

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958
ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE ARMED FORCES

by

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A THESIS

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APPROVED

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PREFACE

This thesis is a detailed study of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and includes:

1. A short historical review of the events that led to the unification of the armed forces in 1947.

2. A study of each of the three major steps previously taken in the continuous attempt to provide the nation with a more effective defense organization.

3. A summary of the startling events that occurred in 1957 which indicated further changes were necessary in the Department of Defense and the processes and factors involved in the formulation of a reorganization plan.

4. A study of the legislative process and its relation to the defense reorganization plan as it passed through Congress.

5. A detailed analysis of the major provisions of the 1958 Reorganization Act.

6. A review of the changes the act made in the Department of Defense.

A study of the internal organization of the three armed forces was not made. My primary interests were the relationship between the three armed forces, between the military departments and the Secretary of Defense, and

between the legislative and executive branches of the government.

Documentary sources used in the writing of this thesis were readily available and include the following: The U.S. Statutes at Large, the Federal Register, Messages of the President, the Congressional Record, the Digest of General Public Bills, Congressional Hearings and Documents, and Congressional Committee Reports and Prints. Issues of the U.S. Government Organizational Manual since 1946 and the Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense since 1948 were exceedingly valuable as sources for tracing the growth of the Department of Defense since its creation. The many biographies of governmental and military officials who held high policy-making positions in the Department of Defense and related departments were an excellent source of background material. Finally, The New York Times and the Army, Navy, Air Force Journal were used to follow the day-by-day events in the defense establishment over the past two years.

This thesis should be of interest to political scientists and to anyone concerned with national defense. First, it is a study of what has happened in the past and thus may give some indication of what may be expected in the future. Second, it demonstrates how difficult it is for the executive department to draft defense legislation

and get it through Congress. Finally, it indicates that the problems of national defense are never-ending and that, as a result, the 1958 Reorganization Act is not the final piece of legislation that will be passed in regard to national security.

Leon K. Wolfe, Jr.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Unification of the armed forces is a relatively new administrative problem because

for centuries, land and naval operations were so separate in action and different in character that they could be carried on in almost complete independence of each other. Although the Army and the Navy fought the same enemy countries, they did not usually fight together. It was easy to define their boundaries and missions. This fact led to the establishment of separate departments of government for armies and navies.¹

However, for several years after becoming an independent nation, the United States did not have separate departments for the Army and Navy. The Department of War was established as an executive department on August 7, 1789 and for nine years it administered both military and naval affairs.

In 1798 the United States entered into an undeclared naval war with France. This naturally brought about a great increase in naval activity. In addition, "the War Department was charged with slowness, extravagance and inefficiency in its administration of naval affairs, and

¹The Air Officer's Guide (5th ed.; Harrisburg, Pa: Military Service Publishing Co., 1951), p. 14.

Secretary of War McHenry recommended that his Department be relieved of the unwelcome responsibility, which was warmly endorsed by President Adams."¹ Consequently, on April 30, 1798, a separate Department of the Navy was established and the two departments remained separated until brought together under the Department of Defense in 1947.

Confederation Is Finally Achieved

Governmental organizations, like all formal organizations in the community, arise because some persons feel that a new organization is needed to attain some desired goal. The nature of the organization that is created, its structure, and the degree to which it is actually adapted to the solution of the problem that called it into existence will vary, depending on the conceptions of its advocates and the environment--physical and social--in which it originates.

Much can be learned about organizations from a study of their origins. Many peculiar facts about existing operations--structure, program emphasis, and even staffing--become understandable only when their history and the forces that presided at the organization's birth are known. Further, information about the groups and forces that urged or opposed the creation of a new governmental organization is often somewhat more accessible than information about its struggle for continued existence. The major crises in an organization's life, including its birth, generally bring it to legislative and public attention, and these crises are duly recorded in documents and by the press.²

¹Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1948), p. 46.

²Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950), p. 25.

It was not until 1898, during and after the Spanish-American War, that it became evident that there was a need for greater cooperation between the Army and Navy. Until that time, the Army had been preoccupied primarily with internal defense matters, for example, fighting Indians, while the Navy had been primarily concerned with defending the country from outside attack. After the United States obtained possession of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the Army became the occupying authority and it became necessary for the two services to work together on many matters. Consequently, in 1903, a Joint Board of the Army and Navy was established, by voluntary agreement, to coordinate matters of interest to both services. This board was composed of four officers from each service and its mission was to advise the Secretaries of Navy and War on matters of joint interest.¹

However, it was the invention of the airplane and its subsequent use as a weapon of war that eventually led to the unification of the armed forces. On August 1, 1907, an Aeronautical Division was established in the Army Signal Corps and this marked the beginning of a

¹The Joint Board was suspended by President Wilson from 1914 to 1919. After this it functioned until 1942 when it was inactivated because of the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was abolished in 1947 when the services were unified.

third major armed force.¹ In March 1916, Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana introduced a bill advocating the creation of a new executive department to be called the Department of Aviation which would contain both Army and Navy aviation. This was the first of over fifty bills proposing either the establishment of an independent air force or unification of the services under a single department of national defense.²

¹In 1914, this Division was enlarged and its name was changed to the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. In 1918, this Section was separated from the Signal Corps and became the Division of Military Aeronautics. Two years later, as a result of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, the Division became one of the combatant arms of the Army and was renamed the Air Service. In 1926, in accordance with the Air Corps Act, the Air Service was renamed the Air Corps, its size was increased, an Assistant Secretary of War for Air was authorized, and the Air Corps was given representation on the Army General Staff. In March 1935, the GHQ Air Force was established to control air combat functions while the Air Corps retained responsibility for aviation supply and training. The GHQAF operated independently of the ground forces and was the beginning of a strategic air force. It was directly responsible to the Army General Staff, not to the Air Corps. On June 20, 1941, the Army Air Forces (AAF) was established and it absorbed both the GHQAF and the Air Corps. In 1947, as a result of the National Security Act, the AAF became the independent U.S. Air Force.

²A summary of these bills may be found in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to the Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, Committee Print, pp. 241-251.

In June 1917, Colonel Billy Mitchell, while serving with the American Expeditionary Force in France, presented General John J. Pershing with a proposal for an Air Service composed of two distinct forces.

One consisted of squadrons attached to the ground armies, corps, and divisions and under the control of ground commanders. The other force consisted of "large aeronautical groups for strategical operations against enemy aircraft and enemy materiel, at a distance from the actual line." The bombardment and pursuit formations making up this force "would have an independent mission . . . and would be used to carry the war well into the enemy's country."

Here was clearly foreshadowed the classic controversy over the proper role of airpower that was to agitate the American military establishment for so many years. The heart of the controversy was destined to be the concept of strategic bombardment.¹

After World War I, numerous committees and boards made studies in regard to either unifying the armed forces or creating an independent air force.² However, both the Army and Navy opposed unification and the creation of an independent air force and as a result no changes in this respect were made in the defense establishment.

¹Alfred Goldberg (ed.), A History of the U.S. Air Force, 1907-1957 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1958), p. 21.

²Studies were made in 1919 by the Dickman Board, in 1923 by the Lassiter Board, in 1924 by a Joint Congressional Committee, in 1925 by the Lampert Committee and the Morrow Board, in 1932 by a Joint Army-Navy Committee, in 1933 by the Drum Board, in 1934 by the Baker Board, and in 1938 by the War Department. All opposed unification except the Lampert Committee. In 1932 the House voted 153-135 against establishing a single department of defense.

On January 9, 1931 an agreement was made by General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff and Admiral William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations which spelled out Army and Navy air responsibilities. The Naval air arm was to confine its operations to fleet activities while the Army Air Corps was to be employed as an element of the Army in defending the coasts of the United States and its possessions. This agreement was significant because it was the first major attempt to reconcile, in writing, the roles of Army and Navy aviation.

A second agreement in regard to the Air Corps was made in May 1938. The Army agreed to limit the operations of the Air Corps to not more than 100 miles offshore as the Navy felt a greater range of operation would allow the Air Corps to infringe upon its mission. However, in September 1939, after the start of World War II, this restriction was removed and the Air Corps' mission was expanded to include the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere and its approaches.¹

Soon after the United States entered World War II, Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt met in

¹For an excellent account of the efforts made by the Air Corps to increase its strength prior to World War II see Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949) and William B. Huie, The Fight for Air Power (New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942).

Washington. At this conference, Churchill was accompanied by his military staff, which included Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives.¹ At the conclusion of the conference, Roosevelt decided that if the United States was going to work closely with the British it would be necessary to appoint counterparts to the British military staff. Therefore, by executive order, he created the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

The first formal meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was held on February 9, 1942. The original members were Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and Lt. General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces.³ In March, Admiral King assumed the combined post of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and CNO

¹The Royal Air Force had been an independent service since 1918.

²See Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 467-470 and William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), Chap. viii.

³The elevation of General Arnold to this position made him practically coequal with his boss, General Marshall, and therefore greatly increased the status of the AAF. This was one of the major factors which led to the establishment of an independent air force after World War II.

when Admiral Stark was transferred to England. In July, Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed Chief of Staff to the President and became acting Chairman of the Staff. These four men were the only members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the remainder of World War II.

The British Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, when working together, were known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Their primary duties were the strategic conduct of the war and the allocation of munitions. The U.S. Joint Chiefs' primary duty was to coordinate the operations of United States forces throughout the world and they were responsible, as a group, only to the President. However, there was a very serious shortcoming in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. None of the members could force another to conform to even majority decisions. Whenever there was disagreement, only the President could decide the matter. Consequently, immediate action could be taken only on those matters in which there was unanimous agreement.

During World War II many revolutionary changes in warfare took place.

Not only had land and sea forces acquired ranges and speeds far greater than ever before, but a third major force, air power, had been introduced, with even greater and undreamed-of speed and range. New methods of communication permitted any one of the three forces to work closely with either or both of the others. New amphibious vehicles, at home on land and water, and assigned both to land and sea

forces, broke the restrictions of former boundaries. Parachute and glider operations brought the air and ground forces closer together as did air-ground cooperation in attacking enemy installations and strong-points. It was possible to use the combined weight of all of a nation's armed forces against a single objective or in coordinated action over a wide area. This called for teamwork on an unprecedented scale.

The need for unified command to make that kind of teamwork possible was recognized immediately, and in each theater of operations a single commander was given authority over all the armed forces in his area. Such was the case with General Eisenhower in Europe, General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, and Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific. In their campaigns, theater commanders were able to use not only ground, air, or naval elements singly, but all three together under a single command.¹

It was evident from the success of the unified commands and the disaster at Pearl Harbor, which was partly due to the lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy, that unification of the armed forces was desirable. However, any attempt to accomplish so great a reorganization of the services during wartime would have been too disruptive and might have seriously interfered with the war effort. In May 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, looking toward the postwar period, established the Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, headed by Admiral J. O. Richardson. The Richardson Committee was composed of two Army and two Navy officers and was instructed to determine the best postwar defense organization and report its findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

¹The Air Officer's Guide, op. cit., p. 14.

The committee visited all of the combat theaters and interviewed some eighty high-ranking military and naval leaders. On April 11, 1945, the Richardson Committee submitted its report. It recommended the creation of a single Department of the Armed Forces with coequal branches--Army, Navy, and Air Force; a single civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces; a single military Commander of the Armed Forces, who would also serve as chief of staff to the President; and an armed forces general staff.

The Army supported the committee's proposals, but the Navy did not. As a result, the plan was forwarded to the President, but no action was taken on it because the President felt that agreement between the Army and Navy was an essential first step toward a unification of the armed forces.

The death of President Roosevelt on April 12 and the succession of Harry S. Truman to the Presidency was of great significance as far as unification was concerned. President Truman wholeheartedly backed the proposals for unification and later wrote:

One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the office of President was that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace. . . .

It had been evident to me, from the record of the Pearl Harbor hearings, that the tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified command, either in

the field or in Washington, as it was any personal failure of Army or Navy commanders.¹

President Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I and had always been a good friend of the Navy. Because of this close relationship, the Navy had been willing to accept some degree of unification since it felt that Roosevelt would protect its status and not allow the Army or Air Force to dominate the postwar military establishment. However, after Roosevelt's death and the succession of President Truman, the Navy persistently opposed all plans for unification.²

On May 15, Senator David J. Walsh (D-Mass.), Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, wrote Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal that:

I doubt very much if any useful purpose would be served by merely objecting to plans which propose the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments. It seems to me, that those of us who feel such a consolidation would not be effective should attempt to formulate a plan which would be more effective in accomplishing the objective sought. . . .

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 46.

²President Truman was an Army captain during World War I and a colonel in the Army Reserves at the start of World War II. Although he volunteered for service, he was not called to active duty during World War II because it was felt he would be of more value to the country as a senator.

I suggest that you consider the question of having the Navy Department make a thorough study of this subject.¹

This led Forrestal, on June 19, to appoint Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former business partner and a member of the War Production Board, to make a study of and recommend the most desirable postwar organization for national defense, presumably from the Navy's standpoint. Eberstadt submitted his report to Forrestal on September 25 and the Navy subsequently used it as the basis for its plan to unify the armed services.²

Eberstadt felt that the armed services were only a part of the total national defense organization and that postwar unification should not be limited to military unification. Instead of favoring a single department of defense, he recommended three separate and equal departments of War, Navy, and Air subordinate only to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as the major link between the three services; a National Security Resources Board would serve as the coordinating body between civilian agencies of the government and the industrial resources of the country; a National Security

¹This letter is in Report to the Hon. James Forrestal, op. cit., p. iii.

²See supra, p. 4, footnote 2, for the full title of this report. It is usually referred to as the Eberstadt Report.

Council would coordinate military and civilian defense efforts and would serve as the principal policy-making body for national defense; and a Central Intelligence Agency would coordinate all intelligence activities.¹

Soon after the end of World War II, the Senate Military Affairs Committee began hearings on plans for unifying the armed forces.² In October the Army submitted its plan to the committee which recommended a single Department of the Armed Forces with subordinate Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces. On December 19, President Truman asked Congress for legislation along the lines of the Army Plan. In his message to Congress, he stated:

The President, as Commander in Chief, should not personally have to coordinate the Army and Navy and Air Force. With all the other problems before him, the President cannot be expected to balance . . . the

¹The Eberstadt Report was the only major proposal that did not recommend a greater degree of unification between the armed services. However, it was the only plan acceptable to the Navy and with some modification it later became the organization adopted for the postwar military establishment.

²Until 1947 both the House and Senate had separate committees to supervise the affairs of the two armed forces. The House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees had jurisdiction over Navy matters while the Military Affairs Committees had jurisdiction over Army matters. Usually, these committees strongly supported the viewpoints of their respective services and jealously guarded their rights. For this reason, if legislation was to be passed, both committees had to be satisfied, which invariably led to compromise and to legislation that at times proved to be unsatisfactory to either service.

several branches of the national defense. He should be able to rely for that coordination . . . at the Cabinet level.¹

In regard to creating an independent Air Force, he said:

Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning is as great. . . .

Parity for air power can be achieved in one department or in three, but not in two. As between one department and three, the former is infinitely to be preferred.²

By May, 1946 little progress had been made because of continual disagreement between the Army and Navy and between the Senate Military and Naval Affairs Committees. Therefore, on May 13, President Truman

called Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to a conference at the White House. At this conference I urged the necessity of the Army and Navy getting together on the problem of unification. I knew it would work out better if I did not order the two branches of the service to reach an agreement, and I therefore suggested that they sit down together and work out their points of agreement and disagreement and submit the list to me.

On May 31 the two Secretaries submitted a joint letter outlining areas of agreement and disagreement. They were not able to agree on four vital points: a single military establishment; setting up of three coordinate branches of the service; control of aviation; and administration of the Marine Corps.

These four points were the basic issues which had always been the cause of conflict between the Army and the Navy.³

¹The New York Times, December 20, 1945, p. 14.

²Ibid. ³Truman, op. cit., p. 50.

The position of the services in 1946 could be summarized as follows:

1. The Army favored a strong, centralized Department of Defense with an integrated top command or general staff and three subordinate departments--Army, Navy, and Air. The Army did not insist on possessing all the forces necessary to carry out its mission. It was willing to borrow what ever was needed from the other services, although it presumed that the commander of a joint operation would be an Army officer.¹

2. Army Air Force leaders went along with the Army because unification meant the Air Force would obtain independence. However, they felt that all land-based aircraft should be under Air Force control, which, if approved by Congress, meant the Navy would lose control of some of its aircraft.

¹Unlike the Navy Department, the War Department was a tightly unified organization. This unification was achieved in 1903 when, as a result of the strenuous efforts of Secretary Elihu Root, a general staff system was established. Prior to 1903 there were thirteen practically independent bureaus, whose chiefs considered themselves responsible only to the Secretary of War, not to the Commanding General of the Army. This situation was alleviated by the general staff system which placed the bureaus under the Chief of Staff. This system corrected many deficiencies in the Army and in 1946 the Army naturally felt a similar type organization would effectively unify the armed forces. See Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946).

3. The Navy did not want any unification. However, if it was forced to accept some degree of unification, then as loose and flexible an organization as possible was desired. The Navy felt it should possess everything necessary to both define and carry out its mission. It desired to be completely self-sufficient and did not want to be forced to depend on the other services in order to accomplish its mission. The Navy was primarily concerned over the possibility of losing its air arm to an independent Air Force and its Marine Corps to the Army. Also, it felt the Army and Air Force would probably vote together on most issues at Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and the Navy would therefore usually be in the minority.¹

In June, President Truman presented a unification plan to Congress which called for a single Department of National Defense and separate and equal departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The plan did not propose a single Chief of Staff which many congressmen feared would lead to military dictatorship. However, Congress adjourned without taking action on the plan and, in September, President Truman again requested the services

¹For an extremely interesting account of Army and Navy differences, see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), Chap. xx. For the Navy's viewpoint, see Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), Chap. XXXV.

to work out a plan that would be acceptable to the next Congress. In November, the services agreed to devise an organization acceptable to both and did so in January, 1947.¹

A major step toward eventual unification of the armed forces took place in January, 1947. As a result of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,² which had been passed by the previous Congress in August, both houses combined their Naval and Military Affairs Committees into single Committees on Armed Services. This eliminated one of the major obstacles to unification because, as President Truman later pointed out,

the chairman of the Military and Naval Affairs Committees, especially in the House, where appropriations originate, tended to become Secretaries of War and Navy. There were a couple of House members, chairmen of the Military Appropriations Subcommittee and Naval Affairs Committee, who had to have seventeen-gun salutes, parades, etc., as often as they could find excuses to visit Army posts and naval bases. These gentlemen were the principal stumbling blocks to unification. This was particularly true of the Naval Affairs chairman in the House.³

¹Forrestal gives a good summary of the various plans submitted for unification in Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 146-170.

²See U.S., Statutes at Large, LX, Part 1, 812-852.

³Truman, op. cit., p. 47.

With only one Armed Service Committee in each House, only half as many people had to be pleased and the battle for unification became much easier in 1947.

On February 26, Truman presented another unification plan to Congress. It was admittedly a compromise between Army and Navy viewpoints on unification rather than an ideal or sound defense organization but with minor changes it was passed by Congress on July 24. On July 26, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law. Navy Secretary Forrestal was appointed as the first Secretary of Defense, primarily to ease the Navy's fear of unification, and he took office on September 17, 1947.


The National Security Act made many revolutionary changes in the defense establishment.¹

1. It established a National Military Establishment² headed by a Secretary of Defense who was a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. (See Chart 1.) He was given general authority over three separate and equal military departments--Army, Navy, and Air Force. Powers not granted to the Secretary of Defense

¹See U.S., Statutes at Large, LXI, Part 1, 495-510.

²The Department of Defense was not established until 1949.

Chart 1. - National Military Establishment, 1947



were reserved to the service secretaries. The Secretary was designated as the principal assistant to the President on all matters relating to national security. He was required to be a civilian who had not been on active military service for ten years prior to his appointment.¹ The Secretary was not authorized a military staff of his own, other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. It authorized each military department to have its own secretary. Although these departments were unified under the Secretary of Defense, they were classified as executive departments and required to be separately administered. Congress even went as far as specifically stating that the three military departments could not be merged. The service secretaries were also members of the National Security Council. Although they were not Cabinet members, they could take a matter directly to the President or Director of the Budget if they considered it necessary and first informed the Secretary of Defense.

3. It authorized a Joint Chiefs of Staff, although a single chief of staff and an armed forces general staff were specifically forbidden. The Joint

¹This provision was temporarily removed, but was not revoked, by a special act of Congress on September 18, 1950, to allow General Marshall to be appointed Secretary in an attempt to restore confidence in the Department after the early failures in the Korean War. See ibid., LXIV, Part 1, 853.

Chiefs of Staff was composed of the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the President's Chief of Staff. They were designated as the principal military advisers to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Their duties included the preparation of strategic plans and the responsibility for establishing unified commands. A Joint Staff was authorized directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the three services, but was limited to 100 officers. The Joint Staff operated under a Director who was required to be junior in rank to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. It established a War Council, headed by the Secretary of Defense and composed of the service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to advise the Secretary of Defense on broad policy matters relating to the armed services.

5. It established a Munitions Board, composed of civilians, to coordinate the military supply program.

6. It established a Research and Development Board, headed by a civilian chairman and composed of two representatives from each military department, to coordinate research and development in the defense establishment.

Although not a part of the National Military Establishment, the National Security Act also established a National Security Council to coordinate all departments and agencies of the government that were concerned with national security; a Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate all intelligence activities; and a National Security Resources Board to advise the President on utilizing all of the nation's resources--civilian, military, and industrial--for total war.

The National Security Act of 1947 was a major achievement, but it was also a compromise in which each side yielded upon matters of principle for the purpose of achieving an agreed solution. The end result would never have been proposed initially by anyone, nor when achieved, defended as a whole as a sound solution. It was simply the best attainable at the time--a recognition that politics is the science of the possible.¹

It is interesting to note the similarity between the National Security Act and the Articles of Confederation. In both cases a weak and ineffective central authority was established with practically sovereign units subordinate to it and greater effectiveness was obtained only over a long period of time by a gradual strengthening of central authority and control.

