A STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES OF SOME OF THE LEADING INDIAN NEWSPAPERS
TOWARD THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES ON MAJOR ASIAN ISSUES
DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 8, 1949 TO JANUARY 22, 1952

by
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to determine the attitude of some of the leading Indian newspapers toward the policies of the United States on major Asian issues, during the period December 8, 1949 to January 22, 1952.

The main source material for this study—The Indian Press Digests—available only for the above-mentioned period. A few omissions in this material are stated below:

2. February 29, 1950 to March 22, 1950
3. April 6, 1950 to April 19, 1950
4. December 10, 1950 to January 22, 1951
5. April 20, 1951 to April 29, 1951
6. September 29, 1951 to October 7, 1951

The Indian Press Digests were based on various Indian languages newspapers numbering 100 to 209 different titles during the period under study.

In order to accomplish the desired purpose of this study, it was considered necessary to discuss the object of preparing the Indian Press Digests. For this, the objectives and set-up of the United States Information Service in New Delhi have been described. An effort has been made to show that the Press Analysis Section, like other sections of the

... is performing one of the essential duties. It informs the

Henceforth, the United States Information Service will be referred to as U.S.I.S.
United States Department of State about the press reaction in India to American policies.

A description of the method of reading the newspapers and eventually preparing the digest has been given for a better appreciation of the merits and demerits of the final product.

brief background on the newspapers with special reference to their circulation, political affiliations, and general attitude toward the United States has been provided.

The attitude of the Indian press has been classified in three groups—favorable, unfavorable, and mixed—by the following methods:

(1) A theme analysis of the contents of the Indian Press Digests has been done by summarizing different viewpoints expressed by the press on American policies on five major Asian issues besides fifteen miscellaneous topics. These are:

(a) Korean conflict
(b) the U.S. policy regarding the recognition of Red China
(c) America's to purchase grain in this country
(d) Kashmir, and
(e) peace treaty with Japan.

Themes are also based on some of the quotations from newspaper editorials contained in the Indian Press Digests. These themes have been shown in three groups: favorable, unfavorable, and mixed.

(2) The themes and the events connected with them have been elucidated in a separate section in order to show the fluctuations in press opinion and their causes. For this, all the major Asian issues and some
miscellaneous topics have been tied together in chronological order. The
background of such issues and of the significant developments connected
with them have been mentioned.

Different shades of opinion expressed by the press during its dis-
cussion on these issues have been analyzed to trace the causes of change.
For instance, it was found that simultaneous occurrence of more than one
event solidified an existing opinion or brought about a noticeable shift
in it.

The outcome of the analysis has been translated in diagrams showing
percentage of the favorable, unfavorable, and mixed themes in relation to
the total number of themes on each one of the issues and the miscellaneous
topics under consideration. One of the diagrams presents an over-all
picture of the relation of the three types of themes to the total number
of themes on all the issues.

The usefulness of the first method of approach lies in its graphic
presentation of the various editorial viewpoints. This method largely
eliminates such viewpoints as were repeated in the Indian Press Digests;
It also facilitates the classification of themes which would be difficult
accomplish by a general roundup of the discussions in the editorials.
The dates and background of the events can be prominently shown under this
method.

The second step involving a study of the fluctuations in the press
opinion by analyzing the important themes has the merit of providing some
of the details of the discussions on various developments which the themes
fail to explain thoroughly.

Finally, conclusions have been drawn from various sections of this
study.
Broadly speaking, these conclusions have been drawn on the following lines:

(1) The merits and demerits of the Indian Press Digests have been pointed out.

(2) An assessment has been made of the possible influence of the press on the people of India.

(3) Figures showing the percentages favorable, unfavorable, and mixed opinions on issues in question have been given in summary form.

(4) The main points of criticism in the Indian press as by the theme analysis, have

(5) An effort has been made to determine the relation between the policy of the newspapers in general and their attitude toward the United States as indicated by the themes.
CHAPTER ONE

OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE IN NEW DELHI

The United States Information and Education program was one of the activities of the War Information Office during World War II. This function was transferred to the Department of State on August 31, 1945, by an executive order of President Truman. 1

The following budget appropriations for the information and education activities during the period under study from 1949 to 1952, show that the importance of this program had been steadily increasing until 1952.

In 1949, the appropriations were $27,000,000. 2
In 1950, the appropriations were $47,300,000. 3
In 1951, the Congress enacted $103,552,789. 4
In 1952, the budget appropriations were $85,000,000. 5

2 The Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 1950, p. 914.
3 The Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 1951, p. 991.
5 Ibid., p. 912.
The estimate 1953 contemplates an increase of $46,036,033 compared with 1952. This increase has been considered necessary partly for (a) an expansion of international broadcasting activities and (b) an intensification of informational activities in critical areas of the world.¹

The United States Information Service in India is a part of the American Embassy in New Delhi and the Consulate offices in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Before India achieved independence in August, 1947, the international information function of the United States was undertaken through the U.S. War Information Office. In 1942, when an American embassy did not exist in India, the United States was represented in that country by a Commissioner in New Delhi and Consul in the port towns.² With the opening of the Embassy, offices started their peace time program.

In each one of the four Indian cities, the U.S.I.S. offices were engaged in a two-way traffic. First, they disseminated information regarding the American way of living and thinking. Second, these offices gathered information on the In press and sent it to the Department of State to be used by the Embassy there.³

¹Ibid., p. 91.
³Margaret Parton, "Propaganda War for India and Asia," The Reporter, February 20, 1951, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 3.
The first task was further divided in two sections: (1) the clarification of American policies by means of personal contacts, publications, and visual media; (2) counteracting Communist propaganda in India by means of various media.

Until 1951, the U.S.I.S. offices performed mainly four kinds of jobs. (1) News bulletins, leaflets, and special articles on America were circulated among a large number of people and institutions whose names were on the U.S.I.S. list. (2) The film unit travelled within and outside the city area to show American documentary films to groups of people or organizations on request. (3) The job of the exhibit section was similar to the film unit. It took part in school exhibitions and international festivals, and presented photo and picture exhibits on American life. (4) A large number of Indian newspapers were surveyed and analyzed by the Press Analysis Section. The editorials and articles of these papers were summarized and digests prepared for the information of the Department officials.

In early 1951, expansion of the U.S.I.S. took place in all sections. Besides, some new projects were also started. In the U.S.I.S. office in New Delhi, the expansion in sections resulted in greatly enhanced quality and quantity of output.

In early 1950, the New Delhi office had a film unit with three or four persons working in a section; the Hindi news bulletin section with three men; the English special feature article section with one man; the mimeographing section with two men, and a few stenographers.

1The author, who has been a member of the U.S.I.S. staff for over twenty years, can describe the operation of the New Delhi office where he worked.
and filing clerks. The American officers of the U.S.I.S. included the Chief Public Affairs Officer and first secretary of the embassy, an Information Officer, an Education Officer, and a Cultural Attache. Others were alien employees.

The film unit worked under the War Information Office in India during World War II. The activities of this section were slowed some time after the war. But the section was revitalized soon after the American embassy opened in that country. This section started its mobile unit tours in August, 1947. Greatest interest was shown in the U.S.I.S. films by primary, secondary, higher educational institutions. The mobile unit covered hundreds miles during each one of its tours. In one month the film section put on 13½ film shows in Delhi area to a total audience of 72,178 persons. ¹

The film section also organized special functions for children where, besides showing films, sweets and balloons were distributed free. The number of children attending such functions ran in hundreds.

The film section projector loan service was used by various organizations for short or long terms. During the last three years some films synchronized in the U.S.A. in Hindi language proved highly successful. This was evident from the demand on the film section and expansion of activities and staff that section. Films like "Textiles Unlimited" were found popular among the textile mill workers. ¹¹

¹Margaret Parton, "Propaganda War for India Asia," The Reporter, February 20, 1951, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 3.
Worker a Farmer was another film which had been in demand by the factory workers.

Because of rate of illiteracy and small number of radio sets in India, visual media were considered of prime importance. The U.S.I.S. had four mobile units in India and planned to expand its movie programs to a o operation, hoping eventually to reach many small villages. The films were largely documentaries about American life, covering subjects such as T.V.A., public health, manual training, education, city planning, and scenes of cities like New York.

After its expansion program came into operation in 1951, the U.S.I.S. expected to receive more mobile truck units which would tour various parts of India. The Bombay, Calcutta and Madras film sections also worked on almost the same pattern.

The photo exhibit section had been in operation during the war. It continued work after the American embassy was opened in New Delhi. Its expansion took place middle of 1950 when it started receiving large quantities of exhibit material from the State Department. The activities of this section were, like the film section, main-connected with educational institutions. Picture, display photos, posters, engraved plastic printing plates shipped from the United States were supplied to groups of people, organizations, educational institutions, newspapers.

Another duty of the exhibit section to lend recorded American music to All India Radio. In one month, according a report, this section lent several programs of American music to All India Radio,
and arranged photo exhibits of life in America to a dozen schools.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Hindi news section which started its work in 1948 with one man translating a few items of prominent news from America on different subjects, and produced a small bulletin to be distributed free among a large number of citizens and editors of newspapers. Shortly afterwards this section employed another person and the size of the bulletin increased. Besides, a special feature bulletin was also produced from time to time. The raw material for such bulletins was supplied by the State Department by wireless to an office which forwarded it to the New Delhi office for translation.

On lines, an Urdu language section was opened in early 1951 with a staff of a half dozen people, all experienced journalists in that language. Also in 1951 was introduced one of the main items U. S. production side. It was the weekly "American Reporter", a twelve-page tabloid newspaper. Edited and printed in India, the paper was initially distributed to about 20,000 readers. This free-distributed publication was printed in English and nine native languages. The New Delhi office employed experienced journalists for this weekly publication in three languages, English, Urdu, and . The English edition had a circulation of 56,000 (in 1953) and the other editions totalling 150,000. The circulation increased steadily.

One of the lead stories of the "American Reporter" were: "Acheson calls for Peace Through Strength," "Relief Supplies Leave for India,"
"U. S. Geologists for "India," "Point Four Plan is 'Democracy in Action' ", and "U.S. Engineer Helps Food Drive in India." The same pattern of onward-and-uplift followed in most of the issues.

"On the whole, the spirit of the newspaper is the same as that which activates all the rest of U.S.I.S. propaganda: a kind of breezy self-confidence in all the greatness of America's expanding economy, and the beneficent effect of this economy on all other friendly nations."¹

In his statement to the "Jackson Citizen Patriot," a former Chief Public Affairs Officer of the U.S.I.S., New Delhi, said:

A basic reason for the introduction of the newspapers and other American education facilities in India is that news dissemination channels in that country have years been in the hands of a British monopoly which is sometimes inclined to slant news in favor of the British at the expense of other nations.²

In addition to the activities of these sections, all U.S.I.S. centers sent out each week reams of material to most of the newspapers, not only in English but in Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Marathi, Gujarati, and Tamil. The material fell roughly into twenty categories, including magazine reprints, daily radio bulletins, economic and labor bulletins produced every other week, agriculture bulletins, world affairs air bulletins, a special monthly of educational news from the United States,

¹Tbid.
²Jackson Citizen Patriot, Jackson, Michigan, Sunday, July 22, 1951.
profiles of leading Americans, summaries of press opinion in America, and texts of speeches by American leaders.

The information service maintained free libraries of American books, periodicals, and newspapers in several cities and planned opening in others. In one month the U.S.I.S. library in New Delhi had 5,800 visitors.¹

Weekly music concerts were held in these libraries where classical and popular American recorded music attracted large crowds of people. The seating capacity in the library was about 100, and a major portion of it was usually crowded with music fans.

Another section of the U.S.I.S., started in 1951, took care of the pamphlets written originally in English and other languages, translated from materials written in India or received from America. Such pamphlets, explaining the American point of view on various issues, were distributed free among all classes of readers through book stores or the U.S.I.S. library.

The Press Analysis Section

A section whose functions this chapter examines in particular, is the Press Analysis Section. As will be shown in the following chapters, this section handled over 200 newspapers every day to prepare a weekly digest, and a monthly round-up, besides sending daily report by cables, depending on the urgency of the in question.

¹Margaret Parton, op. cit.
The Press Digest was based on the editorial opinion of a majority of papers of India on national and international issues of significance to the United States. The number of these papers, published in various Indian languages, had been changing from time to time. Originally started in 1947, the Digest was based on a half dozen papers in the English language. At that time an American member of the staff of the rank of Information Officer prepared the Digest which was meant for the policy makers in the Department of State of the United States.

An Indian gentleman with a brief experience of newspaper work and sound academic qualifications was engaged in April, 1948, to prepare the Digest. Gradually the number of newspapers, and afterwards periodicals, too, was raised an average of thirty a day. These papers and periodicals, included a dozen in Hindi language which were surveyed by another member of the staff employed primarily to translate news items for the Hindi bulletin.

In May, 1949, the number of papers and periodicals had exceeded sixty, when another person with two years' experience in reporting for a news agency and with sound education was employed to assist this section. Besides sharing the English and Urdu language papers with the senior employee, the new member of the staff read the Hindi papers

\(^{1}\)Henceforth referred to as Digest in this thesis.
for inclusion in the Digest. By the end of 1949, the number of papers had risen to more than 100 a day. This gradual rise in the number of continued until the peak limit of 209 was in September, 1951.

Early during 1951 the press analysis section was expanded along with other sections of the U.S.I.S. Five more persons were added to the staff, one of whom was a stenographer and another engaged in clipping news items and U.S.I.S. reproductions. Three of these men had two or three years' experience each on reporting jobs for local daily newspapers.

The New Delhi office continued to work on three languages, while seven other languages, incorporated in the Digests, were handled by the Bombay, Calcutta offices. The arrangement was as follows:

Bombay—Marathi and Gujarati languages
Madras—Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada languages
Calcutta—Bengali language

These three offices translated the editorials and sent the extracts to the central office in New Delhi. The Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Bengali language papers were included in the Digests in 1950, while Kannada, Marathi, and Gujarati were added later.

Early in the week papers started pouring in on the desk and all the men started opening the editorial page of each of the papers to examine the nature of the editorial and the topic discussed. Editorials on different issues were separated from one another. Papers with more than one editorial note on different subjects were either kept at one
place to be used by all the analysts assigned the topics, or distributed with other papers. As soon as all the editorials had been marked in a few minutes on the first day of the week, the topics were divided among all the men, and papers distributed. The same process continued every morning during the week.

News topics were usually assigned at random by the chief of the section. These then became the fields of specialization of the analysts. In the case of continuing new developments on old issues, analysts who had already handled such issues were given preference. On any particular subject, it would be profitable to read one or two editorials from English language newspapers before any other. They usually supplied most of the viewpoints which gave the analyst proper background on the subject. Significant words, sentences, or passages were marked along the margin. Soon after reading an editorial, its summary was typed by the analyst himself, or dictated to the stenographer. The length of a summary of an editorial of a thousand words or more usually averaged between 100 to 150 words. This length was maintained in the case of the first two or three editorials on a particular subject. When the analyst became familiar with most of the main and common viewpoints, the length of subsequent summaries would gradually be reduced to a few words. In the case of short editorial notes, summaries were naturally much shorter than those described earlier.

