THE CITY MANAGER IN THE COMMUNITY:

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

by

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A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Political Science
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

June 1959

APPROVED:

████████████████████████████

(Adviser for the Thesis)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to thank the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration for the financial grant which enabled him to complete this study and pursue graduate work. A special debt of gratitude is owed to those residents of Springfield who gave most generously of their time and knowledge of the community.

Dr. Vincent Ostrom, now at the University of California at Los Angeles, introduced the writer to the topic and supervised much of the writer's work. Dr. Ostrom's insights, imagination, and constructive criticism were invaluable.

The burden of the supervision of this study was assumed by Professor E. S. Wengert shortly prior to its completion. Any merit which the study might have was enhanced by Professor Wengert's stylistic suggestions and recommendations for structural revisions.

Finally, the advice given by Dr. John M. Foskett, sociology, and Dr. Forrest R. Pitts, geography, is acknowledged with the writer's appreciation.

The burden of responsibility for the study cannot be shared, however. This must be assumed, as always, by the writer.

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND ORIENTATION

Introduction

A mass of literature has accumulated in the field of municipal

administration and politics. Critics have pointed out, however, that

the state of knowledge in the general area of municipal government falls

short of the minimal requirements for a systematic political science. The

literature is growing in volume, but little of it rises above the level of

specialized reporting and into the general stream of the discipline. Con-

ceptual construction and empirical research is rare.[1]

> ...the literature of municipal government is studded
> with an array of facts that have been gathered with
> little regard for the construction of general theories;
> and, at the same time, it is beset with theories that
> have been advanced without ever being checked against
> available empirical data.[2]

The criticism raised above was directed to the general level of

the research and publications in the broad field of municipal government.

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[1]For two recent articles commenting upon the literature of munici-
pal government, and the quality thereof, see Lawrence J. R. Herson,
"The Lost World of Municipal Government," American Political Science
Review, LI, no. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 313-329; and R. T. Daland, "Political
Science and the Study of Urbanism," American Political Science Review, LI,
no. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 491-500.

[2]Herson, "Lost World," p. 330.

Critics generally agree that it is also applicable to the more specific

topic of city manager government. There would seem to be evidence to

indicate, however, that there exists a growing awareness of insufficien-

cies in our knowledge of manager government.[3] In this regard Richards

has pointed out that

> Students and practitioners of local government tend to
> become victims of their own traditions, to be dominated
> by their habit patterns. They become blinded by their
> own "truths" and their own environs.[4]

This blindness leads to the formulation of conclusions based largely on

abstract reasoning. An example of these conclusions, and cited by

Richards as an assumption that bears re-evaluation, is that the council-

manager plan is the "best" form of government for most cities. This

assumption deserves

> ...scientific empirical testing--and by a broader measure
> than that of saving pennies. Laws formally structuring
> the organization of government and India-inked black lines
> and boxes on white organization charts do not make all
> communities alike. The imposition of predetermined legal
> forms--however logical or reasonable in the abstract--may
> do a community more harm than good. Preoccupation with
> governmental form, rather than community substance,
> colors much research and affects its results. Organizational

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[3]See "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager
Government" in "Research in Political Behavior," American Political
Science Review, XLVI, no. 4 (December, 1952), pp. 1009-1015.

[4]Allan R. Richards, "Local Government Research: A Partial
Evaluation," Public Administration Review, XIV, no. 4 (Autumn, 1954),
p. 274.

changes may save pennies, but they may also disrupt
the social structure, threaten the existence of groups...
Changes in forms of governments may well be evaluated
by criteria other than "economy and efficiency"...[5]

Lawrence J. R. Herson, whose article "The Lost World of Munici-
pal Government" is a serious indictment of municipal government text-
books, makes a similar point.[6] In analyzing the content of the texts
Herson outlines a series of structural reforms which he continually
finds suggested; among these is the manager plan.

And thus, the textbook comes at last to the form of
government that epitomizes proper administrative theory,
the city manager form of government. In this form there
is encapsulated all that is proper for city government,
and in a representative outpouring of praise, one text-
book writes: "The council-manager plan of government
is the best plan yet devised."[7]

Numerous articles dealing with aspects of manager government
are to be found in Public Management, The American City, National

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[5]Ibid., p. 274.

[6]Herson indicts most of the existing texts on the following grounds:
texts should constitute the wellsprings of any stream of political science,
for they serve not only to summarize the current state of the literature,
but also to orient and guide the work of future contributors to it. "A body
of literature depends on its sources, and when these sources serve notice
that basic problems have been solved, that principles of correct action
have been discovered, then the need for further research seems to pass
away, and the activities of students in the field are diverted into the
making of plans and strategies for putting those "principles" into play.
In short, it may be that the textbooks of municipal government consti-
tute not so much wellsprings as barriers to the production of systematic
research..." Herson, "Lost World," p. 331.

[7]Ibid., p. 337.

Municipal Review, and the many other publications sponsored by leagues of cities and research bureaus. It would be only correct to say, however, that Herson's criticism of textbooks seems applicable to most of this material. The large majority of the articles are written by managers or ardent advocates of the manager plan. Usually they are extremely hortatory in nature and a lack of critical thinking about manager government is quite evident. And, as is perhaps usual in journals which sprung from a reaction to corruption in government, the politician receives perhaps more than his deserved share of criticism; much of it, in the writer's opinion, being rather naive. Conceptual construction and empirical research is rarely found in such publications.[8]

The only major research effort which has been conducted in regard to city manager government was that undertaken in 1937, sponsored by the Committee of Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, relating to the "...results and practical operation of the city manager plan of municipal government."[9] Monographic reports were

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[8]"Previous studies of the manager plan have...been excellent examinations of the operations of government or of the structure of local administration, but most publications have been strongly hortatory... But what is more generally needed is a systematic study that will build upon the administrative studies that have been prepared. In other words, what is needed is a study that will conceive of local public administration in broader terms." "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government," p. 1011.

[9]Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, City Manager Government in the United States: A Review After Twenty-Five Years (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 5.

prepared for numerous cities, some of which were later published under

the titles City Manager Government in Seven Cities[10] and City Manager

Government in Nine Cities.[11] Stone, Price, and Stone, the project

leaders, then published City Manager Government in the United States:

A Review After Twenty-Five Years. This volume is a summary of "...the

principal results of the city manager plan in forty-eight cities that are

operating under it and in two cities that have abandoned it."[12] The

foreword states that

> The purpose of this study was to make a review and
> appraisal of the effects of the introduction of a new
> form of government.[13]

The authors were faced, however, with the problem of selecting criteria

by which the comparative success or failure of manager government could

be appraised. Finally,

> ...after careful consideration...it was decided to
> eschew statistical comparisons as the chief measure
> of the success or failure of manager government in terms
> of efficiency. Instead, the staff undertook to judge the
> effect of the change to manager government on municipal

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[10] Frederick C. Mosher, et al., City Manager Government in
Seven Cities: Case Studies (Chicago: Public Administration Service,
1940).

[11] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, City
Manager Government in Nine Cities: Case Studies (Chicago: Public
Administration Service, 1940).

[12] Stone, Price, and Stone, City Manager Government in the
United States, pp. 5-6.

[13] Ibid., p. 6.

administration by examining the administrative methods used by the government before and after the change....An analysis of these administrative methods gives some clue to the relative efficiency and performance of the old and new forms of government within a city.[14]

One of the two major sections of City Manager Government in the United States is devoted, as the above quotation suggests, to administration. The other concerns what the authors call "political responsibility." In this latter section, perhaps even more than when discussing administration, the authors had great difficulty in selecting criteria by which to make any generalizations concerning the effect of manager government. Thus, in the foreword it is stated:

The material dealt with in Part III--political responsibility-- lends itself even less to statistical treatment....Accordingly, in its visits--which lasted from three days to a month--the staff undertook to determine what questions were significant in each city, to collect information about those questions, and to set it forth in its historical background.[15]

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[14] Ibid., p. 8.

[15] Ibid. It should be noted at this point that Herson, in commenting upon the evidence cited by textbooks to substantiate the assertion that city manager government is the "best" form of local government, reports that the Stone, Price, and Stone volume is usually mentioned as lending credence to the assertion. Herson, in speaking of City Manager Government, says, "The Stone book, in fact, states in its introduction that its authors were unable to formulate any standards or tests of managerial achievement and therefore confines itself to a cataloging of the procedural and structural changes that accompanied the introduction of the manager form in each of the cities listed. Reduced to its logical dimensions, this means simply that the manager form has introduced into certain cities the manager form of government." Herson, "Lost World," p. 340.

In the final chapter of <u>City Manager Government in the United
States</u>, Stone, Price, and Stone set forth certain conclusions of the
fifty city-study. Among them are the following:[16]

1. "The adoption of the city manager plan was advocated by
    groups, either within or without the existing governing body,
    that wanted to get the city government to devote itself more
    effectively to accomplishing its purpose or to broaden the
    scope of its functions."

2. "By comparison with the preceding forms of government the
    city manager plan brought a diminution of partisan or factional
    influence over the government."

3. "The city managers improved the organizations left them by
    the preceding forms of government. They brought to their
    jobs a scientific, or at least a business-like, attitude and
    brought about far more coordination in their governments
    than had existed before."

4. "The establishment of the manager plan increased the prestige
    of the council and improved the status of expert administration
    in municipal government. It brought about a greater degree of
    separation between politics and administration, while in-
    creasing the control of the elected governing body over all
    aspects of municipal affairs."

5. "The adoption of the city manager plan generally led the munici-
    pal government to become an institution with a broader and more
    vital function in the community."

6. "The form of government under the city manager plan, of course,
    had to be supported by leaders who could command the confidence
    of the voters. The effect of the new plan depended upon the
    personalities and the ideals of the leaders who devoted their

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[16]The following conclusions were abstracted from <u>City Manager
Government in the United States</u>, pp. 258-261. The writer felt it un-
necessary to give footnote citations for each quotation.

energies to the city manager movement."

7.   "The ideals of the city manager movement were instantly accepted in the cities that were ready for them and distorted or abused wherever they were in conflict with local political traditions. But nearly everywhere they added to the prestige of city government, lessened its preoccupation with trivial details or factional interests, and increased its ability to render service to the public."

After reading the books and articles of the adherents of the manager plan, such as Stone, Price, and Stone, this writer is always most impressed with the easy and sweeping generalization and the uncritical acceptance of manager government. Too often the findings resemble the arguments advanced by the manager movement. This is the writer's impression of the findings, for example, of the Stone, Price, and Stone research.

Such an assessment is also provided by one of the project papers of the 1951 Social Science Research Council's Inter-University Summer Seminar on Political Behavior. Of the several papers dealing with what the participants considered to be needed research projects in political science, one was published under the title "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government."[17] The paper points out that our knowledge of the effect of the introduction of

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[17] "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government," _American Political Science Review_, pp. 1009-1015.

the manager plan is scanty in terms of empirical data. Rather than

offering proof,

> Political scientists have...tended to assume rather
> than to prove that the formal structure of government
> affects political behavior.[18]

> The assumption of this research plan is that the
> systematic observation of individuals and groups over
> a period of time in sample cities should give answers
> to the questions posed which would be more reliable
> than the off-the-cuff assertions that are commonplace.[19]

The research paper then suggests the building up a body of data

on the political effects of the manager plan by selecting a sample of

cities, studying the political and social structure and history of each

city, and determining citizen attitudes and knowledge of politics.

> The research plan here proposed should, first, give
> us new data and new insights into the process of politics
> under conditions of structural change...[20]

> Thousands of people are devoting major portions of their
> lives to promoting, opposing, or operating manager
> government; hundreds of thousands of dollars are being
> spent every year in campaigns; millions are spent by
> manager cities. No really satisfactory evidence is
> available to indicate whether all of this time and money
> is really being spent effectively from the points of view
> of proponents and opponents of the plan or from that of
> the managers themselves. Since the manager plan is

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 1010.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 1011-1012.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 1014.

spreading, there must exist an impressionistic attitude
that it is compatible with the values of popular govern-
ment, but it may actually be impairing them.[21]

Purpose

This thesis cannot approach the magnitude of the research project
suggested in the preceeding several paragraphs. A more manageable,
problem, and seemingly a necessary step leading to a more critical
examination of city manager government, will be set forth here, however.

The starting point of this study is the writer's surmise that the
doctrines and concepts of the International City Managers' Association
do not serve as an adequate or realistic tool, or model, by which the
behavior or activities of city managers can be analyzed or understood.
Before presenting what might be termed the occupation's self-conception,
or its public image, in Chapter IV, two narratives of a community's ex-
perience with city manager government will be related. The first
narrative describes several conflict situations involving the adoption
of the manager plan and the hiring and dismissal of several managers.
The second narrative directs attention to the process of policy formation
in the community. In this narrative annexation serves as the specific
policy question in which two city managers in the same community were

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[21] Ibid.

involved. In Chapter V the writer will present material which can be used as the basis for a more realistic analysis of manager government. Material from public administration and sociology will be used in this critique of the public image of city manager government. The two narratives, stressing conflict and the process of policy formation, will be used as the "anchor" for the more theoretical material. Finally, in the last chapter of the study, the writer will summarize the material which has been set forth, and make more explicit some critical thoughts about the possible results of manager government.

The Approach

This study is viewed by the writer as an exploratory venture.[22] As such, no hypotheses will be explicitly propounded and then tested in the body of the study. An exploratory or formulative study seems called for when an examination of the literature reveals insufficient research or knowledge in the general topical area to advance any

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[22] Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook have presented a tentative typology of research studies which are classified on the basis of major intent: experimental studies having the function of testing hypotheses; descriptive or diagnostic studies having the function of assessing the characteristics of a given situation; and, formulative or exploratory studies whose prime purpose is the formulation of a problem for more precise investigation, or the development of hypotheses, or the establishment of priorities for further research. See Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, Part One: Basic Processes (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951), pp. 28-47.

precise hypotheses for investigation. Undoubtedly there exists some

feeling that a study which begins with hypotheses is more "scientific"

than one which seeks to end with them; yet, as Jahoda, Deutsch, and

Cook have written:

> It goes without saying that the establishment and veri-
> fication of hypotheses remains a goal of scientific in-
> quiry. Yet there is no short cut to this goal. In many
> areas of social relations significant hypotheses do not
> exist. Much exploratory research, therefore, must be
> done before hypotheses can be established. Exploratory
> work not based on precise hypotheses is an inevitable
> step toward scientific progress.[23]

When working in relatively unformulated areas, Jahoda, Deutsch,

and Cook suggest that the case study approach is a proper tool for

research. They view the case method as a means of stimulating insights

into relationships between variables and as a method of suggesting

hypotheses for future research. The case study method does not seem

to be a method applicable to the testing of hypotheses:

> ...when the purpose is to test hypotheses, the case
> study approach is likely to be inappropriate unless
> the cases selected for study represent an adequate
> sample and unless the methods used in collecting and
> interpreting the data are sufficiently standardized to
> permit the comparison of cases...[24]

Vincent Ostrom has also commented upon the difficulty mentioned above.

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[23] Ibid., p. 24.

[24] Ibid., p. 43.

The value of the case method in generating theoretical
explanations is offset by the difficulty of using cases
as tests of hypotheses. Does the explanation apply
only to the single case or does it apply to the phenomenon
in general of which the one case is only a single instance?
This problem emphasizes the importance of quantity and
variety in case studies used for research purposes.[25]

A case study is conceived of as an extended description of the

processes involved in the making of decisions or of policy formation.

The case study seeks to record the complex of activities of official and

unofficial participants as they deal with problems or policy matters.[26]

The case is usually marked by the abundance of information provided

and the large number of inter-acting variables. The major significance,

perhaps, of the case study approach is that it makes apparent that

"...decision-making in public administration is many things but above

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[25] Vincent Ostrom, Some Reflections on the Use of Case Studies
in Teaching and Research (University of Oregon: mimeographed, February,
1957) paper presented to the Western Political Science Association, p. 10.

[26] Harold Stein has written: "A public administration case...is a
narrative of the events that constitute or lead to a decision or a group of
related decisions by a public administrator or group of public admini-
strators. Some account is given of the personal, legal, institutional,
political, economic, and other factors that surrounded the process of
decision, but there is no attempt to assert absolute causal relationships.
Psychological speculation is avoided, though repetitive patterns of
behavior are cited... While background and aftermath may be briefly
summarized, the main detailed account is confined to a restricted time
period... The decision problems selected for treatment involve policy
rather than technical issues." Stein, editor, Public Administration and
Policy Development: A Case Book (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1952), p. 27.

all a human enterprise, full of the problems and promises that attend every human endeavor."[27] On the other hand, the case method allows the participants to be placed in the complex institutional and legal setting of government.

Strictly speaking, perhaps, the above discussion of the usefulness in an exploratory study of the case study method is not wholly applicable for the material presented in the following two chapters may not meet all of the criteria of "case studies." A distinction between a case study and a "narrative" is probably not sufficient to alter the conclusions about the value of the study of a limited set of events for theoretical purposes. The narrative can also serve in an exploratory study to suggest insights and hypotheses, and as a method of giving reality to theoretical constructs.

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[27] Egbert S. Wengert, "Case Studies in Public Administration: 1. An Introductory Note," Philippine Journal of Public Administration I (April, 1957), p. 102.

CHAPTER II

CONTROVERSY IN SPRINGFIELD: THE MANAGER PLAN

Introduction

The environment in which the participants in this and the narrative found in the next chapter operate is a Pacific Northwest city of approximately 13,000 population. The city, which can be characterized as a workingman's community located in an urban area of approximately 65,000 population, adopted the city manager form of municipal government in 1947. In the following eight years the city of Springfield, Oregon experienced almost a continuous series of crises involving elements of the city government. These crises were marked by the dismissal of city managers; the firing and large-scale resignation of municipal employees; an election intended to end the manager plan; and, threatened and actual recall elections. In mid-1955, following the recall of two city councilmen, Springfield's sixth city manager was selected. Since that time the community and its municipal administration appear to have been stabilized. Obviously, controversies and heated election activities have occurred since 1955, but "realistic social conflict"[1] involving the

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[1] "Realistic social conflict" is here defined as the conflict arising from conflicting claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which

incumbent manager and the general concept of managerial government

has apparently been lacking, or at least has slipped below the level of

common community awareness.

Frequently the literature of the manager movement neglects to

direct attention to conflict involving the manager, unless the plan is

abolished in the community. Probably abolishment is the rare happening,

while community involvement in controversy is more frequent. The

purpose of this chapter is to present a body of material which has as

the focus of attention community conflict involving the city manager.

Drawing upon Springfield's experiences with the manager plan it will

then be possible to examine the conflict situation in the light of the

doctrines and concepts of the International City Managers' Association,

and then to present a different interpretation.

An attempt has been made by the writer to refrain in this narrative

from passing judgment on the goodness or badness, truth or untruth of

the participants' acts or words.

The sources of the material presented in this and the next chapter

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the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their
rivals. See Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 49-54. Nonrealistic conflicts are
"... not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the
need for tension release by at least one of them. In this case the choice
of antagonists depends on determinants not directly related to a con-
tentious issue and not oriented toward the attainment of specific results."
Coser, p. 49.

are varied: newspaper accounts, public documents, observation of meetings by the writer, interviews. When drawing on material available to the public the writer has felt no compulsion to refrain from attributing statements to particular actors. On the other hand, statements expressed by participants during private interviews have not been quoted directly and the writer has exercised his own judgment in utilizing the material and information which came to this attention.[2]

Adoption of the Manager Plan

In late February, 1946, following a meeting with Herman Kehrli, Director of the Bureau of Municipal Research, Mayor Claude Gerlach and the Springfield council's judiciary committee decided to study the city manager form of municipal government. Kehrli was called to the meeting to describe the workings of manager government and to relate to the committee the experiences of other Oregon municipalities using this form of local government. Following a study trip to four Willamette Valley towns operating under the manager plan the committee and Mayor Gerlach,

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[2] All interviewees were promised anonymity. Consequently the individuals who supplied particular items of information have not been specifically identified. In some community studies it has been felt necessary to utilize pseudonyms. The writer has an ill-defined antagonism to this procedure. Should an "outsider" consult the study the names, whether real or given by the writer, will be of little consequence. Should an "insider" read it, very little insight would be required to translate pseudonyms into actual names. No rule concerning the writer's usage of information gathered by interview can be set forth. The writer simply relied on impressions and a "feel" for what would be proper.

who was the executive in a "weak" mayor-council government, stated that they had been impressed by the evident efficiency of the manager towns and governments. The towns which were visited all had managers who were civil engineers and who did the city's engineering work as well as managing. Gerlach and the committee reported later to the council that Springfield could use the same system with little extra cost to the taxpayers. Springfield's municipal engineering, at this time, was done on a per hour basis by licensed engineers living in the vicinity. The managers in the other communities, according to Gerlach and the committee, had all worked for several councils and did not seem to be the targets of political campaigns, but rather were a means of carrying out a continuous plan of development over a period of years.

The council adopted the committee's report and the city attorney was instructed to draw up a tentative charter amendment to be submitted to the council. Press support for manager government came from the Springfield News which editorially stated that the plan deserved consideration. The editorial pointed out that Springfield was growing rapidly; that a multitude of problems arose daily which demanded rapid decision; and that a part-time council and mayor, however conscientious, were simply unable to cope with all of the city business. The editorial also maintained that the manager would be expected to do the city's

engineering and that added costs to the city would be negligible.[3]

The charter amendment as finally unanimously adopted by the city council did not prescribe a "pure" city manager form insofar as the city manager, though given the authority to appoint department heads, had to seek council ratification for such appointments. The amendment did, however, call for the consolidation of the elective offices of city recorder and city treasurer, and the making of the recorder-treasurer office appointive by the manager with council ratification. The city council continued to be most concerned with the engineering aspects of city management: the amendment set up a method of using engineering fees on local improvement work as part of the manager's salary.

Approximately two weeks prior to the election, the Springfield News again editorially supported the proposed charter amendment:

> We believe the city manager form of government...would be an improvement over the old councilmanic form now in use... We think the plan deserves a try. How well it will operate will depend largely on the expertness of the city manager selected.[4]

A week before the election Mayor Gerlach made an appeal to the voters to approve the charter amendment. The rapid city growth (Springfield's

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[3]Springfield News, March 14, 1946.

[4]Ibid., May 2, 1946.

population in 1940 was approximately 3800, and in 1946 it was estimated

to be 6800) and the consequent demands for city services were cited as

major causal factors in the submission of the manager plan to the elector-

ate. Gerlach pointed out the manager would not be a dictator, and that

he could be removed at any time by the council. The manager plan was

also characterized by Gerlach as sure to install "business" practices

in city government. Mayor Gerlach continued to stress that the city

manager would also serve as engineer: "It is the plan of the council

to hire a civil engineer as manager..."[5] and "The city manager would

be expected to do the engineering work on the usual improvements..."[6]

On May 17, 1946, the Springfield electorate turned down the

charter amendment by a vote of 207 to 214. It is noteworthy, perhaps,

that the voters also rejected the city budget at this same election. The

budget, which exceeded the six per cent limitation,[7] called for the

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[5]Ibid., May 9, 1946.

[6]Ibid.

[7]While Article XI, Section 2, of the Oregon constitution, as
adopted in 1910, provides constitutional home rule, Section 11 of the
same article prohibits taxing units, including municipalities, from
exceeding their tax base without seeking electoral approval. The
Constitution thus states: "Unless specifically authorized by a majority
of the legal voters voting upon the question, no taxing unit...shall in
any year so exercise that power as to raise a greater amount of revenue
for purposes other than the payment of bonded indebtedness and interest
thereon than its tax base, as hereinafter defined. The tax base of each

employment by the city of two additional firemen and policemen, and was defeated by a vote of 191 to 243. The similarity in the manager and budget votes indicates, perhaps, that the opposition to the manager plan and to the increased city budget was relatively identical in composition. With available data this is obviously only a supposition, but it is not unreasonable in the light of comparative information.[8]

Ward	Manager Amendment		City Budget	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
1	35	42	35	45
2	28	37	26	40
3	73	37	66	44
4	17	23	19	28
5	29	49	27	52
6	25	26	18	34
Totals	207	214	191	243

On August 12, 1946, the city council again took action to place the identical charter amendment before the electorate. At the November

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said taxing unit for any given year shall be: (a) The total amount of tax lawfully levied by it in any of the three years immediately preceeding... plus six percentum of said total amount; or, (b) an amount approved by a majority of the legal voters voting upon the question of establishing a tax base." Article XI, Section 11.

[8] Stene and Floro found that opposition to the introduction of the manager plan came partially from people who "...retained an individualistic desire to take care of their own needs and let their neighbors do the same." Both new programs of municipal services and "high salaried city officials" were opposed by this element in the community. See Edwin O. Stene and George K. Floro, Abandonments of the Manager Plan: A Study of Four Small Cities (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Publications, 1953), p. 93.

general election the manager amendment was adopted 746 to 553. The
vote by ward was as follows:

Ward	Manager Amendment	
	Yes	No
1	138	88
2	97	78
3	204	95
4	73	72
5	143	115
6	91	105
Totals	746	553

Manager Cloyes

Early in January, 1947, the Springfield city council called for
applications for the manager position. Advertisements were placed in
several journals of municipal government interest and the International
City Managers' newsletter. Applicants were informed that the approxi-
mate starting salary was $5500, and that only licensed engineers need
apply. Approximately three weeks before the manager plan was to go
into operation on July 1, 1947, the council chose W. J. Cloyes as the
city's first manager. Cloyes, who was 41 years of age, had been the
chief sanitarian of Lane County since 1940, and was a civil engineer
trained at the state college. Before relating the events which led to
Cloyes' dismissal some additional background material should be
provided.

Late in January, 1947, the Springfield council received a petition signed by every employee in the street, police, fire, building, and recorder's departments asking for a twenty dollar per month salary increase. Already faced with the possibility of a deficit budget for fiscal year 1947-48, the city council decided in mid-February to pass an ordinance licensing punch boards, pinball machines, and juke boxes. The council stated that the expected revenue would meet the expected budget deficit. Thus, when the city council met with its appointed budget committee in April and May to plan the budget, expected revenues from the licenses were included as sources of city revenue.

In late July, having been in office for less than a month, Manager Cloyes announced that the city departments were to be reorganized. His first move was to place the street and building departments under a city engineer. Cloyes announced that the city would employ a full time engineer rather than hiring one by the job as had been previous practice. These changes, he stated, were being made to secure more effective use of personnel and to centralize authority. Immediately there were repercussions in the community from those who remembered the election publicity given to the proposal that the city manager would also serve as city engineer. A petition was reported to have been in circulation asking that the reorganization and the employment of an engineer not take place. In defense of his reorganization, Cloyes maintained that

a full time engineer would actually result in a saving to the taxpayer and in increased services for the city and property owners.

Another incident occurred in late August, 1947, which placed Manager Cloyes in a rather unenviable position, although it should be remembered that he had no role in the events which led to the situation. The district attorney of Lane County ruled that pinball machines and punch boards were illegal, hence the city of Springfield could not license these devices nor collect revenue. Since July 1, 1947, these devices had furnished the city with approximately $6500 in the form of license revenues, and it had been expected, by the council and the lay budget committee, that approximately $15,000 would accrue to the city in the fiscal year. At this point it should be remembered that the city's budget was not drawn up by the manager. The budget was prepared in the spring of 1947, and Cloyes took office at the beginning of the fiscal year. After the district attorney's opinion became known Cloyes, at the direction of the council, dropped one employee from the fire, police, and street departments in order to stay within the budget limits.

Another controversy became known in late October when four firemen, the city's entire paid force, informed the fire chief that they would resign on October 31, unless the city hired an additional fireman. Manager Cloyes replied that if the threatened resignation was not promptly withdrawn four new firemen would be employed. Councilman

John Boeshans informed Manager Cloyes that he would resign if the city did not stay within the budget for the remainder of the fiscal year. Manager Cloyes informed the council that he would not employ another fireman, and that the reason for the separation from employment of a fireman during the previous month had been due to the legal opinion banning the gambling devices. The first immediate result of this controversy was the resignation of the four petitioning firemen and the hiring of replacements by the manager. The affair was not settled, however. During the month of November a local contractor circulated a petition asking that the council require the manager to hire an extra fireman whose salary would be met by a reduction in the police force. On November 24, the petitions were presented to the council and at that time it became publicly known that the council had unanimously given the manager approval to dismiss the firemen should they not withdraw their letter. In addressing the petitioners Councilman Carl Lewis stated that "...no one here is unwilling to put on another man when finances permit it."[9] He added that it was hoped that the next budget would provide the necessary funds; then the matter was thrown directly into the lap of the manager by Lewis when he stated that the council had employed a manager to consolidate departments for more

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[9] Ibid., November 24, 1947.

efficiency and that the affair should be worked out to everyone's satis-

faction by Cloyes.

In mid-December, 1947, another storm of controversy hovered

over Springfield and its city manager. Kenneth R. Gile, who had been

elected city recorder in 1944, and who was, in 1947, serving in the

combined capacity of city recorder-treasurer as specified by the manager

charter amendment, resigned in what was described as a heated closed

session of the city council. Gile's resignation, the tenth in city

government since November 1, was due to the fact that the city council

had not supported him sufficiently when he refused, as city recorder-

treasurer, to accept for the city certain funds which he maintained were

from gambling sources. Gile asserted that Manager Cloyes had ordered

him to accept a twenty per cent "cut" from certain card games which

were illegally being conducted in Springfield amusement centers. Gile

stated after the council session that he had refused to have a part in

accepting gambling profits for the city treasury when the city ordinances

specifically prohibited such gambling. He also charged that "...because

of unsatisfactory management of the city government I have been left no

alternative but to resign my position."[10] The Springfield News' account

of the closed council meeting reported that Gile stated afterward that

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[10] Ibid., December 11, 1947.

