected with, and in part dependent upon, our brain cells, and bodies where entropy operates--but our minds certainly do exhibit organizing energy and ability that seems provisionally counter to "entropy" as physics describes it; indeed cell growth, replication, multiplication, and integration, and the whole of the evolutionary process, seems a counter tendency to entropy. Entropy continues in, through, and down under the vital processes of building up the new forms of energy, or the pushing of energy up to the new levels exemplified by organic, psychic or mental activity. But: heat entropy itself may be said to exhibit purposive meaning in this relationship! Sugar being transformed into the vital and psychic energies, by the metabolic processes of the body (entropy), as a phenomenon of food ingestion makes it possible for the man, Shakespeare, to work at his desk and give us Hamlet.
In sum, teleological philosophy does not mean (or state) that life or mind are anti-entropic.* Evolutionary processes are rather counter-entropic in respect of their build-up toward dissymmetry or organization. This is accomplished by utilizing entropy, as illustrated by the oxidation of carbohydrates in the cells, or the use of sunlight in photosynthesis in leaves. Life-growth and evolution is a reciprocal process to entropy, not an anti process. Entropy is necessary to the build-up! This discloses its teleological meaning; just as "natural selection," viewed in its total setting or most coherent light, seems "purposive".

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* A term unfortunately used by William Pepperell Montague in a defense of theism in light of the entropy phenomenon (Belief Unbound, Yale University Press, 1930, p. 70f.), and taken up by Wallace I.Matson in his criticism of theism on the same score, op. cit. p. 111-119
1. The "fall of dice" idea: Actually a totally determined process as in any purely "mechanical" motion of inanimate bodies. Could be calculated precisely, if we could collate all the forces involved, such as:

- sides and figures of the dice
- thrust of the finger
- direction of the thrust
- tilt of the dice at the outset of thrust
- air resistance, etc.

2. Probability calculations for such occurrences—i.e., mathematical description of what to expect given the structure of the entities involved, such as the number of sides and markings of the dice, the number of throws, and so on. For example, the theoretical probability that heads will turn up in the throw of a penny is 1/2; in the throw of two pennies is 1/4 (2x2); in the throw of two three-sided dice in the expectation of side "3" to turn up in both cases is 1/9 (3x3); in the expectation of double sixes in the case of regular cubic dice, 1/36 (6x6), and so on.

"In such calculations a common fallacy is to assume that the probability becomes greater that the next throw will bring double sixes because, say, thirty-five throws have been made without double sixes appearing. Unless the dice are loaded the probability of each and every throw is 1/36, and this does not change. Even though one hundred throws were made without the appearance of double sixes the probability that the next throw would yield double sixes remains 1/36. For the probability in such cases is not determined by the number of throws, but by the nature of the die" (Daniel Sommer Robinson, The Principles of Reasoning, 3rd ed., 1947, D. Appleton-Century Co. p. 234).

"Jevons made 20,480 throws of a penny and the result was 10,353 heads and 10,127 tails. This shows that when a sufficiently large number of instances are taken into account the probability laws approach complete certainty. The results are sure to approximate a definite ratio ..." (Ib. p. 235).
3. Natural phenomena sometimes referred to as "indeterminate" and "random":

Heisenberg's principle of "indeterminancy" of the electron; the principle says that we cannot calculate the position and the velocity of an electron at the same time—we can determine either its velocity or its position, but not both simultaneously. The principle is sometimes stated as the uncertainty whether an electron is a wave or a particle. Accordingly an element of unpredictability enters the physical picture of our world at this level, contrary to what has been called nature's general law of uniformity.

Mutation of the genes is sometimes referred to as "random."

Attention is called to the possibility that hydrogen "instability" may have something to do with some types of mutation. (An observation: Hydrogen cannot be totally or radically or "absolutely unstable," or it could never be the basis of even the temporary bond that is necessary in the pre-mutant DNA molecule).

Both these cases seem to mean that we do not as yet fully understand these phenomena—unless they be indeed, truly "chance": events in the following terms:

1. Philosophical "chance" would mean the total, absolute "randomness" of a given motion or process—utter incalculability, unlimited indeterminateness, complete or endless unpredictability—

motion or change of a body or process from one state, position, characteristic, phase, or operation to another without possibility of ever tracing any connection, or "causality," or perceiving or understanding the dependency of the second stage to the first, or the third to the second, and so on. Tennant describes such a meaning of chance in wildest cosmological sense in the following terms: reality conceived as "a self-subsistent and determinate 'chaos' in which similar events never occurred, none recurred, universals had no place, relations no fixity, things no nexus of determination, and 'real' categories no foothold". (Philosophical Theology, Vol II, p. 82)
If "rationality" be defined as seeing connections or relationships, and the tendency of understanding to perceive the whole, coherency of a situation or phenomenon, then such "chance" motion would be totally irrational, without "sufficient reason," rationally groundless an inexplicable brute fact, or surd event.

Is our universe credible as founded on such principle? Take our three hypothetical, primordial characters, "atoms," energy units, or whatever they be:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
X -\longrightarrow Y \\
\downarrow \ \\
Z
\end{array}
\]

and our "awareness of primordial order" as a phase of the cosmological argument, proceeds, Study Guide.\[1/2-9.\]

5. A psychological meaning: Chance as the "capricious," spontaneous, unthinking types of activity sometimes of living beings—a moving-on-impulse type of action. I must walk to Loyal's Texaco Station to pick up my car. Shall I go route A, B, or C? I take B for no particular "reason".

At this point we are reminded of the old monkey and the typewriter argument for the possibility of the "chance" creation of our universe. The analogy is that given sufficient time (an infinite time) the monkey, pounding "randomly" on the keys, could type out Shakespeare's Hamlet. Likewise, the supposition is, given enough time, essentially chaotic elements or factors, by chance contact, could fall into the complex, organized reality of our present universe.

Our reply is, perhaps so, but it is agreed that it would take the monkey infinite time. The monkey couldn't type Hamlet in less

* See F. R. Tennant: Philosophical Theology, Cambridge University Press, 1937, Vol II, p. 82-83 for discussion of various meanings of "chance" in connection with these cosmological problems.
than infinite time! But our world is now in mid passage in time.
The Universe has been created or brought forth or evolved in less
than infinite time! So some factor or factors other than this type
of "chance" would have had to be at work, i.e. other than those
assumed in the monkey and typewriter account.

We could go on with this story. You have to start at least with
the typewriter and the monkey—both rather complex beings. Wouldn't
the monkey have been surprised if, after all his effort, he suddenly
noticed he had typed out Macbeth, rather than Hamlet!

We now proceed to look at some noteworthy, representative
statements of the teleological argument. As a fitting conclusion to
these rather classic versions we append several paragraphs by the
distinguished geneticists, Th. Dobzhansky, clarifying terms and concepts
of the evolutionary theory as we understand it today. His use (and
conscious defense), in the last quoted passage, of the classic
teleological-type term, "creativity," appears to be a striking and
necessary clarification for teleological philosophy, and illustrates a
point which we in a number of places have endeavored to stress. As he
says, if we use the term "creativity" we do not mean thereby any over
simple (and actually deterministic) "autogenesis"—but we point thereby
to the real rational freedom (as we would say) inherent in the process
itself, and expressive of that "God," immanent in the process, or in whom the
process is immanent, to which Dobzhansky so eloquently refers.

*See note, p. 192.
St. Augustine

"The very order, disposition, beauty, change and motion of the world and of all visible things silently proclaim that it could only have been made by God, the ineffably and invisibly great and the ineffably and visibly beautiful" (City of God XI 4).

"Ask the loveliness of the earth, ask the loveliness of the sea, ask the loveliness of wide airy spaces,...ask the living things which move in the waters...fly in the air, ask the souls that are hidden, ask the bodies that are perceptive...Their loveliness is their confession... Lastly, men put their question in man himself, so that they might be able to understand and recognize God, the Creator of the whole universe, in man himself..." (Sermons CCXLI 2 & 3) (Przywara, An Augustine Synthesis, Sheed and Ward, 1945).

St. Thomas

"...It is plain that they (living creatures) achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God". (S.Th. I Q 2, Art. 2).

William Paley
(From Natural Theology, 1802)

"In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But
suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given... When we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g., that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day....

"The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible....

"Every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation...

"As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it" (Paley: Works, pp. 387-391).

Immanuel Kant

(Kant criticized the general teleological argument from design and purpose much as Hume had done, saying that you cannot rise from the uncertain evidences of "design" in lower nature to the idea of an all wise and beneficent Creator. He did, however, restate and accepted the teleological argument when it included man and his moral nature as the highest level of evidence of design or purpose. It is with this in mind, in the passage below, concluding his Critique of Judgment, 1790, that he distinguishes between an inconclusive "physical teleology" and a valid "moral teleology").

"The commonest judgment of healthy human Reason completely accords with this, that it is only as a moral being that man can be a final purpose of creation.... Since now it is only as a moral being that we recognize
man as the purpose of creation, we have in the first place a ground...for regarding the world as a whole connected according to purposes, and as a system of final causes...as regards the reference...of natural purposes to an intelligent World Cause, we have one principle enabling us to think the nature and properties of this First Cause as supreme ground in the kingdom of purposes, and to determine its concept. This physical Teleology could not do; it could only lead to indeterminate concepts thereof, unserviceable alike in theoretical and in practical use.

"From the principle, thus determined, of the causality of the Original Being we must not think Him merely as Intelligence and as legislative for nature, but also as legislating supremely in a moral kingdom of purposes... We shall think this Original Being as all-knowing...all-mighty...as all-good... In this way moral Teleology supplies the deficiency in physical Teleology, and first establishes a Theology..." (S/m1 p. 508-509)

William Newton Clarke

"The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the presence of ends in the universe.

"The universe is one vast order, and abounds in apparent adaptations.... Hence the teleological argument for the existence of God, which has been stated thus: 'Order and useful collocation pervading a system respectively imply intelligence and purpose as the cause of that order and collocation. Since order and useful collocation pervade the universe, there must exist an intelligence adequate to the production of this order, and a will adequate to the directing of this collocation to useful ends'. This is one of the familiar arguments of natural theology. Finding a watch, one could infer from its elaborate structure that an inventive and constructive mind had wrought upon it..."
"It has always been felt that this argument was valid; liable, perhaps, to be overestimated among arguments, but essentially a sound argument; and so it is.

"Modern science, however, has questioned the argument, and has legitimately led to some modification in the form of it. Natural theology assumed that every sign of adaptation to an end gave direct evidence that the Supreme Mind had planned and created that very adaptation. But it is now claimed that adaptations to ends often grow up within the universe, instead of being always impressed upon it from without...It is now claimed that many adaptations that once seemed to prove direct creative planning were not made by action upon the universe, but were brought about by some experience or unfolding within it. In the vegetable and animal worlds, there has been an age-long struggle for existence. This struggle has developed new necessities from time to time in living beings. New necessities have led to the seeking of new objects, -- objects that were not ends at all before; and with the necessity for seeking new ends there has gradually been developed whatever special power the seeking required. Thus the seeking of ends, with the attendant adaptation of powers to ends, grew up in great part within the universe because of incidental necessities, instead of being impressed upon it by creative wisdom. In other words, the ends are those of the creatures that seek them not those of God...

"Yet certain facts must be met; namely, that living things possess power to respond to conditions, develop adaptations, and enter into the seeking of ends; and, at the same time, that this power is limited in a remarkable manner. This power must have come from somewhere and so must its limitations...It has been decided that life may unfold from stage to stage, and that within certain limits living things shall have power to seek ends that may arise in the course of the unfolding. If this gigantic conception is not the offspring of a Mind, then we have no means of knowing what a mind is, or what it produces. Nothing
bears clearer marks of organization by a ruling Mind than the universe, viewed with reference to the vast, yet limited, power of endseeking and adaptation that exists within it....

"...Evolution is recognized as the method of the universe, and evolution is end-seeking .... Many have supposed that the teleological argument is discredited by modern science, and especially by the doctrine of evolution: but the fact is that only in the light of modern science is that argument destined to appear in its full power and value. Order and end-seeking on so vast a scale give overwhelming evidence of a creative and directing Mind.... It may be helpful to add that it requires a mind to understand the universe: how much more to produce it: ... But a mind self-conscious and self-directing is personal, -- the word may be inadequate, but is not untrue. It is the nature of mind to be personal, and we speak correctly when we say that the universe is the work and expression of a personal Spirit" (OCT p.113-118).

Th. Dobzhansky

On Evolution and Creativity


"Evolution is, in part, ectogenesis; it is brought about by causes outside the organism, or more precisely, through interactions between the organism and its environment", p. 405

"Heritable variation is the fountainhead of evolution. Evolution is change in the genetic constitution of the succeeding generations of a species or a population. Natural selection would be futile if the progenies of the surviving fittest were no different, at least on the average, from what the progenies of the eliminated unfit would have been", p. 409.
The process of mutation supplies the genetic raw materials from which evolutionary changes may be constructed by natural selection. Mutation is the source of heritable variation which Darwin vainly tried to uncover. "p. 409.

"The proximate causes of mutation still remain unknown, even though mutagens, i.e., factors speeding up the mutation process, have been discovered", p. 409."although environment may guide the evolution of living things, it does not prescribe just what change must occur", p. 413.

"It must be emphasized that the development of an organism cannot be adequately understood as the outcome of a gradual accretion of 'characters', each produced by a separate gene. The genes function as members of an ensemble, like players in a symphony orchestra rather than like soloists", p. 415

"The fact that genetically similar populations may respond differently to the challenge of the same environment does not invalidate the basic principle that evolutionary changes are evoked by the environment. However, the challenge presented by the environment may be answered in different ways or may not be answered at all", p. 424.

"Evolution is a creative response of living matter to environmental opportunity. I am aware that some biologists regard the word 'creative', borrowed as it is from aesthetics and metaphysics, as inappropriate for the characterization of biological processes. I am unable, however, to find a more apt phrase. Creativity implies origination of novelties, of things or events or ideas which are not known to have occurred before, at least not in identical form. As shown above, there are good reasons to think that evolutionary histories are unique and non-recurrent, despite the fact that elementary evolutionary events are repeatable.....Evolution by natural selection generally tends to promote the adaptedness of species or populations, to increase the consonance between the organism and its environment -- in short, to maximize the probability of the preservation
and expansion of life. This is not contradicted by the shortsightedness and the opportunism of the evolutionary process: immediate gains may eventuate in future harm and ultimate extinction. The risk of failure or non-fulfilment is indeed a characteristic of creativity. Anything really new, being made or planned for the first time, faces the hazard of frustration. By a curious misunderstanding, some scholars have rejected the biological theory of evolution as being crassly mechanistic and relying too much on 'blind' chance and have preferred various forms of autogenesis. And yet it is the former which visualizes a creative process resulting in the emergence of real novelties, while theories of autogenesis assume no creativity but merely unfolding of what was preformed from the beginning"., p. 425-26.


"It is really strange that so many religious thinkers wish to confine God only to the gaps left in the series of natural events. This makes the whole of nature as completely godless as the crudest materialists ever pictured it. This is perhaps a consequence of the old ascetic view, which held that the natural world is evil and corrupt, and that natural man is depraved by Original Sin...Scientific knowledge is cumulative; the breaches between natural events become fewer and narrower. This diminishes a God who stands apart from the created world; not so the God who includes the Creation in His divine being", 135
Chapter Six

Major Arguments for God:

Patterns of Reasoning in the A Priori Mood

3. The Moral Argument

We have just seen how the upper levels of the argument from design utilizes the coming of man as a moral being as the largest significant evidence of Purpose and spiritual meaning in the universe. It is at this place that the teleological merges with the moral argument for God (or makes that argument meaningful, as Kant might have said). In our initial classification of the arguments for God on pages 114-115 we stated that the moral proof typically or characteristically falls under the types of reasoning which we called a priori -- or those based on the existence and sensitivity of oneself particularly as a thinking and moral being. Whereas, to review the matter briefly, the causal and the design arguments are characteristically "empirical" in mood, that is, arise from interest in the external world in general and raise questions about the process, the moral argument, and the subsequent argument from existence of the world as a whole and its knowledge, start from, and raise questions about, the presence and nature of the self, as the self reflects subjectively about its own powers, status, and value. There are, of course, "empirical" aspects or world-referring aspects, in these latter arguments, just as we found the preceding arguments were deeply a priori in many ways. In the discussion which follows we attempt to show both empirical and a priori aspects of the moral and epistemological arguments, while stressing that their general and ultimate nature is a priori.

Recall our general definition of a priori knowledge as the experience of some truth on the basis of self-reflection, and that we do not imply
that it is in opposition to empirical modes of knowledge. As we have said it may simply be a further mode of knowledge or experience, after "empirical experience", which is undoubtedly our first teacher, germinates and awakens the mind to self-awareness and its own activity. Recall also our point that a fully inclusive or coherent "empiricism" would imply the possibility of some a priori knowledge, for an important aspect of empiricism is the spirit of willingness to accept that method of investigation which best suits a given subject matter. A priori insight is the natural way the self understands things about itself. The sense of its own reality as thinking and evaluating energy; its sense of freedom and self-transcendence; its sense of possessing "laws" of "logical procedure" adequate to the guidance of its own thought processes toward "truth"; its moral insights and senses of value (which we are about to examine) represent this dimension of the a priori. We suggest that profoundest insight as the nature in and reality of God comes/a similar way as a priori, and that the first level of this insight is disclosed in man's moral nature.

The Moral Nature of Man

The Universality of Moral Conscience. Men have tended to believe that it was possible to discover common moral values, which would define the content of a common human conscience. To point out the fact in its simplest historical terms we find the primary principles of conduct, such as respect for life, truth, property, discipline of the sexual side of life in some terms, the elevation of generosity, and the criticism of avarice, in all of the major cultures of mankind, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Zoroastrian, Greek, Judeo-Christian, Islamic; and we find these same virtues acknowledged
in many primitive societies as well. furthermore, in the statements of their great sages, many of these cultures asserted that the commandments expressed or reflected a universal cosmic order. we quote at random several noteworthy examples from various ancient cultures.

Hindu

"The eight means of Yoga are, the commandments or Yama, the rules or Niyama, the rules...posture...right control of life force...abstraction...attention...meditation...contemplation. Harmlessness, truth to all beings, abstention from theft, from incontinence and from avarice, constitute Yama or the five commandments. Yama (or the five commandments) constitutes the universal duty and is irrespective of race, place, time, or emergency."
(From Patanjali Yoga Sutras, c. the time of Christ. Ballou 148.)

Buddhist

Now what, brethren, is right belief?
   The knowledge of suffering. . . .
And what, brethren, is right resolve?
   The resolve to renounce sensual pleasures, the resolve to have malice toward none, and the resolve to harm no living creature. . . .
And what, brethren, is right speech?
   To abstain from falsehood, to abstain from backbiting, to abstain from harsh language, to abstain from frivolous talk. . . .
And what, brethren, is right conduct?
   To abstain from destroying life, to abstain from taking what is not given, and to abstain from sexual wrong-doing.
(From the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali Cannon, Ballou 244.)

Confucian

"Truthfulness in speech and the cultivation of harmony constitute what are called 'the things advantageous to men'. Quarrels, plundering, and murders are 'the things disastrous to men'."
(From the Li Ki, Books of Rites, Ballou, 380.)

"There are three things which the superior man guards against. In youth, when the physical powers are not yet settled, he guards against lust. When he is strong, and the physical powers are full of vigour, he guards against quarrelsome-ness. When he is old, and the animal powers are decayed, he guards against covetousness. There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of heaven...of great men...of the words of sages...." (Analects, Ballou, 414.)
Confucius' statement of the Golden Rule: "now the man of perfect virtue (jen), wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others, to be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves; this may be called the art of virtue." (Analects, Ballou, 403.)

What is God-given is what we call human nature. To fulfill the law of our human nature is what we call the moral law. The cultivation of moral law is what we call culture . . . .

Confucius remarked: "The life of the moral man is an exemplification of the universal moral order" . . . .

Confucius remarked: "To find the central clue to our moral being which unites us to the universal order, that indeed is the highest human attainment" . . . . (From the Chung-Yung or Golden Mean, Lun Yutanz, Wisdom of China and India, p. 845-6.)

. . . there is no place in the highest heavens above nor in the deepest waters below where the moral law is not to be found. The moral man finds the moral law beginning in the relation between man and woman; but ending in the vast reaches of the universe. (Ibid. p. 848)

Greek

This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temper- and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order. (From the Gorgias, The Dialogues of Plato, ed. Demos, Random House, Vol I, p. 569.)

Hebrew-Christian

A Paraphrase of Moses Ten Commandments:

"And God Spoke all these words, saying . . . ."

(I) Have no other gods
(II) Make no image
(III) Take not God's name in vain.
(IV) Remember the Sabbath
(V) Honor father and mother
(VI) Do not kill
(VII) Do not commit adultery
(VIII) Do not steal
(IX) Do not lie (bear false witness)
(X) Do not covet

(Exodus 20)

"Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might. And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart...

(Deut. 6:4-5.)

"You shall not hate your brother in your heart... You shall not take vengeance or bear any grudge against the sons of your own people, but you shall love your neighbor as your self: I am the Lord". (Lev. 19:13-18.)

"For this commandment which I command you this day is not too hard for you, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that you should say, 'Who will go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?' Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, 'Who will go over the sea for us, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?' But the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it". (Deut. 30:11-14.)

"This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days, says the Lord: I will put my laws on their hearts, and write them on their minds". (Jer. 31:33-34 and Heb. 10:16-17.)

"And he said to him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. One these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets". (Matt. 22:37-40.)

Islamic

From the Kor’an:

"Bestow not favours that thou mayest receive again with increase..."

"Verily this Koran is no other than a warning to all creatures; to him among you who willeth to walk in a straight path... As to the orphan therefore wrong him not; And as to him that asketh thee, chide him not away....

Weigh therefore with fairness, and scant not the balance....

God... answereth the oppressed when they cry to him...."
Consume not your wealth among yourselves in vain things; nor offer it to judges as a bribe that ye may consume a part of men's wealth unjustly, while ye know the sin which ye commit....

From the Forty-Two Traditions of An-Nawawi:

"No one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself....

Do not be envious of each other; and do not outbid each other; and do not hate each other; do not oppose each other; and do not undersell each other; and be, O slaves of Allah, as brothers. A Muslim is a brother to a Muslim, not oppressing him and not forsaking him; not lying to him and despising him....Here is true piety....A Muslim's life, property, and honour are inviolate to a Muslim...." (From Ballou 1290, 1295, 1299, 1304, 1317, 1337, 1341)

The Rational Springs of Conscience. Our strongest insight, however, into the reality and nature of conscience is rational, rather than merely historical or empirical. Conscience arises in the idea of ourselves as free and rational beings. Concomitant with reason and freedom is the sense of obligation. Freedom implies obligation, which is but another name for freedom in its mature sense. Realizing our freedom, and acknowledging our finiteness of perception and judgment, we are constantly anxious as to whether we will rightly use our freedom, that is to say, for the preservation and enhancement of our life. This "anxiety" is conscience in its elementary form. All men have such anxiety or elementary form of conscience. Reason also implies a sense of obligation. Rational judgment implies the power to judge or misjudge, to judge in favor of all the relevant facts, or only part of them. To judge in part is to make an error, and, in so far as it may be possible, the responsibility of rational life is to avoid error.*

Obligation is the central experience of life. If we had no obligation, we would never act. If there were no obligation to fly, the bird would never do so, and its species perish. In all life there is the impulse to act in such a way as to conduce to life. This is true in the highest scale with man. To live and act means that we have to live and act in some direction. As living beings we are immediately confronted with the problem of which direction? This "which" is the seed of conscience. The will-to-live and the impulse to act on the human level has unique implications involving man's personal and spiritual nature. "Man cannot live by bread alone". He is not interested in mere physical survival on some lowest plane of subsistence, but in survival in terms of his highest, unique capacities as man. In sum, thus far, we have a conscience because we are living, personal beings. One cannot conceive of a free, rational, and acting being, with higher predispositions and aspirations, that does not need, and therefore has, a capacity for conscience.

We may speak of this sense of obligation to use our freedom and our rational powers in the right way -- i.e., the way conducive to life, happiness, and social harmony -- as the "form" of conscience. As an integral freedom such form seems a universal attribute of human nature. (In ethically expression of reason and pathological personality, of course, such form has been trained to be satisfied only by the feeding of selfish drives.)

Implied in this universal form there are two phases of conscience which bring to light its content: a "psychological" phase and an "intellectual" one. The emotional satisfaction which sanctifies the actual decisions which we make when we feel they are right and true is the psychological "content" of conscience. (Stated negatively, of course,
feelings of dissatisfaction and guilt are aspects of the psychological content of conscience when we believe that decisions may not have been rendered according to the fullest and most coherent judgment, or when we believe that performance has fallen short of some character ideal.)

Such emotional content is a corollary, universal quality of the human mind in the area of its rational freedom and conscience. Our central problem, however, upon which we wish to focus, concerns the intellectual content of conscience, or the problem of truth judgment in the area of conduct.

As the practical question we may ask, Where will the intellectual content of conscience tend to be the same for all men? Is there an apex of intellectual life where it is the same? We have just seen how the emotional or psychological quality or feeling will be similar in all men when acts of conscience are performed. In order to understand how the intellectual heart of such emotional content may coincide with men, or to test when it does coincide, we suggest the following proposition, as description of human ethical life: It is that the most rational decision possible, the most inclusive coherent judgment we can make concerning an issue, helps to define the full content of conscience, and in matters of supreme importance tends to be the same for all human beings.

Ten Sources of Moral Insight. Conscience has varied in matters of lesser importance to human welfare as a whole. A Westerner has no content of conscience about the eating of meat, while for the devout Hindu, Gandhi, there was a keen conscience against meat eating. In our myriad ways daily we individuals illustrate varying contents of conscience in matters of merely personal taste or in those of less social importance. One man
pursues his professional drive or "conscience" as a teacher, another as a lawyer or artist. You may prefer to use your vacation fishing; I mountain hiking. But in matters of supreme importance, in the basic issues, we have, characteristically and historically, tended to act in a uniform way. We may repeat with profit the words of Frederick Paulsen,

"Human life...is possible only where all individuals act with relative uniformity." (A System of Ethics, p. 13f).

We offer the following list of some matters of supreme importance or concern in which conscience tends to be the same with all men, defining its common intellectual content. These are matters about which human beings have characteristically tended to make the same decision, or think, reason or act in a uniform way, as they strive to live on the highest plane possible to man. They are practical ways of stating the content of moral law. Such moral principles or laws root in the central-most drives or desires of personal existence:

1. As a matter of normal human life there is the universal desire for self-preservation and self-enhancement according to our highest capabilities as individuals. This has given rise to the basic laws against murder, founded in the universal will-to-live and in the sense of the sanctity of one's own person.

2. There is the universal desire to have access to facts, or to know and to use truth, to have knowledge, to be informed -- to become "educated", as we often say, in one primary meaning of education.

In their effort to catch up with the west, the contemporary thirst for knowledge, in the form of science, agitating the non-Western peoples, as one of the significant social phenomena of our time, dramatically illustrates this human trait.
3. There is the universal desire to have others deal truthfully, trustfully, honorable, or dependably, with you, and the consequent realization that we must act reliably with them. No man can long deal with a liar or a promise-breaker. This has given rise to the basic laws against falsehood in the formal codes, and may be positively stated as the law of veracity.

4. There is the universal desire for recognition, for approval, or to have the friendship of others, to be well regarded by one's peers, to be liked, to be loved and the consequent realization that we must reciprocate friendship and love. This has given rise to the laws of "reciprocity" or Golden Rule principles in many cultures.

5. There has been the human desire for, and to keep one's mate. This has given rise to the laws regulating marriage, and has tended in many cultures toward a monogamous ideal.

6. There is the universal desire to keep one's personal possessions, especially when the fruit of one's own labor. This may be broadened to include the principle of economic security. This human drive has given rise to the laws against stealing, and the basic sanctity of personal property. The contemporary ferment of the world's peoples relative to the desire for a better economic lot -- the basic motif of communist revolutions themselves -- indicate this universal quality of life and conscience.

7. There is the universal desire for just judgment or judicial decision at the bar of legal or political authority -- whether tribal chief, king, commissariat, congress, parliament, or court. This has given rise to the concrete laws and structures of "justice" that aim to limit the arbitrary power of rulers and governments.
8. In the desire to live free from arbitrary force or restraint flows the desire to have a voice in the political authority that rules over us. This has its classic illustration in the rise of democracy in the western world, and presently in the convulsions of former colonial peoples in their efforts to secure independence and establish "popular" governments. An important propaganda appeal in contemporary revolutionary movements is to the ideal of democracy. The Soviet rulers claim to represent the "workers" in the Soviet Socialist "Republics". The Red government of China is hailed as the "People's Republic".

9. There tends to be a universal human admiration of mercy, unselfishness, and love when observed in others, in a St. Francis, a Schweitzer, a Sister Kenny, a Gandhi, arousing in our own conscience the sense of sympathy, and that love should be our own supreme motive.

10. Finally we should cite the universal admiration of such humble virtues as courage, temperance, perseverance at a worthy task, and other such. No society ultimately admires the coward, the uncouth, or the dilettante.

It is true that some of these impulses have not begun to find their expression in social movements and institutions until lately in historic time. But that they are beginning to have realization suggests their age-old and deep-seated appeal to the human heart. Others of the above principles are, of course, ancient as ideals, and began to humanize men at an early time.

In 1957 the Hungarian student, who had been exposed to a Communist education since childhood, wept to the U. N. small-power investigating committee: "We were brought up amidst lies. We continually had to lie."
We could not have healthy ideas because everything was chocked in us. We wanted freedom." Sometimes prior to this at the 20th Party Congress, February 24-25, 1956, in the now famous expose of Stalin, the Soviet dictator had himself eloquently appealed to the Communist deputies' sense of truth and justice.

Granted the full context of the Soviet sense of values, in many ways very different from ours, in which such statements were uttered, scarcely no more classic expression of the human desire for just judgment at the bar of political authority, and the desire for truth as opposed to falsehood could be found in our times than in the Khrushchev speech at that occasion. We are apt to suppose that people in the Communist society are those, particularly, who -- trained in so different a social environment -- represent a branch of humanity with an utterly different brand of conscience from our own. Yet Khrushchev appealed to his hearers in the following memorable terms:*

"Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people'. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man engaged in a controversy be proven...In the main, and in actuety, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the 'confession' of the accused himself, and as subsequent probing proved, 'confessions' were acquired through physical pressures against the accused...The formula 'enemy of the people' was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.

"Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, executed without trial and without normal investigation, created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation...How is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed; only in one way -- because of the application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him into a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away his human dignity!"

Relative to the case of Comrade Eike, Khrushchev announced that he was accused "on the basis of slanderous materials" and "forced under torture"

to confess, and damned this Stalinist procedure as an "odious falsification".

The Soviet Premier cited two remarkable documents, a letter addressed to Stalin by Comrade Eike, written from the latter's cell; and a second letter written from another victim, Comrade Kedrov, to the Central Committee.

Eike in his letter said:

"Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged I would not have dared to send this pre-execution declaration: However, I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now finding my two feet in the grave I am also not lying."

Kedrov appealed with these words:

"My torture has reached the extreme. My health is broken...To die in a Soviet prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Fatherland -- what can be more monstrous for an honest man?...Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grip my heart. No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be, I cry. Neither the Party, nor the Soviet Government, nor the People's Commissar, L. P. Beria, will permit this cruel, irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain that, given a quiet, objective examination, without any foul ranting, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. If believe, I believe."

The Russian heart is not greatly different from the American heart. Highlighting two of the fundamental principles mentioned previously, our observer of Russian life pointed to the "insatiable thirst for knowledge" among the Russians and wrote that "With a vehemence and a determination almost inconceivable to us, they yearn and strive for self-betterment" -- a way in which the Russian heart of late may have overtaken the American.
Personality as Criterion of Moral Law. Moral law is founded in the structure and nature of personal being; it expresses the needs of personal life, is integral to the meaning of personality and to the experience of beings who are consciously aware. We heard the Old and New testaments in their deepest level of ethical thinking, say something like this in passages quoted.

Moral law (or if preferred, we may speak of it as moral duty, truth, or reality) refers to two main things: the fulfilling of all personal lives to their finest possible capacity, and the harmonization of life with life; it is personal fulfillment, love and justice; or, alternatively phrased, it is the fulfillment of persons by love and justice. At this level of insight the concept of moral law and the concept of life's meaning merge. Gordon Gilkey somewhere trenchantly phrased the idea of life's duty, meaning, or purpose as comprising these responsibilities: (1) To realize whatever fine powers are latent within us; and (2) to love and serve those whom life puts together with us. This latter we attempt beyond and above the legitimate concern which we must have for ourselves. To these two levels of meaning in the concept of moral duty or purpose, we add a third, reflecting nature as beings within or of time, and bringing the first two principles together into their implied creative synthesis; namely, our duty is (3) to do what we can to tip the balance of the human future for good -- a partial definition of the good for persons being suggested by our preceding analysis. "Law" in its highest moral sense does not mean rigid, inflexible structure that judges and punishes. Transcending the idea of judgment, which has a legitimate provisional application at certain levels of process, law for living beings means regularity or orderliness of life according to the nature and for the welfare of such being. For personal beings "moral law" is subsummed in the respect for personality and the love commandment. It is self-regulation, the highest work of moral freedom.
The Contribution of Immanuel Kant: In Western culture no one more forcefully stated that moral law is ultimately discernible a priori in the very nature of human personality as self-conscious mind and reason than did Immanuel Kant. His three principles are now cherished possessions of the rational and idealist stream of interpretation of man. They were that the test of moral judgments is found in their universal applicability; that respect for personality in moral judgment is implied highest criterion of moral value; and that moral judgment is autonomous or free. Kant's first maxim, the discovery that the test of moral truth may be seen in its nature as a universal idea, (as a maxim of conduct applicable to all men) stems from the Socratic-Platonic tradition with its interest in universal ideas. The ten moral principles of our preceding section stand such a test of. They are expressions of the human will in terms which disclose that, if universally respected and practiced, all wills (that is, all men) would tend to live in mutual support and harmony; whereas to the extent that human wills disregard these laws, aggress on and destroy each other, no life can stand.

Kant's second maxim, his emphasis on personality as supreme moral criterion, comes from the Hebrew-Christian side of his thinking. This second maxim of the Categorical Imperative: "So act to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end...never as a means only," is really Kant's foundational principle. It is implicit in, or anterior to, the test of universality, and gives the latter principle its ultimate force as truth. Universal moral laws rest on the principle of respect for personality, the moral rule that follows the Hebrew-Christian metaphysical affirmation of the primacy of personality in value and being. On the other hand, the test of universality -- coming from the Greek side of Kant's thought -- is implicit in the Hebrew-Christian ethics. They are
two principles, a primary one, and a corollary, inhering in our moral sensitivity — or, if preferred, they are coordinate principles, two facets of our unitary moral nature.

For example, why be truthful? Because it respects the personality of the other man in quintessential way. To treat him on the basis of honor, trust, and integrity is the supreme way to acknowledge his value and importance as a person. When we deceive a person, we fundamentally mistrust him, that is, doubt his integrity as person. Why can basic moral principles be universalized? Because they are principles which, in fundamental ways, respect or reverence persons. Our foregoing moral laws rest on the principle of personality, and personality is "universal", or at least a world-wide category of being. What was implicit in the Greek morality at its highest — namely, the sacredness of personality — (e.g. Socrates in Book I and II of the Republic, or in the Gorgias) was explicit in the Hebrew emphasis on personality; what was implicit in the Hebrew outlook — namely universality — was explicit in the Greek emphasis on the search for universal ideas, or world-governing, rational forms of order. In any case, the primacy of personality is understood by both sides of Jesus's summary of the law: for love of God is love of the creative source of all personality, which issues in the moral claim of love for neighbor.
The Cosmic reference of conscience. We have discussed the historic, universal scope and the origin of conscience as lying in man's rational nature. Working out from this insight we suggest an initial sensitivity to the reality of God. We may call it the cosmic reference of conscience -- to consider which will prepare us for a final summary of the moral argument.

Cosmic "Moral Reality", supporting man's moral nature, and from which that nature may be derived, is implied by the reality of conscience itself as rational, psychic process intrinsic to the nature of man. Conscience is our sense of responsibility to judge "according to reality". Thus an objective reference lies already in conscience. Our sense of obligation is a given, a priori element of mind. But obligation or sense of ought-ness and duty is the term most descriptive of human life from the standpoint of inner tension as it views an outward world in which it must make its way. The desire of conscience therefore seems to be to discover something which will fulfill it. Anticipated in the very given, existential nature, or constitutional awareness of obligation on our part as men is its desire to respond to, or fulfill something constitutional in the universe. And as we actually find laws of life which govern life harmoniously and well, the growth of conscience toward assurance of some objective meaning continues.

At this point conscience-reference emerges from the shadow of subjective anticipation merely, outward into a more certain realization of the moral nature of the cosmos, for it looks around and perceives that its sense of obligation is a universal quality of human life. As such, Conscience notes that it is an expression of cosmic process. Our sense of
obligation is "cosmic" or "objective" in that all rational beings, mankind at large, have it. It is outside me individually, because it is in the other person too. Like other objective phenomena it is characteristic of a vast range of existence, namely, the order of human life. As a psychological characteristic of rational life wherever found, it seems as objective as the human nose. In so far as human reason and freedom are outcomes of cosmic process, the accompanying "ought", as a psychological emergent, is fundamentally cosmic or objective. Why man should be what he is is a cosmic question. Why we are endowed with freedom and rational mentality and the capacity for personality and conscience is an objective fact of nature and creation -- we have been made that way.

Furthermore, from awareness of itself as an expression of cosmic process it raises the question of whether it may not also be itself an insight into the purposive nature of that process. For we look at process and it seems to be a moral one: it unfolds into personal beings, with the sense of moral duty at the apex of personal awareness. We see nature in her history putting forth energies to the seeming end of creating numerous persons, and we conclude, in a coherent value judgment, that this must be the, or at least one, supreme end or value. Obligation is the inner view that a self has of what from the outside appears to be a creative, moral process. Thus does not our finite "moral mind" sense an ampler Moral Mind purposing the totality of process and existence? The impulse of conscience within, seeming to fit the propulsion of reality without, suggests that it does. The old prophetic affirmation that conscience is "The Voice of God" seems true. If we may define our will to live, and to live righteously, as the fulfillment of Creation's Will, then the ought, which is the
spring of action is in deepest sense an expression of the will of God. Further, to act morally is to act according to the best and wisest. But here again our sense of finitude and imperfection on the side of conscience suggests God. For it is often true that we do not know the full truth and accordingly do not act in the best way. Our sensitivity toward the wiser and the better implies the ultimate standard of the Fullness of Truth in Being. We should strive to know and to permit the wisest and the best to act in us. Thus deepest in the sense of conscience is the realization that "perfection of God is the ground of obligation for all other beings." *

Accordingly, then, have we not discovered a facet of the "ontological argument" in its moral key in this, the self's analysis of conscience in its relation to the World?

The Moral Argument: A Summary

The full mood of moral reasoning for the reality of God says that we discover Moral Mind in the universe through the presence of moral order in the universe.** Moral reasoning about God's reality advances on two fronts:

an / a priori side, already suggested by our previous discussion. Here we express the point of view more succinctly: that the universe is a moral order is suggested by the fact that we are personal beings with moral conscience, that is to say, with awareness / a priori of universal laws that will govern life harmoniously and well, in brief, the law of respect for personality: this, in its most dynamic Hebrew-Christian sense, is the law of love. We have seen that the law of respect, implying love,

* William Newton Clarke

was implicit in the great commandments of the
classical cultures, east and west. Earlier we formulated the practical
expressions of moral law in ten principles, and
discussed Immanuel Kant's rational derivation of the respect for personality
as central, moral truth.

The moral argument also has an empirical side or mood. Looking out
beyond our single selves at process as a whole, in broadest empirical spirit,
we observe that the universe is a moral order because it has produced such
beings as a major outcome of its process; and, on the practical side, we
experience that we cannot survive in the highest way possible to men without
practicing the higher morality of regard for one's fellows. Though they
believed that their ultimate authority came from God's speaking to them
directly through the inner authority of moral conscience or moral truth
(the a priori depth of their insight) the great eighth to sixth century
B.C. moral prophets in Israel found the test for moral law objectively
and concretely in the workings of history. When men and nations collectively
persist in evil actions they meet in the long run with collective ruin or
disaster. Nations that do right in their individual and collective responsibili-
ties — that is, apply the Commandments based on respect for person-
ality — tend in the long run to survive. The great prophets stated the
law in both the negative and positive forms here suggested. Such was the
empirical or experimental truth or law of history as the prophets looked
out at the world of men and events. The sure passing of the brutal empires
of history attests the truth the prophets were uttering.
Pulling the two sides of this resume together and again indicating its basic *a priori* mood in depth, the argument says: being aware of the universal laws of personality and love we are aware of moral cosmic Mind governing existence. Such Mind may be said to be personal because it concerns persons and their moral order. It may be thought of as *Love because the supreme moral law is Love*. It is more than our mind because moral truth embraces all minds, if they will attend to it; it is other than our mind because the idea of love judges through conscience subjectively, when men are sensitized to this law, and objectively in the course of history if men remain unsensitized to it. On the other hand, God's Mind may find expression in, or is found in fellowship with, our minds as we realize love and respect for persons.

The essence of the moral argument is that we sense the absoluteness of the truth of respect for personality and love. Hastings Rashdall summarized the moral argument superbly:

"An absolute Moral law or moral ideal cannot exist in material things...A moral ideal can exist nowhere...but in a Mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all Reality is derived...Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind God." (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 272.)

It is precisely because we must many times look above and beyond immediate empirical verification for our moral ideals that the moral argument has its ultimate force and validity. Because truth in its moral range is often not yet embodied in material relationships, we have our highest experience of Ultimate Mind. Nowhere do advanced moral truths have full or complete existence or embodiment materially in concrete relationships. Yet they are truths that seem universal, eternal, or absolute in their demand; they are yet "ideals", as we say, or transcendent or unrealized...
in process, waiting to have their full expression in process. As such, they seem to lie within the Ultimate Mind that overarches process and guides its development. That all men should love each other, and practice agape, as the ultimate and universal ideal, is certainly Truth of the highest degree. That democracy may yet be brought to a more perfected stage of development in local areas; or that international organization should more perfectly approximate a democratic world-government and system of justice; or that race relations can be vastly improved over the present "empirical" or factual situation, toward complete equality, freedom, and opportunity for all races everywhere; or that the vaster masses of men should come to live in greater freedom from want, and in greater freedom of opportunity for the good life as individuals; or that modern cities should the be cleared of aesthetic and moral blight of slums; or that birth control should be practiced in areas of great over-population, under the current threat of world population explosion; or that we must come to use atomic energy for productivity rather than for military power -- such are moral truths that have no present, full embodiment. Such are not seen or known by or in any "empirical relationships"; for there are no such relationships at present where they are fully embodied. Their validity does not rest in any present material factuality. Look for them as material facts and they are nowhere; look for them as the insistent voice of Moral Truth and they are everywhere. We could not presently know them by exploration anywhere on the plane of sense experience in the present material world. Where then are they and why and how valid and commanding over life? The humanist and entirely naturalist will reply that these ideals which command life are/man's own ideals -- the subjective projections of possible goods upon the imaginary
screen of our future hopes. The idealist and spiritual philosopher replies, that it is in their quality as "Imperatives" or commands that deepest sen-
sitivity to their origin in Eternal Mind is felt. In his view, they reside
in the over-realm of the Transcending Spirit of God, in the fulness of truth
and they impinge on
in Being, as truth by a priori insight.

Indeed we may forsee, with the naturalists, that our human anticipation
of possible dire consequences, if we do not speedily realize the foregoing
ideals, may be a source of their imperativeness, insistence, or command.
But their insistence or command is not soley generated by this fear of
judgment; it does not have its entire origin in the fear of their con-
sequences of our possible failure. They speak as truth above, and prior to,
consequences. We would not do them because we fear judgment; we would do
them because they are right. Their truth does not lodge in their conse-
quences, experienced or anticipated; rather their consequences will follow
from their truth. Whatever their empirical consequences might be, dire if
we fail these ideals, benigned if we heed them, the consequences would be
such because of their prior and continuing validity as truth in the nature
of Being.

For their insistence or command rests on the principle of the supremacy
of personality in being; in that supremacy they have their full meaning,
their ultimate heart and significance. It is the calamity to persons which
is anticipated as the evil consequences of our possible human failure to
act on them. Accordingly religious idealism feels that the Voice of Eternal
Mind speaks in deepest sense in our awareness of the supremacy of personality
in being. Such then is our statement of the moral argument for God.

Let us hear at this point two noteworthy formulations by others, Kant's,
and more recently, William Ritchie Sorley's. After these presentations we append
two topics which will clarify further the position of the religious idealist
concerning the idea of man's moral nature.
The main premises of the moral argument are two: (1) the affirmation of the "objectivity" or "universality" of moral value -- what ultimately does this mean? And (2) the affirmation that personality is supreme in value.

(1) Relative to the first premise, recall our discussion on the cosmic reference of conscience, p. 205f. G. W. Cunningham, summarizing on the validity of the moral argument as he sees it, speaks suggestively to the first point:

"...The main road along which it advances is this: Moral values are objective at least in the sense that they are essential parts of the world-order in so far as human nature is a real part of the world-order; the world-order must consequently be in some sense a moral order, in the sense, namely, that there is room in it for man and the ideal of goodness which is basal to his nature; and this could not be unless the world-order is directed by a conscious rational Being who wills the final triumph of goodness..." (G. W. Cunningham, Problems of Philosophy, p. 421-2).

In the previous sections of this chapter, we have already labored to point out in our own way how a moral argument for God rests on philosophical idealism, or an idealistic conception of "value" -- that is, how the moral sense within reflects or suggests a moral reality without. In fine, the premise and the argument itself are actually one and the same thing; they represent a fundamental or primordial mode or manner of reading our world, namely primarily as a system of life and mind and personal spirit and value, rather than one of spiritless "material" energy. To challenge the argument is simply to challenge idealism itself.

(2) The second premise of the moral argument is the idea of the supreme worth of personality upon which the moral law of respect for personality, and its derivatives, is founded.
moral argument would reply, by two reasonable or coherent insights, on a priori, and the other generally empirical. The a priori insight, as was implied earlier in this study, is the awareness by the self-conscious, personal subject that the locus or creative medium of all value. Accordingly, aware of itself as the creative medium of value something of its own supremacy in value is intimated to it. And furthermore, as the unique type of energy that knows and mediates value, a further awareness of its supremacy in "being", or its relatedness to supreme being, is suggested to it. Finally we might repeat what was said on a former page, in "awareness of the self as thinking energy, in comparison to all other observable energies, the self possesses an intimation of its own superiority in value and possibly in being".

The empirical insight is that nature seems to be producing self-conscious personality as a main, prolific activity. Again we return to what was said on a former page, "...we see nature in her history putting forth energies to the seeming end of creating numerous...persons', and we conclude that this must be the, or at least one, supreme end or value". Such conclusion is made by an over-all coherent judgment, which is the only method we have to discern any value, anywhere, of any kind or degree, if we believe that it is possible to ascertain value.

Let us hear at this point noteworthy formulations by others, Kant's, in God, and more recently, William Ritchie Sorley's. After these presentations we append two topics which will clarify further the position of the religious idealist concerning the idea of man's moral nature.
Immanuel Kant has formulated in classic way the thesis of moral or ethical idealism, namely, that there is in the universe objective moral law known by a priori reason. The following passages are edited from Kant, Selections, Scribner's Modern Students Library, p. 268-87, from the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals".

"Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e. to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, 'Thou shalt not lie', is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and no with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason....all moral philosophy rests wholly....pure....When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by experience, in order....to procure for them...effectual influence on conduct....

"...What sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? ...There remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e. I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested....
I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over-hastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.

"I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason exhorts from me immediate respect for such legislation....

"Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to serve as an original example....examples serve only for encouragement, i.e. they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law commands, they make visible that which the practical rule expresses more generally, but they can never authorize us to set aside the true original which lies in reason...

"From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason....

"There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become universal law....
"If then there is a supreme practical principle, or, in respect of the
human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which...is an end in itself.
The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a
subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards
its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me;
so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme
practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly
the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether
in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never
as means only....

"This respect-inspiring idea of personality...sets before our eyes the sub-
limity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows us
the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self-
conceit...."
Kant's Moral Argument

In addition to Kant's two formal or explicit—but indirect—proofs for God, there is in his writings a more general implicit-type proof based directly on man's moral nature. It is intimated in Kant's ethical thought as a whole and constitutes, in the opinion of this writer, his most far-reaching argument for God. The reader's attention is called to the note below summarizing Kant's two formal arguments.

If we were to substitute the word "duty" for the word "love" in the first paragraph of page 209 above, we would then have a resume of Kant's largest thought concerning belief in God, a kind of epitomy of the deepest ranges of his moral argument. Norman Kemp Smith wrote that Kant's final thought, expressed in his posthumous works, was that "God speaks with the voice of the categorical imperative (the moral law), and thereby reveals Himself in a direct manner" (Quoted in Kant Selections, ed. Greene, Scribners p. 349). The suggestion of such classic paragraphs as the following—which could be duplicated a number of times from Kant's writings—is that moral law roots in personality, finite and ultimately Cosmic, with Cosmic Personality the archetype or source of finite personality. The following selections are from The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant Selections, Greene, op cit).

The source of the sense of duty or the moral law can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself...a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum-total of all ends.... This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own
personality as belonging to the intelligible world. It is, then, not to be
wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature
in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and
its laws with the highest respect"...

"...the moral law...is holy....We justly attribute this condition of the
sacredness of persons as ends to the Divine will, with regard to the
rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, since it rests on their
personality, by which alone they are ends in themselves.

"This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our eyes the
sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows
us the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self-
conceit, is even natural to commonest reason and easily observed.....

"Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason: it is no
other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us conscious of the
sublimity of our own supersensible existence, and subjectively produces
respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their sensible
existence...." (Kant, Ibid., p. 331-333).

"...the moral laws lead....to the recognition of all duties as divine
commands, not as....arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will and contingent in
themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself, which neverthe-
less, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being...The moral law commands
me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my
conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my
will with that of a holy and good Author of the world....those who placed the
end of creation in the glory of God (provided that this is not conceived
anthropomorphically...) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing
glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world,
respect for His command, the observance of the holy duty that His law imposes on
us...." (ib. 365-67). *
Somewhat different from Kant's general argument, implied by such quotations as the above, he formulated two explicit, but indirect-type proofs for God's existence. These are the proofs for which he is usually remembered. One proceeds from the idea of the sumnum bonum, or highest happiness, expounded in The Critique of Practical Reason, to the effect that a perfectly moral world would require that virtue and happiness be joined. But an obvious inference from experience is that they are not joined in this world. Therefore, they must be joined in the next world, according to Kant, in the state of immortality. Now only God could provide for such an ultimate union of virtue and happiness in an immortal condition of the soul. Accordingly, in this proof God is an eschatological postulate for Kant; God is the necessary guarantor of the sumnum bonum, implied as the rational destiny of man's moral nature. The other proof is developed as the final outcome of the teleological argument for Cosmic Purpose, when such argument is raised to its highest moral mood. Along this line of thinking Kant said that moral purpose is found in nature in the presence of a creature, man, with moral obligations to fulfill, thus implying a Moral Purposer or Creator behind nature.

Kant's posthumous fragments emphasized the more general, a priori argument based on God's immediate presence in the moral law or moral consciousness lying at the heart of personal being. In the fragments we find the following: "The imperative of duty proves to men their freedom, and at the same time conducts them to the Idea of God". "God is the morally practical, self-legislating Reason. Therefore only a God in me, about me, and over me". "There is a Being... in me, which though distinct from me stands to me in relations of causal efficacy, and which, itself free, i.e. not dependent upon the law of nature in space and time, inwardly directs me (justifies and condemns), and, I as a man, am myself this Being. It is not a substance outside me..."God must be represented not as substance outside me, but as highest moral principle in me" ([Kant, Selections, op cit. pp. 374-375])

It must be admitted that some of these posthumous fragments on God's immanence are sufficiently ambiguous to make possible a humanistic interpretation of Kant, to the effect that he does not think of God as a trans-human, as well as, an immanent reality. In the judgment of this interpreter, it may be replied that, however intimately God reveals Himself in the moral law, the prevailing trend in Kant's thought as a whole is to believe in God as truly objective, cosmic, and trans-human Reality. God in Kant's main thought is the transcendent source of the law, which man perceives as universal and obligatory -- obligatory precisely because we understand it to be cosmic and inclusive, with its ultimate source.
a larger Mind than our own. Even in the posthumous fragments above quoted, Kant says that God is "distinct from" him. In any case, we trace in these posthumous sayings, stressing God's immanence in, and, in a measure, His identity with, the highest in human possibility, Kant's own effort to correct the devastating criticism he thought he made, in The Critique of Pure Reason, of the ontological argument. By the time he writes his moral argument at its various levels, he tacitly recognizes his earlier mistake in denying the validity of an ontological argument for God. He reconstructs such an argument of his own in his profound moral terms; the posthumous fragments bring this problem within Kant into sharp focus.
William Ritchie Sorley

(1885-1935, Prof. of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. In the following passage from his Gifford Lectures, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 2nd Ed., 1921, Sorley summarizes the moral argument. As stated by him it is the culmination of the "cosmological" argument, and within his context, also the culmination of the argument from knowledge and truth, which we consider next as our final "rational" type argument for God. Accordingly, Sorley's statement below constitutes a bridge to our next level of thinking about Deity).

"The argument...may be looked upon as a special and striking extension of the cosmological argument. In its first and most elementary form the cosmological argument seeks a cause for the bare existence of the world and man: to account for them there must be something able to bring them into being: God is the First Cause. Then the order of nature impresses us by its regularity, and we come by degrees to understand the principles of its regularity, and the laws under which the material whole maintains its equilibrium and the ordered procession of its changes: these laws and this order call for explanation, and we conceive God as the Great Lawgiver. But beyond this material world, we understand relations and principles of a still more general kind; and the intellect of man recognizes abstract truths so evident that, once understood, they cannot be questioned, while inferences are drawn from these which only the more expert minds can appreciate and yet which they recognize as eternally valid. To what order do these belong and what was their home when man as yet was unconscious of them? Surely if their validity is eternal they must have had existence somewhere, and we can only suppose them to have existed in the one eternal mind: God is therefore the God of Truth. Further, persons are conscious of values and of an ideal of goodness, which they recognize as having
undoubted authority for the direction of their activity; the validity of these values or laws and of this ideal, however, does not depend upon their recognition: it is objective and eternal; and how could this eternal validity stand alone, not embodied in matter and neither seen nor realised by finite minds, unless there were an eternal mind whose thought and will were therein expressed? God must therefore exist and his nature be goodness" (p. 348-49)
William Newton Clarke stated the religious-spiritual conception of man's moral nature and the idea of conscience in forceful terms. Conscience is natural to rational life, an integral expression of man as a "rational being". Clarke, 1841-1912, was an outstanding professor of Christian theology at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School between 1890 and his retirement. The following passage was taken from his widely influential book, _An Outline of Christian Theology_, first published in 1898, p. 198-208.

"Man as a Moral Being. A moral being is a being who is active, free, and under obligation with respect to right and wrong. Man is such a being; and the elements of his moral constitution must now be examined. The examination begins with Conscience, because it is through conscience that man becomes aware of the moral significance of his life.

"Conscience is the judgment of a man applied to his own conduct, affirming that acts for which he deems himself responsible are approved or condemned by his standard of right.

"This definition must be unfolded and explained.

"Judgment, a work of intellect, is the discerning of relations between objects or ideas, and the affirming of the relations that are discerned. Among the relations that man judges is the relation that acts or qualities sustain to the conceptions of right and wrong. As he can judge and affirm relations of similarity and difference, distance, number, situation, and the like, so he can discern and affirm right and wrong in acts and qualities. The power of judgment acting upon right and wrong is called the moral faculty. In nature it is not essentially different from the power of judgment in general. So far as it is peculiar it is so because of the peculiarities of the subject-matter upon which it acts. The moral faculty does not create its own standard of judgment, or bring to its work any invariable standard, but judges according to whatever stan-
standard the soul may possess. The soul, which is the man, is the judge, and can estimate acts only by comparison with the standard of right and wrong that the man has accepted....

"Self-approval and self-condemnation have a unique character among judgments. They bring a peculiar pleasure and pain, satisfaction and shame, rejoicing and remorse. They have the importance and solemnity that attend the moral quality. The testimony of the soul in approving or condemning itself profoundly affects its self-respect, and is deeply felt to be prophetic of a higher judgment.

"The moral faculty is called conscience when it acts upon the doing and character of self, judging, and approving or condemning, in accordance with the standard of right and wrong that the soul accepts....

"The importance of conscience is due to obligation....

"Whence came the sense of obligation?....So far as any man is aware the sense of obligation is a native part of the human constitution, as memory is, or reason....

"What, then, is the ground of obligation itself? Why is it that we 'ought'? When this great and solemn element in our life?

"It is implied in what has just been said, that practically man finds a ground of obligation in his own being...we...naturally ask what it is in man that brings him under obligation. By virtue of what facts in himself or in his relations is man subject to duty?

"There are two answers to this question. The first extends to so much as lies within the limits of the human constitution, and the second reaches beyond man to God.

"The first answer is, that obligation necessarily belongs to personality. The elements of personality are such, and so related among themselves, that a person cannot avoid obligation.
"Personality includes the power of rational judgment, which belongs to the intellect. Power of rational judgment implies power to judge and to misjudge; to use the faculties of knowledge and thought according to their nature, or in disregard or violation of their nature; to judge in view of all available relevant facts, or in view of only a part of them; to judge according to reality, or not. The power being present, of what nature is the difference between one kind of judgment and the other? The difference includes a moral element. One kind of judgment is normal, the other abnormal; one is the best that can be done with the powers and opportunities that are concerned, and the other is not. But where there is power of rational judgment, there is an 'ought' between the normal and the abnormal, between the best that can be done and what is less than the best. The possession of rational powers carries with it the obligation to use them normally and in a well-regulated manner. The power of judging implies the duty to judge astruly as possible. The 'ought' is axiomatic. The obligation inheres in the constitution of personality, and is strong in exact proportion to the development of its powers.

"Further: the being who has the ability to know, to reason, and to judge, has also the power to feel, and to be inwardly moved by what he knows; and, to crown the whole, he has the power to act, and is under a natural necessity of acting. His judgments, and the feeling that attends them, will certainly be embodied in action. Here also the moral element is inevitably present, for here, even more plainly, there is an 'ought' between the normal and the abnormal. To act in view of partial judgments and unwarranted feelings is to violate the normal law of activity, and thus to be false to one's self, and do what one ought not. The power of acting on rational and worthy grounds cannot exist without the duty to act only on rational grounds and in a normal manner. In the nature of the case there is obligation to act in accordance with the truest judgments and
the worthiest feelings. Here also the 'ought' is axiomatic, being involved in the necessary relation of action to the actor.

"Thus obligation is inborn, natural to man. Duty inseparably belongs to personality, and man is a person. The ground of obligation, being imwrought to the personal constitution, will remain as long as the personal being of man continues......

"The standard of obligation for an individual at any given time is the best that is known to him; for this is the nearest possible approach, in his case, to the perfect standard....each man's standard is the best that he knows. The best that he knows is what any man ought to do, and can reasonably be required to do. Ignorance has a low standard of obligation, which is raised by every advance in knowledge...."
Appendix A.

Ethics and "Primitive" Cultures

Do "primitive cultures" deviate so markedly from practice of general moral principles as above suggested that the theory of man's moral nature and moral law would be seriously undermined?

The ethical realtivist has been quick to point to the fact that "primitives" have sometimes hunted each other's heads, eaten one another, and engaged in looser sexual customs than "civilized" peoples -- as evidence of the absence of a common moral nature of man. Speaking at this somewhat polemical level at the outset we may be reminded, of course, that such things as head-hunting were not practiced within the tribal group, nor could be, if the tribe expected to endure. Moreover, head-hunting, or cannibalism, or the freer sexual activities of primitive societies, should not necessarily qualify as standard for human conduct, when viewed from mankind's highest moral judgment -- the defender of ethical realtivity, on the score of deviating primitive customs, should remain alert to the snare of the genetic fallacy. We wish, however, to push our argument above this plane.

In a well-known work* on Samoan culture of the South Pacific the following list of Samoan life-situations and "values" appeared, which witness to the humanity of the Samoans, and specifically to validity of a number of our preceeding principles:

jealousy
sorrow
longing for kindness and respect
pregnancy and child bearing
joy, pride in parenthood and family
coercive discipline of the very young
cooperation
individual responsibility
personal industry and artistry
rewards and promotion
pride in achievement, interest in distinction
ambition

*Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, The New American Library, Mentor Book 1949
concern with occupation
sense of permanent and fixed value
taboo of incest
respect for personality
desire for possessions, especially when fruit of one's labor
woman's longing for help and protection of mate
respect for marriage vows (at least in terms of admitted "brittle" or causal Samoan standards)
monogamous ideal
prestige of female virginity at marriage, (especially with "noble" class)
importance of alleviation of anger
dislike of aggressiveness in others
truth and reliability stressed
intelligence and industriousness praised
radical promiscuity censured
generosity
opposition to theft
sense of property and possession
importance of love and friendship

In reference to the basic human desire for friendship and love --
our fourth principle above, and reflected again in the ninth -- the study just cited referred to the case of a little Samoan girl, who by Samoan standards would be called a deviate from her own cultural or social norm. The author of this study wrote the following description in the case of "Mala", whose parents were dead and who was living in a foster home:

"None showed Mala any affection, and they worked her unmercifully...from her early childhood she had been branded as a thief, a dangerous charge in a country where there are no doors or locks, and houses are left empty for a day at a time...She stole; she lied... Probably she will...sink lower and lower in the village esteem and especially in the opinion of her own sex from whom she so passionately desires recognition and affection.

Speaking of another, similar case, in addition to Mala's, our author concluded about both girls:

"Lola and Mala both seemed to be the victims of lack of affection. They both had unusual capacity for devotion and were abnormally liable to become jealous. Both responded with pathetic swiftness to any manifestations of affection. At one end of the scale in their need for affection, they were unfortunately placed at the other end in their chance of receiving it."

Op. cit. p. 120-21
Strikingly illustrative of the "primitive" mind's capacity for admiring unselfishness and love, and also indicative of its ultimate desire for education and enlightenment, and for fair play and justice, is the following remarkable account. It is taken from the records of a noteworthy, contemporary linguistic missions to South American Aborigines. The following reports are in reference to the work of concerned people who, under the leadership and organization of Mr. William Townsend's Summer Institute of Linguistics, have labored to teach Peruvian headhunting tribes how to read and write.

"...the Shapras, vicious killers and head-hunters, were among the most feared of Peruvian tribes. Their chief, Tariri, had attained leadership by the simple device of slaying his predecessor in cold blood, then daring any warrior to dispute his authority. Then one day in 1950 Loretta Anderson, with her first co-worker, Doris Cox, paddled up to his village in a dugout canoe. Climbing the river bank, between rows of glowering tribesmen momentarily immobilized by such audacity, the two slender white girls faced the chief. Using a few Shapra words picked up from a trader downriver, plus sign language, they told him they had come to live among his people and study their language.

"Tariri stared at the two girls in long silence. Then he crisply ordered that they be assigned a hut, with a couple of older Indian women to help them with whatever they were after. Years later he confided to Townsend, organizer of the mission, 'If you had sent reen, we would have killed them on sight. Or if a couple, I'd have killed the man and taken the woman for myself. But what could a great chief do with two harmless girls who insisted on calling him brother?'...

"Abruptly one day Chief Tariri joined a little group the girls were teaching. He stood, frowning, as the lesson went on. After hearing the first Scripture verse translated into his own language, he broke in to ask that it be repeated again and again. Finally, he exclaimed, "My heart understands with a leap!"

"To Doris and Loretta he said, 'When you came, I did not understand why. Now I know. What you are doing makes my people happier and better able to care for themselves...'"

"I like this white girls' God', he said. 'He has brought us many good things. I'm going to stop worshipping the boa'.

*Clarence W. Hall in Reader's Digest Feature Condensation "Two Thousand Tongues To God", August 1959, p. 202, 204, 213. Published Harper & Bros., under the title Adventurers for God, 1959
"In the following months, Doris and Loretta were convinced that Tariri was indeed changed. Not only did he put aside snake worship, but, one by one, without being asked to, he shrugged off witch-doctor practices; outlawed murder, abolished head-hunting..."

"...Throughout Peru's Amazonia, Shironkama is acknowledged as one of the most powerful and, until recently, one of the most feared of the tribal headsmen..."

"Since his conversion three years ago, the chief's rigid rule for his large tribe has been: 'No more killings; no more drunken feasts; no more raids on other tribes for women'...

"Only later did the Wayne Snells (SIL workers with the Machiguengas) learn why Shironkama wanted education for his people. For years his Machiguengas had been victims of a white patron who cheated them blind in trades, worked them for such pittance pay as one fishhook for a whole barrel of rice, indentured them with debt. When the Machiguengas, weary of such treatment, began staying away, the patron called in Shironkama, told him he would have to force his people to work out their debts, gave the chief a gun, saying, 'If they won't work, shoot them!' The chief took the gun, shot two of the patron's henchmen instead. 'The patron will not make you his slaves again', he told his people. 'You are free.'

"Chief Shironkama told me, with Snell interpreting: 'From such white men as the patron, I learned that men who had power read books. I reasoned that, if one is to avoid being cheated or enslaved, he too must have the knowledge that books give. I wanted that knowledge for myself and my people'..."*

* The report continues: "Townsend's aim of 'not taking the Indian out of the jungle but taking the jungle out of the Indian' sounds good -- to all save those with romantic notions about primitive peoples' bliss in their native state. One day, after a large audience had been told about his work, a hearer arose to bait him with the familiar canard: 'You missionaries make me sick! Why force civilization on people so unspoiled and happy? Why not leave 'em along!'