These summaries were typed one after the other on one or more sheets of paper with the date of each newspaper. After a half dozen
or more editorials had been read on one subject which happened to have
a large number of comments, various viewpoints on which a direct or
implied agreement existed among all or most of those papers, were sift-
ed and typed on a separate sheet of paper by the analyst who read them.
The names of the newspapers subscribing to those viewpoints were also
typed. These common themes which were quite specific at a stage when
only a few editorials had been read, became more and more generalized
as a larger number papers accommodated within those points of
view, was that the did not lose their
and central idea.

In the meantime, Urdu and Hindi papers were also read, translated,
and of the same analysts. The summaries of these Indian langu-
age papers and those of others came from three other stations,
were also in equal attention. Many a time it was noted that the
summaries from other stations did not adequate information on the
tone of the editorials.

The number of common viewpoints decreased with the increase in the
number of papers. Besides viewpoints as were common to a
group of papers, there might be a few important ones expressed by a
small number or even one or two newspapers. Such viewpoints were con-
sidered inclusion in the Digest on the basis of their importance
and newness, or the importance of the newspapers.

Next followed the process of separating favorable, unfavorable,
and mixed viewpoints. All these types were included in the Digest in
an order of the number of papers supporting them; the largest number first.
The Digest contained not only viewpoints; it also had noteworthy comments listed such viewpoints. The noteworthy comments of the papers supported the viewpoints directly or indirectly. To avoid repetition of the viewpoints in a noteworthy quotation, the latter might be a continuation of the former with another idea in it. A few such quotations were listed under each viewpoint. Between the viewpoints and the quotations were listed the newspapers which expressed a particular viewpoint. The strength of the support given a particular viewpoint was expressed by mentioning the total number of commentators in words or figures, or their percentage to the total number of papers surveyed by the section, or their relation to the total number of commentators on that particular issue, or "a majority, "a substantial group," "a small number," and so on.

Only important newspapers with significant circulation, or belonging to different political groups were listed. The policy in general and the political affiliations of such papers were mentioned against their names. Sometimes even circulation, specific information about the editor, or the political group it belonged to might also be given. For instance, would be quite relevant to state against a paper's name which happened to be critical of some American policy that its editor had been to America or Russia for a visit some time before that editorial was written. Any change in the policy of the paper was also pointed out. Sometimes the class of readers and the likely influence of the paper's editorials on public opinion was also stated.
Information on the latter part was based on the circulation of the paper.

The analyst would prepare a general round up for front page of the Digest which was supposed to give a brief summary of themes.

The round up and the Digests on various issues were forwarded the chief of the section who put them together in order of the importance of the subjects. Inside the Digest, the topics were arranged in the same order too, the latest issue first, and such issues that had been discussed earlier came next unless there was some new development on an old issue of special significance to the State Department.

The Digest was, then, checked by a political officer of the embassy who used to read about a dozen English language papers every day. Later, it went to the Information officer or, in his absence, to the Chief Public Affairs Officer for another checkup. Before the pouch closed for mail dispatch to America, the mimeographed Digest went to the first senior secretary of the embassy or the Ambassador. It only happened once perhaps, during 1950, that a Digest was delayed the senior secretary's office because there some doubt about the views of some paper included in it.

The general policy of the office and instructions given to the analysts were that the Digest should be objective without any opinion whatsoever of the analysts.

This method of content analysis was introduced by Information Officer in 1949. The earlier method involved preparing a general round up with quotations of more than a few words each for prominent papers. Under that method, first of all, the finished product did not give a
graphic impression to the reader. Second, it lacked the facility with which separate viewpoints could be expressed under the improved method. Third, it did not provide the opportunity to mention the information about the newspaper itself at its appropriate place.

The defect of the improved method was that deviations from the main viewpoints or connotations on the subject expressed by some papers could not be shown in the viewpoints. To meet this difficulty, it would be necessary to prepare the digest combining both the methods showing the themes, fluctuations, deviations, or connotations. Both these placed together would present a more accurate picture.
CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND ON THE INDIAN PRESS

India had nearly 300 dailies and over 3600 periodicals in 1949\(^1\) published in English and about fifteen Indian

Of these, over 100 publications were surveyed every day by the Press Analysis Section of the United States Information Service, New Delhi, in the beginning December, 1949. Until the middle of 1951, the number of the newspapers received in the... kept on increasing steadily and touched the peak figure of 209\(^2\) by September, 1951.

The decision regarding the selection of newspapers for subscription and inclusion in the Digests was dependent, primarily, on their circulation. However, the general policies of the papers, their views on national and international affairs, were also kept in mind.

Attempt was made by the Press Analysis Section to subscribe to papers belonging to different political parties, religious institutions, economic interests, pro-Communist and pro-American proprietors or editors.

\(^1\)V. Narasimhan and Philip, editors, Indian Press Book, 1950, p. 205.

\(^2\)Digest, August 30 to September 7, 1951, p. 1.
In view of the low percentage of literacy in India—18% in 1950—according to the figures published by the Government of India, 100,000 circulation of a daily newspaper—Times of India (English) of Bombay—2 is considered very high. Therefore, a paper with 15,000 to 20,000 circulation ranks among average class papers read by upper to middle classes.

Readership of English papers usually consists of well educated people from middle, upper middle and higher classes. In the case of Indian language papers, some readers may come from the higher classes and most of these have an inadequate knowledge of English. Usually, readers of various Indian language papers are from the middle and lower middle classes. They may be merchants, employees of business concerns, low-paid clerks with high school education, factory workers and artisans with education up to fifth or sixth grade. Among women readers, a high proportion read Indian language papers.

It will be correct to generalize that not all literate people in India are in a position to buy or have sufficient comprehension to read a newspaper. It is also safe to say that subscribing to a daily newspaper is considered an avoidable luxury by many educated families.

Like advertising, word-of-the-mouth dissemination of news not infrequent among less educated or illiterate people. This provides an

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2 Times India, The India and Pakistan Year Book, and Who is Who, 1950, p. 63.
obvious opportunity for distortion of facts in the news.

In the absence of any data on readership of the newspapers in India, the decision of the U.S.I.S. to subscribe to a particular paper based on a rough idea of readership as indicated by the editorial policy of the paper.

This rough estimate of the quality of readers coupled with the authentic information on circulation of the paper, finally determined the importance of the paper in so far as the Digest was concerned.

As regards policies of the papers, it is still hard to form a correct idea because the Indian press is at a young stage of its evolution. Until 1947, before India achieved independence, there were two distinct large groups of papers in the country, (1) nationalist, and (2) communal. A small third group to the ruling class.

The policy of the Indian press, mostly the Indian languages and English nationalist papers before 1947 was mainly to support the nationalist movement of the Congress Party. The communal press supported the Hindu or Muslim parties. The differences among India's political parties became sharp after she achieved independence. Along with this, the classification of the newspapers according to the political affiliations of their proprietors editors became more pronounced. For the Indian press, the present time is one of transition. The stabilization of policies will be achieved after some time though the process has begun. The change of editors on account of the differences of their political views with those of the proprietors is not

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1 Editor and Publisher, The Fourth Estate, 1947 Year Book, pages 344, 346, 347.
unheard of. The change in the views of some of the editors themselves is also noticeable from the Digests.

Nevertheless, a large number of papers seem to have adopted well-defined policies not only on national issues, but on international matters as well. Although the policies of a few papers have considerably changed during the period under study from December 8, 1949 to January 22, 1952, a large majority have followed consistent policy toward foreign countries.

The following pages in this chapter will show the general policies of some of the important (with circulation over 5,000) newspapers in ten different languages spread over various regions of India. These papers happen to be such as were frequently quoted in the Digest. They have been arranged in alphabetical order in two groups, (1) English and (2) Indian languages. Each one of these groups is further classified as (1) favorable, (2) unfavorable, and (3) independent.

The regional significance of various languages is as follows:

1. English—used in varying degrees all over India.
2. Hindi and Urdu—mainly in northern India.
3. Marathi and Gujarati—in and around Bombay area.
4. Tamil, Telugu, and Kannada—in South India.
5. Bengali—in Bengal, e India.

The circulation, establishment, and general policy of the newspapers listed in this chapter have been stated against their names.

The sources of this information are the India Press Digests, the Indian Press Year Book, 1950, and Editor and Publisher, 1947 International Number.
The English Language Newspapers

The English language section of the press in India is very influential. Its influence is not only on the readers but on the editors of the vernacular newspapers as well. Many editors of the vernacular press receive information and inspiration from the English newspaper editorials. The English newspaper editors have higher education as a rule. They are generally better-informed about international affairs. The Digests reveal that the views of the English editorial writers about the United States were more dispassionately expressed than of the contemporary vernacular language editors.

Most of the English papers are published from the capital cities of the States of India. Firstly, these cities have large populations of readers who know English and are in government offices or big business stores. Secondly, the cities have transport and facilities. There are usually very few readers of English newspapers in towns. The influence of the English newspapers, apparently therefore, is confined to cities. But actually the Indian cities have been centers of attraction for the villagers. The thoughts, fashions, customs, dress, and activities of the city dwellers are being adopted with great speed. Hence the influence of the English newspapers is being carried deep into the remote villages of India. But compared to this the influence of the vernacular press is stronger in villages.

Out of the thirty English papers quoted very often in the Digests and given here in the following list, ten are strongly anti-
American, four independent, and sixteen are generally pro-American. A study of the Digests shows that even such papers as are considered usually pro-American editorial views have been strongly criticizing American attitudes toward the Kashmir issue, China, the peace treaty with Japan and some other Asian matters.

Favorable

Amrita Bazar Patrika: Calcutta and Allahabad; English; one of the oldest dailies Bengal; usually critical of Russia; often pro-America; established in 1868. Circulation 75,000.

Bharat: Bombay; English; the late Indian Deputy Prime Minister's son is one of the major shareholders of Hindustan Newspapers Ltd., which runs this paper. The mayor of the city of Bombay is another shareholder. It is pro-Congress party paper. Usually favorable to America though sometimes critical especially on Kashmir and China.


Eastern Economist: Delhi; English weekly; it belongs to Birla, one of the top industrialists of India. This paper is believed to have influence on the financial policies of the Government of India.

Hindu: Madras; English; one of the influential dailies of India, it is read by the middle and upper middle classes. It takes an independent line in its editorials. Its general tone is favorable to the Congress Party, particularly to Pandit Nehru. It occasionally recognizes some beneficial developments in Soviet Russia but its general tone toward that country is not friendly. It occasionally recognizes some flaws and defects in American actions and policies but its general tone toward the U.S.A. is friendly. Established in 1878, the Hindu has a circulation of 62,401.

Hindustan Times: New Delhi; English; Supporter of Government of India's policies, it is generally favorable to America; edited by Mahatma Gandhi's son, Dev Das Gandhi, it is owned by Birla, one of the leading industrialists of India. It is one of the most influential papers in northern India. Established in 1923. Circulation, 50,190.
Indian Express: Madras; English; this paper belonging to the Dempo chain, is rapidly gaining in strength, especially among lower middle class readers. It is nationalistic, taking a pro-Congress party line. It is very favorably disposed toward the United States and opposes Communism both at home and . Established in 1932, the Indian Express has a circulation of 11,700.

Indian Nation: Patna; English; it has been usually friendly toward America, but differs on certain policies; strongly opposed to the air bombing of Korea. It is anti-Congress Party. Established in 1930, it has a circulation of 23,788.

Leader: Allahabad; English; this paper belongs to a newspaper chain by G.D. Birla, a leading industrialist of India; takes independent view of international affairs and happens to be friendly toward the United States. This popular daily has been strongly critical of Russia. It has been a supporter of the United Nation forces in Korea since the Korean war started. Established in 1909, this paper has a circulation of 10,275.

Liberator: Madras; English; a paper with insignificant readership. It is anti-Communist in its editorial attitude, and generally favors closer relations with the United States. It is opposed to the Congress Party. Established in 1942, it has a circulation of 10,000.

Mail: Madras; English; this newspaper is edited by an Englishman, sharply critical of the Congress Party and denounces attempts at nationalisation of private property. Its editorials on international issues generally favorable to the Western Powers. This paper is uncompromisingly anti-Communist and anti-U.S.S.R. and equally firmly friendly toward the United States. Established in 1867, it has a circulation of 26,800.

National Standard: Bombay; English; it belongs to the Express group of papers chain; it is generally pro-American in editorial views. Established in 1939, this paper has a circulation of 10,000.

Searchlight: Patna; English; it is one of Birla’s chain of papers. Formerly was strongly critical of American policies. Since the middle of 1950, it became somewhat favorable to America. A June 1951 report says that this paper had been consistently friendly toward America during the year preceding that date. Established in 1906, this paper has a circulation of 20,466.
Statesman; Calcutta and New Delhi; English; a British daily, this paper is well-produced and has independent editorial policy. It is pro-British. Its influence is now chiefly with Europeans, Anglo-Indians and the conservative section of old Indian Civil Service people with Western education. This paper is read by many Indians even of strongly nationalistic thinking because of its better news coverage, but they may not agree with the editorial page; It is generally favorable to American policies. Established in 1873, this paper has a circulation of 74,000.

Thought; Delhi; English weekly; it has pronounced pro-American views. It does not have much influence; established in 1949, its circulation is 8,500.

Times of India: Bombay, and Delhi; English; it was started more than a century ago. It has been Bombay's leading daily. The Bombay-edition had been supporting American policies until before a change of editor in 1950. The editorials after this change became anti-American. A subsequent change of editor has brought about a change for the better. The circulation of this paper is between 90,000 and 100,000.

Unfavorable

Assam Tribune; Guwahati; English; the only English daily of Assam. It is often critical of America. Established in 1938, this paper has a circulation of 18,500.

Blitz; Bombay; English weekly; it is strongly anti-U.S.A. and pro-Communist. It generally opposes the Government of India policies. The U.S.I.S. New Delhi; a special study of this paper's attitude toward America. Established in 1941, it has a circulation of 38,000.

Cross Roads; Bombay; English weekly; strongly pro-Communist and anti-American. Official organ of the Communist party. Established April 1949; along with some other pro-Communist papers, this paper is a subject of special study by the U.S.I.S.; New Delhi.

Deccan Herald; Bangalore; English; edited by a well-known journalist, Joseph, this paper is usually anti-American and pro-Russian. Established in 1948.
Free Press Journal: Bombay; English; it has a liberal outlook on domestic as well as international matters. It is considered as an unofficial organ of the Socialist party of India. It is strongly nationalist and represents progressive groups within the Congress party. One of the influential dailies, this generally has an unfavorable attitude toward America. But it is also critical of Russia in certain matters. Established in 1930, it has a circulation of 39,000.