> If the city council had backed me up before I submitted my resignation by saying I was right in refusing to accept money on behalf of the city from gambling, I would not have resigned. [11]

The News also quoted a statement made by Councilman Boeshans after the executive session to the effect that after Gile resigned and had left the meeting the council "instructed the manager that there would be no gambling in the city." [12] Two days after Gile's resignation the council held another closed meeting following which Mayor Claude Gerlach, in support of Manager Cloyes, stated that numerous resignations by city employees was not unusual when a city changed its governmental structure. He added that "It is positively not the obligation of the manager to form his policies to agree with the city employees..." [13] Mayor Gerlach also cautioned the community to read the charter amendment which had created the manager plan, and to rely on the council to handle the matter and discount rumors. He pointed out that the manager was responsible to the council alone, and that

> ...it is the problem of the council...to consider and weigh all his mistakes in the light of the truth and not street corner gossip, or a story that has been initiated by some individual who has been

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

required to pay a just bill that he might owe the city....[14]

Manager Cloyes remained publicly silent for a week. At the following council meeting, however, a letter was received from the Springfield Ministerial Association which, by its content, seemed to assume the validity of Gile's charge that Cloyes had directed him to accept gambling percentages which were to be added to the city treasury. The letter stated that the association would

...strongly oppose by every legitimate means, the use of gambling in any form as a source of revenue for the city.[15]

At this council meeting Cloyes, although not answering the gambling charge, directed the council's attention to the difficult situation in which he had been placed. He pointed out that he had assumed office after the fiscal year budget had been drawn and approved. The council and the appointed budget committee, not the city manager, had included in the budget anticipated revenue from the licensing of certain amusement or gambling devices. Subsequently the county's district attorney ruled these devices illegal, and the council had directed the manager to discharge several employees. Following the dismissals the city's

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[14] Ibid. The News' remark about the payment of bills referred to the fact that the manager had taken steps to collect delinquent property taxes due the city totaling approximately $30,000. The manager was eventually able to collect eighty-five per cent of the due taxes.

[15] Ibid., December 18, 1947.

fire department resigned en masse when another fireman was not hired at their demand.

On Wednesday, December 17, 1947, the Springfield city council held a special meeting to deal with some rather routine, but pressing, city business. During the meeting Councilman Boeshans initiated a discussion of the city manager and the resignation of Gile. Boeshans eventually moved that Manager Cloyes be fired; he stated that the council was receiving bad publicity and that more city employees would resign unless Cloyes was dismissed. Councilman Fred Konschot, a supporter of manager government and Cloyes, then asked that this matter not be considered. Konschot added that he had been asked by a group of Main Street business men to deter any such action until a petition supporting Cloyes could be presented to the council. It was at this point that Councilman John Ashworth intervened and stated that the actual differences in the council were due to Cloyes' acceptance of "gambling money" on behalf of the city. Cloyes protested that he did not know that gambling was going on in Springfield; Ashworth moved again that Manager Cloyes be dismissed. Mayor Gerlach, after consulting the city attorney, ruled the motion out-of-order, insofar as this was a special meeting and nothing could be voted upon except those matters formally listed on the agenda.

A few days following the special meeting of the council Manager

Cloyes addressed an open letter to Springfield in which he denied that he had directed Gile to credit gambling funds to the city treasury. In fact, he pointed out that in two directives, on August 25 and December 8, he had ordered the police department to

> ...prevent and eliminate all gambling of any nature in Springfield and the department has rigidly enforced this order to the best of their ability. [16]

At a council meeting held shortly before the end of December, Springfield's first city manager resigned with a blast at the city council. He declared that he had made determined efforts to secure harmony and cooperation in the face of innumerable difficulties. Cloyes urged the city councilmen to take time to read the city charter, and he concluded:

> Both the council members and the city manager should adhere to the letter and spirit of the charter amendment. [17]

At the council meeting at which Cloyes resigned, Kenneth Gile, whose resignation as city recorder-treasurer had left an unfilled position in city government, stated:

> In view of the fact that the common council...have made it clear that they do not sanction the form of government that apparently existed at the meeting of December 8, 1947, at which time I submitted my resignation...and as a majority

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[16] Ibid., December 25, 1947.

[17] Ibid., January 1, 1948. See Appendix A for the manager charter amendment.

of the council and many citizens of the city have asked me to withdraw my resignation I would like to be considered an applicant for the position.[18]

Gile was unanimously reappointed as Springfield recorder-treasurer. One councilman was absent, and Councilman Konschot, a supporter of Cloyes, stepped into the corridor at the time the vote was taken.

At the next meeting of the council, at which time notices of the manager vacancy were submitted to several municipal government journals, approximately twenty-five Springfield businessmen appeared and submitted a petition signed by ninety others, primarily Main Street men, which said:

We consider the city manager form of government to be successful and necessary. We further believe that any city manager should be given a fair and sufficient opportunity to prove his worth.[19]

On March 18, 1948 the Springfield News commented upon the difficulty the council had encountered in their search for a successor to Manager Cloyes:

...we understand that the response to advertisements sent out has not been very impressive. Apparently the city manager post here is not being sought after by any considerable number of qualified men. This is really not surprising since it stands to reason that any man considering the job here would have informed

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., January 15, 1948.

himself of what had gone before. And what went before wasn't the kind of thing to invite keen competition for the job.[20]

Manager Cheatham

In late April, however, the council selected a new city manager, Fred Cheatham. Cheatham, who was 29 years old, had been appointed by Manager Cloyes as the first city engineer under the reorganization program. Cheatham, like his predecessor, held a degree in civil engineering, and this was his first managerial position. On May 6, the Springfield News said:

We've heard nothing but commendation for the city council this week on its selection of Fred Cheatham as city manager... In a community growing as rapidly as this one it is unquestionably true that many--if not most--of the matters to be handled by a city manager are engineering problems....A city manager trained in the science of engineering can and will be valuable.[21]

Manager Cheatham's career in Springfield was uneventful until the November general elections, at which time a successor to Mayor Claude Gerlach was elected. During the mayorality election campaign candidate W. N. Dow charged that his opponent B. P. Larson, the eventual winner,

...has had no actual experience with these problems [water supply, sewage and sanitary systems, power supply]; he

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[20] Ibid., March 18, 1948.

[21] Ibid., May 6, 1948.

has been preoccuppied with his own affairs. But as a candidate for mayor he is publishing some remarkable promises. He promises to "expand water distribution systems," "provide abundant power at reduced rates," "increase fire protection by training of personnel," and "reduce the present tax rate on property."[22]

Manager Cheatham probably dismissed these charges as "politics," but as he was soon to find out, Mayor Larson was true to Dow's words. In January, 1949, soon after taking office, Mayor Larson read a prepared speech to the city council in which he declared that more efficiency was needed in the city departments. The Eugene Register-Guard's coverage of the speech stated:

The mayor...said capable city officials should be found who could organize an efficient department that would not only perform in an excellent manner but also would save the taxpayer money.[23]

Mayor Larson also specifically pointed out in the council speech that the

police department should be headed by a man trained and quali-fied to organize a department more efficiently.

The fire department should be headed by a man trained and qualified to train his men to work more efficiently.

The street department should be headed by a man that could give the city more for their tax dollar in the maintaining of the streets which are in a deplorable condition.[24]

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[22]Eugene Register-Guard, November 1, 1948.

[23]Ibid., January 11, 1949.

[24]Springfield News, January 13, 1949.

In other words, Mayor Larson made it apparent in the speech to the council that he was interested in the hiring of new personnel to head the various city departments. He made these recommendations without consultation with City Manager Cheatham. That Mayor Larson was to be at least partially successful in his desire for new department heads was made apparent in mid-February when Fire Chief Harry Melson "resigned." Then Cheatham appointed, and the council ratified, Harry R. Krieger as the new fire chief. Cheatham, in a statement to the local newspaper, said that Krieger "...is regarded as well qualified for the job of operating the fire department and training the volunteer personnel."[25] Within a week supporters of former chief Melson were circulating petitions asking for his reinstatement and the dismissal of Manager Cheatham. The Springfield News editorially asked for support for the city manager, although it would seem apparent that the press had failed to examine the cause of Melson's dismissal.

> If the city manager form of government is going to succeed here it will be necessary for its friends to vigorously support it. If individuals or pressure groups are going to prevent a city manager from doing his best job then we might as well not have a city manager.

> If his appointments are to be made for him and his every act

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[25] Ibid., February 17, 1949.

regulated or directed then of course he cannot be a responsible manager.[26]

In mid-March, 1949, a council meeting was held which was described by the reporter of the Eugene Register-Guard "as a personal trial of city manager Fred A. Cheatham."[27] During the meeting petitions were presented to the council, bearing the signatures of more than one thousand Springfield residents, asking that Melson be reinstated and that Manager Cheatham be dismissed. Spokesmen for the petition circulators declared that "Melson was one of the best fire chiefs in Oregon," that his work was very satisfactory, that he had built up the department, and that "there was no proof that he hasn't done his duty."[28] During the meeting several questions were directed at Manager Cheatham concerning his reasons for dismissing Melson. Cheatham said he felt his action was necessary for the long-term improvement of the fire department. He related that he had discussed his desire for improvements in the fire department and the need of a new chief with Mayor Larson and that

"...on February 2, the matter was discussed with the fire and water committee [of the council] . The members of the committee

[26] Ibid., March 3, 1949.

[27] Eugene Register-Guard, March 15, 1949.

[28] Springfield News, March 17, 1949.

agreed that a change was advisable and concurred in the selection of a qualified replacement. Subsequently, the selected replacement signified his willingness to accept the appointment, and finally the appointment was confirmed by the common council without a dissenting vote."[29]

Mayor Larson indicated during the meeting that he had proposed to make Melson assistant fire chief so that he could have more time off than he had had in the past. One petitioner, however, pointed out that the minutes of the first council meeting of 1949 showed that the mayor had recommended more competent department heads be employed, and that he had not indicated that Melson be retained in any capacity. Finally Manager Cheatham requested that the matter of the petitions be decided at the present meeting, but the mayor stated that since the petitions represented approximately one-third of the registered voters of the city they should be given further study. Against the objection of Cheatham the matter was referred to the council judiciary committee.

At the next scheduled council meeting the matter became even more confused because of the inability of the legislative body to make up its collective mind. The first thing which happened was that circulators of the petition asking that Melson be rehired and Cheatham dismissed added more than 400 names to the already submitted list. Next, the judiciary committee reported and recommended that the

[29] Eugene Register-Guard, March 15, 1949.

council take no action on the petitions to rehire Harry Melson and to approve the action of the manager in removing the fire chief. The judiciary committee's report was filed, but later in the meeting a motion was passed asking Manager Cheatham to "reconsider" the appointment of Harry Krieger as the new fire chief. Earlier in the meeting the spokesman of the petitioners said that a majority of the town was now against the city manager plan and indicated that Melson would have to be rehired or the council would face recall proceedings. The spokesman continued: "This type of government puts too much power in one man's hands. It is more like dictatorship..."[30] Councilman Fred Konschot, a supporter of the manager plan, then asked the spokesman what was primary in the minds of the petitioners, a new fire chief or a city manager form of government? The spokesman answered, "We want the fire chief [Melson] back in."[31] Councilman Konschot also directed an inquiry to Mayor Larson during the council session. He asked if the mayor did not recommend in his opening message to the council the dismissal of all heads of departments, except the manager. Mayor Larson admitted that this was true.

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[30] Ibid., March 29, 1949.

[31] Ibid.

Konschot then called upon Larson to "get on one side of the fence or the other."[32] Mayor Larson, although not answering the councilman, stated that when he was running for office he had heard that all of the department heads were threatening to quit if he were elected, but now, "we can't get rid of any of them."[33]

At a special meeting of the Springfield council called for the following evening the group again considered its rather contradictory expressions regarding the manager and the fire chief matter. Manager Cheatham asked that the council formally adopt the report of the juciciary committee which had only been received and filed. By a vote of four to two (the mayor votes only to break ties) the council sustained Manager Cheatham's dismissal of Melson and selection of Krieger. Following this action, however, the petition circulators said that an attorney had been hired to make legal preparation for the recall of several councilmen and the abolition of the city manager form of government in the community.

The _Springfield News_ of April 7, 1949, cautioned citizens not to take rash action concerning the manager plan and its operation:

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[32] _Springfield News_, March 31, 1949.

[33] _Ibid._

The threat to change the city's form of government from manager
back to the old councilmanic form because of the fire chief
dispute, we hope will not materialize.

As far as recalling the councilmen voting against the wishes of
the petitioners we also think this is a very bad move.[34]

By late April, however, petitions were in circulation calling for an

election to abolish the manager form in Springfield. The charter

amendment also included a section outlining the governmental structure

desired by the petitioners: the city treasurer and the police judge would

be appointed by the council, while the city recorder would be elected;

the plan called for the granting of power to the recorder to prepare the

budget, act as city purchasing agent, be the business agent of the

council, and to perform such other duties as required by the council.

The measure said that the mayor would be the administrative head of

the city and that he "shall have powers and duties now vested in the

city manager," although the recorder would have supervisory power

over employees. The authority to appoint or discharge employees and

department heads would be vested in the city council. The Springfield

News commented that the amendment was confused and that anyone

working for the city would have at least three bosses.

To us the new proposal would set up kind of a dual system of
city government making the city recorder a sort of city manager

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[34]
    Ibid., April 7, 1949.

but not accountable to the council and since the proposal is to make the office elective he could not be discharged by the council as can a city manager.[35]

Sufficient signatures were collected, however, and the council placed the measure on the ballot to be voted on at a special election in June, 1949. A few days prior to the vote, the local press urged that the manager form be retained.

If the city manager type has not made good in this city then it is the city council's fault. They hire and fire the city manager.

Certain city officials should be out of the grand stand and start playing on the municipal team. It is one thing to shout directions and another thing to win in a fast game...Proper management can get things done if it is not interferred with by politics.[36]

In late May, after the amendment to abolish the manager form was placed on the ballot, Mayor B. P. Larson unexpectedly, at least to some in the community, dropped a "bombshell" during a council meeting. It will be remembered that Mayor Larson was elected on a platform stressing the need of municipal power in the city. After he took office in January the mayor initiated an investigation designed to provide necessary technical and financial data. At the May 23,

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[35] Ibid., May 5, 1949. The Springfield News' editorial was incorrect in one feature of its description of the charter proposal. Section 6 gave the city council the "power to remove from office any officer appointed by said council for good cause upon majority vote. Any officer elected by the people may be removed for good cause by said council upon three-fourths vote." The last provision was probably unconstitutional.

[36] Ibid., June 16, 1949.

1949 meeting of the council Mayor Larson, without prior publicity,

indicated that the survey was completed and that he had a resolution

to submit which would call an election designed to ask the electorate

to give the city the power to sell bonds to finance the development of

a municipal utility. The Register-Guard said that "...Mayor B. P.

Larson uncorked an unheralded municipal plan with such suddenness

that two members of the council, the city manager, recorder, and

attorney were hardly aware the significant issue was ready for council

action."[37] After Larson's resolution was introduced Councilman Bouck

charged that too short notice had been given of the city's intent to go

into the power business:

> I think we would be rushing the matter now. We have a big job
> of getting our house in order first before taking on all this. As
> important as power is there is still something more important to
> settle--our internal problems. At present I feel the power issue
> is a matter of poor timing.[38]

The mayor replied that the survey had been going on since January, and

Councilman Boeshans said that every councilman had been afforded the

opportunity to follow the survey findings. Manager Cheatham pointed

out, however, that "I have been caught flat-footed. I knew of the

move to submit this question at 4:45 p.m. Monday [three hours prior

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[37]Eugene Register-Guard, May 24, 1949.

[38]Ibid.

to the meeting⌉ ."[39] Manager Cheatham went on to warn that other
cities which had entered into competition with privately owned utili-
ties had often suffered in the long run. Several listeners asked if it
had been an oversight that certain city officials had not been informed
that the proposal would be made after the city attorney stated that he
first heard of the resolution at 10:30 a.m. Monday.

> Even though...two council members appeared "unenlightened"
> on the question, the rest of the council and the mayor were
> apparently keenly aware of the situation as they answered
> question after question.[40]

One of the last remarks made by Mayor Larson at the meeting was, "I
live this power question night and day and Springfield is going to have
it."[41]

At the council meeting of June 13 Mayor Larson stated that the
reason Manager Cheatham had not been included among the planners
of the municipal power system was that the manager had opposed public
power when he was employed in The Dalles. On June 25 Manager
Cheatham asked the council's permission to include in the minutes a
statement clarifying his position on public power. The manager's
statement was in the form of an affidavit signed by the president of

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

the Northern Wasco County Public Utility District stating that Cheatham, as assistant city engineer at The Dalles, had not worked against the P.U.D.

At the June 24, 1949 special election the manager form was retained in a close vote, 1111 to 1002. The size of the vote at this special election was also due to interest in two other ballot measures: one was the budget which exceeded the constitutional limitation and hence had to be approved by the voters; the second measure related to the sale of municipal bonds for the purpose of developing a municipal electric utility to compete with the private supplier of electrical energy.[42] It is interesting to compare the manager amendment results with the vote cast on the municipal power question:

Ward	Abolish Manager Plan		Municipal Bond Sale	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
1	163	172	190	151
2	101	97	102	97
3	137	237	165	212
4	111	127	147	95
5	154	193	169	182
6	184	140	215	108
7	152	145	214	84
Totals	1002	1111	1202	929

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[42] See Bert E. Swanson, Power and Politics: A Community Formulates Electric Power Policy (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon, 1959).

Springfield voters narrowly retained the city manager form in June, 1949, but events which occurred in mid-December eventually led to the dismissal of Manager Fred Cheatham. Angered by certain activities of Mayor B. P. Larson in regard to the development of the city-owned electric utility, a group calling itself the Good Government League became active, or rather was reactivated, in December, 1949. The spokesman of the group, U. S. Burt, stated that the League had been organized the previous spring to support the city manager plan and the municipal power amendment at the special election. Burt reported that the Good Government League was distressed at Mayor Larson's handling of the controversy concerning municipal power in Springfield and his by-passing of City Manager Cheatham:

> The mayor especially since the time of the special election has violated his oath at practically every council meeting and has and is continually disregarding the wishes of the majority voters of this city who said in no uncertain words at the special election that they wanted city manager form of government continued.... None of the power business has been done through the city manager's office.[43]

Eventually the Good Government League decided to seek the recall of Mayor B. P. Larson; and after the league procured the necessary signatures on petitions asking for a special recall vote, the city council set

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[43] Letter to the Editor, Springfield News, December 12, 1949. Signed by U. S. Burt, Vera Hanson, Valetta Arthurs, and Robert Perrie.

April 14, 1950 as the election date.

Approximately a week before the election Springfield's city attorney resigned with a blast at the city administration, charging it with "failing to pursue or adopt a course of action beneficial to the citizens of Springfield."[44] The city attorney let it be known that the city manager's position in "no way whatsoever" contributed to his reasons for resigning. He added, "Manager Fred Cheathem is to be commended for the efficient and honest conduct of a difficult administrative post."[45] One factor which led to the attorney's resignation, it was reported, was that Mayor Larson had hired a Portland attorney to deal with municipal bond and power matters without the knowledge of the city manager, or himself.

It was only twelve hours prior to the recall election of Mayor B. P. Larson when the council, in a special meeting, dismissed Manager Cheatham. In the meeting the leader of the group which led the June, 1949 attempt to abolish the manager plan suggested to the council that it "consider the removal of the city manager as the wish of the people."[46] Before the vote Councilman Frank Bouck is said to have told the council

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[44]Springfield News, April 6, 1950.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid., April 20, 1950.

that,

> It was just last year the people voted to retain the city manager
> form of government. As one member of the city council, my
> observation has shown Cheatham loyal, generous, patient, help-
> ful, and considerate.[47]

Manager Cheatham "remained calm during the flurry of charges," ac-

cording to the Springfield News, refused to resign, and said the council

would have to discharge him. This the council did, by a vote of four to

two. The dismissal motion was made by Councilman Alvin Reed.

Councilmen Bouck and John Ashworth, who had been one of the antago-

nists of Manager Cloyes, voted to sustain Cheatham. Manager Cheatham

likely would have had another supporter, Fred Konschot, had not this

councilman resigned in late February, 1950, after moving from his ward.[48]

The following day, April 14, 1950, the voters retained Mayor B. P.

Larson in his position by a majority of 292 ballots. Twelve hundred votes

were cast to retain Larson and 908 voted for the mayor's recall. On

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[47] Ibid.

[48] After Konschot's resignation approximately one hundred resi-
dents of the ward which he had represented petitioned the council to
appoint a woman to the position. Councilmen Ashworth and Bouck
supported the woman, Boeshans and Nicholas voted against her, and
Mayor Larson, breaking the tie, also voted against her. Alvin Reed
was then appointed to the vacancy. Mayor larson voted for Reed
after a tie had occurred in the council. Springfield News, February
23, 1950.

Saturday, at a meeting of the council, which had as its purpose the

canvassing of the recall vote, City Recorder Kenneth R. Gile resigned

his position. Gile, it will be remembered, set off the final charge which

led to the resignation, or dismissal, of Manager Cloyes. In his letter of

resignation, Gile protested the dismissal of Cheatham:

> This action was taken after five or six citizens criticized Mr.
> Cheatham from the floor. Apparently the entire action taken by
> the council was premeditated, inasmuch as the councilman who
> moved that Mr. Cheatham be discharged had served about one
> month as a council member and in that length of time would not
> have been able to become familiar with the operation of the
> various departments under the direction of Mr. Cheatham.[49]

Following Gile's resignation the chief of police and six patrolman re-

signed from city service. On Tuesday evening, at another special

meeting of the council, the city engineer and two councilmen, Frank

Bouck and John Ashworth resigned from the council. Ashworth wrote a

letter of resignation but the council voted to accept only the last para-

graph, moving that the remainder be stricken from the record. The text

of Ashworth's letter follows:

> Subsequent to the general election held in November, 1948,
> certain secret sessions were held by various members of the
> council and the mayor, at which time it was decided that the
> city manager would be instructed to request that all the de-
> partmental heads be discharged. In partial compliance with
> this request, city manager Fred Cheatham asked for and received

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[49] *Ibid.*, April 20, 1950.

the resignation of Harry Melson as fire chief, and when criticism
was launched at the elected officials of the city, such elected
officials failed to back up the City manager and claimed lack of
knowledge of the manager's intention to relieve the fire chief of
his duties.

In the past 3-1/2 years I have had occasion to serve under two
city managers and to have dealings with all of the various de-
partmental heads. It is my opinion that the heads of the various
departments have functioned in a very commendable manner and
that they have properly discharged their duties. If any criticism
could be launched or directed toward any departmental heads or
toward the city manager for failure to operate his department as
efficiently as possible, such lack of efficiency could be traced
directly back to the common council for failure to decide matters
of policy. I can recall repeated requests made by the city manager
and by the various departmental heads for a policy determination by
the council, and the consistent and persistent failure of the council
to decide such policy.

The secret sessions that have been held by certain members of the
council and the mayor have been held without the knowledge of the
city manager and in certain instances without knowledge of certain
members of the council. This is especially true in connection with
the matter of voting for and the construction of a municipal power
system. The city manager was never advised as to the action being
taken by the council with respect to municipal power. In this con-
nection I would like to direct the council's attention to the fact
that the council decides policy and the city manager is charged
with the city administration based on such policy. I have never
been in favor of the numerous secret sessions held by the council,
nor have I been in favor of keeping the city manager in the dark as
to what was being done in connection with the power system.

It is my feeling that the removal of Fred R. Cheatham as city manager
and the tendering of resignations by various employees of the city
during the past two weeks have been the direct results of personal
prejudice on the part of certain elected officials toward the various
individuals concerned. I know of my own knowledge that Mr.
Cheatham and the various departmental heads and employees have
discharged their duties in an efficient manner, and I based this
statement not only on my own personal observations, but on certain
conversations which I have had with citizens of Springfield and
with certain county and State officials.

I now feel that it is impossible for me to continue on as a member
of the city council even though my term of office ends after the

November, 1950 election, and therefore, tender to you, effective as of this date, my resignation as a member of the Springfield city council.[50]

Manager Hamilton

Following the resignations of Bouck and Ashworth the council recessed for forty-five minutes. Members of the council and Mayor Larson conferred with Herman Kehrli of the Bureau of Municipal Research during this interval and after reconvening immediately appointed Springfield ice cream store owner Herbert C. Hamilton acting city manager. Hamilton added that "he had a business of his own to run," and was not a candidate for a permanent position as manager.

The Springfield News' editorial title of April 20, 1950, probably indicated the feeling of many of the community's residents: "Confused City Government." The text of the editorial follows:

Fred Cheatham is out as city manager—relieved of his duties without stated cause by the council other than complaint from a few disgruntled citizens planted in the audience as stage dressing. Even in defeat Fred has gained in statue [sic] considerably. Under trying conditions he remained a gentleman to the end, was impartial to the factions pulling in different directions, and bowed to the brow beatings of no man with trumped up charges. Personal factors over which he had no control in the city administration and the enemies of the manager form of municipal government all mitigated against him.
We suppose things will have to get worse at the city hall before they get better. Any new city manager will have the same difficulties as did Fred. It is hard to see how a capable and reputable engineer can be gotten for city manager with the mess on

[50]Ibid.

his hands that has been cooked up. He must be a "yes" man
for the mayor on the one hand or an appeaser of the council on
the other. Sooner or later he will not be able to keep his
balance on the tight rope.
The manager is supposed to carry out council policy, but most
of the time there has been a lack of policy or confused instruc-
tions from the council. Then there has been deliberate by-
passing of the manager by the mayor and council.
It seemed rather stupid to blow the top at the city hall when
the mayor and council had no replacements for the multitude of
resignations which they must have known would have followed.
City government as far as general control and law enforcement
is concerned has mighty near broken down.
Whether one agrees or not with the past or present administra-
tions, it must be admitted that the city government under those
department heads now resigned have been more efficient than
ever before. The League of Oregon cities, bureau of municipal
research and the auditors will attest to better keeping of records,
and more careful management. It is now going to take consider-
able doing rather than so much oratory to maintain standards of
city government as high as they have been.
The mayor and majority of the council have now received the
ball after much fumbling, it remains to be seen which way they
will run with it.[51]

During the month of May, Acting City Manager Hamilton's trouble

kept increasing. Although the council finally appointed replacements

to its own body, the resignation of city employees continued. For

example, within a two week period the city building inspector, the

municipal judge, and several other employees of the city resigned. It

was not until late May that Hamilton was able to appoint a police chief,

and two weeks later a city engineer was appointed. During the summer

of 1950 the council sought a permanent city manager, but the calm which

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[51] Ibid.

had finally settled over the community was not to last, although the subsequent crisis never reached the proportions of earlier ones. Early in October, James E. Ramey was discharged by Hamilton from his position as chief of police, after serving less than five months. The reasons for the dismissal are unclear but one charge was that Ramey had been accused of mistreating a prisoner. Before taking action, Hamilton presented the matter to the council police committee and asked for advice. The committee agreed with Hamilton's recommendation that Ramey should be given an opportunity to resign and if he did not do so Hamilton should dismiss him. This the manager did after Ramey refused to resign. After hearing of the police chief's dismissal Mayor Larson indicated that he thought Ramey had been "railroaded." The Eugene Register-Guard indicated that it felt that a mayor-council controversy was about to occur at the next council meeting over the manager's action.[52] The expected controversy did not occur, however. At the council meeting the police committee's report covering Ramey's dismissal was read and filed and the council turned to other business. Neither the mayor, the large audience, nor several policemen in attendance made any comment concerning the dismissal, although it was understood that at a previous closed session

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[52] Eugene Register-Guard, October 9, 1950.

of the council the entire police department defended Chief Ramey. A month later Manager Hamilton appointed Harry W. Howard as the new chief of police.

In mid-December Manager Hamilton announced that he would resign as of January 1, 1951. His action indicated that the council had chosen a permanent successor, and one week later it was announced that L. B. Bartlett had been appointed city manager of Springfield.

Manager Bartlett

Bartlett came to Springfield with a long record in municipal government. From 1921 to 1940 he had served as county engineer in Douglas County, Wisconsin; he had a two year term as city engineer in Superior, Wisconsin and served in the same city for five years as director of public works; following one year in Hamilton, Ohio as director of public works he went to Montpelier, Vermont as city manager.

The first several years of Manager Bartlett's tenure were relatively calm ones. In May, 1951, the voters of Springfield allowed the city to exceed the six per cent limitation on taxes by 16.3 mills each year for a five year period. The issue, which enabled a long range development program to proceed, was the subject of an intensive

campaign by the chamber of commerce and city officials. It was not until the summer of 1952 that unrest again centered on manager government, and then it was short-lived. C. B. Dunnington announced in July that he had met with a group to consider circulating petitions to call a special election to abolish the manager plan. Dunnington maintained that poor results had been obtained by the manager even though the taxpayers were carrying a heavier burden than ever before. By mid-September Dunnington's group was circulating the petitions, calling for a return to councilmanic government, and describing the manager office as a drain on the taxpayer. The petitions were never filed, however, and no city officials were publicly connected with the petitioners.

In November, 1952, Edward C. Harms, an attorney, was elected as Springfield's mayor in a three-man contest which saw the incumbent, B. P. Larson, being defeated in his reelection attempt. A year after taking office, Mayor Harms proposed that the ward system of representation be abolished and that councilmen and the mayor be elected on a two year basis, rather than four year terms. Harms maintained that two year terms would "entice more men with the ability and inclination to serve the city." Harms' primary concern, it would seem, was the election of councilmen-at-large rather than by ward, however. He pointed out that at-large elections "...would further avoid any

appearance of city government by clique or small group acting for their

own benefit."[53] The city attorney was asked by the mayor to draw up

an ordinance calling for an election at the May primary at which time

these matters could be decided by the electorate. The measure did

not, however, reach the voters in May. It was not until mid-August,

1954, that Harms again brought up the matter in hope of placing it on

the November ballot. At this time the local press editorially supported

the mayor:

> We agree with Mayor Harms when he says "The ward system
> in Springfield is long overdue for revamping." ...it is apparent
> that the election of council members at large is easily more
> fair than the present method of unequal representation.
> If elections cannot be put on a city-at-large basis, the least
> that can be done in all fairness would be to re-district the city,
> dividing it into wards of equal representation.[54]

At the August 23, 1954 meeting of the city council Mayor Harms

presented an ordinance for the consideration of the council which had

it been passed would have put the matter of terms and election areas

to the voters in November. After the mayor presented his plan Council-

man Breedlove read a prepared statement listing his grounds for opposing

the proposal. He said that councilmen would not be able to become ac-

quainted with city problems and effectively promote solutions to them

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[53] Ibid., January 12, 1954.

