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A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KEYNOTE ADDRESS
TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
DELIVERED BY WALTER H. JUDD
JULY 25, 1960

by
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A THESIS
Presented to the Department of Speech and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
August, 1963
APPROVED

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There were many individuals whose significant assistance enabled the writer to complete this study, and their contributions are indicated in the footnotes of this work. A special debt is owed the Honorable Walter H. Judd for his cooperation in a study that entered both his public and private life, and to the writer's graduate committee who have been the primary benefactors to his educational program. The proof-reading and typing of my friend, Mrs. Lucy Nelhuish, were a vital asset. An expression of sincere appreciation is due the advisor for this study, Dr. W. Scott Nobles, whose guidance and criticism have contributed immeasurably to whatever may be considered worthwhile in this effort.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most important national forums of political oratory has long been the national nominating convention of the two major parties. Such conventions began in the first half of the 19th century and have continued through the 1960 presidential campaign.

The short-lived Anti-Mason Party held the first national nominating convention of elected delegates on September 26, 1831, at Baltimore, Maryland. The Anti-Masons, lacking substantial congressional representation, needed a method of nominating a national ticket other than the customary congressional caucuses. The opponents of President Andrew Jackson held the second national convention in the same city during December 12-15, 1831. Like the Anti-Masons in having few men in Congress, the anti-Jackson Democrats, known as the National-Republicans, needed a method to secure at least a semblance of national representation.¹

Jackson, wishing to minimize the influence of his Congressional opponents, decided that a national nominating

convention would capitalize best upon his appeal to the rank and file of the party. Meeting May 21-23, 1832, in Baltimore, as had the other two conventions, the Jackson-Democrats gave the Vice-Presidential nomination to Martin Van Buren and repaid the political enmity they shared with John C. Calhoun.¹

Thus, the national party conventions became a part of the American scene during Jackson's first term as President.

Uncertain, and held irregularly at first, within a few decades they had developed the main features that have characterized them ever since. In a world of constant political change, they are among the oldest important political institutions to be found in any country.²

Considered by some modern skeptics as little more than a circus, the national convention is more generally evaluated as a significant force in the political life of the nation. Today, the entire nation is invited, cajoled, and almost coerced by the completeness of radio, television, newspaper, and magazine coverage to play at least a passive role in this political catalyst. An efficient method of

¹Richard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Co., 1960), p. 17. Jackson had already been nominated by the state legislatures, but he wanted a method to commit party leaders in all the states to Van Buren rather than Vice-President Calhoun or others.

gaining enthusiasm and direction for party, the convention offers a suitable opportunity for compromise for its members of varied persuasions, for it is, in part, a forum for political decision-making.

The last national conventions of our major political parties that met in the summer of 1960 were streamlined in many ways to improve the "show" for the radio and television audiences; nevertheless, the Democratic Convention of Los Angeles and the Republican Convention of Chicago were successful in their efforts to write platforms and officially bestow the mantle of leadership on Kennedy and Nixon respectively without the dismembering of either party by its "Right" or "Left."

The oratory, discussion, and debate that occur in the national convention afford the modern rhetorician unique examples of oral attempts at mass persuasion. The nomination and acceptance speeches are often ornate, the debate on platform is frequently spirited, and the opening salvoes fired by the keynote speakers may hold more significance than is commonly appreciated. The first major speech at the convention, once described by Mark Sullivan as a combination of "oratory, grand opera, and hog-calling..." the modern keynote speech is often a major rhetorical contribution in its own right.

Meeting in May of 1960, in Los Angeles, the Democrats were keynoted by United States Senator Frank Church of Idaho. The youngest keynoter in either party's history at thirty-five,\(^1\) Church's address may have been the traditional booster for party spirits, but it was a disappointment to many of his listeners.\(^2\) Reminiscent of the style and quality that won him the American Legion Oratorical championship as a high school senior, Church's speech was of stilted and wooden construction and exhibited frequent purple patches and over-worked cliches. Malcom Sillars described the Church speech as "not distinguished," for though "his speech had all the essentials of good structure and clear lines of thought, and despite his reputation as a speaker, it lacked impact.\(^3\)

Richard L. Strout commented: "Senator Church's speech seemed strongly derivative of the study by New Dealer economist Leon Keyserling, 'Tight Money and Rising Interest Rates,' just released by the Conference on Economic Progress.\(^4\)

Despite the warm reception given the young Senator by his fellow-Democrats and although his speech did admittedly fulfill the traditional keynote function of enthusing the

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\(^1\)"Keynoter At Work," Newsweek, July 18, 1960, p. 18.


\(^3\)Ibid.

waiting delegates, reaction to Church's speech paled before that accorded to Permanent Chairman Leroy Collins, former Governor of Florida, who addressed the convention the following day. Rhetorical critics have also praised Senator Eugene McCarthy's nomination speech for Adlai Stevenson as a more dramatic, effective, and carefully designed speech than the Church keynote, although it is true that the two speeches had largely different objectives.

At their Chicago Convention nearly two months later, the Republicans were addressed by Walter Henry Judd, nine-term Congressman from Minnesota who perhaps enjoyed a greater national reputation for his oratory than Senator Church. It will be the author's purpose to analyze the keynote speech of Congressman Judd, attempting to analyze the events and attitudes in the life of the nation, of the speaker, and of the audience—both immediate and remote—that might have caused this speech to be developed in the particular form in which it was delivered. The analysis will be based, in part, upon rhetorical factors suggested by Waldo Braden in his doctoral dissertation:

... (1) an appreciation of the speaker's background, his attitudes, and predispositions; (2) an understanding of the historical trends and the specific events that motivated him to speak; and (3) an awareness of the attitudes, beliefs, and prejudices of
his immediate and secondary audiences. It encompasses an attempt to ascertain and to evaluate the speaker's motives, methods of preparation, basic assumptions, lines of argument, forms of support whether they be logical, emotional, or ethical appeals, and his efforts to adapt himself and his material to the speaking situation.¹

CHAPTER I
THE SPEAKER

Public Career

Walter H. Judd has had a varied and distinguished public career. As a twenty-year veteran of the United States House of Representatives, Judd has been considered a competent spokesman in the Congress and nation in the widely divergent areas of medicine, foreign affairs, the Far East, the United Nations, agriculture, and the Department of State. He has served on several nationally prominent Protestant governing bodies and as a widely respected speaker at religious and patriotic meetings throughout the nation. In the Republican Party, Judd has been considered an internationalist, and a liberal; he has described himself as a "progressive conservative."
Walter Judd was born in the small farming community of Rising City, Nebraska, on September 25, 1898. His father was a hard-pressed farmer, and his mother a school teacher who also managed the small local Congregationalist Sunday School. The sixth of seven children, Judd worked diligently in the fifty-student school, on the family farm, and as the attendant in the local drug store's ice cream parlor. He enlisted in the United States Army in 1918 and served in the field artillery for one year. Judd received his B. A. degree at the University of Nebraska in 1920 and completed his program for the M. D. at the University's Medical School in 1923. Judd worked as a dishwasher to pay his college expenses, but found sufficient study time to be elected to Phi Beta Kappa for his scholarship.

Judd had decided before entering medical school he wanted to be a medical missionary. In 1925, he was appointed by the Congregationalists to their mission hospital in Southern Fukien Province, deep in the interior of China. Judd escaped unharmed from several encounters with Chinese Communist bandits who infested the Fukien area, but he was forced to return to the United States in 1930 after suffering forty-six

malarial attacks.  

During the next three years, Judd studied surgery at Rochester, Minnesota, as a fellow at the Mayo Clinic. He also made frequent speeches to church and civic groups in the area, constantly stressing the danger he saw for all Asia and the West in Japanese aggression in China. Judd was convinced our nation was morally responsible for much of the suffering in China because our businessmen were among the chief suppliers to the Japanese war machine.

In 1934, the Congregational Board of Missions named Judd their new superintendent for the large hospital at Fenchow in North China's Shansi Province, an area that was malaria-free. Returning to China with his wife of two years, Judd soon saw at first-hand the "tragic result of the Japanese onslaught as refugees from the fighting, now less than four-hundred miles to the southwest at Peiping, came streaming through our compound, often at the rate of two thousand a day." After repeated bombing and shelling, Fenchow fell to the Japanese in 1937. During five months spent under

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1 Interview with Walter H. Judd, former Congressman from Minneapolis, Minnesota, Washington D. C., April 29, 1963.

2 Joint Congressional Committee on Printing, Congressional Directory: 87th Congress. Judd married Miriam Louise Barber of Montclair, N. J., in 1932. They have three daughters.

3 Judd Interview.
Japanese occupation, Judd secured with great difficulty most of the provisions and medicine required for the hospital. A new crisis emerged in Judd's life when he developed a rapidly growing facial cancer that could not be treated in Fenchow. Eventually managing to win a safe-conduct pass through the Japanese lines, Judd returned to the United States and, after surgery, spent the next two years giving "a series of fourteen hundred speeches covering forty-six states, all on the frail, family financial shoestring..."¹ to awaken Americans to the danger of Japanese intentions. He called upon Americans "to boycott Japan now or give up their sons later..."² Dr. Judd resumed medical practice in Minneapolis in 1940 on a temporary basis, for he was still giving his speeches on the same theme whenever it was possible for him to accept a speaking invitation. He was giving such a speech in a local Minneapolis church on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, when the news came of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

Now the day arrived when the prophecies that Judd had been making for more than ten years were tragically fulfilled. Several prominent individuals and groups in Minneapolis decided that Judd would make a more appropriate

² "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," The Readers Digest, May, 1947, p. 120.
congressional representative than incumbent Oscar Youngdahl, "... a veteran of the House isolationist bloc ..." Judd was persuaded to run for the post on the condition that his backers would do the bulk of the campaigning. This unusual condition was accepted, and Judd entered the race, defeating Youngdahl in the Republican primary and his Democratic opponent in the general election. He was returned to his seat in Washington by the voters of his district in nine consecutive elections since that original draft.

Judd soon distinguished himself in Congress as an orator and as one of the most competent House members on Asiatic affairs. His ten-point plan for the post-war administration of Japan, prepared in 1943, became the basis for the policies of General Douglas MacArthur and later his nephew, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II. An acquaintance and longtime defender of Chaing Kai-shek and the Nationalist

1 "Eight Eager Congressmen," The Nation, February 27, 1943, p. 295.

2 Judd was defeated in the 1962 Congressional Election by Donald Fraser after a strenuous re-election campaign in his recently reapportioned district, now including the heavily Democratic labor wards on Minneapolis' north side. ("The House," Time, November 16, 1962, p. 22.)

3 Interview for Pacific Stars & Stripes with Baron Teruhiko Waragai, member of the Japanese Diet and Director of the Muromachi News Corporation, June 3, 1958.
Party, Judd defended both when it was politically unpopular in this country.\textsuperscript{1} Judd frankly predicted "the folly of pressuring the Nationalist Chinese to take the Communists into their government, warned against the danger of assessing the Communists in China as merely 'agrarian reformers'," and after the Communist takeover, "became sharply critical of the policies of the United Kingdom in normalizing diplomatic and trade relations with the Chinese Communists."\textsuperscript{2}

As one of the top-ranking Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Judd worked patiently to place foreign policy above partisan politics. He was a strong proponent of the Marshall Plan and attempted to obtain a similar plan for Asia, particularly for Nationalist China. Judd, who speaks two Chinese dialects, has admired the Chinese people since his missionary service in their country. A determined foe of Red China, Judd fought in Congress and in the nation at large through the Committee of Ten Thousand, to thwart any attempts of United States recognition of the

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Time}, June 20, 1960, p. 11. The Cowles-owned \textit{Minneapolis Star} and \textit{Tribune} have never ceased belaboring Judd on this issue.

\textsuperscript{2}Judd Interview.
Communist Government or to give their government a seat in the United Nations. 1

Judd was an early and powerful supporter of the United Nations, having publicly proposed such a federation of world governments prior to the inception of the United Nations at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Judd was a congressional delegate to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, France, in 1951, and to the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization in Geneva in 1950 and Minneapolis in 1958. He was a United States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly in 1957 and a congressional delegate to the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1958. 2

Judd believed strongly in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and urged his friend, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to create a matching force in Asia. 3 He favored technical aid to underdeveloped areas, both through the United Nations and United States programs. Judd was instrumental in persuading other Republican members of Congress that the United States should extend aid to Communist

1 The Committee of Ten Thousand became the Committee of One Million. Its full-page ads against Red Chinese Recognition by the U. S. have appeared in many newspapers. See for example, New York Times, April 19, 1955.

2 Joint Congressional Committee on Printing, Congressional Directory: 87th Congress.

3 Judd Interview.
Satellites when such aid would help these nations regain a measure of independence from the Soviets.¹

His spadework in behalf of the mutual security pacts was recognized by his appointment as a delegate to the signing of the United States-Philippines mutual security pact and the defense pacts with Australia and New Zealand in 1951.²

Judd distinguished himself on the Foreign Relations Committee by the penetrating questions with which he quizzed witnesses, constantly demonstrating that he had done his own homework. He has also been praised for his ability to clarify legislation by amendments.³

Reputation As A Speaker

Widely sought for agricultural, foreign policy, religious, and Republican Party gatherings across the nation for over twenty years,⁴ Congressman Judd arrived at the convention rostrum with an unusually high ethos with his

¹Letter from Francis P. Bolton, Congresswoman from Ohio, December 5, 1962. Congresswoman Bolton is currently the third-ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee where she served for over fifteen years with Judd.


³Time, April 20, 1962. As example, the Peace Corps Bill in 1961 carried forty Judd amendments.

immediate audience and a significant number of his secondary, national radio and television audience. Although one political analyst discovered that many of the convention delegates from the West knew few specific facts concerning Judd's career, they did hold a "generally warm and highly complimentary opinion of him." Many in the convention audience had heard an address by Judd in their own state since the 1956 Convention; moreover, there were still many delegates who had heard and remembered his noteworthy nomination speech for Harold Stassen at the 1956 "pow-wow." During the four years between the conventions of 1956 and 1960, the Executive Secretary of the Republican National Committee indicated that "the requests for Dr. Judd to appear as a speaker at various party functions across the land made him an obvious selection to anyone's list of Top Republican Speakers." The GOP official also gave his personal opinion that "Walter Judd ranked along with speakers like Dewey Short, Charlie Halleck, and Leslie

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1 Interview with Dr. Robert Huckshorn, Social Science Professor at University of Idaho, on leave 1959-1960 for study of the Republican Party and its Convention as a Fellow of Eagleton Institute of Politics (Rutgers University) and the National Center for Education in Politics, April 29, 1963.

