SUN YAT-SENS:
CONTESTED IMAGES OF A POLITICAL ICON

by

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A THESIS

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the afterlives of the Chinese revolutionary icon Sun Yat-sen and their relevant contexts, arguing that these contexts have given rise to different images of the same figure. It serves as a gallery in which these different images are put into conversation with one another, revealing new insights into each. Key to the discussion, Sun is first introduced in a short biography. Then, the thesis moves to his different afterlives: Sun and the fight for his posthumous approval in the Republic of China before 1949; Sun and his usage in Chinese Communist political rhetoric from 1956 through 2016; Sun and his changing image in the ROC-Taiwan, a change that reflects the contentious political environment of an increasingly bentu Taiwan; Sun and two of his images among the overseas Chinese of Hawaii and Penang. Through this exploration, the thesis shows that there is no one Sun Yat-sen.
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“Grandson!” she says magnanimously. “Come home! You’re lost if you don’t. I know you don’t want to; I know you’re scared of all the flies, of the clouds of mosquitoes, of snakes slithering across the damp sorghum soil. You revere heroes and loathe bastards, but who among us is not the ‘most heroic and most bastardly’?”

—Mo Yan, Red Sorghum
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Bored one August morning and about to leave New York for home, a suburb of Hartford, I thought of ways to kill time before slouching into the red pleather train seats that would take me to New Haven and the black fabric car seats presumably baking atop the parking garage there. Since I had to catch Metro-North at some point and did not feel like doing anything in particular, I decided to take the slow way to the station and walk from my sister’s apartment on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn to Grand Central Station in Manhattan. The day was mild and the breeze pleasant, though clouds would gather as I crossed the blue beams of the Manhattan Bridge. I loved the view of the Brooklyn Bridge and lower Manhattan from the Manhattan Bridge, especially in the warmer months when the park below was green and lively. It was less crowded than the Brooklyn Bridge, at any rate. Traffic and trains clanged past as I walked across the span, eventually being spat out near the triumphal gates that mark one’s journey in and out of Manhattan onto the Bowery, a stone’s throw from appliance shops, bars, lighting stores, and Chinatown.

Chinatown is a place I’ve seen more than a few times over the course of my life. When I was a kid, I would go there with my parents or with my grandparents on trips to the city and we’d get dinner at a restaurant there following visits to the Natural History Museum. As I got older, I would hear bits and pieces from my father about the Church of the Transfiguration, my grandmother’s childhood church, and the complex interplays between the Chinese and Italian denizens of Mott Street, north and south of Canal. Eventually, I’d even go on tours of Chinatown as part of the
government-funded STARTALK language program, though Mandarin was incidentally useful at best among the largely English-proficient and Hokkien- or Cantonese-speaking shopkeepers. In time, I would wander about by myself or with friends, Columbus Park being the constant center of my imagined Chinatown. Though evening walks along the Bowery are not the peak of entertainment, Chinatown itself had an odd charm to it. I liked the smells and noise, the foreignness of it. Later, I came to understand more about how neighborhoods like Chinatown, Little Italy, and the old Jewish slums of the Lower East Side came to be, as well as understand more about history in general.

These days the magic charm has faded somewhat, but one figure always attracted me in Chinatown. Even now, many years after our first meeting, I couldn’t help but go check on him when I was back east for winter break, going so far as shelling out money for a dusty hotel room on Second Avenue and trudging down some forty blocks to pay my respects. It was not the peddler with his Cantonese sweets, the bookseller with his Taiwanese smut and Du Fu critiques, nor one of the old men playing checkers in Columbus Park. Rather, in the shadow of the jail tower and along the banks of the most vividly, unnaturally, and unsettlingly cerulean puddle across the bail bond row, stood and stands a bronze statue of a bald old man. The man, Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed “Tianxia wei gong.” Of course, when we first met, I could not read Chinese. Instead, I read the English inscription: “All are equal.” Though I did not really know much about Sun until recently, I found the statue noteworthy, if
nothing else for its central position in the park and his shiny dome.

The introduction to this thesis presents a general outline of Sun’s life and times; it is not meant to be comprehensive, and many stones are left unturned. However, even when summarized, it is clear that both his life as a man and afterlife as a hero were complex. Although I was not yet acquainted with the twists and turns of this narrative in its various versions when I first saw Sun’s statue in Columbus Park, the more I traveled and learned about China in my studies, the more prominent Sun’s bust appeared. No longer was he the bronze codger, but rather a national hero of China, a democratic revolutionary, the Father of the Nation and Our Premier as GMD sources lauded him. I was indifferent towards him when I went to Hangzhou my junior year, otherwise I might have gone to Nanjing to see his mausoleum. Instead, I was mostly struck by the bustling cities of Eastern China and the omnipresent slogans lauding the values of justice, democracy, law, and freedom by posters framing the CCP as the keystone of all China. By senior year, toting books around Wesleyan University’s Olin Library, I saw Sun as a key facet of my thesis on Wang Jingwei’s attempted justification of collaboration, but only key to one chapter. Wang’s justification was largely negative—the war was a disaster by late 1938 and he believed the situation was not likely to improve—but he also invoked a positive argument in justifying collaboration. This relied upon tying China to the New Asian Order of Japan and tying the Sunist ideal of national construction to peace. Sun was the democratic hero of China, and Wang needed to emphasize his ties to him ideologically and symbolically to legitimate himself and his actions as properly patriotic.
Having spent much of that year reading propaganda about Sun, I myself began to think him grand. I even wrote a story inspired by his life, entitled “Walking on Mott Street,” in which a bum named Harry Chiang is haunted by the Columbus Park statue and begins spouting the cause of a vague national revival in the Baxter Street jail. Though I had still only scratched the surface, I began to see in Communist, Chongqing-GMD, and Nanjing-GMD discourses that Sun was a controversial, elusive, and malleable figure. No matter where I looked, I found his shadow. His shadow grew yet more imposing after my second trip to Taiwan.

I stayed in Taiwan for about two months in the summer of 2019 for a translation course at National Taiwan University. While I was soon occupied with other things, I could not overlook Sun’s ubiquity around the Beautiful Isle: Zhongshan Districts, Minsheng Roads, a grandfatherly old man on the money and a stern man on a Lincoln-esque throne. I had seen the SYS Memorial Hall during my first, brief stay in Taipei, but I only really paid attention the second time I went, a sweltering August day shortly before I was to leave Taiwan. The same exhibit from two-and-a-half years earlier proclaimed Sun a “democratic pioneer”—notably excluding the collaborationist Wang Jingwei from a scrolling list of Sun’s associates and comrades—while soldiers stomped around for a crowd of iPhone and Xiaomi cameras. Curiously, the bookstore was filled with books on Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Xi Jinping; few were about Sun or Taiwan. This emphasis on Sun the democrat, in the context of this martial display with glimmering bayonets next to a bookstore full of dictators’ biographies struck me as odd. Sun’s scowl, compared with Lincoln’s bemusement in Washington and Chiang’s warm smile at the CKS
Memorial Hall, also struck me as odd. Dissonant images of Sun were clashing in the crash of boots and digital shutters.

This dissonance was amplified as I learned in a spring seminar on Maoism that Mao Zedong had claimed to be the true successor of Sun. Mao pointedly coopted Sun’s Three People’s Principles with his New Three People’s Principles so as to bolster the CCP’s legitimacy with an appeal to China’s earlier revolutionary heritage. Browsing a proudly Taiwanese bookstore near Xinhai Road, among myriad posters for the Taiwanese metal band Chthonic and flags for the Pan-Green DPP, my curiosity was again piqued. A book printed by the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei equated Sun with Chiang Wei-shui, a Taiwanese nationalist I knew nothing about and had indeed never heard of. Though I did not understand how it mattered, in light of what I knew regarding Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei, Mao Zedong, and others invoking his image, I could not help but find it an ideologically significant association given Taiwan’s own complicated history. It was with a desire to explore these competing images of Sun and to set them in contrast that I undertook this current project.

Seeing Sun’s shadow in my Chinese history classes and firsthand in New York, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland (though I never visited Nanjing, I had noted the existence of Zhongshan Roads in cities like Hangzhou and Shanghai), I decided that a research project that brought GMD, CCP, and distinctively Taiwanese narratives of Sun together may yield new insights into the shaping of political icons like Sun and the narratives that surround them. Remembering that my own first contact with Sun was in Manhattan’s Chinatown, it became apparent that including a
chapter on overseas Chinese would both offer relief from Chinese state-driven narratives and illuminate his image among Chinese communities in non-Chinese spaces. This, I hoped, would allow for new aspects of Sun’s afterlife to emerge. When I attended a Chinese studies conference at the University of Hawaii-Manoa in January 2020, I was lucky enough to go on a tour of Sun-related sites in Honolulu. I found the tour useful for contextualizing Sun’s image in Hawaii. My brief visit yielded a book explicitly focused on Sun and his Hawaiian connections, and some time on the ground looking—albeit haphazardly—for traces of Sun’s legacy amidst information on the Chinese experience there. I resolved that Hawaii would be one of two sites for discussion in this chapter.

Largely due to the advice of my advisor, Professor Bryna Goodman, I looked to Southeast Asia for comparison. I remembered a reading assignment I did in my first term at the University of Oregon for Asian Studies 611, an introductory methods class, for which I read Jing Pei Goh’s thesis on ROC/PRC loyalty politics and Chinese education in Penang. Consequently, I ended up exploring the feasibility of Penang, a city I knew nothing about, as the second site. After some reading, I decided it would make an interesting case, given its unique history and the city’s ties to Sun. Though I have little grounding in the history of Southeast Asia or Penang, I believe the relevant sections add much to this thesis by providing a different perspective on the heterogenous experiences of overseas Chinese and, indeed, a different overseas, non-state image of Sun Yat-sen and its relevant context.

I hope that, by analyzing these discordant images of Sun and by putting them side by side in one paper, I may establish a sort of “gallery” of Sun Yat-sen’s heroic
images—borrowing the historian J. Y. Wong’s phrase. By moving from the concerns of one time and space to the next, we may see who was using Sun and why, and contrast their motivations with those of differently situated individuals. In so doing, we may perhaps see that the one figure of Sun Yat-sen has cast many shadows with vastly different implications. We may, then, be aware that we cannot help but speak of multiple Sun Yat-sens when discussing his legacy. While hardly revolutionary, this insight has significant consequences for how we discuss history in a world in which national histories compete for a truly global audience. Japanese textbooks downplay Japanese brutality in the Second World War for their own students and to preserve Japan’s image overseas. By the same token, Chinese and South Korean textbooks amplify the horrors, inciting indignation among their students and tarnishing Japan’s image overseas. These talking points, though emerging from particular historical locations, can travel quite far from their origin.

Closer to home, conflicting histories have come to mark public discourse and the general landscape of the United States. In Eugene, the Pioneer Mother and Father, statues officially standing on the University campus to represent Oregon’s pioneer spirit and the taming of the land, were dismantled this spring as symbols of white supremacy and domination of native peoples. In Portland, a statue of George Washington himself was toppled owing to Washington’s owning of slaves. Clearly, battles of historical interpretation and iconography are both public and salient these days, and so I find that this exploration of a long-dead man’s competing legacies is relevant to far more than questions of Sun scholarship or Chinese national history. Rather, it is directly relevant to PRC-ROC political squabbling on the world stage, the
cultural contestation of today’s United States, and even, perhaps, questions of
decolonization and nationalism around the world. Should Churchill be remembered as
the wartime statesman of Britain or the starver of India (or, even, the flunkey who
sent the ANZACs to die at Gallipoli)? Was annexation of Hawaii in some way good
for the islanders, or was it another case of might-makes-right imperialism? The
multiplicity of histories, perhaps even beyond Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Histories 1 and
2,¹ revealed by Sun Yat-sen’s various afterlives reflects the contentious work of
historical interpretation in a world of competing local, national, and transnational
agendas.

Plainly, this is the work of one person; I cannot help but display my own
limitations. Nonetheless, I hope that the personal context for this project and my
thoughts on its broader implications help explain my motivations in undertaking it.
Now, we turn to the introduction, in which we establish the baseline for the
fundamental questions of this paper: who was Sun Yat-sen, who did people say he
was, and why? Answers, we will see, are numerous and varied.

¹ Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
INTRODUCTION: THE RIPPLES OF SUN YAT-SEN

The man I am writing about is not famous. It may be that he never will be. It may be that when his life at last comes to an end he will leave no more trace of his sojourn on earth than a stone thrown into a river leaves on the surface of the water.

—W. Somerset Maugham, The Razor’s Edge

i: Introduction

Modern national narratives, if the historian Eric Hobsbawm is to be considered, are quasi-religious substitutions for religion itself in a capitalist epoch that has displaced traditional ways of living.2 These narratives make heroes and villains, saints and sinners, of ordinary men and women in grand dramas involving the destinies of countless millions. The elevation of George Washington and King George III to transcendental figures—the righteous Cincinnatus and the wicked tyrant—speaks to the needs of the church of the nation for such models of virtue and sin. Of course, George Washington was a complicated individual; George III was, in this regard, no different. Popular perspectives on these figures are largely a matter of faith. The spy Nathan Hale is a revered martyr, the general Benedict Arnold a scorned traitor—unless, of course, one subscribes to a Loyalist narrative. Indeed, our current cultural conflict in the United States has once again made the multiplicity of historical perspectives salient. In a wave of historical contestation, public statuary in particular has aroused strong feelings. In Richmond, VA, the fate of Robert E. Lee’s statue is up for debate, though the existence of Confederate memorials and iconography is a long

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running issue in the South. What I find interesting, however, is that the statue debate has moved beyond Confederate monuments. Indeed, the place of such figures as George Washington himself in the American historical landscape has been called into question, as evinced by the destruction of a Washington statue in Portland, OR, in June, 2020. Plainly, George Washington’s political afterlife as the great hero of the American nation is subject to contestation, as are the afterlives of any political icon.

While a study of American national heroes would be eminently engaging, particularly at this moment, here my focus is at once more distant and direct. In considering the historical afterlives of national icons, I find the example of Sun Yat-sen, the great Chinese revolutionary, to be of particular interest and value. Sun is and has been claimed by many different actors—state and non-state—coming from many different contexts and for their own distinctive purposes. By examining Sun, I believe we garner a more clear understanding of the factors at play in a national icon’s political afterlives and the contestation of history. However, each of Sun’s images reveals something particular about its context. We will not find any universal truth in this analysis, but may come to a more comprehensive understanding of Sun’s legacies, their contexts, and the shaping of political narrative more generally.

Several of Sun Yat-sen’s “heroic images”, taken from different contexts, may serve to illustrate the shaping of distinctive political narratives. This thesis takes up four specific afterlives: 1) Guomindang narratives created in the Republic of China

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before the loss of the mainland; 2) narratives created by Chinese Communists in the People’s Republic of China; 3) narratives created by political actors and memorial institutions in the fractious society of the Republic of China on Taiwan; 4) the narrative of overseas Chinese, particularly in Honolulu and Penang, as constructed by local Chinese and interested third-parties. Sun Yat-sen appears to be a ubiquitously venerated figure because he serves as a political icon to modern Chinese nationalism. Unlike Lei Feng—a perfect symbol for one set of ideals—Sun has so many facets that many groups can lay claim to him as such, cast in their own respective clothes. Each iteration of Sun, the icon, is thus particular to its own context, as I hope to prove by grounding each iteration and placing them in juxtaposition—a gallery of customized Sun Yat-sens. While no two Suns are the same, Sun Yat-sen appears to serve everywhere as a symbol of Chinese nationalism: for the GMD ideologues, he was thus a touchstone of legitimacy for Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei during their final struggle for supremacy; in the CCP narratives, Sun is invoked to tie the CCP’s political mission to a long chain of revolutionary Chinese nationalism and to provide a foil with which to highlight the successes of the party-state; in Taiwan narratives, Sun is alternately invoked as a symbol of greater ROC nationalism and indigenized to hold a more parochial relevance to Taiwanese nationalists; overseas, Sun’s connections to Hawaii serve to elevate the place of the Chinese in Hawaiian history and Hawaii in Chinese and world history, while Sun’s connections to Penang do the same for the Chinese of Penang. Everywhere, Sun is built up as a great man, and thus his greatness rubs off on those who use his name for their own purposes, whatever that purpose may be. However, before we dig into the specifics of Sun remembrance
and redefinition, we must outline the basic facts of Sun’s life.

ii: The Life of Sun Yat-sen

Sun Yat-sen, also known as Sun Wen, Sun Zhongshan, Sun Yixian, Sun Deming, Sun Dixiang, and Sun Rixin, was born to Sun Dacheng and Lady Yang in 1866 in Cuiheng, a small village in the southern Guangdong county of Xiangshan.\(^4\) Sun was the youngest son and one of six children, two of whom died in childhood.\(^5\) Eventually, this native son would grow so famous that the whole county of Xiangshan would be renamed in honor of Sun in April of 1925. The new Zhongshan County was later divided into several different jurisdictions, including present-day Zhongshan City (sister-city of Honolulu, HI), Zhuhai City, and Guangzhou’s Nansha District.

However, few could tell at the time that Sun Deming, son of unremarkable land-owning peasants in peripheral Guangdong, would later be famous across the seven seas, subject of countless busts of bronze, odes, and a field of study. His sizeable family was of modest means. Though the family owned land, they owned little and the father Sun Dacheng made most of the family’s income as a tailor in nearby Macao.

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\(^4\) Some sources identify Cuiheng as a constituent village of the town of Yongning; others suggest Xiangshan only had just the village of Cuiheng and no towns. Jiang Xingde, *Guofu Bainian Danzhen Jinian Congshu: Guofu Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Zhuan* ("Father of the Nation Centennial Commemorative Series: The Tale of Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Nation") (Taipei: Zhengzhong Publishing, 1965).


Here is proper order of births for the children of Sun Dacheng and Lady Yang: eldest son Sun Dezhang (Sun Mei), eldest daughter Sun Jinxing (died at age four), second son Sun Deyou (died age six), third son Sun Deming (the future Sun Yat-sen), second daughter Sun Miaoxi, and third daughter Sun Qiuqi.
When he was thirteen years old by Chinese reckoning, Sun would go live with his shopkeeper brother Sun Mei in Honolulu, capital city of the then-independent Kingdom of Hawaii. Particularly when compared to the Cuiheng of 1878, Honolulu was a modern city with bustling streets, an active port, and an international population. While Hawaii was still an independent nation, British and American influences—particularly American business interests—upon the nation were strong by this point in time, and this would be reflected in Sun’s education. He would stay there from 1878 to 1883 to pursue his primary and secondary schooling; his elder brother hoped that the young Sun Deming would help him manage his businesses upon graduation. Sun would attend the Anglican Iolani School, and the Oahu College, then Oahu’s only secondary school. It was after his first semester at Oahu College that Sun began to make noise to his brother about getting baptized. Sun Mei was displeased and refused to further support Sun’s education there, as he believed the school had a bad influence on his brother. Indeed, Sun Mei was so displeased with what Sun Deming was learning overseas that he sent his younger brother back to Cuiheng in 1883. However, young Deming had already been deeply influence by his time in Honolulu and came to admire the accomplishments of the modern world as understood through Hawaii and the large ships that took him to and fro. This

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6 Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford UP, 1998). Jiang, 26. Bergère cites these schools, while Jiang mentions a semester at a St. Louis Academy in between. Jiang also describes Oahu College as “Xiaweiyi Daxue”, “established by the American government”. This makes one wonder if Jiang conflated Oahu College, now the Punahou School, with the University of Hawaii-Manoa. UHM was indeed founded by the American government, but only in 1907, nine years after the formal annexation of Hawaii. Oahu College was instead founded by New England missionaries in the 1840s.

7 I hesitate to use “modern” without qualification, and note that Dipesh Chakrabarty’s provincialization of Europe and modernity illustrates that “modern” is often equated with “Western” due to Eurocentric theories of development and social analysis. However, for the
admiration, presumably also a product of his education at the Iolani School and Oahu College, merged with his own Chinese education to inform a political ideology that would eventually wed Confucian moralism and a Sinicized form of Anglo-American liberalism, an ideology Sun articulated most explicitly through the Three People’s Principles.

After having been sent back to China in 1883, a young Sun soon found his home village, Cuiheng, backwards and the reigning Qing Dynasty beyond contempt. Not long after his return, Sun Deming and his friend Lu Haodong damaged the village altar to the Beiji Huangwang (the Polar King, a local deity), an act that infuriated his fellow villagers and forced him to leave for Hong Kong. We lack precise information as regards Sun’s motivations. We may speculate that Sun, a teenager by this point, was lashing out in resentment of his poor hometown and those who lived there after having been sent back against his will. The episode is often related to his growing faith in Christianity, as he would seek baptism in Hong Kong and adopt the new name Sun Rixin shortly after settling in the colony.8 If we were to follow that line of reasoning, we might imagine that Sun believed the idol not only idolatrous in the literal sense, but also a symbol of backwardness and heathen simplicity. In any case, he would soon return to Guangzhou to study medicine at

purposes of this narrative, we will simply note that the modernity Sun saw and wanted was embodied by the Western world and its hallmarks at the time. 8 The name Rixin (Yat-san) comes from “苟日新，日日新，又日新,” a phrase from the Daxue (“Greater Learning”). It translates roughly to “If it renewed one day, it is to be renewed day after day, and again the next day.” One commentary suggests this refers to the necessity of maintaining daily cleanliness. There is resonance here for Sun’s baptism (cleansing of the soul). Sun supposedly adopted his more famous penname Yixian (Yat-sen) because it was roughly homophonous in Cantonese.
Guangzhou Boji Hospital with a Dr. Kerr before transferring to the Alice School, or the future Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese, under the tutelage of Dr. James Cantlie, Dr. Ho Kai, and Dr. Samuel Manson, earning his license by 1892. During this time, he adopted the penname Sun Yixian (Sun Jyat-sin in Cantonese jyutping and Sun Yat-sen commonly in the West). He married Lu Muzhen (1867-1952) through a matchmaker in Cuiheng in 1885, three years before the death of his father. Sun and Lu had three children together: eldest son Sun Fo (1891-1973), eldest daughter Sun Yan (1894-1913), and youngest daughter Sun Wan (1896-1979). He would practice medicine for a few years, first in Macao before being forced out due to Portuguese law not recognizing his education for licensing purposes. In 1892, he would meet Chen Cuifen; the two would share a twenty-year affair, with Chen following Sun to Japan from Hong Kong and to Penang in 1910. After his six-month stint in Macao, he would begin practicing in Guangzhou, but would soon turn to leveraging his extensive social network for the purpose of fomenting revolt against the Qing in China.

Sun founded the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society) in Honolulu in 1894. The organization was dedicated to expelling the Manchus, reviving the Chinese nation, and establishing a unified government. Sun Yat-sen and his allies Yeung Ku-

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9 Lu would not follow Sun around in his travels, but would move several times. Following the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising of 1895, she and their two children moved to Honolulu; in 1907, she and their three children would move to Kowloon; eventually she would move with their daughters to Penang in 1910. She moved to Nanjing following the Xinhai Revolution but left for Hawaii following the Second Revolution. Post-divorce, she would move to Macao.

10 Lu Muzhen and Sun Mei regarded Chen Cuifen as Sun Yat-sen’s concubine, as the two never formally wed.
wan (Yang Quyun, 1861-1901), Zheng Shiliang, Chen Shaobai (Chan Siu-bak, 1869-1934), and others would later launch the Guangzhou Uprising of 1895 with the help of local underworld societies. The uprising failed, purportedly due to difficulties with the Shantou contingent’s travel to Guangzhou. Sun was forced to flee Hong Kong for Japan, then the US and UK. He was blamed for the uprising’s failures by Yeung and his comrades, members of the Furen Literary Society that had joined the Xingzhonghui for the uprising, and was largely disgraced. Arriving in Kobe, Sun Yat-sen left for Yokohama after a day and changed his appearance. No longer would he don the Qing-imposed queue or Chinese-style robes. He now sported a Western suit, a matching hat, and a neat mustache like a made Meiji man. Though he may have been motivated by practical considerations, the historian Marie-Claire Bergère emphasizes the symbolic nature of his sartorial transformation. Shedding his Manchu-imposed hairstyle for modern Western dress, Sun wholly rejected the Qing and a possibility of returning while they reigned. Simultaneously, he embraced the modern as understood through the suit and hat. He left Tokyo to raise funds in the United States, stopping for a time in Honolulu en route to San Francisco. By sheer happenstance, according to Cantlie’s telling, Dr. and Mrs. Cantlie were also sightseeing in Honolulu en route to London, as Dr. Cantlie had retired and the couple sought to return to Britain. Though Sun recognized them on the street and stopped their driver, the Cantlies failed to recognize him, at first taking him to be a Japanese stranger. Once they realized who he was, they spent some time with him and gave him their London address. Sun still had business to attend to in Honolulu and in the

11 Bergère, 60. See footnote six.
United States; it is known that he stopped in San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City. He spent three months altogether in the US and presumably stopped in many places, though his fund-raising efforts were not met with great success. He thereafter left for London.

Sun found trouble in London. On October 11th, 1896, Sun was kidnapped by the Chinese Legation in an event that Sun scholar J. Y. Wong argues was largely responsible for his rise in stature from a failed rebel to an inspired revolutionary. Walking down Portland Place, the location of the Chinese Legation (a dangerous location for the wanted Sun), Sun was somehow brought into the Legation and locked in a room there. Through the purchased help of an English porter named Cole, who notified Sun’s former medical professors James Cantlie and Samuel Manson, Sun alerted the outside world to his plight. His release was secured by the Foreign Office, but not before the incident became a media sensation in London. Following his October 23rd release, he spent several more months in London exploring, reading, and socializing. Sun would then return to Japan, where he was sponsored by well-connected Pan-Asianists like Miyazaki Torazō (1871-1922) and would thus come into contact with nationalist Asian revolutionaries from China, Japan, Korea, India, and the Philippines. He would also see the fruits of Meiji modernization first-hand, further cemented by Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. Top-down political modernization and industrialization seemed to make Japan, a fellow Asian nation, strong. His time in Japan, much as his time in Britain and the United States, had

significant implications for the shaping of his political ideology.

In 1900, Sun mobilized his network and his resources against the Qing once more. The Revive China Society launched the Huizhou Uprising in 1900, but the uprising failed to spark a broader insurrection against the Qing. Sun lost many members of his network, such as the China-hand turned arms-runner Yamada Yoshimasa (1868-1900), and was forced to flee Japan. This was presumably a disappointing turn of events for Sun. He had been overseeing the uprising from the recently-annexed Japanese colony of Taiwan, and had been promised aid from the Japanese authorities that failed to materialize. His forces, bolstered by secret-society members, were still insufficient.

Sun’s absence from Japan was only temporary. Sun returned to Japan in short order and would found the Tongmenghui in 1905, an umbrella organization for several anti-Qing revolutionary groups like the Xingzhonghui, Huang Xing’s Huaxinghui (Chinese Revival Society), and Cai Yuanpei’s Guangfuhui (Restoration Society). He made many contacts with influential Asian revolutionaries during this time. At some point during this stay in Japan, he would adopt the name Nakayama Shō (Zhongshan Qiao), thus giving rise to his best-known moniker in Chinese, Sun Zhongshan. In 1903, he would also marry the fifteen-year-old Ōtsuki Kaoru, the daughter of his upstairs neighbors. They would have a daughter, Fumiko, in 1906, but Sun was to leave Ōtsuki and Fumiko behind.

All throughout this time Sun was traveling abroad in pursuit of allies and funds for his revolutionary activities. He made frequent trips to Southeast Asia,
Europe, and North America to build connections to local Chinese populations and bolster the treasury of his revolutionary societies: key locations included Honolulu, Penang, Singapore, Tokyo, London, and San Francisco. Minor locations range from Taihoku (then the name of Taipei) to Vancouver, BC. The Singapore headquarters of the Tongmenghui was founded in 1906, and would be Sun’s major base of operations until 1910, when he declared the Penang chapter the new headquarters to escape growing dissatisfaction and increasing challenges to his leadership in Singapore.\textsuperscript{13} However, not all of his funding was sourced from overseas Chinese. Japanese patronage, official and unofficial, would be particularly key following 1914, as would Soviet patronage late in life.

Sun Yat-sen is often credited with being the leader of the Xinhai Revolution.\textsuperscript{14} On October 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1911, the Hubei New Army—a modern Qing army modelled after Western armies—seized the Viceroy’s residence in Wuchang and incited a broad rebellion against the Qing court. Across the Pacific and a half-day behind, Sun Yat-sen learned of these events from a newspaper on the train from Denver to St. Louis—or, as some sources say, Kansas City. Although Sun himself and the rest of the Tongmenghui leadership had little direct connection to the Wuchang Uprising, the New Army’s mutiny would be the first domino in the chain of uprisings and secessions that forced the abdication of the Qing emperor Pu Yi and his regent Zaifeng in a matter of months. The events constituted what is known today as the Xinhai Revolution. In 1912, the Republic of China was declared and Sun Yat-sen

\textsuperscript{14} The revolution was named for the year Xinhai of the sexagenary Chinese calendar in which it occurred, corresponding to the year 1911 of the Gregorian calendar.
elected as its provisional president.¹⁵ He would announce his resignation after a
month and a half in office, handing power over to the Beiyang General and old Qing
power-broker Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) that March so as to ensure the Emperor’s
abdication. Once installed, Yuan’s abuse of power, including his presumed
involvement in the assassination of Song Jiaoren (1882-1913), President of the
newly-formed big tent Guomindang (Nationalist Party), and his acquiescence to the
infamous Twenty-One Demands imposed upon China by the Japanese government of
Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1915, led to a GMD-sponsored rebellion.

Yuan crushed this Second Revolution, forcing Sun and many GMD loyalists
to flee China once again. Sun’s subsequent attempt to challenge Yuan through the
establishment of the Revolutionary Party (gemingdang) would also fail. Many of his
former comrades, including Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, He Xiangning, and others,
chafed at Sun’s insistence that members of the new party swear oaths of loyalty to
Sun himself rather than to the nation, the organization, or the revolutionary cause,
oaths incongruous with the revolutionary spirit motivating members of the old
Tongmenghui. Although Sun was unable to displace him, Yuan’s ultimate attempt to
secure his power by declaring himself the Hongxian Emperor was a spectacular
failure. Following Yuan’s passing, shortly thereafter, the malformed Republic would
be torn apart by rival warlord cliques. Control over the nominal capital Beijing
passed, in turn, through the hands of the Anhui, Zhili, and Fengtian cliques before the
Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army took the city in 1928. This

¹⁵ Though the Republic was not formally established until 1912, the Republican Calendar
marks 1911 as the First Year of the Republic.
sketch oversimplifies a volatile time period and the actors working within it, but suggests the contours of the time.

Sun, for his part, married again in 1915, this time his secretary Song Qingling (Soong Ching-ling, 1893-1981) over the strenuous objections of the industrialist Charles Soong. By this time, Sun had married at least twice, though his union with Ōtsuki Kaoru was not widely known, and he considered Chen Cuifen his concubine, marital practices at odds with Sun and Soong’s shared Christian faith. Sun divorced Lu Muzhen, his wife of some thirty years, to marry Song. Song was spirited back to Shanghai by her family, but snuck back to Japan to wed the newly-divorced Sun against their wishes. Their honeymoon was cut short by Sun’s departure to establish a military government in Guangzhou in 1917 (before he was forced to flee for Shanghai in 1918). However, Song became from this point Sun’s constant companion, and accompanied him to Guangzhou and Shanghai. Following two quiet years of writing and private life in Shanghai, Sun would restructure his political base as the GMD (the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Zhongguo guomindang) in 1919. The party would reunite many of Sun’s old but distanced comrades from the Tongmenghui, like Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, He Xiangning, and Liao Zhongkai.

When the May Fourth Movement broke out, Sun was quiet but somewhat critical. The movement, largely the province of students and intellectuals, exploded in response to the Treaty of Versailles, which recognized Japanese ownership of former German holdings in Shandong. Many decried what they saw as China’s national weakness in the face of foreign imperialism. A common charge leveled by writers like Lu Xun was that China’s history, traditions, and culture were burdens upon the
present, and so Confucianism in particular emerged as a key source of China’s ills. For some, the answer to China’s ills was a program of Western-style modernization—politically, culturally, and economically. Marie-Claire Bergère notes Sun’s distance from this viewpoint. Despite his travels and years of revolutionary organizing, Sun did not weigh in publicly on the movement’s critique of Chinese culture. His private writings of the time were in fact increasingly traditional in tone, not less.16

After two years of relative seclusion, Sun returned to Guangzhou in 1920, moving the party headquarters there. He had little success in expanding the control of his government beyond Guangzhou and was heavily dependent on the forces of the militarist and federalist Chen Jiongming. In 1922, Chen’s forces bombarded Sun and Song’s hillside residence. Sun and Song Qingling fled separately before escaping together on the gunboat Yongfeng, where a young officer Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi/Chiang Chung-cheng, 1887-1975) was present. Presumably aware of his shaky political footing, Sun accepted Soviet aid in reorganizing the Nationalist Party along Leninist party-state lines in 1923. Per the terms of the Soviet offer, he accepted the Chinese Communist Party as members of a United Front and promulgated the Three New Policies of the Nationalist Party: alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, and reliance upon and aid for the workers and the peasantry. On Moscow’s end, this plan was formulated partly by Comintern representative H. Sneevliet, who believed that the fledgling CCP would be able to operate successfully as a “bloc within” the larger GMD and eventually co-opt the party machinery for its own purposes. However, as per the promise of Soviet

16 Bergère, 278-279.
representative Adolph Joffe outlined in the Sun-Joffe Accords, neither the Soviet Union nor United Front would work to establish socialism in China, as China’s situation did not meet the historical requirements for the socialist stage of revolution. Rather, it was the era of the nationalist bourgeois revolution against feudalism, and thus Sun and his forces could be considered historically progressive and appropriate actors.

Though not yet elderly, Sun was severely ill from cancer by 1925. He spent his final years leading the United Front and articulating a codified version of the Three People’s Principles, his ideological legacy: the Principle of Nationalism (minzu zhuyi), the Principle of Democracy (minquan zhuyi), the Principle of the People’s Welfare (minsheng zhuyi). Sun had invoked the Principles of Nationalism and Democracy (or the People’s Sovereignty) for decades. His comrades Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin, skilled orators and writers both, had worked to provide intellectual meat for these slogans in revolutionary papers like the Minbao for years. Sun’s Principle of the People’s Welfare was a later innovation and somewhat contentious. Sun described it as a socialism based upon the writings of Henry George, a famous Single Tax advocate in the United States, combined with the traditional notion of the Great Unity (datong). While Sun was plainly influenced by George and chose to

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17 Henry George was a Philadelphia economist and an inspiration for the Progressive Movement of the fin de siècle United States. One of George’s chief concerns was unearned profit on real estate speculation. Arguing that profit from the hard work of others without adding value to society was intolerable, he proposed a new land-value tax scheme to reduce economic inequality and disincentivize land speculation. Bergère and M. N. Roy trace Sun’s ideas on land reform to Henry George.

18 Datong is one of two stages of perfected society as described in the Daxue (“Greater Learning”). Xiaokang, the first stage, is a stage of moderate prosperity, in which none have severe want. Datong, the second stage, is something of a utopia, in which there is no want
emphasize elements of a mythic Chinese past evoked in historical writings, what
exactly he meant by *minsheng zhuyi* was not entirely clear and would later become a
key issue in his contested legacy. He died without completing his discussion of this
third principle. Afflicted with gallbladder cancer, he passed away on a trip north to
meet with the Beijing government and rival warlord cliques to discuss prospects of
unifying China. His political will charged the people of China with continuing his
revolutionary work, while his personal will left his modest worldly belongings to
Song Qingling. An ultimate “letter of farewell”, drafted by Mikhail Borodin and
addressing the Soviet Union, would later emerge among Communist ideologues to
bolster their ties to Sun and his legacy.19

While Sun was famous in the latter half of life, his image became hallowed
and ubiquitous following his death. His eye-catching funeral train to Nanjing, the
construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in the Purple Mountains outside Nanjing
near the Ming tomb of the Hongwu Emperor, the portrait veneration practiced under
the Nanjing government and continued, to some extent, under the People’s Republic
and ROC-Taiwan regimes suggested and reinforced an almost-saintly significance for
Sun Yat-sen in the tale of the Chinese nation. However, it was only in 1940 that Sun,
who had before been referred to as “Mister Sun”, “Doctor Sun”, or “the Premier”
(*zongli*), was formally declared “father of the nation” (*guofu*) by the provisional
Chongqing-GMD government of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was then in a second

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and all is in harmony with the Great Way. Kang Youwei repurposed the concept of *datong* in
his own thought exercise, *Datong shu* (“Book of the Grand Union”). Xiaokang has, in recent
years, been repurposed by the Chinese Communist Party as an aspirational milestone for
economic development.

19 Bergère, 406.
United Front partnership with the CCP against Japanese invasion and several collaborator governments, including Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized Government at Nanjing. Wang, for his part, also made ample use of Sun to legitimate his own government, and similarly adopted the term *guofu*.

The preceding outline is not meant to be comprehensive; however, it is clear from this sketch that Sun Yat-sen’s complex life lends itself to a variety of interpretations. Some of the malleability of Sun’s character may be conveyed by examining four biographies: one from his early friend in James Cantlie, one from a revolutionary acquaintance and detractor in M. N. Roy, and two others by scholars writing from different perspectives and locations: one by Republican historian Jiang Xingde, a new *zhuan* narrative of Sun’s life written at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War and reprinted in commemoration of his one-hundredth birthday; the other by Marie-Claire Bergère, academic historian and author of the most recent authoritative Western-language biography of Sun, a biography that seeks to separate Sun the hero from Sun the man. I hope that, by briefly contrasting these biographies here, we may observe the evolution of Sun Yat-sen’s “heroic image,” to borrow the language of J. Y. Wong,\(^\text{20}\) and see how it fared in different contexts.

**iii: Four Biographies of Sun Yat-sen**

James Cantlie (1851-1926), a Scottish doctor who helped establish the College of Medicine in Hong Kong, was an intimate acquaintance of Sun Yat-sen. If J. Y. Wong’s *Origins of a Heroic Image* is to be trusted, Cantlie was largely

\(^{20}\) Wong, *Origins of a Heroic Image*. 
responsible for Sun’s elevation from an aspiring but failed rebel to China’s revolutionary hero. To understand the significance of Cantlie in creating Sun’s image, it is necessary to outline the details of Sun’s London affair. In 1894, Sun founded the Xingzhonghui (the Revive China Society), an organization dedicated to toppling the Manchu throne, in Honolulu. Subsequently, in 1895, Sun and his organization launched an uprising in Guangzhou from Hong Kong that failed to depose the local government. Forced to flee abroad and no longer welcome in Hong Kong or Macao, Sun fled to Hawaii and, later, the continental United States. After a long fundraising tour, in the fall of 1896 he made his way to Britain from the port of New York. He arrived in London by way of Liverpool, and found housing near Gray’s Inn in London, thanks to the help of the Cantlies. Between the Inn—one of the Inns of Court that trained barristers and so was surrounded with cheap student housing—and the Cantlies’ home lay the Chinese Legation, an unmarked building on Portland Place near the Oxford Circus.

Sun was purportedly kidnapped one day en route to the Cantlies’ by Chinese agents and imprisoned on the top floor of the Legation. From the top floor, he tried to alert passerby to his plight by throwing notes from the window. These were summarily collected by the British porter-cum-prison-guard Cole, until Sun managed to bribe him into relaying a message to Dr. Cantlie and Dr. Manson, another former teacher. Cantlie recalled his wife receiving a message from the doorstep, written in a woman’s hand. It urged him that a “Sin Yat-sen” was imprisoned in the Legation and

21 To avoid oversimplification, we should note that Wong additionally credits Chen Shaobai, the British press, and the Japanese press as other major contributors.
was soon to be deported to China to be tried and hanged for treason. Cantlie worked
diligently, pressing Scotland Yard to intervene and eliciting the help of the Foreign
Office to prevent Sun’s deportation. Cantlie’s efforts to prevent deportation and
ensure Sun’s release eventually caught the attention of the press, which blew the story
into a media sensation by October 22nd, 1896. Eventually, Sir Halliday Macartney,
Scottish secretary in service of the Chinese Legation and descendent of the famous
Lord Macartney, released Sun on behalf of the Legation. Macartney was subsequently
pilloried in the press as an “Orientalized” Brit who betrayed his race and nation in
service to the Qing. The criticism was particularly intense given that some papers
identified Sun as a Hong Konger (per Sun’s own words at a press conference
following his release) and thus a subject of the Crown unjustly held by the Chinese
Legation.

J. Y. Wong, in his Origins of a Heroic Image, explores Sun’s London
captivity and the roles of outsiders in the incident and the media response. Wong
suggests that Cantlie, an esteemed but largely unknown doctor with some colonial
service at the peak of the British Empire, was not just Sun’s benefactor and guardian
angel, but also, effectively, his first press agent. He helped manage Sun’s
conferences, coached his statements, and even wrote Sun’s famous Kidnapped in
London account. Wong comes to this conclusion as a result of comparing Kidnapped in
London and Cantlie’s later work, Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China. He

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Wong, 67.
24 Wong, 145, 166.
finds strong stylistic resemblance and a mastery of English language and Scottish humor that Sun lacked. While I personally cannot comment on Scottish humor, a comparison might help illustrate the grounds for Wong’s suspicions. In *Kidnapped in London*, “Sun” writes as follows:

The fact of the rescue was the all important measure in the minds of the little group of Englishmen present; not so, however, with my astute countryman; not so especially with Sir Halliday Macartney, that embodiment of retrograde orientalism.25

James Cantlie, in his later book, makes ample use of Sun’s earlier book, explicitly quoting “Sun.” The following passage is openly from Cantlie’s hand:

Though deep-seated discontent simmered in the land, it seemed impossible to develop a master-mind in China fitted for the great task of reform from amongst the rich, the powerful, the families of ancient lineage or the philosophic literati: so Providence selected a man from the humbler classes…26

The books are different in form, but share elements of style that would seem foreign to Sun. Sun offers a logical answer to questions of authorship in his preface to *Kidnapped in London*:

I must beg the indulgence of all readers for my shortcomings in English

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composition, and confess had it not been for the help rendered by a good friend, who transcribed my thoughts, I could never have ventured to appear as the Author of an English book.27

It seems entirely reasonable that Sun would rely upon a native speaker whose transcription presumably included editorial services as well.28 Bergère suggests this version of events, stating that Cantlie helped write the book.29

If we entertain Wong’s conclusions about Cantlie’s likely authorship, we might ask: why would Cantlie do this? What did he gain from turning Sun into a celebrity? Sun was at that moment a failed rebel. His uprising in Guangzhou was a flop, and Sun was derided as inept if not cowardly for having called off the campaign while the Hong Kong contingent was still en route, leaving them to their fates as traitors.30 Unbeknownst to Cantlie, Sun’s former comrade-at-arms Yeung Ku-wan had denounced Sun as a coward. Sun’s only dedicated follower at this point, according to Wong, was his old friend Chen Shaobai, who fled to Kobe and wrote an article on Sun’s London affair that presented an entirely different narrative. However, by recasting Sun as an Anglicized Chinese Christian—well-versed in English and in the liberal arts and sciences, with big hopes for the Chinese and great hatred for the Manchus—Cantlie effectively positioned Sun to gain British sympathy for his cause.

27 Sun, Kidnapped in London, Preface.
28 The rest of Sun Yat Sen (the part that does not concern Sun) is presumably the work of the co-author C. Sheridan Jones. Cantlie states in a foreword that he only gave his input directly relating to Sun. Later chapters on opium, Chinese history, and China’s future are presumably the work of Jones. The first two chapters of Sun Yat Sen are thus presumably the most relevant chapters to sample.
29 Bergère, 64.
30 Wong, 170.
Both *Kidnapped in London* and *Sun Yat Sen* emphasize Sun’s connection to Britain. Since the latter book, published in 1912 after Sun became the provisional president of the ROC, served to reintroduce Sun to the English-speaking world, we will consider it in greater detail.

In *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China*, Sun is presented as a humble, diligent patriot, selfless and charitable in the most Christian sense of the word. With a liberal education and pure intentions, he tirelessly worked to arouse the people of China to overthrow the Manchus, who mismanaged the country and forced the Chinese to live in ignorance and shame. His establishment of the Republic was groundbreaking and appropriate to China’s historical trajectory, as China had essentially functioned as a federal state for centuries. Cantlie curiously omits Sun’s childhood move to Hawaii; placing him in Cuiheng (where he reportedly learned English from an Englishwoman in the vicinity) prior to moving to Canton as a young man. In this account, Sun’s father was an ardent Christian connected to the London Missionary Society:

His father was a convert to Christianity, and was employed as a missionary agent by the London Missionary Society. An English lady connected with the mission interested herself in the young lad, and by her help Sun was well grounded in English. At the age of eighteen Sun became attached to the hospital of the Anglo-American Mission in Canton, then under the direction of a surgeon of considerable repute, Dr. Kerr. He became deeply interested in medicine and surgery, and when twenty years of age he came to Hong Kong
to prosecute his studies in the newly opened College of Medicine.\textsuperscript{31}

This curious account of Sun’s early life is worth exploration (this will be aided by discussion of Marie-Claire Bergère’s authoritative biography on Sun). Cantlie and Jones evidently aimed to present Sun favorably to a British audience.\textsuperscript{32} Telling moments include discussion of why a constitutional monarchy could not work in China, how exactly Cantlie and the British public aided Sun during his London tribulation, and what the Xinhai Revolution signified for China. Also telling, a great deal of miscellanea—from an odd history that combines the Qin and Han to discussion of Chinese physiology—pads the book’s length with content designed to contextualize Sun and the Chinese people he stood to represent. This vaguely Orientalist miscellany includes some material relevant to Sun’s politics, such as his views on women’s rights (in favor, but not for all women).\textsuperscript{33} The authors noted that Sun did not consider illiterate, uneducated people eligible to participate in politics. Nonetheless, Cantlie and Jones also argued that Sun believed the people of China were ready for republicanism. These positions are not mutually exclusive, but the account does chafe with some other later interpretations that present Sun as an icon of democracy and egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, throughout his life Sun consistently believed in what he

\textsuperscript{31} Cantlie, 27.

\textsuperscript{32} The final section of the book (ibid, p. 246) consists of an address from Sun on the likelihood of civil war in 1912. Sun compared the Beijing-Nanjing capital split to a hypothetical debate on moving the capital from Washington, D.C., to Augusta, ME, downplaying the gravity of the actual dispute and the possibility of civil war. The address, directed towards an American audience, illustrates the book was not meant solely for the British market.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 181-182. Cantlie and Jones also note that Sun was against foot-binding, but that foot-binding was not as bizarre as unnamed writers made it seem, bringing in European women’s wearing of excessively small shoes as a comparison.

\textsuperscript{34} Sun’s depiction in American statuary is a topic of limited discussion in Chapter IV, Section II of this thesis.
termed “natural inequality.” He referenced this in his 1924 lectures on *minguan zhuyi*, or the Principle of Democracy, stating that true equality was equality of opportunity and not of outcome or ability.\(^{35}\) We may understand Cantlie’s narrative as an appeal to an elite audience. It is also revealing of both Sun and Cantlie’s assumptions about elite qualifications for citizenship and political participation.

Cantlie’s book clearly presented Sun as a noble, humble revolutionary and patriot who worked hard to liberate his people from the heavy yoke of Manchu tyranny. Sun was not a demagogue as unnamed detractors supposedly alleged, but a gentle speaker preaching:

> A simple sermon, during which his hearers neither applauded nor gave sign of dissent—a spellbound audience listening to a message which had been denied them for centuries. A message of hope to escape from a thralldom [sic] compared with which the monarchical and religious tyranny of the Middle Ages in Western Europe appears as comparative freedom…\(^{36}\)

He reframes Sun’s life to make him more appealing to a British and American audience. In an address directed towards an American audience, Sun sought to assuage fears of civil war brewing in China. That such an address targeted American readers suggests the salience of civil war memory in the United States of 1912, unlike in the Britain of the same year. Unfortunately, the Republic would indeed devolve into civil war among feuding warlord cliques; the end, arguably, would not come

\(^{35}\) Bergère, 374

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 49.
until the end of active PRC-ROC conflict in the 1960s. It is worth noting that Cantlie and Jones paint Sun and China as victims. The Chinese people were victims of the Manchus and Sun himself was kidnapped by the agents of the Legation: the vile Legation assistant Ting Kang (Deng Tingkang), the wicked Halliday Macartney, and the specter of the Chinese minister issuing orders from his sickbed.

Wong helpfully discusses Chen Shaobai’s alternative portrait of Sun’s London kidnapping, which was published in an English-language newspaper in Kobe. Chen stated that Sun, a fearless revolutionary risking all in pursuit of his country’s destiny, voluntarily and knowingly entered the Legation to proselytize revolution. Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao, GMD leaders with close connections to Sun, later reported having heard the same narrative from Sun. Wong explained Chen’s intervention as an effort to reshape Sun’s public image in response to scathing insults published by the faction loyal to Sun’s former partner Yeung Ku-wan. Wong suggests that Sun later adopted this image to illustrate his bravery and selfless dedication to the revolutionary cause. However, Sun never publicly endorsed or repeated this narrative. The fact Sun completely changed his appearance upon leaving China suggests an appropriate level of prudence for a wanted man. Had he been fearless, why would he disguise himself? Of course, the Western suit would presumably serve him better in

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37 One could also argue that the civil war never ended, given the lack of a formal peace arrangement between the PRC and ROC, or that the phase of internecine warlord conflict more or less ended with the success of the Northern Expedition of the GMD and the Central Plains War.
38 Wong, 122.
39 Ibid., 115.
Japan and the West, but the facts of Sun’s life do not support reckless action.40

According to Wong, it is likely that Sun was tricked into entering the Legation by the ministerial assistant Deng Tingkang, but that Deng was not entirely sure he had encountered Sun. The Legation had been informed by the Chinese Minister in New York that Sun had left for London, but they did not know where he was or what he looked like. Deng, as Wong’s narrative goes, was from Xiangshan and knew that Sun was as well; thus, Deng tested the suspect man by greeting him on the street in Xiangshanese dialect. The man’s reported response confirmed his Xiangshan origin. Wong suggests, as Sun wrote in *Kidnapped in London*, that Deng and the Legation believed this confirmed Xiangshanese was possibly Sun, and that it was worth detaining him and then investigating his identity on the off-chance it was Sun. A detective hired by the Legation noted Sun’s frequent travel past the Legation between Gray’s Inn and the Cantlies’ home. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Legation had more significant information on Sun and his whereabouts than “London, currently”. This narrative, of Sun tricked into captivity and indebted to a porter for his rescue, is less inspiring, but it may be more accurate. It also more closely aligns with Sun’s own narrative in *Kidnapped in London* and with Cantlie’s later narrative in *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China*.