[54] Springfield News, August 19, 1954.

within the limits of two year terms:

> The shortened term would make a council more dependent upon the advice of the city manager and city attorney and would make councilmen subject to more pressure from the voters...[55]

Breedlove then moved that the proposed ordinance "not be put to the people." Councilmen Reed and Nicholas supported Breedlove, McChesney abstained, and Mayor Harms received the support of Councilmen Holm and Peterson. McChesney followed with a motion to refer the proposed ordinance to the council judiciary committee for further study. After Mayor Harms and Breedlove exchanged opinions on the value of the ordinance it was referred to the committee without opposition.

In February, 1955, another controversy arose in Springfield which ultimately led to the resignation, or dismissal, of Manager Bartlett, and the recall of two council members.

Early in February police desk Sergeant Merrill A. Parke was suspended for "inefficiency" by Chief of Police Harry W. Howard. It had been learned that a Springfield towing company had complained about not being paid for work done for the police department, the bills having been submitted to Parke for action. During Parke's suspension an investigation of his records indicated that money paid in fines, and submitted to Parke as desk sergeant, had not reached the office of the city recorder. Immediately Manager Bartlett ordered a more thorough

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[55]Eugene Register-Guard, August 24, 1954.

investigation in which all police financial records were checked. Subsequently Parke was arrested and charged with embezzlement. The above statements were the facts as reported by the Springfield News on February 14, 1955. Later there proved to be some dispute about who in city government should receive the credit for discovering the embezzlement. The city council held an executive meeting after Manager Bartlett reported the findings and the arrest of Parke. During the executive session, it was reported by the local press, that unidentified council members questioned City Manager Bartlett, Recorder Mansell, and City Attorney Carmichael about the circumstances of the embezzlement and the charges brought against Parke. Mayor Harms, according to the Springfield News, defended the handling of the case by city officials:

> I believe City Manager Bartlett, Chief Howard, and others concerned deserve praise of this community for the straightforward manner in which they have attempted to get at the bottom of the seeming discrepancies....The public can take assurance that its interests are being safeguarded...It would have been easy to hush the entire investigation.[56]

Harms was forced to come to the aid of the manager and other city officers, it was reported, because of the nature and tone of the questions put to Bartlett by members of the city council. The News' editorial comment stressed that the questioners seemed not so much desirous of

[56] Springfield News, February 14, 1955.

investigating the Parke situation as they were of expressing displeasure

toward the city manager form of government:

A seething undercurrent antagonistic to the whole city manager
plan came out in the open at Monday night's Springfield city
council meeting. Questions relative to the investigation of
alleged irregularities resulting in the arrest of one police
officer were fired at City Manager L. B. Bartlett.
In connection with this matter we wish to point out these facts:
1. The officer has been arrested, accused of embezzlement.
But thus far it is only an accusation. The officer has declared
his innocence. Not until there has been a trial should there be
comment on whether the accused man is innocent or guilty.
Under the law, he is innocent until proven guilty.
2. In general, the crime of embezzlement is difficult to detect.
Every so often a person in a high place in the financial world
is accused of that crime. Instances of wrong-doing have been
found where money was diverted for years, even in the face of
audits and check-ups.
3. The city audits have been made in Springfield according to
established accounting procedure by a competent auditor.
Some councilmen apparently are unable to understand why any
shortages that seem apparent now were not found earlier and
why the city manager didn't do something about them. To this,
we say that it is to the city manager's credit that when he did
learn of the possibility of something being amiss, he ordered
and took part in an immediate investigation. He didn't tell us
what was going on, but we saw his car parked outside the city
hall until a late hour night after night during the last two weeks.
Our present city manager has been here four years. Prior to
that time the city had three city managers whose terms averaged
about nine months each. Under the city manager plan, the coun-
cil sets the policies, then the policies are carried out by the
city manager. Councilmen are supposed to refrain from going
directly to various city departments particularly to refrain from
attempting to use pressure on any department. If the council
doesn't like the way the manager is carrying out its policies,
under the plan this calls for replacement of the manager.
In the council meeting, several times members said something
about complaints they have been receiving. This newspaper
has had one inquiry lately about a street matter. Mayor
Edward C. Harms, Jr., tells us he has had half a dozen calls

the past few months, but none that he regards as a real complaint. The councilmen did not identify people from whom the complaints have been received, and if the city manager doesn't know who is complaining, how can he go about looking into the trouble?

We do know that one can't run a city--this one or any other--without making some enemies.

We know also that the City of Springfield is running without undue strain on the taxpayers. The millage levy hasn't gone up anywhere in proportion to the gains in population, even in spite of the fact that industrial and business properties (which ordinarily carry a great share of the tax burden) have not increased at the same rate as the population and many improvements have been made.

The cost of operating other taxing units has gone up a great deal more in proportion than has the city's expense.

We would like to see this matter brought all the way out into the open. Perhaps a special meeting of the city council, announced in advance and open to everyone interested, should be called just to talk about the city manager plan and how it is working. Justified complaints should be discussed in detail, including time, place and persons concerned. No city official, particularly no city manager, can do his best work when he has to keep his guard up at all times, waiting for a blow from the dark. If something is wrong, let's find it out. And if everything is fine, let's go to work--together--to continue to make Springfield a better place in which to live.[57]

Approximately two weeks later three council members, Breedlove, Nicholas, and Reed, called a special meeting of that body, and after much debate asked for an immediate audit of Springfield municipal funds by the state of Oregon. Councilmen Allen and Briggs, along with Mayor Harms opposed the audit motion. Prior to the vote Reed expressed dissatisfaction that no one had set in motion the procedure for a special

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[57] Ibid., February 17, 1954.

audit of the city's funds, even though approximately a month had passed

since Parke had been arrested. Harms replied, "You're blowing this up

to a big thing when it isn't. I fail to see the necessity of spending

public money when we're going to have an audit in three months any-

way."[58] By a vote of four to two (Nicholas, McChesney, Breedlove,

and Reed for; and Allen and Briggs against) it was decided to seek a

special audit. Prior to the vote Reed said that the shortage should

have been caught at the last audit. Manager Bartlett hastened to point

out that Parke had not yet been convicted and that the police officer

contended that he was innocent. On the other hand, Bartlett cited

numerous cities and businesses in which audits had not caught

shorages that developed over a number of years. Bartlett said "the

auditor was not to blame." Later in the meeting Councilman McChesney

moved that the mayor select two councilman to assist him in recommend-

ing a policy on the calling of committee meetings and council meetings.

This was after Mayor Harms had referred to the city charter as deline-

ator of council duties and a complaint made by Breedlove that the

police committee had exposed the Parke situation but had not been kept

informed of the subsequent investigation. Breedlove maintained that

the manager had not consulted with anyone about the matter, to which

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[58] *Eugene Register-Guard*, March 2, 1955.

Bartlett replied, "If I called you on everything I did each day--then you don't need me here."[59] Mayor Harms accepted McChesney's motion and expressed his hope that the committee "can take the first step in establishing procedure for relationship between the city manager and the council."[60]

A few days following this council session City Manager Bartlett announced that on April 1, 1955 he would assume a newly created position with Lane County as County Road Administrator. On March 14 the Springfield council accepted Bartlett's resignation.

Manager Hamilton - Again

Events in Springfield moved rapidly. At a meeting, called after Barlett's resignation, the purpose of which was to discuss possible candidates for the manager position Councilman Breedlove moved that Bartlett's official connection with the city be terminated on March 21 and that he be given two weeks' vacation pay. It will be remembered that Bartlett's resignation was to take effect on April 1, 1955. The motion was carried by a vote of three to two (Breedlove, Reed, and Nicholas for; McChesney and Briggs against; Allen absent). Earlier

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Springfield News, March 3, 1955.

in the meeting Councilmen Breedlove, Reed, and Nicholas had refused
to sign a letter of commendation for Manager Bartlett. The immediate
dismissal of Bartlett obviously left the city without a manager; the
charter required that a new manager or an acting manager be appointed
within two weeks or the mayor would assume the duties of the manager
until such time as one was appointed. Councilman Nicholas then
moved that former acting City Manager Hamilton be appointed. He
had applied for the position. Mayor Harms attempted to head off the
surprise appointment and protested that the meeting had been held for
the purpose of reviewing several applications for the manager position.
Mayor Harms pointed out that the council had not interviewed any
candidates and that the advertisements placed in several municipal
government journals had not even appeared. Another protest made by
Harms was that the surprise nomination of Hamilton had broken an
agreement that no formal action would be taken at a meeting in which
a full council was not present. Councilman Allen was absent from
the city on business. The nomination of Hamilton was "most
objectionable," said Harms, "when all the council isn't here."[61]
Nicholas replied, "I'm sold on the man. He did such a good job here

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    Eugene Register-Guard, March 22, 1955.

before."[62] Councilman Briggs objected to the nomination, saying that

the council should have an opportunity to interview him before voting.

Before the vote was taken Mayor Harms stated that Hamilton was not

acceptable to him as city manager because of a lack of experience in

municipal administration. "You've got the idea that anyone can be

city manager," Harms stated.[63] Breedlove and McChesney then told

Mayor Harms that they considered that the responsibility for hiring

the manager was their own, and not that of the mayor. Hamilton, now

a grocer in Cottage Grove, was hired by a unanimous vote (McChesney,

Reed, Breedlove, and Nicholas for; Briggs abstaining; Allen absent).

Reed, Nicholas, and McChesney had served on the council at the

time Hamilton had been temporary manager. They praised him for his

ability to get along with people and for his administrative qualifi-

cations. Mayor Harms had the last word, however: "You don't even

look. You didn't even try to find anyone qualified. I'm flabbergasted."[64]

After the council's action the Eugene Register-Guard editorially

commented:

In our opinion it was an act of complete irresponsibility on the

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

part of councilmen Nicholas, Breedlove, Reed, and McChesney.
It was obviously a "railroaded" procedure that you might expect
to find in a private club but certainly not among men who are
responsible for governing a city.[65]

The complexity of the Springfield situation increased in the next

several days. First, Councilman Allen returned to the city and expressed

his anger at the surprise manager appointment. He pledged his cooper-

ation to Manager Hamilton but directed an attack at the councilmen in-

volved in Hamilton's appointment, which he stated was obviously pre-

arranged. On the same day which saw the issuance of Allen's statement,

Mayor Harms indicated that he was calling a special meeting of the

council "to discuss the manner of the recent employment of H. C.

Hamilton, new city manager."[66] The following day the four councilmen

who had voted for Hamilton called a special meeting of the council,

with the time set for fifteen minutes after the meeting called by the

mayor. Mayor Harms labelled their move "an obvious attempt to explain

away their inexcusable action by creating a storm about something that

is already public information. The mayor was referring to the subject

of the meeting called by the councilmen--the alleged shortage of funds

in the police department, the subject which had triggered this contro-

versy.

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[65] Ibid., March 23, 1955.

[66] Ibid., March 24, 1955.

While the above cited events were occurring the state division of audits was conducting its investigation. The auditor informed the council finance committee that the report would show a cash shortage in excess of $15,000 in the prior three year period, all of the shortage occurring in the police department accounts. Councilman McChesney stated, "This is a verification of our belief that an audit was needed."[67] The possible fund shortage was one reason he believed that the community could not afford to be without a manager for even a short period, said McChesney.

Monday, March 28, 1955, saw the initiation of formal action to recall Councilmen Paris B. Breedlove and Ralph Nicholas. Soon thereafter petitions were in circulation. The circulators based their recall action on the "hasty firing" of former City Manager L. B. Bartlett and the "equally hasty" hiring of H. C. Hamilton as his successor. A countermove to recall Mayor Harms and councilmen Allen and Briggs was initiated the same day, but was dropped on Tuesday when it was learned that since Allen and Briggs had not been in office for six months they could not be recalled. This recall action was planned "because they did not want an audit of city books."[68] Similarly, Councilman

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[67] Springfield News, March 24, 1955.

[68] Eugene Register-Guard, March 28, 1955.

Reed was also to be included in the recall attempt directed at Breedlove

and Nicholas, but he had not held office for a sufficient period. The

formal statement appearing on the petition for the recall of the council-

men stated that each should be recalled,

> ...for the reason he is incompetent for the position of city
> councilman as shown by his actions and that he serves his own
> personal interest rather than that of the people of the city of
> Springfield and that he has continued to act without regard for
> the best interests of the city of Springfield.[69]

It was soon apparent that the recall attempt met with much support

in the community. The Springfield News stated:

> Recall is a pretty drastic thing, but after due consideration we
> are in accord with holding a recall election for which petitions
> currently are being circulated in Springfield.
> In the year we have lived in Springfield there has been a feeling
> of unrest around the city hall. There has been a feeling of deep
> discord, of a basic conflict far more reaching than common
> ordinary differences of opinion on what streets to fix and what
> policy to outline for the city manager to follow.
> Complete harmony is no great asset for a city council or a school
> board. There should be differences of opinion. Argument, which
> should be confined to issues instead of to personalities, leads
> to clear courses to follow. It helps a board to chart its course.
> But when there is a feeling of distrust, or doubt, of lack of con-
> fidence that everything is on top of the table, the situation is
> bad.
> And, we are sorry to report, there seems to be just that state of
> affairs existing around the city hall.
> People, in general, do not like to see someone kicked around.
> And that is what happened to L. B. Bartlett whose resignation as
> city manager was submitted several weeks ago in order that he

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[69] Ibid.

might accept employment as Lane county road administrator. There have been rumors around the city hall that several council members did not like Bartlett. Some of the rumors are that requests were made to Bartlett by council members and they were denied, thus incurring for the city manager the enmity of the people who made them. If the requests were proper and were denied, it should have come before the council for full discussion and appropriate action. Similarly, if requests were not in accord with accepted principles of city operation, they should have been discussed. But instead of out-in-the-open talk, there were rumors, rumors, rumors.

Even when Mr. Bartlett was, we think quite unjustly, tossed out 10 days before his resignation was to take effect, nothing concrete came before the open council meeting. There was some discussion about a letter of appreciation to the retiring city manager. Some councilmen didn't sign it. Then--boom--came a motion that Mr. Bartlett's service be ended as of midnight the same day. The vote was 3 to 2, and that was that. No explanation. No discussion. Just doubt left in the minds of all of us as to WHY.

If this wasn't being kicked around, it will do until a better definition comes along.

Now for the matter that has been discussed over every coffee counter in Springfield for the past 10 days, plus over a lot of back fences, in business offices, and wherever else people have gathered in numbers of two or more. That is the rapid hiring of a city manager.

We sat in on an executive session of the Springfield city council Monday night, March 14, at which Herman Kehrli, manager of the League of Oregon Cities, was present. The forthcoming city manager vacancy was discussed in detail. It certainly was our impression that the council planned a long, careful search before filling the job. Even at that time we had heard rumors that one or two council members were advocating the selection of a friend of theirs from Cottage Grove, but nothing of that nature was discussed at the council meeting. Advertising was ordered in periodicals of wide circulation among city employes. These are published only once or twice a month, and it takes some time for an ad to appear--certainly longer than one week.

With a full council present, anyone could have predicted that there would be a 3-3 split on the proposal to fire Mr. Bartlett, and also that Mayor Harms would break the tie with a vote in favor of the city manager.

With Councilman Allen absent, the outcome was certain, also--
that the city manager would be let out, if other councilmen
brought it up in violation of an agreement that was at least
implied.
There are some who probably would call the way the whole thing
was handled "smart politics" but we do not. It was not smart
politics in a community filled with people who believe in fair
play and in the keeping of agreements, either signed or implied.
A recall election should clear the air. The two councilmen named
in the petitions will have an opportunity prior to election to state
their defense. Their accusers should also state their views
frankly and openly.
We hope that whenever the votes are counted and the peoples'
decision is recorded, that the municipality of Springfield, Oregon,
can go forward as a united community without being stigmatized--
as we have heard it--as being "the city of eternal conflict."[70]

On Monday, March 27, the two previously mentioned meetings of

the city council were held. At the meeting called by Mayor Harms letters

were read from the Lions club, the V.F.W., and the Junior Chamber of

Commerce, all of which were critical of the council's action in the hasty

employment of Hamilton. Mayor Harms then directed some questions at

the council, the answers to which he said the public had the right to

know. His first question was: Had any of the council met with or

interviewed Hamilton without the presence or knowledge of the full

council? In answer to Mayor Harms' question there was no direct

answer. Councilmen Breedlove and Nicholas did indicate, however,

that after the meeting at which Hamilton was hired they drove to Cottage

Grove at about midnight to notify Hamilton of his appointment. It was

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[70] Springfield News, March 31, 1955.

"just a nice little drive," said Breedlove.[71] Hamilton was on the job

in Springfield the following morning at 8 a.m. Breedlove indicated that

he had only interviewed Hamilton once, and that was when Hamilton

submitted his letter of application. He said that Hamilton had seen

Councilman Briggs on the same day. Briggs stated that Hamilton had

brought a letter of application to his office and that they had talked

briefly, but "I wouldn't hire an employee that was."[72] Prior to the

conclusion of the meeting called by the mayor, Councilman Allen stated

that he had never been contacted by Hamilton, and that it would appear

that there had been some prearrangement on the part of some of the

council members to select him. At the council meeting of March 14,

Allen claimed that he had informed the council that he would not be at

the meeting of March 21. Allen continued:

> It was agreed nothing important would come up. We agreed on
> qualifications of a city manager. We agreed to screen all appli-
> cants. We instructed that an advertisement be put in the city
> managers' journal....I feel the action was taken because I was
> out of town.[73]

Before the meeting called by the four council members started Mayor

Harms stated,

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

The manner of the hiring was a complete breakdown of the demo-
cratic processes in Springfield....There is but one issue, are
we going to continue to have government of that type.[74]

McChesney voiced the suggestion that Manager Hamilton be given a

vote of confidence; Allen and Briggs refused to consider the suggestion,

and it was dropped from consideration.

The meeting called by the councilmen who had appointed Hamilton

and which was intended for the purpose of discussing city finances was

quite short. Breedlove indicated that the mayor refused to even talk

about the shortages and the findings of the audit. It was brought out,

however, that Councilmen McChesney and Nicholas had discussed the

audit with the state auditor during the previous week and had made

public his tentative findings. Briggs, the finance committee chairman,

said that he had no knowledge of the meeting until the councilmen came

to his office and told him of the auditor's findings. The meeting was

shortly thereafter adjourned.

Meanwhile, the circulating of petitions asking for an election

which would have as its purpose the recall of Breedlove and Nicholas

was proceeding. City Attorney Carmichael was asked for a formal

opinion by Councilman Reed as to why the recall election would be put

to the voters of the entire city when the councilmen were elected from

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[74]Ibid.

wards. Carmichael reported that state law indicated that individuals
facing recall were to be judged by the voters of the electoral district,
which in several court cases had been ruled to be the municipality and
not wards. The city attorney at the same time, however, made a ruling
in regard to the election of councilmen on the basis of wards. It will
be recalled that Mayor Harms had several times proposed that election
of councilmen be on an at-large basis. The city attorney ruled that
the ward election system did not conform to the charter of the city, one
section of which read: "The councilmen shall...be elected by the quali-
fied voters of said town...."[75] The mix-up, was due, said Carmichael,
to the fact that the provisions of the charter had been codified by an out
of state firm in 1941 and that the at-large provision had never been
formally repealed. Thus, council members of Springfield have since
been elected by the voters of the entire city, although they are nominated
from and must be resident of a particular ward.[76]

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[75] Ibid., April 11, 1955.

[76] There is much evidence that the Springfield municipal govern-
ment has long worked without adequate knowledge of the city's basic
frame of reference, the city charter. The confusion in regard to the
basis of councilmanic representation can be cited as one example;
another instance was made public in mid-March, 1956, when the city
attorney ruled that since 1941 the mayor was being given two more years
in office than the charter allowed. When the charter was revised in
1941, the attorney stated, it had been the intent to make the office of
four years duration, but that actually this had not been done because of
error. Thus, the term of a mayor was two years. Springfield News,

The situation in Springfield became even more confused on Friday, April 22, when City Manager Hamilton asked for and received the resignations of Chief of Police Howard and a police captain. Hamilton also asked for the resignation of City Recorder Mansell, who refused to resign until a successor properly relieved him. This action was followed by a statement made by Breedlove and Nicholas demanding that Mayor Harms ask for a grand jury investigation of the shortage of city funds. Mayor Harms replied that Hamilton's requests for the above-noted resignations was both a fulfillment of commitments made by Hamilton prior to his appointment and an attempt to involve the policemen and the city recorder in the embezzlement charges.

On Monday evening, April 25, 1955, the Springfield city council again met. At this session a great deal of time was devoted to a discussion of the embezzlement of funds by Sergeant Parke, who had been indicted and convicted earlier of such a charge, although the district attorney had tried the case only on a particular embezzlement amounting

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March 15, 1956.

Similarly, at the first council meeting of 1958, Mayor Harms directed the council's attention to the prepared agenda which called for him to appoint council committees and for the council to elect a president of the council. He stated that an examination of the charter revealed that former mayors and councils had erred in doing these things annually and that the charter directed them to be done at the first council meeting in January following general election. (See Notes on Springfield City Council meeting, January 13, 1958; observer: Gary Field. Material on file in office of Kellogg Project, Johnson Hall, University of Oregon.)

to thirty-three dollars.

The state auditor who had conducted an investigation of all the city records indicated that shortages in excess of $22,000 were found, but that only police department funds were involved. After explaining the system used by Parke the auditor indicated that no one but Parke was implicated in the shortages. Questions from the audience were directed to why the city recorder had not caught the shortages. The auditor answered simply that the recorder had followed the procedure which he had been directed to follow. He was then asked if it was the council's duty to provide the procedures. "I would think that is right and it may do so by ordinance or resolution."[77] Councilman Reed and McChesney asked about the duties of the city manager and if there was adequate local control. The auditor answered that "One man [the recorder] was given too much responsibility."[78]

Later in the meeting the subject turned to the dismissal of the police officers by Hamilton. Councilman Briggs attempted to show that Hamilton had been asked by several councilmen to dismiss the officers and the city recorder, and that such action was prohibited by provisions of the city charter. Proof of requests or pressure on a manager to hire or fire anyone is sufficient, under the charter, for the

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[77] Ibid., April 28, 1955.   [78] Ibid.

termination of councilmanic office. The two dismissed police officers and a former police officer, who had been consulted by Hamilton about record management in the department, reported that Hamilton had indicated to them that the majority of the council wanted the release of the chief and captain. Manager Hamilton denied this statement but did say "if the majority of the council wanted to let them go, I would."[79] To a question by Briggs, Hamilton denied that he had even discussed the dismissal action with any councilmen, and said the grounds for dismissal were lack of efficiency. The meeting concluded with Briggs' remark that someone was evidently lying.

In regard to the proposed recall of Councilmen Breedlove and Nicholas, sufficient signatures were collected and May 12 was set as the date of election. Prior to the election both councilmen refused to resign; stated that Hamilton was capable and selected justly; and indicated that no one seemed to be particularly concerned about the missing funds in the police department.

A few days prior to the election the News stated:

We believe the recall movement is not nearly as much connected with the police department shortage as the two councilmen would have the public believe.
We believe that the recall is in protest against specific indications of "undercover" dealings.

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[79] Ibid.

We believe that the public likes to see fair and aboveboard
treatment given city employees, and that the recall is in protest
against unfair treatment, either actual or threatened.
We believe the recall is a step in the right direction towards
erasing a lot of unfavorable publicity...
We shall mark our ballot "Yes." "I vote for the recall."[80]

On May 12 Councilmen Nicholas and Breedlove were recalled by
the voters of Springfield. The vote was as follows:

	Yes	No
Nicholas	1405	413
Breedlove	1400	406

Aftermath of Conflict – The Hiring of Manager Turner

One week later Manager Hamilton resigned and the council ac-

cepted his resignation, although a motion was made asking him to

remain until a successor was appointed. This motion was passed when

Mayor Harms voted to break a tie: Reed and McChesney voting to ask

him to remain until a replacement was found; Briggs and Allen voting

in the negative. On June 6, however, the council voted, at the sug-

gestion of Harms, to make City Recorder Mansell acting city manager.

Late in June, 1955, the Springfield council voted to rehire Harry

W. Howard as chief of police. This action caused comment from the

Eugene Register-Guard:

The Springfield city council, in a "we won" attitude, rehired
former Police Chief Harry W. Howard...This, we think, was

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[80] _Ibid._, May 9, 1955.

a bad move. We are not sure the councilmen who voted for
Howard were motivated as much by faith in his ability as they
were by an opportunity to prove to the opposing faction that
they were back in the drivers' seat.
The council stipulated that a new city manager, when selected,
will have the authority to choose another man if he so desires.
Of course, the charter gives the manager the authority to do
this anyway.
We hope the city council will hire a manager who will reflect
the desires of the council as a whole, not of individual council-
men; one who will go about his job as he sees fit, within the
bounds of the charter. He should not be hamstrung by previous
decisions which rightfully should be his own to make.[81]

The Springfield News, on the other hand, maintained that the rehiring

of Howard was simply the correcting of an injustice which had been

done by a discredited clique.[82] It is not too strange, perhaps, that

Councilman Reed cast a vote against rehiring Chief Howard.

During the months of June and July the council sought a new

manager. From a total of approximately sixty candidates their choice

was narrowed to three. Significantly enough, the three major candi-

dates were not from the immediate area. The council voted to pay the

expenses of the candidates, bringing them to Springfield. Reed opposed

this motion saying that anyone seriously interested in the position should

be willing to pay his own travel costs. While the search for a manager

was going on a group of Springfield residents were circulating petitions

urging that former manager L. B. Bartlett be rehired. The circulators

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[81] Eugene Register-Guard, June 30, 1955.

[82] Springfield News, July 7, 1955.

indicated that Bartlett would consider the position should it be offered

him. Then, in late July, Bartlett resigned his position with Lane County

and said he was a serious applicant for the Springfield position. Soon

a counter-petition was in circulation, urging that Bartlett's application

be disregarded and that a non-resident be appointed. "We want to get

a new bunch in there and start all over," said the spokesman of the

petitions opposing the rehiring of Bartlett.[83]

The council announced on August 10, 1955 that E. Robert Turner

had been chosen as the new city manager of Springfield. Turner

attended Dartmouth and received his initial degree from Hobart College

in 1948. He then attended the Wharton graduate school of the University

of Pennsylvania, receiving a master of arts degree in public admini-

stration in 1950. After his graduate work, Turner was chosen to serve

as an intern in Kansas City, Missouri under its well known city manager,

L. P. Cookingham. Later he became city manager in Brookfield, Missouri,

resigning from that position to become Springfield's manager.

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[83] Eugene Register-Guard, July 30, 1955.

CHAPTER III

THE PROCESS OF POLICY FORMATION: ANNEXATION

Introduction

Material will be presented in this chapter dealing with the question of annexation of an urban fringe area located north and east of Springfield. Annexation is a suitable subject to serve as the basis of a narrative illustrating the process of policy formation because it fulfilled criteria which the writer established for the selection of such a topic: first, it was desired that the subject be of general concern to municipalities, and obviously annexation is not of concern only to the community of Springfield; second, a topic was chosen in which more than one Springfield city manager was involved. Both Manager Bartlett and Turner were participants in annexation proceedings. Since the writer was interested in observing whether variable behavior was exhibited by individuals occupying the same position, that of city manager, the choice of a single problem of continuing concern was judged to be a method of diminishing the number of variables which would have to be taken into account. Third, a subject had to be chosen in the light of available data and the possibility of relatively high interviewee-recall. This criterion was fulfilled by the availability of numerous reports,

extensive press coverage, and by the fact that annexation of the same

geographical area is, at this time, again under consideration. Fourth,

a topic of limited size and complexity was necessary. The problem of

workable dimensions has been stated by Rossi in the following manner:

> The blame for the neglect of decision as a major research focus
> must be placed to a large degree on the nature of the phenomenon
> itself. Most of the issues in which we are most interested ordi-
> narily entail a settlement process in which complicated chains of
> choices are made by a large number of decision makers. A de-
> scription of the events involved, for example, in the approval of
> a municipal budget by a city council would result in a large
> document, while more complicated issues would demand even
> more complicated descriptions.[1]

Annexation Election - 1954

In early August, 1953, a group of property owners living east of

Springfield in the confines of the McKenzie Water District met to discuss

annexation to the city of Springfield. At this meeting tentative bounda-

ries of the area under discussion were set (72nd Street on the east, the

tracks of the Southern Pacific railroad on the south, E Street on the north,

and the city limits on the west), and the circulation of petitions asking

the Springfield city council to call an annexation election was planned.

Those individuals asking for annexation were most concerned about the

lack of sewage disposal facilities in the area and the high utility rates

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[1] Peter H. Rossi, Community Decision Making (no place: mimeo-
graphed, March, 1956) paper presented to Study of the Community
conference, p. 17.

being charged residents.

Approximately two weeks later a meeting was held by the petition-
ers with Springfield City Manager L. B. Bartlett, the city engineer, and
Howard Buford, director of the Central Lane County Planning agency. At
this meeting Bartlett and Buford discussed the meaning of and the costs
of annexation. Bartlett indicated that although the city council could
initiate an election by the passage of an ordinance, he felt that the
city council would desire to see petitions presented indicating the
desires of the fringe area residents. Bartlett also stated that he felt
it most desirable that annexation elections be held within the city as
well as in the area of annexation. This was desirable, he said, insofar
as if annexation were successful it would then be necessary to ask the
city to vote on a bond issue in order to provide municipal services in
the new area. Some of the problems of the area and the economics of
the situation were pointed out at this time by the Springfield News:

> Annexation will bring with it a lot of civic headaches and even
> with the greatly added assessed valuation will be a budget
> liability instead of an asset to the city for a long time....

> On the other hand conditions are not likely to get much better and
> may get much worse in the area if it is not annexed. Building
> without proper regulation and more population without sanitary
> sewers will greatly aggrevate the health situation.[2]

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[2] Springfield News, August 13, 1953.

Late in August, the pro-annexation residents of the water district began the circulation of petitions asking the city council to call an election. The leader of the petitioners stated:

> We have been out in the sticks long enough. We need sewers, and we must have other services which can only be provided by a municipality. Our property values are going down because we can't build until we have these services.[3]

Another petitioner indicated that annexation was favored in the expectation that municipal power service would be provided and would bring reduced rates in the area. Commenting upon the power rates of the privately-owned utility, this petitioner said, "We don't want any more twenty per cent surcharges."[4]

The petition circulators apparently did not speak for the residents of the unincorporated area, however. Pro-annexation petitions were signed by 400 residents, while circulators of petitions asking that an annexation election not be held were signed by approximately 800 residents. This attempt at annexation was quietly dropped, but not until after a leader of the anti-annexation group stated that Bartlett and Buford were more interested in the annexation of "big business" to Springfield than they were concerned with public health in the community. It was pointed out that the annexation would have brought the extensive Weyerhaeuser Timber Company plant and several other mills within the

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[3] Ibid., August 20, 1953.   [4] Ibid.

city and made them subject to municipal taxation. This was the first publicly made statement concerning the annexation of industry, but the issue was to arise again.