¹Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington; Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 84.

The First Ten Years

The National Security Act established the organizational structure of the defense establishment but it did not enumerate the roles and missions of the three services. An initial approach to this problem had been made by a Presidential Executive Order on July 26, 1947,¹ but this order was only a general outline of functions whereas a much more detailed and specific enumeration was required. Consequently, Secretary Forrestal met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida, from March 11-14, 1948 and at Newport, Rhode Island, from August 20-22, to discuss the functions of the three services.² At these conferences, Forrestal succeeded in getting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on the roles and missions of their respective services.³

¹See U.S., National Archives, Federal Register, Vol. XII, No. 147, July 29, 1947, p. 5005.

²See Millis, op. cit., pp. 389-396, 476-477, for Forrestal's account of these conferences.

³This agreement is usually referred to as the Key West Agreement. It was first promulgated as a Secretary of Defense Memorandum on April 21, 1948. The document is not generally available, but it may be found in The Air Officer's Guide, op. cit., pp. 20-29. This agreement was revised, without changing the roles and missions originally assigned the services, on October 1, 1953. The complete text of this revision may be found in Stanley, op. cit., pp. 176-188. The latest revision was made, again without changing the original roles and missions of the services, on January 1, 1959. The complete text of this revision may be found in Air Force, February, 1959, pp. 130-136.

The Army, including organic aviation and water transport, was granted primary interest in all operations on land except those involving the Marine Corps. The Army was responsible for:

1. Defeating enemy land forces.
2. Seizing, occupying, and defending land areas.
3. Training antiaircraft artillery units.
4. Training forces for airborne operations.
5. Providing Army forces for defense of the United States against air attack.¹

6. The collateral function of interdicting enemy sea and air power through operations from land.

The Navy, including naval aviation and the Marine Corps, was granted primary interest in all operations at sea. The Navy was responsible for:

1. Destroying enemy naval forces.
2. Maintaining local superiority, including air, in an area of naval operations.
3. Seizing and defending advanced naval bases and conducting such land operations as might be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
4. Amphibious operations and doctrines.

¹Although relatively unimportant in 1948, this provision is presently the cause of a bitter dispute between the Army and the Air Force as to which is responsible for the use of surface-to-air missiles against attacking aircraft and missiles.

5. Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, protection of shipping, and mine laying.

6. Providing naval forces for the defense of the United States against air attack.

7. The collateral functions of interdicting enemy land and air power through operations at sea, conducting close combat air support, and participating in the overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

The Air Force was granted primary interest in all operations in the air except those involving naval aviation. The Air Force was responsible for:

1. Defeating enemy air forces.²

¹This last provision allowed the Navy to participate in strategic bombing which led to future disputes with the Air Force and to the 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals."

²The provisions giving each service the primary responsibility for defeating the counterpart forces of enemy countries is a good indication of the futility of trying to divide up the various military functions among three services. In some cases, another service may be able to defeat enemy forces more efficiently than the service assigned the mission. For example, by strategic bombing, it is possible for the Air Force to defeat enemy land and sea forces before they even come into contact with U.S. Army and Naval forces.

2. Defending the United States against air attack.¹
3. Strategic air warfare.
4. Furnishing the Army with close combat air support, tactical reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.
5. Providing air transport for the armed forces.
6. The collateral functions of interdicting enemy sea power through air operations, conducting anti-submarine warfare and aerial mine laying, and protecting shipping.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible for:

1. Preparing strategic plans and directing the strategic operations of the armed forces, to include the general direction of all combat operations.
2. Preparing joint logistics plans.
3. Establishing unified commands in strategic areas and designating one of their members as the executive agent for each unified command.
4. Submitting a statement of military requirements to the Secretary of Defense for his guidance in preparing the annual defense budget.

¹This was primarily the responsibility of the Air Force. Army and Navy forces assigned this mission came under the Air Force general who commanded the unified Continental Air Defense Command.

The Key West Agreement solved some of the problems in the defense establishment but not all of them because

the attempts to reconcile clashing views have resulted in instruments more akin to an agreement among sovereign states than to a workable doctrine. They have had the same vagueness, leaving each service free to interpret them largely according to its own preconceptions. . . . the Key West agreement was little more than a reformulation of the traditional roles. . . . This formula missed the essential point of interservice rivalry, perhaps deliberately. The disputes have arisen not because the services have sought to take over each other's primary mission--although this too has happened occasionally--but because in pursuit of their own missions they have been impelled by the conflicting pressures of technology and of budget-making into developing overlapping weapons systems. The real difficulty has been that the power, speed and range of modern weapons have obliterated the traditional distinctions between ground, sea and air warfare. . . .

The Key West agreement could receive concrete meaning only in terms of the dispute that had produced the interservice wrangling in the first place: the disagreement over which service should control the nuclear weapons. This was the prerequisite to any claim to be able to contribute to the strategy of an all-out war and was, therefore, the best support for budgetary requests. The upshot was a compromise which demonstrated that the neat distinctions set forth in the general principles of the Key West agreement were inapplicable in practice. . . . And, like many diplomatic instruments, the Key West agreement contained an unwritten understanding--the concept of balanced forces, in which significantly the balance was achieved not by doctrine but by the budget: each service was promised approximately the same yearly appropriation. In short, the Key West agreement had not been the expression of a strategic doctrine but a way to postpone difficult choices.¹

¹Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 26-27. For a good description of the balanced forces concept see Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954), Chap. xii.

One of the major inadequacies of the National Security Act was the restrictions it placed on the Secretary of Defense. Forrestal did not have the legal authority to force the three services to work together as a team. As he had only general authority over the services he usually had to resort to persuasion to get things done. In his first report to the President and Congress, which covered the first fifteen months of operation under the National Security Act, Forrestal stated that several changes should be made in the act.¹ He felt that:

1. The authority of the Secretary of Defense should be strengthened by making it clear he had the responsibility for exercising direction, authority, and control over the military departments.
2. An Under Secretary of Defense should be authorized.
3. The Chief of Staff to the President should be removed from membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that either a fourth officer, or one of the service chiefs on a rotation basis, should be appointed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

¹See U.S., National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948, pp. 3-4. It is ironical that Forrestal, one of the major opponents of unification and the creation of a strong Secretary of Defense, was one of the first to advocate an increase in the powers of the Secretary and greater unification.

4. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be removed from membership on the National Security Council which would make the Secretary of Defense the only representative from the National Military Establishment.

5. The limitation on the size of the Joint Staff should be either removed or raised.

On March 28, 1949 Forrestal retired and was replaced as Secretary of Defense by Louis A. Johnson, a former Assistant Secretary of War. Johnson's troubles began almost immediately. Forced to make drastic cuts because of the limited funds available for defense Johnson, on April 23, upon the recommendation of a majority of the Joint Chiefs, canceled the construction of the Navy's super aircraft carrier United States.¹ He stated that all strategic bombing could be accomplished by the Air Force's B-36 and therefore there was no need for super carriers to carry Navy bombers.

As would be expected, naval leaders were furious. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan immediately resigned and a "Revolt of the Admirals" began which finally ended several months later with the dismissal of Admiral

¹The recommendation was not unanimous because the CNO, as would be expected, objected to the cancellation.

Louis E. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations.¹

During the dispute interests friendly to the Navy circulated an anonymous document which appeared in the press and was circulated in Congress. It charged that the B-36 had been fraudulently procured by the Air Force, as a result of political influence, and that it did not have the capability the Air Force claimed.² Another anonymous document charged that the Air Force had greatly exaggerated the effectiveness of strategic air warfare, that it would serve no useful purpose, and that it was morally wrong.³ The document further claimed that the Air Force had, because of its concentration on strategic warfare, neglected both air defense and tactical warfare.

In an investigation of these charges, the House Armed Services Committee completely vindicated the Air Force of charges of corruption in purchasing the B-36. In the second phase of the investigation that began in

¹For President Truman's version of this dispute see Truman, op. cit., p. 53. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 34-37, also gives an interesting analysis of this controversy.

²The Navy claimed its jet fighters could shoot down the B-36 and, therefore, presumably the Russians could also.

³The Navy was nevertheless very desirous of participating in strategic operations and had started to build super carriers for the express purpose of providing a platform large enough to launch bombers capable of carrying atomic weapons.

September, the committee made a complete review of air operations and reexamined the roles and missions assigned to the three services. Because it was evident that unification had not brought the hoped for results, the House Armed Services Committee, in its report, dealt at some length with what unification did and did not mean.

Unification was, in the view of the committee, a goal to which there might be more than one path. It did not involve operational control of the armed forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor the imposition of the views of any one--or two--of the armed services upon all three. It should not involve "triplification" of administrative costs, nor should it cause "savings" by reduction in fighting efficiency. The Committee particularly stressed that unification should not--and would not--cause a diminution of Congress' role in national defense policies, nor the denial of military advice to Congress by reprisals against officers who gave their personal views. Unification, said the Committee, should involve a comprehensive and well integrated program for national security based upon three separately administered military departments with effective strategic direction and unified control in the field.¹

In the midst of the B-36 investigation, Congress passed the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 and President Truman signed them into law on August 10.² The amendments were the second major step in the development

¹ Stanley, op. cit., p. 95.

² The amendments were based primarily on the recommendations of The Hoover Commission. See U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The National Security Organization, 1949.

of the Department of Defense.¹

1. They changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense.

2. They strengthened the powers of the Secretary of Defense by:

- a) Giving him authority to determine the military budget for the entire Department of Defense.
- b) Removing the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from membership on the National Security Council which made the Secretary of Defense the sole representative on the council from the Department of Defense.
- c) Removing the word general from the clause "general direction, authority, and control" in the 1947 Act; and deleting the clause stating that all powers not specifically given to the Secretary of Defense were reserved to the military departments.
- d) Converting the three military departments from executive departments to separate

¹See U.S., Statutes at Large, LXIII, Part 1, 578-592.

military departments within the Department of Defense.

- e) Eliminating the statutory right of the service secretaries to appeal directly to the President and the Bureau of the Budget.

3. They authorized a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replaced the President's Chief of Staff. He was given precedence over all other officers in the armed services. The Chairman was to serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was to provide the agenda for their meetings but he was not authorized a vote. The Chairman was to be appointed by the President for a two-year term and was eligible for only one reappointment, except in time of war.

4. They authorized a Deputy Secretary of Defense and three assistant secretaries of defense.

5. They authorized an increase in the Joint Staff from 100 to 210 officers.

However, while strengthening the Secretary of Defense's authority, Congress also limited it. He was forbidden to transfer or consolidate any combatant function established by law,¹ required to report to Congress

¹This provision was inserted primarily to protect the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

any reassignment of a noncombatant function, and forbidden to merge the administration of the three services. Also, any service secretary or member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, make recommendations to Congress on his own initiative.

The 1949 Amendments did not solve all the problems in the Department of Defense and additional changes were soon required. As a result of the tremendous buildup of the Marine Corps during the Korean War, it was proposed that the Marine Corps be given representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress approved this proposal and passed an act that permitted the Commandant to sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a coequal member when matters which directly concerned the Marine Corps were under consideration. President Truman approved this act on June 28, 1952.¹

Also during the Korean War, there were continual complaints by the Army about the inadequacy of the close air support supplied by the Air Force. Consequently, the Army began enlarging its air arm and to make plans for

¹See U.S., Statutes at Large, LXVI, 282. It should be noted that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) but is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. He does, however, have an additional direct responsibility to the CNO for Marine forces assigned to the Operating Force of the Navy. When so assigned, these forces are under the command of the CNO.

establishing its own air force. To put a stop to such plans, an agreement on the use of aircraft was signed by Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter and Army Secretary Frank Pace on November 4, 1952.¹ Except for helicopters, the Army was limited to aircraft of 5,000 pounds or less. Furthermore, the Army could use aircraft and helicopters only for liaison, observation, and aeromedical evacuation within a 100-mile combat zone.

During the transitional period between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett, on November 18, 1952, wrote President Truman a letter outlining the areas in the Department of Defense that he felt needed further study and improvement.² These recommendations were made in light of Lovett's long experience in governmental administration and he hoped they would aid the next Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, in improving the defense organization. Lovett recommended that the Secretary's authority be clarified by removing the requirement that the services be separately administered; that the Secretary be provided with a personal

¹See Stanley, op. cit., p. 135.

²This letter is in U.S., Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 1957-58, pp. 493-500. Arthur Krock summarized this letter in The New York Times, January 5, 1958, Sec. 4, p. 3, and pointed out that some of the problems enumerated by Lovett still existed in 1958.

military staff; and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be relieved of their command functions and be confined exclusively to planning and review of war plans.

On February 2, 1953, Secretary Wilson appointed the Committee on Department of Defense Organization, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, to make a thorough study of the Defense Department. After holding extensive hearings, the committee submitted its report to Wilson on April 11.¹ President Eisenhower adopted most of the Rockefeller Committee's recommendations and sent a reorganization plan to Congress on April 30.² It became effective on June 30, as Congress did not disapprove it within sixty days after its submission.

Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 was the third major step in the development of the Department of Defense.³

1. It abolished both the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board and transferred their

¹See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953. Committee Print.

²The President decided to obtain his reorganization aims without giving Congress an opportunity to change them. The plan had to be accepted or rejected in toto, as stipulated in the Reorganization Act of 1949. See U.S., Statutes at Large, LXIII, Part 1, 203-207.

³See Ibid., LXVII, Part 1, 638-639.

functions to the Secretary of Defense.

2. It authorized six additional assistant secretaries of defense and a general counsel with assistant secretary rank.

3. It gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to manage the Joint Staff and its director. This had formerly been done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively.

On October 1, Secretary Wilson made a revision in the Key West Agreement by changing the executive agent system for unified commands.¹ Instead of authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appoint one of their members as the executive agent for a unified command, Wilson decided that he would appoint a service secretary as his executive agent for unified commands. This made the Joint Chiefs of Staff a planning and advisory group without command functions and thus strengthened civilian control in the Defense Department. It also clarified the lines of authority as, under the old system, the service secretaries were being by-passed in the chain of operational command.

Guided missiles were not mentioned in the Key West Agreement because in 1948 they seemed to be of

¹See U.S., Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1953, p. 17.

limited value to the services. Although they had been under development in the United States since the end of World War II, missiles were not considered as a replacement for long-range bombers and other weapon systems because many scientists did not believe a suitable nuclear warhead could be designed for missiles. However, when those difficulties were finally overcome, the services realized that missiles would be the major weapons of the future and therefore they began developing them without giving too much thought to the possibility of using missiles under development in other services. As General (retired) Carl Spaatz, former Air Force Chief of Staff, later said:

There are 37 different types of missiles being developed by the services. That certainly seems to me to be too many. And it is due to the fact that each service wants to move into the missile field regardless of whether each phase of missile development, intermediate range, the long range, all the other phases, are necessary for each service's operation.

There has been a tendency, I would say, for each service to try to move into all fields, to fight the next war all by itself, instead of as a team. . . .

It leads to duplication in the development and the production of weapons, and duplication in providing the units for their operation after they are developed.¹

¹Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. cit., p. 1336.

In an attempt to end the duplication in the missile field, Secretary Wilson, on November 26, 1956 issued a memorandum that defined the missions of the armed forces in regard to guided missiles, without changing the basic Key West Agreement.¹

1. The Army was authorized to use land-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges up to 200 miles and surface-to-air missiles with ranges up to 100 miles.

2. The Air Force was authorized to use land-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges over 200 miles and surface-to-air missiles with ranges over 100 miles.²

3. The Navy was allowed to use all ship-launched missiles with ranges up to 1,500 miles.³

4. Wilson also attempted to settle the dispute between the Air Force and Army in regard to aircraft by limiting the Army to liaison and observation aircraft

¹The complete text of Wilson's Memorandum is in The New York Times, November 27, 1956, p. 22.

²This provision gave the Air Force operational use of all land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), which are surface-to-surface missiles with a range of approximately 1,500 miles. In 1956 both the Army and the Air Force had IRBM's under development.

³This provision gave the Air Force exclusive use of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which has a range of over 5,000 miles.

operating within a combat zone extending not more than 100 miles each way from the front lines.¹

On March 18, 1957, Secretary Wilson further defined the areas in which the Air Force and Army were to operate in regard to aircraft.² The Army was allowed to operate aircraft within the battle zone--that is, 100 miles each way from the front lines--for command, liaison, communications, observation, reconnaissance, fire-adjustment, topographical survey, airlift of army personnel, and material and aeromedical evacuation. The Army was allowed to use helicopters up to a maximum empty weight of 20,000 pounds while aircraft were not to exceed 5,000 pounds empty.³ The Air Force retained its responsibility for strategic and tactical airlift, tactical reconnaissance,

¹Under the Key West Agreement, the Air Force was required to furnish combat airlift for the Army, but when funds are tight airlift expenditures are usually the first ones cut as the Air Force feels its other missions are more important. Consequently, the Army had been slowly building-up an Air Force of its own. Wilson attempted to put a stop to this and said he was not going to allow the Army to build another Air Force within the Army.

²See U.S., Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957, pp. 2-3.

³The basic objective of Wilson's directive was for the Army to develop aircraft with the capability of operating from unimproved fields.

interdiction, and close air support. This directive replaced the agreement between the Army and the Air Force made on November 4, 1952.

During the spring of 1957, the Air Force became increasingly concerned about the Army's missile program because the Army had continued to build the Jupiter, an IRBM, in the hopes that Wilson's decision would be rescinded sometime in the future.¹ Secretary Wilson had allowed the Army to continue its work but stated that the service that developed a missile would not necessarily use it operationally. This meant, as far as he was concerned, that the Jupiter, although built by the Army, would be used operationally by the Air Force.²

On August 13, 1957, Wilson appointed a high level committee to find a way to end the duplication in the IRBM Program since both the Air Force's Thor and the Army's Jupiter were 1,500-mile IRBM's and about comparable in performance. The committee was composed of Air Force Major General Bernard A. Schriever, Army Major General John B. Medaris, and William Holaday, Wilson's

¹Secretaries of Defense come and go. So do Presidents. But the Army just keeps rolling along.

²Although this was an unusual arrangement, it has worked out in practice as the Air Force now has Jupiters employed in its operational units.

Special Assistant for Guided Missiles.¹

Thus, after ten years, it seemed that the services were cooperating little better than they had before they were unified. As soon as one dispute was settled another was always waiting to take its place. Clearly a drastic change in defense organization was necessary. Just as clearly it seemed that only a war or a major crisis would provide the necessary impetus.

¹On November 27 Secretary of Defense McElroy, Wilson's successor, decided to authorize the combat production of both missiles in spite of the fact that it was estimated the cost of producing both missiles would be between \$150 and \$200 million above the cost of completing only one program. McElroy probably felt it would be better to produce both missiles rather than select one as, in all probability, this would have touched-off another interservice squabble. However, the Army was again informed that the Air Force would use the Jupiter operationally.

CHAPTER II

SPUTNIK

On August 26, the Soviet Union announced it had successfully tested an ICBM. The announcement stated that:

the missile flew at a very high, unprecedented altitude. Covering a huge distance in a brief time the missile landed in the target area. The results obtained show that it is possible to direct missiles into any part of the world.¹

The next day at his news conference, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said he had no reason to doubt the veracity of the Soviet claim but emphasized that a successful test-flight did not necessarily mean the Soviet Union possessed an arsenal of operational ICBM's. Dulles added that he did not think the military balance of power between the East and West had been disturbed by this development, as strategic air power would probably continue to form the base of military power for some years to come.

In spite of the Soviet announcement the Administration still seemed more concerned about balancing the

¹The text of the announcement is in The New York Times, August 27, 1957, p. 6. Emphasis is added. By comparing the Soviet announcement with the estimated

budget than in developing missiles. The Defense Department announced, on September 3, that spending for missile development was being curtailed for economy reasons and, again on September 17, Secretary Wilson said that there would soon be further cuts in armed forces expenditures. This, however, never occurred because on October 4 the Soviet Union launched the first man-made earth satellite and a new word--Sputnik--was added to the English language.¹

Surprisingly, most Administration officials seemed unconcerned about the progress the Soviets were making in the space and missile fields. Secretary Wilson, on October 8, his last day as Secretary of Defense, dismissed the Soviet satellite as a "neat scientific trick" and said it was of little military significance.² He also said he doubted the Soviet claim of having an operational ICBM, although intelligence reports indicated that the claim

performance of the U.S. ICBM--the Atlas--it was assumed that the Soviets meant the ICBM reached an altitude of 500 to 600 miles, covered a distance of 5,000 to 6,000 miles in about 30 minutes at a speed of approximately 15,000 mph, and came within 5 to 10 miles of its target.

¹Sputnik weighed 184 pounds, while the planned U.S. satellite was to weigh only three and one-fourth pounds.

²See The New York Times, October 9, 1957, p. 1.

was very likely to be true.¹

The next day at his news conference, President Eisenhower also discounted the military implications of the Soviet satellite except for saying that it demonstrated that the Soviets had developed a rocket with tremendous thrust. He said "so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehension, not one iota."² However, he conceded that the Soviet Union had scored a political victory³ although he said he had never looked upon the attempt to launch a satellite as a race.⁴ He concluded by saying he had no plans to speed up either the satellite or missile program and

¹The U.S. had an extremely powerful, 1,000-mile range radar in northern Turkey that had been tracking Soviet missile launchings for over two years. See Aviation Week, October 21, 1957, pp. 21, 26-27 and November 4, 1957, p. 21.

²The New York Times, October 10, 1957, p. 14.

³The Administration knew the Soviet Union was about to launch a satellite but had not publicized it because it was felt the publicity would give Sputnik more significance than was warranted. However, just the opposite happened. By not publicizing the satellite it seemed more significant than it really was and the impact on the people of the U.S. and the free world was terrific. See Aviation Week, November 25, 1957, pp. 30-31.

