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THESIS ABSTRACT

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Does Nietzsche’s inquiry into the question of truth take him beyond the sense of truth as correctness found in Platonism toward a more Greek understanding of truth that brings concealment into an unsettling prominence within truth? I explore in this thesis a possible double reading of Nietzsche underdeveloped within Heidegger’s first Nietzsche lecture course from 1936-37. The first reading focuses on Nietzsche as an inversion and overturning of Platonism. The second reading focuses on Nietzsche as a thinker who resonates with pre-Platonic thought through his development of semblance and concealment as essential to life. In this second reading I explore a consistent ambiguity within Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche that allows for the more overt reading of Nietzsche as an inverter of Platonism to be contested at least partially.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“The essence of truth is un-truth”

(Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, Section 228)

“The problem of the value of truth came before us - or was it we who came before the problem? Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question marks.

And though it scarcely seems credible, it finally almost seems to us as if the problem had never even been put so far - as if we were the first to see it, to fix it with our eyes, and risk it. For it does involve a risk, and perhaps there is none that is greater.”

(Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #2)

How is it that we come to find something questionable? Do we come to pose our own questions or would it be better to say that the questions choose us, that we are the victims of our questions just as much as we fall victim to a flash flood in the desert?

What if our questions grab us with historical intensity, keeping us wide-awake at night and demanding more from us than we can give? Must we risk ourselves, making our health the sacrifice, as perhaps Nietzsche did, for the sake of a question?
Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche were two thinkers driven to the heights of philosophy by the questions that held them and refused to let go. There is possibly no question more central to both philosophers than the question of truth. For Heidegger, truth remains a constant theme throughout his numerous philosophical transformations. From *Being and Time* to his later lecture courses, Heidegger’s meditations on a critique of the Western metaphysical tradition are consistently guided by a questioning into the essence of truth. In the late 1930s, Heidegger focuses this critique of metaphysics on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. In his four volume set of lectures entitled *Nietzsche*, Heidegger outlines Nietzsche’s position within the Western metaphysical tradition in part through an interpretation of how Nietzsche understands truth. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s understanding of truth does not essentially deviate from the understanding of truth that has prevailed over Western philosophical thought since Plato: truth as correctness. This is to say that something is true because it holds a relation of accordance to either its idea or to an objective state of affairs external to it. Primarily from his reading of the ancient Greeks, Heidegger proposes another essence of truth where truth would occur as unconcealment, as the stepping out from hiddenness into appearing. This essence of truth brings an element of hiddenness, or concealment, into the essence of truth that is later forgotten by the metaphysical tradition after Plato.

Does Nietzsche’s inquiry into the question of truth take him beyond the sense of truth as correctness found in Platonism toward a more Greek understanding of truth that brings concealment into an unsettling prominence within truth? I explore in this thesis a possible double reading of Nietzsche underdeveloped within Heidegger’s first Nietzsche
lecture course from 1936-37. The first reading focuses on Nietzsche as an inversion and overturning of Platonism. The second reading focuses on Nietzsche as a thinker who resonates with pre-Platonic thought through his development of semblance and concealment as essential to life. In this second reading I explore a consistent ambiguity within Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche that allows for the more overt reading of Nietzsche as an inverter of Platonism to be contested at least partially.

By presenting a double reading of Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche, I ask whether Nietzsche’s thinking concerning truth can be contained within the metaphysical tradition determined as Platonism, a tradition defined by a conception of truth as correspondence wherein error or non-accordance is considered as the merely inessential opposite to truth. The guiding context of this paper is Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in light of his understanding of untruth, or concealment, as what is “most proper to the essence of truth.”1 As Heidegger thinks truth as aletheia, the disclosure of beings from out of concealment, the apparent deformations of truth such as dissemblance, dissimulation, falsity, and error pertain to the very essence of truth itself. These deformations are part of the unfolding of the essence of truth, and do not fall outside of truth as its opposite or simple other. Within this understanding, I ask to what extent Nietzsche’s thinking concerning semblance, error, and concealment can bring his work into dialogue with this more originary essencing of truth that pays heed to the inseparability of truth from untruth developed by Heidegger.

The first part of this paper traces Heidegger’s 1930 essay, “On the Essence of Truth”, in order to situate my reading of the Nietzsche lecture course. My reading of the
1930 essay focuses on how when truth is conceived as correspondence, falsity or non-correspondence has a simple relation of exteriority to the essence of truth. This essay has the trajectory of a regression that proceeds to inquire into the ground, or origin, of this conception of truth as correspondence. By continuing this regression to the origin of truth, Heidegger discerns freedom as a letting-be of beings which in turn requires that there be an engagement with an open region and its openness. According to Heidegger, the Greeks experienced this open region as *aletheia*. At the same time, Heidegger introduces a more fundamental and essential untruth, as withdrawal or concealment, that is incapable of being conceived while truth is understood as correspondence. Untruth thought as concealment is no longer the opposite of truth but is the untruth “most proper to the essence of truth.”² The sense of this essential concealment ranges from the *mystery* arising from the withdrawal of the open region itself, to the persistence of this withdrawal into *errancy*, as this withdrawal settles into the way humans comportment themselves to beings while forgetting the clearing that gives, or unconceals, these beings to them. The reconsidering of the essence of truth means for Heidegger a closer and intimate bond of truth to these forms of concealment.

In the second part of my paper, I focus on the second half of Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche from 1936-37. In the first place, I trace how Heidegger’s reading is a continuation of his “On the Essence of Truth” essay insofar as he reads Nietzsche as the most extreme point of deformation of the essence of truth toward becoming a simple correspondence between intellect and thing. This is, again, to situate Nietzsche’s understanding of truth within a conception of truth ubiquitous to western
metaphysics as Platonism. In response to this more straight-forward “canonical” reading, I develop an alternative reading that finds a second, less Platonic, sense to both Heidegger’s choice of Nietzsche quotes, and to the conclusions Heidegger draws from them. To support the acuity of giving a double reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lecture course, I refer to section 234 of Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy* where Heidegger more expressly understands his reading of Nietzsche to be something open and not fully settled. “The way the confrontation with Nietzsche does master and does not master his conception of ‘truth’ must become a cornerstone for the decision as to whether we are helping his genuine philosophy to its future...”

At a key point in section 24 of the lecture course, Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s “How the True World Became a Fable”, drawing to a head the extent to which Nietzsche comes in “twisting free” (*Herausdrehung*) of the Platonic dichotomy of the true and the merely apparent. As a number of philosophers have done in the wake of Nietzsche and Heidegger, I will read the sixth statement of “How the True World Became a Fable” as a moment in Nietzsche’s thought where he eludes oppositional (two-world) thinking altogether, and leaps beyond metaphysical discourse toward a conception of truth that exists inseparably from appearance understood, more richly, as “semblance”. In conjunction with section 25 of the lecture course, where Heidegger invokes Nietzsche’s “ambiguous” use of the word semblance (*Schein*), I find this ambiguous consideration of semblance as a divergence from Platonically informed thought. This move away from Heidegger’s reading leads toward an understanding of semblance as intrinsic to how Nietzsche will come to understand truth. This brings Nietzsche’s understanding of truth
into proximity with Heidegger’s reading of doxa in pre-Platonic thought, as well as de-emphasizes the connection of Nietzsche with Platonism.

Next I will bring in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics to show how the theme of semblance is developed in connection to a sense of being as phusis. As phusis is an emergent presencing, it shines. This shining inherent to being for the Greeks contains a manifold of meanings. As a shining, “being essentially unfolds as appearing”5, yet appearing can also mean seeming, so much so that Heidegger writes that “seeming means exactly the same as Being here.”6 Being cannot be ventured without always paying heed to its possibilities of “not” being what it is. This is, for the Greeks, a struggle wherein Being must be torn away from seeming and “preserved” against it. I show that Nietzsche’s ambiguous handling of semblance can be alternatively understood as a return to this originary struggle between the inextricability of being and seeming.

To give further support to reading Nietzsche in terms of a resonance with pre-Platonic, Greek thought, I develop readings of two of his earliest works, The Birth of Tragedy and the second of The Untimely Meditations. I read them as attempts to regain a thematic of conflict and concealment as essential for the occurrence of truth as a region of openness that withdraws as it gives. By his development of the conceptual personae of “Dionysus”, Nietzsche recognizes the central role of an ontological oblivion that pervaded the height of ancient Greek thought and poetry. From his second essay in The Untimely Meditations titled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, Nietzsche poses a concept of the “unhistorical” that enables the possibility of history, or the living present. Nietzsche’s sense of the unhistorical will be understood as apervasive,
non-psychological forgetting that, through concealing, creates a suitable horizon for the emergence of present things and events. These readings of the Dionysian and the unhistorical in Nietzsche further reinforce my claim that Nietzsche is more fruitfully read in conjunction with pre-Platonic, instead of Platonic, thought. In my readings of the Dionysian and, especially, the unhistorical, I also stress a congruence between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the role of concealment in truth.

1 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, “On the Essence of Truth”, 148
2 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, 148
3 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, p. 285
4 As John Sallis writes, “(How the True World Became a Fable) has been widely discussed, especially in France, as has Heidegger’s recounting of the story, most notably in Jaques Derrida’s text Spurs.” (“Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” 2) As Sallis notes, there has been a plethora of scholarship on interpreting Nietzsche’s “How the True World Became a Fable”, as well as on Heidegger’s interpretation of that fable. While I acknowledge the significant work done on this point, it is not the express purpose of this thesis to sufficiently document the range and variety of scholarship on this question of interpretation. Such an undertaking would require a thesis unto itself.
5 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 107
6 ibid. 105
Heidegger begins his essay “On the Essence of Truth” with the seemingly innocent line: “Our topic is the *essence* of truth.” At first read, this statement may seem tautological with the essay’s title, as logically, this opening line adds nothing in content. Despite appearances, this line contains one more element than does the title: an italicizing of essence. In this essay, Heidegger will be speaking not only of truth, but will allude to the essay’s more primordial topic of attempting to think the relation of truth to essence; of the torsion that will appear within a discourse on truth that will bring it to bear on the nature of essence. This will show that an investigation into truth cannot mirror an investigation into beings, whether those beings are vegetables, the planets or humans themselves. The basic words of Being such as “truth”, “essence” (and “being” itself) essentially “deform” any discourse that attempts to question their predominant sense. The italicizing of essence will come to show that a transformation of an understanding of truth will be simultaneously a transformation of essence, and hence, the discourse itself that attempts to ask these questions must itself undergo such a transformation if it is to say anything beyond the commonplace. There can be no straightforward discourse when questioning toward the essence of the basic words of philosophy.

By explicating Heidegger’s “On the Essence of Truth” essay on the way toward his Nietzsche lectures, I accomplish two goals. First, before proceeding onward to
Heidegger’s complex reading of Nietzsche, it will be important to clarify what Heidegger will refer to repeatedly as truth understood as “the true” or accordant, as well as what Heidegger may begin to mean when he refers to truth as “aletheia”, or unconcealment. The second goal will be to show how a discourse on the essence of truth must necessarily be, in the words of John Sallis, a “deformative” one. This will allow for a reading of Nietzsche as questioning the essence of truth not only by his manifest content, but also by the style and pathos of his writing; by the way in which his style expresses a struggle in the asking of the question so resistant to being questioned, “what do we mean by ‘truth’?”

“What do we ordinarily understand by the word ‘truth’?” writes Heidegger at the beginning of the first section of “On the Essence of Truth”. This statement, while ordinary enough, is delivered ironically as Heidegger is attempting to ask this question regarding our ordinary comprehension of truth both from the perspective of common sense and as the initial step in a genuine philosophic regression toward essence. From the perspective of common sense, truth is hardly a term worth investigating, a term too obvious and “well worn” for there to be a need to ask such a question. Nonetheless, Heidegger is asking the question of truth, and does so precisely by passing through, instead of avoiding, the dissimulations of common sense. In carefully paying heed to the weight of common sense, Heidegger proceeds to outline what I have determined to be the eight characteristics of truth that persisted unquestioningly throughout the history of metaphysics.

Truth is first, the actual. In the most obvious way, we ask someone wearing a nice watch, “Is that actually a Rolex?” To be actually a Rolex means to really be a Rolex and
not a fake or a knockoff. In Heidegger’s example of gold: “actual gold is genuine gold.”

Yet this leaves open the question of what is meant here by “genuine”? Can the

genuineness of gold be denoted by it actually being gold? Heidegger doesn’t think so,
as the use of actual here demands further clarification before giving a decisive answer,
and moves on to the second characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth: accordance.

For a thing such as gold to be considered actually what it is, or genuine, this supposes
that the thing is in some accordance (Übereinstimmung) with what “always and in
advance, we properly mean by ‘gold’”. Genuineness is based on accordance between the
thing and some pre-existing definition or form of that said thing.

The third characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth is that it resides in the
proposition. It is not only the gold itself that is the true or genuine gold. It is equally that
my statements declaring whether the gold is in fact gold are what can be properly
determined as true or false. “Being true and truth here signify accord, and that of a double
sense: on the one hand, the consonance of a matter with what is unposed in advance
regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of what is meant in the statement with
the matter.” Truth means not only that a thing “is” what it is (identity), or stands in
accordance with itself, but also that the true statement accords, somehow, with the subject
matter or state of affairs that it is supposed to be faithfully representing. The fourth
characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth is that this accordance bears a relation to
knowledge and the intellect. The traditional formula of truth, veritas est adaequatio rei et
intellectus, implies that the accordance is not merely between a proposition and the thing,
but of the knowing intellect that produces such propositions and a state of affairs outside
of it. It is now more clearly a case of an interior knowledge needing to be determined and secured as correctly corresponding to an extra-intellectual object.

Heidegger continues to unfold this ordinary conception of truth by claiming that the very possibility of accordance between intellect and thing implies the “Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (ens creatum), is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus divinus i.e. in the mind of God.”¹⁵ Truth as an accordance harbors the theological supposition of a world consisting in created things, meaning that each thing that exists has a proper form or idea in the mind of God to which it must conform, if it is to be truly what it is. The truth of human knowledge is then grounded in the fact that matters and propositions “measure up to the idea”¹⁶. This segways into the sixth characteristic of the ordinary conceptions of truth, namely that truth supposes a worldly reason or what Heidegger calls a “world-order”. This inherent orderliness of the world is only the modern reformation of the theological supposition of a world of created things. Both speak equally to a plan and an inherent intelligibility of things to an intellect, the only difference being that in worldly reason the laws that determine the essence of things are supplied by the human intellect itself and not derived from an (divine) intellect transcendent to it. Truth as accordance is essentially a veiled creationism, or what amounts to the same, a veiled rationalism, or what we will soon see, a more or less veiled Platonism.

The seventh characteristic, and perhaps the most important (despite the lack of space that Heidegger devotes to it in the essay) is that the definition of the essence of
truth is independent of the interpretation of the essence of the Being of all beings.\textsuperscript{17} Truth, as it is usually conceived does not bear directly or overtly on ultimate matters of metaphysics. Instead, truth is something obvious, already decided, and not requiring further evaluation in the unfolding of a metaphysical system. Truth, as that “worn and almost dulled word”\textsuperscript{18} taken in the formula veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, possesses a general and self-evident validity. This would appear to exempt it from being worthy of questioning as part of any metaphysical inquiry, whether it be Leibniz, Kant, or perhaps even Nietzsche. 