Hitavada: Nagpur; English; this paper is owned by the Servants of India Society and generally regarded as the most important organ of public opinion in Central provinces (now, Madhya Pradesh); it is generally nationalist in views. During 1950, it gradually grew more and more critical of America. It was established in 1911. Circulation 5,650.

Indian News Chronicle: English; this daily paper is owned by a pro-American Congress Party member who expired some time ago. But the policy of the editor has made it pursue a Soviet line. The editorials on international events have been written by a pro-Communist editor. This paper became somewhat friendly toward the United States since the middle of 1950. It was established in 1947. Circulation of this paper is very small.

Janata: Bombay; English weekly; this is the official organ of the Socialist Party of India. Usually takes an independent attitude toward both Russian and the United States policies. More critical of American than Russia.

Nation: Calcutta; English; a staunch supporter of Russia. It is strongly anti-U.S.A. It was established in 1948 and was closed down after two years. Its maximum circulation was 18,400.

National Herald: Lucknow; English; a usually pro-Russian daily with a liberal Congress man as its editor. The editorial policy of this paper is set by the major shareholder, Feroz Gandhi, who has favorable leanings toward Russia. It also reproduces considerable material issued by the TASS News Agency of Russia. Established in 1938, it has a circulation of 9,400.

Independent

Hindustan Standard: Calcutta; English; sister publication of Bazar Patrika; formerly somewhat friendly toward America, lately quite unfavorable on the issues of Kashmir, China, and peace treaty with Japan. Often reproduces U.S.I.S. material. Established in 1937, it has a circulation of 28,180.
Indian Republic: Madras; English; it has minor influence. It had been favorably disposed toward America during 1949 and the first half of 1950. But afterwards it started growing critical of this country. It was established in 1949 and has a circulation of 12,000.

Pioneers: Lucknow; Hindi; this paper has been quite favorable toward American policies in the past. During the last two years it, however, differed on certain matters. One of such occasions came up when Prime Minister Nehru made peace moves Secretary Acheson and Premier Stalin. The Digest of July 30, 1950 shows that this paper disapproved the U.S. reply. It is owned by provincial landlords. Established in 1865, it has a circulation of 9,100.

Tribune: Ambala; English; The most influential paper in East Punjab province, the Tribune was formerly a supporter of American policies. Later it was critical of the U.S. attitude toward Kashmir and Indo-China. On Korea this paper has been outstandingly favorable to the U.S.A. though it differed on certain points. It favors recognition of Red China. Established in 1881 it migrated to Ambala after India's partition. Its circulation is 20,000.

The Language Papers

The vernacular (native-language) press consists of a much larger number of newspapers than the English press. Their readers usually are middle class, lower middle class merchants, traders, workers in cities or small towns.

Out of forty-eight papers listed here, twenty-two are anti-American, fifteen independent, and eleven pro-American, according to the Digests.

The following remarks about the newspapers mentioned under the three sections are based on the Digests; the Indian Press Year Book, 1950, and Editor and Publisher, 1947 International Number.

1Editor and Publisher, 1947 International Number, pages 344, 346, 347.
Favorable

Amanda Bazar Patrika: Calcutta; Bengali; a popular daily Bengal. It is usually pro-Congress party and pro-America. Readers from all classes. It was established in 1878. Circulation 16,200.

Andhra Prabha: Madras; Telugu; this paper belonging to the Goenka chain is making rapid progress. It follows the Goenka pattern of general support to the Congress Party and of a favorable attitude toward the United States. Established in 1938, this paper has a circulation of 38,000.

Andhra Patrika: Madras; Telugu; it is the oldest and one of the most influential papers in this language. It is independent in its editorials and is usually unfavorably disposed toward America. It is a staunch supporter of the Congress Party. Established in 1908, it has a circulation of 11,000.

Bande Matara: Delhi; Urdu; more critical of Russia than America; established by one of northern India's nationalist leaders, Lajpat Rai in 1920. Circulation 21,300.


Dinamani: Madras; Tamil; it belongs to the Goenka chain and generally supports the government and Congress policy. It adopts friendly editorial attitude toward the United States and a hostile tone toward Communist machinations. It was established in 1934 and has a circulation of 54,600.

Dinagari: Madras; Tamil; it is a counterpart of Indian Express of Madras. It is staunchly anti-Communist and is usually friendly toward America. Established in 1944, it has a circulation of 51,250.

Hind: Delhi; Urdu; an evening daily with pro-American leanings. Established in 1948, it has a circulation of 14,000.

Hind Samachar: Jullundur; Urdu; usually pro-America; established in 1948; circulation 10,900.

Hindustan: Delhi; Hindi edition of the Hindustan Times; usually favorable to America. Established in 1946, it has a circulation of 23,290.
Swadesamitra: Madras; Tamil; it is the oldest and the most influential paper in this language. Its editor, R. Srinivasan, was a president of the All India newspaper Editors’ conference. The paper supports the Congress Party. It is by no means friendly to either Communism, the Indian Communist Party or Soviet Russia. It takes a better view of the United States. It is read by the influential upper middle class people.

Unfavorable

A1: Banaras; Hindi; it is one of the most influential dailies of this language, published in northern India. Its views are usually independent, but it has been critical of American policies toward Asian countries. The readers of this paper generally belong to middle class. Established in 1920, the paper has a circulation of 13,000.

Ajit: Jullundur; Delhi and Amritsar; Urdu; it has communal outlook in favor of the Sikh community. Usually unfavorable toward America. Established 1943.

Aljamiyat: Muslim edited and owned Urdu daily of Delhi; established in 1925; mostly critical of American policies. Circulation 10,000.

Amar Bharat: Delhi; Hindi; established by a refugee from Western Pakistan in 1947; usually anti-American in editorial views; sometimes criticizes the Government of India; generally advocates American type democracy for India; also critical of Russia; edited by an anti-Soviet person whose personal views on both India and international politics are independent. Circulation 16,860.

Basumat: Calcutta; Bengali; an influential daily with communal outlook; nationalist, conservative and generally unfavorable toward America. Established in 1880. Circulation 36,500.

Janshakti: Bombay; Marathi; this paper is usually critical of American policies; has socialist views.

Lokasatta: Bombay; Marathi; this paper belongs to the Express group. It is edited by a pro-Communist person. It was started in January, 1946. Its circulation is 26,500.

Janmabhoomi: Bombay; Gujarati; it is an evening paper, quite critical of the . . . It was established in 1932; has a circulation of 14,510.
**Jugantar**: Calcutta; Bengali; it is an influential Bengali daily, and a counterpart of the Amrita Bazar Patrika of Calcutta and Allahabad. It is frequently critical of American policies. Established in 1937, it has a circulation of 39,580.

**Loka-Sevak**: Calcutta; Bengali; this paper has minor influence; its attitude toward America is usually uncertain, but it is often unfavorable; established in 1948; circulation 16,000.

**Lokmat**: Nagpur; Hindi; it is a counterpart of Hitavada of Nagpur. Its views on international affairs are mostly independent. It used to be more critical of Russia than America but during the early part of 1951, it grew more critical of America.

**Milap**: Delhi, Jullundur, and Hyderabad; Urdu; it was pro-American in 1949, but later, on account of some changes on its editorial staff, this influential daily became anti-American, and anti-Wehrm government. In 1950 it was steadily unfavorable toward American policies. Established in 1923, this paper has a circulation of 18,000.

**New Bharat Times**: Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay; Hindi; its original name was Nav-Bharat. This paper belongs to Dalmia, a leading industrialist of India. Ever since its inception, it has been pro-Communist and anti-American in its editorial views. It is a widely-read paper. Only during the early part of 1950, this paper was slightly less critical of America on account of the change of editor. Established in 1947.

**Navjivan**: Lucknow; Hindi counterpart of National Herald of Lucknow. It has been pro-Russian and anti-American during the period 1950 and 1951. This paper was established in 1947 and has a circulation of 15,000.

**Prabhat**: Gwalior; Hindi; unfavorable toward the U.S.A.

**Pratap**: Delhi and Jullundur; Urdu daily; it is usually critical of American policies, though itself lacks a definite policy on international issues. Established in Lahore (Pakistan) in 1919 and migrated to Delhi after the partition of the country. Its circulation is 14,800.

**Saami Avas**: Lucknow; Urdu counterpart of National Herald of Lucknow. It is usually critical of American policies. This paper was established in 1946 and has a circulation of 10,000.

**Sanmarg**: Delhi, Benaras and Calcutta; Hindi daily. It is critical of America. Established in 1946, this paper has a circulation of 9,500.
Satyayug: Calcutta; Bengali; this paper is owned by a leading industrialist, Mr. Dalmia who is also a proprietor of Messrs. Bennett Coleman and Co., Ltd., proprietors of the Times of India and other publications. Satyayug is edited by a pro-Communist journalist who visited Russia in 1951. Established in 1949, this paper has a circulation of 13,000.

Swadhinita: Calcutta; Bengali; it is a Communist organ.

Vir Bharat: Delhi and Amritsar; Urdu; it has no particular policy toward America and none either toward Russia. It has been criticizing both these countries equally in the past. During 1950, it showed somewhat more critical attitude toward America. Established in 1928, it has a circulation...

Vishwamitra: Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Patna, and Kanpur; Hindi; it is an influential daily with independent views. The owner of this chain of papers is interested in running it as a business proposition. The editor of Delhi edition is independent of the owner's influence. It has been somewhat more critical of America than of Russia. Established in 1942, it has circulation of 10,000 in Delhi.

Amrita Patrika: Allahabad; Hindi; it has independent views on both Russian and American policies; no particular leanings toward any special interest; sister publication of Amrita Basar Patrika of Calcutta and Allahabad; established in February, 1950. It is one of the well-edited papers in Hindi language.

Amayavarta: Patna; Hindi; Conservative; Hindi edition of the Indian Nation of Patna. It claims independent view and happens to be often favorable to America. However, it was strongly critical of the United States attitude toward Nehru's peace overtures.1. Established in January 1946, this paper has a circulation of 21,142 in 1949.

Bharat Devi: Madras; Tamil; nationalist in tone but often expresses support to policies put forward by the Socialist Party. It is read by lower-middle-class. It is not favorably disposed towards Russia and is neutral in its attitude toward the United States. Established in 1940, this paper has a circulation of 30,600.

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1Digest, July, 1950.
Dina Thanthi: Madras; Tamil; it lacks a defined editorial attitude on international affairs but generally takes a nationalist stand. It is a pro-Congress paper owned by an Indian Constituent Assembly member.

Gujarat Samachar: Ahmedabad; Gujarati; it is a nationalist paper sometimes critical of the Congress party. It usually had independent views on international affairs, and criticized both Russia and the United States wherever disagreed with their policies. Established in 1932, it has a circulation of 17,000.

Hindustan: Bombay; Gujarati; it supports the Congress party of India. Nationalist.

Muslim: Madras; Tamil; it is a nationalist paper sponsored by Muslims.

Navashakti: Bombay; Marathi; it is owned by the Free Press Journal. Is often critical of both Russia and the United States. This paper was established in 1932 and has a circulation of 32,000.

Pradeep: Patna; Hindi edition of Searchlight of Patna, a Birla paper. It was established in 1947, and has a circulation of 13,000.

Pratap: Kampur; Hindi; it is an influential paper with independent views on international and domestic issues. Established in 1913, it has a circulation of 17,000.

Sanskar: Benaras; Hindi; it is rapidly growing. It usually follows independent policy on international affairs, though it has criticized policies. This was established in 1942 and has a circulation of 12,300.

Tej: Delhi; Urdu; edited by a pro-Communist young man and edited by late Deen Bandhu Gupta, member of Indian Parliament, this paper has been strongly critical of American policies in the past. But on Korean issue, it has extended support for South Korean cause. Its attitude toward America has changed for the better. It was established in 1923 and has a circulation of 12,700.

Vandemataram: Bombay; Gujarati; it is a sensational and anti-Congress daily. "The popularity of this paper is largely ascribed to the powerful penmanship of its former editor, Mr. Samaldas Gandhi. Its news features relating to Finance, Exchange, Stocks and Shares, etc., of particular interest to the business community."1 Established in 1941, this paper has a circulation of 23,305.

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1. V.K. Narasimhan and Pothen Philip, editors, the Indian Press Year Book for 1950, p. 222.
Vir Arjun; Delhi; Hindi; this paper has more or less independent views. It has been anti-American and anti-Russian in its editorial. Established in 1922, this paper has a circulation of 10,000.

Watan; Delhi; Urdu; it is an evening paper. Usually this paper takes an independent view of international affairs and criticizes both Russia and the United States. Established in 1929, has a circulation of 9,500.

The discussion of the background of newspapers in this chapter leads to the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian languages</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL CONTENTS

Ordinarily, a theme analysis of the editorial contents of newspapers would involve a process of marking on the margin of the editorial column or underlining words, sentences, or passages which showed adequately the lines of criticism developed in the editorial. The next step would be to summarize these passages and find a common viewpoint of such editorials whose direct opinions or connotations were the same or similar. Such common viewpoints themes might be favorable, unfavorable or mixed.

In the case of the Indian Press Digests, the process of preparing themes was somewhat simpler. The editorials had already been summarized in the Digests. A large number of common viewpoint quotations from the editorials had also been prepared. What was required under such circumstances was arrange all the viewpoints on one particular issue in a chronological order and summarize them to sift out favorable, unfavorable or mixed themes in same order. The same process was followed on other issues.

Consequently, the themes in this chapter are based on significant viewpoints or quotations from the editorials of Indian newspapers contained in the Indian Press Digests from December 3, 1949, to January 22, 1952.

Keeping in view the number of newspapers (maximum 209 and minimum about 100) surveyed by the Press Analysis Section of the U.S.I.S.
New Delhi, it was found necessary that only such viewpoints as were held by a substantial number of newspapers -- at least ten or ten per cent -- should be used while preparing the themes.

On each one of the issues, the themes which had been divided into three groups (1) favorable, (2) unfavorable, and (3) mixed, had been given in separate sections in the order of the developments on those issues.

All these themes stood for that comment which had direct or implied mention of the United States. The favorable themes indicated favorable views expressed about this country, its government, or even prominent individuals. The opposite was true of the term unfavorable. Mixed themes showed such views as were partly favorable and partly unfavorable, or non-committal.

In certain cases where the viewpoints in the Digests did not have any direct or implied mention of the United States, but the noteworthy quotations from the editorials did, themes were based on the quotations.

The issues dealt with in this chapter pertained to Asian problems in which the foreign policies of both the United States were involved. The issues given in separate sections were: (1) Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan which started in September, 1947; (2) the question of the recognition of the Communist government of China and the status of Formosa; (3) Korean war which broke out on the 25th of June, 1950; (4) peace treaty with Japan; (5) the United States grant of $190,000,000 loan to India on May 24, 1951 to purchase 2,000,000 tons of grain from this country.
All other events had been listed under the sub-head "miscellaneous" in one separate section.
Korean Conflict

BACKGROUND: On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces attacked South Korea crossing the 38th Parallel, the dividing line between the two Koreas. On the same day, the Secretary General of the U.N., Mr. Trygve Lie called an emergency session of the Security Council. The Council declared the invasion a breach of peace.