"Townsend replied laughing, 'I think, my friend, you've been no closer to jungle Indians than the movies. If you could sit down with them as I have, and hear them tell in their own tongues the woes that haunt them through witchcraft, superstition, fear and strife; listen to mothers tell of being forced to strangle their newborn babies because of some evil omen; see old folks being abandoned to die because they had become a burden; or sense the hatred bred in them by generations of white men who took advantage of their ignorance to exploit them, steal their lands, ravage their women and ruthlessly shoot them down -- well, the, my friend, you just might change your mind about Indians as quaint people living lives of idyllic happiness'".
We shall refer to one further example from a primitive culture -- the one often cited as illustrating a total inversion of moral values -- the Dobus of the New Guinea Archipelago. The following evaluation rests on material presented by R. F. Fortune in his well-known and authoritative study, Sorcerers of Dobu.*

The primary, sociological facts of the Dobuans are the following:

1. Their principle of inheritance of property through a brother-sister unit, composed of a man, his sister, and his sister's children, and called the "susu" ("mother's milk"). The children of any male member of the susu must marry out of it. A village is composed of several susu groups. Ownership and inheritance of garden plots and fruit palm groves is by susus, not by biological families. The newcomers of a village are termed "those resulting from marriage"; i.e. "strangers". 2. The second basic fact is the obsession with sorcery -- or belief in the power of effecting ill on one's neighbors by magical means. We shall analyze the Dobuan society, from such facts and insights as we gather from Fortune's work, in terms of four of our primary "moral laws" presented on page -- the desire for truth, the desire for justice, and instinct of possession and property, and briefly, marriage customs.

The Dobuan desire for truth is illustrated by the obsession with sorcery itself. The sorcery formulas and techniques are the sum of knowledge or truth to these people. They seek "knowledge" of sorcery above all else because it allegedly gives them power over their neighbors. Fortune describes how the Dobuans learn the incantations and witchcraft in a most assiduous manner and guard this inherited knowledge with extreme secrecy as the most cherished private possession. *E.P. Dutton, 1932
indicated that, at the core of their society, i.e. between close kindred, the Dobuans found it necessary to practice truth in its positive sense as trust or trustfulness, to be non-deceitful or reliable, whereas it was admitted that these virtues were disregarded in dealings with people who were remote to the inner circle of kin.

The desire for justice was illustrated by the account of a pig mistakenly killed for a wild hog by two men. The owner of the pig demanded remuneration from the two concerned, and threatened them with sorcery if they did not make payment! Payment was made. The following quotation suggests how sorcery is used in a kind of "positive" way to bring truth to light and secure justice. The method here refers to a "judicial" use of divination by water-gazing or crystal-gazing in order to find out who the afflicter of a disease may be.

"The diviner summons the village, a member of which he has 'seen' in his water-gazing. The person divined is charged with the deed by the diviner. Then follows a promise of a cessation of enmity and of active black magic by the witch or the sorcerer charged, provided he or his just complaint against the patient is remedied by the patient immediately. The patient pays the black magician and the diviner, and recovers -- unless unreemed grudges undivined as yet still exist elsewhere."* *

Possessions and property customs indicated the basic human desire for these things. Fortune noted that there was assiduous guarding of the fruit-bearing trees (betel nut and coconut palms) from theft. The technique was to hang charms on the trees that would inflict disease on would-be thieves.

"Property is best safeguarded by watching over it. The garden is protected in this manner. An actual garden thief is most heartily despised -- that is, one that is caught in the act. It is believed that yams can be enticed out of one man's garden into another man's by the latter's magic. Everyone, the most respectable included, practiced magic to steal the crops of other person's gardens in this way."**

*Op. Cit. p. 155
** Ib. p. 83
Marriage customs and problems illustrate the basic human desire for and to keep mates. The Dobuans attempt monogamous marriage but find the relationship brittle, fraught with jealousy, suspicion, and unhappiness. Fortune indicated that there were constant arguments and divorces over sexual infidelity.

"Jealousy and suspicion of adultery are sentiments of great and abnormal growth in Dobuan married life...the only safeguard of fidelity in marriage is constant private vigilance by all concerned, and otherwise good treatment of a wife by a husband." *

"Theft and adultery are spoken of as admired virtues if one can evade detection and accomplish them successfully." **

Relative to this last quotation, the "if" appears here to be the all important point, suggesting a basic human conscience at work trying to lift the society to a higher moral plane. Relative to marriage customs Fortune concludes that "despite the premium on unfaithfulness and its counterpart, jealousy, there are some marriages that are happily contracted and happily preserved." ***

We conclude our examination of Dobu culture with the following discussion from Fortune's study to illustrate what moral life was like in terms of fear and suspicion, arising from the obsession with sorcery.

"Disease and modes of death that are indigenous are well known and catalogued by the native. Their production and infliction upon near neighbours is one of the customary occupations of the people. Underneath the surface of native life there is a constant silent war, a small circle of close kindred alone placing trust in one another, a thorough absence of trust in neighbours and the practice of treachery beneath a show of friendliness. Every person goes in fear of the secret war, and on frequent occasion the fear breaks through the surface. The whole life of the people is strongly coloured by

"A man imitates the effects of a cruel disease with obvious enjoyment in his believed power of inflicting it on his neighbour, telling with eclat how his incantation may be placed on a pregnant woman and how it will kill the child within her, and bring about her end in torture, imitating her struggles and her groans in convulsion on the ground, or shrieking in convulsion as he illustrates the agonies of a disease that eats away the skin and leaves a deformity of such a red mass of streaming and streaked jelly where was once a human face, as I saw at least twice, and could scarcely look at as the man tried to turn his head away, is a vile enough object. This debonair and faithful imitation of the

***Ib. p. 78
worst effects of disease or death is the ordinary procedure adopted in the teaching of black magic. It illustrates what can be done with the incantation; it is done with fidelity, and with satisfied conviction of the power to produce such effects and of having produced them on previous occasions. The natives followed their customary procedure in giving me secret knowledge. Thus a man giving me a simple for curing a disease would always chew and swallow some of it in my sight, and call my attention to his doing it. The fact behind this is that treacherous poisoning is a common enough custom. A native will never accept food except from a few people that he knows and trusts, people who accept his food.”

“To sum up, the black art is used not only for collecting bad debts and enforcing economic obligation, in vendetta to avenge one's own sickness or one's kinsman's death, to wipe out any serious insult offered to one, and for the sake of 'trying it out' to see how it works. It is also used generally 'to cast down the mighty from their seats', There is great resentment of any conspicuously successful man in Dobu".

As we look at this culture as a whole we have observed that sorcery is a mode of securing justice, of self-protection, and self-preservation, by a technique of threatening and seeking revenge. Thus the basic law of lex talionis -- a primitive, but positive mode of justice -- is the principle of Dobuan ethics. And, accordingly, the value of personality and respect for personality are present, though dimly and primitively, to this society.

In the evaluation of this writer, Fortune's study indicates the covert presence of respect for personality, as a principle which the Dobuans cannot entirely disregard.

"Outwardly there is great respect for personality springing directly from the fear of hostile sorcery or witchcraft. But secretly there is a covert desire to do the worst by neighbours, springing also from the fear of their sorcery or witchcraft. Thus outward respect goes with as much as can be done in ill turns without detection."

We conclude that the Dobuans illustrate, not only the basic human sense of the value and necessity of personality in a positive way, at least, in the case of one's self and one's immediate kinsmen and friends (a number of times suggested in our source); but, in a negative way, they demonstrate what

**Ib. p. 176
***Ib. p. 78
happens to a society when respect does not go farther, to embrace the stranger and those not near; what happens, when, in fact, respect is substituted by the power of fear and hatred and by the desire to gain an advantage at your neighbor's expense — often a very frightful expense.
The priority of moral reason was stated classically by Kant in the following quotation:

"...no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such apodictic laws...how could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the determination of the will of rational beings generally, and for us only as such, if they were merely empirical, and did not take their origin wholly a priori from pure practical reason?

"Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to serve as an original example..."

But by affirming that moral reason has an absolute validity over and above "experience", ethical idealism does not mean to say that moral truth and insight are totally without connection in experience, floating around in a mystic region beyond life and reality. Moral idealism has been criticized as if this were meant.

May we not, to considerable extent, resolve the tension between ethical empiricism or naturalism and ethical rationalism or idealism in the following way? Empiricism says that ethical truth is learned, by "experience"; idealism has claimed that it is given, interiorly. At least on the plane of the practical interests of both approaches, as we ask the question, What is the relation of moral law to experience, How does the awareness of moral truth a priori relate to social life? -- the following insights may guide us:

1. Man comes to knowledge of moral law through social experience, in the course of personal growth and education; this insight recognized the importance of the teaching factor, of the authority of elders, of the forces by which social institutions discipline us, and the influence of past generations.

Kant, Selections, Op Cit. p. 286-7
2. But when we come to full rational maturity, we can see the "sense" of these truths, that is to say, "rationally" (i.e. a priori: Kant), as founded in the moral being. Man's social experience is such because he is a being of a certain kind. His social experience is founded in his being or nature. On what are the value judgments of ethics based? Our reply is, they flow from some standard "above" or "deeper than" physical nature in the gross or brutal sense, and deeper than social custom. This higher range or source of ethics lies in the nature of man himself as individuality and self-conscious personality.

What, for example, of the problem of the relation of the White man to the Black man, so agitating our country, and South Africa today? How are we to draw up some rule which will govern their relationship? Obviously we have to rise above the historical and social experience of the past and look into the nature of man himself, for our inspiration, into his self-conscious individuality or personality and its metaphysical freedom. The Negro must be freed because man is free. Kant was right, in our view, in affirming that there are metaphysical foundations of morals, transcendent to society, logically prior to "experience" and rooted in "human nature", in man as a transcendent personal and rational being.

Knowledge of the laws of morality, relating life to life, may be initially awakened by experience, but they come ultimately to be recognized or discovered in the nature of man's being, which founds his experience, or makes his experience what it is. In sum, the ultimate validity of the laws are discovered or found in reason, which is awakened by experience; experience may further test and verify them. In a different context, speaking of ontological concepts, Tillich meant something similar to what we have just here tried to say relative to moral concepts. He wrote that "A priori does not mean that ontological concepts are known prior to experience. They should not be attacked as if this were meant.
On the contrary, they are products of a critical analysis of experience. So with moral concepts: they are products of a critical, that is, a rational analysis of experience, which possesses its character by virtue of the rational nature of man.

*Systematic Theology, Vol. I. Chicago Univ. Press, p. 166
1951
4. The Argument from Knowledge and the Idea of Truth

Sometimes called the Epistemological Argument, and also the Ontological Argument. The epistemological and the ontological are forms of the argument from Truth. (In a later section we discuss Descartes's classic expression of the "ontological argument", and a modern adaptation of it in the thought of William Ernest Hocking. In the meanwhile we commence with what we believe to be the most general reference to this type of argument in the idea of truth.) Again we cite William Newton Clarke for his succinct statement of the main idea of the argument from knowledge and truth, as "the discovery of Mind in the universe through the intelligibility of the universe to us" (Clarke op cit. p. 105). Otherwise stated this is the argument from the rationality of the universe, or through the presence and objectivity of Truth in the universe. Like many of our preceding arguments it has two facets, an initial empirical front and an a prior depth.

1. On the empirical side the argument notes that "...we find ourselves able to understand the structure and order of things around us" (Clarke 106). Man discovers the geometrical structure of planetary orbits and motions, and on the basis of this knowledge predicted the existence of Neptune and Pluto before these outermost planets were empirically discovered. He observes and formulates many of the basic physical laws of nature as precise mathematical ratios, $F = \frac{KmM}{d^2}$, $E = mc^2$, etc. On the basis of his study of gravitation and mass, as he reformulated and extended Newton's original work, Einstein predicted that light would be bent in a gravitational field, a phenomenon subsequently observed to be the case. He finds the elements of nature in rational order and system as to properties of atomic weight. By the study of the periodic table of the elements Helium was predicted as an element that must exist to fill the place in the table for the atomic weight 4.002. It
was eventually discovered spectroscopically in the sun's atmosphere. There is seeming rational order and purpose in much organic process and in the evolution of life as a whole. Knowledge of Mendel's laws of inheritance makes heredity predictions possible. When Tycho first discovered the elliptical nature of the planetary orbits, and that they swept over equal ares in equal times, he exclaimed that he "was thinking God's thoughts after Him". Rational law seems objective. Does this not suggest a cosmic Reason or Intellect in or behind nature? Sir James Jeans, the late British astronomer, called God the Great Mathematician. Impressed by the mathematical rationality of nature's basic structures, Einstein exclaimed that God never throws dice. Once more Clarke states the conclusion of the argument in its general empirical mood: "Ability to trust our own powers in knowing things around us implies that the structure and actions of our minds corresponds to the structure and method of things around us" (p. 106).

2. On its a priori side the argument becomes in depth that for "Absolute Truth" which "points to an absolute Mind as its source and foundation" (Harkness CRT 72). We here summarize two arguments for the idea of Absolute Truth that have become classic, an early medieval and/or contemporary.

In Book II of his essay On the Freedom of the Will, St. Augustine defined God in fundamental way as whatever is greater, or higher than, man's mind, and then endeavored to show that "truth" itself fills this definition and must be God. What Augustine meant was that in the truth experience we perceive an objective reality and power that could only be classified by the highest term known to philosophy, God. The point of his argument was that truth is commonly known --/"seen" - with the "eye" of the mind or intellect, by all and sundry who will pay attention to right
reasoning. That truth is commonly known suggests its objective source -- its metaphysical objectivity and reality. We can all see and know the ranges of scientific truth commonly, and when we think deeply about it the ranges of moral truth commonly. Truth, accordingly, seems to be that which is higher or greater than man's mind; any one finite human mind. It seems inclusive of all finite minds, and our experience of coming into knowledge seems like a discovery to us, the exploration of a great realm that was there prior to our individual knowledge of it, and which existed always. We quote Augustine's discussion presently so that the reader may share not only in the beauty of the expression but in the original depth of insight of this particular argument. What was wonderfully adumbrated in the original Platonic philosophy St. Augustine puts into a systematic argument for God that seems to state in ultimate fashion the possibilities of the rational argument.

In his noted essay, The Possibility of Error, Josiah Royce, late American idealist philosopher, approaches the problem by asking the question, "How is intellectual error possible?" How do I know that I err sometimes in judgment, as a common fact of intellectual life? Royce replies, Only because I have an (a priori) awareness of greater, more perfect, or more inclusive truth, against which I test my error. Or another way to put it is to say that the partial and incomplete nature of our present knowledge suggests the more perfect "Absolute Truth". Our present knowledge of the world is partial; for example, our knowledge of the cause and cure of cancer. There is the ultimate truth about cancer that awaits our discovery, and so with all other aspects of our present incomplete knowledge of things. The incompleteness of our knowledge and our imperfect awareness of truth intimates completed knowledge and absolute truth.
A related argument from Royce, pointing to the existence of Absolute Mind, concerns the problem of the world's ultimate unity or non-unity, and closely relates the epistemological and the cosmological arguments at the level discussed on pages 399-400. Royce in his Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*, invites us to study the issue in terms of a negative proposition (to show the absurdity of the opposite proposition is sometimes a helpful way to clarify an argument). Let us assume, he suggests, contrary to "unity", that there is diversity, sundering, and non-relationship, either absolute or partial, among the elements, objects, and phenomena of our world. But in the attempt to assume diversity and non-unity is implied all along the knowledge as to why the universe is alleged to be non-unified, either totally or in part. Such knowledge is precisely the intimation, he believes, of the wider Absolute Knowledge or Truth that embraces the whole, and renders ultimate diversity impossible, and the philosophical pluralisms based on such an hypothesis contradictory. This a priori exercise, Royce believes, in addition to ruling out the supposition that the world is non-unified, establishes the fact that it is unified in a certain way, namely, in terms of the idealist's concept of an ultimate spiritual or mental unity. Not only formal unity is found, but the quality of such unity in Absolute or Cosmic Mind. (*VI, Vol. I, p. 399-400*).

Georgia Harkness concludes the general idealist argument from truth in these words: "With the assurance that truth rests on something solid in the nature of things, and with a dependable criterion of truth [coherence], we may also look with confidence to a dependable cosmic foundation of the whole structure of reality and truth" (*CRT* p. 72). We are now prepared to quote Augustine's and Royce's classic statements of the argument from truth.
Both men discuss the argument in its a priori depth. As the modern Christian idealist philosopher, Josiah Royce, approached the problem from the logical and existential standpoint of our human experience of intellectual error, or the "possibility of error" as he phrased it, the ancient Christian philosopher, St. Augustine, approached the problem from the positive side, the argument from end the presentation of sources by citing Clarke's which we may describe as/the possibility of truth. We will then full summary of the epistemological argument in its general empirical mood. Following these sources we will discuss major premises of the argument from truth, and conclude our chapter with several appendices that discuss other classic forms of the argument (namely, the "ontological") and re-ognize a number of problems related to this manner of thought.
St. Augustine on the Argument from Truth

(In his Book II of the essay On the Freedom of the Will St. Augustine, whose great achievement philosophically was to personalize Platonic idealism in terms of the Hebrew-Christian idea of God as Personal Being, presents the argument for Absolute Truth, or Absolute Mind, which is God. Augustine's presentation is a basic a priori argument for God, conceived as a Mind higher and more inclusive than our own. It is a culminating argument to which all of the preceding arguments may lead. For Augustine "Truth" is the highest symbol of the ultimate or the divine, or rather the intimate presence of God streaming into the mind as light from "above". From Selections from Medieval Philosophers, vol. I, ed. McKean, Scribners, 1929, p. 234).

"Wherefore consider, I pray you, whether you can find in the nature of man something more sublime than reason. ...if we could find something which you not only do not doubt to be, but also to be more excellent than our reason itself, will you hesitate to call that, whatever it is, God?

"...If you did not find that there was anything above our reason except what is eternal and immutable, would you hesitate to call that God? For you know that bodies are mutable, and it is clear that the very life by which the body is animated does not lack mutability in various states; and reason itself is surely shown to be mutable, since it sometimes attempts to arrive at truth and sometimes does not attempt to, and sometimes arrives and sometimes does not. It may be granted that if reason with the aid of no instrument of the body, not by touch, nor by taste, nor by smell, nor by ears, nor by eyes, nor by any other sense inferior to it, but by itself, discerns something eternal and immutable and at the same time discerns itself inferior to it, that must be its God.

"I will readily grant that that is God than which nothing is known to be superior.
Wherefore whether there be something above or not, it will be manifest that God is, since I shall have shown, with his aid, that which I promised, that there is something above reason.

(At this place Augustine argues that mathematical—and moral truth is absolute and "immutable", that is, metaphysically objective and transcendent to the human mind, because commonly known or perceived by all such rational minds, and concludes in the following memorable passages:)

"Just as, therefore, there are true and immutable rules of numbers, the reason and the truth of which you said are present immutable and in common to all who see them, so there are true and immutable rules of wisdom, which, you replied a moment ago when you were questioned concerning a few of them one by one, are true and manifest, and you concede that they are present in common to be contemplated by all who are able to consider them.

"There is a single and immutable truth in all understandings and it is superior to our mind.

"Wherefore you would certainly not deny that there is an immutable truth, containing all these things which are immutably true, which you can not say is yours or mine or any one man's but is present and proffers itself in common to all who discern immutable truths, as a secret and public light in wondrous ways: but who would say that all that which is present in common to every one who reasons and understands, pertains properly to the nature of any of them? For you remember, I suppose, what was gone over a little while ago in relation to the senses of the body: namely that those things which we touch in common by the senses of the eyes or the ears, such as colors and sounds, which I and you see at the same time, or hear at the same time, do not pertain to the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common to us to be perceived. So too, therefore, you would never say that those things which I and you each with his own mind perceive in common, pertain to the nature of the mind of either one of us. For you can not say that what the eyes of two people see at the same time, is the eyes of
this one or of the other one, but a third something to which the glance of both is turned.

"Do you think then that this truth of which we have been speaking for a long time now and in which, though it is single, we see so many things, do you think it is more excellent than our mind is, or equal to our mind, or else inferior? But if it were inferior we should judge, not according to it, but of it, just as we judge of bodies because they are lower, and we say commonly not only that they are so and not so, but that they ought to be so and not so: so too in regard to our mind, we know not only that the mind is so, but frequently too that it ought to be so. And we judge thus of bodies when we say, it is less white than it should have been, or less square, and many others similarly; moreover, we say of minds, It is less apt than it should be, or less smooth, or less vehement, according as the nature of our customs may have disclosed. And we judge these things according to those interior rules of truth which we discern in common: of them on the other hand no one in any manner judges. For although one would say that eternal are greater than temporal things, or that seven and three are ten, no one says that they should have been thus, but knowing them only to be so, one does not correct as an examiner but only rejoices as a discoverer. If, however, this truth of equals were in our minds, it too would be mutable. For our minds sometimes see it more, sometimes less, and by this they show themselves to be mutable; whereas, it, continuing in itself, neither advances when it is seen by us more, nor grows less when it is seen less, but whole and uncorrupted it rejoices those who are turned to the light and punishes those who are turned away in blindness. Why is it that we judge of our minds themselves according to it, when we can in no way judge of it? For we say of the mind, It understands less than it should, or it understands as much as it should. The amount, however, that a mind ought to understand is according as
Has been able to be moved more near to, and to inhere in, the immutable truth. Wherefore if the truth is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that it be superior and more excellent.

"Moreover, I had promised, if you remember, that I should demonstrate to you that there is something which is more sublime than our mind and reason. Behold it is truth itself: embrace it if you can, and enjoy it, and delight in the Lord, and he will give you the desires of your heart. What more, in deed, do you seek than that you be happy? And who is more happy than he who enjoys the unshaken and immutable and most excellent truth? and have we feared to place the happy life in the light of truth?

"By all means, since the supreme good is known and secured in truth, and since that truth is wisdom, let us see the supreme good in truth, and let us secure and enjoy it. He is surely happy who enjoys the supreme good....so the keen and vigorous perception of the mind when it has gazed with sure reason on many true and immutable things, directs itself to that truth itself by which all things are shown forth, and inhering in it, as it were, forgets other things, and at once in it enjoys them all... This is our freedom when we are subjected to this truth: and it itself is our God.

"...That beauty of truth and wisdom, so long as there is a perservering will to enjoy it, does not shut off those who come in a crowded multitude of hearers, nor does it move along in time, nor does it migrate in space, nor is it interrupted by night, nor is it blocked off by shadows, nor does it fall under the senses of the body. Of all the world it is nearest to all those turned toward it who enjoy it, it is eternal to all; it is in no place, it is never away; it admonishes abroad, it teaches within; it changes all who see it to the better, it is changed by none to worse; no one judges of it, no one judges well without it. And it is thereby clear that truth is without doubt more excellent than our minds, which are each made wise by it alone; and of it you may not judge but by it you may judge of others."
"The conditions that determine the logical possibility of error must themselves be absolute truth....

\"We have not the shadow of doubt ourselves about the possibility of error. That is the steadfast rock on which we build.

\"...Common sense will readily admit that if a statement is erroneous, it must appear erroneous to every 'right mind' that is in possession of the facts. Either then there is no error, or else judgments are true or false only in reference to a higher inclusive thought, which they presuppose, and which must, in the last analysis, be assumed as Infinite and all-inclusive. This result we shall reach by no mystical insight, by no revelation, nor yet by a mere postulate such as we used in former discussions, but by a simple dry analysis of the meaning of our own thought.

\"And to sum up, let us overcome all our difficulties by declaring that all the many Beyonds, which single significant judgments seem vaguely and separately to postulate, are present as fully realized intended objects to the unity of an all-inclusive, absolutely clear, universal, and conscious thought, of which all judgments, true or false, are but fragments, the whole being at once Absolute Truth and Absolute Knowledge. Then all our puzzles will disappear at the stroke, and error will be possible, because any one finite thought, viewed in relation to its own intent, may or may not be seen by this higher thought as successful and adequate in this intent.

\"In short, error becomes possible as one moment or element in a higher truth, that is, in a consciousness that makes error a part of itself, while recognizing it as error...Either there is no such thing as error,...or else there is an infinite unity of conscious thought to which is present all possible truth.
Without it there is for our view no truth or error conceivable. The words, This is true, or This is false, mean nothing, we declare, unless there is the inclusive thought for which the truth is true, the falsehood false. No blearly possible judge, who would see the error if he were there, will do for us. He must be there, this judge, to constitute the error. Without him nothing but total subjectivity would be possible; and thought would then become purely a pathological phenomenon, an occurrence without truthfulness or falsity, an occurrence that would interest anybody if it could be observed; but that, unfortunately, being only a momentary phantom, could not be observed at all from without, but must be simply felt from within. Our thought needs the Infinite Thought in order that it may get, through this Infinite judge, the privilege of being so much as even an error.

"... There is no stopping-place short of an Infinite Thought. The possibilities of error are infinite. Infinite then must be the inclusive thought.

"All reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought.

"...Here we have found something that abides, and waxes not old, something in which there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. No power it is to be resisted, no plan-maker to be foiled by fallen angels, nothing finite, nothing striving, seeking, losing, altering, growing weary; the All-Enfolder it is, and we know its name. Not Heart, nor Love, though these also are in it and of it; Thought it is, and all things are from thought, and in it we live and move".

William Newton Clarke on the Argument from Knowledge

"The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the intelligibleness of the universe to us.....

"The practice of trusting our own powers extends very far, and leads to large results. It leads to diligent and continuous study; and the consequence is that we find ourselves able to understand the structure and order of things

*Outline of Christian Theology, p. 105f
around us... We find that we can discover and systematize the chemistry of all the worlds; we are able to trace and formulate the laws of universal motion; to discern the principles of mathematics that run through the universe; to trace out the vast system of classification that prevails throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms; to explore times and places most remote, and understand what lies far beyond our experience. In all this process of knowing -- to the possibilities of which no limits can be set -- we are sure that our powers are to be trusted.....

"...Ability to trust our own powers in knowing things around us implies that the structure and action of our minds corresponds to the structure and method of things around us. To say that our powers of observation and reasoning are trustworthy is to say that the existing order is an order that we understand. It is the same as saying that one rational method is common to our minds and the world that we observe...A rational mind can understand only what is rational. But we are compelled for the very purpose of life to assume that we are capable of understanding the universe, and by experiment we find our assumption confirmed as correct; therefore there must be one rational order in the universe and in us.

"But this is only another way of saying that the universe is ordered by a rational Mind, to which our minds are similar. We understand the universe because it is pervaded by a rational order, and a rational order could be given it only by a rational Mind. Since we can understand the universe, there must be in the universe a Mind similar to our own... The assumption of a rational order in the universe is one of the necessities of thought, and this assumption implies a rational Mind in the universe. Without this assumption not even the most rudimentary thinking is possible; and all thinking, from lowest to highest, confirms the kinship thus discovered between our minds and the Mind of the world.....Without such kinship, science would be impossible; and the vaster and richer our knowledge of the universe, the more solid is the certainty that we and the
universe are alike, the universe bearing the impress of a Mind like ours.

Eternal Being is intelligent.

"This is an argument that cannot be easily overthrown. The intelligibleness of the universe to us is strong and ever-present evidence that there is an all-pervading rational Mind, from which the universe received its character..."
Problems of the argument from knowledge and truth, major criticisms, and replies.

(1) Considering first the general empirical level of the argument as set forth so well by Clarke, the fundamental objection might be raised that the argument rests on the premise that the objective world is a "rational order", that is, an order subject to rational analysis -- but is this premise true? How far can such a proposition be sustained when we examine nature's so-called "laws" and processes closely? Does the world conform to "law"? Are there not many incoherences, disconnections, ineptness in process, abortive events, conflicts and "evils" that belie the thesis that nature is throughout an orderly or rational process? Another way to state the criticism is to ask, is it not possible that man's "rational mind" imposes its own "order" or system upon nature as he studies her, implying order out there for his practical purposes, when actually there may not be such order -- or at least the degree or extent of order he alleges -- within the helter-skelter of nature's motions and masses? Is not man's science and morality an arbitrary kind of human legislation? Clarke himself states such a criticism forcefully:

"It is sometimes said...that this finding of a Mind in the universe means simply that man projects his own mental processes into things around him, and reads in the universe the likeness of himself....It has sometimes been suggested that there is nothing strange in man's understanding the universe, since he belongs to it and is part and parcel of its method. There is no need of a mind in the universe to render it intelligible to man, since man, who is a product of the system, has the same qualities with it, and might naturally be expected to understand it".

In reply it may be said that the crucial point of this level of the discussion is the balance of seeming "order" to "disorder" or lack of order in nature. Do not the critics overstate the case for nature's disorder?
If nature were fundamentally "disorderly", or "irrational", how, as Clarke asks, could man ever know her at all? Or if man merely imposes order, how is he ever sure that this imposition of rational structure is a correct one, or even an approximately correct one? How is he ever certain of any of his scientific judgments? The possibility of knowledge assumes order out there. Further the empirical test is that there is much order, indeed vast reaches of order and seeming "rational" connectedness objectively in the universe. Further, to say that man knows the system simply because he is a product of the system is to assume rationality at the outset within the system. The world brought forth man as its product; one of man's highest attributes is his rationality or desire for rational experience; man's main desire is "to know", that is to say, rationally to understand the system. Again at this place we may well permit Clarke to conclude his discussion. The following comment points out the difficulty of a philosophy that would, in some extreme way, deny objective order or rationality to the universe.

"...This explanation does not account for the facts. Man studies out the nature of an ellipse, and then discovers that the planets move in ellipses. For the fact that the planets stand the tests that prove their orbits to be elliptical, man certainly is not responsible. This is not a mere finding of himself in the universe. He could not mathematically demonstrate elliptical orbits from the movements of the heavenly bodies if they were not there. Man is discoverer, not creator, and the universe bears witness to another Mind than his....

"Why should there be any such thing as understanding the universe? Who proposed that the universe should be understood? If the order from which man came forth is mindless, what is there in it to give any guaranty or suggestion of understanding? What is there in such an order to bring forth a being who can think of that which has produced him? If there is no understanding mind in the premises, whence comes understanding mind in the conclusion?...If there was no mind in the universe before man, two wonderful things happened. Man a part and product of the system, grow up greater than that which had produced him, with a power of understanding that had never
been put into the world by any mind or power whatever, and had
never been thought at all until he discovered them..." (OCT p. 108-9)

Admitting many gaps in our human knowledge of the world and some seeming
incoherency and disorder or "evil" in natural process, a cautious but posi­tive conclusion to this stage of our problem would be to say that on the
whole nature exhibits "reasonableness", or knowable form and order. In­deed, nature exhibits such an extensive degree of knowable connectedness
that the argument from knowledge in its empirical mood has surely a general
validity. The general facts are that nature presents us with regularity
of succession throughout much of her observable field; and that men formu­late descriptive symbols and concepts for her processes. These seem, at
least, tentatively right, as our best approximations to what she really is,
or may be, within her own depth of being. Our scientific approximations,
which we call "natural laws", are not entirely wrong or irrelevant (though	sometimes they are found to be so and must be changed); rather many of them
are almost right, are nearly and virtually adequate correspondences. And
we may advance confidently in our scientific discovery of "nature's laws",
believing that our own understanding of them may approximate more and more
to her own inner workings. Error is possible to a degree, in which the
scientific symbol does not exactly correspond to the event. This of course,
necessitates science's constant reexamination of her hypotheses, and the
reformulation of them as further discovery demands. The possibility of
reformulation implies an ultimate inherent rationality, or knowability of
the world, on the basis of which an understanding of the need for reformu­lation arises, and a successful reformulation may proceed.

What present-day science means by "laws of nature" and her "ration­al­ity", is her general reasonableness and general knowability. This does
not imply that the universe is a rigidly fixed, mathematical-like structure throughout, as a narrow or frozen type "rationalism" might conceive her, as, for example, Spinoza seemed to do. Living beings, growth, evolution, natural experiments with novel form, striving, conflict of forces, and some defeats along the way; plasticity, maleability, a degree of yet unformed structuredness, real freedom and indeterminacy are as rationally necessary to our kind of world, devoted to the coming to be of creatures of finite freedom with real alternative destinies or histories, as any factors could possibly be. The rationality of the universe does not mean that she is an imobile mathematical grid-work, but that she is process and history with all the wonderful possibilities, as well as the dangers and frustrations, of a real history. Is it not something like this that a circumspect science and philosophy would mean by the total "rationality" of the world? Nothing in this broader concept of her rationality -- which gives reign to certain looseness and freeplay of parts -- is contradictory to the argument for God from knowledge or truth, or to the general law of sufficient reason which an open rationalism uses in its exploration of reality. The universe's very her dynamism, plasticity and looseness of process, her coherence, is her ultimate "rationality" -- for because of this, change of form, development toward forms of greater complexity and thereby inherent greater capacity, are possible, and have proved to be (at least on the surface of one planet that we know about) the actual fact requisite to the coming to be of finite forms of spiritual personhood, which defines the creative work of God.

(2) Another major problem of the argument from truth, particularly at that level expounded by Augustine or Royce, is the implication that truth judgments have a standard, or point to a standard "beyond" material relationships. Seizing upon this premise critics might raise the objection
that objective material relationships themselves, rather than Augustine's or Royce's All-inclusive Absolute Truth or Mind, are the standard of our truth judgments. Let us endeavor to reply to this kind of criticism at several stages.

First we would charge the critic to define what he means by "material relationships", alleged to be apart from, or other than, relationship in idea -- we would call his attention to the dogmatic dualism lying covert in his criticism. The argument for God from truth does not mean that there is a radical dualism between truth judgments or truly connected ideas, on the one hand, and "material relationships" on the other, as the criticism seems to imply. Our reply to the criticism based on the first premise just studied indicated that, according to the argument from knowledge, truth judgments or true ideas are reflected in material relationships; "material relationships" are not one kind of thing, and "rational explication" of them another. But rather the explication and the relationships are in some sense identical, or at least significantly correspondent, as the previous discussion endeavored to show. How can we be aware of any "relationships" unless we are rationally aware of them? Unless we are rationally aware, we are not aware at all, and would know of no relationships. Absolute Mind or Truth does not entirely (or perhaps not at all) transcend nature but has an important expression in nature. At this point we might hear Plato or Berkeley ask: What are objects and their "relations" anyway but "ideas" basically? Objects and material relations are so clothed with ideas that we never get to the naked substance or "reality" beneath them. Reality is ideas, or at least on the side of material relationships, she seems to be materially embodied ideas. Do we ever know of any raw reality apart from form? Plato posited a primal, "formless" "matter" (or "receptical" or "space"), but admitted the very great difficulty of
conceiving it apart from form*, and hesitated to say that this was possible.**

With greater certainty Aristotle believed that elemental or "prime matter" never existed apart from form (Ross, U. D. Aristotle, p. 73-74 Methuen, London). There is no stark matter or absolutely inchoate being, crouching and hiding somewhere beneath the luminous structure of form, ideas, or rationality.

How radical dualism may be true, but the burden of proof rests first on those who assume that there is "stark matter" existing somewhere in a formless corner of the universe.

Secondly, a further point clarifying the argument in the light of the present criticism takes us to the very heart of the problem. Adequately to speak to the criticism that material relationships are themselves the standard of truth, we must review briefly the meaning of truth as discussed in Chapter Two. There we tried to say that truth is judgmental or conceptual correspondence of thought to things, or right awareness of relationships. Now how is this "rightness" or "correctness" or this "truth" of "judgmental" or "conceptual" awareness established — i.e. how is the frame and picture of thought within us known to be in agreement with or correspondent to the order and structure of things around us? Only by the sense of the total mind that embraces us and things. Not by the material or empirical relationships themselves alone; for, on an empirical basis, we are never perfectly certain that we have perfectly conceptualized the relation of A to B; there is a limit to empirical experience; there is always "the possibility of error" (Royce). Only by the standard of the Infinite Perceiver, Conceiver, Thought or Mind, which objectively holds all things in their proper relationships, and on their courses in process, and subjectively discloses itself to us in our true judgments, particularly in our logical and moral judgments, do we find a standard for judgment.

*Timaeus, Plato, Selections ed. R. Demos, Scribners, 1927, p. 410-414
**Parmenides, Ib. p. 362
Finally many of our truth judgments, even in the field of natural science, as we have a number of times illustrated in this study, are made prior to empirical verification of the fact. Indeed, much logical truth seems a priori and the categorical form in which the empirical investigation of nature must proceed. Accordingly, it seems that some truth judgments — many of them of paramount importance — are not solely dependent on an initial observation of material relationships. Particularly is this true in the realm of moral truth-judging, as we have previously discussed in the argument from moral experience, p. 208-210.

(3) To meet the possible criticism that one could arrive at the conception of "Infinite Error" as easily as at "Infinite Truth", on Royce's own terms — in the Possibility of Error Essay — and thus cancel the force of his argument, it might be said: —

The higher Inclusive Judgment would cancel the error of the error (or the ignorance of the error), since it would replace the ignorance with knowledge, or "truth". That is to say, it would know the why of the error — it would have, or know, the truth above the error. Accordingly, you could not conceive of "Absolute Truth" as containing, or cancelled by, or replaced by, or vistiated by an "Absolute Error". An error is only an "error" so long as ignorance about this error continues. Once that ignorance is dispelled, it is no longer "error", but truth; and this is precisely what the Absolute is, according to Royce, in its ultimate life. It is full, comprehensive, coherent Truth. It might be said that it contains or has "error", in itself only in the sense that it would, or can, anticipate the errors that finite judgers might make, but at the same time it would know why they were errors; it would know or be the fuller truth about the ignorance, but that naturally, from its standpoint, dispells the ignorance.
Such would be the way Royce might attempt to meet the criticism.

We continue with our own addendum. Error is disconnection or lack of clear relationship of ideas. To imply an "Infinite Error", or even a wider more inclusive error, an erronious judgment would have to "know" its error; i.e. why it is in error. This would at once break the hypothetical compounding or build-up of errors. "Greater error" could only mean a wider more radical disjunction or dispersion of ideas and judgments about our world. A "progress" of thought toward a "unity" of thought in error is, as a possibility, self-contradictory. A movement of thought in error is toward ever greater disjunction and dispersion of ideas in judgment; a direction of ever more fragmentation, separation, and plurality of judgments. If one erroneous judgment be seen or understood to be connected with another erroneous judgment; a net work of true relationships is thereby born -- given the erronious premises of our false judgments, from which we have started out toward our "infinite error"! ("True" conclusions may always be derived "validly" even from premises which are false materially). But truth is then beheld at work in the crevices and interstices of our erroneous judgments. By the time we have supposed we have arrived at our infinite, all-inclusive error, this leaven of truth would have swelled to the point where we would realize why we have in hand an "infinite error". Such circumstances could only imply that we are aware of the infinite background or totality of truth, by which we could ever judge that we had, or had arrived at, "infinite its error"! The process of error itself, evolution and destiny tends to swallow up its own progeny and give them rebirth and redemption anew in truth.
Appendix C  
On Using the Term "Truth"

Recall the discussion in this Study Guide, pp. 29ff, esp. pp. where we gave as the definition of truth: the correspondence of thought to things, of ideas to the way the world is; truth is a psychological judgment that tells what reality is. It therefore refers to and includes being as well as the judgments about being.

"Absolute Truth" or "Fullness of Truth in Being"? We should avoid the sentiment of frozen rigidity in the traditional terminology, "Absolute Truth". Human beings do not know or have Absolute Truth -- only God would have or know what that is. It may indeed mean a totality of knowledge and of being transcending our own, which in part the concept of God has traditionally meant. We can rest assured that "Absolute Truth" would not be an all-devouring, undifferentiated Absolute or a "block universe" -- which would deny finite orders of being, difference, distinctions, and freedoms. Instead of the expression, "Absolute Truth" (which has long had this unfortunate connotation) it is a better description of things to refer (as we have previously done in this study) to "the fullness of Truth in Being".

What does "the fullness of Truth in Being (and in Process)" mean?

Whatever other world: facts it may mean the "fullness of Truth in Being" would include in its meaning our own reality as personal life in its finitude, freedom and experience of growth; and other such lives, created as such by God Himself.

Fullness of Truth is found in moral realities and relationships. These we can know at first hand and can affirm. What further it may mean we can only dimly suppose. In any case, we do know what it means in these terms:
in our sense of personal identity, its desiring quality, its needs, and its aspirations; its sense of freedom and fact of growth, intellectually and morally.

in Love and justice: i.e. our sense of others and our need for them; and in our awareness of the way to relate ourselves harmoniously and well to them and they to us.

"Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free..." -- truth is that sense of value that helps us to grow in freedom and grace, toward responsibility.

The moral life is quality of intention and growth (not a body of completed perfect acts). Jesus's "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt 5:48) is better rendered by the Luke parallel: "Be ye merciful as your heavenly Father is merciful". The "perfection" of God would refer to the Personal Loving source of being and would mean that our basic motive and purpose should be "merciful" love, that is out-going and serving love like God's.

The "absoluteness", then, or fullness of God's Truth would best be understood in, or as, his continuing moral purposes in bringing forth the worlds and establishing the conditions for finite process and freedom, and his becoming of life toward the ideal, i.e. the harmony of life with life in love and justice.

If we employ the term "Absolute" in reference to God, we keep in mind that the expression carries meaning only under that of the Divine "personality". God may be called the Absolute because He is fundamentally a Person, the Personal Causality of the world. His Personality defines His absoluteness. We give Knudson's eloquent words on the absoluteness of God in terms of His Personal, moral self-limitation:
If the idea of metaphysical Absolute is to be retained, it should be in a causal sense of the term; and in this sense there is no inconsistency between it and the idea of personality. From the causal point of view the Absolute is the independent ground or cause of the universe... Everything is dependent upon it for its existence; and it is this that constitutes its absoluteness. But absoluteness thus understood does not exclude self-limitation. And the same is to be said of the power to know and the power of self-control. These powers, which are the essential constituents of personality are also essential to the Absolute, if he be regarded as absolute in power... The common judgment must, then, be reversed. Instead of saying that personality is inconsistent with absoluteness, we must say, rather, that perfect personality is possible only in the Absolute. The contrary view rests upon a mistaken conception of what metaphysical absoluteness is.*

Addendum on the Definition of Truth

Can we define "truth" only in the terms "That which is"? (Thus "error": "That which is not"?). "That which is" would be a partial, incomplete definition of truth. "That which is" implies knowledge of what is, or of being -- how can I say "what is" unless I mean I know what is? If I say "X is", I mean I know that X is. Thus our "correspondence" definition of truth is implied -- truth is the correspondence of our thought to what is, or to things. (Likewise, "error" is not what is not, but error is erroneous process of judgment, and these sometimes are as psychological facts).

In any case, "that which is" is not solely material facts and their relationships; accordingly truth even under this definition includes psychological process, judgmental thought, value thought, and the whole realm of what we call "spirit". The deepest instinct about truth is that it has a moral implication: truth is not only what is, but what ought to be.

To be sure, I can refer to nuts in the forest as examples of what is, that I do not directly (or empirically) know, or are aware of; or I can refer to objects and "laws" or orderly processes and relationships of nature, that, as a scientist I do not yet know, or have discovered, or have acquaintance with directly -- such things we must declare "must be" apart from our present or

or immediate knowledge. But when I venture to talk about nuts or as yet undis-
covered scientific objects and laws -- beyond the point of their unadorned
"thereness" -- I am at once involved in quality perceptions (primary and second-
ary), in judgments as to their properties and relations, qualitatively and
logically, and am involved in the experience of a subject, myself, as "knowing",
or as endeavoring to get his thought forms into correspondence with these things.
And we are thus back in the realization that truth is an implicative system,
meaning a subject-thinking-or-endeavoring-to-conceive-reality; and that we
cannot in over simple sense say merely that truth is "what is". In the realm of
"what is" I cannot leave my own subjectivity out, with its basic drive to know
what is.
Appendix L

The Ontological Argument

A resume

The discovery of Mind in the universe through the presence of truth and the good in the universe—summary of arguments from truth and moral:

Whale has stated the over-all mood of the argument well, where he said, "The very idea of God is possible to us only because God (himself) already stands behind it." (Whale: Christian Doctrine, p. 26)

The classic "ontological argument" used strict, logical implications in examining the "God idea": as "the Being greater than which nothing can be conceived;" therefore His existence is implied in the very idea, since an existing "being would be greater than" a non-existing—St. Anselm. (11th cent.). Descarte's (1596-1650 AD) version in the idea of "Perfect Being," we state in the larger setting of our discussion thus far: "Descartes deepens the argument by putting it in a psychological key, transcending the flat "logical" note of Anselm. The problem is to examine the content of the "God idea" as:

Absolute Truth: Experience of truth and error—incompleteness of our knowledge implies complete, perfect or "absolute" knowledge/truth. Thus Descartes says - "...these excellences do not pertain to (or make the smallest approach to) the idea which I have of God in whom there is nothing merely potential (but in whom all is present really and actually); for it is an infallible token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by little....".

Absolute Good or Perfection: Experience of judgment between better and worse implies absolute good. Thus Descartes says again - "...when I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something (imperfect), incomplete and

*From the Greek "on" and "ontos"—meaning being.

**Descartes Selections, ed. Ralph Eaton, Scribers, 1927, p. 118-125, from Meditations III.
dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after something which is better and greater than myself, but I also know that He on whom I depend posses in Himself all the great things towards which I aspire (and the ideas of which I find within myself), and that not indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually and infinitely...."

Absolute or Originating Power: Experience of our finitude of power and being implies the Infinite Power and Being, upon whom we are dependent. Accordingly Descartes writes again: "...from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me.... All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself, if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future;... if such power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself."

"Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I call God, and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and thus since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea of God within me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God."

The perfection of Thought, Character, and Power is what Descartes means when he says he has an idea of "the Perfect Being". We summarize his argument thus:

a. Aware of his own finitude or imperfection of thought, character, and power, he is
b. Therefore aware of "Perfect Being" as the Ultimate Standard by which he tests or knows his own imperfections in these respects.

c. The idea refers to objective reality, beyond his own mind as its cause, for the idea of "perfection" could not arise in him, an imperfect being. How high up from the ground are you unless you see "the ground" in order to make the judgment? How can you tell black, or shades of gray, unless you know something about white against which you make the judgment? Therefore God Himself is the ground of our idea of God -- the very idea itself is the presence of God in mind. "The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us." (Pringle-Pattison: Idea of God p. 246.)
Hocking broadens Descartes' basic reasoning. He states it in terms of the general imperfection of the world at large, rather than merely on the sense of the imperfection of oneself -- thus Hocking believes he puts the argument on an empirical foundation:

Our Human feeling of being alien in an imperfect world--the sense of our own and the world's imperfection at large--leads to the idea of the transcendent Good. Hocking insists that this is an empirical broadening of Descartes' argument. Absolute Perfection or Good is implied as a prior idea and standard of our judgment upon the world in our encounter or our experience with it.

"Because the world is not yet perfection God is." Hocking's paragraph follows:

...other arguments reason that because the world is, God is. It is not from the world as a stable premise that we can proceed to God as a conclusion: it is rather when the world ceases to satisfy us as a premise, and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial, that we find God -- proceeding then from the world as a conclusion to God as a premise. We have no other premise to begin with: no proof of God can be deductive. It is because neither my world nor myself can serve as a foundation for thought and action that I must grope for a deeper foundation. And what I learn in this grooping is, that my consciousness of those defects will reveal, though in faintest degree, the positive object which is free therefrom.

We conclude with a personalistic implication, (which Hocking does not elaborate): it is the human, personal imperfections of the world in life and society that bears in upon our consciousness. What we want is a perfected human, personal order or existence. Therefore our category of the Transcendent Good, since it concerns personal beings and their welfare, is "personal" in its deepest meaning.

In the following terms, Immanuel Kant gave what is often accepted as the valid criticism of the ontological argument:

...Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. (p. 245)

The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea, but being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even do so much as to inform us any further as to its possibility. ...it being necessary to look for the characteristic of the possibility of synthetical knowledge in experiences only, (p. 251)*

...all speculative proofs end in ....the ontological; ....
In whatever way the understanding may have reached that concept, it is clearly impossible that the existence of its object could be found in it through analysis, because the very knowledge of the existence of the object implies that it exists outside our thoughts. (p. 265-266)

(Kant Selections, pp. 245, 251, 265-266.)

The rebuttal to Kant, as we have previously shown, p. 131-2 points out the nominalistic and dualistic prejudice of his thought at the time he wrote his famous criticisms of the classic arguments for God. That he himself moved toward an immanental theology, in which he could find a valid argument for God in moral experience is, of course, now history. The late British idealist Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, in the following memorable commentary, suggests the significance of the ontological argument.

* The technical logical point here is: Can there be "synthetical" a priori knowledge? Many logicians, along with Kant, believe that there cannot be.

** For a defense in similar terms to ours against Kant's type of criticism of the ontological argument, see K.Y. Collingwood: Essays in Philosophical Method, p. 136. (Quoted by Shaffer in J. Nick: The Many-Faced Argument, p. 251)
Pringle-Pattison on The Ontological Argument

THE IDEA OF GOD, by A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Oxford University Press, 1920.

"We have most of us, I suppose, as good moderns and children of the light, had our gibe at the ontological argument, and savoured Kant's pleasantry of the hundred dollars. But this fundamental confidence of reason in itself is just what the ontological argument is really labouring to express - the confidence, namely, that thought, when made consistent with itself, is true, that necessary implication in thought expresses a similar implication in reality.

"Fundamentally, it is the conviction that 'the best we think, or can think, must be' -- a form of statement which perhaps enables us to see the real intention of the old scholastic argument that 'a perfect being necessarily exists'. In other words, the possibilities of thought cannot exceed the actuality of being; our conceptions of the ideal in their highest range are to be taken as pointing to a real Perfection, in which is united all that, and more than, it has entered into the heart of man to conceive.

"Admittedly, however, such a conception transcends the empirical reality of man's own nature or of the factual world around him,..." (p.241)

"Whence, then, are these ideals derived and what is the meaning of their presence in the human soul? Whence does Man possess this outlook upon a perfect Truth and Beauty and an infinite Goodness, the world of empirical fact being, as Bacon says, in proportion inferior to the soul? Man did not weave them out of nothing any more than he brought himself into being. 'It is He that hath made us, and not ourselves'; and from the same fountain Reality must be derived those ideals which are the masterlight of
all our seeing; the element, in particular, of our moral and religious life. The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us. This is, in essentials, the famous argument for the existence of God which meets us at the beginning of modern philosophy—the argument from the fact of man's possession of the idea of a Perfect Being, which forms the center, indeed the abiding substance, of Descartes's philosophy. This idea, Descartes reminds us, is not just an idea which we happen to find as an individual item in the mind, like our ideas of particular objects. It is innate, he says, in his old-fashioned misleading terminology. He means that it is organic to the very structure of intelligence, knit up indissolubly with that consciousness of self which he treated as his foundation—certainty—so that our experience as self-conscious beings cannot be described without implying it." (246)

"The finite self, in short, with which Descartes appeared to start as an absolute and independent certainty, is not really an independent being at all. It can neither exist nor be known in isolation: it knows itself only as a member of a larger life. The idea of God, Descartes says else—
is innate in the same sense as the latter. The absolutely where, originates along with the idea of self and/finite, if the paradoxical expression may be pardoned, would be entirely shut up within the four walls of its independent entity: it would be a universe to itself with no consciousness of any Beyond, and of course, therefore, without the consciousness of higher or lower. But man is not finite in this sense. Man is by contrast a finite—infinite being, conscious of finitude only through the presence of an infinite nature within him. The possibility of aspiration, infinite dissatisfaction and its obverse, the capacity for infinite progress—these fundamental characteristics of the human and rational life are based by Descartes on the existence of a Perfect Being revealing himself in our minds." (page 247)
"We may well admit that we do not rightly know in what Perfection consists. It is something which we feel towards, whose characters we divine along the lines of our own highest experiences; and our idea is, to the end, something approximative, a hint, a suggestion, a bare outline. If by a positive idea Descartes is supposed to mean a clear, precise, and adequate idea, then it is certain we possess no such idea of a Perfect Being. We should require to be God in order to construct it. But what Descartes really meant by his epithet was that the idea is not a mere negation—as if we simply clapped a 'not' before the finite, and said that the infinite is what the finite is not. The idea is positive up to the very limits of conception, including all that is real in the finite and infinitely more." (page 248)

"The human idea of God or of perfection is, as Locke said in an apt phrase of our idea of infinity, 'an endless growing idea', one which grows with man's own growth, acquiring fresh content from every advance in knowledge or in goodness, opening up fresh heights and depths to him who presses honestly forward; but he who penetrates farthest will be the last to say that he has attained. We are never at the goal, but as we move, the direction in which it lies becomes more and more definite. The movement and the direction imply the goal; they define it sufficiently for our human purposes; and in direct experience we are never at a loss to know what is higher and what is lower, what is better and what is worse." (p. 249)
Chapter Seven

Major Arguments for God

5. The Religious Argument

Its rational nature. We are now prepared to consider the religious, or psychological argument. In somewhat loose, but popular, terminology we may call it at this stage the "mystical argument"; we might even, with due caution call it the "emotional argument". Continuing traditional terminology for the moment, it would be the discovery of Mind in the universe through the experience of "salvation", or moral salvation. This approach to the problem of theism is by no means an irrational one, at least in its highest and finest sense. The connection of this argument with the preceding more "objective" or rational evidences lies in the realization that if there exists a loving Personal Source of being, as the preceding discussions have suggested, such Creator of life and persons would, as a highest aspect of His rational relation to the world, seek to reveal Himself through "emotional" or "psychological" certainty, or through the experience of "salvation" of his creatures from evil. If God is real, and an objective, cosmic source of value, it would be His utmost rational act to want to help finite life, by some immediate experience of "perception", assurance, or revival, into an awareness of, and some realization of highest value or good.

The general meaning of salvation in all religious systems has a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, salvation in all religions
has meant escape from evil of some kind or degree, and attainment of ultimate security or protection from it. On the positive side, salvation has connoted the process by which men come to stand within the favor or security of the highest value and its source, or the divine reality. What constitutes "the divine favor" is defined differently at different historic levels of, for example, the Old Testament, or by different religious systems, according to their varying conceptions of God's nature and requirements. (recall chapter one) Ultimately for western, Hebraic religion, the problem of whether man is a religious being involves his possible knowledge of, and fellowship with, a Cosmic, Personal source of values, who may help him to overcome life's evils, natural, personal, and social. Such overcoming of evil and ultimate fellowship with the Divine Reality would define salvation in the traditional, or classic Biblical sense. In the highest reaches of Old Testament and New Testament thought salvation is intimate, personal, ethical fellowship with God. 

Philosophically and inclusively the general idea of salvation includes the following levels of meaning:

1. - The finding of purpose or meaning for our lives personally.

2. - Growth in freedom from hampering, oppressing environmental determinations of life, and utilization of environmental forces and laws to this end: e.g. in education and science as factors of salvation.

3. - Growth in freedom from inordinate self centeredness or "sin", and from social evils, toward personal joyousness and social harmony; or stated somewhat more positively, growth in the influence or love personally and socially.

4. - Recognition and acceptance of powers that aid in this attainment, powers or forces natural, personal, social, and divine.

5. - Fellowship with God as ultimate source of all value and reality.
we are presently considering
As with the foregoing arguments, the one/also has two phases, an
objective, empirical side, and a subjective form.

1. The general empirical evidence is the religious nature of man.
Man seems to be a being who fundamentally looks for a permanent source and
standard of value in the universe, from which he may obtain help in the
struggle to overcome evil in personal and social life and to realize value,
and with which he seeks some ultimate association or "fellowship". Religion
has been universal with men, and so far as we can tell, is a unique quality
of human life. Once again, and for the concluding time, we quote the
trenchant William Newton Clarke, who states this argument on its objective,
"anthropological" side in unusually clear terms.

"The evidence of the existence of God from the religious
starting-point... The discovery of God through the religious nature
of man.
"Religion... is natural to man, and practically universal...
Religious worship, obedience, and aspiration are as normal to man
as sensation or reasoning. Any one of these powers may be misin­
formed or misdirected, yet they are genuine powers of man... In
a world of reality every power has its counterpart, -- the eye
has light, the reason has truth, and the religious nature has God.
If the religious nature in man has no real being corresponding to
it, no one who is worthy of the adoration and trustful obedience
that man is moved to give One above him, then we can only say that
man was born with his highest nature looking out into empty space
... Moreover, it is the highest in him that is false. But if
human nature is false in its highest region, -- false by being
made so in its very constitution, -- then we cannot be sure that
it is true in any department of its activity. If we say that man's
highest nature naturally deceives him, we resign all right to rely
upon our nature or the validity of our powers, and confidence in
our mental processes is at an end... Just as the mind of man has
proved itself adapted to a world that is constructed according to
methods of mathematics, so the spirit of man has proved itself
adapted to a world in which there is a good God, with worthy
power and authority over human beings. Man comes to his best
life only in proportion as such God is recognized" (OCT 118-120)
2. Above all the others, the religious argument is the subjective argument for God. Its general thesis is that there is a cosmic power for good in the universe on which man may rely for help in the human struggle, and that "saving assistance" flows into life through the subjective floodgates of the mind and emotions. This saving assistance comes as a larger Presence and reality that gives support to the finite soul through the inner experience of new found strength: moral, physical, emotional, and intellectual; renewed assurance, keener purpose, higher joy, peace and exaltation; even sometimes ineffable ecstasy. The argument at this level merges into the problem of the nature and reality of prayer. Traditionally, this type of experience has often included a sense of the saving "grace" of God, felt as the removal of guilt, following repentance for sin or misdemeanor. Grace also means the largest sense of joy and fulfillment in life apart from the remission of specific guilt or sin.

Normative religious experience. In our western culture the Bible has been the fount of inspiration concerning man's religious experience. Let us look therefore at its teaching. In discussing this area of the experience of God we are dealing with the Old Testament idea of salvation at its personal, psychological heart. The Old Testament discloses two primary modes in which Divine Power personally is felt. We have the concept of religious experience:

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*Bear in mind that the Old Testament suggests answers in outline to the question, "How is God known or apprehended?" without presenting full-dress philosophical dissertations on the subject. The elements, however, of the three classical types of "reasons" for belief in God are present in the Old Testament. These are not arguments of a logically abstract kind; they are rather dynamical, affirmative declarations, representing what the Biblical authors believed to be profound experiences of God, on various planes of awareness, intellectual and emotional. Thus:--
(1) As beginning and continuing in a sense of moral well-being, sustained by God's presence. Such noted, joyful Psalms as Nos. 1, 15, 19, 23, 26, 27, 100, 119, 121, 139, 141 suggest this type of experience. This outlook is present in part also in such books, concerned with the inner life, as Hosea, Jeremiah, Job, and Ecclesiastes. William James's chapters on "The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness", in his well known work, The Varieties of Religious Experience, describe in modern terms and examples this type of experience. For the Old and Testament the Divine Presence/renewal is also sometimes felt:--

Footnote continued --

a. The awareness of God through experience of nature: a mode of reasoning based on external or empirical observation of nature's "order", "perfection", "design" or "purpose", leading to the idea of its intelligent Cause, or Maker, e.g. Gen. 1, Ps. 19:1-6; Ps. 104.

In such passages we have the substance of the "casual" and "teleological" arguments for the existence of God. The following further reason suggested in the Old Testament for belief in God are ascending or deepening modes of intellectual experience or perception.

b. The awareness of God through moral experience or experience of moral value: a mode of reasoning based on the inner moral experience of awareness of values and conscience, suggesting moral "law", and Cosmic Moral Mind as Source or Ground of the law; with the added empirical observation that history seems to attest the presence of such law, in the fact that men and groups which do not practice neighborliness and love do not, in the long run, survive; or conversely and positively, when men collectively practice kindness and love, their society tends to survive. The substance of the classic "moral argument" for God is found, as we have already pointed out, implicit in such books as Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and other prophets.

c. Awareness of God through religious experience: derived from a sense of God's help to oneself personally in leading a moral and a well poised or triumphant life, discussed above.
(2) As beginning in a sense of moral self-dissatisfaction. Many of the Psalms suggest an experience of God as forgiving love in life, that relieves and renews conscience, when burdened with a sense of moral failure or sin; and that reintegrates, or re-establishes selfhood, in poise, inward security and well-being.

In sum, on such levels of experience, bearing on psychological and mental well-being, the sense of the Divine Reality is accompanied by a feeling of new assurance, a stabilizing sense of all-rightness with the loving Source of Being, regardless of past errors, failures or sins. Such experiences of mental and emotional renewal of the soul were acknowledged as the wondrous uplifting of the Divine Spirit. God's Presence was deeply known in the removal of anxiety and fear. The coming of a new mind, or release from anxiety, could not always be calculated, or scheduled. The Biblical authors realized that the Divine Spirit must work in and through the complexity of our freedom; they often said they had to wait "in patience" to find relief and renewal. In any case, such may be the meaning of many of the timeless lines of the Psalms and Prophets, such as, Ps. 25; Ps. 42, 46; Ps. 51; Ps. 103; Ps. 130; (Ps. 139) II Isaiah 40: 27-31. Add to these references such others as Is. 26:3 or Ps. 40: 1-5f; I Isaiah Ch 6, II Isaiah Ch. 55.

On either of these levels, such experiences, if true, would not mean that God, or the Divine Spirit, is an external, coercive force that destroys our freedom as men. Rather the implication of all such passages would be that God speaks as an inward voice of truth, which strengthens our freedom by giving it new insight and power. This inward working of the Divine would not detract from the belief that God is the objective source of truth and value, in ultimate Mind beyond the finite self. In contrast to some oriental thought, Hebrew mysticism was

**A clarification of the Biblical concept of "sin" and the role of "repentance" as therapy is here in order. The overall point of view of the Hebrew-Christian Bible is that, being a free spirit, man can choose evil or "sin". The Hebraic definition of sin is
footnote continued--

evil disposition or malice, and may be expressed socially as aggression on
neighbor, or disrespect for personality. Sin is not bodily passion, as with
the dualistic systems; though body and passions may be the instruments of sinful
pride. In Biblical thought sin is often understood to be the prideful usurpa-
tion by men of the place of God, as they set themselves up above other men to
lord it over and aggress upon them (as the story of Cain and Abel); or to stand
as individuals without due humility or respect before God the Creative Power
(as in the story of Moses when he smote the rock that gushed forth with water).

In profoundest Hebraic thought, sin, however, is not an inevitable condition
it may be avoided in life, so that, on the whole, one may lead a life free from
sinful pride and aggression. Many of the Psalms already cited, and other passage
imply this. (Indeed, some passages in the Old Testament suggest that sexuality,
or some other quality not defined, constitutes something originally "sinful" in
human nature, as e.g. verse 5, of the famous penitential Psalm 51. Such places,
however, should be balanced with other sayings, particularly those of the great
prophets, Jeremiah in Ch. 31:29-30f, or Ezekiel in Ch. 18, where the concept of
"original sin", in the sense that there is something which inevitably determines
us to sinful action, is ringingly repudiated.) The point is, rather, that man
should cultivate righteous intention or motive, which will guide him in "paths
of righteousness". Such great Psalms as the 1st, or the 19th, or the 23rd, and
many others, proclaim this possibility.

The Biblical concept of pride in its relation to sin should be further
clarified. The Old Testament does indeed recognize our common, or "natural",
human tendency toward inordinate pride, in its various ranges: pride of power,
of wealth, of position, of class, even of intellect and spirit, that is to say,
"prideful" attitudes which tend toward selfishness and unloving relationship
with others. Such pride may lead to situations of sinful aggression. In sum,
the Hebrew Scriptures point to our common moral sloth, our failure to understand
human need, and failure to express or respond to love. In view of this tendency
it urges men to seek the Divine help to overcome these weaknesses. But the Old
Testament does not mean, as it is sometimes misinterpreted, that all "pride" is
sinful. There is a natural pride, which is not sinful, but psychologically
necessary, as normal self-esteem, or self-respect, expressing our very nature
as sacred persons under God. Everywhere, both Old and New Testaments teach this
sacredness of one's own person, which is source and seat of "normal" or "norma-
tive pride". The age old cry of the human heart for the moral establishment
and maintenance of its selfhood in "normative pride" is expressed in the familiar:
lines of the 139th Psalm:

"Search me, O God, and know my
heart!
Try me and know my thoughts!
And see if there be any wicked
way in me,
and lead me in the way ever-
lasting." (Psalms 139:23-24)
always profoundly moral. The idea of man's possible oneness with God meant identification of moral will and purpose, with God and fellow men in ethical fellowship, rather than the identification of man's "being" in toto, and loss of his personal nature, in the Divine Being. God speaks to man, and is present in, or to, human life through moral conscience. The life of God and the life of man conjoin in the common experience of Moral Truth, Jer. 22:13-19. In this passage, Jeremiah, contrasting the tyranny of Jehoiakim with the righteous reign of his father, Josiah, says:

"He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? says the Lord." (v. 16)

footnote continued--

Likewise, when the Old, or New Testaments, refer to repentance as a desirable and necessary moral quality, they do not mean that persons need have, or must develop, a hyper- or morbid sense of self-dissatisfaction, or consider themselves gross sinners or criminals in some way, before they may be recipients of the Divine love, grace, or favor; or before they can otherwise know, or have experience of God's presence in life. In addition to contrition for possible gross sin, such as the "blood guiltiness" or crime alluded to in Psalm 51, repentance may stand for the general psychological value of being willing to acknowledge our mistakes and shortcomings. It means "to think again", that is, to examine ourselves, and be prepared to acknowledge ways in which we might improve. There could be no psychological or moral growth of any kind without such normal "repentance" as a natural part of our spiritual experience. To experience repentance need not mean that we must look around within ourselves in order to bring to light some imaginary dark, or gross evil, which we must get rid of. It may mean sometimes, of course, that human beings should feel sorry or contrite for injury done, so that the breaches of fellowship between men and neighbors may be healed, and the full moral will of God realized in, and between, persons.
Mysticism. The argument from religious experience has involved us, of

course, in the subject of mysticism. Presently we will call upon two eminent

spokesmen to assist us further in our understanding of these subjects, the late

noted psychologist and philosopher, William James, and the late practicing mystic

Rufus M. Jones. Here we will point out that the main emphasis of mysticism is

on the immediate experience of God.

Generally speaking, it is doubtless correct to say that in the history of

religions there have been two types of mysticism, one characterized mainly by

the eastern religions and tending to imply the ultimate trans-personal or im-

personal nature of deity (recall our discussion, chapter three, Section II);

and another exemplified by western, "prophetic" religion, and on the whole im-

plying, or maintaining, as its prime faith standpoint, the ultimate personal

nature of God.

The one variety has sometimes been called monistic or ontological mysticism. This type emphasizes the feeling of one's metaphysical identity with God and the cancellation or obliteration of evil and suffering by virtue of this ultimate oneness of the finite self with God. In addition to the tendency to stress God as impersonal Being, eastern religions (and here we mean, principally, the classic expression of Hinduism and Buddhism) tended to stress otherworldliness, escape from this life of suffering, and denial of the validity of individual, material existence in the here and now. (In their practical moral injunctions, of course, these systems were highly ethical).

The second type of mysticism could be appropriately called personalistic, moral or ethical -- the mysticism characteristically of the prophetism of the Old Testament, and profoundly reflected in the religion of the New Testament. Its main motif has been the possibility of the experience of oneness -- not necessarily of our being in total identification with God -- but of our moral purpose or will with God's ethical will -- or: \( \text{moral} \)
law, or nature as love, so that we may overcome the world's evils and suffering, by moral activity in life. This mysticism has been personality affirming in both man and God; it is self-preserving in the best sense, life affirming and life saving, not only in a possible hereafter, but in the here and now as well.

