A HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FAILURE OF DOWNTOWN EUGENE'S PEDESTRIAN MALL STRATEGY TO REVITALIZE THE RETAIL CORE, 1971-2002

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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"Downtown" and its revitalization have been among the most prominent issues for post-war American urbanism scholars. Of importance to this research are the federal government's institution of urban renewal in 1954 to revitalize the declining parts of the central city areas and the local governments' incorporation of the "pedestrian mall" strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. The downtown pedestrian malls successfully facilitated the downtown core revitalization in these two decades. However, several of them began to fail in the 1980s, continuing in the following decades. This research examines two questions through a historical study of downtown Eugene, Oregon. First, why did the retail center facilitated by the pedestrian mall begin to decline in the 1980s and eventually fail by the early-2000s? Second, in addition to demolition and reconstruction, what other design and planning-related processes did the urban renewal project experience?

The four major fields of inquiry comprising the literature research framework are urban history, urban morphology (Conzenian approach), space syntax, and urban economic/urban retail theories. The research incorporates a Mixed-methods Research Design, including archival research, interviews, space syntax analysis, mapping/spatial analysis, and statistical analysis. These literary and methodological frameworks examine the following urban morphological components: (1) building morphology, (2) retail business structure, (3) relationship between the mall and the built form, and (4) influential historical/socio-political forces.

Among the many reasons associated with the Eugene mall, the prominent ones are related to the drastic and sudden alteration to the existing built fabric, mall's design and planning, spatial configuration, small business dislocations, the project's planned and inflexible nature, disregard to downtown housing, failure of parking garages, and growth of outer-city areas. However, positive stories like the renewal agency's efforts to facilitate the small businesses or the involvement of downtown merchants and the local community in the process are also central to the mall's story. Additionally, in the later phase of the mall's existence, the retail core experienced a shift in approach by the city and the renewal agency from a retail-centric approach to preserving the existing fabric and attracting diverse residential and commercial projects.

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Shrestha, Subik K. "Traditional Architectural and Urban Design of the Kathmandu Valley: Lessons for a Phenomenological Approach to Understanding and Creating Sociable Urban Place." In *Reflections on the Built Environment and Associated Practices, Vol. 2: Issues in Urban Development of the Kathmandu Valley*, edited by Neel Kamal Chapagain, Subik K. Shrestha, and Kishan Datta Bhatta, 17–32. Kathmandu: Tribhuvan University Press, 2016.

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Dedicated to Shreedhara Bajracharya.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BM	Building Morphology
CEP	Central Eugene Project
COE	City of Eugene
CT	Census Tract
DDB	Downtown Development Board
DDD	Downtown Development District
EDA	Eugene Development Association
ERA	Eugene Renewal Agency
ESMA	Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Area
FL	Frontage Length
FODE	Friends of Downtown Eugene
FOLE	Friends of Liveable Eugene
HUD	US Department of Housing and Urban Development
IR	Interview Respondent
LC	Lane County
LCHM	Lane County Historical Museum
LCHPC	Lane County Historic Preservation Committee
LMA	Leonard Mosias Associates
MM-LA	Mitchell-McArthur, Landscape Architects
OR	State of Oregon, USA
PM	Pedestrian Mall
RBS	Retail-Oriented or Retail Business Structure
RCPM	Retail Center/Core facilitated by the Pedestrian Mall
RERC	Real Estate Research Corporation

ROB	Retail-Oriented Businesses
RTKL	Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, Lamb (Architects and Urban Planners)
USP	Unthank, Seder, and Poticha

1 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the Research

"Downtown" and its revitalization have been among the most prominent issues for post-war American urbanism scholars.[1] The story of radical changes that followed the end of the second world war, which brought prosperity and decline, has been of particular concern to these scholars. Of importance is the federal government's institution of urban renewal in 1954 (an amendment to the 1949 Housing Act) to revitalize those declining parts of the central city areas and the local governments' incorporation of the "pedestrian mall" strategy in the 1960s and 1970s to make the downtown cores more inviting and revitalize the declining business scenario.

Even before the impact of these strategies and programs, executed mostly in the 1960s and the 1970s, were being fully realized, several critics were already aware of the possible dangers. One prominent late-1950s publication in this regard is *"The Exploding Metropolis: A Study of the Assault on Urbanism and How Our Cities Can Resist It.*"[2] Among the many contributors was Jane Jacobs, who argued with premonition, in her chapter "Downtown is for People," that:

> *"We are becoming too solemn about downtown. The architects, planners—and businessmen—are seized with dreams of order, and they have become fascinated with scale models and bird's-eye views. This is a vicarious way to deal with reality, and it is, unhappily, symptomatic of a design philosophy now dominant: buildings come first, the goal is to remake the city to fit an abstract concept of what, logically, it should be. But whose logic?"(Jane Jacobs 1957, 141-142)*

This research examines the failure of one of the post-war downtown revitalization strategies, the pedestrian mall, through a historical study of the case of Eugene, Oregon (a mid-sized American city) (see figure 1.1). Downtown Eugene's pedestrian mall, which opened in 1971, was one of the approximately 200 malls constructed in the United States, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s.[3] The pedestrian mall was implemented by following a simple strategy—create a walkable (open-air) shopping center with enough parking by converting major downtown streets into pedestrianized zones. While adding sociable urban spaces and dramatically improving downtown areas' aesthetics, the pedestrian malls primarily intended to revitalize adjacent retail centers and tackle competition from the suburban shopping centers.[4] The central problem addressed is that, in the following decades, these pedestrian malls (including downtown Eugene's) started to "fail."

Downtown Eugene and its Problems (mid-1960s) → Urban Renewal Plan to solve the problems and make downtown Eugene a strong Economic and Cultural Center (1966-69) → Major component of the CEP plan under study: A pedestrian mall to revitalize the Retail Center (1971)

Figure 1.1. A flow diagram conceptualizing the downtown problem and pedestrian mall strategy to revitalize the core.

Eugene is a mid-sized city located in Lane County, State of Oregon, USA, which occupies about forty-four square miles and has a population of over 172,000 (see figures 1.2 and 1.3).[5] Eugene is selected for this research because of the city's following characteristics:

1. The story of downtown Eugene's post-war transformation is tied explicitly to urban renewal and presents an opportunity to explore the lesser-known aspects of downtown revitalization projects in American cities.
2. It is both a typical and unique American city historico-morphologically, composed of a downtown core and low-density residential development but mixed-use neighborhood centers scattered across the city.
3. It was possible to conduct detailed urban historical research with resources available at the UO Libraries, City of Eugene Office, Lane County Historical Museum, and Digital Archives of the Register Guard (local newspaper).

Although this study is primarily about the "pedestrian mall," the topic of "urban renewal" is equally essential because the pedestrian mall was a part of the city's federal urban renewal program (Project Number ORE R-18), called the Central Eugene Project (CEP). During the mid-1960s, the City of Eugene (COE) envisioned an urban renewal project downtown to strengthen its economic and cultural position. At the time, three major problems were responsible for a declining downtown Eugene—(1) parking shortage, (2) traffic congestion, and (3) high numbers of "substandard" buildings.[6] The CEP project aimed to establish the downtown as the city's main Economic, Social, and Cultural Center (see figures 1.4 and 1.5). The downtown core had to be "saved" because, among other reasons, it was the city's primary tax base, which paid seven percent of the taxes and occupied only 0.04 percent of the land in the city.[7] The local renewal agency, the Eugene Renewal Agency (ERA), monitored the CEP, which had an estimated budget of \$18 million.[8] Of this, the federal grant would cover two-thirds, i.e., \$12 million, leaving \$6 million for the local government to manage.



Figure 1.2. Location of Eugene's within the State of Oregon (OR) and the USA (*top*; sc. ESRI ArcGIS base layer) and Eugene's city limits and arterials for 1970 and the present (*bottom*).



Figure 1.3. A Google Earth 3D view of downtown Eugene in 2020 with CEP area highlighted, the streets (in yellow), and mall (in black) [*left*], and a larger view of the CEP area in 2020 [*right]*.



Figure 1.4. The Central Eugene Project (CEP) area and the major components (Retail, Commercial/Office, Convention, Hotel, and Parking). Each block is around 340 feet X 340 feet. Sc. Original map from a 1969 ERA brochure; reworked by the author.

Figure 1.5. RTKL's 1968 plan for the Central Eugene Project (sc. RTKL's Phase 4 study, p. 77; reworked by the author). See figures Z.5 and Z.6 in Appendix Z for original drawings.

The firm of Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, Lamb (RTKL, Architects and Urban Planners) completed the CEP plan in 1968, and the major components were a (1) Retail Center around an H-shaped Pedestrian Mall (2) renewed Commercial Center (offices and banking institutions); (3) a Cultural Center (Auditorium, Convention center, and Motor Hotel); (4) a Civic Center; and (5) Parking Garages.[9] The ERA later took out the Civic Center from the final plan. Additionally, an essential part of the CEP was to improve the downtown core's aesthetic and physical conditions through infrastructure improvements (see Appendix A for more information).



Components of the pedestrian mall

1. A central plaza with a water feature and viewing platform
2. A landscaped shopping plaza
3. Children's play areas
4. Entrance structures

Public facilities, such as restrooms, information booth, and telephones, Permanent and movable shops, Seating, Mall Coverings

Figure 1.6. The final pedestrian mall design, 1969 (sc. a mall design brochure released by ERA; reworked by the author). See figure Z.7, Z.8, Z.9, and Z.10 in Appendix Z for original pedestrian mall drawings.

The CEP project occupied seventeen and a half blocks of downtown's core. Eight of these blocks were adjacent to the pedestrian mall, most of which was intended for a Retail Core. This eight-block area is the main study area of this research and is termed the **RCPM or the "Retail Center/Core facilitated by the Pedestrian Mall."**[10] The pedestrian mall opened formally on February 13, 1971, after the design team led by Mitchell-McArthur (Landscape Architects) and George T. Rockrise and Associates (Urban Planners) completed the pedestrian mall's final design in September 1969 (see figures 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10).[11] The mall cost $2.4 million and served 600,000 SF of potential retail space, and ERA made several public improvements within the project area at the expense of around $5.1 million (see Appendix B).[12] Since the RCPM area was a part of the CEP, it experienced mass clearance, which directly influenced the pedestrian mall's future. The process of wholesale destruction of a century-old urban fabric and expectations for an almost instant "filling" of the cleared area directly contributed to the pedestrian mall strategy's failure, which this dissertation explores in detail.



Figure 1.7. The CEP area in the early-1970s after mall completion. Sc. City of Eugene Staff.

Figure 1.8. Views of Eugene Mall: along Broadway looking toward Charnelton (*top*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_17620) and looking toward Willamette (*bottom*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_17629.

Figure 1.9. A view of the mall along Willamette looking toward Broadway. Sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_14823.



Figure 1.10. Images of the pedestrian mall: during construction along Willamette (*top*; sc. Lane County Historical Museum Digital Collections (LCHMDC), Catalog# GN991) and along Broadway (*bottom*; sc. LCHMDC Catalog #GN10057).

1.2 Research Questions and Frameworks

The major “problem” behind the research questions is that the pedestrian mall could not revitalize the retail core as anticipated, and the community realized it by the mid-1980s. Between the early to mid-1980s, businesses along a few of the eight mall segments started to realize that the mall was not beneficial, and the first segment was taken out in late-1985. The pedestrian mall history is divided into two phases: Phase 1 (1970 to 1985) is the time between the start of the renewal and the reopening of the first mall segment to cars. After the first segment reopened, the mall’s story entered Phase 2 (1986 to 2002), characterized by the symbolic end to the pedestrian mall as the remaining mall segments reopened. However, a new direction toward downtown revitalization as a part of the same urban renewal program also characterizes this phase.

With these central issues in mind, this research follows two Research Questions-

1. Why did downtown Eugene's retail center, facilitated by the pedestrian mall—an early 1970s strategy to revitalize the downtown—begin to decline in the 1980s and eventually fail by the early-2000s?
2. In addition to demolition and reconstruction, what other design and planning-related processes did downtown Eugene's urban renewal project experience?

This dissertation comprehensively investigates the two questions through seven inquiries (two background and five core inquiries).

1. **Background Inquiries**

    a. Where does the story of the pedestrian malls and urban renewal lie within the American cities’ post-war history?
    b. Which forces and developments inspired Eugene’s downtown urban renewal and the pedestrian mall?

2. **Core Inquiries**

    a. How did the CEP area’s morphology, specifically the RCPM area, transform as a part of urban renewal?
    b. What were the reasons that influenced the pedestrian mall strategy's failure to revitalize the city’s retail core in phase 1 (1970-1985)?

c. How did the pedestrian mall impact the relationship between the street configuration, Building Morphology, and Retail Business Structure in the RCPM area?
d. In addition to demolition and reconstruction, what other "less-explored" processes occurred during downtown Eugene's urban renewal that point toward an alternative viewpoint on urban renewal?
e. Compared to Phase 1, which efforts during Phase 2 (1986 to 2002) defined the city's new approach to downtown revitalization?

Four disciplines that have played a significant role in the research formulation are related to urban history, urban morphology (Conzenian approach), spatial analysis (space syntax), and urban economics (specifically urban retailing). However, the research utilizes only specific areas within each discipline. The essential works in urban morphology that have mostly explained the processes of formation and transformation of cities,[13] space syntax's exploration of the relationship between the spatial and morphological components,[14] urban history's contribution toward the explanation of the processes and forces that make those transformations possible mainly through a historical narrative, and urban retail theories' focus on the spatial distribution of land use and agglomeration/clustering.[15] Additionally, this research incorporates a Mixed-Method Research Design incorporating Qualitative Methods (Archival Research and Interviews), Quantitative Methods (statistical analyses), and Mapping. At its core, the Research Design incorporates a methodology that presents the research as a historical narrative of downtown Eugene while the Qualitative and Quantitative analyses validate the findings. While these methods apply separate approaches to reading the city, this research also aims to "unite" and utilize the common foundations among them as a part of downtown Eugene's comprehensive historical study.

1.3 Research Significance

While only occupying eight blocks (a fraction of this mid-sized city), the RCPM area encapsulated the story of Eugene's economic growth and decline and resonates with downtown America of the twentieth century. On this note, the research ties relevant implications associated with the field of American urban and architectural studies, specifically regarding the historical processes of city formation, design, and planning. Additionally, this research shows that a mixed-method study like the one utilized in this research can facilitate a more comprehensive way of analytically studying the shaping of the built environment under various historical and spatial forces.

1.4 Notes

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[1] Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How American Rebuilds Cities* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990); Robert M. Fogelson, *Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950.* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Alison Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[2] The Editors of Fortune, *The Exploding Metropolis: A Study of the Assault on Urbanism and How Our Cities Can Resist It* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957). This book consisted of five other chapters, "Are Cities Un-American?" and "Urban Sprawl" by William Whyte, "The City and the Car" by Francis Bello, "New Strength in City Hall" by Seymour Freedgood, and "The Enduring Slums" by Daniel Seligman.

[3] Kent A. Robertson, "The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns," *Urban Affairs Review* 26, no. 2 (1990): 250–273.

[4] Of importance to note is that this research is not about the pedestrian mall's "design" to foster a healthy public space but rather about the Retail Center facilitated by the Pedestrian Mall, i.e., the RCPM area.

[5] Data from US Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/eugenecityoregon [last access, March 8, 2021]

[6] ERA, *Project Photographs for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18) August* (Eugene, 1968). LMA assessed the buildings by categorizing them into divisions.

[7] "Critics Hit Hard at Mall Feature of Urban Renewal Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 28, 1968).

[8] In the 1970s, three local funding sources existed for revitalization projects—special assessment districts, tax increment funding, tax-exempt financing. ERA utilized all three forms effectively in the CEP area; the first two primarily for business investments whereas the third to facilitate housing. Also, it is essential to note that the ERA did not invest in the projects but only "facilitated" the investors, property owners, and businesses. Also, ERA was officially involved in street construction, utility improvement, property management, and granting financial assistance to private business people who needed to improve their property.

[9] Lamb Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report* (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1968).

[10] The "RCPM" is coined by the author and was not included in the original CEP plan.

[11] ERA, "ERA Report, 1(5)" (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, October 1969).

[12] *Central Eugene Project, 1969 to 1976 (Unpublished Manuscript)* (Eugene, 1976). The public improvements included Artwork and fountain $20,000, Restrooms and water fountains $35, 817, Street improvements $1,127,228, Sidewalks $384,728, Traffic signals $85,270, Traffic controls $40,958, Landscaping $78,829, Fire alarms $2,057, Water lines $16,282, Sanitation sewers $197,315, Storm sewers $295,745, Pedestrian mall $2,271,668.

[13] Michael R. Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis," *Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers)*, no. 27 (1960): iii–122; Karl Kropf, *The Handbook of Urban Morphology* (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2017); Vitor Manuel Oliveira, *Urban Morphology: An Introduction to the Study of the Physical Form of Cities* (Switzerland: Springer, 2016).

[14] Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson, *The Social Logic of Space*, *The Social Logic of Space* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Bill Hillier, *Space Is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture* (London: Space Syntax Laboratories, University College London, 2007); Bill Hillier, "Cities as Movement Economies," *Urban Design International*, 1996; Bill Hillier, "Spatial Sustainability in Cities Organic Patterns and Sustainable Forms," in *7th International Space Syntax Symposium*, 2009.

[15] Alison Isenberg, *Designing San Francisco: Art, Land, and Urban Renewal in the City by the Bay* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Ocean Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

2 CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 1): URBAN HISTORY AND URBAN RETAIL

The literature research comprises four major fields of inquiry: urban history, urban morphology (Conzenian approach), space syntax, and urban economic/urban retail theories. One of the first steps in explaining the research framework involved locating the research topic within the wider discipline and each of the four fields' roles. As explained in the Introduction chapter, the "larger" field of inquiry that has guided this research's conceptualization is the history of post-war American urbanism. Within the broad spectrum of an American city's post-war history, the specific investigation is about the transformation of post-war downtowns of American cities, specifically a study of the morphological transformation of downtown Eugene's retail core and the pedestrian mall. The need to examine this core inquiry led to three "hunches" that have further dictated the research framework's essential portions. The first is, "how did the morphological transformation manifest itself?" which borrows mostly from urban morphology works, especially M. R. G. Conzen's approach. The second is "what dictated the morphological transformation?" or "why did the transformation occur?" which requires an understanding of the complex processes, borrowing from archival research and urban historiography. The third is investigating the relationship between the urban morphological components that transformed (Retail Business Structure and Street Configuration), which borrows ideas from urban economic/retail theories and space syntax analysis.

Table 2.1 compares the four disciplines based on the main emphasis and assumptions about the built environment. This chapter discusses post-war American urbanism and urban retailing, while the next chapter deals with urban morphology and space syntax.

2.1 Urban Renewal and the Pedestrian Mall: A Post-war Urban History of Downtown America

This section discusses the story of urban renewal and the pedestrian mall strategies implemented in American cities during the post-war decades of the 1950s to 1970s to revitalize the downtowns. The story of other relevant developments during the period (highway developments, suburban growth, and shopping centers) are also discussed. In "Downtown Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities," Frieden and Sagalyn (1990) have postulated that the major developments from the 1950s to 1980s that affected the downtowns were suburban shopping centers, downtown retail malls (pedestrian malls), urban renewal, public-private relationships, downtown business agenda, and new consciousness in city-making.[1]

Table 2.1. Comparison of the theoretical underpinnings of the four disciplines.

Parameters	***Urban history***	***Urban morphology (Conzenian approach)***	***Retail theories***	***Space syntax***
Main emphasis	Study of the forces and events that have shaped various facets of the urbanized society	Nature of the built morphology (buildings, plots, blocks, adjacent streets) and processes of formation and transformation of towns	Formation of trade centers and the relationship between land use at the scale of the region and metropolitan areas	Study of the relationship between society, built form, and streets/public spaces
Assumptions about the built environment	Through a historical study, the forces which have had an impact on the built environment can be identified, and their impacts can be "explained"	The built environment can be illustrated as townscapes, and those records can help in further understanding the built environment	Trade takes place in space, and spatial attributes (e.g., the distance between two trade areas) shape the nature of the cities	Movement economies—the urban structure, defined by the network of streets and public open spaces, play a vital role in determining human movement and, consequently, the city's land-use pattern.

Eugene's downtown pedestrian mall was a "historical" event that the City executed over fifty years ago and lasted until 2002, with its roots going even further into the early post-war decades. Although only occupying a roughly eight-block, the mall's establishment is a critical event in the city's history, and it resonated with the national movement of post-war change. In this research, the pedestrian mall and urban renewal are not considered solely a decision of the city authorities to revitalize the downtown core. Instead, they have been taken as a manifestation of the social, cultural, economic, and political forces acting together to improve the city through a change in the built fabric. The specific topics discussed next are as follows:

1. Introduction to the housing act and urban renewal
2. A few key post-war developments
3. The decline of central cities in the post-war decades
4. Urban renewal and the destruction of the pre-existing fabric
5. Urban renewal as a mid-sized city phenomenon

6. Alternate and less-explored literature about urban renewal

2.1.1 Introduction to the Housing Act and Urban Renewal

To solve the national crisis of housing and improvements of slum conditions in the immediate post-war years, Congress passed the 1949 Housing Act. According to the Committee on Banking and Currency (1949), Section 2 of the 1949 Housing Act established national housing objectives and policies, and the original declaration read as follows:

> *"the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through [he clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the_ goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation."*[2]

Title I of the 1949 Act was entitled "Slum Clearance and Community Development and Redevelopment," and the federal government authorized $ 1 billion in loans over a five-year period to finance the planning of local projects, acquisition and clearance of land, and the preparation of the land for reuse.[3] However, none of the funds would be available for building construction on the cleared site except for structures connected to the development and schools or other public facilities necessary to support new uses in the area. More importantly, the 1949 Act was further modified, and Congress passed the Housing Act of 1954.[4] The Act allocated up to ten percent of federal capital grant funds for renewing nonresidential areas and was named "urban renewal."[5] Through this modification, "urban renewal" as a tool to eradicate the "blighted conditions" in cities entered the national vocabulary—which later became synonymous with the act of enforcing building codes and eminent domain. As Alexander von Hoffman recalls,

> *".... fundamentally, the code enforcement and rehabilitation approach to the slums supplemented but never replaced the earlier notion of urban redevelopment. In fact, the urban renewal concept never really broke from the idea of slum clearance.... Private industry anti-slum strategists had always recommended demolishing and replacing those properties that were beyond saving."*[6]

Gordon (2009) has argued that "in practice, blight is less an objective condition than it is a legal pretext for various forms of commercial tax abatement that, in most settings, divert money from schools and county-funded social services."[7] For example, according to the author's experience of St. Louis, *"the designation of blight often occurred on a proposal-by-proposal basis, at the behest of developers. Blighting, in other words, was driven not by objective urban conditions but by the prospect of private investment. In practice, this meant that investment actually steered away from the most dismal urban conditions as private interests sought the 'blight that's right'—an area with at least some of the conditions needed to make a plausible case for subsidized redevelopment, but not so run-down as to put private investment at risk."*[8]

2.1.2 A Few Key Post-war Developments

C. Gordon explains that while urban renewal sought to revitalize central areas, the program was compromised by "more generous federal policies…. which subsidized and facilitated suburban flight," which included "highway spending, mortgage insurance, and accelerated depreciation for new commercial development."[9] In this sense, one key reason for the decline of central areas was sprawl. Robert Bruegmann views sprawl as "a crazy quilt of nearly continuous suburbia, with subdivisions, shopping centers, and industrial parks crisscrossed by roads and railroads and dotted with parks and open spaces." [10] Additionally, across the nation, automobile use and lack of interest in the city centers led to large retailers opening their branches in the suburbs and cutting on downtown operations by the early 1960s.[11] Congress passed the "Highway Act" in 1956 to provide a 41,000-mile (eventually 42,500) mile system, which made the easy and widespread automobile use across the country in the post-war decades possible.[12] Fogelson (2001) highlights the issue of accessibility in the following way-

"…. the belief that accessibility was the key to the well-being of downtown had emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and became part of the conventional wisdom in the first half of the twentieth century …. [that]…. the value of a piece of commercial property depended on its accessibility—or, as the New York Real Estate Record put it, on "the number and the character of the people that habitually pass it."[13]

The 1950s also saw another crucial widespread phenomenon that would influence the pattern of retail business organizations in American cities also began in the mid-1950s—*the suburban shopping center*. The nation's first Shopping Center, an open-air mall called Northgate outside Seattle in 1950, had stores lined up in the middle of the site surrounding them with parking and turning them inward to form a pedestrian corridor for easy walking.[14] Later, 1956 marked the opening of the first enclosed shopping center in Edina, a suburb of Minneapolis, designed to "get the shopper out of the harsh weather and troubles of the real world."[15] By 1960, there were 4,500 such shopping centers (comprising 14% of total retail sales); this grew to 16,400 by 1975 (33% of retail sales) and over 30,000 by 1987 (over 50% of retail sales).[16]

2.1.3 The Decline of Central Cities in the Post-war Decades

The primary reason for the need to revitalize the central cities was because they began to decline physically and economically, notably in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1973, Judith Friedman concluded (after a study of ninety-one largest metropolitan areas' CBD sales for 1954 and 1967) that CBDs in large cities would never retail the prominence that they once had.[17]

A 1968 study shows a reduction of sales in CBDs across nine major West Coast cities. Between 1954 and 1963, the CBDs' share decreased from an average of fifty-seven percent in those nine cities to under twenty-nine percent in 1963. The share of CBDs was 80.7 percent in Spokane, WA in 1954 to as low as 10.1 percent in Phoenix, AZ in 1963. In 1983, Kent Robertson conducted a study of CBD retail sales between 1954 to 1977 for around ninety cities across the nation, from very large (more than 1,000,000) to small (100,000 to 200,000).[18] In the study, he found that between 1954 and 1977, CBD retail sales (in constant dollars) reduced by 51.5%, SMSA sales in CBDs reduced by 77.7%, and CBD retail sales per city resident reduced by 60.7%. Furthermore, the percent of SMSA sales in CBD dropped from 19.3% in 1954 to 4.3 percent in 1977; downtown retailing declined significantly in small cities than in large ones. Birch (2006) found that between 1970 and the 1980s, thirty-seven out of forty-five downtowns (82%) sampled across each region of the nation lost population.[19]

In the 1970s, city authorities across the nation realized that "downtowns could no longer compete with the suburb and that their rescue depended instead on their distinction from the suburban realm in terms of the nature of their activities, a more compact built environment, and the predominance of pedestrian movement for intra-downtown journeys."[20] However, with changing trends beginning in the early-1980s successful downtown businesspeople and various political forces brought two major socioeconomic changes. First, downtowns became commercial centers primarily through the construction of the office towers. Second, the new generation began considering living close to their jobs (in downtowns). According to Birch's 2006 study, downtowns recovered during the 1980s. Only twenty-one downtowns experienced population decline (47% of 45 sampled), and by the 1990s, the population had grown in more than thirty-two (70%).[21] Additionally, the early 1980s brought a boom in downtown office buildings.[22] Another change was the return of living in central areas as young white professionals replaced lower-income minority groups.[23] In "Downtown Inc.," Frieden and Sagalyn succinctly explain the typical scenario of downtowns across the nation in the eighties as follows (see figure 2.2 for a list of cities that lost or gained population between 1970 and 2000).[24]

> *"the new centers of 1980s featured …. a cluster of office towers mixed with hotels and civic buildings, freeways pumping heavy traffic to the edge of downtown, modern housing complexes, shopping malls, some renovated office buildings and warehouses, many new restaurants, and at least one restored Victorian neighborhood."*



Figure 2.1. A chart showing the American cities that lost or gained at least 5,000 downtown population between 1970 to 2000 (Birch 2006).

2.1.4 Urban Renewal and the Destruction of the Pre-existing Fabric

> *"the downtown investment policy with the most rationalized and repeated supporting arguments…. was also irrational, as embodied in the idea of tearing down Main Streets to save them."*[25]
>
> -Alison Isenberg (2004), on the controversial nature of urban renewal's policy for destruction]

Although initiated to improve the conditions of American cities, the word 'urban renewal' has become a synonym for the government acquisition of land, forceful evacuation of the poor, demolition of properties, and replacement through modern buildings and infrastructures.[26] The major problems associated with urban renewal were that it displaced the residents (predominantly minority) and made the same land unaffordable for original occupants after reconstruction. This led to the dispersal of 'slum dwellers' to other parts of the city and contributed to creating more blighted areas in the process.[27] Researchers have argued that urban renewal's "products" that lasted from 1960 to 1973 were not people-centered compared to prioritizing economy and aesthetics. In addition to evicting previous owners, many cities got reasons to create attractive shopping environments and parking instead of prioritizing strategies that would support robust retailing activities or make downtowns resilient in the long run.[28]

Writing about urban renewal as a practice of Eminent Domain (ED) in 1976, Patricia Munch argued that ED is "the legal right to acquire property by force rather than by voluntary exchange."[29] Works like Martin Anderson's (1967) *The Federal Bulldozer* and Chsester Hartman's (2002) *San Francisco: City for Sale* have told urban renewal's story as that of destruction and eminent domain.

Between 1949 and 1968, the federal government approved 1,946 urban renewal projects in 912 communities.[30] According to HUD's 1965 annual report, by the end of that year, there were a total of 1,699 urban renewal projects underway which utilized the federal grant of which 227 were completed, 894 were executed, and 578 were approved for planning, all combined for total grant reservations of $4.97 billion.[31] By the early 1960s, urban renewal's intentions and effects were felt in many cities— the destruction of private property and not uplifting economic conditions.[32] For example, Anderson (1967) notes that by March 1963, the program had forced over 609,000 people to pack their belongings and leave their homes.[33] By 1974 when the urban renewal program "officially" ended, 1,258 communities had experienced 3,284 projects with more than $13 billion approved (see figure 2.1).[34]

Regarding local history, as Alison Isenberg contends in discussing the case of San Francisco in the 1960s and 1970s, one study by the Bureau of Land Management's leaders had concluded that "urban renewal had primarily benefited white "land grabbers" …. "private profiteers" had targeted redevelopment districts, "buying property and reselling it to the government at a higher price than they paid."[35] Furthermore, projects like South of Market Street/Yerba Buena Center and Western Additions were characteristic of urban renewal—which evicted poor and minority population, small businesses and made the previous land untenable for the poor because of rising cost.[36] Ocean Howell laments that "with little regard for the cultural significance of Fillmore, SFRA divided the Western Addition to A-1 and A-2 and displaced more than 13,500 people without relocation."[37] Hartman summarizes San Francisco's post-war planning as follows-

> *"At no point in the South of Market/Yerba Buena Center development process or in any other project the City initiated or approved was the basic*

threshold question posed of how the city's resources and intervention could best be used to maximize fulfillment of those needs—clearly, what a rational process of planning for social needs would call for. Instead, opportunities were limited to those that private-sector developers initiated and would cooperate with. This is the nature of public planning in America, even in one of its most "progressive" cities."[38]

Similarly, in St. Louis's Mill Creek project case, more than half of the 4,172 displaced and eligible for relocation assistance received no help, and most of the assisted relocations were to substandard dwellings.[39]



Figure 2.2. Charts related to the number of urban renewal projects completed by Year, N=1,141 (top), and federal grants approved by year, total= $10.18 billion (bottom). Data from HUD 1975, 19.

As the urban renewal strategy failed to revitalize the downtowns, and Congress terminated the plan in 1974.[40] By the 1970s, the reputation of urban renewal had decreased to the extent that many agencies dropped the phrase from their project titles and substituted them with "community development."[41] As Jon Teaford summarizes, "mention of urban renewal aroused thoughts of neighborhood-wrecking bulldozers, dispossessed tenants, and sterile high-rise architecture as cold and unfeeling as the bureaucratic process that created it."[42] After the federal sponsorship was terminated in 1974, HUD replaced the program by the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). However, as Gordon (2009) argues, "essentially the same language was imported into new laws, including the profusion of TIF (Tax Increment Financing) laws in the 1970s and 1980s. TIF statutes echoed and expanded the older statutory definition of blight, typically grafting economic considerations, such as underutilization of land, uneven commercial development, and insufficient tax revenues, onto the older 'health and welfare' notion of urban blight."[43]

2.1.5 Urban Renewal as a Mid-sized City Phenomenon

The bulk of urban renewal projects took place in small and mid-sized cities, and Eugene falls in this category. Of the total urban renewal projects by the end of 1974, small and mid-sized cities (i.e., with a population less than 100,000) comprised 86.8% of total project locations (861 out of 992), 65.9% of total projects (1,385 out of 2,102), and 44.3% of grants approved ($4.43 billion of $10 billion) (see table 2.1 and figure 2.2).[44] Cities that belonged to Eugene's category at the time (i.e., a population of 50,000 to 99,999) comprised 12.7% of total urban renewal project localities, 15.2% of projects, and 15.1% of grants approved. Eugene's population in 1969 was 79,000, and it was not until 1977 that its population passed 100,000.

Eugene, being a mid-sized city during its renewal era (and even today), can forward some important insights through its urban renewal experience for downtowns of similar and larger sizes. Appler (2017) argues that although most communities that received urban renewal funds had a population of less than 50,000, traditional urban renewal scholarship has emphasized chiefly the largest cities.[45] Hochfelder and Appler (2020) also note that through 1966, cities with fewer than 100,000 residents accounted for about two-thirds of urban renewal projects.

According to Hochfelder and Appler (2020), "while few of these (small) cities have the cultural or economic influence of their largest counterparts, their collective experience more accurately reflects the course and consequences of urban renewal for the nation as a whole."[46]

The authors argue that stories from small cities "urges us to shift our focus from policy decisions made at the highest levels to the specific, place-based ways in which these decisions shaped conditions on the ground."

Table 2.2. Information on the urban renewal projects until the end of the federal program in 1974.

This table is based on HUD's 1975 Urban Renewal Directory.[47]

Population group (1970 census)	*All programs*			*Urban renewal projects*		
	Localities	*Projects*	*Grants approved*	*Localities*	*Projects*	*Grants approved*
TOTAL	1,258	3,284	$13,144,586,000	992	2,102	$9,989,361,000
1 million and over	7	155	$1,645,489,000	5	120	$803,051,000
500,000 to 999,999	27	254	$1,978,116,000	21	130	$1,479,897,000
250,000 to 499,999	37	275	$2,081,169,000	28	166	$1,614,146,000
100,000 to 249,999	90	501	$2,117,361,000	77	301	$1,664,966,000
50,000 to 99,999	157	521	$1,739,449,000	126	320	$1,509,073,000
25,000 to 49,999	252	552	$1,612,956,000	196	339	$1,280,133,000
10,000 to 24,999	313	527	$1,162,525,000	242	357	$942,946,000
5,000 to 9,999	200	289	$516,840,000	164	213	$443,911,000
under 5,000	175	210	$290,681,000	133	156	$251,238,000

2.1.6 Alternate and Less-explored Literature about Urban Renewal

One key aspect of this dissertation has been a narration of Eugene's urban renewal story beyond the typical portrayal of "destruction followed by rebuilding and not much in between." This view of urban renewal discussed previously has sometimes overlooked the fact that the program followed a complex and lengthy process and cannot be fully understood by a simple and narrow lens of demolition and reconstruction. While this popular view is undeniable, recent scholarship has forwarded a less-explored version of urban renewal. This version has focused on those complex processes' reality and their possible contribution to the design and planning of cities. However, at no point does the "alternate" viewpoint discussed here intends to disregard the well-established reality of urban renewal's destructive impact on minority and low-income population.

Some of the notable works that present the "alternate" viewpoints include that of Lizabeth Cohen (2019) on Ed Logue's story on urban renewal projects in New Haven, Boston, and New York; Alison Isenberg (2017) on San Francisco; and Ocean Howell (2015) on the Mission District/Diamond Heights.[48] Specifically, these authors point toward urban renewal's role not only as a tool for eminent domain or gains and losses in numbers but for a positive outcome that considered the community's needs. As noted by Lizabeth Cohen about her work, "…. challenging the blanket dismissal of all "urban renewal" in the postwar era as unchanging and disastrous, Saving America's Cities explores both its successes and failures and the altered roles played over time by localities, states, and the federal government."[49] It is important to note that these works focus mostly on specific processes and do not necessarily conform to the "products of urban renewal" as a universal remedy to central city problems.

Lizabeth Cohen (2019), in "*Saving America's Cities: Ed Logue and the Struggle to Renew Urban America in the Suburban Age*," narrates a work of a prominent urban renewal figure, Ed Logue, who worked in New Haven (1954-1961), Boston (1961-1967), and New York (1975-1985). One particular story that Cohen tells regarding the positive impact of citizen participation is Madison Park, Boston. In this case, the final negotiated (post-renewal) cityscape was not what Boston Renewal Agency (BRA) or Urban Planning Aid (UPA) wanted but what the community and Lower Roxbury Community Corporation (LRCC) wanted, "a new high school plus new homes with front doors and backyards, developed by and for the neighborhood."[50] In this case, the LRCC had contracted with UPA in July 1966 to "come up with an alternative plan for Madison Park and to conduct a community survey to investigate residents' needs and desires."[51] In another instance, in Charlestown, the new cityscape resulted from negotiation among many parties, and BRA had to accept what it did not envision initially.[52] In the South End lower-income community, the result was a diverse neighborhood despite the relentless pressures of gentrification.[53] As Cohen contends, "One of the most important legacies of urban renewal in Boston was the spur it gave to community organizing, which flourished thereafter in many realms of American society."[54]

Of particular significance is Cohen's descriptions on Ed Logue's viewpoints about urban renewal, such as, "although urban planning and its execution were most successful when handled by locals who knew their cities well, only the federal government could supply sufficient financial and other support to help cities and their residents prosper."[55] Alternatively, "small-scale locally-oriented CDCs not only get the job done, but they do so in a way that increases community participation often missing in the more top-down federal urban renewal of Logue's earlier days."[56] Furthermore, Ed Logue also believed that "development by increment rather than through mega plan often yields greater success and more citizen participation over the long term… and cities thrive by providing dynamic pedestrian-and transit-oriented alternatives to suburbia, not mimicking its sprawl and car-orientation."[57]

Similarly, in "Designing San Francisco: Art, Land, and Urban Renewal in the city by the Bay," Alison Isenberg (2017) shares Grady Clay's vision for urban renewal based on the lost manuscripts of Clay's works from the early-1960s.[58] Most importantly, as Isenberg explains, Grady Clay saw urban renewal as a land problem and challenged the practice of selling rather than leasing renewal parcels.[59] Clay was worried about the impact of "top-down, clearance-based, monolithic, automobile-centered downtown redevelopment," which brought racial inequities. Clay also believed that urban renewal should give citizens more say over the urban form and hoped that his book would help alter redevelopment terms so that real people, rather than invisible "machinations," could set more of the redevelopment agenda. Furthermore, Clay specifically challenged the idea of design competitions (like those in SF's Golden Gateway redevelopment) and advocated for citizen partnerships instead.[60] He forwarded the knowledge that although land needed to be purchased and assembled under urban renewal, it did not need to be sold. The renewal administration and city leaders could still decide what they would actually want to get built.

In another instance, Architectural and Urban Historian Ocean Howell (2015) argues that the urban renewal of the Mission District in San Francisco is an example of rehabilitation and not 'redevelopment.' Furthermore, Howell argues that urban renewal in the Mission was not only about the Eminent Domain. As the author points out, San Francisco Renewal Agency (SFRA) had conducted "hundreds of meeting with the residents with representative groups for five years" under the request of the Mission Merchants Association (MMA).[61] In this sense, urban renewal was, in part, also a tool to "mitigate market forces, promote affordable housing, and renewal of neighborhoods on their terms considering the representatives could negotiate and cooperate with the state powers."[62] Soomro (2018) presents a story from South Bronx's Melrose Commons in 1992, where government officials were able to work with the local organization *Nos Quedamos* (We Stay Committee).[63] As the author further explains, by working with the Architecture firm and with the aid of strong leadership, the committee could retain the existing social and economic capital and successfully develop and implement the neighborhood plan—a victory for civic engagement and bottom-up planning.

Similarly, Fairbanks (2020) contends that while large cities tell stories of minority removal, smaller towns often experienced improved infrastructures and even schools for minority neighborhoods.[64] Specifically, Fairbanks shares the story of the South Dalworth (a neighborhood with a primarily African American population) project in Texas, where the community experienced rehabilitation rather than total clearance. The project accomplished infrastructure improvements, school expansion, and a new recreation center.

Appler's (2017) study of the Cleaver Avenue Project in Lebanon, KY, found that the housing projects after the city's urban renewal differed in "scale, form, and style" from the state's largest city, Louiseville, still leaving the "neighborhood well integrated into the fabric of the surrounding city."[65] Another project of interest in this regard is Diamond Heights in San Francisco, which started in the early-1960s.[66] DH was home to 374 people and 158 houses, and the project that began in 1956 eventually created 2,100 housing units, of which 500 were affordable.[67] Brandi (2012) notes that Diamond Heights, an SFRA-led housing project, achieved its urban renewal goals by creating middle-class and low-income housing, used "sophisticated planning seldom seen in San Francisco," and produced a "racially integrated, stable neighborhood."[68] As Brandi clarifies, although Diamond Heights was not "public" in the traditional sense, it used low-cost FHA loans, limited developers' profits, and set "artificially low prices" for the lots.[69]

Furthermore, Tighe's (2016) account of Asheville, North Carolina, also shares the sentiment that urban renewal programs were much more participatory than are given credit for.[70] Through interviews with the residents, the author found that much of the negative attitude could have been "primarily not in the view of the outcomes of urban renewal, but in the intent." Additionally, the decline of the small businesses was not because of eminent domain but because chain stores like 7-11 and Store 24 replaced many mom and pop" stores and presented "too much competition for local retail establishments." Tighe, however, also contends that whole there are contradicting interpretations of urban renewal in the city, it was clear that "many remember urban renewal as a racist policy with inequitable results for the African Americans."

2.1.7 *The Pedestrian Mall*

This discussion focuses on understanding the context surrounding pedestrian malls' evolution, historical analysis, their role in revitalizing the retail cores as they were meant to, and their failure across the nation (see figure 2.3). It is important to note that this discussion does not intend to provide elaborate details about the malls' urban design qualities or their role as a public urban space.[71] The pedestrian mall's journey to revitalize the downtown business environment began with the 1959 mall in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The pedestrian mall originally evolved from the unity among downtown merchants to fight the common "adversary," the suburban shopping center.[72]

In one of the earliest academic theses on the pedestrian mall, James Richard Taylor (1964) had argued that "a pedestrian mall is a street designed for foot traffic and excludes all but emergency, utility and service vehicles…. It may extend the full length of a shopping street or be interrupted by cross streets that are left open to vehicular traffic."[73] In another study shortly after, Michael Rosner (1966) added that pedestrian mall was "a permanent public right of way designed to provide access to commercial or retail facilities, to segregate normal vehicular and foot traffic and to incorporate landscaping, street furniture, and other amenities."[74] Rosner further added that "the mall is an area designed to facilitate pedestrian movement and enjoyment by eliminating potential conflicts with vehicular traffic and incorporating aesthetics and amenities."[75]

Further studies conducted in the following years suggest that, fundamentally, pedestrian malls were created by partially or wholly restricting vehicular traffic on major downtown streets to create a suburban mall-like environment and usually facilitate the adjacent retail center. Some of the widely-accepted definitions of the pedestrian mall are as follows—

Kent Robertson: "a downtown corridor usually a few linear blocks along with the traditional main shopping districts where pedestrian transportation is given the highest priority."[76]

Roberto Brambilla and Gianni Longo: the "mall" is widely used to describe areas where all vehicular traffic has been banned from a central street and are conscious attempts to mimic the popular suburban shopping malls inside the city.[77]



Figure 2.3. Images of Fulton Mall in Fresno CA (*top)*, Hamilton Mall in Allentown PA (*middle*), and 16th Street Mall in Denver CO (*bottom*) [Sc. Rubenstein 1992].

2.1.7.1 Mall Precedents

The success of suburban shopping centers convinced authorities concerned with city centers that pedestrianizing and bringing malls to the main streets would revitalize downtown retail districts.[78] As Kelly Gregg (2018) argues, Northgate in Seattle, WA (1950) and Northland near Detroit, MI (1954) demonstrated the success that the "pedestrian shopping experience could achieve." One of the earliest people who advocated for pedestrian malls in central cities was Victor Gruen. Victor Gruen's mid-1950s Fort Worth Plan (which got limited to a concept) was the first implementation of the pedestrian mall idea, which utilized the concept of separating auto and pedestrian traffic.[79] As Lizabeth Cohen (1996) notes, Victor Gruen was also a suburban shopping center developer who believed in the positive contributions of such a "protected pedestrian environment" to the suburban population.[80] Michael Cheyne (2010) laments the fact that Gruen was the same architect who was, on the contrary, also a proponent of the suburban malls that were destroying downtown growth in the first place; e.g., the 1954 Northland Mall near Detroit and the 1956 Southdale Mall, the first enclosed Mall in Edina, MN.[81]

The idea of the downtown pedestrian mall was also a result of the unity between retail business people and municipal governments to compete with the suburban retail malls. In one of the early assessments, Taylor (1964) has shared that the mall idea popularized in the early-1960s as downtown merchants realized "the need to improve their retail position due to rising competition and changing shopping habits."[82] Additionally, falling retail sales, unstable tax bases, stagnant real estate values, and increasing competition from regional shopping centers were other reasons. Furthermore, in the 1950s, downtown's dominance as the only retail and densely populated center made way to suburban shopping centers and suburbs. The mall strategy's core ideology relied on making the core downtown streets pedestrian-friendly or fully pedestrianized, improving the aesthetics, and making solid urban spaces would bring in more people and help revitalize the dwindling retail sector. The critical point to note is that it was about improving the downtown's vitality through aesthetics and the downtown retail scenario, which the suburban malls badly hit.

2.1.7.2 Mall Objectives and Benefits/ What Prompted the Pedestrian Mall Idea?

> *"…. pedestrian malls…. conjure up fantasies of outdoor cafes with parasols, play areas filled with laughing children, bustling shop activities, and an oasis of trees, grass, flowers, and fountains in the middle of the urban morass."*[83]

-Roberto Brambilla and Gianni Longo, 1977

The success of the pedestrian malls relied on a set of "expected outcomes" based on the mall actors involved; for example, the government had to justify the construction and maintenance of the mall; property owners and merchants had an investment to safeguard, and the residents needed to be assured of the worth of paying their tax share for such a development. [84]

Writing in 1974, when malls were trendy across the nation, Laurence Alexander, one of the key figures who studied the mall in the 1970s, argued that cities wanted malls because of their potential to build businesses, make downtowns more pleasant and attractive, reduce environmental impacts, increase pedestrian safety (from car accidents), and make downtowns a better place to work.[85] The two assumptions that went into the mall planning were that retail sales volume would increase and costs would be defrayed through special assessments or increased taxes.[86] Essentially, the mall was portrayed as a 'device' to improve the urban environment although not an 'end nor a promotional stunt.'[87] Other objectives relate to an emphasis on pedestrian orientation, such as minimizing pedestrian travel restrictions, minimizing pedestrian/vehicle conflict, and extending the practical travel range without using the personal automobile.[88]

Harvey Rubenstein (1978) argues that pedestrian malls were meant to revitalize the CBDs to increase retail sales, improve property values, compete with suburban shopping centers, and encourage private investments through retail businesses.[89] When the malls were doing well in the 1970s, their "quantifiable" benefits included increases in retail sales, land values, rentals, tax revenues, investments and remodeling pedestrian traffic, and lower vacancies (see Appendix C).[90]

2.1.7.3 <u>Analysis of the Mall Era: The Prosperous 1970s</u>

According to one early-1970s study, retail sales rose to forty percent in the first year of the mall opening, pedestrian traffic up to seventy-three percent, vacancies dropped, and investments, property values, rental rates, and tax revenues rose.[91] The data from three Californian malls in Fresno, Pomona, and Santa Monica further strengthen this argument on sales increase (see figure 2.4 for further data).[92]

Between the first mall in 1959 to the mid-1970s, over 200 downtown pedestrian malls were built across American cities.[93] At least seventeen full malls were constructed by 1968 when the Eugene mall was in the plans, and by the time it opened in 1971, at least twenty-eight had been constructed. By 1974, forty-nine malls either complete or in construction.[94] Through a study of malls across the nation until 1975, Spanbock had made the following assessments[95]

1. Mall costs vary widely;
2. Costs per linear foot show a wide range;
3. The largest concentration of malls cost under $1 million and are in cities of 100,000 or less; and
4. There is no correlation between mall costs and the city's general merchandise sales (for the thirty-three cities studied)



Figure 2.4. Chart showing percentage increase in retail sales after mall establishment across the nation (sc. Shealy 1974).

According to this author's analysis using data from Rubenstein (1978), Brambilla and Longo (1997), and Appendix-A (from a 2009 City of Buffalo study)[96], of the 109 malls, twenty-two were completed in the 1960s, and eighty-six were completed in the 1970s (see Appendix D). Furthermore, figure 2.5 shows that the years between 1974 and 1977 represent the best years of mall construction. At least twenty-nine malls had utilized urban renewal money at least partially for construction. Based on this author's analysis of sixty-four malls (data from Brambilla and Longo 1977 and Rubenstein 1978), most pedestrian malls (see figure 2.6)-

1. Spanned less than five blocks and less than 1,000 feet in total average length and between 60-70 feet in width;
2. Occupied less than 100,000 SF (length * width);
3. Cost between $1.3 to $1.7 million (in 1980 dollars); and

4. Had less than 1,000 parking capacity (with most others less than 5,000) and a 1978 population of less than 100,000.

Like the urban renewal projects, the pedestrian mall was also a mid-sized city phenomenon. Of the sixty-four cities with data available for 1970, forty (63%) had a population of less than 100,000. Out of ninety-one malls, fifty-six (62%) had a population of less than 100,000 in 1978.





Figure 2.5. Charts related to the nationwide figures on the pedestrian mall. The number of malls completed by year, N=100 (*top*), and the number of malls by year that at least partially used urban renewal money (*bottom*).



Figure 2.6. Charts related to the data on pedestrian malls across the nation reflecting the 1970s. From calculations done by the author.

2.1.7.4 Reasons for Pedestrian Malls' Failure Across the Nation

> *"Pedestrian malls opened with tremendous local fanfare and were initially greeted with enthusiasm by the public. However, once the novelty wore off, the exodus of retail sales continued to thwart the economic viability of downtown."* [97]
>
> -Kent Robertson, 1997

Across the nation, while the 1960s and 1970s marked the era of pedestrian mall success, by the late-1980s, most of them had started to "fail" as a strategy to revitalize the retail core. As late as 1978, scholars like Robert Brambilla and Gianni Longo were hopeful for "a new era of the pedestrian mall." Eventually, most of the 200 pedestrian malls were converted back to allow vehicles. No case studies of failures were reported till 1981, and only one author had worked on assessing the success of pedestrian malls.[98] However, by the 1990s, only thirty of them were left. A 2013 study by Cole Judge highlights the following data on malls' failure across the nation[99]

1. An eighty-nine percent failure rate or an eleven percent success rate;
2. Most have been removed or repurposed;
3. Eighty percent of the successful ones in areas with populations under 100,000;
4. The same report cites that by 2005, fewer than two dozen downtown pedestrian malls remained in the United States;[100] and
5. Eighty-five percent of the original 200 pedestrian malls had been reopened to traffic.[101]

Why was there a wave of mall failures beginning the 1980s? Planner Lawrence 0. Houstoun concluded in 1990 that downtown retail failed because of economic and other national trends during the 1970s and 1980s, and the malls' ability to improve retail sales did not have a causal relationship with any fact.[102] Michael Cheyne (2010) suggests that the added aesthetics and improved amenities solution adopted by the mall was an unrealistic idea to solve the downtowns' problems.[103] Dorina Pojani argues that foot traffic in the downtown area was often insufficient to maintain consistently high street activity levels because of low population density.[104] Another major reason could be that in the 1960s and 1970s, the suburban malls by themselves created more retail space than a community could realistically support. Additionally, pedestrian malls could not change street use patterns and stimulate the suburbanized population into new habits.[105]

According to Kent Robertson, the anticipated impact of closing streets on downtown's social and economic situation was unrealistic.[106] According to him, "the malls borrowed only one dimension of the suburban mall formula—the vehicle-free street—and either ignored or failed to replicate the other important design, retail mix, and organizational elements of this model." Linda Baker (2010) argues that the problem with malls was that they were envisioned principally as a structural solution, and little attention was paid to the underlying problem—the lack of a market; consequently, "malls got the blame for killing downtowns even when they weren't at fault."[107] As mentioned in Rosen (2006), other reasons include[108]

1. A decline in dominant industries and general economic health, resulting in less money entering and circulating in the local economy;
2. People's movement from 'decaying' regions to more promising ones;

3. It was initiated too late to have had any effect; and
4. Lack of essential elements such as the already good health of the shopping area, a customer base consisting of a sufficient critical mass of residents or workers, effective publicity, or integrated transit.

Notably, the literature shows that pedestrian malls' decline across the nation was attributed not only to the "internal" problems but several external agents were at play as well. Some important ones were unfavorable national and regional economies or changing customers' habits (e.g., attraction to suburban retail locations). While downtown office activities were making a comeback in the 1980s, the retail sector was still struggling (see Appendix E).[109]

2.2 Urban Retail

This section discusses urban retail theories, qualities of urban retailing, small businesses and the city center, and the impact of urban renewal on small businesses. Since the pedestrian mall strategy's failure was actually a failure to revitalize the retail core, the urban economic/retailing and small business theories have played an integral role in analyzing the nature of the project area's transformation. These studies have also contributed to an understanding of important retail business variables and the need to understand the impact of the city or regional scale economic forces on a much smaller area, like a downtown.

According to Robert Potter, retailing is an activity associated with selling tangible commodities to the consumer. Urban retail is "a facility that sells convenience and durable goods to the public in the course of their everyday life."[110] The theory of urban retail forwards "a set of propositions that seeks to explain the spatial structuring of the urban retailing system and hopefully also casts some light on the system's development and its ideal state."[111]

Before discussing the core topics of this section, it is important to note that the foundation of urban retail theories lies in the classical urban-economic/geography models on the formation and growth of central places or markets. Berry and Parr (1988) contend that economic phenomena occur through an exchange, the exchange occurs in markets, and markets exist where a number of sellers and buyers communicate.[112] Markets are the ubiquitous central places that have been present since the Middle Ages for the exchange of goods and services in a central location.[113] Thus, a central place's prime function is to provide a wide range of goods and services to a diverse population around it.[114] The important urban economic theories of the twentieth century associated with the organization of market or central places can be summarized as follows (see Appendix F for an elaborate discussion)-

1. A region or settlement is a collection of hierarchical distribution of economic activities or centers (e.g., Christaller's Central Place Theory);
2. In a settlement, one can observe typical land-use patterns, for example, arranged in concentric circles or particular axes of transportation/sectors radiating from the city center or as several discrete nuclei (e.g., Burgess and Park Concentric Circle Model, Hoyt's Sector Model, Harris and Ullman's Multiple Nuclei Model); and
3. Economic factors, especially the price of land and rent, which is high in the 'center' and declines as it is farther away from the center, play a significant role in deciding the locations of businesses (e.g., Alonso's bid-rent theory).

Improving on the two previous theories based on a "monofunctional model" by Burgess and Hoyt, Harris and Ullman's (1945) multiple nuclei models proposed that the land-use pattern is configured not around a single center but several discrete nuclei (see figure 2.7).[115] The city's initial nucleus might be the retail district in a central place, the port or rail facilities, or other specialized functions.[116] Like the previous theories, Harris and Ullman also proposed that the following districts had developed in most American cities: CBD, wholesale, light manufacturing, heavy industrial, and residential. The theory supported the idea that multiple nuclei are formed due to the nature of specific activities to locate themselves to take advantage of the extra-urban transportation and separation from other activities.

2.2.1 Urban Retail Theories

Regarding urban retailing, two concepts are important: (1) spatial distribution of retail and (2) agglomeration/clustering of retail.

2.2.1.1 <u>Spatial Distribution of Retail</u>

One of the first studies to link retail trade with spatial characteristics was William Reilly, who proposed the law of retail gravitation through a 1931 book.[117] Based on an analysis of attraction of retail trade from a smaller town to larger cities (more than 130 American cities), Reilly found that (1) outside trade increases at about the same rate as the population of a city increases and (2) a city draws more trade from nearby towns than it does from more distant ones. In Reilly's words, "two cities attract retail trade from any intermediate city or town in the vicinity of the breaking point, approximately in direct proportion to the populations of the two cities and in inverse proportion to the square of the distances from these two cities to the intermediate town."[118] One important assessment made by Potter (1984) is that the distribution of shops is at once both highly dispersed at the macro spatial scale and highly concentrated at the micro-urban scale.[119] He further argued that retail locational patterns (spatial aspects of retail location) and consumer behavioral traits are closely interrelated.[120] Ghosh and McLafferty (1987) propose that retail-spatial analysis consists of three levels—market selection, area analysis, and site evaluation.[121] The authors add that by studying the city's physical structure, it is often possible to subdivide the region into smaller areas, and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population are required.



Figure 2.7. Illustration of the major classical models of urban economics (sc. Harris and Ullman 1945).

Specifically, in the North American context (for example, through an empirical study of Chicago in the 1960s), Brian Berry developed a model "to understand how the basic building blocks of a retail structure fit together" and "accumulate and relate the relevant knowledge that we have about reality."[122] Berry was concerned about the evolution of the neighborhoods and whether they were planned or unplanned. He looked at the kinds of retail uses located in different parts of the city and composed the hierarchical structure of the retail business structure. More specifically, Berry found a pattern (which is taken for granted today) that outside the central business district, the business structure comprises of three necessary components: (1) a hierarchy of business centers; (2) highway-oriented commercial ribbons; and (3) specialized functional areas. The hierarchy of planned or unplanned business centers consisted of isolated convenience stores and street corner developments, neighborhood business centers, community business centers, and regional shopping centers.

In the context of retail business locations in the smaller center, Berry argues that "at fairly regular intervals, particularly the principal street intersections within the city's residential areas, outlying business centers had developed. Such intersections provided desirable spots for retailing because they were the transfer points between streetcar routes and bus lines, with high numbers of potential shoppers available as a result of the large pedestrian movement."[123] However, Johan Borchert (1998) refutes such a claim since, with new forms of retailing, the concept of the hierarchy of shopping centers, in particular, is considered obsolete.[124] In a recent study, Gibbs (2012) has confirmed the phenomenon of America's shopping centers' hierarchy, which falls into one of seven building types—corner store, convenience center, neighborhood center, community center, regional center, lifestyle, or town center, and outlet center.[125]

2.2.1.2 Agglomeration Economies

The theory of "agglomeration economies" is another important aspect that explains the clustering of retail. Economist Bertil Ohlin gave one of the first systematic attempts to develop a "taxonomy of the motivation of spatial concentration" in 1933.[126] Ohlin distinguished three categories under the concept of agglomeration economies: (1) economies of scale (profitable to produce on a large scale concentrated in space); (2) localization economies (an advantage in locating near firms of the same industry); and (3) urbanization economies (benefit of being located in an aggregation rather than in a rural area). Economist Edward Glaeser further elaborated the value of the theory of agglomeration economies (primarily developed in relation to production and labor economics) by concluding that industrial and commercial firms tend to locate close to one another since it increases productivity by primarily focusing on two variables of income and density of a particular population.[127] Agglomeration economies refer to the benefits that come when firms and people locate near one another together in cities and industrial clusters.[128] Of fundamental importance is that the theory acknowledges that businesses do not locate themselves randomly within a city. Instead, similar businesses influence spatial patterning. In the case of retail businesses, agglomeration allows to take advantage of chain or multiplier effect; for example, shopping through the stores or using relevant services that are near, creating a critical mass of retail spaces for "comparison shopping."[129]

Several authors have argued that a healthy tenant mix within the different retail types (convenience, comparison shopping, and specialty) is vital to sustaining a downtown core in a related context. According to Michael Nelson's theory of cumulative attraction, "a given number of stores dealing in the same merchandise will do more business if they are located adjacent or close to each other than if they are widely scattered." Additionally, his rule of retail compatibility states that "two compatible businesses located nearby will show an increase in business volume directly proportionate to the incidence of total customer interchange between them, inversely proportionate to the ratio of the business volume of the larger store to that of the smaller, and directly proportionate to the sum of the ratios of purposeful purchasing to total purchasing in each of the two stores."[130] According to Michael Anikeeff, tenant mix occurs by competitive selection in a market economy. There is a hierarchy of retail functions that appears naturally in response to the population's needs in a trade area.[131] Anikeeff argues that convenience uses like cleaners, beauty shops, barbershops, and shoe repair shops are incompatible with shopping goods stores and are located farther away in large shopping centers. Anikeeff also highlights that four main shop types that benefit from being clustered together are men's stores, women's and children's clothing, food retailers, and personal services.

2.2.2 Qualities of Urban Retailing

This section explains urban retailing's key qualities related to retail types, consumer behavior, overbuilding, private-public partnership, and anchor tenants.

In explaining the importance of central area retailing, Ross Davies (1976) argues that "the central area is a composite amalgam of the various kinds of business configurations to be found throughout the rest of the city and constitutes a microcosm of the total urban retail system."[132]

Samli (2004) has succinctly presented the following difference between three major retail types: Convenience goods, shopping goods, and specialty goods (see table 2.3).[133]

One of the important elements in understanding the retail market is related to consumer behavior. Samli (2004) argues that retailers' success is directly related to understanding consumer behavior and creating consumer value. The author argues that while large-scale retailers are dependent on national economic trends, small and medium-sized retailers need to be concerned about local trends and consumer sentiments. John Benjamin (1996) argues that "retail sales depend on the disposable income of potential customers and their patterns of expenditure."[134] Customers either live in the market area and make shopping trips to retail sites or visit the market area during trips generated for some other purpose. Benjamin adds that "the more space occupied by retailers, the greater the distance that consumers are willing to travel because they are more confident that they will find the desired merchandise price and quality, which reduces the search costs relative to shopping at numerous stand-alone retailers."[135]

Overbuilding is one of the major problems in many retail cores. Kirk Mcclure (2001), through a study of Lawrence, Kansas, found that "there is a long lead time that runs between the time that the developer reads the signal calling for additional supply and opening the development for operation… the signals that spawned development can change dramatically before the development is completed….. it takes time to acquire land and to get the necessary zoning changes in place before the construction can begin…. (and) finally, it takes time to market and then lease the new retail space and get it into full operation."[136]

Table 2.3. A Comparison of the characteristics of different store types.

Store type	***Convenience goods***	***Shopping goods***	***Specialty goods***
Convenience stores	Costumers buy whatever is available	Consumers will choose	Consumers will choose, and brands are very critical
Shopping stores	Consumers shop at different stores for the best service or price	Consumers will likely compare but will try to buy at the best price from the best store	Consumers are product and brand-driven but will compare stores
Specialty stores	Consumers are indifferent to products or brant but prefer to shop at a specific store	Consumers are strongly attached to the store but will compare the products	Consumers strongly prefer the store and product brand

Furthermore, Mcclure also found value in private-public partnerships (e.g., a private developer and public interventions) to improve the retail market. In talking about the conflict of interest between developers/builders and property owners, the author found that while the former advocates that all growth is good for the community, the latter are cautious of not putting their investments at risk by adding too much new space in the market.

Based on their study of nine Ohio cities, Caruson and Muscove (1983) showed that restaurants and department stores are perceived as "most successful" and apparently do the best job of drawing people downtown.[137] Citing Foster (1968), Eppli and Shilling contend that an anchor tenant (department stores) in any shopping center is the first requirement for the retail center's very existence.[138] The author's studies showed that retail clustering and anchor tenant image significantly impact non-anchor business sales, and these variables explain sixty percent of the sales. According to Gatzlaff et al. (1996), anchor tenants' loss negatively impacts a shopping center.[139] First, the remaining tenants face a decline in customer drawing power, a subsequent decrease in rents due to the loss of drawing power caused by the decline in occupied space, and tax base erosion. Over time, some remaining tenants would seek to relocate to better locations. Their study found that the rental rate for non-anchor tenants declines by approximately twenty-five percent after the loss of the anchor retail. Caruson and Muscove (1983) argue that while department stores (anchors) have much greater pulling power from beyond the trade area, other major categories are apparel shops, followed closely by theatres and jewelry stores. The authors also identified that while large anchors like Sears and JC Penney are vital to the downtowns, their retention became a challenge as they favored suburban areas beginning in the 1980s.

2.2.3 Small Businesses, the City Center, and Tenant Mix

Small businesses are key to the success of retail centers. The present view of small businesses in this nation had been realized already in the post-war decades, as shown by a 1955 study by economist Harold Vatter. Vatter had noted that small businesses were more likely to rely on local sources for raw materials, have higher total unit costs of production, be a one-plant establishment, and be dependent on larger firms.[140] Between 1969 and 1976, 66% of all new jobs created in the US were by businesses with twenty or fewer employees.[141] Small local businesses (compared to the franchise and large corporations) are important because they are owned by local investors and contribute socioeconomically to the community where they are present, recruit workforces from and around the community, and care about maintaining a healthy quality of life in the area.[142] The streets occupied by small businesses form an integral part of the place's social fabric and community spirit. The supply-demand chains also remain local as the required raw materials are found locally, and production serves local rather than national or international markets.[143]

For example, through a study of Jamaica Plain (a neighborhood in Boston), Hoffman (1994) has contended that neighborhood businesses encourage local social ties as local retail shops or community grocery outlets often function as community social centers.[144] Asc and Audretsch (1990) also argue that small firms provide two significant contributions to the industrial markets through the creation of (1) technological and entrepreneurial changes and (2) competition and regeneration. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors found that innovative activity is hindered in concentrated markets (typical for large businesses). In contrast, small firms play an important role in introducing new products to the market.[145] Small businesses' essence is free competition and free entry to the markets that promote the expression and growth of personal initiative.[146] Furthermore, small businesses play an essential role as components suppliers and subcontractors to large manufacturers despite their small sales share.[147] As urban economist Ed Glaeser notes, places with greater numbers of small, independent firms and abundant new start-ups experience faster income and employment growth than cities with only one or two major employers.[148]

In a recent study, Gomez et al. (2015) have presented two views about small firms' impact on economic efficiency. First, the conventional/traditional/static view says that small firms decrease living standards and add an economic burden on the economy because they are too small to be efficient.[149] Second, the evolutionary/dynamic view says that small firms are in motion with many new firms entering the industry and many firms exiting out of the industry and are the agents of change.

Gomez et al. (2015) argue that small businesses have three integral qualities—small, local, and independent (see figure 2.8). [150] According to Gomez et al. (2015), there should be a desire for urban areas to have enough businesses located at the center of the triangle (G), i.e., having enough small, locally-based, and independently-run businesses is a predictor of economic resilience and viability. The authors do not claim that the large corporate firms are bad for the city but instead insist that their presence is socioeconomically important. 'Small' is in terms of fitting in the typical main street areas presumably under the constraints imposed by urban living, for example, occupying a small footprint of less than 2,500 SF. 'Local' in terms of having a presence and rootedness in the community in addition to being near/accessible to most local residences by being walkable within few minutes. ‘Independent’ is in terms of having acquired effective ownership and control and not under a large corporate entity, i.e., the power of decision-making is with the business owner.



Figure 2.8. The geometry of small-scale entrepreneurship (Gomez et al. 2015).

As Acs and Audretsch (1990) argue, most empirical work on innovation and technical change has focused on large firms.[151] Solomon (1986) supports this viewpoint and laments that the twentieth century Americans viewed small businesses as inefficient and backward, “a sympathetic but anachronistic leftover from a simpler economic era.”[152] As the author further claims, the wave of businesses’ conglomeration into single large firms can be attributed to the ‘go-go conglomerate’ wave of the late 1960s and the megamergers’ 1980s wave. Large firms are no longer the major providers of new jobs for Americans; but instead, most new jobs emanated from small firms.[153] According to Acs and Audretsch (1990), statistical evidence convincingly demonstrated that small firms play a more prominent role in all sectors of the economy, possess higher growth rates, and account for a more significant share of US employment and sales. The solution to America’s economic crisis, thus, may lie in “moving toward a system of flexible production through smaller companies linked together in industrial communities.”[154] These authors claim that opposed to large corporations, small businesses contribute more to the economy since there is no central control from a remote location. In addition to economically sustaining the downtown, small businesses also help make it vibrant by regularly ensuring people’s flows. A well-organized spatial logic for the distribution of small businesses also provides opportunities for sharing ideas and thus assists in innovation.

2.2.4 *The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Businesses*

However, small businesses have had to experience many difficulties to survive. Across the nation, the difficulties small retail businesses faced in the 1970s were higher gasoline prices, land use controls, and restricted money supply in addition to the rapidly increasing actual costs of new commercial construction, which also dictated the location of retail activities.[155] It was also when small businesses could not respond to the newly competitive market without a loan program. Additionally, the short-term economic policy objectives like broadening the tax base as rapidly as possible were not always supportive of small businesses.[156] In the 1980s, however, the many suburban markets approached saturation, and investors turned to reconsider the downtown areas.[157]

Literature on the impact of urban renewal on small businesses is limited, and between the 1960s and the 1980s, three major works have presented a detailed study on this topic; (1) William Kinnard and Zenon Malinowski's 1960 study for the SBA, (2) Berry et al.'s 1968 study on three Chicago projects from the 1950s—Hyde Park A and B and Hyde-Park Kenwood and (3) Cambridge Systematics 1982 study for the SBA.[158]

2.2.4.1 Study 1

Kinnard and Malinowski (1960) studied 2,729 businesses across twenty urban renewal projects in thirteen cities to investigate the dislocated business firms.[159] They came with the following conclusions (different number of cities were studied to investigate the small business-related characteristics)—

1. Across seventeen projects in eleven cities, 1,486 businesses were displaced; of those, eighty-four percent were commercial (retail and service)
2. Across eighteen projects in eleven cities, there were 2,069 businesses, of which only thirty-five (or 1.7 percent) remained in the project areas
3. In seven cities, on average, 16.6% of business relocated through agency assistance, whereas 83.4% self-relocated
4. The mortality experience of twenty-one projects in fourteen cities revealed that 756 of 2,949 firms were discontinued or disappeared (25.6% or one out of four firms)
5. The amount legally payable ($2,500) was sufficient for over two-thirds of all firms studied
6. Dislocated firms were independent and rarely had more than five employees

7. Seventy-five percent relocations took place within one-mile and nearly forty percent within one-quarter mile

2.2.4.2 *Study 2*

In another study, Berry et al. (1968) investigated whether businesses' liquidation rate after the urban renewal was more than average in three Chicago communities—Hyde Park-Kenwood, Hyde Park A, and Hyde Park B. The clearance in these communities began in the mid-1950s, and in total, the three projects displaced 641 businesses, of which 207 (32.3%) liquidated.[160] In Hyde Park, merchants forwarded the idea for a shopping center, which they believed could facilitate relocation (although the center would offer less space than before).[161] In the end, of the 194 displaced businesses, only four independents and two chains were located in the center, while only thirty-one were in business until 1967.[162] As the authors argue, although there was so much potential for the New Hyde Park shopping center to thrive, "political, legal, and financial contingencies eroded the space to be devoted to the shopping center."

Another key development was the Kimbark Plaza (53rd Street-Woodlawn-Kimbark Shopping Center) of 1960, which was envisioned to restore commercial space and help the displaced businesses and the 65,000 people in the surrounding neighborhoods.[163] Notably, the development did not allow any national chains; the selection of redevelopers would have to address local merchants; the priority was to achieve a balanced distribution of merchants who would own rather than lease. Another center, called "Harper Court" (1962), aimed to facilitate displaced artisans and craftspeople, which, however, ended up with only three (of twenty-nine) businesses in that category.[164]

Importantly, Berry et al.'s study did not find a concrete relationship between urban renewal programs and liquidation rates.[165] However, the reduction in business in the community had been accomplished in two ways: (1) substantial tracts of commercial land were cleared, and (2) the clearance displaced the existing merchants. Furthermore, the changes attributed to urban renewal made it hard for small businesses to enter the market. While most of Hyde Park's businesses (61%) thought they were worse after the renewal, the merchants accepted how renewal was carried out, regardless of the outcome.[166] Most relocatees and non-displacees shared the major problems relating to the loss of customers or businesses, high moving costs, difficulty in finding a new location, and relocating expenses.[167]

2.2.4.3 Study 3

In an early-1980s study, the Cambridge Systematics aimed to find the impact of small businesses' interventions by studying nine downtown revitalization projects in seven cities (including pedestrian malls). Their study found that while the developer and the financing institution's preference could not determine the tenant mix of a downtown shopping, it was largely a product of market forces.[168] In the early-1980s, one distinguishing factor that appeared to benefit small businesses was the trend toward small specialty shops. On the contrary, the 1960s and 1970s downtowns also had major discount stores, variety drug store chains, and department stores. The authors studied Downtown Crossing, Boston, in more detail and found that urban renewal had helped more businesses across each category.[169] The study of the impact on business conditions on projects across seven cities after the revitalization mostly showed a mix of improvements or no change (discussed in Appendix G).

The study also concluded the following based on statistical analyses to find the relationship between various explanatory factors and growth and entry and exit of businesses (for all study sites).[170]

1. All relationships were found to be statistically significant and R-squared value between 0.1 to 0.2;[171]
2. In terms of the rate of business entry and exit, restaurants were the most dynamic;
3. The revitalization projects had a statistically significant impact on increasing the rate of new store entry into the study area;
4. The variation in impacts on small business depends on several factors like the extent of business support, central management activities, physical improvements, the health of the local metropolitan economy, and the relative importance of the CBD as a commercial center; and
5. Common elements to the revitalization included forming a downtown organization that would ensure business participation in the design and funding and encouraging small-scale entrepreneurship.

2.3 Notes

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[1] Frieden and Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How American Rebuilds Cities*. In their work, Frieden and Sagalyn investigate the determining factors that led to the transformation of the American downtowns from the 1950s to the 1980s. The authors have studied six major cities: Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, New York, Pittsburg, and San Francisco and specifically focused on five downtown retail centers: Faneuil Hall Marketplace (Boston MA), Horton Plaza (San Diego CA), Plaza Pasadena (Pasadena CA), Pike Place Market (Seattle WA), and Town Square (St. Paul

MN). The cities and places' description is mainly based on interviews with directors, managers, journalists, presidents, and mayors affiliated with the cities, projects, and corporations.

[2] Committee on Banking and Currency US Senate, *Summary of Provisions of the Housing Act of 1949* (Washington, D.C., 1949), https://web.archive.org/web/20160215080101/https://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/81-171/00002FD7.pdf.

[3] Ibid. $1 billion in 1949 is approximately $10.67 billion in May 2019, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation calculator (https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl). The Housing Act of 1949, a modification to the 1937 Act, was conceived to solve the housing problem. This decision did not arrive because of a single event but rather had roots in the early years dating back to the 1850s when many cities started to feel industrialization's impacts. As such, housing and associated socio-economic and ethnic challenges were the major problems, and specifically downtowns—the core and heart of cities—suffered the most. Title III of the Act was entitled "Low-Rent Public Housing" and authorized Federal contributions and loans for 810,000 units of low-rent public housing over a six-year period. The projects would be meant for occupancy by the low-income families in need of adequate housing, those with annual family income not exceeding five times the rent. The title also reads that the first preference of admission would be given to the displaced population.

[4] Alexander von Hoffman, "The Lost History of Urban Renewal," *Journal of Urbanism,* 2008.

[5] Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It*, 171. To the authorities and the white population, the "racialized" fear that warned them of the possible occupation of the immediate residential district by the migrants and African Americans was a strong enough reason to support urban renewal (p. 189). This facilitated the wholesale destruction of what came under the definition of the "urban slum."

[6] Hoffman, "The Lost History of Urban Renewal," 295.

[7] C. Gordon, *Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 189.

[8] Ibid., 197.

[9] Ibid., 203.

[10] See R. Bruegmann, *Sprawl* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). According to Robert Bruegmann, sprawl is "a low-density, scattered urban development without systematic large-scale or regional public land-use planning."(Bruegmann 2005, 18) The causes of sprawl, as Bruegmann lists, were anti-urban attitudes, racism, economic factors and the capitalist system, government, technology, affluence, and democratic institutions. (Bruegmann 2005, 96–112) The interwar years (1920s-late 1940) marked a mass movement from the City to the periphery (2005, 35). Retail and other businesses boomed in the city cores and drove the inhabitants out, securing living places for the lower-income groups. Car ownership peaked among the middle-class, and living in the periphery was ever more desired. The mass movement can also be related to the industrial

boom occurring far from the City where land was available. So, in addition to residential areas, the periphery also housed large industrial districts with job opportunities.

[11] Fogelson, *Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950.*, 12.

[12] K. T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Dolores Hayden, *Building Suburbia* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2003); Bruegmann, *Sprawl*. By 1975, a "beltway"—the wide expressway encircled the City, was present in every important City (Jackson, p. 267). Between 1950 and 1980, when the American population increased by fifty percent, their automobile numbers increased by 200 percent (p. 246). Furthermore, the rate of private cars per 1000 inhabitants in the US was around 200 in 1940, which had increased to almost 300 by 1950, over 400 by 1970, and close to 600 by 1990 (Bruegmann, p. 74).

[13] Fogelson, *Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950.*, 193–194, 294.0

[14] Frieden and Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How American Rebuilds Cities*, 64–36 and 77.

[15] Richard A. Feinberg and Jennifer Meoli, "A Brief History of the Mall," *Advances in Consumer Research* 18 (1991): 426–427.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Judith J. Friedman, "Variations in the Level of Central Business District Retail Activity Among Large U.S. Cities: 1954 and 1967," *Land Economics* 49, no. 3 (1973): 326–335.

[18] Kent A. Robertson, "Downtown Retail Activity in Large American Cities 1954-1977," *Geographical Review* 73, no. 3 (1983): 314–323.

[19] Eugenie L. Birch, "Who Lives Downtown?," in *Redefining Urban and Suburban America: Evidence from Census 2000*, ed. Alan Berube, Bruce Katz, and Robert E. Lang (Washington, D.C., D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 29–59.

[20] Pierre Filion et al., "The Successful Few: Healthy Downtowns of Small Metropolitan Regions," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 70, no. 3 (2004): 328–343.

[21] Birch, "Who Lives Downtown?"

[22] Frieden and Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How American Rebuilds Cities*, 265. The early 1980s brought a boom in downtown office buildings. From 1960 to 1984, more than 1,325 office buildings covering almost 550 million SF were constructed in the thirty largest metro areas, out of which more than 500 were constructed between 1980 and 1984 (265).

[23] Ibid., 271–272. For example, as early as 1977, thirty-eight cities had taken part in programs that encouraged mortgage lending in old neighborhoods.

[24] Ibid., 287.

[25] Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It*, 252.

[26] Hoffman, “The Lost History of Urban Renewal.”

[27] Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It*; Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer* (Cambridge MA: M.I.T. Press, 1967); Hoffman, “The Lost History of Urban Renewal.”

[28] Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It*, 202, 268.

[29] Patricia Munch, “An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain,” *Journal of Political Economy* 84, no. 3 (1976): 473–498. Through a comparative study of theory and data related to data on Chicago’s urban renewal, Munch concluded that “ED is not necessarily a more efficient institution than the free market for consolidating many contiguous but separately owned parcel into a single ownership unit.” Additionally, the author further argued that ED is “effectively a reassignment of property rights-the seller is deprived of his right to refuse to sell and constrained in his right to bargain over price….and…. consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned parcels of land under one owner supposedly creates a holdout problem, with each seller having an incentive to hold out to be the last to settle and capture any rent accruing to the assembly…. a problem which is specific to the assembly of several ownerships into a single unit arises as a combination of a monopoly and free-rider problem…. ED implies a loss of use rights associated with the property, in particular, effective loss of the right to refuse to sell and greater uncertainty of lease duration, since condemners have special rights to terminate leases.”

[30] Alexander von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949,” *Housing Policy Debate* 11, no. 2 (2000): 299–326. Originally from National Commission on Urban Problems 1968.

[31] Robert C. Weaver, *US Department of Housing and Urban Department Annual Report 1965* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 159. Nine out of the 1,699 projects were in Oregon, for a total grant of $16.58 million.

[32] Hoffman, “The Lost History of Urban Renewal.”

[33] Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer*, 8. By the end of 1962, urban renewal had displaced a total of 259,504 families living in urban renewal areas based on a total of 735 projects (which was not a complete list). Through further assumptions, the author calculated that by the end of 1962, a total of 1,665,000 American citizens were evicted (54).

[34] Douglas R. Appler, “Changing the Scale of Analysis for Urban Renewal Research: Small Cities, the State of Kentucky, and the 1974 Urban Renewal Directory,” *Journal of Planning History* 16, no. 3 (2017): 200–221.

[35] Isenberg, *Designing San Francisco: Art, Land, and Urban Renewal in the City by the Bay*.

[36] For example, about 4,000 persons (3,000 single and 280 families) lived in the SoMa area dedicated to urban renewal and construction of YBC, including more than 700 businesses. Apart from around 300 families, most residents of SoMa were impoverished elderly residents. The original population of 4,000 had dropped to about 1,300 by late-1970, and to about 700 (120 of whom were in the Central Blocks) by late 1972 (94). In the 1975–79 period, San Francisco lost 6,098 residential hotel rooms, homes for many poor and elderly residents (p. 365). Between 1975–85 alone, more than 17,000 affordable rental units were demolished, converted to condominiums or commercial use in downtown San Francisco (327). The Moscone Center that opened in December 1981 displaced 7,600 jobs in 723 small businesses (202).

[37] Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco*, 241. By 1969, SFRA had destroyed "more than 6,000 total housing units…. creating only 662 publicly aided units." Howell mentions further that Filmore (of the Western Addition) was a mostly African American Community and SFRA's project here led the author James Baldwin famously describing the urban renewal as "negro renewal." (241)

[38] Chester Hartman, *City for Sale: The Transformation of San Francisco* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 394.

[39] Gordon, *Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City*, 205–206.

[40] Hoffman, "The Lost History of Urban Renewal," 296.

[41] Jon C. Teaford, "The Heroes and Villains of Urban Renewal," *Journal of Urban History* 22, no. 5 (1996): 665–670.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Gordon, *Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City*, 192–193.

[44] *Urban Renewal Directory* (Washington, D.C., 1974), 6.

[45] Appler, "Changing the Scale of Analysis for Urban Renewal Research: Small Cities, the State of Kentucky, and the 1974 Urban Renewal Directory."

[46] David Hochfelder and Douglas Appler, "Introduction to Special Issue on Urban Renewal in Smaller Cities," *Journal of Planning History* 19, no. 3 (2020): 139–143.

[47] *Urban Renewal Directory*, 6.

[48] Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco*; Lizabeth Cohen, *Saving America's Cities: Ed Logue and the Struggle to Renew Urban America in the Suburban Age* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019); Isenberg, *Designing San Francisco: Art, Land, and Urban Renewal in the City by the Bay*.

[49] Lizabeth Cohen, “Learning Lessons from the Urban Renewal Era,” *New York History* 100, no. 2 (2019): 175–191.

[50] Cohen, *Saving America’s Cities: Ed Logue and the Struggle to Renew Urban America in the Suburban Age*, 226.

[51] Ibid., 223.

[52] Ibid., 232.

[53] Ibid., 239.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., 389.

[56] Ibid., 395.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Isenberg, *Designing San Francisco: Art, Land, and Urban Renewal in the City by the Bay*. In the author’s own words, the book “…. explored how the San Francisco Bay Area, especially the city's northern waterfront, served as a touchstone for the redevelopment experiments, conflicts, and stories of its time and place. In San Francisco, critiques centered on public land stewardship gained momentum in the postwar decades as large-scale rebuilding and environmental planning models spread….. San Franciscans contested the foundations of large-scale redevelopment and high-rises based on long-standing ideals of responsible public land stewardship. The region's thriving allied arts and renewal professions, the "designer's city," applied their broad expertise, forged in vibrant urban environmentalism and sharpened amid the resulting controversies…. (362)”

[59] Isenberg, *Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It*, 277.

[60] A case of the Golden Gateway project commissioned by SOM provides an excellent example of land assembly and its impact on urban form. According to Isenberg, “SOM's report identified 77.7 acres potentially available for the site. Of these 77.7 acres, a staggering 46 consisted of existing streets. The proposed redevelopment parcel converted 21 acres of those former streets into buildable land for development by paring down 46 acres of former streets to 24.9 acres for new streets. Thus 21 of the plan's projected 52.8 net available acreages came from former streets.” (291)

[61] Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco*, 276.

[62] Ibid., 308–309.

[63] Alia Soomro, "Dismantling Mid-Century Urban Renewal: A Community-Based Approach for the Future of New York City," *Brooklin Law Review*, 2018. Bronx residents formed the committee to respond to the city's plan and develop their own "community-based" plan.

[64] Robert B. Fairbanks, "Federal Urban Renewal in Three Small Texas Cities: A Mixed Legacy," *Journal of Planning History* 19, no. 3 (2020): 187–203.

[65] Appler, "Changing the Scale of Analysis for Urban Renewal Research: Small Cities, the State of Kentucky, and the 1974 Urban Renewal Directory."

[66] Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco*; Richard Brandi, "San Francisco's Diamond Heights: Urban Renewal and the Modernist City," *Journal of Planning History* 12, no. 2 (2012): 133–153. SFRA began projects on Diamond Heights, Golden Gateway, and the Western Addition in the early-1960s.

[67] Howell, *Making the Mission: Planning and Ethnicity in San Francisco*, 241.

[68] Brandi, "San Francisco's Diamond Heights: Urban Renewal and the Modernist City."

[69] Ibid., 143.

[70] J. Rosie Tighe and Timothy J. Opelt, "Collective Memory and Planning: The Continuing Legacy of Urban Renewal in Asheville, NC," *Journal of Planning History* 15, no. 1 (2016): 46–67.

[71] For further discussions about Mall's characteristics as a sociable urban space in much detail, see Harvey Rubenstein, *Central City Malls* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978); Robertson, "The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns"; Kent A. Robertson, *Pedestrian Malls and Skywalks: Traffic Separation Strategies in American Downtowns* (Brookfield: Avebury, 1994); Roberto Brambilla and Gianni Longo, *For Pedestrians Only: Planning, Design, and Management of Traffic-Free Zones* (New York: Watson-Guptill Publications, 1977).

[72] Robertson, "The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns."

[73] James Richard Taylor, "Pedestrian Malls in Downtown Areas" (Master's Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1964), 1.

[74] Michael Howard Rosner, *The Pedestrian Mall: Financing, Maintenance and Operation* (Pittsburgh, 1966), 6.

[75] Ibid., 41.

[76] Robertson, "The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns"; Robertson, *Pedestrian Malls and Skywalks: Traffic Separation Strategies in American Downtowns*; Kent A. Robertson, "Downtown Retail Revitalization: A Review of American Development Strategies," *Planning Perspectives* 12 (1997): 383–401.

[77] Brambilla and Longo, *For Pedestrians Only: Planning, Design, and Management of Traffic-Free Zones*, 8.

[78] Kelly Gregg, "Conceptualizing the Pedestrian Mall in Post-War North America and Understanding Its Transatlantic Transfer through the Work and Influence of Victor Gruen," *Planning Perspectives* (2018): 1–27.

[79] James Robert Cothran, "The Downtown Pedestrian Shopping Mall-Its History, Development and Future in the Urban Environment" (Master of Landscape Architecture Thesis, University of Georgia, 1968). As noted by Gregg, Victor Gruen—the biggest proponent of central city malls—argued in a 1959 speech entitled "Is the mall good for downtown?" that the primary function of planning for downtown is to "separate vehicle and pedestrian traffic," and Gruen argued throughout the 1960s that this was the reason for the success of the regional shopping centers.

[80] Lizabeth Cohen, "From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in Postwar America," *American Historical Review* 101, no. 4 (1996): 1050–1081.

[81] Michael Cheyne, "No Better Way? The Kalamazoo Mall and the Legacy of Pedestrian Malls," *Michigan Historical Review* 36, no. 1 (2010): 106.

[82] Taylor, "Pedestrian Malls in Downtown Areas."

[83] Brambilla and Longo, *For Pedestrians Only: Planning, Design, and Management of Traffic-Free Zones*, 8.

[84] Rosner, *The Pedestrian Mall: Financing, Maintenance and Operation*.

[85] Laurence Alexander, *Downtown Malls: Feasibility and Development* (New York: Downtown Research and Development Center, 1974).

[86] Rosner, *The Pedestrian Mall: Financing, Maintenance and Operation*.

[87] Edgardo Contini, "Anatomy of the Mall," *AIA Journal* 51, no. 2 (1969): 42–50.

[88] Phyllis W. Haserot, "Calculating Benefits: What Malls Accomplish," in *Downtown Malls: An Annual Review, Vol. 2*, ed. Laurence Alexander (New York, NY: Downtown Research and Development Center, 1976), 25–33.

[89] Rubenstein, *Central City Malls*, 2.

[90] Susan Shealy, "Mall Costs and Benefits," in *Downtown Malls: Feasibility and Development*, ed. Laurence Alexander (New York: Downtown Research and Development Center, 1974), 31–39.

[91] Ibid.

[92] *Pedestrian Malls in California* (California: Department of Housing and Community Development, 1967). Fresno Mall experienced a 14% increase between September 1964 to 67, Pomona mall 18.3% during the first full mall year, and Santa Monia 9.7% during the first full mall year.

[93] Robertson, "The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns."

[94] Robert D. Erikson, "Mall Status Report," in *Downtown Malls: Feasibility and Development1*, ed. Laurence Alexander (New York: Downtown Research and Development Center, 1974), 40–48.

[95] Marion H. Spanbock, "Introduction to Costs and Results Data," in *Downtown Malls: An Annual Review, Vol. 1*, ed. Laurence Alexander (New York: Downtown Research and Development Center, 1975), 68–84.

[96] Roberto Brambilla, Gianni Longo, and Virginia Dzurinko, *American Urban Malls: A Compendium* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Environmental Action, 1977); Rubenstein, *Central City Malls*; City of Buffalo, *City of Buffalo Main Street Multi-Modal Access and Revitalization Project* (Buffalo, NY, 2009).

[97] Robertson, "Downtown Retail Revitalization: A Review of American Development Strategies."

[98] Basil M. Rotoff, "A Critical View of Pedestrian Malls in North America," *Journal of Urban and Environmental Affairs* 13, no. 213 (1981): 35–43.

[99] Cole Judge, *The Experiment of American Pedestrian Malls: Trends Analysis, Necessary Indicators for Success and Recommendations for Fresno's Fulton Mall* (Fresno, CA: Downtown Fresno Partnership, 2013).

[100] Based on CLUE Group's study.

[101] They were mentioned in the same report, citing the Downtown Memphis Commission's 2008 finding. Some of the cities, other than Eugene, to close their malls were Baltimore, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Pasadena, Burbank, Kalamazoo, Raleigh, Portland (OR), Little Rock, and Tampa.

[102] Lawrence O. Houstoun, "From Street to Mall and Back Again," *Planning* 56, no. 6 (1990): 4–10.

[103] Cheyne, "No Better Way? The Kalamazoo Mall and the Legacy of Pedestrian Malls."

[104] Dorina Pojani, "American Downtown Pedestrian 'Malls': Rise, Fall, and Rebirth," *Territorio* (2008): 173–180.

[105] Dorina Pojani, "Santa Monica's Third Street Promenade: The Failure and Resurgence of a Downtown Pedestrian Mall," *Urban Design International* 13 (2008): 141–155.

