

Cultural Imperialism:
the United States in Latin America

or

"The Velvet Boot of the
Shameless Hussey"

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Cultural imperialism is a vague, undefined term that has recently come into vogue, primarily in revolutionary circles. Despite the ambiguous, cliché quality of the phrase, it is of the utmost importance for understanding relations between developed and underdeveloped countries. One may take any aspect of this relationship, from the economic to the political, and correctly call it an example of cultural imperialism. All depend on the importation of foreign ideas, technology, and institutions from developed countries, with no thought for their appropriateness to the underdeveloped countries.

This observation is useful in recognizing the all-encompassing characteristic of cultural imperialism. In addition, it gives insight into both the roots and the mechanisms of cultural imperialism.

The heart of cultural imperialism is ethnocentrism, the "belief in the superiority of one's own ethnic cultural group."¹ Ethnocentrism also includes a lack of awareness that one holds a cultural bias. An example of ethnocentrism is apparent in a quotation from John Gerassi, Latin American correspondent for Time. "Latin America's social and economic structure is decadent, corrupt, immoral and generally unsalvageable."² Indeed, ethnocentrism is implicit in all publications concerning underdeveloped countries, from development theories to Business Week and U.S. State Department Bulletins. All imply that U.S. technological "know-how" and democratic ideals are the only hope for rescuing the "Third World" from the dark hinterlands of underdevelopment. This attitude can be termed a modern "White Man's Burden."

In any realistic study of cultural imperialism, it must be remembered that raw economic interest is usually the basis for intervention in underdeveloped countries. This economic interest is then maintained and facilitated by humanitarian, social, political justifications. "We're doing this for your own good."

Aside from these justifications, which serve to draw attention from

the reality of economic exploitation, a study of cultural imperialism should examine both the mechanisms and the resultant impact of foreign domination.

Latin America serves as the best area for a study of cultural imperialism because it has had one of the longest experiences with imperialism. This has resulted in a raising of consciousness among Latin Americans that is not paralleled in other areas. Latin Americans are more aware of their subordinate role, in that they try harder to measure up. However, this awareness does not lead to a rejection of that role. This awareness is also a product of the type of colonization in Latin America.

The Spanish colonization of the New World is one of the few examples in which pure economic interest was not the primary motive. The conquistadores, although they did arrive with an unhealthy appetite for gold, transferred Spanish institutions and cultures to the New World. Along with those institutions was transferred a general European prejudice against decadent, feudal Spain and its colonies. This served to set up Latin America for later importations of foreign technology, ideas, institutions, justified by the "fact" that Latin American institutions were hopelessly inadequate for development.

An examination of the early history of Latin America reveals the ways in which the area was prepared for modern forms of imperialism, particularly the cultural type of imperialism which is so pervasive throughout Latin America today. The cultural history of the people has been one of conditioned inferiority, and it was this way from the outset of Spanish colonization. The idea of conditioned inferiority, coupled with the Spanish form of colonization establishes a background against which to view modern cultural imperialism. The implantation of conditioned inferiority caused Latin Americans consistently to look to other Western cultures for models, resulting in domination.

The Spaniards differed in their pattern of colonization from other powers of the time because they sought to establish themselves and their culture in the New World. Spain had been, for a long while, a disunified accumulation of various different cultural and racial types. There was no real unity within the Peninsula until the time of the Reconquest. Spurred by the ever-present struggle with Islamic forces, the Church in Spain began a process of self-purification. As the momentum from this movement increased, the monarchy took up the cause of the Reconquest and initiated the southward movement to drive the Moors out. While it was initially conceived as a religious struggle against Islam, Isabelle and Ferdinand turned this struggle into a movement for national unity. Spain organized itself around its religion.

Spain was closely connected with the Church and, in effect, became its secular arm. Isabelle believed that it was Spain's duty to christianize the world. Spain's primary objective was to force any culture it encountered into conformity with its own religious convictions.

The actual conquest of the New World by the Spaniards was not a particularly long nor difficult process because the high degree of stratification within the pre-colombian societies had already conditioned the people to a relationship of subjugation/domination. When the Spaniards took over the leadership positions within these societies, the peasantry perceived no change in the system, merely a change in leadership.

The Indians initially perceived the Spaniards as semi-gods, and this mistake was lent credence by the smallpox epidemics brought by the Spaniards. From one-third to one-half of the affected population died because the natives had no natural immunity to the disease. It affected the Indians psychologically as well. Smallpox was an unknown, swift and disfiguring disease. While the Indians were able to see that they were being devastated by it, the Spaniards, with their natural immun-

ity were not affected at all. This reinforced their perception of the Spaniards as god-like beings and themselves as something less.

Not all of the Indians were opposed to the Conquest in the first place. Many were sincerely dissatisfied with pre-conquest life, particularly within Aztec society. A great many Indians early identified themselves with their Spanish conquerors and their way of life, even though they themselves were clearly identified as inferiors and ranked at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Many began to wear European clothing, adopted the money economy and bought Spanish luxury items. The Conquest altered the internal structure of native society.⁴ With this early form of cultural imperialism the conditioned inferiority began to take root and vice versa.

During the colonial period, the sense of inferiority expanded to include all but the Spanish born. The creoles, people of Spanish ancestry born in the New World, were unable to compete with the Spanish immigrants. They aspired to positions of power and wealth, but found them already firmly occupied by the Spanish-born. There was small chance of any upward mobility for this developing class.

During the eighteenth century, with the advent of the Bourbon reforms in Spain, all Latin Americans were made more conscious of their inferior position in relation to Spain. The Latin Americans considered themselves linked to Spain only by allegiance to the same king, whereas the Bourbons considered that the colonies existed for the sole benefit and advancement of Spain. It was a normal satellite/metropole relationship which magnified the sense of inferiority in the native-born and led to an important intellectual movement in Latin America.

The Latin Americans looked to Europe for their intellectual traditions, particularly to France. Latin American cities became centers of European culture. Anything of indigenous origin was shunned. Two trends of thought, intimately connected in the Latin American mind, dominated

the area in the eighteenth century. The two trends were toward Europeanization and modernization. The modernizing forces were disseminated from Europe. Modernization along the European model required complex changes in intellectual, social, economic and political spheres. The thoughts which originated in France, that man's position in society was not fixed, appealed to the oppressed Latin Americans.

The problem was that this idea was imported rather than developed internally. The Latin Americans desired a still closer relationship with Europe, the development of which Spain was blocking by maintaining the colonies strictly for its own benefit. Greater prosperity, the imagined result of Europeanization, became synonymous with independence from Spain. The creole intellectuals were awed by the ideals of the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions. When an opportunity for independence arose in the early 1800's, the Latin Americans were ready to break away.