1. 6/16-30/50. The Indian press strongly condemns North Korea's planned aggression which has also been rightly branded as such by the Security Council.

2. 6/16-30/50. The Korean war has world wide significance. We hope the Big Powers and the U.N. do not take any hasty step.

3. 6/16-30/50. The present hostilities can develop into world wide conflagration if Russia steps in. Russia should, instead, exert influence on North Korea to resort to peaceful means for the unification of the Koreas.

4. 6/16-30/50. The urgency and gravity of the situation demand America to come forward with help to South Korea.
5. 6/16-30/50. America's declaration to extend military help to South Korea, Formosa, Indo China and other Southeast Asian countries is a direct intervention in Asian affairs.

6. 7/15-16/50. It is a welcome piece of news that the prime minister of India has sent personal notes to Marshal Stalin and Secretary of State Acheson in an attempt to bring about a settlement of the Korean War. We agree with Nehru that recognition of Communist China will help end the Security Council deadlock and the Korean War.

7. 7/20-16/50. With the continued retreat of the U.S. forces in Korea, the prestige of the United States is seriously at stake.

8. 7/10-16/50. U.S.A. will eventually win.

9. 7/17-23/50. While Stalin's reply to Nehru is encouraging and demonstrates Russia's desire for peace, it is regretted that Secretary Acheson's reply is not.

10. 8/13-27/50. The aerial bombing of Korea by the American planes is shocking to the entire world. It is an inhuman act.

11. 8/13-27/50. Though it is too early to prognosticate, it looks as if the North Korean tide is being slowly stemmed and in certain sectors turned.
Favorable  Mixed  Unfavorable

12. 9/23-10/5/50.  U.S. forces should not cross the 38th Parallel.

13. 9/23-10/5/50.  All possible means settlement should be explored before the U.N. forces go beyond the 38th Parallel.

14. 10/6-20/50.  The to go beyond the 38th Parallel is unfortunate and pregnant with serious repercussions.


16. 11/1-13/50.  There is a chance for a solution, that chance must be explored.

17. 11/1-13/50.  The Security Council decision on November 8, 1950, that Communist China's representative should participate in its deliberations on General MacArthur's report, is wise. The decision speaks well of the U.N. intentions and objectives.

18. 11/28-12/9/50.  The present debacle (in Korea) is because of General MacArthur's gamble which did not pay off.
19. 1/23-2/3/51. The U.N. Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, branding China an aggressor has ended all chances of negotiations. It will only extend the area of conflict leading eventually to a global war.

20. 1/23-2/3/51. The overwhelming support for the resolution branding China as aggressor does not mean anything. matters is the number of independent votes cast for the U.S.A.

21. 2/10-16/51. In the interest of a settlement of Korean problems, the U.N. forces should not cross the 38th Parallel.

22. 2/10-16/51. We approve Mr. Attlee's statement that the 38th Parallel ought not be crossed until there have been full consultations with the . .

23. 3/13-21/51. In the interest of Korean people, renewed efforts should be made to bring about a settlement in Korea.

24. 3/22-30/51. The 38th Parallel should not be crossed because another crossing of the fateful line may lead to a fresh flare-up which may not be confined to Korea alone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26. 3/22-30/51. Not for the first time General MacArthur's intrusion threatens to complicate rather than help matters. The general should be more discreet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. 3/31-4/9/51. Baking is justified in rejecting General MacArthur's truce offer which is coupled with threat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. 3/31-4/9/51. Once again General MacArthur is out to complicate matters. Something should be done about him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. 3/31-4/9/51. The reported re-crossing of the 38th Parallel is a blunder. Surprisingly, the earlier statements of Western power leaders conveyed the impression that going beyond the 38th Parallel was a political question.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. 3/31-4/9/51. The reported authorization to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria is a serious development fraught with dangers of world war. There should be fresh effort for a negotiated peace.</td>
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</table>

**BACKGROUND:** General Douglas MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman on April 11, 1951.

31. 4/10 19/51 commendable courage by sacking the defiant general, whose absence will materially improve the prospects of an amicable settlement of the Korean trouble.
32. 4/10-19/51. In view of the powerful support of the Republican Party which General MacArthur enjoys, his dismissal is bound to raise a political storm in the U.S.A.

33. 4/10-19/51. Only dismissal of General MacArthur is not enough. America should do something more to solve the Korean tangle.

34. 5/7-13/51. General MacArthur's removal does not indicate any fundamental change in the U.S. Far Eastern policy. The difference between the policies of General MacArthur and President Truman is one of degree and not of kind.

35. 5/31-6/12/51. We are glad that there is some hope of arranging a cease-fire on the 38th Parallel. India would like to see that the hostilities in Korea should end without further loss of life. (This comment was made when papers discussed Secretary Acheson's statement that the U.S. might agree to a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel if there should be "a real settlement" of the Korean war.)

36. 5/31-6/12/51. Peace in Korea still seems to be far off as there is no likelihood of an early settlement of the Korean war.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37. 5/31-6/12/51. Although Mr. Acheson's hint on June 2, 1951, of a possible cease-fire on or near the 38th Parallel is quite encouraging, we regret the statement that any contemplated terms would include neither China's admission to the U.N., nor any change in the U.S. attitude toward Formosa. The Korean problem cannot be isolated from the other problems of the Far and solved without reference to them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>38. 6/23-30/51. The Soviet proposal for a cease-fire and armistice along the 38th Parallel should be seriously pursued to round up the conflict causing considerable butchery and devastation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>39. 6/3-30/51. Now, after the Soviet proposal of June 23, 1951, for cease-fire in Korea has been announced, much depends upon America's attitude whether or not peace is established in Korea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. 7/1-8/51. Problems of far greater complexity, political and military, remain to be solved before Korea can think of real peace. However, the progress so far made in truce negotiations is fairly encouraging.</td>
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<tr>
<td>41. 7/1-8/51. We are glad that at long last a combined effort for peace is being made instead of wasting time in futile East-West differences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>42.</strong> 7/1-8/51. A cease-fire in Korea cannot be an end by itself. To establish peace, problems such as the admission of Communist China to the U.N. and the future of Formosa, should also be discussed.</td>
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<td><strong>43.</strong> 8/1-6/51. General Ridgway should agree to the Communist demand that the 38th Parallel should be the cease-fire line. He should not insist on the establishment of the demilitarized zone on the basis of positions now held by the two armies.</td>
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<td><strong>44.</strong> 11/15-26/51. The agreement between the Allies and the Communists on a cease-fire line in Korea is welcome. It is hoped this will lead to greater East-West accord.</td>
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<td><strong>45.</strong> 11/27-12/3/51. While the agreement on a cease-fire line in Korea holds out good prospects for an armistice, the outlook for an overall peaceful settlement remains bleak.</td>
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<td><strong>46.</strong> 12/21-29/51. It is unfortunate that the Communists have rejected the U.N. proposal for an immediate exchange of seriously wounded prisoners of war.</td>
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<td><strong>47.</strong> 12/21-29/51. The gesture of the U.N. Command in offering surrender all Allied-occupied islands beyond the 38 Parallel is wise and commendable.</td>
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<td>Favorable</td>
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<td>Unfavorable</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.G. 12/30/51-1/6/52. We deplore the failure of the U.N. and Communist delegations to reach an armistice agreement within the 30-day time limit.</td>
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</table>

**BACKGROUND:** On January 13, 1950, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, Mr. Malick, walked out after a defeat by a vote of 6 to 3 of his resolution to refuse further recognition to Nationalist China. Malick said his country would refuse to participate in further deliberations of the Security Council or recognize any of its actions in which Nationalist China participated. On August 1, 1950, returned to the Security Council.

1. 7/10-16/50. If the U.N. decisions are to be effective and if world peace is to be established, Russia must be brought back to the United Nations and to accomplish that Communist China must be granted representation.

2. 8/2-13/50. The attitude of the U.S.A. on the question of the admission of Communist China is deplorable.
Favorable

Unfavorable

BACKGROUND: The U.S. White House issued a communiqué on August 28, 1950, asking General MacArthur to withdraw his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars at their Chicago convention. The communiqué also said that the White House reiterated that the policy was to neutralize Formosa until its status was settled without force.

3. 8/28-9/7/50. There is no essential difference between the views of Mr. Truman and those of General MacArthur on Formosa. While Truman’s approach is diplomatic, MacArthur’s is blunt.

4. 9/8-22/50. The United States’ attitude toward the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations is unwise and regrettable. We cannot understand why America does not face the facts.

5. 10/10-19/51. America’s unwillingness to discuss the Formosa issue and the Chinese membership in the U.N. and the reluctance to take into consultation about the draft Japanese peace treaty are not particularly helpful features.

6. 5/7-13/51. The Washington suggestion that economic sanctions should be imposed against Peking will bring about a new crisis.
Favorable

7. 5/7-13/51. Not to speak of giving food to India, America by proposing the embargo is actually trying to hamper the flow of the much needed Chinese food to India.

Mixed

9. 5/11-20/51. Great Britain, which had seriously doubted the wisdom of the proposed embargo in the past, has submitted to America's sure.

Unfavorable

10. 5/11-20/51. It is doubtful if the embargo can have any practical value because China's trade with the signatories to the resolution, barring Britain, is of little account.

11. 5/11-20/51. The proposed embargo will not have any effect on Indo-Chinese trade as India is not exporting any strategic materials to that o

12. 5/11-20/51. The Chinese who are now sending us food may not be able to do so when the blockade is enforced.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. 5/11-20/51. In the light of the embargo resolution we ask America that was the sense in dismissing General MacArthur if the American policy was ultimately to follow the course he had chalked out earlier.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. 7/3-6/51. Formosa belongs to China and should be surrendered to the Communist government of China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. 12/21-29/51. The Chinese Communists' demand that the U.S. should discontinue economic and military aid to the Chiang Kai-Shek regime in Formosa is justified.</td>
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</table>

Food for India:

**BACKGROUND:** The Indian government anticipated a shortage of six million tons of food grain in 1951. Arrangements were made with Australia, Burma, Argentina, and other countries to procure four million tons of grain for cash payments. But the government of India did not have available foreign exchange resources for the remaining two million tons. India's request was discussed by the U.S. Congress.

1. 1/23-2/3/51. As expressed by some American senators, America may not pass on food India without political bargain. India rather than accept such tainted food.
2. 2/4-16/51. President Truman's recommendation on February 12, 1951, to the U.S. Congress for a free gift of one million tons of food grains to India is free from political strings.

3. 2/4-16/51. This new gesture shown in the offer of food grain will be instrumental in relieving distress and in promoting good will among the India people.

4. 2/4-16/51. Even though one million tons of food grain does not fully meet India's request, it is welcome.

5. 2/4-16/51. It is hoped that the shipment of food grain will be speeded up.

6. 2/17-28/51. Mr. Acheson rightly remarked that India could not pay for the two million tons of grains she needed without drawing heavily on her sterling balances and thus retarding her capital development.

7. 3/31-4/9/51. It is a pity that the U.S.A., despite the prodding of President Truman, is yet to make any tangible contribution toward fighting the food battle in India. Needless to remind that whatever is to be done should be done without loss of time.
Favorable  Mixed  Unfavorable

8. 3/31-4/9/51. While the dispatch of food grains from America is still being debated in the U.S. Congress, we are glad that offered one million tons of food.

9. 4/30-5/6/51. India will not accept any conditions dictated by any foreign country in the matter of importing food that sully her honor.

10. 4/30-5/6/51. India will neither subject herself to the American surveillance in regard to the distribution of food grains nor sing a throaty hallelujah to the "Father Christmas of the free world."

11. 5/7-13/51. Mr. Nehru's statement in parliament (May 10) elucidating OCM's attitude to the two bills before the U.S. Congress, should clear the atmosphere of all misunderstandings and misgivings and pave the way for an early shipment of the promised food grains.

12. 5/7-13/51. The U.S. handling of the Indian request for food grains on easy terms to help her tide over her food crisis has been unfortunate.

13. 5/7-13/51. We highly commend Senator Humphrey's move of April 30, 1951, to enlist public support in raising food grains for India, especially when the progress of the Food-for-

U.S.
Favorable

14. 5/14-20/51. We welcome the U.S. Senate's unanimous approval on May 16 of the amended Food-for-India Bill authorizing a loan of two million tons of food grains to India.

15. 5/21-30/51. The Food-for-India Bill approved by the U.S. House of Representatives on May 25, lending 190 million dollars to purchase American food grain, marks a definite improvement on the Senate bill in as much as it does not stipulate repayment in specified strategic materials needed by the U.S.A.

16. 5/21-30/51. Some of the speeches in the House of Representatives during the recent debate on the Food-for-India Bill were really unfortunate.

Mixed

17. 5/31-6/12/51. India welcomes the final approval of the Food-for-India Bill by both Houses of the U.S. Congress, specially for the elimination of the Senate clause stipulating part payment of the loan in strategic war materials including monazite.

Unfavorable

18. 5/31-6/12/51. Despite the avoidable delay as well as undeserving criticism, India is really grateful to the United States for her decision to send two million tons of food grain to tide over the present food crisis.
19. 6/13-22/51. The people of India fully share the sentiments of gratitude expressed by Prime Minister Nehru to the President; the Congress and the people of the United States for their magnificent food aid, even though somewhat delayed, to this country. Indo-U.S. relations are likely to improve.

Kashmir:

BACKGROUND: Kashmir is a state in the north of India. Shortly after India’s partition in August, 1947, Kashmir was raided by the so-called tribal people from across its western border. The ruler of Kashmir acceded his state to India. Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, formally accepted the accession on October 27, 1947. Shortly afterwards India took the issue to the Security Council. There has been a lack of agreement between India and Pakistan on the proposals of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan and of the mediators appointed to settle the issue.

On February 9, 1951, Great Britain pressed for a settlement in the United Nations on the Kashmir issue; she sought a co-sponsorship for a motion to implement the Security Council plan for the U.N.-sponsored plebiscite to which demilitarization of and Pakistan forces was the main obstacle.
Favorable

1. 2/4-16/51. The British resolution envisaging a partial plebiscite in Kashmir constitutes a deliberate attempt to by-pass the fundamental issue involved in the dispute.

2. 2/4-16/51. In her attitude toward Kashmir, the United States betrays a benevolent partiality in favor of Pakistan.

Background: On February 21, 1951, the U.S.A. and Great Britain proposed the U.N. name a new mediator to work out demilitarization plans in Kashmir.

3. 2/17-28/51. The Anglo-American resolution incorporating the "obnoxious" features of the Nixon report, equating the aggressor and the aggrieved, suggesting use of foreign troops, recommending resort to arbitration and providing for eventual partition of the state, is a highly mischievous document.