⁴The U.S. had previously announced that its satellite project was merely a part of the International Geo-Physical Year Program. In its concern over world public opinion, the U.S. had gone out of its way to separate the Vanguard Project from its military program by assigning the project to the Navy. Either the Air Force or the Army

"I don't know what we could have done more."¹

On November 3, the Soviet Union put a second satellite into orbit. Sputnik II weighed 1,120 pounds and contained a dog, the first time a living thing had been projected into space.² It was now clearly evident that the United States was far behind the Soviet Union in space technology and that the successful launching of Sputnik I had not been an accident. Consequently, President Eisenhower decided it was time to personally reassure the American people. On November 7, via radio and television, in the first of a series of messages that were later cut short by his stroke, he reviewed the United States missile program and assured the people that the country, in overall capability, was still ahead of the

would have been a more logical choice because they were developing military missiles that could have been used to launch a satellite. However, by ignoring world opinion and using a military missile, the Soviet Union achieved its objective and gained a great psychological victory.

¹The New York Times, October 10, 1957, p. 14.

²At the time, some United States missile experts estimated that the Soviet Union must have a missile with an engine or engines with 1,000,000 pounds of thrust. They arrived at this conclusion by using a rough rule of thumb, that is, that it takes 1,000 pounds of thrust to put 1 pound of satellite into orbit. The largest engine made in the U.S., at that time, developed only 150,000 pounds of thrust.

Soviet Union.¹

During the talk President Eisenhower announced that he had appointed James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology. The President said that Killian would coordinate the entire U.S. missile program and report directly to him as required.

The next day, Secretary Neil McElroy, who had replaced Wilson as Secretary of Defense on October 9, announced that he had directed the Army to use its Jupiter IRBM to launch a satellite.² He stated that this policy change did not give the Army authority to use the missile in combat but instead was made solely to supplement or back up the Navy's Vanguard Project.

On December 6, the United States' prestige again suffered a serious blow. The first effort to launch an American satellite was unsuccessful as the Vanguard exploded just after launching.³ This failure could hardly

¹For a good summary of the United States missile program prior to Sputnik, see "The Big Miss in Missiles," Time, October 28, 1957, p. 18.

²The Jupiter had been successfully fired, on September 26, 1956, to an altitude of more than 600 miles and a distance of 3,500 miles.

³On November 26, while testifying before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Dr. John P. Hagen, Director of the Vanguard Project, said that the United

have come at a more crucial time. The President and Secretary of State Dulles were just about to leave for the December NATO Conference in Paris where the United States hoped to rally the scientific resources of the free world to meet the recent Soviet achievements.

The spectacular failure of the United States to launch a satellite seemed to be much graver than it really was because the event had been so well publicized.¹ The purpose of this publicity was to let the American people and the world know that the United States was making an effort to duplicate the Soviet successes. However, it was recognized soon afterwards that the chances of failure were always greater than those for success in such a new scientific field and that it would be better to publicize launchings after they had been made rather than before

States could have put up the first satellite if an all-out effort had been made. He said the Vanguard Project suffered from money limitations because priority had been given to military projects. He said he had sought higher priority for the Vanguard in 1955 but had been turned down. He concluded by saying the United States had taken a calculated risk and lost.

¹Senator Lyndon Johnson said the Vanguard was "one of the best publicized and most humiliating failures in our history." See The New York Times, December 7, 1957, p. 1.

they were attempted, which surely was what the Soviet Union was doing.¹

The two successful satellite launchings by the Soviet Union and the dismal failure of the Vanguard were not without value to the United States however, because they provided the impetus needed to get the Department of Defense reorganized. And this was a necessary first step if the nation's defense effort was to be improved.

¹The U.S. did not successfully launch a satellite until January 31, 1958 when the Army, using a Jupiter IRBM, orbited the Explorer which weighed thirty-one pounds. The Vanguard, weighing only three and one-fourth pounds, was not put into orbit until March 17, 1958, over five months after Sputnik I was launched.

CHAPTER III

THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

Although the American system of government is at times criticized because of its separation of powers, this system does have one great advantage--the country is not dependent upon the executive branch alone for leadership and decisive action. Soviet technological achievements during 1957 indicated that there was a good possibility that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in weapon development which previously had been considered as the one area in which the United States was supreme. Consequently, the Senate decided that action on its part was necessary because it did not appear that the Administration was making the all-out efforts necessary in the vital field of national defense.

On November 25, 1957, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, headed by Senator Lyndon Johnson, began an inquiry into satellite and missile programs which continued periodically until January 23, 1958.¹ During the hearings a total of

¹See U.S., Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 1957-58.

seventy prominent witnesses testified before the subcommittee and interviews were held with over 200 other experts. In addition, questionnaires were sent to leaders in science, education, industry, and government.

On the first day of the hearings, Senator Johnson explained the purpose of the subcommittee's inquiry:

We are here today to inquire into the facts on the state of the Nation's security. Our country is disturbed over the tremendous military and scientific achievement of Russia. Our people have believed that in the field of scientific weapons and in technology and science, that we were well ahead of Russia.

With the launching of Sputniks I and II, and with the information at hand of Russia's strength, our supremacy and even our equality has been challenged. We must meet this challenge quickly and effectively in all its aspects. . . .

We hope that when the testimony is finished, we will have a clear definition of the present threat to our security, perhaps the greatest that our country has ever known. . . .

It would appear that we have slipped dangerously behind the Soviet Union in some very important fields. . . .

Our goal is to find out what is to be done. We will not reach that goal by wandering up any blind alleys of partisanship. . . .

This committee seeks only to determine what can be done, what should be done, what must be done now and for the long pull.¹

Although the subcommittee hearings were held primarily to investigate satellite and missile programs, many witnesses, in addition to commenting on these programs, stated that drastic changes should be made in defense organization. They felt that interservice rivalries and the Secretary of Defense's lack of authority in

¹Ibid., pp. 1-3.

some areas were major causes of the apparent inability of the United States to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in the arms race. They therefore suggested that defense reorganization was essential to the security of the nation.

One of the first witnesses to appear before the subcommittee was Dr. Vannevar Bush, a member of the 1953 Rockefeller Committee, former Chairman of the Pentagon's Research and Development Board, and an outstanding scientist and administrator. Dr. Bush said:

The primary objective of the Unification Act was to prepare unitary plans, and for that purpose the Joint Chiefs of Staff were charged with the duty of preparing unified war plans, unified programs.

They have never done so. . . .

I think the difficulty has never resided in the individuals. I think the difficulty has always resided in the form of the organization that was set up. You cannot expect a man to be a forceful leader of a service, the commanding general responsible for keeping the morale of that service at a high pitch, responsible for seeing that that service is at the peak of effectiveness, and at the same time expect that man to sit down with 2 others, forget all of his service responsibilities, and plan actions from a national standpoint for all 3 services.

And the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never done that. They could not have been expected to do so, and they haven't. . . .

The principal reason we have had service rivalries is because there has been no umpire in court.

The services themselves, the three services, have prepared war plans, all different, each one of them the best they can produce. From there on, there has been no means by which those could be brought into a unitary plan.

And since there has been no such means, the 3 plans have been advocated by the 3 services, and the discussion of them has been in the public press, and some of the decisions in regard to them have had to be made right here on Capitol Hill.

That, gentlemen, is not the way to prepare for war. If we had an effective, central planning body acting as a staff to our Commander in Chief, digesting all of these things, putting them into their relative framework, and out of it producing a program for the country that program, when approved by the Commander in Chief, would, in my opinion, have the loyalty of every service, and the bickering would stop.¹

Dr. Bush said that this central planning staff instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be responsible for preparing the nation's overall war plan. The staff would be composed of a high-ranking officer from each service, as distinguished as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they should be detached from all further responsibility to their services. To achieve this, he recommended that they be assigned to the planning staff on their last assignment before retirement or, if necessary, retired officers should be brought back to active duty and placed on the staff. The men selected should have demonstrated that they could rise above service interests and do their planning on the basis of what was the most effective plan for the country.

Dr. Bush said this planning staff should be supported by the brightest colonels and captains in the services and also by civilian scientists and consultants. Plans made by the planning staff for the Secretary of

¹Ibid., pp. 61-62.

Defense and the President would go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, but they would not be allowed to hold the plan up or to alter it.

Dr. Bush said he did not favor the creation of a single armed service because

one of the greatest assets we have in this country is the tradition, the esprit de corps, the pride of the three services, and that we must preserve. That is not an asset to be thrown apart lightly.

But I do know this: That when we have had the 3 services under a single commander in the field, in Germany, in the last war, in the Far East, in Korea, when we had the lines of authority clear, and the 3 services present, we have had proper collaboration and joint action between them. We have had proper handling of their three facilities.

I would like to see that produced on a national scale for planning as well as for field operations.

For that purpose, I think that it is not necessary to merge the three services into a single uniform, and I think it would be a mistake to do so.¹

General James H. Doolittle, USAFR, an outstanding military leader and business executive, testified that he would not advocate a single service in one uniform at the present time but that the three services should not be allowed to interfere with operating commands. He felt that interservice rivalries had progressed beyond the stage of healthy competition and recommended that the Secretary of Defense be given more power and be provided with a personal military staff.

¹Ibid., p. 67.

It is very difficult for a civilian who has recently come in from civil life to cross a dedicated military man who has devoted his entire life to the work in which he is engaged.

I therefore feel that a staff of military advisers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is called for now, and is a natural first step in whatever changes need to be made in our Military Establishment. . . .

I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept is sound but at present it has one handicap, and that is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff represent both the overall military program, and their obligation as head of their service.

Frequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not come to a unanimous conclusion. I do not believe that in this time of crisis, that we can tolerate delays in arriving at the best possible solution of our military problem. . . .

Some day, I believe that we will have to have an old type general staff, with a head. . . . at the present time, . . . we may not yet be ready for that, . . .

But some day, we are going to have to have the means of coordinating our planning, and our operations and doing it on a more rapid basis than we are able to do it today. . . .

There is, on the part of people and the American public, a fear of a military group who will lead us into war. The reason that I know this fear is unwarranted, is because one of my chores was to send young boys out to die, and I do not believe any senior commander who has ever sent young men out to die, wants war. I don't believe that any professional group hates war as much as the military.¹

Lt. General James M. Gavin, Chief of Army Research and Development, who later became a very controversial figure because of his testimony before the subcommittee, recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system be abolished because the Secretary of Defense needed more

¹Ibid., pp. 119-120.

advice than this staff could give him. He agreed with Dr. Bush and General Doolittle that a competent staff of senior military officers working directly under the Secretary of Defense was needed.

I would have them . . . take over the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would have the military staff so organized to handle operations, plans, intelligence, and in fact break up the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . .

The members of this staff should be picked from the Armed Forces based upon their background, which should show, as individuals, a good record of schooling, and ability to get along with other services by having served in the field, in overseas commands and other places where we have joint or unified commands. They should be outstanding individuals of senior grade . . . brought up and then put into a staff that is completely integrated across the board. . . .

Their seniority would be such at this time that it would be somewhat unlikely that they would come back to their service.

Chances are those people would be the ones who would go out ultimately to lead a higher command overseas and the likes of that, but there would be no reason why they could not come back. . . .

As an individual showed ability to move into a staff of this sort perhaps in the senior field officer grade around the grade of colonel then he would be earmarked as a potential top staff officer; a unified top staff man.¹

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the most distinguished naval witness said:

During the war, while I was waiting for decisions, military decisions, in the field, I sometimes had a sense of frustration, and I think it only fair to inform this committee that at one time I agreed with the idea that we would do better with a single source

¹Ibid., pp. 492-493. See also "Toward a U.S. General Staff," Time, January 6, 1958, p. 12.

of decision in Washington, which, of course, meant a single Chief of Staff.

My subsequent experience during the war and certainly my experience in Washington afterward, with more hindsight convinced me I was wrong, and I am now opposed to that concept.¹

When asked why he advocated unified commands in the field, but not in the Pentagon, Admiral Nimitz said:

The decisions that are made in the field are tactical. The fundamental difference between strategy and tactics is that tactics is what you do after you are in contact with the enemy. Strategy is what you do before you come in contact with the enemy or even before you come into a war with him.

Tactical matters are settled very promptly in the field by a single source of decision. Strategical matters involve such things as the preparation of forces, the planning of bases overseas, and aid to allies. . . .

Strategical decisions are primarily made in Washington, and they are usually of such a nature that time is not so important.

But what is important is the careful consideration that has to be given to measures of that kind that involve so much of the Nation's capacity to conduct war. Those are all strategical decisions, and I think it would be harmful to make decisions like that hastily. These are decisions in which the Congress not only is interested but has responsibility because of its constitutional requirement to maintain armed forces.²

¹Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. cit., p. 1314. It should be noted that Admiral Nimitz did not change his mind until after he returned to Washington. Admiral William Halsey, after first advocating a single chief of staff, also changed his views after returning from his combat command. For an interesting discussion of these changes in opinion see William B. Huie, The Case Against the Admirals (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 199-210.

²Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. cit., p. 1324.

General (retired) Carl Spaatz, the first Chief of Staff of an independent United States Air Force, had many recommendations for improving the Department of Defense. He said he would simplify the organization by providing the Secretary of Defense with a single chief of staff instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said he did not believe, as many people did, that this would lead to military dictatorship.

You must view the position of the Chief of Staff, as the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

He is not a military commander. He issues orders in the name of the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, represents the President of the United States.

So between the Chief of Staff and his chance of becoming a military dictator, you have several echelons. You have the Secretary of Defense, you have the President, you have the Congress before whom the military must come for their appropriations, and you have an enlightened American people that would not stand for any such nonsense.¹

General Spaatz said he felt that the three service secretaries, and their under secretaries and assistant secretaries, should be eliminated and that the military chiefs of the services should be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. He said that the roles and missions of the services should be determined by the President and Secretary of Defense, rather than being established by law. Finally, in regard to interservice

¹Ibid., p. 1335. Many of the recommendations made by Gen. Spaatz had previously appeared in his column in Newsweek magazine.

rivalries, he said:

I think rivalry may not be bad, but it should be down at the lower echelons. One likes to think that the outfit he belongs to is better than the others. If you are in one fighter squadron you like to think your squadron is the best of all in the group.

That sort of rivalry promotes efficiency in the units. But rivalry at the top may become disastrous.¹

The last witness to appear before the subcommittee was General (retired) Lucius Clay. He proposed that the Department of Defense be divided into three clearly defined areas:

1. Logistics, which would be controlled by the three service secretaries and would include the recruitment and training of men and the procurement of weapons, equipment, and supplies.

2. The tactical organizations, which would operate directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of the military departments.

3. A scientific evaluation group, which would evaluate the research work done by the services and would be responsible for fundamental and long-range research.

General Clay said he thought that the Secretary of Defense should be given more authority to transfer funds between projects relating to the research, development, and procurement of weapons. He said that all senior

¹Ibid., p. 1336.

officers should belong to the same service and wear the same uniform because all high-ranking officers should be capable of combined command and therefore should be considered as combined commanders. He said tactical units from all services should be placed in unified commands under single commanders, who would be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint committees which are part of the subordinate structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Clay said:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now a nonvoting member, should be given the full authority for the recommendations and decisions which come from that body; . . . the remaining members should be advisory only, and should have no voting power. . . . the Joint Chiefs of Staff is just another committee. . . .

Each member thereof, no matter how big a man he may be, goes there with the ringing in his ears of the views of his associates and subordinates; and if he gives in, when he comes back the looks on their faces make him feel that he has let them down.

In addition, they must depend upon the committees which they themselves have set up, which are composed of representatives of the several services, and each of these representatives has an instructed point of view from his own Chief of service. And if he compromises in any major way, he faces the very serious risk that when he goes back to his own service he will not be very welcome.¹

A frequent argument against a single chief of staff and a general staff was that Germany had lost two

¹Ibid., pp. 1364-1365.

world wars because it had a general staff. General Clay said there was no connection between the two.

I would say that Germany lost two wars after greatly superior forces had been massed to destroy Germany, and that the achievements in the military sense prior to the overwhelming strength in which she was conquered by combined countries of far greater strength than she was, was quite a tribute to the successful operations of a single chief of staff from the military viewpoint.

Now as to whether or not the single chief of staff played an important role in making Germany a militaristic nation, I think it is moot and subject to very careful examination.

In point of fact, the German general staff was not really anxious to go to war when Hitler started his last war, but in the point of efficiency of operations, there is no question but that the German General Staff did prove that the single concept of staff was the most efficient from a military operations viewpoint.¹

General Clay concluded by saying he had no fear of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff becoming a "man on horseback," that is, a military dictator. He further stated that even if there was such a danger, he would rather take the chance than have a "man on horseback ride in from somewhere else."

Although most of the witnesses from outside of the Department of Defense objected to the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, the three service chiefs strongly defended it. At the conclusion of their appearance at the hearings, the subcommittee requested each of the service

¹Ibid., pp. 1365-1366.

chiefs to submit answers in writing to nine questions relating to the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two most significant questions were "What is your experience in performing both functions--that of Chief of Staff of your service and that of being a member of a joint group responsible for the principal military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President?" and "Do you think the Secretary of Defense should have a military staff to advise him in addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?"

In answer to these questions, General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff said:

Planning and operations are very closely related. It is essential that those responsible for planning also be responsible for the implementation of those plans. A clear delineation of functions is necessary to insure that the joint planning mechanism has sole cognizance rather than having a number of other agencies without that clear responsibility also doing planning.

I consider that a compromise solution of a military problem arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually better than a compromise decision made by civilian authority. Moreover, it has been apparent to me that when the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward split views there is a tendency to regard such action as a manifestation of "interservice rivalry" although such is definitely not the fundamental basis for the action. . . .

I do not believe the creation of another military staff would be an improvement. This would further complicate the top levels of the DOD structure and the functions of such a staff would inevitably overlap those of the existing staffs. I believe the greatest assistance to the Secretary of Defense would accrue from greater consultation by him with the JCS,

particularly in arriving at unequivocal decisions on split JCS views.¹

Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, commented that:

My experience in performing both functions; . . . has brought out this truth: The work I do as military chief of my service is what equips me to do my job as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . .

If JCS membership should be severed from the service chiefs, the JCS members would no longer possess the essential military information as their own. They would have to obtain it from someone else--presumably the service chiefs. It would have to be in the form of papers or briefings. In whatever indirect form it took, the information could not be so complete nor so real as it is to the men bearing the responsibilities of service chiefs. . . .

The authority to make strategic plans for the Nation's security cannot be separated from the responsibility for carrying out those plans. This combination of planning authority and executive responsibility is, I believe, the great strength of the JCS system--and a strength possible only under that system. . . .

I do not think the Secretary of Defense could use effectively a military staff to advise him in addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The advice of the JCS is expert, up to date, and responsible. Any other military staff operating in this same field of military advice would not have the necessary detailed and profound knowledge of service capabilities that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do. The existence of an additional advisory staff would merely add a great deal of confusion and eventually necessitate the coordination of the JCS and the advisory staff--a cumbersome arrangement. More time would be consumed in decisionmaking than is now the case. An additional staff would not be bound by the responsibility which now rests upon the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its advice, accordingly, might be faulty and unrealistic. No other device has the built-in guaranty of bedrock accountability which appertains to the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

¹Ibid., p. 1520.

²Ibid., p. 1522-1526.

General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff,

answered:

The advantage of the present 2-hat status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that the members of the senior military advisory body to the Secretary of Defense are the men who carry the responsibility for the combat readiness of the 3 services. This arrangement assures that the Secretary will receive responsible advice based upon a thorough knowledge of the capabilities of the respective services. It is true that their sense of responsibility may also cause them to speak for the needs of their services with an insistence which may sometimes expose them to the charge of service partisanship. However, the danger of excessive partisanship would not necessarily be removed by relieving the joint chiefs of their departmental functions. In the last analysis, no senior officer serving as a Joint Chief of Staff can lay aside completely the experience and habits of thought developed over 30 to 40 years of service. As a matter of fact, he justifies his presence at the council table because he has had this particular type of experience to contribute to the corporate wisdom of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . .

I consider it fundamental that the Secretary of Defense have only one military advisory body reporting to him. The present one, i.e., the JCS, consists of four individuals of different personalities and of different military backgrounds. This diversity would appear to insure the injection of appropriately varied points of view into the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Secretary of Defense receives split military advice, he is obliged to depend upon his own judgment of the issues laid before him by the Joint Chiefs. It is implicit in our system of civilian control that at some point in our Government structure a civilian leader must make decisions on military matters. This hard task falls inescapably on the Secretary of Defense, and no organizational device can relieve him of it.¹

The chiefs, therefore, regardless of past differences closed ranks and wholeheartedly supported the Joint

¹Ibid., pp. 1527-1528.

Chiefs of Staff system and opposed establishing another advisory group under the Secretary of Defense. They probably did so because criticism of the system would be a reflection upon each member and would seem to indicate an inability on their part to work with their fellow-officers.

At the conclusion of the hearings, on January 23, 1958 Senator Johnson issued the following statement:

We began with a simple--but revolutionary--fact. It was that for the first time in all history, a man-made satellite was placed into an orbit around the earth.

There were many who realized that this was an inevitable development of the march of science. But the circumstances under which it happened were startling, and brought into sharp focus facts which had been known previously but not fully appreciated.

We had expected to be first with this achievement. . . . The winner was the Soviet Union.

From the beginning, however, it developed that there was much more at stake than the prestige of being "first."

There is no evidence that the satellite is a weapon now.

But it has two important implications.

First, it demonstrated beyond question that the Soviet Union has the propulsive force to hurl a missile from one continent to another.

Second, the Soviet Union has gathered basic information about outer space.¹

Johnson listed seventeen principal areas where the subcommittee felt decisive action must be taken. Number thirteen was: "Reorganize the structure of the defense establishment."²

¹Ibid., p. 2428.