In discussing Cantlie and Chen, I have touched upon two biographers (to use the term loosely, as Chen only wrote a newspaper article) who constructed particular images of Sun for specific uses. Chen’s image of Sun was one of a selfless

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40 The Chinese Legation did not necessarily know he was in London, given that travelers to Britain did not need a visa or passport at this time. Ibid., 6-7.
revolutionary who could not be cowed by the oppressive Manchu dynasty that had sat atop China for centuries. Cantlie, for his part, also emphasized Sun’s revolutionary selflessness and revolutionary goals, but he took care to present Sun in a way likely to appeal to British readers so as to endear Sun and his cause to them at a time when many Britons preferred the idea of propping up the Qing Dynasty. This British preference might be seen in Major General Charles Gordon’s leadership of the Ever-Victorious Army, a Qing force of Chinese soldiers, in squashing the Taiping Rebellion. Halliday Macartney, for his part, served in the Ever-Victorious Army as a surgeon and later served the Qing government as a civil servant.

However, Cantlie flipped the script. He recast the Taiping Rebellion as a Christian and patriotic revolution against the corrupt and insatiable Manchu despots, thus implicitly connecting Sun with Hong Xiuquan as Christian patriots who learned from the West in order to save China. This implicit connection is reinforced by Wong’s historiographical analysis of various Sun studies. Reframing the Taipings as heroes also entailed casting the Manchus and their representatives in Britain as villains; therefore, Halliday Macartney was slandered as an Orientalized Briton with no integrity despite his previous work to prevent the execution—in line with the Qing Code—of a servant in the Legation some ten years before. Cantlie’s image of Sun clearly sold well in Britain, but it is unclear how well it endured following Sun’s resigning of office and the Republic’s plunge into chaos, particularly seeing that 1914

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41 Wong 296-8.  
42 Wong helpfully complicates the picture by exploring Macartney’s motivations and history, as well as those of the minister-in-residence Gong Zhaoyuan. Long ill and with a disgraced brother, he needed a win to help him advance up the government hierarchy. Detaining Sun, a known rebel, presented a reasonable solution.
would bring more pressing matters to the forefront of British media.

While the colonial doctor Cantlie tailored an image of Sun well-suited to the British public of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, M. N. Roy (1887-1954), an Indian Communist, portrayed a very different Sun Yat-sen in his 1946 work *Revolution and Counter-revolution in China*. The book was first published in German in 1930; the long-delayed English version added chapters to treat new developments. Roy was one of the Comintern’s men on the ground in China in the late 1920s. He had previous experience in Indian independence activities and had helped to found the Indian and Mexican Communist Parties. Though he had only arrived in China in 1927 and was forced to leave shortly thereafter by Wang Jingwei’s expulsion of Communists from the Wuhan government that same year, he later undertook a Marxist analysis of the state of revolutionary progress in China.

While Cantlie wrote *Kidnapped in London* and *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China* to present a sympathetic image of Sun for a British audience, Roy wrote his report for two audiences. The first was for a general German audience in 1930, the second a general Anglophone audience in 1946. His book, as he described it, was chiefly written to analyze China’s history “scientifically” according to Marxist theory so as to explain the failures of the Xinhai Revolution and the success of the GMD counterrevolution. His analysis elucidated the special nature of

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44 For further details on the breakdown of the Wuhan government, see Wang Fanxi’s *Memoirs of Wang Fan-hsi: A Chinese Revolutionary* or Anna Louise Strong’s *I Change Worlds*. 

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Chinese feudalism and the lack of a proletarian basis for a socialist movement in China after 1927. Roy noted in the introduction that the release of the English version had been delayed for more than a decade due to difficulties resulting from his six-year imprisonment in India for his pro-independence organizing. He also referred to a heightened sensitivity on the part of British censors in India to criticism of the United Front and its constituent parts as a result of the Second World War. Consequently, it was only in 1946 that the English version was published. As mentioned above, Roy ended with an epilogue updating the book to the present day. He argued that the Chinese Communist Party was no longer truly Communist—and had not been since the loss of the urban movement in 1927. Rather, the Communist Party of 1946 was really a Radical Democratic Party. For Roy, this was historically appropriate according to Marxist historical materialism and was thus a progressive development.

Roy painted an unflattering picture of Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution, both key elements in later Chinese Communist narratives. Roy had met Sun

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45 M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1946), 24. The crux is that, because China lacked draft animals and large concentrations of land (and that land ownership was controlled by the Emperor, forestalling a sufficiently independent nobility), an insufficient population was displaced from the land into slavery. Agriculture remained labor intensive and did not become more extensive, particularly following the population transfer into South China away from the more slavery-conducive northern plain. The retardation of development into a slave society in turn retarded the development of feudal society, creating a “particular” feudal state given the land ownership pattern mentioned above. Despite moments of progress in the Qin, Song, and Ming, ultimately the destructive forces of counter-revolution—designed to “harmonize” society by controlling the chiefs and kings—and foreign domination (the Qing) disrupt the evolution of Chinese society along the universal dialectic of history. For Roy, this partially explains why the Comintern failed in in China, as they and the CCP simply sought to “copy Russia” without realizing that China was fundamentally different.

46 Ibid., 569.
previously in Japan in 1913. At that time, Sun had declined to help Roy in organizing anti-British activities in India. Roy thus had negative personal experiences with Sun. However, Roy did not write a personal attack, but rather based his analysis of Sun on Marxist historical analysis as well as various records, such as imperial edicts, newspaper articles, and ideological tracts, in an effort to understand the players involved in the Chinese democratic revolution and counterrevolution.

Of course, Roy’s expansive account was not solely concerned with Sun. Rather, he aimed to present a scientific history of China, from the earliest days through the present, according with Marxist understandings of history. Although Sun is only a part of this, he is significant in Roy’s narrative. In discussing Sun and the Xinhai Revolution, Roy described Sun as a foolish petit-bourgeois adventurer without the courage or foresight to hold onto power in 1912, and with a dangerously reactionary outlook on Chinese history in line with Confucian desires to find harmony between disparate and “natural” social classes. Sun was also representative of China’s underdevelopment, as the grand bourgeois were small and largely in league with the feudal elites, leaving incompetent and incapable petit bourgeois like Sun to organize a revolution. According to Roy there was nothing revolutionary about Sun Yat-sen, an insight integral to understanding the failure of the Xinhai Revolution.

First, Roy highlighted Sun’s distance from the Xinhai Revolution. Roy explicitly stated that Sun had nothing to do with the fall of the Manchu court, arguing that the Xinhai Revolution did not even destroy the authority of the imperial system. The first edict of abdication presented republican government as a gift from the Emperor and explicitly called upon former Beiyang General Yuan Shikai, a
conservative figure with vested interest in the existing system, to form the government. The second edict, likewise, ensured that the emperor preserved his position as the “high-priest of society”. Arguing that this was not merely a symbolic position, Roy wrote that “the function of the Emperor as the High priest of society was the cornerstone of the feudal-patriarchal social relations, on the basis of which the Chinese monarchist State had been constructed.” The Emperor’s continuation of this role meant that the social relations of the feudal empire had not changed. Since the social relations were not democratized, the Xinhai Revolution was neither a real revolution nor historically progressive.

Why was the Xinhai Revolution such a failure? Roy stated that it did not advance social relations from feudalism to capitalism. He argued that this was the fault of China’s cowardly bourgeoisie, more frightened by the empowered masses than by the constraints of the feudal system. Roy granted that the abdication presaged the overdue collapse of feudal government and that, to the feudal elites, Yuan Shikai was a more acceptable choice to head a new republican government than Sun Yat-sen, who appeared as the compromise candidate of the bourgeoisie and the “less reactionary feudal elite.” However, Sun and the bourgeoisie “capitulated” to Yuan and his supporters in order to secure the conditional abdication of the emperor. Sun thus lost the Republic:

Nothing more than a mere hint was needed for making the bourgeoisie cower.

Replying to the telegram announcing the abdication of the ruling dynasty, Sun

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47 Ibid., 226
48 Ibid., 233.
Yat-sen, on behalf of the revolutionary Convention and its constituents, expressed pleasure at the development in the North, and congratulated Yuan Shih-kai upon his conversion to the Republican faith. But the Provisional President of the new-born Republic dared question then right of the abdicating monarchy to name the head of the Republican Government. However, in the same telegram, Sun Yat-sen declared his willingness to resign in favour of Yuan Shih-kai...That act of his was greatly praised as a noble example of idealistic patriotism. In reality, it represented sheer cowardice on the part of the bourgeoisie, which surrendered without a struggle. The resignation of Sun Yat-sen meant the fall of the Republic.49

Moreover, the bourgeoisie worked to disavow and suppress the mobilizing masses, their only source of power and legitimacy. In doing so, “they turned their face against mass revolt, and thus supported the sinners [i.e. domestic feudalists, foreign imperialists] against the interests of the country.”50 Not only did Sun not lead the Xinhai Revolution, Roy argues, but due to the cowardice of Sun and the bourgeoisie, “the Republic was a stillborn child,” and the nation soon devolved into anarchy. Feudalism was dead, but capitalism was not yet established, and there was much chaos.

While Roy did address the historical specificities of the Xinhai Revolution, his primary focus in this chapter was an analysis of Sun Yat-sen. His analysis may generously be described as a methodical character assassination. Though we see

49 Ibid., 231.
50 Ibid., 238.
elements of this narrative in his discussion of the Xinhai Revolution—Sun was a bourgeois coward who had nothing to do with his supposed crowning achievement—Roy’s attack became more personal as he discussed Sun’s ideology, the Three People’s Principles, and the basis of his less-than-revolutionary nationalism. In Roy’s analysis, Sunism necessarily negated the existence of the masses’ suffering and was a reactionary doctrine that looked to China’s mythical past as inspiration.\(^51\) This had to do with Sun’s class origins. As small landowners in Cuiheng, his family had vested interests in the system of feudal-patriarchal relations. Moreover, Sun Yat-sen also was influenced by bourgeois thought, a likely result of his time in capitalist zones like Hawaii, Britain, Hong Kong, and the United States. His impressions of capitalist modernity, as shaped by the West, were favorable:

> In Hawai [sic], he found the foreign rule to be beneficial for the natives. He was very much impressed by the law and order established there by American Imperialism. The father of Chinese nationalism was on the point of becoming an admirer of foreign Imperialism. But he was saved because his faith in the superiority of the Confucian culture remained unshaken.\(^52\)

Roy noted disapprovingly that Sun’s brother, Sun Mei—described by Bergère and Jiang as the good and filial son with a keen business sense who enabled his younger brother’s globetrotting misadventures—was a capitalist who had profited from human trafficking between Xiangshan and Hawaii.\(^53\) We should note here that the only basis

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\(^{51}\) Ibid., 251.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 253.
\(^{53}\) Bergère, 75.
for understanding Sun as a nationalist that Roy could see was his chauvinistic faith in Confucian culture, the same culture Roy characterizes as “a threadbare corpse.” He thus attached Sun to the reactionary relations of feudal patriarchy that subject the masses to “brutal pre-capitalist exploitation.”

According to Roy, Sun distrusted the masses and had “no appreciation for social issues” despite his family’s being essentially landless in the decayed feudal system. His revolutionary rhetoric was limited to jeremiads against the Manchu monarchy, lacking any positive considerations or inspiring practical solutions to the many pressing problems of the Chinese peasantry. Roy continued to disparage Sun by discussing his “quixotic” attempts—Roy bemoaned Sun’s ideological inconsistencies over time—at positive theoretical construction in the Three People’s Principles. The Three People’s Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People’s Welfare fundamentally sought to balance Confucian cultural and social considerations with the political demands of capitalist democracy. They succeeded more as Confucianism than as a plea for capitalism.54 Moreover, Sun’s inaugural address deployed the language of a monarch (“plan and beget the blessings for the people”). For Roy, this betrayed a feudal conception of political power, as did the very notion of political tutelage.55 Sun’s somewhat Kantian idea of natural inequality based upon moral capacity, intelligence, and agency also revealed his disdain for the masses, or the buzhi bujue zhe (“those who neither know nor think”) to use his terms. At best, his undemocratic meritocracy was a “benevolent despotism” that kept the people away

54 Roy, 255.
55 Ibid., 257.
from the levers of power.

Key to Roy’s criticism of Sun’s ideology was that Sun was not adequately bourgeois and thus failed to create appropriate revolutionary ideology for this stage of history. Roy blasted the Chinese bourgeoisie for their cowardice and ineptitude. Sun was not even properly bourgeois in Roy’s telling. Despite his brother’s business and Sun’s extensive time overseas in capitalist metropoles and their colonies, Sun failed in many ways to represent a positive political break from feudalism. His reverence for Chinese tradition was already suspicious, as Confucian gentlemen were critical of profit and uninterested in practical issues (one must think only to Fan Chi or Mencius’ discussions with King Hui of Liang) and were—by even their historical standards—reactionary in their reverence for the long-gone rule of Yao, Shun, and the Duke of Zhou. Beyond this, Sun argued that excessive individualism was a problem in China, a most un-bourgeois sentiment. Roy considered it a matter of faith that individualism represented the freeing of the individual to pursue unfettered self-interest, a motivating factor in the economic vivacity and revolutionary nature of bourgeois capitalism (in that it changes the relations of production, unbinding serfs from their land and lords, and lords from their kings; now every man is free to pursue profit, squeezed from wherever it may be found, to the heart’s delight). However, their desires will never be satiated, regardless of how much capital they accumulate and reinvest for yet greater returns. According to a Leninist analysis to which Roy subscribed, the reinvestment of capital eventually builds the decadent and idle rentier class, whose primacy is based upon buying off national opportunists at the expense of
laborers in the colonies.\textsuperscript{56} These colonial subjects eventually bring about the downfall of the capitalist system through anti-colonial national revolutions.

In contrast to Roy and Lenin’s Marxist conceptualizations, Sun argued that individuals in a still-feudal China were too self-actualized, like “loose grains of sand” unable to bear the weight of any great structure.\textsuperscript{57} Building the Chinese nation required a communalism based on the realization of a vibrant national spirit.\textsuperscript{58} According to Roy, such an ideology could not bring about the necessary development of capitalism in that it would not establish bourgeois relations of production. Sun’s idea for land distribution, often portrayed by Chinese communists as Sun’s sloppy attempt to introduce socialist policy to China, was also framed by Roy as reactionary. Following Henry George, Sun’s original conception of land reform did not actually redistribute land. Rather, “uneearned profit” stemming from land speculation was redistributed. Roy argued that this was inappropriate in China, where soaring land value was not a common problem. Moreover, he suggested that Sun’s idea functionally served to preserve the feudal-patriarchal system of land ownership.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite his harsh criticisms, Roy gave Sun some credit. The Principle of Nationalism correctly recognized the evils of imperialism and so in this sense had revolutionary character, in appropriately identifying an enemy of the Chinese people.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] Sun Yat-sen, “The Principle of Nationalism I” (\textit{Minzuzhuyi di yi jiang}), 3, \url{http://sunology.culture.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi/ccd=DW8oq5/grapheviewer1?dbid=CF777777779&initpage=141}.
\item[58] J. Y. Wong speculates Sun’s fixation on the national spirit came from his observing Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in June of 1897 and the public celebration it engendered.
\item[59] Roy, 291-292.
\end{footnotes}
Roy also applauded Sun’s recognition of the Chinese Communist Party’s potential as a force for societal transformation and as an ally of the GMD, as well as his “belated” abandonment of “reactionary principles” in his reformulation of the GMD along Leninist lines. Nonetheless, Roy believed that Sun’s first two principles were necessarily principles of “class domination”, and that the Three People’s Principles as group constituted “deceptive reformism” aimed at forestalling the coming revolution by an alliance of petit-bourgeois and feudal elites. Roy even went so far as to accuse Sun of being pro-imperialist, as Roy equated Pan-Asianism with Japanese imperialism and noted Sun’s approval of Pan-Asianist discourse. On the whole, Roy painted a highly unflattering picture of the revolutionary forebear.

In conclusion, Roy framed Sun Yat-sen as a reactionary figure. His sins were many: Sun was a coward, an opportunist, a shallow petit-bourgeois thinker, a paternalist, an elitist, a Confucian essentialist, a confused would-be revolutionary mired in contradictions (nationalism mandated action against foreign powers, and yet Sun advocated cooperation). Therefore, Roy denied him a place in China’s revolutionary pantheon, as he neither mobilized the masses to overcome their suffering nor did he oppose the true foe of China, foreign imperialism. Sun did not lead any revolution, as is shown by his lack of participation in the revolution, in his first instance, and by his inability to maintain in position as president of the Republic. His main contribution to China’s revolutionary progress was only that he saw the potential importance of the CCP as a political entity. Roy bolstered his case that this did not mean that Sun was a Communist or even remotely inclined in such a direction.

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60 Ibid., 295.
by reference to the Sun-Joffe Accords and the details of Sun’s life. In a forceful argument, Roy aired a long list of faults, undermining Sun’s posthumous reputation as a revolutionary forebear.

Moving beyond these formative, if contrasting, accounts of Sun’s contemporaries, it is instructive to turn now to those of the professional historians Jiang Xingde and Marie-Claire Bergère. Sun had already been crowned “Father of the Nation” (guofu) by the GMD and a “revolutionary pioneer” (geming de xianqu) by the CCP by the time of these historians’ works. Here again we confront widely differing portraits.

Jiang Xingde, a Chinese historian who would follow the GMD regime to Taiwan after 1949, offered a new biography in the Chinese zhuan narrative tradition dedicated to Sun’s life. Chinese biographies in the zhuan tradition tend to be expressly moralistic and aestheticized, and Jiang’s is no exception. Before this work, first published in 1945, Jiang’s most famous work chronicled the life of Zeng Guofan, a Qing-dynasty general who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion. Jiang’s biography of Sun was reprinted in 1965 to mark Sun’s fast-approaching centennial.61 As the centennial of Sun’s birth, 1966 was an ideologically significant year for the Nationalists in Taiwan. Indeed, they used the occasion to launch the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in response to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on the mainland. This ideological landscape of mid-60s Taiwan must inform our reading of Jiang’s reissued work. Nonetheless, we should not overlook that the book had

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61 Jiang. See footnote four.
originally been written for a different context, that of the wartime ROC. Jiang’s book served to bolster the image of Sun according to traditional cultural mores as espoused in the GMD’s New Life Movement, a moment of radical traditionalism, according to Arif Dirlik, that arose as a counterrevolutionary challenge to the Jiangxi Soviet. Invoking New Life virtues of cleanliness, simplicity, and duty, Jiang reshaped Sun to fit in the mold of a traditionally-moral revolutionary at a time when the Communist challenge was gaining the upper hand. The 1965 reprinting further underscores the importance for the GMD of providing a compelling ideological alternative to Communism, and the necessity of a heroic Sun Yat-sen to exemplify this ideology.

Jiang’s narrative begins with the assumption that Sun was destined to be a great revolutionary leader. He begins the first chapter, “The Early Life of the Father of the Nation,” describing a new dawn for China: “A great revolutionary leader’s rise is certainly not accidental. The Father of the Nation was born on the forty-sixth year before the Republic, only about eighty years ago…” From here, Jiang suggested that the natural environment of Xiangshan played into his revolutionary destiny. The unstable weather of the southern maritimes, subject to squalls and typhoons, damp cold and blistering heat, pensive clouds and brilliant skies instilled a deep understanding of natural change and impermanence in the young Sun, Jiang writes. His early life as one of six children, two of whom died young, in a humble, simple, and clean poor family instilled good values into a young Sun. We might note that

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63 Jiang, 1. The original text is: “一個偉大的革命領袖，他的產生不是偶然的。國父生於民國紀年前四十六年，離開現在恰恰是八十年了。”
64 Jiang, 4.
these values resembled those of the former New Life Movement, the ideological
movement that was to take the backwards citizens of China and raise their spiritual
and physical character through disciple to that of civilized people. Jiang periodically
emphasized the traditional character of Sun’s upbringing. He emphasized that this
was not a nuclear family, and that Sun Dacheng took on his late brothers’ widows as
his daughters in addition to his own four surviving children. This detail serves to
amplify the moral benevolence of the Chinese past through him, thus illustrating how
Jiang used Sun Yat-sen and his family as a model of good and virtuous living in his
zhuan. As Marie-Claire Bergère states, this type of depiction is a hallmark of Chinese
biographical norms held over from imperial historians, who were charged with
making moral heroes and villains of historical figures. By projecting New Life
values, salient values for the GMD party-faithful at a time of ideological struggle,
back into Old China through the Sun family, these values are given a stronger
“traditional” foundation and a success story to promote them. Indeed, in both 1945
and 1965 (the dates of the first and second printing), the precarious place of the GMD
in relation to the CCP seems to explain the revival and reinforcement of New Life
values.

The detailed picture Jiang painted of Sun’s early life is unique among the four
biographical narratives discussed here. Although Jiang himself noted that he aimed to
avoid zhuan tropes of childhood heroism and myth-making, an American reader
cannot help but think of George Washington and the cherry tree when reading about

65 New Life Society, Xinshenghuo Yundong Xuzhi (“The Necessary Knowledge of the New
66 Bergère, 2.
the precocious Sun Deming’s courageous and inquisitive acts and his willingness to upset the social order in his pursuit of truth. We are treated to tales of Sun questioning his traditional school-master and the rote memorization of texts, absent discussion of their meaning. Sun wondered why the sky was blue, and, we are told, why China was ruled by Manchus and not Chinese. Jiang’s framing of Chinese rulership of China as akin to the sky being blue, equates the two as equally natural, retroactively undermining claims of rightful Manchu rule. By his questions, Sun is shown as refusing to accept things as they were. His inquiring mind needed to know why.

Likewise, his refusal to accept irrational answers figures in these anecdotes; his curiosity and rationality thus frame his later life as a rational journey to revolution. Jiang further treated to the reader to apocryphal stories, like that of a pirate raid and its aftermath, to emphasize the rationality of Sun’s revolution:

The pirates set sail, leaving only a man—deeply pained in body and mind—to emerge from the smoldering ruins of the house. He shouted wildly, “I’m finished! The pirates took everything! The money I earned through sweat and blood living among the Westerners, that which I had for so many years risked my life— they took it all! I regret not staying there among the Westerners; there they have the protections of law, but here in China we only have prohibitions!

After Father of the Nation heard this, he thought, “Why is it that China lacks laws like those the foreign countries have? Why could this villager, who had worked so hard to earn that money, not find any protection here in China?” He
then began to think of going abroad to see the many kinds of laws that foreigners used to preserve peace and order.\textsuperscript{67}

As seen in this passage, Sun was framed as an ever-rational, ever-curious, and ever-empathetic hero-to-be. The seeds of the man Sun became—the Father of the Nation—were planted in a childhood stuffed with lessons and acts of early heroism.

Sun’s time in Hawaii was notable in that he learned English, business administration, and Christianity there. However, there is some confusion, as Jiang stated he somehow learned English while in Cuiheng from an American named Kerr, but that he also knew no English upon his arrival in Honolulu. Indeed, where, when, and how Sun learned English seems to be a point of contention (recall Cantlie’s assertion that he learned English from an Englishwoman in Xiangshan as a child). If we consider the broader notion of English lessons as indicative of the lesson of recognizing English superiority, as J. L. Hevia suggests,\textsuperscript{68} then discussion of Sun’s English lessons can be read as “Western influences” as learned through colonial didacticism. Thus, this facet of his life is quite important in this and later narratives.

In any case, Jiang described Sun as impressed by the modern city of Honolulu and the large ship that took him there, as well as deeply incensed by the irrational

\textsuperscript{67} Jiang, 12. The original text is: “水盜開船走了，接著從那破壞的屋子裏，走出一個身體和心靈都受了重大創痛的人，瘋狂而顛癱地喊道：‘我完結了！水盜把我所有的都搶去了，許多來我冒着生命的危險，在養人的地方辛苦積聚的金錢，都被強盜搶去了。我懊悔沒有留在洋人的地方—那邊有法律的保護，而在中國只有禁令而沒有保護的！’國父聽後，心理想：‘為什麼中國沒有外國那樣的法律？為什麼這個村人，冒着危險辛苦辛苦掙到了錢，在中國竟得不到保護？’從此他便想到外國去，看看外國人維持治安的種種方法。”

backwardness of China and the Qing regime upon his return five years later. Looking to guide his fellow villagers out of their superstition and complacency, he broke the idol of the Polar King (*beiji huangwang*) before a crowd of his appalled peers.

Subsequently forced to leave town, Sun went to study in Hong Kong, where he also underwent baptism. He later decided to study medicine to cover his revolutionary tracks, as he decided to embark upon revolution following the Sino-French War of 1884. Thus, he enrolled in the affiliated school of Guangzhou Boji Hospital before transferring to the superior Alice School in Hong Kong. Founded largely as a result of the charitable efforts of businessman Ho Kai, it was there that he would meet James Cantlie. Both Ho and Cantlie would be key contacts and supporters later on.

Throughout the book, Jiang’s vision of Sun was consistent: Sun was always destined for revolutionary greatness, an intelligent, truth-loving, courageous, and righteous Great Man. The Xinhai Revolution, though not directly involving him, could not have happened without him, and so Jiang thus credited Sun for its success. Indeed, Sun was now not only the Father of the Nation but also the “gentle mother of the Republic” (*minguo zhi cimu*):

The Republic of China was made by the hard work of the Father of the Nation’s own two hands; indeed, the Father of the Nation was the gentle mother of the Republic, and the care and education of the Republic could not leave the hands of the Father of the Nation, especially in those early times.

But, given the times he was in, the Father of the Nation had no choice but to cease his care for the Republic and cede the responsibility to outside, giving it
to a neglectful person. This could not but have a negative impact on the infant—the Republic of China.  

Unfortunately for the infant Republic, the monstrous Yuan Shikai emerged from “his Beijing nest” among the warlords and imperial toadies of the north to rip the baby from the warm bosom of its Cantonese mother-father and its Nanjing crib. Jiang made no mention of Chen Cuifen or Ōtsuki Kaoru. His divorce of Lu Muzhen is touched on only through fulsome praise to Song Qingling as a modern revolutionary woman and lament of Lu’s old-fashioned sensibilities. This brief overview illustrates what Chinese biographies of Sun in the zhuān tradition look like, particularly in a GMD discursive space, and how they create and reinforce heroic images. Destined to be a hero, Sun’s entire life demonstrated a hero’s journey to greatness, reflected moral values and political ideals then promulgated by the GMD.

Writing in an entirely different context, Marie-Claire Bergère had less expressly political goals in writing her biography, Sun Yat-sen. Published in 1994, Bergère’s work continues to be the most recent, comprehensive, and scholarly biography of Sun Yat-sen for an academic audience. Written originally in Bergère’s native French, an English translation by Janet Lloyd was published in 1996. Because Bergère’s account is so widely regarded, it served as the basis for much of this

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69 Jiang, 95. The original text is: “中華民國是國父一首辛苦造成的，國父是民國的慈母，民國的養育是不能離開國父的，尤其當它還在襁褓的時期。但國父為了當時的環境，不得不把撫育民國的責任讓出來，交給一個無心的人，於是這出生的嬰孩—中華民國，不得不奮鬥到不幸的命運了。” Note the reverential space Jiang uses before 國父.
70 Ibid., 96.
chapter’s earlier biographic sketch of Sun. The discussion that follows highlights several critical and overarching characteristics of Bergère’s portrait. Bergère articulates a few key points about Sun and is explicit in her aim to find the real Sun in between the hagiographic images of Sun as seen in Chinese biography, academic and otherwise, and the considerably less-flattering image that has been painted in Western academia.\textsuperscript{71} Sun, Bergère reiterates, was a complicated individual who altered his message for different audiences. She goes so far as to call him a media superstar who consciously reconfigured his persona for his various audiences:

\begin{quote}
The real Sun Yat-sen, not the frozen image presented by his eulogists but the man revealed by his adventures and words, his successes and failures, is a figure of the contemporary world: a communicator, a kind of media genius, born for jetliners, the Fax, and television, despite having had to content himself with steamers, the telegraph, and the press. He did not stamp his mark upon the history of his time...but Sun himself was fashioned by the historical context in which he lived and which he has come to embody: that of China moving towards modernity.\textsuperscript{72}\end{quote}

One wonders what Bergère’s Sun would have done with cell phones and the Internet, let alone television and fax machines. In any case, it is clear that Bergère intended to respond to perceived biases, either affirmative or negative, in the existing literature on Sun Yat-sen. Her narrative aims to illustrate Sun as he was in the world, not as the retrospective lens of love or hatred makes him appear. Therefore, her account of Sun

\textsuperscript{71} Bergère, 5.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
attempted to make sense of his life without the distortion of posthumous legend. To make sense of Sun’s life, she distinguishes between three key periods, identified as those of “Sun the adventurer,” “Sun the Founding Father,” and “Sun the revolutionary nationalist.” Throughout, whether he proclaimed himself a theorist, a marshal, a rebel, a Christian lamb, or a doctor of medicine, Bergère argues he was always first and foremost an agile, mobile, and perceptive communicator from coastal China. His coastal origin is part of a significant dichotomy for Bergère: dynamic coastal China and stagnant inland China, blue China of the trader and yellow China of the mandarin. This narrative locates Sun and his revolution as a product of this outward-looking, Western-friendly region at arm’s length from the loess plains of yellow China and its accompanying strict imperial supervision.

Bergère’s account of Sun emphasizes that he was a peripheral figure, an outsider looking forward, and that this was indeed one reason for his success. Because Sun was a son of humble means in the far south of China, because he went to work and study in Hawaii, Hong Kong, and Macao, because he was not a member of the literati elite, Sun was well-acquainted with the zeitgeist of the late Qing; with Chinese problems on the ground; and aware of the relative strength and prosperity of modern nations like Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Japan and the West play an integral role in Bergère’s narrative. The treaty ports, particularly in south China, served as a contact zone between China and the modern powers; Bergère traces the origins of a competitive, cooperative modern Chinese nationalist ideology to the treaty ports, which stand in opposition to the xenophobic “anti-Christian and anti-foreigner“ movements of inland China. She writes,
The coastal Chinese were the first to understand that the Western challenge had to be taken up in the same terms as those in which it was presented: with economic development, and with social and political progress. The precocious and vigorous nationalism of the coastal Chinese went hand in hand with their relative cultural alienation and their economic subordination.73

This discussion of coastal nationalism suggests how Bergère sees Sun and his societal context. Sun, raised in Xiangshan, educated in Honolulu, exiled to Hong Kong and later forced to leave Macao for Guangzhou, was immersed in and connected to the culture of maritime China. Indeed, Bergère’s understanding of two Chinas, the maritimes and the inland, the blue and the yellow, calls the controversial documentary *Heshang* (River Elegy) to mind.74 This is a distinctly different understanding of China than that offered by Cantlie or Roy; Cantlie painted a monolithic picture of China and the Chinese in opposition to the Manchus, while Roy invoked Marxist class terminology to differentiate among Chinese actors, terminology that placed China within a global and unequal system of capitalism and imperialism.

Bergère does consider Sun’s attempts to reach the center of Chinese society, but these attempts fit neatly into her overall narrative of the Sun the outsider. For instance, she notes that, in 1894, Sun attempted to send a missive to Li Hongzhang, a key Qing official, to discuss China’s problems and their solutions, but that this

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73 Ibid., 20.
74 The documentary series River Elegy (*Heshang*) aired on CCTV in 1988. It presupposed the existence of dynamic, open blue China and stagnant, insular yellow China, presenting the tension between the two as an engine in Chinese history, narrated as a history of national decline. The colors yellow and blue refer to the silty waters of the Yellow River—heart and sorrow of ancient China—and the open waters of the ocean. It was quite controversial.
attempt to reach Li and meet with him failed. Despite at least one serious attempt to

gain the support of Qing officials (Cantlie cites a missive to the Guangxu Emperor,

but it was presumably the same 1894 memorandum mentioned previously) Sun was

never taken seriously.\(^\text{75}\) Not even reformists like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao of

the Baohuanghui (Protect the Emperor Society) took Sun seriously, though they did

meet with him on several occasions. Sun, unlike Kang and Liang, was poorly

educated by Chinese standards and was famous largely for being a radical

troublemaker, while Kang and Liang had held prestigious positions in the government

before sacrificing these posts to preserve their lives and independently pursue

constitutional reform.

    Although Bergère framed Sun as a “media superstar”, she agreed with J. Y.

Wong’s earlier study that Sun’s heroic image was not his entirely of his own making.

Rather, the figure of Sun Yat-sen was largely fashioned by others (not least of all the

imperial police tasked with finding him). The London affair proved critical:

    ...The essential role in Sun Yat-sen’s metamorphosis fell to his British friends

and protectors. In the mirror that they held up to him, the Cantonese

adventurer appeared as a revolutionary thinker, a strategist of vast designs.

Only too pleased to slip into this new personality, Sun Yat-sen worked hard to

develop the necessary characteristics and, to a certain extent, to conform to its

behavior pattern. The reading and discussions in which he engaged in London

broadened his intellectual horizon and sharpened his political awareness. Now

\(^\text{75}\) Ibid., 50.
all he had to do—and it would be the most difficult challenge—was to get his compatriots to accept his new image.  

However, Bergère does not begin her story of Sun’s myth-making with the London affair. She traces the evolution of Sun’s image back to the failed Guangzhou Uprising of 1895. Instead of an uprising, a *qiyi*, the Japanese press had labelled it a revolution, a *geming*. Bergère thus slightly modifies, but generally agrees with Wong that Sun’s image was largely the creation of others, and that Sun the hero was a role that Sun the man would have to work to fill.

Contrary to Cantlie’s account and to later official remembrances of Sun the hero, in Bergère’s narrative, Sun often appears as a peripheral figure even in organizations he nominally led. When he and Yeung Ku-wen broke ties, he was on the short end of the Revive China Society’s split, with Chen Shaobai and Zheng Shiliang as his only followers. His time atop to the Tongmenghui was marred by factional disputes with Huang Xing and most of the younger members of the organization. Bergère goes so far as to say that Sun was largely despised by members of the Tongmenghui, but that due to a confluence of a factors, he was simply the only feasible leader for the organization. Had Liang Qichao not fully supported Qing reform, had Miyazaki Torazō’s flattering account of Sun, *The Thirty-three Years’ Dream*, not been recently translated into Chinese, and had Sun not been an experienced, well-traveled revolutionary with a sizeable transnational network, Sun would have presumably not been chosen.  

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76 Wong, 59.  
77 Bergère, 128
uprisings, Sun was forced to relocate the Southeast Asia Tongmenghui office to Penang to escape his detractors in Singapore (not to mention those at the main branch in Tokyo). During Sun’s brief, unimpressive period in formal office as the President of the Republic he failed to demonstrate any significant leadership. He had little to show beyond a cabinet bogged down in quarrels and a unilateral issue of some $300,000 worth of war bonds. After the conditional abdication of the Xuantong Emperor Puyi in February of 1912, Sun resigned in favor of Yuan Shikai, who moved the capital from Nanjing back to Beijing.\(^78\) Cantlie could not anticipate the future, but it seems notable that he never again wrote another book by or about Sun, despite surviving him by a year. The revolutionary Roy, meanwhile, explained Sun’s tenure in office as a sham presidency by a cowardly and small-minded petit-bourgeois rebel with little talent for administration. Bergère, a professional historian writing for a contemporary academic audience, more carefully contextualizes what was happening around Sun, with the benefit of time and access to source materials and a perspective of academic research rather than engaged partisanship. Nonetheless, her Sun Yat-sen is not heroic or grand; rather, he seems to have been a master of branding with a particular hatred and determination to topple the Manchu monarchy.

Despite her significant skepticism of Sun’s heroism, Bergère recognizes that Sun is revered in both the PRC and the ROC. She thus frames him as a key figure of historical contestation, not only for his role in competing Communist and Nationalist narratives, but also as a means of grasping historiographical difference, specifically between an ongoing moralistic Chinese hagiographical tradition and more critical

\(^{78}\) Ibid., 234.
historical writing that recognizes the contradiction and complexities of human character and historical moment. These competing visions of Sun the man, Sun the hero, history, and political legitimacy offer useful reference points for the analysis of Sun’s image in different spaces.

iv: The Structure of the Thesis

This study presents and analyzes four distinctive representations of Sun Yat-sen that emerged from four distinctive political contexts. In undertaking this project, I hope not only to explore the conflicted legacy of Sun Yat-sen, but also to raise broader questions of political need, legitimation, and narrative. The core question is: why do so many different people and organizations, steeped in such different contexts and with different modes of legitimation, rely upon the same figure? How do their uses of Sun differ? The particularities of each reconstruction of Sun help illustrate the different priorities and methods of legitimation that characterize different contexts. The basic argument is consistent throughout the contexts, as I believe Sun is so ubiquitously recognized and commemorated, albeit in different ways and for different things, because Sun is well-suited to serving as an icon of modern Chinese nationhood and nationalism, both state and non-state, due to his prominence as a revolutionary and the many hats he would don. Of course, state constructions of Sun are somewhat different than non-state constructions; in the former, Sun primarily serves as a touchstone for political legitimacy; in the latter, Sun is a touchstone of a modern Chinese identity. The identity he represents and the politics he serves to legitimate are distinct in different times and places, and even for different people of the same time and place. In exploring the specifics of this argument, I take up four
temporal, spatial, and political contexts: Republican China from 1925 through the fall
of the mainland Republican government in 1949; Communist China from 1949
through today; Taiwan from the 1940s on through the 2000s; overseas communities
in the United States and Malaysia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Though I
am casting a wide-net, I believe that this allows for a more varied and comprehensive
understanding of how Sun’s image is used beyond the obvious ROC/PRC dichotomy
and so helps decenter our understanding of Sun Yat-sen’s legacy. Changing
circumstances in today’s Taiwan and in overseas Chinese communities will hopefully
add valuable perspectives on how this Father of the Chinese Nation is used in light of
competing nationalisms, state and non-state.

The first chapter shows how the figure of Sun Yat-sen was used by different
GMD figures—notably Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei—in the Republic of
China. Chiang’s *China’s Destiny*,79 assorted writings and statements from Wang80
like “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism to Revive China
and East Asia,” and Chen Lifu’s *Stormclouds Part over China*81 constitute the
primary texts for analysis, with supplemental secondary readings on the history and
politics of this period informing the analysis. I hope to show how GMD leaders relied
upon and used Sun to legitimate their own positions in the party hierarchy, thus

80 Wang Jingwei, “Shixing Sanminzhuyi ji Dayazhouzhuyi, fuxing Zhongguo yu Dongya”
(Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism to Revive China and East
81 Ch’en Li-fu [Chen Lifu], *The Storm Clouds Clear over China: the Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu 1900-1993*, ed. Sidney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers, (Stanford UP, 1994).
illustrating the political value and different uses of Sun in a Republican context. Sun emerges as the ideological and symbolic lynchpin of the fractious GMD. He was useful in bolstering political legitimacy in the party and so was invoked in a wide array of contradictory projects, as perhaps best illustrated by the Wuhan/Nanjing split of 1927 and the Chongqing-Nanjing split of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Given constraints particular to the GMD’s ideology and history, Sun’s usage always required invoking certain political tracts and tropes, such as the Three People’s Principles, his plans for national construction, and his political will.

The focus shifts temporally, not spatially, in the second chapter. Here the focus is Chinese Communist narratives of Sun, specifically tracked through commemorations of Sun’s birthday as reported in the People’s Daily in the years 1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, concluding with a 2016 address from sitting Paramount Leader Xi Jinping. The chapter describes how CCP and PRC figures like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, He Xiangning, Song Qingling, Peng Zhen, and Xi Jinping used Sun as a key part of a national history of revolution based on Marxist dialectic but not so rigorously tied to it. The focus shifts from Sun the democratic, anti-colonial revolutionary during the Mao years to Sun the nationalist, modernizing revolutionary following Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up. While the invocation of Sun’s image is a call to action always, invoking his name also allows CCP figures to look back on the achievements of the PRC regime and so proves quite useful for showing how the CCP has met his call. Recalling Sun and his mission also provides a platform to push for the unification of Taiwan with China, thus this tone varies from rabidly martial in 1966, pacific in 1986, to somewhat ominous in 2016. This chapter also
provides an overview of how different Communists, with differing relations to the Chinese and international Communist projects, interpreted and portrayed Sun and why, further exploring the malleability and utility of Sun’s image.

The third chapter shifts spatially to Taiwan to examine how Sun has been used in the increasingly nativist bentu environment of the post-dictatorship ROC-Taiwan. Key here is a book Chiang Wei-shui produced by the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei that connects Sun to the Taiwanese nationalist Chiang Wei-shui, as well as a commemorative address from Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of Sun’s centennial birthday. With these sources, I hope to illustrate how Sun’s legacy and image have fared in a changing society, well-illustrated by the relegation of Sun to “foreign history” by the Chen administration’s education minister in the early 2000s and a subsequent protest-suicide by a veteran in 2003. Sun, still at the core of GMD ideology after the loss of the mainland, must also be adapted to fit an increasingly local political context. This stands in tension with the standard Blue narrative of Chinese Taiwan, counterpoised with the Green Taiwan, “the heart of Asia.” We see that Sun’s image as guofu has declined along with the prestige and station of the GMD and its associated figures, like Chiang Kai-shek. In response, some have turned to Sun’s early revolutionary days and his influence on local nationalists like Chiang Wei-shui to bolster Sun’s place in an increasingly nativist Taiwanese historical landscape, a response that distorts both Sun and Chiang. Feelings run hot in these matters, as the 2004 suicide of Li Qiyu in Kaohsiung illustrates, and so this should

not be dismissed as historical navel-gazing.

The last chapter is loose and takes the analysis into overseas Chinese diaspora communities to loosely sketch issues raised in non-state Chinese contexts. Here I discuss how Sun is remembered spatially in Penang and Honolulu, given Sun’s close ties with these two cities. The chapter also tentatively formulates more general trends as regarding the particulars of these communities and their images of Sun Yat-sen. I believe that Sun, as a hero of the Chinese national revolution closely associated with modernization and with democratic ideals—due to the standard English translation of minquan zhuyi as the Principle of Democracy—proves a useful figure for Overseas Chinese communities. Recognition of Sun allows for Overseas Chinese to present an agreeable and acceptably democratic homegrown modern hero to their broader communities and so enable the Chinese communities to project a positive image. This chapter relies chiefly upon Sun Yat Sen in Penang\(^{83}\) by Khoo Salma Nasution and Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii\(^{84}\) by Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum. Both the Penang and Hawaii books are published by historical associations concerned with Sun’s time and connections in the local community, and so present non-state narratives regarding Sun’s life and posthumous significance. The Hawaii narrative emphasizes Hawaii’s place in Sun’s life and, accordingly, the place of Hawaii and Hawaiian Chinese in Chinese history; the Penang narrative uses Sun more to discuss the history of the Chinese in Penang. Nonetheless, the Penang narrative also serves to elevate the role of the Penang Chinese in cosmopolitan Penang, Malay Malaysia, and

\(^{83}\) Khoo, Sun Yat Sen in Penang, see footnote thirteen.

\(^{84}\) Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum, Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii: Activities and Supporters, (Honolulu: Hawaii Chinese History Center, 1999).
the world at large through their connection to Sun at a pivotal moment in his career. In considering Sun’s overseas afterlives, we may also find it useful to consider Sun statuary in the United States, as well as heroic statuary at large. Whether a statue of Christopher Columbus overlooking the Connecticut River, Sun Yat-sen brooding in Columbus Park in lower Manhattan, or the Pioneer Mother and Father looking for one another on the grounds of the University of Oregon, such statues make statements about the past and about the present of those who erect them.85

This project’s methodological strength lies in bringing together different narratives to simultaneously explore different images of the same figure. Although Sun Yat-sen is a figure that has drawn much attention, scholarly and otherwise, for well over a century, the study here, with its wide comparative net, enables a careful and nuanced reading of the man and of historical myth-making by juxtaposing and denaturalizing familiar Sun images in different places. In an increasingly global and interconnected academic community, such a study contributes to the understanding of political icons and the pitfalls that necessarily entail studying contested figures like Sun. The narrative relies on straightforward comparative analysis of a curated “gallery” of Sun’s heroic images. In the process, I have sought out narratives produced by political elites and remembrances from museums and memorial institutions. Secondary literature serves to contextualize these narratives, as the

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85 I first wrote this in the winter of 2020; since that time, the Columbus statue has been “taken down for maintenance” and the pioneer statues have been toppled, only furthering my point on the symbolic significance of statuary. Plainly, people feel strongly about statues, and so considering Sun statuary helps us to more comprehensively appraise his afterlives as well as the political nature of public remembrance.
historical context of each is integral to the resulting Sun Yat-sen.

Sun Yat-sen is a contested figure, invoked in widely different contexts. I believe this is because Sun generally represents a modern Chinese hero with a unique and ubiquitous positivity. This is largely due to the formation of a political cult postmortem but is also a result of Sun’s words and deeds in life. Although the invocation of Sun is ubiquitous among those that hold both Chinese nationalism and modernity in high esteem, this is not to say that there is one Sun. The following chapters serve to explore several of Sun’s heroic images. We first turn to Republican China to explore Republican politics, war, and a tug of war over Sun Yat-sen’s posthumous endorsement.
I

FOR CHINA, FOR ASIA!: DUELING GMD NARRATIVES OF SUN YAT-SEN

“It is the state which makes the nation, and not the nation the state.”

— Józef Piłsudski

i: Introduction

During the heated years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, two rivals jockeying for power atop the Guomindang power structure, invoked the figure of Sun Yat-sen to shore up their claims to legitimate rulership. We might describe this battle as one over xuëtong, or the correct—but metaphorical—ideological “bloodline”. As Zhu Xi claimed to inherit the mantle of the ancient sage by way of Mencius, so Sun’s former revolutionary comrades and disciples Chiang and Wang claimed his mantle.

Nonetheless, these modern “bloodline” claims, were in various respects distinctive. Chiang positioned himself as a successor to Sun’s line equal, if not superior, to Sun, while Wang played the part of the faithful disciple reclaiming the teachings of the late master. This may be seen in the differences between Chiang’s ideological magnum opus China’s Destiny, a book that editor and translator of the English edition Philip Jaffe compared to Mein Kampf for what he perceived as its sinister aggrandizement of Chiang, and assorted writings and statements of Wang Jingwei. Though Wang too proposed a guidebook for reviving China, China’s Problems and Their Solutions, it was less fully developed ideologically than China’s Destiny, focusing more on pragmatic questions of national construction and its obstacles. Thus, it will not be a primary focus. Rather, I will build a general picture from two of Wang’s addresses and China’s Problems so that we may see the political
differences between the two men and thereby contextualize how they framed Sun Yat-sen for their own purposes.

Both men used Sun to strengthen their claims to national leadership. Chiang created a radically traditional yet revolutionary nationalist superman Sun Yat-sen. Wang, in turn, depicted a noble transnational figure driven by ideals and principles in the face of great challenges. Chiang’s image of Sun worked to support his claim to ideological equality with Sun, which in turn entitled him to the same levels of authority as his imagined Sun Yat-sen, while Wang’s image of Sun emphasized “far-sightedness,” bravery, and patriotic self-sacrifice. This emphasis served to cast Wang as Sun’s devoted follower in what he framed as the right and difficult choice of working with the Japanese against the Second United Front of the Communist and Chongqing-Nationalist governments against the Japanese invasion.

ii: Historical Overview, 1925-1949

Sun Yat-sen died on March 12th, 1925. This was the beginning of the end for the First United Front, the allied bloc of GMD of CCP born of the Sun-Joffe Accords, and the beginning of Sun’s political afterlives. While Sun, the man, lived a complicated public life, it was only after his passing that other individuals, like Chiang or Wang, could and needed to repurpose his life for their own ends. A brief history of the Republic following Sun’s death is necessary to contextualize narratives of Sun in the Republican era.

When Sun died in 1925, he had already left behind his Guangzhou base in order to negotiate with the northern warlords Feng Yuxiang, Duan Qirui, and Wu Peifu about possible terms for China’s reunification. Sun and the GMD had
reestablished their Guangzhou powerbase following the betrayal of the federalist warlord Chen Jiongming in 1922. In this effort, Sun relied upon the help of Soviet advisors, who brokered a cooperative arrangement with the fledgling Chinese Communist Party. The resulting GMD-CCP United Front was effectively one of several warlord governments operating in South China. The founding of the Whampoa Military Academy, the GMD military school, in 1924 enabled the rise of the Guangzhou government to regional power, as it now had a larger proportion of loyal troops comprising its forces—the remainder being mercenary forces or those under the employ of friendly warlords. The Guangzhou government proved to be a center of labor radicalism under Soviet influence, giving safe haven to strikers from Hong Kong during the 1922 Seamen’s Strike and leading the Canton-Hong Kong Strike of 1925-6 in response to the May 30th Incident, in which striking workers in Shanghai were killed in the International Settlement by British police. Soviet and Communist influence was indeed strong in the Guangzhou government. Mikhail Borodin and Zhou Enlai represented Comintern and Chinese Communist influence, respectively, at the upper echelons. Many Whampoa cadets, like Lin Biao, would later be prominent figures in the CCP. Numerous Guomindang figures like Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei expressed support for the Communist Party and for elements of its revolutionary goals at this time. In keeping with the Soviet-sponsored United Front, Chiang even sent his son by his first wife, Chiang Ching-kuo, to study at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow.

However, the United Front could not endure. Despite the close cooperation of

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the GMD and the CCP under Soviet influence, tensions increasingly permeated the bloc. A pronounced source of tension was the Guangzhou Communist contingent’s support for Chen Jiongming in his fight with Sun, support that CCP General Secretary Chen Duxiu would later lament as a “serious mistake” on the part of the local party members. Moreover, the aims of the various parties in the alliance were not always aligned. While Sun and the Soviet diplomat A. A. Joffe agreed that the economic conditions in China called for national bourgeois revolution, not socialist revolution, many land-owning members of the GMD were discomfited by the CCP’s extensive agitation of labor, industrial and agricultural, in the cities and the countryside.

