NEVER AT HOME: IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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My dissertation is a comparative analysis of immigration and integration policies in Denmark and Sweden. I compared these countries because they take different policy approaches to integration; Denmark uses assimilationist policies while Sweden takes a multicultural approach, but they are getting similar results. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) in 2015, both countries had high poverty levels for non-Western immigrants relative to the native populations—a surprise considering that they have robust social welfare systems. Relying on more than 12 months of fieldwork in Denmark and Sweden, the central goal of this study was to understand why the differences in policies produced a similar outcome of poverty levels. I did a historical analysis of the countries, I collected data using a survey questionnaire, and I did participant observations through field research. The findings from my research indicated connections between nation-building, belonging, historical myths, the perception of non-Western immigrants, and institutional barriers. I found that social practices trumped integration policies, which created similarities in outcomes.

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I dedicate this to my ancestors who came before me who could not pursue higher education. I thank you for your fight that led to my freedom and my access to study at a university. I do this for you and for the future generations to come.

I also dedicate this to immigrants who are trying to find their way in a new country. The fight to be included is difficult. You belong, and there is a home for you. Your future generations will see the benefits of your hard labor.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Modern technological advances have made it not only ideologically conceivable but concretely easier, faster, and cheaper to travel across the world today. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2018 report, 3.4 percent (258 million) of the world's population have resettled internationally—this is more people than ever before in history. Approximately 150.3 million people moved for labor opportunities, while 25.9 million were refugees and 3.5 million were asylum seekers. Immigration has become a central and contested issue in politics. In response to migration, states have implemented policies stipulating requirements for integration as a means to citizenship. Today, integration in Europe means the incorporation of immigrants and also their descendants in terms of their access to work, education, and social capital relative to the native population. However, the focus on integration has shifted recently to socioeconomic status and the physical location of immigrants (spatial residential patterns).[1] This study examines the impact that integration policies have had on non-Western immigrants.

Denmark and Sweden present a puzzle. Denmark adopted assimilation policies with extensive integration requirements while Sweden implemented multicultural policies that do not have extensive integration requirements; however, the countries have similar

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[1] T. R. Balakrishnan and Feng Hou, "Socioeconomic Integration and Spatial Residential Patterns of Immigrant Groups in Canada," *Population Research and Policy Review* 18, no. 3 (1999): 201–17; Lina Aldén and Mats Hammarstedt, *Integration of Immigrants on the Swedish Labour Market : Recent Trends and Explanations* (Linnaeus University, 2014); Abdi Mohamud Hersi, "Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review," *European Scientific Journal*, August 2014.

results with their immigrants. While both states have a commitment to integrating immigrants within their local communities, the states have different inclusion practices. In both Sweden and Denmark, integration policies generally apply to new arrivals and those who are first- or second-generation immigrants. The policies impact immigrants with origins from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, people with Muslim backgrounds and sometimes Eastern Europeans. In this dissertation, these groups are referred to as "non-Western immigrants" and "people from the global south." The politicization of immigration in Denmark and Sweden is marked by three major concerns: the increasing number of migrants, the ethnic and geographical origins of immigrants, and the rising poverty levels of non-Western immigrants living in Europe.

The integration literature classifies integration policies as either multicultural policies that supported diverse groups of people, or assimilation policies that promoted the host country's culture and language as the most important for social cohesion.[2] This study departs from this understanding and presents that the type of integration policies is not important, but that practices and institutions have a larger impact on immigrant integration. Integration policies, therefore, might not adequately indicate that a country has successfully managed ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. For instance, Sweden has consistently been ranked highly by the Migration Policy Index (MPI) since the early 2000s for their integration policies; however, the 2015/2016 refugee crisis in Europe exposed the weaknesses of Sweden's integration policies. Sweden had poverty levels,

[2]Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration* (Guilford Press, 2003).

language problems, and segregated suburban communities—similar problems to countries such as Denmark and France, with assimilationist policies.

The problems in Sweden indicate that there are gaps in Sweden's integration policy goals and outcomes.[3] Sweden's policy goals have consistently ranked number one in the world compared to all other OECD countries according to most policy indexes; however, the outcome in Sweden is one of the worst in terms of the relative poverty of immigrants and their descendants. If successful integration is measured along the lines of income level, education obtainment, employment status, and desegregated neighborhoods, Sweden is not achieving its goal of integration, which is the case for other countries in the EU. This is why scholars are paying even closer attention to the goals and outcomes of integration policies, which is where this dissertation fits in the scholarly literature. This study suggests that the development of national identity is linked to historical myths and that integration policies are a reflection of national identity. It also suggests that integration policies are trumped by institutional barriers and practices that kept non-Western immigrants at a lower socioeconomic status in Denmark and Sweden.

The number of immigrants in Denmark (660,000) and Sweden (1.7 million) is small relative to countries like the United States (50 million), Germany (12 million), the United Kingdom (9 million), Canada and France (8 million); however, the Nordic countries have an essential story to tell. Denmark and Sweden are small countries, but currently, more than 15 percent of people living in the territories were born in a different

[3] James Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, and Pia Orrenius, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Third Edition*, 3 edition (Stanford University Press, 2014).

country. This number does not include descendants of immigrants, including them the numbers can go up to 20-30 percent. These migration trends have challenged robust welfare states such as Denmark and Sweden that are in the early stages of becoming culturally, ethnically, and religiously diverse. Initially, non-Western migrants moved to Denmark and Sweden to work in factories in the 1960s; however, the majority of non-Western immigrants from the 1970s onwards came for humanitarian reasons and family reunification. Sixty percent of immigrants in Denmark and 80 percent in Sweden came as refugees and asylees.[4] Diverse populations are a reality in Scandinavia, and policies related to migration have become contested and challenged as these countries adjust to demographic changes.

Debates in the European Migration and Integration Literature

The theoretical foundation of this dissertation accepts that issues of nationhood, state power, belonging, institutional barriers, and issues with identity politics have eroded the integration process for non-Western migrants in Denmark and Sweden. Scholars Peter Katzenstein (1985) and Ernst Gellner (1983) argued that common background and identity in homogenous societies such as Denmark and Sweden enhanced the ability of citizens to have a strong national identity absent of ethnic and cultural cleavages.[5] This

[4] Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund, "Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State," *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 1, no. 1 (August 1, 2011): 13–24.

[5] Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); John L. Campbell and John A. Hall, "National Identity and the Political Economy of Small States," *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 4 (2009): 552.

shared identity helped mobilize citizens towards solutions more quickly and created a strong national identity and institutions that could protect the small states from international pressures.[6] If this understanding of small homogenous societies is true, then institutions in small homogenous societies were established to maintain the dirty work of "boundary maintenance," according to Adrian Favell (1999). Also, the politics of belonging are manifested in the welfare states by institutional practices that keep the "out-group" out while supporting the "in-group."

As Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) writes, the politics of belonging is sometimes physical, but more often symbolic and separates people into groups of "us" and "them" and into what Benedict Anderson (1991) called imagined communities.[7] Belonging and the politics of belonging is similar to integration, but focuses on groups excluding new members and also on how comfortable or attached new arrivals feel to a host country. The politics of belonging involves not only members of the community creating boundaries by using political power and institutions to maintain their advantage, but also by the resistance and contestation to change presented by other agents or groups.[8] Belonging, on the other hand, suggests that people have different ways of attachment to a host society that can vary from feeling attached to one person to an entire country, belonging can be concrete or abstract, and is always a dynamic process. Furthermore, belonging is complex, multilayered, and can relate to social and political belonging,

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[6] Ernest. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[7] Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London; New York: Verso, 1991).

[8] Nira Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," *Patterns of Prejudice* 40, no. 3 (July1, 2006): 197–214.

economic belonging, emotional attachment, and a person's identification and emotional attachment to a group.[9] The politics of belonging maintains distinctive in and out groups and buttresses against feelings of belonging for newcomers.

Non-Western immigrants in Europe have become controversial as they try to find a home or find belonging. Many scholars suggest that race is not a factor in how non-Western immigrants are treated, while other scholars outline the connection between racism and perceptions about non-Western immigrants having difficulty integrating into Western societies.[10] Anti-immigrant sentiments, linked directly to the politics of belonging, have shifted away from issues related to the ethnic background of immigrants to the threat of Muslims as terrorists and people from the global south whose values are supposed to be fundamentally different from western Europe.[11] The "threat" of new immigrants and their descendants was first recognized in Europe with the movement of the Poles to Germany, the Irish to England, and the Italians to France; however, when looking more closely at integration of these groups, historically Poles, Italians, and Irish were present in the receiving countries for centuries and often it was not just the immigrants who moved but also borders that shifted placing "immigrants" in new territories.[12] Globalization has caused a new wave of migration that allowed people to move to entirely different continents. For example, it has only been in the past 50 years

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[9] Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (Taylor & Francis, 2002); Marco Antonsich, "Searching for Belonging – An Analytical Framework," *Geography Compass* 4, no. 6 (2010): 644–59; Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 5.

[10] David Theo Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 331–64; Willem Schinkel, *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe*, 2017; Alana Lentin, *Racism and Ethnic Discrimination* (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2011).

[11] Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

[12] Lucassen.

that large populations of Eritreans moved to Sweden and Iraqis moved to Denmark. Migration today is marked more distinctly by the ability of more low-income earners from the global south with different cultures and religions to move north.

This study aligns with bodies of work from Goldberg (2006) and Schinkel (2018) who illustrated how Europe has become an object of visibility where concepts of who is European is made-up by the statements that express it. "European" is linked to whiteness and Christianity when historically Europe has encompassed diverse groups of people, including Muslims, Africans, Jews, etc.[13] Europe did not see itself as a collective group of people until after the atrocities of the world wars that led to the development of the European Union (EU).[14] The creation of a European identity was positioned against others who were not European—particularly Muslims and North Africans. The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and subsequent attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom in 2004 only exasperated tensions between Muslims, North Africans, and the EU.[15] As more European countries joined the EU and gained access to move freely to other EU countries, North Africans and people from the Middle East became more limited in their ability to live and move freely in the EU due to their countries of origin.[16]

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[13] Houssain Kettani, "History and Prospect of Muslims in Western Europe," *Journal of Religion and Health* 56, no. 5 (October 2017): 1740–75.

The Moors ruled Europe for 700 years from the early 8th century to the late 15th century. Moors was a term associated with African Berbers, Arabs, and European Muslims. Furthermore, the Roman Empire extended from England to all North Africa countries along the Mediterranean Sea and went to modern-day Syria and Iraq.

[14] Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization."

[15] Edwin Bakker, "Jihadi Terrorists in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadis," in *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe*, ed. R. Coolsaet (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 69–84.

[16] Kelly Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*, 1 edition (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2010).

The governments and the local populations hotly debate immigrant and integration policies in Denmark and Sweden as the countries contend with accepting diverse groups of people and promoting its distinct culture and religious history—this is the politics of belonging that immigration scholars discuss regularly.[17] Integration traditionally meant access to a country through language acquisition and cultural knowledge tests. Today, integration has developed to mean policies that address social and economic disparities present in immigrant majority communities.[18] A central assumption in the integration literature is that integration is linked to the social and economic success of new arrivals.[19] Many reports from the European Union, United Nations, and Denmark and Sweden's national statistic agencies indicated that immigrants from the global south and their descendant have higher and longer term instances of poverty and unemployment relative to the native population in the countries. Denmark and Sweden, despite being successful robust welfare states that provide safety nets for their residents and citizens, are failing when it comes to socioeconomic integration of

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[17] Adrian Favell, "The Development of E.U. Immigration Policy: Supranationalisation and the Politics of Belonging," in *Dialogues on Migration Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 45–56; Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn, *The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging"; Andrew Geddes, "The Development of E.U. Immigration Policy: Supranationalisation and the Politics of Belonging," in *The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe*, ed. Andrew Geddes and Adrian Favell (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), 176–91.

[18] Anthony B. Atkinson and Jakob Egholt Søgaard, "The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 118, no. 2 (2016): 264–291; Balakrishnan and Hou, "Socioeconomic Integration and Spatial Residential Patterns of Immigrant Groups in Canada"; Balakrishnan and Hou; Thesia I. Garner and Kathleen S. Short, *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality)*, Research on Economic Inequality, Book 23 (Portland, Oregon: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015); Taryn Ann Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study," in *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility*, ed. Thesia I. Garner and Kathleen S. Short (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 185–219; George J Borjas, *Labor Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013).

[19] Hersi, "Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review"; Aldén and Hammarstedt, *Integration of Immigrants on the Swedish Labour Market*; Balakrishnan and Hou, "Socioeconomic Integration and Spatial Residential Patterns of Immigrant Groups in Canada."

non-Western immigrants. This dissertation seeks to illuminate the potential causes of the failure of non-Western immigrants to integrate socioeconomically by examining both countries' immigration and integration policies.

This study provides a ground-level view of the connections between immigration, integration, and poverty. It examines the first- and second-generation immigrants in these countries to understand and analyze their integration experiences. It does so by employing both an original survey instrument as well as ethnographic fieldwork, and in-depth interviews. This study moreover probes the history of political attitudes towards immigration to Denmark and Sweden, the settlement of immigrants, and the parallel development of integration policies. The theoretical debates about integration in this study are grounded in the notion that nation-states are responding to and contending with cultural and religious diversity in a world that has become ever more diverse.[20] The focus here is to provide a probable historical context for integration policies and to illuminate a possible connection to the resurgence of nationalism in response to growing immigrant populations in Denmark and Sweden. This project connects to broader debates about migration to Europe from the global south. It looks at how Europe can properly integrate new arrivals while also respecting the diverse cultural and religious backgrounds that non-Western immigrants bring with them.

Denmark and Sweden Case Studies Selection Process

In developing the study, significant thought went into which case studies to use to examine immigrant integration in the context of twenty-first-century Europe. At the time

[20] Hersi, "Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review."

of this project, Denmark and Sweden had chosen entirely different stances in the 2015/16 refugee crisis. Denmark decided to implement restrictive immigration policies that limited the inflow of migrants and refugees into the country, while Sweden allowed in the largest number of refugees and migrants in the EU compared to its population size, which was about 163,000 people. After further probing I learned that the countries also took very different integration strategies with immigrants; Denmark had extensive integration requirements before individuals could get residency or citizenship and Sweden had no integration requirements for residency or citizenship. The nature of this project seeks to examine differences in integration policies and control for other factors that could impact integration, such as differences in culture, history, and language. Comparing similar countries that have vastly different integration policies, illuminated previously hidden issues, and provided a means to understand integration problems with greater clarity.[21]

Most case studies look at outliers or countries on opposite ends of a spectrum to understand a phenomenon. Often France is pivoted against Germany or the United Kingdom for comparative analysis because of the large immigrant populations who have moved there and the differences in their immigration and integration policies. There is an abundance of rich scholarly information about France, the United Kingdom, and even Germany.[22] Instead, countries in Scandinavia provided a reliable comparison that controlled for history, language, and culture. These countries used different types of

[21] Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius, *Controlling Immigration*.

[22] See Rogers Brubaker's Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis (1990); Yasmin Soysal's Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (1994); Adrian Favell's Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (2016); Christian Joppke's Immigration and the Nation-State: the United States, Germany, and Great Britain (1999)

integration policies (assimilation and multiculturalism), yet neither have successfully integrated many immigrants with non-Western backgrounds—a puzzle this project discusses.

The divergence in Denmark and Sweden's immigration and integration approaches began in 1998 when Denmark elected the Danish People's Party (DPP), an anti-immigrant right-wing party, into parliament in response to the refugees from the former-Yugoslavia and the Danes aligning themselves more closely to the United States in the War Against Terror in 2001. Since then, immigration and integration have become hugely politicized in Denmark, and policies gradually changed to be restrictive towards immigration with expansive integration requirements.[23] The conservative government gained a majority votes in 2011 that they have maintained until today.[24]

Sweden, on the other hand, continued with a multicultural integration approach and an open immigration policy until most recently. They made changes to their integration policies in 1990, 2007, and in 2011, but all of those changes supported multiculturalism and expanded resources to immigrants. It was only in 2018, a few years after the refugee crisis that overwhelmed Sweden's native population and immigration system, that a conservative right-wing party (Swedish Democrats) gained substantial parliamentary seats in government. Nonetheless, the liberal party, the Social Democrats (SD), have maintained majority seats in parliament. The policies in Sweden remain very

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[23] Per Mouritsen and Christine Hovmark Jensen, "Integration Policy in Denmark," 2014.

[24] Denmark's liberal party (Social Democrats) in the past two years adapted anti-immigrant policies as well in an effort to gain control over the government. It worked, and in June 2019 the Left and Central Left parties gained control over the government again. The current Prime Minister is Mette Frederiksen the head of the Social Democratic Party.

liberal and multicultural towards immigrants, meaning that language or cultural competency has not become a requirement for immigrants to obtain citizenship or permanent residency. However, cultural competencies, language exams, and education are all required for access to the job market in Sweden since at least 2007. By taking the integration debate away from multiculturalist versus assimilationist policies and switching it to examining possible barriers in the introduction programs, as in the case of Sweden or integration programs as in the case of Denmark, I can illuminate other long-term social effects such as poverty for non-Western immigrants.

Fieldwork: Population, Participants, and Procedure

The project draws from methods used by political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists.[25] It used three different methods to study immigrant integration: historical analysis, a survey questionnaire, and participant observations. The historical research examined the development of national identities in Denmark and Sweden to understand how the countries developed their immigration and integration policies. It looked specifically at first and secondary sources such as written laws, policy documents, history books, newspaper articles, blogs, and journal articles to gather information about the countries' policies. The survey questionnaire asked participants questions about their perception of integration policies in Denmark and Sweden—the goal of the survey was to collect opinions and experiences from the general population. The data were then

[25] I developed my case study analysis from George and Bennett, who are two leading scholars in case study research. I used the KKV method to understand and design scientific inquiry in qualitative research. See the following Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, ed. Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

analyzed using modern data analytical methods. The participant observations involved interviews with immigrants, policymakers, and community leaders, along with my own documented experiences as I became a member of the communities I was studying. I used participant observations to collect data from non-Western immigrants and also to understand integration issues firsthand.

The 12-month field research occurred primarily in Stockholm and Copenhagen municipalities because these cities and the surrounding suburbs have the largest number of people with immigrant backgrounds in both countries. The districts of particular interest were Mjolnerparken in Copenhagen and Rinkeby in Stockholm. The Danish and Swedish integration ministries consider these areas as places with large immigrant populations, high poverty, and high crime rates. Mjolnerparken is in North Copenhagen, where approximately 2,500 people live and represent 38 different nationalities from predominately Africa and the Middle East. The area has 98% non-ethnic Danes. Rinkeby is a suburb in North Stockholm that houses 15,051 residents of which 89.1% have an immigrant background from Africa and the Middle East. Mjolnerparken and Rinkeby are the most segregated neighborhoods.

The research looked at the implications from integration theories, tested the implications against empirical measurements, and used the results to draw inferences about how to best modify the integration theories tested.[26] By selecting just two cases (Denmark and Sweden) and analyzing them in great detail, I could better identify

[26] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, ed. Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005), 35.

conditions and procedures that were linked to successful or failed outcomes related to immigrant integration. Moreover, scholars, today are training in more than one research methodology, or at least have exposure to more than one methodology, to avoid limitations related to different social science methods, e.g., a very narrow view or a birds-eye view of the topic.[27] The significance of the results from this study could help countries understand the gap between their integration policies' goal and the outcomes on immigrant communities.

This dissertation takes into account the history of Denmark and Sweden because the countries' native population's interactions with and perception of immigrants reflect these countries' shared history. The study explores the constructed meanings of being Danish and Swedish and "belonging" that have been passed down through storytelling about national identity. I recognize that these research findings are interpreted based on opinions of immigrants, those who work with immigrants on integration, ethnic Danes, and ethnic Swedes who completed the surveys, and my personal experiences in the countries. Having this in mind, I consider that the engagement immigrants have with policies and their experiences are also shaped by their interactions with the media, their engagement with other immigrants, international politics in their native countries, and, surprisingly, domestic political issues happening in the United States. How people interact with policies is complicated, and I do not claim that this study answers all questions about integration; however, this study does contribute to immigration and

[27] George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.

integration literature by looking more closely at the implication of national myths, history, national identity, institutions, and the politics of belonging on policies.

Defining Important Terms

Admittedly words like immigrant and integration are complex words. For this project, these terms are defined using the EU's institutional organization's definitions as a basis.[28] Immigrants, according to the EU, are individuals who migrated to a new country (first-generation) and individuals whose parent(s) migrated to a new country (second-generation). It refers to individuals regardless of their legal status as refugees, asylum-seekers, or citizen (if at least one parent was born abroad). The term "immigrant" can also be linked to a racialized word that refers to people who are not considered "white" such as Muslims and people from Africa, the Middle East, South America, Asia, and sometimes Eastern Europe.[29] The word in nonracial terms signifies that someone is "not originally from here" in the context of Western Europe. The phrases "non-Western immigrant" and "immigrants from the global south" refer to individuals with origins from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe and are used regularly and interchangeably in this dissertation.

There is no consensus on a single definition for immigrant integration. Nevertheless, immigrant integration is broadly defined according to a process during

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[28] The EU's definition is most relevant here because it can apply to a broad set of governments in the EU. Each country in the EU has its nuances, so by using a broad definition, I can apply it to a broad set of governments and institutions like both Denmark and Sweden.

[29] Steve Garner, "The European Union and the Racialization of Immigration, 1985-2006," *Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts* 1, no. 1 (2007): 61–87.
The use of "immigrant" admittedly fails to capture accurately the generation of people born and raised in a country; however, it is an analytical word that describes not just a migratory past but also a category of people who are not perceived to be native to a territory.

which immigrants and minorities are incorporated into the social and economic structure of the host society.[30] It is the process when immigrants "become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups [integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies [and implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labor market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind immigrants and host communities in a common purpose."[31] The specific emphasis in this project is related to social and economic integration for non-Western immigrants.

I recognize that the use of "immigrant" admittedly fails to capture precisely the generation of people born and raised in a country; however, it is an analytical word that describes not just a migratory past but also a category of people who are not perceived to be native to a territory. I also acknowledge that discussing integration processes for non-Western immigrants, as Schinkel (2018) argued, is bounded in neocolonial forms of monitoring and resurgences of power dynamics; in this case, the subjected are monitored based on their ability to conform to the subject.[32] Discussing integration processes for people who were born and/or raised in a territory is ludicrous as most of them have lived their entire lives in the country and are fluent in the language and know the culture. I use the word integration, in a similar way that I use immigrant, as an analytical term that describes a process of being fully incorporated into a society or belonging. I am

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[30] Richard Alba and Victor Nee, "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration," *The International Migration Review* 31, no. 4 (1997): 5.

[31] IOM International Organization for Migration, "Glossary on Migration," International Migration Law (International Organization for Migration, 2011), 51.

[32] Willem Schinkel, "Against 'Immigrant Integration': For an End to Neocolonial Knowledge Production," *Comparative Migration Studies* 6, no. 1 (September 25, 2018): 31.

examining the integration policies in this project and suggesting that integration policies have barriers to them that can be more limiting for non-Western immigrants than helpful.

Understanding Integration Barriers in Immigrant Communities

The findings from this study are a compilation of themes collected from the survey data, interviews, and participant observations. When I returned from a year abroad, I decided to first look at the trends from the survey data. I had already done extensive research on secondary sources and journal articles about the history of both countries and notes about integration, but I wanted to investigate significant themes from the survey responses after analyzing the surveys with Microsoft Excel, SPSS, and Qualtrics data analysis software. I also compared the survey findings to the observations I made from visiting immigrant communities and my historical analysis of the countries.

The general finding was that policies do not often reflect their purpose and that policies can be trumped by practices in a society and that socially constructed ideas and institutions are important to integration. The study revealed five themes related to integration. The first was that there was not a significant difference in the *perceived* integration of immigrants in Denmark with immigrants in Sweden. Specifically, whether the country used a multicultural or assimilation policy did not matter or impact how immigrant integration was perceived. Building upon this idea that the types of integration policies was not important, I then examined the development of integration and migration policies in both countries.

The second theme was that historical legacies and myths illuminated trends to the governments' and the native populations' responses to immigrants with non-Western

backgrounds. This substantial loss of power and landmass in Denmark throughout the middle ages could be linked to assimilation integration policies. The country, therefore, tends to focus on protecting it's linguistic and cultural diversifying world.[33] The Swedish monarch was exiled for losing Finland to Russia in 1809, and the King was replaced by a French military officer. The new monarch, whose line is still in power today, played a crucial role in building Swedish neutrality. This neutral approach has impacted modern-day trends in Sweden's multicultural policies and immigration policies; specifically, Sweden is more inclusive of diverse groups of people by not requiring integration tests. However, although Sweden was very neutral, it had social policies of conformity for refugees and asylees.

The third finding from this project was that most respondents from the surveys and the interviews believed that poverty relates to structural issues in the integration system in Sweden, while in Denmark poverty was linked to the immigrant's cultural and religious background. The policies in Sweden are multicultural and support diverse cultures; however, the institutions and social policies required them to conform to Swedish cultural practices. The law of Jante (Swedish Jantelagen/ Danish Janteloven) in Nordic countries is a code of conduct that requires people to be modest, not be overly ambitious or do things out of the ordinary—anyone who does not fit the model finds it difficult to belong. Institutions in Sweden have this notion of conformity built into in them. Therefore, although integration programs are not required but suggested,

[33] Per Mouritsen, "The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark," *Ethnicities* 13, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 86–109.

immigrants nonetheless must go through a government program or institution, which forces conformity.

The fourth finding from the project indicates that integration barriers are perceived differently by immigrants and the native ethnic populations, specifically in Denmark policy initiatives did not always match the integration issue it was trying to solve. The new integration programs are problematic not only because they target people in specific communities, but because the policies also assume that immigrants in these communities are not integrated and cannot speak Danish. The survey questionnaire further revealed that immigrants in Denmark saw barriers to integration as related to the race/ethnic background of the immigrant, while the majority of ethnic Danes interpreted the barrier as immigrants not understanding Danish culture/values and language. In Sweden, the survey revealed the opposite. Immigrants said that race/ethnic background was not as big as a factor for immigrants as that of understanding Swedish culture and language. While, ethnic Swedes said that racism and discrimination was a huger barrier to integration for immigrants.

The fifth theme came mostly from the interviews and suggested that successful integration in Denmark and Sweden was available for non-Western immigrants who believed in themselves or had someone else who motived them to accomplish their goals to go beyond limitations or structural barriers in the host societies. They practiced Jante Law or at least understood it enough to function in mainstream society and had a sense of belonging to the society. The people I interviewed were generally refugees or children of refugees, and they had a certain level of respect for the Danish and Sweden social welfare systems and governance practices. They genuinely were happy living in these countries

and bought into the ideas that Denmark and Sweden were one of the best countries to live in the world. They tended to take advantage of the opportunities associated with the universal social welfare system (i.e., universal education, and healthcare) to help them succeed in the host societies and in many cases beyond the capabilities of the native population. The findings in this study are fascinating and are detailed throughout the chapters of the dissertation.

WHAT'S TO FOLLOW

The moment immigrants move to a new society; they have to establish themselves in their new home. This is not only related to their physical needs of shelter and food but also in a cultural and social sense. How immigrants become successfully integrated into host societies is crucial as more than ever, people are moving and settling in different regions from which they were born. This project speaks to these issues of integration in host societies that are contending with new cultures and religions in their borders and also preserving the host society's traditions. The Welfare States such as Denmark and Sweden, in most recent years, have had to adapt to these cultural changes. New arrivals and their descendants face barriers to integration, particularly those coming from the global south. This dissertation is organized in six chapters--three chapters that discuss the background, framing, and conclusions of the study and three chapters that are separated by the research methods.

The first chapter introduced the study, outlined the research question and terms, briefly described the integration literature, and concisely provided the theoretical grounding for the project. Chapter two explores the theoretical framework for the study

and describes how the project relates to prior integration and immigration research. It shows the relevance of the research problem to current debates about immigration and integration. The remaining three chapters are divided by the methods used in the study. Chapter three provides a historical background of the countries using secondary sources, government policies, and statutes to investigate integration policies from a historical perspective. Chapter four presents the survey data collected from participants and outlines in detail the findings from the surveys. There are charts, tables, and statistical analyses presented in this chapter of the study that discusses results from the survey questionnaire. Chapter five changes gears from the statistical analysis and relies heavily on interviews and observations I made using the participant observation method. Lastly, chapter six summarizes the main findings from Denmark and Sweden, and it discusses the implication of the results for integration in Europe and suggests policy changes. I end the last chapter on a positive note with the hope that immigrants in Denmark and Sweden will be fully incorporated into their host societies.

Using an impressive multimethod approach, this study looks at public perceptions and opinions on immigration from the perspective of the host society and immigrants. Rather than attempting to categorize the host population as racist or nationalist, this dissertation argues that issues about integration policy are best understood through questions of who belongs to the nation and political membership. As Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn (2013) highlight in their book, the relationship between citizenship, race/ethnic, religion, and immigration is important to the politics of belonging. The central aspect of understanding perceptions about immigrants begins with understanding the development of opinions about immigration that is embedded in the history of the

countries.[34] Beginning with a historical analysis, the dissertation documents why opinions exist in Denmark and Sweden about immigrants and immigration policy, institutional practices, the formation of laws, and integration policies. Then, through an analysis of perception about immigration and integration policies among the native and immigrant populations, the study examines ethnic and racial identity in relation to belonging in the host countries.

[34] Masuoka and Junn, *The Politics of Belonging*.

CHAPTER II. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter details the theoretical framework from which the study is grounded. This dissertation takes the state as central actor and examines the development of integration policies in Denmark and in Sweden through theories about nation-building, cultural myths, and national identity. Katzenstein (1985) and Gellner (1983) argued that small cultural homogeneous societies have an institutional advantage to build strong economic systems that helps them cooperate in ways that larger societies find it difficult. They found that diversity such as class, ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences prevented social mobility prior to industrialization in small societies. The central idea for Katzenstein and Gellner was that a common background and identity enhanced the ability of people to have a strong national identity absent of cultural cleavages. This shared identity helped mobilize people to solutions in society more quickly and create a strong national identity that could protect the small states from international pressures.[35] This led to the creation of institutions that helped small countries deal with their vulnerabilities—this are institutions that facilitate cooperation, sacrifice, flexibility and rigorous state action in the national interest.

I suggest that with the recent demographic shifts in Denmark and Sweden in the past 50 years, the idea of a homogenous society to fuel economic growth no longer fits as a model for the countries. In fact, the institutions implemented when both countries were homogenous societies has become a barrier to integration for non-Western immigrants. In

[35] Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*; Campbell and Hall, "National Identity and the Political Economy of Small States," 552.

other words, the same institutions that helped facilitate economic growth for the homogenous societies are now creating barriers and social cleavages for the diverse populations that undeniably exists in the countries today. The institutions that facilitated sameness are now placing non-Western immigrants who cannot [or do not want to] assimilate to the host cultures at a socioeconomic disadvantage. These diverse individuals who are now citizens or at least permanent legal residents and have rights in the host nations and a say in institutions. The topic of immigrant integration has become extremely important in Scandinavia as countries such as Denmark and Sweden have received the majority of their diverse population in the past 50 years.

Institutions in Denmark and Sweden have created certain patterns of behavior related to the countries' responses to immigrants that has been socially constructed as a result of shared experiences in the culture and history. Denmark and Sweden are small welfare states that have extensive universal welfare programs, strong economies, and a strong sense of equality embedded in their notion of statehood. They have similar histories of immigration and egalitarianism, yet they have taken on very different integration policies. Denmark has one of the most restrictive integration policies in Europe, while Sweden, although recently introduced a limit on refugees, has maintained a very liberal multicultural integration policy. Their differences in approach, however, has not yielded differences in integration for non-Western immigrants. In fact, non-Western immigrants in both countries are the poorest in the European Union (EU) relative to the native populations. This dissertation examines the integration policies in Denmark and in Sweden to understand why both types of policies (assimilationism and multiculturalism) are failing in the countries.

The deviation in integration policies began in 2002 when Denmark slowly made changes in their immigration and integration policies that tightened asylum and marriage laws and initiated required integration requirements for the first time in their history. From 1994 through today, Sweden's policies have remained mainly liberal in terms of no required language or cultural knowledge tests. Only after the 2015/16 Refugee Crisis has Sweden introduced slightly more restrictive refugee policies that limited refugees to 5,000 as concern grew that the country had overextended itself. Given these two different approaches and that these are robust welfare states, it comes as a surprise that immigrants in both countries, particularly non-Western immigrants, are the poorest relative to the host population and they are the largest unemployed group in both countries. This primarily marks integration policies as a failure in the states as integration in Europe has come to mean the ability of an individual to work to earn an income, which is associated with lower poverty levels, education attainment, and language ability.

Given that non-Western immigrants are the poorest in both countries, other factors should be considered to examine integration issues, not merely the policies the states have implemented. Throughout this chapter, I discuss the current debates about integration policies which include multiculturalism versus assimilationism, the shift to integration tests, and lastly, I discuss the role race/ethnicity plays in perceptions about immigrant integration processes. A central position here is that race/ethnicity should also be included in the discussion of integration because the people who are impacted mainly by the policies and who are the poorest in the countries are not western Europeans and/or Christians—the majority come from the global south. I also discuss barriers that the

integration policies and institutions themselves might be presenting to diverse populations in Denmark and Sweden.

Immigrant Integration in Denmark and in Sweden

The immigrant integration literature in Western Europe is vast; therefore, everything cannot be reviewed in the course of this dissertation. There are three interlinked areas of research that are built upon in relation to the research question. The literature examined here addresses the current debates about multicultural versus assimilationist integration policies, the transition to integration tests, and the role race plays in perceptions about immigrant integration processes in the context of Europe. A central position here is that integration in Denmark and Sweden is racialized, where the primary issues are race/ethnicity because the people who are impacted mainly by the policies immigrated from the global south and are non-Europeans and non-Christians. Furthermore, this research demonstrates that non-Western immigrants are subjected to systemic barriers in the integration process irrespective of the multicultural or assimilationist policies. I present here that due to institutional barriers that attempt to downplay or exclude diversity in both countries non-Western immigrants are often excluded when they cannot at least adopt Scandinavian ideology or way of life. Katzenstein and Gellner called homogeneity important to socioeconomic success of small countries, but it is also important to understand how this practice has become a barrier.

Integration for many European politicians is the inclusion of first-and second-generation (and sometimes third- generation) immigrants into mainstream society. Integration and immigration policies are intertwined as both are the plans countries develop to incorporate new arrivals into their community. Integration has also come to

mean a plan of action to include descendants of immigrants with non-Western backgrounds socioeconomically into European society. The issue in Europe might not simply be the citizenship tests or the type of integration policies that a country implements (e.g., assimilationist or multiculturalist) but integration issues stem from ideas of who belongs and who does not belong in Europe. There are specific barriers that poor non-Western immigrants encounter from integration requirements that other Western immigrants and high-wage earning immigrants do not face, especially as it pertains to language, education, and access to higher-wage jobs. Immigration scholars rarely examine how integration can be achieved from the immigrant's perspective by highlighting factors that contribute to barriers.

Denmark and Sweden integration policies are evaluated in this study because they exemplify opposite approaches in Europe that are yielding the same results. At first glance, Sweden's immigration and integration policies are the simplest in the European Union (EU) because there are no tests or language requirements associated with obtaining citizenship or residency. However, Sweden has integration requirements such as language classes, educational programs, cultural immersion classes, which are prerequisites for refugees and asylees to obtain access to the workforce. See Table 1 below. Immigration and integration policies are reflective of each countries' historical, political, social, and economic conditions, which is the reason countries' policies vary.

TABLE 1. INTEGRATION POLICIES IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN**

	Denmark	Sweden
Program Required	Yes, everyone must attend for residency and citizenship. Linked to benefits for refugees, aslyees, and their family members. Administered by the Danish Ministry of Integration.	No, only refugees, asylees, and their family members. The program is voluntary, but allowance is linked to the program. Administered by the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen)
Language Requirement	Required for everyone. B2 Level, takes 2-3 years, max 5 years (exceptions for parental leave and illness).	Voluntary for everyone, required for people who receive a government "adjustment allowance". SFI courses provided for 2-3 years, max 3 years (exceptions for parental leave and illness).
Country Knowledge Requirement	25 questions, 20 correct to pass, exam is in Danish.	Cultural classes and cultural activities if necessary. Agreements made with Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen)
Education/Work Requirement	After program must have a job or attend school.	After program should have a job or attend school. If not, can attend a work program offered to all residents and citizens.

* Information from Denmark and Sweden government's website for immigrants.
**Policies are not required in Sweden, but they are linked to the adjustment allowance.

INTEGRATION THEORIES ARE COMPLEX IN EUROPE

The study of integration as a discipline derived initially from debates about immigrants who were moving from Eastern Europe to Western countries during and after the World Wars and the Cold War. Essential questions about citizenship came out of Hannah Arendt's work on human rights and the study of totalitarianism.[36] Arendt posited that granting individuals citizenship gave them full civil and political rights in the name of the state, which only recognized "nationals" as its national community by right of

[36]Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1 edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973).

origin or birth.[37] She argued that by virtue of citizenship, stateless individuals were invisible because if they lost their citizenship, they could not acquire a new one.[38] The underlying premise of this stance was that citizenship and national belonging are closely linked together, as citizenship marks one's membership in a political community and therefore, citizenship needed to be extended to immigrants and refugees.[39]

Integration policies came out of this understanding of citizenship as national communities wanted introductory programs to assist new arrivals adaption process in the host society. Some scholars argued that societies needed to be more inclusive of diverse groups of people and promoted multiculturalism, which pivoted foreign cultures as just as valid as the host culture. Others took a more traditional view and promoted the importance of the host culture and that newcomers needed to assimilate. The debates about which practice was the best for successful integration has dominated the discussion about immigration for the past 30 years. The first integration debates centered on assimilation versus multiculturalism policies. Multiculturalism is the political philosophy that maintains cultural and religious distinctiveness as important values to a host society. Multiculturalism is a "salad bowl" and "cultural mosaic" method of mixing groups together; each diverse member maintains its own cultural practices.[40] An example of multicultural societies would be Canada and the United Kingdom. Assimilation,

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[37]Patricia Mindus, "The Contemporary Debate on Citizenship. Some Remarks on the Erased of Slovenia," *Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava*, no. 9 (January 1, 2009): 29–44.