2 Interview with William S. Warner, Executive Director, Republican National Headquarters, April 29, 1963.
Arends in the House during the years those men served together there.\(^1\)

Walter Norblad is perhaps typical of the many Republican Representatives who have served in the Congress with Judd and respected his contribution:

\[\ldots\] his speaking in the House of Representatives is well known as one of the outstanding speakers we have [sic] and I assure you that when Dr. Judd arises to speak he gets the full attention of the House. He is extremely effective as a speaker and an outstanding man in debate.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Letter from Honorable Walter Norblad, U. S. Congressman from Oregon, August 1, 1962.
CHAPTER II

THE AUDIENCE AND OCCASION

The Keynote Speech Historically

The bitterly divided Democratic Convention that met in Chicago in 1896 brought a new innovation to American politics; the address of a 'keynote' speech to the delegates. Almost equally divided on the free silver issue, the delegates passed over the temporary chairman named by their national committee and selected Senator John W. Daniel to make a speech "that should be a keynote for a silver crusade."¹ Although the significance of the Senator's speech was eclipsed the next day by William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech, the idea of a major address delivered by the convention's temporary chairman became a part of each party's ritual throughout the Twentieth Century.

In 1952, the Republican Party departed from tradition by the separation of the role of keynote speaker and temporary chairman. Since General Douglas MacArthur, the Republican's choice for the keynote, was not a parliamentarian, it was decided that Walter S. Hallanan of West Virginia would

serve as temporary chairman and introduce General MacArthur.\footnote{Edwin A. Miles, "The Keynote Speech At National Nominating Conventions," \textit{Quarterly Journal of Speech}, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (February, 1960), pp. 26-27.} The keynoter's official program duties ended when his speech was delivered. The Republicans had also departed from tradition in naming MacArthur, for he is the only military figure to have delivered a convention keynote. The Republicans have continued their separation of the keynoter and temporary chairman roles since the 1952 convention, but the Democrats have not followed the Republican example.

Although the temporary chairman does not control the machinery of the convention for any considerable time under either party's organizational plan, the post derives considerable influence from the keynote speech alone, for this address proclaims the chief points on which the party will base its appeal to the voters. It is believed that in the party in power, the keynoter is usually selected by the President or at least under his strong advice since the address will discuss the record of the administration and offer a suitable opportunity to set the emphasis for major campaign issues.\footnote{Paul T. David and Ralph M. Goldman and Richard C. Bain, \textit{The Politics of National Party Conventions}, A Brookings Institution Study (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Co., 1960), p. 65.} A
contemporary historian has explained the more immediate goals and normal style of the speeches:

In present-day politics the keynote speech has two primary purposes: to raise the enthusiasm of the delegates to a high pitch and to rally the voters of the nation to the party's standard. Loud cheers, sustained applause, and prolonged demonstrations are apt to greet the more impassioned passages of the orator. His language is inclined to be bombastic, for custom demands that he 'avoid no extravagance of speech, either in praise or blame' in glorifying the brilliant accomplishments of his own party or in lamenting the dismal failure of the opposition.¹

Therefore, "Most Americans listen to a keynote address with good-natured tolerance. It is not supposed to be fair and objective. It is the pep talk at a football rally."² Will Rogers, who attended a number of conventions in the role of newspaper columnist, reviewed the speech by the GOP Keynoter Senator Simeon D. Fess of Iowa in 1928 in an entertaining manner, but also correctly reflected the expected partisan direction of the keynote. According to Rogers' interpretation of the speech,

"... the Republicans were responsible for 'radio, telephone, baths, automobiles, savings accounts, enforcement, workmen living in houses and a living wage for Senators.' On the other hand, the 'Democrats had brought on war, pestilence, debts, disease, boll weevil, gold teeth, need of farm relief, suspenders, floods, famines, and Tom Heflin.' So lavish was the orator's praise of retiring President Calvin Coolidge that Rogers thought

sure he was referring to 'Our Savior' till they told me, 'no it was Coolidge.' The way he rated them was Coolidge, the Lord, and then Lincoln.¹

Despite the humor of the above comment, the keynote is designed for a serious purpose and generally serves as a vital asset for the convention. A less ordinary purpose was served as Martin H. Glynn, former Governor of New York, delivered his keynote to the Democrats in 1916. The party leaders learned the real mood of the delegates, and the anticipated theme of 'Americanism' was rejected because of the enthusiastic response of the convention to Glynn's theme, "He kept us out of war."²

The keynoter's role is also a frequent stepping stone to political power for the orator, especially if the convention is dead-locked or essentially uncommitted in its presidential or vice-presidential choices. Many Americans can remember the speech of Alben W. Barkley at the Democratic Convention of 1948 that captured the enthusiasm of the delegates and the vice-presidency for Barkley. That keynote speech also gave Barkley the distinction of being the only person in the United States to keynote a political convention three times.³

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¹Miles, Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, No. 1, p. 30.
The Republican keynoter in 1916 owed considerable credit to his well-received keynote address for his subsequent nomination and election in 1920. Warren G. Harding had been a little-known United States Senator until his popular keynote address in 1916. Walter Judd was considered a serious contender for the vice-presidency after his own keynote address to the Republicans in Chicago in 1960.¹

It is also appropriate to note that keynote speakers come from the top ranks of national political life. Since 1900, fourteen United States Senators, twelve Governors or former Governors, four Representatives, and one Cabinet Member have addressed Republican or Democratic conventions as keynote speakers. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was the first keynoter in GOP history to fall outside these political ranks. The Democrats have made only three exceptions to these politically elite: former jurist Alton B. Parker in 1912, National Chairman Homer S. Cummings in 1920, and Historian Claude G. Bowers in 1928.² Senators have been chosen for chairmanship with considerable frequency in both parties since the turn of the century, but there has been a recent tendency in both parties to appoint governors as keynote speakers and temporary chair-

²Miles, Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, No. 1, p. 31.
men. Quite clearly then, the post of keynote speaker is one of great influence and prestige. It is an honor and a responsibility extended to an individual of considerable political renown by the respective national committees.

The Current Issues

Events in the spring of 1960 were less than ideal for Republican development of a campaign based on 'peace and prosperity' themes. The economy had slanted down into a recession phase. On the 'peace' front, matters were even worse, with apparent confusion within the Administration on the handling of the U-2 incident, and the collapse, on May 16, of the Paris summit conference.¹

The economic recession did not hit its full slump until October, but the gradual slump in economic activity was a real concern to the Republicans. Richard Nixon said "the power of the 'pocketbook' issue was shown more clearly perhaps in 1958 than in any other off-year election in history."²

The GOP had suffered disastrous defeats in 1958, with only 153 Republicans left in the 437-member House, thirty-five Republicans in the Senate now one-hundred strong, fourteen Republican Governors, and with the Republicans in control of both houses of the state legislatures in only seven states.³

¹Inside Politics: The National Conventions, 1960, p. 20.
³Ibid., p. 302.
On May 19, in Portland, Oregon, Senator John F. Kennedy suggested that the United States should "express regret" to Premier Khrushchev for the U-2 reconnaissance flights. This position had seemed momentarily to backfire on Kennedy, but in a few weeks the people appeared to be more concerned with such domestic issues as unemployment, increased federal spending, the agricultural surplus problem, and the growing problems of integration in the South.

Nelson Rockefeller sounded very much like a candidate on May 8 when he delivered a strong attack on the lack of direction he alleged existed in Nixon's foreign policy statements and on the Eisenhower defense budget, which he considered inadequate.

Kennedy, as well as other leading Democratic campaigners, constantly complained of the stagnation of the American economy, the seriousness of the allegedly low level of national economic growth, and the so-called "missile gap" between the Soviet Union and the United States.¹

The issue of the Congo was a fairly simple one in 1960. The United States had strongly backed the United Nations in its "power-play" that had forced the Soviet Union out of the immediate picture, even to the point of evacuating the Russian embassy staff. In Cuba, the domestic policies of Fidel Castro

¹"To Work In Earnest," Newsweek, August 1, 1960, p. 24.
appeared eminently authoritarian to many Americans, but no clear crisis or breakdown of friendly relations had occurred. GOP Senator Jacob Javits described this "... a sorry period for any administration in power. ... The United States was reaping a harvest that had been planted, whether we wish to say wisely or foolishly, by tenants long since departed. ..." In fact, according to Javits, "The only encouraging headline that the Republicans had in the press for nearly four months of any real moment was the 'Successful Firing of the Polaris [Missile]'."¹ Or as a writer of considerable renown from the opposite side of the political fence expressed it:

... 1960 was a year of national concern—vague, shapeless, unsettling, undefinable national concern ... the Congress of the United States saw fit for the first time to hold formal hearings on the National Purpose; ... the outgoing President of the United States saw fit to leave as his legacy to the incoming President and the people an official paper that, for the first time in American history, self-consciously attempted to define the National Goals. It was a political year ushered in, symbolically, by the greatest newspaper in the country, The New York Times, finding fit to print on its front page a dispatch from Moscow that reported that the Russians had now taken to referring to themselves as 'the greatest power on earth'—a proud vulgarity hitherto reserved for Americans alone. It was a year in which Americans sensed the world about them changing as the politics of entire continents overseas changed; and they knew their own world would be changing too.²

¹Interview with Honorable Jacob J. Javits, U. S. Senator from New York, April 29, 1963.
If conventions epitomize the mythology and legendry of American national politics, then Chicago epitomizes the convention city. For one hundred years, ever since the nomination of Abraham Lincoln at the Wigwam, it has been the favorite city of political convention-goers. Counting notches for fourteen Republican and nine Democrat national conventions in the last twenty-five quadrennials, Chicago can boast that here were first named all the following Presidents of the United States: Lincoln, Grant, Garfield, Cleveland, Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt, Harding, Coolidge, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower.¹

Chicago does indeed have a rich heritage in the American presidential "ballgame," and as a city it is eager to keep its franchise. Its central location geographically and its physical attributes of numerous hotels, motels, restaurants, and entertainment attractions, all in close proximity, make it ideal. Moreover, the citizens of the "Windy City" have a pleasant knack of identifying with the party that is currently conventioneering in their midst. It was a boisterous, hot city for the delegates in 1960, and it provided some free entertainment to compete with campaign ballyhoo.

Eli, billing himself simply as a "servant of the Lord," preached doom to the crowds outside the Conrad Hilton, handing out leaflets that told the delegates "You are so busy worshiping the almighty dollar and seducing each other that you do not see the handwriting on the wall:

¹Ibid., p. 188.
America Must Fall." A ghost of yesterday wandered through the press corps: Philip Willkie, son of the famous Wendell Willkie, who, believing he could single-handedly duplicate his father's feat in stampeding a convention, handed out press releases running himself for Vice-President with Mr. Nixon. Mr. Willkie campaigned simultaneously in Chicago for election as Indiana State Superintendent of Public Instruction...  

But very few of the delegates or spectators were interested in Eli or Philip Willkie. The customary sound trucks were present, frequently making an antiphonal response of their message. The Rockefeller loud-speakers blared "For He's A Jolly Good Fellow," while the more correct Nixon theme song was "Merrily We Roll Along." Collegiate Republicans and Young Republicans were in greater evidence than at any previous convention; the young ladies of these groups were particularly conspicuous prior to the convention as they paraded at the respective hotels occupied by the various state delegations, usually dressed in short, scarlet skirts with the white blouses or in pink-striped gingham. The "young" Republicans and pre-convention crowds seemed gay, but such popular nearby night-clubs as the Pump Room reported poor business and complained that "this was the most penny-pinching convention crowd that they had ever known..."  

The poor attendance at the Pump Room may have resulted from the state of gloom, perhaps even anger, that settled over  

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1Ibid., p. 190.  
2Ibid., p. 190.
a large part of the more conservative delegates, alternates, and party faithful when they heard of the Rockefeller-Nixon meeting in New York. Known unhappily to many as the "Fourteen Point Compact of Fifth Avenue," the public announcement of the joint-communique caused a storm of righteous outrage from the one-hundred-member platform committee who now felt their efforts in three early days at the convention were meaningless. Already many members of this platform committee had probably strained greatly to accept the liberal tone of their committee's deliberations. The "Compact" was soon the top American news story, causing delight among the Democrats and serious consternation among Republicans. Barry Goldwater spoke at least for the conservative wing of the GOP when he labeled the Rockefeller-Nixon agreement a "surrender" and a "Munich of the Republican Party." When Vice-President Nixon arrived in Chicago shortly after noon on Monday, July 25, he was astonished with the common interpretation given to his meeting with Rockefeller. He has since written in his Six Crises the following reaction:

... I found the delegates in an angry and rebellious mood. They thought Rockefeller deserved nothing but the back of my hand. But through an initial press conference in which I directly took on all the charges of "surrender" to Rockefeller and answered each of them, and by meeting groups of delegates on virtually a round-the-clock basis as well as greeting and shaking hands with every one of the 2600 delegates and alternates, I was finally able to set the record straight and to prepare the way for a receptive audience for my acceptance speech.¹

¹Nixon, Six Crises, p. 316.
Regardless as to a judgement of how successfully Nixon managed to satisfy the convention with "his" platform, one could safely say that the 1960 Republican Convention had an inauspicious beginning. Although it appeared that most of the delegates respected the political talents of Nixon, it is probably true that many of the delegates were not genuinely happy with his candidacy. The GOP conservatives had arrived in Chicago expecting another defeat, for they realized that their favorite, Senator Barry Goldwater, could be neither nominated nor elected in 1960. They still retained some frustration about the Eisenhower nomination, which they had fought. Although many later acknowledged him to be a good President, the conservatives generally did not believe "Ike" was the politician they had needed to rebuild their party. Many GOP Conservatives still believed that there was too much "Me-tooism" toward the Democrats.¹

Since the Warren Harding campaign in 1920, the party standard-bearer had been more liberal than the party's conservative wing. Nixon had at one time seemed a fairly good copy of the conservative's "ideal" candidate, but he had appeared to become much more liberal in the last eight years. At his news conference called to explain that Rockefeller's views were

¹Huckshorn Interview.
in reality very close to his and had not therefore constituted a "surrender." Nixon went even further in displeasing the conservatives by interjecting that "the platform was just the beginning of the campaign proposals he had up his sleeve."¹

Despite the animosity or at least distrust from the Right, it is equally necessary to remember that many Republicans of the Rockefeller "school" found Nixon disappointingly conservative for their taste. These Republicans in general had more to be happy with in the controversial agreement signed by Nixon and Rockefeller; a strong civil rights plank was a virtual certainty, and a searching new look at defense spending seemed promised. Clearly, the liberals had more reason to be congenial than the conservatives as the opening session of the Twenty-Seventh Republican National Convention was convened by its National Chairman, Senator Thruston Morton.