In February, 1954, approximately thirty-five persons attended a meeting at the McKenzie Water District's fire station office, east of Springfield, at which time the possibilities of annexation or incorporation were discussed. Those attending the meeting finally decided that they would seek incorporation rather than seek annexation by the city. It was pointed out, however, that it would be financially impossible to incorporate unless the Weyerhaeuser plant and land was included in the area. Six days later the plans to incorporate were in total collapse after a meeting at which George Weyerhaeuser, the plant manager, declared that the company wanted no part in either annexation or incorporation. He was quoted as saying, "There are no sewage problems facing our plant; we have our own disposal system."[5] He went on to point out that the plant had its own water system, fire and police protection, and lighting facilities, and that any incorporation or annexation would mean that industry was paying for unneeded services.

Following a two hour public meeting in March, 1954, petitions bearing the names of 439 residents of the area east of Springfield were

[5]Ibid., February 11, 1954.

presented to Mayor Harms asking that an annexation election be called.

Mayor Harms, who attended the meeting, concluded the meeting by saying

that other than the solution of mutual problems such as surface water and

sewage disposal the city had no particular interest in annexation. Earlier

in the meeting Springfield's city manager, L. B. Bartlett, had warned

that annexation would not mean the immediate provision of sewers.

Municipal services would likely not be available for at least a year be-

cause of necessary technical surveys, bond issue elections, and possible

construction delays. George Weyerhaeuser again voiced opposition to

annexation: "...we do not want to see industrial tracts subject to city

taxes."[6] City spokesmen pointed out that annexation of the area would

be financially impossible without a corresponding increase in assessed

property tax valuation which only industry could provide.

In mid-May, 1954, the city council heard arguments pro and con

in regard to annexation. Attorney Donald Husband, representing the

Rainbow and McKenzie Water districts which would have been only

partially annexed by the proposed boundaries, pointed out that the

Rainbow District did not have sewage disposal problems, and that the

governing board of the McKenzie District instructed him unanimously to

oppose annexation. At this point Springfield councilman Alvin Reed

moved that the consideration of annexation be dropped and the motion

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[6]*Ibid.*, April 1, 1954.

was seconded by Paris Breedlove. The motion was withdrawn, however, after Mayor Harms stated, "From my personal standpoint I would just as soon wait a few years, but in the area to the east they have a problem that is not easy to ignore...It affects property values in the city."[7] It was pointed out by residents of the Rainbow District, north and northeast of the city, that more than ninety per cent of the residents had signed petitions opposing annexation. The residents of Rainbow felt they should be excluded from possible annexation, and that the reason they had not been was that the city council "...need the tax revenue from valuable residential areas to offset the heavy expenses of sewers east of town."[8] Mayor Harms replied that the allegation was not true:

> ...I would point out that even the most valuable residential
> areas do not pay their way by and large...and to annex areas
> which are residential only is a liability rather than an asset
> from a tax standpoint.[9]

Harms said that if the city were only tax-hungry it would not even consider annexing residential areas, only industrial sites. He asserted that the city was interested in the immediate annexation of the fringe area only to preclude later problems. Surveys had indicated that city expansion was inevitable, Mayor Harms indicated, and that economic and technical factors made it wiser to annex large areas rather than only small ones which had immediate and pressing service problems.

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[7] Ibid., May 14, 1954. [8] Ibid., June 17, 1954. [9] Ibid.

In late June, 1954, the Springfield council directed the city
attorney to draw up an ordinance calling an election without and within
the city Councilman Alvin Reed was opposed to the calling of the
election. The boundaries of the area to be annexed can be noted in
Appendix B of this study. A month later the council accepted the ordi-
nance and the boundaries set forth therein and set September 14 as the
date of the election. Only a few days prior to the election the owners
of agricultural land in the area proposed for annexation sought an in-
junction in the circuit court to prevent the city from conducting the
election. The owners maintained that the land was suitable only for
farming purposes, was not subdivided, and had no use in the fore-
seeable future for residential, business, or industrial purposes. The
city answered the contention of the owners by stating that even farm
land in the contiguous area had to be annexed in order that a workable
solution to drainage, sewer, police and fire problems could be worked
out. The request for an injunction was not acted upon and the results
of the election made it a moot demand.

The election itself was preceeded by large scale advertising
paid for by residents of the area and by industries located in the area
voting on annexation. Weyerhaeuser interests purchased several full
pages in the local newspaper urging that a "no" vote be cast. The
Weyerhaeuser advertisements intimated that the timber company would

close the plant if annexation were successful. One appeal stated:

WOULD **YOU RISK SPRINGFIELD'S FUTURE**
JOBS AND PAYROLLS?

IF NOT, VOTE <u>NO</u> ON ANNEXATION

1. INDUSTRIAL GROWTH MEANS MORE JOBS, BIGGER
PAYROLLS

2. THE PROPOSED ANNEXATION WILL ENDANGER
SPRINGFIELD'S INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

3. YOUR "NO" VOTE WILL KEEP SPRINGFIELD PAYROLLS
GROWING

FOR JOBS, PAYROLLS, PROSPERITY--VOTE NO ON ANNEXATION[10]

The Springfield News also recommended that a "no" vote be cast:

After a considerable study of the pros and cons, we feel that
the annexation is premature and that the boundaries are unfair
and unrealistic....The pressing problem is sanitary sewers
and drainage for the area out to 38th Street. That matter should
get complete attention, either as a sewer district or as part of
the city. We have no doubt but what the remainder of the area
in Tuesday's election, plus more territory to the north of
Springfield, someday will be part of the city--but we want it to
be added with mutual desire and understanding, and to be a real,
functioning, vital, cooperative part of Springfield... We suggest
a "No" vote on Tuesday.[11]

The annexation measure was turned down both inside the city and

in the fringe area: in Springfield the vote was 192 yes, 248 no; outside

the city it was 79 yes, 274 no.

Following the election Mayor Harms issued a statement in which

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[10]<u>Ibid.</u>, September 2, 1954.   [11]<u>Ibid.</u>, September 9, 1954.

he said the voters had taken a short-sighted view of the situation.

> I am extremely disappointed on the vote within the City of
> Springfield. I believe it is taking a short-sighted view of the
> situation.
> I believe the council did the proper thing in submitting the
> proposal to the people, and that the council is glad to know how
> the people feel about annexation....
> There were many good and valid arguments about annexation, but
> I believe the people were misled by distortions and half-truths
> put out by certain of those opposed to annexation.
> It is a falsehood that industries now located outside the city
> were promised by the city that they would not be annexed....to
> say that we would restrict the logical area for growth and develop-
> ment by such assurances is ridiculous. [12]

In January, 1955, at the first city council meeting of the year

Mayor Harms urged that annexation be given consideration during the

year. He stated:

> I believe this annexation measure failed because the City had
> nothing to offer except vague possibilities. Regardless of
> present sentiments, the fact is that the areas east of our present
> boundaries will one day be parts of Springfield. I therefore re-
> commend that we get ready for this expansion by submission of
> a bond issue to the voters for the trunk sewer to the north and
> east, which could be extended and would then serve these areas
> when annexed. These people would then be assured that their
> major problems would be taken care of almost immediately upon
> their coming in. [13]

Annexation Election - 1955

In February, 1955, residents living east of Springfield again

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[12] *Ibid.*, September 16, 1954.

[13] Text of Mayor's Annual Message, Springfield City Council,
January 10, 1955, mimeographed.

initiated an attempt to be annexed by the city. Following a meeting at which the group was addressed by City Manager Bartlett they began the circulation of petitions asking the council to call an election. The Springfield News reported that the group was "cheered" by the report made by Barlett in which he cited possible city action if annexation attempts were successful: streets would be graded, the McKenzie ditch would be cleared, work on surface drainage would be done, and engineering reports could be prepared prior to the initiation of sewer construction.[14] The petitions which were circulated by the fringe area residents called for annexation to the east of Springfield to 49th Street. It should be noted that boundary descriptions on petitions have no legal force on the city, they serve only as a recommendation. The council prescribes the boundary of areas to be annexed, or rather the areas which will vote on annexation.

Early in March a two-hour public meeting was held at which time both proponents and opponents of annexation were able to discuss annexation and boundary limits. Gary Washburn, a fringe area resident and leader of the proponents of annexation, was asked many questions concerning the boundaries set forth on the petitions. He answered that boundary lines were drawn "...between areas that have expressed a preference for annexation and areas that don't want to join with

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[14] Springfield News, February 24, 1955.

Springfield."[15] Opponents of annexation asked why there were differences between the areas proposed for annexation in 1955 and the area which was under consideration in the 1954 election. Washburn's answer was given to such a question, but the questioner recalled that proponents of annexation in 1954, including Mayor Harms, had stressed that it was economically and technically wiser to annex large areas rather than having spot annexation. The questioner was interested in knowing whether the situation had changed. Buford, the planning consultant, stated that a trunk line sewer, for example, could be built large enough to serve other areas if they later voted to annex, and that costs of the sewer would be carried by a long-term bond issue anticipating the other areas eventually sharing in the costs. Mayor Harms, the Springfield News reported, after some skirmishing about the boundary lines said, "The only issue is whether the people inside the boundary lines are in favor of or are against annexation."[16] Mayor Harms added, however, that the city council had not considered the matter of annexation and that it had the privilege of altering the boundaries.

A representative of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company also spoke at the meeting and reiterated the organization's opposition to the annexation of its property. Washburn's petitions again called for the inclusion of the plant within the limits of Springfield. The company representative

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[15]Ibid., March 7, 1955.   [16]Ibid.

warned that Weyerhaeuser directors would not

> ...dump that kind of money in here [for expansion of the plant] ,
> where they constantly face tax increases, especially if they
> would get nothing for their taxes....Let's not deceive ourselves
> and force industry to other locations...We can jeopardize our
> future growth.[17]

Planning consultant Buford said that Weyerhaeuser officers would be

derelict in their duty if they did not oppose annexation, but he also

pointed out that,

> Industry should pay its fair share of development so people can
> live as they should. Industry came in not to benefit the area but
> to benefit by natural resources.[18]

Before the Springfield city council had an opportunity to discuss

the annexation petitions, the city's chamber of commerce, through its

board of directors, voted to request that the council delay any decision

until a "prompt and impartial" survey was made. The chamber also

offered to pay for the survey which was to include a study of the needs

of the area proposed for annexation with suggestions for solutions.

The chamber's proposal was presented at the next meeting of the

council, and included was a proviso that the survey research organi-

zation would be chosen by a committee representing the chamber of

commerce, the city council, industry, and Lane County. Washburn

and other pro-annexation leaders objected to the survey. They requested

that the council call an election in the area immediately, intimated that

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[17]Ibid.   [18]Ibid.

the chamber of commerce's request for a survey was a stall, and that
"the chamber is set up to promote business...and to advertise such
things as the weather and should not be concerned in annexation."[19]
Mayor Harms declared that "I am personally in favor that an annexation
election be held. The survey will not tell us anything we don't know.
The need is there for sewers."[20] The council passed a motion unani-
mously, however, giving ninety days for a survey to be made. Although
it never became common community knowledge there is evidence to
indicate that the chamber of commerce financing was only a ruse, and
that the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company paid the survey costs. Howard
Buford also maintains that after the choice of an organization to make
the survey was determined the tenor of the report was pre-determined.

During the same week which witnessed the council's approval of
the chamber of commerce-proposed survey the Lane County Board of
Commissioners heard state and county health officers report that it was
absolutely essential to public health that the area between Springfield
and 42nd Street on the east be serviced by a sewer system. The county
health officer stated that,

Without sewers the people do not have a safe place to live....
The lack of sewers affects a much larger population than any
of us can appreciate. The sewage in McKenzie ditch goes through
Springfield, and is just as likely to spread disease in the city as
east of the city limits.[21]

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[19] Ibid., March 17, 1955. [20] Ibid. [21] Ibid.

The health officers did not recommend the placing of sewers east of 42nd Street because of sparse settlement and what they considered the lack of an acute problem. Gary Washburn, present at the meeting, indicated that the pro-annexation group was willing to alter the eastern boundary proposal, and that the 49th Street proposal had been suggested to his group by advisors with the long-range view in mind."[22] Following Washburn's remarks Howard Buford commented that any alteration in annexation boundaries was basically a matter of whether Springfield could afford to put in a trunk line sewer without the large industrial property valuation east of 42nd Street. City Manager Bartlett indicated that this was the case and that he would recommend no annexation of the area should it result in financial difficulty for the city.

The city council agreed on March 21, 1955, that an election would be called two weeks after the completion of the survey of the area should the chamber-sponsored study recommend the 49th Street boundary which the original petitions had urged. The council was also informed by the city attorney that should the study recommend different boundaries, which the council accepted, then the council had only to repeal the election ordinance, pass a new one with the boundary alterations, and thus reinaugurate the election mechanism. The council again decided that vote would be held within the city as well as in the

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[22] Ibid.

area proposed for annexation.

To give the residents of Springfield an opportunity to express views concerning annexation the council held a public hearing in mid-April. Only one resident of the city appeared, but the proponents and opponents of annexation living or working in the area appeared in force. George Weyerhaeuser, manager of the timber company's Springfield area operation again expressed opposition to annexation. He did add that the organization had no opinion concerning the annexation of residential property adjacent to the city, but he maintained that the inclusion of industrial property was intended "...to solve its [the city's] financial problems."[23] This being the purpose of the annexation out to 49th Street, he said it was

> ...wholly unreasonable and therefor illegal, because it has
> as its sole purpose the addition of the company's property to
> the city's tax rolls in order that the taxes so produced may pro-
> vide the funds necessary to produce adequate drainage and
> sewage facilities upon the property of others. It is respect-
> fully submitted that such a proposed annexation will constitute
> a taking of this company's property without compensation there-
> for and in violation of the law...[24]

The reliance placed upon a technical survey to provide answers to the annexation question did not lead to the anticipated result. Industrial Survey Associates, a California firm, had received the primary

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[23] Ibid., March 14, 1955.   [24] Ibid.

contract for the survey, but then sub-contracted the matter of sewers

and drainage problems to a Corvallis, Oregon engineering firm. The

two organizations submitted contradictory reports. The Industrial Survey

Associates' report recommended immediate annexation of only 32nd and

33rd Streets. Problems of the area to the east, it was suggested, could

be alleviated simply by surface drainage. This report recommended that

the industrial property of Weyerhaeuser not be annexed. The report

ended with the following statement:

> The East Springfield annexation and sewer project now in view
> would not well serve the interests of any of these groups the
> property owners to be annexed, the city taxpayers, the major
> industrial plants, the taxpayers of Lane County . It would offer
> no assurances of early relief for the unsanitary conditions in the
> area; it would burden the city with heavy costs without meeting
> its future needs...[25]

Conversely, the report of the engineering firm recommended that annex-

ation of an area east to 49th Street take place, in order that "dangerous

health conditions both to those living within the area and to residents

of the city..." be alleviated.[26]

It was not until late August, 1955, that the council acted in

regard to the petitions asking for annexation which had been filed in

mid-March. It will be remembered that these petitions called for an

annexation election on an area extending to 49th Street. At the council

meeting it was moved that the election be held, and that the 49th Street

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[25] Ibid., June 27, 1955.   [26] Ibid., July 21, 1955.

boundary, as suggested, be retained. Councilmen Briggs, Jenson, and Haynes voted in the affirmative; opposed were council members McChesney, Reed, and Allen. Mayor Harms broke the tie by voting in the affirmative. The area to be considered for annexation was estimated to be two square miles in size and have a population between 2000 and 2500. Quite obviously, the area included the holdings of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company and several other lumber plants.

Prior to the vote calling an election for September 30, the council heard the opinions of many area residents and property owners. Opinions as to a proper boundary were as disparate as speakers. Some, who opposed annexation to 49th Street and also opposed only the annex-ation of the two streets contiguous to the city's eastern limits, sug-gested that 42nd Street was a proper line. George Weyerhaeuser re-minded the council of the 32nd and 33rd Streets recommendation of the survey firm. Washburn stated that the residents that he represented would favor the 49th Street boundary as their original petitions had specified. Mayor Harms reminded George Weyerhaeuser that the engi-neering report had recommended annexation of the entire area. Council-man Reed said he thought the area was simply too large, while Council-man McChesney favored the 42nd Street boundary, but urged that indus-trial sites east of that line be excluded.

Although the annexation had originally been scheduled for

September 30, it was later changed to October 14, because of legal

technicalities. As the election date neared the residents of the city

and the fringe area were subjected to much publicity, including a

doggerel poem urging that annexation be consummated. The Springfield

News probably expressed the community's lack of consensus in regard

to the election when it stated:

We view with mixed emotions the annexation election to be held
October 14.

We have confidence in majority rule. Through the years the
American public has demonstrated a remarkable ability to separate
the wheat from the chaff, the basically fair from the basically un-
fair. We feel that the annexation elections will draw a heavy
vote...We feel that Springfield should extend a helping hand to
areas wishing to consolidate or annex--but the moral question is
whether the many benefits possible would outweigh a basic un-
fairness in the proposition. It is up to each voter to decide that
for himself.[27]

The election results indicated that annexation had again been de-

feated, although residents of Springfield voted in the affirmative:

Springfield--yes 482, no 462; the fringe area--yes 123, no 154. Both

pro- and anti-annexation forces spent substantial funds in the cam-

paign, although undoubtedly the heavier expenses were incurred by indus-

tries opposing the annexation measure. Mayor Harms stated prior to the

election that much of the advertising purchased by the industries was

"erroneous, inflammatory, and misleading."[28]

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[27] Ibid., October 6, 1955.

[28] Ibid., October 13, 1955. A partial copy of a Weyerhaeuser

Negotiation, Indecision, and Postponement

It was in early March, 1956, that annexation again became a matter of discussion in Springfield. At a meeting called by Gary Washburn several city officials and planning consultants appeared and discussed the possibility of calling another election. Mayor Harms of Springfield suggested that it was not the proper time to call an election, and that he preferred to wait until January, 1957. But Harms indicated that annexation would be placed on the council agenda for mid-March. Washburn indicated that if boundaries were to be prepared he would consult with Howard Buford. Buford, present at the meeting, expressed his willingness to assist in boundary preparations, but suggested that annexation petitions be prepared for specific small areas so that if opposition developed in any area it could easily be omitted from consideration by the council. City Manager Robert Turner of Springfield cautioned against any immediate steps leading to an annexation election. He said that "strong expressions" from the area would be necessary before he would recommend to the council that an election be held, insofar as two elections had been defeated in the recent past. The pro-annexation group reiterated the health and drainage situation in the area and stated that problems were becoming even more critical. Mayor Harms agreed with their statements, and said the "sooner we get them

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advertisement can be found in Appendix B.

in, the sonner solved," but he cautioned that "we must be sure this time it will pass; we can't go on holding elections."[29]

The Springfield council, at its next meeting, upon the recommendation of Mayor Harms and Manager Turner, tabled any action leading to the holding of an annexation election in East Springfield.

It was not until January, 1957, that annexation again came to the concern of residents of Springfield and the urban fringe. Early in the month Gary Washburn and John Perin, annexation leaders, visited City Manager Turner to discuss the possibilities of an election. Turner told them that the city had no plans at that time to submit an election proposal to the voters, and urged them to take up the matter with the Commissioners of Lane County. The County Commissioners then called a meeting to consider the feasibility of annexation and to discuss tentative boundaries. At the meeting there was considerable disparity of opinion as to the proper governmental device for alleviating sewer and drainage problems. The County Commissioners, through Commissioner Straub, suggested that annexation to Springfield would be the wisest and most economical solution. On the other hand, some opponents of annexation pointed out that state law provided for the creation of special sewer districts with taxing power. Commissioner Straub made the point

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[29] Ibid., March 6, 1956.

that such a district would be financially inadequate unless the industrial property was included. Manager Turner told the opponents of annexation that,

> We are not attempting to come out and take you in. A lot of study must be made. Personally, I feel that annexation is the only way. If you have any solution, Springfield would be glad to help.[30]

Springfield's City Manager then reiterated his belief that the council would have to be convinced of the area's interest in annexation before it would call another election. He maintained that the health problem was, or should be, as much of a matter of concern to the county as to the city of Springfield.

Late in January, 1957, Lane County and East Springfield industries agreed to finance another engineering survey of the fringe area. The Corvallis engineering firm which had suggested annexation to 49th Street in 1955, was given the contract. At the meeting which led to the survey proposal City Manager Turner stated that,

> I do not believe from a tax standpoint that Springfield could take in a million dollars of valuation [East Springfield's valuation minus the Weyerhaeuser holdings] and spend $1,400,000 without incurring problems...It would be a six-mill increase....The city's position is that without the valuation, it can't afford to annex the area.[31]

Approximately one month later the engineering firm reported its findings, and suggested alternative plans to alleviate sewage and

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[30] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1957.   [31] *Ibid.*, January 24, 1957.

drainage problems east of the city. The report indicated, however, that annexation was the most economical plan. No eastern boundary was suggested by the report although it included cost figures for annexation to 72nd Street and 49th Street. Following the submission of the report Mayor Harms urged that plans be made which would lead to the annexation of the urban fringe. He pointed out, however, that,

> the assistance of industry is needed in providing services for the area. I could not, and I do not believe the council could, in good conscience undertake to burden the city of Springfield with the additional tax load required unless industrial valuations were included.[32]

During the remainder of February and in early March negotiations were carried on and reports concerning annexation were prepared. City Manager Turner prepared a supplemental report which was submitted to various officials and the involved industries and which contained cost figures for other city services to be provided in case annexation was completed. The engineering report dealt solely with sewer and drainage costs. In addition, John Perin's pro-annexation forces began the circulation of petitions again asking the city to call an election out to 49th Street. An additional action which later proved to be of significance was that George Weyerhaeuser was replaced as manager of the timber company's operation by R. A. Kronenberg at about the time that

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[32] Ibid., February 25, 1957.

the engineering firm's report was being discussed in the community.

On March 18, 1957, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company suddenly with-
drew objection to the annexation of East Springfield. In a letter to all of
the Springfield area employees of the organization Manager Kronenberg
stated that annexation would not be opposed if the city would annex the
entire McKenzie Water District. This would have made Springfield's
eastern boundary 72nd Street. The text of the letter which included the
company's conditions follows:

As you know, the sanitation problem in the area to the east of
Springfield has been discussed at great lengths during the past
several years. Various studies have been made and various
solutions have been suggested. Also, during this period annex-
ation to the City of Springfield has been voted on in three differ-
ent elections, and in each instance the voters have decided
against annexation.

The Weyerhaeuser Timber Company opposed annexation as a
solution because the company believed that the boundaries were
not fairly drawn, and because the company provided for itself
all the services that a city could provide. Lane County and Oregon
State sanitary officials have studied the problem and arrived at the
conclusion that the installation of sanitary sewage collection and
disposal facilities is the only sure way to correct the condition.

In order to determine the cost of such installation an engineering
firm has made two separate studies. In the latter study, they
have calculated total cost and have shown the millage rates that
would develop in the area with and without industry. Using this
as a base, City of Springfield officials have estimated the costs
of other city services. It is probable that the question of annex-
ation will come up again for a vote of the people both inside and
outside of the city.

Your company has always felt that it should take part in the com-
munity just as every other good citizen does. We feel that if a

sound program of city development should be presented the
people in the area would exercise their good judgment if an
annexation election is held. We believe also that a program
for the solution of the problems in the area east of the city
should include the following items:

1. Correction of the sanitary conditions in the area is essential.

2. That boundaries drawn for proposed annexation should be
fairly drawn. By this we mean boundaries for proper development
of the area, and a logical and natural extension of the city to in-
clude the present boundaries of the McKenzie Water district and
the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company Springfield plant.

3. That the city provide factual data to show what millage rates
would be to supply other services such as water, streets, light-
ing, sidewalks, police protection, fire protection, etc., and
including that of sanitary sewage disposal. Also that figures
concerning extra assessments to the residents over and above
tax millages should be presented in full. These would include
street and sidewalk, sewer lateral, and sewage service charges.

4. That the city provide a time table that would show as truly as
possible when the various services would be made available to
the area residents.

5. That the city would exercise its best ability to establish
sound budgets and operate within those budgets.

When this information has been provided, and if an annexation
election is again held, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company will
go along with the desires of the residents of the City of Spring-
field, and the residents in the area east of town.[33]

As soon as the Weyerhaeuser statement was made public Mayor

Harms announced that a plan such as had been suggested by the timber

company was already under discussion and preparation by city officials.

Mayor Harms and Manager Turner indicated that a "go slow" attitude

[33] Ibid., March 18, 1957.

would be taken by the city in the face of the absolute necessity of obtaining cost figures and in the preparation of detailed plans showing project priority in the area to the east. They pointed out that it would be difficult to initiate any annexation proceeding prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, July, 1957.

Several days later the Springfield city council in an informal meeting let it be known that regardless of the date of an annexation election it would be impossible for the city to provide services in the area until July, 1958. The primary reason being that the budget for the fiscal year 1957-58 was already in its first stage of preparation. At this meeting Manager Turner informed the council and his department heads that his cost and service study could not be completed until late fall and that an election would not be advisable until November. Another election, to authorize the selling of bonds for sewer construction, would then be necessary, Turner pointed out. General agreement was reached at the meeting that the entire McKenzie Water District be annexed, however, City Attorney Carmichael urged that boundaries be considered from the point of view of sanitary problems and the terrain and not simply by looking at a map. There was some feeling on the part of several councilmen that the Water District boundary was a "logical" one, and should be adhered to in any annexation election. Any alteration, they suggested, would

indicate that boundaries were being set for "political" reasons.

That the proponents of annexation were expecting opposition to annexation from other sources, insofar as the industrial plants had apparently agreed to be annexed, soon became apparent. The new source of opposition never publicly voiced its antagonism and annexation proponents attempted to coopt them, but were never completely successful in doing so. Should the entire McKenzie Water District be annexed to the city of Springfield it would have meant the dissolution of the district's fire protection organization, and it was known in the community that the volunteer fire organization had opposed the partial annexation of the district in the past, but had been content to remain in the background and allow Weyerhaeuser to lead annexation opposition. Thus, the Springfield News urged the following:

> One of our favorite fire departments is that of the McKenzie district, where the men have a community consciousness and provide a nerve center for much progressive action in the district. We hope that in the event of annexation this department can be kept intact, to continue its service both in fighting and in other community endeavors.[34]

Similarly, at a meeting of pro-annexation leaders, following the Weyerhaeuser statement, John Perin indicated that,

> "...he and others have been concerned about the status of the fine fire department of the McKenzie Water district in the event of an annexation. Discussing this matter with city officials, he

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[34]Ibid.

said he is confident that the McKenzie department can be kept intact, if the department wishes that, and that full-time paid firemen needed for East Springfield can be hired from among the present McKenzie volunteers."[35]

During the spring of 1957, Manager Turner and his department heads were engaged in preparing cost estimates and other necessary material. At the same time Turner directed the Springfield Planning Commission to continue to investigate "workable, practical" boundaries for annexation.[36] At the same time, however, Turner indicated that he proposed that "we take the entire water district as a base and work from that."[37] Buford, the city planning commission's advisor, urged that hesitancy be the city's attitude in assuming the burden of providing water services to the district should it be annexed. He admitted that state law provided several mechanisms but he indicated that perhaps the city should not become involved in the water business.

In early September, 1957, Manager Turner told the city council that he would not recommend an election for November. It was his feeling that there had not been a sufficient expression of interest in annexation from the area to the east of the city. At the same time,

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[35] Ibid., March 21, 1957.

[36] The Mayor's Annual Message to the Springfield City Council, delivered in January, 1957, had urged the Planning Commission to initiate a master plan for annexation.

[37] Springfield News, June 6, 1957.

planning consultant Howard Buford told the city's Planning Commission

that he would recommend annexation to the east only to 58th Street. He

stated:

> We would be in a much better position to tax and serve people
> most equitably by stopping at 58th....then we can catch our
> breath before going on east.[38]

No action was taken at that time on either recommendation.

Within one month Manager Turner had reached the same conclusion

about the eastern boundary as had been proposed by Buford, although for

perhaps different reasons. Turner told the Springfield planning com-

mission that,

> I have the impression people living in the area east of 58th
> Street are not entirely in favor of annexation...I'm not saying
> it [annexation] should be done until the people there show the
> inclination.[39]

The long-awaited city report concerning the cost of municipal

services to be provided the eastern area should an annexation election

be successfully held was made public by City Manager Turner in mid-

October, 1957. The report was based upon projected annexation to 72nd

Street and did not recommend any change in this boundary. The city

manager did point out, however, that if the boundary line were reduced

millage rates would likely decline insofar as the further east annexation

was carried the smaller the amount of assessed valuation was available

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[38] Ibid., September 12, 1957.   [39] Ibid., October 10, 1957.

for taxation purposes. Besides presenting technical and economic data,

Manager Turner made it explicit to the public in this report that annex-

ation would mean an immediate bond election; he also pointed out that

if annexation were successful it would be legally binding until the begin-

ning of the fiscal year, thus no taxes would be collected until July 1 and

no services would or could be provided until that date. Turner also

stated:

> The annexation of an area east of the City of Springfield...is
> financially feasible. But annexation should not be undertaken
> without a very strong indication from the people of the area
> east that they desire such a move...We should not place our-
> selves in the position of forcing annexation on anyone. We
> should proceed only on the basis that a mutual problem exists
> and that we are undertaking its solution for the ultimate benefit
> of the citizens of both the McKenzie Water district and the City
> of Springfield.[40]

Following the presentation of Turner's report Mayor Harms suggested

that the city's planning commission submit a report indicating proper

boundaries from the standpoint of planning. The consensus of the

council was that, like Turner, they did not feel it necessary to call

an election unless area residents indicated their support of annexation.

