

SOME PHASES
OF
MEXICAN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
1910 - 1914

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
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Chapter I

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Mexico and the United States

The history of Mexico and the United States during the five years preceding the "critical era", 1910-14, was more than customarily free from dispute or the portent of trouble. In general the period was characterized by reciprocal expressions of courtesy, friendliness and good will. If below the surface the sensational bubbling of Mexican oil sent ominous reverberations through a half dozen chancelleries not the slightest echo was carried in the diplomatic pouches between Mexico City and Washington, D. C. Positive acts of friendship gave substance to the niceties of diplomatic exchange and lent to the whole an appearance of international equanimity which gave strength to the despot Diaz and hope to the suckers for peace. In 1907 the United States graciously lent the aid of its powerful arm in the perpetuation of that worst scandal of all Mexican centralism, the subjugation and enslavement of the Yaqui Indians, by laying down a strict embargo on arms traffic across the Arizona border. (1) In the same year the then American Secretary of State, Mr. Elihu Root, made his Latin-American visit in the course of which he delivered his justly famous "we desire no territory" speech. On his

(1) Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Government Printing Office, 1918, Washington, D.C., p. 852. (Hereafter referred to as U.S.F.R.)

journey through Mexico he was received with enthusiastic acclaim. A few months later war in Central America was the occasion for the two republics to offer their friendly aid in the hope of settling once and for all the chronic troubles of that unhappy land. The result was the preliminary protocol of September 17th, 1907, which led directly to the Central American Peace Conference. (2) This conference, which met in Washington, D.C. on November 14th, 1907 drafted the treaties creating the Central American Court of Justice. (3) The inauguration was set for December 20th, 1908 with representatives present from all the signatory powers. The ceremony itself was a model of traditional Latin American hospitality and eloquence. Senor Greel, the Mexican spokesman, in the course of his address stated that this happy project

"is the result of the labor of the Pan American conferences; it is a consequence of the deliberations of the Hague; it is the national soul which palpitates in the Mexican people always disposed to glorify justice; it is the fruit of the voyage of the distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Elihu Root, that sincere friend of Latin-America. It is the triumph of justice over passion and of principle over force." (4)

Even before this, the two countries had ratified and proclaimed an arbitration convention for the pacific settlement of all controversies save only those affecting national

(2) U.S.F.R., p. 226.

(3) Ibid, p. 215.

(4) Ibid, p. 227.

honor and vital interests. (5) This convention, one of the series for which Mr. Root was responsible, was not more than gesture since the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo provides sufficient guaranties, presumably, against overt acts of aggression by either of the two nations toward the other.

Appropriately enough this sentiment of mutual good will culminated in the meeting of Presidents Diaz and Taft on the international border in 1909, (6) and in the presence, at the Centennial of Mexican Independence in 1910, (7) of a distinguished group of American citizenry. This celebration, the most elaborate affair ever given in the new world, marked the zenith of the power of Diaz. Shortly thereafter, revolution and its concomitants brought an end to the externalized peace of a military order and paved the way for fifteen years of almost continuous difficulty between the two nations.

The Cycle of Revolution In Mexico

The roots of this outbreak lay deep in the past. If we are to view the event in terms of the broadest historical perspective the revolution of 1910 may be considered as the perennial effort of a degraded population to achieve

(5) U.S.F.R. 1908, p. 625.

(6) Ibid, 1909, p. 425.

(7) Ibid, 1910, p. 713-16.

what has been dimly conceived to be its rights. When in 1810, Hidalgo, the Creole priest, raised the banner of revolt against the overbearing lordship of the Spanish aristocracy, currents of thought and action were released, which only in the third decade of the twentieth century hold a dubious promise of fulfillment. For the revolution of 1810 was, in a very real sense, characteristic of the subsequent movements through which the Mexican people have sought to secure for themselves a dignified status among the nations of the world and a sound basis for their own economic well-being. It was characteristic in that the elimination of the efficient head and cause of their conditions failed to provide for the fulfillment of revolutionary expectations. The Spaniards fell but the fruits of eleven years of strife were received, not by the inarticulate millions, but by the Roman Catholic Church. (8)

Hopeless chaos ensued and personalism, the bane of Mexican politics then as now, became the measure of allegiance, the dubious hope of salvation and the helpless prop of national solidarity. Numerous presidents and innumerable "plans" added to the general confusion until Senito Juarez, the great Mexican patriot defined the issue anew. On this occasion the church was marked for attack and this objective received its embodiment in Article 123 of the Constitution of 1857 which provided for the legal separation of

(8) E. Gruening; Mexico and Its Heritage, Century Co., New York, 1928. p. 164, et seq.

church and state.

A terrible civil war lasting three years was precipitated by this enactment, leaving Mexico defenseless in the face of European attack. At length, following the close of the American Civil War, the unfriendly attention of the United States was focussed upon the foreign regime in Mexico with the result that the liberals were again established as the de jure authority.

The struggle against the "ecclesiastical tyranny" was renewed but with results which were disappointing to those engaged in its prosecution. Unhappily Juarez died shortly after reassuming control and although his position was taken and his program continued by another liberal, Lerdo de Tyado, reaction in the person of Porfirio Diaz overthrew the government and inaugurated what was to be the longest period of Mexico's internal security since the deposition of the last Spanish viceroy.

The Mexican Ethos

But there is more in Mexican history than the theatrical performances of aggressive individuals engaged in the exploitation of their fellows proportionate to their particular powers. When Cortes and his little band engaged the powerful Moctezuma for possession of the Mesa Central, the status of the Indians--their economies, their loyalties, their gods, their pleasures and industries, their arts and manners--in a word, the ethoses of the various tribes, was

virtually identical with that of their descendants at the time of Porfirio Diaz' downfall. And in the general scene the nature of their loyalties stands out prominently. Mexico is a land of tribes, of varied cultural patterns, whose distinguishing features are reinforced by ethnic differences. (9) A truly Mexican nation is yet in the process of formation. Patria Chica--little country, community, tribe--they understand and give ready allegiance to. Patria Grande--Mexico of Mexicans in an all-enveloping sense--is a hope of contemporary leadership. The Yaqui Indians and the Mayans of the south have but one thing in common; the horrible treatment dealt both by their superiors in power. If the geographical separation is great the cultural distance between the respective inhabitants is immense and is given edge by a difference in racial extraction. It is not an exaggeration to say that the most difficult task of the group now in power is the elimination of these profound differences which preclude the formation of an unified culture. The most difficult, the most necessary, and--perhaps--the most cruel. Not all of the leaders in this work are like that able anthropologist, Dr. Gamio, who, while earnestly engaged in seeking a solid foundation for a Mexican nationality, is carefully leaving the broadest latitude for the retention

(9) Vasconesles, Some Mexican Problems, University of Chicago, 1926, p. 1.

of phases of tribal culture not integral to the primary
(10)
objective.

The Spaniards

To an already complex picture the Spaniards have not made a happy addition. Fundamentally their political annihilation was attempted and, in the main, achieved by the revolution of 1810-21. They remain as the peak of the social hierarchy. Their arrogance toward the many is only equalled by the hatred of the latter for them. This sentiment has its roots in centuries of caste discrimination and economic degradation for which the Spaniards were largely responsible. Having found a land well along the road toward latifundia under the native disposition their task was made easy. The native chiefs were deposed and executed and deserving lieutenants received their provinces. If the tempo was heightened, the scale of operations enlarged, the process remained essentially the same. (11) In time the land holdings of individuals grew to enormous size. The so called system of encomiendas, by which families and groups "commended" to the hacendado, giving possessions in return for his solicitous care, gave way when abolished by crown edict to a regime of peonage in comparison with which slavery in the United States may

(10) Gruening, op cit, p. 661.

(11) Gamio, Manuel Aspects of Mexican Civilization, 1926, p. 27.

be considered to have been an expression of benevolent paternalism. (12) Toward the end of the century the run of the tide became unmistakable. (13) As usual the aristocracy gave way reluctantly, to reluctantly to save the war which engulfed them, in 1821, withdrew from the scene of action as a dynamic force in Mexican life.

The Land Problem

To understand Mexico it is necessary to know something about Mexican geography. A land of three-fourths of a million square miles should be able to provide bounteously for its fifteen million inhabitants, yet such could not be more mistaken. In 1910, in spite of the discovery and exploitation of oil, in spite of extensive mining operations, in spite of the introduction of hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign capital, in spite of thirty-five years of absolute internal peace, during which internal development proceeded, unceasingly, in spite of a rising standard of living throughout the western world, in spite of everything, that is to say, which a technological civilization could give to a country prodigiously rich in the resources necessary to its man, the economic condition of ten million Mexican peons was worse than it had been a hundred years

(12) McBride, Geographical Land Systems of Mexico, 1923, p. 67.

(13) McBride, op cit., p. 67.

(14)
 before! Man and nature bears the responsibility. Only a fourth of the entire country can be used for agriculture, save by the expenditure of sums beyond the capacity of any government in power since 1910. Into the relatively small mesa central are gathered most of the total population. From time immemorial the basis of the economy has been agriculture. It remains so to this day and for this reason the most urgent, immediate task of the revolutionary program has been and is the division of the large landed estates,— the creation of a large body of small, independent ranchers in place of four hundred and forty-one hacendados who with the church, the governing clique and the foreign concessionaries owned, controlled and derived the economic benefit from virtually the entire nation.

(15)

The Catholic Church

One of the most considerable contributions of Spain to the Mexican culture has been the Roman Catholic Church. But largely the tale is a testimonial, not to the asceticism of God's vicars, but to the brutality and greed of a corrupt hierarchy. Although they came as saints, degeneration, except in rare and beautiful individuals, made them the instruments of the anti-Christ. If the accumulation

(14) Hockett, Land and Oil Dispute with Mexico, Carnegie Foundation, p. 7

(15) Hockett, op cit., p. 29.

of land and riches, the leading of pompous and sensual lives, the degradation and virtual enslavement of natives, if revolutionary intrigue and treachery, assassination and hypocrisy be the measure of Godliness conceived in Christian terms, then the Roman Catholic Church, as it operated in Mexico may be taken as the criterion of moral excellence. (16)

As early as 1767 the abuses of the Jesuits led to their forcible expulsion and the expropriation of their lands. (17)

During the first revolution they, the hierarchy, connived at, and were responsible for, independence, when continued attachment to Spain appeared to involve ruin for themselves in Mexico. The notorious Iturbide, darling of the churchmen, was "elected" on a platform whose chief intent was the maintenance of the agrarian status quo. (18)

It is almost impossible for a citizen of the Model Republic to grasp the extent of the priestly power. Their spiritual office invested them with control over the minds and consciences of the illiterate millions. They were the money-lenders of the nation. They owned half of the country's real estate. They held mortgages on much other property. The police and the army were their minions. They compiled the Index. Their censorship of freedom of expression was absolute. Finally

(16) See Gruening, op cit. Chapter on the church.

(17) Mosie B., Spain's Declining Power in South America, p. 97.

(18) McBride, op cit, p. 66.

they possessed certain privileges--fueros--which guaranteed them immunity from the law of the land. (19) There was a "close" corporation whose creed was impugned and whose power was attacked by the disinherited in body and spirit. La Reforma was only belated expression of centuries of animosity.

In the War of the Reform the church became the open and avowed antagonist of the Indian millions whose open and avowed objective was the recovery of their lost birth-rights. The hierarchy lost and in defeat the highest church men in the land appealed to the imperial imagination of the emperor of France. (20) Indian Mexico, prostrate after three of civil war, was confronted with the fact of foreign domination to be exercised presumably, in behalf of their internal enemies. And although the constitution of 1857, which remained the law of the land theoretically until 1917, actually until 1914, or perhaps 1876 contained safeguards against the return of the "ecclesiastical tyranny", Porfirio Diaz was not long without its aid. The subtle despot made no effort at open alliance. Rather, the relationship was in the nature of an understanding, an entente cordiale. In the words of Priestly, historian of Mexico, the church made "no open attempt--to dominate politics. Only with the tacit consent

(19) Gruening, idem.

(20) Gruening, p. 207.

of Diaz did it continue its economic dominance, providing fuel for the flames of revolt which broke out in 1910." (21)

It may be justly inferred that this was not without a consideration of a kind. The events of the past fifteen years would appear to confirm it.

During the campaign following the resignation of Diaz the church again enlisted on the side of conservatism. (22)

They were defeated in as popular an election as Mexico had ever witnessed. As yet there was no distinct anticlerical bias apparent in the movement. (23)

The rise of Huerta received their enthusiastic support and "they sowed the wind". And when he fell they "reaped the whirlwind". (24)

The church was doomed and the constitution of 1917 records the fact in legal form.

The Heritage of Distrust

Rightly or wrongly, the United States in the Mexican apprehension, is the Colossus of the North. This sentiment which has dated from the time of their independence, originated in the fear that their country would be absorbed by the aggressive young giant. Even before the separation

(21) Priestly, H. I., The Mexican Nation: A History, 1923, Chapter 22.

(22) Gruening, p. 213.

(23) Gruening, idem.

(24) Idem.

from Spain the loss of Florida paved the way for the establishment of a tradition. Once started, support was always forthcoming from both sides of the border. If the halls of Congress shook with the cries for "natural boundaries" in the early half of the century there was no absence of individuals in Mexico willing to capitalize on such expression for political purposes. The modern historian has compelled a revision of General Grant's characterization of the Mexican War; never-the-less, for Mexicans the entire affair was in the nature of a colossal steal. They point to the physical facts. The foreigner was invited to their land. He came, acquired property, accepted the favors of a generous government, and, when numerous enough rebelled against the benefactor during a period of internal dislocation at the ^{or report} overt instigation of the Yankees. For their purposes that is sufficient and the belief as belief loses nothing in its intensity by reason of its inadequate factual basis.

The classic expression of American aggrandisement at Mexico's expense is found in the Gadsden purchase. The territory acquired was small and the price paid perhaps not too ridiculous. But in the Mexican mind the exchange is regarded as the last word in plunder. Santa Anna, the repudiated militarist, was maintained in power by virtue of his success in making the negotiation. At the moment when the entire nation, weary of his ruthless exploits, was making every effort to dislodge him, the government of the

United States, friend of justice and democracy, was the
 (25) instrument of his continued power. Thenceforward,
 until late in 1927, the general viewpoint has been one
 of fear and distrust. It remains to be seen whether a
 change in economy has or can effect a change in attitude.

For the dynamic of an earlier imperialism was land
 hunger. Its results were tangible and visible in terms of
 border extension. Today the agents of imperialism--
 economic it is called--can, by the discreet use of powers
 which at least some consider more or less at their dis-
 posal, maintain a mannerly exterior the while ends are
 achieved. The transition was not effected in a moment
 however, and Mexico, when in need of steel to reinforce
 her already stout concrete, can point to the Caribbean
 activities of the United States with some degree of re-
 levance. The carry-over does not affect the argument; the
 significant fact is that, beginning shortly after the
American Civil War the nature of the American interest in
Mexico shifted from an emphasis on land to an emphasis on
investment. In addition to creating the general problem
 of investment and its control--which has yet to be answered--
 the movement had special meaning within Mexico itself. It
 is now fairly well established that the impulse which found
 expression in the Madero revolution was motivated by the

(25) I have depended upon J. F. Rippey, The United States
 and Mexico, 1926, Chapters 7 and 8, for fact and
 interpretation.

desire of the middle class to gain some degree of political recognition and the perquisites which attend its possession. (26) Once under way the current could not be controlled and the constitution of 1917 and the labor laws passed subsequently bristle with restrictions on capital. In the Mexico with which this paper will deal, that period has not arrived. A generalization to the effect that foreign concessionaries were competing along national lives and with native capitalists for the favors which appear to have been the whim of Diaz and that the English interests seemed on the point of winning, which in turn antagonized the Mexicans and at least the Americans, is defensible. So the story runs. Whether the latter part is true or untrue cannot be determined now with certainty. Diaz with his usual sagacity was in no mood to permit the Americans to gain a transcendent control. If he sought to offset a too powerful Doherty with an ambitious Cowdray, it was good statescraft in his school. As usual with his kind he counted too strongly on the passivity of his subjects and much too strongly on the applicability to foreigners of the good doctrine of divide and rule. With the Great War but a short distance ahead, Mexican oil was not to be

(27)

lightly abandoned. The causes were many but these two

(26) F.R., 1911, p. 352. Wilson to Knox, Oct. 31, 1910.