It was a foregone conclusion for most Americans that Richard Nixon would be the Republican presidential nominee. The major items of uncertainty were the vice-presidential nominee and the platform to be adopted. As the convention opened, it appeared to many delegates that only the vice-presidency was yet to be decided, and it was naturally

expected that the presidential nominee would exercise the
greatest power in the selection of his running mate. There
must have been many delegates who wondered to themselves
if the trip to Chicago was worth the time.
CHAPTER III

THE SPEECH

The keynote address was scheduled as the last speech given during the first day of the convention. The Judd speech was, according to some observers, the third keynote of the day, following the major hortatory efforts of Goldwater and former President Hoover. During the opening session, the delegates received greetings from Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Congresswoman Marguerite Stitt, and Governor William G. Stratton of Illinois; heard the Kansas high school student who was the American Legion Oratorical Champion and the chairman of the American Heritage Foundation in short addresses; and adopted rules and officers for permanent organization.

The Second Session of the Republican Convention featured in addition to the major addresses of Goldwater and Hoover a dramatized memorial program honoring Abraham Lincoln, an introduction of all Republican Senators and senatorial candidates, presentations of gavels to the perma-

See for example the Editorial of the Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 1960, p. 18.
nent chairman by several state delegations, and additional speeches by the GOP candidate for United States Senator from Illinois, by Assistant Republican National Chairman Mrs. Claire B. Williams, and by Temporary Chairman Cecil Underwood, Governor of West Virginia. Congressman Francis P. Bolton introduced keynoter Judd, the last speaker of the day, with a short, carefully edited speech that was a quick resume of his public career and personal philosophy. The introduction to Judd was a glowing one, and the speaker was greeted with a cheering, standing ovation.

**Thesis and Lines of Argument**

In his opening remarks, Judd came immediately to the message of the occasion. He followed the advice of his friend Robert Humphries that he should eliminate his originally prepared three introductory paragraphs and go immediately to the real beginning of his speech content. In what then became the introductory paragraph of his speech, Judd promised a departure from what he considered the ordinary path of the traditional keynote: "blaming the other party for everything that is bad, taking credit to ourselves for everything that is good. . . ." Partially fulfilling

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1. Judd Interview.
2. Ibid.
this pledge, Judd offered two sections of his speech to an explanation of the basic differences between the Democrats and Republicans, concerned that many American citizens believed them to be the same.

Perhaps in an attempt to find common ground and probably hoping to win some degree of acceptance among his Democratic and Independent listeners in the larger national audience, Judd said during the introduction of his speech:

\[\text{We know, as do you who are listening, that both the Democrats and the Republicans want a strong, free, and prosperous America in a peaceful and secure world. The difference between the two parties is not over these good objectives, but over the best way to achieve good objectives and keep them.}^1\]

The editors of *Vital Speeches*, including the Judd speech in their magazine as one of the major addresses of the 1960 Republican Convention, considered the last line of the above quotation as the primary thesis of the Judd address, entitling it, "The Best Way To Achieve Good Objectives and Keep Them."\(^2\) Judd did not plan a title for his speech, but felt that the quotation from his speech utilized as a slogan-like title on copies of the keynote address distributed by the Republican National Committee was "more reflective of the most urgent theme of the keynote, transcending political

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 90.

\(^2\)See *Vital Speeches*, Vol. XXVI (August 15, 1960), p. 646. Judd's opposite number, Senator Church, was not so honored.
overtones."

1 A line from the speech: "We must develop a strategy for victory . . . to save freedom! Freedom everywhere!" was regarded by Judd and by the GOP National Committee as the major thesis of his speech. A supporting thesis was that the Democrats had demonstrated themselves to be short-sighted, inexperienced, unwise, and particularly incompetent to handle Communists, thus making them clearly unable to preserve freedom. This "freedom strategy" would have its greatest test externally, and Judd agreed with Kennedy that "foreign policy is the most important issue in the campaign." Consequently, Judd employed almost half of his fifteen-page speech in defense of Republican foreign policy and in a blistering attack on the foreign policy records of former Presidents Truman and Roosevelt.

In discussing domestic issues, Judd followed through on his introductory statement about similarity in goals of the major parties. He denied that Republicans were against such progressive measures as "security for old age, adequate medical care, better education, better housing, protection of the rights of labor and of minorities, and aid to agriculture."2 Instead of opposing these programs, Judd

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1 Judd Interview.

2 Judd Keynote Address transcript, p. 90. See Appendix.
argued that the GOP's fight with the Democrats was not over the validity of such programs, but how best to implement and administer them. Judd does not detail any basic distinction between Republican and Democratic methods for administering such domestic programs, except to state that the Republicans favored minimum federal intervention in the lives of citizens, even for benevolent activities. Instead, Judd stressed the Republican goal of optimum individual initiative and a relatively unhampered operation of free enterprise. Improvements in various facets of the national economy were cited as proof that the Republican plan had worked under the Eisenhower Administration. In a strong statement, Judd contrasted the record for corruption and scandal in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.

In his conclusion, Judd expended more than two pages of text in a statement regarding basic philosophical differences between the two parties. His explanation centered on the size and concept of government and elaborated his view of the desirability of allowing individuals and groups to satisfy their own needs without government interference. Judd believed that no matter how well-intentioned the government programs might be, the citizens would lose their incentive to help themselves. He drew upon an esteemed Democrat, former President Woodrow Wilson, for a quotation that testified: "The history of liberty is a history of the
limitation of governmental power, not the increase of it."¹
In this argument as in many others, Judd asked a question, supplied the Democratic answer, and then attacked the alleged answer.²

A less controversial but equally effective sub-point was Judd's statement that the situation facing our nation in 1960 was much like that which faced Lincoln in 1860, only now the slavery which we opposed was on a world basis. Yet, as Lincoln knew, there was still no chance of "... this whole wide world going on indefinitely half slave, half free."³ Thus, Judd had a constantly underlying and frequently stated proposition that this nation should not maintain a defensive holding action, but rather mount an unspecified offensive attack to win the world struggle with communism. In part the solution was that our citizens had to "sell" democracy more effectively and fervently than the communists espoused their ideology. The remainder of the argument was in the form of a generalization that the people of the United States must leave the leadership for our ship of state in the hands of tried and true Republican hands, rather than consider a transfer to the shoulders of

¹Ibid., p.112.
²Ibid., p.112.
³Ibid., p.115.
allegedly immature, ambition-motivated, unwise, short-sighted Democrats. Walter Judd explained to the author that he wished to deliver a speech that allowed Nixon to point with "justifiable pride to the achievements of the Eisenhower Administration in his campaign," and yet "... give Nixon additional freedom of policy and new direction that any new leader of the ticket ought to have the ability to exercise."\(^1\) It might appear that Judd consciously designed a large part of his content to answer the political oratory of the Democratic Convention and of the post-convention campaigning; however, Judd stated that his speech was intended to be a rebuttal on only two issues: (1) that the free world condition had slipped due to Republican errors as suggested by Democratic Keynoter Frank Church, and (2) that Eisenhower's cancellation of his visit to Japan was due to some personal inadequacy.\(^2\)

In outline form, the keynote speech might appear as follows:

\(^{1}\) Judd Interview. Judd was confident that Nixon would receive the GOP Presidential Nomination, and was a strong friend and backer of Nixon. Nixon was one of the few Republicans to read the speech prior to its delivery.

\(^{2}\) Ibid.
I. Introduction: This keynote will not be a traditional one:

A. The traditional keynote is inadequate tonight because:
   1. The times are too serious.
   2. The country is in danger.

B. The American people actually need to know which party can best serve them, for
   1. The better party should have an understanding of the forces against them at home and abroad.
   2. The better party will have the best leaders, most capable of handling the problems.

C. Both parties want the same good objectives for the country, they only differ in method of obtaining those good objectives and keeping them, and
   1. The Republicans always oppose measures that they believe are unsound.
   2. Republicans do not make promises in order to win elections.
   3. The Democrats can beat the Republicans in promises, but the communists can out-promise the Democrats.

II. The basic problem today is the powerful enemy that threatens Americans, and
A. The Republican Party was born in such a time of crisis to deal with human slavery which it successfully solved.

B. Today's problem of world slavery can be solved by today's Republicans.

C. Republicans have recently demonstrated their ability to handle international problems effectively, for

1. Republicans ended the fighting in Korea.

2. Republicans prevented half a dozen other threats from becoming war.

3. Republicans accomplished this by
   a. Support of principles.
   b. Balanced military power.

4. Republicans have solved the Democrat's "missile gap" and strengthened our deterrent force.

5. Republicans have not portrayed the U. S. as a second-rate power just to get elected.

6. Republicans have employed the U-2 to prevent another Pearl Harbor.

7. Republicans did not back down to Khrushchev over the Berlin problem.

8. Republicans have not tried to fool the people with false optimism.
9. Khrushchev, not Republicans, wrecked the Paris Summit Conference.
a. Khrushchev tried to set the Allies against each other.
b. When he did not succeed in dividing the Allies, he killed the Conference.
c. Khrushchev has now been forced to achieve his ends by subversion.

10. The Communists had to thwart foreign trips by Republican leaders due to their popularity.
a. Eisenhower achieved a greater triumph in India than communist leaders.
b. Communists could not risk similar popular demonstrations for Eisenhower in Japan or the U. S. S. R.

11. Democrats get along better with communists since the communists get what they want out of them.

D. It wasn't Republicans who were responsible for such blunders, as

1. Recognizing the Soviet Union in 1933 and treating it like a respectable power.
2. Giving the Russians a free hand in the Balkans against Churchill's advice.
3. Agreeing to the Communist take-over of 100 million free, non-Russian people in Eastern Europe.

4. Cutting off West Berlin from the free world and giving the Russians East Germany.

5. Promising Manchuria to its rightful owners, the Chinese, and then giving it to the Russians at Yalta.

6. Dividing Korea, and giving Northern industrial area to the Communists.

7. Giving the Soviets the Kurile Islands, an integral part of the Japanese home islands.

8. Allowing the Communists a truce in Korea so that they could cause more trouble.

9. Accepting a truce in Korea without a Chinese withdrawal or requiring the Communists to lay down their arms.

E. The Republicans have consistently tried to tear down the Frankenstein monster of communism that the Democrats have helped to build up.

F. That is the reason the Republicans are against the recognition of Red China or admitting Red China to the United Nations.

G. But the Republicans are not ignoring China, and have been negotiating with the Red Chinese Govern-
ment for over five years.

H. Republicans have faith in America and can most ef-
fectively combat communism in the new challenge
that Khrushchev has given.

I. The voters, being wise, will return the power of
foreign policy to trusted Republican hands.

III. The American Domestic Scene also requires Republican
leadership, for

A. The Republicans have built a "middle-of-the-road
Government" that is best for the whole nation.

B. The Republicans have had a better record of clean
government without scandal.

C. The Republicans have achieved prosperity without
war, something the Democrats have not been able to
do in this century.

D. The Republicans have checked inflation.

1. They did so without autocratic controls.

2. They have used the free enterprise system and
kept it free.

a. Republican record for price stability is
better than Democratic record.

b. Republicans have achieved more jobs for
workers with higher pay.

c. Republicans have achieved higher personal
income for entire nation.
E. Republicans have strengthened federal programs, as
1. Social Security strengthening and more citizens covered.
2. Vocational Rehabilitation expanded.
3. Agricultural surpluses used to help deserving groups.

F. Republicans have taken fewer tax dollars from the American public.

IV. Philosophy of Republican Party is the best attitude for the nation, for

A. Democrats believe in government from the top down, Republicans from the bottom up.
1. Best form of government is from the bottom up.
   a. Woodrow Wilson testimony.
   b. Intent of the founding fathers and authors of the U. S. Constitution.
2. Too much governmental help kills individual initiative.

B. The same Republican philosophy and attitude that solved the problem of 1860 will solve the problem of 1960.
1. We need renewed faith in God.
2. We must recognize that the world cannot exist half slave, half free.
3. We must not remain on the defensive, we must take the offensive.
Conclusion:
V. We must have a rebirth in our party and within each one of us, and we can then save our nation. Let's go to work!

Supporting the Arguments

Although the Judd keynote speech had a strong flavor of American nationalism it did not lose sight of its primary goal: to raise the reputation of the Republican Party and its morale and to negate those same factors for the Democrats.

Judd may have succeeded in disarming some of his non-Republican listeners in the national audience by stating that his speech would not follow the traditionally partisan path.\(^1\) His explanation that the "times were too serious" implied that the life of the nation was so seriously endangered that he would not resort to the customary political bombast, but would show the path of political salvation to the nation. The speaker also promised a careful dichotomy of the parties that would demonstrate clearly the superiority of one over the other. Thus, in the introductory remarks, the audience was first led to expect a less partisan approach, and, secondly, a speech that would generally prove which was

\(^1\)Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 89.
the better party to furnish the leadership for the nation. The keynoter demonstrated quickly that his address was not original in direction, motive, or substantiation. It was not the most flagrant address in hyperbole among recent keynotes, but it was, by impartial standards, a completely political speech, and it offered little, if any, more than the usual keynote proofs for its charges.

Many of Judd's arguments, judged by rhetorical standards for logical demonstration, were weak. He relied more heavily upon his ethical appeal gained through his character as a speaker and the emotional appeal of his arguments.

His strongest emotional appeals were aimed at such diverse topics as giving the "poor" Nixon a chance with the "rich" Kennedy,¹ the identification and complete reliance of Republicans on the attitudes and philosophy of Abraham Lincoln,² the humiliation that Americans would share if their President had apologized to Khrushchev as Democrats suggested,³ the lives of American boys being thrown away in Korea for no purpose,⁴ and his refusal to do

¹Ibid., p.114.
²Ibid., p.115.
³Ibid., p.98.
⁴Ibid., p.94.
his daughter's math lessons because he wanted her to learn
to take care of herself, just as the Republicans felt the
people should have the opportunity to care for themselves. ¹
These appeals were more emotional than logical in their
presentation.