[106] Robertson, “Downtown Retail Revitalization: A Review of American Development Strategies.”

[107] Linda Baker, “Walking Wins Out,” *Planning* 76, no. 5 (2010): 24–27.

[108] Steven Brinkerhoff Rosen, “The Success and Failure of Pedestrian Malls in Europe and America” (City and Regional Planning, California Polytechnic State University, 2006). In this master’s thesis, Steven B. Rosen cites Warren’s (1998) exogenous reasons for malls’ failure. The author also cites Ford’s (2003) argument that “the cities built pedestrian malls at the same time that they cleared the surrounding housing and retail areas that might have complemented the malls,”—which is valid for Eugene’s case.

[109] Frieden and Sagalyn, *Downtown, Inc.: How American Rebuilds Cities*.

[110] Robert B. Potter, *The Urban Retailing System: Location, Cognition and Behaviour* (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984).

[111] Ibid., 26.

[112] Brian J.L. Berry and John B. Parr, *Market Centers and Retail Location* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 1–3.

[113] Walter Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 139–140.

[114] Peter E. Lloyd and Peter Dicken, *Location in Space: A Theoretical Approach to Economic Geography.* (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1972), 29.

[115] Chauncy D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman, “The Nature of Cities,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 242, no. 1 (1945): 7–17.

[116] According to Harris and Ullman, the specialized functions, (1) require specialized facilities (e.g., the retail district is attached to the point of greatest intracity accessibility; (2) group because they profit from cohesion; (3) locate farther if they are detrimental to each other; and (4) may not be able to afford the high rents (e.g., wholesaling and storage or industries).

[117] William J. Reilly, *The Law of Retail Gravitation* (New York, NY: Pilsbury Publishers, 1931).

[118] Ibid., 9.

[119] Potter, *The Urban Retailing System: Location, Cognition and Behaviour*.

[120] Ibid., 15.

[121] Avijit Ghosh and Sara L. McLafferty, *Location Strategies for Retail and Service Firms* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987).

[122] Brian J. Berry, *Commercial Structure and Commercial Blight* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 4. Berry undertook this study to lay the extent, location, nature, and commercial blight trends and deterioration in metropolitan Chicago. It focused specifically on the business structure of a large metropolis and components of this structure—business centers, ribbon developments, specialized functional areas, and topics like trade areas, retail competition, optimum store location policies, and consumer shopping and travel behavior.

[123] Ibid., 11. Furthermore, Berry used at least eleven variables to conduct the study of Chicago's retail business structure (110)- number of different kinds of functions, number of business establishments, front feet occupied by functions, peak land value, total sales of business establishments, total salaries of retail service employees, the total number of workers in business establishments, total shopping trips, area of trade in square miles, total population, total income, average family size, median family income, population density, and the quantity of parking.

[124] Johan G. Borchert, "Spatial Dynamics of Retail Structure and the Venerable Retail Hierarchy," *GeoJournal* 45, no. 4 (1998): 327–336.

[125] Robert J. Gibbs, *Principles of Urban Retail Planning and Development* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2012), 4.

[126] Max Keilbach, "Why and How Does Economic Activity Concentrate in Space?," in *Spatial Knowledge Spillovers and the Dynamics of Agglomeration and Regional Growth* (New York: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH, 2000), 31–32.

[127] Edward L. Glaeser, "Agglomeration Economies," in *Cities, Agglomeration and Spatial Equilibrium* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 116–164; Edward L. Glaeser, "Introduction," in *Agglomeration Economics*, ed. Edward L. Glaeser (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2010), 1–14.

[128] Ibid.; Edwin S. Mills, *Urban Economics*, 1972.

[129] Mark J. Eppli James D. Shilling, "How Critical Is a Good Location to a Regional Shopping Center?," *The Journal of Real Estate Research* 12, no. 3 (1996): 459–468; Neil M. Coe, Philip F. Kelly, and Henry W.C. Yeung, "Spaces of Sale: How and Where Do We Shop?," in *Economic Geography: A Contemporary Introduction* (Wiley, 2017), 333–368.

[130] Michael A. Anikeeff, "Shopping Center Tenant Selection and Mix," in *Megatrends in Retail Real Estate*, ed. John D. Benjamin (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 215–237.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Ross L. Davies, *Marketing Geography with Special Reference to Retailing* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1976), 153.

[133] A. Coskun Samli, *Up Against the Retail Giants: Targeting Weakness, Gaining an Edge* (Mason, OH: Thomson, 2004), 94.

[134] David C. Ling and Greg T. Smersh, “Retail Site Selection Using GIS,” in *Megatrends in Retail Real Estate*, ed. John D. Benjamin (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 13–64.

[135] Mark J. Eppli and James D. Shilling, “Changing Economic Perspectives on the Theory of Retail Location,” in *Megatrends in Retail Real Estate*, ed. John D. Benjamin (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 65–79.

[136] Kirk Mcclure, “Managing the Growth of Retail Space,” in *Downtowns: Revitalizing the Centers of Small Urban Communities*, ed. Michael A. Burayidi (New York: Routledge, 2001), 232.

[137] Peter S. Carusone and Brenda J. Moscove, “Patterns of Success in Small-City Downtown Retailing,” in *Proceedings of the 1983 Academy of Marketing Science (AMS) Annual Conference*, 1983, 1–5.

[138] Mark J. Eppli and John D. Benjamin, “The Evolution of Shopping Center Research: A Review and Analysis,” *The Evolution of Shopping Center Research: A Review and Analysis* 9, no. 1 (1994): 5–32.

[139] G. Stacy Sirmans, Dean H. Gatzlaff, and Barry A. Diskin, “Suffering the Loss of an Anchor Tenant,” in *Megatrends in Retail Real Estate*, ed. John D. Benjamin (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 261–275. The authors present their findings by studying a Central Florida shopping center and two neighborhood shopping centers in Georgia and Florida for a comparative study.

[140] Cited in Mansel G. Blackford, *A History of Small Business in America* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991).. Moreover, most small businesses are single-unit enterprises and do not have plants or offices in more than one locality.

[141] Inc. Cambridge Systematics, *Impacts of Downtown Revitalization Projects on Small Business* (Washington DC: Small Business Administration, 1982), 3. Information cited from Birch’s 1979 study, who used the Dun and Bradstreet study of 5.6 million businesses over ten years.

[142] Rafael Gomez, Andres Isakov, and Matt Semansky, *Small Business and the City: The Transformative Potential of Small-Scale Entrepreneurship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

[143] Blackford, *A History of Small Business in America*.

[144] Alexander von Hoffman, *Local Attachments: The Making of an American Urban Neighborhood, 1850-1920* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 91, 99–102.

[145] Zoltan Ji. Acs and David B. Audretsch, *Innovation and Small-Scale Firms* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990).

[146] Sandra Anglund, *Small Business Policy and the American Creed* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000). Referring to House and Senate Committees on Banking and Currency reports, the author further argues that small businesses are portrayed as a "safeguard against the evil of monopoly" and "bulwark of free competitive enterprise."

[147] Steven Solomon, *Small Business USA: The Role of Small Companies in Sparking America's Economic Transformation* (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1986).

[148] Cited in Gomez, Isakov, and Semansky, *Small Business and the City: The Transformative Potential of Small-Scale Entrepreneurship*, 8. Further works cited include Glasser and Kerr, who found that the larger the size of the firms, the slower the overall employment growth; Anna Lee Saxenian, who observed that the region's abundance of small independent firms facilitated further entrepreneurship by developing a network of independent suppliers that lowered the costs of entry for new capitalists; and Fleming and Goetz's analysis based on 2,953 counties in the US, who found that counties with higher densities of small, locally-owned businesses experienced greater per capita income growth.

[149] Zoltan J. Acs, *Are Small Firms Important? Their Role and Impact* (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).

[150] Gomez, Isakov, and Semansky, *Small Business and the City: The Transformative Potential of Small-Scale Entrepreneurship*.

[151] (Acs and Audrestsch 1990, p. 6)

[152] Solomon, *Small Business USA: The Role of Small Companies in Sparking America's Economic Transformation*.

[153] (Zoltan Ji. Acs and Audretsch 1990)

[154] Blackford, *A History of Small Business in America*.

[155] Cambridge Systematics, *Impacts of Downtown Revitalization Projects on Small Business*, 4.

[156] Ibid., 9. One example is "fiscal zoning," where the potential revenue and tax gains would determine land use.

[157] Ibid., 15.

[158] William N. Kinnard and Zenon S. Malinowski, *The Impact of Dislocation from Urban Renewal Areas on Small Business* (Small Business Administration, 1960); Brian J. L. Berry, Sandra J. Parsons, and Rutherford H. Platt, *The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Businesses: The Hyde Park-Kenwood Case* (Chicago: Keogh Printing Co., 1968); Cambridge Systematics, *Impacts of Downtown Revitalization Projects on Small Business*.

[159] Kinnard and Malinowski, *The Impact of Dislocation from Urban Renewal Areas on Small Business*, 23–24.

[160] Berry, Parsons, and Platt, *The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Businesses: The Hyde Park-Kenwood Case*, 5.

[161] Ibid., 28. Hyde Park's 55th Street Business and Professional Men's Association" voted for a shopping center within the renewed area.

[162] Ibid., 47.

[163] Ibid., 49.

[164] Ibid., 70–71.

[165] Ibid., 131. The data gathered was from businesses in four Chicago communities (Hyde Park, Oakland, Woodlawn, and South Shore)—a total of 15,000 businesses through the 8,600 stores and offices between 1953-1966 (93). However, they were able to conclude that "retail business declined more rapidly in Hyde Park-Kenwood from 1953 to 1967 than one might have expected if the community had retained a stable middle-income character, or even if it had undergone a complete racial transition to low-income status." Additionally, the aggregate amount of change in the area by 1967 was consistent with the market's nature that urban renewal had created.

[166] Ibid., 155.

[167] Ibid., 170–172.

[168] Cambridge Systematics, *Impacts of Downtown Revitalization Projects on Small Business*, ii, 12.

[169] Ibid., 108. Small (helped 31% and hurt 21%); Medium (helped 53% and hurt 13%); Large (helped 50% and hurt 9%).

[170] Ibid., 144. Dependent variables—mean annual rate of employment growth per business (of businesses entering or exiting), mean annual rate of new store entry, and mean annual store exit rate. Independent variables (1 or 0 scores)—chain store or not, large or otherwise, restaurant or otherwise, apparel or otherwise, service or otherwise, after or before revitalization and unemployment rate, sales in CBD as a percentage of SMSA sales.

[171] Ibid., 156.

3 CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW (PART 2): URBAN MORPHOLOGY AND SPACE SYNTAX

The second literature review chapter discusses the Conzenian Approach to Urban Morphology and Space Syntax.

3.1 The Conzenian Approach to Urban Morphology

Several scholars have forwarded a definition of urban morphology, which suggests that it refers to studying the form and structure of human settlements and the process of their formation and transformation.

Peter Larkham: *urban morphology extends beyond the narrow conception of urban form and includes the individuals, organizations, and processes shaping that form.*[1]

Karl Kropf: *urban morphology is broadly concerned with identifying and classifying the objects of study concerning their shape, form, and internal structure, as well as seeking to understand how and why the objects take the form they do*.[2]

Anne Vernez Moudon: *urban morphology is the study of the city as human habitat, considering the city not as an artifact but as an organism where the physical world is inseparable from the processes of change to which it is subjected.*[3]

Broadly, two essential elements make up urban form, (1) physical form (tangible and persistent representation of the built environment or the manifestation of the spatial relations of physical objects) and (2) land use or function (interrelations between humans and some physical form).[4] In response to this "popular" view of urban morphology, the field's attachment to rigid systems of historical forms, Vitor Oliviera (2016) has contended that it also deals with the changes in the already existing system and the new areas of the town that, for example, begin with new streets.[5] According to Jeremy Whitehand, "in the case of urban morphology, the actual outcome of decisions in the landscape, though it is an imperfect record, is an immensely detailed testimony to past events and may well be a more reliable guide to process than ostensibly more direct records of the decisions involved…. urban forms are, after all, a direct outcome of processes and in a real sense, the embodiment of the attitudes pertaining at the time and in the place of their creation."[6]

The scholarly field of urban morphology is large, so the focus is on the studies of the transformation of towns at the micro-morphological level through the perspectives of "Conzenian urban morphology." "Conzenian approach to urban morphology" refers to a body of work forwarded by the German urban Geographer Michael R. G. Conzen, most notably through his 1960 work on Alnwick, Northumberland, UK. Conzen was one of the first researchers to study a settlement by utilizing an "historico-geographical" approach to understanding urban areas (defined as townscapes), which played a significant role in the formal establishment of the field "urban morphology."[7] Through several studies of towns across Germany and the UK, Conzen established a methodology to investigate the transformation of the physical form of "townscapes." Most importantly, Conzen found that the townscape is not a unitary object but is composed of three systematic form complexes, which are (1) town plan, (2) town's building fabric, and (3) urban land and building utilization pattern.[8] Through this study, he popularized a method for analyzing town plans to assess regional structure-based historical town maps.[9]A town plan is "the topographical arrangement of an urban built-up area in all its man-made features."[10] Furthermore, Conzen demonstrated that a typical town plan contains three distinct complexes of plan elements: (1) streets in street-system; (2) plots in street-blocks; and (3) buildings in block-plans.

Figure 3.1 shows Alnwick in 1897 as an example of Conzen's method of illustrating a townscape. The drawing shows streets, plot divisions, buildings erected before 1851 (the previous period), and buildings erected between 1851 and 1897. The building types shown are "commercial and industrial buildings and their accessories," "community and institutional buildings and their accessories," and "dwelling houses with or without shops and their accessories." Conzen prepared similar maps for six years between 1774 to 1956 to illustrate Alnwick's townscape transformation. Through studies of town-plans of Alnwick from the Anglian period (c. seventh century AD to c. 1070) to 1956 and dividing it into six "morphological periods," Conzen derived critical processes of conducting urban morphology research—fundamentally the transformation of a town across its history in relation to the more extensive and local socio-economic processes. According to Conzen, each "morphological period" leaves significant material residue in the landscape and is most likely characterized by a unique social and economic milieu.[11]

Jeremy Whitehand summarizes the achievement of Conzen's study of Alnwick—his seminal 1960 work—as follows[12]

1. Establishment of a basic framework of principles, most specifically the tripartite; division of townscape into town plan, building forms, and land use;
2. Recognition of the individual plot as being the fundamental unit of analysis;
3. Use of large-scale plans in conjunction with field survey and documentary evidence; and
4. A conceptualization of townscape transformation



Figure 3.1. Alnwick in 1897 representing one of the six morphological periods, shown here to portray Conzen's method of illustrating a townscape (Conzen 1960).

> *"Conzen's work is central to architecture and urban design in that it has a preoccupation with the ordinary-buildings which make up the greater part of the settlements, how the built environmental changes and how different parts transform, the importance of urban conservation, and the role of drawing/maps as an exploratory tool."*
>
> -Ivor Samuels, 2005

Conzen's work can be considered a combination of analytical and descriptive historical analysis of small European market towns and provides suggestions for any town studies in general. His research strength lay in the finely detailed reviews and descriptions of the relationship between the human (socio-economic) and physical forms in a town. Conzen has also derived two critical understandings that helped shape urban morphology as a distinct field. The first is that the accumulation of urban form is not a simple superimposition, and the second is that simple static additions are easily recognized.

However, according to Peter Larkham (2006), Conzen's study was primarily monographic, i.e., describing physical forms rather than analyzing their origins and development.[13] Moudon (1997) argues that "Conzen's inductive and empirical research is lacking in "rigor and predictive power."[14] She further says that urban morphologists (only) focus on the tangible results of social and economic forces. In reviewing Conzen's work, Ivor Samuels (2005) asks if the form is of minor importance as long as the social and economic conditions are well understood.[15] One of the critical questions in this regard, thus, is whether the reliance on form and function as the fundamental elements defining urban morphology obscuring the importance of the deeper but less visible contemporary and historic socio-economic processes at play.

3.1.1 The Study of Teasdale's Yard (in Alnwick) and Foundations for Study at a Micro-morphological Scale

One essential contribution of Conzen's work on Alnwick to this research has been the description provided on Teasdale's yard. By taking an example of Teasdale's yard's transformation between 1774 and 1956, Conzen has explained the burgage cycle—the transformative cyclic process in which burgages (urban plots) experience incremental growth, saturation, or slum-like condition, clearance, and re-growth.[16] The building uses (mostly visible in 1849) included brewery, coal houses, coachhouse, candlemaker's workshop, cartwright's workshop, grocer's shop and office with dwelling over, dwelling of two, privy, public house, piggery, stable with loft over, smith, single-room tenement, wash-house with school, and lumber-house (see figure 3.2).



Figure 3.2. Transformation of Teasdale's Yard (along Fenkle street) between 1774 and 1956 (Conzen 1960).

As Conzen explains, by 1827, the building coverage in Teasdale's yard had reached 34.8%, a more than double increase from 14.7% in 1774. The area had already contained some of the back-to-back houses by that year—the defining unit of slum creation.[17] By 1849, the development had almost doubled once again compared to 1829, with a 62.9% coverage (repletive phase). The plans of 1864 (65.2% coverage) and 1921 (65.2%) show that the burgage had experienced very little change, and slum conditions had already been experienced (climax phase). However, after this period, there were sudden changes.[18] In 1937, the area was subject to slum clearance (recessive phase). The back-to-back houses and most of the yard's workshops and outhouses were demolished and the coverage reduced to the level of 1774 by 1956, at 19.3% (final stage). The boundaries previously defined by walls or fences disappeared, and the whole clearance area was treated as one unit. As Conzen notes, this wasteland was only temporary, and "sooner or later socio-economic revaluation of the site within its urban setting attracts new forms of land use, such as those resulting in central redevelopment schemes or public open spaces."[19] One crucial assessment from this study is that the processes were cyclic and "produced by factors operative over the country as a whole."[20]

3.1.2 Micro-morphological scale

Several scholars have suggested that the focus is given solely to the macro-scale in many morphological studies, which "lacks a sensitivity" to historical urban processes at the micro-scale.[21] These authors have also argued that micro-scale analysis considers the smallest unit of urban morphology—the building and its interface on the street.[22] As such, the scale of investigation in this research is referred to as the **micro-morphological scale.** Inspired from Conzen's descriptions of the townscapes, this scale considers the street system, the block system, plots within the block system, buildings' morphological patterns, and structure of land utilization.

3.2 SPACE SYNTAX

Since the pedestrian mall was created by a drastic intervention in the streets, space syntax can provide significant insights into the relationship between the urban space network and building use. The specific central contention of space syntax utilized in this research is that urban structure, defined by the network of streets and public open spaces, plays a vital role in organizing the city's land use. This research utilizes space syntax analysis to investigate (1) the characteristics of downtown/RCPM area's spatial qualities within the larger urban system (e.g., Eugene City), (2) the potential of the mall streets to facilitate movement, and (3) examine the relationship between business investments in the RCPM area and its street network configuration.

Space syntax presents a theoretical and analytical method of understanding cities.[23] In a seminal space syntax work, Hillier and Hanson (1984) contend that fundamentally, the social knowledge of any urban society is inherently embedded within its spatial network or the network of the streets, open spaces, and built forms.[24] Specifically, the authors argued that the spatial network is represented in the form of "spatial expression of the urban system" that defines the "social antecedents and consequences of the spatial form" in cities and buildings.[25] In turn, the spatial variables are expressed as a "syntactic system"—a set of related rule structures formed out of simple combinations of the elementary objects, relations, and operations.

The field of space syntax is vast, and its scope ranges from the study of space at the scale of a building's layout (e.g., Julienne Hanson's 1998 "Decoding Home") to that of entire regions (e.g., Serra and Hillier's 2017 study of road networks in all of UK). However, the focus here is to analyze the impact of the city's configuration on the downtown core, spatial analysis of the downtown core, and analysis of the relationship between movement patterns and retail business patterns. The scope of space syntax research in this dissertation is related to one of its central contentions—also known as "movement economies." In a crucial 1996 paper on "Cities as Movement Economies," Hillier argued that the structure of the urban grid, land/economic distribution, and densities in historically evolved cities are always related to each other, all governed by humans' natural movement, which in turn is influenced by the urban grid or the street system.[26] This structuring of land use then generates a multiplier effect, which in turn affects the movement, and this cyclical process is key to the way cities are structured.

One idea at the center of space syntax is "configuration," which is about the relation of one element with everything else in the system.[27] It considers the relationship between the parts (micro) and the whole (macro), such that the more extensive system impacts each member of the system and vice-versa. Hillier's work in understanding configuration/relationships, derived from the fundamental basis of society and urbanism, and space syntax's ability to visually and statistically test and explain various urban phenomena is at the core of its usability.

In this regard, one practical concept is "centrality." According to Hillier, "centrality is determined by the presence of retail services, markets, catering and entertainment, and other activities that benefit from quotidian movements."[28] Spatially, centrality is a product of "both overall configuration of the grid and the kind of local process of grid adaptation and intensification." Therefore, the spatial configuration of any urban area (e.g., a small neighborhood) in itself and in relationship with the larger urban fabric play a role in determining its central role in shaping the movement flows pattern and distribution of land uses. As seen in London's space syntax in figure 3.3, the long east-west red line in the middle represents Oxford Street, which incidentally is one of the busiest streets in Europe. Considering London's complexity and the number of streets, this map exemplifies space syntax maps' capability to translate the physical urban structure into meaningful characteristics of the urban system.



Figure 3.3. The space syntax map of London (Hillier 2007, 162).

3.2.1 Technical Aspects of Space Syntax

3.2.1.1 Space Syntax Maps

Space syntax analyses are generally represented by "maps." The space syntax maps (which are of different types, such as axial maps, segment maps, isovist maps, etc.) address the broad spectrum of society, culture, economics, sustainability, building form, land use patterns, and human movement at the scale of regions, cities, small towns and neighborhoods, blocks, and buildings. When initially founded, space syntax analysis was usually represented by "axial maps," which has been replaced mainly by "segmental maps" in recent years (see figure 3.4). For a space syntax analysis using axial maps, the most fundamental way of expressing a "city" or urban structure is to represent its streets as "axial lines"—the longest line that can be drawn through an arbitrary point in the spatial configuration.[29] Studies have shown that Angular

Segmental Analysis (ASA), used in this research, converts the axial lines into segments and presents a more accurate representation of the urban system.[30]



Figure 3.4. A typical axial lines map (left) and Angular Segment map (right).

Additionally, ASA uses angles as the measure of distance instead of the metric system. Space syntax acknowledges that there are three fundamental measures of distance: topological (based on connectedness or number of steps), geometric (angular change in direction), and metric/Euclidean (linear distance).[31] Of three ways for analyzing, this research uses angular segment analysis because several authors, based on empirical studies, have argued that angular distance represents the most accurate portrayal of human movement (both pedestrian and vehicular).[32] Visually, space syntax maps are color-coded maps of street networks, resulting from the street network's analysis based on "connectivity." The colors reflect the streets' movement potential and characterize the spatial, functional, or social qualities of the urban space.

Furthermore, understanding the space syntax maps requires a knowledge of the "syntactic measures." The syntactic measures represent certain spatial characteristics that measure the specific nature of "street connections." Integration and Choice are the most fundamental measures used in space syntax and correspond to the two essential elements in any trip: selecting a destination from an origin (Integration) and choosing a route and so the spaces to pass through between origin and destination (Choice).[33]

Integration measures each spatial element's or street segment's distance to all others in a system and refers to the "to-movement" potential.[34] In practical terms, integration measures "the degree to which the accessibility of space as a destination from all others.[35] Mathematically, integration is reflected by how "deep" a street is with respect to the system.[36] In space syntax, depth measures the minimum number of lines that must be crossed to get from one line to another. Spatially 'deeper' areas have all other lines farther to them and are less integrated. Hillier also adds that the best predictor of movement is Integration in most urban layouts based on his studies.[37] Choice measures the quantity of movement that passes through each spatial element on the shortest or simplest trips between all pairs of spatial elements in a system (up to a certain radius and defined distance) and refers to the "through-movement" potential.[38] Research has shown that mathematically, it calculates the number of shortest paths overlaps between all graph nodes. Therefore, Choice denotes urban movement hierarchy through the street networks, i.e., major streets connecting important land uses. For example, through a study of a 3 km X 3 km area of the Barnsbury area of North London, Alasdair Turner found that the angular betweenness has a very high correlation with the observed vehicular flow.[39] Miguel Serra and Bill Hillier have also validated this phenomenon in a 2017 study.[40]

In addition to the syntactic measures, another important characteristic of space syntax analysis is the "measure of scale," i.e., whether the maps represent the entire system or local areas. In other words, space syntax maps are represented at two fundamental scales: global and local. Global measures usually represent the city (radius N) and show the potential of vehicular movement. Local measures are informed by specific radii (steps 1, 2, 3, 5) or metric (400 m, 800 m, 1200 m) and provide information at the pedestrian scale. For example, local integration measures "how many other lines are either a few steps or within a certain distance away from each line" within the given radius (example, 400 meters).[41] According to Hillier, "local Integration (considering only a part of the urban system) is the best predictor of smaller-scale movement…. that usually means pedestrian movement because pedestrian trips tend to be shorter and read the grid in a relatively localized way…. while global Integration (considering the whole system) is the best predictor of larger-scale movement, including some vehicular movement, because people on longer trips will tend to read the grid in a more globalized way."[42]

Considering that even the Angular Segmental Analysis has limitations, Hillier and colleagues developed a method in 2012 to 'normalize' the integration and choice values. [43] These normalized measures made worldwide cities' comparison possible using a single metric and eliminated the bias created by the urban system's size—the two main problems with older methods. According to their empirical studies,

Normalized Integration (NAIN) = $NC^{1.2}$ / TD

TD is Total Depth, which is the minimum number of segments that must be crossed to get from one segment to another, and ND is Node Count, which is the number of lines or segments encountered on the route from the selected segment to all others.[44]

Normalized Choice (NACH) = log (Choice+1)/log (TD+3)

This research uses four specific measures representing normalized Integration and Choice, whose meanings are as follows-

1. Global Integration (NAIN)- the potential of street segments to integrate/connect the entire system and are potential destinations at the city scale considering the vehicular flow;
2. Local Integration (NAIN radius 400 m or 800 m)- the potential of street segments to function as destinations to the pedestrians or at a five-minute/ten-minute walking distance;
3. Global Choice (NACH)- the potential of street segments to facilitate the most efficient vehicular movement across the city; and
4. Local Choice (NACH radius 400 m or 800 m)- the potential of street segments to facilitate quickest trips between origins and destinations.

3.3 Examples of Space Syntax and Urban Morphology Research

The purpose of this section is to discuss some works related to space syntax and urban morphology and is divided into the following sections-

1. Morphology and syntax of American cities
2. Space syntax, Conzenian approach, and studies at micro-morphological scale
3. Conzenian urban morphology, space syntax, and historical research

3.3.1 Morphology and Syntax of American Cities

Regarding American cities, two topics that have been of interest to Conzenian urban morphologists and space syntax researchers are (1) the study of the American grid and (2) the system of the city center and suburb. According to Michael P. Conzen (M. R. Conzen's son), four cultural values have affected the American urban form[45], (1) *lassiez faire*, i.e., free-market capitalism (cities as economic machines); (2) individualism and privatism; and (3) anti-urbanism; (4) social fluidity and aesthetic eclecticism. M. P. Conzen claims that although most towns were laid out on the grid-iron pattern, they are complex and no less imaginative than other grid forms. Space syntax researcher and urbanist Mark D. Major also shares this sentiment who adds that while the downtowns/city centers of most American cities largely consist of uniform “rectangular grids,” the structural syntax of any city is never “monotonous” or “uninteresting.”[46] Even within the rectangular or uniform grids that form the urban core of most American cities, no two grids are perfectly the same since they exhibit local differentiation within the structure, for example, in each grid’s dimension. Furthermore, American cities are diverse at a larger scale since each of them has a diverse topography, specifically in the form of “interruptions” (e.g., natural features like rivers) and “urban grid holes” (e.g., large parks or green areas).[47] Besides, the post-1950s development of freeways and consequent suburbanization further introduced ‘irregularities’ and ‘complexities’ to the American city. The contribution of these ideas to the research is that Eugene’s spatial analysis should also consider its complexity, although the study area is small and entirely made of uniform rectangular grids.

Although much fewer compared to European cities, recent scholarship has looked at American cities from the perspective of space syntax. Some key scholars are John Peponis, Mark D. Major, Saif Haq, and Sophia Psarra, who have studied Atlanta and Detroit in more detail. For example, through a historic space syntax study of Atlanta, Haynie and Peponis (2009) found that the city’s center “has a shifting patchwork of distinct sub-areas, not as an integrated system, but a microcosm of patterns” and “projects a symbolic spine to compensate for the instability of functional connection and cognitive core.”[48] They also found that Atlanta suffered disconnection in its spatial structure after the 1950s (see Appendix H for space syntax studies of American cities).[49]

3.3.2 Space Syntax, Conzenian Approach, and Studies at Micro-morphological Scale

Several works have sufficiently shown a relationship between land uses and street configuration using space syntax analysis at the city's scale. Mostly, these authors have established a relationship between street network configuration and commercial activities. Some notable works include Fiasconaro et al. (2016) on Rome[50], Scoppa (2013) on Buenos Aires[51], Porta et al. (2012) on Barcelona[52], Porta et al. (2009) on Bologna[53], Piovani et al. (2017)[54], Chiaradia (2009) on outer London[55], Sevtsuk (2014) on towns in Massachusetts[56], Hidayati et al. (2019) on Jakarta[57], Haus et al. (2017) on Amsterdam[58], Mohamed et al. (2017) on Cairo.[59] However, the focus of this research is on the micro-morphological scale.

Some notable works exploring the relationship between built morphology/land use and space syntax at the micro-morphological level are Torma et al. (2017) on South London towns[60], Narvaez and Penn (2016) on Cardiff, Vaughan (2013) on outer-London towns, and Palaiologou et al.'s (2016) study comparing London's Terrace houses and Manhattan's Rowhouses.[61] One key researcher whose works have linked the historical processes, space syntax, building morphology, and land-use at the micromorphological level is UCL Professor of Urban Form Laura Vaughan.[62] Her research mostly centered on London and its peri-urban areas has focused on the characteristics of diversity and adaptability over time. Additionally, she has also explored the characteristics of the urban areas that facilitate "encounters" and "co-presence" in the "everyday" urban environment, which according to her, provides a basis for the sustenance of urban culture. Vaughan contends that space syntax analysis considers the urban network as a spatial configuration, proposing a fundamental relationship between spatial morphology, movement patterns, and land distribution as a "movement economy."[63]

Specifically, her study on four London towns (High Barnet, Loughton, South Norwood, and Surbiton) from 1880 to 2013 found that "the continuity of generic types of activity, despite major changes to the actual functions they maintain, seems to be a consequence of there being a variety of building types, sizes and street morphologies which together are more likely to propagate patterns of co-presence over time—providing the minimal but essential balance between the stability of uses, on the one hand, and adaptability in building, as well as use class, on the other."[64] Additionally, "a shorter frontage length, smaller building footprint, smaller plot size, and higher plot efficiency" are more well-suited to adapt to use change. Vaughan cautions researchers not to overlook the "self-evident aspect of land use diversity," and that "the greater the diversity of land uses, the more likely it is to generate different sorts of activity by different sorts of people."

In another key study, Torma et al. (2017) argue that streets' spatial-morphological characteristics play an important role in the centers' socioeconomic resilience "by perpetuating a process of continuing morphological transition." They reach this conclusion by investigating the impact of the historical transformation of accessibility, block structure, and land uses on buildings in two town centers-South Norwood and Surbiton (in South London). More specifically, they found—

- The patterns of street segment accessibility may have contributed to the positive changes to Surbiton compared to South Norwood and also its socio-economic resilience;

- Where buildings on plot frontages show greater persistence to change, it suggests that the resistance might be an aspect of urban form character rather than land utilization of the individual plot;
- Streets that are important for wider scale rather than local scale movement are more likely to be subject to change (all other things being equal); and
- Even a fine-grained difference in the street network's Choice value can influence land-use diversity and functional changeability.

In a Cardiff-based study, Narvaez and Penn (2015) found a positive and significant correlation between Integration and Choice and mixed-use-buildings along the streets and middle blocks.[65] Specifically, they demonstrated that mixed uses tend to be located on main streets of local districts, which in turn also show "a presence of through-movement (represented statistically as a choice) for local pedestrian footfall." Similarly, a study of Paseo de la Reforma in the Cuauhtemoc neighborhood in Mexico City by Flores-Pena and Ortiz-Chao (2017) found that there exists a "complex mix of factors, always conditioned or enabled by proximity, behind these changes." The "changes" relate to the patterns of proximity between related uses, namely offices and their complementary uses.

In a 2016 study, Palaiologou et al. argue for a need to understand cities at the "micromorphological" levels and advocate for "the need to study further the contribution of building morphology to the collective realm of the quotidian city….. (furthermore)…. how the macro-scale approach in analyzing spatiotemporal phenomena in urban space lacks a sensitivity to historical urban processes at the micro-scale where the generic and culturally specific aspects of the diachronic city interact to give rise to actual communities." [66] In this sense, the micro-morphological level deals with the scale of what is "between buildings and streets."[67] Notably, the research found that the degree of building-street connectivity is both "syntactic property of the building morphology" and "a cultural expression of societal norms at the micro-scale."

3.3.3 Conzenian Urban Morphology, Space Syntax, and Historical Research

History is an essential component of urban morphological research. Originally, Conzen studied Alnwick by dividing its history into "morphological periods," as explained previously. Recently, studies like Oliveira and Medeiros's (2020) work on the urban form of Portugal investigated twenty cities based on (1) accessibility, density of (2) street blocks and (3) plots, and (4) continuity of building frontages.[68] The authors found three types of cities: first with "high" values for all characteristics, second with "low" values for all characteristics, and third with no apparent pattern. Additionally, they found that a similar degree of (high) values for each urban form parameter can characterize each morphological period, justifying a relationship between historical periods and the particularity of urban form.

On the contrary to the Conzenian approach, history is not at the core of space syntax research. Although space syntax has the potential to demonstrate the morphological and syntactic evolution of cities. Among the space syntax researchers, Sam Griffiths has most prominently argued for the potential of space syntax theories in spatiotemporal studies of a city. For example, through his works on Sheffield's transformation from 1750 to 1900, the author has argued for a more integrated and multifaceted research framework and demonstrated three possible fields of investigation: syntactical growth processes; syntactical, morphological histories; and spatial-locational histories.[69]

3.4 Notes

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[1] Peter J. Larkham, "The Study of Urban Form in Great Britain," *Urban Morphology* (2006): 117–41; Karl Kropf, "Aspects of Urban Form," *Urban Morphology* 13, no. 2 (2009): 105–120. One of Karl Kropf's central questions in his work on "Aspects of urban form" is the relation between local processes and global structure. The scope (scale) of urban morphology lies in studying the two essential elements for an entire city its parts (e.g., the downtown).

[2] Kropf, *The Handbook of Urban Morphology*.

[3] Anne Vernez Moudon, "Urban Morphology as an Emerging Interdisciplinary Field," *Urban Morphology* 1, no. 1 (1997): 3. Moudon also argues that form (buildings and their related open spaces, plots or lots, and streets), resolutions (building/lot, street/block, city, and the region), and time (historic-transformations and replacement) constitute the three fundamental components of urban morphological research.

[4] Moudon, "Urban Morphology as an Emerging Interdisciplinary Field"; Kropf, "Aspects of Urban Form"; Kropf, *The Handbook of Urban Morphology*.

[5] Oliveira, *Urban Morphology: An Introduction to the Study of the Physical Form of Cities*.

[6] J. W. R. Whitehand, "The Basis for an Historico-Geographical Theory of Urban Form," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 2, no. 3 (1977): 400–416.

[7] Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis"; Michael R. Conzen, "Town Plan and Building Types as Systematic Aspects of Urban Morphology, Exemplified by Alnwick," in *2004. Thinking About Urban Form: Papers on Urban Morphology*, ed. Michael P.

Conzen (New York: Peter Lang, 1964), 101–107; Michael R. Conzen, "Urban Morphology: A Geographical Approach," in *2004. Thinking About Urban Form: Papers on Urban Morphology*, ed. Michael P. Conzen (New York: Peter Lang, 1977), 47–59; Michael R. Conzen, "Morphogenesis and Structure of the Historic Townscape in Britain," in *2004. Thinking About Urban Form: Papers on Urban Morphology*, ed. Michael P. Conzen (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 60–77.

[8] Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis"; Conzen, "Urban Morphology: A Geographical Approach."

[9] The three fundamental attributes to the geographical approach to urban morphology are (1) functional (a study of the system of interacting forces); (2) morphological (distinct spatial form); and (3) historico-geographical (change in time). In another 1985 work, Conzen argued that the rich historical stratification studies are based on axiomatic (three aspects and forms are period-specific), temporal (UM periods have distinct cultural traits), and human agency (secular socio-political conditioning). The three development aspects of historical townscape include accumulation (pre-urban nucleus, craftsmen settlement, additional buildings, marketplaces, Burgage repletion); adaptation (based on functions and occupations); and replacement (through land use and building use). [Michael R. Conzen, "Morphogenesis and Structure of the Historic Townscape in Britain," 2004. Thinking About Urban Form: Papers on Urban Morphology, ed. Michael P. Conzen (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 60–77.]

[10] Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis," 4–5.

[11] The six morphological processes in the town-plan analysis of British towns are (1) accretionary growth (from a nucleus), (2)urban fringe belts (ring-like irregular zones with residential accretions, (3) building repletion (transformative internal change-filling of plots-further filling with varying uses-slum like character-slum clearing (economic pressures to overcome obsolescence of inherited forms lead to replacement on a larger scale); this is the Burgage cycle), (4) building replacement (adaptive and new bigger buildings, (5) metamorphosis (small scaled-amalgamation, plot concentration), and (6) central commercial development (development of current street system and newer streets).

[12] J. W R (ed) Whitehand, *The Urban Landscape: Historical Development and Management, Papers by M. R. G. Conzen, Institute of British Geographers Special Publication* (London: Academic Press, 1981).

[13] Larkham, "The Study of Urban Form in Great Britain."

[14] Moudon, "Urban Morphology as an Emerging Interdisciplinary Field."

[15] Ivor Samuels, "Conzen's Last Bolt: Reflections on 'Thinking about Urban Form,'" *Urban Morphology* 9, no. 2 (2005): 136–144.

[16] Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis," 25. A burgage is the individual units or the urban plots (in typic British towns) held by the burgess and typically consists of a house, yard, and garth (garden).

[17] Ibid., 67.

[18] Ibid., 92.

[19] Ibid., 94.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Garyfalia Palaiologou, Sam Griffiths, and Laura Vaughan, "Reclaiming the Virtual Community for Spatial Cultures: Functional Generality and Cultural Specificity at the Interface of Building and Street," *Journal of Space Syntax* 7, no. (1) (2016): 25–54, http://joss.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk.

[22] Ibid., 33–34.

[23] 1. The Space Syntax Laboratories at the Bartlett School of Architecture, University College London, is the leading institution conducting space syntax research. More information on their website: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/architecture/research/space-syntax-laboratory

[24] Hillier and Hanson, *Soc. Log. Sp.*, 1–8.

[25] Hillier and Hanson, *Soc. Log. Sp.*

[26] Hillier, "Cities as Movement Economies"; Hillier, *Space Is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture*, 113.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Bill Hillier, "Centrality as a Process: Accounting for Attraction Inequalities in Deformed Grids," in *Proceedings of the 1st International Space Syntax Symposium* (Brasilia, 1999), 6.1-6.20.

[29] Alasdair Turner, Alan Penn, and Bill Hillier, "An Algorithmic Definition of the Axial Map," *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 32 (2005): 425–444. For a complete illustrative explanation of the space syntax and, specifically, the syntactic attributes used in this paper (axial lines/maps, segment lines/maps, integration, choice, and depth), see Hillier and Hanson (1984) and Hillier (2007). Also, refer to the papers on the Journal of Space Syntax (free access at http://joss.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/journal/index.php/joss/index) and Space Syntax Symposia (free access at http://www.spacesyntax.net/symposia/) When computing spatial maps, however, axial maps have major limitations. First, the minimum unit is the axial line, and it ignores "segments," which are the actual minimum spatial unit in a street network. Second, axial maps do not allow advanced angular analyses.

[30] Bill Hillier and Shinichi Iida, "Network Effects and Psychological Effects: A Theory of Urban Movement," *Proceedings 5th International Space Syntax Symposium* (2005): 553–564, http://www.spacesyntax.tudelft.nl/media/Long papers I/hillieriida.pdf; Tasos Varoudis et al., "Space Syntax Angular Betweenness Centrality Revisited," in *Proceedings of the Ninth*

International Space Syntax Symposium, ed. Y O Kim, H T Park, and K W Seo (Seoul: Sejong University, 2013), 057: 1–16.

[31] Hillier and Iida, "Network Effects and Psychological Effects: A Theory of Urban Movement"; Hillier, "Spatial Sustainability in Cities Organic Patterns and Sustainable Forms."

[32] Hillier and Iida, "Network Effects and Psychological Effects: A Theory of Urban Movement"; Varoudis et al., "Space Syntax Angular Betweenness Centrality Revisited." Hillier and Iida (2005), through an empirical study of four London towns (Barnsbury, Clerkenwell, South Kensington, and Knightsbridge), demonstrated that movement in cities reflects the geometrical and topological structure of the network configuration more than metric distance and, specifically, least angle measures performed the best (Bill Hillier and Shinichi Iida, "Network Effects and Psychological Effects: A Theory of Urban Movement," Proceedings 5th International Space Syntax Symposium, 2005, 553–64). In other words, humans chose pathways based on the distance that has the least angle turns and not ones that are the least close in terms of metric distance. More specifically, the authors argue that "…. it is then an unavoidable inference then people are reading the urban network in geometrical and topological rather than metric terms. Although it is perfectly plausible that people try to minimize distance, their concept of distance is, it seems, shaped more by the geometric and topological properties of the network more than by an ability to calculate metric distances…." (562)

[33] Bill Hillier, Tao Yang, and Alasdair Turner, "Normalising Least Angle Choice in Depthmap and How It Opens up New Perspectives on the Global and Local Analysis of City Space," *Journal of Space Syntax* 3, no. 2 (2012): 156.

[34] Ibid., 155; Hillier, "Spatial Sustainability in Cities Organic Patterns and Sustainable Forms."

[35] Bill Hillier et al., "Creating Life: Or, Does Architecture Determine Anything?," *Architecture and Behavior* 3, no. 3 (1987): 233–250; Hillier and Iida, "Network Effects and Psychological Effects: A Theory of Urban Movement."

[36] J. A.F. Teklenburg, H. J.P. Timmermans, and A. F. Van Wagenberg, "Space Syntax: Standardised Integration Measures and Some Simulations," *Environment & Planning B: Planning & Design* (1993).

[37] Hillier "conjectures" that it might be so because choice, by its nature, is not intuitive to the visitors and so is a better predictor of movement for inhabitants who have better knowledge of the layout. Furthermore, integration is a reliable predictor because there are always a good number of relative strangers in an urban layout.

[38] Hillier et al., "Creating Life: Or, Does Architecture Determine Anything?"; Hillier, "Spatial Sustainability in Cities Organic Patterns and Sustainable Forms"; Hillier, Yang, and Turner, "Normalising Least Angle Choice in Depthmap and How It Opens up New Perspectives on the Global and Local Analysis of City Space"; Alasdair Turner, "Angular Analysis," in *3rd International Space Syntax Symposium* (Atlanta, 2001), 30.1-30.11; L. Freeman, "A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness," *Sociometry* 40 (1977): 35–41.

[39] Alasdair Turner, "From Axial to Road-Centre Lines: A New Representation for Space Syntax and a New Model of Route Choice for Transport Network Analysis," *Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science* 34, no. 3 (2007): 539–555.

[40] Miguel Serra and Bill Hillier, "Spatial Configuration and Vehicular Movement," in *Proceedings of the 11th Space Syntax Symposium* (Lisbon: University of Lisbon, 2017), 122.1-122.21.

[41] Hillier et al., "Creating Life: Or, Does Architecture Determine Anything?"

[42] Hillier, *Space Is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture*, 99–101.

[43] Hillier, Yang, and Turner, "Normalising Least Angle Choice in Depthmap and How It Opens up New Perspectives on the Global and Local Analysis of City Space."

[44] https://1www.spacesyntax.online/glossary/

[45] Michael P Conzen, "The Study of Urban Form in the United States," *Urban Morphology* 5, no. 1 (2001): 3–14, http://www.urbanmorphology.org/pdf/conzen2001.pdf.

[46] Mark David Major, *The Syntax of City Space: American Urban Grids* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018).

[47] Mark D. Major, "Are American Cities Different? If so, How Do They Differ?," in *Proceedings of the 1st International Space Syntax Symposium* (London, 1997).

[48] Stephanie Haynie and John Peponis, "Atlanta: A Morphological History," in *Proceedings of the 7th International Space Syntax Symposium* (Stockholm, 2009). The study considered the evolution of Atlanta's center (area contained within a four-mile radius) through analysis of nine historical maps from 1853 to 1995.

[49] Other findings were as follows (1) the core structure reaches the denser areas in the city but rarely penetrates past them; (2) points of intersection that occurs in the core cognitive structure rarely coincides with areas of highest density; (3) no clear pattern of connection and orientation could be found, that resonates with the sense of fragmentation still experienced today; and (4) changes to the central city are not attempts to reinvest, extend, or transform the historically stable static core of streets.

[50] Alessandro Fiasconaro et al., "Spatio-Temporal Analysis of Micro Economic Activities in Rome Reveals Patterns of Mixed-Use Urban Evolution," *PLoS ONE* 11, no. 3 (2016).

[51] Martin D. Scoppa, "Towards a Theory of Distributed Attraction: The Effects of Street Network Configuration upon the Distribution of Retail in the City of Buenos Aires" (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013).

[52] Sergio Porta et al., "Street Centrality and the Location of Economic Activities in Barcelona," *Urban Studies* 49, no. 7 (2012): 1471–1488, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0042098011422570.

[53] Sergio Porta et al., "Street Centrality and Densities of Retail and Services in Bologna, Italy," *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 36, no. 3 (2009): 450–465. This work computed the relationship between three specific street centrality indices (closeness/integration, betweenness/choice, and straightness) and primary (anchors) and secondary economic activities (based on Jane Jacobs' (1961) work "The Death and Life of Great American Cities." The research tools used for the analysis are Multiple Centrality Assessment (MCA) and Kernel Density Estimation (KDE).

[54] Duccio Piovani, Carlos Molinero, and Alan Wilson, "Urban Retail Location: Insights from Percolation Theory and Spatial Interaction Modeling," *PLoS ONE* 12, no. 10 (2017).

[55] Alain Chiaradia et al., "Spatial Centrality, Economic Vitality/Viability Compositional and Spatial Effects in Greater London," *Proceedings of the 7th International Space Syntax Symposium* (2009): 016:1-016:19.

[56] Andres Sevtsuk, "Location and Agglomeration: The Distribution of Retail and Food Businesses in Dense Urban Environments," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 34, no. 4 (2014): 374–393.

[57] Isti Hidayati, Claudia Yamu, and Wendy Tan, "The Emergence of Mobility Inequality in Greater Jakarta, Indonesia: A Socio-Spatial Analysis of Path Dependencies in Transport-Land Use Policies," *Sustainability* 11, no. 5115 (2019): 1–18.

[58] Birgit Hausleitner and Meta Berghauser Pont, "Development of a Configurational Typology for Micro-Businesses Integrating Geometric and Configurational Variables," in *Proceedings - 11th International Space Syntax Symposium, SSS 2017*, 2017, 66.1-66.14.

[59] Abdelbaseer Mohamed and Akkelies Van Nes, "Spatial Accessibility and Commercial Land Use Patterns: Planned Versus Unplanned Areas in Cairo," in *Proceedings of the 11th Space Syntax Symposium* (Lisbon, 2017), 94.1-94.18.

[60] Ikka Torma, Sam Griffiths, and Laura Vaughan, "High Street Changeability: The Effect of Urban Form on Demolition, Modification and Change in Two South London Suburbs," *Urban Morphology* 21, no. 1 (2017): 5–28.

[61] Laura Narvaez and Alan Penn, "The Architecture of Mixed Uses," *Journal of Space Syntax* 7, no. 1 (2016): 107–136.

[62] See Laura Vaughan, "High Street Diversity," in *Suburban Urbanites: Suburbs and the Life of the High Street*, ed. Laura Vaughan (London: UCL Press, 2015), 153–74; Laura Vaughan, Ashley Dhanani, and Sam Griffiths, "Beyond the Suburban High Street Cliche: A Study of Adaptation to Change in London's Street Network: 1880-2013," *Journal of Space Syntax* 4, no. 2 (2013): 221–41; Also, see: Palaiologou, Griffiths, and Vaughan, "Reclaiming the Virtual Community for

Spatial Cultures: Functional Generality and Cultural Specificity at the Interface of Building and Street."

[63] Vaughan, "High Street Diversity."

[64] Ibid.

[65] Narvaez and Penn, "The Architecture of Mixed Uses." The authors differentiate between Commercial-Residential Buildings (CRBs) along the street and in the corner locations.

[66] Palaiologou, Griffiths, and Vaughan, "Reclaiming the Virtual Community for Spatial Cultures: Functional Generality and Cultural Specificity at the Interface of Building and Street."

[67] Additionally, the authors also present a clear historical background to the two building types and conclude the difference in the two building types' morphology based on their building interface characteristics (e.g., door encounter rates). They find that Row Houses are strongly connected to the street "due to the high frequency of entrances and door-to-door encounters (3.8 meters for a door on average vs. 5.4 for London Terrace Houses)." On the other hand, London's Terrace Houses "bears such morphological and social unity, that it could be considered as a single building taking up the whole block front."

[68] Vitor Manuel Oliveira and Valerio Medeiros, "The Urban Form of Portuguese Cities," *Urban Morphology* 24, no. 2 (2020): 145–166.

[69] Sam Griffiths, "The Use of Space Syntax in Historical Research: Current Practice and Future Possibilities," in *8th International Space Syntax Symposium* (Santiago de Chile, 2012).

4 CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Introduction to the Research Design

This research incorporates a Mixed-methods Research Design (MMRD) that includes Qualitative methods (Archival Research and Interviews), Space Syntax, Mapping/Spatial Analysis, and Quantitative Methods (statistical analyses using t-test, regression analysis, and measures of central tendency).[1] Researchers who use mixed methods employ a research design that uses quantitative and qualitative data to answer a particular question or set of questions.[2] The MMRD is structured so that Qualitative Methods (specifically Archival Research) have helped frame the scope of the research (Downtown Eugene's Narrative History), whereas Mapping and Quantitative Methods illustrate and validate the findings.[3] This research follows "Convergent/Concurrent Design" within the Mixed Methods Design since both qualitative and quantitative data have been collected from the beginning.[4] Also, both data sets have been simultaneously analyzed, and the two sets of analyses are integrated to cross-validate and compare a historical phenomenon. The Research Objectives dictates the Research Design, which is divided into two categories—Background and Core.

1. The Background Research examines the
    1. Position of the pedestrian mall and urban renewal in post-war American history
    2. Post-war forces and developments that motivated downtown Eugene's urban renewal and pedestrian mall
2. The Core Research examines the
    1. Transformation of the RCPM area (retail core)
    2. Reasons for the failure of pedestrian mall strategy to revitalize the retail core (during phase 1, 1970 to 1985)
    3. The spatial configuration of the pedestrian mall and the relationship between the spatial and built components of the RCPM area
    4. Alternative perspectives on the complexity of urban renewal processes
    5. A new direction to downtown development (during phase 2, 1986 to 2002)

In terms of the Core Research, Investigation 2.1, "Transformation of the retail core during phase 1 (1970-1985)" comprises the measure of the Parcel and Building Morphology (BM) and ROB Structure (RBS) transformation between 1965, 1978, and 1985 (see table 4.1). This helps understand the nature of urban renewal's impact on the project area. The BM variables are related to the Ground Floor Area, Total Floor Area, Total Building Frontage Length, Average Building Frontage Length, and the number of stories. The RBS variables are related to ROB counts by Building, Quarter block, Street segment, and Entropy (mix of ROB by category). Investigation 2.2, "Reasons for mall's failure," comprises a list of several internal and external "reasons" derived through the study of archival texts that relate to the failure of the pedestrian mall strategy. They are presented as a narrative, and the micromorphological maps and charts support the narrative. Investigation 2.3 "Space Syntax Analysis and the BM/RBS of RCPM area" aims to understand the spatial characteristics of the pedestrian mall in terms of supporting the potential pedestrian movement. It also identifies the "nature" of the relationship between the pedestrian mall and the adjacent RCPM as the area experienced the renewal-led transformation. Investigation 2.4 "CEP: More than destruction" looks at the complex processes involved in downtown Eugene's urban renewal story that is beyond the simple comprehension of "destruction" and reconstruction." Investigation 2.5, "Mall reopening and new directions during phase 2 (1986 to 2002)," investigates the story of the pedestrian mall's symbolic end and shifting narratives from a retail-centric campaign to community participation, celebrating/preserving the existing businesses, and inviting economic or land-use diversity in the upcoming projects.

Table 4.1. A diagrammatic representation of the Core Research inquiries.

Inquiry	***Content***
2.1 Transformation of the retail core during phase 1 (1970-1985)	Building Morphology (BM) and ROB Structure (RBS) transformation between 1965, 1978, and 1985.
2.2 Reasons for mall's failure	A historical narrative of internal and external reasons that contributed to the failure of the pedestrian mall strategy to revitalize the downtown's retail core.
2.3 Relationship between space and physical/functional structure	Analyzing the spatial characteristics of the pedestrian mall and its relationship with the Building Morphology, and Retail Business Structure of the RCPM area.
2.4 CEP: More than destruction	The complex processes involved in downtown Eugene's urban renewal story beyond the simple comprehension of "destruction and reconstruction."
2.5 Mall reopening and new directions during phase 2 (1986 to 2002)	Story of the pedestrian mall's symbolic end and shifting narratives from a retail-centric campaign to community participation, celebrating/preserving the existing businesses, and inviting economic or land-use diversity in the upcoming projects

4.2 Data Sources

Three types of primary sources used are Archival texts, Interviews, Maps, and Business Directories, as follows (see figures 4.1[5], 4.2[6], and 4.3)-

1. **Archival texts—**
   a. Over 500 Newspaper articles between the 1940s to 2000s; and
   b. Nearly 100 documents, including the City of Eugene and ERA reports (the 1950s to 2000s), manuscripts/unpublished documents/letters (1970s and 1980s), ERA meeting minutes (1969 to 1972), and Theses and Dissertations related to Eugene
2. **Interviews** consisted of talking with four people involved in Eugene's urban renewal.
3. **Maps and Drawings—**
   a. Eugene's street map (1960s and 1970s);
   b. Downtown's historical images (1950s to 1980s);
   c. Downtown maps showing building footprint (the 1960s to 2000s);
   d. 3D drawings (1970s to 1990s);
   e. Google Earth 2D and 3D views; and
   f. Downtown Eugene's site images (2017-2021)
4. **Classified Business Directories** (with the City Directories) for the Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Area for 1965, 1968, 1978, 1985, 2000, and 2018.[7]



Figure 4.1. A screenshot of UO's newspaper index search webpage.

Figure 4.2. A screenshot from LCHM's Digital Collections.



Central Eugene Planning Study
Final Report

Phase 1 Reconnaissance
Phase 2 Alternative Objectives
Phase 3 Alternative Strategies
Phase 4 Alternative Designs

Eugene Renewal Agency
Prepared for the
Urban Renewal Agency
of the City of Eugene, Oregon
June 1968

Central Eugene Project
ROGERS, TALIAFERRO, KOSTRITSKY, LAMB
Baltimore, Maryland
A. M. Voorhees and Associates, Inc.
Washington, D. C.

◆ OREGON ◆

EUGENE-SPRINGFIELD
Metropolitan
Directory
1965

Including an Alphabetical List of Names of City and Rural Residents, a Street and Avenue Guide, a Classified Business Directory, a Reverse Telephone Directory and much information of a miscellaneous character.

◆ SOLD BY SUBSCRIPTION ONLY◆

PUBLISHED BY
JOHNSON PUBLISHING CO.
115-11TH AVE. E. EUGENE, OREGON
PHONE 342-1922

A Directory Library of Directories from other Cities for free use of the General Public is maintained at your Chamber of Commerce Office by the Publishers

Figure 4.3. Cover page for some of the Eugene-related sources. RTKL's Central Eugene Planning study from 1968 (*left*) and Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory for 1965 (*right*).

4.3 Research Methods

The research methods utilized in this research are related to-

1. Archival Research
2. Interviews
3. Mapping of Micro-morphology
4. Space Syntax
5. Statistical Analyses

4.3.1 Archival Research

As mentioned previously, this dissertation is organized to present a narrative history of the failure of Eugene's pedestrian mall strategy to revitalize the retail core. Archival research has played a central role in organizing the entire research and presenting an analytical inquiry of the historical sources by organizing the archival data into crucial topics that assist in the core investigations (see figure 4.4). This process of arranging the narrative history as key topics has been chosen over presenting a chronological interpretation of historical events. The extensive historical inquiries have also led toward a truthful and even an "alternate" story about the actual processes that were taking place during the urban renewal decades.[8]

Recently, Shane Ewen (2016) has argued that urban history is a unique field and is different from social history in that "it approaches the city in its totality, in producing whole histories of the way that a city has, in the words of Dolores Hayden, been planned, designed, built, inhabited, appropriated, celebrated, despoiled, and discarded."[9] Sociologists Mark Ventresca and John Mohr argue that archival research methods facilitate investigating historical documents and textual materials.[10] H. J. Dyos, one of the earlier proponents of the discipline, had argued regarding formalizing its scope in the late-1960s that the study of urban history does not only mean "the study of individual communities (local history) but the investigation of altogether broader historical processes and trends that completely transcend the life cycle and range of experience of particular communities."[11] Bruce Staven (1983) recalls that to H. J. Dyos, urban history permitted historians to "take the city and explain its present condition in terms of the historical forces that have put it where it is."[12] According to Harry Jansen (2001), historical research (which is different from historical writing) concerns tracking historical facts and making individual statements about these facts in a historical narrative without being limited to synthesis.[13] Additionally, Monkkonen (1988) has forwarded a perspective of "new urban history," which discards the view of a historical study as being just a collection of descriptive information. The author argues that "urban biographies instead (tend) to compress important archival research into the conceptual framework provided by the chronology of an individual city."[14]



Figure 4.4. A diagram showing the steps followed in managing archival texts.

4.3.1.1 Archival Data Collection

The first round of data collection began at the LCHM, which had newspaper snippets on the urban renewal and other documents and manuscripts related to Eugene's post-war history. Each available document was recorded by taking pictures on a camera or a phone. The person of contact was Cheryl Roffe. One resource that particularly required more effort (but was the most crucial) was the newspaper articles. First, newspaper articles by relevant contents were searched using UO's newspaper index for Oregon newspapers.[15] The index was used to search Newspaper articles by important keywords like "mall," "pedestrian mall," "urban renewal," "downtown," 'businesses," "merchants." The index provided information of relevant newspaper articles under those heading, which included information on their date and the page number. This information was then used to access the actual newspaper article through Google's Newspaper archive, which provides digital access to Eugene Register Guard.[16] Other required data were made available from the City of Eugene office[17], UO libraries[18], UO Special Collections, University Archives, Eugene

Chamber of Commerce, Lane County Historical Museum, LCHM digital archives photographic collection.[19]

4.3.1.2 <u>Archival Data Analysis and Management</u>

The preliminary round of investigation (mostly data available at LCHM) and a few other documents, notably RTKL's study available at the UO Library, helped generate a basic idea of Eugene's urban renewal and the pedestrian mall's history. This step further led to the formation of the potential and specific research inquiry around the pedestrian mall strategy's failure. After deciding that the main Research Questions would be centered around the pedestrian mall's failure, the data collection formula was to collect and read as much relevant information as possible and "go where the data leads." After an extensive study of the texts and annotations, they were stored in chronological order under three headings (1) newspapers, (2) meeting minutes, and (3) reports/all other documents. The ordered text was used to develop relevant "Preliminary Topics (PTs)" related to the core inquiry related to mall failure. Any PT without much useful information or those which could not be related to the issue of "mall's failure" was not pursued further. The filtered set of PTs formed the "Major Topics (MTs)." For instance, some of the MTs were "introduction to urban renewal and pedestrian mall," "criticisms of urban renewal," "downtown merchants' involvements," "story of individual businesses," "ERA viewpoints." Simultaneously, the major research question and main inquiries were also being finalized. The annotations under each MT were then selected to answer relevant "Main Inquiries (MIs)" after developing them into "narratives." It is important to note that descriptions under each topic could fit into multiple inquiries. Therefore, each MI inquiry and the entire investigation follow a historical narrative approach.

4.3.2 Interviews

4.3.2.1 <u>Data Collection</u>

The Interview consisted of a questionnaire with eighteen questions and was performed between April and June 2020. Eight individuals involved in Eugene's urban renewal program were contacted, out of which four responded. The respondents could participate in either one of the two ways (1) phone interview or (2) written response to the questionnaire, sent via email or mail. The questionnaire was made available to the participants in advance and given two months to reply via email. One respondent chose option 1, and three chose option 2. A follow-up communication was made with the participant as required. The phone interview was recorded using a digital recorder while the written response was stored in a word processor. The interview responses were manually transcribed and used in appropriate locations within the dissertation chapters. There is no single chapter or section that is solely dedicated to the interview responses. Instead, crucial points learned from the interviews, where mentioned, are cited in the footnotes as required. Individual respondents are not identified by their names but rather given identifiers Interview Respondent (IR) 1, 2,3, and 4 (see Appendix I for full transcripts of the interviews).

4.3.2.2 Analysis

Each of the four responses was recognized as Interview Response 1 to 4 (IR1 to IR4). Their text responses or transcription were noted in different colors. These responses were then arranged according to questions 1 to 18. This arrangement allowed the responses to be easily ordered according to the "major topics" mentioned previously. Like the archival texts, the interview responses under "major topics" were utilized to answer the relevant main inquiries.

4.3.3 Mapping of Micro-morphology

The micro-morphological study of the area's-built fabric following the Conzenian approach has been integral to this research design. Conzen's work has also hinted at the fact that detailed records of the past and the present can provide knowledge about the social, cultural, economic, and political forces that impact the built environment. Micro-morphological maps are utilized in the research to illustrate how the project area transformed and how the various forces were manifested in the built environment. Specifically, this research considers that the defining aspects of a micro-morphological study include the street system, the block system, plots within the block system, buildings' morphological patterns, and structure of land utilization (see figures 4.5 and 4.6).[20]

These "maps" are based on the project area's architectural/urban design drawings. However, they are different than "drawings" because they are color-coded to illustrate a specific set of data related to (1) building morphology and (2) retail business structure. The maps are Qualitative (e.g., how nice, or clear?) as well as Quantitative (e.g., how much transformation?).[21] The following steps have been followed (see figure 4.7)—

1. Georeference (overlay on the real-world satellite image)→ Using the "Georeference" tool in ArcGIS, raster image of the downtown maps (with building footprint). Geolocating is important to get a sense of real-world scale (step 1);

2. Create Building Morphology (BM) maps→ Trace the georeferenced maps in ArcGIS or AutoCAD (and export back to ArcGIS) (step 2);
3. Geolocate the Retail Businesses as points→ First, the address for ROBs were taken from business directories for respective years and manually input in Excel. The address table was converted to geolocated points using the "Address Locator" tool in ArcGIS. (step 3);
4. Create ROB Structure and Morphology (RSM) maps→ The specific types of RSM maps used show ROB counts by segments, by building, by quarter block. The retail business points were connected with segment lines (steps 4a and 4b), buildings (step 5), and quarter blocks (step 6), and ROB numbers were counted by using the "spatial link" tool in ArcGIS; and
5. Illustrate the BM and RSM maps to reflect certain morphological attributes/variables or calculate any required data.



Figure 4.5. A set of maps from Conzen's work on Alnwick demonstrating analysis at the micromorphological scale (redrawn by the author, original from Conzen 1960). The maps portray the transformation of a portion of Alnwick (the Central Triangle) between 1774 and 1956.

Figure 4.6. Illustration of the micro-morphological scale and major components.



Figure 4.7. A visualization of the steps involved in converting printed maps (raw data) into micro-morphological maps. The figure to the left of 4b (*bottom left*) indicates the area for considering ROB counts for each segment; for example, for segment AB, the ROBs within the blue circles, each with a radius of 200 feet (or 60 meters), have been counted.

4.3.4 Space Syntax

Space syntax is used in this research to investigate the relationship between space (the pedestrian mall) and built fabric (building morphology and ROB structure) to add further insights into the pedestrian mall strategy's failure. Of the available scientific urban analysis tools, space syntax offers a unique and advanced approach by considering the overall urban configuration's impact in any part of the constituent fabric.[22] Additionally, a set of theories developed in the 1970s (evolving ever since) backs up the space syntax methodology. A spatial analysis of the mall using a tool like space syntax is appropriate because it was a defined public space intended to maintain a strong connection with the built fabric. Space syntax presents one of the most sophisticated tools that help examine the relationship between space and other urban form constituents (e.g., patterns of land use). Space syntax analyzes each street segment's connections with all other segments within the system and calculates the points. There are two most important space syntax measures used in this analysis: Integration and Choice. Integration refers to the number of connections for each street segment across any given system (which can be a small neighborhood or an entire city/region). In contrast, Choice refers to the number of times the street segment falls in the shortest travel path across the entire system.

The space syntax methods are related primarily to the generation of space syntax maps using Depthmap software.[23] Depthmap software, developed by the Space Syntax Laboratory, is used to conduct space syntax analysis of urban systems. Within several tools available within Depthmap, Angular Segmental Analysis (ASA) has been used. ASA incorporates a street network analysis called "axial analysis" or "segmental analysis," which is primarily based on each street segment's connection within the entire system.[24] ASA follows these steps (see figures 4.8 and 4.9)-

1. Select a city map (in print) with street patterns for each decade (see step 1 in figure 4.8);
2. The first step to digitize the map is to "Georeference" the city maps over the real-world base layer (satellite image) of Eugene in ArcGIS;[25]
3. Trace the street network to make axial maps in ArcGIS (see step 2);
4. Export the axial maps to DepthmapX software and conduct the desired type of space syntax analysis
    a. Import the axial map (raw layer) from step 3 as a "dxf" layer (one of the most compatible layers that Depthmap recognizes);

b. Convert axial map layer to segment map in Depthmap;

5. Conduct ASA in Depthmap and get the angular segment map (see step 3); and
6. Import the analyzed space syntax maps back into ArcGIS to prepare final maps.

The standard way of representing space syntax maps is through colors that follow the pattern of V-I-B-G-Y-O-R (Violet to Red). V-B-I-G, Y, and O-R colors generally represent lower, medium, and higher values, respectively (see legend in step 3 in figure 4.8). Higher values represent streets or spaces with a higher potential to facilitate pedestrian or vehicular movement.



Figure 4.8. A visualization of steps involved in the conversion of a raster street map into a space syntax map. The final map (3) is obtained after the axial map (2) is analyzed in Depthmap software.

4.3.5 Statistical Analyses

The statistical analysis tools used are t-test, linear regression analysis, and central tendency measures (mean and median). The data analyzed were mainly related to the project area's building morphology and retail business characteristics. R-Studio[26] and Microsoft Excel were used to conduct the statistical analyses.

T-test was explicitly used to find if

1. Mean areas of buildings before and after the renewal differed significantly;
2. Space syntax measures for segments that lost or gained ROBs between 1978 and 1985 differed significantly; and
3. Space syntax measures for segments that experienced drastic vs. lesser change in building frontage after the renewal differed significantly.

Regression analysis (Linear Regression model) was used to find if a significant relationship existed between space syntax measures and ROB counts.

4.4 Bringing the methods together

As seen in figure 4.10, in terms of investigating the core inquiries, the purpose of the research methods is to facilitate an examination of "HOW" a phenomenon occurred and "WHY' the phenomenon occurred. In this regard, Mapping of Micro-morphology and Statistical Analyses can only show 'HOW," but they cannot answer "WHY?" Archival Research is the central research method and can "strongly" answer both "HOW" and "WHY," but it is not fully equipped without support from Mapping of Micro-morphology and Statistical Analyses. Interviews can answer both "WHY" and "HOW" but cannot be relied on its own. Lastly, Space Syntax can "moderately" answer both "WHY" and "HOW" and can be relied on its own, but its potential is limited.

Additionally, the research design aims to bring together different methodologies, which is an accomplishment of this dissertation in itself. Specifically, while archival research, micro-morphological mapping, and space syntax analyses have certain limitations, the methodology triangulates each other to study the central research questions comprehensively (see figure 4.9 and table 4.2). For example, archival research, mostly based on texts and interpretation of drawings, does not incorporate analytical maps. Instead, the micro-morphological mapping addresses this issue. Similarly, the importance of the role of historical forces in shaping the built environment is not readable through urban morphology or space syntax maps. On the other hand, space syntax maps highlight the "invisible" spatial characteristics of the built environment, which urban morphology maps or historical studies cannot portray.



Figure 4.9. A diagram summarizing the Research Methods.

Table 4.2. Comparison of the research methods with respect to their scope in this research.

	Archival Research	Micro-Morphology Mapping		Space Syntax Analysis
		Built Form	Retail Pattern	
Strength	Explains the complex historical processes and provides a framework for a narrative story	Descriptive/Analytical illustration of the formation and transformation of the built form and land-use patterns		Analytically explains the nature of urban structure and provides insights into the relationship between urban structure and built form/land-use patterns
Form of illustration	Architectural drawings, historical images	Townscapes—which consists of the system of plots, buildings, land utilization, and streets)	Spatial mapping—location and intensity of businesses with or without respect to the street network	Space syntax maps—color-coded map of the street network which shows the potential of the individual street segment to facilitate pedestrian or vehicular movement
Limitations	Does not offer sophisticated tools to organize the findings	Recognizing the "complexity" of historical forces that impact the built form is a not key issue	Built forms do not matter much if the characteristics of location, clustering, or land use patterns are understood	Does not prioritize non-spatial (e.g., historical) forces, and spatial configuration is considered the "only" way of understanding and explaining the city

4.5 Notes

[1] Daphne Watkins and Deborah Gioia, *Mixed Methods Research* (Oxford University Press, 2015); Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, *Mixed Methods Research: Merging Theory with Practice* (Guilford Press, 2010). The research design acknowledges that the terms "methodology" and "method" are not synonymous, although they are often treated as such. Methodology is a lens or a philosophical worldview through which research is examined, whereas methods are tools and techniques that are used to conduct the research.

[2] Ibid.; A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003); Patricia Leavy, *Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, Mixed Methods, Arts-Based and Community-Based Participatory Research Approaches* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2017).

[3] Downtown Eugene is referred to as the core area centered in the CEP boundary. The total Downtown Eugene is more popularly understood to cover a larger area (CT 39).

[4] As explained in Ibid., 175; Alex. W. Edmonds and Thomas D. Kennedy, *An Applied Guide to Research Designs Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2017); Watkins and Gioia, *Mixed Methods Research*. As explained in The other design methods are explanatory sequential, exploratory sequential, qualitative nested in quantitative, and quantitative nested in qualitative.

[5] Link to the image https://library.uoregon.edu/dc/newspaper/index.php?newspaper=registerguard (last accessed, March 2021)

[6] Link to the image https://lchm.pastperfectonline.com/) (last accessed, March 2021)

[7] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory* (Eugene: Johnson Publishing Co, 1968); *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory* (Eugene: Johnson Publishing Co, 1978); *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory* (Eugene: Johnson Publishing Co, 1985); *Polk City Directory, Eugene, OR* (Livonia, MI: R. L. Polk and Co., 2000); *Eugene, Springfield Yellowbook* (Yellowbook, 2018).

[8] Some alternative viewpoints on urban renewal are related to the complex processes involved in addition to a more straightforward notion of demolition and new construction or the genuine dedication of ERA and the City in improving downtown Eugene's situation.

[9] Shane Ewen, *What Is Urban History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 16.

[10] Mark J. Ventresca and John W. Mohr, "Archival Research Methods," in *The Blackwell Companion to Organizations*, ed. Joel A. C. Baum (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 805–828. According to the authors, some characteristics of "new archivalists" include reliance on formal analytical methodologies; focus on the measurement of organization and its constituent elements rather than on organizations themselves; emphasis on the study of relations rather than objects or attributes; concern with measuring the shared forms of meaning that underlie social, organizational processes; and interest to understand the configurational logics that tie these various elements together into organized activity.

[11] H. J. Dyos, *The Study of Urban History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 7.

[12] Bruce Staven, "In Pursuit of Urban History: Conversations with Myself and Others-a View from the United States," in *In Pursuit of Urban History*, ed. Derek Fraser and Anthony Sutcliffe (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), 407–427.

[13] Dyos, *The Study of Urban History*, 8.

[14] Eric H. Monkkonen, *America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities & Towns 1780-1980* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

[15] Link to the index:
https://library.uoregon.edu/dc/newspaper/index.php?newspaper=registerguard

[16] Link to Register Guard digital archive: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=4pF9x-cDGsoC

[17] One of the important contact persons was GIS Technician Sarah Zaleski

[18] One of the important contact persons was UO Data Librarian Kathleen Stroud

[19] https://lchm.pastperfectonline.com/randomimages

[20] Conzen, "Alnwick, Northumberland: A Study in Town-Plan Analysis"; Conzen, "Urban Morphology: A Geographical Approach." He defined town plans as "the topographical arrangement of an urban built-up area in all its man-made features." (4-5).

[21] Ko Ko Lwin, Yuji Murayama, and Chiaki Mizutani, "Quantitative versus Qualitative Geospatial Data in Spatial Modelling and Decision Making," *Journal of Geographic Information System* 4 (2012): 237–241; Greg Brown et al., "Mixed Methods Participatory GIS: An Evaluation of the Validity of Qualitative and Quantitative Mapping Methods," *Applied Geography* 79 (2017): 153–166. Partial reference taken from https://www.earthonlinemedia.com/ebooks/tpe_3e/essentials/map_types.html A qualitative map expresses the presence or absence of the subject on a map, is open for interpretation, and does not reflect results objectively, whereas a quantitative map is expressed as numerical values that can be easily translated to derive meanings. Additionally, qualitative mapping provides for an interpretive approach to place values and meanings without pre-defined typology, while quantitative mapping provides a list or typology of spatial attributes for mapping. Lwin et al. (2017) explain that while qualitative mapping is grouped by the same urban scale and land use activity classifications (e.g., residential, commercial, industrial, public facility, roads, etc.), quantitative maps are grouped by similar regional scale classifications (e.g., forest, water, agricultural land, etc.).

[22] Hillier, *Space Is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture*.

[23] The software information is available in the following link:
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/architecture/research/space-syntax/depthmapx

[24] The first step for space syntax analysis is to prepare or obtain either an axial lines map or a road-center line map of the urban system. Since neither was available for Eugene, the author prepared the axial line map by tracing the street map.

[25] Georeferencing is the process of aligning a raster map into the real-world base map.

[26] R-Studio is an open-source platform statistical analysis software. For more information, visit the link: https://rstudio.com/

5 CHAPTER V: GROWTH OF A MID-SIZED CITY: EUGENE'S POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS (THE 1950S TO 1970S)

This chapter discusses Eugene's historical developments and the downtown situation in the post-war decades (the late-1940s to late-1960s) that prompted the urban renewal and the pedestrian mall construction. Notably, the city's population boom, a series of ambitious projects, a realization of several internal (downtown) and external (regional/national) problems, and visions of a renewed downtown core played influential roles.

5.1 Post-war Growth

The City of Eugene bears its name from Eugene Skinner, who founded the city in 1846—the year of his arrival.[1] In 1853, the city was officially named "Eugene City (see Appendix J for Eugene's pre-Wold War 2 history)."[2] Eugene started experiencing massive growths beginning in the 1940s, which peaked in the 1950s through the 1970s. While there was a gradual growth until the end of WW2 in size and population, the city grew dramatically in the post-war decades (see figures 5.1 and 5.2).

The period between 1940 to 1980 (the four key decades for downtown Eugene and this research) can be divided into two parts (see figure 5.3) (1) 1940 to 1960 (gradual growth) and (2) 1961 to 1980 (explosion). Eugene's growth in the 1940s and 1950s provides a significant idea about the city's incoming boom from the 1960s to the 1980s—the decades of Eugene's urban renewal. In the four decades, Eugene's population grew five-fold from nearly 21,000 to 105,5000. A city that had occupied less than five sqm in 1941 had grown to occupy almost thirty-five sqm by 1980. In the fifties and sixties, Eugene's population and retail trade grew faster than Oregon and the rest of the nation.[3]



Figure 5.1. Charts showing Eugene's population growth between 1860 and 2018; note the growth between 1940 and 1970 (*top*) and a more detailed account of the population in the postwar decades (*bottom*). Sc. Lane Council of Governments (https://lcog.org/DocumentCenter/View/1370/Historical-Population-of-Lane-County-and-Cities)





Figure 5.2. Chart showing Eugene's growth in size from the 1860s to 2000s in square miles (*top*) and a map of Eugene's growth history (*bottom*). The source of the original map is a GIS file available through the UO Libraries data share program.





Figure 5.3. Charts showing Eugene's annual population growth rate after 1940 (*top*) and percent population change in Eugene compared to Lane County, Oregon State, and the United States from the 1940s to the 1970s (*bottom*).

By 1960, its population had reached almost 51,000. However, with several large annexations, much of the population growth took place in the peripheries and not in the central areas. A few accounts confirm that between 1930 and 1960, and especially between 1945 and 1955, Eugene's periphery, comprising the newly annexed areas, grew faster than the inner-city population.[4] According to the city-county planning consultant Howard Buford, twenty-five annexations occurred in postwar years until 1954, eighteen of which were after 1950.[5] Consequently, the population of the fringe area was more than the central city by 1956.[6] Between 1960 to 1980 (the period of the city's highest growth), its population grew from around 51,000 to more than 105,000. Simultaneously, the city's boundary increased from fifteen to thirty-five square miles (mostly attributed to rapid annexations).

5.2 Eugene's Ambitions Manifested (the 1950s to Early-1960s)

The crucial developments in the E-S area that are closely related to the city's move for federal urban renewal are as follows—

1. The city's ambitious plans of the 1950s
    a. A study for the downtown civic center, c. 1955;
    b. Renewal efforts (including the unsuccessful Mulligan-Skinner Urban Renewal plan, 1959);
    c. Beginning of the city-wide arterial system; and
    d. First Eugene-Springfield Regional Plan, 1959
2. The story of the 1960s
    a. Highway constructions in the 1960s; and
    b. The first enclosed shopping center-Valley River Center (VRC), August 1969.

5.2.1 The Ambitious Plans of the 1950s

One of the first city-wide planning-related developments of the post-war years was the passing of the first Zoning Ordinance in 1948 (amended in 1955; see figure 5.4).[7] In the first few years of the 1950s, Eugene's ambition to strengthen its position as a regional center became apparent. For example, in 1954, City of Eugene and Lane County authorities envisioned a "Civic Center."[8] Being the seat of Lane County, Eugene was selected to host the Governmental Center in a three-block area around the Courthouse south of the Park Blocks. The same year, the County hired "Architects Collaborative," a group of local architects, who, by 1955, developed a plan for the Courthouse area.[9] The Plan aimed to include a Library, Lane County's Government Building, City Government Buildings, State and Federal Buildings, Southern Pacific Station, and an Auditorium and Cultural Area.[10]

Eugene's ambitions of the early-1950s culminated in at least three major planning efforts, which were executed between 1959 and 1961: (1) The first regional Plan, the 1959 Eugene-Springfield Development Plan by Central Lane County Planning Commission (CLCPC),[11] (2) 1959/60 Mulligan-Skinner Urban Renewal Project, and (3) 1961 East University of Oregon Campus Development Plan.



Figure 5.4. Eugene's Zoning Map for 1955 (sc. City of Eugene 1955; reworked by the author).

Eugene experienced at least three renewal projects before the CEP began in the late-1960s. The first was the “Mulligan-Skinner Urban Renewal Project” of 1959, an unsuccessful urban renewal proposal turned down by the voters in May 1960 (6,022 Y versus 8,498 N).[12] Although unsuccessful, the proposal marks a crucial turning point in the city’s intention to revitalize the downtown core. The second was the successful 1961 East Campus Development Plan (ECDP). ECDP aimed for the “orderly redevelopment, for higher educational purposes…. of the east end of the UO campus.”[13] The third was related to constructing a new City Hall downtown at the expense of several old offices and apartments.[14] John Stafford and two other UO students designed the building, which won a citation for “Excellence in Community Architecture” by AIA in August 1965.[15]

5.2.2 The story of the 1960s

The growth of the 1950s culminated into an urgent realization for a more robust street plan, for example, as included in the 1959 E-S Plan.[16] Specifically, the Plan proposed extending the downtown commercial area west from Lawrence to Jefferson Street to provide enough land to build a new shopping mall, with customers driving to the site over the proposed new Washington-Jefferson Street Bridge (see figures Z.1 and Z.2 in Appendix Z for information on the proposed arterial systems in the 1950s).[17] By the end of the 1960s (just before the urban renewal launched), the completed major highway and arterials loop including the Beltline, Interstate-5, Interstate-105, Delta Highway, Pacific Highway, Northwest Expressway, 6th and 7th avenues, 11th avenue, Willamette Street, Franklin Boulevard, River Road, Coburg Road and two major bridges (Washington-Jefferson and Ferry Street) had been completed as well (see figure 5.5).[18]

However, the highway system and the bridge connections of the 1960s had “unintended” consequences considering the downtown. While cross-downtown traffic was averted, the highway system inspired further growth of the peripheral areas and negatively impacted downtown’s role in becoming the region’s CBD. Furthermore, other socio-economic changes meant that the entire city’s complexity was changing and was felt by the central area as it trailed the prospering peripheral developments. The problems started to be severely felt in the downtown during the 1960s, and by 1965, the city decided to act through a possible solution-the federal urban renewal program.

While the above developments either favored or indirectly motivated the city’s struggle to revitalize the downtown, the news of Valley River Center’s (VRC) inevitable construction demanded urgent action from the downtown authorities and merchants. VRC was the Eugene-Springfield Region's first large, enclosed shopping center located outside the central area. The news of VRC first arose in 1964, which forced downtown merchants and authorities to think about downtown survival even more seriously. By 1965, the shopping center's conversations had started to worry about downtown business owners who were already facing competition from small commercial centers.[19] In June 1964, planners in Lane County had requested to commercially zone a sixty-four-acre site north of Eugene for a $12.5 million shopping center to comprise about 600,000 SF of floor space (which would later become the VRC).[20] Although the city did not want the new mall's construction, it could not stop the construction since it was Lane County's property.[21] VRC opened to the public in August 1969 and was located only 1.4-miles northwest of Eugene.[22] When first opened, the VRC complex occupied an eighty-acre site north of the Willamette River and west of the Delta Freeway. John Graham and Company's architectural firm designed the 8000,000 SF project with an estimated cost of $15 million. It provided free parking for approximately 4,000 cars (while downtown had 5,000 in total). VRC had a competitive edge over the downtown mall because it provided an enclosed and controlled environment and 'unlimited' ground-level parking.



Figure 5.5. The scenario of Eugene's major arterials by the late-1960s; the major arterial system was almost complete to its present state by this time, i.e., before urban renewal had begun. Drawn by using the city's street map for respective years and Welsh 1978.

5.3 Realization of Downtown Problems in Eugene (the early 1960s Onwards)

One RG article highlighted the post-war growth of downtown Eugene as follows-

> *"From a maze of narrow, dirty streets and dilapidated buildings planned and constructed in the horse and buggy era, Eugene's downtown began to take shape as a modernistic, integrated business district that could adequately serve the area's present and projected future population."*[23]

In the late-1940s, Eugene's downtown was the region's dominant economic center with a rich business mix. As evident in the 1949 downtown area map, retail businesses on the ground floor filled downtown Eugene in the post-war years, mostly concentrated along Broadway and Willamette Street (see figure 5.6). Small and medium-sized businesses of various types exclusively occupied the central blocks, and there were only a few large retail chains like Montgomery Wards. One crucial characteristic of downtown Eugene that the final CEP plan ignored was people living above ground-floor retail shops and single-room-occupancy hotels—a central quality of vibrant urban places.[24] By the 1950s, Downtown Eugene boasted national chain stores, including JC Penney, Sears, Wards, and large local stores like Rubenstein's. The following description of downtown Eugene in the 1950s by Jonathan Stafford is illuminating-

> *"My memories of downtown Eugene during the 1950s reveal a picture that could have been painted by Norman Rockwell. In those days, downtown was the regional center of activity, not only for retail businesses but also for civic and cultural events. All the essential services and features associated with a center existed in downtown Eugene during that era. If you needed to buy something, downtown Eugene was the best place to find it. National chain stores-the Bon Marche, JC Penney, Newberry's, Montgomery Ward, Sears, and Woolworth's were located within a few blocks of each other, along with local department stores, such as Russell's and the Broadway. You could also buy groceries-at Safeway at 13th and Willamette, Newman's fish store on East Broadway, a number of bakeries, a doughnut shop. Hardware stores, wholesale, and retail, were represented, too, with Quackenbush's Eugene Hardware, and John Warren's (which also sold sporting goods), as well as the Surplus Store, an enticing repository of random items from shovels to shaving cream…. People lived downtown-in apartments above ground-floor retail shops, as well as in single-room-occupancy hotels. The Eugene Hotel and the Osborne Hotel provided dining and meeting rooms for residents. A variety of services, from attorneys to bankers, from tailors to doctors, dentists, and pharmacists, were available downtown, along with general offices….. You could also get your car gassed and serviced."*[25]

Figure 5.6. The downtown area in 1949. Retail businesses are shown in pink. (sc. Sanborn maps available at the UO Library; redrawn by the author).

The downtown was booming in the early-1960s (see figures 5.7 and 5.8). In 1963, for example, fourteen large department/variety stores belonged to ten different companies within the downtown.[26]

"It appears that ·the unique thing about downtown Eugene is that there is nothing really as unique as we would like to believe, but rather that it has the basic ingredients of a small town: informality, lack of defined districts or land use patterns, lack of rigid structuring... [the central district] is not centered on one axis as are most small cities.... The downtown, as experienced by the pedestrian, should not be made to rely totally on Broadway and Willamette as the only "city places" but rather allow him to experience the entire downtown as a homogeneous grouping of places and land uses."

-from the firm Unthank Seder Poticha's 1969 mall design proposal.



Figure 5.7. A view of Willamette Street c. 1960, looking north from the 10th avenue intersection. Businesses with signs on the left or west included Seymour's Cafe, Newberry, Leed's Shoes, Woolworth's, J.C. Penney's, and (with a sign over the street), the Heilig Theater. On the right or east side were Nickles Shoes, Rudolph's Furs, the Fox Theater, Kaufman's, and (probably) Stanley's Restaurant. Sc. LCHMDC Catalog #GN105653).



Figure 5.8. A view of Willamette Street c. 1960 looking north from the 10th avenue intersection. The buildings shown are the First National Bank on the left and Hotel Hoffman on the right. (sc. LCHMDC Catalog #GN987.

The 1963 map in figure 5.9 shows that the area that ERA later chose for the CEP possessed a mixture of different kinds of businesses (retail, services, eateries, entertainment). At least 280 businesses occupied the ground floor, with total coverage of 1.08 million SF, while parking occupied 320,000 SF. Only fifteen different building spaces occupying 63,000 SF (4.1%) were vacant. Additionally, the ground floor spaces in downtown were also used for residences, churches, and car sales lots. National chains included Bon Marche, Sears, Montgomery Ward, JC Penney, Woolworth's, JJ Newberry, WT Grant Co., Miller's Department store, Thrifty drugs, and Payless drugs. Large local stores were Rubenstein's furniture, Gray's furniture, and Broadway store. Clearly, the problem of downtown revitalization was at least not about attracting more retailers but to reorganize the land use distribution and probably eliminate the smaller stores.



Figure 5.9. Downtown Eugene in late-1963 (recreated by the author; original map by Dave Van Fossen, obtained from UO Library).

5.4 The Escalation of Downtown Problems (Early to mid-1960s)

By c. 1962, on the one hand, Eugene had been experiencing positive growths and attempts at development, while on the other, urban problems, specifically in the downtown area, had started to exacerbate. Within the rich mixture of buildings and businesses, at least three underlying "internal" problems were invisible in the drawings and urban plans, forcing the urban renewal project (see figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12). They existed in the form of (1) substandard buildings, (2) inadequate parking, and (3) traffic congestion. The most notable external challenges were rapid peripheral growth and the creation of an outer-city retail center. As multiple ERA members and other city authorities would later proclaim, the original idea behind the entire renewal program was simple and obvious—"rebuild the downtown area" and "remove the blight."

Figure 5.10. Images of downtown Eugene showing the buildings in dilapidated condition before the urban renewal (sc. a 1968 document by ERA).



Figure 5.11. Willamette Street between 6th and 7th avenues c. 1965 looking southeast. From left to right, the businesses in this block were ReSale House, Allied Surplus, Loren's Barber Shop, and the Smeed Hotel. Sc. LCHMDC Catalog #GN11033.



Figure 5.12. An aerial view of Eugene in 1965, looking east from near 6th avenue and Washington Street (at lower left) Willamette River at upper left. Sc. LCHM catalog #GN260; original photo by Harry Gross.

5.4.1 Substandard Buildings

The existence of “blight” was one of downtown Eugene's key problems in the 1960s and a major reason for urban renewal (see figure 5.13). Appropriately documenting the presence of “substandard” buildings was the first step in justifying the federal urban renewal program. According to a 1967 structural survey by Leonard and Mosias Associates (LMA), which reflected the condition of 1960s, the conditions of the 192 CEP area buildings were as follows (1) Standard (29 or 15%); (2) Deficient but Rehabilitation feasible (37 or 19%); (3) Deficient and Rehabilitation Questionable (41 or 22%); and Substandard (85 or 44%).[27] The estimated rehabilitation cost would be greater than fifty percent needed to replace the entire structure (see table Z.1, Z.2, and Z.3 in Appendix Z for further information on the assessment of structural conditions). However, the Historic Structures Committee appointed by the Citizens’ Advisory Committee (SCORE) determined that no buildings or structures within the urban renewal area were of historical or architectural significance.

Another complex downtown-related issue of the 1960s was land assembly, as highlighted in an RTKL study.[28] Because of high land prices, many developers were discouraged and unable to assemble large parcels—and as such, downtown Eugene had only a few new buildings constructed in recent years. RTKL pointed out that newer and structurally stable buildings were only two to three stories high, thereby reflecting the relatively low-intensity utilization of downtown land.

Figure 5.13. A map showing the structural condition of CEP area buildings before the renewal.