In the early part of November the city planning commission re-

commended that 58th Street be the eastern boundary of the annexation

area. This body urged, however, that municipal services be provided

in such a manner that they could be made to handle an enlarged area

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[40] _Ibid._, October 14, 1957.

should the area between 58th and 72nd Streets desire to be annexed at a later date. The meeting at which the recommendation was made witnessed a variety of statements concerning proper boundaries. Springfield's city engineer suggested that exclusion of the area east of 58th Street was "postponing the inevitable."[41] City Manager Turner then pointed out that the Lane County Health office had stated that little health problems existed east of 58th. On the other hand, John Perin, annexation leader, suggested that his group would strenuously object if the boundary were set further east than 58th Street. He indicated that opposition might develop to annexation if a boundary further to the east than 58th Street were set. A week later the city council accepted the report of the planning commission and stated that should interest in annexation be forthcoming the 58th Street line would be the annexation area's eastern limit. Soon thereafter Perin and other annexation supporters started the circulation of petitions asking the council to call an election.

John Perin and Max Gardner, the area annexation leaders, soon called a public meeting in the fringe area to which both supporters and antagonists of annexation appeared. At that time Manager Turner stated that Weyerhaeuser Timber Company would not oppose annexation, even

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[41] Ibid., November 7, 1957.

though the boundary had been reduced from the company's 72nd Street proposal. He said Weyerhaeuser had "...withdrawn all objection... they are not entirely overjoyed at the prospect of annexation, but they are not objecting."[42] Mayor Harms, answering boundary objections, stated that the description had been drawn on the basis "of what land is urban in character, what land belongs in the city, not where we can pass an election."[43] Many individuals at the meeting stated, however, that they would vote against annexation because they owned agricultural property in the area. Others pointed to the economic recession and stated that they had no desire to increase their tax rates.

During the remainder of December and first part of January pro-annexation leaders were circulating petitions. The city, through City Manager Turner, had indicated that at least seven hundred signatures should be presented on the annexation petitions to demonstrate to the council that area residents were supporting annexation. Early in January, 1958, John Perin reported that the required signatures had been nearly collected but that circulators had found that there was a good deal of antagonism to annexation between 49th and 58th Streets. Perin also stated that there were indications that the McKenzie Water District's volunteer firemen were opposed to annexation. The pro-annexation

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[42] Ibid., December 2, 1957.   [43] Ibid.

leaders suggested that boundaries should be revised, making 49th Street

the eastern limit. Manager Turner squelched any such move when he

reported that it was his understanding that Weyerhaeuser Timber would

oppose annexation should the boundaries be altered. Company officials

confirmed this, but declined to offer any comment. Mayor Harms also

reaffirmed the city's position by stating that he and the council were

committed to logical boundaries rather than political ones. Several days

later Weyerhaeuser made its position clear when in a public statement it

said:

> We believe that the Springfield Planning Commission approached
> the matter from a sound and logical standpoint and their finding
> for the 58th Street east boundary fulfill the standards of wise
> planning.[44]

Antagonists of annexation soon were in the field with petitions to

counter those circulated by proponents of annexation to Springfield. The

antagonists maintained that "The area proposed for annexation includes

five dairy farms, in addition to approximately 500 acres of farm land."[45]

They urged that with some assistance from the state highway department

and the county, along with the water district, drainage and sewage

problems could be eliminated.

Late in January, 1958, petitions were presented to the city council

by both supporters and antagonists of annexation. Both group of petitions

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[44] _Ibid.,_ January 16, 1958.   [45] _Ibid.,_ January 20, 1958.

carried the signatures of more than seven hundred area residents. An attorney representing opponents of annexation stressed, at the council meeting of January 27, that a serious difference of community opinion was indicated by the conflicting petitions. He also said there were three major arguments against holding an annexation election: the presence of agricultural and dairy interests in the area involved; the recession which had harmed the economy of Lane County, and the consequent possible defeat of a bond election; and the availability of county planning services for the area proposed for annexation. This attorney mentioned that if an election were successfully held it would likely be challenged in the courts because of the presence of agricultural land in the area. After proponents and opponents had spoken Mayor Harms called for expressions of opinion from the council. Councilman Jenson spoke against holding an election insofar as it appeared that it would be doomed to defeat. Briggs urged that an election be held. Mayor Harms stated that annexation was the only long-range solution, but that he was surprised at the number of opponents to annexation, as indicated by the petitions. Jenson then moved that an election be postponed, and the motion was seconded. Briggs inquired as to the date to which the matter had been postponed. Mayor Harms stated only, "It cannot be postponed indefinitely."[46]

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[46] See Report on the Springfield City Council meeting of January 27,

John Perin, the annexation leader, apparently realizing that the council was going to postpone the annexation election urged that his group be allowed time in which to adjust the boundaries of the area. He indicated that annexation to 49th Street would win voter approval. The vote on postponement was four in favor, and one against (Briggs). Mayor Harms then stated that he felt the entire council was in favor of annexation, but that it appeared that even if the election were successful it would be difficult to pass a large bond measure.

Speaking to the pro-annexation leaders, Mayor Harms said:

My sympathy is with you and has been for about five years. I intend to urge the council to call an election in the late summer...[47]

Postscript

In early August, 1958 Mayor Harms indicated that he expected to recommend that the city council place the question of annexation on the November ballot. Harms pointed to a recent survey made by the health office of Lane County which indicated that twenty-eight per cent of the residences in the area were in violation of sanitary codes. Harms said he felt that the council was obligated to put the matter on the ballot and that circulation of petitions would not be necessary, insofar as the

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1958, by Gary Field. On file at Kellogg Project, Johnson Hall, University of Oregon.

[47] Springfield News, January 30, 1958.

proponents of annexation had collected in excess of 700 in January, 1958.

Manager Turner said that his office would have to re-evaluate the finan-

cial study of the area but that no major change was anticipated. Manager

Turner also stated that if annexation was successful the water district

would continue to provide water services to the area.

He also mentioned the high regard the city has for the McKenzie
volunteer firemen, and said he hopes they will become members
of the city organization if annexation passes.[48]

Three weeks later Mayor Harms suggested that the council postpone

any annexation election until after January, 1959. The reason for the

alteration of dates was that the city council later passed an ordinance

calling an election at the November general election for the purpose of

seeking approval to sell bonds in order to purchase the privately-owned

electrical utility. Harms said the issues were so important that to put

both of them on the ballot might cause some confusion and make the in-

formation job on the part of the council more difficult.[49]

Springfield city manager Turner indicates that he had some influ-

ence on the mayor's alteration in plans for calling an annexation election

in November. Turner now opposes immediate annexation. His opposition

is not so much toward the theory of annexation, but is caused by the fact

that he believes that the city has too many projects now in operation. He

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[48] Springfield News, August 4, 1958.   [49] Ibid., August 28, 1958.

cites urban renewal and the need for street improvement within the city.
A successful annexation election, he points out, would simply multiply
his present problems and that the city forces would be unable to cope
with the added area at this time. He indicates that annexation will
eventually occur, but that he will attempt to dampen the ardor of pro-
annexation forces until the city has made more internal progress. He
also has some doubts whether the voters would approve a bond issue
should an election be held.

CHAPTER IV

THE DOCTRINES OF MANAGER GOVERNMENT

In this chapter the major elements in the contemporary doctrine of
the city manager movement will be presented. In addition material focus-
ing on the changes which have occurred in the philosophy of the movement
will be introduced. Later in the study some comment on the adequacy of
the doctrines of manager government will be offered, but in this chapter
an attempt has been made to tell the story as do the International City
Managers' Association and the advocates of the manager plan.

The Professional Orientation

Since its formation in 1914, the International City Managers'
Association[1] has published material ranging from hortatory accounts of
the advantages of the managerial form of local government to technical
manuals dealing with municipal finance. A constant theme of much of
this literature is that the occupation of city manager deserves to be

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[1] The best one-source history of the city manager movement, al-
though it is now dated, is Leonard D. White, The City Manager (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1927). For later events the International
City Managers' Association's journal, Public Management, is the best
available source of information.

regarded as a profession.[2] Other observers have also used the term

"profession" when describing the city manager status.[3] Writing in 1927,

Leonard D. White presented what he considered to be the criteria of a

profession and compared these criteria with his observations of the city

manager occupation and the manager movement.

> For the present purpose a profession is understood to include:
> (1) an organized body of knowledge and an established method
> of procedure; (2) a group of persons united in an association
> comprising a substantial proportion of the membership of the
> profession; (3) known standards of admission to the profession,
> so that a distinction can be made between those who are and
> who are not qualified to membership; (4) recognized methods of
> training recruits; (5) a code of ethics; and (6) a wide spread
> sense of professionalism, denoting thereby an obligation to the
> group and a loyalty to the ideal of service rather than personal
> advantage as a standard of conduct.[4]

White's conclusion was that "The city managers as a group are making

definite progress in attaining the dignity of the professional status."[5]

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[2] An early example of this theme can be found in Clarence E. Ridley
and Orin F. Nolting, The City Manager Profession (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1934). This book should be viewed as an
authoritative and an official statement of the ideology of the manager
movement insofar as the authors were the director and assistant director
of The International City Managers' Association at the time of publi-
cation.

[3] For example, see George K. Floro, "Types of City Managers,"
Public Management (October, 1954), pp. 221-225; and H. Stone, D. Price,
and K. Stone, City Manager Government in the United States: A Review
After Twenty-Five Years (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940),
esp. pp. 66-69. Status is here defined as "...a position in a social
system occupied by designated individuals..." Robert K. Merton, Social
Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, rev.
ed.), p. 368.

[4] Leonard D. White, The City Manager, p. 272.   [5] Ibid.

In regard to the criterion of an organized body of knowledge and

an established method of procedure, White stated that

> The managers possess at the present moment a nucleus of common
> knowledge peculiar to their own work, certain standardized patterns
> of action, and on a larger scale the whole technique of executive
> methods so rapidly being developed within and without government.
> They have done nothing until the present moment to organize this
> common knowledge and methods so as to make them easily avail-
> able, nor are they generally familiar with the literature of manage-
> ment.[6]

The annual convention of the association and the journal, previously

known as the City Manager Magazine and now titled Public Management,

were regarded by White as the major techniques utilized to spread a

knowledge of the techniques and methods.

White's second criterion of a profession was the presence of an

association comprising a substantial proportion of the membership of the

occupation. In the International City Managers' Association he found

such an association, although he pointed out that a considerable

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[6]
    Ibid., pp. 272-273. In commenting upon managerial lack of
interest in administration, White said: "...I was impressed with the
preoccupation of the managers with physical construction and their
neglect of the intellectual and moral interests of the community....The
managers lack interest in the theory of municipal government. Mr.
Richard S. Childs addressed their annual convention in 1918, suggesting
some probable lines of future development of municipal government...
The managers were not convinced by this address, and on another oc-
casion they expressed themselves so contemptuously of the "theorist"
that an outsider, Mr. George C. Sikes, felt obliged to come to the de-
fense of the speaker. Mr. Childs was told directly that theorists were
not welcome at the meetings of the Association. Curiously enough the
managers as a group are not interested in administration...They are

minority of managers had never joined the organization.[7] The association, White maintained, had aided in the growth of an esprit de corps, but he was disturbed by the fact that the association had not developed protective functions,

> ...seeking to defend its members from malicious opposition or to clear the name of members who have fallen victim to political or other intrigue. This is a delicate function, but one which many professional organizations undertake. Thus the American Association of University Professors will investigate and publish a statement in cases where it believes a member of the academic group has been unfairly dismissed or where the principle of freedom of speech has been violated....The professional solidarity of the managers would be strengthened if they should undertake to protect their members against unwarranted interference, at least to the extent of publishing the facts and then giving a public warning that a given city does not offer any manager a fair opportunity. This procedure would also involve the readiness of the Association to decline to publish a statement where the fault lay primarily with the manager.[8]

A third professional criterion suggested by White in 1927, was that professions generally have formal standards of admission to membership.

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performing certain operations, but it does not appear that they view these operations in any generalized form. They do not discuss administration in its wider aspects at their conventions..." White, pp. 148-150.

[7] "A considerable minority of the managers have never joined the Association....The bulk of these men are local appointees who are not professional managers at all and who have no general interest in the city-manager movement. A few of them are fearful of offending some local feeling by joining an outside organization.. A few of them are simply ignorant or stupid with regard to the Association." White, pp. 274-275.

[8] White, The City Manager, p. 277.

Speaking of the manager occupation and the association he said:

> The managers have no test of membership other than that indi-
> cated in the Constitution: "any person twenty-one years of age
> who is the administrative head of a municipality appointed by
> its legislative body, and who has served in that capacity for a
> period of not less than twelve consecutive months."[9]

White was also concerned by the fact that the association had never

seriously considered setting up tests of ability for membership.

> Nor have they thought of setting up any criterion of the appli-
> cant's attitude toward his work, i.e., whether he intended
> following it as a career. A rough estimate would rate perhaps

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[9] Ibid., pp. 279-280. The constitution of the International City Managers' Association, as it stood after revision in September, 1947, specified that full membership could be granted only after the manager served for a period of three years: "Any person who is the administrative head of a municipality and appointed by its legislative body, who has served in that capacity for at least three years, and whose professional conduct conforms to the code of ethics of this Association shall be eligible to this membership...The application shall bear the indorsement of at least two corporate members." Article VII, section 2, of the Constitution of the association. Before an individual is entitled to full membership the association asks for written objections from its members. If objections are received the executive board of the International City Managers' Association has ultimate authority to admit or reject the applicant. The constitution also provides for associate members, who have voting rights in the association, but who have served as manager for less than the required three years. Article VIII, section 1, deals with expulsion procedures. Only after the association has received a written request from ten full members, stating a cause for expulsion, does the procedure begin. The constitution provides that the executive board of the association shall examine the charges and if justification for expulsion are found to exist the manager in question is allowed to present a written answer to the charges. The final decision of the board can be appealed by the member, and the issue is then submitted to the membership for a secret mail ballot. A majority of the ballots cast is required to reverse the action of the executive board.

four managers out of ten as not professionals in any sense of the word.[10]

The fourth criterion of a profession according to White was the existence of recognized means of preparation for entering the occupation. Within the manager movement White found little agreement concerning the desirable minimum of preparation, nor was there agreement in regard to preferred preliminary training. "The managers have consistently neglected to pay attention to this phase of their professional interests."[11]

Since the International City Managers' Association possessed a code of ethics, originally adopted in 1924, White found that this criterion of a profession was fulfilled.

The code...stands as a sincere and worthwhile attempt to formulate certain of the rights and obligations of managers in their official duties. To draft the code is of itself a notable achievement.[12]

The sixth criterion of a profession, as proposed by White, was a wide spread sense of professionalism, denoting an obligation to the group and a loyalty to the ideal of service rather than personal advantage. White found that

The managers are not given to emotion or sentimentality, but one can read in their remarks sincere and devoted expressions of faithfulness to the larger movement toward an efficient democracy of which they are a part.[13]

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[10] _Ibid._, p. 281.　[11] _Ibid._, p. 283.　[12] _Ibid._, p. 285.　[13] _Ibid._, p. 286.

The preceding brief review of the findings of Leonard D. White,
as of 1927, has been included for purposes of comparison with con-
temporary views of the city manager occupational status. Probably the
most recent review of the occupation, as well as being an authoritative
statement, is to be found in a publication of the International City
Managers' Association, City Management--A Growing Profession.[14] The
report states that

> From the beginning, the city manager aspired to be recognized
> by the world as he regarded himself--a professional man engaged
> in professional work, governing himself by professional standards,
> obligations, and ethics...[15]

Like White's earlier work, the report then set up a definition of a pro-
fession, although admitting that it was difficult to distinguish between
professions and what it termed the professionalized skilled trades.

> The characteristics which are basic to all recognized professions
> are as follows: It is a type of vocation that normally requires
> such extensive training and experience that one would not ordi-
> narily prepare for it except as part of a plan to make it a lifetime
> career. Successful performance demands an understanding of the
> theoretical structure of some departments of learning or science
> including a general knowledge of the wisdom accumulated through
> the ages, and also a set of abilities or skills accompanying the
> understanding.

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[14] Report of the Committee on Professional Training of The
International City Managers' Association, City Management--A Growing
Profession (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1957).

[15] Ibid., p. 3.

The understanding and accompanying abilities are applied to
practical affairs of men. Always consideration of the general
welfare of clients is the first ethical imperative of service.
And those engaged in the calling have recognized a collective
responsibility for the interest in the improvement of services
to such an extent that they have formed an association to main-
tain and improve ethical standards, to promote training of its
members, and to collect and disseminate pertinent knowledge
and understanding. These characteristics, basic to recognized
professions, give them prestige, responsibility, and public
usefulness.[16]

Next, the report posed the question: "On the basis of these

qualities of professionalism, does membership in the International City

Managers' Association meet the criteria of a profession?"[17] The report's

answer was an affirmative. Yet, the report would appear, in fact, to be

a denial of the proposition that the occupational status is that of a pro-

fession. It is quite true that since Leonard D. White wrote in 1927, the

association made strides in disseminating organized bodies of knowledge

and established, and apparently successful, methods of procedure.[18]

Equally obvious is the fact that the association is still functioning and

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[16]
   Ibid., pp. 67-68.   [17] Ibid., p. 68.

[18]
   An example of the association's activity in disseminating "bodies
of knowledge and established methods of procedure" is its municipal
management series. In this series, which has had several editions, are
the following: The Technique of Municipal Administration, Local Planning
Administration, Municipal Finance Administration, Municipal Personnel
Administration, Municipal Police Administration, Municipal Fire Admini-
stration, Municipal Public Works Administration, and Municipal Recre-
ation Administration. In the forward to the third edition of The Technique
of Municipal Administration the development and rationale of the series

a code of ethics, although revised several times, is still operative. On

the other hand, there would seem to be reasonable grounds to deny that

the occupation can be termed a profession, but this will be treated at

greater length in a following chapter.

Unlike the legal or medical professions, the city manager occu-

pational group does not have a formal educational process which must

be met and passed by aspirants. The Report of the Committee on

Professional Training of the International City Managers' Association

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is set forth: "The nature and approach of this series can best be ex-
plained by a brief review of its origin and development. In 1934 the
International City Managers' Association received...several special
grants...for the preparation and administration of in-service training
courses for municipal officers at the administrative, or management,
level....In its early years the Institute confined its training activities
solely to training by the correspondence course method. This, of
course, required the preparation of study materials. It was soon dis-
covered that the published texts available were not suitable for the
kind of training for which the Institute was established. It was neces-
sary, therefore, for the Institute to prepare its own training texts, and
in the seven-year period from 1935 through 1941 eight of these texts
were prepared and published....The two distinguishing features of the
volumes in this series are traceable directly to their origin. First, they
approach municipal problems from the point of view of top-level admini-
strators--city managers, department heads, and their principal aides.
Second, because they were prepared as the basis for training courses,
their emphasis is on the "how" rather than the "what" of municipal
administration. They are not intended as detailed manuals or as ex-
positions of model systems of administration, but their objective is to
help the administrator analyze his duties and responsibilities and to
suggest approaches and methods that other administrators have proved
by actual experience." The Technique of Municipal Administration
(Chicago, The International City Managers' Association, 1947, third
edition), p. vii. The place of this series in the dissemination of the
group ideology was stated by Sommers: "...the series are enshrined

declined to recommend any particular educational program. Even had one been recommended the association lacks any legal enforcement powers. The committee did stress, however, the advantages of some work in college-level public administration courses and the frequently utilized internship or administrative assistant program. The Report did note that many managers receive appointment without specific training, but went on to state that

> ...the increasing attractiveness of education and training for city management and the increasing tendency of city councils to seek trained managers indicate the development, if not the full attainment of a professional career. The tendency of many managers to look to no other career points in the same direction.[19]

A distinguishing characteristic of a profession, it has been suggested, is the existence of some form of state licensing or professional sanctioning done with the approval of the state. This is not found within the manager occupation.[20] There are those, however, within the

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as the ultimate references on municipal problems...The texts are not only valuable guides for administrators on the job; they are also basic sources for training in the city as well as in the university." William A. Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review," Western Political Quarterly, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), p. 141.

[19] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 68.

[20] The International City Managers' Association is somewhat active in the placing of managers as the following statement illustrates: "This Association will list without charge in its bi-weekly News Letter any city manager vacancy with details as to qualifications and salary, which the council supplies. This gives city managers and men desiring to enter the profession an opportunity to apply for the position. The Association

International City Managers' Association who advocate organizational

certification of managers. Some others, including various city managers,

also favor a contractual tenure agreement between a city manager and the

city council. The proclaimed purpose of certification is to weed out those

who may not have the proper background, training, or successful munici-

pal experience;[21] while the proposal for a formal agreement between the

city and the manager is to grant him greater job security. The Committee

on Professional Training frowned on certification, stating that

> The conclusion may be drawn that city management is a profession
> of relatively high standards, but as a new profession it is not ready
> yet to prescribe and enforce rigid standards of membership. The

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is interested only to the extent that a qualified person be appointed. It
does not recommend or seek the appointment of any candidate. However,
the executive director upon request from responsible members of a city
government either will furnish brief statements concerning the qualifi-
cations of a specified candidate or will give any authorized represen-
tative of the city free access to the qualification and experience records
of its entire membership." The Selection of a City Manager: Suggested
Procedure to Aid City Councils in Appointing a Manager (Chicago: The
International City Managers' Association, 1947), pp. 9-10.

[21] Although the association has no formal authority to bar indivi-
duals from holding manager positions it does exercise some degree of
power, obviously, over membership in the formal organization. Only
those managers who have served for three years are eligible for full
membership in the association. Another qualification is that the as-
sociation will admit only those managers who hold positions in cities
which the association define as possessing an adequate manager charter.
Thus, if a city charter does not grant the manager authority concerning
municipal appointments which the association deems sufficient, the
manager will not be considered eligible for membership. The associ-
ation also is able to remove a manager from membership for various
causes, the chief one being a violation of the association's code of
ethics.

position of The International City Managers' Association is that for the time being, at least, licensing or certification will not help to promote better service to municipalities. The qualifications for successful performance have not been sufficiently standardized to justify rigid prescriptions commonly associated with certification.[22]

In disavowing contractual agreements the same report noted:

Strange as it may seem to an outsider, the institutional insecurity of city managers is in full accord with the policies of their professional organization. Occasionally members have suggested ...a policy of annual or biennial contracts on the grounds that such policies would promote better service or more highly qualified managers. But the proposals have been overwhelmingly rejected. The Association is convinced that, up to the present at least, no scheme has been devised which would restrict the freedom of governing bodies to appoint and remove managers without infringing upon popular control of local government, which is the primary ethical imperative of the city management profession.[23]

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[22] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 68.

[23] Ibid., p. 71. An observer has recently written of the certification and contract proposals: "...this is advancing the cause of professionalism beyond the limit of the democratic principles involved. City councils can not be bound as to whom they should choose for their manager and they certainly will not take it happily to have a professional organization "certify" likely candidates for the position. While both of these ideas may gain impetus as we grow more conscious of security, they should not be allowed anything more than token discussion among the managers and their citizen advocates." William A. Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review," Western Political Quarterly, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), p. 148. Somewhat indicative, perhaps, of the position which has been attained by the manager movement and its guild is the fact that recently a proposal was made that city managers be covered by a retirement plan. For the proposed scheme see Kent Mathewson, "A Retirement Plan for Managers?" Public Management, XL, No. 3 (March, 1958), pp. 54-56.

The Changing Ideology of Manager Government

Both external observers and members of the International City

Managers' Association have commented on the changes which have

occured within the manager movement and the occupational organization

since 1914, concerning ideology and orientation. A former president of

the International City Managers' Association, George E. Bean, has

stated:

> ...we can trace three periods in the growth of city manager
> government. These periods overlap and blend together to a
> certain extent so that it is impossible to give them definite
> dates. The first period was the public works phase. This
> period was the early era of the Association. Small groups
> interested in the manager plan were scattered and it was a process
> of getting together and finding out how to do specific things....the
> second stage, what we shall call the techniques phase of manage-
> ment. Today many schools are teaching the techniques of manage-
> ment--something which was not even thought of before....During
> this phase the Association has acted as a clearing house--a
> means of getting together and coordinating the work of individual
> managers, research groups, and teachers.
> A few years ago a broader philosophy began to develop, which we
> can call the art or philosophy phase of management. [24]

Writing in 1927, Leonard D. White wrote that, "...I was impressed

with the preoccupation of the managers with physical construction and

their neglect of the intellectual and moral interests of the community...."[25]

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[24] George E. Bean, "Current Trends in City Management," Seventh
Annual City Manager School: A Report (Lawrence, Kansas: Governmental
Research Center, University of Kansas, 1954), p. 23.

[25] Leonard D. White, The City Manager, p. 149.

The period of which White wrote can be identified with Bean's period of public works. Bean has also written that in this period "...the primary topic of discussion by managers was how to get specific things done, mostly in the field of public works."[26] That the manager movement was once engineering-oriented is verified by Ridley and Nolting who state that as of 1933, seventy-six per cent of those managers who held college degrees received them in some branch of engineering.[27] Similarly, Stone, Price, and Stone found, in their study of forty-eight cities having the city manager form, that of the first managers appointed in these cities between 1908 and 1937, thirty-six of them had engineering degrees, three had other college degrees, and nine had no college training. By December 31, 1938, however, the study indicated that of the forty-eight managers then in office thirty had engineering degrees, six had other college degrees, three had incomplete college work, while nine had high school or less.[28] These figures, while not conclusive, would tend to substantiate the assertion that the occupation was at one period

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[26] George E. Bean, "The Future of the Manager Profession," Public Management, XXXVII, No. 2 (February, 1955), p. 28.

[27] Clarence E. Ridley and Orin F. Nolting, The City Manager Profession, p. 84.

[28] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, City Manager Government in the United States: A Review After Twenty-Five Years (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 265.

engineering-oriented, but that at some rather indefinite period another trend was in evidence.

Although no definite date can be assigned, it would probably be correct to assume that the techniques phase occurred in that period which witnessed the initiation of the International City Managers' Association's publications (previously cited) dealing with the techniques and principles of municipal administration. The first editions of these volumes appeared between 1935 and 1940. It is perhaps significant that the Municipal Year Book, containing statistics, papers, and proceedings of the association's convention and conferences, was first published in its present form in 1934. It was also in the early 1930's that the association first issued such publications as The Qualifications and Selection of a City Manager and had committees functioning in fields such as training and education.[29] The orientation of the techniques phase was stated by Louis Brownlow in the forward to the Ridley and Nolting study of 1934.

> What is more slowly coming to be recognized is that there is also a technique of administration. It is gradually coming to be admitted as consistent with the essential doctrines of democracy that there is a problem of management, of the coordination of the several functions and activities of local government, of integrated responsibility, for the municipal

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[29] See Ridley and Nolting, especially Chapter VI, "The International City Managers' Association and its Activities."

administration as a whole.[30]

Before turning to the third phase of city manager ideology it would seem advisable to direct some attention to the code of ethics of the International City Managers' Association. An examination of the code, as it has been revised, would indicate that it mirrors the alterations in the ideology of the movement and within the occupational group. But of equal importance for the purpose of this study is that

> ...the "working code" of ethics--written or unwritten--largely define appropriate professional behavior with respect to four categories of people: the larger community, fellow participants, unauthorized practitioners, and clients.[31]

Even though this study has indicated some doubt as to whether the city manager occupation is properly termed a profession, there would seem to be no question as to the importance of the place of the code in the ideology of the manager movement.

> The city manager enjoys professional status and recognition in part because he acknowledges that the Association's code of ethics is binding upon him. He is individually responsible to himself and to his own conscience for the observation of that professional code. He is also responsible to all fellow members of the profession for his standard of personal conduct. He knows that he can be removed from membership in the Association if he violates the group's standard of ethical conduct. Thus the code

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[30] Ridley and Nolting, p. xi.

[31] William J. Goode, "Community Within a Community: The Professions," American Sociological Review, 22, No. 2 (April, 1957), p. 197.

helps to enforce professional responsibility.[32]

This study is not concerned with discussing each and every change which has been made in the association's code.[33] The more significant changes, in terms of Bean's three stages, should be noted, however.

The 1924 code stressed that "No manager should take an active part in politics," while section 6 indicated the existence of a policy-administration dichotomy.

Although he is a hired employee of the council, he is hired for a purpose--to exercise his own judgment as an executive in accomplishing the policies formulated by the council; and to attain success in his employment he must decline to submit to dictation in matters for which the responsibility is solely his.[34]

By 1938, however, although disclaiming that a manager was in any sense a political leader, section 5 urged that,

In order that policy may be intelligent and effective, he [the city manager] provides the council with information and advice, but he encourages positive decisions on policy by the council instead of passive acceptance of his recommendations.

The code of ethics, as revised in 1938, would seem to indicate that the

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[32] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 81.

[33] For a discussion of these changes see Hugo Wall, "Changing Concepts of Managerial Leadership," Public Management, XXXVI, No. 3 (March, 1954), pp. 50-53; and Douglas G. Weirford, "The Changing Role of the City Manager," Public Management, XXXVI, No. 8 (August, 1954), pp. 170-172.

[34] See Appendix C of this study for the texts of the association's code's of ethics.

association's concept of the managerial role in municipal government

expanded in the intervening years. Yet, sections 6 and 7 urged that

the manager remain in the background of municipal affairs.

> The city manager realizes that it is the council, the elected re-
> presentatives of the people, which is entitled to the credit for
> the fulfillment of municipal policies and leaves to the council
> the defense of policies which may be criticized.[35]

and,

> The city manager keeps the community informed on municipal
> affairs but keeps himself in the background by emphasizing the
> importance of the facts.[36]

The code of ethics of the International City Managers' Association was

again revised in 1952. It would appear that this revision indicated that

a new stage in the development of city manager doctrine had been attained.

Sections 4 and 5 of the 1952 code are significantly different in content

from their earlier counterparts. Section 4 proclaims that a city manager

is a community leader[37] and gives a new statement as to proper mana-

gerial behavior when municipal policy is undergoing attack.

> The city manager as a community leader submits policy proposals
> to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on

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[35] Emphasis mine.

[36] Emphasis mine.

[37] Bean referred to the third stage in the development of manager
doctrine as that of art or philosophy. This is used synonymously in the
literature with community leader or leadership doctrine.

matters of policy to give the council a basis of making decisions on community goals. The city manager defends municipal policies publicly only after consideration and adoption of such policies by the council.