(27) Doherty and John Linds' testimony in Fall Report, 1919. Davenport, E.H. and Cooke, S.R., The Oil Trusts and Anglo American Relations, MacMillan, 1923, p. 67.

alone were more than sufficient to send him on his travels.

The Immediate Antecedents of the Revolution of 1910

This momentary glance of Mexican history indicates some of the factors which were brought into play upon the appeal of Madero to the nation. Overt opposition to Diaz first appeared in 1903 in Nuevo Leon while the state elections were being held. A pacific demonstration was suppressed with some bloodshed. Two years later Benito Juarez Democratic clubs were organized in the same state with a program which provided for "no reelection" of municipal presidents or governor.²⁸ The organization held a state convention (which for reasons of safety to its delegates met in Mexico City) and in general attracted the notice of the discontented elements throughout the country. The futility of this sort of opposition to Diaz was demonstrated on election day. Once under way, however, the sentiment grew, receiving additional strength from the statement of President Diaz in March, 1908 to the effect that he would retire when his term of office--the seventh-- was completed. "I welcome an opposition party in the Mexican Republic", he stated. "If it should develop power, not to exploit, but to govern, I will stand by it."⁽²⁸⁾ An immediate result was the publication of

(28) This information, including the quotation, is to be found in note preceding the correspondence in United States Foreign Relations, p. 348-54. Quote from Greel's Interview in Pearson's Magazine, March, 1908.

Francisco Madero's "La Sucesion Presidencial" which made the author the leader of this party. Madero's thesis was simple: the Mexicans had always been exploited by the few in pursuit of their own selfish interests. The cause was chiefly political he held and would disappear if the population could choose their own officials with sufficient frequency. At the time when the homeopathic cure for democracy was becoming respectable in the United States, Madero was preaching his panacea to his Mexican friends. The reception was enthusiastic. "No reelection and effective suffrage" was inscribed on the revolutionary banner. It may not have meant a great deal but it was a motto and Mexicans must have their mottos.

The opposition had not been misled by the greeting which Diaz had extended to their party. Their fears were realized when the dictator again announced his intention to become a candidate to succeed himself. He chose for his vice-president the "iniquitous" científico, Ramon Covial, one of the most hated men of Mexico and one whom Madero described as fully competent to maintain the Diaz-system. The Mexican machivelli was eighty years old. The contest now began in earnest with the elections set for June 26th, 1910. On June 5th, while campaigning in San Louis Potosi, Madero was arrested and imprisoned. He escaped to the United States and promulgated his plan of

San Louis Potosi at the same time issuing a manifesto declaring the government of Diaz illegitimate after the thirtieth of the following November.

While the Maderist movement was thus under way efforts were being made to invalidate the election through the courts. One hundred and fifty cases of fraud were presented in due form; the courts refused to hear the plaintiffs. Thereupon a direct appeal was made to the National Congress for a new election. The Congress not only refused to entertain the petition; they declared the legal election of Diaz and Cerral. It was then that the opposition was definitely convinced of the futility of further peaceable measures. Armed insurrection was selected as the court of final appeal.

(29) U.S.F.R., Ibid.

Chapter II
THE FIRST REVOLUTION

It has been suggested that the end of Porfiro Diaz was presaged by an ever increasing opposition to his subservience to foreign interests, the church, and his private coterie of advisors, the Cientificos. Concomitantly outbreaks against foreigners occurred in which Americans were the chief sufferers. These outbreaks were aggravated by the social and economic position which Americans, resident in Mexico, occupied. The iron hand of Diaz was, for a time, sufficient for their protection. The provoking incidents therefore usually resulted from forays across the northern border which Diaz was almost powerless to prevent. The Americans in the border states did not passively accept these marauding excursions; the Texas rangers are only a well-known example of the measures employed in self defense. Fire added to fire only increased the rancor on both sides; it burned at white heat when a body of Mexicans crossed the Rio Grande at San Benito, Texas and in the course of their visit, killed two ranger officers. (1) Reprisals

(1) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 349.

did not occur however until an alleged Mexican citizen raped and murdered an American woman. He was burned alive by a mob of Texans at Rock Springs and Mexico rang with protest. (2) It was this event, probably more than any other which gave the rebellious elements in the country an opportunity to make themselves heard. Secretary Knox quickly disavowed the legality of the burning (3) but the public indignation was aroused and by a clever maneuver it was identified with the opposition to the dictator. (4) As ambassador Wilson wrote: "It is a common form of thought in the Mexican mind that the Americans are getting the best of everything in the country and that they should be molested whenever possible through the forms of law or otherwise." (5) This sentiment occasioned by the Texas burning, continued to grow in volume and intensity until the ambassador felt called upon to protest with more than usual vigor against it. (6) The Mexican government, above all apologetic, reminded Mr. Wilson that arrests had been made and expressed the hope that similar action would occur in the United States. (7)

(2) Ibid.

(3) U.S.F.R.; 1911, p. 357, Knox, de la Barree, Nov. 10, 1910.

(4) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 358, Wilson to Knox, Nov. 14, 1910

(5) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 352, Wilson to Knox, Oct. 31, 1910.

(6) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 354, Wilson to Knox, Nov. 10, 1910.

(7) Idem.

Diaz was energetic in proportion to his power. He suppressed the more violent of the newspapers, dispersed public meetings, closed various centers of anti-American propaganda including the University and in general did what he could to compel a cessation.

Not content with customary methods of protest, Ambassador Wilson addressed a long public letter to the Mexican Herald (American owned) in which he stated that the American government would "leave nothing undone which should be done" (8) to the end that Americans would be relieved from mob abuse. (9) While no one single cause could be cited as provoking the anti-American (unless it was the Texas affair) the demonstrations were an asset to the rebels since their suppression by the Federal Government linked Cientifico and Gringo and swelled the insurrectionary bands accordingly. (10)

The situation was now growing critical as the time for the armed insurrection was approaching. On November 26th, Mr. Wilson wrote his department a letter describing the situation fully. Discontent was not confined to any one class; it shot through the entire society. Should a popular leader of strong character appear chaos would result. The earlier suppressions had not removed causes. The very

(8) Idem.

(9) U.S.F.R., p. 366, Creel to Wilson, Nov. 24, 1910.

(10) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 353, Wilson to Knox, Oct. 31, 1910.

nervousness of the government and the rigor of their censorship was portentous. The Ambassador feared for the future. (11)

The following March he was in Washington, D. C. in conference with the President. It was his opinion that the situation in Mexico was far worse than the press dispatches disclosed. "Diaz is on a volcano of popular uprising" of which the small outbreaks were the early symptoms. He thought a general explosion altogether probable. (12)

In view of this report the president, after consulting with the secretaries of war and navy, ordered the mobilization of an army division of full strength at San Antonio, Texas, a brigade of three regiments at Galveston, a brigade of infantry on the California border and a squadron of war vessels for San Diego and Galveston. (13) In Mexico this was immediately interpreted to mean intervention. However, President Taft gave definite assurances of his intention not to intervene (14) and President Diaz expressed his satisfaction with the explanation for the troop movement. (15) President Taft explained his order as a measure.

(11) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 357, Wilson to Knox, March 26, 1910.

(12) U.S.F.R., 1911, President Message, p. XI, Dec. 7, 1911.

(13) U.S.F.R., 1911, Message to Congress, p. XII.

(14) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 416, H. Wilson to H. L. Wilson, Mar. 7, 1911.

(15) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 423, de la Barra to Knox, Mar. 14, 1911.

of precaution for American lives and properties, to aid in enforcing the neutrality statutes, (16) and because it was calculated to have a quieting influence on internal Mexico. (17) Whether Diaz recognized it, the mobilization was a measure of prudence for the contingent necessary for intervention as it is scarcely plausible to expect that a unit of this size would be required to defend the border states against the operations of isolated bands. However, Mr. Taft was aware of the dangers of intervention and the ease with which such a venture could become a necessity, but in spite of express disclaimers to the contrary the fear was widespread both in the United States and Mexico that an ulterior purpose impelled the move. Only the governmental circle in Mexico City took the disclaimers at face value. The suspicion was so lively there that Mr. Knox asked Mr. de la Barra to have his innocence published in the Mexican newspapers. This de la Barra did (18) but without striking results.

If fear of intervention was general in Mexico, sentiment in favor of it was not absent in the United States. Governor Sloan of Arizona, following an engagement between the Federals and the Insurrectos opposite Douglas in which

(16) U.S.F.R., 1911, see chapter on Neutrality.

(17) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. XII, Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1911.

(18) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 423, De la Barra to Knox, Mar. 9, 1912.

two Americans were killed and a number wounded earnestly petitioned the President for positive action. "In my judgment," he telegraphed, "radical measures are needed to protect our innocent people, and if anything can be done to stop the fighting at Agua Prieta (Mexico) the situation calls for such action."⁽¹⁹⁾ This incident

involved a technical violation of American sovereignty which was dismissed upon promises of adequate compensation for damages.⁽²⁰⁾ In reply Mr. Taft credited both sides with attempting to observe the rights of residents north of the boundary, which however, in the stress of battle could be easily lost sight of. "The situation might justify one in ordering our troops to cross the border and attempt to stop the fighting...." But, in his judgment, such a procedure would only result in resistance and greater bloodshed and the misconstruction of motives. The Mexican public would be enraged which would result in reprisals against Americans in Mexico, and pressure in favor of intervention "might not be practicable to resist." "It is impossible to foresee or reckon the consequences of such a course and we must use the greatest self-restraint to avoid it." He admonished the Governor of Arizona, pending his earnest representations

(19) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 459, Gov. Sloan to Pres. Taft, Ap. 17, 1911.

(20) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 458, Wilson to Knox, Ap. 17, 1911.
Incl. I.

to the Mexican government so to distribute his Douglas constituents, that safety from the shot and shell of the morrow's battle would be assured. (21) The "earnest representations" were despatched. The Federal forces received the blame for the action and the Diaz government was definitely warned that a recurrence would compel the measures which he was anxious to avoid. (22)

If the President were reluctant to engage in a venture, the political consequences of which none could foretell, he was supported in his own mind by doubts of its constitutionality. It would be interesting to conjecture what a Roosevelt might have done in this instance with a Dominican experience behind him. However, President Taft, in commenting upon the press despatches which purported to show that he contemplated intervention, stated that he "seriously doubt(ed) whether I have such authority under any circumstances; and if I had I would not exercise it without express congressional approval." (23) That is the equivalent of saying that he knew that intervention, irrespective of ends to be achieved or means to be employed, was merely a euphemism for war, the declaration of which was the respon-

(21) U.S.F.R., 1911, Pres. Taft to Gov. Sloan, April 18, 1911.

(22) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 459, Wilson to de la Barra, April 15, 1911.

(23) U.S.F.R., 1911, Presidents Message to Congress, p. XII, quote from letter to Chief of Staff, dated Mar. 15, 1911.

sibility of Congress. One of the most significant papers in the correspondence is that which instructs Ambassador Wilson that the warning sent on April 15th was not to be released to the press. (24)

This view was of course subject to change, and events of the following weeks were successful in effecting this. The situation in Mexico was becoming worse steadily. The suspension of constitutional guarantees had already been resorted to. (25) Division in the Federal camp was a fact.

Limantour, the strong man of the cabinet was openly opposing the President's vacillating policy. He failed to delegate the requisite authority and his own inertia prevented him from forcing the measures necessary to put down the rebellion. (26) On March 29th, a new cabinet was

appointed. (27) On April 3rd, Diaz announced his intention of going before to ask for laws to prevent reelection, to effect a reform of the judiciary, to give local autonomy and to legalize the division of the great estates. (28) A few days later vice-president Corral left for Europe on an eight month's leave of absence, the orthodox manner of withdrawal and the surest evidence of the approaching

(24) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.464, Knox to Wilson, April 20, 1911.

(25) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.427, Dearing to Knox, Mar. 17, 1911.

(26) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.431, Wilson to Knox, Mar. 22, 1911.

(27) US .F.R., 1911, p.441, Wilson to Knox, Mar. 29, 1911.

(28) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.444, Wilson to Knox, April 3, 1911.

(29) climax. By May 4th, Diaz was ready to enter into negotiations with the revolutionaries.
(30)

Under such conditions as these the expectation of a stiffened attitude on the part of the President is justified. His original remarks on the subject had quieted the anti-American manifestations as they had sobered the government to a sense of its responsibility. By April 17th, President Taft was willing to state that he would intervene in the event of a condition of anarchy but only with "great reluctance".
(31) The American ambassador stated that the act of the President alone could save the situation.
(32)

Presumably, that meant intervention, but President Taft refrained. An occurrence of May 3rd threatened for a time to cause more difficulty. A telegram from the American Charge at Buenos Aires relative to statements published in the newspapers in that city involved Minister de la Barra in a papable act of dishonesty. The Mexican government had accepted President Taft's explanation for the mobilization as satisfactory. In a dispatch to his charge, de la Barra had stated that the presence of the American troops on the northern border was very distressing and that it might lead to conflict.
(33) The immediate situation relieved the

(29) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.452, Wilson to Knox, April 12, 1911.

(30) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.475, Wilson to Knox, May 4, 1911.

(31) U.S.F.R., p.459, Pres. Taft to Knox, April 17, 1911.

(32) U.S.F.R., p.432, Wilson to Knox, March 25, 1911.

(33) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.473, Wilson to de la Barra, May 3, 1911.

minister from the necessity of making an embarrassing reply.

On May 4th, the ambassador telegraphed his department that anarchy impended contingent upon the success or failure of the peace negotiations (34)

and three days later Madero issued a statement declaring all negotiations at an end. (35) The drive on Mexico City was to start immediately

since he would forego the capture of Juarez in order not to risk the repetition of another Agua Prieta affair. (36)

The next day Diaz announced he would resign when permitted to do so by his conscience--that is, when order was reestablished. (37) At this time Wilson was instructed to provide for local defense, all Americans to

"remain strictly non-partisan". (38) On May 11th, irrespective of his original intention, Juarez had fallen to the Maderists (39)

and on the seventeenth of May, Carbajal, the government commissioner was instructed to notify Madero that the President and vice-president would resign before the end of the month. The armistice suggested provided for the ad interim presidency of Mr. de la Barra, his

(34) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 475, Wilson to Knox, May 4, 1911.

(35) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 477, Letcher to Knox, May 7, 1911.

(36) Idem.

(37) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 477, Wilson to Knox, May 8, 1911.

(38) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 477, Knox to Wilson, May 8, 1911.

(39) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 481, Edwards to Knox, May 11, 1911.

cabinet was to be appointed by him in agreement with Madero and a generous political amnesty was to follow upon the cessation of hostilities. (40) At eleven o'clock of the same night the armistice went into effect and the first phase of the Mexican revolution was at an end. (41)

President Taft had succeeded in avoiding the difficulty of intervention through a very trying period. Whatever unknown motives prompted this forbearance, he seems to have sincerely desired that Mexico settle her own problems without the friendly aid of the American military arm. In this, he would appear to have run counter to some of the suggestions of his ambassador. In refraining from intervention he earned the gratitude of some of the political leaders and perhaps the educated classes in Mexico. What little there was vanished instantly when the next mobilization occurred the following February.