Yet, even after their political liberation, they still directed their attention outward. They sought to import European and U.S. models and impose them upon their own societies in the quest for development. Indeed, Latin American constitutions were modeled after European and North American examples. Their conditioned inferiority was still at play. They rapidly adopted the European philosophy initiated by Comte - positivism. This philosophy stressed the progressive nature of history. The Latin Americans believed that progress lay in the rejection of their colonial past, even though this was their only identity. They believed that they were importing civilization in order to conceal an imagined absence of culture.⁵

This type of thinking dominated during the 1800's in Latin America, and somewhat into the 1900's. This coincided rather conveniently, for the United States, with its expansionistic age. The Monroe Doctrine appeared in 1823 and informed the rest of the world that the United

States would tolerate no interference in its hemisphere. This is also the time of the War with Mexico, in which Mexico lost nearly a third of its territory to the United States.⁶ It is the time of the Spanish-American War when the U.S. gained control over Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. In the same year as this, the United States expanded in the Pacific with the acquisition of American Samoa and the Hawaiian Islands. In order to link the two colonial areas in the Atlantic and the Pacific, the U.S. found it necessary to help Panama break away from Colombia so that they could build the Panama Canal.

Mexico serves as a particularly clear example of what resulted from the dominance of positivistic thought and the expansionistic spirit of the United States of the time. Under the rule of Porfirio Diaz in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century, Mexico became the showplace of Latin America - especially Mexico City became the Paris of the Latin American world. This "development" was achieved because Diaz and his positivistic thinkers felt it necessary to attract foreign capital, at any price.⁷ Diaz conceded the foreign domination of the economy.⁸ Investors were granted huge concessions of land in return for building up Mexico's infrastructure. Mexico developed somewhat, but at the expense of its autonomy. This extreme outward orientation continued until Mexico exploded in revolution in 1910, because the "development" had been destroying so many of its people.

This outward-looking development scheme is not merely something out of the past. The sense of inferiority continues to the present day. As one prominent Latin American sociologist has said, "We Latin Americans have received, more than discovered, new economic, social and political systems. In general, we have accepted these systems whole, without any discrimination, without an awareness of our own culture, and without a process of assimilation."⁹ The United States took increasing advantage of Latin America's lack of discrimination in following years.

The advent of the Second World War had a marked effect upon relations between the United States and Latin America. The United States became increasingly aware of Latin America as the inferior partner in an alliance which served to strengthen and protect the United States' position as a world power. Much emphasis was placed upon the need for hemispheric solidarity.¹⁰ Military security and the restriction of potential Axis influence in Latin America were prime concerns. There were two main reasons for the United States' interest in cooperating with the governments of Latin America. One was the possibility of an actual invasion of the Western Hemisphere. The other was that the U.S. war effort increasingly depended upon Latin American raw materials as the scale of war industries grew and other sources of raw materials were closed off. Latin America was also politically and economically vulnerable. There was the prospect that Germany might gain considerable influence in Latin America.¹¹ The United States initiated various public aid and cultural relations programs, designed to promote cooperation and understanding within the hemisphere. Public aid for economic development was a means of coping with the European threat. At the least, this aid money would increase production of strategic raw materials, and would replace German capital.¹² The cultural relations programs developed during World War II were "by effective use of governmental and private facilities, in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, to further the national defense and strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere."¹³

The Cold War, with its threat of Communism, reinforced the desire of the United States to bind Latin America to North American interests and values. "From the point of view of U.S. security, Latin America, because of proximity is one of the more important world areas."¹⁴ A centralized Latin American research institute was advocated, for the purpose of analysis of Soviet programs and propoganda, and for the

coordination of all U.S. programs, in order to prevent Communist penetration.¹⁵ Cultural relations programs were to insure "the presentation of the truth."¹⁶ In fact, outright U.S. propoganda was encouraged in order to combat the open presence of Communists in Latin Ameruca. Those favoring a more exaggerated U.S. presence pointed out that, while Soviet and Marxian publications were readily and cheaply available in translation, "Half a generation of literate people in Latin America is scarcely aware that Western education, culture, and scholarship produce either text books, treatises, scholarly studies or literature."¹⁷ They argued that

"Far from expecting that the United States will refrain from any activity, many Latin Americans insist that the United States ought quite openly to engage in propoganda and other measures to counteract Communist efforts...Many are surprised and bewildered because it has not come into existence."^{18a}

Even frank ownership of Latin American newspapers was suggested, merely because the Communists had already done so. The accuracy of some of these statements is questionable, although their goal was perhaps not to be accurate, as much as to incite action against the Communist threat taking root in Latin America.

Behind the United States' ubiquity in Latin America - be it through cultural relations programs, political and military intervention, economic aid or influence upon education and academic thinking - lie certain values and interests which the U.S. considers superior to all others. This ethnocentric view accentuates the Latin American "conditioned inferiority", for these nations are being presented with a model to which they must aspire if they wish to advance, development itself having been defined in the Western tradition. The United States attempts to remodel Latin American society, and seems quite unaware that this action may not be justified.^{18b} There is an inability to look at Latin America from a Latin American standpoint and to create new concepts.¹⁹ This is illustrated by the following:

Consolidation of congenial values and institutions in developing countries is an important element in the U.S. quest for peace and security. Its aspirations in this regard have little to do with the "cultural imperialism" so beloved by Communist propaganda. Coca-cola, juke boxes, and milkshakes are not basic ingredients to the success of American society. The basic ingredients of successful Western society are as much in the sphere of social organization as they are in technology. If the developing nations want to find quicker and better paths to modernization, they must seek out the positive elements that have contributed to Western success...adapt and adopt they must if they are to progress. ²⁰

The author of the above passage goes on to state that the U.S. interest in the transference of institutions is

partly based on the experience that they are more effective than those offered by the Communist world, that they are therefore more likely to lead more quickly and more surely to a stable modern society...rejection of its U.S. formulas for organizing society is bound to heighten its insecurities...the U.S. must seek rejection of the antagonistic system that challenges its position in the international community. ²¹

National security means nothing more than making sure that the American way of life continues undisturbed by foreign challengers. ²²

"Congenial values and institutions" are clearly those most conducive to the democratic and capitalistic systems, i.e., U.S. interests. These include high rates of investment, "generous scope for individual initiative in economic life, governmental responsibility both for a favorable economic climate and for economic progress." ²³ The "stable modern society", presumably democratic, would be open to the penetration of U.S. capital, and sufficiently indoctrinated in the consumer tradition as to provide a market for U.S. exports. ²⁴ This consumer orientation, and the value structures of democracy and capitalism, as introduced in Latin America, serve as a backdrop for political, military and economic intervention by the United States. Cultural imperialism serves to justify and to increase the efficiency of other forms of imperialism.