In sum, the one has been the mysticism of union, or the feeling of ontological oneness with the Ultimate — with bliss, rapture, ecstasy, transport as chief psychological content of the experience. The other has been the mysticism of communion, with God and fellow creatures — with the joy of moral oneness or the union of motive, purposes and acts with the Divine in social love, as characteristic psychological content.

Sometimes the term "mysticism" has been reserved to designate the former type of religious experience, that of ontological unity; while the term "prophetism" or "prophetic religion" is held to indicate the latter form, or the experience of the ethical unity of will, or purpose. To be sure, practicing mystics have differed in their implications as to whether man's immediate experience of God on the "mystical" plane was one carrying the sense of the "personal", or the contrasting awareness of the trans-personal or impersonal nature of Deity; or the sense of the impelling nature of ethical duty, as opposed to the realization of transcendence of value or ethical duty in our practical human terms. Indeed, for the Sankhya Hindu mystics there is no deity at all! Accordingly, as we use the term "mysticism" we no doubt have to do so with some looseness or ambiguity. Be this as it may, however, interpreters of mysticism often point to three characteristics, which may be said to be the more or less common ingredience of the experience:

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*The author here recommends the splendid analysis of Harris Franklin Rall in Christianity, An Inquiry into its Nature and Truth, Scribners, 1944, p. 61f.

**Rall, Ibid.
The immediate knowledge of the Divine presence in intense "feeling", resembling perception in the sensory area.

Awareness of God's immanence, or availability in the world.

A feeling of optimism -- that is, or will be, ultimately right with the world and the self, containing:
- a sense of a supporting Presence,
- heightened, or deepened sense of insight into truth,
- enlarged understanding, clearer judgment,
- expansion of the self, mind, soul, spirit, moral nature into ineffable wonder, joy, compassion, peace,
- new sense of power, either to rise above the evils of the world in the manner of the east, or ethically to attack its evils in the manner of the west.

Some theorists have explained that, in the mystical experience, the Divine presence wells up into conscious life through the subconscious mind -- so William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Accordingly, we may appropriately conclude this chapter with James's classic description of religious or mystical experience in its universal form. We also include an exposition of a committed, modern mystic, Rufus Jones, who in the subsequent passage beautifully summarizes the philosophy and outlook of mysticism.
William James on Religious Experience

(1842-1910. James was a universal type of personality, an outstanding psychologist, philosopher, and religious theoretician of his day. He taught at Harvard from 1873 to 1907. The following passage is from his Conclusions in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902)

"...Is there, under all the discrepancies of the creeds, a common nucleus to which they bear their testimony unanimously?....

"...There is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet. It consists of two parts:-

1. An uneasiness; and
2. Its solution.

1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand.

2. The solution is a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.....

"The individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticizes it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with something higher, if anything higher exists. Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but a most helpless germ. With which part he should identify his real being is by no means obvious at this stage; but when stage 2 (the stage of solution or salvation) arrives, the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of himself; and does so in the following way. He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck....
"So far, however as this analysis goes, the experiences are only psychological phenomena. They possess, it is true, enormous biological worth. Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them, a new life opens for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of two universes meet; and yet this may be nothing but his subjective way of feeling things, a mood of his own fancy, inspite of the effects produced. I now turn to my second question: What is the objective 'truth' of their content?

"The part of the content concerning which the question of truth most pertinently arises is that MORE of the same quality' with which our higher self appears in the experience to come into harmonious working relation. Is such a 'more' merely our own notion, or does it really exist? If so, in what shape does it exist? Does it act, as well as exist? And in what form should we conceive of that 'union' with it of which religious geniuses are so convinced?

It is in answering these questions that the various theologies perform their theoretic work, and that their divergencies most come to light. They all agree that the 'more' really exists; though some of them hold it to exist in the shape of a personal god or gods, while others are satisfied to conceive it as a stream of ideal tendency embedded in the eternal structure of the world. They all agree, moreover, that it acts as well as exists, and that something really is effected for the better when you throw your life into its hands. It is when they treat of the experience of 'union' with it that their speculative differences appear most clearly. Over this point pantheism and theism, nature and second birth, works and grace and karma, immortality and reincarnation, rationalism, and mysticism, carry on inveterate disputes....

"...The subconscious self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required. Apart from all religious considerations, there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of. The exploration of the transmarginal field has hardly yet been seriously undertaken...."
"Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true....

"Here the over-beliefs begin: here mysticism and the conversion-rapture and Vedantism and transcendental idealism bring in their monistic interpretations and tell us that the finite self rejoins the absolute self, for it was always one with God and identical with the soul of the world. Here the prophets of all the different religions come with their visions, voices, raptures, and other openings, supposed by each to authenticate his own peculiar faith....

"Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes. If I now proceed to state my own hypothesis about the farther limits of this extension of our personality, I shall be offering my own over-belief--though I know it will
appear a sorry under-belief to some of you -- for which I can only bespeak the same indulgence which in a converse case I should accord to yours.

"The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. So far as our ideal impulses originate in this region, (and most of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing us in a way for which we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal.

"God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God. We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, at those parts of it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfills or evades God's demands. As far as this goes I probably have you with me, for I only translate into schematic language what I may call the instinctive belief of mankind: God is real since he produces real effects....
"That the God with whom, starting from the hither side of our own extra-marginal self, we come at its remoter margin into commerce should be the absolute world-ruler, is of course a very considerable over-belief...

"...What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, I know not. But the over-belief on which I am ready to make my personal venture is that they exist. The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in... Assuredly, the real world is of a different temperament -- more intricately built than physical science allows. So my objective and my subjective conscience both hold me to the over-belief which I express. Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?"

Rufus M. Jones on Mystical Experience

(b. . . a noted, contemporary Christian mystic and philosopher of mysticism. The following piece taken from The Atlantic Monthly, May, 1942, is a classical expression of mysticism and mystical theory. The first part of it is also an able description of the spiritual concept of mind and man).

"When we pass from the superficial theory of the mind as a receptacle, as a kind of bird cage, to the true conception of mind as self-conscious spirit with capacity for free creative scope, the change is a momentous one. Mind as we actually know it is self-transcendent. It sees and
goes beyond what is before its footlights, what is given' to it. It is not only receptive of sense data, but it has its own range of self-activity and organizing power. It produces from within 'free ideas' and the non-sensuous universals through which it organizes and expands its experience and makes it 'knowledge' of the order of truth. There is no knowledge until the mind has done its creative organizing work and rises to the insight, I know this. The mind cannot and does not stop satisfied with anything merely 'given'. It has a thrust, an urge for more, for a beyond. If we expect to arrive at any significant goal of life, we must first of all pass over from the lower-case conceptions of mind, as a causal product of the material order and a mere enlargement of the animal type, to a higher-case interpretation of mind of unique spirit scope. This change of outlook is not got by a leap in the dark, but by a more careful diagnosis of what is involved in mind itself in its profoundest operations.

"This insistence upon the unique operation of mind itself does not imply any tendency to belittle the sphere of the senses. The loss of a sense is a real limitation of the range and scope of experience...."

"It is probably true, too, that we should not find ourselves either, should not know ourselves as spirit, if we did not develop our personality in and through relations of give-and-take to a world of nature. It is there that we get our discipline. It is there that we get our intellectual nurture. That is the locus in which we find our values of life. It is there we get our stock of working knowledge. But in so far as we find ourselves and know ourselves as spirit it is not through the approach of the senses. We have no senses for the apprehension of self.
It is through a direct awareness, 'knowledge of acquaintance', that we know ourselves. I do not arrive at the knowledge that I am I by looking in a mirror, or by grasping my foot by my hands, but by an incontrovertible and irreducible inner experience, which is utterly unique. Mind as spirit in its essential nature is self-conscious as well as merely conscious. It knows itself in its own sphere and in ways quite unlike the way of sense knowledge. When the level of self-consciousness is reached there is a unique transition from all lower types of consciousness. Something utterly new comes into operation. There on this new level is a type of mind that knows itself.

"There does not seem to be any insuperable reason why spirit of our type may not meet and directly commune with Spirit of the eternal type. It becomes merely a question of evidence of fact. If telepathy between human minds were a common and well-attested mode of communication, direct correspondence between minds would be taken for granted without further argument. But telepathy at best is a rare occurrence, still questioned by strict scientists, and at the present stage of verification a dubious ground of support. It is a fact, however, that we recognize other minds. We are in rapport with other minds, by methods which transcend sense and lie beyond mere inference. The consciousness of 'self' and the consciousness of 'other' are born together, and we cannot use one of them as the searchlight to find the other. There comes a leap of 'acknowledgment' of other persons which is of a very different order from our attainment of the sense of the reality of external objects. Deep calls unto deep within us and like knows like. If it is granted that we know ourselves by an irreducible and incontrovertible experience, and if we know other minds by an equally
irreducible and incontrovertible operation, there would seem to be ground for the expectation that spirit would have mutual and reciprocal correspondence with an Over-World of Spirit.

"From time immemorial persons have been aware of correspondence with a Beyond, with a More than themselves. Sometimes it has seemed like an invasion, an incursion into the individual mind from beyond its margins, bringing a sense of exaltation or rapture; and sometimes it has seemed as though it were a thrust of the individual mind through a gate, or drawbridge, into the central Keep of the universe, with a corresponding sense of exaltation.

"Saint Teresa in her Autobiography has given many accounts of this first type of invasion. 'A rapture', she writes, 'is absolutely irresistible. It comes, in general, as a shock (that is a something unexpected), quick and sharp, before you can collect your thoughts, or help yourself in any way, and you see and feel it as a strong eagle, rising upward and carrying you away on its wings'.

"Richard of St. Victor in the twelfth century speaks of his experience of having his mind 'rapt into the secret closet of the divine privacy, while it is on all sides encircled by the conflagration of divine love, and it is intimately penetrated and set on fire through and through. It (the mind) strips off self and puts on a certain divine condition, and being configured (or transfigured) to the beauty it is gazing upon, it passes into a new kind of glory'.

"The experience of the celebrated mystic of the Eastern Church, Saint Simon the New Theologian, is an excellent typical illustration of invasion. 'Suddenly', he says, 'God came and united Himself to me in a manner quite ineffable; He entered into every part of my being, as
fire penetrates iron, or as light streams through glass...I am filled with light and glory; my face shines like that of my Beloved and all my members glow with heavenly light'.

"There is a remarkable passage of this first type in the Diary of Josiah Royce's mother, amid the perils of her pioneer journey across the continent. Face to face with an appalling danger, she suddenly found herself environed by invisible forces. She says: 'Whence this calm strength which girded me round so surely?...I had known what it was to believe in God and to pray that He would never leave us. Now He came so near that I no longer simply believed in Him, but knew His presence there, giving strength for whatever might come....That calm strength, that certainty of One near and all sufficient hushed and cheered me'.

"Here is the testimony of a young man who was sentenced to an English prison because he refused to take military service: — 'A Cell, Police Station, In England, September 3, 1941. 'I have just had a wonderful experience. I cannot adequately describe it. I have gradually been becoming aware of a Presence in the cell, and suddenly the whole room was charged with infinite Power. I was as if in the midst of a vast congregation, yet utterly intimate. The place was illuminated and yet not physically so. The emotion of my happiness was so powerful that it struck me through and through, and I had a very storm of weeping in my weakness. Yet through it I have gained a profound strength...This cell is now a holy place to me, and I am overcome with an impulse to glorify and worship....I know now how the saints were upheld whatever their condition. In the words of George Fox, 'I had great openings'. Only those will understand who have been through it themselves!'...."
"St. Augustine in his famous biographical account...is a good illustration of the second type, which I have called the 'thrust' from within...In the Confessions, St. Augustine describes how step by step he passed from external things and bodily sense, from the changeable to the unchangeable and 'thus with the flash of one trembling glance the soul's inward faculty arrived at That which is'.

"Nobody has given a better account of this second type than that of Jacob Boehme the Silesian shoemaker -- the most remarkable of all Protestant mystics. He says in the Aurora: 'While I was in affliction and trouble, I elevated my spirit, and earnestly raised it up unto God, as with a great stress and onset, lifting up my whole heart and mind and will and resolution to wrestle with the love and mercy of God, and not give over unless He blessed me -- then the Spirit did break through. When in my resolved zeal I made such an assault, storm and onset upon God, as if I had more reserves of virtue and power ready, with a resolution to hazard my life upon it, suddenly my spirit did break through the Gate not without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and I reached to the innermost Birth of the Deity and there I was embraced with love as a bridegroom embraces his bride.'

"Boehme's account implies throughout a mutual and reciprocal correspondence between the human spirit and the divine Spirit, and that would be true of almost all accounts of both these types of experience. They differ only in the degree of the objective or subjective emphasis...."

At this place we interrupt Jones's article to insert another contemporary account of a mystical kind, or what seemed a direct communion with the Divine Spirit, known to the author of this
book at first hand. It comes from a young divinity student's experience of some years ago. The testimony is, as he records it, "I had, for some weeks been deeply engrossed in the study of several great contemporary philosophers of religion in preparation for a paper for my beloved teacher, Nels Ferre, who taught me to understand the meaning of Agape as the central Christian message. The theme of the paper was to be 'God as Cosmic Mind'. During the reading and preparation, attempt had been made thoroughly to absorb the concepts of Whitehead, Boolin, Hocking, and several other great, modern minds on the idea of God". The testimony continued: "I had become saturated with the most elevated theological and ethical thinking of the day; until my whole being seemed filled with their understanding of the Supreme Reality and the Supreme Goodness that lay behind, or just within, the visible texture of physical nature. Then, suddenly, one night, in the late mystic hours, at the closing portion of some trivial dream -- the contents of which has long since passed out of memory -- the scene was suddenly changed, as if a great curtain of horizon girdling extent had quickly lifted upon a new stage or dimension of experience, and I felt my spirit elevated and expanded, to fill, as it were, the whole space of the room, overflowing the house where I was visiting, passing through walls and roof, as if they were not there, and on beyond into the outer world of this blessed night". Our source then testifies that he "was not conscious of leaving his body, but that his body, prone in a half wakefulness, seemed to have at that moment a fitting receptivity and response, by which his mind could become alert to the Truth and ultimate Reality within whose presence he stood. Above all and surrounding all was
sense of the vast supporting Personal Presence and Good Will, as if the absolute love of a gracious elder brother or Father, with whom conversation, communion, fellowship was joyous and complete, a union that was peculiarly intellectual and moral. When the privileged gathering up and gathering subsided, and I found myself completely awake in the gray dawn of another real day, I was in a state of profound humility, a sense of benediction, and physical perspiration, yet thankful that such an experience, so unusual and unexpected, yet totally real, had been granted me. The descent from this height was accompanied by new assurance of the loving reality of God our heavenly Father, and a renewed purpose that intellectual and moral striving and love would be more sincere, intense, and continuing for me. Testimonies to the Baptism of the Holy property in the history of Christianity, and there are parallels Spirit are common in other faiths. The testimony was that the experience just recounted might possibly be interpreted in these terms, with the caution that such experiences, if they are real, should in no wise be abused by being inordinately sought, so that attention is diverted from life's more practical and pressing tasks.

We return now to the concluding paragraphs of Jones's moving report.

"These two divergent aspects of mystical experience are very well brought to light by the two rival words for love which have run through the whole history of Christian life and thought. Saint Paul took an ancient Greek word for love (Agape), often used in former times with a lower significance, and raised it to a unique height of meaning. It became especially in the thirteenth chapter of the First Corinthians, a new word and a new wonder, the full glory of which Christians themselves are only beginning to grasp. Agape lies at the heart of Christ's life.
and in His parables. It is 'the thing itself' which we call Chris-
tianity. It expresses the movement of love downward, from the Heart of
God. It is the new splendor in God, the immense outreach of grace, which
Christ has revealed. It is the perpendicular confrontation of man by
the unfathomable love of God. It is spontaneous, uncalculating, ad-
venturing, sacrificial love, giving itself for others, not in return
for merit, or desert, but just for love's sake. We love, if in the
true sense we do love, because the birth of God has taken place in us,
'for God is Agape'.

"Plato wrought a similar transformation in the other Greek word for
love, Eros. This word usually meant desire for the opposite sex --
'the maiden passion for a maid'; it was essentially desire for some-
thing for the sake of the self. It was egocentric love. Eros, unlike
Agape, moves from below up. Plato, in a passage in the Symposium...,
which in its glory of style and beauty is one of the noblest pieces of
prose in all literature, raised this Eros type of love to its loftiest
meaning. Here Eros is the passion in us for eternal beauty, for eternal
reality. We are here in this lower world of sense, -- far from the true,
the beautiful, and the good, -- but we have in our inmost soul (Nous)
something divine which makes us long for our true home, our dear Father-
land. This is the noblest message of Greek thought. It was caught in
its fullest sense by Saint Augustine and expressed in imperishable
fashion in the opening words of his Confessions: 'Thou, 0 God, hast
made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they find rest
in thee'. That is the very heart of the urge of upward-striving
mysticism.
"There are, then, the two ways: the way down (Agape) and the way up (Eros), the double search. Both ways are essential to vital Christianity, but the most amazing thing is this Agape passion in the heart of God which the greatest mystics have discovered and experienced.

"The major difficulty these types of 'direct experience' have to face in the rough-and-tumble world, and even more in the world of exact science and in the laboratory of the psychologist, is the difficulty of transmission, of establishing validity, of making an inner, private experience overt and explicit and universally convincing. A drama which is enacted in the soul of man, from the very nature of the case, cannot be made public for spectators in a stadium or be put on exhibition for a general audience. The experience I am talking about is not a conceptual type of knowledge, which can be brought under and transmitted to everybody. It is rather a penetration of spirit universal categories through intimate fusion with the Object, by which the mind enters the stream of life itself and shares in its flow. It is knowledge of acquaintance which comes 'lifewise', and it is tested the superabundance of life which attends it, the increased vitality, by the extraordinary dynamic quality of it, the flare of radiant energy that comes with it, rather than by the new stock of ideas which can be communicated to others.

"This must not be taken to mean that the experience in question is reduced to a 'feeling' or an emotion, or the active push of the will. The innermost nature of the whole undifferentiated self is in operation. It is the emergence of a new and deeper level of consciousness rather than the functioning of one aspect of mind. There is a matrix of the life of the mind (Nous) in us which underlies 'thinking' and 'feeling' and 'willing', out of which these processes emerge. Knowledge and action always involve a wider context of experience. There is a foundational mental structure
in us, deeper than reasoning or arguing or proving, which is the mother
ground of our forms and categories. In this matrix consciousness we
transcend, or fuse together, subject and object, and live and move and
possess ourselves in these moments of identity, which all great poets
and creators as well as mystics experience.

"My late friend, Professor Charles A. Bennett of Yale University,
called this type of experience the 'total-working' of the mind, as
contrasted with the 'part-working' which characterizes most of our mental
operations. Bennett gives the following account of the 'total-working
experience': (1) In it the mind apprehends as a whole. It is synoptic.
It is intuitive, not analytic; noetic, not discursive. (2) The knowledge
it confers is inarticulate and cannot readily be translated into con­
ceptual terms. (3) Yet this knowledge is destined to become articulate,
for the two types of knowledge are not incompatible, though they are
distinguishable. (4) Even when inarticulate it is positive....

"I am standing forth as a champion of the mystic's experience,
not because of the comfort and serenity which that experience brings.
I am profoundly interested in it because I am convinced that at its
highest and best it is a pathway to the truth of life and the reality
of God. I believe and am persuaded that mind as self-conscious spirit
has, as it emerges into being, brought with it something whose essential
aspects are akin to eternal reality, that like knows like, and that,
however far inland we may be from the shores of the Fatherland, ever
the twain -- spirit with Spirit -- may meet....

"...What happens...is that the direct contact with the Fountain-
Source of life heightens the whole significance of life, reorganizes the
content of the mind, melts and fuses the materials of thought into new form and brings fresh creative power. This is seen especially in the lives of the greatest prophets of the race. They did not receive magically communicated messages or forecasts of the future. There was rather a creative fire kindled in their soul. They became the spiritual statesmen of their critical epoch. They saw God and then saw what the nation ought to be and do...

"What I am concerned to maintain in this essay is the thesis that mystical experience may quite naturally be expected to occur from the fundamental nature of mind as self-conscious spirit in relation with its ground and origin in the Over-World of Spirit...It is not an affair of a few rare souls, who possess a miraculous gift or endowment. It is the way rather of health and normality. The range and quality of the experience vary from low to high, from slight to momentous, as is true also in the sphere of aesthetics or mathematics, but some sort of commerce, of mutual and reciprocal correspondence, with the Beyond attaches to our essential nature as persons..."
The Argument for the Personality of God:

A Conclusion

We have endeavored to show in the five great, traditional arguments for God the existence of Ultimate Intelligence and Love. In this brief closing section we try to pull together or summarize the argument for the existence of God as Personal. We do this in the two over-all moods which we have indicated as the objective and empirical on the one hand, and as the subjective or a priori on the other. Within this second mood we may generally include the religious argument just recounted, for it is, above all others, the especially subjective approach to knowledge of God, and we have found that it is by no means anti-rational or irrational. Indeed we have said that a religious argument would have highest place among rational arguments themselves for God, since, if God is real, one of the highest expressions of his rational life and activity would be the direct disclosure to or communion of Himself with, his finite creatures, in the general way that religious arguments or mysticisms affirm.

On the empirical side, then, we may summarize and conclude in this way:
Cosmic history and the ultimate meaning and nature of existence can be evaluated by the emergence of finite personality. Indeed the hypothesis, that progress toward the personal is the meaning and intent of cosmic process, has a general empirical foundation, which tends to throw the burden of proof on those who deny it. This evidence is the existence of a world of manifold individualities, high among which stands man, as a creature of "personality", potential of further personal development. We may then, with reasonable empirical assurance, conclude this stage of our summary with these two broad, cosmological proposition:

One, process is personal -- personality has appeared and is a dominant form of finite existence.
Two, a personalized process suggests a personal explanation. It is hard to explain the personal development that cosmic process manifestly is unless there be, as Bume once said, a cosmic "coefficient of personality as a condition of the development". In other words, already suggested, the cosmic ground or conditions out of which personal beings come must be such as to make personal beings possible -- this would be our minimal empirical evaluation of ultimate reality. But further, the cosmic ground of being is no passive condition, but, looking at cosmic history on the whole, there is a general suggestion that it is an active condition, working with conscious foresight. Everywhere the conditions appear as a kind of active preparation for finite being to take the form of individuality and ultimately personality, as we think of atoms, or stars, the emergence of plants and animals, and finally men. In brief, God as personal is known in His essential world-activity -- in His man-making. Activity is the essential medium of personality. And as any personality other than our own is known by inference through its actions, in the environment that it moves and orders, so the Infinite's individuating and personality-making activity is witness to His unseen, Personal Presence. Such is the empirical argument for God in broadest terms. This summary just presented is similar to that given at an earlier day by the modern American idealistic and personalistic philosopher, Borden Parker Bume.

On a more subjective, a priori, or immediate depth of insight some human beings believe they have a degree of innate awareness of a Supreme Being, whom we may call God, in the full personalistic meaning of that term; for we are aware a priori of certain fundamental things:

At the depth of the causal argument we found we were aware of Ultimate Being, Power, Order, and Purpose as rational categories necessary to explain the existence and the coming to be of things as they are. First, in the depth of our mental life we know that nothing can come from nothing, which gives the
idea of Absolute, Ultimate, or Eternal Being. Second, the general contingency of the world of nature suggests a non-contingent Source and Origin, conceived either as a transcendent Reality or as an abiding, immanent Power of organization itself. Further, we know that mechanical, infinite regress is not a sufficient explanation of the evolutionary unfolding or emergence of the worlds and the objects within them; nor can we rest with the description of the unfolding or emergence as an adequate explanation. Thus we arrive at the notion of Absolute Origination, Causality or Power. Third, still within the framework of cosmological, or original, or ontological ideas we next become aware of Primordial Unity or Order. Present relationships and integration implies original coherence and unity: our present order of the world could not have arisen out of absolute original disorder or chaos. Moreover, the principle of integration must be sufficient in its wisdom and power to account for the actual scope of integration we in fact find in our world, in order to explain the advanced areas of coherent growth and evolution into higher wholes, culminating in life, mind, and finite persons. This suggests Supreme Purposiveness. And the meaning of such purposiveness we grasp from our own interior sense of ideal ends or truths, both scientific and moral, that urge our lives toward the fulfillment of things wise and good. Such is our outer and inner vision of the Supreme Actuality by which Aristotle named the cosmic reality and its process.

We cannot get this far in our summary without also having already implied the fullness of Truth in Being that our experience of partial, but growing knowledge and increasing intellectual awareness of the world suggests. Nor, when we move practically and particularly into the moral sphere of thinking, can we long remain unaware of the Ultimate Good or Righteousness implied in the moral law of respect for persons, which governs life. Next, near the end of our searching, the concept of Absolute Love arises within us as ultimately characterizing the previous meanings of ultimate Being and Order. For Absolute Love is
implied in the fact that we do exist and that the power behind or within the universe has seen fit to legislate existence rather than non-existence, and further has made possible our personal existence, and has striven to prepare the opportunities that bring us forth. Absolute Love is also further disclosed in the immediacy of religious mysticism, as the sense of the saving Presence and Power of God, emotionally, comes down, surrounds, and lifts us upward. Finally the full coherent breadth, heighth and depth, of all the preceding range of thought and experience, and suffusing them with ultimate significance, is the awareness of Ultimate Person or Personal Spirit; for if the Fullness of Being, Power, Order, Truth, Goodness and Love are not "Personal", then we have no way of knowing what "personality" is. Tending to substantiate the final venture of rational faith we have the intuitive sense of the supreme worth of our own finite personal beings, and accordingly the sense that personal being must be the very foundation and structure of existence, its basic meaning and fact. God is the cosmic ground or condition, as we said a while ago, the ultimate set of relations, that makes finite personal beings possible, and judging by the influence of ideals in our lives, this Ground seems to see to it that process moves in the direction of moral persons as its outcome. God is the Greater Personality, of course, far more than we. The sense of ourselves as imperfect persons -- someone has said somewhere, persons in the making -- incomplete but growing in knowledge and character, or at least with the possibilities of such growth, implies the Perfect or Ultimate Person, who becons from within, and from beyond, our imperfect expressions of intellect and love. The last few sentences have suggested the substance of the "ontological" arguments for God from Plato, to Descartes, to Hocking, and many others. In sum, do we not discover God through various intellectual and practical perspectives?
Part IV

God's Relation to the World

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Chapter Eight
The Problem of Evil

The Logical Problem
And A Prospective Solution

If the world is created, integrated, and ordered by the power and love of a Divine Mind or Person, why is there evil? If there were no God, or if God were less than self-conscious, i.e. less than Personal, loving mind, there would be no problem of evil intellectually speaking. There would in that case, of course, be a problem practically speaking; namely, the problem of how to get rid of specific evils, such as pain, mental disorder, social disharmony, and how to control floods, and winds, and earthquakes that destroy life and property. Only when God is postulated as the personal loving Creator and sustainer of existence, i.e. when conceived as an "all good" and "all-powerful" Being, or as righteous omnipotence, does evil become an intellectual problem, viz. a problem for faith. The attempt to solve such a problem has traditionally been called a "Theodicy".

Theism must make adequate reply to the following, now classic, criticism of David Hume:

(From Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 1779)

Demea: "The whole earth, believe me, Philos, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the newborn infant and to its wretched parent: Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and 'tis at last finished in agony and horror.

"Observe too, says Philo, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too,

* From the Greek 'Theos' God, and 'dike', justice.
in their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation. Consider that innumerable races of insects, which either are bred on the body of each animal, or flying about infix their stings in him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and destruction.

"Man alone, said Demea, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. For by combination in society, he can master lions, tigers, and bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey upon him.

"On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried Philo, that the uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. ...Man is the greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other: and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation.

"But though these external insults, said Demea, from animals, from men, from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those, which arise within ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet.

'Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs
Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
Marasmus and wide-wasting pestilence.
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.
And over them triumphant Death his dart
Shook, but delay'd to strike, tho' oft invok'd
With vows, as their chief good and final hope'
(Milton: Paradise Lost, XI)

"Were a stranger to drop, on a sudden, into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, an hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewn with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence....

"And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy; therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: but the course of
nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for what purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

Epicurus' old questions are yet unanswered.

Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?........

"No! replied Cleanthes, No!........

"The only method of supporting divine benevolence (and it is what I willingly embrace) is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated: Your melancholy views mostly fictitious: Your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is more common than sickness: Pleasure than pain: Happiness than misery. And for one vexation, which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments.

"Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is extremely doubtful, you must, at the same time, allow that, if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments: And how many days, weeks, and months are passed by several in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture: And in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate; the nerves relax; the fabric is disordered; and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how often rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted; courage languishes; melancholy seizes us; and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and consternation" (Hume: Selections m/1, p. 360-368).*

Whether God's relation to the world be conceived in more idealistic or monistic terms, or in pluralistic or realistic terms -- in other words, whether He exercises control by an immediate immanence of being, or by sheer transcendent or transitive power -- He is still responsible for his world. Theism on either terms must answer the question why God has created, or brought forth from Himself, a world with the possibility of evil process within it; i.e. why He has made the world as it is.

*Hume, Selections, ed. by Charles W. Hendel, Scribners, p. 360-368
Materialists and sceptics have formulated the problem in terms of a dilemma. We heard Hume say above:

"Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil..."

Some theists, notably Edgar S. Brightman and others in modern times, frankly accept one horn of this dilemma, namely, the first proposition:

"If God is all-good, he is not all-powerful".

Brightman claims that, though God is all good with respect to his intentions for the world, He is not all powerful in His ability to deal with evil by perfectly controlling process. This is known as the doctrine of the finite God. (Theism, of course, could not accept the second propositions, that 'if God is all-powerful, he is not all-good'.) We will consider the doctrine of the finite God presently. Suffice it for now to ask: Need, theism accept the dilemma by accepting this horn? The dilemma may be countered, we will argue, by passing through or "escaping between the horns", as logical studies phrase one method of dealing with logical dilemmas. This type of reply to Hume's dilemma is accomplished by a third proposition, involving the idea of God's self-limitation, which may not impale us on either horn.

We pose, as our type of solution, an alternative hypothetical proposition which by-passes the horns of the Lucretius-Hume dilemma, and possibly states a truer picture of the cosmic order than the 'finite God' idea:

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* E.g. John Stuart Mill, F. C. S. Schiller, William James, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, A. Tsanoff, Peter A. Bertocci. (See Brightman APR, p. 295-301 for discussion of the history of theistic finitism.)
If God is 'all-good' and 'all-powerful', His relation to the world may be one of self-limitation.

Indeed, we will end up by believing that it must be one of self-limitation, if God is 'all-good', that is, conceived to be moral in character. Brightman would call such a position "theistic absolutism". To avoid problems suggested by the word "absolutism", however, to which we have previously pointed, we believe it better to refer, more simply, to the idea of the adequacy of God's Goodness and Power. Before we present this type of theodicy, which reflects the main spirit of the classic tradition, we will first consider Brightman's view of the finite God. Our procedure will be to reverse the usual way the subject of evil is divided for discussion, namely into the problem of:

(1) **Moral evil**, or why man's inhumanity to man is permitted by a good and just, creative Father? and

(2) **Natural evil**, or why the pain and suffering inflicted by disease, natural calamity, abortive and inept physical process, is sanctioned by such a God?

We will begin with the deeper, or more difficult level of this problem as suggested in No. "2" above -- natural evil -- and subsequently deal with level "1", the problem of moral evil.

* In Biblical thought, some aspects of Augustinian philosophy, and in many modern theologians, such as, Albert C. Knudson, D. C. Macintosh, F. R. Tennant, Harris Franklin Rull, and, more recently, John H. Hick.
The Theodicy of the 'Finite' God*

Brightman uses the alternative expressions "finite God" and "finite-infinite God". The following sentence describes the finite and the infinite features:

God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature.

By the first clause, Brightman doubtless means for one thing that, in comparison to man, God is supreme in consciousness, value, and creative activity. Also God is supreme simply as the creative source of the world. Although from an ultimate standpoint of faith, God may be the creative source of the world, for Brightman, when we come to wrestle with the problem of evil, in looking at the details of God's relation to the world in its present temporal process, we must refine our definition of Deity. In Brightman's system we therefore have God presented as absolute in his will for good but finite in his power, with the area of creation not yet fully under the divine control called "the Given". "If we suppose the power of God to be finite, but his will for good infinite, we have a reasonable explanation of the place of surd evils in the scheme of things".

The second and third parts of the previous quotation summarize the deeper way Brightman understands God to be limited or finite. One suggestion is that if this is a universe of many persons, God is, by definition, limited in a sense by others!

* Edgar S. Brightman, The Problem of God (1930); A Philosophy of Religion (1940).


*** Brightman, PG, p. 113 and see p. 124.

**** For example see Brightman, PhR, p. 332 and esp. 337.

***** Brightman, PhR, p. 319. And see p. 313.
free choices. Another is that limitation is characteristic of 'personality' in and of itself, and that would include, again by definition, the divine case as well as the human. This may be summed by saying that, to Brightman, the finiteness of conscious personality as we know it in ourselves is the central clue or analogy among "four main types of evidence" for the finite God. The four types of evidence adduced by Brightman are:

The religious evidence runs to the effect that the attitude of human worship itself has sometimes suggested a dark, unfathomable side of God. Brightman cites the experience of some mystics, who, while in the mystic rapture or ecstasy, in experiencing God as supreme Good or Love, felt a terrifying, dark, abysmal depth in Divine Presence. Another line of evidence is that all process, natural and historic, is movement and contrasting movement; thesis, antithesis, and then synthesis; effort, opposition, and victory on a higher level. This historic "dialectic" of contradiction and struggle reminds us of the Hegelian theory of the life of the Absolute, but principally reflects the fact that God struggles, is sufferer. God's "goodness is not merely an abstract quality but the constant victory of constant effort".

A further and very decisive evidence are "the facts of evolution" in detail. Disteleology and surd evil in its process positively prove that the Creative power is at least delayed, "a spirit in difficulty", in its program of world building.

* Brightman, PG, p. 131-5; PhR, p. 364-5.

** Brightman, PG, p. 126.


**** Brightman, PG, p. 135-6.

***** Brightman, PG, p. 135.

****** Brightman, PG, p. 126-31 and see PhR, Chapter X.
But centrally important in the hypothesis of the finite God is the clue that the nature of consciousness itself offers. Brightman says, "Assuming...that there is a personal God, I wish to show from the nature of consciousness that he must be finite".* At this level of analysis, he presents two reasons which in general describe the Divine Personality from the finitistic point of view.

(1) The fact of human freedom impels him to write: "...confidently I express the view that if man is truly free, God must be finite as regards his knowledge...Man's freedom is an actual limitation on the foreknowledge of God".** But more profoundly than the fact of freedom on just man's side, there is the implication of what free consciousness would mean anywhere - even in God. If God himself, as a personal consciousness, is free, there is much in the example of human choice, with its results that go beyond our powers of prediction and control (making us tragically 'finite'), that suggests "something analogous in the divine freedom, although only remotely so".*** This assumes, of course, that God chooses in ignorance of results, as human choice is often made. Brightman concludes that God's "foreknowledge" is limited.****

(2) The "nature" of God (as one's "nature" does for any conscious being) conditions and limits His "will". This "nature" is composed of His reason, His temporal activity, and "the Given".***** Apparently here Brightman uses the word "limit" in a particularly literal sense. Accordingly, if God's nature limits His will, God must be conceived as finite in His Power. We attempt to illuminate the point in greater depth by the following analysis.

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* Brightman, PG, p. 131.
** Brightman, PG, p. 132.
*** Brightman, PG, p. 131-2.
**** Brightman, PG, p. 131-2.
All consciousness possesses active and passive factors. In our human case it is clear that the passive is due to a considerable extent to sensation. In God's case, we cannot attribute an external factor, such as sensation, but must resolve the problem by believing that there is the passive, contrary factor within the Divine Nature itself, thus explaining the struggle of creation throughout cosmic history.

"We must", he wrote, "acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of things, in which the active is indeed in control, but maintains its control with struggle and pain." 

The above description may be summarized in Brightman's own words: "Every person, human or divine, has experiences which his will does not produce, but finds." Our own conscious personalities are analogous to the finite-infinite consciousness of God.

This, then, is the structure of our human spirits; they are active wills dealing with passive experience and laws. Our activity is directed on the content of sensation, and is subject to the limits of rational possibility. We are thus finite beings; whose wills are limited by what is given to them; yet we are also in some ways capable of the infinite. Not only can we grasp the meaning of the mathematical infinite, but we can also think of eternal and self-sufficient beings. Our own spirit with its active-passive nature is also finite-infinite. Now the faith with which religious idealism confronts experience suggests that the small segment of the universe which we call ourselves is truly a sample of what the whole universe is.

Brightman's is a vigorous and courageous attempt to deal realistically with the problem of evil at its most acute spot - the surd, unnecessary evils of physical process. He believes that only theistic finitism can cope adequately with such facts as cancer, or the enormous waste and cruelty disclosed in the evolutionary history of the world. Back of Brightman's discussion, of course, lies the classic

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* Brightman, PG, p. 134-5.
** Brightman, PhR, p. 364.
*** Brightman, Personality and Religion, Abingdon, 1934, p. 83
the Epicureans,

attack on theism by / and in modern times by Hume, in terms of the logical
dilemma that - given the world as we find it - either God is not all-powerful, if
all good; or He is not all-good if all powerful. Brightman solves the dilemma by
accepting the first horn of the dilemma, in order to save the goodness of God. As
an historical analogue to his principle of the Given, he uses Plato's concept of the
'material receptacle' found in Timaeus. However, he avoids the suggestion of world­
dualism in Plato by affirming that the material element must somehow be within God,
who constitutes a "monism of purpose and personal identity".* The Given refers to
God's "unwilled, non-voluntary consciousness".** Brightman feels that this solution
proceeds along empirical lines and is the most coherent interpretation of the co­
existent facts of good and evil in our world.***

In conclusion, Brightman believes that the Finite God is progressively over­
coming evil, through the work of moral salvation and the material elimination of
evil. God's spirit, the cosmic source of value and personal being, works through men
of good will, in both the moral and the scientific areas, in a joint effort of bring­
ing evil under more and more control. Although Brightman was primarily a philosopher
of religion , who attempted to find answers to the questions of existence through
rational inquiry, above and beyond any specific religious tradition, he did, however,
in the last analysis, find particular inspiration in the Christian theological outlook.

* Brightman, PhR, p. 339.

** In his Philoophy of Religion, Brightman lists the context of the 'Given' aspect
of God as: - p. 337
1. "the eternal uncreated laws of reason".
2. "the eternal and uncreated processes of non-rational consciousness" - e.g.
   - "sense objects" or qualities
   - "disorderly impulses and drives" [the sub-conscious]
   - "pain and suffering"
   - "space and time"
3. "Whatever in God is the source of surd evil".

*** Brightman, PhR, p. 309 & 314.
Jesus's teaching of love, and the central Christian idea of suffering, or the Cross, would symbolize for Brightman, the way God is "slowly and painfully" overcoming the evils of the world.

**Criticism of Brightman's Finite God:**

1. Is a limited, or finite God the adequate object of religious devotion or worship? If it is true that God has such a dark or unruly, Given side, this would be the less admirable aspect of the Divine nature. How, consequently, could the religious emotion, implying reverence and devotion to a "holy" and an adequate Divine Reality arise? (We have heard Brightman's reply that the religious emotion itself, where it implies acknowledgement of "mystery" or incalculable depth in God, supports his theory.)

2. Brightman claims that a finite God is a more "coherent" solution to the problem of evil than a belief holding to the "infinite" power as well as the infinite goodness of God. But is it? Would not Brightman's "Given" put God at variance with, or within, himself? Brightman's description of the Given leaves us with a God who is not rationally coherent. How does the Given relate coherently to God's absolute will for good? If God has such an absolute will for good, could He not do something, more promptly and directly, about his own Given by bringing it under his complete control? How in this theory does the "imperfect" relate to the more "perfect" side of God?

We summarize our criticism by saying that Brightman's is not a pure finitism, based on a metaphysical dualism, as, for example, were the Platonic or the Zoroastrian systems; or that, of the Sankhya Hindus. Brightman splits the personality of God in such a way that the outcome is not coherent, as he anxiously hopes that it might be.**

As Knudson suggested, to escape a duality of the world, a metaphysical duality, Brightman posits a duality in God, a theological duality.*** He separates the Divine Experience from the Divine Will in such a way as to leave us with a difficult antinomy. Would not God's "finite power", as Brightman defines it, reflect adversely upon the hypothesis of His "infinite goodness"?

** Compare Brightman, FG, p. 185-7.
*** Knudson, DG, p. 273-5; Brightman's system "can hardly be regarded as satisfactory either religiously or intellectually".
It is precisely the concept of God's "goodness" that leads us to the alternative solution to the problem already outlined, namely, that if God is 'all good' (by which we mean creative Agape), He, as moral rationality, "limits" Himself in His relation to his finite, but moral, that is, freely developing world. Accordingly, Brightman (and before him Hume, et al.) have confused, and mistated the problem of evil, in terms of the disjunctive proposition: 'God is either all good, or all powerful' -- whereas we pose the former, and possibly simpler, hypothetical proposition as the proper way to state the solution to the problem of evil: If God is morally adequate as Creator and sustainer of the world, His relation to it must be one of moral self-limitation or forbearance. In what follows we elaborate this type of theodicy.

God, Freedom, and Pain*

For many people the problem of evil is a major stumbling block to belief in God. A history professor asks, Why did a good God permit Hitler to incinerate millions of Jews? A parishoner wants to know why his beloved wife must lie dying of cancer? A female Pepsi wasp plunges its stinger into its tarantula victim, injecting just enough venom to paralyze, but not to kill, the spider host, so that the wasp larvae may eat the living but helpless body. Why has the syphilis germ come to be in the course of the evolution of life? It lives, survives, and thrives only in higher organic hosts, which are its victims. Treat some kinds of bacterial disease with our modern "miracle drugs" and, in reaction to the medication, mutating genes produce new, hardier strains of the destructive microbe. Why is there pain--especially when it seems "excessive," "prolonged" and "unnecessary"? If God is good and loving, and if His power is adequate, Why is there physical and mental suffering in our world? If the evolutionary process is the divinely appointed,

* This essay first appeared in The Harvard Theological Review, April 1962, p. 143-159.
creative method, why has so much of it taken a course of brutality and aggression? Raising the question at the most fundamental level of process, why has evolution taken place by "mutations", many of which must be classified as "evil" when they result in the suffering of living forms? For many minds the fact of pain, and back of it, the phenomenon of "evil", or "inept" mutation remains the unhealed core of the problem of evil, and a barrier to religious faith.

Theistic faith must make adequate reply to the inquiry of sincere doubt regarding pain, and one of its more obvious cosmic origins in what we here provisionally call "evil mutations". Facing the fact of pain in our world, are there rational grounds for belief in the loving goodness and the sufficient Power of a Creative Person?

The type of argument upon which one form of Personalistic Theism has traditionally relied, is to say that pain is basically a good, not an evil. (Recall that we have rejected the concept of "the finite God" as religiously inadequate.) It is a normal kind of organic—and psychic—mechanism that prompts adjustment to unfavorable situations. Pain is a warning, a "red flag", as it is often explained, to all forms of finite life that something is going wrong, that danger is near, and that steps should be taken to remove the danger, or get out of its way. As the late Douglas Clyde Macintosh wrote, "a special sort of sensation, sharply stimulating to change, is called for," if finite life is to survive. Would infant animal life without the pain reflex have much chance to reach maturity? Medical science has discovered that persons with low pain reflexes are constantly in grave danger of injury and disease.

While the foregoing argument, which points to the general purposive value of pain, seems reasonably true or satisfactory, theism must respond in more extensive way to a number of questions, and logical alternatives, which its sincere critics raise. The present discussion attempts to meet some of these issues concerning natural evil, and centers particularly on the questions, why pain as such seems
necessary in our kind of world; why there is sometimes intense and prolonged pain; and finally why evil mutations which give rise to pain occur in process.

The Rationality of Pain

The necessity of the pain reflex constitutes one of the most important ideas in the solution to the problem of evil from the standpoint of theistic philosophy. Sometimes, however, theism hears from its critics that, logically or ideally speaking, pain may be unnecessary; that the world of life could have been constructed on some other plan than that of the pain reflex. To this kind of question theism would reply: consider whether some alternative to pain is rationally conceivable in our kind of finite, developmental world?

A life of "sensation" seems to imply pain as a possibility. Pain is the "negative" aspect of sensory life. It arises when senses are over- or excessively stimulated. Given finite sensation, pain and pleasure, are its intrinsic meaning. Sensory life implies possible pain. What, for example, would the situation have been were there no pain reflex in sight, eating, or breathing? Staring wide-eyed at the sun (a temptation which living beings with eyes do have) without a pain reflex relative to sight, would have resulted in destroyed organs of vision. Or consider the fundamental process of eating. Had there been no pain reflex in the elementary form of hunger, or in connection with the eating of harmful substances, it is difficult to see how life could have survived. Had there been no pain reflex accompanying breathing as an elementary aspect of life, it is again hard to understand how there could have been life at all. Pain seems to be a normal, inevitable, and valuable kind of experience for individual sentient forms. On a basic moral level the experience of pain seems important too. If the baby pulls the cat's tail, there are painful reprisals for the infant, teaching it that other sentient individualities are in
existence too, whose life and feelings must be respected. Can a finite world of our kind of sensibility and individuality be conceived without the pain reflex? It seems to this analyst impossible, theoretically, to imagine or construct a world without pain.

At this point, the sincere critic of theism might change his direction of inquiry to ask: Why did not God (or nature, if she is benevolent) produce organs of vision which would have withstood the destructive penetration of too direct and prolonged exposure to solar rays, or human stomachs that might have "digested" tacks, rocks, or dirt, with no ill or painful effects; or create arm bones big and strong enough to have lifted mountainsides, or be able to withstand the crushing fall of a tree? Such questions as these may be summarized by asking, Why are not living forms more substantial in physical power and capabilities? Could not God have made them this way? Essentially, the question implies, Why is not life more "infinite" than it is? And the reply of theistic faith could be to point out that finite life is, by definition, situated in a surrounding "environment". Where would the critic stop, short of the very infinite itself, in his hypothesis that living forms could, and should have been made more substantial? An arm bone, for example, of any finite size or degree of strength is always less substantial than some feature of the environment that surrounds it, and may be a source of evil to it. Any degree of health of a finite creature, has, by definition, its upper limit, given boundaries of space and time, qualities of temperature, of water or atmospheric media in which it lives including the nature and character of beings, forces, or organisms external to it. The concepts of "health", "stamina", or "immunity" have meaning only in relation to the characteristics of the environment which a living being inhabits. Qualities of environment, temperature and weather, diminishing or changing food supplies, hostile organisms or non-living forces, may come to exceed what an organism can sustain in
health, endurance, or immunity. Environment, therefore, means that there is something that limits life from the outside, that restricts, hampers, and confines it; that upon occasion bombards, afflicts, and blasts, calling for, as Macintosh wrote, as a rational promise of life, a "special sort of sensation, sharply stimulating to change." This proposition seems supported by coherent experience, and the "facts" of life, at least in terms of all that the world "fact" and "finite life" can possibly mean to us.

Still, however, the critic of the proposition that pain is rationally necessary, given a finite world, might raise a third theoretical possibility at this level of our argument. Why, he might continue, could not the Creator have instituted some more pleasant type of "warning", or sensation, or experience, that would have "sharply stimulated change"? Is it not possible, for instance, to conceive of the principle of sensory "pleasure" or "good feeling", to have been a sufficient stimulus of change in the presence of dangerous circumstances and forces? Might we not conceive, for example, of some neutral device, like the flashing of a vision of amber "light" in the mind when danger, either internally or externally, is present to the organism, as a sufficient or adequate warning?

To this phase of the question the theist would reply that part of the logical meaning of "pleasure" (and the hypothetical, mental light above mentioned would be a kind of neutral pleasure, warning of danger) is also the possibility of its opposite or deprivation of pleasure; and if deprivation is extreme or acute enough, do we not have the pain concept on our hands again? It must be admitted, of course, that the feeling of positive good or pleasure, or its anticipation, is for living beings often sufficient stimulation to important modes of action and change of situation. This is true in anticipation of sexual pleasure, normally of eating pleasure, or simply in the anticipation of a pleasant swim on a warm day, and many such other
pleasures. Does anticipation, however, of mere pleasure seem sufficient in cases of sudden and acute physical crisis? When the boulder is loosened and is plunging down the mountain side toward a man, there is needed the anticipation of acute pain, and even of total loss of life, in order to stimulate sufficiently quick change to a place of safety. (Integral to this kind of experience is, of course, also the anticipation of the well-being or "pleasure" that will be experienced in the safe spot when it is reached as one realizes that one has narrowly escaped serious injury and perhaps even death.) In such circumstances, the fear of the danger and consequent pain seems to be a logically integral or necessary coefficient in our formula, "a necessary stimulus of change."

What we have just said suggests the problem of "psychic pain," e.g. fear, disappointment, realization of one's ignorance of facts which are necessary to one's survival, etc. Here again our insight is that psychic pains are logical implications of finite existence as such, and of its basic will to live. If there is finite life at all, or desire to live, implied in such life is fear of forces that may assail it; disappointment when drives toward objectives are frustrated; frustration when one realizes that he is ignorant of the facts vital to fulfillment of drives. In sum, neither physical nor psychic pain is avoidable, given finite existence; integral to the logic of finite existence is the pain reflex, on both a physical and psychic level.

The Problem of Intense Pain

Having discussed the general necessity or rationality of the pain reflex in a developmental world of finite, or limited sentient individualities, based on finite structure and the possible breakdown of structure, we must next consider the problem of what may seem to be, from the standpoint of a sufferer, "excessive", "unnecessary",
or intensified and prolonged pain. If God is good and loving, and if his power is adequate, why is there in our world such pain, e.g., as caused by cancer and other debilitating and uselessly prolonged disease, bodily and mental? Such have been called "surd" or irrational evils. The deeper aspect of the question, as we have already indicated, concerns evil mutation.

In speaking to these issues, we should distinguish two levels of concern: There is (a) the problem of the "intense pain" or the suffering itself as such, and (b) the somewhat broader problem of the cosmic causes or agents of such suffering as cancer and other disease. Ultimately the causes of pain are disease germs, chemical imbalances or deficiencies, and the mutations that have given rise to disease germs or weakness of body.

(a) The problem of why intensified, or prolonged pain, which we may be inclined to call excessive or unnecessary, exists in our kind of world is in part a semantical problem. We do not mean by "semantical" to rule out the emotional and sentient reality of such pain, but we should make the effort to clarify terms precisely so that we may understand just exactly what the intention is of such expressions as "excessive" or "unnecessary", relative to pain.

Commonly, these terms indicate the point beyond which continued pain ceases to be a mere warning, or fails to contain remedial good as warning. Sentiently and emotionally to many sufferers there is pain which seems "excessive" or "unnecessary." Such expressions refer to intense discomfort beyond the apparent usefulness or purpose of pain as a necessary, biologically sharp stimulation urgently calling for change. Scientifically considered, however, the logic of pain in a finite world implies the possibility of its intensiveness under certain conditions. Accordingly, if intensity in pain is possible, the situation should not suggest the moral failure of the Creator, or His world. The term intensity is one of necessary description and simple fact. The problem of "excessiveness" of pain should really be stated as the problem of "intensity" of pain.
Finite process must sometimes suffer "intense pain" as an extreme possibility of sensitivity's very nature and rationale. This is understood when we realize that pain reflex has a range, from "mild" to "intense". Given the pain reflex in general, as a necessary form of experience, if finite beings are to learn to survive in an environmental world, it seems obvious or reasonable that pain reflex have a range. In general philosophic terms, degree of organization is the coefficient of pain; pain is an accompaniment of broken structure or smashed integration. When ingressive forces are violent enough and organic integration is complex enough, pain will be severe or intense, as the inevitable resultant of violent and extensive breakdown of normal, organic balances or structure. A mechanical kind of analogy (though, of course, it must not be pressed too far) may assist us at this place. The collapse of an apartment house, with its high degree of organization and complexity, would certainly be a "greater", more "severe", or "intense" kind of destruction than the fall of three matchsticks propped up to support each other. This may illustrate the problem of extreme pain. Acute pain indicates that larger destructive forces are at work upon, or within, the organism, and at areas which threaten greatly the total organism and its continued life as a whole. Given finite sentient (and psychic) integration, pain must be proportional, more or less, to the amount of disintegration and the degree of violence of the agressing or ingressing forces that disrupt organic tissue and processes.

In summation thus far, it seems to this writer that the possibility of "intense pain" is a rational corollary inhering in the pain reflex itself, which seems necessary to finite sentient life, in its limited, but high degree of organization and complexity. Given the factors of finite sentient life and its implied pain reflex, it follows that such reflex will have a range, with its upper levels. That a greater pain should call attention to a greater danger seems of logical value. That pain have a range, and upon occasion may reach a level of "severe intensity" seems a ration-
al consequence of the finite structuredness of existence. Intensity of pain refers to the possible range of negative sensitivity which the sensitivity principle implies.

It is questionable whether we should ever use the term "excessive" or "unnecessary" relative to pain. Pain is always logically "necessary," if organic beings are to be duly warned of threatening destructive forces. If those forces are larger, more aggressive themselves, the pain involved becomes simply more necessary, rather than less. Frequently, the idea of unnecessary pain refers to excess or intensity of its duration, and accordingly we should speak next of this.

The problem of prolonged pain, or intense pain temporarily, like the preceding problem of extremity in "amount" or "quantity," is best understood in terms of its logical possibility, given a world of sentient experience. The fact is that finite sentient existence is dominated by the basic will-to-live. Aggressive forces of disease, when they attack organisms, attack this, the deepest and strongest principle of finite existence—the will to live, the struggle to be. It seems inevitable that the conflict may be, and often is, prolonged, or temporarily severe, when aggressive forces are violent and the breakdown of integration is extensive. By "will-to-live," of course, we do not mean fully conscious or voluntary command over the issues of our own life or death, as a possibility of direct or immediate, internal willing. We cannot will our death as a normal possibility; although the voluntary or mental giving way of the desire to live is a frequent precursor of organic death. The depth of the will to live is psychically sub-conscious and rooted in the organic. In cases of intense suffering, there is frequently hope that the illness, or the affliction, or adversity, may abate, disclosing the stubborn will to live. The hope is normal; without it life could never have survived. The conflict of life's hope with the hazards of existence is our reason for the prolongation, often times, of pain.
It must be granted, of course, that there comes a point when hopelessness may set in, and at this point the wisdom and humaneness of the medical prolongation of life which is hopelessly suffering may be questioned. Prior to the days of modern medicine, "hopeless sufferers" died more promptly. Of course, "hopeless suffering" is a factor of inverse proportion to the extent of medical knowledge. It is not an absolute quotient, and the glory of modern medicine is that the elements of hopelessness, intensity, and necessity of suffering are being greatly reduced. In the view of a broad theism, it may be said that, during the days prior to modern medicine, the Creator did intervene in the cases of more hopeless suffering, as He worked through normal psychic and organic laws to effect an earlier and merciful death. Since the advent of modern medicine such a theism would see the love and purpose of God at work in modern medicine.

What has just been described about organic integration, its possible breakdown, and its suffering intense and prolonged physical pain, may likewise be affirmed of psychic integration, relative to mental pain and illness. Given the higher complexity of psychic integration in human beings, there is present the possibility of breakdown in rational coherence or in psychic structure. Again a mechanical analogy may not be wholly adequate, but there seems much general truth in the assertion that the finer and more complicated the piece of machinery, the more subject it is to possible breakdown. The human being's more complex psychic organization is the basis of his higher freedom, but possessing this higher organization and freedom we run a greater risk of nervous and mental breakdown than what seems true of lower animal life.

Furthermore, the problem of human mental illness is compounded by the complex social environment which men have created for themselves, and to which individuals must adjust. Nervous complexity and the complexity of the social environment makes very difficult the problem of tracing the causes of mental illness and of suggesting
its cure. Once again, however, our general point remains the same as it has been from the outset of our discussion, namely, given finite or limited, structured existence (in this case emotional, psychic, or mental structure) we have implied the possibility of breakdown.

The recent indications that some mental illness is caused by chemical problems tends to bear out the principle thesis of this study thus far, that pain, both organic and psychic, is a factor of our finite structured existence. The discovery seems wonderfully to reduce the enormity of mental illness, on the side of understanding its causality. If much of its causality is "mechanical", as suggested by chemical imbalances, there appears to be nothing inherently absolute or inevitable about mental illness, in our kind of higher, but finite psychic life; the road seems open toward eventual extensive relief from this kind of evil through advance in psychiatric and chemical medicine. The moral and social causality of mental breakdown is, of course, a more complex issue, which only the moral and social sciences can in the long run help to explain and to relieve.

We are now prepared to discuss the deeper level of the problem of excessive or prolonged pain which we indicated at "b" above. We said that the issue concerned the cosmic causes of pain, such as disease germs, or chemical imbalances or deficiencies; and behind this the "evil mutations" that give rise to germs in the first place, or those that fail to strengthen valuable forms of life against organic disease and imbalance by strengthening hereity. This profounder plane of our problem will present certain ultimate "theological" questions, relative to why God created the world and invested its process with freedom and limitation.

The Problem of Evil Mutation:
The Rationality of Finitude and Freedom

The preceding analysis of pain suggests that this form of evil is due to the finitude and freedom of natural process. Essentially, evil occurs when one type of
free process aggresses upon and destroys another. Thus, it seems reasonable to explain excessive organic pain and disease in these terms. Disease caused by microbes and even the more mysterious diseases like cancer, whose full causes still remain unknown, are due fundamentally to ingressions by destructive process, imbalances somehow in nature's laws. Bacterial disease is now largely under scientific control. How stirring to us to realize that medical science is approaching the control of cancer by chemical means. Actually the problem of cancer or other disease that may be such as certain forms of insanity, when once the imbalance due to chemical imbalance is understood and a cure foreseen, will not present so forbidding an aspect of the problem of evil as disease caused by microbes, or by destructive viruses, those active structures half way between living and non-living levels of process. Why did evolution produce the leprosy bacillus? Why is there such "evil mutation"?

In our attempt to clarify this no doubt deepest phenomenon of evil, the first thing we should recognize is that on its level of bacterial life, such mutation is a "successful" adaptation to a new situation within its environment. It is in this vein of thought that we discover some rational understanding of the problem of evil mutations, a vein which we must bring more into light in our remaining discussion.

Having presented these initial insights the honest critic of theism will ask at once, Why does God allow such mutation, which, from the higher standpoint of the personal value that it destroys, must be classified as an "evil"? The answer that seems reasonable is to affirm that such mutation, apparently, is the risk God must run in creating or bringing forth a finite world of freely developing process. The over-all rationality of such possibility seems born out by the thoughtful conclusions of genetical science itself. The geneticists Dunn and Dobzhansky write:

Harmful mutations and hereditary diseases are thus the price which the species pays for the plasticity which makes continued evolution possible.∗

∗ Heredity, Race, and Society, Mentor, p. 81, 1952.
What we say from here to our conclusion is the theological illumination of this scientific judgment.

Accordingly, from the standpoint of theism's solution to the problem of evil, the above quotation contains the idea of the neutrality of mutations as a necessary principle of, and relative to, physical process. The mutation of the genes makes the survival of life possible in the long run in any environment, or amid environmental changes, within, of course, upper and lower limits of temperature and other absolute environmental boundaries for life. In theistic faith, and from the standpoint of values, this "neutrality" of mutation would itself seem purposive, since its affect is that life does survive. To theistic faith, the immanent rationale of mutation is that life shall survive. Such seems a sufficient rational explanation—in terms of, and behalf of, life's free experimentation with adaptation—of the problem of "evil mutation", the problem of evil at its core. No mutation as such is evil, unless it destroys higher organized value, pointing toward personal value. The principle of mutation itself is good. Life as a whole would have been impossible without it.

At this place, however, the critic will ask, Could not the Creator have given some life the power of mutation and denied it to other forms? To which we would reply that mutation seems inherent in finite life as such; the principle of mutation is included in all the forms that have arisen out of the first "life germ". The general will to live of all orders of finite life, of which mutation seems the central expression, is good—such a general will to live in all forms would be the primary basis of any finite creation. Without it a finite creation is unthinkable. It is only when an impersonal force, or the will-to-live of one creature painfully destroys another, that the problem of evil arises. An ultimate question, then, which the critic asks of theism is, Why, in the first place, does God bring forth a world and the consequent possibility of pain? Actually there are three questions involved at this level of our analysis, which constitute the heart of the rationality of our proposition above
stated, that evil is due to the finitude and freedom of natural process. Accordingly, at this place we must consider the following primary theological issues (and we attempt to do so only in the spirit of reservation proper to discussion at such level):

First, Why does God create or bring forth at all? Belief in a Personal, moral Creator helps us to answer this question. God creates or brings forth the world out of sheer, outgoing love (Agape). Not only because of "the yearning of the divine for fellowship," as Seth Pringle Pattison has suggested, does God create; but God may create a finite order, and the conditions for the emergence of finite personality also for the sake of its own ultimate being and enjoyment of freedom. Of course, the enjoyment of freedom is realized only in and through the fellowship with God, ultimately, and that is why we can never wholly escape God's love. "Though I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there." But absolutely speaking, it is as if God, in order to fulfill His own nature as Love would continue to create a finite world, in which finite persons can come to be, even if all such beings in some ultimate pride were to forsake Him. Would not the love of God create a finite world, and the conditions for finite persons to be, endlessly for their own sake, and not alone for some response the Divine expects?

Second, Why does God bring forth finite, limited beings and not in the first place, some more perfected infinite being or world like Himself? We touched upon this type of problem earlier in our discussion. We suggest further here that Reality has to be One, or a single power, if there is to be rational world order. If God is conceived to create at all, He does not or cannot create other infinite Gods such as himself. That would violate His own living Unity and result in many and confusing standards of the Real.** Rather, if God creates at all, He creates beings of a finite

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** If we conceive that He created other infinite beings like Himself, perfected in his Type of character and power, there would still be the one type of Divine Nature, Love, and Purpose. Would not the principle of unity underlie the conception so that we would not depart from monotheism, but re-affirm it?
and subordinate order as an implication of His nature. It is good that God creates the world, not only as an expression of His own deepest nature as Agape, but also for the sake of the finite life and freedom in His world which His creative Agape implies. But finite existence means limitation, conflict upon occasion, toil, and pain, and doubtless intensive pain, where conflict in finite process is acute, and a higher order of finite structure and value is at stake in the conflict. These are the primal risks that a God of Love must run in conceiving and creating a finite world.

Third, Why does God create an order of freedom? Another way to state this question is to ask Why God has not commenced with a world "morally perfected" at its outset, and continue it as such throughout its history? Such a question takes us into the intrinsic idea of "moral", and we perceive that the idea of a moral world or moral process is intimately related to freedom. Sometimes it is supposed that a "perfected" moral world would be one in which neighborliness and love were automatic or pre-determined effects. But such relationships could be guaranteed in this sense only if there were no finite freedom. The world must be in some real sense free; for, if it were not, it would not be possible for creature with a moral nature to arise within it, to grow, and to become responsible agents on their own account. A world absolutely mechanically guaranteed as to its moral relationships by some kind of obtrusive, Divine fiat, would not be a moral world at all. It could only be a world of material atoms, not one of free persons. As Harris Franklin Rall writes, "...the good can never be handed over as a finished product to a passive recipient...it can only be an achievement."** The very meaning of "love" and "neighborliness" stand for affection and helpfulness freely given. No relationship is "moral" if it is not founded in a free motive. Our world must be one in which finite beings freely achieve the good, if it is to be a moral world.

* This is why we say that the question, Who made God? is "childish", i.e. irrational. The concept itself of God renders illogical the idea of Gods creating Gods in infinite regression. Creation needs only one God of adequate moral purpose and power; more than one such God would be superfluous, and therefore irrational. The concept of God means His eternal purpose and power, and this implies his single nature, and rationally excludes the idea of others like Him or prior to Him.

** Christianity, p. 327, Scribners, 1941.
What we have just said recalls the frequent Christian emphasis on the moral necessity of freedom as the proper explanation for moral evil or sin, and what we are here attempting to do is to apply the criterion of freedom as explanation of "natural evil" at the lower ranges of process in animal evolution, out of which man has organically sprung. The basic premises or criteria of moral existence at the human level would logically apply, to some extent at least, to the antecedent levels of process which gave rise to the human level. If there is continuity between life and all process, as evolution seems to teach, freedom on the higher levels of personal life would have had its preparation in a commitment of the world process to freedom, or descending degrees of freedom, in sufficient depth, no doubt, to account for the emergence of our "evil mutations" above described. The law of freedom must underly the universe as a whole, if it is a place of moral process and growth.

Basically we must define "moral" in terms of the values of free choice and the responsibility that comes with choice. The evolution of life is the evolution of the experiment of choice, of the practice of choice. May we not understand the principle of mutation itself to be the profoundest or most universal level of "choice"? What is true about the moral requirement of freedom and responsibility on the human plane of life, may be applied, at least by way of analogy, to the evolution of life as a whole.

When a certain development in the evolutionary history of living forms "chooses" an ill-adapted mutation, the inevitable consequence of that selection or development is death to that species. In other words, what is represented constantly on our own level of higher freedom in the case of human choices, seems also illustrative, at least to considerable extent, of the evolution of life as a whole. To say that what applies to life at its highest level must also to some extent apply to life at lower levels and as a whole seems reasonable, if all life to be continuous with itself and
our world a coherent one. When the mutation occurred that took that particular evolutionary development leading to the dinosaur group, all the risks were accepted by that phase of organic process at that juncture—the "positive risks" that size and strength would take those species far and long, but also the "negative risks" that lack of brain capacity, or the incapacity for the evolution of intelligence, might eventually contribute to their extinction. Evolution has created life by educating life.

Concluding Premises

The theistic explanation of pain and evil mutation rests on certain premises. These seem rationally necessary as the fullest, or most coherent judgments concerning basic matters of process and reality. One of these is the empirical judgment that all life has continuity or unity. Another is that some device was necessary whereby life could freely adapt itself in order for there to be (1) organic evolution, development, or adaptation, and (2) ultimately spiritual evolution or moral adaptation, as the inherent possibility of higher human freedom. Such a device we find in the principle of mutation, with its mysterious fecundity, implying a near limitless possibility of form, and resident in the "first life germ," and present even possibly at sub-living levels of nature and process. If these premises or principles be granted, and they seem to describe the very heart of the evolutionary process, we have in them considerable justification of the world as she has gone on, and is. Such a picture may help us to see, at least to some extent, why in the course of process, even such a thing as a disease germ, harmful to its host, might arise as a necessary risk within the total or unified stream we call "life" and its "evolution" or "creation". Our ultimate evaluation of the presence of disease germs must be understood in the context of mutation; and we understand that the world of life as a whole could not have come to be without mutation. But a world such as ours, even one in which there
lies some risk of evil mutation, if the product as a whole would have been impossible without the risk, seems a justifiable world.