(40) U.S.P.R., 1911, p.486, Wilson to Knox, May 17, 1911.

(41) U.S.P.R., 1911, p.486, Wilson to Knox, May 18, 1911.

Chapter III

THE AD INTERIM PRESIDENCY OF DE LA BARRA

The provisional presidency of de la Barra was a needed and welcome breathing spell for both Americans and Mexicans. Mr. de la Barra, one of the ablest of the old school diplomats set about with considerable energy to bring Mexico to ~~its~~^a sense of ~~its~~^{its} responsibility. His efforts were not wholly successful, it was true, but in comparison with the last few months of Diaz tenure his administration showed laudable activity. Open revolt still prevailed in a large part of the republic, particularly in Oaxaca and Morelos where the exploits of the great Zapata produced a reign of terror for the Hacendados. When he assumed control, President de la Barra found that his position would not permit a too impressive demonstration. He therefore decided to ignore Zapata until in a position to deal with him once and for all. He then announced his intention to "deal sternly and drastically with disorders wherever they show themselves". This policy pleased the Ambassador who was

(1) Gruening, p.560.

(2) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.513-14, Dearing to Knox, Aug. 26, 1911.

(3) U.S.F.R., p.510-11, Wilson to Knox, July 28, 1911.

of the opinion that in the absence of such application,
 chaos would ensue. (4) If Mr. Wilson is to be believed,
 the situation called for a heroic treatment. The finan-
 cial status was deplorable. The demands of the mobs
 were impossible to satisfy. Jurisdictions in offices
 conflicted. The tribal cacique was to be feared. Within
 the new party friction and conflict was springing, the
 conservatives were again coming from cover and, most im-
 portantly distrust of Madero was becoming more notice-
 able with each day. (5) The future looked dark indeed.

Fortunately the diplomatic sector was relatively
 quiet during this period. The operations of General Reyes
 were brought to an abrupt end by the action of the Ameri-
 can government, (6) and his campaign during the presidential
 election came to be regarded as a jest. (7) One event of
 capital importance occurred. This was the creation of a
 temporary court of claims "of excellent personnel" (8) to
 pass upon damages to foreigners arising from revolution-
 ary activities. These claims were numerous and confined
 to no one part of Mexico. By far the most important cases

(4) U.S.F.R., p.409, Wilson to Knox, July 11, 1911.

(5) Idem.

(6) See chapter on Neutrality.

(7) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.518, Wilson to Knox, May 22, 1911.

(8) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.934, Wilson to Knox, July 6, 1911.

however were those connected with the Agua Prieta and Ciudad Juarez affairs in which Americans had lost their lives although on United States territory.

In the meantime Mexico was preparing for a presidential election. It was taken for granted that Madero would be nominated and elected, but his vice-president was more difficult to select. Pino Suarez, former governor of Yucatan, finally received the nomination in the "first untrammelled political convention ever held in Mexico",⁽⁹⁾

At the same time Madero and de la Barra, after an initial difficulty over an officer, Victoriano Huerta,⁽¹⁰⁾ were working in cooperation. After an absence of two months Ambassador Wilson was able to report a "practical restoration of order in a very large part of the republic. Nevertheless, a spirit of restlessness, of nervous tension, of dissatisfaction with any and all political programs" *was evident* which stood in unhappy contrast with the one relieving aspect of the scene, namely, the almost complete disappearance of anti-American sentiment.⁽¹²⁾

As expected, Madero and Suarez were elected in October.⁽¹³⁾ The election was unique in Mexican history in

(9) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.514, Dearing to Knox, Aug. 26, 1911.

(10) Idem.

(11) Idem.

(12) Idem.

(13) Ibid, p.519, Oct. 18, 1911.

(14) that official adersion was entirely absent. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson characterized the whole affair as "farical" and essentially unrepresentative of Mexican opinion. (15) Irrespective of the ambassador's motives, (they will be discussed in their proper place), which may have had some effect upon his utterances, the question arises which one man could have been representative of culturally, socially, politically, economically, plural Mexico. Admitting all of Madero's personal defects--he was not an executive, he was vacillating, a dreamer, a man of ideas and not of action who would pass in the United States for an intellectual--the fact remains that he gave expression to the social aspirations of many millions of Mexicans. He thereby became their leader and spokesman. Mr. Wilson admitted once that his book, *La Sucession Presidencial*, practically caused the revolution. In terms of the good Yankee democratic theory of the divine right of the och-loeracy, his election was eminently justified whether testified to by ballots or bullets. He was certainly as representative of Mexicans as Diaz. In fact, both were equally so and the paradox is part of the answer to "the Mexican problem".

Madero was inaugurated on November 6th, 1911.

(14) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 519, Wilson to Knox, Oct. 27, 1911.

(15) Idem.

Ambassador Wilson's high hopes for the Indemnity Commission and its satisfactory disposition of American claims were in some degree lowered by the events of the summer and fall of 1911. The usual procedure in the absence of special arrangement would have been to present the claims through the Embassy. Whenever the more efficient commission methods is used, the government nevertheless retains its right to "consider measures it should take" in the event of injustice to its nationals. This represents the habitual attitude toward the cases arising under the "Calvo doctrine". The injured national must exhaust the legal possibilities before appealing to the home government. The latter never surrenders the ultimate right of diplomatic appeal.

In September of 1911, Mr. Wilson reported a rumor to the effect that Mexicans were to receive preferential treatment at the hands of the commission. (16) The state department replied that in such event there remained no course open to the American government other than to present the claims through the usual diplomatic avenue. (17) Although the Mexicans denied the report and conceded special privileges to the Americans (18) the most important of which was

(16) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 941, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1911.

(17) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 941, Wilson to H.L. Wilson, Sept. 22, 1911.

(18) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 942, Wilson to Knox, Oct. 2, 1911.

(19)
 an extension in time. — The difficult border cases re-
 mained unsettled. It was a constant reminder of Mexico's
 chronic incapacity to act. (20) By this time (January 8,
 1912) Ambassador Wilson was definitely ignoring the com-
 mission. Precedents in cases of other nationals only
 revealed its incapacity the more and the suspicion was
 growing that the dilatory manner was affected for a pur-
 pose. (21)

Repeated efforts were finally successful in prodding
 Madero into action. His consuls were instructed to in-
 vestigate the Agua Prieta and Juarez affairs and this work
 was begun and prosecuted with considerable energy. (22) The
 interested Americans failed to avail themselves of this
 opportunity however. The reason for this reluctance to
 present their claims was the action of American congress.
 By joint resolution this body instructed the American
 Secretary of State "to investigate the claims of American
 citizens growing out of the late resurrection in Mexico,
 to determine the amounts due, if any, and to press for
 their payment." (23) Apparently the American claimants

(19) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 943, Wilson to Knox, Oct. 9, 1911.

(20) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 951, Knox to Wilson, Jan. 8, 1912.

(21) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 952, Wilson to Knox, Jan. 10, 1912.

(22) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 962, Edwards to Knox, Apr. 8, 1912.

(23) Idem, p. 962.

preferred not to risk their chances for appropriate compensation before a Mexican tribunal, if opportunity were offered to present the same cases before an American tribunal. This enactment and fear of ~~were~~ terrifying action led the Mexicans to view the questions of indemnity with greater readiness. The following June Charge Schuyler was able to report that the investigations had been completed and that the Mexican government had decided to pay the majority of the claims although some were exorbitant and a few untenable. (24)

When the question of claims again reached an acute state the general atmosphere had been altered considerably. It is perhaps best to view the subject in the light of these developments.

(24) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 967, Schuyler to Knox, June 5, 1912.

Chapter IV

NEUTRALITY

Some of the first, and in one sense, the most important problems to arise between the two countries as a result of the Revolution related to the violations of neutrality. In his annual address to the Mexican Congress in 1908, Diaz, referring to the operations of the Oppositionists across the border stated that "when attacks were made on small border towns by bands of outlaws, the government has not only concentrated forces along the boundary to prevent the fleeing marauders from seeking refuge in the American territory but has also instituted prosecutions for violation of the neutrality laws against individuals who had made plans in the United States for raids into Mexico."⁽¹⁾ In 1910 Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon were indicted by the Federal grand jury for alleged violations. Ricardo was convicted and imprisoned; his brother was freed and continued to write widely-quoted articles which greatly emboldened their revolutionary friends within Mexico.⁽²⁾ When Madero escaped from Monterrey prison into San Antonio, Texas, there to issue his plan, direct the revolutionary program, seek the materials of warfare for his faith and

(1) U.S.F.R., 1908, p.604.

(2) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.550.

solicit the moral support of the American people, the Mexican government definitely asked for his arrest. (3)

In reply Madero issued a simple "statement to the American People" asking only for the hospitality which all free peoples have always accorded to those from other lands who strive to be free." (4) The secretary of State courteously informed the Mexican government that violations would be dealt with in accordance with the law and international usage. (5)

Continued agitation on the border and the petitions of the Diaz government finally provoked a full statement of the position which the United States took with respect to the entire problem. By this time the rebels were boldly advancing their cause both within Mexico and the United States. Such violations as were said to have been and were being committed fell into three categories; (a) the shipment of arms and munitions of war; (b) the passing of individuals and groups between the two states for revolutionary purposes; and (c) expressions of such a nature as to cause others to engage in activities of a subversive intent.

Secretary Knox stated first that a "long established

(3) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.368, Wilson to Knox, Nov. 16, 1910.

(4) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.350.

(5) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.364, Adee to Wilson, Nov. 19, 1910.

rule of international law" did not prevent casual commerce in arms, for such if captured was subject to confiscation. (6) The Treaty of Washington, "the most progressive statement of modern international law on the subject" (7) was explicit in the premises. By its terms a neutral government is bound, he stated:

1. To exercise due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specifically adapted in whole or in part within such jurisdiction to war-like use.

And 2. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of military supplies, or arms, or the recruitment of men.

And 3. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing

(6) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.375. Knox to Wilson, Dec. 14, 1910.

(7) Ibid, p.375.

(8)

obligations and duties.

In addition to taking the above as the minimum standard for neutral conduct, the United States has supplemented the international provisions by ordinary act of Congress, the so-called neutrality statutes. These laws are designed to prevent the complicity of any resident in the United States in any undertaking which has for its purpose the forcible the forcible subversion of a friendly power, with proper penalties

(9)

therefor,

The Mexican government however continued to flood the state department with requests for investigations of the activities of Madero and his confederates. All of the acts to which they objected were undoubtedly for the purpose of obtaining assistance, physical and moral, for the forthcoming revolution. It was very difficult to fix responsibility however, for the sentiment along the border was such that assistance in avoiding arrest was usually obtainable. The definition of a subversive act was equally difficult. Expressions of a revolutionary nature, the Mexican government uniformly held to be violative in spirit and deed. Whatever may have been and is the attitude of the American government toward its own citizens in this connection, the attitude held by the Taft adminis-

(8) Ibid, p.575.

(9) U.S.F.R.,ibid. p.375-6. From Revised Statutes, sections 5291-5291.

tration toward the Mexican foreigners was identical with that to which John Stuart Mill gave expression in his essay on Liberty. The mere spoken word is not an act in itself. Knox pointed to the fact that the Federal constitution guaranteed freedom of speech. Mexicans resident in this country were permitted the rights of citizens in that regard. Only in the event of a definite act or acts "of which the mind can take cognizance" could a violation be considered to have been committed, ⁽¹⁰⁾ and the government clung closely to this premise.

It will be remembered that one of the chief reasons for the March, 1911 mobilization was to give a more effective application to the neutrality statutes. There is an imponderable factor that enters into this kind of a situation that defies evaluation. Was the Taft administration anxious to see the Madero insurrection successfully repulsed? If not would a diplomatically correct attitude suffice to relieve the government of responsibility? The general assumption is that the American people, including the president, and especially the inhabitants of the border states, were not only in favor of Madero, but anxious to see Diaz overthrown. General Reyes accused Madero of receiving support from the American government besides having the benefit of a lenient application of the neutrality laws. ⁽¹¹⁾

(10) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 393, Knox to de la Barra, Jan. 23, 1911.

(11) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 712, Wilson to Knox, Jan. 10, 1912.

Madero replied that not money, but the overwhelming support of the border population was the explanation for his success. (12) The difference in significance is only a difference of degree assuming only the latter to have been true. Not a change of fact but of tone is discernable from the chronological tale as recorded by the state papers. And the nervousness which took hold of Mexican officialdom causing them to address appeals to the slightest provocation may have prompted the state department to be more skeptical in the attitude displayed. The usual procedure was to refer the requests to the proper department after which investigations were instituted. Logically, the final burden fell usually upon consular officials and upon their reports the department ordinarily depended. These reports were invariably unfavorable to the Federals. On February 11th, 1911, Mr. Huntington Wilson acting secretary of State, was severely pointed in his remarks to the Mexican Ambassador, Senor Pereyra. After expressing the willingness of his government to prevent violations and reiterating the impossibility of interfering with casual commerce in arms, he stated bluntly that "almost all of the information has upon careful and minute examination, proved to have been based upon groundless rumor." (13)

(12) Ibid, p.712.

(13) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.404, H. Wilson to Pereyra, Feb. 11, 1911.

The state department repeatedly stated that the mere spoken word was not a violation; that the commercial transportation of arms and munitions was perfectly legal; and that the passage of unarmed individuals or small groups could not be denied. (14) The last category involved in important distinction. Secretary Knox distinguished between the isolated groups of unarmed men of whom, there would be many under normal condition passing across the border and those manifestly intent upon the organization of a military expedition. Only to the latter could the neutrality statutes apply, although, presumably members of the first group might be in sympathy with the revolution. (15)

The capture of Ciudad Juarez brought up another phase of the difficulty. This city, located across the international border opposite El Paso, Texas, was the strategic point of the north under conditions of actual warfare. It is the railroad and distributing center for a large area. In rebel hands it could be used as a depot through which the materials of war could be moved from the United States to needed points on the battle front. The attitude of the United States toward exportation through this city was

- (14) (a) U.S.F.R., 1911, Knox to de la Barra, Jan. 23, 1911, p. 393.
 (b) Ibid, p. 396, Jan. 24, 1911.
 (c) Ibid, p. 397, Jan. 24, 1911.
 (d) Ibid, p. 398, Jan. 25, 1911.
 (e) U.S.F.R., 1911, Wilson to Percyra, Jan. 23, 1911, p. 400
- (15) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 375, Knox to Wilson, Dec. 14, 1910.

therefore an important consideration. The city was scarcely in the possession of the Maderists before President Taft issued his instructions for the direction of the custom's house at El Paso. The possession of Juarez, he stated did not affect the duty of the United States in the matter. Free passage from El Paso was not forbidden by the neutrality statutes or international law. El Paso itself could not be used as a depot. He recognized the advantages accruing to the rebels from their success but denied that the responsibility of the United States was involved. Consequently legitimate commerce could not be interrupted. (15)

Exciting days followed and when the problems of neutrality again arose a new government was in control at Mexico City. The new regime of course inherited the unliquidated debts from past as well as the assets. The operations of a group of men in Baja, California were responsible for the discussions arising from one of the former. About 500 persons, intent upon the creation of a socialistic state invaded the peninsula hoping to detach it entirely from Mexico. The contention of the Mexican government was that these men, many of whom were Americans, were engaged in a fantastic filibustering expedition. "They were therefore under the protection of

(16) U.S.F.R., 1911, p.494, Knox to Wilson, May 26, 1911.

no political flag" and the Mexican government could not be held accountable for any damages which they might inflict upon residents of the area, including aliens. (17)

In fact, the United States, by permitting them freedom of action which included appeals for recruits through the New York press, was fundamentally responsible for any destruction of property which might result. (18) This was not acceptable to the state department. Any movement which had for its purpose the overthrow of one government and the establishment of another "has upon this hemisphere, been uniformly regarded as a political movement" wrote Secretary Knox. (19) The nature of the cause made no difference. Appeals through the newspapers were not acts which the "mind could readily take cognizance of". The United States had not permitted its territory to be used as a base of operations; the crossing of unarmed men was not a violation of neutrality. The government of the United States was therefore unable to countenance the claim of the Mexican authorities that their latter responsibility was unattached.