5.4.2 Parking Shortage

A prominent "parking space" related dilemma is that it is of high importance to downtown but not an efficient use of the prime land. Between 1951 to 1962, the need for vehicular access replaced about forty percent of curb parking within the area bounded by 5th avenue, 14th avenue, Lincoln Street, and High Street.[29] A 1962 survey by the Junior Chamber of Commerce on the Community Attitude Survey found that seventy-five percent of the respondents considered downtown Eugene "inadequate" and highly prioritized parking as things needed to make a better community.[30] The city hired E. A. Barton, a parking consultant from Cleveland, OH, to survey the parking conditions, which resulted in the "Barton Report" in August 1963. It concluded that within a 53-block area in the city's core, the demand for parking exceeded the supply by nearly 2,800 spaces. The report projected that by 1975, the demand would increase to 4,000 spaces short if the current facilities remain the same. Another study completed by a

Citizen’s Advisory Committee in February 1964 recommended that the Eugene City Council (ECC) consider a $2.5 million bond issue to acquire and develop the downtown property for off-street parking. Additionally, a 1964 report by the Metropolitan Civic Club also highlighted the parking problem in downtown Eugene.[31]

5.4.3 Traffic Congestion Downtown

RTKL’s 1967/68 study reflected that general curb parking (thirty-six percent of the total parking inventory) impeded vehicular circulation in the downtown core.[32] Additionally, the pedestrian vs. automobile conflict at each intersection impeded pedestrian circulation within the core. As one Eugene resident, Charles Roffe would recall later, the city wanted to eliminate congestions and chaotic mixing of cars and pedestrians from downtown.[33] More specifically, RTKL highlighted the following characteristics of downtown circulation[34]-

1. The present downtown circulation is based on an existing grid street system with one-way designations of various streets;
2. The existing circulation system’s capacity is limited by traffic, on-street parking, and single-purpose destinations;
3. There is a high demand for internal circulation capacity due to a single purpose and dispersed land use; and
4. Completing the freeway loop will remove through traffic from the downtown streets and relieve some of the present internal circulation congestion.

5.5 Support for Pedestrian Mall/Urban Renewal in the 1960s

5.5.1 The Early 1960s

In the early-1960s, Lane County Planning Director Howard Buford had predicted that the Eugene area’s population would grow tremendously in the coming decades, and the CBD had to prepare for a ‘metamorphosis.’[35] In June 1964, Buford proposed a modified shopping mall for downtown Eugene, combined with an off-street parking program as an effort to revitalize downtown and make it competitive with the suburban shopping centers (see figures 5.14 and 5.15).[36] Buford had realized that the shopping centers attracted customers because of abundant parking and aesthetic appeal and wanted to follow the same logic to lure customers downtown. However, there was also the conscience that pedestrian mall alone would not solve all of downtown’s problems. For example, a 1964 newspaper article on the Pomona Mall quoted a store owner on the mall who advised Eugenians not to think of the mall as the "panacea for all their problems" and that the malls were only a "platform for exchanging goods with the public."[37]

Shortly after, in response to the shifting early to the mid-1960s situation of the downtown area, the new county planning consultant Frank Hurza argued that the downtown revitalization could only be possible if merchants and landlords join hands and develop a "total plan." Hurza had further added that just off-street parking and a mall could not be considered a total plan and that "it must provide variety and depth in the selection of merchandise and services."[38] Hurza also added that downtown's retail sales share had been plummeting because while in 1930, downtown areas made more than ninety percent of all retail sales, it had declined to less than thirty percent share in 1964.



Figure 5.14. A 1963 sketch of downtown Eugene pedestrian mall planned for the year 1980 looking eastward on Broadway, by the architectural firm of Hamlin & Martin (sc. Register Guard March 31, 1963).



Figure 5.15. A 1964 sketch showing the pedestrian mall concept, a view of Broadway prepared by the Lane County (sc. Register Guard October 25, 1964).

In the November 1964 election, voters approved Measure 51, a charter amendment authorizing pedestrian malls by a 1.65:1 margin (16,392 YES vs. 9,902 NO).[39] Eugene voters were favorable toward making positive changes to downtown and did not completely oppose the idea that some streets could be closed to cars.[40] Specifically, Measure 51 cleared away legal obstacles, which likely would have made downtown mall planning almost impossible, and the city amended a Charter to authorize the construction of a pedestrian mall.

5.5.2 ERA's Formation

Having realized several downtown problems by 1965, the city authorities and downtown merchants were convinced that those problems would only worsen if the city did not take appropriate measures. Mayor Edwin Cone intended to rebuild the downtown by providing parking, replacing worn-out buildings, rerouting traffic flow, and constructing a shopping mall.[41] City Councilperson Lester Anderson argued the need for a strong association between downtown merchants, property owners, and professionals, further aiming for a federal loan for a feasibility study and preparation of a master plan.[42] Many considered urban renewal the ultimate tool for saving the downtown, and the support from the merchants played a crucial role.[43]

The need for downtown revitalization led to one of the most telling stories from the sixties—the city leaders' trip to California in October 1965. The pedestrian malls around that time were successful in increasing retail sales across multiple Californian cities.[44] Therefore, to understand the prospect of urban renewal, twelve city officials and six businesspeople visited pedestrian malls in downtown Fresno and Sacramento on October 12 and 13, 1965, and returned with positive impressions (see figure 5.16).[45] This tour convinced the city leaders that Eugene must also seek federal help to solve its downtown problems, mainly through pedestrian mall construction.[46] As then-City Manager Hugh McKinley recalled, one councilman hopped off the plane at Eugene at the end of the tour and exclaimed, “We are ready to go!”[47]

Figure 5.16. Images of Downtown Fresno, a city that city officials visited in 1965 (sc. A 1968 document entitled “Downtown Fresno and the Fabulous Mall”).

In December 1965, shortly after the visit to California, the Eugene City Council established the Urban Redevelopment Agency (URA), composed of five members (local residents). The URA later became the Eugene Renewal Agency (ERA; name confirmed in July 1967)—a local body of seven citizens that would authorize the city’s urban renewal processes (see figures 5.17, 5.18, and 5.19).[48] In December 1965, the same month that URA was formed, a federally financed master plan for the redevelopment of Eugene’s CBD received support from a group of downtown property owners.[49] In early-1966, ERA formally sent its first document to HUD as a part of the CEP application. Table 5.1 explains further events and stories related to the CEP between 1966 and 1969.

When formed, the ERA had two objectives[50]

1. Rehabilitate existing structures within a seventeen-and-one-half block area, bringing them up to City Building code standards; and
2. Demolish and redevelop all parcels with substandard buildings that cannot be rehabilitated.

Figure 5.17. Eugene Renewal Agency's logo.

Figure 5.18. ERA Director David Hunt in mid-1967 (sc. Register Guard June 18, 1967).

Figure 5.19. ERA director David Hunt (left); other members from left to right- Mrs. Richard Miller, C.F. Shearer, Ray Hawk, Charles Duncan, Roy “Max” Morse, Barbara Mitchell, and Fred Brenne (sc. Register Guard December 9, 1968).

Table 5.1. Timeline of events related to ERA's urban renewal application and approval and the pedestrian mall.

Date	***Event***
March 1966	ERA submits the first formal document in the process of acquiring an urban renewal grant to HUD entitled "Survey and Planning Application."[51] The preliminary studies after the initial loan application in March 1966 were conducted through a $35,000 loan from the Eugene Industrial Development Commission (EIDC)-a land investment group which made the loan as a 'civic gesture.'
May 1966	City Manager Hugh McKinley hires Dave Hunt to be the executive director of ERA
December 1966	HUD approved the federal funds with a planning advance of $480,366 and a grant reservation of $12,069,508.[52]
1967	ERA hires several firms for urban renewal studies—Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, and Lamb (RTKL, planning firm) of Baltimore, MD in February 1967 for an $81,000 contract,[53] Leonard Mosias and Associates (LMA) of San Francisco around the same time to conduct the structural surveys, Real Estate Research Group (RERC) completes a report on Eugene's land use and marketability in June 1967, which looked at urban renewal's potentials in the downtown redevelopment area.[54] RTKL completes the studies in four phases between August 1967 and May 1968.[55]
March 1968	RTKL publicly presents the CEP plan to the ECC, Planning Commission, ERA, and SCORE.[56] ERA submits the "Application form for the Workable Program for Community Improvement" to HUD, which summarizes the buildings' structural condition in the proposed renewal area.
Around May 1968	RTKL completes a four-phased CEP planning document.[57] Broadly, RTKL proposes the following specific land-uses for the renewal project[58]: (1) the removal of 200,000 SF of "substandard" retail space and 15,000 SF of substandard office space and (2) construction of 150,000 SF of new retail space; 500,000 SF of new office space; a cultural-convention center; a 300-unit new motor-hotel; and new parking garages for a total of 1,500 cars.
September 1968	ERA sends the formal application to HUD for an urban renewal grant. The type of application was a temporary loan for project execution for ORE R-18, and the amount of the contract was $480,366 (budget approved on June 6, 1968). According to the application, the renewal project would need $18,393,332, of which two-thirds to be provided by the federal government would be $11,735,959. Additionally, the relocation grant was $331,445.
March 1969	HUD approves ERA's application.[59]
Around May 1969	The first round of HUD grants becomes available, a disbursement of $2.5 million.[60] After securing the urban renewal fund, ERA appoints Tom Johnson, former City Engineer of Springfield, as the Project Engineer responsible for administering the construction and demolition, Pat Burrington as the Real Estate Supervisor responsible for land acquisition and disposition involving clearance and redevelopment, Bill Pierson as the Relocation Supervisor, and Architect Robert Thomas as the Rehabilitation Supervisor.[61]

Table 5.1. (continued)

Date	Event
	Also, ERA hires the firm of Unthank, Seder, and Poticha (USP) to conduct design studies for the pedestrian mall/pedestrian precincts in the downtown core. USP provided suggestions based on twenty-eight ‘design concepts,’ some of which were primarily related to circulation, urban design details, mallway ideas, and the organization of urban spaces. A contract for preliminary and detailed design and working drawings on the $1.5 million Mall was accomplished on June 18, 1969.[62] However, ERA fires the firm shortly after and does not contract for the second phase of the study, and hires Landscape Architects Mitchell-McArthur.[63] ERA begins acquiring parcels and expects the acquisition process to continue over the next four years, i.e., until 1973. The urban renewal plan aims to demolish seventy-seven of the 192 structures in the urban renewal area during the initial period. The first property purchase is Luckey’s Club Cigar Store at 814 Willamette, approved on May 9, 1969, for $110,000.[64] Miller’s Department Store is the first store to be relocated and reopened on April 21, 1969, at 135 W Broadway.
June 1969	The accomplishment of contract for preliminary and detailed design and working drawings on the $1.5 million pedestrian mall.[65]
September 1969	The ECC approves the pedestrian mall design during a public meeting that includes downtown property owners, business people, and SCORE representatives.[66] The final design for the pedestrian mall includes the team of Members of the mall team consisted of Mitchell-McArthur (Landscape Architects), George T. Rockrise and Associates (GRA-Architects and Urban Planners, San Francisco), Morin, Longwood, and Edlund (Architects, Eugene); Balzhiser and Colvin Engineering, Inc (Mechanical and Electrical, Eugene); William W. Wilson (Structural Engineer, Eugene); Gale M. Roberts (Contractor) (see figure 5.21).[67]

Figure 5.20. Mall designer Hugh Mitchell pointing toward the physical model of the pedestrian mall (sc. Register Guard September 30, 1969).

5.5.3 *Justifying the Need for Urban Renewal*

Studies of the downtown conducted by RTKL and RERC in 1967-68 resulted in findings that helped ERA justify urban renewal. First, they documented the downtown's situation. RTKL acknowledged the following problems and opportunities related to the renewal area (see table 5.2)[68]

Table 5.2. List of downtown problems and opportunities in the 1960s.

Problems	***Opportunities***
1. Major regional retail competition (potentially from VRC) 2. The through-transportation corridor (auto and rail) went through downtown 3. The extended and scattered retail district 4. Pedestrian-vehicular conflict throughout the core area 5. Franklin Blvd. commercial strip development 6. Inadequate accessibility and congestion	1. Potential development of multimodal transportation interchange 2. Downtown could become a governmental and civic nucleus in addition to becoming a strong retail nucleus 3. The close-in residential area and University housing, and institutional uses (e.g., medical and educational)

Second, an RERC study highlighted the following issues pertinent to downtown Eugene in the 1960s[69]

1. Economic development is thwarted by high property prices and high absentee ownership;
2. Residential use occupies less than five percent of the study area, with a high apartment vacancy rate;
3. Compared to other cities, Eugene is deficient in central area office space relative to its population, with approximately three SF office space per capita and an overall vacancy rate of twenty-five percent;
4. Public transportation system is lacking;
5. Maintenance of through-traffic in downtown is required to not make it congested, primarily through additional limited-access expressways for travels, not passing through downtown; and
6. Need for adequate parking.

The planning studies brought forward the urgent need for urban renewal to eliminate these downtown problems and make most of the existing opportunities. For example, RTKL's 1967 assessment on the retail core's reorganization assumed the "elimination of sub-standard and deficient facilities, realignment of functional and land-use relationships, adequate and accessible parking, overall environmental upgrading (pedestrian amenities, landscaping, traffic segregation)."[70] However, RTKL had also predicted a potential future dominance of regional shopping centers in the Eugene-Springfield region, and therefore, downtown needed to facilitate smaller specialized retail businesses.[71]

Garnering confidence from these findings, ERA published one of its first official pamphlets on the urban renewal project in June 1967, entitled "A Time of Change in the City: A Time of Challenge to the Community."[72] This brochure recognized the need for downtown revitalization by retaining the existing businesses and attracting new ones. Some of the downtown problems it outlined were: automobile access and off-street parking, substandard buildings, vacancy in office buildings, high property prices, fragmented property, building ownership, and absentee owners. ERA labeled these downtown problems as a "downtown crisis" (see figure 5.21).[73]

Both ERA and the City agreed that the conditions of deterioration and blight existing in the urban renewal area constituted "a menace to the community and are detrimental to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the residents of the community" and further sought to eliminate the condition through federal financial assistants.[74] A December 1968 Register Guard Editorial argued for urban renewal by favoring wholesale redevelopment over the more-costly "piece-meal."[75] The editorial also contended that the renewal would provide insurance savings to homeowners and other property owners across the city, create numerous parking spaces and pedestrian malls to favor the shoppers, and create increased job opportunities with a significant increase in the taxable value.



Figure 5.21. A pamphlet advertising the urgency for urban renewal (cs. c. 1968, obtained through LCHM).

5.6 Notes

[1] A.G. Walling, *Illustrated History of Lane County Oregon* (Portland, OR: A.G. Walling, 1884).

[2] *Oregon Cultural Resource Inventory Report* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1985).

[3] The comparison of retail business numbers per capital between Eugene and Oregon for 1958, 1963, and 1967 shows that Eugene had proportionally far more retail business-related numbers than Oregon.

[4] John Van Landingham, "Betty Niven: The Mother of Modern Planning in Eugene," in *Eugene 1945-2000 Decisions That Made a Community*, ed. Kathleen Holt and Cheri Brooks (Eugene: The City Club of Eugene, 2000).

[5] Eugene Register Guard. December 5, 1954. Eugene's area has doubled since war II. The fringe areas consisted of the Friendly, Glenwood, Bethel, Bailey Hill, River Road, Willikanzie, and Norkenzie neighborhoods.

[6] Ibid.

[7] City of Eugene, *Comprehensive Zoning Plan of the City of Eugene* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1948); City of Eugene, *Comprehensive Zoning Plan: City of Eugene* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1955).

[8] Central Lane County Planning Commission, *A Plan for Public Buildings Eugene, Oregon* (Eugene, 1955). Several Lane County authorities had realized in the early 1950s that Eugene, although being its county seat, was facing the problem of obsolescence of governmental buildings. According to a 1955 report entitled "A Plan for Public Buildings," governmental

buildings were scattered in and around the downtown, which needed to be restructured for convenience to the public, increased administrative efficiency, the economy of land acquisition, and improved civic pride.

[9] Ibid.

[10] "A Long Range Plan for a County Civic Center," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 5, 1954).

[11] Central Lane County Planning Commission, *Development Plan-Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Region* (Eugene, 1959). The plan was primarily made eminent due to the population forecast for substantial growth in the coming years. The plan established that the CBD district extended "westward from the half-block between Washington and Lawrence streets to the half-block between Jefferson and Madison streets." As such, the CBD occupied 344.67 acres with 115.6 acres or 33.5 percent devoted to the streets. At the time, there was 0.55 acre of commercial land per 100 persons in the city, significantly more extensive for a typical US city of its size (the standard is 0.2 to 0.3).

[12] "Streets, City Hall in; Urban Renewal Out," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 21, 1960). Further information is made available in a pamphlet entitled "Questions and answers on Mulligan-Skinner urban renewal project and civic center development proposal on the May 20, 1960 ballot."

[13] *East Campus Development Plan of the University of Oregon* (Eugene: Business Office, University of Oregon, 1961).

[14] Abel Patterson, "Clockless Towers: Eugene's Architectural War on History" (Master's Terminal Project, University of Oregon, 2007).

[15] "Civic Center Wins National Recognition," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 9, 1965).

[16] "Cross-Town Streets Program Outlined," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 16, 1950); Landingham, "Betty Niven: The Mother of Modern Planning in Eugene"; Dan Wyant, "Peripheral Routes Needed to Clear Traffic Congestion," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 30, 1957); "Planners Seek to Improve Eugene-Springfield Traffic Pattern," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 30, 1957). One problem was that, in the 1950s, the local streets were acting as major traffic carriers, and the County realized there needed to be a more robust street plan. These developments are also strongly tied to the upcoming developments like the Mulligan-Skinner urban renewal program planned for the central area between the 6th and 8th Avenues between Willamette and Oak streets. Already by 1950, major arterials like 7th, 11th, and 13th were suffering traffic congestions because of a lack of "proper access from the industrial areas northwest of the city to the southern and eastern residential areas without traversing the streets in the business area." Also, significant congestions were centered around 19th and Willamette and 19th and Hilyard streets because of the growing suburban expansion. Traffic circulation was a well-known item in the agenda of the E-S planning department by 1957. A significant problem needing fixing was that Eugene's traffic routes converged to the central hub, which is downtown Eugene and there was an urgent need for peripheral roads. For example, there was a bottleneck created in the River Road area, and a "single, inadequate street at the Van Buren grade crossing was the primary

way for more than 10,000 people." In the 1950s alone, the registration of motor vehicles doubled from 35,000 to 70,000. The downtown streets were in much stress, especially from users traversing east-west or north-south, who did not have the option of using any peripheral or alternative road. In 1957, Planning Consultant Howard Buford proposed an arterial perimeter road system for the Willakenzie and River Road areas north of downtown Eugene that would connect Pacific Highway (then new) with Highway 99 through a six-mile controlled access road. Furthermore, an even bolder arterial system was envisioned to facilitate traffic from one area of the river to the other and east-west across town without the need of entering the congested downtown area. The Regional Plan of 1959 also highlighted the problems with the city's circulation system. A few problems identified were that the local streets were acting as major traffic carriers. The county officials realized the need for a robust street plan starting with a principal north-south traffic route—the Spencer Butte Expressway—a portion extending from 30th Street in the south to a point south of Bloomberg Road and the Pacific Freeway.

[17] Landingham, "Betty Niven: The Mother of Modern Planning in Eugene."

[18] Eugene Historical Review Board, *Eugene Modernism 1935-65* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 2003); Manning Welsh, "The Belt Line Highway: An Agent of Change in the Eugene Springfield Landscape" (Master's Thesis University of Oregon, 1978).

[19] Eugene Historical Review Board, *Eugene Modernism 1935-65*.

[20] Marvin Tims, "Shopping Center Poses Circular Question," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 7, 1964).

[21] "County Postpones Autorama Zoning," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 16, 1969).

[22] Editor, "Valley River Facts, Figures," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 3, 1969); Don Bishoff, "Crowds, Sales Top Expectations at Valley River Opening," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 5, 1969). As VRC's manager Ed Swelgert guessed, there could have been 50,000 to 60,000 people vising the Mall on the first day. Swelgert had remarked that "there's so darn much merchandise, so attractively displayed, that it creates a kind of madness in a first-time visitor." VRC provided jobs for between 1,800 and 2,000 people, with Meier and Frank alone employing 500, contain more than sixty stores when fully occupied, including JC Penney. The building covered more than 450,000 SF, 700,000 SF total floor space, and equaled three city blocks in length. Two general contractors-Wayne Shields of Eugene and H. A. Anderson of Portland, were the principal partners in its development.

[23] "Renewal: Asset or Hot Potato," *Valley News (Oregon)* (Eugene, January 24, 1973).

[24] Jonathan Stafford, "Heart Murmurs: Resuscitating Downtown," in *Eugene 1945-2000 Decisions That Made a Community*, ed. Kathleen Holt and Cheri Brooks (Eugene: The City Club of Eugene, 2000), 87.

[25] Stafford, "Heart Murmurs: Resuscitating Downtown."

[26] The large stores were (1) Bon Marche; (2) WT Grant; (3) 88 cents store; (4) Sears; (5) Miller's Department store; (6) JC Penney; (7) Woolworth; (8) JJ Newberry; (9) The Broadway store; and

(10) Montgomery Ward. Out of them, 88 cents store, Broadway store, and Montgomery Ward. The largest among them in terms of ground floor occupancy were Bon Marche and Sears that occupied quarter-blocks or 25,600 SF area. Miller's, one annex of Montgomery Ward, one of the two Broadway stores, and both 88 cents stores were comparatively much smaller, occupying between 3250 to around 8000 SF. In contrast, WT Grant, other Broadway stores, JJ Newberry, Woolworth's, JC Penney, and Montgomery Wards occupied between 10,000 SF and 18,000 SF ground floor areas.

[27] ERA, *Project Area Report for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18), July 1968* (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1968). Leonard Mosias and Associates (LMA) conducted the original study in 1967.

[28] Lamb Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 1 Reconnaissance* (Eugene, 1967).

[29] Metropolitan Civic Club, *The Parking Problem and the Downtown Parking Bond Issue* (Eugene, 1964).

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Lamb Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary* (Eugene, 1967).

[33] Patterson, "Clockless Towers: Eugene's Architectural War on History."

[34] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*.

[35] "Eugene What a Wonderful Town," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 31, 1963).

[36] Sam Frear, "Planning Consultant Offers Shopping Mall Plan for Core Area," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 13, 1964). The plan only involved the core area around the intersection of Broadway and Willamette streets and would convert Willamette street into a pedestrian mall for two blocks south of Broadway and on Broadway for two blocks west of Willamette Street.

[37] Sam Frear, "Pomona Mall: Pedestrians Only," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 25, 1964).

[38] "Total Plan Needed Downtown, Group Told," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 9, 1964).

[39] https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/468/City-of-Eugene-Election-History?bidId=

[40] "Vox Populi," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 5, 1964).

[41] Sam Frear, "City's Need of U.S. Aid Clear after Tour'," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 14, 1965).

[42] Ibid.

[43] "Pedestrian Mall Just Part of Urban Renewal Plan (3rd)," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 11, 1968).

[44] Ed Kenyon, "Many Cities Bear Witness 'The Mall' Solution Works," *Register Guard* (Eugene, December 13, 1968). Around this time, the success of the pedestrian malls through retail sales increase in recently built examples was compelling—Fresno (up 14%), Pomona (up 18.3 %), and Santa Monica (up 9.7%).

[45] Frear, "City's Need of U.S. Aid Clear after Tour'."

[46] Making the trip to Fresno and Sacramento were Mayor Edwin Cone; Councilmen Dick Crakes, Ray Hawk, Glen Purdy, Lester Anderson, Bruce Lassen, and R. E. McNutt; planning commission members Vince Farina, Duane Lafferty, and Morven Thomas; James Longwood and Jack Foster of the Downtown Eugene Committee; and Central Lane Planning Consultant Howard Buford.

[47] Ed Kenyon, "'Corpse' of Urban Renewal Alive and Well in Eugene (1st)," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 9, 1968).

[48] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18)* (Eugene, 1968); Kenyon, "'Corpse' of Urban Renewal Alive and Well in Eugene (1st)"; ERA, *A Time of Change in the City: A Time of Challenge to the Community*, 1967. When established, the nine-member board, including two members of the city council and seven other citizens. The City Council appointed members for four-year terms, and the council approves the agency's development plan (from the 1981 document "A Commitment to Downtown Eugene" by the City of Eugene).

[49] Sam Frear, "Downtown Property Owners Back Redevelopment Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 8, 1965). Supporting the proposals for a planning effort were Gertrude Kaufman (president of Kaufman Bros., Inc,), Paul Lansdowne (manager of Eugene Hotel), Harold Lyons (partner in Lyons Furniture Co., George Schaefer's, downtown property owner, Henry Lowry (owner of Lowry Fine Cameras), Mervin Dahl (manager of the First National Bank of Oregon main branch), Trygve Vik (president of Vik Construction Co.), Ralph Robinson, a partner in The Broadway, C.F. Wright (secretary of the Eugene Medical Center), Charles Bonnett (downtown property owner), V. Edwin Johnson (partner in Johnson Furniture Co.), Maurie Jacobs (president of M. Jacobs Furniture Co.,) Nathan Rubenstein (partner in Rubenstein Furniture Co., and J.A. Labadie (trust officer of the US National Bank in Portland).

[50] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18)*; Kenyon, "'Corpse' of Urban Renewal Alive and Well in Eugene (1st)"; ERA, *A Time of Change in the City: A Time of Challenge to the Community*. When established, the nine-member board, including two members of the city council and seven other citizens. Members were appointed by the City Council for four-year terms, and the council approves the agency's development plan (from the 1981 document "A Commitment to Downtown Eugene" by City of Eugene).

[51] ERA, *Survey and Planning Application* (Eugene, 1966).

[52] ERA, *A Time of Change in the City: A Time of Challenge to the Community*.

[53] "Urban Renewal Pact Ok'd for Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 7, 1967).

[54] Real Estate Research Corporation, *Land Use and Marketability: Central Eugene Area Preliminary Report* (Eugene, 1967).

[55] The four phases were published as (1) Reconnaissance in August 1967; (2) Alternative Objective in November 1967; (3) Alternative Strategies in February 1968; and (4) Alternative Designs in May 1968. The final plan, however, was presented a few months before May 1968 publicly. As mentioned in the Phase 1 document, the decisions were voted on at each phase by a 30-member Planning Review Committee, composed of the City Council, Eugene Renewal Agency, Eugene Planning Commission, and seven members of SCORE (a 100-member citizens' group formed in October 1966 as a local/public representation on downtown projects.

[56] "Renewal Plan to Be Unveiled Tonight," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 27, 1968); "Critics Hit Hard at Mall Feature of Urban Renewal Plan."

[57] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 1 Reconnaissance*; Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*; Lamb Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 3 Alternative Strategies* (Eugene, 1968); Lamb Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 4 Alternative Designs* (Eugene: Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, Lamb, 1968).

[58] Ibid., 76.

[59] "Urban Renewal Plans Ok'd," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 20, 1968); Ed Kenyon, "Urban Renewal Grant Announced," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 24, 1969).

[60] ERA, "ERA Annual Report 1969" (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1970).

[61] ERA, "ERA Report 1(1)," *ERA Report* 1, no. 1 (1969).

[62] ERA, "ERA Report, 1 (2)" (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, July 1969).

[63] "Bushes and Fountains," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 28, 1969).

[64] ERA, "ERA Report, 1 (2)"; "Agency Anxious to End Real Estate Leadership," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 26, 1970); "Article about Luckey's Cigar Store," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 2, 1974). Tad Luckey Sr. had first opened the store in 1911, which later closed its door in 1974.

[65] ERA, "ERA Report, 1 (2)."

[66] Ed Kenyon, "'Let's Get on with the Show,' Mall Proponents Urge," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 30, 1969).

[67] ERA, "ERA Annual Report 1969"; Kenyon, "'Let's Get on with the Show,' Mall Proponents Urge"; ERA, "ERA Report, 2 (1)" (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, May 1970).

[68] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 3 Alternative Strategies*, 18.

[69] Real Estate Research Corporation, *Land Use and Marketability: Central Eugene Area Preliminary Report*.

[70] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*.

[71] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 3 Alternative Strategies*.

[72] ERA, *A Time of Change in the City: A Time of Challenge to the Community*.

[73] From a 1968 ERA pamphlet published to advertise the need for urban renewal.

[74] From a December 4, 1968 agreement between The City and ERA (document obtained from a City of Eugene staff).

[75] Editor, "Eugene UR Project No Boondoggle," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 22, 1968).

6 CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS OF MALL FAILURE: INTRODUCTION AND RADICAL TRANSFORMATION

Chapters 6 to 9 elaborate on the reasons for the Eugene pedestrian mall's failure to revitalize the downtown retail core. The first chapter on the reasons associated with the Eugene mall's failure focuses on the radical transformation of the project area after the renewal. It is important to note that the reason for failure is mostly associated with the first phase (the 1970s to mid-1980s), i.e., the time between the renewal's start and the reopening of the first (of eight) mall segments.[1] The story of phase 2 (mid-1980s to early-2000s) is investigated from a slightly different perspective, as will be discussed in the later chapters. These discussions on the mall's failure do not aim to condemn past decisions or urban renewal itself but rather intend to present an elaborate story and even a few alternative/less-explored views.

The findings of this research associates Eugene mall's failure to the following reasons—

<u>Core Reasons (chapters 6 to 8)—</u>

1. The urban renewal-led radical transformation of the built fabric through a clearance in terms of Building Morphology (BM) and Retail-oriented Business Structure (RBS), including small business dislocations (chapter 6)
2. Design and planning related issues (chapter 7)
    a. Conceptualizing the mall when the area was largely vacant
    b. Complete closure of eight core segments to cars
    c. Mall's shape and size
    d. Accessibility and other qualities of the central plaza fountain and other mall elements
3. Problems associated with the spatial configuration (chapter 7)
4. ERA's negligence in listening to criticisms (including the firing of USP) (chapter 8)
5. A planned project with very little flexibility (chapter 8)
    a. Reliance on large retailers
    b. Land-use segregation and restriction of retail uses
    c. Large parcel reservations for pre-determined projects
    d. Pursuance of large projects for too long
    e. ERA's inflexibilities toward small businesses
6. CEP's disregard to downtown housing (chapter 8)

7. Parking garages could not entice visitors as anticipated (chapter 8)

<u>Other reason (chapter 9)—</u>

1. The ERA did not consider historic preservation
2. Issues of inclusivity: tight mall rules and undesirables
3. Unforeseeable "external" factors (changing socio-economic structure and peripheral shopping centers)

In September 1986, almost a year after the first segment had opened, a city official Elaine Stewart accounted that the pedestrian mall was not designed to allow retail to work, and drawing direct inspirations from California malls was not a good idea.[2] Specifically, Stewart argued that the Eugene mall's scale was very large for the city, and there were problems with a lack of accessibility. John Porter of the Eugene Planning Department also agreed to this notion. The Eugene mall's failure symbolically began in 1985 with the reopening of the first segment, along Willamette, between 10th and 11th avenues.

A popular explanation defending the responsible organization is the fact that at the time, the downtown needed an uplifting and federal renewal program was the only funding option—a sentiment shared by the interview respondents as well. Although several decisions could have been taken differently, the mall's success was not a guarantee. Additionally, several external factors were also at play in the region and across the nation, most related to economic changes, making the mall's survival incompatible with the changing time. The IRs summarized the pedestrian mall experiment in the following ways-

> *"I would obviously criticize the entire effort. It destroyed the historic fabric of Eugene. It was a gigantic mistake which we continue to pay for every day…. instead of rehabilitating our urban core, we decided to tear most of it down and opt for "new" buildings." (IR1)*
>
> *"Eugene's 1960s and early 70s' renewal actions, in hindsight, were the most disruptive and misguided – demolishing too many buildings, closing too many streets to traffic (limiting traffic to two small lanes with lots of sidewalk room would have been better), not providing nearly as much housing on and around the mall …. not having a strong connection (e.g., mass transit, bike, promotions) to the University of Oregon campus with its significant number of students and staff which is located fairly close to the pedestrian mall…." (IR2)*
>
> *"At the time, what Eugene did made sense… but for example, the city did not appreciate the importance of small businesses… or an effective program to*

save them… Parking was sufficient, but accessibility may not have been as good….” (IR3)

“The first time I saw the mall in 1974 I thought it was really cool and pretty. It was still new. But it was clear that businesses were failing. Ten years later when I went to work for the city, in an office located on the mall, it was apparent to me that it wasn't going to be viable in the long run. There were increasing problems in every direction.” (IR4)

6.1 Issues to Note Before Discussing Mall’s Failure

Before turning to the reasons for the mall’s failure, three key topics need clarification: (1) the CEP was a “success” only the pedestrian mall strategy was a failure, (2) indications of mall’s failure, and (3) what the failure was not about.

First, it is important to note that the CEP successfully completed most projects originally planned—only the “retail center” component failed. In other words, the failed component was the aim to create such a large downtown retail center adjacent to the pedestrian mall after wholesale clearance. From one perspective, the CEP could be considered a “worthwhile experiment” for two reasons: (1) it constructed much of the components in the original plan (2) after reopening the mall streets, the “failed” RCPM area bounced back with several large and small non-retail projects in the 1990s and 2000s.

Writing in May 1990 in the context of reopening the mall, Hugh Prichard cleared out the achievements of the CEP as follows[3]

1. Completion of the pedestrian mall;
2. Construction of Hult Center, Hult parking, Community Conference Center, Parcade, construction, and improvements to LTD’s transit area;
3. Completing several new and rehabilitation projects on land assembled and sold by ERA: Hilton Hotel, Citizens building, Aster Publishing Building, Scan Design, Sahlstrom Building, Atrium Building, Harry Ritchie’s, Seymour’s, Valley Stationery, Broadway Store Building;
4. Rehabilitation of historic buildings included Smeede Hotel, Schaefer’s building, McDonald Theatre; and
5. Improving public infrastructure, including upgrading streets and alleys, widening, sanitary sewers, traffic signals, underground utilities, storm sewers and sidewalks, mall furniture.

Acknowledging that the loss of retail stores was the biggest blow to the CEP project, Hugh Prichard retrospectively argued in May 1990 that although the property value did fall during the 1980s, CEP was not a failed program, and real estate values had fallen throughout Eugene marketplace.[4] If compared to the bustling cores of larger cities across the country, Eugene's downtown core today looks much less "vibrant." However, considering such an ambitious project across a larger area of a mid-sized city, which did not go as planned in the first two critical decades, the downtown area was able to recover, specifically after the mid-1990s. Therefore, a more appropriate way of framing Eugene mall's failure is that the pedestrian mall strategy failed to reconstruct a strong "retail-only" downtown core, but it did not necessarily fail Eugene's Downtown. Additionally, with mall deconstruction and other changes, the downtown core has become a mixed-use downtown center instead.

Second, the reopening of the mall back to cars only "symbolized" the mall's failure. In reality, the loss of businesses, vacant buildings, and undeveloped lots was the major reason for converting the mall back to vehicular streets. The loss of businesses prompted the merchants (and authorities) to work together to solve the shrinking retail core issue and, consequently, a four-phased deconstruction of the mall to allow cars back to those streets between 1985 and 2002.

Third, the logic behind the "pedestrian mall" component of Eugene's CEP was not a recipe for failure in and of itself. Closing specific Downtown segments to vehicular traffic and making them pedestrianized zones/urban spaces (i.e., the pedestrian mall) undoubtedly contributed to what happened in the next three decades. However, the strategy's failure was not solely because of the pedestrian mall/closing of the streets to the car. There were many external and internal causes, and the complex relationship between several components of the CEP aided in the failure of the pedestrian mall strategy.

6.2 Introduction to the Renewal-led Transformation

This section explains the results of the intervention in the CEP and RCPM area in terms of its Building Morphology (BM) and Retail-Oriented Businesses Structure (RBS) between the 1960s (before the renewal) and mid-1980s (beginning stage of failure). Additionally, the period of comparative prosperity during the late-1970s is also studied. Three periods reflect the crucial moments during phase 1: (1) the 1960s (1965 for ROB studies and late-1960s for building morphology studies), (2) 1978, and (3) 1985. The massive transformation started with ERA's vision and RTKL's plan for the CEP. The two big components were clearance of parcels with substandard buildings and facilitated pre-determined projects in terms of land use.

The CEP undoubtedly changed the downtown core's morphology (i.e., the project area) drastically as anticipated (see figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). However, it is important to note that the process of demolition and clearance of the existing fabric was not a problem by itself. The actual problem was the demolition scale (proportion of the existing built fabric demolished), the speed at which it took place, and the anticipation to fill the void in a very short period. In the simplest of terms, the RCPM area could not generate enough interest from developers and investors to "fill the renewal-led voids."

In July 1969, shortly after HUD approved the urban renewal application, ERA was set for property acquisition. During this time, ERA director David Hunt claimed that many people have the wrong conception of urban renewal as being 'wholesale clearance.'[5] Unfortunately, as the events that follow have shown, Eugene's experience was not different. As a part of the urban renewal project, ERA cleared at least 17.5 acres (45%) of the approximately 40.5 acres of developable land in the seventeen-block CEP area. The original downtown fabric resulting from over 110 years of growth was lost and, along with that, a rich mixture of diverse small stores. Although ERA initially hoped to demolish only seventy-seven of the 192 buildings in the CEP area,[6] it ended up demolishing at least 117 (61% of the total).[7] Of the at least 169 retail businesses in the late-1960s before the renewal, only forty-five were still present in 1978 (of the data available). These numbers mean that three-quarters of the original businesses left the project area. A total of at least 133 residents, 334 businesses, and twenty families were displaced.

All Interview Respondents (IRs) agreed that urban renewal happened because there were no alternatives to revitalize large-scale downtown projects. However, IR1 and IR2 believe that downtown Eugene's revitalization would have been possible without destroying the existing fabric to that degree. Eugene opted for urban renewal because "its leadership was part of a trend of cities and their residents who were seeking ways to make their core areas more vibrant with retail being a large part of the equation…. (Additionally) they also contributed to the city's needs for property taxes."[8] However, instead of making money available to renovate and restore old buildings, federal money was made available to simply tear them down, with compensation to the owners (IR1).

On the contrary, IR4 believes that the demolitions were “very justified,” however, some of them had “viable businesses on them.” According to him, “the buildings were substandard, and many could not be saved due to their condition or their rubble foundations.” However, acknowledging the importance of expensive rehabilitation of historic buildings like Smeede Hotel, AxBilly Department Store (Downtown Athletic Club), IR4 comments that

> *“Many things are possible if there is unlimited money. There wasn't. Not even close.” (IR4)*

Specifically, IR1 lamented the destruction of the old public market building on the SE corner of Charnelton and W. Broadway, describing it as a “wonderful old thing with arches and big spaces for wagons and stalls. The kind of place that would now be appreciated as beautiful and historic.” IR2 argues that “if more had been retained (many of which were more than a single story), there could have been more mixed-use and more character to the downtown. According to him, this is “more desirable to the residents, employers/employees and visitors and give each city’ core area distinction.”

6.3 CEP/RCPM Area Morphology, Urban Renewal Processes, and Land Sales Offerings

The following section begins with an explanation of the CEP and RCPM area’s urban morphology, urban renewal process, and the Land Sales Offerings (LSOs) to comprehensively explain the process of CEP-led transformation.

6.3.1 CEP and RCPM Area’s Morphology

The CEP area covered around seventy acres in the 17.5 blocks (sixteen full and three halves across nineteen different blocks) (see figures 6.4 and 6.5). The total available area within the CEP boundary (excluding the streets and sidewalks) was 41.6 acres, of which the RCPM area occupied 18.8 acres. Morphologically, each downtown block is 340 feet by 340 feet blocks, separated by sixty-six foot right of ways, including twelve-foot-wide sidewalks on both sides.[9] Each block is divided into four quarter blocks, each 160 feet by 160 feet separated by about fifteen to twenty-foot wide alleys.

Figure 6.1. The existing morphology before urban renewal (*top*) and RTKL's CEP plan which anticipated drastic changes (*bottom*).

Figure 6.2. ERA-led demolition of Brass Rail building which housed the Brass Rail Tavern, Loren's barbershop, and Pope's ice cream and donut shop (*top*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier PH338-008) and Allied Surplus Store building (*bottom*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier PH338-009).



Figure 6.3. Views of the mall before the renewal (*top*), after the mall (*middle*), and at present (*bottom*) [another two sets in the following pages]. The author took images on March 26, 2021. Before and after images were obtained through a City of Eugene staff.

Before renewal/ mall

After renewal/ mall



At present

D

H



Before renewal/ mall

After renewal/ mall

At present

A

C



6.3.2 *Urban Renewal Processes*

Broadly, ERA's role in the execution of the urban renewal (related to the pedestrian mall and retail core) consisted of constructing the pedestrian mall, improving public infrastructure, acquiring and clearing parcels, preparing parcels for redevelopment, and facilitate existing businesses and new investors.[10] Starting with mid-1969, the formal processes of urban renewal included (see figure 6.6 and Appendix K for elaborate discussion)-

1. Completion of structural surveys to determine if a building is standard, sub-standard, rehabilitation questionable, or rehabilitation feasible;
2. Acquisition of properties with substandard buildings and rehabilitation questionable if owners decline to rehabilitate;
3. Provision of assistance to businesses, property owners, and others displaced;
4. Clearance of properties;
5. Creation of "disposition parcels," many of which were created by consolidating several attached cleared parcels (see figure 6.7);
6. Announcement of Land Sales Offering (LSOs);
7. Review and acceptance/rejection of the proposals; and
8. Beginning of construction

After receiving the first round of federal grants, one of ERA's first steps was acquiring properties. ERA estimated that property acquisition alone would require around $1.75 million.[11] Other estimates were that the project would displace 172 businesses, seventeen families, and thirty individuals. This was later revised to include 241 businesses, sixteen families, and 132 individuals. Luckey's Club Cigar Store at 814 Willamette approved the first property purchased for $110,000 on May 9, 1969.[12] The clearance work started in January 1970. Court Loma at 857 Lincoln Street, Walling Building (Willamette and 11th avenue) were the first buildings to be demolished.[13] The first phase of mall construction began on May 4, 1970, with a groundbreaking attended by ERA and city officials and downtown business people, and the first new sidewalk was poured on May 13.[14]

6.3.3 *The Land Sales Offering (LSO)*

ERA offered at least four LSOs (#1 for six parcels on March 9, 1970, #2 for two parcels in September 1970, #3 for at least twenty-five parcels on August 13, 1971, and #4 for two parcels on November 3, 1971). Of the four LSOs, #1 and #3 are important and provide information about the first years of business investments in the CEP area (see figure 6.8). By the first proposal review for LSO #3, ERA had received ten new redevelopment proposals in response. The initial proposals, submitted by ten different bidders, promised more than $4 million in development in the renewal area. However, these offers were for only about a third of the properties put up for sale. By early November 1971, the nearly $4 million in investment dropped to $2.2 million as ERA rejected three proposals. While investors made several proposals, the CEP did not receive the anticipated number of interests, especially in the RCPM area during the two major LSOs (#1 and #3). While the proposals were integral to CEP's success, several displacement problems emerged, especially related to the small businesses. The acceptance of new proposals meant that the old occupants would face displacement.[15] One ERA staff compared these events of "displacements and investments" to a game of musical chairs, and that ERA was trying to make sure no one is left out without a chair (see Appendix L for further LSO story, Appendix M for details on communication between property owners and ERA, Appendix N for proposals on disposition parcels,).[16]

6.4 Downtown Area Transformation

One more topic requiring attention before discussing the CEP/RCPM area transformation concerns the larger downtown area. The "official" downtown area or Census Tract 39 (CT 39) occupied over 330 acres, which means the CEP area only occupied 21%. Between 1967 and 1977, the total value of downtown Eugene's retail sales and its share within Lane County's sales declined from over twenty-five percent in 1967 to eleven percent in 1972 and nine percent in 1977 (see figure 6.9).[17] Additionally, by 1977, downtown had grown to become a major center for Specialty Stores (bookstores, outdoor equipment, camera, computer, etc.), which boasted a share of forty-two percent (compared to only twenty-two percent in 1972).[18] Between 1970 and 1980, the downtown population decreased from 2,342 to 2,077 (-11%), and the median income declined by almost forty-four percent. Although the absolute numbers for downtown employees increased from 8,500 to 11,000 (+29.4%), downtown's share of Lane County employment numbers declined slightly from 12.1% to 10.7% between 1970 and 1980.[19]



<u>Figure 6.4. A diagram explaining the basic morphological characteristics and notations of the study area.</u>



Figure 6.5. Parcel map before the urban renewal with assigned block numbers shown in red.



Figure 6.6. The proposed process for developing a parcel (sc. a 1969 "Development Document" by ERA; recreated by the author).



Figure 6.7. “Disposition parcels” (thick red border) were created by ERA in early-1970 after consolidating the cleared parcels.



Figure 6.8. A map showing parcels offered as a part of LSO3 in August 1971. The ones that received an offer by November are shown in green (sc. Register Guard October 13, 1971, and ERA Report 3 (1), 1971).

However, in contrast to the late-1970s, downtown started to struggle in the early-1980s. For example, in the first two years, the total number of retail business employees declined from 2,585 in 1980 to 2,217 in 1982 (-14%) while retail business establishments decreased from 206 to 188 (-9%).[20] Also, by 1982, the level of permanent retailing employment declined by a small margin compared to 1976.[21] A 1983 report explained downtown's declining situation as follows,

> *"the root causes of problems Downtown are certainly not all visible. Many are tied to economic variables, not the environment, parking, structural conditions, or other physical factors. The regional economy has clearly not been a supportive factor to Downtown's commercial success since the mid-seventies, but this does not explain away all of Downtown's difficulties since the sixties. Clearly, a combination of regional economic phenomena and a decline in the relative draw or attraction of Downtown has brought it to the current conditions."*[22]

Based on the records of the gross-receipts tax (that businesses paid to facilitate the free parking program), downtown retail sales in 1985-86 totaled $94 million, which was a seven percent drop compared to 1974-75 when adjusted for inflation.[23] Furthermore, a 1983 report by LeBlanc and Company claimed that downtown was stagnant. However, regional projections through 1995 assumed that population boom and economic growth could add nearly $600 million (in 1983 dollars) in retailing and services spending.[24] The report further predicted that if a new major store arrived downtown, the businesses to benefit would be Apparel, Household goods, Specialty goods, Furnishings, and Restaurants. If non-major stores arrived, only Restaurants and Specialty stores would experience growth. In 1983, the total retailing area occupied in the downtown area was 1.41 million SF (only an 8.5% increase from 1975), whereas office spaces occupied 1.89 million SF.[25] General Comparison goods accounted for over forty-four percent space occupancy, whereas Eating and Drinking establishments had almost sixteen percent share.

6.5 CEP Area and RCPM Transformation

The following discussions illustrate and interpret the degree of the CEP and RCPM area's Building Morphology (BM) and Retail-Oriented Business Structure (RBS) by comparing three sets of periods as follows-

1) Before the renewal vs. realization of failure (1965/1968[26] vs. 1985);
2) Before the renewal vs. a prosperous mall period (1965/1968 vs. 1978); and
3) Period of decline (1978 vs. 1985).

The BM is compared in terms of Ground Floor Area, Total Floor Area, numbers, stories, Building Frontage length. The RBS is compared in terms of total numbers and numbers by business category, business mix, numbers per segment, and numbers per quarter block.





Figure 6.9. Charts comparing downtown retail sales for 1967, 192, and 1977. Downtown sales as a percent of total Lane County sales for Retail Category, 1967 vs. 1972 vs. 1977 (*top*) and total sales in 1977 $million for retail categories in Downtown Eugene (CT 39) for 1967, 1972, and 1977 (*bottom*).

6.5.1 Before and After (the late-1960s vs. 1985)

6.5.1.1 *Parcel Transformation*

The term "parcel" refers to "any tract or contiguous tracts of land in the same ownership uninterrupted by public rights-of-way whether one or more platted lots or parts of lots, as contained in the Project Boundary and Land Use Map."[27] Before the renewal, the CEP area contained 194 parcels, and the average area of each parcel was almost 11,000 SF. Within the area, which would later be the RCPM area, the total area occupied by eighty-three existing parcels (and forty-five buildings in them) was around nineteen acres. The parcel structure transformed as parcels at several locations got consolidated or broken down after the renewal (see figure 6.10). One of the primary intentions of the renewal was to facilitate building expansions and create new larger parcels. Between 1968 and 1995, twenty-three out of sixty-nine quarter blocks or one-third experienced a decline in parcel numbers whereas sixteen experienced an increase.[28] Parcel consolidation within the RCPM area was relatively less as three separate quarter blocks experienced parcel consolidations (parcels made larger) whereas six experienced parcel sub-division (parcels made smaller). Outside the RCPM area, the two northern blocks (eight quarter blocks) experienced the most considerable change as twenty-two parcels were cleared and consolidated to make way for the Cultural-Entertainment Center (Auditorium/Parking, Hotel-Conference Center/Parking).

6.5.1.2 *Building Morphology*

In the forthcoming CEP area in the late-1960s, a total of 192 buildings covered 26.7 acres of ground floor land (64.1%), and 7.38 acres (17.7%) were dedicated to parking. Following the demolition of substandard buildings, the CEP area's inventory declined from 198 to 94 (-53%), whereas from 92 to 57 (-38%) in the RCPM area (see figures 6.11, 6.12, and table 6.1). However, while only 46% of the buildings were in the RCPM before the renewal, the share increased to 61% by 1985. This finding suggests that a higher proportion of new building development occurred inside the RCPM area.

Figure 6.10. Maps and charts related to the CEP area parcels transformation. Late 1960s parcels map (*top left*), 1995 parcels map (*top right*), a map showing the loss or gain in parcel numbers between the late-1960s and 1995 for each quarter block (*bottom left*), and a chart showing the total number of quarter blocks (out of sixty-nine) with the respective difference in parcel counts between the late-1960s and 1995; for example, the second bar shows that twenty quarter blocks experienced a decline of one to five parcels (*bottom right*).

Figure 6.11. A comparison of the transformation of CEP area's-built form, the late-1960s vs. 1985.

Figure 6.12. Maps showing the distribution of undeveloped areas for the late-1960s (*left*) and mid-1980s (*right*). These plots were being used for parking while awaiting development.

Table 6.1. Comparing Building Morphology numbers for the CEP, RCPM, and oRCPM areas, the late-1960s vs. 1985.

Particulars	***CEP***		***RCPM***		***oRCPM****	
	Late-1960s	***Mid-1980s***	***Late-1960s***	***Mid-1980s***	***Late-1960s***	***Mid-1980s***
Total number of buildings	198	94	92	57	106	37
Mean GFA of buildings (SF)	5,808	10,426	6,848	8,947	4,906	12,703
Total GF Coverage (SF)	1,150,000	980,000	630,000	510,000	520,000	470,000
Percentage coverage	64%	55%	77%	62%	53%	48%

*oRCPM—the area outside the RCPM area but within the CEP boundary

In terms of the Building Area, two types of calculations show the nature of transformation: (1) Ground Floor Area or Coverage (GFA) or building footprint and (2) Total Floor Area (TFA). The total GFA declined from 1.15 million SF to just below 1 million SF (-15%) in the CEP area and from 630,0500 SF to 510,000 SF (-19%) in the RCPM area. In the CEP area, the average GFA increased from around 5,800 SF to over 10,000 SF (+78%) (see figures 6.13, 6.14, and tables 6.1 and 6.2).[29] However, the Cultural/Entertainment Center that included the Hult Center/Parking and The Hilton Hotel/Conference Center influenced this drastic change. Without these Cultural Center buildings, the mean area would have been 7,800 SF (+34%). At least forty-eight buildings in the CEP area were either retained or rehabilitated, which had an average GFA of 11,000 SF. Twenty-five of them were inside the RCPM area with the same average GFA. However, within the RCPM area, the GFA increased less severely, from 6,800 SF to 9,100 SF (+36%). Another major difference between 1968 and 1985 was the dramatic loss of smaller and medium-sized buildings (GFA less than 2,500 SF and between 2,500 and 10,000 SF) and a gain in larger buildings (more than 10,0000 SF up to 25,000 SF). Tiny buildings (< 2,500 SF) were reduced from 17 to 4, while medium-sized buildings (2,500 to 9,999 SF) halved from 56 to 28.

Figure 6.13. Maps showing the building morphology of the CEP area in the late-1960s and mid-1980s according to building footprint (Ground Floor Area).



Figure 6.14. Chart comparing the CEP area building distribution by Ground Floor Area (the late-1960s vs. 1985).

Table 6.2. A comparison of building areas in RCPM and CEP area.

Parameter	***1968***	***1985***	***% change***
Mean GFA of all CEP area buildings	5,808	10,426	+80%
Mean GFA of all CEP area buildings without the Auditorium-Hotel-Conference for 1985	5,808	7,800	+34%
Mean GFA for all RCPM area buildings	6,850	8,950	+31%
Mean TFA for all CEP area buildings	15,000	32,000	+113%
Mean GFA for post-renewal only buildings in CEP for 1985	5,808	10,000	+72%
Mean GFA for Post-renewal only buildings in RCPM for 1985	5,808	6,000	+3%

However, this data on GFA buildings do not provide a complete picture of the actual transformation, and it is important to consider the Total Floor Area (TFA). In the CEP area, the mean TFA doubled from 15,000 SF to 32,000 SF between 1968 and 1985 (for the data available). While the data on the TFA of all buildings is not available, the more than doubling as calculated from the available data shows a dramatic shift (see figure 6.15). Additionally, at least nine new buildings constructed between 1973 and 1985 occupied "giant" footprints of 12,500 SF or more (see table 6.3). Also, these buildings had a TFA between 25,000 SF to 200,000 SF. In summary, while the argument is not those large buildings created a negative impact, the sudden change in morphology (from a century-old fabric dominated by smaller buildings to mostly large buildings after the renewal) created a massive disturbance in the building and economic fabric of the retail core.

Figure 6.15. Comparison of the late-1960s vs. 1985 by the buildings' number of stories.

Table 6.3. A list of large post-renewal buildings between 1973 to 1982 and their area coverage.

Building name	***Area (SF)***	***Stories***	***TFA****
Hult Center	38,840	6	--
Hilton Hotel	16,950	12	203,400
Parcade	48,000	4	192,000
Hult Center Parking	40,000	4	160,000
Citizens Building	14,500	10	145,000
Atrium Mini-Mall	26,000	3	78,000
Conference Center	32,000	2	64,000
South Park Building	12,500	3	37,500
Far West Federal Building	12,500	2	25,000

* Note that the TFA was calculated by multiplying the number of stories for the respective building by its GFA. These numbers may be different from the actual numbers.

However, it is also important to discuss the overall nature of the entire "post-renewal only" construction until 1985 was slightly different. Of the thirty-nine new buildings within the CEP area, the mean GFA was 10,000 SF, of which twenty occupied less than 5,000 SF in the area. Twenty-five of them were inside the RCPM area, with an average GFA of 6,000 SF. Therefore, it can be concluded that the new post-renewal buildings in the RCPM occupied comparatively less footprint. For the thirty-nine new buildings in the CEP area, the mean TFA was over 36,000 SF. The TFA of the post-renewal buildings ranged from a low of 1,770 SF to a high of over 225,000 SF. However, the mean TFA for twenty-five of the new buildings inside the RCPM area was 12,000 SF only (i.e., on par with the pre-renewal morphological structure of the area before the renewal). Considering all the above data for building areas for the CEP area and RCPM area, a Welch two-sample t-test for GFA and TFA showed that the buildings constructed after the renewal were significantly larger in area than pre-renewal buildings (see Appendix O)

In terms of the Building Frontage, two variables provided an idea of how the BM changed before and after the renewal (i.e., the late-1960s vs. 1985). They are Total Building Frontage Length (TBFL) and Average Building Frontage Length (ABFL). In the RCPM area, the average for TBFL for the late-1960s was 150 feet and 130 feet for 1985. The ABFL mean was ninety feet for the late-1960s and eighty-five feet for 1985. Of the thirty-two semi-mall segments, nine lost TBFL, i.e., a portion of the street became vacant or accommodated ground-level parking.

On the contrary, only three gained TBFL. Only southern Olive leg experienced a high gain (of more than forty feet). Eleven of the thirty-two semi-mall segments lost ABFL, which means that building widths got smaller on average along with these segments. However, eight of them gained ABFL, which means that building widths got larger on average along with these segments. These were mostly along the eastern side of Willamette between 8th avenue and Broadway alley (see figures 6.16 and 6.17).



Figure 6.16. Maps showing the transformation of building morphology in RCPM area, late-1960s vs. 1985; the difference in TBFL (top left), ABFL (top right), and the total number of buildings (bottom). Note the segment names on the top left image; for example, W1BW means Willamette segment 1, part B, west side or B3BS means Broadway segment 3, part B, south side or O2AE means Olive segment 2, part A, east side.



Figure 6.17. Chart showing a "difference" in Total Building Frontage Length (TFL) and Average Building Frontage Length (AFL) for each side of the semi-segments before and after the renewal (in feet).

6.5.1.3 ROBs

As discussed previously, improving the numbers or capacity of ROBs in the CEP area and, more specifically, in the RCPM area was one of Eugene's urban renewal program's primary goals. However, the total ROB numbers declined in the CEP area from 231 in 1965 to 119 in 1985 (-48.5%). In the RCPM area, the total ROB numbers declined from 123 to 78 (-39%) (see table 6.4). Compared to the smaller and diverse small retailers before the renewal, a larger, fewer, and less diverse pattern resulted in most quarter blocks (see figures 6.18 and 6.19). The figures show that in 1965, business distribution was more uniform, and there existed a strong network of high (21-30 ROBs) and very high (> 31 ROBs) intensity segments. By 1985, the situation had become severely worse, with only the central Broadway segment having high business intensity (> 20 businesses). Specialty stores were the most important business in the RCPM area, followed by service-oriented businesses (see table 6.5). Another important business category, the Apparel sector, suffered a major setback by 1985 as its number reduced to only eight.

Figure 6.18. Maps of RCPM area showing ROB numbers for each building.



Figure 6.19. Maps of the CEP area showing the transformation of ROB numbers by segment between 1965 and 1985.

Table 6.4. Table comparing ROB numbers for 1965 and 1985.

ROB characteristics	***CEP area***		***RCPM area***		***oRCPM area***	
	1965	***1985***	***1965***	***1985***	***1965***	***1985***
Total number of ROB	231	119	132	78	39	41
% difference	-48%		-41%		+5%	
Average ROB each building	1.17	1.27	1.43	1.37	1.08	1.11

Table 6.5. Comparison of total ROBs numbers by category in the RCPM area, 1965 vs. 1985 (excluding department and merchandise stores)

Categories	***1965***	***1985***	***Decline (1965 vs. 1985)***
Apparel and Shoes	17	8	-9
Eating and Drinking	13	7	-6
Service Oriented	23	9	-14
Specialty	48	32	-16
Others*	22	19	-3
TOTAL	123	75	-48

* Others includes Appliance, Equipment, Electronics, Furniture and Home, Personal Care, other retail, miscellaneous retail

The major businesses categories considered for this study are (1) Apparel, Shoes, and Related; (2) Appliances, Equipment, Electronics; (3) Department and Variety Stores; (4) Eating and Drinking Establishments; (5) Furniture and Home; (6) Personal Care; (7) Service-Oriented[30]; (8) Specialty[31]**; and (9) Other Retail.

In addition to concentrating and maintaining ROB numbers, another key aim of the RCPM area was to diversify the retail base (tenant mix). Entropy is a measure that shows land-use mix (Bordoloiet al. 2013).[32] As the authors further clarify, “since the entropy is normalized using the natural logarithm of the number land uses, its value lies between “0 and 1” where “0” represents homogenous land use, and “1” indicates the tract of land is equally distributed across all land use types.” The RCPM area had an entropy value of 0.83 in 1965 and 0.84 in 1985, which shows that the business mix was almost identical. However, this data underscores a fact previously established—that there was a decline in the absolute loss for each category. Thus, another metric labeled as “entropy metric” considered the “log of total ROB counts” to reflect this. The new entropy metric (entropy * log (ROB counts)) was 1.73 for 1965 and 1.57 for 1985.

6.5.1.4 A Note on Tax-increment Funding

Of the $6 million that the City/ERA had to manage, ERA planned to fund $4 million through self-liquidating tax allocation bonds or "tax-increment financing." With this strategy, the increased property tax income based on property values within the renewal area would pay the bonds.[33] According to Callies and Gowder, Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is "a method of financing the redevelopment of underperforming property by isolating the value added to the property from a proposed redevelopment (the increment) and taxing that increment only to pay for the redevelopment project."[34] This method is commonly applied to a redevelopment district and is used to raise money from the incremental tax to pay bonds for the renewal/redevelopment project. The idea is that the area being redeveloped pays taxes to the city for the lower "base value" at the start of the project, after which the value freezes until the project is completed. Tax revenue generated by the difference between the actual value and the frozen value called the "Increment" would be separated exclusively for a project. As the property values and economy increase in the redevelopment areas in the future, the tax generated will not go to other districts in the city but will be used within the redevelopment district. One downside of TIF to the rest of the city was that any tax raised within downtown during the prescribed period could not be used outside the CEP area.[35]

For the CEP area, the lower frozen value was $39.1 million for 1968. The ERA intended to spend these tax dollars to subsidize private investors willing to develop downtown lands and pay various debts and bond issues. The economic consultants had estimated in 1968 that the urban renewal project would produce $56 million in increased property values by 1978, making the total value $92 million.[36] Between 1970 and 1986, more than $14 million was generated for urban renewal downtown, and several development efforts got assistance from this money (see figure 6.20).[37] ERA spent the money to subsidize private investors willing to develop downtown lands and pay for various debts and bond issues.[38]

6.5.2 Post-renewal to 1978

ERA successfully cleared many parcels by the early-1970s, drastically transforming the pre-existing urban fabric, mostly because a large portion of the project area was "empty," as seen in the 1972 scenario post-demolition (see figure 6.21). The challenge in the coming years and decades was to retain existing businesses and attract many new ones. The 1970s was a prosperous decade for the CEP and the RCPM area. By 1974, at least eighteen projects worth over $13 million in investments had been constructed or rehabilitated (see figures 6.22 and 6.23). Some of the buildings completed in 1974 alone included the Citizens Building, South Park Building, The Atrium, Valley Stationery, The Toy Shoppe, Luckey's Club Cigar Store, Latham's Luggage, and Mattox Pipe and Outdoor wear (see Appendix P for ERA's accomplishments between 1969 and 1974 and Appendices T.4, T.6, T.8, T.14 for a historical discussion on some of these buildings).[39]



Figure 6.20. Charts showing the values for tax generated annually in the CEP area (*top*) and assessed values (*bottom*) in $ million (sc. Register Guard September 14, 1986).

The only two options for downtown around the mid-1970s were to either strengthen its small businesses and diversify that or plan for a large retailer.[40] VRC had a lead on comparison shopping goods with four full-sized department stores, and the group felt that downtown should not try to go after VRC and should focus on a different model, like the one they proposed focusing on smaller stores. The smaller stores were more important than previously thought since department stores only accounted for 25% of total sales in the downtown area, according to KMA.[41]

The following statement from an RG newspaper article clarifies the situation of the CEP at the start of 1977-

> *"a downtown district with no vacant stores and a pedestrian mall that's the envy of many a city across the nation." Furthermore, the same article claimed that "ten years and $30 million later (urban renewal program), many of the old buildings that were getting marginal use had been replaced by new retail or office structures…. and most have been remodeled and are considered classics of the city's heritage…."*[42]

Figure 6.21. CEP area in 1972 by ground floor uses (*left*). Note that the buildings inside the thick red polygons were scheduled for demolition at the time. Original downtown map prepared by Bullier and Bullier Realtors, available at UO Library; recreated by the author). The situation of the CEP area after an early round of clearance (*right*) (sc. Register Guard January 2, 1972).



Figure 6.22. Images of new buildings constructed in 1974 in the CEP area (sc. ERA's 1974 Annual Report). The building names/businesses are a) Valley Stationery (b) Toy Shoppe (c) Luckey's (d) South Park building (e) Latham's (f) Mattox (g) Smeede Hotel (h) Atrium building (i) Citizens Building.



Figure 6.23. JC Penney building after the mall construction (*top*; sc. LCHMDC Catalog #GN10991) and the same building repurposed as the Centre Court in 1977 (*bottom*; sc. Register Guard December 17, 1978).

In a late-1977 interview, local businessman George Mattox contended that the downtown had been booming for at least the 'past five years.'[43] He also added that more people did not come downtown because they thought that the downtown was "a depressed area" (which Mattox denied and condemned bad publicity as the reason for such sentiment among the public). Harry Ritchie, who owned jewelry stores downtown and VRC, added that the region's population growth had made it possible for the mall and VRC to prosper simultaneously. Most importantly, even VRC manager Dick Hanses believed that VRC was not engaged in a "life-or-death battle" with downtown Eugene. Eugene's Mall Manager Ray McIver even claimed that the Eugene mall was a prototype for cities that have wanted to upgrade their core areas.[44]

The late-1970s was a comparatively prosperous time for the RCPM area, thanks to the businesses that stayed and new ones that came in (see figure 6.24). Downtown merchants stayed for various reasons. According to IR2, Downtown merchants and property owners remained downtown because they had significant investments downtown[45] , and tax increment dollars were available for physical improvements. Additionally, many merchants remained for a while "were located in buildings which the retailer-owned, or they were able to renegotiate much lower rents than they had been paying in the seventies." (IR1, IR2) Additionally, "others saw opportunities to serve a different customer type (specifically later in the 1990s), …. a growing number of office workers—Symantec, tenants of the new US Bank tower, more college students from U of O, and Lane CC, the Downtown Athletic Club)." (IR2) In another instance, he also recollects that some businesses were not doing well and getting displacement money through urban renewal was a good option to them (see Appendices T.5 and T.9 for more stories of late-1970s projects).

Figure 6.24. A map of CEP area's building morphology by dates of building construction, until 1978.

6.5.2.1 *Building Morphology*

During the post-renewal era until 1978, ERA commissioned at least thirty-two buildings in the CEP area. These buildings cumulated to a total GFA of more than 250,500 SF or 31% of all CEP area buildings at the time. The average footprint of these new buildings was 7,800 SF, or 11% less than the average of all CEP area buildings (see table 6.6). Post-renewal buildings' average area seems lesser because older buildings like Sears and Bon occupied very large footprints. Of the thirty-two new buildings, twenty-three new ones were constructed in the RCPM area, covering more than 140,000 SF GFA, with an average footprint of 6,160 SF (see figure 6.25).

Figure 6.25. Maps of the CEP area showing the transformation of the Ground Floor Area of buildings between the late-1960s and 1985.

Table 6.6. BM characteristics of post-renewal construction within the CEP area by 1978.

Morphological characteristics	***CEP area***		***RCPM area***	
	Post-renewal construction	***Share of post-renewal construction***	***Post-renewal construction***	***Share of post-renewal construction***
Total number of buildings	32	34%	23	40%
Mean area of buildings (SF)	7,830	--	6,160	--
Total ground floor coverage (SF)	250,550	31%	141,750	29%
Total number of ROBs	--	--	58	56%

6.5.2.2 ROBs

Even during the mall's most prosperous era in 1978, the RCPM area boasted only 98 ROBs which was 20% less in numbers compared to 1965 (see table 6.7). In new buildings built after the renewal within the RCPM area, there were fifty-eight ROBs in 1978 (41% share of all CEP and 56% share of all RCPM area businesses). This translates to 1.81 businesses per building, compared to 1.53 for the entire CEP area in 1978. It shows that new buildings of the 1970s tended to have a high proportion of retail businesses in them (see figure 6.26). ROB numbers declined for each category, too (see table 6.8). Specialty stores got reduced the most, a decline of eleven from forty-eight to thirty-seven. However, these stores were still the dominant type of business in the RCPM area.

While the mall strategy failed in the end, the intention of the retail center project to concentrate ROBs in the RCPM area had partially succeeded during the late-1970s. For example, while the distribution was diverse before the renewal, by 1978, it was more or less concentrated in the RCPM area and the block east of Broadway after the renewal efforts (see figure 6.27). Also, while the share of ROBs in the RCPM area (total CEP area numbers) in 1965 was 57%, it was 73% in 1978.

Table 6.7. A comparison of ROB numbers for 1965 and 1978.

ROB characteristics	*CEP area* 1965	*CEP area* 1978	*RCPM area* 1965	*RCPM area* 1978	*oRCPM area* 1965	*oRCPM area* 1978
Total number of ROB	231	143	132	104	39	39
% difference	-38%		-21%		0	
Average ROB each building	1.17	1.54	1.43	1.82	1.08	0.93

Figure 6.26. Transformation of RCPM area's ROB counts per building between 1965 and 1978.



Figure 6.27. Maps of CEP area ROB numbers by segment for 1965 and 1978 (*top*) and the difference between ROB counts by segment between 1965 and 1978 (*bottom*).

Table 6.8. A comparison of total ROB numbers by category in the RCPM area, 1965 vs. 1978 (excluding department and merchandise stores).

Categories	***1965***	***1978***	***Difference***
Apparel and Shoes	17	17	0
Eating and Drinking	13	10	-3
Service-Oriented	23	20	-3
Specialty	48	37	-11
Others*	22	14	-8
TOTAL	123	98	-25

* Others includes Appliance, Equipment, Electronics, Furniture and Home, Personal Care, other retail, miscellaneous retail

6.5.3 Period of Decline (1978 to 1985)

The comparative prosperity of the 1970s was not enough to justify and sustain the pedestrian mall strategy in the coming decades. Even during the "prosperous 1970s," several key RCPM quarter blocks/parcels and adjacent areas were still vacant. These vacancies could not be filled with any development in the early to mid-eighties—the period which experienced the first mall reopening. Between 1970 and 1981, the renewal agency had razed 117 buildings and constructed 3,000 parking spaces.[46] By this time, the total number of retailers had dropped by sixteen since 1976, while VRC boasted eighty-five retail businesses and a six percent increase over 1980's spending of $50 million.

The downtown community, which did not largely anticipate the mall's failure in the 1970s, began thinking of reopening Willamette between the 10th and 11th avenues as the mid-1980s approached. One of the first public accounts on the community's serious desire to reopen the mall streets was published in the Register Guard in June 1983.[47] At the time, many downtown merchants agreed that the mall was not working and some favored reopening a segment of Willamette and Broadway to traffic. Others presented ideas to improve the situation of the mall environment instead.[48] Additionally, several business owners were also troubled by the expense they had to incur because of subsidized parking—a problem that could have driven businesses and other employees, and customers away. For example, one of the Citizens building owners, Louis Walker, was quoted as saying that the free parking program at the employers' expense was not effective in improving downtown Eugene's retail and commercial growth.

According to IR4, "the recession of the 1980s, which involved the collapse of the lumber industry, was another huge blow…. Also, since the city did not own most of the property, it was (and is) privately owned by many owners…. it was never easy to have a broad strategy that everyone supported and had the money to invest in." IR1 shares his experience in the following ways-

> *"In the hard economic times of 1980-82, I had an office upstairs on the NE corner of Broadway & Willamette. It looked out over the vast wasteland, including the defunct fountain….. At one time, there were many little coffee shops, breakfast places, sandwich places, and these all gradually disappeared in the eighties and nineties."(IR1)*

Vacancies reflected the dire situation of the pedestrian mall around this time. For example, in June 1984, on one block face alone (the south side of Broadway between Olive and Charnelton streets), four of eleven storefronts were vacant.[49] Other stores were closed on Willamette Street between 10th and 11th avenues, on Olive Street north of Willamette, and the other two mall blocks of Broadway. Mark Matassa presented an accurate assessment of the mall for the mid-1980s by stating that "today the mall is neither a ghost city nor the "bustling hub" that planners and retailers have been dreaming about for two decades."

According to observations by a downtown merchant, several mall blocks were vacant, whereas those outside were not suffering as much. The mayor-elect of the time (mid-1984), Brian Obie, also supported bringing in vehicle traffic again to the mall to improve its situation.[50] By July 1984, a decision to tear a part of the mall segment along Willamette between 10th and 11th avenues was underway.[51] The ECC approved the reopening of the mall block and tearing down the Eugene mall's southernmost block in November 1984, confirming vehicle traffic in the 1000 block of Willamette Street for the first time in fifteen years.[52] The adopted design included "a two-way street with a raised median island, parallel parking and sidewalk bulges on both the east and west corners of Willamette at 10th but a bulge only on the east corner at 11th."[53] The reopening was completed in November 1985 for a price of $200,000.[54] As one article stated, "Helium-filled balloons lifted the cut ends above the street, and a half-dozen antique cars drove past to mark the historic moment." However, according to David Hunt, this segment was not originally in the plans.[55] The reason for its inclusion was that "at that time Montgomery Ward occupied the corner of 11th and Willamette…. the block was full of busy stores whose owners complained they were being left out of the mall." As Hunt further remarked, "they signed a petition to close off auto traffic…. They got what they wanted." (see figures 6.28, 6.29, 6.30, 6.31, and 6.32)



Figure 6.28. Views of the pedestrian mall in 1980 (sc. Register Guard March 30, 1980).



Figure 6.29. Views of the pedestrian mall in 1983 (top; sc. Register Guard June 19, 1983) and 1984 (bottom; sc. Wayne Eastburn as published in Register Guard September 25, 1984).



Figure 6.30. A sketch showing the redesign of Willamette (from 10th avenue intersection looking southwest). Sc. Register Guard March 28, 1985.



Figure 6.31. Image of the Willamette between 10th and 11th after it reopens to cars in November 1985 (sc. Register Guard November 15, 1985).

Figure 6.32. 1985 Eugene Celebration in the Central Plaza (sc. Register Guard March 17, 1987).

6.5.3.1 Building Morphology

The construction activity was very low in the RCPM area during the early-1980sas most new constructions took place outside the RCPM area. These projects were on the northern portion of the CEP area—the Hult Center and The Hilton Hotel/Conference Center (see figures 6.33, 6.34, and 6.35). The total GFA increased from 820,000 SF to 980,000—i.e., new constructions occupied at least 160,000 SF (+20%) of the ground floor in the project area. However, the total GFA in the RCPM area changed only slightly from 490,000 SF to 510,000 SF. The undeveloped five quarter blocks occupying 128,000 SF area within the RCPM had still not received any project by 1985.

Figure 6.33. Building morphology of the CEP area showing buildings by year of construction until 1983. The empty areas (white) were still awaiting developments.

Figure 6.34. The Hilton Hotel, Conference Center, and Hult Center in the Background, c. 1982. Sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_07616.

Figure 6.35. A 3D view of the CEP area in the mid-1980s.

6.5.3.2 <u>*ROBs*</u>

Between 1978 and 1985, the CEP area lost at least twenty-four ROBs (from 143 to 119), whereas the RCPM area lost twenty-six or a quarter of its inventory (the absolute decline was from 104 to 78) (see figure 6.36 and table 6.9). Almost all the CEP area decline was in the RCPM area, which justifies the realization of the pedestrian mall strategy's failure by 1985. The ROB numbers reached their lowest numbers for each category by 1985 (see table 6.10). In terms of ROB category, Apparel and Shoe stores reduced from 17 to 8; Eating and Drinking from 10 to 7; Service-Oriented from 20 to 9; and Specialty from 37 to 32. However, as businesses fled the retail core, the oRCPM area was not affected as much. In 1978, only 27% of all CEP area ROBs were in the oRCPM, whereas by 1985, the share was 34%. While this does not seem large, the absolute numbers tell the actual story. Even while the RCPM area lost businesses, the oRCPM area gained two businesses as the numbers increased from 39 to 41. In addition to the small businesses, JC Penney and Ward also left the area in this period, and only Bon and Sears remained. Both left by 1990 as well.

<u>Figure 6.36. Transformation of RCPM area's ROB counts per building between 1978 and 1985.</u>

Table 6.9. A comparison of ROB numbers, 1978 vs. 1985.

ROB characteristics	***CEP area***		***RCPM area***		***oRCPM area***	
	1978	***1985***	***1978***	***1985***	***1978***	***1985***
Total number of ROB	143	119	104	78	39	41
Average ROB each building	1.54	1.27	1.82	1.37	0.93	1.11

Table 6.10. A comparison of total ROB numbers by category in the RCPM area, 1978 vs. 1985 (excluding department and merchandise stores).

Categories	***1978***	***1985***	***Decline (1978 vs 1985)***
Apparel and Shoes	17	8	-9
Eating and Drinking	10	7	-3
Service-Oriented	20	9	-11
Specialty	37	32	-5
Others	14	19	-5
TOTAL	98	75	-23

Additionally, the data on ROB changes by street segments is also illuminating. Specifically, the east and west Broadway Mall edges and the southern half of Willamette Mall suffered a decline. However, one important aspect to note is that between 1978 and 1985, not all mall segments declined with the same intensity (see figure 6.37). Some mall segments gained a few businesses (like Olive street, central Broadway, and northern Willamette). The loss was suffered by western and eastern Broadway segments and the southern Willamette area, with one Willamette segment losing twelve ROBs. Thus, the Willamette segment between 10th and 11th was taken out first as a part of the mall reopening in 1985.

Another noticeable change included the loss of businesses in the Atrium mini-mall and southern portion of Willamette (see figure 6.38). Simultaneously, the central Broadway had improved with a further increase in a variety of ROBs. In a 1988 study, Al-Mulhim calculated the CBHI and CBII values for downtown Eugene for 1987.[56] According to the study, the intersection between Broadway and Oak had the Peak Land Value Index (PLVI) with a value of $20 PSF. Two decades before, in 1968, the PLVI was highest at the intersection of Willamette and Broadway, i.e., the “center” had shifted one block east.



Figure 6.37. Transformation of CEP area's ROB numbers by segments, between 1978 and 1985 (*top right and top left)*, RCPM area by the difference in ROB numbers by segment between 1978 and 1985 (*bottom left*), and RCPM area by the difference in ROB numbers by quarter block between 1978 and 1985 (*bottom right*).

Figure 6.38. Location of ROBs identified by major categories anchor stores (1) Bon (2) Sears and (3) Atrium for 1978 (*top*) and 1985 (*bottom*).

6.6 Small Business Dislocation

While the previous discussions explained the "quantity" of ROB transformation, they did not address some important characteristics of the post-renewal small business dislocations. One major reason small businesses could not stay in the renewal area is the high cost of bringing the buildings up to standard. Only a few property owners of substandard and "rehabilitation questionable" buildings decided to rehabilitate their properties, so they had to let ERA acquire them. On the contrary, buying a property and constructing a new building was not a problem they had to face in VRC. Based on the discussions in the ERA meetings, of the fifty-four "substandard" parcels, all but seven property owners decided not to redevelop, mostly because it would not be "feasible to do so."[57] (see figure 6.39) On average, the twelve properties (for which data is available) would have required more than $660,000 in total (or $55,000 each on average) to bring the buildings up to the code (in c. 1970 dollars).[58]

Figure 6.39. A map of the CEP area showing substandard or rehab questionable parcels (in dark grey) that property owners decided not to rehabilitate (*left*), and the price required to bring the respective parcel to code in c. 1970 dollars (*right*). Information was gathered from several ERA meeting minutes between 1969 and 1971.

Another particularly important calculation is related to the impact of urban renewal on small businesses in terms of how many survived and how many left the CEP area. While the high costs of developing property and sustaining the business were one reason, ERA showed contrasting attitudes (both for and against) when it came to small businesses.[59] David Hunt had argued at one point that the urban renewal program had made possible the collection of small shops mostly along Willamette street between 7th and 8th Avenue. However, in reality, many buildings which housed those businesses were set for demolition.

Much earlier in 1971, downtown merchant Leroy Latham (of Latham's Luggage) had boldly claimed that "in ten years (downtown) Eugene…. (was)…. going to be the most modern ghost city in the United States."[60] In his own words, Latham was able to sustain in the downtown location only because he owned four other stores and could use his basement as warehouse space. Notably, Latham also added that when urban renewal first started, "they (many businesses) ….. took the maximum $10,000 that was provided by urban renewal as relocation money and simply left town." He recalled receiving one urban renewal bulletin that boasted that it had successfully moved 133 merchants out of downtown. In Latham's view, the authorities called it "successful" because "the merchants moved out without public protest." He further mourned,

> *"our downtown lost its character; we lost the only thing we had to offer that the covered malls did not…. It was a place where all kinds of funny little service establishments were available-shoe repair shops, insurance salesman's offices, small drug store, eyeglass repair places-almost anything you could imagine. Little, low-rent, hole-in-the-wall places where the owner made a living and provided a payroll for a couple of people…. there were hundreds of small two-to four-person offices up over the stores. These people not only worked there, they shopped downtown. We all spent money with each other…. But when urban renewal upgraded the real estate, these marginal operators could no longer afford to pay the rent. They took the program's relocation money and left…"*[61]

In another instance, Frager's Women's wear, which had opened in 1940 and located at 986 Willamette street, closed in October 1975, citing urban renewal as the reason behind its demise.[62] Before leaving, the owner lamented that except for the chains, like Woolworth's and Newberry's, most had vanished or been sold to new owners and that the tearing up of the downtown for so long was the reason many downtown customers permanently left for VRC. In another instance, in early-1983, Norm Thompson Outfitters Inc., the upscale apparel and gift store (198 W. Broadway), closed its Eugene Mall store after just two-and-a-half years of opening.[63] According to the owners, the store could not achieve its sales goals, lost money, and overestimated the numbers of potential customers in the Eugene area. However, the owners did not blame the mall but the market in general.





Figure 6.40. Maps showing the location of businesses that survived and did not survive the renewal until 1978.

Of the at least 166 ROBs from 1968, only forty-four (27%) were still present in 1978, and the remaining 122 either liquidated or relocated outside the CEP.[64] This clearly shows the amount of impact of the renewal in displacing the existing businesses. Of the 134 ROBs from 1978, ninety-three (69.4%) were post-renewal businesses (see figure 6.40). Although a huge share of pre-renewal businesses (122 or 73%) did not survive, the CEP was able to attract at least ninety-three new ones, of which sixty-one (66%) were in the RCPM blocks (see Appendix S for a list of businesses before and after the renewal during different years).

There are a few other accounts that show the number of business dislocations and new arrivals. According to a September 1986 Register Guard article, twenty-six businesses survived along Willamette and Broadway, fifty-six did not survive, and thirty-one new ones arrived.[65] Similarly, twenty-six new ROB stores had come to the RCPM area in 1985 (compared to 1978), whereas thirty-eight had remained in the area until 1985 compared to 1978 (see table 8.1).

Similarly, according to the map in figure 6.41 showing the original and final location for eighty-seven businesses, at least thirty-eight (44%) relocated outside the CEP.[66] If the average center-to-center length between the road of two blocks is considered 400 feet, forty-five relocated less than two blocks away (each moved 375 feet on average), thirty-one relocated three to four blocks away (1,150 feet average), and eleven relocated more than four blocks away from their pre-renewal locations (2,100 feet average).

Table 6.11. Rate of businesses that survived and new business numbers after the renewal.

Year	***Nature of business***	***% survived***	***Area description***	***Source***
By 1978	ROBs	27%	CEP	Author's calculations from city directories
By 1986	All businesses	32%	Along Willamette and Broadway within the CEP area	September 1986 RG article
Year	***Nature of business***	***Number of new businesses***	***Area description***	***Source***
Post-renewal up to 1978	ROBs	93 or 69% of total	CEP	Author's calculations from City directories
Between 1978 and 1985	ROBs	26	RCPM	Author's calculations from City directories



Figure 6.41. Map of relocations and distance between original and relocated location from the early-1970s. The original source is an unpublished map from ERA obtained through the City of Eugene Staff.

6.7 Notes

[1] Although the second phase (the late-1980s to early-2000s) figuratively experienced the Mall's end with the reopening of the remaining seven segments, it occurred primarily due to a "domino effect" that the first phase had actually helped establish. In this regard, the second phase has been investigated with a different lens—a period that witnessed much more than the eventual sealing of the Mall's fate. In other words, although both phases suffered from a lack of retail business retention and new investments—thus leading to Mall reopening—the second phase should also be recognized for "newer" perspectives and approaches to downtown developments (which will be covered later).

[2] Mike Stahlberg, "New Wave of Eugene Officials Poised to Fix Mall's Mistakes," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 14, 1986).

[3] Hugh Prichard, "Our City Deserves a Flexible, Responsive Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 6, 1990).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Pepper Berkeley, "Shopping Center Threat Sparks Eugene Interest in Facelift for Aging Downtown Area," *Sunday Oregonian* (Eugene, July 9, 1967).

[6] According to ERA's 1969 Annual Report.

[7] From an unpublished manuscript on "1969 to 1976 Central Eugene Project"

[8] IR2, who was not present in Eugene in the early years, shares this based on experiences in working in urban environments and teaching housing and public policy at a university.

[9] George T. Rockrise, *Eugene Urban Design Studies* (Eugene, 1970).

[10] Some of the ways ERA facilitated existing large retailers were by providing parking and opportunities for expansion. The agency also assisted displaced old small businesses in acquiring loans to remain in the area.

[11] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, December 22, 1971" (Eugene, December 22, 1971).

[12] ERA, "ERA Report, 1 (2)"; "Agency Anxious to End Real Estate Leadership."

[13] ERA Yearly Report for 1969.

[14] ERA, "ERA Report, 2 (1)."

[15] For example, Joe Dursterhoff had just opened a small fish and chips restaurants two weeks ago and had spent $4000 for remodeling but now learned that someone wanted to buy the building in which he rented the space and tear it down. A Eugene attorney, Wayne Helikson, submitted a proposal on behalf of a group that wanted to spend $315,000 to build a condominium office building at the 11th avenue and Oak street corner. If the proposal were accepted, Dusterhoff and

other occupants, including the building's primary tenant, Ricketts Music Co., would be without a home.

[16] Ed Kenyon, "Eugene Renewal Officials Hope to Find Space for All Who Want It," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 17, 1971).

[17] LeBlanc and Company, *Markets and Services in Downtown Eugene* (Eugene, 1983).

[18] Comparison goods include apparel, general merchandise, specialty store goods, furniture, hardware, and related. Convenience goods include food and drug and personal care. Adjusted for inflation, the downtown retail sales only increased by a fraction between 1972 to 1977 ($86.8 to $89.4 million) but were far higher in 1967 (over $140 million). While the value of convenience goods sales did not change by much, the comparison goods sales reduced by at least $18 million compared to 1967.

[19] Ibid. Downtown's percentage share declined because Lane County's employed population grew at a higher rate from 70,000 to 103,000 (+37%).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Stahlberg, "New Wave of Eugene Officials Poised to Fix Mall's Mistakes."

[24] LeBlanc and Company, *Summary of Downtown Development Prospects, Issues, and Plan Alternatives* (Eugene, 1983). This was an unpublished September 1983 document by LeBlanc and Company on retailing and service and office-based employment for downtown Eugene. This document provides key information about the situation of the 1970s and early 1980s.

[25] Ibid. This was an unpublished September 1983 document by LeBlanc and Company on retailing and service and office-based employment for downtown Eugene. This document provides key information about the situation of the 1970s and early 1980s.

[26] ROB data for before the renewal is represented by 1965, whereas for building morphology, ERA's maps mostly from 1968 are used. In this sense, the late-1960s and 1968 are used interchangeably in discussions about pre-renewal Building Morphology.

[27] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18) [Modified December]* (Eugene, 1968).

[28] The year 1995 was taken to represent the post-renewal situation since a parcel map for the 1970s or 1980s was not available. A decline in numbers indicates that several parcels got consolidated to facilitate larger developments (one of CEP's goals). In contrast, parcels gain shows that larger properties were split up into smaller lots (suited for small businesses).

[29] The larger area is also attributed to the changes following the 1948 Ordinances.

[30] Service Oriented businesses includes Banks, Finance Companies, Savings and Loans, Dry Cleaners and Laundry, Barbers, Shoe repair, Printing stores, Beauty Salons.

[31] Specialty Stores include Books, Crafts, Fabrics, Gifts, Imports, Jewelers, Shoes, Liquor, Records, Musical Instruments, Sporting goods, Stationers, Toys, Hobbies.

[32] Rupjyoti Bordoloi et al., “Quantification of Land Use Diversity in the Context of Mixed Land Use,” *Social and Behavioral Sciences* 104 (2013): 563–572.

[33] “In the End, Renewal Pays for Itself (4th),” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 12, 1968).

[34] David Callies and W. Andrew Gowder, “Introduction,” in *Tax Increment Financing*, ed. David Callies and W. Andrew Gowder (American Bar Association, 2012).

[35] “In the End, Renewal Pays for Itself (4th).”

[36] Ibid.

[37] “Taxpayers Help Pay for the ‘Surgery,’” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 14, 1986).

[38] Because of the tax-increment scheme, the 1986 tax rate was $29.59 per $1000 instead of $28.99 for the rest of the city.

[39] ERA, “ERA Annual Report 1974” (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1975).

[40] FoLe, 1976. Citizens’ Alternatives for Eugene

[41] FoLe, 1976. Citizens’ Alternatives for Eugene

[42] “Downtown,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 2, 1977).

[43] “Conversation with George Mattox: He Tells about Being in Business for Yourself,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 20, 1977).

[44] Marvin Tims, “Eugene’s Core in a New Ballgame,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 27, 1977).

[45] For example, some were long time Eugene residents with deep family ties (e.g., M Jacobs, Rubenstein’s).

[46] Susan Pack, “'A Place to Work, Shop, Live and Have Fun’,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 1, 1981).

[47] George Barker, “Merchants Say Mall a Mistake,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 16, 1983).

[48] Some of them include, for example, (1) installation of overhead awnings to shelter shoppers from the rain; (2) removal of the massive wooden pedestrian sheller which now crosses 10th at Willamette; (3) establishment of an environment where small, low-rent offices and shops could return to the downtown district; and (4) condensing of the retail business district to make businesses easier for shoppers to find.

[49] Mark Matassa, "Downtown: Where Now?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 3, 1984).

[50] Ibid.

[51] "Here Are Downtown Decision-Makers," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 3, 1984).

[52] Mark Matassa, "City Votes to Reopen Mall Block," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 1, 1984).

[53] Jim Boyd, "Council Oks Willamette Reopening," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 9, 1985).

[54] George Barker and Jim Boyd, "Cars Regain Rule of One Block of Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 15, 1985).

[55] George Barker, "Willamette to Reopen at Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 28, 1985).

[56] Al-Mulhim Mohammed, "The Internal Structure of the Central Business District of Eugene, OR: 1949, 1968, and 1987" (Master's Thesis, University of Oregon, 1988), 30; Raymond E. Murphy and J. E. Vance, "Delimiting the CBD," *EconomicGeography* 30, no. 3 (1954): 189–222. The study was based on Murphy and Vance's 1954 study in which the authors developed a method to find the boundary of CBDs in terms of three indices Total Height Index (THI), Central Business Height Index (CBHI), and Central Business Intensity Index (CBII). THI is the total floor space of the block divided by total ground floor space, CBHI is total central business space by total ground floor space of the block, CBII is the percentage that total floor area that central businesses make up of the total floor space at all levels of the block.

[57] Data gathered from several of ERA's meeting minutes between 1969 to 1971, obtained from a City of Eugene staff

[58] Displaced businesses were eligible for several benefits (1) payment of moving expenses; (2) a federal small business displacement payment for possible loss of profit in a new location; (3) assistance in finding a new location.

[59] "Eugene's 'Sub-Culture' Shops Get Back of Agency's Hand," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 4, 1971). For example, one downtown merchant had asked if ERA director David Hunt would favor "sub-culture shops" like handcrafted items such as candles and leather goods that were housed in old structures acquired by ERA for clearance. In response, Hunt had said that he had no concern for them, relegating them to being "California imports" and "interim tenants who until six months ago weren't even in Oregon."

[60] Barker, "Merchants Say Mall a Mistake."

[61] Ibid.