4. 2/17-28/51. The United Kingdom and the United States have been actuated by ulterior motives rather than justice and fair play in sponsoring the Kashmir resolution.

5. 2/17-28/51. The U.N. Security Council, which has been seized by power politics, is no longer an independent organ devoted to the maintenance of global peace and security.

Unfavorable
6. 2/17-28/51. India's rejection of the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir is a foregone conclusion.

7. 2/17-28/51. The government of Kashmir should proceed with the setting up of the constituent assembly in the state undeterred by the attitude of the Western nations on the Kashmir issue.

8. 3/1-12/51. India's rejection of the Anglo-American Kashmir resolution is justified.

9. 3/1-12/51. The United States and the United Kingdom are leaning toward Pakistan rather because they feel she will be more dependable than India in the event of another war.

10. 3/22-30/51. The revised Anglo-American resolution of March 26, 1951, on Kashmir is a deliberate repudiation of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan's resolutions of August, 1948, and January, 1949, as it retains arbitration to demilitarize the state.

11. 3/22-30/51. Being opposed to arbitration for vital and fundamental reasons, India cannot accept the revised Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir.

12. 3/22-30/51. Indian newspapers endorse Prime Minister Nehru's views that acceptance by India of the revised Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir will be "dishonorable to India."
13. 3/22-30/51. The United Kingdom and the United States are not honest in their attitude toward the Kashmir problem. They seem to be actuated more by power politics than by considerations of equity and international justice.

14. 3/22-30/51. The willing U.N. acquiescence in the Anglo-American conspiracy will be highly deplored by the conflict-ridden world.

15. 3/31-4/9/51. The Indian press endorses Nehru's statement of March 28, 1951, rejecting the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir and declaring India's determination to face the consequences flowing from this refusal.

16. 3/31-4/9/51. India should withhold cooperation from the proposed U.N. arbitrator in case the Security Council attempts to implement its Kashmir resolution, in face of her opposition.

17. 3/31-4/9/51. The U.N. attempts, first to connive at Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir and later to reward aggression, do not augur well for world peace.

18. 3/31-4/9/51. Both the United Kingdom and the United States are actuated by ulterior motives in their attitude toward the Kashmir dispute.
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<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
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<tr>
<td>19. 4/30-5/6/51. We have nothing against the personality of Dr. Frank P. Graham, U.N. mediator-designate to Kashmir, but prodigal as he is of the India-rejected Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir, he cannot be welcomed either by the governments or the people of India and Kashmir, and as such, he will receive no cooperation from either in his task.</td>
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<td>20. 6/13-22/51. Prime Minister Nehru has done well in protesting publicly against the machinations of the United Kingdom and the United States who have abetted and are abetting Pakistan in the &quot;fantastic nonsense&quot; of the U.N. approach to the Kashmir problem.</td>
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<td>21. 7/1-8/51. The U.S.A. and the United Kingdom have not been playing fair with India in her dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.</td>
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<td>22. 7/21-31/51. The partisan attitude of the Anglo-American powers is due to their unholy alliance with Pakistan — the former having guaranteed to the latter support against India in her Kashmir dispute in exchange for a right to establish military and air bases in that country in their over-all global strategy against the U.S.S.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. 9/6-17/51: India cannot accept Dr. Graham's reported proposal of demilitarization in Kashmir on the basis of equality between India and Pakistan, the latter being the aggressor. Nor can she accept the partition of the state. Dr. Graham's mission would thus seem to have failed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. 12/21-29/51: The U.N. has become the foreign affairs department of the U.S.A. The dominant powers at the U.N. want to exploit the U.N. body to further their ulterior motives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. 1/16-22/52: Jacob Malik's statement of January 17, 1952, on Kashmir provides a correct appraisal of the Kashmir dispute. The Anglo-American bloc has been deliberately obstructing a settlement.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Peace Treaty With Japan:**

1. 1/19/50: India's Prime Minister Nehru's speech and the decision of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference at Colombo, Ceylon on January 9, 1950, that a quick settlement of the Japanese issue should be reached, or command is, delay would strengthen the hands of the Communists.
2. 11/28-12/9/50. The documents exchanged be-
U. si regarding a peace
treaty with Japan show a wide divergence be-
tween the viewpoints of the two countries. It
is difficult to see how these viewpoints can be
reconciled.

3. 7/14-20/51. Surprisingly, the peace terms as
embodied in the Draft Treaty have given a
choice to Japan to conclude a treaty either
with the Communists or the Nationalists. This
tamounts to ignoring the facts.

4. 7/14-20/51. Another defect in the draft re-
lates to the clause allowing Japan to conclude
a treaty with other states for stationing
foreign troops in her territory and enter into
a regional pact with them. This means that the
continue to remain in
Japan.

5 7/14 20/51 The absence of restrictions on
Japanese rearmament has disturbed Asian powers.
Pears harbored by Australia and New Zealand,
however, seem to have been partially alloyed
by the draft of a Pacific pact between them
and the U.S.A.

6. 7/14 20/51. In the treaty nothing is
said to the future of Formosa. The GOI thinks
that the future of Formosa should be settled in
accordance with the recommendations of the Cairo
and Potsdam Declarations which proposed return
of these islands to China.
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<tr>
<td>7. 8/1-6/51. India's objections to the Japanese draft peace treaty are justified and they should be removed before she could be a party to the treaty.</td>
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<td>8. 8/11-20/51. The revised draft is substantially the same as that published a month ago. India's reasonable objections have been ignored.</td>
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<td>9. 8/21-29/51. India is fully justified in refusing to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. Nor is there any point in attending the San Francisco Conference, especially after the announcement that the terms of the treaty are final.</td>
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<td>10. 8/21-29/51. The stationing of American troops in Japan would only jeopardize her independence and perpetuate American domination.</td>
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<td>11. 8/21-29/51. New Delhi's objection to the U.S. proposal for trusteeship control of the Bonin and Ryukyu islands is justified because such a term in the treaty hardly allows Japan to attain a position of honor and equality.</td>
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<td>12. 8/21-29/51. To leave undetermined the future of Formosa is to invite dangerous trouble in a not too distant future.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. 8/21-29/51. The U.S. should realize that a Japanese Peace Treaty would spell a settlement in Asia can have little meaning when China is excluded and India is absent.</td>
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<td>14. 8/21-29/51. There is fundamental difference between the approaches of America and India toward Japan.</td>
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<td>15. 8/21-29/51. Let it be known that such a treaty cannot lessen tension in the Far East.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. 8/30-9/7/51. Reaction of the American press and politicians to India's rejection of the draft treaty is unfortunate. Just as India will try to understand and appreciate America's view, India expects America should, in the same manner, try to look at the matter without passion or prejudice.</td>
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<td>17. 8/30-9/7/51. It is unfortunate that some senators should say that the American Wheat Loan had not succeeded in drawing India to the American side, because India has refused to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan.</td>
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<td>18. 8/30-9/7/51. The terms embodied in this peace treaty are not likely to create an atmosphere favorable to peace in the Far East.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. 8/30-9/7/51. Any treaty which is not signed by Russia, Red China and India has no chance of success.</td>
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<td>20. 8/30-9/7/51. Had India participated in the San Francisco Conference it would have been more embarrassing for America because it would have looked as if Russia and India were in alliance.</td>
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<td>21. 8/30-9/7/51. President Truman's speech at San Francisco on September 4, 1951, classifying those who supported the treaty as peace levers and those who did not as war-mongers was unjust and uncalled for.</td>
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<td>22. 9/8-17/51. The Japanese Peace Treaty is a draft for a new world war.</td>
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<td>23. 9/8-17/51. India's boycott of the San Francisco Conference was not intended to placate Russia or Communist China. It flowed from fundamental convictions.</td>
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Favorable | Mixed | Unfavorable
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**Miscellaneous Issues**

**President Truman's Speeches**

**BACKGROUND:** President Truman made a statement to the press on April 20, 1950, calling for a campaign of truth.

1. **4/27/50.** It is true that plain truth will not only triumph over the forces of totalitarianism but also will help extend democracy and faith in democratic principles. But mere propaganda cannot fill hungry stomachs. Economic and other forms of aid are undoubtedly necessary to counter Communist propaganda.

**BACKGROUND:** In his foreign policy speech in San Francisco on October 17, 1950, President Truman said that he would continue to help meet aggression but would not interfere otherwise in the affairs of countries.

2. **10/6-20/50.** The call to Asia for a partnership of peace sounds strange in the face of America's attitude toward Red China and Indo-China.

3. **10/6-20/50.** It is disappointing that the President's emphasis has been on American power.
Favorable

Mixed

Unfavorable

4. 11/28-12/9/50. President Truman's statement of November 30, 1950, that the use of the atom bomb in Korea was always under active consideration, is highly objectionable. Only the U.N. can sanction the use of this deadly weapon.

5. / use would also alienate public opinion, especially in Asia.

6. 1/9-15/52. President Truman's State of the Union Message on January 9, 1952, does not indicate any change in U.S. policy. Once again the emphasis is on increasing armaments.

Ex-President Hoover's Speech:

BACKGROUND: the United States ex-President Herbert Hoover made a suggestion before the American Newspaper Publishers' Association April 27, 1950, that the United-Nations should be reconstructed without Russia and her satellites.

7. 5/1-11/50. We agree with Prime Minister Nehru's view that Russia should not be expelled from the United Nations. A United Nations without Russia would accentuate differences and widen the East-West gulf, eventually leading to war.
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**Big Three Foreign Ministers' Conference:**

BACKGROUND: Secretary Acheson's report to Congress on May 31, 1950, and earlier, a communique issued at the conclusion of the London Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and France on May 11 through 16, 1950, declared that the three powers would encourage and support the "merging" of independent nations of Southeast Asia and expose the aims and methods of Communist imperialism which is plotting nationalist movements to promote its expansionist policy.

8. 5/18/50. It is easy to understand why Great Britain and France should be most anxious to get the U.S.A. to underwrite the security and integrity of their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. The astonishing fact is that the U.S.A. has let herself enter into commitments to bolster up European colonialism in this region.

**Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations:**

BACKGROUND: The conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held in Lucknow, India from October 3 through 15, 1950.
**Table:***

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<th>Favorable</th>
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<tr>
<td>9. 9/23-10/5/50. The Western powers should have better appreciation of &quot;Asian sentiment.&quot;</td>
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**Acheson Plan:**

**Background:** On September 20, 1950, Secretary Acheson proposed before the U.N. General Assembly that a permanent armed force should be raised to bar aggression to the U.N.

| 10/6-20/50. The Acheson Plan may convert the U.N. into a "larger edition of the Atlantic Pact." |

11. 10/6-20/50. The moves in the U.N. to raise a permanent armed force are meant to circumvent the veto power of Russia.

**Indo-China:**

**Background:** The United States decided on October 17, 1950, to give financial aid to France for military aid of that country and the Associated States of Indo-China.

12. 10/6-20/50. By securing American aid, the French want to retain their imperialistic domination over Indo-China.
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<tr>
<td>13. 10/21-31/50. Before America takes any step to send American military aid to Viet Nam, she should realize that the war in Indo-China is different from the Korean war. It is a war between the Indo-Chinese people and a foreign power which wants to impose its domination over the former.</td>
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**Assassination of the Iranian Prime Minister:**

<p>| 14. 3/1-12/51. The assassination of the Iranian prime minister is a tragic episode in a drama, the main springs of which are rivalries between Russia and the Anglo-American bloc over strata-oil fields. |
| 15. 3/13-21/51. Iran is heading for revolution and anarchy, tossed as she is between the Anglo-American bloc and the Communists. |
| 16. 5/14-20/51. American intervention in Anglo-Iranian oil quarrels will complicate the situation more than solve the problem. Persia's right to nationalise the oil industry is indisputable. |
| 17. 5/21-30/51. The U.S. note to the Persian government on May 18, 1951, not to act unilaterally in the matter of nationalisation of the oil industry was irritating and deserved the treatment it was accorded. |</p>
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<th>Favorable</th>
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<th>Unfavorable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. 7/9-13/51. Iran's acceptance of President Truman's offer to send to Teheran his foreign affairs adviser, Mr. Averell Harriman, might help in securing a negotiated settlement of the oil dispute.</td>
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<td>19. 7/21-31/51. It goes to the credit of Mr. Harriman that he has been able to induce the Persian government to discuss the oil issue with Britain; it is now for Britain to act and not miss the chance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. 12/30/51-1/8/52. Britain's warning that she would intercept tankers carrying Iranian oil was fraught with grave consequences. Both Britain and the U.S. should &quot;pause to think afresh&quot; and try for a new approach as economic blockade of Iran would drive the country into the arms of the Soviet.</td>
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Argentina and Spain:

21. 7/14-20/51. Britain's concern over America's intention, reported July 18, 1951, to negotiate some form of bilateral arrangement with the Franco regime in Spain will be shared by most of the people.
22. 7/21-31/51. It is unfortunate that in order to get strategic advantages against the Soviet Union the U.S. is trying to negotiate with Fascist Franco. Britain's opposition to the move is understandable.

Indian Ambassador's Statement:

BACKGROUND: On September 19, 1951, India's ambassador to the U.S.A., Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit made a statement explaining India's foreign policy.

23. 9/18-28/51. While welcoming Mrs. Pandit's reaffirmation of her country's affinity with the democracies, it is hoped the statement will lead to better appreciation of India's case abroad, especially in the U.S.

24. 9/18-28/51. The corner-stone of India's foreign policy is her earnest desire for peaceful settlement of disputes. If she has differed with the U.S. on certain occasions, it is because she has felt that on these issues the American attitude will not serve the ways of peace.
25. 10/15-21/51. Egypt's rejection on October 15, 1951, of the Four-power plan, though not surprising, is to be regretted. It is doubtful if Egypt can defend the Suez Canal single-handed. She is bound to lose U.S. sympathy.

26. 10/22-28/51. Despite widespread sympathy for the Egyptian national aspirations, it cannot be said that Egypt's sovereignty is in danger. Egypt, being unable to defend the strategic Suez Canal Zone single-handed, would do well to join the projected Middle East defence board.

27. 11/15-26/51. The Western powers will achieve nothing by trying to impress the Arab world with a show of force in Egypt.

28. 11/5-11/51. Without doubting the peaceful intentions of the Western powers, it must be admitted that their seven-point disarmament plan announced on November 7, 1951, contains nothing new and is not likely to promote the cause of peace.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29. 11/15-26/51. Mr. B. N. Bau's proposal of November 16, 1951, for a no-war declaration by the Big Powers can provide a proper setting for the discussion of disarmament proposals.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. 11/27-12/3/51. Mr. Wyshinsky's willingness to accept international control of atomic weapons and to participate in the Big Four talks on disarmament is the first good news from Paris.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. 12/12-20/51. In the light of past experience and in view of serious differences between Russia and the Western powers over vital aspects of the disarmament issue, the Big Four agreement to establish a disarmament commission will fall to enthrone war-haunted people. It is, however, heartening that the talks have not been abandoned.</td>
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</table>

**BACKGROUND:** On December 19, 1951, the U.N. Assembly approved the Big Three disarmament resolution; it rejected the U.S.S.R. amendments, approved creation of a disarmament commission and ordered it to study the reso- 

| 32. 12/21-29/51. By adopting the Western plan on disarmament the U.N. has contributed little toward real disarmament. The basic fact remains that the big powers have failed to evolve a joint plan. So long as there is mutual sus- picion and fear world tension will not ease. |
Churchill's U.S. Visit.