During the period of de la Barra's provisional presidency, a counter-revolution appeared under the leadership of the former Diaz officer, General Reyes. The head-

(17) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 491, Zamacoena to Knox, May 24, 1911

(18) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 494-5, Zamacoena to Knox, May 27, 1911.

(19) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 500, Knox to Zamacoena, June 7, 1911.

quarters of this movement were in San Antonio, Texas, and their operations, of course, extended across the border. Although confronted with the identical tactics which they, as revolutionaries, had employed, the government in power earnestly sought the assistance of the American government in coping with them on the basis of neutrality violations. In conversation with the American Ambassador, Mr. Wilson, the minister for foreign affairs asked that the conspiracy of General Reyes be brought to the attention of the state department with the view of enforcing the neutrality laws "under the most liberal interpretation possible". (20) Ambassador Wilson "earnestly recommended that energetic measures be taken on the border and that every possible assistance compatible with our laws be given to the Mexican government". (21)

Whether the acts of General Reyes and his confederates were more flagrant as violations than those of Madero or whether the government was willing to assist Madero to the extent of a more drastic enforcement, the fact remains that General Reyes, together with a number of his associates, was indicted by a Federal grand jury, arrested, and confined in Santiago prison to stand trial for the alleged crime. (22)

(20) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 521, Wilson to Knox, Nov. 15, 1911.

(21) Idem.

(22) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 525, Knox to Wilson, Dec. 30, 1911.

On the other hand the position of this government with respect to revolutionary speeches, the casual commerce in arms and munitions and the passing of un-armed groups back and forth between the two countries, (23) remained precisely as it was before Diaz' resignation. Nor was there a deviation when Juarez fell to the Liberalists, a more formidable movement than that initiated by General Reyes. The acting secretary stated that the American government would treat with the defacto authorities in that city as they had treated Madero the previous year. (24) President Taft's proclamation of March 2nd, 1912 had no real significance. He merely admonished the citizens of the United States to observe the laws and usages regulating neutral conduct. (25) The correspondence which this proclamation provoked did result in a more explicit statement of the American position since the Mexican representative expressly refused to refer to commerce in arms as contraband. Therefore, "the rules and laws governing warfare and the conduct of neutrals are not involved", (26) replied the secretary. The status of Mexico was one of peace, as for example, that of Canada at the moment.

(23) U.S.F.R., 1911, p. 521-22, Knox to Crespo, Nov. 17, 1911.

(24) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 730, H. Wilson to H.L. Wilson, Mar. 1, 1912.

(25) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 732, H. Wilson to H.L. Wilson, Mar. 2, 1912.

(26) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 737-8, Crespo to Knox, Mar. 5, 1912.

Consequently no commercial interdiction of any sort was possible. Hence, if violations were being committed these were contrary, not to American, but to Mexican law and the responsibility for punishment, the task of that government within Mexican jurisdiction. (27) With regard to the neutrality laws Mr. Wilson went on to show that a distinction must be made between the obligations of international law and those, such as the neutrality statutes, which were self imposed. "The duties of neutrality cannot be either expanded or contracted by national legislation." In effect this was saying that the private law of the land, in so far as it extended beyond the international usage, was a private American affair to be executed in a private American manner.

This situation was radically changed however, by the joint action of the American Congress empowering the president to place an embargo upon the exportation of arms and munitions (28) into any country in which, in the president's discretion, "conditions of domestic violence exist which would be promoted by their use". (29) Two days later

(27) *Idem.*

(28) Arms and munitions were defined in the restricted sense by Attorney General Wickersham and adopted by the state department. "This excludes food, ordinary clothing, and ordinary articles of peaceful commerce." U.S.F.R., 1912, p.759, Wickersham to Taft, Mar.25, 1912 and footnote.

(29) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.745, Joint Resolution of Congress, approved March 14, 1912.

President Taft proclaimed the injunction in force in
 respect of Mexico. ⁽³⁰⁾ The question of exceptions arose
 immediately. The state department recommended that, as
 between Federals and revolutionists, no exceptions be
 made whatsoever. ⁽³¹⁾ The foundation for this belief was
 the fear of reprisals to which the border towns would
 be subjected by rebel bands when denied their sources
 of arms. Temporarily this rule was adopted. The Presi-
 dential Proclamation "applied impartially to all....and
 for the present, for obvious reasons, no exceptions are
 being made". ⁽³²⁾ Originally it had been the president's
 intention to formally except all federal consignments
 and to make the exemption a part of the document. ⁽³³⁾ He
 was finally dissuaded by the department from committing
 this open act of partisanship. Nevertheless, in deference
 to the president's wishes the practice was to grant ex-
 ceptions whenever addressed through the Mexican Embassy. ⁽³⁴⁾
 However the state department very carefully indicated to
 the president that the legislation, if enforced would prove
 embarrassing since it represented an arbitrary interference

(30) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.745, Pres. Procl. March 14, 1912.

(31) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.749, H. Wilson to Pres. Taft, Mar. 16, 1912.

(32) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.780, H. Wilson to H.L. Wilson, Mar. 17, 1912.

(33) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.874, H. Wilson to Pres. Wilson, Mar. 24, 1913.

(34) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.874, Ibid.

with the natural course of events and therefore fixed upon the American government a measure of responsibility for the outcome. It were better to refrain from any action of this nature but in the event, the law should be applied impartially else the American government leave itself open to the charge of partisanship. (35)

This assertion may be taken as typical of the course which the department of state endeavored to follow, but which was changed to accord with the president's wishes. Scarcely ten weeks before, the distinction involved had been given a vigorous expression by Secretary Knox in reply to a request "to tighten the vigilance" along the border. Mr. Knox felt compelled to say that his department drew a clear distinction between a vigorous enforcement of our neutrality laws and international usage governing neutrality and "activities such as are seemingly desired by the Mexican government, and which would, if carried out amount in effect to cooperation and participation with a foreign government....in putting down revolution". (37) In the absence of rights, duties and obligations arising from treaties etc, such an application obviously violated the international duty of

(35) Ibid.

(36) U.S.P.R., 1911, p.525, Crespo to Knox, Dec. 3, 1911.

(37) U.S.P.R., 1912, p.709, Knox to Wickersham, Jan. 3, 1912.

(38)
neutrality.

By the time the president issued his proclamation of March 14th, the general policy had been pretty thoroughly outlined. Thenceforward, until Woodrow Wilson became president, deviations from that policy were slight, always excepting the attitude taken in the exceptions of arms consignments. During the period of accelerating coolness beginning in July, 1912, and ending with Madero's deposition, that special dispensation was never withdrawn. (39)

(38) Idem.

(39) The deaths of Americans as a result of the fighting at Agua Prieta and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, although involving a technical violation of American rights in terms of international standards was dismissed by the American government on Mexico's promise to pay indemnities. This is discussed in the chapter on Ad Interim Presidency of De la Barra.

Chapter V

MADERO'S PRESIDENCY

We may rightfully assume that the Taft administration sincerely desired to give President Madero an opportunity to straighten the affairs of his country in conformity with the usual international expectations.

It was even alleged at the time by some Revistas that Madero had received material assistance from the United States during the revolutionary period implying that he therefore was under a special obligation to that govern-

ment. ⁽¹⁾ This allegation Madero denounced as "malicious"

and "unfounded". ⁽²⁾ Be that as it may Hearing and Free-

man are at some pains to quote from the official record of the Blatt-Converse case to prove the complicity of

the Standard Oil Company in the movement ⁽³⁾ in which oil concessions were involved. While neither of the joint

authors is notorious for objectivity in judgments

(1) U.S.P.R., 1912, p.712, Wilson to Knox, Incl.I, Jan.10,1912.

(2) Idem, Incl.I.

(3) These two men were Americans who enlisted in the Madero forces while under American jurisdiction (violation of the neutrality statute) crossed over to Mexico, were chased back across the border by federal officers who captured them on American territory and returned them to Mexico where they were placed in jail to await trial for treason, (violation of American sovereignty). Due to the unusual features of the case they were the subjects of a long correspondence. Most of the difficulty was eliminated by Diaz who released them by personal dispensation. I have not been able to check the quoted statements. Hearing & Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy, 1925, p.69, Hubsch & Viking Press.

involving the Standard Oil Company they frankly confess that the question of whether Madero favored American interests after he became president, is open. (4)

In this connection the position of Ambassador Wilson becomes difficult to understand. A possible insight into his attitude is provided by his political origins. As this falls within the hurly-burly of American politics and big business it may or may not be just. It is offered for what it is worth on the authority of Mr. Ernest Gruening, whose recent book, Mexico and Its Heritage, is reported to be the most comprehensive treatment of the entire subject. (5)

According to this author, Madero, from the moment he took office was never free from the efforts of the American Ambassador to embarrass him. (6) For his trouble he received the hisses of the Mexican City populace many times. This antipathy can be traced in part at least to his business and political connections. Mr. Wilson received the appointment to Mexico City through the influence of his brother, former senator John M. Wilson, republican boss of the state of Washington, who was a close political associate of Richard Ballinger, Taft's first Secretary of

(4) Ibid, p.90.

(5) Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage, Century Co., 1928.

(6) Ibid, p.561.

(7) the Interior. The relationship of the latter to the Gugenheim interests is said to have been revealed during the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy. The Gugenheims, the American Smelting and Refining Company, had large holdings in Mexico. The wealthy Madero family was likewise prominent in the smelting and mining industries. The interests of the two conflicted and the political ties of the American Ambassador made him the protagonist of the American company and the foe of Madero. (8)

This in brief is the explanation which Mr. Gruening gives for the continual opposition by which Ambassador Wilson sought to embarrass Madero. He would therefore say that the messages detailing the impossible conditions which the ambassador was never at a loss to send to his department were palpable exaggerations, calculated to cause friction between the two governments and having as their ultimate purpose the retirement of President Madero. (9) These opportunities were enlarged by reason of Mr. Wilson's circle of friends, popularly known as "The Society of Friends of the American Ambassador" who for one reason or another were constantly petitioning the Mexican government--through Mr. Wilson--for a redress of their, or their client's

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid, p.562.

(10) grievances. Mr. Wilson, for example, was very energetic in prosecuting the Chinese claims arising from the horrible massacre at Torreón; one of his coterie had been retained as counsel by the Chinese. (11) The apogee of his aims was reached in the alleged conspiracy to effect the forcible deposition of Madero in the coup d'état of February, 1913 and finally in his refusal to save the life of Madero when it was within his power to do so. The evidence is convincing. It will be well to remember however that the American government did not necessarily share his viewpoint on all occasions. The consistent willingness to grant exceptions on arms traffic following the Proclamation of March 14th, 1912 to the federals is sufficient proof of that. In the end, whether due to the Ambassador's persuasion or to an independent judgment in the case, the administrations view coincided pretty closely with that of their representative. Except for the February coup d'état and the fact that the presidential term was almost completed a climax must undoubtedly have been reached.

Ambassador Wilson began the year with a long letter describing the internal conditions. "The truth is that at this moment Mexico is seething with discontent," the chief cause of which appeared to be the weakness of the new

(10) Ibid, p.561.

(11) Ibid, p.566.

president. Revolution continued over a large part of Mexico; in the south the chronic activities of that interesting chieftain, Zapata, were a standing testimonial to the impotence of the central power. In the north Ciudad Juarez had fallen, Torreon was doomed, and the state of Durango was "uneasy".⁽¹²⁾ The threatened strike of 1900 American employees of the Mexican railways, the result of a policy of Mexicanization adopted by the government, was calculated to produce the most deplorable conditions.⁽¹³⁾ Two days later the situation in Chihuahua was "very bad" although Torreon and Ciudad Juarez were "better".⁽¹⁴⁾ At the Constitution Day celebration in Mexico City the president was "received without any demonstration and in silence."⁽¹⁵⁾ An undercurrent of excitement caused by rumors of prospective intervention was visible.

The latter manifestation was not without its basis in fact. Following the receipt of message of February 5th, Secretary Knox wrote President Taft suggesting the advisability of increasing the military contingents along the border which apparently was done.⁽¹⁶⁾ That is to say, the

(12) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.716, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 3, 1913.

(13) Ibid, p.716.

(14) Ibid, p.717, Feb. 5, 1913.

(15) Idem.

(16) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.716, Knox to Pres. Taft, Feb. 3, 1913.

entire regular army of the United States was assembled on the following day. This force was later augmented by the National Guards and a request for volunteers brought the total strength of the entire unit to 100,000 men. (17) Throughout Mexico this was interpreted as a disapproval of the Madero regime. "Whatever may have been the motive of so formidable a demonstration of power, the effect upon the fortunes of the Maderes was highly unfavorable. It breathed life in every patently hostile group or person. It encouraged banditry. It actually stimulated rebellion. In the opinion of a discerning American observer it was for Madero a thrust which it is scarcely an exaggeration to number with the wounds that killed him." (18)

While no references are given in support of these remarks (which perhaps a historian of a more orthodox school would hesitate to express so positively) there can be small doubt but that Ambassador Wilson had noted something which fits into the general context fairly well. (19)

Irrespective of the military movements however, President Taft was not convinced of the necessity for intervention. On February 12th, Ambassador Wilson, and all consular

(17) Gruening, p.562.

(18) Gruening, op cit, p.562. quote from Bell, the Political Shame of Mexico, p.148.

(19) The following day Fletcher reported from Chihuahua that the situation had "cleared" due to a fear of intervention. U.S.P.R., 1912, Fletcher to Knox, p.717, February 6, 1912.

officers in Mexico were instructed in most precise terms (20)
"officially to deny all foolish stories of intervention".
The sole concern of the American government was the well-
fare of the lives and property of their nationals. Fur-
thermore, a strict impartiality toward all factions was
enjoined (21) and the question of departure from revolu-
tionary areas was left to the judgment of those involved.

If Ambassador Wilson is to be taken as authority,
conditions were such during the following week that
"energetic action" (22) was necessary to protect the Amer-
ican lives and interests. At the same time the northern
situation became critical as another attack on Juarez was
anticipated. This was the occasion for the first an-
nouncement of the intention to forcibly prevent a repeti-
tion of the Agua Prieta and Juarez affairs of the
preceding year.

"The president feels that his duty and public opinion
absolutely forbid toleration of any repetition of injury
to Americans on American soil, as now threatened at Juarez,
and he is disposed to give public ^{warn} warning, that in such
emergency he would be obliged to order troops to cross
the line, as a police measure, and to disarm or drive

(20) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.720, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 12, 1912.

(21) *Ibid*, p.720.

(22) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.724, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 22, 1912.

away from Juarez any fighting forces threatening life in El Paso, thereafter returning." (23)

The position of the government at this time was not easy. Would a declaration of honest intention to act only for defense of border residents be acceptable in Mexico at face value? Assuming an initial step in this direction would the matter of withdrawal be easily accomplished? Irrespective of motive, and object, would not the first step result in a general assault upon all Americans within Mexico? Could these be withdrawn and the whole difficulty sidestepped? Would not the very act of preliminary withdrawal excite the Mexican populace to attacks on the assumption that intervention was intended? These are some of the questions with which the executive department of our government was confronted. Ambassador Wilson believed it desirable to state fully and explicitly the reasons for any "police" measures extending across the border together with a statement announcing the intention to withdraw upon the return of order. (24) He warned the department of the difficulties surrounding withdrawal (25) and intimated that in any event intervention which was not thorough would be resented by Americans by reason of

(23) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.724-5, H.Wilson to H.L.Wilson, February 24, 1914.