²Ibid., p. 2429.

In summary, a majority of the witnesses appearing before the subcommittee felt that interservice rivalry was the major cause for the apparent failure of the United States to stay abreast or ahead of the Soviet Union in the fields of guided missiles and space satellites. They felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system was one of the primary causes of interservice rivalries because three members-- that is, the three service chiefs--performed conflicting dual functions. This forced the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate as a committee which resulted in many of its decisions being compromises instead of solutions to vital national problems.

To correct this situation, most of the witnesses felt that the Secretary of Defense should be given additional power to enable him to settle disputes between the services. Some of them recommended the creation of a central planning staff directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and completely independent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several witnesses went even further than this and recommended the abolishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the creation of a single chief of staff and an armed forces general staff.

The opposite point of view was expressed by the service chiefs, who opposed both the abolishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the creation of another planning

staff. They recommended retention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system because they felt it was the only system in which those giving advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President were also the persons responsible for the combat readiness of the services. In addition they felt that it was desirable for those making the plans for national defense to be responsible for their execution.

Consequently, there were good reasons for both abolishing and retaining the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The attempt to solve this problem would be one of the major issues in the forthcoming battle to reorganize the Department of Defense.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROCKEFELLER REPORT

In a democracy such as the United States the people are not dependent solely upon the government for leadership. Private citizens have often made great contributions to the nation and under the American system of government their services can be effectively and advantageously utilized. After Sputnik indicated that the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in certain vital fields of weapon technology, many individuals made recommendations for improving the defense establishment.

The most comprehensive and widely acclaimed of the proposals was the Rockefeller Report. This report was prepared by the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a private organization established by the Rockefellers to assess major problems and opportunities likely to confront the United States during the next ten years.

The Special Studies Project was composed of an Overall Panel and seven subpanels. The Overall Panel was composed of thirty-three distinguished Americans, including

Nelson A. Rockefeller, who was Chairman.¹ Each member of the Overall Panel also served on one of the seven subpanels and each subpanel was assigned one of the specific problems undertaken by the Project.

On January 5, 1958, after a fourteen months study, one of the subpanels--Panel II--published a report entitled International Security-The Military Aspect which subsequently was referred to as the Rockefeller Report.² Panel II's report was published before the other panels completed their studies because the Overall Panel felt that Sputnik indicated an immediate need for its publication.

The Rockefeller Report contained twelve chapters which covered all aspects of the nation's military posture while Chapter VI dealt entirely with the need for reorganizing the Department of Defense. The panel listed three major defects in Defense Department organization and stated that these defects were inherent in its structure, that

¹Some of the better known members of the Overall Panel were Chester Bowles, Arthur F. Burns, General (retired) Lucius D. Clay, Gordon E. Dean, Henry R. Luce, General (retired) James McCormack, Anna M. Rosenberg, David Sarnoff, Edward Teller, Robert B. Anderson (prior to becoming Secretary of the Treasury), James R. Killian Jr. (prior to becoming Special Assistant to the President), and Henry A. Kissinger.

²See Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., International Security-The Military Aspect, Report of Panel II of the Special Studies Project (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958).

they could not be removed by modification, and that they would be further aggravated by the passage of time.

1--The roles and missions assigned to the individual military services have become competitive rather than complementary because they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety.¹

The panel stated that when the Defense Department was first established it was felt that through joint planning by the Chiefs of Staff there would be a coordinated and harmonious development of the nation's military potential but that this had not happened because of the organizational structure itself. In addition,

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our effort to develop an integrated national strategic plan has been beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due fundamentally to "parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and missions. . . .

The revolutionary advances in technology have made the traditional division of functions increasingly obsolete. Given the range and destructiveness of modern weapons the present assignment of roles and missions forces each service to duplicate the efforts of some other service. . . .

It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service that it should see in any developing enemy threat predominately those elements which its own particular organization seems best adapted to counter. And each service by a natural rationalization judges the proper balance of forces to be the one which maximizes its own role. . . .

New weapons are placed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of missions being reshaped to conform to an evolving technology and to new military problems.²

¹Ibid., p. 27.

²Ibid., pp. 27-29.

2--The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preclude the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States.¹

The panel stated that three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the ranking officers of their services and thus had dual responsibilities. As a result, even with the best of intentions, the service chiefs could not avoid being advocates of a service point-of-view. Their position reflected a lifetime of dedication to a particular service and since each chief felt he was responsible for the future of his service, its status was one of his main concerns. The military chiefs, therefore, had little opportunity to think about overall strategic problems.

Thus under the present organization most of the decisive pressures on the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization are produced by the individual services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions too often as a committee of partisan adversaries engaged in advancing service strategic plans and compromising service differences. . . . The result is that our military plans for meeting foreseeable threats tend to be a patchwork of compromises between conflicting strategic concepts or simply the uncoordinated war plans of the several services.²

3--The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of trying to arbitrate and control inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.³

¹Ibid., p. 27.

²Ibid., pp. 29-30.

³Ibid., p. 27.

The panel stated that the Secretary of Defense was confined, to a great extent, to the essentially negative functions of arbitration and control and had become the referee of disputes over policy originating in the services. Because these disputes reached him only after positions had hardened, the Secretary found it difficult to play a positive and creative role in formulating high military policy. This had led the Secretary and his immediate staff to assume many administrative tasks which could be better handled by the individual services.

A principal objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can give a more effective lead to the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, while delegating to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden.¹

To remedy what it felt to be defects in the Department of Defense, the panel recommended eight specific changes be made in defense organization.

a) The military departments should be removed from the channel of operational command.²

The chain of command at that time was from the President to the Secretary of Defense to a service secretary to a commander of a unified command. The recommended change would place unified commands directly under the Chairman

¹Ibid., p. 30. ²Ibid., p. 31.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting for the Secretary of Defense. The service secretaries, while losing operational control of combat units, would retain responsibility for recruitment, training, research, procurement, and supply. This would allow them to concentrate on management and logistics and would leave strategic planning and combat operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b) All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into unified commands to perform missions which are called for by our strategic requirements.¹

Since military missions were no longer confined to land, sea, or air categories, they would be functional and appropriate Army, Navy, and Air Force units would be assigned to unified functional commands which would operate under single commanders. The assigned units would be organic to the command, not just placed there temporarily. In addition, the missions assigned to unified commands would not be frozen by legislation but would be determined by the President as required by technological and strategic considerations.

c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be designated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President.²

This change would make the Chairman the principal military

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 32.

advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense instead of the Joint Chiefs collectively. It was recommended because service chiefs served in a dual capacity while the Chairman was the only member who could give his full attention to overall strategy. The service chiefs would remain on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but would serve only as advisors to the Chairman with particular responsibility in the area of logistics, training, and procurement.

d) The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be organized on a unified basis and placed under the control of the Chairman.¹

The Joint Staff functioned under a Director and was divided into a number of groups, each with equal representation from the three services. In addition to these groups, there were several committees, representing each military department, which acted on documents prepared by the staff groups before they were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee system was established because each service desired to judge independently the work produced by the Joint Staff. This system would be abolished and an integrated staff system, that is, the traditional divisions of G-1, G-2, etc., would be established to replace it. In addition, the Joint Staff would be responsible to the Chairman instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively.

¹Ibid.

e) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equivalent should receive their permanent promotions from the Department of Defense and would become officers of the Armed Forces of the United States.¹

This recommendation would, in effect, establish another service which probably would lead to complete merger of the armed forces. Since entry into this service would be the goal of most officers throughout their careers they would know that their future depended on their ability to take a broad view of military affairs, rather than a more narrow service point-of-view. Consequently, it was felt this proposal would eliminate many interservice disputes.

f) The line of operational command should be from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the functional commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his capacity as Principal Military Advisor.²

As noted above, the military departments would be removed from the operational chain of command. In addition, it was recommended that the Secretary of Defense be designated Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces which, the panel felt, would further strengthen civilian control over the armed forces.

g) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the three military Departments.³

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid.

This recommendation was not a change but merely amplified the duties that would be retained by the service secretaries after their authority over operational commands had been removed.

h) The Secretary of Defense should be given authority over all research, development and procurement. He should have the right of cancellation and transfer of service programs together with their appropriations. He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of research and development programs at the Defense Department level.¹

This change would give the Secretary of Defense powers which traditionally and constitutionally belonged to Congress. Research and development would no longer be conducted within each service but would be brought up to the Secretary of Defense level. The panel felt this was necessary because, unless the Secretary of Defense was given control over research, development, and procurement, his role would continue to be essentially one of arbitrating disputes between the three services.

In another chapter, entitled "Budget for National Security," the panel stated that the budgetary process would be greatly improved if military budgets were prepared and presented in more discriminating terms. Since the present method did not give a clear indication of what appropriations would accomplish in terms of military missions, it

¹Ibid.

was natural for Congress to make reductions by percentage cuts across-the-board without considering the effect on strategy and military missions. The panel stated:

Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible. However, a start can be made toward a system that corresponds more closely to a coherent strategic doctrine. It should not be too difficult, for example, to restate the presentation of the service budgets, so that instead of the present categories of "procurement," "operation and maintenance," "military personnel," etc., there would be a much better indication of how much goes, for example, to strategic air, to air defense, to anti-submarine warfare and so on.

Another highly desirable change is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under present rules, the top personnel of the services spend a great part of six months every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments. Much of the next six months are consumed in testifying before congressional committees and otherwise defending the service budgets as approved by the President. If the budgetary process would extend over an entire congressional term, the energies of key personnel could be directed toward strategic doctrine and overall management. At the same time congressional control would be more meaningful because the examination of requests could then be more careful.¹

In summary, it will be noted that the members of Panel II agreed with the majority of the witnesses appearing before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system and the Secretary of Defense's lack of authority to settle interservice disputes were the major defects in the defense establishment. To correct these defects the Rockefeller Report made some

¹Ibid., pp. 58-59.

proposals that were just as drastic as those made by subcommittee witnesses.

The Rockefeller Report, in conjunction with the testimony given to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, thus supplied the Administration and Congress with many expert recommendations which could be used in the event it was decided to reorganize the Department of Defense.

CHAPTER V

THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN

There is a widely held conception that the officials of the executive branch--and the President in particular--should occupy a special role in the initiation of legislative proposals. For some, this is the only way to approximate under American conditions the much-admired ideal of Cabinet leadership as exercised under a parliamentary system. For others, it is more the natural consequence of our own political structure. Only the executive officials, it is argued, have the specialized expertise and the familiarity with administrative operations necessary for the preparation of a sound legislative proposal. In these officials alone can one find the aloofness and objectivity needed to protect the public interest against the assaults of private groups. In the President alone can one find a national leader elected by the entire people and responsive to the interests of the entire people.¹

The State of the Union Message

In his State of the Union Message, delivered personally to Congress on January 9, 1958, President Eisenhower stated that the purpose of his message was to outline the measures that would give Americans a feeling of confidence and to place before Congress an outline of action designed to focus the country's resources upon the

¹Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 426-427.

two tasks of security and peace. In this special category he listed eight items that he felt required prompt action and emphasized that they were not merely desirable, but imperative. Reorganization of the Department of Defense was at the top of the list.

The first need is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishments in maintaining the security of the nation. . . .

Recently I have had under special study with the intimate association of Secretary McElroy the never-ending problem of efficient organization, complicated as it is by these new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be finalized. I shall promptly take such executive action as is necessary and, in a separate message, I shall present appropriate recommendations to the Congress.

Meanwhile, without anticipating the detailed form that a reorganization should take, I can state its main lines in terms of objectives:

A major purpose of military organization is to achieve real unity in the defense establishment in all the principal features of military activity. Of all these one of the most important to our nation's security is strategic planning and direction. This work must be done under unified direction.

The defense establishment must plan for a better integration of its defensive resources, particularly with respect to the newer weapons now building and under development. . . .

In recognition of the need for single control in some of our most advanced development projects, the Secretary of Defense has already decided to concentrate into one organization all anti-missile and satellite technology undertaken within the Department of Defense.

Another requirement of military organization is a clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted civilian authority. . . .

Next there must be assurance that an excessive number of compartments in organization will not create costly and confusing compartments in our scientific and industrial effort.

Finally, to end interservice disputes requires clear organization and decisive central direction, supported by the unstinted cooperation of every individual in the defense establishment, civilian and military.¹

This message seemed to indicate that the President intended to make an all-out effort to get the Department of Defense reorganized. However, on January 15, at his first news conference following his State of the Union Message, President Eisenhower said that while he had some rather fixed ideas about the proper defense organization he was not going to insist that all of his ideas be adopted.

Now my personal convictions, no matter how strong, cannot be the final answer. There must be a consensus reached with the . . . Congress, with the people that have the job of operating the services. . . . I would be the last to ask for a detailed organization in which I believe because . . . [it] has got to be effective after there has passed from the scene a man who happened to have particular strong convictions in the matter.²

The President also said that he looked for a great deal of argument over any reorganization plan but he would express his views as best he could.

Many of the reporters at the news conference mistook the President's statement as a backdown from his

¹The text of the President's message is in The New York Times, January 10, 1958, p. 8.

²Ibid., January 16, 1958, p. 14.

State of the Union Message and reported that he was willing to compromise and was not going to insist upon his views being accepted by Congress. But to show that he still felt strongly about the need for defense reorganization, the President reiterated, in a speech to a \$100-a-plate Republican Party fund-raising dinner in Chicago on January 20, that he intended to personally participate in the job until it was done.

The next day Secretary McElroy announced that he had appointed three high-ranking military officers and three prominent civilians to help him with defense reorganization: Air Force General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral (retired) Arthur W. Radford, Twining's predecessor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Radford's predecessor and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization; Charles A. Coolidge, a former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; and William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense.¹

Secretary McElroy--probably to keep from being accused of appointing still another Pentagon committee--

¹General Alfred M. Gruenther, a former commander of NATO, was added as an adviser on February 7, 1958.

said his advisers would operate individually, without a chairman, although Coolidge was appointed as a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Reorganization. McElroy also said his advisers would interview many former and present high-ranking military and civilian officials while formulating their recommendations.

On January 25, President Eisenhower made an unusual visit to the Pentagon to confer with top defense officials. He talked for over two hours with Secretary McElroy and his new military-civilian advisory team. Asked why the President went to the Pentagon rather than having defense officials come to the White House, Press Secretary James Hagerty answered, "the President said he was going to take a personal interest in this, so he went over there. It was his idea."¹ This visit was the first time President Eisenhower had gone to the Pentagon on business since becoming President and was further indication of his determination to get the Department of Defense reorganized.

On February 7, as mentioned in the President's State of the Union Message, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established in the Department of Defense to control the research and development of all space projects not clearly within the responsibility of the three

¹Ibid., January 26, 1958, p.1.

military services. Roy W. Johnson, a General Electric Vice President, was appointed Director. He was directly responsible to Secretary McElroy, which thus placed ARPA above the three services.¹ Under ARPA's control, space weapons were to be developed by each of the services but not necessarily for their own use. When ready for combat production, these weapons would be assigned to a service for operational use.²

On February 21, in an attempt to get away from the pressures and turmoil of Washington, Secretary McElroy and his advisers went to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, for three days to finalize their recommendations to the President. However, on February 26, without waiting

¹One of the primary reasons for establishing ARPA was to head off the growing dispute between the Army and Air Force over the anti-missile missile. Consequently, ARPA immediately assumed responsibility for existing Air Force and Army projects to develop an anti-missile system.

²The services were not happy with this arrangement. Primarily, they objected to ARPA because they felt that the service which would use a weapon operationally should also be responsible for its development. The Air Force, feeling it was the most likely service to operate in space, was particularly displeased. Major General Bernard Schriever, head of the Air Force's Ballistic Missile Division, expressed the Air Force's position when he said ARPA was not needed and would be a costly duplication of effort.

for the President to forward his reorganization plan to Congress, Representative Carl Vinson (D-Ga.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and two other committee members, Leslie C. Arends (R.-Ill.) and Paul J. Kilday (D-Tex.) introduced identical defense reorganization bills in the House of Representatives.¹ Instead of increasing the power of the Secretary of Defense as the President proposed these bills would increase the authority of the three services.²

1. Fourteen of the twenty-nine under secretaries and assistant secretaries in the Defense Department and military departments would be eliminated. This would be accomplished by abolishing the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, International Security Affairs,

¹House rules forbid multiple sponsorship of bills. However, the rule is evaded by members introducing identical bills.

²For a summary of these bills see U.S., Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Digest of Public General Bills, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Final Issue 1958, p. E-97. The bills introduced by Vinson, Arends, and Kilday were not the first introduced during this session of Congress. On January 7, Representative John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced a defense reorganization bill in the House. On February 3, Senators Prescott Bush (R-Conn.) and Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) introduced a joint bill in the Senate. On the same day, Senator John S. Cooper (R-Ky.) also introduced a bill on defense reorganization, which would replace the three service secretaries with under secretaries of defense and give the Secretary of Defense full authority and control over the entire Defense Department. However, there was little chance of these earlier bills becoming law.

Health and Medical Affairs, and the General Counsel; merging the Assistant Secretary for Properties and Installations and the Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics into an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Materiel Requirements; and abolishing the under secretaries and two of the four assistant secretaries in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2. Of the 2,400 civilian employees in the office of the Secretary of Defense, 1,800 would be abolished.

3. The authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over unified commands would be strengthened by giving them statutory authority to coordinate the operations of unified commands, designate the geographic boundaries between these commands, and assign forces to and withdraw forces from these commands.

4. Service chiefs would be authorized to delegate administrative details to their vice chiefs which would enable the chiefs to devote more of their time to Joint Chiefs of Staff duties.

5. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would again become members of the National Security Council.

6. The power of the Department of Defense Comptroller would be restricted by taking away his authority

to supervise, judge, and control military justifications for programs and requirements.

In a joint statement, the three representatives said:

The proposal is intended to provide a more streamlined organization by removing the administrative confusion created by assistant secretaries, deputy secretaries, deputies to the assistant secretaries and assistants to the assistant secretaries that now impede and obstruct decision-making by the Secretary of Defense.¹

Since these bills differed in many respects from the President's proposals and were backed by Representative Vinson, it seemed that they would be a serious threat to any plan President Eisenhower submitted to Congress.

It is not, of course, easy to resist the forces that want to keep things as they are. The Navy, with the powerhouse that it operates on Capitol Hill, is foremost among these forces.

Navy strategists are credited with inspiring the latest maneuver intended to block any administration plan of reorganization going beyond a mere tidying up of the present setup. This is the bill introduced by

¹The New York Times, February 27, 1958, p. 1. For a good example of the detail to which assistant secretaries went in the execution of their duties see the Department of Defense Instruction entitled "Refuse Collection and Disposal" which was reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, pp. 161-166. This instruction outlined in detail how often the services should collect garbage, how it should be disposed, the type of equipment to use, and how to wash out garbage cans, for example they "will be washed or cleaned by the most economical and effective method to maintain satisfactory sanitary conditions." In addition, the services were required to forward two copies of implementing instructions to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Properties and Installations.

Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee and Republican Whip Leslie Arends, the ranking minority member of that committee. . . .

The net effect, in the view of those who believe that greater unification is imperative, would be to give the three separate services greater autonomy and leave the secretary with less power than he has now. The Vinson-Arends measure is credited by some to Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Sr.

Vinson has never made any secret of his determination to keep the status quo in the defense department. He sees red at any suggestion of authority concentrated in a single chief of staff. Under the happy relationship he enjoys with the Navy, his native Georgia has been generously sprinkled with naval largesse.

It is an old game the Navy has played often before.¹

Representative Vinson has been a member of the House of Representatives since 1914, longer than any present member except Speaker Sam Rayburn, which makes him a very powerful figure. He was Chairman of the old House Naval Affairs Committee from 1931-1947, which were great years for the Navy as it was then considered as America's first line of defense. Vinson has consequently been a loyal friend of the Navy for many years and has been against any proposal that would decrease the Navy's autonomy. After World War II, Vinson was one of the major opponents of unification and partly through his efforts a strong, centralized Department of Defense was not created in 1947. Since 1947, when the Naval and Military

¹Marquis Childs, "Navy Said Stalling Effort to Unify Armed Forces," The Oregonian (Portland), March 9, 1958, p. 34.

Affairs Committees were combined, Vinson has been Chairman of the Armed Services Committee whenever the Democrat's controlled the House. From this strategic position he has usually come to the Navy's assistance whenever it was required and has been an opponent of greater unification primarily because of its effect on the Navy.

Vinson was not the only one to jump the gun on the President. On March 24, Senators Styles Bridges (R-N.H.), ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) introduced a bill in the Senate that was almost identical to those introduced in the House by Vinson, Arends, and Kilday.

It should be mentioned that the . . . proponents of this proposal are alike in peculiar attachment to existing armed services.

Vinson and Bridges always have been known as spokesmen for the Navy, due to huge establishments of that branch in their states. And Arends' Illinois and Mansfield's Montana are comparably important as seats of Army and Air Force activities.

A concentrated defense authority could very well start changing things around--for example, consolidating the great number of presently overlapping Army, Navy and Air Force training establishments, storage bases and arms-manufacturing plants. Quite a few of these greatly expensive establishments might be totally dispensed with.¹

During March the Administration was accused by some congressmen of slowing down in its efforts to present its defense reorganization plan to Congress at an

¹Jay Hayden, "Plan to Reshape Pentagon Hits Snag in Congress," The Oregonian (Portland), March 27, 1958, p. 14.

early date. As a result Senator Lyndon Johnson suggested to Secretary McElroy that he present detailed reorganizational plans to the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee by April 2 and reminded McElroy that he had told the subcommittee that he would have firm recommendations ready for Congress by the end of March. Johnson added that the press had carried reports that there would be no proposals and no changes in the Department of Defense structure and added:

The best response to an allegation of inaction is always action. . . . I trust you will put at rest the uneasiness that has been engendered throughout the country by the rumors and that you will be in a position at that time to recommend the steps that are necessary to reorganize the Defense establishment in the interests of greater efficiency and effectiveness but without relinquishing civilian control.¹

President Eisenhower's popularity and prestige were at one of their low points during March. As a result, many people doubted that the President was in a strong enough position to make a real fight for defense reorganization. Besides the opposition in Congress, there were many people within the Department of Defense who did not desire an increase in the Secretary of Defense's authority and, because of ties with old congressional friends, they were in a position to hinder the President.