33. 12/30/51-1/8/52. In his anxiety to avoid commitments on major policy issues on the eve of the presidential election, Mr. Truman will have to face a difficult task in his forthcoming talks with Mr. Churchill, who is arriving in America on January 5, 1952.

34. 12/30/51-1/8/52. The extent of differences in the foreign policies of the U.S. and the United Kingdom is so wide that it is difficult to envision complete agreement between the two countries.

BACKGROUND: A joint communique by Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill was issued on January 9, 1952. It contained a resolution, a warning and a promise that the two powers would unite their strength and purpose to insure peace and security. It also said that they would unify their policies not only in Europe, but in the Middle East and Asia.

35. 1/9-15/52. Although the joint declaration by President Truman and Mr. Churchill that they do not consider war inevitable is welcome, it is difficult to visualize how peace can last if the armament race continues.
American Ambassador's Press Conference

BACKGROUND: On November 16, 1951, the U.S. Ambassador, Chester Bowles, held a press conference in New Delhi.

37. 11/5-11/51. Ambassador Bowles has made the correct approach in elucidating his aims for bringing about understanding between India and the U.S.A.

38. 11/5-11/51. If America's aim is to root out Communism, the panaceas would be to render economic rather than military aid to smaller and underdeveloped countries including India.

39. 11/5-11/51. Mr. Bowles' explanation of non-recognition of Communist China by the U.N. is not satisfactory.
Favorable

Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreement:

BACKGROUND: On January 6, 1952, India and the United States signed a five-year pact for $50,000,000 technical aid from the latter country to be utilized in various projects in India. This program falls under the India-America Technical Cooperation Fund. On January 7, 1952, the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Bowles said that more U.S. aid in the future would depend on the U.S. Congress, but that he would urge the government of his country to extend one billion dollars aid to India.

40. 12/30/51-1/8/52. The Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreement is a welcome step. It should constitute an "important landmark" in the relations between the two countries. It is gratifying that there are no political strings attached to the offer.

41. 1/9-15/52. By signing the agreement for technical cooperation India has accepted foreign direction and initiative in the economic development of the country for paltry sum.

42. 1/16-22/52. By urging the U.S. administration to give a billion dollars aid to India to help raise her living standards, Mr. Bowles has done a signal service to both the U.S. and this country.
Collective Security Resolution:

**BACKGROUND:** On January 12, 1952, the U.N. Assembly approved a resolution asking the members to keep forces ready for use if the Assembly recommended it.

**43. 1/9-15/52.** The Western resolution strikes at the very roots of the U.N. charter and hence will not serve the interests of peace.

**44. 1/9-15/52.** By choosing to remain neutral on the resolution the Indian delegate has vindicated GOI's line of non-involvement in power-bloc politics in the U.N.
A summary of the themes -- favorable, unfavorable, and mixed -- on the various issues reported in this chapter, is given in the following table. The percentage relation of the favorable, unfavorable, and mixed themes on these issues to the total number of themes on each issue is also shown in this table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number of Themes</th>
<th>Percentages of Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean Conflict</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for India</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Peace Treaty</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Diagrams 1-6 show the percentage relation of the favorable, unfavorable, and mixed themes to the total number of themes on issues concerned.

Diagram 7 shows the overall percentage relation of the favorable, unfavorable, and mixed themes on all the issues to the total number of themes.
CHAPTER FOUR

FLUCTUATIONS IN INDIAN PRESS OPINION

The Indian Press Digests prepared by the Press Analysis Section of the United States Information Service, New Delhi, India, showed that the interest of the Indian newspapers in America during the period from December 8, 1949 to June 15, 1950 was insignificant. However, this conclusion can be drawn with certainty because there were a few omissions in the material available for this period. The chronological study of various themes reveals that a large volume of comment regarding American policies started appearing in the Indian papers with the beginning of the Korean war, June 25, 1950.

Some of the major issues under discussion during the period from December 8 to December 27, 1949 were the internal matters of India, the recognition by Burma of Red China's government, Indo-Pakistan relations, and Kashmir. The first significant topic concerning both India and the United States was the India-America Conference during the first and second weeks of December 1949. The editorial comments on this topic, analyzed between 8 to December 27, 1949, show that a large section of the press looked favorably upon this conference. Said that the usefulness of conference in promoting understanding between India and the United States and in finding solution to their
common problems could not be denied.

Mixed opinions were expressed on the statements during this period by the Assistant Secretary, George McChesney, the Ambassador, Loy Henderson in New Delhi. However, the number of papers commenting on these statements was very small.

Agreeing with the U.S. Ambassador’s statement of December 21, 1949 six papers said that "basically the Indian and American attitudes on international affairs are animated by the same ideals and 'sense of morality'. We hate authoritarian and totalitarian doctrines." A few comments were unfavorable.

An analysis of the discussion on Kashmir in the Press Digest of December 27, 1949 shows that a very small section of the press mentioned the United States in editorials. But the attitude of these papers was not favorable toward America. One of the four papers, for instance,

Digest, December 27, 1949.

Kashmir is a princely state in the north India. According to 1952 World Almanac, the area of Kashmir is 8,471 square miles and population in 1950 was 4,370,000. Shortly after India's partition in August, 1947, Kashmir was raided by the so-called tribal people from across its western border. The raiders, according to Pakistan government's version, came from the northwestern part of the territory outside Pakistan. The ruler of Kashmir found it necessary to accede his State to India to seek help for the defence of the State. Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor-General of India accepted the accession on October 27, 1947. Shortly afterwards India took the issue to the Security Council and this appointed a Commission called the United Nations Commission on Kashmir, has been a lack of agreement on the findings of the Commission and the mediators who followed it. Whereas India's complaint before the Security Council is that Pakistan aggressor in Kashmir, Pakistan claims that India had no right to interfere in the Kashmir issue, and that Kashmir had no legal right to accede to
General McNaughton\(^1\) will be free to act within the bounds of his reason and discretion, and no attempt will be made, as in the case of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan by Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee to influence his judgment.\(^2\)

At this stage during the week ending January 5, 1950, a large number of papers commented on the recognition by India of Red Chinese but there hardly any mention of the U.S. Later, during the same week and the following week a few comments were noted on the possibilities of America's recognition of Red China; America's continued military aid and advice to the Nationalist Chinese leaders to defend Formosa, and the future of Formosa itself:

A substantial group of papers believed that America recognize Red China but would wait for the right time. These papers said "sooner or later America will have to face facts."\(^3\)

President Truman's statement of January 5, 1950, denying the reports that America would help Chiang Kai Shek defend Formosa,\(^4\) received

\(^1\)The Mediator in Kashmir.

\(^2\)"Digest, December 27, 1949;"

\(^3\)"Digests, " January 12, 1950.

\(^4\)"Digest, January 5, 1950."
very meagre comment. The majority of commentators (which could be called significant) looked this statement favorably, and said:

President Truman has revealed his statesmanship by refusing to succumb to the powerful pressure of interested political and military circles to help Chiang defend Formosa with American aid.¹

A subsequent statement by President Truman on January 4, 1950, and known as the "State of the Union Message" was commented upon by a small number of papers which expressed mixed opinions. They complained that the amount earmarked for the under-developed countries of the East ($35,000,000) was too little compared to the amount promised for the European Recovery Program ($3,628,000,000).

Between January 9 and January 1950, the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Colombo, Ceylon, considered the question of a peace treaty with Japan and decided to set up a Working Committee to study this problem. Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, also made a speech at the Conference representing Indian opinion suggesting "a quick settlement of the Japanese under conditions that would allow Japan's economic rehabilitation, political self-determination, and early withdrawal of occupation forces."² He asserted that a delay in this matter would strengthen the position of the Communists. These two developments attracted a large amount of mixed comment suggesting

¹Digest, January 12, 1950.
²Digest, January 19, 1950.
earnestly or ironically that the initiative on this question rested with the U.S.A.

Another decision of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference, to set a consultative committee to study the economic condition of the under-developed countries was reviewed in the Indian papers which said that the success of the program of economic development of Asian countries depended on the U.S.A.¹

During the period February 24-28, 1950, some unfavorable comments were noted on the U.S. Roving Ambassador, Philip Jessup's press conference in New Delhi on February 23, 1950, denying that America was exercising pressure on India on the Kashmir issue. Scattered comments on this topic suggested editors' beliefs that the U.S.A. was supporting Pakistan's cause.

President Truman's statement of April 20, 1950, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors evoked mixed comments. The general theme of a large group of prominent newspapers was:

It is true that plain truth will not only triumph over the forces of totalitarianism but also will help extend democracy and faith in democratic principles. But mere propaganda cannot fill hungry stomachs. Economic and other forms of aid are undoubtedly necessary to counter Communist propaganda.²

The attitude of the press became unfavorable after ex-President Herbert Hoover's statement of April 27, 1950, before the A.N.P.A.³

¹Digest, January 19, 1950. ²Digest, April 27, 1950. ³Digest, May 4, 1950.
suggesting a reconstruction of the U.N. without Russia and her satellites. Pandit Nehru's remarks about this statement helped solidify this unfavorable trend. Papers thought that a U.N. of Mr. Hoover's imagination would not be able to solve the problems.

The next event making the press opinion more unfavorable was Secretary Acheson's report to May 31, 1950, earlier a communiqué issued at the of the London of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and France, May 11-14, 1950. The communiqué declared that the three powers would encourage and support the 'merging' independent nations of S.E. Asia and expose the aims and methods of Communist imperialism which is exploiting nationalist movements to promote its own expansionist policy . . . ."1

Commenting on this statement papers said:

"It is easy to understand why Britain and France should be most anxious to get the U.S. to underwrite the security and integrity of their colonial possessions in S.E. Asia. The astonishing fact is that the U.S. has let herself enter into commitments to bolster up European colonialism in this region."

The attitude of the press during the months of May and June, 1950, until before the Korean war started on June 25, 1950, was mostly unfavorable. Although comment on President Truman's two speeches— at

1Digest, May 18, 1950.
2Digest, May 18, 1950.
Columbia, Missouri on June 9, 1950, and at St. Louis, Missouri on June 10, 1950 was very sparse, the trend of the editorials was unfavorable. The Digest of June 9, 1950, reports that the gradually growing unfavorable attitude should be recognized as partly responsible for the diminishing volume of comments on the speeches of American leaders. There were only three comments on the first speech of the President, and five on the second. Excepting one, all were critical of the President's "attack" on Russia.

This unfavorable trend of the Indian press was temporarily arrested with the beginning of the Korean War. The Digests show that during the period June 16-30, 1950, there were three favorable themes and two unfavorable. The favorable papers said that they strongly condemned North Korea's planned aggression which has also been rightly branded as such by the Security Council.

1 They agreed that North Korea's aggression was a menace to world peace and that realizing the gravity of the situation, the United States should come forward with help to South Korea. Another group of favorable papers thought that in order to avoid any further aggravation of the situation, the big powers should move cautiously.

The unfavorable themes primarily condemned America's intervention

1Digest, June 16-30, 1950.
in Korea and her declaration to extend military help to South Korea, Formosa, Indo-China and other South East Asian countries. A substantial number of papers also advised Russia to exert influence on North Korea to resort to peaceful means, the unification of the Koreas. Although this theme does not make any mention of the United States, a study the noteworthy comments in the Digest listed under this viewpoint shows that Russia's "peaceful intentions" have been acknowledged whereas America's intervention" has been condemned.

The next Digest for the period of July 1 to 9, 1950, shows that the press was discussing India's foreign policy in regard to the Korean war. Disappointment was expressed with Russia's attitude which was considered unhelpful to the solution of the Korean conflict. There was hardly any comment about the United States which needs a special mention here.

A shift in the editorial opinion was again noticeable during the period July 10-15, 1950, when the papers started discussing the question admitting Communist China to the U.N. in order to bring Russia back to the Security Council. They thought that the U.N. decisions could only be effective if these two problems were solved. Although these themes do not mention the United States, the noteworthy comments in the Digest indicate that opinion was mixed. There was a tendency to acknowledge that the U.S. reluctance to admit Communist China to the Security Council was understandable. But in the same breath it was expressed that the Anglo-Americans were not justified in excluding Russia from the U.N. just for the sake of making effective decisions. One group of
papers suggested that if, even after her return to the Security Council, Russia continued to give trouble, America would get more world support.

More mixed comments were noted when the continued retreat of the U.N. forces caused concern to the press. However, hopes were expressed that the U.N. (or the U.S.) eventually would win.

The attitude of the press grew more unfavorable after Prime Minister Nehru's personal notes of July 7, 1950 received replies from Secretary Acheson and Marshal Stalin. Stalin's reply was considered encouraging and indicative of his desire for peace. But a substantial number of papers regretted that Secretary Acheson's reply, which was opposed to the idea of recognizing Communist China, was not helpful to the cause of peace.

Further intensification of this unfavorable trend was noticed during 17 to August 27, 1950, on account of the aerial bombing of North Korea by the U.S. planes. Some papers called it "inhuman" and "shocking".

Discussing the U.S. White House announcement1 that General MacArthur had been asked by the State department to withdraw his message on Formosa to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago, a substantial number of papers said: "There is no essential difference between the views of Mr. Truman and those of General MacArthur on Formosa. While Truman's approach is diplomatic, MacArthur's is blunt."2

1According to the New York Times of August 29, 1950, the White House issued a communique on August 28, 1950, asking General MacArthur to withdraw his message to the V.F.W., Chicago. The communique also said that the White House reiterated that the U.S. policy was to neutralize Formosa until its status was settled without force.

2Digest, August 2-13, 1950.
At this stage when the press comment was growing highly unfavorable, the question of crossing the 38th Parallel by the U.N. forces arose.

The Digest of September 23 to October 5, 1950, shows that the Indian papers started warning the United Nations forces that crossing the 38th Parallel would be detrimental to the interest of peace in Korea. The papers suggested that before making any decision to cross the 38th Parallel, all possible means for a peaceful settlement should be explored.

A study of the noteworthy comments listed under these themes shows that the opinions of the papers commenting the question of crossing the 38th Parallel at this stage were mixed. Not all the noteworthy quotations from the editorials of the newspapers were completely favorable or unfavorable.

In the midst of these discussions on Korea, the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held in Lucknow, India. The conference which opened on October 3, 1950, and closed on October 15, 1950, attracted which showed hostility on the part of the newspapers concerned. Almost all the influential publications said that the Western powers should have better appreciation of Asian sentiment. Some of the comments were extremely pointed. For some papers said that India did not have any fear of militant Communism. It was only the fear of Western imperialism which was a threat to that country.