(24) U.S.F.R., p.725, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 24, 1912.

(25) Ibid, p.726.

(26)
inevitable reaction against them.

The internal situation became steadily worse as the conservatives again began to assert their power. Ciudad Juarez fell to the Liberalists, Chihuahua was in open revolt, the name of Francisco Villa appeared before the public. The American government becoming more apprehensive over the safety of its national, instructed, tentatively to suggest withdrawal from the more desperately contested regions.
(27)

This message was sent only one hour before the Presidential proclamation of March 2nd was on its way to the same destination for broadcasting over the whole of Mexico. The proclamation itself was an honorable gesture in apology for the long-recognized lawlessness of the American people who were under no compulsion to obey the neutrality laws. This, the president asked, as well he might. The note to the press--"not as a statement but for their guidance" was equally unaggressive: strong hope for the restoration of order by Madero; the Americans advised to leave at the discretion of the Ambassador; finally and most significantly the reiteration of the policy of non-intervention.
(28)
(29) But it

(26) Ibid, p.726.

(27) U.S.P.R., 1912, p.731, H.Wilson to H.L.Wilson, Mar.2, 1912.

(28) Ibid, p.732.

(29) Ibid, p.733.

required repeated telegrams from the state department to convince the government that the warning to withdraw was not the initial step in a long process and the Mexican public was even more stubborn. ⁽³⁰⁾ Their restlessness and the growing discontent finally led the Diplomatic Corps to set about energetically to provide for the local defenses of foreign lives and properties. In spite of the need for such measures President Taft, on March 14th, pursuant to an instruction by the joint action of the American Congress empowering him to prevent the exportation of arms and munitions ⁽³¹⁾ "into any American country" in which ⁽³²⁾ "conditions of domestic violence exist" issued a proclamation to that effect in respect of Mexico. In view of the consistent reports of lawlessness sent not only by the Ambassador but by consuls from various sections of the country, the action of the Congress and the President was notable. If the first proclamation had frightened, the second destroyed the fright. At least in official circles, ⁽³³⁾ where the message was not only assuring but heartening. In President Madero's address to the Mexican army he referred to it as an example of the motives actuating the President

(30) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.735, Wilson to Knox, Mar. 4, 1912.

(31) Ibid, p.739, Mar. 7, 1912.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Ibid, p.745, Mar. 14, 1912.

of the American government. From beyond these official circles however Ambassador Wilson could not hear even a single note, even of appreciation. Philosophically, he advised the state department to leave the verdict to history.
(34)

This sketch of the events of the first three months may serve to set the tone for the period which definitely ended in the following September. The American attitude became a little harsher; the requests a little more peremptory; the impatience a little less readily concealed. On the Mexican side a corresponding attitude was assumed. But it is difficult to maintain even a measure of objectivity. Those who know Mexico either love or hate; the limits of both have yet to be transcended. If a Gruening anathematizes Huerta, a diplomat's wife idealizes him. There is something about the land which never leaves the observer emotionally unaffected, except, perhaps, an occasional Priestly whose books are chiefly remarkable for an indifference to significant detail. Obviously the most reasonable procedure would be to waive the analysis and then state the facts in all their eloquence. But for Mexico all of the facts are not available and in any event there is no general agreement upon them as such. For, if we follow the wire from Mexico City to Washington, D.C., we will receive an impression of a nation staggering drunkenly into a hopeless chase

(34) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.753, Wilson to Knox, Mar. 20, 1912.

from which it can be saved only by a heroic specific administered by the benevolent playmate north of the Rio Grande. And by the same token, should we elect to follow the none-to-fully documented history of Mr. Gruening a different picture is revealed. Is Mexico really in serious difficulties? To be sure; consider her heritage. Is anarchy likely to ensue? The American Ambassador is doing the utmost within his power to cause it. Is Madero as serious in his work as he might be? He is the only hope!

Taking the American Ambassador for authority the general situation on September 1st, 1912 would be about this. The economic and financial condition is intolerable; American lives and property throughout Mexico are in jeopardy. The government is in no position to enforce its authority over many large areas. More formidable coalitions against the government are imminent. Mexicans are suffering from an indirect but deliberate persecution. The personal weakness of Madero is known to all. Many specific claims and grievances lie ignored as though intended for that treatment. To quote from his letter of August 22nd:

"The president's attention should, I believe, be called to the growing anti-American spirit of the Madero administration, which not only shows a decided preference

for European markets in all lines but is harrassing and discriminating against American interests, at the instigation of a group of corrupt men who surround the president and manifested recently in the lockout of the American employees of the railways, in the persecution of the Associated Press, and the one American Newspaper in Mexico, in the government's suborned decision in the Tehuallilo case, in the discriminatory and almost confiscatory tax placed on the oil products at Tampico, and in the present attempt to annul the concession of the Mexican National Packing Company." (35)

Six days later Mr. Wilson in the course of a long letter to Secretary Knox stated that "this administration, while nominally pro-American, and suffering to some extent in public opinion because of its supposed pro-Americanism, is really conducting a campaign against American interests in Mexico, and this campaign seems aimed to make the members of the Madero family and the personal and political adherents thereof, the beneficiaries of American loss." (36)

The attitude displayed received its logical expression in the note of September 15th addressed to the Minister of foreign affairs which for a parallel in Mexican-American diplomatic history must await the happy days of William

(35) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 826, Wilson to Knox, Aug. 22, 1912.

(36) Ibid, p. 831, Aug. 28, 1912.

Jennings Bryan's tenure. In a most extraordinary tone the "government of the United States", acting through Mr. Wilson informed the administration then discharging the duties of government in Mexico that investigations of a number of murders and the punishment of the guilty must be undertaken immediately; that the persecution of Americans by petty officials and the courts must stop; that the persecution of the Associated Press, and the Mexican Herald (American owned) could no longer be tolerated, that confiscatory taxes were being levied on American oil companies in Tampico and that injustice of the treatment of various companies at litigation with the Mexican government should cease else "it would evidently become necessary for the government of the United States to consider what measures it should adopt to meet the requirements of the situation." Finally a categorical and comprehensive answer was requested from the Mexican government as to what it proposed to do with regard to the various cases which were classified into groups: (1) To effect the capture and adequate punishment of the murderers of American citizens; (2) To put an end to the discrimination against American interests; (3) To initiate measures calculated to eliminate revolutionary conditions which were causing hardship and suffering to American settlers.

(37) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 842, Wilson to Escurrian, Sept. 15, 1912.

The minister for foreign affairs replied categorically. Of the 13 alleged murders of which 4 had occurred during the reign of Diaz, judicial investigation had been instituted in ten cases of which ³ had resulted in conviction and punishment. Two had been released for lack of evidence. One of the deaths had resulted from an attack by a peon who objected to the American making love to the peon's wife. These were American filibusters. The remaining cases were under investigation. (38) Senor Pascurian in conclusion cited numerous cases in the United States of a denial of justice in which many Mexican citizens were the victims. The Rock Spring's tragedy was conspicuous in the list. (39) To the charge of levying discriminating and confiscatory taxes on American oil companies, Mr. Pascurian replied that Mexico and English companies had paid the tax (1½ cents American Currency) without dispute. Furthermore, exorbitant as it was, the amount was less than the California levy. (40)

Likewise it was contended that the editor of the Mexican Herald, originally the recipient of a subsidy from the Diaz government, was angered by the refusal of Madero to continue the practice whereupon he started a terrific

(38) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.871-2, Schuyler to Knox, Nov. 27, 1912.

(39) Ibid, p.873.

(40) Ibid, p.875.

campaign against the government, publishing false reports of an alarming character which caused panic throughout the country. (41) The editor was put in jail for a penal offense .

The difficulties with the Associated Press had arisen over differences regarding the contract between the government and the company. The equity in Mr. Rascurian's judgment lay with Mexico. In a similar manner the other cases were answered showing that either the Mexican government was not guilty of the alleged wrongdoing or that questions were susceptible of discussion. (42)

In concluding this categorical reply the Mexican minister expressed his surprise at the use of such an expression as "the administration now discharging the duties of government in Mexico" in addressing his office after having granted official recognition. "Without aspiring to unusual consideration, the Mexican government believed it might expect from a friendly government..... that if it considered it necessary to refer to the personnel of its government, it would employ a term less harsh than the one it used,--probably without precedent to this day in diplomatic courtesy---. The personnel of the present government deplores the incident and forgets it!" (43)

(41) Ibid, p.874.

(42) Ibid, p.874.

(43) Ibid, p.877.

In the following December Ambassador Wilson and Senor Tasoulian had a conversation in New York City in which the same general subject was brought up. In the absence of proper guaranties Ambassador Wilson suggested submission to a court of arbitration. Nothing came of the suggestion however. (44)

After an absence of two months the American Ambassador again resumed charge of the American Embassy at Mexico City. Instructed by the state department to prepare a reply to Senor Mascuraino's categorical answer to the ultimatum of September 15th, 1912, he wrote a long denunciation of the entire Mexican scheme which, is notable for its platitudinous rhetoric. The foreign minister's note was characterized as "evasive, disingenuous, frivolous, at variance with the facts, illogical in its conclusions and lacking in that seriousness of tone and dignity of utterance which should characterize the diplomatic exchanges of governments." (45)

Apparently the state department permitted the manuscript to die without fulfilling its function. (46) But it would have been equally futile if presented to Madero in person. Revolution never completely stamped out during his tenure in office, suddenly gained a

(44) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 985, Memorandum, Dec. 21, 1912.

(45) U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 886, Wilson to Knox, Incl. p. 889.

(46) U.S.F.R., 1913, p. 893. Note.

velocity which in eleven days swept him out of office and in thirteen days accounted for his death.

There is now the unpleasant task of determining the degree of responsibility for which our representative must answer in this episode. Unfortunately dependence upon his arch-accuser, Mr. Gruening cannot be avoided except in a very small way. Late in March a report "circulated insistently through banking and commercial circles" of Mexico City purporting to show that the American Ambassador, acting under instruction from the American government, was propandaising in behalf of Mr. de la Barra, former ad interim president, whom presumably, the United States desired to have restored to office. (47) That is all. But a month before he had admitted acts somewhat beyond the province of the ordinary ambassador.

"I have recently been so deeply impressed with the danger of the situation and so profoundly apprehensive of the responsibilities which the downfall of the Madero government would place upon our government, that in addition to offering this government every particle of information and advice which I thought of use or benefit. I have most discreetly and carefully, through reliable persons generally, but directly in two instances, endeavored

(47) U.S.P.R., 1912, p.768, Wilson to Knox. Incl. Wilson to Calero, March 27, 1912.

to induce leading members of the Catholic party, of the old regime and of the commercial elements of the city to make some demonstration of a public character, coupled with a tender of service and support as might have a moral effect on the country at large." (48)

One of two things is true of this statement: either he had no conception of the nature of Mexican politics or his "as might have a 'moral' effect" was a common falsification of a nefarious scheme. Needless to say the voluntary assumption of this responsibility represented a slight breach of diplomatic etiquette.

It will be recalled that de la Barra resigned his office as president on November 6th and sailed immediately for Europe. As usual his stay was to have been for eight months. He returned in less than six and Mr. Wilson reported "a tremendous ovation for de la Barra, just arrived". (49) He received the most important appointment in Huerta's cabinet.

The principal in this palace revolt was Victoriano Huerta, full blooded Mixtec Indian, and one of the most extraordinary figures in Mexican history, a worthy successor to Santa Anna and Porfirio Diaz. If we are to believe Mrs. O'Shaughnessy he was the worst in ⁴aligned innocent of all history. That there was blood on his expressive little

(48) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.723, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 20, 1912.

(49) U.S.F.R., 1912, p.776, Wilson to Knox, Apr. 6, 1912.

velvet hands, his character index she did not deny. But his devotion to his Mexico, his patriotism was such that it compensated for all of his vices--if vices they were--and his unerring diagnosis of Mexico's crying economic evil--land reform--was sufficient for her to place him among the true patriots of his land. To men he was courteous, to women chivalrous. His clever tongue never lost an opportunity to transform words into pretty compliments -- for the charge's wife. His patience and perseverance were twin virtues born of an Indian stoicism. His capacity for "copitas" was legendary, although he was never seen intoxicated. And the sublime dignity with which he received the American thrusts--whatever his methods, his ends, or his support--revealed a heroic figure which grew in stature as the inevitable approached realization.

Victoriano Huerta was originally the commander of the federal forces sent by de la Barra to chastise Zapata. At the moment when his campaign appeared on the point of success, Madero intervened and through personal influence caused the withdrawal of the entire force. No motive, other than Madero's consistent policy of conciliation explains this action. Huerta asked to be relieved from his command and retired to Mexico City to sulk. He was finally pacified by Madero by the offer of the command of the northern expedition against the conservative reaction

and a liberal gift of money should success attend his efforts. In this campaign Huerta captured the bandit Pancho Villa and ordered his execution. Again Madero interfered. Villa was taken from his jurisdiction and placed in jail in Mexico City. This occurrence Huerta did not forget and was probably the cause for the lack-disciplined manner in which the campaign was prosecuted. (50)

When Huerta returned to the capital he was placed in command of the palace guard, which, in the event of formidable revolutionary manifestations, would become the president's last defense.

The revolt of February 9th, 1913 was essentially a conservative movement. Its leaders, Felix Diaz, nephew of Porfirio and General Reyes had each attempted rebellion previously and each had been defeated by the Federal forces. They were supported by the great land owners, the catholic church and the aristocracy. In its incipency the cuartelazo appeared unlikely to succeed. It required treachery within the presidential palace and the (alleged) complicity of Ambassador Wilson to effect the deposition of Madero. The event occurred ten days after the original outbreak and except for the peculiar assistance received would probably never have taken place. (51)

(50) This is based on a letter from Tetcher, American Consul at Chihuahua to Knox. U.S.F.R., 1912, p. 851, October 16, 1912.

(51) Gruening is categorical in his opinion. op cit p. 566.

The intervening period is known in Mexico as the "tragic ten days". General Reyes was killed in the first assault on the palace and Felix Diaz became the sole leader. On the first day the ambassador reported that Diaz had three thousand troops and that the street populace were shouting "Viva Diaz" and "Death to Madero". (52) Later in the same day he telegraphed that Madero was unable to afford protection and that the Diplomatic Corps had authorized him to demand such from Diaz. The following day Mr. Wilson requested the sending of a battleship to each of three Mexican ports in the interests of safety for Americans. (53) At noon he reported that "practically all the local state authorities, police and sales have revolted to Diaz". (54) And the next day "public opinion, both native and foreign, as far as I can estimate, seems overwhelmingly in favor of Diaz." (55) Wilson was convinced that the American government should send "firm drastic instructions, perhaps of a menacing character" in which event he might be able to induce a cessation of hostilities and an orderly settlement of the situation. (56) The department

(52) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.700, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 9, 1913.

(53) Ibid, p.700, Feb. 10, 1913.

(54) Ibid, p.701. Gruening op cit 566 states "that the fact was that the entire rebellious force consisted of 800 men, 3 batteries of artillery and the palace guard".

(55) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.702, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 11, 1913. 10:a.m.

(56) Ibid, p.704. 6:p.m.

was willing to send warships but not instructions of the character desired. Instead Knox recommended that foreigners seek places of safety.