[62] "Frager's 'Done in' by Renewal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 3, 1975).

[63] "Norm Thompson Closing Store on Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 3, 1983).

[64] The data was calculated by listing all the ROBs from respective city directories and manually comparing the name of the businesses.

[65] "The 'malling' of Eugene," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 14, 1986). Note that the list accounts all businesses and not only retail-oriented.

[66] The original map was obtained from City of Eugene office and traced for further analysis.

7 CHAPTER VII: ANALYSIS OF MALL FAILURE (CORE REASONS 1)- DESIGN AND PLANNING ISSUES

The second chapter on the reasons associated with the Eugene mall's failure focuses on the impact of the mall's design and planning issues. The following components have been examined-

1. Selection of the mall streets
2. Complete closure of eight segments to cars and issues related to vehicular circulation
3. Design qualities
    a. Conceptualizing the mall while the area was largely vacant
    b. Mall's shape and size
    c. Accessibility and Other Mall Qualities
4. Problems of spatial configuration (space syntax analysis)
    a. Pedestrian behavior in the mall
    b. Spatial connectivity of the mall
    c. ASA of a 6 X 6 block
    d. ASA of original 1969 design
    e. Relationship between the spatial and functional components

7.1 Selection of the Mall Streets

The existing anchor stores primarily determined the mall streets' selection, such that the anchors defined both the periphery and the center (see figure 7.1). These large retailers would act as magnets by attracting high pedestrian traffic volumes, whereas the buildings between would contain small businesses. The 1965 map of ROBs by segments in figure 7.1 shows that the future RCPM area would be composed of the same streets with maximum retail concentration before the CEP. According to the map, each of the eight street segments that would later become the mall constituted high ROB numbers, while the B-W intersection was the center. The highest number of retail businesses along two sides of a single street segment was twenty-six. Of the four street segments with very high ROB concentration (20 to 26), three were the future mall segments, and the other was the 8th avenue segment east of Willamette Street. The downtown was the city's only dominant retail core until this time. There were 911 retail businesses within the city limits, and the central half-mile radius (taking W-B as the center) contained 344 (38%) retail businesses.



Figure 7.1. Location of large retailers in the CEP area before the renewal, which influenced the extent of the pedestrian mall (shown in light blue). The street segment colors represent the intensity of retail business concentration in 1965, i.e., before the renewal.

7.2 Complete Closure of Eight Segments to Cars and Issues Related to Vehicular Circulation

The street closure created a barrier-free pedestrian movement, but it meant that patrons on the car either had to be dropped outside the mall or find parking. According to IR3, the pedestrian mall strategy and the concept of pedestrianization after arriving by car does not work because "you could not use as long as you could see it" and that people would only leave their cars if there were attractors (e.g., large retailers). IR4 also supports this claim, saying that the mall was "way too big and did not have cross traffic…. someone could not be dropped off or picked up at the door." Additionally, as IR3 further argues, "the mall was a kind of a dam—they stopped the flow of cars—and as bad as cars were—they (had to be) there and needed access." While this was partly true for VRC as well, its products were "known—franchise products—you'd know where you are going—no ambiguity." However, in downtown, "there was ambiguity.. (it was not clear)…. where visitors would be visiting."

A space syntax analysis for the central one-mile radius area for 1970[1] shows that the streets' ability to facilitate vehicular movement changed drastically after establishing the mall (see figure 7.2). According to the NAIN (global Integration) map, Willamette's central role as a north-south integrator or "major destination street" disappeared after taking out the streets, and the role was diverted to Charnelton, Ferry, and Patterson in addition to Hilyard street. In terms of the east-west streets, 13th avenue lost its role as a major integrator across the area, and only the eastern half remained dominant. Instead, 18th avenue appeared as an important connector. According to the NACH (global choice) maps, Willamette lost its significance, whereas the loop of 6th/7th/8th, Charnelton, 11th, and High streets in the CEP area became important vehicular streets (see figure 7.3). Interestingly, Willamette street completely lost its central role in the area, whereas eastern 10th ave appears important. Charnelton and 11th avenue retained their position as important streets.

In addition to converting the previously vehicular streets to a pedestrian-only urban space, the mall also addressed inefficient vehicular circulation and congestion. Since the mall area got restricted to cars, the main vehicular traffic flow concept included a one-way inner one-way loop and an outer one-way loop (see figure 7.4). The inner one-way loop moved east-west and north-south along 8th, Charnelton, 10th, and Oak, and an outer one-way loop moving west-east and south-north along 7th, Lincoln, 11th, and Pearl. The inner and outer loops would allow connection with other major arterials.

According to IR1, the traffic situation was exacerbated by converting streets into one-way in the 1970s. While agreeing to the fact that congestion and efficient vehicular circulation downtown was one of the reasons for creating the mall, IR2 adds another perspective, that “ironically, having a vibrant, economically thriving retail environment only works if lots of people can get to retail spaces and enjoy the experience of staying there so they’ll be inclined to come back again.”



Figure 7.2. Space syntax analysis (Integration maps) of the central area showing the situation before mall segment removal and after.

While congestion in downtown Eugene was one of the factors inspiring the downtown mall, the segments that would be converted to the mall were not among the heaviest traffic serving streets in the central area.[2] According to a 1969 traffic flow map (a time before the pedestrian mall)[3], streets that supported the most traffic were the 6th and 7th avenues leading to the Coburg road, which connected the city further to northern areas via Interstate 5 (see figure 7.5). Willamette Street (which stretched north-south across the city) also contained very high traffic, followed by Oak, Pearl, and High streets. While this data does not inform us of the capacity to flow ratio, i.e., if the streets were overburdened, it presents a clear view of the intensity of traffic movements in the central downtown area compared to other streets. More importantly, the future pedestrian mall segments (8th avenue, Broadway, and 10th avenue) only had a "medium" intensity of traffic in comparison.



Figure 7.3. Space syntax analysis (Choice maps) of the central area showing the situation before mall segment removal and after.



Figure 7.4. Traffic circulation plan in RTKL's CEP plan (recreated by the author; original from an ERA brochure).

Consequently, this means that first, the mall streets did not support the highest traffic flows. Second, diverting traffic away from these streets most likely strained other surrounding streets carrying higher traffic volume by an even higher degree. A traffic study from 1984 shows the situation after the renewal. At this point, since Willamette was closed, a high amount of north to south circulation was spread to Pearl and High streets, whereas the east to west circulation pattern had not changed by much.



Figure 7.5. Maps showing vehicular flow data for 1969 and 1984 (see figure Z.4 in Appendix Z for the original 1969 map).

7.3 Mall's Design Qualities

This section investigates the mall's design, specifically those that may have impeded the interaction between the mall patrons and the surrounding buildings. Understanding or predicting human behavior is an important aspect of public space research. Previous authors like Jan Gehl, William Whyte, Donald Appleyard, and more recently Vikas Mehta have studied human behavior in public places and the built environment's ability to impact people's moving and resting behaviors.[4] However, it is impossible to accurately quantify the impact of these designed environments on the success or failure of particular projects. Nonetheless, the mall's following qualities contributed to creating an "unfavorable" mall environment.

7.3.1 Conceptualizing the Mall when the Area was Largely Vacant

Conceptually and practically, the mall (as public space), completed beforehand, could not have effectively maintained a strong relationship with the built fabric that was yet to be developed. In other words, the mall design was conceived with a post-renewal (i.e., a largely vacant site) in mind (see figure 7.6). The figure shows the extent of clearance during early-1972 (red/purple) overlaid on the anticipated built form as seen in the final urban design plan of 1969. Although the original mall design shows distinct built forms and there were urban design guidelines in place, it was not probable to predict the characteristics of future developments for such a large expanse of vacant lands along the mall. By the time the RCPM was "filled" with buildings in the late 1990s and early-2000s, the community had realized that the mall strategy did not work as anticipated.

Figure 7.6. A map showing the difference between the anticipated RCPM area form and the situation after renewal-led clearance.

7.3.2 *Mall's Shape and Size*

This section discusses the mall's size and relates it with the extent of demolition in the RCPM area. ERA expected this cleared portion would be occupied by "new" buildings with retail or compatible uses (see figure 7.7). The mall spanned 3000 feet across the three streets and eight segments along Broadway, Willamette, and Olive. In this sense, the total length assuming building frontage (on both sides of the mall) would be 5,120 feet (2 * 3,000 – (length of streets and alleys)). According to the analysis of all malls in the US, the average length was 1,500 feet, and the median was 1,225 feet. This means that the Eugene mall was at least double the length of a typical mall. Additionally, the H-shape deviated from the typical strategy of having a linear mall, which may have been "confusing" to mall patrons compared to if it was linear.



Figure 7.7. Analysis of mall's size (length).

However, the problem was not only the length or shape but the extent of demolition and the anticipation for the retail or compatible businesses to fill those areas. According to the 1972 data, the demolished buildings spanned 1,880 feet along the mall or thirty-seven percent. The median Average Building Frontal Length (ABFL) for 1985 buildings in the RCPM area was seventy-three feet (considered eighty feet for ease of calculations). Considering that all the empty frontage along the mall would have to be filled with median-sized buildings, at least twenty-three such new buildings would have been needed just inside the RCPM area.

7.3.3 Accessibility and Other Mall Qualities

A historical examination and study of the mall's design (drawings) show that several issues limited its ability to function effectively as a public space, provide access and visibility, and support the RCPM area. Some of them were the fountain in the Central Plaza (intersection of B-W), playgrounds, seating, public toilets, and mall covers (see figures 7.8 and 7.9).

During the initial public review of the mall design, the fountain was one of the elements that had garnered attention, receiving comments like "perplexing," "sterile expanse of central plaza guarded by Penney's high prison walls," and the "inexplicable roof over 10th avenue at the Willamette crossing."[5] Additionally, some had argued that the central plaza would be too formalized, i.e., it would channel pedestrians instead of allowing them to move freely.[6] The fountain stood twenty-foot tall and had moving pools of water, constructed to serve as the focal point of the mall area's main plaza. According to the plan, the central fountain occupied 150 feet by 120 feet of space—too large considering the location—the key retail business intersection. Even Mayor Lester Anderson had suggested that the fountain might have been too big. In May 1977, ERA hired Eugene landscape architect Peter Thompson to improve the central mall fountain's design.[7] Thompson commented that downtown shoppers and visitors congregated on the mall at the intersection of Broadway and Olive streets and not on Broadway and Willamette's plaza area.[8] Thompson further contended the area had "no relationship at all to the overall retail area" and further suggested providing more seating, plantings, and possibly some retail activity on the Broadway and Willamette plaza. A July 1977 survey among mall merchants to determine whether they believe the fountain should be removed or modified showed that many favored demolition or, at least, alteration.[9] ERA's Assistant Director, Bob Thomas, said the existence of the fountain helps reduce the size of the plaza "when there's nothing happening there, which is most of the time." The fountain was later taken out in mid-1996.[10]

Figure 7.8. A 1971 view of the Central Plaza fountain looking toward Broadway (sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_17611).

Figure 7.9. Views of the children's play area along Willamette (*left*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier 2010_VRC_10515) and along Broadway (*right*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_17618).

Another problem was the mall components blocking access and visibility, specifically along Western Broadway. Later, Don Miles' firm remodeled this section in 1987.[11] The $658,000 refurbishing of the two segments removed "bulky structures that had blocked shoppers' view of businesses and areas susceptible to muggers." It also took the restrooms and post office and reduced the size of the children's play structure.

One additional design problem in any public space in Eugene is its rainy weather. In the initial review of the mall design, several audience members had expressed support for covered mall space. At the same time, the designers favored open-air design based on their observations of existing malls and shopping centers.[12] One of the earlier realizations of the need for a mall cover came around early-1977, as most downtown merchants believed that covered walkways to protect mall shoppers from the rain would help their businesses and attract new retail stores.[13] The renewal agency board was told it would cost an estimated $739,000 to $6 million to cover the mall, depending on whether a relatively inexpensive rain cover or an air-conditioned mall were installed (see figure 7.10).



Figure 7.10. Proposals for mall cover from 1980 (*left*; sc. Register Guard August 1, 1980, drawn by Feril Angco) and 1983 (*right;* sc. Register Guard March 1, 1983).

Around late-1977, the issue resurfaced again, with the concern being to keep shoppers dry during the winter months.[14] Bob Thomas, a staff for the Joint Pedestrian Cover Committee, led the program.[15] In February 1978, the ERA board agreed to spend $5,600 for a study to find ways to protect mall shoppers against the weather through a contract with a Eugene Architectural Firm of Herbert & Keller for a study.[16] A few months later, in May, ERA and the South West Oregon Chapter of AIA surveyed the issue of a pedestrian mall cover.[17] A total of 336 responses were evaluated, and most people who returned the questionnaire thought the mall "is a special public place that deserves special treatment." The respondents "favored awnings over any other form of mall cover, but also frequently mentioned the possibility of partial cover between buildings (such as across the mall) or a pedestrian cover such as an arcade, integrated within new building construction." However, unlike "Merchandise selection" and "Convenience," the "weather" was not among the participants' top priorities for visiting downtown. A workshop constituting about eighty designers and other professionals conducted as part of the mall cover study concluded that the mall's other problems were more important than weather protection.[18] An August 1980 plan included a $2.75 million proposal to build covered walkways for pedestrians that would cover Broadway from Charnelton to Oak streets and one side of the Olive street leg.[19] Finally, in April 1983, a study that proposed covering the Eugene Mall with various towers, shelters, and canopies was accepted by the Downtown Commission members.[20]

7.4 Problems of Spatial Configuration (Space Syntax Analysis)

This section discusses the space syntax analysis of the CEP area. Specifically, the goal is to understand the area's potential in facilitating pedestrian movement once the patrons arrived Downtown.

7.4.1 A Note on the Scope and Limitations of Space Syntax Research

Space syntax is utilized as an explanatory and analytical tool because researchers have used such analyses to improve the understanding of towns, cities, and regions of all sizes across multiple geographies. However, although the street configuration is directly linked with the built morphology, it is only one of the many contributing factors. For example, considering the urban renewal project—characterized by wholesale destruction, reservation of parcels for a specific use, pre-specified land-use categorization by area—as opposed to more natural and incremental growth, space syntax could have limited implications in explaining the impact of street configurations in determining the building and retail business morphology.

Additionally, the spatial configuration is not the only factor determining key decisions related to the location of businesses. A few examples exist regarding a previous point on how socio-political or other economic decisions and policies can override the "spatial" knowledge. For example, the central 8th avenue area, one of the most connected segments, laid vacant for a long period before generating interest in the late-1970s from Pankow Development for an office tower. Although occupying a central location, the project got canceled due to the developer's dissatisfaction with the city's handling of the proposed development. It was not until the mid-1990s that the US Bank building was finally constructed. This example shows the role of the area's socio-political climate in attracting investments even though the location is spatially well-connected. In another instance, the western blocks adjacent to the mall, which Broadway Place now occupies (established in 1999), are also very well connected in the integration map. However, development came very late because ERA reserved it for a long time for parking, and zoning would not allow residential use.

7.4.2 Pedestrian Behavior in the Mall

Don Miles Associates and PPS had conducted a pedestrian behavior study of the mall area in 1986 as a part of the city's effort to improve the retailing environment.[21] The report argued that the strategy for improving the quality of public space on the mall needed to be based upon the idea of an urban streetscape and not an urban park. Specifically, the public space design problems in the mall cited by the study were that the trees were creating visual and physical obstructions which hinder movement and merchandising, and linkages between the mall and the surrounding community were weak due to poor signage and entryways.[22] The study claimed that the southern block of Willamette (10th to Broadway) had high visitor numbers on weekdays and Saturdays due to the variety stores, restaurants, shops, the Downtown Athletic Club, and the transit site (see figure 7.11 and table 7.1). The study also argued many advantages of reintroducing cars, chiefly to concentrate and intensify pedestrian activity, increase accessibility to the center of downtown for shoppers, employees, clients, delivery, service, and emergency vehicles, increase the visibility of the pedestrian-only zone and shops along with it, and create opportunities for a successful intermingling of pedestrians, vehicles, public amenities, and retail activities.

The pedestrian counts data for 1986, shortly after the first mall was taken out, shows that central Broadway was the most traversed along with other segments along the street (see table

7.1). The numbers along Broadway have a stark difference with Olive and Willamette, which were receiving fewer pedestrian movements.



Figure 7.11. Maps showing the data on the pedestrian count for c. 1967, i.e., before the mall (*top left*; RTKL 1968), for 1986 (*top right*; Don Miles Associates and PPS 1986), and for 1991 (*bottom*; sc. Register Guard September 26, 1991).

Table 7.1. Pedestrian counts for the mall segments in 1986.

Street segment	***Pedestrian count (1986)***
B1	139
B2	205
B3	116
O1	44
O2	60
W1	34
W2	78

7.4.3 The Spatial Connectivity of the Mall

At least one space syntax study was conducted for Eugene by Aso Jaff in 1997.[23] Jaff investigated the relationship between the layout and configuration of the publicly accessible open space system of downtown Eugene and patterns and densities of pedestrian movement. The author found that local Integration correlated more with pedestrian numbers (R^2= 0.25) compared to global Integration (R^2= 0.19) (see figure 7.12). The study also found that Downtown Eugene's encounter rate (a measure of persons observed over 100 meters per minute) was remarkably lower than in other cities.[24] Furthermore, Jaff demonstrated that local Integration has a better correlation to pedestrian movement than global Integration.[25] Second, the grid's global rather than local structure was found to influence the distribution of vehicle movement. Jaff also computed the relationship between the distribution of street-level functions and the integration value of the street segments and concluded that only a weak relationship existed between retail, gastronomy, and professional services plotted against Integration.[26]



Figure 7.12. Scatter diagrams of Aso Jaff's 1997 space syntax study of downtown Eugene (Jaff 1997, 14).

This analysis aims to determine if the Downtown (central one-mile area) occupied the spatial center/area of the most-connected streets of the city (see figure 7.13). The year of study is

1970, which is significant because it is one of the first years after the major arterial system was completed in Eugene. Additionally, the year also presents Eugene's situation before urban renewal formally proceeded the intervention on streets. The two measures considered for this study, Choice (NACH radius 800m) and Integration (NAIN radius 800m), help explain the central area's spatial characteristics with respect to the entire city.

According to the analysis, the CEP area was not the integration (spatial) core within this one-mile central area. Instead, the area to the west/northwest of the CEP area was the most integrated for the pedestrian movement, and in theory, the foreground network for local destinations. The Broadway-Willamette (B-W) intersection, considered the Downtown's central intersection, does not represent the most connected within the urban system considered. However, this is not to say that the CEP area was not highly integrated. Interestingly, a network of streets with the highest connectivity formed by Charnelton street, 8th avenue, and Pearl street circles the RCPM/CEP area. Additionally, the NACH r 800 m map shows that CEP area streets did not facilitate the fastest through movement across the area either. This point is crucial because the analysis predicts that downtown patrons who arrived at any given point in Downtown would not have moved across the CEP area during the course of natural movement between downtown destinations.



Figure 7.13. NAIN radius 800 m map for the central one-mile area (left) and NACH radius 800 m map (right) showing that CEP area was not the spatial center.

To further understand the potential movement behavior of pedestrians inside the CEP/RCPM area, this study incorporates two sets of space syntax analyses (see Appendix Q for further space syntax analysis of entire Eugene):

1. Angular Segmental Analysis (ASA) of the 6 X 6 block downtown core for 1978; and
2. ASA of the original 1969 design

7.4.4 ASA of a 6 X 6 Block Downtown Core for 1978

The two important questions for the ASA discussed next are: (1) was the mall area "highly connected" from the point of view of street configuration? (i.e., did the mall area stand out as an area with high movement potential and thus, suitable for business investments?) and (2) what can the syntax analysis reveal about the pedestrian movement characteristics within the downtown core?

The area considered for this study spans three blocks in each direction of the B-W intersection for a total of thirty-six blocks (6 X 6) for the year 1978.[27] Figure 7.14 illustrates the Choice (NACH) and Integration (NAIN) map for the 6X6 area. One observation that stands out is the central core in the NACH map formed by 8th avenue, Broadway, Olive, Willamette, and Oak—the major streets in the RCPM area. However, the Willamette segment does not stand out as the most connected within this core.



Figure 7.14. Space syntax analysis of the 6 X 6 block downtown core (including alleys) for 1978.

On the other hand, the NAIN map shows that the whole lengths of 8th avenue, Charnelton street, and Oak street are the most integrated. However, there is not an identifiable integration core. Although less pronounced in the NAIN map than NACH, the network around the RCPM area formed by Charnelton street, 8th avenue, and Oak street have very high values for both NAIN and NACH. In conclusion, considering the natural pedestrian movement across the downtown core, the mall area had a comparatively higher potential of facilitating quick trips across the system but not as much as destination streets (except Broadway).

7.4.5 ASA of the Original 1969 Design

The analysis shows that considering the mall elements, the network of Charnelton, 10th ave, the southern half of Willamette alley, Oak alley, Oak street, and 8th avenue would have formed the network the most well-connected streets in both Integration and Choice maps (see figure 7.15). Interestingly, neither Willamette nor Broadway appears to be spatially important. Clearly, the mall elements which occupied the central locations impacted the nature of pedestrian movement and influenced the potential of the mall segments to connect the system spatially.



Figure 7.15. Space syntax analysis of the original 1969 mall design.

7.4.6 Relationship Between the Spatial and Functional Components

This section discusses space syntax analysis results to identify the relationship between space (i.e., the mall's street system) and the nature of the building and land-use morphology for two time periods: 1978 alone and the difference between 1978 and 1985. Two questions crucial to the space syntax analysis are:

1. Is there a relationship between spatial and morphological characteristics of the RCPM area for 1978? (to show if the post-renewal developments were related to the spatial connectivity of the mall within the larger system); and
2. Is there a relationship between the spatial characteristics of the RCPM area and changes to its RBS characteristics between 1978 and 1985? (to show if the nature of ROB changes (mostly decline) between the two years had any relationship with the nature of the mall's spatial connectivity within the larger system).

Space syntax map for the year 1978 is used for both analyses. Specifically, this section discusses the following-

1. Statistical test of the relationship between ROB and syntactic measures for 1978;
2. Statistical test of the relationship between ROB difference between 1978 and 1985 and syntactic measures for 1978; and
3. A qualitative assessment of (2) above, i.e., the relationship between ROB difference between 1978 and 1985 and syntactic measures for 1978.

7.4.6.1 ROB vs. Syntax

The results show that a significant relationship exists between ROB counts and Choice and Integration within the 6X6 block area (see table 7.3). The slopes (9.0 for NAIN and 15.9 for NACH) show that for every unit change in NAIN, the number of ROBs changes by 9, whereas for every unit change in NACH, the number of ROBs changes by 15.9 (see figure 7.16). This indicates that although significantly related to both measures, the business intensity is more sensitive to Choice values than Integration.

Table 7.2. Results of the regression analysis results of the 6 X 6 block area and ROB counts for 1978.[28]

Syntax variable	*R-sq*	*Equation*
NAIN[29]	0.04 (p-value 0.006)**	ROB = 9.0 * NAIN – 7.8
NACH[30]	0.06 (p-value 0.002)**	ROB = 15.9 * NACH – 9.0
*Significance levels * < 0.05 **< 0.01 *** <0. 001*		



Figure 7.16. Scatterplot for ROB counts for 1978, and NACH (*left*) and ROB counts for 1978 and NAIN (*right*).

7.4.6.2 ROB Change Between 1978 and 1985 vs. Syntax

Another investigation determining a relationship between retail business structure and street configuration is to test whether the street segments' spatial characteristics can explain the decline of businesses along each street segment between 1978 and 1985.[31] This investigation uses the Welch Two Sample t-test analysis (in R-Studio). The two groups which defined two sets of street segments (dependent variables) are-

- Group 0—street segments with a decline in ROB numbers between 1978 and 1985; and
- Group 1—street segments with no change or increase in ROB numbers between 1978 and 1985

A derivation of useful conclusion from this analysis must meet two criteria—

1. The mean value for either NAIN or NACH or both syntax measures for Group 1 should be more than Group 0 because it will be against the assumption for segments experiencing ROB growth to have lower syntax values; and
2. There must be a significant difference in mean between Group 0 and Group 1 segments for either NACH or NAIN or both syntax measures (evidenced by a p-value less than 0.05).

A result that meets both of these criteria will favor the alternative hypothesis that segments that experienced ROB growth had a significantly higher syntax value than those that experienced losses between 1978 and 1985 (see figures 7.17 and 7.18).

Of the seventy-seven street segments within the RCPM area, twenty had gained businesses; six did not experience change; and fifty-five lost businesses. Thus, twenty-six were in Group 0, and fifty-one were in Group 1.[32] According to the t-test results, NACH vs. ROB differences had a p-value of 0.038 (i.e., < 0.05), signifying a significant difference in the mean values between the two groups (see table 7.4).[33] Additionally, the mean value for NACH for Group 0 was 1.2497, whereas Group 1 was 1.287. Although NAIN did not have a significant difference in mean, the mean of Group 0 was 2.079, which is lesser than Group 1's mean of 2.104.[34]



Figure 7.17. Histogram of the difference in ROB counts (by segment) between 1978 and 1985 (*top*) and a Boxplot showing NACH values for two groups of "ROB changes between 1978 and 1985" (*bottomt*). Group 0- ROB numbers declined, and Group 1-ROB numbers did not change or increased. Group 1 has a significantly higher mean compared to Group 2.



Figure 7.18. Scatterplot of NACH (x-axis) vs. diff between 1978 and 1985 ROB numbers (y-axis).

Table 7.3. A table summarizing the t-test analysis results between space syntax measures and ROB number change between 1978 and 1985.

Syntax variable	***Is there a significant difference in mean?***	***Is the mean of Group 1 more than Group 0?***
NAIN	No (p-value 0.2438, > 0.05)	Yes
NACH	Yes (p-value 0.0338, <0.05)	Yes

Thus, this analysis concludes that the choice measures were significantly different for street segments that lost or gained ROB between 1978 and 1985. Furthermore, this points to the phenomenon that ROB numbers generally declined along segments with lower potential to support through-movement or short trips through the system, whereas ROB numbers generally did not change or increased along segments with higher potential for through movement.

Additionally, the regression analysis between NACH and ROB difference between 1978 and 1985 shows a significant relationship with an R-sq value of 0.06 (p-value 0.025).[35] The NACH slope from the analysis shows that a 1-point change in the NACH value of a segment would change the ROB difference between the two years by 13.9 ROBs.

7.4.6.3 A Qualitative Assessment of the Relationship

The discussions to follow present a qualitative interpretation of the relationship established above. According to figure 7.19 on the difference in ROB numbers between 1978 and 1985, B1A, B3B, three southern Willamette segments, and southernmost Olive segment lost businesses. In contrast, three Olive segments, the central Broadway portion, and northern Willamette gained businesses. Interestingly, Willamette 3A and 3B, which were the first segments to reopen to cars, had very low NACH values. This segment also faced the greatest loss between 1978 and 1985 (-14 and -10). Additionally, the Central and Eastern Broadway segments, which have higher NACH values, were doing better in terms of retail businesses. The syntax map also illustrates that the Northern Olive has a better choice value than the southern Olive segment.

To further understand the phenomenon, each of the sixteen semi-segments was given "points" based on their intensity of ROB numbers change and NACH values. Table 7.5 shows whether each segment had a match between points for NACH and ROB difference. A match would indicate that the respective segment had either (1) lost businesses and had low NACH values or (2) gained business and had high NACH values. According to the table, of the sixteen segments, there was a match for twelve segments. The segments O2A, B3A, B3B, and W1B, showed contradictory values, of which only B6 experienced business loss but has high NACH values.

Table 7.4. A qualitative assessment of the relationship between ROB number change between 1978 and 1985 and NACH values for the sixteen mall semi-segments.

Mall segment	***Points for ROB difference****	***Points for NACH****	***Match between ROB and NACH Rank?****
Olive 1A (O1A)	4	4	**Y**
Olive 1B	5	4	**Y**
Olive 2A	5	3	N
Olive 2B	1	2	**Y**
Broadway 1A (B1A)	2	3	**Y**
Broadway 1B	4	4	**Y**
Broadway 2A	5	4	**Y**
Broadway 2B	5	5	**Y**
Broadway 3A	3	5	N
Broadway 3B	1	4	N
Willamette 1A (W1A)	2	3	**Y**
Willamette 1B	5	3	N
Willamette 2A	4	3	**Y**
Willamette 2B	1	2	**Y**
Willamette 3A	1	2	**Y**
Willamette 3B	1	1	**Y**

* Points for ROB difference: 1 for the highest decline, 0 if no change, and 5 for most gain between 1978 and 1985. Points for NACH: 1 if least connected and 5 if most connected.
** Considered a match if there is up to a 1-point difference between ROB Rank and NACH Rank (e.g., 3 and 4 or 2 and 1 are considered a match but not 1 and 3).



Figure 7.19. Change in ROB numbers between 1978 and 1985 for the mall segments (*left*) and NACH map of only the RCPM area (*right*). Note the labels for each semi-segment.

Another set of investigations analyzes the relationship is that between the syntax and ROB distribution by category (see the syntax and ROB 4X4 grid map). One observation is that both Bon and Sears are located along Charnelton street, which is highly connected. Other streets adjacent to the anchors also have high Integration measures. Additionally, in the NACH maps, the paths from inside the mall area in the east-west directions leading toward both anchors have high values compared to those coming toward the mall from the outside. Northern Olive is more connected than the southern segment, aligning with the former's robust mix of businesses. Furthermore, the maps in Figure 7.20 show agglomeration and diversity within the CEP area. Note the anchor stores (1) Bon, (2) Sears, and (3) Atrium.

Figure 7.20. Maps comparing the location of ROBs by category and NACH map for 1978 (*top*) and 1985 (*bottom*).

In summary, the findings suggest that as the project area transformed after the renewal, the street connectivity dictated the building morphology and retail business structure to some degree. This relationship was shown statistically and through a qualitative interpretation. However, the values for the strength of the statistical relationship are very low. Future research incorporating the length of the street segments, width, and other control variables could establish a stronger relationship between urban morphology's spatial and functional components. The space syntax analysis's major contribution is establishing a statistically "significant" and a practical relationship between downtown Eugene's core's morphological components in the post-renewal context.

Furthermore, this analysis implicated three crucial aspects of space syntax analysis and urbanism at once:

1. Space syntax can only partially explain the impact of spatial configuration in cities' economic or morphological organization; and
2. Several invisible forces in addition to the spatial configuration define the nature of the building and land-use morphology in addition to the grid system and natural movement.

Space syntax analysis is not well-equipped to find relationships at the individual segment or building scale. Instead, its strength lies in arriving at meaningful conclusions about the "micro-morphological area."

7.5 Notes

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[1] Reason for selecting the year 1970: The time between 1965 to early-1970 is a significant year for Eugene and the CEP. By 1970, the major arterials were complete, VRC was constructed and opened, and the CEP had just begun with the demolition of acquired parcels and the first LSO. Analyses of these years will help identify the logic behind CEP and MALL, for example, selecting the Mall streets selected for vehicular closure or whether a space syntax analysis can provide some logical explanations.

[2] Statistical analysis between space syntax variables and vehicle counts for 1969/1970 for downtown showed a "significant" positive relationship. The dependent variable considered for each segment was the log of total vehicle count for 1969, whereas the explanatory variable was NACH (a space syntax measure). The results indicate a medium-degree of relationship (R2 = 0.25, p-value=0.000). In other words, twenty-five percent of the variance in the traffic volume across the streets in Eugene for 1969-70 could be explained by the configuration of the street

system alone. The equation was vehicle count = 15,652 * NACH – 11516. This means an increase in 1 unit of NACH represented an increase in 15,652 vehicles across the street segment.

[3] The July 1969 traffic flow map (i.e., before the establishment of the Mall) prepared by the Traffic Engineering Division, Department of Public Works, City of Eugene gives an account of total vehicular counts for a twenty-four hour period for more than 100 street segments for the area bounded by Madison street (west), High street with a portion of Coburg road ramp (east), 5th avenue (north), and 13th avenue (south)—the area that defines the entirety of Eugene's central core.

[4] William H. Whyte, *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces* (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1980); Donald Appleyard, Sue Greson, and Mark Lintell, *Livable Streets* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); Jan Gehl, *Life Between Buildings: Using Public Space* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1987); Vikas Mehta, *The Street: A Quintessential Social Public Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).

[5] Ed Kenyon, "Serene Plan Draws Spark," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 28, 1969).

[6] Ibid.

[7] "Renewal Agency to Demolish Del Ray Restaurant Building," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 20, 1977).

[8] "Architect Says Mall Focus Has Shifted West," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 8, 1977).

[9] "Mall Fountain to Come Out?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 13, 1977).

[10] "'So Long Fountain,'" *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 12, 1996).

[11] Jim Boyd, "Broadway Debut," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 26, 1987).

[12] Kenyon, "Serene Plan Draws Spark."

[13] "Potential of Downtown Will Be Reviewed," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 19, 1977).

[14] "Plans Afoot on Great Mall Coverup," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 11, 1977).

[15] "Mall Cover Still in the Planning Stages," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, January 31, 1978).

[16] "Cover for Eugene Mall Studied," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 17, 1978).

[17] "Pedestrian Cover Questionnaire Results Out," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, May 9, 1978).

[18] "Eugene Searches for a Roof to Raise the Spirits of Its Downtown Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 9, 1978).

[19] "Mall Plan: A Qualified Endorsement," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 1, 1980).

[20] "Panel Accepts Mall-Cover Study," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 12, 1983).

[21] Don Miles Associates and Projects for Public Spaces, *Eugene Downtown Public Spaces* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1986).

[22] The researchers took informal interviews with selected property owners and merchants and conducted a block-by-block mapping of different activities, further aided by time-lapse photography. Most business and property owners supported the idea of removing visual and physical barriers in the Mall and reintroducing traffic on Willamette street. A block-by-block activity mapping conducted on Friday, January 24, and Saturday, January 25, 1986, drew several conclusions.

[23] Aso J. Jaff, "The Spatial Pattern of Downtown Eugene and Its Effect on Pedestrian Movement" (Master's Thesis, University of Oregon, 1997).

[24] Ibid., 39–40.

[25] Ibid., 47. The empirical data was collected by counting the number of pedestrians and vehicular traffic passing through major downtown streets.

[26] Ibid., 59–60. As the author explains, the sparseness of functions and the low differentiation in the distribution of integration values in the downtown area can explain the low correlation.

[27] The year 1978 is selected as it represents one of the best mall years.

[28] Only the 156 semi-segments within the CEP area was considered for the regression analysis.

[29] Residuals:

```
   Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max
-11.560  -5.869  -1.079   4.233  21.862
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)   -7.813      6.545  -1.194  0.23445
NAIN           8.986      3.219   2.791  0.00591 **
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 7.348 on 155 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.04785,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.04171
F-statistic:  7.79 on 1 and 155 DF,  p-value: 0.005914
```

[30] Residuals:

```
   Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max
-12.776  -5.412  -1.491   4.858  21.763
```

Coefficients:

```
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)   -9.008      6.061  -1.486  0.13923
NACH          15.867      4.937   3.214  0.00159 **
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 7.291 on 155 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.06248,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.05643
F-statistic: 10.33 on 1 and 155 DF,  p-value: 0.001592
```

[31] The year 1978 is selected because it is one of the best mall years and 1985 represents a time of realization of mall's failure.

[32] A total of nine segments that were outliers in terms of NACH values were taken out. NACH, because only that syntax measure showed a near to significant p-value.

[33]Other values were—t-statistic = -2.122, df = 66.416; 95 percent confidence interval: -0.074312546 to -0.002271164

[34] For NAIN, there was no significant difference in mean, with p-value 0.2438, t-statistic = -1.176, df = 65.912.

[35] The analysis did not consider the outliers for ROB differences. The calculations found the following: lower outlier -11.5 and higher outlier +8.5. Q1=-4, Q2=-4, Q3=1, Q4=17, IQR=5. The formula used for lower outlier Q1 - 1.5 * IQR and higher outlier Q1 + 1.5 * IQR. The regression analysis yielded the following results:

```
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max
-7.0606 -3.1996 -0.1989  2.6886 10.3987
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  -20.687      7.666  -2.699  0.00893 **
NACH          13.898      6.046   2.299  0.02485 *
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 4.299 on 63 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.07738,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.06274
F-statistic: 5.284 on 1 and 63 DF,  p-value: 0.02485
```

8 CHAPTER VIII: MALL FAILURE (CORE REASONS 2)

The third chapter on the reasons associated with the Eugene mall's failure focuses on the following points:

1. ERA's negligence in listening to criticisms (including the firing of USP)
2. A planned project with very little flexibility
    a. Reliance on large retailers
    b. Land-use segregation and restriction of retail uses
    c. Large parcel reservations for pre-determined projects
    d. Pursuance of large projects for too long
    e. ERA's inflexibilities toward small businesses
3. CEP's disregard to downtown housing
4. Parking garages could not entice visitors as anticipated

8.1 ERA Neglected Constructive Criticisms

ERA faced complaints and doubts about the pedestrian mall and urban renewal's large-scale destruction from the planning stage and throughout the mall's existence. However, ERA did not pay much attention to these comments during the first two critical decades (the seventies and eighties). Instead, ERA focused on making the initial vision of the CEP plan successful. Some of the stern critics included organizations like Friends of Liveable Eugene (FOLE), who opposed the 1977-78 retail and multi-use center proposal (discussed later), and individuals like Archie Weinstein and Otto Poticha, who raised concern about specific components of the renewal and the mall. Most criticisms were about the urban renewal project's top-down approach, lack of sensibilities for the local community and small businesses or property owners, an inclination toward large single-use projects, and complete restriction of vehicles in the mall.

The mall came under severe criticism during the CEP's unveiling presentation on March 28, 1968.[1] One of the two architects in the Planning Review Committee labeled the mall plan as a "gimmick" to lure shoppers. Architect Otto Poticha, a planning review committee member, said that the mall was emulating a shopping center and voted instead for a need of a mixture of uses.[2] James Longwood, another architect member of the committee, argued that the open mall would not be attractive in Oregon's "miserable wet weather." Later, during the plan's final public review (and approval), Poticha argued that the new mall design left no room for 'individual expression' and was an effort at making downtown ‘homogeneous,’ a practice that would destroy the image of an ‘urban downtown.’[3]

In December 1968, Carles Potterf, then president of the Taxpayers Protective Association, had raised a voice against the urban renewal by contending that “it was just another form of socialism…. and is pushing all the ‘crummy’ businesses and people into some other area which gets crummy afterward.”[4] Potterf believed that many downtown merchants agreed with him and expressed surprise at other business people who could not see downtown Eugene’s future after the urban renewal. As early as January 1973, there were several “early complaints” about the mall, based on the prior years’ experience. Chiefly, that the mall was killing established businesses and replacing them with a “smattering of counter-culture shops” was too hard to get to by automobile, and once there, it was too hard to park beside.[5]

In another instance, around July 1976, concerns about proposed retail expansion at the west edge of downtown prompted strong reactions from a newly formed organization called Friends of a Liveable Eugene (FOLE).[6] The group concentrated its criticism toward the 1974 Livingston and Blayney and 1976 KMA reports which had suggested a large commercial complex in the vacant areas of the mall. In August 1976, FOLE published a report entitled “Citizens’ Alternatives for Eugene,” which contained an alternative proposal to locate the “competitive downtown center.”[7] Based on a community workshop, FOLE provided suggestions on three different categories (1) commercial development, (2) traffic, and (3) housing/zoning.[8] Maintaining the importance of community participation as a central issue, the group advocated for (1) a compact commercial area fully integrated with the mall, residential developments in downtown or vicinity, utilization of vacant lands, and (2) a broader range of transportation alternatives; (3) the Westside residential community had to accommodate as much low-cost housing as possible, provide loans for housing, rehabilitation of existing houses, located medium to high-density housing east of Lincoln street, housing over the stores and other businesses. The ERA did not take such alternative viewpoints seriously. Instead of focusing on the strengths of smaller businesses or accommodating downtown housing, they pursued large retailers and “megaprojects” in the remainder of the late seventies.

8.1.1 Firing of USP

One important event during the mall design process was the design proposal by Unthank, Seder, and Poticha (USP). While this does not exactly fit the topic of “criticism,” it is relevant.

ERA had hired USP to conduct design studies for the pedestrian mall shortly after securing federal grants in March 1969.[9] However, ERA fired USP in June 1969 over disagreements and hired the Landscape Architecture Firm Mitchell and McArthur (MM), who completed the final design in September 1969. Not heeding any element of USP's proposal, ERA opted for a strictly pedestrianized mall that avoided the perceived "chaos" between pedestrians and cars. In doing so, ERA chose a design that transformed the core into a park-like environment where walking and car-centric visitors could not intermingle at all. ERA assumed that this intermingling could occur after visitors parked their cars and walked to the mall from parking garages (which did not happen as anticipated, as discussed later). Additionally, opposite to what was proposed by USP, the final CEP plan completely ignored the subtle and fine-grained opportunities for small businesses and mall patrons through a system of well-connected pathways and various open spaces (e.g., a public market, bus place, ice sink).

Almost two decades later, in September 1986 (after one segment had reopened), Poticha recalled that their decision to propose against totally closing Willamette Street was a key factor behind his firm's termination.[10] Poticha also recalled that Charles Kupper, ERA's second director, called him "three or four years ago and told him he had stumbled across a dusty copy of Poticha's original mall study." Kupper said he read the thing and wanted to know, "What the hell happened? That's exactly what should have been built."

In their design proposal, USP had recognized the informal patterning of downtown Eugene and wanted to avoid Broadway and Willamette as the only two central streets. In their design, USP specifically provided suggestions based on twenty-eight 'design concepts,' which were primarily related to circulation, urban design details, mallway ideas, and the organization of urban spaces. However, the most important elements in the USP's design concept were plans for the mall streets (including vehicular and pedestrian circulation), merchants and small shops; change in levels; a system of open spaces, parking, and bus stations/public transportation. They envisioned a high-density, bazaar-like development with small shops to provide spaces for small merchants who were displaced from urban renewal. Only Broadway between Charnelton and Pearl (four block-street segments) would have been completely free of traffic.[11]

Additionally, the plan would also allow nighttime vehicular traffic in a portion of Willamette street. According to Poticha, it would preserve the traditional "teenage pastime" of an automobile promenade along Willamette Street on weekend nights. One downtown property owner and furniture store merchant, Harry Rubenstein, agreed that the through streets proposed in

ERA's renewal plan would isolate fringe area businesses. However, some downtown property owners favored ERA's concept as well.

Regarding vehicular circulation, the main difference and disagreement between RTKL and USP were that the USP plan proposed making Broadway fully pedestrian extending from Lincoln to Pearl. Olive would be a part of the vehicular loop. At the same time, Willamette would be pedestrian-oriented and opened to vehicles and extended between the 7th to 11th avenues (shown in thick red dash in the right image in figure 8.1). USP also proposed a two-lane "inner loop" around the downtown core, which would go around an area bounded by 8th and 10th avenues and Olive and Oak streets (shown in light purple in figure 8.1). Justifying their plan, architect Otto Poticha argued that the traffic plan was modified for a freer flow of pedestrians throughout the downtown area. Otto Poticha had argued that "the wider, more heavily traveled thorough streets projected in the renewal plan would isolate the inner core from the fringe retail area." However, ERA wanted a four-lane through streets along 8th and 10th avenues and Charnelton and Oak streets. ERA also wanted Olive to be fully a part of the mall and not a loop. On the contrary, the USP plan provided several open spaces and a public market, while the RTKL plan had two central plazas (see figure 8.1).

A space syntax analysis of the RTKL vs. USP plan clearly shows that RTKL completely restricted vehicles on the Olive and Willamette segment, which had the potential of high connectivity for vehicular access (see figure 8.2). In both plans, 7th ave, 8th ave, 11th ave, Charnelton street, Pearl street, and High street would maintain central roles. In a related context, Otto Poticha had once argued that "the wider, more heavily traveled thorough streets projected in the renewal plan would isolate the inner core from the fringe retail area." Another highlight of the USP plan was ERA's (particularly David Hunt's) disagreements, primarily because it 'deviated' substantially from the urban renewal plan, fundamentally regarding traffic circulation in the area (see table 7.2).[12] The following discussions further elaborate USP's design based on these design elements and add ERA's reaction (mostly through David Hunt) (see Appendix R for further discussion).[13]

Table 8.1. A comparison of the RTKL plan vs. USP proposal.

Design description	***ERA/RTKL plan***	***USP proposal***
Vehicular circulation	Minimize conflicts with pedestrians and introduce peripheral traffic/loop streets that would not permit through-traffic. Additionally, certain streets would form an inner vehicular loop within the urban renewal area with through-traffic prohibited.	An inner vehicular loop was completely missing from USP's plan. The 8th avenue-Olive st-10th avenue-Oak st loop plan was to develop it as a two-lane street with widened sidewalks in phase 1 and then make it entirely pedestrian in phase 2.
Pedestrian mall	All eight mall segments to be fully pedestrianized and restricted vehicle access did not anticipate the segment between 7th and 8th avenues and between Oak and Pearl for the mall.	The pedestrian mall would be an eleven and a half street segment (with only Broadway segment as completely pedestrian), and the Willamette portion would be partly open to the vehicles; the mall extended from 7th avenue (north) and extended till Pearl st (east)
Inner loop design	Narrower sidewalks and four lanes of traffic (44 feet in total for four 11-foot lanes or three 12-foot lanes with 8 feet for parking).	Wider sidewalks and two lanes of traffic



Figure 8.1. A comparison of RTKL (*left*) vs. USP (*right*) proposals for vehicular circulation, mall, parking, and open spaces.



Figure 8.2. Space syntax analysis of the central area considering RTKL's plan and USP's plan for vehicular movement.

8.2 Planned Project with Very Little Flexibility

Some components of ERA-led urban renewal and RTKL's CEP plan were extremely inflexible. The plan intended to radically transform the project area's morphology, especially in terms of building sizes and land-use structure. For example, while the pre-renewal morphology had a large share of small and medium-sized buildings and a mixture of uses, the CEP plan envisioned larger buildings and a strict definition of separate uses (two crucial aspects that diverged from the pre-existing morphology). ERA respected the original plan to a very high degree during the project's execution. Although the shapes and exact locations of the final buildings altered to a certain degree, ERA was committed and successful in achieving the "intended kind of fabric" in terms of building form and land use distribution. As was a common spirit of the time, the plan reflected the spirit of the 1960s—a new image of renewed city centers—consisting of a bigger scale, clean lines, visual aesthetic standards, ordered landscapes, and strictly defined uses.

Specifically, the following characteristics defined the inflexibility of the "strictly" planned CEP-

1. Reliance on large retailers
2. Segregation of uses
3. Reservation of large parcels for pre-established projects

4. Pursuance of large projects for too long

8.2.1 *Reliance on Large Retailers*

Large retailers were at the core of the RCPM strategy, and the problem that the project area faced was the loss of anchors after they left. Creating the RCPM area or selecting the mall streets followed a clear strategy—the area was defined physically by the anchor stores' locations and conceptually by treating them as magnets to attract visitors, who would further attract more businesses. ERA strongly believed that large retailers were the means and end to a successful retail core, while smaller shops could not sustain a retail core by themselves. While ERA understood that the ideal situation was to have both small retailers and large retail anchors, as the 1980s progressed, the large department stores concept in downtowns (across the nation) started to become "obsolete." The CEP plan was not robust enough to save the area during such times of drastic changes, and the dominance of VRC in attracting the downtown anchors and other potential ones within the E-S area had been well-established by the early-1990s.

Large retailers were very important to the downtown core. An RERC study from 1967 (before the renewal) showed that the preference for major downtown retail stores was Bon Marche (20%), J. C. Penney (17.2%), Villa Mart (15.7%), Bi-Mart (15.1%), and all others (31.5%) (based on a survey among the Eugene area residents).[14] After the renewal and before the first large retailer left, the situation of anchor stores (in terms of area distribution) were as follows (see table 8.2)[15]

Table 8.2. Data on downtown anchor stores in 1974.

Department Store	*Gross floor area (SF)*	*Situation in 1974*
Bon March	108,000	
Sears	87,000	The lease had about ten years to run; a new lease with improvements offered but not accepted
JC Penney	56,000	The lease had about three years to run
Ward	43,000	Closing in 1975
Total	294,000	

According to a study by Keyser Marston Associates, for the year 1976, sales of shopper goods or department store-type merchandise was $43 million for downtown Eugene (about a twenty-four percent share of Lane County).[16] For 1976, Eugene-area department stores had sales of $56 million, a thirteen percent sales increase over 1975.[17] Furthermore, according to a 1987 survey by Market Research and Analysis firm in Eugene (N=305 people), the most popular stores were Bon Marche (46.6%), Sears (28.9%), Women's clothing stores (13.1%), and Athletic stores (21.6%) (N=305). The main reason people shopped in Downtown Eugene was because of a variety of stores/selection (24.9%), convenience (22.3%), open-air environment (13.4%), different than VRC (11.8%), and pleasant atmosphere (11.8%).

The IRs also iterated the importance of anchor stores in the following ways-

> *"the 1990s was the end of the department store era as they became an obsolete retail model. Therefore, they moved to the suburban malls…. (one aspect that had changed was that) …. before, the anchors were perceived to be the heart…. (whereas now) …. the strong independent retailers (have been) keeping the downtowns alive—the unique stores—the shopping malls are for cheap selections." (IR3)*
>
> *"At the time Eugene's mall was conceived very few mid-size and larger cities considered downtown to be downtown without large anchor retail. This can be said of cities as diverse as Portland, Seattle, Fort Wayne, Minneapolis, St. Paul and Knoxville (cities where I've worked)." (IR2)*
>
> *"Those big stores created street traffic that made the smaller businesses viable. Relying on them wasn't the only strategy. But there weren't strategies anywhere for downtowns that worked well." (IR4)*

Unfortunately, all four large anchors had left the RCPM area by 1990 for either VRC or Gateway Mall, starting with Montgomery Ward in 1975. The large retail anchors were central to downtown Eugene, and their loss marked an "unfillable void." The CEP plan could not cope with the changing circumstances. While downtown recovered from JC Penney and Ward's outbound flight by the late-1970s, it could not recover from Bon Marche and Sears' departure in 1990, leading to further decline of the area. Maintaining a similar degree of patrons became impossible after the two stores left, specifically along the mall's western Broadway and Olive segments. One report by Duncan and Brown confirms that the major increase in the retail vacancy rate (in the 1990s) was attributable to "the ripple effects of the Bon leaving the west end of the mall."[18]

However, the city leaders were still confident even after Bon Marche and Sears were left in the downtown area by the late-1970s. For example, in early-1982, reacting to a possibility of the Sears leaving downtown, Mike Gleason, Eugene's City Manager, noted that Sears' departure would not be much damaging.[19] Gleason was confident that the downtown was evolving into "a specialty retail area, with a mix of office buildings and retail stores."[20]

8.2.2 Land-use Segregation and Restriction of Retail Use

Segregating and defining the location of different uses was at the core of the CEP plan, and ERA was very conscious of not mixing "incompatible uses," especially among the ones that were retail and commercial. Regarding land-use configuration, the RTKL plan's adopted strategy was to establish a large retail center, provide parking around the retail center's edges in all directions, establish commercial uses (offices and banks/financial institutions) on the eastern periphery of the retail center, and a cultural center in the northern blocks (see figures 1.4 and 1.5). Retail or other small businesses also spread loosely on the ground floor of parking structures. However, the massive two-block Cultural Center would not allow any incompatible uses.

The core of the CEP (or RCPM area), covering more than 800,000 SF of buildable land within the eight blocks, was committed to accommodate only one use—retail and retail-compatible businesses. In hindsight, it has become clear that the ambition and commitment to cover such a large area with retail and only a few other compatible business types would not favor the project's success. The approved designs and ideas "copied" a successful suburban shopping center model without regard for the project's size, potential investors, retail business management policies, or target population. Generally, any suburban mall-inspired retail core has two possible outcomes. Either business would flourish due to the benefits of agglomeration and proximity with the anchors, or if one area suffered a setback and the anchors left, the concentrated businesses could all suffer at the same time. Unfortunately, the area suffered the consequences of the latter beginning in the mid-1980s.

The CEP plan's success in concentrating retail businesses in the mall area is clear in a 1978 map (see figure 8.3). While ROB distribution across the street segments was diverse before the renewal, it was more or less concentrated in the RCPM area in the late-1970s. In contrast, the retail presence in the northern area was eliminated.

The segregation of use proposed in the CEP plan and the City's Zoning Ordinance complemented each other. In 1948, Eugene passed its first Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance-No. 9188. According to Section XII of the document, most Downtown Eugene areas fell under the "C-3 Central Business District."[21] In 1955, the Zoning Ordinance was further modified, eliminating the possibility of mixed-use centers and allowed maximum land for single-family residences. According to the 1964 Land Use map, every block in the RCPM area was C-3 CBD, whereas those in the northern area were partly industrial (see figure 8.4). In terms of zoning, not much changed around the CEP area by the 1980s. Even the 1984 Downtown Plan claimed that the C-3 Central Business District zone is "intended to preserve and enhance areas within which the greatest possible concentration of retail sales and businesses will occur."[22] (see figure Z. 11 in Appendix Z for the original diagram of the Downtown Plan) The CEP area zoning maps for this period show that apart from streets/alleys (which occupied 36% of land), 32% of the land was shared by Retail trade while parking occupied 18%.[23] Additionally, 61.3 acres (87%) were under C3 Zoning (Major Commercial District), an additional 5.6 acres (8%) was C2 (Community Commercial).



Figure 8.3. CEP area and the extent of high retail concentration in grey for 1965 (*left*) and 1978 (*right*). Only the quarter blocks with more than three ROBs are reflected in this "retail core." The area in red had a retail presence in 1965 but not in 1978.



Figure 8.4. Land use maps of the downtown area (CT 39) for 1964 (left) and 1988 (right).

8.2.3 Large Parcel Reservations for Pre-established Projects

Another component of the CEP plan was reserving large parcels for pre-determined projects in the plan. The Cultural Center (consisting of an Auditorium, a Hotel, a Conference Center, and Parking) and public Parking garages were the most notable ones.[24] Other cases were, providing expansion areas for anchors, a small business center (which became the Atrium mini-mall), etc. ERA went to work on this issue right away, beginning in 1970, especially in ensuring that a large area was reserved, even at the cost of other potential projects. ERA notably held up the two northernmost blocks for a pre-planned Cultural Center for almost a decade between the early-1970s (when the area was cleared) until the late-1970s/1980 (when plans for Hult Center and the Hilton Hotel/Conference center were finalized).[25] Mostly attributable to their potential size (e.g., for a Regional/National Auditorium Complex or a 300 room Hotel), these projects' locations were more or less fixed because only a specific area within the CEP boundary was available to host such a project. The main issue with holding parcels was that those areas could (and did) receive proposals for small or different "types" of projects (ones that were different from a Hotel or Auditorium). Even the ERA members were divided in this issue of (1) whether to proceed as development proposals come, (2) stick to the original plan, (3) whether all components of the planned Cultural Center had to be located together, and (4) if yes, where?

One interesting story along this history is related to ERA's rejection of a 1973 proposal by local businessman Archie Weinstein for a mixed-use project (see figures 8.5 and 8.6). Instead of Weinstein's project, ERA opted for a hotel project offered by Harold Pollin, which later got canceled in 1976, and ERA had to wait until 1980 for the final Hilton Hotel deal with another developer.[26] While ERA could not go ahead with Weinstein's mixed-use project because it had to follow certain HUD protocols, ERA was not subtle in expressing the desire for the pre-determined hotel project and the potential for higher tax returns. In the aftermath, ERA earned sharp criticism from local businessmen like Archie Weinstein, who lamented the 'hypocrisy' of Eugene city officials. One example he pointed to was ERA's effort to save "Montgomery Ward in downtown Eugene while approving renewal agency actions removing other existing businesses."[27] While the debate is not about whether the mixed-use project that could have been built almost a decade prior would have been more beneficial than the Hilton Hotel and Conference Center, ERA and COE's inflexibility against its pre-determined goals was not a very strong point as far as CEP and downtown Eugene's future went (see Appendix T.16 for the complete story of this project).



Figure 8.5. A portrait of Archie Weinstein (sc. Valley News October 24, 1973).



Figure 8.6. Archie Weinstein's proposal for a retail and mixed-use project (instead of a hotel) for the site east of Willamette between 6th and 7th avenues (sc. Register Guard January 14, 1974).

8.2.4 Pursuance of Large Projects for Too Long

The years between the late-1970s to mid-1980s (c. 1977 to 1985) are very important to the mall's story. Even with the RCPM area doing well in the late-1970s, ERA and the city pursued "megaprojects" for part of the area until at least the mid-1980s. This relentless pursuit for a large center even after some of the anchors had fled downtown and its distrust toward the potential of independent small to medium-scaled mixed-use developments proved a major setback for the RCPM area. These events spearheaded the irreversible decline that began around 1985.

However, at least two phenomena influenced ERA's pursuit for a "large social and economic center" within the CEP around 1977. First, there were still many undeveloped parcels, and second, downtown planning studies of the 1970s had suggested the possibilities of large-scale retail and multi-use centers.

For example, two studies, one in 1974 by Livingston and Blayney and another in 1976 by Keyser Marston Associates (KMA), had suggested some form of concentrated retail/mixed-use center as a possibility for Downtown Eugene's future. The 1974 study had first suggested the possibility of a 600,000-SF enclosed mall regional shopping center with two major department stores in the "four or five blocks" at the west end of the Eugene mall between Lincoln and Charnelton and 8th and 10th avenues.[28] One hope was that by the mid-1980s, population growth and increased buying power of the Eugene-Springfield metropolitan region would make this downtown regional shopping center feasible. While the E-S area grew, the consumers were attracted to the outer-central city retail centers compared to the downtown. Another 1976 study of retail businesses for downtown Eugene conducted by San Francisco firm KMA reiterated the 1974 study's suggestion for a big downtown department store.[29] However, KMA's report clarified that downtown also had another option moving forward, to continue being a retail center that concentrated on apparel, furniture, specialty shops, and eating and drinking establishments. In other words, KMA had also suggested that Eugene's downtown could survive without major department stores as a collection of smaller shops and specialty stores mainly catering to growing numbers of office workers.

Starting in 1977, ERA embarked on a $50 million plan for a mixed-use center stretching from the center to the southern RCPM area after hiring Elbasani, Logan, and Severin Design Group (ELS) (see figures 8.7).[30] Although the plan had ample provisions for small stores as a part of the Retail/Commercial Center (to cost $20 million), the key focus was to yet again to expand the existing anchors and addition of a third large anchor. The other two key components were multiple parking garages ($16 million) and a Multi-use Hotel/Convention Center ($14 million).[31] ELS's study resulted in the "A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene" (SREDE report) report in May 1977.[32] Based on this study, ERA published "An Invitation for Development Proposals" in September 1977. The City of Eugene would participate with private developers by assembling the site, providing parking structures, and implementing traffic improvements. ERA invited developers throughout the nation to submit proposals for participating in a joint public-private multi-use center plan.[33]

ERA expended a lot of effort, time, and money on this project. For the proposed Retail/Commercial Center, 300,000 SF would be assembled for parking structures and retail development, out of which 160,000 SF would be sold to developers, and 140,000 SF would remain the city for parking.[34] By the time, an area covering 200,000 SF had already been assembled, cleared, and in "construction-ready" condition to facilitate the new center, with another 100,000 SF to be completed by the city soon. The ECC planned to spend $11.3 million to facilitate the retail center in addition to $2.4 million already spent for acquisition and clearance. The funds would come from ERA funds and tax allocation bonds. The developers had to secure the retail business tenants and develop the retail center according to the plan. In addition to the existing stores, the new retail center would have offered 1.1 million SF of retail space downtown—the equivalent of a major regional shopping center.[35] However, the developers that ERA hired could not attract enough investors. The plan's failure was realized by 1981, i.e., around three years later, specifically after one of the developers' efforts to persuade Nordstrom failed (see Appendix T.1).[36]

Figure 8.7. The 1977-78 proposal for a multi-use center by ELS (see figure Z.12 in Appendix Z for original drawing).

One interesting observation from the space syntax analysis of the new retail center's design proposal is that the main diagonal axis does not show strong connectivity (neither NAIN nor NACH) (see figure 8.8). Additionally, other "narrower" diagonal paths in the northern area are very poorly connected—showing that these segments would not have been able to generate a high amount of natural movement.



Figure 8.8. Space syntax analysis of the proposed 1978 multi-use downtown center.

After this major failure, several ERA critics got an opportunity to reiterate what they were saying all along. For example, through a November 1981 article, Archie Weinstein, a displaced tenant by then, questioned: "how many national chain stores have come in (after the renewal)?"[37] Unfortunately for ERA and downtown Eugene, the answer was zero. This metric is important because it was set by the ERA repeatedly to evaluate the success of the retail core. At this point, several observers had realized that the goal of competing against VRC had not been achieved. Many start to be convinced that the renewal had to be abandoned. Some even pointed at the need to bring the cars back and that the mall was a mistake.[38]

Meanwhile, many others blamed the larger area's poor economy, which downtown's retail numbers from the early-1980s also reflect. However, this was not the end of ERA's pursuit. The city again commissioned another developer for a possible climate-controlled shopping center in the same area in 1983, which also failed shortly after.[39] In this case, the problems were because most of the proposed project area was privately held land instead of city-owned lands. Finally, with the reopening of the first mall segment in 1985, the ERA and city began taking a different approach to revitalizing the RCPM area.

8.2.5 ERA's Inflexibilities Toward Small Businesses

ERA was not "easy" on small businesses and understandably so to maintain the HUD guidelines and guarantee the most compatible projects in the CEP area. However, each ERA staff had certain views about every proposal, which had to be solved internally for each project to be approved and constructed. In the process, small business owners had to face difficulties as the ERA and the business people/investors could not always be on the same side. The stories of George Boehnke (Printer), Quackenbush (Hardware), and Benjamin Franklin Savings Federal Savings) elaborate on these points.

The story of George Boehnke's struggle to get a spot in the CEP area (outside the RCPM) explains the difficulty of passing ERA and HUD's bureaucratic processes even with the investor's positive motives. In a way, this example also manifests a few of ERA's preferences, which it tried to push for as much as possible. George Boehnke, a printing shop owner, and a displaced tenant, proposed buying a portion (2,700 SF) of a larger parcel owned by Maurie Jacobs and investing $28,000 (offer of $10.37 Per Square Feet or PSF). Another proposal by Maurie Jacob himself intended at spending up to $250,000 in building a structure for relocating downtown businesses. Additionally, Jacobs' proposal would mean that the entire parcel occupying more than 55,000 SF would belong to single ownership, an idea that ERA favored![40] However, considering that George Boehnke had been interested in relocating for a long time and because no other parcel was available for rehabilitation to offer, the ERA was concerned about Boehnke as well. Boehnke argued that some businesses had already moved out of downtown after the renewal, primarily due to a lack of suitable and affordable spaces. Furthermore, Boehnke also added that there was a surplus of retail in the downtown, and service businesses like a Printing Store would help add to the diversity. However, the ERA staff were mostly unconvinced and preferred Jacobs's proposal for an expanded furniture store over Boehnke's (see Appendix T.7).[41]

The story of Quackenbush's Hardware Store explains ERA's tendency toward exercising Eminent Domain. The Quackenbush Hardware store, the local and oldest surviving downtown store, was opened by Arthur Quackenbush and his father in 1903 (see figure 8.9).[42] However, according to the structural assessments, the building was substandard and was offered for LSO3.[43] Once the locals heard of the news of the possible demolition of the store, there were concerns about saving it all around. The announcement of demolition even stirred protests from some area residents. A "Save Quackenbush" contingent was established as the downtown hardware store was 'a city tradition.' in late February 1971, Mrs. Helen Quackenbush informed ERA of her interest in rehabilitation. The problem with rehabilitation was that it would cost more than $100,000 so at this point, ERA buying the property seemed more likely than Mrs. Quackenbush rehabilitating it.[44]

The story that follows presents ERA's nature of forcing occupants out of the area. ERA persuaded Helen Quackenbush (in her eighties at the time) and attempted to "get her signature to the right to purchase her store."[45] In her own words, ERA representatives forced her by saying, "You'll have to sign sooner or later, Mrs. Quackenbush. Why not save yourself thousands of wasted dollars and a lot of grief? We'll win eventually." So, she signed the letter, and soon ERA received support from the members for condemnation proceedings. Disregarding this "threat," Mrs. Quackenbush hired the firm of USP, who completed the renovation.[46] USP's design objective was to retain the essential character of the Quackenbush store. Project architect for USP Phil Gall was noted as saying, "it's the way things operate inside that appeals to most people. That's the real character of it."[47] The formal reopening of the Quackenbush store occurred on Saturday, November 6, 1971.[48] The store was not much different from the old store, and there was only a minimum change in the store's traditional atmosphere (see Appendix T.12).

Figure 8.9. The Quackenbush Building after rehabilitation (*left*; sc. LCHM Catalog number GN365) and a plaque honoring Helen Quackenbush (*right*; sc. Eugene Downtown News September 5, 1978).

Another example is related to ERA's strict rule in rejecting the proposal based on design. For example, in November 1971, Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association (BFFSLA) proposed a three-story building for Disposition Parcel 122-A in response to LSO3. The parcels' previous owners had decided not to rehabilitate the structure (occupied by Henry Lowry Fine Cameras and other businesses before the renewal) since the cost was high (around $123,000).[49] However, in March 1972, ERA rejected BFFSLA's offer because the design was patterned to look "exactly like Philadelphia's Independence Hall."[50] The Design Review team, which included Eugene-based Landscape Architect Fred Cuthbert, Springfield-based Architect Donald Lutes, Portland-based Landscape Architect Hugh Mitchell, and Portland-based Architect Walter Gordon, instead suggested a general colonial-style architecture rather than a replica of another building. In April 1972, BFFS decided to end its pursual of the parcel and rather build outside the renewal boundary at East 11th avenue.[51]

8.3 CEP's Disregard to Downtown Housing

Two issues are important regarding downtown housing/residences. First, the entire downtown area was facing a decline in residential population, and it was out of ERA's control. Second, and more importantly, the final RTKL plan did not accommodate any residential uses, and ERA did not make accommodations in the seventies and eighties. During the urban renewal years, the downtown housing, declining in the project area even before the renewal, was exacerbated by excluding any provisions for residential projects in the final CEP plan.

However, although the final CEP plan did not accommodate downtown residences, RTKL's study documents from the 1960s had suggested the development of medium (townhouses) and high-density (high rise) residential use in the downtown core in relation to the Civic Center and the retail core that accommodated various income ranges.[52] RTKL had also recommended that the downtown core "reinforce specific selected uses in the downtown and introduce dominant new land uses including a cultural convention center, private office, institutional, high-density residential uses, and transportation facilities."[53]

Additionally, several studies had suggested the potential of downtown housing in the 1970s (see Appendix U for a brief history of downtown housing in Eugene). For example, a 1974 report had mentioned the need for "two to three level garden apartments at forty du/acre with parking under the buildings" for the downtown.[54] Furthermore, another study predicted that in the mid-1970s, 1,000 or more additional housing units would support an estimated 100,000 SF of retail and services.[55] According to a survey by KMA, downtown Eugene had lost its strength in retail in the 1970s, with the basic determinants being population and purchasing power.[56] The report indicated a path for downtown, which depended not only on "a multi-faceted attempt to increase downtown's draw regionally, but to introduce additional diversity into the area's residential and commercial character." Furthermore, according to a 1980 study, the downtown core and adjacent neighborhoods were rated "higher" for conversion of existing properties into residential units and "lower" as the ability to attract new construction.[57] The 1984 Eugene Downtown Plan also acknowledged that the CEP did not consider housing within its boundary even after the 1977 Multi-Unit Property Tax Exemption Program to stimulate rental housing in the central area.[58]

According to one study by Al-Mulhim Mohammed, downtown housing greatly reduced between 1949 (the year the city passed the first Zoning Ordinance) and 1968 (just before the renewal) within the CEP area.[59] The numbers further reduced between 1968 and 1987, from eleven residential locations to seven (see figure 8.10). Between 1970 and 1980, downtown suffered population loss from 2,340 to 2,075 (-11.3%) and median household income loss from $5,660 to $6,550 (a 44% decline after adjusting for inflation) (see figure 8.11).[60] Also, Downtown had a lower share of housing (as a land-use) compared to commercial uses. In 1976, the residential land-use share in the core blocks was 8%, while 55% of land-use in the downtown fringe was residential. However, 39% of the downtown core's land use was commercial.[61]



Figure 8.10. Location of households in the downtown area in 1949, 1968, and 1987 (Mohammed 1988).





Figure 8.11. A chart on percent change in population and the median income for downtown (CT 39) from 1970 to 2000 (*left*) and downtown's share of employment and housing stock compared to Lane County for 1970 and 1980 (*right*; sc. LeBlanc and Co, 1983).

There is a direct link between downtown housing and a core area's capability to support businesses, a fact that had already been realized in Eugene. According to the retail sales data for the area of support for 1976 among downtown employees, close-in residents, and other trade areas, close-in residents were responsible for 21% of sales in Department stores, 23% in Apparel and Shoes, 11% in Books, Gifts, and Jewelry, 10% in Eating and Drinking Establishments, and 17% in Other Retail. The close-in residents' share was much lower than the contribution of downtown employees and the area outside the downtown.[62]

The 1980s brought a new wave of interest from the authorities to include housing. For example, in an unsuccessful attempt in 1981, ERA had invited developers to submit proposals for buildings a combination commercial/residential structure downtown.[63] The proposed development site was an ERA-owned vacant parcel near 11th avenue and Willamette street on the mall's west side.[64] In June 1984, Mayor Brian Obie argued that he believed downtown housing was the new direction because "people want to live close to where they work, and then you get retail because people want to be able to shop."[65] Finally, the CEP area successfully secured the first housing project, "Broadway Place," in 1999/2000. However, by the time the city implemented serious changes in the 1990s, the mall's condition had changed irreversibly. The new housing developments arrived too late to have any impact on the mall's future.

8.4 Parking Garages Could Not Entice Visitors as Anticipated

As described previously, downtown parking was among the major problems that influenced the decisions related to urban renewal. ERA staff had realized early in the process that the CEP had to solve downtown parking problems by providing enough parking garages in the appropriate locations. They also knew that the parking issue was closely related to the downtown mall's success. Parking was a key issue because many mall patrons would travel downtown via car, and the relationship (distance) between the parking location and mall destinations was important to their visit. Managing vehicular circulation and deciding the location for parking garages around the mall was a challenging issue considering that the mall did not allow any vehicles in the pedestrian mall.

The following quotes taken from the IRS are illuminating about downtown Eugene's parking situation—

> *"From the photos of 1950's/60's Eugene downtown, I imagine it was actually harder to park back in those days. There was lot of traffic because downtown was an economic success! Make it a ghost town and solve those traffic problems." (IR1)*

> *"Parking is often perceived to be in short supply in many cities. Nearly every US city I've worked in (over fifty – mostly as a consultant but four as development director or manager) resonates with a whine that there's not enough parking and/or that it's too expensive….. During the (initial) years I was there we had an abundance (even over-abundance) of parking spaces available (my department at that time owned and oversaw all the public garages downtown and we always had a surplus of spaces)." (IR2)*

Notably, the COE and ERA, on their part, were successful in providing free downtown parking and constructing multiple parking garages. In their 1960s studies, RTKL found that curb parking (which occupied 36% of the total street) impeded circulation and, thus, efficient articulation. Therefore, one natural solution was to add parking garages around or adjacent to key mall locations.[66] Also, ERA and the COE successfully implemented more than 2,000 free parking to the downtown patrons through the Overpark (the only garage until 1978), nineteen downtown parking lots, and around 350 formerly metered street spaces in October 1973.[67] By June 1978, after completing the Parcade, around 2,800 free parking spaces were present compared to around 1,825 in 1969.[68] There were four major parking garages constructed within the CEP area by 1982—Overpark (610 spaces, built in 1969), Parcade (438 spaces, built in 1976), Eugene Conference Center Garage (299 spaces, built in 1981), and Hult Center Garage (515 spaces, built in 1982).[69] However, the Conference center and Hult parking were not public. Additionally, at least thirteen quarter blocks offering at least 7.64 acres of undeveloped space were used as temporary parking spaces. This included the city-owned vacant lots awaiting development, which provided 790 parking spaces (see figures 8.12, 8.13, and 8.14).



Figure 8.12. Downtown Development District (DDD) Boundary or Downtown parking assessment district (*left*) and 1966 Overpark Garage Assessment District (*right*).

Figure 8.13. The 10th and Oak "Overpark" garage was completed in 1969 (but it was not a part of CEP).



Figure 8.14. Map of the CEP area in the mid-1980s showing parking locations. The city-owned parking lots provided almost 800 spaces (sc. Parking capacity data from 1980s studies and LeBlanc and Company 1984).

However, even with the ample parking opportunities, the downtown community, including employees, merchants, authorities, and most importantly, the mall patrons, found parking issues problematic. According to Cole's 1990 Shopper survey, 92% parked in surface lots (80% in 1986) and less than 5% parked in parking structures in 1986 and 1990.[70] IR1 observes that most people did not want to park in multi-level parking structures, and mall patrons perceived parking as unsafe and time-consuming. Additionally, "people do not expect to park blocks from their destination and then walk along an outdoor pedestrian "mall," particularly in winter."

A May 1990 survey on mall patrons' preference found that among the popular reasons for not coming to the mall was lack of selection of stores, followed by "inadequate parking or parking that was too distant from the shopper's destination and imperfect traffic patterns."[71] In one of the early mall years, ERA director David Hunt had claimed that the undeveloped sites at the time would be fully developed by 1980.[72] Not only was there comparatively less development, but the city's existing parking structures failed to produce enough revenue to meet operating and maintenance expenses. Instead, due to a $170,000 deficit in the parking program, the tax on retail receipts in the downtown parking district increased from $2.50 per $1,000 of sales to $3.50. Outside the parking garage and other private parking, the CEP plan did not properly accommodate on-street public parking to entice the potential mall patrons. According to an assessment from June 1984, the Overpark and Parcade were both usually less than half-full according to city records, even counting the employees who had to pay to park.[73]

In addition to the parking garages being unpopular among mall patrons, the parking provision was not perfect since downtown employers and property owners within the Downtown Development District (DDD, a parking assessment district) had to pay for the "free" program.[74] Furthermore, they were themselves restricted from using the free parking. As a businessman noted, the parking scheme had "enforcement problems, too many unused spaces; high parking fees for downtown workers, the need for more revenue, lack of adequate signs and future parking needs."[75] According to one account, professionals who worked downtown had to pay a heavy share and could have played a role in them moving away.

For example, according to an account of a downtown employer, the parking tax had cost a downtown employer $900 a month before closing his downtown office.[76] This phenomenon was crucial to downtown, and the mall since a large proportion of the sales came from the downtown employees. IR2 agrees that businesses stayed away "due to the perception that there was not sufficient parking downtown and/or the reality that you actually had to pay for parking (at least after the first one or two free hours).” According to IR4, there was plenty of parking after renewal, especially in large garages. However, some people did not like parking garages (so they did not use them) although they were close. As IR2 notes-

> *“The issues on parking are nearly always perception and “convenience.” For some people, if they can’t find a parking spot within a block from the stores they’ve selected or if they have to drive around the block a few times, then there’s believed to be insufficient parking.” (IR2)*

However, this author’s study of parking locations and pedestrian movement between the major mall intersections (destinations) and those parking locations (origins) for 1985 shows that the location and distance were not inherently an issue (see figure 8.15). Rather, the problem could have been related to the perception of safety and the need to traverse through the multi-story parking garages. The study found that the farthest distance between a mall destination (black dots) and ground level of parking (grey dots) was 9.5 minutes walking distance (790 m or 2,600 ft), and the average was 3.2 minutes away (265 m/870 ft). Of the thirty-three different locations from the parking structures (grey dots; considering ground level only), twenty-six were less than four minutes away, five were less than six minutes away, and only two were more than six minutes away from the closest mall intersection. The space syntax analysis shows the degree of correlation between the shortest path of travel (choice map) and the likely route between parking and mall destinations. As evident, most routes between parking and mall destinations had higher choice values (therefore, paths for shortest travel across the system). This points out that parking and circulation routes between parking and mall destinations were most likely not an actual “problem” but a perceived one.



Figure 8.15. A map showing analysis of the potential movement of mall patrons between parking and the mall for 1985 (*top*) and 1978 NACH map with parking locations (grey dots) and mall centers (black dots) (*bottom*).

8.5 Notes

[1] "Critics Hit Hard at Mall Feature of Urban Renewal Plan."

[2] Poticha, a partner in the firm Unthank Seder and Poticha, had arrived in Eugene in 1962 in search of a small livable community. He was also a member of the Special Committee on Renewing Eugene (SCORE). Previously in 1967, USP was commissioned by the ERA to do a design concept but was later rejected by ERA.

[3] Kenyon, "'Let's Get on with the Show,' Mall Proponents Urge."

[4] Ed Kenyon, "Public to Have Its Say on Urban Renewal Proposal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 15, 1968).

[5] Don Robison, "It Looks as If Mall May Work, after All," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 21, 1973).

[6] "Westside Group Fights Retail Growth," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 17, 1976).

[7] Friends of Livable Eugene, *Citizen's Alternative* (Eugene, 1976).

[8] Keeping the importance of community participation as a central issue, the group first advocated for a compact commercial area fully integrated with the mall, residential developments in downtown or vicinity, and the utilization of vacant lands. The second was for a broader range of transportation alternatives. Third, the Westside residential community had to accommodate as much low-cost housing as possible, provide loans for housing, rehabilitation of existing houses, located medium to high-density housing east of Lincoln street, housing over the stores, and other businesses.

[9] Unthank Sedar Poticha Architects, *Conceptual Studies of Pedestrian Precincts-Central Eugene Renewal Project* (Eugene, 1969).

[10] "More Doctoring for Downtown Eugene," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 14, 1986).

[11] Ibid.

[12] "Debate Flares on 'Pedestrian Precinct,'" *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 1, 1969). For example, during a late April 1969 public meeting, ERA and USP clashed over USP's design proposal. In the meeting were downtown merchants, property owners, and real estate personnel. In the meeting, Hunt claimed that USP's plan for the pedestrian mall 'deviated' substantially from the urban renewal plan, fundamentally regarding traffic circulation in the area.

[13] Ibid. Additionally, Hunt's comments are taken from one of ERA's unpublished manuscripts obtained from the City of Eugene office.

[14] Real Estate Research Corporation, *Land Use and Marketability: Central Eugene Area Preliminary Report*.

[15] Livingston and Blayney and LeBlanc and Company, *Eugene Commercial Study* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1974).

[16] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals* (Eugene, 1977).

[17] "Business Beat: Area Department Store Sales up 19%," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 23, 1977). According to the commerce department, "all known department stores" in an area met government criteria if they employed at least twenty-five people and carried such items as furniture, home furnishings, appliances, radio, etc.

[18] Based on a report emailed to me by a Duncan and Brown representative on July 6, 2020. Additionally, the survey boundary was formed by 5th to 11th avenues and Charnelton to Highs streets. The area included 753,947 sf of retail and 560,585 sf of office space.

[19] Tony Baker, "Downtown Waits Wonders," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 28, 1982).

[20] At the time, Dan Palmer, manager of The Bon, had assured that they had no intention of moving and Sears' departure would not hurt them. Palmer reminded the community that "…. there were 200 retailers downtown, not just Sears and The Bon."

[21] City of Eugene, *Comprehensive Zoning Plan of the City of Eugene*.

[22] Downtown Commission, *Eugene Downtown Plan* (Eugene, 1984), 57.

[23] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18), Modified December 1989* (Eugene, 1989). Zoning data for January 1, 1984

[24] However, it is important to note that during the planning stage in the early-1970s, the ERA staff was divided among whether to reserve large areas for such massive projects or to accept smaller or "incompatible" projects as they arrived. Nonetheless, in the end, the developments in the oRCPM, where most of the parcel reservations took place, the pre-planned developments happened the way ERA anticipated, even though it had to wait for almost a decade.

[25] Don Nelson, "Curtain Rises on Civic Center Dream," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 28, 1978); Don Nelson, "Plan Approved for Civic Center," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 18, 1979); Marvin Tims, "Eugene Hilton Gets Go-Ahead," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 16, 1980); Editor, "Convention Center, 425-Car Parking to Cost $5.7 Million," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 8, 1980).

[26] Don Bishoff, "The Hotel Is Dead-Long Live the Hotel!," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 3, 1976); "Urban Renewal Agency Seeking Hotel Developer," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 7, 1976).

[27] Ed Kenyon, "Weinstein May Fight," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 23, 1973).

[28] Livingston and Blayney and LeBlanc and Company, *Eugene Commercial Study*. The study even calculated the potential economic return of such a center, which, if built, could have a total

taxable cash value of $20 million and could generate additional tax of $600,000 each year, which in turn, could support a tax increment financing of nearly $3 million at full capture.

[29] "What Does Downtown Eugene Need?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 30, 1976). Like the 1974 study, KMA also advised ERA to look at the west edge of downtown for a new growth area: a key objective being providing a new department store near the Bon Marche. KMA projected that with Sears rebuilding on its existing site in the future or another nearby location, the downtown would have the drawing power it needed to stay in competition with VRC or postpone developing another regional center. Thus, the KMA study showed that a system of three major stores, including Bon Marche, Sears, and a third department store—all nearby, would be a powerful magnet to the shoppers and small stores. Specifically, KMA advised that the new department store needed to provide around 100,000 SF of retailing space.

[30] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals*.

[31] "Grand Scheme for Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 20, 1977).

[32] ERA, *A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene* (Eugene, 1977).

[33] "Proposals Requested to Develop Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 6, 1977).

[34] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals*.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Marvin Tims, "Board Performs Last Rites for Downtown Expansion Project," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 4, 1981).

[37] Pack, "'A Place to Work, Shop, Live and Have Fun'."

[38] Barker, "Merchants Say Mall a Mistake."

[39] Mark Matassa, "Two Firms to Develop Mall Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 29, 1983).

[40] This sentiment is presented by ERA staff, for example, during a November 3, 1971 meeting.

[41] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1971" (Eugene, November 3, 1971).

[42] Hal Whipple, "Missiles and the Mad Mouse," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 28, 1971).

[43] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, February 17, 1971" (Eugene, February 17, 1971).

[44] "Quackenbush's May yet Be Saved from Wrecking Crews," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 19, 1971).

[45] Whipple, "Missiles and the Mad Mouse."

[46] "Efforts to Save Store Making Progress," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 3, 1971); "Tradition-Laden Quackenbush's Hardware to Stay," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 4, 1971).

[47] "Quackenbush's to Be Almost Same," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 5, 1971).

[48] "'New' Quackenbush's Store Nears Opening," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 31, 1971).

[49] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1971."

[50] "Panel Rejects Building Plans," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 1, 1972).

[51] "Benjamin Franklin to Build Outside Renewal Bounds," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 15, 1972).

[52] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 3 Alternative Strategies*.

[53] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*, 69.

[54] Livingston and Blayney and LeBlanc and Company, *Eugene Commercial Study*.

[55] LeBlanc and Company, *Markets and Services in Downtown Eugene*.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid. Cited from a 1980 document "Housing in Eugene's downtown."

[58] Downtown Commission, *Eugene Downtown Plan*.

[59] Mohammed, "The Internal Structure of the Central Business District of Eugene, OR: 1949, 1968, and 1987."

[60] Census Tract data from www.socialexplorer.com. In line with the lack of housing in the downtown core, there was not a single service like full-size grocery or a family supermarket in the area in the 1970s. The nearest was located "at least eleven blocks away in each direction" according to one account. While the west and south east had more than 55% devoted to single or multi-family housing in 1975, the numbers added up to less than 11% in the retail core.

[61] Total area occupied by "core blocks" was 121 acres and "fringe blocks" was 331 acres. Data from an unpublished 1976 manuscript on "Downtown Eugene Retail Analysis."

[62] Data from an unpublished 1976 manuscript on "Downtown Eugene Retail Analysis."

[63] "Commercial/Residential Building Sought for Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 4, 1981).

[64] This move was in part due to the recent survey of forty prospective developers, twenty-eight of whom expressed "keen interest" in the program.

[65] Mark Matassa, "The Plan: No Panacea," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 6, 1984).

[66] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*, 24. Based on George T. Rockrise's 1970 study, ERA' s requirements for off-street parking for uses developed in the study area were as follows—Restaurant/Bar (1 for each 60 SF of Gross Floor Area), Retails, Banks/Financial institutions, fraternal organizations (1 for each 300 SF); Business and professional offices (1 for each 400 SF); Personal services (1 for each 500 SF); Business services (1 for each 700 SF); Hotel/Motel (1 for each guest room); Theaters/Meeting halls, Arenas (1 for four seats).

[67] "Free Parking Starts," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 14, 1973).

[68] Lisa Strycker, "Major Issues Face Voters," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, June 20, 1978).

[69] Downtown Commission, *Eugene Downtown Plan*. In 1983, when all major parking structures were completed, there were about 11,538 parking spaces within downtown (CT 39) area occupying about thirty percent excluding streets; 10,313 (ninety percent) were off-street parking.

[70] Jeff Cole, "Should Willamette Street Be Opened to Automobile Traffic Between Eighth and Tenth Avenues in Downtown Eugene Oregon?" (Master's Thesis, University of Oregon, 1990).

[71] "The Downtown Survey," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 26, 1990). Nearly half said they were drawn into the core area because of specific stores. Interestingly, concerns over personal safety were not among a major deterrent.

[72] "More Doctoring for Downtown Eugene."

[73] Mark Matassa, "A Fuss over Parking," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 4, 1984).

[74] Strycker, "Major Issues Face Voters."

[75] Don Nelson, "'Free' Parking Has Empty Ring to It," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 30, 1981). In the early 1980s, it cost about $1,200 per stall to build a surface lot, and more than $7,000 per stall to build a parking garage (without land costs) but gave $45,000 year in return.

[76] Matassa, "A Fuss over Parking."

9 CHAPTER IX: OTHER REASONS ASSOCIATED WITH MALL FAILURE

The fourth chapter on the reasons associated with the Eugene mall's failure focuses on the following secondary phenomenon-

1. The ERA did not consider historic preservation
2. Issues of inclusivity: tight mall rules and undesirables
3. Unforeseeable "external" factors (changing socio-economic structure and peripheral shopping centers)

9.1 The ERA Did Not Consider Historic Preservation

The CEP plan lacked any provision for preserving historic buildings in its original plan and, therefore, had to be preserved mostly through private efforts. Additionally, over the years, ERA was not interested in facilitating any form of historic preservation either, and many ERA leaders did not think historical preservation was important.

According to a mid-1970 account by the Lane County Historic Preservation Committee (LCHPC), seventeen historically/architecturally significant buildings in the area were worthy of preservation (see figures 9.1 and 9.2 and table 9.1).[1] However, the ERA staff believed that LCHPC brought the issue too late for consideration. In ERA's defense, SCORE had reported to ERA that there was no building worth saving in downtown Eugene a few years earlier, in May 1967.[2] Furthermore, ERA expressed concerns about LCHPC's appeal because of cost issues, rehabilitation of such deteriorated structures, and finding tenants for those older buildings even if the structures got rehabilitated. The seventeen structures would require around $2 million to buy when added together, excluding the restoration cost. According to UO Professor Phillip Dole, this was ERA's responsibility to fulfill. However, there was no money available in the ERA funds for historic preservation.

Figure 9.1. Buildings proposed for Historic Preservation in mid-1970 by Lane County Historic Preservation Committee.

Table 9.1. List of historic buildings in 1970.

SN	*Name*	*Use*	*Date*
1	Former First National Bank	Surplus store and barbershop	1883
2	Smeed Hotel (see Appendix T.13)	Rug shop, jewelry/sculpture shop	1884
3	Old Masonic Lodge		1887
4	Quackenbush	Hardware	1903
5	Old St. Francis Hotel	Warehouse with street-level offices	1909
6	Ardel		1910
7	Oldfield's Electric		1920
8	McDonald Theater	Clothing store, etc.	1925
9	Ellingsworth	Clothing store for men	1935
10	JC Penney		1939
11	John Warren Hardware Co.		
12	Tiffany		
13	Building 1	Henry Lowry camera shop, etc.	
14	Wooden Building 1		
15	Old Lane County Land and Title Co.	Coburn's camera shop, etc.	





Figure 9.2. Images of two historic buildings, Smeed Hotel (*top*) and Tiffany Building (*bottom*). Sc. Register Guard June 28, 1970.

On the one hand, supporters of preservation like Dole argued that a renewed center did not require everything to be brand new and that it was a shopping center approach and strongly resented the idea of tearing down buildings that deserve to be rehabilitated.[3] Dole insisted that "the bulldozer approach to urban renewal is a thing of the past… and there is such a thing as heritage, an obligation to future generations, and what we preserve now is going to increase in value many times over in the future." On the other hand, ERA members felt that most of the seventeen buildings would be a "good riddance" from the downtown area. ERA members, including director David Hunt and Rehabilitation Supervisor Bob Thomas, shared the belief that the value of the old buildings was centered around nostalgia rather than true historical or architectural worth. In the end, ERA oversaw the demolition of at least seven of the seventeen (based on this author's study). Notable rehabilitation included the Smeede Hotel, Tiffany Building, Schaefers Building, Quackenbush building, McDonald Theatre Building, Ardel Building, and three historic buildings along 800 Willamette street (a part of the Park-Willamette project). At least two of these buildings (McDonald Theatre and conversion of Ardel to Downtown Athletic Club) received loans and assistance for rehabilitation from ERA through the tax increment funding. Others were mostly private endeavors.

One important story related to historic preservation in the CEP area is that of the "three buildings" located adjacent to Willamette Street—Preston Building (861 Willamette st), Hall Building (865 Willamette st), and Portland Store Building (873 Willamette) (see figure 9.3).[4] This case is important because ERA accepted a $5 million proposal by Park-Willamette Associates and the architectural firm of USP, which involved mostly new construction using only portions of the old buildings. In accepting the proposal, the ERA board had rejected a $2.59-million proposal by the Willamette Buildings Development Group and architect Dan Childress. They had proposed the remodeling of the three existing structures and building a smaller adjacent four-story structure.[5] While the USP plan would produce a much higher tax-increment revenue of $121,000 a year to help finance urban renewal, the Childress plan would generate only $63,000. [6] Furthermore, the USP plan would accommodate a restaurant, a basement theater, and six rooftop condominiums, whereas the Childress plan contained a restaurant but no theater or housing.

Previously, the Eugene Historic Review Board (EHRB) had unsuccessfully attempted to secure a historic designation for these buildings.[7] However, ERA was against such a process and instead offered to provide a historic designation for the Portland Store (oldest of the three buildings) with the possible renovation of the other two.[8] ERA director Charles Kupper argued that the buildings had previously been altered to the degree that they no longer represented a distinct architectural style. Instead, he asserted that new buildings would bring more tax revenue than older ones, further suggesting "adaptive rehabilitation" rather than historic restoration (see Appendix T)

Regarding Historic Preservation, ERA board member Stephen Shepard had remarked that there were more than simply historic preservation issues involved in not choosing the Childress plan. However, Don Bishoff, a Register Guard contributor, criticized the USP building for providing only lip service, specifically pointing at its "raise-front abstraction of what might have been."[9] Bischoff also accused ERA of tearing down old buildings and advocating for high-tax producing new developments. One City Councilman, Jack Delay, shared his disappointment toward ERA's inability to consider redevelopment projects that included historic preservation.[10] In response to a protest by rehabilitation supporters, City Attorney Stan Long argued that the ERA was "an autonomous agency and its decisions cannot be appealed to the council" (see Appendix T.15)[11]



Figure 9.3. Images related to the preservation of the "three historic buildings along Willamette;" a view of the three buildings from Feb 1975 (*top*; sc. Oregon Digital; Identifier pna_07639), a snippet of the newspaper heading on the approval of the USP plan (*middle*; sc. Register Guard May 25, 1979), and the rejected Childress plan and the approved USP plan (*bottom*).