The eighth and final characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth opens a central issue for the purposes of this paper. The question is how untruth is to be considered. Along with the unquestionable obviousness of the essence of truth itself, there follows an “equally obvious” claim that “truth has an opposite, and that there is untruth.”\textsuperscript{19} This untruth is determined as a simple non-accordance of the intellectual knowledge or statement with its matter. There are two crucial moments or aspects of this sense of the false or untrue that will be paramount to understanding the revolution Heidegger is about to undertake as he questions truth far beyond what common sense has determined for it. The first is that untruth is here, in the ordinary conception of truth, considered to exist in an oppositional relationship to truth proper: that untruth’s “non-accordance” with the thing, is a simple negation or failure to accord. I say that the fruit is a peach and it turns out to be an apricot. The two statements of “it is a peach” and “it is an apricot” simply reject or oppose one another, unable to exist in the same universe due to the apparently inarguable law of non-contradiction. The second point about untruth
here is that, following from what was said above, untruth or ‘falsity’ “falls outside the essence of truth.”20 An investigation into ‘the truth’, understood as accordance, does not need to consider untruth, as this opposing falsity is the mere negation or failure of accordance. Untruth can here be understood solely through its failing to be true, and hence having no essence or being of its own.21 It then is clear that with the ordinary conception of truth, the “question of comprehending the pure essence of truth, untruth, as such an opposite of truth, can be put aside.”22 There is no need to pay any heed to mere untruth or falsity as one strives toward truth as the accordance to the pure idea of the object in question.

Now that what is meant by truth is unquestionably an accordance between an intellect and a matter, and that falsity has no place in any such investigation into the thematization of truth, how does Heidegger reignite the need to question this essencing of truth? And, importantly for the purposes of this paper, how will Heidegger then conceive of truth differently, that is, in the relationality of truth and untruth? Heidegger finds his opening in asking how accordance is possible, for a proposition and a thing are two very dissimilar beings. This accordance between two very dissimilar beings is made possible by a previously existing relation between the two. This necessary pre-existing relation is what Heidegger will call comportment. If the pen on the table and my statement about it are to come into accord, there must first be a relation between myself and the pen that opens up the possibility of saying something about that said relation. This accordance, now understood as a comporting (Verhalten) or free relation, must take place within an open region. This open region would allow for the possibility of two things to stand
opposed. This would be an open region “not first created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness.” In Heidegger’s first overturning of the ordinary conception of truth, truth is no longer to be found primarily in the proposition. Truth now has a new locus: the open region of comportment.

Heidegger continues his descent into the ground of the possibility of truth as correctness and establishes that the “essence of truth, as the correctness of a statement, is freedom.” It is important to notice that here Heidegger is not pronouncing a new essence of truth, but is concluding his line of thinking that considers the ground of the metaphysical essence of truth. While Heidegger has displaced the locus of truth from the proposition toward the open region of comportment, the essay is still moving, by section three, within the metaphysical conception of truth. The actual transition to another essence of truth, which Heidegger will call aletheia, will not begin for a couple more pages. Importantly, this transition is initiated by Heidegger broaching the phenomenon of withdrawal as it first applies to how our engagement with the open region itself withdraws in concurrence with our engagement with beings. This moment of the open region’s withdrawal as it enables the possibility of comportment with beings, is the beginning of an essential turn within Heidegger’s discourse on truth. The discussion becomes one of both truth as a revealing comportment, and now also untruth taken as the withdrawal that enables truth as correctness. As Heidegger writes, “the question cornering the essence of truth thus first reaches the originary domain… when, on the basis of a prior glimpse of the full essence of truth, it has included a consideration of untruth in its unveiling of the essence.”

The break from truth as accordance or
correctness only occurs once untruth is radically reconsidered as the withdrawal of the clearing, and what Heidegger will hence explore as *concealment*.

As truth is to be reimagined as aletheia, or unconcealment, the guiding change that occurs in this transformation of truth is that of the relation between truth and untruth, as they no longer oppose and repel each other like oil and water.\(^{27}\) In fact, as Heidegger writes at the end of section five titled “the Essence of Truth”, “what brings into accord is not nothing, but rather a concealing of beings as a whole.”\(^{28}\) Untruth, now to be taken as concealment, complements the opening of a clearing and hence is an indispensable moment of truth’s essencing both as accordance and as accordance’s ground of possibility, letting-be. This indicates that untruth is now *intrinsic* to the essence of truth such that Heidegger can say that “letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing.”\(^{29}\) The language of opposition fades and in its place arises a language that articulates how untruth is not only intrinsic to the essencing of truth, but “preserves” and “conserves” this emerging of truth. This is also to take untruth as no longer something simple, no longer the simple “not” of non-accordance. Concealment has within itself multiple ways it prevails within the essencing of truth. As was mentioned earlier, the first sense of concealment is the withdrawal of the engagement with the clearing itself in the occurrence of our comportment to beings within that open region. This sense of concealment is further clarified and added upon in section six as Heidegger elaborates a sense of concealment as “mystery”. In an answer to the query of what conserves letting-be in this relatedness to concealing, Heidegger answers that it is “nothing less than that concealing of what is concealed as a whole”\(^{30}\). Concealing is not only the withdrawal of
the engagement with the open region, but consists in a second concealing of that very withdrawal itself. Concealment takes on the sense of both concealing and self-concealing, as it is the “concealing of what is concealed”. This double concealment holds as the mystery. Yet, this is not the end. This double concealment bears a tendency toward a forgetfulness of this very tendency to concealment. As humans “cling to what is readily available” or comport themselves to beings, the mystery, the concealment of the withdrawal of the open region, itself withdraws or is concealed to the ultimate point of its falling into oblivion. By its own inner necessity, the double concealment of the mystery intensifies into its own self-disavowal in errancy. In this movement of errancy, as human beings engage with the available beings environing them (by our very necessity to act and to live as ex-sistent, as still engaging in the open region), truth (as the lighting up of this open region) takes its leave and we live in-sistently. In this basic forgetting of the mystery in errancy, Dasein in-sists, an in-sistence where the human being is left “to replenish its ‘world’ on the basis of the latest needs and aims”. Yet, as we are turned toward the readily available beings that environ us, Dasein must at the same time be, in some manner, ex-sistent, or still held out into the clearing in some way. To be in-sistently turned toward beings is at “one and the same time” to be ex-sistently turning away from the mystery.

The relation of truth and untruth, in the more original questioning of truth, becomes a relation thought more originarily as a “turning to and fro proper to Dasein.” Truth is a turning within Dasein from ex-sistence to in-sistence, and vice versa. This turning highlights the indissoluble jointure of truth and untruth as mystery and errancy. It
is here, in the constant turning to and fro of Dasein from mystery to errancy and (in
moments) back to the ex-sistence of letting the mystery hold sway, that truth thought now
as aletheia is further distinguished from metaphysical or Platonic truth. This turning
within Dasein is not a stable and harmonious congruence of parts. As truth is now thought
to contain its own non-essence (mystery-errancy), the questioning of this truth is now to be carried out through struggle or by an “intrinsically discordant”36 event. To enter into the questioning of truth is to enter into the polemos of Heraclitus. As Heidegger writes in his 1932 essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”, “truth originally means what has been wrested from hiddenness.”37 In like manner, ex-sistence, through its ownmost possibility to fall into the forgetfulness of in-sistence, is only experienced through a struggle against the prevailing oblivion of Being as humans are continually and essentially drawn to the immediate, useful beings of the world. The “unity” of truth and untruth is, I claim, a Heraclitean harmony of tensions that demands strength.38 This sense of struggle, or the need for a “wrestling” of unconcealment from a stubborn hiddenness, hearkens to the Greek word for truth itself: aletheia. Truth, as the revealing of beings as they are, is not at the root of the word. Instead, the fundamental concealment, i.e. lethe, has the foremost place in the word. We cannot say that truth comes first, but that truth finds its ground or essence in this more originary lethe, or concealment. In this continual and creative struggle within the essence of truth, there is a certain priority of untruth within this turning.

A crucial point that Heidegger carefully unfolds in this questioning of truth takes him further afield of the common sense and metaphysical understanding of truth. In
questioning the essence of truth from the essence of truth, instead of from the doxa or appearance of truth as correctness, the “monstrous” question must be broached as to how untruth might have a peculiar priority within this initial interrelation of truth and untruth. The possibility is introduced in section six of the “Essence of Truth” essay when Heidegger writes, “the concealment of beings as a whole, un-truth proper, is older than every openness of this or that being.” The questioning of truth is now beyond the stating of a relation between truth and un-truth that contests the metaphysical claim that un-truth, as error, does not belong to the essence of truth. Heidegger goes one step further and broaches the almost impossible question: Could untruth, as the manifold senses of concealment, be the essence of truth? And, in asking this question, how would “essence” itself be transformed? I believe this question remains underdeveloped within the 1930 essay itself. In the essay as a whole, the emphasis is more on creating a transition of thought from out of truth as accordance toward the essential bringing together of truth and untruth as aletheia, leaving this more monstrous and extra-metaphysical possibility as a marginal feature of the essay. Heidegger, though, will further develop this possibility of the essence of truth later in Contributions to Philosophy: Of The Event.

In remark 226 of Contributions to Philosophy called “Aletheia and the clearing of concealment,” Heidegger begins by distancing his own meditations on truth from his earlier focus on aletheia, or what we might call the positive moment of unconcealment. “(Aletheia) indicates that concealment is experienced only as what is to be cleared away, what is to be removed.” In his earlier questioning of truth through the word aletheia, there was an undue emphasis on the moment of revealing or unconcealing. Heidegger’s
self-critique of his earlier meditations on unconcealment continues as he writes, “my previous attempts at projecting the essence of truth, the endeavor to be understood was always primarily directed at an elucidation of the modes of clearing, the variations of concealment, and their essential interconnection. (cf., e.g., the lecture on truth, 1930)”. Heidegger is here becoming aware that in the tacit priority given to the element of truth within the full essence of truth, his approach had remained still too metaphysical. The 1930 essay is still caught within a paradigm that understood untruth or concealment on the basis of, or from, its moment of coming into presence. This does not mean that Heidegger, in the 1930 essay, understood the concealment of mystery and errancy in terms of presence. It would be clearer to say that what we could call his direction of meditation at the time was one of regress that descended toward concealment before experiencing from out of that very concealment. The experience of concealment was still always to a degree mediated by the initial experience of unconcealment. “Therefore questioning, too does not address the concealment itself and its ground.”45 Heidegger intensifies his brief excursion into asking if untruth might be “older” than truth, and begins to use the language of truth, here in Contributions, as the “clearing for concealing.” The emphasis is now on concealing. The clearing or revealing is now for concealing. Untruth, or concealment, is not only older than truth, but now is what we might call the sheltered essence of truth. Heidegger is now able to say that, “truth as the clearing for concealment is thus an essentially different projection than is aletheia.”46 Aletheia is now seen by Heidegger as still determined “on the basis of phusis”, by the emergence of beings in their presencing, and is hence too close to the determination of
truth resulting from a fixation upon this emergence: the Idea of Platonism. Whereas in the “On the Essence of Truth” essay, Heidegger never distinguished his own path from that of aletheia, there is now a clear distancing in play from that basic word toward something stranger that places the emphasis on what does not reveal itself. It is at this point that we can say along with Heidegger, and in a quite Nietzschean phrasing, that the “essence of truth is untruth”\textsuperscript{47}.

Before continuing forward in this paper toward a questioning of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, there is one more key disruption performed by Heidegger against the metaphysical conception of truth that needs to be thematized. “Our topic is the essence (Wesen)\textsuperscript{48} of truth.”\textsuperscript{49} The first line of “On the Essence of Truth”, by italicizing the word essence (although the sentence’s proper subject is truth) hints that this essay is equally, although somewhat furtively, a discourse on essence. This aspect of the essay comes full circle in section seven, immediately following Heidegger’s discussion of errancy. A new possibility of questioning arises when (or if) Dasein is able to be sustained in a “resolute openness toward the mystery”\textsuperscript{50}, without succumbing to the ontological closure of the movement of errancy (i.e. becoming so ensnared in comporting toward beings that the possibility of raising the question of being, or how these beings are given, is forgotten and unable to be asked). This possibility of questioning is the revealing of the intertwining of the “essence of truth with the truth of essence”. While metaphysical truth understood as accordance existed as independent of metaphysical inquiry as such, truth, when questioned in a non-metaphysical manner, is simultaneously an interrogation of essence. Truth, essence, and Being become in this questioning a differentiated, yet
somehow inseparable, trinity. Far from a harmless given, truth has here become not only the first question of philosophy, but a question that raises all others in being asked. Truth now is thematically recognized by Heidegger as an event that reverberates through every questioning and every inquiry that can be made into the Being of beings. Yet, if we remember that here truth is to find its essence, its ground, in untruth, where are we with essence itself, with Being? Where are we to stand once the basic words that ground us have abandoned their complicity with the good sense of reason and become their own distortion and dissolution? As this paper continues, the question will continually be raised as to how far Nietzsche himself does (or can) travel in this direction of a disruptive, alien, and paradoxical truth. I will bracket Heidegger’s own constant evolution with respect to this question and restrict myself to use what has been said so far as a framework to better understand, not only Nietzsche himself, but to guide my own reading of Heidegger’s multifaceted interpretation of Nietzsche in the 1930s.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, p. 136
8 John Sallis, *Double Truth*, “Deformatives”, p. 85
9 John Sallis, “Deformations”, from *Double Truth*; p.85
I am deeply indebted to this essay for helping guide my thinking in my early attempts to gather my thoughts together about such a polyvocal and nuanced work as “On The Essence of Truth”.
10 Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, p. 137
11 I will be using the term “metaphysics” in this paper to refer exclusively to metaphysics in the idiosyncratic, Heideggerian sense; the history of western thought, as specifically conceived by Heidegger in the 1930s, that stretches from its complicated beginnings in ancient Greece to the modern day historical phenomena of nihilism.
12 ibid. 137
The deformative paradoxicalness of questioning into truth already begins to show itself here.

ibid. 138

ibid. 138

ibid. 139

ibid. 139

ibid. 136

ibid. 139

ibid. 139

ibid. 139

ibid. 139

Evil was nothing for Spinoza, as was falsity. Both were a lack of being and in no way expressions of nature’s power.

ibid. 139

ibid. 141

ibid. 142

As Sallis points out as well, Heidegger is still proceeding from (thinking out of) the ordinary conception of truth until the end of section 5 (“The essence of truth”). Such a shift from accordance to unconcealment requires a leap that is only performed at the end of section five when Heidegger begins to speak of concealment for itself, and attempts to speak from concealment, or untruth, itself. Heidegger’s footnote, added in 1943 states, “Between 5. And 6. The leap into the turning (whose essence unfolds in the event of appropriation).” (148) This attempt of Heidegger’s to begin to speak from what does not show itself, intimates a clear methodological change from the phenomenological standpoint of Being and Time and is an important point of transition in the development of Heidegger’s work from the 1930s and beyond. This discontinuity of truth is discussed in great detail in John Sallis’ essay “Interrupting Truth” from Double Truth (1995).

ibid. 146
There has been much criticism of Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia by scholars like Ernst Tugendhat who argue that Heidegger’s account of truth “fails to specify the modes of uncovering and givenness characteristic of agreement.” (Beck 2018)

This amounts to the claim that Heidegger’s aletheia makes the possibility of agreement between truth claims and their object difficult, if not impossible to determine. This determination then has the further consequence of giving Heidegger’s account of truth a lack of “criterion for distinguishing truth and falsity.” (Beck 2018) In being limited to the finite, historical horizon of aletheia, we have no recourse to question the truth of this horizon and therefore, under Heidegger’s paradigm, we will be incapable of critiquing our historical horizon on normative grounds. An interesting response to this difficulty in Heidegger’s account of aletheia comes from William Smith who writes, “It is only as resolute that Dasein can make the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity normative for itself in a critical sense.”(176)

Resoluteness, a term featured prominently in Being and Time, means the existential transformation of taking over, or realizing, one’s fundamental temporal nature or constitutive finitude. Smith suggests that such a seeing into one’s temporal horizons can furnish a critical perspective upon the horizon of aletheia, as this resolute seeing involves the becoming transparent of this horizon distinct from the usual manner in which the horizon is covered over by common sense interpretations of objects and events. In resoluteness there can emerge a normative standard that is capable of “resolving to work out the inconsistencies in its skills and standards in light of the things themselves.”(176) While this is a thought-provoking solution to Tugendhat’s Kantian informed critique of Heidegger, Smith is writing under the assumption that the possibility of making normative claims needs to be saved. As I understand Heidegger’s notion of aletheia, truth as aletheia in no way disrupts the usual, everyday sense we have about things-in-themselves and the possibility of our knowledge claims being false according to a normative truth. Aletheia does not refute truth as correctness, but grounds correctness, along with all of its normative language games, within a historical sending of Being. This abyssal ground of historical Being does not interrupt normative claim-making by forbidding knowledge of a non-historical thing-in-itself, for the non-historical thing-in-itself is in fact historical, and resides “within” the historical horizon once we take this horizon to be truly one of Being and not one of a Kantian horizon of epistemological subjectivity. It is almost ubiquitous among these criticisms of Heidegger’s notion of aletheia that they come from an uncritical reliance on the classical Kantian dualism of a horizon of subjective knowledge juxtaposed to a possibly unknowable objective world. Such Kantian-informed critiques of aletheia that focus on section 44 of Being and Time have apparently failed to take into consideration section 7, on the “Concept of Phenomenon”, wherein Heidegger curtly removes his philosophy from the subject-object centered questions of epistemological relativity and things-in-themselves. Heidegger

Pathmarks, 148

ibid. 148

ibid. 148
Ex-sistence is the standing out of the human, as Dasein, into the clearing; and in standing out, to be claimed by Being. As Heidegger will say at a later date, it is “that in which the essence of man preserves the source that determines him.” (Basic Writings, “Letter on Humanism”, p. 228)

Doxa is a Greek word often translated as “opinion”. In the context of Heidegger’s thought doxa will have a far more complex and nuanced range of meanings from “appearance”, to “view”. With respect to inceptual Greek thought, doxa will come close to aletheia in so far as it carries the basic sense of the shining forth of beings.