The association's conception of proper managerial behavior when municipal policy is under attack has changed from that of silence and leaving the task of defense to the council (1938 code, section 6) to that of spokesman of the council and defender of policy. In contrast to the code of 1938, which held that the council was entitled to the credit for the fulfillment of municipal policies, section 5 of the 1952 code states:

> The city manager realizes that the council, the elected representatives of the people, is entitled to the credit for the establishment of municipal policies. The city manager avoids coming in public conflict with the council on controversial issues. Credit or blame for policy execution rests with the manager.

The alterations in the formal code of ethics of the International City Managers' Association which were suggested and ratified at the 1952 convention were not sudden innovations. The concept of the city manager as a community leader has only slowly evolved; in fact, this position was proposed as a goal very early in the association's history. [38]

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[38] White has written, "The opinion of the managers is reflected from year to year in the proceedings of their annual convention...This record of opinion...reveals an unremitting conflict between two schools of thought....One...insists that the manager "is the servant absolutely of the council," that a clear demarcation can and should be made between the legislative and administrative functions of a city government, that the manager...should push the council always into the foreground....The

On the other hand, the community leader position which emphasizes the manager as a policy leader, is a major departure from the original and formally approved theory of council-manager government.

In 1927, Leonard D. White was aware that elements existed within the International City Managers' Association which urged an expanded role for the city manager in municipal affairs. At that time he sounded a warning.

> A...hazard facing the manager movement is to be found in the adventuresome spirit of many managers... who seek not only to give good administration, but also to furnish the brains, enthusiasm, and leadership in deciding what shall be the policy or program of the city. This may be referred to as community or civic leadership...The temptation to follow this path is intensified by the unwillingness or inability of the council to supply effective leadership. This course is one which, if persisted in, will sound the death knell of the manager plan...for a manager who undertakes civic leadership stakes his position on the acceptance of his program by the voters. If his program is rejected and no man can supply effective leadership without courting the possibility of rejection, he sacrifices his position...[39]

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opposing school of thought denies that a clear demarcation can be made between the duties of manager and council; points out that the manager is necessarily the center of public interest...; and inquires whether after all the manager must not inevitably become a community leader, dealing with council and people on a broad base of policy and program as well as the narrower base of city administration. The City Manager, p. 182.

[39] Leonard D. White, The City Manager, pp. 300-301.

White also warned that if the manager entered the arena of public opinion by being identified with a particular policy he would necessarily also become identified with certain groups and have to oppose other groups.

Regardless of the admonitions made by White, and those made earlier by other leaders of the city manager movement,[40] the conception of the city manager as community leader finally became the accepted doctrine of the movement. Probably the most explicit statement heralding the acceptance of this development was that made by the president of the International City Managers' Association at the 1948 convention.

> I believe therefore that we as city managers owe it to our communities to exercise more imagination and vision in initiating policy proposals for action by the council. We have the best interests of our cities at heart. That is our job and that is what we work for. We must broaden our concept of managerial duties and not wait for the council or even citizens to propose actions which we believe the council should consider...The city manager--a community leader or not? I say yes.[41]

In 1952, the International City Managers' Association revised its code of ethics to make explicit and formalize this new conception of the place of the manager in the community.

> It would seem, then, that as the story of the council-manager plan unfolds, the kind of manager envisaged by the originators

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[40] See Stone, Price, and Stone, City Manager Government in the United States, pp. 70-76.

[41] C. A. Harrell, "The City Manager as a Community Leader," Public Management, XXX, No. 10 (October, 1948), p. 294.

has failed to develop. This original mold cast the manager in
the role of a colorless, inconspicuous expert director of admini-
strative matters and a person who was unconcerned with what
policies he was assigned to administer so long as he enjoyed
complete freedom in his own narrow specialty, administration.[42]

In the early days, the average manager sought the role of a
relatively anonymous administrator; now he finds himself closely
associated with policy formation and with community leadership.[43]

Granting that the community leader stage in manager doctrine has

been reached and given institutional approval, the question remains, Why

did the manager movement and the International City Managers' Associ-

ation feel it necessary that the managerial role be extended to call for

explicit policy recommendation functions? The answer to this question

sheds some light on the occupation's conception of the adequacy of

elected municipal officials.

The literature of the occupational association and its public

advocates emphasizes that the greatest weakness of council-manager

government lies in the fact that unless the manager assumes the function

of policy recommendation and general community leadership this function

remains largely unfilled. John E. Bebout, an official of the National

Municipal League, states, for example:

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[42] Wall, "Changing Concepts," p. 51.

[43] L. P. Cookingham, "Ridley's Goal--A Mature Profession,"
Public Management, XXXVIII, No. 8 (August, 1956), p. 153.

Neither the city charter nor the fact of popular election can be
counted on to endow a legally strong mayor with the skill and
wisdom to be the kind of leader in policy and administration
that a city should have. But if a "strong" mayor fails to provide
proper leadership, there is generally no one who can fill the
breach. Members of the city council are in no position, legally
or politically, to compensate for his deficiencies...[44]

If a city manager is available Bebout feels the problem is diminished.

The general tenor of the arguments of the advocates of the community

leader-type manager is that neither a mayor nor a council can be expected

to function as sources of policy recommendation. The literature of the

association, even admitting that there is some validity to the argument,

seems to envision the manager as being the only one in community

affairs with the answers to municipal problems. For example:

Lead those whom you contact--members of the council, sub-
ordinate employees, and citizens--into the proper channel by
tactful suggestion rather than by too persuasive argument.
make them feel that they have had a major part in making the
decisions and in establishing the policies which you deem to
be in the best interest of the individual and the government.[45]

Democracy and Efficiency

Advocates of the city manager form of municipal government

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[44]
John E. Bebout, "Management for Large Cities," Public
Administration Review, XV, No. 3 (Summer, 1955), p. 192.

[45]
Guideposts on Assuming a City Manager Position (Chicago:
International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 21.

maintain that this form has as its central idea the resolution of the con-

flict between "democracy and efficiency."[46] The basic commitment to

democratic government is preserved by the popular, at-large election

of a small council, on a non-partisan basis by the use of the short

ballot. This system, according to the supporters of manager govern-

ment "...provides capacity and control for the citizen over his govern-

ment."[47] Efficiency in municipal government can be achieved by the

employment of an individual trained for the function of administration.[48]

Any danger of an irresponsible or unresponsive bureaucracy is made

impossible by placing ultimate authority over revenue, expenditures,

and the manager's tenure in the hands of the council.

The democracy-efficiency dichotomy, as viewed by the occupa-

tional association and its public advocates, rests on certain well defined

ideas about municipal politics and the role of the manager in politics.

While the occupational group recognizes the existence or possibility of

political contests and disputes concerning public policy, it admonishes

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[46] City Management--A Growing Profession, pp. 20-21.

[47] Ibid., p. 20.

[48] In the publication The Selection of a City Manager: Suggested Procedure to Aid City Councils in Appointing a Manager (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1947), p. 1, it is maintained that "If the difficult task of selecting a properly qualified manager is faithfully carried out, and effective and economical administration is practically assured."

the manager to refrain from becoming involved in local political affairs.

The city manager does not participate in election campaigns. He
does not support candidates or identify himself with any party or
faction.[49]

On the other hand, the International City Managers' Association's con-

ception of political activity within the community also requires the

manager to be a community leader.

The manager plan and its advocates deny a place to partisan

politics:

Council-manager government is founded on the principle that
partisan politics, insofar as is humanly possible, shall be
eliminated.[50]

Political machine government, seemingly considered synonymous with

partisan government, is to be replaced by the manager plan. Literature

of the manager movement frequently reaches the level of passionate

rhetoric in the denunciation of municipal political activity. With

phrases emanating from the history of American reform movements, the

International City Managers' Association and its adherents seem still

to be combating the Tweed Ring:

Skepticism toward the stock efforts to discredit the administra-
tion [the city manager] , its officers, and its efforts is important.

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[49] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 26.

[50] Leonard G. Howell, What Are the Elements of Continued Success-
ful Operation for the Council-Manager Plan of Municipal Government
(Boulder, Colorado: Colorado Municipal League, 1951), p. 3.

There will always be those who place self-interest above the welfare of their city, who will harass the new regime because the traditions and customary performance of city manager government are clean and non-political. Politicians who crave power for spoil' sake, vice rings, gangsters and grafters of all kinds will use every means to sabotage good government.[51]

Similarly, the only alternative to manager government is bad government:

The voters must remember that true manager plan is the antithesis of political machine government. If they want political machine government, they should not have adopted the plan. The "favor" system will prevent this plan from working as it ought to work, and the voters must choose between favors and good government.[52]

Non-partisan elections are a prime value in the doctrine of city manager government. With elimination of partisan politics from municipal government, advocates of manager government have sought ways to overcome the "sins of indifference and lack of interest" on the part of the public, according to a former president of the International City Managers' Association.[53] Indifference and lack of interest toward municipal government is criticized in the literature of the occupational association not simply as being contrary to democratic values, but also as enabling politicians to control the community. To counter charges

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[51] Richard S. Childs, Best Practices Under the Manager Plan: Role of Voters, Press, Council and Manager (New York: National Municipal League, 1942), p. 1.

[52] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[53] Howell, What Are the Elements...?, p. 3.

that manager government may encourage indifference and apathy, the

advocates of the manager plan advocate a continuing organization at the

community level which will have as its functions:

> ...to keep opinion intelligent and informed, and to serve as the
> only proving ground from which leaders may rise, for all civic
> action has more chance of success if there is an individual
> around whom sentiments may rally.[54]

The non-partisan voter organization is also charged to

> ...join forces to find out the facts about city government and
> how well it is working, they can choose and help elect to the
> city council men with integrity, capacity, fairness and public
> spirit; they can formulate a program embodying their ideas of
> what the city government ought to do to improve services and
> increase efficiency; they can defend the manager plan from att
> attacks by self-seeking politicians; they can collectively
> insist upon the principles of non-political, representative and
> efficient administration...[55]

There is evidence, as shown by the case study "The Cambridge

City Manager,"[56] that organized activity on the part of the adherents

of manager government is necessary, and that "good men" are unable

to influence public policy unless organized. The writer of the pre-

viously cited case states:

> The assumption seems to have been that local government
> should be in the hands of "good men" elected on their

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[54] Childs, Best Practices, p. 2.   [55] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[56] This case is found in Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book, Harold Stein, ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), pp. 573-620.

individual merits. The question arises, however, in the light
of the Cambridge experience, whether good men, subject to no
group ties, can coalesce to establish policy. Alternatively, it
can be asked if individuals having no common ties can be re-
sponsible. It is worth noting that the first time that there seemed
to be any hope of establishing a program via the council in
Cambridge came with the election of a CCA-sponsored majority.
Perhaps responsible parties and party government (in the British
sense) that seem so elusive on our national scene may be more
practical in our smaller governmental units; but it is necessary
to note that effective and consistent administration based on
program choices sponsored by opposing parties and decided by
the electorate is hardly possible unless both parties accept the
constitutional fundamentals of the government, i.e., in Cambridge,
Plan E. Without such mutual acceptance, debate over programs
will be perpetually confused by the efforts of one party to overturn
the constitution.[57]

Basically, then, the doctrine of manager government argues that political

parties are bad; that so-called non-partisan community organizations are

necessary and a good. "Bad" politics includes organized opposition to

the manager plan and to opponents of particular public policy originated

by the manager or by those who support him. The motives of individuals

or groups which oppose manager government, doctrine, or practice are

suspect. The argument put forth in the Cambridge study, and quoted

above, which indicates the acceptance of controversy as long as there

is mutual acceptance of constitutional fundamentals is at first glance a

powerful one, but the implication is that the manager plan is sacrosanct

and that any attempt to criticize or replace it with some other form of

municipal government is virtually immoral.

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[57]Ibid., p. 616.

Prescribed Managerial Behavior

As a necessary first step in outlining the behavior prescriptions

of city managers in the policy formation process it would seem wise

to turn to the literature of the International City Managers' Association.

The literature, of the community leader phase in manager doctrine,

contains a standard list of managerial functions:

1. To see that all laws and ordinances are enforced.

2. To exercise control over all departments and appoint,
   supervise, and remove department heads and subordinate
   employees of the city in accordance with merit.

3. To make such recommendations to the city council con-
   cerning the affairs of the city as may seem to him de-
   sirable.

4. To keep the council advised of the financial condition
   and future needs of the city.

5. To prepare and submit the annual budget to the council.

6. To prepare and submit to the council such reports as may
   be required by that body.

7. To keep the public informed through reports to the council,
   regarding the operations of the city government.

8. Perform such other duties as the council may, by ordinance
   or resolution, require.[58]

In addition to the above functions, the same literature prescribes certain

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[58]
City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 25. This list of
manager functions is replicated in the literature.

relationships and principles to which the manager should adhere:

1. Deal with the council as a whole rather than with an individual member or members, except where the committee system still prevails. Even in the latter case, information and recommendations should be prepared and furnished as if for the consideration of the entire membership of the council.

2. Maintain careful impartiality in all his contacts with council members. This is especially important where the membership of the council, for any reason, is divided or antagonistic. He should take particular care to have full information and factual data for all questions on which his judgment is likely to be questioned.

3. Refrain from assuming ceremonial or other functional duties which clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the mayor or president of the council.

4. Assume his role as a responsible civic leader--not a political leader--and act accordingly.

5. Insist that the council hold him alone responsible for the administration of municipal affairs and that all requests for service be made through him rather than to departmental officials.

6. Establish a clear understanding with the council as to its functions and those which are the responsibility of the manager. To the council belong the functions of enacting legislation, determining the policies to be carried out by the city government, and passing upon the budget.

7. Remember that once the council has determined upon policy matters, it is the manager's duty to execute them without criticism even though he may not be fully in accord with such policies.

8. Keep strictly to sound principles in the administration of governmental affairs, not compromising here and there simply for the purpose of gaining favor with a certain

member or members of the council.[59]

In addition to formulating prescriptions for managerial behavior the occupational association also prepares material directed to managers concerning what is to be regarded as proper behavior for those with whom the manager associates.

The literature usually assumes that a city's mayor is elected by the council from its own membership, rather than being elected separately by the community. This distinction seems significant insofar as the literature of the manager movement tends to underrate the possibility of conflict between a mayor and members of the council. Yet, it is said that, "It is the mayor's duty to exert his best efforts to unite the council into a working, cohesive group."[60] The difficulties which would be faced by a council-elected mayor who attempted to "unite the council" should there exist an opposition faction are not frequently taken into account. Nor is the prescribed behavior of the manager, who is caught between council factions, spelled out to any extent.

Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that manager doctrine ideally visualizes the mayor as the most prominent figure in municipal

[59] Howell, What Are the Elements...?, pp. 6-7.

[60] Handbook for City Councilmen in Council-Manager Cities (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1955), p. 15.

affairs. Leonard D. White was quoted as stating that in the ideal rela-
tionship the mayor

> ...will be a prominent figure in municipal affairs and will take
> an active lead in initiating city policy, in presenting it to the
> voters, in defending it against attack, and in protecting the
> city manager against criticism for whatever policy the council
> may embark upon. It assumes the mayor will be the chief
> political figure in the city.[61]

At the same time, however, the manager is frequently directed not to
become involved in political activity in the city. Yet, because of
political leadership inadequacies on the part of mayor and council the
manager is prescribed to become a community leader. The literature of
the occupational association, it would appear, also prescribes the
manager to become a manipulator.

> Lead those whom you contact—members of the council, sub-
> ordinate employees, and citizens—into the proper channels by
> tactful suggestion rather than by too persuasive argument.
> Make them feel that they have had a major part in making the
> decisions and in establishing the policies which you deem to
> be in the best interest of the individual and the government.[62]

Three major managerial expectations of the role set have been
set forth by a former president of the International City Managers'
Association:

> The mayor, who is usually elected by the council from its
> members, does not and should not interfere with the administrative

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[61] Leonard D. White, The City Manager, p. 180.

[62] Guideposts on Assuming a City Manager Position, p. 21.
Emphasis mine.

functions of the manager;

The council, including the individual members, deals with the administration only in a formal manner through the city manager;

Administrative functions are at no time delegated to committees or individual members of the council.[63]

In a pamphlet directed to elected municipal officials the International City Managers' Association explicates other managerial expectations: emphasis is placed upon the fact that the manager expects to be the primary source of information and policy to the mayor and council.

The manager is responsible to the council for the proper conduct of all city activities under his direction. He provides the council with information and advice and makes recommendations. He is the council's technical advisor and consultant...[64]

As a community leader the manager

can and should outline desirable community goals for the council, but he does not make an issue of his proposals.[65]

The manager, as a non-political appointee, says the occupational association, desires and expects the council to dominate public sessions. "The spotlight is on the legislative body, not on the manager."[66]

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[63] Howell, What Are the Elements...?, p. 5. Although these statements are not set forth in the form of expectations they are easily translatable.

[64] Handbook for City Councilmen, p. 25.

[65] Ibid.   [66] Ibid., p. 31.

The council, the International City Managers' Association states, is responsible for the determination of policy but that the manager must be relied on for determining what is needed to be done, what can be done, and when it can be done. The association cites the budget as an example of coordination in policy between manager and council, it being prepared by the manager and his department heads, then submitted to the council for examination and approval.

A mass of material has been presented in this chapter and must be drawn together in some relatively coherent fashion. The International City Managers' Association's doctrines and prescriptions for managerial behavior must be ordered in some convenient and wieldy schema. To accomplish this end a tentative analytic model will be adapted from Harold D. Lasswell's The Decision Process.[67] Lasswell suggests, very tentatively, that policy formation can be analyzed by using seven

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[67] See Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1956). It should be pointed out that the title of this monograph, the decision process, is in this study considered to be synonymous with what has been called the process of policy formation. The point to remember, and made explicit by Lasswell, is that the process of policy formation does not end with a formal vote in a legislative body, but rather that it is an on-going process involving, tentatively, the seven functional components outlined by Lasswell in The Decision Process. In Power and Society, Lasswell and Kaplan maintain that a decision is only one type of policy. "A decision is a policy involving severe sanctions (deprivations)." p. 74. The authors continue: "Severe sanctions are 'involved' when they are expected to be used or are in fact applied to sustain a policy against

functional categories."[68] These include:

Intelligence: information, prediction, planning

Recommendation: promotion of policy alternatives

Prescription: the enactment of general rules

Invocation: provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions, including demand for application

Application: the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions

Appraisal: the assessment of the success and failure of policy

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opposition....From the standpoint of society as a whole, it is often impossible to determine, without further information, whether a given legislative act, executive decree, administrative rule, or court judgment is a decision....decision is an effective determination of policy..." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). The distinction between decision and policy drawn by Lasswell and Kaplan is probably not too relevant for our purposes. Vincent Ostrom, in commenting upon the Lasswell and Kaplan definition of decision, has written: "This approach unduly circumscribes the scope of political policies and tends to commit the study of political relationships to one of power 'over' without adequate attention to the power 'with' aspects of political phenomena." See An Approach to the Study of Political Behavior in the Local Community (University of Oregon: Mimeographed, March, 1954), paper presented to the Western Political Science Association, p. 3.

[68] Several facets of these seven categories should here be made explicit. First, Lasswell makes clear that all "agencies" of a body politic perform all functions to some extent. For example, even though the prescribing function is the most distinctive activity of a legislative body, that body and its parts perform such functions as intelligence, recommendation, and termination. Second, Lasswell recognizes that unofficial participants are apt to be active in the process of policy formation. In the United States, for example, the press has traditionally performed the

Termination: the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework[69]

It will be remembered that above-cited categories are suggested for use in the analysis of the process of policy formation,[70] but Lasswell's emphasis was on institutional structures. These categories were not suggested for use in dealing with the activity of individuals occupying official positions. Nevertheless, with some modification of

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function of intelligence and recommendation. Third, the functions do not necessarily occur or follow in a single chain. The application of a prescription, thus, might lead someone to recommend a new prescription.

[69] Lasswell, The Decision Process, p. 2.

[70] For the sake of clarity a definition of policy and policy formation will be offered. Policy will be viewed as a projected program of goals and practices which become controlling in the behavior of persons in the group or community. The definition of policy presented here is not too different from Rossi's definition of a community decision: "A community decision is a choice among alternative modes of action whose goals are the change or maintenance of community-wide institutions or facilities, and which is made by an authoritative person or group within the community institutions." Peter H. Rossi, Community Decision Making (no place: mimeographed, March, 1956), paper presented to Study of the Community Conference, p. 2. Policy formation or policy making is assumed to be a political act which involves the selection of a projected course of action and includes the response of others. Basically, policy formation can be viewed as a sequence of events concerned with problem-solving activity; policy being the result of an awareness of a difficulty carried to fruition in a program of action. It is probably unnecessary to point out that policy formation cannot be limited to the activity of the formal institutions of governments. Every form of human association and organization has recourse to policy in determining courses of action and patterns of social relationships. For two incisive accounts of the politics of policy formation see

the categories an attempt will be made to utilize them in the construction of a model of proper managerial behavior, as set forth by the International City Managers' Association.

For the purpose of this study, concentrating as it is upon the activities of the incumbent of an office--the city manager--in the process of policy formation, it would seem necessary to amend the Lasswellian categories of analysis by the addition of one category. Activities associated with the term administration can not readily be fitted into the schema suggested by Lasswell. Now the objection can be raised that administration and policy formation are disparite acts, but the writer would point to the relatedness of these functions; the activities of an appointed administrator, it is held, are instrumental in the operationalizing of legislative prescriptions. As a very practical example, the administrator's control of personnel can be instrumental in effectuating or, for all practical purposes, destroying legislative prescriptions. Administration, as a functional category of analysis shall be added to the Lasswellian schema.

If policy formation was considered to end with legislative action, i.e., the making of a prescription, then administration, as a functional

Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), especially pp. 303-330 and Norman A. Martin, "Practical Politics in Administration," Personnel Administration, 20, No. 4 (July-August, 1957), pp. 7-11.

category of analysis, would not be necessary. Insofar, however, as
a prescription does not become policy until it becomes controlling in
the behavior of persons in the appropriate group or community, and
since administration is an important element in determining whether
the prescription is effectuated in the group or community, this category
will be added to the Lasswellian schema. Some objection might be
raised to the addition of this category on the ground that the category
of invocation is sufficient. Yet, invocation would seem to the writer
to indicate activity at the level of operative employees. Herbert Simon
has indicated the influence of administration upon an organization:

> How, then, do the administrative and supervisory staff of an
> organization effect the organization's work. The non-operative
> staff of an administrative organization participates in the ac-
> complishment of the objectives of that organization to the ex-
> tent that they influence the decisions of the operatives--the
> persons at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy.[71]

Now it will be necessary to formulate a working definition of the
category of administration. Talcott Parsons has suggested that organi-
zational behavior is marked by three decisional processes: policy,
allocation, and coordination.[72] Parsons' "policy decisions" are

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[71] Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1947), p. 2.

[72] Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to
the Theory of Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1, No. 1
(June, 1956), p. 74.

decisions which "relatively directly commit the organization as a whole
and which stand in relatively direct connection to its primary functions."[73]
A "policy decision" is here considered to be equivalent to a prescription
made by the authorized individual or group in an organization but it also
indicates that administration is a part of the policy formation process.
The allocative decision process concerns personnel, finance, and
physical facilities.

> In the case of personnel the fundamental consideration is the
> allocation of responsibility....The second main aspect of the
> allocation process is the budget....It means the allocation of
> fluid financial resources which in turn can be committed to
> particular "uses," namely acquisition of physical facilities
> and employment of personnel.[74]

Decisions of coordination, according to Parsons, involve what Barnard
has called the problems of "efficiency."[75] Coordination decisions seek
to provide motivations to adequate performance in order that policy de-
cisions can be achieved by use of the tools supplied by the allocative
process.

Similar to Parsons' three decisional processes is Litchfield's
conception of the administrative process, which he states "...functions
in the areas of policy, resources, and execution."[76]

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[73] Ibid., p. 75.   [74] Ibid., p. 78.   [75] Ibid., p. 79.

[76] Edward F. Litchfield, "Notes on a General Theory of Admini-
stration," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1, No. 1 (June, 1956), p. 20.

A "policy" is a definition of those objectives which guide the
action of a whole enterprise or a significant portion thereof....
The "resources" of administration are four: people, money,
authority, and materials. "Execution" is a function of integra-
tion and synthesis which is intended to achieve a dynamic and
total organism.[77]

Litchfield's first point is similar to one that has been made in this study:

that administration is intimately involved in the policy process. Litch-

field agrees with the statement made by Simon that,

although any practical activity involves both deciding and
doing, it has not commonly been recognized that a theory of
administration should be concerned with the processes of
decision as well as the processes of action. This neglect
perhaps stems from the notion that decision-making is con-
fined to the formulation of over-all policy. On the contrary,
the process of decision does not come to an end when the
general purpose of an organization have been determined. The
task of deciding pervades the entire administrative organization
quite as much as does the task of doing--indeed, it is integrally
tied up with the latter.[78]

The administrative process, according to Litchfield, is ideally a cycle

of action which includes the following specific activities: decision-

making,[79] programming, communicating, controlling, and reappraising.[80]

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[77]Ibid., pp. 20-21.   [78]Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. 1.

[79]Decision making, says Litchfield, in its rational, deliverative,
discretionary, and purposive form is performed by means of the following
subactivities: definition of choice, analysis of the existing situation,
calculation and delineation of alternatives, deliberation, and choice.
Litchfield, "Notes on a General Theory of Administration," p. 13.

[80]Ibid., p. 12.

For the purpose of this study, however, the similarity between Parsons' allocation and coordination decisions and Litchfield's resources and execution areas should be noted, also. Administration shall be defined in this study as including the activities associated with the execution of prescriptions: the allocative decisions, the coordination decisions, and decisions made concerning the methods of effectuating a particular legislative prescription.

In an attempt to draw together the prescriptions for managerial behavior and the expectations of the manager we will turn again to Lasswell's categories of functional analysis. It should be remembered that these prescriptions are viewed as part of manager doctrine and are set forth by the International City Managers' Association as maxims of proper managerial behavior.

Intelligence: In the process of policy formation within the municipality the International City Managers' Association stresses that this function is to be served by the trained "professional" manager. He is regarded as a fountainhead of information concerning management techniques, prescriptions made in other communities to meet similar problems, and as the actor charged with having an awareness of the needs of the community. On the other hand, the association has the expectation of others in the role set that they are amateurs who cannot be expected to possess specialized knowledge which is applicable to governmental

situations. The manager "...provides the council with information..."[81]

Recommendation: The manager is told to "make such recommendations to the city council concerning the affairs of the city as may seem to him desirable."[82] Ideally, legislative recommendations for policy are expected to come from the elected representatives, primarily. But the emergence of the doctrine of the community leader manager is said to result from the inadequacies of the mayor and the council. Since the manager is viewed as the source of information about needs and techniques, he is also prescribed to be the most active participant in the area of recommendation.

Prescription: The making of legislative prescriptions, in the community, is the task of the city council which acts on the basis of the information and recommendations supplied by the manager. In any municipality, obviously, other governmental agencies are active in the making of prescriptions which are controlling in the behavior of individuals, although the council is perhaps not involved. When the literature of the manager association states that the council is responsible for the making of policy it probably would be more correct to say that it is

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[81] Guideposts, p. 25.

[82] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 25.

responsible for the making of prescriptions.

Administration: In this category the manager is again the dominant
figure. Prescriptions for managerial behavior indicate that the manager
is responsible for control over allocative decisions (those dealing with
personnel, finance, physical facilities), coordinative decisions (those
seeking to provide motivations to adequate performance on the part of
those in the organization), and decisions of execution. The occupa-
tional association tells the manager that he is responsible for exer-
cising control over appointments and the budget, and that he must
insist that the council hold him alone responsible for the administration
of municipal affairs. The elected officials are expected to refrain from
any activity in the administrative affairs of the city.

Invocation: This category of analysis was defined by Lasswell as "the
provisional characterization of conduct according to prescriptions..."[83]
This function is performed by anyone authorized to appeal for the appli-
cation of the community's prescription in passing judgment on an act or
actor. As Lasswell describes this function it would appear that it is
primarily considered to be carried out by operative employees in the
community. Insofar as the manager is prescribed to be most involved
in allocative decisions and in the execution of legislative prescriptions

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[83] Lasswell, The Decision Process, p. 2.

this would be considered a function for which he is primarily responsible. "To see that all laws and ordinances are enforced" is a managerial behavior prescription.[84]

Application: This function is defined as the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions of the community. Lasswell indicates that institutionally this function is carried out by a judicial branch. In many cases the writer has observed that the Springfield city council has directed the city manager to reconcile the acts of residents with legislative prescriptions, rather than having the city manager initiate a process with the police and the city attorney which would ultimately lead to the application of the sanctions.

Appraisal: This functional category resembles that of intelligence. Again, the city manager through mechanisms such as annual or monthly reports concerning the activity of departments and project reports is intimately involved with this function.

Termination: This category is regarded as similar to that of prescription. Thus, the elected representatives are charged with the duty of ending or amending particular prescriptions, acting upon the information, recommendation, and appraisal of the manager.

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[84] City Management--A Growing Profession, p. 25.

Summary

In concluding this chapter it might be well to rapidly review the major contemporary doctrines and concepts of the manager movement without any comment being offered. First, the International City Managers' Association attempts to develop a public image of the city manager as a professional. The existence of a dichotomy between policy and administration is stressed. The manager is directed to remain external to municipal politics, but at the same time he is urged to become a community leader because of the incapacity of elected representatives. Conflict in the community which involves the city manager is frequently pictured as being brought about by politicians. To counteract political forces working to overthrow the manager plan the International City Managers' Association recommends that a citizen organization be formed to protect the manager and the manager plan.

It might be added at this point that implicit in the above-mentioned statements involve, or so it appears, severe contradictions.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICT AND POLICY FORMATION: THE
PERSPECTIVE OF MANAGER GOVERNMENT

As was promised in an earlier chapter when narratives of city

manager conflict and a policy formation process were presented an

attempt must now be made to draw together some of Springfield's

experiences with manager government. This chapter will deal with

these experiences from the vantage point of the doctrines and ideology

of the manager movement. Finally, several questions must be raised:

Are the doctrines and prescriptions of the manager movement sufficient

to account for events which occur in a community? Is the image of the

city manager, put forth by the International City Managers' Association,

a valid and exclusive one? These questions are raised by the material

found in this chapter, and will be treated in the next chapter at greater

length.