These values are inculcated into Latin America in a variety of ways, including the aforementioned cultural relations programs, educational systems, models and theories developed in the social sciences,

and through members of the U.S. business community. "There is a deep faith that the export of the American business system, U.S. institutions and U.S. values would make the world safer for democracy, and an unblinking readiness to resort to diplomatic and military counter-revolution when other means failed."²⁵ Meanwhile, North Americans continue in their ethnocentrism. Too many look down on the nations of Latin America, and consider them to be insignificant.²⁶ There is an attitude of pseudo-superiority common among Americans abroad, indeed, many have a phobia about speaking anything but English.²⁷ It is interesting to note that it is a much more stringent and lengthy process for many Latin Americans, such as Mexicans or Colombians, to enter the United States than vice versa.²⁸

The inter-American cultural relations programs developed during the war were a major step in the process of binding Latin America to U.S. interests. The programs were not limited in scope - one U.S. government official reported, "We use these terms culture, cultural to cover the entire range of knowledge, technical and otherwise - that knowledge in which men have a common stake and which in one way or another can advantageously be shared cooperatively."²⁹ There is a semi-mysterious air about these projects which emerges from an apparent reluctance to enunciate certain aspects of the programs.

The results of cultural-relations programs are in their nature intangible and elusive, consisting as they do of subtle changes in personal attitudes...The duties of these cultural relations officers would not be clearly defined until after longer experience - perhaps never - for their positions are what their ingenuity, culture and energy make them.³⁰

The "Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs" worked through departments of Information, Basic Economy, Commercial and Financial, and Transportation - clearly a broad range.³¹

The categories of accomplishments include: the exchange of professors and students; travel grants to leaders of science, education and the professions; assistance in the maintenance of American

libraries and the translation of books; encouragement of cultural institutes; and the use of educational motion pictures and radio.³² Journalists were included in the exchanges. These Latin Americans were chosen "on the basis of their professional distinction and their desire to report and interpret democracy in action, as demonstrated in the vast war program."³³ Commentators, writers, actors, and technical experts were brought to the United States, to cooperate in the preparation and broadcasting of programs to Latin America.³⁴ North American short-wave programs, broadcasted eight hours daily, reached a considerable audience: "a single radio chain in Colombia, which was broadcasting English lessons prepared by a local American resident, received thirteen thousand requests for the small printed textbook which accompanied the course."^{35,*}

Special programs were created for students (future leaders) to study in the United States because it was realized that money was not enough to change culture. There was a need to educate people to live "better." A visit to the United States could demonstrate the benefits of a change in life-style. Students could change while in North America and take new customs back with them.³⁶ This motive did not go unrecognized by Latin Americans, however. Brazilian ambassador, Gilberto Amando cautioned, "Don't become French-men in France, Americans in the U.S.... Stay Brazilians always, in the way you speak and dress and above all in your manner of being and living."³⁷ Denationalization was a "professional hazard."

The school system plays an extremely important role in cultivating certain values within a society. Ivan Illich discusses the relationship between education and consumerism and inferiority in Latin America in his article, "Cultural Imperialism and Disestablishing Education in Latin America." Consumer orientation and conditioned inferiority facilitate domination by a foreign power (in this case, the U.S.) and aid in the manipulation of Latin America towards U.S. inter-

ests. Illich maintains that "school initiates to the myth of unending consumption."³⁸ Schools teach that instruction produces learning - the existence of schools produces the demand for learning. Essentially, we are taught to need school, (non-professional activity and the self-taught man are discredited) and to believe that the more we attend school, the more we learn. This is related to the urban belief that progress produces something of value, and production produces demand.

School is of one piece with growth economy and industrial production. Inevitably the initiation to social reality through the ritual of schooling teaches the transfer of responsibility from tradition and self to planning and institution. Inexorably, school destroys a rural subsistence-oriented ethos and substitutes for it an ethos that fits industrial agriculture.³⁹

As the urban-industrial myths are introduced, the whole society is initiated into the myth of unending consumption of services. The economic backwardness of an area is blamed on the low level of schooling of the poor, who quickly learn to accept that they are inferior because they lack schooling.

Inevitably, conversion to the tenets of school inculcates a sense of inferiority to those who live far from the city...The ritual (graded promotions) proclaims the coming of an earthly paradise of never-ending consumption, and at the same time inculcates to the wretched and dispossessed a sense of guilt for their exclusion from it (for having dropped out)."⁴⁰

Illich states that "It really doesn't matter at which level you drop out to accept your inferiority if you have accepted the belief that more investment of school hours makes another man more productive and therefore entitles him to more consumption."⁴¹ Rural groups are alienated, degraded and forced into the acceptance of second-class status. Urban middle-groups, eagerly seek more schooling in order to become a little less inferior, and to be entitled to an increased amount of consumption.

The United States has actively encouraged the rise of educational levels throughout Latin America. Illiteracy "has been declining with growing rapidity, stimulated by technical and financial aid to educa-

tion from the United States Point Four Program, the OAS, and the U.N."⁴² The Agency for International Development has also been a major source of assistance to "cooperating" countries, particularly in the development of these nations' capacities to teach English.⁴³ In 1965, eighty-eight million dollars was received by Latin America from AID for educational assistance. This figure rose to 155 million dollars in 1966 - "to reach new levels of educational accomplishment."⁴⁴ AID training programs have been established to increase agricultural education and introduce modern methods, better seed, and more plant food.⁴⁵ This can be viewed as yet another extension of North American ethnocentrism. Wheat production is seen as a criterion for development, yet it is traditional only to the West.⁴⁶ The intended meaning is that in all ways, including diet and cuisine, Western culture is superior and the North American version nearly perfect."

There is great emphasis upon foreign language education in these programs. "The Peace Corps is and was an educational initiative. We like to think of it as a university in dispersion, spread over forty-six countries - thousands of Peace Corps volunteers teaching English."⁴⁷ It is even considered to be superior to native languages - "English is not only the principal language in international communication but may well serve as a unifying force in those newly independent nations where regional languages have persisted as abrasive forces."⁴⁸ Of course, English is also the language of modern science and engineering.

It is not surprising that the United States would take great interest in promoting education in Latin America. "Education has come to the foreground as the prime instrument through which orderly social change takes place."⁴⁹ In Latin America, "The spread of education accounts in part for the emergence of the expanding middle groups in society and it will probably continue to produce a certain 'leveling up' of social status and outlook by giving many previously isolated

subgroups a common educational background." These "expanding middle groups" are, again, important to the United States in the sense that they are a potential consumer market. Consumer goods and luxury items imported from the United States (or other foreign countries) serve as mechanisms and symbols of status achievements for middle groups who wish to imitate the national elite.