Indeed, even some Communist members of the Wuhan government, such as Chen Duxiu or Soviet advisor Mikhail Borodin, were alarmed by “excesses” among the peasantry. Similarly, many Communist distrusted the Nationalists and subsequently ridiculed their symbols. For instance, Communists like Wang Fanxi found the beliefs and practices of the Guomindang, including the veneration of Sun Yat-sen and his Three People’s Principles, “too laughable for words.” Wang emphasizes, nevertheless, that he and his comrades were shocked by Chiang’s bloody purge in Shanghai, illustrating that many Communists within the alliance had imagined the

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88 “Sun-Joffe Accords” [Sun Zhongshan xiansheng yu Su’e teming quanquan dashi Yuefei lianhe xuanyan], *Annals of Sun Yat-sen Full Text Retrieval System*, 1-1923, [http://sunology.culture.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/s2gsweb.cgi?o=dchronicle&s= id=%22YC0000002164%22.&searchmode=basic
GMD were indeed their revolutionary comrades.91

Despite the growing tensions, the alliance lasted well into the Northern Expedition, the drive north to militarily unify China under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership and to replace the internationally recognized Beiyang government. Three events were key to the end of the United Front: the Zhongshan Incident; Chiang’s April 1927 purge of Communists; Wang’s July 1927 purge of Communists and the dissolution of the Wuhan government. First was the Zhongshan Incident. On March 20, 1926, the gunboat Zhongshan (formally named Yongfeng, the same gunboat that had whisked Sun and Song Qingling to safety and away from Chen Jiongming’s troops in 1922) passed by the Whampoa Academy. Chiang Kai-shek, the Commandant of the Academy, claimed that the gunboat was behaving suspiciously while under the command of a Soviet captain. Although the specifics are disputed, contemporary Chen Lifu (then an official close to Chiang and later an influential leader of the GMD’s CC Clique) and historian Jay Taylor write that Deng Yanda—political director of the army—called upon Chiang’s residence in person92 and Wang Jingwei’s wife Chen Bijun called his wife Chen Jieru over the phone to ascertain his movements and schedule in the days prior.93 Fearing a Communist coup, Chiang

91 Ibid., 33.

There is some disagreement over who called, whom they called, and when. Fenby states that Deng Yanda called in person and that Chen Bijun called Chen Lifu, which is confirmed by Chen. However, Chen makes no mention of Deng Yanda. Ah Xiang, an unverifiable figure, claims that Chen Bijun called Chen Jieru instead.
launched a midnight coup the night of March 20th, 1926. His loyal men surrounded the residence of Wang Jingwei, placing Wang (sick in bed) and several Soviet advisors (who had been visiting his residence) under effective house arrest while rounding up and expelling Communists from the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army.\textsuperscript{94}

Second came Chiang’s April 1927 purge, beginning with Shanghai’s Communists. This may be understood in the context of the unfinished Northern Expedition and in GMD factional politics. Building off an earlier attempt by Sun himself in 1922, the National Revolutionary Army of the United Front pushed north from its Guangzhou stronghold with two armies, one (led by Chiang) aiming first for the Wuhan tri-city and second working up the coast. Following the fall of Wu Peifu’s forces in summer of 1926, the GMD Political Conference declared the cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankou the new Capital District in early 1927.\textsuperscript{95} As for the eastern army, by spring of 1927, the NRA general Bai Chongxi would chase the warlord Sun Chuangfang’s forces into Shanghai, where a worker’s uprising organized by the CCP took the city in the name of the National Government; however, Bai’s forces and Du Yuesheng’s Green Gang butchered the workers and any known Communists in the city in what is now called the Shanghai Massacre (also called the April 12\textsuperscript{th} Incident for the date it occurred).\textsuperscript{96} Following the purge, Chiang declared Nanjing the national capital and formally broke with the CCP, thus setting his

\textsuperscript{94} Fenby, 94.
\textsuperscript{95} Ch’en Lifu, \textit{Storm Clouds}, 50.
\textsuperscript{96} “Chiang Group Speed War against Reds: Shanghai Commander Issues a Scathing Denunciation of Communists, Telling Plots. 100 Killed in Canton Raids Moderates Disarm Labor Unions There After Fighting in Streets -- Protect Foreign Section”, \textit{New York Times}, April 17, 1927, 1.
government in opposition to the Wuhan government, which still included many Communist members and advisors. While Chiang and his rightist allies purged Communists throughout the territory of the Nanjing government, the Wuhan government initially refused to break with the Communists and their Soviet advisors. Comprised of the GMD Left and the CCP, the Wuhan Government would be ground down by a downriver blockade from the newly-founded Nanjing Government. Chiang claimed Nanjing was the true and rightful capital of the Republic.

In a third and final crucial shift, Wang and the Wuhan GMD broke with the Communists and conducted their own violent purge in July, following the failure of an alliance with Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun and the grave attrition of economic and military resources.97 A final factor was a telegram sent from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin—in the midst of a leadership struggle with the internationalist Leon Trotsky—to the sitting Comintern advisor, M. N. Roy. The telegram called for the arming of the workers and peasants under the jurisdiction of Wuhan. Roy showed this telegram to Wang Jingwei, who blanched, worrying that the Wuhan Government was under the thumb of the Soviets and their Chinese Communist juniors. Efforts from Mikhail Borodin to assuage Wang and the GMD Left, many of whom were economic elites who felt threatened by violent mass uprisings, failed. Thus, the Wuhan government recognized Nanjing as the legitimate capital of the Republic. Wang would once again go abroad, having only returned to China that April.98 Chiang would also step away from public life for a time following the purge.

Following the Wuhan purge, the CCP engaged in urban uprisings, notably in

98 Ch’en, *Storm Clouds*, 57.
Nanchang and Guangzhou. All failed to instigate a broader insurrection and were suppressed by the GMD. These failures marked the end of the CCP’s reliance on urban, proletarian movements and a retreat to the countryside, where founding rural Soviets became the order of the day.\(^9\) Crushing these Soviets would be the paramount concern of Chiang Kai-shek, who would rise from the Wuhan-Nanjing Split as the chief leader of the Guomindang and the party-state it sought to create. However, the GMD remained a fractious entity, as did the Republic of China. There were three key factions: political cliques within the Guomindang, militarist cliques ostensibly within the Guomindang, and groups outside the party-state apparatus.\(^1\)

The preeminent clique within the Guomindang following Chiang’s powerplays would be the CC Clique (\textit{CC pai}) of the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, a right-wing faction that would succeed the rightist Western Hills Faction (\textit{xishanpai}) associated loosely with Hu Hanmin and Lin Sen as the chief clique of the GMD Right.\(^0\) There were other cliques on the right, such as the quasi-fascist Blue Shirts. However, centrists like the elite Political Study faction remained a key component of the GMD party-state, as did leftists. Wang Jingwei would reemerge as a leader of Chen Gongbo’s left-leaning and fervently anti-Chiang Reorganization Clique (\textit{gaizuopai}).

Though Chiang would be the preeminent figure within the Guomindang, he was not always the titular leader, and would indeed step down and go overseas after initiating the anti-Communist purges of 1927. He would never be gone for long. His

\(^9\) Communist activities are discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.
opponents Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin periodically posed a threat to Chiang’s rule, but did not succeed in supplanting him or his followers. Wang generally travelled abroad when he met obstacles, purportedly for medical treatment. Hu, on the other hand, would be confined to his home by Chiang in 1931 just before the People’s Congress. Following great outrage among party members, Chiang released Hu. In 1931, Hu would go to Guangzhou and established a rival GMD government there with the military support of the warlord Chen Jitang, a government opposed to Chiang’s personalistic rule, Japanese aggression, and the CCP until its collapse following Hu’s death in 1936.102 Chiang stepped down again at the end of 1931, but soon returned to the helm of the Nanjing Government.

Outside the political arena of Nanjing, individual militarist cliques retained a great deal of power even past the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, which ostensibly unified China. The Guominjun, Shanxi, and New Guangxi cliques marshalled forces against Chiang and the Nanjing regime in 1929 following a failed demilitarization conference. The resultant war would be the largest of the chaotic Warlord Era. Chiang staved off the challenge of the three cliques owing to the aid of the of the Fengtian Clique and the Ma Family Armies of the Northwest. Wang Jingwei, having been tapped by Feng Yuxiang of the Guominjun to head a new government in Beijing (renamed Beiping following the establishment of the Nanjing government), once again went abroad. Chiang and his Nanjing government survived the challenge, but it was costly in lives, in productivity, and in territory. It hardly meant that Nanjing now ruled unopposed; regional generals and governors retained a

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102 Eastman, 16.
high degree of autonomy, and other oppositional regimes would be established, like Sheng Shicai’s Soviet-friendly regime in Xinjiang and Hu Hanmin’s Guangzhou government. Zhang Xueliang’s Fengtian Clique once again proved instrumental to Chiang’s regime, recognizing Nanjing despite initial sympathies for the Guangzhou government. However, Zhang would soon force Chiang to swallow a bitter pill, illustrating the power that factions had in the Nanjing decade despite or, perhaps, because of Chiang’s personalistic dictatorship.

The Fengtian Clique of Zhang Zuolin and, later, Zhang Xueliang controlled Manchuria and its environs till September 18th of 1931, and would prove a decisive clique in the political fate of Chiang Kai-shek. Under Zhang Zuolin, it had long received support from Japan. By the late 1920s, however, Japanese imperialists in the military command, the government, and throughout broader society looked to Manchuria as a lifeline for the imagined crises of the Empire. For his failures in hamstringing the GMD’s Northern Expedition, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by soldiers of the Japanese Kwantung Army in a railroad bombing in 1928 known as the Huanggutun Incident. Following this, his son Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to the Nanjing government, sensing Japanese responsibility in his father’s death. In response, the Kwantung Army manufactured the Mukden Incident and subsequently seized Manchuria, there establishing the puppet-state of Manchukuo. This displaced the Fengtian army into China proper.

Without territory of its own, the Fengtian army worked to suppress

103 Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (University of California Press, 1999).
Communist activity in the northwest as per the orders of Nanjing, a task Zhang and his soldiers purportedly found senseless given the growing and apparent threat of Japanese encroachment. By this time, Chiang’s Encirclement Campaigns had almost succeeded in crushing Communist forces in Jiangxi and Hunan. In October 1934, surviving Communist forces broke the tightening encirclement and fled overland through Yunnan and Sichuan to the desolate reaches of Shaanxi Province in the truly arduous and later mythologized journey known as the Long March. Zhang’s forces were tasked with stamping out the newly-transplanted Communists, but instead worked with them to entrap Chiang Kai-shek at his lodgings outside Xi’an to force a deal. Instead of prioritizing “internal pacification” ahead of “external defense,” Chiang agreed on December 26, 1926—two weeks after his initial capture—to work with the CCP and form a Second United Front against Japanese aggression. This outcome was no foregone conclusion, particularly given that some Nanjing generals favored risking Chiang’s life to achieve internal pacification. Nonetheless, Chiang returned to the regional stronghold of Luoyang and resumed his duties as paramount leader. By this point, the new Communist stronghold surrounding the towns of Yan’an and Baoding drew in revolutionaries from throughout China.

On July 7, 1937, open conflict once again broke out between Chinese and Japanese troops. Suffice it to say that the war did not well for the Chinese. By late 1938, the Japanese had seized most of North and East China and most strategically important ports. The Communist leadership remained in Yan’an, while the Nationalist leadership retreated first to Wuhan, then to Chongqing. Following the National

Army’s burning of Changsha and the loss of Guangzhou, the National Government at Chongqing was dependent largely on reestablishing war industries in the mountainous hinterland of Yunnan and Sichuan. Following British and American entry into the war after the Japanese invasions and attacks of December, 1941, the Chongqing government was resupplied via the Burma Road. However, Chiang’s wartime Chongqing regime was challenged by Wang Jingwei’s puppet Nanjing regime starting in 1940. Wang defected in December of 1938, calling Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s terms of surrender reasonable and preferable to continuing the disastrous war. Wang’s government would claim supremacy over existing collaborator governments in East and North China, but was itself largely restrained by Japanese military administration. Meanwhile, the Communist regime continued operating out of Yan’an and carrying out guerrilla operations in North China. Despite the ostensible peaceful alliance between Chongqing and Yan’an, there were several of intentional attacks on the Communist forces by Chongqing-Nationalist forces such as General Shangguan Yunxiang’s raid on the New Fourth Army in January of 1941.

Following years of fighting, the Japanese war effort—having expanded beyond China to span the Pacific and South Asia—collapsed. Final attempts to retake the initiative, like Operation Ichigo, failed to change the course of the war. Wang Jingwei died in Nagoya in 1944 and the Reorganized Republic of China was then headed by Chen Gongbo, Wang’s earlier partner in the gaizuopai. A major propaganda victory for Chongqing came in 1943 with British and American renunciation of extraterritorial privileges in China. Nonetheless, Chiang’s government
was not to endure long on the mainland following the end of the Second World War, the broader global conflict that came to encompass the Second Sino-Japanese War. Faced with empty coffers, rebellious soldiers, and dwindling American aid, the GMD lost control of greater areas of China in the face of rising Communist forces. Mounting defeats, like the siege of Changchun in 1948 and the Battle of Huaihai in 1949, illustrated the increasing weakness of the GMD military apparatus. In 1949, the national government retreated from Nanjing several times, landing at old provisional capital locations for brief periods before finally abandoning the mainland for Taiwan, only recently reclaimed as Chinese territory.  

Throughout this tumultuous history, Chiang labored to cultivate his connection to Sun’s legacy. He oversaw the construction of Sun’s Nanjing mausoleum, the reinternment of Sun’s remains, and the large-scale building of Sun’s personality cult. The construction of the mausoleum and the reinternment were foundational to this effort. Sun, having died in Beijing in March of 1925, was buried in the Xiangshan district of Beijing not long after. However, to emphasize the place of Nanjing as the new capital and the heart of a new republic as well as to connect Sun to the founding Ming emperor entombed in the Purple Mountains, which would viscerally connect the Republic with the last “native” dynasty, Sun’s body was moved to a newly-built tomb in the mountains in the spring of 1929.  

The move was a momentous occasion for Chiang’s propaganda team. Song Qingling was called back from Moscow, where she had moved after the collapse of the Wuhan government in

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105 Taiwan and the Nationalists’ time there will figure prominently into Chapter III.  
1927, to walk alongside Chiang to underscore Chiang’s now personal connection through marriage to Song and, by extension, her late husband Sun. Song notably refused to walk with Chiang, but her presence was still significant to this effect and indeed helped legitimate Chiang’s connections to Sun.\textsuperscript{107}

Chiang was not merely concerned with Sun, of course. Sun was instrumental to Chiang’s claim to rightful leadership and to his vision for China’s future. However, Chiang did not rely solely on Sun in consolidating his own power and reshaping Chinese society, as the New Life Movement, the enduring White Terror, and the development of his own personality cult illustrate. Mentioned previously, the New Life Movement, a Guomindang attempt at cultural revolution based upon Confucian, Christian, and political-scientific values of public hygiene is worth a second look, as it was a key part of Chiang’s attempt to build a compelling GMD ideology. The citizen of Old China was held in opposition to the citizen of New China. The Old Chinese, perhaps descended from the late Qing trope of “the sick man of Asia”, was filthy, lazy, small-minded, petty, and weak, closer to beast than human in Chiang’s own words. The New Chinese was the foundation of New China. New Life publications and later GMD publications influenced by the movement established a connection between the values of the New Life and the life of Sun Yat-sen. Indeed, if we think back to Jiang Xingde’s zhuan-style biography of Sun Yat-sen, we may recall that Sun’s upbringing was explicitly described in the terms of the New Life Movement: cleanliness, simplicity, and so forth.\textsuperscript{108} In the context of the Encirclement

\textsuperscript{108} Jiang Xingde, \textit{Guofu}, 3.
Campaigns of the early 1930s, the New Life Movement was developed as an ideological answer to Communism, then spreading throughout China and Jiangxi in particular. Though scholars disagree as to how to interpret the New Life Movement, we may simply note that it was tinged with Confucian-Christian moralism, social Darwinism at the national scale, and a desire for modernity as envisioned through modern cities and modern hygiene. On a tour of Jiangxi in 1934, Chiang and his wife Song Meiling launched the New Life Movement there in the provincial capital of Nanchang, which was to be a model city of New China. Nanchang was thus also connected to Sunist plans of modernization as expressed in New Life terms.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{iii: Chiang Kai-shek’s Superhuman Sun Yat-sen}

We have briefly touched upon Chiang Kai-shek’s actions and prominence in the years after Sun’s death. Before examining his political usage of Sun, there are several biographical details to bear in mind. First, Chiang was born in 1887 in the prefecture of Ningbo to a family of modest means. Second, he died in Taipei in 1975, where he and his government fled in 1949. Throughout his life, Chiang was a military man. He had studied abroad at a Japanese military school, the Shikan Gakkō, and returned to China with modern military knowledge. This led to his appointment as Commandant of the Whampoa Academy, which, in turn, led to his prominence in the GMD as the effective leader of the party’s army. After the Northern Expedition and his rise to supremacy in the GMD, Chiang consistently leaned on his military

\textsuperscript{109} The movement also enabled the rise of Chiang’s infamous “blueshirts”, paramilitary unofficial police connected with the unrecognized Blue Shirt Clique and reminiscent of Mussolini’s blackshirts and Hitler’s brownshirts, and so also illustrated the influence of the GMD Right at the time.
background, connections, and values. Even when he held no formal role in the government, like his “retirement” during the short-lived Sun Fo government of 1932, his deep ties to the GMD/ROC military made him a key player and foretold his return to power. His ties to the Green Gang may have also strengthened his grip on power. Long-time associate Chen Lifu adamantly denied that Chiang was a member of the Green Gang; nonetheless, he corroborated Chiang’s reliance upon coercion and personalistic authority in ruling.

Chiang’s marital history suggests his inclination to instrumental alliances. He famously left his first wife Chen Jieru in Cikou while he courted another woman in Shanghai, before ditching her to pursue Song Meiling. Whatever his motivations, marrying a Song daughter was plainly economically and politically advantageous, given that Ailing was wed to the financier H. H. Kung and Qingling was the widow of the late Dr. Sun. Chiang’s political alliances also lend themselves to charges of opportunism. Despite becoming synonymous with anti-Communism following 1927, he was at an earlier time known as the Red General and sent his son Ching-kuo to study in the Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow during the time of the First United Front. For good measure, he later sent his other son Wei-kuo to study military science in Nazi Germany during the 1930s.

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110 Eastman, 14.
111 Ch‘en Lifu, *Storm Clouds*, 65, 109. Chen stated that while the Green Gang and the GMD worked together and were friendly, the GMD leadership had no formal connection to the Gang.
113 It should be noted that Wei-kuo was not Chiang’s biological son, but rather the son of Chiang’s colleague Dai Jitao, and that Chiang had adopted him due to Dai’s fear of career
While Chiang’s political authority derived largely from his military authority, access to Shanghai money, and personal connections, his political career and beliefs were his own creation. After 1927, he believed that Communism was a “disease of the heart’ and so the greatest danger facing the Chinese nation, even greater than foreign imperialism or endemic rural poverty. Moreover, Chiang believed that the poor physical, mental, and spiritual hygiene of the Chinese citizenry was largely responsible for China’s national decline, and so launched the New Life Movement with Song Meiling’s active participation in 1934. This is significant in that it shows Chiang placing the onus of the national revival at the level of the individual citizen, an onus that—to him—warranted extensive mobilization and regulation of life by the government. Related to this point, Chiang also believed in martial solutions to social and economic phenomena, and his authority in Nanjing was personalistic and vast.114

In the midst of his many pursuits, successes, and failures, Chiang invoked the name and figure of Sun Yat-sen, asserting Nationalist pedigree of his plans. Nowhere was this more apparent than his final split from his long-time rival Wang Jingwei during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Both men needed Sun to shore up their own footing. My analysis of how Chiang used the figure of Sun Yat-sen to legitimate himself politically thus focuses on the war years of the late 1930s through the 1940s, looking at how he presented himself in relation to Sun and to GMD challengers like Wang Jingwei. In this context, the key text is *China’s Destiny*, Chiang’s most implications resulting from his affair in Japan, which suggests strong personal loyalty or at least strong interest in protecting certain relations.

114 Eastman, *Nationalist Era*, 21. An American Foreign Service Officer remarked of 1934 Nanjing that “the shadow of Chiang Kai-shek controls this whole scene.”
significant attempt to position himself not only within Sun’s own lineage but also as a political thinker and visionary in his own right. The book is part history, part policy, part sacrament, an effort to narrate China’s rise from backwardness and depravity through a revival of national strength and virtue under Chiang’s leadership. Published first in 1943 and translated into English in 1947, *China’s Destiny* was intended to motivate the Chinese nation and to provide an ideological path forward for the beleaguered Chongqing government during the Second World War and, subsequently, during the resumed Chinese Civil War.

Chiang begins *China’s Destiny* with a brief history of China, a story of national decline in line with Confucian longing for the mythic past. The Zhonghua nation split into five “stocks”, which grew estranged and came to think themselves separate races: Han, Tibetan, Muslim (Hui), Mongol, and Manchu. Through cycles of dynastic vigor and decline, the Chinese nation somersaulted through history before arriving at its most pitiful moment: the humiliations of the late Qing. The nation was so far gone that Chiang described it thus:

During the last hundred years, China’s national position and the morale of the people deteriorated to such an extent that an unprecedented situation developed. Territories required for the survival of the Chinese nation experienced the painful process of partition. The oppression and bondage of the unequal treaties further undermined the vitality of the Chinese state and the nation. A survey of our long history of five thousand years reveals the alternate rise and fall of states and the survival and extinction of nations. Yet the national decay during the last hundred years reached a point unequaled in
our history. The state and the nation became weakened and encountered inner crises in the political, economic, social, ethical, and psychological spheres until the basis of rebirth and recovery was almost destroyed.\textsuperscript{115}

Indeed, Chiang’s vision of the late Qing was not one of simple dynastic decline, but a veritable precipice of national and racial extinction (\textit{wanguo/zhongmie} respectively). The central government from the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} to mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century lost control of key territories: Hong Kong, Tibet, the Ryukyu islands, the newly minted province of Taiwan, the northern marches of Burma, Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Rehe, Chahar and Suiyan, and significant chunks of cities throughout China proper. In this narrative, strategically important territory seems to constitute China and its environs, including former tributary states like the Ryukyu Kingdom, not simply the borders of the Qing Empire.\textsuperscript{116} While the loss of territory was deeply concerning, the establishment of foreign settlements in cities like Tianjin, Shanghai, and elsewhere was perhaps even more pernicious. These settlements brought with them consular extraterritoriality, which undermined the sovereignty of the Chinese national authorities and worked against China in international trade and affairs, bringing forth severe political and economic disadvantages.

In Chiang’s narrative, the onset of this severe decline “was not only due to the inferiority of her guns and steamships to those of the West, but was mainly caused by her political degeneration, the chief source of which was absolute monarchy.”\textsuperscript{117} This characterization of the Qing monarchy affirms the significance of Sun Yat-sen, who

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{115} Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{China’s Destiny}, 42
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 36-40.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 59.
\end{footnotesize}
grasped the source of China’s weakness and sought to overthrow the monarchy and expel the Manchus, establish a republic, and redistribute land, goals that the people came to fervently support. Phillip Jaffe, editor of the 1947 English-language translation of *China’s Destiny*, comments that later editions of *China's Destiny* omitted the latter two goals from Sun’s revolutionary program, thus highlighting the desire of GMD censors to suppress mention of these Sunist goals in light of the long-standing GMD dictatorship and failure to remedy land discontent. Here we may see a notable example of the political editing of Sun’s image to meet present political considerations.

Chiang charged that although Sun understood the cause of decline and led the democratic revolution to save China, few of Sun’s colleagues or followers understood what democracy actually entailed. The public and some party members like Song Jiaoren believed democracy meant simply importing Western models of constitutional democracy with the separation of powers. Sun, however, grasped the necessity of educating the people to be good citizens, promoting industry, and, in this fashion, realizing the Three People’s Principles. This portrait conveys Sun held a top-down understanding of democracy, with an emphasis on hierarchy rather than representative elections. Chiang did not value elections or parliamentary government. Rather, he believed the people needed to be properly educated by the revolutionary organs of the GMD so that they could participate in government. This latter point conforms with Sun’s idea of tutelage, echoing Sun’s belief that the first Republican

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 69.
government failed because China was not yet ready for democracy. This sense of the backwardness of the people and their lack of preparation to meet the challenges of citizenship was not particular to Chiang, but he is perhaps notable for his emphasis on disciplinary indoctrination and state-directed modernization.

Chiang did not simply argue that China’s poverty resulted from Qing weakness and mismanagement. He asserted that the declining morality of the Chinese people at large was fundamentally responsible for the humiliation of the formerly great Chinese nation: “Our numerous historical national humiliations all resulted from the fact that we debased ourselves and scorned our own cultural heritage.” These observations hearkened back to his pet project, the New Life Movement, as the path toward national salvation. Each citizen, all descendants of the Yellow Emperor according to Dai Jitao’s famous “National Flag Anthem” (guoqige), was responsible for honoring the sacrifices of revolutionary forebears like Sun and the Huanghuagang Martyrs of 1911. All were tasked with realizing the Three People’s Principles to achieve national revival. This meant that mild dissent or any lack of active compliance meant that the citizen was undermining the very health of the nation. In this framework, public expectoration was not simply physically unhygienic, but also a corruption of China’s very moral fiber and an attack on the national polity. Such behavior was “lower than that of beasts,” to use Chiang’s language. This understanding of the nation as a single constitutive body is reminiscent of Gotō

120 Wang Ching-wei [Jingwei], China’s Problems and Their Solution. (Shanghai: China United Press. 1934), 86.
Shimpei’s *kokutai* model of national well-being, with each citizen a cell.\footnote{Yukiko Hayase, *The Career of Goto Shinpei: Japan’s Statesman of Research, 1857-1929* (Florida State University, 1974), 19-20.} Gotô developed this model while studying medicine in Germany in the 1880s, which perhaps explains its resemblance to later National Socialist understandings of the nation as a body and associated anti-smoking campaigns. Though I find no direct links, I speculate that Chiang’s understanding of national health was informed by his time in Japan at a point when Goto’s ideas were mainstream.

According to Chiang’s understanding of China’s problems and solutions, Sun Yat-sen correctly identified the burdensome character of the Manchu monarchy on China and the need to violently excise it from the national body. He thus led a popular revolution against the Manchu monarchy—according to the earlier editions of *China’s Destiny*—in order to establish a republic and redistribute land to the tiller. He was a great man of unusual insight and ability, able to correctly infer the true nature of democracy, the true nature of China’s ills, and their rightful solutions. Chiang labeled Sun as a man of great authority who demanded unquestioning obedience in the name of ancient virtue:

> Previously, the members of the Revolutionary Party and the people as a whole did not clearly understand the theories of the Father of our Country, nor did they have complete confidence in them; therefore, the Father of our Country took upon himself the entire burden of reorganizing the Revolutionary Party. Reviewing the situation at that time, he said: “The fact that, although our revolution achieved several military successes and yet was not completed, was
because the Party itself lacked a solid foundation. All Party members did not observe Party rules, but acted independently. They did not even display the ancient virtue of unquestioning obedience to their leaders, much less grasping the new ideal of winning of freedom. At that time, I had no alternative but to take up the burden single-handed and reorganize the China Revolutionary Party.”  

Sun’s reorganization of the Revolutionary Party into the Guomindang in 1919, referred to above, took place in 1919. However, Chiang’s deployment of this quotation of Sun appears in regard to Chiang’s reference of the reorganization of the Guomindang in 1924, about which no details are given. Chiang’s positioning of this quotation thus leads the reader to assume that the GMD was also single-handedly reorganized by the great and correct Father of the Nation. Jaffe, editor of the translation, notes that no mention whatsoever is made of the substantial involvement of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party in reorganizing the GMD. Here we may see an illustration of how Chiang attempted to purify Sun’s mixed political associations so as to bolster Sun’s alignment with Chiang’s anti-Communist stance.

Throughout Chiang’s narration, nonetheless, Sun is not just a leader, but a figure of such authority that he single-handedly reshapes parties and China’s national destiny.

Chiang’s insistence on Sun’s singular greatness and worthiness for absolute authority is curious in light of other depictions of Sun, particularly given his antipathy towards the monarchy and his explicit embrace of democracy as a goal. An early

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123 Chiang, 110.
passage in Chiang’s book clarifies Chiang’s line of thought:

If the Father of our Country [SYS] had not promoted the Three People’s Principles and led our National Revolution, China would have suffered the same fate as Korea [then a Japanese colony]… Fortunately, Sun Yat-sen, with his prophetic foresight, applied his great courage and wisdom to the task of establishing China’s freedom and equality, and of arousing the whole nation. He fought for forty years, directing the common aspirations of all the Chinese people into the right channels. On his deathbed, he designated the abolition of the unequal treaties as the first objective of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution, and left to us, the comrades who survived him, and to the citizens of the entire country, the accomplishment of this great task. We have continued the fight till this day, and have finally succeeded in the first step. Thus the opportunity for the recovery of the nation and the hope for the rebirth of the state are now presented to the citizens of the entire country. I, Chiang Kai-shek, have been identified from the beginning with restarting the Republic of China on the road to independence and freedom… (42-43)

The purpose of Chiang’s narrative, needless to say, is not simply to present the words of his teacher, the Father of the Nation. Rather, when he talks about Sun’s goals, problems, and character, he is also talking about himself. If only Sun’s authority had been recognized and followed, if only Chiang’s authority was recognized and followed, then China’s rightful destiny as a great, prosperous, and free nation would be realized. In remembering Sun, Chiang was really commemorating himself and bolstering his standing as a paramount leader.
China’s Destiny memorialized Sun as charging the Chinese people with eradicating the unequal treaties as the chief concern of the national revolution in his final statement, his will. While this was plainly one of Sun’s aspirations, as the abolition of the unequal treaties was one the main and immediate tasks entrusted to the Chinese people in his will, Chiang curiously ignored the other specific immediate task, namely, convening a “People’s Congress”. The precise wording of this line in Sun’s final testament is, “The present tasks are to convene a People’s Congress and do away with the unequal treaties. These ought to be accomplished as soon as possible, and are the charges of this will.”\textsuperscript{125} Chiang ignored this other task in celebrating his government’s success in achieving the goals of Sun’s will. The relinquishing of treaty privileges by Britain and the United States on January 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1943 was a major propaganda boost for Chiang’s regime and the Alliance. This boosted his claim that the Nationalist Government in Chongqing was not only fulfilling the will of Sun, but also reestablishing the national strength of China (which had been sapped by the treaties, he argued) and working tirelessly to establish a more just and righteous world order.\textsuperscript{126}

Nonetheless, Chiang’s evasion of the second task is not insignificant. At this moment, remembering Sun’s other charge would not be productive or effective. In contrast to the accomplishment of eliminating extraterritoriality, the first People’s Congress, convened from May 5\textsuperscript{th}-17\textsuperscript{th} of 1931, was a political disaster that resulted

\textsuperscript{125} Sun Yat-sen, Will I, written by Wang Jingwei and authorized by T.V. Soong, March 11, 1925, accessed at \url{http://sunology.culture.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi/ccd=6cUe1/grapheviewer1?dbid=CF777777786#}. The original text is: “最近主張開國民會議及廢除不平等條約，尤須於最短期間。促其實現，是所補簽。”

\textsuperscript{126} Chiang, 148-151.
in the previously mentioned Nanjing-Guangzhou Split, as Chiang had arrested Hu
Hanmin to prevent his participation and disorganize his supporters. Chen Lifu notes
that the congress, held for the purpose of drafting and ratifying a provisional
constitution for the period of political tutelage, “only looked good on the surface” and
that Chiang, in arresting Hu, had “made too many enemies” and nearly provoked a
civil war.127 While Chiang stepped down from leadership for a time and the Mukden
Incident of September 18, 1931 presented more immediate concerns, the People’s
Congress of 1931 was surely not what Sun had in mind. Therefore, Chiang found it
more useful and timely to remember the abolition of the treaties, a new event with
bearing on the regime’s latest policies and efforts, than to remember the more distant
embarrassment of the People’s Congress and the political turmoil it involved.

To conclude, in *China’s Destiny*, Chiang labored to paint a coherent picture of
Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary traditionalist. His Sun prized obedience and loyalty,
anti-foreignism and nationalism (though not “narrow nationalism” or xenophobia),
unity and strength. In short, his Sun evoked elements of Chiang’s quasi-fascistic
leanings in ways that might betray his own self-image, but this formulation risks an
oversimplification of Chiang’s at-times contradictory political beliefs. Authors like
Jay Taylor, Lloyd Eastman, Arif Dirlik, Fukamachi Hideo, Li Guannan, and Liu
Wennan disagree on the precise character of Chiang’s beliefs, in any event.

Chiang defined Sun’s revolution as being “aimed at realizing the Three
People’s Principles”. He claimed that few understood what this what actually meant

to Sun. Chiang’s Sun also focused on the realization of true democracy, and so argued that Song Jiaoren and the parliamentarian GMD missed the point; they imitated the outer form of Western democracy without engaging in the cultural revolution and revival necessary for the deeper realization of *minquan zhuyi*. Chiang’s Sun focused on realizing the Principle of the People’s Livelihood, but this—as the editor points out—did not necessarily include “land to the tiller” and had absolutely nothing to do with Communism. Indeed, Chiang’s account erased the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union from Sun’s life, despite his close dealings with the CCP and Soviet advisors like Borodin and Galen in the last years of his life. One of the key emphases of Chiang’s narrative was to highlight the ability of Chiang’s government to realize a key task in Sun’s will, thus reinforcing his claim to Sunist legitimacy.

iv: Wang Jingwei’s Transcendent Nationalist Sun Yat-sen

Wang Jingwei, like Chiang, had a substantial following within the galaxy of established Guomindang power. In fact, his revolutionary career was longer than Chiang’s and indeed went back to the days of the Tongmenghui. His revolutionary credentials were so impeccable that he was initially selected to lead the Guomindang Executive Committee following Sun’s death in March 1925, though his leadership would be partial and short-lived. Key to Wang’s revolutionary prestige was his skill with the written and spoken word, his close personal connection with Sun Yat-sen, and the cachet of his assassination plot against the Prince Regent Zaifeng in 1910. Though he and his co-conspirators failed to assassinate the Prince Regent, who ruled in the name of the boy emperor Puyi, Wang achieved national fame as a revolutionary martyr as a result of his writings from jail and his media savvy. He was spared a death
sentence, which was the standard sentence for treason, and was released only a year into his prison sentence due to the collapse of the Qing in late 1911.

Though he was close to Sun, having served as his personal secretary in Japan in 1905, Wang did not support him during the days of the Revolutionary Party (1914-1919). During this time, he largely stayed out of national politics and traveled, going to France to remove himself from the situation and, officially, to learn about national consciousness:

Since the nation has been unified, those who think deeply have realized that although the tyrants have been done away with, most people’s thinking hasn’t progressed. For the future of our countrymen, we must change their thought…For years I have been on the run, detained, unable to fulfill my aspirations. Somewhere in the course of my studies, I long ago resolved to go to Europe, partly for my own education, but also to tirelessly study the people’s psyche and how to correct it. 128

However, he returned to China after Sun re-founded the GMD in 1919, and accompanied Sun to Beijing on his trip to negotiate with Feng Yuxiang and the northern warlords in 1925. Following Sun’s turn for the worse, Wang drafted Sun’s personal and public wills; the public will, previously quoted, would become a mainstay of Guomindang propaganda, with its charge to finish the national revolution

and realize the Republic of China.

Despite his prominence and nominal position atop the Executive Committee, Wang ultimately played second fiddle to Chiang Kai-shek after the Northern Expedition. This disappointment, Chen Lifu and others argued, was the root cause of his collaboration in 1940.\textsuperscript{129} Wang’s GMD Left coalition had been undermined during the Canton Coup of 1926 and was ultimately destroyed in the summer of 1927. Although Chiang forced the issue by his April purge of the Communists, Wang himself dealt the killing blow to the First United Front and his Wuhan government that July by executing his own purge on July 15.\textsuperscript{130} After this, he went abroad to Europe for a time before returning during the Central Plains War of 1930 to discuss heading a rival Beijing government with the support of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan.\textsuperscript{131} After these maneuvers fell through, he would exit politics again, collaborating briefly with Hu Hanmin in Guangzhou before returning in 1932 after the failure of the Sun Fo government.\textsuperscript{132} At this point, Wang became the President of the Legislative Yuan and the central figure in the Reorganization Clique. Until his late 1938 defection from Chongqing, he would work with Chiang within the GMD, being granted a deputy leadership position second only to Chiang as head of the National State Council. Though Chiang and Wang collaborated during this time, the period is clouded by a mysterious assassination attempt. According to Chen Lifu, on November 1, 1935, Wang was shot while posing for a photograph to inaugurate the

\textsuperscript{129} Chen Lifu, \textit{Storm Clouds}, 141-3.  
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 71.  
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 79.  
\textsuperscript{132} Eastman, 14.
sixth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee at the Fourth National Congress. Chiang Kai-shek was conveniently not present, and so some observers, like Wang’s wife, Chen Bijun, implied Chiang was involved in the incident.\(^{133}\)

In any case, Wang defected from Chongqing and would, on December 29, 1938, issue a telegram from Hanoi addressed to Chiang and the Chongqing Central Party Commission.\(^{134}\) In this telegram, Wang praised the peace terms offered by Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in a public statement on December 22, 1938 and advocated for ending the war on these terms:

> The point of the War of Resistance is to preserve the independent existence of the nation. Since the war began, our wounds have been grave and the pain deep. If the war can be ended in a just peace, then the nation’s independent existence can be protected. If this can be done, then the goal of the war is already met.”\(^{135}\)

Wang’s defection from Chongqing leads us to the chapter of Wang’s life that is key to our account of contending GMD usages of Sun. At this point, Wang became leader of the Peace Movement and of the Reorganized Government in Nanjing.

There are several key threads to Wang’s political career and thought that we should consider when appraising his wartime politics. One, Wang believed in the

\(^{133}\) Chen Li-fu, Storm Clouds, 115.

\(^{134}\) This telegram, in Chinese, is called the yandian. I prefer calling it the Hanoi Telegram, which has a more obvious meaning to the English reader.

\(^{135}\) Wang Jingwei, “Yandian” [Hanoi Telegram], Wang Jingwei Zhengzhi Lunshu [The Political Writings of Wang Jingwei], (Taipei: China Times Publishing, 2019), 244. The original text is: “中國抗戰之目的，再求國家之生存獨立，抗戰年餘，創鉅痛深，倘猶能以合於正義之和平而結束戰事，則國家之生存獨立可保，即抗戰之目的已達.”
primacy of national construction (*jianguo*). All other things, including territorial integrity, military supremacy, political democracy, and so forth were secondary to national construction, which was itself shorthand for the institutional and economic modernization of China.\textsuperscript{136} Wang compared revolution to building a highway. The present was the time for laying the foundation of gravel, not for the asphalt. Also fond of medical metaphors, Wang claimed that “China was sick” and that the primary step was to raise the baseline health of the national body through national construction; once the patient was stronger, more strenuous operations could be commenced.\textsuperscript{137} Wang’s plan for national construction was identified as Sun’s plan as outlined in his *Plan for National Construction*. Wang argued that construction required peace and that only this construction would resolve the socioeconomic issues tearing at the fabric of the Republic. For this reason, Wang indirectly decried Chiang’s focus on prioritizing the eradication of the Communists, arguing that:

> Armed force is a destructive element, as wasteful as it is expensive. Huge numbers of men are engaged in destruction who should be employed on construction, and the wickedness of it all does not end there, for after the fury of the fight has passed there remains want, misery, and suffering among the wretched people whose homes and fields have been trampled down by the warring factions.\textsuperscript{138}

This leads us to our second point: Wang was a gradualist in all things. He argued that “Economic conditions in China are such that the objects expounded by the late Dr.

\textsuperscript{136} Wang Ching-wei, *China’s Problems*, 8. 
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 13-14
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
Sun Yat-Sen cannot be attained by radical but by moderate and peaceful measures.” Three, Wang was more of a party man and a constitutionalist than Chiang, and so he often was invoked as the rightful constitutional leader of Guomindang by his supporters. Four, Wang agreed with Chiang on some points. Both were against importing foreign political systems, both favored a period of tutelage, and both opposed immediate action against Japanese imperialism. Wang applied the same logic for opposing the costs of fighting the Communists to fighting the Japanese; in regard to the latter, he highlighted the added factors of Japanese military supremacy and international indifference. Nonetheless, while he argued against aggressive action, he did call for “spirited resistance” and no compromises with the Japanese; Manchuria would be retaken, in time.

Even so, in late 1938, Wang praised Konoe Fumimaro’s peace terms. By March of 1940, Wang would be the President of the Reorganized Government in Nanjing. Given his prior writings, this is perhaps surprising, but it was consistent with principles such as the primacy of national construction and the necessity of peace to these ends. In any case, defecting and collaborating with the Japanese was not a popular decision. In a propaganda tract titled Guanyu Wang Jingwei panguo (“Regarding Wang Jingwei’s Betrayal of the Nation”), Chiang, He Xiangning, Zhou Enlai, Bai Chongxi, and others all denounce Wang as a traitor, a coward, and a

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139 Ibid., 37.
141 Wang, *China’s Problems*, 113.
shadow of his former self while arguing for the inevitability of Chinese victory. \(^{142}\) Wang, a skilled orator and ideologue facing intense pressure, thus crafted a new image for Sun Yat-sen in an effort to legitimate his decision to collaborate with the Japanese. To create this new image of Sun Yat-sen—a transnational, Asian, and yet still very Chinese Sun Yat-sen—Wang turned to several key figures and moments in Sun’s life. First, he turned to Sun’s Asian connections, especially his Japanese connections. Second, he invoked Sun’s 1924 speech in Kobe to illustrate Sun’s East Asian regional consciousness. Third, he tied Sun’s Three Principles to the Japanese ideology of Pan-Asianism with the goal of establishing a Chinese Pan-Asianism and an Asian image of Sun Yat-sen.

In the first regard, Wang invoked Sun’s ample Asian connections. Sun was a sociable man with extensive connections in many networks, and so this was not difficult. Sun was, moreover, indeed sponsored by Pan-Asianist organizations in Japan like the Black Dragon Society, well-familiar with Pan-Asianists like Miyazaki Torazō and Toyama Mitsuru, and at least acquainted with Asian revolutionaries like the Filipino diplomat Mariano Ponce or the Indian revolutionary M. N. Roy.

By looking at how Wang remembered Sun’s connections with one of these Asian contacts, his friend, neighbor, and revolutionary collaborator Yamada Yoshimasa, we may see that establishing Sun’s Asian linkages was a key part of Wang’s effort to establish Sun as more than just a Chinese revolutionary. This idea of transcending of mere nationalism in favor of shared regional interests was crucial to

the ideology of mid-Shōwa Pan-Asianists like Rōyama Masamichi. Wang’s narrative surrounding Sun and Yamada helpfully illustrates how this worked:

So, why am I talking about realizing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism, why is there an “and” there? Well, it’s because Pan-Asianism does not stand in opposition to the Three People’s Principles, Pan-Asianism is a part of those principles…Pan-Asianism was the topic of the Father of the Nation’s speech in Kobe on November 23, the thirteenth year of the Republic [November 23, 1924]. In accordance with the times, the Chinese Nationalist Party emphasized alliance with Russia, but the reason the Father of the Nation was giving this speech was because the Father of the Nation knew that alliance with Russia wasn’t enough. The completion of the Chinese Revolution required the understanding of the Japanese, and so he specifically went out of his way to give this speech in Kobe. Moreover, this focus [on Pan-Asianism] didn’t just begin there, it was there from the very start of the revolution. Now, I have hard proof to show everyone, an inscription from a memorial stele the Father of the Nation established on February 27, the second year of the Republic [February 27, 913]. More than ten years before this, during the Huizhou Uprising of the year Gengzi (1900), a Japanese comrade, Yamada Yoshimasa, died for the Chinese Revolution. The Father of the Nation erected that stele for him in the second year of the Republic, and on the stele was “the vanguard of the Asian revival” (xingya zhi xianjue). From

143 Though I have not found any direct mention of Royama’s work in Wang’s speeches, understanding contemporary Pan-Asianist trends in Japan is useful for seeing what was distinctive about Wang’s usage of Pan-Asianism and Chinese nationalism.
this we can see the raising of Pan-Asianism…Now, why did Yamada Yoshimasa participate? Because ever since the Jiawu War (First Sino-Japanese War), many aspiring knights of Japan already realized that Sino-Japanese war was not good, and that anything less than Sino-Japanese cooperation would not be enough to revive East Asia, that anything less than assisting the Chinese Revolution would not reach the standard of Sino-Japanese cooperation, and so they took part in the Chinese Revolution and became the pupils of the Father of the Nation. They followed the Father of the Nation into revolutionary war. Yamada Yoshimasa was but one of those who, for the Chinese Revolution, fully exhausted their loyalty, completed their benevolence [ren]. The Father of the Nation deeply understood this, and so called them the vanguard of the Asian revival. That was the year Gengzi. It’s already been forty-one years since then. Pan-Asianism is not a piece of trendy oratory, but a pillar of the Father of the Nation’s revolution.144

144 Wang Jingwei, “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism”, 2752-4. The original text is: “。。。爲什麼說實行三民主義及大亞洲主義呢，爲什麼用一個“及”字呢，因爲大亞洲主義，不是與三民主義對立的，而是民族主義之中的。。。大亞洲主義是民國十三年十一月二十三日國父在神戶講演的，以時代論，中國國民黨正主張聯俄，何以國父有此講演，這因爲國父知道聯俄是不夠的，中國革命的成功，一定要得到日本的諒解，所以特地繞道神戶，做這演講，而且國父的這種主張，絕不是始於那個時候，從發起革命之始，就這樣主張了，我如今將一種確實的證據，給各位看，這是民國二年二月十七日國父在日本所立碑文的拓本，在民國二年之前十多年，庚子年（一九〇〇年）惠州擧義，日本的同志山田良政君，爲中國革命而死，國父於民國二年，爲他立了這塊碑，被上寫著“興亞之先覺”由此可知大亞洲主義的提倡，是如何的陳舊了。。。山田良政君，爲什麼加入呢，因爲自從甲午之役以後，許多日本有志之士，已經覺得中日戰爭是不辛的，非中日合
Key to Wang’s argument in this passage was that Pan-Asianism, itself, was a Sunist concept and an integral part of his revolution from the very beginning. Yamada Yoshimasa, a former China-hand for the Meiji government during the First Sino-Japanese War and Sun’s former neighbor, does not particularly matter to Wang as an individual; indeed, he is simply useful as a symbol of Sino-Japanese cooperation.145 By remembering Yamada, Wang is firmly establishing Sun—from his early revolutionary days—as concerned with the “Asian revival”, of which the Chinese revolution was an integral part. In this way, Wang extended Sun’s revolutionary concerns beyond the borders of China and thus linked Sunist Chinese nationalism with Pan-Asian regionalism.

In considering how Wang attempted to link Sunism and Pan-Asianism, we should consider what Pan-Asianism was. Pan-Asianism was a largely Japanese doctrine of Asian regionalism based upon vague notions of shared culture, economic
interests, faith, destiny, race, and geographic proximity. Key to the ideology in all its iterations was its anti-Western, anti-colonial bent, which is best summarized by the phrase “Asia for the Asians”. At its peak, the Tokyo Conference of 1942, representatives from Indonesia, the Philippines, China, India, Siam, and other Asian nations came together to preach the gospel of Asian unity. However, while Pan-Asianism today is largely associated with Shōwa-era Japanese chauvinism, one scholar, Chao Hsun-ta, argues that Pan-Asianism had three main iterations. These were, first, the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, in which Japanese triumph illustrated new possibilities for Japan and the Asian nations against Western powers; second, the aftermath of Sun’s 1924 Kobe address, in which he charged that post-Meiji Japan was following the martial Hegemonic Way of the West, but could still return to walk the virtuous Kingly Way of the East; third, the aftermath of the establishment of Manchukuo and the Lytton Report, after which the Japanese government resolved to go its own way and pay no heed to the objections or concerns of the Western powers. Pan-Asianism chiefly differed from its predecessor, Japanese Asianism, in that instead of Japan simply being a regional power with Monroe Doctrine-esque aspirations, Japan now aspired to liberate Asia and guide its lesser, abused neighbors forward into a prosperous Asian modernity. Read less charitably, liberation facilitated domination.

Beyond general rhetoric and broad points of agreement, however, Pan-Asianism was not a unified ideology. Different thinkers had different understandings.

of what Asia was, what was Asian about it, and what Asian regionalism was supposed to accomplish. Okakura Kakuzō (1862-1913) believed that Asianness was necessarily rooted in the ancient and the spiritual, and that Meiji modernization risked undermining the very essence of Asia itself.147 Pan-Asianism, it follows, must then be built upon the basis of Asia’s spirituality and not on industrial force, however necessary industrial force may be in the modern world. Later, a young Mitsukawa Kametarō would argue that the essence of Pan-Asianism was in Asia’s shared culture, race, and interests in resisting Western colonization, and that Japan—the model Asian nation, both modern and knowing the pain of colonialism—was perfectly suited to liberating and leading its neighbors.148 An elder Mitsukawa, however, believed that Pan-Asianism was simply license for rightful Japanese expansion across Asia, as Japan was the rightful liberator and leader of its backwards, helpless neighbors.

Finally for our brief consideration of Japanese Pan-Asianists, Rōyama Masamichi argued for a Pan-Asianism of collaboration and cooperation, with Japan the first among equals in a regional body of Asian nations. This, while far less chauvinistic than the elder Mitsukawa’s Pan-Asianism, still privileged Japan; in any case, Rōyama’s conception of Pan-Asianism aptly described the ideal nature of Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere, but the reality of the sphere more closely resembled a Japanese sphere of dominion than an Asian Union of equal member-states, as illustrated by the pigeon-holing of Prince Demchugdondrub in the allegedly

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independent Mongol state of Meng Jiang.\textsuperscript{149}

As we can see from our brief look at Japanese Pan-Asianism, the status of Japan was generally privileged, regardless of whether the thinker in question articulated a nationalistic or regionalistic Pan-Asianism. However, Wang’s attempt to tie Pan-Asianism to Sunist nationalism is notable when we consider that thinkers like Rōyama Masamichi believed nationalism was an impediment to regionalism, not an integral engine within it. Rōyama argued that:

The unity of the East must be born of the transcendence of nationalism. Where is the motive force capable of accomplishing that transcendence? It is latent in the very expansion of Japanese nationalism toward the Asian continent…The principle intrinsic to Japan’s advance is not imperialism but rather regionalism for the purposes of defense and development. This principle of regionalism has become manifest only recently. It is entirely natural that the immature Chinese nationalism should misunderstand and distort this as imperialism.\textsuperscript{150}

In contrast to Rōyama, Wang does not try to contort Sun into such an understanding of anti-national regionalism. His attempt to create a Pan-Asian Sun relies upon the unity of the nation and the region, the linked fates of China and Asia, the

\textsuperscript{149} Hsu Shu-hsi, \textit{Whither Japan}, (Shanghai—HK—Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, 1941), 68. Though the foundation of Meng Chiang in the territory of Suiyan and Chahar under the rule of Prince Demchugdongrub was supposedly the establishment of an independent Mongol state freed from Chinese hegemony, the prince’s government was so hampered by layers of Japanese civil and military advisors that it was unable to function without the approval of Tokyo.

complementary nature and shared origins of Pan-Asianism and the Three People’s Principles.

v: Conclusion

Both Chiang and Wang emphasized their personal connections to Sun Yat-sen. While this emphasis on a lineage of personal closeness was not a new phenomenon, it intensified during the time of the Chongqing-Nanjing split. This increasing stress on personal connection to Sun was largely due to a need on the part of both Chiang and Wang to prove themselves and their government as the legitimate ROC government, a need more pronounced than possibly at any other time in GMD history. Though the Wuhan-Nanjing split was also a time of pronounced tension between Wang and Chiang, these tensions resolved within months by the concession of Wang and the Hankou GMD. However, following the assassination of Wang’s secretary Zeng Zhongming in Hanoi by agents of Dai Li151 and Japanese PM Konoe Fumimaro’s aite wo sezu telegram,152 which declared a Japanese policy of non-communication with regards to Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD-Right, there was presumably no way for Wang and Chiang to truly reconcile their break.153 Combined with the high stakes of what was framed a war of national survival by Chiang and a

151 Chen Lifu, Storm Clouds, 138.
The full phrase used was “爾後国民政府ヲ対手トセズ”, meaning essentially that “We, henceforth, refuse to deal with the Nationalist Government.”
war of national destruction by Wang, this was not simply a power struggle like during the war of unification. The dire stakes of the wartime split, framed as a battle for the survival of the Chinese nation, meant that each side was locked into their position and needed to legitimate it by all means necessary.