This hostile attitude of the press was also evident from the comments on President Truman's foreign policy speech at San Francisco.  

1 New York Times, October 18, 1950. President Truman said in his speech on October 17, 1950 that he would continue to help meet aggression but would not interfere otherwise in the affairs of other countries.
Two unfavorable themes were noted the Digest of October 6-20, 1950. In one theme, an overwhelming majority of papers said that the President’s call to Asia for a partnership of peace sounded strange in the face of America’s attitude toward Red China. Another substantial group of papers deplored that the President’s emphasis was on America’s power.

It may be noted that during this period the views of the papers on the question of the recognition of Communist China, the crossing of the 38th Parallel, and policy toward Formosa were often repeated. This unfavorable trend solidified the in the United Nations to raise a permanent armed force. Papers thought it was meant to circumvent the veto power. Russia. Most of the papers discussing the Acheson Plan for the United Nations said that it would threaten weaken the international organization by ignoring the principle of Big Power Unity. Another large group of commentators said the Acheson Plan may convert the U.N. into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact. One of the papers even went to the extent of saying that the Acheson a logical sequel to the conviction that a third world war was inevitable. It added that the was aimed not so much at not averting another war as at making preparations for winning it.

At this stage the U.S. decision on October 17, 1950 to give financial aid to France for military equipment of that country and the Associated States of Indo-China evoked strong comment ranging—mixed and unfavorable. Some papers said that before America took any step to
send military aid to Viet Nam she should realize that the war in Indo-China was different from the Korean war. It was a war between the Indo-Chinese people and a foreign power wanted to use its domination over the former. One of these papers also maintained that the United States was contributing to an aggressor's role in Indo-China.

The long spell of hostile attitude of the Indian press was broken for a short duration, according to the Digest of November 1-13, after the Security Council decided on September 29 that Communist China's representative should participate in its deliberations on General MacArthur's report which was before the Council for consideration.

A large number of commentators thought this decision was wise and the credit for it was given to the U.S.A. They said that it was a proof of American honest intentions to settle the Korean issue peacefully.

However, comment was again critical of the United States when General MacArthur's report on Korean fighting and the intervention of Chinese troops went before the Security Council on November 6, 1950.

One of the editors blamed MacArthur the in which, they thought, was the result of his "gamble in Korea which did not pay off." Another theme was that MacArthur's report would precipitate a grave situation for the United Nations.

A few comments, however, said that China's intervention in Korea

1 Bao Dai's government of Indo-China fighting against Ho Chi Minh's government.

2 Digest, November 28 r 9, 1950.
was an act of aggression and that she would be responsible for the consequences.

While the attitude of the editors continued to be unfavorable during the month of November 1950, there was one significant theme in regard to Japan which shows that most of the papers had neither very unfavorable nor favorable opinion. On November 24, a seven-point treaty calling for four-power talks was discussed by the press. The documents exchanged between the U.S.A. and Russia were commented upon by a large majority of papers. The general view expressed by most of them was that the documents showed a wide divergence between the viewpoints of the two countries. Papers thought it was difficult to see how these viewpoints could be reconciled. This theme and the quotations of individual papers in the Digest do not show any criticism of America alone.

President Truman made a statement on November 30, 1950, warning that the use of the atom bomb in Korea was always under active consideration and that it would be used if needed to assure victory. A total condemnation of this statement is evident from the Digest of November 28, to December 9, 1950.

Almost the entire press said that only the U.S. could sanction the use of "this deadly weapon". They thought that the use of the atom bomb would not only make world war inevitable but would also alienate public opinion, especially in Asia.

In the midst of these discussions, India's request for food grain
assistance from the United States was discussed by a large number of papers. At its early stages this issue received some favorable comments. This state of affairs did not exist very long. Reports of unfavorable congressional opinion on India’s request for food grain assistance and the delay caused in the receipt of help gave birth to some doubts as to America’s sincerity to help the dangerous countries of Asia.

On two issues coming up together before the United Nations branding by the U.N. General Assembly of Red China as an aggressor February 1, 1951, and the remarks of some of the senators—the opinion of a large number of papers became more unfavorable. The consensus regarding food issue was that if the American senators are not in favor of sending food grains to India without political bargain, Indian would rather starve than accept tainted food.  

On China, an overwhelming majority of papers said that by branding Red China as aggressor, the U.N. had ended all chances of negotiations. They asserted that this action would only extend the area of conflict leading eventually to a global war. Another significant theme was that the overwhelming support for the resolution would be an indication of the United States’s will to help India.


2_____, January 23-February 3, 1951.
tion branding China as aggressor did not mean anything. Papers said:  

"What matters is the number of independent votes for the U.S.A."¹

It is noteworthy that the majority of papers continued to warn that the 38th Parallel should not be crossed. There were also some significant comments on the discussions on Kashmir issue before the Security Council.² Papers said that the projected British resolution envisaging a partial plebiscite in Kashmir constituted a deliberate attempt to bypass the fundamental issue involved in the dispute. Although there is no mention of the United States in the theme, the noteworthy comments in the Digest of February 4-16, 1951, use the word Anglo-American instead of only British when the "t" of the formula Kashmir. A substantial group of papers asserted that in her attitude toward Kashmir, the United States betrayed a benevolent partiality in favor of Pakistan.

Further comments on this subject during the month of February, 1951, when the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir was presented on February 21, 1951, for discussion, said that India should reject the resolution.³ Almost the papers said that the United Kingdom and the

¹Digest, January 23-February 3, 1951.

²On February 9, 1951, Great Britain pressed for a settlement in United Nations on the Kashmir issue; she sought a co-sponsorship for a motion to implement the Security Council plan for the U.N. sponsored plebiscite to which demilitarization of Indian and Chinese forces was the main obstacle.

³The U.S.A. and Great Britain proposed U.N. name new mediator to work out demilitarization plan.
United States were actuated by ulterior motives rather than justice and fair-play in sponsoring the Kashmir resolution. Another theme was that the Security Council which had been seized by power politics, was no longer an independent organ devoted to the maintenance of global peace and security. One of the sarcastic comments was that "Kashmir is not Korea and Pakistan is not China." And an overwhelming majority of papers said:

The Anglo-American resolution, incorporating the 'obnoxious' features of the Dixon report, equating the aggressor and the aggrieved, suggesting the use of foreign troops, recommending resort to arbitration and providing for eventual partition of the State, is a highly mischievous document.

Apprehensions and doubts arising out of the discussion in the U.S.A. of the food gift and the reports of unfavorable congressional opinion generally subsided after President Truman's message of February 12, 1951, to Congress authorize the supply of grain to India. Commentators except the pro-Communists hailed the President's

1Digest, February 17-28, 1951.

2Ibid.

3H.S. Truman, "Indian Food Crisis," U.S. Department State Bulletin, F., 26, 1951. President Truman's recommendation to the Congress on February 12, 1951, for a free gift of one million tons of food grain to India.
recommendations. A large majority of papers which acknowledged that the gift was intended to be without any political strings. They said that even though one million tons of grain did not fully meet India's request, was a welcome gesture which would be instrumental in relieving distress in India and in promoting will among the Indian people.

Mr. Acheson's statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House, Washington, received very favorable comment. Almost all the commentators said that Mr. Acheson rightly remarked that India could not pay for two million tons of grain she needed without drawing heavily on her sterling balances and thus retarding her capital development.

While the editorial comments and sentiments on deal continued to be quite favorable, there was the familiar vehemence against the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir. In the former case, America was congratulated for her "humanitarian outlook"; the latter, she, along with Britain, was being blamed leaning heavily toward Pakistan expecting that Pakistan would be more dependable than India in the event another war. Thus, for some time, the Anglo-American resolution seemed to have again dissipated some of the good will which characterized early comment on the grain gift.

At this stage comments appeared on a Russian offer of fifty thousand tons of grain in exchange for jute, and the Chinese rice which

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arrived Indian ports. While even the favorable comment was gradually growing unfavorable toward America on account of the delay which was being caused in the passage of the bill before the U.S. Congress, papers started hoping that the Russian offer would be accepted by the Government of India.

Kashmir and Korea were the most discussed topics during the months of March and April, 1951. According to the Digest of March 13 to April 19, 1951, strong criticism was noted against the United States on the original and the revised Anglo-American resolutions. India's rejection of these resolutions was endorsed.

The press blamed the United States and the United Kingdom for power politics and injustice. An overwhelming majority of papers said that the revised Anglo-American resolution was a deliberate repudiation of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan's resolutions of August, 1948, and January 1949, as it retained arbitration to demilitarize the state.

Some of the commentators suggested that India should withhold cooperation from the proposed U.N. arbitrator in case the Security Council attempted to implement its Kashmir resolution in face of her opposition.

In the case of Korea, the most heated discussion was noticed on

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General MacArthur's report of March 23, 1951, and his plan for peace with North Korean and Communist Chinese forces. A great majority of papers said that the General's statement contained no indications whatsoever of his desire for peace on terms acceptable to Communist China. What had been asked for looked like a surrender rather than peace talk. Papers warned that MacArthur should be more discreet or else the matter would be complicated rather than solved.

The press also said that Peking was justified in rejecting MacArthur's truce offer which was coupled with threat. The Digest of March 31 to April 9, 1951, shows that the re-crossing of the 38th Parallel and the authorization to bomb the Chinese bases in Manchuria considered serious developments pregnant with possibilities. These developments once again evoked more unfavorable comment on "American unwillingness to discuss the Formosa issue and the Chinese membership of the United Nations". There was no change in the attitude of the papers until MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman on April 11, 1951.

Almost the entire press welcomed this decision of the President. Papers said "the U.S. President has displayed commendable courage by sacking the defiant General, whose absence will materially improve the prospects of an amicable settlement of the Korean trouble." The same group of papers also said that this action will raise a political storm in the U.S.A. because the General had powerful support of the Republican party. Papers, however, thought that dismissal of the General alone would not be enough. America should do something more to solve
the Korean tangle;

Once the food issue came up for discussion. This time the comment was unfavorable to begin with but later some themes showing favorable attitude were noted in the Digests of April 30 to May 13, 1951. The criticism was mainly against the conditions attached to the grain supply. Papers said that India would neither subject herself to the American surveillance in regard to distribution of grains nor "sing a throaty hallelujah to the Father Christmas of the free world." This attitude was changed for the better after Senator Humphrey's move on April 30, 1951, to enlist public support in raising grains.

Another development was Prime Minister Nehru's statement of May 1951, before the Indian Parliament in which he elucidated the Government of India's attitude on the two bills before the U.S. Congress expressed satisfaction with the terms of grain bills which were not considered discriminatory or derogatory.

This favorable trend was retarded by a fresh development on China as a result of the embargo resolution before the United States Congress which prohibited the export of strategic war materials to China and North Korea. This subject was tied in with the grain deal which was already under discussion. Resenting this resolution, papers said the proposed restrictions on export to China would further complicate the situation in Korea and lead to a world war. Fear was expressed by a large number of papers.

1Digest, April 30 to May 13, 1951.
that this blockade might hamper the flow of the much-needed Chinese
grain India.

Another theme in the Digest of April 14-20, 1951 was that the
embargo resolution proved there was little difference between the pol-
icy of the U.S. Government and that of General MacArthur who had,
before his dismissal, suggested similar actions against China.

The final approval on May 16 and 24, 1951 of the Food for India
Bill by both Houses of the U.S. Congress brought about a significant
change in the attitude of the Indian press which became appreciably
favorable. Papers welcomed the decision to $190,000,000 to
India to purchase grain from America. They also expressed gratitude
over the elimination of the Senate clause stipulating part payment of
the loan in strategic war materials including monazite.

The last theme on this subject according to the Digest of June 13-
22, 1951, was that the people of India thank the U.S. President, the
Congress and the people of the United States for magnificent food
aid to India. Papers said that Indo-American relations were likely to
improve.

Before the question of the peace treaty with Japan came up for
discussion during the period July 14-20, 1951, a few mixed and unfavor-
able themes were noted in the Digests of June 13 to July 13, 1951.
Comments on Kashmir deplored the attitude of the United Kingdom and the
United States during the continued discussion on this subject in the
Security Council. The comments on Korea discussed the Soviet proposal
June 23, 1951, for a cease-fire and an armistice along the 38th
Parallel. Almost all the papers said that this proposal should be seriously pursued to end the conflict in Korea. A few papers, however, asserted that after the Soviet proposal for cease-fire had been announced, "much depended upon America's attitude whether or not peace would be established in Korea." Once again they reminded that Communist China's admission to the U.N. was the most logical course for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.

The Digests from July 14 to September 17, 1951, show the major subject discussed by the Indian press during this period was a peace treaty with Japan. The government of India's communique of August 20, 1951, explaining her position regarding the terms of peace with Japan was widely discussed and approved by almost all the papers. Regarding the terms of the peace treaty, comment was highly unfavorable. A number of important themes shows that the papers thought the draft did not take into account vital facts of the situation as Communist China's had been ignored. One of papers seemed quite perturbed over absence from the draft of restrictions on Japanese rearmament which, according to the papers, might help her once again to become a menace to Asia.

The right given to Japan to conclude a treaty for stationing foreign troops in her territory was interpreted as a "device" to retain American troops in Japan. The only relieving feature seen in the treaty was the provision regarding non-payment of reparation by Japan.

About ten per cent of the commentators remarked that in the light
of the history of the Far East during the last half a century, Russia's non-participation in the Japanese peace treaty was likely to create complications.

The fact that India's suggestions regarding peace terms had been rejected, as well as the Government of India had rejected the proposed draft, made the Indian papers more critical of America.

Editors, strongly objecting to the clauses relating to the stationing of American troops in Japan as well as retention of the Bonin and Ryukyu islands under U.S. trusteeship, contended that such terms constituted an affront to Japan's honor and an infringement of her sovereignty. Several papers said that America would thus continue to "dominate" Japan. They also emphasized that the proposed treaty would not lessen tension in the Far East, as the majority of Asia's population would not be represented at the San Francisco Conference. A large number of papers supported the Government of India's stand in regard to Formosa, which, they said, should be returned to China. There was also renewed demand for the recognition of Communist China.

There was great uproar against President Truman's speech at San Francisco on September 4, where the treaty was to be signed. Papers said that the President's classification that those who supported the peace treaty were peace lovers and those who did not support it were war-mongers, was unjust and uncalled for. Editors also took exception to the reactions of a section of the American press and some politicians to India's stand on the proposed treaty. Finally papers
took pains to convince the United States that India's absence from
the San Francisco Conference was not Russian inspired but based on
fundamental convictions. Some of the papers asked the Government of
India not to delay her separate bilateral peace treaty with Japan.