Perhaps the best image of how this transformation of essence may unfold as something “monstrous” comes from Nietzsche’s description of the consequences of killing God. Here Nietzsche pleads, “What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually?... Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?” (The Gay Science, “The Madman”, p. 181) I see the monstrous character of this “plunging” stemming from its occurrence as the result of a questioning into God. We killed God in our desire to better know God. In wanting truth (the will to truth), in asking the question of truth, one has found anything but the truth as it was pre-conceived. This thinking at cross-purposes to oneself is precisely what I would call “monstrous”.

Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, Indiana University Press, 2012
In the German, this word *Wesen* has a verbal connotation not heard in the English “essence”. *Wesen* can mean, in addition to the “what” of a being, the “how” of a being, or the way in which a being presents itself in its temporal unfolding. I believe this sense of the word carries a similar sense to what Merleau-Ponty will describe as the “style” of a being.

*Pathmarks*, 136

ibid. 151
CHAPTER III

HEIDEGGER’S CANONICAL READING OF NIETZSCHE

In Heidegger’s first lecture course from the Nietzsche series of lectures courses, titled “The Will to Power as Art”, Heidegger takes up the topic of truth in the thinking of Nietzsche not only in relation to art, but as an exemplary moment in Heidegger’s own reflections on the history of Being. The question of the role of art within Nietzsche’s “metaphysical” project as a whole transitions in section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course toward a more explicit discussion of how, in Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche understands truth. The issue is also raised by Heidegger at this juncture as to whether Nietzsche sufficiently raises the question of truth, raises it to the point of “truly” overcoming the historical trajectory that began with Plato and the collapse of aletheia. Does Nietzsche pass over this challenge and remain fundamentally “metaphysical”? Does this passing over occur despite Nietzsche's overt attempts to liberate himself from that very tradition, and what he takes to be its most basic suppositions?

In this section of the paper, I follow what I call Heidegger’s “canonical” reading of Nietzsche through three key elaborations of it: section 19 of “The Will to Power as Art” from 1936/37, “Plato Doctrine of Truth” 1940, and section 234 of Contributions titled “The Question of Truth (Nietzsche)” 1936-38. In this canonical reading of Nietzsche, I show how Heidegger consistently places Nietzsche as a final step within the history of being’s withdrawal toward nihilism. More importantly for the purposes of
this paper, the extremity of Nietzsche’s place within this history makes him both the thinker least able to raise the question of truth in a non-metaphysical way, yet also uniquely capable of seeing the question of truth as worthy of interrogation. This clarification of Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche will then allow an exploration of a second, and more subterranean, reading of Nietzsche developed by Heidegger within the 1936/37 lecture course. This second reading will open the interpretive possibility of a more radical Nietzsche, a Nietzsche who raises the question of truth to an abyssal extreme that does not only invert, or even overcome, Platonism, but twists free of it.5455

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in the 1930s hinges around the issue of truth, what Nietzsche understands by that well-worn word, and whether there is an opening within Nietzsche’s thought for a transformation of truth in its essence, and not a simple inversion. As Heidegger writes, “we must first ask upon which route of meaning the word ‘truth’ moves for Nietzsche…” and he answers, “that it moves along the route which deviates from the essential route.”56 At his most unequivocal, Heidegger says that the question of the essence of truth is “missing in Nietzsche’s thought.”57 Though there is an obvious respect for Nietzsche, as his path possesses a certain degree of originality and historical importance for Heidegger, on the more specific and fundamental question of Nietzsche’s penetration into the essence of truth, Heidegger remains consistently skeptical. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche falls short of an authentic questioning into truth because, first of all, he takes truth as something evident. What Nietzsche takes for truth is not the essence of truth itself, but what Heidegger will consistently call “the true”. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s understanding of truth moves within a conception of the truth
as “the true”. This “oversight” as Heidegger calls it, brings Nietzsche into philosophical communion with the “entire history of occidental philosophy since Plato and Aristotle.” By Nietzsche's adoption of truth as “the true”, Heidegger is quick to show that this understanding moves within the notion of truth as accordance, or correctness, elaborated upon earlier in this paper. This is a truth that is a truth of knowledge. It becomes equivalent to say that something is true and to have knowledge of that said thing. For Heidegger, truth and knowledge become almost interchangeable terms implying the relation of accordance between a knowing intellect and the thing or object to be known.

What might be called Heidegger’s evidence that Nietzsche holds such a conception of truth to be “the true”, comes from a reference to the well known remark 493 from the Will to Power that reads, “Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live.” Heidegger takes from this quote that, despite Nietzsche’s extreme position on truth, his understanding of truth as having an opposite, namely error, still places Nietzsche firmly within the metaphysical conception of truth as correctness. Heidegger writes, “that Nietzsche says ‘truth’ is an error; all these are advances of thoughtful inquiry. And yet! They all leave untouched the essence of truth itself.” Does Nietzsche here still maintain that oppositional and inessential relation between truth and untruth characteristic of truth as accordance? Is the metaphysical dichotomy of truth and falsity still upheld as Nietzsche blurs their boundaries and shifts the emphasis toward a primacy of falsity? As Heidegger writes, “Nietzsche’s conception of the essence of truth keeps to
the realm of the long tradition of Western thought, no matter how much Nietzsche’s particular interpretations of that conception deviate from earlier ones.” Heidegger consistently recognizes that Nietzsche’s thinking challenges the conception of truth that defines and confines Western thought. He also, with equal consistency, reads Nietzsche as still entirely determined by that very same conception of truth without qualifiers. An inversion of Platonism will always remain beholden to the essence of truth it inverts. By Heidegger’s “logic”, the philosophical movement of inversion will always be distinguished from a transformation of essence. Inversion, while appearing critical to what it inverts (i.e. Platonism), shares a concealed essence with what it inverts. The question that needs to be posed here is then: Can Nietzsche inaugurate a transformation of the essence of truth while still adhering to the language of metaphysics, the language of truth (as in the “true world”) and error? A further development of this question requires first, a fuller account of Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche, in order to broach the topic of a second and more favorable reading present near the conclusion of the 1936/37 lecture course.

A second presentation of how Heidegger reads Nietzsche in the light of his development of the history of Being, comes from the 1932 essay “On Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”. Here Heidegger traces a change in the essence of truth that unfolded at the inception of Western thought. By following Plato’s allegory of the cave with minute attention to Plato's uses of metaphor, Heidegger delimits two different essences of truth contending with one another within the allegory. These two essences are truth as aletheia or unconcealment (the more originary essence), and truth as accordance. The former is
present in the allegory through the image of the cave and the “life and death struggle”\textsuperscript{64} that the human faces in his/her movement out of the cave. The latter is present through the trajectory marked by the transition from the image of the fire to the image of the sun, and overall by the constant thematic of light and its blinding brilliance to the unaccustomed cave-dweller. In addition, Heidegger notes within the allegory there is not just the metaphorical presentation of two different essences of truth. In the laying out of the allegory there is also a marked transition away from truth as aletheia, as truth as correctness comes to greater and greater prominence. As Heidegger explains, “Certainly unhiddenness is mentioned in its various stages, but it is considered simply in terms of how it makes whatever appears be accessible in its visible form (edios).”\textsuperscript{65} This transition to the consideration of only the visible form necessitates a fundamental shift toward all the characteristics of truth as accordance. This shift includes the connection of truth to the act of knowing, as well as the privileging of sight and the direct look.\textsuperscript{66}

Once this transformation of truth into correctness comes to prevalence in Plato, it does not then wane in its power, as the eventuation of Plato’s thought passes further back into the annals of history. In Heidegger’s development of the history of Being, that history is in fact the continued empowerment of this prevailing of truth as correctness into increasingly more forgetful forms of humanism.\textsuperscript{67} As the locus of truth changes from beings themselves to becoming a “characteristic of human comportment”\textsuperscript{68}, the experience of the revealing of beings as a whole falls further and further into oblivion. With this being-historical tendency in place, Heidegger then must read Nietzsche’s thinking as the ultimate and most “humanistic” (i.e. oblivious to the question of Being)
stage of this history. Not only this, but Nietzsche must also bear an extensive relation to Plato. This is first because every figure within this historical trajectory must bear the mark, so to speak, of the predominance of the eidos, or visible form, on their philosophizing. Secondly, by coming near the possible conclusion (or exhaustion) of this history, Nietzsche bears a privileged relation to Plato as he is uniquely exposed to the full possibilities and consequences of this essence of truth that was brought to the fore by Plato twenty four hundred years ago. It is important to reiterate that in this history Heidegger is attempting to trace, it can neither be called progressive (i.e. Hegel) or regressive (i.e Rousseau), although the regressive understanding might come closer to grasping the directionality of this history. This is not a linear history, but one that bears at least two trends. There is, first, the trend toward the greater and greater oblivion or abandonment of beings by Being that co-exists with an ever-intensifying subject-centeredness. Yet, there is also a trend of preparation for a future overcoming and a consequent new, or other, beginning. By the exhaustion of the possibilities of metaphysics, metaphysics brings itself to the possibility of its own self-overcoming.

In this 1932 essay, Heidegger also returns to note 493 of The Will to Power, to further reinforce Nietzsche’s extreme position within the unfolding history of metaphysics. In his commentary to remark 493 Heidegger writes, “If for Nietzsche truth is a kind of error, then its essence consists in a way of thinking that always, indeed, necessarily, classifies the real… sets up as the supposedly real something that does not correspond -i.e. something incorrect and thus erroneous.” Even in what amounts to a parody of accordance, there appears, for Heidegger, no possibility of a Nietzschean
challenge to the prevailing of truth as accordance. Nietzsche’s playing with the most extreme possibilities of the words “truth” and “error” still condemns him to further enslavement within the paradigm of correctness. For Nietzsche, to claim that truth is an error supposes the conception of truth whereby falsity is determined by the non-accordance of statement and thing. His changing of the value of these words bears in no way on their essence. What we might call the “emptying out” of truth in note 493 of The Will To Power, for Heidegger, has no bearing on an essential transformation in thought toward a more originary essencing of truth. If anything, Nietzsche has become even further removed from the ungrounded glimmer of aletheia that was present in Plato’s allegory of the cave.

It is clear that in section nineteen of the 1936/37 lecture course and in the 1932 essay, Heidegger unequivocally finds in Nietzsche’s philosophy no openings toward a fundamentally new possibility of thought, and that Nietzsche’s thinking is the “unconditioned fulfillment” of the change in the essence of truth that became prominent amid the time of Plato and became secured in the Christianization of the Western world. Yet, it cannot be denied that Nietzsche is the thinker that, other than Heidegger, went furthest in questioning and problematizing the deepest suppositions of Western thought, especially truth and the “true world”. If this is so, how does Heidegger justify his reading of Nietzsche as the “most unrestrained Platonist in the history of metaphysics”? By turning to section 234 of Contributions, I further elaborate on this question of the dual sense of Nietzsche’s place in the history of Being, in preparation for finding a more favorable reading of Nietzsche latent in the 1936/37 lecture course.
The collapse of aletheia refers to the way in which the originary Greek experience of the clearing was not able to be properly grounded by Greek philosophy, and hence collapsed in upon itself. This collapse opened the way for the coming to prominence of the Platonic Idea, and for the proposition to be understood as the loci of truth. See Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event sections 73, 116, 211.

The term “canonical view” is used by William Melaney (in his essay “Heidegger’s Allegory of Reading: On Nietzsche and the Tradition”) to describe Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche that reads Nietzsche as “an almost perfect demonstration of how the forgetfulness of Being continues the dominant positions of modern metaphysics.”(223) I will be attempting to complicate and challenge this “canonical” reading of Nietzsche by multiple routes.

Alan D. Schrift, in his book Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, lays out Heidegger’s three “methodological choices” that, in Schrift’s opinion, make these Nietzsche lectures more about Heidegger’s own philosophical project than they serve in giving a useful exegesis of Nietzsche’s own philosophical corpus. The first of these choices is Heidegger’s decision to locate “Nietzsche’s philosophy proper in his unpublished Nachlass”, guided by the opinion that “the true doctrine of a thinker is left unsaid in what he says.”(15) The second choice is to read Nietzsche philosophy as forming a system centered around the doctrines of eternal recurrence, will to power, and nihilism. The third choice is that Heidegger views “all serious philosophical thinking as metaphysics”(19), meaning that there is a guiding view to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche that consists in posing the question as to how Nietzsche thinks the being of beings as a whole, and whether he can raise the question of being as such. Schrift claims that the “hermeneutic consequences” of this “metaphysicalization of Nietzsche qua serious thinker are enormous.”(20) I agree wholeheartedly with Schrift on this claim of the enormity of effect that Heidegger’s choices have upon his reading of Nietzsche. Though, I do not think this effect is altogether as problematic as Schrift argues. Similarly to Deleuze’s books on Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson, Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche injects a much needed dose of philosophical imagination into the hermeneutic possibilities of reading Nietzsche. While such speculative studies may strike some as bad scholarship, this says more about the state of contemporary scholarship, in its dearth of risk-taking, than it does about Deleuze and Heidegger. Such complaints against Heidegger in fact, by my estimate, invoke a correspondence theory of truth in arguing that Heidegger’s reading is not staying in line with the ‘true’ Nietzsche. If his studies on Nietzsche were gauged by what they revealed (aletheia) about the possibilities of being itself, instead of whether they conformed to the ‘actual’ Nietzsche, this discussion would be a mute point; as his studies are undisputedly revealing, even if it is not always ‘Nietzsche’ who is revealed.
It is important here to clarify the three terms utilized by Heidegger in describing the relation of Nietzsche’s thought to Platonism: inversion (Umkehr), overturning (Überwindung), and twisting free (Herausdrehung). Inversion refers to the most basic and least original phase of Nietzsche’s thought where, within the two-world schema of Platonism, Nietzsche simply reverses the valuations of the super-sensuous and sensuous. Now the sensuous is the ‘true’ and the super-sensuous is the ‘false’. This inversion is best captured in statement five of “How The True World Became a Fable” and for Heidegger represents Nietzsche’s positivist phase of the late 1870s and early 1880s. “Overturning” refers to Nietzsche’s explicitly stated project in the final year of his productivity, where he would go beyond a mere inversion and, through a reevaluation of all values, overcome the basis of Platonism itself: nihilistic values. “Twisting free” is Heidegger’s term for the possibility in Nietzsche’s philosophy of a sufficient break with Platonism. This would be where Nietzsche’s thought would no longer find its sole ground in the fundamental decisions of metaphysics (i.e. reality/appearance, being/becoming, being/thinking). As John Sallis explains, twisting free would require “not merely the inversion of the hierarchical opposition between the true and the apparent but a transformation of the very ordering structure governing both the Platonic subordination and its inversion… that there be not merely inversion but also displacement.” (“Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” 2)

The question, to phrase it in terms used by John Sallis, is: Does Nietzsche bring a “second moment” into play beyond his moment of inversion? (Double Truth, p.87) What I will try to make clear in this paper is that there is present, in both the early and later writings of Nietzsche, an extra-metaphysical displacement (a “second moment” beyond inversion) of truth different, but commensurate, to that of Heidegger’s.