Judd did not seem to be guilty of many inconsist-
encies, but one was particularly glaring in the speech.
Near his conclusion, Judd had stressed the increases of
various governmental aid programs to the people, detailing
the figures of seven and one half million more people
covered by Social Security and of a jump from five to
fourteen million in people receiving Social Security bene-
fits,² and of gigantic increases in vocational rehabilita-
tion³ and agricultural surplus disbursements.⁴ In almost
the next breath, Judd launched into his major philosophical
distinction between the parties, where he stressed that the
Republicans did not believe in "government handouts", or
"in government orders, edicts, and government controls.

..."⁵ Judd chose to state Republican support and expan-

¹Ibid., p. 114.
²Ibid., p. 109.
³Ibid., p. 110.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid.
sion for various liberal programs, generally admitted to be of Democratic origins, and then almost in juxtaposition, to launch his explanation of Republican philosophy that capitalized on individual initiative and few governmental programs. He allowed himself to be vulnerable to the charge of inconsistency and riding both sides of the fence.

It is generally agreed that evidence is composed of examples, expert testimony, and statistics. In his fifteen page keynote, Judd cited fourteen examples involving statistics that we could label as "facts," and quoted prominent Americans as expert testimony proof for four major arguments. In his use of nine rhetorical questions, Judd used a partisan historical narrative of "facts" to ascribe many postwar events that strengthened the communists as Democratic responsibility for these events and to remove Republicans from a part of the guilt of each of these "facts" of history. The fallacy of Judd's argument here was that much of the transfer of land and people occurred during the war when the Allied powers were engaged equally in occupying conquered territories and when the majority of Americans, including both Democratic and Republican leaders, were unable to visualize an ulterior motive to Russian occupation.

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2Judd Keynote Transcript, pp. 101-102.
activities. Judd's causal connection was at best dubious.

Many of Judd's examples of statistical evidence are weakened by his failure to adapt his figures to fluctuating values of the dollar, to the sharp natural effect of a war economy inflation contrasted to peacetime stability, or to adjust this monetary increase to an also expanding population. For example, Judd stated that "personal income has gone up by a whopping 33%--from $301 billion in 1952 to $420 billion in 1960--and a larger share of that higher income than ever before, more than 4% larger, [for] the pay envelope of workers. . . ." In this argument he has failed to consider the larger number of workers in the labor force, both in sheer population growth and due to the return to civilian life by military forces following the Korean War. The "4% per cent larger pay in labor's pay envelope" did not mean real purchasing power, since the cost of living rises would have more than eroded the 4% per cent actual dollar increase.

Another Judd fallacy was the inaccurate statement that "... the Republican 83rd Congress . . . gave the American people the biggest single tax cut in their history. . . ." To have reflected truly the tax cut, Judd should

1Ibid., p. 103.
2Ibid., p. 109.
have indicated that he meant the largest tax cut in number of dollars, and not the largest cut in percentage effect on the individual citizen or corporation. He was guilty of a similar statistical fallacy when he spoke of "the 48 per cent price rise under Truman that leveled off to less than 10 per cent under Eisenhower, . . ."1 neglecting to add that the Korean War had sharply effected the Truman period statistics.

To the audience, the strongest emotional appeal of the speech was the often-repeated theme of "survival" or "freedom from want and fear." Alan Monroe in his classic work on psychological motivation listed the following four primary motives, either by themselves or in some type of combination, as a cause for all our behavior:

1. Self-preservation and the desire for physical well-being.

2. Freedom from external restraint.


4. Preservation of the human race.2

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1Ibid.

To the writer, Judd's keynote address seemed a clear example of each of these primary motives in a constantly reinforcing pattern. The failure of the Paris Summit Conference was entirely the fault of Mr. Khrushchev, said Judd in an appeal to self-esteem of Americans. "The U-2 flight was aimed at preventing war," he explained, appealing to the first primary motive and others. He neglected to say that the timing of the flight of the ill-fated U-2 piloted by Major Powers was poor, or that our conduct after the Russian capture of the plane and pilot was poorly handled by American diplomats. It was not too difficult a task to convince most of the American audience that the fault was entirely Khrushchev's.

Placing the fault of the ego-deflating stand-off in the Korean War was a more difficult task, but Judd used emotional statements and familiar themes to accomplish the task. Starting with the emotional statistic of "33,000 American youths killed" in a war he implied we did not dare win, the keynoter over-looked limitations of a joint United Nations-United States Command that hesitated to cross Chinese borders and thereby risk involving Russia in the war.

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1 Judd Keynote Transcript, P. p. 98.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 104.
The "Korean Police Action" was a war many Americans did not understand and found little in which to take pride, and Judd's statement that implied that Eisenhower was largely responsible for its successful conclusion was accepted at face value by many Americans. Probably the more significant value of this reference was a later mention of war which implied the Democrats were a war party. Judd finally planted this old GOP theme adroitly when he spoke of Republican prosperity achieved without war and added that it was "something our predecessors have never been able to do in this century." ¹

In general, Judd is better in attacking than defending. The fault of his defense is that he seemed to make almost irrational refutation to charges that particularly angered him. For example, the Kennedy reference to Eisenhower as the "President who began his term by going to Korea and ends it by staying home from Japan . . ." ² brought a vociferous reply from Judd. One of his fallacies in relying to this argument was that foreign demonstrators against Eisenhower were all communists, a charge that Judd did not substantiate. He then declared that the communists were not

¹Ibid., p. 98.

²Time, July 25, 1960, p. 10.
strong enough to snub anybody until the Democratic Presidents helped make them powerful.\(^1\) The questionable "proof" for that argument was a quotation from the early days of the Truman Administration and prior to the beginnings of the cold war when Truman had referred to Stalin as "good old Joe."\(^2\)

Judd's final answer to this argument was that anyone who managed to have successful diplomatic relations with the communists did so because he gave the communists what they wanted. This was something Republicans were not willing to do,\(^3\) said Judd.

In his choice of expert testimony, Judd appeared more successful. His use of Kennedy's testimony that "we have the greatest deterrent force in history . . ."\(^4\) was vital from the man who had recently criticized the Republican Administration's defense policies. The frequent reference and quotations from Abraham Lincoln were helpful identification for present day Republicans and suggested strongly that the same basic Republican philosophy would successfully meet the needs of the hour. Perhaps the most effective use of personal testimony came from the great Democratic President Woodrow Wilson whom Judd quoted to

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\(^1\) Judd Transcript, p. 100.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 105.
substr抨itate the Republican view that liberty exists where government powers are limited.\textsuperscript{1} It was in the exposition of Republican philosophy that Judd presented his most persuasive arguments, both in delivery and construction. Carefully articulating the philosophy without his usual tenor of vindictiveness, Judd explained with more than ordinary fairness the distinction between the two parties in the concept of government size and function. If the listener remembered Judd's denial in his introduction that Republicans were against social welfare programs, he may have been somewhat confused as to where Judd drew the line between the parties in actual practice. But his personal analogy that compared helping his daughter with her math and the government's over-zealously helping its citizens to do what they should learn to do for themselves was a lucid and appealing argument.

Using what he called "common horse sense" reasoning,\textsuperscript{2} Judd followed a basic pattern expected of the keynote with success. As we have said, his pathetic and ethical proof were strong and much of his logical argument and reasoning were so combined with emotional appeals that the listener was convinced frequently of the argument's validity. It is perhaps anticlimatic to add that the keynoter was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 113.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Judd Interview.
\end{itemize}
personally convinced of the truthfulness of each of his charges, even after months of hearing Democratic counter-refutation.¹

From a strictly logical point of view, some of Judd's reasoning was assumptive; some of it was clearly fallacious. His evidence, especially his use of statistics, frequently fell far below the standards set by argumentation textbooks. Compared with other keynote speeches, however, and considering the partisan nature of the occasion, Judd's speech would merit milder censure on this point than a different occasion and a different audience might demand.

Audience Adaptation

Judd has not stated whether he was more concerned with the immediate audience of Republican delegates in the Chicago Amphi-theatre or with his indirect, national audience that listened to his speech on radio and television or read the speech in print. Yet, from the comment of Judd to the author that he wished most importantly in a "political sense" to make an address that would broaden the scope of Nixon's campaign,² it would appear that Judd was more concerned with his larger, uncommitted national audience. A rhetorician, writing in a symposium article concerning the

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
1960 Republican Convention, wrote: "A happy balance was struck by speakers who directed remarks both to the immediate and the radio-television audience."¹ The significance of this adaptation to a mixed audience is partially explained by Oliver and Cortright in their speech textbook when they comment: "You adapt the quality of your ideas to the highest common denominator; their expression to the lowest..."² This distinction is aimed primarily at levels of audience sophistication, and this is one important element. In this regard, the Convention audience was undoubtedly the higher audience in terms of educational accomplishment and probably in intellectual comprehension level. This Convention audience could have comprehended a more elevated vocabulary, but the partisan political flavoring was vital for them.

On the other hand, the mixed audience label suggests another kind of basic difference that is particularly evident in modern political speaking. As Adlai Stevenson expressed his views in the 1956 campaign on the mixed audience:


This is really a baffling problem. I come into a hall full of dedicated Democrats. We are exhilarated. We tend to see things in black and white. But at the same time, I am speaking to people watching television in their living rooms, to the fellow in the kitchen with his feet up on the table who says no politician can be trusted, to all kinds of people everywhere. What kind of speech can I give under these circumstances? In the past, I have resolved this conflict in favor of the unseen audience. We have to be pragmatic about it: The television audience is much larger, and presumably the partisans are already won.  

Although Judd's speech was more ceremonial and an established part of the ritual of the respective national conventions, it seemed to have a much broader primary aim than inspiring the assembled Republicans. Judd's theme that the nation needed an offensive strategy for victory was an appeal larger than the usual party slogans. Moreover, even the subservient theme that the Republicans could best develop and implement this victory strategy seemed more directed to convincing the nation than the party.

Judd's speaking engagement "in the spring and summer of 1960 and [his] correspondence from all across the nation had convinced him that people were tired of merely defending. . . . They were ready to take the offensive and I agreed. We needed to score on the communists. Not just maintain a holding action. You don't improve your position

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that way."¹

The only other direct clues from Judd were that:
(1) he was "anxious that my speech not sound labored," and
(2) that he "would give my honest views, regardless of
whether or not my audience might like me thereafter."² Judd
had expressed concern about his ability to adapt to such a
large audience in his letter of acceptance to Senator
Morton, the National GOP Committee Chairman, and explained
that his customary method of speaking was "freewheeling"
rather than reading from a manuscript. Yet, he assured
Morton that he would do his best "with this vitally
important assignment. . . ."³

Professor Robert Huckshorn said that "the mood
of the Convention was moderately conservative, and that Judd's
oratory, along with Nixon's, was most harmoniously tuned
to the mood of the great majority of the delegates."⁴ Never­
evertheless, the writer believes that an analysis of Judd's
address reveals a greater concern for the broader, indirect
audience in the major portion of his speech, although it is
also true that Judd met the expectations of the GOP delegates

¹Judd Interview.
²Ibid.
³Letter from Walter Judd to Thruston B. Morton, June 16, 1960.
⁴Huckshorn Interview.
with his message.

Although Judd did not wish to comment on the
effectiveness of the speech of his opposite number at the
Democratic Convention, Senator Church, his comments did
suggest that audience reaction to the speeches of the earlier
Democratic Convention had illustrated that "the people
wanted specifics, not ephemeral, philosophical solilo-
quies. . . ."¹ During the planning stages of Judd's
speech, Nixon had agreed with his appraisal that the public
wanted to hear "a specific statement of offensive strategy
to battle communism."²

Several Republican Senators had sent suggestions
to Judd through Senator Goldwater, the Chairman of the GOP
Senatorial Election Committee, that they "... were hopeful
of vigorous refutation to recent Democrat charges that
implied Republicans were responsible for the deterioration
of the free world since the end of World War II."³ It has
been mentioned earlier that these same charges had already
seemed an important provocation to Judd, but the request was
solid reinforcement for his view from a powerful group of
Republican leaders.

¹ Judd Interview.
² Ibid.
³ Interview with Honorable Andrew F. Schoeppel,
Judd's speech applied to a host of motive appeals\(^1\) which were generally basic enough to be psychological inducements to the majority of his listeners. His introductory statement that proclaimed a departure from the traditional keynote achieved a sense of urgency that was related to the motive of survival, both for national and individual freedoms. It also suggested that the speaker intended to be largely non-partisan in his remarks, a gentle nudge to the indirect audience that included Democrats and Independents that their sense of fair play should dominate their concordant motive of loyalty to institution.

The major exposition of the speech which proclaimed relative superiority of Republican achievements and abilities was exemplary of material designed to win the audience's motivation of "approval and admiration," and the motivation of " emulation" that should particularly appeal to strong Independents. The motives of "security" and "fear", which are listed frequently under the broader designation of "survival," were strong psychological appeals in the body and in the conclusion of the speech.

The frequent references to the Diety and beloved such American leaders as Lincoln and Wilson were helpful for

\(^1\)For an explanation of the motive appeals as they are utilized in this paper, the reader is invited to see James A. Winans' *Speech Making* (New York City: Appleton-Century Co., 1938), pp. 302-322.
Republican identification with significant authority and admired institutions. As the keynoter became inspired by his immediate audience, his language became increasingly filled with direct comment. Such statements as "you know," "I ask you," "Was it?," "our blessed land," "you're awfully kind!," and similar parenthetical adaptations, became evident.