Our second premise above is that the principles or causes of evolution as we know them have after all been "ideal" means for the evolution of life toward responsible moral intelligence, for they are the only principles conceivable that could account for organic evolution. Inherent in it was all the possibility of moral growth which we empirically perceive and also subjectively experience as possible. The factors or cause of evolutionary change, in the mutation of the genes, are precisely those that have made finite freedom possible, with all of its higher potentials that we acknowledge as men. These therefore seem the utmost rational factors, and, accordingly from the standpoint of value, factors of utmost good. If the product, finite freedom, could have come to be in no other conceivable way than by mutation and evolution, then the process as we know it is moral. The end must surely justify the means, in this case, if there is only one means, which, furthermore, in and of itself, seems to be rational and without intrinsic evil. We have suggested above how the means, mutation, as a general principle is intrinsically good.

The final premise of a faithful, rational theism, regarding the mutational mode of world development must be the following. It relates to the ultimate question regarding evil, to which we have already alluded, and which we rephrase here. "Why could not Deity, by employing some kind of transitive power, at once destroy a mutant, immediately when it appeared, which could only be an evil to itself or to higher organized value? Our reply is, that given mutation at all, we must have mutation throughout. If mutation is in life by necessary premise, (2) above, its consequences also must appear, and its operations carry through to their end. If the Creator denied its operation, or the fruits of its operation (even though those fruits sometimes must be classified from the standpoint of higher systems of value as "evil") at one point in life, would he not have to deny it at all points where the outcome
seems doubtful? Would not, however, such a transitive approach by God jeopardize life as a whole? If Deity experiments with finite freedom at all, His major purpose in so doing is to see what such freedom will make of itself. There is always the possibility, given the plasticity of evolution as we know it, that a form which is, or seems, now evil, may in the future mutate further in such a way as to work ultimate good for itself or to others concerned. That mutation which determined the development of man's puny size, relative to some animal forms, was compensated by the mutation which eventually resulted in his brain, the superior organ of intelligence in the animal kingdom. In our present conclusion we have been talking in part about mutation toward harmful parasites. We should recall therefore that the original type of mutation which produced harmful parasites has produced many parasites that live in symbiotic and necessary relationship to their hosts. Furthermore, it now seems a fact of genetical science that evil mutations, even evil parasitic mutations, tend to kill themselves off by the operation of natural selection."

The general facts of the necessity of mutation as the basic principle of life and its adaptation; of the general wisdom and good inhering in the very concept of a finite order of structure and individuality, such as we have been describing our world to be; these larger positive facts of existence as we know it seem to justify the over-all conclusion, which may be uttered with a fair degree of moral certitude and faith, that our world is, after all, regarding necessary process, "the best possible world"; for, in many ways, it seems the only kind of world imaginable in which freedom is possible, and not only possible, but has been and is a major fact. And moral freedom can make it a world of best value in ultimate fulfillment of its possibilities as now a world of best process.

In conclusion, we suggest that the foregoing line of reasoning renders unnecessary Brightman's "Finite God" idea, with its hypothesis of the Given, or the dark abysmal side of the Divine Nature.

The Problem of Moral Evil

The problem of moral evil or sin, to put it in the classic way, is to ask why God permits "man's inhumanity to man"? Fundamentally moral evil or sin may be defined as disrespect for personality, and, specifically in its social meaning, as aggression by human beings on other human life. A rational theism believes that it satisfactorily explains this phenomenon in terms of human freedom as a moral necessity of man's nature. The accumulative factors that make for or add up to man's inhumanity to man, are, of course, on the personal side, the factors of ignorance, of indifference or inertia toward the needs or the sufferings of other, and of positive malice; and on the social side, evil laws and institutions, bad cultural habits and patterns. (We prefer to limit the term "sin" to positive malice; leaving the expression "social evil" to stand for other ranges of inhumanity.) All of these agencies and instrumentalities of man's inhumanity to his fellow men, of "sin", or "near-sin", and social evil are -- in the over-all picture -- a result of human freedom; and, they may, by striving, be overcome by man's freedom, both in individual and in social life.

St. Augustine, in Book II of his essay On the Freedom of the Will, asked in a classic way, Why did God create man free to sin? and replied that freedom is the premise of a moral universe:

"...if man is something good and can not act rightly except when he wishes, he ought to have a free will without which he could not act rightly. For it is not to be believed that, because sin is committed by it too, God gave free will for sin. Therefore, since without it man can not live rightly, there is cause enough why it should have been given."

In more modern terms it has been said, "moral evil is the product of finite free will which is itself a good". * Or "it is better to be able to choose, think, discern, and decide wrongly than not to be able to decide at all". **

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* Peter Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1951, p. 401, Prentice Hall.

** Noreen Welch, student, 1959.
The foregoing thesis of the moral "necessity" of freedom, if ours is to be a moral universe, seems a satisfactory answer to the moral level of the problem of evil. The meaning of man as a "moral being", and the meaning of the universe as a whole as "moral", includes at its center the idea of human freedom. The universe would not be a moral place or process if it did not have finite rational freedom of our human kind, with its consequent responsibility and possibility of growth and development. Lacking finite freedom at the level we are now discussing it, the universe would simply be at best an amoral place. This seems to be good logic, and good moral philosophy; it is coherent and sufficient.

But lest the sincere agnostic or humanist critic yet believe that the above type of reply to the problem of moral evil represents a too facile traditionalism, let us paint the picture of man's inhumanity to man or moral evil in some graphic and dire, and yet true historic form. For example, why did God permit such a thing as a medieval torture chamber, or Hitler's murder of millions of Jews, and the torment of modern concentration camps? Why does he not dispatch "legions of Angels" or employ some other direct divine power to deal with such specific forms of moral evil, in order to alleviate some terrible and innocent human suffering? Truly, such a picture as this or some other which one might imagine, arouses righteous indignation and even a "holy wrath".

The response of a rational theism to a question of this kind turns once again to the fact and necessity of freedom in life, if life is to have a moral quality. And a counter question may be fairly raised, if you allow that divine power should morally have directly intervened in such cases of innocent suffering. We may ask, where would one stop with the judgment that divine power should intervene in the cases of man's inhumanity to man? Just as logically, in each and every single case of inhumanity -- whether gross, or less gross, dire or less dire -- the world over and throughout all history; in every family relationship, when, for example, in the hardness of parents' hearts a Romeo was kept from his Juliette; in every relationship of
neighbor to neighbor, in each and every instance of a group's oppression of another group of human beings, of a king's sending an innocent commoner to the Tower; of a nation's aggression against another nation; of Soviet tanks suppressing the Hungarian freedom fighters; of a cheating and deceitful business transaction; of the total sorry treatment of men by men, in personal, political, or economic power situations—the critic could not, with consistent logic, deny our insistence that God should intervene to make the world a "perfect" but, of course, a puppet order. If God should have intervened at Dachau or Buchenwald, he should have intervened in the Little Rock school integration crisis, or in any other. Why would God not strike any injustice in the face with a lightning bolt? But what would such all-powerful, direct, and universal intervention do to human freedom and our ultimate moral responsibility and personal integrity as men? Presumably, as we have said, God's relationship to the world at its upper levels of such freedom cannot be in terms of coercive, transitive, or mechanical power.

As Rall in his trenchant analysis points out, God’s power is not irresistible, externalistic, or compulsive; God’s power is not abstract, but of a specific kind, conditioned by his nature: as creative, bringing forth a finite world and lesser beings, “he limits himself by that very fact: for creation means giving something of his own life to lesser beings, and life in any creature means a certain power of its own”. As reason, “so he acts according to that reason and order which form his very being”. As goodness and love he chooses only high ends and “uses appropriate means”—sympathy, sacrifice, even suffering and persuasion. In sum, in His relation to the higher orders of freedom God acts through truth, which “waits upon the receiving mind”, and through love, which waits upon the receptive heart.*

In sum for moral evil, two premises or foundational insights stand out for our guidance in this area of reasoning:

* Christianity, Schribners, 1941, p. 325–6
Recall that

1. The moral superiority of freedom to non-freedom. This point was well said by a former student: "It is better to be able to choose, think, discern, and decide wrongly than not to decide at all." Or as Peter Bertocci phrased it: "Moral evil is the product of finite free will which is itself a good."

2. God's ultimate approach to the world of moral freedom must itself be moral rather than mechanical, i.e. persuasive rather than compulsive. We call the reader's attention to the full passage by Harris Franklin Rall on this point, p. , and again cite the inspiration of a former student:

   "If God desires good in man, yet permits evil, it must be because he is a God of love, who prefers persuasion rather than compulsion. Compelled goodness would not be genuine, and would defeat God's purpose. True, if our conduct were mechanically perfect like a machine, such harmony would fulfill the purpose of the maker, but it could not fulfill any ideas of its own. ...the exclusion of the possibility of moral evil in this world would make the world something other than a moral order."**

A Personalistic Definition of Evil

It is not sufficient to say merely that evil may be defined as failure or abortion of natural process (as Aristotle might have defined it), or even to say, as St. Augustine did, that evil is a privation of being, or disintegration of organized being and value. We ultimately want to know what "proper organization" and value are? Accordingly, we are faced with the necessity of a "personalistic" definition of evil. Evil is process on any level which hinders the coming to be, personal growth, health, and social harmony of finite personal beings. A tornado sweeping over a barren rock at sea is not evil. Accordingly, any factor that disrupted or hindered the evolutionary development of the world toward this major end or value, would be evil. Evil

* Moreen Welch, Spring 1959.

** Introduction to Philosophy of Religion, Prentice Hall, 1951, p. 401.

would be the deprivation of existence and process of the ultimate possibility of becoming personal, that is to say, of issuing in finite persons, and providing opportunity for their personal well-being.

There does not seem to have been, of course, judging by general empirical evidence, such a total evil as the preceding definition implies, since process has issued in personal life. There have, of course, been many temporary evils that have hindered, retarded, and challenged this process, in the course of human history and in the course of nature prior to and below history. Process faces such evils today, and will tomorrow. But process toward the personal has gotten a good start, in spite of evils, and there is much intimation of the coming ultimate victory of good. (Our subsequent chapters on man and moral value will help to define the "well-being" implied in the foregoing definition.)

Finally, in some defense of this definition, we should say that it need not be a narrowly "anthropomorphic" understanding of evil, which leaves out the entire animal kingdom below man. On the contrary, it is so stated as definitely to include that lower order of life. Evolution has taught us that there is continuity of our life with that of the animals; there is organic and intimate relationship. Our life could not have been without the preceding eras of nature's prolific experimentation with many kinds of living forms prior to the appearance of man. Accordingly, in a general sense, what may be evils for man would be evils for the totality of life, or that living phase of existence that has prepared for man. And also, putting the matter in another way, it is a simple fact of observation that what is evil for man is very often evil for animals too. The animal species have been necessary steps toward the ultimate personalization of finite being. The will to live is common to both the higher and lower orders of life, and, in general, the will to live is the first "good" of the universe. Without it, a finite developmental process of "life" could not be;
but with it, or out of it, comes the eventual personalization of life. Accordingly, our personalistic definition of evil expressed above includes the total context of life in a universe which makes personalistic life ultimately possible.

Some Replies to David Hume

Douglas Clyde Macintosh*, on the Organization Of the World, the Understanding of Evil, and the Process by Which Evil is Overcome

"Our final topic under theological theory is the question as to whether our view of the nature and character of God and of his relations to man and the universe will stand the test of criticism in face of the evils which exist in the world. The most insistent problem with regard to evil is undoubtedly the practical problem — how to get rid of it. But the more theoretical problem of evil — the problem as to how, in the presence of so much evil in the world, it is not unreasonable to believe in the existence of a God both great enough and good enough for the religious needs of man — this, too, becomes in the end a practical problem, since the vitality of a theistic faith for thoughtful people depends in no small measure upon their finding a tolerable intellectual adjustment at this point.

"This religious problem of evil is one in face of which some systems of theology simply collapse in self-contradiction. This is true, for example, of the theology which affirms on the one hand the absolute moral perfection and absolute omnipotence of God and his complete predetermination of all facts and events, the evil as well as the good, and yet maintains on the other hand that for the moral evil which has come into existence in human life men will be punished with inconceivably sever and absolutely endless torments. Well may the problem of evil be given up in such a system as insoluble.

* From Theology as an Empirical Science, Macmillan, 1927 ed., Part III, p. 216-229. Macintosh was the noted professor of Theology and philosopher of religion at Yale University Divinity School from 1909 to 1942.
"In undertaking to consider the question as to whether any self-consistent view is possible which shall at once meet the requirements of our empirically founded religious assurances and square with the experienced facts of evil, it is easily evident that certain doctrines are virtually excluded from the outset. This is particularly true of that exaggerated and misguided optimism which would maintain that even at present 'all's well with the world', that the world we live in is in all respects the best possible world -- in short that 'whatever is, is right'. But on the other hand our theological theory would suggest the question as to whether any view is not unduly pessimistic if it holds concerning the world (at least in its general constitution and as it is dependent upon the willed activity of God) that it is not a good kind of world -- or even the best possible kind -- in which to have man begin his development. In distinction from both of these positions, the unduly pessimistic and the inconsiderately optimistic the thesis we would undertake to defend is this: that while this world is far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless in view of its general constitution it may be regarded as the best possible kind of world in which to have man begin his development, and that the evils which exist in the world furnish no good reason for abandoning belief in a God who is both good enough and great enough to meet every real religious need.

"The best possible kind of world must be a world of law and order. This seems a pretty obvious assertion with which to begin. The physical world, as a world of law, gives all living beings a steady and dependable platform upon which to stand. To its uniform processes the organism may adjust its activities and learn to make habitual the most favorable adjustments. Indeed, if the world were not thus essentially dependable in its processes, it would seem that no real or permanent progress in the constitution or activities of organic beings could be looked for. No habit could be any better than any other habit; no character any better than any other character.
"But the ruthless processes of natural law, admitting of no exceptions in order to spare the individual organism or any other object, inevitably tend and not infrequently lead to the injury or even to the violent and premature death of organic beings, human as well as other, and to the destruction of objects which have value for living beings. The lives of men and animals and the existence of objects of value are exposed from time to time to various 'accidents', in all of which the impartial, law-abiding processes of nature are involved. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tempests, floods, fires, extremes of heat and cold, diseases of all sorts -- these and other disaster-bringing events are incidental to the world we live in being a world of undeviating natural law.

"Now it is all very well to enlarge upon the desirability of a world of law and order, but would it not be well if there were a way of intervening in this world of mechanical and chemical law, for the guarding of life and objects of value from the injury and destruction that would otherwise befall them? And in order that this intervention should not break up the orderliness and dependableness of the world, and thus lead to confusion and stagnation, might it not be well that it should be not a process of suspending the laws of the physical world, but one of introducing new factors whose processes would themselves be according to their own laws and uniformities?

"This may seem a good deal to ask -- an intervention in a world of law, which would yet be no breach of law, but itself the exemplification of law, a sort of law-abiding miracle -- but as a matter of fact it is just this which we find in existence in the world in which we live. In the processes of sensation we see this law-abiding miracle for the protection of the living organism and its possessions. Sight, hearing, sensations of taste, smell, touch, heat and cold, pleasant sensations and sensations of pain -- these are the desired protective processes made, as it were, to order."
Miraculous as they are from the standpoint of the merely mechanical, chemical and physiological, they are nevertheless perfectly orderly and law-abiding, being definitely conditioned upon certain events in the nervous system, and exhibiting certain inner uniformities (physical laws) of their own.

"The serviceable function of sense-processes is well known. Sight, hearing, and the sense of smell not only enable men and animals to avoid many enemies and threatening dangers; they also make it possible for them to secure their own food and the other necessities of life. Sensations of sight, smell and taste are associated with the activities involved in satisfying appetites which in the main operate to preserve the life of the individual or of the race. And one of the most indispensable of sensations is the sensation of pain in its various forms and combinations. Where quick or decisive reversal of conditions is necessary, if injury to the organism is to be avoided, a special sort of sensations, sharply stimulating to change, is called for; and this is what we have, as a blessing in disguise, in the sensation of pain. If the burning of the flesh, exposure to extreme heat or cold, bodily exhaustion, hunger, thirst, wounds and conditions of acute disease were not normally accompanied by the sensations of pain, all the 'higher' and more complicated forms of animal life would soon be killed off by the ruthless operation of natural forces. Indeed, in the light of the now well-established evolutionary view of the origin of species, the human species included, we can say that a world without any pain in it would have been a world in which men could never have appeared; his animal ancestors would have been killed off long before the biological conditions for the appearance of the human species had been reached.

"It seems clear, then, that a world in which there occur, in a law-abiding way, sensations of many sorts, including sensations of pain, is a much more desirable kind of world from the standpoint of the well-being of physical life and all that depends
upon it, than any world of physical law without such processes of sensation. But it may be objected that in this law-abiding character of sensation there is involved a good deal of pain which is not of immediate use to physical life. For example, just because, when certain bodily conditions exist, certain sensations appear, there is often much pain in connection with incurable disease, and even in curable cases pain may continue for some time after the appropriate remedy has been applied. Moreover, biologically necessary operations are often accompanied by intense suffering. Of course, it is to be recognized that pain which is not directly and immediately valuable for the life of the body may still prove, in the case of man, valuable for moral discipline. Theoretically, it would seem, this ought to be true of all human pain ultimately. Besides, most systems of education and reform provide for the deliberate addition of pain of one sort or another, for the sake of correction and discipline. Thus much pain that is not immediately and directly useful for the life of the body may come to have biological value, ultimately and indirectly. And yet, when all has been said, it would seem that there is, by virtue of the law-abiding processes of sensation, a good deal of suffering, human and animal, which, it is not unreasonable to suppose, the would would be much better without. While it is not easy to prove that any human suffering will be absolutely useless, there can be little doubt that much of it is needless.

"Would it not be well, then it may be asked, if there were a way of intervening so as to regulate the life of sense, and especially sensations of pain, in order that needless pain might be reduced to a minimum? It would be desirable, however, on general principles, that any such intervening process should not involve a suspension of the laws of sensation, and that it should proceed according to laws of its own. This amounts to a demand, once more, for a 'law-abiding miracle'; but it is a demand which we find already granted. Just such a factor of modification in the life of sense, intervening without suspending the laws of sensation and in a way that is according to laws of its own, we find to exist in the activity of thought."
Thought observes sensations and their conditions, remembers them, and anticipates future possibilities, probabilities and certainties. Such thought leads to knowledge of the conditions of pain, and when combined with consideration of what pain, on the one hand, is valuable for guidance or discipline, and what pain, on the other hand, is unnecessary this knowledge tends to lessen the amount of needless suffering. By taking thought man can anticipate and avoid unnecessary and disagreeable experiences. For example, he can learn to avoid the pains that follow excess in the pursuit of pleasure. By 'taking pains' enough to study the causes of undesirable effects, he has been able, on behalf of others as well as for himself, to provide against very much greater future pains. The discovery of anaesthetics is simply a conspicuous example of the law-abiding intervention of thought in the processes of sensation.

"But thinking is a means of intervening, not only to prevent pain and modify other sense-experiences for the better; it can work against physical disasters directly. Especially in the overcoming of disease, scientific investigation has accomplished wonderful results, and it is probably not too much to say that science has made it possible for twice as many people to live twice as long as formerly. And science, of course, is not the whole of thought, but only its more methodical development.

"But while thought is a most important means of intervening for the prevention of needless suffering and for the more effective safeguarding of life and property, it must be admitted that it is not always as successful as could be wished. In fact, there is evil in the realm of thought, intellectual evil in the form of ignorance and positive error, and this further complicates our original problem. Sometimes error as to the ends to be pursued, or as to the means to be employed, or mere ignorance and vacuity of mind may cause an immense amount of unnecessary suffering
and disaster to life and objects of value. Not only is there often failure, through ignorance, to remedy remediable evils; there is often the imposition of additional suffering and destruction of life as the direct result of erroneous ideals. Religious persecution is a case in point.

"But not only are ignorance and error, as results of inadequate thought, themselves evils and the occasion of further evils in the way of suffering and disaster. Exact, scientific thinking may serve to make injurious processes all the more potent and disastrous. Science serves to make crime more skillful and to make war so destructive as to threaten the future existence of the race.

"Does it not seem desirable, then, that there should be some intervention in the life of thought, such as might direct it into beneficent channels, making information more accurate and complete, and the whole process of thought more effective for good? No doubt such intervention would be desirable, provided it did not unduly interfere with the dependable order of the universe in the realm of the physical, or in the life of sensation or thought, but took place only under definite conditions and within narrow and discoverable limits.

"This third call for normal 'miracle' has also been anticipated in the constitution of human nature. In the human will, or capacity for voluntary attention, we find a way of intervening for the direction and concentration of thought, so that ignorance and error may in the normal and dependable way be progressively overcome, and the whole thought process directed towards eliminating needless suffering and disaster and realizing in a more positive way the truest human ideals.

"This miracle of human free will carries with it immense possibilities of making the world a better place for man to live in. Our doctrine that the world in its general constitution is the best possible kind of world does not mean that it is as good a world as it ever can be. While remaining a world of physical law, and one in
which there occur the orderly miracles of sensation and thought, our world may be made, by virtue of human free agency, a much better world than it is or ever has been. If all human wills were as good and efficient as, by virtue of their freedom, they might be, thought would become so much more effective for good, that the life of sense would be so unified for the better, and physical evils so guarded against, as ultimately to make the conditions of life on the earth in most respects almost ideal. Apart from the final inevitableness of physical death — a fact which involves problems which we must presently consider — it may be said that if only the wills of men were as well-disposed as they might be, there would be little or nothing to regret, ultimately, in such injurious accidents and biologically unnecessary sufferings as might still persist through man's not yet having learned how to prevent them. Is it not better that man should have the training in mind and character involved in finding out how to combat disease and other causes of pain and disaster than that by some arbitrary and purely magical miracle these evils should be removed without any human effort, and so without any training of the human intellect or will? Moreover, the possibility of training in fortitude involved in the facing of unavoidable danger, and in the endurance of unpreventable pain, is surely not a thing to be regretted. Neither does it seem desirable that the race should be without any such training in social sympathy and helpfulness as is made possible by the fact of actual or threatened suffering and loss. Nor, finally, would it be well for humanity to be without the socially unifying spectacle of individuals, voluntarily and for the good of others, undertaking courses of action which necessarily involve great suffering for themselves.

"With the exception of the problem involved in the inevitable death of the individual, our general problem of evil might now be regarded as solved, if this free will of man, to which we have referred, were always at the same time a good will. But the very fact of free will, which is the necessary condition of good choices, and consequently of the development of moral character and a good will, also makes evil choices
possible, with their many unfortunate consequences, including the development of immoral character and an evil will. Moreover, this evil will tends to make evil choice habitual, and so to aggravate its own evil condition. Besides, moral evil is very potent in increasing the other kinds of evil to which we have referred, viz., needless injury and disaster to life and its values, needless suffering, and needless ignorance and error. Through man's inhumanity to man, the world is far from being the best possible world. Universal and permanent good will in man would make heaven on earth, but the evil human will has gone far -- in war, for instance -- toward making hell on earth.

"And yet what is desirable is not the taking away of human freedom of choice and action. Other things being equal, a world of human free agency is the best possible kind of world. Without it moral personality would be impossible. Man would be a mere mechanical puppet, some of whose actions were mysteriously accompanied by process of completely predetermined sensation and thought. But a world of moral freedom is one in which it is possible for man to learn the right way of life, if not through the preferred way of anticipating possible evil and avoiding it, then through the bitter consequences of thoughtless or wilful wrong-doing. The case, then, is similar to that of intellectual evil. There is danger in free thought and investigation, lest one fall into error, with its unfortunate consequences. There is danger, similarly, in free choice and action, lest one fall into sin and its many consequent evils. But it is better to think than not to think, and better to choose than not be able to choose. The possibility of moral personality and of continual progress towards an ever-developing moral ideal is without doubt worth the risk of individual choices of moral evil.

"But in view of the seriousness of moral evil and its consequences, and considering the costliness and uncertain efficacy of learning to do right through experiencing the painful consequences of doing wrong, it seems highly desirable that there
should be yet another way of intervening, this time in the life of the human will, to guard against this peculiarly serious form of evil, viz., human sin. But it is desirable also that this intervention should occur without destroying the orderliness of nature or of the life of sense and thought and without interfering with the freedom of human choice and action. This again may seem a great deal to ask, but it is not too much. Provision has been made for just this sort of normal intervention, in the miracle of moral salvation through the right sort of religious dependence.* This experience of salvation from sin through the right adjustment of the life to God is not forced upon anyone; human freedom is not violated, and happily so, for there could be no moral salvation if it were. But if all individuals were to fulfill as fully as possible the religious conditions of salvation from sin, the world we live in would come to seem to us so nearly the best possible world, that it would be easy to believe it to be the best possible kind of world for the first stages of man's development. If, then, the world is not what it would be if man were to make as full use as he might of the source of moral renewal in religious experience at its best, the fault is his own. The world as a world of human freedom, even in the matter of choosing or rejecting moral salvation, is a better kind of world than one of any other imaginable sort would be, whether it were a world in which developing creatures could never need salvation because they were not free and so could not sin, or a world in which there was sin but no provision for salvation, or a world in which an external 'salvation', so called, was forced upon the individual without his choice or against his will, and so at the expense of his moral personality....

*Macintosh's conception of the "right sort of religious dependence", or the normal miracle of "moral salvation" is the theme of this great book as a whole -- perhaps best summarized in Part II, Chapters 4 and 5, respectively entitled, "Revelation in the Christian Experience of Salvation" and "The Laws of Empirical Theology", pp. 132-166.
power to live is nevertheless soon reached. Every human individual, however valuable he may be as a means of human betterment or as an end in himself, must ultimately part with this material body and disappear from the earthly life of the race.

"Now so far as the well-being of the human race on earth is concerned, it is no doubt better that all must ultimately die than that there should be no such thing as bodily death. If the latter were the case, the earth would soon be full of old people, there would be no room for new generations, and the resulting racial stagnation may be left to the imagination to depict. If only it were possible to be assured that all the essential values of individual personality were somehow conserved, in spite of the death of the body, it would be possible to maintain that even a world in which physical death is universally inevitable is still the best possible kind of world in which to have the human individual pass the first stage of his development.

"But is it possible to find a reasonable basis for believing that the death of the body does not mean the end of those values that are bound up inseparably with personal existence? What is called for is one more normal and universally dependable miracle, viz., the miracle of personal immortality." Hence we would conclude that even a world in which the ultimate physical death of all human beings is inevitable may still be, so far at least as that is concerned, the best possible kind of world to be the scene of the first stage of man's development. The death of the body may be but the liberation of the spirit to enter upon a further and possibly more untrammeled stage in its development.

"We have thus indicated the solution of the religious problem as to how the fact of evil in the world is compatible with the sufficient greatness and goodness of God. It may be well to summarize briefly the main course of our discussion. A physical world of absolutely dependable law and order is a better basis for the development

* Macintosh presents the case for immortality in Part I, Chapter IV, and Part III, Chapter IV of TES.
of physical life than any alternative that can be suggested. But the working out of the natural processes in such a world tends to prove disastrous at times to physical life and to objects having value for life. A means of guarding against such disasters without violating physical law is to be found in the facts of sensation, including pain. Sensation itself occurs according to law, and consequently under certain circumstances there tend to be instances of needless pain. A means of guarding against such needless pain, and also against disaster to life, is to be found in thought. The processes of thought occur according to physical law, and consequently under certain circumstances there tends to be erroneous thought. A means of guarding against error is to be found in the capacity of directing attention, within necessary limits and yet in a free and creative way. This free agency, however, while indispensable for the development of moral personality, also necessarily involves the possibility of moral evil, which when it becomes actual, carries with it a train of error, needless suffering and disaster or injury to life and objects of value. A means of guarding effectively against moral evil is to be found in the religious experience of moral salvation, an experience which occurs without violation of the laws of nature or of mind, and without violating the free agency of man. But in spite of these normal miracles of sensation, thought, free will, and the religious experience of moral salvation, there remains the inevitable fact of physical death.

The complete solution of the problem of evil thus requires the postulate of the further miracle of the soul's survival of bodily death -- a miracle assurance of which may be found in a type of religious experience which is universally valid and accessible to all who are willing to fulfil the necessary conditions. These are the miracles we can be assured of, and they are the only ones we need to be assured of to be able to maintain that however far, through man's misuse of freedom, the world may fall short of being, as yet, the best possible world, it is nevertheless the best
possible kind of world to be the scene of the first stages of man's development. And through man's co-operation with God, undertaken in dependence upon God, this best possible kind of world may be brought more and more into conformity with the ideal of the best possible world.

Harris Franklin Rall, W. R. Sorley, and F. R. Tennant
on the Idea of "Divine Power" and the "Goodness"

of the World

"The whole problem of evil needs a new consideration involving, first, an analysis of underlying ideas whose meaning has been taken for granted, and, second, a better use of our present knowledge, that is, of the great Christian insights on the one hand and of modern knowledge on the other. The underlying ideas that demand our study are the good as it relates to man and the ideas of goodness and power as they refer to God. It is not only the popular writers but the philosophers whose treatment has been superficial; and too often the high insights of the Christian faith have been lacking in the discussions of the theologians.

1. What do we mean by the good for man? Back of most discussion is the hedonistic assumption: hardship and toil and pain are the great evils of life, pleasure and ease are its great good. Thus for John Stuart Mill the benevolence of God means that the one aim of creation is 'the happiness of his creatures.' Against this we must set the Christian conception: Life is the only good, life in which man's highest possibilities are being achieved. That means vision and desire, truth as liberating insight and never-ending search, love that brings both joy and pain, ideals that are infinitely above us and that yet are our only true life. It means God, the

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* Rall: Christianity, pp. 321-337.
God who casts down and lifts up, who is our judgment and our hope, our endless quest and our only peace. But one thing it is not, this good that is life: it is not something outside us. It is not any possible creation of engineer and architect, though this were God himself...."

"2. What, we must ask next, is our conception of the goodness of God? It is certainly not that sentimental indulgence which often passes for this with men, especially in the idea of parental love. The goodness of God is, indeed, as tender as that of a mother, as patient as a father's love, pitiful as belonging to one who knows all our need and enters into all our pain, and wide as the heavens above and the race of men below. But this love is ethical, redemptive, creative. His goodness is good will, that is, it is a high and fixed purpose aiming at the supreme good of man. It is redemptive and therefore set against all evil. It is creative: it is goodness at work, active, unswerving, sparing no toil or pain in itself or in its object, seeking to give its own life to this creature man, not intent on granting pleasure and sparing sorrow, but rather on the creation in men, and the sharing with men of its own life, the life of truth and wisdom, of holiness and love.

"3. The concept of the power of God needs even closer scrutiny.... Power is thought of in the abstract, as power in general; it is conceived as absolute, irresistible; it is treated as external force. The criticism of these ideas will help us to a true conception."

"(1) It is a mistake to talk of power in the abstract: power is always of a specific kind. To speak of power in and by itself is simply to deal in words. Power is the ability of any being to act or function according to its peculiar nature and to accomplish its ends. The strength of a Hercules is physical. His five-foot wife may possess a moral power which can wrap him around her finger. An 'absolute' dictator with all his armies cannot compel confidence and affection. The idea of power in the abstract is like that idea of being in the abstract, or 'pure being,' which,
taken over by theology, led to the idea of a God wholly opposite to man and utterly remote, to whom, since every determination was supposed to mean negation, not even moral character could be ascribed because that would limit his pure 'being.' Such a God is no God, is nothing. All being is determinate being, being of a definite kind, and that is true of God. So the power of God is determinate, since it is his being in action and thus is conditioned by his nature."

"(2) The idea of irresistible power is equally unmeaning and untenable. It is a part of that abstract absolutism which has afflicted theology. There is an absoluteness which belongs to the Christian concept of God as one from whom all things come, upon whom all things depend, and who is perfect in goodness. But the traditional absolutism, with its denial of every kind of condition or limitation, is of another kind. Power, whether human or divine, is conditioned by the nature of the being that acts, by the ends that are set, and by that with which it works. It is, therefore, never absolute or irresistible. When God seeks a moral end, the idea of irresistible power is ruled out by that very fact; instead, God 'stands at the door and knocks.' When God wishes to create, he limits himself by that very fact; for creation means giving something of his own life to lesser beings, and life in any creature means a certain power of its own. Similarly he is conditioned by his own being. He is reason, and so he acts according to that reason and order which form his very being. He is wisdom, and so he must by his very nature choose high ends and use appropriate means. He is love and so he must suffer in sympathy and must toil and sacrifice. At none of these points can it be a matter of bare will acting with irresistible force......"

"(3) Underlying these errors is the third, the conception of divine power as externalistic and compulsive. This is to think of power on the lowest plane, as physical force. Only physical force can be conceived as irresistible. Power on the higher levels from its very nature is not irresistible: truth waits upon the receiv-
ing mind, love is not compulsive. The power that develops life and shapes character must work indirectly. The conception of a divine compulsion working from without is as mechanistic in its way as the old materialism. It must be given up for a concept in which the transcendent God is seen to work immanently; and that means not irresistibly."

"And now the outline of our problem begins to grow clear. We leave aside as non-Christian the hedonistic conception of the good; and the idea of God's power as an irresistible force that can accomplish any end by direct action we perceive to be a childish transfer from the physical world to the moral realm where it is simply irrational. Our problem now becomes, not so much that of evil, as that of the good. If the good can never be handed over as a finished product to a passive recipient, if it can only be an achievement, then a good world will be one which is adapted for such attainment. Then our great question is: What kind of a world is fitted for this end?.........."

"1. In a world where good is to be achieved, there must be freedom........"

"2. A good world will be one of toil and struggle and resistance........"

"3. A world fitted for the achievement of life must be one of order, and an order that is universal and dependable........"

"4. A good world must be one of social relations and social solidarity........"

"5. A world that is fitted for the achievement of life will be one of suffering and pain........"

"The character of a free agent is made by facing and fighting with obstacles; it is not formed along the line of easy successful reaction to stimulus. Facile adaptation to familiar environment is no test of character nor training in character.

Macmillan, New York, 1921, Second Edition

The personal life cannot grow into the values of which it is capable without facing the hardness of circumstance and the strain of conflict, or without experience of failure.... The question at present is not the kind of world in which perfect goodness can exist, but the kind of world in which goodness can begin to grow and make progress towards perfection. Perfect adaptation would mean automatism; it is not and cannot be a school of morality. It is even consistent with morality as I have conceived it, which implies freedom and the personal discovery and production of values. And I will hazard the statement that an imperfect world is necessary for the growth and training of moral beings. If there were no possibility of missing the mark there would be no value in taking a true aim. A world of completely unerring finite beings, created and maintained so by the conditions of their life, would be a world of marionettes. They might dance through the span of existence to the amusement of a casual spectator (if such may be imagined); but their movements would be all predetermined by the Maker; they would have neither goodness nor the consciousness of good, nor any point of sympathy with the mind of a free spirit. Not such are the beings whom God is conceived as having created for communion with himself.... These spirits have had their beginnings at the lowest levels of organic life. They must fight their way upwards through the long stages of man's development. In this progress they have to attain reason and freedom, so that the good may be known and chosen; until, tried by every kind of circumstance, they find and assimilate the values which can transform the world and make themselves fit for the higher spiritual life......

"Are we justified in saying that the imperfect and puzzling world that surrounds us is an unfit medium for the moral life -- if by the moral life we mean the triumph of the spirit -- or that it makes impossible the adoption of an ethical point of view in interpreting reality? I do not say that experience of the relation of natural
forces to moral ideas and moral volitions justifies of itself the inference to divine goodness at the heart of all things. The mere fragment of life with which we are acquainted is too scanty to bear so weighty a superstructure. All I have argued is that our experience is not inconsistent with such a conclusion. And, if there are other reasons for saying that goodness belongs to the ground of reality and that the realisation of goodness is the purpose and explanation of finite minds, then the structure of the world as we know it is not such as to make us relinquish this view; on the contrary, a view of the kind is supported by the general lines of what we know about the world and its history."

"... if the moral ideal be the best or the highest that the world conceivably can fulfil, the process by which alone it is attainable is also good, despite the evil incidental to it. Theism requires that the world be an imperfect or mixed world, in that it takes the purpose of the world to consist in the realisation of the highest values by finite and developing creatures, with which an omnipotent establishment of non-moral or static perfection would have nothing in common.

"... Confronted with the choice between the happy and innocent life of the brute, without thought before and after and pining for what is not, on the one hand, and the life of moral endeavour and spiritual progress, on the other hand, human beings would be practically unanimous in deciding that it is better to have risen above the non-moral level and to have tasted of the tree of knowledge:...."

Chapter Nine

Further Perspectives
On God's Relation to the World

I. God and Matter

It is frequently pointed out in our day that theistic philosophers and philosophical theologians find it easier to converse with the natural scientist (probably more easily with the physicist than with the biologist or psychologist), than in more recent modern times. This is due to the fact that the old Democritian wooden-like atom, as the description of matter has, of course, long since gone by the board.

1. The Need for a Mediating Term: Energy.

That concept of matter, which, by definition, was so utterly unspirit like, could never really be harmonized with idealist, spiritual, or religious philosophies. These claimed that reality was of another form in its depths or heights, namely, "spirit". The best that could be done with the older view of matter was either to say, as did Lucretius, Democritus's Roman disciple, that there were "gods", but that they were totally extraneous and without relation to the known universe of material atoms; or to solve the problem in some classic deistic or dualistic fashion as did Plato. In the Timaeus dialogue, God (Plato's eternal, active, creative principle) looked to the ideal laws, or forms of being subsumed under the idea of the Good (the second cosmic principle); and impressed the ideas on an eternal but originally incoate or formless "matter" (The third of his metaphysical principles). The Deistic Newtonian cosmology, with its description of the world as absolute masses moving in absolute mechanical order in an absolute or static space and time, could only conceive of Deity as a remote Causal Intelligence, who manufactured the world machine. God
manufactured and wound up the cosmic watch (to use Paley's famous analogy), set it in motion, and then retired. In such dualistic or deistic schemes, where would Deity have relation to the world? Could prayer or providence, for instance, have any truth or reality in such a view? More like modern naturalistic theologians, Newton himself, of course, profoundly identified God with the universal space-sensorium.

Popular agnosticism has often followed the belief that total Reality is best conceived as "mass" in mechanical motion, devoid in its original state of "life", or "mind", or "spirit" or "consciousness". Life and mind are tenuous, derived, or ephemeral products of material stuff, like mist rising and vanishing from a dark bogg on a chilly morning.

The problem of Deity, in its relation to matter, has at least in part its analogy in the problem of the relation of mind to body. The classic definitions of matter as inert mass and of mind as inert spiritual substance (as tabula rasa), making the two orders of reality totally different in kind, kept the two apart. The problem will surely remain, if we persist in interpreting either matter or mind as completely disparate types of realities -- the difficulty with all rigidly dualistic systems. The problem is not so much how to get mind (in the older sense) related to matter (in the older sense) as how to understand either or both in terms which will mediate the one to the other. The essential problem is to get the hardness and inertness and mechanism out of the concept of matter (as indeed modern physics seems to do), while at the same time relieving the concept of spirit of its ghostliness, otherworldliness and vaporous formlessness.

Today, of course, we are told by the scientists that the "revolution in physics" has taken place. Matter is now "evanescent" (Dampier); the older idea that she is some kind of hard, inert, stuff is gone. Matter is now a dynamic, and in many ways an illusive reality; you can not any more point the finger at her microscopic
instances and declare them to be precisely "there" in absolute finality, as one would hold up a baseball or a cannon shot and say, "Here is matter". For we are told that some of her microscopic instances disappear in one energy level and reappear in another, and moreover that some of these movements have the appearance of indeterminateness or incalculability. The concept of particle or mass has become (at least alternatively) the concept of power or energy, and even the concept of freedom has crept in as a possibility. Sir William Dampier wrote:

"...The old materialism is dead, and even the electrons, which for a time replaced particles of matter, have become but disembodied ghosts, mere wave-forms. They are not even waves in our familiar space, or in Maxwell's aether, but in a four-dimensional space-time, which our minds cannot picture in comprehensible terms.

"...Thus matter, which seemed so familiar, resistent and eternal to nineteenth-century materialists, has become incredibly complex; it is scattered as minute electrons in the vast empty spaces of atoms, or as wave-groups which somehow pervade the whole of them, and moreover, is vanishing into radiation, even from our Sun alone at the rate of 250 million tons a minute!"


Such announcements by the scientist have encouraged the religious philosopher, idealist, and theist. The larger insight now is that Reality is orders, levels, echelons and "heirarchies", of energies. In modern terms, which have now become classic, we have thought of these orders or echelons of energy as the "inorganic", the "organic", the "psychological" or "mental", and the "spiritual" levels. The energy concept brings the various orders of beings or realities nearer to each other in kind. Energy has become the mediating term.

In the definition of the real, we take power and individuality to be major descriptive predicates. Scientific thought continues its assumption that atoms and sub-atomic forces are types of "individualities"; but we know them, however, as realities largely by their powers in our age of atomic concerns, by their explosive effects. So far as atomic things are concerned, "individualities" are indirectly
seen as vapor traces of particles moving in scientific vapor chambers. (Individualities at these levels of scientific concern are dealt with primarily as statistical crowds.) At the higher range living forms are also individualities and orders of power. Finally, from the standpoint of our own interior awareness of ourselves as finite self-conscious beings, we sense our peculiar and distinguishing quality to be our individuality, with its inherent power or activity of will and purposive life.

Spirit, as we know it from the inside is self-ordered energy: it is not formless vapor. A solution to our problem, then, lies in the direction of conceiving the world as a hierarchy of energies, with mind or mental energy at the top. The general distinction, that there is an aspect of our world which may be called "material", and another which may be termed "spiritual", can no doubt be retained, but without thinking of these differences in such hard and fast fashion as to make them mutually exclusive. We cannot reduce the world to the older concepts of matter and mechanism, or raise it to an ill-defined and out-of-sight "spiritualism", without doing violence to certain aspects of the real on either side. No doubt, from the standpoint of our interior subjectivity, the precise way in which mind or spirit relates to, and influences, body, and vice versa, will remain a mystery (perhaps because it is a place where God himself stands); but to conceive the real in terms of energy or energies, materiaiological, biological, and psychological, helps in the solution of the mind-body problem, and also in the God-matter problem. The problem of relation and influence then becomes one of a transference of energy forms, and we know that that takes place. Examples are found in the transference of mechanical energy into electrical and chemical forms. James Arthur Hadfield, sometime Surgeon in the Royal Navy, and contributor to the symposium on Immortality, edited by Canon B. H. Streeter, suggested a striking analogy of the relation of consciousness to material energy. He wrote in that book:
"Consciousness is...a phenomena of intensification: it is produced when our sensations are raised to a sufficiently high pitch of tension. It is due to mental friction: to the effort to cut a new channel through the brain. Heat and light may both be produced by the transmission of a current of electricity along an electric wire: they may, from the physical point of view, differ only in the length of their waves and in velocity. But the essential feature of our analogy, imperfect as it is, is that in its resultant expression light is a different form of energy from heat, and therefore stimulates an entirely different system of nerve-endings in our bodies. Consciousness is thus a different form of energy than nerve energy, though it may have arisen out of it; it is, in fact, psychic energy, which is impossible to describe in terms of the physical.

"This dramatic leap from the physiological to the psychological is the most important factor in the evolution of mind. It is the decisive factor which once and for all turns the balance and establishes the supremacy of the mind over the body..." p. 65, Streeter, et. al., Immortality, Macmillan, 1922.

2. Emerging Idea of God and World

How does the mind-body problem bear upon the relation of Deity to matter? Advanced ideas of God have claimed that value experience in human life -- truth, value, aesthetic value, and moral value -- is a clue to the meaning of Deity, or is a point where human experience becomes aware of Deity. At this place, however, there have been two great watersheds of thinking about God, or use of the term "God".

One major alternative is that value experience, to be sure, emerges at the top of the system of evolutionary energies which is the cosmos; but that value experience, or value energizing, is totally human or subjective. It is a self-enclosed, internal process with no reference to any correspondent form of reality or energy out in nature below man, or prior to him in natural history, or above him in the stars. There is no glorious self-luminous cloud of inter-galactic value - where Truth, Beauty, and
the Good have their transcendent home - beyond the human psyche. Value is purely and totally a human psychological possession: man in his highest and best social self is "God" -- so John Dewey in our time has classically formulated this type of solution to the idea of Deity and matter. No doubt such a view will appeal to many scientific minds in our day, and to some Christian theologians.*

The other major watershed, however, and the older one, of thinking about Deity has been that value is indeed in some sense cosmic, or trans-human. The idealist, spiritual, or religious traditions of the race have believed this. This type of faith has said that our human sense of value at its best reflects what is intended, what is trans-humanly propagated as higher purpose, and what is to be preserved in the totality of the systems of energy. Accordingly, "God as Cosmic Mind", source and sustainer of value, has become standard phraseology in 20th century theology, particularly that embued with the naturalistic spirit, or an empirical scientific outlook. Modern philosophies of religion, instead of attacking the evolutionary hypothesis, have turned it to their own account, as we have endeavored to show.

3. Immanence and Transcendence

Otherwise stated this question may be put into a form which we have earlier raised, What is the status of Nature in an idealistic or theistic philosophy? Does nature as a whole have an independent, derivative, and real, though created existence of its own, or does it have a kind of phenomenal existence more immediately dependent upon the Divine Being and Will?

There are those within theism (the naturalistic theologians) who tend to accept the more "realistic" view of nature, while others have clung to the more "phenomenal" view -- or the view that nature's absolute independence is more "apparent" than actual (the traditional idealists). It must be acknowledged that this question takes us to one prominent limit of finite understanding. As for us, we are inclined to

*It seems to us that the "death-of-God" theologies of radical immanence of the 1960's (Altizer, et al.) is a revival of Dewey's humanism in Christian verbage.
raise the question and then to leave it there. Do we need to know the intimate de-
tails of God's exact relation to nature? That there is some "connection" from within the Divine standpoint would be an obvious and ultimate article of a rational faith. We can of course only speculate. From the standpoint of theism, nature may be either of the above alternatives. She may even possibly be a combination of the two, with certain aspects of her being standing more independently of God's immediate control than others.* In either case, she may be regarded as an evolutionary emerging sys-
tem, integrated and hierarchically ordered. But we venture a bit further.

There are undoubtedly the two aspects of God's power in his relation to the world. We have mentioned these previously. He is, on the one hand, "efficient power", or "material power", if the reader prefers the term, who founds and sustains existence on the level of basal nature under the general rule of law. Space, time, gravi-
tational and atomic energies, the principle of mutation which differentiates living forms in evolution**-- i.e., the mystery of life and its growth on the physical plane -- all may be understood as aspects of God's efficient causal power or being. Whether God's control over His world is an immanence of "being" or an immanence of "power" (do not these amount to the same thing?), God fills up the lower levels of the hier-
archy with "natural necessity" and physical determination, up to and beginning with higher life. At this point two factors become operative: finite freedom on the one hand and God's "final" or "ideal power" or presence on the other. The latter type of power may appeal to and persuade, but does not compel, freedom.

God's dealing with existence at the higher levels of finite freedom cannot be by the direct, coercive method of His efficient, creative or basal sustaining power, but, rather, by the indirect method of moral purpose. We call this final, teleological, moral, ideal or spiritual power. It is, in the over-all sense, the power of truth that leads and develops existence persuasively or/emptively after it has attained

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*Recall our discussion in the last chapter on the idea of the self-limited God.

**In detail, of course, we imply the mutation-natural selection polarity as the fuller statement of evolutionary causality.
the capacity for free, intelligent, and moral growth. In our chapter on evil we pointed out, where freedom begins to operate, when life appears, or even prior to life, if freedom can be said to be present at more elementary levels. God leaves His world to its own devices, from the standpoint of an efficient causality. This relinquishing or limiting of his direct power or control is for the sake of the world's own free growth or development into higher ranges of finite form and freedom (at this level of insight the problem of evil may have its solution, as we earlier saw). God limits himself in His relation to the world in its upper levels so that finite freedom may become responsible and moral. In the meanwhile, God patiently waits to enter his world again at the top of the hierarchy through moral truth as the finite spirit becomes willing to walk with, perhaps some would prefer to say, receive the Divine Spirit. In the meanwhile He does indeed exercise efficient causality in the disciplines of historic process, where it may be necessary to goad man's inertia or judge his sins.

II. God and Human Freedom: Moral Autonomy and the Divine Will

This phase of our discussion follows from our earlier presentation of the moral argument for God. Such an argument in the Kantian setting as was ours, in considerable part, faces the problem of the relation of "moral autonomy" to the "Divine Will". We endeavor now to clarify this issue as best we may by referring again to Kant, and presently to the philosophy of Josiah Royce. Royce endeavored to solve the problem of the relation of the Divine to the human "wills" in terms reminiscent of Kant. His position seems to us of profoundest insight. We refer to Kant first.

Kant's third statement of the moral imperative emphasized the freedom of the human will in moral thought and decision, and spoke of it as "the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will". He continued to say, speaking of the moral man:
"...the will...itself is universal legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)...
...the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are universal and...he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which is designed by nature to give universal laws". (Greene, ed., Kant, Selections, 1929, pp. 331-332).*

We would agree with Kant here that moral reason is autonomous or legislates the law itself because true freedom and reason are the same thing. Moral law is a derivative of rational freedom. But a question concerning the meaning or intent of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole arises.

His principle of autonomy or freedom could be interpreted as a "humanistic ethic", which is "non-religious", making "religious ethics", or the idea that moral laws or truth are founded in the will of God superfluous.

In reply to this it may be said that Kant's is not an "autonomous ethic" in the sense that there is only man and not God. Such would indeed be an extreme humanistic interpretation of Kant. Everywhere he refers to God and in stirring passages implies that the moral law is founded in His will. It may be possible to interpolate Kant in a humanistic direction, but he himself certainly did not intend to advocate a nontheistic or radically humanistic ethic. Let us then support Kant's deeper insight along this line with our own brief excursus. The situation between human moral freedom and the Divine intellect or will is here perhaps clarified by stressing three implications of Kant's philosophy beyond the points we have already brought out in previous chapters:

First, if God's mind is free and rational like our own, He himself would legislate the moral law as we do. His legislation of it is prior to that of any one of us and in that sense would be the cosmic standard. The moral law is the legislation of all free spirits — God's and man's together. If they "reason" the "law" similarly, that is because "reason" is the transcending reality; and that, according to an idealist-religious philosophy, is precisely what has come to man from God.

*Scribner's
Second, God has created our mind in His image, that is to say, with the same moral freedom and rationality or propensity and capacity to legislate moral law as He does. Even though we legislate the law freely we do not thereby deny God his place or abrogate our responsibility toward him; we are not "autonomous beings" in the sense of some non-theistic humanism, since we are dependent upon and owe our natures to God as our creator. Our sense of finitude saves a religious metaphysics and a religious ethic. In willing moral law we remain aware of our finitude and our derivation from cosmic antecedents, the ultimate nature of which as love our very intuition of moral law on its highest plane suggests.

Third, what do we mean, then, when we say that the moral law is founded ultimately in the will of God? and that God's will is our standard? And with this, we revert to a point earlier made. Personality is the supreme work of God in creation — its coming to be, and its success, happiness, and salvation express God's highest will. Therefore in every act in which we strive to respect and consciously further the well-being of persons we express or do God's will, that is, we fit in with the manifest intent of creation. (Kant would have put it: in so far as we do our duty we express God's will.)

We conclude this digression into Kantian philosophy by bringing our discussion around again to a point emphasized in Royce, but employing the Kantian line which we believe was the inspiration for the Roycean solution to the problem of the wills:

Kant wrote, "every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free".*

In the history of Idealism in a later context than Kant, Josiah Royce attempted to solve the problem of the relation of the Divine to the Human "Wills" in terms

* Greene, Kant, Selections, p.335.
similar to those we have just suggested. Kant spoke in the context of a more traditional dualistic theism, or personalism, with God understood as something other or transcendent to his world, with the world and man as the created product of the Divine Will. Royce spoke rather in the context of Absolute Idealism, with God or the Divine Mind understood as being in some sense the total life of the World raised to the concept of an Absolute Consciousness.

We are all free, yet we all have the idea of freedom commonly. Moral or responsible freedom is the Idea of Ideas that connects all men and constitutes the Life of God on the side of the Divine individualization or concretion into a world of finite persons.

We are "in" the 'being' of God, in the sense that we are a part of the Divine Meaning or Idea for the world. But this meaning or idea is precisely that we should be free. We endeavor to clarify further this insight of Royce by the following analysis.

The clue to Royce's thinking in this particular was his teleological understanding or definition of personal selfhood in both the finite human case and the Divine or Cosmic Case. Royce considered the "self", on both the Divine and the human planes, as a teleological process that comes into "reality" in man's case, or achieves its cosmic destiny in God's case, only through growth toward realization of a supreme life plan, or purposive "ideal". God's "life plan" would be the totality of meaning of the cosmic process as a whole.

That process must be described as Infinite Personality in the act of releasing or realizing its 'purpose' or 'idea', namely, the creation of finite lives, with their release, in turn, of finite purposes and ideas in progressive enrichment of the whole. God is the willer of the conditions (of whatever sort necessary, both material or otherwise) of finite freedom. This is the distinctive nature of the Absolute Life
and Activity. Individuality, in both man and God, is defined by its fulfillment of a single purpose, in constant realization of some over-all or commanding 'idea'. The single or all-commanding purpose on a cosmic scale, which would define its greater individuality, is its aim to will into being, as the supreme Idea, finite individuality and the conditions of its freedom. This means, in substance for Royce, that God is defined as the ground or condition that makes personal being possible.

Paul Tillich's trenchant phrase, God as the Ground of Being, or the Power of Being, describes, I believe, what Royce said earlier in our century concerning a fundamental definitional notion of God. The value of Royce is that he analyzed this notion from profoundest introspective standpoint, that gave to his philosophy its special intellectual power and appeal.

Royce went on to say that the difficulty of understanding the relationship between the 'wills' is cleared up when we realize that the 'power of will' or 'causality' cannot be conceived mechanically or quantitatively -- that is, in terms of billiard balls or 'forces' hitting each other. In mechanical terms the problem of the wills is indeed insoluble. Rather than the idea of 'causation' with its connotation of material forces, we must use the spiritual conception of 'meaning'. Thus the Absolute God does not 'cause us'; He 'means us'. This spiritualizing of the conception of force or causality is, I believe, a necessary step toward the solution of the problem of the wills. Royce says that being is deeper than causation understood in any mechanical sense. We are 'in' the 'being' of God, in the sense that we are a part of the Divine Meaning. But this meaning is precisely that we should be free.

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** Royce, PC. 2, p. 61f and WI.2, p. 269. Brightman corroborates this general point of view where he says that inter-activity and communication are not literal merging. The inter-activity of personality with other personality is a spiritual phenomenon, without proper analogy in the physical realm of gross forces, PT, p. 60.
**** Royce, WI.I, p. 466-70.
Furthermore, we should recall that for Royce, selfhood does not have a thing-like reality, of either material or spiritual quality. Royce is against any 'realistic' doctrine of the self. It is not a hard core of inexplicable fact; it is "no more datum". On the Cosmic as on the finite scale it is essentially "a meaning embodied in a conscious life". Thus God on his side is not conceived as a kind of divine Substance which 'wills' as a secondary and derivative function of its "being". He does not possess a solid kind of being, or fixed, realistic entity, which later bestirs itself and sends forth its power. Rather for Royce it would seem that the Cosmic Being and the cosmic Willing and Individuation are one and the same process. God has a 'being' of 'function' and 'meaning' identical with his 'power' and purposes just as finite individuals do. For Royce, the cosmic process of individualization and personalization is possible only because in its ultimate reaches of meaning it itself is Conscious and Personal. Royce would answer Bosanquet's dictum that 'to will a will is to will its content' by saying that such a way of putting the problem is too materialistic or quantitative, too mechanical. Both God and men are purposing spirits; and the purposes of two personal beings can, in a manner of speaking, become identical, as spiritual ideas, without implying the mutual destruction or cancellation of their respective selfhoods.

We summarize and conclude on Royce's solution to the problem of the wills. In The World and the Individual he wrestled most strenuously with the problem of his alleged "absolutism", or as his critics have put it, his "block universe" theory of reality, in behalf of both human freedom and the divine freedom. He endeavored to solve the problem by ruling out any notions of mechanical causality for describing the relationship of the Divine to the human "will". He substituted rather

* Royce, PC. 2, p. 61.

** Royce, WI.2, p. 269.

***Carl Boyer, Colorado College, c. 1958
the concept of a spiritual or moral relationship, centered in the idea of freedom itself, the Idea of Ideas (reflecting an emphasis in Kant), where the divine and the human realities, or orders of being, may, without logical or metaphysical confusion, be conceived to meet. God and man are mutually self-expressed in the "meaning"-for-freedom, which is the central spirit of the world process. We believe that a solution to the problem of the wills must follow Royce in this thinking.

To round out the picture of Royce's significant contribution to theistic philosophy, in terms of his own life-long development as a philosopher, we conclude with the following:

In his last work, The Problem of Christianity (1913), Royce's earlier term, "meaning", becomes "interpretation". The social process in its profounder operation is one where persons mutually understand each other in the dimensions of empathy and love so that a common, on-going life may be secured (p. 166f., p. 100-1). "Interpretation" or the will to interpret is included under the will to reflect logically and coherently and the will to love; it stands as the divine impulse (p. 217 f.) because its end is "complete mutual understanding" (p. 220). In The Problem of Christianity, Royce joined his idea of "the Community of Interpretation" -- his central theme of that book -- to his former conception of God the Absolute.
If in one body of Royce's writings we find the conception of the differentiation or dispersion of the divine "meaning" into finite freedom as a kind of supreme cosmological principle, we cannot overlook his final and complementary conception of God the Absolute as the community of "interpretation". He says that "this essentially social universe, this community" is "the sole and supreme reality": the Absolute (The Problem of Christianity, New York: Macmillan, Vol. II, 1913, p 296). This formulation stands in the middle of his general discussion of the principle of "Interpretation". As the principle of togetherness, of community, without which neither the community nor the individuals whom the community nourishes could exist, Interpretation is therefore "absolute". It is the very principle or power of ethical existence or the moral relationship. Royce's "Absolute Truth" has here been thoroughly warmed up and moralized. It is spiritual process; it is love. It is not the passionless, cosmic Thought of the Early essay, "Possibility of Error." In The Problem of Christianity Royce may sound sometimes as though he is saying that God, or the Absolute, is but a verbal hypostasis of his principle of Interpretation. Yet on the whole I think he meant to retain his belief in Divine Spirit as Cosmic Reality, now viewed, however, less abstractly or less merely logically, but rather more in psychological dimensions as immanent Spirit, called in his own words, "God the Interpreter" (pp. 219-21). We close this section with his memorable words to this effect:
"And, if, in ideal, we aim to conceive the divine nature, how better can we conceive it than in the form of the Community of Interpretation, and above all in the form of the Interpreter, who interprets all to all, and each individual to the world, and the world of spirits to each individual.

In such an interpreter, and in his community, the problem of the One and the Many would find its ideally complete expression and solution. The abstract conceptions and the mystical intuitions would be at once transcended, and illumined, and yet retained and kept clear and distinct, in and through the life of one who, as interpreter, was at once servant to all and chief among all, expressing his will through all, yet, in his interpretations, regarding and loving the will of the least of these his brethren. In him the Community, the Individual, and the Absolute would be completely expressed, reconciled, and distinguished.

...If love for this community is awakened, then indeed this love is able to grasp, in ideal, the meaning of the Church Universal, of the Communion of Saints, and of God the Interpreter...". (The Problem of Christianity, Vol. II, Macmillan, 1913, p. 219-21).

Royce is not just the academic philosopher; he obviously became the Christian theologian, who attempted -- along with others such as Borden Parker Bowne, who worked from slightly different perspectives -- a grand union of Judeo-Christian personalistic sentiment and categories with those of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical idealism.

III. God's Will as Ethical Standard

What does a religious philosophy mean when it refers to God's will as highest ethical standard? The clue to its thinking in this area is the central position personality holds among values. Stated in the most comprehensive way, a Hebrew-Christian personalistic philosophy says:

1. Personality or the coming to be of personal beings is the supreme work of creation: that is, expresses God's will. (More finely, not only their coming to be, or purpose, but their well-being, happiness, or "salvation" is the supreme will and work of God.

Two basic insights support this affirmation:

(a) An a priori factor: that I am a person in the process of becoming, or growing is the central fact and meaning of at least my existence. There is no more important
fact to me. But this my worth I do not myself create; it is here with my presence; it was given me by all the creative forces that made me, most of which I have not solicited.

(b) An empirical factor: general empirical evidence to this effect I see in the development and progress of nature at large. Nature brings for/individuality, lays the foundation for personality, which history takes up and refines. In the simple presence of other personal beings like myself I indirectly infer a self-valuation like my own. The arrival of numberless personal beings of moral possibility indicates or suggests the personal and moral meaning or purpose of cosmic process.

(2) Therefore we can say that the will of God is our standard in life with real meaning. May it not be said that there is in simple experience a connection between the Divine Will, the Will of Creation, and our own "will" -- our own effort at life -- if we limit the issue to its "moral sense" and center it in a personal-istic philosophy? May it not be said that my will "coincides" with God's (with that of Creation) in every instant that I supremely respect and consciously further the principle of personality -- in myself and in others whom I find sharing existence with me? In every act in which we strive to respect and consciously enhance the happiness of persons and social well-being we do or express God's will -- we fit in with the manifest intent of creation.

(3) Regarded in a "naturalistic" and non-religious way, the "will of God" would be a metaphor for what nature seems to be doing in bringing forth individuality and personality. But if philosophy can show that existence is derived from Personal Being, then the concept of God's will is more than a metaphor for an impersonal process. It could then be taken -- literally; it would suggest the personal origin and purpose of this process. Our previous chapters have been studying such a philosophical alternative to naturalism.
When I say that God acts or "wills" through me, I do not mean this in a mechanical, but in an ethical sense. God is not a billiard cue, and we the balls. The concept of human freedom breaks down if the attempt is made to think out the relation of the divine to the human will on any such mechanical plane. The only way wills can act together or "coincide" is to respond conjointly to truth. The way we have power and influence over each other's lives on the finite plane is in this way. Causation between minds could only come about by the power of the "ideas" held in common by those minds. If I conceive a "truth" to which you assent and upon which you may act, then I have influenced you. The influence of one mind upon another -- without sacrifice of freedom -- is one of the commonplace and most certain of experiences. Would not the analogy hold for the relationship of the Divine Mind to the finite mind -- with the added factor that true ideas are an expression of the Divine Mind? Truth, as we have seen, is not coercive, but persuasive. This is because the nature of God is fundamentally "person" and "love". He does not obtrude himself; he 
gives
himself. The Divine Mind would influence the finite mind, not by coercion -- any more than one finite mind influence another by coercion -- but rather by the truth and its persuasion. Finite wills are free to move "within" or by "truth", which in a measure stands for the Divine Will. Finite wills morally acting are the highest expression of truth as process.

Recall that we have said that a personalistic idealism does not stop with the conception of truth as impersonal cosmic structure, any more than it would leave the concept of love on this plane. Rather a personalistic idealism has the conception of Ultimate Personality, of which truth in its moral meaning seems to be an intimation. To review briefly our chapter on truth, truth is knowledge of the world and its relationships in various ways -- sentient relationships, scientific relationships, and moral relationships. Truth in the moral or valuational meaning is awareness of the world as bearing an order of life (of which oneself is the immediate example) and of
the relationships between such lives that would make for their well-being and harmony. Truth, then, having to do with the personal and its relationships, as the personal being realizes his own existence and assists others to realize theirs, implicates itself with the fundamental condition (God) that makes personal being possible.

Thus far, then, let us say that the relation of finite personality to a divine Personality cannot have a "structural" or "material" analogy. God's will does not support ours as rafters support a roof. There is, however, an "intellectual" and "spiritual" analogy in the conception of God as the life of truth itself, and we may all experience a sharing and a sense of dynamic self-fulfillment in that.

A further way to clarify the problem before us is to ask with W. R. Matthews "whether in fact we find it possible to will freedom for others"?* In Matthew's analogy what we do is will the conditions of freedom, for example, for our children, by, in part, controlling the physical and social environment in which they grow up. On a wider scale in the cosmic and historical environment, it may be conceived how God wills the conditions of freedom for finite moral beings: first, on the level of cosmic activity, by bringing forth a world with creatures capable of intellectual and moral development; and second, by conditioning the historical order directly through finite individuals themselves in their experience of the power of love (in personal and social ways) to harmonize existence.

Somewhat like this, St. Augustine, on the freedomist side of his thought, in a memorable passage discussing the Divine Will as an all-encompassing category, said that men stand within the Will of God and that that will "cooperates" with ours where we attempt to do the right — in brief (in terms of our present thought) fulfill our obligations to personality in coordination with Moral Order and the meaning of existence. But even where men disregard, singly or collectively, that highest principle, they still stand within the Divine Will, though that is said to "operate"

* W. R. Matthews: The Purpose of God, Scribner's, 1936, p. 159
against us in the form of Moral Order, founded in personality, which seeks to main­
tain itself in the judgments and disciplines of history.*

St. Anselm, the medieval Augustinian theologian, stressed the same point on its
negative side: "And so, should any man or bad angel be unwilling to submit to the
divine will and rule, yet he cannot escape from it; for when he would escape from
under the will that commands, he does but run under the will that punishes."** The
great Augustianian theologians conceived of moral truth and its order as expressing
the "divine will". The joyousness of life when in harmony with that will is an ex­
pression of the moral order confirming itself. The judgments and disciplines of
life when out of harmony with God's will is an experience of moral
order maintaining itself.

IV. The Ideas of Divine

Predestination, Providence, Foreknowledge, and Omnipotence

What meaning, if any, does a religious philosophy now-a-days assign to these
rather traditional terms?

Predestination, I believe, should drop out of the religious vocabulary as a
confusing, if not a malicious term. It harbors too much the old conception of theo­
logical determinism -- that God foreknows and therefore "predestines" every human
thought and action. This was a central belief in orthodox Mohammedanism, and in
Christendom it reached its worst expression in the Protestant theologian John Calvin.
Calvin believed that there was an exact number of elect souls predestined for Heaven
under the prevenient Grace of God, and an exact number automatically predestined to
hell by His wrathful judgment.

Philip Schaff, Scribner's, 1908.