¹Johnson's remarks are in Aviation Week, March 24, 1958, p. 17.

Partly because "real unity in the defense establishment" would reduce the power over the Pentagon of . . . congressional committees . . . the Bridges-Vinson bills have plenty of bi-partisan support in both houses. In short, if he wants to have his way, the President is going to have to take on some of the most powerful and determined men in Congress, which he has always disliked doing. He will also probably have to take a stronger and more controversial stand than that recommended by his own secretary of defense, something he also dislikes doing. . . .

The usual Pentagon process of erosion-by-compromise has also been going on. To judge by reports emerging from a big Pentagon pow-wow held on Tuesday to draft recommendations to the President, these recommendations are likely to be pretty pallid, a mere scratching of the surface of the problem.

In short, the Navy and the other powerful forces fighting "real unity" in the Pentagon may have won the ball game already, even before the President sends to Congress the message on defense reorganization he has promised. But that outcome is not yet certain.

For it is obvious why some of those close to him want the President to demand and fight for really strong action. The issue makes an ideal battleground for the President, since it is an issue on which he can speak with unquestioned authority.

What is more, the spectacle of the President fighting hard for what he believes would do a lot to restore his tattered prestige. In this sense the issue far transcends in significance the matter of how our defenses are organized. For the course the President takes will tell a lot about his state of mind. As one of those most eager to see the President make a fight put it: "He's wobbled on so many things, if he wobbles on this one he's finished."¹

The Reorganization Message

In a reorganization message to Congress on April 3, the President finally outlined his plan for reorganizing the Defense Department. He did not "wobble" and

¹Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "President Urged to Make Fight on Unity," The Oregonian (Portland), March 31, 1958, p. 14.

there was no compromise as had been predicted.¹ The

President said:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapon systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. . . .

Service responsibility and activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security tree. The present organization fails to apply this truth.

While at times human failure and misdirected zeal have been responsible for duplications, inefficiencies, and publicized disputes, the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization.

Parenthetically, I may observe that these rivalries, so common in the national capital, are almost unknown in the field. Here in Washington they usually find expression in the services' congressional and press activities which become particularly conspicuous in struggles over new weapons, funds, and publicity. It is just such rivalries, I am convinced, that America wants stopped. . . .

No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives. Genuine unity is indispensable at this starting point. No amount of subsequent coordination can eliminate duplication of doctrinal conflicts which are intruded into the first shaping of military programs.

¹The President's message is in U.S., Congress, House, Recommendations Relative to our Entire Defense Establishment, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, House Doc. 366.

The need for greater unity today is most acute at two points--in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and in the major operational commands responsible for actual combat in the event of war.¹

The President listed six specific areas in which he felt revisions were essential.

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our overall military objectives.²

The President said each unified commander should have unquestioned authority over all units in his command and that forces should be assigned to and removed from these commands only by the Secretary of Defense. However, the President emphasized that this did not mean he desired the services to be merged.

2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense.³

The President said this could be accomplished by eliminating the service secretaries and chiefs from the chain of operational command.

3. We must strengthen the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 1-5. ²Ibid., p. 5.

³Ibid., p. 6. ⁴Ibid., p. 7.

The President said the Joint Chiefs of Staff should serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his direction of the unified command but should act only under the authority and in the name of the Secretary. In regard to the Joint Staff, the President said the committee system should be discontinued and replaced by an integrated staff; the statutory limit on its size should be raised or removed; and the Chairman, instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively, should assign its duties and appoint its Director. To ease the burden on the service chiefs, the President said they should be allowed to delegate a major portion of their service responsibilities to their vice chiefs and their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties should become their principal duty. Finally, the President said that the law providing that the Chairman have no vote should be repealed.

4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.¹

The President said the service secretaries should be relieved of direct responsibility for military operations and assist the Secretary of Defense by managing the vast administrative, training, and logistics functions of their services. In addition, the President felt that at least

¹Ibid., p. 8.

one and perhaps two of the four assistant secretaries in each service should be eliminated and the duties of the remaining assistant secretaries should be determined by the service secretaries rather than being fixed by law.

5. We must reorganize the research and development functions of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.¹

The President said the Secretary of Defense's control over research and development funds and organization should be complete and unchallengeable to ensure effective use of available resources and to prevent unwise service competition. To give the Secretary the caliber of assistance he required, the President recommended that the new position of Director of Defense Research and Engineering be established in place of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He said the Director's salary should be equal to that of the service secretaries and he should rank immediately after the service secretaries and above the assistant secretaries of defense.

The Director would act as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters; supervise all research and engineering activities in the Department of Defense, including those of the ARPA

¹Ibid.

and the Director of Guided Missiles; direct those research and engineering activities that required centralized management; and plan research and development to meet the nation's overall military requirements instead of the more limited requirements of each service. However, the President said that most of the research activities already under way in the services would remain there.

6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.¹

The President said that defense appropriations should be made to the Department of Defense rather than to the three services.² He said this would go far toward stopping the services from vying with each other for congressional and public favor which had worked against unity in the Defense Department.

The President said that Congress should eliminate the provision requiring the services to be separately administered and should give the Secretary of Defense authority to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate

¹Ibid., p. 10.

²The Secretary of Defense prepared the budget for the entire Defense Department but Congress divided its appropriations among the military departments. The Secretary of Defense could withhold approval for expenditure of these funds but could not transfer funds from one service to another. This limited the Secretary's flexibility in meeting urgent new situations unforeseen at the time appropriations were requested.

functions within the Department of Defense. He recommended that the assistant secretaries of defense be empowered to give appropriate instructions to the services, after approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the right of the service secretaries to appeal to the Secretary of Defense.

The President said the Secretary of Defense should be allowed to strengthen Defense Department supervision over service legislative liaison and public affairs activities in order to remove one of the principal outlets for service rivalries. He also said that before officers were advanced beyond the two-star rank, or were assigned to higher command or staff positions, they should demonstrate the capacity for dealing objectively--without extreme service partisanship--with broad national security matters. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense should be allowed to establish procedures for the transfer of officers between services, with their consent.

In conclusion, the President said his recommendations would move the country forward in many important ways.

We will have better prepared our country to meet an emergency which could come with little warning.

We will have improved our military planning.

We will have accelerated decision-making processes.

We will have effectively organized our defense programs in the crucial fields of science and technology.

We will have remedied organizational defects which have encouraged harmful service rivalries.

We will have improved the overall efficiency and unity of our great Defense Establishment.¹

The President's message to Congress contained his overall plan for reorganizing the Defense Department. Because of this he included eight changes in the message which he considered as administrative procedures and thus did not require legislative action. Consequently, the following day, under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, President Eisenhower directed that:

1. All combat forces in the Department of Defense be organized into unified commands directly under the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The military departments be removed as the executive agents for unified commands and that they concentrate on administration, training, and logistical functions within the Defense Department.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as a staff to assist the Secretary of Defense in directing the unified commands, but with no authority to issue orders to unified commanders except in the name of the Secretary of Defense.

4. The Joint Staff committee system be discontinued and that an integrated operations division be added to the staff.

¹Ibid., p. 13.

5. The Defense Department's budget estimate for the 1960 fiscal year and thereafter be prepared so as to permit Congress to appropriate funds to the Defense Department rather than to the individual services.

6. The Secretary of Defense review the numbers as well as activities of personnel in the services engaged in legislative liaison and public affairs and transfer the functions to a centralized agency.

7. The Secretary of Defense's principal assistant for legislative liaison be a civilian whom the President would recommend for appointment.

8. Officers be considered for promotion to top ranks--that is, three-star and four-star--and assignment to high command and staff positions only after they had demonstrated, among other things, the capacity for dealing objectively--without service partisanship--with broad national problems.

By ordering these changes into immediate effect, the President was able to start his reorganization of the Department of Defense without waiting on Congress to act. However, many congressmen questioned the President's authority to make some of the changes but no immediate action was taken to stop the moves.

At his news conference on April 9, President Eisenhower strongly defended his plan and gave further

indication that he intended to fight for adoption of his proposals. When asked if he was convinced that his plan contained adequate safeguards against the Secretary of Defense becoming a "czar," the President stated that the Constitution itself contained these safeguards as he was Commander in Chief of the armed forces and therefore outranked the Secretary, and that Congress controlled appropriations. In addition, he said the Secretary was dependent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice. President Eisenhower said there was always great horror and alarm expressed when reforms were attempted and asked:

How could anyone like the Secretary of Defense suddenly accumulate and concentrate in one corner or one spot the power to take over this Government and not have the most terrific reaction in this country that has ever happened? And let's don't forget the spiritual strength and the traditions of America.

The idea of making a czar out of anybody--usually they have always tried to do it about a military man--now they found that wasn't very profitable because, when they look back over history, they couldn't find a single military . . . man in modern history--not to say American history, but in modern history, except in certain of the . . . Latin-American countries. . . .

So they gave up that argument, and now they are talking about a civilian as czar. I don't see any sense to it at all.¹

Asked how he planned on getting his plan through Congress, since some very powerful congressmen were opposed to it, the President said:

¹The New York Times, April 10, 1958, p. 18.

I don't care how strong they are or how numerous they are. Here is something for the United States. Here is something that is necessary. I would get . . . onto the air as often as the television companies would let me on. I would keep it up until I would have the United States understanding that it is their pocketbook, first of all; more than that, it is their safety. . . .

Now, these are two very great compelling reasons in my mind. I don't care just who is against this thing. It just happens I have got a little bit more experience in military organization and the directing of unified forces than anyone else on the active list.¹

When asked how far a President should go in persuading individual congressmen to come around to his point of view, the President answered:

Well, you do a great deal of that, of course, and most of it off the record, because frequently you are talking to people of the other party and you don't want to embarrass anybody. But the President, manifestly, can't get around to the 531 people in this whole Congress. He has to confine himself largely to the people in the committees and in the leaderships.

But I would say this: I would not eliminate any effort that I thought would be productive.²

On April 10, in his first major speech since taking office, Secretary McElroy expressed his viewpoints on the President's reorganization plan in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington. He said that the primary need for reorganization was to put the Defense Department on a wartime basis in order to reduce the reaction time in the event of an enemy missile attack. He pointed out that in every war during the past century the United

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.

States had to change its military organization after war started. He said this was no longer possible because war would come, in the space age, too fast to permit the traditional shift from a peacetime to a wartime organization and, therefore, the Defense Department should operate on a wartime basis at all times and be ready to react instantly to sudden attack.

During the talk McElroy attempted to conciliate Congress by denying that the President's reorganization plan would make him a "czar," set up a Prussian-type general staff, create a single chief of staff, or abolish the traditional military services. In regard to one of the most strongly opposed provisions of the plan, he said that giving him greater control over defense appropriations would not reduce congressional control over the purse because he desired the power to transfer only a small percentage (5-10%) of appropriations in order to achieve greater flexibility to exploit sudden technological breakthroughs.¹

Probably McElroy's most significant statements were those concerning military men who might publicly express their disapproval of the President's plan. These remarks seemed to be an advanced move to squelch any open

¹However it should be noted that 10% of defense appropriations was approximately \$4 billion.

military rebellion against defense reorganization. When asked how far he thought a military man could go in opposing the reorganization plan, without being insubordinate, McElroy stated:

I can see no excuse for military or civilian members of the defense organization undertaking to make public speeches in their official capacities in opposition to the program of their Commander in Chief to strengthen the nation's defenses.

On the other hand, officials of the department are required when testifying before Congress to give their personal judgments and opinions when asked for them. Certainly I would expect each department witness to answer such questions frankly and fully in the light of his professional knowledge and experience and with consideration of his position as a member of the defense organization which is commanded by the President.

I would think that if a man of integrity and conscience felt so strongly opposed to the basic policies and programs of his organization that he could not effectively discharge his responsibilities, he would so advise his superiors. I know that is what I would do.¹

The Draft Bill

The preparation of a bill is essentially a strategic phase of the legislative struggle. . . . It is not merely a method of recording policy or general principles that have been previously formulated. It is part and parcel of the process of policy formulation. It is a job of formulating general principles in a precise form and of making a long series of choices between alternative methods of building upon them. Moreover, bill drafting represents an important act of taking the initiative in formulating issues in a

¹The New York Times, April 11, 1958, p. 1.

manner most consistent with one's own views and interests. . . . The ability to draft effectively is thus a vital element in the power picture. . . .

Bill drafting calls for more talents than can be obtained through abstract legal training, no matter how excellent it may be or become. It calls for an intensive knowledge of administrative regulations, judicial decisions, existing law, and other proposed laws in the field where the work is being done. It requires an understanding of the realities behind the legal forms; above all, it requires an ability to appraise the lineup of interests and the relative strength of conflicting pressures and to assist in the formulation of basically political decisions. It calls for flexibility and dexterity in the use of language, both to convey meaning and, where necessary, to avoid meaning; both to avoid emotional connotations and, where necessary, to arouse emotion. In short, it calls for a wide range of talents and skills in law, administration, economics, politics, and public relations.¹

President Eisenhower's reorganization message to Congress was primarily a statement of his intentions and, in a way, a "trial balloon." However, a proposal for legislation has little meaning unless drafted into a bill. Consequently, the effect of the President's plan on the Department of Defense depended primarily on the exact phraseology of the legislation he sent to Congress.

On April 16, the President sent a draft bill to Congress. In the accompanying letter he said:

The draft bill contains no provisions relating to the appropriation of funds to the Department of Defense. . . . I have directed that the department's budget estimates for the 1960 fiscal year be prepared

¹Gross, op. cit., pp. 188-191.

and presented in a form to provide the needed flexibility. Because this requires no change in law, the problem is not dealt with in the enclosed draft bill.¹

This statement indicated that the President had decided to sidestep a fight with Congress on this issue and would instead attempt to achieve his aims the following January when the budget for the 1960 fiscal year would be submitted to Congress.

The 1960 defense budget is to be drawn up so that McElroy will, in fact, be able to determine how the 40 billion dollars or more is to be spent among the services. This is to be done by reducing the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the status of "projects." The word "projects" is the key, since the secretary currently has authority to shift funds from one project--the reconstruction of a naval base, for example--to another project.

This is, in short, a resourceful way of wrapping up the 40 billion dollars defense budget so that, short of tearing it completely apart, the congressional committees will have to take it on the President's terms. The President is reported to have said that if they do try to tear his next defense budget apart, he will simply refuse to accept Congress' own handiwork and will operate the Defense Department on deficit requests which, in view of national security, the Congress could hardly deny.

A defense budget, as it goes to the capitol, is as thick as two or three metropolitan phone books. Its very complexity gives the executive branch a considerable power.²

¹The New York Times, April 17, 1958, p. 10.

²Marquis Childs, "Big Congressional Fight Due if Ike Pushes Defense Plan," The Oregonian (Portland), April 14, 1958, p. 16. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 18, noted three ways in which the Secretary of Defense could be given more flexibility with defense appropriations. Congress could appropriate a

Although the President did not publicize the fact, his draft bill also contained one very important addition. He inserted a provision that would repeal the right of service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to Congress, on their own initiative, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that they deemed proper. This therefore was still another attempt by the President to keep members of the Department

modest emergency fund to the Secretary for allocation, at his discretion, to new and unbudgeted projects; it could grant a limited transfer authority to the Secretary so he could shift funds between services up to, for example, 10% of total defense appropriations; or it could appropriate funds in larger categories so that there would be greater flexibility for shifting funds within those categories. He said these provisions could be used either singly or in combination.

On April 25, in a statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Major General (retired) Otto Nelson, representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, made still another proposal for making defense appropriations. He recommended that instead of making appropriations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the three services they be made to the following categories within the Department of Defense: Military Personnel, Construction of military facilities, Research and development, Procurement and production of military weapons and equipment, Maintenance and operations, and Departmental administration. Nelson said this would give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility without weakening Congress' control of the purse.

of Defense from opposing the Administration on defense matters.¹

At his news conference on April 16, President Eisenhower said that he did not intend to let military leaders who opposed his plan get out-of-hand as they had so many times in the past during similar controversies. When asked what he thought high-ranking officers should do if they felt they could not support his plan, the President said:

A man has a duty to appear before a Congressional committee . . . and [if] he is asked for his personal convictions about anything in the services, why, I think he has an absolute duty to give those convictions.

But . . . public speaking or in other words, apparently propagandizing . . . that is an entirely different matter.

It would be only the attempt to show publicly insubordination and doing it voluntarily, that would be something that would require correction.²

The fight for defense reorganization, in many ways, seemed to narrow down to a personal battle between President Eisenhower and Representative Vinson. On April 16, the day the President sent his draft bill to Congress,

¹It is interesting to note that service secretaries, although they are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure, usually become as partisan as military men. Consequently, the President probably felt it was just as important to forbid the secretaries from going to Congress as it was to forbid the service chiefs.

²The New York Times, April 17, 1958, p. 20.

Vinson made an hour-long speech in the House opposing most of the President's plan.¹ He stated:

In effect, the President of the United States has asked the Congress to merge the armed services into one vast organization; he has asked Congress to surrender, to one man in the Pentagon, its constitutional responsibilities to prescribe the basic roles and missions for the armed services; he has notified Congress that, notwithstanding the long legislative history to the contrary, he has already directed the creation of a supreme general staff; and he has further notified Congress that he has directed the Department of Defense to prepare its budget in such a form as to reduce the congressional control over appropriated funds for defense purposes. In addition, the President has asked that Congress concur in such overt steps that have already been taken even though such recommendations have not been enacted into law.

I do not profess to be a military leader; I do not profess to know the technical aspects of strategy and tactics, but I do know that as one member of the House of Representatives I shall fulfill the obligations imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States with reference to our national security. . . .

Space ships, satellites and guided missiles cannot abrogate the Constitution of the United States.

Scientific advances and technological progress may frighten some people into unwise and hastily considered decisions, but I do not believe they will stampede the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the American people.²

Vinson then went on to criticize each of the controversial provisions in the President's plan.

His proposals in respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would, if put into effect, destroy this sound, effective and war-proven system in all but name. . . .

One of the truly great virtues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been the manner in which it effects a

¹Vinson's speech is in U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, CIV, pp. 5901-5907. (Daily Edition).

²Ibid.

unity of planning and command. . . .

It is by this simple, but fundamental, device that unity of authority and responsibility is effective, it is the means by which the fatal theory of the "ivory tower" is avoided.¹

In regard to eliminating the service secretaries from the chain of operational command, Vinson said:

The President, in effect, asks that the military departments be relegated to housekeeping bureaus with the superintendent in charge of housekeeping as the head of each military department.

Thus, the message, for all practical purposes, eliminates three civilian secretaries. By eliminating these three civilian secretaries, we would enhance the power of the Secretary of Defense to the extent that the net result is greater concentration of military control subject only to the mental and physical capabilities of one individual secretary. If ever there was an open invitation to the concept of the man on horseback, this proposal is it.

Obviously, the Secretary of Defense cannot personally exercise such vast powers. His powers must be delegated. To whom will these powers be delegated? The answer is obvious: an increasingly powerful supreme high command, the Joint Staff. The Secretary will have nominal power. Actual authority will be exercised by the Chairman and the super Joint Staff which the reorganization would actually establish. That is precisely the means by which the great German General Staff controlled Germany. . . .

The concept of this staff system is unilateral thinking at all costs. There can be no room for discussion, no room for debate, no room for service advocacy, no room for split papers. From this system will come complete merger, and undoubtedly an ability to fight a war based upon a single concept.

The Secretary of Defense, in the future, will have presented to him, not a choice of decisions, but only unilateral decisions. The Congress will be told by the military leaders of the future one philosophy of warfare and then will be asked to rubber-stamp it with an appropriation. . . .

¹Ibid.

If that one-sided thinking is wrong; if the decisions of that super staff and its single Chief based upon a single concept are incorrect; if the decisions for the Congress and the Secretary of Defense to make are narrowed to a yes or no on a single viewpoint, and that decision is wrong, this nation, and Christian civilization, will die.¹

In regard to defense appropriations, Vinson said:

I know of no concept more dangerous to the security of the United States than that which the President recommends in his message with respect to the appropriation of funds. No Secretary of Defense has the ability, the knowledge, the clairvoyance, the time, the strength and the wisdom to assume the operational control of the entire military establishment. . . .

I do not intend to be a party to any statute, system or device which seeks to give the Secretary of Defense complete control over the original appropriation of funds as well as their ultimate disposition.

I am convinced that the collective wisdom of the Congress of the United States supersedes the collective wisdom of the Secretary of Defense.²

Vinson concluded by saying:

I wish to make it clear that I am not casting any aspersions on the present Secretary of Defense or any individual.

But laws are written for all men, not one man. The good intentions of one Secretary and one President do not guarantee the same intent in future Secretaries, or future Presidents.³

The day after Vinson's speech, President Eisenhower gave a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the International Press Institute which was broadcast nationwide over radio and television. As he had promised at his April 9 news conference, the President made a fighting attack against the opponents of his reorganization plan

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.

and most of his talk seemed to be a rebuttal aimed directly at Representative Vinson.¹ The President said:

Unified strategic plans, carried out in peace or war under unified direction, presuppose that the directing head, the Secretary of Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism, has sufficient authority over supporting activities to assure execution of the basic plans. This I submit, is the sum total of unification. . . .

I find it hardly surprising that a defense revision agitates partisans and traditionalists. Never has it been otherwise, whether we have gone from battleships to carriers in the Navy, from piston engines to jets in the Air Force, or from cavalry to armor in the Army--and, in all services, from TNT to nuclear weapons. . . .