The elevation and redefinition of Sun Yat-sen as the Father of the Nation (guofu) was an effect of this struggle for power; both sides turned to calling Sun, who had previously been known as Dr. Sun or the Premier (zongli), guofu. While he had been called guofu before, it was not until spring of 1940, in direct response to Wang’s huandu—return to the capital—ceremony that officially marked the founding of his Reorganized Government, that Sun was legally enshrined as the Father of the Nation by Chiang’s regime.154 Scholar Du Yue argued that this elevation of Sun as the guofu also served to firmly tie the GMD party-state to the Chinese nation itself.155 Moreover, while guofu had been a superlative in the past, it now subsumed Sun’s very name. Also around this time, Chiang Kai-shek began referring to himself as Director-General (zongcai) in emulation of Sun’s previous epithet, zongli.156 At this point, we should remember that Chiang Kai-shek generally referred to himself as Chiang Chung-cheng (Jiang Zhongzheng), a name directly connected with Sun’s most commonly known Mandarin name Sun Zhongshan through the zhong character. We can see through the politics of naming and titles like this, as well more indirect methods like his earlier marriage to Song Meiling and the wide circulation of

155 Ibid., 213.
156 Taylor, “Contradistinction”, 672.
photographs with Sun and Chiang together, that Chiang was clearly concerned with establishing links between himself and Sun.\textsuperscript{157}

Wang also made ample use of the Father of the Nation epithet, as seen above, but did not try to connect himself to Sun in the same ways as Chiang. While Chiang, through his personal stylings and publishing of original ideological tracts like \textit{China’s Destiny}, seemed to equate himself to Sun, Wang portrayed himself more as Sun’s disciple than co-conversant, partly per the norms of collaborator contradistinction, in which figures like Wang or Petain found it preferable to present an image of a reluctant patriot more than a superhuman leader.\textsuperscript{158} Wang relied heavily upon his own revolutionary credentials, his personal ties to Sun, and the invocation of Sun’s own ideology and history to forward his claims and authority as legitimately Sunist.

In conclusion, Wang and Chiang offer two different visions of Sun Yat-sen, born of their political needs. Wang’s Sun was an Asian revolutionary who sought peaceful reconstruction, thus incorporating and justifying Wang’s own politics. Chiang’s Sun was a traditionally-minded national leader of extraordinary ability and wisdom who emphasized strength, discipline, and obedience, and so provided ideological grounding for Chiang’s own politics. However, both Chiang and Wang made Sun a figure of paramount importance, unlike the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists laid their own claims to Sun and invoked their own images of him, images quite distinct from what we see in GMD narratives.

\textsuperscript{157} We might note that Jeremy Taylor argues that Chiang was far more concerned with making himself Sun’s equal and promoted Sun to also promote himself through this equivalence.
\textsuperscript{158} Taylor, “Contradistinction”, 676.
II

RED SUN OVER CHINA: SUN YAT-SEN & THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

But Lao Quan didn’t buy it: the more I explained, the more confused he got. In the end, he threw in the towel and said: “To be perfectly honest, who the hell has time for this crap? At our level, we just do as we’re told. You people with pens are just full of bullshit.”

—Cao Nancai in *Mao’s Lost Children*

i: Introduction

Although Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the Guomindang, the chief rival of the Chinese Communist Party and the perennial enemy of the Chinese people in CCP narratives, Sun himself has been frequently honored by the Chinese Communists since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In this chapter, we consider differing Chinese Communist narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen and the contexts that produced them. My main sources for examination will be a collection of commemorative articles published in the *People’s Daily*, the official newspaper of the CCP-PRC party-state, on the recurring ten-year anniversary of Sun’s birth (November 12th, 1866). Some articles provide overviews of the festivities, others are published speeches; all will help illustrate official uses of Sun’s image in Communist political narratives. In this way, I hope to explicate Sun’s pre-reform and post-reform trajectory in CCP hagiography. Finally, I will bring these historical remembrances of Sun together in a brief conclusion to illustrate how figures like Mao Zedong, Song Qingling, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping view and use Sun.

When put in their relevant context, we see that Sun, first honored largely for his work towards the democratic revolution in the 1950s, is later honored and
defended from culture warriors on the basis of his fervent anti-imperialism in the 1960s. Following the reform years, Sun is remembered more so as a patriot and a modernizer, with his nationalism becoming the key point of his worthiness by the administration of Xi Jinping.

We may note at this point Sun’s own frequent hobnobbing with marginal figures of empire, such as the Straits Chinese of Penang, the colonial doctor James Cantlie, and the members of the Pan-Asianist Black Dragon Society. We may also note Sun’s own turn to petty militarism after the failure of the Second Revolution and the Indian Communist M. N. Roy’s biting criticism of Sun for being a petit bourgeois adventurer. However, these aspects and interpretations of Sun’s life are not explicated in these narratives. Rather, we see an idealized Sun helpfully buffed to fit neatly into the reigning CCP narrative of the day. This Sun, generally, was a poor boy from the countryside with a deep peasant consciousness, a logical hatred of the feudal Qing monarchy and the semi-colonial straits of China’s fin de siècle, a revolutionary nationalist spirit, a set of bourgeois goals for his revolution, and a poor if sympathetic understanding of socialism and the destiny of the Chinese Communist Party.

In short, honoring Sun Yat-sen became newly useful for the Communists after the establishment of the PRC, as honoring Sun establishes a revolutionary lineage that predates the CCP and so has a longer and broader influence than Party history. Incorporating Sun not only helps to delegitimize the GMD by claiming their guofu as a forebear of the socialist revolution, but also gives the CCP a foil of earlier days with which to compare the PRC and its various achievements. Moreover, defining Sun, his achievements, and his values at these grand decadal commemorations allowed CCP
leaders and figures to make broader value statements and set the tone of the era. We might note that one aspect of this tone is the place of Taiwan, which shifts from the domain of the American running-dog Chiang Kai-shek and his lackeys to be liberated by force to the residence of misguided “Taiwan compatriots” who ought to help realize Sun Yat-sen’s dream of reunifying China and thus completing his revolution.

ii: A Brief Overview of the CCP and the PRC

As mentioned in the prior chapter, the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 and allied with the Guomindang in 1924 under the guidance of the Soviet Union. Representative H. Sneevliet and others had believed that the CCP would be most effective operating as a “bloc within” the GMD, which they argued was not really a political party so much as it was a revolutionary nationalist movement. Following the Hanning Split between Nanjing and Hankou and the subsequent reunification of the GMD under the rightist Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, the Communists were driven out of the cities and into the countryside. Desperate urban uprisings in Nanchang, Guangzhou, and other cities ended in failure. The Communists would regroup to form rural Soviets in the hinterlands of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, the largest being the famous Jiangxi Soviet. Chiang and the GMD Right made the immediate destruction of these Soviets top priority, and the subsequent encircling campaigns pressed in on the territory of the Soviets. In a daring attempt to escape the encirclement, the Red Army fled the Soviets for west China, then northwest China; the grueling Long March from the Soviets to the new revolutionary base of Yan’an in Shaanxi Province would take months and put the Communists through great hardship. However, the Long March now stands as an
event of mythic proportions in the PRC, providing the CCP with a tale of hardship and suffering that also serves as a player’s stage for the fine qualities and heroic selflessness of the Communists. It also is the teleological starting point for Mao Zedong as Chairman Mao; though he had been an influential leader in rural Hunan, it was the Long March that thrust him to a prominent place in the Party.

Following the move to Yan’an, many revolutionaries flocked to the area to participate in the building of Communist rule in the area. Among these were notable figures like the author Ding Ling, but many more were people of little renown and much enthusiasm. However, enthusiasm waned among some cadres as the society at Yan’an did not live up to its revolutionary creed. Ding Ling, for instance, criticized her comrades for treating female cadres with a double-standard,\textsuperscript{159} while the journalist Wang Shiwei criticized the Communist Party elite for their privileged, elitist attitudes in Yan’an.\textsuperscript{160} Ding Ling, for her part, was officially reprimanded and would be rusticated some years later on charges of rightism, while Wang Shiwei met an unfortunate end in 1947, executed under murky circumstances as the Communists fled a GMD attack against Yan’an.

By late 1946, full hostilities between the Guomindang and the CCP had resumed; by 1956, the CCP formally controlled all of mainland China aside from the southeastern marches of Fujian Province. While GMD activities in the Northwest and along the Yunnan-Burma border continued during this time, the foundation of the

\textsuperscript{159} Ding Ling, “Sanbajie yougan” [Feelings on International Women’s Day], 3-9-1942, Marxists.org, \url{https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/yanan1942/2-02.htm}

\textsuperscript{160} Wang Shiwei, “Ye bai he hua” [Wild Lilies], 3-17-1942, Marxists.org, \url{https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/yanan1942/1-02.htm}
People’s Republic in 1949 meant that the CCP already claimed formal, exclusive, and legitimate authority over all of China. The continued threat of the Nationalists was certainly not lost on the CCP authorities, given their continued activities in the Northwest, the Southwest, and fortification of Taiwan and coastal Fujian outposts like Kinmen. Therefore, political legitimation was not yet constructive in 1946, as the PRC did not exist and the CCP only needed to discredit the sitting power and promise pragmatic changes. The high-octane smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek—among other propaganda efforts—and promises of land reform in New China constitute evidence of this situation. While certainly positive ideological efforts were taken within the Communist Party, the CCP was not yet a party-state, and so this had not been nationalized. However, by 1956, the party-state had been established, and the masses now needed to be brought into the ideological fold. Legitimation now required some constructive efforts, and Sun Yat-sen evidently proved a useful figure in the CCP’s narrative of national liberation and self-strengthening.

Much changed between 1956 and 1966. For instance, the PRC and the USSR turned from partners to adversaries. Mao Zedong, himself the subject of a strong personality cult and distrustful of Nikita Khrushchev, denounced “Soviet revisionism” and articulated a way forward for a more purely Chinese Communist revolution. Khrushchev, for his part, distrusted Mao and what Khrushchev saw as his Stalinist tendencies, tendencies which Khrushchev had unequivocally denounced in his midnight address “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” on February 25, 1956. Though this had not been an issue for the 1956 commemorations, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, and Mao believed that the “revisionists” were
destroying anything revolutionary about the Soviet project. In any case, by 1960, the damage had been done. No longer would the Soviet Union provide the Chinese state with advisors or material aid, and no longer would Chinese people study the “black earth of white birch forests [i.e. Soviet conditions and realities] over the red soil of bamboo forests”, as the 1976 film Jue Lie [“Breaking with Old Customs”] would put it.\footnote{Sigrid Schmalzer, Red Revolution, Green Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 37-38.} Charting a new path forward, Mao would initiate the Great Leap Forward and total communalization of agriculture in 1957 to leap beyond the binding confines of dialectical history. Volunteerism could triumph over technocratic plans and incrementalism, as model projects like the Dazhai commune seemed to prove. However, the Great Leap Forward and its production targets failed to come to fruition. Drought, mismanagement, zeal, party structures, and misguided pest eradication campaigns resulted in a disastrous famine that killed millions of rural Chinese, particularly in regions like Henan and Anhui where political mobilization was especially fervent.\footnote{The disasters resulting from the Great Leap Forward are discussed elsewhere, but are not the focus of my work. My main source here is Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone (NY: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2012).} Steel produced by backyard smelters was essentially a waste, for the product was poor and kept farmers from other tasks. The many failures of the Great Leap Forward resulted in Mao being sidelined by more technocratic CCP elites like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

Just before the Great Leap took off, an environment of suspicion permeated Beijing. The Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956, in which Mao solicited dissent and criticism of the CCP’s administration, had led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957,
in which critics and dissidents were punished as “poisonous weeds”. Though it is unclear exactly why Mao cracked down on solicited dissent, with his own justification resting on the need to weed a garden to get desirable results, this and the denunciation of the formerly-esteemed Peng Dehuai for speaking out against the Great Leap Forward created a climate of fear in Chinese political circles.\textsuperscript{163} However, the GLF greatly discredited Mao and his leadership. Following the Great Leap, the CCP sidelined Mao and began to rule more technocratically, rule that involved the stratification of society into a good, red quasi-aristocracy and a bad, black under-caste. This division relied largely upon notions of good and bad blood as based upon ancestral ties; if one was descended from a revolutionary martyr, then one’s blood was good.\textsuperscript{164} The converse is obvious.

It was against this sort of stratified society that Mao had initially sought to struggle, if his earlier writings are any indication. Categorical suppression with no room for individual agency was, after all, the real dagger in the heart of Miss Zhao.\textsuperscript{165} Accordingly, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter the Cultural Revolution or the CR) to disrupt the stratification of Chinese society and to promote the revolutionary character of New China. It was also a movement against the Party and so gave individuals agency to challenge what had been a domineering, inaccessible authority.\textsuperscript{166} The Cultural Revolution became a symbol of anti-

\textsuperscript{163} Maurice Meisner, \textit{Mao Zedong}, (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 156.
\textsuperscript{165} Mao Zedong, “Miss Chao’s Suicide”, 1919, \textit{Marxists.org}, \url{https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1919/miss-chao.htm}.
\textsuperscript{166} Yiching Wu, 2.
authoritarianism to many oppressed groups around the world, and cemented a global image of a most revolutionary Mao and a most empowering Mao Zedong Thought, “the spiritual atom bomb.”\(^{167}\) However, the Cultural Revolution devolved into chaotic infighting between CCP factions, Red Guard factions, and other belligerents. Following Mao’s death, the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath were blamed on his wife Chiang Qing and the Gang of Four (consisting of Chiang, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongyan). Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng, who insisted upon maintaining “whatever” Mao would have wanted, was pushed aside by Deng Xiaoping and the reformists in 1978.

The real details of the Reform and Opening Up are beyond our scope; what is most important here is the shift from Maoist ideological purity to Dengist pragmatism. “Whichever cat catches the mouse” is the better cat, as Deng put it. The Chinese economy grew rapidly following the normalization of relations with the United States, the monetization of the renminbi, the opening of the Chinese economy gradually through the creation of Special Economic Zones and the implementation of their lessons elsewhere, and a turn away from militarism. Though financial difficulties in the 1990s resulted from the breaking of “the iron rice-bowl” (the state-owned enterprise and the failsafe jobs it provided) under Zhu Rongji and from the IMF Crisis of 1997, the economy overall grew at a tremendous rate between the Deng years and today. We may note, however, that while the era of Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao saw rapid growth and an emphasis on China’s peaceful rise to prominence,

\(^{167}\) Fabio Lanza, \textit{The End of Concern: Maoist China, Activism, and Asian Studies}, (Duke UP, 2017), 43-44.
the Xi Jinping years have thus far seen slowing economic growth—referred to as the “New Normal” of a caught-up, developed economy—and a preponderance of saber-rattling in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and along the mountainous border with India. Though this thesis does not dwell on current events, we might note that the Xi years may yet bring about more unforeseen developments. It is with this basic context in mind that we must consider the following commemorations of Sun Yat-sen to better understand the images of Sun being created and for what purpose.

iii: Glory to Sun, the Democratic Revolutionary!—Commemorating Sun Yat-sen’s 90th Birthday in the People’s Daily

Every ten years on November 12th or 13th, starting from 1956 on, the Chinese Communist Party commemorates the birth of Sun Yat-sen with pageantry, speeches, and a People’s Daily recap of the event. Though each commemorative speech is different in its particulars and the general narrative changes over time, they all follow similar logic and espouse a similar narrative: Sun Yat-sen, a great forebear of the Communist revolutionaries, initiated China’s democratic revolution, the necessary precursor for the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to socialist revolution according with Marxist historical analysis. This consistent depiction of Sun as a great revolutionary was tied to the need to legitimate the CCP in Marxist terms, but he is also invoked to create a constant thread of revolutionary nationalism and as a way of comparing the Old and New China of CCP rhetoric. In this way, Sun’s life and image are manipulated to fit within the framework of a CCP narrative that combines nationalism, Marxism, and—after 1976—pragmatism in legitimating the regime. Commemorating his birth deepens his connection to the CCP and so furthers the
nationalist legitimacy of the Party; it also provides an opportunity for reflection on the past for the purposes of glorifying the present.

1956 marked the late stages for Sino-Soviet cooperation, with both the Hungarian Uprising and the Hundred Flowers Movement fueling Chairman Mao Zedong’s suspicion of reformist mindsets and political opposition within the PRC. The year also marked the 90th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth. Unlike his 80th birthday in 1946, a time when the Communists and Nationalists were once again embroiled in desperate combat, the victorious CCP seized upon Sun’s 90th birthday for a major commemoration, as evinced by extensive coverage in the People’s Daily. Drawing upon a potent global spirit of anti-colonial nationalism, the fledgling state invited participants from around the world for a ceremony that included figures as high-ranking as GMD Revolutionary Committee chairwoman He Xiangning, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Chairman Mao himself. Why was Sun suddenly so crucial to the CCP? Why hold such a large commemorative event on his 90th birthday? In answering this question, we should consider the political context.

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168 The 1946 papers from November 11-13th do not detail any similar commemoration events, highlighting that the CCP’s formal commemoration of Sun began after the party had assumed power.
169 He Xiangning, a woman of diverse talents and pursuits, was a longtime member of Sun’s Tongmenghui, the Minister of Women’s Affairs in Sun’s United Front regime, the widow of the GMD general Liao Zhongkai, and an accomplished painter among other things. After Liao’s assassination in 1924—an event which led to the ouster of Hu Hanmin and direct competition between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek for party leadership—He Xiangning drew back from politics, but would co-found the Revolutionary Committee of the GMD in 1948 and be a prominent figure in top PRC institutions.
Figure 1: Front page of the November 12, 1956 People’s Daily.

A keystone in the 1956 commemoration was a speech delivered by Mao Zedong, a speech that was printed in the People’s Daily on the occasion and later
reprinted as a canonical text as regards CCP orthodoxy on Sun. Mao praises Sun in a
calling for remembrance:

Remember our great revolutionary forebear, Mr. Sun Yat-sen!

Remember during the preparatory period of the great Chinese democratic
revolution, with the clear standpoint of the Chinese revolutionary factions, his
sharp struggle with the reformist factions! In this stage of struggle, he was the
flag-bearer of the Chinese democratic revolution.

Remember his rich contributions of leading the people to overthrow the
imperial system and establishing a republican state during the period of the
Xinhai Revolution.

Remember his rich contribution of updating the Old Three People’s Principles
into the New Three People’s Principles in the first period of GMD-CCP
cooperation.

He has left us many beneficial things in the realm of political thought…170

Mao continued to explain the significance of Sun in contemporary China by stating
that all Chinese, aside from “certain reactionaries” like the GMD followers of Chiang
Kai-shek in Taiwan and capitalist-roaders still on the mainland, were carrying on his

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170 Mao Zedong, “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng” (Remember Dr. Sun Yat-sen), People’s
Daily (Renmin Ribao), November 12, 1956, 1. The original text is: “纪念伟大的革命先行者
孙中山先生！纪念他在中国民主革命准备时期，以鲜明的中国革命民主派立场，同中
国改良派作了尖锐的斗争。他在这一场斗争中是中国革命民主派的旗帜。纪念他在辛
亥革命时期，领导下人民推翻帝制、建立共和国的丰功伟绩。纪念他在第一次国共合作
时期，把旧三民主义发展为新三民主义的丰功伟绩。他在政治思想方面留给我们许多
有益的东西。”
revolutionary work through the present stage of socialist revolution.

Concluding, he remarked upon his personal experience with Sun, saying that:

Dr. Sun was an honest man. I had heard him give many speeches and felt he had a certain grandeur of spirit. From how he paid attention to the specifics of China’s historical situation and the present social situation, and from how his research paid attention to the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and of other foreign nations, I know he was very open-minded. 171

Notably, Mao praised Sun as honest, humble, and open-minded. To his credit, in Mao’s eyes, he endeavored to understand the specifics of China’s own historical trajectory and the societal questions resulting, emphasizing the importance of understanding China on its own terms. However, Mao also praised him for studying the Soviet Union and other foreign countries, taking it as a sign of his open-mindedness and curiosity. Notably, by mentioning the Soviet Union by name, Mao indicated that Sun found the Soviet Union particularly worthy of understanding and so reinforced Sun’s connection to the CCP through this receptivity to the standard-bearer of socialism. Of course, Sun never went to the Soviet Union, but Mao noted his interest in conjunction with his broader interest in the domestic issues of foreign nations as well, recognizing the immutable reality of Sun’s globetrotting existence.

We might briefly note that by lumping together the Soviet Union and the nameless foreign nations, Mao himself made a statement by relegating the lessons of Soviet

171 Ibid. The original text is: “孙先生是一个谦虚的人。我听过他多次讲演, 感到他有一种宏伟的气魄。从他注意研究中国历史情况和当前社会情况方面，又从他注意研究包括苏联在内的外国情况方面，知道他是很虚心的。”
Communism to foreign studies, undermining the universal claims backing certain understandings of Communism and reinforcing his own understanding of state Communism.

This personal connection between Mao and Sun was not close, but Mao did make a point to mention it in his terse remarks. Mao’s conclusion thus demonstrates that pointing to a legendary figure like Sun and his personal experience of this figure granted him a certain amount of credibility and authenticity. In this way, Mao augmented his own revolutionary authenticity with another facet, that of a faithful heir of Sun in that he had firsthand heard Sun’s speeches and worked with him in his later years; this connection created a historical lineage that extended beyond the CCP. Moreover, Mao’s claims that the CCP already completed Sun’s unfinished work of democratic revolution illustrated how the CCP ideologically discredited their Nationalist foes. ¹⁷²

Further delegitimating the GMD, Mao coopted Sun’s ideology itself by emphasizing the New Three People’s Principles. While the GMD did and continues to emphasize Sun’s articulation of the Principles of Nationalism (minzu zhuyí), the People’s Sovereignty/Democracy (minquan zhuyí), and the People’s Welfare (minsheng zhuyí), Mao emphasized the New Three People’s Principles as the correct, updated thought of Sun with regards to national salvation and organization. The New Three People’s Principles (New TPP/Old TPP henceforth) were first articulated in

¹⁷² Given that the CCP claimed that establishing the PRC had successfully completed the democratic revolution and thus initiated the stage of socialist revolution, any attempt to institute capitalist development was historically reactionary and without basis. Only progressive ideals and policies that helped bring about communism were legitimate according to this dialectical vision of history, and so the GMD had no leg to stand on.
Mao’s speech “On New Democracy”, delivered on January 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1940. Mao, at the time of the Second United Front and responding Wang Jingwei’s defection from the United Front, stated that the Old TPP and the New TPP was not his distinction, but rather Sun’s own distinction. The Old TPP simply were old and obsolete, while the New TPP reflected the correct understanding of the post-Xinhai, post-Yuan Shikai Chinese revolutionary movement. The New TPP were contained and codified in the 1924 Manifesto of the First Party Congress of the GMD. They consisted of alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist Party, and supporting the workers and peasantry.\textsuperscript{173}

Mao created binary choices to justify and cement the New TPP as the ideologically correct TPP. One can ally with the Soviets, or ally with the imperialists. One can work with the Communists, or one can work with the Japanese. One can work to support the workers and peasants, or one can give up on any pretense of revolutionary activity given that China is a peasant nation and New Democracy is “fundamentally a question of giving the peasants their rights.”\textsuperscript{174} In doing so, he created a framework in which the Communist Party was the faithful heir to Sun’s revolution, a key part of his plans for Chinese revolution, and a key part of his ideology. By Mao’s logic, opposing the Communist Party was tantamount to treason against Sun and his work. Thus, no opponent of the CCP could legitimately claim to represent Sun or his thought. In this way, Mao invoked Sun to legitimate the CCP regime and to delegitimate the Nationalists, his rivals in invoking Sun and his legacy.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 97.
for their own competing political ends.

Mao and his 1956 speech memorializing Sun became the basis for the CCP’s later narratives of Sun. We might periodize CCP Sun commemorations into three eras: first, the 1956 Sun, reflecting the politics of the first-five year plan, was framed using the terms of post-Stalin, Soviet-esque Chinese communism; second, a more radical commemoration in 1966 framed Sun using the terms of Cultural Revolution-era Maoism; third, a version of Sun reformulated to fit the post-“Reform and Opening Up” CCP capitalist reform.

We may contextualize the early PRC remembrance of Sun in terms of other 1956 articles that illustrate what was in vogue in Chinese politics at the time. Sun Yat-sen was not a socialist, one article admits. However, Sun was upheld as a socialist sympathizer and fervent admirer of the USSR. This assertion of Sun’s explicit admiration for the Soviet Union came at a time when Soviet advisors remained a visible presence in the Chinese communist party-state and in the wake of significant Soviet aid programs that predated the proclamation of the People’s Republic on October 1st, 1949. Zhou Enlai similarly articulated Sun’s admiration for the Soviet Union as he built up the standard picture of Sun as a democratic revolutionary in league with the Communists working towards progressive ends under a united front. Zhou then directly connected Sun’s mission as a prelude to calling for the immediate invasion of Taiwan for the purposes of expelling the reactionary Chiang government, so as to reunify China. Even more telling, Zhou

175 “Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Yongsheng” [The Eternal Life of Dr. Sun Yat-sen], People’s Daily, November 12, 1956, 1.
connected Sun’s vision of anti-imperialist national revolution to anti-colonial nationalisms in Africa and Asia, to the concurrent Suez crisis in particular, reflecting the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the perceived relevance of Sun to the global decolonization movement.  

Lin Boqu and He Xiangning filled out the remaining Chinese statements for the 1956 ceremony. Lin, a longtime member of the Nationalist Party, delivered a theoretical address that sought to explicate the connections between Sun and the Communist narrative of revolution. Lin stated that Sun was deeply influenced by the successes and failures of the Taiping Rebellion and by the Hundred Days’ Reform. From the Taipings, Sun learned of the disaffection of the masses and their great revolutionary potential; from the reformers, Sun learned of the extent of Qing corruption and stagnation, as well as how the reformers unwillingness to rely upon the masses and champion their causes—unwillingness stemming from fear, Lin suggests—doomed their initiatives from the start. This emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the masses, in particular the proletariat, represents an attempt to steep Sun in Communist ideology and provide a basis for CCP narratives of history by articulating them through the respected figure of Sun Yat-sen. Notably,

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176 Zhou Enlai, “Zhou Enlai de Kaimuci” [Zhou Enlai’s Opening Address], People’s Daily, November 12, 1956, 2.
177 Lin Boqu was an early member of the Tongmenghui and a long-time supporter of Sun Yat-sen. He later would work for the Communist Party, participating in the Nanchang Uprising of 1927 and marching to Yan’an as part of the Long March. He was a prominent figure in the early PRC and stood with Mao when Mao announced the foundation of the PRC in Tiananmen Square. “Lin Boqu: The founding of the host PRC”, Lin Boqu Guju, http://www.lbqijq.com/news/info/69?type=54
Lin states that prior uprisings had not been connected to the proletariat, China’s most progressive class in Marxist terms, and so failed because they did not represent historically progressive movements according to historical materialism. Rather, such movements like the Taiping or various Ming restorationist uprisings (carried out by peasants) and the Hundred Days’ Reform (carried out by elite landowners) were necessarily reactionary in that they sought only to restore old dynasties, found new dynasties, or modify existing dynasties. None of these three possibilities were historically progressive in a feudal society, as they all preserved the feudal relations of production. Sun’s revolution, therefore, was unique and successful in that it was historically progressive. Although Sun did not live to see it completed, the CCP claimed to have completed the democratic revolution with the founding of the PRC, and this legitimated the initiation of socialist development under the CCP.

Lin further emphasized Sun’s poor understanding of socialism, his distrust of Western capitalism and pursuit of Chinese-style capitalism to avoid characteristic Western abuses of the poor. Lin also made a point of Sun’s avid anti-imperialism, which, Lin suggests, dated back to at least the activities of the Tongmenghui, but was heightened by the success of the October Revolution: “Sun Yat-sen, like all patriots, saw something in the October Revolution: a force that could truly oppose imperialism.” This crucial link establishes why Sun admired the Soviets, which—

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179 A common demerit attributed to Sun in Communist narratives is that Sun did not truly understand socialism and that what he did understand came from thinkers like Henry George, a somewhat influential thinker from the time who advocated for the Single Tax as a key social policy. The Single Tax would tax all “unearned” value on property in an attempt to prevent rampant land speculation.

180 Ibid.
in ceremonial terms—had been a slogan only up until Lin’s address. By this, Lin also
established the nationalist credentials of the Communist Party, being the party
consistently supported by the anti-imperialist USSR, and thus underscored how
opponents of the Communist Party were necessarily anti-nationalist, pro-imperialist
traitors. The de-legitimation of the GMD was two-fold; they were portrayed as
reactionaries for their opposition to socialism and portrayed as national traitors for
their opposition to the CCP.

In discussing the potential dangers of imperialism, Lin mentioned the
Hungarian Uprising, which he framed as a reactionary uprising supported by foreign
imperialists against the people’s government of Hungary. He also cited the Suez
crisis, in which Britain, France, and the fledgling state of Israel invaded Egypt and
occupied the Canal Zone in response to socialist Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Both incidents, to Lin, demonstrated the
need for vigilance and cooperation in anticolonialism.

He Xiangning, longtime Tongmenghui member and chairwoman of the GMD
RevComm, rehashed the main points of the prior speeches while emphasizing four
things the audience is to remember about Sun: Sun was a staunch anti-imperialist;
anti-imperialism relies upon the masses; the people’s welfare (*minsheng*) is of
paramount concern and was to be effected through land equalization and the
establishment of a command economy. He concludes by decrying the GMD’s usage
of the National History Museum¹⁸¹ to warp the legacy of Sun to suit reactionary

¹⁸¹ It is not immediately clear what He is referring to here. I presume she objected the ROC
government’s “moving” of the National History Museum (国史館/Academia Historia) to
purposes, a betrayal undeserved by the revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen.

The presence of a sizeable contingent of international guests, including a Soviet representative named Moskatov—identified with the Central Auditing Commission—conveyed the international significance of Sun Yat-sen as an anti-imperialist, revolutionary hero of the decolonization movement. Many of the guests’ remarks conveyed similar sentiments. Bashir Ahmad, Pakistani representative, lauded Sun’s humble roots, his revolutionary and anti-imperialist spirit, and the inspiring example of the PRC for Asian and African nations struggling to fight the colonial powers. The speeches at the event were accompanied by a sizeable selection of congratulatory telegrams from figures like Sukarno of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, Nehru of India, and Sihanouk of Cambodia, seemingly orchestrated to demonstrate the international appeal of Sun and his anti-imperialist image. At the same time, it illustrated the PRC’s friendly relations with much of the Second World and the Global South in the immediate aftermath of foundation and the Bandung Conference.

**iv: Down with US Imperialism and the Reactionary Elements!**—

**Commemorating Sun’s Centennial Birthday in 1966**

It is in the context of the dawning Cultural Revolution, China’s recent

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Taipei, to the GMD’s control over many historical documents pertaining to Sun, and the GMD’s own efforts to present a Sun favorable to their cause. Given GMD usages and images of Sun are discussed further in Chapters I and III.

182 Bashir Ahmad, “Bajisitan Kexuedabiotuan Tuanzhang Baxi’er Aihamaide de Jianghua” [Pakistani Scientific Representative Team Head Bashir Ahmad’s Remarks], *People’s Daily*, November 12, 1956, 4.
development of nuclear weapons material and spiritual, and the escalating American involvement in Vietnam that we must frame Sun Yat-sen’s centennial birthday bash. Unlike in 1956, no significant international contingent was present at the 1966 commemoration, despite the perhaps more obvious significance of Sun’s 100th birthday. This evinces the diplomatic isolation facing the PRC following the CCP’s falling out with the Soviet Communists but before CCP leadership reestablished some limited if significant connections with the United States and its allies. Rhetorically, the commemorations of Sun here vary in scope, but they all present Sun as man of humble origins, a revolutionary for his time, and a fierce anti-imperialist. This focus on anti-imperialism was perhaps at its height in the heady days of the mid-1960s, being sharper than in the 1956 addresses and far more prominent than in any post-reform addresses.

Unlike 1956, Mao did not speak at the 1966 commemoration. In view of the events at hand, this is unsurprising. Mao was a largely silent public face during the Cultural Revolution, adding to the mystery of this historical event. The Sino-Soviet split also precluded the presence of any Soviet representative, again unlike 1956. Speaking instead were Dong Biwu, Song Qingling, He Xiangning, and Zhou Enlai. One international delegate, a Miyazaki Seimin of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Alliance, addressed the audience. Miyazaki’s presence was quite significant given the otherwise sparse representation of international guests. Even more significant was that Miyazaki Seimin was none other than the descendant of Miyazaki Torazō, Sun’s Japanese friend and ally from his early revolutionary days. However, unlike in

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183 Israel Epstein, *Soong Ching-ling*, 305.
1956, there does not seem to have been an international component to this anniversary aside from Miyazaki, somewhat surprising considering a centennial seems more significant than a ninetieth anniversary (possible arguments otherwise, presumably that it marks one and a half traditional sexagenary cycles, seem weak at best). No other foreign guests spoke, nor were any telegrams presented. Perhaps this has to do with the fading of the Bandung spirit, perhaps this reflects China’s increasing global isolation following the Sino-Soviet split and before détente with the United States. It is not entirely clear. It must be noted that such isolation said much about the inward-turn of the Chinese ‘60s and the radical self-reliance of the early Cultural Revolution days.

Dong Biwu’s opening statements helpfully clarified some of the refrains from 1956 to better fit the climate of 1966. His narrative highlighted that Mao Zedong personally completed the democratic revolution by overthrowing the forces of imperialism, capitalism, and feudalism—it was after this that he, personally, initiated the socialist stage of revolution. These 1966 themes correspond to the glorification of Mao in the politics of the anti-Party Cultural Revolution and Mao’s lively personality cult. Indeed, the main thrust of Dong’s opening address was less a commemoration of how Sun benefited China or what he did in life, but rather how far China had come under Mao—Dong’s recognition of Sun appears almost as an afterthought. While Dong began by reciting a familiar phrase, that “Sun was our revolutionary forebear who opposed reformists” [this time citing Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao

184 The traditional Chinese lunar calendar operates in sixty-year cycles.
185 This could simply be a problem of access, as I don’t have all the pages to this one.
specifically], lead the Xinhai Revolution, articulated the Old and New Three People’s Principles, and allied with the CCP and USSR,” his tone was more dismissive of Sun and more laudatory of Mao than any seen in the 1956 commemorations. However, while he did not heap praise upon Sun, Dong did emphasize the work of Sun as the foundation of the socialist revolution and of the Cultural Revolution.186 “Today, all the people of China—under the personal direction of the Great Leader Chairman Mao—are working to carry out a historically-unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Although the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, whether in breadth or depth, cannot be imitated by any other revolutionary movement,” Dong declared, “we are historical materialists and must honor them, as their work formed our foundation. We are the heirs of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary work.”187

As for current affairs, Vietnam now replaced the Suez Canal and the Hungarian Uprising as the current cause célèbre against the forces of imperialism, in particular the specter of the “U.S. imperialists” (Mei Di). The Suez Crisis demonstrated the continuing threat of recolonization as old empires and new states

186 Dong Biwu, “Zai Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Dansheng Yibaizhounian Jiniandahui shang, Dong Biwu Fuzhuxi de Kaimuci” [Vice-Chairman Dong Biwu’s Opening Remarks at the Celebration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Centennial Birthday], People’s Daily, November 13, 1966, 1. The original text is: “他作为中国革命民主派的旗手,在民主革命准备时期,同当时以康有为、梁启超为代表的改良派进行了不调和的斗争。他领导了辛亥革命,推翻了封建王朝,建立了共和国。他在晚年,同中国共产党进行了合作,制定了联俄、联共、扶助农工的三大政策,对三民主义作了新的解释,把旧三民主义发展为新三民主义。”

187 Ibid. The original text is: “今天,全中国人民正在我们伟大领袖毛主席的亲自领导下,进行着一场史无前例的无产阶级文化大革命。这场无产阶级文化大革命,无论就其广度和深度来说,都是历史上任何革命运动所不能比拟的。我们已经做的和正在做的,大大超过了我们的前人。但是,我们是历史唯物主义者,我们是在前人奋斗的基础上创立了我们自己的事业的,我们是孙中山先生革命事业的继承者。”
attempted to resist nationalist movements and projects, such as Nasser’s nationalization of the vital Suez Canal. The Hungarian Uprising, in the 1956 speeches, represented the threat of fifth-column movements within Communist states, the ever-present danger of reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Vietnam, representing the threat posed by the United States and its own brand of imperialism, had more in common with the Suez Crisis than the Hungarian Uprising, and so perhaps represents a fear of domino theory. That is to say, as the U.S. justified intervention in the Vietnamese war with domino theory, the PRC may have feared the failure of the Vietnamese Nationalists under Ho Chi Minh would provide the US with another staging ground for undermining the CCP and aiding a GMD invasion of the mainland.\textsuperscript{188} Indeed, the plight of Vietnam and the threat of American imperialism was a constant refrain in all of the 1966 speeches.

Much as Dong invoked the 1956 ceremonies, Zhou Enlai’s speech began with quoting Mao’s speech ten years prior, reinforcing the presence and authority of Mao despite his absence. Before discussing Zhou’s speech, we might briefly consider Mao’s absence and the attendance list of this ceremony. Despite Mao’s prominent place—with his man Lin Biao alongside—on the front page of this issue of the \textit{People’s Daily}, neither Mao nor Lin were listed as present.

\textsuperscript{188} Domino theory was the idea of George Kennan, US State Dept. Sec’y, and claimed that one state falling to communism would lead to many others meeting the same fate, just as one domino knocks over many others. We may consider that the PRC leadership seemed to be working with its own understanding of domino theory, in which losing one socialist ally to \textit{Meidi} could lead to a spiraling situation that would threaten Beijing, by so closely identifying with the North Vietnamese and North Koreans.
Mao’s absence stands in contrast to the prominent yet suspect list of attendees:
Zhou Enlai, Song Qingling, He Xiangning, Dong Biwu, Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and more.¹⁸⁹ Many of those present had problematic ties to

¹⁸⁹ “Fachang Sun Zhongshan de gemingzhandoujingshen…” (Developing Sun Yat-sen’s Spirit of Revolutionary Struggle), People’s Daily, November 13, 1966.
“rightists”, whether that meant the GMD, the technocratic CCP, or the CCP old-guard, and would suffer as the Cultural Revolution grew chaotic; in the case of Liu Shaoqi, he would soon be persecuted unto death, dying in prison in 1969. Israel Epstein, in his biography of Song, suggested that this ceremony was itself a chance to humiliate less than politically correct figures:

That day, too, marked the final public appearance, for all time, of Liu Shaoqi…As Chairman of the People’s Republic, he outranked all others present. Yet the official report listed him seventh, not only below Zhou Enlai, the Premier, and Dong Biwu, a vice-chairman, but also below Tao Zhu and Chen Boda, members of the Cultural Revolution Group, and Deng Xiaoping, soon to be his partner under attack. Still further down, in a glaring slur, was [PLA general and revolutionary hero] Zhu De…These humiliations were obviously deliberate. For Liu, they were a prelude to utter downfall, for Zhu De, a punishment for having failed to join in the chorus of the ultra-Left (Red Guard posters were already maligning the old revolutionary hero as an unreconstructed warlord!).

If this was the case, we might wonder who wanted to humiliate Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De and why would this ceremony be the way to do it. Obviously, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De had opponents in the upper-ranks of the PRC, opponents who were perhaps capitalizing on the budding Cultural Revolution to undermine their rivals. Exploring this in depth, however, would take us too far afield. Let it suffice to say that

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190 Epstein, 303.
commemorating Sun was not only a chance to commemorate the success of the PRC, but was also a field of political maneuvering and conflict for PRC power-players. Given how fraught the political climate of the Cultural Revolution era was, it is not surprising that the speakers at this event largely took advantage of the opportunity to praise Mao and establish themselves as politically-correct. It is notable, however, that many of the speakers worked to update Sun’s reputation to fit the times. This speaks partly to self-interest (those with links to Sun could not afford to have these links be problematic) but also to the great malleability of Sun’s image and its continued usefulness. So long as Sun’s image could be shaped to fit the times, Sun remained a valuable figure.

Returning to Zhou Enlai, his 1966 address held far more venom than his address of 1956. Zhou spent most of his time railing against the American Empire and its Nationalist “running dogs” in Taiwan, but several details stick out. First, when Zhou discussed the reactionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek, he specifies that Chiang was a “traitorous disciple” of Sun serving the global interests of American imperialism. It is evident that such commemorations of Sun remained useful for attacking the ideological and political legitimacy of the Guomindang.\(^{191}\) Second, and perhaps more of the time, Zhou specifies that Sun’s alliance with the Soviet Union was with Lenin’s Soviet Union; the USSR of “Khrushchev’s revisionism” was now a rival and Zhou needed to distinguish the friendly, helpful, USSR of Lenin and Stalin

\(^{191}\) Zhou Enlai, “Zhou Enlai Zongli de Jianghua” [Premier Zhou Enlai’s Remarks], *People’s Daily*, November 13, 1966, 2. The original text is: “今天，美帝国主义是中国人民和全世界人民最凶恶的共同敌人。美帝国主义霸占我国领土台湾，敌视中国人民，利用孙中山先生的叛徒蒋介石作为它的走狗。美帝国主义侵略越南，不断扩大侵越战争。”
with the technocratic, imperialist, less-than-revolutionary behemoth pressing against China’s northern borders in the 1960s.\footnote{192} Zhou went so far as to claim that the Soviet Union was now the “accomplice” of the United States and that China was now the light of democratic socialism in an increasingly hostile world. More pertinently, by emphasizing Lenin’s Soviet Union as the source of Sun’s inspiration and by breaking this Soviet Union from the post-Stalin “revisionist” USSR, Mao’s admiration of Stalin and utilization of a Stalinist personality cult thus became a connection with Sun, and so further cemented the legitimacy of Mao and his anti-Party movement. Zhou concluded with a call for “following Sun Yat-sen’s spirit of anti-imperialist resistance” in “liberating” Taiwan, unifying China, and continued opposition to the forces of American imperialism in Taiwan, Vietnam, and Latin America.\footnote{193} Zhou thus illustrated the global concerns of CR-era Sunist rhetoric and the primacy of Sun’s image as an anti-imperialist nationalist revolutionary to that effect.

In the longest address of 1966, Sun’s widow Song Qingling (Soong Ching-ling) offered a biography of Sun and considered why his life was worth commemorating. This is the most personal of any commemoration of Sun in the PRC,
as might be expected from his widow, but her speech remained couched in political language and categories. She, evidently, had to prove Sun to be a politically-viable hero in a quickly changing landscape, and worked hard to meet her goal.

Her biography began with an image of Sun Yat-sen the country boy. Sun, born to poor peasants in Guangdong, was well-aware of the hardships of the common people, for he was of the common people and tasted bitterness firsthand. According to Song, “Sun was born to a poor peasant family and sometimes did not have enough to eat—he could only fill up on sweet potatoes to stave off hunger. When he was a child, the local storyteller would tell tales of the Heavenly Taiping Kingdom and other peasant rebellions, and he was enraptured…” His poor, rural upbringing was the foundation of his discontent, and he therefore understood the plight of the peasants for he was of the same cloth. Song states that his brother, Sun Mei, was a farm laborer in Hawaii, and Sun would come learn of the outside world through his time there.

Song repeatedly reiterates Sun’s positives: Sun Yat-sen had a lifelong concern with the welfare of the people, with the welfare of Asians, with a disgust for warlordism and a love of humility. He died with little and accepted less in life (not even a leather

194Song Qingling, “Sun Zhongshan—jiandingbuyi, baichiburao de gemingzhe” (Sun Yat-sen—Unyielding, Unbreaking Revolutionary), *People’s Daily*, November 13, 1966, 3. The original text is: “孙中山出生在一个贫农家庭, 有时饭不够吃, 只好以甘薯充饥。童年时代, 当地方说书人常在晚上讲太平天国和其他农民起义事迹的故事, 使他听得入迷。他的家庭出身、他和下层被压迫人民的共同生活, 以及他所听到的人民企图挣脱压迫者的斗争故事, 在他的思想上留下了不可磨灭的印象。以后的发展证明, 这些童年的经历对于他决心终生献身革命起了决定的影响。”
coat in winter, according to one anecdote she tells), despite his incessant fundraising for the revolutionary cause, for he was not one to skim off the top. While abroad, he came into contact with the national consciousness of the Han people as preserved by the overseas Chinese; such national consciousness had long been dormant in China due to Qing suppression, Song implied, but the overseas nurtured it and Sun learned from them that he was, too, a Han Chinese with a stake in the national mission.\(^{195}\) Song took care to explain his frequent absences from the country, including at the time of Xinhai Revolution, as in service to the revolutionary cause, and emphasized that the Xinhai Revolution arose from his revolutionary organizing and agitation. Though she granted he was, as other revolutionary forebears were, flawed and had a poor understanding of socialism, she underscores that he was indeed the revolutionary forebear of the Chinese socialist revolution and that he and his compatriots were figuring out “the rules of revolution” as they went along. His public will, charging every Chinese to continue the revolution, spoke of his continued relevance to the oppressed masses of the world.

However, perhaps most significant was how Song used Sun to talk about the Chinese revolution. Through her discussion of Sun and his times, Song laid bare her methods of excusing Sun’s inadequacies (as a 1960s PRC audience might have seen them) as well how commemorating Sun was largely a way to commemorate the progress of China since his time:

He [Sun Yat-sen] was born before the era of imperial monopoly capitalism.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.
When he was born, the domestic feudal monarchy had just been rocked by the Taiping Kingdom peasants’ revolution and our nation’s people had just come into contact with the capitalist states…

When he passed on from our world, the power of imperialism thought itself paramount. The Great Powers of Europe carved up our nation’s land like a melon while neighboring Japanese militarism menaced the existence of our entire country. The nation had been split by warlords into several parts…

Today, China has undergone such great historically-significant changes! Under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people have already moved the three great mountains of imperialist invasion, feudal governance, and bureaucratic capitalism. The Chinese people have not only triumphantly completed the New Democratic revolution, but have also obtained brilliant successes in socialist revolution and construction…

Now, why are we now commemorating Sun Yat-sen? I think it’s so that we always cherish the memory of an unbreaking, unyielding revolutionary leader of the Chinese democratic revolution, China’s great revolutionary forebear.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. The original text is: “他生在帝国主义垄断资本开始统治世界之前。他出生的时候，国内的封建王朝刚刚受到太平王国农民革命的震撼，我国任命还刚刚同资本主义国家生接触。当他离开人间的时候，帝国主义力量正不可一世，欧洲列强处心积虑要瓜分我国领土，近邻日本的军国主义也不断威胁着我们整个国家的生存。国家被军阀们分割成几部分。。。今天，中国发生了多么伟大的具有历史意义的变化！在中国共产党和毛主席领导下，中国人民已经搬掉了帝国主义侵略、封建统治和官僚资本垄断这三座大山。中国人民
Naturally, given the tensions of the moment and her own respect for Mao, Song lauds his personal leadership but also took a risk in lauding the accomplishments of the CCP as a body. She used her address to paint a dismal picture of China in his youth, his radicalization as a model with which to explain broader peasant radicalization, the struggles of the revolutionaries (including Sun and Mao) against steep odds, and the dazzling successes of the PRC, and in so doing helps us understand the mechanics of these commemorations perhaps more deeply than any other speaker.

As for Miyazaki Seimin, he represented a Japanese-Chinese interest group called the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association (his title is presented as *Rizhongyou xielishi zhang*, or assistant director of *Rizhongyou*) and delivered a speech hailing Sun as a great Asian revolutionary and a moral compass. He invoked both his own family ties to Sun, his childhood memories of Sun, and the historical memory of Japanese Tang official Abe no Nakamaro throughout his speech. Doing so allowed Miyazaki to establish his own authority, as someone with close if indirect ties to Sun and as a Japanese friend of China, as well as to illustrate the ideals of Sino-Japanese cooperation and the intertwined cultural, historical, and national roots of China and Japan. Miyazaki stated,

> Japan and China are two neighbors separated by a sea. Therefore, it is plain as can be that two nations have an extremely long and rich history of interaction.

不但胜利地完成了新民主主义革命，而且在社会主义革命和建设中取得了光辉的成就。。。 那末，我们现在为什么还要来纪念孙中山呢？我想，这是为了使我们永远怀念中国民主革命时期这位坚定不移、百折不挠的革命家，中国伟大的革命先行者。”
Everybody knows about Abe no Nakamaro, China’s Jianzhen Heshang, and others, those who—through their bravery and wisdom—made outstanding contributions to the futures of two nations. In this process of mutual exchange, how much influence Japanese culture had in China, I don’t really know. What we think really matters is that, over the long and friendly course of this exchange, Chinese culture had a deep and lasting influence on the lives of the Japanese nation and our forebears.  

Miyazaki was keen to play up the cultural connections between China and Japan, reaching into the past to provide evidence of a friendship that more recent events had perhaps called into question. Given that he was a guest, his flattery of his Chinese hosts is not surprising and perhaps natural, seeing as the Japanese invasion had only concluded some twenty-one years earlier.

Later in his address, Miyazaki noted Sun’s high expectations for the “capitalist Japan” of the Meiji era and lauded Sun’s 1924 speech in Kobe, lamenting that Japanese then did not heed his admonitions. The speech in Kobe is generally

197 Miyazaki Seimin, “Rizhongyou xieli shizhang Gongqi Shimin de Jianghua” (Sino-Japanese Friendship Committee Manager Miyazaki Seimin’s Remarks), People’s Daily, November 13, 1966, 4. The original text is: “日本和中国,是一海相隔的邻邦。因此,两个民族之间的来往历史有着极为长期而丰富的内容,是理所当然的事。大家都知道,日本的阿部仲麻吕和中国的鉴真和尚等人,曾以他们的勇气和智慧,为两个民族的友好往来作出了卓越的贡献。在这个相互往来的过程中,日本的文化给予中国多大影响,我是不大了解的。我们认为重要的是,在这个悠久的友好往来的历史中,中国文化深深地渗透到日本民族即我们祖先的生活之中。”

198 Ibid.
cited as Sun’s articulation of a Sunist Pan-Asianism, in which the Ways of the King and the Hegemon stand opposed. The Kingly Way (wangdao) is the Way of the sagely kings of old, the Way of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety that takes Yao and Shun as its North Star; the Hegemonic Way (badao) is the Way of the hegemon-warlords of Chunqiu and chaos, the Way of violence, coercion, and intimidation that takes Xiang Yu, Cao Cao, and Alexander as models.\(^{199}\) In Sun’s binary, the Western powers adopted the Way of the Hegemons, relying upon gunboats, conglomerates, and law to dominate weaker nations, while the ideal path of the Eastern nations is the spiritually-whole path of virtue, good governance, and good living. Japan, with its colonization of Korea and Taiwan, its seizure of Shandong and the Carolines, its Meiji Restoration, had begun to walk the path of the hegemons, but it was not too late to return to the good and right wangdao.