**Cur Deus Homo, Bk I, Ch. XV, trans. by John Baillie in The Place of Christ in
Modern Christianity, p. 153
God's Will: the Good, Truth, Divine Love -- all men, both good and bad, stand within.

Area of the Love of God

The good human will stands within as a positive expression of the "cooperation" of God's will.

Moral Order confirming itself

Area of God's Judgment

Bad human will does not escape the divine will, which "operates" upon it in the judgments and disciplines of life and history.

Moral Order maintaining itself.
Theological determinism, of course, runs counter to our sense of "freedom" and "responsibility". Such a belief would make untenable the idea that man is a moral being. When we speak of man as a moral being we mean that he is in some degree responsible for his actions, and he is accountable for his actions only if he is some sense "free". Theological determinism, no less than the determinism of an entirely mechanistic or materialistic philosophy, really destroys the idea of man as a spiritual being.

Undoubtedly, one of the origins of predestinationist thinking in Christianity is found in St. Paul's letter to the Romans, chapters 9-11. This extensive passage treats the problem of election and predestination in terms of the question, How will Israel fit into God's plan of redemption through Christ? The matter profoundly troubles Paul — erstwhile Pharisee and now Christian missionary. Though he by no means answers the question clearly, he does see great historic good or purpose coming out of Israel's "trespass" in rejecting Christ. It is through this rejection that "salvation has come to the Gentiles", or the whole world, i.e. through his, Paul's preaching. In the end, Israel herself will be saved, because -- by presumption in Paul's thinking -- what is predestined is the love and faithfulness of God! Actually, taking this clue — the everlasting provision of the Divine Love we may move to our second, more useful term.

Providence. What are the "Providences" of God? What has God "provided" as the good order, necessary to the outworking or fulfilling of his loving plan for creation, the world, and men? We suggest several ascending, or deepening levels of meaning to the idea of Providence.

1. God has provided a stable natural environment, the physical laws of existence and their outworking, upon which living beings may stand, and upon which they can rely, as a dependable platform in the midst of which they learn to make "the most favorable adjustment" (Macintosh) for survival and growth. Gravitation will be the same
"law" tomorrow that it is today; so will be the laws of chemistry and other physical laws -- we can depend on these things and must conform our lives to them. Were gravity or the air we breathe one thing today and something else tomorrow; were the elements of water one type of compound today and something radically different and unstable tomorrow -- life could never have arisen in the first place, much less maintained itself, or advanced. No doubt the "permanency" of the laws of nature is a relative thing; perhaps there has been, and continues to be, slow change -- as in fact we know to be the case. Environmental change has forced life to adapt. But change cannot be so abrupt or so radical as to make viable, or rational adaptation impossible. We are therefore speaking of the general, over-all or long range per-durability of the laws of nature. These have constituted an environment of sufficient stability for living beings to arise within it and make their way successfully. This is the first level of the meaning of God's providence.

2. Rising out of this, and partly comprehended within or implied by it, are the laws of the coming to be, or the integration of the elements into living forms -- their emergence, evolution and organization into personal life and freedom. Mutation, natural selection, and any other processes rationally conceivable as ingredient to this development, are here understood. The Possibility of dynamic and multiform development of material energy into living beings of many kinds, with the most complex forms representing mental and spiritual adaptation, is a further profounder meaning of providence.

3. Again, rising from this spiritual adaptation, or implied in its meaning, are the aesthetic and moral laws or values that may inspire and guide the life of spiritual beings into fullest personal joy and social harmony. Love and justice are the spiritual energies that provide for the happiness and order of personal beings. Love is provided as the ultimate law of our being, and in faith we deem that it expresses
the ultimate nature of things. From the Divine Love we have come forth in the cosmic order; by love we relate ourselves creatively to our fellows; and through the gate of love we will pass at last into the Divine presence. In brief, moral reality is foreordained. Love is sure to heal and to save under ordinary circumstances — hatred is sure to divide and kill. Such is the providential law or meaning of human history. In and through love, God has established the basis for the success of our freedom, if we respond to its challenge and its promise.

Accordingly, we are now prepared to state the meaning of Providence in practical, personal life. My friends and acquaintances, people near and far, by their decisions create the situations in which I must make my decisions. They are instruments of God's Providence for me when their decisions are constructive and helpful, loving and just. I have to go the way of their program for me; certain doors are open for me and others are closed; but I am free to decide within boundaries and limits. Think, for the moment, of the vast Providence that the founding Fathers of our constitutional democracy ordained for us as individuals — by their decisions back there for the orderly regulation of freedom in a free society! Or think of the Providence that a University, this very institution of learning, that faithful men and women of a previous Oregon generation, around 1870, founded for the continuing generations of students and teachers — for you and me — a place for you to learn and prepare yourselves for a useful and satisfying life — a place for me to earn a living and to fulfill my particular calling. Or consider the very special providences that our deeper friendships, or a happy marriage, are to us.

On our part, when the decisions of others, relative to us seem shortsighted or unjust, then Providence may flow through our side of the equation as we react with justice and love. This was the point of the beautiful story of Joseph in the Old Testament, where Joseph, now prime minister to the Pharoah, said to his brothers, after he had disclosed himself to them, who had sold him into slavery into Egypt:
"But Joseph said to them, 'Fear not, for am I in the place of God? As for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today. So do not fear; I will provide for you and your little ones.' Thus he reassured them and comforted them. (Genesis 50: 20-21)

Summarizing the idea of Providence we may say that God acts in and through the context of human freedom and society, through the instrumentality of values perceived by the human mind and embodied in social structure and order.

**Divine foreknowledge** — otherwise sometimes termed the omniscience of God.

The problem of the divine foreknowledge is intimately tied to the idea of time. By saying that God must somehow have "foreknowledge", if He is to be God, is to say, it seems to us, that God must be subject, somehow, to **Time** — that time is a transcending reality, outside, above, or more absolute than God Himself. To speak of a divine in front of "foreknowledge" is to imply that time is out/... God, somehow, that he is a "finite" being relative the the time concept or reality, and caught in its flow, as we seem to be immersed. To assert that he has "foreknowledge" is to say that He, God, does battle, in a manner of speaking, with the primeval dragon, Time: conquers it, subdues it, brings it under his absolute ken, so that He can divine its secrets, right now, before, and after, along the time intervals at any designated position, behind, or in the future.

But is not the problem of God's "foreknowledge" cleared up, if we perceive that time itself is an ultimate expression of the Divine being or reality — a primal aspect, and an immediate experience on our part, of the Divine reality?

Then strictly speaking there is no magical "foreknowledge". There is only the Time front, itself sensed as "moving", intuited as the opportunity for creativity — a moving "now", with openness and indeterminacy as the meaning of any quasi "future" that we can anticipate? This brings our thinking back to a previous point. It must be astrue to say that God is Time itself as to say that He is Freedom itself, or that He is Love. At least principal points of convergence of the Divine and the Human are the ideas of time, freedom, and love. Perhaps it is most reverent to say that God is the fount of time, freedom, and love. In any case we return to our discussion of time particularly.
If we go in the other direction and say that God is above time, we mean that the Divine is some kind of Absolute "Eternity". This, of course, would make time an illusion. But if time is a reality and God is a reality, they must be conceived together, with time as an intimate expression of His very "life" as God. God would therefore experience His own time-Self as from the "inside", precisely as we ourselves do. He would anticipate or "foreknow" a "future" only in the sense that he, as we do, may be aware of alternative values and purposes as yet unrealized, which would constitute a "future" state of things, if and when realized. So conceived, God's "foreknowledge" does not determine a future; it can only anticipate alternative "futures", and their ramifying "consequences", just as we "foreknow" without foredetermining our own finite futures. It may be conceded here, of course, that the Divine life in this area is far richer and profounder than our own, but not essentially unlike our own.

We conclude that a Divine "foreknowledge" cannot determine finite action; this would destroy freedom. Furthermore, it need not do so any more than my relative and limited foreknowledge of what a friend of mine might do would destroy his freedom. What God foreknows is the consequences for good or ill of action in a moral universe, the nature and laws of which he knows intimately.

Is not our human situation vis-a-vis the Divine anticipation of the Future (for we had better speak of "anticipation" rather than "foreknowledge") something like the following diagram?
The branches represent the ordinary channels of circumstance that guide, and sometimes absolutely control, life. A, B, C, and D, are the consequences, the outcome of our activity, which an "omniscient" God would comprehend. The x's represent life's limited choices, however, which we are absolutely free to make within the circumstance of each choice. Indeed, the problem involves again the idea of God's self-limitation in certain aspects of His relationship to finite free persons.

Omnipotence. At the close of our chapter on evil we discussed the idea of God's "power", p. . We add here the following quotation from the noted British preacher-theologian, Leslie D. Weatherhead in his memorable essay, The Will of God:

"What is meant by the omnipotence of God is that he will reach at last his ultimate goal, that nothing of value will be lost in the process, however man may divert and dam up the stream of purpose nearest him, and that God -- if he cannot use men as his agents -- will, though with great pain to himself and to themselves, use them as his instruments. 'I know that thou canst do all things, and that no purpose of thine can be restrained.'" (The Will of God, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, p. 54, 1954).

This eminently practical conceptualization of the Divine omnipotence suggests a last topic germane to this chapter, and here again we will refer briefly to the above essay.

V. The Idea of God's Will

and Human Circumstance

Weatherhead's five sermons on the will of God are in fact a practical treatise on the problem of evil, a topic which we have already considered at some length. Weatherhead approaches the problem from the commonplace standpoint of religious piety which is often heard to say that this or that event, circumstance or experience -- whether good or ill -- "must be the will of God". He clarifies that there are three levels of meaning to "God's will" in this type of life-context for the man of faith.
First there is God's "intentional will"; then God's "circumstantial will", if his immediate or intentional will cannot be fulfilled; finally there is his "ultimate will", which the eyes of faith may discern as working in, through, around, and beyond circumstances in fulfillment of God's larger plans for good, perhaps in altered but nevertheless in sure, and loving terms. Among others he uses the classic illustration of the life and career of Jesus.

Thus it was God's intentional or more immediate will, not that Jesus should be martyred, but "that he should be followed". Weatherhead then continues:

"The circumstantial will of God, God's will in the circumstances which man's evil provided, was that Jesus should accept death, but accept it in such a positive and creative way as to lead to God's ultimate will -- namely, the redemption of man, winning man back to God, not in spite of the Cross, but using the Cross, born of man's sin, as an instrument to reach the goal of God's ultimate will. (Ibid., p. 32)

This, of course, is a particular theological illustration drawn from within a special stream of religious tradition and belief. Analogous illustrations could be drawn from the lives of the founders of other religious traditions -- Moses, for example, or Buddha. In any case, Weatherhead's homiletic purpose or interest here could illuminate any life which is lived from within the standpoint of faith. Each man may scan his career, looking back, and perceive the concentric loving spheres of God's "intentional", "circumstantial", and "ultimatu will" embracing, and at work, in his life.

God's ultimate will (this side of the religious hope in a heavenly destiny, of course) is that each of us live joyous lives personally, and harmonious lives socially, fulfilling whatever fine powers are latent within us, and loving and serving those, both near and far, with whom life relates us (Gilkey). The circumstantial will and the intentional will are concentric spheres within this largest ambit of our divine-
human "meaning" or "purpose". Each man may perceive or sense in his own way, of course, the providential circumstances or the divine "intent" at any given moment or point in his life; and we here refer to our previous discussion of the idea of God's providence.
Appendix A

The Problem of "Divine Purpose"

I  The world evolutionarily conceived, but without "Divine Purpose":

Evolutionary process

unthinking matter/energy

Pure epigenesis: unfounded, capricious novelties — very antithetic to each other.

Problems of this view: 1. Why the "upward trend"? Remarkable that "higher life", mind-intelligence, values appear. Assumption: they do so by sheer happenstance "chance". (Recall our study of the idea of "chance"). 2. How explain the basic unities of nature — the universality of material "form and law"? 3. The highly probable speculation that life is universal (how credible scientific hypothesis)?

Two schemes illustrating a possible "Divine Purpose"

II  Pre-formationism, pre-ordination:

Every entity fated in a Divine "Plan".

a wholly static purpose idea, of wholly invariant qualities realized by an evolutionarily unfolding "spinozist conception of the world evolutionized"?

Problems of this view: no room for finite "freedom" or "novelty" — no room for varied realization of the "ideal".
The divine purposing may be conceived as pre-ordination, in which every detail is foreseen. An
analogy is presented in Mozart's (alleged) method of composition, who is said to have imagined
a movement - its themes, development, embroidery, counterpoint and orchestration - in all its
detail and as a simultaneous whole, before he wrote it. If God's composition of the cosmos be
regarded as similar to this, all its purposiveness will be expressed in the initial collocations,
evolution will be preformation. On the other hand, God's activity might be conceived as
fluent, or even as 'increasing', rather than as wholly static, purpose. It might then be compared
in relevant respects, with the work of dramatist or a novelist such, perhaps, as Thackeray,
who seems to have moulded his characters and plot, to some extent, as he wrote. And it would appear
that the divine purposing must be partly thus conceived if conative creaturally activity may
either co-operate or clash with the Creator's, so that providential control and adaptation to the
emergent must enter into the realisation of the divine plan.... attainment of ethical per-
fection....may be contingent or conditional aspects of the divine end, while progressive becoming
throughout all reaches and domains of the universe, may be its ultimate essence....
If evolution is itself an end and not a means to an end, the hard dualism of means and end must vanish. Childhood, for instance, will not be merely a stage in the making of a man; nor will groping past generations have worked merely to provide their posterity with better opportunities for making further advance. As a rose-bud has a beauty or perfection different from but equal to that of the full-blown rose, so may each stage in the life of individual or the race have, along with its appropriate work, an intrinsic value, or be an end in itself as well as a means to something beyond. The only conclusion now to be elicited from the foregoing remarks is that teleology and theism may admit of statement in terms of other than the static concepts, and the abstraction such as perfection, that is of no kind, which dominated thought until a century or so ago......"(Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, Ch IV, from Alston, Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, p. 84-85.)
Part V

The Religious Idea of Man: Man as a Spiritual Being
Chapter Ten

Various Philosophies of Man:

Historical Typologies

I

Greek, Hebrew-Christian, Naturalistic

The ideological warfare between liberal democracy and the totalitarian systems of communism, and lately fascism, have highlighted, for our time, the importance of the question, "What is man?" So far as contemporary history is concerned, the doctrines of man could be well analyzed first in terms of the liberal, democratic, and Hebrew-Christian views as opposed to communist and fascist philosophies. However, we will summarize the ideas of man on a somewhat broader basis and subsequently in our chapter relate democracy and the two totalitarianisms to our more general analysis.

One way to classify the doctrines of man, at least so far as western thought is concerned, has been by a three-fold analysis under the headings: the classical Greek view, the Hebrew-Christian view, and the modern-naturalistic view.* Let us examine each of these views as they cover the following problems:

1. the idea of man's uniqueness
2. man's relation to the divine
3. man's relation to the body and nature
4. the source of evil to man and sin
5. the idea of salvation from this evil
6. the idea of human history and destiny

The Classic Greek Idea of Man

Man's uniqueness. The prevailing conception of Plato and Aristotle, as major representatives of Greek philosophy, is that man's uniqueness lay

*A typology used by Reinhold Niebuhr in his Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Chapter 1.
in his "rational" capacity. Aristotle defined reason as man's ability to form general concepts. According to the Greeks, this is the capacity that especially distinguishes men from animals, and best defines what we mean by "soul".

His relation to the divine. In his Republic Plato identifies the "image of God" in man with man's reason. The "divine" aspect of the universe is its uncreated, eternal, rational structure, which Plato calls by the technical term "ideas". Plato thought of the ideas as patterns transcendent to nature, in which nature somehow "participates". Aristotle, Plato's pupil, thought of the ideas or "forms" as immanent in nature. The ideas or forms are analogous to what we would term today the universal laws of nature, including moral as well as physical law. Recall our earlier analysis (Chapter Three) of Plato's and Aristotle's conception of God. Following Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics emphasized particularly the conception of God or Zeus as the immanent form and order of nature. In sum for the Greeks, /form-discerning reason/ is that which is most like God.

His relation to the body and nature. Man's reason, soul or mind is sharply distinguished from body. Particularly in Plato's dualism is emphasized "horizontal" in terms of the dividing line that can be drawn between mind above and body below:

Man: reason/mind; the divine, good principle
sense/body/material nature: the evil principle

The source of evil to man and sin. Man's body as an aspect of material nature tends to be identified with "evil". Man sins because of the inertia of matter as it weighs upon spirit. The drag of bodily passions pulls the mind down. This at least was one prominent phase of the thought of Socrates and

*At least in his more ascetical dialogues, e.g., Phaedo.
Plato, and comes to light best in the dialogue *Phaedo*. Aristotle, however, and also the great dramatists, Aeschylus and Euripides, like the Hebrews, finding much of the trouble in man's "will" and its "pride", analyzed sin more profoundly than did Plato.

** Salvation from evil.** In one sense Greek thought may be said to be optimistic about salvation, at least in certain sides of Socratic and Platonic doctrine. Socrates and Plato tended to believe that reason alone could and would control the passions of the body, and thus that all would be well with life. We have the famous Socratic dictum that *virtue is knowledge* -- that to know the right is to do it. Aristotle, however, criticized this doctrine as oversimplified and naive. In broadest perspective, as indicated especially in the dramatists, we may conclude that pessimism is also a prevalent note in the Greek view. The Greek outlook contained a chronic melancholy about the brevity and evils of human existence. For Aristotle a temperate, rationally controlled, perfectly integrated and self-sufficient life would be the ideal for which we must strive.

**The idea of history and destiny.** We turn to the Stoics particularly for the Greek idea of history as cyclical. In the Stoic mythology every world epoch begins and ends in a universal conflagration, after which there is a new formation of world, animals, men and human culture, in another eon identical to the preceding one. The course of "history" is, first a golden age, then progressive decline, finally universal evil, with an ending and a beginning again in the Cosmic Fire. The Stoic view singularly dramatizes the lack of any significant conception of history as directional or linear.

Although we may refer to the Stoic view as standard for the Greek conception of history, Plato in the *Phaedo* speculates most beautifully on the possibility of personal immortality for souls which have managed to free themselves from all
sensual, bodily taint. In the same dialogue Plato also mentions the doctrine of reincarnation in various animal forms, according to one's reward (which Hindu and Buddhist philosophy has espoused), as a possibility for those persons who have not freed themselves from bodily passions. Whether Plato himself believed this as a literal possibility is not entirely certain. In any case, for Plato man's highest duty and destiny is to catch a vision of Truth, the eternal Ideals. As this is achieved the soul participates in that which is "eternal" by definition and is thus "immortal".

The Hebrew-Christian Idea of Man*

Man's uniqueness. The Bible suggests that man's uniqueness is found in the freedom of his will. To a degree far transcending all other creatures man is free. Another way to say the same thing is that man's uniqueness is suggested by the sacredness of his personality: "even the hairs of your head are all numbered ... you are of more value than many sparrows" (Matt. 10:30-31).

Reinhold Niebuhr states that the Hebraic conception of the image of God in man refers to man's freedom and "self-transcendency" rather than to his "reason".** In the opinion of the present writer the idea of man's will and self-transcendency is indeed a more ample description of the image of God in man than possibly that of "reason", if taken in too narrow a sense; however, understood in fullest way both reason and self-transcendency are "factors within

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*For a classic discussion of the Biblical idea of man see Harry Emerson Fosdick: Guide to Understanding the Bible, Harper, 1938, Chapter II.

**Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Chapter 1.
intelligence", two facets of the same essential nature. The Greek and Hebrew views are actually complimentary to each other rather than contradictory.

**Relation to the divine.** What is alike in both God and man is free personality; though in the divine case "personality" would be far more in power and goodness than what it means ordinarily in man. In the Bible the prevailing implication is that God is not the eternal rational order immanent in the universe, but rather the transcendent Will which creates the universe. God is the infinite Spirit past perfect searching out by the finite mind of man. Everywhere, however, in the Bible the affirmation is that the Creator is good and his ways reasonable. His creative intelligence and good will, if not immanent in, are most certainly reflected by his creation (e.g. Ps. 104). In sum, if the Greek view seems to be in terms of a two-story universe, with body and matter below and mind and divine reason above, the Hebrew conception is that the universe is an order on three planes. Man stands on an intermediate or derivative plane between God and nature (e.g. Ps. 8 - a view also shared by other ancient religions, e.g. Confucian, Zoroastrian). There is a creative mind, above man's mind, upon whom man depends for his being, to whom he owes reverence and love and whose righteous laws he must obey. The Greater Mind is disclosed to man's mind in the truth experience, particularly moral truth (Amos et al).

**Relation to the body and to nature.** In the Hebrew system there is unity rather than duality of body and soul. Often in the Old Testament the material concepts, "breath" or "wind", stand for soul and spirit. Man is a psychophysical whole. He is not a dualistic being of "soul" versus "body". Body is not evil inherently. Body is an expression or instrument of the... contro-

*A phrase here borrowed from Denison Maurice Allan's excellent discussion in dialogue with Niebuhr of the similarities and contrasts of Greek and Hebrew views of man, in The Realm of Personality, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947, p. 43.*
lting spirit, which animates it. Man's will unifies his nature, he is a unitary spirit, not merely a collection of physical and psychic states (as e.g. in original Buddhism).

The source of evil to man and sin. As the Hebrews see the problem of existence, man's body and the material universe are not evil, for God declared that the created world of nature was good (e.g. Gen. 1). Sin is not so much caused by the inertia and sluggishness of "matter", reflected in the "passions" of the body, as by malicious will, by evil intent. "Out of the heart", that is, out of the spiritual side of man's nature, "are the issues of life", life's major decisions both sinful and righteous. The Hebraic conception of sin is more subtle than the Platonic. In contrast to the Platonic doctrine that knowledge of the right will somehow guarantee the doing of the right, the Biblical thinkers realized that man can and often does go against his own knowledge of the right. Rather than defining man as Plato does in the Republic, in terms of reason as highest in human make-up and spirit (or will) second, which is always allied with reason against the passions of the body, the Hebrews realized that man's will may join the baser drives of the body (symbolical of all selfish interest: St. Paul) against his reason or better judgment (Rom. 3). Thus to the Hebrews sin in its profoundest sense is not so much an expression of the physical side of man as a possible development within man's spiritual nature itself. The body is relatively innocent; but it is the "soul", that is to say, the possibility of malice in mind and will, that would define wickedness.*

Salvation from evil. Salvation is peculiarly a temporal process. It means a change in the whole of man's nature, body and soul, or, rather, such

*A somewhat fuller commentary on the idea of "sin" in the OT follows here: (OT Guide, p. 175)
a change or reorientation of the attitudes of his mind or soul as will tend to
guarantee greater perfection in all ramifications of bodily existence. The
change of soul is wrought by the ingression of the perfect righteousness of
God himself into the human "heart". In the Hebraic system, then, it is a change
from the "old man" to the "new" -- body and soul together remade into "newness
of life" or transformed personality. Essentially, in the Hebraic view
man is a creature of nearly unlimited possibilities for good or evil, depend­
ing on whether he permits God's Love to enlighten his mind and sanctify his
acts (1st Epistle of John).

The idea of history and destiny. In contrast to the Greek, the Biblical
view is that this is a purposive universe. Rather than cyclical we may call
the Hebraic insight linear and eschatological -- that is, there is a doctrine
of purpose, direction, and end in its conception of history. The process which
is nature and history is working itself out according to a Divine plan, begin­
ning with a creation, advancing in a direction, and ending in a consummation
in transcendent time and place, and perhaps even on earth. Human sin may
frustrate the process for a time, perhaps even change its direction, but ulti­
mate victory is assured, in Western religious terms, through the power of God
at work in synagogue and church.

The Modern-Naturalistic Idea of Man

The modern view of man is in part a transformed, naturalized Greek view.
Its philosophic ancestry goes back mainly to the ancient naturalistic or mater­
ialistic school of Democritus (contemporary of Socrates), Epicurus, and Lucre­
tius, with some influence from Aristotle.
Man is not unique in this system in the sense that he has something in
his make-up -- whether it be rational mentality (Plato) or free transcendent
personality (the Hebrews) -- that in any absolute way sets him above the rest
of nature. Man has reason, to be sure, with its logical and evaluative powers,
but reason is understood to be a phenomenon of the processes of nature herself.
These ancient naturalists explained "mind" in terms of infinitely fine and
smooth material "atoms", different in degree by way of size and shape from
the grosser atoms that make up the rest of physical nature, but in no sense
different in kind. Death was defined as the dispersion of such "soul atoms"
upon the disintegration of body. It is but a step from this ancient materialistic psychology to the modern conception of "mind" as essentially an expression of organic process.

Man's relation to the divine. More it seems out of deference to popular
belief than anything else, the ancient atomists said that there were "gods",
but that they had absolutely no relation to this world. They neither create
it, nor are their divine purposes found anywhere in it. Nature rather is a
mindless, purposeless mechanism, from all eternity independent of the gods and
moving by her own fixed "laws". Indeed, the main burden of Lucretius' famous
poem De Rerum Natura is to free the mind of man from "religious" superstition
or fear by helping man to understand that causation is purely "natural".
Practically speaking he believed that in atheism lay the secret of peace of
mind and happiness.

Perhaps typically, then, "naturalism" has come to mean that there is no
"God" in any significant, traditional sense. Some modern naturalisms, however,
continue to use the term "God". One school defines "God" as nature's energy;
another as human ideals, and both affirm that man's highest, "religious" duty
is to achieve the "values" which are latent in nature's process itself. Still
other naturalisms (depending on how the term "naturalism" is defined) are more
theistic in the traditional sense (recall chapter 3 on various ideas of God).

Man's relation to the body and nature. The distinctive belief of natural-
ism is that this is a one-story universe. As we saw above, man's life of
thought, his mind, reason, or personality is an expression of natural, bodily
process. "Mental energy" is but a phase of natural, material energy. What was
but vaguely understood in ancient cosmology as the "evolutionary" character of
and well defined natural process has become a prominent feature of modern scientific and philo-
osophic thought. In summary at this place, then, we can say that modern natural-
ism stresses man's evolutionary origin, the continuity of his life and being
with that of lower nature. Though the concept of "matter" has undergone great
refinement in the modern period over and above ancient atomism, the point of
view at present in many quarters is still "materialistic". The essential char-
acter of nature is that she behaves according to entirely predictable forces,
energies, or pressures. However, much of the newer 20th century natural-
isms wish to suggest the spontaneity and "freedom" of organized matter at the
level of life and mind, their point of view remains haunted with an older
mechanism and determinism, which they cannot completely shake off.

The source of evil to man and sin. Actually the belief in the exactly
predictable and deterministic character of nature throughout all her levels
has been a boon to naturalistic thought on its ethical side. Modern naturalism
found itself in a particularly optimistic mood in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Unlike Platonic and more like the Hebrew-Christian understanding,
modern naturalism has not regarded body and the forces of nature as in themselves
evil. But unlike the Christian and more like the Greek, naturalism has tended
to oversimplify the problem of sin by defining it essentially as "ignorance".

Also like Plato and Aristotle modern naturalism has recognized the interrelationship between individual conduct and the character of the state or society, as a whole, realizing that the problem of life involves "social" as well as personal ethics. Modern naturalistic thought, however, has believed that sin is caused largely by evil environmental conditions rather than (to cite the view of some classic Christian theologians) by any perversity of human nature itself.

**Salvation from evil.** Remove these conditions, therefore, transform environment by science through education, and human life may be remade. Essentially this may be accomplished by the discovery of nature's impartial "laws", physical, psychological, sociological, and historical, and the reordering of life according to them. Probably the most famous of modern naturalistic humanists, John Dewey, proclaims that what is needed most is the application of "scientific intelligence" to all areas of life.

Characteristic of much modern naturalism is its indifference, if not its opposition to religion as traditionally understood and organized. The prevailing tendency in modern naturalism has been to affirm confidence in man himself, in human education and science, as sufficient to save us from our ills, without sense of a transcendent or superhuman source of help in God. This loss of "Christian humility", exemplified by the /' self-confidence of democratic western man in the 19th century, becomes the inordinate arrogance of the communist in the Marxian development or of the fascist in that related form of totalitarianism. Both of these systems seek to employ the wonderful power of science (the gift of modern naturalism) without restraint of either Christian or Greek forms of humanistic morality, though fascism in our time has sinned more egregiously in this respect than has communism.
Human history and destiny. Its religious critics like to chide modern western naturalism for its easy optimism, and idea of more or less "inevitable progress", brought about by operation of the factors mentioned above. Modern naturalism should indeed be criticized for its over simple definition of progress in terms of technological achievement in the realm of science, and institutional humanization in the field of society. Scientific humanism has found purpose in the universe, but only human purpose. Believing this to be sufficient, the thought has been that man may progressively alleviate the tensions of life by humanizing or democritizing his economic and political relationships, with a relatively stable, free world order as outcome. Human events since World War I have, of course, increasingly called into question this easy-going expectation of a more or less automatic progress. For one thing the need for inclusive expansion scientifically a more / definition of progress than that of merely technological / or and "liberalization" socially institutional expansion/has become evident.* Not only naturalism but also much modern idealism may be criticized for its too easy optimism.

Synthesis of the Foregoing Ideas of Man

Is synthesis of the preceding views possible in light of the largest and best insights of each? A general "yes" may be tendered in answer to this question as qualified by the following analysis and criticism.

First, it probably should be pointed out that both the Hebrew and the Greek views (at least on the Platonic side) may be classified as "transcendental" or, in general sense, "idealistic", in contrast to the naturalistic conception. A transcendental or idealistic view of man may be defined as one which holds to the idea of the supreme reality and permanent significance of man's "spirit", in some sense over and above the sum total of functioning

*See our discussion p. 501.
physical parts or "body". In contrast to the prevailing naturalistic assumption that "mind" must be understood as a function of the body, could the higher truth be that body should be defined as a function of mind and spirit, as idealisms tend to do? In any case, the problem becomes one of defining clearly what is meant by "spirit". (We attempt such a task in our subsequent chapters)

Plato would have meant by spirit man's generalized, abstract thought; the Hebrews meant rather man's personal self, of which we should probably say abstract thinking is a function. The self seems to be that power which relates and coordinates ideas as if from a deeper, more mysterious center. Plato lacks the sense of importance of individuality. In many places he dismisses it as an expression of bodily materiality and therefore—somewhat in the manner of classic Hinduism— as illusory, or at least thinks of it, along with other physical objects, as a far inferior kind of reality than abstract ideas. (Recall our earlier discussion of Plato in chapter 3). We see therefore that certain kinds of idealism, of which Plato's is a variety, as well as much naturalism, with its emphasis on nature's impersonal forces, may be criticized for their loss of the sense of individuality. The trenchant warning of Reinhold Niebuhr cautions as at this place:

As the idealists lose individuality in the absolute mind, so the naturalists lose it in "streams of consciousness" when dealing with the matter psychologically, and in "laws of motion" when thinking sociologically. . . . A genuine individuality can be maintained only in terms of religious presuppositions which can do justice to the immediate involvement of human individuality in all the organic forms and social tensions of history, while yet appreciating its ultimate transcendence over every social and historical situation in the highest reaches of its self-transcendence.*

In the view of the present writer the above quotation would have to be qualified at certain points, chiefly by saying that, as we have seen, there are

several types of modern idealism. Some indeed are impersonalistic; but others are personalistic. Modern idealisms are usually a combination, in greater or less proportions, of Greek rationalism, in which personal nature of ultimate reality was never clearly understood, and Hebrew personalism.

On the whole, in spite of some shortcomings, there were great values in the Greek philosophy of man which must not be overlooked. Undoubtedly, chief of these is its emphasis on "reason". D. M. Allan memorably summarizes this Greek contribution in the following lines:

••• the wisdom of the classical view comes to us with renewed force in an age of unreason. The great truth which Plato and Aristotle bequeathed to the ages is that reason within us is the principle of order. It is no mere negative restraint upon animal impulse within man's nature. It reaches up and out to a cosmic order that lies above and beyond us.....

Curiously enough, the psychologists of today are rediscovering this ancient insight. For whether they hold to one or many factors within intelligence, they agree that its function is to grasp relationships—that is, "forms of order"—within wholes of many kinds...
The mood of distrust of reason, therefore, so prevalent in our day, is deeply wrong in its attack upon reason, right only in protesting the deification of reason or its perversion to inhuman ends.*

Second, the "personalism" and the emphasis on sympathy and love are the outstanding contribution of the Hebraic thinkers of the Bible to the philosophy of man. Even more than the Greeks the Hebrews, with their emphasis on the supremacy of personality, insist upon the definition of man as "transcendent spirit", to use terms to which we will return frequently in this study.

Third, "science" has been the contribution of modern naturalism. The main point of the naturalistic philosophy has been that man can know and, to a considerable extent, can control the forces of nature for the benefit of life. In so far as this is accomplished, it is, of course, of paramount value.

It seems to this writer that the philosophic "reason" of the Greeks, plus the dynamic "love" and "personalism" of the Hebrews, plus the "science" of

*The Realm of Personality, op cit., p. 43-44.
modernity may suggest the synthesis for which we are looking. Could the love and personalism of Hebraic Man become the conscience of Scientific Man, both together redefining in a larger synthesis the general good sense or "wisdom" of the Greek, Rational Man, which Plato and Aristotle had as their ideal?

II

Democracy, Communism, Fascism, and the Ideas of Man

Communism and fascism, in contrast to democracy, have been the live options, symptomatic of the tragic tensions of modern history, that have competed for man's intellectual allegiance on every level of interest, personal, social, political, economic, and cultural.

Perhaps deepest in the democratic understanding of man is the belief that he is a "spiritual being". This view has had at its center the idea of individual freedom, which is rooted in the Biblical emphasis on man's spiritual transcendency and supremacy of personality. Accompanying the idea of freedom has been belief in a reasoned, orderly, and social minded approach to life, in the spirit of ethical responsibility to all one's fellow men. This comes from Greek thought at its best as well as from the Hebrew. Of no less importance, however, has been the emphasis of naturalistic philosophy on experience and experiment. If a principal ideal of democracy has been "equality" in terms of alleviation of slavery and human toil, natural science (gift in part of naturalistic philosophy) in its brighter results has made possible an ever greater equalization of life and freedom from toil. Not only has natural science in the spectacular ways of technological assistance to man's upward struggle toward freedom been a boon to democratic history, but more quietly, and perhaps more significantly, the scientific spirit of caution, of experience
and experiment, has motivated much of the growth of democratic political institutions, notably in one area the development of English common law. In a very real way, then, the democratic achievement has come about as a grafting together and a flowering of the best in the three traditions, Classic, Hebraic, and Naturalistic.

Possibly the simplest thing to say about the communistic idea of man is that he is not a "spiritual being". This view sees only the physical dimension of life. Man is entirely a bodily earth-bound being, a complex piece of psychological machinery, with primarily economic interests, whose history has been largely materialistic.* Communism presses the materialistic, mechanistic and deterministic side of naturalism, which many naturalistic philosophers of the west have long since sought to modify toward a freer, humanistic position. But communism is not only a perversion of liberal naturalism; it is also a distortion of Greek rationalism, and it has even been called a Christian heresy.

It distends the idea of man's rational sufficiency suggested by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy into a dogma devoid of metaphysical depth and Greek humility before the cosmos, quite foreign in attitude to the open, enquiring spirit of Greek rationalism. There is indeed a superficial resemblance between Plato's "Republic" and the present Soviet state. But there is this all-important difference: that Plato was attempting to found his ideal state on the principle of "justice", which he believed reflected transcendent reality beyond time and place. Certainly Stalinist philosophy recognized no cosmic, trans-human "metaphysical" standard, nor such basically liberal conceptions of justice as Socrates appealed to in the Gorgias, and in Book I of the Republic, in his

*We cite the reader to the materialistic psychology expressed by two authors of two Soviet textbooks in psychology published respectively in 1946 and 1950 by the Soviet Ministry of Education. We also realize we are perhaps here characterizing the philosophy of N. Lenin or N. Bukharin, rather than Karl Marx. In a noteworthy study, Marx's Concept of Man, 1961, Erich Fromm takes great pains to point out that Marx was essentially a liberal "humanist", not an egregious materialist, as he has been caricatured in popular thought.
argument with the totalitarian thinkers Callicles and Thrasymachus. Finally
the ideas of love, equality, and social, economic justice, explicit in Hebrew-
Christian thought, communism removes from their personalistic and theistic,
religious grounding in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. It expects these liber-
al values somehow to be achieved in the inhumane, metaphysical vacuum of
soviet power politics.*

The Nazi-Fascist conception of man. If Marxism can be partially traced to
the naturalistic, and, in certain respects, to the idealistic movement of wes-
tern thought, the origins of fascism are usually located in "romanticism",
itself a philosophy with both naturalistic and idealistic elements. Romanticism
at its best suggests art, music, poetry, and immediate apprehension of God
through mystical, religious feeling; and in the realm of human relationships
fellowing-feeling, sympathy and love. It may stand for the brighter and
lighter, spontaneous side of human nature. In a person like Rousseau it may
even suggest the vital, passionate struggle of freedom and democracy with autocrats monarchy. Any high and noble emotion could be analyzed in terms of
man's "romantic" side. Romanticism, however, may also imply irrationality and
darkness.

According, the romantic view at its worst implies that man must be inter-
preted solely in terms of, and should give vent irrepressibly to, his sub-
 rational vitalities. In this view man himself is more a being of sheer "life"
and brute "impulse" than a creature of "higher reason" or "transcendent spirit". Fascism stems in part from this darker side of the romantic tradition through
Nietzsche and others.

*We realize, of course, that this paragraph probably describes the Stalinist
era rather than the contemporary, more "liberal", thawed-out, and dis-unified
Communism of this decade.
In spite of these historic connections, however, fascism was a reversion essentially to a barbaric, primitive view of man, more ancient than the developments we have been studying. Even more than Stalinist Communism, fascism in deepest sense may be interpreted as a total break with the entire Classical, Hebraic and humanitarian naturalistic stream. For example, its superior race theory was but one central aspect of a conscious and absolute inversion of all the "liberal values" that the three great systems, in their various ways, have attempted to uphold. If communism is in some sense a development within, but a distortion of, the Graeco-humanistic-scientific tradition, exploiting certain of its defects and errors, fascism was a complete denial of the rational tradition. Indeed, the unlimited capacity for evil of the late Nazi and Fascist states, and the "mystical" implication that they sought to attach to their concepts of "nation", "master race", "leader", and "war" suggested a kind of inverted, "spiritual" philosophy, which has doubtless best been characterized by the epithet demonic.* Many writers have long since pointed out the quasi-religious character of both fascism and communism.

Practically speaking, there has been little difference between the fascist and, thinking of its Stalinist form, communist systems in their devastation of liberal and humane values. If there is some distinction, however, it might be said that whereas communism (at least in its initial stage of revolutionary violence), was an oppressive development in the guise of universalistic, humanitarian "ideals", fascism was naked slavery, with no humanitarian pretense whatever. The common element in these totalitarianisms was the idea of the state as supreme in reality and value rather than the individual. They represented the tendency in most dire and concrete manner of some phases of modern philosophy to press to extreme the sociological as opposed to the personalistic

*See Aurel Kolnai: The War Against the West, Viking Press, 1938, for a documentary study of Nazi philosophy.
conception of man. The rise of these forms of oppression in our modern day must give the adherents of the elder views of man (liberal idealism and liberal naturalism) pause, challenging them at once to a more searching criticism of weaknesses in their systems, while at the same time encouraging a more strenuous defense of their excellences.
Addendum on Existentialist views of man. In one form existentialism is a combination of Hebrew-Christian emphasis on freedom and modern naturalism's atheism. Man can develop humane ethical life (Sartre) as a sheer act of his own will (a Kantian influence), but there is no ultimate vision of the total personal and moral meaningfulness of existence. Life is ultimately absurd (Camus). There is the dictum in existentialism, "existence before or above essence". This is to say that vitalities and freedom are the prime, first, or "existential" factors of reality over and above "reason", "ideas", or the rationally organizing sophistications of intelligence. This is anti-Platonic in tradition. It is nominalist. It is also romanticist in the placing of vital freedom at the foundation of things. Actually there are two types of existentialism. What we have just described is the secularist, non-religious, or non-theistic variety.

Religious or theistic existentialism is represented by such figures as Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich (in part), and Buber. These men add to the above description of the human situation the dimension of religious "faith". Briefly stated, faith in the ultimate personal meaningfulness of existence, under God, is what is needed if man is to overcome his existential anxieties and sins, and the sense of the absurdity of life.
APPENDIX A

Oriental Conceptions of Man in the Universe

A Resume

Hinduism: Two Schools of Thought

I. The idea of being:

A. Idea of Ultimate Reality:
   - Vedanta: Brahma monism, impersonal absolute idealism—God as impersonal Whole of Being.
   - Sankhya: Dualism: matter vs. spirit—ultimate non-significance of the personal factor, though "selves" continue as impersonal, non-conscious realities.

B. Idea of Man:
   - Impersonalistic, personal identity ultimately lost in Brahman
   - Personality not ultimately significant in Sankhya system
   - Bound by the past determinations of karma, man not fully free and responsible.

C. Idea of Nature and world process:
   - Maya: illusion that matter is real. Sansara-karma: evil on negative side; ideas of basic law on positive side that insures justice; punishment for sins committed, reward for virtues.

   - Sankhya: illusion that soul is real. bound by matter, which is real.

II. The idea of knowledge, truth, or wisdom:

To overcome avidya or ignorance that keeps man in above state of illusion.
Intuitional, immediate, non-logical, non-discursive. Ultimate truth is mystical rapture, not scientific knowledge.

III. Ideas of value:

A. The idea of the Good:
   - Above man and life—union with the infinite—submersion of the personal self into:
     - Infinite whole of Being in Vedanta
     - Infinite unconscious state of self in Sankhya
B. The idea of Evil: Entanglement in sansara-karma; separation of the finite self from:
the unchangeable and eternal Being in V.
the unchangeable and eternal self in S.

C. The idea of Salvation: Through negation of the self, or finite individual existence by intellectual or philosophic "illumination"/emancipation: moksha-
Through union with the infinite above and beyond all finite distinctions---absorption into Brahman by intellectual annihilation of matter.

D. Ethics: Kindly, but dispassionate relationship to others on practical plane of ethics. The Five Rules of Dharma, stressed as the necessary ethical preparation for ultimate philosophic vision defined as identification with God, or supportive of the self from matter.
Respect for: Life
Truth
Property
Chastity
Non-avarice or generosity

Buddhism: Two Schools

I. The Idea of Being:

A. The idea of ultimate reality:
Hinayana (Original Buddhism)
All is process, change, flux—no eternal unity of being. A sophisticated materialism more theistic

Mahayana (Developed Buddhism)
An eternal compassionate Buddha Mind (Suchness) behind the phenomenal world (cp. Vedanta)
An absolute idealism theistic in tendency. Manifestations in the many Bodhisattvas.

B. The idea of man:
Hinayana (Original Buddhism)
No unity of psychic being: only the "skandhas" or transient states of consciousness. An impersonalistic, associationist theory

Mahayana (Developed Buddhism)
Ourselves and all others a part of the Absolute Buddha Mind (cp. Vedanta).
Mahayanist afterlife includes provisional personal immortality.
II. The idea of knowledge truth and wisdom:

Metaphysical knowledge not important (op. modern positivism) but psychological knowledge is: 4 truths, 8-fold path the way to release and peace. The 4 truths: that existence is pain—dukkha caused by desire—tanha can be overcome—sambodi by ethical and contemplative life—dhamma

III. Ideas of Value:

A. The idea of the Good:

Hinayana
Release from pain and the desire that causes it—Nirvana: an ultimate psychological condition in which all awareness of personal existence has been extinguished.

Mahayana
The impersonal reality of the Buddha Mind transcendent to the phenomenal world: to share the compassion and love of this Mind is the highest aim, is Nirvana.

B. The idea of evil:

The world process: of rebirth, with its pain; desire as such is evil, physical and psychical exist-
tence are evil. In sum the ego or individuality, which defines existence for living creatures, is evil. Evil is emotional in quality: unsatisfied desire--gives rise to all the practical evils of life.

Yet a practical acceptance of life while it lasts this side of ultimate enlightenment--the "layman's ideal" is to suffuse life with Buddhist quietude and compassion.

C. The idea of Salvation: Suppression of desire. The arhat ideal in which self effort (or accumulation of merit: compassion, charity, study, ascetic practice) is the basic technique. Karma operates positively in conjunction with free will or self effort to overcome desire and rebirth--karma a law of grace and freedom; Nirvana: nothingness(?). Suppression of desire plus dispelling of ignorance about the ultimate nature of the world as Buddhist Mind; by means of: a) faith in the Bodhisattvas (the spiritual beings or saints) and their compassionate, saving grace, and/or b) immediate enlightenment apart from merit or works (i.e. charity, study ascetical practices) though these may be practiced on side. Nirvana: oneness with the infinite compassion of the Buddha Spirit. Karma (cosmic law) becomes personalized in the Bodhisattvas, or its effects transcended or annulled by them. A restoration of optimism.

Confucianism*

I. The Idea of Being:

A. Ultimate Reality: Lower nature, human nature, Heaven are an ordered whole governed by the moral law, Tao.
B. The idea of man: Tao is known and felt in moral conscience as "truth." Tao is thus the sum total of the rational structure of existence. Related to Heaven through tao, which is expressed in his conscience; thus a "spiritual" being, in his higher mind. Naturally good. The body and physical life not evil, but a definite part of man's nature as good.

C. The idea of nature: Physical nature is good. Unlike the high Indian systems, Hindu or Buddhist, the Chinese "have cultivated an aesthetic appreciation of nature" (Noss). Lower physical nature is not ultimate for them, but has a valuable role, and a real, not a deceptive, structure. The Chinese accepted nature. (Recall that the Indian thought "tends to give the value of illusion to nature--; or at least yearns to triumph over it" (Noss). Indian thought tended to deny nature as unworthy and unreal.)

II. Idea of Knowledge: There is ultimate or absolute truth in Tao. Moral knowledge is the complete form of knowledge. Tao is known intuitively but may be tested empirically.

III. Ideas of Value:

A. The idea of the Good: Total existence is good by virtue of Tao. No inherent evil or evil process.

B. The idea of evil: Man's lack of harmony with Heaven and nature and their ordered moral law, Tao. Practical, social, human evil is a result of bad environment and bad education.

C. The idea of salvation: Man and nature are organically related: the way of salvation is to find the secret of harmony between lower nature, human nature, and heaven. The practical and moral content of Tao may be expressed in several terms counting moral virtues, such as
   li: feudal and family propriety
   shu and chung: negative and positive reciprocity
   hsien and ch'en: truth, integrity, sincerity
   jen: perfect virtue summarized in self-respect, generosity, trustworthiness, diligence; clemency
Heaven sends judgments when the laws of Tao are broken. Righteous personalities in government will guarantee righteous social order. Such organize positively the factors of earthly life. (Contrast the Indian theme that man must escape from nature and the factors of earthly life as way of salvation).
   "...Man can attain salvation through the realization of his essential nature."
   (Life magazine, April 4, 1955)
Chapter Eleven

Major Theories of Mind:

What is "Selfhood"?

Another way to analyze various conceptions of man is to focus on technical theories of "mind" that have been presented by philosophers and psychologists. We will analyze the main philosophies of mind under the headings: (1) the spiritual substance theory, (2) associationist and behavioristic theories, (3) the functionalistic theory of Aristotle, (4) sociological theories, and (5) personalistic theories.

I

Mind as Spiritual Substance*

The venerable spiritual substance theory of soul-mind is a thoroughgoing dualistic conception. It may be roughly pictured by two concentric circles, the outer area representing the body and the inner one the immaterial, immortal soul, or mind unit, resident for a time in the body, and, from theethical side, often an opponent of it. This is the theory of selfhood in much traditional religious thought. It is essentially Plato's view, and has had its modern exponent in Descartes.

Synopsis:

1. Mind is an interior spiritual unit, immaterial, indestructible, other than body: dualism.

2. Frequently, body as an opponent of mind -- sensations, passions a drag on body: ascetic in tendency.

3. Frequently, mind a passive entity -- tabula rasa -- on which knowledge, or experience is written.

Critical Note: is dualism necessary; is mind passive; is body in opposition i.e. bad?

II

Mind as a Non-Unified Relation of States

Associationist theory. David Hume's analysis of mind represents the classical criticism of Descartes' conception. Hume's view has been variously called the associationist or relational idea. In essence, for this theory the mind is a collection, not a unity. For Hume it was a "bundle of impressions". The numberless physiological and psychic states (sensations, emotions, abstract ideas, etc.) are associated together by the laws of "resemblance", "proximity", and "causation". Several merging circles, representing our various experiences, none of which, however, are permanent and for which there is no one center, might picture this theory. It could be said that there is a quasi or hypothetical center, representing the present moment of consciousness, where the interlocking circles or states are thickest. Remove the circles, however, one by one and we finally have nothing left -- no real, abiding self. Such related ideas or mental states may still be "immaterial" principles (as they may have been for Hume), but they lack ultimate integration and unity. In ancient 6th Century India Gautama Buddha developed a psychology and philosophy of mind quite like this. The idea of a complex relation of various elements or factors will remain an important aspect of the general theory of mind.

Behavioristic (Materialistic) theory. Hume's view was taken to a materialistic extreme with some forms of behaviorism in the belief that all so-called
"mental states" are but disguised physiological—(e.g. laryngeal)—movements. Mind is simply brain subjectively functioning. Or as it might be phrased, mind is equivalent to encephalic currents. From the ancient atomistic theory of soul, best set forth by Lucretius, through Thomas Hobbes' conception of the self as essentially "spring . . . strings . . . and wheels,"* through the 18th century French materialist La Mettrie and others, to the physiological behaviorists, John B. Watson and his disciples, the materialistic point of view in western thought may be traced:

Synopsis:

1. Mind an aggregation of parts -- conscious states -- related by the laws of association; no unifying self.

2. Two variations:

a. Hume: a collection of psychic states -- ideas, feelings, etc. -- which may be thought of as immaterial forces, as Hume, by his silence on the specific point, more or less allows.

b. Behaviorism: mind equivalent to material, physical states of body (brain and nervous system functioning), disguised physiological movements, e.g. of the vocal cords in the larynx (Watson), or a more refined view, as encephalic currents.

Critical Note: how do the separate psychic states or physical movements become "associated"? Does not "associated conscious states" imply a unifying consciousness? (See our fifth theory later in this chapter. A further reply to the materialistic conception of mind is tendered in our next chapter)

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The "functionalistic" (often synonymous with "materialistic") view of mind is considered in its essential terms in the following theory.

III

Inter-Mind as/Active Function, or Process

Environmental and process theories -- general position. Several theories of mind with a wider outlook than physiological behaviorism, but based primarily on its "functionalistic" and relational conception, may be called "objective-functional", "environmental", or "sociological" "process" theories. These in their various forms understand the related factors to be more than subjective, internally associated psychological elements. The relational system which is "mind" has an external or environmental spread. "Mind" has both a subjective and objective locus.

Aristotle's functionalistic conception. This point of view was suggested at an early date in western thought by Aristotle. His functional conception of soul is tantamount to a theory of mind. In his eye and axe analogies of soul, the "soul" or spirit of the eye is the "seeing", of the axe is the "cutting". The active form of a thing is its "soul". Essentially in this view organism and environment are functionally and inseparably related. "Seeing" implies both seer and object seen, the "within" and the "without". For Aristotle the highest level of "soul" in man is the act of "rational thinking", the function and process which relates him in a unique way to his world. In this case, the subjective pole of mind is man's "reason"; the objective pole is nature's impersonal active "förm", her "rational" structure, laws, processes---reason's outward counterpart.
Synopsis:

1. The "soul" is the function of the organism interacting with the environment -- the eye analogy:

   ![Eye analogy diagram]

2. What is the highest phase of interaction between an organism and its environment? Ans: the rational thinking of man. The human being functioning in his highest capacity, i.e., thinking rationally, defines soul as a whole for man. (Also "mind" has a certain impersonal objectivity in nature's forms for Aristotle)

   ![Human thinking diagram]

Critical Note: Aristotle affirms that there is a "capacity" for rational thought in man. This seems to assume that there is an interior distinctive, or prior, "reality", that we may call "mind".

What functionalistic theories of mind are trying to emphasize is the deeper truth that mind is activity or energy rather than a passive immobile "thing" or "substance". If functionalistic theories of mind imply that there can be a kind of abstract ghostly function without something that is functioning, or process without being, it seems to this writer that they are incomplete in their analysis of mind or mental life. Aristotle's soul-of-the-eye as its process of seeing could not be without the eye itself that does the seeing.

IV

Social Mind Theories

Sociological theories of mind are built on the concepts relation, function, inter-action, and process.
An idealist view: Not unlike Aristotle, modern Hegelian idealisms have emphasized the conception of mind as the interactivity and process of a total world environment, a cosmic milieu which is essentially "minded". Mind is a phenomenon of environment (conceived as dynamic and growing) rather than isolated selfhood. For example, some persons are "Christian" in mind and spirit because of the Christian environment in which they have been nurtured; or "democratic" politically because of upbringing in a liberal social order. "Individuality" is defined by the greater "social whole". Again a system of circles might represent this viewpoint. This time, however, the circles stand not only for subjective states of consciousness, but also the "thinking" of the social "organism" as a whole as embodied in its concrete institutions. Individuals might be thought of as points on the circumference of such circles. The circles pulsating, interacting, in process of expansion into the institutions of 19th century Prussia would be Mind or Spirit in its objective meaning to Hegel.

Beyond, of course, its narrower embodiment in concrete human institutions, the absolute idealists understood the Absolute Mind to have a wider cosmic actuality of its own. Human institutions merely approached or approximated rather than fully defined or exhausted it. To Bosanquet, for example, knowledge of the Absolute in its full nature lay somewhere beyond man's higher artistic and religious intuitions. Man's highest civilized feelings suggest what is Absolute. In any case, the Absolute Mind has a cosmic margin of its own out beyond finite historic process.
The full nature of Absolute Mind itself.

All the relationships of life and history conceived as interacting and developing, contributing to World Consciousness, or Mind.

Individuals (?)
Mind as Social Behavior

Naturalistic view: Remove from this "idealistc" sociological version, or "social mind" theory, the notion that environment itself is "mined" or "spiritual" in any literal trans-human sense beyond tangible, material institutions--omit the "mysticism" of absolute idealism--and we have in essence what John Dewey calls "social behaviorism" and to him the most adequate type of naturalistic conception of mind. Mind is a function of the "body" of society. Mind has a kind of quasi embodiment in speech and the other media of social interaction. A red traffic light, for example, meaning that I should stop my automobile, would suggest the practical context and meaning of "mind". Mind has a primary physiological pole in the "red" that I see as organism; a higher "meaning" context, common to all, to me and the rest of the town, in the "idea" of danger that it contains; and an objective locus or place environmentally or socially in the stop light, the power plant of the community, and the town ordinance that established these things. "Mind" is a symbolic term, not a literal one.

Our system of merging circles, somewhat like those for absolute idealism, may serve once more for this conception, but in the present case they would be dotted, indicating that mind is not "real" or "substantive" or cosmically primordial or in any way a literal reality independent or beyond human interrelations. The old-fashioned noun word "mind", connoting substance and reality, is simply philosophical license, for Dewey. We should rather use active, verbal terms such as "thinking", "sensing", "relating", etc., i.e. Aristotelian functional language, when referring to conscious processes.
Synopsis of sociological views of mind:

1. Emphasis on relation (Hume), on interaction and function (Aristotle) and on social and historic process (modern conception of evolution and history): mind has to be understood in terms of the total historic and social development of man. Mind is a thing of environment rather than isolated selfhood.

   An example of the way "mind"/"personality"/"selfhood" is conditioned by, or derived from, the social environment: a particular person's "mind", as a Protestant Christian, or a Reform Jew, is due to the Christian or Jewish environment in which he has been reared.

2. Two main branches:

   a. Absolute Idealist: Hegel, Bosanquet, et al. The "social mind" theory -- our minds are parts or expressions of the social mind, which comes to self-realization in the concrete institutions of history: environment itself as literally "mind".

   b. Naturalistic: Dewey, et al. The social theory divested of the notion that mind is a trans-human metaphysical reality, i.e. shorn of the "mysticism" of former view. "Mind" not a "thing" in any terms -- rather refers to speech and the other media of social interaction, by which a thinking organism gets itself related to an environment: "Social behaviorism".

Critical Note:

a. With respect to Absolute Idealism: are we just hypothetical "points" on the greater circles with no reality of our own? Recall our earlier criticisms of impersonalistic idealisms.

b. With respect to the naturalistic view: is not subjective thought, consciousness, mind as a unitary power of some kind and to some degree assumed all along in this theory? Recall our previous criticisms of John Dewey's philosophy.
The old spiritual or soul-substance theory was "personalistic" in so far as it stressed "unity" as the primal ingredient or meaning of mind. More adequate personalistic theories, however, must include the concept of mind as complex "relation" and "function," that is, "process," as well as unitary or unifying principle. Several major contributions to such a theory of mind have come from both philosophers and psychologists in our time. We review some of these.

The philosophic personalism of Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne's position can be classified by two terms, "personalistic" and "transcendental" (or perhaps "holistic"). He set forth a theory of mind that was "personalistic" because it stressed the personal unity of mind or spirit above or behind or around the various "states" of consciousness; it was "transcendental" because it believed that essential mind or spirit is more than either physiological process on the one hand or social interactivity or behavior on the other. Improving upon the spiritual substance theory, this philosophy would say that the mind is a higher whole, inclusive rather than exclusive of body. If we were drawing circles again, it might not be inappropriate to say that mind is the outer or controlling sphere, and body the inner instrumental sphere. To the entire sociological school (absolute idealistic as well as naturalistic) it would say that mind or spirit may be related to, and nurtured in, but is not limited, or totally defined by, environment; it has a distinctive dimension of its own perpendicular to or transcending environment, or it may come to have such a transcendence as the outcome of its genesis.

The Hebraic thinkers of the Bible, St. Augustine, Kant, to mention some of the classic names, and modern personalistic philosophers, theologians, and
psychologists in their various ways have contributed to this general personalistic view of mind-spirit. The nub of personalistic thinking about mind is that an active, unitary inclusive self is needed to organize ideas and relate experiences, else such things as grammatical and logical thought, memory, psychological growth, in a word, coherent knowledge, experience, and science are inexplicable. Hume's associationist view lies at the basis of most naturalistic and behavioristic theories of mind. Against these Borden Parker Bowne argued powerfully that if the several conscious states or processes ever get "associated" this implies a mutual, inclusive "consciousness" which does the associating. For example, on the most primary level of thinking experience, to bring two ideas or thoughts, a and b, into grammatical or logical relationship reveals, as it were, beneath the judgment, the conscious Subject, "which is neither a nor b, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness."* There are not only "states of consciousness,"but also, he said, "consciousness of states." vs. William James: "The thoughts themselves are the thinker.

Without this unity, premise and conclusion would fall hopelessly asunder, and the possibility of thought would perish.

... Consciousness ... ...exists only through acts of relation, and hence only through the unity of the subject.**

In our next chapter we will stress such an analysis as constituting the necessary starting point for a "spiritual" definition of selfhood.

The personalistic view mind.
Dotted circle for body is to suggest that there is no rigid dualism between mind and body as in the spiritual

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1. Mind is a unifying power/ as self: illustrated in the simplest thought process. transcending, functioning bodily

2. Mind a/whole greater than the sum of its parts, inclusive rather than exclusive of body. (For illustrations of the conception of body as an instrument of mind see page 24.)

Critical Note: Doubtless no theory fully explains the problem of the mind's apparent unity or its relation to body (see ...); but the personalistic view would claim to do more justice to the facts of experience than other theories. In the following statement, G. Watts Cunningham raises the fundamental question about mind:

"From the survey of these... types of theory, two points stand out fairly clearly. The first is that the problem of mind as thus debated concerns some mechanism of unity among particular experiences. The second point is that it concerns some sort of relation between this mechanism and the bodily organism." (G. Watts Cunningham, "Problems of Philosophy, Henry Holt, 1935, p. 264)

To gain a further perspective on the ground thus far covered, the theories of mind divide into two broad classifications as follows:

**Naturalistic theories:** denial of the "reality" of mind or self

**Transcendental, Wholistic, or Idealistic theories:** affirmation of the "reality" of mind and self.

1. Functionalistic (e.g. Aristotle)
   2. Associationist or relational
      a. General (e.g. Hume)
      b. Behavioristic or materialistic (e.g. J. B. Watson)

2. Social views (e.g. Dewey)
3. Social view of absolute idealists (e.g. Hegel)

**A Teleological View of Individuality or the Self:** Josiah Royce

The reader will recall our discussion in chapter nine, where in an effort to solve the problem of the relation of the Divine and human "wills" (or God's "freedom" in relation to man's) we cited Josiah Royce's conception of the "self,"
in both the Divine and the human case, as a teleological or voluntaristic process, page 357. We here recapitulate, and add to that discussion, as it bears on our present concern. Royce has essentially a personalistic view of mind or selfhood, but one which is dynamized or "functionalized" in profoundly suggestive way.

"Being," or "individuality," he wrote—and we here limit our discussion to the "being" involved in our own sense of "self," or selfhood, or personality—"is...the expression of Selective Interest."* And again, "Individuality is a category of the satisfied Will."** Personal being in our own cases (also in the larger life of God, he believed) is "idea" focussing or precipitating itself into concrete actuality through will or purposive activity. Or in slightly different terms, personal being comes to be as ideas (that is plans, purposes, ideals) will their individuality or concrete realization in actualized life. Here is a definition which, it strikes us, exactly describes what we are, are doing, and hope to be, from the standpoint of our own interior awareness as "persons": we as "selves" are a teleological process coming into focus or "reality" only through growth toward realization of some or a few, supreme life plan(s).

Any life has to limit, narrow, focus, let fall away extraneous, or supernumerous, ideas, plans, ambitions, hopes, expectations, into some one or a few viable options, which we may then strive to realize or achieve. At the end of this development and while in the progress, we "find ourselves" as we say—the actual "person" that we gradually become—the teacher, lawyer, politician,

** Ib., Vol II, 1913, p. 432. Royce was making these points in the larger context of so defining the world as a whole.
Royce phrases this philosophy of selfhood in the following way:

...By an individual being, whatever one's metaphysical doctrine, one means an unique being, that is, a being which is alone of its own type, or is such that no other of its class exists...

...if you look closely at that region of our consciousness where first we come nearest to facing what we take to be an experience of individuality, you find, I think, that it is our selective attention especially as embodied in what one may call our exclusive affections which first brings home to us what we mortals require an individual being to be.*

...an individual...is no abstract conception, but...is a conception expressible only in terms of a satisfied will. An individual is a being that adequately expresses a purpose. Or again, an individual so expresses a purpose that no other being can take the place of this individual as an expression of this purpose. And the sole test of this sort of uniqueness lies in the fact that in this individual being, just in so far is its type gets expression at all, the will or purpose which it expresses rests content with it, desires no other, will have no other.

I conclude then, so far, that if this world contains real individuals at all, it is a teleological world,...**

We wrote in our earlier reference to Royce in chapter nine that neither in the Divine example nor in the human, does selfhood have a thing like "reality." Royce is against any doctrine of the self viewed as mere static "substance" of either material or spiritual quality. We heard him say the self is not some hard core of inexplicable fact; it is "no mere datum."***

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But on the Cosmic (i.e., God's) as on the finite side (man's) it is essentially "a meaning embodied in a conscious life."* Selfhood is a "being" of "function" and "meaning" identical with its power, purposes, and achievements. Selfhood is a teleological, that is, a moral process. Royce said, "The life of our consciousness is...a life of watching our deeds."**

We should not close this chapter dealing with such a large subject matter in such limited space and terms—and especially the present section on "personalistic" theories of mind—without recognition of the vast field of investigation and speculation, from the side of technical psychology. Among psychologists and philosophers who have investigated the self-phenomenon, Allport recognized two moods under the caption (1) personalistic psychology, and (2) the psychology of personality. This distinction indicates whether one allows respectively a somewhat more daring specualtive, or "philosophic" approach to the study of the "self" or a more cautious, "empirically" disciplined approach.***

Our own thinking about the nature or meaning of "personal mind" is a version of "personalistic psychology" (using Allport's distinction for the moment) derived from the philosophic tradition bearing such names as Kant, Wm James, Royce, Mary Whiton Calkins, Bowne, Brightman, Bertocci. Allport classifies the noted psychologist William Stern**** as standing in this tradition of "personalistic," that is, philosophical "psychology:"

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*** Gordon W. Allport in his noteworthy, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation, Henry Holt, 1937, chapter XX: "The Person in Psychology."

**** Stern: General Psychology From the Personalistic Standpoint, Macmillan 1938.
The telic view of selfhood above reviewed in the classic form of Josiah Royce has had, of course, its expositors in other figures of our time, who have written from varying standpoints, using different idiom perhaps but developing the same interpretations of personality as dynamic, purposive energy. A noteworthy example it seems to us is Heidegger's "existentialist" philosophy of human existence or the human reality, Dasein, as set forth in Being and Time. Fernando R. Molina (ed): The Sources of Existentialist Philosophy, Prentice-Hall, 1969, p. 132-137, esp. 133D, 134B, 136C,D,
and mentions further representatives, such as Calkins, Bowne, James Ward, and others. Allport separated himself to some extent from this group as an expositor of the "psychology of personality."

Working from the side of clinical psychology, the widely recognized Carl Rogers has developed a distinctive psychology of the "self" as a dynamic organizing "I," closely resembling the spiritual philosophy of selfhood suggested in this present chapter.

We should also mention the "field," "holistic," "organismic," and "gestalt" approaches to the study of personality as represented by investigators like Lewin, Koffka, Kohler, Anuyal, Maslow, Lecky, and others. The thoroughgoing dynamic and holistic approach of these psychological investigators of personality theory would, in general terms, express many of the implications of our own view of mind, or the personal self, as thus far described. Lewin's quite conscious introduction of the concept psychical energy, as the most inclusive, phenomenological descriptive term for personality closely resembles our emphasis.

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* Ibid., pp. 552-557.

** Ibid., pp. 558f.


**** Hall and Lindzey, chapters 6 and 8.

In sum, these psychological theories, in so far as we are acquainted with them, express, more or less, from the standpoint and interests of the technical psychologists, what we have called with Royce the teleological view of the self. This teleological view of personality is eloquently expressed, it seems to us, by Allport himself at the close of his text:

He [man] is more than a bundle of habits; more than a nexus of abstract dimensions; more too than a representative of his species. He is more than a citizen of the state, and more than a mere incident in the gigantic movements of mankind. He transcends them all. The individual, striving ever for his own integrity, has existed under many forms of social life—forms as varied as the nomadic, feudal, and capitalistic. He struggles on even under oppression, always hoping and planning for a more perfect democracy where the dignity and growth of each personality will be prized above all else.*

Chapter Twelve

Man as Spiritual Being:
The Reality and Transcendency of Spirit

Common to the idea and language of man as "religious being" is the concept of man as "spirit", or "spiritual being". Man as spiritual being is a comprehensive idea involving several levels of meaning. We have already dealt with a major aspect of man as spirit in our discussion of truth and reason (Part I, Chapter 2). The concept of man as a "rational being" is a significant element in the idea of him as "spirit". A religious view which defines man as spirit claims to define him in most inclusive or coherent sense.