[38]Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

[39]Peter J. Spiro, *Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[40]Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Clarendon Press, 1995); Steven Vertovec, "Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities," *International Social Science Journal* 50, no. 156 (June 1, 1998): 187–99.

however, is the opposite of multiculturalism and means that the immigrant fully adapts to the host country. Assimilation emphasizes the process of one-way adaptation; therefore, newcomers have to give up their linguistic and cultural practices to be a member of the new society.[41] An example of the assimilationist approach is France, whereby citizens have a French national identity and nothing more. Assimilation means that immigrants should fully integrate themselves into a host country and lose most, if not all, of their cultural heritage in the process. Debates about which method was the best for integration dominated integration and migration literature from the late 1980s and into the mid-2000s and present day.

How a country perceives its national identity is exemplified in policy requirements (multicultural or assimilation) to obtain citizenship. Countries like Sweden maintain that citizenship should be inclusive and relatively easy to acquire, while countries like Denmark put higher demands on people who want to become citizens.[42] Citizenship is, therefore, a proxy for national identity and self-understanding in some countries—obtaining citizenship becomes a defining factor as to whether a country is inclusive or exclusive towards outsiders.[43] The higher the demands on the new arrival the greater chance that national identity is a privileged status saved for the native ethnic population and those who are able to assimilation—societies who implement assimilationist policies, therefore, extend rights to people who can pass integration

[41]Chantal Lacroix, *Immigrants, Literature and National Integration* (Springer, 2010), 8.

[42] Chapter three outlines specifically why Denmark and Sweden take these different approaches to citizenship; Denmark, because it once was a powerful state in Northern Europe and now is the smallest country, is protecting its culture and language by requiring assimilation policies, while Sweden, a country that has become neutral because of the current French dynasty that pacified surrounding power, took on a multicultural policy.

[43]Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard University Press, 1992).

markers. Multicultural societies, however, are based on equality through rights that come with citizenship, not on the ability of people to integrate.[44]

Both assimilationist and multiculturalist policy initiatives existed throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Most countries used assimilationist policies and shifted after the end of Communism when more Eastern European countries began joining the EU in 2004 and again in 2007.[45] Multicultural policies gave intrinsic value to racial and ethnic equality that was linked to human rights and democratic citizenship. Ethnic and racial identity was a central point for immigrants, which can be traced back to the atrocities committed by the Nazis during WWII. The Holocaust and the displacement of millions of people in Europe motivated the United Nations to create the Commission on Human Rights 1946,[46] Which eventually became the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2006. The UNHCR acknowledged the right of people to move across national borders and seek asylum from persecution.[47] The immigrant-focused human rights perspective expressed a clear view that the immigrant's cultural heritage needed to be respected and that they should have equal access to become a citizen in a territory as part of their human right. The underlining perspective was that all

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[44]Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[45] An example of this is the change Germany made to its nationality laws in 2000 to allow individuals who had resided in Germany for at least 8 years who were under the age of 23 access to Germany citizenship. This was the first time since prior to the First World War that Germany extended citizenship to non-ethnic residents. This was an act towards multiculturalism because at least citizenship was extended to immigrants.

[46] The UN expanded statements about refugees in 1941, based on Article 13 and 14 of the Convention of Relating to the Status of Refugees.

[47] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written in 1948. Article 13 says (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state, and (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Article 14 says: Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

fundamental civil and political rights would allow individuals to express their culture without being persecuted.

Multiculturalism was revered as the best type of integration for many years because it assumed and hoped that all cultures could co-exist under one nation-state. Immigrant communities could develop cultural centers funded by the government, dual citizenship was permissible, and there was affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.[48] Most countries implemented modest forms of multicultural policies, with the exception of the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where extensive multicultural policies were implemented. However, in 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron said that multiculturalism had failed in their countries because of the numerous terrorist attacks committed by European citizens with immigrant backgrounds.[49] As a result, Europe has become more obsessed with integration tests, and the tests became a precursor to membership.[50] The tests ranged from naturalization procedures that led to the immigrant giving up their previous citizenship, to migration control procedures that included tests before they could have legal and long-standing access to the territory.[51]

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[48]Ruth Rubio-Marín, *Human Rights and Immigration* (OUP Oxford, 2014).

[49] Sohail Daulatzai and Junaid Rana, eds., *With Stones in Our Hands: Writings on Muslims, Racism, and Empire* (University of Minnesota Press, 2018); Amélie Blom, "Emotions and the Micro-Foundations of Religious Activism: The Bitter-Sweet Experiences of 'Born-Again' Muslims in Pakistan," *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 54, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 123–45; Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, "Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107, no. 52 (December 28, 2010): 22384–90; Bleich, "Muslims and the State in the Post-9/11 West: Introduction."

[50] Christian Joppke, *Citizenship and Immigration* (Polity, 2010); Christian Joppke, "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe," *West European Politics* 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–22.

[51] Ibid

The Shift from Multiculturalism and Assimilation to Integration Indicators

In most recent years, the multicultural strategies and the assimilationist strategies across Europe were rendered obsolete. The focus has shifted to center on "integration" policies that promote aspects of assimilationism. Multicultural societies were said to have created ethnic enclaves that left immigrants and their descendants not only open to radicalization but with terrible education systems, scarce work opportunities, and high-crime areas.[52] Immigrants and the native populations were said to have lived parallel lives and never fully integrated with one another. There has been a resurgence of assimilationist policies as a result of terrorism, and the rise of right-wing parties in Europe and countries are making immigration policies more restrictive and requiring more language and cultural tests.[53] Multiculturalist and assimilationist debates shifted to integration indicators that mark when a new arrival is successfully integrated and able to participate in a host society fully.

The trend in Europe has been to adapt integration tests that examines an immigrant's ability to speak the language, retain the knowledge of the culture and history of the host country, and participate in the labor market. According to a study by Carrera and Wiesbrock in 2009, language tests had become widespread in Europe (26 of 33 countries use them), but some countries like Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus, Italy, Belgium, and

[52]Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[53]Hugh Eakin, "Liberal, Harsh Denmark," *The New York Review*, March 10, 2016; Jens Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe," *Journal of Language and Politics* 16, no. 4 (June 12, 2017): 485–96; Maud Cordenius, "Opinion | Sweden, Land of Migrants," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2018, sec. Opinion,

Poland did not have language requirements.[54] Cultural knowledge, assessed through civic tests, was required in 17 out of 33 countries. Countries like Denmark and France increased the difficulty of their language and country knowledge tests, in 2012 and again in 2016, after the various terrorist attacks in Europe and the immigration crisis in 2015.[55] Integration tests have rendered immigrant access to membership (e.g., resident, permanent resident, citizen) contingent on their language acquisition, cultural knowledge, and economic self-sufficiency.[56] The integration tests show that Europe is coming to terms with non-Western immigrants staying; however, the tests reflect the general belief that integration is not just a factor of political citizenship but also a condition for societal membership.[57] The general belief in many countries today in Europe is that to keep societies, integrated immigration policies must have cultural requirements linked to it from the start. Therefore, to have cohesive communities devoid of terrorism or ethnic enclaves, newcomers must adapt before obtaining residency.

Counter research on integration tests has questioned if these efforts to test immigrants' knowledge of host country history and practices have been successful. There is evidence that shows native-born citizens know less about their home countries than the new arrivals. In 2011, a study in Canada indicated that immigrants to Canada had more knowledge about the country's history than the native-born citizens and that native-born

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[54] These language and cultural tests are still required by most countries examined in the 2009 study Carrera and Wiesbrock, in 2019.

[55] Bleich, "Muslims and the State in the Post-9/11 West: Introduction"; Kristina Bakkær Simonsen, "Does Citizenship Always Further Immigrants' Feeling of Belonging to the Host Nation? A Study of Policies and Public Attitudes in 14 Western Democracies," *Comparative Migration Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 3.

[56] S. Carrera and A. Wiesbrock, "Civic Integration of Third Country Nationals: Nationalism versus Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy," January 1, 2009.

[57] Rubio-Marín, *Human Rights and Immigration*, 74.

citizens would fail the knowledge test.[58] Furthermore, integration tests cannot indicate how integrated a person could become or if they have the propensity to become radicalized. The same concerns applied to language tests, which many argued was a crucial aspect of integration. In 2008, the Finnish Minister of Migration and European Affairs raised concerns about the level of language proficiency that was required to be successful in society because, in Finland, applicants could fail the language exam and still be proficient enough in Finnish to succeed in their daily lives. Many argued that integration tests were designed to limit access to the host country.[59] Nonetheless, integration tests still dominate immigration and integration strategies in Europe today.

Citizenship tests, some scholars argued, were a resurgence of nationalism and cultural traditions, implemented by the state to assimilate newcomers into the host society via language, cultural knowledge, economic sufficiency, and allegiance tests.[60] Tools that measured successful integration essentially became a means of integration—so citizenship or residency became the reward for successful integration after immigrants met specific requirements.[61] Citizenship requirements could be assimilation requirements because they are an extension of policy legacies, citizenship traditions, and philosophies about newcomers.[62] If a newcomer does not meet these requirements, the state has the

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[58]Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, "Shaping Citizenship Policies to Strengthen Immigrant Integration," August 2, 2012,.

[59] Sara Wallace Goodman, "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 5 (May 1, 2010): 753–72; Sara Wallace Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[60] Ibid

[61]Rainer Bauböck et al., *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Comparative Analyses - Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries* (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 24.

[62]Per Mouritsen, "Denmark between Liberalism and Nationalism," ed. Tore Vincents Olsen, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 4 (April 1, 2013): 691–710; David Jacobson and Gayla Benarieh Ruffer, "Social

right to deny them settlement and to repatriate them into their country of birth.[63] Some argued that these tests could be in violation of human rights laws because they place an intrinsic value of one culture over another, which creates cultural hierarchy systems.[64] The liberalization of immigration policies created a significant move towards universal personhood, many scholars thought, until a closer examination of integration policies revealed that they were grounded in nationalism and cultural hierarchy.

Who are Integration Policies Targeting?

With the establishment of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, concerns about immigrant integration have been on the political agendas of EU countries for the last twenty-five years. The expansion of the EU to Eastern Europeans, globalization, and the increasing number of migrants in Western Europe has caused significant concerns for the countries. Most recently integration has become a topic connected to the growing diverse urban communities across Europe's major cities that have increasing poor populations with rising instances of gang violence, drug, and human trafficking, and homegrown terrorism.[65] As Europe's major cities became more diverse and globalized, multicultural policies that promoted specific group identities and assimilationist policies that proposed

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Relations on a Global Scale: The Implications for Human Rights and for Democracy," in *Dialogues on Migration Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*.

[63]Bauböck et al., *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Comparative Analyses - Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries*; Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*; Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans, "Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 5 (May 1, 2010): 773–91.

[64]Rubio-Marín, *Human Rights and Immigration*, 74.

[65] Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, October 31, 2018, 1–24; Simon Cottee, "Jihadism as a Subcultural Response to Social Strain: Extending Marc Sageman's 'Bunch of Guys' Thesis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 5 (November 1, 2011): 730–51; Garner and Short, *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality)*.

a clear national identity have become challenging to achieve. Instead, a focus on the generic term "integration" has developed to mean learning the host country language and joining the workforce. The most recent integration initiatives target specifically non-Western immigrants and their descendants, who are statistically the poorest in Europe.[66]

The European Commission conceptualizes integration as a mutual process whereby the immigrants and the host population participate in the process of change, but most of the adaptation is expected to be undertaken by the immigrant.[67] Integration, therefore, is a complex process related to participation, and personal and social change—all of which were connected not only to the newcomer adjusting to the host society but also to the host society adjusting to the newcomer.[68] The labor market, the employer, and the other colleagues play a significant role in the immigrant adjusting to the new society—immigrants will likely learn the host language and learn about the host culture at work.[69] Therefore I argue that integration research needs to address the native population perception of immigrants and the openness of institutions (e.g., universities,

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[66] Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study"; Torun Österberg et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty? The Achilles Heel of the Scandinavian Welfare State," in *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility*, vol. 23, 0 vols., Research on Economic Inequality 23 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 185–219.

[67] Robert Murdie and Sutama Ghosh, "Does Spatial Concentration Always Mean a Lack of Integration? Exploring Ethnic Concentration and Integration in Toronto," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (February 1, 2010): 295–96.

[68] Christian Joppke, "Tracks of Immigrant Incorporation," in *Outsiders No More?: Models of Immigrant Political Incorporation*, ed. Jennifer Hochschild et al. (Oxford University Press, 2013); Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation* (Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

[69] Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, "Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 166–91; Banulescu-Bogdan, "Shaping Citizenship Policies to Strengthen Immigrant Integration"; Ricky Van Oers, Eva Ersbøoll, and Theodora Kostakopoulou, *A Re-Definition of Belonging?: Language and Integration Tests in Europe* (BRILL, 2010).

government offices, workplaces, etc.) that receive newcomers. Comparative immigration policy rarely speaks to adjustments institutions go through to accommodate new arrivals.

Institutions (formal and informal) play a significant role in the immigrant integration process. When large populations move to a new country, typically these immigrants are impacted by and impact labor unions, political parties, educational systems, etc.[70] The OECD and the EU have an annual report that examines immigrant integration in all of these areas and most recently focused on relative poverty levels of immigrants in comparison to the native populations. The results are not good, particularly for social welfare countries such as Denmark and Sweden. They both have higher poverty rates compared to other OECD countries. See Figure 1 below. The rise in poverty amongst non-Western immigrants across Europe has motivated the EU to focus on reducing poverty and enhancing job opportunities for immigrants residing in member countries. Integration was aimed at helping newcomers adjust to their host societies; however, overtime integration had developed to mean incorporating non-Western immigrants into communities and specifically into institutions of employment and educational programs.

[70] See the following literature for reference. Janice Fine and Daniel J. Tichenor, "An Enduring Dilemma: Immigration and Organized Labor in Western Europe and the United States," in *Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration (Oxford Handbooks)*, ed. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor (Oxford University Press, USA, 2012); Tina Gudrun Jensen et al., "Analysis of Integration Policies and Public State- Endorsed Institutions at National and Regional Levels in Denmark," n.d., 26; Teri Givens, "Effects of Migration: Political Parties," in *Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration (Oxford Handbooks)*, ed. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor (Oxford University Press, USA, 2012), 153–70; Saltanat Liebert, "The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy: The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan," *Public Administration Review* 70, no. 3 (2010): 390–400.

FIGURE 1. MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX 2015



*Taken from www.mipex.edu/sweden and www.mipex.edu/denmark on February 17, 2017.

Remarkably, although Sweden ranked number one for their integration policies according to MIPEX in 2015, a recent OECD report also in 2015 showed that 31% of immigrants in Sweden live in relative poverty compared to the host population while 22% of all immigrants in Denmark live in relative poverty compared to the host population. Looking even closer at the percentage of *non-Western immigrants* in the countries, poverty rates rose to 25% in Denmark and an eye-popping 36% in Sweden, see Figure 2 below. This suggests that the actual practice of integration, at least economic integration for non-Western immigrants, is at stake. Denmark and Sweden ranked very high when it comes to overall poverty for non-Western immigrants compared to other OECD countries. For instance, the United States spends the least on universal social welfare of most OECD countries and has a 32 percent poverty rate for its immigrant population compared to its native-born population of 24 percent while Sweden ranked 31 for all of its immigrant population and 36 for its non-Western society. The disparity

between immigrants and non-Western immigrants in Sweden and their native population (16% and 21% respectively) is much higher than the difference between immigrants in the US and their native population (6% difference). Denmark also has a very high percentage difference between its total immigrant population poverty levels and their non-Western immigrant poverty levels (9% and 12% respectively) compared to the United States. See Figure 2 for more details. This is an unexpected outcome because Denmark and Sweden's universal welfare systems provide education, healthcare, and parental leave as human right for all of its residents to safeguard them from poverty.

FIGURE 2. OECD 2015 RELATIVE POVERTY PERCENTAGE RATES REPORT

Country	Total Immigrants	EU-Born Immigrant	Non-Western	Native Population
Denmark	22	18	25	13
Sweden	31	21	36	15
United States	32	--	--	24

*In percentages of the poverty rate of the population aged 16 years and over.
**Data from the OECD 2015 report.

A contributing factor to the high percentage of poverty rates for non-Western immigrants has been credited to the increase of uneducated or low-educated refugees and asylees who moved to the two countries since the 1990s. About 40 percent of the refugees and asylees came from Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—countries whose educational systems had been destroyed by war.[71] Many refugees and asylees arrived in

[71] Jørgensen, "Decentralising Immigrant Integration: Denmark's Mainstreaming Initiatives in Employment, Education, and Social Affairs" (Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014); Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund, "From Paradoxes of Multiculturalism to Paradoxes of Liberalism. Sweden and the European Neo-Liberal Hegemony," *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 9, no. 2 (November 2011); Fredrik Segerfeldt, "En arbetsmarknad för alla: Så kan integrationen förbättras" (Stockholm, Sweden: Migro, 2013).

Denmark and Sweden without the ability to read and/or write in their native languages, let alone in a foreign language.[72] Furthermore, the people who obtained a higher education from those countries could not prove their credentials because the educational institutions and/or government records in many cases had been destroyed. When they arrived in Denmark and Sweden, they not only had to meet specific language requirements to work in the countries, they also had to take or retake basic educational classes (e.g., math, writing, and reading) so that they could function in a work environment. This set the refugees and asylees back at least a decade before they could work in a basic cleaning job. Denmark's integration process was 8-9 years long, so the time it took them to obtain citizenship correlated to the time it would have taken them to get permanent residency.

Studies today focus on economic and labor-market access to measure integration because of the high poverty rates of non-Western immigrants in Europe; however, these factors alone do not adequately describe a picture of successful integration because none of these factors are mutually exclusive. For example, an immigrant child who grew up in a poor, segregated neighborhood could be impacted by the quality of their education, which can later change their access to higher education and employment prospects.[73] Failures for integrating into one domain could easily cause failures in other domains.[74] Lastly, having a job typically protects people from poverty, but this is not the case for

[72] Segerfeldt, "En arbetsmarknad för alla: Så kan integrationen förbättras."

[73] George Galster and Patrick Sharkey, "Spatial Foundations of Inequality: A Conceptual Model and Empirical Overview," *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (2017): 1–33.

[74] Ager and Strang, "Understanding Integration."

non-Western immigrants. According to the OECD's 2015 report, twenty percent of immigrants who are employed lived below the poverty line in Denmark and in Sweden, which is twice as high as the native populations. About half of all immigrant children lived below the poverty line, and their parents had an annual income of about 20,000 euros ($22,225) in both countries.

Debates about Immigration and Integration

The goal of this section is to examine the policies in Denmark and Sweden to understand why they are getting similar integration results when the policies are very different. Integration policies in Denmark and Sweden were quite similar until the 2000s. The early onset of these changes occurred when the anti-immigrant political party, Danish People's Party (DPP), was elected into government in 1998 in response to the many immigrants from Eastern Europe and refugees and asylees from the former-Yugoslavia moving to Denmark throughout the 1990s.[75] The DPP, following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon in the US, aligned themselves more closely with the US—Denmark was the only Scandinavian country to approve the US invasion of Iraq in 2002. Denmark sent troops to invade Afghanistan with the US in 2002, and Denmark continues to support the US's mission in Afghanistan.[76] Immigration policies in Denmark gradually became more restrictive with expansive integration requirements, while policies in Sweden generally remained the

[75] Mathias Danbolt and Lene Myong, "Racial Turns and Returns: Recalibrations of Racial Exceptionalism in Danish Public Debates on Racism," in *Racialization, Racism, and Anti-Racism in the Nordic Countries*, ed. Peter Hervik, Approaches to Social Inequality and Difference (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 39–61.

[76] The Danish Royal Army continues to support the US mission in Iraq. I have met and interviewed several veterans who served in the Danish Royal Army in Afghanistan during the War on Terrorism.

same. To establish a clear picture of the policies, the history of migration to these countries must be reviewed.

The migration histories of both Denmark and Sweden are the same in many respects. During the 1950s, there was a significant push to recruit laborers to help in the various manufacturing industries in both countries. Sweden hired laborers primarily from Finland, Italy, the former-Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey; laborers in Denmark came mainly from the former-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Morocco. Open labor migration laws ended in Scandinavia by1975 as the international market retracted with the 1973 Oil Crisis. After 1975, labor migration ended, and immigration shifted to family reunification and refugees/asylum seekers.[77] The groups who came were asylum seekers and refugees primarily from the former-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia according to the Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2012. The movement of people from these countries to Scandinavia was a result of the changes to the UNHCR's policies in 1967 that removed both the "temporal and geographic" restrictions of "refugee status" from groups outside of Europe.[78] Scandinavian countries received the majority of their diverse populations from refugees and asylees who primarily immigrated just 50 years ago. Policies in Denmark and Sweden were very generous to immigrants, but as the economies experience market stresses and international security issues became prevalent, immigrants presented a real threats to the countries national security and Denmark and Sweden's policies started to diverge.

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[77] Brochmann and Hagelund, "Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State."

[78] Krystyna Slany, "Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe since the Early Fifties till the Late Eighties," *Polish Sociological Review*, no. 104 (1993): 355–86.

The divergence in immigration policies in Denmark and Sweden was most noticeable when in 2002 the newly conservative Danish government stopped family reunification for spouses under 24 years old.[79] This rule came along with a law that required the couple to have a combined connection to Denmark that exceeded any attachment to another country. The Danish resident also had to have the financial means to provide for arriving family members. The government collected collateral (the most recent amount in 2019 is 102,000 DKK equivalent to $15,334) from the couple to put in an escrow just in case the foreign spouse needed financial assistance from the government.[80] The 24-year rule applied to all residents in Denmark who were seeking residency for a foreign partner based on family reunification; however, it disproportionately impacted non-EU and non-EEC (European Economic Community) immigrants who had been in Denmark compared to native-born residents and also individuals who could not afford that financial collateral for the government. As a result of the policy changes, there was a drastic reduction in the number of marriage immigrants to Denmark and also asylum and refugee applications.[81] While Denmark was becoming more restrictive in its immigration policies, Sweden's policies remained the same.

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[79] Vibeke Jakobsen, Tomas Korpi, and Thomas Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia," *European Journal of Population* 35, no. 2 (May 1, 2019): 305–28.

[80] This money is to ensure that the foreign spouse does not use the government's stipend allowance. Otherwise, the spouse has rights to healthcare, child stipend, and universal education as a Danish citizen.

[81] See Andersen, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2009.

The 24-year rule increased the population of marriage migrants to Malmö, Sweden—since people cannot settle in Copenhagen, they live in Sweden and commute to work in Copenhagen. The Øresund Bridge is only a 20-minute commute from the city center in Malmö to the city center in Copenhagen. See also Nicole Stokes-DuPass, *Integration, and New Limits on Citizenship Rights: Denmark and Beyond* (Palgrave Macmillan the US, 2015).

Integration policies in both Denmark and Sweden were also largely the same until the early 2000s. It became apparent that the newer non-Western immigrants were not succeeding in the Danish and Swedish labor markets. Debates ensued as to why this was occurring in welfare states that had high social assistance programs. The research found that immigrants' low employment rates, coupled with their high dependence on government subsidies, created high situations of poverty.[82] As a result, questions developed throughout Scandinavia about welfare rights and work incentives for immigrants. Three essentials ideas emerged from this time, which included: changing benefits systems for immigrants to incentivize them to work, creating training programs for immigrants, and facilitating better language acquisition programs.[83] The programs targeted both immigrants and refugees/asylees who were already in the countries and future newcomers. Denmark implemented all of the policy initiatives while Sweden implemented voluntary language and training programs.

Significant divergence in integration policies between the two countries occurred when Denmark implemented a Start Help allowance for refugees and asylees. The Start Help program was introduced in Denmark in 1999 with the new Integration Act. This program created a mandatory introduction program for all non-EU immigrants, and the program provided a government allowance specifically for immigrants at a value below

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[82] Brochmann and Hagelund, "Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society," in *Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society*, ed. Patrick Baert et al., 1st Edition, 2010, 288; Jakobsen, Korpi, and Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia," 308–9; Garner and Short, *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality)*.

[83] Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study"; Österberg et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty?"; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44; Atkinson and Søgaard, "The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark."

the social allowance benefits for Danish citizens.[84] They did not succeed, and the previous program for immigrants was restored a year later. In 2002 the Start Help benefit was re-introduced, and it again reduced the government allowance for immigrants to 35% below the subsidy given to Danish citizens—and as of 2019, the percentage has reduced further to 50% compared to what Danish citizens in need receive as a cash benefit.[85] In comparison, Sweden implemented a social benefit allowance program in 1994 specifically for refugees and asylees, however, it was the same cash benefit that Swedish citizens received. Interestingly, although immigrants in Denmark and Sweden received different allowances, the poverty level for immigrants are the same. Therefore, the difference in the allowance for immigrants versus citizens does not account for poverty levels in the countries.

The only similarity between the integration programs in Denmark and Sweden was the contents of the work training requirements, the dependence of non-Western immigrants on the low government stipend, and the language requirements for integration. A major difference was that the integration program was mandatory for all immigrants in Denmark and voluntary for immigrants in Sweden. Although Sweden still does not have integration requirements to obtain citizenship or residency, it does continue to have integration requirements that new arrivals can voluntarily undertake, which are highly suggested and linked to social allowances for refugees and asylees. The content of both integration programs in Denmark and in Sweden required 2-3 years of full-time

[84] Brochmann and Hagelund, "Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State."

[85] Peder J. Pedersen, "Immigration and Welfare State Cash Benefits: The Danish Case," *International Journal of Manpower* 34, no. 2 (2013): 113–25.

participation in language courses, cultural knowledge courses, and work-related training.[86] The difference in the programs from a government administrative perspective was that it was mandatory for the municipalities in Denmark to implement the integration programs by the central government with full funding whereas in Sweden the central government made it voluntary for the municipalities to do integration programs and provided general guidelines and very little funding from the central government.[87] The Swedish government also gave more control to the local municipalities while the Danish governments heavily regulated requirements for the program. Nonetheless, the way the programs were administered and the voluntary nature versus the required nature of the programs did not have a significant impact on immigrants because the countries' socioeconomic integration yields similar results.

Factors that contributed to long-term poverty was the length of time it took to complete the integration programs. Although the government provided stipends for immigrants, those stipends met the basic living costs of people who received them. I go into more detail about what social allowances cover in Chapter 3. To mention briefly, government allowances in both countries provide the minimum costs it takes to live in Denmark and Sweden. Furthermore, immigrant women with children were more negatively impacted by integration policies than immigrant men. This is because women and children were subjected to lower incomes longer than men. For instance, women in

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[86] See the following Jakobsen, Korpi, and Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia."

[87] See Brochmann and Hagelund 2010 and Djuve and Kavli 2007 for more information.
It is important to note that although Sweden was not pouring money into integration programs, they were funding multicultural initiatives such as language training for immigrant children, cultural centers for municipalities, etc. See

Denmark and in Sweden have a right to take parental leave for up to 50 weeks (11.5 months) in Denmark and 480 days (16 months) in Sweden per child. Since newly arrived immigrant women typically do not have an extensive work history in the host countries, they are likely to receive the governments' minimum allowance for parental leave longer placing them and their children in situations of long-term poverty. They also need to meet the integration requirements, so it will take them one or two years longer per child to achieve all integration requirements. In fact, immigrant women are the poorest demographic in Denmark and Sweden.[88] The new integration strategy implemented by both countries in 2019 is trying to tackle the disparity amongst immigrant women from the global south. This discussion highlighted that there are barriers to integration for immigrant women.

Theory and Empirical Evidence

The theoretical starting point of this analysis begins with the understanding that integration is often linked to labor market performance for immigrants, which is impacted by language ability and educational attainment. In addition, institutional structures and perceptions about diverse groups in the host society are essential barriers to labor market mobility.[89] This concept of barriers is particularly crucial in host countries that have not historically been exposed to large non-Western groups of people. The underlying assumption of institutional barriers theory is that policies, procedures, and/or situations systemically disadvantage certain groups of people over other groups of people and exist

[88] Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study"; Segerfeldt, "En arbetsmarknad för alla: Så kan integrationen förbättras."

[89] George J. Borjas, "Immigration and Welfare Magnets," *Journal of Labor Economics* 17, no. 4 (1999): 607–37; Borjas, *Labor Economics*.

when there is a situation of majority-minority group dynamics.[90] When an initial population is very similar, systems naturally emerge to meet the needs of that population; however, when there are changes in the population, and the systems do not change to meet the needs of the new demographics, the old policies can hinder the success of the new members with different needs. The central position here is that integration policies in Scandinavian countries have not met the requirements of the actual demographics of people it is intended to serve. Instead, the policies have helped to become barriers to integration, specifically with the length of education and language training programs, performance-based integration programs linked to social welfare, and housing placement programs. By examining the policies more closely, one could outline the various hindrances to socioeconomic integration.

Institutional barriers theory typically applies to theories related to path dependency and the resistance to change in public and private organizations.[91] It has also been applied to institutional barriers based on gender, sex, race/ethnicity, religion, and age. Rarely are integration issues discussed in terms of the obstacles that integration policies might present to new arrivals in Europe who immigrated from non-Western backgrounds. There are theories that explain barriers to *immigration* which are based on preventing certain groups from migrating from or entering another country based on a

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[90] Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power : The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Vintage, 1992).

[91] Liebert, "The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy"; Gerald Berk and Dennis Galvan, "How People Experience and Change Institutions: A Field Guide to Creative Syncretism," *Theory and Society* 38 (2009): 543–80; Archon Fung et al., *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance* (Verso, 2003); Feliks Gross, *Citizenship and Ethnicity: The Growth and Development of a Democratic Multiethnic Institution* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999); Jensen et al., "Analysis of Integration Policies and Public State- Endorsed Institutions at National and Regional Levels in Denmark."

government's policies, but rarely are integration policies discussed in light of barriers that they present to certain groups of people. As discussed in the previous section, the consequences of stricter integration policies in Denmark since 2002 has not created significant change in the immigrant (particularly refugee and asylee) participation in the labor force.[92] The integration policies in Sweden, which were voluntary and not restrictive, also did not positively impacted immigrants' access to the labor market and higher incomes.

Structural issues in the incentivized programs in Denmark and in Sweden could have impacted integration chances for refugees and asylees. Economic theories suggest that restricting government social allowance will help improve immigrants' access to employment. However, when Denmark implemented these policies, it had minimal impact on the socioeconomic status of non-Western immigrants. The central aim of Denmark's integration policies has consistently been to decrease non-Western immigrants' dependence on social allowance and increase their role in the workforce.[93] Denmark succeeded in this endeavor as non-Western immigrants have higher employment rates; however, the integration policies rushed to place non-Western immigrants into any job, which happened to be low-wage work such as cleaning and caregiving.[94] The integration policies inadvertently pigeon-holed non-Western immigrants into low wage jobs that provided relative lower earnings compared to the

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[92] Jakobsen, Korpi, and Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia," 311.

[93] Torben Tranæs, "Indvandring til Danmark: arbejdsmarkedets centrale rolle for indvandringspolitikken" (Denmark: Samfundsøkonomen, 2014).

[94] Johannes Kananen, "Nordic Paths from Welfare to Workfare: Danish, Swedish and Finnish Labour Market Reforms in Comparison," *Local Economy* 27, no. 5–6 (August 1, 2012): 558–76; Pedersen, "Immigration and Welfare State Cash Benefits."

native population. In some cases, the low-wage salary was the same as the social welfare allowance from the government; therefore, there was no real incentive to work, and working did not necessarily reduce poverty levels.[95] The requirements of the integration programs were also hindrances to the non-Western immigrants in Sweden.

Since 1968, Sweden implemented policies that gave immigrants access to the welfare state on the same basis as the native population. The idea was that allowing new arrivals access to the Swedish system would promote egalitarianism, which is a core principle of Swedish neutrality and social welfare model.[96] By 1975 the Sweden Parliament unanimously approved the Government Bill 1975/76:26 that promoted equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. Sweden supported rights-based citizenship based on belonging to a national community, not a racial/ethnic or religious group.[97] The integration requirement in Sweden supported full membership in Sweden and also created the expectation that immigrants would be self-sufficient. Social welfare programs for immigrants were explicitly linked to the goal of full employment and economic growth.[98] Government allowances were linked to integration measures and participation in the workforce.[99] Sweden maintained multicultural policies that supported immigrants maintaining their cultures and language with funding from the government.

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[95] Jakobsen, Korpi, and Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia," 311.

[96] Karin Borevi, "Multiculturalism and Welfare State Integration: Swedish Model Path Dependency," *Identities* 21, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 710.

[97] Karin Borevi, "The Political Dynamics of Multiculturalism in Sweden," in *Challenging Multiculturalism*, ed. Raymond Taras, European Models of Diversity (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 138–60.

[98] Diane Sainsbury, *the Welfare States, and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (OUP Oxford, 2012).

[99] Christer Lundh and Rolf Ohlsson, "Immigration and Economic Change," in *Population, Economy, and Welfare in Sweden*, ed. Tommy Bengtsson (Springer-Verlag, 1994).

Immigrant introduction programs were introduced in Sweden in 1994, and they offered language and educational programs. If new arrivals did not participate in the programs, their government allowance could be reduced or withdrawn. In 2010, the integration policy became mandatory in order to receive government assistance with the introduction of the Government Bill 2009/10:60 that transferred the responsibility to the central government to enforce the law, not simply the municipalities.[100] The integration program was required if immigrants received government assistance; otherwise, the actual program was not mandatory. The program primarily referenced refugees and asylees who typically came to Sweden with minimal means and needed government assistance. Therefore, in effect, the plan was mandatory for refugees and asylees who moved to the country with no financial means to support themselves. In the same way that the labor policy negatively impacted the Danish population, it had a negative impact on the Swedish population because non-Western immigrants once again were shuttled into low-wage jobs such as cleaner, gas station attendants, and caretakers.

Although many countries in Europe were moving towards integration that promoted civic integration (often called assimilation),[101] Sweden's model was different because it did not require participation in an integration program as a prerequisite to citizenship or residency. The requirement for residency and citizenship in Sweden has been stipulated at 5 years since 1975, and in 1991 Sweden liberalized its policies to allow for dual citizenship, and citizenship is transferred by birth to a Swedish citizen (jus

[100] Brochmann and Hagelund, "Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society."
[101] Joppke, "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe."

sanguinis).[102] The integration in Sweden, in terms of the set requirements for access to citizenship, continues to be the complete opposite of Denmark that demands integration requirements linked to residency and citizenship rights as demonstrated in Table 2. Their citizenship and residency requirements did not hinder socioeconomic integration like their actual integration policies.

TABLE 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCY AND CITIZENSHIP 1995-2019

	Denmark	Sweden
	1995	
Language Requirement	Informal	No
Citizenship Test	No	No
Restrict Rights to Social Benefits	No	No
Family Reunification	Liberal	Liberal
Dual Citizenship	No	No
Years of Residence	6 or 7 years	4 or 5 years
	2005	
Language Requirement	B1	No
Citizenship Test	Yes	No
Restrict Rights to Social Benefits	Yes	No
Family Reunification	Restricted	Liberal
Dual Citizenship	No	Yes
Years of Residence	8 or 9 years	4 or 5 years
	2019	
Language Requirement	B2	No
Citizenship Test	Yes	No
Restrict Rights to Social Benefits	Yes	No
Family Reunification	Restricted	Liberal
Dual Citizenship	Yes	Yes
Years of Residence	8 or 9 years	4 or 5 years

*Information is taken from Danish and Sweden government citizenship websites

[102] Generally speaking, children born to foreign parents in Sweden do not get automatic citizenship although they can apply for citizenship after turning 18.

One of the significant ways that non-Western immigrants were limited in Sweden was through their housing resettlement policy for refugees. Humanitarian, residential placement programs for refugees and asylees systemically placed immigrants in low-income areas with larger communities of low-wage earners and people on government allowances. More than half of a million people in Sweden live in low-income areas around the country, and the majority of them are immigrants and their descendants.[103] Similar parallel societies exist in Denmark—as more than 50 percent of people living in low-income areas are non-Western immigrants and their descendants, and at least 40 percent living there are unemployed.[104] The integration programs placed refugees and asylees into neighborhoods that had been traditional hubs for low-income earners (even Danish and Swedish citizens) and places that had a high proportion of non-Western immigrants since the 1980s.[105] The residential restrictions have been linked to major structural, systemic issues as non-Western immigrants largely lost opportunities to develop interethnic social contacts with the native populations,[106] and, they had lower standards in elementary and high school educational achievements.[107] As a result of lower education attainment, refugees and asylees had less access to higher education, which impacted jobs that they could get in the future. This is not to say that immigrants did not choose to live in neighborhoods that reflected their diverse culture and religious

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[103] Aldén and Hammarstedt, *Integration of Immigrants on the Swedish Labour Market*.

[104] Ellen Barry and Martin Selsoe Sorensen, "In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant 'Ghettos,'" *The New York Times*, October 8, 2018, sec. World; Eakin, "Liberal, Harsh Denmark."

[105] Bo Malmberg et al., "Residential Segregation of European and Non-European Migrants in Sweden: 1990–2012," *European Journal of Population* 34, no. 2 (2018): 169–93.

[106] Moshe Semyonov and Anya Glikman, "Ethnic Residential Segregation, Social Contacts, and Anti-Minority Attitudes in European Societies," *European Sociological Review* 25, no. 6 (December 1, 2009): 693–708.

[107]

values, as is often the case with immigrant groups, nor that ethnic communities are not integrated. However, the role of the government in settling groups in similar areas also influenced spatial segregation, and education and income levels tend to be lower in these areas, which influenced integration.

The Danish and Swedish integration policies were similar in that they provided economic incentives to new arrivals to participate. The similarity suggests that the connecting factor hindering integration is the integration programs themselves and the economic incentives presented by the governments. The biggest systemic issue with the programs is that they disproportionately placed immigrants in low-income housing and therefore, poor-performing schools. The Danish and Swedish labor markets are not good at absorbing large numbers of low-wage low skilled workers because jobs of that nature simply do not exist in large quantities in the countries. There are few jobs for people who do not at least have a high school diploma, and the mid-income jobs are typically guarded by unions. This creates a problematic situation for non-Western immigrants who are not highly qualified to get into the job market. Some people blame racism/discrimination, and others say that it is the lack of cultural integration. Both of these factors might be at play to some extent, but the systemic structures in government and societies are often difficult to fix. One cannot simply dismiss the economic systems and structures that have been instrumental in dismantling poverty for the majority of people dwelling in those countries. The point of this dissertation is to highlight how boundaries have been at play in both countries' integration policies.

The Role of Race/Ethnicity in Scandinavian Societies

The previous survey of the different approaches to the study of integration highlights how current literature remains deafeningly silent about the role race/ethnicity plays in integrations policies. Most Scandinavians link racism to the US because of its history of slavery and Jim Crow laws and to South Africa because of a history of apartheid that separated people on the grounds of race. In fact, the issue of racism and discrimination seems to have disappeared from the history of most Europeans countries (with the exception of countries such as France and the United Kingdom). The only collective memory of racism in Europe is linked to nationalism in the early 20the century associated with Nazi-Germany when many Jews, Poles, and other minority groups were brutally murdered and displaced because of their ethnic and/or religious backgrounds.[108] Beyond this issue of nationalism, there seems to be cultural and historical amnesia across Europe, and particularly Scandinavia, associated with their role in the racial hierarchy and the slave trade.