Wilson seemed anxious for authority. On the 14th of February he requested instructions as to the measure of control which he would exercise over the warships due in their respective ports the following day and recommended that he "be clothed...with power to act immediately in crises without further instruction", (57)

The department thought such blanket authority "unadvisable", (58)

On February 15th, Ambassador Wilson suggested to the British, German and Spanish ministers the feasibility of requesting the resignation of President Madero. (59) This was done on the same day to which Mr. Madero replied with a refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of diplomatic representatives in a strictly domestic affair. (60) In this project the Ambassador claims he had only the ultimate welfare of the nation in view. Shortly after a rumor was abroad of impending intention. This resulted in a long address sent by Madero to President Taft asking for a denial of the report. (61) Wilson himself admitted

(57) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.708, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 14, 1913.
(58) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.710, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 15, 1913.
(59) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.710, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 15, 1913.
(60) Ibid.
(61) U.S.F.R., 1913, p.713, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 15, 1913.

he had touched on the subject in conversation with the minister of foreign affairs disclaiming responsibility because of the well-understood unofficial nature of the remarks. (62) Taseurain regretted the occurrence and (if Mr. Wilson is to be believed) he knew that the president's telegram "was based on falsehood". (63) The attitude of the state department in view of the tone of the Ambassador's telegrams was clearly stated in ^{the} reply~~s~~ sent the same day. The entire situation was being watched very closely as the possible necessity for intervention was appreciated and any course consistent with the dignity of the nation was being employed. "It is left to you to deal with this whole matter of keeping Mexican opinion, both official and unofficial in a salutary equilibrium between a dangerous and exaggerated apprehension (of intervention) and a proper degree of wholesome fear." (64) Three hours later the American consuls throughout Mexico received explicit instructions to announce publicly that the Hadero telegram was misleading; that he had been informed of his error; that no forces had been landed and that the American policy remained unchanged, (65) that is, that the warships were sent for observation

(62) U.S.F.R., p.716, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 17, 1913.

(63) Ibid. p.716.

(64) U.S.F.R., p.717, Knox to Wilson, Feb.17, 1913.

(65) U.S.F.R., p.717, Knox to Wilson, Feb.17, 1913.

particularly in relation to protection for nationals. The incident was closed in this manner except for the last minute effort of President Madero to save his government by telegraphing to the governors of all the Mexican states that intervention was imminent. (66) According to the official record which Ambassador Wilson left behind him he first learned of the contemplated ^{revolt} of February 18th on the previous day. A personal messenger from Huerta informed him "to expect some action which will remove Madero from power at any moment. The "plans" (were) fully matured, the purpose of delay being to avoid any violence or bloodshed". (67) Wilson had no suggestions to make "beyond requesting that no lives be taken except by (68) due process of law".

The promised event took place. Senors Madero and Suarez resigned protesting "whatever may be necessary". Wilson despatched the personell of the new cabinet to Washington and called the two leaders into conference. (69)

(66) U.S.F.R., 1913, Wilson to Bryan, p.770, Mar. 12, 1913.

(67) U.S. F.R., 1913, Wilson to Knox, p.713, Feb. 17, 1913.

(68) Ibid.

(69) According to constitutional procedure the order of the presidential succession in the event of vacancy in the office of president and vice-president devolves first upon the minister for foreign relations, then upon the minister for gubernation, etc. Senor Tascorain became president automatically upon the resignation of Madero and Suarez. He did not appoint a minister for foreign relations. He did appoint Huerta to the ministry for gubernation. Tascorain thereupon resigned and Huerta became constitutional president. U.S.F.R., 1913, p.722, Artson to Bryan, March 12, 1913.

So much for the official story. Gruening's narrative differs both in fact and interpretation. His first witness is the Cuban minister, the Honorable Marques Sterling whom he quotes as follows:

"Mr. Wilson has since said that Embassy converted itself into the center of all activities in favor of humanity, but in all truth as I saw it, then and later, with the testimony of the Spanish minister, Senor Cologen, and the numerous proof which have been accumulating since the embassy was not other than the center of a true conspiracy against the government."⁽⁷⁰⁾

Testifying for himself Mr. Gruening states that the coup had been set for the noon of February 18th. Circumstances delayed the event until 1:30 p.m. however, Mr. Wilson had already notified the state department that he understood that the Federal generals (Huerta) had taken control of the situation.⁽⁷¹⁾

Madero was in prison. Felix Diaz, leader of the citidel revolt and Victoriano Huerta erstwhile commander of the government defense, foresaw difficulties for both had aspirations. The American embassy was a neutral spot; the American Ambassador acted as referee.⁽⁷²⁾

(70) Gruening op cit p.567. Quote from M. Sterling; The Last Days of President Madero, p.379-80.

(71) Gruening, p.567. Latter remark from "Disorders in Mexican Department of State Division of Information Series. No.95, Mexico, No.18.

(72) U.S. P.R., 1913, p.722, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 19, 1913.

The result of the conference was the compact of the Citadel since known in Mexico as the Pact of the Embassy, by the terms of which Huerta was to become provisional president and Diaz the candidate of the party in the coming election. This meeting at which the diplomatic corps was present was called by the ambassador to effect a modus operandi between the two groups of combatants. To it he declared: "Mexico has been saved. From now on we shall have peace, progress and prosperity. I have known about the plans to imprison Madero for three days. It was slated to occur this morning." Gruening continues: "To the astonishment of the diplomats he announced the exact composition of Huerta's cabinet. To them the compact was read aloud. The ambassador led the applause. When Felix Diaz entered, the ambassador cried out "long live General Diaz, Savior of Mexico...." After Huerta and Diaz had been ceremoniously ushered out, one of the diplomats asked, "and what will be the fate of poor Madero?" "Oh," answered Ambassador Wilson, "they will put Senor Madero in a mad house where he should always be kept. As for the other, (Suarez) he is nothing but a scoundrel, so if they kill him it will be no great loss." "We must not allow it," said the Chilean minister. "We must not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico," (73) replied the ambassador.

(73) All of this in Gruening, p.568. Quote from Sterling, p.471-2.

Wilson's responsibility for Madero's and Suarez's death lay not so much in what he did as what he failed to do. Even the department recognized his responsibility in the matter and instructed him to consult with Huerta to prevent anything "which would injure the reputation of the Mexican civilization".⁽⁷⁴⁾ For, Huerta had already requested his advice regarding the manner in which President Madero should be taken care of, i.e., to put him into an asylum or to send him out of the country. Mr. Wilson had replied that he, (Huerta) ought to do that which was best for the peace of the country.

Whatever that may have meant, Madero and Suarez, while being transferred from one penitentiary to another were killed. The government stated that while enroute a group had attacked the escort and that in the free firing the deposed president and vice-president had lost their lives.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Wilson was "disposed to accept the government's version of the affair and consider it a closed incident, in spite of all current rumors."⁽⁷⁶⁾

Crucening's final evidence to convict Ambassador Wilson of duplicitous conduct in these events consists of a copy of an interview between Mrs. Madero, wife of the ex-president

(74) U.S.F.R., p.725, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 20, 1913.

(75) U.S.F.R., p.731, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 23, 1913.

(76) U.S.F.R., p.736, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 24, 1913.

and Robert Hammond Murray, who at that time and subsequently was the Mexican correspondent of the New York World. The purport of this document is that Wilson was very unwilling to intercede in their behalf, that he was brusque and discourteous, and that he seemed not to be concerned with their personal safety. After protracted petitioning he promised to send a telegram to President Taft which the president's wife hoped would save their lives and to do what he could to prevent injury to them. The general impression however, is that Ambassador Wilson made his promises not with the intention of keeping them but with the hope of ridding himself of an unwelcome visitor. The historical authenticity of this document or of the fact contained therein is however not above impeachment. The conversation was recalled some two and one half years after the assassination by a woman who, by the most casual of standards, cannot be considered as dispassionate. But by a strange irony Wilson is witness against himself. Three weeks after the event he defended himself before Secretary Byron by writing:

"I believe that in announcing publicly my acceptance of the official version of the death of these two men-- and indeed, I could not, in reference to the gravity of the situation, take any other course--I adopted the surest

method of arresting hasty judgment, and of allaying that singular and perverse sentimentality which frequently leads to the commission of greater crimes as punishments for lesser ones." (77)

If Mr. Wilson were not interested in Madero he was greatly interested in winning recognition for the new power. He was particularly anxious to establish the legality of the succession (78) and immediately after the coup asked for explicit instructions in this regard. (79) The slowness of the department however was compensated for by the Ambassador's ability to meet a situation. In the absence of instructions he therefore set about in the usual diplomatic way to give official acceptance to the new regime and telegraphed instructions to all the American consuls in Mexico to do all in their power to effect a nation-wide submission. (80)

"In view of the statements and tenor" of his recent telegrams the department was disposed to look upon the new government as constitutional. (81) They were not willing to give recognition, however, until satisfactory statements

(77) U.S.F.R., p.772, Wilson to Bryan, March 12, 1913.

(78) U.S.F.R., p.775, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 20, 1913.

(79) Idem.

(80) U.S.F.R., p.728, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 21, 1913.

(81) U.S.F.R., p.728, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 21, 1913.

regarding the pending issues between the two countries were
 forthcoming. (82) In spite of assurances Washington was
 skeptical. (83) The reason was not far to seek. The almost
 unanimous verdict of the American press was that the Mexi-
 can government's explanation of the Madero assassination was
 inadequate. In such circumstances and with retirement
 almost upon them, the administration declined, courteously,
 but no less firmly to enter into official negotiations with
 the Huerta government and instructed Mr. Wilson to revise
 his instructions to the American consular officers accord-
 ingly. (84) This was the situation with which Mr. Wilson
 was confronted when he took the president's oath less than
 one week later.

(82) This refers to the ultimatum of Sept. 15, 1912.

(83) U.S.F.R., p.746, Knox to Wilson, Feb. 27, 1913.

(84) U.S.F.R., p. Knox to Wilson, Feb. 28, 1913.

Chapter VI

PRESIDENT WILSON AND "GENERAL" HUERTA

The inauguration of Woodrow Wilson introduced a new and different personality into Mexican and American diplomacy. The accidents of American politics apart, we may say that Wilson was elected on a program of reforms to comb the hair and brush the teeth of capitalism. One may doubt the fidelity with which the Wilsonian doctrine was prosecuted; one cannot doubt its efficacy as political doxey, (in 1912) nor perhaps the sincerity of its original impetus. So far as Wilson and the United States knew this doctrine was to have a strictly intra-American application. The accidents of history necessitated an expansion in the American horizon and President Wilson countered to this strange fate by a proportionate expansion of his favorite theme-- democratic, constitutional government for the United States, and Mexico, and self-determination for the whole world. A new era of idealism in world politics was the order of the day and in this epic struggle, Wilson, the leader of Christ's legions was opposed by the anti-Christ Huerta, creature of "interests" and symbol of government by violence in their behalf.

"We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles, in fact and in practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition."⁽¹⁾

This speech delivered one week after his inauguration set the tone of the administration's policy toward Huerta's regime. It was, in effect, the publicly announced intention not to recognize the dictator. Obviously the attitude of the South American and European powers would have considerable to do with its efficiency. With their cooperation Huerta was certain to fall. Without it he might defy the United States successfully. The position of England, whose interests in Mexico were greater than any other nation except the United States, was especially important.

The British foreign office first responded with an unequivocal answer: the British government would not recognize Huerta either formally or tacitly.⁽²⁾

The surprise was rather great, therefore, when Ambassa-

(1) Robinson and West: Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson Macmillan Co. 1917, p.190. Delivered March 11, 1913.

(2) Hendrick's, Life and Letters of W.H. Page, Vol. I, p.190. Doubleday Page & Co., 1922.

dor Bryce informed President Wilson that his government
 had extended recognition on March 31st. ⁽³⁾ Nor did Bryan
 and Wilson seek for long for a reason for this conduct.
 Huerta, the political descendant of Porfirio Diaz in
 purpose and deed was supported by the old Diaz pet, Lord
 Cowdray, whose Mexican oil concessions were immense and
 whose ambitions for wider fields even greater. Consciously
 or unconsciously the position of the American oil pioneers
 G. L. Dehony and the Standard Oil Company may have condi-
 tioned the point of view. ⁽⁴⁾ The possibility apart, however,
 Wilson considered Cowdray the backbone of the Huerta gov-
 ernment. This was given edge by the contract the oil man
 had with the British navy, a contract which in the nature
 of European circumstances at the moment, would make the
 British government his champion to the bitter end. ⁽⁵⁾ And
 then the British foreign office blundered. Sir Lionel
 Carden, known throughout the western hemisphere for his
 hostility to the United States, was appointed British
 Ambassador to Mexico. ⁽⁶⁾ In Ambassador Page's judgment
 "that man (Carden)--has caused nine-tenths of the trouble." ⁽⁷⁾

(3) U.S.F.R., p.784-5, Bryce to Bryan, Mar. 31, 1913.

(4) E.L.Dehony's remarks before the Committee on "Investi-
 gation of Mexican affairs, 1913.

(5) Hendricks op cit p.181.

(6) Ibid, p.197.

(7) Ibid, p.220.

And Colonel House responded. "We do not love him for we think that between Cowdry and Genden a large part of our trouble in Mexico has been made." (8) At a diplomatic tea Mrs. Page was handed a note by a famous London society woman which purported to show that if certain British commercial interests were not checked in their activities a serious situation would develop between Great Britain and the United States. "It's all being done for one man", she said. This, presumably, refers to Lord Cowdry, for later when the government saw the Wilsonian light Page speaks of Cowdry as a fine example of English sportsman. The basis for this characterization was the latter's cheerful willingness to lose a fortune a day because the decision had gone against him. (9)

That however, occurred some months later. The obvious inference was that Great Britain was selling her soul for Mexican oil at the expense of American idealism. Should the other powers follow her lead the new principle would be smothered. Precisely this occurred. In rapid succession Spain, (10) China, Italy, Germany and Portugal, (11)

(8) Hendrick, op cit p.216.

(9) Ibid, p.216.

(10) U.S.F.R., p.790, H.Wilson to Bryan, April 12, 1913.

(11) U.S.F.R., p.806, H.Wilson to Bryan, May 17, 1913.

(12) Norway, and Russia (13) recognized. And incidentally,
 the negotiations for a European loan were completed. (14)
 Only the A.B.C. powers looked to the United States for
 direction. Brazil, after conferring with her neighbors
 asked if the United States would be "incensed" should
 they recognize before we "should find it convenient to
 do so" (15) Secretary Bryan hoped that such action would be
 withheld (16) and the Brazilian foreign minister assured the
 American ambassador, Mr. Morgan, that they would await the
 American pleasure.

This was small consolation for the major losses. Con-
 sequently the first task of Wilson's new ambassador to
 London was to effect a withdrawal of this recognition, (17)
 a most difficult assignment. Mr. Page himself was in close
 sympathy with the president's Mexican policy. He too was
 an apostle of the new idealism; the work now given him in-
 volved convincing an audience schooled in the old world
 diplomacy, of the absolute sincerity and integrity of the
 president's purposes. Had industry alone sufficed, Mr.

(12) U.S.F.R.? p.805, H. Wilson to Bryan, May 25, 1913.

(13) U.S.F.R., p.806, H. Wilson to Bryan, June 1, 1913.

(14) U.S.F.R., p.801-5, H. Wilson to Bryan, May 15, 1913.

(15) U.S.F.R., p.805, Morgan to Bryan, May 31, 1913.

(16) U.S.F.R.? p.806, Bryan to Morgan, May 31, 1913.

(17) Hendriks, op cit p.183.

Page would have made short work of the job. The British listened attentively but remained unconvinced. Mr. Wilson's motives may have been unimpeachable. Nevertheless, in British eyes he was damned by one gross inconsistency, the party plank to the effect that the Panama Tolls Act would not be repealed.

This bit of legislation has a history which dates from at least 1850. For the purpose of this paper the Hay Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 will suffice as a starting place. Article 3 of that treaty provides that:

"The Panama Canal shall be free and open to vessels of commerce and war of all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise."

To the layman the meaning is clear: American vessels-- coastwise or otherwise--were not to receive any benefits from the fact of immediate jurisdiction. The necessary technicality was introduced. "All nations" did not include the United States. And, to clinch the argument the possession of the "rights of sovereignty" had changed the situation so that the original terms had shifted in meaning.