In the chapter just preceding, we presented various theories of "mind" or human "personality", concluding with an exposition of several forms of personalistic theory of mind as essential functioning unity and telec energy. In suggesting the superiority of this form of understanding of man we were advancing in general terms a spiritual view of his nature. This chapter seeks to clarify further the idea of man as spiritual "unity", and as "self-transcending" "energy" and "reality". We will, before we conclude, have considered the traditional terminology "soul", and suggested a place or manner in which it may profitably reside in our description of man.

A further word about method before we proceed. Our argument from here forward will continue to be an "empirically" or "rationally coherent" one, as Chapter Two heretofore defined, p. 56. Considering the subject matter with which we are concerned, part of that method must be of necessity an introspective, self-reflective or "a priori" one. A topic such as freedom, for example, cannot be treated adequately or thoroughly apart from such method. The reader,
therefore, must at this stage, as in our earlier one treating the arguments for God, continue to consider as appropriate a rationally reflective method. If this is ruled out, leaving only the alternative of some narrowly "empirical" or sensate method, we would be left with a devalued and unsatisfactory coinage for such metaphysical exchange as we must here make. We may profitably recall the spirit of Locke's words, if not the letter, that there are probably several legitimate methods in the understanding of truth, and the discovery of reality. He wrote:

_We have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation._ (Echu, IX, 2.)

We here, then, stress the "intuitive" sense of what we believe ourselves to be. I in no way wish thereby to rule out legitimate, objective, or "empirical science" and what it may tell us about the nature of brain, and the relation of brain functions and parts, as we examine that organ from the outside, to what we feel ourselves to be as blee energy from "inside" ourselves. Indeed, our latter-day discoveries that brain "functions" may be described as encephalic or electrical energies, has helped to bring, it seems to me, the two realms of "mind-spirit" on the one hand, and "body-matter" on the other, together in a way transcending the egregious "dualisms" of former times (recall our discussion in chapter nine). But this anticipates our venture. What we stress for the moment is the need for some degree of a priori method in the discovery of man, and we might well repeat here the words on this subject of a noted psychologist, uttered in warmth and warning earlier in our century. James R. Angell wrote:
We may agree that in theory all and in practice much of our mental life might be stated in terms of objective behavior. To do this would involve trespassing rather freely on the preserves of biology, physiology, and neurology on the one side and upon those of the social sciences on the other. But such trespass is perfectly legitimate provided the trespasser is willing to face the chance that he may find himself annexed, appropriated, and in general swallowed up by the owner of the territory which he invades. When she abandons the stronghold of consciousness as her peculiar institution, Psychology is moderately certain to find that as an autonomous government she has ceased to exist and has become a mere dependency of biology or some other overlord...

When it comes to discarding introspection I demur. Introspection ought to be checked by every possible objective device, but even for one frankly and exclusively interested in objective behavior as such, it seems to me at present to afford information not to be gained elsewhere...

It is a wise instinct which science has always followed to glean information wherever it can be found. Until it can be shown, as it has not yet been shown, that introspection is either fundamentally incompetent, or clumsily and viciously misleading, it is the part of good judgment to use it. Refine it, check it, train it, but do not throw away a good tool until you certainly have a better in hand. And do not forget that in much which offers itself as objective method, introspection is really involved either directly or indirectly.

Let us then bid the movement toward objective methods and objective description in psychology God-speed, but let us also counsel it to forego the excesses of youth.*

I. Various Meanings of "Spirit"

In the conflict with non-spiritual philosophies, one of the more important tasks of philosophical, theological, and social thinking today is to reinvest the word "spirit" and the idea of man as a spiritual being with significance. In its casual usage, the term is often void of meaning--

or utterly confused by a multiplicity of meaning! Commonly, in the west, the word symbolizes the religious, Biblical, and Christian doctrine of man, and it is frequently used in connection with the democratic and liberal view. In the religious tradition it has usually meant man as an "immortal soul." In social and political thought it has implied the ideas of "freedom" and "equality." In a philosophical naturalism like John Dewey's, it has stood for scientific, "organized intelligence." In philosophical idealism and humanistic philosophies in general, "spirit" has meant the height of man's thinking, rational, and emotional nature which perceives, understands, appreciates, and realizes value—that activity of the "soul" which has to do with "Truth," "Beauty," and "Good." In some specific philosophical idealisms it has often meant the "World Mind" or "Spirit," of which the human mind and spirit have been regarded as part. In a ball game it means the "collective enthusiasm" of the team or the spectators.

We cannot, of course, here run the gamut of meanings. In one edition of Crudon's Concordance, some nineteen different meanings for the term in Elizabethan English were listed for the King James Bible. In a story around the campfire, it has meant a ghost.

The significance or definition here sought for the term will turn out to relate in part to its traditional religious meaning—that there is something distinctive or unique about man, which we may call "spirit": a greater whole, more than, and not entirely subject to, the body; the real, intrinsic self or person, transcendent to nature and yet dependent on her, and ultimately dependent on and subject to God, the Divine Spirit. A renewed definition should also include the best insights of the rational, philosophical tradition, to the effect that man's spirit indicates, at least in part, man's "reason." By retaining, or perhaps reorganizing and
discovering new values in each of these meanings, a more effective use of the word may be made.

The materialistic systems, philosophical, psychological, and social, have not believed that man has a "spirit" or "is spirit" in the sense outlined above. The rise and popularity of these systems may be as responsible for the decline of interest in understanding spirit as the failure of idealistic and religious philosophies to define it more carefully. In attempting to speak of spirit, we use related words like "mind," "self," "personality," "soul." We continue to define and to relate these terms as may be necessary. For our present purposes we use them synonymously, with the following brief digression to indicate several possible distinctions.

We sometimes speak of the "whole mind," i.e. the entire sensory, thinking, willing, feeling alive, in all its depth and heighth, with no distinction between conscious and subconscious sensations and emotions, etc. As modern psychology has shown, however, we should more accurately speak of two levels of "mind" at the very least, the conscious and sub-conscious. That there is a sub-conscious mind needs no elaborate proof here. Every time we forget the name of our "very best friend" whom we are trying to introduce to someone else implies the presence of that other dark room, without windows, the sub-conscious mind, like a cellar, just beneath the floor of the conscious mind. The name has gone "somewhere." It hasn't fled from the mind entirely, else we would never be able to recall it at all. It has for the moment disappeared. Presently, after some mysterious mechanism, hidden in the walls of our being, completes its work, the lost name rises like a fugitive ghost through the floor. There it suddenly is--it has popped from the sub-conscious into the conscious mind.
We may mean then, in our usage of self, soul, or spirit, "the whole mind" above mentioned, the entire mansion with all its apparatus, not just the bright room of "present consciousness," realizing that there are cellars, attics, and closets where memories and habits, lost words, inspirations and idle thoughts are stored, where crowding and tightly wound emotions wait ready to spring, sometimes with devastating anxiety, sometimes with liberating, exhilarating ecstasy.

In another usage we might, however, mean the following. A possible distinction might be made between the "blue rose" which I hold on the mind's imaginative "screen" at the moment and the power that at will changes the blue rose to a yellow one. Accordingly, some may prefer to reserve the terms self, soul, or spirit for this deeper level of power or will, in some distinction to the pictorial "ideas" and "images" projected by our mind's eye. We could indeed say that "mind" is the upper level of "ideas," while the "spirit" is the deeper or profounder. Not that we should make such an absolute distinction between "ideas" and "spirit" as did George Berkeley in the 18th century; for both ideas and spirit-will are known within the circumference of consciousness and must therefore be related in a profounder unity.

At any rate, I feel that these distinctions are more subtle than we now need, and for the purpose of our present discussion, mind, self, soul, and spirit will continue to be interchangeable, more or less coordinate expressions. One further digression may be helpful before we continue with

\*We take up again at a later place the idea of "soul" for further discussion, p.
Personality—a philosophical definition. It has been traditional to divide the field of consciousness into two levels, first, simple animal percepts or sensations, and second, concepts or ideas. We open our eyes, for example, to the colors about us for an illustration of percepts as raw sensation in its instantaneous, non-reflective presence. The first and main assurance about percepts is that they seem to stream into our awareness from outside us. By "concepts" or "ideas," however, we mean the processes that originate and occur primarily within the mental field. This subjective side of consciousness seems divided further into two phases or levels: One, the psychical image, the blue rose or the imaginary apple that I now "see" if I wish to, in my mind's eye; and two, the power of generalization (possibly sometimes without "psychical images") illustrated by a chain of mathematical reasoning or intuition, or other complex deductive or inductive thinking. This refers to the profound ability of our mind's eye to "see" connections and relationships between things on a level deeper than immediate sensation. David Hume gave a good name in common speech to this power when he referred to it as "the relations of ideas"—the connection made, for example, between a falling apple and the rising of the tides, by a mathematical formulation of gravitation.

Next, there is our entire emotional complexity, of course, which must be considered in a generalized description of human "personality": our desires, longings, loves; our fears, aversions, anxieties; our fulfillments, our joys, our ecstasies. Finally, in a philosophic résumé of what "person-
ality" is, we refer to "self-consciousness" in the human sense, here briefly, and later on discuss this aspect again under the idea of "freedom."

There seems to be a difference between animal "consciousness" and human "self-consciousness." Consciousness may be defined in a general way simply as a living being's awareness of its environment. Men and animals have this in common. Self-consciousness, however, is consciousness of oneself in peculiar self-determining relation to one's environment, which animals apparently do not have to the same extent as human beings. For example, my cat and I leave the room at the same time via the window when fire starts in the wastepaper basket and gets out of hand. Both of us are cut as we squeeze through the window. On the outside the cat becomes at once preoccupied solely with licking its wounds, its attention absorbed by the local problem of the bleeding paw. I, however, not only run for the alarm, but in my chagrin at being cut, reflect: "How stupid! Why didn't I try the door?" The cat after the act would hardly reconsider its decision. A self-conscious being is the most general way to think of a personal being.

In sum, we have been defining human "personality" in our generalized philosophical terms as constituted by our life of sensation, our life of imagination and reason, our emotions; and our self-transcendence, or our human freedom—each of these being different perspectives within the same reality as interiorly experienced in ascending comprehensiveness.**

**For those to whom the word "mind" may seem too old-fashioned and substantive, we suggest the terms "conscious experience" or "self-conscious experience." Even the materialist or behaviorist type of thinker realizes that there is "conscious experience," that he has this kind of experience, or that he must account for it.
II. The Reality of Mind-Spirit:

Are Mind and Brain Identical?

We return to the materialist-spiritualist controversy raised in our chapter on theories of mind. The perennial way to state the primary question between materialist and idealist spiritual philosophies is simply to ask: are mind and brain identical? That many philosophers, psychologists, bio-chemists, and common citizens believe that they are identical, points, of course, to a truism of contemporary belief about man.

At this stage of the decision, we suggest to the reader to peruse a technical study of the nervous system and brain for detail concerning the "physiology" of "mind." There is, for example, the recent, thoroughgoing and open ended book by Dean E. Wooldridge: *The Machinery of the Brain.* The title of this excellent expository treatise indeed indicates its ultimate materialist position, philosophically speaking. Dr. Wooldridge believes, in the last analysis, that man and his "mind" is ultimately "machinery," although vastly complex, digital-computer-like, electronic machinery. This book is an up-to-date statement of the materialist hypothesis, replete with fascinating facts, challenging to the idealist view that "mind" cannot be explained in terms just of "physical machinery" alone.

Wooldridge goes to great pains to interpret consciousness (though he admits that "consciousness is a problem, p.219f."); in the higher range of mental activity, like learning, memorization, associative recall, or concept formation, as "thought mechanisms," that is to say, the electrical functioning of the astronomically supernumerous, complex, and inter-
related neurons, or nerve cells (axons, cell bodies, dendrites, and synapses) of the brain. When our modern knowledge of the physiology of brain process clarifies that specific so-called "spiritual" functions or qualities like reasoning ability, memory, emotional joys or terrors can be specifically located (some types of functions more, and others less) in gray matter and cells and electrically stimulated—turned on and off by brain probes or electrically wired needles; when it is plain that destruction of brain in sufficient amount is inevitably followed by destruction of specific "personality" powers, such as will, memory, etc.—the modern case for the "materiality" of "mind," and its "identity" to or with "brain," has been stated with overwhelming overriding force. But we will here ask this scientific investigator, and lively expositor, to sum up the case as he sees it in his own words:

Most impressive of all, of course, are the observations that reveal the physical basis of the "higher processes" of emotion and intelligence. The discovery of pleasure and punishment centers in the brain—discrete, localized, stable aggregations of neurons in which an electric current means a sense of well-being, hunger; sexual gratification, rage, terror or pain—made it difficult for those whose thinking emphasized the dichotomy of the brain and the mind. This difficulty was further increased by the evidence for the controlling effect on personality of the integrity of the neuronal connections to the frontal lobes, as well as by the clear relationship established by Penfield between stimulating cortical currents and the "mental" processes of speech and memory. And evidence for the automatic, machinelike nature of some of the learning processes has further aggravated the plight of the brain/mind dualist.

In short, all the material of the preceding chapters has consisted of evidence for the applicability of the established physical laws of nature to the activities of the nervous system. The underlying thesis throughout has been, in essence, "The brain is a machine."* At one point, Dr. Wooldridge's interpretation and the philosophy here espoused is in hearty agreement—namely that the traditional

"brain/mind" dualism is in error, and must be supplanted by a more adequate philosophy of mind in relation to body. In an earlier chapter we have already called attention to this need (page 347); and we will return later specifically to the discussion with Dr. Wooldridge at this point.

We will in the meanwhile summarize the case, for the "transcendence" of mind—and presently attempt to state precisely what we mean by this, semantically, psychologically, and perhaps, even ontologically. Accordingly, from the subjective or introspective standpoint we experience the following distinctions.

(1) **Sensation** (mental or conscious experience on the most immediate, primary level) as qualitative experience is incommensurate with or "unlike" nervous impulse, or the "reflex" of the brain-nerve system. "Stimulation of the visual area at the occipital pole of the brain by an electric needle results in flashes of light in the field of consciousness." A little less technical way to state the same thing might be: a blow (material impact) on the head makes us see "stars," blue, yellow, and red, in the mind! What is this mysterious subjective experience of seeing stars—or of sight, vision, or "light" every time we open our eyes, with which we shall illustrate sensation?

Physics's description of the objective energy on its cosmic side of a given by

"ray" of "light" or color is the general formula:

\[ \lambda = \frac{c}{f}, \]

i.e., type of light or color = velocity of light

\[ \text{frequency} \]

Frequency is defined as the interval between the wave "crests" of a particular type of light, violet, green, yellow, or red:

What physics means by objective color is stated by the formula, \( \lambda = c/f \).

But what physiology and psychology mean, you and I subjectively, is "green" to choose a specific color. We cannot say that the formula, \( \lambda = c/f \), or the wave, "\( \bigcirc\bigcirc\bigcirc\bigcirc\bigcirc \)" is "green." Were we to apply our subjective "light" terminology to these external stimuli, all we might say is that they are "dark," indeed a good word to symbolize their own inner-most, unknown qualities. What we really mean is that your and my physio-psychological powers somehow have the capacity of interpreting \( \lambda = c/f \) as "green," in response to the external stimulation of retina, nerves, and brain. Similarly with the other basal sensations, sound, taste, and so on. Our inner experience of sensation is qualitatively different from \( \lambda = c/f \)." It is "incommensurate" in the sense that there is no way by which we can directly or in some kind of one to one terms translate \( \lambda = c/f \) into "green." Generally speaking, \( \lambda = c/f \) is that with which nerves and brain have to do.

But green is an expression of our inner life of "mind" and "consciousness." (For the meaning of green as something objective, that it is/actually on or in, for example, the leaf at which we are looking, recall page 54.)

We pass next from immediate experiences of sensation to a more reflective level of "ideas," "thoughts," and "meanings."
(2) Thought or meaning is a variable, while the physical process of nervous reflex remains constant. The psychological experiment is commonplace of the two identical, dark profiles facing each other. From one perspective of "meaning," the picture represents two silhouetted heads; from another it depicts a white chalice in the middle, which the profiles make. The meaning, the work of mind, changes at will, but the physical elements, the actual lines and light, which the brain receives, remain constant.

There is a slightly more general way to state the same point. Though there is the area in sensation where the physical and mental seem to merge, the mind is chiefly preoccupied with meaning and values, whereas the brain is concerned with physiological process. The fact that identical acts physically speaking can have entirely different significance suggests the difference between spiritual meaning on the one hand, the function of mind and brain or bodily movement on the other. When Lincoln put his name to the Emancipation Proclamation he went through identically the same act physically (his brain's co-ordination of pen with paper, etc.) as in signing a hundred more trivial documents with entirely different meanings. The physical aspects of killing in self defense and in premeditated murder are identical—the same finger pulls the same trigger of the same pistol according to the pattern of a constant physiological reflex acting from brain to nerves' end; but the meaning of the actions are different, and the distinction is recognized by law. Such examples suggest that there is a difference between "mind" and "nervous system."

* An illustration of William E. Hocking.
Another way to state the same point is to say that mind is conscious of its own content (of "meaning"); the brain is not. The mind is self-reflective; it is conscious of its own functions and powers. It is full of colors, ideas, emotions, ambitions, reasonings, plans, fears, doubts, senses of values, decisions all the time, and is aware of a ubiquitous intramural self that evaluates and relates this content. The brain, however, is not conscious of what it looks like on the inside or how it works as an electro-chemical mechanism. We never see our own graymatter, or the neurons or synapses, or the atoms of hydrogen or carbon, which chemically compose our brain. If mind-spirit were identical with brain, it is strange indeed, that, with its self-conscious power, the mind never reports directly on the physical content or processes of brain. As Bowne once emphasized in a forceful passage, the mind reports on everything else—on external objects, on abstract ideas, on values, etc.—but never on the inner cellular, chemical structure or electrical processes of the brain. His words are memorable and we repeat them:

One would expect that the thoughts would represent, if anything, the organic processes of which they are said to be the inner face: whereas they never refer to these, and commonly refer to things entirely apart from the organism. Nervous combinations and movements are said to have ideas for their mental face; and the natural thought would be that those ideas would be ideas of their peculiar nervous correlates. But this is never the case; indeed, that there are such correlates is even now a matter of not very cogent inference. This complete silence of the organism as to what is going on in itself, and the report instead of what is taking place in the outer world are very remarkable facts. Certainly, when matter is declared to be a double-faced entity, we should expect to find the mental face reflecting that part of the physical face which attends it, or which is next to it; but the mental face never reflects the physical series which produces it, but some other and unconnected series. Thus a set of rays of light fall upon the body and a thought results, but not a thought of the nerve-processes, or molecular motions which produce the thought, but a thought of some external luminous object. It is strange, indeed, that anything should result, but that the thought should be a reproduction of the
object is surprising in a far higher degree. The wonder is still greater in our perception of others' thoughts. Here some waves of air fall upon the ear, and at once the nerves produce thoughts with the added assurance that they are the reproduction of a thought-series which exists apart from our own.*

(4) **Brain is in space and subject to the laws of "matter."** Can ideas be spoken of in spacial, prepositional terms? Where are my ideas of the blue and yellow roses? Can we make any sense by saying that one is "beside," "above," or "behind" the other, as we would speak of physical objects? The best we can do is to say that they are "in the mind" in general, and that mind is related or connected with brain. But this is as far as we can go in trying to locate ideas in space. A related problem concerns that of **time.** Mind in both memory and forethought seems to possess some measure of transcendence over "time." (On the other hand, however, real, flowing time seems to be as much an integral attribute of spirit as of nature, necessary to individual, personal existence; and one of our most fundamental and direct contacts with the flow or will of reality itself.**)§

To summarize thus far, is the realm of thought on a different plane from that of material nature as physics and chemistry must test it? A "thought" apparently has no weight, nor spacial dimensions, nor other features that generally characterize "physical matter." Indeed, the fact that there are electro-encephalic currents ("brain waves") calculable to the

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**See our essay *The Personal Significance of Time, Space, and Casuality*, *American Quarterly*, November 1960, for analyses of "time," and "space" as integral aspects of the meaning of "personality," and as themselves clues to the spiritual-personal nature of reality.
physical realm, which metrically record thought activity, suggests that mind-spirit and its content of thought is a type of energy, no doubt in a measure continuous with, but at the top of, the hierarchy of natural energies (see-page-150).

(The fact that mind-spirit seems to be to some extent discontinuous or incommensurate with gravitational space, the material order in most general sense, may be a kind of a priori "intimation of immortality." In any case, the common experience of such discontinuity should remove some of the fear that the body and its disintegration at death must necessarily say the last word in the destiny of individual life.)

What we have so far pointed out comes to focus as a final step in the case for the "transcendency" of mind.

(5) It is the experience that mind seems to be, or to have, an energy of its own, over and above the body reflex system, and with this suggestion we pass to our next section which elaborates it.

III. Mind-Energy, Body as its Instrument, and the Reality of the Self

Mind Energy. The case for mental energy may be briefly summarized. On the level of the most common-place experience we all sense that our plans and intentions, our force of will behind our ideas, which are "mental factors," are causes of physical action. It may be a mystery just how ideas of the future, for example, can command life and bodily actions in the present, but it is none-the-less a fact. Similarly, ideas of the bet-
ter (our "ideals") constantly give rise to human action and change history. Likewise, ideas of the worse, bad news, worry, fear, rage, mental aberrations and "complexes" are frequently the causes of organic symptoms, adrenalin secretion, ulcers, hysterical lameness, etc.* The idea of food to a hungry man, who has been busily engaged when his wife interrupts him with the call to dinner, instantly excites the salivary glands. Concentration of thought and attention can, to a considerable extent, black out organic sensation and functions. Being oblivious to the clock's ticking or the children's noise and similar experiences are common to all.

Along this line we cite a number of "empirical," or "experimental" type evidences for mind energy: Hindu Yogi, Saints, and sages, for example, have shown that some persons, with training, can exert a certain degree of control at will over some involuntary bodily functions, such as pulse beat, heartbeat, pain reflex, etc.** The influence of ideas (mind) over body, seems dramatically illustrated by hypnotism. Physical manifestations such as "cold sweat," "burns," "blisters," rigid limbs, the inducing of anesthesia, are caused in patients by hypnotic "suggestion." Dramatic instances of auto-hypnotically induced, anaesthesia to sound; or complete pain anaesthesia/in entire limbs by patients, trained to self-hypnosis through "reflex conditioning," are reported by Andrew

*See, for example, Melvin Zax and George Stricker: Patterns of Psychopathology, Case Studies of Behavioral Dysfunction (McMillan, New York, 1936)

**Currently the scientific study of meditation, and its effects in these ways is being conducted by the physiology department of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, reported by Peter Hazelhurst, dispatch of The Times, in Eugene Register-Guard, Sunday, June 1, 1969. See also report on works of Drs. Bernard Engel, Joe Kamiya, and Peter Land, (respectively of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development in Baltimore, Langley Porter psycho-physiatric Institute in San Francisco, and University of Wisconsin) relative to the training of the body automatic system by conscious control—Time, July 13, 1969, p. 67
Salter in his well-known book, *What is Hypnosis, Studies in Conditioning*, (Citadel Press, New York, 1963, p. 40f.). Whether hypnosis be fully explained or not by a "reflex conditioning" theory, which Salter presses, a report such as the following from his case histories reveals that his subjects were trained to bring their own conscious powers of thought to bear upon, and dramatically to control what is normally involuntary pain reflex:

This subject was also conditioned to produce an anaesthesia at will in any part of his body, while remaining in the so-called waking state. In order to produce this anaesthesia, the subject had merely to concentrate on the part of his body in which he wished the absence of feeling, and to think "The feeling is going away. The feeling is going away." This was conditioned to produce a complete anaesthesia. In order to restore sensation, the subject had to think "The feeling is coming back. The feeling is coming back." That would suffice. All subjects were similarly trained to anaesthetize themselves.

The subject would inflict perceptible injuries upon himself with a sterilized needle and knife point as he explored his anaesthesias. After a while he was not allowed to check them because it was found that this subject as well as the other two members of this group, inflicted deep injuries upon himself in his surprise at the utter absence of feeling. All the subjects laughed and denied that they enjoyed any masochistic pleasure in their self-punishment. "It isn't punishment," they said.*

Further examples of what appears to be a power of control by "mind" are those numerous cases of people, who, after brain injury, disease, or surgery, are able by force of will to recall lost faculties, re-educating what may be left of the brain to take over functions of those parts that have been removed or have deteriorated. I quote at length one such case as reported by D. M. Allan in *The Realm of Personality*:

When...the brain is seriously damaged, it is the spirit of the man who owns the brain that is all-important. If he resigns himself to his fate, all is lost; but if he puts up a determined fight, he can work wonders with what is left.

of his brain. He can lose approximately one half of his brain and still regain most of his abilities.

This was demonstrated in the notable case of Dr. Saloz. At the age of sixty this capable physician was stricken with aphasia of the severest type and could neither speak, read, nor write. Only a few words such as "yes," "no," and "thanks" survived of his large vocabulary. The cause of this condition, as revealed by an autopsy later, was an extensive degeneration of the left hemisphere of his brain. Most men would have given up in despair. But Dr. Saloz was a man of iron determination, and with admirable courage and persistence he set himself to the task of re-educating himself. He had to start on the level of a child, but after three years of painstaking effort he was once more able to use his lost faculties. He made a personal study of aphasia and wrote an illuminating account of his case. Looking back, he testified that "he felt at first as one immured in a sepulchre, that he knew what he wished to express, but had lost all the instruments of expression and that symbols conveyed nothing to him. It seemed to him that he had entered another world where his ideas were soft and downy, as in a dream...He had ideas, thoughts, or conceptions, but lacked the symbols of self-expression." At the end of his period of resolute self-education, his medical advisor could detect no defect in his mind except for an unusual stubbornness of ideas.

Numerous instances of this kind have convinced neurologists that when one area of the brain is destroyed, other areas can be organized to take its place... We may justly conclude that a creative attitude is as necessary in restoring lost functions of the brain as it is in learning to use the full potentialities of that marvelous organ in the first place.*

The experiments of E. L. Travis connecting the intensity of thought or concentration to the frequency or wave length of electrical "brain waves" is illuminating.** Describing this experiment, Allan writes,

"Travis presents tables of concomitant variations which show that as one goes from 'mental blankness' to 'mental effort' by degrees, the proportion of 'small waves' to 'large waves' steadily increases. This striking


change to smaller waves seems to accompany any process in which consciousness becomes more highly focused, that is, in which there is a specific attentative effort.*

In addition to the above line of evidence, some may wish to cite the extensive experimentation in "extra-sensory perception" (ESP) phenomena that investigators like J. B. Rhine, of Duke University parapsychology institute, Robert H. Thouless of Great Britain, and others have been carrying out for a good portion of this century. The general point of these investigations, if one accepts their findings, is to indicate that there is a distinct mental energy that seems to by-pass ordinary channels of sense perception. We will not here attempt an exposition or evaluation (except in the brief note below**)

*Ibid. p. 218. Also for description of this phenomenon, with charts of encephalographs illustrating the intensity of brain waves when the subject is mentally alert in contrast to the relaxed waves when inattentive, drowsy or asleep, see Wooldridge, *The Machinery of the Brain*, op. cit., p.98-1018.

**The natural scientists have long proclaimed empirical method as their own special way (and often exclusive way) of discovering truth about our world; that is to say, about the nature of beings and processess, and the relationships which hold between beings and process. The empirical spirit is the outward look, the canon or faith that holds that only objective nature can tell us what she is like; extreme empiricism has repudiated the application of any private opinion, subjective dogma, or preconceived value on the part of the inquirer himself as he proceeds about his investigation of things. And this indeed is the proper method about many objects of scientific inquiry. Radical empiricism looks askance at any claim of the man's inner spirit to know something about either itself, or reality more widely, by any a priori, introspective, or self-reflective analysis. Such methods have simply been ruled out of court by some empirical dogmatists as "unscientific," occult, and even possibly fanatical.

The parapsychologist, and Mr. Rhine among them, as I understand their procedure, have quietly bypassed this criticism, and have been conscientiously endeavoring to find out if there were not some empirical way after all to test whether there be a non-empirical mode of knowledge. To examine his works gives one the impression that he is a sober empirical investigator, endeavoring to bring to light, by careful and extensive experiment, fact and only fact in Extra-Sensory Perception. I greatly wonder myself about some of the alleged findings in this area, particularly in the areas of prognosticative extra-sensory perception. If the future of human activities can be known in advance by these extra-sensory powers somewhat in an analogous manner, as an eclipse of the sun may be predicted by astronomical knowledge, what does this do to our feeling of human freedom, and the openness of the future for individuals and for history? Whatever psychokinesis may allege, to the effect that some human events may be anticipated in advance, I am inwardly certain of human freedom, and that many future human events are indeterminate in character.
of this specialized field--fascinating or doubtful, as one is inclined to regard the "evidence." Academic psychologists in the United States are wont to regards these experiments and investigators with varied approval. Rhine is under suspicion by some as not being a careful enough investigator of the alleged facts of ESP. Others who have reported in this area, like Gardner Murphy, are respected by their colleagues. In some defense of Rhine, we cite two independent sources. At an annual meeting, the American Institute of Mathematical Statistics stated publicly about Dr. Rhine's words:

"...that, assuming that the experiments have been properly performed, the statistical analysis is essentially valid. If the Rhine investigation is to be fairly attacked, it must be on other than mathematical grounds."

The noted psychologist, William McDougall, professor of psychology at Harvard (1920-27) and later head of the department at Duke University (1927f.), spoke of Rhine on the side of his experimental procedures and scientific intensity, as "a ruthless seeker after truth, almost, I may say, a fanatical devotee of science, a radical believer in the adequacy of its methods and in their unlimited possibilities."

To recapitulate briefly, in addition to intuitive evidence of mind energy, we have cited as empirical type evidence for mind energy (1) the fact of "concomitant variations" between mental effort and the amplitude or intensity of brain waves; (2) the effect of mind on body in producing organic symptoms--such as the dramatic cases of the rebuilding of lost mental and physical faculties by acts of will, in hypnotism, in the control to some extent of ordinarily involuntary body functions through meditative techniques,

*Reported in Reader's Digest, February, 1948, p. 140.

**From the Foreward of J. B. Rhine: Extrasensory Perception, 1934, pp. vi-vii.
as with Hindu mystics, and in general the well-known relation of mind on body in the whole area of health; and (3) the problematical ESP investigations.

At this stage in the discussion the question arises, by such philosophy as the foregoing are we not advocating an egregious "mind/body" or "body/mind" dualism of the older and unacceptable sort? In reply, we refer the reader to chapter nine, page 347, where we suggested that the relation of "mind" to "body" is a relationship of energy systems or levels and by no means a rigid mind vs. body dualism of the traditional and totally bad kind. We continue here for further clarification of the foregoing question along this line, having in mind the particular criticism of a physiologist like Wooldridge in his forementioned study. In chapters eleven and twelve of that book he gives an extensive materialist-mechanist critique of what he terms the "brain/mind" dualism, with due acknowledgement of the "troublesome property of consciousness" (p. 219). He concedes that it may ultimately be discovered to be something more than a merely "passive" property or effect, which he, in the current writing, believes it to be. We quote again the following summary of his position, which includes an acknowledgement that the question of a possible dynamic, over and above a mere "passive" wording of consciousness must be left open.

For those to whom the idea of a completely passive sense of consciousness is unacceptable, there is nothing in this treatment that is logically inconsistent with an ultimate determination that some small degree of conscious control exists. Our working hypothesis, for all practical purposes, is simply that known physical principles are adequate to explain the brain processes to the depth of detail to which present knowledge makes speculation reasonable. A small perturbation in the operation of these physical principles, which could be of great philosophic importance, might not be observable by the computer or brain scientist for many years to come. As to such a possibility, we can preserve an open mind.*

*Ibid., Wooldridge, p. 220.
In general reply to the principal point of these two chapters of the Wooldridge study, we believe analysis must declare there to be--existentially--a "distinction," "difference" (or a "dualism") of a semantical sort, behind which there is a distinction of a psychological kind. Our point is that is not the color "green;" neither is an encephalic electrical frequency qualitatively the same as the "thought" of love for my mother that I may have in my inner self. We are certainly speaking of a degree of, or a qualitative, but perhaps not of a radically distinct, difference in kind. We do not believe that a spiritual philosophy intends, or must move from this degree of semantical or psychological "dualism" to a radical, ontological type "dualism" of the older kind: implying two totally, or absolutely different or unlike things--"mind" vs. "matter." Indeed, our proposition that what we are dealing with in reality are related, perhaps even superordinate echelons of energy fields, is the conceptual path down which we--like the materialist we aim indeed best tread in the proper description of these phenomena. To avoid intellectually destructive dualism. But neither can we move to the other extreme and limit our description of reality to a too simplified (and therefore abstract) brain/mind monism.

From our "self" standpoint there is a sense of "freedom," or of "indefiniticity," or power of "will" and self-initiative; there is a sense of "incongruity" or incommensurateness between the "content" of our "mind" as self-luminous, self-reflective "ideas," "purposes," senses of "value" and "ideals;" as "feelings," "emotion," and even "sensory" experience, and the electro-chemical, and "digital-computer" descriptions of the brain and its process; and tantamount to this, there is a sense of difference, or sense of the "transcendency" of the self. In terms, however, of Wooldridge's brain/mind monism, such self experience is purely illusory, or inexplicable.
How do we explain the sense of transcendency of the self to "mechanical" models and interpretations? How do we explain the very subjective but real sense of transcendency as being produced, according to the "mechanical" view, by "mechanism" defined as non-transcending? To think in terms of mind "reality," we do not have to think—if the reader will bear a repetition—in terms of the brain/mind "dualism" picture, criticized by Wooldridge. Rather, in a spiritual philosophy, we think in terms of brain-mind transcendency—with due emphasis on connection, not disconnection.

It may be as untrue to say that mind is "brain functioning," meaning a total identity of "mind" with "brain," as to say that the bronze casting is the plaster matrix from which it is formed or made. At one stage the casting is the matrix "functioning," to be sure; and the casting is, genetically, absolutely dependent on the matrix for its being or formed reality. But the end product of the process is a casting that "transcends," that is, becomes independent of, the matrix—there still remaining, of course, the one-to-one likeness of the matrix contours and the casting features. Or, in a similar analogy which we have already employed (Hadfield, page 351), it seems as untrue to say that brain/mind are identical as to say that the "light"emitted and the "heat energy" of the wire through which electricity is passed "are the same." The sense of qualitative difference between mind-experience from the interior standpoint, and the observed electrochemical mechanism of brain functioning, need not be interpreted as an egregious "dualism" connoted by the picture, brain/mind. We think of mind-energy as a super-ordinate energy with a sense of its own integrity emerging from brain energy, under the rationale of many widely experienced forms of the transferrence of energies. There need be no more degree of egregious "dualism" between mind and brain energies than there is between the stored chemical energies of a battery and the electrical energies that flow from it.
when the connections are made. Indeed, a sense of bad dualism enters and may increase only as we persist to think in an out-moded way, and natural energies, or process, in over-simplified mechanical or "materialistic" categories; or, on the other hand, when we continue to think of spirit as some form of vaporous or ghostly abstraction, unlike disconnected, and essentially alien to materialistic energy. We have said that neither extreme may be implied by spiritual philosophy. From the standpoint of creation, the self (or spirit) is "material;" from the standpoint of the self, creation is "spiritual."

G. N. M. Tyrrell said with some force:

There is no reason why nature should terminate at the point where our senses cease to register it, and no reason... why, beyond this point, it should not be governed by unfamiliar laws....

The higher laws of the spirit may be "unfamiliar" (that is, unanalyzable in mathematic or quantitative terms) only in the sense that we have no mental picture of their "structure," as we can come to know the "structure" of external material objects. Bear in mind, however, that the very word "structure" is a materialistic term, connoting opaque, material forms in spacial relationships; whereas such terms may be inapplicable to the mind-spirit energy or reality. The latter seems self-luminous, fluid, "structureless," that in some kind of grid work sense; rather, mental energy has been better identified by the classic terms "immaterial," "formless," "free." To be sure, such free spirit is unacquainted or unfamiliar with its own ultimate origin, and perhaps with its ultimate destiny, but it is familiar enough with the laws of its own nature to classify itself with some

certainty as a distinctive type of energy and reality, at the top of the hierarchy of energies, which we call, at the foundational plane, physical, at an intermediate level, organic, and at a higher echelon, psychological.

That these energy echelons interpenetrate, interflow, and are mutually dependent is a truism of experience. Philosophies which have presumed to submerge spirit down into "mere matter," as the old materialism attempted, have failed to answer many critical questions about spirit. On the other hand, philosophies which have attempted to vaporize matter, up into the immaterial rarity of so-called "pure spirit," and arrive at an illusionist conception of the material world, are equally unrealistic idealisms. Whatever the ultimate relationships may be, in the mind of God, between the physical, the organic, and vital, and the psychological and psychic ranges of energies in the cosmic order, the spirit's energies are self known to itself in its self-initiating power, or freedom; in its logical, deductive, and inductive powers, which we call truth inquiry; and of its value discerning powers that lead to insights about Good and Beauty.

At this place the student may raise two further questions of considerable importance. The first is whether cause and effect have to be "alike"? The second is, what about the law of conservation of energy—would not mental causation conflict with the principle of conservation? As for the first problem, we know that cause and effect do not have to be "alike." Light produces chemical activity; and electric current sets up a magnetic field; the mechanical energy of water flowing through the sluices of a hydro-electric ....

*Actually, are not the "laws" of mind and thought (or "spirit") quite familiar? Namely, they seem to be the "law" of our self-determining nature itself, or our freedom; the laws of logical procedure, deductive and inductive, and the laws of moral and aesthetic awareness, or response to good and to beauty.
dam is transformed into electrical energy. "That an effort of the human will should be followed at once by a change in the intensity or direction of nerve currents sweeping across the brain is, therefore, not different in principle from other transformations in which the energy of the cause differs markedly from the energy of the effect."

As for the conservation of energy, Sir William Dampier, historian of science, analyzing the laws of thermodynamics (conservation and dissipation of heat energy) cautions us that science does not know about the total quantity of energy in the universe. The "law" of conservation arises out of experiments with limited systems of events such as the transference of mechanical work into its exact equivalent in heat as defined for the needs of the specific experiment (Joule's experiment). ** Be that as it may, mental energy, so far as we experience it, seems to be "free" and "transcendent;" it can manipulate, within bounds, lower orders of energy.

Body as instrument of mind, an organizing whole. We have discussed above how mind seems to be an active agency. It seeks constantly to organize and shepherd bodily life and experience into a coherent whole. Take, for example, a simple experiment in sensation from "Gestalt psychology," by considering the following lines:**:

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*D. M. Allan, The Realm of Personality, op. cit., p. 220

** History of Science, op. cit., pp. 248, 256-257.

What are the natural "groups" or "wholes" that the perception of these lines seems first and most readily to form (gestalt, German for "form")? The A-B, C-D, and E-F groupings seem to be the natural units. Alter the experiment in the following way:
and the "wholizing" (or holizing)* effect of the experience is heightened. This and similar examples suggest that the mind strives to perceive in terms of "wholes." The physical, bodily elements of the experience, the lines and light, seem forced into this mode by consciousness. Or consider several more general illustrations, for instance memory. The physical sensations of yesterday, my passing and noting a certain tree on the way to work, are united with those of today, my seeing the tree again, by memory. Memory, a mental function, is inclusive of discrete, bodily experiences and functions. Michaelangelo as an artistic mind makes his hand and fingers function in behalf of marvelous creative wholes, e.g. the Sistine ceiling in a way impossible to me, although physically our hands are the same. In brief, our thoughts and purposes in life are constantly coordinating and putting our bodies, with their separate factors of sensation and muscular effort, to the unified courses of action that are our programs of work, study, or play.

* See our former discussion of J. C. Smute's philosophy of "holism," Chapter three, page .
The relation of nature and mind. William E. Hocking, writing on the subject, "why nature exists," said in his ever-pictureaque manner of philosophizing:

An empty mind is no mind at all. To be a mind and to be occupied with objects are one and the same thing. Now a purely contemplative mind might be imagined which would be occupied solely with abstractions, such as numbers. But in order that the mind should have character or personality, there must be difference between contemplation and concrete action. It must be possible to think first and act afterward. Now action means that a thought enters a world of sense, with infinite interconnections. Thus the world of sense is an essential part of what we mean by "will." Nature is necessary in order that mind may qualify as will.

Thus nature is not only useful to mind: it is necessary in order that mind should exist, as a concrete and active reality. We cannot have nature and mind, as if mind could be something by itself. Nature is so essential to the very notion of mind, that if mind cannot be a product of nature, nature must be a function of mind.*

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*Types of Philosophy, Scribners, 1939, pp. 312-313.
The reality of the self. We are now ready to conclude this section with a brief statement of what a spiritual philosophy means when it speaks of the self as a "reality," to which we append definitions of "soul" and "brain."

We start perforce with a definition of the "real," and suggest that the ideas of unity and power are basic to our notion of what makes many things real (recall our discussion, page ). We may say now that the self is a type of reality for the following reasons, including the definition just reviewed.

First, the self is a unity. We have already noted how the self is a unitary and unifying power. No doubt the ancient nominalistic definition of the real as the individual is a true insight. At least it seems to be true for a great many of the world's realities: atoms, stars, galaxies, stones, genes, elms, elephants, and for us spiritual beings. The work of modern psychology in discovery of the vast complexity of selfhood, extending down into the subconscious, would not detract from the idea of its ultimate unity. Perhaps the analogy of a "federal republic" fits the nature of selfhood as "unity" better than that of "absolute monarchy." The basic struggle of all men to integrate personality, above the conflicting subordinate "selves" which we find within, is at least indication of a fundamental drive toward unity. Our life is commanded by the idea of unity.
Second, the **self is a Power**. The profoundest realities are often powers or energies which we cannot see, known however through their effects. Power, force, energy, have long been in physical science a kind of primary definition of the real. As I raise a book counter to the law of gravity both unseen powers are present through their effects, gravitation and my will. And likewise with other such realities, electricity, magnetism, life, love. In the earlier part of this section we suggested how mind may be an energy of its own kind—a highest form of cosmic power. Consciousness seems to be one among the types of reality involving unity and power.

To **know**, to **evaluate**, and to **relate oneself** effectively to the world—cognition, valuation, decision—briefly suggest the special functions of the self as power. To use the eye analogy in a slightly different way from Aristotle, the eye never sees itself, but "knows" it is a reality by its function, its power of sight. Actually this analogy is defective because mind, as we have already indicated, does in a sense "see" itself! This brings us to our next point.

Third, the **self is a reality because it is self-knowing**, or self-transcendent, a self-reflecting power. This fact has no other natural analogy; we must turn simply to consciousness itself for a description. Another way to speak of the self-reflective power of the self is to refer to its capacity to have ideas of ideas. Somewhere Hocking said, in his **tranchant terms**, that we can "think on thinking." The Scholastics, in their observation that intellect had **perfect reflection**, stated the present point in an arresting way. Jacques Maritain, modern interpreter of Thomism and scholasticism, described their view by the following:

> In their consideration of the intellect, they observed, for instance, that the latter is capable of **perfect reflection**,
that is, of coming back entirely upon itself—not in the manner of a sheet of paper, half of which can be folded on the other half, but in a complete manner, so that it can grasp its whole operation and penetrate it by knowledge, and can contain itself and its own principle, the existing self, in its own knowing activity, a perfect réfection or self-containing of which any material agent, extended in space and time, is essentially incapable. Here we are confronted with that phenomenon of self-knowledge, of prise de conscience or becoming aware of oneself, which is a privilege of the spirit, as Hegel (after St. Augustine) was to emphasize, and which plays so tremendous a part in the history of humanity and the development of its spiritual energies.*

This brings us next to the largest phase of our discussion, the idea of self-transcendence, the heart of the conception of man as spirit. Before we proceed to this, however, we digress briefly to consider two addenda:

**A definition of soul:** When self-awareness is raised to consciousness of its unity and power, we may, for the sake of traditional language, say that it is aware of itself as "soul." "Soul," traditionally has meant that sense of an abiding, unitary, or unifying power of will or intellect that expresses the deepest aspect of our mental life. This does not mean, of course, that the "soul" yet necessarily knows itself as "immortal," or a type of everlasting unity and power—though the connotation of immortality was present in the traditional notion of "soul." Immortality may indeed become a possibility of the soul-self, but it is hardly an original, or immediate quality of self-conscious life, as are the experiences of unity and power.

**A definition of brain:** A brain is (1) the organ by which (or from which) finite self-hood, or self-conscious life or experience comes to be: that is, grows into an awakened, or self-conscious awareness of itself as a new, emergent form of unity, energy, and power, which it calls mental or

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spiritual, and feels is a "reality," under the definition of reality as unity and power; (2) is the instrument by which finite selfhood knows and relates itself to an environmental world, and exercises command over that world through ideas, plans, and purposes, with the aim of making that world a place where the spirit's higher values and ideals may better be realized.

This is a fully empirical definition by being fully coherent, including all the facts of physiology plus the fact of our inner, self-reflective awareness of conscious life.

IV. The Transcendency of the Spirit

The idea of self-transcendence is part of the conception of man as a "spiritual being," indeed, its central point. We have just indicated how a definition of man as "spirit" would explain first that the mind is in some sense a "reality" in terms of its "unity" and "power." Now we must show that the latter points have fullest meaning in the idea of the spirit's transcedency.

There are two problems particularly in connection with self-transcendence which need clarification. The one is what will here be called the "sociological definition" of personality and self-transcendence. The sociological viewpoint is espoused not only by many naturalistic philosophers, but, as we learned in the discussion of the sociological theories of mind in the preceding chapter, also by some idealists. The other important issue involves the question, is the self-transcendence of the human spirit an irrational or trans-rational phenomenon? Some neo-orthodox theologies have challenged us with this possibility.

The sociological idea of personality examined. A forceful sociological definition of selfhood and self-transcendence was the version presented by
the idealistic philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet. In his Gifford Lectures one of Bosanquet's central tasks is to define individuality and to show that, not the idea of the private, finite self, but that of the "social whole" defines individuality or personality. Man's "individuality, his self-identity, lie outside him...His nature...is in process of being communicated to him."** "...Personality itself is only possible in virtue of an individuality which already transcends it."*** Short of the Absolute itself, Bosanquet means the larger "individuality" of the particular human group, or society as a whole, from which we derive unconsciously many personality characteristics. Self-transcendence to this absolute idealist means to lose oneself in, and for the good of, the community or social whole, as one would lose or forget himself in some worthy civic enterprise. Putting the question back into the related term of unity, the prominent 'naturalistic' philosopher, John Dewey, suggests substantially the same thing where he said that social cooperation "is...(the)...kind of unity that seems to me to give the clue to understanding the unity of the human being."**

Now, this is, indeed a commonplace and a valuable, but not the critical philosophic meaning of personal unity and self-transcendence. It must be granted that there is much truth to the sociological definition of selfhood in the general sense that social background often makes the man. We are indeed, in one important sense, products of our culture. Nevertheless, the critical definition of individuality should not be in terms of its sole derivation from society. For one thing, this would confuse material


** Ibid., Bosanquet, p. 270.

fact in the field of genetical science, which believes that each human being has a unique set of gene components, as the foundation of personality on the physical side.* For another, in the sociological definition of personality the tendency is to leave finite, human centers of individuality in shadowed unreality, if not destroyed altogether by being absorbed into the general abstraction which is society (with all that this can mean for evil in the totalitarian states). The sociological theory in either its idealistic or naturalistic forms tends to lose sight of personality, either by the confusion of individuality with the metaphysical absolute or with the literal state.** Actually, "society" is the abstraction. It is not prior to the category of personality, rather personality is prior to it. In fact, "society" exists nowhere but in the minds and wills of individuals and in the relationships set up between individuals. The Constitution of the United States for example ultimately exists only in the thoughts and hearts of the president, the members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the individual citizens of the country.

In some sociological thought the field theory of society is presented as a middle position between extreme individualistic views of human life and personality and extreme "social mind" theories. For example, Solomon Asch has very thoughtfully described this possibility in a recent study.*** His main point is that there are two realities, the one, individual, the other social. "Society," however, constitutes a field of force, comparable to those of physics in electricity, gravitation, or magnetism. As

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** Reinhold Niebuhr in NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, Vol. I., has analyzed these trends carefully.

*** Solomon E. Asch: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1952, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Ch. IX.
individual atoms have their field structure when associated in groups, like a chemical compound, with their nature, behavior, and qualities in large part understood only in terms of the group as a whole, so individual human action and personality is in considerable measure formed by the socio-historical "field" in which it finds itself.

In reply, it may be pointed out that this description is primarily an analogy, helpful, to be sure, in understanding that society is a type of "reality" with a "force" that conditions and modifies individual life. The criticism, however, is the possible implication that the "force" of the social field is identically comparable to the material forces of chemical, gravitational, or magnetic fields. In the latter cases we are dealing with the realm of absolute natural determinations—a pin must rise to meet the magnet by virtue of the latter's "field." The properties of hydrogen and oxygen in the "field" combination $H_2O$ are exactly predictable, given constant outside factors. In contrast, however, on the human level of organization the particular human group or individual does not in any absolute way have to respond to a given social "force" or "field." Indeed, an individual often responds to the social environment in ways contrary to his deepest, ideal desires—i.e., against his will—if he is to survive. But to suggest that such environmental field sets up an absolute pressure like those of chemical affinity or magnetism is to stretch an otherwise valuable analogy.

It seems to the present writer that the social field still has its locus and its only "reality" in individual wills. The price of eggs is a series of human decisions all the way back, granted the near infinitely complex casual relationships of a price structure, of which no one individual is completely cognizant, and the fact that I must pay that price, if
I expect to have an omelet for breakfast. The "force" and "reality" of the social field as it affects or even coerces me is defined by the cumulative action of other men, living and dead, with the action of one/often carried over in the form of "influence" either conscious or unconscious in the thinking and action of another. The "impersonality" and seeming trans-individual "objectivity" of this social web or structure is an appearance, the main content of which is the failure of human cognition to comprehend the infinite degree of relationships involved. Society seems like an impersonal, metaphysical reality not only because the influences of individuals on each other are often unconscious, but because they are often in the form of group against individual; and finally because it usually takes more than individual action to adjust and change the social field.

Further, the sociological view in some of its extreme forms does not carefully distinguish between being "related" to something, and being "identical" with it. I am related to the sun by virtue of its light and heat, which conduces to my comfort and well-being and very life, but I am not identical with the sun. Generally speaking, the sociological theory of personality, like certain older theories of evolution, essentially makes the mistake of emphasizing too exclusively the force of "environment" in the origin of life.

The personalistic theory subsumed. Rather than the sociological emphasis on social wholeness as the criteria of individuality, the true, personalistic criterion is separateness and uniqueness, or difference of one human being from another. In the true criterion of the individuality, the emphasis should be on the discrete purpose and will of each person over and above those characters of his life derived or borrowed from
society. Josiah Royce, an idealist who certainly understood and stated the values of the sociological view in an inimitable way in every volume he wrote, nevertheless senses and defines individuality in the true personalistic way: "By an individual...we mean an essentially unique being, or a being such that there exists, and can exist, but one of the types constituted by this individual being."*

Giving due credit, then, to the legitimate insights of the sociological view, Edgar S. Brightman carefully analyzed the difference between it and a personalistic conception. The result of his discussion in several places** is that the self or personality is a dynamic whole, a true "realm"—developed in and expressed by interaction with the environment. Personality gains in being and self-consciousness (it does not lose these qualities, as extreme sociological theories imply) by its interaction with the environment. Further, Brightman suggests that the power by which the self is able to interact with and relate to the environment is reason. The self's transcendent quality is defined, not by its loss of self-awareness and absorption in either the metaphysical absolute on the one hand or the state on the other, but by the intensified self-consciousness required in observing the total world from the higher perspective of reason. Personality could not relate to, interact with, and in a word know the environment unless it were in a sense above the network of relations viewing them all at once. In this sense the self is indeed a transcendent whole, but its wholeness is its self-conscious, personal unity, which makes knowledge, judgment, and change possible. Its trans-


cendence is along a dimension perpendicular to environment, not coinci-
dent with it.

**Self-transcendence and reason.** Possibly no one in our day has so
forcefully defined man's spiritual transcendence over nature as has
Reinhold Niebuhr. His point of view, however, differs from the above
analysis mainly on the question of "reason" and its role. Along the
vertical dimension of spirit above the plane of nature Niebuhr reminds
us of the levels of human self-transcendency, which seem to reach upward
in infinite regression. His main points are, first there is the plane
of nature on the widest inorganic and organic front short of higher con-
scious life. Second, there is the plane of consciousness, of sentient
awareness of environment, which man shares with the higher animals. Third,
there is the level of self-consciousness, the higher perspective of man's
distinctive rational awareness of his world. From this altitude he looks
down upon the world critically; can develop a science; can construct means
and instruments by which he overcomes the hazards of the natural environ-
ment more successfully than animals, and lives above it in an artificial,
social one of his own creation. Fourth, there is the infinite reach of
the self-conscious levels, which Niebuhr seems to believe is trans-rational.
According to him, it is out of this depth or down from this height that,
on the one hand, come man's impulsive, irrational, and sinful acts that
darken life, and on the other his higher emotional insights of beauty
and goodness that lift and enoble life. This level is (or these levels
are) trans-rational in the sense that so much of human thought and act-
ivity cannot be "rationally" explained, that is, as being derived from a
completely coherent set of general concepts. Moreover, it is from this
level that ultimately the insights of religious faith come.

* NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, Vol. I., especially Ch. I.
The principal criticism of this classic discussion in *Nature and Destiny of Man* concerns the prevailing assumption that man in his self-transcendent acts steps out of "reason" or above reason. Indeed, the deeper note is sounded by Niebuhr himself, at least in the following place, where in just criticism of much shallow rationalism he says:

...the rationalists do not always understand that man's rational capacity involves a further ability to stand outside himself, a capacity for self-transcendence, the ability to make himself his own object, a quality of spirit which is usually not fully comprehended or connoted in "ratio" or "hous" or "reason" or any of the concepts which philosophers usually use to describe the uniqueness of man.*

Thinking of man's "rational capacity" in this larger sense, it seems to the present writer, that man's self-transcendence is rational throughout. In its essence "rationality" is the ability to judge a previous judgment. Thus, self-transcendence in the sense of self-reflection has an infinite scope. Each self-transcendent thought or act is "reason" functioning in a higher perspective of judgment and self-criticism. It is this that makes both scientific and moral knowledge, and historic advance and transformation in these areas, possible. Self-transcendence is at once reason's own acknowledgement of its present limitations, but further, of its courage to judge and correct its own finite judgment in the interest of ultimately discovering the fuller truth. "Dialectical thinking" (most simply understood as thought's own self-corrective power) goes on within this larger ambit of reason itself. This is not to say that human reason in some fallen and misguided pride is to usurp the place of God. Rather, it is to be aware humbly and faithfully of the larger truth (and truth is an expression of God!), and to say that we possess and effective though finite ability, adequate for life, of receiving truth.**

* Ibid., Niebuhr, p. 4.

** We recommend the following distinctions: trans-rational= acting when the reasons are not clear; and ir-rational= going against known reason, or failing to find out the reason.
This quality of rationality, able to transcend the world, in indefinite ascendency, defines man's essential freedom and spirituality. It is man's distinctive feature, his uniqueness—that with which God can work, making possible man's salvation and growth.

Infinite ascendency of the spirit

4. Infinite reach of the self-conscious levels

3. Plane of self-consciousness and man's distinctive rational awareness of his world: makes man's scientific and moral growth or history possible; the ability to judge a judgment.

2. Plane of consciousness (higher sentient awareness)

1. Plane of nature

We are now prepared to discuss the problem of freedom and related topics under the idea of man as a "moral being." Before proceeding to our next chapter, however, we present in two appendixes some classic statements of the major, opposing views of "mind," "man," "the self," or "personality." Namely the materialist and the spiritual conceptions; and a third appendix outlining the solutions of the mind-body problem in classic philosophy.
APPENDIX A

Materialist Ideas of Man:
The Disunity and Materiality of Mind

David Hume (1711-1776) in A Treatise of Human Nature sets forth in classic terms the associationist or non-unitary theory of mind and affirms the futility of the search for a central spiritual self or person. (From Hume, Selections, ed. Hendel, Scribner's, Modern Students Library, p. 81-91).

"Of the Immateriality of the Soul"
and "Personal Identity"

"I desire those philosophers, who pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds, to point out the impression that produces it, and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates, and from what object it is deriv'd. My conclusion is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence.

"There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self. Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppose'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thr' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppose'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea.

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me."
"But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to af-
firm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection
of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapi-
dity.... Nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably
the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several
perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity.... Whatever natural propension we
may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.... the successive perceptions
only... constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place,
where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is com-
posed.

"... relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object of
thought to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated
the continu'd object. The resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake,
and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related ob-
jects.... Our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that
we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts,
beside their relation....

"We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity.... The under-
standing never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the
union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a cus-
tomary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that iden-
tity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting
them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because
of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them....
'Tis, therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity,
and causation, that identity depends....

"... The true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of dif-
ferent perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the
relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and
modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas;
and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases
another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn. In
this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a
republic or commonwealth....

"As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this suc-
cession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd upon that account chiefly, as the
source of personal identity. Had we not memory, we never shou'd have any notion
of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which con-
stitute our self or person.... In this view, therefore, memory does not so much
produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause
and effect among our different perceptions....

"The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great im-
portance in the present affair, viz., that all the nice and subtle questions
concerning personal identity can never be decided."
John Broadus Watson ( ) in Behaviorism, 1930 (W. W. Norton & Co.) explains that "behavioristic psychology" is opposed to all outmoded "soul," "self," idealist, personalist, or spiritual views of the mind, saying that the proper object of psychological study is not "mind" or the subjective states of an alleged "consciousness" or conscious entity at all, but rather "behavior," as the only expression of our psychic nature which can be empirically observed and quantified. His is a classic expression of an extreme "functionalistic" theory of man's psychic nature. (The following passages are selected from pp. 1-19, 238-268, and 303-304.)

"Two opposed points of view are still dominant in American psychological thinking--introspective or subjective psychology, and behaviorism or objective psychology. Until the advent of behaviorism in 1912, introspective psychology completely dominated American university psychological life.

"The conspicuous leaders of introspective psychology---Titchener...and James....... claimed that consciousness is the subject matter of psychology.

"Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior of the human being. Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviorist, who has been trained always as an experimentalist, holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic.

"...religious concepts...heritages of a timid savage past--have made the emergence and growth of scientific psychology extremely difficult.

"One example of such a religious concept is that every individual has a soul which is separate and distinct from the body. This soul is really part of a supreme being. This ancient view led to the philosophical platform called "dualism"....

"Wundt, the real father of experimental psychology....substituted the term consciousness for the term soul. Consciousness is not quite so unobservable as soul. We observe it by peeking in suddenly and catching it unawares as it were (introspection)....

"In his first efforts to get uniformity in subject matter and in methods the behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined.

The Behaviorist's Platform

"The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be observed, and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we observe? We can observe behavior--what the organism does or says. And let us point out at once: that saying is doing--that is, behaving. Speaking overtly or to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball.
"The rule, or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts in front of him always is: Can I describe this bit of behavior I see in terms of 'stimulus and response'?" By stimulus we mean any object in the general environment or any change in the tissues themselves due to the physiological condition of the animal, such as the change we get when we keep an animal from sex activity, when we keep it from feeding, when we keep it from building a nest. By response we mean anything the animal does—such as turning toward or away from a light, jumping at a sound, and more highly organized activities such as building a skyscraper, drawing plans, having babies, writing books, and the like.....

"To observe people is the fundamental starting point of behaviorism. You will soon find that instead of self-observation being the easiest and most natural way of studying psychology, it is an impossible one; you can observe in yourselves only the most elementary forms of response. You will find, on the other hand, that when you begin to study what your neighbor is doing, you will rapidly become proficient in giving a reason for his behavior and in setting situations (presenting stimuli) that will make him behave in a predictable manner.

The interest of the behaviorist in man's doing is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. To do this it must gather scientific data by experimental methods. Only then can the trained behaviorist predict, given the stimulus, what reaction will take place; or, given the reaction state what the situation or stimulus is that has caused the reaction....

What is Thinking?

"Thinking, on account of the concealed nature of the musculature with which it is done, has always been inaccessible to unaided observation and to direct experimentation. And there is always a strong inclination to attach a mystery to something one can't see. As new scientific facts are discovered we have fewer and fewer phenomena which cannot be observed, hence fewer and fewer pegs upon which to hang folk-lore. The behaviorist advances a natural science theory about thinking which makes it just as simple, and just as much a part of biological processes, as tennis playing.

The behaviorist advances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves. The evidence for this view is admittedly largely theoretical, but it is the one theory so far advanced which explains thought in terms of natural science...We have all had the proofs before us time and again that the larynx can be removed without completely destroying a person's ability to think. Removal of the larynx does destroy articulate speech but it does not destroy whispered speech....My theory does hold that the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicit or internal speech (thought)....Our main line of evidence comes from watching the child's behavior. The child talks incessantly when alone. At three he even plans the day aloud.....Possibly it always will be difficult to obtain an overwhelming mass of positive evidence for this view.....we can say that "thinking" is largely subvocal talking—provided we hasten to explain that it can occur without words."
The Spiritual-Idealist View of Man: 
The Unity and Energy of Mind

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in the Critique of Pure Reason speaks of the highest focus of human reason as the "transcendental unity of apperception." Although affirming the existence of ultimate psychic unity in these terms, he believed (at least in this stage in his thinking) that further qualities of "soul," such as transcendent freedom or immortality, cannot be known on the basis of the "transcendental unity" alone. His statement, however, remains a classic summary of the idea of the unity of psychic life, in opposition to non-unitary theories. (The following passages are taken from Kant, Selections, ed. Greene, Scribner's, Modern Students Library, pp. 76-78, 170-171.)

"...the consciousness of oneself...cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data only. It must be a condition which precedes all experience, and in fact renders it possible, for thus only could such a transcendental supposition acquire validity.

"No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity or one kind of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects is possible. This pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness I shall call transcendental apperception....I also call the unity of it the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that it contains the possibility of knowledge a priori.

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"Of that subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge...Besides this logical meaning of the I, we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which forms the substratum and foundation of it and of all our thoughts."
Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910) expands the essential thesis of Kant, just quoted. As father of one influential form of American Personalism, Bowne acknowledged his indebtedness to Kant, Berkeley, and others. In the following selection (Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Harpers, 1897, pp. 20-30) he argues against Hume concerning the awareness of the unity of the self. (The final passage is from Personalism, Houghton-Mifflin, 1908, p. 266). Though primarily a philosopher, Bowne expresses the essential point of personalistic psychology and the personalistic concept of mind, previously described, chapter eleven.

"The General Conditions of Thought"

"We consider first the unity of the mental subject as the condition of thought.

"Let us take the judgment a is b, where a and b are any two particular states of consciousness. How is this judgment possible?

"The answer is, It is possible only as there is a conscious subject M, which is neither a nor b, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness. Then, by distinguishing, comparing, and uniting them in the unity of one conscious act, it reaches the judgment a is b. But so long as we have only the particular states a and b, they remain external to each other, and the judgment is non-existent and impossible.

"...judgment... may be psychologically one, but logically it involoves the distinction of a and b as well as their union. Without this distinction the judgment is impossible. And for this logical distinction and union alike we need something which is neither a nor b, but which comprehends and acts upon both. This something we call the self. By it we mean not anything sensuously or imaginatively presentable, but only that unitary and abiding principle revealed in thought, and without which thought is impossible.

"The judgment as an act is unique and lonely. Physical images only serve to obscure it, or, rather, contradict it. The field of consciousness is spaceless and partitionless. Our objects are separated, but not in space or time. They are united, but not spatially or temporally. The relation is logical, not physical, and does not admit of being pictured. The attempt to construe it to the imagination misses its true nature, and leads to that mechanical externalism which seeks to build up mind from without. How the judging act is possible is the unparalleled mystery of consciousness. But then it is a fact; and the unity of the thinking self is not an hypothesis for its explanation, but its analytically necessary condition. Without this a and b fall asunder, and the judgment is impossible....

"We conclude, then, that the unity and identity of the thinking self is an absolutely necessary condition of the simplest and most elementary judgment.

"This account of the matter is not accepted by all. A very general claim of the sensational physiological school is that a simple passive consciousness is possible which is made up of particular units of feeling or impressions; and these impressions, when united by association, are supposed to give us the judgment as a matter of course. On this view there is no unitary self which judges; but there are particular impressions grouped by association, and this grouping is the judgment."
"...if we allow those "simple passive" states, we are not advanced. For, by hypothesis, no one knows itself, to say nothing of knowing its neighbors; and thus the conditions of the judgment are not given. For this we need, not simply states of consciousness, but a consciousness of states: and this is a very different thing.

"Nor will association help us. Indeed, association itself means nothing except for a consciousness which is not composed of particular states, but which in its unity comprises particular states as belonging to itself. In other words, the association of sensations is nothing in the intellectual world except for an abiding self. To see this we need only ask where, or for what, the sensations are associated. To say that they are associated for one another is to endow them with mutual consciousness. To say that they are associated in the nerves is to plunge into unintelligible cerebral mythology. If there were an independent consciousness which embraced them, we might say that sensations are associated in consciousness; but this will not apply to a view which recognizes only states of consciousness, and not consciousness of states. Thus the doctrine has no assignable relevant meaning whatever, except with reference to an abiding self....our self-distinguishing, self-identifying thought must be conceived as something above particular thoughts, as having, comparing, and judging them, and as abiding through them.....

"Under the pressure of verbal intimidations, some of the weaker brethren among the psychologists have such fear of the "scientist" before their eyes that they are ready to ignore facts in order to be scientific. It is supposed to be metaphysical, and hence unscientific, to speak of a real self; and hence they hesitate to do so for fear of losing caste with the "scientists"....

"Only a theoretical prude, therefore, or one so anxious for the purity of science as to forget that science itself must be subordinated to fact, will take offence at the notion of the self if the facts call for it. But in affirming the self, we affirm nothing picturable or sensuously presentable, but only what we mean and experience when we say "I." And this self, so far from being a questionable fact, is one of the surest items of experience. The sun in the heavens, as objective reality, is far more questionable.