Studies of the conditions believed necessary for the development of a democratic form of government have been conducted in the various social sciences in the United States and serve to explain U.S. involvement in education of developing countries. Seymour Martin Lipset's work, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" is one example. Lipset examines ⁵¹ "cultural prerequisites to a successfully functioning democracy." He reports that the most important single factor which differentiates those giving democratic responses from others has been education: the higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices. ⁵² "Education presumably broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and ⁵³ increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices." Education is deemed not a sufficient, but close to a necessary condition for democracy. If this is the North American perspective, it is no wonder that the United States has supported the spread of education in Latin America! Lipset also comments upon the importance of middle groups: "A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderate conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties, and penalize extremist groups." ⁵⁴

Models such as Lipset's must be approached with caution, however. His study is an example of the patterned or fixed ways of thinking which have been exported to Latin America through U.S. social sciences -

cultural imperialism through academics. It is forgotten that things that happen in one part of the world do not have to happen the same way in other parts of the world. There seems to be a belief in the social sciences that theories and methods are universally valid. Scholars proceed as if Latin America could be understood using the same concepts as those applied to Western Europe and the United States. Ethnocentric Western observers expect the same combinations, the same syndromes, and the same elements to be repeated.⁵⁵ It is assumed that all possible creations of history were exhausted by the experience of a few countries in a few centuries. "Latin America is seen as one specific instance of a general course of events already studied and fully comprehended."^{56a} Development theories which impose advanced models of development upon less developed societies are one example of such ethnocentrism.^{56b}

Studies of "overpopulation" in Third World countries also reflect this academic ethnocentrism. "The present and emerging rates of population growth seriously handicap socioeconomic advance in many of the developing countries. In some it has created food shortages and even the threat of famine. A lower rate of growth (that is, a lower birth-rate)⁵⁷ would facilitate their development." The imposition of this viewpoint distracts attention from the relationship between imperialism and "overpopulation". Lipset's article on the requisites of democracy is also marred by the assumption of universal applicability of Western standards. In a discussion of the main indices of wealth he writes, "in the less dictatorial Latin American countries there are ninety-nine persons per motor vehicle, as against 274 for the more dictatorial ones."⁵⁸

One of the unfortunate results of this domination of academic thought is the perpetuation of conditioned inferiority, thereby facilitating imperialist cultural domination. Latin Americans are trained, through the social sciences, to consider themselves as inferior, backwards,

archaic, and hopelessly unstable. The continuation of the "Black Legend" exemplifies this.⁵⁹ The Black Legend is an interpretation of Spain's colonization of Latin America which greatly emphasizes the exploitation and corruption of the economic and political systems implanted in the New World. This legend contends that Spain's basic motivation throughout the Conquest and colonization was greed, and that Spain had absolutely no conscience in her dealings with the Indians. The religious-missionary aspects of the Conquest, and the moral and philosophical debates concerning the justification of the Conquest and the treatment of the Indians are not given adequate consideration in this argument. Latin Americans are thus forced to view their background in the worst possible light, accentuating their "inferiority."

The short-lived Project Camelot (see Appendix) is an example of the detached superiority with which many social scientists regard Latin America. Project Camelot was a multidisciplinary study initiated by the U.S. Army and Department of Defense, with the purpose of developing a model for the prediction and influence of "politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world," i.e., counter-insurgency.⁶⁰ The list of countries recommended for study includes numerous Latin American nations-- in fact, thirteen out of the twenty-three countries on the list are Latin American.⁶¹ The project was aborted shortly after being publicly exposed in Chile, where it had been scandalously denounced as an imperialist, intervention-oriented study "intended to investigate the military and political situation prevailing in Chile and to determine the possibility of an anti-democratic coup."⁶² Whatever the actual motives behind the "rise and fall" of Project Camelot, it is indicative of the attitude that Latin America should serve as a laboratory for social scientists who wish to test pet theories.

The United States has also attempted to dominate Latin America by

means of the business community. The businessmen's role has been seen as necessarily integrated with the importation of desirable cultural patterns through education. The insistence upon educational reform to mold people into the correct modes of development calls for "basic reforms of teaching methods and specialists to meet the needs of tomorrow...The foreign business community [in Brazil] has a clear responsibility to set an example in this matter because of its access to the technology management methods and educational systems of the now highly industrialized nations." ⁶³ American businessmen have also continued the denigration of the Latin American, emphasizing the Latin's inferiority when judged by US value standards. One article contrasting the US and Brazil asks, "Are the Brazilians good workers?", and concludes that they are not comparable, for they are slower and less interested in their work. ⁶⁴ This attitude is paralleled in Mexico by the following quotation: "Before we came here the campesinos didn't know and didn't care what a factory job would mean. A few tortillas was all they needed to eat, and for something to do there was always that wonderful pastime of making sons." ⁶⁵

Happily, this method of cultural imperialism (inculcation of values through the business community) seems less successful than some others. Perhaps it is because the true nature of this form of domination is less readily concealed. "Take the word profit. The average American considers profit a reward for work. The average Brazilian considers it proof that he's been exploited. He constantly confuses capital with profit...The Americans in Brazil have sold their products well, but most of them have not sold the free-enterprise system at all." ⁶⁶

The impact on popular culture is the most visible facet of cultural imperialism. "The United States presence is pervasive culturally as well as economically. Latins listen to American music, see American movies, drive American cars, drink Coca-Cola, and shop at Sears. The American tourist is to be seen everywhere worrying out loud about the water and food and complaining about the difficulty of making himself understood in English."⁶⁷

The above quotation illustrates the extent of, primarily, United States cultural influence in Latin America. Briefly, this aspect of cultural imperialism encompasses the advertisement and sale of foreign imports, changes in the Spanish language due to the intrusions primarily



"He said, 'Hot taco! Another American takes the bait hook, line and sinker!'"

of Americanisms, all aspects of popular entertainment and culture, tourism, and the bastardization of indigenous arts and crafts to fit the ever-growing tourist market.

In the field of advertising and sale of consumer goods, U.S. companies find a fertile field in Latin America. In surveying the potential Brazilian market, a U.S. government survey (1972) noted that "the Brazilian economy has created an attractive market for imported goods...The market outlook is for continued growth." ⁶⁸ The survey further advised U.S. companies on potential advertisement possibilities, noting that consumer goods should be promoted through Sunday editions of major newspapers and Brazilian advertising firms. The survey also noted that "selected items with a high degree of style and innovation" ⁶⁹ were better advertised in the Commercial Newsletter of U.S. Foreign Service Posts. This latter suggestion illustrates the all-too-common equation of the United States with sophisticated and advanced products.