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, 148

ibid. 149

ibid. 149
The difficulty in determining the extent to which Nietzsche twists free of Platonism (and its conception of truth) is redoubled by Nietzsche’s inability to resist speaking of truth in the Platonic sense, even if part of a rhetorical strategy to destabilize the very concept. As David Farrell Krell writes, “the word truth is one that Nietzsche is always embarrassed to use, and yet it is a word he cannot renounce.” (Infectious Nietzsche, 35) 

The challenge will be to show that Nietzsche has an extra-metaphysical understanding of truth grounding his use of truth in the metaphysical sense of correctness. Krell sees such an extra-metaphysical understanding of truth present even from the beginning of Nietzsche’s thought. As Krell writes, “truth, at least as adequation of assertion to state of affairs, is a position that is already surpassed by the time of The Birth of Tragedy.” (Infectious Nietzsche, 36) In support of this claim, Krell cites Nietzsche, “Here the opposition of a true and an apparent world is missing: there is but one world, and this one is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without meaning… A world thus construed is the true world.” (The Birth of Tragedy, preface section 5, xvii) Later in this thesis, I argue that The Birth of Tragedy stands as evidence that Nietzsche is an extra-metaphysical thinker with respect to truth for a reason different than what is here proposed by David Krell. Krell claims Nietzsche is an extra-metaphysical thinker of truth as early as The Birth of Tragedy because, at that stage, Nietzsche is contesting the two world model in favor of a single world of the false. I see this as not going far enough in recognizing how Nietzsche contests metaphysical truth in his early period. In distinction to Krell, I claim Nietzsche’s main strategy of contesting metaphysics and its understanding of truth in The Birth of Tragedy is through his development of an essential concealment through the conceptual personae of Dionysius. As I discussed with “How the True World became a Fable,” eliminating the true world in favor of a world of appearances is only the commencement of an inversion of metaphysics. To overcome, or even twist free of, metaphysics requires a more radical transformation. I claim this more radical transformation occurs in Nietzsche as he discusses modes of concealment such as Dionysius and the “unhistorical” (from the second of the Untimely Meditations).

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p.272

If one is to fall into the liar’s paradox and say “This is a lie,” that sentence will be, strictly speaking, neither true or false. It cannot even be false, because to be false is to fail to accord with the proper (and true) idea of the proposition, but there cannot be an idea of the false, otherwise it would be a ‘true’ idea and hence would fail to capture the very falsity of ‘the false’. The very speaking of a paradox such as “this is a lie” recoils upon and into itself unceasingly. Paradoxes can be neither true or false, but only the incessant motion of a thinking that can find no idea to rest upon. I find that to linger in a paradox is to already experience something “monstrous” and beyond truth and falsity.

ibid. 153

Pathmarks, 172
Could it be that *smell* was the privileged sense with some pre-Platonic philosophers instead of sight? John Sallis in his essay “Hades”, explores how the sense of smell is for the pre-Platonic philosopher, Heraclitus, the sense which comports us to concealment. Fragment B 98 of Heraclitus reads, “Souls smell in Hades.” Hades here carries the connotation of concealment, as Hades was the god of the underworld in Greek mythology. With respect to this fragment, Sallis asks the question, “But why is that mode of comportment in which man comports himself to concealment identified (by Heraclitus) as corresponding to the sense of smell?” (*Delimitations*, 190) It could be that smell comports us to concealment better than the other senses because smell is the sense "least capable of drawing things out of their withdrawal.” (*Delimitations*, 191)

As Heidegger writes, “The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same time the beginning of ‘humanism’.” (*Pathmarks* 181)

Heidegger makes the placement of Nietzsche within this historical trajectory abundantly clear when he writes, “Insofar as ‘value’ and interpretation in terms of ‘values’ are what sustains Nietzsche’s metaphysics… and since for him all knowledge takes its departure from the metaphysical origin of ‘value’, to that extent Nietzsche is the most unrestrained Platonist in the history of metaphysics.” (*Pathmarks* 182)
CHAPTER IV

COMPLICATING THE CANONICAL READING

Heidegger begins section 234 (“The question of truth (Nietzsche)” of Contributions by writing, “The last one who asked the question of ‘truth’ and asked about it most passionately, is Nietzsche.” At a time contemporaneous to the 1936/37 lecture course, Heidegger concedes that Nietzsche is in fact not only raising the question of truth, a questioning that would seem at odds with his more critical assessments of Nietzsche brought to our attention earlier in this paper, but is doing so “most passionately”, as a fundamental aspect of his philosophical project. With the passage, could Heidegger be reading Nietzsche as on the way to a questioning of truth that could be considered as, at least, a preliminary or preparatory attempt at what Heidegger himself sought in his essay “On the Essence of Truth”? Heidegger again reiterates this possibly altered reading of Nietzsche as a passionate questioner of truth by adding a couple paragraphs later, “To be sure, inasmuch as the question of truth stands at the center of Nietzsche’s last meditations…, everything acquires a new vitality.” Could this be the beginning of Heidegger seeing Nietzsche as a transitional figure on the way toward Heidegger’s own original questioning into truth, instead of as the “unconditioned fulfillment”, or dead end, of metaphysics taken in the sense of truth as accordance? This is unlikely, as in the first quote cited above there are quotes around the word truth. This is implying that Heidegger is understanding the questioning of Nietzsche to not break with truth as correctness, despite Nietzsche’s important step of questioning that truth from within its immanent
unfolding. In the second quote, the final word of the quote, ‘vitality’, may hint that
Nietzsche will bring this question of truth into the orbit of the question of life understood
as the will to power. This will be to take away the primacy of the questioning of truth and
will be an incarnating of the “essence of truth back into life.” Heidegger clarifies this
questioning present in Nietzsche by saying that “Nietzsche does not ask the question of
truth in an originary way.” So while the inclusion of Nietzsche as a passionate questioner
of ‘truth’ lends to the beginning of a more favorable reading of Nietzsche as a thinker
perhaps on the way to an extra-metaphysical stance, Heidegger quickly reels back this
possibility and reinscribes this questioning back within a systematic project of
Nietzsche’s philosophy to think “life” as will to power, that “center of will and power
which wills its own enhancement and surmounting.”

Nietzsche’s questioning into truth nonetheless draws again the attention of
Heidegger in section 234 when the latter writes, “Nietzsche seems to inquire deepest into
the essence of truth when he asks, ‘What is the meaning of all will to truth?’ And when he
calls knowledge of this question ‘our problem’.” Again Heidegger is here expanding
the possibilities of Nietzsche’s philosophy beyond the narrow confines elaborated upon in
section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course and the 1932 Plato essay. This is because
Nietzsche is, at least on the surface, preparing the way for the question of truth to become
again the central and basic question of philosophy as such. But this questioning is already
couched within a language of will, and so Heidegger’s commentary on this very point is
that, in Nietzsche’s questioning into truth, truth is already taken in the usual sense of the
true, the accordant. This questioning, while an important moment within metaphysics,
nonetheless already assumes and moves within an unquestionable taking of truth to be “the true” and is hence a faux questioning. The thought of Nietzsche does not rise to the point of unsettling this metaphysical essence of truth from its concealed dominion over the whole of Western thought. In Heidegger’s estimate, “truth is taken by Nietzsche as something settled.”77 While Nietzsche questions into the meaning of truth, and even problematizes the question of truth in a way that no one before him was able to do: truth, in its essence as accordance, prevails unquestioned.

In this lengthy section 234 of Contributions, Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche expands to include the possibility of Nietzsche to begin to be understood as a transitional78 thinker. Nietzsche can be read here as a thinker whose ensnarement in the most extreme possibilities of metaphysics both enables him to begin to raise the question of truth in a way no one before him was capable, as well as limits him in this questioning to only a partial or fragmentary advancement. While section 234 of Contributions complicates Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, it by no means runs contrary to his interpretations developed in the 1936/37 lecture course and 1932 essay, as seen so far. In returning to the 1936/37 lecture course, I will be attempting to excavate a more extra-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche in the seams of the overt “canonical” interpretation now laid out in some detail. Whereas Heidegger’s explicitly stated stance on Nietzsche shows to bear a consistent message, I do not believe his own texts always align with that expressed intent. This development of a second reading of Nietzsche within the 1936/37 lecture course will then not be one that leans on the intentions of Heidegger himself, but could be what one might call a reading of the text against the author. My advancement of
a second reading of the first Heidegger lecture on Nietzsche will then be an expansion of a certain possibility of the text, a possibility clearly present, but underdeveloped and perhaps willfully ignored, by Heidegger himself.

73 Contributions to Philosophy: Of The Event, p. 285
74 ibid. 286
75 ibid. 287
76 ibid. 287
77 ibid. 288
78 This is the transitioning from out of the closure of metaphysics into the opening of some non-metaphysical space, whether that be the space of the Nietzschean “Übermensch” or Heidegger’s “Other Beginning”. Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in particular, utilizes the language and metaphoric of bridges and bridging in order to make the important point that philosophy’s task should be one of not only critiquing the present, but ultimately, one of surpassing it through the creation of bridges. As Nietzsche writes, “The now and the past on earth - alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come. A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future - and all, also, as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra.” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Second Part, On Redemption, from The Portable Nietzsche, 250) Here there are two senses in which Zarathustra is transitional. The first is in how Zarathustra serves as a bridge to the future through his three qualities of being a seer, a willer and a creator. The second is by Zarathustra’s state of incapacity before the bridge itself. Though a seer of the transition, he is incapable of bringing it to enactment himself. I think the extent to which Nietzsche can be read as a transitional thinker depends less on how acutely or accurately he prophesies what is to come, but on the self-awareness he displays in admitting how his philosophy boldly triumphs in falling short of being the enactment of a transition. I see being a transitional thinker as not limited solely to the enactment of a transition, but as one who, like the Gods of ancient Greece, gives signs and points by hints. A sign, while showing itself, “at the same time only foreshadows or portends, and hence does not completely unveil but simultaneously shrouds.” (Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 37)
CHAPTER V

A SECOND READING OF NIETZSCHE IN HEIDEGGER’S 1936/1937 LECTURE COURSE

To pursue this second and less metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, I focus on the final two sections of the 1936/37 lecture course: sections 24 and 25. First, I tease out an intriguing feature of Heidegger’s exposition of Nietzsche’s famous piece, “How the True Word Became a Fable.” Then I bring to light certain consequences of Heidegger’s discussion of semblance as having both a significant and yet enigmatic, or ambiguous, position within the final developments of Nietzsche’s own thought. I then support this second reading of Heidegger’s lecture course by turning to Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics, in order to continue developing the importance of the concept of semblance for a philosophizing that transgresses the limits of metaphysics as defined by truth as accordance.

Beginning in section 24 of the 1936/37 lecture course, the focus of the lecture shifts away from a discussion of Plato’s theory of art as mimesis (which was covered in detail in sections 20-23) back to a more focused discussion on Nietzsche’s philosophy itself and the unique challenge it presents to the philosophical tradition synonymous with Platonism. The zenith of section 24 involves a point by point commentary by Heidegger on “How the True World Became a Fable”, and will require close attention if a second reading of Nietzsche can begin to be teased out. The “Fable” contains six points, each standing for one of the six divisions of the history of Platonism, a history constructed by
Nietzsche in his final year of productivity. The “Fable” begins with a terse summary of how Plato understood the “true world” as something “attainable for the wise, the pious, the virtuous,” and according to this understanding, Plato was himself the true. “He lives in it, he is it.” Heidegger writes at the end of his commentary on number one that here, with Plato, “the ‘true world’ is not yet the object of a doctrine; it is the power of Dasein; it is what lights up in becoming present; it is pure radiance without cover.” Plato’s stance still bears the mark of inceptual Greek thought. His thought still possesses an adherence to phusis as the emerging forth into presence of nature and the holding power of that radiance. Also with Plato, we cannot yet say that the ‘true world’ transcends the apparent, but is almost immanent with the appearances. What we might call the true enemy of Nietzsche’s history only emerges after Plato, in the birth of Platonism which is not to be confused with Plato himself. Statement two begins to establish the “unattainability” of the true world, as Plato’s thought is twisted into the mold of Christian doctrine and promised to its “sinners who repent.” Statements number two to four begin to catalogue the growth of a scission between the two worlds of truth and appearance and that scission’s increasing distance as this history unfolds through its Kantian and German Idealist permutations.

Statement five is where Nietzsche’s own place within this history is first thematized by Nietzsche himself. Statement five reads, “5. The ‘true world’ - an idea which is of use for nothing, which is no longer even obligating - an idea become useless, superfluous, consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!” It is here that Heidegger notes that Nietzsche is designating the “first segment of his own philosophy.” In this
fifth statement, Nietzsche is placing his own earlier philosophy within the context of the fable’s history. This earlier philosophy was itself already an inversion of Platonism insofar as the supersensuous world was deemed useless, refuted and deserving of abolition. Yet, such a move of abolition does not go far enough. As Heidegger notes, “the vacant niche of the higher world remains”. Even though one is left by the fifth statement with only the apparent world, by abolishing the true or supersensuous world, there is still a tacit affirmation of the two world schema in that very act of abolition. There is inversion without displacement. This is why Heidegger will fervently distinguish the sense of overcoming or inversion from his own attempts at an essential transformation of essence. The former will always retain the trace, if not the whole schema of what it overturns, while the latter seeks to make the leap into another beginning. Nietzsche’s overturning must then go one step further. With the first abolition of the true world, there is then the demand for an even greater abolition: the abolishment of the apparent itself, and hence the two-world schema that undergirds it.

Statement six carries out what I will call the meta-abolition of even the supporting schema itself. It reads, “6. The true world we abolished: which world was left? The apparent one perhaps?…. But no! Along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!” Here a second abolition occurs, but it does not occur in the same mode as did the first. In statement five, Nietzsche said “let us abolish it!”. This is signaling an active abolition or overcoming of the ‘true world’. Yet, in statement six Nietzsche states that we have abolished the apparent one. In Statement six, the past tense construction is used to show the occurrence of what I am calling the meta-abolition of the
schema of the true and the apparent. What is important in the past tense construction is that the temporality of the event cannot be reduced to having ever occurred in the active present. It is not only that “I” did not actively take on this course of action, but going one step further, the action appears to have always already occurred. Similarly to Nietzsche’s statement on the death of God that “we have killed him,” the past tense construction shows that Nietzsche understands great events as occurring behind the back of the thinker, as an unwilled event of thought that drives the thinker toward something strange and unrepresentable. Where are we by the end of statement six? What is there left to think?