If science is to deal with facts without distortion, no fact can well be more scientific than the one thus described by Thomas Reid: "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks and acts and feels. The self or I is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thought, acts, and feelings which I call mine." However we may change the name, we are forced to retain the thing, or the thought life falls asunder and vanishes.

"Sundry metaphysical questions may indeed be raised concerning the nature of this self and in what its permanence consists; but they do not touch the fact of permanence. The fact is revealed in thought itself; and no one has ever succeeded in more than a verbal denial of it. Moreover, the metaphysical questions apply equally to all reality, and are not special difficulties of psychology. On the plane of ordinary thinking, where for action we demand an agent, and for changing states an abiding subject, there is nothing which can show a better title to be called real and abiding than the thinking self. And if we raise the deeper metaphysical questions we find the apparent realities of sense perception vanishing into phenomena, while selfhood seems to be the only thing that can show any claim to abiding existence. But these deeper problems we hand over to metaphysics. Here it suffices to point out that, whatever mystery the reality and permanence of the self may involve, they cannot be denied without wrecking thought altogether. As to the fact, the uninitiated will find some
help in deciding from remembering that the claim is simply that I am not thoughts but I think, and that I who know think am the same who thought yesterday....

"The trick of language whereby the self is denied is assumed in order to express its own denial is well illustrated in the following passage from Hume, in which he proclaims the reduction of the self to a flux of impressions:

'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception....If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different idea of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.'

"We shall get a realizing sense of the advantage of expressing a theory in language which hides its true nature if we will be at pains to substitute for the personal pronoun in this passage the vanishing impressions required by the theory. As none of these abides beyond the instant of its occurrence, and all are perpetually dissolving into something else, it follows that the first I is not the same as the second I, and that of the later I's no one has any identity with any other. The Hume of the beginning of the passage dissolves into any number of other Humes before it ends. But the humorous nonsense of the doctrine is concealed from the reader by the language employed, which throughout implies the denial of the theory....

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"Man himself in his essential personality is as unpicturable and formless as God....The essential meaning of personality is selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know." (Personalism, p. 266.)
In 1922 Canon B. H. Streeter and others compiled an influential book entitled "Immortality, An Essay in Discovery", Macmillan. The following selection is taken from a discussion in this book entitled "The Mind and the Brain," by James Arthur Hadfield, M. A., M. B. (Surgeon, Royal Navy). His analogy of the wire filament and its light as having relation like that of the nervous system to consciousness is a striking comparison. It suggests how conscious mind may indeed be related to the nervous system, and even dependent upon it for its origin, while also becoming possibly a different form of energy qualitatively, and perhaps independent in its own right from the bodily, sensory, or stimulus-response system. (pp. 64-66.)

"Consciousness is the sensation of psychic states. When we speak of being "conscious" of any sensation we mean that by some means we become "aware" of it. Let us realise that there are millions of sensations which never rise to consciousness; impressions that do not impress our mind sufficiently to make us "aware" of them. Such, for instance, are the "sensations" of normal digestion, breathing, or the secretions of glands. These functions are always sending impressions up to the higher centers, but, under normal conditions, they do not produce consciousness of their movements. They become conscious only when these organs are disturbed and their functions upset, in which case we may be very painfully "aware" of them. But let us pause for a moment. What do we mean when we say that we are "aware"? What is it to be "aware"? Who is it that is conscious? We have, in using these terms, taken a great stride: we have, in fact, passed from physiological to psychical terms. In using such words as "aware" we are using terms for which we can find no physiological substitute. We have, in fact, entered the realm of "mind," a sphere into which physiology cannot enter and in which it cannot live. Like a fish which cannot breathe in the open air, physiology pants and expires in its efforts to follow the mind into the psychic region; the atmosphere is too rarefield; thought is too etherial to be grasped by it. In short, physiology has to abandon this field to...psychology.

"In the earlier stages physiology may, with some reason, claim to explain the phenomena presented. It can trace the stimulus as it passes round the reflex arc, up the sensory nerve, across the synapse or junction, and down the motor nerve. This acts with the same mechanical certainty as the touching of an electric button at one end of a wire produces the ringing of a bell at the other end. But when we come to consciousness, physiology fails to satisfy us, because we are dealing with something that is different in kind from nerve energy. We may make use of our last illustration (remembering that it is only an analogy, and at best only explains the mechanism of consciousness) to make clear this difference. An ordinary current of electricity produces heat in a wire--such is the normal mechanism of nerve energy as illustrated in the reflex action. But let this current pass through a filament of exceptional refinement, and be raised to a greater intensity, and the heat will be transformed into light. Consciousness is thus a phenomena of intensification: it is produced when our sensations are raised to a sufficiently high pitch of tension. It is due to mental friction: to the effort to cut a new channel through the brain. Heat and light may both be produced by the transmission of a current of electricity along an electric wire: they may, from the physical point of view, differ only in the length of their waves and in velocity. But the essential feature of our analogy, imperfect as it is, is that in its resultant expression light is a different form of energy from heat, and therefore stimulates an entirely different system of nerve-endings in our bodies. Consciousness is thus a different
form of energy from nerve energy, though it may have arisen out of it; it is, in fact, psychic energy, which is impossible to describe in terms of the physical.

"This dramatic leap from the physiological to the psychical is the most important factor in the evolution of mind. It is the decisive factor which once and for all turns the balance and establishes the supremacy of the mind over the body....

"Henceforward the mind begins to live a life independent of the body. The tulip springs from a bulb, and in its early stages derives all its sustenance from the store of food in the bulb. But when its leaves are well established, and it has exhausted its store of nourishment, it begins to breathe in strength and force from the sunlight and air around, without which it would fade and wither and fail to produce the perfect flower. So mind can come to perfection only by turning to the light, and freely exercising its intellectual and aesthetic functions. The mind arises from the body and its sensations, but only in the sense that the dragon-fly springs from the grub which lives in the mud of a stagnant pool; its origin is humble but its life in the sunlight is a whirl of coloured brilliance and wanton liberty. This new form of energy which we call consciousness has a similar freedom and autonomy; it originated in physical sensations of the body, but has taken wing, breathes the airs of the ethical blue, and is nourished by spiritual food. Thus the mind has now as little in common with the sensations of the body from which it sprang, as this fiery, dazzling, creature has with the slime-covered grub."

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APPENDIX C

Classic Views of the Mind-Body Problem

(1) Interaction theory (Descartes). This theory has as its metaphysical background the conception that reality is a rigid, dualistic affair—in fact, that there are two, absolutely distinguishable kinds of reality. One is matter, the realm of "extension," as Descartes called it; the other is mind, the realm of selfhood and its "thought," which is spiritual, non-extended "substance." The belief is that mind and body somehow interact. For example, acts of will that cause the body to move, or physical pains that cause apprehensive thoughts would illustrate such interaction. Descartes speculated that the "point" of connection between mind and body was the pineal gland deep within the brain! The problem with this theory is how to conceive the causal relation between an idea or spiritual force and a physical motion, if matter and mind are two such completely disparate things? In any case, there certainly is "interaction," regardless of how we may evaluate the details of Descartes' dualism.

(2) The parallel theory (Leibniz). Leibniz suggested that there is no interaction between mind and body, but that when one wills, the other accordingly acts, due to a "pre-established harmony" between the two orders of existence. God arranged these parallel orders from the foundation of the world. The trouble with this theory is not the ultimate reliance on God so much as the assumption of the parallelism itself, which seems repugnant to a sense of simplicity and coherence. Actually the parallelistic theory is a more rigid, separating kind of dualism than the interaction theory of Descartes. The parallel view seems to deny our undoubted experience of interaction between mind and body rather than explain it. The trouble with both views is their too great reliance on a spiritual substance understanding of the mind.

(3) Double aspect theory (Spinoza). The difficulty of this view is to all extent and purposes like that of Leibniz. Spinoza believed that our human "thought" and what we observe to be the world of matter and "extension" are but two aspects, called "attributes" of a more fundamental and largely unknown "reality," called "Substance" or "God." God's only known attributes are thought and extension. Spinoza's view is sometimes called psycho-physical monism. The trouble with this view is that Spinoza postulates an unknown "y" (God-Substance) to explain an already unknown "x" (how mind and body relate?). Again the argument with Spinoza is not so much that he falls back ultimately on God for explanation, as with the repugnance to coherence and simplicity of the double-aspect notion itself. The basic criticism of Spinoza is that he never really solves the problem of Descartes' dualism, as he tried to do. He posits an ultimate fundamental unity of nature in God. But why, then, for man, whom Spinoza conceives as a finite "me" of God, is there the appearance of duality between Thought and Extension? Spinoza's is an ambiguous monism. The next two attempts to solve the problem are quite frankly monistic, each in its opposite way.

(4) Extreme materialism or the denial of mind (Watson, et al). This view is that mind is in no sense "real," and for it the mind-body problem disappears. The real must be defined in terms of "matter" and its mechanical forces, and these alone. Mind is an "epiphenomenon"—it is like the "glow" or "light" of an electric filament. It is there while electricity is running through the wire
and the filament is functioning; but "turn the light out" and it is nowhere, as if it had never been, though filament and its material parts (i.e. the brain) remain. The basic contradiction in materialism is brought out by asking, "How does non-conscious matter produce consciousness which claims that it is not wholly material?" The spectre of consciousness reappears to haunt the materialistic mind, and to raise the mind-body problem again. Extreme materialism glosses over the distinctions that conscious introspection suggests, which we have reviewed this chapter. The view just described "materializes" the universe too much.

(5) Extreme idealism or the denial of matter. This point of view tries to exorcise the mind-body problem with the magic of saying that matter is in no sense "real," Extreme forms of idealism claim that matter is but "appearance" or "illusion." The main problem of an extreme idealistic belief is, of course, how to explain the material aspect or "appearances" of the world? Extreme idealism glosses over distinctions that sense experience suggests. It "spiritualizes" the universe too much.

Difficulty of the classic views. Each of the foregoing theories in their classic forms erred in either one or both of two points, namely, in conceiving of matter as inert mass and of mind as spiritual substance totally different in kind--in short, the problem of dualism.

Value of the older views and summary of the energistic conception. As has already been suggested in general terms, a solution lies in the direction of conceiving of the world as a hierarchy of energies with mind, the super-ordinate energy. The development of physics during the past one-hundred years, and also trends in psychology and the theory of mind, are helping to bridge the gap between mind and matter. As we have said, the general points of the older views, that there is an aspect of our world that must be called "material," and another which must be termed "spiritual," should be retained, without thinking of these differences is such hard and fast fashion as to make them mutually exclusive. No doubt the spirit of Spinoza's synthesis although not the letter, should be our ideal, with attempt to work out the problem in a more satisfactory manner than he did. In addition to "personalistic idealisms," philosophies of "organisms" "organicism," "holism," "spiritual-field" theories, "panentheisms," and others of the naturalistic type are attempting to do this, each with its varying measure of success. Their main emphasis is that we cannot reduce the world to the older concepts of matter and "mechanism," or raise it to an ill-defined and out-of-sight "spiritualism" without doing violence to certain aspects of the real on either side. Most modern philosophies agree that to conceive the real in terms of energy or energies helps in the solution of the mind-body problem, since then it becomes one of a transference of energies, and we know that that takes place.

The general value of idealism. The abiding general truth of a spiritual or idealistic philosophy is its claim that reality cannot be defined in terms of an all-engulfing materialism or mechanism and exclude or nullify the patent force and reality of the spiritual aspect, known particularly in self-conscious experience. If both sides have to yield to some extent, undoubtedly self-conscious experience forces the materialistic side to yield first. Better to insist on spirit at the expense of matter, than the other way! Actually, we have asked, need the legitimate claims of either side be forfeited?
Personalistic idealism, that stemming particularly from Berkeley's philosophy, has insisted that "matter" must be understood as the immediate or direct energizing activity of the Divine Mind. Without falling prey to Berkeley's eighteenth century provincialisms, or committing ourselves uncritically to his views, we might commend to the reader's attention the over-all spirit of his solution to the matter-mind problem. Berkeley's position possesses a greater universal appeal if we state his point negatively. It is that matter cannot be understood in such a way as to remove it entirely into a metaphysical citadel of its own dark, disparate, outside the realm of spirit and alone—which spirit can neither understand nor reach. So much of Berkeley most spiritual philosophy would accept. Berkeley's desire was to retain the aspect of matter as something "real" to finite spirits, but keep it under the rule and dominion of Cosmic Spirit. Essentially Berkeley's solution to the problem is similar to Spinoza's (and to Classic Vedanta) with the important difference that in the case of Berkeley, personal Cosmic Spirit takes the place of the metaphysically dark God-Substance of Spinoza.

The following quotation of E. S. Brightman is a forceful, contemporary statement of the mind-body problem by this kind of personalism. We present it as a type of Christian solution to this perplexing problem.

Mind...interacts with and is dependent on body, which, for the personalist, means that human personality interacts with and is dependent on Divine Personality; for body is in nature and nature is God in action. A brain is the Divine Personality in action at the point of the continual creation of a human personality. Mind is not in nature, but nature in the Divine Mind is God's way of creating human mind.*

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Man as "Moral Being:"
His Freedom and Responsibility

The elements of man as a "moral being" are

1. his freedom,
2. his search for "values" and a "meaning" or purpose to his life,
3. his awareness of and participation in the moral order of the universe—or his sense of "moral law,"
4. his sense of conscience as arising in these things,
5. his ideas of righteousness (and moral, wrong, evil, or sin) as expressive or reflective of this moral order.

These five things are related aspects of his moral nature, and obviously in much of our preceding discussion we have been talking about them. We invite the reader particularly to review our analysis of the moral argument for God, in chapter six, page 182 where point three has already been quite fully discussed; and our analysis thus far of major aspects of point 2 in chapter nine, page 371. Accordingly, in this chapter we will discuss more fully than we have previously done, the problem of freedom, the meaning of life's meaning or purpose, conscience, and the ideas of righteousness.

I. The Idea of Freedom

A two-year-old youngster in a playpen demonstrates human nature in its yearning to be free! We have already considered several topics in the idea of freedom, as discussed from a religious point of view, such as the idea of recalling our repudiation of the notion of a divine determinism or divine "foreknowledge" or "predestination." We now move over into another area of consideration; it concerns the idea of "natural determinism." We
ask, "What is the character and limits of nature's determination of man?"

To look at this question will focus our attention upon the logical limits between which the meaning of freedom must lie. We then enter upon a deeper discussion of that meaning, or the reality of freedom.

(1) The Idea of Natural Determination

Natural determinism. How far do the "laws of nature" determine human life or condition human freedom? Again we will state briefly a few general principles.

(a) Natural determination cannot be universal or absolute. The actual fact of our psychological freedom would disprove the hypothesis that there is no freedom. Indeed this involves the problem of carefully defining what we mean by freedom (see section 2).

(b) The degree to which there is determinism. Briefly, we may say that there are several levels of intensity or degrees of "freedom," or, what is the same thing, of amount or kinds of "control" of our lives by the natural situation in which we find ourselves. Generally speaking, human freedom rises in its ascendancy from lower planes of determination in the following scale; reading up:

Self-transcendence----------------area of true or highest freedom

Psychological law----------------areas in which "vital" processes and the "sub-conscious" limit freedom

Biological law

Chemical and physical law----------------areas in which basal nature limits freedom

The fact of regularity in the operation of law in these areas makes for a dependable and predictable world, a situation which is itself the greatest boon to our ultimate freedom. Because of these areas of law, regularity,
and predictability the world is one over which we can have **control**. Its laws control us so that we may in our way gain greater control over it! The self-transcendent spirit of man constantly utilizes the lower levels of natural law in order to increase his freedom. Without a world of "law" in its lower reaches, we would never be able to learn how to "make habitual the most favorable adjustment."

**Where freedom lies: a rational mean between extremes.** The following diagram may help to state the problem of freedom and determinism:

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<td>(the billiard ball analogy)</td>
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Professor Harold Titus gives an excellent summary of the problem. "Human freedom is neither freedom from causes nor freedom from laws. It is the ability to act from self-chosen ends. It is the power to direct mechanisms in line with our purposes. Without reliable cause-and-effect relationships, our human purposes would meet frustration at every turn."*

*There are many types of determination in, and over, life. We have already suggested some of these, such as physical and chemical, biological, psychological, and social. In the midst of these kinds of determination, in what follows we define more carefully wherein our freedom lies."

*Living Issues in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 182.*
2. Meanings of Freedom

From a practical standpoint as we observe life, freedom means initially two things, related to each other as a higher and a lower experience.

Freedom of movement. Freedom means first and most simply the power to act in alternative ways. Man's freedom on the bodily level is like that of other higher life, a "natural liberty" characteristic of animals and distinguished from the rooted condition of plants. But this first meaning of freedom, on the plane of action and getting things moved in the outward world, leads to the next inner, and for the moment we shall say, higher meaning. It is, by way of degree at least, more distinctive of human than any other form of life.

Freedom of thought. This is the power to deliberate, to pay attention mentally, to think—the mental choice or decision behind the action. This is what we mean by freedom at its private intellectual center. It has been summarized by some philosophers as the freedom to choose truth from error. This type of freedom of the spirit all men possess, in spite of chains and dungeons. The fight of liberal political history has been for the right fundamentally to express this freedom. In the area of science it is known as the freedom of scientific inquiry. On the philosophic plane freedom of thought means the freedom to judge judgments and implies our self-transcendence (recall our previous chapter). In sum, our two levels are:

1. Freedom of thought: mental attention, or deliberation, choice and decision.

2. Freedom of action: power to carry out our thoughts or deliberations.
Freedom of will. Which of these "levels" of freedom is primary? On first consideration No. 1 seems to take initial and most significant place; yet, on second thought No. 2 may seem more fundamental. It appears more basic in the sense that we are always free to act capriciously, or without thought or against our best thought and judgment! Level two may ignore or rebel against level one. Here the Hebraic understanding of "will" as the principle deepest in freedom seems to offer the best explanation. The factor common to both levels is the will: the will to think, and the will to act. Ultimately "truth" should be the standard for thought, and in turn for action, and when level two does not heed level one, if one is functioning rightly, it does not heed truth.

Intellect and Freedom. In attempting to place the dispute between reason and freedom in largest coherent light, the problem may be phrased in another way, as the alleged difference between the "rationalistic" and the "romantic" meanings of freedom. The romantic instinct about freedom preserves the realization that deeds do not always have to conform to thoughts. Indeed the romantic definition of freedom seems counter to certain forms, or interpretations of the "rationalistic" definition, as that, for instance, found in Spinoza, where he wrote, "a free man... (is) a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone."* This apothem may not be greatly different from Jesus' "know the truth and the truth shall make you free," or Socrates' "knowledge is virtue." Such sayings are sometimes interpreted to mean that there is a certain mechanical compulsion in reason that obtrudes itself upon the whole mind, 

nullifies will, and absolutely determines action or choice in one and only one direction, namely, a "rational" one. A deterministic meaning may be closer to that of Spinoza or Socrates (recall Aristotle's criticism of Socrates at this point,*) than to Jesus' words. Such sayings, however, may mean that a man is morally free in highest sense if he freely chooses the rational way, as a conscious, interior, personal decision, acknowledging other possible choices which he might alternatively have made; they need not mean that he is compelled so to act.

Indeed, rationalistic definitions of freedom err, if they limit the meaning of freedom to the power of analytical thought alone, or identify it too closely with logical mechanism alone, as Spinoza may have done. Rational freedom has a wider ambit than that implied in such concepts. Freedom is the power and the right to go against analytical reason, if we choose to do so. But in so doing, freedom reveals its own deepest rational meaning. There are further depths to reason, to human "rationality" in fullest sense, than the one merely of analytical or logical power; or of abstract ratiocination or power of classification of experiences into universal categories or types. Reason is also in its most comprehensive meaning, a synthesizing, synoptic, whole-seeing, or coherent of relationships and values. From the viewpoint, then, of this highest coherent reason, the power to go against reason on the lower analytical plane would seem wholly reasonable or rational for truly free beings. Such freely rational beings we sense ourselves to be. That it would be "immoral" for us to go against analytical reason, when it arrived at a logical conclusion, we also sense; but that we are free or not to swing our choice and action, without compulsion, into line with analytical reason reveals to us our highest rational freedom and

moral dignity. To be sure, the rational training of motive and conscience may make decisions tend, as it becomes good habit, toward the "dictates of reason alone."

On the other hand, extreme romantic conceptions err, if they believe that freedom is to be identified with essentially anti-rational, undisciplined vitality. On the human level there is little vitality that is totally without some degree of motive, thought, or concern. The idea of freedom must steer its course between the Scylla of some extreme Spinozistic determinism, to the effect that "If I know, I must" (which experience believes), and the Charybdis of extreme indetermination, and irresponsibility, to the effect that "If I live, I may," in the sense that all things are possible and all permitted to man (which experience again believes). Real freedom, human freedom, lies between the hypothetical, absolute determinations of a "perfect intellect," as Spinoza seemed to think of it, and the absolute indetermination of pure impulse and vitality as extreme romanticists might conceive it.

In actuality, "perfect intellect" would not mean a mechanically frozen system of logical implication and this alone. Our point in this, where we have touched upon it, and in previous chapters, has been to say that "freedom" and "intellect" are two aspects of the transcendent personality of man; we have seen that they are not conflicting phases, but rather that one implies the other. An aspect of the "perfection" of perfect intellect would be its freedom to think; "perfect intellect" would after all be a free intellect. Kant's view of freedom in the now classic moral terms, "If I ought, I can," suggests the moral median between the extremes discussed above. Ultimately the so-called conflict between reason and freedom Kant resolved in the "idea of freedom," which we mentioned in an earlier context.
I say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free."* Can we not return with profit to this classic solution? The idea of freedom is the exalted ideal that moral rationality acts before life—the ideal of a life morally self-determined by its own will, to live according to the dictates of moral law, perceived by reason functioning in its highest capacity. The idea of freedom is the intellectual side of freedom; freedom itself, the ability to judge a judgment, is the free side of intellect. Borden Parker Bowne, who as much as anyone in contemporary times, strove to preserve the rational tradition in Christian philosophy, and who looked to Kant as one of his intellectual forebears, wrote the following penetrating words on our very point at issue:

The laws of thought represent absolute fixities of mental procedure. They are the constants of the mental equation, representing no legislation of the will but the changeless nature or reason. They admit, then, of no abrogation or rebellion; and yet, while thus secure from all tampering and overthrow, they do not of themselves secure obedience. For this there is needed an act of ratification by the free spirit. The mind must accept these laws and govern itself in accordance with them. Only thus do we become truly rational, and that by our own free act. Thus we discover freedom and uniformity united in reality, or rather we discover reality as having these opposite aspects...Thus we see that the assertion that freedom means lawlessness is mistaken. An element of uniformity must always be allied with freedom...this element becomes controlling only through freedom.**

If the romantic view of freedom, that there is incorrigible impulse, sheer, dark vitality, and this alone, at the center of man's being, is true, then there is little hope ultimately for the discipline of such "freedom."
The rational view of freedom, however, seems at once more illuminating and more salutary. The rational understanding of freedom is its profoundest definition, and it suggests the most cogent "proof" for freedom.

* Kant, Selections, ed. T. M. Greene, Scribners, 1929, p. 335.

** Personalism, Houghton Mifflin, 1908, pp. 205-6
Having clarified, then, to some extent what we mean by freedom, we turn next to the argument for it.

3. Arguments for Freedom

There are five principal steps in the "proof" of freedom. Each successive step pushes the argument into a wider sphere of comprehension and inclusiveness.

(1) The biological proof. Being creatures not rooted to the ground as a tree, but outfitted with feet and hands, nature has by our fundamental constitution made us "free"—laid upon us the necessity to turn to right or left, step forward or backward, stand still or take flight in the need to forage for food or seek shelter and protection. Nature ministers to trees—as it were, coming to them in their wants; she has, however, cut animals and man loose, left them alone to decide and act on their own if they are to survive. Man shares this kind of physical freedom, of course, with many other living creatures. The degree of freedom that a creature has is determined by the type of organism that it is. If man had wings, he would be "as free as the birds!"

(2) The psychological or emotional proof is indicated dramatically in a kind of negative way by our common-place moments of hesitation and indecision. I am finishing my sophomore year. The problem of selecting a major course of study faces me. My whole future may turn one way or another as a consequence of this choice. It is a pretty important matter! What program shall I select; which way shall I go? In the mood of uncertainty, in the anxiety, alarm, and even dread that we may feel at such moments of high decision, we are most conscious of our freedom; the sense of our own responsibility as free creatures weighs heavily upon us. Such experience is the basis of mankind's common belief in freedom.
(3) **The rational proof.** The central experience of our life is that our thought is free. Nothing that I here write (except perhaps the truth) will coerce your thought. You are free to accept as true or false what is here said--free to receive or to reject it. (We have already said that this is not only your freedom, but your right too.) Put the matter negatively. Let us accept the deterministic hypothesis for the moment to see how it may test against experience. If, then, determinism is true—if all our being and movements are absolutely predetermined by the cosmic mechanism, in which we are cogs, according to this view, then our thoughts would be determined in advance. I now think of our old friend the blue rose; but I do not call this to mind myself. Who or what does then? Some inexorable external power chalks this across the blackboard of my mind. It is not my idea then, but Its or His! I do some deed in consequence of some thought; it is not I, but the universe that commits the crime. I am therefore absolved! A mistake is made in adding a column of figures. But I have not made the error—the error was committed by the universal machine of which I am a part and which determines me throughout all my being, even the errors which my judgment makes! I fall in love with my sweetheart. She needn't take it seriously, because it is not really I who has freely fallen in love with her, but the world machine, of which I am but the blind and dumb slave:

But thought is precisely what is not determined in advance—at least in any such mechanical way as determinism logically implies.

Borden Parker Bowne in the previously cited passage and the present one analyzed the rational meaning and necessity of freedom in most cogent form. We continue with his words:

Freedom itself has the deepest speculative significance for reason and science, as well as for morals and religion....
Our first care... must be to decide what we mean by freedom...
By freedom in our human life, we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, and ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not mean an abstract freedom existing by itself without relation to intelligence or desire, but simply this power of self-direction in living men and women.

With this understanding of what freedom is, we recur to its speculative significance. This appears first in its bearing on the problem of error. That problem lies in this fact. First, it is plain that unless our faculties are essentially truthful, there is an end to all trustworthy thinking; but, secondly, it is equally plain that a large part of thought and belief is erroneous; hence the question arises as a matter of life and death for rational thought, how to reconcile the existence of error with faith in the essential truthfulness of our faculties. Freedom is the only solution which does not wreck reason itself. If our faculties are essentially truthful and trustworthy, but may be carelessly used or willfully misused, then we can understand how error should arise without compromising the truthfulness of our faculties. But on any other basis error becomes cosmic and necessary, and reason is overwhelmed in skepticism...

Hence anyone wishing to find his way into the problem of freedom will do well to consider first of all the relation of freedom to intelligence itself, and the collapse of rationality involved in the system of necessity.*

As we have earlier seen, reason means in part the power to judge judgments. This recalls our discussion of consciousness and self-transcendency.

(4) The proof from consciousness can be simply stated. If we were not free we would not be, or need to be, conscious. If our actions were all determined in advance by the cosmic machinery, we would not have to be conscious, any more than a falling stone needs to be conscious in order to have its motion explained. If we were not free, consciousness would be an inexplicable superfluity. Consciousness is an organism’s awareness of its environment. If our motions were determined in advance, we would not have to be thus awake or aware. But the getting of food and the avoid-

ence of dangers could all be carried out for us by the universe. But we are conscious; therefore, we are free. Consciousness implies freedom and is freedom.

Add to this the highest level of consciousness in self-consciousness and self-transcendence, and we see what freedom for man is in all its majesty and possibility. Indeed we have the final depth of insight about how and why we are free.

(5) The proof from moral self-consciousness. Above all, self-consciousness has to do with moral choice, "right" and "wrong." At the center of our beings we are most aware of the problem of doing right, of making wise and good choices, if life is to be well lived—if need be, of judging our former thoughts and actions. Here, then, we touch Kant's great insight about freedom. "If I ought, I can," he said, which seemed to him to imply the reality of freedom in its highest moral sense. To state the matter negatively helps to clarify the point: if I were a determined being, I could not possibly have a sense of obligation. But I do have a sense of obligation; therefore I cannot be a determined being.

4. Society, Freedom, and Responsibility

The social determination of freedom. The relation of our real human freedom to the natural and social environment, which does indeed condition and determine life, may be brought out in most positive fashion by mentioning the sociological factors that help us to grow in freedom out of the environmental determinations of existence. They are the multiform institutions of education, science, economics and politics, of art, morality, and religion—briefly, human culture, when at its best. Education frees by enlarging knowledge; science by expanding human control over nature; free
economic institutions by increasing the production and distribution of goods; democracy by giving men self-government; the forms of religious and moral culture by designating general norms for belief and conduct that will tend to guarantee the best development of institutional life as a whole.

**Freedom as the power of attention.** Freedom is not just a matter of simple choice between two alternatives, selecting a red apple in preference to a green one—it is this, but much more. Actually, freedom is the **power of attention** (freedom of thought) to the problems of life in all their obscurity and complexity. Man with the airplane or the moon rocket has come to be literally "free as the birds!" But the story of man's mastery of the air and of space, or any other technological or social advance, is a good illustration of man's long **struggle** to be free and of the interrelation and **social solidarity** of man's free life. These achievements are made not just by one person, but by numerous individuals patiently bending their attention to life's problems, wherever the vision of greater freedom is bright and insistent enough. On the historical-social plane it took more than one man and more than one generation to create the American democracy. On the personal plane, one's fulfillment of his vocational ambition is not a matter of this moment's decision alone, but rather a matter of many decisions and great labor. Freedom is the morally rational education of our motives and habits. It is self-determination.

**Freedom as responsibility.** Freedom is ultimately found in responsibility. As we catch the idea of the social responsibility of our freedom, we begin to see some of the final meaning and purpose of freedom itself, namely the freedom to serve our fellows in the cooperative adventure of life—the
highest freedom implied in the wisdom of him who said, "...he who loses his life for my sake will find it."*

Having touched on the purpose of freedom, we should turn briefly to an final point.

II. Intimations of Life's Meaning

The desire for life to have meaning is the second stage of our self-awareness as moral beings. The old popular song, "Why was I born, Why am I living? What do I get? What am I giving?" reflects a rather basic philosophic query. College is one of the great periods of transformation and development in a young person's life. So much is packed into those four years! Among the more serious problems the average college student faces is the one about his future vocation. Except for the rare student who (either from an early, real maturity, or sometimes a brash immaturity!) has long since made up his mind in high school exactly what he plans to do, college men and women ask themselves the basic question, "What am I to do with my life? What are my really largest interests and purposes? Is there any way that I can really make my life count. What is the meaning of my existence?"

Recall points mentioned in several previous chapters as background for the present discussion of freedom, responsibility, and the sense of life's meaning. The first of those earlier insights appeared in chapter nine, where we were discussing the idea of God and his relation to the world of human freedom, and the conception of "providence," page 366. The second was our resume of Royce's /zological view of the meaning of self-hood or

* See our subsequent chapter on "love and self in the teachings of Jesus," for analysis of this saying in the full Judaeo-Christian context.
personality in chapter eleven, page 42. With those discussions in mind, we can now proceed to a summary statement of the idea of life's meaning or purpose from the standpoint of a spiritual philosophy. Harold Titus in a superlative analysis of this problem suggests that we human beings become assured of, or discover meaning for our lives personally, on the basis of the following insights or types of experience:

First, the capacity for meaning. He reminds us that we all wish life to have meaning, that is, importance and purpose; we all search for meaning. The wish and the search indicate at least that there is a capacity for meaning, and this suggests that there should be a content or fulfillment of this capacity, someplace, sometime, somehow, if we can but find it. Psychologically, man is a being that wants meaning and will either find it or make it. How important, then, to discover, if we can, the right and the wholesome meaning, lest dark and destructive meanings fill the void.

We begin to see that the problem is a twofold one. Firstly, it concerns the universal purpose of human life and the meaning of history as a whole, and secondly, the purpose of my life in particular.

The first level of these questions we commenced to discuss in the previous places above recalled. The main purpose of our present context is to throw some light on the sense of purpose of the particular life. It will be well here to keep in mind another earlier paragraph of the study where, in mentioning life purposes, we referred to Gordon Gilkey's two points and added a third. Our purpose in life is (1) to realize whatever five capacities are latent within us; (2) to love and serve those with whom life has placed us; and (3) to help prepare the human future for good and not for evil. Titus' following emphasis contains these insights.

* Living Issues in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 136f.
Second, creative ability. Leading out of this desire for meaning we find corresponding to, and fitting in with it genuine creative urges and abilities in most men, which Titus reminds us are "part of or...related to the creative forces of the universe."* These creative urges may be generalized in terms of the marital, the vocational and serviceable, the artistic, and the recreational.

From exercising these creative abilities, we derive our more immediate satisfactions or senses of meaning to life.

The following three principles help us to find meaning in the longer historical sense—that we as individuals are in some way important to the larger on-going of history and the world process. Accordingly, we come to our next point.

Third, dependency of the future on us. One of the deepest insights springing out of the creative urge is the realization that, as we gain independence and increasing control over life, the future depends to a considerable extent on us and how we handle the present, whereby we "gain a new sense of importance and responsibility."** What our generation does—not do will partially influence and determine the next generation.

Fourth, new meaning constantly coming to light. "More meaning is created or discovered as we move forward."*** How dramatically this is illustrated in the creations of modern science. In this technological field we modern men are veritable wizards, who can command the lightning and the thunder, fly through the air, and to the moon, and explore the

* Ibid., p. 137
** Ibid., p. 137
*** Ibid., p. 137
fathoms of the sea. But in our twentieth century disillusionment we have come to realize that "scientific progress" by no means preempts the meaning of life's meaning. In fact, as we toy with the atom bomb, the possibility of "scientific progress" leaves us rather frightened and doubtful. We perceive that real meaning is withheld until there is fulfillment of "the humanities," in the social, artistic, and personal-moral areas of life. Here in the realm of the spirit, then, will be found the real intrinsic values, to which our mechanical instruments are but ministers.

Fifthly, historical purposiveness. The idea of a meaning to life roots in the idea of a purposive history and purposive universe founded in the will of God. As we believe we discover what this general purpose is, and fit specifically our own lives into it in our several creative tasks, they take on direction and meaning.

We suggest that, in fulfillment of the larger purposes of God, the tasks of men are, scientifically and philosophically, "to extend the areas of our awareness;"* socially and religiously to plumb the depths of fellowships with man and God; personally to intensify our own feeling of well-being and happiness. In most general terms, the foundation of existence is God; the purpose of existence is the coming of finite personality; the ultimate means of existence is love and cooperation; and the fulfillment of existence is fellowship.

III The Ideas of Conscience and Righteousness

We invite the reader at this stage to review the discussion of the "moral nature of man" in chapter three, dealing with the moral argument for God, especially pages 192-207. We there set forth the concept of

* Ibid., Titus, p. 138
conscience as an accompaniment of man's freedom and rationality; we cited ten principles which we believe reflect a common "content" of human conscience concerning matters of supreme importance for men the world over; we reviewed Immanuel Kant's concept of the rationality of conscience as fruitfully describing the idealist's philosopher's concept of the naturalness and the universality of man's moral nature; and leading into the moral argument for God, we discussed what we called "the cosmic reference of conscience." From that place in our discussion we here continue with the idea of conscience.

1. Change and Growth in Conscience

The standard of conscience should be truth. "Con-science" means "with knowledge," or "with truth." What the content of our conscience is should be determined by the true facts and relationships of the universe. A basic truth is the dissimilarity of persons, making some of the content of the conscience of different persons different in a great many matters not of universal or supreme importance. Brand Blanshard summarizes what conscience is, "...conscience...is simply our mind as a whole making its response to an act that comes before it."* And our mind as a whole constitutes our personality. Thus eating meat was repugnant to Mahatma Gandhi and with him a matter of deep conscience, whereas it may not be for you or me. This, of course, acknowledges that different backgrounds of culture and training will make for differing content of conscience between individuals. Such facts of relativity in conscience suggest several further main principles.

Conscience is complex. Blanshard speaks very truly again where he writes, "conscience (is) not a single voice but a chorus of voices." He reminds us that conscience as we ordinarily find it is partly the voice of habit, partly the voice of intelligence, and partly the voices of feeling and desire; and we might add the voices of others' approval or disapproval. The problem here is to allow moral intelligence rightly to train habit, feelings and desires. The most coherent analysis of life that we can make will tend to be the main guide of conscience. This complexity suggests the next point.

Conscience is variable. It can change; it can grow. As suggested above, the standard for our changes in conscience should always be truth. Then change will be real growth and enlargement of moral perspective. Larger insight into the truth may make a change of conscience imperative. The tragedy of much commonplace human life is that conscience stops growing at too early an age. Blanshard expresses it in another maxim, "Other things equal, the richer the mind, the better the conscience." The training and right education of conscience is always humanity's central task. The following principles may help us in the cultivation or education of conscience:

(a) We often need to develop conscience in areas where it was previously lacking, or brighten up old conscience tarnished over by habit.

(b) Growth may take the form of "dropping" outmoded conscience.

(c) Change, growth, enlargement of conscience should take place in areas where an enlarging sense of the truth suggests change.

(d) Bear in mind that we human beings will continue to face dilemmas of conscience throughout life. By the nature of our finite situations, we

* Ibid.

** Ibid.
can never become fully acquainted with all the facts that, ideally, perhaps, should be considered in any given situation, calling for moral decision and action. We will always lie under the tension of imperfect judgment, to the extent that we may lack full, coherent understanding. Accordingly, we have to train ourselves, and our emotions, to live with ourselves within the circumstances of life. We have to learn to accept ourselves. What may we do appropriately as we have various moral dilemmas and ambiguities? The reply is, we appropriately (that is, quite morally), either suspend judgment and action, oftentimes until further facts are in—perhaps even postponing action indefinitely, where a decision simply does not have to be made necessarily by us at the moment, and perhaps never; or we act on the best judgment that we can muster now, resting in the faith that this is all life's duty could expect of us.

At this place we can but mention the problem of oversensitive, and pathological, or perverted consciences. That there are such consciences the slightest examination of life reveals. Undoubtedly, Adolph Hitler was a man of ringing "conscience;" we would doubt whether of "wholesome conscience." Adequate education, modern psychiatry, a liberal religion no doubt are the instruments available to remove these dark areas in the life of conscience, so that they do not become besetting guilts. We may here refer with profit to Reinhold Niebuhr's great prayer: "Lord, grant us the serenity to accept what we cannot change, the courage to change what we can, and the wisdom to know the difference."

Blanshard again says, "Conscience is an imperfect light; granted. But that only proves that we should make it clearer, not that we should put it out."*

* Preface to Philosophy, op. cit., p. 138
2. The Idea of Righteousness:
Some Practical Tests of Right and Wrong

Morality, according to C. S. Lewis, comprehends three orders of harmony: harmony between individuals; harmony within the individual; and harmony between man and the power that made him. Practical life should seek to establish these orders of harmony. We have been suggesting the general principles that would tend to make for these harmonies. Let us now attempt to define as concretely as possible the idea of "happiness" or "wellbeing" and of "right" and "wrong."

Well-being, or happiness, the good for persons, has several principal elements: (a) physical health; (b) psychological health; (c) "success" at one's vocation, or what one feels is his special work in the world (principally the Greek understanding of happiness); (d) the sense of loving "service" to one's fellow men in some larger cause than mere ministry to one's own "success" (the Hebrew understanding of happiness); (e) the achievement of lasting fellowship or friendship with other individuals, of which a happy marriage may be center and is the epitomy; (f) a sense of poise in success or failure in realizing those ideals, before the total universe and the power that sustains and gives it ultimate meaning and purpose, i.e., "God." These elements of happiness are of course all interrelated. Individual cases are examples of relative fulfillment or failure to realize these ideals in varying degrees. Rarely is a human life privileged to enjoy the perfect realization of them. We have to learn to be satisfied with partial happiness, and rely finally on the last criterion for our ultimate poise. Brand Blanshard discusses the difference between happiness and pleasure in the following cogent terms:

By pleasure we mean the feeling that comes from satisfying our more immediate appetites, desires, and
impulses; we speak of the pleasure of a good meal, a good novel, or a good game of tennis. By happiness we mean the feeling, less intense perhaps but less vulnerable and more enduring, that comes with the satisfying or our more central and long-range impulses, such as the desire for friends, for success, for the full and free play of our faculties.*

A definition of right conduct. In summary of the personalistic view of ethics here set forth, we quote the succinct definition of Titus:

...and act is right if it leads to the development of persons or to a more harmonious personal and social life....Conduct is right if it proceeds from a good motive, through the use of the best available means, to consequences that are beneficial."** A. C. Wickenden summarizes in practical way the criteria or tests of right conduct in his book Youth Looks at Religion.*** He reminds us that in contemplating an act we should think of (a) the effect of the act on one's own person. Would it be degrading or uplifting. We have seen how the element of one's personal motive is basic. (b) The effect on others. Would the act bring blessing or blight? These two, of course, are the principal criteria. Three further guides of a corollary nature are (c) the long-range effect. What difference will the act make to us in the future? (d) Publicity. Would the act be generally approved? This appeal to consensus gentium is of course a limited criterion, and although sometimes ambiguous, it may be a helpful criterion in general terms. Some acts have to be done against public opinion; the opinion of the majority about some matters may be wrong. (d) Universality. Could we conceive the act being done by all and sundry without ill effect? This was Kant's basic criterion. It's admitted limitation is that it is sometimes very difficult to apply this

* Ibid., p. 164

** Living Issues in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 381

*** Harper, 1948, pp. 127-32
criterion in concrete cases and crises. We have seen that this last criterion is really based on the principle of personality.

3. The Idea of Sin

We again at this place invite the reader to review carefully what was said in our footnote, page 268-270, on the concepts of sin, 'pride' and repentence as found in the Bible. Beginning there, we continue with the following recapitulation and add several further general observations on this topic.

A definition of wrong conduct and sin: Conscious aggression on other personal life, to live at the expense of other life against its will, would be the definition of wrong, or sin, on its social side. This defines "injustice." Disrespect for the principle of personality, my own as well as others, would define sin more inclusively. The causes of sin as injustice are threefold: ignorance, inertia or indifference, and malice or conscious perversity. The degree of responsibility increases in this order.

Can sin be sub-volitional? Must sin always be a conscious act or may it include unconscious acts which have harmful consequences to our neighbors? It seems to the present writer that we should limit the essential definition of sin to conscious malice and acts of aggression against our neighbor, letting such terms as "mistake" or "error" or possibly even "social sin" cover the multitude of unpremeditated and unconscious, harmful acts.

A theological meaning of sin. Oftentimes in the religious tradition, sin has been defined as a defiant or rebellious relation to God. What is
the connection between this religious and the moral meaning of sin above set forth? Most simply stated, aggression on other personal life can be considered as a form of rebellion against God because God has willed other life to exist as well as one's self, and aggression upon it is defiance of the divine will. Virtually, in acts of aggression, one is putting himself in the place of God, that is to say, denying that there is the higher authority to which both one's self and one's neighbor are responsible. It is this mutual relationship before God that equalizes the status between oneself and one's neighbor. Thus aggression on neighbor becomes a personal defiance of God. The theological and ethical meanings of sin are inextricably interwoven, as the Bible in numerous ways suggests. To disrespect our neighbor's personality is to disrespect the very highest principle of being, which reflects what God Himself is. Love of God is love of the creative source of all personality, and sin against God would be, for one thing, sin against personality.

"Is there "original sin?" Bear in mind that the doctrine of original sin was rejected by the great prophets—e.g. contrast Jeremiah 31:29b and Ezekial 18 with Psalm 51:5, and recall our discussion on pages 268 to 270. (See also our appendix on Jesus' concept of man, below.) However, perhaps the term original sin has some usefulness if it refers to a tendency in life to live at the expense of other life, or if it stands for the element of pride in men, which tends to keep them selfishly seeking their own security at the expense of others. Such "tendency," however, should by no means be regarded as inevitable, constitutionally determined by, or "original" in our nature in some way, or incorrigible or intractable. Traditional doctrines of a "biologically inherited," or a predestinationist view of "sin" (see our earlier discussion of predestination, page 265) must simply be rejected. Clarifying the meaning
of "sin" and discussing the necessity of maintaining an essentially "ethical" or voluntaristic conception, Albert C. Knudson said in his searching way:

Original sin may refer to the unfavorable psychological conditions under which the child begins his moral life: inherited evil tendencies, animal passions, bad habits later formed, and the organized evils of human society. These factors ... limit our freedom and incline our wills toward evil. They are not themselves morally evil apart from the actions of our wills. They are temptations rather than sinful states....

Sin as pride. It is often said that "pride" is the essence of sin, and this point is indeed found in Biblical understanding. But by pride as sin is meant the inordinate pride that would set a man above his neighbor and thereby defy God's will and work in his neighbor. Reinhold Niebuhr, in his thorough-going way, reminds us of the ranges of pride that define sin in essential terms. One is the pride of power, over nature and over other men, that leads to the various kinds of economic and political exploitation. This kind of pride involves us in the sins of greed and injustice. Another is pride of knowledge, intellectual pride or the affirmation that "the truth" as one sees it is the ultimate truth. Such ideological pretension involves us in the sins of arrogance, intolerance, and prejudice. Finally Niebuhr points out that there can be moral or spiritual pride. This would be to hold that "our partial standards and relative attainments are the unconditioned good, and claim divine sanction." Briefly, this is the sin of trying to make our finite selves ultimate, and defines the essential meaning of sin against God. Generalizing in broadest terms, Niebuhr says sin "has its source...in man's willful refusal to acknowledge the finite and determinate character of his existence."

* Principles of Christian Ethics, Abingdon-Cokesbury (1943, p. 101-102)
*** Ibid., p. 177.
Accepting Niebuhr's main point, we must distinguish, however, between normal or legitimate "pride," the necessary self-confidence without which we would not be psychologically poised, which God has given us as created centers of finite life—and the inordinate prides, above described, which may indeed be called sin. In his first volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr fails, we believe, to distinguish carefully between these two meanings of pride.

Relative sinlessness, or relative perfection. Much necessary work has been done in present-day theological thought, especially by "Neo-Orthodox" theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, in calling modern man's attention to the fact and the nature of sin. But a religious philosophy may reject the traditional doctrine of man's "total depravity." We call attention to the patent doctrine of relative sinlessness (or relative perfection) possible to man which runs throughout the Bible. Realistically, no man is "perfectly good," or has through the whole course of his life, been entirely without some measure or degree of "sin" in the general ways defined above. There is, however, the perfectionist ideal in the New and Old Testaments, and it must be recognized as a prominent point of the Judaeo-Christian ethical philosophy. The problem is clarified by asking, "Is altruistic action or agape-love (action beyond self-interest) ever possible to human life?" Jesus certainly thought it was, else there was no point in his parable, for example, of the Good Samaritan. The problem becomes one of maximizing, in so far as human finitude and fraility permit, the approach to life in terms of agape-love. The conscious, persistant attempt so to live may be defined as a kind of "relative sinlessness." This possibility would be the final grace of religious life, in the belief of Judaism.

* Examples of the doctrine of relative sinlessness or relative perfection in Bible:

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and Christianity. Albert C. Knudson again summarizes the matter in most forceful way:

"The quest after sinlessness is, therefore, not an attempt to get rid of the metaphysical "roots of sin," nor does it require complete compliance with all the detailed requirements of an external standard of absolute purity. It is rather such a wholehearted devotion to the fundamental Christian principles of love and holiness as will save one from deliberate violations of them. Violations may now and then occur, but where they are few and not of a serious nature, the moral quality of the life is determined by its obedience rather than by its lapses, and in such a case we may speak of a relative sinlessness. Such a sinlessness is a constituent element in the Christian moral ideal."

APPENDIX A:

JESUS' PHILOSOPHY OF MAN

In view of the widespread confusion that Christianity is a system of belief which teaches the concept of man as inherently, or "originally," evil, or "sinful," it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a discussion clarifying this issue. We acknowledge, of course, at the outset that much historic "Christianity" or "Christian theology" has so taught—and the idea of man's inherent "sinfulness" is emphasized in conservative, fundamentalist, and neo-orthodox circles now-a-days as a sine qua non of the Christian faith and outlook. It is another matter entirely, however, whether Jesus himself as the historic "founder" of Christianity so viewed


Commenting about the apparent contradiction in I John 1:8,10, A. C. Knudson says: "In these verses those are condemned who say 'We have no sin,' or 'We have not sinned.' But the reference here would seem to be not to Christians in general but to persons who denied that they had themselves ever sinned. Otherwise there would be a plain contradiction in the text." (Principles of Christian Ethics, p. 150.)

* Principles of Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 153
man. We believe that it is very problematic whether a doctrine of "original sin" or the inherent evil of man can be, without question, derived from the reported words of Jesus. It is quite true that St. Paul so believed; and accordingly, the emphasis on this theme in the theology of the church has, no doubt, derived from Paul, rather than expressly from Jesus. In any case, the following is presented as a summary statement of Jesus' conception of man:

Jesus' conception was realistic. Highlighting this generalization, we suggest three specific characterizations of His understanding of man:

1. Fundamental to Jesus' outlook was his belief in the sacredness of human personality, its supremacy in value and being, derived from his Jewish heritage. In Fosdick's trenchant phraseology the distinctive Hebrew-Christian outlook emphasized "personality as boundless in value and possibility" and expressed the faith "that God and his universe are pledged to the satisfaction of personality's inherent promise."* True to his Jewish inheritance, Jesus possessed an optimistic view that man and life are good. His affirmation of the sacredness of human personality is asserted in such passages as the following:

Matthew 5:43---Love enemies
6:26,30---You are of more value than the birds and grass of the field.
7:12---The Golden Rule
10:29-31---You are of more value than many sparrows; the hairs of your head are numbered.
20:1-16---Parable of the laborers and the hours.
16:25---The Great Paradox with
20:26-27... 

Luke 10:25-37---The great commandment, and parable of the good Samaritan: love God and neighbor as thyself.**

Mark 2:27---Man takes precedence over sacred institutions, e.g. the Sabbath.

2. Jesus often thought of men as being like "wandering sheep" who need guidance.* This evaluation is suggested by the familiar parable of the lost sheep (Luke 15:5f), and, in John's gospel, by the figure of Jesus himself as the Good Shepherd. Jesus enjoins repentance at the beginning of his ministry (Mark 1:15), and it is reported that he forgives the sins of people who came to him needing help. This does not mean, however, that Jesus believed that all men were abject, gross, or depraved sinners. Like Jeremiah (31:29) and Ezekiel (ch. 18) he did not seem to believe in inherited "original sin." His sayings, as "Suffer the little children to come unto me, for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven" (Mark 10:14, Kj. J.); or, "It is not the will of my Father, who is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. 18:14), suggests his positive or optimistic outlook on human nature in its original state. In the incident of the healing of the blind man in John 9:3, he is reported as saying, in direct answer to the question whether the man had sinned, "It was not that this man sinned, or his parents." Furthermore, there are those passages where, in quite natural way, he assumes that many men are "righteous":

Mark 2:17---Came not to call the righteous but sinners.
Matthew 25:31,37---The quiet, unassuming righteous who were not aware of their virtue.
5:18---The Beatitudes
5:45---God's sun shines on the just and the unjust.

In enjoining repentance Jesus points to the sound psychological principle of being willing to change our mind, to remake values that guide us, indeed to acknowledge past mistakes and sins, if they have

* As phrased by Wesley G. Nicholson
occurred, and to resolve toward renovation and improvement. Such attitudes of mind make moral growth possible.

That the need, and the experience, of renovation and growth is normative for most human life may be the implication of Jesus' saying in the Q document (Matt. 7:11) where, in the larger context of affirming God's forgiving and bestowing love, in contrast to imperfect humanity, he is reported as saying: "If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask him?" (The New English Bible and Smith suggesting, simply, "bad as you can be sometimes") Goodspeed translate: "bad as you are"/. Indeed in the famous saying in Mark 10:18 Jesus apparently included himself among "imperfect" men. In John 8:1-11 (woman taken in adultery) we have a passage not found in some of the earliest manuscripts--RSV translators have indicated it as a footnote addition. I.e., it may be late and apocryphal. In any case, where Jesus is reported as saying "Let him who is without sin among you be the first to throw a stone at her," he is not describing the metaphysical nature of man, but obviously a particular type of sin, or human weakness--into which human beings (and no doubt particularly men) are prone to fall. He is not only reminding men of their frequent lust, but also their lurking hypocrisy. Note that the passage as a whole emphasizes his sympathy with the sexual problem,

and expresses his faith that human nature--woman in this case exemplified in the---could find and continue in a better way!

3. One summarizing affirmation is certain: Jesus, like his prophetic forefathers, believed in human moral freedom, and appealed to men's inherent possibility to be righteous. This all-encompassing outlook embraces his
He believed that human life could become predominantly, or characteristically free from sin, Matthew 5:38-48, 13-16. In addition to saying that God's nature as love, and his own example, were present to inspire men in the quest for the good life, he suggested that, men's reasons—as native impulse—could guide them, Matthew 7:24-27; 9:13; 12:7; Luke 12:57. Jesus put his faith in all kinds and conditions of men. He excluded none from his society or assistance, not even official outcasts such as publicans or harlots. The often-quoted interpretation in John's Gospel, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" has summarized for Christian faith Jesus' understanding of men in the positive terms here set forth.


...Characteristic of the Christian view of man is that he is understood primarily from the standpoint of God, rather than the uniqueness of his rational faculties or his relation to nature. He is made in the "image of God." It has been the mistake of many Christian rationalists to assume that this term is no more than a religious-pictorial expression of what philosophy intends when it defines man as a rational animal. We have previously alluded to the fact that the human spirit has the special capacity of standing continually outside itself in terms of indefinite regression. Consciousness is a capacity for surveying the world and determining action from a governing center. Self-consciousness represents a further degree of transcendence in which the self makes itself its own object in such a way that the ego is finally always subject and not object. The rational capacity of surveying the world, of forming general concepts and analyzing the order of the world is thus but one aspect of what Christianity knows as "spirit." The self knows the world, in so far as it knows the world, because it stands outside both itself and the world, which means that it cannot understand itself except as it is understood from beyond itself and the world....

Individuality is a fruit of both nature and spirit. It is the product of nature because the basis of selfhood lies in the particularity of the body. The self is most obviously separated from other selves by the simple fact that it is grounded in a physical organism which maintains its discrete existence and has its particular and dated history. Yet nature arises only gradually to the reality of individuality. In the inorganic world substances or forces are integrated and disintegrated so as to produce capriciously "unique" events (the upheaval of a particular mountain, for instance, and its gradual corrosion) but no unique or irreproducible unities. The inorganic world is thus subject to recurrences which can be charted with mathematical exactitude; hence the intimate relation between physics and mathematics.

In the organic world nature rises to the particularity of organisms, characterized by an interdependent and indestructible unity. The plant lives as a unity and its death means the destruction of that particular unity, its component elements sinking back into the inorganic world. On a still higher level animal life achieves a higher measure of discrete particularity, through an organism with a specific centre of unified interdependence, a central nervous system. Through this nervous system the animal achieves a higher degree of separation from its environment; yet its actions are governed by instincts which bind the individual animal to the general characteristics of the species. Variations in colour, size, and, possibly, temper are capricious rather than significant and are subject to predictable recurrences. In animal life it is the species rather than the individual which is really unique. The particular animal merely expresses through endless repetition the special life-strategy of the species.

Genuine individuality, embodying both discreteness and uniqueness, is a characteristic of human life. It must consequently be regarded as the product of spirit as well as of nature. Nature supplies particularity but the freedom of the spirit is the cause of real individuality. Man, unlike animal existence, not only has a centre but he has a centre beyond himself. Man is the only animal which can make itself its own object. This capacity for self-transcendence which distinguishes spirit in man from soul (which he shares with animal existence), is the basis of discrete individuality, for this self-consciousness involves con-
sciousness of the world as "the other." The animal knows its particular needs and the particular objects in its environment which satisfy those needs. Its consciousness therefore does not transcend the natural process in which it is involved. Animal consciousness is merely the expression of a central organic unity of an organism in relation to its immediate environment. Human consciousness involves the sharp distinction between the self and the totality of the world. Self-knowledge is thus the basis of discrete individuality.

Human capacity for self-transcendence is also the basis of human freedom and thereby of the uniqueness of the individual. Human consciousness not only transcends natural process but it transcends itself. It thereby gains the possibility for those endless variations and elaborations of human capacities which characterize human existence. Every impulse of nature in man can be modified, extended, repressed and combined with other impulses in countless variations. In consequence no human individual is like another, no matter how similar their heredity and environment. To a certain degree man is free to reject one environment for another. If he dislikes the spiritual environment of the twentieth century he may consciously choose to live by the patterns of the thirteenth century. If he finds his physical environment incongenial he has the capacity to modify it. The pride of modern man has sometimes tempted him to forget that there are limits of creatureliness which he cannot transcend and that there are inexorable forces of nature which he cannot defy. It is nevertheless important to remember that human spirituality is sharply distinguished from animal existence by the measure of human freedom and the consequent degree of discrete and unique individuality in man.

Human individuality, being a product of spirit as well as of nature, is subject to development....

The naturalistic portion of modern culture seeks to reduce the whole dimension of spirit in man to an undifferentiated "stream of consciousness" if indeed it does not seek to reduce consciousness itself to purely mechanical proportions..

Beginning with Thomas Hobbes a fairly consistent denial of the significance of selfhood, certainly of transcendent individuality, runs through the empirical and naturalistic tradition....

John Locke is sufficiently influenced by Cartesian thought to define the self as a "thinking thing" and to insist on personal identity as a reality.... The idea of self-awareness does not, however, enter into Locke's conception of personal identity from which he explicitly subtracts the element of self-transcendence involved in memory: "Could we suppose any spirit stripped wholly of all its memory or consciousness of past actions" this "would make no variation in personal identity." (ECHU, II, 25). It is perfectly true that this would make no difference in the identity of what may be called the "empirical ego," the self as involved in the unity of the body. But it is precisely the pure or transcendental ego, which stands above consciousness as the consciousness of consciousness and which expresses itself in terms of memory and foresight, which is the real centre of human personality.

David Hume, in this as in other respects, purges Locke's thought of Cartesian elements in the interest of a purer empiricism and denies the possibility of any awareness of the ego.... The ego is always the centre of relations so that it is perfectly correct to observe, "I do not catch myself without a perception..." even if Hume were correct in his interpretation of the empirical a stream of impressions it would still be pertinent to inquire into the nature of the "I"
which he implies when he says: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself." It is reality of that "I" as subject which challenges the validity of all purely empirical interpretations of the ego.

However great may be the achievements of modern psychology, it is not unfair to say that the psychological systems which remain within the confines of the naturalistic tradition never get beyond the varying interpretations of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. Behaviouristic psychology is an elaboration of Hobbes' position. The position of Locke is taken by all "dynamic" psychologists who emphasize the initiative of the ego and the unity of its processes. Of those who follow Hume..../William/ James' assurance that the hypothesis of a substantial principle of unity is superfluous, is an interesting example of an ever recurring effort of psychology as a natural science (and of all natural science for that matter) to affirm its character as a pure science by its metaphysical scepticism. But, unfortunately, this scepticism leads to implied metaphysical credos. An object which has both surface and depth cannot be correctly interpreted in terms of one dimension when it has in fact two. That is why science which is only science cannot be scientifically accurate. This is particularly true of Geisteswissenschaft in contrast to physical science. It is more particularly true of psychology which deals with a dimension of depth in the human spirit, transcending the scientific method. Every rigorous effort to remain within the confines of pure science reduces psychology to physiology, and physiology to bio-mechanics. This ultimate unity and transcendence of the human ego are indeed beyond pure science. Yet it is a necessary undertaking to inquire into the realities of that region "beyond."

Psychological theory of the past decades exhibits, of course, a wide variety of schools which range from mechanistic to organismic interpretations, and from atomistic and behavioristic interpretations of consciousness to interpretations which emphasize configurative wholeness (Gestalt psychology)....The real profundities of self-consciousness, the complex problems of personality, in the breadth of its relations to the world of nature and history on the one hand and in the depth of its dimension as self-conscious ego on the other, are the concern of only those schools of psychology which frankly leave the confines of natural science and regard psychology as a cultural science, which means that their psychological investigations are guided and prompted by philosophical and therefore semi-religious presuppositions.
In this chapter we suggest some of the central concerns and perspectives of ethics from within the Judaeo-Christian tradition. There are, the idea of God as loving heavenly Father, whose righteous and loving will is the ultimate standard of ethics and whose Holy Spirit is the dynamic source of, or inspiration to lead the ethical life; the understanding of this divine love as "agape," the New Testament term that has come to summarize the "Christian ethic" in much contemporary religious discourse on the nature of ethics; and the place or role of the self in the society or fellowship of selves, which is the kingdom of God.

I. The Fatherhood of God

Jesus carried over from his Jewish background and reemphasized the belief in God as a Father, concerned for, loving, and forgiving men "their trespasses," if men in a like spirit of loving concern forgave one another's trespasses--to cite the familiar translation of the Lord's Prayer. The phraseology, God as "Father," appears in the Old Testament and in other Jewish literature of the late Old Testament age. In the book of the prophet Hosea in the Old Testament God is tenderly depicted as a father in his relation to Israel, "my son." The expression translated "mercy" or "steadfast love" is chesed, a Hebrew counterpart for the New Testament agape. 

24 Psalm 68:5, 103:13; Ecclesiasticus 23:21; Book of Jubilees 1:24-5.
In the New Testament, the phrase describing God as "Father" appears a number of times, for example, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:7), and, in that context, with love, or agape as descriptive of the fatherly nature of God. 26

Inspiration for the moral life is here described as flowing from this quality or nature of the divine reality (Matt. 5:44-48). Central to the religious experience of Jesus was an intense (and for Christians regarded as unique) reliance upon, and fellowship with, God as the Heavenly Father of Love.

II. Agape Love

Christian love is the love for another, or for others. It is respect for persons activated, into out-going, self-giving service, which may call for varying degrees of self-denial or self-sacrifice in our human relationships. However, rather than some inflexible "law" or demand, it is the spirit of willingness to serve, to yield, "to wash one anothers feet," in joy and in freedom. 27 The English expression "altruism" sometimes means a kind of dry, disinterested duty; as we use it below, however, we will mean by it Christian love, or the dynamic love of persons.

In varying syntactical forms within the New Testament, the Greek word "agape" often means this active love of persons, and is translated "love." 28

26 "...I say to you, Love (agapete) your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven..." Matt. 5:44.

27 Agape is not "other" than justice, but includes or relates to justice, as that spirit which sometimes calls for arbitration or harmonization of sincere conflicts in interest.

28 In the New Testament, forms of Agape are used in varying senses, for example, not only to show the classic "love for enemies" (Matt. 5:44) or God's love toward men (Rom. 5:8), but also to state utilitarian love (Matt. 5:40), and even love as enjoyment of life for the self, i.e., in an "eros" sense, (1 Peter 3:10—a quote from Ps. 34:12-16). In Matt. 22:37, the great Commandment, the one term Agapeis covers love for God, for oneself, and for neighbors.
In much contemporary Christian discourse it summarizes the Christian ethic. Both the term and the idea are found in such well known places as the following:

Matthew 5:44-48: Love enemies, etc.


John's Gospel, Ch. 15: Greater love hath no man.
I Cor. Ch. 13: St. Paul's hymn to love.

Gal. 2:20 & Eph. 5:2: Christ's love in undergoing suffering and death.
First John 4:7-12

We may summarize the Christian agape in simplest terms as Giving Love: it seeks realization or fulfillment of other's interests and needs. It is altruism in highest meaning.

Christian writers today have found it convenient to contrast the New Testament Agape with another common meaning of the word "love," also having a Greek original, "Eros," found in Plato's beautiful dialogue Symposium. In that writing we have a moving depiction of the self, seeking self-realization or self-fulfillment in the highest terms of one's quest for spiritual values: truth, beauty, and the good. Taking this theme as our own, we may let Eros stand for Craving Love, which seeks self-realization or fulfillment of one's own interests in some form. Eros may encompass the range of cravings from the desire to satisfy bodily or physical appetites to the satisfaction of higher spiritual needs. To speak of love for candy, to satisfy one's sweet tooth; or love of music, to satisfy aesthetic craving; or love for friendship; or love of knowledge is to speak of "eros" on various planes. In addition to love for the opposite sex, or erotic craving, as we say in English, eros in Plato's dialogue stands for the full range of
values for the self. As giving love may be expressed by the classic term Altruism, so craving love may be summarized by the expression Egoism.

Are altruism and egoism opposing and contradictory impulses or principles? That the "tension" of ethical life arises in the problem of the relationship between altruism and egoism is plain. That giving love, agape, should sometimes take precedence over craving love, or eros, may also be suggested by the Judaeo-Christian ethic. But does this mean that one's self or personal being, in one's own interests and needs, is in some unalterable or irreconcilable way opposed to other selves or persons in their interests or needs? Does agape conflict with eros? Are love for others and love of self mutually exclusive? What does the New Testament teach about such central concerns of the ethical life? How does it resolve the tension between altruism and egoism? What is the place or role of the self, in one's relation to other selves, in being? This is the ethical problem.

There is considerable controversy among theologians as to precisely what Christian love, or agape means, relative to the role or the place of the self in the ethical relationship. Some discussion among contemporary writers, suggests that the Gospel rules out the self and its claims—or at least much argument tends toward a negative view of the rights, needs, or place of the self. For example, it is said that there is no place for self love in the Gospel; or that in some way Jesus did not really mean in the great commandment, "love thy neighbor as thyself."30 Or it has been


argued that Christian ethical motivation is not based on the infinite worth of personality—but rather that agape means to love another even though he be "worthless."

Behind the more particular Biblical problem of the place of the self in the love relationship within Jesus' reported thought, lies a wider philosophic type of theological opinion today which disvalues finite selfhood, or individuality, in its separateness of being from the "Ground of Being," as somehow evil, unworthy, or "sin." In this larger discussion today there is the outlook, proclaiming itself to be the "Christian view," which negates and condemns the self by pointing to the inevitable "Ontological" fate of its finitude or "separation." Accompanying this perspective is an emphasis on "anxiety" as the characteristic motif of our being, that is, (we would say) on psychological ill-health and emotional perturbation.

Other Christian opinion insists that the self is described in the Gospel as having and playing a legitimate role in being; that the characteristic feeling of the self is its sense of joy in life; that the largest aspect of Christian teaching is the worthfulness of all persons; that all persons mutually share a right to existence, one's self as well as the other; and that the Christian Gospel of love solves the tension between the altruistic and the egoistic impulses.