Style

In the introduction to a rhetorical symposium on the 1956 political campaign, Ernest Wrange wrote: "It is readily acknowledged that the language of American politics is generally noted neither for the richness of its imagery nor the depth and maturity of its underlying thought." If we accept the self-evaluation of Walter Judd, we might conclude that Wrange's quotation applies clearly to him. Judd has insisted that he is not a good public speaker, and has detailed several speech faults. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that any man who has served as an active spokesman for his party and church, and has been his congressional district's distinguished representative for


2Judd Interview.
twenty years could be completely devoid of style. Indeed, an absence of any conscious attempt at embellishment and rhetorical imagery would itself constitute a style. One should accept with reservation, therefore, Judd's feeling that his "complete efforts are centered only in developing speech content. . . . I pay no attention to style."¹

Contradicting Judd on his evaluation of his speaking style is a long-time acquaintance and competent speech critic, Robert Forsythe, who said:

Dr. Judd's style is that of a prophet. He is intense, concise, and so forceful in his flood of well-chosen words that he carried one right along with him. His word-choices, sentence structure, and stylistic qualities complete the authoritative-persuasive mood which he creates.²

The writer agreed with Forsythe's analysis of Judd's speaking and that of Herbert Johnston, who explained:

I have always thought that one could see in his [Judd's] speeches the man himself. Deeply religious above all other traits, his style is inspiration even in an attack on something he considers evil. . . . Sensitive, strongly opinioned, and an uncompromising perfectionist in his own life; his language and speech topics convey them all without talking down

¹Ibid.

²Interview with Robert Forsythe, Minnesota State GOP Chairman, former college speech professor, Assistant-Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the Eisenhower Administration, Minneapolis, September 7, 1962.
to you, laboring the point, or being a milk-toast.

In his keynote, Judd spoke in everyday English, unsophisticated and comprehended easily by listeners of junior high school maturity. His word choices were clear, accurate and appropriate. There was no evidence of stilted language or slang, merely ordinary "talk" that any citizen understood quickly.

Although his sentence structure was often complex, Judd sounded generally terse. His embellishments were restricted largely to rhetorical questions and dramatic assertions. Typical of Judd's politically effective rhetorical questions were: "Can our Nation's prestige be raised by tearing it down? Aren't they on the American team?" and "Will they please tell you just what they think the American people wanted their President to do? Apologize and hand over West Berlin? . . . did they want him to blow up and start a war?" Judd also adopted a rhetorical question format to deny Republican responsibility for alleged blunders that led to a Communist victory in each case. The

1Interview with Herbert Johnston, Executive Secretary of the Minnesota State GOP Committee, a job he was persuaded to accept by his long-time friend Judd. He had also worked closely with Judd in religious activities and YMCA work, Minneapolis, September 7, 1962.

2Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 93.
repetition of nine "Was it the Republicans . . ." made a hailstorm attack on the opposition and allowed Judd direct address to his audience, one of his "favorite speaking devices." ¹

The frequent references to God and the help of a divine power seemed appropriate coming from Judd's lips since his ordinary conversational quality sounded prayerful to many listeners. ² Judd gave one brief prayer, mentioned the word "God" five times, and interspersed in his speech these religiously connotative words: "salvation, faith, blessed, pray, soul," and "dogma." ³

The keynoter understood the power of loaded language which he used most notably in describing the failure of the Paris Summit Conference. He accused Khrushchev of a "ruthless torpedoing" and "scuttling" of the Conference and of having attempted "to whittle down our resolution and soothe us into relaxed slumber." ⁴ In the same vein, Judd stated later that "Khrushchev stands naked before the whole world, exposed for his true objectives." ⁵ Judd's

¹Judd Interview.
²Conclusion by writer based on GOP Convention Delegate Survey.
³See Judd Keynote Address in Appendix.
⁴Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 99.
⁵Ibid., p. 105.
language in answering charges made by Democratic leaders against Eisenhower and Nixon was equally strong. He answered in part: "As long as two previous American Presidents [Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman] were willing to give in to Soviet leaders, they got along famously with them." As a clincher to this argument, Judd exhibited a rare example of his irony and humorous sarcasm when, mimicking Truman, he said with acid sweetness, "Good old Joe."

Judd employed effectively word imagery and figures of speech "as a method of making the message more vital and real for the audience." He utilized a vivid metaphor in labeling the communist conspiracy a "Frankenstein monster that our predecessors did so much to build up." One of the few but effective instances of personification was "this administration has not been hiding its head in the sand, or pretending that Red China does not exist..."

Although he denied any familiarity with the classical rhetoricians, Judd followed successfully Aristotle's

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1Ibid., p. 105.
2Judd Interview.
3Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 100.
4Ibid., p. 103.
prescription for good style: 1 "Good style is, first of all, clear. Clearness is secured through the use of name-words (nouns and adjectives) and verbs, that are current." 2

The composition of sentences demonstrated that Judd had a practical understanding of the language appropriate for a speaker to the general public. His words were not particularly vivid, but were clear and accurate for his meaning. He showed a definite affinity in the keynote, and in his earlier published speeches and articles, for the short, often one-syllable word. 3 Popular expressions were restricted to widely understood and current terminologies as "Ike," "whopping," and "shooting square." 4

1 Judd Interview. Although he had no formal training in speech or public address in high school or college, Judd had frequent speaking exercises after college as a "member of the deputation teams for the National Volunteers." As the national president of this nation-wide college youth group dedicated to promoting missionary programs over-seas, Judd had one of his richest thrills as the presiding officer and as speaker for the national convention in 1923 that drew more than 7,000 students to Indianapolis. His favorite speakers, all from his youth, were the Reverend Doctors John R. Mott, George Ellingwood Joy, and Frank G. Smith.


3 For a published article, see "The Case for the Republicans," Saturday Evening Post, October 11, 1952; for speeches, see Vital Speeches: "Korean Unification and Prisoner Issue," (19:578-85/July 15, 1953); "Philosophy of Trade With Asia," (20:531-35/May 1, 1954); "How Can We Be So Stupid?" (17:293-300/March 1, 1951); "What is The Truth About China?" (11:490-501/June 1, 1945); and "Conflict Moves To A Climax," (24:623-7/August 1, 1958).

4 Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 91, 100, and 108.
hyperboles were demonstrated in his frequent contrasts between Republicans and Democrats. A good example is "Democrats clamored, screamed . . . while President Eisenhower announced. . . . "

The antithesis of "rights are not what our Government must do for us; rights are what our Government cannot do to us," underlies the "liberty of the individual" issue. The epigram "Republican management of the government, not management of the people" is but another striking example of his effective usage of figures of thought. Although he stressed that "content was more the total effort with me," Judd voiced his "special appreciation for analogies," explaining that they seemed a superior method of making ideas clear and interesting for all types of people," and that he tried to use "medical, Biblical, or political analogies . . . my areas of particular experience and interest." In the keynote he referred to a personal analogy that compared his doing his daughter's math lesson and governmental aid programs for individuals. His reminder that if "I did my daughter's math, she would vote for me . . . " was point-

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1 Ibid., p. 100.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 Ibid., p. 111.
4 Judd Interview.
5 Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 115.
edly clear.

The question often arises in rhetorical studies of political speeches whether we are seeing the style of the speaker, or the style of the ghost-writer. Russel Windes, Jr. stated that all the speeches at the 1960 Republican Convention were so similar that they suggested being written by a common ghost-writer. This charge Judd denied vigorously, describing explicitly his own personal preparation and research of the keynote content. Judd limited his "outside assistance to suggestions for editing and slight re-wording." He indicated that the keynote speech as delivered was from his sixth draft and was between one-third and one-fourth shorter than his first draft.

Unless interrupted by his enthusiastic audience in an uncompleted statement, Judd's composition usually sounded smooth and polished, even in the impromptu revisions he made to his manuscript speech. Whereas his style of intense, forceful expression was consonant with his somewhat severe personality, an occasional touch of humor, especially irony, appeared, generally in an extemporaneous addition to his prepared manuscript. These additions were a welcome

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1Windes, Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, p. 250.
2Judd Interview.
change in an otherwise monotonous pattern.

**Delivery**

Many viewers in the television and radio audience (who were not familiar with Judd and his speaking style), and even many of the immediate audience in the Chicago Amphitheatre, were probably struck almost immediately by his voice and his delivery pattern. His voice was high-pitched, solemn, fervently sincere, and he sounded much more like a Bible-belt evangelist than a member of Congress. Many of these same people immediately noticed the rapidness of Judd's delivery, although he was speaking more measuredly and deliberately slower than the "240 words per minute delivery" that he had used in his earlier speaking career.  

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1 The writer has listened to a tape recording of the speech many times in the analysis of the content, style, and other attributes.

2 Based on the Delegate Survey conducted by the writer and covering the Republican delegations of Oregon, New York, Kansas and Tennessee at the 1960 GOP Convention.

3 "First Things First," *Time*, April 20, 1962, p. 29. From an analysis of the speech recording, the writer learned that Judd slowed his rate of delivery considerably for this occasion. His over-all rate in the speech was 140 words per minute. His rate reflected a gradual climb from 136 words in his introduction to 155 words in the main body of the speech and to 156 in the conclusion. This compares with the average of 120 words per minute for representative college orators reported by William Norwood Brigance, "How Fast Do We Talk?," *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, XII (November, 1926), pp. 337-342.
With clipped, concise articulation and diction, Judd never failed to convey his mood and ideas. The audience and the speaker quickly warmed to each other, and applause soon caused difficulty in completing Judd's long, frequently complex sentences in his manuscript speech.¹

Shortly after Judd was publicly named the Republican keynoter, he promised the press that there would be "no partisan attack on the Democrats; he would simply stick to the facts," and, according to Newsweek: "True to his promise, there was no hell-fire and brimstone in Judd's message."²

The political charges by recent Democratic speakers may have been responsible for a change in Judd's plans, but the writer could not agree with the cited Newsweek evaluation. The well-organized summation of Republican achievements balanced by charges of Democrat recklessness, irresponsibility and give-aways to the communists were present in partisan oratory in the best Harry Truman "give 'em hell!" manner, although in more restrained language. Similar to the Newsweek commentary was that of the New York Times:

Mr. Judd's experience and skill in forensic political medicine made him the natural choice of his party to prescribe the continued administration of Republican remedies to bolster the nation's vitality.

¹These interruptions are distinguished easily in the speech recording. Judd finally added such admonitions as, "Hear me, the last part!" See Judd Keynote Transcript, p. 114.

²"Confident Keynote," Newsweek, August 1, 1960, p.20.
His platform manner is methodical rather than dramatic, and his treatment, a dosage of carefully marshalled facts rather than an appeal to emotion.1

Judd described his own speaking method as that of "an arguer--not an orator." His usual pattern of delivery was the extemporaneous method, and he generally utilized "only a page outline of notes for public speaking." He reported that for this keynote, he felt he "should write out the speech since I would be speaking for the whole party."2 Although Judd had prepared a manuscript for this speech, his strong familiarity with the content and his frequent alteration of language and sentence structure, plus occasional additions of new ideas and phrases, made it seem largely extemporaneous. The ideas in the speech had been used in many earlier Judd speeches and articles, and as he told one newspaper correspondent: "I started writing that speech in 1942. . . ."3

As noted previously, there are several examples in this speech of sarcastic humor at the expense of his political adversaries, but few of these statements were delivered in a light or even humorous tone of voice. Instead, the sober note of urgency that permeated the speech was

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2 Judd Interview.

3 *Time*, June 20, 1960, p. 12.
seldom lightened, and this policy seemed altogether wise in view of the complete acceptance and agreement that Judd ultimately desired to win from his audience. Moreover, the writer found Judd unhesitant about admitting that his evangelistic-sounding delivery did not properly equip him for humorous presentations. Judd, while discussing this characteristic, related that:

Many people believe I sound very similar to my fellow-Minnesotan [Senator] Hubert Humphrey. . . . He was never able to tell a funny story or use a very light touch in speaking either. . . . I guess you would have to call us both crusaders, although our crusades have headed in opposite directions since he left the Mayor's office in Minneapolis.¹

As he has indicated himself, Judd sounds much more like a debater than an orator. His rapid delivery was among the few critical comments suggested as possible areas of improvement by the convention delegates included in the writer's survey, but he was considered better in delivery than any previous keynoter by a great majority of the surveyed delegates who had heard two or more convention keynoters. Only General MacArthur was cited as having had better delivery by a delegate who described himself as "an oldtimer" and appreciative of the "old style of oratory."²

¹Judd Interview.

²Delegate from Oregon whose reply indicated attendance at all GOP Conventions since 1936, except 1944. Mail Survey of Oregon Delegates, June, 1962.
Yet, although there is a definite criticism of delivery, it is the personal belief of the writer that this same feature may have helped him to gain credence for his ideas. As Bishop Whately suggested over a generation ago: "Much of the force of what is said depends on the degree of rapidity with which it is uttered." It is the opinion of the author that a slower exposition of several Judd arguments might have weakened their acceptance since many of the arguments gained their acceptance more from the appearance of sincerity and deep conviction of the speaker than from the strengths of his logical proofs. For Judd, such fervor was conveyed in part by a rapid rate of delivery.

The sentence structure of Judd's text often became extremely complex and his rapid delivery enabled him to complete a lengthy sentence before the initial statements were lost in the audience's memory. Moreover, Judd's clear, concise diction gained by clipped, articulate and often over-emphasized pronunciation allowed him to deliver rapidly a completely intelligible speech. There was not a single word in the fifty-two minute address which was not completely distinguishable. Judd believes that his speech rate is too rapid, and that he allows his voice to drop incorrectly, causing incorrect inflection and improper emphasis. He also complained that his own voice had a "Nebraskanese" quality with such characteristics as dropping the "ings" on words.
He stated that he had never really considered himself a public speaker, and that he was always so much concerned about the content of his speeches that he had little thought to their delivery. ¹

One remaining facet of delivery that deserves discussion is the physical or bodily activity of the keynoter during his speech. Many television viewers recalled that Judd employed broad, sweeping gestures that occasionally went "off camera" during the television close-ups of the speaker. Judd was an antimated speaker during the address. He had been urged by the Republican Television Adviser to ". . . rehearse his speech for a trial television run," but he declined with the explanation that "spontaneity is my one gift in delivery . . . I've never believed in canning up for delivery."²

Dr. Robert Huckshorn, seated with the Idaho Delegation near the front of the convention auditorium, recalled that several members of the Idaho Delegation were impressed with Judd's gestures as they were with the other elements of the speech. "Some were surprised by Judd's gestures, commenting that they looked 'evangelical' and that they went almost always 'heavenward,'" Huckshorn's personal

¹Judd Interview.
²Ibid.
view was that Judd's "gestures were a combination of Harry Truman and Frank Clement [the 1956 Democrat Keynoter and Governor of Tennessee]."¹

A Midwestern Congressman mentioned "the intense, fervent look of Judd's face—or eyes," but was "... surprised that his facial expression seldom changed..."² Chief Convention Page Tom Van Sickle agreed with the above view, noting: "The heavy make-up used on Judd's face for the television cameras might have hidden a lot of changes in facial expression; however, even the closest part of the audience could see little change..."³ Van Sickle also remembered that "Judd moved around to the side of the speaker's podium once during the speech, but was quickly signaled to stay closer to the microphones... He seemed to become more animated and physically alive after the audience began to respond so favorably to his speech."⁴

When he was not gesturing, Judd's hands generally

¹Huckshorn Interview.