9.2 Issues of Inclusivity: Tight Mall Rules and Undesirables

Two problems related to the inclusivity of all patrons in the mall that the city could not deal with were (1) management of rules and (2) incorporate the "undesired" transient population (see figure 9.4). Historical accounts clearly show that these issues directly impacted the downtown merchants since potential customers were drawn away due to a "perceived" unsafe mall environment.



Figure 9.4. Image of a board listing the mall rules (*left*) and the mall criminal code (*right*). Taken from Mohammed 1988.

Shortly after the mall opened, the ECC adopted certain rules on the mall, some of which were (1) a ban on any wading use of the mall fountains (so, only for passive and visual enjoyment); (2) tight rules for holding events in the mall; (3) prohibition of frequent use of the mall by the same organization; (4) no pets; (5) no biking.[12] The reasons given by the city for enacting these rules were (1) to renew, preserve, and enhance the economic value and appearance of the CBD; and (2) to provide an area and atmosphere conducive to the harmonious blending of the civic, social and economic life of the community. IR4 clarifies the situation of downtown in this regard—

"I worked at 72 W. Broadway. I was downtown all the time and had a front row seat. I worked for the Eugene Development Department. There were empty spaces, low rent businesses, and "mall rats" hanging out and they seemed pretty scary to the general public. Sometimes these people (mostly young but also predators) were doing nothing wrong. But other times they were dealing drugs, cursing and generally not acting in a way that was conducive to a retail environment" (IR4)

"There is no question that drug use and sales were a problem from the beginning. One reason being that police had little access to the area. They would have to leave their vehicles and walk, and this is not necessarily their favorite thing to do." (IR1)

The city's inability to balance the perception of mall safety was detrimental to the downtown mall's status. The "unorthodox" mall patrons were mostly a problem to the downtown merchants and visitors and was a big issue to the mall.[13] IR4 points out that some people "hung out" in the mall that made customers uncomfortable. However, studies also showed that the mall's conditions were not bad, but the problems were more of perception and poor image.[14] In many instances, those "troublemakers" only wanted "a place to hang out in the city."[15] IR4 also agreed that safety issues were more of a perception than a real one but added that "perception is really important for customers."

Regardless, this was a major problem for downtown merchants as they kept the visitors away from their stores. In one instance, the loitering crowd of youngsters forced one merchant to move his store from near the Overpark (on 10th avenue between Willamette and Oak streets) to the Atrium complex.[16] According to IR2, building owners, businesses, residents, employees, and visitors all voiced legitimate concerns about a range of safety concerns. "The city and various non-profits (e.g., Downtown Eugene Inc. which provided safe and clean services, Cahoots which provided services for drug/ alcohol addicts) worked tirelessly to address safety issues."

Much later, an April 1987 mall survey of 400 people commissioned by Cawood Communications found that thirty-seven percent mentioned that transients' presence was the most unlikable aspect of the mall. Twenty-three percent would avoid shopping in the mall because of safety reasons, and twenty-one because of parking problems. In the late-1980s, Nike chose to leave downtown for the 5th street market citing "social and other problems," like loitering, vandalism, drug dealing, and other crimes, in addition to accessibility, parking, bus lines reconfiguration, and the perception of public safety.[17]

9.3 Unforeseeable External Reasons for Failure

It is important to note that the CEP and the pedestrian mall construction were not independent decisions. The drivers for the mall's "failure" did not come solely from the events within the downtown or even the city's boundary. In addition to the "core" internal reasons, at least two external causes were directly related to the mall's failure (1) loss of economic capacity of central areas and prosperity of peripheries and (2) VRC and other outer-town shopping centers. Understandably, these external developments, which added pressure to the downtown retail core, were not under the control of any single downtown-related organization. However, the City/ERA's decision to pursue such an ambitious retail project for the downtown core even after they had realized the trends across the nation in the 1960s in itself is questionable.

9.3.1 Changing Socio-economic Structure of the E-S Region

Although Eugene has mostly been a mid-sized city since its establishment, it experienced rapid growth in the post-war decades. The E-S area grew from a combined population of about 70,000 in 1960 to almost 150,000 by 1980.[18] In these two important decades, the fast-growing E-S area experienced changing sets of socio-economic conditions, which influenced downtown's role as a CBD. Consequently, given the shift in the region's makeup and developments between the 1970s and 1990s, it would have been tough for the downtown retail core to thrive, regardless of the revitalization projects' nature.

The progress that motivated the city to take bold decisions like the Central Eugene Project in the 1960s—would be partially responsible for the decline of downtown's retail sector as peripheral areas prospered more than the central areas in the decades after 1970. The analysis of Census Tracts (CTs) within the Eugene-Springfield area between 1970 and 1990 reveals two phenomena. First, the central areas mostly lost population or gained very little (up to 200), whereas the peripheral areas gained population. Specifically, the four CTs north and east of VRC gained a very high population of up to 5,000 each. Second, the central area lost its "income capacity,"[19] whereas peripheral tracts and those north of the Willamette River experienced gain (see figure 9.5). The map comparing the income power by CTs for the years 1970 and 1990 shows that all the CTs surrounding the downtown (CT 39) lost "income power." While CT 39 (downtown) suffered high loss, other CTs toward the west, east, and south of downtown suffered a very high loss. On the contrary, all the peripheral CTs experienced either high or very high-income gain.

Along with the socio-economic conditions that favored peripheral areas and areas around VRC over the central CTs, the ROB concentration also grew rapidly in the outer-central city areas (see figure 9.6). Between 1965 and 1985, many outer-city areas experienced a growth in ROB numbers while most of the central area experienced a decline. While total ROB numbers grew from 1,036 to 1,419 (+37%) for the whole city between 1965 and 1985, it declined from 582 to 570 within the central one-mile area and from 485 to 412 within the central half-mile area. While the central area lost ROBs, the outer area experienced growth from 454 to 849 ROBs. In those twenty years, 82 blocks lost ROBs, whereas 181 experienced gain. Those who gained ROBs were disproportionately located outside the one-mile area, while those who lost ROBs were disproportionately located inside. Three blocks that lost the most ROBs (55, 41, and 30) were all part of the CEP area. While in 1965, only 53% of the city's ROBs were outside the half-mile area, by 1985, the share had increased to 71%.[20]



Figure 9.5. Maps of the Eugene-Springfield Region's Census Tracts showing population difference between 1970 and 1990 (*top*) and Net loss and gain in "income capacity" between 1970 and 1990 in terms of 1990 dollars (*bottom*). The original data source is Social Explorer (www.socialexplorer.com).



Figure 9.6. Map of Eugene showing the change in ROB numbers between 1965 and 1985 by 400 m X 400 m "blocks."

9.3.2 The Impact of Peripheral Shopping Centers

> *"Businesses gradually began shifting out of downtown, into Valley River Center and other places where it was easier to park and there were more retail options. As the big anchor stores moved, the local retailers lost traffic and volume." (IR1)*

A few accounts from the 1970s also confirm that the Valley River Center (VRC) and RCPM area combined too much retail compared to the E-S metropolitan area's population. Also, the region did not experience sufficient growth in sales volume following VRC's opening to justify two large retail centers (see figure 9.7).[21] IR3 also supports this idea and argues that "mall became like a subsidiary… ground floors got converted to office, karate, antique stores, etc.…

indicating low-rent uses….” IR4 also insists that “there's only so much retail business, and it sucked a lot of life out of downtown.”

In 1974, almost 4 million SF of retail space was available in Eugene while its population was 93,800, i.e., almost 43 SF per capita.[22] The downtown had 1.27 million SF or 32% share of the total, whereas VRC had 730,000 SF or 18.6% share, i.e., downtown and VRC had more than half of the city’s total. Also, at least three medium-sized centers offered 380,000 SF to 450,000 SF retail space outside of downtown.

VRC (opened 1969), the E-S region’s first and largest enclosed shopping mall, and the Gateway Mall (which opened two decades later in 1990) played a major role in taking the businesses away for Downtown. Besides the existing small downtown businesses, all four large retailers in the mall left one by one for these two shopping centers between the 1970s and early-1990s. A Eugene City Councilman, Dick Hansen, had once remarked that “except in cornfields, where successful shopping centers can be created from scratch, “retail doesn’t lead, it follows.”[23] Hansen’s suggestion that retail in a downtown location follows the area’s context may or may not have been true, but one of the reasons downtown struggled can be attributed to VRC, whose chairman, ironically, was himself.



Figure 9.7. A map of E-S’s retail business concentrations in the mid-1970s. Sc. Livingston and Blayney and LeBlanc and Company (1974, 16).

All IRs agreed to the notion that the pedestrian mall's failure partially resonated with the national trend of the peripheral shopping center in the following ways—

> *"Almost all (pedestrian malls) failed as retailers fled to locations which may or may not have been cheaper but had ample parking and fulfilled the American Dream of arriving by car and not paying for parking." (IR1)*
>
> *"The malling of downtowns was an intriguing experiment by American cities to create the kinds of environments often found in European cities where there has been a long history of large pedestrian plazas and open spaces surrounded by restaurants and retail (with plenty of housing within easy walks). American cities however faced uphill struggles against auto centric suburbanized retail and living." (IR2)*
>
> *"In hindsight, the mall was a failure, but Eugene was a microcosm only—there was a Malling of America—from healthy mall retail to pedestrian mall and the likes of VRC." (IR3)*
>
> *"It happened all over the country. Where it did not happen was the exception. Some Capitol cities were spared a bit because they had so many government offices in the downtown that provided a core of people…. Nationally there was a trend toward covered mall shopping centers with convenient free parking. Valley River Center opened, and it was a new thing" (IR4)*

In addition to the internal downtown problems that some merchants viewed as unfavorable, one of the major reasons for businesses departing the mall was the prospects of owning a store in VRC. VRC attracted both large anchors and small businesses that were downtown. Previously, a notable downtown merchant Maurie Jacobs had argued in the early-1980s that when VRC opened in 1969, and the CEP began a few years after, "a big part of their trade had fled" when the central business district began reopening for business a few years later.[24] It is important to note that VRC had opened in August 1969, over a year before the mall's inauguration, less than 1.5 miles farther from downtown. Between mid-August and early-1971, the mall area transitioned from approval of the plans to the beginning state of mall construction and inauguration.

Although authorities claimed that the downtown and VRC were complementary, VRC did not benefit downtown.[25] In 1970, even before the mall area formally opened, VRC was a strong retail center with at least forty-two stores and two anchors. At the time, VRC already had at least twenty apparel stores, four gift shops, two jewelry stores, and seven shoe stores.[26] At least five had moved from downtown, and seven had stores in both centers. Several merchants who had stores both downtown and VRC toward mid-1970 accounted that business at VRC was either good or better than anticipated while downtown sales had dropped 'as much' or 'more than' expected. In another instance, a jewelry store that had been in downtown Eugene for twenty-five years was moving to VRC because the owner thought it was "more conducive to do business there."[27] The owner claimed that by the start of August 1971, the downtown store had experienced a decline for at least twelve to fifteen months. The merchant further added that the mall had not accomplished what businessmen had anticipated it would do and that "many stores are closing—you see signs all over." Additionally, another merchant, the owner of Weisfield's, was also moving to VRC, citing reasons such as (1) an economic downtrend with high unemployment in Lane County than in other areas of the nation in the past eighteen months and (2) ERA's disruptive attempts at the mall.[28] However, from the mall's perspective, these businesses left too early before the RCPM area started to attract businesses later in the decade.

Even during the very early stage of the project in c. 1970, while the downtown businesspeople did not fully approve that VRC had hurt the downtown business, they pointed out that it could be one factor responsible for the profit decline.[29] The merchants, however, mostly pointed to the stock market, the slump in the forest products industry, unemployment, and the general economic conditions in Eugene, Lane County, Oregon, and throughout the nation. Simultaneously, the merchants also believed that the shopping center had attracted an increasing number of 'out-of-town customers.' In response to the question of whether the mall construction (i.e., the restriction to vehicles) had hurt businesses, some businesspeople denied the causality. In contrast, some argued that there was no way to determine. However, most responders were positive that business would probably improve after the mall's completion.

Nonetheless, merchants with stores at the mall and VRC claimed that the downtown store lost more and VRC stores gained more than expected. According to IR1, mall failure's major reasons were "flight of retail to the suburbs and the difficulty of parking, walking in all weathers, and crime." Furthermore, according to IR4, downtown did not have central ownership but many owner-operated small businesses that wanted to operate on their own schedule.

According to a mid-1970s interview survey by Keyser Marston Associates of merchants (several of whom had stores located in both the downtown and the VRC)[30]

1. The lack of weather protection in the downtown mall was often cited as the single greatest obstacle the downtown has in its efforts to compete with the VRC;

2. VRC was more popular than downtown because the rural-oriented population tended to prefer VRC due to its large department stores, and downtown's image was not positive, especially due to safety concerns, parking shortages, and traffic congestion; and
3. VRC had an image of a 'single unit' under single management compared to downtown, which was "a group of individual stores."[31]

While the downtown area generally had much higher proportionate sales in the early-1970s, the scenario had flipped by 1976. By 1976, the amount was $51 million for Downtown and $62 million for VRC (+21.5% for VRC).[32] By this time, Montgomery Ward had closed its 43,000-SF downtown facility, and Penney's had reduced its selling area in the downtown store from 56,000 SF to 27,000 SF. The major decrease in the downtown was experienced in the general merchandise category, whereas the gains occurred in the apparel, furniture, and eating and drinking categories. In 1976, VRC occupied 960,000 SF of space with four major department stores, and it did not have any more land available for further development.[33] Until the late-1970s, however, VRC and the RCPM area were 'friends' since the downtown was doing well, and so was VRC (see figures 9.8).[34] By the mid-1980s, when the mall's decline had begun, the total ROB numbers in the mall was 75 (in addition to the Bon Marche and Sears) while it was 68 in VRC (in addition to JC Penney's, The Crescent, Meier and Frank, and Ward) (see figure 9.9).[35]

Figure 9.8. Aerial view of the VRC from the west and the surrounding (*left*) and plan of the VRC showing major retail categories with the RCPM area overlaid as dotted red lines (*right*).



Figure 9.9. The ratio of RCPM: VRC ROB numbers by category excluding large anchors (1978 vs. 1985). A ratio of more than "1" shows a higher number of businesses in the RCPM area.

As mentioned previously, large retailers left one by one for VRC and Gateway Mall between 1975 and 1990.[36] It started with Montgomery Ward in March 1975 (the move was already confirmed in late-1973).[37] While JC Penney, for example, operated at both locations for seven years, it eventually left downtown in 1977.[38] Downtown started losing businesses to another shopping center in the plan beginning the late-1980s/early-1990s —The Gateway Mall.[39] Gateway Mall, the 730,000 SF retail center located along I-5 in Springfield (bordering Eugene), eventually opened in March 1990. It occupied 680,000 SF that housed 120 specialty merchandise, a 300-seat food court, a twelve-screen theatre, a 15,000 SF video arcade, a community room for local organizations, and five anchor stores.[40] Sears left for the Gateway Mall in September 1989,[41] and finally, Bon Marche left in July 1990.[42] The failure to retain the existing anchors and attract any other new ones played a big role in the further decline of the RCPM area in the fifteen years between 1975 and 1990. One direct impact was that after Bon and Sears left by mid-1990, two large and empty buildings impacted the mall's two legs as the decade began. Montgomery Ward opened its 106,00 SF store in VRC in March 1975,[43] Sears opened its 119,500 SF location in Gateway Mall in October 1989,[44] and Bon Marche opened its 124,000 SF VRC store in August 1990.[45]

Bill Lipham, the assistant manager for Montgomery Ward, shared that they left downtown in 1975 because "VRC has additional space, a cover, other large retailers, better parking and more people."[46] According to Sears' store manager Bob Newman, business in the downtown location was profitable, but the big problem was parking, retail space, and design (e.g., lack of covered mall).[47] Also, Sears wanted to occupy a single large floor area occupying around 100,000 SF instead of multiple floors, which was impossible in the downtown area.[48] According to a November 1984 newspaper article, when the Blade—a men's clothing store, opened in downtown Eugene in c. 1947, Broadway and Willamette was" the hottest retail corner in the country."[49] According to the store owner, the decision to move out was due to declining sales and its VRC branch's popularity. Sales volume in the 3,900-SF shop at the time was about half of the VRC location.

At one point in the 1970s, i.e., even before the downtown Eugene mall had opened, the Downtown's Manager was quoted as claiming that "the economy got us (the downtown) not VRC." However, in light of the evidence presented, it is very hard to deny that VRC (and later the Gateway Mall) directly contributed to what happened to downtown retail.

9.4 Notes

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[1] Gene Breyerton, "Downtown Buildings: How Valuable and Costly Are Their Preservation?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 28, 1970); "Fate of Downtown Structures in Limbo," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 12, 1972). Around mid-1970 the Lane County Historic Preservation Committee or LCHPC attempted to save several downtown Eugene Buildings from demolition.

[2] Three years later, in June 1970, however, after LCHPC was notified of the presence of several historically significant buildings, Architect Otto Poticha and University of Oregon Professor Philip Dole spoke out against the thoroughness of SCORE's assessment (Breyerton, June 28, 1970). The two favored preservation of the historic buildings, including members of SCORE James Savage (director of the Lane County Pioneer Museum), Ivan Collins (director of the Wagon Museum at UO), John Warren, Ron Lovinger (UO Professor), Carolyn Ballin, and Inez Fortt.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Dispute Centers on Three Old Buildings," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 8, 1978); "Bulldozers Spare Those Relics (Eyesores?)," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 3, 1977). The three structures were the final remnant of nineteenth century "Italianate commercial architecture" surviving in Eugene, according to city officials.

[5] "Agency Reaffirms Plan for Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 13, 1979).

[6] "History Loses to the Giant Clam," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 25, 1979).

[7] "Dispute Centers on Three Old Buildings"; Lisa Strycker, "Preservation Week: Window to the Past," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, May 9, 1978); "Review Board Withdrew Request That the Buildings at 861, 865 and 873," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 19, 1979). EHRB was created as a five-member board in 1975.

[8] "Three Downtown Buildings Have Been Recommended for Historic Landmark Status," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 15, 1978).

[9] "History Loses to the Giant Clam."

[10] Don Nelson, "Historic Bind Blocks Council," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 31, 1979).

[11] Ibid.

[12] "City Eyes Tighter Mall Rules," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 3, 1971); "Rules for Eugene Mall Use Debated for Hours," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 15, 1971); "Eugene Adopts Rules, Guidelines on Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 17, 1971); "New Mall Regulations to Be Aired at Meeting," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 17, 1972); "Stricter Mall Rules Favored," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 31, 1972); "Mall Grass Won't Be Put off Limits Yet," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 7, 1972).

[13] They went by many names- "homeless," "transients," "street people," "mall rats," "hecklers," "hoodlums," "loiterers," "hippies," etc.

[14] "Walking Beat Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 6, 1970); "Those Teeny-Bopper Hookers," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 27, 1977).

[15] "Mall Gathering Point for Well-Behaved and Hoodlums," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 1, 1977).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Mark Davis and John Hedlund, "City Ignores Downtown Problems," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, 1988).

[18] In the same period, Portland, the State's largest city, had almost no population growth, which remained at around 370,000 (Data taken from https://population.us/or/portland/)

[19] Derived by the author as an experimental metric, income capacity = annual median household income * total population for each CT (adjusted to 1990 dollars). The loss or gain for each CT is the difference in the "income capacity" between 1990 and 1970.

[20] In addition to the findings discussed in the text, the total number of blocks that gained at least one ROB- 159 out of 181 (88%) were located outside the one-mile area. Similarly, those who gained at least two ROBs was 69 out of 85 (81%); gained at least five ROBs was 30 out of 39 (77%); gained at least eight ROBs- 20 out of 25 (80%); gained at least ten ROBs-14 out of 16 (88%). On the contrary, of the total number of businesses that lost at least one ROB was only 10

out of 82 (12%) were located inside the one-mile area; who lost at least two ROBs was 7 out of 32 (22%); and who lost at least five ROBs was 5 out of 12 (42%).

[21] LeBlanc and Company, *Markets and Services in Downtown Eugene*.

[22] Livingston and Blayney and LeBlanc and Company, *Eugene Commercial Study*.

[23] Matassa, “The Plan: No Panacea.”

[24] George Barker, “A Merchant Who’s in Love with His City,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 23, 1982). Maurie Jacobs opened his furniture store in c. 1938 in the corner of Eighth avenue and Olive street. Jacobs even played a role in bringing the Hult Performing Arts Center to downtown, which opened in 1982, the Alton Baker Park, and the free off-street parking.

[25] However, as the years passed, one way the downtown distinguished itself from VRC was through a large concentration of restaurants and specialty stores.

[26] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory* (Eugene: Johnson Publishing Co, 1970). The list of stores in VRC included ***Apparel (20)***—Action Alley, Albert's Hosiery, Anita's, Baxter And Henning, Blouse Tree, Clarks Jr., Clothes Tree, Gay Blade, House of Uniforms, Kaufman Bros, Martin Beren's Tall Fashions, Mode O' Day, Motherhood Maternity Shops, Nobby Shop, Oregon Squire, Petries, Roos Atkins, Rosenblatts, Tie Rack, Topps And Trousers; ***Department Stores (2)***—JC Penney, Meir And Frank; ***Gifts (4)***—Memory Lane, Northland Gifts, Party Card, Pot Shop; ***Jewelry (2)***—Harry Ritchie's, Skeie's; ***Shoes (7)***—Burch's, Hardy Shoes, Leeds, Nadeau's Junior Boot Shop, Nelson's Footwear, Nickels Shoe Store, Thom Mcan; and ***Others (9)***—Merle Norman-Beauty shop, Russell Stover-Candy, Fabric House, Latham's Luggage, JK Gill-Office supplies, Noah's Little Ark-Pet shop, Viscount Records, Singer Co-Sewing, Tinder Box-Tobacco.

[27] Register Guard, “Weisfield’s to Move: Mall ‘Climate’ Cited,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 3, 1971).

[28] “Needed: Togetherness,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 5, 1971).

[29] 70-07-19a RG

[30] 1976 Retail trend document that includes the Keyser Marston Associates study data

[31] KMA also found that downtown employees mostly supported the downtown stores, residents who live near the downtown, and the population at large with a focus on individual specialty stores, whereas VRC had a more general source of support, with an ability to attract family shoppers.

[32] In 1972, Downtown's total sales were $46 million and for VRC was $32 million (+44% for downtown). In 1976, the largest retail addition at any one location in the E-S Region was the expansion of the VRC (+234,000 SF). [from A 1976 “Retail trend” document that includes the Keyser Marston Associates study data] At the time, VRC occupied a total of 956,000 SF space.

This additional space was shared by two new department stores JC Penney and Meier and Frank. Further expansions took place in Montgomery Ward and Lipman Wolfe.

[33] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals*; Tims, "Eugene's Core in a New Ballgame." Around late-1977, VRC had 102 businesses compared to 70 in 1969, whereas the retail sales exceeded $85 million—nearly double the sales volume recorded in 1971.

[34] "Valley River and Downtown Mall Still Friends after 10 Years," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 3, 1979). Both were big centers for apparel stores, whereas the RCPM was a much bigger center for specialty stores, eating and drinking establishments, and service-oriented businesses. With the construction of additional retail and office structures and the Valley River Inn, the entire complex was valued at about $50 million and was occupied by about 100 businesses. According to Dick Hansen, VRC's manager since July 1971, the center recorded gross sales of $26 million during its first full year of operation. For 1978, the center's gross sales totaled $101 million.

[35] Both of the mall's large retailers would leave downtown by the start of the nineties. In 1985, while specialty stores were still the RCPM area's strength (32), the apparel store numbers had declined to only eight. At that time, VRC had 23 apparel stores, 29 Specialty stores, excluding the multiple large retailers.

[36] Ward had remained in the location for 44 years, Sears for 42 years, and Penney for 38 years.

[37] Ed Kenyon, "Montgomery Ward to Open Valley River Store Wednesday," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 10, 1975).

[38] "JC Penney Closes Eugene Mall Store," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 2, 1977).

[39] Allen I. Johnson, "Downtown Eugene Is Facing a Major Crisis," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 15, 1988); Paul Dunwiddie, "Gateway Mall Opens with Fanfare," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 15, 1990). General Growth of California Inc. (part of a group of development companies founded and run by Martin and Matthew Bucksbaum) developed the retail center. Even before its formal opening, Gateway had secured at least thirty stores, including a 119,500 SF Sears, 116,700 SF Target, and Emporium

[40] "Two Main Stores Open at Mall Site," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 4, 1989); "New Mall Expects to Be 70% Leased by Spring," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 4, 1989). The most expensive space rented for $29 PSF per year plus taxes, maintenance and insurance and rents were negotiated on a store-by-store basis. Expected sales were $200 PSF for the first year.

[41] Paul Dunwiddie, "Sears Says Goodbye to Downtown Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 28, 1989).

[42] Paul Dunwiddie, "The Bon to Close July 28," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 28, 1990).

[43] Kenyon, "Montgomery Ward to Open Valley River Store Wednesday."

[44] Dunwiddie, "Sears Says Goodbye to Downtown Mall."

[45] Paul Dunwiddie, "Bon Ready to Exhibit New Store," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 31, 1990).

[46] Pack, "'A Place to Work, Shop, Live and Have Fun'."

[47] Dunwiddie, "Sears Says Goodbye to Downtown Mall." Sears closed its door on the downtown location on October 1, 1989, with a plan instead to open a 119,500 SF location in Gateway Mall. At the time, Bon Marche was the only one left, but the store was also planning to open a 124,000 SF store at VRC.

[48] The Downtown Sears occupied 72,000 SF in total but split into three floors (of 24,000 SF each). After it closed, the forty-year-old Sears building was for sale for $1.6 million. Before leaving, Sears leased the space at $3 PSF per year with taxes paid. Sears was paying $280,000 a year rent based on sales.

[49] "The Blade Cutting out of Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 16, 1984).

10 CHAPTER X: THE CEP PROJECT—MORE THAN DESTRUCTION

Chapters six to nine elaborated on the reasons associated with the mall's failure, and this chapter discusses how urban renewal went beyond a more direct comprehension of "destruction of the original fabric and replacement by new sets of buildings" by focusing on Phase 1 of the mall era (1970 to mid-1980s). In line with this argument, the next chapter covers phase 2 (1986 to 2002). Specifically, this chapter aims to investigate the following question concerning small business investments and the transformation of the RCPM area: if downtown Eugene's urban renewal and the pedestrian mall were not only about demolition and rebuilding, what other processes played a substantial role?

The previous chapters argued that Eugene's urban renewal and pedestrian mall radically transformed downtown's morphological and retail business structure. Through those assessments, it is easy to characterize the mall as an experiment that led to the "destruction" of the old downtown core. However, the mall's saga spanned for more than thirty years. In these years, the downtown mall experienced more than destruction and rebuilding but also a few potentially positive lessons, which have not been explored as much. Therefore, in investigating the central question, a less-explored urban renewal story could be uncovered, providing significant knowledge about the complex processes involved in downtown's transformation in the post-war decades. A section in the Literature Review (Chapter 2) began this discussion through the works on local history by urban historians like Lizabeth Cohen and Alison Isenberg. In a similar vein, this chapter explores the "positive" side of Eugene's urban renewal project (CEP) by examining the following:

1. ERA and COE's genuine concern for the small businesses
2. Downtown merchants' involvement
3. CEP's focus on reducing absentee ownership
4. ERA's organizational structure and basis for CEP

10.1 ERA and COE's Genuine Concern for Small Businesses

> *"I think everyone's motives were good. As they say in baseball, no one bat a thousand (perfect). The best laid plans don't always work out for so many reasons." (IR4)*

A previous chapter on the analysis of the mall's failure argued that ERA gave much more attention to bringing large retailers or other larger projects than small businesses. While this was true, ERA also made efforts to serve the displaced small businesses, retain as many old businesses as possible, and attract new ones. The next paragraphs discuss a few events related to ERA and the City assisting small businesses.

For example, during each Land Sales Offering (LSO), the first priority (for up to the first two months) went exclusively to the displaced businesses or property owners. While LSO 1 started in March 1970, the priority window was open until June 30, whereas July 1 was the opening date to anyone regardless of whether they were displaced or not. Similarly, LSO2 began on September 3, 1970, with November 4 being the final day for the period giving preference to owners and tenants in the area. During the early days of the renewal, ERA director David Hunt had clarified that the agency would not accept just "any proposal" bringing in money. He was aware that accepting proposals solely based on financial motives without considering the impacts of new construction downtown could be detrimental.[1]

The meeting minutes of the early 1970s show that the attendees of the ERA meetings discussed each proposal in detail. The ERA would only make recommendations if all members "seconded" with reasons for support. For example, in a July 1971 ERA meeting, regarding the ground floor of the Parcade Garage (then called the 8th avenue parking structure), at least two ERA staff argued that eliminating the idea of a large retailer was "short-sighted," and that a decision should not be based on current economic condition but on future possibilities.[2] They wanted the shops to be retail-oriented and small enough to support merchants who could not afford larger spaces. Also, the location for Parcade partly relied on whether it would impact the consolidation of the retail area or ease of access to the retail core.

In another instance, one ERA member had argued that having the same kind of shops as in Overpark would not be enough for businesses looking to afford small space.[3] Another ERA staff argued that there was a minimal possibility of a major retailer coming into the area for at least the next five to ten years and that there was a present need to accommodate the small businesspeople instead of waiting for a large project. Even David Hunt understood the prospect of small business conglomerations, adding that the best way was for the city to own and operate such a facility themselves instead of waiting for a private redeveloper and provide necessary lease arrangements and loans. The story of several projects highlights these points.

In January 1977, ERA approved its agent, Bullier & Bullier Realtors, to sign leases with parties who were interested in starting retail outlets on the ground floor of the Parcade Garage.[4] Two shops, a coffee and doughnut restaurant, and a cutlery store, planned to lease from 700 to 900 SF of the available 21,600 SF feet of retail space and pay a minimum of 55 cents PSF. Other businesses interested were a restaurant/tavern, ice cream parlor, kitchen supplies store, import outlet, bakery, barbershop, and jewelry store. In one instance, the owners of McKenzie Outfitters, a Eugene retail store carrying outdoor gear and clothing, which opened in August 1977 in the Parcade, praised the improvements around the area and cited that as the reason for locating there.[5] McKenzie Outfitters was the fourth business to open in the Parcade after Western Pioneer Title Co., Huey & Sons Knife Emporium, and The Beach House. In January 1978, ERA authorized a contract with J.E. Beck Co. for the interior construction of two shops that would add another 3,400 SF space under occupation.[6]

In another instance, in October 1975, the city (through Mayor Les Anderson and council members) announced that small business ventures would be added to the mall's expanse to draw shoppers downtown.[7] The ECC even approved guidelines that would allow various commercial activities to extend into the downtown mall, from vending carts to small concession stands.[8] The city leaders agreed that “the presence of a few small concession stands and maybe some roving sidewalk vendors should add to the vitality of the mall…. from a purely commercial standpoint, they should draw business to rather than away from the established retail stores.”

One specific example of ERA’s involvement in securing a major small business venture is the Atrium mini-mall constructed in 1974 (see figure 10.1). In part, the project was made possible through David Hunt’s vision to create a specialized center for displaced and other small businesses. This example shows that the ERA members knew that while the key to downtown success was retaining the anchors (Sears, Wards, Penney’s, and Bon Marche) and adequate parking, small retailers between these anchors would also be equally vital to sustaining the retail core. ERA planned to utilize one quarter-block site to help businesses remain in the CEP area by allowing for a development that would rent them spaces in the building.

In the early years, there was a consensus among ERA members that the price of land on the Eugene mall—either to buy or to lease—would be so high that the smaller merchants with less capital would be forced out.[9] Additionally, ERA also wanted to advise the city to provide subsidies to potential smaller shops.[10] ERA staff was also concerned about helping merchants who owned shoe repair shops and letting them finish their own shops. David Hunt believed that

ERA would be able to develop a specialized center with provisions for displaced and other small businesses.[11] ERA planned to utilize the site to allow displaced and other small businesses to remain in the CEP area by leasing spaces in the building. In addition to leasing the space to small businesses, Hunt also wanted to offer small business owners an opportunity to buy spaces in the building as a condominium, making the tenants the owners.[12] Considering the management and ownership of common spaces, Hunt proposed a concept that involved constructing a building as a "shell" by the developer all at once and then subdivided to provide spaces for small businesses as required.[13]



Figure 10.1. Interior view of the Atrium mini-mall building (*top*; sc. Valley News January 24, 1973) and views from Olive Street (*bottom*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifiers pna_07782, and pna_07781).

In April 1972, ERA accepted a bid by Churchill Village Development of Eugene (CVD) and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance to invest $1.2 million over developer James Blinkhorn's proposal to invest $690,000.[14] One of the reasons for the approval was the project's ability to include higher-rent tenants in addition to those displaced by the renewal. CVD's offer to reinstate the displaced merchants at a lower rate was a significant aspect of the project. Rents would be 38 cents PSF for displaced businesses and 52 cents for others.[15] Although CVD agreed to pay only $2.60 PSF, which was $2.4 below the market rate, HUD approved the proposal since the developer agreed to provide 18,000 SF (or about one-third of the total building space) at a below-market rental rate. The building would offer 29,000 SF for retail and 18,500 for office.

Additionally, an 18,000 SF basement area was available to tenants for storage.[16] The Atrium Building opened in early 1974, and by 1978 at least nineteen ROBs occupied the building—two barbershops, one beauty salon, two book stores, one craft shop, one Ice cream shop, one Jeweler, one Liquor store, one Men's clothing store, five eateries, one shoe repair shop, one sporting goods store, one toy store, and one yarn shop.[17] By 1985, however, many businesses had left the complex, and there were only nine ROB left.[18] In November 1997, the City of Eugene agreed to purchase the Atrium building for its main downtown office (see Appendix T.3).[19]

In addition to designing and planning for small businesses, ERA played a central role in securing financial assistance to small businesses. According to HUD's urban renewal laws, the local agency was responsible for financially aiding the businesses being relocated because of the project to another decent, safe, sanitary, and financially feasible place.[20] The maximum relocation payment was $25,000 and a maximum payment of $3,000 for loss of property.[21] Additionally, certain businesses were eligible for a $2,500 Small Business Displacement Payment (see table 10.1).

Table 10.1. Various types of loans available to small businesses in the CEP area.

Loan	***Amount***	***Interest***	***Maximum payment period***
Displaced business loans	No limitation	4.25%	Twenty years
Business loans	$350,000	5.5%	Ten years plus the time needed for construction
Economic Opportunity Loans	$15,000	5.5%	Fifteen years
Small Business Investment Company loans			Five to thirty years
Pool loans	$250,000 (for each pool member)	5%	up to twenty years
Development company loans	$350,000	5% or 5.5%	up to twenty-five years

In one instance, in March 1974, ERA, in cooperation with three banks, made provisions to provide rehabilitation loans to CEP area businesses with an interest rate of 6.25 percent, which would apply to more than twenty-five businesses.[22] In June 1974, HUD approved an additional $365,000 in rehabilitation loans, making assistance to twenty-nine business rehabilitations possible through a new sum of $1.1 million.[23] Five buildings obtained the 3% Federal loans in 1974, and another ten paid application fees to commit a total of $545,000 of the available money by the year's end. The local loans would be used as "companion loans" to the Federal funds, which were limited to $50,000 per loan. By the end of 1974, ERA had spent over $1.22 million in relocation benefits that included 133 residents, twenty families, and 334 businesses.[24]

10.2 Downtown Merchants' Involvement

Although the City Council made the final decisions, the merchants' involvement in three fundamental things is notable: (1) support for the urban renewal and the pedestrian mall strategy (2) assistance in financing a parking garage and the free parking program; and (3) reopening the mall to cars (discussed further in the next chapter).

10.2.1 Merchants' Supported the Renewal and Pedestrian Mall Plan

Downtown Eugene's urban renewal and the pedestrian mall were a decision inspired not only by the City Leaders but also by the Local Community and Downtown Merchants. The need for downtown revitalization garnered serious attention among the downtown merchants beginning the early-1960s. It was mostly the merchants, not the residents, who raised the need for downtown revitalization/urban renewal. Downtown merchants were specifically concerned about improving the retail core in response to two mid-1960s situations, (1) substandard buildings and (2) competition from a possible suburban shopping center.

By 1965, the downtown community had realized that Eugene's retail core was decaying physically, and specifically, business owners were concerned about its future in light of the regional shopping center. As one RG article mentioned in 1968, Eugene's urban renewal was possible because it was "a realization by the city's civic and business leaders that Eugene's retail core, vital to the city's economy, is being threatened and needed to be brought up to date with the present-day shopping habits."[25] Shortly after the presentation of the urban renewal plan in March 1968, the Retail Merchants Division of the Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce agreed that strengthening the downtown Eugene retail shopping area will be the prime objective of the CEP program.[26] By September 1968, there was a widespread understanding among the downtown merchants that the pedestrian mall was a much-needed option; supported further by a realization that Eugene's retail core—vital to the city's economy—is being threatened and "needed to be brought up to date with the present-day shopping habits."[27]

During the rest of the late-1960s, downtown merchants and like-minded leaders reiterated the need for retail modification if it was "supposed to have a chance of survival."[28] While the community (led by downtown merchants) criticized the plan's specific components, there was a broad agreement that urban renewal and, specifically, the pedestrian mall was an appropriate strategy.

10.2.2 The Merchants Helped Finance a Parking Garage and Organize Free Parking

A "parking assessment district" funded the $2 million 668-capacity "Overpark" parking garage completed in 1969 (however, this garage was not a part of the CEP). In this scheme, businesses and property owners close by would pay extra taxes since they would benefit the most from the upcoming parking garage. They were obliged to pay their "fair share" over twenty years. However, all net revenues from the parking facility would be used to pay the bond, and the assessment was based on the proximity of one's property to the parking site.[29] Eugene Downtown Association (EDA), a local business and property owners' group, headed this effort.

The merchants played a central role in organizing free parking in downtown Eugene during the 1970s. According to IR4, "parking was only free downtown because of three funding sources: (1) a gross receipts tax—revenue was gutted when the big retailers left; (2) a tax on professionals (lawyers, doctors, etc.) that was repealed when they started leaving downtown to avoid the tax; (3) a special property tax that was no longer legal when Measure 5 was adopted statewide in 1990."

In October 1973, the city successfully provided more than 2,000 free parking spaces to the downtown patrons through the existing parking spaces in the Overpark, nineteen downtown parking lots, and around 350 formerly metered street spaces.[30] By April 1972, a group named "Free Parking Committee" headed by downtown business owner Maurie Jacobs had been formed. The group set a goal for free parking to "keep downtown Eugene alive and competitive with other shopping areas."[31] The free parking program's primary aim was to provide customers with free off-street parking within a district for any length of time and impose a time limit on the street parking. However, the employees and employers could not use this facility, and it was reserved for downtown visitors.

The Downtown Development Board (DDB), created by the ECC in June 1972, administered the parking program in addition to promoting transportation-related issues such as walking, bicycling, and public transit, including parking (see figure 8.13 for DDD boundary).[32] The way the parking scheme worked was that tax was assessed on property within DDD, such that property owners paid a percentage of the assessed property value ($8.7 per $1000), retailers paid a percentage of sales ($2.5 per $1,000), and professional people paid fees ($160 annually).[33] In 1969 (before the urban renewal interventions), all downtown parking spaces were either metered or for hire.[34] There were 1,825 spaces available in thirty central lots for shoppers' parking, and only 220 or nine percent of them were in permanent public ownership. By 1976, a total of 2,309 spaces were available within the CEP area (+27% compared to 1969).[35] A total of 1,730 or 62% of shoppers' parking space was in permanent public ownership, and 85% were accessible from the inner loop. The estimated usage of shoppers' parking spaces for an average shopping day was 5,475 in 1969 (1,825 spaces times estimated turnover of three), whereas it was 9,236 by 1976 (+69%; 2,309 spaces times estimated turnover of four). However, shopper auto circulation counts for the CEP area dropped by seven percent from 72,590 in 1969 to 67,850 in 1976.[36] By June 1978, after completing the Parcade, around 2,800 free parking spaces were present in downtown Eugene compared to around 1,825 in 1969 (see figure 10.2 and Appendices T.10 and T.11).[37]



Figure 10.2. An information board advertising downtown's free parking program (sc. Photo by John Harris published in Eugene Downtown News June 20, 1978).

10.3 CEP's focus on reducing absentee ownership

One problem that the urban renewal program highlighted in the 1960s was that of absentee ownership. While the data on ownership of the area before the renewal is not available, the situation of the mid-1980s shows a significant share of properties by local investors. According to an October 1984 account from The Register Guard[38], of the sixty-nine downtown properties, at least thirty-seven had Eugene-based owners (54%), twelve were publicly held, six were Portland-based, and five were Seattle-based. Guard Publishing Co., the local investors, owned the second-most expensive property worth $7.13 million (see figure 10.3).[39] In total, Eugene-based owners' properties were valued at least $32.96 million (42%).

Figure 10.3. Map showing the value of CEP area properties in the mid-1980s.

Additionally, an unpublished ERA document from 1985 provides data for fifty-nine properties with an assessed value of $80.96 million in total.[40] Of the fifty-nine buildings,

1. Twenty-two were rehabilitated using City Loans (CL) with a total assessed value of $10.16 million (12.5%);
2. Thirty were new buildings developed on ERA property with a total assessed value of $39.37 million (348.6%);
3. Three were in buildings under Public Ownership (PO); and
4. Four were in buildings on private property (PR) (see Appendix W).

10.4 ERA's organizational structure and basis for CEP

The ERA had a rigid structure, and it employed a systematic process to execute the CEP. Specifically, many organizations (in addition to ERA and ECC) and public participation played a role in the urban renewal decisions. Also, several design and planning studies determined ERA's decisions in executing the details of the CEP plan.

10.4.1 Organizations Involved

Within ERA's administrative structure, there were many levels (see figure 10.4). In addition to ERA and ECC, many organizations were involved downtown. The ECC formed several organizations in the 1970s to assist in downtown development, particularly the CEP area. Some of them were the Eugene Downtown Association (EDA), Eugene Downtown Commission (EDC), and Downtown Development Board (DDB). It is important to note that these organizations' members were primarily local residents, downtown merchants, and local property owners. Also, the Planning Review Committee, which approved the designs and plans, was monitored by a representative from different organizations, like the ECC, Eugene Planning Commission, ERA, and SCORE representatives (see Appendix V for further information on these organizations).

10.4.2 The Role of Design and Planning Studies

Between the early-1970s and 1990s, the ECC and ERA commissioned many design and planning studies (see table 10.2). They relied on other independent reports, demonstrating that decisions taken during the urban renewal years were not arbitrary. The following studies were of particular importance[41]



Figure 10.4. The hierarchical structure of ERA as an administrative body. Sc. an unpublished "Resolution #276" document obtained through a City of Eugene Staff.

Table 10.2. A list of major design and planning studies commissioned by ERA and COE to facilitate the urban renewal program.

Year	***Title***	***Company***	***Brief detail of the report***
1974	Downtown Eugene Commercial Study	Livingston and Blayney	To anticipate retail and office development pressures and recommend zoning policies and public actions. Concerning the downtown, the report made several assessments and predictions for the future.
1976		No author, but includes a study by Keyser Marston Associates	Studied retail scenario for the mid-1970s, conducted interviews with downtown merchants, provided suggestions for retail core
1976	Citizens' Alternatives for Eugene	Friends of a Liveable Eugene	They were prepared in response to the 1974 study, especially arguing against the potentially large, enclosed shopping center downtown and supporting small independent businesses.
1977	Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene	A team led by the Downtown Planning Review Group (DPRG)[42]	To envision the possibilities for downtown retail and multi-purpose center and provide recommendations on design, financing, and traffic.
1983	Markets and Services in Downtown Eugene	LeBlanc and Company	It consisted of studies of downtown markets and services, housing in downtown Eugene, and a Summary of Downtown development prospects.
1983	Free Parking in Eugene Downtown: Perspective of Employees	UO Planning Department	
1986	Eugene Downtown Public Spaces	Don Miles and Project for Public Spaces	Studied mall users' behaviors and suggested specific changes to certain mall segments, including making provisions for vehicular traffic
1990	Retail Task Force (RTF) Report	Retail Task Force[43]	Included RTF's work program consisting of Downtown Tenant Mix, Downtown Property Owner's Agreement, Downtown Redesign Principles, and Recommendations for Public Policy to Support downtown development.

10.5 Notes

[1] Kenyon, “Eugene Renewal Officials Hope to Find Space for All Who Want It.”

[2] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971” (Eugene, n.d.).

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Firm to Study Downtown Potential,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 21, 1977).

[5] “New Outdoor Store to Open,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 3, 1977).

[6] “Parcel Contract Authorized,” *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, January 17, 1978).

[7] “Sidewalk Vendor May Work Downtown Mall,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 7, 1975).

[8] “Using the Mall,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 17, 1975).

[9] Jim Sellers and Ann Baker, “Downtown Eugene-- Dying or Reviving?,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 5, 1971).

[10] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971.”

[11] For example, during a July 28, 1971 ERA meeting, Hunt forwarded his opinion of small businesses by arguing that “a group of businesses could be put together at the kind of places these people can afford and if a private entrepreneur (could be managed)…. (and)…. if some public route that could be taken,” further adding that shops are desirable under any structure regardless of when built.

[12] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, September 2, 1970” (Eugene, September 2, 1970).

[13] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, November 4, 1970” (Eugene, November 4, 1970).

[14] Ed Kenyon, “Renewal Panel Accepts $1.2 Million ‘Mini-Mall’ Bid,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 26, 1972).

[15] “Deadline given for Potential ‘Mini-Mall’ Businesses,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 22, 1972).

[16] “Mini-Mall Plans Told,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 15, 1973).

[17] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory*.

[18] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory*.

[19] Joe Kidd, “City Agrees to Purchase Atrium,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 20, 1997).

[20] Based on a Eugene-related document dated June 1968 highlighting the impact of the upcoming urban renewal and provisions to be made for the businesses. ERA's relocation benefits were supposed to cover the cost for moving (including storage costs for one year or less) and/ or any actual direct losses of property, a Small Business Displacement payment, and relocation assistance.

[21] Moving expenses could include the cost of dismantling, crating, packing, insuring, transporting, unpacking, reassembling, reconnection, and reinstallation of personal property, merchandise, etc., exclusive of the costs of any additions, improvements, or alterations to any structure. A business concern is defined as "a corporation, firm, partnership, individual or other entity engaged in some type of business or profession necessitating fixtures, equipment, stock- in trade, or other tangible property for the carrying on of the business or profession."

[22] "Renewal Agency Offers Loan Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 21, 1974).

[23] "Additional $365,000 Loan Granted for City's Renewal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 28, 1974). The money would be loaned at a 3% interest rate over twenty years. Also, in June, HUD notified ERA that over a $1 million in 3% Section 312 loan funds could be made available for rehabilitation.

[24] ERA, "ERA Annual Report 1974."

[25] "What's Going to Happen Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 25, 1968).

[26] "Pedestrian Mall Plan Unveiled," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 28, 1968).

[27] "What's Going to Happen Downtown."

[28] "Urban Renewal Planners Find Problems Many and Urgent," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 10, 1968).

[29] City of Eugene, "City of Eugene Letters on 10th and Oak Parking," November 1966.

[30] "Free Parking Starts."

[31] Jim Frake, "Free Parking Plan without Meters or Tokens Downtown's Goal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 12, 1972).

[32] Lisa Strycker, "Who Pays for Free Parking?," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, February 28, 1978).

[33] Ibid.

[34] *Central Eugene Project, 1969 to 1976 (Unpublished Manuscript)*. Obtained from a City of Eugene Staff

[35] Ibid. Obtained from a City of Eugene Staff

[36] It is the total of all average daily traffic on streets passing through an area measured at edges of project area and averaged for each street and adjusted to show shopper traffic only.

[37] Strycker, "Major Issues Face Voters."

[38] Mike Stahlberg, "Who Owns Downtown? Large 'conglomerate' Owns $77 Million of the Core Area," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 14, 1984).

[39] Hilton Hotel was the most expensive property with $12.23 million value and owned by the Sixth Avenue Hotel Association, Daseke Realty Corporation (based in Stamford, CT). Other highly-valued developments were The Park-Willamette Building (combined with another bank building; $6.2 million) was publicly held (First Interstate Bank of Oregon) whereas the Citizens Building ($5.9 million) was owned by Citizens Associates (Louis Walker and Russell Osterman).

[40] Of these properties, only ten overlapped with properties listed in the RG article.

[41] This may not be an exhaustive list and does not include studies done before the implementation of the urban renewal, which is discussed in another chapter.

[42] Other companies associated were the Downtown Advisory Committee (DAC), Elbasani, Logan, and Severin (ELS Design Group) for Architecture and Planning, Keyser Marston Associates for Market and Financial Analysis, and Barton-Aschman Associates for Traffic and Parking study. The membership of DPRG consisted of two representatives from City Council, two from ERA, two from Planning Commission, one from Downtown Development Board, one from Eugene Downtown Association, and four from Central area neighborhood organizations.

[43] The members of the RTF included Chairperson Julie Aspinwall-Lamberts, Peg Allison, Dorothy Anderson, Peter Bartel, Shawn Boles, Ronnel Curry, Mark Doonan, Ron Fletcher, Allen Johnson, Eric Jung Johann, Betty Niven, Brad Perkins, Sue Prichard, Tim Scherer, Emily Schue, and Dan Tucci

11 CHAPTER XI: STORY OF PHASE 2—MALL REOPENING AND NEW DIRECTIONS

This chapter is about the RCPM area's story during phase 2 of the mall's existence (i.e., between 1986 and early-2000s). This period starts with the reopening of the first segment and ends with the reopening of the final mall segment in 2002. Like the first phase, the total ROB numbers during the second phase declined considerably. As a result, this phase experience the "symbolic" end to the mall after cars were allowed back to these streets. However, the legacy of the second phase lies in the new direction taken by the ERA, City, and the downtown community. Specifically, the narrative on revitalizing the retail core shifted from a retail-centric approach to incorporating community participation, celebrating/preserving the existing businesses, and inviting economic or land-use diversity in the upcoming projects. Notably, the discussions also add to the previous chapter's argument that many complex processes were involved during the urban renewal, some of which deserve to be explored more. Specifically, the key developments that occurred during this phase were-

1. Loss of ROBs and two large anchors
2. Public meetings that influenced mall reopening
3. Campaigns of local "pro-mall" groups in successfully postponing mall reopening
4. Relentless pursuit of "no-mall" groups and success in reopening the mall
5. Downtown revitalization strategy from a retail-centric to diversity and mixed use-centric approach.

11.1 Transformation of the RCPM Area During Phase 2

The end of the mall's existence was completed between 1992 and 2000. The remaining six segments reopened in four stages: Olive between 8th and 10th avenues in September 1992, Willamette between 8th and 10th avenues in November 1996, and Broadway in September 2002 (see figure 11.1). Between 1986 and 1991, the mall experienced remodeling projects, but no segment reopened to cars, notably due to protests from those who wanted to preserve the mall (explored in detail later). The following statement from IR2 highlights the situation of phase 2-

> *"When I arrived (with my family in 1986, worked for the city until 1998), the downtown mall was struggling. The Bon Marche and Sears were the only two department stores left and both were planning to leave for Valley River Mall (Sears went first followed a couple of years later by The Bon). Some smaller*

retailers and downtown restaurants were doing ok but there hadn't been any new housing at all and relatively little new office space. While there was active downtown programing, a downtown theatre, and the City had at the beginning of the 80s completed a major new mixed-use development that provided a Hilton Hotel and world class performing arts center, the retail vacancy rate was high and roving gangs, mostly juveniles but in one case a family of thugs, contributed to make downtown feel unsafe at times, particularly in the evening."

Figure 11.1. Map showing the timeline for mall reopening across four stages from 1985 to 2002.

Between 1985 and 2000, the ROB numbers reduced from seventy-five to sixty-one. The Specialty Store category, which decreased from thirty-two to fifteen, suffered the most. However, there was an increase in Eating and Drinking establishments, from seven to fifteen. Service-Oriented ROB numbers had not changed by much, and neither had Apparel and Shoe stores (see figure 11.1). Out of the thirty-two quarter-blocks, fifteen lost businesses, while seven experienced an increase (see figure 11.2). Clearly, the entirety of the central and western RCPM area lost businesses. This loss is also reflected in the "ROB by segments" map. However, the map also shows that not all mall segments experienced a decline.[1] According to the map, western and central Broadway, Olive, and southern Willamette lost businesses, whereas the northern and central Willamette and eastern Broadway gained businesses. The central Broadway—the main mall segment—lost the highest number of ROBs (eight). The impact of Bon Marche and Sears leaving the area by 1990 is clearly visible in the maps (see figure 11.3). It is important to note that Olive and Willamette mall had completely reopened eight and four years prior, respectively, while the Broadway portion was still a mall in 2000. The need for Broadway to reopen because of failing ROB numbers and the positive impact of reopening Willamette is visible in the maps. However, ROB numbers were not the only determinants of how the area was doing by this time. As will be discussed further, several non-retail projects were constructed during this period not reflected on the RBS maps.



Figure 11.2. A chart comparing ROB numbers by category (RCPM area, 1985 vs. 2000). "Others" include Appliance, Equipment, Electronics, Furniture and Home, Personal Care, other retail, miscellaneous retail.

Figure 11.3. Maps showing the change in ROB numbers between 1985 and 2000 by quarter block (*left*) and segments (*right*).

11.2 A detailed Story of Phase 2

11.2.1 Story from 1986 to 1991

The important events of this period were the CEP plan amendment, West Broadway remodeling, public sessions on mall reopening, and postponement of further reopening. Comparatively, the period between 1986 to 1990 was a prosperous time for some segments of the mall. According to one data reported by the mall manager Russ Brink for late-1986, eighteen new shops moved into the mall while only seven moved out.[2] Additionally, the vacancy rate in the core area dropped to less than seven percent.[3] The vacancy rate in the retail core bounded by 8th and 10th avenues, and Charnelton and High streets had dropped to 6.9 % in October from the July level of 10.1 %. Based on several accounts, conditions were improving around late-1986 in the RCPM area.

Furthermore, four large buildings, Schaefers, Park- Willamette, Centre Court, and Johnson Furniture buildings, were involved in major renovations.[4] According to George Barker, a few downtown blocks were "one of the greatest concentrations" of outdoor/sports shops on the West Coast.[5] Of the major ones along the mall were Luby's Sports Center (23 W 6th avenue), McKenzie Outfitters (79 W Broadway), and Eugene Athletic (94 W Broadway). These stores had recently completed either renovating or moving to a different location within the mall. Talking about the improving situation in the mall area, the Luby's Sports Center owner claimed, "two or three years ago, you could walk through the Eugene Mall, and it was like death warmed over.

There were too many of us who were not really merchants-people who were spoiled during the 1970s when all you had to do was throw some merchandise against the walls, and it would walk out…. But the recession cleaned out the non-merchants….”

The prosperity was also in part due to the remodeling projects. Merchants along the Broadway mall’s western end expressed satisfaction and gratefulness over the fact that a previous project for a multi-department store retail center did not go through.[6] While the area was “falling apart” in 1985, it had been almost entirely occupied by mid-1987. Jim Ivory, one of the downtown merchants (Eugene Athletic Supply), had fought the idea then. Raising the issue of the importance of ‘tenant-mix,’ Ivory argued that although McKenzie Outfitter across the street carried some of the same items, both were doing good because customers wanted “choice.”

According to the yearly surveys conducted by Duncan and Brown, Inc., the retail space vacancy rate in March 1986 (shortly after the first segment opened) was 8.62%, which reduced to 6.99% in 1988 and increased again to 9.43% in 1990 (see figure 11.4).[7] Of the total vacant retail space in downtown Eugene, 16,132 SF, or 30%, was in the mall in 1988. In comparison, the national office vacancy rates were 16.3% for downtowns and 22.8% for suburbs during the last quarter of 1987; for downtown Portland, retail space vacancies were 5.7%, and office vacancies were 19%.[8]



Figure 11.4. A chart showing the vacancy rate for Retail and Office space in downtown Eugene (1986-1992) from a study by the firm of Duncan and Brown. Note that the data includes Sears and The Bon, and the adjusted rate without considering these buildings would be 14.8%. As the retail vacancy rate increased in the early-1990s, office vacancy rates dropped.

11.2.1.1 CEP Plan Amendment

The years between 1986 to 1989 saw revisions of the original 1968 CEP plan. According to Bob Hibschman, who coordinated the plan, one of the main aims was to "strategize the development of city's development sites"—the properties acquired by the urban renewal agency and used as surface-level parking lots."[9] EDA's development strategy in the updated plan was to attain a "continued development of downtown incrementally, parcel by parcel" specifically on the two and a half blocks of publicly owned land that was used as surface parking lots (e.g., 8th and Willamette).[10] After working on changes starting early-1986, the final December 1989 amendment included new priorities like encouraging downtown housing, develop the vacant private and public lands, encourage non-retail uses like a downtown public library and a transit hub, open mall to vehicles if required, build more parking garages, and encourage rehabilitation of existing structures.[11]

11.2.1.2 West Broadway Remodel

By the end of May 1987, a proposal for Willamette renovation that would cost $1.5 million had moved ahead.[12] The proposal included the redesign of Willamette Street between 8th and 10th avenues, East Broadway between Willamette and Oak, and the plaza at Willamette and Broadway, including the restroom construction. Several changes to the mall had already cost approximately $860,000. These costs included $200,000 to reopen the one-block section of Willamette between 10th and 11th in 1985 and almost $660,000 for the ongoing remodeling on West Broadway between Charnelton and Willamette streets. The remodeling was later completed in June 1987 under the supervision of Don Miles (see figure 11.5).[13] The $660,000 refurbishing of the two segments removed "bulky structures that had blocked shoppers' view of businesses and areas susceptible to muggers." It also took the restrooms and post office and reduced the size of the children's play structure. Additionally, the refurbishment also added street lighting, benches, bicycle stands, new signage, and landscaping (see figure 11.6).



Figure 11.5. Don Miles standing in front of the fountain (sc. Register Guard March 18, 1986).

Figure 11.6. Broadway segment between Charnelton and Willamette after renovation (sc. Register Guard June 26, 1987).

11.2.1.3 Pro-mall vs. No-mall: Public Sessions on Mall Interventions

The May 6, 1990 edition of The Register Guard had two contradicting commentaries regarding making changes to the urban renewal plan. Hugh Prichard (chairman of Citizens for Downtown) wrote in favor of a "flexible plan." In contrast, William J. Mason (chief petitioner for the referendum and vice chairman for Fair Allocation of City Taxes) argued against further interventions in the CEP (like reopening mall streets, or enlarging the project boundary, or extending tax-increment to twenty more years) (see figure 11.7).[14] Mason claimed that urban renewal came at the cost of regular city services like schools, police, and fire protection. He also pointed out that a small downtown area was receiving a disproportionate amount of tax benefit. In the twenty-two years between 1968 and 1990, over $52 million had been spent within the urban renewal boundary. Prichard, on the other hand, presented an optimistic view of change. While acknowledging the loss of retail stores, he also pointed toward the achievements of CEP.


Urban renewal ballot measure vote will make

THE DOWNTOWN DECISION

Our city deserves a flexible, responsive plan
By HUGH PRICHARD

Reject council's attempts to act without voters
By WILLIAM J. MASON

Figure 11.7. A snippet of the titles of two contrasting newspaper articles on views regarding mall reopening (sc. Register Guard May 6, 1990).

After the first reopening (in 1985), the issue of reopening further mall streets followed extensive public discussions among the city authorities, downtown merchants, residents, and local organizations. In March 1986, the city proposed a vision to return cars to the remaining mall segments.[15] A part of the plan was converting one-way Willamette Street to two-way traffic from the mall to 20th avenue. The details of reopening and remodeling had emerged from a study by Seattle and New York City planning consultant Don Miles Associates (DMA) and Project for Public Spaces (PPS), which had recommended reopening the pedestrian mall to vehicular traffic on Willamette from 8th to 10th avenues and taking out "large public mall structures"[16] The "mall structures" referred to the existing playgrounds, permanent concrete benches, shelters, and heavy vegetation. The removal of the mall cover at 10th and tearing out the southernmost block of the Willamette Street section of the mall was accomplished by September 1986.[17]

The journey to further reopening commenced with a late summer 1986 proposal to remodel the mall streets. Specifically, the proposal contained a list of five options[18]

1. Leave the two-blocks section of Willamette (between 8th and 10th) as it is (Status Quo);
2. Create a "pedestrian streetscape," similar to the design concept adopted for the Broadway, with no vehicular traffic but with the removal of visual barriers and designation of different zones of activity;
3. Open Willamette street to one-lane, one-way specialty traffic (such as a downtown trolley), regular LTD buses, or autos;
4. Open the street to limited two-lane, two-way traffic in a "vehicle mall" design with a "textured" vehicle area and limited drop-off bays; and

5. Reopen it as a full street, with a median strip, similar to Willamette between 7th and 8th avenues or between 10th and 11th avenues.

The likely potential of further mall reopening (Willamette segment) garnered support and criticisms. While residents, community groups, and city officials involved in creating the mall wanted to preserve the mall, merchants and some city authorities were more inclined to reopen Willamette Street. Clearly, the public was against further destruction of the downtown and spending tax dollars unnecessarily. However, Greg Byrne, the city's Downtown Development Manager, condemned the original design choices, making the mall look more like a park than a retail street. Abe Farkas, the Eugene Development Department director, claimed that seven or eight developers from across the nation had told him that reopening Willamette was essential for the city to interest a developer, specifically around the 8th and Willamette site.[19] Similarly, Richie Weinman, Eugene's Community Development Coordinator, believed that "cars and people really can mix well."[20]

A detailed account of the members of the public and merchants' opinions is available through the minutes of a late August 1986 "Willamette redesign information session" in response to the city's redesign proposals.[21] At least twenty-two residents commented during the meeting, who raised issues related to a grocery store and food establishments, the addition of bike paths, security, mall furniture (lightning, play areas, benches) and trees, extended hours, and rain covers. During another public hearing on October 15, seventeen spoke in favor of reopening, whereas thirteen were against reopening.[22] During the same public meeting, suggestions offered to the Eugene Downtown Commission and Planning Commission ranged from "no changes to the pedestrian mall on Willamette Street to ripping it out completely and installing a two-lane street all the way to 6th avenue, past the Hult Center for the Performing Arts." Most present also voiced their disdain for the fountain (see Appendix X for a full list of comments).

In late November 1986, basing its decision on a survey of downtown merchants, the Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce endorsed reopening Willamette Street to vehicular traffic between 8th and 10th avenues.[23] According to the survey, the reopening was favored 73:46 (1.6:1) by downtown business representatives. Also, several downtown merchants voiced their opinions by sending letters to the city.[24] At least fourteen merchants sent letters favoring the reopening while seven opposed. While the choice for those who favored reopening varied, most wanted #2. Those who opposed claimed that the region's economy and business management practices were more responsible for the mall's failure than mall redesigns (see Appendix Y).

One strong rationale for opening Willamette street from 8th to 10th Avenue was the $1 million in private funds invested in the blocks along the reopening Willamette leg between 10th and 11th.[25] Downtown Commission Chairman Michael Schwartz claimed that the increased sales enjoyed by merchants on Willamette between 10th and 11th avenues, a stretch of mall torn out and replaced by street last fall, proved that a similar project completing the reopening of Willamette would be advantageous to the retailers.[26] Specific examples were the private investments like the Downtown Athletic Club's construction and the renovation now underway of the McDonald Building, both at 10th and Willamette.[27] Another example was the renovation of the Schaefers Building.[28] However, Willamette along 7th to 8th, which was not a part of the mall, suggested that allowing traffic was not a guarantee for success—as several storefronts along the east side of the street lay vacant.

The major problems along Willamette Street (between 8th and 10th, which would have been relevant to the 10th to 11th segment as well) included[29]

1. Need to develop underutilized surface parking lots;
2. Absence of major viable developments in years;
3. The static price of downtown land;
4. Difficulties in accessing Broadway between Willamette and Charnelton; and
5. Mall atmosphere "dead" during the night and problems of security

A survey of the Eugene-Springfield area had also revealed that improving downtown access could improve the area's economic health (through a statistically significant random sampling). According to a document from June 1987, the downtown problems that could be addressed by reopening the streets were as follows[30]

1. Inadequate private investment;
2. Poor and inaccurate perceptions of security and safety;
3. Confusion and difficulty in accessing many downtown locations;
4. Stagnant or declining property values;
5. Declining retail market share;
6. Inadequate growth in gross retail sales;
7. Lack of "Class A" office space downtown; and
8. Undeveloped sites in prime downtown locations.

A major five-hour-long ECC public hearing on Willamette street reopening occurred on Monday, July 13, 1987, at 7:00 pm that lasted until about 12:15 am.[31] The hearing drew 400 to 500 residents; seventy-three people spoke, of which forty-nine opposed reopening the street and twenty favored. Ed Aster, publisher of trade magazines with offices in the Aster Publishing Building, supported keeping the mall as it is. Laraway Giustina, speaking on behalf of his family (that owned a large share of properties in downtown Eugene), said that the mall had not been beneficial to downtown Eugene's economic well-being.

11.2.1.4 Pro-mall Groups and Postponement of Mall Interventions

Advocacy groups like the Friends of Downtown Eugene (FODE) helped postpone the mall reopening for a few years in the late-1980s. Voices against mall reopening finally led the ECC to vote against Willamette reopening in September 1988 (see related figure 11.8).[32] However, it was not until 1996 that Willamette would be reopened. Later in 1986, the reopening issue got rerouted to Olive Street through an initial effort by City Councilperson VP Ruth Bascom. IR2 also agreed that some of the mall proponents fought changes such as enabling the Pankow office-library-retail mixed-use development and made it hard to move ahead with Broadway place and street openings.

During an October 15, 1986, public hearing, Sue Girardeau of the League of Women Voters of Lane County argued that the League would choose to keep the “status quo” on Willamette Street since the City staff had presented no evidence that remodeling the mall would improve retail trade. On the other hand, Del Stephens, the EDA president, led the board’s unanimous support for reopening Willamette to vehicular traffic.

In opposition to the probability of reopening of Willamette to vehicular traffic, FODE sent a letter to the Mayor and ECC Members on March 25, 1987.[33] Citing a study by Don Miles and PPS (which had suggested reopening), the letter argued that the opening would not cause an increase in the number of businesses and retail sales. The group even presented a copy of the statement signed by over 250 people expressing their support to make no changes to the mall. At least two other surveys, one by owners of Book Mark and Tarym’s Toys and another by Betty Niven (N=89), mostly found similar opinions among the community members. On June 1, 1987, another letter by the Friends highlighted the Downtown Commission’s intention to spend millions more of taxpayers’ money by reopening the mall on Willamette between 8th and 10th avenues. The Friends did not believe that the mall caused the economic problems downtown, but instead, several other factors were involved, chiefly the severe economic decline of this area, coupled with the development of shopping centers.



Figure 11.8. Anne Bennett, a proponent of removing the mall's fountain and reopening Willamette to traffic (*left*; sc. Register Guard May 31, 1987), and a group of protesters opposed reopening Willamette (*right*; sc. Register Guard July 14, 1987).

The pro-mall groups also demanded evidence to support the fact that bringing cars back to downtown Willamette Street would improve the retail business scene. Instead, they argued that the vitality of the downtown retail business depended more upon the individual merchants than upon the rearrangement of store locations. Several critics of reopening the mall also argued that only good marketing techniques bring customers, like well-designed window displays.[34] Sam Frear, who represented the Friends, argued through an RG article that,

> *"We believe the access to downtown Eugene works fine. Access is tied to parking and regardless of whether Willamette is open or not, people will have to park in the same places. Much of the burden place on the mall for making it difficult to get around is really a failure of signage and other directional aid…. We are bothered, too, by your giving economic considerations the over-whelming weight in coming up with your decision. Our point is that the mall has become a vital part of our community life. In destroying the mall, we will lose a special quality that made Eugene different…. Finally, we are bothered by the inference that somehow the mall has failed. In large part this is precipitated by the Development Department and the Downtown Commission in poor mouthing the mall in order to justify a solution…."*[35]

By July 1987, EDA, representing the downtown business interests, began re-evaluating its position in light of increased opposition from the business community.[36] A large banner reading "Keep Willamette St. Closed to Auto Traffic" hung from the Aster Building on 8th and Willamette streets, and dozens of storefronts along with the street display posters against the proposal. Many feared that the reopening would ruin downtown Eugene's unique flavor with traffic noise and exhaust while demolishing the mall's function as a community gathering place.

A poll conducted by Prince Puckler's ice cream owner recorded 275 oppositions, with only twenty-seven in favor of the reopening proposal.

In one instance, an RG advertisement, paid by Downtown business people and Friends of Downtown, advocated the public to ask the ECC about opposing the plan to open Willamette Street to automobile traffic between 8th and 10th avenues.[37] The reasons outlined were that more than $650,000 of tax dollars had already been spent on upgrading the mall, and $1.5 million more would be required. The mall supporters argued that they were yet to hear a single convincing argument that returning traffic to the heart of the mall would be an improvement in any regard. Other arguments in support to keep the mall as it is were-

1. People who now patronize Downtown have said they do not want the traffic, exhaust, and noise that opening Willamette will bring;
2. There is no evidence that opening this stretch of Willamette will increase patronage; it may actually decrease the mall's use;
3. Several people have repeatedly said that what Downtown needs is better merchandising, standardized hours, and a stronger emphasis on diversified retail businesses to increase its use;
4. Opening Willamette to auto traffic will increase hazards to disabled and elderly patrons rather than improve access; and
5. There are many more constructive and imaginative ways to spend $1.5 million of tax money to encourage Downtown development, such as city-required lighting and patron-oriented amenities.

The public's response to that advertisement was overwhelming. The City Hall received 1,286 "clip-and-mail coupons" from the advertisement.[38] The subject of one hearing was the full fourteen-page draft update of the urban renewal plan for downtown Eugene—which included the city's $21 million worth of public improvements, including five parking structures in the downtown area during the next two decades. One comment in the coupon read, "Please! Do not open Willamette Street between 8th and 10th (avenues) to auto traffic"[39] According to a bookstore owner (the Literary Lion), "the economy has turned around. More customers are on the mall at morning opening hours now than could be found during the peak noon-hour two years ago while the peak traffic now has dramatically increased compared to before."

In September 1991, a "Save the Mall" committee opposed mall reopening campaigns and bashed the ECC for spending too much time and effort on that topic.[40] Initial supporters were Ed Aster (Aster Publishing), Friends of Downtown Eugene, and the League of Women Voters of Lane County. At the time, the ECC was working on preliminary drawings to show how cars and pedestrians could share Willamette street and Broadway and Olive legs. Other proponents of the status quo pointed at Sears and Bon, who left downtown even with streets on two sides.[41] They added that only opening the mall did not guarantee success, and a comprehensive plan for the downtown and mass public transit options was required. Cynthia Wooten, a former city councilperson, reiterated that poor management and marketing were the reasons for the mall's problems, not a lack of accessibility for motorists.[42]

An important verdict came in May 1991, when voters rejected the downtown mall's $3.2 million redesign plan that would have to reopen all except the west Broadway segment to vehicles.[43] In disappointment, several businesses intended to leave downtown. Many merchants believed that the downtown lost its lost chance at retailing with the defeat of the measure.[44] A poll conducted by Moore Information of Portland on May 24 and 25 of 200 people on the city's proposal to redesign downtown mall revealed that a majority disapproved; thirty-nine percent believed it was a waste of money.[45]

11.2.2 Story from Early 1990s to early-2000s

The important events of this period are the reopening of remaining mall segments and the City and ERA's new direction toward downtown development. In contrast to the late-1980s, the early-1990s were a depressing time for the RCPM area, especially the western end, with the loss of Bon Marche and Sears. By the early months of 1990, it was clear to many that the twenty-two-year-long urban renewal phase had come at the cost of regular city services like schools, police, and fire protection.[46] Many people pointed out that a small portion of downtown received a disproportionate amount of tax benefit and argued that in the twenty-two years between 1968 and 1990, ERA had spent over $52 million just for the CEP. Generally, business in the mall was not looking good at the time. Nearly half of the businesses downtown attracted twenty or fewer customers per day. More than half of the retail shops attracted fewer than fifty customers per day.[47]

According to the Duncan and Brown study, the retail space vacancy rate jumped to 29.3% in 1992 (14.8% excluding Bon Marche and Sears) compared to 9.43% in 1990 (see table 11.1).[48] On the other hand, office spaces experienced a positive transformation (from 20.35% vacancy in March 1986 to 4.87% by March 1992). As the report commented, "the major increase in the retail vacancy rate is attributable to the ripple effects of the Bon leaving the west end of the mall and the substantial vacancies in the 900 block of Willamette Street." By 1992, of the total vacant spaces of 274,979 SF, 172,532 SF (63%) was mall-oriented. The total annual sales of fourteen major retailers in the East Broadway area during the two years between the summers of 1989 and 1991 increased from $5.7 million to $4.6 million.[49] By contrast, the overall sales downtown, including the pedestrian mall, fell to $64 million from $106 million in the same period.

Many businesses were frustrated with the loss of businesses that accompanied the two major anchor stores' departure.[50] Darrin Wahl (of JJ Newberry; between Broadway and 10th along Willamette) believed that reopening the street would bring more cars by his store, although he was unsure if they would stop to shop. In June 1993, the west end—along Broadway between Olive and Charnelton was seventy-five percent vacant—nine of sixteen storefronts, including the 92,000 SF Bon Marche building, stood empty.[51]

Table 11.1. Retail and office space vacancy rate in downtown Eugene from 1986 to 1992 (sc. Duncan and Brown).

Survey Date	***Retail space***			***Office space***		
	Area (SF)	*Vacant (SF)*	*Vacancy rate*	*Area (SF)*	*Vacant (SF)*	*Vacancy rate*
Mar 1986	740,794	63,848	8.62%	557,856	113,546	20.35%
Mar 1987	751,952	57,838	7.69%	541,626	97,450	17.99%
Mar 1988	753,947	52,707	6.99%	560,584	79,340	14.15%
Mar 1989	759,347	55,174	7.27%	564,584	65,342	11.57%
Mar 1990	753,445	71,046	9.43%	607,304	98,568	16.23%
Mar 1991*	929,922	218,132	23.46%	607,304	59,735	9.84%
Mar 1992*	939,922	274,979	29.26%	607,304	29,573	4.87%

* Includes Sears and The Bon

Between the late-1980s and early-1990s, the appeal of downtown malls drastically changed as well. IR1 shares an experience of working on properties that had once rented for over a dollar PSF and "were now asking as little as $ 0.25 a foot." In 1988, the mean asking price for mall-oriented space was 79 cents PSF per month and 70 cents for non-mall locations. One account also showed that rents along Willamette Street toward the end of 1988 were as low as 20 to 40 cents.[52] In comparison, Fifth Street Market's rates were as high as $3. As John Brown argued in the late-1980s, the low rental rates discouraged investors from constructing new buildings downtown, so constructions were more likely to be owner-occupied.[53] Around mid-1991, some retail spaces were being offered for as low as 30 cents PSF—the same rate charged for warehouse space in other parts of town.[54] By 1992, the asking price for retail downtown was as low as 45 cents PSF with a high of $1 PSF.

11.2.2.1 *Olive and Willamette Reopening*

With the support from downtown merchants, ERA and the ECC were relentless in their pursuit of mall reopening and were successful in 1992. After unsuccessful attempts at reopening the Willamette segment between 1986 and 1991, the priority had shifted to Olive reopening by 1992. However, Downtown Design Committee had proposed a redesign of the mall area in 1991, which played an influential role in the future changes (see figure 11.9). Additionally, a study from 1991 shows that most merchants between 8th avenue and Broadway did not support Willamette, whereas those between Broadway and 10th avenue wanted Willamette to reopen (see figure 11.10). As IR2 comments, "given community politics where there were many residents who wanted to retain the mall, and many who wanted it open, (the City) found an interim compromise—open Olive Street to auto traffic while making streetscape improvements to Broadway…. these improvements served as placeholders until more significant action could be taken in the '90s."

One of the early proposals had come from future Mayor Ruth Bascom, who recommended converting Olive between 5th and 13th avenues to two-way traffic in September 1988.[55] Downtown merchants along Olive voiced their opinions. For example, Ariene Halslip of Green Pepper fabric store opposed reopening Willamette street but thought Olive reopening made more sense since it would require tearing of a smaller amount of mall. Bill Combs of Burch's Fine Footwear, who had favored Willamette's reopening, liked Olive reopening even more. Some members also said that Olive reopening would not be as crucial as Willamette in terms of changing the issue of mall accessibility. Even fierce opponents of opening Willamette street, like ECC members Debra Ehrman and Emily Schue, found sense in opening Olive.[56] However, reopening Olive would not be approved until mid-1992.

At the start of 1992, Mayor Jeff Miller unveiled a plan to convert the west end into a library and government complex and spending up to $3.5 million to reopen Olive street.[57] During the unveiling, several merchants in favor of reopening Olive were present, including Jim Ivory (Eugene Athletic), Maurie Jacobs (Rubenstein's Furniture), and the owners of McKenzie Outfitters. The ECC approved reopening Olive into two-way traffic in April 1992.[58] Voters narrowly approved the reopening in May 19 election, and Olive opened to vehicles in September 1992.[59] The design included two 14-foot traffic lanes, left-turn lanes at the 8th and 10th avenue intersections, parallel parking for fourteen to sixteen cars, sidewalks, and sidewalk intersections featuring brick accents. The reopening of the mall segment cost $700,00, of which $500,000 came from the Lane County road fund and the rest from the city's urban renewal fund.[60] By early-1995, the reopening had spurred at least $1.5 million in new private investments and at least 150 new jobs.[61]

In early-1995, the issue of reopening Willamette garnered attention again. Jim Torrey (future Eugene Mayor) led a new campaign to put the issue on the ballot.[62] In late February, the ECC voted 7-1 to put the Measure on May 16 election with three funding options: city's urban renewal dollars, Lane County road funds, and downtown property owners' contributions.[63] The Measure passed with a sixty-two percent majority (19,988 YES vs. 12,390 NO).[64] As a part of the campaign, the downtown businesses and other supporters had raised $33,000. According to Hugh Prichard, the revitalization of the Olive segment since reopening led to the Measure's success. The Willamette segment between 8th and 10th streets opened on November 1, 1996 (see figure 11.11).[65] According to one account, the Willamette design was "basically the same as Olive street"—brick-paved instead of concrete or asphalt, and the plaza met the street without a grade.[66] The two traffic lanes ranged from eleven to fourteen feet wide, with seven feet for parking on both sides of the street. The required funding of $1.82 million came from three sources: $750,000 from Lane County road funds, $970,000 from the urban renewal fund, and $100,000 from downtown property owners.

11.2.2.2 New Directions for the RCPM area Projects: From Retail-centric to Diverse

After the first reopening in 1985 and as further mall segments reopened on by one, one of the major changes in the RCPM area was a wave of non-retail commercial and housing projects. A new paradigm shift brought forward a realization of the importance of "Private-Public Partnership" (PPP) instead of the previous urban renewal era mentality that relied on federal funding and individual/private investors. Table 11.2 discusses the important RCPM area projects between 1985 and 2000.

During the late-1980s, several parcels were used as temporary parking, awaiting development (see figures 11.12 and 11.13). IR2 recalls that the city also made efforts to partner with private firms in redeveloping large renewal agency-owned sites as mixed-use projects, which was a difficult task because "rents from retail and office were often short of what was needed to service debt from larger mixed-use projects." Additionally, as IR2 argues, "without public-private partnerships, it's unlikely that these buildings would have been saved and so effectively reused."

In accepting the city's new direction for downtown, Eugene Development Department's Elaine Stewart had noted in September 1986 that "the public benefit of having a strong downtown, strong retailing downtowns, is …. protecting the investment that the city already has…."[67] This is summarized in the following statement from IR2 as well—

> *In the mid to late 80s, the city's Planning and Development Department (using TIF, CDBG and other federally secured funds) provided low interest loans to private developers, businesses and building owners to rehab and revitalize their properties – these included a former vacant department store that was sold to a developer who took considerable risk by converting it into the Downtown Athletic Club (which brought many times more clients into the core than anyone expected), rehab of a theater and other older buildings. We provided loans to restaurants and small businesses for tenant improvements that enabled them to open and/or expand. We also beefed up a clean and safe program in effort to make residents and visitor feel more welcome downtown." (IR2)*



Figure 11.9. A 1991 Downtown Design Committee proposal for the mall showing the proposed design (*top left*), a typical view of convertible street sidewalk area (*middle left*), a view of the north from Willamette and 10th (pedestrian-oriented, convertible street) (*bottom left*), Broadway/Willamette Plaza structure and park linkage (with streets closed to cars) (*top right*), and Broadway/Willamette Plaza structure and park linkage (with streets open) (*bottom right*).



Figure 11.10. Willamette Street's map highlighting merchants' opinions on Willamette reopening around mid-1991 (sc. Register Guard May 5, 1991).



Figure 11.11. A view of Willamette mall deconstruction (*left*; sc. Register Guard March 21, 1996) and an image from the day of Willamette reopening (*right*; sc. Register Guard November 2, 1996).



Figure 11.12. Images of the vacant lots in the CEP area. The 11th ave and Willamette st intersection were planned at the time for a multi-unit housing development which did not happen (*top left*; sc. Register Guard January 31, 1989), a parking lot at 8th avenue and Willamette (*top right*; sc. Register Guard October 8, 1988), and a view from the western end of Broadway mall showing the 8th and Willamette site (parking lot toward the middle) at the time being considered by Pankow (*bottom*; sc. Register Guard July 13, 1989).

Figure 11.13. Downtown Eugene, CEP area in 1990 (sc. Register Guard May 6, 1990).

Table 11.2. Details of projects in the second phase (see figures 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 11.18, 11.19, 11.20, and 11.21).

SN	***Projects***	***Date***	***New or Rehabilitated***	***Details***
1	Downtown Athletic Club (see Appendix T.2)	1985	Rehabilitated	The Historic Ardel Building was converted into the Downtown Athletic Club by Eugene resident Rob Bennett in late-1985 at the expense of $4 million, of which the city had arranged a $1.5 million construction loan.[68] The project held 43,500 SF of space on three floors and contained a 25-yard swimming pool, weight and exercise room, six racquetball courts, a full-sized gym and whirlpool, saunas and steam rooms, and a separate locker room for men, women, teenage boys, and teenage girls.
2	McDonald Theater Building	1986	Rehabilitated	
3	Schaefers Building	1987	Rehabilitated	The Historic Schaefers Building renovation began in February 1987 with the aim of duplicating the original 1929 exterior.[69] At the time, Daphne Walwyn of Vida, Oregon, owned the building, who planned to use the building for office space on the upper floors and retail on the street level. The building planned to offer 35,000 SF space. The building was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1981. According to Jesse Smith, development finance manager for the Eugene Development Department, while historic preservation was more expensive than conventional remodeling methods, they would get tax advantage and eligibility for certain historic preservation loans. Of the total estimated cost of around $150,000 for exterior, $100,000 came through HUD loan and $20,000 through the city's historic preservation loan.

Table 11.2. (continued).

SN	*Projects*	*Date*	*New or Rehabilitated*	*Details*
4	Central Building	September 1988	Rehabilitated	The building underwent a $250,000 renovation to include new retail shops and offices.[70] Broadway and Pearl Associates of Eugene owned the building, who also owned the Quackenbush building. The same block also contained Valentine’s wine and cheese, Mariah’s clothing shop for children, the Beyond Conception maternity shop, Cobblestone-garden gift shop, and the Three Birds-a galley studio.
5	Tiffany Building (Apartments)	1991	Rehabilitated	The building was built in 1905 as the McMorran Washburne Building and was renamed later and was listed as a historic landmark in 1980.[71] A fire of unknown origin caused an estimated $700,000 damage in March 1986, but according to contractor Mark Vik, the building was sound and only required minor structural bracing. Daniel Tucci acquired the building in 1990 and was made ready for businesses and residents by August 1991.[72] The one- and two-bedroom apartments ranged from 430 to 1,075 SF with monthly rents of $425 to $750.
6	Symantec Software Company (Bon Marche building reuse)	1993	Rehabilitated	In August 1993, Symantec—a Cupertino CA-based Software company, established its office in the vacant Bon Marche Building.[73] The major aids were a $300,000 State Grant for moving costs, a $130,000 State Grant for Computer Training, a $500,000 loan from the city for Building Renovation, and up to 170 discounted parking permits.

Table 11.2. (continued).

SN	*Projects*	*Date*	*New or Rehabilitated*	*Details*
7	US Bank Tower	1995	New	US Bank planning to build an office tower on property acquired by the city for less than $700,000[74] The $12 million, eight-story tower, occupying over 100,000 SF, served as the bank's Western Oregon headquarter.[75] When opened, the ground floor was occupied by retailers and the bank's consumer branch, whereas the upper floors were offices.
8	Atrium mini-mall occupation by Eugene City Office	1997/98	Rehabilitated	
9	LTD Transit Center/Eugene Bus Station	1998	New	The new $12-million downtown station opened on Sunday, April 5, 1998.[76] WBGS Architecture and Planning designed the complex.
10	The Broadway Place (Housing)	2000	New	The complex was constructed at an investment of $13.4 million by Long Associates and $12.9 million by the city.

One way new private developments were made possible was partly by utilizing the amount generated from tax increment funding. Between 1970 and 1986, the CEP generated more than $14 million, which could be utilized to benefit the project area.[77] ERA spent the money to subsidize private investors willing to develop downtown lands and pay for various debts and bond issues. Also, by this time, the city had promised up to $10 million in tax increment bonds to lure developers in addition to building parking structures. The downtown businesses also received more than $460,000 worth of low-interest commercial revitalization loans from the city to reduce private sectors' risk in developing downtown properties and businesses. Many projects completed by this time received funding from the tax-increment dollars—intended for that exact purpose, i.e., bring in more developments to the CEP area by aiding developers.

1 Downtown Athletic Club, 1985
2 McDonald Theater Building, 1986
3 Schaefers Building, 1987
4 Central Building, September 1988
5 Tiffany Building (Apartments), 1991
6 Symantec Software Company (Bon Marche building reuse), 1993
7 US Bank Tower, 1995
8 Atrium mini mall occupation by Eugene City Office, 1997/98
9 LTD Transit Center/Eugene Bus Station, 1998
10 The Broadway Place (Housing), 2000

Figure 11.14. CEP area developments (1985 to 2002) based on an August 1998 map prepared by the City of Eugene (obtained through the UO Library).

Figure 11.15. Images of the Ardel building in c. 1955 showing Nickles Shoe Store and Rudolph's Furs (top; sc. LCHM Catalog #GN1092) and the new Downtown Athletic Club building after Ardel’s renovation (bottom; sc. Peggy Shekell as published in The Oregonian May 24, 1986).

Figure 11.16. The McDonald Building after the renovation in 1989 (sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_16472).

Figure 11.17. Schaefers Building in 2002 (sc. LCHM catalog #GN 10111).

Figure 11.18. US Bank building in 1995 (sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_12383).

Figure 11.19. An image of Broadway Place Apartments under construction (sc. Register Guard March 21, 1999).



Figure 11.20. Tiffany building in 1956 (sc. LCHM Catalog #GN883).



Figure 11.21. 1974 concept diagrams of the Transit Center (*top*; sc. ERA 1974 Annual Report) and Lane Transit District Downtown Bus Station in the 2000s (*bottom*; sc. Oregon Digital, Identifier pna_20709).

Also, the city made thirty-one loans totaling $1.6 million to existing and new businesses downtown between 1983 and 1993, leveraging a further $9.6 million in private financing.[78] Several downtown investors, including Rob Bennett (of Downtown Athletic) and Dan Tucci (of Tiffany Building), had received support from urban renewal funds and argued that without assistance/loans from the tax money generated, new projects like theirs were not possible (see table 11.3). By 1993, the CEP had generated more than $27 million in property taxes, which translated to $1.8 million each year on average, well over the $1.3 million needed to retire the bond on urban renewal projects. A council member even advocated for a new approach to downtown development, for example, through code changes that would require developers who built outside downtown to pay extra for city services, an idea that would stop giving subsidies to non-downtown area developments.

Regarding the new projects in the 1990s, the IR2 says that the process,

> *"…. included selling key city owned sites for mixed use projects. The first was for what is now the US Bank building with ground floor retail and the second was Broadway Place (the first new quality apartment building in the core area in over 20 years). There were also partnerships with the private and non-profit sector to add more housing with active (retail) ground floors (e.g., the Tiffany building) and bringing in quality affordable units. These projects eventually led to the reopening of Willamette street (which may have required a couple of citywide votes). By bringing more slow-moving traffic (auto, bike), downtown became more enticing for subsequent redevelopments that occurred in the late 90s and early 2000s. By this time private lenders were more willing to make investments downtown – though many of the most significant still required robust public injections (e.g., rehab of the former Penny's department store building into creative office with ground floor retail)." (IR2)*

According to IR1, who was also one of the developers involved in the US Bank Center and Broadway Place, "one of the things we wanted to achieve, was a street-level vitality which is missing in all of the Urban Renewal era buildings…. so, (we) built storefronts at the base of both of these buildings, to provide life and vitality to the sidewalk and street," which worked positively for the area. Also, IR1 points out that urban renewal era buildings, like the Wells Fargo Bank building or the Citizens Building, "do not "address" the street, they provide no small spaces, just unbroken walls of concrete or glass."

IR2 argues that in addition to the new building projects, the city also undertook "Placemaking design" strategies in projects like the Broadway redesign, specifically to "increase foot and vehicle traffic and eyes on the street." Furthermore, IR2 adds that the city also partnered with private sectors "to rehab vacant buildings (the Bon Marche), and develop market-rate and affordable housing—again eyes on the street and shopping patrons; and various low-interest loans and grants to help small retailers/restaurateurs via building improvements and working capital." One relevant fact is that one influential group of developers in the downtown area, the Giustina Family, held at least twelve properties in the east Broadway section by late-1999.[79]

Table 11.3. The beneficiaries of urban renewal generated tax income by June 1993.