Miyazaki lamented that Japan continued along the badao. He concludes by stating that, if the recent war had any lessons, it taught that Japan needed a good relationship with China to enjoy any sort of peace or prosperity.\(^{200}\) Sun, a Chinese revolutionary who spent much time in Japan and had many Japanese allies (Yamada Yoshimasa\(^ {201}\) and Miyazaki Torazo\(^ {202}\) being two), was a fine symbol for the Sino-Japanese friendship that ought always be, and so was as worthy of Japanese admiration and commemoration as Chinese. Moreover, by advancing China along the

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\(^{199}\) Chao Hsun-ta, “Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism in Taiwan”, 87.

\(^{200}\) Miyazaki Seimin. The original text is: “第二次世界大战后, 日本人民通过这个惨痛的教训, 深刻地认识到日本不同中国友好, 就不可能有和平和繁荣, 从而, 对孙文先生向日本人民提出的劝告有了进一步的体会。”

\(^{201}\) Wang Jingwei, “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism”, 2752.

\(^{202}\) Bergère, 73.
path of democratic revolution, he aided the world revolution, and so was only more laudable. Miyazaki concluded by hoping that Japan and China could team together to stand against the “paper tiger” of American imperialism.

He Xiangning, once again speaking in her capacity as head of the GMD Revolutionary Committee, rehashed the basic list of Sun’s achievements. Helpfully, she was quite clear in her list: peasant-born Sun led the Xinhai Revolution, overthrew the monarchical system, opposed constitutional monarchy and reformists, and discarded the old TPP (nationalism, democracy, and land equalization) in favor of the new TPP (alliance with the Leninist USSR, alliance with the CCP, alliance with the workers and the peasants).²⁰³ Sun gradually learned to rely on force of arms, unite with the masses, work on achieving democratic revolution, and focus on opposing foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism (ie the warlords). She credited him with some new achievements: he was the first Chinese to use the term “revolution”²⁰⁴ in the late days of the Qing Dynasty and articulated the Land to the Tiller policy as part of the Principle of the People’s Welfare, thereby supporting later Communist land-reform initiatives.

Notably, He rhetorically equated Sun to Mao in discussing her own revolutionary trajectory. “I’m old,” she proclaimed, “but what I can take comfort in is this: during the stage of democratic revolution, I followed Sun Yat-sen, and now in

²⁰⁴ Her exact comment is as follows: “Dr. Sun was the first in the most recent hundred years of Chinese history to use the word ‘revolution’. He started using ‘revolution’ over seventy years ago.” The original text is: “孙先生是中国近百年史中，第一个提出“革命”的人。他开始使用“革命”这两个字，是在七十多年前了。”
the stage of socialist revolution, I follow Mao.” Such an equation once again furthered the connections between the great revolutionary forebear being commemorated and the great revolutionary helmsman, and so furthered Mao’s personal legitimacy as well as safeguarded the reputation of Sun. After all, if Sun was the Mao of that era, then wouldn’t criticizing him be similar to criticizing Mao? Therefore, this comment can also be seen as an attempt to safeguard those connected with Sun, like longtime Tongmenghui member and ally of Sun He Xiangning, during a time of great political unrest. He was keen to emphasize her support for the Cultural Revolution, framing it as a lesson from Sun. Even though Sun was old by the time he allied with the CCP and the Soviet Union, his lifelong pursuit and recalibration of revolution illustrated that he never rested on his laurels, and so neither should she. Keeping up with the times and advancing revolution meant supporting the Cultural Revolution.

Though new details emerged to accommodate new political realities, the general narrative of Sun produced in 1966 is similar to that of 1956. Sun, the democratic revolutionary forebear, did many things to advance revolution in China, and should be remembered for his great contributions that, in turn, led to the ongoing socialist revolution. The particulars—such as Mao’s greatness, the urgency of defeating American imperialism and its new ally Soviet revisionism, and the importance of constant revolution—largely reflect the political shifts of the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution.

v: The Father of Modern China!—Commemorating Sun’s 120th Birthday
By 1976, New China was changing once more. Chairman Mao Zedong, the Great Helmsman himself, passed away in September of that year; Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the People’s Republic, passed away that February. Song Qingling had largely retired from the public eye and He Xiangning had passed away some years earlier. Most urgently, a campaign against the Gang of Four (articles denouncing the Gang and its members take up the rest of the front page) and the chaos of “their” Cultural Revolution was at full-steam in the press. We may note as well that Chiang Kai-shek, the eternal face of the GMD “running dogs”, had passed away in 1975, and the United States had semi-normal diplomatic relations with the PRC as of the establishment of Liaison Offices in 1973, thus undermining the main constructed enemies of earlier Sun commemorations. Soviet revisionism still existed, however, but the Chinese technocrats were now vying for control. In any case, many living connections to Sun were now gone, and so commemorations would never again be so personal or varied.

Presumably because of these changes, one finds few details related to Sun commemorations in the People’s Daily of 1976. The only article I found was one in which some B-list political figures observe a ceremony in Beijing. The article included few details on the ceremony itself and is similar in form to overview articles presented in 1956 and 1966 issues; however, unlike those years, there are no other articles that provide the printed speeches. They also seem to have lost a great deal of symbolic weight, judging by the sparse coverage and lackluster attendance. Though Song was alive at this point, she did not attend the Beijing ceremony, as other things were taking precedence in November of 1976.
Figure 3: The November 12, 1976 issue.

Skipping ahead, much had changed between 1966 and 1986. As stated above, the importance of Mao Zedong’s death cannot be overstated. Following his death, the ouster of the Gang of Four, and the fall of Hua Guofeng and his “whatever-ism”, Deng Xiaoping and the technocratic faction of the CCP took control of the state. Reform, once a dirty word, was now the slogan of the day. Deng’s “Reform and
Opening Up” (gaige kaifang) changed much about Chinese society, and would eventually lead to the collapse or radical transformation of many fixtures of Mao-era life, social, economic, and political. Various products of the reform movements included “market socialism”, the monetization of the renminbi, the dissolution of communes and reconfiguration of work-units, and the undermining of Mao’s revolutionary culture in favor of Dengist pragmatism and gradualism.\(^\text{205}\) It was a most unrevolutionary time to commemorate a revolutionary forebear, but 1986 saw a sizeable commemoration. As it was the 120\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary of Sun’s birth, this ceremony marked the conclusion of two sexagenary cycles. Articles were published on relevant topics on both November 12\(^{\text{th}}\) and 13\(^{\text{th}}\).

The November 12\(^{\text{th}}\) articles are varied, covering the opening of new exhibits relating to Sun Yat-sen, announcing the release of a commemorative coin to mark the occasion, a poem by a Song Dan\(^\text{206}\) titled “Zhongshan Mausoleum”, and various commemorative articles. The coin, released by a joint Beijing-Hong Kong company, illustrates the key role of Hong Kong in opening up the Chinese economy by providing a middleman between the still-insular socialist economy and the global marketplace.\(^\text{207}\) A common theme of the commemorative articles is that Sun was a great nationalist and figure of modernization. The shifting portrayal illustrates the


\(^\text{206}\) It is unclear who Song Dan was. Perhaps this Song Dan is the same as the Lieutenant General Song Dan who attended the Nineteenth National Congress, but I find no conclusive evidence to support that beyond his name and his having a plausible age, being born in 1951.

political shift in priorities from socialist revolution (either on universal “scientific” Soviet terms or on particular “red soil” Chinese terms) to “socialist development”. The transcript of Peng Zhen’s keynote address in the November 13th issue only further suggests this.

On the fourth page of the November 12 issue, Deng Yingchao—widow of Zhou Enlai—and Huang Jianqiu, described Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary nationalist whose primary goal was “catching up with the West” and creating “a strong and prosperous nation-state” (*minfu bingqiang de guojia*). They justified the Xinhai Revolution by stating that modernization was not possible in “semi-colonial, semi-feudal China”, and so the Qing monarchy had to be removed if China was to modernize. While prior addresses made little point of justifying the Xinhai Revolution, it is interesting that Deng and Huang felt the need to.

Huang and Deng did not invoke the term “hypo-colony” (*cizhimindi*) but rather “semi-colony” (*banzhimindi*) in commemorating Sun. This reflects that the

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208 Deng Yingchao and Huang Jianqiu, “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Danzhen Yibaiershizhounian” (Commemorating the 120th Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s Birth), *People’s Daily*, November 12, 1986, 4.

209 Sun famously termed China “a hypo-colony”, a colony of many rather than a colony of one. Much less than being a semi-colony, which Lenin defined as a country on the verge of being colonized, or an outright colony, a nation dominated by another politically (and, Lenin would emphasize, economically), China was essentially “the slave of any country that had a treaty” due to the pernicious cycle of imperial bullying, concessions, and piling concessions due to “most-favored nation” clauses in many treaties. This meant that if France exacted new concessions from the Qing, then Britain could claim these for Britain, as a “most-favored nation” was to get the best possible treatment. Effectively, this meant that if one state pressured China further, many states would then be able to claim these concessions for themselves. Sun described this as being the slave of many rather than one, and this meant that not only was China a slave-nation, but a slave lacking even a master duty-bound to provide basic support. Truly, there was nothing more pitiful than a hypo-colony in Sun’s eyes, and any attempt to describe China as a “semi-colony” was a vain attempt to avoid the sordid reality of things.
authors, in their capacity as writers for the government mouthpiece People’s Daily, did not necessarily subscribe to Sunist understandings of Chinese history, and so illustrate that the CCP at large did not either. This is no different than from the earlier commemorations in the sense that neither subscribed to Sunist understandings of history, preferring instead dialectical history and Leninist categories. However, Huang and Deng feel the need to justify the 1911 revolution. This is a departure from 1956 and 1966, in which revolution against the Qing monarchy was good and not needing much justification. The means by which they justify it are also odd in the context of ’56 and ’66: modernization was impossible under the Qing monarchy. In a sense, this is similar to saying that history could not progress without the overthrow of the feudal regime, but the term “modernization” with the explicit goal of “catching up to the West” suggest a new understanding of history based upon developmentalism along the lines of Western modernity. Chinese Communists had preferred terms like progress and struggle, but the Dengist shift to goals of modernization according to capitalist standards seems to suggest several possibilities. One is that the Party had abandoned claims to have already completed the democratic revolution if they now sought to meet the standards of bourgeois capitalism; a second possibility is that the characteristics of what constituted socialism officially—as deigned by the CCP—had shifted.

Huang and Deng emphasized that the current goal was to establish a prosperous and culturally vibrant socialist state, indicating that official rhetoric of being in the stage of socialist revolution had not changed. They lauded Sun’s New Three People’s Principles, now seemingly recast as “treating the CCP and socialism
as friends, allying with the CCP, relying on the masses”, as well as Sun’s constant “revision” (xiuzheng) and progress to keep up with the times.\textsuperscript{210} They emphasized learning from other countries and Sun’s plans for national construction over his revolutionary activities. Finally, they concluded with an appeal for unification with Taiwan. While in 1956 and 1966 Taiwan was seen as the outpost of U.S. imperialism as supported by its running dogs Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists, traitorous to Sun and China, in 1986 and afterwards the CCP began striking a more conciliatory tone when it came to appeals for unification. Sun’s major dream was now framed as national unity; what a shame it is Taiwan had yet to return to China! Only when the nation was whole could national construction truly reach fruition, and so it was imperative that the GMD in Taiwan realize their shared interest with the CCP and come back into the fold. Only then would Sun’s dreams be realized. In this case, Sun was still used as a weapon against the Taipei GMD, but no longer to delegitimate; rather, the goal now was to pressure them into cooperating with Beijing.

This focus on bringing the Taipei GMD back into the fold was echoed, unsurprisingly, in a GMD Revolutionary Committee lecture on the need for a Third United Front. The First United Front was initiated in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen to build the GMD into a Leninist revolutionary party for the purpose of pursuing national unification, while the Second United Front was initiated in 1936 by the CCP and Zhang Xueliang by pressuring Chiang Kai-shek into alliance at gunpoint for the purpose of focusing CCP and GMD efforts against the encroaching Japanese. Now, in 1986, it was time for a Third United Front under the auspices of a new policy—One

\textsuperscript{210} Deng and Huang, \textit{People’s Daily}, 4.
Country, Two Systems—to build a strong and prosperous China according to the standards of the modern, capitalist nations while still advancing along the road of socialism.\textsuperscript{211} The policy of One Country, Two Systems was designed to dissuade ROC fears of outright Communist takeover, and was to be substantiated by the examples of Hong Kong and Macao following their reabsorption into the PRC as special administrative regions in the late 1990s.

Other articles from this Reform-era commemoration come from various sources and cover various topics. One article, a travel article promoting Sun’s old home in Cuiheng, reinforced a narrative of progress and so lauded the accomplishments of the CCP while also illustrating the rising importance of advertising in the market-socialist economy. Another, covering Shanghai mayor Jiang Zemin’s speech for the Shanghai commemorations, emphasized Sun’s nationalism and his spiritual contributions to liberation, while one at the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou connects \textit{tianxiaweigong} to \textit{yixinweiguo de jingshen}.\textsuperscript{212} Notably, this seems to be the first year examined in which Sun ceremonies were carried out nationwide and not solely in Beijing. A Xu Xianzhong continued to emphasize Sun’s opposition to the reformists, and so we can see that not all reform was created equal;

\textsuperscript{212} “\textit{Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Danzhen 120 Zhounian}” (Commemorating the 120\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s Birth), \textit{People’s Daily}, November 12, 1986, 6.

I leave this in romanization because translation of \textit{tianxiaweigong} is itself reflective of the politics of Sun interpretation. One standard is “all under Heaven is for the common good”. This is connected to “the spirit of putting the heart and mind in service to the country”, and so further illustrates Sun’s nationalism. At least as far as the Columbus Park statue is concerned, “All are equal” has replaced “All under Heaven is a commonwealth” as of November, 2019.
to distinguish the Reform and Opening Up from the Hundred Days’ Reform, the Qing had to be made an obstacle to the primary good of modernization, whereas the Party was the tool for executing modernization.213

Peng Zhen’s address, made on November 12 and printed in the November 13th issue, reinforced these statements, with some variations.214

Figure 4: The November 13, 1986 issue.


214 Peng Zhen was a longtime CCP member who had fallen afoul of Mao Zedong and was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. He was later rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping and the reformists; in 1986, he was the chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress.
Sun was to be honored for his nationalism and his thought on national construction. He struggled all his life for the salvation of the Chinese nation and its poor, suffering masses, bestowing upon the them the “thought-weapon” (sixiang wuqi) of the Three People’s Principles. Sun’s openness to learning from others, his general openness (kaifangzhuyi), his cultural confidence all stood to inspire Chinese everywhere. Peng concluded by emphasizing the great achievements that came with past United Fronts, pitching One Country, Two Systems as a good deal for Taiwan, and appealing to Chinese at home and abroad (that is, overseas Chinese) to follow Sun’s thought and to unite for the strengthening of China.

In summary, 1986 commemorations differ chiefly in their recasting of Sun. His revolutionary contributions to the realization of bourgeois democracy are no longer emphasized; rather, chief is his nationalism, his drive for establishing a modern China, and a vague sense of revolutionary commitment to the nation.

vi: Commemorating Sun’s 150th Birthday—Live from Beijing!

On November 11th, 2016, a live ceremony was hosted in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 150th birthday of Sun Yat-sen. It is unclear if other ceremonies had been televised live before this. To mark the ceremony, Xi Jinping, the first Paramount Leader of the PRC since Deng Xiaoping, gave a long address to the assembly there. Notably, Xi was the third of three sitting Secretaries-General of the Chinese Communist Party to deliver keynote remarks on

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such an occasion, the first being Mao Zedong himself in 1956 and the second being Jiang Zemin in 1996. In his remarks, Xi Jinping emphasized Sun Yat-sen’s great contribution to the Chinese nation, his high moral character, and his love of country. Xi began his talk stating:

We are gathered here today to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s birth, cherishing his timeless contributions to the independence of the nation, the progress of society, and the happiness of the people, taking note of revolutionary spirit and his superior moral qualities, and encouraging all Chinese sons and daughters, at home and abroad, to join in the struggle to realize the great revival of the Chinese nation.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a great hero of the people, a great patriot, a great forebear of the Chinese democratic revolution. He dedicated his life to the revolution, to saving the state and its people, and wrote an outstanding contribution to the annals of the Chinese nation.216

Xi’s introduction clearly framed Sun as a superior person, a great nationalist, and a forebear of the democratic revolution. Somewhat unlike earlier CCP narratives, which emphasized Sun’s humility and acknowledged his many flaws, the Sun of Xi’s rhetoric is a lofty hero and patriot. According to Xi, Sun was responsible for founding the Revive China Society, the Tongmenghui, for articulating the Three People’s Principles, for leading the Xinhai Revolution, for opposing warlordism, for allying with the CCP, for updating the Old Three People’s Principles into the New Three People’s Principles, and for guiding the democratic revolution through the GMD and the Northern Expedition.

The political use of Sun is perhaps more obvious in Xi’s speech than in any other CCP discussed here. He goes into great length discussing the lessons of Sun for

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the CCP, “Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary heirs”:

The members of the Chinese Communist Party are the most fervent supporters, the most loyal partners, the most faithful heirs of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary work. Before he passed away, CCP members resolutely supported Sun’s work. After he passed away, CCP members faithfully followed Sun’s will, uniting to lead the whole country’s people, of all races, in heroic struggle, continuing forward, offering great sacrifices to complete Sun Yat-sen’s unfinished work: using the New Three People’s Principles to take victory in the revolution, building a People’s Republic of China in which the people are the masters of the house, realizing national independence and the people’s liberation. On this basis, the CCP members unite to lead the Chinese people forward in struggle to complete the socialist revolution and to establish a socialist system.

In the sixty-seven years since the establishment of New China—particularly in the last thirty years since the Reform and Opening Up—the Chinese people have experienced great leaps and dazzling success on the road of socialism under the leadership of the CCP. Today, we can tell Dr. Sun that, yes, we are closer than at any point in history to realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation, and have more confidence and capability to do so than at any other point.218

218 Xi Jinping, *Xinhua*. The original text is: “中国共产党人是孙中山先生革命事业最坚定的支持者、最忠诚的合作者、最忠实的继承者。在他生前，中国共产党人坚定支持孙中山先生的事业。在他身后，中国共产党人忠实继承孙中山先生的遗志，团结带领全
Of course, as in all CCP commemorations, a key aspect of this revival is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China; Xi reiterates that “both sides of the Strait” are flesh and blood and have a shared destiny. Moreover, reunification is the “sacred duty” of the Chinese, at home and overseas, and is framed as a key facet of Sun Yat-sen’s plan for national revival. Xi explicitly stated that the CCP were the loyal heirs of Sun and that they were indeed closer to realizing his mission, defined as the great revival of the Chinese nation, than at any point in history. By using the occasion to inform a dead Sun of this progress towards his revolutionary goals, Xi used the opportunity to celebrate the successes of the CCP and to reinforce its claims to revolutionary legitimacy.

To further reinforce the CCP as Sun’s most dedicated students and heirs, Xi listed the key lessons for all Chinese, regardless of party membership or formal citizenship, to learn and live: his “fervent patriotism” and “devotion of self to the nation”; his “tianxia wei gong” spirit and “great compassion for the people”; his “relentless pursuit of truth” and his “keeping current with the times”; his “unshakeable, dauntless revolutionary spirit”.

Concluding his remarks, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of Sun Yat-
In over five millennia, the Chinese nation has, in the course of its own development, already produced outstanding contributions to the human race. In coming times, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation will inevitably produced yet greater contributions for the great work of peace and development!

Comrades, friends!

Dr. Sun Yat-sen said back then: “Using four-hundred million common people, the abundance of many thousands of miles of land, if we work to make it great, then we can have no match under Heaven,” “I only hope that you, gentlemen, will take this great task of reviving China upon your own shoulders.” In his final days, Sun Yat-sen exhorted, “The revolution is not yet finished, comrades—continue to work hard!” Realizing the modernization of China, the revival of the Chinese nation, the shared prosperity of the Chinese people—we still have a long way to go and many obstacles to overcome.

I call upon all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and the esteemed Sun Yat-sen, including mainland compatriots, Hong Kong and Macao compatriots, Taiwan compatriots, and overseas compatriots, regardless of party beliefs, regardless of where you are, to unite more closely, to take hold of this historic opportunity, to take up this historic responsibility and to push forward in the great revolutionary work of Sun Yat-sen and our other revolutionary forebears! Strive onward with the great work for which all
dreamers and idealists have, since the dawn of the modern era, struggled so dearly! Strive onward with the great revolutionary work for which all modern Chinese have struggled so dearly!219

Xi’s final charge illustrates the narrative in miniature. Regardless of Sun’s specific work, his work was—in a larger sense—the work of the Chinese national revival. He was not the only one to pursue this work; rather, this work has been the province of all Chinese, and thus is made a national mission for all Chinese, regardless of party-membership, citizenship, or place of residence. Sun Yat-sen, being a figure of vague beliefs, shifting party allegiances, and transnational connection, thus serves as a central figure in this work, an example of devotion to nation for all to follow. Plainly, this narrative of Sun simplifies much about his life, such as his own turn to warlordism, his somewhat questionable romantic life, his questionable claims to leadership of his own revolutionary organizations—to say nothing of the Xinhai Revolution. These inconveniences are buffed out to create a brilliant image of Sun, playing off Sun’s existing clout in the PRC and abroad, to define the CCP’s

219 Ibid. The original text is: ‘5000多年来，中华民族在自己的发展历程中已经为人类作出了伟大的贡献。未来岁月里，中国人民和中华民族也必将为人类和平与发展的崇高事业不断作出新的更大的贡献！同志们、朋友们！孙中山先生当年说：“以四百兆苍生之众，数万里土地之饶，因可发奋为雄，无敌于天下。”“惟愿诸君将振兴中国之责任，置之于自身之肩上。”孙中山先生在生命的最后时刻仍然嘱咐，革命尚未成功，同志仍须努力。实现中国现代化，实现中华民族伟大复兴，实现全体中国人民共同富裕，我们还有很长的路要走，还有很多困难和风险要去战胜。

我呼吁，所有敬仰孙中山先生的中华儿女，包括大陆同胞、港澳同胞、台湾同胞、海外侨胞，无论党派信仰，无论身在何处，更加紧密地团结起来，把握历史机遇，担当历史责任，把孙中山先生等一切革命先辈为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！把近代以来一切仁人志士为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！把近代以来中国人民和中华民族为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！’
revolutionary values, to reiterate the need for unification with Taiwan, and to bring overseas Chinese and *gangtai’ao*. Chinese into the fold of the great Chinese national revival—the true work of Sun and his true descendants, the CCP.

**vii: Conclusion**

In conclusion, the standard CCP narrative of Sun as presented in commemorative articles presents the image of a democratic revolutionary pioneer who toppled the Qing and struggled for the sake of China, eventually meeting his helpful allies the Communists. Specifics vary by decade: in 1956, the Soviet Union is in, Bandung was recent, and Sun was an inspiration to anti-colonial movements worldwide; in 1966, the Soviet Union was out, Vietnam was underway, and Sun was the Mao of his era; in 1986, Maoism was out, reform was in, and Sun was a modernizing nationalist above all else. This narrative remains as of 2016, the most recent decennial celebration of Sun, though certain particulars have changed. The redefinition of Sun Yat-sen in these official state ceremonies serves to illustrate changing top-level priorities in the PRC in different decades. The ceremonies, additionally, served as opportunities for political maneuvering, with Sun’s allies redefining Sun to make him politically palatable for different times, and, in doing so, safeguarding their own positions. Alternatively, the ceremonies served as opportunities to humiliate political rivals, as the 1966 humiliation of Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De by unknown parties, presumably of the pro-Cultural Revolution flanks,

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220 Hong Kong (*xianggang*), Taiwan, and Macao (*Aomen*) are sometimes referred to in tandem as *gangtai’ao*, particularly in PRC airports.
We might think back to the Indian Communist M. N. Roy’s narrative of Sun for comparison. To Roy, Sun was constantly a petit-bourgeois schemer bungling his way through insurrectionary efforts, finally redeeming himself somewhat through accepting Soviet aid and advice, allying with the Chinese Communist Party, and doing away with the more reactionary elements of his past revolutionary efforts. This distinction is presumably explained by the fact that Roy, an internationalist with a rigid understanding of history as social science, disliked Sun’s nationalistic revolution and Sun’s sloppy, inconsistent revolutionary efforts; the CCP, being a national Communist organization, likes Sun’s nationalism. Both found him useful. For Roy, Sun, his times, and his ilk explain, in part, the failure of the socialist revolution in China; for the CCP, Sun provided a link to the past that allows for useful, becoming contrast with the present as well as link that further legitimates the CCP as the home and hero of Chinese nationalism. Of course, the CCP is not a monolithic entity, and so we see that there are multiple variations on Sun the Communist forebear.
III

SHADES OF BLUE, SHADES OF GREEN: SUN YAT-SEN &
THE BEAUTIFUL ISLE

“History is revised as I like it.”
—Chthonic, “Rage of My Sword” (大械鬥)

i: Introduction

As the GMD’s political fortunes decline and as Taiwanese identity increasingly sheds connection to China, figures like Sun are being redefined to better fit new understandings of nationhood in Taiwan. The overall effect is to make Sun more relevant to a society increasingly distant from its nominal status as the Republic of China. To examine this redefinition, I will explore how representations of Sun Yat-sen have changed in Taiwan from the martial law period to today, or roughly from the 1950s through the late 2010s. To do so, I will first establish a brief historical narrative of Taiwan and how the island arrived at its present situation. Next, I will explore how Sun was discussed in martial law Taiwan and how Taiwanese became implicated as particular figures in the greater project of Chinese nationalism. Third, I will explore a shift in post-liberalization Taiwan to a more native, or bentu, political environment and how this creates an awkward situation for the Guomindang and its associated symbols, like Sun Yat-sen; I focus on one text, a zhuan narrative of the Taiwanese nationalist Chiang Wei-shui that also features Sun to consider how Sun is apparently being redefined in a way that is politically palatable for the Pan-Green camp.

ii: Taiwan, China, Japan, and China
Taiwan, an island off the coast of Fujian and longtime home of Austronesian peoples, has had a complicated relationship with the Chinese nation. Large-scale Han migration to the island began around the time of the Ming-Qing transition, with most migrants hailing from the Fujianese cities of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. Various Western powers, including the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the British controlled forts on the island at some point, with the Dutch Fort Zeelandia in Tainan and the Spanish Fort Domingo in Tamsui the most famous. Following the Qing conquest of the pirate king and Ming loyalist Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), the island would formally be made a prefecture of Fujian Province, a status it would hold until the end of the 19th century. As part of Qing modernization reforms designed to strengthen the court’s claim to the island in light of pressure from Japanese expansionism and Western imperialism, Taiwan was reorganized as a province in 1885. Modernization projects, such as the establishment of Taipei as the new capital and the building of a railroad from Keelung to Hsinchu, evinced the ambition and failures of the Qing reform movements. While the capital move went smoothly, the 63-mile-long railroad—the first planned leg of a railroad connecting all the Taiwanese West Coast—proved rickety and could not be used.221

Following the First Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which formalized its conclusion, the isle of Taiwan was ceded to Japan “in perpetuity”, along with the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) and the Liaodong Peninsula.222 This

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222 Other treaty provisions, such as the recognition of an independent Korean Empire, the payment of indemnities to Japan, and the granting of most-favored nation status to Japan, were perhaps more immediately important. Indeed, the cession of Liaodong to Japan
cession of Taiwan to Japan—though it did not endure—proved critical to the island’s development. Though Taiwan had been a peripheral area of the Qing Empire, it became a model colony for the Japanese Empire. Governors-general like Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei oversaw extensive modernization programs. These programs ranged from the building of the aforementioned railroad, the development of Taipei into a modern colonial capital, the introduction of new cash crops, and the foundation of tropical medicine institutions.\(^{223}\) Gotō would be particularly important for biological views of race, fitness, governance, and national health in the development of multiple administrative systems for Taiwan and in the field of public hygiene in the Japanese empire more generally.\(^{224}\)

Taiwan would not be as critical a colony as Korea. Thereafter, the rhetorical “dagger pointing at the heart of Japan”\(^{225}\) became a center of industry for Japan following its 1910 annexation. Taiwan, nonetheless, would be crucial geopolitically as a southern foothold in the Pacific, agriculturally for tropical and subtropical crops, and politically as a poster child for the munificence and benevolence of Japanese imperialism. To be recognized as a great power, Japan needed lucrative and useful colonies, and so Taiwan was indeed integral to the forging of a new imperial Japanese

\(^{223}\) Fraser, 98.
image. Old-growth Taiwanese cedar trees would come to form the grand *torii* gates of the Meiji Shrine in central Tokyo, a material affirmation of the imperial grandeur of the Meiji Emperor and the growing Japanese empire.  

During Japanese administration, Han Taiwanese and Aboriginal Taiwanese were held apart from Japanese Taiwanese. The predominant population group of the “civilized zones”, Han were effectively second-class citizens; aboriginals, in the “savage zones”, were classified as part of “scientific” administration and subjected to great restrictions on the freedom of movement. Partly as a result of this second-class status and partly as a result of a rising anti-imperialist movement inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and nationalists in China, Korea, and elsewhere, Taiwanese nationalists like Lin Xiantang and Chiang Wei-shui actively opposed the ruling Japanese administrators. The Taiwanese independence movement of the 1920s, largely a bourgeois democratic movement (to borrow Marxist terms), would not succeed in establishing Taiwan as an independent nation. Rather, as Japanese imperialism intensified, in the terms of Louise Young, the Han Taiwanese and Aboriginal Taiwanese needed to be integrated into the national polity (*kokutai*) as coequal “subjects of the Emperor” (*sekishii*, lit. “infants”). This *dōka undo* (lit. “assimilation movement”) was not unique to Taiwan; indeed, it was prominent in Korea as well. However, given Taiwan’s ethnic composition, assimilation was particularly important:

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226 Observed during a visit to the Meiji Shrine in Shibuya, Tokyo in August, 2019.
227 Paul Barclays, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s Savage Border 1874-1945* (University of California Press, 2018), 212.
The movement to convert Taiwanese into ‘loyal subjects of the emperor of Japan’ began at this point. This movement quickly involved Taiwanese of all ranks in ‘patriotic service’, and labor service became one way to show devotion to the nation. The fact that the war was waged against China—the origins of most Taiwanese or at least of their ancestors—complicated Japan’s labor operations: logically Taiwanese had to be completely converted into Japanese before they could be deployed to the front.229

In an effort to make good Japanese subjects out of the Taiwanese and Koreans, the two peoples of Japan’s largest and most integral directly-administered colonies, colonial students were educated in Japanese. Colonial subjects in both Korea and Taiwan were made to take Japanese names and speak Japanese in official and public circumstances. The imperial religion of modern Shintoism was also introduced through the construction and veneration of shrines in the colonies. During the Second Sino-Japanese War and the later Pacific Theater of the Second World War, Taiwanese would serve as soldiers, interpreters, and support-labor for the Imperial cause, many at least nominally as volunteers.230

Following Japan’s defeat, Taiwan’s status was uncertain. Though it was a colony of Japan, it had been taken long before Japan’s “hot” 1930s and, unlike Korea, Taiwan had no prior history as an independent nation. In any case, Japan had not formally relinquished claims of sovereignty over the island in surrender. The


230 Ibid. 106-7,111.
Republic of China unilaterally declared the Retrocession of Taiwan in 1945, reclaiming it as a province of China and introducing it, for the first time, as a province of the Republic of China.\textsuperscript{231} What amounted essentially to the annexation of Taiwan by the irredentist ROC was supported implicitly by its wartime ally the United States, which was then occupying Japan and exerting a heavy influence on Japanese affairs.

Many Taiwanese chafed under the new GMD regime. ROC officials, police, and soldiers appeared less trustworthy and less competent than the old Japanese administrators, and some Taiwanese continued to actively identify with their lost connection to Japanese empire. Others experienced no nostalgia for Japanese rule but had advocated an independent Taiwanese state and so could not be satisfied as one small province of the gargantuan ROC. Most simply suffered as the Republican administrators brought the chaos and corruption of mainland China, battered by the disastrous Japanese invasion and further destabilized by the resumption of GMD-CCP civil war, to the formerly insulated island. Under the administration of Chen Yi, grain was exported from Taiwan to the mainland to support Nationalist troops and population centers, driving up prices in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the GMD took over Japanese state monopolies and used them to bolster the regime’s coffers while also pursuing a “de-Japanification” campaign.\textsuperscript{232}


This effectively settled the matter of Taiwan’s future status, though legally it was not until the 1952 Treaty of Taipei that the Japanese government formally renounced claims of sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores.

\textsuperscript{232} Chien-Jung Hsu, \textit{The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan's Media, 1896-2012} (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2014), 67. The last Japanese language news article printed in official...
These monopolies were peripherally related to a defining moment in post-war Taiwanese history. In 1947, a dispute between a black-market cigarette vendor and Taipei police enforcing the state tobacco monopoly became violent, with the police firing into an angry crowd, killing one. This led to an island-wide outcry. The provincial governor Chen Yi met the resultant protests with ruthless military suppression. The 2-28 Incident, named for the initial protest’s date of February 28th, 1947, came to clearly mark the coercive power of the new regime, its willingness to use force against dissent, and the relative powerlessness of the civilian population.\(^\text{233}\) Many of the slain or disappeared were Taiwanese nationalists (including Taidu nationalists and Zhonghua nationalists), elites with wealth from the Japanese era, and other politically-active or prominent groups.\(^\text{234}\) The crackdown reinforced GMD control and served to severely weaken local resistance.

The general trajectory of Taiwanese history during the martial law period is marked by the cessation of American aid to the GMD, the GMD loss of the mainland, the end of Operation National Glory, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance, the “Economic Miracle”, and the end of the martial law period in the late 1980s. The Guomindang declared martial law in 1948 as a result of the increasingly dire position of the Nanjing government on the Chinese mainland. This order was extended to Taiwan Province in spring of 1949 as the war situation grew yet bleaker. Following

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\(^\text{233}\) Some five to ten thousand people were killed or disappeared during the crackdown. Chen Yi was relieved of his position by the Nanjing regime shortly thereafter and was blamed for the excesses of the event, which presaged a period of White Terror in Taiwan.

\(^\text{234}\) Ibid. 70.
the Nationalists’ retreat from the mainland in late 1949, Mainlanders (largely known in Taiwan as *waishengren*, or “people from other provinces”) began to occupy privileged positions throughout Taiwanese society. The ROC apparatus emphasized state-owned enterprise at this time, with the result that most of Taiwan’s larger firms were owned by the state, and these were largely operated by Mainlanders. Native Taiwanese (*benturen*, or Han Taiwanese who had lived in Taiwan before the Nationalists’ retreat) largely worked outside the government-controlled sectors of the economy or as lower-level employees within it. Legislative representation cast the ROC as it had looked during the election of 1948; representatives from the lost provinces held their seats, as no elections could be held in the lost territories to replace them. This rendered Taiwan a disproportionately tiny voice in a legislature with little authority beyond Taiwan Province and the coastal marches of Fujian. This limitation based on provincial population also limited the number of Taiwanese who could join the civil service.

After the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, American aid resumed and would prove instrumental in GMD development programs. The GMD gradually moved away from its SOE-centric development model over the course of the 1950s and implemented land reform reminiscent of reforms enacted in Japan under the American occupation forces. This land reform, designed and implemented under the charge of Chen Cheng, was ideologically linked to Sun Yat-sen’s “land to

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236 Hsu, 58-59.
the tiller” program under the Principle of the People’s Welfare.\textsuperscript{237} The reforms included new regulations on rent and landlord-tenant relations and subsequently ensured fairer treatment of tenants. New farm sizes were too small to support surplus agricultural labor,\textsuperscript{238} a feature that accelerated urbanization.\textsuperscript{239} Fearing that the Great Leap Forward on the mainland might succeed and noting dwindling American aid for Taiwan, the GMD lifted restrictions on foreign investment starting in 1959. This opened the Taiwanese economy to growing numbers of aspiring Japanese and American investors.\textsuperscript{240}

Operation National Glory, the National Army’s mission to retake the mainland for the ROC, illustrated that Chiang Kai-shek and his government had a concrete, if unsuccessful, plan to recover the Mainland through military force. By and large, however, the ROC government devoted most of its energies to the practical task of developing Taiwan as a model province. Taiwan was promoted as a cultural and societal model, not just an economic model. To this effect, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance, launched in 1966, attempted to cultivate a connection to Chinese cultural tradition. This meant that the classics were taught in school, that Confucian virtues were promoted again as in the New Life Movement of the 1930s, that Peking opera was on the stage, and that \textit{Zhongyuan} (Central Plains) culture was promulgated.

\textsuperscript{237} Chen Cheng (1897-1965) was a prominent ROC general and politician who served as the governor of Taiwan Province, premier of the ROC, and later vice-president of the ROC.\textsuperscript{238} Gates, 50-51
\textsuperscript{239} F. A. Lumey, \textit{The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek} (London: Berrie and Jenkins, 1976), 67-70. Basic features included the limiting of rent to 37.5% of the harvest, mandating minimum contract lengths of six years (but allowing for termination if the tenant was two years in arrears), introducing new agricultural technology to increase yields, the forcible purchasing of land in excess of three hectares, and the consolidation of farmland.
\textsuperscript{240} Gates, 52.
on the Beautiful Isle. New buildings like the National Palace Museum and the Yuanshan Hotel in Taipei were designed to reaffirm the Sinitic identity of Taiwan. Grand, palatial, they invoked the grandeur of an imagined imperial past in the muggy concrete cityscape of fast-growing Taipei, a city that didn’t exist in any meaningful sense of the term before the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance helpfully illustrates what establishing Taiwan as the “revival base of the nation” looked like to GMD planners; it meant preserving and reifying a traditional China, standing in opulent opposition to the New China then undergoing the chaos and cultural destruction of the Cultural Revolution.

Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his eldest son Ching-kuo served as the President of the ROC. Chiang Ching-kuo oversaw Taiwan at a period of tremendous economic and infrastructural growth and launched programs like the chui Taiqing (“promoting Taiwanese youth”) initiative to “Taiwan-ize” the GMD and the state apparatus of the ROC. He famously declared that “I am also a Taiwanese,” and nominated the benturen Lee Teng-hui to serve as his Vice-President, naming him as his successor. Lee was confirmed as VP by the Legislative Yuan in 1984, and succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death in 1988. A Hakka from Taipei, a former Japanese soldier, a former Communist sympathizer, and an agricultural economist, Lee would lift martial law orders in 1988. His tenure was marked by further Taiwanization and democratization, including the direct election of presidents, in

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response to the Wild Lily Protests of 1990. He would be the first democratically elected President of the ROC and would famously frame Taiwan as the ROC-Taiwan. While not radical by the standards of Taiwanese independence activists, Lee’s characterization of the regime suggested that there was something particular about the ROC as it existed on Taiwan, and emphasized the largely Taiwanese nature of the surviving ROC. If the Republic of China was to be democratic in such a situation, it must necessarily represent and be composed of its majority of Taiwanese constituents.

Following Lee’s presidency, Taiwan has seen a back and forth between the post-authoritarian GMD (known in Taiwan often by the older appellation “KMT”) and the Democratic Progressive Party, an opposition party born from the Dangwai Movement of the 1980s. The two parties are the central institutions in Taiwan’s two main political camps today. The Pan-Blue camp, in which the chief party is the GMD, is more socially conservative. The Blue camp values Chinese national identity, and—since the Shanghai Accords of 1992—closer cooperation with the PRC. The

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242 The Wild Lily Protests of 1990 was a student protest movement that pushed for the democratic election of presidents, vice-presidents, and legislative representatives. The students occupied the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the plaza before it. Lee expressed his support and later made good on his promise to further the democratization of Taiwan’s political system, one reason he would be elected in the first popular election of an ROC president in 1996.

243 No meaningful opposition parties were allowed to participate in the Guomindang party-state of the ROC, and so dissenting politicians would run as independents “outside of the party” (dangwai). These dissenters would face intimidation, violence, and official censorship throughout the martial law period. Following a turning point at after GMD crackdown on a dangwai march for human rights in Kaohsiung, the dissenters would draw international attention, thus bringing further pressure on the Chiang Ching-kuo government to reform. Following liberalization, the DPP arise from the Dangwai Movement and would come to form one of Taiwan’s two main parties.
Pan-Green camp, led by the DPP, is more socially progressive, values Taiwanese national identity, and is wary of Beijing. Both parties are arguably Taiwanified by this point in time, with the *waishengren* having been in Taiwan for several generations, but the disagreement over the relationship between Chinese and Taiwanese identity remains a contentious issue between the two camps. Moreover, *bentu* and *waisheng* identities remain salient. Under DPP presidents Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen, the ROC-Taiwan government worked to further indigenize Taiwan and undo much of the GMD’s Sinification work. For his part, GMD president Ma Ying-jeou worked to reestablish some of Taiwan’s connections with China, both culturally and economically. This Blue-Green split is key to understanding the image of Sun Yat-sen in post-Retrocession Taiwan, as will be explicated below.

### iii: Sun, Chiang, and Changing Taiwanese Politics

During the era of GMD dictatorship and Taiwanese Sinification, official histories explicitly and deeply tied Taiwan to China. For example, in the *Pictorial History of the Republic of China*, an English-language history for foreign readers published on the occasion of Chiang Ching-kuo’s election as president in 1978, Han settlement is redefined as dating back to the Qin and Han Dynasties. The pirate-lord and Ming-loyalist Koxinga, furthermore, is made to be a great nationalist hero “able to expel the Dutch and reconstruct Taiwan as his bastion for resistance against the Manchus and restoration of the Ming Dynasty,” paralleling the GMD’s own mission following 1949.\(^{244}\) However, while the Manchus and the Communists are equated as

\(^{244}\) Much like the GMD after 1949, Koxinga was not successful in retaking the Mainland, and so this parallel is somewhat ironic.
bandit invaders that must be resisted and overcome, Qing control over Taiwan was framed as a formative moment in the development of Taiwan so as to strengthen historical ties between Taiwan and mainland China. To this effect, the late Qing officials Shen Baozhen (a high-ranking official in Taiwan Prefecture) and Liu Mingchuan (the first governor of Taiwan Province) are described as laying “the cornerstone for Taiwan’s modernization.”

Liu’s railroad project, described earlier, is reproduced here to highlight this Chinese modernization project. Further connecting Taiwan to China, stone tools are produced and described as illustrating the shared culture of the ancient Taiwanese and Chinese. Ancient maps featuring the isle of Yizhou (yi here being the same yi for the “eastern barbarians” of Chinese antiquity) and the geologically recent break of Taiwan from the Asian landmass, meanwhile, also serve to suggest an ancient and visceral connection to mainland China.

Beyond this affirmation of ancient, modern, and fundamentally organic connections with China, Japanese rule is presented as brief, cruel, oppressive, and barbaric. Japanese brutality is illustrated through photos of Japanese soldiers bayonetting and flogging Taiwanese prisoners, by a remembrance of the Wushe Incident and the associated Japanese massacre of aboriginal Taiwanese, and by photos of Japanese “narcotics manufacture”—the latter notes that Japanese “soldiers

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246 Ibid., 106-110.

We might consider that a map showing an island of barbarians in relation to China does not necessarily establish that two were closely linked, particularly as Japan, Korea, and the Ryukyu Islands are presented in a similar fashion. However, we might also recall that Chiang Kai-shek laid claim to Korea and the Ryukyu islands in China’s Destiny.

247 The Wushe Incident of late 1930 occurred when Seediq aboriginals in the village of Wushe killed some 130 Japanese out of dissatisfaction with Japanese rule of the aboriginal territories. Japanese authorities responded with martial force, killing over 600 Seediq.
of fortune” made good money pushing drugs on the Chinese mainland. However, the Taiwanese are shown at every corner resisting this rule in favor of Chinese nationalism. Quotes and figures produced include Mainland GMD politician Dai Jitao’s charge “Blood is thicker than water,” featured in the *Taiwan Minbao*. Chinese nationalists from Taiwan like Qiu Niantai, a soldier who fought against the Japanese in Taiwan before retreating to Guangdong, is celebrated for later serving as a “Chinese volunteer” against the Japanese seizure of Manchuria. Also featured is Lai Lai, a man from Miaoli who launched attacks against police stations in Taiwan after seeing the success of the Xinhai Revolution during a 1912 visit to Shanghai. Qiu and Lai had quite different fates, with Qiu becoming a high-ranking GMD member later in life and Lai being swiftly executed by the Japanese, but both figures are celebrated here to support the narrative of Taiwanese as patriotic Chinese. The chapter concludes with a section titled “President Chiang Kai-shek and the Retrocession of Taiwan”, in which the Retrocession is framed as a Sunist mission that was personally fulfilled by Chiang:

In modern times, the lot of Taiwan has been decided by the two Sino-Japanese Wars: the first one, in 1894, lost Taiwan to imperialist Japan under which Taiwan was ruled 51 years; the second was also known as China’s War of Resistance that started in 1937, lasted eight years, and finally through the

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248 Ibid., 174. Opium was legal and controlled by a state monopoly in Japanese Taiwan. Chinese nationalists interpreted Japanese state control of opium as a tool of controlling the Taiwanese and of undermining China by using Taiwan as a drug-peddling base. Opposition to the opium monopoly, as we will discuss, was a hallmark of Chiang Wei-shui’s activism.  
249 Ibid., 209.  
250 Ibid., 161
sagacious leadership of President Ciang, ended in imperialist Japan’s unconditional surrender. Taiwan was retroceded to China, and the Taiwanese again became Chinese. None can ever admire sufficiently the way President Chiang accomplished what Dr. Sun Yat-sen had set out to do long, long ago.251

That Chiang had successfully fulfilled Sun’s goals was a key point of Chiang’s carefully constructed political image in Taiwan, in which he figured as a successor, student, and equal. We may even consider that Chiang’s success in doing what Sun could not achieve in his own time may even serve to qualify Chiang as Sun’s superior in this framing, though to explicitly suggest so would perhaps be politically unwise. Indeed, if we consider that Sun veneration was a key point of the GMD’s image cultivation, undermining Sun would serve to undermine the party itself. We might consider Mao’s anti-CCP turn in the 1960s in further thinking about individual personality cults and how they related to pre-existing symbols and structures. Therefore, Chiang’s successes were framed as Sunist successes, and not as something new, although Chiang’s personal role in achieving these old goals was emphasized to glorify his name.

The above description of retrocession illustrates how official histories published in the martial law period portrayed Chiang in relation to Sun, and Sun in relation to Taiwan. To fully grasp this lineage, we must look at an earlier section in the chapter, aptly named “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Leadership of the Revolution and Its

251 Ibid., 211.
Relationship to Taiwan.” This section frames the first Canton Uprising as directly linked to the Treaty of Shimonoseki: “the cession of Taiwan and the Penghu islands…provoked a surging tide of nationalism among the people of Taiwan,” and “Dr. Sun engineered the first Canton Uprising only five days after the fall of the island province.”252 The book indeed suggests that the second branch of the Revive China Society was founded in Taiwan that year, linking “the national revolution to the recovery of Taiwan in an [sic] motivation and nexus.”253 The overview concludes with the statement that

> Though Taiwan had become estranged since 1895, the people of Taiwan never abated in their reverence for Dr. Sun…It is no accident that today Taiwan is the bastion for China’s eventual recovery and rejuvenation, to which all Chinese, on the mainland and overseas as well as in Taiwan, look for hope for the future.254

This narrative accompanies photographs and captions that illustrate Sun’s connections to Taiwan, such as Sun’s use of the island as a base for the Huizhou Uprising of 1900, and the contrasting failure of Japanese authorities in Taiwan to provide promised support. Other photos include hotels where Sun stayed, a portrait of his long-time Taiwan-based friend and ally Chen Shaobai—the founder of the RCS Taiwan branch—and a portrait of Lin Wei-ko, a wealthy Taipei resident and donor who supported the 1911 Canton Uprising. All serve to underscore Sun’s connections

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252 Ibid., 145.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
While Sun’s time in Taiwan was eminently important to the book’s narrative, more important still was the participation of Taiwanese in Chinese revolutionary organs. Chiang Wei-shui, the subject of the next section, appears in this book as just such a Chinese nationalist revolutionary from Taiwan. In a two-page spread, Chiang’s life is narrated accordingly:

Chiang Wei-shui (1891-1931) was a native of Ilan and a graduate of the Medical College in Taipei. He was heartened by the success of the revolution that established the Republic, but sorely aggrieved by Yuan Shih-kai’s imperial ambitions in 1916, so much so that he went so far as attempting to assassinate Yuan with germs. He failed, but upon return from Peking he ran a clinic and took part in the 1920 formation of the New People Society, from which time he began to engross himself with wrestling civil rights from the Japanese. With Lin Hsien-tang he co-founded the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1921, and he was so active that he attracted the attention of the Japanese authorities, who imprisoned him for a time in 1923. On his release, he founded the Taiwan Min-pao and was imprisoned again for the paper’s anti-Japanese views. In 1927, he was one of the founders of the Taiwan Min-chung Tang and persisted in an uncompromising attitude until death overtook him in August, 1931, and the party he founded also died. All through his life he was in spirit a follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and a nationalist who never

\[255\] We might consider that such connections are reminiscent of connections seen in overseas communities in Malaya, the Straits, or even North America. This will be expounded upon in more detail in the next chapter.
wavered in his resolution to see Taiwan restored to the fatherland.256

Chiang was presented as a whole-hearted Chinese nationalist from Taiwan, a Chinese
whose local identity and reality as a Taiwanese under Japanese rule complemented
his larger sense of Chinese nationalism. To further this point, the author notes that
Chiang’s bookshelf held Sun’s works, thus portraying him as a filial disciple and
admirer.

Such a simplified picture of Taiwanese as Chinese, no more or less Chinese
than a Cantonese or a Henanese, functioned to support the legitimacy of the GMD
party-state in Taiwan. Similar messages were accordingly promulgated in public
ceremonies. In November 1966, as his sworn enemies in Beijing conducted a parallel
ceremony that claimed Sun’s legacy, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech commemorating
the opening of Chung-shan Hall and the centennial birthday of Sun Yat-sen.