²Interview with Robert A. Dole, Representative of Sixth Congressional District of Kansas, former high school speech teacher and debate coach, Russell, Kansas, December 29, 1962.

³Interview with Tom R. Van Sickle, member of the Kansas Legislature, Fort Scott, Kansas, April 23, 1963.

⁴Ibid.
rested on the top of the lectern near the pages of his manuscript, but this seemed to be a relatively small portion of the time to the writer. Even during a private conversation, Judd "talked" with his hands, and the keynote occasion apparently only broadened this natural tendency. His only other physical movement of importance was the Judd habit of drawing slightly back on the balls of his feet when asking a question or issuing a challenge, and then leaning slightly forward when answering such questions. This trait was most obvious during Judd's series of nine rhetorical questions.

In a Delegate Survey of Oregon, Kansas, New York, and Tennessee, no respondent mentioned Judd's bodily activity or gestures either to praise or criticize, although the broader category of delivery was consistently mentioned with favor. The writer agreed with Lionel Crocker that when one watches experienced speakers, "... unless you make the attempt to study their gestures you will not notice them... There will be no lost motion." The physical expression of Judd was an integral part of the total speech situation, and the fact that it did not stand out as noteworthy in the minds of many delegates is probably an indication of its effectiveness.

1Judd Interview.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY EVALUATION

Achievement of Purpose

In his analysis of the 1960 Republican Convention, Russel Windes declared that in addition to the generally publicized presidential-nominating and platform-writing features, the national conventions have four less commonly appreciated functions, including:

1. The convention creates, sustains, and communicates images of party candidates and the party itself.
2. The convention creates, sustains, and communicates counter-images of opposing candidates and party.
3. The convention sets the tone and sets up the issues for the campaign which follows, demonstrating to party members how those issues ought to be handled.
4. The convention serves to excite the party faithful to work harder for victory.

Windes added that "... in the fulfillment of these significant convention purposes, the role played by speech is an indispensable one." Since it is conceded generally that the keynote speech is aimed largely at functions just cited

1 Windes, Quarterly Journal of Speech, October, 1960, p. 249.
2 Ibid.
and is one of the major opportunities for persuasive and "official" speaking in the traditional convention arrangement, Judd's keynote address can be appraised with Windes' criteria in mind.

Beginning the appraisal with a non-partisan view, the opinions of two political analysts of the National Center for Education in Politics are on record. John H. Kessel of the University of Washington said of the Judd keynote:

This speech made a great impression both on the delegates and on the general public. Spontaneous public support began to build for his nomination...[for the vice-presidency].

Kessel's colleague in the Republican study, Robert Huckshorn of the University of Idaho, expounded the same view:

As an immediate and indirect audience keynoter, Judd did exceptionally well. He created the image for the Republicans that was desired, and achieved the opposite for his party's opponents. He inspired his fellow Republicans and his fellow Americans to work harder for American goals; largely establishing these goals as within the grasp of Republicans, but beyond the capabilities of Democrats. His refutation was stronger than the original Democratic attack, and his offense succeeded frequently in making the Communists and Democrats seem like partners in crime.

Kansas' Republican Congressman Joseph Skubitz, although a more partisan critic, offered a delegate's view of

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1Inside Politics: The National Conventions, 1960, p. 51.

2Huckshorn Interview.
the Judd speech:

Congressman Judd demonstrated in that keynote speech that he is one of America's outstanding orators of our time. He had a statesmanlike debater's approach to the keynote. His speech was an inspiration to every Republican in the Hall, and I have yet to hear a direct comment that was critical of his evidence or logic from a listener on radio or television. It gave us tremendous material for an offensive campaign.¹

Christian Science Monitor Correspondent William Stringer described the reasons Judd's speech themes were successful:

Traditionally the Republican Party has risen to its most effective heights on the wings of strongly held ideals—the opposition to slavery in the days of Abraham Lincoln, the battle against trusts and industrial barons in the years of Theodore Roosevelt. This hope for winning attitudes accounted partially for the thunderous applause given the convention keynoter. . . .²

Stringer was joined in his analysis of the speech's attitudes by an editorial in his own newspaper:

Much of Mr. Judd's review of recent events was highly effective. He was on sound ground in declaring that Mr. Khrushchev wrecked the summit not because the United States was weak but because it was strong. Also in pointing out that the U-2 successes during four years should be recognized and appreciated for their peace-keeping services. He was effective, too, in recalling that the missile gap was not wholly a Republican production.

Other aspects of the Judd foreign affairs review were much less accurate and reasonable. This campaign will not be helped by raking up charges about


not trying to win the war in Korea and giving away Eastern Europe. But Mr. Judd's account of domestic prosperity, increase in jobs, and wages, and the checking of inflation was far more persuasive. Indeed, unless the number of Americans actually experiencing "hard times" rises sharply before November, the Democrats may find the prosperity issue still potent.

But the part of this speech which best projected the essential Republican image and tied in with Hoover and Goldwater keynotes was its ringing exposition of freedom as beginning with individual achievement, not with governmental bestowals.¹

Republican National Committeeman Floyd Ruppenthal declared:

Judd made one of the most effective speeches, political or otherwise, that I have heard in over 40 years as a listener, who has himself often spoken in public. He spoke to the people as one of them who knew his subject, first-hand, and was full of it. He "sold" himself and his subject so well that the delegates interrupted him repeatedly with applause and cheers.²

A Republican delegate from Oregon whose comments reflected considerable rhetorical sophistication analyzed Judd's keynote as follows:

It should be noted that the job of the keynoter is not to convince the audience before him. He is to please that audience and convince the TV audience. Therefore, the keynoter is "sui generis." It is not the ordinary political speech with or without TV. It must be judged by its own standards. Furthermore, it carried yet another burden—or at least Judd's did. It was designed to convey an image of the Nixon campaign. Judd himself—his background, his physical


features, everything about him--conveyed the image of the campaign, as it was then planned. Within that known image, Judd had to work in presenting his two speeches in one.

An excellent speech for the occasion. The physical difficulties of speaking to a huge, hot and restless crowd and to the vast TV audience are unbelievable to the average person. Judd's speech did both very well. His speech evoked a response from his volatile audience which enhanced the TV presentation. It correctly gauged the mood of his live audience. By doing so and evoking an audible response of such magnitude, it carried also the TV viewer.¹

Two other members of the Oregon Republican Delegation to the Chicago Convention expressed minor criticisms: "I thought it was effective and dramatic but an over-simplification in stating the Republican point of view."² "Although he engendered considerable enthusiasm in the multitude, he reminded me of Billy Sunday giving a 'hell, fire and brimstone' speech. Converts were obtained while the words were flowing, but the message was soon forgotten."³

Windes, in describing the speeches of a convention that "was better than any convention in many years," asserted:

No matter what one thinks of the substance of Walter Judd's keynote address, its influence must be admitted. No matter how many dead cats he threw out,

¹Delegate Survey response from anonymous Oregon Delegate, July, 1962.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
he gave the delegates what they wanted and needed, a slashing, rip-roaring, old-fashioned rebuttal of the charges made by the Democrats in Los Angeles. It was a powerful speech, vigorously delivered.¹

Comparative Evaluation

Leo Egan reported in the New York Times an interesting account of the contrasting Democratic and Republican Conventions:

Mr. Judd's keynote address was delivered to a jubilant, cheering, capacity audience that filled every available seat in the huge International Amphitheatre. . . . The major speakers had an attentive audience, far more so than was evident at the Democratic Convention in Los Angeles two weeks ago. . . . Mr. Judd's sallies against the Democrats were frequently cheered and applauded. They obviously furnished the kind of ammunition the delegates expected to take back home with them for use in the campaign.²

Malcolm Sillars relates his view of the Democratic speaking in the previously cited rhetorical analysis of the 1960 Presidential Campaign.

Having junked the old appeals and evidence, most convention speakers, unsure of their new audience, failed to find the dramatic evidence and linguistic techniques to strike fire in the political forest of 1960.³

¹Windes, Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, p. 257.
Theodore White has a distinctly different explanation when he contrasts the effectiveness of the two party keynoters in the 1960 campaign. White alleged: "By the time, on Monday evening, the keynote speaker Senator Frank Church of Idaho, rose to set the note, all he had to say had already been reduced to cliche." Long an unfriendly critic of Judd, White asserted that the GOP keynoter was "a master of arousing hate. . . ." However, White was a reluctant witness to the fact that "at both the Democratic and Republican Conventions the best technical orations, the responsive orations came from Minnesota men, Eugene McCarthy and Walter Judd, as if both had inherited the old-fashioned Minnesota Populist knack of heating the political blood. . . ." Described by Malcolm Sillars as lacking "impact," the Church keynote was a poor second to Judd's and was "... indicative of reflective oratory which may be in keeping with the new times but does not have the emotive excellence which Alben Barkley gave to the despondent assembly in 1948. . . ."

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2 Judd Interview.
4 Ibid.
Another comparative evaluation came from Republican National Committee Secretary, Miss Josephine Good, who was seated a few feet from the speaker's podium on the raised stage. Miss Good told the writer that Judd's speech was much better received by the delegates and nation, in the opinion of National [GOP] Staff, than even such a popular convention keynoter as General Douglas MacArthur. Judd's speech was much longer than MacArthur's though it was delivered much more rapidly. I became completely enthralled with Judd's speech. Dr. Judd never allowed your attention to wander. It was a magnificent speech; it was no wonder that Judd was boomed for the vice-presidency when he finished his keynote speech.¹

The forty-one delegate survey responses that came from four representative states revealed that the great majority of delegates agreed with the National Secretary's evaluation. Oregon Delegate Joe B. Richards admitted that after hearing Judd and the earlier 1956 keynoter, Governor Arthur Langlie, he thought the "Washington Governor's speech was lifeless and pointless by comparison."² A second anonymous Republican Oregonian considered Judd the best keynoter he had heard, because of his "superior logic, clear organization, and sincere delivery. . . ."³ This

¹Interview with Miss Josephine L. Good, Executive Secretary of the Republican National Committee and Director of the 1960 GOP Convention, April 29, 1963.


delegate's comments are representative of the majority of the delegate survey responses.

Also typical is the report of a Tennessee delegate:

I felt that this keynote contained more documentation and specific examples in supporting arguments than most of the keynotes of both parties in several years. . . . Judd had more of a following with the delegates before he spoke than everyone except MacArthur, and after the speech he could have had the vice-presidency if he had wanted it. . . . His speech and Nixon's acceptance speech were the convention highlights. It's difficult to even remember the major arguments of most of the keynoters, but I'll be able to remember Judd's for a long time, especially his analogies. . . .

A response from another Tennessee delegate contrasted Judd with Frank Clement, the Tennessee Governor who delivered the 1956 keynote for the Democrats:

"Clements was over-dramatized and Judd had superior facts and delivery." A Tennessee delegate who had heard MacArthur's keynote on television thought Judd "perhaps not as emotional in appearance and stimulating to the Republicans," but reported, "I still look back with a thrill on Judd's speech." This last comment was one of the few which found

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3 Ibid.
Judd ranking lower in total effect than an earlier keynoter and it was the only such view from a Tennessee delegate. Tennesseean Millsaps Fitzhugh mentioned Judd's "statesmanship" and added that Judd "is very popular in the South." Two yet unmentioned Tennessee delegates who collectively had attended seven conventions selected Judd as the best keynoter in their memory, one adding that Judd "had more punch."1

Only nine delegates of the New York GOP contingent replied to the delegate survey, and of those nine, only one had attended a convention prior to 1960. This New Yorker had attended six conventions, and recounted the 1960 Convention in Chicago:

... an electrifying experience. I think this was possibly the best speech ever made by Congressman Judd. He used to the full his histrionic abilities, was most impressive in his obvious knowledge and depth of his subject and his passionate sincerity and belief most telling.2

The twelve Kansas Republican delegates responding to the survey were uniform in rating Judd the best keynoter they had heard in their collective attendance at twenty-five conventions. A delegate who had represented Kansas at all

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conventions since 1940, excepting 1944, not only found Judd "superior," but felt that Judd "had only been speaking five or ten minutes and ... was sorry that it was over." ¹

A former Kansas United States Senator wrote:

Judd was far more effective than Arthur Langlie and he had better content to his speech than General MacArthur. MacArthur had better delivery. Overall, I thought Judd to be the most effective that I have heard. He seems like an authority when he starts talking about the way he has seen the world slip over to the communists, mostly due to mistakes and "deals" of Democrat presidents. ²

The former state chairman of the Kansas Republican State Committee and convention delegate in 1960 said:

Governor Langlie's Keynote Speech to the 1956 convention was a good speech—but just another good political speech. Judd's rated superior in any league. Both he and Judd used repetition for effectiveness. (e.g. Langlie: "We promised," Judd: "Was it a Republican Administration?") Langlie was not a national figure and could not talk as one who had been on the scene. Other keynote speakers have been good. But none in my period of observation has so "fired" the convention and the TV-radio audiences as did Walter Judd. ³

Probably the most complete response, and the most meaningful with its broad experience of conventions, is that of an Oregon couple who wrote this answer to the request that they compare Judd to earlier keynoters heard:

¹Delegate Survey response from Kansas, July, 1962.
²Delegate Survey response from former U.S. Senator Harry Darby from Kansas, July, 1962.
³Ruppenthal Interview.
The only other keynoter who compared favorably with Judd was our own Senator Fred Steiwer who I heard at my first convention in Cleveland in 1936. Senator Steiwer was also very well received by the delegates because he had an excellent speech. Stassen [former Governor of Minnesota] and Governor Green [of Illinois] were good, but they lacked the significant message that Walter Judd had prepared. General MacArthur had the more polished, eloquent delivery that I've always admired, but his material was a slight disappointment to many of us. Governor Langlie [of Washington] was a definite disappointment even to his own Washington Delegation.