Support type	***Beneficiary, year of support***	***Estimated support***
CPP	US Bank Office Tower (1994)	$688,000
	Downtown Athletic Club (1985)	$213,000
	Aster Building (1984)	$125,000
	Eugene Hilton (1981)	$100,000
LN	Tiffany Building (1992)	$350,000
	Downtown Athletic Club (1985)	$250,000
	West Bros. BBQ (1993)	$115,000
	McDonald Theatre (1986)	$60,000
PI	Eugene Community Conference Center (1980)	$7,100,000
	Downtown mall improvements (early-1970s)	$4,500,000
	Parcade (1976)	$3,500,000
	First segment reopening of Willamette street (1985)	$700,000
	Reopening of Olive Street (1992)	$180,000

Category of assistance-- [PI] Public Improvement Projects; [LN] Loans; [CPP] City Property Purchase

The major residential projects in the downtown area included Tiffany Building rehabilitation (1991), High Street Terrace (1997, by Guard Publishing Co.), The Broadway Place (2000), and Aurora Complex (2004). According to IR3, taking out the mall streets influenced downtown Eugene's transition to a mixed-use area because it made residential developments possible with the occupants having access to the street.[80] According to him, the 1990s was a "renaissance in urban housing," and the Broadway Place was the first project in "twenty to thirty years built on the mixed-use principle" He further asserts that "what we lost in retail we gained in housing… " The restoration of the Tiffany Building in 1991 was an important milestone in downtown's pathway to add downtown living. In 1993, the project garnered the following comments from occupants, mostly concerning downtown living[81]

> *"People who find out I live there are really curious about what it's like…. It's stunning. I've lived in downtown Seattle. Here, you don't have to worry so much about the parking and the crime."*

> *"I walk to work in a minute and a half. I can be at the Downtown Athletic Center—a world class facility—in no time. I bank across the street at US Bank. I am just around the corner from the Hult Center"*
>
> *"The writer in me needed a place like this…. I love books and I can go right downstairs and be in a huge bookstore."*
>
> *"This is perfect for me…. There are restaurants everywhere. A lot of people don't like the downtown mall, but I think it's terrific. I've got a great view of the Saturday Market."*
>
> *"I'm a real lover of urban living and historic renovation…. You still do pretty much do your shopping on your way home from work. In (Washington, DC). I had no car for two years. I walked to and from work and did all my errands on the way."*

In 2000, only about 1,000 people lived downtown, with a thirty percent vacancy rate compared to five percent for the rest of the city (based on the 2000 census).[82] However, the year experienced the construction of the CEP area's first major housing complex, The Broadway Place. The project was a part of a mixed-use complex occupying 13,500 SF, which provided 170 apartments, ground floor retail and office spaces, and two parking garages totaling 736 spaces.[83] The parking garages were owned by the City of Eugene, while the Broadway Apartments LLC, led by Long Associates, owned the apartments and commercial space. In late January 2002, the City revived new tax breaks to help create new housing downtown (primarily for low-income people). For example, one criterion was not applying any property taxes to the developers for ten years.[84] Similarly, the 2004 Aurora building (by St. Vincent de Paul) at the corner of 11th avenue and Oak street (outside the CEP boundary) was a fifty-four-unit, five-story structure for low-income renters that offered one- and two-bedroom apartments at the cost of $304 and $474 a month, respectively and also included two retail spaces on the ground floor.[85]

11.2.3 Broadway Reopening and the End of the Mall

In June 2001, the ECC voted unanimously to place on the September 18 special election ballot a Measure to lift a prohibition on reopening Broadway.[86] Voters approved the Measure by a 2:1 margin (20,233 Y vs. 9,924 N).[87] In mid-January 2002, the ECC unanimously approved a $2.4 million plan with the following funding sources: $1.6 million from Lane County road fund, $634,000 from the City, and $200,000 in the form of a promissory note from property owners along the street.[88] The Broadway segment reopened to traffic on September 23, 2002.[89] The final design included "narrow traffic lanes separated by landscaped medians, with limited street-side parking" to encourage "vehicle access but pedestrian convenience." The entire plaza area at the

W-B intersection was brick and curbless to facilitate a quick closure and transformation into a public space for events. The design also featured "bulb-outs where the sidewalk bulged onto the street and gradually tapered six inches high bumps at pedestrian crossings."[90]

In September 2001, after the ECC had voted to reopen Broadway, Mayor Ruth Bascom commented that "we certainly have accumulated evidence that our dreams—and I was in on those dreams—didn't work."[91] A few months earlier, Scott Maben, an RG contributor, had lamented that "Business leaders and city officials agree that the costly experiment in urban renewal has proved catastrophic for most merchants on the street….. Revenues slumped; big retail stores fled to suburban malls…. Once the heart of the business district, the Eugene Mall today is home to the greatest concentration of empty storefronts in downtown."[92] During a 2001 meeting, one merchant had complained that sales declined for years because of poor urban design decisions like shortage of on-street parking; another business owner complained that "the neighborhood is becoming untenable as a place to do business" and that the merchants could not see any other alternative than to open the street.[93]

After Broadway reopened in September 2002, Denny Braud, the Broadway reopening manager, remarked, "the last several years, you could drive a bulldozer through here and not hit anyone," referring to the lack of activity in that area.[94] Joe Mosley accounted that reopening hoped to "reintroduce life to what had become a moribund downtown in which vacant storefronts often outnumbered shoppers and other pedestrians." Abel Patterson presents the story of the 2000s in the following way, "blocks once crammed with ten or more buildings are now divided into sixths or quarters. Imposing concrete storefronts built in the 1970s to house the large retailers that never came, sit vacant next to the giant holes left by the large retailers, like Sears, that never came back."[95] As cited by Abel Patterson, Ken Guzowski, a Eugene City Planner, had once commented that if all of downtown's old buildings had been remodeled instead of being torn down, Eugene would have had one of the largest and most attractive historic districts in the Northwest. Furthermore, this would have meant a better opportunity for businesses to occupy these older buildings with possibly lower rents and reasons for more people to live downtown.

11.3 Notes

[1] Martha Kerns, “New High-Rise Planned for Downtown Eugene,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 8, 1988). The article also adds that the vacancy rates for office space declining gradually since late 1985 and rental rates on the rise.

[2] “Outlook Brightens for Downtown,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 4, 1986).

[3] Businesses that had moved in recent months within the downtown areas were Flowers Unlimited (Cardae) and Mark’s Hallmark Shop. Other new stores in downtown Eugene were Doung Huey Sporting Goods (in the Parcade); Gitane of Eugene, Precious Company and Gift World International (all in the Centre Court Building); Gold Mine Jewelers and Savin North-west (in the Aster Publishing Building); Rayn Staffel Oriental Rugs (in the Smeede Hotel); Simple Gifts, Kinko’s, and Tim Wrap (in the McDonald Theatre Building); Opus 5 (on East Broadway near Willamette); Second Thoughts (77 W. 11th Ave); T.J. Max-well (115 W. Broadway); P. Blanton (104 W. Broadway); Fitness Fashions (Atrium Building); Giant Grinder (Overpark); and a jewelry store (51 W. Broadway).

[4] “Downtown’s Comeback,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 9, 1986).

[5] George Barker, “Gore-Tex Gulch of the West Outdoor Stores,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 1, 1985).

[6] George Barker, “Few Mourn Enclosed Mall Idea,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 26, 1987).

[7] Based on a report emailed to me by a Duncan and Brown representative on July 6, 2020. Additionally, the survey boundary was formed by 5th to 11th avenues and Charnelton to Highs streets. The area included 753,947 sf of retail and 560,585 sf of office space.

[8] “Downtown Shows More Signs of Rebounding: Office/Retail Vacancy Rates in the Eugene Downtown Core Area,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 3, 1988).

[9] “Process to Update Urban Renewal Plan Approved,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 29, 1986).

[10] Development Department, “Development Department Staff Memorandum, April 3” (Eugene, April 3, 1986).

[11] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18), Modified December 1989*, 3. One of the CEP amendment proposals, which was unsuccessful, was changing the project area boundary. According to the final amendment from December 1989, the final boundary was not changed. Instead, the focus moved to utilize the publicly-owned development sites.

[12] “Updated Renewal Plan Envisions Costly Projects,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 31, 1987).

[13] Boyd, “Broadway Debut.”

[14] Prichard, "Our City Deserves a Flexible, Responsive Plan"; William J. Mason, "Reject Council's Attempts to Act without Voters," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 6, 1990).

[15] Kathleen Monje, "Plans for Competitive Eugene Mall Brings out Critics," *Sunday Oregonian* (Eugene, March 24, 1986).

[16] John Henrikson, "Downtown Mall Subject of Continued Argument," *The Emerald* (Eugene, July 7, 1987). A mall study by Don Miles Associates and Project for Public Spaces (PPS) would be published shortly after in April 1986.

[17] Stahlberg, "New Wave of Eugene Officials Poised to Fix Mall's Mistakes"; "Be Heard on Mall Changes," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 1986); Mike Stahlberg, "City's 'Heart' Getting Surgery Again," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 1986).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jim Boyd, "Stepping Forward – or Backward?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 31, 1987).

[20] Henrikson, "Downtown Mall Subject of Continued Argument."

[21] "Comments Received from the Public at the Willamette Redesign Information Session" (Eugene, August 28, 1986). This document was made available by a City of Eugene staff.

[22] Jim Boyd, "Mall Creators Defend Work," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 16, 1986).

[23] George Barker, "Willamette Reopening Favored," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 26, 1986).

[24] From a set of unpublished letters sent to the City by different businesses mostly between the months of August and October 1986 on the issue of favoring automobile on Willamette; the document was obtained through a City of Eugene staff.

[25] A document from June 1987 on rationale for opening Willamette street from 8th to 10th avenues

[26] Monje, "Plans for Competitive Eugene Mall Brings out Critics."

[27] "More Doctoring for Downtown Eugene."

[28] "Updated Renewal Plan Envisions Costly Projects."

[29] Development Department, "Development Department Staff Memorandum, October 28" (Eugene, October 28, 1986).

[30] A document from June 1987 on rationale for opening Willamette street from 8th to 10th avenues

[31] Jim Boyd, "Obie, Councilman Pull out of Mall Vote," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 14, 1987).

[32] Ann Portal, "Mall Issue Rerouted on Olive," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 21, 1988).

[33] Friends of Downtown committee consisted of N. Ray Hawk, W. O. Korns, Joan S. Mazo, Charles T. Duncan, Betty Niven, Ruth E. Miller, Glenn Purdy, Samuel T. Freer, Wallace Swanson, and Les Anderson.

[34] "Mall Should Be Kept," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 2, 1987).

[35] Sam Frear, "'Friends' Oppose Cars on Willamette," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 9, 1987).

[36] Henrikson, "Downtown Mall Subject of Continued Argument."

[37] "Lets Preserve the Downtown Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 6, 1987). The downtown businesspeople who paid for the advertisement were Omers of Scan/Design, Backstage, Literary Lion, The Ugly Duckling, Creative Kids, Prince Pucklers, Melange for Women, Seymours, Aster Publishing. Other downtown community members (including members of FODE were N. Ray Hawk, Ruth E. Miller, Betty Niven, W.A. Korns, Glen Purdy, Les Anderson, Wallace A. Swanson, Joan S. Maxon, Samuel T. Frear, Charles T. Duncan, and George A. Hermach.

[38] Jim Boyd, "Mall Issue Draws Opposition," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 11, 1987).

[39] Kathleen Monje, "Eugene Braces for Public's View on Fate of Mall," *Sunday Oregonian* (Eugene, July 12, 1987).

[40] Ann Portal, "Group Begins Initiative to Petition to Save the Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 21, 1990).

[41] Bill Wooten, Paul Nicholson, and Ray Wolfe, "Mall's Just Starting to Get a Strong Beat," *The Register-Guard*, May 5, 1991.

[42] "The Mall: An Open Question," *The Register-Guard,* May 5, 1991.

[43] Ann Portal, "Voters Reject Redesign of Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 22, 1991).

[44] Paul Dunwiddie, "Disappointed Merchants Predict Exodus from Mall," *The Register-Guard*, May 22, 1991.

[45] Ann Portal, "Mall Voters Just Say No," *The Register-Guard*, June 2, 1991. Furthermore, according to the survey, forty percent said the downtown mall was somewhat crucial to Eugene's image, and twenty-four percent believed it was essential; Fifty-seven percent opposed spending funds to improve Eugene's mall; Seventy-one percent opposed opening only Willamette street

and sixty-five percent opposed opening only Olive; Fifty-seven percent did not want the fountain to go while twelve percent wanted in removed; Forty-eight percent were "somewhat satisfied" with the design of the mall; Thirty-three percent though the mall was "somewhat safe" and thirty-one percent believed it was very safe, and forty-one percent went to the mall to shop less than once a month.

[46] Mason, "Reject Council's Attempts to Act without Voters."

[47] Paul Dunwiddie, "Merchants Say Parking Biggest Problem," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 6, 1990). The survey, conducted on behalf of Downtown Development District Taskforce, was mailed to 870 merchants of which 254 were returned.

[48] Based on a report emailed to me by a Duncan and Brown representative on July 6, 2020. Additionally, the survey boundary was formed by 5th to 11th avenues and Charnelton to Highs streets. The area included 753,947 sf of retail and 560,585 sf of office space.

[49] Paul Dunwiddie, "Downtown Office Building Sold," *The Register-Guard*, February 4, 1992.

[50] "The Mall: An Open Question."

[51] Jeff Wright, "Business Goes South at West End of Mall," *The Register-Guard*, June 13, 1993.

[52] Davis and Hedlund, "City Ignores Downtown Problems."

[53] "Downtown Shows More Signs of Rebounding: Office/Retail Vacancy Rates in the Eugene Downtown Core Area."

[54] Paul Dunwiddie, "Disappointed Merchants Predict Exodus from Mall."

[55] Portal, "Mall Issue Rerouted on Olive."

[56] Ann Portal, "Olive Street a New Focus of Mall Talk," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 29, 1988).

[57] "Miller Wants Mall Street Open," *The Register-Guard*, January 7, 1992.

[58] "Council Approves Olive Street Plan," *The Register-Guard*, April 16, 1992.

[59] Ann Portal, "Residents Are Split on Olive Reopening," *The Register-Guard*, May 20, 1992.

[60] Jeff Wright, "Mall Redesign Likely Headed for City Vote," *The Register-Guard*, January 24, 1995.

[61] Jeff Wright, "Reopening Willamette Called Boost to Pride," *The Register-Guard*, February 10, 1995.

[62] Wright, "Mall Redesign Likely Headed for City Vote."

[63] Jeff Wright, "City Oks New Vote on Street Reopening," *The Register-Guard*, February 23, 1995.

[64] Bill Bishop, "Voters Say Yes to Everything," *The Register-Guard*, May 17, 1995.

[65] "City Celebrates as Street Reopens," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 2, 1996).

[66] Kelly Fenley, "Willamette's Design Sets and 'easy-Does-It'' Pace,'" *The Register-Guard*, October 31, 1996.

[67] "More Doctoring for Downtown Eugene."

[68] "Downtown Athletic Club Opens," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 31, 1985).

[69] Dan Wyant, "Another Historic Landmark Gets Facelift: Work Begins on Schaefers Building," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 13, 1987).

[70] Martha Kerns, "Renovation Lures Shops Downtown: Bright Future Seen for East Broadway," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 8, 1988).

[71] "Rehabilitation Possible for Tiffany Building," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 19, 1989).

[72] Bob Welch, "Life in the Tiffany Building: Downtown Digs," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 9, 1993).

[73] Tad Shanon, "$1 Million in Aid Seals Symantec Deal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 24, 1993).

[74] Jeff Wright, "Will Urban Renewal Stay in the Future of Downtown?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 13, 1993).

[75] "U.S. Bank Holds Ribbon Cutting," *The Register-Guard*, December 16, 1995.

[76] Suzanne Hurt, "Bus Stop Achieves Fresh Start," *Register Guard,* April 3, 1998.

[77] "Taxpayers Help Pay for the 'Surgery'"; Stahlberg, "New Wave of Eugene Officials Poised to Fix Mall's Mistakes." However, because of the tax-increment scheme, the 1986 tax rate was $29.59 per $1000 instead of $28.99 for the rest of the city.

[78] Wright, "Will Urban Renewal Stay in the Future of Downtown?" In a June 1993 Register Guard article, Jeff Wright highlighted the problem with tax increment financing—a key contribution of CEP to the downtown area businesses—that it could be used for projects that had "more to do with economic perks for downtown businesses than with correcting urban blight.

[79] Christian Wihtol, “Giustina Expands Downtown Holdings,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 17, 1999).

[80] IR2 argues that without street access, people would have been able to live in the mall and there would also be issues of parking to the residents.

[81] Welch, “Life in the Tiffany Building: Downtown Digs.”

[82] Patterson, “Clockless Towers: Eugene’s Architectural War on History.”

[83] Drew DeSilver, “City Centered: Broadway Place Aims to Revive Downtown, Rein in Sprawl,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 19, 2000).

[84] Diane Dietz, “Council Revives Housing Waiver,” *The Register-Guard*, January 29, 2002.

[85] Susan Palmer, “03-11-29-1B New Building Offers Low Rent, High Class,” *The Register-Guard*, November 29, 2003.

[86] Scott Maben, “Downtown Eugene: Voters Say on Mall’s Fate,” *The Register-Guard*, January 6, 2001.

[87] Scott Maben, “Voters OK Reopening, Nix Change in Election,” *The Register-Guard*, September 18, 2001.

[88] Diane Dietz, “Broadway Plan Wins Acclaim, Approval,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 17, 2002).

[89] Joe Mosley, “Seeing Traffic Is Believing,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 24, 2002).

[90] Dietz, “Broadway Plan Wins Acclaim, Approval.”

[91] “On the Block: The Fate of Eugene’s Pedestrian Mall Is in the Hands of the City Voters,” *The Register-Guard*, September 14, 2001.

[92] Scott Maben, “Downtown’s Dead Zone,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 25, 2001).

[93] Maben, “Downtown Eugene: Voters Say on Mall’s Fate.”

[94] Mosley, “Seeing Traffic Is Believing.”

[95] Patterson, “Clockless Towers: Eugene’s Architectural War on History,” 37.

12 CHAPTER XII: CONCLUSION

12.1 Summary of findings

This research on a portion of downtown Eugene's history has taught important lessons about the processes that transformed the central area of an American city during the post-war era. The purpose of the following summary is not to make a harsh assessment of Eugene's leaders from that era. Rather, the point is to realize those past "mistakes" and ask if similar mistakes are being made at present.

Eugene's "experiment" with the pedestrian mall and urban renewal shows that the authorities led most of the key processes (sometimes based on personal logic). At the time, these authorities were confident that their approach/intuitions would work. However, their approach also seems to have assumed a near-perfect socio-economic or political scenario. The only valuable precedent they had were similar experiments across the nation that were working at the time. The Central Eugene Project (CEP) exemplified the result of the authorities/planners/designers' one-sided approach to doing what they think was right for the city (based mostly on their own realizations/intuitions/experiences in life/trends of the time) vs. thinking about what may not work in the near future or what the city and the people actually needed. The processes followed during Eugene mall's first phase (1970 to c. 1985; when the seeds of failure were planted) ignored the genius of the "everyday people" (including professionals) in the community.

This is not to argue that diligence and passion were lacking among Eugene's leaders. The urban renewal was arduous and complicated, and the leaders and the downtown community at the time were only attempting to realize the visions of what a city center should be. Besides, they saw the federal urban renewal program as the only option for such a large project. Also, some problems on the way, like the construction of the VRC or the declining regional economy, were out of anyone's control.

However, as this research shows, it is not easy for a single institution, especially with an inflexible agenda, to successfully complete such a large project. Nor does one institution have the answer to all of the city's core problems. The city leaders in the 1960s and the 1970s formed an inflexible-one-sided strategy, and their solution to downtown Eugene's problems began with a "questionable" move—to literally "eliminate" those problems and not work around them. They were not successful in realizing the basis for economic sustainability within the grand schemes of the CEP's master design.

The urban renewal-led clearance caused the demolition of at least 45% of the CEP area, a massive intervention of an area that had gradually grown over more than a century (until that point). The cleared areas could not receive the anticipated number of projects in the RCPM area. Also, the new projects were larger (Total Floor Area). While this is not a "negative" thing, the larger buildings could not sustain business interests as anticipated, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Several design and planning-related issues could also be related to the mall's failure. First, the original mall design anticipated a "fully occupied" building fabric along it, while in reality, a large portion was eradicated by the early-1970s. Second, a total of eight-core segments were closed to cars, which meant that downtown patrons either had to arrive on foot or via cars and park at least a few blocks away from the mall destinations. Third, the mall was "too large," spanning for than 3,000 feet, and additionally, instead of being linear, the mall was H-shaped. Although this meant that the mall had a larger expanse across the core, it proved to be a costly experiment considering the inability to attract uniform business interests across each segment. Fourth, elements like playgrounds, seating, vegetation, and a fountain occupied the mall. While these components play an essential role in creating places for mall patrons to rest, they limited the mall's ability to function effectively as a public space, provide unhindered accessibility and visibility, and ultimately support the adjacent retail core.

The CEP was responsible for large numbers of small business dislocations. For example, only 27% of the pre-renewal ROBs were still present in the area in 1978, which meant that the remaining were either liquidated or relocated outside the project area. Also, owners of substandard or rehabilitation feasible buildings could not save their buildings because of high rebuilding costs. On the other hand, business people could move to Valley River Center (VRC) and occupy a spot without the complications related to building a new structure or wait for building completion. Also, the Eugene Renewal Agency (ERA) was very inflexible toward small businesses, as it forced businesses out of the area and did not make it easy for new businesses/investors to move in. While ERA had to (understandably) satisfy HUD's conditions for each project, it was sometimes unnecessarily concerned about the "compatibility" of the proposed project.

ERA was not very receptible to constructive criticisms and did not want any changes in the way of what it had already planned. Most criticisms were about the project's opaque top-down approach, lack of sensibilities for the local community and small businesses or property owners, an inclination toward large single-use projects, and complete restriction of vehicles in the mall. Instead of focusing on the strengths of smaller businesses or accommodating downtown housing, they pursued large retailers and "megaprojects" in the remainder of the late seventies.

Like mentioned before, ERA strictly followed the final CEP plan and was not very flexible about changes. Specifically, ERA was adamant in its resolutions related to (1) large retailers, (2) land-use segregation and restriction of retail uses, (3) reservation of large parcels for pre-determined projects, and (4) pursual of "megaprojects" for too long (into the 1980s). First, the CEP was not robust enough to adapt to the large retailers' departure (Montgomery Ward, JC Penney, Bon Marche, and Sears). These large retailers played a central role while they were still downtown and left a large hole when they left. ERA "assumed" that with the presence of four large retailers, the small retail businesses/projects would be attracted "automatically" to create a "specialized" center. Second, instead of mixing diverse uses, the idea of creating a large retail core around the pedestrian mall relied on segregation in the first place. Third, ERA reserved large parcels for projects like the Hotel-Conference Center, Auditorium, or Parking Garages. While several of the anticipated large projects were constructed by the early-1980s, this came at the cost of confusion, quarrels, and potential investors were driven away due to an unhealthy political environment. Fourth, ERA pursued the dream for a megaproject even until the early-1980s, when the experience had shown that larger department stores or chain stores were unlikely to come to downtown Eugene. For example, such a massive undertaking, like the $50 million plan for a multi-use retail center, took a lot of time and energy. ERA lost the possibility to leverage its effort toward small and medium-sized businesses or downtown housing in the crucial years of the early-1980s.

COE and ERA did not seriously regard affordable downtown housing as an important part of a vibrant downtown core until it was very late, considering the pedestrian mall's fate in the 1990s. Affordable housing is an essential quality required for downtowns of the future if they want to sustain themselves. Residential developments were not a part of the CEP plan. Neither of the two organizations made much effort to help residents live within the project area in the 1970s and the 1980s. In addition to housing, another element entirely missing from the CEP plan was historic preservation. While organizations tried to pressure ERA for financial support, its staff were not interested in such an endeavor. During the first phase, most of the renovations were private efforts, while a few received supports (loans) during the second phase through tax-increment dollars.

The parking garages were a major component of the CEP, but they could not entice visitors as anticipated. This means that many potential mall patrons stayed away from the area, which directly contributed to declining sales and consequently the mall's failure. Studies from the 1980s showed that the hassle of parking in a multi-story garage as opposed to a ground floor, the perception of an unsafe environment, and the need to walk during the winter rains from the garage to the mall destinations contributed to the "unpopularity" of the parking garages.

The mall was not an inclusive space, specifically when it first opened and throughout its existence. Two problems related to the inclusivity of all patrons in the mall that the city could not deal with were (1) management of rules and (2) incorporation of the "undesired" transient population. ECC adopted many mall rules like a ban on any wading use of the mall fountains, restricted holding events, no pets or biking, and no sitting on the lawn. Also, while the "transient" population created problems for the merchants and consumers, potential mall patrons stayed away due to a "perception" of an unsafe mall environment.

However, the drivers for the mall's "failure" did not come solely from the events within the downtown or even the city's boundary. In addition to the "core" internal reasons, at least two external causes could have been directly related to the mall's failure (1) loss of economic capacity of central areas and prosperity of peripheries and (2) VRC and other outer-town shopping centers. Understandably, these external developments, which added pressure to the downtown retail core, were not under the control of any downtown-related organization. For example, while total ROB numbers grew from 1,036 to 1,419 (+37%) for the whole city between 1965 and 1985, it declined from 582 to 570 within the central one-mile area and from 485 to 412 within the central half-mile core. VRC, which opened eighteen months before the mall, always posed a direct competition. In addition to many potential small businesses, VRC and later, the Gateway Mall attracted all large downtown retailers by 1990.

In addition to these reasons associated with the mall's failure, Eugene's mall and urban renewal stories are also associated with a few positive experiences. Some of them included the renewal agency's efforts to facilitate the small businesses and the involvement of downtown merchants and the local community in the process. For example, ERA and COE were genuinely concerned about providing spaces to small businesses as they understood that only large retailers could not sustain the retail core. One specific example is the ERA's effort to construct the Atrium mini-mall—a specialized place that hosted displaced businesses at a lower rent. ERA understood. The involvement of downtown merchants also dominates the mall's story. While merchants could not "vote" to change the decisions, they were involved in decisions related to the mall's conception (in the first place) to selecting the mall streets, organizing free downtown parking, and later reopening the mall streets to the vehicles.

Between the CEP/pedestrian mall's first phase and downtown Eugene's present situation (the late 2000s onwards), the second phase (1985 to early 2000s) can be considered a transition phase. Although all mall segments eventually reopened and the ROB numbers had dramatically reduced by 2000, the retail core experienced a shift in approach by the COE and the renewal agency from a retail-centric approach to preserving the existing fabric and attracting diverse residential and commercial projects. This era is important for the construction of several non-retail commercial and housing projects in the area like the US Bank tower, occupation of Bon Marche by Symantec Software company, LTD Eugene Station, and the Broadway Place Apartments.

12.2 The 21st century downtown Eugene: Current Approach, Downtown at Present, and Moving Forward

Shortly after cars were allowed back to all streets, Hugh Prichard claimed that the presence of government and private offices that drew people to downtown by the early-2000s had created a "fertile ground for retail spin-offs" in the form of "clubs and restaurants" and "small to medium size shops that were expected to flesh out a downtown mix."[1] Downtown Eugene's present character has been shaped more or less by this approach taken by the COE since the start of the new century. For example, the 2017 "Envision Eugene Comprehensive Plan" speaks volume of the city's most current approach to urbanism, as it aims to "translate the values of our community into land-use policy" and focuses on six key components related to Economic Opportunities, Affordable housing, Climate Change and Energy Resiliency, Compact Urban Development and Efficient Transportation options, Neighborhood Livability, and Natural Resources.[2] Regarding downtown, the plan emphasizes the role of the urban economy and promoting downtown as "a hub of creative, entrepreneurial activity that can attract new investment and retain and grow existing businesses that thrive in the urban environment."[3]

Also, in 2017, the COE, in collaboration with the firm Urban 3, prepared a database on tax and land use. By dividing the city into four different kinds of properties (single-family housing, a coffee kiosk (low-storied small business), a downtown office building (mid-rise), and big-box stores), the report graphically portrayed the taxable value per acre for each property under different categories.[4] Their findings show that the downtown is "providing financial support for city services at a much higher rate than other parts" (see figure 12.1).[5]



Figure 12.1. A map of Eugene's building values based on the taxable value per acre. Sc. City of Eugene in collaboration with Urban 3, 2017, Mapping Value, 20-21).

As figure 12.2 further shows, the downtown and central areas still form the retail core. Other larger centers, mostly along major highways and along Willamette street toward the south, present competition to the central retail areas. Currently, the CEP area is a mixed-use area with retail, multi-family housing, and general services (see figure 12.3). There are 312 multi-family units (35.8% of total land use), 154 retail businesses (17.75), and 342 general services (39.2%).[6] A total of sixty-three properties out of 116 (54%) surveyed by the COE between September and October 2020 were in blighted condition.[7]



Figure 12.2 A map of Eugene within its Urban Growth Boundary showing the network of major arterials and Kernel Density Estimate map of ROBS in 2018.



Figure 12.3. Current urban renewal boundary with land use (sc. City of Eugene 2020, Appendix Exhibit D. 28).

As seen in the current views along the former mall, the downtown core is mostly composed of one to four or five-storied buildings that constitute retail or service-oriented businesses (see figure 12.4). Most of them were either constructed after the renewal or rehabilitated after the mid-1980s. While drastically different in morphology compared to the pre-renewal years (the 1960s), they contribute to downtown's urban life by hosting a mix of uses like retail businesses, restaurants, apartments, offices, banks, and public institutions. At present, downtown Eugene is not much vibrant, but this may not be solely attributable to what is happening in these core blocks but because much of downtown does not have similar blocks hosting the same level of activities. “Ideally,” if several other “cores” with similar qualities existed in proximity, the larger downtown would be a much stronger urban center.



Figure 12.4. Elevation of downtown Eugene along the former mall blocks.

However, this situation should only improve in the aftermath of the renewal. Unfortunately, with the COVID pandemic, the downtown is under even more stress as many businesses either moved or closed permanently. According to a recent COE study of the CEP area, at least thirteen businesses in the CEP area stated that they had permanently closed, and 16% of ground-floor street-facing businesses in the area are closed or empty.[8] Change is inevitable to cities. The ability to cope with changes is one of the important hallmarks of successful cities. Downtown Eugene "barely survived" the costly urban renewal experiment, but the developments that followed in the 1990s and 2000s helped it withstand the "big shock" of the renewal. The CEP tested the city core's resilience, but it survived. However, it could not emerge as an ideally "vibrant core" that is usually of great pride to its city's residents.

12.3 Suggestions for future work

This research elaborated the historical processes and results of those processes taking downtown Eugene's case as an example. This historical research presents a potential for future research that would help make downtowns vibrant centers of the city with diverse uses and, most importantly, downtown inhabitants. Two specific disciplines present important areas of future research: (1) exploring the role of research tools like space syntax in improving the understanding of American downtowns and (2) potential for equitable and affordable housing in downtown Eugene.

Space syntax studies across different parts of the world, and as partly observed in this research, have helped improve our understanding of the built environment by providing knowledge about the relationship between the built forms, the functional constituents of those built forms, and the network of spaces that run along them. For example, this research's space syntax analysis showed that the mall streets that lost or gained ROBs between 1978 or 1985 were significantly different in terms of their spatial measures. This finding suggests that the street network configuration, i.e., their relationship to the larger system, is an important determinant of the retail core's success and failure.

An important requirement for downtown improvement is first to increase the number of patrons visiting downtown. The only two ways this can happen are: either people from across the city visit downtown or sufficient people already live downtown. One key factor promoting the latter, i.e., increasing downtown's residential population, is equitable, affordable housing. Downtown Eugene needs more of them for its sustained growth. People living downtown not only utilize the existing businesses and services but also create a multiplier effect to influence further businesses and activities—a fact that should not be underestimated. Downtown's sustained progress cannot be left to the downtown employers and businesses and a sparse population base. As history has shown, the outer city population may not be counted as a reliable downtown consumer group, nor can any single project sustainably change downtown's fortune. Downtown's fate is largely in the hands of the people who call downtown a permanent home.

12.4 Notes

[1] Joe Mosley, "Goodbye Country, Hello Downtown," *The Register-Guard*, August 24, 2003.

[2] *Envision Eugene: Comprehensive Plan* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 2017), https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/37261/Envision-Eugene-Comp-Plan-FINAL-Adopted-no-Appendicies.

[3] Ibid., 9.

[4] The following formula has been used to compute the annual property tax: Annual property tax = Taxable value X Tax rate.

[5] *Mapping Value in Eugene, Oregon* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 2017), 21.

[6] City of Eugene, *An Ordinance Adopting an Amended Urban Renewal Plan for the Downtown Urban Renewal District* (Eugene, 2020), https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/59106/2020-Urban-Renewal-Plan-Amendment?bidId=. Exhibit B, 3.

[7] Ibid., Exhibit C, 1.

[8] Ibid. Exhibit C, 2.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES AND URBAN DESIGN GOALS OF THE CEP

One of the final urban renewal plan documents released by the ERA in December 1968 mentioned that the primary objectives of the urban renewal plan were "to improve the project area through redevelopment and rehabilitation of sub-standard buildings, to eliminate blighting influences, to modify the street system and to provide pedestrian amenities."[1] The specific objectives can be categorized as follows (categorized by the author; points taken directly from the CEP plan document)—

1. Land use
    - Reorganization and consolidation of the main commercial area by providing expansion possibilities for existing retail operations and a new site for a major retail development in block 126 (i.e., the southwest block west on Willamette and Broadway);
    - Provision of assembled sites for a new office, retail, service, and other commercial uses; and
    - Creation of an appropriate setting for the proposed auditorium-convention center adjacent to the Civic Center and the retail core to provide additional nighttime activity and variety in the area
2. Circulation
    - Modification of the existing street system to improve the circulation pattern and accessibility to major parking facilities; and
    - Creation of traffic-free pedestrian precincts with appropriate landscaping, open spaces, rest areas, and other shopper amenities and conveniences.
3. Parking
    - Provision of adequate parking to meet the demand of the existing and new commercial development; consolidation of parking into major facilities located around the edge of the retail core.
4. Public works
    - Installation of public improvements that will stimulate private investment in new development to protect the existing economic base and increase tax income to the City and County.

At a public meeting in late April 1970, the Planning Review Committee approved the urban design goals for CEP, which were as follows[2]

1. Augment the existing and planned system of pedestrian areas and open space;
2. Maintain distant vistas to the buttes along north-south streets as orientation points [which also meant not closing 6th to 7th along Willamette st];
3. Strengthen the civic image of the park blocks by locating the building of community importance on adjacent sites;
4. Site public facilities to utilize 'borrowed open space' rather than remove additional land from tax rolls;
5. Assure the activity of public spaces by mixing land uses to create day-night activity;
6. Soften the definition of the northern edge of the retail comparison shopping area to encourage related development toward the north;
7. Locate and arrange public-funded development to maximize the incentive for related private development;
8. Provide weather-protected walks;
9. Provide for the separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic whenever possible;
10. Provide parking;
11. Maintain free circulation of vehicular traffic on all streets in the area;
12. Develop a significant skyline and identity to the central district;
13. Create identifiable pedestrian linkages into and from the downtown area; and
14. Make provisions for mass transportation in the downtown area at convenient locations

An essential aspect of the plan was that initially (at least until July 1968), the CEP boundary was larger. The area occupied thirty-five blocks, and the area was "bounded on the north by the Southern Pacific railroad, on the east by Mill Street, on the south by 11th Avenue, and on the west by Charnelton Street."[3] However, the CEP boundary was later reduced and finalized to seventeen-and-half blocks in July 1968 (see figure A.1).[4]



Figure A.1. The older CEP area and reasons for exclusion (sc. RTKL's phase 2 study, 1968, 25).

Notes

[1] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18) [Modified December]*, 4.

[2] ERA, "ERA Report, 2 (1)."

[3] ERA, *Survey and Planning Application*.

[4] ERA, *Project Area Report for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18), July 1968*. According to RTKL's study, the old renewal area contained approximately 130 acres (5.72 million SF), of which 65% (3.71 million SF) was development land, and 35% (2.01 million SF) was the circulation area.

APPENDIX B: HISTORY OF THE PEDESTRIAN MALL DESIGN

Although Mitchell-McArthur and George Rockrise Associates' team commissioned the final mall design, at least two other studies directly impacted its design and planning.

First, a 1967 RERC study recommended that, like in other cities (e.g., Fresno), Eugene could mitigate the downtown's misfortunes through urban renewal and specifically by "converting the street into a pedestrian mall and rehabilitation of existing downtown structures." It also suggested that the downtown development could be concentrated along a Broadway Mall between Willamette and Charnelton streets. Furthermore, according to the study, Bon Marche and Sears with one or two major departmental stores and a variety of smaller retail outlets could potentially provide a "sufficient agglomeration of retail facilities to constitute a dynamic, sound shopping district which can be expected to retain a significant portion of retail sales in competition with other shopping center developments."

Second, in their November 1967 document "Alternative Objectives," RTKL had proposed attaining horizontal separation in the downtown core by creating pedestrian islands (malls and plazas), and the mall was incorporated as "pedestrian precincts."[1] RTKL suggested implementing the mall along Broadway and parts of Olive and Willamette Streets, creating a hierarchy of pedestrian streets (traffic-free precincts and dominant pedestrian areas) and not one type of strictly pedestrian street, and plan for continuous pedestrian movement between ground level and the second floor of adjacent buildings. Specifically, regarding urban space and pedestrian circulation and amenities, RTKL proposed the following[2]

1. Creation of pedestrian districts and a system of public open spaces which link together the functional elements of the CBD;
2. Development of a series of urban plazas over underground parking;
3. Creation of a second-level public area to facilitate the development of a system of pedestrian bridges across major streets linking buildings and parking structures together and extending the traffic-free pedestrian districts to the second level; and
4. Include landscaping, street furniture, lighting, and fountains to improve the life and character of the urban places; with the park blocks as a strong reference for the entire downtown

In late April 1970, GRA completed its study. The report highlighted the urban design qualities for the area north of 8th avenue within the CEP area, specifically traffic movement along the streets.[3] Most specifically, the Rockrise Report proposed[4] (1) providing definition of the northern edge of the retail area while encouraging related development toward the north, i.e., identifying a retail core, (2) separating pedestrian and vehicular traffic wherever possible to assure the comfort and safety of the pedestrians and to facilitate free movement of vehicular traffic, and (3) maintaining a free circulation of vehicular traffic on all streets in the area. This report played a significant role in ERA's determination to close the streets to vehicular traffic and improve the understanding of the one-way loop streets' limitations and capabilities to facilitate vehicular movement.

12.5 Notes

[1] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 2 Alternative Objectives-Preliminary*, 39.

[2] Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky, *Central Eugene Planning Study Final Report Phase 4 Alternative Designs*.

[3] Rockrise, *Eugene Urban Design Studies*.

[4] Ibid., 18.

APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF NATIONAL PEDESTRIAN MALL RELATED SURVEYS

Table C.1. Increase in retail sales after pedestrian mall construction.

This table is based on Shealy (1974).[1]

City, State	*% increase in pedestrian traffic*	*investments remodeling and new construction*	*% increase in property value and rentals*
Fresno, CA (first year)	60	$40,000,000	
Fresno, CA (first three years)			
Springfield, IL (first)			
Kalamazoo, MI (first five)	40	84% of stores remodeled; $ 16,000 new construction	30
Kalamazoo, MI (first nine)			
Knoxville, TN (first)			27-75
Pomona, CA (first)	73	$7,700,000 (first three years)	20
Atchison, KS (first)		$3,500,000 (ten new businesses)	Yes
Danville, IL (first)		remodeling improvements in storefronts, expansions	
Danville, IL (first two)			
Jackson, MI (first)			
Providence, RI (first)			
Santa Monica, CA (first)		$1,500,000 remodeling	
Miami, FL (first)	50	Yes (new construction)	Yes
Eugene, OR (first)	7	$13,000,000	

Notes

[1] Shealy, “Mall Costs and Benefits.”

APPENDIX D: LIST OF PEDESTRIAN MALLS

Table D.1 List of pedestrian malls across the nation and relevant information.

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
16th St. Mall	Denver	CO	1982								
Akard Street Mall	Dallas	TX	1974	$890,000	3		844,401	Semi-mall (S)	0		
Austin Ave.	Waco	TX									
Broadway Street Plaza	Tacoma	WA	1976	$1,500,000	2	154,581	157,000	Full mall (F)	5,973	1,385	80
Captain's Walk	New London	CT	1973	$1,426,209	6	31,360	31,630	S	1,483	1,200	50
Centennial Mall	Lincoln	NE	1970	$603,775	7		149,518	F	0		
Center City Mall	Williamsport	PA	1976	$1,500,000	10		37,918	F, S	0		
Central Plaza	Galveston	TX	1970	$160,000	2	61,109	61,809	F	4,273	600	75
Centralia Downtown Mall	Centralia	IL	1970	$33,955	1	15,217	15,217	F	685	400	70
Centre Street Mall	Pottsville	PA	1977	$1,250,000	7		19,715	F	0		
Chestnut Street Transitway	Philadelphia	PA	1976	$7,400,000	12	1,950,089	1,861,719	Transit Mall (T)	9,306	5,600	60
Church St. Mall	Burlington	VT	1981								

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
City Center Mall	Eugene	OR	1971	$1,350,000	5	94,000	79,028	F	2,800	1,134	66
Coffee Street Mall	Greenville	SC	1975	$274,000	1	61,208	61,436	F	1,850	420	50
Coos Bay Mall	Coos Bay	OR	1970	$2,000,000	3	14,130	13,466	F	2,284	900	60
Courthouse Plaza	Monroe	NC	1976	$280,000	3	13,000	11,282	F	895	540	45
Downtown Greenville Mall	Greenville	NC	1975	$425,000	2		29,063	T	0		
Downtown Mall	Erie	PA	1974	$1,600,000	4		130,084	T	0		
Downtown Mall	New Bedford	MA	1974	$495,000	3	101,777	101,777	F	3,384	850	50
Downtown Mall	Lake Charles	LA	1970	$650,000	4	77,998	77,998	F	5,000	1,600	65
Downtown Mall	Atchison	KS	1964	$3,600,000	2.5	13,556	12,565	F	1,100	900	60
Downtown Pedestrian Canopy and Mall	Wilkes-Barre	PA	1977	$2,300,000	2		58,586	S	0		
Downtown Salisbury Plaza	Salisbury	MD	1968	$165,000	2	15,252	15,252	F	1,220	800	50
Downtown Shopping Mall	Toccoa	GA	1971	$1,800,000	1	8,000	6,971	F	550	500	48
Downtown Walkway	Winston-Salem	NC	1975	$1,500,000	8	133,683	133,683	F	6,521	2,970	30

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
East Lansing Mall	East Lansing	MI	1975	$312,000	2	47,450	47,540	F	967	937	24
East Liberty Mall	Pittsburgh	PA	1974	$3,585,000	14	525,275	520,089	F, T	2,000	3,700	75
Essex Mall	Salem	MA	1977	$1,000,000	4		40,556	F	0		
Exchange Street Mall	Raleigh	NC	1977	$2,000,000	3.5		147,273	F	0		
Fort Street Mall	Honolulu	HI	1969	$2,766,450	6	324,871	324,871	F	9,831	1,738	50
Franklin Commons	Fayetteville	NC									
Franklin Square	Michigan City	IN	1969	$494,000	4	39,363	39,369	F	1,120	1,380	82
Franklin Street Mall	Tampa	FL	1974	$533,954	5	292,109	297,586	S	4,045	1,200	50
Freeport Downtown Plaza	Freeport	IL	1968	$120,000	2	27,736	27,736	F	1,450	600	40
Fulton Mall	Fresno	CA	1964	$1,600,000	6	165,972	165,972	F	4,500	2,800	80
Gay Street Mall	West Chester	PA									
Golden Mall	Burbank	CA	1967	$964,000	6	88,871	88,871	F	2,707	2,400	80
Gordon's Alley	Atlantic City	NJ	1973	$1,500,000	0.5	47,859	47,859	S	240	250	85
Granby St. Mall	Norfolk	VA	1976								
Hamilton Mall	Allentown	PA	1973	$5,000,000	4		109,572	S	0		
Inn Street Mall	Newburyport	MA	1975	$2,500,000	4		15,807	F	0		

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
Ithaca Commons	Ithaca	NY	1975	$1,130,000	3	26,226	26,226	F	1,450	1,100	66
Jefferson St. Mall	Burlington	IO	1970s								
Jefferson Street Mall	Burlington	IA	1977	$10,000,000	5		32,336	F, S	0		
K Street Mall	Sacramento	CA	1969	$3,600,000	9	264,000	257,105	F	8,522	3,200	80
Kalamazoo Mall	Kalamazoo	MI	1959	$82,348	2	85,000	85,555	F	8,800	1,900	66
Kansas City Kansas Mall	Kansas City	KS	1971	$2,300,000	3		168,213	S	0		
Lake St.	Oak Park	IL	1972								
Landmark Mall	Decatur	IL	1970	$530,000	3.5	90,397	90,397	S	3,315	1,600	80
Las Cruces Downtown Mall	Las Cruces	NM	1972	$1,200,000	7	37,857	37,857	F	1,300	2,200	70
Last Chance Mall	Helena	MT	1974	$417,414	4	24,651	22,730	F	1,680	1,900	60
Lebanon Downtown Mall	Lebanon	NH	1968	$450,000	1	9,725	9,725	F	407	375	86
Levee Plaza	Winoa	MN	1969	$225,000	3		26,438	F	0		
Lexington Street Mall	Baltimore	MD	1974	$800,000	2	905,759	905,759	F	7,665	650	62
Library Place and Gallery Place	Washington	D.C.	1976	$6,300,000	3		756,510	F	0		
Lincoln Road Mall	Miami	FL	1960	$600,000	8	87,072	87,072	F	3,199	3,000	100

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
Lower Main Street Mall	Patterson	NJ	1974	$568,000	1	144,824	144,824	F	2,035	300	50
Main St. Mall	Tulsa	OK	1970s								
Main Street	Buffalo	NY	1986								
Main Street	St. Joseph	MO	1974								
Main Street	Vicksburg	MS	1970s								
Main Street Mall	Spartanburg	SC	1975	$750,000	2	44,456	44,546	F	3,531	1,080	85
Main Street Mall	Charlottesvill e	VA	1976	$2,000,000	5		38,880	F	0		
Main Street Mall	Pougkkeepsie	NY	1973	$3,200,000	3	32,029	32,029	F	2,700	1,600	75
Main Street Mall	Painesville	OH	1973	$143,045	1		16,536	F	0		
Main Street Mall	Little Rock	AR	1977								
Main Street Walkway	Evansville	IN	1971	$1,000,000	7	138,764	138,764	F	4,259	5,000	60
Maine Way Mall	Portland	ME	1975	$225,000	5	65,116	65,116	F	4,500	1,900	38
Maplewood Mall	Germantown	PA	1974	$500,000	2		1,861,719	Full Mall (F0	0		
Market Square Mall	Knoxville	TN	1961	$313,000	1	174,587	188,470	F	7,900	440	130
Market Street Mall	Wilmington	DE	1976	$1,500,000	6	80,000	85,000	F	8,850	1,900	66
Michigan Mall	Battle Creek	MI	1975	$2,000,000	4	38,931	38,931	F	3,820	2,637	66
Michigan St.	South Bend	IN	1970s								

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
Mid-America Mall	Memphis	TN	1976	$6,000,000	12		623,530	F	0		
Middletown Mall	Middletown	OH	1974	$6,000,000	2		48,767	F	0		
Nicolet Mall	Minneapolis	MN	1967	$3,875,000	8	434,500	434,400	T	33,273	3,300	80
North 14th St. Mall	St. Louis	MO	1980s								
Occidental Mall	Seattle	WA	1973	$750,000	2	550,000	530,831	F	1,270	560	85
Old Capital Plaza	Springfield	IL	1971	$565,000	3	91,753	91,753	F	13,190	640	85
Oldtown Mall	Baltimore	MD	1976	$2,600,000	2	905,759	905,759	F	375	1,500	45
Park Plaza Mall	Oxnard	CA	1969	$653,000	3	85,104	71,225	F	1,450	1,500	80
Parkway Mall	Napa	CA	1974	$1,500,000	9	35,978	35,978	F, S	2,125	656	40
Parsons Plaza	Parsons	KS	1971	$85,000	4	13,015	13,015	F	767	1,190	80
Pearl St.	Boulder	CO	1977								
Penn Square	Reading	PA	1975	$1,600,000	2	87,643	84,097	F, S	4,560	1,110	160
Plaza 8	Sheboygan	WI	1976	$1,600,000	3.5		50,000	F	0		
Pomona Mall	Pomona	CA	1963	$682,000	9	87,384	87,384	F, S	3,326	2,976	70
Portland Transit Mall	Portland	OR	1977	$15,000,000	22		379,967	T	0		
Progress Place	Jackson	MI	1965	$80,000	3	45,484	45,484	F	3,174	1,200	66
Promenade	Richmond	IN	1972	$750,000	4	43,399	43,999	F	759	1,088	68

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	City/Place	State	Date open	Cost	No of blocks	1970 population	c. 1978 population	Type	Parking	Length (ft)	Width (ft)
Redding Mall	Redding	CA	1974	$1,600,000	2.5	16,659	16,659	F	1,448	1,470	40
Redlands Mall	Redlands	CA	1977		6		36,566	F	0		
River City Mall	Louisville	KY	1973	$1,717,000	3	361,472	361,706	F	31,955	2,815	60
Riverside Downtown Mall	Riverside	CA	1966	$730,107	4	154,000	140,089	F	2,450	1,600	100
Rockford Mall	Rockford	IL	1975	$890,000	4	147,370	147,370	F	3,250	1,190	66
Santa Monica Mall	Santa Monica	CA	1965	$675,550	6	88,289	88,289	F	3,384	1,800	80
St. Clair Mall	Frankfort	KY	1975	$325,000	1	23,000	21,902	F	4,868	400	80
State Street Mall	Auburn	NY	1972	$170,000	1		34,599	F	0		
State Street Mall	Chicago	IL	1979								
State Street Mall	Madison	WI	1970s								
Stoneplace Mall	Dallas	TX	1965	$110,000	1	844,401	844,401	F	33,500	200	50
Town Clock Plaza	Dubuque	IA	1971	$1,400,000	8		62,309	F	0		
Trenton Commons	Trenton	NJ	1974	$1,800,000	2	104,638	104,786	F	2,700	1,250	60
Vermilion Park	Danville	IL	1967	$112,000	2	42,570	42,570	F	2,129	1,350	82
Washington Square Mall	Lansing	MI	1973	$850,000	3	131,546	131,403	F	19,682	1,300	82

Table D.1. (continued).

Name	*City/Place*	*State*	*Date open*	*Cost*	*No of blocks*	*1970 population*	*c. 1978 population*	*Type*	*Parking*	*Length (ft)*	*Width (ft)*
Washington Street Mall	Cape May	NJ	1971	$1,500,000	3		4,392	F			
Westminster Mall	Providence	RI	1965	$530,000	6	179,116	179,116	F	11,705	1,266	60
Wyoming Avenue Mini-Mall	Scranton	PA	1978	$862,000	1		103,564	S	0		
Youngstown Federal Plaza	Youngstown	OH	1974	$18,327,000	3	140,909	140,909	F	4,784	1,091	100

Source: Brambilla and Longo (1977) for date opened, cost, number of blocks, 1978 population, and type. Rubenstein (1978) for 1970 population, number of parking spaces, mall length, and mall width.[1]

Notes

[1] Brambilla, Longo, and Virginia Dzurinko, *American Urban Malls: A Compendium*; Rubenstein, *Central City Malls*.

APPENDIX E: LIST OF SUCCESSFUL PEDESTRIAN MALLS BY 2013

Table E.1. List of successful pedestrian malls by 2013

This table is based on Judge (2013).[1]

Pedestrian Mall	*City*	*State*	*Population*	*Mall Length*	*Area characteristic*
Third Street Promenade	Santa Monica	California	90,377	3 blocks	Beach
Pearl Street Mall	Boulder	Colorado	98,889	4 blocks	University
Lincoln Road Mall	Miami Beach	Florida	90,588	8 blocks	Beach
Pedestrian Mall	Iowa City	Iowa	68,947	4 blocks	University
Exchange Place	New Orleans	Louisiana	360,740	1 block	High Tourism
Fulton Street	New Orleans	Louisiana	360,740	1 block	High Tourism
Downtown Cumberland Mall	Cumberland	Maryland	20,739	3 blocks	High Tourism
Front Street	New Bedford	Massachusetts	95,183	3 blocks	Beach
Inn Street Mall	Newburyport	Massachusetts	17,552	1 block	Beach
Fremont Street Experience	Las Vegas	Nevada	589,317	5 blocks	High Tourism
Downtown Mall	Lebanon	New Hampshire	13,120	1 block	University
Jay Street Pedestrian Walkway	Schenectady	New York	66,273	1 block	University
Long Wharf Mall	Newport	Rhode Island	24,034	1 block	Beach
Church Street Marketplace	Burlington	Vermont	39,522	4 blocks	University
Main Street Downtown Mall	Charlottesville	Virginia	40,482	8 blocks	University

Notes

[1] Judge, *The Experiment of American Pedestrian Malls: Trends Analysis, Necessary Indicators for Success and Recommendations for Fresno's Fulton Mall*.

APPENDIX F: LITERATURE REVIEW OF CLASSICAL ECONOMIC MODELS

This section discusses fundamental literature related to urban-economic geography and urban retail business structures, specifically those associated with (1) Central Places Theory and Polycentrism and (2) Location Theory. Two overlapping fields that need a brief introduction before moving forward are Urban Economics and Economic Geography (see table of comparison below).

Table F.1. Comparison between Economic Geography and Urban Economics.

Economic Geography	***Urban Economics***
It is concerned with the spatial patterning of the economic systems—an organizational structure through which humans seek to allocate scarce resources efficiently.[1]	It is concerned with the economic relationship and processes that contribute to the essential spatial characteristics of size, density, structure, or land use pattern.
It aims to understand the spatial component of supply and demand, precisely how the "distance" factor, whether in terms of physical or temporal, influences the way goods are exchanged. Evolutionary EG, a branch of EG and essential for this research, explains the spatial evolution of firms, evolutions, networks, cities, and regions from elementary processes of the entry, growth, decline, and exit of their firms and their locational behavior.[2]	It uses the analytical tools present in the Economics discipline to explain cities' spatial and economic organization and metropolitan areas to deal with their unique economic problems.[3]

One of the essential questions separating and connecting the two disciplines is examining how "the friction of distance" from the city core impacts the city's economic patterning. Much of the foundational works in these fields (e.g., Central Place Theory or Location Theories) have originated from the ideas regarding the production economy or the supply-side, i.e., the spatial patterning of manufacturers, suppliers, and consumers. However, the focus here is more on the patterning of consumption and exchange and not so much on manufacturing and supply, so literature on urban economics becomes only partially applicable. While UE and EG works span the regional and global scale economics, they also provide significant insights into a single city's comprehensive understanding.

The foundational EG and UE theories that shaped the understanding of much of the post-war knowledge of the cities in North America and Europe were laid out in the earlier decades through (1) Christaller's Central Place Theory (1933); (2) Burgess' Concentric Zone model

(1925); (3) Hoyt's Sector Model (1939); (4) Harris and Ullman's Multiple Nuclei Model (1945); and (5) Alonso's bid-rent theory (1960). Fundamentally, each theory/model argues that considering all other things being equal, cities exist because of the economic core(s) that have a mutual physical relationship with residential and other land uses. One thing to note is that fundamentally, these models have limitations for this research since they were based on the early twentieth century's agricultural economies and assume homogeneous social and geographical constituencies. A discussion of these theories is to follow.

Christaller's Central Place Theory—Christaller, in his seminal work on the central places of Southern Germany in the 1930s, defined central places as "places which have central functions that extend over a large region, in which other central places of less importance exists."[4] In this context, centrality referred more to the central function than to the region's central location.[5] The fundamental question surrounding Christaller's central place theory was: "why are there large and small towns, and why are they distributed so irregularly?"[6] Christaller hoped to find an answer to this question by studying the sizes, numbers, and distribution of settlements across Southern Germany. He found that cities of various sizes exist, ranging from a small hamlet performing a few simple functions to a large city with a large tributary area and providing more complex "services" such as wholesaling, large-scale banking, and specialized retailing.[7] While the "central places" are the settlements distributed across the region with strict spatial hierarchies, the spatial hierarchies of places exist as higher-order (less in number) or lower-order (more in number) (see figure F.1).



Figure F.1. An illustration of Christaller's central place theory. According to Ullman's interpretation of the CPT, circles leave unserved spaces. Hexagons do not leave unserved space and represent a better theoretical shape. Furthermore, the small hexagons are service areas for small places and large hexagons for larger central places (Ullman 1941, 856.)

Additionally, Christaller modeled different “urban hierarchies” in terms of the intensity of the central places through three different principles: (1) marketing, (2) transportation, and (3) administrative. Christaller contended that among the three principles, the marketing principle is the primary law of distribution of central places, which argues that “if the central places lie at certain equal distances and in the proper orientation with respect to central places of a higher order, and if they can be grouped so that there is a certain number of places belonging to each group, then it can be concluded that almost without exception the location of central places conforms to the principle of marketing” (1966, 190; see figure F.2).



Figure F.2. A system of central places according to the market principle (1966, 61) (*left*) and the marketing regions in a system of central places (1966, 66) (*right*).

Burgess’s concentric zone model—While Central Place Theory connected the economic processes in the developments of towns of different sizes in a large region, Ernest Burgess’s concentric zone model developed a model for a single metropolitan area. Burgess argued that a typical land use pattern in a city can be explained and follows the structure of concentric circles. Through a study of Chicago, he argued that “…. typical processes of the expansion of the city can best be illustrated, perhaps, by a series of concentric circles, which may be numbered to designate both the successive zones of urban extension and the types of areas differentiated in the process of expansion …. (which) …. represents an ideal construction of the tendencies of any town or city to expand radially from its CBD on the map.” (see figure 2.7)[8] As Burgess argued furthermore, the inner zones tend to extend their area by invading the next outer zone as “distribution takes place which sifts and sorts and relocates individuals and groups by residence and occupation.”[9]

Hoyt’s Sector Model—While Burgess’ model showed that a uniform distribution of land uses forms cities, in 1939, Homer Hoyt published a study of Chicago's residential structure, which included ideas for the “sector model.” [10] The sector model was a re-examination of Burgess’ 1925 concentric model and primarily argued that the city's high-income sectors were in one or more sectors of the city and did not form a "ring" around the CBD. Furthermore, several factors, for example, topographical, tend to distort the circular pattern.[11] In other words, the sector model states that growth along a particular axis of transportation usually consists of similar types of land use. The city is represented as a circle with "sectors" that radiate out from the center of that circle, with similar types of land use originating near the center of the circle and migrating outward toward the periphery (see figure 2.7).[12] Hoyt confirmed that "the retail shopping center, and not the financial center, is the central point in most cities if the center is determined by converging lines of traffic, the density of pedestrian traffic, or by peak land values."[13]

Harris and Ullman's Multiple Nuclei Model—While these theories generalized significant economic processes involved in city creation, they were a monofunctional model. Improving on the two previous theories by Burgess and Hoyt, Harris and Ullman's (1945) multiple nuclei models proposed that in cities, the land-use pattern is built not around a single center but several discrete nuclei.[14] (ss figure 2.7) The authors argued that the initial nucleus of the city might be the retail district in a central place, the port of rail facilities, or other specialized functions that:

1. Require specialized facilities (e.g., the retail district is attached to the point of greatest intracity accessibility;
2. Group because they profit from cohesion;
3. Locate farther if they are detrimental to each other; and
4. May not be able to afford the high rents (e.g., wholesaling and storage or industries)

Like the previous theories, Harris and Ullman also proposed that the following districts have developed in most American cities: CBD, wholesale, light manufacturing, heavy industrial, and residential. The theory supports the idea that multiple nuclei are formed not only because of high rent in the central locations but also due to the nature of specific activities to locate themselves to take advantage of the extra-urban transportation and separation from other activities.

Location Theory—One aspect common to all the previous models is that location played a crucial role in land use distribution. The studies related to Location Theories further improved these ideas. Location studies primarily argue that economic factors, especially the price of land and monthly rents, play a significant role in deciding the businesses' locations and that the businesses benefit from a symbiotic relationship of being located close to each other.[15] The locational choice is about identifying where the particular economic activity will be located when the locations of all other activities are given, which are governed by the desire to maximize profits or utility by reducing the cost of distance.[16] Cost minimization occurs when the city's organizations reflect households and firms' attempts to overcome 'the friction of space,' e.g., transportation cost and rent.[17]

One of the most famous works on the relationship between urban locations and economic activities is Alonso's 1960 "bid-rent theory.[18] Alonso found that market centers evolve through a competitive bidding process among the businesses who want to locate themselves in the central location to save time and travel costs. As such, rent and land prices decrease further from the market center because of the increased travel cost. Alonso also clarified that when a purchaser acquires a land, he/she acquires two goods (land and location), and there is an associated negative good (distance) with positive costs (commuting costs) or conversely a positive cost (accessibility) with negative costs (savings in commuting). In other words, businesses in central locations have better accessibility but must bear higher costs, whereas those farther away must travel to a certain distance to reach the center but pay less for rent and occupation of the land. However, one limitation of this study is that it corresponds only to a single-center city, a featureless plain, and transportation availability in all directions.

Notes

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[1] Lloyd and Dicken, *Location in Space: A Theoretical Approach to Economic Geography.*

[2] Koen Frenken and Ron Boschma, "Geographic Clustering in Evolutionary Economic Geography," in *Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Economic Geography*, ed. Charlie Karlsson, Martin Anderson, and Therese Norman (Northampton, MA, 2015), 291–302.

[3] James Heilbrun, *Urban Economics and Public Policy* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 2.

[4] Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany*, 17.

[5] Ibid., 43.

[6] Ibid., 1.

[7] Edward Ullman, "A Theory of Location for Cities," *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 6 (1941): 853–864, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/218800.

[8] Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in *The City: Suggestions for Investigation of Human Behavior and the Urban Environment*, ed. Robert

E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1925), 50.

[9] Ibid., 54.

[10] Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Housing Administration, 1939).

[11] Ibid., 12.

[12] Harris and Ullman, "The Nature of Cities."

[13] Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*, 19.

[14] Harris and Ullman, "The Nature of Cities."

[15] Martin Beckmann, *Location Theory* (New York: Random House, 1968); Ullman, "A Theory of Location for Cities."

[16] Harry W. Richardson, *Regional Economics* (New York, 1969).

[17] Ibid., 119.

[18]" William Alonso, "A Theory of the Urban Land Market," in *Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association*, vol. 6, 1960, 49–57.

APPENDIX G: IMPACT OF URBAN RENEWAL ON BUSINESSES ACROSS THE NATION

Table G.1. List of major urban renewal-led changes for projects across seven cities.

This table is based on a 1982 study.[1]

Mall, City	*Impacts on business conditions after revitalization*
Trenton Commons, Trenton	Only twenty-five percent of the stores were owner-occupied when the mall began, and the remaining had to face a tough choice; the fast-food restaurants played a central role; independent stores were not present in large numbers.
State Street Mall/ Capitol Concourse, Madison	A significant process of store transformation occurred in the project area; a noticeable increase in the number of restaurants, several of them in the long-vacant second-story spaces, was observed; almost all businesses were independent.
Mid-American Mall, Memphis	Retail sales had stabilized since the opening of the mall; two major department stores established and a slight increase in sales; approximately twenty-five new businesses opened in the first year—dominated by fast food and small specialty shops catering to the new crowd of office workers; mall did not seem to favor businesses of any particular size.
Lexington street mall, Baltimore	Little noticeable effect on the mix of businesses.
Old Town mall, Baltimore	Old town mall underwent marked physical transformation and dramatic realignment of ownership; over half of the eighty-four building properties changed ownership; the individually operated stores went from ninety-nine percent white-owned to forty-three percent black-owned.
Canal street, New Orleans	Retail mix (in terms of market orientation or size of establishments) did not change significantly
French market, New Orleans	Resulted in the displacement of a few small retail and non-retail businesses which were “incompatible” with the newly upgraded image of the area or which could not afford the increased rent; replaced by small independently owned retail establishments oriented toward a primarily middle and upper-middle-class clientele; fully rented during the study period.
The Portland mall, Portland	A decline of retail sales reported to have leveled off since 1977; observed upgrading of existing stores and in-moving of new stores.
Downtown Crossing, Boston	Perceived results from merchants’ responses—forty-six percent concluded that the project did not affect their establishment, thirty-nine percent thought the project had improved businesses, fifteen percent felt it hurt the business; small businesses were hurt more and helped less by the project than larger ones; independently owned stores were also hurt more and assisted less compared to chain stores.

Notes

[1] Cambridge Systematics, *Impacts of Downtown Revitalization Projects on Small Business*.

APPENDIX H: SPACE SYNTAX STUDIES OF AMERICAN CITIES

Haynie and Peponis (2009) have studied the evolution of Atlanta's Center by analyzing nine historical maps from 1853 to 1995 and identifying that there have been significant shifts in the spatial structure of the urban area.[1]

Psarra et al. (2013) studied the urban configuration of Detroit from 1796 to 2010.[2] The authors contend they are attempting to establish an alternative yet strong reason for the collapse of the industries beyond the explanation provided by the social (segregation) and economic (weakening of motor industries) factors. Their study found that the transformation that occurred beginning the 1950s after the construction of freeways led to the spatial disconnection between the city core and the surrounding areas and caused socio-economic degradations, primarily industrial manufacturing. [3] More specifically, the interconnected spatial network of Detroit "…. gradually expanded and altered [post-war] …. facilitating the emergence of the segregated city, based on a different model of spatial accessibility and economic production…. [and]…. although in 1920s Detroit the distribution of retail, industrial and residential development was a function of the street network and its spatial logic, today's land uses (the year 2010) largely follow the logic of high-speed car transportation." The authors further found that industrial units located close to a highly connected (choice) network diminished from 36% in 1921 to 24% in 1952 and 19% in 2009. This led to the conclusion that "although in 1920s Detroit the distribution of retail, industrial and residential development was a function of the street network and its spatial logic, today's land uses largely follow the logic of high-speed car transportation." Additionally, since the 1950s, the street network had "lost its capacity to integrate the social and economic activities in the city, which followed a new logic of production, consumption and distribution." The primary reason for this post-1950s disconnect between the inner-city center and residential areas was because of "disruptions to the connectivity levels caused by the interstates, industrial sites and railway lines."

Howsley (2003) studied three districts in Portland, Oregon (Southeast, Northeast, and Pearl) to understand the implications of street networks on gentrification.[4] The neighborhoods were selected based on two categories through which gentrification occurs: planned (Pearl district) and (2) natural (Hawthorne and Broadway). Howsley found that Pearl District does not have any established residential and commercial land use pattern, no main commercial artery through the development, and commercial and retail sites are distributed throughout the whole area.[5] Spatially, Pearl District shows a lack of a hierarchy of spaces and major integrators and thus is unsuitable for a small business economy that presumably requires "spatial differentiation." Hawthorne and Broadway, on the other hand, have commercials use along a main linear route.

Notes

[1] Haynie and Peponis, "Atlanta: A Morphological History."

[2] Sophia Psarra, Conrad Kickert, and Amanda Pluviano, "Paradigm Lost: Industrial and Post-Industrial Detroit-An Analysis of the Street Network and Its Social and Economic Dimensions from 1796 to the Present," *Urban Design International* 18, no. 4 (2013): 257–281.

[3] Ibid. The main purpose of the study was to explore how the socio-economic forces that took place in Detroit relate to the transformations of its urban form

[4] K. Howsley, "Uncovering the Spatial Patterns of Portland's Gentrification," in *Proceedings of the 4th International Space Syntax Symposium* (London, 2003).

[5] Ibid. As the author explains, gentrification is "the process by which middle to upper income residents acquire housing in a traditionally low-income neighborhood, raising property values and displacing low-income residents…. a process that is not solely defined by changing economic structures…."

APPENDIX I: RESPONSE OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

A total of four respondents replied of ten contacted. Three replied via email, and I conducted a phone interview with one. The questions that the participants did not answer have not been included.

Appendix I.1 Interview Respondent 1

1 Do you believe that the pedestrian mall idea to improve downtown Eugene's retail core was a failure? If yes, what do you think were the reasons for the failure? When did the failure of the mall start to become evident to you?

Yes, it was a failure, both financially and culturally. Retail businesses fled downtown. The ones who remained open relocated to Valley River Center, Oakway Center, and other suburban locations.

At first, in the mid-seventies, Eugeneans kept coming downtown and many local and regional retailers flourished. The Bon Marché, Sears, JC Penney, and many local specialty stores for shoes, outdoor gear, books, fashion, hardware. These retailers reinforced one another and gave people multiple reasons to come downtown.

Business gradually began shifting out of downtown, into Valley River Center and other places where it was easier to park and there were more retail options. As the big anchor stores moved, the local retailers lost traffic and volume. Most people do not want to park in multi-level parking structures. They are perceived as unsafe and time-consuming. Also, people do not expect to park blocks from their destination and then walk along an outdoor pedestrian "mall", particularly in winter. As shoppers and walkers declined, the "mall" began to feel unsafe, uninviting, unused. Retailers fled to other locations.

When the Bon Marché and Sears departed, in @ 1990, the decline of downtown was obvious to all.

Over one hundred US downtowns created pedestrian malls between the late sixties and late seventies.

I have visited many. I believe that all of the exclusively pedestrian malls have failed. A few, which provide easy automobile access still exist, such as Bolder, CO. still exist. The first pedestrian mall in America, In Kalamazoo, Michigan, finally failed and was reopened to traffic in the late 90's. The reasons given are the same as Eugene's: Flight of retail to the suburbs and the difficulty of parking, walking in all weathers, and crime.

2 When it was being conceived in the mid to late-1960s, why did the city leaders, residents, and other concerned parties believe that urban renewal and the pedestrian mall was the best strategy to revitalize downtown Eugene's retail core?

A great question. It was considered the best strategy because it was the only strategy being used across the country in mid-sized cities like Eugene. There were no alternatives and this was the only urban strategy which received federal funding. Instead of making money available to renovate and restore old buildings, federal money was made available to simply tear them down, with compensation to the owner. The feds invented this "tear down" process for "urban renewal" and there were no viable alternatives. So, the midsize downtowns across America were largely destroyed, mostly because of this federal funding strategy.

Many well-meaning, civic leaders in Eugene believed that tearing it down was the only thing to do, and that it would "revitalize" the core. It didn't, and that was clear within the first 10 years.

3 To your knowledge, what were the critics of the mall saying in the early years, i.e., before the mall was constructed or in the 1970s?

It is hard to separate "the mall" from the vast demolition of downtown buildings at the same time. It would have been possible to build a mall without tearing down the existing buildings. But, as said above, there was no viable financing for restoration, only destruction. So, critics were mainly people who thought that tearing down the historic buildings was a bad idea. But they had no strategy to provide financing for rehabilitation and restoration.

4 The retail center that was facilitated by the mall was relatively successful for some time, at least until the late-1970s—thanks to the businesses that stayed and new ones that came in. What made the property owners, developers, and businesspeople invest or propose development in the new downtown mall or the urban renewal area?

Mainly, it was simply a cultural trend which was happening across America and there weren't any alternatives. Downtown retailers and property owners could see the development of suburban centers and correctly predict the negative impacts on downtowns.

So, instead of rehabilitating our urban core, we decided to tear most of it down and opt for "new" buildings.

An aside: It is extremely unfortunate that the late sixties and seventies were a time of the ugliest architecture in American history. This period has been called “the decade that taste forgot” and that is especially true if you look at downtown Eugene. Terrible examples abound, if you’d like to go on a walking tour.

5 Eugene’s mall took a different turn in the 1980s and 1990s as it started to become “less popular” compared to the 1970s. What is your experience during those two decades?

As businesses fled to the suburbs and the “streets” became deserted, the experience was one of daily disappointment. At one time, there were many little coffee shops, breakfast places, sandwich places, and these all gradually disappeared in the eighties and nineties. One of the most successful,

took the unusual step of moving to downtown Springfiled where it flourished for decades as “The Pump” . It was, and still is, right on Springfield’s heavily travelled downtown Main Street.

In the hard economic times of 1980-82, I had an office upstairs on the NE corner of Broadway & Willamette. It looked out over the vast wasteland, including the defunct fountain.

6 There have been arguments that what happened to downtown Eugene was not a unique phenomenon and that the failure could be associated with the national trends of the time. What is your view on this?

As stated above, the failure of mid-sized downtowns was a national trend. Almost all failed as Retailers fled to locations which may or may not have been cheaper, but had ample parking and fulfilled the American Dream of arriving by car and not paying for parking.

The sad failure of downtown Eugene was repeated in hundreds of American downtowns.

7 What is your view on the strategy to rely on big stores like Sears, Bon Marche, JC Penney, that were in downtown Eugene at the time?

Historically, there was no strategy. Prior to the sixties, almost all retail was conducted in “downtowns”.

There were no suburban alternatives and so downtown was the only place that national retailers would consider locating. Most local retailers wanted to be as close to these big, national stores as possible.

And rents reflected this.

8 Was the demolition of substandard buildings truly justified? Would it have been possible to renovate/revitalize some of the buildings instead?

Yes, it would definitely have been possible. It would probably have been much cheaper as well.

And we would have kept a historic fabric which has now been lost forever. It is impossible to walk through today's Downtown Eugene and have any idea what the place once was.

The demolition was the result of federal legislation which provided financing for just one narrow way to "develop" a downtown, which was by tearing much of it down.

9 Why did most businesses who were displaced from the urban renewal not return to downtown Eugene?

Because they were either doing well in their new locations or they were out of business. For many years, some of them flourished. Now, of course, we are in a new period of decline for bricks and mortar retailers and most of the suburban malls are suffering great economic decline. They try to reinvent themselves and one of the hilarious strategies is to try and create new "main streets" on the exteriors of the giant malls. Lots of small storefronts on a street or parking lot. Gateway in Springfield illustrates this well.

10 Why did some of the businesses decide to remain?

Many which remained for awhile were located in buildings which the retailer owned. Or, they were able to renegotiate much lower rents than they had been paying in the seventies. They couldn't sell because there were no buyers; no one with any confidence in downtown.

As a commercial real estate broker, I worked on properties which had once rented for over a dollar a square foot and were now asking as little as $ .25 a foot. This resulted in some retailers lasting a few years longer, but also led to the decline of those buildings as they were not kept in good condition.

11 It is well-understood that keeping large retailers was the most important aspect, but small businesses were also the key to the survival of the retail centers. In this regard, did the Eugene Renewal Agency or the authorities incline to certain kinds of small businesses? Was there any bias at all?

I don't know of any bias. After the very few years of comparative success, the decline happened rapidly and I'm sure the ERA would have welcomed whatever types of retail businesses they could get. Except pornographic book and movie stores. I do remember controversy when "adult" bookstores wanted to come into downtown. They did not succeed and were certainly rejected by the ERA.

12 What was the nature of the loan and other financial support for small businesses?

The Eugene Renewal Agency made funds available to tenants for remodeling, upgrading, buying equipment and I feel that they did a good job with what they had. I participated in the citizen review of these activities as a member of the Downtown Development Board and the Downtown Commission and other committees that I have forgotten the names of….

13 Parking shortage was one of the major components of urban renewal. What was your experience of parking in downtown Eugene after the renewal efforts?

I understand that the average person thinks it is difficult to park in downtown Eugene. I am not the average person and I find it extremely easy and convenient. I always find a place within a block or so of my destination. This is true today and it was true for decades.

Of course, it is different for downtown employees, who are not allowed to park on downtown streets.

I arrived in Eugene in 1970, when the mall was gravel. The streets had been torn up and the mall was just being paved and landscaped. From the photos of 1950's/60's Eugene downtown, I imagine it was actually harder to park back in those days. There was lot of traffic because downtown was an economic success! Make it a ghost town and solve those traffic problems…

14 Traffic congestion was one of the major components of urban renewal. Was the issue of traffic congestion solved around the mall area or downtown after the interventions?

No, the traffic situation was made to be insane due to the introduction of one-way streets. In the

Seventies, almost every street in downtown was converted to One Way. If you tried to give directions about how to get to a store just a block away, it might take three streets and many turns to get there.

I was on the Downtown Commission as we tried many different ways of wayfinding, mapping, explaining how downtown worked. It was impossible.

It was apparently part of the sixties mentality to think that one way streets were more efficient and therefore better. They played their own part in destroying a cohesive and understandable downtown.

15 Mall safety was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

Yes, like today, it was a place for people to hang out. This was made very easy since there was no traffic and there were grassy areas and sitting areas and a fountain with no water in it most of the time. The average citizen with a life to lead probably didn't spend much time "hanging out", but people with nothing better to do found it to be a great place to exist. There is no question that drug use and sales were a problem from the beginning. One reason being that police had little access to the area. They would have to leave their vehicles and walk and this is not necessarily their favorite thing to do.

Many experiments were tried. Put in benches; remove benches. Put in a stage with bleachers and have entertainment. Take out the bleachers. Fail to have enough entertainment to make any difference.

Hold evening events which may or may not attract the citizens you would like to attract. And so on.

Hire consultants who say the same tired things.

The dismal social situation in downtown today is pretty much how it has been for decades. It is made worse as homelessness and drug use accelerate in America, but it has been a big problem from the very beginning of what I call "The Maul", or "The Mauling of Eugene".

16 Preservation of historic buildings was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

Yes, we failed miserably. We tore down dozens and dozens of old buildings. Could they have been saved? Of course, but as stated earlier, the federal policies of urban renewal favored demolition over rehabilitation.

For example, we destroyed the old public market building on the SE corner of Charnelton and W. Broadway. It was a wonderful old thing with arches and big spaces for wagons and stalls. The kind of place that would now be appreciated as beautiful and historic. This is just one of many examples of how Urban Renewal destroyed the center of our city.

You can view the alternative to our Urban Renewal efforts by visiting Corvallis. In that city, the old downtown was left alone. It was not "improved" or demolished. While it suffered plenty of economic decline, it has had a nice resurgence, and a big part of this is the wonderful “feeling” of the place; the historic buildings. These are human-scaled 2 and 3 story buildings exactly like the ones which once existed in downtown Eugene. Retail struggled and continues to struggle in Corvallis, but this is a national problem, unrelated to architecture. Meanwhile, downtown Corvallis “feels” good and downtown Eugene “feels” like…. nothing.

17 Personally, would you criticize some aspects of Eugene’s urban renewal and the mall? If yes, what would the criticisms be?

I would obviously criticize the entire effort. It destroyed the historic fabric of Eugene. It was a gigantic mistake which we continue to pay for every day.

18 Can you add other perspectives on the mall’s story based on your involvement in downtown Eugene at the time?

Yes.

I was one of the developers who built the US Bank Center, an 8 story building at 8th & Willamette, and also Broadway Place, 170 apartments above 750 space parking garage with continuous, groundfloor storefronts.

One of the things we wanted to achieve, was a street-level vitality which is missing in all of the Urban Renewal era buildings. So, we built storefronts at the base of both of these buildings, to provide

life and vitality to the sidewalk and street. It has worked! It was also a struggle!

If you contrast this approach to the Urban Renewal area building such as the Wells Fargo Bank building at NW corner of Broadway and Oak, or the Citizens Building at 10th & Oak, the difference is obvious. These buildings do not “address” the street, they provide no small spaces, just unbroken walls of concrete or glass. They simply do not feel inviting or comfortable. It is a simple, demonstrable difference in approach. I could go on, but will stop here.

Best wishes, Subik!

Appendix I.2 Interview Respondent 2

1 Do you believe that the pedestrian mall idea to improve downtown Eugene's retail core was a failure? If yes, what do you think were the reasons for the failure? When did the failure of the mall start to become evident to you?

Think the concept of improving retail viability downtown by developing a pedestrian mall needs to be considered within a larger context (which you may already be acknowledging). That larger context includes a number of factors: 1) By the early 60's many American cities were experiencing declines in retail owing to a range of socio- economic and demographic shifts – the growing car culture, expansion of suburban housing – fostered in part by federally backed home mortgages that favored single family detached suburban housing, for some cities white flight, and the subsequent emergence of many retailers seeking to capture these trends by building large retail malls with acres of surface parking outside of city cores; 2) To help save and revitalize city centers a number of smaller and mid- size cities (e.g., Boulder, Burlington, and of course Eugene) ventured into an urban experiment – trying to differentiate their core areas from the suburban retail and living explosion. These experiments were in part funded in the early 60s with federal urban renewal dollars and subsequently largely by state enabled local resources like tax increment financing (TIF) via the creation of Urban Renewal Areas - URAs (of which downtown Eugene was one); 3) The private lending arena at mid- century favored less risky suburban developments and made funding city core area redevelopment more difficult by not providing the same lending terms to the latter as the former; 4) Major "anchor" retailers in smaller to mid-size cities preferred locating in car accessible, abundantly parkable, clean and perceived to be "safer" suburban locations.

As I think you already know the original concept to nurture/revitalize Eugene's city center retail by creating a pedestrian centered mall that would offer a different type of resident and visitor experience, one that included a substantial amount of housing, other open spaces, fountains, office buildings and more structured parking. All of these components would have needed to been built in order for retail to thrive in Eugene.

From my perspective, having arrived there in 1986, where Eugene fell short early on was – by then nearly 20 years into the malling experiment – 1) not providing any substantial new housing (apartments or condos) or significant amounts of new office space within the downtown URA; 2) Eugene's concept for a ped mall closed too many streets to even limited auto traffic – both east – west and north –south streets. This left the mall area with an environment that lacked needed housing and new office essential to support and nurture retail, and made the pedestrian areas look less vibrant and feel less safe particularly in the evening; 3) not having a strong connections (e.g., mass transit, bike, promotions) to the University of Oregon campus with its significant number of students and staff which is located fairly close to the pedestrian mall (Other mall cities like Boulder and Burlington were better able to capture retail dollars from their nearby campuses).

Given this context, I think the larger concept had merit – though it needed adjustments as noted above – but its execution fell very far short.

2 When it was being conceived in the mid to late-1960s, why did the city leaders, residents, and other concerned parties believe that urban renewal and the pedestrian mall was the best strategy to revitalize downtown Eugene's retail core?

I wasn't there then, but having not only worked in urban environments, but having taught housing and public policy at a university, my sense is that Eugene leadership was part of a trend of cities and their residents who were seeking ways to make their core areas more vibrant – with retail being a large part of the equation. In many cases, Eugene's included, having a vibrant city center with more office, housing as well as retail, also contributed to city needs for property taxes (keep in mind that many of the new retail malls were locating outside of city boundaries where property taxes were lower).

3 To your knowledge, what were the critics of the mall saying in the early years, i.e., before the mall was constructed or in the 1970s?

I could only venture a guess here based on what critics of similar urban experiments were saying in a range of cities. These included comments such as: "downtowns are safe anymore" so don't waste money on them; it takes me too much time to find parking downtown – it's easier at a mall with acres and "free" surface parking.

4 The retail center that was facilitated by the mall was relatively successful for some time, at least until the late-1970s—thanks to the businesses that stayed and new ones that came in. What made the property owners, developers, and businesspeople invest or propose development in the new downtown mall or the urban renewal area?

Again, there are better sources than me for this that you should speak with. My recollection based on people I spoke with after moving to Eugene was that early on the mall was: 1) a novelty; 2) locally owned retailers were willing to give it a go as they had significant investments downtown – owned their buildings, were long time Eugene residents with deep family ties (e.g., M Jacobs, Rubensteins); 3) available tax increment dollars for various physical improvements

5 Eugene's mall took a different turn in the 1980s and 1990s as it started to become "less popular" compared to the 1970s. What is your experience during those two decades?

My family lived in Eugene and I worked for the city between '86 – '98. When we arrived the downtown mall was struggling. The Bon Marche and Sears were the only two department stores left and both were planning to leave for Valley River Mall (Sears went first followed a couple of years later by The Bon). Some smaller retailers and downtown restaurants were doing ok but there hadn't been any new housing at all and relatively little new office space. While there was active downtown programing, a downtown theatre, and the city had at the beginning of the 80s completed a major new mixed-use development that provided a Hilton Hotel and world class performing arts center, the retail vacancy rate was high and roving gangs, mostly juveniles but in one case a family of thugs, contributed to make downtown feel unsafe at times, particularly in the evening.

In the mid to late 80s, our planning and development department (using TIF, CDBG and other federally secured funds) provided low interest loans to private developers, businesses and building owners to rehab and revitalize their properties – these included a former vacant department store that was sold to a developer who took considerable risk by converting it into the Downtown Athletic Club (which brought many times more clients into the core than anyone expected), rehab of a theater and other older buildings. We provided loans to resturants and small businesses for tenant improvements that enabled them to open and/or expand. We also beefed up a clean and safe program in effort to make residents and visitor feel more welcome downtown.

This work was linked to efforts to address physical changes to the mall. Given community politics where there were many residents who wanted to retain the mall and many who wanted it open, we found an interim compromise – open Olive Street to auto traffic while making streetscape improvements to Broadway. I believe Olive opening required a vote (worth verifying). Either way, these improvements served as placeholders until more significant action could be taken in the '90s.

Those included selling key city owned sites for mixed use projects. The first was for what is now the US Bank building with ground floor retail and the second was Broadway Place (the first new quality apartment building in the core area in over 20 years). It initially had ground floor retail (not sure what's there now). There were also partnerships with the private and non-profit sector to add more housing with active (retail) ground floors (e.g., the Tiffany building) and bringing in quality affordable units. These projects eventually led to the reopening of Willamette street (which may have required a couple of citywide votes). By bringing more slow moving traffic (auto, bike), downtown became more enticing for subsequent redevelopments that occurred in the late 90s and early 2000s. By this time private lenders were more willing to make investments downtown – though many of the most significant still required robust public injections (e.g., rehab of the former Penny's department store building into creative office with ground floor retail).

6 There have been arguments that what happened to downtown Eugene was not a unique phenomenon and that the failure could be associated with the national trends of the time. What is your view on this?

I generally concur with this position. The malling of downtowns was an intriguing experiment by American cities to create the kinds of enviorments often found in European cities where there has been a long history of large pedestrian plazas and open spaces surrounded by restaurants and retail (with plenty of housing within easy walks). American cities however faced uphill struggles against auto centric suburbanized retail and living.

Some cities, like Boulder and Burlington I think have had more success with their malls over time. In both cases they avoided negating auto traffic on as many streets than Eugene. They also drew considerable patronage of their malls from major universities and for a time at least were not challenged initially by a large competing suburban retail mall. Scores of other cities went through malling and most that I'm award of have de-malled either entirely or mostly.

7 What is your view on the strategy to rely on big stores like Sears, Bon Marche, JC Penney, that were in downtown Eugene at the time?

At the time Eugene's mall was conceived very few mid-size and larger cities considered downtown to be downtown without large anchor retail. This can be said of cities as diverse as Portland, Seattle, Fort Wayne, Minneapolis, St. Paul and Knoxville (cities where I've worked). Each of these cities (and scores of others) went to great lengths trying to retain and attract more anchor department stores.

8 Was the demolition of substandard buildings truly justified? Would it have been possible to renovate/revitalize some of the buildings instead?

Yes, more building could and should have been saved and adaptively re-used. By the time I arrived many older buildngs had already been removed. From the mid-80s on however, there have been strong and successful efforts to adaptively re-use what did remain of the older building stock (Tiffany, Penny's, Wards, McDonald Theatre, etc).

If more would have been retained (many of which were more than a single story) there could have been more mixed-use and more character to the downtown which is more desirable to residents, employers/employees and visitors and give each city' core area distinction.

9 Why did most businesses who were displaced from the urban renewal not return to downtown Eugene?

Best to you spoke with the businesses which I'm assuming you've done or plan to do. Think you should ask why they left chronologically, that is, which left in the early phase of the mall, middle and last leg of its tenure.

My recollection – based on talking with folks who were around when the Mall was first launched – is that some businesses were not doing well and were fine being bought out, some weren't doing well for many years and this was a good time to sell, others relocated to alternative locations where they'd have a good chance to grow, still others saw that traffic for retail was headed to malls and other retail centers and the downtown stores couldn't compete. Don't know how many moved due to eminent domain but the city should have records of all this. In addition a number of businesses stayed away due to the perception that there was not sufficient parking downtown and/or the reality that you actually had to pay for parking (at least after the first one or two free hours).

During my tenure in Eugene, there was a considerable transition of business types – businesses that couldn't compete with a then very successful Valley River Center or other location were replaced by a new restaurants (e.g.,West Brothers, specialty stores (Sport clothing), branches of educations institutions (Pacific U), tech firms (Semantec) and so on.

10 Why did some of the businesses decide to remain?

Various reasons. Some had long downtown histories and were committed to staying as long as they were still able to make money (M Jacobs, jewelry stores, old bars, Kiva). Others saw opportunities to serve a different customer type (growing number of office workers – Semantec, tenents of the new US Bank tower, more college students from U of O, and Lane CC, the Downtown Athletic Club).

11 It is well-understood that keeping large retailers was the most important aspect, but small businesses were also the key to the survival of the retail centers. In this regard, did the

Eugene Renewal Agency or the authorities incline to certain kinds of small businesses? Was there any bias at all?

Again, I'll share what we focused on during my tenure in Eugene. We provided low interest loans and in some cases grants to small businesses for tenant improvements and façade improvements, in addition to working capital. We made efforts to partner with private firms in redeveloping large renewal agency owned sites as mixed-use projects – this was very difficult in that achievable rents from retail and office were often short of what was needed to service debt from larger mixed use projects. One of our more innovative projects involved a partnership with the Pankow Development Company (which then owned Citizens Bank Building), to partner with us in building a new facility that had a new city library as a ground floor anchor tenant along with small retail, with a 10 story office building above. This project went to a public vote and was defeated (reasons included – some folks didn't like the idea of a public library as part of a mixed-use building, others didn't approve the city providing the land, still others didn't like the scale of the project). Two larger mixed projects did succeed however, the current US bank building with ground floor retail and Broadway Place (housing over retail).

12 What was the nature of the loan and other financial support for small businesses?

See comments above. Also talk with Mike Sullivan if you've not done so, as he oversaw many of our loan/grant endeavors to small firms.

13 Parking shortage was one of the major components of urban renewal. What was your experience of parking in downtown Eugene after the renewal efforts?

Parking is often perceived to be in short supply in many cities. Nearly every US city I've worked in (over 50 – mostly as a consultant but 4 as development director or manager) resonates with a whine that there's not enough parking and/or that it's too expensive.

I don't know the what parking counts (number of on street and garage spaces) were available prior to the mall or when it first opened. I do know that during the years I was there we had an abundance (even over-abundance) of parking spaces available (my department at that time owned and oversaw all the public garages downtown and we always had a surplus of spaces). The issues on parking amounts is nearly always perception and "convenience". For some people, if they can't find a parking spot within a block from the stores they've selected or if they have to drive around the block a few times, then there's believed to be insufficient parking.

Our staff belief in Eugene was that people don't come downtown to park, they come for the experience and the range of stores, restaurants, open spaces, hotels, and other amenities as well as programing of downtown. You get do downtown by car, bus, bike or walking and try to make each of these modes a good experience.

14 Traffic congestion was one of the major components of urban renewal. Was the issue of traffic congestion solved around the mall area or downtown after the interventions?

My understanding is that congestion was one of the reasons for creating the mall. Ironically, having a vibrant, economically thriving retail environment only works if lots of people can get to retail spaces and enjoy the experience of staying there so they'll be inclined to come back again. It's taken many decades and Eugene has been working on improving the downtown experience – though it has been fraught with challenges (again, rents not supporting development cost unless there's subsidy involved, safety perceptions, etc).