Figure 6: Chung-shan Hall (the Zhongshan Building), Taipei.257

256 Ibid., 193.
257 Figure 2—Photo by Peter Bronski, 2011, Wikimedia,
This speech is significant in that it illustrates an official narrative of Sun during the martial law years, but also in that it marks the formal beginning of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement.258

In his speech, Chiang bemoaned threats to China’s ancient cultural traditions, asserting an unbroken daotong (a philosophic or ideological bloodline) line stretching from the great sages through the present day. The mantle of upholding Chinese culture at a time when “red disaster [Communism] floods the world, the nation is in dire straits and facing unprecedented calamity…” and “Our superior five-thousand year-old traditional culture is threatened to point of risking extinction” was plainly an urgent task to Chiang.259 Beyond a mere reference to Communist rule, the disaster he beheld now included the talk of “cultural revolution” and “smashing the old world” and its outmoded culture. Chiang defined the basis of this culture in terms of “ethics, democracy, and science.”260 His salvation lay with the rightful heirs of Sun and the mantle of daotong, the GMD and the ROC. The solution was a three-pronged plan for cultural revival, endorsing ethics, democracy, and science as the keys to renewing Chinese culture:

The Three People’s Principles issued by our Father of the Nation take the continuation of our Chinese race’s bloodline as their responsibility, and

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260 The manta of “ethics, democracy, and science” (lunli, minzhu, kexue) is featured prominently at Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.
furthermore aim to preserve and renew our five-thousand-year-old national culture. We will exhaust our efforts in this endeavor, aiming to embrace the highest cultural values unto this purpose. It is as the Father of the Nation said: “When there is morality there may be a country, when there is morality there may be a perfected world.” The national morality mentioned here is like a holding a ceremonial wine vessel, in that “first, everyone must take self-cultivation as the root.” He also said, “My Principle of Democracy takes the people’s sovereignty as its first resolution.” From this, we see the issuance of the idea that the people are the roots of the nation. He also said, “In all things we must rely upon scientific principle. Only then may we resolve these issues, only then may we reach our goals satisfactorily.” Here, “the Way of Construction is in the People’s Livelihood,” and in all that the People’s Livelihood must consist of in daily life. For example, the necessities, such as the six categories of food, clothing, domicile, profession, education, and pleasure—this is the origin of the Father of the Nation’s six-faceted plan for scientific national construction, the root of national prosperity and longevity.261

This solution further involved a series of concrete tasks: building “grand

261 Ibid. The original text is: “國父發明三民主義，以繼承我中華民族之道統為己任，乃使我五千年民族文化歷久而彌新，蓋我中華文化之精華，盡摶於此也。是以國父謂「有道德始有國家，有道德始成世界」，此即民族倫理道德「壹是皆以修身為本」之秉彝也。又謂「余之民權主義，第一決定者為民主」，此則民惟邦本思想之發皇也。又謂「凡事皆要憑科學道理，才可以解決，才可以達到圓滿目的」，此乃「建設之首要在民生」——而民生所日用必需不可或缺者，莫過於食、衣、住、行、育、樂六者，故國父特以此六者科學化之建設，為促使民富且壽之張本也!”
things” to remind Chinese and visitors alike of the grandeur of Chinese culture, associating Sun and his mission with this grand culture, and reminding the Chinese people of unfinished work and their suffering compatriots across the waters:

Today foreigners come to Taiwan to travel, more and more by the day, trying to see the richness of Chinese material culture, but they can’t even get a glimpse of the grandeur of traditional Chinese architecture. What a shame!

Last year, on the occasion of the Father of the Nation’s birthday, the government resolved to build a hall on Yangming Mountain and name it “the Zhongshan Building”, styled as a “Chinese Cultural Hall”, so as to remember the Father of the Nation’s virtuous work in building the Republic with his own hands and manifest the glory of Chinese culture for all to see.262

This year the hall is completed, and we now use it to mark the one-hundredth birthday of the Father of the Nation. But this one hall, just one of our few buildings built in a traditional manner, simply cannot fully represent the full face of Chinese culture! All of our countrymen, when coming to view this hall, will see its name and reflect upon its meaning. They will remember the unfinished work of the Father of the Nation and will thus join forces to work towards its realization! This hall also manifests the ideology of the

262 Ibid. The original text is: “今者國際人士之來臺觀光者，與日俱增，嘗以其僅見中華文物之豐富，而未能一睹我中華文化傳統建築之宏規，引為莫大之缺憾！去歲 國父百年誕辰，政府請於陽明山啟樓建堂，且乞以樓顏之曰「中山樓」，以堂顏之曰「中華文化堂」，意在紀念 國父手創民國之德澤，亦以發揚中華文化之矞皇。議其堂廡之制，則鹹以為自節用愛人而言，即土階石室，猶以為大；但自表彰中華文化之博大悠久而言，雖重簷藻梲，猶以為小；中正謹如眾議，許崇其堂廡，經營興作，蓋誠不可以棲棲者，以儉於 國父；亦不可以吝此區區者，使無以見我中華文化之久而且大也。”
Three People’s Principles, that which our nation follows, as a condensation of our culture, bringing together practice and the arousal of virtue!\textsuperscript{263}

But alas! Looking west across the waters, all I see are lesions. The ferries sunken, the green mountains bare—could these be the Central Plains? Their tears are bitter and blood dry, their lives and deaths passing unannounced—could it be that our countrymen, our flesh and blood are here? It’s enough to make this one, Zhongzheng, forget his age and the weight of his responsibilities, despite his trials and tribulations. We must remember the dangers we face, and work every day to become stronger! Do not let the joys of visiting this fine, splendiferous building commemorating our Father of the Nation cause you to forget your sorrows and worries! What you must know is that this is a symbol of the revival base for rebuilding our national culture, that when we resolve to extirpate the red calamity and retake the mainland: only the glorious White Sun\textsuperscript{264} will shine over the marches of the Mainland; the benefits of ethics, democracy, science, and the Three People’s Principles will extend to all our brothers and sisters on the mainland, just as on today’s base of freedom Taiwan; we will from then on have no regrets about leaking roofs, no regrets regarding the Father of the Nation’s will that puts the people first;

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid. The original text is: “經歲而堂成，今以國父一百晉一誕辰，敬啟管鑰。惟此一堂廡，僅略具我傳統建築範疇之一二，自不足以言代表中華文化之全貌！凡我國人，來瞻於此堂此樓之下，顧其名而思其義，應念國父之遺志未竟，願相與一心戮力以竟之！又當思三民主義，乃為我民族之所託命，亦為我文化之所凝聚，願相與實踐而振德之！”

\textsuperscript{264} A reference to the national flag of the ROC, commonly called the “Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth” (qingtian bairi mandihong) flag.
we will have furthermore seized this opportunity to revive the highest virtues of the new Chinese nation for all the land.\textsuperscript{265}

Chiang explicitly invoked Sun for political legitimation, as discussed previously, but this legitimation took on new aspects as the ROC and PRC changed. The Cultural Revolution on the mainland posed a great threat to traditional Chinese culture, and Chiang—who had long held that traditional Chinese culture was the root of China’s greatness and the antidote to its contemporary problems—used this commemorative address as a point of contradistinction. In contrast to the rhetorical weight placed upon the mainland, Taiwan appears small and, in various ways, incidental in the speech. It is mostly useful as a model for what “free China” looks like, in opposition to the China overrun with Communists. But Taiwan also emerges as a place of want. As a peripheral space in the late dynasties and a foreign space in the early dynasties, Taiwan lacked the grand architecture then under threat in Henan and Shaanxi, lacked the strong association with the traditional Central Plains culture of the Shang and Zhou Dynasties to which Chiang appealed. In this way, it becomes clear that remembering Sun offers an opportunity for Chiang to remember the GMD’s image of traditional China, an image highly preoccupied with “the wellspring of traditional

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid. The original text is: “嗟呼! 隔水西望，滿目瘡痍，渡頭落日，青山一髪者，莫非中原！淚枯血乾，死生無告者，莫非吾同胞與骨肉焉！是以中正雖歷經艱難險阻，與侮辱橫逆之來，猶予日孳孳，而忘其身之老，責之重也！尤冀我國人操危慮患，莊敬日強！毋徒以遊目此璀璨瑰瑋紀念國父之建築，而樂以忘憂！須知此為復興基地重建民族文化之標幟，當益堅其消滅赤禍，重光大陸之信念，惟有我青天白日之光輝，普被於大陸之疆土；倫理、民主、科學三民主義之福祉，均霑於大陸全體之同胞，一如今日自由基地之臺灣者然；而後始無懼於屋漏，無愧於國父與先民之遺規，且以此為復興我中華文化明德新民之契機，則庶幾乎!”
China, the Central Plains. Building a commemorative hall named for Sun in a Zhongyuan-esque style in 1966 was a means of knitting together the GMD, Sun, Taiwan, and traditional China.

Sun’s connection to Taiwan was further reinforced through the Chiang cult itself. As Chiang was the face of the GMD government and of the ROC more broadly, Sun served as the lofty paternal figure standing behind Chiang and the Chinese nation, tasking it with fulfilling the great work of the Chinese Revolution, of realizing the Republic and its Principles. The two were so closely linked in official narratives that to praise one essentially meant praising the other. Thus, commemorating Sun was itself an occasion to celebrate Chiang, much as CCP commemorations of Sun were also occasions to celebrate socialist progress (and, in 1966, Mao Zedong). It is no coincidence that the two grandest monuments in Taipei are the Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Halls. Notably, upon Chiang’s passing, the SYS Memorial Hall was the site of his lying-in-repose. Nor is it a coincidence that it is chiefly on Taiwan that Chiang’s formal name, Chiang Chung-cheng or Jiang Zhongzheng is widely used. The chung/zhong character suggest a direct and brotherly linkage to Sun Zhongshan.

This may also be seen in eulogies and panegyrics to Chiang following his passing.

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266 The Central Plains, as mentioned, are often regarded as the origin of Chinese culture, as the Shang and mythical Xia hail from the Yellow River valley. Chiang’s preoccupation with the Central Plains, a region that the GMD—an organization based in South China and initially composed largely of southerners—had little direct connection, illustrates how Chiang sought to connect the contemporary Republic with the traditional China of bygone days. Cultivating such a connection was integral to the GMD narrative of Chinese Taiwan and to justifying efforts to Sinify Taiwan and to retake the mainland.

267 Notably, upon Chiang’s passing, the SYS Memorial Hall was the site of his lying-in-repose.

Ai Wen, “Let Us Turn Our Grief into Strength”, Homage to Our Leader: Essays and Poems in Memory of the Late President Chiang Kai-shek (Taipei: China Forum Inc., 1975), 125.
death in 1975. While this chapter does not dig deeply into Chiang commemorations, a brief survey may illustrate the basic trend. Writers published works featuring florid and fawning descriptions to commemorate the life of Chiang and portray him as a brilliant leader in his own right. For example, Chiang Mu, in “I Saw, I Heard, I Thought, I Mused”, waxed:

O our dear and respected leader, you are a born saint and sage whose greatness has made us impressed to a greater degree with the need of our revolutionary task, and we believe that the splendor of the Three Principles of the People will always be the splendor of the twentieth century and of the whole universe. It is you who have [sic] provided us with the basis on which we can build our unshakable hope as a nation, a nation blessed with the history of 5000 years. It is also you who have made inviolable the dignity of the Chinese race.268

Writing on the victory over Japan, Kui-ren in “Eternal Grief—President Chiang as I Knew Him” writes:

Then came sweet victory. In majestic splendor flew high the Flag of the White Sun and Blue Sky. The Three People’s Principles and China’s Destiny became objects of avid study among the students. We were no longer slaves to a foreign race; we were no longer a vanquished people without a country to call our own. Enthusiastically we stood erect under the National Flag or in the

268 Chiang Mu, Homage, 102. Unfortunately, no characters are provided for reference, and so I have been unable to confirm details about Chiang Mu. I believe Chiang Mu is 姜穆 (1929-2003), a Miao author who went to Taiwan with the GMD.
hall where were hung portraits of the Father of the Republic and of you, dear President. We were given the chance to know the dignity of man, and to be proud being born Chinese.²⁶⁹

Chu Hsi-ning, in “The Great Man Is Always with Us”, imagines the SYS Mausoleum in Nanjing with a matching CKS Mausoleum next to it:

The two mausoleums [sic] would provide the opportunity for endless generations of the Chinese and of the people from other parts of the world to see and worship the two national heroes and leaders, the two giant stars in the firmament of the twentieth century, the two great seers whose vision is colored by the Three Principles of the People, and the two oriflammes in which mankind takes pride.²⁷⁰

Finally, for our purposes, Chang Chao-ch’i mourns Chiang in verse, writing

“Ah! Giant of our nation—mankind’s eternal model/Anti-Communist prophet/Inheritor of our Founding Father’s revolution/You! Never, never will you/Disappear from/Our weeping.”²⁷¹

While he is equated with Sun, some distinguishing features of Chiang are his Christian faith, his long tenure as leader—in some capacity—of the ROC, his military background, and his ultimate strength in failure. Though Chiang is described as

²⁶⁹ Kui-jen, Homage, 15. I believe Kui-ren is 归人, the penname of Huang Shoucheng 黃守誠 (1928-2012), an award-winning author who achieved renown in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁷⁰ Chu, Homage, 200. I believe Chu Hsi-ning is 朱西寧(1927-1998), an author who had served as an officer in the National Army during the Civil War.²⁷¹ Chang, Homage, 253. I believe Chang Chao-ch’i is 張肇祺 (1925-1998), another author who came with the GMD to Taiwan. His penname was Ping Sha 平沙, as in “level sands”.
facing great adversity, these authors make his dignity and perseverance in the face of said adversity a mark of his superior character, thus providing a role model for the citizens of the beleaguered Republic. While the quoted selections highlight the nominal equality of Chiang and Sun, it may be observed that many of the addresses make no note of Sun at all and instead praise Chiang as a distinctive god-like man\textsuperscript{272} of superior virtue, knowledge, and action. Ultimately, while Chiang was equated with Sun, it may have been that, for many, Chiang’s heroic image was superior to that of Sun, but perhaps this is simply an effect of his more approximate death and the fact these were after all eulogies for the recently deceased Chiang. Written at a time when the ROC was being displaced from the international stage, in mourning for Chiang and glorifying him, these writers were perhaps mourning for and glorifying the Republic itself.

In any case, the explicit connection of Chiang and Sun and of Taiwan to the ROC, was also reinforced through smaller, if no less important steps. The presidents of the ROC, from Chiang through Chen Shui-bian, all paid homage to a portrait of Sun before delivering their monthly addresses at the Presidential Manor in Taipei. Sun’s portraits still grace official functions in Taiwan. The national anthem remains the \textit{Sanmin Zhuyi} hymn, and the flag remains the Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth. Moreover, Minsheng and Xinhai Roads, Zhongshan and Zhongzheng Districts, GMD statues and GMD branch-offices pervasively mark the ROC-controlled territories. Sun’s image adorns the $100NTD bill, just as Chiang’s image adorns the

\textsuperscript{272} There are not a few messianic allusions.
$200NTD bill, and both grace coins as well.\textsuperscript{273}

Since liberalization, Sun’s legacy, for so long bound to the fortunes of the GMD and Chiang, has suffered for it on Taiwan. The idea of indigenization, or \textit{bentuhua}, has created distance between Taiwan and any greater sense of Chinese nationalism, leaving aside the political baggage of ROC nationalism in post-dictatorship Taiwan. Picking up this baggage again, we might consider that \textit{qu Jianghua}, or “de-Chiangification” has been a widespread cultural and political phenomenon in Taiwan. In a fashion that mirrors the removal of many Mao statues on the mainland, many of Chiang’s statues have been torn out of the ground and thus scrapped or left to rust out of view. The DPP even attempted to rename the CKS Memorial Hall in Taipei in fall of 2008, opting instead for the “Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall”.\textsuperscript{274} This was not widely accepted, however, and the GMD reinstated its former name shortly after the party’s strong performance in the 2008 elections. Nonetheless, the square before it still holds the newer name of “Liberty Square”.

While memorials and “gratitude halls” in the form of shrines still dot Taiwan, such as the CKS Memorial Hall in Taipei or the CKS Gratitude Hall on Qilin Island in Kaohsiung, Chiang is associated with the worst of the GMD’s White Terror by what historian Jeremy Taylor calls a newly “homogenizing” Green history constructed, at least in part, in service to a DPP nation-building program.\textsuperscript{275} The

\textsuperscript{273} Ceremonial coins featuring lesser figures like Chiang Wei-shui have also been minted since the presidency of Lee Teng-hui.  
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., 185.
stains of the White Terror and the increasingly hallowed 2-28 Incident—a newer namesake for parks and memorial, a frequent talking point for the Green-minded about Blue crimes, and the subject of everything from films like Hou Hsiao-hsien’s *City of Sadness* to anime-inspired dating simulators like *The Rainy Port Keelung*—mar Chiang’s reputation. As the old 1950s-1960s call for retaking the mainland and toppling the CCP seems increasingly out of touch, Chiang seems ever more distant from contemporary Taiwan and ever more pigeonholed into the role of an autocratic “butcher” from the past. Indeed, the CKS Memorial Hall itself offers an exhibit on Taiwan’s journey from autocracy to democracy, only a short journey on the stairs from the great statue hall atop the memorial or the historical exhibition at ground level.276 Fewer and fewer Taiwanese identify themselves as Chinese. Even *waishengren* who still identify in that fashion are more and more removed from any family roots or historical connections in Zhejiang or Shandong. Of course, the relative normalization of Sino-Taiwanese relations since 1992 has seen the formation of new connections. Thus, the broader identity shift is hardly a simple narrative of withering roots.

On the whole, nevertheless, Chiang, the Nanjing government, and Operation National Glory appear in contemporary Taiwan as ever more distant and foreign entities. We might note that in 2006, Chen Shui-bian declined to deliver a speech

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276 Observed during a visit to the CKS Memorial Hall in June of 2019. This is perhaps not to be taken out of context, as there were many exhibits in the Memorial Hall, including a painting gallery, a special photography exhibit, a traveling exhibit on Garfield the cat, and a statue garden featuring Taiwanese wildlife in various colors, including a fish adorned with the White Sun, Blue Sky, and Red Earth. Nevertheless, given the contested history of the Hall and the DPP’s recent electoral successes, the inclusion of such an exhibit suggests that the fight over the Hall and the legacy of Chiang will continue into the future.
commemorating Sun’s 140th birthday, purportedly due to fears of Daobian (Depose Bian, as in Chen Shui-bian, presumably making use of one of bian’s more bodily meanings to insult Chen), protestors marred the event. The Double-Tenth national day ceremonies were indeed marred by protests, some violence, and the heckling of Chen before foreign dignitaries, and so this is perhaps an open and shut case.277 It nonetheless suggests that Chen, an ardent Green, did not regard commemorating Sun’s birthday as an essential duty when faced with political challenges. Given Chen’s efforts to undermine the GMD image of Chiang and the vestiges of Chiang’s prior personality cult by means of name-changes, rededications of space, and his promotion of a national identity with little space for ROC symbols, it would seem Chen also found it convenient to avoid honoring Sun. Thus, the incident offered an opportunity to chastise his immediate opponents by ignoring their cherished icon on a significant anniversary.

iv: Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui, the Anti-Japanese Martyr

We now turn to a specific work to illustrate how Sun Yat-sen is, indirectly, being discussed in contemporary Taiwan, a far different political environment than that of the Sinification years. Now, bentu politics and identity are strong in Taiwan, with Sun and his revolution being at most tangentially related to Taiwan under Japanese rule—a period bentu identitarians remember increasingly fondly, with Lee

Teng-hui serving as a prime example.\textsuperscript{278}

![Lee Teng-hui](image)

Figure 7: Lee Teng-hui strikes a pose.\textsuperscript{279}

As narratives of Taiwanese history increasingly formulate Taiwan as removed from China (a formulation in which emphasizing the influence of Japanese rule is useful), the official public-school curriculum has been a ground for contestation. In what was a highly controversial move, DPP Education Minister Du Zhengsheng in November

\textsuperscript{278} Though Lee was a member of the GMD, following his retirement he has been an active promoter for the Greens, helping the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen with their presidential campaign. He is not an independence advocate, however, in line with his earlier ROC-Taiwan doctrines that maintain the de facto existence of an independent ROC state on the island of Taiwan and its environs.

\textsuperscript{279} Photo courtesy of the Lee Teng-hui School, found below.

2004 released a draft history curriculum that consigned Sun Yat-sen to the dustbin of “Chinese history”, a category now separate from “Taiwanese history” as per the educational program of then-President Chen Shui-bian. Newly rectified “Taiwanese history” textbooks avoided mention of Sun, illustrating the attempt to wrest Taiwanese history apart from Chinese (especially ROC) history. A further point of distancing was that Sun was originally consigned to “ancient Chinese history” by the DPP-controlled Ministry of Education, as he died before the Second World War. So controversial was this attempt to excise Sun from Taiwanese history that an elderly veteran, Li Qiyu, committed suicide before a statue of Sun Yat-sen in the city of Kaohsiung on Sun’s 138th birthday (November 12th, 2004) in protest. Although Green media organs like the *Liberty Times* did not link Li’s suicide to the row over Sun and Taiwanese history books, Blue outlets and Chinese outlets in Hong Kong like the *Apple Daily* and on the mainland like the *People’s Daily* made much of the link, framing Li as something of a martyr and lamenting the thought that

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280 Yang Mengyu, “Taiwan ‘wuba’ Sun Zhongshan liru Zhongguo gudaishi” (Taiwan ‘Mistakenly’ Makes Sun Yat-sen Ancient Chinese History), November 11, 2004, BBC, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_3990000/newsid_3996300/3996399.stm?fbclid=IwAR06ixPR4nuNEoHvP7Ryvv7-s0AfgT2WhVoLmguuXVXDvddJ0dJWXEdZY](http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_3990000/newsid_3996300/3996399.stm?fbclid=IwAR06ixPR4nuNEoHvP7Ryvv7-s0AfgT2WhVoLmguuXVXDvddJ0dJWXEdZY).


282 Apple Daily (Pingguo Ribao), “Guofu shouru tailaobing jifen gehou” (Father of the Nation Disgraced—Taiwan Veteran Slits Own Throat in Rage), November 13, 2004, [https://hk.news.appledaily.com/international/daily/article/20041113/4438556?fbclid=IwAR1oHRfSEOOb7_PwoQDb0FBr0UUAsLgE18COhyvMrM-pi7PRZZiHQoZK4FQ](https://hk.news.appledaily.com/international/daily/article/20041113/4438556?fbclid=IwAR1oHRfSEOOb7_PwoQDb0FBr0UUAsLgE18COhyvMrM-pi7PRZZiHQoZK4FQ).

Taiwanese saw their *pater patria* as a “foreigner”.

The move, part of Chen’s Taiwanization campaign that included the designation of the square before the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and across from the National Library as Liberty Square (*ziyou guangchang*), illustrates the fraught status of Sun Yat-sen in contemporary Taiwan, being a space with two competing national narratives. One demands reverence for Sun as the Father of the Nation, that nation being the Republic of China, and another demands he be regarded as a foreigner, if perhaps a commendable revolutionary. This latter narrative, a Taiwan-centric narrative, has gained steam politically over the past generation, as evinced by the frequent proselytizing of the Taiwanese independence advocates by Ximending, by Tsai Ing-wen’s hearty victory in the 2019 election over the GMD candidate Han Kuo-yu, and by the success of Pan-Green media. Polls, such as those conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in New Taipei confirm that a growing number of Taiwan residents identify primarily as Taiwanese.\(^{284}\) However, the same polls confirm that a large if declining number of Taiwanese consider themselves Chinese, either solely or in addition to Taiwanese. Solely-Chinese identifying responders are a small minority these days, but Chinese-Taiwanese identifying responders still constituted a third of responders in 2019.

Given that strong identification with one’s home province is a long-standing feature of Chinese culture and society, this is not necessarily surprising. Indeed, identification with the province of Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation would support Pan-Blue narratives. However, we might consider that there is a growing sense among Taiwanese that Taiwan is a culturally Chinese nation, a member of a greater Chinese cultural-linguistic sphere like Malaysia or Singapore, and not that Taiwan is politically part of a larger Chinese nation. If the wording of this poll obscures finer details, it nonetheless illustrates two key facts for our purposes: one, many Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese; two, many Taiwanese still identify, in some sense and to some extent, as Chinese. The number of Taiwanese identifying as solely Taiwanese
has risen from a minority in the mid-90s to a plurality in the mid-2000s to a solid majority by the late 2010s. This means that, for a majority of Taiwanese, symbols of explicit Chinese identity hold little allure.

Some institutions in Taiwan have nevertheless attempted to reinforce the connection between the Republic of China, the Chinese nation, and the island of Taiwan, a task made difficult for previously discussed historical reasons. In 2009, the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall published a zhuan narrative titled “The New Founder of Taiwan History—Chiang Wei-Shui” (Taiwan xianjian xielie—jingwei fenming changliu: Chiang Wei-shui xiaozhuan). Edited by Jiang Yanmei and Luo Ailing, the book is a hagiography of Chiang Wei-shui (1890-1931), a doctor-cum-activist who organized Han Taiwanese against Japanese colonial rule before succumbing to illness at an early age. At stages, he tried to assassinate both Yuan Shikai and the Taishō Emperor, pushed against the state opium monopoly in Taiwan, and later turned to labor organization in addition to his Taiwanese nationalist organizing. The book is replete with relevant photographs, illustrations, quotations, and a timeline. Before presenting the narrative itself, we might note the cover and back cover of the book.

At front, an illustrated Chiang sits comfortably yet formally at a desk. He wears a student uniform and has taken off his cap. Behind the scene, a French map, labeled “Tai-Ouan ou Isle Formose” (Taiwan or the Isle of Formosa), is visible. This map is reproduced again on the back cover in greater detail. Visible now are the cities marked: Taiouan (Tainan, once referred to as Taiwan itself), Tantieu (Presumably
Takao or Dagou, the old name for Kaohsiung)\textsuperscript{285}, and so forth.

Harbors are marked with anchors near Tainan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores/Pecheurs). This map was likely intended to be of use for French sailors in the general area.

What is significant about this map on the book cover, for our purposes, is how it is framed and manipulated. The isle of Taiwan appears as just that: a solitary island dominating the scene. Bits and pieces of Fujian (presumably today’s PRC-controlled Pingtan County, here labelled “Pitcou-tchay”) are visible in the northwest corner, but

\textsuperscript{285} The name of southern Taiwan’s largest city is itself emblematic of the island’s complicated history. The area was once called Takau by aboriginal inhabitants. Han migrants from Fujian and Guangdong spelled the city phonetically as 打狗, but later Japanese colonial authorities found the name inelegant and chose new characters to represent the phonetic name, 高雄 Takao. After Retrocession, the Japanese name was kept but the pronunciation in Mandarin did not align with Takao/Takau, and so the city is now Kaohsiung/Gaoyxiong.
Taiwan dominates as a largely self-contained entity, the center of its own realm. Furthermore, the French text and styling of the map serve to present Taiwan, intentionally, in the light of foreign recognition. We may speculate that this choice serves to distance Taiwan from both China and Japan; thus, neither historical legacy of territorial expansion is evoked to suggest the natural belonging of the island to a larger political or geographic entity. The book deploys this foreign map in three locations. The first is the cover, with the aforementioned illustration of Chiang sitting. The back cover shows the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall superimposed over central Taiwan. Here the map appears in a central position in the image. The map appears in a third reproduction on the portrait page (as most political biographies in China begin with at least one portrait). For this portrait page, a mature Chiang—dressed in a Western suit and black cravat—is framed like a bust. His heroic image stands above a famous quote of his: “Countrymen must unite, unity is strength” (tongbao xu tuanjie, tuanjie zhen youli).

There are two prefaces to this book. Each is provided with an accompanying English translation for the foreign reader. The first preface outlines the nature of the associated exhibit and presents a basic overview of Chiang Wei-shui. Quoting the rough English translation (with light editing for ease of reading), the purpose of the exhibition is as follows: “In order to let the people see how Taiwanese martyrs—with unselfish minds and dauntless spirits—defended the nation (situsimin, lit. “this land and this people”) and their courageous accomplishments to this end, our memorial hall has been holding a series of collections of the late heroes of Taiwan.” Chiang Wei-shui is named alongside Lee Yu-pang and Tung-Min Shieh as great historical
figures and “Taiwan Martyr[s]”\textsuperscript{286} The preface continues, tying Chiang, the
Taiwanese nationalist movement of the 1920s, and the Taiwan People’s Party and
Sun, the Chinese Revolution, and the Guomindang:

In 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen successfully led the Chinese Revolution. Chiang
Wei-shui was inspired by Dr. Sun’s leadership and his revolutionary cause. In
1913, Chiang Wei-shui studied at Taiwan Medical College and launched
fundraising initiatives among the people. The first objective of the Taiwanese
students’ revolutionary activities was to give financial support to the “Second
Revolution”, the Anti-Yuan Campaign, and to protect the Provisional
Constitution. The Taiwan People’s Party was established in 1927, and Chiang
Wei-shui designed the first flag, which was blue on top, red on the bottom and
white in the middle, and the second one, which had three stars on the up-left
corner in blue and three-fourths of the flag in red. Both were inspired by Dr.
Sun’s revolutionary spirit. Mr. Chiang Wei-shui submitted the outline
according to Dr. Sun’s clause of the Principle of People’s Livelihood: each
tiller of the soil will possess his own fields…

Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui were both medical doctors and
received professional education and training. They saved the nation with
loving kindness. Living in times of national crisis and under unequal rule in
politics, they elevated nationalism and revolutionary spirit. Also, they built a
body of concrete ideology and it had a great impact, inspiring the people’s

\textsuperscript{286} Given that Chiang died of an illness presumably unrelated to his political activities, it is
curious that he is designated a martyr.
thought. They both established parties and associations but passed away at the highest point of their lives. Dr. Sun accommodated to the world trend and arduously initiated the way to democracy, providing an utmost inspiration for Chiang Wei-shui…

Other commonalities are pointed out, such as the public activism of both men, their propensity for writing and lecturing, and social organizing. Cheng Nai-wen concludes by stating that Chiang is “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”, noting several tributes to his name and thus inaugurating the exhibition.

The second preface, titled “The New Founder of Taiwan History—Chiang Wei-shui”, offers another address from the exhibit’s inauguration. Here, the grandson of the man and CEO of the Chiang Wei-shui Cultural Foundation Chiang Chao-ken portrays Chiang Wei-shui as a modern-minded humanist who sought the political, cultural, and material development of an independent Taiwanese nation. He too elucidates similarities between Chiang and Sun, but notes that the two are not exactly similar figures:

Researcher Huang Huang-hsiung, who was the first one that studied the philosophy of Chiang Wei-shui, enthroned my grandfather as Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen. He believed that Chiang Wei-shui’s status was as important as Dr. Sun in history. Both Dr. Sun and Chiang were doctors and founded associations and political parties. They not only cured the sick people but also aimed to save the country. Influenced by Dr. Sun’s thoughts, Chiang Wei-shui

founded the Taiwan Culture Association, headed by a premier. He followed the same ideals that were promulgated by Dr. Sun’s Tung Meng Hui. Both experienced revolutionary awakening. Chiang Wei-shui also commemorated the second Memorial Day for Dr. Sun and delivered a speech in the Gangding lectures.

There are still some differences between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui. For instance, Dr. Sun advocated revolution but Chiang preferred non-violent movements. Dr. Sun emphasized science, while Chiang took culture more seriously. Dr. Sun traveled around the world in order to get financial support from the overseas Chinese to overthrow the Ching government. Chiang Wei-shui, on the other hand, helped found the association that aimed to promote cultural and political improvements in Taiwan. When Dr. Sun passed away, Taiwanese called him the guide of the weak peoples. My grandfather was called the savior of the Taiwanese after his passing away. Moreover, all Taiwanese held memorials for him…288

From both Chiang and Cheng’s opening addresses, both of which were designed to contextualize and frame the 2008 exhibition on Chiang Wei-shui at the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei, we may see a clear attempt to link Chiang to Sun and so recast Sun to fit into a more local Taiwanese national history. In Cheng’s telling, this is a hierarchical teacher-student relationship, in which Chiang intentionally modelled his revolutionary organizations and actions after Sun’s. Indeed, Chiang

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288 Ibid., 13-14.
“read thoroughly all the Sun’s publications, he actively established newspapers, delivered speeches, and organized societies in order to introduce new knowledge in the world to promote the people to an advanced level.”289 In this framework, Chiang engaged in a didactic mission of political education so as to awaken the national consciousness of the Taiwanese against the Japanese, taking inspiration and knowledge from Sun’s own revolutionary experiences. This thus serves to tie together Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism while still appealing to a bentu sensibility. Sun Yat-sen, the guide of weak peoples, thus becomes an influential figure in Taiwanese nationalism due to his influence upon the nationalist activist Chiang Wei-shui. These narrative connections to Sun suggest that he retains some sort of political or cultural capital even as Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD are displaced from an increasingly bentu Taiwanese history.

While Sun’s revolutionary organs—the Tongmenghui, the Revolutionary Party, the Nationalist Party, etc.—are invoked here, both speeches sidestep the standard Blue narrative we might expect to hear: Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese revolution, was an inspiration to fellow Chinese in the Japanese colony of Taiwan like Chiang Wei-shui. Given the effort expended to tie Sun and Chiang Kai-shek together following the 1930s, we might expect a mention of Chiang Kai-shek in Sinified Taiwan, as we see in the eulogies for Chiang presented earlier in this paper. However, there is no such mention of the Retrocession, no mention of Chiang; the focus is simply on Chiang Wei-shui and Sun. This suggest an active effort on the part of the speakers and curators to recast the image of Sun Yat-sen to better fit into the

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289 Ibid., 7.
environment of *bentu* Taiwan, an image that avoids the baggage of the White Terror, GMD dictatorship, and the 228 Incident.

Chiang’s mention of Huang Huang-hsiung is noteworthy as well. Huang’s book, *Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan de Sun Zhongshan* (Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen) may be identified as a major source for this narrative. An academic history, Huang’s narrative expounds on Chiang’s life in far greater detail and includes an entire section on how Chiang was inspired by Sun, arguing that Sun Yat-sen was widely respected in Taiwan for his revolutionary work, his persistence, his support for colonized peoples in their own struggles, and his worldly vision. Huang argues that no one in Taiwan studied Sun and his work more diligently or faithfully than Chiang Wei-shui.²⁹⁰ He produces a telling quote of Chiang: “My ideal People’s Party needs to create ‘a party that can serve as a machine for the Taiwanese liberation movement.’ Just as the Chinese Guomindang is the machine for the Chinese liberation movement.”²⁹¹ Of interest for us in this investigation, Huang states that during the martial law period, mention of Chiang was largely a taboo topic due to official censorship of any strain of pro-independence history. For this reason, most Taiwanese remained ignorant of Chiang Wei-shui. Huang notes that contemporary GMD discussions of Sun’s relationship with Taiwan rarely engage with the Taiwanese nationalist movement in any depth, but appears sympathetic to the GMD and to a broader sense of Chinese national identity.²⁹² Indeed, his focus is at once local and

²⁹⁰ Huang Huang-hsiung, *Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan de Sun Zhongshan* (Taipei: China Times, 2015), 313/2977 on the Kindle iPhone app but no actual page number. This is a reissue; the first edition was published in 2006.
²⁹¹ Ibid., 317-318.
²⁹² Ibid., 294/2977.
highly Sinocentric: Chiang Wei-shui is portrayed as a local hero and as a real salt-of-the-earth guy, but with a firm sense of Chinese identity on some level, if not necessarily political. Regardless of Huang’s personal politics, he writes that by studying Sun’s relationship with this movement, we may see a far more significant influence of Sun on broader Taiwanese society than the mere details of where he happened to stay or whom he happened to see during his few visits to the island.

Huang’s study of Chiang emphasizes that Chiang had a Taiwanese consciousness and believed that the Chinese liberation movement and the Taiwanese liberation movement were not the same. However, the Memorial Hall zhuan itself reinforces Chiang’s Han identity, and thus his identification with a broader Chinese nation. The first section on Chiang’s early life emphasizes that, “In 1891, Chiang Wei-shui, zi name Xuegu and ancestral home in Zhangzhou, Fujian, was born in Yilan.” His father, after learning of the Chinese loss of Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, resolved that his son would not receive a “colonial education”. Therefore, he studied under the traditional teacher Zhang Jingguang until he was 18, when he transferred to public school and graduated in two years. Zhang is credited with instilling a deep sense of “national consciousness” into his pupil. Following this, he “walked the fishing road” (a country road along the coast, presumably) to Taipei to sit for the entrance exam to the Governor-General Medicine School, scoring first. “Then he started to receive a modern medical education, to make friends with like-minded souls. He received the baptism of new education and thus awakened his

293 Jiang and Luo, Chiang Wei-shui, 16-17.
national consciousness, catching a ‘political fever….”’

Chiang’s early life is framed so as to emphasize his identification with a certain minzu yishi, a national consciousness that is not explicitly named as Taiwanese nationalism or as Chinese consciousness. However, Chiang’s Han identity is reinforced through his traditional names, the naming of his ancestral home of Zhangzhou, and his education under a traditional Chinese teacher as opposed to Japanese colonial education. His native Taiwanese locality also appears prominently in the narrative, which depicts Chiang as a humble boy from Yilan who walked to Taipei by foot, earnestly seeking greater opportunity.

As the zhuan continues, interspersed with quotes and pictures, Chiang suffers under the “intense oppression” of the Japanese colonial government until 1911:

Under these severe laws and controls, which bound the thought and personal freedom of all Taiwanese, a thought movement, a yearning to break from bondage, surged forth ceaselessly. In 1911, the success of the Chinese revolution led by Sun Yat-sen made these outstanding medical students all undergo magnificent awakenings of national consciousness. Of these, Chiang Wei-shui’s practical competence was the fiercest.

Using his practical competence, Chiang organized his compatriots and donated funds to help the Guomindang fight the Second Revolution against Yuan Shikai. Beyond

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294 Ibid., 17.
295 Ibid., 19. The original text is: “在這些嚴刑峻法的控制下，捆綁了台灣人民的思想及人身自由，因此極欲掙脫束縛的思潮也翻騰不已，1911 年孫中山所領導的中國革命成功，使得這群優秀的醫學校學生們激發出民族意識，其中又以蔣渭水的具體實踐能量最爲強烈。”
this, Chiang was supposedly even involved in plans to assassinate Yuan and the Emperor Taishō of Japan with bacterial weapons. Chiang Chao-ken’s subsequent emphasis on his grandfather’s peaceful methods and local focus is striking, given that the zhuan itself goes to length to illustrate the young Chiang’s more radical involvement in the long Chinese Revolution and his seemingly strong identification with Chinese causes and culture—or, in the case of the anti-Taishō plot, his violent anti-Japanese activities.

However, Chiang and Ai intersperse the exhibition narrative with quotes that show Chiang to be a Taiwanese patriot first. One such quotation, which immediately follows the brief noting of Chiang’s revolutionary plots to kill Yuan and the Taishō Emperor, Chiang declares that “Countrymen! Taiwan is our Taiwan, Taiwanese society is our society. We can not put aside responsibility here. Taiwan’s excellence is our excellence, Taiwanese society’s upward benefits are also our benefits.”

As the narrative continues, Chiang is further tied to Sun. Reflecting on his dissatisfaction with his personal life despite his apparent success as a doctor and a businessman, Chiang finds inspiration in Sun’s writings:

“I’m acquainted with many and met not a few people, but what Dr. Sun Yat-sen once said, “If I met only one who knew me, then I’d have no regrets,” really, he hit the mark! After five years of working, ordinary friends for private matters—so-called “booze buddies”—are not lacking, but comrades in

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296 Ibid., 21. The original text is: “同胞呵！台灣是我們的台灣，台灣的社會是我們的社會，是不是袖手旁觀放棄責任的。台灣的裏還是我們的厲害，台灣社會向上的福利，也就是我們的福利。”
the public sphere are entirely so. This means I have no choice but to wait, to hide my intent and bide my time. After I’ve been in business for ten years, I believe I’ll find the life I led in the first five and the life I led in the second five will be drastically different. In other words, the me of the first five years may have led a life without any significance, but the me of the second five years will have led a significant life indeed.297

Aside from his personal admiration for Sun, Chiang is also framed here as being an active student of Sun’s formal political work. If his early attempts at fundraising and assassination may be considered his first entry, Chiang’s return to sustained political activity from the private sector is presaged by mention of the publication of Sun’s texts. Indeed, the authors state that Chiang devoured and digested the *Sun Wen xueshuo* (Speeches of Sun Yat-sen) and *Minquan chubu* (First Steps of Democracy) completely.298 Following this, the reader is presented with a narrative of Chiang’s organization of the Taiwanese volunteer movement against the GGT and against the institutions of colonialism in Taiwan. This organization involved meetings, lectures, and mass action like hiring a private plane to drop flyers over Tokyo. In the latter move, Chiang and his comrades were protesting the lack of Diet-representation for or even Diet-control over Taiwan—the Governor-General of Taiwan, an appointed position, was authorized to act with an unconstitutional level of autonomy (termed

297 Ibid., 23. The original text is: ‘相識滿天下，知心能幾人，孫中山先生說：’得一知己
可以無憾 “實在不錯呀! 開業五年間，私情上普通朋友，所謂酒肉朋友，卻是不少，而 公務上的同志則全無，使我不得不隱忍待時，韜晦過日，我的開業已過十年間，前的五年間的我的生活，和後的五年間的我的生活，大有差別。換句話說，前五年的我，是做了無意義的生活，后五年的我，是做了有意義的生活。”

298 Ibid., 25.
ritsurei) due to the shrewd politicking of Itō Hirobumi back in the late Meiji era.299

Solidifying narrative connections between the two figures, Chiang is credited with working to raise the cultural, political, and spiritual levels of the Taiwanese through the Taiwan Culture Association and through such publications as the Taiwan Minbao. The name of the newspaper makes explicit reference to the Minbao published by Sun’s Tongmenghui in Tokyo before the Xinhai Revolution. After factional strife resulted in the disintegration of the TCA, Chiang is credited with reorganizing some of its members into new groups like the Taiwan People’s Party, the Taiwan Tongmenghui, and others so as to pursue a more active pressure campaign on the GGT.300 By this point, of course, Chiang’s political trajectory was quite different than Sun’s. Chiang and his organizations pressured the GGT for institutional reforms, such as bringing in League of Nations inspectors to force Japanese authorities to revise their opium laws.301 Sun, as described in the introduction, had abandoned reform efforts after the failure of the Qing in the Sino-French War of 1884. To clarify, this means that Chiang saw the possibility and desirability of greater Taiwanese autonomy within the Japanese imperial framework, while Sun saw no possibility for Chinese national revival within the Qing imperial framework.

Chiang’s domestic relationships seem to also evoke those of Sun in this narrative. Chiang, like Sun, entered a traditional arranged marriage at a young age,

299 Fraser, 96.
300 Jiang and Luo, Chiang Wei-shui, 35.
301 Opium was legal in Japanese Taiwan, but was controlled by a government monopoly that restricted purchases to registered addicts. Purchasable amounts were to decrease over time, with the goal of weaning addicts off opium while profiting off opium sales. Chiang and his compatriots were opposed to the GGT’s issuance of the special permits that legalized opium sales under this system.
although Chiang’s match was arranged much earlier than Sun’s marriage with Lu
Muzhen—Chiang Wei-shui was only 4 years old when he and Shi You were
paired.302 Like Lu Muzhen in Jiang Xingde’s zhuan, Shi You is a fine wife and
mother, “an honest, hard-working woman who supported him behind the scenes after
their marriage so that he had no worries for home. She bore him four children:
Songhui, Songming, Shiqian, Shiying.”303 Nonetheless, Chiang, was to meet a
revolutionary partner down the line, much as Sun’s elopement with Song Qingling
was described in Jiang’s zhuan. Through the youth group of the Taiwan Cultural
Association, Chiang met Chen Tian, the only woman in the youth group. “Sweet as
her name”, Chen and Chiang were meant to be:

Chen Tian lived up to her name, bright and clever, sweet and beautiful,
accommodating and considerate; she was not only Chiang Wei-shui’s
revolutionary partner, but was also his soulmate, often accompanying him and
helping to carry out social movements and lecture tours. In September of
1927, Chen Tian spoke at the Mongka lectures…and frequently delivered him
letters, clothing, books, and other odd things sent from his comrades after
Chiang was imprisoned following the Zhijing Incident…

When Chiang died, Chen was only 32 years old. Watching her dearly
beloved fall ill and pass away, Chen was thrust deep into despair for a time.
She went up to the Ciyun Monastery on the banks of the Tamsui River and
devoted herself to clean eating and pious living. After this, her only company

302 Ibid., 42.
303 Ibid.
would be plain lanterns, wooden fish, and Sanskrit songs.  

While differences between the two figures abound, the narrative of the exhibition suggests their commonalities and deep linkage.

By the end of Chiang’s life, the Japanese authorities had outlawed the Taiwan People’s Party and injured Chiang in a crackdown. He continued to deliver speeches and worked to agitate the workers, peasants, and urban proletariat politically but did not again organize a formal political organization. He died of typhoid at age 41 in August of 1932. His former comrades organized a funeral for him, modelled on Sun Yat-sen’s 1929 funeral procession as befitting “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”. However, ground burials were illegal under Japanese administration, and so the procession, comprised of supporters from all aspects of his political activities and private citizens, ended at the Banqiao Crematorium. No grand memorial was built for his ashes.

The book ends with a reflection on Chiang’s legacy. Noting with approval Taiwan’s peaceful transition to democracy, the editors state that Chiang’s great gifts to the Taiwanese were his “Taiwanese spirit”, his advancement of bentuhua, and his

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304 Ibid., 43.

Note: The “Tian” in Chen Tian’s name is the character 甜 , meaning sweet. The original text is: “陳甜人如其名，靈慧甜美，處事圓融，設想周到，不但是蔣渭水的革命夥伴，也是心靈伴侶，經常陪伴著蔣渭水從事社會運動及講演活動，在當時他也可以獨自上臺演說宣傳理念。1927 年 9 月，陳甜在參加艋舺的講演會後亦遭檢肅。蔣渭水因治警事件被關在牢裏的時候，陳甜常寫信給他，也經常給他寄些衣物、書籍、甚至業績寫其他同志的東西，這些都是蔣渭水在獄中最大的精神安慰。蔣渭水去世時陳甜才 32 歲，深愛的人乍然病逝，是他頓時萬念俱灰，她到淡水河邊的慈雲寺修行吃齊，從此伴隨她的只是青燈、木魚和梵歌。”

305 This appellation is often used by the historian Huang Huang-hsiung, and is perhaps a response to DPP usages of Guomindang de Sun Zhongshan (the GMD’s Sun Yat-sen).
project of cultural revivalism.\textsuperscript{306} We may wonder if it is appropriate to credit Chiang with holding a \textit{bentu} sensibility, given the term’s association with post-CKS Taiwan, but a detailed assessment of Chiang’s cultural works and beliefs is outside the scope of this study. We may simply note that a memorial park in Taipei, a highway linking Taipei and Yilan, and other memorials in the name of Chiang are listed before the book concludes with a caption: “Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui, forever in our hearts” (\textit{yongyuan liucun zai women xinzhong de Sun Zhongshan yu Jiang Weishui}).\textsuperscript{307}

Key to the narrative of Chiang Wei-shui as “the new founder of Taiwan history” is his social activism, political organizing, and modern nationalist consciousness. In illustrating Chiang as such a man while also casting him as a disciple of Sun,\textsuperscript{308} Sun Yat-sen himself is recast as a modern anti-imperialist nationalist and activist. This aspect of Sun’s legacy is emphasized beyond all else. While this is a prominent theme in Sun’s legacy, highlighted notably in post-reform CCP narratives of Sun, this image of Sun sidesteps his identity as \textit{guofu}. Moreover, this image avoids recognizing Sun’s links to the historical baggage of Taiwan’s unique history by minimizing his connection to the GMD, presumably to keep Sun attractive in light of GMD violence and the growing strength of \textit{bentu} identity in Taiwan. Indeed, by emphasizing Chiang’s connections to Sun through rough parallels in life experience and Chiang’s identity as a distant student, Sun Yat-sen is brought

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{308} Chiang himself clearly cast himself as a student of Sun, and so the editors are not pulling any tricks in this comparison.
into the pantheon of *bentu* Taiwanese nationalism, if somewhat indirectly. That such maneuvering is possible suggests the weakening position of Sun as *guofu* in an increasingly de-Sinified Taiwan, together with the weakening of such political idols as Chiang Kai-shek. While Chiang’s connections and rough equality to Sun were key to his own political image, as seen earlier, Chiang’s image has been undermined by Green memories of the White Terror and of the GMD as a foreign dictatorship imposed upon Taiwan by force of arms. To shore up Sun’s position in such a climate means that reliance upon Chiang and the continued existence of the ROC on Taiwan is not enough; Sun was thus removed from the state and the nation and recast in an earlier mold, the mold of the worldly, learned, and passionate doctor-cum-revolutionary fighting for nationalism, democracy, and the people’s welfare through Chiang Wei-shui. This effort is seemingly motivated more by a desire to save Sun from the dangers of a changing historical climate, itself presumably more motivated by the great political and cultural capital of Sun Yat-sen, the world-famous revolutionary and idealist, than by the reality of Sun’s ties with Chiang. While Chiang was plainly influenced by Sun, they never met or corresponded. Moreover, Chiang is not notable enough of a figure to fully subsume Sun at this time, and so the impetus to place Sun within Chiang’s narrative reflects the importance and imperiled position of Sun’s own place in Taiwanese society.

We might also consider that Chiang’s life is perhaps not so neat as the exhibition narrative would suggest. Through the Jiang-Luo book, we see signs of Chiang’s increasingly leftward lurch in his mobilization of workers, his focus on the urban proletariat, and his attempts at labor organizing, a lurch that historian Chao
Hsun-ta argues differentiates him from the “reformism” of the Three People’s Principles and Sun Yat-sen. Chao states that Chiang shifted to favor class conflict, while Sun insisted that the classes of a “weak nation” must band together harmoniously to oppose oppressor nations as a single national force, a shift that illustrates Chiang was more radical than Sun. We might also consider that Chiang himself saw Taiwan as a unique entity, Taiwanese being “Japanese citizens of the Chinese nation” with a unique positionality conducive for understanding both sides and bringing about peace in Asia. This substantiates Chiang as a far different thinker than Sun, unless we are to buy into Wang Jingwei’s account of the Asian Sun. Even if we did, we might note that by situating the Taiwanese as a mediator at the crossroads of East Asia, Chiang carved out a unique place for Taiwan in the world, one that recognized both its Chinese and Japanese identities (but still largely ignored any notion of a bentu Taiwanese identity). This Pan-Asianist lurch is not present in either the Pictorial History narrative of Chiang, the Chinese patriot from Taiwan, or the Greenish narrative of Chiang, the Taiwanese patriot who studied and admired the revolutionary nationalist Sun Yat-sen. However, this is not Huang Huang-hsiung’s interpretation of Chiang, but this rather emerges unmistakably from Chiang’s own article in a commemorative fifth-anniversary edition of the Taiwan Minbao.

Seeing this, we might think of Sun’s own leftward lurch at the end of his life,

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310 Huang Huang-hsiung, “From “Discovering Chiang Wei-shui” to “Protecting Chiang Wei-shui” (Cong ‘faxian Chiang Wei-shui’ dao ‘shouhu Chiang Wei-shui’), Hanxueyanyijutongxun, 36: 1 (141) 2-2017, 7-8.
his own ambiguous Pan-Asianist sentiments, and the controversy that the two
engendered and still engender. Much as Chiang Wei-shui was suppressed by the
Japanese and the GMD for his dissenting views on Taiwan’s destiny, many aspects of
Sun’s life are suppressed in the images displayed in this paper. Chiang Kai-shek
erased Sun’s ties to the Communists, the Communists downplayed Sun’s own erratic
politics and schmoozing with imperialists. Now, we see here that the Greenish Sun is
suspiciously washed of his bluer hues, and that both the exhibition narrative and the
earlier mentioned *Pictorial History* ignore Chiang Wei-shui’s own socialist activities,
preference for working gradually within the Japanese imperial system (yet violent
opposition to Japanese rule), and his own unique conception of Taiwan as the land
between two great empires. These aspects of Sun’s and Chiang’s lives are suppressed
because the complexities they pose undermine convenient narratives that serve to
legitimate existing power structures. In considering any portrait, we ought to consider
why it was painted and how the painter recasts reality.