(18) Hendricks, p.242.

The Panama Tolls Act was therefore passed in 1912 stating that "no tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in the coast wise trade of the United States". Wilson's party was pledged not to repeal the law.

It was this enactment which formed the basis of Englishmen's skepticism and proved difficult to the Page technique. The Ambassador was fully conscious of his handicap and importuned Wilson, House and Bryan in the interest of its revocation. Evidently the president was equally aware of the issue for early in July, 1913 he despatched Colonel House to London to consider the matter. The internal American situation at the time prevented any positive action but Colonel House convinced Sir Edward Grey that the president was anxious to remove this last barrier to Anglo-American friendship. "Colonel House therefore suggested that President Wilson be left to handle the matter in his own way and in his own time, and he assured the British statesman that the result would be satisfactory to both countries." (19) Sir Edward agreed and the understanding dated from that moment. (July 3rd, 1913.)

In view of this conference the action of Great Britain on July in notifying the United States that their recognition of Huerta was provisional and would be withdrawn

(19) Hendricks, p.246.

following the October elections is intelligible. (20)

Sir Edward Grey thought the other European powers would adopt a similar policy. Nevertheless, the situation in Mexico was distressing. Sir Lionel Sargent was enroute to Mexico and in the course of which he made very severe remarks about the president's policy. (21) By October the situation needed a general accounting in so far as England and the United States were concerned. The proposed trip of Sir William Tyrrell, private secretary to Sir Edward Grey offered the opportunity for a complete understanding. His first meeting with the Secretary of State had elements of the comic in it.

"The British oil men were nothing but the 'paymasters' of the British cabinet declared Mr. Bryan."

"You are wrong," replied the Englishman, who saw that the only thing to do on an occasion of this kind was to refuse to take the secretary seriously. "Lord Cowdray hasn't money enough."

"Oh," said Mr. Bryan, "...Then you admit the charge."

Secretary Bryan continued by saying that the Foreign office had handed its Mexican policy over to the oil barons for predatory purposes.

"That's just what the Standard Oil people told me in

(20) U.S.P.R., p.801, Laughlin to Bryan, July 11, 1913.

(21) Hendrick, p.198-9.

New York," the British diplomat replied. (22)

Sir William's meeting with the president was more socially agreeable. He convinced Wilson that Great Britain if satisfied that the lives and properties of their nationals were safe, would be willing to accept the Washington lead. Incidentally he mentioned the Tolls question and received a satisfactory answer. But he could not secure an explicit statement of the president's Mexican policy.

"When I go back to England, I shall be asked to explain your Mexican policy. Can you tell me what it is?"

"President Wilson looked at him earnestly and said, in his most decisive manner: "I am going to teach the South American republic to elect good men!"

"Yes, but, Mr. President, I shall have to explain this to Englishmen, who as you know, lack imagination. They cannot see what is the difference between Huerta, Carranza and Villa."

"The only answer he could obtain was that Carranza was the best of the three and that Villa was not so bad as he had been painted." (23)

The English phase of the story has temporarily caused the eclipse of Huerta. This has been necessary for the entire Wilson policy was premised upon English support.

(22) Hendricks, p.202-3.

(23) Ibid, p.205.

Meantime the events at Mexico City had been proceeding to a normal conclusion.

Irrespective of what may have been the original intention of Ambassador Wilson in the matter of recognition, he was stopped from doing more than paying his unofficial compliments to the new government and of engaging in communication with them without committing his own government. (24)

In this he was followed by the A.B.C. powers in South America and at first by Great Britain, Germany, Spain and Austria. (25)

He was himself earnestly engaged in convincing the new administration at Washington, D.C. of the necessity for recognition. Whatever the antecedents and the accomplishments of the Huerta, the circumstances at the moment warranted, if they did not demand, decisive action of some kind on the part of the state department. Wilson admitted the deplorable internal situation placing the blame almost wholly upon Madero and his eighteen months of incompetence. American interests were suffering as a result. Representatives were ignored and foreign business competitors were capitalizing upon the impasse by increasing their markets when anti-American sentiment expressed itself in economic boycott. (26) Huerta was having great difficulty in

(24) U.S.P.R., p.763, Wilson to Knox, Mar. 5, 1915.

(25) Idem.

(26) U.S.P.R., p.601-4, Wilson to Bryan, May 15, 1915.

arranging for a loan which the European powers were loathe to enter into in the face of the American opposition. (27) Nevertheless Huerta was organizing a splendid army and Ambassador Wilson confidently anticipated its success. (28)

At this particular time the Mexican public believed they had hit upon the reason for the unresponsive attitude of Secretary Bryan. It was the misfortune of President Wilson that at this time a formidable revolution under the leadership of Carranza was spreading over the state of Coahuila, Sonora, and Chihuahua, the three northern border states. The United States had been linked with it from its inception. (29) The supposition was that a new republic was in the process of creation backed by Yankee hopes and perhaps assistance of a more substantial sort. The expectation was that a second Texas affair imperiled independence, and later admission. This gave rise to most violent expressions of anti-Americanism which, of course, Huerta capitalized. (30) It was only a last resort of the early stages. Huerta would have given almost anything except his position for American recognition. In his judgment,

(27) U.S.F.R., p.762, Wilson to Bryan, Mar. 24, 1913.

(28) U.S.F.R., p.804, Wilson to Bryan, May 15, 1913.

(29) U.S.F.R., p.774, Wilson to Bryan, Mar. 13, 1913.

(30) U.S.F.R., p.804, Wilson to Bryan, May 13, 1913.

failure to extend it was the paramount reason for continued insurrection. Nor, could he wholly account for the presidential attitude, (31) since it is yet to be wholly accounted for and the objections, such as they were, could bear but slight weight with an Indian Caudillo. His government was intent upon the performance of its international obligations. Though not legally elected it was as legal as any government should possibly be. The responsibility for his failure--should he fail--would be, in Latin American opinion at least, upon the shoulders of the American president. (32) Finally, how could he assume the tasks of liquidating the American-Mexican difficulties when any suggestion of the matter presupposed the existence of two sovereign states meeting on a plane of international equality? (33)

The recognition received from the European powers and loan had of course bolstered his position but the United States still stood as a menace by his side. Ambassador Wilson's patience was exhausted by July. In his opinion there were but two courses open: to recognize and demand guarantees or to close the embassy entirely. It was impossible to negotiate with Huerta; a policy of

(31) U.S.F.R., p.799-800, Wilson to Bryan, May 8, 1913.

(32) Idem, p.800.

(33) Idem.

studied indifference and discrimination prevented that. Boycotts, private and official, accompanied by a rising tide of resentment were ruining American business and destroyed what little prestige the embassy commanded. Only action of a "firm, formidable and impressive character" (34) could have any effect.

Anti-American demonstrations (35) brought a veiled threat from the state department (36) which however, Huerta ignored. Huerta's position at the moment was not enviable and it is possible the crafty caudillo actually hoped to cause an open break with the United States which might have unified the country with him as leader. Probably as long as Ambassador Wilson was in Mexico he had hopes of securing the coveted recognition. When the latter left--he was recalled--there was small hope of American assistance, and England became his sole prop.

In the communication announcing the return of Ambassador Wilson, the appointment of John Lind (37) as president's confidential agent was also made. Wilson's purpose in sending Mr. Lind was outlined in his speech to Congress on August 27th, 1913. After reviewing his hopes

(34) U.S.F.R., p.810, Wilson to Bryan, July 11, 1913.

(35) Ibid, p.811, July 12, 1913.

(36) Ibid.

(37) U.S.F.R., p.813, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, July 13, 1913.

and the efforts made to aid Mexico including the conclusion reached that nothing done in the usual way would be effective he stated that "accordingly I took the liberty of sending the Honorable John Lind, former governor of Minnesota, as my personal spokesman and representative to Mexico City, with the following instructions: (38)

1. To press earnestly upon those in power the following considerations and advice. (a) The American government cannot longer remain inactive when no progress toward the creation of respected government is being made. (b) Such action is expected by the other powers. (c) The motives of the government of the United States are disinterested. (d) The situation in Mexico is obviously incompatible with international obligations. Therefore, a satisfactory settlement seemed to be conditioned on:

1. An immediate armistice effective throughout the nation.
2. An early and free election to which all agree to take part.
3. The consent of General Huerta to eliminate himself from the election. (39)
4. Agreement of all to abide by the results.

The Mexican government was in no mood to accept the president's confidential agent. The foreign office shortly

(38) Address to joint session, Aug. 27, 1913. U.S.F.R., 1913 p.820.

(39) Idem, p.821-2.

after receiving notice of his coming stated that "if Mr. Lind...does not properly establish his official character, or if he is not the bearer of the recognition of his government, his sojourn in this public will not be pleasing".⁽⁴⁰⁾ However he was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and presented the conditions as laid down by President Wilson.

The reply was emphatic. The Mexican nation under no circumstances could permit a foreign government to engage in acts, the very commission of which would be a denial of Mexico's sovereignty. Mr. Lind's mission was a pitiful failure in spite of Mr. Wilson's lofty purpose.⁽⁴¹⁾ This failure was the occasion for the policy of watchful waiting.

"Meanwhile what is our duty?" "While we wait the contest of rival forces will undoubtedly for a little be sharper than ever, just because it will be plain that an end must be made of the existing situation, and that very promptly."⁽⁴²⁾

As "the conflict of rival forces" became a little sharper Huerta openly assumed the position of dictator.

(40) U.S.F.R., p.619. Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Aug. 7, 1913.

(41) U.S.F.R., p.825-7, Ibid.

(42) President's message to Congress, Aug. 27, 1913, p.822-3.

On September 23rd, Senator Belisario Dominguez delivered an anti-Huerta speech in the Senate Hall. (43) He later disappeared, the government denying all knowledge. In the Chamber of Deputies resolutions were introduced demanding an investigation of his supposed death. (44) Huerta countered by arresting one hundred ten of the members. This he admitted to be unconstitutional but necessary in the face of the circumstance confronting the nation. He thereupon assumed the power of Congress in the departments of Gobernacion, Finance and War and became in theory and deed the dictator of Mexico. (45) His first official act was to decree the repeal of Congressmen's exemption from arrest. (46) Nevertheless Huerta insisted that the elections for the presidency and the new chambers would proceed as arranged previously and that he himself would not be a candidate. (47)

The promised elections occurred on October 26th without seriously affecting the situation internally or internationally, save only to confirm President Wilson's convictions. Huerta declared the election null and void and proclaimed himself ad interim president until such time as the new

(43) U.S.P.R., p.835, O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, Oct. 11, 1913.

(44) Idem.

(45) Idem, p.838, Oct. 13, 1913.

(46) Idem, p.839.

(47) Idem, p.898, Oct. 23, 1913.

congress, to be elected in July, 1914, should terminate his tenure. (48) The attitude of the Wilson administration during this period was characterized by an accelerating impatience. The president was "shocked at the lawless methods employed by General Huerta" (49) in dissolving the congress and in the arrest of many of its members. On October 24th, Bryan sent a message to "certain diplomatic officers of the United States" instructing them to inform the various Foreign Ministers that his government would have "certain representations to make in regard to the situation in Mexico and therefore requested that no action be taken toward recognition until the position of the United States was understood. (50)

On November 7th another circular letter was forthcoming: "while the president feels that he cannot yet

(48) U.S.F.R., p.866, Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Dec. 10, 1913.

(49) Ibid, p.868, Oct. 13, 1913. This telegram was sent to Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Russia, Salvador, Spain and Sweden, for presentation to the respective foreign ministers.

(50) U.S.F.R., p.869. Bryan to representatives in Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and Spain. October 24, 1913.

announce in detail his policy with regard to Mexico, nevertheless he believes that he ought in advance thereof to make known to the government to which you (the representative diplomatic officers) are accredited, his clear judgment that it is his immediate duty to require Huerta's retirement from the Mexican government, and that the government of the United States must now proceed to employ such means as may be necessary to secure this result."⁽⁵¹⁾

On November 24th, a more direct note indicated that "watchful waiting" was to be superseded by less peaceful action.

"It is therefore the purpose of the United States to discredit and defeat such usurpations whenever they occur. The present policy of the government of the United States is to isolate General Huerta entirely; to cut him off from foreign sympathy and aid and from domestic credit, whether moral or material and to force him to resign.

"It hopes and believes that isolation will accomplish this end and shall await the results without irritation or impatience. If General Huerta does not retire by force of circumstances, it will become the duty of the United States to use less peaceful means to put him out."⁽⁵²⁾

(51) U.S.F.R., p.836, Bryan to Certain diplomatic officers, Nov. 7, 1913.

(52) U.S.F.R., p.443, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Nov. 24, 1913.

The response of the powers to these messages was varied. Almost without exception the Central and South American republics elected to abide by the president. (53) The Italian government was embarrassed by a prior recognition and had a new ambassador then approaching Mexico City. Furthermore Italians as well as Englishmen were having difficulty learning to what extent Huerto was morally inferior to the other aspirants. (54) Spain was considering the situation. (55) Russia had always considered the Mexico an exclusively Mexican affair. "In my opinion, the only satisfactory solution is annexation, and this action Russia would see with approval". (56) Austria "was not inclined to probe too deeply into the methods by which their chief executives attained office" and consequently would recognize anyone in actual control. (57) Germany feared that intervention would result in a "long cruel war" and non recognition, in anarchy. (58) Their only concern was for German commercial interests which were "suffering terribly". (59)

(53) U.S.F.R., p.859, Penfield to Bryan, Oct. 23, 1913.

(54) U.S.F.R., p.857, H.Pago to Bryan, Nov. 8, 1913.

(55) U.S.F.R., p.862, Willard to Bryan, Nov. 18, 1913.

(56) U.S.F.R., p.852, G.S.Wilson to Bryan, Oct. 27, 1913.

(57) U.S.F.R., p.842, Gerald to Bryan, Oct. 17, 1913.

(58) U.S.F.R., p.865, Ibid, Nov. 17, 1913.

(59) Rippey op cit, p.336.

As usual England occupied the key position. Professor Rippey states that when Wilson made his annual address to Congress on Dec. 2nd the great powers were in general accord with his policy. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Page's efforts were likewise readily rewarded.

"A few days after this Whitehouse interview (between Sir William Tyrrell and President Wilson), (see page 90) Sir Lionel Gordon performed what must have been for him an un congenial duty. This loquacious minister led a procession of European diplomats to General Huerta formally advised that warrior to yield to American demands and withdraw from the presidency. The delegation informed the grim dictator that their governments were supporting the American policy and Sir Lionel brought him the unwelcome news that he could no longer depend upon British support."

And in truth the British official attitude had been changing so that on November 13th, Ambassador Page could report from London that "the general feeling toward Huerta has completely changed here, and his elimination is regarded as certain imminent and desirable; but they regard this as the task of the United States...." ⁽⁶¹⁾

Nevertheless the American charge at Mexico City was very aware of the presence there of Admiral Craddock of the

(60) Hendricks, op cit, Vol. I, p/209.

(61) U.S.F.R., p.661, Page to Bryan, Nov. 13, 1913.

British navy who in company with Sir Lionel presented themselves in full uniform before the Mexican dictator, "making it a very formal ceremony", (62) on the very day Wilson appeared before the American Congress. And the same official suspected Sir Lionel of using his influence to hasten the appearance of the Italian minister in Mexico City to bolster the failing resources of Huerta. (63)

On December 2nd, 1913 President Wilson addressed the American Congress. In the field of Foreign relations there was "but one cloud upon our horizon"--Mexico. But "little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. And then when the end comes we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions." (64)

In spite of President Wilson's hopes, Huerta clung to position with tenacity. Wilson was equally determined to

(62) U.S.F.R., p.865, Oshanghnessy to Bryan, Dec. 2, 1913.