The impact of United States consumer goods in Latin America has been termed a "Consumers Revolution." ⁷⁰ This relatively new twist in U.S./Latin American commercial relations was sparked by Sears Roebuck Company. Sears opened its first Latin American store in Havana in November 1942, largely as an experiment. In 1947, Sears' invasion of Latin America began in earnest with the opening of its first Mexican branch, after an intensive two-month publicity campaign. By 1959, Sears employed 10,000 Mexicans and sales had grown from 15 million dollars in 1949 to over 100 million in 1959. ⁷¹

Sears has its greatest impact in the middle class. By offering modern conveniences, from electric refrigerators to televisions, at affordable prices, Sears is schooling the Mexican middle class to the consumer-oriented tastes and needs of the U.S. middle class, thus creating an ever-expanding market for its goods. ⁷²

Sears also served as the impetus for Mexico's modern consumer-goods

industry. To facilitate its continued development, Sears created its own Mexican suppliers by lending money to Mexican nationals to expand into the consumer industry, and then Sears bought interests in these businesses.

An additional example of the introduction into Latin America of the U.S.-style consumer-goods industry is the chain of "Tía" in Colombia, an imitation of the American five-and-dime. In one Bogotano shopping district alone, Chapinero, there were two "Tías". A quick visit to either one would reveal a very heavy percentage of U.S. imports, especially in packaged food products and beauty aids. It was possible to buy any brand of American shampoo. Indeed, one American student's Colombian mother recommended that she buy Johnson's Baby Shampoo. The Colombian counterparts to American products could not visually compete. Their less sophisticated packaging made them look like poor country cousins.

Supermarkets, or "supermercados" are another example of the Colombian change to a U.S. style of consuming. Supermarkets have begun to replace the large open markets found in every Latin American city, where far superior and cheaper fresh produce, meats, dairy products, etc. can be bought.

An examination of modern Latin American Spanish reveals *more graphically* the relentless North Americanization of Latin America. Imported comic strips and products are the main sources of Americanisms. "Practically every article of food, with brand name intact, is shouted and jingled at you on radio and television, strikes you in the face as you go down aisles of 'supermercados' ",⁷³

Comic strips, however, are the worst offenders, as they are "a peculiar combination of the written and the spoken."⁷⁴ This results in a syntactical corruption of the language, meaning that Spanish words are fitted to English syntax. This type of corruption usually has its worst effects on the speech habits of the barely literate. They

can offer no defense against these changes, as they are unable to recognize the corruption of Spanish grammar. ⁷⁵

In looking at language change in general, there are three factors that contribute to language modification. These are:

- 1) new forms, constructions or meanings may develop,
- 2) an archaic or secondary form may be revived,
- 3) current use may be changed in meaning or construction. ⁷⁶

A long list of new forms introduced into Spanish encompasses mainly English words either incorporated directly into Spanish or given a Spanish grammatical form, usually the infinitive verb form. A few of the more glaring examples should demonstrate the effect, such as: checar (to check), clóset, pluma fuente (fountain pen), el living (replacing la sala), fuente de sodas (soda fountain), perros calientes (hot dog), bar; also sports terms, such as: cártcher, fílder and bateador (batter).

In comparison to these obvious intrusions, changes in construction are much harder to recognize. These usually consist of direct translations of English idioms. For example, one now hears such monstrosities as "usar la cabeza" (use one's head) and "tomarlo suave" (take it easy).

Aside from these direct translations, correct current useages have been modified, either in meaning or constructions. An obvious example of construction modification is the introduction of the possessive adjective from English structure. For example, in Spanish one would say, "Me lavo las manos." (I'm washing my hands.) One now hears, "Me lavo mis manos." This type of construction does not exist in correct Spanish.

Meaning modifications include the change of "operar" from "to cause or set going" to "to operate machinery", and the substitution of "bloquear" (to block) for "obstruir."

To a lesser extent, archaic Spanish forms are being revived through reintroduction via English. An example of this is provided by the

word "retalación", an archaic word which was reintroduced to parallel the English word "retaliation."

The cultural invasion of Latin America by the United States, although apparent in both language changes and the consumer industry upon examination, is immediately apparent in the realm of popular entertainment. Many a young backpacking gringo hoping to "get away from it all" has been unpleasantly surprised by the avalanche of U.S. movies, songs, and books that awaits him/her in Latin America. "Culturally, U.S. companies provide most of the entertainment and information available in the continent: films, television and wire service news." ⁷⁷

During the period from January to May, 1976 more than fifteen U.S. films played in Bogotá, Colombia. Among these films were: Lenny, Day of the Locust, Jaws (the biggest hit), One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, Roller Ball, Mahogany, Nashville, The Sunshine Boys, Taxi Driver, Romeo and Juliet, The Night Porter, and a Dustin Hoffman festival of five films. No Colombian films played in popular Bogotá theaters. Indeed, the only Latin film advertised was a Mexican comedy starring Cantinflas (who was popularized by the American film Around the World in 80 Days.)

In the same manner, television is also almost completely dominated by the United States television industry. The 1964 International Television Almanac lists some interesting statistics for Latin America. Television began in Mexico in 1950. By 1964 "a T.V. set had become an article of prime necessity. The urge of every Mexican home to get a set is so great that numerous poor families, living in houses not much better than huts pride themselves on a T.V. set that is very painfully paid for on the installment plan." ⁷⁸ As of 1964 there were forty-five persons for every television. ⁷⁹ Almost all programs were dubbed American series. The principle sponsors were beer, cigarette, automobile and cosmetic companies.

In Brazil, although there had been some efforts to limit U.S.

domination of television, the field was still open enough for the Almanac to note that "the first American producers who bring their know-how of T.V. serial production to Brazil will make a fortune."⁸⁰ Brazil did restrict foreign shows to less than twenty-two and a half hours out of every seventy-two hour weekly transmission schedules.⁸¹ However, it was cheaper to import and dub shows than to produce them in Brazil.

Unfortunately there is no more recent formal information available on television broadcasting. However, the state of Colombian television in 1976 did not seem to be much better. Old U.S. serials were still very much in evidence, including The Saint and The Avengers. Colombian programs consisted of cheap imitations of United States soap operas and situation comedies.

In an article by E. Bradford Burns, "Brazil: The Imitative Society", the total subversion of Brazilian cultural life, including popular entertainment is outlined. In 1922, aware of increasing Brazilian economic dependence on Europe, the intellectual community proclaimed "Modern Art Week" at the Municipal Theatre in São Paulo to proclaim their country's intellectual independence. This trend was killed in 1964 with the military overthrow of the Vargas government (applauded by the Johnson administration), and the subsequent censorship of all areas of Brazilian cultural expression. The result was a reversal to a complete imitation of American and European trends. Books became a luxury of the upper class which favored French, English and North American authors. Brazilian popular theatre regressed to a pallid imitation of American productions. The most popular show in 1972 (title in English) was Brazil Export Show '72, a "flawed copy of a second-rate T.V. musical."⁸²

The Brazilian government is interested in keeping all anti-government protests quiet, and relations with the United States friendly. As a result, Brazilian cultural expression is totally

repressed, as the government fears that it might serve as an inspiration for renewed protests.