Most countries in Europe participated in the trade of human beings from Africa, South Asia, and South East Asia for labor, goods, and capital. Denmark and Sweden also joined in the slave trade. Denmark owned the U.S. Virgin Island that was called the Danish West Indies until 1917. Denmark agreed to end the trading of enslaved people in 1792, but slavery did not end in the Danish West Indies until a major slave revolt happened in 1848 and Denmark agreed to end slavery over a 12-year timespan. In 1917,

[108] Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization"; Neda Atanasoski, "'Race' Toward Freedom: Post-Cold War US Multiculturalism and the Reconstruction of Eastern Europe," *The Journal of American Culture* 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 213–26.

the US bought the Danish West Indies from Denmark and renamed it the US Virgin Island. The Danish Empire had colonies, forts, and trading posts throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean which generally ended in 1917, but still exists in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.[109] Sweden also had colonies in West Africa (Ghana, Butri, etc.), in the US (Delaware), and the Caribbean (Tobago and Saint-Barthélemy). The Swedish colonial system ended in 1878. Denmark and Sweden have similar histories of colonialization and slave trade to many other European countries; however, their role in the slave trade was not as expansive as other countries such as the UK, Spain, France, and Portugal. Therefore, the historical impact of slavery and racial hierarchical systems is often not recognized or understood by Scandinavians because the effects of colonialism and racism took place in the colonies themselves and not in Scandinavia.[110]

Today, with the development of technology and the establishment of human rights laws, people from the global south have moved to Europe for economic reasons and for humanitarian reasons. The massive migration of people from the global south to Scandinavia has become a central issue because, for the first time in history, Scandinavians have large numbers of visibly different and non-Judeo-Christians in their territories. This is not to say that Germans, English, Estonians, Russians, Italian, French,

[109] Claus Füllberg-Stolberg, "Economic Adjustments and the Fight for Cultural Hegemony in the British and Danish West Indies after Slavery," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 31, no. 2 (2008): 145–68; Ernst Ekman, "Sweden, the Slave Trade and Slavery, 1784-1847," *Outre-Mers. Revue d'histoire* 62, no. 226 (1975): 221–31.

[110] I must recognize those colonial scholars in Greenland and in the Faroe Islands would argue that there have always been hierarchical systems in place in relation to people from these territories. They would also say that Denmark continues to occupy Greenland and the Faroe Islands as the last colony of the Danish Empire. For more information, see Colonialism in Greenland: Tradition, Governance, and Legacy by Søren Rud. Also, Finland has an expensive history of hierarchal systems in place in relation to Sweden. See Nordic Whiteness by Catrin Lundström and Benjamin R. Teitelbaum 2017.

and Jews have not historically lived in Denmark and Sweden, but that Africans, Asians, and people from the Middle East have now moved to the region at higher numbers than ever before. As a result of these demographic shifts, Scandinavia has become more ethnically and religiously diverse, and questions of race and certain privileges ascribed to being European and Nordic arguably has begun to manifest.[111] Institutions such as healthcare and education that once were thought to promote equality are now showing signs of discrimination at least for new arrivals who are not of European or Western descent.[112] Denmark and Sweden historically eradiated their countries of inequalities related to socioeconomic class and rights for women, but race scholars from the region argued that the states now need to recognize their racialized past so that new arrivals from the global south have a better chance at integration.[113]

It has been only in the past 50 years that Scandinavians have dealt with large-scale immigration from the global south; however, ideas about racial hierarchy was very prevalent in the region during the early twentieth century. Many of the ideas associated with racial hierarchy came from Scandinavia and specifically Sweden when it developed the first institute in the world that studied racial biology in 1922 under the leadership of Herman Lundborg.[114] The National Institute for Race Biology gathered statistics and

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[111] Michael McEachrane, "Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden," *Human Rights Review* 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 471–93; Ylva Habel, "Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism? Teaching While Black," in *Education in the Black Diaspora: Perspectives, Challenges, and Prospects (Routledge Research in Education)*, ed. Kassie Freeman and Ethan Johnson (New York, NY: Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2012).

[112] Hannah Bradby et al., "Undoing the Unspeakable: Researching Racism in Swedish Healthcare Using a Participatory Process to Build Dialogue," *Health Research Policy and Systems* 17, no. 1 (April 23, 2019): 43.

[113] Danbolt and Myong, "Racial Turns and Returns"; Bradby et al., "Undoing the Unspeakable: Researching Racism in Swedish Healthcare Using a Participatory Process to Build Dialogue."

[114] McEachrane, "Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden."

photographs to categorize the racial-make-up of human beings and developed racial categories of people. Lundborg, however, was ousted from his position in 1926 because of his vision of Nordic white supremacy and his anti-semantic views.[115] In the following years, the institute moved away from racial profiling and towards genetics. Eventually, the institute was integrated into Uppsala University where more than 63,000 people were forcibly sterilized. The majority of people sterilized were from the Sami indigenous group, Swedish Roma, and people with mental and physical disabilities. The institute no longer exists, but many Scandinavian scholars argued that the impact remains.

A cornerstone to Nazism was the belief in the superiority of the Nordic race.[116] In 1937 Joesten highlighted that the Nazi conception of racial superiority was built upon the connection Nazi-Germans made to the Vikings from the Nordic region. Joesten's article in *Foreign Affairs* said that the Nordic man was believed to "incarnate everything that was beautiful, strong, noble, and pure. He was of handsome stature and shape, with a straight nose and a square chin, dreamy yet steely blue eyes, blond hair, and a mailed fist." Although Scandinavia countries generally did not have hierarchal systems based on race and ethnicity in the countries with their strong social welfare models, the notion of racial superiority still existed in the general understanding of themselves in relation to other groups.[117] Scholars have argued that racial superiority; however, has been replaced with the view that Europeans have cultural advantage over other groups.

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[115] Tobias Hübinette and Lennart E. H. Räterlinck, "Race Performativity and Melancholic Whiteness in Contemporary Sweden," *Social Identities* 20, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 501–14.

[116] Joachim Joesten, "The Nazis in Scandinavia," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 1937.

[117] Habel, "Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism?"; McEachrane, "Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden"; Mathias Danbolt, "Retro Racism: Colonial Ignorance and Racialized Affective Consumption in Danish Public Culture," *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 7, no. 2 (June 27, 2017): 105–13.

Most recently, scholars have examined racism in light of immigration policy-making and gave particular attention to the ways that asylum-seekers have become the racialized group in Europe in the construction of national identity narratives.[118] Integration issues have been linked to the native population's general negative attitudes towards outsiders who come from the global south, and these negative attitudes towards immigrants have increased with the number of terrorist attacks in Europe. [119] Since the early 2000s combating terrorism has dominated collective EU foreign policy as it concerns immigration.[120] A big concern is that by providing sanctuary to Muslim immigrants, there is a potential to blindly support militants or people who might later become homegrown terrorists.[121] Intertwined with these issues have emerged notions of cultural superiority, and that by way of liberalism everything Western is interpreted as superior to other cultures and systems.[122] For instance, a university degree earned in Australia is perceived to be more valuable than a degree earned in Syria.

It will take an immigrant from the global south more time, especially if they come from a poor background in their home country, to become integrated into Western countries compared to immigrants from western countries. Denmark and Sweden, and most Western countries have fast-tracked immigration and integration policies for people who meet income, education, and labor market demands. These individuals tend to be

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[118] Garner, "The European Union and the Racialization of Immigration, 1985-2006."

[119] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "This is a White Country: The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the World-System," *Sociological Inquiry* 70, no. 2 (2000): 188–214; Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

[120] Bleich, "Muslims and the State in the Post-9/11 West: Introduction."

[121] Sarah K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Cornell University Press, 2005).

[122] McEachrane, "Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden."

middle or high-income earners from the global north. Western immigrants are, therefore rewarded with easier integration policies while non-Western poor immigrants are not. See the integration requirements in Table 1 above. Immigrants in Denmark can apply for residency after 4 years if they meet certain income and education requirements while refugees and asylees can apply for permanent residency after 8 years. The policies in Sweden are more relaxed, but wealthier immigrants can apply for permanent residency after 4 years, and they do not have to meet integration requirements because they are not reliant on government subsidies. This points to issues surrounding superiority complexes if not based on race/ethnicity then on wealth and connectedness to western cultures.[123]

In this brief discussion on race/ethnicity in Scandinavia, I wanted to establish that discrimination based on ethnic and/or religious backgrounds might be a barrier to integration. This does not negate the fact that humanitarianism has been the backbone of Scandinavian countries as they have provided generous aid to numerous countries around the world and have had extreme success in their social welfare programs. However, racism and discrimination should be considered when looking at the disproportionate number of non-Western immigrants living in relative poverty in Denmark and in Sweden. Chapter 4 goes into a deeper discussion of discrimination from the perspective of immigrants and the host societies to outline how the perspectives vary significantly depending on the different groups.

[123] Max Weber and R. H. Tawney, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2003).

RESEARCH STRATEGY, DESIGN, AND PROCEDURES

This section presents the design and specific procedures used to conduct the study. Political Science is a field that uses a variety of methods to explore questions about the world around us.[124] To find a fuller and more detailed picture of this project, I employed both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. As a person who enjoys statistical analyses of large datasets, I also understand that large-N studies cannot generally provide the nuanced view that analyzing specific case studies can provide. With this project, I wanted to dig deeper and find the underlying structures, mechanisms, and processes of integration policies in Denmark and in Sweden. Therefore, I employed three different research methods deriving from political science, sociology, and anthropology. Often in research, the process of discovery is just as valuable as the research project in itself. A key aspect of this project are the diverse methods I used in the project. I used historical analysis, participant observation, and a survey questionnaire.

The first stage relied on primary and secondary sources to support the preliminary background aspect of my emersion process and the second stage involved implementing my research plan and collecting data. I interviewed people with immigrant backgrounds, spent significant time in immigrant majority communities, and spoke to representatives at integration agencies and nonprofits to help structure my research questions and strategies. I participated in two summer schools that focused on integration after the refugee crisis in Europe; one was the Oslo Summer School in Comparative Social Science Studies at the

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[124] Evan S. Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 435–52; King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*; Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

University of Oslo in 2016, and the other was a Faculty Seminar in Berlin, Germany called "Germany, Europe, and the Refugee Crisis." I learned extensively about the Refugee Crisis in 2015/2016. I further cultivated my knowledge of the region by analyzing the historical evolution of the integration and immigration policies in Denmark and Sweden and the politics that surrounded state-building and national identity in relation to immigrants.

The second stage of this research process occurred when I spent an intensive year from 12-months in Denmark and in Sweden doing fieldwork on immigrant integration. I gathered information using interviews, survey questionnaires, and I embedded myself in the immigrant community. I spent the first rigorous six months (August - January) in Denmark and the last intensive six months (January-July) in Sweden. The data were collected with funding from the United States Fulbright-Schuman Program and the Diversity Excellence Scholarship from the University of Oregon. Data collection involved participant observation in the most significant immigrant neighborhoods in Copenhagen (Mjølnerparken) and in Stockholm (Rinkeby-Tensta). I used a variety of research techniques to gather data to discuss complex issues related to integration. This study is an exploratory story that uncovers trends in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of integration policies.

Fieldwork: Population, Participants, and Procedure

The concept of integration, as discussed in this dissertation, is the ability for immigrants to establish themselves economically and socially in a host country to the same degree as the host country's native population. The concept of integration policy is different in Denmark and in Sweden. The Danish government sees integration as a set of

policies that helps immigrants adapt to Danish culture and values so that they can be the same as Danes or at the minimum accept Danish way of life as the most important in their transitional process. Accepting Danish culture means that displays of religion, culture, or traditional dress are secondary to showing allegiance to the collective identity of being Danish. The Swedish government interprets integration as a set of rights that provide equal opportunities for immigrants to establish themselves in Sweden at the same level as the native population. It is based on giving immigrants support in the form of rights associated with language training, education obtainment, and job placement to help them be successful in the country. It is a rights-based system in Sweden while in Denmark, it is a system to facilitate sameness. To get at the heart of perceptions related to integration practice and policies in Sweden and Denmark, I collected survey data and interviewed the general population.

The interviews were done with people on various dates and times between September 2017 and July 2018. The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes. The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face in people's homes or in their workplace with the exception of one phone interview and one Skype interview. Most of the interviews were audio-recorded. The interviews had semi-structured questions at the beginning of the interview and ended with a set of open-ended questions about integration practices. Open-ended questions were used to give the participants the ability to respond freely to specific themes related to their thoughts about integration and immigration policies. Policymakers were not included in the interviews as the purpose of this project was to get perspectives from people impacted by integration and immigration policies. Questions for the participants specifically focused on their experiences with

integration as a concept in their everyday lives in their communities. The only so-called elites interviewed in this study were community leaders, non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders, and people such as immigration attorneys, social workers, and language instructors who all worked directly with immigrants. They were asked their perspectives on the success of integration policies. The interview questions are in Appendix A. All of the respondents were living in Denmark or Sweden.

The survey tool I created was based on observations, interactions, and interviews I had with various people in Denmark and Sweden. I wanted to get a broader look at perceived integration, so I used a survey questionnaire to gather a large amount of information quickly. The complete survey questionnaire is in Appendix B. The survey had 45 questions and took respondents 15 minutes to complete. The questions were available in English, Danish, and Swedish. Survey data were collected using Qualtrics Research Survey Software online. The survey respondents were first recruited using the snowball method, however, when I realized that the survey data collection process was going slowly, I purchased a sample of 500 respondents (250 in Denmark and 250 from Sweden) through Qualtrics from Survey Sampling International LLC (SSI).[125] This gave me access to a panel of individuals in Denmark and in Sweden would be willing to complete the survey, with an incentive of award points towards their miles. Qualtrics sent my survey to the general population in both countries. The survey data collection process went from November 1, 2017, through December 20, 2017, and included 1039

[125] I used the snowball method to recruit 33 people to participate in the survey questionnaire, once I realized that I was running out of time for the project, I followed the suggestion of a quantitatively focused political scientists at my host institutions and purchased a survey sample panel from Qualtrics Survey Sampling International LLC (SSI), which is often used in social science research to study the general views of a population.

participants, about 500 from each country and half of which were collected using the snowball method. The respondents used their personal computers or mobile devices (laptops, cellphones, etc.) to complete the online questionnaire.

My personal experience in both Denmark and Sweden informed this project in many ways. I found myself welcomed in both countries by the immigrant populations to the extent that I felt like I truly belonged. I also felt embraced by Danes and Swedes who wanted to share their perspectives with me about immigrant integration. Chapter 5 reflects my personal experiences. Most of which comes through in the references to specific interviews I did with various people. My research was informed by the participates and observations I made—including the survey tool I created. This project also reflects the experiences that I had and the experiences I saw displayed in front of me.

Conclusion

This chapter featured the theoretical framework from which the dissertation is based. Like everywhere in the world, immigration in Scandinavia has become an important topic in recent years. Denmark and Sweden share important factors in how they respond to immigration in relation to the rest of the world. They both are small welfare states that have strong universal welfare programs and strong open economies embedded into their notions of statehood. They have similar histories of immigration and egalitarianism yet, despite this, they have taken on different integration policies. Denmark has introduced assimilationist policies while Sweden continues to have multiculturalist policies. Their different approaches have grasped the attention of scholars, politicians, and the media in the past decade.

As mentioned previously, the divergence in policies began in 2002 when Denmark made incremental changes in their policies that tightened asylum and marriage laws, and they introduced comprehensive integration policies. From the 1990s through today, Sweden's policies have largely remained the same. Only after the 2015/16 Refugee Crisis has Sweden introduced more restrictive asylum policies as concern grew over too many refugees and asylees in the country. Integration policies in both Denmark and Sweden have proven to be ineffective because immigrants in both countries, particularly non-Western immigrants, are the poorest relative to the host population and they are the largest unemployed group in both countries. Integration has come to mean the ability of an individual to earn an income, which is associated with lower poverty levels, education attainment, and language ability.

Since immigrants are the poorest in both countries, the general belief is that they are not integrated at least socially and economically. This suggests that assimilation and multicultural integration policies might not be an essential factor in immigrant integration. The literature review examined current debates about integration policies: multiculturalism versus assimilationism, the shift to integration tests, and the role race play in perceptions about immigrant integration processes. A central position here is that race/ethnicity should also be included in the discussion of integration because the people who are primarily impacted by the policies and who are the poorest in the countries are not western Europeans and/or Christians—the majority come from the global south.

Finally, I recognize that the research findings in this project are interpreted based on opinions of immigrants, those who work with immigrants on integration, ethnic Danes and Swedes who completed the surveys, and my personal experiences in the countries. I

understand that the way people interact with policies is complicated and I do not claim that this study answers all questions about integration; however, this study does contribute immigrant integration literature by opening the black box of the state apparatus to look at how human beings are impacted by foreign and domestic policies. The next chapters in the dissertation will further discuss the research findings in this study.

CHAPTER III. HISTORY, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND IMMIGRANTS

INTRODUCTION

Denmark and Sweden share a history, they have a similar language and culture, but they both took distinctive paths towards their immigrant and integration policies. The history of Scandinavia tells the story of two dominant kingdoms, Denmark and Sweden, that united against the powerful Germanic groups spread across their territories. The union was facilitated by a woman, Queen Margarethe of Denmark, in 1387 and lasted for 130 years. This was the first time in Scandinavia's history that the Viking clans and the royal families were not fighting for power. Under the Kalmar Union (1387-1523) Scandinavia had individual kingdoms, e.g., Danes, Swedes (Finns were part of Sweden), and Norwegians but they were all subject to the Danish Royal crown. Denmark became the most powerful kingdom in Northern Europe for almost one hundred and fifty years. Denmark lost its hegemon status to Sweden, which directed Denmark into a downward spiral of loss that eventually led the country to be occupied by Germany during the Second World War. The long history of loss and defeat caused Denmark to have a closed society towards foreigners and immigrants as a protection mechanism.

Sweden rose to power as Denmark’s power dwindled over the centuries. Sweden's status as the most powerful country in Northern Europe was solidified with its military success against the Holy Roman Empire that led to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Sweden gained control of the Baltic Sea and additional territories in the Baltic region. Sweden remained the hegemon of the north until Russia began to make military gains in the 18th century. Ultimately, Russia annexed Finland from Sweden after a military defeat

in 1809. The military, aristocrats, and government in Sweden blamed the royal family for the loss and exiled them from the kingdom. They replaced the dynasty with Jean Baptiste Bernadotte the Marshal of Napoleon's army. Jean Baptiste was renamed King Karl Johan, and his dynasty remains the ruling dynasty in Sweden today. King Johan led the way for Swedish neutrality as he had to manage international diplomatic relationships with the powerful nations at the time such as Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

As a result of the histories of Denmark and Sweden, this chapter presents that the countries developed a specific response to immigration based on their early modern history. Denmark has chosen an assimilationist approach to integration that required new arrivals to leave their cultural and linguistic backgrounds at the border to foster immersion into the state's apparatus. Denmark's model reflects the country's desire to maintain its very existence because of the massive territory and influence it lost over the centuries. Sweden, however, supports multicultural integration by allowing new arrivals to maintain their own linguistic and cultural backgrounds and Sweden's requirements to establish residency and citizenship is the shortest amount of time in Western Europe. Sweden's multicultural policies reflect the neutrality that King Karl Johan implemented in 1810 as he was juggling his new role as king and his relationships with the dominant powers at the time.

This is chapter highlights that the change in Danish and Swedish national identities shaped both countries' immigration and integration policies. This is similar to research by Katzenstein and Gellner, who looked at historical patterns to explain national

identity in small democratic societies today.[126] They argued that small homogenous nation-states were successful in their economic policies and with building institutions because there were not ethnic cleavages to halt policy initiatives from contending ethnic and religious minorities. Within societies like Denmark and Sweden, socialism and capitalism could flourish together because the citizens al had the same ideas about governing themselves. History shows that this was very important in Denmark and Sweden—it also points to how integration policies got implemented in each country and developed into strong national principles.

The findings in this analysis present that Denmark and Sweden's historical response to changing demographics was different. Denmark's national identity was associated with the history of loss; the need for Danes to protect their culture, language, and religion; and the notion that sameness means equality and therefore difference threatens the egalitarian society. Sweden's integration policies are hindered by their "color-blind" multicultural policies that does not recognize racial tensions that existed in the society; the perspective that the state is the benevolent leader, and the overextension of the state.

Denmark: What was Lost Outward Will Be Found Within

Denmark is a small country with 5.78 million inhabitants and a landmass of 16,573 square miles, which is a little bigger than the size of the state of Maryland in the United States. Denmark ranks number 133 on the list of countries by landmass and is

[126] Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*; Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly, *Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition (New Perspectives on the Past)*, 2 edition (Cornell University Press, 2009).

considered one of the wealthiest countries in Europe with a generous welfare system. Non-Western immigrants and their descendants are just 15% of the total population. The general population in Denmark tend to trust the government and the political process, and most people believe that politicians and the Royal Family are looking out for the common good of the people. The National Lutheran Church (Folkekirken) is a symbol of Danish culture as Denmark was one of the first countries to fully establish Lutheranism as the official religion of the country in 1849.[127] The government, the Church, and the Royal Family emerged as crucial players in the establishment of the country in medieval history.[128] Anything that threatens these institutions, such as massive immigration from non-Western European societies are often perceived to be threats to Danish national identity and very existence.

As Sir James Mellon, the British Ambassador to Denmark in the 1980s noted, in his account of Denmark, "The Danes are not a nation…they are a tribe, this is the strength of their fellowship and the reason that they have an unshakeable trust in each other."[129] Ambassador Mellon found that the Danes had a significant concern for the weak in their group, a consensus for uniformity, avoidance of conflict, and a belief that the political process could yield results through open discussion and compromise rather than face-to-face conflict. He argued that these traits make Danes different from other Europeans and that the Danes operate within a "gated-community" structure with a high

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[127] Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Denmark 1513-1660: The Rise and Decline of a Renaissance Monarchy* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[128] Carsten Bach-Nielsen, "The Role of the Lutheran Church in Denmark," *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 25, no. 2 (2012): 293–310.

[129] Knud Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*, First Edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 4.

level of social trust similar to that of tribal groups in Ghana.[130] The average Dane is comfortable supporting poor Danes with their tax dollars, however, when the Danes do not identify with a social group, they are not as willing to pay high taxes to support the "outsider" who is perceived to be taking advantage of Danish social welfare.[131]

Danish Early Modern History: A United Scandinavia 1397-1523

The attempts of Denmark to preserve their cultural, ethnic, and linguistic background started with its ascension into becoming the hegemon of the Nordic region in 1397. Nordic countries stood at a crossroads of modernization in the 14th century. Would the region become German by the powerful German Hanseatic trading towns sprinkled throughout the region? Would it get taken over by the budding Russians to the East, Great Britain to the West, or the mighty Holy Roman Empire to the South, or would it be destroyed by the internal fighting between the clans? The answer came from Queen Margareta of Denmark who gained control over Scandinavia with her strategic power plays.

Queen Margareta came to power due to the misfortune of the men in her family. Her brother Christopher Duke of Lolland's, heir to the Danish throne, died from wounds he suffered at battle in 1363. King Valdemar IV of Denmark, Queen Margareta's father, lived another 12 years after his son died, but when the king eventually passed away, he left behind no heir. Queen Margareta and her husband King Haakon VI of Norway

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[130] Jespersen, 6.

[131] E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen, *Mistrusting Refugees* (University of California Press, 1995); Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality and Social Trust," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, July 1, 2005).

convinced that nobility to let their son be king so that they could unify Denmark and Norway against German Hanseatic forces in the region. The nobles named five-year-old Olaf heir to the Danish throne in 1375. Queen Margareta's husband King Haakon of Norway unexpectedly died in 1380 before his son reached maturity, which effectively made young Olaf king of both Denmark and Norway at the age of ten. Queen Margareta became regent of both countries until he turned 15. Unfortunately, young King Olaf II died unexpectedly at the age of 17 in 1387 and Margareta was made the Regent of Denmark and Norway, which solidified her power. She agreed to help the Swedish nobility in 1389 rid themselves of their King Albert of Mecklenburg, who was unpopular. Queen Margaret successfully ousted him, and she became the "Mistress and true Lord" of all of Scandinavia.[132] Queen Margareta merged Denmark, Sweden, and Norway together in 1397 under the Kalmar Union for 130 years.

Despite Sweden and Norway being subjected to the Danish Crown, each kingdom had autonomous power to rule themselves. The Kalmar Union was effective because it protected Scandinavia from the influential Hanseatic German cities and the Holy Roman Empire to the South.[133] It also helped establish stability among the Scandinavian clans, among families, and between the aristocrats and the crown. Nonetheless, the Kalmar Union tended to benefit Denmark over the other kingdoms because Denmark controlled all trading routes along the Baltic Sea. This put Denmark at odds with Sweden who also

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[132] Scandinavia today is considered just Denmark, Sweden, and Norway while Nordic countries include Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Greenland, Faroe Islands, Åland Islands. Historically, these other territories belonged to Denmark, Sweden, or Norway so I include them as part of "Scandinavia" because Queen Margaret would have been mistress and lord of those territories as well during her reign.
[133] Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*, 24.

had an interest in dominating the Baltic trade route. Tensions between Denmark and Sweden led to about 90 years of civil wars and rebellion over who would control the Baltic trade route. Sweden left the Union on several occasions only to rejoin again after promises from Denmark for more autonomy. Despite the Union's success at unifying Scandinavia against Germanic influence, the Kalmar Union ended in 1523 when Sweden ultimately left. Sweden dissolved the Union after King Christian II of Denmark brutally beheaded 82 of the Swedish noblemen in 1520 in order to prevent Sweden from rebellion. In 1521, Magnate Gustav Vasa of Sweden led a rebellion that caused the nobility in Denmark to dethrone King Christian II, and two years later, Sweden exited all agreements with Denmark and established its autonomy as a separate kingdom, and Gustav Vasa was crowned King of Sweden. Norway remained united with Denmark, but the end of the Kalmar Union marked the period when Denmark began to lose its hegemonic status in the North.

Sweden's separation from Denmark led to about 200 years of fighting between the kingdoms. The wars were marked by three different phases. The first phase included the Nordic Seven Years War (1563-70) and the Kalmar War (1611-13), which were initiated by Denmark to force Sweden to reunite with them and reestablish the Kalmar Union. The two wars were unsuccessful, and Sweden remained independent from Denmark. The second phase started under Christian IV of Denmark, who reigned between (1588-1648). The countries entered into the Thirty Years War. During the war, Denmark lost some of their Norwegian territories: Jemtland, Herjedalen and Idre and Serna, and the Danish Baltic Sea islands of Gotland and Ösel to Sweden. It was obvious

by the end of the Thirty Years War that Sweden had become the strongest military power of the North and that Denmark was in threat of its very existence. [134]

The third phase of fighting were wars in which Sweden took control of the Northern part of the Øresund ("The Sound" in English), and the territory north of it called Scania in 1658. The Øresund is a strait (narrow passage of water) that served as the principal passage for trade between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea that goes to the Atlantic Ocean. Scania is territory directly north of the Øresund that encompassed 200,000 ethnic Danes, which was a fourth of the Danish population in 1658.[135] The loss of this area was a significant blow to Denmark, which inevitably led to new wars between Denmark and Sweden called the Scania War from 1675-1679 and the Great Northern War 1709-1720. Denmark never recovered the region. The people in Scania were brutally incorporated politically and culturally into Sweden to mitigate Danish influence in Sweden.[136] Today, the Scanians view themselves as Swedish but maintain a culture that borrows from Danish and Swedish traditions.

After Denmark lost Scania in 1658 King Frederick III's of Denmark took control over all legislation, executive, and judicial powers; eventually, the King controlled the state finances, and he was the chief decision-maker for wars.[137] The idea was that a strong King could protect the country from being attacked. New systems of weights and

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[134] Gary Dean Peterson, *Warrior Kings of Sweden: The Rise of an Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (McFarland, 2014).

[135] Kjell O. Lejon, "The Role of the Church in Making a Neighboring Enemy a Loyal Citizen—An Example of Pseudo-Indigenization of Fellow Lutherans," *Journal of History Research* 6, no. 2 (June 20, 2016).

[136] Kjell O. Lejon.

[137] Lockhart, *Denmark, 1513-1660*, 247.

measurements were created and, the most substantial accomplishment was registering all agricultural land in the small territory, which was intended to allow the King's government to administer a unified and cohesive method to better tax landowners and to provide soldiers for the wars who were often tied to specific lands.[138] King Frederick III replaced the Danish aristocracy with mostly German well-educated professionals who were loyal to him and who had the capacity to maintain the expanding government.[139] The Danish nobles, who had been in charge of government administration previously, lost their positions and by the beginning of the 19th century, less than 10 percent of the bureaucrats had a noble background.[140] The professional bureaucrats' role was to collect taxes, administer the national army, and deal with implementing the nation's foreign policy. The King required civil servants to have unconditional loyalty to him and the state which was part of the Danish state-building process to solidify the king's power as the hereditary sovereign.

Denmark was unbeaten in establishing a precedent for a centralized government and a strong bureaucrat sector even though the king had absolute power. The King, as a result, gradually minimized corruption in government.[141] Today, Denmark's government and civil service workers are said to be the least corrupt in the world—Danes generally

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[138] Mette Frisk Jensen, "The Question of How Denmark Got to Be Denmark – Establishing Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption in the State of Denmark 1660 – 1900," Working Paper Series: The Quality of Government Institute, 6 (June 6, 2014): 1–26.

[139] Eva Ersbøll, "Report on Citizenship Law: Denmark," Report on Citizenship Law (Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies EUDO Citizenship Observatory, July 2015), 3.

[140] Frank Jørgensen and Morten Westrup, *Danish Central Administration until 1848* (Viborg, Denmark: Dansk Historisk Fællesforening, 1982), 25–30.

[141] Frisk Jensen, "The Question of How Denmark Got to Be Denmark – Establishing Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption in the State of Denmark 1660 – 1900," 8.

have a high trust of the government, their politicians, and civil servants.[142] With the King stabilizing the authority of the monarch in the early 17th century, he created an unwavering loyalty from bureaucrats and the peasants. The peasants and the merchants especially favored the monarchy because taxes were also collected from the aristocrats, which had not been the case previously. The monarchy over the years also created a wealthy bureaucratic middle class comprised mostly of ethnic Germans, because the King trusted them over the Danish nobility.[143] Tensions between the crown and the aristocracy came because Denmark was an elective monarchy, meaning that the nobles an elected the King, prior to the establishment of the absolute monarchy.

As Denmark began to grow its economy, hostilities developed towards the Germans in the royal courts who were also growing in power in the 18th century. The first documented instance of nationalism in Denmark was the Act of Citizenship in 1776. This law limited bureaucratic positions to ethnic and native Danes in response to the largely ethnic Germans bureaucrats who ran the kingdom.[144] Under the new law, only ethnic Danes could have a position in government. Foreigners and their children who were not naturalized could work and live freely in Denmark with the same protections as citizens; however, they could not work in the government. Denmark operated under the principles of jus sanguinis or citizenship by blood—meaning that if one's parents were Danish

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[142] Andreas Bergh and Christian Bjørnskov, "Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State," *Kyklos* 64, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 1–19; Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust," *Issues in Social Science* 3, no. 2 (November 20, 2015): 90.

[143] Eva Ersbøll, "Report on Citizenship Law: Denmark," Report on Citizenship Law (Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies EUDO Citizenship Observatory, July 2015).

[144] Ersbøll, 5–6.

citizens, one had citizenship. This is opposite to the jus soli model in the United States were citizenship is granted if someone is born in the country or to parents.

Denmark Loses More Land, People, and Influence

Denmark suffered a tremendous financial loss during the Napoleonic Wars from 1803–1812. After Napoleon's defeat, the Danish king, because of his alliance with Napoleon, had to cede Norway to Sweden in 1814. This was a significant blow to Denmark's national identity because Denmark and Norway had been united since the Kalmar Union of 1397. Denmark became the smallest Nordic country by population and landmass. In exchange, Denmark acquired the Lauenburg area (near Hamburg, Germany) which comprised mainly of Germans. This changed the ethnic composition of Denmark, making a third of the population ethnically German.[145] The loss of Norway threatened Denmark's internal balance structure because now there were just two dominant ethnic groups: Germans and Danes. With the loss of Norway, the geopolitical dynamics of Denmark changed, creating tensions in Denmark.

Lauenburg, the territory Denmark acquired in 1814, was close to the Schleswig and Holstein region in Southern Denmark and had both ethnic Danes and ethnic Germans in the territory. Adding Lauenburg unbalanced the ethnic dynamics in Denmark. The problem developed because the majority of people in Lauenburg, Schleswig, and Holstein were ethnic Germans and did not want to be part of the Danish Kingdom.[146] The Danish minority who were mostly in the mixed area of Northern Schleswig did not want

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[145] U Østergaard, "Danish Citizenship Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism," in *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options* (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), 139–84; Ersbøll, "Report on Citizenship Law: Denmark," 4.

[146] Palle Lauring, *A History of Denmark*, 7 edition (Copenhagen: Nordic Books, 1986), 207.

to be united with Prussia and instead wanted to remain part of Denmark. Denmark entered two wars with Germany over Schleswig and Holstein. The First Schleswig-Holstein war occurred between 1848-1850 and erupted when ethnic Germans, with support from Prussia, drove Danish troops out of the region. The war resulted in Prussia having to restore Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. Denmark was not unbeaten in the Second Schleswig-Holstein War in 1864. Denmark lost both Holstein and Schleswig to Prussia in 1864.[147] With the loss of Holstein and Schleswig, Denmark became a mostly ethnically homogeneous nation-state for the first time in its history. Their relationship with Germans grew more tumultuous and became a dominating factor in Danish foreign security policy in the 19th and 20th centuries.

By the start of the first world war (WWI), Denmark was surrounded by dominant powers. The location of the United Kingdom to the West, Sweden, and Russia to the North, and Germany to the South placed Denmark in a vulnerable situation. Denmark scathed through WWI by declaring itself neutral and was very prosperous from trade profits across the Baltic Sea.[148] Contrastingly, Denmark was not so lucky in the second world war (WWII). On April 9, 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and established a de facto protectorate over the country. By August 29, 1943, Germany placed Denmark under military occupation, which lasted until the end of WWII in 1945. Denmark maintained its government, and King Christian X was able to maintain his position as the leader of

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[147] Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*; John H. Bille, *A History of the Danes in America.* (BiblioLife, 2010); Hans Norman and Harald Runblom, *Transatlantic Connections: Nordic Migration to the New World after 1800* (Oslo; Oxford; New York: Norwegian University Press ; Distributed worldwide except Scandinavia by Oxford University Press, 1989).

[148] Tim Knudsen and Uffe Jakobsen, "The Danish Path to Democracy" (European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Marburg, Germany, 2003), 15.

Denmark although the government coexisted with Hitler's government. Denmark's leaders took the less heroic route and cooperated with their German occupiers to keep the peace in the country and to spare the lives of their citizens.[149] Hitler's Nazi Germany viewed the Nordic people as superior and/or equal to them in terms of the Nazi racial hierarchy system, as opposed to people groups such as Africans, Slavs, and Jews, so very few Danes lost their lives in the German occupation.[150] Nonetheless, Denmark was in a peculiar situation because its army, territory, and population were too small to fight the Germans. Its approximation to Germany and size made it an easy target for Hitler. The German occupation of Denmark solidified that Denmark was no longer a military power.

The modernization of Denmark proved to be a long litany of loss and defeat. Denmark never regained its status as a dominant military power country in Northern Europe. The Danish leaders of the 20th century made a conscious decision to withdraw from the international boxing ring to cultivate their few resources and small territorial boundaries.[151] The Danes embraced the idea that "Hvad udad tabes, skal indad vindes," meaning, "What was lost outward will be found within." This was written by famous Danish poet, Hans Peter Holst in 1811 and it became popularized by the Danish Health Society in 1914 as they restored coastal land in Jutland after the war that caused Southern Denmark to become a part of Germany.[152] The restoration project represented Denmark's commitment to rebuilding its society by developing the government, society, and culture

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149 Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*, 254.

150 Joesten, "The Nazis in Scandinavia."

151 Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*; Lauring, *A History of Denmark*; Lockhart, *Denmark, 1513-1660*.

152 Henrik Dethlefsen, "Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation or Collaboration?," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 15, no. 1–2 (January 1, 1990): 193–206.

from within. Modern Danish national identity is linked to the shrinking of the country's national borders, territory, and their dwindling international influence over the last millennium[153] This coupled with their internalized desire to survive as an independent nation-state distinctive from Germany and Sweden has led the small country to feel endangered by large groups of people who visibly, religiously, or culturally do not fit the model of what it means to be "Danish." Having a national identity with ties to a specific language, culture, and people-group shaped Denmark's current integration policies that force people to adapt.[154]

The Crisis of Identity in Denmark, When Equality Means "Sameness"

The concepts of equality related to sameness and equal treatment developed after Denmark lost massive territories and influence.[155] Modern Danish society was built on the idea that people could trust their neighbors because their neighbor was paying taxes just like they were, and when anyone got sick, they all received the same treatment. Danes trusted that the government would provide the same social and economic opportunities irrespective of age, sex, income, family background for each person in society.[156] Since Denmark was left largely homogeneous after WWII, this notion of sameness worked because everyone in Denmark had the same or nearly the same expectations from the state.

153: Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*.

154 Kristian Jensen, "Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn" (PhD Dissertation, May 13, 2016).

155 Ulf Riber Hedetoft, "More than Kin and Less than Kind: The Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge," *National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience*, 2006, 398–430.

156 Michael Booth, *Almost Nearly Perfect People The Truth About the Nordic Miracle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2014), 28.

The connection between sameness and equality is reflected in both Denmark's immigration and integration requirements. Immigrants are not allowed permanent access to Denmark if they cannot meet specific benchmarks in language, cultural knowledge tests, and job obtainment, which are all reinforcements of the Danish national identity. To be perceived as wildly different in religion, ethnic background, physical dress, or in mentality is at odds with the Danish tribal notion of equality.[157] The concept of equality in Denmark is related to an understanding that equality requires a degree of sameness. The more similar people are, the easier it is to support the notion of equality.