Heidegger’s interpretation of the sixth statement is how it “shows that, and how, (Nietzsche) must advance beyond himself and beyond sheer abolition of the supersensuous.” If statement five was the metaphysical position of Nietzsche himself, statement six is his own self-overcoming, his own moment of radical ec-stasy. Nietzsche's zenith of thought is then recognized by Heidegger as not being reducible to an inversion of Platonism. There is here a second overcoming, but according to Heidegger not one of metaphysics. This second overcoming is that of the philosopher himself. Nietzsche’s “Fable” contains its own overcoming, its own moment of erasure by the sixth statement, equally signifying the overcoming of Nietzsche the metaphysician. The terse style of statement six leads to an overcoming of its own sense of overcoming as it breaks down before the reader’s eyes into the terse clarity of a few fragmentary words and phrases, “Midday; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; highpoint of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.” Insofar as Nietzsche writes into the “Fable” his
philosophy’s overcoming as well as his own, what we might call Nietzsche’s final position is that of a double overcoming. The question now stands: is a double overcoming sufficient to pose the claim that Nietzsche, in this movement of double overcoming, is also undergoing a transformation in the essence of truth? Is this where we can finally say that Nietzsche “twists free” of metaphysics? As Heidegger’s writes, “A new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be changed. To that extent, overturning Platonism must become a twisting free of it.” Yet, are we not talking here of Nietzsche overcoming even the need for an ordering structure or schema, overcoming the need for a new system? Nietzsche has not only actively abolished the “true world”, but has undergone a passive abolition of the very support schema that cut being into two (i.e being/thinking, reality/appearance, etc.). The question is less one of twisting free of Platonism through the institution of a “new hierarchy”, but rather: Does this double overcoming constitute a change in the experience of the essence of truth? The clearest sign that Nietzsche, by the sixth statement, is treading on new (abyssal) ground comes from the style in which the statement concludes. With “Incipit Zarathustra” there is an exhaustion of the possibilities of language, and the communication between writer and reader becomes one guided primarily by what is not written, in that Nietzsche cannot continue the fable. There is no seventh statement because it has not yet occurred in history. The seventh statement is an impossibility, because Nietzsche knows all too well of the moral/metaphysical suppositions that guide his discourse and which let him only signal the radical outside of metaphysics that he so fiercely intuits. The reticence Nietzsche manifests at the cusp of this double overcoming does not think merely within
the essence of truth as accordance. Unable to make the leap beyond himself and therefore metaphysics as such, he points to unexplorable territory. By using the language of metaphysics to absurdity, followed by reticence, Nietzsche problematizes the logic of accordance by dangling his words over an abyss and asking his reader, ‘where are we now?’ Nietzsche’s “Fable” is supple evidence that he fathoms some other essencing of truth that is not merely the inversion, or even the twisting free, of the first one. This is not to claim that Nietzsche is well on his way onto the path of Heidegger carried out in the “On the Essence of Truth” essay. Instead, it is to claim that Nietzsche is on his own path toward rethinking the essence of truth (and hence the truth of essence), one that can be considered different in approach, but perhaps commensurate in scale and greatness, to that of Heidegger.91

A second significant point in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche arises from an intensive discussion of Nietzsche’s use of the concept of semblance (Schein) within his final year of productivity92. Here again, I show how Heidegger’s own elaboration of Nietzsche lends further evidence to an extra-metaphysical reading of the great philologist from Basel. The following discussion pursues two questions: How does Nietzsche reach this notion of semblance?93 How does semblance upend metaphysics understood as grounded in the essence of truth as accordance?

In section 25 of the 1936/37 lecture course, Heidegger charts the continuance of Nietzsche’s thought beyond the dual abolition of the supersensuous and the sensuous undergone in his “overturning of Platonism”94. In Heidegger’s reading, if Nietzsche is to continue beyond the “Fable”, reality is to be “defined afresh.”95 This requires giving a
new meaning, a new interpretation to the sensuous. For if the sensuous is to no longer be
determined in a relation to the supersensuous, then the sensuous can no longer be what
*merely* appears. The meaning of appearance itself requires a new formulation, a new
essence. The problem for Nietzsche is then how can the sensuous, as what traditionally
has “merely” appeared and is therefore something that can not determine the “what” or
essence of beings themselves, “constitute reality proper”?96

In Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche, beginning from a nascent understanding of the
“living”, takes each focal point of life, which is always a striving of force against other
forces, to create for itself an “angle of vision.”97 From this angle of vision singular to
each living point of force, a horizon is engendered, “within whose scope something can
come forward into appearance for him at all.” Each of these interpretive horizons
generated by the striving of each living point of force is what Nietzsche will call a
“perspective”. And, of course, Nietzsche goes one step further in stating that being itself
is *nothing but* these perspectives, hence, writes Heidegger, “the perspectival is the basic
condition of all life.”98 Now, Nietzsche takes an important step beyond this first,
metaphysical sense of the perspectival99, a step documented by Heidegger in his 1936/37
lecture course, yet not given the emphasis that, in my reading, it deserves. With the
perspectival, one conceives of many little monadic creatures each striving, each
interpreting the other forces it interacts with so as to form its unique horizon. Yet in this
first conception, there is still the being in-itself of the monadic creature, or some
substance-like being preceding this striving and horizon-forming. There is the
supposition of a world in-itself of substantive creatures that grounds this first explanation
of the perspectival. This vision of the world is steeped in the biological and borrows the language of life-philosophy before turning to the implications of the multiplicity of horizons or perspectives. Nietzsche himself challenges this more biologic understanding of perspectival reality when he writes: “Fundamental question: whether the perspectival is proper to the being, and is not only a form of observation, a reaction between different beings? Do the various forces stand in relation, so that the relation is tied to a perceptual optics? That would be possible if all Being were essentially something which perceives.”

Nietzsche clarifies that the sense of the perspectival developing here is not as simple as each living force having its own perspective through which it observes the world. Being is not simply the interaction, or “reactions”, of various beings as each respectively strives to dominate through its own singular perspective. This is no longer the straightforward metaphysical question of what the being of beings is, a question which could be answered in the Leibnizian fashion: it is monadic. Nietzsche is here questioning further than could Leibniz (despite all the correctly identified similarities that Heidegger notes between the two great thinkers). In my reading, the perspectival alters its sense here to not simply be my view upon the world, my unique way of making the world come to a stand, but, prior to this, to be the way beings themselves essence as perceptual, as freely shining forth in appearing. This appearing is not constituted by active, living beings upon an inanimate world, but is an appearing/perceiving that precedes the perceiver, an appearing/perceiving that grounds even the possibility of perceiving errantly. Being is preeminently view-giving, or as Heidegger will formulate Nietzsche’s name for being: “Perspectival-perceptual.”
Now we are in a position to see how semblance is to become both a crucial thought and enigma for Nietzsche. As Being is understood in its essence to be perspectival-perceptual, semblance can no longer exist as extrinsic to the real. In the “On the Essence of Truth” essay, falsity was understood as non-accordance and hence inessential to the essence of truth taken as accordance. In a similar manner, metaphysical thought expelled semblance from the being of the real. Semblance is what appears to be so, but is in truth not so. We have reached reality, or ‘the true’, when semblancing has been dispatched with and we are left with “the real”, and only the real. With Nietzsche’s radicalization of the perspectival-perceptual, semblance can no longer be considered as an incidental and extraneous occurrence to being. The two (being - semblance), just like truth and untruth once understood from their ground in the revealing-concealing of aletheia, can no longer be held decisively apart. As Heidegger writes, semblance now becomes “proper to the essence of the real.” One consequence that follows is the introduction of an indeterminateness that is not merely the fault of the process of cognition, but is how being comes to presence. The possibility of a true or unified-unifiable perspective upon the world is thrown into question. As Heidegger writes, “In such a multiplicity the univocity of the particular perspective in which the actual in any given case stands is lost.” Reality can no longer be cleaved into the true and false, for the ‘true’ view upon things that could guide such a cleavage is not only absent, but any “view” can now be understood as the ‘true’ view of things. Going further, we cannot say any longer that all these views that may have a possible claim to “truth” are simply appearances, for that would implicitly involve some grasp of the ‘true’ view that may
determine them as such. The concept of semblance functions at the height of Nietzsche’s thought as the “apparentness as such proper to reality”\textsuperscript{104}, the self-showing of being that precedes the very distinction of the true and the apparent (or false). This more indeterminate and fundamental notion of semblance falls only into the form of either truth or “mere appearance” when what becomes manifest in one perspective petrifies and is taken to be the sole definitive appearance. One could say that here true and false perspectives (“reality” and “appearance”) are produced from out of the unformed chora\textsuperscript{105} of semblance. Nietzsche echoes this “chora-like” understanding of semblance at the basis of his philosophy when he writes, “I do not posit ‘semblance’ in opposition to ‘reality’, but on the contrary take semblance to be the reality which resists transformation into an imaginative ‘world of truth’.”\textsuperscript{106} Before there is a world, either true or false, there is first semblancing or a fundamental shining forth.\textsuperscript{107} This is not a shining forth of something, for that would be to understand Nietzsche under the biological paradigm wherein coherent entities precede and actively structure and control this initial shining forth or semblancing. When Heidegger reaches the zenith of his discussion of this exceptional notion in Nietzsche’s philosophy, he describes this being-real of semblance as a “bringing forward into appearance, a letting radiate; that it is in itself a shining. Reality is radiance.”\textsuperscript{108}

What should we make of this? If what we may call the real, in its essence, “shines” before it may be properly determined as either true or false (theses as understood under the prevalence of truth as accordance), then Nietzsche here has stepped beyond an inversion of metaphysics. His thought is no longer on the path to “truth”, if we are still to
understand by that word the truth of how things must really be in-themselves. He has entered upon a path of questioning that has perhaps removed him from his stated task of the “reevaluation of values” and delivered him unto a genuine questioning of being itself, of how being gives, or does not give, itself. It is in this way that we can now better understand statement 493 from *The Will To Power*. “Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of being could not live.” In one sense the truth, understood by the essence of accordance, is false insofar as the process of taking-something for true is to fix a fluid process in place, and hence “falsify” it. But we are now at the point to hear another sense to this statement of Nietzsche’s. By having gone beyond the notion of error as simply what does not accord (I said “apple” when it was in fact a ‘peach’), Nietzsche has found the essence of the false, as semblance, to be more basic to being than either the ‘truth’ or the ‘falsity’ of being in accord. Error does not mean “mere error” for Nietzsche any more than appearance can mean “mere appearance”. With semblance (*Schein*), error is thought from its essence as a first letting-radiate of being, that being is first view-giving. Nietzsche’s meditations have led him to the very origin of the scission into the true and the false, into the truth of an ambiguity that cannot be wholly true, wholly accordant with itself. By having thought untruth to its ground in the initial “bringing forth into appearance” characterized by semblance, Nietzsche has not only challenged the limits of metaphysics, but has also challenged Heidegger’s estimation of his philosophical limits from section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course.

In section 19, Heidegger claimed definitively that “Nietzsche’s conception of the essence of truth keeps to the realm of the long tradition of Western thought, no matter
how much Nietzsche’s particular interpretations of that conception deviate from earlier ones.” Yet we have now a Heidegger who six sections later, in section twenty-five, opens his reading of Nietzsche, perhaps accidentally, to possibilities that challenge the canonical reading presented earlier. There is now a path in Heidegger’s interpretation that brings Nietzsche into a certain consonance, not with the end of the history of Being, but with its inceptual first beginning. Within Nietzsche’s questioning into the essence of the false as semblance, is there the possibility of a distinctively pre-Socratic resonance? Could Nietzsche be a Greek first, and a nihilist second?

To get a hold onto how Nietzsche’s thematization of semblance transcends the limits of the metaphysical essence of truth, I will turn to Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, to give a fuller elaboration of the extra-metaphysical tendencies at the root of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The struggle of Greek Dasein in the midst of the belonging together of being and seeming, and the rich sense of semblance (*Schein*) as part and parcel of the emergent power of phusis, will help to shed light on the discussion of semblance given earlier. This will be to distance ourselves from the Nietzsche-Platonism connection and to move toward reading Nietzsche as closer akin in important respects to the pre-Socratics. Through this elaboration, I will begin to make the case that Nietzsche’s most lucid meditations on truth not only are critical of the interpretation of truth as accordance, but show the beginnings of an understanding of truth in the aletheaic tension of revealing-concealing.
There can be little doubt of the resemblances between Nietzsche’s history of Platonism and Heidegger’s own history of Being. Both histories identify an important turn within the being of beings with Plato and proceed to expose a mostly regressive history that intensifies this change in being. Such a commentary on these resemblances deserves far more space than this paper can allot.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 485

Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol 1*, 205

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 485

ibid. 485

Martin. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 207

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 486

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #125, p.181

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 208

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 486

This is not to be confused with the negation of a negation that creates a new positive moment of synthesis.

Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 210

There is also an interesting divergence between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the prognosis, or possibility of overcoming nihilism. While both thinkers agree on what we might call their diagnosis, their respective prognoses vary considerably. This question is handled deftly in Daniel Conway’s essay, “Heidegger, Nietzsche, and the Origins of Nihilism”. Conway explains that Heidegger’s characterization of nihilism in which “Nothing befalls being itself”(12), and Being reveals itself only in concealment, leaves human agents with little to no leeway in terms of evoking resistance to this state of affairs. We are left, “until Being reveals itself in a new aspect” of its own accord, without any “prescriptive or ameliorative measures” to alter this situation. “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” “Only a God can Save us.” (Der Spiegel, 1966) Conway sees a more feasible political response to the ills of modernity in Nietzsche, as “by conceiving of nihilism in purely naturalistic terms, Nietzsche salvages the philosophical project of critique and enables us to envision the possibility of change.”(13) The issue I take with Conway’s account of the possibility of critique in Nietzsche through his naturalization of the terms of nihilism (as a state of prolonged physiological exhaustion, for example), is Conway’s failure to heed the possibility that the epistemological paradigm of “naturalism” supposes a humanist perspective that cannot fully engage with the farthest-reaching consequences of nihilism. Naturalism questions a certain variation of subject-oriented thinking but does not question subject-centered (or humanist) thinking all together.
The introduction of semblance in section 25 is not unrelated to the twisting free of metaphysics performed in statement six of the “Fable”. William Melaney, in his essay “Heidegger’s Allegory of Reading: On Nietzsche and the Tradition”, follows Heidegger in showing that the “emergence of an abyss” in the delivery of statement six is what “renews the meaning of metaphysics in Nietzsche’s later work” (231). The “fable” clears the ground, so to speak, for Nietzsche to ground a new metaphysical system founded upon this abyss which can only be “that of life” (231) and spurs the discussion of perspectivism as a result. Melaney is critical of Heidegger here on the point that “arguing in favor of Nietzsche’s renewal of metaphysics, Heidegger seems to place him in the paradoxically Kantian position of separating reality from the perspectives that enable us to experience the real as the product of human mediation.” (232) Part of what I will be attempting to lay out in the following section of my paper is how Nietzsche’s notion of semblance arises as the erasure of the possibility of engaging with him on Kantian terms. The ambiguity of Nietzsche’s handling of semblance (Schein) will demonstrate that Nietzsche is no longer operating under the clean cut distinctions of appearance and reality that guide the Kantian framework. “Semblance” is precisely that which neither can be called the “real” nor the “apparent”, as it is both and neither. The real and apparent distinction applies to beings, and I will attempt to show that semblance can be better understood as being, as coming-into-appearance, as phusis.

93 In his essay, “Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” John Sallis makes the case that the German word Schein should be translated here as “shining” instead of “semblance”. Sallis claims that to translate Schein as “semblance” would be to still “enforce in the translation that very subordination of the sensible to which Nietzsche would twist free.” (“Twisting Free”, 2) Translating Schein as semblance would still invoke a two-world schema for Sallis, as the sensible semblance would still be devalued by some reference to the supersensible truth to which “the sensible would be mere semblance.” (2) In distinction from Sallis, I keep Schein as “semblance” for most of this section because I want to keep in view all of the possible senses of the word and avoid making a premature decision on Nietzsche’s philosophy. I also often keep to the translation of Schein as “semblance” in order to stress the connection of Nietzsche’s thinking to the pre-Socratics, as developed in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics. (See section 5 of this thesis) I would say that the extra-metaphysical character of Nietzsche’s use of Schein is not only in it having the possible sense of “shining” or “radiance”, but also in its very manifoldness of senses. This ambiguity and fluidity of Schein stands out as more extra-metaphysical to me than any of its particular senses. The undecidability of how to translate Schein makes it a kind of Derridean pharmakon, eluding both the two-world schema of Platonism as well as the one-world schema present in statement five of “How the True World Became a Fable.”