Tourism and the consequential bastardization of indigenous crafts is the last impact on popular culture to be examined. This last human invasion is like adding insult to injury. Not only does the United States export its entertainment and products to Latin America, but also *its* citizens, looking for amusement and bargain buys. One of the best examples of the "tourist effect" is Chichicastanengo, Guatemala. Chichicastanengo is (or was before the February earthquake) a mountain Indian village chosen by the Guatemalan government to be preserved as a "typical Indian village" because of its Indian market and church, (one of the best examples of the syncretization of pre-colombian religion and Catholicism). Chichicastanengo has now become a mecca for the tourists, especially during the Christmas season. The market, traditionally for food, medicinal herbs, and small repair services, has been taken over by stands selling bad imitations of Indian wares. The tourists out-number the inhabitants, with polyestered matrons in Keds haggling and gesturing with merchants to get a good "bargain" on some cute Indian craft.

The serious impact on popular culture by the United States should be obvious from the preceding discussion. Nothing escapes Americanization, and Latin America is left with very little it can call its own. As was stated earlier in this article, this impact has a potential revolutionizing effect, as it is a constant reminder of U.S. domination of Latin America. Fortunately, there are Latins, especially intellectuals, painfully aware of the exploitation of their culture. Out of this awareness has arisen a body of literature both as a protest against the U.S. presence and as a reaffirmation of Latin American culture. Among these authors are Octavio Paz and Manuel Puig. Puig, an Argentinian, has written a novel, The Heartbreak Tango, about an Argentinian village caught fast in illusions and

daydreams about Hollywood stars and spectaculars. They wait impatiently for the next Ginger Rogers/Fred Astaire film to come to town.

Paz, a Mexican, has written articles on the U.S. orientation of Mexican literature. He notes that

the attitude of these critics (Latin critics of Latin works) is very much like that of the the Latin American bourgeois twenty years ago who refused to drink anything but imported whiskey or champagne. It would appear that in order to receive any attention in Latin America, a work must first have the blessing of London, New York or Paris. ⁹³

Not only the intellectuals but the working class is also aware of the U.S. invasion of Latin America. However, ^{its} awareness takes the form of anger instead of literary protest. In the words of a Venezuelan worker, "None of us in this house has ever drunk a Coca-Cola. One day we will kill those who make them." ⁹⁴

The U.S. is able to dominate Latin America culturally because it does so economically to such a large degree. Particularly with regard to Mexico, "the fact that America is the economically dominant partner predisposes that Mexican culture will change more than American culture, and that Mexicans will generally be forced into socially subordinate roles vis-a-vis Americans." ⁸⁵ This statement is as true for the rest of Latin America as it is for Mexico. Yet not only does the economic predispose the cultural, but the cultural helps to maintain the United States' economic dominance of Latin America. In this study we will focus upon Mexico, Colombia and Brazil.

As it happens with the rest of the "underdeveloped" world, the Latin American countries consistently have an unfavorable balance of trade. Much of this unfavorable balance is a direct result of their trade and other relations with the United States. In the six-year period from 1960 to 1965, the flow of capital from the United States into Latin America was 2.8 billion dollars, while the flow of cap-

ital out of Latin America into the United States was 8.3 billion dollars for the same period of time. In that six-year period, foreign investment in Latin America caused, not growth, but rather a net loss of 785 million dollars a year in the Latin American balance of payment.⁸⁶

Although Mexico does attempt to limit and control American involvement in its economy by regulating the types of imports, Mexico's foreign trade is still largely with the U.S. The United States is still responsible for about 65% of Mexico's foreign trade.⁸⁷ The U.S. buys about 70% of Mexico's total exports and provides about 60% of its total imports.⁸⁸ Mexico exports primary products such as metals, raw cotton, coffee, cattle, vegetables, henequen and sugar and imports U.S. manufactured goods, specialized machinery, railway equipment, motor vehicle parts, chemicals and other similar items.⁸⁹ Mexico's foreign trade deficit in 1973 was nearly 1.8 billion dollars. This was a record high. In 1972 Mexico's foreign trade deficit was one billion fifty-three million dollars.⁹⁰ Tourist income helps to balance this trade deficit. In 1972 Mexico's income from tourism totaled 899 million dollars.⁹¹ This is a misleading figure, however, because many Mexicans cross the border to do grocery shopping and to satisfy other similar needs and wants. Most of the average tourist dollar in an area like Tijuana is eventually respent by Mexicans in southern California.⁹²

The situation in Colombia is similar. Colombia depends upon the U.S. for the bulk of its export market and its imports, although the U.S. position is being challenged somewhat by the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1960 the United States bought 65% of Colombia's exports and supplied 60% of its imports. In 1964 the amount decreased somewhat, with the U.S. having bought 44% of its total exports and supplying 48% of its imports. The majority of Colombia's capital goods still come from the U.S. In the years from 1959 to 1963 the outflow

of capital was two and a half times greater than the influx into Colombia. In 1966, four dollars entered the United States from Colombia for every dollar that entered Colombia from the U.S. Colombia's primary dependence on the U.S. for both its export and import trade aggravates its financial dependence on U.S. capital sources. ⁹³

Brazil's trade relations do not appear to be as heavily dominated by the United States, most likely due to its own incredible natural resources. Yet the Brazilian economy still offers an attractive market for American exports. The U.S. has been providing a declining portion of Brazil's imports in the past few years. However, the U.S. remains Brazil's largest single supplier. It supplied 27.8% of Brazil's imports in 1972, with a sharp increase indicated for 1973. The principal products the United States exported to Brazil in this time period were earthmoving equipment and parts, bituminous coal, phosphates, wheat, and jet aircraft. ⁹⁴ Brazil is as dependent upon U.S. heavy machinery and chemical products as are Mexico and Colombia.