A finishing touch was given to this subject in the statement
issued by Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, India's Ambassador to the
United States. In this statement issued on September 19, 1951, she
explained India's foreign policy and her earnest desire the pac-
ific settlement of disputes. She also said that if India had differ-
ed from the U.S.A. on certain occasions, it was because she felt that
on those issues the American attitude would not serve the of
peace. Comments on this statement show that highly critical atti-
tude of the press was somewhat toned down. A majority of papers wel-
comed the Indian Ambassador's reaffirmation of her country's affinity
with the democracies, and hoped that the statement would lead to
better appreciation of India's case abroad, especially in the United
States.

According to the Digests of November 5 to December 3, 1951,
the press discussed (1) the joint declaration from Paris on November 7,
1951, of the three western powers; (2) American Ambassador Chester
Bowles' press conference of November 16, 1951, in New Delhi, and (3)
Korean peace.

The attitude of most of the papers during this period was either
mixed or unfavorable. Discussing the peace talks of the three big
powers, regarding the disarmament program, the papers said:

Without doubting the peaceful intentions of the Western Powers, it must be admitted that their seven-point disarmament plan contains nothing new and is not likely to promote the cause of peace."

The adoption on December 19, 1951, by the U.N. of the Western Powers' disarmament plan received mixed comment. Papers deplored that the big powers had failed to evolve a workable plan. It was attributed to the suspicion and fear of each other among the big powers. In this connection, the proposal of India's permanent representative, Mr. B.N. Rau, which he placed before the United Nations on November 14, 1951, for a no-war declaration by the big powers received a large number of comments. A substantial group of papers said that this proposal provided a proper setting for the discussion of disarmament proposals. The opinions expressed on this proposal were critical of both Russia and America.

American Ambassador, Mr. Bowles', press conference evoked mixed comment, too. Whereas Bowles' approach in elucidating his aims for bringing about understanding between India and the U.S.A. was praised, these papers criticized him and the policy of his country for not recognizing the Communist Chinese government. A majority of papers said that if America's aim is to root out Communism, the panacea would be to render economic rather than military aid to smaller underdeveloped countries including India.

As regards Korea, opinion remained mixed for some time during this

1Digest, November 5-14, 1951.
period. The agreement on a cease-fire line in Korea praised and hopes were expressed that it would lead to greater East-West accord.

The Communists rejection of the U.N. proposal an immediate exchange of seriously d prisoners of war in Korea brought about a favorable change in press opinion on d America. Many papers condemned the decision of the communists and supported the "honest" and "earnest" approach made by General Ridgway, Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, which had no ulterior motive" except the plain fact that he wanted the welfare of the men and the distress of their families alleviated.

Ever since the cease-fire talks started, papers have emphasized that peaceful settlement should not be prevented by too close insistence on particular peace terms by either side. Hence quite an influential segment of the press said that the U.N. should accept the 38th Parallel the demarcation line. Similarly a substantial number of papers asked the Communists not to interrupt the talks by demands like withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea or exclusion of United Nation newsman from the Kaesong talks.

Cautious optimism was the keynote of the attitude of Indian press during the truce talks covered in the Digests of November 5, 1951, to January 22, 1952. The declaration of the U.N. Command in offering to surrender all Allied-occupied islands beyond the 38th Parallel was considered wise and commendable. But finally the failure the U.N. and Communist delegations to reach an armistice within the thirty-day time deplored.
Kashmir was infrequently discussed at the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952. Dr. Frank Graham's appointment as mediator in Kashmir was unwelcome to most of the papers. The majority of papers were skeptical of his success regarding demilitarization of Indian and Pakistan forces. A common theme at the time of the rejection of Dr. Graham's first and second reports was that it tended to concede to Pakistan parity with India in the matter of demilitarization in Kashmir. Some papers even said that the U.N. became the foreign affairs department of the United States.

The last significant event regarding Kashmir mentioned in the Digests of January 16 to 22, 1952, is the statement by Russia's representative in the Security Council, Jacob Malik. Writing on his statement which he made on January 17, 1952, an overwhelming majority of papers said that it provided a correct appraisal of the Kashmir dispute. Papers agreed with Malik that the reason for the protracted failure of the efforts of the mediators in Kashmir was the underlying motive of the U.S.A. and Britain to interfere in the internal affairs of Kashmir and to turn that country's freedom in the hands of the U.N. as a trust territory with Anglo-American domination in the guise of aid. Some papers remarked that the facts of the situation testified that such a conclusion appeared inescapable.

Except for two favorable themes noted during the month of January, 1952, on Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Agreement, all other themes were either mixed or unfavorable. On January 6, 1952, India and the United States signed a five-year pact for $50,000,000 technical
aid from the latter country to be utilised in various projects

India. This program falls under the India America Technical Cooperation Fund. On January 7, the American Ambassador, Mr. Bowles, said that more U.S. aid in future would depend on the Congress, but that he would urge the government of his country to extend one billion dollar aid to India. A large number of papers said that Mr. Bowles had done a signal service to both India and the U.S.A.

These two events helped the Indian press pass favorable comment about the United States. Welcoming the agreement, papers said that it should constitute an important landmark in the relations between the two countries. Satisfaction was expressed that there were no strings attached to the offer.

Mr. Churchill's visit to the United States on January 5, 1952, his talks with President Truman, and the joint communiqué issued by the two leaders' aroused some comment. A substantial group of papers said:

Although the joint declaration by President Truman Mr. Churchill that they do consider war is welcome, it is difficult to visualise how peace can last if the armament race continues.

Last comment in Digests under study is on the Collective Security Resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly on January 12.

1 New York Times, January 10, 1952. The joint Communiqué was issued on January 7, 1952. It contained a resolution, a warning and a promise that the two powers would unite their strength and purpose to insure peace and security. It also said that they would unify their policies, not only in Europe, but in the Middle East and Asia.

2 Digest, January 9-15, 1952.
1952, asking the members to keep forces ready for use if the Assembly recommended it. Reaction to this resolution was very critical. Papers said that the resolution "strikes at the very roots of the U. N. Charter and hence will not serve the interests of peace."

Another viewpoint on this subject endorsed India’s decision to remain neutral on the resolution. is, the papers said, was a vindication of the Government of India’s line of non-involvement in power-bloc politics in the United Nations.

A brief review of the attitude of the Indian press during the period December 8, 1949, January 22, 1952, gives the following impression:

1. Discussions on Kashmir issue have always had unfavorable comment on American policy toward India.

2. The question of the recognition of Red Chinese Government always evoked critical remarks about American foreign policy.

3. In the matter of peace treaty with Japan, the Indian press has consistently disapproved American policy.

4. On Korea, the majority of commentators were favorable in the early stages. But later they became more unfavorable than favorable. The recognition of China as the primary step to solve the Korean issue has always been considered during discussions on this subject. American policy on this matter made the Indian press more and more critical of that country. The crossing of the 38th Parallel by the U.N. forces has always been unfavorably criticized.

1Digest, January 9-15, 1952.
5. The question of the status of Formosa was always discussed with unfavorable attitude to American policy about this island.

6. The United promise of financial military aid to France to fight Ho Chi Minh forces in Indo-China has not been approved by Indian papers.

7. The food deal with India was the only subject which received favorable comment in the beginning and at the end. But the press showed a very sensitive attitude during the discussions on this bill in the U.S. Congress. Except during the final phases of this issue, comment was usually unfavorable.

8. The Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Program more favorable than unfavorable marks.

9. Considering the fluctuations in the opinions, it have been noted the of unfavorable comment was reached when four major issues, Korea, Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir, U.S. senators' attitude on food-for-India Bill and the delay in shipping the grain, China's recognition were being discussed in the early part of 1951. A similar climax was reached when, after termination of the food issue, the question of the Japanese peace treaty was discussed along with Korea, Kashmir, and China, toward end of the summer of 1951.

10. On miscellaneous subjects, the press attitude has usually been unfavorable toward the United States.

11. I may also be repeated here that during the early part of the press Digests under study, the Indian press showed a very insignificant interest America.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been to determine the attitude of some of the leading Indian newspapers toward the policies of the United States on major issues, from December 8, 1949 to January 22, 1952. The study justifies the following conclusions:

1. The activities of the United States Information Service in India covered a large field, using various media to disseminate information about the United States.

2. The work of the Press Analysis Section was one of the useful projects of the U.S.I.S., keeping the State Department of the United States informed about the press opinion in India on its policies.

3. The Indian Press Digest was both extensively and intensively prepared.

4. Except for a few minor defects as pointed out at the end of Chapter One, the Digests presented a fairly accurate picture of the press opinion in India.

5. The method of basic subject matter analysis of editorial contents was properly amplifying in preparing the Digests.

6. The Digest would show a more accurate picture of the press opinion if a general description of the tone of the editorials were given along with the themes and quotations.
7. In the Digest, there was no uniform method of showing the strength of support a particular viewpoint received from the commentators. The number of or expressing a viewpoint ought to be indicated besides mentioning whether that number constituted a majority, or minority, or a certain percentage of the commentators on a particular issue.

8. The summaries of the vernacular newspapers received the New Delhi office from Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras offices, might not convey a correct picture of the tone of the editorials. A statement showing the general slant of the editorials was needed.

9. It undoubtedly would be difficult to prepare a digest based editorials written in various languages in different parts of the country. In case there was a doubt about the views of any newspaper, the New Delhi office would not be in a position to satisfy itself.

10. The percentages of English newspapers whose attitudes were favorable, unfavorable, and independent toward the United States policies on Asian issues were 54.3, 33.3, and 13.3, respectively.

11. The percentages of favorable, unfavorable, and independent newspapers in languages were 22.08, 45.8, 31.2, respectively.

12. A majority English language papers was favorable and a majority of Indian language papers was unfavorable. The English newspapers generally commented more dispassionately than the vernacular papers.

13. Because the middle and lower middle classes read more Indian language papers than English, the influence of the Indian press on the masses probably was more unfavorable than favorable.

14. The list themes, given in Chapter Three, shows the follow-
Percentage of themes in relation to the total number of themes on each issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean conflict</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for India</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Pakistan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace treaty with Japan</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures show that on the issues of China, Kashmir, and Japan, almost the themes were unfavorable. This leads us to believe that the United States, almost the policies of the United States Government towards these issues, the readers of Indian newspapers, were not an adequate picture of the point of view on Kashmir. They constantly were reminded that the United States attitude on Asian issues, particularly in the case of Korea, the opinion of the press was divided from the beginning of the war. In Korea, the opinion of the press was divided from the beginning of the war, but a reverse order was noticed at later stages of the Korean war. The opinion of the press was divided from the beginning of the war.

On the other hand, the opinion of the press was divided from the beginning of the war, but a reverse order was noticed at later stages of the Korean war. The opinion of the press was divided from the beginning of the war.
On miscellaneous issues, a majority of themes were unfavorable while an insignificant minority were favorable.

On food issue alone a majority (more than half) of themes were favorable, and the press showed a very sensitive attitude during the discussion on this bill before the U.S. Congress. It also showed impatience at the delay caused in the decisions by the U.S. Houses to pass the bill. The attitude of the press on this subject might have antagonized a section of public opinion against America and the American public opinion against India.

15. The fluctuations in press opinion were, briefly, as follows:

The climax of unfavorable comment was reached when four major issues: Korea, Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir, food-for-India bill before the United States Congress, and Communist China's recognition, were being discussed in the early part of 1951. A similar climax was again reached when, after the termination of the food issues, the question of the Japanese peace treaty was discussed along with Korea, Kashmir, and China toward the end of the summer of 1951.

16. During the early part of the press Digest under study, the Indian press showed a very insignificant interest in America. However, this conclusion can not be drawn with certainty because there were a few omissions in the material available for this period.

17. Later, the over-all attitude of the press was critical of American policies in so far as Asian issues were concerned.

18. Some of the most unfavorable English language papers were:

(a) Blitz, weekly of Bombay.
(b) Cross Roads, weekly of Bombay.
(c) Nation of Calcutta.
(d) National Herald of Lucknow.
Some of the most favorable English language papers were:

a. Indi as Madras.

b. Mail as.


d. Statesman of Calcutta and New Delhi.

e. Thought weekly of Delhi.

Some of the most unfavorable vernacular papers were:

(a) Aljamiat of Delhi; Urdu.

(b) Janashakti of Bombay; Marathi.

c. Calcutta.

d. Bharat Times of Delhi; Hindi.

Some of the most favorable vernacular papers were:

(a) Bharat of Allahabad; Hindi.

(b) Dinamani of Madras; Tamil.

c. Hindustan of Hindi.

19. A review of the study shows that the pattern shows that the attitude of the Indian press in general has been consistent, too. The editors of Indian newspapers were generally prompt in commenting on any development on issues relating to Asian countries.

20. The fact that a majority of newspapers were unfavorable and a majority of themes were unfavorable too, substantiates the remarks contained in the Digests about the general attitude of the newspapers toward the United States.

21. Finally, granting that the opinion of newspapers plays an important role in influencing public opinion, it may be inferred that the readers of Indian papers were generally inclined to be critical of the U.S. policies on Asian issues examined in this study.
Suggestions for Future Study

The source material used in this study has been the Press Digests which were prepared by the U.S.I.S., New Delhi, only for the U.S. Department of State. In view of the unavailability of this particular material in the libraries or in the bookstores, excerpts of Indian newspaper editorials entitled "ily" Foreign Radio Broadcasts monitored and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the Department of State may partly serve for continued research on this subject.

The press digest may also be obtained from the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, or the U.S. Department of State by special arrangement.

Another possibility is that the library subscribe to fifteen twenty newspapers representing different languages and political parties in India. A tu based on the original source material—the in such papers—will be highly profitable.

Yet another source is the "Indian Press Digest" started recently (March, 1952) the Bureau of International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of California, in Berkeley. This digest consists of the editorial opinions of over a half dozen newspapers. But, a report in the digest indicates that in future a larger number of papers will

With any one or more of these materials used for future research, it should not be difficult to produce good results.

Besides a continued study on this subject, the following fields
closely connected with this, offer scope for future research:

1. A content analysis of the editorial opinions, special articles, and news items in the pro-Communist Indian publications alone will make a useful project for research. These publications usually contain material against the United States. The news items too are often written with an anti-American slant.

2. The U.S.I.S. libraries in India provide a field of study. These libraries have American books on different subjects. A study of the types of books kept in those libraries, and the nature of the demand of readers should make an interesting topic.

3. A detailed study of the activities of various sections of the U.S.I.S.—the film section, the exhibit section and their inter-relationships—would offer another possible field of research.

4. A study of the various types of programs on the Voice of America broadcasts for India offers another possible field of research.

5. The analysis of the material used by the Far Eastern Desk of the U.S. Department of State for Indian consumption could be an interesting subject. This material is published in news bulletins, special bulletins on economic, political, and social aspects of American life, and a variety of other publications like pamphlets, leaflets, and weekly newspapers.

6. All India Radio used a large number of records of American music. These records loaned to that organization without any cost or obligation. A study of the kind of music frequently used by All India Radio would be a revealing project for research.
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