With increased emphasis on alternative modes (a much improved mass transit system, more bike accommodations, etc), less reliance on cars, and the presence of many more close in housing units, students and other factors I don't see that congestion is an issue there.

15 Mall safety was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

Agreed, safety has been and still is a challenge on the mall area.

During my tenure there building owners, businesses, residents, employees and visitors all voiced legitimate concerns about a range of safety concerns. The city and various non-profits (e.g., Downtown Eugene Inc which provided safe and clean services, Cahoots which provided services for drug/ achohol addicts) worked tirelessly to address safety issues. As the homeless population began expanding these issues grew and still to my knowledge, present.

Among the physical development actions we took were: Placemaking design such as Broadway redesign, opening Olive and Willamette – all to increase foot and vehicle traffic and eyes on the street; partnering with private sector to rehab vacant buildings (the Bon Marche), and develop market rate and affordable housing – again eyes on the street and shopping patrons; and various low interest loans and grants to help small retailers/restaurantuers via building improvements and working capital. Combined, these actions were helpful but not sufficient. More direct interventions were needed to provide various types of assistance to the homeless, street gangs, drug addicted, etc.

16 Preservation of historic buildings was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

During my tenure there, we put considerable funds into the rehab of a range of important historic buildings including the Tiffany, McDonald Theater, the Downtown Atheletic Club – which was a small department store, among others. We viewed historic preservation and adaptive reuse as a vital commitments to retain downtown character, differentiate downtown from new development areas, as well as for sustainability – which was just emerging as an important public agenda. These efforts have been continued on the former Penny's department store and others.

I think it's important to recognize that without public private partnerships it's unlikely that these buildings would have been saved an so effectively re-used.

17 Personally, would you criticize some aspects of Eugene's urban renewal and the mall? If yes, what would the criticisms be?

Urban renewal was and is one key part of city's efforts to revitalize downtowns and inner city neighborhoods with limited resources that are available in the state of Oregon. The urban renewal tool kit (tax increment funding for infrastructure, building rehabs, land acquisition, business assistance, affordable and mixed-income housing, parks, etc) is, I think one of the best vehicles cities have. How cities choose to use this tool is the key issue – some have used it more effectively than others. Most places, Eugene included, I think, generally have used it to provide more good outcomes than negative results. Eugene's 1960's and early 70s' renewal actions, in hindsight, were the most disruptive and misguided – demolishing too many buildings, closing too many streets to traffic (limiting traffic to two small lanes with lots of sidewalk room would have been better), not providing nearly as much housing on and around the mall as would be needed to help sustain retail were all actions that should have been handled differently. But this was an early experiment in how to adapt older sections of a city so they might survive within the context of a much more auto oriented, suburban growth environment where land was cheaper and readily accessible.

I also think that some of the mall proponents (those who became wedded to keeping the mall at all costs during the 80s and 90s), erred when they strenuously fought changes such as enabling the Pankow office-library-retail mixed use development, and made it hard to move ahead with Broadway place and street openings.

18 Can you add other perspectives on the mall's story based on your involvement in downtown Eugene at the time?

I tried to do this in responded to the above questions. However, once you've read through my responses, please feel free to give me a call and we can chat.

Appendix I.3 Interview Respondent 3

1 Do you believe that the pedestrian mall idea to improve downtown Eugene's retail core was a failure? If yes, what do you think were the reasons for the failure? When did the failure of the mall start to become evident to you?

My opinion is that there were many factors. Nationally there was a trend toward covered mall shopping centers with convenient free parking. Valley River Center opened and it was a new thing. There's only so much retail business and it sucked a lot of life out of downtown. Some department stores opened at VRC. VRC had one owner and it enforced rules about when stores opened and closed. It was also private property and could keep out those who they didn't want. Downtown didn't have central ownership. It had many owner operated small businesses who wanted to operate on their own schedule. The streets/mall were public spaces and some people hung out there that made customers uncomfortable.

The mall was way too big and didn't have cross traffic. Someone couldn't be dropped off or picked up at the door. It was bound to fail — as did almost every pedestrian mall in the USA.

When the mall was planned there was also a plan to have a ring of freeways that surrounded downtown and would activate the area. Those weren't built.

Each issue, and there were many, were nails in the coffin. The mall was created with good intentions and a good plan. It just was not going to buck the tide of VRC and changes in shopping patterns.

The recession of the 1980's, which involved the collapse of the lumber industry, was another huge blow.

The first time I saw the mall in 1974 I thought it was really cool and pretty. It was still new. But it was clear that businesses were failing. Ten years later when I went to work for the city, in an office located on the mall, it was apparent to me that it wasn't going to be viable in the long run. There were increasing problems in every direction.

2 When it was being conceived in the mid to late-1960s, why did the city leaders, residents, and other concerned parties believe that urban renewal and the pedestrian mall was the best strategy to revitalize downtown Eugene's retail core?

I'll pass on this one. I wasn't there. (But I think they were desperate for a way to save downtown and this was the national trend)

3 To your knowledge, what were the critics of the mall saying in the early years, i.e., before the mall was constructed or in the 1970s?

I don't have good knowledge of this. However, some property owners didn't want their property taken as part of urban renewal. Many of these properties were in very bad shape - but did have viable businesses on them.

4 The retail center that was facilitated by the mall was relatively successful for some time, at least until the late-1970s—thanks to the businesses that stayed and new ones that came in. What made the property owners, developers, and businesspeople invest or propose development in the new downtown mall or the urban renewal area?

I'll pass on this one.

5 Eugene's mall took a different turn in the 1980s and 1990s as it started to become "less popular" compared to the 1970s. What is your experience during those two decades?

I worked at 72 W. Broadway. I was downtown all the time and had a front row seat. I worked for the Eugene Development Department. There were empty spaces, low rent businesses, and "mall rats" hanging out and they seemed pretty scary to the general public. Sometimes these people (mostly young but also predators) were doing nothing wrong. But other times they were dealing drugs, cursing and generally not acting in a way that was conducive to a retail environment. Downtown was not a good place in many ways despite many heroic efforts.

6 There have been arguments that what happened to downtown Eugene was not a unique phenomenon and that the failure could be associated with the national trends of the time. What is your view on this?

I agree 100%. It happened all over the country. Where it didn't happen was the exception. Some capitol cities were spared a bit because they had so many government offices in the downtown that provided a core of people.

7 What is your view on the strategy to rely on big stores like Sears, Bon Marche, JC Penney, that were in downtown Eugene at the time?

Those big stores created street traffic that made the smaller businesses viable. The large buildings that housed them existed and empty buildings are a huge problem too.

Relying on them wasn't the only strategy. But there weren't strategies anywhere for downtowns that worked well.

Once again, the city didn't own most of the property. It was (and is) privately owned by many owners. It was never easy to have broad strategy that everyone supported and had the money to invest in .

8 Was the demolition of substandard buildings truly justified? Would it have been possible to renovate/revitalize some of the buildings instead?

It was very justified. The buildings were substandard and many couldn't be saved due to their condition or their rubble foundations.

Rehab did exist for many buildings (e.g. Smeede Hotel, AxBilly Department Store (Downtown Athletic Club)) but was also very expensive.

Many things are possible if there is unlimited money. There wasn't. Not even close.

9 Why did most businesses who were displaced from the urban renewal not return to downtown Eugene?

I don't know if that is true. But, relocation twice is expensive.

10 Why did some of the businesses decide to remain?

Don't know

11 It is well-understood that keeping large retailers was the most important aspect, but small businesses were also the key to the survival of the retail centers. In this regard, did the Eugene Renewal Agency or the authorities incline to certain kinds of small businesses? Was there any bias at all?

I don't know

12 What was the nature of the loan and other financial support for small businesses?

I'll let someone else answer

13 Parking shortage was one of the major components of urban renewal. What was your experience of parking in downtown Eugene after the renewal efforts?

There was plenty of parking after renewal, especially in large garages. Some people don't like parking garages though. Parking was available and it was close. Some people didn't warm up to it.

Parking was only free downtown because of three funding sources:

1. A gross receipts tax - revenue was gutted when the big retailers left
2. A tax on professionals (lawyers, doctors etc) that was repealed when they started leaving downtown to avoid the tax. Many went to Country Club Road
3. A special property tax that was no longer legal when Measure 5 was adopted state wide in 1990.

On street parking was supposed to be only for customers. Many employees (and some business owners) abused it and cheated.

14 Traffic congestion was one of the major components of urban renewal. Was the issue of traffic congestion solved around the mall area or downtown after the interventions?

Don't know. Downtown congestion never seemed like a problem to me from the time I moved to Eugene to the present.

15 Mall safety was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

It was truly an issue — and more of a perception issue than a real one. But perception is really important for customers.

16 Preservation of historic buildings was one of the bigger concerns during the mall's existence. Do you have anything to share on this issue?

I'll pass

17 Personally, would you criticize some aspects of Eugene's urban renewal and the mall? If yes, what would the criticisms be?

I'll pass, except to say that I think everyone's motives were good. As they say in baseball, no one bat a thousand (perfect). The best laid plans don't always work out for so many reasons.

18 Can you add other perspectives on the mall's story based on your involvement in downtown Eugene at the time?

Not at this time.

Appendix I.4 Interview Respondent 4

Transcription of phone interview (Excerpts/Notes taken during the interview are noted below)

In hindsight, it certainly was a failure—

Eugene was a microcosm only—there was a Malling of America--- from healthy mall retail to ped mall and the likes of VRC--- so the demise of Eugene mall was the VRC….

The indication of failure was when the anchor retailers closed…. Around mid-late 80s.. by 1989—all those anchors were gone…. To the mall….. the downtown was left to the small independent retailers…. The small retailers had hard time competing with the VRC…. So then the city was like—we have to take action--- to save downtown…..

The problem started way before… it failed as an urban renewal project… and we had to put the streets in—downtown Eugene never recovered…. But E was not alone… it was a trend for the mid to large cities…. Highways came..

Hult center was an attempt to put an anchor to downtown Eugene….

One alternate example is Portland--- was able to maintain solid retail mix use… even in the 1970s….. both franchise and independent retailers….

Successful malls became central cities—were no longer covered…

On the flip side, the central cites (successful cities) tried to become like malls… Consistent hours, consistent marketing,

Two retail models…

Eugene was not big enough to support two large retail stores.. and mall became like a subsidiary… ground floors got converted to office, karate, antique stores, etc… indicating low-rent uses…. [toward the end]

Few bright spots—downtown athletic club…

Uses had to be destinations….. retails alone could not act as such..

Other part that perplexed (me) a lot is--- why it worked in other cities but not in Eugene..

Why pedestrian traffic does not work in American cities?

Retailers said—you could not use as long as you could see it.. the mall was a cut-off zone for vehicular visitors…

But this was true for VRC as well----

However, for VRC, the products were known—franchise products—you'd know where you are going—no ambiguity…

But in downtown—there was ambiguity—not clear where visitors would be visiting..

When you talk to Richie—he was there--- he went to Colorado as well----

Why was it H formation? Why was that large?

Tank traps—

Took fountain down--- Ruth Bascom did the first move to physically remove..

Saturday market basically worked--- such a destination—people knew where they were going--- better transit access, parking…

Why were the malls taken out in phases?

Reluctance to admit failure… its hard to reverse decision….

The general nature was going down and down….

Would you say that at the time

Coming back to streets was not a very good solution but combined with the renaissance in urban housing made it different in the 90s…

When Charnelton place was built (first housing) in 20 to 30 yrs in downtown eugene built on mixed-use principle… the model was

What we lost in retail we gained in housing…

Residential plus retail and office…

Portland is an excellent model…

Eugene has been able to bring this required change to downtown

What role did it play in 2000? How did the physical context of the mall inhibit the… in transition of Eugene to a mixed-use…

Without taking the mall out, the residential development would not have happened as people cant live in the mall—parking issues…

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE MALL? MALL WAS A CATALYST FOR THE POST DEVELOPMENTS?

Why were the successful malls successful? What are the variables? Could study that…

Charnelton place—1999 to 2000

Ritchie or Mike… talk for drawings

Nan Lawrence

The mall was a kind of a dam--- they stopped the flow of cars—and as bad as cars were—they were there and needed access… the reason people get out of their car is if there are things that attract that…. E.g., the large retailers.. after the mall dam broke, people could do other things—like live…

Why did the big stores leave?

The Bon Marche was open—Sears later became the office—

The 90s was the end of the department store era--- became an obsolete retail model—the move became moving to peripheral malls (suburban malls)… first they moved, then they went bankrupt.. and were replaced by boutique… niches..

Losing energy.. see pedestrian counts…

90s was like a ghost town

At the time—destination retailers were perceived to be the heart--- the department stores!!

Now, the strong independent retailers have been keeping the downtowns alive—the unique stores--- the shopping malls are for cheap selections…

At the time, what Eugene did made sense…

The city did not appreciate the importance of small businesses… or an effective program…

Parking was sufficient but accessible may not have been as good….

Directly related to lack of pedestrians….. a haven for people looking for isolation

How does downtown reflect the structural problems? And how is downtown a lens to look at the problems?

APPENDIX J: EUGENE'S PRE-WAR HISTORY (THE 1840S TO 1940S)

According to the document "Eugene Area historical Context Statement" (1996), the period beginning the earliest days of Eugene during the mid-1840s to 1945 can be divided into five eras[1]: (1) 1846-1870: settlement, statehood, and steam power; 1871-1883: railroads and industrial growth; (3) 1884-1913: progressive era; (4) 1914-1940: motor age; and (5) 1941-1945: war era. However, this discussion categorizes the pre-war era into three phases (1) 1846 to mid-1880s; (2) the late-1880s to 1910s; and (3) the 1920s to 1940s.

The first phase (the 1840s to mid-1880s) spans from Eugene's founding to when it was well-established as a town with a dedicated economic center, residential developments, and transportation system. Eugene City bears its name from Eugene Skinner, who founded the city in 1846—the year of his arrival.[2] In 1853, the city was officially named "Eugene City," and the same year, the first merchandise store opened (see figures J.1 and J.2 for the city's earliest maps and other illustrations).[3] Following the 1785 Land Division Ordinance, the city's major planning was conducted by dividing the site into thirty-six one-mile (640 acres) sections, which, in turn, were divided into 160-acre properties. This division gave rise to the streets that provided access to each lot. Commercial and residential development occurred rapidly from the 1850s to the 1870s and was generally centered around the original townsite.[4] By 1884, Eugene's commercial area was well-established and growing, and the most densely developed commercial blocks were along Willamette Street, south of the railroad depot to 11th Avenue.[5] The downtown was growing fast with twenty-five brick business buildings and over fifty wooden ones; most businesses were on Willamette Street from 7th to 8th avenue (midblock) and on 9th avenue (now "Broadway") from Willamette to Oak Streets. In terms of the earliest transportation system, significant developments include the beginning of stagecoach service in 1857 and mule-drawn streetcar over paved street beginning 1864.



Figure J.1. Plan of Eugene in 1856 (sc. Lane County Historical Museum).



Figure J.2. Early-Eugene from the nineteenth century (*top*) and an aerial perspective looking south (*bottom*). These images were made available by the Lane County Historical Museum.

The second phase (the late-1880s to 1910s) consists of two crucial historical factors, (1) the beginning of public transportation and (2) the pursuance of economic independence (see figure J.1). This phase begins with Eugene's boom as a town and ends with the first phase of extensive automobile use that dramatically influences the city's morphology. Furthermore, a transformation in city governance as Eugene looked for independent economic development and multiplied compared to the previous era marks this phase.[6] Eugene developed further in terms of providing transportation to its residents during this era. As the city expanded, there was a need for public transportation and the streets were improved, and electric cars existed for over two decades between 1906 to 1927.[7]

Additionally, Eugene also has a history of railroads that were introduced in 1871 and, notably, the 1889 Siuslaw and Eastern Railway Navigation Company project.[8] Another significant development during this phase is Eugene's struggle to become an independent town, specifically in the 1890s, as evident by various government plans like the formation of commercial clubs and increased awareness among the residents for economic progress.[9] The 1890s also experienced the beginning of an alliance between Eugene's elite businessmen or capitalists and farmers in the hope of gaining economic independence.[10] The central story of the early 1900s was Eugene's determination to seek independence from the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the City of Portland, which continued throughout the 1920s.

Figure J.3. Downtown Eugene in the 1890s (*top*) and the 1920s (*bottom*). Sc. Sanborn maps, available through the UO Libraries; recreated by the author.

The third phase (the 1920s to the 1940s) is characterized by the widespread use of automobiles and the beginning of the “modernization” of the urban landscape before WW2. The three crucial developments can be listed as (1) construction of the first highways and the automobile era; (2) downtown commercial development boom; and (3) economic impact of the railroads (see figure J.1). With the advent of modern technologies in the 1920s, the dominant form of development that influenced Eugene’s morphology (like most American cities) was the development of highways and automobiles. One of the important highway-related stories from this era includes the present-day Highway 99 (Pacific Highway) improvement in 1921.[11] Highway construction helped create larger and segregated urban neighborhoods entirely different from the previous phases, even during the pre-WW2 era. A significant boom in downtown commercial development also characterizes the third phase (see Appendix Z for downtown Eugene’s 1920s map). The present-day central core of Eugene centered on the Broadway-Willamette intersection began taking its shape during this phase.

Notes

[1] City of Eugene, *Eugene Area Historic Context Statement* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1996).

[2] Walling, *Illustrated History of Lane County Oregon*.

[3] *Oregon Cultural Resource Inventory Report*.

[4] City of Eugene, *Eugene Area Historic Context Statement*; Alvin Urquhart, *Geography of Eugene (Manuscript)* (Eugene, 1990).

[5] City of Eugene, *Eugene Area Historic Context Statement*.

[6] Marcus Cristoph Robbins, “Striving to Loosen the Bonds of Dependence: Eugene, Oregon, 1890 to 1929” (Master’s Thesis, University of Oregon, 1990).

[7] Urquhart, *Geography of Eugene (Manuscript)*.

[8] Robbins, “Striving to Loosen the Bonds of Dependence: Eugene, Oregon, 1890 to 1929.”

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] City of Eugene, *Eugene Area Historic Context Statement*.

APPENDIX K: INFORMATION ON URBAN RENEWAL PROCESSES

This section discusses the following issues-

1. Steps followed as a part of urban renewal and other details
2. Rules regarding property acquisition
3. Selection of development projects
    a. ERA's design objectives for the proposal review
    b. Information required of the developers
    c. The basis for selecting developers
    d. Steps for approval of proposals

A description of steps followed as a part of urban renewal is as follows-

1. After the buildings were deemed structurally substandard and parcels were acquired, disposition parcels were created by organizing several continuous acquired parcels into a larger parcel, as shown in figure 6.7.[1]

2. The cleared lands or disposition parcels would be sold to private investors for the construction of most new commercial buildings (retail and office) "designed and placed to best enhance the eye appeal and the functioning efficiency of downtown Eugene."[2]

3. ERA respected the original criteria of not removing any sound structure, and early on, the agency had confirmed that it would not facilitate a concentrated demolition of any set of old buildings, except, possibly, to make room for the Auditorium-Convention center. At least forty such disposition parcels were offered for redevelopment through four Land Sales Offerings between March 1970 and November 1971 (discussions to follow).

4. The minimum parcel size disposed of by ERA after the acquisition was 12,000 SF, with minimum dimensions of 80 feet by 150 feet and a maximum allowable FAR of 4.0.[3] ERA offered a total of four Land Sales Offering (LOSs) between early 1970 and late-1971. The first one was on March 9, 1970, for six parcels, the second on September 3 for two parcels, the third on August 13, 1971, for at least twenty-five parcels, and the fourth on November 3 for two parcels.

5. All redevelopment proposals for the disposition parcels underwent reviews of architectural design, landscape design, site planning, urban design) and they had to be

approved by ERA. In this sense, the ERA did not accept every proposal it received arbitrarily. Additionally, each proposal was scrutinized and discussed in detail. All acquisitions would have to be approved by HUD and “restricted to the extent of the acquisition authorized by the Agency.”[4] All structures had to be rehabilitated per several codes for new construction with amendments adopted by the COE.[5]

The ***rules regarding property acquisition*** were as follows (as listed in the original documents)[6]

1. Only those properties necessary to achieve objectives of the Renewal Plan will be acquired; substandard or rehabilitation questionable buildings that are not needed to carry out an objective of the plan will be subject to an Owner-Participation Agreement; Regarding the properties under the “owner participation” category, ERA would outline “the work necessary to bring the buildings up to standard will be outlined and evaluated for economic feasibility;”
2. If rehabilitation or bringing the structure up to standard were not economically feasible, ERA would acquire the property and demolish either part or whole of the structure;
3. Every reasonable effort will be made to acquire each property at the fair market value as determined by two independent, professional appraisals.” The property owners can go to court if they feel the offer is inadequate; and
4. Regarding property management, the properties after acquisition by ERA would be “rented to tenants and owner-occupants to provide maximum time for a successful relocation,” and the cleared land would be “leased by the agency until needed for development.”

ERA considered the following **design objectives** for the proposal’s review (see figure K.1)[7]

1. Integrate spaces and building forms in relation to adjacent structures to provide a harmonious composition of masses, materials, colors, and textures;
2. Maintain the building scale relationship of the development to the street, pedestrian mall, and the project's overall urban design;
3. Integrate off-street parking with the total development, its functional relationship to the overall vehicular circulation system, and the screening of parking from public view; and

4. Provide an efficient, direct, and convenient system for pedestrian circulation, together with landscaping and other appropriate treatment of public areas and lobbies.



Figure K.1. Original sketches illustrating the urban design guidelines prepared by George T. Rockrise and Associates, San Francisco, CA.

This set of exemplary diagrams show Parcel A, Block 127. The guidelines associated were, (1) augment pedestrian circulation along malls with pedestrian ways through private development, (2) subdivide alley frontages to provide activity along alleyways, (3) integrate weather protection for pedestrians into new development, (4) setback buildings to emphasize entrance to mal I opposite parking structure, (5) vary setbacks along frontages to avoid monotony, (6) upper floors may be allowed to project to provide spatial variation and weather-protected walks below, (7) extend a sense of the pedestrian mall by using the same family of materials in private development, and (8) confine service traffic to service courts.

The developer had to provide the following information during the proposal[8]

1. Parcel Number (indicate If entire or portion);
2. Name of Developer;
3. Principal associates to be utilized in undertaking the development (indicate Architect and Real Estate Brokers);
4. Narrative description of development Including a statement of the general architectural character of the development and its relationship to the Urban Design Guidelines;
5. Proposed Improvement schedule, Including estimated construction time;
6. The estimated cost of improvements;
7. Businesses to occupy the development, if known;
8. Outline the types of uses by square footage;

9. Total square footage of building area;
10. Estimated rental rate per square foot If the development is being built for lease; and
11. Proposed purchase price stated in dollars per square foot.

The specific basis for the ***selection of developers*** was as follows[9]

Note—The first preference for redevelopment would be given to the "owners of the property being acquired or businesses being displaced by the project."[10]

1. The proposed sales price of the land;[11]
2. Overall economic contribution to the CEP, including the total anticipated investment in improvements;
3. Overall contribution and degree of compatibility that the proposed use would have in developing a strong retail core;
4. Economic feasibility of the proposal and financial capability of the redeveloper;
5. Degree of compliance with the Urban Design Guidelines;
6. The extent to which the proposal would provide opportunities for relocation of businesses being displaced from the project; and
7. Proposed construction schedule.

The steps that followed the ***approval of proposals*** were as follows[12]

1. As each proposal is accepted, ERA must publish a newspaper notice of its intention to negotiate with the redeveloper;
2. The contract is drafted and signed by both parties;
3. The redeveloper proceeds with preliminary plans for the project following the outlines of the proposal;
4. ERA's design panel reviews the preliminary plans;
5. Completed construction drawings get reviewed, and ERA officials assess the redeveloper's financial capabilities;
6. The redeveloper, who is ready to build, is given title to the property; and
7. The redeveloper receives a certificate of completion, giving the clear title of the property.

Notes

[1] I could not find the logic or ERA's explanation for creating the disposition parcels in a specific way.

[2] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, February 17, 1971."

[3] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18) [Modified December]*. The codes to be followed were (1) 1967 Uniform Building Code Vol. 2; (2) National Electrical Code, 1965; (3) Uniform Mechanical Code, 1967 (Uniform Building Code Vol III); (4) Uniform Plumbing Code, 1967; (5) Fire Prevention Code, 1965; (6) Sign Control Ordinance of the City of Eugene.

[4] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, April 16, 1969" (Eugene, April 16, 1969).

[5] ERA, *Urban Renewal Plan for Central Eugene Project (ORE R-18) [Modified December]*. The codes to be followed were (1) 1967 Uniform Building Code Vol. 2; (2) National Electrical Code, 1965; (3) Uniform Mechanical Code, 1967 (Uniform Building Code Vol III); (4) Uniform Plumbing Code, 1967; (5) Fire Prevention Code, 1965; (6) Sign Control Ordinance of the COE.

[6] From an undated (probably around mid-1968) ERA newsletter obtained from LCHM. The document listed a piece of detailed information on ERA's Real Estate Guidelines and Policies related to the urban renewal.

[7] ERA, *Development Documents, Central Eugene Project, ORE E-18, Land Sales Offering Number 1* (Eugene, 1969).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. The document also offered guidelines for the sale of property in the CEP for potential developers and redevelopers and identified the properties for sale.

[11] It is important to note here that there were two types of prices associated with many parcels depending on the location—(1) the purchase of a parcel-the price of the property and (2) the price of the parking assessment to support the 10th and Oak Parking garage—The Overpark (the assessment districts and financing are discussed later). Based on ERA's Meeting Minutes from October 7, 1970.

[12] Kenyon, "Eugene Renewal Officials Hope to Find Space for All Who Want It."

APPENDIX L: THE STORY OF LAND SALES OFFERINGS (MARCH 1969 TO THE END OF 1971)

The story of business investments in CEP began with a specific interest in the planned RCPM, which was made possible formally with the first Land Sales Offering (LSO 1) on March 9, 1970. The agency reviewed initial proposals on April 30, and June 30 was the end of the preference period for displaced businesses. Therefore, July 1 was the opening date to anyone, regardless of whether they were former owners or tenants. ERA reviewed the initial proposals on August 28. Of the disposition parcels, LSO1 was for six parcels: (1) 227A; (2) 227C; (3) 127A; (4) 127C; (5) 127F; and (6) 134B.[1] The ERA did not receive any offer for 227C and 134B for a long time.

Table L.1. Information on disposition parcels offered for LSO1

This data is taken from an ERA Report.[2]

Disposition parcel no.	*Area (SF)*	*Contract Deposit*
127-A	2,4675	$10,000
127-C	4,462	$3,500
127-F	8,307	$4,000
134-B	28,268	$12,000
227-A	7,864	$3,000
227-C	8,195	$3,000

By April 30, 1970, the first reviewing date for proposals received for LSO1, ERA had received two proposals for Parcel 127-C from Danish Imports (the original tenant) and Harry Ritchie (the property owner and a jewelry store owner downtown). These offers were the first ones to arrive for the RCPM area. Danish Imports offered $10 PSF, whereas Ritchie offered $11. ERA staff wanted to move with the latter, mostly based on the price offered. Considering all other things being equal, ERA was more likely to choose a proposal with a higher amount per SF. Other proposals to follow (making the total to four by July 1) were as follows[3]

1. Thompson’s Properties, Inc. proposed Parcel 127-F at $8, and the proposed building would accommodate Thompson’s Lafayette store first and maybe a Record Mart later; and

2. B&A Inc (Mr. and Mrs. William Lee) proposed for Parcel 227-A for a Chinese restaurant offering a price of $5.59, which was below the value of the land, and so ERA decided to request $6.50

LSO2 began on September 3, 1970, with November 4 being the final day for the period giving preference to owners and tenants in the area. There were only two parcels offered; 128-B (made up of parcels 128-5000, 5100, 5200), i.e., the Broadway property, and 132-A (132-12000), i.e., the Ransom property (outside the MALL area).[4] By October 1, 1970, ERA had received only a single proposal in response to LSO2 for the Broadway store. E. S. Ritter and Company offered the lowest bid of $12,400 to demolish Broadway west of the alley located at 30-40 E Broadway (Parcel 128-5000).[5]

The positivity at the start of 1971 surrounding the urban renewal is clearly expressed in the following statement from Sunday Oregonian's Northwest Magazine (cited in ERA's 1970 Annual report), "a rather joyful type of exhilaration, as if Eugene were a modern-day frontier town, sprawling full of vitality, eager to experiment…." It also added the Eugene Register-Guard remark, "particularly during the construction of the mall has the town taken on a frontier flavor, its citizens feeling that they are in on an important beginning."[6]

There was a break of almost a year between the two LSO2 and LSO3, most likely due to the mall opening and other developments that followed. LSO3 opened on August 13, 1971, with the first review of proposals scheduled for October 12. All remaining properties (twenty-five separate parcels covering a total area equaling more than three city blocks) owned by ERA at this time were being offered for redevelopment. Some of the properties not yet acquired by the agency, but scheduled to be acquired, were offered as well. In total, the offer was for more than half of all the property ERA was planning to acquire. By the first half of October 1971 (date of the first review), ERA had received ten new redevelopment proposals in response. The initial proposals, submitted by ten different bidders, promised more than $4 million in development in the renewal area. However, these offers were for only about a third of the properties put up for sale.

Table L.2 Information about the proposals initially received by the ERA in response to LSO3.

Also, see figures 6.5 and 6.8.[7]

Disposition Parcel	*Offered by*	*Details of the proposal*
125-A and 125-B*	Slocum and Tillman	This was the largest single proposal in response to LSO3 for development worth more than $1.5 million on two parcels (125-A and 125-B) on the east side of Willamette street between 8th avenue and Broadway. The sites, at the time, were occupied by a restaurant, record shop, stationery store, luggage store, and jewelry store. Real Estate personnel Thomas Slocum and Terry Tilman (who declined to reveal whom they were representing) proposed to build a four-story commercial and office building with retail businesses on the lower levels, offices on the upper floors, and a sub-street level first floor). The investors also added a caveat of moving the pedestrian alley to accommodate development. While ERA believed it was possible, the proposed price of $4 was below the minimum for the site, so the proposal was rejected.[8] Other offers ranged from at least $5 PSF to $12.
122-A	Benjamin Franklin Savings and loans (BF)	A three to four-storied building; the estimated development cost was $800,000[9]; at the time, Robert's Lunch and Bar owned the site. The offer was $12 PSF and an additional $2.25 PSF for parking assessment. ERA later rejected the proposal.
128-A	Home Saving and Loan Association	for about $400,000 to expand its present facility at the SW corner of Broadway and Oak and also to build retail space for stores being relocated under urban renewal and a pedestrian walkway from Overpark to Mall
125-A, 115-D, and/or 126-C	alternate bids by optometrist Dr. Larry Semler	$500,000 worth of investment. This deal was later pulled off because of his interest instead in becoming a tenant.[10] Another proposal was offered by Thomas Slocum, Terry Tillman, et al. for parcels 125A and 125B with
126-C*	Al and Mary McCullough (Danish Imports), Latham's Luggage (LeRoy Latham), and Valley Stationery owner Joe Anselmo for relocating their present downtown businesses.	
227-A	Robert Saks, owner of Furnitureland in Springfield	Spend between $157,000 to $200,000 for facilities for a new furniture store on the recently razed St. Francis Hotel site.

Table L.2. (continued).

Disposition Parcel	*Offered by*	*Details of the proposal*
228-C	Ricketts Music Co.	Build new quarters for the firm's downtown store on one-half of either of two parcels, one on the west side of Olive south of Broadway at the cost of $60,000.
132-A	a group headed by Eugene attorney Wayne Helikson	A $315,000 proposal to construct a condominium office building covering 10,000 SF on Rickett Music Co.'s present location.
227-D	Dr. Robert Williamson, optometrist, and architects Mention, Hanns, and Lindeberg	Build new quarters for their businesses at the cost of $44,800 on the smallest parcel offered for sale.
115-A and 115-B*	Maurie Jacobs	Expand the furniture store. Jacobs requested to close or move the alley between parcels 115-A and B.[11] ERA held discussions with City Traffic Engineer Al Williams and Project Engineer Mr. Hatch concerning this closing of the east-west alley for seventy feet. ERA approved Jacobs' request for closing the alley between parcels 115-A and 115-B for his proposed redevelopment of parcel 115-A.
127-A*		ERA placed a tentative hold on the sale of this parcel pending development by EIDC (a mini-center to house small businesses displaced by the CEP and requiring low-rent office or commercial space). This parcel later got developed into the Atrium mini-mall.

* These parcels/projects have been discussed in greater detail later in Appendix T's business stories.

By early November 1971, the nearly $4 million in investment dropped to $2.2 million as ERA rejected three proposals—two of them (by Dr. Larry Semler and BF on the same site) and one for parcel 125-A and 125-B by Slocum and Tillman.[12]

November 3. 1971, was the date for LSO4 offering parcels 12-8B (The Broadway Store site) again in addition to 132-B. Parcel 128-B was offered for sale after the previous contract had been terminated with the owner Ralph Robinson. ERA set January 7, 1972, as the date for review of the initial proposal. Before LSO4, Ralph Robinson had announced that he was not moving ahead with the plan and had forfeited the $8000 deposit.[13] In late November, Mr. and Mrs. Lee submitted a proposal for the north portion of parcel 116-A (around 18,240 SF) to construct a restaurant at the cost of approximately $200,000 with equipment and fixtures costing appx $120,000. This would replace the restaurant previously owned by them in the same place.

Furthermore, the Lees also proposed parking for twelve cars on the 7th avenue side. The proposed price was $5 PSF, and ERA agreed to let the project be built as soon as the SBA loan was made available. There was still a 5,400 SF area remaining in the parcel, which could be of interest to many potential developers, among which George Boehnke was being contacted. In December 1971, ERA received a proposal for Parcel 129-C (915 Oak street) from Elmer Sahlstrom.[14] Sahlstrom's proposal was for a three-story office building for a law firm for $6 PSF plus a parking assessment of $4.5 PSF. In February 1972, ERA approved the proposal.[15]

Parcels 115-C and 115-D had not received any interest by the end of 1971, and ERA decided to put them on hold for possible future use as a motor hotel.[16] At the same time, ERA finished reviewing owner-participation parcels (which largely involved assessing the cost of bringing the structures up to code and the percentage of replacement value required to bring it to code). In August 1972, ERA acted on five new projects that would add a total of $2.5 million of development to the CEP (see table L.3).[17]

Table L.3. Proposals received in 1972.

Parcel	*Proposal by*	*Proposal detail*
128-A and 128-E	Portland Federal Savings and Loan Association	Redevelopment costs estimated at $1.7 million
129-A		A professional building estimated at $300,000
115-C (northern portion)	Ada and William Lee	Ming's) restaurant building estimated at $320,000
126-C	Danish imports	project valued at $156,000
227-2100		Build a small building named Eyearc, valued at $45,00; to house Standard Optical Co. on the ground floor and Mention, Hanns, and Lindburg's architectural firm on the second floor.

Notes

[1] Taken from a March 1970 LSO1 document

[2] Taken from ERA's Land Sales Offering document from 1970

[3] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1971” (Eugene, May 20, 1970).

[4] “Agency Gives Salary Boost to Urban Renewal Director,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 4, 1970). Ransom building tenants included an artist’s supply store and a piano and organ sales firm. Around that time, the purchase of three more downtown properties also have been approved by ERA-Manerud Building on (123 10th avenue), a building housing a hardware store and a fabric shop on the west side of Willamette between 8th and Broadway (around 856 Willamette street) and a building housing a restaurant and a record shop on the east side of the same block) (could not locate)

[5] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, October 1, 1970” (Eugene, October 1, 1970).

[6] ERA, “ERA Annual Report 1970” (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1971).

[7] “Ten Bidding on Downtown Property,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 13, 1971); ERA, “ERA Annual Report 1971” (Eugene: Eugene Renewal Agency, 1972).

[8] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1971.”

[9] “Ten Bidding on Downtown Property.”

[10] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1971.”

[11] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, November 8, 1971” (Eugene, November 8, 1971).

[12] Ed Kenyon, “Renewal Board Accepts Proposals,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 3, 1971).

[13] “Bicycle Dealer to Open Mall Store,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 10, 1971).

[14] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, December 15, 1971” (Eugene, n.d.).

[15] “Construction to Start next Week on Building of ‘The Broadway,’” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 18, 1972).

[16] ERA, “Meeting Minutes, December 22, 1971.”

[17] Editor, “Renewal Agency Acts on Five New Projects,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 17, 1972).

APPENDIX M: DETAILS OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS' RESPONSES

Table M.1. Details of property owners' responses regarding the parcels that were not structurally "standard" (mainly rehabilitation questionable).

NOTE—See figure 6.5 to locate the parcels within the CEP area.

ERA meeting date (yy-mm-dd)	*Parcel #*	*Amount to bring the building to code*	*Owner to redevelop?*	*Property Name*	*Owner*	*Uses [tenant]*	*Remarks*
69-01-15	113-8100		No	Sher Khan property	Elmer Sahlstrom		This property was sold to Sahlstrom for $35,000 in December 1968, just before the public hearing. He was given an offer of $45,000 by ERA, which ERA rejected.
	114-7100		No	Ella Day Trust		Coburn's Book Fair and others	
	114-7100		No	Ella Day Trust			
	115-15800		Yes	Rubenstein's self-service furniture store			
	115-17500		No			Eugene Fireplace Shop	
70-05-06	122-2800		No				But the building is rehabilitation feasible, and so ERA does not want to purchase it
	122-2900	$21,000	No		Aaron Jones and Lewis Hoffman	Robert's Grill	
70-11-04	122-3000		No		Lewis Hoffman and Aaron Jones	Mattox Pipe Shop and other small stores	
70-12-02	125-4100		No	Hoffman Trustee			Rehabilitation exceeds the current value of the building
70-10-02	125-4200		No	Goodrich, Slocum			Rehabilitation exceeds the current value of the building
70-05-20	125-4300		No		Nathan and Lee Frager		

Table M.1. (continued).

ERA meeting date (yy-mm-dd)	Parcel #	Amount to bring the building to code	Owner to redevelop?	Property Name	Owner	Uses [tenant]	Remarks
70-09-02	125-4400	$83,000	No	Stickels		Del Ray Restaurant and Chrystalship Record Store	About 50% of replacement cost
69-10-15	126-1000		Yes				
69-12-16	126-1000		No	Payless	Mr. Bonnett and his heirs	Three buildings	
70-06-03	126-700	$87,567	No	Harry Ritchie Jewelers and Cressey's Bookstore	Donald Slocum		
70-09-02	126-800	$70,000	No	Pratt Building Corporation		Heath's Fabric and Coast-to-Coast Store	Replacement cost plus $218,770
69-10-01	127-8500		No		Bank		
69-11-19	127-8600	$26,000	No	Thompson Lafayette store	Gilbert Hulin		
69-08-06	127-8800		No	Phillips Oil Co			
70-03-18	127-8900		No		Jim Breazeal; occupied by Harris Upham		Being demolished to facilitate the widening of the alley beside it
70-08-19	127-9000		No	Seymour's Café	George Schaefer		Two buildings on the property; one is substandard, and the other one is rehab feasible. Staff recommended that ERA acquire the entire parcel.
69-08-06	127-9200		No	Leeds Building		Shoe store	
70-03-04	128-5000		No				
70-06-03	128-5000	$29,500	No		The Sanders Heirs		
69-12-17	128-5100	$18,352	No	Broadway Store	Buck & Company		
69-05-07	128-5200		No	Walling building	Kaufman?		
70-06-17	128-5700		No	Ardel Building	George Schaefer		It would require appx 40% of the replacement cost to rehabilitate
	128-5700		No	Ardel Building			
70-03-04	128-6200		No		Robinson and Smith		
70-03-18	128-6300		No				
70-03-18	128-6301		No			Home Bakery	
70-11-04	128-6400	$24,000	No		J. P. O' Neil	Eugene Investment Company	
70-05-20, 71-02-03	128-C		No	Titus Property		Proposed for a part of mall public space	
70-07-15	129-6500	$30,000	No	S & H Green Stamp Store		Library	
70-09-02	129-7000		No	Manerud Building			

Table M.1. (continued).

ERA meeting date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Amount to bring the building to code***	***Owner to redevelop?***	***Property Name***	***Owner***	***Uses [tenant]***	***Remarks***
69-10-15	129-7500	$98,738	No, after learning of the cost to rehabilitate	Quackenbush			
71-01-20	129-7500			Quackenbush	Mrs. Quackenbush		
70-04-01	132-12000		No	Ransom building			
70-11-04	133-12500	$156,717	No		George Schaefer	Ellingsworth's and 88 cents store	Replacement value of $489,000
69-05-07	134-9700		No	Empire building	Kaufman?		
69-05-07	134-9800		No	Schmidt property	Kaufman?	Mitchell's men’s shop	
70-04-01	218-14800		Yes (this property was rehab feasible)				Plan to subdivide and made available for several smaller tenants
69-10-15	227-1700		No	St. Francis Hotel		Hotel	Hunt mentions his interest in assembling this parcel with the Oldfield parcel
69-08-06	227-1800		No		Oldfield		
70-08-19	227-2100	$18,000	No	Snappy Service Café			Replacement cost estimated at $20,000
71-01-20	228-7700		No				To be acquired to widen the alley to 21.5' by taking 7.5' from the parcel
70-01-20	228-8200			Sears			
71-11-17	122-2900	$21,000	No	Robert's Grill	Aaron Jones and Lewis Hoffman		

APPENDIX N: DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED PRICE FOR VARIOUS PARCELS

Table N.1. Details of the proposed price for various parcels as a part of Land Sales Offering based on ERA meeting minutes.

Date (yy-mm-dd)	*Parcel #*	*Proposed price per SF*	*Owned by*	*Proposal received date*	*Proposed by*	*Previous occupation*	*Intended use*	*ERA staff recommendation*	*Remarks*
71-10-13	115-A					Rubenstein budget store and liquor store			The proposal will only be accepted from Rubenstein and the old liquor store
71-03-03	115A (lot 15800 only)	$10.37			George Boehnke				
71-03-03	115A (whole parcel)	$6.00			Maurie and Sylvia Jacobs				
71-03-03	115B	$5.00			Maurie and Sylvia Jacobs				This meant that an area of more than 55,000 SF could have been consolidated under a single ownership
71-12-22	115C, 115D				No interest shown			Hold it for possible motor Hotel	
71-10-13	115-D	$20.00			Dr. Larry Semler		For himself/ displaced tenants		

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-12-01	116A (north portion appx 18,240 SF)	$5.00			Mr. And Mrs. Lee		Restaurant		
71-11-17	122-2900		Aaron Jones and Lewis Hoffman			Robert's Grill			Owners decided not to rehabilitate
71-10-13	122-A	$12 PSFand approximately 17,283 SF to the N-S alley, plus p.a. $2 PSF			Benjamin Franklin Savings and Loan	Henry Lowry Cameras, Roberts Frille, and others	3-4 story facility		
71-11-03	122-A	$12.00			Benjamin Franklin		20,000 SF rentable area-- 3 to 4 story building	The staff recommended reservation of the parcel until the acquisition of the remainder of the parcel…	

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-10-13	125-A				Tom Slocum and Terry Tillman	Hoffman's Jewelers, Latham's Luggage, Valley stationery			
71-11-03	125-A and 125-B	$4.00			Thomas Slocum, Terry Tillman et. al			Proposal rejected	…. If pedestrian alley separating the parcels could be moved to accommodate development….
71-10-13	125-B				Tom Slocum and Terry Tillman	Chrystal Ship, Del Ray Restaurant			
71-11-08	126C				Three developers working together--McCullough (Danish imports), Latham's luggage, and valley stationery				See note as well

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal receive d date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-10-13	126-C				Aleen and Mary McCullough (Danish Imports) and Leroy Latham of Latham's luggage	Harry Ritchie Jewelers, Heath's Fabrics, Coast-to-Coast, Cressey's	A one-story building with second-level display space		
71-11-03	126-C	$5.00			Allen and Mary McCullough (Danish Imports) and Irvin Latham (Latham's Luggage)		Retail developments	The prospect of consolidation is good but is below minimum	ERA rejected… but ERA would try to relocate them to another property
71-11-03	126-C north half	$8.00			Joe Anselmo of Valley stationery		Two-story retail and office spaces	Cutting service court to the rear of the site by 10 feet, adding to the parcel, and providing sufficient space for everyone… offer accepted!	Offered north 45 feet and east 90 feet of the parcel. Hunt wanted all three potential redevelopers to work together on the site.

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	*Parcel #*	*Proposed price per SF*	*Owned by*	*Proposal received date*	*Proposed by*	*Previous occupation*	*Intended use*	*ERA staff recommendation*	*Remarks*
70-07-01	127-A				Downtown Condominium Inc.		The Atrium (Mini Mall)		
70-05-20	127-C	$10.00		30-Apr	Danish Imports	Danish Imports		Select Harry Ritchie	
70-05-20	127-C	$11.00	Harry Ritchie	30-Apr	Harry Ritchie Jewelers	Danish Imports		Select Harry Ritchie	
70-05-20	127-F	$8.00			Thompson's Properties, Inc.				
71-10-13	128-A				Home Savings and Loan	Home Savings and Loan			
71-11-03	128-A	$5.00			Home Savings and Loan Association		An arcade from 10th and Oak garage, shops for displacees and office spaces	Accepted! Since they own the surrounding parcel, they would own a quarter block in total	Approximately 12,800 SF to be offered first to present downtown Eugene businesses being displaced. The total development cost would be approximately $400,000, with a construction time of about two years.

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-07-07	128B				Ralph Robinson proposing JC Penney building				
70-10-01	128-B	$12.06			Ralph W. Robinson and RWR Investment Corporation, Oregon Ltd.	The Broadway Store	The Broadway Mall-- a building appx 30,400 SF	To accept the proposal. In a meeting a week later, ERA staff discussed that the proposal is not realistic, and ERA should not go ahead and put the parcel up for sale because the proposal had not complied with "development documents presented to the realtor."	Incorporated into the design should be consideration of improvements to be made in the n-s and e-w alleys and coordination of the front design with the mall

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
70-11-04	128-B	$8.50		3-Nov	Ralph W. Robinson of the Broadway Store				Under the new proposal, the 10th and Oak parking assessment would be transferred in the amount due at the transfer of title to the new owner as outlined in the Development Documents. The proposed price was within the appraisal rate. Although lower than the anticipated figure, it was accepted.
71-01-20	128-B1	$2.00			Owner of parcel 128-4900 occupied by Town and Travel Store			Disposition approved	The disposal would clear up the ownership of the front half of the narrow strip owned by the Agency.

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-12-15	129C	$6.00	University Development Fund		Elmer Sahlstrom		Three-story office building		
71-12-15	129C	$12.00			Benjamin Franklin				
71-10-13	132-A				Attorney Wayne Helikson	Ransom Building	One-story general office 10,500 SF		
71-11-03	132-A	$5.00			Attorney Wayne Helikson		Condominium type offices	Accepted	
71-07-07	227A				Mr. And Mrs. Lee		Restaurant		
70-05-20	227-A	$5.59			B & A (Mr. And Mrs. William Lee)		A restaurant to replace Ming's but	Renegotiate with a proposal of $6.5 SF	
71-10-13	227-A				Bob Saks of “Furnitureland”	St. Francis Hotel	Retail furniture outlet		
71-11-03	227-A	$5.00			Robert Saks		Furniture store	Accepted	
71-10-13	227-D				Dr. Williamson (Standard Optometrist)				

Table N.1. (continued).

Date (yy-mm-dd)	***Parcel #***	***Proposed price per SF***	***Owned by***	***Proposal received date***	***Proposed by***	***Previous occupation***	***Intended use***	***ERA staff recommendation***	***Remarks***
71-11-03	227-D	$7.00			Robert Williamson (Optometrist) and Mention, Hanns and Lindburg (Architects)			Accepted	
71-10-13	228-A or 228-C				Rickets Music Company				
71-11-03	228-C (southern half)	$7.00			Rickett's Music Store	Masonic Lodge		Held on negotiation with Sears… offer accepted	Would like 3,200 SF on either site (228A-Masonic Lodge site being their other priority)
71-10-13	Northern half of 126-C				Joe Anselmo of Valley stationery		One-story building with basement storage.		
		$11.00		30-Apr	Harry Ritchie Jewelers				
					Maurie Jacobs				

APPENDIX O: STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF CEP AREA'S MORPHOLOGY

This section discusses the results of the t-test on the late-1960s and 1985 Building Morphology of the CEP area. Previous analyses have shown dramatic shifts in building sizes based on average area. However, another important question is: *are they "significantly" bigger?* As a statistical validation of the transformation, the Welch two-sample t-test for GFA and TFA comparisons of buildings before and after the renewal yielded the following results (Group 1 indicated late-1960s values and Group 2 indicated 1985 values)—

1. GF area of all buildings in the CEP area for late-1960s and 1985: p-value 0.000; The year late-1960s mean of 5,825 SF was less than 1985 mean of 10,696 SF;[1]
2. GF area of all buildings inside the RCPM area for late-1960s and 1985" p-value 0.028; The late-1960s mean of 6,747 SF was less than the year 1985 mean of 9,113 SF;[2]
3. GF area for all buildings inside CEP in the late-1960s and only new buildings after post-renewal inside CEP: p-value 0.023; late-1960s mean of 5,825 was less than 1985's 10,237 SF;[3] and
4. TFA for all buildings inside CEP in the late-1960s and only new buildings post-renewal inside CEP: p-value 0.039; The late-1960s mean of 15,193 was less than the post-renewal mean of 36,378.[4]

The p-value for each of them is less than 0.05, which translate to the following conclusions—

1. There was a significant difference in the mean of GFC (footprint) for buildings in the CEP area between the late-1960s and 1985;
2. There was a significant difference in the mean of GFC (footprint) for buildings in the RCPM area between the late-1960s and 1985;
3. There was a significant difference in the mean of GFC (footprint) for buildings in the CEP area in the late-1960s and new buildings built after the renewal until 1985; and

4. There was a significant difference in the mean of TFA for buildings in the CEP area in the late-1960s and new buildings built after the renewal until 1985.

Thus, considering the above data for building areas for the CEP area and RCPM area, the buildings built after the renewal were significantly different in area and larger than pre-renewal buildings. However, there is one data that did not yield a significant difference between pre-renewal and post-renewal buildings. According to the t-test, the TFA for all buildings inside CEP in the late-1960s and only new buildings post-renewal inside the RCPM area had a p-value of 0.366 (>0.1).[5] Additionally, the late-1960s mean of 15,193 SF was less than the post-renewal mean of 11,991 SF. This translates to the fact that the TFA for new buildings inside the RCPM area did not significantly differ in mean compared to the pre-renewal situation. In other words, new buildings inside the RCPM area maintained the morphological pattern that existed before the renewal.

Notes

[1] t = -4.7015, df = 116.54, p-value = 7.143e-06
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-6922.865 -2819.018
sample estimates:
mean in group 1 mean in group 2
5824.778 10695.719

[2] t = -2.2329, df = 102.66, p-value = 0.02773
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-4468.4391 -264.4486
sample estimates:
mean in group 1 mean in group 2
6746.871 9113.315

[3] t = -2.3599, df = 41.363, p-value = 0.02308
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-8187.6288 -637.3284
sample estimates:
mean in group 1 mean in group 2
5824.778 10237.256

[4] t = -2.1319, df = 40.15, p-value = 0.03919
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0

95 percent confidence interval:
 -41267.939 -1103.567
sample estimates:
mean in group 1 mean in group 2
      15192.73   36378.49

[5] t = 0.91465, df = 38.659, p-value = 0.366
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
 -3880.728 10284.196
sample estimates:
mean in group 1 mean in group 2
      15192.73   11991.00

APPENDIX P: LIST OF ERA'S PROGRESS BY YEAR (FROM ERA'S ANNUAL REPORTS)

Table P.1 ERA's progress for each year, 1969 to 1974 (sc. ERA's Annual Report for respective years).

Particulars	***1969 (after May)***	***1970***	***1971***	***1972***	***1973***	***1974***
Price paid for property (parcels) acquisition	$4,346,221	$4,218,770	$1,653,197	$1,249,023	$793,000	$536,000
Total relocation benefits		$163,401	$134,498	$195,000	$281,000	$408,000
Mall construction			$36,403	$125,000	$340,000	$2,000,000
Rental-- property management income	$78,591		$366,390	$407,935		$142,000
[other] Investments in redevelopments			$725,000	$215,000	$3,500,000	$7,000,000
Public works improvement projects				$560,000	$140,000	$410,000
Relocation paid					$281,000	$368,000
Total investments in new constructions						$8,700,000
Total tax paid	$57,690					$39,300
Total paid for demolition/site clearance				$114,000		
Property tax on rental property			$124,974	$466,000		
Land sales income						$434,000
Spent on rehab			$160,000			

Table P.1. (continued).

Particulars	*1969 (after May)*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*
Investment proposals accepted						
Buildings demolished	3	18	14	17	9	21
Total parcels purchased/acquired	40	34	11	14	8	4
Business relocations	13	54	43	53	65	62
Building rehabilitations completed				6	20	11
Total rehabs undergone/began						
Residents relocated				10	24	10
Families relocated					4	3
ERA's rental agreements				29	45	
New buildings completed				2		

Table P.2 Cumulative data on ERA's progress by the end of each year, 1969 to 1974 based on ERA's Annual Reports for the respective years.

Particulars	***End of 1969***	***End of 1970***	***End of 1971***	***End of 1972***	***End of 1973***	***End of 1974***
Related to money ($)						
Price paid for property (parcels) acquisition	$4,346,221	$8,564,991	$10,218,188	$11,467,211	$12,260,211	$13,153,733
Total relocation benefits	$41,018	$163,401	$297,899	$492,899	$773,899	$1,181,899
Mall construction		$1,350,000		$1,700,000		$2,000,000
Rental-- property management income	$78,591	$78,591	$444,981	$852,916	$1,500,000	$1,642,000
[Other] Investments in redevelopments			$725,000	$940,000	$4,440,000	$1,642,000
Public works improvement projects				$1,100,000	$3,300,000	$3,700,000
Relocation paid	$14,701			$550,000	$727,000	$1,220,000
Total investments in new constructions						$13,000,000
Total tax paid	$57,690					$583,000
Total paid for demolition/site clearance			$214,000	$306,000		
Property tax on rental property					$543,000	

Table P.2. (continued).

Particulars	***End of 1969***	***End of 1970***	***End of 1971***	***End of 1972***	***End of 1973***	***End of 1974***
Related to numbers (#)						
Buildings demolished	3	21	35	52	65	86
Total parcels purchased/acquired	40	74	85	99	104	108
Business relocations	13	67	110	163	272	334
Building rehabilitations completed						18
Total rehabs undergone/began			16			53
Residents relocated	9			96	123	133
Families relocated	1			12	16	20
Rental agreements	46				74	
New buildings completed				3	20	

APPENDIX Q: SPACE SYNTAX STUDIES OF EUGENE

This section discusses the followings-

1. Space syntax analysis of Eugene for 1970
2. Statistical relationship between spatial and retail business characteristics at the city scale for 1970

Appendix Q.1 Space Syntax Analysis of Eugene, 1970

According to the NACH maps, several observations are crucial. First, the central area has a share of a considerable number of streets with high values (going in both directions) (see figure Q.1). Although the central area is composed mainly of rectangular grids, there is considerable differentiation in values. This phenomenon justifies that even within a uniform grid, not all streets have equal potential to facilitate vehicular traffic. While highways and major arterials have been recognized as having high values outside the central area and across the city, the entire system of major arterials has only been loosely defined on the map. Nonetheless, these streets with high values spread in all directions and either penetrate (south) or circle the residential areas (mainly north).

The NAIN map clearly shows a distinctive pattern with highly integrated streets in the central area (in both directions) and a gradient of less-integrated areas outward from the center (see figure Q.2). The segregated single-family residential area on the northwest, northeast, and south area clearly visible as well. The central area forms a distinct integration core consisting of both vertical and horizontal streets. The NAIN radius 800 map shows that the city's local destinations centers are a continuous network of streets present in the central part. A network of streets with similar characteristics is largely missing in the peripheral areas of the city.



Figure Q.1. NACH map of Eugene for 1970.



Figure Q.2. NAIN map of Eugene in 1970.

Appendix Q.2 Relationship Between Syntax and Land-use at City Scale

This section discusses the results of a regression analysis that tests the relationship between the street segments' space syntax characteristics (exploratory variable) and the number of ROBs along them (dependent variable) in 1970. Since the most relevant syntactic measure related to destinations' location is integration, the regression analysis was conducted between NAIN and the number of ROBs for each street segment. The regression analysis result has shown that a significant relationship (p-value < 0.05) exists between several space syntax measures and the number of ROBs along the respective segment for the year 1970. The regression analysis (at city-level, more than 8,300 segments) yielded the following results-

Syntax measure	***R-sq***	***Equation***
NAIN	0.055***	ROB counts= 0.961 * NAIN – 0.8
NAIN400	0.006***	ROB counts= 0.126 * NAIN400 – 0.04
NAIN800	0.033***	ROB counts= 0.403 * NAIN800 – 0.352
NACH	0.021***	ROB counts= 0.378 * NACH – 0.187
NACH400	0.001***	ROB counts= 0.096 * NACH400 + 0.061
NACH800	0.005***	ROB counts= 0.223 * NACH800 – 0.066

*Significance levels * < 0.1   **< 0.05   ***<0. 01*

APPENDIX R: USP'S PROPOSAL FOR THE PEDESTRIAN MALL AND DAVID HUNT'S ASSESSMENT

Table R.1. David Hunt's assessment on USP's mall design proposal.

Design element	*USP proposal*	*David Hunt's assessment*[1]
Pedestrian circulation	Two hierarchies of potential pedestrian activity (1) intense along Broadway and Willamette and (2) heavy along the alleys within the four blocks adjacent to the Willamette-Broadway intersection.[2] While Willamette would be developed as a part-time mallway, Broadway would be entirely pedestrian with "small shops, covered areas, and miscellaneous uses to improve the shopping environment." The alleys were saved for pedestrian circulation and delivery.	
Merchants and small shops	Facilitate smaller downtown merchants that fit in the smaller lands primarily along Broadway.	According to Hunt, they needed larger space, and some specific uses (pawn shops, saddleries, and surplus stores) may not be facilitated in the mall areas. Hunt also pointed out the need to locate the small shops in all mall sections (including Olive and Willamette streets). Additionally, according to Hunt, the ramps next to the Olive and Broadway intersection for access to the underground walkways would reduce the "design opportunities for the quarter blocks east and west of that intersection."
Change in Levels	Include a multilevel system for moving pedestrians between origins and destinations. There would be two-level shops (grade and -1), including underpasses linking parking to public spaces and private developments.	Hunt pointed out two specific problems with this: (1) several properties were subject to owner-participation, and this design could not be feasible, and (2) the overhead walkways would require merchants with two floors to develop double entrances.

Table R.1. (continued).

Design element	***USP proposal***	***David Hunt's assessment***
System of open spaces	A hierarchy of open spaces (bus place, public market, and two open squares) in front of larger buildings. The intersection of Broadway and Willamette would have an elevated platform.	Some properties were under owner-participation or exempt from renewal, and a continuous system of open spaces would not be possible. Hunt, however, agreed to the idea of providing open spaces in front of buildings as setbacks.
Parking	The blocks on the edge of the proposed Mall would be the location for parking.[3] Instead of concentrating on parking garages, USP proposed segregating them around the central blocks so that each block had access to some amount of parking, and the need for vehicles to move around the inner loop around downtown was avoided.	Many properties that USP proposed for parking were outside the control of ERA.
Bus/Public transportation	Including bus stops within the mall area in addition to highlighting the need for a city-wide bus system with easy accessibility to the city center.	

Table R.2. Difference between USP's plan and RTKL's/ERA's for vehicular circulation-

Street Name	***RTKL plan***	***USP plan***
6th avenue	Two-way	East to West
7th avenue	West to east	West to East
8th avenue	East to West	Vehicular loop
Broadway	Entirely pedestrian	Entirely pedestrian
10th avenue	West to East	Vehicular loop
11th avenue	East to West	East to west
Lincoln	South to north	North to South
Charnelton	North to south	South to North
Olive	Entirely pedestrian	Vehicular loop
Willamette	Pedestrian between 8th and 10th avenues	Semi-vehicular/pedestrian between 7th and 11th avenues
Oak	South to north	Vehicular loop
Pearl	North to South	North to South

Notes

[1] Hunt's comments are taken from one of ERA's unpublished manuscripts obtained from the COE office.

[2] Unthank Sedar Poticha Architects, *Conceptual Studies of Pedestrian Precincts-Central Eugene Renewal Project*, 29.

[3] Ibid., 33.

APPENDIX S: LIST OF BUSINESSES BEFORE AND AFTER THE RENEWAL

This section consists of

1. List of ROBs that survived the renewal and were present in 1978
2. List of businesses that survived and did not survive along Willamette and Broadway mall
3. List of ROBs that retained or arrived between 1978 and 1985

Table S.1 List of ROBs that survived the renewal and were present in 1978.

Name of Businesses that Survived the Renewal (present in both 1968 and 1978)		***New businesses in the CEP area after the renewal (until 1978)***			
SN	***Business***	***SN***	***Business***	***SN***	***Business***
1	Baker's Pharmacy	1	Acme Up and Down Tavern	50	Kites and Other Delights
2	Baxter and Henning	2	Alta Bea	51	Boutique Gallery
3	Blade	3	Ambassador Travel	52	Larsen's Town Barber
4	Boehnke Printing	4	Ana In	53	Lei Hawaiian Fashions
5	Bon Marche	5	Asia Garden	54	Literary Lion
6	BookMark	6	Athletic Department	55	Luby's Sports Center
7	Brenner's Furniture	7	Atrium Flowers	56	Maico Hearing Aid
8	Bristow's Jewelry	8	Atrium Shoe Repair	57	Mal's Custom Tailoring
9	Broadway Store	9	Away Travel	58	Mark's Hallmark Shop
10	Burch's	10	B&H Stamps and Coins	59	Marley's
11	Carl Greve Jewelry	11	Back Door	60	Mattox Outdoor Outfitters
12	Coffee Shop (Medical Center)	12	Back Stage Dancewear	61	Mcayeal's Wardrobe Cleaners
13	Columbian Optical	13	Boardroom	62	Mckenzie Outdoor Outfitters
14	Ellingsworth's	14	Brian's	63	Medical Center Barber Shop
15	Elwood Jewelers	15	Bronson Travel	64	Men's Formal Wear
16	Fletcher's for Children	16	Bus Stop Concession	65	Mister Dickens Dally Bread
17	Flowers Unlimited	17	Candy and Corn Shop	66	National Theatre
18	Harry Ritchie Jewelers	18	Chrystalship	67	Nu Look

Table S.1. (continued).

Name of Businesses that Survived the Renewal (present in both 1968 and 1978)		***New businesses in the CEP area after the renewal (until 1978)***			
SN	***Business***	***SN***	***Business***	***SN***	***Business***
20	Hoffman's Jewelry	20	Circus Hut Sandwich Shop	69	Oregon Repertory Theatre
21	JJ Newberry	21	Cloak Room	70	Original Joe's
22	John Warren Hardware	22	Creatively Yours	71	Overpark Restaurant
23	Johnson Furniture Co.	23	Daniel Coulter	72	Pijon
24	Kathryn's Gifts	24	Danish Imports	73	Pipe N' Pouch
25	Kaufman Bros	25	De' Frisco's	74	Porter's Foods
26	Kt's Bake Shop	26	Earth Shoe	75	Postal Instant Press
27	Latham's	27	Edelweiss Import Chalet	76	Prince Puckler's Gourmet Ice Cream
28	Lerner Shops	28	Enchanted Doll House	77	Radio Shack
29	Luckey's	29	Endgames	78	Red Wing Shoe Store
30	M. Jacobs Furniture	30	Eugene Appliance and Services	79	Reflections
31	Olson's Jewelers	31	Eugene Outdoor Store	80	Sands of Time
32	Pit Restaurant	32	Fashion Fabrics	81	Scandinavian Interiors
33	Quackenbush	33	Firestone	82	Scott's
34	Rubenstein's	34	Fredrick's Fashion Center	83	Selmer Optical Co
35	Sears	35	Gabrielson's Jewelers	84	Senior Crafts Gift House
36	Seymour's Greenery Restaurant	36	Gallenkamp's	85	Shells
37	Skeie's Jewelry	37	Gandalf's Den	86	Shirley's Myrtlewood
38	Thrifty Drug Store	38	Gari Goldsmiths	87	Something Special
39	Toman's Jewelers	39	Gold Cross Drugs	88	Special T-Shirts
40	Town & Travel Apparel	40	Golden Key Hair Fashion	89	Spotted Mule Saddlery
41	Toy Shoppe	41	Grandmother Taught Us	90	Steven J
42	Valley Stationery	42	Green Pepper Fabrics	91	Stitchery
43	Willoughby Hearing Aid	43	Harley Mull Hearing Aid Services	92	Sundown Sleeping Bag Co
44	Wilson Music House	44	Hendel House Imports	93	Toad Hall Hi-Fi
45	Woolworth Co	45	House of Lee	94	Uncommon Scents

Table S.1. (continued).

Name of Businesses that Survived the Renewal (present in both 1968 and 1978)	New businesses in the CEP area after the renewal (until 1978)			
	46	Huey And Sons	95	Valley Shaver Service
	47	Hutch's	96	Veerman's
	48	Jeanery	97	Vegetarian Restaurant
	49	John Homes Interiors	98	Wallace Opticians

Table S.2 List of businesses that survived and did not survive along Willamette and Broadway mall.

Businesses that survived[1]—
Burch's Fine Footwear (R), Columbian Optical, F. W. Woolworth & Co, First Interstate Bank, Flowers Unlimited, Fox National Theater (N), Harry Ritchie's Jewelers, Hoffman's Jewelers, J. J. Newberry Co., Kaufman Bros. Inc., Latham's Luggage (R), Lerner Shops, Little King Restaurant (N), Loren's Barber Shop, Luckey's Club Cigar Store, Mark's Hallmark Shop (N), McDonald Theatre, Oregon Athletic, Seymour's Restaurant, Skeie's Jewelers Inc., The Bon Marche, Thompson's Records, Toman's Jewelry, Town and Travel Apparel, US National Bank of Oregon, Valley Stationery (R).
Businesses that did not survive—
A-1 Loan and Jewelry, Allied Surplus, Andrea's, Anita Shop, Baxter & Henning, Belvedere Hotel, Bergman Bail Bonds, Bristow's Jewelers, Bruno Studio, Carl Greve Jewelers, Chase Flowers & Gifts, City News Center, Coburn's Film Shop, Crystal Ship, Danish Imports Center, Del Ray Restaurant & Lounge, Eighty-Eight Cent Stores, Ellingsworth Store for Men, Elwood Jewelers, Equitable Savings & Loan, Eugene Barber College, Eugene Federal Savings & Loan, Eugene Fireplace Shop, Eugene Outdoor Store, Eugene Surplus Sales, Flint Studio, Foo's Restaurant, Fredrick's Fashion Center, Fredrick's Fashion Fabrics, Gari's Etcetera, Gay Blade, Heilig Theater, Home Bakery, J. C. Penney Co., John Warren Hardware, Johnson Furniture, London Cellar, Luby's, Miller's Dept. Store, Montgomery Ward & Co., Nagler's Shoe Co., New Moon Imports, Nickels Shoe Store, Odyssey Coffee Shop, Olson's Jewelers, Optique Eyewear & Jewelry, Pastime Tavern, Pay Less Drug Store, Roe Shoe Store, Scandinavian Home Furniture, Sport Haus, Standard Optical Co., The Attic, The Broadway, The Varsity Shop, Thrifty Drug Store, Weisfields Inc.
Newcomers—
B. Dalton Bookseller, Backstage Dancewear, Bradford's Hi-Fidelity, Centre Court, Dough Huey's Sporting Goods, Downtown Athletic Club, Endgames, Eugene Hilton, Favors, Feminine Fancies, Fletcher's for Children, Fuch's Business Liquidators, Goldmine Jewelers, Larsen's Barber Shop, Lazar's Bazar, LCC Downtown Center, Leah's Wine & Co., London Hair Studio, McKenzie Honey Farms, McKenzie Outfitters, Melange, Olympic Outfitters, Prince Puckler's Ice Cream, Scan Design, Soaring Wings, Tarym's Toys, The Bon-sai Restaurant, The Lei Hawaiian Fashions, Walt's Photography.

Table S.3. List of ROBs that retained or arrived between 1978 and 1985.

List of New Stores in the RCPM area in 1985 (compared to 1978)		***List of Stores that remained in the RCPM area in 1985 since 1978***	
1	Appliance and Video Store	1	Atrium
2	B Dalton Bookseller	2	Creatively Yours
3	Blue Heron	3	Atrium Flowers
4	Bradford Hi-Fi	4	Blade
5	Cole’s	5	Bon Marche
6	Computerland	6	Book Mark
7	Courtside	7	Burch's
8	Diana's	8	Candy and Corn Shop
9	Eugene Appliance and Service Inc	9	Carl Greve
10	Eugene Athletic Supply Co	10	Daniel Coulter
11	Exchange Restaurants and Lounge	11	Danish Imports
12	Feminine Fancies	12	Edelweiss Chalet
13	Four Seasons	13	Elwood's
14	Franklin's	14	Endgames
15	Gem Trades International	15	Fletcher's for Children
16	General Nutrition Center	16	Flowers Unlimited
17	Glamour Girl	17	Gold Cross
18	HA Center	18	Hoffman's
19	Jasmine Valley	19	Johnson Furniture
20	Riker And Riker	20	Kaufman’s
21	Rosewaters Deli	21	Latham’s
22	Scandia Down Shops	22	Lazar's Bazar
23	Standard Optical	23	Lei Hawaiian Fashions
24	Wassom's	24	Literary Lion
25	Willoughby	25	Mark's Hallmark Shop
26	Woman's Jewelry	26	Mattox
		27	Mister Dicken's Daily Bread
		28	Pipe N' Pouch
		29	Prince Puckler's

Table S.3. (continued).

List of New Stores in the RCPM area in 1985 (compared to 1978)	*List of Stores that remained in the RCPM area in 1985 since 1978*	
	30	Red Wing
	31	Sears
	32	Seymour's
	33	Something Special
	34	Toman's
	35	Town and Travel
	36	Valley Stationery
	37	Yarn Shed
	38	Harry Ritchie's

Notes

[1] The following list appeared on a September 14, 1986, issue of The Register-Guard. The survivors were listed on the 1970 Eugene City Directory. "R" represents businesses relocated elsewhere on the mall, whereas "N" represents the same type of business being conducted at the same address under a new name.

APPENDIX T: STORIES OF PROJECTS/BUSINESS INVESTMENTS IN THE CEP AREA

Appendix T1. 1977-1978 Multi-use Center Proposal

In 1976, ERA commissioned studies to convert the southern portion into a multi-purpose center and, by 1977, started to offer the area for developments based on the plan prepared. ECC adopted Resolution (No. 2716) to support retail expansion in downtown Eugene on July 20, 1977.[1] In July 1976, the ECC asked the ERA to formulate a plan for a new retail center within the CEP area, which began in March 1977 after hiring Elbasani, Logan, and Severin Design Group (ELS). ERA hired ELS, based in Berkeley, CA, in January 1977 to study prospects for the commercial expansion in downtown Eugene.[2] In addition to ELS for Planning and Architecture, the project team included Keyser Marston Associates for Market and Financial Analysis and Barton-Aschman Associates for Traffic and Parking study.[3]

ERA expected ELS to work on a possibility for the retail expansion, primarily focusing on (1) the potential for attracting a major department store, hotel-convention center, or other developments to downtown Eugene; (2) public improvements that might be necessary to accommodate them; (3) finances and other related issues. Furthermore, the ELS consulting firm looked at sites for expansion and improvement projects such as street widening and mall covering, which were essential to attract developers to downtown Eugene.

In March 1977, the ELS Design Group presented four preliminary ideas for downtown development to the twelve-member Downtown Planning Review Group.[4] The group also forwarded the plan to invite about twenty-five developers from twelve states, the District of Columbia, and Canada to build downtown Eugene. The four alternatives envisioned by the ELS group for the retail center were-

1. <u>Minimum development—</u>Sears moves its store out of downtown after its lease expires in 1983, a 75,000 to 90,000 SF restaurant-entertainment center is added, a 250 to 300 room hotel is built, and an expandable 55,000 SF civic meeting facility is constructed;
2. <u>Moderate development—</u>Sears stays downtown in a new or upgraded 75,000 SF building, a retail-restaurant-entertainment center of up to 150,000 SF is built, a developer builds a hotel, and an 85,000 SF civic meeting and exhibit center is constructed;

3. Moderate to large development—Sears stays downtown in a new or upgraded 100,000 SF building, a retail-restaurant-entertainment center of up to 250,000 SF is built, a hotel is added, and an 85,000 SF civic and exhibit center is built; and
4. Downtown regional retail center – Sears stays downtown in a 100,000 SF building, a third department store of 100,000 SF and a fashion retailer of 50,000 SF is attracted, and the retail-restaurant entertainment facility, hotel, and civic and exhibit center are built.

According to a mid-April 1977 update by ELS[5]

1. Both Bon Marche and Sears were staying downtown, possibly expanding as well, and a new department store was going to open on the parking lot southwest of the Bon and north of Hutch's bicycle store;
2. A fashion retailer was going to locate on the northwest corner of 11th avenue and Willamette Street on the site of a surface parking lot, and two three-level parking structures were projected on the parking lot directly west of Bon and on the southwest of the Atrium shopping mall;
3. New shops and restaurants were expected to provide a retail link from the Bon and the new department store near it to the new fashion store at the 11th and Willamette street intersection; and
4. A hotel building with other uses was being expected on the parking lot at 8th avenue and Willamette Street, south of the new Parcade parking structure and across from the Eugene main branch of the US National Bank of Oregon.

ELS's study resulted in the "A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene" (REDE report) report in May 1977.[6] To assist in preparing the report, ERA commissioned the formation of two bodies (1) Downtown Planning Review Group (DPRG), consisting of twelve members, and (2) Downtown Advisory Committee (DAC). These groups and the consultants met in eleven public planning sessions between early March and late May 1977. After completing the retail study, ERA published "An Invitation for Development Proposals" (IDP document) in September 1977. The City of Eugene (COE) would participate with private developers by assembling the site, providing parking structures, and implementing traffic improvements. ERA invited developers throughout the United States to submit proposals for participating in a joint public-private multi-use center plan.[7] ERA placed advertisements in The New York Times and the West Coast edition of The Wall Street Journal. According to the document, the CEP was ninety percent complete by this time.

The development offer aimed to receive proposals for[8]

1. A downtown regional retail center
    a. Approximately 200,000 SF of new shops;
    b. Three major department stores containing approximately 275,000 SF;
    c. A new two-level mall; and
    d. New parking structures providing approximately 2,100 parking spaces.
2. A downtown multi-use hotel/convention center
    a. A hotel of approximately 300 rooms;
    b. Approximately 60,000 SF of shops and entertainment and recreation use;
    c. Approximately 60,000 SF of convention and exhibit use; and
    d. parking for 450 cars.

According to DPRG, the approved design of the downtown regional center would

1. Permit sears to move to a new and expanded store in downtown;
2. Reinforce three of the six legs of the mall and specifically the weakest southern leg;
3. Help in the expansion of the existing Bon Marche and reinforce the Atrium mini-mall and 50,000 SF of mall's retail space;
4. Use diagonal street configuration to limit development and traffic into the surrounding residential community; and
5. Use land already in public ownership and require 101,380 SF of additional privately owned land for the retail center development.

The specific location of the multi-purpose center was chosen because (1) it would fortify activity on an additional two legs of the mall; (2) it was close to the center of the mall and the governmental and office uses; (3) the Parcade was nearby; and (4) the site was already in ERA's ownership. Later, in September 1977, in response to the REDE document, ERA published another document highlighting the invitation for proposals for new developments (a bit modified from the REDE document).[9]

For the proposed retail center, 300,000 SF would be assembled for parking structures and retail development, out of which 160,000 SF would be sold to developers, and140,000 SF would remain the city for parking.[10] Around 200,000 SF of the site had already been assembled, cleared, and in "construction-ready" condition to facilitate the new center at the time. Also, another 100,000 SF was to be completed by the city soon. The City Council expected to spend $11.3

million to facilitate the retail center in addition to $2.4 million already spent for acquisition and clearance. The funds would come from ERA funds and tax allocation bonds. The developers had to secure the retail business tenants and develop the retail center according to the plan. In addition to the existing stores, the new retail center would have offered 1.1 million SF of retail space in downtown—the equivalent of a major regional shopping center.[11]

The REDE study's recommendations on traffic and parking included[12]

1. Location of LTD's transit terminal facility on ERA-owned land at the northwest corner of 7th and Willamette;
2. Widening of Lincoln and Charnelton streets to four lanes to handle traffic rerouted from Washington and Jefferson streets; and
3. Accommodate the vehicular traffic from the retail centers and widening the 6th avenue portion along Oak and from Olive to Lawrence and widening the 7th avenue portion from Jefferson to Charnelton, 11th avenue portion between High and Jefferson; 13th avenue portion between Jefferson to High; Oak Street portion between 13th and 11th avenue; and 10th avenue portion between Charnelton and Oak.

ERA expected that the private developers would build the commercial center and hotel the city would build the publicly-owned convention center and parking garages. The city would finance (1) land acquisition, street improvements, and two new parking structures using existing renewal agency money, (2) the sale of downtown property, and the additional property taxes generated by the value of new downtown development. The project intended to keep Sears downtown, forestall the development of another outlying VRC-type shopping area that would draw business from downtown, and strengthen existing downtown businesses while not damaging downtown-area neighborhoods.[13]

The total $50 million estimated costs of the center included $20 million for the commercial center, $14 million for the multi-use center, and $16 million for parking garages.[14] This project would be made possible by a private and public construction that could be completed by 1990. The city's estimated $15.8 million costs to build the parking garages, acquire private land, build the convention center, widen streets would come from ERA, the additional taxes resulting from increased downtown property values, and the sale of the land to a developer.[15]

The project's success hinged on attracting enough developers and the addition of the third major store.[16] The city was willing to accept the plan and modify it if the developer wished.

Retaining Sears was one of ERA's intentions, although they were prepared for Sears' departure (on paper). ERA members understood that retailers already on the mall should be "aided rather than cut off by any major new development." So, at least on paper, another objective was to compact new activities around the mall rather than scattering it or expanding downtown retailing boundaries.

By June 1977, the ERA Board was prepared to endorse the proposal and search for developers to build a downtown Eugene Shopping complex and a hotel/convention center.[17] In July 1977, the Eugene City Council (ECC) endorsed ELS's proposal for the $50 million expansion of the downtown mall.[18] Additionally, three developers were planning to build 323 downtown apartment units among them in separate projects, but they contended they would not proceed without exemption. ECC also approved the implementation of a 1975 state law allowing a ten-year property tax exemption for new multi-family housing projects in downtown areas. Project consultants and city staff members said the estimated $11.7 million in public improvements required by the plan would be financed entirely by (1) the additional taxes resulting from the increased value of the downtown property after the project was developed, (2) land sales to developers, and (3) federal urban renewal funds. One audience member opposed the plan during a public meeting, saying that it did not provide enough evening activities. Additionally, the mall's open space was designed to move pedestrians rather than allow people to relax and socialize.

The REDE report assumed that by 1985, a regional center with 520,000 SF of Gross Leasable Area (GLA) would be developed in the downtown area, with 335,000 SF of them being completely new. The major ones among the existing which will be a part of the retail center would be Bon Marche (75,000 SF) and Sears (50,000 SF). However, as evident in the mid-1980s investigations, the mall did not receive the two large department stores they were hoping for but instead, all existing anchors left by 1990.

In March 1978, Sutter Hill proposed to find retailers for an enclosed mall development anchored by three major department stores to the ERA.[19] The Sutter Hill proposal would include

1. Remodeling the existing Bon Marche department store to adapt to a two-level mall;
2. A new Sears store of about 150,000 SF on two levels; and
3. A third, undesignated two-level department store occupying 75,000 to 150,000 SF.

The proposal anticipated one new department store on the west side of Charnelton Street and Broadway. The other new store would be in the general area of the block bounded by 10th and 11th avenues and by Olive and Willamette. Shops in the enclosed mall, which would contain an additional 150,000 SF of sales area, would run diagonally between and link the two stores. The existing Bon Marche would be tied into the new retail area at the Broadway-Charnelton intersection. The proposed project would require about 175,000 to 240,000 SF of land for the buildings and another 200,000 SF for parking for at least 2,000 cars in adjacent multi-level structures. Sutter Hill Limited added that the "viability" of the project could be 'greatly enhanced' by getting Sears as an anchor tenant and securing a third department store.

The same month, the Downtown Planning Review Group (PRG) recommended the John S. Griffith Company of Irvine, CA, to develop a $30 million major retail project in the mall area.[20] The PRG consisted of the Eugene City Council representatives, Downtown Development Board, Eugene Planning Commission, Eugene Renewal Agency, Westside, Whiteaker, and West University neighborhood associations. In the meeting, Daniel Donahue Jr., the president of John Griffith Company, warned the planning review group members that a downtown retail project would not be successful unless at least two major retail stores could be influenced to locate new facilities in the mall area. Discussing the topic of a possible "tenant mix" in any downtown Eugene enclosed mall, Donahue added his firm would hope to have about twenty-two percent of the space devoted to women's ready-to-wear; fourteen percent for jeans and pants, ten percent for food services, ten percent for footwear, and the rest for miscellaneous uses. If the program were successful, it would have doubled downtown's retail area of approximately 400,000 SF.

Unfortunately, starting mid-1979, the city began learning about its developers and financial parties' failure to secure deals related to the planned downtown revitalization. The City learned in June 1979 that the year-long effort by John S. Griffith Co. to put together a $30 million retail expansion program in downtown Eugene has "apparently" failed since the firm could not obtain commitments from major retailers to locate in the downtown area, further adding the downtown retail expansion plan was "too inflexible."[21] Around this time, i.e., mid-1979, several civic leaders and officials began to feel that Downtown Eugene would grow soon from only a retail center and become a center for "residential, cultural and nightlife uses."[22] At the time, the elements of this "new downtown" (which extend outside the CEP boundary) included the following projects, most of which were expected to be completed by 1982-

1. A $20.3 million performing arts center (Hult) is scheduled to open in January 1982- consisting of a 500-seat theater, a concert hall with at least 2,200 seats, and a 500-car parking garage. The site is bounded by Oliver and Willamette streets and by Sixth and Seventh avenues;
2. A proposed $10-million, 250 room, privately financed Hilton Hotel would be built on the block just east of the performing arts center, along with a $2.8 million convention center and parking facilities;
3. A proposed $9.5-million expansion of the Fifth Street Public Market would extend the market west to Pearl Street and take up the north half of the block bounded by High and Pearl streets and East Fifth and East Sixth avenues; and
4. A $5 million project to redevelop property near Eighth and Willamette streets by Park Willamette Associates to remodel three existing empty buildings and four stories of new construction on an adjacent vacant lot.

City officials and civic leaders hoped that these projects would trigger additional and diversified development, particularly high-rise apartments and condominiums, in the downtown area.[23] At the time, property values downtown were still as high as $20 PSF. The 1980s saw further disappointments and shocks that deterred the city's plan to reinvigorate the downtown retail scenario. By early-1981, the three-year-old effort to develop a retail expansion project in downtown Eugene 'died' after Ellis-Dutcher Properties could not persuade Nordstrom to come to downtown, who instead decided to build a new store at VRC.[24]

The City Council adopted a retail development design guideline in September 1983 and began negotiations with Price Development Company and Sonoma Financial Corporation.[25] According to the developers, the proposed development could contain three major stores and about 100 smaller shops on 3.75 city blocks east of Charnelton Street, between West Eighth and West 11th avenues. The Downtown Commission gave an August 31, 1984 deadline to the two firms to refine its mall project plan, determine costs, and secure two letters of commitment from major retailers.[26]

By early-1985, the two firms envisioned a two-story, climate-controlled shopping center anchored by retail stores that possibly would include Sears and The Bon, and by as many as two others, "perhaps" Montgomery Ward, J.C. Penney, Nordstrom, or Mervyn's department stores.[27] They also presented plans that showed a shift of the development site to the north, with a fourth anchor tenant tentatively planned for the block bounded by Charnelton Street on the north, Olive

Street on the East, and West 8th avenue on the south.[28] However, the plan's demise was confirmed in late August 1985 after the developer, and the COE could not come to terms—the city and the developers were $20 million to $40 million apart in their visions.[29] Other discrepancies were that most of the site was proposed for privately held land, instead of city-owned lands; focus on concentration instead of only using the city-owned land on the mall's perimeter. However, this provided opportunities for The Bon and Sears to concentrate on possible expansion.

Meanwhile, the city approved a long-range plan to spend more than $7 million in the mall area. About half of it was redesigning and rebuilding the central plaza area into a more functional community center. With these failures and declining retail business scenarios, the first mall segment (along Willamette street between 10th and 11th avenues) reopened to automobiles in November 1985.

Figure T.1. A map of the CEP area showing the location of buildings discussed in Appendices T2 to T16 (below).

Appendix T2. Ardel Building/Ax-Billy

The Ardel Building was constructed in c. 1910 and housed the largest department store between Portland and San Francisco at one point.[30] The building was the site of the old "Ax Billy" store.[31] In late-1985 local resident Rob Bennett rehabilitated the building and converted it to the Downtown Athletic Club.[32] This story is related to the mid-1970s development proposals received for the building.

In March 1975, Hunt recommended a redevelopment proposal by Navarre Davis of Kaufman Bros. for a new building be accepted over other proposals that called for rehabilitating the building instead of tearing it down.[33] The other two proposals, both for rehabilitation, had come from Architecture Instructor Albert Pastine and builder Norman Fogelstrom. Kaufman's Davis wanted to build a three-level building-a two-story structure with a basement-for a new Kaufman's women's specialty store estimated to cost more than $1 million. Fogelstrom's plan would have provided space for some twenty retail shops, costing $320,000 for the building's improvements. Fogelstrom offered a purchase price of $5.32 PSF, a total of $4,140 more than Davis's bid. Davis had offered $8 PSF, which equated to $5 PSF as the market values. Hunt favored the Davis proposal since it would show a net profit and higher tax return, although neither of the two scenarios was guaranteed to happen. Fogelstrom's spokesperson Bill Emery argued in return that their proposal would bring a "charm to downtown" and provide rooms for small shops. However, to Hunt, the Kaufman proposal would act as a major tenant.

In April 1975, Kaufman's plan was approved by ERA with a 4:1 vote during a meeting attended by more than forty people at the City Hall's McNutt Room.[34] Most audience members supported saving the building. Kaufman Bros were planning to leave their current location at 951 Willamette street and had been downtown since 1938. On the other hand, the Ardel building was not in a condition to be saved and had to be rehabilitated from "the ground up," according to an inspection. In this note, a downtown resident of eighteen years, Phyllis Earley, commented against the Kaufman proposal, insisting that "the central, core area is getting a look of a bombed-out city- everything's being replaced ….. a brand-new town looks great on paper, but it can become as sterile as an old one." However, support for Kaufman's proposal came from downtown merchants Maurie Jacob and Harry Ritchie. Jacob argued that it would favor the 'highly specialized retail complex' vision of the downtown. Against the notion of new construction, architect Otto Poticha suggested that ERA respect its principles and favor Fogelstrom's proposal, which was willing to rehabilitate the building.

Appendix T3. Atrium Mini-mall

One specific example of ERA's involvement in securing a significant small business venture was the Atrium mini-mall constructed in 1974. Partly, the project resulted from David Hunt's vision to create a specialized center for displaced and other small businesses. ERA planned to utilize one quarter-block site to help businesses remain in the CEP area by allowing for a development that would rent them spaces in the building. Around September 1971, ERA had the equivalent of six blocks to sell, including the two blocks that the Auditorium-Convention center would require.[35] There was a consensus among ERA members that the price of land on the Eugene mall—to buy or lease—would be so high that the smaller merchants with less capital would be forced out. In response, David Hunt forwarded the belief that ERA would be able to develop a specialized center with provisions for displaced and other small businesses.

Additionally, ERA staff also wanted to advise the city to provide subsidies to potentially smaller shops.[36] ERA staff was also concerned about solving the problems of smaller merchants like shoe repair shops and letting them finish their own shops. For example, Hunt had forwarded his opinion of small businesses by arguing that "a group of businesses could be put together at the kind of places these people can afford and if a private entrepreneur (could be managed)…. (and)…. if some public route that could be taken," further adding that shops are desirable under any structure regardless of when built.