Conflict and Manager Government in Springfield

The manager plan was introduced in Springfield apparently because

of the desire on the part of some to increase and improve municipal

services. The rapidly increasing population and the lack of public im-

provements due to war-time shortages made it seem necessary to

introduce a governmental form which had been publicized as being able

to efficiently and economically provide physical facilities. The

Springfield proponents of the manager plan emphasized that the manager

would also serve as the city's engineer, and that very little added cost

to the taxpayer would accrue. We know that one of the first manager's

acts was the reorganization of city departments and the employment of

a full-time city engineer. Manager Cloyes' action was met with some

antagonism from elements in the community who cited the pre-election

statements concerning the combined manager-engineer position. Cloyes,

incidentally, was an engineer and a local resident at the time of his

appointment. It would be an educated guess that Cloyes had difficulty

regulating his degree of involvement in local affairs because of his

community connections. Another difficulty which Manager Cloyes faced

was that he was administering a budget which he had no part in formu-

lating. This fact might have been of little significance had not the

county's district attorney ruled that a source of revenue which the

budget makers had relied upon was illegal. Faced with the possibi-

lity of a deficit budget the council abdicated its responsibility by

turning the problem over to Cloyes by indicating to him that he must

resolve the dilemma by dismissing several municipal employees.

Cloyes' eventual resignation "under fire" might be said to be due to

the fact that he did not have control over the department heads,

primarily Recorder Gile. Gile, who was serving as elected recorder at
the time of the adoption of the manager plan, had been continued in the
office as an appointive officer by the council, and Cloyes had no part
in his appointment and had taken no steps to remove him. We have
no knowledge of whether Cloyes actually directed Gile to accept
gambling funds for the city treasury, but the issue can be stated as
involving the invocation of legislative prescriptions. City ordinance
prohibited gambling in the city: Cloyes maintained that he had directed
the police department to enforce this prescription; Gile maintained that
Cloyes was not invoking the council's prescription, and in fact was
accepting funds from gamblers in order that a sagging city treasury be
bolstered. Cloyes was supported publicly in the controversy by Main
Street business elements--seemingly a pattern in cities operating under
the manager plan.[1] Manager Cloyes was not in any sense a "profession-
al" manager; it is unlikely that he had any special knowledge of admini-
stration, nor of the occupational association's prescriptions for mana-
gerial behavior. In addition to this, the Springfield council under which

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[1] "Support for manager government centered primarily in the down-
town business leadership, and was most pronounced among the rising
businessmen or the junior chamber of commerce people....On the
opposition's side were found for the most part people of the laboring
classes, a few fringe area businessmen...and individuals who were
politically ambitious and relied for support upon the lower economic
classes." Edwin O. Stene and George K. Floro, Abandonment of the
Manager Plan: A Study of Four Small Cities (Lawrence, Kansas:
Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas, 1955), p. 100.

Cloyes operated was not a newly elected one. It is true that the council had placed the manager amendment on the ballot, but it is also true that this same council had sat as the legislative body under a weak mayor charter, and its committees had acted as departmental executives. The habits learned under one governmental form likely were carried over to the manager form. A testable generalization would be that neither the manager, council, nor other city employees and officials had reached any explicit, or even implicit, consensus as to the rights and obligations of others in the formal structure of the municipal government.

The council's next city manager appointee was again an engineer and a local resident. In fact, Manager Cheatham had been Cloyes' city engineer appointment. Newly elected Mayor B. P. Larson obviously interfered with Cheatham's managerial prerogatives when he suggested, in his first address to the city council after being elected, that Cheatham replace the incumbent department heads because of "inefficiency." Cheatham, in his first manager job, at least partially followed the mayor's recommendation when he dismissed the fire chief. The manager's position was further weakened by vacilation on the part of the mayor and the council. Mayor Larson did not give Cheatham public support after the dismissal, especially after some 1500 petitioners asked that the fire chief be rehired. The council also vacilated and failed to give public support to the manager, even though a council committee had

earlier supported the dismissal. Manager doctrine demands that the elected officials defend the action of a manager when 1) they have concurred in his action, or 2) when he carries out duties given him by the charter, as for example, in the hiring or firing of personnel. Events which occurred in May and June indicated that Mayor Larson and his council cohorts were unwilling to allow Manager Cheatham to become involved in their plans for the development of a municipal utility. When an elected mayor actually deals with the development of policy issues, as the occupational association ideally states he should but does not think he will, then perhaps the mayor must have complete assurance that a council-appointed administrator shares similar values and beliefs. Mayor Larson later was accused of by-passing the manager in the regard to the municipal utility scheme by a citizen organization which initiated recall proceedings against the mayor. Manager Cheatham obviously became an issue in municipal politics--something which the International City Managers' Association vigorously prescribes shall not happen. Yet, a citizens organization was active and was defending what they considered to be manager prerogatives. Citizen support of the manager is prized by the occupational association. Immediately prior to the recall election Manager Cheatham was dismissed by a divided council. The depth of the controversy was indicated by the resignation of two councilmen, Recorder Gile, and a large part of the

city's police department following Cheatham's dismissal. Councilman
Ashworth's letter of resignation charged that the council had failed to
make policy determinations, that secret council meetings had been held,
and that the manager had been "kept in the dark" concerning municipal
power developments. Advocates of the manager plan would perhaps
have reasonable grounds for stating that the mayor and his faction had
failed to support the idea of manager government, on the other hand,
Cheatham's dismissal in itself can be viewed as a logical act as viewed
from the occupational association's doctrine which ideally maintains
that the mayor and council are the primary source of policy recommen-
dation and that unless the manager is willing to support or carry our the
decisions of the council he should resign or be dismissed.

The next city manager appointee was another local resident, but
rather than an engineer the council chose a local businessman. Hamilton
was only acting manager, however he too became involved in controversy.
Mayor-council conflict was apparent after Hamilton dismissed, with a
council committee's approval, his own appointed police chief. Mayor
Larson stated that the police chief had been "railroaded," but he took
no action other than this verbal expression. Hamilton probably can be
characterized as typical of Floro's "old guard personnel" with their
attachment to local affairs and local political groups.[2]

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[2]See this study, Chapter VI.

In 1951, L. B. Bartlett became city manager of Springfield after
long experience in engineering and public works and short service as
city manager in Vermont. As was pointed out Bartlett's first several
years as Springfield manager were relatively quiet ones. At the same
time, however, it was obvious that there was growing friction between
council factions especially following the election of Harms as mayor.

> The council was divided into two factions. Faction A included
> Reed, Nicholas, and Breedlove. Faction B included Mayor Harms,
> Jack Briggs, and Vernon Allen. The city manager (Bartlett) was
> pretty well identified with Faction B, and so was the city attorney
> (Carmichael)....The other councilman, McChesney, was kind of
> a fence straddler, voting for the winning side.[3]

Mayor Harms' attempt to abolish ward representation was likely viewed
by Breedlove and Nicholas as an attempt to make their reelection more
difficult. The embezzlement of city funds was utilized by what has been
described as Faction A to dismiss the city manager and eliminate Faction
B. One observer has stated:

> One of the things that caused the difficulties was that the city
> manager thought that he had to stay on the winning side of the city
> council factions, and to serve as a "glad-hander" with the business
> folks in town rather than to truly serve as an actual manager of the
> activities and financial transactions of the city government. It was
> evident that one reason for the council not being aware of the situ-
> ation has been due to the poor information being given them by
> their auditor...[4]

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[3] Interview with Lloyd Frese, conducted by Paul Newton, Spring,
1956, p. 1. On file in office of Kellogg Project, Johnson Hall, University
of Oregon.

[4] Ibid.,

After the embezzlement was brought to light there continued to be conflict in the council over the question of calling for an audit. The mayor and his council supporters and the city manager opposed the immediate audit, but the opposing faction was able to win the council vote. Subsequently, Manager Bartlett resigned, and the majority faction on the council was able to reappoint former acting manager Hamilton as permanent manager. The methods utilized by the Breedlove-Nicholas faction, however, enabled other elements in the community to successfully seek their recall.

Following Hamilton's resignation the city council, now dominated by the Harm's faction, appointed Turner as manager. In every respect Turner possessed those qualifications which the occupational association's contemporary ideal suggests. He was college trained in public administration and deliberately prepared himself for the occupation by attending a graduate school which trains men for the manager position. After graduate school he served as an intern under one of the leading practitioners in city management. Then Turner entered the occupation as a manager in a small town, of 8000 population, and subsequently accepted the Springfield assignment. He would appear to be a prototype of the occupation's ideal--the advancement-by-moving manager.

Turner's tenure as Springfield manager has not witnessed the conflict which attended that of the other position holders. For one thing the council has been dominated by Mayor Harms and his faction.

This writer has had an opportunity to observe numerous Springfield council meetings and has been impressed by the consensus which exists on this body. Mayor Harms has described the present council as the best he has seen.[5] Councilman Reed is the only incumbent member who was identified with Breedlove and Nicholas, and Harms has apparently consciously attempted to shield Reed from adverse criticism resulting from the recall and has tried to coopt Reed into his own faction.[6]

The only evidence of criticism directed toward Manager Turner occurred during the 1956 mayoralty election when an ad was submitted to the Eugene Register-Guard stating that Turner was being paid an exhorbitant salary and that he had received a free vacation to Lake Louise and a car from the city. The political advertisement referred to the fact that Turner attended a meeting of the International City Managers' Association at Lake Louise and that the city furnishes him with a car for official purposes. The advertisement was never carried by the newspaper. The ad was signed by some local labor leaders and apparently was in conjunction with the campaign of former Mayor B. P. Larson who

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[5] Interview with Mayor Edward Harms, conducted by Peter Kane, February 20, 1957, p. 2. On file in office of Kellogg Project, Johnson Hall, University of Oregon.

[6] Ibid.

was a candidate. Manager Turner has been quoted as saying that if he
had to "take what Bartlett took" he would immediately resign and find
another job.[7]

The manager plan probably will not fulfill the expectations of its
proponents unless 1) the council is content to act only as a deliberative
body and refrain from activity in the area of administration, and 2) only
if the mayor either refrains from acting as a policy recommender, or if
he and the manager share a common system of values, or have reached
and agreement as to the proper activity of the other actor. Springfield's
history of controversy concerning the manager plan and the several
managers would seem to substantiate these generalizations.

The manager plan will become a stage for conflict it would appear
when intra-council conflict occurs, even if the manager or the plan it-
self are not party to the original dispute. The Springfield electoral
system of ward representation likely encouraged council conflict be-
cause of the nature of the matters considered by this council. In
other words, Springfield as a rapidly expanding city was faced with
requests for services from newer areas, and each councilman likely
viewed problems from the perspective of his particular ward.

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[7] Interview with Manager Turner, conducted by Peter Kane,
December 5, 1956, p. 2. On file in office of Kellogg Project, Johnson
Hall, University of Oregon.

Although no causal relationship is being suggested it would appear that controversy centered around those managers who were engineer-trained and local residents. Bartlett, although not a local resident at the time of his appointment, was in the community for approximately four years before he became the center of conflict, and there is some indication that he had become identified with a particular council faction--thus breaking a "commandment" of the occupational association. Hamilton, in Floro's typology would be considered a manager who threatened occupational prestige and stability. A local resident, Hamilton apparently owed his appointment to the feeling on the part of the dominant council faction that he would be "their" manager and pliant to suggestion. Manager Turner, on the other hand, has not been faced with a divided council. In addition to this he is recognized as a "professional" who can and will leave Springfield employment should controversy centering on him arise.

The Manager and Policy Formation

In the next section of this chapter attention will be directed to the activities of Springfield city managers Bartlett and Turner. Their behavior in annexation matters will be examined as will be their concepts of the proper function of a city manager.

Manager Bartlett

L. B. Bartlett became city manager in January, 1951, following

a long career in municipal engineering and public works. He served as city manager in Montpelier, Vermont for a short time. He resigned his position in Montpelier because he did not care for the manager occupation in that city as he was required to spend most of his time as an inside manager. After resigning, Barlett was employed by a consulting engineering firm in Walla Walla, Washington, and then became city manager in Springfield. Bartlett says he submitted an application for the position in Springfield because he understood that it would enable him to be involved in the physical aspects of city management. The city of Springfield, it will be remembered, was at this time in the midst of municipal physical activity as street construction and other improvements were being made.

Bartlett is a large, rather quiet, weather-beaten man, probably 60 years of age, and possesses a salty sense of humor. He is presently employed as a real estate salesman by former city councilman Vernon Allen.

When he became city manager in 1951, L. B. Bartlett relates that the two city council factions were so antagonistic that public meetings were often turned into shouting matches. His most notable achievement, he maintains, was that he was able to "coax" the competing factions into at least a semblance of public order when in public session. This was done, says Bartlett, by holding short pre-council

sessions on topics which were apt to arouse controversy.

Bartlett makes no pretense about the regard in which he was held by certain members of the council. He attributes this partially to his denial of requests made by some councilmen for favors. Bartlett also reveals that several councilmen attempted to interfere in what he con- sidered to be his prerogative--the execution of policy. Council members frequently sought information from municipal employees and attempted to overseer public works projects. Finally, according to Bartlett, he was forced to inform city employees that they were to answer no questions, nor fill any request, made by a member of the city council.

Bartlett admits that when he took the manager position in Springfield he had no desire to advance to a larger city. It was his intention to remain as city manager in Springfield for an extended period. The embarrassment caused him by the discovery of shortages in the police department was one factor which led him to resign, but he also feels that he no longer, if ever, had the confidence of the council. Bartlett says that the faction which was instrumental in dismissing him prior to the effective date of his resignation, desired a "yes" man as city manager and wanted not only to "make policy" but also administer it. Bartlett feels that a strict demarcation can and should be made between policy and administration. At no time did he ever become involved in policy in any manner, says Bartlett. Very few recommendations were made to the

council by him, and he viewed himself as an administrator.

As of this date, several years after leaving city employment, Bartlett wonders if his limited activity was the correct approach. He states that he has an extremely high regard for the ability of Manager Turner and wonders if he would have been more successful if he had been the kind of manager that Turner is. Bartlett admits, however, that this would have been impossible insofar as he and Turner came to the job with entirely different backgrounds and job perspectives. Bartlett, although not antagonistic to the community leader approach, does not feel that this is the proper role for an appointed manager. Community leadership is the function, he says, of the mayor and the council. Other factors, he feels, also would have made it impossible for him to be the community leader manager. He cites the difference in composition and temper of the city council as one factor. A community leader manager would have been dismissed rapidly in the period during which he was manager. Bartlett also maintains that the city has matured in the last five years. The recall of two councilmen who were instrumental in his dismissal acted like a cathartic to the community. Almost any manager who followed him would have had a successful and non-controversial period of employment, says former Manager Bartlett.

In regard to the question of annexation, Bartlett states that his activity was minimal. Reflecting on his activity he now wonders if he

should not have gone into the community and attempted to "sell" annexation to its opponents, much like Manager Turner tries to sell policies to the various organizations in the city. Bartlett says that he personally favored annexation of the area east of the city out to 72nd Street. He also admits that he spoke before various pro-annexation groups, but says that he did so on their invitation and that he did no more than present technical and legal data for their consideration. Again, in reports to the city council, he says that he presented nothing but factual reports for that body's consideration. It was not his function, he feels, as city manager to make any positive recommendations to the city council. When called upon he would volunteer information and would attempt to execute council decisions adequately, but involvement in community affairs or the making of firm recommendations was not in his sphere of proper activity. Bartlett admits that he recommended that if the council were to call an annexation election in 1954, 72nd Street should be made the eastern limit. The council, however, did not accept his advice, the recommendation for which he says was made solely on the grounds of engineering feasibility and a consideration of possible city expansion.

In regard to the 1955 annexation election which was initiated while he was city manager, but which was held after his dismissal, Bartlett speaks rather angrily of the opposition of Weyerhaeuser Timber

Company. Bartlett ways, however, that at no time did he attempt to alter the opinion of the industries which were opposed to annexation. Involvement in such community controversies was not in the province of the city manager--but should be handled by those responsible for the making of policy decisions, the elected mayor and councilmen.

Manager Turner

E. Robert Turner, Springfield's present city manager, is in almost every way the opposite of his predecessor L. B. Bartlett. Turner attended Dartmouth and Hobart, and received an M. A. degree in public administration from the University of Pennsylvania. He then served as an intern in Kansas City under L. P. Cookingham, one of the leaders of the city manager occupation. After completing his training in Kansas City, Turner became city manager in Brookfield, Missouri, and in 1955, was hired as Springfield's city manager. It would appear that in almost every respect Turner is the epitome of the International City Managers' Association's ideal manager. For example, his graduate college training was in administration, he served an apprenticeship under a recognized manager, he then served in a small town and advanced to a larger one. Turner will admit that his vocational goal is to advance to an even larger city. While Bartlett is rather quiet and to some degree inarticulate, Turner is urbane, has a New England accent, and dominates every meeting or conversation. The age difference between Bartlett and Turner is quite obvious,

also.

Turner became city manager in Springfield during the aftermath of
the recall of councilmen Breedlove and Nicholas. There is every indi-
cation that the council has not desired to initiate any controversy in the
community. Councilman Alvin Reed, the only member of the council who
actively supported the dismissal of Manager Bartlett, still serves on
that body. Both Mayor Harms and Manager Turner feel that Reed, al-
though they do not agree with his ideas, is the best member of the
present council. Mayor Harms, it has been reported, has deliberately
attempted to shield Reed from adverse criticism and has attempted to
coopt him into his group.

Manager Turner has indicated to this writer that he thinks that
the city would be well served if he were to resign in the near future.
He states, however, that such an action will not be forthcoming be-
cause several projects with which he has been associated are only now
coming to operation, and he does not think it would be "right" for him
to leave at a critical period. The factor which causes him to think of
resigning is simply that he thinks the council has reached the stage where
they are willing to "let Bob do it." In other words, Turner admits that he
has attempted to fulfill the community leader role, and that perhaps he
has been too successful. He feels that on the part of the majority of
councilmen there is a willingness to let him gather information, make

proposals for community action, "sell" it to the community, and then execute the policy. Turner fears that if he should leave the council might splinter without some active force directing its attention to important aspects of community development. Manager Turner has a very high opinion of Mayor Harms, but doubts that a mayor, who is an unpaid, part-time official, would have the time and capacity to serve as community leader. Turner and Harms have had extremely close personal relations and there has been no public conflict between them. Turner states that they have differed on some matters privately, but in general their views are quite similar.

Manager Turner does not feel that he will ever be one of the leaders of the occupational association. He says that at the meetings of the International City Managers' Association he often is the "fly-in-the-ointment." In other words, his views are regarded as too progressive by the managers who are of an earlier generation. As examples he cites his desire that the occupational association have some method of keeping incompetents out of city management. He does not feel that this can be done on a national level, but suggests some form of state certification after an individual has fulfilled certain academic and intern requirements. He would not require a city council to employ a certified manager but would urge that city councils do so in order that the city would have some assurance of the competency of the manager.

Some form of authority would also be invested in the manager association
to remove a manager from the list of certification for certain causes. This
writer, however, feels that Turner's ideas are gaining a greater measure
of support as the older generation of managers gradually passes from the
scene.

There is no question but that Manager Turner has accepted and
attempts to fulfill the community leader-city manager ideal which the
occupational association now stresses. Yet, he recognizes that the
manager as community leader phase has some dangers. But he says
there seems to be no alternative to this development. Elected officials
simply lack the interest, training, and capacity to fulfill the functions
which the modern city demands. There would seem to be little doubt
that Manager Turner dominates municipal government in Springfield,
and especially at the level of public awareness as seen from the per-
spective of the observer of meetings of the city council. For example,
Peter Kane has written:

> Turner's opinion was accepted. With almost every piece of
> business before the council Turner's opinion was accepted
> without question. In fact the casual observer would easily
> have received the opinion that Turner was running the meeting.
> He sat at the head of the table with Harms, whose only function
> seemed to be to call for the vote on each item.[8]

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[8] See a Report on the Springfield City Council Meeting, October 8,
1956, Observer, Peter Kane. On file in office of Kellogg Project, Johnson
Hall, University of Oregon.

The present writer has made a strikingly similar observation on the conduct of Springfield city council meetings.

In regard to the annexation of the area east of Springfield, Manager Turner says that he had little concern with the matter in 1955 as he had just been employed and that he was not consulted, nor did he offer any recommendations concerning whether an election should be held or what would be appropriate boundaries.

Manager Turner states that although he is in favor of annexation of the area to the east, as the only equitable method of solving community health problems, that he has always tried to put a "brake" on the overly ardent supporters of annexation by reminding them of the costs and that annexation will not mean immediate provision of most municipal services. One method of slowing down annexation forces, he says, is to require that they present the city with petitions bearing a large number of signatures. This was what he did in 1956, and the council accepted his recommendation that annexation be postponed.

In 1957, when pro-annexation forces were again encouraging annexation to the city, Manager Turner says that he urged the leaders to expand the community's awareness of health and drainage problems in the area. This was the function of the meeting conducted by the Lane County commissioners in January, 1957. During the early part of 1957 Manager Turner said that he decided that annexation would be

the only appropriate solution to common problems and he turned to the

task of removing the major opponents to annexation, Weyerhaeuser

Timber Company.

In diminishing the opposition of Weyerhaeuser to annexation,

Manager Turner basically acted as a mediator between the city and the

company. Prior to his arrival in Springfield and during the first year of

his tenure he says he realized that the major obstacle was that city

officials and company leaders simply would not sit around a conference

table and calmly discuss the matter of annexation. He cites the fact

that Mayor Harms and George Weyerhaeuser seemed to do nothing but

make caustic and angry remarks about the other which then became

public. Turner's first task was to get the two men together. Mayor

Harms, he relates, had the view that the Weyerhaeuser organization

was nothing but an economic octupus and that George Weyerhaeuser was

a pampered rich man with vestiges of the robber baron. Turner, on the

other hand, describes George Weyerhaeuser, then the plant manager, as

a rather stuffy young man who felt that everybody should love and respect

big business and especially the Weyerhaeuser organization. To bring the

two men together Turner relates that he first took them to a tavern on the

edge of town where they became inebriated, and in doing so had a very

frank discussion about problems of public health in the community and

what annexation would mean to the city and industry. Manager Turner

states that this drinking bout was the beginning of the end of controversy between the city and Weyerhaeuser. After this, although the company still opposed annexation, no derogatory public statements emanated from the mayor or George Weyerhaeuser.

Manager Turner then says he began to visit Weyerhaeuser's office quite frequently and presented the matter of annexation in terms of public opinion. He states that he asked the young plant manager about the costs of Weyerhaeuser advertising. Then he pointed out that if an epidemic were to begin in the community the company, because of its opposition to annexation--which would eventually lead to the provision of sewers and a drainage system--would be publicly accused of being responsible. Thus, the goodwill which had been built up at a large cost would probably be rapidly dissipated. Annexation was thus presented to the organization as a method of alleviating possible future public antagonism, and not as something which would be of no possible benefit to the timber company. Soon thereafter George Weyerhaeuser was recalled to the company's main offices and was groomed to be the heir-apparent to the timber company. Shortly thereafter, in Maych, 1957, the organization withdrew its opposition to annexation. Turner attributes this rather rapid alteration of opinion to his mediation and negotiation with George Weyerhaeuser. He states that this approach had not been attempted before because the mayor

was simply antagonistic toward large scale economic organizations and
Manager Bartlett made no attempts to go into the community in regard to
policy matters.

After the removal of industry objection to annexation it appeared
that the council would place the question on the ballot. Yet Manager
Turner refused to recommend a policy of rapidity. He continually urged,
and the council accepted his recommendation, that petitions should be
circulated in the area in order that community opinion might express
itself. He stated that it would be foolish to incur added municipal
expenses by holding an election which was sure to be defeated. In
some respects, Turner's "go slow" policy gave opponents of annexation
an opportunity to organize and to circulate petitions. This he admits,
but he says that it would have been extremely foolish for the city to
annex the area if large scale opposition existed, even were it a
minority.

In mid-1957, when annexation was being considered, Turner
states that he favored annexation to 72nd Street, but that he was
willing to accept the recommendation of the planning commission as
long as the Weyerhaeuser property was included. He says that any
annexation without the industrial property would be financial suicide
for the city.

January, 1958 saw the presentation to the council of petitions

from both pro- and anti-annexation groups. At the urgent recommen-

dation of Manager Turner the council deferred action on the election.

Turner again cited the large scale organized opposition to the proposal

and the costs of holding an election. He also urged that an unsuccess-

ful election would probably make it difficult to annex in the future.

Summary

It would appear that variable behavior was exhibited by Managers

Bartlett and Turner in regard to annexation. Other than on this topic no

information concerning their "working" behavior has been collected

which would support a firm generalization. The disparate behavior very

likely was in large measure due to disparate conceptions of the proper

function of the manager: Bartlett having what might be termed the

anonymous administrator-engineer perspective; Turner being represen-

tative of the community leader phase of the manager movement. It

should not be overlooked, however, that Bartlett and Turner were formal

subordinates of councils of different composition. Our attention should

now turn to a more formal consideration of the activity of Bartlett and

Turner in regard to annexation.

First, let us identify the tentative and null prescriptions made by

the Springfield city council concerning annexation. Three major annex-

ation prescriptions were made by the deliverative body: the calling of

an annexation election for September, 1954; the calling of an election

for October, 1955; and the decision not to call an election which was
reached in January, 1958. The second prescription will be excluded
from consideration insofar as neither Manager Bartlett nor Manager Turner
were involved throughout the period prior to the making of the prescription.

In the process of policy formation involving annexation in 1954 the
only conclusion which can be drawn is that Manager Bartlett played a
minimal role and was not an active participant. Mayor Harms was
probably the prime actor in the process. It is not possible to point to
any individual or group as being responsible for bringing the question
of annexation to the community's awareness. The circulation of peti-
tions by residents of the area initiated the process leading to the
council's tentative prescription, however. A major source of information
and recommendation for the pro-annexation groups and the city council
was Howard Buford, the planning consultant. Boundary designations
were largely the result of Buford's recommendations to the petitioners.
The city council then accepted the boundaries as drawn. The council's
action in calling the election can be described as a tentative prescrip-
tion which became nullified as a result of the annexation election.
Mayor Harms' remarks following the election were in the nature of an
appraisal of the election and a suggestion that he would approve the
renewal of the process leading to another annexation election. Manager
Bartlett has stated that in no way was he involved in the events leading

to the annexation election, and that he did not desire to function in any capacity, except as providing technical data for the council's consideration. The city council made no request of Manager Bartlett for information or recommendation concerning whether an election should be held or boundaries. Neither the mayor, manager, nor council attempted to remove the objections of Weyerhaeuser to annexation. Similarly, the proponents of annexation failed to make any effort to win the annexation election.

In the decision of the Springfield city council not to call an annexation election in 1958, City Manager Turner was an active participant. While committed to annexation in principle, Turner has constantly recommended a "go slow" policy to the city council. Several reasons can be cited for this recommendation: first, Turner feels that an unsuccessful annexation election is not only costly to the city, but makes it even more difficult to annex in the future; second, he is concerned about annexing an area which has a sizeable minority of residents opposed to such action; third, local economic conditions might result in the defeat of the bond issue which would have to follow a successful annexation vote; fourth, and probably of major importance, is Turner's previously cited opinion that the city of Springfield is in the midst of several other important projects, such as urban renewal, which might suffer if the burden of providing services to a fringe area were added.

It might be added that Turner has stated that he would like to move to another city in the near future and every additional project would make it more difficult for him to resign the Springfield position. It is true that Manager Turner was instrumental in removing the objection of Weyerhaeuser to annexation, and he is very proud of this accomplishment, but in the months between the timber company's acquiescence to annexation and the January, 1958 decision by the council not calling an immediate election, Manager Turner altered his opinion concerning the wisdom of having an annexation election. His influence can perhaps be measured by the council's about-face to this matter. Similarly, he has apparently also caused Mayor Harms to publicly state that annexation proceedings must now be postponed until sometime in early 1959.

CHAPTER VI

ADDITIONAL APPROACHES TO AN EXAMINATION
OF MANAGER GOVERNMENT

This study is concerned with whether the doctrines, concepts, and behavior relationships set forth by the International City Managers' Association and by ardent advocates of manager government are adequate techniques and tools for the understanding of events which occur in a community. If only the accepted doctrines and concepts of manager government are used, how can the several conflicts which occurred in the Springfield community be explained? It is here suggested that the ardent supporters of the manager plan would have to rely almost exclusively on a "devil" theory of political life; conflict involving the manager being the result of the machinations of politicians. On the other hand, the International City Managers' Association attempts to develop a public image of itself as a professional organization composed of single-minded community leader-type city managers. If this were the case, would it not be likely that different individuals occupying the same official position, and dealing with similar matters, would exhibit relatively similar patterns of behavior? In other words, the writer is suggesting that a monolithic and unified conception of the manager movement

is incorrect and that variable behavior is apt to be exhibited by individuals occupying the same position. This was the observation drawn from the behavior of Managers Bartlett and Turner in the process of annexation policy formation.

In this chapter the writer intends to present some additional approaches which might be utilized in the analysis of a community's experience with manager government.

Conflict and the Concept of Role[1]

Earlier in this study status was defined as a "...position in a social system occupied by designated individuals."[2] On another level

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[1] The writer is in complete agreement with the following statement: "In surveying the literature one is confronted with what seems at first to be a hopeless mass of different definitions, usages, and implications of the role concept." Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role--A Re-Survey of the Literature," Social Forces, 30, No. 2 (December, 1951), p. 142. Other treatments of role and associated concepts which the writer has found helpful include the following: Ralph M. Stogdill, Ellis W. Scott, and William E. Jaynes, Leadership and Role Expectations (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1956), Research Monograph Number 86, Bureau of Business Research; Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), esp. pp. 3-78; and Melvin Seeman, "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," American Sociological Review, 18, No. 4 (August, 1953), pp. 373-380.

[2] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, rev. ed.), p. 368.

of generality, Barnard's definition of _status_ would appear to be pertinent

for the purpose of this study.

> By "status" of an individual...we mean...that condition of the
> individual that is defined by a statement of his rights, privi-
> leges, immunities, duties, and obligations...and, obversely
> by a statement of the restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions
> governing his behavior, both determining the expectations of
> others in reference thereto.[3]

Intimately associated with the term status is the concept of _role_:

> A role represents the dynamic aspect of status....When he puts
> the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he
> is performing a role.[4]

Linton was thus, according to Robert K. Merton, defining _role_ as "...the

behavioral enacting of the patterned expectations attributed to that posi-

tion."[5] Merton has pointed out, however, that it would be erroneous to

maintain that a status is associated with only a single corresponding

role. He would maintain, rather, that every status involves an array of

associated roles. This fact of the social structure is given the term

role-set. Role-set is

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[3] Chester I. Barnard, _Organization and Management: Selected
Papers_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 208.