94 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol 1, 211

95 ibid. 211
In “Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” Sallis is wary of Nietzsche’s use of the perspectival to the extent it is language that remains tethered to the two-world schema of the sensible and the intelligible. As Sallis writes, one “needs to consider whether the character marked by the word perspectival does not remain, all too decisively, within the orbit of the very opposition (of the sensible and the intelligible).”(3) I agree with Sallis that the when the sensible is interpreted as perspectival, Nietzsche is in danger of falling again “under the yoke of the Platonic opposition.”(3) Though, in distinction from Sallis, who does not attempt to directly answer this question of the perspectival in his essay, I claim that we can begin to answer this question of the perspectival by removing perspective from its connotations of subjectivism. As I show in this paper, Nietzsche himself challenges this two-world connotations of the perspectival by saying the perceptual character of being itself precedes the substantive character of beings who would actively constitute such perpetual perspectives. I see this challenging the two-world, and even the one-world, schemas by the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the perspectival as it appears from out of itself, as it does not issue from a pre-existent entity. In the depths of what Heidegger will call Nietzsche’s name for being, the “perspectival-perceptual”, I see no center from which to make the decision of a true and an apparent world. Its ambiguity and manifoldness might even preclude one from calling it a “world” all together.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Grossoktavausgabe* (Leipzig, 1905 ff.); Vol. XIII p.227-228

Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche Vol 1*, 213

In Plato’s account from the *Timaeus*, chora is “mother and receptacle of this generated world” (51a), the formless space or clearing that allows for intelligible forms to take rise. The relevance of the chora to Nietzsche’s notion of semblance is how both notions attempt to think beyond the limits of what is recognizable and intelligible, yet where there is still being, still “something” to be comprehended.

Semblance here loses all sense of being a semblancing of something, or a dissimulating of some truth standing above or behind it. This is now to speak of an original priority to what univocally shines or radiates, and which is neither true nor false (which amounts to standing behind or appearing in front).
James Magrini in his essay, “Truth, Art and the ‘New Sensuousness’: Understanding Heidegger’s metaphysical reading of Nietzsche”, follows a similar discrepancy within Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as I have clearly posed. Magrini, in close attention to section 25, shows that Heidegger himself is claiming Nietzsche to hold a novel view of truth and one that is not easily reconciled with the correspondence model of truth. “Admittedly, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche holds a unique view of truth... and is skeptical of ‘theoretical’ idealism’s claim to possess the absolute certainty of knowledge, the undying faith in the correspondence model of truth and the ability of propositions to accurately picture reality.” (120) Magrini, similarly to myself, stresses the possible inconsistency of Heidegger in still upholding the position that Nietzsche’s view of truth is maintained exclusively by knowledge, as the possibility of knowledge is precisely what is put into question by the remarks on semblance. Magrini expands upon this possibility of a conception of truth in Nietzsche’s work that goes beyond the correspondence model by returning to an earlier work of the philosopher. Magrini focuses on Nietzsche’s 1874 work, “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, to give an alternative theory of truth present in Nietzsche, one he describes as possessing an extreme skepticism toward the traditional correspondence model of truth. This alternative conception of truth proposed by Magrini, that can be found in the 1874 work, centers around how “language constructs the laws of truth” and that this aesthetic nature of truth arises through the creative and “imaginative use of language” in the construction of metaphors that contain no “referential accuracy” (121). This conception of “truth as metaphor”, by cutting out any role for the thing-in-itself, is no longer constituted on the basis of a subject (language) - object (thing-in-itself) relation, according to Magrini. In my view, this linguistically creative account of truth identified by Magrini does not move beyond the correspondence model of truth for a few reasons. The first is that Heidegger’s discussion of the correspondence theory of truth is grounded in a prevailing essence of truth as *homiosis*, which is not reducible to only the characteristics of truth that Magrini is contesting in the correspondence model of truth. While a metaphorical account of truth eliminates the need for an explicit relation between subject and object, such a conception of truth still adheres to the essential trait of *homiosis* wherein the correctness of the ‘gaze’ “becomes a characteristic of human comportment toward beings.” *(Pathmarks 177)* As the correspondence theory of truth is grounded upon an essencing of being whereby “human beings... move into a central place among beings”, the metaphorical conception of truth in no way runs counter to this trend toward human or subject-centeredness. Metaphorical truth, in fact, plays right into Heidegger’s narrative of Nietzsche as being the “unconditioned fulfillment” (181) of Plato’s doctrine of truth. Metaphorical truth’s hyper-subjectivism, while on the surface goes beyond correspondence, fulfills the deeper meaning of the correspondence theory of truth which is its essential trending toward the
This is a path I claim to be opened by Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, yet is a path Heidegger himself does not travel. My taking of this path, though in part supported by Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in section 25 of the 1936/37 lecture course, will follow this possible resonance of Nietzsche with pre-Socratic thought further than Heidegger was willing to venture.

James Crooks, in his essay “Getting over Nihilism: Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Appropriation of Tragedy”, performs two invaluable services in furthering the discussion of Heidegger and Nietzsche’s readings of the Greeks. Cooks first does an admirable job avoiding the temptation to reduce Heidegger and Nietzsche’s pervasive interest with Hellenic culture to the influence of nineteenth century German Hellenism. Though it is true that Heidegger and Nietzsche’s “compression of Greek culture into a single Western Grunderfahrung”(40) was not wholly idiosyncratic in light of 19th century German Hellenism, there are better grounds to understand Heidegger and Nietzsche’s Greek focus than the explanation of intellectual nostalgia. Secondly, Cooks advances that Heidegger and Nietzsche’s “appropriation of tragic knowledge” is warranted by each thinker’s respective analysis of the current cultural epoch of nihilism.

Joe Balay, in his essay, “Heidegger on the Semblance of the Beautiful”, attempts to show that the Greek view of phusis developed by Heidegger in the 1935 lecture course succeeds, where the Platonic conception of eidos failed, in being able to more originally grasp the discordance of semblance (art) and truth that Heidegger problematized in section 19 of the 1936-37 lecture course. Balay follows Heidegger very closely and concludes that “Nietzsche ultimately fails to uncover what is effaced in the Platonic discordance of these relations (of beauty, semblance, and True Being)”(360). He then turns to Heidegger’s reading of Greek Dasein in the 1935 lecture course and writes that it is “here that Heidegger locates what has been effaced in the discordance between these relations (beauty, semblance, truth) in Platonism. For in Heraclitus and Sophocles, being appearing, seeming, truth, beauty are neither separated as mere opposites not lumped together like some confused amalgam, but ‘precisely by being apart’ the discordance of these relations ‘enter into the supreme way of belonging together’.”(363) Balay does not recognize, as I do, the importance of section 25 of the 1936-37 lecture course in putting into question the purely Platonic limitations of Nietzsche’s project. While we both see the 1935 lecture course as an important continuance of the discussion of the relation of semblance and truth that began in the 1936-37 lecture course (despite the chronology of these lecture course), I see Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in section 25 as a transitional moment between these two lecture courses. The ambiguity and prioritization of semblance for Nietzsche makes it difficult, in my reading, to assimilate his project to the more or less clean dichotomy of art (semblance) and truth maintained in Platonism. I approach the 1935 lecture course as complementing and continuing what Heidegger began with his questionably non-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche’s novel conception of semblance at the end of the 1936-37 course.
This interpretative attempt to read Nietzsche in concert with the Greeks is not as entirely foreign to the project of Heidegger as it may seem, based on what I have cited so far from Heidegger on Nietzsche’s place in his history of Being. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger presents some of his least critical statements on the topic of Nietzsche’s philosophy and reads Nietzsche as something of an ally to Heidegger’s cause of confronting and questioning the growing wasteland of contemporary nihilism. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger also gives a rare and favorable acknowledgment to Nietzsche’s understanding of Greek Dasein, showing that a Nietzsche-Greek connection, even in the framework of a Heideggerian philosophical narrative, is not only plausible, but supported. Heidegger writes, “To be sure, Nietzsche fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found its way to the decisive question although Nietzsche did reconceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its entirety in a way that is surpassed only by Hölderlin.” (133)
The second half of Heidegger’s 1935 Lecture Course *Introduction to Metaphysics* entitled, “The Restriction of Being”, follows the de-cision, or splitting up, of the basic
distinctions that constitute metaphysical thought from their inceptual “belonging-together”. The second of these distinctions, that of being and seeming, presents a more
nuanced discussion of semblance and its belongingness to being. The challenge of the
lecture course is to grasp the “concealed unity of Being and seeming,” and to follow it
through to the “inceptive distinction” of its splitting or breaking up as the two rigidify
into a stable dualism. Heidegger finds a “trace” of the understanding of this inceptive
distinction in the use of the German word *Schein*. By his account, there are three senses
of *Schein*. First, there is *Schein* as the “luster and glow” of a candle as it flickers upon the
night stand. Secondly, there is *Schein* in the sense of “appearing” or the manifestation of
something. Thirdly, there is *Schein* taken as semblance or mere seeming. This third sense
is meant in the everyday way one might say that “it seemed to be an eagle, but turned out
to be an osprey.” Of these three senses of *Schein* common to the German language, the
second mode of *Schein*, “appearing in the sense of self-showing”, serves as the ground
of possibility for the other senses. In this move toward the inceptive, the essence of
seeming lies in “appearing”, in the “self-setting-forth” of beings as they become present.
It is at this remarkable point that seeming no longer can be something that stands opposed
and distant to ‘true’ being, but it is here that “seeming means exactly the same as Being.” Yet, it is not only that here seeming is brought into a resonate intimacy with Being. The inner connection of being and seeming can only be fully understood if we are to understand Being differently. If we are to hear Being as ‘merely’ what is, or what exists, and as a word that is too abstract to be worthy of thought, then this belonging together of Being and seeming will be lost to our ears. For the resonating of being and seeming to take hold in us, Heidegger says Being must be understood in a “correspondingly originary way” with seeming. Being must open to us, as it did to the Greeks, as \textit{phusis}, the “emerging-abiding sway.” For Heidegger, in order to grasp \textit{seeming} in its ground of possibility as appearing in self-showing, Being must correspondingly be taken as \textit{phusis}. It is only in this transformation of Being within its essence, that it can be properly grasped that, “Being essentially unfolds as appearing.” Being and seeming stand as belonging-together only if Being is understood as the stepping forth into appearance of \textit{phusis}. Yet, this is not all. As Being essentially unfolds as \textit{phusis}, this already “implies that Being, appearing, is a letting-step-forth from concealment.” Insofar as Being is \textit{phusis}, beings stand in unconcealment. Beings are true then, not on account of their relation to some standard, idea or supersensuous measure of truth, but because they are, in taking their stand in presence, \textit{aletheia} (un-concealment). With the prevailing of Being as \textit{phusis}, comes “truth” as the wrestling forth of beings from their hiding into an abiding presencing, or un-concealment. As Heidegger writes, “For the Greek essence of truth is possible only together with the Greek essence of Being as \textit{phusis}.” If we are to think semblance toward its ground of possibility, there
is not only a corresponding transformation of Being toward \textit{phusis}, but truth must be
grasp more originarily as \textit{aletheia}. All three basic words arise at once, and to say one is to
say all three. In this intimate belonging a word like \textit{doxa} can arise. Doxa, often translated
as opinion, in its inceptive\textsuperscript{126} breadth of meaning can mean all of the following: glory, the
respect in which someone stands, the aspect or view that something gives, and the
opinions we may construct of something. Doxa can resonate as the glory that is, in the
words of Heraclitus, what the noblest choose “above all others,”\textsuperscript{127} and it may sound to
the ear as an opinion in the sense of being an old wives tale (i.e. that hot soup is an
effective treatment for the common cold). This is not a careless or “bad” ambiguity of the
language, but, in Heidegger’s judgement, a “play with deep foundations” and a
“multiplicity that preserves the essential traits of Being in the word.”\textsuperscript{128} Inceptual thought
lives in the ambiguous, the multiple, and the unmastered. To think with Greek Dasein is
to dwell at the juncture of the “interlocking triple world”\textsuperscript{129} of Being (\textit{phusis}),
unconcealment (\textit{aletheia}), and seeming (\textit{doxa}).

In returning to Nietzsche, it is then no objection to his profundity when Heidegger
writes that “Nietzsche does not become master of the fate entrenched”\textsuperscript{130} in the word
semblance (\textit{Schein}). Having followed how a more originary grasp of \textit{Schein} has led
Heidegger, in the 1935 lecture course, toward a joining of semblance with a sense of
being as \textit{phusis} and truth as \textit{aletheia}, I do not see why Nietzsche’s most brilliant, though
ambiguous, remarks on semblance cannot place him on that same path. In inceptual
Greek thought, a rich and multifaceted sense of semblance belonged immediately to the
sense of Being as an emerging forth into appearance (\textit{phusis}), and to truth that was a
stepping out from hiddenness into appearing (aletheia). Nietzsche’s conception of the perspectival-perceptual shares with pre-Socratic thought this multifaceted and ambiguous sense of an original radiating or shining-forth preceding the familiar division of subject and object, true and false. It is in this light, the light of Pre-Socratic thought, that the philosophy of Nietzsche can be interpreted as a transitional philosophy, one neither containable by the history of metaphysics, nor wholly free of it. As I see it, if we want to understand the most original moments of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is more fruitful to place his thinking into dialogue with the Pre-Socratics, than to read his thinking at an acute point of oblivion in the modern epoch. It is important to note here that Nietzsche himself took his philosophy as closer to the pre-Socratics, and at a significant distance from the moderns. In Ecce Homo, he wrote that he was the “first tragic philosopher” and that his project was more of an attempt at completing what even “the great Greeks” could not do: perform a “transformation of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos.”

In what I have shown so far, it is now more plausible to read within the philosophy of Nietzsche an implicit understanding of being as phusis. In my reading, by defining Being as essentially perspectival-perceptual, Nietzsche takes a bold step beyond the metaphysical essence of being as constant presence, and instead evokes its more originary character: to radiate forth into a univocal play of views, of seeming and doxa. Going one step further, I will now develop how there is an unstated, yet developed, understanding of truth as aletheia in the seams of his philosophy, making Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche does not question the essence of truth, defined metaphysically as ‘the true’, increasingly problematic. Carrying out this more ambitious and transitional
reading of Nietzsche requires a clarification of two elements of the essence of truth as "aletheia" that will be the focus of my transitional reading. The first of the two elements is the sense of struggle, or "polemos," in the wresting forth of Being from its hiding in the various modes of concealment (seeming, distortion, forgetting, oblivion). The second is the threatening, yet complementary, power of concealment as co-essential to the revealing of Being as "phusis." I show that Nietzsche is properly attuned to these aspects of inceptual Greek thought and gives them a key place within his own philosophical writings. To show this requires returning to the earlier writings of Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Untimely Meditations.* In the former, I highlight an acute awareness in Nietzsche of the primordial struggle that drives and constitutes the soul of Attic thought. In *The Untimely Meditations,* I delve into the concept of the "unhistorical" and how it serves as the abyssal ground that both threatens and makes possible what is "true," present, and "historical".

117 These distinctions (Unterscheidungen), or differentiations, are Being and becoming, Being and seeming, Being and thinking, and Being and the ought. The first two of these four differentiations are formed "at the very inception of Greek Philosophy" (*Introduction to Metaphysics*, 100). The differentiation of Being and thinking unfolds definitively with Plato and Aristotle (p. 100). The differentiation of Being and the ought is, in the words of Heidegger, "prefigured only distantly" (p. 100) with the bringing together of the *on* (being, what is) with the *agathon* (good) in Plato.

118 Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 104

119 ibid. 104

120 ibid. 105

121 ibid. 105

122 ibid. 106

123 ibid. 107
As Heidegger stresses later in the fourth chapter of *Introduction to Metaphysics*, “the inception is what is most uncanny and mightiest.” (165) His critique of post-Greek philosophy can be all-too-briefly summarized as philosophy’s inability to “hold on to the inception” (165), to hold onto this original breaking out at once of Being in its four differentiations. Inceptual thought is to hold to this original breaking apart in all its uncanniness and force.

Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol. 1*, 215

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 729

Univocal here means that all the views are equally said of Being and no view is initially in a privileged relation to, or position within, Being. No one view is *essentially* more in Being than another. This does not rule out any differences between views whatsoever, but only eliminates possible *essential* differences that would divide different views at the level of their being.
CHAPTER VII

CONCEALMENT AND STRUGGLE IN THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY

Truth as *aletheia* cannot be fathomed without an inquiry into concealment, not only an inquiring into the forms of dissimulation, but into the revealing powers of concealment itself. Also, there is the presence of struggle in the essential intertwining of the emerging into presence of truth with its proper untruth taken as (concealment). As Heidegger writes in the 1935 lecture course, in the inceptual Greek experience of *aletheia*, “only by undergoing the struggle between Being and seeming did they wrest Being forth from beings, did they bring beings into constancy and unconcealment.”\(^{133}\) And in Heidegger’s 1943 lecture course, *Parmenides*, he again reiterates this point by saying, “un-concealment indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment and is in conflict with it. The primordial essence of truth is conflictual.”\(^{134}\) In stressing the hyphen that both conjoins and separates the two parts of the word, truth is not to be mistaken for something that may stand there, waiting for us to come into knowledge of it. Truth, as un-concealment, is a storm that eventuates in the struggle to wrest it from the manifold modes of this fundamental phenomenon\(^{135}\) of concealment (seeming, dissimulation, forgetting). Similarly, this movement of struggle in the need to wrest unconcealment from its stubborn hiddenness, was given in the image of the pain undergone by the cave-dwellers in Plato’s allegory, as they began their unwilling ascent toward the sun. In the character of Oedipus, such a struggle between truth and untruth is brought to a dramatic climax. It is a “unique struggle between seeming (concealment and distortion) and
that drives Oedipus to attempt to unveil the horrors of what remained in stubborn hiddenness. This passion for unveiling epitomizes the fundamental attunement of Greek tragedy. This strife inherent in the manifestation of the truth of Being is also captured in Heraclitus: “The mind, to think of the accord that strains against itself, needs strength, as does the arm to string the bow.” There is no ‘true world’ here set apart from the appearances, and there is no talk of harmony without polemos. There is first and always the struggle as truth becomes related here, not to knowledge, but to courage. As Nietzsche writes, “How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare?” Such is the question we must ask ourselves in order to understand how far we ourselves might travel on this path of aletheia, which is necessarily a path of polemos, of an essential conflict that drives the human toward the decision between being and seeming. How far Nietzsche himself is attuned to the strife of un-concealment, is addressed in greatest detail in his earliest work, The Birth of Tragedy.

The Birth of Tragedy is a text structured by a fundamental relationship between the Apollonian spirit of form, light and individuation and the dark, dissolutive and self-forgetting spirit of the Dionysian. The self-forgetfulness of the Dionysian makes it the figure of a fundamental tendency in being toward concealment. As concealing, it is not only the withdrawal of form as the “subjective vanishes,” but also the explosive excess that empowers the Apollonian form-engendering force as its “mysterious ground.” These “spirits” are not merely, in Nietzsche’s account, representations of nature taken by human beings in the function of myth-making. Nietzsche goes further to show that these two powers “burst forth from nature herself without mediation by the human artist.”
Nietzsche’s reading of the Greek embattlement to set this twofoldness of being into art is not to be mistaken for a modern idealist philosophy that brackets the being of things to only our subjective conceptions of them. There is here a virtuoso attempt to think “Greek Dasein”\textsuperscript{143} from out of Greek Dasein itself, to resist the translation of it into the language of Schopenhauer’s epistemology and pessimism.

In the first six sections of \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}, there is a treatment of each of these essential Greek tendencies as if they could stand as things separate from one another. Yet, from the outset, Nietzsche is setting the scene for a monstrous intertwining, and articulating a need each has for the other. The twofoldness of the Apollonian and the Dionysian involves “perpetual conflicts with only periodically intervening reconciliations.”\textsuperscript{144} For Nietzsche, the genius of Greek Dasein is how they were able to take a stand within the “strife of this antithesis” and perform the “metaphysical miracle”\textsuperscript{145} of having both conflictual forces coalesce within the art form of Attic tragedy. He continues his approach into an understanding of this conflictual bond between the presencing and measured light of the Apollonian and the dissolutive and concealing excess of the Dionysian, by inquiring into what serves as the ground for this Apollonian, form-engendering light. Not just the ground, but even the impetus of the Apollonian spirit lies in the intimacy that the Greeks kept with the “terrors and horrors of existence.”\textsuperscript{146} Only a people who could experience being itself as something too terrible to exist, who could nod their heads in agreement with Silenus, could be a people equally dedicated to the enshrinement of being in beauty. The beauty of the Apollonian culture comes to its ground by always having to “overthrow some titanic empire and slay monsters” and the
Apollonian takes its stand always after having “trumped over a terrible depth.”¹⁴⁷ This is, though, not to take this triumph of form as a defeat over the essential untruth of the Dionysian, as the Apollonian “could not live without Dionysius!”¹⁴⁸ This beauty of individuation and form is less in the Apollonian itself as it grows from the return of Greek Dasein from its experience of absolute loss in these Dionysian depths. To repeat, there is very little evidence in the text that these two spirits can be considered as two static powers that then meet at the joining point of Tragic art. There is a much more consistent development by Nietzsche of these two spirits serving as significant markers within a creative journey of collapse (or death) and return (or rebirth) intrinsic to Greek Dasein. As Nietzsche writes, the “light-picture phenomena of the Sophocles hero are the necessary productions of a glance into the secret and terrible things of nature.”¹⁴⁹ In my reading, this return from the proper untruth of Dionysian oblivion does not serve as a balance or counter-measure to the Apollonian, as it does not come later or from outside the light of Apollo. The Apollonian is instead a form-giving that operates over this abyss, and is given its sharpness of limit precisely in this intimate familiarity with the simultaneous ungrounding and threatening possibility of Dionysian excess.

This nihilating excess gives the term, “Greek cheerfulness”¹⁵⁰, an intense irony to the ears of Nietzsche and his readers. It is a monstrous cheerfulness, and an undigestible one to our sensitive, modern stomachs. It is a joy, but not one stemming from an overcoming of the annihilative possibilities and unrepresentable suffering of the Dionysian. Their joy resided in what I will call the constant need, struggle, and resultant thrill to wrest order from the perpetual possibility of chaotic dissolution. In my reading,
this intrinsic strain at the heart of the coming to appearance of the Apollonian against the
powers of forgetting and dissolution, is what gives Attic Greece both a unique stance
within the unconcealment of Being and what makes Nietzsche later reflect that *The Birth
of Tragedy* was an “impossible book.” It was an impossible book precisely because
such an essential and intimate strife of the twofoldness of powers is impossible to capture
within the modern logic of non-contradiction, which cannot resist placing the Apollonian
and Dionysian as antithetical powers requiring a synthesis. From the metaphysical
essence of truth as accordance, it is impossible to conceive the Apollonian as having its
ground, its essence, in the abyssal pain of the Dionysian. The law of non-contradiction,
and its demand to keep opposites separate in essence, encumbers our attempts to enter
into the *agon* of Greek Dasein. Nietzsche is sensitive to these failures of metaphysical
language and its law of non-contradiction. In hindsight, his first book was not only an
impossible undertaking, but “badly written, heavy, painful… (and) void of the will to
logical cleanliness.” What if these criticisms point to the very element that made this
the least metaphysical, the least governed by the ‘true’, of any of Nietzsche’s sustained
works? *The Birth of Tragedy* is a work not containable to the province of the
metaphysical essence of truth just when it is at its least logical, dirtiest, and most
impossible. In it is captured the beginnings of a powerful inceptual grasp of the
*polemos* at the origin of the Greek sense of being as *phusis*, and truth as *aletheia*.

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133 Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 111
134 Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 26
It is an important question as to whether one can consider concealment as a “phenomenon”, as it is precisely what does not show itself forth. Yet, as Heidegger reminds us in Being and Time, phenomena are “initially and for the most part not given.” (SUNY 2010, p.34). The phenomenon is not reducible to its presence, but is often “submerged” (verschüttet) or concealed to some extent. Concealment is then not opposed to the phenomena, but intertwined with, or inextricable from, the movement of self-showing.

Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 112

Heraclitus, Fragments, #45

Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 674

As John Sallis writes, in his book Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, the figure of Dionysius is a figure “withdrawn” and “without image”, and cannot be “directly manifest.” (42) Yet, as Sallis points out, this abyssal character is not exhaustive of what Nietzsche says of the Dionysian. Dionysius is equally an excessive figure, a figure of ecstasis, of standing outside of oneself. The figure of Dionysius has this peculiar twofold nature of, on the one hand, withdrawal and abyss, and on the other, the self-oblivion of ecstatic rapture. In Sallis’ reading, this juxtaposition of abyssal withdrawal and ecstatic giving makes the figure of the Dionysian an “excessive figure” and one that “exceeds the circuit of metaphysics” (42). This makes the Dionysian a kind of Derridean Pharmakon that operates always in supplement to the controlled metaphysical discourse of clean oppositions. Dionysius is both “reunion/dismembering, healing/killing.” (51) This prompts the question by Sallis (which is of the utmost importance to this section of my paper): “What if, instead, it should turn out that from the beginning Nietzsche’s thought is engaged in twisting free of Platonism…?” (4) Similarly to Sallis, I read the figure of Dionysius as in excess of metaphysics in so far as Nietzsche is, in The Birth of Tragedy, moving in a direction wherein that which withdraws and is unimaginable becomes question-worthy in unprecedented fashion. While this contradictory figure of the Dionysian is an important element of a reading of the text as extra-metaphysical, I believe that equal attention needs to be paid to the conflictual element of the Apollonian-Dionysian twofoldness. This unrepresentable strife at the heart of greek Tragedy, as it is torn open and configured into the impulses of Apollo and Dionysius, is an unresolvable tension foreign to the attunements that accompany the harmonious fitting-into-place of the eidos and its images that began to take hold with Plato.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 1

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 4

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 2
This is a term borrowed from Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Greek Dasein stands, for Heidegger, as a “unique and creative self-assertion amid the turmoil of the multiply intertwined counter-play of the powers of Being and seeming.” (111) In less Heideggerian language, Greek Dasein is the way in which early Greek thinkers experienced the mutual unity and antagonism of Being and seeming non-dualistically and as occurring through a constitutive struggle.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, preface, section 2

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, preface, section 3

In his essay, “The Truth of Tragedy,” John Sallis takes this impossibility of the *Birth of Tragedy*, a comment Nietzsche himself made in a later reflection on the nature of that book, as a guiding theme. One interesting claim Sallis makes in the decipherment of Nietzsche’s self-judgement is that the genesis of tragedy escapes the writing medium of a scholarly text, that it is unfathomable to write good and decent scholarly prose that captures such a monstrous genesis. “Does the very thing to be said, the birth of tragedy, escape the mere voice of the scholar-author, requiring in its place - though concealed behind it - the strange voice of a maenadic reveler?” (159) This question of the limits of acceptable academic prose to adequately tarry with the cruelty and abysses of extra-metaphysical thought is almost an unequivocal “no”. Why is this? I believe it has far more to do with the dominant attunements of our bourgeois “professionalism” culture than it involves any fundamental incapacity or limitation of our language and grammatical forms.
I have made the case in a previous section of this paper that, by thinking semblance as more basic to the projection of being than the accordance of statements and matters as “true”, Nietzsche is able to be placed into an interpretative proximity with the Pre-Socratics concerning their shared experience of the emerging, or shining forth, of Being as phusis. Yet, more needs to be said before broaching the idea that there may be, at the ground of Nietzsche’s philosophy, an experience of truth as something essentially other than being merely ‘true’, or accordant. To return briefly to Heidegger’s lecture course from 1935, the essence of truth projected as unconcealment is not sufficiently grasped by its force of appearance, or what we might better call its ontological movement of emerging into presence. As was outlined earlier with respect to the 1930 Heidegger essay on truth, this more originary essencing of truth as aletheia is also a proper “non-essencing” of untruth. While truth as accordance bears an inessential and extrinsic relation to what does not accord, the ‘false’, aletheia cannot be understood by its positive moment of ‘truth’, or revealing, alone. As Heidegger writes in the 1935 lecture course, “because Being, as phusis, consists in appearing, in the offering of a look and of views, it stands essentially, and thus necessarily and constantly, in the possibility of a look that precisely covers over and conceals what beings are in truth.”154 In revealing, there is the equal possibility that to reveal is also to conceal and that truth is always constituted by this constant possibility and danger of being covered over, or of being mistaken for a
seeming. Truth or revealing takes its stand amidst this continual threat of falling into concealment. This importance of concealment to the movement of revealing is further given a central position in Heidegger’s 1943 lecture course, Parmenides. Here Heidegger writes, “perhaps there are modes of concealment that not only preserve and put away and so in a certain sense withdraw, but that rather, in a unique way, impart and bestow what is essential.” Here, concealment cannot be properly understood as a form of negation of the positive movement of revealing. The belonging-together of concealment with the movement of unconcealment is not reducible to the former as a necessary hindrance to the revealing, such in the way one needs the resistance of heavy weights in order to become strong. Concealment itself reveals, and the movement of revealing is a concealing. An example Heidegger gives to illustrate this point is in the pseudonyms of Kierkegaard. With his pseudonyms of “Anti-Climacus”, “Johannes Climacus”, and others, “we have a covering that at the same time reveals.” In the giving of a false name, Kierkegaard is also revealing something important about himself, both in the connotations of the chosen false name and in the very choice to use a false name. There is almost undoubtedly more being revealed in the use of a pseudonym than in the ordinary ‘true’ adherence to using one’s name of birth.

While the belonging-together of concealment and the movement of unconcealment is thematized by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy by the intertwining of the Dionysian and Apollonian, Dionysian concealment is still consistently subordinated to the form-giving power of the Apollonian. In the The Birth of Tragedy, concealment is still for unconcealment. Dionysian untruth ultimately serves the truth of artistic form. At
this point, it is still to be determined whether Nietzsche can conceive of a truth whose essence is untruth. This would be the point where there is an unconcealment for concealment. Concealment would then no longer bear the mark of the negative or the merely abyssal. Instead, concealment would, as Heidegger writes, “not only preserve and put away and so in a certain sense withdraw, but that rather, in a unique way, impart and bestow what is essential.”

Can Nietzsche conceive of such an extra-metaphysical nonessencing of untruth? In my reading, a proper prioritizing of untruth or concealment as bestowing comes into focus for Nietzsche most clearly in his discussion of the unhistorical in the second of the 1874 Untimely Meditations. It is here that Nietzsche best articulates a grasp of a fecund concealment at the heart of the shining (Schein) of beings.