But in the present situation it is more than gratifying to me to have the assurance that the convictions of senior civil and military leaders in all parts of the Defense Department closely parallel my own. They have cooperated loyally in designing the details of the proposed reorganization.

Much of the criticism we will likely hear, therefore, will probably be loudest and most bitter not from responsible service leaders but rather from outside sources. These sources often resist military change far more vigorously than the services themselves.²

In contrast to Vinson's speech, the President then strongly supported each of the controversial provisions in his reorganization plan.

From some quarters it will be said, for example, that the changes I have discussed will merge our traditional forces into a single armed service.

This is not so. . . .

It will also be said that a monstrous general staff, usually called "Prussian"--I am always amused when I hear that word, because I nearly always ask the individual to explain it to me by telling me what he thinks a "Prussian" general staff was. Few can do it. In any event they fear that this monstrous staff will threaten our liberty.

¹The President's speech is in The New York Times, April 18, 1958, p. 8.

²Ibid.

This is nonsense. . . .

It will likely be said, in the same breath, despite the obvious contradiction, that not a professional military staff but the Secretary of Defense will be made a "czar" who will overwhelm our liberty.

This, too, is not so.

We shall have neither military nor civilian czars. . . .

It will likely be said, in addition, that these proposals will violate the responsibilities of Congress, especially its power over the purse.

As I have said, this is equally farfetched.

The Congress will keep, in every respect, its full constitutional authority over the appropriation of funds. But greater flexibility in defense spending will result in greater efficiency, more responsiveness to changing military requirements, and more economical management of major defense programs.

Apprehensions such as these are at the least misconceptions. At the most they are misrepresentations. I repeat--there will be:

- no single chief of staff;
- no "Prussian" staff;
- no czar;
- no 40-billion-dollar blank check;
- no swallowing up of the traditional services;
- no undermining of the constitutional powers of Congress.¹

In conclusion, the President said:

If the program which I so earnestly support and believe in is adopted by the Congress:

There will be a stop to unworthy and sometimes costly bickering.

There will be clear-cut civilian responsibility, unified strategic planning and direction and completely unified combat commands.

There will be a stop to inefficiencies and needless duplications encouraged by present law.

Thus we will meet our dual needs--safety and solvency. The Congress willing, we shall have maximum strength, with minimum cost, in our national defense.²

As the battle shifted to the halls of Congress it was apparent that the President's plan was destined to

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.

have a rough voyage because of considerable congressional opposition to many of his proposals. However, President Eisenhower could not have picked a better issue on which to make a stand, as he still enjoyed enormous military prestige as one of the greatest commanders of World War II.

Even more important was the President's willingness to fight for his plan. Since January there had been a fundamental change in the President's concept of Presidential leadership and the constitutional separation of powers. Previously, he had felt that a President should merely propose legislation and let Congress act upon it freely, without resorting to executive pressure. Now it was evident that he no longer adhered to this philosophy and would exert as much pressure as was needed to get his plan approved. The inherent powers of his office provided most of the means.

Among these is a President's ability to influence congressional action through the manipulation of patronage, the allocation of Federal funds and projects, and the handling of constituents' cases in which members of Congress are interested. Still more important is the power which he enjoys as leader of his party and chief election campaigner and by reason of occupying a strategic position for promoting broad coalitions of social groups and interests.¹

¹Gross, op. cit., p. 102.

CHAPTER VI

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The legislative highway is neither short nor easy. Rather it is a long, uphill grind over dangerous terrain with booby traps and pitfalls all along the way. Traffic congestion alone can mean protracted delays. The number of twists and bends in the road is almost endless. At every turn in the road action can be held up by new points of view, new facts, new attacks, new grouping of forces, complex amendments, and alternative proposals. Moreover, the road may be blocked by the opposition of a small minority of Senators and Representatives in strategic positions. Sometimes even a single member can completely stall the progress of a bill either in committee or on the floor.¹

The President's reorganization plan was introduced in the House by Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin (R-Mass.) on April 16² and in the Senate by Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, on April 21.³ These bills were immediately referred to the House and Senate Armed Services

¹Gross, op. cit., p. 175.

²This bill (H.R. 11958) is not generally available but it may be found in Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, April 19, 1958, p. 11. A summary of the bill may be found in Digest of Public General Bills, op. cit., p. E-173.

³See ibid., p. A-73. It is interesting to note that while anyone can prepare a bill, only a Senator or Representative can introduce a bill in Congress.

Committees. However, Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, decided not to take any action on the bill referred to his committee until a bill had been passed by the House and forwarded to the Senate for concurrence.

The House

The committee hearings outrank the floor sessions of Congress--or, for that matter, the policy conference of any other government agency--in the sheer scope and volume of public operations. They provide a means through which members of Congress can educate themselves on the issues involved in a bill. They serve as a clearing-house for information needed by all the contestants in the legislative process. They provide a springboard for propagandistic and pressure activities. They serve as a testing ground on which preparatory battles can be fought before a measure moves on to a subsequent stage of committee decision. In the case of major legislation it is usually impossible without full and intensive hearings to produce a measure that can stand up on the floor of Congress or prove its value after enactment.¹

The House Armed Services Committee began its hearings on defense reorganization on April 22.² The first of fifteen witnesses to appear before the committee was Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy who was questioned extensively for four days. Although he defended the President's plan,

¹Gross, op. cit., p. 284.

²See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reorganization of the Department of Defense, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

McElroy conceded that under the plan the service chiefs could theoretically be stripped of their commands, although he felt this was unlikely. Consequently, he agreed that the committee should spell out what command functions the chiefs would retain after reorganization was accomplished. McElroy also admitted that economy was not a major reason for reorganizing the Department of Defense as the cost of new weapons was bound to increase defense expenditures in the future regardless of how it was organized. He said the primary reason was to streamline the chain of operational command in order to improve the Department's reaction time against enemy attack.

Several members of the committee informed McElroy that they were greatly concerned about the possibility of retaliation by the Administration against military leaders who might testify against the President's plan during the hearings. On this point, McElroy repeated a statement he had recently made--members of the Department of Defense were free to testify frankly, without fear of retaliation, but they were forbidden to publicly criticize the plan and would be expected to fully comply with it after the reorganization bill was enacted. McElroy also said that he would not object if the committee eliminated the provision in the President's plan that would repeal the right of service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to appear before Congress with complaints on their own initiative. He said this right, as far as he knew, had never been exercised and besides was not very important anyway.

During the last day of his testimony McElroy, without attaching any great significance to his statement, agreed that some language in the President's plan was unnecessarily broad. He said this had happened because Department of Defense attorneys could not find legal wording that would remove ambiguities in the plan except by the use of somewhat broad language. He said he would not object to more precise phraseology being substituted because "our feet are not set in concrete on this." Consequently, McElroy agreed to let the committee rewrite some parts of the bill if the substance and intent were preserved. He concluded by saying: "If we can attain our objectives by some other legislative language, there is no reason why we should not be willing to consider alternative ways of doing these things."¹

The next day the newspapers claimed that McElroy had accepted major revisions in the President's plan, that the administration had begun a well-ordered retreat from its original position, and that the stage had been set for

¹Ibid., p. 6156.

a compromise with the hostile Armed Services Committee. President Eisenhower, who at the time was vacationing in Augusta, Georgia, was greatly disturbed by these newspaper reports. Although the President said he felt certain that McElroy had not intended to imply that the Administration was softening on its stand, he telephoned McElroy to confirm his beliefs. Later in the day, Press Secretary James Hagerty issued the following statement which he said the President had written himself:

This morning the President talked by telephone with the Secretary of Defense. The subject was the Defense Reorganization Bill and some news stories implying that the Secretary of Defense was willing to compromise the objectives sought in the Defense Reorganization Bill which the President personally sent to Congress.

While the Secretary of Defense properly has not insisted on rigid adherence to words and phraseology, he has confirmed to the President that no changes in the meaning of any feature of the modernization program has been implied by any testimony of his. Both the President and the Secretary are agreed that there can be no compromise on--or retreat from--the essentials of this legislation.¹

Secretary McElroy also issued a statement to the press:

I don't think there is any reason to say that there is only one way to express the legislation that is needed in order to accomplish the results that are needed. . . . We are not wedded to language if there is substitute language which will be equally successful in achieving the stated goals of the President. I am confident that the committee understands my position.²

¹The New York Times, April 27, 1958, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 43.

General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who followed McElroy as a witness, said he was 100% behind the President's plan. Twining said that the changes requested by the President amounted only to "tidying up the law" but admitted that it would increase the stature of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that practically all of the nation's combat units would eventually be placed in unified commands. Twining further said that he would like to lay to rest forever any thought that the President's plan would lead to an organization similar to the German General Staff. He then read a specially prepared paper containing an excellent summarization of the German General Staff and the misconceptions that many people had in regard to such a staff.

Those who oppose the concept of greater unification in the United States Defense Establishment argue that a single military staff designed to coordinate the activities of all United States armed services, would create in the United States a counter-part of the notorious German General Staff of World War I and World War II. This, the argumentation continues, is patently evil because German aggression in those wars was the inevitable result of the predominance of the single German General Staff which, by establishing control over all the armed services, was able to lead Germany down the road to military dictatorship and ruinous war. The same kind of organization would, as it had in Germany, create in this country national militarism which would be likely to lead the Nation down a comparably disastrous road.

It is also asserted that defeats which befell Germany in World Wars I and II were largely due to the inflexible kind of military thinking which is characteristic of a single General Staff. If the United States were to adopt such an organization, our

Military Establishment would be characterized by comparable inflexibility and inefficiency. We defeated Germany with a Joint Chiefs of Staff system. . . . Our World War II victory, it is asserted, is proof-positive that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system is more efficient than the single General Staff system which carried Germany down to defeat.

These assertions regarding the evils and dangers of a single General Staff of the Prussian or German variety are based upon a fundamental historical inaccuracy.

Germany did not have a single General Staff for her armed services in World War I. The German Army and the German Navy were completely independent, and no staff existed to coordinate their efforts. It was to a large extent due to the failure of Germany to coordinate its Army and Navy efforts that Germany failed to achieve a quick victory in World War I.

At the beginning of World War II Hitler exercised control over three entirely independent, and uncoordinated military services . . . through a small personal staff composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. . . . The individuals on this small personal staff of the German dictator were picked not for their military knowledge, but because of their loyalty to Hitler and to the Nazi party.

The historical evidence is clear that there was in Germany no pretense toward unified staff control of the three armed services during either World War I or World War II. The Germans never established a unified command structure at any echelon below Hitler, and his personal staff advisers. . . .

There was, of course, a German General Staff during World War I and World War II. This staff, however, was an Army staff only, and in neither war did it have any responsibility for overall interservice coordination. Undoubtedly, the German Army General Staff was in many respects characteristic of German militarism. Throughout its history the General Staff served as a loyal and highly effective military instrument at the personal disposal of the Chief of State. It knew no civilian control other than the Chief of State himself. Its permanent corps of officers tended to lose contact with problems in the field, and, as a result, was frequently guilty of inflexibility and autocratic methods. Yet, despite these faults, it was a highly efficient military organization, which was in large measure responsible for the amazing successes of the German Army in both world wars. Had there been a similar organization coordinating all the efforts of all the German

armed forces in World War II, there is solid historical evidence that many of the most serious German military mistakes, for which Hitler and his small group of personal advisors were responsible, would never have been made, and the course of World War II would undoubtedly have been far different than it was; ultimate Allied victory could have been far less certain. . . .

As to the danger which a general staff system poses to national civilian institutions of government, it should be pointed out that far from the German general staff taking over the German Government prior to World War II, it was Hitler who took¹ over the German general staff and the German army.¹

As the hearings progressed some members of the House became irritated by Vinson's incessant interrogation of Department of Defense witnesses. On April 28, Representative Perkins Bass (R-N.H.) charged that Vinson himself was a "czar" and that the President's plan had been improperly referred to a hostile committee which had already prejudged it. The next day, Representative Frank Osmers (R-N.J.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, charged that committee members spent one-third of their time trying to solve a "whodunit," one-third trying to prove the bill made no substantive changes in existing law, and one-third arguing that its passage would ruin the country.²

¹Hearings, Reorganization of the Department of Defense, op. cit., pp. 6178-6180.

²The "whodunit" charge was in reference to Chairman Vinson probing General Twining to find out if the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered the President's plan

After General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, testified in favor of the President's plan, two military leaders who did not favor the plan appeared before the committee. The first of these was Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. Burke said he agreed with the intent of the President's plan, but that he had misgivings about virtually all of the major provisions as they were written.¹ He said the language in the bill would permit a future Secretary of Defense to exceed the President's

among themselves prior to its submission to Congress. Twining admitted they had not, but said they had given their views to Secretary McElroy individually. He said they had not discussed it together because he feared there would be a leak and he did not want it to come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vinson had also interrogated Charles Coolidge, McElroy's Special Assistant for Reorganization, who had drafted most of the Administration's bill, to find out who had added the provision that would abolish the right of service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring their complaints to Congress on their own initiative. Coolidge explained this provision had been added after the Department of Defense sent the bill to the White House, but said he did not know who added the provision. The second charge referred to the comments of some committee members that no changes in existing law were necessary as the Secretary of Defense already had the power to make most of the changes requested by the President. The third charge referred to claims that the President's plan would allow the creation of a single chief of staff, which would lead to military dictatorship.

¹This was a very effective way of opposing the President's plan. Agreeing with a plan in principle means very little when objections are made to almost all of its major provisions.

intent. He then repeated all of his, and the Navy's, old fears--the bill would allow the abolition of naval aviation and the Marine Corps and permit the formation of a large, all-powerful general staff over the armed services which would lead to military dictatorship.

The next day General Randolph Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps, said he supported the general aims of the President but strongly opposed certain measures of the reorganization plan. He particularly objected to the provision which would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to transfer or abolish functions in the Defense Department as he felt some future Secretary might use this power to abolish the Marine Corps. In general, Pate said he preferred more decentralization rather than more centralization in the Department of Defense.

The next three military witnesses, General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, and the two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar Bradley and Admiral (retired) Arthur Radford, all strongly supported the President. Then on May 6 President Eisenhower received very strong and unexpected support from Representative Clarence Cannon (D-Mo.), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. During a 48-minute speech on the House floor, Cannon said:

Who is better qualified, in training, experience and capacity than General Eisenhower. . . . I may,

at times, presume to differ with him on agricultural matters because I am a farmer and he is not. But when it comes to military affairs . . . he is a General--and I take off my hat to him with heartfelt alacrity.

And what about the obtuse Admirals, who like the Bourbons never forget and never learn--never forget how the last war was fought and never learn how to fight the next war. . . . Rather than collaborate with the Army or the Air Force the Navy has always insisted on establishing its own facilities, and has deliberately duplicated military facilities at a waste of billions of tax dollars. The Navy insists on constituting itself as an entire and complete defense department. . . . It duplicates every function of the entire Defense Department. . . .

The President asks for this legislation and Congress should pass it and start this reasonable, sensible, long-delayed, much-needed revision at the earliest date possible. And yet every conceivable species of propaganda imaginable is being used against it. . . .

This is not an academic discussion. A thousand years of civilization weigh in the balance. . . . It is high time we put an end to this insane bickering between the services, eliminated billions of wastage and begin to develop sufficient military strength to keep us out of war.¹

This support, from such a powerful representative, was a good indication that the President's strenuous campaign in support of his reorganization plan was beginning to bear fruit. Consequently, he began exerting all the pressure at his command on the Armed Services Committee. The President asked for support of his plan in an address to the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in a talk at a Republican Party dinner, and in statements at

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, CIV, May 6, 1958, pp. 7301-7303, (Daily Edition).

his weekly news conferences. In addition, he wrote a personal letter to some 200 of his business friends soliciting their support. In this letter, the President said:

Because of your business experience, it seems to me that you may be particularly impressed by an analysis suggested to me lately by a good friend who heads one of our great corporations. He suggested that present operations within the Department of Defense are similar to a corporate operation that would permit each important subordinate to report separately and independently to the board of directors, by-passing the chief executive (officer) entirely. This, of course, would be completely unworkable; it could hardly be tolerated long because tough competition with better organized units would soon produce a profit and loss statement that could spell disaster. . . .

If this little comparison with corporate practices appeals to you as helpful in appreciating the crying need for defense modernization, I hope that you and others will find it useful in awakening the public to the grave seriousness of this matter.¹

Probably because of the increasing Presidential pressure, Chairman Carl Vinson, on May 12, abruptly halted the Armed Services Committee's public hearings and the committee began drafting a bill in executive session. However, two committee members, Charles S. Gubser (R-Cal.) and Leon H. Gavin (R-Penn.), protested that Vinson had refused to let representatives of the American Legion and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Generals Alfred M. Gruenther and Lucius D. Clay, all strong supporters of the

¹The President's letter was reprinted in The New York Times, May 12, 1958, p. 15.

President's plan, give public testimony. Vinson rejected their complaint and said he felt the committee had sufficient information and that there was no point in "rehashing the same line of testimony." However, for what it was worth, he did agree to accept written statements for the record.

Looking back over the House hearings one is impressed by the manner in which the testimony of Defense Department witnesses was organized and chaperoned. . . . Witnesses were provided with little black loose-leaf books of about 120 pages, containing background data, 40 pages of questions and answers, and numerous quotations from leaders in Congress and the Defense organization in support of the ideas in the President's plan.

Memorandum were circulated throughout the Departments telling prospective witnesses that the Secretary of Defense considered them "personally responsible for insuring that they completely understand the Department of Defense position or policy on the point or points upon which they expect to testify." If they are uncertain, the letter said, they should make arrangements for a briefing by the "appropriate agency" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This memorandum said that "while not attempting to restrict the testimony of a Service witness, the Secretary of Defense urges that if the witness can in good conscience support the views of the Department of Defense he should do so."

Another memorandum to witnesses said that the transcript of their testimony would be read by a "working task force". . . . Suggested revisions were to be returned to each witness, but the "revisions should be looked upon simply as suggestions; if the witness does not agree with the suggested changes, they should be deleted and ignored."

Thus, while witnesses were told they could speak their mind, the implied pressure for conformity was strong.¹

¹ Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, June 7, 1958, p. 10. A special unit was established in the Pentagon to

On May 16, the Armed Services Committee unanimously approved a compromise reorganization bill that gave the President most of what he had requested.¹ The major changes made in the President's plan were:

1. The Secretary of Defense was given authority to abolish, transfer, or reassign service functions, except major combatant functions, thirty days after notifying Congress of his intent. The Secretary was given authority to abolish, transfer, or reassign major combatant functions only if Congress did not pass a disapproving concurrent resolution within sixty days after receiving notice of the contemplated change. Under the committee's bill, a function became a major combatant function whenever a member

assist defense officials who were scheduled to appear before the Armed Services Committee. This unit was headed by Robert E. Holt, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics and included two representatives from each service. The unit tried to anticipate the questions committee members might ask and prepared answers to these questions. In addition, when officials were asked by the committee to prepare written answers to their questions, this unit produced the reports that were submitted. In order to achieve close coordination with top officials, Holt reported three or four times a day to Oliver M. Gale, Special Assistant to Secretary McElroy. Gale later denied that the unit was engaged in propaganda. He said it was only a research group for the convenience of defense officials. See Jack Raymond, "Special Unit Aid Defense Revision," The New York Times, May 10, 1958, p. 8.

¹See U.S., Congress, House, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, Rept. 1765.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with a proposed change in functions. The President had requested that the Secretary of Defense be given authority to make these changes after giving Congress thirty days notice. This was rejected because a proposed change in functions could be prevented only by an act of Congress, which the President could veto. This meant that in order to maintain an existing law it might be necessary for Congress to raise a two-thirds majority to pass another law to protect its previous action. The House was concerned about this provision because of its effect on Congress' constitutional authority to define the roles and missions of the services. If the Secretary of Defense could change functions at his discretion congressional authority would be greatly weakened.

2. The committee repealed the provision in existing law that stated that the military departments had to be "separately administered," but this was of little significance because the committee instead required them to be "separately organized." Instead of the Secretary of Defense exercising his authority through assistant secretaries of defense as requested by the President, he was required to exercise his authority through the service secretaries. The committee felt that the Department of Defense was too large an organization to be completely

centralized under one secretary and that if the service secretaries were to be held responsible for their organization, the Secretary of Defense should act through them. If this was not done, the committee felt that the chain of command would be ambiguous and would make the position of the service secretaries untenable.

3. The committee refused to repeal the provision in existing law that gave service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to come to Congress with complaints on their own initiative. The committee felt it was essential to retain this provision in order for Congress to get the information it required to exercise its constitutional power to provide for the national defense.

Immediately after the committee's action, President Eisenhower sent Chairman Vinson the following letter:

I have just been shown your committee's revision of the defense reorganization legislation. . . . From a quick reading I have these impressions:

First, on the whole the bill clearly reflects constructive efforts to correct the main difficulties which have troubled our Defense Establishment in recent years. I congratulate you and your committee colleagues for the progress made toward developing a sound defense structure.

Second, by and large the bill seems to deal positively with every major problem I presented to the Congress.

Third, in certain respects--two quite important--I believe that changes would make the committee's revision clearer in intent and more clear cut in effect within the Defense Department, and therefore would result in greater departmental and operational

efficiency. I am requesting a member of my staff to give you my views on such items. I hope this language will be suitably adjusted on the House floor.¹

The two changes requested by the President were:

1. That the Secretary of Defense not be required to exercise his authority through the service secretaries.

2. That the Secretary be allowed to abolish, transfer, or reassign functions unless Congress forbade the change within thirty days after receiving notice of a proposed change.

Most committee members accepted this letter as a commendation for their work and therefore expected little or no opposition from the Administration when the bill was presented to the House for approval. Consequently, on May 23, the committee considered and then rejected the President's request to revise the bill. However, on May 28, the President again let it be known that he would not be satisfied with the committee's bill unless it gave him all that he had originally requested. In a public statement, the President strongly objected to three provisions in the bill and urged the House to delete them.