To be equal in Denmark, therefore suggests that people are the same.[158] This is also supported by the perception that Denmark is a culturally homogeneous society that has both egalitarianism and universalism as core elements to its constitution and social welfare system.[159] The concept of integration hinges on the individual's ability to give up any other cultural or religious background to become a Dane. Thus, when a person is a second-generation Palestinian practicing Muslim born and raised in the impoverished neighborhood of Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen, they are perceived to be foreign to Denmark. Their cultural and religious distinctiveness from Danish culture and religion marks them as a foreigner. Access to citizenship literally and figuratively is not granted if one cannot look Danish or act Danish. Fractions started to arise in Denmark with the

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[157] Jensen, "Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn."

[158] Steffen Jöhncke, "Velfærdsstaten Som Integrationsprojekt," in *Integration: Antropologiske Perspektiver*, ed. Karen Fog Olwig and Karsten Pærregaard (Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2007), 37–62.

[159] Hedetoft, "More than Kin and Less than Kind: The Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge."

arrival of immigrants with different religions, ideological perspectives, and ethnic backgrounds in the 1980s and 1990s.

The political and public perspective in Denmark towards immigrants was generally positive. In the 1960s, most non-Western immigrants came to Denmark from Turkey, Pakistan, and Eastern Bloc countries on guest workers programs. Guest workers would help meet labor shortages in the manufacturing industries in Denmark and then return home to their native countries. This labor shortages in Denmark came as a result of WWII and the millions of people who died from across Europe and the industrial boom that followed. Most countries in Europe imported labor from Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.[160] The immigration policies in the early 1960s were unrestrictive as labor migrants could move back and forth between Europe and the Global South to work then go home because there was not much permanent migration.[161] However, with the 1973 Oil Crisis, the price of oil sky-rocketed a recession hit most economies around the world. Massive layoffs occurred as Denmark no longer needed labor, so the government restricted guest workers programs.[162]

The Danish government tried to send people back to their home countries, but it was nearly impossible because the roots that many of the men had established in Denmark were deeply set. Furthermore, the men wanted to stay, and they would have had

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[160] Tiziana Caponio, "(Im)Migration Research in Italy: A European Comparative Perspective," *The Sociological Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2008): 445–64; Groenendijk, C.A., "Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 8 (2006): 215–30.

[161] Jeroen Doomernik and María Bruquetas-Callejo, "National Immigration and Integration Policies in Europe Since 1973," in *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors*, ed. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, IMISCOE Research Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 57–76.

[162] Chiara Berneri, *Family Reunification in the EU: The Movement and Residence Rights of Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 4.

to go back to worse economic situations in their home countries.[163] The government allowed them to remain in Denmark and to send for their wives and family members as a result of humanitarian laws adopted by the United Nations (UN) that allowed for family reunification in 1977. The UN also established the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1967 that allowed refugees from outside of Europe to be relocated to different regions of the world, prior to this refugee status and relocation was specifically for people who were displaced in Europe as a result of the world wars.[164] This meant that although labor migration to Europe was closed because of the economic strains, humanitarian laws provided another means of migration, people could leave impoverished, war-torn countries in the Global South for protection in the Global North. Due to this new international law, Denmark and the whole of Europe saw a steady flow of refugees and asylees starting in the 1980s. Today, Denmark has a diverse population of about 15 percent of non-Western immigrants dwelling in its territory.

Widespread negative perceptions of immigrants in Denmark did not materialize until after the mid-1980s when larger refugee, asylum-seekers, and family reunification groups moved to Denmark in larger quantities. Most of the non-Western immigrants came from Turkey, Poland, Syria, Iraq, and Romania. Due to these large groups coming for family reunification Denmark changed its Aliens Act in 1986 making the asylum and citizenship process more complicated, and rules of family reunification were further

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[163] Stephen Castles, "The Guest-Worker in Western Europe — An Obituary," *International Migration Review* 20, no. 4 (December 1, 1986): 765.

[164] Groenendijk, C.A., "Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law"; Berneri, *Family Reunification in the EU: The Movement and Residence Rights of Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens*.

tightened in 1992. In 1998, Denmark was one of the first countries to develop an Integration Act to teach immigrants the Danish language and introduce them to Danish society. In response to the increasing immigrant population, the conservative anti-immigrant party, the Danish People's Party (DPP) was established in 1995.[165] Under the DPP the government in 2001 required new arrivals to assimilate by language acquisition, pass an actual citizenship test, and live in Denmark at least nine years before Danish citizenship or permanent legal residency was granted. Denmark has chosen an aggressive integration policy for new arrivals and most recently developed an integration strategy for people living in poverty.

The Danish integration policy is two-fold; it addresses new immigrants who desire to live permanently in Denmark and people who are already citizens or permanent residents in Denmark. The general perception is that the immigrants who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s were not successfully integrated because the policies in place then did not require enough of them. For instance, when refugees and asylees first arrived in Denmark in the 1980s and 1990s, they received a government stipend, and they were not allowed to work until they mastered at least high school level Danish and were approved for refugee status or asylee status. Most immigrants went through the language immersion program for at least a decade, and many did not work. The ones who finally did get a job were placed in low-wage jobs as cleaners or caretakers for the elderly and young children. In the meantime, they were living and raising their children in low-income housing in neighborhoods with the worst education programs and highest crime

[165] Hedetoft, "More than Kin and Less than Kind: The Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge."

rates. This caused refugees and asylees to be about a decade behind other immigrant groups such as immigrants from the EU, the United States, Canada, and Australia who typically worked in high wage jobs upon moving to Denmark.[166] The integration system and immigration policies disproportionately placed refugees and asylees at a disadvantage because of the lengthy time it took to be enfranchised.

The refugees and asylees who came in the 1980s had skills that Denmark needed in the 1960s, but by the 1990s—work was no longer abundant.[167] Furthermore, both the immigrants and the government thought that the refugees and asylum seekers would remain for a short period of time in Denmark and then eventually go home. [168] As the years went by, it was apparent that the refugees from the 1980s and 1990s would be permanently in Denmark. At the same time, a negative perception of immigrants in Denmark was solidified with the terrorist attacks in the United States followed by the controversial Mohammed cartoons published in Denmark in 2004 linking Muslims to terrorism and the idea that they were too culturally different to integrate. Given these social and political changes, the government blocked refugee migration during the 2015/2016 Refugee Crisis.

The Refugee Crisis in 2015/2016 caused Denmark to take a tough stance against refugees and asylum-seekers entering the country. Denmark since then has refused to accept the 500 refugees a year that the United Nationals High Commission for Refugees

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[166] Atkinson and Søgaard, "The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark."

[167] Berneri, *Family Reunification in the EU: The Movement and Residence Rights of Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens.*

[168] Stefanie Brodmann and Javier G. Polavieja, "Immigrants in Denmark: Access to Employment, Class Attainment, and Earnings in a High-Skilled Economy," *International Migration* 49, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 58–90; Atkinson and Sogaard, "The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark."

(UNHCR) has allocated to them since 2015—the height of the so-called Refugee Crisis in Europe. Denmark only accepts asylum seekers who have made their way to Denmark on their own financial terms from abroad. Only 3 percent of all foreigners granted residency in Denmark were refugees in 2017, these were all refugees who had been in Denmark prior to 2015, and the dwindling numbers show a pattern of decrease in 2018 and 2019. Denmark has received fewer asylum seekers than other Western European Union countries with the exception of the United Kingdom.[169] According to Danish NGO Refugees Welcome in 2018, only 1,300 people were actually granted asylum in Denmark the rest are in refugee centers or were deported outside of Denmark. They also implemented even more integration strategies for non-Western immigrants and their descendants who were already in the country.

The formal institutionalization of the current Danish integration strategy began in 2015 with a request from the government to calculate how much immigration cost the Danish state. The Ministry of Finance in 2016 reported that non-Western immigrants and their descendants cost the Danish state 33 billion DKK ($5.02 billion) in 2014 while western immigrants created a net profit amount of 6 billion DKK (~$1 billion). The cost and benefits are linked to how much income one earns and the taxes collected from that income. Immigrants from western countries tend to earn high-incomes and therefore are taxed heavier creating a net profit for the state, while refugees and asylees tend to have higher cases of unemployment and receive government subsidies, which costs the state money. From these reports, the general consensus in Denmark was that non-western

[169] Edward Delman, "How Not to Welcome Refugees," *The Atlantic*, January 27, 2016.

immigrants were a burden to the welfare state and needed to participate in the labor market.[170]

With the financial burden as the central argument for better integration practices for non-Western immigrants, the current strategy is to minimize the perceived financial burden. Danish society promotes the notion that able-bodied citizens and residents should work to contribute to the greater good of society so that they can have a robust universal welfare system.[171] Most refugees and asylees received government welfare stipends for several years as they established themselves in Denmark. The tensions arrive in Denmark when immigrants are unemployed or underemployed long-term while also receiving government welfare benefits in the form of monthly allowances and also universal services like education, healthcare services, and parental leave. In a heavily taxed system in which people pay 35-60 percent income tax and 20 percent sales tax, tensions arise especially in a relatively small country like Denmark. The population is only 5.7 million people with a GDP per capita of $56,307.51 in 2017—one of the highest in the world, yet, the perceived financial burden and threat of immigration is higher for the domestic population who is accustom to people looking and acting like them.

In 2017 the Ministry of Immigration and Integration said that their primary goal was to quickly get refugees into the labor market so that they could better contribute to society. The start allowance from the government for refugees and asylees was reduced in

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[170] Somdeep Sen, Liv Bjerre, and Michelle Pace, "Policy Barriers and Enables WP3 Report," SIRIUS: Skills and Integration of Migrants Refugees and Asylum Applicants in European Labour Markets (University of Jyväskylä, April 2019), 180.

[171] Svendsen and Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust"; Niels Kærgård, "Social Cohesion and the Transformation from Ethnic to Multicultural Society: The Case of Denmark," *Ethnicities* 10, no. 4 (2010): 470–87.

2017 to compensation that was lower than what ethnic Danes received who were on government allowances. The idea behind this change was to force refugees and asylees off of government assistance. Danish citizens and residents with a non-Western background were also subjected to a reduced payment, which warranted a critique of the policies being discriminatory towards other ethnic groups who were not ethnic Danes.[172] The Danish government wanted to get abled-bodied immigrants and their descendants off of the monthly government stipend so that they could work and sustain themselves. Studies have shown the positive effects of decreasing government subsidies, which has led to better employment and financial independence.[173] This goes back to the Danish notion of egalitarianism and sameness, the perception in the society was that non-Western immigrants were heavily dependent on government subsidies, and therefore the immigrants need to be taught how to be a Dane.

Immigrant integration became the focal point of most researchers to understand why some immigrants in societies with universal social welfare programs have higher instances of poverty compared to the native ethnic population [174]. Furthermore, systems with universal social welfare tend to have higher instances of immigrants leaving their home countries to fight in ISIS or al-Qaeda.[175] Sweden and Denmark continue to use

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[172] Atkinson and Sogaard, "The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark"; Barry and Sorensen, "In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant 'Ghettos.'"

[173] Jacob Nielsen Arendt, "Effekter Af Beskæftigelses- Og Uddannelsesrettede Indsatser for Ikke-Vestlige Ledige Indvandrere," 2014, 7; Rambøll, "Viden Til at Komme i Mål Med Integration." (Copenhagen, Denmark: Styrelsen for International Rekruttering og Integration, 2016)9.

[174] Kamaldeep Bhui, Nasir Warfa, and Edgar Jones, "Is Violent Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, Migration, Poor Self-Reported Health and Common Mental Disorders?," *PLoS ONE* 9, no. 3 (March 5, 2014); Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study"; Garner and Short, *Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality)*.

[175] Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, "Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no.

very different strategies (assimilation and multiculturalism) yet both countries have similar results with their immigrant populations not fully being integrated and also demonstrating higher poverty levels than the native ethnic populations. The next section starts by giving a brief historical context for Sweden. It then examines the reasons why Sweden chose their specific immigration and integration policies and became a state focused on a humanitarian agenda that interestingly led to structural discrimination issues in Sweden's integration practices.

Overall, Danish integration strategies are assimilationist due to the shrinking of the country's size and the country's regional and global influence. Historically, the Danes held on to their country, culture, and language by focusing inward to better the lives of individual Danes and protecting themselves from outside cultures and linguistic influences notably from Sweden and Germany.[176] The Danes built an egalitarian society that continues today to redistribute wealth and resources to support all the members of the group and, in return, all able-bodied individuals are expected to work to contribute to the greater good of society.[177] The Danish government uses their notions of an egalitarian society to promote sameness and combat anything that is perceived to be different from the average Dane as a manifestation of their survival techniques from the past.[178] The

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5 (September 2, 2016): 837–57; Benmelech and Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?," October 31, 2018; Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?," Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2016).

[176] It is important to note that about 80 percent of Danes speak fluent English and are influenced by American culture—they do not feel threatened by this concept. Instead, many of them are very proud of their language ability in English and knowledge of American culture at least the people I interacted with expressed with general view.

[177] Karen N. Breidahl, Nils Holtug, and Kristian Kongshøj, "Do Shared Values Promote Social Cohesion? If so, Which? Evidence from Denmark," *European Political Science Review*, February 2017, 1–22.

[178] Karin Borevi, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, and Per Mouritsen, "The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States," *Comparative Migration Studies* 5, no. 1 (March

findings in this research suggest that there are three factors hindering the successful integration of immigrations. The first is that Danish national history of massive land loss influences its notion of identity. The second, is that sameness in Denmark means equality, and lastly, since equality is linked to sameness, immigrants who are different are not perceived to be equal to Danes, which has led to immigrants being isolated in low-income communities.

Sweden: The Benevolent State

The history of Sweden is rooted in a variety of factors, including their Viking past, the Kalmar Union of 1397, wars between surrounding countries, the robust social welfare system, and egalitarianism. The modern history of Sweden starts at the point when Sweden was united under the Danish Crown with the Kalmar Union of 1397-1523. The previous chapter outlined how Queen Margarethe of Denmark became the Queen of Scandinavia as her brother, father, husband (King Häkon) and eventually her young son died. Queen Margarethe defeated King Albrekt of Sweden in the Battle of Åsle in 1389 which led to a unified Scandinavia under the Kalmar Union in 1397. In the Kalmar Agreement, each country retained its own individual laws, institutions, and customs. It was a confederation to maintain security mainly from the Germans; however, with the death of Queen Margarethe in 1412, the Union started to dismantle. Sweden began to view the Union as progressively favorable for the Danes and oppressive towards them.

20, 2017): 9; Jensen, "Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn"; Mouritsen, "The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark."

The Stockholm Bloodbath occurred after the Danish King Christian II beheaded most of the nobleman and clergy members in 1520 to prevent separatist movements that had sprung up once again in Sweden.[179] The massacre opened the door for Gustav Vasa, the son of Erik Johansson who was a nobleman murdered by Christian II, to take complete control of Sweden and become King within just three years. King Gustav Vasa was a zealous leader who inspired the commoners and soldiers to fight for independence from Denmark.[180] The King eventually hired a professional army with monetary help from Lübeck, a Northern city in modern-day Germany, that was weary of the expansion of Danish influence in Northern Germany. King Gustav Vasa ruled Sweden from 1523 until his death in 1560. He is known as the founder of modern Sweden and the person who inspired Sweden to become the hegemon of the Northern region in Europe. For most of the next three centuries, Sweden became a sovereign state defined by wars with Denmark, the growth of their power in Europe, conflicts between the nobility and crown, and the centralization of government.

Sweden became a dominant force not only in Scandinavia but throughout Northern Europe and in many parts of the world. Sweden's role in the Thirty Years War 1618-1648 impacted religious and political dynamics in Europe. The Thirty Years War was a conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire. The protestants wanted to change their religion to Lutheranism and also gain more autonomy from the Catholic Church while also having more control of their own kingdoms. King

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[179] Neil Kent, *A Concise History of Sweden*, 6th ed. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 29.

[180] Jorgen Weibull, *Swedish History in Outline*, First Edition (Stockholm: Coronet Books Inc, 1993), 38.

Gustav II Adolf of Sweden led the Swedish army to invade and defeat the Holy Roman Empire which established Sweden as the leader of the Protestant world.[181] The Treaty of Westphalia, which was led by Sweden, marked the point in history where the modern nation-state system developed, and state sovereignty was invented. Each state had a right to their own religion and autonomy from outside influences.

By 1648 Sweden controlled most of the Baltic States, and within another 60 years, Sweden had colonies spread throughout North America, Africa, India, and the Caribbean.[182] Sweden's economy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was essential to its success as an empire. It relied on agriculture, natural resources, production, and trade. The King had an efficient military which was well organized and well-paid, that facilitated absolute power to be held in the hands of the King.[183] Sweden's early history is saturated with a strong military background and marked by the country's attempts to dominate the Baltic Sea against the Danes and eventually the Russians. Swedish naval forces proved to be superior in the 16th and 17th centuries, providing them with control over the North Sea and Baltic Sea. The Swedish government, military, and monarchy, even with its internal problems, successfully dominated Northern Europe from 1560 until 1721. Although Sweden had 300 years of fighting with Denmark, Denmark's power had diminished significantly by the late 18th century, so the real enemy in the north became

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[181] Peterson, *Warrior Kings of Sweden*.

[182] Suvi Keskinen et al., eds., *Complying With Colonialism: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region*, 1 edition (Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009).

[183] Paul Douglas Lockhart, "The Swedish 'Absolutist' State, 1679–97," in *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Paul Douglas Lockhart, European History in Perspective (London: Macmillan Education UK, 2004), 124.

Russia. Sweden eventually lost its status in the North with the rise of the Russian Empire over a series of years and by 1809 Sweden was no longer a world power.

From Neutrality, Industrialization, and Labor Movements to Egalitarianism

Sweden's downfall from the hegemon in Northern Europe started with the Great Northern War from 1700–1721, continued with the diabolical Russo-Swedish War from 1788–1790, and ended with the annex of Finland to Russia in 1809. Russia invaded Sweden in 1809 to try to force them to join an embargo on the United Kingdom. When Sweden refused, Russia took complete control of Finland, which had been under Swedish control since the 13th century. Russia also occupied all of Sweden's Baltic territories and effectively ended Sweden's dominance in continental Europe.[184] The Swedish royal family in the 18th century, King Gustav III and King Gustav IV, were blamed for causing economic hardship and restricting the power of the nobility by forcing the country into too many wars over the years. Gustav IV was overthrown by the Swedish army, and his entire family was exiled to Germany in December 1809. This marked a point in Sweden's history that the absolute monarchy ended, and the military and nobles gained power over the kingdom.[185]

Losing Finland also resulted in democratic principles storming the country in 1809 as the government power was split between three different institutions: The King, Riksdag (parliament), and the courts. Executive power was still in the hands of the King; however, the power to oversee collected taxes were in the hands of the Riksdag, power to

[184] Byron J. Nordstrom, *The History of Sweden*, 1 edition (Greenwood, 2002), 59.
[185] Lockhart, "The Swedish 'Absolutist' State, 1679–97."

create laws was divided between the King and Riksdag, and power to judge was in the hands of the courts.[186] This shaped Swedish national identity and established a stable centralized government as power has been divided between these institutions. It also shaped the political parties' abilities to have influence in government and in policymaking. Sweden was left without a ruler in 1809 with the exile of the King and the royal family. The Swedish army had in mind Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, a military man who was Marshal in France to become king. The Swedish military and nobles saw him as the perfect candidate because his brother was married to Napoleon's wife's sister, so Sweden would have a more favorable stance with France, and he already had a son who could take over the kingdom if he died.[187]

Jean Baptiste Bernadotte was crowned Prince of Sweden and head of state from 1810-1818. He was renamed Karl Johan XIV in 1818 when he became king. King Johan needed to prove his allegiance and authority in Sweden, so he joined the Napoleonic war on the opposite side of France. The Swedish military and nobles gladly accepted Bernadotte as their King. His family is still the ruling dynasty in Sweden today. Swedish national identity began to form with the development of a stable centralized government under King Johan who promoted peace and neutrality after the Napoleonic wars. This neutral stance eventually led to Sweden developing a national identity related to welfare systems, equity, and support for multiculturalism.

Sweden's modern national identity was built upon a strong democratic neutral government that was supported by the newly appointed King Johan. The King is noted as

[186] Nordstrom, *The History of Sweden*, 67.
[187] Bruce Hopper, "Sweden: A Case Study in Neutrality," October 11, 2011.

an influential person in Swedish history who steered the country towards neutrality. War was about to break out between Britain and Russia in 1834 over a dispute in the Middle East. The war, in the end, did not occur as the newly appointed King Johan made it clear in a confidential memorandum to the British and Russian governments that Sweden and Norway in the cause of any war would have "strict and independent neutrality."[188] This is the first documented instance in which Sweden showed a clear neutral stance. King Johan also gave a detailed account of his French heritage and his respect for independence that Napoleon threated to erode across Europe. He emphasized his allegiance to his new homeland, Sweden and stressed the importance of autonomy of all countries in Europe. He also detailed his interest in maintaining relationships with both Russia and Britain. In the confidential memorandum in 1834, he wrote the following. It is evident that King Johan wanted a neutral government not only to have peace but also to protect Sweden's commercial industries. The King's stance was also fueled by industrialization, farmers and merchants' interest in the budding external markets.

The origin of the Swedish Welfare State began with the industrialization period in Europe (1760-1820). The industrialization was primarily fueled by European trade companies that used enslaved labor, indentured labor, and feudal systems to produce goods such as sugar on plantations to sell to Europe and goods such as iron in the Baltics under serfdom for trading; European markets made tremendous profits.[189] As merchants

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[188] Krister Wahlbäck, *The Roots of Swedish Neutrality* (Stockholm]: The Swedish Institute, 1986), 8.

[189] David Richardson, "The Slave Trade, Sugar, and British Economic Growth, 1748-1776," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17, no. 4 (1987): 739–69; Angela Sutton, "The Seventeenth-Century Slave Trade in the Documents of the English, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Prussian Royal Slave Trading Companies," *Slavery & Abolition* 36, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 445–59; Chris Evans and Göran Rydén, *Baltic Iron in the Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century* (Brill, 2007).

and farm-owners became wealthy from trading of goods, they demanded institutional change in the government to get more rights for themselves as rights were only available to nobility at the time.[190] Sweden did not directly have a feudalism system in place, nor did the country have an extensive slave or trading companies in the Americas and Africa to the same magnitude of the British, Spanish, and French.[191] However, by maintaining neutrality, Sweden benefited by allowed warring trading companies to use their trading ports in the Americas when other ports were closed because of conflicts between warring parties.

Sweden became interested in the slave trade in the 17th century when it was clear that western developed nations were capitalizing on the demands for sugar and other exotic crops in the Americas by using free labor. [192] Sweden established its first colony in Delaware in the United States and a trading post in Ghana in 1638. In the 18th century, Sweden also established trading posts in China and in the Caribbean. In 1784 King Gustavus III received Saint Barthelemy from King Louis XVI from France in exchange for trading privileges in Gothenburg, a coastal city in Sweden. The primary source of income from the island was not so much from slave labor, although there were at least 2,500 enslave people working on the island, most of the wealth came from other

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[190] Lars Edgren and Lars Olsson, "Swedish Working-Class History," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 35 (1989): 69–80; Mats Olsson and Patrick Svensson, "Agricultural Growth and Institutions: Sweden, 1700–1860," *European Review of Economic History* 14, no. 2 (August 1, 2010): 275–304.

[191] Sutton, "The Seventeenth-Century Slave Trade in the Documents of the English, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Prussian Royal Slave Trading Companies"; *Slavery, Atlantic Trade, and the British Economy, 1660-1800* (Cambridge University Press, 1750); Ylva Habel, "Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism? Teaching While Black," in *Education in the Black Diaspora: Perspectives, Challenges, and Prospects (Routledge Research in Education)*, ed. Kassie Freeman and Ethan Johnson (New York, NY: Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2012).

[192] Ekman, "Sweden, the Slave Trade and Slavery, 1784-1847."

countries using the Swedish port for the exchange of goods and people.[193] Sweden profited from the slave trade because of its neutral stance that allowed trading companies to use their trading post during times of war. Sweden eventually ended slavery in all of its colonies on October 9, 1847.

Social Welfare and Multicultural Polities Introduced by the Social Democrats

The democratization process in Sweden gradually extended rights to all its citizens from about the 1830s with the development of wealthy farmers until arguably 1975 when Sweden implemented in the social welfare system. In the beginning, when King Johan first took power, the government continued to represent the rights of just one-sixth of the population, which excluded most of the peasants. Sweden was divided by an estate system, i.e., clergy, nobles, bourgeoisie, and peasants.[194] All Swedes were guaranteed fundamental legal protections and freedom of speech and could belong to any religion of their choosing, which was typically Catholic or Protestant in the nineteenth century. Criticism of the new system, however, mainly came from farmers, merchants, and the rising middle class, groups that still had limited representation in government. Sweden in 1830 had a major political uprising led by the farmers and the growing urban middle class who wanted rights in the state to be more inclusive of them.

Swedish political system changed significantly in 1865 when parliament was changed from four different chambers of varying levels of importance to just two

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[193] Ekman; 225.

[194] The estate's system legally defined people's duties, roles, obligations, and responsibilities under the feudal system. The monarchy was for the king and the queen. The clergy made up the first estate, the nobles made up the second estate, and the peasants and bourgeoisie made up the fourth estate.

chambers of equal importance. The First Chamber was chosen by the country assemblies and communal councils, 150 members were elected every three years. Candidates had to be at least 40 years old and earn a substantial income or have a substantial net worth. The Second Chamber comprised of 230 members and was representative of the landowning farmers and merchants' class. Candidates had to be at least 30 years old and could not make more money than elected officials in the elite sector. The First Chamber represented the nobility, upper bureaucrats, military officers, and the urban rich. The Second Chamber was dominated by landowning farmers. Only about one-sixth of the population could vote in 1865, laborers and women still did not have suffrage. The labor movement in Sweden really shaped the entire country to be a nation-state that promotes equality.

The labor movement in Sweden was divided into two parts: one focused on political representation, the other on building a union [195]. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) was founded in 1898, which organized all trade unions under one association. [196] The labor movement was associated with the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), which is still the dominant governing party of Sweden today. Both LO and the SAP have dominated political life in Sweden since the late 19th century.[197] Even today, with 70% of its population in a union, Sweden has the highest number of members in a union in the world. The labor union demanded better working conditions, the right to vote, regardless of gender and income. As a result of LO, by 1909 the majority of men

[195] Edgren and Olsson, "Swedish Working-Class History."

[196] Pedersen, Røed, and Wadensjö, *The Common Nordic Labor Market at 50* (TemaNord, 2008).

[197] Henning Jørgensen, "The Role of the Trade Unions in Social Restructuring in Scandinavia in the 1990s, Abstract," *Revue française des affaires sociales*, no. 4 (2003): 151–76.

got the right to vote, and in 1919, women could vote in municipal elections and by 1921 universal suffrage was extended to all legally abiding people in Sweden.

From 1809 through 1919, fundamental political rights were extended to all members of society, which marked a notable change in Sweden from absolute monarchy to full democracy. The history of the labor movement and the laborers succeeded in taking over the government and built the modern Swedish society that reflects an egalitarian society with strong social welfare programs. The labor party has had a significant impact on government policies, work, and life in Sweden for almost 200 years.[198] The labor party is one of the leading reasons that Sweden has maintained strong welfare policies, policies that support egalitarianism, and multicultural integration policies. Sweden represents a country that has the most significant membership in a labor union in the world. Although Sweden established rights for the poor and women, they still had problems like many other countries in Europe during both world wars. Sweden established itself as a neutral country during the World Wars, but it was still heavily entrenched in politics in Europe as Sweden had to manage tenses relationships with Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Social Democrats Gain Control of the Swedish Parliament

This notion of national identity in Sweden developed with the Social Democrats gaining dominance in parliament. The period between 1914 and 1945 was afflicted with frightening problems, massive deaths, and technological advancements, such as the tank

[198] Edgren and Olsson, "Swedish Working-Class History."

and nuclear weapons. The 1920s and 1930s presented an economic crisis that affected the world and generations to come. Fascism was on the rise, and social and political tenses were very high as countries tried to define their democracies. Sweden during this time took a foreign policy initiative that favored restraint and neutrality. This was the case at least when it came to direct war with dominant world powers such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia. The Swedish government and King agreed in official documents that Sweden no longer had the capacity or desire to fight a war against other countries whose militaries were superior to Sweden's military.[199] Sweden's foreign policy and national identity became embedded in the notion of neutrality *and* humanitarian aid. The Social Democrats implemented policies that locked-in practices that became the backbone to Swedish foreign-policy and domestic policies.

During World War I while the Entente (Britain, France, Russia) and the Allied Forces (Germany and Austria-Hungary) planned for quick victories, Scandinavian countries hoped to avoid war altogether. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had announced their neutrality in the war in 1912 and reinforced their intentions again in 1914. Sweden had a long history with Germany balancing against Denmark during many of the wars between the 15th–19th centuries, and strict neutrality was not necessarily possible for Sweden.[200] Sweden's new foreign policy had supported Germany for over 40 years. King Gustav V's wife was a direct cousin of the Kaiser Wilhelm II in Germany. Furthermore, economically, Germany was a vital source of raw materials and manufactured products for Sweden and Germany was an essential buyer of Sweden's iron and manufactured

[199] Wahlbäck, *The Roots of Swedish Neutrality*, 10.
[200] Nordstrom, *The History of Sweden*, 94–96.

products. [201] Sweden earned substantial profits from trading in World War I, which helped the lower, middle, and upper classes gain more wealth.[202] Capitalism flourished, and more rights were extended to the masses.

Although Sweden had a democracy, Sweden was still a country with deep class divides with the new industrial working class, and the upper-class elites. The workers related to socialism and communism while the elites strived for capitalism. Democracy had been achieved now that there was better representation in the government, but the class system was more challenging to change. The lower classes wanted social, economic, and political equality. As a result, seven political parties developed. The Swedish Communist Party wanted radical social and economic reforms that would change the entire system of governance. The Social Democrats wanted reform; however, they wanted to use the current governing system to facilitate better equality. The Liberals divided into two parties over issues of Prohibition: The Farmer's Party focused on economic issues related to agriculture while the Liberals mainly focused on Prohibition. In 1933, however, the Communist Party shifted its alignment to the Social Democrats. The Conservatives continued to hold onto their views of the class, world order, and legitimacy. Some Conservative party members shifted to the far right and established affiliations with the Nazi regime.

The Great Depression (1929-1939) hit Sweden in 1930. It caused prices to skyrocket, and high unemployment, about 187,000 union workers, were without jobs.

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[201] Eric Golson, "The Economics of Neutrality: Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Second World War" (Ph.D., The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2011).

[202] Rolf Karlbom, "Sweden's Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933–1944," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 1965): 65–93.

When employers tried to increase their profits by firing more people, riots erupted in the streets. On May 14, 1931, protesters met with armed soldiers in Lund, Sweden. As a result of this clash, four marchers and a bystander were killed, and five others were injured. The labor movement was outraged, and 80,000 people gathered in the streets of Stockholm the next day. The county governor and the police chief were absolved of any wrongdoing, but the leader of the Communist Party, Axel Nordström, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. As a result of the rioting and the subsequent deaths, maintaining peace and strengthening democracy became a primary goal for many Swedes. These events in the 1930s set the stage for Sweden to become a social welfare country because the Communist Party was blamed for the death and injuries.[203] The Social Democrats took over from the Communist Party and held the majority seats in parliament from 1932 onwards to the present day, and they shaped policies that facilitated a strong universal welfare system. They also facilitated the notion of humanitarian aid coupled with refugee and asylee migration as part of the national identity.

In hopes to avoid being drawn into World War II Sweden declared neutrality again in September of 1939. Sweden was the only Nordic country that was not attacked or invaded by Germany. Sweden was supposed to be neutral throughout the war; however, the government allowed German equipped divisions to cross from northern Norway to Finland. Germany had access to Swedish railroads which transported men and weapons to and from Norway. Sweden allowed Nazi vessels and aircraft to use Swedish airspace and territorial waters. They continued to export products such as iron ore and

[203] Michael F. Metcalf, "The First 'Modern' Party System?: Political Parties, Sweden's Age of Liberty and the Historians," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 2, no. 1–4 (January 1, 1977): 265–87.

ball bearings to Germany, both of which were crucial for the development of the German Tanks.[204] The clear tradeoff for Sweden was that Germany agreed not to invade them. Sweden's behavior was not necessarily neutral, but some say necessary for the country to prevent invasion from Germany. Sweden's economy flourishes during WWII, allowing for the country to focus on humanitarian aid later once the war was over.

The Development of Social Welfare in Sweden, the "Swedish Model"

Sweden is famous for its extensive social welfare system that was said to have eliminated poverty by providing government benefits to everyone through high tax schemes. The Swedish welfare state is based on the central idea that everyone has a fundamental right to healthcare, family services, pensions, free education (including university education) irrespective of income. The so-called "Swedish Model" evolved in the 20th century with the majority of change occurring post-1945. Because Sweden did not suffer from the war on its soil during the world wars, the government could focus on establishing a robust egalitarian welfare system more quickly than Denmark, Norway, and Finland.[205] Furthermore, neutrality in Sweden caused the country to prosper from their trade agreements with Germany throughout WWII[206] and later with Russia during the Cold War.[207]

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[204] Karlbom, "Sweden's Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933–1944," 34.

[205] Svendsen and Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust"; Andreas Bergh, *Sweden, and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014).

[206] Golson, "The Economics of Neutrality"; Shiva Pratap Singh, *Glimpses of Europe: A Crucible of Winning Ideas, Great Civilizations and Bloodiest Wars* (Gyan Publishing House, 2010), 534.

[207] On the grounds of neutrality, Sweden joined the United Nations (UN) in 1945, but it did not become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which meant it could still trade with Russia. Swedish profited greatly from being a neutral country. See Wahlbäck's 1986 article *The Roots of Swedish Neutrality* and Bruce Hopper's 2011 book *Sweden: A Case Study in Neutrality*.

The Swedish Model developed from the 1930s through the 1970s, which blurred the lines between different socioeconomic classes.[208] The Social Democrats (SD) in the 1930s began making policy changes in government after the Great Depression, which eventually led to universal welfare in 1975 that was created to protect all Swedes against social insecurity.[209] Universal welfare systems became the bedrock of the nation along with an 85-90 percent employment rate. Female labor participation increased as labor demands increased, which led to public childcare facilities supported by employers and unions.[210] The SDs introduced a myriad of labor laws in the 1970s that increased equality. The Swedish Model worked because the system contained both private business ownership and government control.[211] Manufacturing remained in the control of private owners but was accompanied by a high taxation policy on income and consumption, which redistributed income to low-income earners.

Scholars have also noted that the Swedish Model succeeded over the long haul for several additional reasons. First, the model was implemented slowly over a period of time. The government took control of all health insurance schemes prior to the end of WWII, and then they integrated all pensions plans from private companies and local

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[208] Svendsen and Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust"; Bergh, *Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State*.

[209] Golson, "The Economics of Neutrality"; Lars Magnusson, *An Economic History of Sweden*, 1 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2000); Pontus Hansson and Lars Jonung, "Finance and Economic Growth: The Case of Sweden 1834-1991," *Research in Economics* 51, no. 3 (1997): 275–301.

[210] Paula Berntsson, "Den kvinnliga reservarbetskraften — förlegad retorik eller aktuell politik? Exemplet den offentliga barnomsorgen," *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 105, no. 3 (2002): 238–49; Mats Johansson, "Inkomst Och Ojämlikhet i Sverige 1951-2002," Arbetsrapport (Institute for Futures Studies, March 2006).

[211] Bo Rothstein, "Introduction: The Decline of Swedish Exceptionalism?," in *The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics*, ed. Jon Pierre, 2015.

municipalities into the central government in the 1950s. [212] After these two significant integrations, the government followed with education, parental leave, etc. until the Swedish Model was fully developed by 1975. Secondly, Sweden did not need to recover from war, and therefore, they sold natural resources such as iron ore to countries in Europe that were rebuilding.[213] Thirdly, since Sweden had declared neutrality and refused to take a side in the Cold War, its defense budget was small, and it could trade with both the Capitalist West and the Communist East.[214] Fourth, which is crucial for this research, Sweden did not have to manage a large immigrant population from 1945 through the 1970s and therefore the country did not have significant problems such as nativism or racism that can occur with demographic changes [215], however, this changed once Sweden opened up to massive immigration.

Immigration to Sweden 1945-2018

Between 1945 and 2018, Sweden's population increased from 6.7 million to 10.4 million inhabitants. The most significant population growth came from non-Western refugees and asylees, their family members, and descendants from the past 40 years.[216] According to Statistics Sweden, by the early1990s Sweden took in about 40,000 non-Western refugees a year that increased to 80,000 a year by 2011. In 2015 Sweden took in its

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[212] Eric Brodin, "Collapse of the Swedish Myth," *Economic Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1992): 14–22.
[213] B. Boëthius, "Swedish Iron and Steel, 1600–1955," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 6, no. 2 (July 1, 1958): 144–75.
[214] Hopper, "Sweden."
[215] Robert D. Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 137–74.
[216] Nordstrom, *The History of Sweden*, 143.

largest non-Western refugee/asylee population of 166,000 in one year compared to its population size in any Western country. Immigration has impacted the country's ethnic makeup, language, popular culture, economy, and politics. People who immigrated to Sweden after 1945 fell into three categories: labor migrants and their dependents, refugees, and asylees, and their descendants.

From 1945-1967 Sweden was in need of laborers to work in their booming ore and forest industries. The Nordic countries entered into a joint labor market agreement in 1954 that allowed Nordic people to work in other Nordic countries. Immigration from Denmark, Norway, and especially Finland was massive at this time as the Swedish market had not suffered from the war on its territory and could provide work opportunities to other Nordic countries.[217] Immigration also opened up to countries in Southern Europe such as the Former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, which was the first time that populations from outside of the Nordic region or Northern Europe gained a significant presence in Sweden. Labor and refugee immigration increased in Sweden throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but the foreign population in Sweden reached just 2 percent of the total population by 1975. [218] As Swedish economic expansion started to retract by the late 1960s, the state and manufacturing companies saw less need for immigrant labor. As a result, the government implemented a policy in 1967 to regulate non-Nordic labor to halt labor migration and to get the people already in Sweden to

[217] Daniel Rauhut, "Integration of Immigrants in Sweden 1945-1975," *Finnish Yearbook of Population History* XLV (2010): 108.
[218] Lundh and Ohlsson, "Immigration and Economic Change."

return home.[219]This brought labor migration to an end, but it also fueled refugee and family reunification migration.