**v: Conclusion**

Although Taiwan remains the Republic of China in name, much about its
political circumstances have been transformed in the last seventy years. This has
meant that, to keep Sun Yat-sen relevant, bodies and individuals with the desire to do
so like the SYS Memorial Hall have shifted from relying upon reinforcing Sun’s
status as the Father of the Nation, given the GMD and the ROC’s declining relevance
to Taiwanese identity, to recasting Sun as a scrappy revolutionary leader who inspired
the Taiwanese nationalist movement of the 1920s. The shift at once distances
contemporary Taiwanese nationalism, which is relatively kind to the Japanese
colonial period, from the Taiwanese nationalist movement of the colonial period. Furthermore, by recasting Sun as a great revolutionary indirectly responsible for Taiwanese revolutionary activity and by dropping the reliance upon such mantles as the Father of the Nation, the authors of the book insulate Sun from the volatile fortunes of the GMD, the political baggage of years of association with the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult and the martial law abuses of the GMD, and the uncertain future of the ROC mantle. The aim seems to be that even if Taiwan was tomorrow declared independent and the Blue Sky, White Sun, Red Earth hung only in museums, Sun would have a significant place in the history of this new Taiwan, if not as its *pater patriae*.

This desire to preserve and protect Sun’s legacy in Taiwan presumably stems from Sun’s immense political and cultural capital, but also from people’s own Chinese identity. Having been hailed as the Father of the Nation, as an anti-imperialist revolutionary, as the guide of the weak and the Father of Chinese Democracy, Sun weighs heavily upon the historical landscape of Chinese cultural zones. Plainly, the SYS Memorial Hall has a vested interested in defending the legacy of Sun, but even private citizens like Li Qiyu have martyred themselves (in his case, quite literally) to protect Sun’s legacy and ties to Taiwanese society. We might speculate that when Mr. Li set out for Kaohsiung with a knife in hand, he was not simply defending the honor of a man he never met. Rather, he was defending the very symbol of his own Chinese identity, the esteemed father of his professed nation, from the onslaught of a Taiwanese *bentu* cultural revolution that esteems Japanese colonialism and Taiwanese parochialism, and, more significantly, that would deny
him his own heritage as a son of the Yellow Emperor and a soldier of the Chinese
revival. Of course, this is only speculation, and dead men tell no tales. Nonetheless,
we will continue considering the place of heritage, threats to cultural continuity, and
divergent histories further in the next chapter, which will consider the place of Sun
Yat-sen among Chinese communities in two overseas locales: Hawaii and Malaysia.
SANDALWOOD & BETEL NUTS: SUN YAT-SEN IN HAWAI'I & PENANG

Amidst a changing world and the advancement of sciences, people recognize even more the legitimate values of Confucianism when seeking a solution to modern social problems.

—Dedication of a Confucius statue on Trinity Street in Hartford, CT

i: Introduction

We have spent much time considering the figure of Sun Yat-sen and his usage by state actors in China, and by less directly-associated bodies in the liminal space of Taiwan. We now shift to non-state narratives of Sun from non-Chinese spaces to explore new perspectives on Sun. In the following chapter I will briefly explore the local histories of Hawaii and Penang to probe how Sun is defined among two distinct overseas Chinese communities. Such spaces, beyond the control of the Chinese state and yet subject to Chinese state politics, offer a distinctive context for understanding the factors at play in the representation of Sun Yat-sen. Sun is defined to fit neatly with local political values; therefore, how Sun is remembered says something about how local Chinese relate to the larger local society.

My sketches of each location are provisional. I had the opportunity to visit Honolulu and do some preliminary research on the ground there, and so am better acquainted with Sun’s Hawaiian afterlife. In Hawaii, the book Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii—written by Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum—evinces an attempt to frame Sun as a son of Hawaiian soil, a kamaaina.311 The commemorative

311 A kamaaina is a local Hawaiian, but not necessarily an ethnic Hawaiian, for which the term would be kanaka.
book tells the story of Sun’s time in Hawaii and provides details on his revolutionary associates there, largely Revive China Society and Tongmenghui members.

Throughout their book, Lum and Lum simultaneously raise the stature of the Hawaiians in Chinese history and the Chinese in Hawaiian history. They present the people of Hawaii as fully behind Sun and his mission, thus magnifying the aura of his aspiration for a democratic Chinese republic. Sun’s Chinese republic also evinces a Hawaiian Chinese attempt to illustrate Chinese modernity and democratic modernity, thus dignifying the identity of the Chinese in the United States in the terms of the local political environment. Differing particulars in Sun statuary, however, betray a more complex field of actors involved in remembering, presenting, and defining Sun, such as the Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace and Education, and city governments in the US, the PRC, and the ROC. In discussing Sun’s Hawaiian afterlife specifically, the introductions to the Lum and Lum book serve well to illustrate this point. I also refer to demographic trends in Hawaii, though only cursorily, to better situate Sun remembrance in the context of greater Hawaiian society, a society quite different from Chinese and Taiwanese societies.

For the purpose of comparison, I also bring in the Malaysian state of Penang as another example of how Sun’s heroic image is shaped in overseas communities. In discussing Penang, Khoo Salma Nasution’s book *Sun Yat Sen in Penang* may serve to illustrate one aspect of his Malaysian fate. Khoo illustrates Sun’s relatively transient connection to the city but also the distinctive place of the Chinese in Penang and in broader Malaysian society when placed in conversation with Lum and Lum’s *Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii*. She emphasizes division among Chinese in the Straits and framing
Sun’s time there as a time of adversity with the intense support of a few. In this fashion, Khoo plays up the revolutionary nature of Sun’s struggle, the charity and foresight of his Penang supporters, and the often-difficult lives of emigrant Chinese in the Straits. Khoo also touches upon the role of place in commemoration with explicit discussion of 120 Armenian Street, the former headquarters of the Nanyang Tongmenghui, and the place of Sun Yat-sen in differing political agenda by the book’s end.

We should not only think of local histories when considering the “place” of overseas Chinese in Hawaii and Malaysia. Because their positions were globally inflected, we should also consider how Chinese governments and organizations, from the Qing, the Tongmenghui, and Baohuanghui to the ROC, PRC, and Taiwanese independence crowd used and use the overseas Chinese in their own agendas. Beyond this, we must also consider how the Chinese populations in these locales have adapted to their environs, what Sun Yat-sen means in these extranational spaces, and why he is remembered. In Hawaii, Sun remembrance appears to serve to reinforce a local Hawaiian identity. Hawaii appears as a nation with a unique history, distinct from the rest of the United States, and Sun remembrance there reflects the contestation of loyalty by the ROC and PRC governments as well as the shifting place of Hawaii in the world and, later, Chinese in American society. In Penang, where the Chinese population has been subsumed into Malaysia unlike the Chinese of independent Singapore, remembering Sun offers an opportunity to remember the glory days of freeport Penang, a jewel of the Straits and the pivotal, if underappreciated, role it played in both Chinese and world history. By remembering Sun’s time there, Khoo
raises the stature of the Nanyang among Chinese spaces and the place of Penang in broader Chinese history. We also see in both Honolulu and Penang that Sun’s political afterlives are not only subject to Chinese in China and abroad, but also to the broader non-Chinese world with which these communities necessarily interact.

I will use overseas Chinese to mean ethnic Chinese living outside of China, and use both terms more or less interchangeably. I am aware that some authors, such as Leo Suryadinata find the usage of “overseas Chinese” problematic for it presupposes that ethnic Chinese are a homogenous entity loyal to a Chinese state—today the PRC—and so invokes “yellow peril” politics to stoke prejudice against ethnic Chinese in other nations. However, this chapter, in part, touches upon Chinese state attempts to connect with ethnic Chinese abroad through the figure of Sun Yat-sen, and so I find using “overseas Chinese” appropriate in this context.

ii: A Brief History of Hawaii and the Hawaiian Chinese

The Hawaiian Islands, forming a volcanic archipelago in the Mid-Pacific, were first settled by Polynesian sailors in the first millennium of the common era. The islands would remain isolated until growing maritime trade networks led to their integration within trans-Pacific trade routes and maritime industries. The islands became known to the Western world following the arrival of explorer James Cook in 1778 off the shore of Oahu. He and his crew returned the following year to further

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313 The following history comes largely from a textbook used in the Territory of Hawaii in the late 1920s. Though dated, I believe it is a useful resource for understanding the basic history of Hawaii till that point and the official narrative surrounding the Territory’s annexation.
chart the islands, but Cook would be killed by his former hosts in the domain of Kalaniopuu following a scuffle. Kalaniopuu, one of several powerful chiefs in the islands, ruled the isle of Hawaii. His domain was split following his death. His nephew, Kamehameha I, waged war to unify the island of Hawaii. Following his success in 1792, he invaded eastern Maui. Kamehameha I would eventually extend the control of his domain over the islands of Maui, Oahu, and Molokai and declare himself King of Hawaii. Kauai and its dependent Niihau swore fealty as autonomous islands within the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1810.314

During the five-king Kamehameha dynasty, foreign interests in the Hawaiian Islands increased as the islands grew in economic and strategic importance. First, the islands were a useful waystation in the trans-Pacific fur trade. They emerged soon after as a valuable source of sandalwood.315 Following the mid-19th century collapse of the sandalwood trade, Hawaii relied upon its position as a waystation. Trans-Pacific fur trader and whalers—having significantly depleted Atlantic whale stocks—frequently called upon on the islands. The city of Honolulu on Oahu in particular emerged as a valuable resupply base with a good harbor. American, British, French, Russian, and Japanese interests in the islands were significant by the late 19th century. Aside from this, rising sugar, coffee, potato, and rice industries on the islands were fueled by American expansion to the Pacific coast of North America. Population booms in California and Oregon fed demand for Hawaiian sugar and potatoes, which

314 Ibid., 93.
315 Ibid., 116.
became important exports after the whaling frenzy of the 1840s subsided by the 1860s. Pineapples and bananas became important cash crops for largely foreign-born plantation owners by the end of the nineteenth century. American interests in the islands, firmly entrenched since the days of the sandalwood trade, led to the islands’ annexation in 1898.316

In 1893, the monarchy of Hawaii, having passed out of the hands of the Kamehamas and into those of the Kalakaua dynasty, was overthrown by Sanford B. Dole and his league of American-friendly republicans.317 After annexation as a territory in 1898, Hawaii grew significantly. Hawaiian plantations grew in size and scale, the most notable being the Dole Plantations of Sanford B. Dole, the first President of the Republic and the first Territorial Governor of Hawaii. The University of Hawaii-Manoa was founded in 1908 as part of the development of the islands into a modern colony and the Pearl River Lagoon was developed into Pearl Harbor, a critically important naval base for the US Pacific Fleet. Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor were an integral part of the broader escalation of the Pacific War on December 7th, 1941, as Hawaii was the key staging ground of the US Pacific Fleet. Hawaii was admitted as a state in March of 1959, several months after the admission

316 Ibid., 125-126.
317 The republicans were largely wealthy business owners who sought the annexation of Hawaii into the United States. This was not the first time the islands had flirted with annexation. In 1854, Kamehameha III purportedly also submitted a request for the immediate annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii by the USA as a full-fledged state following pressure from businessmen on the islands and threats from American filibusters.317 However, Dole and his crew administered Hawaii as a republic for five years before the islands were admitted to the United States as the Territory of Hawaii, not as a state. The deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the native monarchy is still a matter of historical grievance among some Hawaiians.
Given Hawaii’s history as an isolated archipelago of Polynesian kingdoms and chiefdoms, Hawaii’s population was unsurprisingly different from that of the continental United States. The native population of Hawaiians had shrunk in the late 18th century due to exposure to unfamiliar diseases resulting from contact with Europeans. Nonetheless, native Hawaiians still comprise a significant portion of the population. Aside from native Hawaiians, there are other Polynesian peoples, such as South Seas islanders brought to Hawaii to supplement the dwindling population of native Hawaiians during the reign of Kamehama IV. Today, there are also many Micronesians from the US protectorates of Palau, Micronesia, and Tonga.

Aside from Polynesians and Micronesians, Hawaii has a significant population of Chinese. Many Chinese came to labor on Hawaiian plantations during the mid-nineteenth century, though many had come as independent farmers and traders before the rise of commercial sugar plantations. Though Chinese businessmen and farmers had pioneered sugar farming on the islands, it was primarily American businessman who benefited from the rapid settlement of California and the Great Mahele land reforms in Hawaii. Just as on the American mainland, the influx

318 The exact bloodline that constitutes Native Hawaiian identity is limited to “full-blooded” from “half-blooded.” Though not the focus of this paper, J. Kehaulani Kauanui’s *Hawaiian Blood* addresses the blood-count definition of Hawaiian identity as codified in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921.
319 Kuykendall, 217.
320 Clarence Glick, *Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants in Hawaii*, (University of Hawaii Press, 1980), 23. Glick estimates that two-thirds to three-fourths of some 46,000 pre-annexation Chinese immigrants came to work on sugar or rice plantations, but notes many did not stay in this line of work for long.
321 Ibid.
of Chinese into Hawaii led to the growth of anti-Chinese sentiment, particularly among white Hawaiians and visitors. Following the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1882 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 were also valid and enforceable in the Territory, hampering the movement of indentured labor and Chinese more generally to the islands. Sun Yat-sen himself had to procure a fake Hawaiian birth certificate to enter Hawaii following annexation.

Clarence Glick notes that fewer Chinese were coming entered to work on the plantations. More migrants moved into business for themselves and thus constituted competition for the Anglo-American business elite of Hawaii. However, the growing plantations still required cheap labor and so Japanese and Filipino (the Philippines having been taken from Spain and made into a US colony following the 1898 Spanish-American War) migration came to replace Chinese migration. These groups together largely displaced native Hawaiian labor as the chief sources of labor on the islands. Portuguese and Germans were also solicited to work on these plantations.

While many white (a vague and changing term) immigrants had come to the islands for missionary or commercial purposes in the era of the Hawaiian Kingdom, many more came after the coup of 1893 and the annexation of 1898. The establishment of the Naval Station at Pearl Harbor, the Territorial Government in Honolulu, and the University in Honolulu drew many white and black American mainlanders to Oahu in particular.

While my focus in this section is on how Sun Yat-sen is presented and

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322 Ibid., 17-18.
323 Lum and Lum, *Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii*, 39-41. See footnote eighty-four.
remembered among the overseas Chinese in Hawaii amidst its shifting demography, properly presenting this requires more context for the Chinese presence in Hawaii and trends among the population there. As stated above, Chinese first came to Hawaii as lascars, sailors, and passengers aboard Western ships in the late eighteenth century, but mass migration from China to Hawaii did not occur till the mid-nineteenth century. As mentioned above, Chinese migrants to Hawaii came for differing reasons, but regardless of their profession, they came largely as single men. Some of these men would return to China, others would settle down in Hawaii, but many went back and forth. As Hawaii’s Chinese population was largely male, Hawaiian Chinese generally married native Hawaiian women or went home to find a Chinese bride.\footnote{David Wu and Harry Lamely, “Introduction—The Hawaii Chinese: Their Experience and Identity over Two Centuries”, \textit{Chinese America: History & Perspectives—The Journal of the Chinese Historical Society of America} (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 2010), 1-11, 4.} Their wives and children sometimes followed their husbands to the Islands; others stayed in the ancestral village. Those who brought wives and family to Hawaii or married there tended to invest there and establish deeper roots than those sojourners, who kept family at home and invested back in China.\footnote{Glick, 103.}

Most Hawaiian Chinese of the Kingdom era hailed from Guangdong, and Xiangshan County in particular. This was largely because ships from Canton to Honolulu stopped at Macao first, a stone’s throw from Xiangshan.\footnote{Wu and Lamely, 2.} Xiangshan was not a rich place, and many apparently felt the need or ambition to try their luck overseas. One such Xiangshannese was Sun Mei, the elder brother of Sun Yat-sen.
This shared identity as Cantonese and Xiangshanese meant that many in Hawaii supported Sun and his Guangdong government following the failed Second Revolution. Even so, many other Hawaiian Chinese supported Yuan and dismissed the GMD as troublemakers.327

Returning to the migrant experience, the story of Sun Mei and Sun Yat-sen itself reflects several facts about migration between China and Hawaii. First, it underscores economic motivations behind migration. Had Sun Mei been comfortable at home, he most likely would have had little reason to move. Second, it underscores the importance of family and social networks in migration. Sun Yat-sen followed his brother Sun Mei to Honolulu to work at his store, subsequently following him to his ranch on Maui. Sun Mei also helped to import Chinese laborers from Xiangshan to Hawaii to work on plantations and ranches. Those who knew and trusted Sun Mei might evidently turn to him in securing work or recommend his services to those they knew.

In the early generations, Chinese who went to Hawaii generally worked lowly jobs on plantations. At this early juncture, distinctions between Punti (bendi, or Cantonese natives) and Hakka (kejia, or “guest households” who came to Guangdong in the eleventh century) were observed and reinforced in Hawaiian Chinese associations and networks. Later, many Hawaiian Chinese worked as merchants, and by the mid-twentieth century, many Hawaiian Chinese became professionals or

327 Glick, 289.
businesspeople. However, over the course of the period Hawaiian Chinese had grown increasingly cut off from China following the enforcement of Chinese exclusion starting in 1898, culminating in a near-total breaking of ties after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Hawaiian Chinese had organized themselves into native place associations or huiguan, largely representing their home districts in Xiangshan or other counties in Guangdong. Many sent remittances back home. Some even returned home to conduct business, take up office, or carry out charitable initiatives like the building of roads or temples. Following the establishment of the PRC, Americans could not travel to the Chinese mainland and Chinese could not travel to the United States or its territories, thus breaking the link between Xiangshan, Guangdong, and Hawaii. Following the isolation from their families back in Guangdong and general intermarriage of Hawaiian Punti, Hawaiian Hakka, and newcomer Chinese Americans, these distinctions grew less clear.

Today’s Hawaiian Chinese compose a fluid mixture of peoples. Some hail from long-time Hawaiian backgrounds, others are newcomers from mainland China, Taiwan, or Nanyang territories like Malaysia or Singapore. Still others are Chinese Americans from various parts of the United States. Complicating local identities is the increasingly prominent identification of Taiwanese Americans, or Americans of Taiwanese descent who do not strictly identify as Chinese. The nominal existence of

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329 Lum and Lum’s biographies of Sun’s Hawaiian contacts illustrate the relatively frequent to-and-fro movement of prominent Hawaiian Chinese.
330 Glick and Glick, 48.
one China, with the de facto existence of two regimes claiming—to varying extents—to be that China, and the rise of a distinctive Taiwanese nationalism produce a contentious force field of political ties. At least three non-American governments claim to represent some measure of the Huayi, Huaren, or Huaqiao of Hawaii and the Western world.331

There is also the matter of contested Hawaiian and American identities. Hawaii’s past as an independent kingdom, the perceived illegitimacy of its annexation in 1898, and the general physical and cultural distance between Hawaii and the mainland US complicated the place of Hawaiians within the United States and, therefore, the place of Hawaiian Chinese within the United States as well. According to Clarence Glick, many Hawaiian Chinese do not solely identify as Chinese, but rather identify strongly as local Hawaiians as well.332 This is especially true of mixed-race Hawaiian Chinese, to the extent that some do not even identify as Chinese. The complex interplay in Hawaiian Chinese identity and Sun’s historic ties to the islands mean that local incarnations of Sun Yat-sen are unique. They combine tropes of other American images of Sun with local particulars that serve to elevate the place of Hawaii on the world stage and, thus, the place of the Hawaiian Chinese.

iii: Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii

331 James Jiann Hua To’s Qiaowu explores the difficult politics of PRC, ROC, and Taiwanese outreach to overseas Chinese in detail. Related to the understanding of overseas Chinese, three main terms—Huaqiao, Huayi, and Huaren—are in common parlance. Though all similar terms, Huaqiao has the connotation of a Chinese abroad that will return to China, Huayi one that will not on any permanent basis, and Huaren simply someone of Chinese descent.
332 Glick and Glick, 47.
Before turning to Lum and Lum’s commemorative book, it may prove beneficial to first explore the landscape of Hawaiian Sun commemoration. Key to our brief overview are the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the foundation responsible for notable Sun statuary around Hawaii and for *Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii*, and the Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace and Education. Both foundations are tied to branches of the Sun family, with the latter foundation having been the personal project of the late Lily Sun Sui-fong, daughter of Sun Fo. Also integral are municipal governments of Honolulu, Kaohsiung, and Zhongshan. We see in the erection and dedication of Sun statues competing groups working to court the public opinion of Hawaiian Chinese, redefining Sun and his legacy to best fit their own political sensibilities and objectives.

For instance, a 1965 statue of Sun that greets visitors to Honolulu’s Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL) explicitly lauds the projected democratic nature of Sun’s revolution. Erected by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the Airport Statue sits in the Chinese Garden near the ticketing window and baggage claim of Terminal 2. The statue sits beside a pleasant Chinese-style pavilion and a small pond in a generally-Chinese style garden. I say generally Chinese in that it does not appear to reflect any specifically regional garden tradition, such as the white walls and artificial mountains of a Jiangnan garden. Notably, sitting in a “generally Chinese-style garden” allows for Sun to stand for the Chinese nation as a whole and not be limited by regional distinctions and associations, distinctions that had divided Chinese Americans in Hawaii and elsewhere.
The statue bears English and Chinese dedications. The front view simply reads tian xia wei gong, the ubiquitous Sun Yat-sen memorial quote seen also in Manhattan’s Columbus Park and on a pailou outside Taipei’s National Palace Museum. The English text, dedicated on the occasion of Sun’s 100th birthday, marks Sun as the “founder of the Republic of China”, the “author of the Three People’s Principles”:

He devoted his entire life to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. Author of the “Three People’s Principles”, he founded the Republic of China. An advocate of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism, he always exerted his utmost efforts to aid the weak and support the faltering with a view towards the realizing of universal justice as well as cosmopolitanism. He was revered by his people and admired by the world. On the centennial anniversary of his

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333 Photos by the author, January 5, 2020.
334 Curiously, the Committee was using Chinese reckoning, by which one is one-year old at birth, but we might note that this is at odds with the 1966 centennial celebrations in both the ROC-Taiwan and the PRC.
birth, we respectfully erect this statue in everlasting tribute. Presented to the State of Hawaii by the Hawaii Dr. Sun Yat-sen Centennial Memorial Committee, November 12, 1965.335

Sun Yat-sen, sitting prominently in the airport’s Chinese garden, is thus presented as a universally beloved Chinese hero of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism to the traveling masses passing through the corridors of the Inouye International Airport. Celebrating Sun as cosmopolitan and compassionate, an angel of mercy and justice, the dedication is fit for a modern-day saint and finds a place for Sun outside of the national pantheon of China. Instead of sitting alongside the Hongwu Emperor, Chiang Kai-shek (or Mao Zedong) as a great Chinese nationalist leader, Sun is recast such that he may walk alongside Abraham Lincoln,336 Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther King Jr. While he is still celebrated for his revolutionary work, Sun is made a moral exemplar in terms of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism, terms familiar to an American audience. After all, it is difficult to celebrate Sun as a nationalist in a space that does not take Chinese nationalism as an evident good and in which Chinese nationalism has little cache. Recasting him as an icon of more familiar virtues allows non-Chinese American travelers, milling through the garden while waiting for their flights, bags, or parties to quickly interpret (presumably approvingly) the statue and

335 The Chinese dedication is effectively identical: “碑記：國父孫公諱文逸仙號中山生於公曆一八八六年十一月十二日歿於一九二五年三月十二日畢生盡瘁創倡三民主義筆肇建中華民國主張自由平等博愛濟弱扶傾身體力行求天下為公進世界大同國人景仰舉世欽際慈百年誕辰恭立銅像永垂不朽。—中華民國五十四年十一月十二日立。”

336 Sun’s stance, sitting sternly in a chair, seems to evoke Abraham Lincoln’s statue at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., though not as explicitly as the later statue built for the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei. The Taipei hall opened in 1972.
the figure it represents.

In contrast, the Chinese dedication does not locate Sun beyond Chinese nationalism, but rather honors him as the guofu of the Republic of China. The dedication is even dated according to the Chinese calendar: November 12, the fifty-fourth year of the Republic, a striking difference from less nationally marked English dedication. Although these stylistic distinctions do not deeply affect the main body of text, they do speak to the ways that one statue deploys different messages for different audiences. The English dedication presents a relatively universalized Sun, while the Chinese dedication adopts the language of ROC Chinese nationalism, presumptively deemed relevant to Chinese-literate visitors. The two dedications remind us of overlapping national identities and their gaps. Plainly, Sun Yat-sen cannot be the Father of the Nation in the United States, which has its own pantheon of Founding Fathers. Nonetheless, a strong sense of Chinese national identity among the members of the Hawaii Dr. Sun Yat-sen Centennial Committee necessitated honoring Sun’s importance for the Chinese nation he stood to represent. The linguistically camouflaged honoring of Sun as guofu also perhaps suggests that the Hawaiian Chinese who erected the statue felt some disconnection from mainstream American society and its symbolic representations. At the same time, the group avoided airing these feelings to a broader English-speaking audience, possibly to preserve simultaneous claims to their U.S. citizenship.

A later statue, of ROC provenance, presents a different image of Sun to a different audience. Situated off of the Nuuanu Creek and only feet from the original headquarters of Sun’s Revive China Society, the Nuuanu statue was donated by the
city government of Kaohsiung in the 1984 to commemorate the 90th anniversary of
the RCS’s founding in Honolulu. The plinth, a 2007 addition to the 1984 statue,
was donated by Lily Sun’s Dr. Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace and Education.

![Image of the Nuuanu statue and its plinth.](image)

Figure 11: The Nuuanu statue and its plinth. The White Sun and Blue Sky, part of the
original installation, can be seen below.

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337 By the other bank of the creek is a statue dedicated to Filipino revolutionary icon Jose
Rizal.
338 Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, “How many Dr. Sun Yat-sen statues are there in
Hawaii?”, January 25, 2019, [http://sunyatsenhawaii.org/2019/01/25/how-many-dr-sun-yat-
sen-statues-are-there-in-hawaii/](http://sunyatsenhawaii.org/2019/01/25/how-many-dr-sun-yat-
sen-statues-are-there-in-hawaii/).
339 Photos the author’s, January 8, 2020. Though I have not looked expressly for these plinths,
a Sun statue with an identical plinth stands in the International District of Seattle. The statue,
observed during a March 2019 trip, was outside the Chung Wa Benevolent Association (7th
Avenue and Wheeler Street). Photos of identical bases beneath Sun statues at the Honolulu
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office and at Sun Mei’s former ranch in Kula, Maui, may be
seen at the address below. Identical and odd translation of tianxia weigong as “All under
Heaven Are Equal” (seen elsewhere as “All under Heaven for the common good” and “All
under Heaven is a Commonwealth”) can also be found on a new base below the Columbus
Park, Manhattan statue.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, “How many?”
A scholarly Sun, in a jacket and changpao robes, stands considering a book in the shade of a tree. He now stands atop a shiny black base that elevates him above passerby; it is unclear if the statue was atop a plinth before 2007 or if he stood directly on the emblazoned sidewalk. The distinctive octagonal plinth, engraved with golden characters reading “peace”, “filial piety”, and “justice” among other things, is of a model seen in other locations. Although an exhaustive analysis of the who’s, how’s, and why’s of Sun statuary in the United States is beyond the scope of this thesis, we will briefly note that Sun, standing on a pedestal emblazoned with Confucian virtues and objectives such as righteousness, loyalty, harmony, grasping the nature of things, and the extension of knowledge, thus stands as an icon of Confucian morality and political modernity through his connection to democracy, political equality, and the establishment of a Chinese republic. Unlike the plinth of the airport statute, which marks Sun as the saint of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism in an almost French trifecta, the Lily Sun plinth identifies Sun as a sort of modern Confucian sage, in keeping with the scholarly stance of the Kaohsiung statue.

2007 was a busy year for Sun statuary aficionados in Honolulu. In November 12 of that year—the 141th anniversary of Sun’s birth—Honolulu’s Gateway Park was also rededicated as the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park by the government of Honolulu, then under the administration of Mayor Mufi Hanneman. The rededication, which involved the dedication of a new Sun statute by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, served two distinct yet interrelated purposes. First, it was part of a community revitalization effort. Rededicating Gateway Park to honor Sun was one of
ten points of a community-city negotiated plan to revitalize the Honolulu Chinatown in 2006. Plainly, Sun Yat-sen has continued relevance to the Honolulu Chinese community if the community decided that the dedication of a park in his name should constitute one point of a neighborhood revitalization program. This suggests that a Sun park and statue both helped to reinforce the Chinese identity of Chinatown while also celebrating the virtues of democracy conducive to an American political environment.

However, there was also a diplomatic motivation underlying the rededication. The rededication of Gateway Park also served to commemorate ten years of a sister-city relationship between Honolulu and Zhongshan in Guangdong. The international dimension to the rededication is reinforced by Mayor Hanneman: “There was great support to mark the 10th anniversary of our sister-city relationship by honoring Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is universally known as the Father of Modern China. I firmly believe that there is no more beautiful or appropriate setting in our city to honor him than this park.” The mayor’s comments illustrate the explicitly diplomatic nature of the rededication and the interplay between local and international forces in the naming of a small city park, but also explicate Sun as the “Father of Modern China”. We have recently seen Sun as guofu, the benevolent, wise, and fantastic father of the ROC popularized as part of a GMD propaganda war in the

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340 As noted previously, Zhongshan City was formerly Xiangshan County, and in 1925 was renamed by the ROC government in honor of Sun. Deng Xiaoping’s PRC government redesignated Zhongshan County Zhongshan City in 1983.

1940s. However, this appellation is somewhat different than the Father of Modern China mentioned in the Hawaii of 2007. What is this China? This modern China is the modern People’s Republic of China of reformist rhetoric, as seen in the second chapter. This Sun is not a traditionalist superman like Chiang’s guofu or a bourgeois, anti-imperialist revolutionary leader like the Sun of early PRC commemorations. Rather, this Sun is defined primarily by his modernism and nationalism. Naturally, Deng and other post-Deng CCP leaders invoked this Sun, the Father of Modern China, largely to emphasize the role of the CCP in bringing about modern China, thus helping to legitimate CCP party-state dictatorship.

Of course, the Mayor of Honolulu has no reason to bring that into his comments. However, he did use this epithet, perhaps as a diplomatic gesture of goodwill towards his counterparts in Zhongshan. But Hanneman did not wax about the merits of post-Reform China or its leadership, as he was the mayor of an American city; excessive praise for a foreign government would not play well at home, particularly given the sometimes tense relationship between Beijing and Washington and still-existent ROC sympathies among portions of his own Chinese American constituents. To sidestep all of these issues while still pleasing Zhongshan, he simply invoked Sun as the Father of Modern China without defining what exactly this meant.

While the Gateway Park rededication served to please Chinese Americans in Honolulu and Chinese officials in Zhongshan, the statue in the park is itself worthy of discussion.
Unlike all other Sun statues discussed here, this statue portrays Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii as he was: a young boy. It is perhaps anachronistic to call it a statue of Sun Yat-sen, as Sun Deming did not adopt the name Sun Yat-sen until he was already a man. By portraying Sun as a boy, the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation emphasized what was unique about Sun’s ties to Hawaii; it is thus different from all other Sun statues and would make sense nowhere but in Hawaii or, perhaps, Cuiheng. It further serves to emphasize that the young, impressionable Sun—books in hand—learned many of his most formative lessons in Hawaii, and so claims a special place for Hawaii in the life and legacy of Sun.

While statues are valuable for shaping the historical landscape of a geographic

342 The left photo comes from a January 8, 2020 visit to the park, but it was unfortunately under construction. The right photo comes the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation’s article, “How many Sun statues…?”, cited above.
space, they are limited in reach. If you do not live near it or regularly pass by it, you would have to make a special trip to see it. The erectors of the airport statue presumably recognized the limitations of a stature’s reach and so chose a prominent place for it at a busy transit site, maximizing the number of people who would see it. The Nuuanu and Gateway statues are not located in the transitional space of an airport, at once in Honolulu and yet removed from the city itself. Rather, they are placed near significant sites in Honolulu’s busy Chinatown and so see significant foot and automotive traffic from tourists, locals, and commuters. We might speculate that the airport statue was placed to influence visitors’ understanding of Sun, but the Honolulu airport is the largest airport in Hawaii and the sole transit link to the mainland and foreign nations, and so it would be shortsighted to presume only tourists see the statue. As for the Chinatown statues, we might note that they see more local traffic, and are more immediately present in the fabric of the city than the airport statue. Their reaches are limited, nonetheless, by the nature of the medium.

Unlike statues, however, books are eminently mobile and dense, and so narratives may be promulgated across any physical distance and expounded upon in great detail. It is with this in mind that we turn to Lum and Lum’s book *Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii and His Supporters*. This book, published by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, presents itself as an authoritative local history of Sun’s time in Hawaii and his connections to the local Chinese to a broad, borderless English-literature audience. Accordingly, its value rests largely on its claim to local authority and how it uses the authority to reshape the image of Sun. The book thus tells as much about the Chinese in Hawaii as it does the details of his connection to Hawaii then and now.
In exploring these questions, we might recall that Sun’s time in Hawaii was described by his biographers variously as a formative encounter with Western modernity, with Christianity, and with Chinese backwardness. To James Cantlie, Sun’s time in Hawaii was when Sun learned of the glory of Western civilization and in so doing learned the true extent of Qing China’s poverty and backwardness. M. N. Roy held a similar characterization, but argued that Sun’s cultural chauvinism was the only thing saving him from becoming an outright advocate for Western imperialism. Jiang Xingde, instead, echoed Sun’s approval of Hawaiian modernity, but emphasized Sun’s growth from a boy to a man there, as well as his contact with Christianity and his consciousness of being a Chinese in a non-Chinese space. Marie-Claire Bergère, in a more academic fashion, highlighted his contact with modernity and Christianity in Honolulu, and noted his frustration with Xiangshan’s superstitious parochialism upon his unwilling return at the age of seventeen. She, like Jiang, also made note of Sun’s boredom working for Sun Mei, thus foreshadowing the young boy’s unusual path.

*Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii* has three sections. The first section explores Sun’s six visits to Hawaii; the second focuses on Sun’s local fundraising initiatives. The final section provides brief biographies of prominent Chinese men in Hawaii associated with Sun’s Hawaiian Revive China Society and Tongmenghui chapters. Finally, the book has an appendix featuring photographs of relevant historical materials.

The book’s foreword, written by Leigh-wai Doo of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, clearly situates Sun as influenced by his formative years in Hawaii as a boy and thus emphasizes the place of Hawaii in Sun’s life:
The people in the Kingdom of Hawaii and later Territory of Hawaii, U.S.A., were principal contributors to Dr. Sun’s early year education, moral values, and support of the Democratic Revolution of 1911, and the subsequent unification efforts of Dr. Sun in China. As Dr. Lin Jia You, director of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Institute of Zhong Shan University in Guangzhou, China, has said, “Without his experience in Hawaii, there would not be the great career of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.” It was in Hawaii that Dr. Sun Yat-sen developed the concepts and the moral character that were the foundations of his career. As a boy of thirteen, Sun Tai Chu learned English with such a proficiency that four years later he received an award from King Kalakaua of Hawaii. His concepts of government evolved from his schooling, which exposed him to the British and American systems of democracy. His character evolved, in those formative years of thirteen to seventeen years old, from the Anglican Iolani School and the Protestant Punahou School.

Manpower and funds came from Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s brethren who had emigrated to Hawaii from Zhongshan County in China, where they spoke the same dialect and had common relatives and friends. It was with this group of Chinese in Hawaii that he formed the first revolutionary party of China, Hsing Chung Hui, in 1894, and took refuge after the first of many revolutionary attempts in China. From the people of Hawaii he raised funds, sold bonds, and gained volunteers to fight in China, including in the later years, stimulating China’s first air force with funds and pilots from overseas Chinese. Dr. Sun Yat-sen came to Hawaii six times, living a total of seven years in Hawaii. His
closeness to Hawaii and the confidence he felt in being a kamaaina, a person of the land of Hawaii, is reflected in his statement to a newspaper report in 1910: “This is my Hawaii. Here I was brought up and educated; and it was here that I came to know what modern, civilized governments are like and what they mean.”

Doo’s introduction puts Hawaii front and center for Sun’s political education. The people of Hawaii, regardless of its political identity as a sovereign Kingdom or a dependent Territory, were “principal contributors” to Sun’s thought, values and career (from 1894 to 1911 through 1925). The close-knit Xiangshan community in Hawaii is explicitly credited with brotherly and patriotic support of Sun and his initiatives, and Sun himself is cast as a “kamaaina”, a Hawaiian son of the soil. Sun’s “my Hawaii” sentiments are a key piece of Sun remembrance in Hawaii, as also evinced by the quote’s prominent place in the previously mentioned Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park at the corner of Hotel and Bethel in Honolulu’s Chinatown.

Following the Chinese textual tradition of multiple prefaces and introductions particular to biographies, a second introduction by Lum and Lum underscores the central place of Sun in world history and Hawaii’s place in Sun’s life, thus elevating Hawaii through Sun:

Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen), the father of modern China, is one of the most

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343 Lum and Lum, viii.
344 Unfortunately, the park was closed for construction when I attempted to visit in January of 2020, and so this cannot be verified firsthand. However, a web search shows a plaque with the quote prominently displayed by the statue. City and County of Honolulu. Dr. SYS Hawaii Foundation, “How Many?”
honored and revered statesmen in the world. At the turn of the twentieth century, he led the Chinese people in a revolutionary movement that succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, thus ending more than two thousand years of imperial rule in China. In October 1911, a republic was established, and he was elected the first provisional president. The Republic of China was also the first republic ever to be established in Asia.

The description of Sun as “one of the most honored and revered statesmen in the world”, is curious title considering that Sun spent little time as a statesman and most of his time as a revolutionary and political organizer. Though Sun has an undeniable record as for revolutionary longevity, persistence, and leadership, he was only the President of the ROC for several months, and never again attained high office. The inclusion of Sun in the category of “statesmen” elevates Sun to the likes of national icons like the Roosevelts, Churchill, or de Gaulle, thus providing an immediate frame of reference for the unfamiliar American reader. Similarly, the establishment of the first Asian republic makes Sun not simply a Chinese statesman, but more grandly, an Asian statesman providing inspiration for Asians more broadly and invoking the democratization of Asia according to U.S.-style democratic-republican models.

Unsurprisingly, given the location and the agenda of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the introduction continues to highlight the significance of Hawaii in Sun’s life:

Hawaii and its people played an important role in the life of Sun. Hawaii was

345 Lum and Lum, xv.
known as Sun’s second home for he spent his teenage years here. He had family and many friends in these islands, where he carried out important revolutionary activities. During his years in exile outside of China, he was not allowed to land in many countries, for example, the Dutch Indies (now Indonesia). Even in Japan, where he spent many years, using it as a base for his activities, he occasionally found himself not so welcomed. But he never had any difficulties in returning to the Islands. The Hawaiians, especially those of Chinese ancestry, wholeheartedly supported him financially and politically. In many instances, they risked their lives to support the revolution. Sun once said: “Hua Qiao [overseas Chinese] is the mother of the revolution.”

The Chinese in Hawaii are well worthy of such an honor.\textsuperscript{346}

Significant here is the phrase “the Hawaiians, especially those of Chinese ancestry”. While elsewhere making explicit reference to Chinese sojourners abroad (\textit{Huaqiao}) and the Chinese in Hawaii, the editors here include non-Chinese Hawaiians among Sun’s “wholehearted” supporters. By including non-Chinese Hawaiians, the majority of Hawaiians (native, white, Japanese, or Filipino) thus become the financial patrons and political backers of Sun’s revolutionary anti-monarchist project. Sun and his revolution are not framed as a historical footnote in a minority history within Hawaii, but rather part of mainstream Hawaiian history. This also serves to elevate the role of Chinese in Hawaiian history along with the Hawaiian Chinese in Chinese history. Hawaiians’ welcoming attitude towards Sun moreover contrasts with fickle Japanese or cold colonials in the Dutch Indies and the Straits. This further situates Hawaii as an

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.
incubator of an international democratic movement.

Such emphasis on Hawaii’s place in Chinese history is further evinced in the final paragraph:

Hawaii played a historic role in the birth of modern China. It was known that the cradle of the Chinese revolution because it was here in the Islands that Sun founded the first revolutionary organization, the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) 興中會, which later developed into a strong political party called the Tung Meng Hui, which overthrew the Manchu regime. It was reorganized in 1912 to become the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) 國民黨. It was in Hawaii that Sun and a little more than a hundred Chinese first vowed to bring down the Manchus, and this little spark ignited into a prairie fire that burned down the decaying Manchu regime.347

This specific and historically accurate focus on Sun’s small network in Hawaii partially mitigates the prior suggestion of widespread, wholehearted Hawaiian support. In any case, the foundation of the Revive China Society in Honolulu in 1894 becomes the “little spark” that “ignited a prairie fire” that “burned down the decaying Manchu regime”. Lum and Lum also note that Sun adopted his focus on land reform as a key goal of the Revolutionary Army during his time organizing the Tongmenghui and its related organizations in Hilo in 1910.348 This places the RCS at the foundation of the Xinhai Revolution and Hawaii as a factor in the shaping of his revolutionary

347 Ibid.
348 Ibid., 31.
mission. As noted earlier, other narratives of the anti-Qing revolution emphasized instead Sun’s time in London, Sun’s time in Cuiheng, Sun’s lessons from the Taipings, and Sun’s lessons from the Bolsheviks. Though the last of these plainly developed after the fall of the Qing, we might recall that Communist narratives of Sun focused on the evils of the feudal structures of Chinese society and not the actual Qing monarchy, which was simply the latest dynasty to sit atop an old hierarchy. In any case, by placing the Revive China Society at the forefront of the narrative, Hawaii becomes the wellspring of the Chinese revolution and Republic.

iv: The Nanyang Chinese and the Isle of Penang

Chinese Americans, and the Chinese of Hawaii more pertinently, have a particular history and identity that necessarily colored Sun Yat-sen’s local image. For the purpose of comparison, we now turn to the Chinese of Nanyang, or the Southern Sea, who illustrate a different history of the Chinese diaspora. Nanyang, in Chinese, means “the southern ocean” and refers essentially to Southeast Asia. I will use the term Nanyang interchangeably with the Southern Sea, though note that this term would generally include the climes of northern Indian Ocean. The Chinese of the Southern Sea, like their Hawaiian/American counterparts, are a sizeable group within global Chinese diaspora consisting chiefly of Chinese economic emigres. However, the Nanyang Chinese have a long history of trade and residence in Southeast Asia with complicated implications in the present, much of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, a brief sketch of this diverse group may usefully frame a more focused discussion of the Chinese in Penang. This discussion, in turn, is limited to the necessary context for analysis of Sun Yat-sen in Penang, written by Khoo
Salma Nasution.

As a novice on Penang, I will refrain from making comprehensive arguments about the region’s history and will focus mostly on the Sun book and what it reveals as one Nanyang Chinese perspective on Sun, represented here by the Penang Chinese. Penang, with its shifting demographics and complicated relationship to both British colonialism and Malaysian nationalism, is an interesting space in which to consider Sun representations and the communities that create them. Khoo’s book, like the Lum and Lum book, is not serving any state-sanctioned political project, as many of my sources in the prior three chapters do. Rather, it is an individual work for a community organization, serving to illustrate how non-state actors interpret and portray Sun for their own purposes. In Khoo’s case, her book serves to incorporate Sun into the local history of Penang and elevate the place of Penang in world history. It also serves to commemorate the successful restoration of her family’s old property at 120 Armenian Street, the once-headquarters of the Tongmenghui’s Nanyang branch.

Unlike the state histories in prior chapters, one difficulty in discussing the Nanyang Chinese is the lack of convenient borders, spatial and temporal. Even the history of the Chinese in the United States and Hawaii is helpfully bound by the confines of overlapping American and Hawaiian history. The history of the Nanyang Chinese, however, spills over several national, imperial, and transnational histories. We might note that the Chinese of Borneo had quite different lived experiences than the Chinese of Rangoon or Phuket, that Chinese in Malacca during the 15th century had a different view of things than their descendants some five centuries later, and
that Chinese migrants to Johor, the Straits, or Sumatra in the 19th century came from a different China (and different places and backgrounds within this China) than those that fled the chaos of the Ming-Qing transition.

Key for our purposes is the binary between the prosperity of Chinese traders in Southeast Asia and the penury of Chinese miners, plantation workers, and petty merchants. Well-developed networks of traders, largely hailing from the southern maritimes of China, made great profit over the centuries. The Peranakan Chinese (or baba nyonya), as the locally-acculturated, longtime “non-Chinese Chinese” residents of Malaysia, southern Thailand, and Java are generally known, often profited as mediators and middlemen in global trade networks.349 The eminent scholar Wang Gungwu describes the Peranakan Chinese as “a proto-national community” descended from a pre-national network of emigrant trades in Southeast Asia with particular significance for understanding the political machinations of national identities, having been “made” Chinese by the national empires of Britain and the Netherlands.350 During the era of imperial excursions into Southeast Asia, these imperial powers competed over strategic locales like the Straits of Malacca, spice islands like Palau Run, and entrepots like Rangoon and Batavia (now Yangon and Jakarta) and worked to categorize the people there; the Peranakan Chinese were noted for their active participation in the Dutch and British imperial systems and their ability to mediate between local culture, the imperial culture of Britain or the Netherlands, and the Chinese culture of newcomer Chinese (Totok or sinkeh). Within

the British Straits Settlement, later-comers born in the Straits territories and Peranakan Chinese would both be labeled “Straits Chinese,” but more recent arrivals often lacked the social connections that enabled Peranakan Chinese and the Straits Chinese to so effectively serve as middlemen. They also responded far more enthusiastically to the promulgation of Chinese nationalism by figures like Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei than did the proto-national Baba, who Wang describes as being Chinese but not Chinese enough to meet the standards of this brand new national Chinese identity.351

Due to the wealth of these big-time Chinese merchants, particularly in the open Straits Settlements, both Qing officials and anti-Qing revolutionaries made fundraising trips to Nanyang. Sun Yat-sen himself made many trips to the region for exactly this purpose, and even lived in Singapore and Penang for some time. Battles between reformers, revolutionaries, and the Qing establishment would be fought in the press of colonial entrepots as each side sought to capture hearts, minds, and wallets. After the success of the Xinhai Revolution and the descent of the Republic into warlordism, Malaya and the Straits remained an important zone of recruitment, fundraising, and optics-shaping for the Tongmenghui’s successor, the GMD.352 Sinkeh Chinese were often zealously receptive to Sun and the GMD’s proselytizing, but the Peranakans had a more mixed response. The proto-national Peranakans “were aware of what it meant to be part of a great nation” due to their existence within the Dutch and British national empires, but their receptivity to Chinese nationalism was

351 Ibid. 81.
352 C. F. Young and R. B. McKenna explore this topic in their The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912-1949.
tempered by their own ambiguous local identities and comfortable connections to European empire, Qing officialdom, and local communities. The Peranakan would largely be subsumed into the Sinkeh in British Malaya and the Straits Settlements due to the great amount of Sinkeh migrants in the late Qing and early Republic, but remained a more prosperous and distinctive group in the Dutch East Indies due to the relative dearth of Sinkeh migration in the same period.

The general historical trajectory after Sun left the Straits is generally narrated in this fashion: the European empires lost control of their colonies and independent nations rose in their place. Given the Straits Chinese’ active participation in the preexisting imperial systems, this has not necessarily worked to their advantage. Nanyang Chinese in post-independence Indonesia faced violence, discrimination, and assimilationist pressures, while Chinese in Malaysia experienced forced deportations and executions during the Malayan Emergency and continued discrimination due to *bumiputera* laws that legally favor ethnic Malays for housing, work, and loans. Perhaps because it was booted from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has emerged as a premier business, financial, and transit center, much due to the work and to the benefit of Singapore’s large Chinese population. Because Singapore was expelled from Malaysia after only two years of membership in the federation, it—unlike Penang—was able to set its own policies. Penang, once a Crown Colony like Singapore, suffered as part of Malaysia for want of autonomy. Indeed, while both Singapore and Penang started from similar circumstances, the two city-states had quite different trajectories. By examining the history of Penang with the different fate

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353 Wang Gungwu, 87.
of Singapore in mind, we can more effectively understand Khoo’s work as well as complicated place of the Chinese in Penang, Penang in the world, and the general history of Nanyang.

Penang, a city off and on the coast of the Malay Peninsula, was one of the largest and most significant port cities of the imperial era. Technically speaking, Penang now refers to the state of Penang, comprised of the isle of Penang (today entirely filled by the capital city/borough of George Town) and the mainland borough of Seberang Perai (home to the city and district of Butterworth). Before this time, Penang was a sparsely populated island off the coast of Kedah, a sultanate under the umbrella of Siam. Penang, renamed Prince of Wales Island, was ceded to the British East India Company (EIC) by the Sultan of Kedah in 1786 in exchange for Captain Francis Light’s promise of military aid. This aid never materialized. The densely populated coastal lowlands of Seberang Perai, or Province Wellesley, were seized from Kedah by the EIC in 1800. The mainland borough, a crucial source of foodstuffs for George Town and later tin for the British Empire, would expand thrice before reaching its current borders in 1870. In 1823, the colony of Penang was absorbed into the larger EIC colony of the Straits Settlements, in league with Dindings (the present Manjung District), Malacca, and Singapore. The colony itself was managed under the Presidency of Bengal within the EIC’s Indian government. After the Crown’s usurpation of the British East India Company’s governmental responsibilities in 1858, the Straits Settlements were governed by the British Raj. Following local

354 Khoo Su Nin, *Streets of George Town, Penang* (George Town, Malaysia: Janus Print and Resources, 1993).
dissatisfaction in the Straits with the poor quality of colonial administration, the Straits Settlements were declared a Crown Colony in 1867. Thus, administration of Penang shifted from Bengal to Singapore and the British Colonial Office in London.