Three provisions of the reported bill directly conflict with the reorganization I proposed to the Congress.

These three provisions continue to emphasize

¹The President's letter is in House Report 1765, op. cit., p. 6.

disunity and separation within the Defense Department. They continue to imply Congressional approval of wasteful rivalries.

I have had convincing evidence that Americans everywhere favor a thorough going reorganization of the Defense Department. The committee has acted commendably on most of the needed changes. But in dealing with our defense establishment, pretty good is not good enough, and going part way is not going far enough.

America, having started on this reorganization, wants the job done right.

I earnestly hope . . . that the changes needed for an effective reorganization will be made by the House of Representatives when this bill comes up for debate.¹

In regard to the provision that required the Secretary of Defense to exercise his authority through the service secretaries, the President said:

[this] language is best described as a legalized bottleneck. It constricts the authority of the Secretary of Defense; puts a premium on intransigence by low Pentagon levels; blocks normal staff processes; fails to express the intent of the committee as explained in its report; will . . . cause "administrative chaos" if fully implemented.²

In regard to the provision that gave a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to declare a function a major combatant function, the President said:

[this] language is best described as the "Everyone's out of step but me" provision. It vests astonishing authority in one military man without regard to the views of his military colleagues, the Secretary of Defense, the President and the Congress; allows one military man to hold up defense improvements for many

¹The New York Times, May 29, 1958, p. 8.

²Ibid.

months and perhaps block them altogether; subordinates civilian judgment, authority, and responsibility; repudiates concept of flexibility of combatant functions.¹

In regard to the provision that gave service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to appeal to Congress on their own initiative, the President said:

[this] language is best described as legalized insubordination. It invites interservice rivalries; invites insubordination to the President and Secretary of Defense; endorses the idea of disunity and blocking of defense modernization; suggests that Congress hopes for disobedience and interservice rivalries; is bad concept, bad practice, bad influence within the Pentagon.²

Committee members were shocked by the President's bitter criticism. Representative Melvin Price (D-Ill.) laid the blame for the President's attitude on White House political advisers and said:

It is amazing that he could make this statement after congratulating us in his earlier letter on the constructive work we had done. The only conclusion I can reach is that the President does not know what's in the bill.³

The Armed Services Committee, in spite of the President's remarks, took no further action on the bill as it had already considered at great length and unanimously passed the provisions that the President opposed. However, on June 4, Representative Joseph Martin, House Minority Leader, announced he would offer amendments to

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., May 30, 1958, p. 9.

reshape the reorganization bill more to the President's liking when it reached the House floor. As a compromise he proposed that:

1. Instead of requiring the Secretary of Defense to exercise his authority through the service secretaries, his orders would go through assistant secretaries of defense to the services, but only when this authority was specifically delegated by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Functions in the Department of Defense would be considered as major combatant functions only if two or more members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly opposed a change in functions, after which Congress would have forty-five days in which to act.

3. The right to take service problems to Congress would be granted only to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of to both the chiefs and service secretaries.

On June 11, Representative Martin held a party caucus and told Republican members of the House that anyone who did not support the President when the reorganization bill came before the House would find themselves "out in the cold" at the White House. This pressure succeeded in shattering the solidarity of the Armed Services Committee as most Republican members of the committee announced they would support the President's request to amend the bill. This led Democrat members of the committee to charge that

the President had turned the issue of national defense into a political power struggle. Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-La.) complained that:

I would have to be awfully naive and totally blind not to see what is happening here today, and it is a sad day . . . for this country when the Committee on Armed Services is plunged into partisan politics. . . . But I wonder where is this heat and where is this pressure coming from. I wonder who is generating and financing these hundreds of thousands of letters which are pouring into our offices each day by overlords of industry and by giants of business who speak with such authority on a bill they have never seen and never read. . . .

Let us ignore this oppressive heat. Let us ignore these propaganda phrases which are being passed down, and come to a firm decision which has been made by 37 men, tried and true, with full knowledge of their business.¹

Chairman Vinson claimed it was the first time in his forty-four years of service in Congress that an issue involving national security had become a subject of partisan politics. Nevertheless, he urged Democrats to vote for the bill or its amendments solely on their merit. Representative Kilday said he harbored no bitterness toward Republican committee members who deserted Vinson because he knew they had been "under merciless political pressure" to do so.

When the Defense Reorganization Bill came up for consideration the next day, Republicans offered the compromise amendments proposed by Martin for each of the

¹Congressional Record, op. cit., June 11, 1958, pp. 9815-9816.

three provisions in the bill which were opposed by the President. However, each amendment was rejected. The first was defeated 183-170, the second 123-97, and the third 150-82. After this, all three amendments were presented together and Republicans tried to get the House to send the bill back to the Armed Services Committee with instructions to write the amendments into the bill. This proposal also was defeated 211-192.¹ Finally, after it was evident that the amendments had no chance of passing, the original committee bill was approved 402-1.²

So ended the campaign in the House. Now the whole process had to be repeated in the Senate.

The Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee, headed by Senator Richard B. Russell, began its hearings on defense

¹See the Congressional Record, op. cit., June 12, 1958, pp. 9846-9847. This vote was a good indication of the effectiveness of Presidential pressure. Of the 211 Representatives voting against adopting the amendments, only 15 were Republicans while 172 of the 192 Representatives voting for adoption were Republicans.

²This bill (H.R. 12541) is in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, pp. 1-7.

reorganization on June 17.¹ Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was the first witness and he was questioned for two days. McElroy said he felt that the Senate should make the changes in the House bill requested by the President.

1. He said the provision requiring him to operate through the service secretaries would weaken his authority and impair efficiency in the Department of Defense because as long as there was a provision in the law on which the service secretaries could predicate a claim of autonomy they were likely to exercise it.²

2. He said he needed the authority to transfer or abolish functions in order to eliminate overlap and duplication in the Department of Defense and that the

¹See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

²At one point during McElroy's testimony, Senator Russell suggested that eliminating the service secretaries and replacing them with under secretaries of defense might be an easy way to streamline and coordinate the Department of Defense. McElroy said this was an attractive idea but it had been considered and rejected because it would be difficult to get able men to head the military departments if they were denied the more prestigious title of secretary. In regard to this remark it should be noted that each of the military departments is larger than any other executive department in the federal government. Consequently few men would accept such responsibility without receiving a comparable title.

elaborate procedures passed by the House were actually more restrictive than existing law and could delay important action for months.

3. He said the provision allowing a single member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine when a function was a major combatant function gave unprecedented power to a single individual, established an effective military veto over civilian control, and encouraged dissension among members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. He said the provision allowing members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appear before Congress on their own initiative tended to undermine necessary administrative loyalties and foster interservice rivalries and disunity.

5. He said he desired greater authority for the assistant secretaries of defense because his policies had to be carried out through someone with delegated authority because it was impossible for the Secretary of Defense to run the department alone.

Chairman Russell, however, did not agree with most of McElroy's recommendations and said he felt the House bill would probably be adopted by the Senate with perhaps a few minor adjustments. He said the Secretary of Defense already had all the power he needed to effectively administer the services and that administrative weaknesses and

poor leadership, not existing law, were the causes of any inefficiency or inadequacy in the operation of the Department of Defense. In regard to interservice rivalries, he said the Secretary could easily keep order by dismissing any subordinate who "dragged his feet" or disobeyed an order.

On June 19, Admiral Burke appeared before the committee. He said he felt the House bill was satisfactory. He said he did not object to the provision in the bill that required the Secretary of Defense to operate through the service secretaries or to the provision giving a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to determine major combatant functions. In regard to the President's third objection, Burke said it was of little significance.

If I felt that the security of this country were involved, then it would not make any difference to me whether the provision was in the law or not. I would feel it was my duty to protest until I was heard.¹

As would be expected, Secretary McElroy was not too pleased with Burke's testimony. On June 21, while

¹Ibid., p. 120. General White, who preceded Admiral Burke as a witness, agreed that this provision was of little importance. He said if he felt he had to go to Congress with a complaint he would resign first and then appear as a civilian. However, he supported the President's request for changes in the House bill.

holding a short news conference at Quantico, Virginia,¹ McElroy was questioned by reporters about the pressure being exerted on military leaders to force them to conform with the Administration's position on defense reorganization. McElroy answered:

I don't see how a service chief can fail to be aware of the strong interest of the President about these amendments. It seems to me it would be very difficult for a chief or for me to be unaware that the President is Commander in Chief and that he wants these amendments.

The chief should make his own decision about his testimony in the light of that fact.²

When asked about Burke's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, McElroy remarked:

I am disappointed in him, regard it as regrettable. I think he is a fine officer. I am sorry he is mistaken in this respect.³

When asked about Burke's future, McElroy said he had no plans to change his position, but that he was not the only one responsible for his future, evidently referring to possible action by the President.

Most of the reporters interpreted McElroy's comments as a rebuke and as a result the next morning the

¹McElroy was attending the annual conference of some 175 high-ranking military and civilian defense officials which was held at the Marine Corps School from June 20-22. Admiral Burke also was present at the conference.

²The New York Times, June 22, 1958, p. 1.

³Ibid.

newspaper headlines exclaimed: "McElroy Rebukes Burke."

Later that day McElroy denied that he had rebuked Admiral Burke and in an attempt to end the furor caused by his remarks he issued the following statement:

It has been suggested that at a press conference yesterday my response to questions relating to Admiral Burke's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee constituted a rebuke to Admiral Burke. This is incorrect. The Secretary can be disappointed, and he can regret parts of an officer's testimony without it being anything more than that.¹

However, this statement did not satisfy Chairman Russell. He said, on June 23, that McElroy's remarks were in direct conflict with his promise that military leaders would be allowed to testify freely at the committee's hearings.

Secretary McElroy's weekend statement rebuking Admiral Burke for his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee is startling proof of the necessity for retaining the law assuring Congress of the right to receive the unbiased professional judgment of our military leaders.

If the Congress is to meet its Constitutional duties to provide for the national defense, it must necessarily have the advice of these experts. Clear implication in the Secretary's statement that the Joint Chiefs must conform or be purged is more in keeping with the totalitarian concept of government than with our free government of divided powers.

The Secretary's admission that he had called the military chiefs together and advised them that their testimony to the committees of Congress must be given in the light of their knowledge of the views of the Executive Branch creates a grave doubt as to whether the Congress can get the free and frank opinions of these men on legislation before the Congress. A

¹Ibid., June 23, 1958, p. 1.

witness testifying under the sword of reprisal will find it difficult to give his honest views. . . .

In these circumstances, I doubt whether further testimony from the military chiefs will contribute anything to a greater understanding of the issues involved by the Congress or the people of the country. For this reason and until the committee can be assured that these officials may testify in complete candor without being threatened overtly or covertly, I am cancelling the appearances of General Taylor and General Pate that were scheduled for tomorrow.¹

This move put the Administration in a precarious position because there was little hope of getting a bill satisfactory to the President if Senator Russell became overly antagonistic. Therefore, the following day Secretary McElroy conferred with Russell by telephone. However, they did not come to an agreement. Consequently, the next day McElroy sent the following letter to Russell:

So that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and its members, I am glad to restate my position regarding testimony given before Congress by military and civilian members of the defense organization.

It is my conviction that officials of the department when testifying before Congress should give their personal judgment and opinion when asked for them. With consideration of his position as a member of the defense organization, each department witness would be expected to answer such questions frankly and honestly. . . .

There should not in my opinion be any question of retaliation or penalty for such testimony. . . . Once decisions have been taken on matters covered by a witness' testimony, I would expect the witness to perform under them without any question or reservation.

There is nothing in this position which would keep me from being disappointed or regretful that an official

¹Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, June 28, 1958, p. 2.

does not support fully the recommendations of the President. My honest statement of disappointment in an informal press conference certainly does not in my mind constitute a rebuke or an indication of possible reprisal.¹

This statement satisfied Russell and the hearings were resumed on June 26.

When Secretary McElroy made his final appearance before the committee on July 2, he announced that the President was willing to withdraw his objection to the provision giving service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to appear before Congress on their own initiative if the committee would delete the other two provisions in the House bill to which the President objected. McElroy said that getting these two provisions removed would make the "insubordinate" provision considerably less important. President Eisenhower probably yielded on this point because he realized that there was

¹The New York Times, June 26, 1958, p. 7. In this connection it is interesting to note a statement made by General Gavin while testifying before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on January 6, 1958. When asked by Senator Johnson if he felt his testimony before the subcommittee had deprived him of future opportunities in the Army, Gavin answered: "I don't think I helped myself any. . . . You don't help yourself by coming up to a committee and being straightforward and frank. . . . When you go back over there sometimes you are asked why you said so-and-so, and if you are right it is all right, but you never know when you might be just a little bit wrong. Then you are in trouble." See Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. cit., p. 1455. General Gavin resigned from the Army soon after making these remarks.

little chance of getting the committee to delete all three of the disputed provisions and because it was unlikely that Congress would ever agree to deleting a provision that might prevent it from obtaining information essential to the execution of its constitutional prerogatives.

In many respects the provision giving service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to appear before Congress was of little importance and, as Secretary McElroy stated, it had never been used. It was of little practical value because military leaders have several ways of making their grievances known without putting themselves "on the spot."

1. Most high-ranking officers are on friendly terms with one or more congressmen. If they feel it is necessary for Congress to have certain information they can covertly pass it to a friendly congressman. Then, if necessary, the congressman can arrange for witnesses to be asked to appear before the Armed Services Committee.

2. Leaks can be made to friendly members of the press. Publication of controversial information can lead to congressional hearings, as in the case of the 1949 B-36 investigation.

3. All of the services have close ties with service-connected industries. Complaints can be passed on

to industrial leaders, many of whom are retired officers, and they can make them public with little fear of reprisal.

4. Finally, the services have allied service associations--the Association of the United States Army, the Air Force Association, and the Navy League.¹ These quasi-official organizations frequently express service viewpoints on a multitude of controversial issues. Most of the time statements appearing in the monthly magazines published by these associations can be relied upon as the applicable service's position on a particular issue, although the information must be termed "unofficial." These associations have their headquarters in Washington and have chapters throughout the country which means they are able to muster support for the services on a nationwide basis. In addition, they hold well publicized annual conventions at which they strongly express viewpoints favorable to their services.

¹The Association of the U.S. Army is composed of active-duty army personnel and former members of the Army and has a membership of 60,000. It was founded in 1950 by the merger of the Infantry Association and the Field Artillery Association. The Anti-Aircraft Artillery Association joined the organization in 1955. The Air Force Association was founded in 1946, even before the Air Force became an independent service, and has a membership of 58,000. The Navy League was founded in 1902 but has a membership of only 22,000 because, unlike the other two associations, active-duty personnel are not admitted to membership.

The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded its hearings on July 9 and went into executive session. Soon afterwards, on July 14, a military coup d'etat in Iraq overthrew the monarchy and established a republic. The next day the United States began landing marines in Lebanon. With these momentous events taking place, Congress suddenly realized that it was no time to be bickering over defense matters. On July 15, with a sense of urgency in the air, the Armed Services Committee completed its work on defense reorganization and unanimously passed a modified version of the House bill.¹

The committee gave President Eisenhower most of what he wanted.

1. The provision allowing a single military chief to declare a function a major combatant function and the provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to exercise his authority through the service secretaries were stricken from the House bill.

2. The service secretaries were prohibited from appealing to Congress on their own initiative, but members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained this right.

3. The restriction on the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change service functions was modified.

¹See U.S., Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, Rept. 1845.

The Senate bill provided that no function established by law to be performed by the Department of Defense could be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated until thirty days after the Secretary of Defense notified the two Armed Services Committees of his intentions to make such a change. If during this thirty day period either committee reported a resolution recommending rejection of the Secretary's proposal, the change would be forbidden for forty additional days. If during this forty day period a house passed the resolution reported by its Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense would be restrained from making the change.¹

4. Assistant secretaries of defense were authorized to issue orders to military departments if the authority was delegated to them by the Secretary of Defense. However, these orders had to be issued through the service secretaries.

The Senate unanimously passed the modified bill, after only a few hours of debate, on July 18 and sent it back to the House with a request for a conference in the event the House did not accept the changes made by the Senate.

¹In one respect this provision was more restrictive than it had been in the House bill because a contemplated change could be blocked by only one house. Under the House bill, it required both houses.

The Conference Committee

Every bicameral legislature needs some means whereby its two branches can iron out their inevitable disagreements on policy matters. In the United States this need has been met through the creation of ad hoc conference committees selected to deal with individual measures.

Since the members of a conference committee invariably come from the legislative committees which have handled a measure, conference committees must be viewed as an extension of the standing-committee system. They are by-products of the structure of committee power in existence at a given moment. Since conference-committee bills cannot be amended in either house but must be accepted or rejected in toto, the conference committees represent committee power in its most concentrated form. . . .

The differences between measures approved by each of the two houses are often of crucial importance to individual members of Congress, private organizations, and executive officials. Conference committees become the only practical method of settling these differences.¹

The House did not agree with the changes the Senate made in its bill but did agree to a House-Senate Conference Committee to work out a compromise bill. Chairman Vinson and Representative Leslie Arends, the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, headed the nine-man team of conferees appointed by the House. Chairman Russell and Senator Leverett Saltonstall, ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, headed the five-man team from the Senate.

¹Gross, op. cit., pp. 317-318.

Although the managers on the part of each House meet together as one committee they are in effect two separate committees, each of which votes separately and acts by a majority vote. For this reason the number of the respective managers is immaterial.

The conferees are strictly limited in their consideration to matters in disagreement between the two Houses. Consequently they may not strike out or amend any portion of the bill which was not amended by the Senate. Furthermore, they may not insert new matter that is not germane to the differences between the two Houses.¹

The conference committee convened on July 23.

Since the reorganization bill had been considered and reconsidered in great detail over a four-month period, all of the conferees were well acquainted with its provisions. Consequently, it took only twenty-seven minutes for them to settle their differences. The result was a compromise between the House and Senate bills which gave President Eisenhower practically all that he had originally requested.² The following changes were made in the Senate bill:

1. The service secretaries, in addition to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were given the right to present complaints to Congress on their own initiative.
2. A provision was added which required the service

¹Charles J. Zinn, How Our Laws Are Made (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 19.

²For the report of the conference committee, see U.S., Congress, House, Defense Reorganization Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, Rept. 2261.

secretaries to be responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of their departments. This replaced the provision in the House bill that the Senate had deleted which required the Secretary of Defense to exercise his authority through the service secretaries.

3. Assistant secretaries of defense were prohibited from giving orders to the services unless the Secretary of Defense specifically delegated the authority, in writing, with respect to a specific subject area, and the orders were issued through the service secretaries.

Final Approval

On July 24, both houses quickly, unanimously, and without debate, passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 by voice vote. Both President Eisenhower and Chairman Vinson seemed happy over the results. Vinson said, "the original position of the House, which sought to retain the separate identity of the military departments has been sustained."¹ President Eisenhower congratulated the committee for a bill that "adequately meets every recommendation I submitted to Congress on this subject."²

So ended the great battle.

¹Ibid., p. 12.

²The New York Times, July 24, 1958, p. 1.

It will be noted that the long fight between President Eisenhower and Chairman Vinson was fought primarily over the possibility of executive encroachment on Congress' constitutional prerogatives rather than over the reorganization of the Department of Defense. Both houses gave President Eisenhower practically everything he requested in regard to defense reorganization. Congress objected only to those proposals which threatened its rights and power.

Because military power is, or can be, the source of total power in a nation, the Founding Fathers, with Cromwell in mind, divided control of the nation's military forces between the executive and legislative branches of the government to keep it from falling into the hands of one person or group. However, the Founding Fathers violated the military principle of unity of command. As a result, military leaders are continually caught in the middle of the power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the government and frequently find themselves in the impossible position of trying to serve two masters.

General Twining, when asked why he defended a defense budget he did not agree with, once stated:

It is the system of our Government. If you are a military man, you can say it is inadequate and turn your suit in. We do not play in the military that way. If, on the other hand, you say it is adequate,

then you do not feel good about that.

I think these committees are a little rough on these witnesses up here. I think you ought to reconsider what to do. These people are honest, sincere, and they do the best they can. They feel that the service should have such-and-such an amount of money and such-and-such forces, and they put it through the routine system of our Government budget-making process. Then you call them back and ask them, "Is this adequate?"

Well, you know the rules just as well as I do. I think it is a hell of a note. Some of these boys are taking a pretty good beating, the Schrievers and the Gavins and the rest of them. I am a little heavy on this one. . . .

I will give you all the information you want, and the witnesses will give you all the information you want, but you should not bring them back again and say, "Is this still adequate?" after the decision has been made by the President. In the military terminology, a commander has made a decision. If everybody starts bucking it, it is just no good, you have no military system left. . . .

To take the President's final decision and turn it back at them and say, "Is this adequate?" I think that ought to be reconsidered. It puts the military man in a pretty tough seat, because if he says it is adequate, he just, I think, is approaching insubordination; and if he says it is inadequate, he has more or less perjured himself.¹ in-

Military leaders will have to accept this untenable position as one of the hazards of the military profession. However, in trying to serve two masters military leaders are, at times, unable to serve either Congress or the President to the extent needed for them to effectively discharge their constitutional responsibilities in regard to national defense. This is one of the dilemmas of the American system of government.

¹Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. cit., pp. 1844-1845.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

Once a bill has been successfully steered through the tortuous shoals of Congress, it undergoes a rather quick and routinized processing so that a certified product can be presented to the President. It is checked by clerks of the two houses, printed on parchment as an "enrolled bill," and signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. A clerk of the house in which it was first passed takes it to the White House where it becomes another piece of paper to burden the most heavily burdened public official in the world.¹

President Eisenhower signed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 into law on August 6. At the time, he stated:

While some time will be required for its complete implementation, the Secretary of Defense is beginning this action at once. . . .