The period from 1975 to 1990 is often linked to a transitional phase in Sweden immigration from labor immigration to refugee and family migration. Major wars and political upheavals around the world displaced significant groups of people. Sweden became a dominant receiver of refugees, asylees and family reunification immigrants marking the second wave of newcomers to Sweden. The people who came in the 1970s and 1980s were primarily from Iran, Iraq, Chile, Eritrea, Palestine, and Southeast Asia. By the 1990s, they came primarily from the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and many countries in the Middle East. Once the immigrant groups established permanent residency, they brought their family members to Sweden through family reunification laws.[220] Sweden became known as a haven that embraced multiculturalism and people fleeing persecution. Sweden continued to accept refugees and asylees into the twenty-first century, which drastically impacted not only the ethnic landscape of the country but also challenged the generous nature of social welfare.

The third group of immigrants in Sweden are not necessarily immigrants, because they themselves did not include immigrant to Sweden, but their parents did. Sweden reported in 2018 that 24.1 percent of inhabitants in Sweden had a foreign background, meaning that they or both their parents were not born in Sweden. When considering the number of people who have just one parent born in Sweden, the number increases to

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[219] Amir Skodo, "Sweden: By Turns Welcoming and Restrictive in Its Immigration Policy," *Migration Policy Institute Europe, Brussels*, December 6, 2018.

[220] Karin Borevi, "Family Migration Policies and Politics: Understanding the Swedish Exception," *Journal of Family Issues* 36, no. 11 (September 1, 2015): 1490–1508.

about a third of the Swedish population having an immigrant background.[221] The top non-Western immigrant groups came from, in order as listed, the Former-Yugoslavia, Syria, Iraq, Poland, Iran, Somalia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. People born abroad with non-Western backgrounds make-up about one million people in Sweden (10 percent of the population), this number does not include diverse Swedes who were born in Sweden. Most European countries after World War II do not publish official statistics of people's ethnic and/or religious backgrounds. Therefore, the ethnic and/or religious diversity of Sweden could be 20-25 percent of the total population with people who are visibly and culturally different from ethnic Swedes. Most of the immigrants in Sweden live in the same neighborhoods creating ethnic enclaves of immigrants.

The largest cities in Sweden, such as Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, have become multiethnic places where various ethnic groups developed neighborhoods that express their own native cultures. Most of the communities developed around the mid-1970s when larger groups of non-Western migrants first began arriving in Sweden.[222] The suburbs were traditionally places that absorbed immigrants for decades and, in many ways, hid them from sight. Most of the immigrant neighborhoods, such as Rinkeby and Tensta near Stockholm, have high unemployment, low performance in schools, and gang violence. This has created a negative perception of non-Western immigrants in Sweden. Furthermore, because Sweden is a welfare state that functions best with a large working population, tensions began to arise in relation to the non-Western immigrants in the country who have a higher percentage of unemployment and therefore higher instances of

[221] Statistics Sweden, "Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017," February 21, 2018.
[222] Malmberg et al., "Residential Segregation of European and Non-European Migrants in Sweden."

reliance on government stipends. This immigrant policy created an intense backlash, primarily from the conservatives Swedes.

As many scholars have noted, immigration can unsettle historical sense of community, which establishes a sense of "us" as members of a community and "them" who do not belong to that shared community nor have rights.[223] According to researchers, the growing number of ethnically distinct newcomers can erode the sense of social solidarity on which welfare states are constructed.[224] Alt-right and moderate Swedes began to resent the refugees and economic migrants who arrived from Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.[225] This was primarily due to the economic strains the country experienced from new policy initiatives that increased labor costs beginning in the 1970s when the SDs developed the Swedish welfare system and extended rights to all members in society.[226]

Beginning in the late 1960s, as more immigrants arrived in Sweden, the government also extended welfare benefits to them as a result of the nation's commitment, under the Social Democrats, to support the moral principle of equality and generosity.[227] Welfare was extended to guest workers in 1968 with a policy that ensures all residents had the same rights as natural-born citizens. The Swedes, or at least the

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[223] Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum"; David Brady and Ryan Finnigan, "Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy?," *American Sociological Review* 79, no. 1 (2014): 17–42.

[224] Svendsen and Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust"; Bergh, *Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State*.

[225] Lewis Davis and Sumit S. Deole, "Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe" (ifo DICE Report, December 2017).

[226] Bergh and Bjørnskov, "Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State"; Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights*; Torben Andersen, "Challenges to the Scandinavian Welfare Model," *European Journal of Political Economy* 20, no. 3 (2004): 743–54.

[227] Bo Rothstein, "The Moral, Economic, and Political Logic of the Swedish Welfare State," ed. Jon Pierre, *The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics*, December 17, 2015.

Social Democrats, thought that the best way to facilitate good citizenship was to provide all people with the same fundamental social rights which included healthcare, education, government stipends, etc.[228] The monumental work of Helene Ginsburg in 1983 highlights the expectation the government had that new arrivals would feel accepted in society and would want to live up to certain expectations such as having fulltime employment to contribute to Swedish society. Sweden was one of the first countries in the world to implement multicultural policies that supported ethnic and religious diversity. Even today, individuals who move to Sweden and intend to stay for at least a year have access to free university education, universal health care, and job training services.

Sweden's immigration and integration policies gave new arrivals rights independent from meeting specific integration requirements such as language tests and lengthy residency requirements in order to become a legal resident or a citizen.[229] The Swedish constitution, Chapter 1, Article 3 in 1974, established principles that allowed immigrants to express their own culture. The belief was that this led to immigrants' feeling better about themselves, and therefore, they could better integration with the Swedish culture.[230] There have been numerous shifts in Swedish integration and

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[228] Helen Ginsburg, *Full Employment and Public Policy: The United States and Sweden* (Lexington Books, 1983); James Traub, "The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth," *Foreign Policy*, February 10, 2016.

[229] Sara Wallace Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Christian Joppke, "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe," *West European Politics* 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–22; Emily Cochran Bech, Karin Borevi, and Per Mouritsen, "A 'Civic Turn' in Scandinavian Family Migration Policies? Comparing Denmark, Norway, and Sweden," *Comparative Migration Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 7.

[230] Ishtiaq Ahmed, "Multiculturalism in Sweden: Riots Spark Debates About Identity and Policy," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2014): 98–104.

immigration policies over the years, but the differentiation still remains from its other European counterparts that immigration rights are not linked to integration achievements. Sweden introduced a few mandatory requirements since the 2000s, such as a minimum requirement of 5 years for citizenship. However, residence permits, and citizenship remain unlinked from economic and acculturation performance in Sweden.

Refugees and asylees particularly do not contribute to the welfare state, and if they do, they make 20-30 percent fewer earnings than ethnic Swedes and people from Western European countries over their lifetime. Economic scholars have explored the impact of immigration on the expenditures of social welfare programs. They focused on the impact of immigration on the welfare state in terms of spending, and they pondered the draw that strong social welfare programs have on immigrants from low-income countries. Borjas (1999) argued that the U.S. had a reduction in the number of migrants who would leave once they were unemployed because of the social welfare benefits they received after losing their jobs.[231] A study in Europe (2002) indicated that immigrants who moved to generous social welfare programs such as in Sweden and Denmark were disproportionately dependent on government stipends compared to the native population.[232] This is mainly due to low-income earners who use publicly provided education systems, medical services, and who will eventually withdraw pensions but have not paid significantly into the welfare state.[233] The immigrants who earn low-

[231] Borjas, "Immigration and Welfare Magnets."

[232] Tito Boeri, Gordon H. Hanson, and Barry McCormick, eds., Chapter 3. *Immigration Policy and the Welfare State: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[233] See the following on the Welfare States and Costs. David Frum, "If Liberals Won't Enforce Borders, Fascists Will," *The Atlantic*, April 2019. Borjas, "Immigration and Welfare Magnets"; Andersen, "Challenges to the Scandinavian Welfare Model"; Nancy Jurik and Julie Cowgill, "The Construction of

incomes are usually a result of barriers to high wage jobs, particularly refugees and asylees, in welfare states.[234] The barriers often facilitate a decade of dependence on government stipends in addition to robust social welfare securities, which translates to long-term poverty for immigrant children.

Prior to obtaining permit residency in Sweden, the Swedish government has established rights for people seeking asylum. According to the Migrationsverket, the Swedish Migration Agency, all asylum applicants have a right to emergency healthcare, dental care, maternity care, and contraception. People under 18 seeking asylum are entitled to the same healthcare and dental care as children who are residents in Sweden. The Migration agency provides accommodation while applicants wait for their decision; it is free if the individual or family cannot afford it. The government will also provide financial support for daily expenses, accommodation, and a special allowance. For accommodation where food is provided asylum-seekers receive between 24 SEK ($2.52) a day for a single adult where food is provided or 71 SEK ($7.41) day where food is not provided by the accommodation. Asylum-seekers can work during their application process if they have proper documents proving their identity from their home country. Otherwise, they cannot work until they have a work permit. Children have a right to attend school under the same conditions as other children. However, adults have to wait

Client Identities in a Post-Welfare Social Service Program: The Double Bin d of Microenterprise Development," in *Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy: 1st (First) Edition*, ed. Helen M. Ingram and Anne L. Schneider (State University of New York Press, 2005), 173–96; Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick, *Immigration Policy and the Welfare State*; Rainer Bauböck and Peter Scholten, "Introduction to the Special Issue: 'Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism,'" *Comparative Migration Studies* 4, no. 1 (2016): 4; Bergh, *Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State*.

[234] Österberg et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty?"

until they have a residency to attend school. There is no requirement to learn Swedish to get access to citizenship or residency. Only people with a residency permit and a social security number have access to language courses. It takes at least four years of legal residency for asylum-seekers and refugees to obtain permanent legal residency in Sweden or citizenship. Sweden remains one of the easiest countries to get permanent residency and citizenship in the European Union, although they have increased scrutiny towards applicants since 2017.

Obtaining legal residency or citizenship is relatively more straightforward in Sweden compared to other EU countries such as Denmark, which requires 8-9 years of permanent residency for all individuals who are not high-income earners, including refugees and asylees. Nevertheless, in Sweden, on average, it could take ten years before new arrivals have the job training and language skills to enter into the labor market. Although Sweden gives access to residency and citizenship much faster than Denmark, entering the labor market and becoming enfranchised into Sweden takes the same amount of time as in Denmark, which is between 8-10 years. For example, this could be due to new arrivals' inability to validate their education from their home countries whose intuitions have been dismantled during the war as in the case of Syria, often educational training has to be repeated in Sweden. The lengthy adjustment period could have been a result of policy initiatives that require specific benchmarks in the language before refugees and asylees have access to jobs. Or, it could be a result of people from war-torn countries who might not have had access to stable elementary educational systems who need basic educational training before they can join the job market. The government in 2017 has tried to fast track this process into the labor market for highly skilled asylees

and refugees (e.g., doctors, scientists, professors, etc.) by implementing short study programs so that they can join the workforce in a couple of years. However, there still leaves a large percentage of immigrants and refugees who are not highly skilled, and it will take them a long time to adjust to their new life in Sweden.

Obtaining legal residency or citizenship is relatively more straightforward in Sweden compared to other EU countries such as Denmark, which requires 8-9 years of permanent residency for all individuals who are not high-income earners, including refugees and asylees. Nevertheless, on average, it could take ten years before new arrivals have the job training and language skills to enter into the labor market. Although Sweden gives access to residency and citizenship much faster than Denmark, entering the labor market and becoming enfranchised into Sweden takes the same amount of time as in Denmark, about 8-10 years. Lengthy adjustment periods in Sweden could be a result of policies that require specific benchmarks in the language before refugees and asylees have access to jobs. The government in 2017 tried to fast track this process into the labor market for highly skilled asylees and refugees (e.g., doctors, scientists, professors, etc.) by implementing short study programs so that they can join the workforce in a couple of years. However, this leaves a large percentage of immigrants and refugees who are not highly skilled, and it will take them a long time to adjust to their new life in Sweden.

Throughout the waiting period in Sweden, refugees and asylees not only receive social welfare benefits (e.g. education, healthcare, parental stipend for children, etc.), which are fundamental rights in Sweden, they also get housing, a food stipend, and living allowance to support themselves as they adjust to life in their new country. However, the money they receive keeps them at the poverty level. They are, in fact, less wealthy than

the native population, and it can be a decade before they can join the workforce and get higher-paying jobs. This could set them and their descendants back decades. Immigrants and their descendants experience higher poverty rates because of structural practices that limited access to jobs, housing, and educational services in both Denmark and Sweden. This will be discussed more in Chapter 4.

Conclusion: The Same Result But Different Strategies

Economists and political scientists have argued that the Scandinavian welfare state's strength rests on foundations of high levels of trust and solidarity, low levels of unemployment, and high taxation.[235] Trust and solidarity have traditionally been emphasized and have encouraged citizens to accept a robust state that imposes heavy taxes to provide social security, employment, and universal healthcare.[236] However, social trust has started to erode in both Denmark and Sweden with the arrival of non-Western immigration.[237] As the countries have grappled with fully incorporating these newcomers, they chose different paths towards integration. This chapter provided an overview of Danish and Swedish history in relation to their assimilation and multicultural policies. Denmark chose an aggressive assimilation policy that forced newcomers to assimilate by leaving their own culture and religious backgrounds at the border. While Sweden chose a policy that supported their humanitarian mission, which promoted multiculturalism that did not force new arrivals to acculture Swedish norms or behaviors.

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[235] Jensen, "Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn."
[236] Bergh and Bjørnskov, "Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State."
[237] Svendsen and Svendsen, "The Puzzle of the Scandinavian Welfare State and Social Trust."

Neither of these policies worked as research has revealed that non-Western immigrants have higher poverty levels than any group.

The effects of structural issues related to where immigrants are placed in housing, access to employment in both countries, and the general framing as immigrants as "other" or socially "less than" has placed non-Western immigrants at a disadvantage. As a result, they have higher instances of poverty and dependence on government subsidies. The national identities embedded into what it means to be Danish and Swedish are the leading cause for immigrants with non-Western backgrounds to not fulling being incorporated into the societies. Unresolved issues relating to structural barriers have hindered full integration in Denmark and Sweden—the length to becoming enfranchised in both countries was the same even though the integration policies were different. Furthermore, tensions developed in Denmark and Sweden in similar ways in relation to specifically refugees and asylees being a tax burden to society as they tend to have higher unemployment and low-wage jobs.

In conclusion, high functioning welfare states need citizens and residents who have the ability to work and contribute to the demands of the high taxed systems. When there are more people perceived to take government subsidies rather than contribute to the welfare state, the immigrant would feel less welcomed into the host society. In Denmark, the notion of sameness has played a tremendous role in building the Danish national identity in response to the country losing territory and influence. In the name of preserving their culture, language, and ethnicity, Denmark has developed a clear stance against immigration, which borders on the line nationalism. Sweden continues to be open to multiculturalism, but the Swedish Democrats have gained significant ground in

parliament by becoming the third-largest party in parliament. Sweden is slowly becoming more restrictive towards immigration as perceptions about refugees and asylees have evolved towards a negative stance. It will be interesting to see how immigration and integration policies will impact the nations in the future. The next chapter will look at survey data collected from Denmark and Sweden that analysis perceptions about integration from the perspective of immigrants and the native ethnic populations.

CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS

Massive migration has become an international concern to western societies as migration can impact a country's economy, security, and domestic politics.[238] The perception that a society has towards migrants impacts how that particular group is received in the host country and can facilitate tensions with the native population. This study revealed through the survey questionnaires that the problems related to immigrants integrating in Denmark and Sweden are perceived differently by the native population and immigrants. The immigrant population sees the policy initiatives minimally as isolating and, in extreme cases, as xenophobic. As large influxes of diverse migrant groups come, citizens feel threatened because of nationalism and in-group out-group dynamics.[239] The survey questionnaire was the research tool used in this analysis of immigrant integration.

Prior to conducting the primary analysis, the survey data were screened for completeness, missing value patterns, outliers, and violations of specific statistical assumptions. Of the 1029 respondents who participated in the survey, 50% began the survey but did not complete a single question; this is normal for survey data as most tend to get a response rate of just 30 percent. A small proportion of respondents (4.5%) completed between 2%–77% of the survey. Forty-five (45.6%) percent of respondents completed 100% of the survey. All analyses conducted in this study used data from the

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[238] Greenhill discusses threats to a state's security from migrant sending states while Samuel Scheffler in the article *Immigration and the Significance of Culture* (2009) exams migration as a threat to national identity. Both of these perspectives are valid and, in fact, are connected. Modern nation-states often feel threatened when large numbers of migrants move to the country which impact cultural practices and the availability of domestic resources.

[239] Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*; Gellner and Breuilly, *Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition (New Perspectives on the Past)*.

second and third groups of respondents, who completed the majority of the survey. Thus, the sample included a total of 515 respondents. Analysis of missing value patterns indicated that the percentage of missing data ranged from 6.4% for religion and 28.7% for income. Little and Rubin's 2002 Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test indicated that missing data appear to follow certain patterns as indicated by a significant chi-square ($\chi^2 = 209.29$, df = 33, $p < .001$).[240] Studies show that many people do not feel comfortable responding to questions about their religion or income, which accounts for this missing data and this suggests that the missing data pattern may not be random.[241]

Given the sample size and to limit bias, four outliers were removed from the study. Examination of the outliers revealed that four respondents had scores below three standard deviations from the mean for *perceived integration*. Some of the common methods to accommodate data with outliers include data transformation and data truncation. Transformed data are difficult to interpret, particularly when the raw scores have meaningful scales.[242] Exclusion of outliers may lead to an underestimation of standard errors thereby reducing analytic efficiency.[243] Given the sample size and to avoid any bias resulting from the inclusion of outliers, I excluded the four outliers from

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[240] Roderick J. A. Little and Donald B. Rubin, *Statistical Analysis with Missing Data* (John Wiley & Sons, 2014).

[241] In a future survey, I would consider thinking of ways to help people respond to question prompts better. However, a specific strategy to combat this issue is to use the data that is available. See Costello and Osborne 2005 for more details about using a dataset with missing data. They argued that this was a legitimate strategy because the research is using the information available and not making assumptions.

[242] Jason W. Osborne, "The Effects of Minimum Values on Data Transformations," April 2002. Data transformation is used when moving data from one source to another. For instance, the data were collected using Qualtrics Survey services and the responses were transferred to SPSS and R for analysis. Moving data from one system to another can sometimes impact the results of the data.

[243] Jason W. Osborne and Amy Overbay, "The Power of Outliers (and Why Researchers Should Always Check for Them)," *Practical Assessment* Research and Evaluation, no. 9 (2004).

the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. Although ANOVA is robust in its assumption of normality, *skewness* and *kurtosis* were tested for values of perceived *integration*. Results of the analysis showed that in absolute value terms, both the skewness value of .29(SE=.12) and kurtosis value of .31(SE=.23) were within acceptable limits. The histogram in Figure 3 also confirms that the perceived measure of integration does not deviate much from the norm and that the survey questionnaire is a valid measure of integration.

FIGURE 3. HISTOGRAM OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION



RELIABILITY OF THE ANALYSIS

The measure of *perceived integration* comprised of five items that tend to reflect five dimensions of integration. The dimensions ranged from satisfaction with life in general, to satisfaction with level of education, to satisfaction with neighborhood safety. To check that the measure assesses the underlying ideas of perceived integration, a reliability analysis was carried out and was tested using Cronbach's alpha test. This test measures the reliability of the scale used in the quantitative scientific tests. The results indicated that the tools used to measure perceptions of integration are reliable. Alpha values higher than .90 indicated that the internal validity of the survey results are excellent and alpha values higher than .70 indicated that internal consistency is acceptable. The current samples perceived an integration scale at (α = .77). This is a similar result to the reliability test performed using similar instruments, such as the ICS in 2013, and the NAS study in 2013, which looked at adult migrants in Taiwan and Denmark respectively.[244] This test shows that the survey tool and scale are a reliable method of analysis.

Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Respondents

Table 3 presents the demographic characteristics of the survey sample of Danish and Swedish participants. The table shows that over half (52.5%) of the participants identified as females, 46.9% males, and just .4% identified as other. Table 3 also shows

[244] See the following studies. Shu-Fen Kuo et al., "The Development and Psychometric Testing of East Asian Acculturation Scale among Asian Immigrant Women in Taiwan," *Ethnicity & Health* 18, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 18–33; Paola Masillo, "A Comparability Study of Two Italian Language Proficiency Tests for Adult Migrants" (12th Annual EALTA Conference Policy and Practice in Language Testing and Assessment, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2013).

that the vast majority (94%) of respondents are citizens or permanent legal residents in their respective countries, this number includes people with immigrant backgrounds born in the host country. A large majority (78.2%) of respondents were ethnic Danish or Swedish citizens. Less than 25 percent (21.8%) were immigrants, descendants of immigrants, or had at least one parent who immigrated to Denmark or Sweden. The majority of people who completed the survey were between the ages of 18–54 years old. The number of respondents over 54 years old was just 16.4%. See Table 1 below.

TABLE 3. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Female	226	52.7
	Male	254	46.9
	Other	2	.4
Legal Status	Citizen	446	94
	PLR	15	3.2
	RP	13	2.7
Age Range	18–34	202	41.7
	35–54	202	41.7
	55 and above	80	16.5
Background	Native	338	78.2
	Immigrant	100	21.8

Key: PLR= Permanent Legal Resident; RP= Residence Permit

Main Analysis of the Survey Data

To address the first question a two-way ANOVA was used. A two-way analysis variance (ANOVA) test is used to look at the main effects of the independent variables to see if there is an interaction or a relationship between variables. This question was concerned with not only how perceived integration might vary by country but also considered whether the effect of perceived integration might differ across native born citizens and immigrants. Perceived integration was subjected to a two-way ANOVA, concerning Denmark versus Sweden, and native-born populations versus immigrants. More specifically, a two-way ANOVA with two main effects and an interaction effect was conducted to compare mean levels of perceived integration. The descriptive statistics for perceived integration by country and immigration are presented in Table 4. The mean perceived integration across countries and immigration status appear to show that there are no differences between the two countries and perspectives of integration.

The ANOVA results indicated that the main effect for the respondent country was not statistically significant, $F(1, 232) = 2.29$, $p = .13$, suggesting that there are no statistically significant differences between Denmark and Sweden in how immigrants are perceived to be integrated in each country. This is validated by the fact that poverty levels are high in both countries specifically for children with immigrant backgrounds according to the 2015 OECD report on poverty. Similarly, the results indicated that the main effect for respondent's immigration or natural citizenship status was not statistically significant, $F(1, 232) = .06$, $p = .80$, suggesting that there are no statistically significant differences between native born citizens and immigrants in how they perceived immigrants' level of integration to their respective society. Not surprisingly, the

interaction effect (native born citizen and immigrant) was not significant either, $F(1, 232) = 1.02$, $p = .3$. Immigrants and the native-born population views of perceived integration was very similar and the difference in opinions was not statistically significant between each group in Denmark and Sweden.

TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INTEGRATION BY COUNTRY AND GENERATION

Country	Population	Mean	SD	#Respondents
Denmark	Immigrant	3.96	.52	21
	Native	3.85	.60	195
Sweden	Immigrant	3.75	.65	34
	Native	3.81	.53	186
Total	Immigrant	3.84	.57	381
	Native	3.83	.57	436

In addition to between country differences, this study examined the contribution of *religion* and *income* to integration of immigrants into the host country. The increasing number of Muslims in Europe has painted them as a threat to western Europeans especially with the rise of jihadist terrorism and the perception that Muslim women particularly pose a threat because they tend to not work but withdraw welfare benefits for their children.[245] Income has continuously been a factor related to perceptions of integration, whereas a person with high incomes tend to be perceived to be more

[245] Milan Obaidi et al., "Living under Threat: Mutual Threat Perception Drives Anti-Muslim and Anti-Western Hostility in the Age of Terrorism," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48, no. 5 (August 1, 2018): 567–84.

integrated. Towards this end, two one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for *religion category* and another for *income category*) were conducted. A one-way between subjects' ANOVA to compare the differences in perceived integration among four categories of religion revealed that the effect for the *religion category* was statistically significant, $F(3, 432) = 3.58$, $p = .01$. Multiple comparison results indicated Christians reporting signifyingly higher perceived integration than respondents in the "Other" religious category and Muslim religious category (see Tables 5 and 6).

TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY RELIGIOUS CATEGORY

Religious Category	Mean	SD	n
Christian	3.92	.56	184
Muslim	3.82	.74	19
Other	3.63	.65	48
No-Religion	3.80	.53	185

Note: other = other plus Jewish, Buddhism, Hinduism

TABLE 6. ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY RELIGION

Source	SS	*df*	MS	F	*p*
Between Groups	3.45	3	1.15	3.58	.01
Within Groups	138.71	432	.32		
Total	6555.28	435			

Similarly, a one-way between subjects' ANOVA test that compared the differences in perceived integration among five income categories revealed that the effect of *income* was statistically significant, $F(3, 366) = 7.57$, $p < .01$ (see Table 7). The one-way ANOVA is used when comparing categorical independent variables and one continuous variable. Multiple comparison results indicated those with *low* (3.58) income reported signifyingly lower perceived integration than those who had indicated *high* (3.97) or *very high* (4.12) income categories. Interestingly, the low-income (3.58) and medium (3.79) income group did not differ from the group that refused (7.74) to provide income information. This shows that income level and religion may have an impact on perceived immigrant integration.

TABLE 7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY INCOME CATEGORY

Income Category	Mean	SD	n
Low	3.58	.58	45
Medium	3.79	.59	113
High	3.97	.50	80
Very High	4.12	.38	38
Refused	3.74	.53	91

TABLE 8. ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY INCOME

Source	SS	*Df*	MS	F	*p*
Between Groups	8.71	4	2.18	7.57	.000
Within Groups	104.15	362	.29		
Total	112.86	366			

In addition to determining the role of income and religion, the project examined if there are country level differences in several indices of integration, in other words, whether respondents voted in the previous election, believed that full integration is possible, and thought that immigrants are treated well. To examine patterns across the two countries, a chi-square test of independence was utilized. Table 9 presents cross tabulations and chi-square tests for the *integration indices* by country. As can be seen from the table, there are no significant differences between respondents who resided in the two countries with regard to whether they voted in the previous election or whether they believed that full integration was possible. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between residents in both countries regarding whether they thought immigrants are treated well. The table shows that immigrants in Denmark are perceived to be treated better than immigrants in Sweden. In Denmark 68.1% of respondents said that immigrants are treated well whereby 56.1% of respondents in Sweden said that immigrants are treated well. Treated "well" was defined as having the same level of access to jobs, education, and housing at the same level as the native population. Nonetheless, the table also shows that a similar percentage, 89.3% in Denmark and 87.8% of respondents in Sweden, thought that immigrants were actually integrated into the host society.

TABLE 9. CROSS TABULATIONS AND x^2 TEST RESULTS FOR INTEGRATION INDICES BY COUNTRY

Variables	Denmark	Sweden	Chi-Square Tests of Independence
Voted			$x^{\$}$ (1) = 2.03,
No *n* (%)	50(24.9%)	39(19%)	p = .09
Yes *n* (%)	151(75.1%)	166(81%)	
Full Integration			$x^{\$}$ (1) = .84,
No *n* (%)	22(10.7%)	29(13.7%)	p = .22
Yes *n* (%)	183(89.3%)	183(87.8%)	
Immigrants Treated			$x^{\$}$ (1) = 7.41,
No *n* (%)	17(8.2%)	31(11.5%)	p = .02
Yes *n* (%)	141(68.1%)	119(56.1%)	
Maybe	49(23.7%)	62(29.2%)	

The research study also aims to address whether people with non-Western cultural backgrounds are less likely to integrate in Europe. It was expected that Muslims, Africans, and people from the Middle East (non-Westerners) have a more difficult time integrating into Europe. To test this a chi-square test of independence was used. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between each country and the perceived difficulties in integrating into society for some ethnic or religious groups. The relation country and the perceived difficulty for Muslims to integrate into Western European society was not statistically significant, X^2 (2, N = 429) = .20, p =.90 in each country. Similarly, the perceived difficulty for Africans, Eastern Europeans, Western Europeans, North Americans, Asians and South Americans to integrate into the

host country were not statistically significant different from each country (see Table 10). This means that the perceived difficulty for immigrants from non-Western backgrounds to integrate was viewed as the same by respondents in Denmark and Sweden. About half of the respondents found it very difficult or difficult for Muslims and Africans to successfully integrate in both countries and one fourth said that it was either not easy/not difficult and less than a fourth said that it was very easy/easy for them to integrate. This shows that the ethnic/religious background is often perceived as a huge barrier to integration according to the survey respondents.

The data in Table 10 show that perceptions play a major role in how immigrants and the native population interact with each other. Other Nordic peoples were seen as easily able to integrate (62.4%) in other Scandinavian societies followed by North Americans (53.8% Denmark and 54.6% Sweden) and Western Europeans (47.9% Denmark and 52.1% Sweden). Interestingly, North Americans were seen as better able to integrate into both Denmark and Sweden than people from other EU countries. Eastern Europeans (38.5% Denmark and 31.5% Sweden), South Americans (32.5% Denmark and 31.9 % Sweden) and Asians (30.2% Denmark and 27.3% Sweden) were seen as similarly able to integrate into Denmark and Sweden. The backgrounds that were perceived to be the least likely to easily integrated were Muslims (22.5% Denmark and 21.8% Sweden) and lastly Africans (20.2% Denmark and 19.9% Sweden).

TABLE 10. PERCEIVED EASE OF INTEGRATION FOR RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL GROUPS BY COUNTRY.

Religious/Cultural Category	Denmark	Sweden	Chi-Square Tests of Independence
Muslims			$x^{\$}$ (2) = .20,
VE/E *n* (%)	48(22.5%)	47(21.8%)	*p* = .90
NEND *n* (%)	58(27.2%)	63(29.2%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	107(50.2%)	102(49.1%)	
Africans			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 1.45,
VE/E *n* (%)	43(20.2%)	43(19.9%)	*p* = .48
NEND *n* (%)	60(28.2%)	72(33.3%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	110(51.6%)	101(46.8%)	
Western Europe			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 2.65,
VE/E *n* (%)	114(47.9%)	124(52.1%)	*p* = .27
NEND *n* (%)	51(23.9%)	38(17.6%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	48(22.5%)	54(25%)	
Eastern Europe			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 2.36,
VE/E *n* (%)	82(38.5%)	68(31.5%)	*p* = .31
NEND *n* (%)	80(37.6%)	92(42.6%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	51(23.9%)	56(25.9%)	

VE= Very Easy, E = Easy, NE = Not Easy, ND = Not Difficult, VD= Very Difficult, D = Difficult

TABLE 10. CONTINUED

Religious/Cultural Category	Denmark	Sweden	Chi-Square Tests of Independence
North America			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 5.260
VE/E *n* (%)	114(53.8%)	118(54.6%)	*p* = .07
NEND *n* (%)	59(27.8%)	43(19.9%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	39(18.4%)	55(25.5%)	
Asia			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 1
VE/E *n* (%)	64(30.2%)	59(27.3%)	*p* = .97
NEND *n* (%)	95(44.8%)	100(46.3%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	53(25%)	57(26.4%)	
South America			$x^{\$}$ (2) = .24,
VE/E *n* (%)	69(32.5%)	69(31.9%)	*p* = .88
NEND *n* (%)	99(46.7%)	98(45.4%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	44(20.8%)	49(22.7%)	
Nordics			$x^{\$}$ (2) = 8.29,
VE/E *n* (%)	133(62.4%)	139(63.4%)	*p* = .01
NEND *n* (%)	36(16.9%)	18(8.3%)	
VD/D *n* (%)	48(20.7%)	54(27.3%)	

VE= Very Easy, E = Easy, NE = Not Easy, ND = Not Difficult, VD= Very Difficult, D = Difficult

BARRIERS TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN

The governments in Denmark and Sweden passed laws to help immigrants learn the language, help immigrants obtain gainful employment to support themselves, help them navigate the naturalization process, and learn the host countries' norms and values. The spectrum of how these systems work varies, but the general understanding is that all

of these values are important to integration. A study from the National Academy of Science, Engineering, and Medicine in 2015 found that the level of education, language ability, and income all help improve immigrants and their descendant's integration process. Nonetheless, there are often barriers that could hinder integration despite the goals of policy.

Integration refers to the degree to which new arrivals obtain a job, learn the host language, secure an education, and participate in civic life. Another factor to integration is based on where immigrants live. For instance, people who live in poor immigrant majority communities are perceived *not* to be integrated while people who live in a community with the majority of ethnic Danes or Swedes are argued to be *more* integrated. Therefore, categories of integration are important aspects of how countries measure integration but are by no means exhaustive or a perfect measure of it. Measuring immigrant integration is complex because some of the categories are representative of problems in societies overall and do not reflect issues specific to immigrants. Such as the issues of most immigrant communities having high instances of poverty while also encompasses people largely with immigrant backgrounds; this could be an integration issue or simply a problem reflected in society. Nonetheless, starting somewhere by using rigorous research from scholars and policy institutions in the United States and Europe helps to establish a base point for examining integration.

CHART 1. CAN IMMIGRANTS INTEGRATE?

Chi-Squared Tests (Denmark)		**Chi-Squared Tests (Sweden)**	
p =	0.569	*p* =	0.937
Chi Square	0.324	Chi Square	0.00632

Df = 1 Df = 1



The question arrives then that if most people in both countries believe that integration is possible why are there larger portions of the population with non-Western immigrant backgrounds 28% more likely to be impoverished than the native ethnic population when everyone is supposed the have the same access to resources in the welfare state? Given this fact, there must be a study to examine the barriers to integration.

The most prominent barriers to integration were perceived to be learning the language, finding a job, racism and discrimination, and cultural barriers for immigrants and the native population, see Chart 2. The table shows the percentage of each group's ranking of specific issues related to barriers to integration in Denmark and Sweden. The percentages indicated how many people show that specific issue as important.[246] Immigrants in Denmark ranked the most important barriers such as language, finding a job, and racism and discrimination (respectively) as the top three issues for integration.

[246] The categories for barriers to integration were created based on interviews with immigrants in both Denmark and Sweden. When I heard a barrier mentioned in the interview multiple times, I included it in the survey questionnaire. To me, this indicated that it was an issue important to the integration process that needed to be explored in greater detail.

Ethnic Danes said language, cultural barriers, and children succeeding (respectively) as the most prominent barriers to integration. Immigrants in Sweden said that finding a job, language, and cultural barriers were hindrances. Ethnic Swedes said language, finding a job, and cultural barriers were the top three issues for integration. About 30 percent of immigrants in Denmark said racism and discrimination were a problem while just 18.2% of ethnic Danes said it was a problem. In Sweden, 28% of ethnic Swedes said that racism was an issue for integration compared to the opposite just 14.6% of immigrants in Sweden who said it was a problem. Racism and discrimination played an important role in barriers to integration largely for immigrants in Denmark and for the ethnic Swedes. This aligns with the interviews that were conducted with the participants. The following sections will discuss the prominent barriers to integration and use supporting evidence from interviews with people from the host countries.

CHART 2. PROMINENT ISSUES IMMIGRANTS FACE



Barrier One: Perceptions of Immigrants' Language Ability

The survey questionnaire asked people living in Denmark and Sweden what they thought were the most prominent issues immigrants encountered when adjusting to life in the countries. The data showed that 65.9% of ethnic Danes and 59.5% of Danish immigrants thought that learning the language was the most important issue while 56.3% of ethnic Swedes and just 39% of Swedish immigrants said that learning the language was a prominent issue. The majority of people marked language as the number one issue in each group. Many other scholars support this notion that learning the language of the country in which one lives is crucial for successful integration particularly in the areas of job placement, making friends with the local population, and accomplishing an everyday task in a new country from purchasing bread at a store to getting legal documents.[247] Language is presented as a barrier because of the misperceptions surrounding who can speak and who cannot speak the host country languages. Most immigrants are presumed not to speak Danish or Swedish because the native populations are not accustomed to foreigners speaking their language.

Immigrants today generally can function in Scandinavia without learning Danish or Swedish if they know English and/or German; however, integration is difficult when the immigrant does not know the host country's language.[248] Swedish and Danish post-

[247] Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen, "The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States"; Goodman, "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies"; Ager and Strang, "Understanding Integration"; Rafael Alarcón et al., *Making Los Angeles Home: The Integration of Mexican Immigrants in the United States*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2016); Banulescu-Bogdan, "Shaping Citizenship Policies to Strengthen Immigrant Integration."

[248] Oers, Ersbøoll, and Kostakopoulou, *A Re-Definition of Belonging?*

undergraduate programs at the master's and Ph.D. levels are entirely in English. The Bachelor's degree programs have English-taught courses, but they are limited. The fact that the majority of courses at the master's and Ph.D. level suggests that English is a well-known language in Denmark and Sweden. Most people can function without knowing the local language; however, knowing the native language in host countries always leads to better integration and understanding of the local population and culture.[249] Governments have recognized this importance and therefore have emphasized language obtainment for new arrivals. The governments in Denmark and Sweden have implemented numerous initiatives to teach new arrivals the host language.

Danish Language Immersion Process

Denmark in 1998 had a loose language requirement integration; however, the country broadened the law in 2002 to require all new arrivals to learn Danish up to B2 (high intermediate) if they intended to obtain citizenship or permanent residency. Generally, speaking the immigrants who arrived after 2002 took formal language courses and had proficiency in Danish. One perspective in Denmark is that immigrants who arrived prior to this continue to lack Danish language skills because the government did not require it. A large portion of the older generation that moved to Denmark in the 1980s

[249] Oers, Ersbøoll, and Kostakopoulou; Linda M. Crawford-Lange and Dale L. Lange, "Doing the Unthinkable in the Second-Language Classroom: A Process for the Integration of Language and Culture," 1984.

and 1990s, particularly immigrant Muslim women who have been out of the workforce for decades, are often portrayed in the media as not being able to communicate in Danish.[250] According to the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 47 percent of non-Western working-aged immigrant women are employed compared to 74 percent of Danish women who are employed. Since language is a crucial aspect of integration and working helps develop language skills and cultural immersion, it is largely believed that non-Western immigrant women do not speak Danish because they have been house-wives for their families. Denmark did not have a stringent language requirement in order to obtain citizenship until 2002, so there was no real incentive to learn Danish.

Today, language courses in Denmark are offered through the local municipalities and through private language schools for everyone.[251] It can take 2-8 years to obtain the B2 level required for Danish citizenship or permanent residency. Course prices range from 1,000 DK ($150) to 2,000 DK ($300) per level depending on the length of the courses and the language level, individuals can take courses as many times as it takes to pass the course, and the government covered the costs. Assimilation costs can often be high for social welfare states, especially when covering the costs for migrants.[252] For this

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[250] Peter Nannestad, "A Game Real Actors Won't Play? Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Denmark as a Collective Action Dilemma," *The International Migration Review* 38, no. 1 (2004): 287–308; Mikkel Rytter, "'The Family of Denmark' and 'the Aliens': Kinship Images in Danish Integration Politics," *Ethnos* 75, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 301–22.