Penang, like most of Britain’s East Asian and Southeast Asian holdings, was occupied by Japanese forces from 1941-1945. During Japanese occupation, European residents were largely evacuated by the British government while Chinese and Tamil residents were killed en masse by Japanese forces in a systemic massacre known as the Sook Ching. The Sook Ching was most pervasive in the Straits Settlements, though Japanese forces attempted to extend it into the Malay heartland of the Federated Malay States. In 1946, Penang became a member of the Malayan Union, succeeded in 1948 by the Commonwealth Federation of Malaya. This was not universally popular, and some in Penang unsuccessfully pushed for an independent Commonwealth state of Penang out of a strong sense of British Straits identity and a “fear of the resurgence of Malay power” among the Straits Chinese in particular.355 Many Penangites looked enviously at Singapore at this time, which was not amalgamated into the Malay Federation.356 During the Malayan Emergency, a Communist insurrection against British colonial authorities, “alien squatter” Chinese—those not residents of Malaya—were deported in an attempt to remove potential PRC agitators from the colony. Many innocent Malayan-Chinese were


Given the *bumiputera* system that would arise in Malaysia, this fear was perhaps warranted. 356 Ibid., 55.
caught up in the dragnets.\footnote{Low Choo Chin, “The repatriation of the Chinese as a counter-insurgency policy during the Malayan Emergency”, \textit{Journal of Southeast Asian Studies}, 45 (3), pp 363-392, 10-2014, 364.}

In 1963, the Malayan Federation united with the colonies of Singapore, Sabah (formerly British North Borneo), and Sarawak. The merger formed the Commonwealth nation of Malaysia, though Singapore would be expelled from Malaysia within two years. Following Singapore’s expulsion, Penang became the largest city in Malaysia. Its status as a freeport was rescinded by the Malaysian government in 1969, and its preeminence in Malaysia has since been eclipsed by the capital of Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding suburbs of the Klang Valley.\footnote{Daniel P. S. Goh, “Between History and Heritage: Post-Colonialism, Globalisation, and the Remaking of Malacca, Penang, and Singapore”, \textit{TRaNS: Trans –Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia}, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January) 2014: 79–101, 92.} Penang, nevertheless, remains the economic center of Northern Malaysia and a major city of Southeast Asia, although the city’s economy struggled for many years following the revocation of freeport status.

Penang is an ethnically diverse state, with George Town (or Penang Island) majority Chinese and Seberang Perai plurality Malay. Both boroughs have historically had significant Eurasian, Thai, and Indonesian populations (of course, Wang Gungwu would caution against mapping present national identities onto the pre-national era), as well as a small but powerful colonial minority of British administrators and, briefly, Japanese occupiers. The Penang Chinese largely came from Zhangzhou, Fujian Province, if the predominance of Zhangzhou Hokkien may
be considered evidence of origin. Attracted by Penang’s status as a freeport, many emigres (especially from the Five Clans of Tans, the Yeohs, the Lims, the Cheahs and the Khoos) came to Penang from China or elsewhere in Nanyang to take advantage of Penang’s special status. While many Penang Chinese came directly from China, some were Peranakan Chinese from elsewhere in Southeast Asia. However, the Peranakan were less numerous and less influential in Penang than elsewhere in Southeast Asia due to the sheer amount of new arrivals from China and the newcomers’ domination of local business. In telling the tale of Penang’s diverse population, Khoo’s narrative of Penang is not one of limits, of closed doors. Rather, she celebrates a “liberal haven” and a “cosmopolitan melting pot” for the world’s people, attributes of Penang’s unique “Straits culture.” By emphasizing Penang as a “Straits” cultural zone, she thus frames Penang separately from the Malay mainland and carves out a niche for it in the vein of Singapore. We might speculate that establishing the unique Straits culture of Penang of the former Straits Settlements may stem from a nostalgia for colonial days, but perhaps it instead reveals a longing

Khor has a lengthy discussion on the strategies different clans employed to attain preeminence in the sociopolitical landscape of colonial Penang, ranging from Malayification, Hokkien-ization, and Anglicization so as to curry favor with the sitting power group.
361 Neil Khor Jin Keong, “Economic Change and Straits Chinese”, 60.
362 Khoo, Streets of George Town, Penang. Ibid.
for a Penang distinct from a Malaysia that has swallowed it.

Economically, Penang grew on spice, tin, and shipping. Freeport status, key to Penang’s growth in an area surrounded by closed Dutch ports, was also crucial in the rise of Singapore. Singapore emerged as the more important of the two ports due largely to geography. Situated at a crucial bottleneck in the Straits of Malacca, Singapore emerged as the center of the British Straits Settlements. Malacca itself was a closed Dutch-controlled port until the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 rearranged the balance of the two colonial spheres of influence in the region. The capital of the Settlements would shift from George Town to Singapore in 1836, reflecting Singapore’s preeminence. Regardless, Penang remained a crucial port in Southeast Asia with particular importance to the tin industry of the Malayan peninsula, the Aceh black pepper trade, and the local coconut oil trade.\(^{363}\)

**v: Sun Yat-sen Revolutes in Penang**

With this context in mind for understanding the history and geography of the Chinese presence in the region, we now turn to the commemorative history *Sun Yat-sen in Penang* by Khoo Salma Nasution. Unlike other works previously discussed, Khoo’s book is largely linked with efforts to preserve a specific historical site, and as such has somewhat different priorities. Rather than prioritizing Sun’s connection to local history, Khoo is as much telling the history of 120 Armenian Street in George Town as she is telling the history of Sun in Penang. Unlike *Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii*, there is no significant attempt to localize Sun or claim him as a native son,

\(^{363}\) Chong Kah Yuan.
presumably due to the distinctive timing of Sun’s sojourn in Penang. By this point, he 
was already a mature and established revolutionary; arguing that local Penang society 
shaped Sun’s already-formed character is thus more tenuous than the Hawaiian claim 
on Sun.

The specific focus of Khoo’s book is clarified on the very first page:

This book highlights an episode in Dr. Sun Yat Sen’s career as leader of the 
Chinese Republican Revolution, before he became the first President of the 
provisional government of China. From Penang, Sun Yat Sen planned the 
famous Second Guangzhou Uprising [Huanghuagang Uprising] which took 
place in the spring of 1911. Through the dedication of his Penang supporters 
[italics added for emphasis], the Nanyang Headquarters also played an 
important role in shoring up the Xinhai Revolution after the Wuchang 
Uprising on 10th October, 1911. The Nanyang Headquarters operated from 
120 Armenian Street. From here, the Kwong Wah Yit Poh was first published 
as a revolutionary newspaper. This house been preserved to remember the role 
that a group of people in Penang played in 1911 Chinese Revolution, a major 
event in world history.364

This blurb gives the Chinese of Penang, one group within Penang, credit in helping 
carry forward the Chinese Republican Revolution, as Khoo terms it. It also defines 
the Xinhai Revolution as world history, and thus allows non-Chinese to lay claim to it 
in some sense, perhaps a necessary addendum for an Overseas Chinese writer to

364 Khoo, Sun Yat Sen.
make. Not being a Chinese national yet feeling a sense of Chinese identity, claiming Chinese history as world history perhaps strengthens the individual’s connection to this history and allows the claiming of this history. After all, a Malaysian citizen claiming Chinese history as one’s own would presumably arouse questions from both Chinese nationals and one’s own Malaysian compatriots, but certainly the same citizen could claim world history without too much difficulty.

This seems to help overseas Chinese sidestep issues of nation and identity in discussing personally relevant if strictly extranational history while avoiding claims of competing nationalisms that draw unfavorable historical associations. We might think to the Malayan Emergency and Malayan suspicion of the Chinese in Malaya as being agents of the PRC, or think back earlier to the Japanese occupiers’ suspicion that all Chinese—Sinkeh or Baba—were necessarily agents of the Chinese state and partisans in the making. Drawing less extreme examples, competing loyalties could be extrapolated from Straits Chinese ties to the Qing court and to anti-Qing secret societies in conjunction with professed loyalty to the British or Dutch empires. Given the real and legally sanctioned status of non-Malay Malaysians as second-class citizens through bumiputera laws, the caution of Malaysian Chinese in directly claiming ownership of Chinese history seems warranted. That the Hawaiian Chinese more freely claim ownership of Chinese national history suggests, in turn, that the Hawaiian Chinese feel more assured in their American identity than the Malaysian

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365 When considering national histories and claims to ownership, of course, we might consider that the extensive participation of non-Chinese in Chinese history, as well as non-Americans in American history and non-Indians in Indian history, seems to suggest that our Malaysian friend might easily claim that everything is world history to some extent.
Chinese do in their Malaysian identity, but perhaps also reveals that the Hawaiian Chinese, in turn, are more assimilated into mainstream American culture than their Malaysian counterparts.

On the note of historical ownership, an introduction by Lynn Pan, a noted scholar in the field of overseas Chinese studies, celebrates *Sun Yat Sen in Penang* for “allowing the people of Penang to rediscover their own history”, for Khoo’s work in restoring 120 Armenian Street, and in underscoring the connection of Chinese in China and abroad.\(^{366}\) Pan makes two noteworthy statements in the introduction, most notably the on the portrait of the archetypical Chinese “Revolutionary”, whom she notes as Janus-faced. One such face of the revolutionary in China is that of the globe-trotter Sun Yat-sen, while the other is that of the deep-rooted Mao Zedong.\(^{367}\) We might extrapolate that the two faces of the Revolutionary underscore the tensions in contemporary Chinese nationalism between cosmopolitanism and nativism, between the worldly *yang* and the parochial *tu*—or, to invoke the *River Elegy* dichotomy, the dynamic blue China of the southern coasts and the stagnant yellow China of the interior. She also notes the love-story of the fiery orator Wang Jingwei and the Chinese daughter of Penang Chen Bijun as “one of countless examples of the close connections forged between the Chinese in China and the Chinese overseas.”\(^{368}\) Pan

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366 Ibid., 6.
367 Pan frames them respectively as the Father of the Republic and the Father of the People’s Republic. Her approach thus equates and differentiates Sun and Mao in a fashion that departs somewhat from general PRC narratives, which situate Sun as a venerable if unsuccessful bourgeois revolutionary and Mao as the great leader of the democratic and socialist revolutions. Her comparison does, however, call He Xiangning’s 1966 remarks to mind, in which He notes she followed Mao just as she then followed Sun, thus equating the two figures.
368 Ibid.
does not bring in the later baggage of Wang and Chen, but rather remembers them for their ocean-crossing romance and joint attempt on the life of Zaifeng, Prince Regent of the Qing, which brought together domestic and overseas dreams of transforming China. To Pan, such dreams demonstrate that Chinese, in China and without, hold a role in the ultimate destiny of the Chinese nation, and so claims the ethnic Chinese abroad as overseas compatriots.

The book consists of eight sections. The first part of the book is titled “Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution”, the second part “Mobilizing the Nanyang Chinese”, third “The Tongmenghui in Penang”, fourth “Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Nanyang Headquarters in Penang”, fifth “Revolution and Martyrdom”, “Dr. Sun’s Family in Penang”, seventh “The Legacy of Sun Yat Sen’s Supporters in Penang”, eighth “120 Armenian Street Then and Now”. The book ends with some photographs, a timeline, and a bibliography.

Khoo does not make significant departures from the general outlines of Sun’s life as presented in Marie-Claire Bergère’s biography. She does, however, emphasize Sun’s time in Nanyang in particular, stating that he established 20 branch offices and recruited 3,000 members for the Tongmenghui in Nanyang.369

She then moves away from a Sun and China-centered story into a brief discussion of the Chinese in Malaya and Penang, a local history. Divisions were many and wide. First among these divisions was the distinction between Straits Chinese, those residing in the Straits Settlements before their organization as a British

369 Ibid., 15.
colony or having been born in the colony, and Qing subjects who emigrated to the Straits. While Straits Chinese (here not distinguished from Peranakan Chinese) “adopted local customs and dress”, “[knew] how to work with the British government”, and “embraced modernity” through English education, the newcomers (Sinkeh) were “shopkeepers, artisans, mechanics, and coolies” in the mines and plantations of Southeast Asia. Penang, the capital of the Straits till 1836, served as a gateway to Southeast Asia for migrant Chinese in Khoo’s narrative. Aside from this salient distinction between Straits Chinese and Qing migrants, she also brings regional identities into her discussion of Nanyang Chinese. She notes that Chinese in the Southern Sea were generally Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hakka, and Hainanese from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. While we might imagine that being overseas may have fostered a sense of Chineseness in contrast with other contact groups in areas like Penang and Singapore, regional identities by no means simply fell away. As in Hawaii, regional identities remained an important system of social organization, with the bang cliques of the Straits being perhaps even more exclusive than the village cliques of the largely Xiangshanese, increasingly assimilated Hawaiian Chinese.

Noting the multiplicity of political sympathies among Chinese in Penang, Khoo frames the overseas Chinese as holding three attitudes towards national revival, that nation being China. That the overseas Chinese felt strongly about plans for Chinese revival demonstrates that most did not feel strong attachment to the national empire of Britain, nor did they feel common cause with the Malay sultanates. First,

\[370\] Ibid., 20-21.
conservatives sought the protecting of Qing rule. Indeed, Khoo notes Sun had trouble courting the elite, as the elite Chinese of Penang were generally conservatives wooed by the Qing government with titles in exchange for funds. The second common attitude towards national revival Khoo notes was reforming Qing rule, as Kang Youwei and his *Baohuanghui* members advocated. The third, and most contentious opinion, was toppling Qing rule outright. Sun, finding Nanyang Chinese to be generally in favor of the reformists, “engaged in a polemical war” against them to secure the patronage and support of the Nanyang Chinese in his mission to topple the Manchu Qing dynasty. Sun and his allies Huang Xing, Hu Hanmin, and Wang Jingwei are remembered as being key to Sun’s proselytizing efforts in the Straits and British Malaya.\(^\text{371}\) They had considerable success in gaining funds and converts to the revolutionary cause.

Beyond political sympathies, Khoo’s narrative emphasizes the diversity of identities and beliefs within the Penang Chinese community. She notes the community’s generalized connection to China and to other Chinese communities overseas approvingly. Manifesting her own opinions, Khoo also lauds the hard work and self-sacrifice of Penangites like Wu Shirong (Goh Say Eng) in supporting Sun and his revolution. So loyal were the Penang Tongmenghui members to Sun that Sun relocated his Nanyang headquarters to Penang to distance himself from his detractors at the Singapore branch. Members of the Philomathic Union would even pool their finances to support his family monetarily during his time in Penang, providing a

\(^{371}\) Ibid., 26
monthly stipend of $120-130. By highlighting this episode, Khoo makes the Penang Tongmenghui the benefactor and lifeline of Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Revolution, as well as the true party faithful in a time of great disillusionment. In so doing, she elevates the Penang revolutionaries to be pivotal members of the Tongmenghui and generous revolutionaries of uncommon dedication.

Further emphasizing the place of Penang in Sun’s life and, hence, in the history of China and the world, Khoo portrays Sun’s Penang conference as a crucial moment for the Chinese Revolution. In this moment, Sun brought together his most loyal supporters and pushed for another uprising in Guangzhou. This was a difficult sell after some fifteen years of failed uprisings and many thousands of dollars spent in support of these uprisings. Sun framed it as the “Last Battle” of the Tongmenghui, the final chance to realize the Chinese Revolution and topple the Manchu Qing despots. While he was successful in rallying supporters and funding to his cause, the Huanghuaguang Uprising did not succeed in toppling the Qing, nor was it the end of Sun’s efforts to realize this goal. He did not give up. As mentioned previously, he was fundraising in the United States when the Xinhai Revolution broke out in October of 1911. And so, the Penang Conference is at once a pivotal moment in which Sun rallied the doubting faithful for a final battle against the Qing despots but also largely meaningless, for it produced nothing but another failed uprising and another fundraising trip. This episode itself demonstrates a central question of Sun narratives and political biography as whole: did the event actually matter? To bolster

372 Ibid., 86.
373 Ibid., 53.
Sun’s connection to Penang, it must, and so it does in Khoo’s narrative. A dismissive reader might write it off as yet another of Sun’s failures, but in a sympathetic narrative aimed at elevating the place of Penang and the Penang Chinese in Sun’s life, it became a crucial juncture in the fate of the Chinese nation and the world at large.

However, as Khoo makes clear, Penang was not a Chinese city, but rather a cosmopolitan entrepot within the British imperial system. British authorities and the European elite of the Straits did not take Sun’s presence very seriously at first. News of his relocation to Penang sparked a newspaper editor for the *Straits Echo*, clarified by Khoo to be European, to remark that “The only fault we have Dr. Sun Yat Sen as a revolutionary is that he doesn’t seem to revolute…” and that Sun had nothing to show for the considerable sums of money he collected from residents of Penang, Singapore, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the authorities later proved to have a weighty presence on Sun’s operations in the Straits and beyond as concern with his agitation among the Chinese there grew. After Sun’s incendiary “Last Battle” speech in late 1910, John Anderson, Governor of the Straits Settlements, banished Sun from the Straits. Sun was effectively forced to leave Asia. As Khoo notes, Sun found most doors closed at this point:

> By the time he came to live in Penang in 1910, Dr. Sun was already a wanted man in China, as well as a *persona non grata* in Japan, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, and British Hong Kong. Conditions in Singapore were unfavorable due to heavy British surveillance and internal dissension.

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374 Ibid., 56.
within the Tongmenghui.

Penang was Dr. Sun’s last stronghold in the region. After he was banished by the British colonial government of Malaya and Singapore, there was not a place in the Nanyang where he was allowed to set foot.375

Khoo’s narrative of Sun concludes with the success of the Xinhai Revolution, the financial and other contributions of Penang Chinese to the Chinese Revolution, and a brief discussion of Sun’s family. As Sun Mei, caretaker of Sun’s wife Lu Muzhen and their children, was exiled from Hong Kong, Sun Mei brought the family to Penang. There Sun, Lu, their two daughters, and Sun’s mistress Chen Cuifen were in close contact. Interestingly, Chen Cuifen is referred to as Sun’s second wife, despite her general absence in other narratives, Here she is referred to explicitly as the “Nanyang wife” (Nanyang po).376 Sun’s supporters are credited with jumpstarting Chinese education in the Straits and founding schools like the Chung Ling School. Relevant organs like the party paper Kwong Wah Yit Poh are celebrated as long-running institutions of Chinese Nanyang society. A brief history of 120 Armenian Street concludes the narrative, showing the Tongmenghui and the Kwong Wah Yit Poh moved out by 1912, explaining the neighborhood’s explicit connection to underworld societies before their prohibition and suppression following the Penang Riots of 1867.377

375 Ibid., 63.
376 Ibid., 92.
377 The influx of Sinkeh, many single men of little means, led to a proliferation of gangs. A tong war broke out in 1867 between the Red Flag tong and the White Flag tong. The violence was suppressed by the Straits authorities after ten days and the arrival of police
Khoo concludes by showing photos of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao visiting the site on separate occasions, demonstrating that Sun and his connection to Penang have current, extra-local implications. The visit of Hu Jintao in 2002 is worth considering in the frame of ROC/PRC politics with regards to overseas Chinese, mentioned earlier. As Malaysia recognizes the PRC as the legitimate Chinese state, naturally Hu and not his Taiwan contemporary Chen Shui-bian would be invited to visit. Hu’s public visit to the former headquarters of the Tongmenghui reinforces the PRC’s connection to Sun Yat-sen and thus further legitimates the PRC narrative of Sun Yat-sen as the democratic forebear of the Chinese socialist revolution and, later, the pioneering revolutionary of the modern Chinese nation. Mahathir’s visit, made on the occasion on the First Chinese New Year Open House and the opening of a related exhibit on Sun in 2001, is beyond my focus, but we may simply note that the visit of a sitting, democratically-elected Malay Prime Minister to the site on such an occasion serves to emphasize the importance of the Chinese vote in Penang, the significance of the Chinese in contemporary Malaysian politics, and the sometimes tense relationship between Penang, a former crown colony, and the rest of Malaysia.\footnote{We might think back to the Penang secession movement, the example of Singapore, and Penang’s unusual demographics and history in comparison to the rest of Malaysia in considering why the Prime Minister of Malaysia might make an effort to court the reinforcements from Singapore. Afterwards, gang activity and social organization was heavily suppressed by the Straits authorities.}

\footnote{We might also note that Mahathir, hailing from Kedah, might represent a deeper symbolic shift in fortunes of Penang and Kedah, of the imperial entrepôt and the nation-state that subsumed it.}
Penang Chinese. We should note here that Mahathir had enjoyed years of support from Malaysian Chinese for his promulgation of a more inclusive Malaysian national identity (*bangsa Malaysia*)—one that made space for Malaysia’s significant Chinese and Tamil populations—as opposed to a more strictly ethnic Malay national identity (*bangsa Melayu*), and so his honoring of Sun may in turn have had implications for a sense of Chinese-inclusive Malaysian nationalism.\(^{379}\) Even if this is so, what is it about the figure of Sun Yat-sen specifically that reverberates among the Chinese of Penang?

Perhaps, as argued above, it is because Sun Yat-sen was indeed a globetrotter. A nationalist with an eye to modernizing China, a traveler with tracks in many lands, Sun is uniquely suited to serving both as an emblem of modern China and as a Chinese figure with some connection to overseas Chinese populations. By honoring Sun, overseas Chinese may celebrate their Chinese heritage by honoring this symbol of a vaguely defined modern China, a worldly revolutionary with concrete goals and a vague ideology, with widespread if shallow roots in so many places. In considering what Sun represents in a given place, we must necessarily consider the history of the place and its relation to the broader history of the Chinese nation, of Chinese migration overseas, global imperialism, and local nationalisms. For the Chinese of Penang, Sun was a down-on-his-luck revolutionary who fought hard against slim odds and the weight of a largely disapproving world order. Given that the Chinese of Penang are largely descended from Sinkeh, migrants who eked out a living on the

margins of British and Chinese realms, that perhaps holds special significance to local self-images. In remembering him through *Sun Yat Sen in Penang* and in restoring the former TMH headquarters at 120 Armenian Street, Khoo, one Penangite of Chinese descent, honors the far-sightedness, the charity, the Chinese patriotism, and strong local roots of some Penang Chinese, thus ensuring that the story of the Chinese in Penang and their role in world history is preserved.

**vi: Conclusion**

In conclusion, overseas Chinese have complicated relationships with China, Chineseness, and with its modern symbol Sun Yat-sen. These relationships are heavily influenced by local history, competing nationalisms, the disputed nature of “China,” and the contentious and—at times—culturally and politically suspect character “Chineseness.” In Hawaii, Lum and Lum—writing on behalf of the prominent Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation—emphasize Sun as a hero of modern world history, a democrat, and a humanist. Moreover, they frame him as deeply influenced by his time in Hawaii, and so elevate the role of Hawaii in world history. In Penang, Khoo—writing largely to commemorate a successful historical conservation project—is not so triumphant, nor does she paint such deep connections between Penang and Sun. Partly this is because Sun spent only a year in Penang, and this was long after his revolutionary die was cast. However, as we have seen throughout this paper, Sun’s image remains malleable in various respects and presents certain opportunities for redefinition. Khoo frames Sun as a pioneer of the Chinese revolution, a zealous and honest man suffering to realize his selfless goals, and frames the Chinese of Penang as a conflicted bunch. Some oppose Sun, some help
him, and some die for his cause, the cause of toppling the Qing and establishing the Republic of China.

Although this analysis does not dwell on how the sitting governments of China—the PRC and the ROC—attempt to shape Sun’s image overseas, we may nonetheless note the hand of Kaohsiung City in donating the Nuuanu statue, the hand of Zhongshan City in donating the Gateway Park statue, and the face of Hu Jintao himself among the shelves of 120 Armenian Street. By presenting Sun statues and shaping what they mean, the governments of the PRC and the ROC have attempted to reinforce their own narratives of nationhood and bolster their own ties with overseas Chinese communities in a bid for some level of loyalty or connection. We see local Chinese ancestry groups in the United States and Malaysia competing to define Sun’s legacy with monuments in public places, with official celebrations and recognitions, and with commemorative histories. We also see Mayor Hanneman commenting on the rededication of Gateway Park in Honolulu and Prime Minister Mahathir browsing the exhibit at 120 Armenian Street, clearly exhibiting that local politicians and communities too use Sun for their own political purposes and so recast the image of Sun to fit more neatly into their own non-Chinese state contexts. Any further statements would overstep the bounds of this present study, but it may be worth considering the competition over Sun Yat-sen’s political legacy in overseas Chinese spaces in conversation with preexisting literature on international politics and the role of diaspora groups in contests of legitimacy.
CONCLUSION: A GALLERY OF SUN YAT-SENS

But finally, it’s not a question of which is right. I mean, reality is kind of made up of these different layers. So maybe in *that* reality you were serious about trying to kill me, but in *this* reality you weren’t. It depends on which reality *you* take and which reality *I* take.

—Haruki Murakami, *The Wind-up Bird Chronicle*

i: Introduction

Centuries ago, the English writer Samuel Johnson ended his story of the Abyssinian prince Rasselas with “The Conclusion, in which Nothing Is Concluded.” His quip might well serve for my own conclusion here. There can be no comprehensive conclusion; Sun’s afterlives march along their own respective paths, and will to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. They will continue to shape, and be reshaped by changing actors, forces, and needs in their various dynamic environments. The thesis explores multiple and divergent features of Sun Yat-sen’s political legacy, illustrating, in the process, something of the politics of historical interpretation and public memory.

While I have no comprehensive conclusion to offer, this thesis has indeed shown that the figure of Sun Yat-sen has taken on multiple forms and meanings since the man’s passing on March 12th, 1925. This conclusion amplifies this rather mundane truth by briefly raising an encounter with Sun memory that remains beyond the scope of this thesis. Doing so will help to illustrate the ongoing political stakes of Sun’s posthumous trajectories in other contexts. Here I simply want to note the space of encounters among variant Sun memories, and an evanescent attempt to construct an enduring image of Sun Yat-sen the Confucian humanist, a border-crossing Chinese
figure explored and tentatively established at a January, 1994 transnational conference in Hangzhou that drew together ROC, PRC, and overseas Chinese contingents of historians, philosophers, and institutions. Finally, I will briefly reiterate the main points of the four body chapters and dwell on the significance of Sun and his images.

**ii: Sun Yat-sen the Confucian Humanist**

In a collection of papers titled *Sun Yixian sixiang yu rujia renwen jingshen lunwenji* (Collection of Papers on Sun Yat-sen’s Thought and the Humanist Spirit of Confucianism), scholars from around the Chinese-speaking world came together in conversation to discuss Sun Yat-sen’s thought and its relationship to Confucianism. This collection was printed on the occasion of the Fifth International Conference on Sun Yat-sen’s Thought and the Twenty-First Century, a conference hosted by the Sun Yat-sen Research Communication Fund (*Sun Wen Xueshu Sixiang Yanjiu Jiaoliu Jijinhui*, registered in Taipei in 1992) in January of 1994. The conference, sponsored by National Taiwan Normal University and hosted in the PRC city of Hangzhou—with site visits to Suzhou and Nanjing—, reflects a then-new development: the 1992 Shanghai Consensus, in which both PRC and ROC representatives agreed to uphold a “one-China consensus” in which both sides agreed that there was one China, and that they only disagreed as to which government represented this China. This consensus is invoked explicitly in the volume as an

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380 *Sun Yixian sixiang yu rujia renwen jingshen lunwenji* (Collection of Papers on Sun Yat-sen’s Thought and the Humanist Spirit of Confucianism), Sun Yat-sen Research Communication Fund, 1994.

aspirational framework. The 1992 consensus led to a great interlinking of the PRC and the ROC-Taiwan economically, socially, and culturally. However, this interlinking was and is not without tension. We see from this conference, and in particular in the opening addresses to this conference, cautious optimism that the reopening of communication, trade, and travel between the PRC and ROC was enriching both sides and serving to defuse tensions between them. To further underscore their shared history and culture, shared ties that provided the basis for upholding a one-China consensus, representatives from both the PRC and ROC put forward this conference to discuss Confucian influences on Sun Yat-sen’s thought, thus bringing together an ancient and modern symbol of China with which both sides could identify. We might note extensive and enthusiastic cooperation from both sides, but that Ru Xin’s address, discussed in detail later on, suggests PRC initiative in organizing the conference.

The foreword for the conference proceedings begins by carving a unique niche for Sun Yat-sen as a great philosopher who linked Eastern and Western philosophy:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century. His Three People’s Principles and Sun Wen Xueshuo not only disseminated Chinese culture, but also brought Eastern and Western thought together in the same pan. Moreover, he became the founder of the first republic in Asia and brought countless millions under its shield. His influence is vast, his person
beyond compare."382

Figure 13: The conference attendees visit the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing.383

382 Ibid. The original text is: “孫逸仙先生為二十世紀最偉大的思想家之一，其所著三民主義、孫文學説，不僅傳承中華文化，融合東西學術於一爐，而且成爲亞洲第一個民主共和國的創始人，使億萬人民蒙其庇蔭，其深遠影響，並使無出其右。”
383 Sun Yixian Lunji, preface.
Aiming to keep Sun Yat-sen studies up to date, the conference participants discussed the humanist aspects of his thought. The chief recurring theme in the essays is Sun’s fusion of Western and Eastern thought, a sort of updated zhongti xiyong (Western learning with a Chinese basis) in which Western science combines with Confucian morality to form an ideal system of humanistic political philosophy. While the Confucian revival has been discussed in detail elsewhere, Sun’s inclusion in the broad milieu of Confucian humanism is telling of a more nationalistic than humanistic project.

In an opening address from the first day of the conference, January 21, 1994, Zhao Lingling frames the conference’s purpose as providing a chance to explore “Sun Yat-sen’s Sino-Western cultural views, his philosophy of the people’s welfare and cultural ideals”; “changing societal and cultural mores on both sides of the Strait in the process of seeking modernization”; “Confucianism’s contemporary significance and value in constructing a societal order”; “the connection between Confucian ethics and East Asian economic development”; “how, in the midst of the materially-rich and spiritually-poor society in which modern people live, to use Confucian humanistic mores to settle the heart and increase our quality of life”; and “how to use Confucianism as the main axle in driving cultural development, raising national spirit, exhibiting cultural ideals, so as to build a culturally-affirmative basis belonging to 21st century Chinese with which to complete national unification.” Zhao’s use of

384 Ibid. Zhao Lingling, “Sun Yixian sixiang yu nianyi shiji guoji xueshu xilie yantaohui kaimu dianli—zongzhaojiren Zhao Ling Ling boshi zhici” (Opening Ceremony for the International Conferences Series on the Thought of Sun Yat-sen and the 21st Century—Director Dr. Zhao Lingling’s Remarks), 1.
boilerplate political phraseology in this framing illustrates that this was hardly an apolitical undertaking for mainland institutions. She also notes that this conference was only possible because the preceding one, the Fourth Conference in Beijing, had gone so well. Details on other conferences in this series are, unfortunately, unclear; I was unable to confirm or deny the existence of a Sixth Conference or ascertain details of the apparently successful Fourth Conference.

The focus on Sun Yat-sen and the Western-inflected humanistic Confucianism to which he supposedly subscribed and its political implications for Chinese of the Sinosphere was reiterated in another opening address. An address from Ru Xin, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, framed mainland interest in the conference as providing an opportunity for fellow Chinese to come together to discuss something they share in common—their revered Sun Yat-sen and the Confucian tradition of humanistic thought. Indeed, while I use the term “Sinosphere” above, the common glue of Chinese identity, according to Ru Xin, is the veneration of Sun and the cultural influence of Confucianism, making more of a “Sunosphere”:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom we all revere, was the great revolutionary forebear of China, a great patriot. He struggled his whole life to save China, to build a united, prosperous, and strong China. He was also one of modern China’s

385 The Sinosphere is a shorthand term for the Chinese-speaking world, taking the mainstream usage of Sinitic languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien, Wu, and so forth) as the key marker of Chinese identity. I use the term here as the speakers make special reference to overseas Chinese and, in particular, to the Chinese of Singapore as being in the same boat as mainland and Taiwanese Chinese. Such a marker, being members of a larger Chinese nation defined by language, serves this purpose, but raises questions over who counts as Chinese and why. After all, many citizens of the PRC do not speak a Sinitic language natively, and many overseas Chinese are not proficient in Sinitic languages.
prominent thinkers. While he sought rationality from the West, he was also eminently concerned with ensuring the continuity of the excellent aspects of our traditional thought and culture. To use his own words, “To take our ancient culture and brighten it by means of world culture.” As for his take on Confucian thought, he mercilessly criticized the outdated, negative aspects of Confucian thought that hampered China’s progress, but as for the positive aspects, like the datong idealism of “All under Heaven is for the common good,” “the people are the root of the country” and “the people are what is valuable,” and “education for all”, he gave his full affirmation. However, he was not simply keeping the old, purely carrying it forward. Rather, he sought to bring it in step with the times, and so provided new explanations and interpretations. His attitude towards Confucianism, towards our modern cultural construction and spiritual civilization was very enlightened. Consequently, our conference’s theme is not only of ethical significance, but of practical significance. I hope that, by means of free academic discussion, everyone might come to a deeper understanding of the research on Sun Yat-sen’s thought.

In recent years, the links between schools have developed quite a bit; this is a joyous thing. We are all Chinese, the blood that flows within our veins is all Chinese blood. I believe that, if only we can establish the one-China consensus [italicized to emphasize the aspirational nature of this consensus], establish that we are all Chinese, if everybody can sit down and talk, then the biases and problems between us will all be gradually resolved. In this respect,
academic communication has a great positive use. It helps establish dialogue and understanding between two sides, communicates thought, does away with misunderstandings, builds friendship. It is also of benefit that it’s good for the progress of scholarship itself. We at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have, in these recent years, been working tirelessly towards developing scholarly communication between the Two Shores of the Taiwan Strait.

Although our capabilities are limited, we are willing to exhaust them and, from today on, will continue to work hard to promote scholarly cross-Strait dialogue to do some things. We hope that we can get the support and cooperation of our friends in Taiwan.386

Ru Xin’s address serves to establish that Sun and Confucianism are both common ties

386 Ibid. Ru Xin, “Dalu Zhongguo Shekeyuan Ru Fuyuanzhang Xin Zhisi” (Mainland China Academy of Social Sciences Vice-President Ru Xin’s Address), 3. The original text is: “孫中山先生是我們大家都憧憬的中國革命的先行者，偉大的愛國主義者，他爲了救中國，建設一個統一的繁榮富强的中國奮鬥了一生。他又是中國近代史上一位傑出的思想家，他在向西方尋求真理的同時，也十分重視繼承和法償我國傳統思想文化中的優秀的成分，用他自己的話來說，就是“發揚吾固有之文化，且吸收世界之文化而光大之”。以他對儒家思想的態度來說，他對儒家思想中的落後的阻礙中國進步的消極因素是加以無情批判的，但對其中的一些積極因素如“天下爲公”、“民爲邦本”，“民爲貴”的思想，“有教無類”的教育思想以及道德觀念等等，是給予充分肯定的。但他也不是原樣照搬，單純繼承，而是根據時代的要求，而給予新的解釋和發揚。他對儒家思想的這種態度，對我們今天的文化建設和精神文明也仍然很有啓發的。因此，我們這次研討會的主體不僅有理論意義，也有實際意義。希望通過自由學術討論，使大家對孫中山思想的研究更深入一步。

近幾年來，連按之間的學術交流有進一步的發展，這是可喜的現象，我們都是中國人，在我們需管理流的的都是中國人的血，我相信，只要確認一個中國確認我們自己是中國人，大家坐下來討論，我們之間的分歧問題慢慢都是可以解決的。在這方面學術界的交流能夠其很好的促進作用，它有助於雙方增進相互瞭解，溝通思想，消除隔閡，建立友誼，對於學術研究本身的進步，也是大有益處的。我們中國社科院，這幾年來一直致力於開展兩岸之間的學術界，我院雖然能力有限，但願意竭盡微薄的力量，今後繼續努力在推進兩岸之間學術交流方面做一些事，希望能夠得到台灣學術界朋友們的合作和支持。”
between the two sides, reflecting the status of both as symbols of China and the desire, on the part of PRC-affiliated conference organizers, to use these symbols to develop a stronger, more holistic sense of Chinese national identity. This came at a time of newly open relations between the PRC and ROC, but before Taiwanese *bentu* political identities came to the fore of ROC-Taiwan politics, and so illustrate the mood of the time.

Both Zhao Lingling and Ru Xin served to represent mainland institutions, but the list of sponsors and associated entities explicates that this was hardly a mainland-only initiative. Many ROC-Taiwan institutions, leaders, and private citizens either sponsored or participated in the conference, while others sent regards to mark its undertaking. Lee Teng-hui, sitting President of the ROC, sent ceremonial remarks to express his good wishes and the good wishes of the ROC government. The names of the ROC Unity and Self-Strengthening League (*Zhonghua minguo tuanjie ziqiang xiehui*); ROC Ministry of Education; ROC Cultural Construction Committee (under the Department of Culture); GMD Party History Committee (*dangshihui*); Furen University and National Taiwan Normal University all appear as sponsors. Clearly there was a substantial ROC involvement in funding and branding this conference, but lacking numbers, it is difficult to determine the specific breakdown of how the conference was funded and organized. We might note that the conference itself was hosted on the mainland and featured many mainland scholars, including Zhao Lingling (Peking University), Mao Jiaqi (Nanjing University), as well as scholars of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Such a list of sponsors, participants, and associated individuals seem intended to illustrate that this was a joint initiative, and
one that—as previously mentioned—explicitly aimed to provide a common platform for discussing Chinese issues—here embodied by Sun Yat-sen and Confucianism—among Chinese scholars of different citizenship. This description only scratches the surface of the conference proceedings, which would serve as a rich resource for another thesis on ideological re-framings of Sun in the context of cross-strait relations. For such a project, one might imagine chapter titles such as Sun the Communist, Sun the Confucian, Sun the Christian, Sun the liberal democrat, Sun the fusion. Of course, a limitation of such a structure would be that Sun is so often presented as a fusion of modern and traditional, of West and East, that such divisions could be prove rather arbitrary.

iii: Conclusion

This thesis has explored key threads of Sun’s historical afterlives in different Chinese spaces, state and non-state. In the introduction, I introduce Sun Yat-sen in consideration of various biographies, which each paint distinctive portraits of Sun that serve particular uses. James Cantlie, a Scottish doctor who taught Sun in Hong Kong, presented Sun favorably to a British audience so as to garner sympathy in wake of his London kidnapping and, later, upon the founding of the Republic of China. M. N. Roy, an Indian revolutionary disappointed by Sun in life, presented Sun unfavorably to a broad audience of Germanophone and Anglophone readers—the intended audience presumably of a Marxist inclination—to “scientifically” illustrate why the Xinhai Revolution failed. Jiang Xingde, a Chinese historian of the early-to-mid 20th century, presented a zhuan-style biography of Sun that served to make him a moral exemplar according to the virtues of the Chiang Kai-shek GMD. Finally, Marie-
Claire Bergère, a contemporary French historian, aimed to cut through some of the polarized tendencies of much Sun scholarship to find the man behind the myths. This diverse set of texts and perspectives served both to introduce Sun and the politics (and aesthetics) of historical interpretation in distinctive contexts. This discussion revealed that even the details of Sun’s life, like where he learned English, are largely politicized to shape particular images of Sun.

The first chapter considered Sun Yat-sen’s political afterlife in the pre-1949 Republic of China. I found this required a hefty amount of contextualization; just as the introduction required its own biographical contextualization, the substantive chapters of the thesis each required significant historical context to reveal what was significant about Sun’s image in a given time and place. In the pre-1949 ROC the key interpretive context lay in the fractious nature of the Guomindang and the position of Sun as the ideological lynchpin of the party. Factions, seeking to legitimate their own aspirations and ideals, turned to Sun, as demonstrated most intensely during the Second Sino-Japanese War, in which the Chongqing government of Chiang Kai-shek—united with the Communists—and the Nanjing government of Wang Jingwei—collaborating with the Japanese—invoked their own images of Sun as guofu, the Father of the Nation. Chiang’s Sun was a great man of uncommon ability who demanded obeisance and obedience, while Wang’s Sun was a great revolutionary of all Asia who worked through his party—not his army—to effect change.

The second chapter looked at Sun’s afterlife in the People’s Republic of China. To evoke the broad trajectory, I used People’s Daily reports on official
commemorations of Sun’s decennial birthday celebrations (1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, and 2016) with context to understand the significance of particular speakers and their invocations of Sun. The precise politics underlying the 2016 address remain obscure, but it serves to present the trajectory of Sun’s image in the PRC more clearly. In this gallery of PRC public memory, rhetorical focus largely articulates changing political priorities and values among the changing PRC elite, a varied group of people with shifting stations and discordant priorities. In the Soviet-aid years of the 1950s, Sun’s admiration for the Soviet Union was explicit, his status as the bourgeois forebear of the democratic revolution noted; in the Cultural Revolution years of the late 1960s, Sun was made into a Mao of his time, a fierce anti-imperialist nationalist and, to some, a flawed hero. Following the Reform and Opening Up, Sun’s militant anti-imperialism and status as the forebear of the democratic revolution were deemphasized, while his modernization projects and “patriotism” took on newfound preeminence.

Chapter Three turned to Sun’s afterlife in the ROC-Taiwan. Following a discussion of Taiwan’s unique historical and political context in relation to mainland China, I analyzed Sun through the figure of the Taiwanese activist Chiang Wei-shui. Key here are the rhetoric of the official *Pictorial History of the Republic of China* and *Chiang Wei-shui*, as well as Chiang Kai-shek’s speech dedicating Chung-shan Hall upon the centennial birth of Sun Yat-sen. We see that Sun was first presented as he was by Chiang in the mainland ROC, that is, as *guofu*, but that the problematic place of Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in Taiwan’s fractious political climate forced those, like the curators of the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei, with an interest in saving Sun
from the maw of a contested history to redefine Sun through the figure of Chiang Wei-shui. Chiang Wei-shui, once framed as a Chinese patriot from Taiwan, is now framed as a Taiwanese nationalist working within the Japanese imperial order, reflecting changing understandings of history in Taiwan. Sun, for his part, becomes newly significant as an Asian revolutionary and a great inspiration to Chiang. Both Sun as *guofu* and Sun as an Asian revolutionary, narratives designed alternately to reinforce the Sinitic identity of Taiwan as the ROC or to establish Taiwan as its own unique nation, make space for Sun in the contentious Taiwanese cultural arena, in which *bentu* identity is increasingly dominant over a sense of Chinese Taiwan.

The fourth and final chapter moved beyond the PRC, Taiwan, and cross-strait relations to examine Sun’s afterlives among overseas Chinese, or ethnic Chinese living outside China. To take the heterogeneity of the overseas Chinese experience into consideration, I chose two sites—Hawaii and Penang. Both sites have real historical ties to Sun, and actors within the Chinese communities there have laid locally and globally inflected claims to Sun. In Hawaiian statues and text, we observed a general narrative of Sun Yat-sen, the great modern democratic hero of China, deeply influenced by Hawaiian society and culture. In Penang, a preliminary and limited encounter with local Sun interpretation suggests a usage of Sun that serves mostly to elevate the place of the Penang Chinese in world history and reinforce their claims to the Xinhai Revolution. The Penang Sun appears as a largely down-on-his-luck revolutionary with big dreams and empty coffers, an image that perhaps resonates with the Chinese of Penang for particular historical reasons. We see in both cases the active and obvious hand of politicians, local and international,
honoring Sun for their own varied political purposes, demonstrating that these Chinese diaspora communities are not only politically significant entities in their own communities and nations, but are also significant to Chinese state projects. Although I present Hanneman, the Kaohsiung City council, the Zhongshan City council, Hu Jintao, and Mahathir, I did not address this topic in great detail; it would be a promising avenue for further exploration.

I am aware that there are many shortcomings to this thesis, as well as avenues for further exploration. There is no dearth of material on Sun Yat-sen, and that is the central rub of this thesis. I chose materials that I believed would illustrate different aspects of Sun’s life, and selected different media to bring together a diverse set of materials. This has some limitations. Plainly, comparing China’s Destiny directly with the People’s Daily is an awkward and peculiar exercise, as one was a major ideological tract and one a party newspaper. Public statuary and museum exhibit-books introduce new variables. A media studies scholar would surely find such comparisons problematic, absent engagement with media theory. Nonetheless, the exercise serves the purpose of the thesis—exploring Sun Yat-sen’s political afterlives—admirably, with contextualized critical readings of all materials, as manifold forms of historical memory, as its methodological hinge. A future writer could certainly glean more from greater contextualization of particular types of sources, for example, considering the People’s Daily as a newspaper, the history and tropes of the People’s Daily, or the interpretation of monuments as a medium to glean new insights into Sun representation.

One of my initial impulses was to compare different pictorial histories of Sun
Yat-sen, given that I had found several that could serve to more precisely contrast the
different narratives of Sun by limiting variables. However, I found myself unable to
incorporate these pictorial histories into my thesis, just as I have omitted films,
documentary and otherwise. We might consider that a thesis that put several PRC,
ROC, and American pictorial histories in conversation with The Pictorial History of
the ROC, Remembering Chiang Wei-shui, Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii, and Sun Yat Sen in
Penang (all, roughly speaking, pictorial histories in a sense) would have been more
cleanly framed. Nonetheless, such a thesis would have also missed different aspects
of Sun’s afterlives, such as his use in grand ideological tracts, his presence in
newspapers, and on street corners.

We might consider, also, that smaller annual commemorations of Sun take
place in different spaces, and that a different thesis might have limited its scope solely
to Sun commemoration ceremonies. Such a thesis could distinguish between major
and minor Sun celebrations in different spaces and times to explore broader trends, or
dive into a single time or space to fully flesh out a single topic. For instance, as I
wrote the section on CCP commemorations, I had originally planned to put the
People’s Daily publishing commemorative speeches in conversation with similar
events in the ROC. I had some material difficulties with finding relevant events in the
resources available to me, but I imagine such a study—perhaps even analyzing Sun
commemorations only in Nanjing, Beijing, Taipei, or Kobe—would reveal much
about Sun’s changing images. However, I believe focusing solely on public
commemorations and their associated news coverage, much like focusing solely on
pictorial histories, would not achieve my goal of presenting varied images of Sun

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Yat-sen as effectively as putting pictorial histories, commemorations, and political tracts in conversation with one another.

I regret not being able to fully analyze each time and place; for instance, I had sought to incorporate a book titled Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi yu Minsheng zhuyi (Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood) into the PRC section to further analyze how Sun and his political ideas are being framed in the contemporary PRC, but found myself unable to due to time constraints. Moreover, I had sought to incorporate a more complete discussion of Chiang Wei-shui’s biography into the ROC-Taiwan chapter, a more detailed discussion on Chinese state appeals to overseas Chinese and the framing of the Penang Conference in Chinese history in the overseas Chinese chapter, and a more comprehensive consideration of Sun Yat-sen’s figure in GMD political oratory in the ROC chapter. Finally, my discussion in the fourth chapter is limited by my relative ignorance of ethnic Chinese issues and my particular ignorance of the history of Penang. In any case, I believe my analysis of the materials selected nonetheless articulates distinctive features of Sun’s afterlives in these respective times and places.

What are the deeper implications of the existence of distinctive Sun Yat-sens explicated in this comparative study? Much as we know different aspects of people in life, we know different aspects of people’s afterlives. To some, Sun Yat-sen was a great hero of traditional China, to others a revolutionary heralding the dawn of the people’s democratic revolution. To yet others, he was a saint of democracy and humanism, to others a modern Confucian sage, and others still saw him as the guide of weak peoples and a revolutionary inspiration. Of course, there are other Sun Yat-
sens. He was also a petit-bourgeois moron, a Christian patriot appealing to British sensibilities, a precocious child born for greatness, and a media superstar changing hats to fit his preferred images. Even this, still, is only a handful of images. He was also a troublemaker son, a rebellious brother, a doting husband and father, a deadbeat dad, a medical student, a shopboy, a professional schmoozer, a failed “revoluter,” a democratic revolutionary, an autocratic warlord, a Christian convert of questionable conviction, and a quasi-Confucian intellectual. All this to say that a careful look at the afterlives of Sun Yat-sen reveals that there is no unitary figure of Sun Yat-sen, and that we cannot help but consider the multiplicities of his image when considering the significance of his life. This is not unique to Sun Yat-sen. Much as there are a seemingly infinite portraits of Sun Yat-sen, at least enough to fill a wing at the Met, there are many disparate, distinctive, and dissonant images of Mao Zedong and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Much as any attempt to find “China”, whether one China, two Chinas, yellow Chinas and blue Chinas, is doomed to fail, any attempt to find the definitive Sun Yat-sen must take into account the multiplicity of his afterlives in pursuing the truth of his antemortem days. We might even venture so far to say that there cannot be an objective image of Sun Yat-sen, but this would risk a turn into historical nihilism. At least, the nuanced biographies of professional historians who incorporate materials from Sun’s multiple lives and locations—such as that of Marie-Claire Bergère—provide the basis for understanding the man. Understanding his legacies, nonetheless, requires a broad and detailed engagement with these portraits, their painters, and their provenance. I hope this thesis has served to provide a useful gallery for these contentious images of Sun Yat-sen.
Thinking about this multiplicity of Sun Yat-sens and different dimensions of historical memories, we might think about Toru Okada and May Kasahara, characters in Haruki Murakami’s *The Wind-up Bird Chronicle*. Okada, or “Mr. Wind-up Bird” to Kasahara, following the advice of two aging Kwantung Army veterans, had been sitting at the bottom of a dry well in suburban Tokyo looking for his wife and for self-understanding. The two, it would turn out, are closely linked. His neighbor Kasahara, being something of a sadistic teenage girl and knowing of Okada’s plans, pulls up the rope ladder Okada used to get in the well and puts the cap on it. The epigraph is taken from a conversation after Okada, thanks to third-party intervention, manages to get out of the well. Okada posits that Kasahara wanted to kill him, while Kasahara denies this, saying she only wanted to push him to his limits. Okada, having moved between the real world and a questionably real dream world during his time in the well, then muses that, perhaps in one reality, she was indeed trying to kill him, but in another she wasn’t.

In this moment, Okada and Kasahara are occupying different realities with no hopes of reconciliation beyond a turn to relativism. Kasahara cannot square with her actions, having—accidently, purportedly—killed her boyfriend a year or two prior, while Okada cannot forget that she pulled up the ladder in conjunction with earlier troubling statements she made. Moreover, Okada can still not square with the infidelity and departure of his wife. Perhaps in one reality, his wife loved him, but in another, she did not. The differences between our Sun Yat-sens are not quite so stark, but, like these alternate realities, these different afterlives cannot coherently coexist in the same framework. One must be true, but how to know? For Okada, the process of
knowing involves a great deal of self-searching (or, less charitably, hallucination) in
the musty earth of Setagaya; for us, a considerable amount of historical research into
the lives and doings of others. It is only with great effort and careful analysis that we
can move beyond shallow relativism and map, with limitations, the contours of
reality, its various interpretations, and the significance of these interpretations and the
contexts that inform them. It is no easy task, but perhaps one does need to push one’s
limits to truly understand.
APPENDIX

NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

I use Pinyin romanization for Chinese names except for conventional names widely known in the West (i.e. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek) and in use in the local area (i.e. the more common use of Wade-Giles and Gwoyeu Romatzyh in Taiwan and Romanized Hokkien in Penang).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SYS—Sun Yat-sen                        CKS—Chiang Kai-shek
GMD—Guomindang/Kuomintang/Nationalist Party KMT—see GMD
CCP—Chinese Communist Party
Progressive Party
PRC—People’s Republic of China
NRA—National Revolutionary Army
Society
GGT—Governor-General of Taiwan
of Korea
Comintern—The Communist International
RevComm—The Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang
DPP—Democratic
ROC—Republic of China
RCS—Revive China
GGK—Governor-General
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