I was not back from the Pacific in 1944 and did not hear Governor Earl Warren [of California], but other "old-timers" without exception tell me that Judd gave the best speech in their memory, and my wife (though not a delegate) says that Claire Booth Luce gave a better speech than Warren at that 1944 convention. The wife says that the Luce speech was second only to Judd's speech and Vice President Nixon's Acceptance Speech in all the speeches she has heard at the five conventions she has attended. I've attended all except the 1944 Convention and would rank Congressman Judd as the best speaker in keynote content and second only to General MacArthur in oratorical delivery.¹

It would have been impossible then, as it is now, to know the complete reaction of the American public to Judd's keynote speech. It was obvious from simple observation, and the writer's Delegate Survey has served to confirm, that the Republican auditors in the Chicago Amphitheatre were greatly moved by the Congressman's speech. There are two additional signs of recognition afforded Judd's oratory by his party's national committee. Judd was prevailed upon by the GOP National Committee to give a

¹Delegate Survey response from Oregon, July, 1962.
thirty minute address over two national television hook-ups on the evening prior to the election. He has been listed along with such other speakers as Eisenhower, Dewey, Percy, Lodge, Rockefeller, Goldwater, and Mitchell in a special Republican task force used for major addresses in the campaign. Judd undoubtedly was considered a top Republican campaign orator in 1960, and his successful keynote speech contributed significantly to that evaluation.

In brief summary, Walter Judd's convention keynote speech was one of the best-received, most effective such addresses in modern political history. It owed its effectiveness primarily to Judd's compelling sincerity, his simple, hard-hitting language and delivery, and his skillful selection and adaptation of persuasive campaign themes.

\[1\text{White, Making of the President, p. 264.}\]
APPENDIX I. KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Best Way To Achieve Good Objectives And Keep Them

Thank you, Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. Chairman, fellow Republicans, fellow Americans.

As we meet tonight in this Republican National Convention of 1960 I do not believe that you want me to indulge in the traditional keynote speech, blaming the other party for everything that is wrong, taking credit to ourselves for everything that's right, and trying to convince the American people that if they'll just elect us to office, then we'll solve every problem, increase every benefit, expand every existing program, start a whole flock of new programs, give everyone everything he wants -- and reduce the national debt at the same time. [applause] I have a notion you heard enough of that two weeks ago to last ya' quite awhile. [applause]

1This is the exact text of the address as it was released for the press with corrections and bracketed information provided by the writer after listening to the speech on tape.
The times in which we meet tonight are too serious for that.

The problems we face are too disturbing;

Our country's safety — your safety and my safety — are too greatly endangered.

What the American people want to know as they're watching us here tonight is: which party has the greatest capacity to keep this country safe and sound?

Which party is the most alert to and best understands the powerful forces against us, abroad and at home?

Which party best understands the forces for us, abroad and at home? And, which party has the ablest, the most experienced, the best qualified and finest men to lead our country through the perilous months and years ahead?

We do not pretend that the Republican party is always right and the Democratic party is always wrong.

We know, as you who are listening know, that what Democrats and Republicans want is a strong, free and prosperous America in a peaceful and secure world. The difference between the two parties is not over those good objectives; the difference is over the best way to achieve those good objectives — and keep them.

Some Democrats have regularly tried to make it appear that we Republicans are opposed to various good ends — such as security for old age, adequate medical care, better
education, better housing, protection of the rights of labor and of minorities, aid to agriculture—just because we do not agree with the solutions which they advocate, because we believe they are not the right solutions to get the answers we all want. But it is not because we are against the good ends; it is precisely because we are for them that we oppose measures we deeply believe are unsound.

Sometimes we are told that to win elections, we Republicans should make grandiose promises, like those the opposition party made at its Convention. Maybe that is a way to win elections; but we repudiate it, first because it would not be shooting square with you, the voters, and second, it wouldn't succeed. For there is not chance of our being able to out-promise the Democrats!

Might I add at this point the mild warning to our friends in the Democratic Party to this effect: that if elections in this country are to be won on the basis of who makes the most promises, then they can easily beat us. But they won't be in power very long, for the Communists can easily beat them. They have no scruples at all. [heavy applause]

Overshadowing everything else as we meet is the hard fact that a powerful enemy threatens America on every front. It is the most dangerous assault in our nation's history, in part because it is so different from any previous threat.
The Republican Party was born in a time of crisis. It was brought into being by the strong free spirits of a century ago, to deal with the gravest problem of the nineteenth century—namely, HUMAN SLAVERY.

In 1860 in this city the Republican Party nominated as its candidate for the Presidency of the United States a man who had risen from the humblest beginnings to become a leader in the effort to end human slavery without destroying the Union.

He led our party to victory, the nation to salvation, and the people to a rededication to the sound principles on which the country had been founded and had grown great.

We want tonight, both to honor Abraham Lincoln and to learn from him.

Please God, we may do as well with our divided world as he did with his divided nation. [Heavy applause]

Mark my word, the gravest issue of the 20th century is also HUMAN SLAVERY -- this time not men enslaved by other men; but, far more complex and dangerous, masses of men enslaved by the state, their own governments.

More human beings are in bondage tonight than ever before in human history. Nine hundred million abroad are denied by their own government the simple right to worship, to speak, to assemble, to join, to own; the right of a man to choose or to change his work and to live his own life with his family and friends—in freedom.
In this total situation, the Republican Party stands today as it has from the beginning—\textit{for} freedom and against Slavery. [applause]

You will judge both parties not by promises but by performance. And it is on the basis of our record of solid performance that we proudly present to you in this convention, an honest accounting of our stewardship during these eight years—and a look at the future.

How well have we done what we said we would do when you elected us?

How do we propose to deal with the challenges we face now, at home and abroad?

Why do we believe our Republican principles and proposals offer the greater hope for accomplishing the greatest good and the greatest growth for America in the next four years?

Let us deal first with the international situation.

We said in 1952 we believed we could get and maintain peace with honor, and have done it.

We brought to an end the fighting in the Korean War which the Truman Administration \textit{would not win and could not stop.} [heavy applause]

It didn't make sense to continue to enlist American youth and exhort them to fight well in the noblest tradition of America's \textit{greatest heroes} -- but not to fight \textit{too} well
because then they might win, and that would provoke the enemy. They should give all they had, their lives -- and 33,000 did -- but they must not win! It was the first war ever fought -- so far as I am aware in all history in terms of trying to please the enemy! To continue that war was madness. [heavy applause]

Then President Eisenhower took charge. It took time, patience, skill, but within nine months, the fighting was brought to a close -- without dishonor, without sacrificing the interests of any ally, or weakening our own security position in the Pacific. We Republicans are exceedingly proud of that accomplishment. [heavy applause]

In addition, this Administration has prevented a half a dozen other threats from developing into wars -- do you remember Trieste, the Mossadegh uprising in Iran, Guatemala, Formosa, Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, West Berlin? Not a one developed into war! And how was that accomplished? Not by sacrificing our principles in secret deals under the table; but by steady, patient firmness and strength in support of principles. What principles? First, our own historic principles: human freedom; keeping our word; steadfast support of friends and allies; and, second, wholehearted support of the United Nations.

In short, our efforts everywhere have been to help build free nations up; the efforts of the Communists everywhere are to pull free nations down.
It does not avail, however, to be firm in support of principles unless we have the strength to back it up. This Administration has built up gigantic strength in our own armed forces and given vital assistance in building up the strength of other nations standing with us against the common threat. Ours is a balanced power, not all our eggs in one basket, whether it be a bomber basket, a missile, submarine, or any kind of a balanced power basket.

President Eisenhower will perhaps have something to say on this subject tomorrow night. I hope the armchair experts who have thought they knew more about our armed strength than he and our Joint Chiefs of Staff will listen in too. [heavy applause]

But I am compelled to take notice here of certain charges made by the opposition party.

It is claimed for example that this Administration allowed a missile gap to develop. No, it found a missile gap and has managed to get it almost closed. [strong conviction]

When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the preceding administration had actually retarded work in this field, even though it knew the Soviet Union was making tremendous efforts. The Truman Administration in eight years had put 17 times more into price supports for peanuts than for long range missiles. [heavy applause]

The Eisenhower Administration is today putting 40
times as much into such missiles each month as the previous Administration did in 8 years, and they accuse us of lagging? [irony in voice]

It took the Soviet Union 12 years to develop its long range missiles. It took this Administration six years to get ours operational. Anything wrong with that? ["No," said audience]

Senator Kennedy was reported by the Press to have said on February 21st of this year, quote "We have the greatest deterrent force in history and thank God for that," unquote. He was right!

But it is not enough to have such vast overall power. Our primary desire in building up such striking force is not to fight a war, but to deter a war. And it is not just the strength that we have, it is the strength which our enemies, our allies and our own people know that we have, which is our main hope of deterring war.

Now I ask you, what kind of reckless and irresponsible action is it for anyone to misrepresent the United States as second-class power, as was done in the Democratic Convention, and thereby encourage the very attacks which all Americans profoundly hope and pray can be prevented? [heavy applause-strongest so far] Do they want to get into office that badly?

Did you see the movie shown at the Democratic
National Convention two weeks ago, dredging up scenes of hunger, squalor, and misery in the United States as if they were typical of this blessed land. You would have thought our country was on the verge of falling apart. What kind of salesmanship for their country is that?

I ask you, can our nation's prestige be raised by tearing it down? Aren't they on the American team? [audience, "No."]

It is devoutly to be hoped -- because it offers our best chance of avoiding war -- that Mr. Khrushchev, in making up his mind about our actual military, economic and moral strength, will depend a lot more on the reports of his own agents than on the misstatements made in the heat of the Los Angeles Convention.

It was claimed that this Administration has not taken the initiative in the cold war, that we have allowed things to drift. Yet the orators condemn the Republican Administration for brilliant examples of successful initiative. For example, the U-2 flights. If we had not developed U-2 and had not been using it to keep up to date on military preparations within the Soviet Union, we could properly have been charged with inviting another Pearl Harbor. [heavy audience response] The fact that our U-2 operations were so outstandingly successful for four years should be a source, I should think, of intense pride to all Americans. Let me remind you,
the U-2's were not provoking war, they were helping to pre-
vent war.

Again, it has been suggested that the President
should have done something different or better about Mr.
Khrushchev's breakup of the Paris conference. Will they
please tell you just what they think the American people
wanted their President to do? Apologize, and hand over West
Berlin? ["No," audience] On the other hand, did they want
him to blow up and start a war? Of course not!

The facts are that it has been the President himself
and Secretaries of State Dulles and Herter who on innumerable
occasions have warned the American people against optimism
regarding any conference with Communists at the Summit in the
absence of any evidence of change in their objectives and
methods.

At the Paris conference, everybody hoped that the
miracle might take place and Mr. Khrushchev would abandon his
avowed purpose to bury us -- one way or another. Tragically,
there was no miracle. Mr. Khrushchev himself killed the hope.

But his ruthless torpedoing of the Paris meeting
was evidence of the failure of his foreign policy, not of
ours. His strategy for at least two years had been the old one
of trying to conquer the West by dividing it. He tried his
best to set our allies against each other and against us. He
came to our country and talked about peace and friendship,
trying to whittle down our resolution and to soothe us into relaxed slumber. He did not succeed.

When Mr. Khrushchev knew before the Paris conference convened that he had failed to divide, deceive or soften up the free powers, he had no choice but to break up the conference. Otherwise, he would either have had to back down on Berlin, or start a war. Either would have been fatal to him. So his scuttling of the Paris conference and his grotesque efforts to pin the blame on us were proof positive, not of American and Western weakness, but of our strength.

[heavy applause]

With the bald deception of Mr. Khrushchev's phony peace posture exposed at Paris by himself, he had to change his tactics and make a different effort to divide and conquer. He is now moving heaven and earth to achieve by subversion what he could not achieve by division of the Western powers. He is trying to upset free governments, one by one, by ordering into action the apparatus the Communists have been systematically building and training in all other countries for decades, for the very purpose now revealed so plainly in Japan and Cuba.

Why did the Communists have to cancel President Eisenhower's visit to Russia and resort to such violent measures in Japan to prevent his visit there? Not because of the ineffectiveness of the President's visits abroad, but because
of their demonstrated effectiveness. [heavy applause]
The Red leaders saw the vast difference between Eisenhower's reception, for example, in India, and the receptions given Khrushchev and Chou En-lai. The Reds didn't dare let Ike chalk up another tremendous triumph with millions of people in Mother Russia itself, and in a key country like Japan.

It has been charged that no previous Presidents or Vice Presidents ever suffered such insults abroad—as if somehow that was their fault. There are two inescapable answers. One is that as long as two previous American Presidents were willing to give in to Soviet leaders, they got along famously with them. Good "Ole' Joe." [heavy applause] Why should the Communists insult those Presidents as long as they were getting what they wanted?

Naturally Khrushchev would prefer not to negotiate with a Republican President who he has learned will not be taken in or intimidated or tricked into any concessions. [heavy applause]

Now the second answer to the charge that no previous Presidents had been so snubbed or insulted is this: No previous President has faced a Communist conspiracy that was strong and arrogant enough to take such action as Mr. Khrushchev took, and how did the Communist conspiracy get so strong and arrogant? That cannot be laid at the door of Republicans. Look again at the record.
I would rather not go over the mistakes of the past; there's more than enough to talk about regarding the future. But if we Republicans are to be charged with incapability to deal with the forces of aggression which those who make the charges helped to build up, then we owe it to the truth to set the record straight. [heavy applause]

The troubles we are in with the Communists are exactly the troubles that Republicans warned for years before 1952 would develop if we followed the courses that were followed.

I ask you, was it Republicans who recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 and gave it acceptance into our country, ["No," audience] gave it acceptance into our country as if it were a respectable and dependable member thereof?