[251] As a Fulbright scholar in Denmark from August 2017 through January 2018, I had free access to Danish language courses. I met with a language in-take assessment administrator who interviewed me based on my prior language skills and educational level to assess my capabilities to learn Danish. Since I had high intermediate proficiency in Bulgarian, a language I learned as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Bulgaria, and because I am pursuing my Ph.D. I was placed in a higher language group. While the language assessment officer was interviewing me, I wondered how the Danish government could afford the costs for every migrant from the EU and outside of the EU to attend numerous years of language classes. The government eventually changed the policy because of the costs.

[252] Masatoshi Jinno, "Assimilation, Immigration, and the Welfare State," *FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis* 67, no. 1 (2011): 46–63.

reason, starting in 2019 the Ministry of Immigration and Integration in Denmark announced that it will no longer offer language courses for free and that they require all EU citizens and migrants to pay for their language courses required for citizenship or permanent legal residency. The only exception is for refugees and asylees; the government will continue to pay for their language and educational training. It would be interesting to see how this impacts Western immigrants, who tend to be high-income earners, and their decision to become permanent residents or citizens in Denmark.

The survey showed that learning and speaking Danish is one of the most important aspects of integration, but the survey also showed that most immigrants are at least fluent in Danish, see Chart 3 below. Of the total number of people with immigrant backgrounds who completed the survey, 55 percent said they were native speakers, 32 percent said that they were fluent, and just 13.2 percent said they had basic Danish language skills. This shows that the language requirement in Denmark is being enforced and people speak Danish. Furthermore, second and third-generation immigrants grew up speaking Danish in schools. The perception that immigrants do not speak Danish is a gross exaggeration when nearly 88 percent of immigrants are fluent in Danish, which has been confirmed by other studies.[253]

CHART 3. IMMIGRANTS SELF-ASSESSED LANGUAGE ABILITY (DENMARK)

[253] Hjarn v Zernichow Borberg, *Nydansk er nydanskere og danskere virkelig så forskellige?*, 1st ed. (Multivers, 2016); Jørgensen, "Decentralising Immigrant Integration: Denmark's Mainstreaming Initiatives in Employment, Education, and Social Affairs"; Ministry of Finance, "Act Amending the Act on Active Employment, Law on Social Services, the Law on Integration of Aliens in Denmark and Various Other Laws," June 9, 2018.



Studies have shown that immigrants who were not born or raised in Denmark speak Danish, but it is with an accent. Danes automatically assume that they are not fluent in the language when they hear an accent because Danes are not used to hearing their language spoken by foreigners.[254] Comparatively, native English speakers are more accustomed to different accents in English not only because so many different native-English accents exist (e.g., the United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Australia, etc.), but also because so many non-Native speakers speak and write in English. It is much easier for native-English speakers to accept different English accents then it is for Danes to accept different Danish accents. According to the self-assessment, most immigrants in Denmark speak Danish, albeit maybe with an accent. In Denmark, although some of the older generations of immigrants might not know Danish fluently because there was no language requirement, the younger generations who went through school in Denmark speak Danish fluently and know Danish culture—Danish is their native tongue.

Sweden Language Immersion Process

[254] Margaretha Järvinen, "Negotiating Strangerhood: Interviews with Homeless Immigrants in Copenhagen," *Acta Sociologica* 46, no. 3 (2003): 220.

Sweden does not have formal language requirements to obtain citizenship, although they do require refugees and asylees to take language courses as part of their education and job training. The results from the survey indicated that the majority of immigrants in Sweden who took the survey are not native speakers. A total of 84.4% listed themselves as fluent in Swedish, while only 12.5% of immigrants said they were native speakers, and just 3.1% said that they had only basic Swedish language skills. These numbers are very different from Denmark, where the majority of immigrants were native speakers. Furthermore, more people indicated that they were not fluent in Danish (13.2%) compared to the number who said they were not fluent in Sweden (3.1%). Given that Sweden does not have a language requirement for citizenship or permanent legal residency, it is surprising that fewer immigrants are fluent in Danish compared to immigrants in Sweden. Language acquisition in Sweden has always been a tool of integration for the country, but no a tool for citizenship or residency.

CHART 4. IMMIGRANTS SELF-ASSESSED LANGUAGE ABILITY (SWEDEN)



To get permanent residency or citizenship in Sweden, the person must be at least 18 years old, have legally lived in Sweden for at least five years, conducted themselves according to the law, pay all government fines, and have a permanent residence at the time of applying. If a person is applying for citizenship and has lived with their registered partner for at least two years, they can apply for Swedish citizenship after three years of legal residency. Sweden does not have an official language requirement or cultural knowledge tests for immigrants to obtain citizenship or residency. Although Sweden does not have a language requirement for immigrants, it does have a national language school, called Svenskundervisning för invandrare (SFI), Swedish for immigrants in English, that plays an integral role in integration.

SFI has existed in Sweden since the 1960s to help immigrants learn Swedish and has part of the state's integration process since then. Knowledge of the Swedish language is seen by the Swedish government as important to becoming acquainted with Swedish culture and an important first step to the process of employment.[255] The laws changed in Sweden in 1973 when the government realized that labor migrants who were recruited in the late 1950s through the mid-1960s to meet industry labor shortages were staying permanently in Sweden.[256] The laws in 1973 gave labor migrants the right to be compensated while they took time away from work to learn Swedish. In 1986 the teaching structure changed again after an evaluation from the government revealed that the language courses needed to be aligned with additional educational training for new

[255] Oers, Ersbøoll, and Kostakopoulou, *A Re-Definition of Belonging?*

[256] Erik Bergqvist, "Svensk integrationspolitik: En redogörelse för framväxten av svensk integrationspolitik" (Örebro Universitet, 2011), 22.

arrivals. As a result, the teaching structure split into two specific areas of instruction: language training and basic education for foreigners. SFI focused on adult language training for foreigners while adult basic education program Komunal Vuxenutbildning (Komvux), the municipal adult education in English, allowed foreigners to obtain a grammar school and high school level education in Sweden.[257] This was important for refugees and asylees who came from war-torn countries who might not have had access to education in their home countries, whose educational systems in their home countries were not comparable to Sweden, or for individuals who did not have access to their transcripts from their home countries and needed additional training in Sweden.

Language acquirement is important to the integration process. The goal of integration is to allow immigrants the ability to take part in political, social, economic, and cultural life in their host country to live at the same level as the native population. The ability to speak the host country language is an important part of the integration process. However, many factors need to be considered on behalf of the migrant as linguistic abilities often differ depending on where immigrants migrated from and their socioeconomic status in their home country. Immigrants who come from a multilingual region (such as Africans, and South East Asians) or because the process of migrating exposed immigrants to new languages may make them more aware of linguistic differences, which leads to faster retention of a new language.[258]

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[257] Komvux was established in 1968 as a tool to educate adults who lacked basic education skills. It is a mix between the GED (general education development) program and the community college program in the United States and teaches adult primary education (grammar school) and secondary education (high school) subjects. Many Swedes go to Komvux if they did not get a high school diploma or if they want to retake subjects that they did not achieve the grades needed for admissions into a university.

[258] Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism* (OUP Oxford, 1992).

The ability of a new arrival to navigate a new society is impacted by their background. The rise of refugees and asylees from war-torn Iraq and Somalia since 2005, who came from poor backgrounds and destroyed educational infrastructures, could have facilitated integration issues related to language learning and access to employment in Sweden. Language development relates to people's abilities to learn given their psychological situation, their exposure to other languages, their educational history, and so on. Given all these different scenarios, barriers related to language learning, and perceptions about who can and cannot speak the language, has become a crucial identifier of integration. Employment, especially in the context of the welfare state, is an important part of helping new arrivals learn the host country language. The next section will discuss the barriers to integration as related to employment.

Barrier Two: Immigrants Access to Employment

As mentioned previously, employment has become a central issue to integration in Denmark and in Sweden based on an analysis from the OECD in 2007 and again in 2015 showing that Scandinavia countries are among the worst performers in terms of non-Western immigrants participating in the workforce. As a result, immigrants have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and immigrants are overrepresented among government allowance recipients.[259] Immigrants' success in the labor market depends on many factors related to the immigrant themselves, the country of origin, the circumstance of migration, class and the destination country. Taking into consideration the labor markets in Scandinavia, language acquisition can be difficult for new arrivals if they have

[259] Galloway et al., "Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study."

not had exposure to a Germanic language. Furthermore, high minimum wage and labor market demands for high levels of formal education qualifications place new arrivals who do not meet these standards at a significant disadvantage.[260] Labor market migration has become the key indicator as to rather immigrants are integrated or not in a host society. To this end, Scandinavian countries have implemented new integration programs in 2007/8 and again in 2014/15 to better facilitate labor market integration.

Integration in Scandinavia has largely become a labor market integration issue. The Ministry of Labor in Sweden is in charge of integration policies and works with a host of other ministries and agencies (i.e., ministry of justice, Swedish Migration Board, the Police, the Migration courts, etc.) that facilitate immigrant integration. The Ministry of Immigration and Integration in Denmark in the same vein has made employment a central issue for integration. The survey data collected in this study show that a large percentage of immigrants and the native populations in Denmark and in Sweden named "finding a job" as a prominent issue of integration, see Chart 5 below. More than one-third of all immigrants and the native population in Denmark ranked employed as the top issue for immigrants. Immigrants in Sweden ranked it as the number one issue pertaining to immigrants while immigrants in Denmark ranked it as the second most important issue for immigrants. All of the groups (immigrants and the ethnic populations) listed employment as the first or second important factor. In both countries the goal is to speed-up integration so that immigrants can go directly into the workforce.

[260] Jakobsen, Korpi, and Lorentzen, "Immigration and Integration Policy and Labour Market Attainment Among Immigrants to Scandinavia."

CHART 5. WHATARE THE MOST PROMINENT ISSUES IMMIGRANTS ENCOUNTER?



Sweden: Labor Market Integration

The Swedish government's major focus by the start of the 2000s was to streamline the integration process for immigrants from the moment they settled in the country to get them into the workforce. In early 2011, the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality was ended by the center-right government coalition.[261] The responsibility of integration was handed over to the Ministry of Labor with a Minister of Equality responsible for working against discrimination and segregation. The focus on employment is not unusual because, as mentioned previously, Sweden has one of the highest unemployment rates of all OECD of foreign-born residents compared to the native population, 28% of non-Western immigrants in Sweden are unemployed.[262] The unemployment level increased, according to the Migro research report in 2013, due to the large influx of refugees and asylees from Iraq (39 percent) and Somalia (25 percent) since 2008 whose educational systems have been disrupted from war. One issue is that highly

[261] Segerfeldt, "En arbetsmarknad för alla: Så kan integrationen förbättras."
[262] Segerfeldt.

qualified migrants, refugees, and asylees credentials cannot be verified or recognized by the Swedish government because the home institutions are not reliable for verification. Non-Western immigrants from those countries also lack language skills to work in the Swedish labor market, not to mention that a destroyed educational infrastructure can hinder education attainment later. For instance, if a medical doctor, economist, or university professor from Somalia does not speak Swedish, or at least English, it is very difficult for them to find a comparable job in Sweden even though they are highly educated. Those skillsets are needed in Sweden but are not transferrable if one cannot speak Swedish. This situation places high-skilled labor in under-employed positions or renders them unemployable.

The Ministry of Labor allotted funds to address disparities in the workforce by creating government operated programs in conjunction with language immersion programs. Instegsjobb (initial job) was created by the government in 2007 to help immigrants get into the labor market while they are also learning Swedish. The entry level positions provide government wage subsidies of 80% for up to 24 months for companies that hire immigrants. The benefit for the employer is the obvious fact that they do not have to pay full wages for the new arrivals. The work entry program for immigrants takes place during SFI language education, once the SFI courses are completed, the entry level job ends and the ability to participate in the program also ends. In 2008 and later 2014, Sweden made additional reforms that allowed employers more leeway for non-Western immigrants who arrived in Sweden with English language skills. The Swedish strategy for integration included a faster track for language immersion, and access to work, school, and adult training programs.

The Swedish government is trying to dismantle barriers to integration by targeting people when they first arrive to the country. In 2014, the government implemented one-year study programs, tests in certain subjects instead of lengthy reeducation programs, and a fast-past Swedish language immersion program for highly educated individuals who arrive in Sweden to get jobs in similar fields where they worked in their home countries. The goals were to adapt an education plan that took into consideration the educational experiences that individuals brought with them. Having options meant that the new arrivals had a higher chance of completing language instruction and getting into the workforce. Another new initiative included in these reforms was the adult-education (folkhögskolor) programs that included fast past educational programs for adult learners.

Not all people with immigrant backgrounds are new arrivals, so the government has also taken initiatives to incorporate impoverished people living in the suburbs of major cities around Sweden into society. These initiatives are largely led by the municipalities, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and immigrant associations. For instance, the Assyrian Federation carries out integration-related work. The Chilean community (Chilenska riksförbundet) organizes advocacy work for the labor market to promote equality, voting rights, and they do work around anti-racism. The Turkish community has Turkiska Riksförbudet, which promotes awareness about integration issues for Turkish immigrants, anti-discrimination measures, and they also host cultural events that promote acceptance and cross-cultural learning. There are numerous Cultural Centers in Sweden in immigrant majority neighborhoods, such as Mångkulturellt centrum (Multicultural Center) that promotes research-based practices related to integration.

The most recent focus of the Ministry of Labor has geared towards helping immigrant women get into the workforce. Government reports consistently show that immigrant women are the lowest paid and have the highest unemployment rate in Sweden—they make up 63.1 percent of the 28 percent of those registered as unemployed in Sweden. The goal is to get more immigrant women into the labor market, according to the Minister of Labor Ylva Johansson.[263] The Ministry of Labor recently allotted 300 million SEK ($31.5 million) to the employment of immigrant women. The first step is for immigrant women to learn Swedish. Since many immigrant women do not work when their children are young, the goal is to have language courses for those who are on parental leave to participate in efforts to learn Swedish. Daycare facilitates and kindergartens are also being staffed with language instructors for parents on leave. The Danish government has also taken measures to help immigrant women find work.

Denmark: Labor Market Integration

In July 2018, the Danish government implemented new integration laws that impact immigrants and their descendants who are permanent legal residents or citizens. This integration policy is different because it is not solely addressing new arrivals to the country, but it impacts people who are already legal residents and citizens of Denmark. The new laws aim to solve income gaps and criminal issues that are disproportionately represented by people with immigrant backgrounds. Denmark has a very low poverty rate of 5%, which means 308,000 people live below the poverty line. However, half of this

[263] Sofia Brändström and Minstry of Employment, "300 Million for More Efforts for Foreign-Born Women" (2019).

number comprised of immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, as in Sweden, a large percentage of unemployed people in Denmark are women. According to Statistics Denmark, 53 percent of working-age women immigrant women do not work—a large percent of impoverished people are also immigrant women. The government introduced a myriad of new laws in July 2018 to regulate the life of people living in low-income areas. The idea behind the laws is to forcibly compel immigrants to integrate into mainstream society in Denmark vis-a-vi work. The general perception is that refugees and asylees move to Denmark for the social welfare available to them.

In 2018, the government cut the integration allowance in half with the idea to motive refugees and asylees to get a job. According to Statistics Denmark 2019, asylees and refugees receive between 6,010 DK ($909.49) and 12,019 DK ($1818.24) a month depending on their status as single, with a spouse, or with children. They also get a stipend of 1,500 DK ($227.26) monthly for attending language classes. After paying their taxes and rent, families with two adults and three children on government allowances on average have about 7,420 DK ($1122) a month of disposable income for food and other family expenses compared to citizens on government allows who have about 15,000 DK ($2,225) a month for disposable income. The average disposable income for families not on government allowances is 16,024 DK ($2413). This creates a system of perpetual inequality as limiting resources for one group over a series of years will make it difficult for immigrants and their children to financially catch up to other groups.[264]

[264] Mira C. Skadegård and Iben Jensen, "'There Is Nothing Wrong with Being a Mulatto': Structural Discrimination and Racialised Belonging in Denmark," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 39, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 451–65, Danbolt and Myong, "Racial Turns and Returns."

There is an ongoing debate in Denmark about Muslim women who are primary stay-at-home caregivers for their children or women who are now grandmothers who came in the 1980s but never worked outside of their home or learned Danish. The actual number of women in this group is often exaggerated and heavily politicized in Danish media. The biggest issue is that generally, most people work, including women, and taxes from those salaries are redistributed to the general populations to take care of healthcare, childcare, education, etc. One of the benefits of the high taxes is the quarterly stipend that parents receive from the government to ensure that every child has their basic food and clothing needs met. This is for all children, whether citizens or not, who live in Denmark. If individuals do not work, they are not contributing to social welfare from their taxed income. The debate about Muslim women is often pivoted against farmers and their wives who also tend not to work outside of the house, but collect child subsidies; however, they do not receive the same scrutiny as immigrant women.

Misperceptions in Denmark about immigrant integration have caused the Danish government to created integration policies that would unremittingly foster an assimilation strategy fit for *newly* arrived immigrants. The new laws have been largely approved by parliament but present a tremendous problem to immigrants who are subjected to them. The most infamous law requires parents living in low-income neighborhoods to send their children to daycare from the age of one for at least 25 hours a week for mandatory instruction on Danish values including the tradition of Christmas and Easter, and Danish language.[265] Parents who do not comply could face a stoppage of government subsidies

[265] Barry and Sorensen, "In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant 'Ghettos.'"

for their children. Other citizens in Denmark who do not live in these low-income neighborhoods have the option of enrolling children in preschool [or not] up to the age of six, and they can continue to receive their quarterly stipend from the government. The difference is how and who the law applies to with its aim specifically towards ethnic and religious minorities living in impoverished neighborhoods.

The demarcation of immigrant neighborhoods in Denmark has placed immigrants in a peculiar position. The government wants to integrate them but at the same time, labels them as different and not truly Danish. This has created a divide along the lines of class, race, and religion. The government integration initiatives were created in 2018, so seeing the actual impact of the policies on poverty levels in Denmark will unfold as more time passes. Nonetheless, the new policies, along with previous policies, have stimulated feelings in Denmark that viable work opportunities are limited for non-Western immigrants because of their race/ethnic and/or religious backgrounds. The next section will discuss racial barriers in both Denmark and Sweden.

Barrier Three: Perception of Racism and Discrimination

In the context of most Nordic countries, racism is a term associated with the slave trade in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, and the eugenics of Nazi Germany.[266] This tradition of restricting the meaning of racism has silenced and detached Nordic countries from their participation in the slave trade and in the Eugenics movement well after World War II.[267] Racism has been framed as something in the past and far

[266] Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization"; Kristín Loftsdóttir and L Jensen, *Introduction: Nordic Exceptionalism and the Nordic "Others,"* 2012.

[267] Suvi Keskinen et al., eds., *Complying With Colonialism: Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region*, 1 edition (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009); Rikke Andreassen and Kathrine

away from Nordic history or, at best, extremely right-wing.[268] The idea of Nordic racial exceptionalism has been pivotal in the region's understanding of their relationship with people with immigrant backgrounds. The fact that people in Nordic countries do not recognize the impact of their racial intolerance has been labeled by Ylva Habel as "sanctioned ignorance," which has nurtured a culture of color blindness mixed with claims of not seeing visible differences such as skin color although people are discriminated against because of these differences.[269] The culture of racial silence has worked to hide the ways that racism impacts the lives of non-White people in Europe.[270]

In 2006 David Theo Goldberg explored the notion of race and racism in Europe in his work *Racial Europeanization*. He found that the European Union (EU) created the notion of "Europe" as a region comprised of a specific "race of people," which has become deeply embedded into European societies today. Prior to Europeanization, nations and individual groups existed, such as Germans, French, Swedes, etc. but a collective "European identity" is relatively new and developed alongside the notion of exclusive membership in the EU pivoted against people groups and or countries who were members not such as North Africans, Muslims, Turks, etc. The manifestation of racism in Europe is most exemplified with the treatment of non-Western immigrants, whose cultures and religions are perceived to be backward and primitive compared to

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Vitus, *Affectivity and Race: Studies from Nordic Contexts*, 1 edition (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2016).

[268] Andreassen and Vitus, *Affectivity and Race*; Habel, "Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism?"; Michael Nebeling Petersen et al., "Pippi Og Den Danske Uskyld: Om Ikke-Diskussionen Af Racisme i Danske Medier," *Peculiar.Dk* (blog), October 6, 2014; Danbolt, "Retro Racism."

[269] Habel, "Challenging Swedish Exceptionalism?," 104.

[270] Lene Myong, "Adopteret: Fortællinger Om Transnational Og Racialiseret Tilblivelse" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 2009).

western developed countries (e.g., United States, Australia, Canada) that have a cultural connection to Europe. [271]

One of the main beliefs about racism in Europe is that the extermination of Jews in Nazi Germany represents the *only* real manifestation of racism physically on the continent. This simultaneously bans other experiences of racism and excludes experiences related to colonialism, orientalism, and exoticism that people with immigrant backgrounds often face in Europe.[272] Europe's 500 years of colonial history, in which *most* European countries participated in the sell and trade of human beings from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, disappeared from most of their histories with the exception of France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Racism today is perceived to be an exception in European societies and associated with alt-right neo-Nazi extremism. Racism has therefore been buried and instead *tolerance* has succeeded essentially manifesting the tolerate actor's position of power because their actions can never be interpreted as racist since it is never anti-semantic or as extreme as neo-Nazis.[273] Racism, in Europe today, represents a mixture of institutionalized practices that are embedded into the fabric of society, which represents everyday racism—experiences that tell and demonstrate to non-White people that they do not belong.[274]

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[271] Racism in this context is understood according to dictionary.com's depiction of the word that links extreme ideology to prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism against someone of a different race or ethnic background based on the belief that one's own race or ethnic background is superior.

[272] Barnor Hesse, "Im/Plausible Deniability: Racism's Conceptual Double Bind," *Social Identities* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 12.

[273] Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization," 353.

[274] Philomena Essed, *Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory* (SAGE, 1991).

The survey data showed that the native and ethnic participants in the study viewed racism and discrimination differently. In modern Europe racism is expressed in anti-immigration laws, overly excessive immigrant integration policies, the panic of terrorism and securitization, immigrants' lack of educational and employment opportunities (structural racism often interpreted as social problems) and a swathe of other policies pivoted towards immigrants of non-Western European backgrounds. Immigrants in Denmark and Sweden have experienced all of these instances of everyday racism that many people do not recognize as racist. From the study, ethnic Danes (18.2%) saw racism and discrimination as a factor in the adjustment experience of non-Western immigrants, while 29.7% of immigrants in Denmark viewed racism as a problem for integration. Interestingly more ethnic Swedes (28.5%) marked racism and discrimination as a barrier to integration while just 14.6% of immigrants in Sweden marked racism and discrimination as a hindrance to integration. In fact, *immigrants* in Denmark (29.7%) and *ethnic* Swedish participants (28.5%) viewed integration barriers similarly pertaining to racism and discrimination. See Chart 6. The reasons behind this similar view can be linked to the debates surrounding the Muhammad cartoons published in Danish media in 2004 that has released a predictable attitude in Denmark about the non-discussion of racism and discrimination where "racism is always already presented as a nonsensical thing" that is wrong on all levels and yet not applicable to Denmark.[275] Ethnic Swedes, on the other hand, identified racism and discrimination as an issue that could be traced back to Sweden's ideologies about neutrality.

[275] Danbolt and Myong, "Racial Turns and Returns"; Petersen et al., "Pippi Og Den Danske Uskyld."

CHART 6. BARRIERS IMMIGRANTS ENCOUNTER



In Denmark there has been a shift of focus on the dangers of political correctness which has been framed as a new form of racism—political correctness and censorship equals a loss of freedom. [276] The debate centers on not being like Sweden, which Danes view as being overly politically correct as manifested in Sweden's antiracist policies and censorship on remarks that might be damaging to minority groups. For example, a most recent case was when the Swedish clothing-retail company H&M had an advertisement with a Black boy wearing a hoodie that said: "Coolest Monkey in the Jungle" that received a lot of criticism around the world. Historically, people of African descent have been called monkeys. This advertisement sparked protests around the world. Several stores in South Africa were vandalized and people around the world boycotted H&M. The company responded by issuing an apology and explaining that they would try to learn from their mistakes to move forward in the future. Denmark viewed this censorship as political correctness and against freedom of speech. The political correctness labels

[276] Danbolt and Myong, "Racial Turns and Returns."

Swedish mainstream culture had been reduced to destructive political correctness in Danish debates.[277] Freedom of speech has made Danes unaware of the impact this has on people with immigrant backgrounds.

The Effects of Danish Racial Exceptionalism

Another survey question in this study asked about the strengthens and weaknesses that diversity brings to Denmark. The perception was also very different for ethnic Danes and immigrants in Denmark. Just 55.7 percent of ethnic Danes said that diversity strengthened Denmark while 74.2 percent of immigrants said that diversity strengthened Denmark, see Chart 7. Studies show that non-Western immigrants tend to have more children than ethnic Danes and in the past ten years the immigrant population in Denmark has grown by 15 percent.[278] Religious and racial diversity in Denmark are inevitable as more diverse people migrate to the country and have more children than ethnic Danes. Culture in Denmark is changing and the simple fact is that tensions between the native population and foreigners is inevitable.[279] Native Danes will try to protect their cultural practices and newcomers will always have aspects of their own culture that they pass down to their children.[280] The response that some ethnic Danes are having to diversity

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[277] Danbolt, "Retro Racism."

[278] Silje Vatne Pettersen and Lars Østby, "Scandinavian Comparative Statistics on Integration: Immigrants in Norway, Sweden and Denmark," *Samfunnsspeilet*, May 2013; Bech, Borevi, and Mouritsen, "A 'Civic Turn' in Scandinavian Family Migration Policies? Comparing Denmark, Norway and Sweden"; Jørgen S. Nielsen, *Islam in Denmark the Challenge of Diversity* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012).

[279] Samuel Scheffler, "Immigration and the Significance of Culture," in *Nationalism and Multiculturalism in a World of Immigration*, ed. Nils Holtug, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen D.Phil, and Sune Lægaard (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 119–50.

[280] Richard Alba and Victor Nee, "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration," in *The New Immigration: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, ed. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, Carola Suárez-Orozco, and Desirée Qin-Hilliard (Psychology Press, 2005), 35–65.

highlights both British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel's stance in 2015 that multiculturalism had failed in response to the rising terrorist attacks and violence in Europe perpetrated by immigrants.

Immigrants will bring their own cultures with them, but they are also impacted by the domestic culture in which they find themselves. Adaption happens both ways with immigrants and the host society being influenced by each other.[281] For instance, street food in Denmark has been heavily impacted by Turkish cuisine. Almost every street corner in Copenhagen has doner kebabs (durum, shawarma) which are warm slices of falafel, lamb, beef, or chicken cut from a vertical roasted meat slab that is then mixed with fries, mayo, and vegetables and placed inside of pita bread. This is one of many ways that Turkish traditions and food have influenced Denmark. Immigrants in Denmark have also been impacted by Danish culture, particularly by eating smorrebrod—a traditional Danish open-faced sandwich on dark ryebread that has cold cuts, cheese, and spreads on top. This food is native to Denmark (broadly speaking Scandinavia) but it is also a tradition that immigrants in Denmark have also adopted. Diversity in many ways is flourishing in Denmark despite the often-negative perspective of it. Nonetheless, diversity framed as multiculturalism in Europe has become a proxy for social and political issues related to immigration, identity, political disenchantment, terrorism, and working-class decline. As a result, people feel fragmented in which immigrants feel alienated and citizens are resentful towards diversity.

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[281] Alba and Nee, "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration," 1997; Alarcón et al., *Making Los Angeles Home*; Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul, "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (August 2008): 153–79; Veit Bader, "Culture and Identity: Contesting Constructivism," *Ethnicities* 1, no. 2 (August 1, 2001): 251–85.

CHART 7. DOES DIVERSITY STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN THE COUNTRY?



The Effects of Swedish Racial Exceptionalism

Issues surrounding racism and discrimination in Sweden are complex. As indicated in Chart 6, immigrants in Sweden do not perceive racism and discrimination as a hindrance to their integration process while a larger percentage of ethnic Swedes do see it as a hindrance to integration. The disparity in opinions might be linked to laws and policies in Sweden that have been in place since the 1970s that help combat racism and discrimination. Because Sweden has the most explicit anti-discrimination laws in Europe for immigrants that promote equality and access, the immigrants might feel like they have more of a voice to express discontent compared to immigrants in Denmark. The changes in Swedish laws in the 1970s was influenced by ideas about multiculturalism in the international context with influences from Canadian and UK policies and politics.

Sweden was influenced by ideas about the cultural rights of citizenship,[282] multiculturalism,[283] and liberal pluralism[284] for decades after 1970s Sweden implemented reforms that erased assimilationism that was the strategy in most European countries at the time. The Swedish multicultural model was the most well-developed attempts that merged together liberal ideas of citizenship with diversity.[285] The central focus in Swedish integration laws was to promote equality, freedom of choice, and partnership through formal laws that gave immigrants easier access to citizenship and minority groups (such as the Finns and native Sami people) rights to their unique identities as ethnic Swedes.[286]

This worked for a while in Sweden, but the model had its shortcomings as outlined in *Paradoxes of Multiculturalism* by Schierup and Ålund in 2011. They argued that institutional practices in the Swedish multicultural model led to a hierarchy system that gave immigrant organizations generous but heavily politicized and highly-conditioned systems of public support.[287] The system was found to promote systemic discriminatory institutional practices because it spun immigrants from Africa, Asia, and

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[282] Charles Taylor, *The Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[283] John Rex, "The Concept of a Multicultural Society," *Warwick: Centre For Research in Ethnic Relations,* Oc-casional Papers in Ethnic Relations, No. 3 (1985); Stephen Castles, "Democracy and Multicultural Citizenship: Australian Debates and Their Relevance for Western Europe," in *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*, ed. Rainer Bauböck (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), 3–28.

[284] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.*

[285] Maritta Soininen, "The 'Swedish Model' as an Institutional Framework for Immigrant Membership Rights," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 685–702; Goodman, "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies."

[286] Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund, "The End of Swedish Exceptionalism? Citizenship, Neoliberalism and the Politics of Exclusion," *Race & Class* 53, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 45–64.

[287] See Schierup and Ålund page 129

the Middle East into “social problems” that needed to be fixed based on their ethnic background, culture or religion. The issue of immigrants, particularly refugees and asylees from non-Western countries, became an even larger problem when difficulties in the Swedish welfare model were impacted by the ebbs and flows of the international market in the 1990s and again in 2008 with the economic downturns. This left refugees and asylees at a disadvantage in the exclusive Swedish labor market and in society as they became a target for problems associated with the overexpansion of the welfare state. This manifested itself through the uprising of neo-Nazi grassroots movements that led to attacking of refugee camps and a populist party, New Democracy, developing and winning seats in the Swedish parliament in 1991. However, this rising did not last long because Sweden did another analysis of their multicultural program throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s that lead to new initiatives implemented by 2007 to promote diversity management, based on the U.S. model of diversity management in public policy and business, rather than rights determined along the lines of ethnic and religion. The new policies also focused on the total population to develop institutions in the housing, education, health, and labor market for all people who had a disadvantage because of their background or ability level. Basically, Swedish integration policies merged with the concepts of economic growth to help immigrants find jobs and be more incorporated in society by placing the responsibility on all members of society, including the immigrants. The point here was to highlight that integration laws in Sweden since 1975 have given immigrants’ rights to challenge issues related to discrimination that they might encounter in Sweden. It is for this reason that many of them in the survey might have marked that

discrimination and racism is not a major hindrance to integration in Sweden, although they did say that immigrants are *not* generally treated equal in Sweden.

The survey questionnaire asked respondents if they thought immigrants were treated equal to the native population. The question explained that treated equal meant that immigrants were socially accepted as a national of the country and had equal access to jobs, education, healthcare, etc. The survey revealed that although immigrants in Sweden did not think racism and discrimination was a hindering factor to integration, they did say that immigrants were not treated equally to ethnic Swedes. 56.3 percent of the participants with an immigrant background said that they were treated the same, while 43.8 percent said that they were not treated equally. Around the same percentage of ethnic Swedes (Yes = 55.1% and No = 44.9%) expressed a similar opinion about the treatment of immigrants in Sweden.

CHART 8. ARE IMMIGRANTS TREATED THE SAME AS THE NATIVE POPULATION?



Integration is fairly complicated as it is difficult to measure whether someone is integrated or not in terms of their psychological attitudes towards their new host societies. Just because someone who is economically and socially well connected to a new host country does not necessarily mean that they are integrated mentally with the host culture, while someone who is not economically well off or not well-connected might strongly be connected to the host culture.[288] Nonetheless, there are measures used to determine integrated based on language, employment, housing, etc.

Conclusion

The goal in this chapter of the dissertation was to outline, discuss, and explore the differences in opinions about integration from the perspective of immigrants and the native population. In the case of language acquisition immigrants and the native population in both countries had similar outlooks and placed language at the top of the list of issues immigrants face when it comes to integration. Following this category was

[288] Carrera and Wiesbrock, "Civic Integration of Third Country Nationals: Nationalism versus Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy"; Ager and Strang, "Understanding Integration."

racism and discrimination. Immigrants in Denmark said that racism was a prominent issue while ethnic Danes did not see it as such an important issue in comparison. In Sweden, the native ethnic population thought that racism and discrimination were a hindrance to integration while the people with immigrant backgrounds did not rank it as high. The reasons why there was a disparity in the understanding of racism and discrimination in Sweden were linked to the laws and policies implemented in the 1970s, 1990s, and later in 2011 that solidified immigrant rights. Although immigrants in Sweden thought that racism and discrimination were minimal, they did not think immigrants were treated equally to the ethnic population, as indicated in Chart 8. This points to issues of who belongs and who does not belong in Sweden based on skin tones, culture, and religion. The disenfranchisement of the Muslim community in Europe has become a prominent issue of integration as more Muslims feel isolated in society.

A major issue in Europe is the role of Muslims in societies. Many media commentary and scholars argued that Muslims in Europe are not integrated because their culture and religion are not compatible with Western culture.[289] However, Muslims historically in Western countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have been very well integrated both socially and economically into the fabrics of society.[290] Muslims have held, and continue to hold, a variety of socioeconomic positions

[289] Fatima El-Tayeb, "Oppressed Majority: Violence and Muslim Communities in Multicultural Europe," in *With Stones in Our Hands: Writings on Muslims, Racism, and Empire 2018.*, ed. Daultatzai Sohail and Rana Junaid (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2018), 83–100; Hans Rustad, "Assimilation vs. Parallel Societies The Danish Experience with Jews and Muslims," *Document* (blog), December 12, 2017. Maha Azzam, "The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, no. 2 (2007): 123–34.

[290] Kettani, "History and Prospect of Muslims in Western Europe"; Daulatzai and Rana, *With Stones in Our Hands: Writings on Muslims, Racism, and Empire*.

in society and they earn wages similar to or better than that of non-Muslims.[291] These negative attitudes in the West rose out of the rising terrorist incidences perpetrated by people who claimed a Muslim identity. The psychological impact of terrorism has had a negative impact on the perception of Muslims in Western societies. [292] Muslims today are largely perceived to be a threat to western societies because of the potential for them to be indoctrinated by jihadist ideology that is anti-West and supports violence. The rise of new jihadist ideology was shaped by the war against terrorism.[293] The Danish case links directly with Sweden as who has claims to be a "true Swede" or "true Dane" is linked to race/ethnicity, culture, and religion.

This divergence in Denmark and Sweden happened gradually starting from the late 1990s. Denmark has progressively gotten more restrictive on immigration and integration while Sweden has operated under a liberal immigration and integration system. Although Sweden has begun to change its policies, it is still much easier to get permanent residency and citizenship in Sweden than many other EU countries. Both countries are pivoting towards integration policies that focus on labor market integration to relieve the welfare state of social welfare restraints caused by a higher percentage of non-Western immigrants who have not accessed the workforce for a variety of reasons. The issues of the different stances in policies in Denmark and Sweden have been linked to different ideas about nationhood and social cohesion. Sweden operates under the

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[291] 1615 L. St NW, Suite 800 Washington, and DC 20036 USA202-419-4300 | Main202-419-4349 | Fax202-419-4372 | Media Inquiries, "The Muslim American Experience in the Trump Era," July 26, 2017.

[292] Farah Pandith, *How We Win: How Cutting-Edge Entrepreneurs, Political Visionaries, Enlightened Business Leaders, and Social Media Mavens Can Defeat the Extremist Threat* (Custom House, 2019).

[293] Pandith.

notion of civic nationhood that gives the right to citizenship to anyone who meets policy standards irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. Denmark, on the other hand, operates under ethno-civic nationhood which is based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties to the land.[294] The distinction in their approaches reflects in their policies.

The results are the same in both countries because of issues related to language, education, and racism, access to the job market have hindered immigrants from being fully incorporated members of both societies. These issues, coupled with the vitality of the global market, which heavily impacts the welfare state and the domestic job markets, has put immigrants at odds with the native population. Integration is a two-way process, so the blame is not simply on the host society, but also on the recent increase in refugees and asylees from war torn countries who came with fewer skillsets, fewer education qualifications, and less language experience compared to previous immigrant groups. The Danish and Swedish governments have to figure out a way to incorporate educated immigrants from non-Western societies with shortened education programs and language immersion programs. The other issue is education people who have never received an education previously. Educating refugees and asylees is an expense but necessary task to fight against poverty for future generations. The next chapter will discuss the field research for this study and highlights specific insights from the interviews.

[294] Jensen, "Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn"; Per Mouritsen, "Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn," in *Constituting Communities* (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008), 1–30.

CHAPTER V. ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

Integration, as discussed throughout this dissertation, is the ability of immigrants to establish themselves economically and socially in a host country to the same degree as the native population. The Oxford dictionary says that integration is the unrestricted ability to bring together people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds into an equal association. It is the opposite of segregation. States interpret integration in different ways. The Danish government sees integration as a set of policies that helps immigrants adapt to Danish culture and values so that they can be the same as Danes or at the minimum accept the Danish way of life. Accepting Danish culture means that displays of religion, culture, or traditional dress are secondary to showing allegiance to the collective identity of the state. The Swedish government interprets integration as a set of rights that provide equal opportunities for immigrants to establish themselves in Sweden. It is based on providing immigrants support with language training, education obtainment, and job placement to help them be successful in the country. It is a rights-based system in Sweden while in Denmark it is a system that facilitates sameness. In both cases immigrants have to adapt to the state and the immigrant's culture is secondary to the goals of the state. To get at the heart of perceptions of integration practice and policies, I did 12 months of in-depth field work in Denmark and Sweden. I interviewed numerous people from the general population and did fieldwork.