The Atrium mini-mall construction story formally began when ERA received a letter of interest from Downtown Condominium Inc. for the Disposition Parcel 127-A in July 1970.[37] ERA got interested in the proposal since it was seeking a private group to develop a limited profit shopping area for smaller merchants or 'condominium style businesses.' Parcel 127-A occupied a whole quarter block, but by August 1970, ERA had received only three proposals, which was not enough to put together a potential redevelopment program for the entire site. ERA planned to utilize the site to allow displaced and other small businesses to remain in the CEP area by leasing those spaces in the building. ERA commissioned the firm of Stearns and Mention architects to draw a layout of shops to attract developers.[38] In addition to leasing the space to small businesses, ERA Director David Hunt also wanted to offer small business owners an opportunity to buy spaces in the building as a condominium, making the tenants the owners.[39] Considering the issue of management and ownership of shared spaces, Hunt proposed a concept that involved constructing a building as a "shell" by the developer all at once and then subdivide to provide spaces for small businesses as required.[40]

While the previous effort did not go ahead, in November 1971, an interest in the parcel re-surfaced with a proposal by the Eugene Industrial Development Center (EIDC) in response to LSO3. EIDC proposed to build "an atrium mini-mall center" to house small businesses displaced by the CEP that would allow for low-rent office or commercial space like ERA had previously envisioned. According to the EIDC plan, a new building would accommodate up to twenty-four tenants on Parcel 127-A, which ERA readily favored.[41] However, by February 1972, it was clear that the EIDC proposal could not move forward.[42] Later in April, ERA accepted a bid by Churchill Village Development of Eugene (CVD) and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance to invest $1.2 million over developer James Blinkhorn's proposal to invest $690,000.[43] One of the reasons for the approval was the project's ability to include higher-rent tenants in addition to those displaced by the renewal. CVD's offer to reinstate the displaced merchants at a lower rate was a significant aspect of the project. Rents would be 38 cents PSF for displaced businesses and 52 cents PSF or others.[44] Although CVD agreed to pay only $2.60 PSF, which was $2.4 below the market rate, HUD approved the proposal since the developer agreed to provide 18,000 SF (or about one-third of the total building space) at a below-market rental rate. The building would offer 29,000 SF for retail and 18,500 for office. Additionally, an 18,000 SF basement area was available to tenants for storage.[45] The Atrium Building opened in early 1974, and by March 1974, two businesses had already opened (1) The Athletic Department and (2) Funke's Studio of Dance occupying 2,000 SF space and operated by Florence Funke.[46]

The tenants planned to be included by the end of 1974 were[47]

Name	***Business Type***	***Area (SF)***
Robertson's	Sandwich Shop	2,200
The Decathlon Club	Men's exercise facility with an indoor track	5,000
Sonotone of Eugene	Hearing Aid Center	700
The Golden Key Hair Fashions	Hair/Beauty Salon	950
The SuperCut	Barber Shop	700
Jim The Shoe Doctor	Shoe Store	600
Elwood Jewelry	Jewelry	1,200
Gallery Merlotte	Art Gallery	
Cinera Seven	120-seat theater	1,250
McKenzie	Coffee Shop	
Artebella's	Women's Boutique	

Around mid-1977, three years after opening, although the building was doing well, some observers argued that Atrium was an unsuccessful endeavor.[48] For example, Bullier and Bullier Real Estate's Don Amacher argued that the Atrium should not have been built and further speculated that the original developers would have built it only half as large if they had known that downtown merchants displaced by urban renewal could get long-tern, low-interest loans to build new stores.[49] Also, according to Amacher, the Atrium's hope for leasing office space was thwarted by construction downtown of the Citizens Building, South Park building, and Far West Federal Plaza. The Atrium was flourishing in the late-1970s (1978), with at least nineteen ROBs—two barbershops, one beauty salon, two book stores, one craft shop, one Ice cream shop, one Jeweler, one Liquor store, one Men's clothing store, five eateries, one shoe repair shop, one sporting goods store, one toy store, and one yarn shop.[50] By 1985, however, many businesses had left the complex, and there were only nine ROB left.[51] In November 1997, the COE agreed to purchase the Atrium building for its main Downtown Office.[52]

Appendix T4. Broadway Store

According to ERA's assessment, the Broadway Store was located at 60 E Broadway, in a rehabilitation questionable" parcel. As such, the parcels ERA offered the parcels during LSO2 as disposition parcel 128-B. Initially, the Broadway Store occupied parcels 128-5000 and 128-5100 and was owned by Ralph Robinson. Robinson planned to expand the store to occupy the whole of disposition Parcel 128-B. Robinson proposed a new location (the whole of disposition parcel 128-B) for the store for a total investment pf of $154,362, including $12.06 PSF for parking assessment such that the price just for the property was $89,599.50 or $7 per SF. This price was unacceptable according to the ERA, and the staff was recommending rejecting the proposal. However, some ERA members desired Broadway to remain downtown, so they did not want the store to leave.[53]

ERA had not received any proposal by November 4, 1970, in response to LSO2, except by Robinson for the Broadway Store site. Robinson offered a new proposal of $8.5 (approx. $108,800 just for the land) and spend a further $425,000 on the new building. Under the new proposal, the 10th and Oak parking assessment would be transferred in the amount due to the title's transfer. This proposal was acceptable to the ERA, and the Broadway Store was expected to "enhance future development in the area." Thus, parcel 128-B would be developed as the expanded Broadway Store.[54] However, Robinson did not commit further, and in early September 1971, almost a year after the proposal's acceptance, the contract expired because of failure to commit. According to ERA attorney Richards, three possibilities were open to ERA: (1) retaining the full amount of the good faith deposit of $8,000) as liquidated damages; (2) retaining the good faith deposit and allowing it as a credit against any future development in CEP on the part of the Broadway Store; and (3) return the deposit or any part thereof as part of a compromise settlement.[55] While Robinson indicated his desire to stay in the renewal area, the contract had to be terminated for noncompliance with the contract's terms and failure to submit Construction Plans as specified.[56] As a result, ERA again offered the parcel as a part of LSO4 in November 1971.

Later in late January 1972, ERA again received a new offer from Robinson to buy and build a new store, which ERA accepted.[57] Robinson offered $5.25 PSF for the 12,800 SF property, which was $3.25 lesser than the offer previously made and would bring the ERA $67,200. ERA acquired the property for $368,000, including the three buildings that occupied the site. At this time, ERA Director David Hunt recommended accepting the latest proposal, even though the offer was less, saying that the conditions had changed since the last contract fourteen months ago, possibly in terms of reduced land values. Additionally, the assessment attached to the 10th and Oak Overpark construction had increased from $5.40 to $6.95 PSF because of the added Overpark costs. The new proposal retained the original construction cost estimate of $425,000 in construction. By July 1972, the Broadway was ready for a new two-storied $475,000 store measuring 80 feet by 160 feet and was 12,000 SF larger than the older one.[58]

Appendix T5. Centre Court

JC Penney offered its building for sale in late-1976 after deciding not to stay downtown.[59] The store closed on July 2, 1977, due to decreasing sales, larger space available than required, and the VRC outlet's superior performance.[60] In 1969, Penney had established a 220,000 SF store in VRC when the shopping center first opened. The first downtown JCP had opened in 1915 at a different location, and it moved to its second location in 1939.[61] The building, owned by Pacific University at Forest Grove, occupied a total area of 75,000 SF and was put for sale (building and land) for $575,000 through Bullier & Bullier Realtors. According to the store's district Manager James Pollock, only 26,000 SF of the building's 75,000 SF was being used at the time (3.5 of five floors). According to ERA director Charles Kupper, "both the covering of the façade and the construction of two additional floors…. (done in 1957)" had made this building "less desirable, both to potential buyers and to downtown Eugene."[62]

However, JC Penney's departure was not a "big shock" to the EDA and ERA leaders. Nonetheless, the immediate challenge for the RCPM area was to find a developer to renovate the vacant five-storied building, which was accomplished soon. The Belluschi-designed modern building was repurposed and planned for a mixed-use facility, "Centre Court," in late-1977.[63] In the summer of 1977, Portland businessman Ronald Smith had purchased the fifty-year-old structure for about $500,000 and was planning to invest $400,000 more to remodel the building. By late-1977, the building's first tenant, "Impressions," a women's contemporary apparel store, opened for business on the street level floor. Additionally, leasing arrangements had been made for the following businesses[64]

Name	***Business Type***	***Area (SF)***
Baxter & Henning,	Men's clothing store	2,500
The Cookery	Cooking supplies, copperware, pots and pans, and gourmet supplies	
	Sandwich shop and Danish pastries	2,000
Just for Kids	Children's bookstore	800
Gari Goldsmith	Jewelers	
Artisanos	Imported Women's clothing	
The Lemon Tree	Beauty salon	2,300
	Import store	1,100
	Girls' and women's clothing store	2,000
Bo-Bette	Lingerie shop	770

By January 1978, all but 1,800 SF of the original 23,000 SF leasable space in the Centre Court had been rented.[65] Around April 1978, after an investment of $1 million, the refurbished structure housed seventeen new commercial businesses and played an essential role in revitalizing the central mall area.[66] According to the Impressions store owner, the businesses were doing good, and the Court was successful partly because of "a good mixture of tenants and the building's exciting atmosphere." The same positive sentiment was shared by several other tenants as well. One of the reasons for the Centre Court's earlier success was the timing of the building's renovation, i.e., late-1977/early-1978. By December 1978, the building housed fifteen shops and two restaurants on the main floor and mezzanine.[67] Starting in the early-1980s, however, the building, just like the rest of downtown, started to experience a decline. Finally, in January 1983, a Colorado-based developer purchased the building.[68] By the end of 1984, the Centre Court building petitioned the Court for a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.[69] However, until June 1984, Centre

Court played a significant role in offering office spaces on its upper floors and was attributed to the downtown area's revitalization.[70] At the time, the building's office rents were about $9 PSF, and retail rates went between $10 to $12.50 PSF plus a gross sale percentage over a minimum amount.[71]

Appendix T6. Citizens Building

ERA staff unanimously accepted a January 1973 proposal to build a $3.5- million high-rise office building at the northeast corner of 10th Avenue and Oak Street (that would later be The Citizens Office Building at 975 Oak St).[72] The building was not required to provide parking because the site is in the Overpark assessment district.

Appendix T7. George Boehnke and the Printing Store

The story of George Boehnke, a downtown printing store owner, and displaced merchant, is one of a struggle between small business investors, the ERA, and the urban renewal process. George Boehnke was the owner of Boehnke Printing, located at 35 W 8th avenue and occupied Parcel 115-17500. Boehnke had been in the location since 1934, i.e., for more than thirty-five years by the time Eugene's urban renewal began. Being in a substandard building, ERA planned to acquire the property and include it in the larger disposition parcel 115-C. However, Boehnke (a potential displaced business owner) wanted to purchase parcel 115-15800 in disposition parcel 115-A. At the time, the parcel was under the occupation of Rubenstein's Furniture store owner Maurie Jacobs.[73] Maurie Jacobs planned to rehabilitate a former liquor store on Olive, directly south of his present furniture store, for self-use.[74] In addition, he planned to construct small shops for other merchants on the site east of the rehabilitated building, used for parking at the time. Jacobs offered a proposal to spend more than $100,000 initially and upwards of $250,000, ultimately in a structure to relocate downtown businesses. ERA liked the idea of giving ownership of the entire disposition parcels to one owner, preferably Maurie Jacobs. On the other hand, Boehnke wanted to buy the 2,700 SF northern portion, which formally occupied parcel 115-15800, and invest $28,000 for a building that was a part of the parcel.[75]

On the one hand, if accepted, a November 1971 proposal by Maurie and Sylvia Jacobs for Parcel 115-A would give the entire half-block to single ownership, as 'desired' by most ERA staff.[76] On the other hand, George Boehnke's plan for a part of the disposition parcel 115-A did not generate the same level of enthusiasm from the ERA staff. Boehnke had proposed purchasing a portion of 115-A and rehabilitate the building. Boehnke's total proposed price was $28,000 for a 2,700 SF property ($10.37 PSF) of the northern portion of the disposition parcel 115-A. Jacobs proposed to purchase the entire parcel 115-A at the rate of $10 PSF for the 2,700 SF and $5 PSF for the balance of the parcel, meaning more than $81,000 in total. The total size of 115-A was 13,500 SF, which meant that Jacobs' average proposed rate was $6 PSF.[77] Additionally, Jacobs was also interested in Parcel 115-B for $5 PSF, which would be a parking lot for the next ten years and was located adjacent to Jacobs Fine Furniture Store parcel owned by ERA. Maurie Jacobs' proposal presented a possibility of consolidating more than 55,000 SF under a single ownership-an idea of most promise to ERA members.[78]

However, considering that George Boehnke had been interested in relocating for a long time and because no other parcel was available for rehabilitation to offer, the ERA was concerned about Boehnke as well. Boehnke argued that some businesses had already moved out of downtown after the renewal, primarily due to a lack of suitable and affordable spaces. Furthermore, Boehnke also added that there was a surplus of retail in the downtown, and service businesses like a Printing Store would help add to the diversity. However, the ERA staff were mostly unconvinced and preferred Jacobs's proposal for an expanded furniture store over Boehnke's.[79]

At a November 8, 1971 meeting, Boehnke's attorney Lewis Hoffman, attempted to convince ERA by arguing that George Boehnke's bid was higher than Mr. Jacobs's. Additionally, Boehnke was a displaced tenant and, as such, would be entitled to a higher preference. Boehnke had proposed to purchase a portion of the parcel and renovate the existing building. Jacobs had proposed to buy the entire parcel, including the buildings. In addition to the present furniture store, Jacobs also owned Parcel 115-15600 and property in the same block's southeast quarter block. The Real Estate Guideline stated that "persons who own property and/or operate a business in the project area will be extended a reasonable preference to acquire cleared land for redevelopment." Attorney Hoffman argued that having placed a higher bid, Boehnke was entitled to the award, and also, Jacobs was not a "displaced" tenant since he would have held ownership of other un-acquired properties. In making this argument, Boehnke also reminded ERA of the original purpose of renewal—to keep the businesses downtown! Boehnke further added that other small merchants were concerned over ERA's inclination toward keeping large investors over smaller ones, which indirectly forced smaller businesses to leave downtown.

In response to Maurie Jacobs' proposal to allow Boehnke to rent, he reacted by saying that he and several other merchants wanted to become owners rather than tenants and stay downtown. One merchant in agreement with Boehnke was Coburn's Shoe Store owner, who expressed concern about ERA's promises to small businesses. He argued that displaced businesses should be the ones to get the first choice, further adding that if ERA denied Boehnke this right, there was not a lot to be hopeful for moving forward to merchants like them. In the end, the ERA staff decided that Maurie Jacobs' proposal would benefit the CEP substantially and chose him over George Boehnke. Later, the disposition parcel 115-C became the Parcade, and Jacobs expanded the furniture store in Parcels 115-A and 115-B.

In the meantime, ERA repeatedly offered Boehnke another available area within the CEP.[80] Later in December, ERA contacted Boehnke for a portion of Parcel 116-A, covering an area of 5,400 SF. In April 1972, tired of the back and forth processes, George Boehnke charged ERA with 'playing politics' and not supporting local businesses enough since ERA rejected his second proposal too.[81] ERA rejected this second proposal by Boehnke and his attorney Keith Rodman to acquire a 5,400-SF property on 747 Willamette street for $4 PSF because it was too low (HUD did not accept bids lower than $5 PSF at the time).

Finally, in May 1972, his third proposal to construct a new building and relocate was approved for the exact 747 Willamette street location.[82] ERA selected Boehnke's proposal over two others. It planned to demolish the old structure (two buildings that looked like one) located on the east side of Willamette street about midway between the 7th and 8th avenues. Boehnke had bid $4.7 PSF compared to the original bid of $4. Although Boehnke's was less than the other offer from Jack Bonner of Bonner's Tavern for $5.75 PSF, ERA accepted the offer because Hunt believed that "renewal agency guidelines on making property sales decisions specify criteria other than price as being factors," further adding that Boehnke was a displaced businessman.

In contrast, Bonner's Tavern was established after the renewal program had begun. Boehnke's proposal to construct a new building faced criticism from Bonner for not opting for preservation. However, the building Bonner wanted to renovate was only one of the two buildings that needed to be saved together, and they shared a wall too. ERA staff claimed that having to retain that building and demolish the other would have required costly construction. Later in March 1987, Boehnke's printing store closed after more than sixty years in business.[83]

Appendix T8. Latham's and Others

The parcel on which Leroy Latham's business "Latham's Luggage" was located (857 Willamette st, later relocated to 55 W Broadway) was scheduled for demolition. In July 1972, Latham learned that he was bidding for parts of the same property in Parcel 126-C.[84] The other bid was from Joe Anselmo (owner of the neighboring Valley Stationery at 865 Willamette street), whom Latham accused of 'playing games' and partnering with ERA. Along with Latham and Anselmo, owners of Danish Imports had also submitted bids on the parcel located "across the mall from the present locations of Latham's and Valley Stationery [parcels 125-4200 and 125-4300 or disposition parcel 125-A]." Anselmo submitted a bid of $8 PSF for thirty-six front feet, while Latham submitted a bid of $6 PSF for twenty-five front feet. ERA favored Anselmo's bid at the time.

However, in late September 1972, ERA accepted bids from Burch's shoes (for 99 W Broadway) and Latham (for 55 W Broadway) for parcel 126-B.[85] Burch's proposal was for a $324,000 development, including $76,800 for the 9,600 SF parcel at the rate of $8 PSF. At the time, the proposed store site included The Toy Shoppe, Elwood Jewelers, The Athletic Department (a specialty athletic shoe shop), The Candle Carte, and Harry Krishna's New Delhi (a delicatessen-restaurant). Burch's shoe store was founded in 1931 at 1032 Willamette St. by Henry Burch. The store hand moved to its present location in 1940 and enlarged to its present size in 1959. The Combs had purchased the business in 1960. Burch's store also operated a 7,000-SF store at VRC. Latham's bid was also at $8 PSF for a total of $100,000 for a 3,000 SF parcel on the eastern edge of the same quarter-block. Between the two new developments was the former Payless drug store up for sale located at 63 W Broadway—vacant since it closed earlier in 1972.

ERA approved these two and other proposals in December 1972.[86] Other proposals in the same parcel were (1) by McDuff's Inc. to construct a two-story building to house a restaurant and two small retail shops at the cost of $175,000 and (2) by George Mattox and John Brandt to relocate the Mattox pipe Shopin a new $60,000 building at 57 W Broadway. McDuff Inc.'s final accepted bid was $8 PSF for property fronting on Broadway and $4 a square foot on 1,800 SF at the property's rear. Mattox bid $8.50 PSF, who confirmed that the present pipe shop building would be demolished to construct a retail shop and office building.[87] The Mattox bid was on a 2,400-SF parcel located between McDuff's property on the west and the new Latham's Luggage location on the east. Later in 1984, George Mattox closed his thirty-three-year-old store.[88]

Appendix T9. Loy's Restaurant

In December 1976, ERA sold a 4,200-SF parcel to restaurant owner Jack Loy of Springfield, who planned to open a new family-oriented restaurant at the west edge of downtown Eugene.[89] Loy proposed building a two-story 8,000 SF building behind the existing restaurant on West 8th avenue with a restaurant on the ground floor and a private dining room and rental space on the second level. ERA chose this proposal over another one from real estate salesman Dale Forster of Eugene, who proposed building a single-story, 4,000 SF retail building. Forster had offered to pay more for the vacant site—$5.75 PSF compared to Loy's $5.25—and have his building completed a year earlier. Still, ERA decided to go with the latter since it offered "the greater overall economic benefit to the urban renewal program and the central Eugene business district." Loy had proposed to invest more than $331,000 in his building, while Forster planned to build a $120,000 structure. According to an ERA member, another reason for approval was that Loy's building would have 3,000 SF of rental space. However, another ERA member (who was also a downtown retailer) argued that there were already many restaurants downtown, so consideration could be given to retailers who would bring more people downtown. Real estate broker Pat Burrington, who represented Forster, added that the downtown office in Loy's proposal was extraneous. Other ERA members favored Loy's proposal as the restaurant was also a retail business by nature and would bring nighttime customers downtown. In January 1978, ERA reviewed and approved construction drawings by architect Kenneth Y. Nagao for a restaurant/pie shop to be constructed at 138 W 8th avenue by Jack Loy.[90] Loy, at the time, was also the owner of the Pit Famous Barbeque at 800 Olive street.

Appendix T10. Overpark Parking Garage

The first major parking garage in downtown Eugene was the 600-capacity Overpark (located outside the CEP boundary). The Seattle firm of N. G. Jacobson and Associates designed the $2 million structure was unveiled on September 9, 1968.[91] The building plans included space for retail on the ground floor. The plan faced a two-year delay as property owners contested the method of assessing. EDA, headed by chairman Ralph Robinson (downtown property owner), had unanimously endorsed the $2 million structure earlier in mid-1966.[92] Under the proposal, property owners within the district would pay the revenue bonds, which would be issued to finance land acquisition and construction.

The project was approved in late-1966 after a public hearing.[93] This approval cleared the way for the city to acquire the required lots on the southwest and northwest corners of 10th avenue and Oak street. Members of ECC argued in support of the parking structure, adding that it was necessary to improve the downtown as a shopping center against the competition presented by the outlying shopping centers. The party to support the parking program included members of the city and few local property owners, whereas those opposing it mainly were property owners unhappy with the assessment or the city's approach of "confiscation."

The city formed a parking assessment district to finance the garage, which would mandate contributions from the area's property owners (see figure 8.13).[94] The purpose of creating the assessment district was to develop an off-street parking facility by assembling land and sharing the cost on an "equitable basis per the benefit derived." In this method, the property owners close to the site and those who would potentially benefit from the structure were obliged to pay their fair share over twenty years. However, all net revenues from the parking facility would be used to pay the bond, and the assessment was based on the proximity of one's property to the parking site.[95] Some property owners complained that the assessment district was too small and unfair to the small segment of downtown property owners. Some merchants also expressed dissatisfaction over the location, especially its distance from the core. A letter from November 1966 sent by the city to one property owner mentions that the property owner's total share would be $34,540 over twenty years (more than $1,700 per month in total).[96] However, the parking assessment plan did not change, and the garage's construction was completed in 1969.

Appendix T11. Parcade Garage and its Location

The 430-space garage 'The Parcade' was dedicated in January 1977 and completed in early-1978.[97] When first completed, it also offered 22,000 SF retail space on the street level. The plan for such a parking garage was in the original CEP plan. In the 1970s, ERA discussed considerable time during the meetings to decide on an appropriate location. The name "Parcade" was not decided until 1977 and was referred to mostly as "8th avenue parking structure." ERA first reviewed five proposals for appropriate design and location in July 1971. [98] One of the proposals was for a 600-capacity garage similar to the Overpark. ERA rejected at least two proposals. The first proposal planned to span across the 8th avenue and was rejected because ERA staff did not favor "the appearance and effect of a street-spanning parking structure." The second one was for a site running north and south between 7th and 8th avenues in the block between Willamette and Olive streets.

The sites given consideration were two half-block (east-west) properties located on the north and south sides of the 8th avenue between Olive and Willamette streets. At the time, the Parcade was one of three other parking structures planned to be located on the retail core's perimeter. The other two were planned to be located in the vicinity of 10th avenue and Olive and Broadway west of Charnelton street.

Discussion regarding the South location (Parcel 126-A)—According to Hunt, the south side site would have the advantage of being closer to the retail shopping core but would eliminate a half-block-sized property along Olive between 8th and Broadway from being a potential location for a major retail store.[99] Additionally, the south of 8th avenue location presented the possibility for the retail area's consolidation.[100] Also, this decision would make the northeastern corner of Olive and Broadway (southwestern quarter block of Block 126) very desirable by opening up the northeastern corner of 8th and Olive (southwestern quarter block of Block 115) for small businesses and providing parking behind it (i.e., in 126-A). Hunt noted that according to Williams, there would be a definite traffic advantage if north of 8th was chosen, but south did not have a significant problem either, and it would also be closer to the core area.[101]

To Traffic Engineer Al Williams, the most desirable parcel was located on the south side of 8th avenue.[102] According to Williams, from an economic standpoint and effect on shopping, the south side was desirable, and from the auditorium point of view, the north side was desirable. An ERA member (Mr. Henning) added that it is more important to consider a location closer to the mall than to the proposed auditorium site (at the northernmost end).[103] Another ERA member (Kellogg) reiterated that locating in the southside would improve patrons' activity because of proximity to the mall.[104] Furthermore, another ERA member (Shearer) wanted the location to be on the south side of 8th avenue, further adding that the north would be more critical for developments like high-rise residential development.[105]

One of the interested developers (Landskroner) argued that if located south of 8th avenue, there could be retail operations between the site and the mall.[106] Also, that way, other developments could take place further north of 8th avenue. Potential developers (Landskroner and Fackrell) were not interested in waiting for a major retailer and wanted the parking garage closer to the mall.[107]

Discussions regarding the Northside (Block 115)—According to Hunt, the site north of 8th avenue (in the ground level of Parcade) would also be of interest to the small business owners who wanted to locate closer to where they were.[108]

Discussions regarding the site along Willamette (Parcel 115-C)—In one of the meetings, Hunt expressed his desire to locate the parking structure on the west side of Willamette between the 7th and 8th avenues.[109] According to Hunt, choosing this location would (1) permit the smaller development desired by small merchants on the northeast corner of 8th and Olive (115-A), (2) retain the large parcel between Broadway and 8th for a major retailer (126-A), (3) provide reasonable access for the parking structure, and (4) connect both the north and south areas. This would also allow the hotel or office building to locate across the street from the parking structure.[110] However, Hunt was not strict about his view about the hotel's proximity. One ERA member (Henning) indicated that this option would not let the central core area be compact, and the parking would not be closer to the stores in the mall (which was desired).

Discussions about the final verdict—During a July 21 meeting, three ERA members voted YES, and one voted NO in a motion to pass the southern site as the designated site.[111] During an August 4 meeting, another ERA member moved to locate the parking to the south side of 8th avenue (since the July 21 move had only four of the seven ERA members, so it could not move ahead). At that time, three voted YES, and four voted NO. Another ERA member then moved again to locate the parking on the north of 8th instead, and it passed unanimously.[112] While further discussions in the later years (1973-1975) are not available, the final Parcade location chosen was neither the south site nor the north, but the one along Willamette between 7th and 8th avenues (which occupied half of the northern site).

In September 1975, ERA awarded a contract for constructing a multi-level parking garage to Minden Construction Co. of Portland.[113] The firm had submitted the second-lowest bid of $2.47 million. The 3.5 level structure would have retail shops on the ground floor level and provide parking space for 415 automobiles. The funding for construction would come from a $4 million bond being financed by tax increment funds.

Appendix T12. Quackenbush

Arthur Quackenbush and his father opened the Quackenbush Hardware store in 1903, and it was the oldest surviving downtown store in the 1970s.[114] When it opened, horse-drawn wagons and buggies crowded Broadway-the street on which it was located. According to one account, a lady from eastern Canada, who could not find rare pattern china anywhere, found it in Quackenbush's. Before his death in January 1970, Arthur (and Helen) Quackenbush had fought off ERA's attempts to acquire the land.

The store building stood on Parcel 129-7500 (disposition parcel 129-B), and the building in which the store stood was substandard according to ERA's assessment. In early 1971, ERA submitted a letter to Mrs. Quackenbush, in care of First National Bank as Trustee, indicating the agency's final offer for the land and given a final acceptance date of February 3, 1971, for condemnation proceedings to be instituted. According to ERA, several parties were interested in this property.[115] ERA even discussed an interest expressed in the Quackenbush store's rehabilitation and offering the property for sale subject to rehabilitation and redevelopment. In fact, the parcel was offered for LSO3 as a part of disposition parcel 129-B.[116]

However, once the locals heard of possible demolition, there were concerns about saving it all around. The announcement of demolition even stirred protests from some area residents. A "Save Quackenbush" contingent was established as the downtown hardware store was considered a heritage. The store included "an old-time general store atmosphere that included pull-chain-operated change tubes and period piece weighing scales."[117] Back in 1969, when its demolition was planned, the Lane County Historical Society was interested in its preservation but could not move forward due to a lack of funding. However, in late February 1971, Mrs. Helen Quackenbush informed ERA of her interest in rehabilitation. The problem with rehabilitation was that it would cost more than $100,000 so at this point, ERA buying the property seemed more likely than Mrs. Quackenbush rehabilitating it.[118]

The story that follows presents ERA's nature of force occupants out of the area. ERA persuaded Helen Quackenbush (in her eighties at the time) and attempted to "get her signature to the right to purchase her store."[119] In her own words, ERA representatives forced her by saying, "You'll have to sign sooner or later, Mrs. Quackenbush. Why not save yourself thousands of wasted dollars and a lot of grief? We'll win eventually." So, she signed the letter, and soon ERA received support from the members for condemnation proceedings. To see if the cost could be lowered, Mrs. Quackenbush hired the firm of Unthank Seder and Poticha (USP), who estimated that the rehabilitation was possible for $30,000.[120] After a month, a construction firm offered a low bid of $40,734 for rehabilitation, which was still more than $30,000 estimated by USP. However, Mrs. Quackenbush decided to go forward with the rehabilitation.[121] USP's design objective was to retain the essential character of the Quackenbush store. Project architect for USP

Phil Gall was noted as saying, “it’s the way things operate inside that appeals to most people. That’s the real character of it.”[122] In August 1971, ERA further discussed the issue of the Quackenbush parcel and rehabilitation of the store.[123] The parcel (129-B) had four buildings in total; the two buildings east of the main building were to be removed, and the other two would be brought up to city code. At this point, ERA intended to buy the two east-side buildings and demolish them but not acquire the land.[124] The formal reopening of the Quackenbush store occurred on Saturday, November 6, 1971.[125] The store was not much different from the old store, and there was only a minimum change in the store's traditional atmosphere.

Mrs. Quackenbush died in late September 1972 at the age of eighty-three.[126] The price of the property was later set at $900,000. After Mrs. Quackenbush’s death, the store was sold in September 1973 to Rural America Merchandising Concept (RAMCON) from Minneapolis, and the new owners pledged to operate it the same way as before and retain all fifteen employees.[127] However, at the end of 1975, the owners lost their lease and started to liquidate the inventory.[128] At the time, the property got appraised at $137,970 and the building at $30,510. Fortunately, one of the investors from the same firm got a new lease on the property shortly after.[129] The building was again sold to a team of three investors (one from Eugene and two from Portland) in October 1979.[130] By that time, according to one of the owners who pledged to maintain the place's nostalgia, the store had evolved into a miniature shopping center. In September 1980, the store let go of the “hardware” portion of the store since it was not competitive against other larger businesses. Later that year, the building was sold to Tom Slocum of Broadway and Pearl Associates of Eugene due to “poor economic conditions” and inability to “run a profitable operation at this location, primarily because of high-interest rates and lack of off-street parking,” according to one of the owners.[131] The new owners also maintained the old tradition of the store. Two tenants at the time, Scandia Down in the basement and Men’s Hair by Women on the third level would remain in business. In October 1982, the building (and McDonald Theatre) were placed in the National Register of Historic Places.[132] Six years later, in June 1988, the HRB designated the building as a local historic landmark.[133] At the time, Dan Giustina of Broadway and Pearl Associates owned the building.

Appendix T13. Smeed Hotel

One crucial building among the list of buildings marked for preservation was the Smeed Hotel, which was renovated with historic preservation professionals and architects' efforts. Built in 1885 as the Baker Hotel, it was later renamed Hotel Eugene (1892), Eugene Hotel (1902), Hotel Smeede (1907), New Smeed Hotel (1931), and Smeed Hotel (after 1938).[134] The hotel had opened in April 1885 after Chas Baker sold the building and furnishings to Stephen Smeed for $12,000.[135] A notable account of the hotel is that in 1891, William Jennings Bryan—a three-time Presidential Nominee for the Democratic Party—slept there. The building was known to be the oldest surviving brick building hotel in Lane County.[136]

According to ERA's assessments, the hotel building was scheduled for demolition. In the early-1970s, the Smeed was vacant of tenants except for two shops on street level. A few experts even presented an idea that the building could house the Pioneer Museum. However, in April 1972, ERA agreed to a request by the firm of USP to submit a proposal for the rehabilitation of the building.[137] Earlier, ERA had deemed the building unfeasible for restoration at the price of $350,000. Although work was not completed at the time (in late-1973), Architect Otto Poticha of USP estimated the total investment to be about $280,000, including the original purchase price and renovation work to meet the building codes.[138] In his own words, the team was "trying to maintain the integrity of the building and not cover it up."

Appendix T14. South Park Building

ERA announced a $2 million, four-story office and commercial building called the South Park (located at 101 E Broadway) in October 1973.[139] The project would be developed by the Johnson & Harrang Investment Co. Principals, designed by architect Daniel M. Herbert, and John H. Herrick was the Structural Engineer. The potential tenants at the time included a City attorney, a branch of the Oregon Bank, other professional and service firms, retail stores, and a restaurant. The structure, including a basement and mezzanine, totaled about 60,000 SF. The construction site had been occupied previously by the Lumberman Building and adjoining structures. After the clearance of the property, the displaced tenants included Henry Lowry Fine Cameras, Mattox Pipe Shop, and Robert's Lunch & Bar.

Appendix T15. Three Historic Buildings along Willamette Street and Historic Preservation

One important story related to the preservation of the historic building in the CEP area is that of the three buildings on Willamette Street—Preston (861 Willamette st), Hall (865 Willamette st), and Portland Store (873 Willamette). This story is tied to the fundamental question of the City and ERA's intentions for downtown Eugene—preserve the existing historic fabric or ignore it. The three buildings were located adjacent to each other, and ERA acquired them as a part of the urban renewal after the initial structural assessment. Before the renewal, they housed Hoffman's Jewelers, Valley Stationery, and Latham's Luggage. At the time, ERA had agreed to sell the land occupied by these three buildings to a group headed by Eugene attorney developer Wayne Helikson, who were planning to tear down the structures in addition to the adjacent Del Ray building (845 Willamette st) and build a three-story office building. According to a study by Glenn Mason, director of the Lane County Museum, the 1873 Hoffman Building was the oldest structure downtown at the time. The Valley Stationery Building was built around 1889, and the Latham building was built c. 1902 (which began as Preston's Harness Shop). A UO design studio "Design 380 Urban Repair," even conducted a structural feasibility study of the buildings and found that while the Hoffman building was in poor condition, the remaining two were in relatively good shape. Nonetheless, the students recommended renovating all three buildings, arguing that it would cost less than tearing them down and building a new structure.

At the time, the Eugene Historic Review Board (EHRB) was considering recommending the Eugene City Council to provide the structures with historical status, and if approved, the property owners could apply for State and Federal funds to help restore and maintain the building exteriors.[140] The buildings were listed on the Statewide Inventory of Historic Sites, and Buildings and the state Advisory Committee approved their "nomination" for the National Register of Historic Places on Historic Preservation in 1978.[141] The buildings were not designated as historic landmarks, and almost a year later, in May 1979, EHRB decided to give up its efforts.[142] The Historic Landmark status would generally entitle the property owners to apply for grants to restore and maintain building exteriors. Such a status also forced the property owners to seek EHRB's approval for exterior alterations or demolition.

The ERA did not favor the historic designation of the buildings due to potential problems during the area's redevelopment. Instead, the agency offered a compromise to provide a historic designation for the Portland Store (oldest of the three buildings) with a possible renovation of the other two at the developer's option.[143] According to ERA director Charles Kupper, the buildings had previously been altered to the degree that they no longer represented a distinct architectural style. Instead, he asserted that new buildings would bring more tax revenue than older ones, further suggesting "adaptive rehabilitation" rather than historic restoration. EHRB member Glen Mason argued in response that the buildings had historic merit because they were representative of the city's commercial development and that it was not necessary for a place to be 'famous' to justify their preservation.

Appendix T16. Two Northern Blocks and the Case of Archie Weinstein

As evident in the earliest meeting minutes, a dilemma existed among ERA staff on whether to hold large areas/entire blocks for other development or break up the parcel as the proposals came.[144] For example, during a July 1971 meeting, ERA staff discussed Parcel 126-B, which occupied the whole quarter block. One ERA member suggested that putting a time limit would have to be set for holding the parcel indicated for a major retailer. At one point, even David Hunt was against this idea of waiting for a prominent developer because there were interested parties at the time for a moderate-sized store if the parcel was to be split up.[145]

As the RTKL plan shows, the Cultural/Entertainment Center (Auditorium, Conference, Hotel) was reserved for the area north of 7th avenue. After acquisition and total clearance, the two empty northernmost blocks on each side of Willamette street became disposition parcels 114-A and 114-B and 113-A and 133-B. The Lane County Auditorium Association (LCAA) had favored the location (a "site somewhere in an area bounded by Oak and Olive streets and 6th and 8th avenues."), as early as January 1970. LCAA wanted to build a Cultural Convention Center (Community Convention Center and Auditorium).[146]

According to the ERA meeting minutes of March 4, 1970, LCAA submitted a letter to the City Council asking for the reservation of those two blocks for an auditorium/convention center. However, the issue was whether the auditorium had to be located in the CEP area. Hunt believed that "the auditorium complex would provide much for the downtown area and would make the downtown complete as a center of the community….. This social impact would be lost should the auditorium complex be located outside the Project area."[147] The sets of disposition parcels 113 and 114 also occupied the Willamette street segment, and therefore, one issue was the need to close Willamette between 6th and 7th for the proposed auditorium-convention center construction.[148] Four downtown merchants were in opposition of the closing—George Boehnke, Maurie Jacobs, Sanford Nemerovski, and Archie Weinstein, most of whom were not excited about the mall idea either. However, as Maurie Jacobs clarified, they were not against the idea of an auditorium downtown, just the closure of another street segment.[149] Additionally, the closure of streets would bring the disadvantages of inaccessibility to CBD from northern downtown, circulation problems in the CEP area with "impaired circulation,"[150] traffic stress on other streets, loss of property value (against the original intent of the renewal program). George Boehnke even commented that he had learned that small business people and banks, and professional people around the area could be looking to moving out of the downtown area because of such traffic blockage.[151]

ERA faced the dilemma of whether to close the street or not have the auditorium locate in the CEP area. The option of having a cultural center with a street in the middle was not probable. One specific reason given by Architect Mr. Amundson (of the firm Lutes and Amundson; the architect for the LCAA) was that if the auditorium complex were built on two sites, it would not be an "operational unit."[152] Furthermore, Amundson also commented that the problem was about movement during bad weather and that convention managers against designing a convention center that was not contiguous. Even after learning about these issues, ERA wanted to look for options to keep the auditorium in the project area without closing the street.

While the ERA and LCAA were seeking the approval of a downtown site for the auditorium and a hotel developer in the early-1970s, ERA received an offer for the eastern block in September 1973. The offer was from Archie Weinstein, the Eugene Surplus Store owner (located in the western block, 666 Willamette street) and a displaced tenant, who offered $250,000.[153] Weinstein proposed to build a retail/mixed-use complex occupying two quarter blocks between 6th and 7th avenues (current location of the Hult center). However, ERA had planned the site for a motor hotel. Regardless, ERA staff informed Weinstein that they could not even consider the offer since a Portland developer Harold Pollin had already offered $150,000 for the same property to build a Hotel. The problem with Weinstein's proposal was that it had arrived after Pollin's.[154] While Weinstein claimed he had made an offer earlier through a letter, the regulation required that proposals be made during regular meetings.

The estimated cost for improvements of Weinstein's proposed 72,500 SF complex was $1.45 million.[155] However, ERA could not even receive the sketch of the design legally. According to the proposed design, retail stores would occupy the street-level spaces, a second-story level facing Willamette Street would be rented as office space, and there would be provisions for off-street parking and pedestrian ways. The proposed complex's retail use would involve his Surplus Store, a store selling Western merchandise, a restaurant and lounge, drug store, beauty supply shop, a sewing center, appliance sales, shoe repair, and a hardware store. The proposed rental rate of all spaces would be consistent with the local market, which at the time was 35 cents to 55 cents PSF. However, in January 1974, Weinstein learned that he had "lost the renewal fight."[156]

However, before that, Weinstein appeared for a public hearing on a petition to substitute retail stores for a proposed downtown hotel at the end of 1973.[157] Before securing a public hearing in November 1973, Weinstein had argued for developing the site into retail stores instead of a motor hotel.[158] However, David Hunt reminded Weinstein that the urban renewal plan from the beginning had prioritized the idea of consolidating retail uses on and adjacent to the Eugene Mall. Hunt further added that the decision to choose the Hotel proposal was based on advice from economic consultants.

Under urban renewal procedures, anyone who had acquired the property for redevelopment (ERA in this case) could decide the land-use change.[159] HUD had set a minimum price of $1.75 PSF on the property, and Pollin's offer for the hotel amounted to $1.4 PSF. In January 1974, ERA sent a letter giving Weinstein a March 1 deadline to move out of his downtown surplus sales store.[160] In reaction, he told the ERA board members to not "act like a bunch of dictators."

Despite the continuing protest, ERA gave Harold Pollin a contract for a proposed ten-story hotel with a $189,500 land sale in February 1974.[161] Weinstein protested that the public work improvements requested by Pollin alone would cost the taxpayers of the city around $1 million. Hunt refuted this logic and instead argued that the return on tax dollars of Pollin's proposed $3.4 million Hotel would exceed that of Weinstein's proposed $1.4 million complex. The Hotel would provide around $57,000 more in tax dollars in the first year alone. The ERA board also denied a request by Weinstein to reclassify the western block (reserved for a commercial-auditorium center) to commercial retail sales and office on the grounds of the later uses being "incidental to other permitted uses."

Weinstein was a critique of ERA's urban renewal project, specifically the process of revitalization by destroying most of what existed.[162] He believed that the project was a "$20 million destruction of downtown" that put small merchants out of business.[163] In a petition sent to ERA, Weinstein also included a list of eighty-one stores which he said had been "driven out of the Eugene downtown core area" by the renewal program versus only a single new store located downtown since the renewal program began.[164]

However, at a later November 1973 meeting, Robert Rubenstein, a furniture store executive, refuted the claim by saying that twenty-seven stores had moved into new downtown locations, and another twenty-two had committed. Hunt also added that ERA had helped fifty-seven businesses to relocate and have scheduled relocations for thirty-six more. Out of those thirty-six, more than half were scheduled to move to the Atrium building, which was still in construction at the time. Hunt further claimed that urban renewal had already seen \$3.5 million in new development downtown and has another \$8.8 million committed for a total of \$12.3 million in assured development. Additionally, contrary to Weinstein's claim, Hunt also argued that only twenty businesses had moved out of downtown, fourteen had ceased operation, out of which nine had done so because 'they were marginal operations.' Hunt also added that Weinstein's list included eighteen that were still downtown, seven closed or in bankruptcy at the time the property was acquired, seven whose owners retired, two not in business when the renewal began, and thirteen that consolidated with other businesses.

In another instance, Weinstein lamented the 'hypocrisy' of Eugene city officials to make an effort to save "Montgomery Ward in downtown Eugene while approving renewal agency actions removing other existing businesses."[165] In addition to comments about the site and the CEP, Weinstein also made frequent remarks about the ERA itself. For example, he clarified that the ERA was not a government agency but a city project.[166] He presented questions about ERA's mandate to vacate the twenty-nine plus stores to replace them with a motor hotel.

After losing the battle to erect a retail/office center in February, Weinstein announced in March 1974 that he was quitting business after almost twenty-five years and entering politics.[167] He also announced his plans for the final day of his store, May 4, to have "a wake and a funeral to symbolize the closing." As mentioned in one newspaper article, "…. the wake will begin at 6:10 p.m. with the burial to follow…. there's going to be a lot of Irish whiskey here and urban renewal will be the pallbearers." Weinstein added that he had no intention of relocating the store because no new suitable site was available. He further added, "now the devastation and destruction of a once-popular, busy, and lively Eugene downtown retail business-core area, is causing the death of a great store…. Urban renewal is the best friend Valley River Center has ever had."

A newspaper report from the day of the store's closing remarks that after the store finally closed that day, "…. the sales counter was converted to a bar, the doors reopened and a jovial throng of approximately 100 friends, curious onlookers, and nostalgia-filled customers poured in to pay its last respects to the business."[168] There was even a "sendoff" for a casket bearing the "body" of urban renewal. Weinstein even announced two new slogans for his political future: "Hunt the Urbangate" and "Bake" the Bakers. The Bakers were Alton Baker Jr., Publisher of the Register-Guard, and General Manager Edwin Baker.

Regarding the fate of the other hotel proposal, Pollin withdrew from his plan to build the hotel in April 1976 because of difficulties in financing a hotel, and so ERA renewed its lookout for a new hotel developer.[169] In September 1976, Developer Jim McClory bid for two entire city blocks to build a four-story hotel and a convention center (accommodating at least 1,000 people) at a purchase price of around $1.9 PSF for a total of $406,653—two entire city blocks.[170] However, a few days later, McClory dropped the plan because of the developer's feeling that the downtown retail expansion plans were in trouble.[171] McClory referred to opposition by Friends of a Liveable Eugene and residents of the downtown westside regarding the proposal for a new enclosed shopping center west of the existing mall. In his own words, McClory did not want to get involved in a downtown quarrel and became unsure of downtown's potential to grow in the near future. ERA had been looking for a hotel developer since 1973.

In November 1976, ERA again received another proposal for an $8 to $ 10 million Hotel and Convention Center by businessmen Robert C. Smith and William Pollock of Eugene.[172] They proposed a rate of $1.75 PSF for a total of $374,000 on parcels located on both sides of Willamette between the 6th and 7th avenues. Smith and Pollock proposed building a five or six-story, 300-room hotel on the westside parcel and constructing a Convention Center across Willamette Street. The hotel itself would have convention rooms that would accommodate 250 to 1,200 people.

In November 1977, the Eugene Planning Commission recommended a five-acre parcel-a block north of the Eugene Mall as a site for the development of a "Civic Center Complex" in the two blocks on either side of Willamette between 6th and 7th avenues (including the closure of the Willamette segment).[173] As proposed at the time, the center would include a small theater seating about 500 people, a larger theater/concert hall seating about 2,500, and a conference and activity center for community meetings and conventions. The proposed facilities also include parking underneath the structure for 435 to 450 cars, rehearsal rooms, meeting rooms, plazas, landscaping, and all necessary equipment.[174] The economic impact of the Civic Center was promising—during the three-year construction period, Economic Research Associates estimated that 571 new jobs would be created, generating a total payroll of more than $8.6 million.

In March 1978, ERA rejected a proposal by Janisse-Mortier-Pohll Partnership, a Eugene-based development firm, to develop a multi-use hotel and convention center on an agency-owned site between Willamette and Olive streets, south of 8th avenue.[175] ERA director Charles Kupper thought that the firm did not have the "experience or the equity capital necessary to undertake the hotel development." Kupper also suggested that the parcel proposed for a hotel location be frozen until the community decided on the proposed development of a civic center complex in downtown Eugene. Finally, on June 27, 1978, voters approved the passing of an $18.5 million bond to finance the Performance Arts building within the Civic Center by a 3:2 margin (10,473 YES and 6,846 NO).[176] The funding would be used for a 2,500 seat concert hall and a 500-seat theater on the eastern block. In January 1979, the City Council approved an architectural concept for the performance center by Hardy Hoizman Pfeiffer Associates of New York and Don Lutes as the local architect.[177] Simultaneously, in April 1979, ERA selected a Salt Lake City Firm, Development Associates, to develop a privately financed 250-room $10 million Hilton Hotel and a publicly financed Convention Center.[178] The convention center would be supported by a tax increment bond of $2.5 to $3 million. The west block of the two-block "civic center" site would have a $20.3 million (updated cost) performing arts complex with a concert hall, theater, and parking garage. In total, the cost of the Civic Center would be more than $40 million.[179]

By July 1980, ERA had moved forward with constructing the Convention Center and adjacent underground parking facilities for about 425 cars at an estimated cost of $5.75 million.[180] Construction of the adjacent $15.5 million Hilton Hotel was scheduled to be completed in the spring of 1982. According to Kupper, the ERA would use "cash on hand plus tax increment financing" to pay for the convention center and parking. The Nils and Jewel Hult Center for the Performing Arts (named in commemoration of the couple's $3 million donations) opened in September 1982 at the cost of $22.3 million.[181] Mayor Les Anderson called the effort "the biggest community commitment that ever took place in Eugene."

Notes

[1] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals*.

[2] "Firm to Study Downtown Potential."

[3] ERA, *A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene*.

[4] "Potential of Downtown Will Be Reviewed."

[5] "Downtown Shopping Area in Expansion Plan," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, 1977).

[6] ERA, *A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene*.

[7] "Proposals Requested to Develop Downtown."

[8] ERA, *An Invitation for Development Proposals*.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] 1977, *Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene*

[13] "Renewal Board Expected to Endorse Downtown Shopping Center," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 15, 1977).

[14] "Grand Scheme for Downtown."

[15] Ibid.

[16] ERA, *A Study of Retail Expansion in Downtown Eugene*.

[17] "Renewal Board Expected to Endorse Downtown Shopping Center."

[18] "Council Endorsed Proposal for a $50 Million Retail Expansion of Downtown Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 12, 1977).

[19] "Downtown Development Proposal," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 2, 1978).

[20] "Panel Suggest Major Retail Project for Downtown," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 21, 1978).

[21] "Downtown Plan Dies," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 11, 1979).

[22] "Downtown's New Twist," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 1, 1979).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Tims, "Board Performs Last Rites for Downtown Expansion Project."

[25] Matassa, "Two Firms to Develop Mall Plan."

[26] Mark Matassa, "Mall Plan Ok'd," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 13, 1985).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] George Barker, "Plan for New Downtown Mall Discarded," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, August 28, 1985).

[30] Dana Tims, "Mall Harvest Hope in Club's Prosperity," *Sunday Oregonian* (Eugene, March 2, 1986).

[31] "Renewal Staff Wants Ardel Building Demolished," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 20, 1975).

[32] Tims, "Mall Harvest Hope in Club's Prosperity."

[33] "Renewal Staff Wants Ardel Building Demolished."

[34] Don Floyd, "Renewal Agency Okays Plan to Tear down Ardel Building," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 3, 1975).

[35] Sellers and Baker, "Downtown Eugene-- Dying or Reviving?"

[36] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[37] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1970" (Eugene, n.d.).

[38] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, August 19, 1970" (Eugene, August 19, 1970).

[39] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, September 2, 1970."

[40] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 4, 1970."

[41] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 17, 1971" (Eugene, November 17, 1971).

[42] "'Mini-Mall' Planned," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 23, 1972).

[43] Kenyon, "Renewal Panel Accepts $1.2 Million 'Mini-Mall' Bid."

[44] "Deadline given for Potential 'Mini-Mall' Businesses."

[45] "Mini-Mall Plans Told."

[46] "Center for Specialty Shops Opening Doors for Business," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 10, 1974).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] "Jefferson Elevator: Eugene's Newest Mini-Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 29, 1977).

[50] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory*.

[51] *Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Directory*.

[52] Kidd, "City Agrees to Purchase Atrium."

[53] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, October 7, 1970" (Eugene, October 7, 1970).

[54] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 4, 1970."

[55] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, September 1, 1971" (Eugene, n.d.).

[56] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, September 15, 1971" (Eugene, n.d.).

[57] Ed Kenyon, "Downtown Bid by The Broadway Ok'd," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 28, 1972).

[58] Ginny Burdick, "Broadway Ready for Opening at New Downtown Location: New Store to Concentrate on Fashions," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 25, 1972).

[59] "Future of Downtown Penney Store in Doubt," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 4, 1976); "Firm to Study Downtown Potential."

[60] "JC Penney Closes Eugene Mall Store."

[61] "JC Penney to Abandon Downtown Store," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 13, 1977).

[62] "Will Store Be Unmodernized?," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 22, 1977).

[63] "Specialty Shops to Occupy Old Penney's Store," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 27, 1977).

[64] Ibid.

[65] "Centre Court: A Menagerie of Stores, Restaurants, and Atmosphere," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, January 17, 1978).

[66] "Old JC Penney Building Lures Shoppers to Mall," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 5, 1978).

[67] "Top Three Levels of Centre Court to Be Ready in March," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 17, 1978).

[68] "Centre Court Purchased by Colorado Developer," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 11, 1983).

[69] "The Blade Cutting out of Downtown."

[70] "The Ghosts of Economic Despair," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 1, 1984).

[71] In late-December 1987, another developer purchased the building, before finally landing in the hands of local developers Tom Connor and Don Wooley, who bought the building in March 1997 for $1.55 million. Ibid.; "Developers Purchase Centre Court," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 29, 1987); Christian Wihtol, "Duo Purchases Centre Court for $1.55 Million," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 25, 1997).

[72] 73-01-24-1b High-rise office building approved By Ed Kenyon

[73] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, March 3, 1971" (Eugene, March 3, 1971).

[74] "Ten Bidding on Downtown Property."

[75] Kenyon, "Renewal Board Accepts Proposals."

[76] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1971."

[77] According to Jacobs, the entire parcel purchase would take place in two stages. Phase 1 would include rehabilitation of the existing building. Phase 2 would be developed with a series of service and retail shops for other tenants in conjunction with part of the same quarter block owned by Jacobs.

[78] The discussions in the ERA meetings (minutes) show ERA staff's delight over such a possibility. One board member even claimed that such a proposal coincided with the original goal of the CEP.

[79] Ibid.

[80] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, November 8, 1971."

[81] Ed Kenyon, "Eugene Renewal Agency Accused of Playing Politics," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 6, 1972).

[82] Ed Kenyon, "Printing Firm to Build New One: Old Building to Come Down," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 18, 1972).

[83] "Boehnke Printing Co. Closed after More than 60 Years in Business," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 13, 1987).

[84] Ed Kenyon, "Businessman Miffed by Bid," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 20, 1972).

[85] "Burch's, Latham Bids on Mall Sites Accepted," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 20, 1972).

[86] "Renewal Board Ok's Quarter-Block Project," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 14, 1972).

[87] Ibid.

[88] George Barker, "Store Days Concluding for Mattox," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 10, 1985).

[89] "Agency Board Okays Restaurant in New Building at West Eighth Avenue," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 3, 1976).

[90] "Parcel Contract Authorized."

[91] Ed Kenyon, "Council to Unveil Parking Structure Plans Tonight," *The Register-Guard*, September 9, 1968. Other members of the team were Moris, Longwood, and Edlund (architectural consultants), Mitchell and McArthur (landscape) and Balzhiser and Colvia (mechanical and electrical consultants).

[92] Floyd Rinehart, "Erection of Downtown Eugene Parking Structure Pushed," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 2, 1966).

[93] Ed Kenyon, "Parking Garage Gets Approval," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 22, 1966).

[94] City of Eugene, "City of Eugene Letters on 10th and Oak Parking."

[95] Ibid.

[96] A letter sent by the City of Eugene's Department of Finance to Heir Sanders, a property owner of the newly formed parking district, dated November 3, 1966.

[97] "Firm to Study Downtown Potential."

[98] "City's Second Parking Garage; Site Decision Expected Soon," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, July 8, 1971).

[99] Ibid.

[100] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1971" (Eugene, August 4, 1971).

[101] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[102] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 7, 1971" (Eugene, n.d.).

[103] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1971," n.d.

[104] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 15, 1971" (Eugene, n.d.).

[105] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[106] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 7, 1971."

[107] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1971."

[108] Ibid.

[109] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[110] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1971."

[111] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[112] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1971."

[113] "Contract Awarded for Parking Garage," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 6, 1975).

[114] Whipple, "Missiles and the Mad Mouse."

[115] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, January 20, 1971" (Eugene, January 20, 1971).

[116] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, February 17, 1971."

[117] "Efforts to Save Store Making Progress."

[118] "Quackenbush's May yet Be Saved from Wrecking Crews."

[119] Whipple, "Missiles and the Mad Mouse."

[120] "Efforts to Save Store Making Progress."

[121] "Tradition-Laden Quackenbush's Hardware to Stay."

[122] "Quackenbush's to Be Almost Same."

[123] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1971."

[124] The two buildings to be demolished were already acquired and bids were received for demolition with Inter-City Construction Co. the low bidder at $1,950.

[125] "'New' Quackenbush's Store Nears Opening."

[126] "Mrs. A. Quackenbush Dies at 83," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 28, 1972).

[127] Jim Frake, "Quackenbush Store Sold; Quantities to Be Retained," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 27, 1973).

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[129] Dan Wyant, "Quackenbush's to Be Reopened," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 20, 1976).

[130] Marvin Tims, "Three Businessmen to Buy Quackenbush's," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 10, 1979).

[131] Marvin Tims, "Quackenbush's Quitting Business," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, December 17, 1980).

[132] "More Buildings Labeled Historic," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 11, 1982).

[133] Ann Portal, "Quackenbush Listed as Historic Landmark," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, June 22, 1988).

[134] Breyerton, "Downtown Buildings: How Valuable and Costly Are Their Preservation?"; Donna Weatherly, "Legacy of the E.R.A.," *Eugene Magazine* 2, no. 6 (1975): 20–23; Jim Frake, "Old Hotel Getting New Life," *The Register-Guard*, November 11, 1973.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ed Kenyon, "Month given to Show Saving Hotel Feasible," *The Register-Guard*, April 19, 1972.

[138] Frake, "Old Hotel Getting New Life."

[139] 73-10-08-2b $2 million renewal project under way

[140] "Dispute Centers on Three Old Buildings"; Strycker, "Preservation Week: Window to the Past." EHRB was created as a five-member board in 1975.

[141] "Three Downtown Buildings Have Been Recommended for Historic Landmark Status."

[142] "Review Board Withdrew Request That the Buildings at 861, 865 and 873."

[143] "Three Downtown Buildings Have Been Recommended for Historic Landmark Status."

[144] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, June 28, 1971" (Eugene, June 28, 1971).

[145] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, July 28, 1971."

[146] "Eugene Civic Auditorium Seen by 1974," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 8, 1970).

[147] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, March 24, 1970" (Eugene, n.d.).

[148] Ed Kenyon, "Downtown Auditorium Suffers 2nd Setback," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, April 7, 1971).

[149] ERA, "Meeting Minutes, March 24, 1970."

[150] As pointed out by Traffic Engineer Al Williams on the March 24, 1970 meeting

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] "ERA Can't Accept $250,000 Offer," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 26, 1973).

[154] "Weinstein Loses Main Renewal Fight," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 17, 1974).

[155] "Weinstein Submits Retail Plan on Hotel Site," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 14, 1974).

[156] "Weinstein Loses Main Renewal Fight."

[157] "Weinstein Wins Forum on Hotel Site Protest," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 8, 1973).

[158] "ERA Can't Accept $250,000 Offer."

[159] "Weinstein Wins Forum on Hotel Site Protest."

[160] "Weinstein May Win Extension: March 1 Is Moving Deadline," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, January 3, 1974).

[161] "Hotel Plan Gets Go-Ahead from Urban Renewal Agency," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, February 7, 1974).

[162] A newspaper article received from LCHM without a date, but is about Archie Weinstein's critique of urban renewal.

[163] "Archie Weinstein's Wake for Renewal Agency," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 5, 1974).

[164] Kenyon, "Weinstein May Fight"; "Panel Reacts Sharply to Downtown of Future," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 3, 1973); "Weinstein Wins Forum on Hotel Site Protest."

[165] Kenyon, "Weinstein May Fight."

[166] "Businessman Charges 'Rape' of City," *Valley News (Oregon)*, October 24, 1973.

[167] "Weinstein to Quit Business for Politics," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, March 6, 1974).

[168] "Archie Weinstein's Wake for Renewal Agency."

[169] Bishoff, "The Hotel Is Dead-Long Live the Hotel!"; "Urban Renewal Agency Seeking Hotel Developer."

[170] "Downtown Hotel Plan Dropped by McClory," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 8, 1976); "Developer, Renewal Board Agree on Contract for Downtown Hotel," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 3, 1976).

[171] "Downtown Hotel Plan Dropped by McClory."

[172] "Agency Gets Another Proposal for Downtown Eugene Hotel," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 19, 1976).

[173] "Downtown Site Endorsed for Civic Center," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, November 16, 1977).

[174] Strycker, "Major Issues Face Voters."

[175] "Downtown Development Proposal."

[176] Nelson, "Curtain Rises on Civic Center Dream."

[177] Nelson, "Plan Approved for Civic Center."

[178] Don Nelson, "Civic Center May Get 250-Room Hilton," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, May 1, 1979).

[179] Tims, "Eugene Hilton Gets Go-Ahead."

[180] Editor, “Convention Center, 425-Car Parking to Cost $5.7 Million.”

[181] Fred Crafts, “Arts Center to Bear Hult Name,” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, September 24, 1982).

APPENDIX U HOUSING EFFORTS IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA (THE MID-1970S TO MID-1980S)

In 1976, the City zoned three and a half blocks of the downtown area as MU-Westside Mixed-Use to support residential use.[1] According to the 1976 "Downtown Westside Alternative" report, (1) the westside neighborhood had the potential to increase multi-family housing stock from 375 to more than 600 units; (2) in the downtown area, housing opportunities existed exclusively on private and publicly-owned parking facility locations; and (3) the conflict between housing and retailing downtown was most significant at the western edge of the mall.

The news of a "proper" housing complex downtown—the Broadway Center—first broke in late April 1978. Planned for the entire block west of Washington Street between 8th avenue and Broadway, the planned three-story project would provide 107 units and at the cost of $2 million.[2] At the time, one of the developers had commented that the project was designed "to specifically meet the City's goal for the 1990 plan which encourages a development of quality, high-density living accommodations in the urban core area." In 1980, two high-density condominiums were finally completed Lincoln Terrace on the corner of 10th avenue and Lincoln street) and Hight Street Rowhouses [outside CEP boundary].[3] Lincoln Terrace offered twenty-one units on 22,000 SF, whereas High Street Rowhouses offered eighteen units on 34,000 SF. The price to own these condominiums was $77 to $100 PSF. USP designed both complexes in an effort to promote high-density housing, and they owned the High Street Rowhouses.[4] In the words of Otto Poticha, "We'd gone to dozens of meetings through the years in which planners and elected officials have preached the gospel that we have to have higher density housing, and we have agreed with them, so we designed two and financed one of them to supply evidence that good housing can be accomplished on much less space." USP had to invest about $1.4 million in the High Street property and go through "a lengthy fight" with an organization called the "East Skinner Butte Friends and Neighbors" that protested the rowhouse development.

In 1983, around 1,600 housing units existed within the downtown boundaries.[5] The 1990s marked a turning point for downtown living in Eugene as the decade attracted several projects inside the CEP area and in neighboring blocks. Furthermore, according to a 1981 study, downtown had a total of 1,512 units, including hotels and rooming houses, and the bulk of available housing was in the Westside District.[6]

Notes

[1] John Blayney Associates and Lor and LeBlanc, *Eugene Downtown Westside Alternatives* (Eugene: City of Eugene, 1976); Downtown Commission, *Eugene Downtown Plan*.

[2] "Broadway Center to Be Built," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, April 25, 1978).

[3] Dan Sellard, "High-Density Living," *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, October 26, 1980).

[4] Ibid.

[5] LeBlanc and Company, *Markets and Services in Downtown Eugene*.

[6] Ibid. Cited from a 1981 document "Housing in Eugene's downtown long-term strategies"

APPENDIX V: INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN EXECUTING THE CEP

Table V.1 The full list of organizations involved in the CEP.

Organization	***Name of members***
City Council	Edwin Cone, Mayor; Lester Anderson, Council President; Nancy Hayward; Bruce Lassen; Catherine Lauris; H. C. McDonald; R. E. McNutt; Glen L. Purdy; George Wingard
Eugene Planning Commission	Betty Niven, Chairman; Clare Hamlin; David Hoffman; Brian Obie; James Pearson; John Stafford; Morven C. Thomas
Eugene Renewal Agency	Frank Shearer, Chairman; Wallace Swanson, Vice-Chairman; J. David Hunt, Executive Director; Theron V. Rust, Administrative Assistant; A. Robert Thomas, Project Coordinator; Charles Duncan; Ray Hawk; Roy Morse; Ruth Miller; George Wingard
SCORE Representatives	Carl Fisher, Chairman; Glen Porter, Vice-Chairman; George Boehnke; Catherine Eaton; Samuel Frear; James Longwood; Otto Poticha

The City Council incorporated Eugene Downtown Association (EDA) in February 1969 to coordinate and promote the Downtown Development District free parking program.[1] The EDA was contracted to (1) promote the free parking program, (2) market downtown activities (3) coordinate cultural events. It was a non-profit, non-sectarian and non-partisan organization made up of all people, firms, associations, or corporations having a place of business or owning property within the free parking district. Most of the group’s nine members had to live, work or own property within the downtown boundaries.[2]

The EDA received its budget from Downtown Development District taxes (monitored by DDB), which also paid for the free parking program downtown. By 1981, there were about 400 members in the association and twenty-four on the EDA board. By 1984, EDA boasted 500-members consisting of downtown business people and property owners formed to market and promote downtown businesses.[3] In May 1982, the City Council created the Eugene Downtown Commission (EDC) to draft the Downtown Plan, which would present a vision of the future for downtown and refine the Eugene- Springfield Metropolitan Area General Plan.[4]

In 1972 the City Council established the Downtown Development Board (DDB) to administer a free parking program within the Downtown Development District (DDD).[5] DDD was an area where business and property owners and taxed to fund free customer parking, support downtown economic activity, and encourage alternative forms of transportation. The free parking program provided unlimited parking through 2,800 on and off-street spaces in the 1970s. In 1976, the DDB agreed to fund a full-time mall manager and secretary, who coordinated activities such as special sales, contests, and cultural events taking place in the mall. At the time, the board was composed of eleven members, nine of whom had to be property or business owners or employees within the DDD.

Notes

[1] "EDA Responsible for Downtown Events," *Eugene Downtown News* (Eugene, February 14, 1978).

[2] "Here Are Downtown Decision-Makers.".

[3] Matassa, "Downtown: Where Now?"

[4] Ibid.

[5] City of Eugene, *A Commitment to Downtown Eugene* (Eugene, 1981).

APPENDIX W: ASSESSED VALUES OF DOWNTOWN PROPERTIES IN THE MID-1980S

Table W.1. Assessed values of downtown properties in the mid-1980s.

Data source: Register Guard October 14, 1984 article (RG) and an unpublished ERA document from 1985 received from a City of Eugene Staff (ERA_d).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Sixth Avenue Hotel Association Limited-Daseke Realty Corp.,	Stamford, CT	Hilton Hotel		66 E 6th Ave	$12,230,530	RG	
Guard Publishing Co.-Edwin M. Baker, Alton F. Baker Jr.	Eugene		3/4	East of High St On Both Sides Of 10th Ave	$7,126,040	RG	
First Interstate Bank of Oregon-public	Publicly held	Bank Building		99 E Broadway	$6,192,360	RG	
First Interstate Bank of Oregon-public	Publicly held	Park-Willamette Building		857-881 Willamette St		RG	
Citizens Associates- Louis Walker and Russell Osterman	San Francisco	Citizens Building		975 Oak St	$5,869,370	RG	
Fifth Street Public Market-Norman and Donna Fogelstrom and Obie Communications Corp-Brian Obie	Eugene	Retail Complex	1/4	296 E 5th Ave	$2,259,740	RG	
Danell and Ehrman Guistina and South Park Associates	Eugene	Office building	1/4	101 E. Broadway	$2,259,740	RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Eugene Retirement Properties Ltd-- A. E. Brim and James Williams	Portland	Eugene hotel retirement center	1/4	222 E Broadway	$1,897,840	RG	
Donald and Jean Stevenson and Centre Court, Oregon Ltd	Eugene	Centre Court building	1/8	44 W Broadway	$1,760,000	RG	
U.S. National Bank	Publicly held	Bank Building		811 Willamette	$1,775,100	RG	
U.S. National Bank	Publicly held	Office Building		250 E 5th Ave		RG	
Atrium Building Partnership- John Hedlund and Bernd Hoffman;	Portland	Atrium Building		99 W 10th Ave	$1,750,540	RG	
Vintage Properties Inc.- John Hedlund and Bernd Hoffman	Portland	Retail building	1/8	SE Corner At 10th And Willamette	$335,940	RG	
Broadway and Charnelton Inc-- James A. Walsh and W Fix	Seattle	Bon Marche property	1/2	175 W Broadway	$1,661,290	RG	
State Federal Savings and Loan-- Howard Harpole	Eugene	Eugene Medical Center Building		132 E Broadway	$161,640	RG	
State Federal Savings and Loan-- Howard Harpole	Eugene		1/4	SW Corner 10th And Pearl		RG	
Benjamin Franklin Savings and Loan	Publicly held		1/4	201 E 11th Ave	$1,471,430	RG	
Benjamin Franklin Savings and Loan	Publicly held	Equitable building		899 Willamette St		RG	
Eugene Civic Building- Edwing Cone, John Soreng, Donald Furtick, and others	Eugene	Office building		777 High St	$1,439,430	RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
BNW Corporation-Gary Pierpoint and M. G. Albrich	Eugene	Bank Building	1/4	299 E 11th Ave	$1,297,690	RG	
BNL Development Corp and Eugene Station Association- J. B. Parish	Seattle	Oregon Electric Station Property	5/8	27 E 5th Ave	$1,203,310	RG	
C. Von Hickman	Eugene	Fifth Pearl building retail complex	3/8	207 E 5th Ave	$1,178,480	RG	
Maurie Jacobs and Slyvia Jacobs, Schella Schwartz and Beverly Zell Trust	Eugene	M. Jacobs Furniture store and retail shops	1/2	725 Olive St	$1,035,680	RG	
Teresa C. Folts	Hagerman, Idaho		1/8	NW Corner 7th Ave And Olive St	$1,032,120	RG	
Consolidated Dairy Inc-Louis Arrigonl and Marshall Douglas	Seattle		3/8	Near 6th Ave West Of Olive St	$1,003,340	RG	
Bernice Schlesinger and Others	Portland		1/4	SWE Corner Broadway And Charnelton	$909,630	RG	
Ralph Schlesinger and Others	Portland		1/8	SW Corner Broadway And Olive	$454,970	RG	
Donald Slocum and estate of Margaret Slocum and Thomas Slocum	Eugene	Office building		541 Willamette St	$791,440	RG	
Donald Slocum and estate of Margaret Slocum and Thomas Slocum	Eugene		1/8	540 Oak St	$419,180	RG	
Robert C. Loomis, Neal Sande, and others	Eugene	Retail buildings		160-174 E Broadway	$985,980	RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Elmer B. Sahlstrom	Eugene	Office building		100 E Broadway	$894,810	RG	
B&A Inc- Ada Lee and Robert Lee	Eugene	Wan Shine Inn property		7th Ave And Willamette	$890,000	RG	
B&A Inc- Ada Lee and Robert Lee	Eugene	Tiffany Building [Restaurant and office] building		795 Willamette St		RG	
William and Ada Lee	Eugene		1/8	165 W 11th Ave	$177,850	RG	
TUMCK TONSH Investment Co- Donald Furtick, C. F. Larson Trust, Richard and Marjorie Scott, Tom Slocum	Eugene	Sears property	9/16	10th And Charnelton St	$880,000	RG	
Pacific Western Bank (inside Citizen bank)	Publicly held	Pacific Western Bank (inside Citizen bank)		975 Oak St	$854,530	RG	
Donald R. Furtick	Eugene	Retail building	1/4	NE Corner 11th Ave And Olive	$833,410	RG	
EBELLA Corp- Nathan and Samuel Rubenstein and others	Eugene	A portion of furniture store		121 W. 8th Ave	$768,760	RG	
	Eugene	Buildings		800 Olive St		RG	
	Eugene	Buildings		1063-97 Willamette St		RG	
Lester and Mary Orchard	Eugene	Auto parts store	1/4	23 W 6th Ave	$786,850	RG	
RWR Investment Co. Ltd- Ralph W. Robinson	Eugene	The Broadway Building	1/8	30 E Broadway	$785,000	RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Carl and Patricia Holvick	Palo Alto, CA		1/8	East Of Olive St Between 5th And 6th Ave	$755,370	RG	
Dana Investment Corp and HJK Motel Partnership-- William Hofmann, Martin Jeppenson and Hans Kristensen	Eugene	Timbers Motel complex	1/4	1015 Pearl St	$712,780	RG	
Broadway and Pearl Associates-- L. M. Ehrman, N. B. & Dan Giustina, and Donald and Thoman Slocum	Eugene		3/8	NW Corner Broadway And Pearl	$686,660	RG	
First Midland Inc.- F. J. O'Conner and Kevin Sheeby	Portland		1/4	NE Corner 10th And Lincoln	$626,800	RG	
Stanley and D. A. Summers	Stanley and D. A. Summers	Johnson's Furniture		135 W. Broadway	$626,780	RG	
Lem Wilson and Son	Ontario		1/4	SW Corner 10th And Willamette	$571,810	RG	
Phoebe Redding	Phoebe Redding		1/8	NW Corner Broadway And Willamette	$560,960	RG	
Pacific Northwest Bell	Publicly held		1/4	SE Corner 10th And Oak	$548,000	RG	
Mary E. Scherer	Mary E. Scherer	Sears Auto center	1/2	942 Olive St	$534,550	RG	
Glenn and Beverly Fackrell	Eugene	Seymour's Restaurant		966 Willamette St	$523,860	RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Rubenstein Brothers--Nathan and Samuel Rubenstein	Eugene	Part of Rubenstein's furniture store		131 W Olive St	$500,770	RG	
Albert Daugherty	Eugene		1/4	SE Corner 7th Ave And Charnelton	$505,700	RG	
Bill and Mary Combs	Eugene	Burch's shoe store		99 W Broadway	$480,230	RG	
Robert Booth	Tualatin, OR		1/2	N Of 5th Between Lincoln And Charnelton	$472,840	RG	
Joel and Julie Diamond	Seattle	Retail building		957 Willamette St	$459,440	RG	
Joel and Julie Diamond	Seattle	Retail building		125 W 11th Ave		RG	
Provident Mutual Life Insurance	Publicly held	Firestone tire store	1/4	NW Corner 11th And Pearl	$454,320	RG	
Mcnutt Enterprises- Ronald, Robert, and Michael McNutt, and Molly Preston	Eugene		1/4	Northeastern corner of Broadway and High streets	$450,000	RG	
Greyhound Lines Inc	Publicly held	Bus terminal		987 Pearl St	$446,640	RG	
Oregon Electric Railway- a subsidiary of Burlington Northern	Publicly held		1/4	NE Corner 5th And Pearl	$371,420	RG	
Oregon Electric Railway- a subsidiary of Burlington Northern	Publicly held		1/2	5th, Olive And Charnelton		RG	

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
Pearle Ridenour	Eugene		1/8	N Of 8th Between Charnelton And Lincoln	$439,100	RG	
Euphrema Laraway	Eugene	Retail building		966 Willamette St	$412,020	RG	
Mead A. Carver	Eugene	Retail building		175 W 8th Ave	$394,220	RG	
Marguerite C. Bronson	Eugene	Parking lot	1/4	NW Corner 10th And High St	$388,590	RG	
Robert and Patricia Wilson	Eugene	Retail building		1045 Willamette St	$360,150	RG	
Our Town Investors, Ltd-Neal Sande, Robert C. Loomis	Eugene	Retail building		138 W 8th Ave	$378,500	RG	
		Hult Center		1 Eugene Center	$16,528,360	ERA_d	PO
		Lane Community College		101 W 10th Ave	$1,896,120	ERA_d	PR
		Mcayeal's wardrobe Cleaner		1060 Olive St	$167,410	ERA_d	CL
		Rubenstein's		115 W 8th Ave	$890,240	ERA_d	CL
		Fusch's Liquidators		1209 Pearl St	$777,800	ERA_d	ERA
		Kiva		125 W 11th Ave	$189,180	ERA_d	PR
		Coles Artist Supplies		142 W 8th St	$248,980	ERA_d	ERA
		Brenner Furniture		151 W 8th Ave	$307,610	ERA_d	CL

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
		Lazar's Bazar		164 W Broadway	$181,690	ERA_d	ERA
		Pacific Nautilus conditioning center		189 W 8th Ave	$389,980	ERA_d	CL
		Town and Travel		20 E Broadway	$96,530	ERA_d	CL
		Parcade		35 W 8th Ave	$3,883,380	ERA_d	PO
		Willamette Savings		360 8th Ave	$1,320,320	ERA_d	ERA
		Latham's		55 W Broadway	$269,650	ERA_d	ERA
		Home Federal Savings		59 E 11th Ave	$1,268,920	ERA_d	PR
		Conference Center		66 E 6th Ave	$7,168,100	ERA_d	PO
		Boehnke printing		747 Willamette St	$152,030	ERA_d	ERA
		Valley Stationery		77 W Broadway	$184,060	ERA_d	ERA
		Mckenzie Outfitters		771 Willamette St	$285,990	ERA_d	ERA
		Smeed building		790 W 8th Ave	$268,730	ERA_d	CL
		Flint Studio		830 Olive St	$160,770	ERA_d	ERA
		ComputerLand		844 Olive St	$213,090	ERA_d	ERA
		BookMark		856 Olive St	$128,450	ERA_d	CL
		City Hall 2		858 Pearl St	$490,610	ERA_d	PR
		Hoffman's		881 Willamette	$307,080	ERA_d	CL

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
		Sahlstrom building		915 Oak St	$896,860	ERA_d	ERA
		Dean Owens (attorney)		933 Pearl St	$230,040	ERA_d	CL
		Green Pepper fabric shop		941 Olive St	$232,440	ERA_d	ERA
		Harry Ritchie's		956 Willamette St	$325,820	ERA_d	ERA
		National Theater		969 Willamette St	$263,460	ERA_d	CL
		Downtown Athletic Club		999 Willamette St	$4,500,000	ERA_d	ERA
		Office		N.E. Oak And 11th	$373,760	ERA_d	ERA
				Nw Corner Broadway/Olive	$446,520	ERA_d	CL
		Schaeffers		992 Willamette St	$1,060,000	ERA_d	CL
		Quackenbush		160 E Broadway	$750,800	ERA_d	CL
		Zenon Café et al.			$671,840	ERA_d	CL
		Washburn/Tiffany building			$589,950	ERA_d	CL
		Mcdonald		1010 Willamette St	$550,680	ERA_d	CL
		Players			$356,000	ERA_d	CL
		Steven J.		941 Oak St	$184,780	ERA_d	CL

Table W.1. (continued).

Owner name	***Owner location***	***Project name***	***Property size (in blocks)***	***Address***	***Assessed value***	***Source***	***Type****
		Park Willamette (Aster)		865 Willamette St	$3,183,150	ERA_d	ERA
		South Park			$2,257,990	ERA_d	ERA
		Scan Design			$677,010	ERA_d	ERA
		Restaurant			$463,320	ERA_d	ERA
		Office/Retail			$297,750	ERA_d	ERA
		Rodman Attorney		744 W Park St	$161,700	ERA_d	ERA
		Luckey's Cigar			$135,590	ERA_d	ERA
		Eyearc			$108,320	ERA_d	ERA

*PO Public Ownership; PR Private Ownership; ERA ERA owned; CL City Loans

APPENDIX X: A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE AUGUST 1986 PUBLIC MEETING

People made the following remarks on the two positions regarding the reopening Broadway/Willamette section of the mall during a late-August 1986 meeting[1]—

<u>Comments from residents</u>

1. Focus instead on providing Grocery stores on the street level and apartments on the second floor to populate the inner city
2. Provide additional food establishments and merchants who sell items that appeal to the mall shopper; the mall should not be a VRC clone and is not set up to be a shopping center
3. Most customers are downtown employees (anyways).
4. Add bike paths instead; stay open until 9 pm.
5. Give (the merchants) some breaks to get started in downtown (for remodeling the stores); add covered walkways; open late after 5 pm; add a grocery store
6. Should be policed to stop panhandlers and druggies
7. Need proof to convince that option 5 will bring back business.
8. Use the money to hire security, elevators in the overpark, awnings, and protection in the mall; do not open play area to vehicles; do not take out trees and shrubs
9. Some changes are ok, but options 3 to 5 are excessive; they could provide direct access from the Sears and Atrium to the central part of the mall
10. Market the area like a mall with covered walkways; provide better information centers
11. Try to get another major retailer
12. Many businesses will not survive this major reconstruction; needs refinement, not obliteration; why open when most downtown users are not from outlying regions?
13. Never let two lanes of traffic through
14. "I think it is ridiculous to pay a bunch of bureaucrats $20,000 to $50,000 per year to come up with the type of hare-brained schemes that you've presented here when thousands of people in our city are in dire need of help."
15. The general economy of the state and county was relevant to the mall's success; spend money on lighting, etc.

16. Money should be spent elsewhere; the actual problems is security, rain protection, more businesses, and variety
17. The plan will help bring traffic to the interior of the mall where it is failing
18. California-style malls should not have been built in a place with so much rain; the trees are taking over the mall
19. Eliminate 'ugly' old buildings; we need more shops like in 5th Street Market; need people living in or near downtown
20. Modified to include alternating parking bays as opposed to parking on both sides
21. Meets the needs of a variety of users—pedestrians, businesspersons, and vehicle drivers
22. Open all streets to limited traffic and provide more streetlights

Notes

[1] "Comments Received from the Public at the Willamette Redesign Information Session." This document was made available by a COE staff.

APPENDIX Y: LATE-1986 DOWNTOWN MERCHANTS' REMARKS ON MALL REOPENING

Table Y.1. Late-1986 downtown merchants' remarks on mall reopening.

Business	***Choice***	***Choice #***	***Remarks/Comments***
Favors	yes	5	
Scan Design	yes	2	Opposes vehicular traffic even with on-street parking in front of businesses; business is doing good
Goldmine Jewelers	Yes	5 w/ on-street parking	Does not favor a median planter
Prince Puckler's	Yes		
Tarym's Toys	Yes		
Hoffman's Jewelry	Yes	5	Suggests doing the same to Olive street; consider eventually adding traffic to east Broadway between Willamette and Oak
Melange	Yes	2	Prefers not having traffic; thinks security and improved tenant mix will help business more than traffic
Mainstage theatre company	Yes	2	
Literary Lion	Yes	2	Closing Willamette at certain times of day; option 5 changes the character of Willamette too much
Town and Travel	Yes	4	Suggests opening up visibility-take out the fountain and no median
Switchboard Info Booth	Yes	3	Likes the shuttle bus idea and improving the visibility of businesses; downtown needs more signage
Lerner shop	Yes	2	80 percent of customers are downtown employees; gets business from spillover from central plaza activities
Harry Ritchie's	Yes		city remove the mall between 8th and 10th; build a thoroughfare instead; present pedestrian mall did not bring the prosperity and vitality that its planners predicted;
Lean's wine and company	Yes		7th and 8th avenues are isolated from other downtown areas
US bank	No		
Park Willamette	No		
Woolworth's	No		Gets a lot of business from patrons and spillover from central plaza activities; sales increasing since 1982

Table Y.1. (continued).

Business	***Choice***	***Choice #***	***Remarks/Comments***
Scan Design	No		Pedestrian traffic is ever increasing; option #2 will bring the needed continuity back to the mall, following the approved redesign and will be less expensive; no amount of mall redesign will help the businesses if they do not recognize their market and actively promote their products
Marylyn Klein Larsen	No		Against spending money but using it for tax breaks to businesses
Edmund Soule	No		Unless the economy of Oregon improves, no change to the mall will work
K Schreider	No		Customers never returned to the mall after its renewal

Note that the proposal contained a list of five concrete options[1]-

1. Leave the two-blocks section of Willamette as it is (Status Quo);
2. Create a “pedestrian streetscape,” similar to the design concept adopted for the Broadway, with no vehicular traffic but with the removal of visual barriers and designation of different zones of activity;
3. Open Willamette street to one-lane, one-way specialty traffic (such as a downtown trolley), regular LTD buses, or autos;
4. Open the street to limited two-lane, two-way traffic in a “vehicle mall” design with a “textured” vehicle area and limited drop-off bays; and
5. Reopen it as a full street, with a median strip, similar to Willamette between 7th and 8th avenues or between 10th and 11th avenues.

Notes

[1] From a set of unpublished letters sent to the city by different businesses, mostly between the months of August and October 1986, on the issue of favoring automobiles on Willamette. The document was obtained through a COE staff.

APPENDIX Z: REFERENCE TABLES AND IMAGES

Table Z.1. Details of the rating system.

Building component	***Penalty points***
1. Foundations	
No defects;	0
Low sections (inadequate height above grade);	0
Shrinkage cracks	0
Settlement-minor	0
Surface wear shallow	0
Earthquake breaks-minor	0
Deep wear (in joints or surfaces)	1
Top below grade-less than 1/4th	1
Top below grade-more than 1/4th	3
Missing-less than 1/4th	3
Missing-more than 1/4th	5
Structural defects-major	5
Makeshift construction-less than 1/4th	1
Makeshift construction-more than 1/4th	3
2. Exterior walls and trim	
Recently painted; Deterioration or missing parts not visible; Painting and minor repairs needed; Painting & minor replacement of members needed	0
Weathering less than 1/4th	1
Weathering more than 1/4th	2
Breaks in masonry-minor	1
Breaks in masonry-extensive	5
Loose masonry surface-minor	1
Loose masonry surface-extensive	5
Extreme deterioration-less than 1/4th	2
Extreme deterioration-more than 1/4th	5
Serious settlement	5
Buckling- less than 1/4th	3
Buckling- more than 1/4th	5
Structural members missing	.5 each
Structural members hazardous	.5 each
Single wall construction- less than 1/4th	1

Table Z.1. (continued).

Building component	***Penalty points***
Single wall construction- more than 1/4th	2
Makeshift repairs- less than 1/4th	1
Makeshift repairs- more than 1/4th	2
3. Structural stability	
3A. Vertical loads	
Walls inadequate- minor	2
Walls inadequate- extensive	6
Posts or columns inadequate- minor	2
Posts or columns inadequate- inadequate	4
Floor deflection-minor	2
Floor deflection-extensive	6
Roof sagging and/or framing inadequate	3
3B. Lateral loads	
Floor and/or roof diaphragms missing, minor	2
Floor and/or roof diaphragms missing, extensive	6
Wall stability inadequate- minor	2
Wall stability inadequate- extensive	6
4. Roofing	
New or recently repaired	0
Minor deterioration	0.5
Re-roofing required	2
Roof construction sagging	2
5. Windows	
Sash new throughout	0
Deterioration not evident	0
Deterioration minor	0
Weathering and deterioration extensive	1
Sash broken- less than 1/4th	1
Sash broken- more than 1/4th	2
Panes broken- more than l/4th	1
6. Entrances and exits	
Condition satisfactory	0
Painting and minor repair	0
Weathering and deterioration extensive	1

Table Z.1. (continued).

Building component	***Penalty points***
Doors broken and/or makeshift repairs (each door)	0.5
Doors missing (each door)	0.5
Number of exits inadequate	2
7. Exterior stairs and porches	
Condition satisfactory	0
Painting and minor repairs required	0
Deep wear- less than 1/4th	0.5
Deep wear- more than 1/4th	1
Incidental breaks less than 1/4th	0.5
Incidental breaks - more than 1/4th	1
Loose or missing members less than 1/4th	0.5
Loose or missing members - more than 1/4th	1
Treads, risers, or flooring missing, less than 1/4th	0.5
Treads, risers, or flooring missing, more than 1/4th	1
Balustrade or railing missing, less than 1/4th	0.5
Balustrade or railing missing, more than 1/4th	1
Extreme deterioration or extreme settlement (each flight)	1
Makeshift repairs	0.5
Steep or hazardous (each flight)	1
8. Chimneys and vents	
No visible defects	0
minor settlement	0
Shallow surface wear in brick joints	0
Painting of sheet metal required	0
Deep **wear** in joints or surface	0.5
Major settlement or deflection	2
Part missing or loose	0.5
Holes in sheet metal	0.5
9. Interior conditions	
Surfaces new or recently refinished	0
Defects not visible	0
Minor refinishing required	1
Minor surface cracks & deterioration	1
Dilapidated and complete refinishing required	6

Table Z.1. (continued).

Building component	***Penalty points***
Buckled surfaces- less than 1/4th	2
Buckled surfaces- more than 1/4th	3
Single wall construction- less than 1/4th	1
Single wall construction- more than 1/4th	2
Makeshift repairs- less than 1/4th	1
Makeshift repairs- more than 1/4th	2
10. Heating system	
Adequate	0
Capacity inadequate	1
Capacity deficient	1
Missing	2
11. Plumbing	
Satisfactory	0
Fixtures deficient- minor	1
Fixtures deficient- extensive	2
Number of fixtures- missing	.25 per fixture
Piping deficient- minor	1
Piping deficient- extensive	2
12. Electrical	
Main service adequate	0
Main service inadequate	1
Insufficient outlets-minor	0
Insufficient outlet-extensive	1
Total replacement of wiring necessary	2

Table Z.2. Point system (penalty) incorporated by Leonard Mosias and Associates to determine the structural condition of buildings.

SN	***Building component***	***Maximum penalty points allocated***
1	Foundations	5
2	Exterior walls and trim 5	5
3	Structural stability (vertical and lateral loads)	12
4	Roofing	2
5	Windows	2
6	Entrance and Exits	2
7	Exterior stairs and porches	2
8	Chimneys and vents	2
9	Interior conditions	6
10	Heating system	2
11	Plumbing	2
12	Electrical	2

Table Z.3. Classification of building condition (based on total points accumulated points).

Condition determined	***Points***
Standard	6 or less
Deficient-Rehabilitation feasible	7 to 13
Deficient-Rehabilitation questionable	14 to 23
Structurally substandard and Requiring Clearance	24 or more

Figure Z.1 Ten-year arterials plan from 1950 highlighting a need for cross-town traffic (sc. Register Guard, Oct 16, 1950).

Figure Z.2. A new arterial system envisioned in 1957 to facilitate traffic from one area to another without the need to cross the downtown (sc. Original map by Dan Wyant as published in Register Guard Apr 30, 1957).



Figure Z.3. Original July 1969 Traffic Flow map for Eugene's CBD. Map prepared by Traffic Engineering Division, Department of Public Works. Available at the UO Libraries; reformatted by the author to fit in the page.



Figure Z.4. RTKL's original CEP plan showing land use distribution (RTKL, Phase 4, 77).



Figure Z.5. RTKL's original CEP plan showing retail organization (RTKL, Phase 4, 79).





Figure Z.6. Final design by the team led by Mitchell-McArthur (sc. ERA’s brochure, available at UO Library map collection).



Figure Z.7. Original section drawings of the pedestrian mall across the Central Plaza (*top*), showing the mall shops (*middle*), and play area and mall restrooms (*bottom*).



Figure Z.8. An aerial view (sketch) of the Central Plaza at Broadway and Willamette (*top*) and its physical model (*bottom*).



Figure Z.9. Original sketches of the pedestrian mall design.

Downtown Plan Design Area

1. Downtown Mall
2. Willamette Street, 10th to 11th Avenues
3. South Willamette Street Pedestrian Improvements (11th to 13th Avenues)
4. Central Market and Plaza Area
5. North Willamette Street Pedestrian Improvements
6. Skinner Butte Stair and Plaza Improvements
7. Fifth Avenue Pedestrian Improvements
8. Ferry Street Bridge Access Improvements
9. River Access
   High Street and Fourth Avenue Pedestrian Improvements
   Fourth Avenue River Access
   Eighth Avenue River Access
10. East Broadway Pedestrian Improvements
11. Mill Race Restoration

Downtown Design Area Descriptions:

A. High Street Light Industrial Area
B. Lincoln Street Transition Area
C. Government Center Area

Figure Z.10. Original drawing from the Downtown Plan 1984.

Figure Z.11. Original design drawing of the multi-use center proposed in 1977 (sc. ERA's "An Invitation for Development Proposals" document).

APPENDIX AA: IRB APPROVAL

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

DATE: April 07, 2020 **IRB Protocol Number: 01242020.039**

TO: Subik Shrestha, Principal Investigator
Department of DSGN Architecture & Interior Architecture

RE: Protocol entitled, "An inquiry into the failure of Eugene's pedestrian mall (1971-2002): A narrative history of its urban morphological transformation"

Notice of Review and Exempt Determination

The above protocol has been reviewed and determined to qualify for exemption. The research is approved to be conducted as described in the attached materials. Any change to this research will need to be assessed to ensure the study continues to qualify for exemption, therefore an amendment will need to be submitted for verification prior to initiating proposed changes.

For this research, the following determinations have been made:

- This study has been reviewed under the **2018 Common Rule** and determined to qualify for exemption under **Title 45 CFR 46.104(d)(2).**

Contingency(ies):

- Effective March 23, 2020, face-to-face interactions with human subjects are restricted unless a request is made by the investigator and approved by the UO Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the Office of the Vice President for Research (OVPRI). Investigators are permitted to conduct only those activities that can be facilitated remotely once the restriction takes effect. This restriction is in effect until changes are communicated by the OVPRI. See the OVPRI COVID-19 FAQs for Human Subject Research for the most up to date information and guidance for research teams and staying compliant during the current public health event.

Approval period: April 07, 2020 - April 30, 2021

If you anticipate the research will continue beyond the approval period, you must submit a Progress Report at least 45-days in advance of the study expiration. **Without continued approval, the protocol will expire on April 30, 2021 and human subject research activities must cease.** A closure report must be submitted once human subject research activities are complete. Failure to maintain current approval or properly close the protocol constitutes non-compliance.

You are responsible for the conduct of this research and adhering to the Investigator Agreement as reiterated below. You must maintain oversight of all research personnel to ensure compliance with the approved protocol.

The University of Oregon and Research Compliance Services appreciate your commitment to the ethical and responsible conduct of research with human subjects.

COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS • RESEARCH COMPLIANCE SERVICES
677 E. 12th Ave., Suite 500, 5237 University of Oregon, Eugene OR 97401-5237
T 541-346-2510 F 541-346-5138 **http://rcs.uoregon.edu**

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

Sincerely,

Chris Duy

Chris Duy
Research Compliance Administrator
Research Compliance Services

CC: Howard Davis

COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS • RESEARCH COMPLIANCE SERVICES
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