31 cp. Paul Ramsey: Basic Christian Ethics, Scribners, 1950, pp. 94-5, 101. George Thomas, in the work above cited, note 29, after granting the legitimate place of "self-respect" and "self-acceptance" in the message of Jesus makes the following assertion, which, to this analyst, leaves us in ambiguity: "...it is possible for a person to be concerned for the Kingdom of God without loving himself...the aspiration for its (the Kingdom) life demands the reflection of all self-love, aiming at the satisfaction of its own desires; the principle of life 'in the Spirit' is love of God and love of neighbor leading to Transcendence of the self. Every person must choose which of these two opposing principles he will follow" (pp. 57-58, italics his). Later, however, in his chapter on "The Life of Love," Thomas suggests a correction to the above impression in opposing Nygren's view that "agape" rules out "eros" or "natural love in all its forms." (p. 78.) (Cont'd)
According to such view the solution to the ethical problem may be suggested by Jesus' "paradoxical" utterance itself, where he expressed the principle: "whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life will save it." (Mk. 8:35; Matt. 16:25). The problem is to interpret what the losing of the self means. Does it mean self-abnegation and the obliteration of the self, its reduction to zero, or its complete erasure? Does Jesus mean that desire, or the impulse to live, intrinsic to personality or selfhood, is evil and should be destroyed? Actually the great paradox has its parallel or alternative phrasing where, if we may join the two sayings, losing the self is defined as the dedication of self in service, (Mk. 10:42-45; Matt. 20:26-27): "...whoever will be great

(31 cont'd) Ramsey also raises a question where he writes: "Christian love, attributing worth to the neighbor's needs infinitely superior to the claims of self, does not rest upon a doctrine of the infinite, inherent value of human personality in general..." (p 94, op. cit.). This statement should be compared to his analysis of Christian ethical motivation on the succeeding page, where he says, "...love for neighbor for his own sake insists upon a single-minded orientation of a man's primary intention toward this individual neighbor with all his concrete needs...It begins by loving 'the neighbor,' not mankind or manhood." (italics his.)

Concerning self-love, Ramsey says on page 101: "No more disastrous mistake can be made than to admit self-love into the ground-floor of Christian ethics as a basic part of Christian obligation, however much concern for self-improvement, for example, may later come to be a secondary, though entirely essential, aspect of Christian vocation."

As a whole the above books are meritorious commentaries on the Christian ethic, but at these crucial points on the personality criterion, and the problem of love and the self, they seem unclear.


among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant (KJ Matt. 20:26-27). Jesus teaching here seems to be that a full-orbed motive for life would be one of dedicated self-giving in service looking to the needs of others, concern for them and their welfare, over and above and beyond mere concern for one’s self. That Jesus did not mean, by such sayings as the great paradox, to rule out legitimate self-interests, seems affirmed in the Great Commandment, or in the Golden Rule, where the self is expressly included as having rightful place in the ethical relationship. If one insists on terminology or the letter, in the phraseology of the Great Commandment, agape expressly includes the idea of legitimate self-esteem, self-regard, or "love of self" along with love of neighbor. 33

The Christian Gospel is a gospel of self-realization for all selves inclusively. Indeed, it is not an ethic of self-realization in an exclusive or "selfish" sense. Jesus’ ethical teachings in their full context suggests that agape is psychologically satisfying, whereas eros alone or by itself, as a sole motive for life, would be self-defeating. Live life in terms of a hypothetical eros alone, that is, in terms of self-seeking, deaf to, or heedless of other lives around us, and we will miss the secret of life, or that very self-realization which we legitimately crave. Live life, however, in the spirit of agape, and we not only serve and help others to fulfill their lives, but we find highest joy, and fulfill our own lives in the highest way, by so living—this, in our view, is the meaning of Jesus’ paradoxical utterance. The total outlook of Jesus teaching and the New Testament (as does the Old Testament in its highest reaches of thought)—as mankind searches for the solution to the ethical problem—is found in the fellowship that agape establishes, or tends to secure.

33 See note 28
Psychological reality seems to be this: that the love and respect that others have for one's self is the highest form of self-realization. Agape achieves this; eros alone or by itself, does not. When one reaches out toward another, in the spirit of agape, that is, to love him and serve his interests and needs, over and beyond one's own—when the other realizes that his life and welfare is your concern too—confidence and friendship are established. Then, as a product of this relationship, when one stands in love and fellowship with others, one experiences full or highest well-being or joy or happiness. We know this in our deeper human friendships. Agape does not rule out legitimate ranges of eros; it simply says that life lived solely in terms of eros, will not complete its destiny in fellowship; whereas in agape we find life's highest satisfactions.

Life is a proper mixture of eros and agape, with agape a more inclusive statement of motive, indicating the design of others' desire to live along with the self, and, in the highest sense, to live together in fellowship.

True, agape should over-reach in its aim just the closer circle of one's more intimate friends—to include all and sundry and even those who may be antagonistic, or one's enemies, as Jesus says (Matt. 5:46). It is active good will toward all men as sacred in their persons. In his saying in Matthew 5:46—"if you love those who love you, what reward have you?"—Jesus seems to mean that love should be more, or reach beyond, or rise higher than, bare utilitarian or mutual or market love—the love and service of others only if they love and serve in return.

III. The Self in the Teachings of Jesus

Such passages as the following emphasize or suggest the right to personal life, fulfillment or self-realization as included in the meaning of agape and the kingdom of heaven. This theme is an extension of the primary New
Testament teaching of the sacredness of personality.

**Matt. 5:3f**
- The Beatitudes: "Blessed are those who," etc.
- On anxiety and trust, and recognition that God affirms our need for material security.
- Ask and it will be given you, and Golden Rule.
- The faithful servant in parable of the talents to enter into the joy of the master.

**Mk. 12:30-31**
- The Great Commandment: Love neighbor as self.
- He that loses life in service will find it.

**Luke 6:38**
- Give and it shall be given you.

**Acts 20:35**
- It is more blessed to give than to receive.

**John 16:24**
- That your joy may be full.
- That men may have life abundantly.

**Matt. 5:23**
- Passages including the idea of justice, acknowledging men's fundamental right to selfhood, fair play, and the principle of arbitration and adjustment between persons.

**Luke 18:2-16**
- Acknowledgment of personality differences or "gifts" and personality conflicts and problems, setting limits to comradeship.)

**Mark 9:2f**
- Where Jesus selects the disciples so that they would be near him, and passages which expressed his need for fellowship with special friends.

We may point out that the explicit doctrine of "rewards" in the Gospel emphasizes the self (Matt. 5:3, 8, 10; 6:4, 6; 10:42; Luke 6:35; 11:28; Mark 9:47).

Many contexts contain the idea of life's consequences, fruits, and rewards. In a number of instances life's rewards in Jesus' teachings are practical and utilitarian in addition, no doubt, to some which are eschatological and transcendental.33a A practical and this-worldly concern for the

self, in its will-to-live and personal need, seems plain in the great prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread" (Matt. 6:11); or in the saying, "Call the laborers and pay them their wages" (Matt. 20:8); or "Give and it will be given you; good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, will be put into your lap. For the measure you give will be the measure you get back" (Luke 6:38)—said in a context about life with other men, concerning generosity as the normative response to generosity. And even in the sayings about a heavenly or transcendental reward, it is concern for the self and its individual destiny that is implied.

An implication of the parable of the talents is Jesus' approbation of self-expression in the practical world, in addition to the probable central meaning which enjoins faithful stewardship for the kingdom.

A point of central importance, connected with the problem of the self, in Jesus' ethical teaching, is the meaning of his saying that the perfection of God is highest ethical standard, or inspiration for the moral life. As it stands in Matthew, Jesus' words concluding the section on agape love (5:43-48) "You, therefore, must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (v.48) do not necessarily suggest some rigid, static absolute, or completed pattern which the finite self must fit before it may qualify for salvation. Rather may not the "perfection" of God refer here to the personal loving source of our being, and to imitate this would mean that our full-ordred motive and purpose should be outgoing and serving like God's, as Cosmic Source or Creator of all persons? At least part of the meaning of Jesus' Sermon in Matthew is to lay stress on intentions or motives, as defining virtue, goodness, or righteousness, rather than to erect an absolutistic, or abstract standard of perfections, without room for growth or margin for error. Dynamic respect for personality—one's own as well as other, pointed
up in the idea of love of enemies and over-reaching forgiveness—is the full, or Divine-like motive. It is interesting that Luke's version of the Sermon (Q source here) suggests the possibility of this type of commentary. In comparing the two sources we find that Luke refers to the Divine mercy as the divine standard of righteousness: "Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful" (Luke 6:36). Also in the Lukan report we have the significant addition of reward for the self in the love relationship, and the elevation of the selves to status of "sons" of the Most High as the fulfillment or destiny of that relationship (6:32-36).

Christianity has two ultimate objectives, an objective of motive, and an objective of results. Its objective of motive is Agape; its objective of results is the Kingdom, or Fellowship. Each of these may be transposed and become means and results for the other. In stressing agape we must not forget that one ultimate objective of the Christian ethic is fellowship, and fellowship implies oneself and one's fulfillment as well as the other self and his fulfillment. Agape is the means to fellowship. We should expect to experience a sense of well-being, or personal fulfillment (or "self-realization") in doing any right or duty, including Agape. (Matt. 5:1f; Acts 20:35; Luke 6:38; Matt. 25:21; 7:7-12). The Agape-Fellowship polarity of the Christian ethic means the self-realization of all selves in a bond of serving love to each other. The Christian ethic, of course, is not self-realizational in the sense of realizing the self in exclusion of, or at the expense of, others.

The Christian metaphysics and Christian ethics includes oneself as well as other selves. The ultimacy of personality in being and value is the cardinal motif—all persons, everywhere included, one's own as well as another are sacred. The problem of Christian ethics is to solve the "tension" between the legitimate claims of one's own "ego" and those of another. Fel-
solves this tension and agape creates fellowship. The motive of agape is to love the other person, in his material and spiritual need, first, in the sense that it transcends thought of material reward for oneself, or even of the reward of winning friendship. One may not win friendship in some particular isolated case; but he must still love in agape. However, the facts usually are that friendship and fellowship are established; accordingly agape tends to solve the deepest need of the self as a by-product of its activity. Usually agape establishes the earthly fellowship with men, as the normal outcome of the moral laws of the universe. Agape always establishes the fellowship with God.

Self-love is an express aspect of Christian ethics, if it means one's self-respect, and one's self-acceptance as a sacred person along with other persons, created as such by God. Agape does not mean self-denial or self-abnegation, or self-annihilation in some morbid or extreme sense. (This would rather be the ethics of extreme philosophic Hinduism or Buddhism.) Jesus' highest ethical teachings include the self: The Golden Rule, Matthew 7:12; The Great Paradox, Mark 8:35; 10:43-44; The Great Commandment, Mark 12:30-31; It is a mistake to say that Christian ethics is not self-realizational in the highest sense advanced in our preceding discussion, or that Christian ethics rules out self-love, in the terms expressed above: i.e. as legitimate self-esteem, central to stable personality. It would indeed rule out self-realization or self-love in some inordinate sense that would exclude others from fellowship with the self, or that would seek to dominate others and to live at their expense, in the true meaning of "selfishness" or sinfulness.

Furthermore, for there to be love, there has to be one who loves, i.e. one's self or one's own person. For others to be served there must be a self or oneself who serves. Therefore, love itself implies one's self or one's person and establishes it in value and in being. The concept of service im-
implies
two selves, one's own and the other.

The Christian ideal of self-forgetfulness or self-sacrifice does not mean
to destroy the self, but to let the self become completely outgoing and
loving as God's own self is. Consciousness lies at the heart of the idea
of the self. The difference between Christian self-consciousness and pagan
or utilitarian self-consciousness or selfhood is that the latter is domi­
nated by consciousness of one's own needs; whereas Christian selfhood is
dominated by consciousness of the needs of others over and above and beyond
mere concern with the needs of the self, but not exclusive of God's ultimate
aim of the establishment of all selves in fellowship. Christian consciousness
does not deny the legitimate claim and right of oneself to existence, or
question the value of self-existence, as the Eastern religions in some res­­
pects seem to do.

Agape includes the self. The Christian ethic is like an ellipse: it
has two foci. One focus is self-realizational in the highest form of fel­­
lowship—-the focus which is the self. However, the other focus, the focus
centering on other life, is absolutely essential, if the focus of the self
is to be realized or to have legitimate meaning and status. Likewise the
other person is commanded to focus on us in agape, to establish us. There
could be no focus of agape, or the love and service, and establishment of
the other, for the sake of the other, if there were not the focus of the self
who serves and establishes, and is likewise a focus to receive the agape of
the other. The outer curve of the ellipse itself is the society or fellow­­
ship established by these two principles, both selves going out to each other
in agape, as the moral gravitation by which these foci are maintained in
being. The Christian ethic is inter-self-realizational.
In his discussion of the relations of "eschatology" to "ethics" in a context acknowledging the trans-ethical, mystical dimension in the life and teachings of Jesus, Amos Wilder concludes with a memorable sentence:

But in a higher sense ethics still... characterizes the fellowship of the kingdom in that it is a kingdom of personality, a communion of selves, whose peculiar beatitude is made possible by the combination of liberty and loyalty. 33b

IV. Joy and Existence

The Judaeo-Christian scheme of values is not one primarily emphasizing "separation," "sin," and "anxiety." Rather it stresses fellowship, righteousness, and joy. "Sin" is not some inevitable status of finite being, resulting from a metaphysical "separation" from the Ground of Being in God; though it may indeed be, in the Biblical perspective, that "separation" is a provisional consequence of possible sin! In any case, the larger Biblical message is on the sacredness of the self, and it expresses undying hope in the possibility of human growth toward good. Closing, then, on the larger metaphysical scheme woven into the background of this immediate section we wish to say that in the sense of our finitude and freedom arises a primal sense of joy in life and existence, derived from Ultimate Love. We do not first have a sense of "anxiety" arising out of our possible coming into nothingness or non-being. Philosophies of anxiety state a truth, and play their part, but they do not state the whole truth of life, nor its fundamental truth. The genius of the religion of Jesus as stressing life's joy seems enshrined in the Beatitudes, or in his words, above mentioned, about the kingdom of Heaven as being like the trusting, joyful attitude of little children.

My awareness of myself as true object to God--implicit in our sense of finitude--carries a sense of the gracious love and generosity of God as the
Creative Power, or "Power of Being" that brought me forth or makes me possible. Let us start from the sense of joy, then, rather than anxiety, as the first sentiment of our self-experience. So starting we may challenge the philosophies of "estrangement" from being, as characteristic of man.

sense of "estrangement", but rather fundamentally a sense of existence and its We do not fundamentally have a goodness as the work of Creative Love. And out of our sense of joy springs the trust that life will open unto us, and unto us with others jointly, into fuller, and ever more abundant, meaning.
APPENDIX A

Personality as Criterion of the Judaeo-Christian Ethic

Are there two points at issue here, namely: a. What is the ultimate reason, sanction or motive of the Christian ethic of agape love? And b. What is the precise role or place of the self in being, and in the Christian ethic of love? This analyst believes that these issues are identical in substance. In any case, in speaking to the first question, we should recall that Jesus appealed to several sanctions or reasons for his ethic and program. Amos Wilder indicates five such motives uttered by Jesus for the Christian life and conduct, namely: a reverent appeal to the authority or prestige of Scripture (but not in sense of an absolute binding law); an appeal to reason and common sense; an appeal to the nature of God as love; an appeal to the authority and example of Jesus himself; and an appeal to consequences, i.e. to reward and judgment. Prof. Wilder believes that this last type of appeal, in its transcendental or eschatological aspects, was a formal sanction, the nature of which Jesus could anticipate only by symbolic expressions suggested by the apocalyptic thought forms of his day, while the appeals to reason and God's nature as love were more fundamental in the thinking of Jesus.*

We would add (and perhaps this is only an elaboration of the sanctions of reason and of God's nature as love; or perhaps it is a summary of all of them together) that the sacred worth of personality is certainly an underlying motive, sanction, reason, or theme for Christian love. This point seems implicit in many of the great sayings and parables: The Golden Rule, The Good Samaritan, The Prodigal Son returned, The Lost Sheep found, the Laborers...

hired last announced as worthful as the first to be hired; his sayings that
in the eyes of God men are supremely worthful, more valuable than the grass
of the field, or than many sparrows; in the injunction to love enemies, to
forgive our neighbors, as God loves and forgives us. His sayings, "Suffer
the little children to come unto me... for of such is the kingdom of heaven"
(Mark 10:14, KJ); or, "it is not the will of my Father who is in heaven that
one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. k8:14), suggest not only the
ingenuousness and simplicity of childhood as a character ideal of the kingdom,
but also Jesus' positive or optimistic outlook on human nature in its origi­
ginal state, and on the divine attitude toward personality's worthfulness or
value, as it comes from the Creator.

It may indeed be granted, if this is what is sometimes meant, that the
Judaeo-Christian personality criterion of being, value, and ethical life, does
not mean that man is conceived solely as a Platonic universal, or trans-earthly
"essence" of individuality; but rather the personality criterion refers to the
concrete reality of people, or persons as individual "creations" of God.
Our view is that the correct statement of the Judaeo-Christian metaphysics
does indeed and ethics would be that it rests on a doctrine of "the infinite, inherent
value"* of all human persons, oneself, as well as the other--however much
also we all share in such "universal" qualities as individuality, freedom,
reason, a life of desire, and of some responsiveness to value.

Interpreted in one way, Jesus' Great Commandment, on its side of love to
God, implies personality as a "universal" or "cosmic" criterion. May we not
say that the command to love God means to love, honor, or reverence the Creative
source of all personal life, or personality? We love and reverence God, in
utmost gratitude, for our own and our neighbor's being. We love God who has

* Contrast Ramsey, op. cit., p. 94.
brought us forth from the Creative mystery of His Being out of his love for us. Moreover, as we may love another human person for what he is, over and above and beyond what he may do, so, by analogy, part of the meaning of our love for God may be our love for what He is as the Supreme Person, beyond His aspect as the creative source of all being. The love of a younger brother for an older brother, or of a son for a father, is our best human analogy of this dimension of the human love for God. Such loves at their highest have risen above utilitarian value, and are in a sense what we may mean by the agape love of men toward God.

Also, from the standpoint of a further side of contemporary debate about the nature of Jesus' teaching, we assume that much of it is practical, and this-worldly, and not entirely "eschatological" or "apocalyptic," or bearing solely on the expectation of the imminent end of the world and historic time, in anticipation of the early return of the "Son of man." We believe that the tone of many of Jesus' utterances, their note of ageless wisdom that appeals directly to mind and heart, to experience, reason, and aspiration, suggests that he was speaking of God and Man in terms relevant to life as such on any plane in both its personal and social needs. In many such clues the faith of the expositor finds in Jesus' sayings an understanding of life, in its religious dimensions, that transcends the particular apocalyptic outlook of the first century. This analyst is in agreement with the form of interpretation which believes that, as we study the Gospel records closely, we hear Jesus speaking with a genuine concern for historical reality and the problems of this world, with a gradual lifting of vision toward eschatological and transcendentnal themes.*

* Amos N. Wilder, op. cit.
APPENDIX B

Josiah Royce and Albert C. Knudsen on

Christian Love

"The love which Jesus preached has often been misunderstood. Critics, as well as mistaken friends of the Master's teachings, have supposed Christian love to be more or less completely identical with self-abnegation—with the amiably negative virtue of one who, as the misleading modern phrase expresses the matter, "has no thought of self." Another modern expression, also misleading, is used by some who identify Christian love with so-called 'pure altruism.' The ideal Christian, as such people interpret his virtue, 'lives wholly for others.' That is what is meant by the spirit which resists not evil, which turns the other cheek to the smiter, which forgives, and pitied, and which abandons all worldly goods.

"Now, against such misunderstandings, many of the wiser expounders of Christian doctrine, both in former times and in our own, have taken pains to show that love, as the Jesus of the sayings and of the parables conceived it, does not consist in mere self-abnegation, and is not identical with pure altruism, and is both heroic and positive. The feature of the Master's doctrine of love which renders this more positive and heroic interpretation of the sayings inevitable, is the familiar reason which is laid at the basis of his whole teaching. One is to love one's neighbor because God himself, as Father, divinely loves and prizes each individual man. Hence the individual man has an essentially infinite value, although he has this value only in and through his relation to God, and because of God's love for him. Therefore mere self-abnegation cannot be the central virtue. For the Jesus of the sayings not only rejoices in the divine love whereof every man is the object, but also invites every man to rejoice in the consciousness of this very love, and to delight also in all men, since they are God's beloved. The man whom this love of God is to transform into a perfect lover cannot
henceforth merely forget or abandon the self... Every man, this self included, has just such a unique value, and must be viewed so. Hence the sayings are full of calls to self-expression, and so to heroism. Love is divine; and therefore includes an assertion of its own divinity; and therefore it can never be mere self-abnegation. Christian altruism never takes the form of saying, "I myself ought to be or become nothing; while only the others are to be and saved." For the God who loves me demands not that I should be nothing, but that I should be his own."


"The true Christian ideal is self-realization through self-sacrifice. It includes both self-love and the love of others. And the love of others is not unmotivated. It is conditioned by the moral worth of its object. If it were not, it would not itself be moral. It is the sacredness of personality that makes love morally obligatory. This applies to love both of oneself and of others. Indeed, so far as the attainment of the moral goal of life is concerned, everyone has a greater responsibility for himself than for anyone else. Self-love is therefore a moral obligation. But it cannot in our social world be detached from the love of others, nor can the true love of others be completely detached from the love of self. In other words there is a common moral ideal that is implicit both in true self-love and in the true love of others and that binds the two together. This moral ideal is furthermore grounded in both our love of God and his love of us."


"Love, however, which is thus detached from the idea of worth and from the idea of duties to self has ceased to be love in the moral sense of the
term. If there is no worth in ourselves or in others, which imposes obligations upon us, it is clear that love in the latter as well as the former case has no moral or rational basis. It was insight into this fact that led Augustine to base both the love of self and the love of others on the presence of God in the human heart. Self-love, as he conceived it, means loving God in ourselves, and the love of others means loving God in them. In other words, it is the divine sanctity of the human soul that imposes the obligation of love upon us, and this obligation applies to ourselves as well as to others.

In this chapter we presume to write briefly on some of the more "personal aspects" of religion. Traditionally these personal aspects have meant such things as "faith" and "prayer," personal "religious experience," the problem of life's meaningfulness and sense of God's providence in life, and the problem of belief in immortality. Some of these topics we have already covered and will not elaborate further here, such as the concept of faith dealt with in chapter one, page 23-27; the discussion of "religious experience" and the idea of salvation in chapter seven on the religious argument for God, pages 263-274; the idea of "providence" in chapter nine, pages 396-373; and the problem of the personal meaningfulness of life, germane to religious experience, considered in chapter thirteen, page 478. In the present chapter we will discuss those topics in the preceding list not yet specifically considered—namely, prayer and belief in a hereafter or immortality; and we will conclude with the idea of the religious meaningfulness of history. This last topic touches upon personal religion insofar as a sense of the personal meaningfulness of life and God's providence in life would naturally lead into the larger question of whether human history as a whole has meaning. Accordingly, we shall conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the Judaeo-Christian conception of history and human destiny.

I. Prayer

If answer to prayer is a reality and affects results in life, it would be religion in the most experimental and empirical mood.
1. The difference prayer makes in life: the need for prayer. Prayer is a natural expression of belief in the universe as a moral and purposive place, conceived to be interested above all else in our own finite personal lives. Prayer is the supreme response on man's part to this kind of a universe. The difference prayer would make seems crucial. If the universe is such a place, then it would be through prayer that we gain support from the ultimate purposiveness to live our life in the fullest, most meaningful and happiest way. If the universe is such a place, alive with the purposes of God, to neglect prayer would be the greatest oversight on a man's part. It would be failure to utilize life's supreme resource in God. Perhaps to experiment with prayer confirms the experience that the universe is such a place. William Adams Brown said:

   Prayer is the most serious business in life. It is the way in which we define for ourselves the final issues and relate ourselves to the ultimate reality.*

2. Conditions for belief in prayer and types of prayer. The basic condition, obviously, would be the belief that God is in some sense a reality. Accordingly, various types of belief about God would have corresponding beliefs about "prayer." The two great watersheds of thinking about God are the impersonalist and the personalist.

   If God is thought of mainly as the impersonal whole of being, somewhat after the manner of the classic pantheisms, prayer then would take the form of "meditation," and perhaps "aspiration." It would be meditation in reverence and awe about the wonder and mystery of existence, with no thought of the dependence of existence on Ultimate Personal Being. It would be aspiration for the good, the true, and beautiful, the highest ideals and abstractions of which we can think without conceiving these as also repres-

* The Life of Prayer in a World of Science, Scribners, 1931, p. 132.
senting or reflecting the "thoughts" of a personal source of all existence in God. John Dewey, for example, in his system of naturalistic, religious humanism allowed "religious" emotion and aspiration in this sense. A great deal of Oriental piety has stressed the ultimate union of man with the transpersonal "God" , e.g. Brahman , in and through meditative discipline.

Prayer for the theistic personalist in broadest terms would mean "communion" of the finite person with the Infinite Person, and the real response of the Infinite Person to primary needs and aspirations of the person finite. Traditionally speaking, prayer has thought to be legitimately expressed by several kinds of moods, such as:

1) Petition (for things?)

2) Petition for personal spiritual values or gifts--e.g., for illumination and clarification of moral and/or intellectual perplexity--in which the prayer for faith itself may have some legitimate place; for moral qualities for one's life, such as the power to forgive and to love.

3) Prayer for forgiveness for oneself for conscious moral failure or misdemeanor, expressed in the attitude of contrition.

4) Prayer of adoration, thanksgiving and praise in the midst of the sense of life's well-being; at times of great joy or fulfillment; or at the passing of illness or great danger. Involved here is a complex sentiment reflecting belief in God as protective Creator, sustainer, and preserver of life.

5) Intercessory prayer for the health and welfare of others.

For the modern man of religion, living in a "scientific" day and age, can prayer have meaning or reality in all of these ways? Or if not in all perhaps, in which particularly?

3. Analysis of belief in prayer as a reality--its intellectual presuppositions: David Elton Trueblood encompasses the issue, we believe, in the following memorable statement:
So long as one really believes in God, no ethically sensitive petition need be ruled out. God does not need to change the laws of nature in order to answer prayer, if the laws themselves, as there is reason to believe, are dependent upon a divine purpose, and are relatively constant only because God's will is constant.

Unless the world is a closed mechanical system, there seems no reason to doubt the efficacy of prayer, but we know that it is not such a system, for there are men in it. A world in which thought can move matter is a world in which it is wholly reasonable for prayer to affect destiny.*

Analyzing this statement, we find the characteristic presuppositions or emphases that our belief about prayer must have as modern men:

a - Belief in God
b - An ethically sensitive petition
c - Recognition that we live in a world of "natural law"
d - Yet at the same time realizing that it need not be viewed as a "closed mechanical system"
e - Our own experience that thought (acting within the realm of law) can move matter

The critical problem for many modern minds as to whether prayer can be a reality or a significant force in life centers in the question whether the concept of "prayer" does not conflict with the idea of a world of "natural law." The old "rationalist" criticism that a wise Providence would not "interfere" in his world of "natural law" to cause an ad hoc miracle, we believe should hold as a general guide of our thinking in this area. Accordingly, the resolution of the conflict moves in the direction of redefining prayer, to be sure, away from some of its traditionalist meaning, to center primarily in point b above, or ethical sensitivity; while at the same time we become aware of the meaning of "natural law" in

fullest, synoptic, or coherent inclusiveness, suggested by points c, d, and e. To discuss this latter need first.

We live in a universe of what we have heretofore called superordinate energies, or a hierarchy of "laws," representing ascending orders of complexity and freedom: materiological energies and laws, biological or organic laws, with the psychological or psychogenic laws of "thought" and "free spirit" the topmost echelon of these inter-related energies, and their modes of operation or process which we term their "laws." Further, the facts of evolution and growth, the arrival of real novelties, and, ultimately, experienced freedom, suggest that our universe is not a closed "mechanical" system (recall our discussion of mechanism vs. purpose, pp. 150-157). Indeed, the very meaning of a world of "law" as something moving or operating with a predictable constancy contains its tel- orological implication in the realization that such is necessary as a stable environment, if living beings are to learn to make habitual the most favorable adjustment (D. C. Macintosh). The world of "law" as viewed from the perspective of belief in God is again well evaluated by Trueblood:

...the order of the world is accounted for by reference to the constancy of divine purpose...Prayer means conscious participation in the purposive order in particular situations....

And again by W. A. Brown:

...law...whether inner or outer, is not a barrier to progress, but the condition which makes it possible.

How, then, may we define prayer as a hypothesis regarding spiritual energy, in such form as to be consonant with the understanding of the universe as a system of superordinate law-abiding energies, among which prayer itself takes its normal place?

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* Ibid., p. 277

** The Life of Prayer in a World of Science, op. cit., p. 132
4. **What is highest prayer?** We here wish to avoid such a dogmatic or narrow interpretation of prayer as would possibly rule out its meaningfulness in other dimensions or interpretations where no doubt many people, past and present, have believed its significance or reality to lie, in addition to our understanding of prayer as relating primarily to the area of moral sensitivity. Is prayer for material things possible? Is prayer for the healing of broken bones ever effective or a reality? We do not wish to deny its possibility in such areas of hope, where people testify that they have experienced its power, but we tend to feel that its highest or finest meaning transcends (indeed must transcend) its use for such material goals; and we tend to believe that in the growing religious life it is normative for the meaning of prayer, at its most mature, to come to have, more or less exclusively, the moral or ethical power and significance, here described. We leave open the possibility, when prayer has done its sure work of good within the plane of thought, spirit, and mind, that it then may have important effects, derivative, and possibly even direct, in the realm of the "material," such as aiding bodily healing. (We do not deny, of course, that there has been, perhaps often times, an observed relationship between "prayer," "mental conditioning," or "faith," and healing in some forms of illness.)

In any case, we believe that prayer at its highest should be for spiritual values, for oneself and for others. For fortitude and courage in the face of obstacles; for quickening in the will to do one's duty in the day-to-day necessity of making moral decisions; for strength against temptation; for clarity of judgment in intellectual perception amid the perplexities of life; for forgiveness, if need be. **Thus prayer is constant communion with God concerning His expectations for your life.** Indeed,

*Leslie D. Weatherhead: Psychology, Religion, and Healing.*
transcending oneself, it should aim at securing values for others, such that our prayers should be that we ourselves become instruments of love and service.

The late Douglas Clyde Macintosh believed that he formulated quite exactly the "law" of the answer to prayer, and that prayer so understood could always be counted upon to "work," as the experiential "proof" of the reality of God, or in his own alternative words, of a "Divine Factor," operating within and behind the experience.* The formula can be rendered in two ways:

a) Formulated as normative psychology (from the subjective side)

\[ E \rightarrow \text{RRA(VE)} \rightarrow \text{ap} \]

ego•right religious adjustment toward volitional effect gives answer to prayer

b) Formulated as a dependable theistic reaction (from the objective or cosmic standpoint)

\[ \text{DF} \rightarrow \text{RRA(VE)} \rightarrow \text{ap} \]

Divine Factor•right religious adjustment toward volitional effect gives answer to prayer

In Macintosh's exposition of the normative law of answer to prayer, the two formulas are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. For if indeed it could be asked, are E and DF the same? E and DF (Ego and the Divine Factor) are logically or exhaustively identical, then "prayer" could indeed be called wish-fulfillment, or perhaps self-hypnosis, at least a self-verifying tautology.

Macintosh, however, believed that the content or experience itself of right religious adjustment (in the moral or volitional terms meant) and the sense of answer to prayer discloses a truly "objective" factor, God; "objective," or "transcending," because of a characteristic sense of

incoming "strength" not entirely self. He was thus accustomed to present the following diagram, which represented, he believed, the authentic "Christian" experience of God, and answer to prayer:

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| Area where the Divine Personal and the human personal conjoin in the sense of strengthened moral personality.* Arrow D would indicate a directional movement, or guaranteed response of the Divine Factor toward and "into" the finite as the finite made effort (i.e., right religious adjustment) in the direction f. toward D. in order to "receive" the Divine Presence.

Macintosh rationalized the reality of prayer (and religious experience in its normative moral dimensions—recall our discussion pp. 266-70) extremely suggestively in the above way for the religious consciousness. (We call the reader's attention to appendix A of this chapter where we have excerpted the main portion of Macintosh on "religious experience" and "prayer," in his own eloquent words, from his classic work, Theology as now an Empirical Science.) We summarize what we have just elaborated into a general statement or definition of prayer. When prayer is the deepest expression of our reverence for personality and seeks a volitional effect in the furtherance of good for personality, finite life feels infusing power and the sustaining presence and help of the Personal Source of life

* Perhaps, in some cases, radically restructured personality: "conversion"
Through prayer we experience that which we cannot explain, and solve the mystery of the relation of finite to the infinite. We do not know how peace, power, and courage come to us. We know only that they come.*

5. The medium of prayer. As in physical science, processes and laws need a continuum in or through which their operations effect their results, causalities their consequences, so in the "spiritual realm" prayer needs its communicating medium or continuum. That spiritual sensitivity continuum is love--through it prayer works. This was beautifully expressed by the noted Scottish preacher, John Watson. He phrased it in particularly Christian terms—as the Christian preacher—but that would not detract from the universal appeal of his insight; since the "Christ" whom he particularly reverences in his statement is the expression in his tradition of the love which is universal in all great religions. Love as a sensitivity medium is a spiritual reality. Operating through it, as we essentially pray to be ourselves the answers to others' prayers, we can come to see how prayer at its most exalted can have real effect, or be an effective power. After relating his experiences of answer to prayer, John Watson offered three inferences:

"(1) People may live in an atmosphere of sympathy which will be a communicating medium. When someone appears to read another's thoughts, as we have all seen done at public exhibitions, it was evidently by physical signs, and it served good purpose. It was a mechanical gift, and was used for an amusement. This is knowledge of another kind, whose conditions are spiritual and whose ends are ethical. Between you and the person there must be some common feeling; it rises to a height in the hour of trouble; and its call is for help. The correspondence here is between heart and heart, and the medium through which the message passes is love.

* The Life of Prayer in a World of Science, op. cit., p. 124
(2) This love is but another name for Christ, who is the head of the body; and here one falls back on St. Paul's profound and illuminating illustration. It is Christ who unites the whole race, and especially all Christian folk, by His incarnation. Into Him are gathered all the fears, sorrows, pains, troubles of each member, so that He feels with all, and from Him flows the same feeling to other members of the body. He is the common spring of sensitiveness and sympathy, who connects each man with his neighbour and makes of thousands a living organic spiritual unity.

(3) In proportion as one abides in Christ he will be in touch with his brethren. If it seem to one marvelous and almost incredible that any person should be affected by another's sorrow whom he does not at the moment see, is it so marvelous, although quite credible, that we are so often indifferent to sorrow which we do see? Is it not the case that one of a delicate soul will detect secret trouble in the failure of a smile, in a sub-tone of voice, in a fleeting shadow on the face? "How did he know?" we duller people say. "By his fellowship with Christ" is the only answer. "Why did we not know?" On account of our hardness and selfishness. If one lives self-centered--ever concerned about his own affairs, there is no callousness to which he may not yet descend; if one lives the selfless life, there is no mysterious secret of sympathy which may not be his. Therefore, if anyone desire to live in nervous touch with his fellows, so that their sorrows be his own and he be their quick helper, if he desire to share with Christ the world burden, let him open his heart to the Spirit of the Lord. In proportion as we live for ourselves are we separated from our families, our friends, our neighbours; in proportion as we enter into the life of the cross we are one with them all, being one with Christ, who is one with God."

II Immortality

In this section we consider the rational foundations of faith in immortality. Basic questions in this area of philosophy of religion are:

Of what value is belief in "immortality?" What do we mean by "immortality"--what would it be--i.e. what are varied views of immortality?

Among possible meanings of immortality, there is the faith that it is "personal". Is "personal immortality" a possibility? This is the question we will be centrally considering here.

1. **Varied meanings of immortality.** In the great religious traditions several alternative meanings of man as having some kind of death-transcending destiny are present. At the risk of some over-simplification we suggest that there have been four basic views, given below. To these we add/first philosophic or logical possibility that will make our list complete as to beliefs about a transcending destiny for man.

   - **The first of these positions is the denial that there is a transcending destiny of any kind—or that this idea has any meaning or significance for us men.** Accordingly, we have the following five philosophical possibilities:

     1) **The belief in no "immortality":** the materialist position.

     2) **Absorptionism:** the belief that man's finite "spirit" is to be reabsorbed into the absolute or ultimate impersonal whole/Being, with no remainder of anything that we could call personality or personal consciousness left—exemplified in many Hindu and Buddhist scriptures.

     3) **Deification, divinization, or apotheosis of man theme.** Here the belief is somewhat like two above—but with the idea that we finite spirits become literally the infinite Spirit or Person Himself; we become literally identified with the Supreme Consciousness, as Consciousness, or Person—thus man as the outcome of his religious striving becomes "God"; we are exalted reality really God Himself all along, but become fully aware of this/only upon at which transition release from this life, / our consciousness can expand into This point of view is its full realization as Supreme or Cosmic Consciousness, exemplified also again in Hindu scriptures; in Muslim Sufi writings; and in the western tradition.
(4) **Personal immortality.** The belief that in the presence of God, or in God Himself in some way, we are preserved or remain as "personal consciousesses" or spiritual persons, distinct from God and from each other. This possibility as a type of immortality, would logically necessitate, it seems to us, the continuation of our own sense of finitude in such a Hereafter or "Heaven." In the west at least this has been the most commonplace meaning of immortality.

(5) **Reincarnation** as a mode of immortality.

Thus 3, 4, and 5 are varied meanings of "personal immortality." We will not here attempt to argue a case either for or against "reincarnation." Many peoples throughout historic time have believed in reincarnation. I think we may keep our minds open to the possibility that reincarnation could be true as a metaphysical fact—surely not with all of the pessimistic over-tones of the classic Sansara-Karma doctrine; but with the main idea that the Spiritual Purposiveness or Administration of the universe may be providing worlds of transcending beauty, in galactic times and spaces, where "reincarnated" souls find themselves in bodily, humanoid existences, and in such terms of felicity and joy as to be literally and relatively "heavens" in contrast to our earthly existence here and now. This could be the ultimate destiny of men and women who by the power of God were thus "rewarded." Faith can legitimately take such a form it seems to us. Indeed, in the Hebrew Christian West, where the Sansara doctrine of the east was not specifically present (save in some of the ancient Greek outlook: Plato, *Phaedo*), there was the similar theme of the "resurrection of the body."

Deificationism (3 above) seems to us a doubtful possibility—because of its inherent and ultimate impersonalism (?). Our evaluative premise here is that (finite?) personal identity and difference is a supreme cosmic value. Empirically speaking the production, / creation of
such identities seems to be what the cosmic process is busiest doing, or
is all about. If that is the case, what becomes of "personal identity"
and difference, and variety, if all such are ultimately transmitted into
a single "Personal Consciousness," "God" Would not our own self-values
thereby be lost or blurred? It takes two to love. In such monistic God-
Person (if this is what some of the Sufi mystics mean when they identify
self with Allah), where then would be love? There must needs be an inherent
cosmic "dualism" between self and others so that love can arise. In pro-
foundest religion God is Agape. If He makes finite persons in the first
place, as an outcome of His love (recall our discussion, p. ),
would He not desire, and plan, to keep them as such, from the very nature
of Himself as Personal love? Accordingly, we believe that the idea of
"personal immortality" best satisfies the sense of values of a personalistic
metaphysics—and therefore our rationale for immortality has point 4 above
in mind as its guiding conception, including possibly (if desired) some
degree of reincarnationist or resurrectionist theory as aid to it. If
reincarnationism and/or resurrectionism are left out, then some kind of
theory of bodiless "spirits" would be implied by our fourth alternative.
At any rate, we now endeavor to state the case for immortality more or
less in the terms outlined in the fourth alternative.

2. The difference belief in immortality makes. The funda-
mental question is, can we have an ethical universe without immor-
tality? Is immortality needed in a moral universe—is immortality necessary
We believe that is
to ethics? ? immortality a necessary corollary to the hypothesis that
our world is a moral place and process. . for two
reasons.

In the first place, we will be certain to treat a man right if we
regard him as an immortal being, as the most precious and everlasting thing
in the universe. Belief in immortality does not arise from the desire for unending bliss for oneself. This would found the belief in a too self-centered and non-ethical motive. It is naive to allege that Christians and other religious people believe in immortality because they are looking for pie in the sky by an by. Rather belief in immortality is necessary for highest ethical sensitivity. Immortality is implied in the ethical premise that personal being, or personality, is of ultimate significance. Psychologically speaking, are we most deeply motivated to treat a man with highest respect, or go out to him in love and service, in the fullest implications of love, unless we regard his personal being as of ultimate and eternal significance, of quintessential and permanent value? Belief in immortality is an a priori affirmation of the ethical consciousness.

Tennant and Hocking state the point well. Tennant said:

Immortality becomes a matter of more or less reasonable belief, as distinct from deducibility from assured metaphysical principles or from more or less arbitrary postulations concerning the harmonising of moral experience. It is...a demand for coherence in what is, as a matter of fact; a moral universe.*

In his inimitable manner, Hocking wrote what we can summarize as the argument for immortality from love:

And thus to love is to treat the loved being as worthy of permanence. The impulse of caring is to hold that being forever above the accidents of time and death—as if one could! The miracle of love is that it so spontaneously forgets its own limitations: it assumes its right to act in loco Dei—and with the right assumes also its capacity! The pathetic folly of human affection? Or is it the reverse, a point at which human finitude rises to the point of participating in

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deity? I propose that here, in willing to confer immortality on another mortal, the self is in that moment reaching a deeper self-consciousness, an intimation of its own destiny.*

In the second place, and very much related to what has just been said, the belief in immortality puts meaning and a consequent energy into our struggle to perfect personal and social life.

3. What then are the rational grounds for belief in immortality?

First, there are the ethical grounds, just reviewed.

Second, belief in the goodness and sufficiency of God is the foundation. That there is conscious planning in the universe for immortality seems a necessary postulate, else how we could survive the actual cataclysm of bodily death would be utterly incomprehensible. The same creative power that brought us into being in the first place would be required to get us over the crisis. Is a philosophy of immortality without God convincing? (McTaggart attempted such in a position that resembles the Sankhya Hindus.**) What we mean by immortality is the permanent significance of personal being--this implies the power, ground, or condition that brings forth, and sustains, personal being, and this in one sense is what we mean by God. The conception of immortality is impossible apart from the conception of God.


** The Sankhya Hindus, in ancient times in the Orient (6th century B. C.) and the early 20th century British philosopher and personal idealist, MacTaggart, defined personal spirits as by nature self-subsistent or "eternal" souls, a metaphysical view which includes the idea of immortality without God. (See our criticism of McTaggart's non-theism, "The Personality of God, A Dialogue in Anglo-American Idealism," 1966, chapters six and seven.)
Third, a philosophy of progress and purpose implies immortality. Belief in immortality grows naturally out of the conception that the universe exists for some end—the end of bringing into existence personal beings with dynamic or expanding capacities of growth for good, for intellectual, aesthetic, and moral enrichment. Man is nature's escape from necessary mechanism—he is a free spirit, for good or evil. "Our faith in the survival of man's soul: fits the universe in the sense that it continues its picture of development and saves it from irrationality and meaningfulness." (John Hanes Holmes: Ingersoll Lectures, Harvard, 1947, "The Affirmation of Immortality."

The belief is a logical and psychological accompaniment to a life of earnest effort and striving. Hocking again said, "To cease at the peak of attainment is to lose the full meaning of that attainment. From the mere logic of meaning, then, there is no moment at which conscious existence could appropriately cease," (quoted from the above mentioned lectures.) Kant's argument comes in here: that our earthly span is never sufficient to get done what we were born to do, Immortality is a corollary to the doctrine of the purposiveness of existence.

The basic definition and meaning of immortality, then, would be the by extension of purpose beyond this life, whatever the mode may be which this is secured, or the "form" that immortality may take.

Fourth, we may focus on the general mystery of matter and physical existence in any case, as itself a clue. Hard materialism is no longer a tenable view of reality. The very atoms are full of energy and insubstantiality—and may in themselves be the same thing that we experience from our subjective viewpoint as the energy of life and will. "I stand upon the brink of the unknown, utter and unplumbed...If we accept, as we
must, the indestructibility of matter, no less must we accept the indestructibility of the spirit with which matter is informed," said the eloquent John Holmes, (Holmes, op. cit.).

Arthur Train in his novel, The Autobiography of Ephriam Tutt: has Tutt say (I paraphrase) "How we may live forever, would be no stranger a possibility than that we have lived at all!"

In sum: mind, self-conscious life, personal consciousness, are better clues to reality than bare sense and soil. The experience of purpose, the discovery of truth, the up-building of ideals and values are our fundamental clues to the nature and meaning of existence. Personal identity and unbroken consciousness persist through physical changes of the body. Is this a clue of the transcendence of personal consciousness over material changes? A kind of scientific proof for immortality would lie in the direction of proving the case for the reality and independence of mind-energy.* Would death be the liberation of mind-energy, that form of energy with which we are already acquainted at the top of the hierarchy of energies? What is the energy of mind which is eternal? Plato said in the Phaedo that it was truth itself, and that the soul knows that it is eternal because it may participate in the eternal order of truth itself.

4. Further possibilities and problems: the "vision of God." Much of the mystic literature of the west (as in the east) moves along the absorptionist—identificationist—deificationist themes discussed above; and the meaning of the ultimate life with God, or "Vision of God," as anticipated in the mystic's present momentary "vision," which vouchsafes his ultimate and perduring experience in a Hereafter, were expressed in such lines as the following by St. Thomas:

* Recall chapter 12
Here the soul in a wonderful and unspeakable manner both seizes and is seized upon, devours and is herself devoured, embraces and is violently embraced: and by the knot of love she unites herself with God, and is with Him as the Alone with the Alone.*

Jacques Maritain concludes his powerful little book, *Approaches to God*** (in large part an exposition of St. Thomas) with a defense of the identificationist outlook in a memorable commentary, which we quote at some length in Appendix B. In contrast to this classic interpretation of the Vision of God theme, we here pose an alternate view, a confessio fidei, as to what the Vision of God could mean from within a personalist philosophy of existence.

First, however, an appreciation of the deificationist philosophy of the destiny of man: If it be true that we are indeed to be transmuted into Deity Himself, in toto, then our destiny is to become the inner workings and creativity itself of being, becoming, and the universe. Doubtless this is not to be disparaged as a less than grand and awe-inspiring idea. We reverently suggest, however, that this philosophy points to an aloof and lonely destiny, "alone with the alone" (recall St. Thomas' sentiment above). We believe that the following is a warmer, more personalized conception of man's metaphysical destiny.

Our freedom, and our finitude will continue permanently—even in a Hereafter—even our "ability to sin," perhaps (compare the Lucifer myth). God's creative love, in our view, implies this. We will, however, have "the more perfect," more intimate, direct, and satisfying knowledge or


** Chapter five, "The Desire to See God"
"vision of God" as sustaining Source of Being and Supreme Goodness and Love. "Vision" implies a certain standing "outside"—reverent and respectful of the object in vision, at some distance to its own inner sacredness and sanctity. Our "epistemic freedom" (to borrow a phrase of John Hick) which God has originally given each of us must of necessity continue if personality is to continue, though doubtless at a lessened "distance" from God than may now be necessary.

That it will be a "vision" and "acquaintance" analogous to our present vision and acquaintance of earthly friends is our view. As we know them through their sustaining love toward us, without desiring to be them, without desiring to take away their reality, or they ours, and our mutual joy and satisfaction in fellowship is therein vouchsafed, so it will be in our relation with God. Our destiny will be fellowship, community, kingdom, not "identity"—and so we believe is the Biblical theme of destiny. Destiny is likened in the words of Jesus to a "banquet," a "bridal festivity," a "kingdom."* Accordingly, there will doubtless never be a time when we will cease from exercising faith: faith that the Source of Being or the First Cause is truly "Person," rather than impersonal Being (just as we are relatively sure now, but not absolutely sure, that our friends are persons rather than ultimately some impersonal structures); faith that God is good rather than evil, or indifferent; and finally faith that we are ourselves free rather than bound! Personhood in its real finitude and freedom implies faith as a continuing and primal necessity of its being. The minute faith ceases, personality ceases. Several corollaries and comments follow from this analysis.

(1) The ultimate externality of knowledge for God's created beings. We will never have a knowledge of perfect "internal relations"—contrary

*In St. Paul we perhaps have a nascent identification or deification philosophy of destiny.
to the expectation of absolute idealisms, as well, apparently, as to the hope of Thomism. A universe of persons implies this boundary of knowledge—we must always remain with a certain "epistemic distance" from God.

(2) As personality implies the continuance of faith in the above terms, so love, integral to the meaning of personality, implies the continuance of faith. Perfect identity with another would shrink love to zero. Love implies a certain separateness of being. Love implies, not a desire to be the other person, but to interact with him in his presence in mutual appreciation and joy, in fellowship. Love respects the mystery of the other selfhood. Love means affirming and respecting the other person in his sacredness and reality, with always a margin of "ignorance" (or realization of lack of identity in being, if that is what ignorance means), present or acknowledged in the relationship. But by this willing and creative "ignorance" we affirm his reality in being! So it is not a destroying ignorance, but a constituting and creating respect that is the ultimate effort of our being, vis-a-vis another. Creative acknowledgment is the ultimate fulfillment of knowledge. This seems identical precisely to what we mean by moral nature or virtue, or "reason." This/personality and its immanent logic of respect we feel to be the "divine image" or "spark" struck into us. That much of God we do know! And perhaps this suffices! In the Kantian and Roycean formula, God shares "His being" in the "Idea of Freedom;" but this is as much as He can do—would He preserve our being in love. What God shares with us is the immortality of His freedom, rather than an identification of being in some metaphysical totality. God is that Love which ever goes forth to love us/finite and free.

(3) God's "eternity" (in which we will share) can only mean that He has a primordial or time-full, unchanging moral purpose. His purpose for
good extends from time immemorial to time immemorial! His "eternity" is filled with the time energy of His purpose. Is Heaven "endless time" or "timeless eternity;" is it continued "purposive life" or "rest"? Perhaps there are values in believing it to be timeless eternity and rest; but as for us, we keep our hope to the possibility that it is a life of good purpose in unending time—and no doubt, in "other spaces."*

Addendum on the Meaning of Love Toward God

In what sense do we love God "more" than ourselves? We love the creative source of personality more than self in the sense that we know we do not create ourselves—we love and reverence the creative power which transcends us. In loving God "more" we do not deny the very self that He has brought forth in us. In loving God as the creative Source of personality, we love and reverence ourselves, as selves, supremely: in loving ourselves, as we love others, we love and reverence His highest work in creation. We love and reverence Him "more" as we love and reverence more any superior source of power and ability to ourselves, without subtracting from or negating ourselves. It is because of God that I love myself; my destiny in moral or responsible freedom is what He wishes!

III The Religious Meaning of History

When we use such a title as the above, we are aware that the "meaning of history" would vary in the thought of the great religions, or the philosophical system. For example, its meaning for the

* See William Ernest Hocking on "other spaces," Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience, pp. 28-29.
Hindu-Buddhist system of thought, as for the classic Greeks, or Platonic, was that history, in the larger cosmic ongoing, is "cyclical," whereas for the Hebrew-Christian outlook history is conceived as a "linear" process, or progress. We will not attempt here to analyze the meanings of history in all the major intellectual traditions of mankind, but will focus on the Judaeo-Christian tradition of the west, in terms of what we believe to be its central or underlying personalistic philosophy—the major features of which we have been outlining in this study.

In the Bible itself there are two teachings about "history" and its outcome. One can be called the transcendentalist (or apocalyptic) mode of thought. In the New Testament, for example, in many passages and reported words of Jesus, there is the apocalyptic conception of the "Kingdom of Heaven" as an entirely transcendent reality, which will come as a supernatural act of God at the end of the present world and its history. In New Testament times it was widely believed that this kingdom of God was about to appear imminently, or very soon (e.g., Mark 4:24-27; 13:3; etc.). Many scholars (generally following Schweitzer) feel that this apocalyptic vision was one of the central notes of Jesus' teaching. Other scholars, however, (e.g., Branscomb), believe that the apocalyptic interpretation was an early church heightening or overcast of Jesus' original thought, in fact more "realistic."

This more realistic interpretation finds also among Jesus' reported words the idea of the "kingdom of heaven" as a type of subjective, psychological, or individual inner state of mind and heart; an ethical decision, a kingdom of love; which comes quietly, without external signs and the cosmic fanfare announced by the current apocalyptic literature of his time, but more or less gradually, as men come to experience and realize it in personal relationships.
(e.g., Mark 4:26-30; 8:11; Luke 17:20; etc.). We add to this realistic note, found in some of the teachings of Jesus, the view of the earlier ethical prophets in Israel, between the 8th and 6th centuries, to the effect that historic time would issue in a golden age of peace, prosperity, and universal human felicity under the spiritual leadership of Israel. (The apocalyptic or transcendentalist view of history followed in point of time the more realistic interpretation of the earlier ethical prophets just reviewed.)

It will doubtless never be conclusively decided which of these views the historic Jesus himself may have embraced or emphasized more—we simply have to accept the fact that his friends reported both conceptions as coming from his lips. In any case, perhaps the spirit of both views can, to some extent at least, be blended into a general interpretation, such as the following, which would also include the thinking of Jesus' contemporaries among the great rabbis.

In simplest terms the Judaeo-Christian interpretation of history is the belief that the ultimate purpose of history is the triumph or fulfillment of the kingdom of God. Whatever final, transcendent consummation of the kingdom, beyond our present human understanding, may have been assumed in the actual thinking of Jesus and his contemporaries, their teachings are also replete with the message that we are, in the meanwhile, to seek, as fully as possible, the triumph of love and justice in practical terms, realizing that this aim may have but a partial or approximate fulfillment on earth. Accordingly, in the spirit of such a synthesis, we ask: on what philosophic grounds may we rest a reasonable hope that love and justice will triumph?
The Main Tenets of a Religious or
Judaeo-Christian View of History

1. There is moral order, or moral law in history. History "tends
to support relationships of justice and love,"* and to reject those of
selfishness, brutality, and aggression. This was essentially the teachings
about history of the great 8th-6th century B.C. ethical prophets of Israel
(recall our previous discussion of these themes, chapter six). To consider
the possibility on its dramatic, negative side, do the wrecks of the tyran-
nical empires, along the way of history, bear out the truth of this over-
view of historical law implicit in the thought of the great prophets: the
Assyrian, the late Roman, Tamerlane's, Hitlers?

2. The primary causes of historical events are the free, moral decisions
of men.** The personal factor, the human person, making decisions
in reaction to situations, is the dominant type of historical causality or
energy. There are, indeed, a plurality of causes of historical process,
but history in the long run is made by conscious personal response to the
personal and the impersonal material pressures of life. Harold Titus well
summarize this point:

History is made, in considerable part, by persons who
make up their minds and who act with courage and intelligence.
Climatic, political, and economic conditions may provide a
stimulation for human beings, but these conditions do not
wholly determine the response made to them.***

3. The meaning of "progress" in a personalistic, open view of ex-
istence and history: We would first cite the


** cf. Ib. p. 168

*** Living Issues in Philosophy, 1946, American Book Company, pp. 391-2
(1st edition)
century dogma that the central meaning or purpose of history would be disclosed by an inevitable, gradual material "progress." Rather the larger historic fact has been the growth or expansion of more and more opportunity for good or evil, of which atomic science is the great symbol and expression of 20th century man, considering its potentialities for good or ill. The true meaning or nature of such "progress" as has actually occurred must be understood in the following way. There has indeed been "growth," "increase," "progress" in man's understanding of, and mastery over, nature (technological progress), giving him greater "freedom" of a certain kind; but at the same time this has necessitated greater responsibility, or has brought to the forefront of his consciousness the imperative need for increase in personal and social moral control of his historical situation. The meaning of progress at its deepest level in a philosophy of moral personalism can only be understood or measured by the degree we-men face up to our moral responsibilities, as individuals and as human groups. Material progress is incidental or corollary to such moral progress, defined by man's increasing awareness of responsibility, as we may be able to achieved. According to this insight then, we may suggest the following, inclusive definition of "progress" in a Judaeo-Christian personalism. Such a definition we believe states what has in part already taken place, and what the ideal fulfillment of human life and history may be, if we are guided by these ideals.

Progress is the increase in, and preservation of, truly humane and creative value. Perhaps most simply stated, progress would be increase in the welfare of persons. What "humane and creative value" or "the welfare of persons" means, we have already suggested in many places in previous chapters. To those insights we add the following: Progress is growth in or toward:
a) Theoretical knowledge, and the educational and technical facilities providing for it.

b) Technological use of nature's resources, without pollution or ecological disruption.

c) Growth in moral character personally.

d) In economic welfare and security for all men.

e) In political welfare and security for all men, such as guaranteed by democratic constitutions and bills of right, the spread of humane and democratic forms of government and administration, the ultimate abolition of armaments and war, of race prejudice.

f) Expansion and enrichment of all legitimate modes or instruments of human fellowship on highest social, cultural, and religious planes:
   - The family
   - The institutions of Art, Music, Literature, and education, etc.
   - In guilds, clubs, and recreational associations, etc.
   - In the church, synagogue, mosque, as focal points of social, moral, and religious fellowship.

A particular, or special, need of our present historical epoch is the understanding of progress to be the bringing of collective moral practice—especially in race, industrial, and international relations—into greater conformity with the highest ethical insights of personal moral behavior. The vast collectivities of modern society must become tractable to love.

4. Opportunity is fluid in history, giving issue to an indomitable hope for history, characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian spirit.

Due to the enormously complex character of historical causation, the Christian outlook is that history is never exactly predictable in some absolute, mechanical way (where Marxists are in error). The unexpected crops up; there is a spontaneous element in history. Therefore, religious man never despairs. "We do not close up any possibility for some answer or partial answer" to pressing problems (Spurrier, p. 181).*

We look at history as always leaving some doors open through which the spirit of God may enter. The Christian view is realistic; it is neither excessively optimistic or extremely pessimistic. Man has more than a fighting chance on this planet; though we should face the possibility that the experiment with responsible freedom might fail here (though it need not fail elsewhere on other worlds). "The Christian view, therefore, is neither a simple pessimism nor a simple optimism, but it is a view which we believe is able to face grim realities, yet also retain possibilities for new creative action."*

5. God acts in history. The fundamental Judaeo-Christian theological proposition is that the Divine Mind may be, and has been, a directive influence in history. How is such a proposition conceived or brought within a rational perspective? We believe the answer to be a simple, natural, personal and social one, not an occult one. Accordingly, when it is said God acts, we mean:

a) Creatively in nature itself, in the course of whose processes free, personal life has come to be.

b) Redemptively in history in the best personal decisions and social influences, i.e., through the instrumentalities already mentioned, those of personal decision making, political, economic, social, and cultural media. Where God or the Divine Mind could and would act in or upon history is through the ideas and actions of godly men, acting not only as individuals, but often times in creative concert. (Here our discussion reflects the philosophy of "providence" outlined in chapter nine.)

6. Men must act in history. Religious men must develop policy and a mode of action in history. Here is implied the involvement of religious people, in church and synagogue, in social debate and in action on social issues, as guided by the ideal of love.

* Ibid., p. 182.
We summarize this brief review of the meaning of history in a Judaeo-Christian type of religious understanding. Can there be a policy of religious man in the attempt to control or guide history? We believe the answer to be yes, and that it is based on the preceding premises, which we here condense into:

a) "That history is the result of human acts behind which there is is a motivating standard of value."*

b) That men are endowed with moral freedom.

c) That God can act in history through men as they come to be motivated by a Christian standard of value, or its equivalent in other forms of faith.

That standard of value is the belief that reverence for, or love of persons, is supreme ethical truth; and that any personal acts or social policies that express such reverence—i.e. which enhance or promote the welfare of persons and their joy and fellowship—is in line with cosmic and historical purpose, in a word, does the will of God.

St. Augustine's analysis of history as the conflict of the two Cities, the City of God and the City of this World, of Good and Evil, of Love and Selfishness, is symbolically true, or descriptive of, the central type and institutions of conflict going on in men's hearts and minds and therefore in human history.

* A phrase of Basil Matthews.
APPENDIX A

D. C. Macintosh on the Empirical Laws of Religious Experience and Answer to Prayer

"... we are taking the position ... that in experimental religion at its best there is objectively valid religious perception...

"In experimental religion, as in all experiential life, there are factors which are constant and others which are variable. Now the possibility of formulating empirical laws depends upon the discovery of constant relations in the midst of experienced variations. Among the constants involved in the present instance are nature with its laws, and certain aspects of the social environment and of human nature in general. The most important constant for theology, however, is the being and character of God. This is the Constant of empirical theological laws. The God whose existence, in the light of permanently successful religious experience, we are justified in assuming, has been defined above as the necessary objective Factor in religious experience, or the Object of active religious dependence, or the Source of salvation, i.e., of religious deliverance from evil. Other preliminary definitions, sufficient to mark off the religious Object from other objects are the following: the objective Source of that inner or spiritual preparedness for whatever the future may bring which is achieved through the right sort of religious adjustment; or again, the Power, not identical with our empirical selves, nor with the merely physical or merely human environment, which makes for righteousness in and through us according as we relate ourselves to it in a certain discoverable way. This is the Reality which we have called the Holy Spirit... God is a constant Source of unfailing spiritual power...

Among the variables which tend to enter as factors into religious experience are certain phases of the social environment and of the individual training and outfit of ideas. Often these are constants relatively to some collections of religious data, and variables relatively to others. But the two most important variables, at least within the individual religious subject, are the quality and degree of responsiveness of nature or constitution, and the particular religious adjustment adopted. According to the variation from individual to individual, and from one time to another within the same individual, the results of the religious adjustment come quickly or slowly, and steadily or unsteadily. For example, the conditions of right religious adjustment being fulfilled and persisted in, there are some persons into whose lives there will be a gradually increasing incoming of the divine, and others in whose cases the incoming may be delayed for some time, and then, when the constitutional resistance has been overcome, it may manifest itself suddenly. However, the influence of the social religious environment may counteract the tendency to slowness and unsteadiness. But in general there would seem to be at least four possible types, due to constitutional and environmental differences, viz. (1) that of quick but unsteady returns, (2) that of slow but steady returns, (3) that of quick and steady returns, and (4) that of slow and unsteady returns...

It may be worth while to point out the mistaken nature of the notion often entertained that the adjustment is primarily or even exclusively intellectual, i.e., that there is a law of religious experience the sole and sufficient human condition of which is correct religious opinion or belief....The 'right religious adjustment' must be sought primarily in the volitional rather than in the intellectual realm....
"...First, then, there must be concentration of attention, with the aid of appropriate guiding ideas, upon the Object of religious dependence, identified with the Source of religious deliverance, with special reference to a thoroughly moral end which represents 'the soul's sincere desire.' There must also be a whole-hearted or absolute self-surrender to the divine Being, a consecration and abandon of one's self to be worked upon and through by the divine Power; and at the same time an absolute dependence upon God with reference to the thoroughly moral and sincerely desired end which is to be realized with the assistance of the divine Power. It is also important that there be a willed responsiveness, or readiness for active expression, as the divine Being may seem to guide and impel....

"...primary theological laws...may be called laws of the answer to prayer, understanding by true petitionary prayer what we have described under the caption of 'the right religious adjustment.' This right religious adjustment is, of course, psychologically impossible save on the supposition that God is real and will respond favorably to those who diligently cultivate the relation; but it is never spiritually fruitless....

"...Prayer is the soul and essence of experimental religion; and rather than ceasing to pray for the reason assigned, we should pray and critically observe the results, until we learn what true prevailing prayer is, and what may and what may not be looked for as a possible direct and immediate answer to prayer. In the end it will be borne in upon us by experience that what we have called the right religious adjustment is true prayer, and this will become a habitual attitude with us. And so, instead of praying until we "cease to pray," we shall have prayed until, as Paul puts it, we 'pray without ceasing.'...."
Among the elemental religious experiences of a volitional sort which may be predicted on the basis of knowledge of the theological law or laws of such experiences are the following: the receiving of moral power for repentance (as the turning away of the will form moral evil); the receiving of the same for moral aspiration; for self-control and courage (in so far as these are moral, as distinct from physiological); for victory over temptation (in so far as the problem is a moral rather than an intellectual one, such as it would be, if it were simply that of knowing the most effective means of putting an end to the temptation; suggestion); and further, for faithful service to one's fellows and for the steadfast endurance of affliction and overcoming of obstacles. And the laws of such elemental religious experiences may be stated in abbreviated form as follows: On condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired truly moral states of the will (such as repentance, moral aspiration, and the moral elements in self-control, courage, victory over temptation, faithful service and patient endurance), God the Holy Spirit produces the specific moral results desired....

"The theological law of religious assurance has to do with experimental assurance of God and of reconciliation, rather than with the reasoned assurance by means of which this may be partially anticipated or supported. It may be stated as follows: On condition of the right religious adjustment so persisted in as to lead to the characteristic Christian experiences of 'regeneration' and 'fulness of the Spirit,' and consequently in some measure to the Christian feelings of peace, joy and love, God enables us, through an intuition which naturally arises out of our religious experience, to 'feel sure' that he is real and that we are reconciled to him."
APPENDIX B

Jacques Maritain

on Immortality as Man's Identification with God

"...It is natural and normal that, knowing a reality—and the most important of all—from without and by means of signs, we should desire to know it in itself and to grasp it without any intermediary. Such a desire follows from the very nature of that quest of being which essentially characterizes the intellect. There is in the human intellect a natural desire to see in His essence that very God whom it knows through the things which He has created....

"To know God in His essence is evidently something which transcends the powers of every created or creatable nature, for it is to possess God intuitively, in a vision in which there is no mediation of any idea, but in which the divine essence itself replaces every idea born in our mind, so that it immediately forms and determines our intellect. This is to know God divinely, as He Himself knows Himself and as He knows us, in His own uncreated light....

"...Such desires reach for the infinite, because the intellect thirsts for being and being in infinite. They are natural, but one may also call them transnatural. It is thus that we desire to see God; it is thus that we desire to be free without being able to sin; it is thus that we desire beatitude."

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1 On the transnatural desire for beatitude, or of absolutely and definitely saturating happiness, as distinct from the strictly natural desire for happiness or felicity in general, see our Nau: Lecons sur les Notions Premiere des la Philosophie Morale (Paris, Taqui, 1950) pp. 97-98.
"...Through the night of faith it is given us to attain in His inner
life—on the testimony of His Word—the very God who will be intuitively
graped when faith gives way to vision."