The interviews and ethnographic study occurred during field research in Scandinavia. The interviews were approximately 60 minutes long and I also had enriching untimed conversations with people in both countries that lasted from 3 minutes

to two hours that also informed this study. The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in people's homes or in their workplace with the exception of one phone interview and one skype interview. The informal impromptu interviews were not recorded and took place in various social settings. All of the official interviews were audio recorded, except one where the participant did not want to be recorded due to feeling uncomfortable with their voice being recorded. I took extensive notes for all interviews and later transcribed audio recordings to include them in this project.

All of the interviews and enriching conversations were conducted in English. Scandinavians have the best non-native speaking English skills in the world, according to the English Proficiency Index. In fact, Sweden has ranked number one in the world for many years followed by Denmark and Norway, which are ranked number four and five in the world for non-native English speakers. My experience in Scandinavia indicated that at least 60-80 percent of the population were fluent in English and the majority of the remaining people could speak basic words and phrases. Everyone I interviewed and had enriching conversations with were fluent in English, including the immigrants. The participants were fluent irrespective of their education level. The participants ranged from individuals with a basic education that is required in Denmark and Sweden up to the age of 15/16 years old to people who earned a Ph.D. in Engineering from prominent universities in the countries. The participants in the official interviews had the option of using a translator, but they all chose to do the interview in English.

The official interview questions started with semi-structured questions and ended with a set of open-ended questions. The open-ended questions gave the participants the ability to respond freely to specific themes related to integration and immigration

policies. Questions for the participants specifically focused on their experiences with integration as a concept in their everyday lives. The participants were asked the same questions, but the people who worked with immigrants were asked additional questions about the role of their organization in the integration process. All of the participants had to reside in either Denmark or Sweden. The interview questions are in Appendix B. I asked all participants for verbal consent to use their responses in this study. If they did not agree, I did not include them.

Using the snowball method, upon arrival to Denmark and later Sweden, I asked my host institutions if they knew of people who would be interested in participating in the study. I asked friends from Denmark and Sweden if they had family members or people they knew who would be interested in participating in the study. I posted announcements in various groups on Facebook aimed at immigrants. I asked people in my local grocery store, gas station, dentist office, restaurant and the immigration office if they would participate. Essentially, I solicited the help of everyone and anyone that I encountered in my daily life. In the end I interviewed 34 people in Denmark and in Sweden. I interviewed numerous refugees, asylees and migrants who were high-income earners and low-income earners. I interviewed far right party voters and far left party voters. I interviewed people whose family members were radicalized and joined the Islamic State and went to fight in Syria. I interviewed Muslims, Christians, Jews, and atheists about their perspective on integration. I had numerous enriching conversations with people throughout the study that were not official interviews but informed many aspects my research.

The style of this chapter is different from the preceding chapters as it uses a different research tool. This chapter mirrors my personal experiences and interviews I had with participants. Participant observation was used to find patterns and make inferences about the societies. This project reveals interactions I had with real people in each country, experiences I had during a preliminary research trip for a month during the summer of 2016, and experiences I had in the region when I visited for the first time in 2011. I gathered a treasure trove of real-life stories that illustrated themes related to immigrant integration in Denmark and Sweden. My research was informed by the participates and observations I made and my own personal experiences in these countries. This chapter reflects the experiences that I had and the experiences I saw displayed in front of me.

The themes I found in the study mirrored some of the findings that were noted in the historical analysis chapter and the survey questionnaires data related to barriers to integration: language, employment, institutional barriers, and perceptions about race/ethnicity of immigrants. The ethnographic study additionally revealed that non-Western immigrants who succeeded in Denmark and Sweden, essentially the ones who were socially and economically integrated, had additional personality traits and/or support from members in the host countries. I will briefly highlight the barriers to integration that was also mentioned in the previous chapter, but then I will discuss successful integration practices from immigrants who came from the global south. The next section discusses my cultural immersion process as a researcher to set the stage for how I conducted this study.

Researcher's Cultural Immersion Process

I deeply embedded myself into the host countries to get a nuanced understanding of integration. I went through the immigration process that all non-European Union (EU) citizens have to go through, so by all means I was an immigrant. I took several uncomfortable trips to the immigration offices to fill-out legal paperwork. I opened a bank account in both countries and registered myself twice as a temporary resident when I moved from Denmark to Sweden. I enrolled in the required Danish language courses for foreigners, Sweden does not technically have language requirements for new arrivals, so I did not enroll language courses there. However, I attempted to enroll in language courses in Svenskundervisning för invandrare (SFI), Swedish for Immigrants in English, which is a free Swedish language education program for immigrants in Sweden. Unfortunately, I could not enroll in the courses because my visa was only for six months and I was not a refugee or asylum-seeker. SFI courses are free for people live in Sweden for at least a year and for people who come for humanitarian reasons.

I fully submersed myself into the Swedish and Danish culture as an immigrant. My physical body allowed me access to immigrant communities that I would not have had access to otherwise. People treated me as though I was a non-Western immigrant upon initially meeting me. Anytime, I entered state institutions or encountered people in my everyday life, my physical body spoke volumes to the fact that I was not from Denmark or Sweden let alone Europe. This made the process for me to imbed myself in immigrant communities easier because other people who looked like me identified me as

an insider with them.[295] Muslim women let me into their homes for interviews. Immigrant men saw me as part of their community and respected me as an independent successful woman. My style of dress and mannerisms are very "Western," so people often assumed that I was a second-generation immigrant before speaking to me. Once people spoked to me and realized that I came from the US, the native-born populations treated me "special" because I was often the first Black American many of them had met. The immigration officers seemed friendlier when they realized that I was less likely a threat or likely to stay in the country permanently because I was from the U.S. and visiting for research purposes.

I spent significant time in immigrant majority neighborhoods. I regularly went to the dentist, the public library, grocery stores, coffee shops, clothing stores, and haircare/beauty supply stores in immigrant majority neighborhoods for my own basic needs. I participated in numerous social events geared towards immigrants.[296] In both Denmark and Sweden, I joined a religious social group that was comprised of immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, we met weekly to discuss not only faith, but social and political issues as it related to being diverse people in Europe. In addition, I started a meetup.com[297] group in Stockholm, called *Beyond Color for Women in*

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[295] Maxine Baca Zinn, "Field Research in Minority Communities: Ethical, Methodological and Political Observations by an Insider," *Social Problems* 27, no. 2 (1979): 209–19.; Robert K. Merton, "Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 1 (1972): 9–47.

[296] I use "immigrant" throughout the dissertation for clarity purposes as it is how government and public discourse refers to the demographic of people who are ethnically, racially, or religiously different from the native western European population in Denmark and in Sweden. This is not a study about discourse and rhetoric used to describe POCs in Europe, which could be an interesting topic to research; however, that is not the focus of this dissertation.

[297] Meetup.com is an online resource that connects people offline to meet in person about their shared interests.

Stockholm to get to know more women of color in Sweden. The group currently has 183 members since I launched it in January 2017. The group gathered for social events such as watching movies (we saw Black Panther together and had a discussion after the movie), happy hours, eating at various trendy ethnic restaurants around Stockholm etc. We also attended educational workshops, performances, and discussions about diversity in Sweden at community centers around Stockholm. I interviewed a few women from this group and had very enriching conversations with others about their integration process. I got interested in Scandinavia from a trip I had taken to visit a friend I met in Chicago.

My First Experience in Scandinavia

My first experience in Scandinavia was in the summer of 2011 when I took a trip to Malmo, Sweden to visit a colleague who had become a close friend. I met him when I was a study abroad advisor at a university in Chicago. He worked in the Dean's office on the top floor of our building and I worked on the first floor. We bounded in the hallway my first week on the job. He stopped me in the hallway to ask me if I worked at the University. When I replied, "Ye"s and told him that it was my first week on the job, he then informed me that we were two of the three people of color in the entire building who worked for the University who were not professors. We would joke about it all the time over lunch and became close friends as a result of it. A few years after we met he decided to move back to Malmo after 15 years in the United States. I made plans to visit him in Sweden since I was taking a group of students on a study abroad trip to Ireland and Sweden was a direct flight away from Dublin.

Per my friend's suggestion I flew into Copenhagen, Denmark and I took a 15-minute train ride into Malmo. The train went over the Oresund strait, a narrow body of

water that separates Denmark from Sweden. The Oresund has a significant historical context for the region as many battles were fought over who would control the strait and thus the Baltic trade route. This situation, however, was prior to my knowledge of the historical significance of the Oresund strait. I was nonetheless impressed by everything I saw. The beautiful water, the clear blue sky, combined with the clean modern train gliding over the bridge was very peaceful and calming for me. This was the easiest border crossing from one country to the next that I had ever experienced in my life. I was very happy to be in Scandinavia.

My friend met me at the train station in Malmo around 12 o'clock in the afternoon. He suggested that we walk to a nearby café in the city center so that I could get a little food and coffee before we walked 15 minutes to his mother's apartment. He had been back in Sweden for less than a month, so he was staying with his mom until he could find a job and get resettled in Sweden. He had applied to several jobs around Sweden and had interviews the coming weeks. The city center was beautiful and indicative of architecture I associate with medieval Europe. The cobblestone streets, the old colorful buildings, the outdoor cafes, and the restaurants—it was simply breathtaking. We sat outside at a café to enjoy the warm sun. I ordered cappuccino and pastry and my friend ordered a coke. The minute we placed our order, people started to recognize my friend and stop at our table to say hello.

Five of his childhood friends walked by the café and we had conversations with all of them. As each childhood friend left, I got information about them. One guy had moved to Sweden as a Palestinian refugee from Jerusalem when he was 7 years old and he was the same age as my friend when he came to Sweden. Another childhood friend

had moved to Sweden from Iraq and was of Kurdish descent. That friend did not shake my hand, my friend explained, because he was a practicing Muslim now and could not touch women. Lastly, he mentioned that the blonde girl I had just met was not Swedish and that she came from Bosnia at a young age and was also as a refugee.

As his last friend left the table, my friend asked me if I noticed anything different about Malmo. I was unclear about what he meant, and I asked him to explain. He asked me if I had noticed that there were very few ethnic Swedes in Malmo. He was very proud of his hometown and the diversity that was displayed around us. I also was very happy to be in Malmo, because I too had grown up in an immigrant neighborhood in Chicago that was diverse beyond black and white racial diversity. People living in my neighborhood were from all over the world and practiced every religion that one could imagine. I loved my childhood neighborhood and I thought that Malmo would be the same. I was very happy to be there.

We left the café after we finished our food and headed to his mom's apartment. As we got closer to the apartment and further away from the city center, the neighborhood began to change. It no longer looked like medieval quaint town in Europe. I felt like I was back in Bulgaria where I did Peace Corps and the buildings were built in the 1970s but were barely maintained. I felt like I was in the suburbs of France where I had travelled a year prior to visit my French Algerian friend who lived in the poorest suburb near Paris. The neighborhood reminded me of the ghettos of Chicago where my cousin was born and raised until my uncle got enough money to move them into a house in a safer neighborhood. I could not believe that I was in Sweden.

I was shocked because the level of poverty that I saw around me was astonishing especially for a social welfare country that has free education, healthcare, and government stipends for people in need. Sweden had ranked the highest for the happiest people in the world on many occasions. Yet, here I was in an impoverished area similar to impoverished neighborhoods I had visited across the globe. To be clear this was not abject poverty where people do not have running water or bathrooms. These people were not the most miserable or unfortunate living in utter humiliation because of their financial status. This was poverty that one would see in the global north that reflects poverty where people have the bare necessities for living and nothing more. I was shocked. This was not like my childhood neighborhood in Chicago that was a safe cultural hub.

To be fair, my friend warned me back in Chicago that he was from the "ghettoes" of Sweden. Even at the café that day, he tried to warn me again that he lived in one of the poorest areas in the country with him mentioning that there were very few ethnic Swedes in Malmo. I simply did not hear him. I could not receive what he was saying because, in my mind, Sweden, and Scandinavia, was the socialist ideal that I aspired for the US. It could not be nearly as dangerous as poor areas of Chicago or New Mexico that have very high crime rates. I did not believe him because Sweden is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. I had another reality check when we reached his apartment complex.

The first thing I noticed were four young people of African and Middle Eastern descent across the courtyard. They had bottles of what looked like alcohol and I could recognize the smell of marijuana. They were talking loudly, laughing and joking. When they saw us walking across the courtyard, they greeted us and continued with their afternoon activities. This was a Friday and after school, so although it was a little

unnerving, I simply put it out of my mind. As we entered my friend's apartment building I could smell the urine in the hallway. I did not react. My friend assured me that his mom's apartment was nice and not to pay attention to the hallway. We entered the apartment and indeed it was comfortable and clean. His mom greeted me in English and offered me traditional East African food and coffee. Drinking coffee in Eritrean culture is a ritual where friends and family talk and get to know each other. I was honored to participate in this ceremony in Sweden. I had a great time visiting my friend that week, but I saw a side of Scandinavia that I did not know existed.

I tell this story because it expresses the complexities and the diversity of life in Scandinavia. One the one hand there is universal social welfare that provides for all citizens and residents living in the state, however, on the other hand there is high levels of poverty for many immigrants who come from the global south who are often isolated from mainstream society. Furthermore, there is vibrant diversity in Scandinavia that is often overlooked as part of the national culture. This is not limited simply to Scandinavia, but in Europe in general. There are communities of people across Europe who practice traditional tea ceremonies, speak their own languages, and live in poverty and yet they are integrated. Integration is very complex, because it can go beyond socioeconomic status. It is how the immigrant is received in the host society and how the individual sees themselves in relation to the native population.

My friend eventually went on to get a high-ranking administrative position at a leading university in Stockholm. His now wife, who also has an immigrant background, has a management position in an investment bank in Stockholm. They are very successful and there are many more stories of successful people from his neighborhood in Malmo.

The most famous soccer player in Sweden, Zlatan Ibrahimović, whose parents were Bosnians, grew up with my friend. They both are examples of successful people from Malmo, but the majority of people from his neighborhood were not successful. In fact, some of them were recruited to fight with the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and had died abroad or were in prison in Sweden. Others had succumbed to selling drugs or participating in gangs. This planted a seed in my mind to explore communities of color in Europe more closely. I became fascinated by people of color in Western Europe and their ability to succeed in liberal democratic societies. This curiosity extended beyond the traditionally researched countries such as the United Kingdom and France. I wanted to explore what life was like for people of color living in Scandinavia.

Preliminary Research in Scandinavia

The next time I visited Scandinavia was in the summer of 2016 for preliminary research. I arrived with a new level of interest in socialism. President Trump was the presidential candidate for the Republican party, and I had my cards set on Bernie Sanders, but once he was out of the race, I saw green and I had my hopes were set on Jill Stein. I was excited about visiting countries that represented my own political views that valued universal social welfare programs and preserving the earth. I was also fascinated by the issues of immigration and integration that appeared to have divided Europe. In 2016 Germany and Sweden had agreed to take in a large share of the people arriving to Europe from Syria and Iraq, while the majority of other countries in the EU such as Denmark and Hungary refused to allow in refugees or asylum-seekers in their borders beyond letting them pass through to countries that would accept them. The United

Kingdom was so distraught over the potentiality of immigrants arriving in their country that they called a national vote and the majority of people who voted decided to exit the EU. Despite the turmoil and political debates that were happening around me, this was a great time to be in Europe and collect preliminary data. I learned a lot in that initial visit.

I arrived in Copenhagen in late June with my twin sister. I decided to visit touristy attractions before starting my preliminary research. My good friend from Germany took a train up from Hanover. He had spent a year in Stockholm studying economics, but he had never visited Denmark even though he lived less than a seven-hour train ride away. We booked an Airbnb apartment in one of the most expensive areas in Copenhagen to have easy access to the restaurants, bars, and nightlife. Copenhagen did not disappoint us. The restaurants were fantastic for all types of cuisine. We visited a Thai restaurant, Italian restaurant, and we had traditional Danish smorrebrod (open-faced sandwiches) and pastries. We all agreed that we could not get enough of the delicious food. My German friend had to go back to work on Tuesday, so he left Denmark that Monday. My sister and I shifted to another Airbnb a few blocks away from the Mjolnerparken neighborhood, one of the poorest areas in Copenhagen.

We rented an Airbnb apartment from an East African woman who was in Canada for a year completing a master's program. Her aunt met us at the apartment to give us a tour and provide us with keys. The apartment was beautifully decorated with Ikea furniture and had all the amenities we were used to in the US. The aunt spoke very little English, but she asked us if we spoke Danish or Amharic. When we responded that we only spoke English she proceeded to give us the tour in her limited English. We had access to the washer and dryer in the apartment along with all of the pots and dishes in

the kitchen. After the introduction, my sister and I decided to get dinner. We noticed a doner kebab storefront on the bus ride to the apartment, so we went there for dinner.

The moment we entered the restaurant I could smell the delicious chicken and spices cooking on the virtual rotisserie. The cook came from the back of the storefront carrying frozen meat that he placed in a refrigerating element near the grill. He then greeted us in Danish to ask us for our order. My sister immediately responded that we did not speak Danish and he switched to English. I ordered a chicken durum extra spicy, and my sister ordered a meal with rice, kebab meat, and sautéed vegetables. As we waited, the cook asked us were we were from. I said that we were from Chicago and that we came to Copenhagen from the US.

The cook looked at us with special interested and asked us if we knew of Mohammad Ali? We mentioned that yes, we knew of him and that he was a great boxer in the US. I also mentioned that I had met Mohammad Ali a couple times at a diner in Chicago where he and his wife Lonnie frequently went when they were in Chicago. Mohammad Ali had recently passed away on June 4, 2016, so I mentioned this to the cook. He then said that he knew this already and that Mohammad Ali did a lot for African Americans like us and for Muslims like him in the US. He disclosed that he was the owner of the shop and came to Copenhagen in the 1980s from Pakistan. He mentioned that Muslims were not treated well in Denmark and that people like him and Black people like us needed to stick together. He finished cooking our meal and placed my durum on a thin sheet of aluminum foil and he put my sister's meal in a takeaway box. We paid and before we could walkout he asked us if he could show us something. We said sure and washed his hands before he went to the back of the restaurant.

He came back with his cellphone and asked us if had ever read the Quran, I mentioned that I had taken a world religion course and that some of the course material came from the Quran. He then proceeded to pull up the Quran on his cellphone and read us scriptures about the Prophet Mohammad and how Allah loved us. He said that he was an Imam at his Mosque and that there were people who could help us learn more about the Muslim faith. He read about five additional scriptures and I was mesmerized. His proselytizing strategy was very similar to things I had experienced from Christians in the United States. He was warm, welcoming and got me intrigued by linking struggles that Muslims experienced to that of African Americans. He was very charismatic and passionate about his faith. He gave us a flyer about his mosque and invited us to come if we were interested. I mentioned that we were headed to Sweden after a week and that we could not make it to his mosque, but that I would visit it in the future. I left the storefront fascinated that an Imam recognized a Black Muslim American's contributions to the fight for equality. I planned to interview the owner and to visit his Mosque when I returned. When I went back to the restaurant a year later, I could not find the owner or the Mosque.

That summer of my preliminary research debates about immigration and integration was on the minds of most people in Europe. This was after the European Refugee Crisis a period marked by high values of people moving into the EU, the Charlie Heblo killings in Paris in January 2015, and the terrorist attack in Copenhagen on February 14, 2015 when a discussion organized by controversial Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks ended with three people killed, including the perpetrator, and five police officers were injured. The perpetrator of the terrorist attack in Copenhagen was a jihadist who grew up not too far from the kebab storefront. After my experience in Denmark I took a

train to Malmo for a second time. I travelled to Gothenburg and Stockholm to check out immigrant communities in those cities. My sister flew back to the US and I then travelled to Oslo, Norway to attend a summer school on migration at the University of Norway. That summer I explored the region and discovered that I had enough potential data to do a study in Scandinavia for a year comparing integration in Denmark and Sweden.

Barriers to Immigrant Integration in Denmark and Sweden

There are five barriers to integration that I observed from the in-depth field study. The first three mirrored the findings that I saw reflected in the historical analysis chapter and the survey data chapter such as barriers presented by language ability, access to employment, institutional barriers, and perceptions about race/ethnicity of immigrants. The ethnographic study additionally revealed the importance of cultural allies who helped facilitate the new arrival's immersion process into the host society. Barriers is something the makes it difficult or blocks something from happening or being achieved. Barriers in integration can happen at multiple levels and are often cultural and established as practices that connect to organizational and bureaucratic arrangements that maintain the social expectations of behavior. Many integration barriers are established arrangements and practices that are not internally controlled by one person, but instead derive from entrenched practices. The hurdle that immigrants have to overcome is understanding the barriers and jumping past them. Everyone whom I interviewed who had a high-paying job, spoke the host language fluently, and felt like they belonged had two things in common, they were self-motived people and/or they had a cultural ally. A cultural ally is someone willing to support another person in order to remove external barriers that

prevent that person from using their skills and abilities to succeed in a community. They are showing the new arrival the way so that they understand the rules of the society.

Social rules in Scandinavia play in important part of successful integration. As mentioned in the first chapter, Jante law is a code of conduct in most Nordic countries that emphasis the importance of not doing things out of the ordinary or being overtly personally ambitious. This law promotes the notion of having just enough and not thinking that you are special or better than anyone else around you. The cultural compass sets average as a goal and discourages individual success. This is not to say that people in Nordic countries are not successful, however, they must be humble about their success and express modesty in their achievements. For instance, the founder of Ikea, Ingvar Kamprad took the bus everywhere in Sweden. In an interview he attributed his success to being humble and never giving his employees the impression that he was more important than them. Kamprad died on January 27, 2018 when I first arrived in Sweden for research, he was worth 59 billion dollars. Jante law ties also into the success of social welfare in Nordic countries because people are used to living modest lifestyles, they are more willing to share in high taxes to benefit the good of the society as a whole.[298] Anyone who transgresses against Jante law are held with suspicion and hostility as it goes against the society's social stability and sense of harmony. The immigrants who could understand these concepts related to social cohesion did very well in the society, immigrants who did not adhere to these rules were outsiders. A barrier to integration was not understanding required behaviors and expectations of the host societies.

[298] Booth, *Almost Nearly Perfect People The Truth about the Nordic Miracle*.

Integration is the core theme presented throughout this project. I opened all of the interviews with the question, “What is integration to you?”. The answers varied from each respondent, but one that stuck out to me the most came from a Vietnamese woman who moved to a small town in Denmark in the late 1980s with her parents, grandparents, Aunt, and her siblings. They were part of the 800,000-boat people who fled Vietnam between 1975-1995 by boat and ship after the Vietnam War. She was lucky to have all over her family members survive the boat ride when they landed in southeast Asia. Her family members lived in a refugee camp until they were settled in West Germany before they got refugee status and then were finally settled in a small town in the southern part of Denmark. Today, Denmark has about 14,669 Vietnamese people living in its territory and most of them came for humanitarian reasons. The person I interview, whom I will call Linh, was in her second year of medical school when I met her. She was married to an ethnic Dane. She was getting ready to go on maternity leave from medical school in expectation of her first child. I met Linh at mutual friend’s housewarming party. This friend suggested that I speak to Linh about integration because of her background as a refugee and because she had strong opinions about integration. Linh and I arranged to meet at a coffee shop in central Copenhagen the following week.

I met Linh at a trendy coffee shop near her medical school. She got there before me and was waiting near the front of the coffee bar when I arrived. The coffee shop had a warm feel to it with a combination of copper, brass, and wood accents. The coffee bar was wooden and set on a platform and behind the counter the baristas were preparing coffee and food. I ordered a delicious ham sandwich with vegetables, coffee, and a cookie. Linh ordered the combination of something similar: sandwich, coffee, sugary

snack. We sat down and started the interview right away. She was on her lunch break and had to go back to the hospital after an hour. I could tell the Linh was a little nervous because she kept peeking at me as I pulled out my recording device. I explain to her that everything would be confidential. She smiled mentioned that her sister interviewed people for her Ph.D. research and that her sister paid she and her husband to transcribe them. She then laughed at me and said, "You are going to have a lot of work to do transcribing all of your interviews." I smiled and mentioned that transcribing was my least favorite part of research and that I would use a similar method that her sister used. We smiled and that seemed to break the ice.

The first question I asked Linh was about integration. I wanted to know what integration meant to her. She said that integration was about a relationship and people supporting you to help you adjust to a new country. Integration was about "a community of people who welcomes and shows you how to adapt to the new country." She attributed her success in getting into medical school, her parents and grandparents' successes in Denmark to their neighbors. She said their success was beyond initiatives of the government, she related it to her neighbors who took the approach of not trying to change them or their view on the world, instead her neighbors slowly introduced them to the new world where they lived.

> We had this amazing family [in my town]. This guy who worked in the army in Denmark. When he got older he started a driver's education school. He took my whole crazy family, I have five aunts and two uncles, my grandparents, my parents, [to learn how to drive]. He was like, to be able to work in Denmark and to function in Denmark, you need to drive a car. He took the whole family under his wings, and we of course paid for the driver's course, but he was constantly patient. [My family] didn't know the language well, so he had to do it in English. Considering that this was 27 years ago, it was definitely harder [for him]. But, he was just adamant. For example, my

> grandfather failed the test like three times or something like that, and my mom to, but he was constantly adamant until they succeeded. And, now he's is a family friend. Every year he insists that he's family and he brings a big bag of Danish Christmas candies. Until we were 15 he gave my mom 100 kroner for each of us to buy gifts because he considered us to be his relatives. He has been to every family wedding. He was at my wedding. The fact that he said OK, let me walk this way with you so that you have a driver's license is so practical, right?

Another neighbor helped them as well. When Linh's family first arrived in Denmark they were placed in the richest area in their town because it was the only house available that could fit a large family. Their neighbor was very rich, and he really liked her father. The neighbor did not have a son but considered Linh's father like a son. He helped her father understand finances and how to manage the Danish system. Her father also helped the older neighbor around his house fixing things that needed repair. Their relationship was a close bond—like a father son relationship. When the rich neighbor passed away, the pastor who officiated the funeral read a note from the deceased man that said he considered her father like a son. Both these families helped Linh's family because, she believes, the neighbors were open to people with diverse backgrounds and her family was also open to different cultures. She said the following

> If you are an immigrant and there is no body there to show you the way or to welcome you, you will be standing on the outside looking in. The rhetoric [they use today] is harsh, harsh, harsh. [They say] you're just a problem, you're taking all the money, and so many things are wrong because you are here. Constantly being faced with the fact that you are different. You look different and then of course you need to find your group who feel the same way. Instead [Danes] should say I'll just show you and help you.

Linh is a prime example of someone who is successfully integrated in Denmark. She speaks Danish flawlessly. She will earn a high income as a medical doctor. She respects Danish cultures and traditions. She is Christian and she feels very Danish.

However, she realized a few years ago that the immigrants that they were talking about in the media, was her. She said, "I just realized something a couple years ago and I was so sad. I just looked at my husband and said to him, I think I have always considered immigrants not me. I have always considered everybody else, but I am just as much as an immigrant as the Muslim girl who comes here because of work. They are actually talking about me." She went on to say that the she understands why Muslims in Denmark are so angry and why it is easy for them to hate. Because, no matter how hard they fight to belong, to prove that they are not bad, Danes always hold it against them. She said, "I remember when I was younger my dad told me, you know you always have to fight a little harder because we live here. I was like I don't get that. I thought it was so unfair, because like I didn't decide to move here, even though it's easier for me because I am Asian, I didn't decide to move here you decided for me."

A interesting aspect to what Linh mentions, is that it is easier for her to live in Denmark because she is Asian compared to other ethnic groups. I heard this repeated throughout Denmark. In fact, the Queen Margrethe II of Denmark in 2016, in a memoir co-written with journalist Larsen, mentioned that certain groups like Southeast Asians refugees were more easily integrated in Denmark than other groups because of their calm demeanor and orderly way of organizing themselves.[299] Likewise, an ethnic Danish male I interviewed said that he did not think his daughter would have difficulty being accepted in Danish society because she is half Asian.

> Her mother comes from a generation of adopted Koreans. I think the Danes are used to that and that helps a lot. Plus, she [my daughter] is pale

[299] Thomas Larsen and Margrethe II, *De dybeste rødder: dronningen fortæller om Danmark og danskerne*, 1st ed. (Gyldendal, 2016).

> like me with blue eyes so ethnically she will be alright. I am not worried about that. She looks very white so not everyone notices that she has something else like Asian. I think to some extent Danes think that it is something cool about mixed cultures mixed race. I'd like to think that and particularly with Asian mix. I have thought about her being bullied in school because she just started, but I don't think so. There are a handful of other kids like her that are mixed with Danish and Asian.

Later, I found that Denmark per capita has the highest number of adoptees from South Korea in the world, 9,297 came between 1965 and 2008 according to the South Korean Ministry of Health and Affairs in 2009.[300] This father was not concerned about his daughter fitting in to Denmark because she had light skin and eyes, which is a clear indication that skin color and features are considered when thinking of acceptance in Denmark on equal terms as Danes.

The main takeaway that Linh brings to this discussion of integration is the concept of allowing immigrants to maintain their culture, but also understanding that a cultural ally is important for success.. In Linh's case, her neighbors helped them learn about Denmark—he was their cultural ally. She shared with me another story about adjusting to her small town in Denmark. Her parents, when they first moved to Denmark, always kept their curtains closed. The neighbors around them were getting suspicious of her family and assumed that they were hiding something or planning something evil for the town. It was not until their friendly retired army neighbor told them that they had to leave their curtains open at all times that they realized this was a tradition or cultural norm in Denmark. In fact, must Danes leave their curtains open because it is very dark in

[300] Parents who could not have children in Denmark from 1965-2008 adopted children from South Korea. Today, there are a lot of fertility services in Denmark that helps with these issues, so parents are using alternative methods in place of adoption.

Denmark during the winter, the homes are usually designed to let in a lot of natural light. Without insider information about this practice in Denmark, it would be very difficult for new arrivals to integrate. Integration is a two-way street where the new arrival has to adjust to the new environment and the host society has to adjust as well and help immigrants. Cultural allies play a crucial role in helping immigrants.

Connecting Integration Barriers to Race and Ethnicity

Muslims in Europe have gotten a horrible representation stemming from increased terrorist attacks on European soil. According to Religion Monitor in 2018, Muslims were often frustrated by discrimination in the labor market and they want to practice their religion without it hindering their careers. Muslims are more likely to live parallel lives rather than join a community as a result of feeling isolated. Cultural allies are just as important for Muslim's but more often than not they are not living or working in integrated communities. This deals with not only structural issues when the governments in Denmark and in Sweden instituted a long-term practice of placing refugees in the same neighborhoods, but it goes even beyond that because not all immigrants were placed in immigrant majority communities as indicated my Linh from Vietnam. I conducted an interview with a third-generation ethnic Kurdish woman, whom I will call Awira, whose grandparents immigrated from Turkey in the 1970s. She grew up in a small town in Denmark where the majority of her family lives today.

Her grandfathers on both sides immigrated to Denmark from Turkey as migrant workers and brought their wives and family members later. Her parents were born in Denmark and she was also born in Denmark. She was raised in a small town in the manner of any ethnic Danish child: celebrating Christmas and eating pork. Her childhood

was virtually absent of any real religious values or ethnic values linking her to her Turkish, Kurdish, or Muslim background. I met her in the Fall 2008 when she was 18 years old. Her dark hair and almond skin-color made me think she was Bulgarian when I first met her, but when she explained she was from Denmark, I realized that she was an ethnic minority in her home country just like me. I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Bulgaria while she was doing a leap year through the Erasmus Program, the EU education abroad and volunteer program for young people. We became very close while I was wrapping up my time in Bulgaria. I might have been the first African American she met, and she certainly was the first Turkish Dane I had ever met in my life. She spent another six months in Bulgaria and then she travelled to Indonesia for an additional six months before returning to Denmark.

I kept in contact with her over the years through Facebook, and when I decided to do research about immigrant integration in Scandinavia, I messaged her. I knew from her Facebook posts that she was wearing a hijab now and that she had converted to Islam. I also saw that she was married to a Muslim man who had two children with his previous wife. The person I met ten years prior was no-longer the wide-eyed secular teenager but was a full-fledged adult Muslim woman. I messaged Awira in 2016 when I arrived in Denmark for preliminary research. We made plans to meet but she cancelled because her husband's son had died the day we were supposed to meet from a heart murmur while he was at school. I expressed my condolences and told her to take care of her family and that to keep in contact with me to let me know how they were all doing. A year later, I was eventually able to meet with Awira for the first time in ten years. I messaged her when I was back in Denmark to ask how her family was doing and to see if she wanted to meet.

She responded immediately and suggested a vegan restaurant in a trendy area of Copenhagen called Norrebro. She wanted to go there because the food would be healthy, and she did not have to worry about pork being used in the ingredients. We met and talked for at least two hours. It was wonderful to catch up with her and to learn that her family was coping with the death of her husband's son. She mentioned that we needed to meet again, and we made arrangements to meet at her house for the in-depth interview the next week.

As I made plans to visit Awira in her home, I started to get a little afraid. I looked on google maps to see where she lived, and it was about a 20-minute train ride outside of Copenhagen in one of the poorest suburbs of the city. I did not want a rendition of events that I had experienced in Malmo and I knew that recently gun violence had become very prominent in Copenhagen. In fact, a fellow Fulbrighter from New York City had called me Saturday to say that he was on the bus on the way back to his neighborhood north of Mjolnerparken, the most dangerous in Copenhagen, when he saw a group of guys chasing another guy and shooting at him. My friend was surprised because we were in Denmark. The summer we were in Denmark there were 15 instances of gun violence in Copenhagen. Although there were no deaths associated with the shootings, the government investigated 25 different addresses associated with gangs and drug violence. I knew that Awira was not involved with gangs, but I was concerned about getting home too late from visiting her. She suggested that we meet in the morning, because her husband's other child lived with them now and she needed to get him from school so earlier would be better for both of us.

It took me about an hour to get to her home. She met me at the train station on her bike. She was wearing a hijab that covered her hair and a baggy dark blue ankle length dress over lose fitting black cotton pants. She had on no makeup, but she still looked very beautiful in her conservative baggy clothes. It was about 10 am and she suggested that we go for a walk around her neighborhood for a few hours and then we could head to her house for lunch. In a similar vein as my friend in Malmo, she asked me to notice that the majority of people around us were not ethnic Danes. She gave me the history of the neighborhood and said that it used to be a town for Danish people who worked in factories. They were usually low-income earners and that the neighborhood had slowly been replaced with immigrants over the years. She was not from this town, but her husband grew up here and felt very comfortable in the neighborhood. We visited the local library that she described as a wonderful place for children. We visited a local park near the a river water, and we talked about our lives after Bulgaria.

I learned from my friend that her conversion process to Islam was difficult for her family. Although her parents and grandparents are Turkish Kurds, they had no religious ties to Islam beyond cultural practices. In fact, her parents are atheists and her siblings either converted to Christianity or are not religious. Her brother is married to a Ghanaian woman who was born and raised in Denmark, they attend Christian services regularly, and her sister is married to an ethnic Dane and they are not religious. My friend's parents tried to persuade her not to become Muslim because they felt that she would be stigmatized in Denmark as the society had become generally unwelcoming for Muslims. When she told them that she was Muslim and that this would not change, they tried to convince her that she should not wear a hijab even if she decided to be Muslim. None of

it work. She joined a Mosque, started practicing Islam, and wearing conservative clothing. At this point it was about noon, so we headed to her apartment for lunch.

Her apartment complex was indicative of many apartment buildings I had visited in Europe. It was nice, clean, and comfortable, but basic in many ways. The neighborhood reminded me of clean "project" buildings in the US when they were built in the 1960s and 1970s to house factory workers in major cities. Her building was a large brick building that had at least 100 units in one complex. The majority of people in her building were immigrants and their descendants. We took the elevator upstairs and that was also clean and functioning. Her apartment building was really nice even if it did not have all the bells and whistles of higher-income neighborhoods. We talked more about her conversion to Islam as she prepared lunch. She had the following to say about converting is Islam and radicalization.

> I think when I converted, I was also in a risk group of being radicalized. What prevented me from not being radicalized, maybe it's just me and I'm just analyzing now, but what protected me is that I went to different places and went to different mosques and I met different people. And when I developed in my own religion, I found out that the other mosque that I went to first had some opinions that are different from this mosque. I listened to both of the opinions. I actually thought oh that this new place is actually better with their opinions. I think because I went to a different Mosque and met different people, I was protected from becoming radical.

When I asked her why she converted to Islam, she mentioned that she felt like she belonged and that she was welcomed into the religion. She also said that her experience in Indonesia in 2008 after she left Bulgaria created a curiosity in her to explore Islam because of the Muslim women she met there were really nice, and she respected them. Once she converted to Islam and started wearing a scarf, people treated her differently in

Denmark. Now, several times a month people would tell her that she was free now and that she did not need to wear a hijab. We talked about the impact of these words on her as a third-generation Dane. She said that it made her feel isolated from the society and the only country she has ever known. She expressed that if people actually treated her as a Dane, she might start to feel like one and feel accepted in society. She hoped that her children in the future would be accepted as Danish. From her interview and many others, I learned that there are racial tensions that run deep in Denmark. People with immigrant backgrounds largely do not feel like they are accepted in society, particularly Muslims.

Her husband came home from work early. By this time, it was 2:30 in the afternoon. His mother brought his son home from school a little after he arrived. He is Chilean descent, but he was born in Denmark to parents who were refugees fleeing Pinochet's regime in the 1980s. He spoke Spanish to his mother, Danish to my friend, and English with me. It was a beautiful example of diversity that exists in Denmark. His mother wanted to take the son shopping for shoes, so the little boy left with his grandmother. At this time, I asked my friend and her husband about the loss of their other son last year. They said that it was very difficult for the family. His ex-wife gave him all parental rights to the other son and left Denmark. She supposedly moved to Turkey, but, my friend and her husband suspected that she had married an ISIS fighter in her grief and was somewhere in Syria. They did not like to talk about it in front of their son because he had already lost his brother just a year prior. They told their son that his mother was in Turkey. The mother would sometimes call to talk to her son, but they told her not to give the son details about where she was or what she was doing.