While Mexico follows the U.S. development model, it makes an attempt to protect and aid its developing industries within that model. It enforces prohibitive duties in an effort to prevent the flooding of the market by foreign merchandise of a type which would compete with native industry. ⁹⁵ The government is developing or buying into basic industries and encourages Mexican private capital to do the same. There will not be enough Mexican private capital to do the job, as long as Mexico follows the U.S. development model. ⁹⁶ The Mexican government is attempting to stimulate a mixed government-private enterprise economy controlled almost entirely by Mexicans, much to the chagrin of American investors. Yet, much of Mexico's industrial development demonstrates once again American dominance. The Mexican government has instituted a fairly intensive border industrialization program. Under this program, North American companies build the labor-intensive

assembly plants on the Mexican side of the border, while the more basic technological production of the parts is conducted on the North American side of the border. Many of the border cities have such "Dual-plant" set-ups. The components are made in the U.S., imported to Mexico for assembly and re-exported for sale in the United States. The Mexican government grants tax and other favors to such industries and allows the parts and raw materials into Mexico duty-free as long as they are destined for re-export.⁹⁷ This type of dependent industry is what Business Week refers to as "incubating industry". Yet Mexico can scarcely avoid such arrangements with its huge neighbor if it desires any sort of industrial development in these areas. As the saying goes, "Pobre México - tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos."⁹⁸

The situation is similar in Colombia, although its greater distance from the U.S. hinders such convenient "mother-hen" arrangements. The Colombian manufacturing industry is also based on the assembly of components which are manufactured in the U.S. For example, the "Colombian" automobile industry imports and assemble parts, all of which come from U.S. corporations. Firms which produce beer, soup, pharmaceuticals, papers, rubber, and electrical machinery import most of their primary materials, as well as their basic machinery, from the United States. Colombian industry is therefore very dependent upon, although not owned by, U.S. capital.⁹⁹

Brazilian industry is also dominated by the U.S. This is necessarily the situation as long as Brazil intends to follow the U.S. model of development, as Brazil's industries can now only supply 50% of the country's needs.¹⁰⁰ As well as the importation of heavy machinery and industrial equipment which keeps Brazil's industry functioning, Brazil has many "technical assistance" programs with the United States. Brazilian factories are permitted to send samples of their products to the U.S. for expert product analysis and suggestions for improve-

ment. These technical assistance programs include the training of Brazilian industrial specialists in the U.S. Brazil's native industry, like Colombia's and Mexico's, is not truly autonomous and is not directed toward the country's real needs. In the case of Brazil, the capital has been invested into export, processing and service industries instead of industries which would provide a basis for Brazil's continued industrial development.

U.S. private investment in Latin America helps to preserve the belief in this development model which is unsuitable for true development in Latin America, because the economies cannot sustain the necessary base for such development. The United States has deeply penetrated the economy of Latin America through a vast outlay of private investment. By the end of 1968 American business interests had nearly thirteen billion dollars invested in Latin America and the Caribbean, all in areas which they considered the most important, and not where the individual countries would have liked to have had it directed.

U.S. investments constitute half of all foreign investment in Mexico, and 12% of the total investment. This equaled 1840 million dollars by the end of 1971. Private U.S. direct investment far outstrips government loans and grants and U.S. capital is entering in rapidly increasing quantities. This occurs in spite of the regulation that a foreigner may not have a majority holding in a Mexican company. What this regulation translates into practical terms is that the foreign individual or firm may retain control over 49% of the company and, by selling the remaining interests in small amounts to a variety of Mexican firms or individuals, it still retains the working control of the company. Mexico is especially important to U.S. investors because it serves as a stepping stone to the rest of Latin America. It has become the businessman's base for all of Latin America. Mexico is the strategic gateway to the lands of the south,

where there is the "smell of money being made". It provides a good training ground for countries wanting to work the entire Latin American market.

Foreign investment in Colombia follows similar lines, although the investors do not consider it as important strategically as Mexico. U.S. private investment in Colombia composes over three-fourths of the foreign capital invested there. This capital is concentrated in areas that the U.S. investors consider worthwhile. The known U.S. direct investment in Colombia is estimated at 684 million dollars. Much of the investment takes the form of a joint venture, as in Mexico, where the U.S. partner retains the working control of the "Colombian" firm. Colombia is losing money on these arrangements. For example, about 85% of the earnings generated by the exportation of oil in Colombia is repatriated to the United States. ¹⁰⁷

Brazil's economy is also heavily dominated by foreign capital. At the end of 1973, total direct foreign investment in Brazil was 4579 million dollars, about two-thirds of which was in manufacturing. The U.S. direct investment is about 37% of the total foreign investment at 1717 million dollars. ¹⁰⁸ Much of the U.S. capital invested in Brazil goes towards "development projects." A good example of this is Project Brazil which plans a trans-Amazonian highway. As the designers envisioned it, "the empty spaces of the Amazon would be filled with Brazilians." ^{109a} Another development project which U.S. companies supported was designed by the Hudson Institute in 1965 and it called for the damming of the Amazon. ^{109b} This would create an internal sea one-fifth the size of France that would help open up the interior of Brazil. The developers envisioned the internationalization of the Amazon. The Brazilians rejected this, however, because it would denationalize the Amazon. Along with the Amazon projects, much U.S. capital is used to develop nuclear energy in Brazil. Construction of

the first reactor began in 1975 and completion is expected in 1977.

The United States government is supportive of the private capital being invested in Latin America. Congress tied much of the U.S. "aid" to Latin America directly to the purchase of goods and services from the U.S. As Senator Frank Chrch explains, "Thus our aid - so-called - became an ill-disguised subsidy for American exports."¹¹¹ Along with such blatant support of U.S. business interests, other stipulations on the aid help to guarantee future markets for U.S. business. The whole character of U.S. aid has been changing in recent years. It is becoming primarily a loan program. In 1965, 70% of U.S. aid was in the form of loans, This was up from 10% in 1955.¹¹² Many countries must take out new loans in order to obtain the foreign exchange to pay the interest and amortization on old loans, at higher rates of interest. The increasing use of international commercial style loans instead of grants for development purposes creates the illusion of a commercial transaction and increases the responsibility on the part of the borrower.¹¹³ The U.S. government used foreign aid as a flexible, useful instrument of national policy to foster the sale of American goods.¹¹⁴

In addition to this major change in the character of U.S. aid, Congress added numerous punitive sections to the Foreign Assistance Act, designed to prevent expropriations and the like. The borrowing government must, in essence, regulate its imports to suit the United States. Because of these stipulations it happens that the U.S. becomes intimately involved in areas of a country's sovereignty, its tax policies, its monetary system. AID technicians sit as advisers and overseers at the highest levels of the recipient government in finance matters to assure that all policy decisions will be favorable to the U.S.¹¹⁵

The United States dominates the world-wide banking network, from which many of the loans originate. These banks maintain the dollar as the key currency, evidence of the U.S. dominance.¹¹⁶ The U.S. has been

trying to produce internal change through external aid. The aid that the U.S. gives is seldom without stipulations as to how it must be used, as evidenced by Robert McNamara's statement that World Bank loans should give preference to those underdeveloped nations which have implemented birth control programs. The birth control programs are presented as beneficial to the poor masses. The democratic ideology will not allow the programs to be implemented more crudely, such as paying women to have loops inserted, because it's important to maintain the ideological pretense that this is being done to benefit the masses. However, others view this type of tied aid as "a political weapon aimed at limiting the revolutionary potential of a young and growing proletariat, assaulted on one hand by consumer propaganda and on the other by the growing frustration of marginal economic and social conditions."¹¹⁷