Now that this measure has become the law of the land, I know that the personnel throughout the military establishment, civilian and military, will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to assure its faithful execution.²

The 1958 Reorganization Act made many important changes in the Department of Defense.³ (See Charts 2 and 3.)

¹Gross, op. cit., p. 390.

²The New York Times, August 7, 1958, p. 3.

³See U.S., Congress, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law 599, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

Chart 2. - Department of Defense Prior to 1958 Reorganization Act





Chart 3. - Department of Defense After 1958 Reorganization Act



1. The President was authorized, with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and acting through the Secretary of Defense, to establish unified and specified combatant commands and to determine their force structure.¹ The three military departments were removed from the chain of operational command and the commanders of the combatant commands were made directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. Forces assigned to the combatant commands from the three services were placed under the full operational control of the commanders of the unified and specified commands and could be removed or transferred from these commands only by authority of the Secretary of Defense. Each military department was held responsible for the administration of the forces assigned to the combatant commands from its department. The responsibility for the support of the combatant commands was to be vested in one or more of the military departments as required. All forces not assigned to a unified or specified command were to remain for all purposes in their respective services.

Unified commands were established in combat

¹A unified command is one containing units from more than one service. A specified command contains units from only one service and is assigned a specific mission, such as the assignment of strategic air warfare to the Strategic Air Command.

theaters during World War II and have been successfully used ever since. The 1947 National Security Act gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to establish unified commands and under the 1948 Key West Agreement they were authorized to designate one of their members as the executive agent for each unified command. This authority was removed by the 1953 revision of the Key West Agreement and instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointing the executive agent, the Secretary of Defense appointed a service secretary as his executive agent for each unified command. The 1958 Act again changed the chain of command by making the unified and specified commanders directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, rather than to the service secretaries. This change thus removed the ambiguity that previously existed which at times led the services to attempt to retain control over forces from their departments assigned to unified commands.

This provision of the 1958 Reorganization Act was the most revolutionary change made in the defense establishment since the services were unified in 1947.

2. Service chiefs were permitted to delegate their authority and duties to their vice chiefs. The act specifically stated that orders issued by the vice chiefs had the same effect as those issued by the chiefs.

Although unified and specified commands were to

be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, they would be directed operationally by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the name of the Secretary of Defense. Consequently, this increased responsibility made it necessary for the chiefs to turn over most of their service duties to their vice chiefs. The service chiefs therefore made their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their primary duties. This should satisfy those critics of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system who objected to the fact that the service chiefs had dual responsibilities.

3. Each military department was required to be separately organized under its own secretary although the departments were to function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

The National Security Act of 1947 limited the Secretary of Defense to "general authority, direction, and control" over the three military departments, each of which was authorized to have its own secretary. The three service secretaries were almost as powerful as the Secretary of Defense because they were members of the National Security Council; they could take matters directly to the President or Director of the Budget if they considered it necessary; the military departments were classified as executive departments and required to be "separately administered"; and any power not assigned to

the Secretary of Defense was reserved to the service secretaries. Consequently, the strong position of the service secretaries forced the Secretary of Defense to rely on persuasion, rather than direction, to achieve his objectives.

Congress began to increase the Secretary of Defense's powers in 1949. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 removed the service secretaries from membership on the National Security Council; the word "general" was removed from the clause "general direction, authority, and control"; the provision reserving all powers to the service secretaries not specifically given the Secretary of Defense was removed; the military departments were converted from executive departments to military departments within a new Department of Defense; and the right of the service secretaries to appeal directly to the President and Director of the Budget was abolished. However, a new provision was added--service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given the right to make any recommendation they deemed proper to Congress, on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense.

In the 1958 Act, Congress changed the words "separately administered" to "separately organized," because the President felt the term "separately administered"

limited the authority of the Secretary of Defense. However, Congress insisted on including the term "separately organized" to ensure that the services would not be merged. The provision allowing the service secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go directly to Congress on their own initiative was also retained to ensure members of Congress that they would not be deprived of the expert military advice needed to exercise their constitutional prerogatives in regard to national defense.

4. Assistant secretaries of defense were forbidden to issue orders to the military departments unless the Secretary of Defense had specifically delegated the authority, in writing, with respect to a specified subject area, and the orders were issued through the service secretaries.

Prior to the passage of the 1958 Reorganization Act, assistant secretaries were assigned duties in almost every functional area in the Defense Department.¹ In exercising these duties the assistant secretaries, on many occasions, dealt directly with subordinate officials in the military departments, thus by-passing the service

¹In 1958 there were Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs; International Security Affairs; Comptroller; Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve; Supply and Logistics; Properties and Installations; Health and Medical; and Research and Engineering.

secretaries and undermining their authority. While recognizing that it was necessary for the Secretary of Defense to delegate most of his authority to assistants, Congress attempted to preserve the authority of the service secretaries and to eliminate possible misunderstandings by requiring the assistant secretaries of defense to issue authorized directives to the military departments through the service secretaries.

5. The provision which stipulated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have "no vote" at Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings was eliminated.

The 1949 Amendments, which established the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically stated that he would have "no vote" at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because Congress wanted to make sure that the Chairman would not have the authority to resolve disagreements between the service chiefs. However, at the time, Congress did not seem to realize that the chiefs did not settle their disagreements by voting--they were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense who made the final decision--which made the requirement that the Chairman have no vote meaningless.¹ Because of this, Congress removed the restriction.

¹Disagreements forwarded to the Secretary of Defense were commonly referred to as "split papers."

6. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was granted the authority to select the Director of the Joint Staff and to assign the staff its duties.

The 1953 Reorganization Plan No. 6 gave the Chairman, instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively, the authority to manage the Joint Staff. However, the Joint Chiefs continued to select the Director and members of the Joint Staff, subject to approval by the Chairman. The 1958 Reorganization Act further increased the powers of the Chairman by giving him the authority to select the Director, instead of merely approving his selection, and to assign the staff its duties. The Joint Chiefs retained their authority to select the members of the Joint Staff, subject to the approval of the Chairman.

7. The limitation on the size of the Joint Staff was increased from 210 to 400 officers. The tenure of the Director and members of the Joint Staff was limited to three years, except in time of war. Officers completing a tour of duty could not be reassigned to the Joint Staff for at least three years, except that selected officers could be reassigned with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. However, the number of officers reassigned in less than three years could not exceed thirty at any one time. The Director could not be reassigned to Joint Staff duty after serving three

years, except in time of war.

A Joint Staff, directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was first authorized by the National Security Act of 1947. The Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively appointed the Director and members of the Joint Staff and assigned the staff its duties. To ensure that it would not become an organization similar to the German General Staff, Congress specifically forbid the Joint Staff from becoming an armed forces general staff and limited it to 100 officers. To keep one service from dominating the staff, Congress stipulated that staff members must be selected equally from the three services. Finally, to prevent the Director from obtaining authority similar to that which a single chief of staff over all the armed forces would have, Congress stipulated that the Director must be junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The 1949 Amendments increased the limitation on the Joint Staff from 100 to 210 officers.

While raising the limitation on the size of the Joint Staff to 400 officers Congress again attempted, in the 1958 Reorganization Act, to prevent the staff from becoming a general staff by limiting the tenure of assigned officers to three years, which would prevent the formation of a permanent elite staff similar to the German General

Staff. Also, this restriction would provide the Joint Staff with a continual influx of new officers from the field with different perspectives and would provide the field commands with officers who possessed high level staff experience. It was necessary to increase the size of the Joint Staff because it was required to assume many additional duties relating to the unified commands which had previously been performed by staffs of the three services.

8. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was permitted to organize and operate the Joint Staff along conventional staff lines.¹

Prior to 1958, the Joint Staff was divided into three groups--a Joint Intelligence Group, a Joint Strategic Plans Group, and a Joint Logistics Plans Group. These groups were composed of officers drawn equally from the three services and assigned to the staff on a full-time basis. Above the Joint Staff were ten joint committees, three of which--the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint Logistics Plans Committee--were directly above the three groups of the Joint Staff. The joint committees were composed of

¹This meant the staff could be organized into the traditional staff sections of G-1, Personnel; G-2, Intelligence; etc.

officers drawn equally from each service but they served on these committees only part-time, that is, in addition to their other service duties. The joint committees had been established to give each service an opportunity to appraise the work of the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff made the detailed studies required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but were required to forward their staff papers to the joint committees for review before they went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If a service representative did not agree with a staff paper his objections were passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in disagreement, it was then necessary for the Secretary of Defense to make the final decision.

The President abolished the committee system prior to the passage of the 1958 Reorganization Act and consequently staff papers prepared by the newly organized Joint Staff would go directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff without the services intervening.

9. No function established by law to be performed by the Department of Defense could be transferred, re-assigned, abolished, or consolidated until thirty days after the Secretary of Defense notified the two Armed Services Committees of his intentions to make such a change. If during this thirty day period either committee

reported a resolution recommending rejection of the Secretary's proposal, the change would be forbidden for forty additional days. If during this forty day period a house passed the resolution reported by its Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense would be restrained from making the change. However, the Secretary of Defense was allowed to make any change in functions not established by law; to transfer new weapons from one service to another; and to appoint a single agency for supply or other service activities common to more than one service.

The Secretary of Defense was specifically forbidden by the 1949 Amendments to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate any combatant function established by law. The 1958 Reorganization Act modified this requirement by making it possible for the Secretary to make such a change, although one house could prevent the action simply by passing a resolution within seventy days after receiving notice of the contemplated change.

10. The President was given the authority, if he considered it necessary because of hostilities or the imminent threat of hostilities, to transfer, reassign, or consolidate, but not abolish, any function in the Department of Defense until the termination of the emergency, at which time the function would be restored to its pre-emergency status.

While the 1958 Reorganization Act was being considered by Congress, President Eisenhower strenuously objected to the provision in existing law that required the Secretary of Defense to obtain congressional approval to transfer or abolish service functions established by law. The President felt that there should be no restriction on the Secretary because, in the event of an emergency, he might need to make changes in the Department of Defense very quickly. Congress recognized this necessity but gave the President, rather than the Secretary of Defense, the authority to transfer functions during emergencies. To ensure its control over roles and missions, Congress stipulated that the functions would be restored at the end of the emergency.

11. A Director of Defense Research and Engineering was authorized who would rank immediately after the service secretaries, although drawing the same compensation, and above the assistant secretaries of defense. The Director was to be appointed from civilian life by the President and would perform such duties with respect to research and engineering as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a) He would be the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific

and technical matters.

- b) He would supervise all research and engineering activities in the Department of Defense.
- c) He would direct and control those research and engineering activities that the Secretary of Defense designated as requiring centralized management.

The position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Guided Missiles was established in 1949. This position was increased in stature and redesignated as the Director of Guided Missiles in November 1957 and the Director was given authority to supervise all guided missile programs in the Department of Defense. The positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Applications Engineering were created in 1953 as a result of Reorganization Plan No. 6 which authorized six additional assistant secretaries of defense. In 1956, these two positions were consolidated into the single position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In February 1958, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was created in the Department of Defense to supervise all military space and satellite projects. The new Director of Research and Engineering was to

supervise and control the activities of all of these Defense Department agencies.

12. The number of assistant secretaries of defense were reduced from nine to seven, although the reduction was not to become effective until six months after the date of the Reorganization Act. Rather than fix their responsibilities by law, Congress gave the Secretary of Defense authority to determine the seven assistant secretaries' area of responsibility.

Assistant secretaries of defense were first authorized by the 1949 Amendments, which authorized three. The 1953 Reorganization Plan increased this authorization to nine. Prior to the passage of the 1958 Reorganization Act, only eight of the authorizations were being utilized, which meant that only one assistant secretary would have to be eliminated.

13. The President was given the authority to transfer any commissioned officer, with his consent, from one service to another.

Although this provision applied to all officers, it was put in the 1958 Reorganization Act primarily for the benefit of officers in the technical and scientific fields. As in the case of the Jupiter IRBM, it was possible for one service to develop a missile and for another to use it operationally. In such circumstances some

officers might find it desirable to transfer from one service to another.

The 1958 Reorganization Act was the fourth major step taken in the continuous attempt to provide a greater degree of unity between the armed forces. It made the most drastic changes in the defense establishment since the services were unified in 1947 and, as a result, it should go a long way toward settling many of the problems that have confronted defense secretaries during the past eleven years.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

President Eisenhower stated at the time he signed the 1958 Reorganization Act that it would take some time to implement all the changes authorized. Furthermore, the intervention in Lebanon caused some delay in initiating the changes, but a beginning was made in August when the Joint Staff was completely reorganized. The staff was divided into the following directorates: J-1, Personnel; J-2, Intelligence; J-3, Operations; J-4, Logistics; J-5, Plans and Policy; and J-6, Communications and Electronics. Papers prepared by the Joint Staff were to go directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff without the services intervening.

On September 15, the European Command, commanded by Air Force General Lauris Norstad, became the first unified command to become directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense.¹ On December 1, the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command, a specified command under

¹General Norstad, who is also the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), has two bosses. He is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. forces in Europe and to the NATO Military Committee for allied forces in Europe.

Admiral James L. Holloway¹ and the Alaska Command, a unified command headed by Air Force Lt. General Frank A. Armstrong became directly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. The change-over was completed on January 1, 1959 when four unified commands, the Caribbean Command, headed by Army Lt. General Ridgely Gaither; the Atlantic Command, headed by Admiral Jerauld Wright;² the Pacific Command, headed by Admiral Harry D. Felt; the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), headed by Air Force General Earle E. Partridge;³ and the other specified command, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), headed by Air Force General Thomas S. Power, became directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

In his reorganization message to Congress on April 3, President Eisenhower said he felt that Congress should

¹Admiral Holloway was in command of the U.S. forces that occupied Lebanon during the summer of 1958.

²Admiral Wright, who is the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), like Norstad, has two bosses. He is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. forces in the Atlantic and to the NATO Military Committee for allied forces in the Atlantic, although no allied forces will be assigned to this command until after the outbreak of hostilities.

³General Partridge is also the Commander of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) which is a joint U.S.-Canadian Air Defense Command. CONAD is the U.S. portion of this command.

make defense appropriations to the Department of Defense rather than divide them between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the three military services. However, the President's draft bill did not contain any provisions for changing budget procedures. The President said, at the time, that he had directed the Secretary of Defense to present the 1960 defense budget to Congress in a form that would provide the flexibility needed to transfer funds between services.

On October 12, during the preliminary stages of preparing the 1960 budget, the Administration announced that it had abandoned its plans to give the Secretary of Defense wide powers to shift funds between the services.¹ It was stated that the President had decided the Secretary already had sufficient flexibility and transfer authority and that the extensive changes in budget procedures he originally advocated would not be needed. By this move, the President gave up attempts to interfere with congressional appropriation procedures.

President Eisenhower had a very difficult time finding a capable scientist to accept the important position of Director of Research and Engineering because it was likely to be a job with plenty of headaches. One of

¹See The New York Times, October 13, 1958, p. 1.

the Director's major responsibilities would be to supervise the Department of Defense's missile program and it was certain that some of his decisions would make one or more of the services unhappy, with resulting interservice disputes. In November, it was reported that the President had abandoned his plan to appoint a Director because, after an extensive search, no one of suitable stature could be found who desired the post.¹ However, on December 24, five months after Congress had authorized the position, President Eisenhower appointed Dr. Herbert F. York as Director.² At the time of his appointment, York was Chief Scientist in the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and was head of the Advanced Research Projects Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis.³

¹See The New York Times, November 3, 1958, p. 1.

²It was clear that the long search had been a fruitful one. York, although only 37 years old, had compiled an outstanding record as a scientist. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, later served there as an associate professor of physics and as an associate director of the famed Radiation Laboratory, and was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

³The Institute for Defense Analysis is a private corporation which was created in 1956 chiefly to provide research talent on contract to the government at higher salaries than the civil service structure allowed the government to pay to scientists directly. ARPA used this device as a means of getting top quality scientists who otherwise would not have been obtainable.

The new Directorate of Research and Engineering absorbed the Defense Department's Directorate of Guided Missiles and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. York did not receive a scientific budget of his own but assumed supervisory control over all of the Defense Department's \$2.5 billion research and engineering projects and the authority to overrule all other agencies and services in the Department of Defense in the space weapon and missile fields.

As a result of the 1958 Reorganization Act, the Key West Agreement was revised on January 1, 1959 although the basic missions of the three services were not altered.¹ Changes were made primarily to realign the chain of command and to spell out the additional responsibilities assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to unified commands. They were to:

1. Serve as advisers and as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to unified and specified commands and to provide a channel of communications from the President and Secretary of Defense to these commands.

¹The document was reprinted in Air Force, February, 1959, pp. 130-139.

2. Prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands.

3. Review the plans and programs of commanders of unified and specified commands to determine their adequacy for the performance of assigned missions.

4. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense the requirement for the establishment of unified and specified commands and the force structure of these commands.

5. Determine the headquarters support required by commanders of unified and specified commands and recommend the military departments to which the responsibilities for providing such support should be assigned.

Because of the greatly increased responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense directed that the duties of the service chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take precedence over all of their other duties.

The changes made in the Department of Defense since the passage of the 1958 Reorganization Act have been relatively easy and noncontroversial ones. However, it is only a matter of time before more difficult decisions will have to be made in regard to guided missiles and space

projects.¹ There are several areas where one or more problems may arise.

1. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created on July 29, 1958 to supervise the nation's non-military space projects. The Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) supervises military space projects. Conflicts between these two organizations may develop in the future as it may be difficult to determine whether a particular space project is military or civilian.²

2. Air Force leaders feel that all units that will participate in strategic bombing should be placed

¹The 1956 Memorandum issued by Secretary Wilson is still the basic guide in this area as neither the 1958 Reorganization Act nor the 1959 revision of the Key West Agreement dealt with the assignment of missiles.

²One conflict has already arisen between the Army and NASA. In October, NASA asked the Army to relinquish control over some 2,100 civilian scientists engaged in missile and space research in the Ballistic Missile Agency at the Army Ordnance Missile Command at Huntsville, Alabama. The Army strenuously resisted this attempt by NASA to take its top scientists and an open fight ensued similar to interservice disputes of the past. As a compromise, President Eisenhower, in December, allowed the Army to retain its personnel and facilities at Huntsville but ordered it to turn over its Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena, California to NASA. NASA probably will attempt to obtain other service facilities in the future as most of the facilities it needs are in the Department of Defense.

in the Strategic Air Command (SAC).¹ This would include carrier aircraft and the new submarines which will carry the Polaris 1,500-mile range IRBM. It seems certain that the Navy, judging from past performances, will attempt to block such a move.²

3. Although the Air Force is primarily responsible for defending the United States against air attack, the Army also participates in this mission. Army units are responsible for point defense, that is, defense of an immediate target area, and they are currently using the Nike-Ajax, which has a range of 25 miles, and the Nike-Hercules, which has a range of 85 miles, for this purpose. The Air Force is responsible for area defense, that is, the defense of a geographical area, and is currently using the Bomarc surface-to-air missile, which has a range of 200 miles, and manned interceptors. These two missile systems--the Nike and Bomarc--were developed

¹This was advocated by General Thomas Power, SAC Commander, in a speech to the Air Force Association in March 1958. See Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, March 8, 1958, p. 11.

²There is also a possibility of a ninth unified command being created primarily to fight limited wars. This new command will probably be composed of units from all three services--the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), the Marines, and Army's Strategic Army Command (STRAC). If this unified command is established, the Navy may finally lose control over some combat elements of the Marine Corps.

for defense against aircraft and, although there is some overlap, they are both employed in order to provide the nation with a defense in depth.¹

In the future, more highly developed surface-to-air missiles will be required for defense against attacking ICBM's. Consequently, several years ago, both the Army and the Air Force began making plans to develop an anti-missile missile. To eliminate duplication in this field, the Air Force project--the Wizard--was cancelled and the Army's proposed missile--the Nike-Zeus--was selected as the anti-missile missile because it was further along in development. However, the Air Force was authorized to develop the long-range radar which will be used in conjunction with the Zeus when both systems become operational. A decision has not yet been made as to which service will use the Zeus operationally but, although it was developed by the Army, the Zeus could be assigned to the Air Force.²

¹The purpose of a defense in depth is to subject enemy aircraft to continuous attack as they approach a target area. The first line of defense is long-range interceptors, then the Bomarc, and finally the Nikes. Therefore, the closer an enemy comes to his target, the more air defense weapons there will be employed against him. Defense in depth also has a dimension other than range. The concept embodies a variety of weapons which will force an enemy to devise very sophisticated equipment and elaborate tactics to successfully penetrate the defense system.

²For two very informative articles on this subject, see Claude Witze, "The Antimissile Muddle," Air Force, May, 1958, pp. 64-67 and "The Mix-up in Air Defense," Air Force, September, 1958, pp. 37-41.

A precedence was set for such an event when the Jupiter IRBM, which was developed by the Army, was later assigned to the Air Force for operational use. The Army will probably be exceedingly unhappy if the same thing happens again.

The problem areas enumerated above indicate that the 1958 Reorganization Act will not solve all the problems in the Department of Defense. However, no single piece of legislation has ever solved all present and future problems because the problems of national defense are never-ending. Revolutionary changes will continue to occur in the future. In many cases it will be impossible to plan for them and the only recourse is to have a defense organization that can adjust to new situations with a minimum of delay. The changes made in the Department of Defense by the 1958 Reorganization Act will go a long way toward providing such an organization.

Since the services were unified in 1947 each succeeding attempt to solve the problems in the Department of Defense has resulted in a greater degree of unification and increased authority for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 1958 Reorganization Act appears to go about as far as it is possible to go in this direction without completely merging the armed forces. If, in the future, it is felt that additional changes

are necessary, it is likely that the services will finally be completely merged into one service, with all personnel wearing the same uniform.

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