Was it Republicans who, at Tehran, against the urgent advice of Mr. Churchill, agreed to give the Russians free hands in the Balkans? ["No," audience]

Was it Republicans who secretly divided Poland and gave half of it to the Soviet Union? ["No," audience]

Was it Republicans who agreed to the Communist take-over of a hundred million people in Eastern Europe who are not Russian? ["No," audience]

Was it a Republican Administration which at Potsdam gave the Soviet Union East Germany and left West Berlin cut off from the rest of the free world? ["No," audience]
Was it a Republican Administration that publicly promised that Manchuria would go back to its rightful owners, the Chinese, and then secretly at Yalta gave control of Manchuria to the Russians. ["No!" audience]

Was it a Republican Administration that divided Korea and gave control of North Korea to the Communists? ["No!" audience]

Was it a Republican Administration that gave to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands which had never been anybody's except Japan's, thereby endangering both Japan's and our own security in the Pacific? ["No," audience]

Was it a Republican Administration that rightly put its hand to the plow in Korea, and then when victory was in sight turned back, allowing the Reds to recover so they can make still more trouble in the future? ["No," audience]

Was it a Republican Administration that fell for the Communist offer of a truce in Korea without requiring that the North Korean aggressors lay down their arms and the Chinese Communists get out of Korea where they had no business to be? ["No!" audience]

You know that it wasn't under Republicans that 600,000,000 human beings disappeared into human slavery behind the Iron Curtain in the first 5 years after World War II. In fact, the record will show that Republicans opposed these steps every time they were taken.
In contrast, what our Republican Administration has done in these 8 years is, with initiative and imagination, to stop the process of retreat before the Frankenstein monster that its predecessors did so much unhappily to build up.

We have resolutely opposed anything anywhere that would make Communist regimes stronger, and we shall continue to do so!

That is why, for example, we have opposed and must oppose official recognition of Communist China or its admission into the United Nations, [heavy applause] unless or until it will give up in a dependable way its aggressive acts and threats against other neighboring countries; that is, give up Communism! Recognition and admission of Communist China would needlessly present it with smashing victories. Does it make sense to build up an avowed enemy. ["No!" audience]

But our refusal to give Red China the tremendous boost of official recognition does not mean -- as has been asserted by people who ought to know better -- that this Administration has been hiding its head in the sand, or pretending Red China does not exist, or trying to ignore 600 million Chinese. The exact reverse is the truth. This Administration is acutely aware of Red China's existence and the threat it constitutes to freedom, not only in Asia, but everywhere.

It was not this Administration which indulged in the illusion
that Communists in China are democratic agrarian reformers!

We are not ignoring Red China. On the contrary, we have been negotiating with its official representatives for years. The 99th such negotiation, unfortunately still fruitless, took place just last week.

Surely my fellow-citizens it is now plain to everyone that since the Communist world conspiracy remains the same, and since we don't intend to surrender, and since nobody wants a hot war, there is only one alternative left. We must win this cold war. [heavy applause] To do this we must have leaders who understand this enemy and its tactics, and will mobilize all our resources for the struggle.

We must use more effectively some of our strongest weapons, the values and virtues of a system of government which has given freedom and dignity and better living standards to human beings than any other system ever has. How many of us understand our own system well enough to sell it to others with contagious enthusiasm, as the Communists are so well trained to sell theirs.

We must let loose in the world the dynamic forces of freedom in our day as our forefathers did in theirs, causing people everywhere to look toward the American dream.

Men have always found ways in the past to bring down tyrants; why should we lose hope that men will find ways to bring down today's tyrants, if only we don't build the
tyrants up! [heavy applause] In short, we have a good strategy for holding. But, ladies and gentlemen, we cannot hope to win this cold war in the end just by holding. We must develop a strategy for victory!

A new chapter has now been opened by Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union stands naked before the world today, self-exposed, its objectives and its unchanging methods of deception and trickery revealed by its own acts.

It is going to require stronger approaches now, different strategies, new tactics by someone who has proved he understands Communism.

America has the brains, she has the wealth, she has the weapons. Who can galvanize into rocklike firmness America's will?

I am confident that the nearer our people come to Election Day next November, the more they will become convinced that the course of wisdom and sureness for America is to continue to entrust the destiny of our blessed land to steady, competent, experienced, principled Republican hands. [heavy applause and cheers]

It has been said by Mr. Kennedy that the most important issue in this campaign is foreign policy. We agree and welcome the test. [applause]

Now let's take a short look at our record on the domestic front.
What did we say in 1952 that we would do? First, we said we would be a middle-of-the-road government. Now that's never a popular government because in a middle-of-the-road government nobody gets all that he wants. But if anybody gets all he wants, it's at somebody else's expense and it isn't good government. We believe that middle-of-the-road government is, in the long run, the best kind of government for everyone.

What else? We promised we would clean out the corruption that was a scandal under the previous Administration and led to more than twenty convictions of high officials. I am proud of the fact that there has not been a single conviction for malfeasance in office of any high official of this administration. Now that does not mean everything has been perfect. It does mean that wherever and whenever there was any slightest suspicion of impropriety, this Republican Administration has not tried to cover up; it has cleaned up. That is what you wanted it to do.

We said we were convinced it was possible to get prosperity in this country without war—something our predecessors had never been able to do in this century. We succeeded.

The first requirement was to stabilize our economy and slow down the inflation which was stealing the people's substance—and was especially cruel in its eating away of the
value of the pensions and social security benefits upon which millions of older persons were counting for the security and serenity they so richly deserve in their years of retirement.

Now, how could inflation best be checked? The Democrats, always one answer: more controls. President Eisenhower announced he would take off the controls. And you will recall how some screamed that there the Republicans go, yielding to the profiteers, big business, money interests; prices for the common people would now go sky high.

But did they? ["No," audience] The prices which had been going sky high—48% in the seven years—promptly leveled off and stayed practically stable for four years, and as you've been told twice before today, the total increase under this Administration has been less than 10% in seven years as against 48% in the preceding seven years. We achieved this stability not by changing our free system, but by using it. It works better than those of little faith in the American people give it credit for.

We said in 1952 that if the Federal Government would stick to its proper function of running the business of the nation, and get out of trying to manage the affairs of our people, the creative energies of the American people and their millions of individual enterprises would create a vaster expansion of production and trade, with correspondingly greater
expansion of jobs than the Government itself could ever do. Were we right or were we wrong? Well, there were sixty-one million jobs when we took over, there are sixty-eight million jobs tonight.

And not only more jobs, jobs at higher wages. Wages up 39% in these seven years! Do you recall the seven consecutive cost-of-living increases that labor had to fight for, just to keep up with inflation under President Truman? In contrast, real wages, actual purchasing power, has gone up 20% under this Administration.

This is the measure of how much better off rank and file people are today. Does this sound like a Party of big business?

Our workers have better food and clothing for themselves and their families, more homes, more automobiles, more refrigerators, more TV's, more free time for study, for recreation, for sports, for travel for whatever. The record is clear that labor has done better under this Republican Administration than in all its previous history, and we're proud of it.

Personal income, the money that goes into your pockets, has gone up a whopping 33%--from $301 billion in 1952 to $420 billion in 1960--and in constant dollars.

Furthermore, a larger share of that higher income than ever before, more than 4% larger, now goes into the pay envelopes of workers. Anything wrong with workers getting a
bigger share of the national income under the Republicans than they ever got under the Democrats? ["No," audience]

Isn't it just plain horse sense, my fellow citizens to whom I'm talking, isn't it just plain horse sense to trust for the next four years the leadership which has enabled you to do so well for yourselves in the last 8 years?

While the Republican 83rd Congress was in power to cooperate with the Republican Administration during its first two years, we gave the American people the biggest single tax cut in their history and at the same time expanded the benefits to people; more social security benefits, more for highways, hospitals, health, housing.

And you still have that tax cut. If I may borrow a phrase that you perhaps remember: Don't let them take it away!

The Republican record in the area of meeting human needs has been one of remarkable action and progress on all fronts, contrary to the image promoted by the opposition that they alone are the party of the people.

Under Social Security 7½ million more people are now covered than before. The number receiving benefits has increased from five to more than 14 million persons.

Under the Vocational Rehabilitation program, which I had the privilege of working with on my first major bill when I went to Congress, and which was strengthened by
Republicans in 1954, under that program some 400,000 disabled men and women have been returned to active, self-respecting employment and have earned almost $2 billion. This is the true American system of enabling people to do things for themselves.

Bold and dramatic steps have been taken to expand medical research in cancer, heart disease, mental illnesses, and other crippling and killing maladies.

In the seven years prior to 1953, the value of surplus agricultural products distributed in the school lunch program and to needy persons, institutions, schools and Indian reservations totalled $263 dollars. In the seven years since 1953 the total distributed is $960 million worth--3½ times as much. Anything wrong with that record? ["No," audience] This is help to those who need it.

In short, we have moved vigorously whenever and wherever action by the Federal Government is the proper and best way to deal with any problem affecting public safety and the people's welfare.

When did any government ever take less from the people in taxes and give them more in return?

And how was it done? This is the major point! Not by government orders, edicts, or controls; and not by government handouts. It was done not by changing our principles of freedom of enterprise, but by sticking to our principles.
It was done by good Republican management of the government, not management of the people.

Obviously I cannot try here to outline our detailed proposals for the years ahead. I haven't even mentioned vitally important areas like education, health, agriculture, conservation, taxation, and a dozen others which would require almost a separate speech each. But I tell you they will be covered before this Convention is over.

But there are some basic principles, tested principles of freedom—which we believe it is necessary for us to understand and to follow, if we are to meet successfully the challenges of the future.

Many Americans have come to think that our two major parties are, after all, just about the same. But it is not so. The main difference between them as I said in the beginning, is not over good ends. The difference, and it is a profound one, is over means. Which are the right and best ways to get the good ends?

We Republicans deeply believe that the first function of a government is to protect the liberty of the citizen, not to take it away.

There have never been but two basic philosophies of government -- government from the top down, and government from the bottom up. Our fathers believed and so do we Republicans, that most problems can best be solved from the bottom
up by the people themselves.

One philosophy puts its primary faith in government officials. The other puts its primary faith in the good sense and the capabilities of our people.

We are not against adequate Federal Government. There must be such government to prevent abuses of power. We merely want to keep it limited to its proper fields, so that the liberty of individuals will be protected. The Republican Party stands for liberty.

In the Democratic Convention you heard a lot about Woodrow Wilson. What did he, a genuine student of government, think on this issue? In a speech in New York in 1912 he said, "Liberty has never come from the government. Liberty is a history of resistance." And I'm still quoting, "The history of Liberty is a history of the limitation of governmental power, not the increase of it." That is the end of the quote.

Nobody that I know has said it better than that. Yet we now see those who claim to be the followers of Wilson insisting that the way to expand liberty is to increase the powers of the government.

How did our fathers do to limit government to its essential functions? By putting the government under a constitution. Many regard the Constitution as the means by which the government regulates the people. No, it is the magnificent means devised by our fathers by which the people
can regulate the government.

Why did they insist on having a bill of rights in that Constitution? In order to be sure that their government would take care of them? No, in order to be sure that their Government could not interfere in their taking proper care of themselves.

Rights are not what our government must do for us; rights are what our government cannot do to us. Rights are not guarantees by the government, rights are guarantees against the government—even against our own government, because we want to keep it a good government! [heavy applause]

We believe that all men are created equal. In support of this fundamental faith, Republicans work for government that will provide equality under the law for all citizens, and equality of opportunity for all citizens. We believe this is the best way to get the fullest possible rewards for all citizens.

It is because of this Republican emphasis on equal opportunity for all that the Republican Party is the party to which youth will naturally gravitate, if we make our principles clear to them. For what do young people want most of all? They want to get ahead and to improve their condition. The Republican Party stands always for maximum freedom and opportunity—for every man to get ahead.
This is why it is possible in America for the son of a rich man, like Jack Kennedy to become President. This is why it is possible in America for the son of a poor man, like Dick Nixon, to become President. [heaviest applause given during speech]

You're awfully kind. I don't say these things because I'm a Republican. I'm a Republican because these are the things I believe with all my heart and soul! [heavy applause] Now let me summarize it.

Republicans believe that that government is best, not which does most for its citizens directly, but which makes it possible for most citizens to do most for themselves -- and then assists with those who, for whatever reason, interrupted by applause hear me the last part, it's not enough to give opportunity for most to get ahead. That's the best way to get something built up with which we can assist properly those who, for whatever reason, cannot provide the basic necessities and decencies for themselves.

I think we can state it as a law, that whenever a government does for its citizens that which they have the capacity to do for themselves, individually and in groups, it begins to destroy both their capacity and their incentive to do for themselves. That is, it begins to weaken rather than to strengthen the foundations of freedom and the means of progress.
I can work my girl's arithmetic problems for her better than she can work 'em for herself. I can get the right answer almost every time. And she would like to have me do it for her. She'd even vote for me if I'd do it. But I don't! I'll help, suggest, advise, counsel, nudge, maybe pray, but I don't work them for her, not because I don't love her, but because I do and want her to succeed--and that is the way for her to grow and learn how to solve problems.

Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg said, "Now we are engaged in a great civil war testing" -- testing, among other things, whether government of the people, by the people and, for the people can long endure.

Lincoln and the Republican Party brought our country through that crisis 100 years ago. Now we are engaged in a greater crisis--the whole planet--all of mankind is engaged in the mightiest conflict in all history. It is a world civil war. What is it about? It is about exactly the same thing as then: Is Government of the people, by the people, and therefore for the people to perish, literally, from the earth?

During the fiery trial of Lincoln's day he warned solemnly that this nation could not exist half slave and half free. The Republican Party succeeded in restoring unity and freedom and peace to the nation.

My friends, can this whole wide world of our day
go on indefinitely half slave, half free? Deep down in our hearts, we know the answer is, NO.

The reason why it has not proved possible to get any real agreement with the Communist world all these years is because the Communists are not pursuing the same objectives as we are pursuing. And why are they not pursuing the same objectives? Because they don't believe the same things we believe—about man, about the universe, and that means about God.

If we in America of whatever political opinion at the moment, are to prove worthy of this most terrible testing in our Nation's life, we too must resolve with Lincoln, "that, under God, this Nation shall have a new birth of freedom."

It was under God that our freedom was born. Only under God can there be a rebirth of freedom.

What then is our role to be? Listen again to Lincoln in his message to the Congress in 1862, which you've heard already. "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so must we think anew, and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves, and then we shall save our country."

There it is.

"Under God, a new birth of freedom;
A new and deeper understanding of it;
A new and deeper dedication to it.

With such a rebirth within you and me, and within our beloved Party, we shall deserve to be entrusted by the people with the awful responsibilities of governing this great and beautiful land. And the people turn to us and our country will be saved.

And now let us get to work!
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