My friend's husband converted to Islam as a teenager because most of his neighbors where Muslims and he felt connected to the faith. He was studying to become a dentist, a profession that many educated Muslim men pursue in Scandinavia. They invited me to stay for dinner because at this point it was 5pm in the evening. I wanted to learn more about my friend's husband, so I asked him about his integration process being a Latino Muslim in Denmark. I was fascinated by his response. He mentioned that initially when people met him they assumed he was Turkish or from the Middle East because of his tan skin and beard, but when they learned of his Chilean background, they were always more welcoming towards him. He said that he got better treatment as an ethnic Chilean because the values in Chile were seen as more similar to Denmark than Turkish or Middle Eastern backgrounds. However, he noted that since he did not drink alcohol as a Muslim, he felt isolated at work. No one invited to social events because they did not want to offend him. He said that he would be willing to go and drink water or juice, but they never invited him.

My friend Awira and her husband's experiences in Denmark as a third- and second-generation Danes, was fascinating. I could tell that she had a similar awakening to realizing that she was considered in immigrant in the same way that Linh had when she realized that she too was considered an immigrant. Awira had the following to say about immigration.

> Why are people so afraid of getting immigrants to Denmark? Of course, we should take care of our economy and everything but the way they see immigrants now, I think it's actually a bit of racist way of seeing immigrants. I mean they don't see them as human beings. Because if you see them as human beings you would like for them what you like for yourself. For third-generations or second-generations like me it's easier [to be integrated]. We know the language and we are grown up here, so we

> can get a good education and we can get integrated in that way. But still the whole way that the Danes maybe see me is that I'm still different and I feel different. I think maybe other people would not see me as integrated because of my background mainly because I wear a scarf because I'm different from the majority.

She interestingly places herself as different from immigrants but at the same time sees herself as connected to them. She speaks fluent Danish, so life is easier for her. She is a third-generation immigrant who grew up in Denmark, so she understands Danish culture without difficulty. However, her religion marks her as different and she and her husband live in a parallel society not only marked by where they live but also in how they are excluded from communities at work. Understanding diversity and accepting others as members of a community is difficult. Racism and discrimination according to people I interviewed was something that they experience regularly as sometimes people can be insensitive to their cultures and religion.

Several immigrants interviewed for the research project spoke about the negative perception Danes had of their culture. An African woman I interviewed said that she divorced her husband of twenty years because of the tensions she felt with her husband's family and her own African culture. She came from a middle-class well-educated Zambian family. She attended boarding schools with foreigners in Zambia and received a university education from the United Kingdom; her ex-husband did not attend university and was from a small town. Her ex-mother-in-law would say to her, "In Denmark speak Danish." She was expected to put her African heritage aside to be part of Denmark. She said that once in a while she wanted speak English, her language of education, or speak her own native African language. She said, "If you feel unwanted by the majority in that country where you are living, then you don't really make an effort to try and mix because

they are not making the effort to understand you. Then if you're being attacked all the time and hearing that through the media you are not welcomed, I think it's makes it difficult to survive in Denmark."

I interview Dr. René León Rosales, who is the research director at the Mångkulturellt centrum (Multicultural Center) in Stockholm. He has an immigrant background from South America but has lived in Sweden since childhood. I asked him about integration in Sweden, which can also apply to issues in Denmark. During the interview he had the following powerful words to say about racism in the Sweden from his personal experiences and also as he saw reflected in his research.

> The notion of being a migrant is really connecting to skin color. So even if you're born here with parents who were born abroad or maybe they were born here, but whose skin color is different [and] you don't have the normative Swedish physic, they ask you where you are from. I can see that you're not from here, so where are you from? And a lot of activists are talking about the notion of everyday racism. I think in the US you have notions of microaggression. There is a reaction to that question because basically what you're saying is, I see that you're not white, so you know your body does not belong to this place. So, for me in the everyday life we have in our perception the world is managed also by patterns where we connect bodies with places. We react where bodies are out of order. You know? You see some bodies that you really don't think that kind of body belongs here. For a lot of people here [in Sweden] the bodies that are naturally connected to this landscape are white bodies and this is really implicit. Implicit, in a way that it's not often problematized.

Dr. Rosales's view on successful integration was different from my own because he did not believe immigrants ever completely were integrated irrespective of their education level or income. He had the following to say "I'm not a researcher in this area and I've not done an advance political or social analysis, but often many educated people [and high-income earners] feel really frustrated by how they are treated. Although they are well-educated and although they're really smart, they find themselves in

[uncomfortable] situations that they kind of don't want to accept." This uncomfortable situations often refer to being treated differently like Awira's husband who was never invited to go out afterwork with his colleagues. In some cases, having an accent when you speak the host language makes people automatically assume that you do not understand them or speak their language. In many ways Dr. Rosales is correct about integration never fully being achievable because the person who is different will always be marked by their dissimilarities. Integration however, in a monetary sense, is achievable as more people with immigrant backgrounds can access better jobs and not have to live in poverty. I turn in the next section to employment and continue with the theme of cultural ally and self-determination as a method for immigrants be integrated.

Immigrant's Access to Employment

I started this chapter about my friend who I met in Chicago a decade ago and I will end with his story of integration. My friend immigrated from East Africa to Sweden in 1987. He was about 7 years old when his parents fled Eritrea for political reasons. His family initially lived in a small-town in Scania (a region in Southern Sweden), but eventually they moved to Malmo to be in a more diverse community. He spent the formulative years of his childhood in the poorest suburbs of Malmo with people from Africa, Bosnia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia etc. His childhood neighborhood is infamous for its high crime, high unemployment rates, and diversity. The neighborhood is the largest immigrant community in Sweden—80 to 90 percent of the people living there are immigrants and their descendants. Most of the people in the neighborhood are impoverished. Yet, my friend is very successful in Sweden despite being from that neighborhood. He and his wife, who is also Eritrean, studied in the United States for their

bachelors and master's degrees and returned to Sweden to take various management positions in their professions. When I asked him about integration and barriers in Sweden, he had the following to say.

> Of course, in a way there's a lot of barriers in society for people who are not of that society, but those barriers can and are broken at all times by people who push the barriers. And if you push enough in the right way, at least in Sweden, they can't legally stop you from getting a degree, it's your human right. And if you get a degree, you can apply for jobs. And, people [immigrants] will say, "Well, yes I have a degree, but no one will hire me." And then they give reasons as to [why by saying] well my name is different." I know a guy, back when I was younger, who finished high school and got a [Bachelor's] degree. His name was Muhammad, first name. He applied for jobs and couldn't get jobs to the point where he changed his first name. In some sense I think it worked for him. [However], I felt really sad for him. I really did. And I understand him, but in that same time I know other Muhammads who have jobs; I truly do. So, I don't know if it's systemic because if other Muhammads have gotten jobs, but he didn't, does that mean the system is not for all Muhammads? But yes, there are barriers, I won't lie. Some have had it easier than others, but the consensus is that [everyone] has to push and eventually you will break the barrier.

The majority of immigrants I interviewed in Sweden talked about their rights to education, their rights to equal treatment, and their rights to access to employment in association with their human rights. Immigrants recognized that racism and discrimination exist in Sweden, but they also have a sense of self-advocacy because they could call upon the law and their basic human rights to challenge systems of oppression. My friend had the following to say about racism and discrimination in related to jobs.

> I think systemic treatment [discrimination] is hard to break. That's why I say you as an individual have to be strong and don't let the system, I know is cliché, but don't the system break you. Instead let it be a motivational factor. Again, even though there are systemic breaks in society you still have the legal rights, if you know them, to obtain the things you want to attain within the law. You have to become knowledgeable. I've worked my way up from the 'gutter' in Sweden, bad neighborhoods, into where I am today. And if I had let the system tell me that this is not possible, or

> individuals tell me that this is not possible, I wouldn't be here today. I can promise you that. I chose to stand up for myself. It's not like it [biased systemic and individual treatment] was evident and visual for me either, but you feel it of course but then I don't let it bother me. I didn't let it break me.

In this sense, he is alluding to Sweden's history of strong multicultural policies that have promoted the ideas of right for all people living and working in Sweden irrespective of their immigrant or minority background. My friend also mentioned that he understood Swedish people. He understood the Jante law and being humble in his interactions with people. He had a respect for Swedish people and their society, and he has a respect for his own cultural background. He was able to succeed in Sweden, because he was determined to do so. He listened to the wise advice from work mentors that he had in the United States and he also had close friends in Sweden who mentored him to having a leading position at a prominent university in Stockholm despite systemic barriers.

In conclusion, the goal of this chapter was to discuss results from my participant observations. Immigrant integration was introduced from the perspective of immigrants in Denmark and Sweden. The field study revealed the importance of understanding expectations in Danish and Swedish societies, the important role of cultural allies, and the importance of self-determination. Feeling welcomed in a community is contingent upon the political climate at the time. Islamic values are pivoted against western values, because of the rise of terrorism in Western Europe perpetrated by Jihadists since 2001. The media positions that argued that Muslims are not integrated because their culture and religion are not compatible with Western cultural values. However, Muslims historically in Western countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have been

very well integrated both socially and economically into the fabrics of society. It has been only recently that Islam and immigration have become a prominent debate in Europe.

Immigrants in Denmark and Sweden recognized that racism existed in their host countries. However, Swedish immigrants talked a lot about their rights and did not necessarily associate racism or discrimination to their ability to succeed in the country. Many of the people I spoke to in Sweden saw genotype as an important factor to feeling like they were native to the country, but they all recognized that they had rights in Sweden. They understood that under the law, all Swedes, citizens and residents alike, were supposed to be treated equally. Therefore, when the Migration Policy Index (MPI) ranked Swedish integration and migration policy as number one in the world, in many ways, that is valid. Immigrants feel empowered by the multicultural policies and that they have a right to work, to education, to healthcare, etc. Sweden succeeds in the way. In practice, there is a tremendous hurdle that immigrants have to overcome, which requires them to understand Swedish cultures and traditions and fit in the mode of what it means to be Sweden, which is embedded in Jante law.

Denmark appears to be very different from Sweden in terms of how immigrants interpreted racism and discrimination. The Danish immigrants I interview thought that there was a general distain for immigrants, particularly Muslims, in Denmark. They liken this distain to issues of racism and discrimination and the lack of respect for diverse cultures. The larger issue, as addressed in Chapter II, is Denmark's attempt to maintain its very existence since it is such as small country and massive migration could impact Danish culture and tradition. It also goes to Denmark's political stances in relation to terrorism, the country promoting the controversial cartoons in claims of freedom and

speech, and so forth. Nonetheless, every person I interviewed in Denmark felt integrated when they had Danish friends who explained cultural nuances and expectations to them. They also felt integrated when their own cultures were respected by Danes.

The Danish government interprets integration from the lens of sameness. Membership to the society is granted based upon how an immigrant can adapt to the Danish language and accept Danish cultural values. The government perceives integration as a set of policies that helps immigrants adapt to Danish culture and values so that they can accept the Danish way of life. The Swedish government sees integration as a set of rights that provide equal opportunities to immigrants. It is a rights-based system in Sweden while in Denmark it is a system that facilitates sameness. In both cases immigrants, nonetheless, have to adapt to the state and the immigrant's culture is secondary to the goals of the state. The following chapter provides the concluding remarks to this dissertation.

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

I started this dissertation talking about the puzzle that Denmark and Sweden present to the world. Denmark, since 2001, has chosen to implement assimilationist policies, while Sweden has maintained multicultural policies; yet they are getting similar results to their integration progress. The OCED has reported high instances of long-term poverty for immigrants in both countries compared to other developed nations and to the native populations in Denmark and Sweden. This dissertation sought to study these countries' policies, societies, and history more closely to understand why this was occurring. By selecting just two cases (Denmark and Sweden) and analyzing them in great detail, I could better identify conditions and procedures that were linked to successful or failed outcomes related to immigrant integration.

As Peter Katzenstein (1985) and Ernst Gellner (1983) outlined in their research, small homogenous societies gained strength and economic wealth because there were no minorities to challenged dominant social structures and policies early in the industrialization period or in the early history of the countries. Countries like Denmark and Sweden created innovative industrialized institutions because minorities were not there to object to the goals of the homogenous group. Although their theory suggests that everyone in a homogenous society will think and act similar and that women will have similar ideas to men, which is problematic., there is still something to their argument. Denmark and Sweden have become diverse societies, and this project indicated that institutions, policies, and social behavior were socially constructed over time in these countries and were conducive towards people who could fit into the "in-group." Others

who could not "fit-in" tended to be the poorest in the societies and experience the politics of belonging as an out-group. I presented in this study that the institutional structure of integration policies, both formal and informal, are not helping build social capital and the socioeconomic status of non-Western immigrants.

An important aspect of this study involves the "politics of belonging" and "belonging." The notion of belonging is very different for people associated with diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds and with different ages, gender, sexuality, etc.—the experience of belonging is multilayered and can cover a multitude of experiences in different scenarios.[301] Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrated that not only do integration approaches seem related to national identity, but that as Benedict Anderson (1983) argued, nationalism is not based on rationality but links to modernization, international threats from the outside world, industrialization, and capitalism. "Belonging" is different from the "politics of belonging," as the politics of belonging operates under the assumption of imagined communities that supports nationalism and barriers to outsiders.[302] Nationalism promotes an idealized relationship to the state for its members and creates politics of belonging by isolating non-members through restrictive policies, negative rhetoric, and isolation. Nationalism is similar to familial and religious attachment where there is no rational reason and self-interest necessarily involved, beyond protecting the interest of the group. Belonging, on the other hand, relates to social locations, identification, and emotional attachments, and ethical and political values.[303] A

[301] Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging"; Masuoka and Junn, *The Politics of Belonging*.
[302] Anderson, *Imagined Communities.*
[303] Masuoka and Junn, *The Politics of Belonging*.

non-Western immigrant can feel emotionally attached to their communities, their neighborhoods, and even the country in which they dwell, but the "politics of belonging" can hinder their political engagement, entitlement, and status in the host community.

The findings from my research illuminated connections between nation-building and the politics of belonging to historical myths and to current integration policies in Denmark and Sweden. I argued that Denmark and Sweden are getting similar policy outcomes even though they used very different integration policies because informal and formal policies are barriers to non-Western immigrants. This study argued that there is a gap between the goals of integration policies and the outcome in immigrant communities. I found that socially constructed practices and institutions trumped integration policies, which created the similarities in outcomes in the two countries. The study highlights that by changing integration requirements, and by loosening standards explicitly established for non-Western immigrants, better integration could happen for new arrivals in Europe.

Limitation of the Study

With every research project, there are limitations. Amongst the various limitations of this study, the data are not representative of the entire immigrant or native population in Denmark, Sweden, Europe, or the world. The survey and the fieldwork provided insight into the topic of immigrant integration but did not explain the specific behavior of all immigrants in the world let alone all immigrants in each country. The categories of integration such as civic engagement, economic status, education attainment, linguistic and spatial integration, are not all perfect indicators of integration because the native populations could also suffer in these areas and they do suffer in these areas.

Furthermore, this study focuses on socioeconomic integration and a little on spatial integration, which could create blind spots in the analysis. Other studies could do a more in-depth analysis of other integration markers. By no means does this study answer all questions about immigrant integration or immigration policies. It provided a simple insight into a huge issue.

An additional limitation is the demographic of people included in the project. The study focuses on people who have already established themselves in the host country, meaning that they have lived in Denmark or Sweden for at least seven years. It also looks at the opinion of the native population. Researching recent arrivals might be useful to fully understand the process of integration from the beginning stages to the end. Furthermore, the study does not focus on the agency of immigrants themselves. Although it discusses immigrants and takes statements from them, it misses their agency in their own struggle for social capital and belonging. Future projects should consider including this as a factor of the immigrant integration process.

The last limitation I want to discuss concerns terminology related to assimilation, multiculturalism, and integration. Chapter 2 goes through the various points at which the debates move away from assimilation to multiculturalism and how the center of this very debate concerns issues of integration, social inclusion, and belonging. Framing integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, belonging, etc. is difficult because they are understood differently in various cultural contexts. The way one defines each term may impact the results of a study. I define integration from an economic perspective in terms of socioeconomic integration because that is how it is discussed today, which could generate specific results in the study. If a different study interprets integration differently,

they will come up with different results. Although this study does have some limitations, the findings here are rich and contribute greatly to immigration and integration literature.

The Future Impact of the Study

Globalization has changed the world we live in to be more interconnected and diverse than ever before. I discussed in the introduction chapter that 258 million people had settled internationally. More people are moving now than ever before, although it is only 4 percent of the world's population who settled internationally. However, the majority of immigrants moved to seven countries; the US, Germany, Russia, the UK, China, France, and Canada. Although Denmark and Sweden are not the top destinations for most people migrating abroad, they are a top destination in the West for people leaving their home countries for humanitarian reasons. As more people move abroad and more wars create displaced people, it will be imperative to create a two-way integration process that will help immigrants thrive in their new societies and the host societies to adapt to new arrivals.

Social welfare countries like Denmark and Sweden needs immigrants. The populations are aging, and young people do not have as many children as did in the past. Immigrants provide a great source of labor mainly when they contribute more economically to the governments than what they receive. A significant issue in Scandinavian countries is the perception that immigrants receive more government subsidies than native populations. Problems occur because people who arrived for humanitarian reasons tend to rely on government aid for at about a decade before they can provide for themselves. Since, this is the largest immigrant population in the

countries, outside of Western EU immigrants, it becomes more expensive for the government to house humanitarian immigrants and, as a result, the host populations have become more resentful towards them. Ten years of dependence on government stipends puts the immigrant into long term poverty, so it is not a good practice for them to remain on government subsidies long-term, although it might be necessary while they adjust to their new countries.

Immigrant integration should be a two-way process in which the receiving society and immigrants adapt to each other. Immigrants have been pressed to adapt to new host societies through language, education, work, and cultural immersion programs, which are all important, but integration policies fail to recognize the role of the state to help the native population adapt to new arrivals. This study did a close analysis of integration requirements and showed the potential barriers for immigrants. Particularly, if the goal is to get immigrants into viable jobs, then the introduction programs need to be shorter. Furthermore, governments need to ensure that all people in a society feel respected and accepted; immigrants should feel like they fully belong in the host society. A central theme in this study also addressed the massive importance of national identity and socially constructed myths that eroded multicultural integration programs such as the program in Sweden. If the idea that national identities are socially constructed is taken as truth, then the state can reconstruct national identity to be inclusive of diverse people.[304]

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[304] William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Siniša Malešević, *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 5–40; Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Diana Sze Man Kwan, "Social Construction of National Identity: Taiwanese versus Chinese Consciousness," *Social Identities* 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 33–52.

To help incorporate immigrants into society and to create "belonging," the state must address cultural and historical myths that support homogeneity. In response, governments need to create new socially constructed ideas that support diversity in the globalized world. This study indicated that political institutions and socially constructed ideas trumped integration policies. A significant way to address socially constructed ideas about who belongs and nationalism in a society is through education and textbooks.[305] This means that textbooks that support diversity and inclusion need to be implemented from the elementary school level through the university level to promote positive messages about diverse people living in a society who are not ethnically European and/or Christian. It worked when Europe was restructuring itself to become the EU after the Second World War, and it can work again to establish non-Western immigrants as equals to Europeans. There needs to be room for immigrants to be entirely accepted in a host society no matter their genotype or religion. If the goal is to promote human rights for all people, then acceptance of difference is crucial, especially if immigrants are to feel at home in their new countries.

[305] Lynn Davies, "Educating against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicisation of Young People," *International Review of Education / Internationale Zeitschrift Für Erziehungswissenschaft / Revue Internationale de l'Education* 55, no. 2/3 (2009): 183–203; Volker R. Berghahn, *Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States*, ed. Hanna Schissler, First Edition edition (New York, New York: Berg Pub Ltd, 1988); Claudia Schneider, "The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617 (2008): 107–22.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS

FILTER QUESTIONS:

1. **To know if you are eligible for this survey, can you tell me in which year you were born?** *If you don't know, write in 9999.*

   WRITE IN YEAR: _____
   Y Y Y Y

2. **In which country where you born?** *If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

   WRITE IN Country: _____

3. **In which year did you first come to live in [country]?** *"Live" means to settle down as immigrant. It does not mean simply to visit as a tourist or for school. Write in 9999 if you don't know.*

   WRITE IN YEAR: _____
   Y Y Y Y

4. **What nationality/ies did you have when you were born?** *Nationality can be the country where you were born or your ethnic background that you got from your parents. Write in as many as necessary. Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in "Don't Know," if you don't know.*

   SEP

   WRITE IN:

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

5. **And what nationality/ies do you have today?** *Include your nationality at birth. Nationality can be the country where you were born or your ethnic background that you got from your parents. Write in as many as necessary. Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in "Don't Know," if you don't know.*

   a. _____ If you are now a national of (country), Skip Q6 and Go to Q7]

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

6. **What type of residence permit do you have now in [country]?** *Mark an "X" next to what applies to you.*

   a. ___ Work/entrepreneur

   b. ___ Study

   c. ___ Family reunification

   d. ___ Permit for relatives of an EU/EEA national

   e. ___ Permanent resident

   f. ___ EC long-term resident

   g. ___ Asylum-seeker

   h. ___ Refugee

   i. ___ Beneficiary of subsidiary protection / Other humanitarian status

   j. ___ er legal residence status (e.g. health)

   k. ___ Renewing an expir

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS:

7. **In what city or town do you live in [COUNTRY]?** *If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

WRITE IN: _____

8. **In what neighborhood do you live?** *If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

WRITE IN: _____

9. **In what municipality do you live?** *If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

WRITE IN: _____

10. **Last year, that is 2016, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes?** Mark an "X" by the option that applies to you. *If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

a. ____ 10,000 – 17,999

b. ____ 18,000 – 22,049

c. ____ 23,050 – 32,499

d. ____ 32,500 – 52,499

e. ____ 52,500 – 72, 499

f. ____ 72,500 – 99,999

g. ____ 100,000 – 149,999

h. ____ 150,000 +

i. ____ Don't know

LIFE SATISFACTION QUESTIONS:

11. **Could you please write down on a scale of 0 to 10 how satisfied you are with each of the following items?** *Where 0 means you are very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied?*

Write a number between 0 - 10 for each item. 0 = dissatisfied and 10 = very satisfied

a. Your life these days _____

b. Your present level of education _____

c. Your present job [if you are not currently working, write 55] _____

d. Your accommodation _____

e. Your family life _____

f. Your health _____

g. Your social life _____

h. Refusal [Write 88 if you don't want to answer] _____

i. Don't Know [Write 99 if you don't know] _____

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY:

12. **Have you ever applied to become a citizen of [COUNTRY]?** *Mark an "X" by one of the selections.*

a. ____ No [Skip to Question 17]

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ My parents or guardian applied for me

d. ____ I was born a citizen [Skip to Question 19)

e. ____ Refuse

f. ____ Don't know

13. **In what year did you apply for [Country] Citizenship?** *If you have applied multiple times, put the year when you first applied. If you don't know write in 9999.*

WRITE IN YEAR: _____
Y Y Y Y

14. **Which procedure did you use to get [country] nationality?** *Mark an "X" by the option that applies to you. Write in the name of other procedures not listed. If you don't know write in "Don't Know."*

a. ____ [Name of ordinary naturalization procedure]

b. ____ [Name of procedure for spouse/partner of national]

c. ____ [Name of any facilitated procedure]

d. ____ I was born with this nationality

e. Other: WRITE IN _____

f. ____ Refused

g. ____ Don't Know [1 SEP]

15. **Please mark "X" if any of the following potential problems that sometimes happen when people apply for [country] nationality happened to you.** *Mark an "X" by one of the selections. If you applied under more than one procedure, just write problems in first procedure.*

a. ____ I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing).

b. ____ I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees).

c. ____ The authorities had too much power to "do whatever they wanted."

d. ____ I did not understand the procedure/requirements.

e. ____ I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a citizen of [country].

f. ____ I had no problems applying.

g. ____ Refused

16. **What happened to your citizenship application afterwards?** *Mark an "X" by one of the selections.*

a. ____ Ultimately accepted

b. ____ Rejected

c. ____ Awaiting the response

d. ____ I refuse to answer this question

e. ____ Don't Know

17. **Do you want to become a citizen of [country]?** *Mark an "X" by one of the selections.*

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't know

18. **Which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to become a citizen of [country]?** *Mark an "X" by the selections. Please choose all that apply.*

a. ____ I cannot fulfill the requirements.

b. ____ I do not know if I fulfill the requirements.

c. ____ I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, complicated, long, expensive).

d. ____ I do not think that I will settle in (country).

e. ____ I do not think that I can keep the citizenship of my home country if I become a citizen of [country].

f. ____ I want to become a citizen.

g. ____ Refuse

h. ____ Don't Know

19. **Do you think that becoming a citizen or being a citizen helped/will help you personally to...?** *Mark an "X" by the selections. Please choose all that apply.*

a. ____ Get a job or improve your job/business

b. ____ Get more education or training

c. ____ Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political activities)

d. ____ Feel settled in [country]

e. ____ None of these

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

20. **Do you think having citizenship is necessary to improve your job/business opportunities, education or training, or community involvement?** *Mark an "X" by one of the selections.*

a. ____ Yes, having citizenship is important in [country] to have access to these.

b. ____ No, I have access to these things as a non-citizen

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

LONG-TERM RESIDENCE:

21. **Have you ever applied for a [permanent/long term residence permit] in [country]?** *Permanent/long-term residents do not need to regularly renew their*

residence permit. They have a more secure residence and many of the same rights as (country) nationals. Mark an "X" by one of the selections.

a. ____ No [Go to Questions 30]

b. ____ Yes [Go to Question 21]

c. ____ My parents or guardian applied for me [Go to Question 30]

d. ____ (Refused)

e. ____ (Don't Know) [Go to Q26]

22. **In which year did you apply for [permanent/long term residence permit] in [country]?** *If you have applied multiple times, put the year when you first applied. If you don't know write in 9999.*

WRITE IN YEAR: _____
Y Y Y Y

23. **Please tell me if any of the following potential problems that sometimes happen when people apply for a [permanent/long term residence permit] happened to you.** *Mark an "X" by the selections. Please choose all that apply.*

a. ____ I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing)

b. ____ I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees)

c. ____ The authorities had too much power to "do whatever they wanted."

d. ____ I did not understand the procedure/requirements.

e. ____ I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a citizen of [country].

f. ____ I had no problems applying.

g. ____ Refused

h. ____ Don't know

24. **What happened to your permanent/long term residence permit application afterwards?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Ultimately accepted

b. ____ Rejected

c. ____ Awaiting the response

d. ____ I refuse to answer this question

e. ____ Don't Know

25. **Do you think that becoming a permanent/long term residence helped you personally to...?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Get a job or improve your job/business

b. ____ Get more education or training

c. ____ Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political activities)

d. ____ Feel settled in [country]

e. ____ None of these

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

26. Do you want to become a permanent/long term residence of [country]? *Mark an "X" by one selection.* [SEP]

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't know

27. **Which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to become a permanent/long term residence of [country]?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ I cannot fulfill the requirements.[SEP]

b. ____ I do not know if I fulfill the requirements.

c. ____ I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, complicated, long, expensive).

d. ____ I do not think that I will settle in (country).[SEP]

e. ____ I do not think that I can keep the citizenship of my home country if I become a citizen of [country].

f. ____ I want to become a citizen.

g. ____ Refuse

h. ____ Don't Know

28. **Do you think that becoming a citizen or being a permanent/long term residence will help you personally to...?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Get a job or improve your job/business

b. ____ Get more education or training

c. ____ Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political activities)

d. ____ Feel settled in [country]

e. ____ None of these

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

29. **Do you think having permanent/long term residence is necessary to improve your job/business opportunities, education or training, or community involvement?** *Mark an X by one answer.*

a. ____ Yes, having permanent/long term residence is important in [country] to have access to these.

b. ____ No, I have access to these things as a non-permanent/long term residence

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

FAMILY REUNION

30. **Including yourself, how many people—including children—live here regularly as members of this household?** *(Please include all people, relatives or non-relatives, who live with you at the same address as your only or main residence and share the living accommodation and/or share at least one main meal a day).* *If you don't know, write in 9999.*

WRITE IN #: __ _

31. **Which of these descriptions best describe your current marital status?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Legally married or civil union

b. ____ Legally separated / divorced / Civil union dissolved [Skip to Question 34]

c. ____ Living with my partner (cohabiting)

d. ____ Widowed / Civil partner died

e. ____ None of these [Skip to Question 38]

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't know

32. What nationality/ies did your spouse/partner have when he or she was born? *If you have been married many times, write for your most current spouse/partner.*

Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in "Don't Know," if you don't know. Write in all that apply.

WRITE-IN:

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

33. **What nationality/ties does he or she have today?** *Includes nationality at birth. Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in "Don't Know," if you don't know. Write in all that apply.*

WRITE-IN:

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

FAMILY MEMBERS: The next section of questions will ask you about your family. If you have a spouse/partner, this question is about your and spouse/partner's children, including adopted. The children could be any age, over or under 18, when you applied.

34. **Since you moved to [country], did you ever have a/any your spouse/partner or children who was living outside [country]?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Yes

b. ____ No

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

35. **Have you ever applied for family reunion so that your spouse/partner or children could move to [country]?** *Family reunion means your right to sponsor your close family members to join you and live here in [country]. Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Yes

b. ____ No [Go to question 38]

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

36. **In which year did apply?** *Write in 9999 if you don't know.*

WRITE IN YEAR: _____
Y Y Y Y

37. **What happened to their application afterwards?** *(If you applied more than once or for more than one person, please answer for the 1st time.) Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Ultimately accepted

b. ____ Rejected

c. ____ Awaiting the response

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

Go to QUESTION 40.

38. **Would you like to apply for them/any of them to live here?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Yes [Go to Question 40]

b. ____ No [Go to Question 39]

c. ____ It depends on their future situation (e.g. health, personal, financial) [Go to Question 40]

d. ____ Not applicable: Family bonds ended due to e.g. death, divorce, separation. [Go to Question 40]

e. ____ Refuse [Go to Question 40]

f. ____ Don't Know [Go to Question 40]

39. **Overall, which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to apply for family reunion?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply. Go to the next section of questions beginning with Question 41*

a. ____ I have close family members who do not want to come live with me in [country].

b. ____ I cannot fulfill the requirements.

c. ____ I do not know if I fulfill the requirements.

d. ____ I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, complicated, long, expensive).

e. ____ I have close family members abroad who are already citizens of [country] or EU citizens.

f. ____ I do not think that I will settle in [country].

g. ____ Refuse

h. ____ Don't know

Go to the next section of questions beginning with Question 41

40. **Did any of the following potential problems that sometimes happen when people apply to be reunited with their family members happened to you?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing)

b. ____ I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees)

c. ____ The authorities had too much power to "do whatever they wanted."

d. ____ I did not understand the procedure/requirements.

e. ____ I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a citizen of [country].

f. ____ I had no problems applying.

g. ____ Refused

h. ____ Don't know

i. ____ Other (write-in) _____

LANGUAGE AND INTEGRATION COURSES:

41. **What is/are your mother tongue(s), the main language(s) that were spoken in your family when you were a small child?** *Write in all the different languages spoken in your family when you were a child.* [1 SEP]

WRITE-IN:

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

42. **Which other language(s) do you speak well enough to be able to have a conversation?** ***[Exclude your mother tongue(s).]***

WRITE-IN:

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

43. **Below is a list of different reasons that may discourage people from learning [country language]. Which, if any, of these would apply to you?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ I haven't time to study properly

b. ____ I am not motivated enough

c. ____ It is too expensive

d. ____ Poor teaching/boring methods/inadequate learning materials

e. ____ It's hard to find information about what's available

f. ____ I don't need to know the national language

g. ____ Refused

h. ____ Don't know

44. **Have you completed [a language/integration course provided OR funded by government] in [country]?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Yes

b. ____ No [Go to question 46]

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

45. **To what extent do you think this course helped you personally to do any of the following...** *Mark an "X" on all that apply.*

SEP

a. ____ Learn basic [language]

b. ____ Learn all the [language] that you wanted to learn

c. ____ Learn the specific [language] vocabulary that I need for my job or skills

d. ____ Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political activities)

e. ____ Refuse

f. ____ Don't Know

LABOR MARKET MOBILITY

46. Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last 7 days)? *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ in paid work or away temporarily (employee, self-employed, entrepreneur, working for your family business)

b. ____ in school (even if on vacation)

c. ____ unemployed and actively looking for a job

d. ____ unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job

e. ____ Permanently sick or disabled

f. ____ Retired

g. ____ doing housework, looking after children or other persons

h. ____ in compulsory community or military service

i. ____ Refuse

j. ____ Don't Know

47. **Which of the types of organization do you work for?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Public sector (education, health, state-owned enterprise, central or local government)

b. ____ A private firm

c. ____ Self-employed (including entrepreneur, family-owned business)

d. ____ Not-for-profit organization

e. ____ Domestic or home care

f. ____ Unemployed

g. ____ Refuse

h. ____ Don't Know

48. **Do you think that your main job here in [country] uses all the skills that you obtained in your training and work life?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ My job matches my skills & training

b. ____ My job matches my skills but is not in the area for which I trained

c. ____ My job does not require the skills & training that I have.

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

49. **Thinking about yourself, do you think that for you to keep your job or find a job soon...** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Your education and training to date is sufficient

b. ____ You need training/education but you cannot currently do this

c. ____ You need training/education and you will do so

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

f. ____ Other (write-in) _____

50. **From the following list, what are the main reasons preventing you from taking part in a training course?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ You cannot afford it

b. ____ Training conflicts with your work schedule

c. ____ You do not have time because of family responsibilities

d. ____ You do not know about any training offers

e. ____ There is no course that meets my specific needs

f. ___ I have difficulties with [country language(s)]

g. ____ You should follow training and you will do so

h. ____ Refuse

i. ____ Don't Know

51. **In total, how many years have you been in paid work?** *Count years in full or part-time work equally. For fractions of a year, if more than 6 months, count as 1 year. If less than six months, count as zero.*

WRITE IN YEARS:

a. In [country] ___ ___

b. In your country of birth ___ ___ L SEP

c. In any other country where you lived ___ ___

d. (Never had a paid job) ___ ___

e. Refused ___ ___

f. Don't know ___ ___

POLITICAL AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION:

52. Which, if any, do you belong to or do unpaid voluntary work for in

[country]? *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Political party or groups in [country] politics

b. ____ Trade unions

c. ____ Immigrant/ethnic group organization (support or promotion of groups' social, cultural, or political interests)

d. ____ Sports, Social, Professional, Humanitarian, Environmental

e. ____ Religious

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

53. **Do you know of a specific association run by immigrants or ethnic minorities in [country]?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

54. **Have you heard of the [Local, Regional, or National Immigrant Consultative Body]?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

55. **Would you vote if there was a general election tomorrow in [country]? If you are not a national citizen would you vote if you had the right to vote?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ Refuse

d. ____ Don't Know

56. **Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] NATIONAL election in [month/year]?** *If you do not have the right to vote, check NA. Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ No [Go to question 57]

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ NA

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

57. **Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] LOCAL election in [month/year]?** *If you do not have the right to vote, check NA. Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ No

b. ____ Yes

c. ____ NA

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

58. **Which of the following reasons apply to why you did not vote in the last election?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ I am not interested in [city] politics

b. ____ I am not interested in politics in general

c. ____ I do not feel close to a particular political party in [country]

d. ____ My vote would make no difference

e. ____ I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, complicated, long, expensive).

f. ____ I was unable to vote (e.g. absent, ill, citizenship)

g. ____ Refuse

h. ____ Don't Know

59. **Would you say that we need more MPs with an immigrant background in the [country Parliament]?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Yes, definitely

b. ____ Yes, probably

c. ____ No, probably not

d. ____ No, definitely not

e. ____ Refuse

f. ____ Don't Know

60. **Can you tell me if you agree with these statements about MPs with an immigrant background?** *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ It would be symbolically important for [country] to have more MPs with an immigrant background

b. ____ MPs with an immigrant background would better understand immigrants

c. ____ They would better represent immigrants' interests

d. ____ I would be more likely to vote for them

e. ____ Having an immigrant background don't matter

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

h. ____ Other (write-in) _____

LAST QUESTIONS:

61. **Which of the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ Living comfortably on present income

b. ____ Coping on present income

c. ____ Finding it difficult on present income

d. ____ Refuse

e. ____ Don't Know

62. **Below are some aims people say [country] should concentrate on. If you had to choose among these six aims, which would be your first, second, third…choice?** *Please give numbers: 1 for your first choice, 2 for your second choice…and so on.*

____ Economic Growth

____ Environmental safety (air pollution)

____ More say in government

____ Immigration/refugee rights

____ Lack of good jobs

____ Too much crime

____ Refuse

____ Don't Know

63. **Which of the following do you feel is most responsible for recent outbreaks of violence in [country]?** *Mark an "X" by all that apply.*

a. ____ The way children are raised by parents

b. ____ Lack of access to jobs and/or opportunities for education

c. ____ Television

d. ____ Fanaticism

e. ____ Isolation

f. ____ Refuse

g. ____ Don't Know

h. ____ Other (write-in) _____

64. **How happy are you in the community in which you live**? *Mark an "X" by one selection.*

a. ____ Very satisfied

b. ____ Somewhat satisfied

c. ____ Neutral

f. ____ Somewhat Dissatisfied

g. ____ Very Dissatisfied

h. ____ Refuse

i. ____ Don't Know

65. In your own words, tell write in the most important problem immigrants face in [Country]?

WRITE IN:

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Ask Community Leaders Only:

1. What role do you play in providing services for the immigrant community?

Ask Everyone:

2. Where do most immigrants come from in [country]? Why do you believe people immigrate to this country?
3. What services does the government provide that helps immigrants transition to life in [country]? Do you think these services are enough to help with this transition? What is integration according to this country? Is integration for new immigrants or for second generation immigrants to adjust to society?
4. Who are considered immigrants in [country]? What happens when they are second-generation born in the country? Are they still considered immigrants?
5. What is Integration? Do you think integration is a factor in why immigrants may/or may not become radicalization? If not, why? If so, why?
6. Are immigrants successful in this country? What reasons prevent immigrants from succeeding in [country]? What helps them become successfully? Is it government's responsibility to help immigrants succeed or is it the responsibility of the immigrant themselves?
7. What is radicalization/extremism to you? Do you think immigrants are becoming more radicalized/extreme in Europe in general and more specifically in this country?

    a. If so, why do you think immigrants are becoming for radicalized in Europe, and more specifically, in [country]? What can government or the community do to stop this from happening?
    b. If not, why do you think the immigrants in this country are not becoming more radicalized? Is it the government or the community that is doing something to prevent radicalization, or is it something else?
8. What government services are provided to immigrants that are not helping their situation?
9. What government services are provided to immigrants that are a significant help to their situation?
10. Do you think letting a lot of immigrants into the country is potentially dangerous for [country]?
11. If you could change anything about the way immigrants are handled in this country, what would you change?
12. Do you have any additional comments that you want to add to this interview?

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