The second moment in early Nietzsche that evokes an extra-metaphysical sense of an essence of truth not reducible to accordance, comes from the second of the Untimely Meditations, titled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”. Here, within the question of the value of history and of whether such historical knowledge can serve as a path to “untimely experiences,” Nietzsche broaches a topic that is of significant import in the discussion of his relation to inceptual Greek thought and its extra-metaphysical possibilities. It is in this second of the Untimely Meditations that Nietzsche advances the concept of the unhistorical. The concept is first used as a description of animals, insofar as they are confined solely to the present in such a way that the animal “conceals nothing and at every instant appears wholly as what it is.” Yet, the unhistorical has a very different sense in conjunction with the historical nature and propensity of the human being. Humans are constitutionally disturbed by the past, as we are made wretched by the
“imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one.”160 The remaining present of our past (or history),161 closes off all possibility of happiness. Such unlimited presence would be, somewhat ironically, a “gravedigger of the present”162, as such uninhibited presence would undermine the very possibility of presence itself. As an example, the condition of possibility for the resuscitation of a memory is precisely that all other memories lay in latent repose, or more aptly put, stay forgotten. “There is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal.”163 I see here the beginning of both a criticism and a displacement of the privileging of presence164 definitive for the Western philosophical tradition. Later on in the meditation, Nietzsche plays with the possibility that the metaphysical privileging of the historical, or present, may be only an “occidental prejudice”165. Presence, or the historical, cannot be the sole gauge and standard of being. It is an inherently self-undermining force, as its proliferation is also its impossibility. Presence, thought alone, is an absurdity. Presence has an intrinsic need for a limiting and extinguishing of its own light. What Nietzsche calls the health of the human being consists in the formation of a horizon166 in the interplay of presence and the lethe167 of the unhistorical. The unhistorical, which makes the human just “one little vortex of life in a dead sea of darkness and oblivion”168, is the very “womb” of the appearance of individual freedom, or the possibility of historical actions and events. This essential lethe constitutive of historical experience is not then to be conceived as an equal, but opposed, counterpart to the historical. This is not a relation of synthesis. The historical, much like the Apollonian, finds its ground and essence in the dark, abyssal sea that it floats upon so precariously. In similar manner, as the present is
made possible by the unhistorical, so equally does action find its ground of possibility in
the near-sightedness of the soul. There can be no true act\footnote{169} in the grand economy of
things, for if we knew all the factors and subterranean motivations that brought us to
action, we would ultimately be reluctant to call any of our actions “honest”, “virtuous”,
or even “free”. Historical action and events take their grandeur from the "blindness and
injustice in the soul"\footnote{170} of one whom acts. In fact, truly historical humans, Nietzsche
notes, “think and act unhistorically.”\footnote{171} History, or presence, does not only need the
unhistorical to give it limit and horizon, but is properly subordinated to and “stands in the
service of”\footnote{172} this unrepresentable, unhistorical power. In my reading, what Nietzsche is
advancing in the second untimely meditation is a force of concealment that arises not
only co-essentially with the possibility of history (his stand-in for presence), but is, in a
sense, “older”\footnote{173} than this history. This unhistorical power stands, similarly to the sense
of concealment developed by Heidegger in the 1930 “On the Essence of Truth” essay, as
what enables an open engagement with beings in its gifting withdrawal. In doing so,
concealment, for both Heidegger \textit{and} Nietzsche, takes a “mysterious” precedence over
the open region that is revealed.

Heidegger himself, in his 1938-39 Seminar on the second \textit{Untimely Meditation},
reads Nietzsche's concept of the unhistorical as akin to a prevailing of concealment. He
writes, “The unhistorical (\textit{Das Unhistorische}) is (in this sense) history (\textit{Geschichte}).”\footnote{174}
What Heidegger is denoting with \textit{Geschichte} is, as Andrew Mitchell puts it, the “event or
occurrence of the truth of being (concealment).”\footnote{175} The history of Being is a secluded,
concealed event as it is the history of Being’s withdrawal and its abandoning of the
human. Is it possible that Nietzsche’s account of the unhistorical could lend itself to a re-working of the idea of history? History (Geschichte) would be understood in how it primarily conceals, or provides non-subjective limitations to the revealing of beings, instead of being the linear record of past events. Could Heidegger be reading Nietzsche as embarking upon such an extra-metaphysical account of history? This is almost certainly not what Heidegger was intending, as the curious remark, one favorable to a non-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, is situated within a text that exemplifies what I have called Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche. Throughout the seminar, Nietzsche’s sense of forgetting and history is repeatedly tied to a tradition of metaphysical subjectivity. Heidegger says later in the seminar that “Nietzsche had in no way overcome subjectivism… but Nietzsche only replaces subjectivism of consciousness with that of life.”

Does Heidegger overlook something in this early work of Nietzsche? What I see as being passed over by both Heidegger and Mitchell in their reading of this text is Nietzsche’s insistence on the priority of the unhistorical. This power of oblivion is not only something that enables presence, but is what we may call “older” than historical presence itself. This does not mean that the unhistorical is older chronologically. It’s “age” comes from its ontological priority. We could say, with Nietzsche, that presence is a peculiar modification or contraction of this older, more fundamental, unhistorical power. The apparent prioritization of presence itself can be understood by the tendency of self-forgetfulness (errancy) essential to the prevailing of the unhistorical. In what I
believe to be Heidegger’s subjectivist reading of Nietzsche, he misses the non-
psychological character of the “unhistorical power.” Heidegger insistently reads the
unhistorical, as one element of Nietzsche’s grand concept of “life”, as a forgetting that
functions as the absenting of what is present. The unhistorical, in my reading, goes one
step further as it is not the psychological process of forgetting. It is, more radically, the
ontological event of the falling into oblivion of what has been forgotten. The human
psyche itself cannot perform such an event, as that would be to further repress the
forgotten thing, hence keeping it in some way present and viewable at some later time.
The unhistorical, in addition to its positive power of gifting the historical through
withdrawal, is also the radical absenting of the absent that erases even the trace of that
which once was, as it erases every relation to the historical (forms of presence). This can
only occur ontologically, and be an occurrence not in the human and its psychological
apparatus, but in being itself. This non-relational aspect of the unhistorical might even
be a point where Nietzsche takes the notion of concealment further than Heidegger was
willing to concede. As Mitchell writes, “Forgetting is not relationlessness, as Nietzsche
would have it, for Heidegger, but a particular type of relation, a non-relation.”
Heidegger holds in the 1938-39 seminar that for him, forgetting, in renouncing any
relation to the opposition of presence and absence, must be taken as a “non-relation of the
retaining… and commemorative relation; a particular non-relation, the ‘no longer’ and
not-yet-again.” This leaves a clear sense of phenomenological intentionality within
Heidegger’s meditative sense of forgetting, as the event of forgetting comes into its own
only by the holding of oneself in relation to the withdrawal of this quite tenuous relation.
In my reading, the non-relationality of the unhistorical severs any and all of our relations to the possibility of having an intentional relation with the past. This places Nietzsche on an unthinkable path toward not just a sense of essential concealment that mysteriously bestows and pervades the givenness of beings, but even further toward a second sense of essential concealment as an annihilation of the first concealment (double concealment). In my reading, this non-relationality of the unhistorical properly deserves the name of errancy, or, the “essential counteressence” of truth.184

In the second essay of the Untimely Meditations, I have shown Nietzsche’s philosophy to have a rich sense of concealment in two respects that go beyond The Birth of Tragedy. In doing so, I have further strengthened my claim that Nietzsche is a philosopher not reducible to the metaphysical essence of truth as accordance. First, in my reading, Nietzsche brings concealment to the position of not only being intertwined with unconcealment, but takes concealment (the unhistorical) as older and more basic to being. Second, Nietzsche finds in this radical concealment a certain non-relationality, or double concealment, intrinsic to the unhistorical that further removes Nietzsche’s thinking from a metaphysics of presence. There is undoubtedly a sense of concealment present in Nietzsche's notion of the “unhistorical” that transgresses the limits of subject-centered metaphysical thought and opens out onto the question: What may the truth of this withdrawn, non-relationnal abyss be if it cannot be something that can be held as ‘true’? And what essence of truth are we on the way toward, but also already thinking within, when we begin to interrogate what does not show itself?

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History should here be taken as the entities or traces of the past in the mode of the present or presence, or in the form of present representation. In Nietzsche’s use of history in the second untimely meditation, history is not opposed to the present. It is instead a term for the remaining present of what is, or was once, present. The human being, for Nietzsche, is historical in so far as we cannot let the past become something that truly “passes”, or is forgotten. Our historical nature, our immense propensity to keep the past presents within the horizon of the current present leads to “the greater and ever greater pressure of what is past”(UM 61). History in this context could be called the human’s great sickness and perpetual dyspepsia, as the weight of these retained presents “push (man) down or bend him sideways” as his or her’s “dark, invisible burden.”(UM 61)

In his essay “The Coming of History: Heidegger and Nietzsche Against the Present”, Andrew Mitchell argues that in the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche’s most pertinent critique of presence does not originate from his conception of the unhistorical and forgetting. Mitchell instead considers Nietzsche’s most effective attack against the hegemony of the presence of the present in his thinking of the political. As Mitchell writes, “Nietzsche’s thinking of history would be a struggle against this politically enforced presence of the state, of property, of ego”(409). Nietzsche’s counterforce to the state would be the “community of life” where life is precisely something that exceeds its own bounds, that exists in some sense of ec-stasis. I see such a shift of terrain in the discussion of Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation as a forfeiting of the possibility that Nietzsche is anything but a metaphysical thinker of presence. Mitchell’s reading lends too much authority to Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche, and gives Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche ultimate say in terms of Nietzsche’s ontology and conception of truth.
Charles Bambach, in his essay “History and Ontology: A reading of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation”, will also, similarly to myself, understand this notion of “horizon” in non-psychological or non-subjective terms. He writes that “what Nietzsche seeks to do… is to interpret time from within the horizon of being.” It is important to keep in mind that this horizon is not constituted by the active functioning of a faculty, but is, I claim, passively formed in a properly non-psychological time-space. It is difficult to conceive of this horizon being attributable uniquely to each individual because, if the force of the unhistorical was in fact a subjective power or faculty, it would not be a force of forgetting but of repression. Forgetting cannot happen but passively, in being itself and not in the subject or psyche. (We are here at the inverse of Bergson’s theory of memory being preserved in itself.)

In Classical Greek, the word *lethe* can mean “forgetfulness”, “oblivion”, or “concealment” and is related to the Greek word for truth, *aletheia* (α-lethe). Heidegger makes an interesting observation in the 1942-43 *Parmenides* lecture course that, although the crossing out of the *a* in “aletheia” leads to “lethe”, “nowhere do we actually find this word as the name for the false.” (*Parmenides*, p.20) The word commonly used by the Greeks for what we would call “falsity” is *pseudos*, not *lethe*. *Lethe*, though in the etymological form of “untruth”, is not reducible to untruth as we commonly use the term to mean falsity and lying. *Lethe* resonates more closely with the sense of concealment discussed in Heidegger’s 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”, as the concealment of beings “older than every openness of this or that being.” (*Pathmarks*, 148)

By the truth of an action I do not intend how the action accords with moral standards of a given time. Truth is meant here in the sense of the truth of a theatrical drama. The truth of, or what is revealed by, a character’s words or actions is often concurrent with the character not being fully aware of how these words effect the direction of the play, their fate, and the fate of other characters. The character’s truest actions signify that there is a larger, unrepresentable confluence of events at work that transcend the explicit actions that occupy the present moment of the play. Precisely the hiddenness of this confluence to the acting character allows for their actions to unfold as either tragic or comedic.

**References**

166 Charles Bambach, *Pathmarks*, 148

167 Martin Heidegger, 1938-39 Seminar on Nietzsche’s *On the Utility and Liability of History for Life*, 95

168 Andrew Mitchell, “The Coming of History: Heidegger and Nietzsche against the present”, 403
Nietzsche continues this idea of the priority of the “negative” term of forgetting over the “positive” remembering in the second essay from the *Genealogy Of Morals*. Here he writes that “forgetting is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression…” (GM II, section 1) While I see this as an important return to, and possible refinement of, the idea of the “unhistorical” from thirteen years prior, it is questionable as to why Nietzsche insists on calling this force of erasure both a faculty and “active” in the 1887 text. The verb to forget, by the rules of grammar, must have a subject that “performs” the active verb, yet in fact I am powerless to make such an event occur (for actively forgetting is to repress and is undeniably distinct from forgetting in the broader sense). I do not believe Nietzsche to be entirely ignorant of this point of forgetting as occurring beyond our range of voluntary action, and hence also beyond the scope of consciousness.

Patrick Wotling, in his essay “Ultimate Skepsis: Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of Interpretation”, also distinguishes between the common psychological understanding of forgetting and what Nietzsche is possibly proposing here. Wolting writes, “forgetting does not mean that the thing thought, the thing represented in our mind in the moment just prior, disappears.” (71) This is to determine forgetting with respect to its being an eclipsing of consciousness, to its being no longer present, understanding the occurrence of forgetting from the perspective of conscious representation instead of from the source of forgetting itself: the unhistorical. Wolting, though, does not pursue what I term this trace-less, ontological forgetting. Instead, his focus is on a different kind of psychological forgetting wherein “to no longer think about something that one possesses also constitutes the specific mark of internalization.” (71) To forget, in Wolting’s reading of Nietzsche, is actually to remember the consciously forgotten thing unconsciously, to experience the presence of what is thought in action, in the “perfect mastery of what is thought”. He makes the connection here to the functional certainty of the drives. Forgetting is then the unconscious or unknowing perfection of sure, instinctual action, in so far as that action is all the more perfect for not having to be circumvented through the cumbersome apparatus of consciousness. This forgetting as the “work of internalization” (other than being determined entirely in terms of consciousness and subjectivity) runs entirely contrary to Nietzsche’s intentions in the second untimely meditation. Nietzsche’s notion of the health that results from the passive forces of the unhistorical does *not* arise as an internalization of what is no longer conscious. Health is precisely for Nietzsche when what no longer is, slips into the non-relationality of oblivion, and in doing so constitutes or gifts the very horizon of life itself by this vacuum of nihilation. To conceive of a sense of forgetting in Nietzsche that involves an internalization of the thing forgotten, misses the notion of health put forward by Nietzsche in the *Untimely Meditations* entirely.
In my reading, the unhistorical is primarily something “positive”, something that creates or gifts in its power to erase. When Nietzsche speaks in the second essay of the *Genealogy of Morals* about forgetting, it is associated first with the descriptors of “active” and “positive”. (GM II, section 1) (See full quote in footnote 177)

By “being”, I mean that which is denoted by the “it” in “it thinks”. As Nietzsche writes, “With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact, which these superstitious minds hate to concede - namely, that a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, and not when ‘I’ wish… *It* thinks; but that this ‘it’ is precisely the famous old ‘ego’ is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an ‘immediate certainty.” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, #16) What we can call the functions of thinking, forgetting, and willing do not stand for Nietzsche as displays of subjective control and power. Instead, these “acts” indicate the powerlessness of our power, and where one finds the most intimate properties of the “I” steeped in a non-dialogical otherness. I believe Nietzsche would agree with Maurice Blanchot when the latter writes, “At the same time as we make use of forgetting as a power, the capacity to forget turns us over to a forgetting without power.” (*The Infinite Conversation*, 195) This “forgetting without power” is very close to how I am reading an important aspect of Nietzsche’s concept of the unhistorical.

Andrew Mitchell, “The Coming of History…”, 401

Heidegger, 1938-39 Seminar, 46

*Pathmarks*, 150
In this paper I presented a unique reading of certain elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy, both engaging intensely with Heidegger’s canonical interpretation of Nietzsche, and proceeding to advance a less subject-centered and metaphysical interpretation of that philosophy. By focusing in particular on his notions of semblance (Schein), the Dionysian, and the unhistorical, I developed an interpretation of Nietzsche that brings his thinking into closer proximity to pre-Platonic Greek thought as it is interpreted by Heidegger, while also thoroughly questioning Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche as a thinker of only truth as accordance. I presented the possibility that Nietzsche’s philosophy contains the germinal elements of an inceptual Greek (or extra-metaphysical) experience of truth as aletheia. In addition to this, I explored the possibility in Nietzsche for a prioritization of concealment that may even surpass the experience of truth as aletheia. By showing the resonances of Greek phusis in Nietzsche’s mature notion of semblance (Schein), and the rich sense of strife and concealment in his early notions of Dionysius and the unhistorical, Nietzsche’s philosophy eludes its placement as either the culmination of metaphysics or the most extreme ensnarement within metaphysics. By de-emphasizing an interpretation of Nietzsche in terms of his place within modern thought (i.e. Descartes and Schopenhauer), I have attempted to open the texts of Nietzsche to an extra-metaphysical reading that intensifies the untimeliness of his ideas and his guiding pathos. By reading Nietzsche through a Heideggerian lens, I
have attempted to bring Nietzschean thought closer to Heidegger while, at the same time, preserving the many unresolvable differences and nuances that exist between these two significant figures. In conclusion, I have developed in this thesis a somewhat uncanonical reading of Nietzsche that both expands the range of his possible interlocutors and keeps to the fecund ambiguity of his writings. In doing so, I have kept open the question of Nietzsche and his understanding of truth. Instead of closing any doors on Nietzsche’s philosophy, my hope is to have opened a new one. May creative scholarship in the area of Nietzsche and in the light-footed labor of interpretation never die.
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