(63) Ibid, Dec. 2, 1913. This was probably a personal responsibility on the part of Sir Lionel Carden. For presidents see Hendricks.

(64) U.S.F.R., P.X and XI, Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1913.

let internal affairs develop to the bitter end and threatened the revocation of the embargo on arms traffic. (65)
 This was proclaimed on February 8th, 1914. (66) For a month following this announcement no active moves were made on either side of the border. Within Mexico, Wilson's cherished scheme was advancing steadily. Tevion fell to the constitutionalists and the advance toward Mexico City was under way. On April 9th, 1914 however, an event occurred in Tampico harbor which brought the situation to a crisis. Eventually, Huerta must surely have fallen. The Tampico incident and the others similar to it only accelerated the process and gave a dubious honor to the American navy.

On April 9th, 1914, Colonel Hinojosa and a squad of Mexican soldiers arrested eight men from the U.S.S. Dolphin who were loading gasoline into a tender from Tampico wharf. Two of these were within the boat which was flying the American flag. This was the technical violation. All were unarmed. They were taken to a jail and released by the commanding Mexican officer a short time later with proper expressions of regret for the occurrence. The ignorance of the subordinate officer was alleged as the true explanation for the incident. (67)

(65) U.S.F.R., p.446-7, Bryan to all Dip. missions, Jan. 31, 1914.

(66) U.S.F.R., 1914, p.447-8.

(67) U.S.F.R., p.451, Fletcher to Daniels, Apr. 11, 1914.

Admiral May in high command at Tampico refused to accept ignorance as sufficient answer. He declared the act hostile and demanded a formal disavowal and apology, the assurance of proper punishment for the offending officer and a public salute of 21 guns to the American flag hoisted on Mexican territory, the salute to be made within 24 hours of six o'clock of the same day. (68) Bryan concurred wholly in this ultimatum. (69) Admiral Fletcher at Vera Cruz sug-

gested the seizure of Mexican gunboats in the event of delay. (70) Secretary instructed Charge Oshaughnessy to place the matter before the foreign office with great firmness. (71) Huerta asked the recall of the ultimatum

placing the blame upon the misunderstanding of the subordinate officer. (72) At this moment President Wilson gave his approval to the manner in which the navy and Mr. Bryan were conducting the affair, adding however that Holy Week (a widely celebrated religious holiday in Mexico) might warrant a postponement. (73) The Mexicans were not entirely opposed to ~~give~~ the salute. They were afraid that the navy

(68) U.S.F.R., p.451, Fletcher to Daniels, Apr. 11, 1914.

(69) U.S.F.R., p.449, Bryan to Pres. Wilson, Apr. 10, 1914.

(70) U.S.F.R., p.451, Fletcher to Bryan, Apr. 11, 1914.

(71) U.S.F.R., p.450, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 10, 1914.

(72) Ibid, p.449, Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Apr. 11, 1914.

(73) U.S.F.R., p.452, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 11, 1914.

would slight their dignity by refusing to return it. Mexican opinion at the moment was not ready to countenance any subservience to the United States and conversely American opinion was probably no more ready to permit the slight to vanish in Mexican apologies. The Mexicans did however have a legal defense, although regretting the practical applicability of the principle implied. This was that the wharf upon which the Americans landed was under martial law and that the officials were justified in viewing any landing of troops, for whatever purpose, as a violation. ⁽⁷⁴⁾ The American reply was that no notification of marshal law had been received and they were therefore not responsible. ⁽⁷⁵⁾ Mayo was ordered not to press the issue until further instructions arrived. At about the ^{S.M.} time Charge Oshaughnessy had virtually convinced Huerta of the foolishness of not submitting. The possibility vanished however when a newly appointed official stiffened him by reference to Mexican's sovereignty. ⁽⁷⁶⁾

The Tampico affair was now quite in the background. But "two recent and heinous crimes" had been committed by the Mexican authorities and for these justice was to be

(74) U.S.F.R., p.454, Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Apr. 12, 1914.

(75) U.S.F.R., p.458, Fletcher to Daniels, Apr. 14, 1914.

(76) Oshaughnessy: a diplomat's wife in Mexico, p.258. Harper & Brothers 1914.

exacted. The first was a 2½ hour delay in the transmission of a cable to the charge. Nelson Oshaughnessy arranged that matter in two minutes over the telephone. "The incident was less than nothing until mentioned in the open cable from Washington." (77) The other incident occurred in Vera Cruz on April 12th. A mail orderly from the U.S.S. Minnesota, in full uniform and official bag on his shoulder, was arrested by a Mexican policeman following an altercation with a Mexican soldier. Both were taken to a jail where, upon inquiries made by the Jefe Politico, the orderly was released and the Mexican placed in a cell. "The attitude of the Mexican authorities was correct; there is no cause for complaint against them and the incident is without significance." But the available units of the Atlantic Squadron were already on the way to Mexican ports. (78)

In this emergency Huerta suggested submission of the difficulties to the Hague and referred to the article in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which provides for the peaceful arbitration of disputes beyond the power of diplomacy. (79) Bryan replied that "it could in no circumstances be a subject for discussion by such a tribunal

(77) Oshaughnessy, op cit p.269.

(78) U.S.F.R., p.468, Canada to Bryan, Apr. 16, 1914.

(79) U.S.F.R., p.468, Fletcher to Daniels, Apr. 16, 1914.

as the Hague." (80)

Huerta still declined to salute. He suggested a simultaneous salute which Bryan refused to consider saying that Huerta could be assured the reply would be made. (81)

On the next day the expected ultimatum arrived. Should General Huerta not have complied with Admiral May's demand by six p.m. April 18th the president "will on Monday, April 20th, lay the matter before Congress with a view to taking such action as may be necessary to enforce the respect due the nation's flag." (82) Huerta was willing to salute contingent upon the signing of a protocol binding the Americans to reply. (83) The charge agreed (84) but Bryan with Wilson's consent refused for two reasons: (a) the salute must be unconditional and (b) the other course might be construed as recognition. (85) And Huerta refused to accord an unconditional salute. (86) The "powers" were informed.

In conformity with the ultimatum of April 18th, the

(80) U.S.F.R., p.466, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 17, 1914.

(81) U.S.F.R., p.466 Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 17, 1914.

(82) U.S.F.R., p.468, Ibid, Apr. 18, 1914.

(83) U.S.F.R., p.469-70, Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Apr. 18, 1914.

(84) Idem.

(85) U.S.F.R., p.471, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 19, 1914.

(86) U.S.F.R., p.472, Oshaughnessy to Bryan, Apr. 19, 1914.

president appeared before the joint session of Congress to deliver his speech upon the "situation in our dealings with General Victoriano Huerta at Mexico City. A review of the events from the Tampico incident to the final refusal to salute opened the message. In view of the remarks of his official representatives at the place of occurrence, the inclusion of the telegram and mail orderly incident was mildly disingenuous. Mr. Wilson did not believe that he was fighting Mexico--he was fighting an individual. He did not believe that he was interfering in Mexican affairs-- "the people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right." General Huerta had singled out Americans as the object of his particular hatred. The process could not continue. "The president closed his address by asking their approval for his use of the armed forces of the nation, "because we wish to always keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty...wherever it may be employed for the benefit of mankind." (87)

On the same day the House of representatives supported the resolution in favor of the president's action by a vote of 323 for and 29 against. (88) Two days later with Admiral Fletcher already in possession of Vera Cruz the senate gave

(87) U.S.F.R., 1914, pp.474-6.

(88) U.S.F.R., p.476, Bryan to Oshaughnessy, Apr. 20, 1914.

its assent, 72 favoring and 13 voting against. In the final resolution the word "justified" replaced the word "authorized" to give the action the character of a specific redress of a specific indignity. Without the substitution the resolution would have been a declaration of war.
(89)

The American bluejackets took Vera Cruz early in the morning of April 22nd, 1914.⁽⁹⁰⁾ The approach of a German steamer with munitions for Huerta was the immediate occasion for the movement.⁽⁹¹⁾ In all, probably 230 Mexicans lost their lives; the American loss was slight. The most interesting phase of the adventure--save only the gallant defense of the youthful Mexican cadets--was the attitude of General Carranza, whom, as chief of the constitutionalists, Wilson had been grooming for the presidency. Mexican caudillos may quarrel among themselves for the spoils of pillage but they are one in opposition to any infringement of territorial sovereignty. General Carranza objected to the invasion of the sovereign territory of Mexico and politely invited the American government to evacuate.⁽⁹²⁾ This the

(89) U.S.F.R., p.482, Bryan to Amer. Dip. Missions, Apr. 22, 1914.

(90) U.S.F.R., p.481, Canada to Bryan, Apr. 22, 1914, 8: a.m.

(91) Idem, p.480, April 21, 1914.

(92) U.S.F.R., p.483-4, Carothers to Bryan, Apr. 22, 1914. Fletcher reports that Carranza was compelled to take this action by his lieutenants.

American government refused to do hoping to gain his consent through the easily controlled Villa. ⁽⁹³⁾ This attitude and its corrolary had some bearing upon the *Niagara* Conference.

Wilson was now in possession of Vera Cruz. The question arose; what was to be done with it? From a possible embarrassment he was saved by the action of the A.B.C. ⁽⁹⁴⁾ powers in offering their services as mediators. In accepting the Secretary of State intimated that a full and frank discussion would be desired by his government. ⁽⁹⁵⁾ Huerta readily gave his consent. ⁽⁹⁶⁾ Only Carranza refused. His motive is difficult to understand. He must surely have known at the time that Wilson was in favor of his candidacy for president. But he steadfastly denied the right to discuss Mexican affairs at the conference except those relating exclusively to Huerta and Wilson. ⁽⁹⁷⁾ His consistent success in the field was placing him nearer to Mexico City while the mediators were fumbling at Niagara. It was this persistent refusal to accept the competency of the conference which practically resulted in its failure to accomplish anything. From one premise the United States would not

(93) U.S.F.R., p.486, Bryan to Letcher, Apr. 24, 1914.

(94) U.S.F.R., p.489, Guma, Bacon and Mujica to Bryan, Apr. 25.

(95) U.S.F.R., Bryan to Mediators, Apr. 25, 1914.

(96) U.S.F.R., p.482, Mediators to Bryan, Apr. 28, 1914.

(97) U.S.F.R., p.504, Special Commissioners to Bryan, May 23, 1914.

recode: "Huerta must be eliminated", (98) The corollary
 "a constitutionalist must be president" was insisted upon
 (99)
 with equal consistency.

By the time the conference had completed its tasks, the strength of Carranza was too great to be overcome. Whether that fact affected the policy of the American issue would be rather difficult to determine. It is sufficient to say that a protocol was finally agreed upon which differed considerably from the original tentative plan embodying the minimum demands of the United States. This protocol provided for a provisional government to be constituted by the mutual agreement of the parties to the struggle within Mexico. This government was to be recognized, immediately upon its institution, by the United States and governments of the mediating powers. An absolute amnesty for all residents within Mexico was to be proclaimed. The American government was to present no claims for a war indemnity. Finally, international commissions were to be set up to settle the claims of foreigners arising from the revolution.

In conformity with the instructions received a Mexican congress sitting in Mexico City, named Francisco Cabajal, minister for Foreign Affairs on July 10th, 1914 (100) . On the

(98) Idem.

(99) Idem.

(100) U.S.F.R., p.561, Oliveria to Bryan, July 10, 1914.

15th of July, Huerta resigned and Carbajal became pro-
visional president. (101) On the same day Secretary Bryan
wrote to the Brazilian minister at Mexico City, tempor-
arily in charge of the American Embassy: "We take it
for granted that the new president will immediately enter
into negotiations with Carranza for the peaceful transfer
of authorities." (102)

(101) U.S.P.R., p.563, Oliveria to Bryan, July 15, 1914.

(102) U.S.P.R., p.564, Bryan to Oliveria, July 15, 1914.

CONCLUSION

This thesis purports to show some of the aspects of American-Mexican diplomatic difficulties which arose during the years 1910-1914. In the introductory chapter I have tried to indicate a few of the major threads of Mexican history in order that the play of events proper would become partially intelligible in terms of their historical origins. The corresponding half I have assumed, for the most part. This period closes with the fall of Porfirio Diaz. Considerable attention was given to the last year of his rule since the revolutionary operations across the international border so intimately affected the Americans in matters pertaining chiefly to the violations of the neutrality statutes. A reasonable inference from the narrative is that, during this period the United States government was not extremely vigilant in the application of these laws. The reasons were probably numerous, the chief among which appears to have been a general sympathy with the Maderist movement, aided, possibly, by less idealistic motives on the part of a few.

That there was a possibility of intervention during this period is not to be doubted. President Taft, however early decreed that intervention would occur only under the most urgent of circumstances, the safety of American life being the basis of his judgment. He was successful in

avoiding this contingency. During the provisional presidency of Senor de la Barra and through the first year of Madero's term these laws were more consistently administered, evidently with the view of giving the new government an opportunity to work out its own salvation. The striking example of this sentiment of sympathy was the embargo placed upon arms and munitions, and the policy of exemptions adopted by which the federal government received the materials of war necessary for its purpose. From September, 1912 until the Huerta coup d'etat of February, 1913 an attitude of growing impatience was observed toward Madero which, save for the close of Taft's term and Madero's fall, may have led to a crisis.

The difficulties facing the American government during this period are not to be minimized. Anti-American sentiment was usually in evidence more or less, and the continual indifference to American grievances a constant spur to positive action. With Huerta in control at Mexico City and Wilson at Washington, D.C., the inevitable crisis could not be postponed indefinitely. President Wilson, upon receiving approval from the powers for his policy, deliberately set about to effect the retirement of Huerta, first by semi-peaceful methods and secondly when failure seemed probable, by the military occupation of Vera Cruz. Of this occupation but little may be said. The unavoidable

inference is that Wilson was awaiting a pretext. When it appeared the occupation took place. The original grievance, while possibly correct in strict international usage, was pushed to its uttermost extreme in order to provoke a crisis. The second and third offenses were without basis of any kind and Mr. Wilson's employment of them was disingenuous.

The occupation of Vera Cruz was the occasion for the A.B.C. powers to offer their services as mediators in the general controversy. The position of the United States in the proceedings was emphatic; Huerta must go. Although Wilson was supporting Carranza, the latter refused to be a party to the affair, denying the competence of the group to discuss the whole Mexican-American problem. In the end Huerta resigned and the power was transferred indirectly to Carranza, without his having relinquished his position in any respect. In these terms, therefore, Wilson's policy was successfully consummated.

Personality entered into the five years with peculiar force. Except for President Wilson, the most eminent individual was the American Ambassador, ~~Dr.~~ Henry Lane Wilson. It is alleged that he represented the margin which made the Huerta revolt a success and was in part responsible for Madero's assassination. However that may be his policy was one of consistent opposition to Madero from the time of his inauguration to his resignation. As a supporter of

Huerta he introduces an inconsistent element into the usual explanation for the Vera Cruz affair, namely that it was a quarrel between American and English oil interests in which the English were supporting their favorite, Huerta. President Wilson however, soon rid himself of the opposition in his own camp.

In the end it cannot be said that much was accomplished by the Wilsonian program. Unfortunately this paper closes at the moment when the results of his policy should have appeared. We know that they did, Carranza, ^{not} above all a politician, was the first Mexican to give a logical sequence to the revolutionary development. The ends sought received their expression in Article 27 of the constitution of 1917.

Mexican-American history both before and since that time is not tribute to the wisdom of Wilson's careful selection, to which Wilson objected as strenuously as did his successors in office. In 1914, Carranza was his preference. Had he accepted Huerta another Diaz despotism would probably have arisen. It is not altogether certain that this would not have been desirable since "constitutional" government in Mexico is, and will remain the merest jest. But in 1915 Wilson was a democrat and an invincible one. He was also a schoolmaster. The results may speak for themselves.

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