The problem with this type of "aid", besides the fact that the U.S. is attempting the core of a society via its economic power, is that it must be repaid. The foreign debt burden of the Latin Americans is rising all the time. In 1964, the foreign debt burden in Latin America amounted to 10 billion dollars, one-half of which was due in five years. In order to meet these loan conditions, the net flow of resources northward would equal that coming in as "foreign aid."¹¹⁸ Mexico, for example, received 75 million dollars in loans from the World Bank, 67.5 million dollars from the Inter-American Development Bank, and 52 million dollars from Export-Import Bank, increasing its foreign debt burden and reliance upon foreign capital.¹¹⁹

U.S. loans and credits to Colombia cost it dearly and reinforce its financial dependency on the U.S., as well as bringing with them political conditions which protect and advance the private foreign capital interests, at the expense of Colombian development. The specific and general conditions attached to loans force the Colombian government to open up the economy to foreign exploitation, by removing any controls

on imports and exports and other such self-protective measures. The terms of the aid compel Colombia to buy certain goods which it doesn't need and which cannot contribute to its true development. In addition, Colombia must pay more for these goods than if they were purchased elsewhere.¹²⁰

Aid to Brazil is likewise contingent upon Brazil's compliance with U.S. demands about expropriation and other matters. These stipulations are also a part of the policy of the International Monetary Fund. The U.S. provides much aid to the Latin American countries in the form of technical assistance programs designed to educate the participants still further in the U.S. development model. Thus, the Brazilians, and other Latin Americans, are accepting aid which will educate them into further dependency on the U.S.¹²¹

The U.S. government is not above direct intervention or maintaining a military presence in Latin America in order to foster and maintain the right kind of investment atmosphere. In the time period from 1898 to 1924, the U.S. directly intervened no less than thirty-one times in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. More recent examples of this are the Bay of Pigs venture, the invasion of Guatemala in 1954, the military occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the CIA involvement in Chile in 1973.¹²² The U.S. gives substantial amounts of military aid to Latin American governments because it views military aid as a deterrent against Communism or as a force for stability. U.S. military missions constitute a large and visible U.S. presence.¹²³ Where conditions demand it, however, the U.S. uses a more subtle approach. In Mexico, U.S. Army personnel are forbidden to wear their uniforms while on leave.¹²⁴ In Brazil, the military presence is much more visible. There are a great many military personnel in Brazil. The U.S. also sponsors a number of "public safety" programs in which former U.S. policemen teach Brazilians modern police techniques which they use to "stabilize" Brazil.¹²⁵ In Colombia, the U.S. has maintained a

military mission since 1939. Nearly 4000 Colombian officers have been trained at U.S. service schools as part of U.S. military aid to Colombia. Under the U.S. auspices and with U.S. training and equipment, the Colombian government has launched and continues to carry out a systematic campaign of repression against the rural insurgents.¹²⁶

While all three of these sample countries import primarily manufactured goods, they export principally agricultural or other primary products. This type of exchange normally leads to an unfavorable balance of trade due to the price fluctuations of the world market for primary products and the often comparatively inflated prices of manufactured goods. These countries will most likely continue their trading pattern because they are determined to follow the U.S. model of development and their native industries are unable to supply the basic demands of such development. The economic domination continues to a large extent because of the import-export trading pattern and this trading pattern continues because of their faith in the U.S. model of development. Their faith in this model of development relates to the idea of conditioned inferiority discussed earlier in the paper. The U.S. is able to continue cultural domination because of its economic domination. Thus, the economic influences the cultural, and the cultural influences the economic, in a vicious cycle.

The Latin Americans emerged from their historical experience with a colonial economic structure and a profound sense of inferiority. This outward-directed economic structure was not conducive to independent development. When coupled with a "conditioned inferiority", this structure causes Latin Americans to look outward for "superior" models of modernization. The dependency on outside inspiration leaves them vulnerable to further domination, deepening their economic dependency and sense of inferiority. Latin America is caught in a vicious circle.

Dominant foreign powers, i.e., the United States, perpetuate this pattern by means of cultural infiltration, because it is in their economic interest to do so. Unfortunately, there are internal factions who benefit from the status quo and thus

support it. "In its dependence on the U.S., the ruling class goes too far, it favors and defends this dependency against the interests of the immense majority."¹²⁷
This class has the power (aided by the U.S.) to suppress any scattered protest.

In order to break the pattern there must be a concentrated movement to reject the foreign models and the values implicit in them. It will be impossible to extricate themselves unless there is a radical altering of their development model, hence in their way of viewing themselves and their culture.

The goals of development have always been stated "in terms of consumer value packages standardized around the North Atlantic."¹²⁸ U.S. models of modernization have been built upon these consumer values and the view of people as economic entities, whose needs can be created to provide markets for various products. This is Latin America's bind, it has been molded culturally and economically into this world view. Political revolutionaries have not always succeeded in the rejection of this development package. "The political revolutionary wants to improve existing institutions - their productivity and the quality and distribution of their products. This vision of what is desirable is based on consumption habits developed during the last 100 years."¹²⁹ It is necessary to redefine these habits and the concomittant needs which have been artificially created. Ivan Illich writes, "We need an alternative program, an alternative both to development and to merely political revolution. Let us call this... either institutional or cultural revolution, because its aim is the transformation of both public and personal reality."¹³⁰

Ideally, such a revolution must originate in the advanced countries, for it is here that the distortion of what we can and need to have has its roots. This seems a long way off, yet if this redefinition cannot take place within the developed countries, it is difficult to see how it can occur in the underdeveloped nations. They are trapped in the bind of cultural imperialism, conditioned to want the type of development that they must reject. This is a disturbing conclusion to come to, only great optimism one to believe that there must be a way out.

The following description of Project Camelot was released on December 4, 1964, through the Office of the Director of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University in Washington, D. C. It was sent to scholars who were presumed interested in the study of internal war potentials and who might be willing to assemble at a four-week conference at the Airlie House in Virginia in August 1965. This release, dated December 4, 1964, is a summary version of a larger set of documents made available in August 1964 and in December 1964 [I.L.H.].

Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are:

First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies;

Second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and

Finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things.

The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will be conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government. A large amount of primary data collection in the field is planned as well as the extensive utilization of already available data on social, economic and political functions. At this writing, it seems probable that the geographic orientation of the research will be toward Latin American countries. Present plans call for a field office in that region.

By way of background: Project CAMELOT is an outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army's role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the less developed countries in the world. The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of counterinsurgency (some pronounceable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better). This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active insurgency problems.

Another major factor is the recognition at the highest levels of the defense establishment of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of insurgency. Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the over-all counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Government.

Appendix

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