[4] Ralph Linton, quoted by Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes,
"The Problem of the Concept of Role--A Re-Survey of the Literature,"
Social Forces, 30, No. 2 (December, 1951), p. 145.

[5] Merton, _Social Theory and Social Structure_, p. 368.

...that complement of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status....It should be plain that the role-set differs from the structural pattern which has long been identified by sociologists as that of "multiple roles." For in the established usage, multiple roles refer to the complex of roles associated, not with a single social status, but with the various statuses (often in differing institutional spheres) in which individuals find themselves--the roles for example connected with the distinct statuses of teacher, wife, mother, Catholic, Republican, and so on.[6]

The status of city manager, thus, would have a distinctive role-set associated with it; members of the city council, municipal employees, the electorate, manager colleagues, and so on. Every position or status will possess a set of defined behavior maxims, or _prescriptions_ which will make more or less explicit what is considered to be appropriate behavior for the status occupant.[7] These prescriptions constitute a

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[6] _Ibid._, p. 369.

[7] Prescriptions can probably be viewed as emerging from the self, legal maxims (for example, the prescribed behavior of the manager is to some degree structured by the charter and ordinances of the city, and perhaps by laws of the state), and the assimilation and internalization of statements of rights and duties made by organizations such as the International City Managers' Association or inculcated through some form of common training process. In other words, an actor's behavior can be understood to be a function of environment, personality, and status-role. The writer, however, would agree with Rossi that "It seems likely that the most important source of variation among decision makers lies in their roles rather than in the personal qualities which they bring to their offices. The more of the decision maker's total interests and activities is invested in the role itself, the more likely are role expectations to determine his decision making behavior. Thus, at the one extreme, we would expect that the role of voter, being poorly defined and undemanding, would have little effect on the voter's choices; while at the other extreme, the professional social worker in

behavioral model for the actor, and provide him with a pattern by which he can deal with those in his role-set. In addition to prescriptions concerning his own behavior, the actor occupying a status will also possess a set of complementary expectations. These expectations are concerned with the behavior of actors in the role-set, and are meant to make explicit what is to be regarded as legitimate and illegitimate behavior. Prescriptions are thus to be viewed as the "ought to do" behavior patterns of the actor occupying the status which is associated with a definable role-set. Expectations are held by the status occupant and refer to the "ought to do" behavior patterns of those in the role-set.

The foregoing discussion was initiated from the perspective of the status occupant, in this case the actor occupying the position of city manager. Examining the situation from the vantage point of an actor in the role-set of the status occupant there would similarly be found to exist prescriptions and expectations of proper behavioral patterns. As an example, a city councilman will likely have a conception of the proper activity, duty, and responsibility of an actor occupying such a position, that is, prescriptions concerning councilmanic

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charge of a community organization would be acting according to a well-defined conception of the best way he might fill the demands of his office." Peter H. Rossi, Community Decision Making (no place: mimeographed, March, 1956), paper presented to Study of the Community Conference, p. 23.

behavior. Similarly, the councilman will have expectations concerning

the proper behavioral activity of individuals with whom he interacts

while acting as councilman, among these the city manager.

There is some empirical evidence to indicate that institutional

and organizational leadership positions are positions of high vulner-

ability for role conflict because "...our cultural imperatives impose

mutually contradictory demands with which the institutional leader must

deal."[8] Seeman cites four major bi-polarizations of values, or dimen-

sions of role conflict,[9] which he maintains are found in American culture:

(1) the status dimension which refers to the conflict between the success

ideology and the ideology of equalitarianism; (2) the authority dimension

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[8] Melvin Seeman, "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," _American Sociological Review_, 18, No. 4 (August, 1953), p. 374. Seeman's article deals with the results of a survey conducted with 77 Ohio school superintendents and 1065 teachers. Other studies concerning role conflict include the following: Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, _Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role_ (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); Jackson Toby, "Some Variables in Role Conflict Analysis," _Social Forces_, 30, No. 3 (March, 1952), pp. 323-327; J. W. Getzels and E. G. Guba, "Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," _American Sociological Review_, 19, No. 2 (April, 1954), pp. 164-175; and Ralph M. Stogdill, Ellis W. Scott, and William E. Jaynes, _Leadership and Role Expectations_ (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1956), Research Monograph Number 86, Bureau of Business Research.

[9] Seeman defines role conflict as "...the exposure of the indivi-dual in a given position to incompatible behavioral expectations," p. 373. For a discussion of various definitions see Gross, Mason, and McEachern, _Explorations in Role Analysis_, especially Chapter 15, pp. 244-257.

which involves conflict between the values of dependence and independence; (3) the institutional dimension "...involves the choice between universalist and particularist criteria for social action;"[10] and, (4) the means-end dimension which is the conflict between emphasis on getting the practical job done as against emphasis on the process of achievement.

It has been held by Seeman that three basic types of role conflict exist, in which the above cited dimensions of conflict are made manifest.

The typing of role conflict is based upon the situation that obtains with regard to the criterion group or groups--i.e., the significant others who are the definers of the social role.[11]

The three types of possible role conflict found by Seeman are the following: (1) agreement within the criterion-making group on behaviors which are mutually difficult to achieve under the given institutional conditions; (2) significant disagreement within the criterion group regarding role definition; and (3) disagreement between criterion groups regarding the nature of the given role.[12]

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[10] Seeman, p. 375. In commenting upon the institutional dimension, Seeman quotes Stouffer and Toby: "An especially common role conflict is that between one's institutionalized obligations of friendship and one's institutionalized obligations to a society," p. 375.

[11] Ibid., p. 376.

[12] As a classic example of conflict involving disagreement between criterion groups, Seeman cites the case of the industrial foreman who is caught between conflicting definitions of his role by worker and management.

Seeman began his study by defining role conflict as "...the exposure of the individual in a given situation to incompatible behavioral expectations."[13] The major criticism which the writer of the present study would make is that Seeman has made only a partial examination of the phenomenon of role conflict. Seeman's previously cited study was concerned with the variability in expectations held by a criterion group or groups for the behavior of the incumbents of a single position, the school administrator. Similarly, it is to be expected that there exists a high probability that the city manager status is one of high intrarole conflict.[14] The writer's criticism can be made more explicit by turning again to the concept of role-set.

> It would seem that the basic source of disturbance in the role-set is the structural circumstance that anyone occupying a particular status has role-partners who are differently located in the social structure. As a result, these others have, in some measure, values and moral expectations differing from those held by the occupant of the status in question.[15]

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[13] Seeman, p. 373.

[14] "An individual is confronted with intrarole conflict if he perceives that others hold different expectations from him as the incumbent of a single position....In inter-role conflict, an individual perceives that others hold different expectations for him as the incumbent of two or more positions." Gross, Mason, and McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis, pp. 248-249.

[15] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 370.

Merton, like Seeman, recognizes that disparate and contradictory

evaluations and expectations held by members of the role-set concerning

the status greatly complicate the task of the actor occupying the position.

Role conflict, it would appear to the writer, can only be understood when

recognition is given, as Merton apparently does, to the possibility that

the conflict is the result not only of the exposure of an individual to

conflicting behavioral expectations, as expressed by the criterion-

making groups or the role-set, but that attention must be directed to

the status-occupant's prescriptions and expectations of the behavior

of those in the role-set. In other words, and as an example, segments

in the role-set of a city manager might have contradictory expectations

of proper managerial behavior, but it is maintained here that this situ-

ation can be described as role conflict only if both expectations are

considered legitimate[16] by the status occupant--i.e., if the managerial

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[16]Among those who have discussed the concept of role conflict some
feel that incompatible expectations must be legitimate, while others do
not require this delimiting factor. Talcott Parsons restricts the concept
of role conflict to an actor's exposure "...to conflicting sets of legiti-
mized role expectations...." He defines legitimate expectations as
"institutionalized role expectations....The fact that both sides of the
conflicting expectations are institutionalized means that there is the
basis for a claim to legitimacy for both patterns. "Talcott Parsons,
The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 280-
282. Seeman apparently does not require that incompatible expectations
be legitimate in order that the term role conflict be applied to the pheno-
menon. The term legitimate has been used in this study in the following
manner: "A legitimate expectation is one which the incumbent of a focal
position feels others have a right to hold. An illegitimate expectation is

prescriptions allow for the apparently contradictory expectations or are silent as to proper managerial behavior.[17]

The point which is being made here is that in conflict situations in which the city manager is involved, and when the goal is the reduction of such conflict, it would be unwise to attribute this solely to evil politicians. Too often this is implicitly the explanation which is offered by the International City Managers' Association and its supporters.[18] A

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one which he does not feel others have a right to hold. An expectation which is felt to be legitimate will be called a perceived obligation. One which is felt to be illegitimate will be called a perceived pressure." Gross, Mason, and McEachern, Explorations, p. 248.

[17] It has been pointed out that "An important feature of large proportion of social roles is that the actions which make them up are not minutely described and that a certain range of variability is regarded as legitimate. Sanctions are not invoked against deviance within certain limits. This range of freedom makes it possible for actors with different personalities to fulfill within considerable limits the expectations associated with roughly the same roles..." Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, "A General Statement," p. 24, in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, editors, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[18] A tendency would seem to exist within the city manager movement, and with its public advocates, to explain controversy in manager cities and abandonments of the manager plan as being due to the machinations of evil men. For example, Arthur W. Bromage's monograph Manager Plan Abandonments: Why 51 Communities Shelved Council-Manager Government (New York City: National Municipal League, 1954), has one section titled "Selfish Interests Strong, Citizens Weak." This section of the monograph deals with so-called political factors which led to plan abandonments. Advocates of city manager government often go to rather humorous extremes in the portrayal of opponents of the plan. One example should be sufficient, although it could be replicated: "Skepticism toward the stock efforts to discredit the administration, its officers, and its efforts is important.

more fruitful approach to conflict situations would, it is here suggested,

be to examine the situation from the vantage point of role theory. Research

might indicate that conflict involving the manager was due to the lack of

an explicit consensus between the manager and the role-set as to the

"proper" behavior of the manager, and similarly, the "proper" behavior

of elected officials, municipal employees, and so on.[19]

There will always be those who place self-interest above the welfare of
their city, who will harass the new regime because the traditions and
customary performance of city manager government are clean and non-
political. Politicians who crave power for spoils' sake, vice rings,
gangsters and grafters of all kinds will use every means to sabotage
good government." Richard S. Childs, Best Practice Under the Manager
Plan: Role of Voters, Press, Council and Manager (New York City:
National Municipal League, 1942), p. 1. An antidote to the rhetoric of
the advocates of the manager plan was supplied by Stene and Floro, when
they pointed out that political factors, economic disturbances, and de-
fective charters were undoubtedly important factors in various abandon-
ments of the plan, but that "...the present studies, emphasizing public
attitudes, were based on the premise that other factors of equal or
greater importance might be disclosed. The conclusions suggest that
perhaps the behavior of city officials and leading supporters of city
manager government contribute as much to dissatisfaction as do the
campaign activities of a politically organized opposition." Edwin O.
Stene and George K. Floro, Abandonments of the Manager Plan: A Study
of Four Small Cities (Lawrence, Kansas: Governmental Research Center,
University of Kansas, 1955), p. 3.

[19]Such research as has been suggested here has been done for
several other occupations. For example, see: Eugene A. Wilkening,
"Consensus in Role Definition of County Extension Agents between the
Agents and Local Sponsoring Committee Members," Rural Sociology, 23,
No. 2 (June, 1958), pp. 184-197; and Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and
Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the
School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958).
Similar research projects can be noted in the text and bibliography of the

The point made in the preceeding section that status occupants will possess a set of defined maxims, or prescriptions, for behavior seems, in general, to be an accurate characterization and a useful concept. Yet, it needs some clarification when applied to the city manager status.

Raymond W. Mack has pointed out that, "In the framework of the characteristics of the occupation we can better understand the behavior of the man."[20] In other words, Mack was stating that the behavior of individuals occupying an occupational position could be understood by a knowledge of the orientation of the occupation. Thus, the International City Managers' Association would stress that the behavior of the city manager was in large part formed on the basis of the occupational association's emphasis on the community leader orientation and the professional orientation. But is this a completely accurate characterization of the manager status? The writer would urge that it is not because of two factors: first, it will be suggested that the manager occupation is an

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review article, Francis S. Chase and Egon G. Guba, "Administrative Roles and Behavior," Review of Educational Research, XXV, No. 4 (October, 1955), pp. 281-298. With the exception of the literature dealing with school administrators the writer has seen no similarly systematic work on other government administrators or elected officials.

[20] Raymond W. Mack, "Occupational Ideology and the Determinate Role," Social Forces, 36, No. 1 (October, 1957), p. 44.

indeterminate occupational status; and second, that within the occu-

pational association there exist contrary conceptions of the function and

proper behavior of the manager.

The City Manager - An Indeterminate Occupational Status

It has been suggested by Raymond W. Mack that occupational

statuses can be placed on a continuum which serves as a measure of the

occupation's "determinateness."[21] Mack maintains that this measure is

a mechanism which will indicate those occupations where a high poten-

tiality for conflict exists between the actor occupying the status and

those in his role-set. Mack's determinateness scale is based on the

assumption that

> ...any occupation is characterized by patterned role expecta-
> tions which are internalized by the incumbents and reflected in
> the...role behavior observable among the practitioners of that
> occupation.[22]

The ideal types, located on the extremes of the continuum of determinate-

ness, are: the determinate occupational status which is characterized by

elaborately prescribed requirements for entry which must be met by those

aspiring to the occupation; the rights and duties of the actor occupying

the occupational status will be explicit and known to both the actor and

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[21] Mack, "Occupational Ideology and the Determinate Role,"
pp. 37-44.

[22] Ibid., p. 38.

and those with whom he interacts in his occupational status--that is, among his role-set. "The expectations of the role behavior in such a status will be narrow in range and relatively definits;"[23] and the opposite ideal type, the indeterminate occupational status, is characterized by less stringent requirements for entry into the occupation, shifting both with time and locale. Neither the rights nor the duties of the actor occupying the indeterminate occupational status will be firmly established, and both will hence be a subject for possible misunderstanding between the actor and those with whom he interacts. "The expectations of role behavior in such a status will be wide in range and relatively indefinite."[24] The occupants of a determinate occupational status would likely be considered professionals, although Mack does not make this explicit. In fact, he denies that high determinateness is equivalent to prestige or that "...the continuum of determinateness is a stratification continuum."[25] On the other hand, Mack maintains that

> ...the person in a determinate occupational status will view his
> work as an end in itself, and will define future goals in terms of
> his job, while a person in an indeterminate occupational status
> will view his work as instrumental, and will define life goals
> primarily as money. He will more often, then, view his present
> job as a means of gaining entry into some other occupational
> status.[26]

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[23]Ibid.　[24]Ibid.　[25]Ibid., p. 39.　[26]Ibid.

The occupant of the determinate occupational status has met rather elaborate prescriptions to enter the occupation, and his rights and duties are quite explicit, according to Mack. This description is similar to the definition given to a _professional_ by sociologists. Talcott Parsons has distinguished the professional from other occupational types in the following manner:

> ...the professional is distinguished largely by the independent trusteeship exercised....This means that its typical member is trained...usually by a formally organized educational process, so that only those with the proper training are considered qualified to practice the profession. Furthermore only members of the profession are treated as qualified to interpret its traditions authoritatively and, if it admits of this, to develop and improve it. Finally, though there usually is considerable division of labor within such a group, a substantial proportion of the members of the profession will be concerned largely with the "practical application" of the traditions to a variety of situations where it can be useful to others than the members of the profession itself. The professional man is thus a "technical expert" of some order by virtue of his mastery of the tradition and the skills of its use.[27]

Similarly, Everett C. Hughes has emphasized that the professions are distinguished by a training period of some length; the training usually prescribed by the profession itself, and often sanctioned by the state.

He continues:

> The training is assumed to be necessary to learning the science and techniques essential to the practice of the function of the profession. The training, however, carries with it as a by-product assimilation of the candidate to a set of professional

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[27] Talcott Parsons, _Essays in Sociological Theory_ (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954, rev.ed.), p. 372.

attitudes and controls, a professional conscience and solidarity. The profession claims and aims to become a moral unit.[28]

In those who come to assume the professional attitude the occupation is represented both as a culture and technique. The technique is developed with reference to certain objects or activities....The interests, which the occupational group couches in a language more or less its own, are the basis of the code and policy of the occupational group. The code is the occupation's prescribed activity of the individuals within toward each other; the policy represents its relation to the community in which they operate. There is always a limit to the degree in which the code and policy of an occupation can deviate from the general culture of the community. Its members are products of a lay society. The practice of the occupation demands some degree of social sanction by the outside world.[29]

Abstracting from these two statements there would seem to be considerable agreement concerning the definition of a profession and a professional. Among those which can be mentioned are the following: a formally organized educational process; state sanctioning of the training program and state certification of occupational aspirants; an explicit code or rules of behavior, either written or unwritten; the gradual development of what might be termed a "guild spirit"; and, the assimilation and internalization of professional prescriptions. In other words, the professional's rights and duties are well known to the occupant of the status position and to those with whom he interacts, and the aspirant has satisfied the prescriptions for entry into the profession. The

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[28] Everett C. Hughes, "Personality Types and the Division of Labor," _American Journal of Sociology_, XXX, No. 5 (March, 1928), p. 762.

[29] _Ibid._, p. 764.

sociological definition of a profession seems quite similar to Mack's

definition of a determinate occupational status.

The City Manager Ideal

George K. Floro[30] has made a comprehensive and systematic

study of career patterns and "types" of city managers. Based upon

research conducted with fifty-five city managers in Michigan over a

two-year period, Floro has identified seven types of city managers[31] on

the basis of work patterns and job perspectives.

. Within the occupation Floro was able to distinguish between those

managers who (1) enhance the occupational group,[32] and (2) those who

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[30] See his "Types of City Managers," Public Management, XXXVI, No. 10 (October 1954) pp. 221-225 and "Continuity in City-Manager Careers," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, No. 4 (November, 1955), pp. 240-246. Other treatments of city manager types are to be found in Steve Matthews, "Types of Managerial Leadership," Public Management, XXXIX, No. 3 (March, 1957), pp. 50-53; and A. Gayle Waldrop, "A Councilman Views City Managers," Public Management, XXXIV, No. 7 (July, 1952), pp. 146-149. The latter two articles tend to be rather hortatory, as are many of those found in the journal, Public Management.

[31] Floro states, however, that "Most of the managers interviewed were oriented toward one of the two occupational ideals." "Types of City Managers," p. 225.

[32] "The city-manager occupation and the organizations which advocate the adoption of that form of government are separate, with distinctive functions, purposes, and personnel for the most part. The two are interdependent nonetheless. While not an active advocate, a manager's actions are expected to contribute indirectly to the continued expansion of the movement." Floro, "Continuity in City-Manager Careers," p. 241, footnote 6. Similarly, the code of ethics contains admonitions that no

appear to threaten occupational prestige and stability. In the former group,

the types Floro found were the prominent one-city manager and the advance-

ment-by-moving manager.[33] The types he identified in the latter group in-

cluded the non-professional one-city manager, the jumper, the floater,

and the individualist.[34]

1. The prominent one-city manager. Floro found this type to be

   marked by long tenure in one city and is recognized by his

   colleagues as a "distinguished" manager.

   > The perspectives of the prominent one-city manager include
   > a conception of tenure in terms of a job that is carved out
   > in a city over a long period...His perspective is associated
   > with the aspiration to remain as long as the council and the
   > people want him to remain, and he often has assurances
   > that he can have the local appointment as long as he wishes.[35]

2. The advancement-by-moving manager. This second occupational

   ideal, Floro found to be the more prominent variety. Each city is

   considered as preparatory to the next by the advancement-by-

   moving manager.

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one accept a city manager position "...unless he is fully in accord with
the principles of council-manager government." (1952 code, section 1.)

[33] See below a description of the "types" identified by Floro.

[34] There is some difficulty in placing the engineer manager in
either of the categories. Neither is this type considered an occupation-
al threat nor does he appear well-indoctrinated in the traditions of the
group.

[35] Floro, "Types of City Managers," p. 222.

Tenure is usually viewed as a unit of work. He ...
carves out work in fairly neat packages over a relatively
short time--as short a period as two years...After this
work is accomplished, or its completion is assured, he
feels he is free to move to take advantages of further
opportunities....Colleague rules restrain the advance-
ment-by-moving manager from exploiting a city by means
of a program of quick and conspicuous accomplishment
without regard to the long run development of a city.[36]

3. The nonprofessional one-city manager. Floro identified four sub-

types in this classification. All four, however, are marked by an

unwillingness to dissociate from their former places in the local-

ity or local politics.

Old guard personnel...temporarily appointed to the
manager office during an interim period between regularly
appointed managers.[37]

An old timer in the municipal organization who wants to
give it a try in rounding out a municipal career. "Getting
along" with the council may not be too distrubing even if
"programs" get "busted up"...[38]

The "unexpected appointment" ...the selection from...
the ranks or promotion to administrative office too rapidly.
Such managers think they are totally unprepared or not
ready. Movement to other cities is not anticipated. Tenure
is conceived of as a temporary period and municipal oper-
ations are closely supervised by the city council members
at the expense of manager initiative.[39]

The fourth variation...is the manager with a well-estab-
lished preference for another occupation before reluctantly
accepting the manager appointment.[40]

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[36] Ibid., p. 223. [37] Ibid. [38] Ibid. [39] Ibid. [40] Ibid.

4. The jumper manager. Professional colleagues of this type consider

    him to be irresponsible in moving from one city to another with only

    short tenure in each. This mobility is regarded as primarily for the

    purpose of achieving the symbols of advancement, namely, a larger

    salary in a larger city.

5. The floater manager. This type is identified by Floro as

    > ...a manager who enters the occupation as the "best job"
    > available to him at the time and continues to remain on
    > that basis, while he currently considers "best job offers"
    > in or out of city government. He does not appear to be
    > well indoctrinated in the traditions of the occupational
    > group.[41]

6. The individualist manager. Floro feels that similarity exists be-

    tween the floater and the individualist, but that the latter is differ-

    entiated by his willingness to exploit opportunities in the manager

    field by surreptitious means, namely,

    > ...by catering to local councilmen and other local persons
    > who may be dubious of the professional manager but none-
    > theless want the benefit of an outside manager.[42]

7. The engineer manager. This type, according to Floro, has a

    > ...distinctive pattern of movement from one small city
    > to another small city. He does not have a perspective
    > that allows for advancement through movement to in-
    > creasingly challenging appointments. Work is defined

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[41] Ibid., p. 224.　　[42] Ibid.

in terms of discrete projects...and much time is spent
out of the office on the job.[43]

It was found by Floro that the most general problem faced by a city

manager was that of "...becoming substantially involved in local affairs

without overdoing it and impairing his effectiveness."[44] It would appear,

quite obviously, that the position demands substantial participation by

the individual manager in the affairs of the local community--with the

council, municipal employees, and the public. At the same time,

certain precepts of manager doctrine, especially those which are anta-

gonistic to partisan activity within municipal government, picture the

manager office as one which is necessary "...for the protection of the

people against themselves."[45] Thus, the managers who are judged

"successful" and said to enhance the occupation's prestige, this

"success" being based on colleague judgment, are those offering

"...effective resistance to entrenchment of local organizations."[46]

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[43]
Ibid. Three of the four managers serving in the communities,
studied by Stene and Floro, which abandoned the manager plan were
"...professional engineers and had served municipal government in
engineering capacities. ...they seemed more interested in physical
improvements than in other phases of municipal administration." Stene
and Floro, Abandonments of the Manager Plan, p. 94.

[44]
Ibid., p. 221.

[45]
Ibid.

[46]
Ibid.

The nonprofessional, jumper, floater, and individualist, as viewed by

colleagues, are either unable to dissociate themselves from previous

connections with the locality or have not assimilated the traditions

of the occupational group. Colleague judgment demands that a city

manager possess an "outsider" orientation. He should "...be a per-

petual "newcomer" in a locality."[47] The city manager who is a local

resident at the time of his appointment must become dissociated from

uniquely local sentiment and local obligations which might interfere

with the duties of the manager office, if he desires to gain colleague

approval.

It was previously stated that a general problem of the city manager

was that of involvement in local affairs. Floro points out that

...the office has contradictory duties. Many specific contra-
dictions arise from the enterprising and innovating functions
of the manager in the indigenous organization and the locality.
These are embraced by the general problem of regulating involve-
ment—of being substantially involved in local affairs but not too
involved.[48]

By the regulation of involvement is meant, according to Floro,

...the process by which the city manager maintains a certain
freedom from obligations in immediate situations which might
jeopardize his office and by which he carves out work to do
that defines his necessary obligations.[49]

There would appear to be three basic methods by which the city manager

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[47]Floro, "Continuity," p. 241. [48]Ibid. [49]Ibid., p. 243.

can regulate his involvement in local affairs: the threat of resignation,

rigorous adherence to the code of ethics, and assimilation of the pre-

scriptions as set forth in the literature of the International City Managers'

Association. In regard to the threat of resignation Floro has written:

> One of the colleague rules is that a manager should be "willing
> to resign" to protect his "integrity" as a manager, the local
> manager office, the manager "profession" and the manager plan.
> This is part of the involvement problem. The manager is expected
> to be sufficiently free from local claims upon him so that he can
> "leave gracefully" if his obligations to colleagues require a
> resignation. Ordinarily a manager is not expected to remain in
> a city if it is necessary to "fight" (this generally implies a
> public issue) to retain his appointment. Furthermore, he is
> expected to remain sufficiently free from local commitments so
> that he can use a resignation threat (usually indirectly and in
> a preventive way) if the special character of the office is in
> jeopardy or if the city council becomes committed to a course
> of action which supposedly would require the manager to violate
> his ethical code.[50]

The second method by which a manager can possibly regulate his

involvement in local affairs is by a strict adherence to the occupational

association's ethical code. Several of the 1952 code's provisions, for

example, are seemingly directed to this end. Section 7 warns the

manager not to become involved in partisan affairs by stating "The city

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[50] Ibid. It should be noted that the 1924 version of the code of
ethics of the occupational association stated that "Power justifies re-
sponsibility, and responsibility demands power, and a city manager who
becomes impotent to inspire support should resign." (Section 7). This
provision was deleted, however, in the later revisions of the code.

manager ...recognizes that the chief function of the local government
at all times is to serve the best interests of all the people on a nonparti-
san basis." The manager should, prescribes section 8, deal with the
council as a unit rather than with individual members. Managerial rela-
tions with municipal employees are prescribed in section 9; the objective
again being regulated involvement on the part of the manager in local
affairs.[51]

> The city manager handles all matters of personnel on the basis
> of merit. Fairness and impartiality governs the city manager in
> all matters pertaining to appointments, pay adjustments, pro-
> motions, and discipline in the municipal service.

Obviously, the code of ethics is a limited document--it cannot cover
all situations which might arise in the course of a manager's employment.
A voluminous mass of literature is available to the manager, however, in
the form of publications of the International City Managers' Association.

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[51] Floro feels that a newly appointed manager's relations with city
employees must be handled carefully because of the probable "old guard"
ideology held by the employees. The manager must be a co-ordinator of
specialists in different endeavors and an integrator of personnel having
various vested interests. See "Continuity," p. 240. For relevant dis-
cussions of manager-employee relations and the role of bureaucracy in
thwarting policy proposals see Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the
Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); J. Donald
Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British
Civil Service (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), esp. pp.
287-305; many other pertinent articles are to be found in Robert K. Merton,
et.al., editors, Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1952). One study of abandonments of the manager plan found that, "within
the administrative systems there was evidence that city manager govern-
ment did not have strong support among city employees." Stene and Floro,
Abandonments of the Manager Plan, p. 96.

Much of this material also seems aimed at suggesting methods by which

the manager can regulate his involvement in local affairs. An example

of the occupational association's attempt to regulate involvement can

be seen, for example, in the statements which urge that local residents

not be appointed to the manager office.

> ...experience has shown that in most instances there are decided
> advantages in having the manager come from out of town....he
> will be able to start his administration without being suspected
> of having friends to reward or enemies to punish. It seems to be
> true that pressure is more likely to be brought to bear on the
> local appointee with reference to appointments and the letting of
> contracts.[52]

The association also advises managers to regulate involvement by fol-

lowing this suggestion:

> Don't get to know city council members too well personally,
> because some members would be quite willing to take a new
> manager under their wing for obvious reasons. The public must
> not get the impression that any group controls the manager or
> is controlled by the manager.
> Don't form close personal associations with staff personnel.
> Don't become identified, even socially, with any particular
> group or public.[53]

It should be noted that Alvin W. Gouldner has recently used the

terms "cosmopolitans" and "locals" in an analysis of latent social roles.[54]

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[52] The Selection of a City Manager (Chicago: International City
Managers' Association, 1947), p. 7.

[53] Guideposts on Assuming a City Manager Position (Chicago:
International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 24.

[54] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an

Cosmopolitans were defined as

> those low on loyalty to the employing organization, high on
> commitment to specialized role skills, and likely to use an
> outer reference group orientation.[55]

Locals, conversely, were described as

> those high on loyalty to the employing organization, low on
> commitment to specialized role skills, and likely to use an
> inner reference group orientation.[56]

There would seem to be a high correlation between Gouldner's

cosmopolitans and the occupational ideal-type city manager, as found

by Floro and as indicated thus far in this study. For example, the

ideal-type city manager is not one closely identified with the locale

in which he serves; he regulates his involvement. The ideal city

manager looks to the occupational association as his reference group;

the importance of the code of ethics and occupational prescriptions have

been pointed out and will be commented upon later.[57] The association's

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Analysis of Latent Social Roles--I," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2,
No. 3 (December, 1957), pp. 281-306; and, by the same author, Part II,
A.S.Q., 2, No. 4 (March, 1958), pp. 444-480.

[55] Ibid., p. 290. [56] Ibid.

[57] William A. Sommers has commented, "The International City
Managers' Association has been the key in developing standards and
procedures and thus furnishing the thread of continuity to managerial
practice." "Council-Manager Government: A Review," Western
Political Quarterly, XI, No. 3 (March, 1958), p. 145.

emphasis upon the techniques and skills of management have also been given some attention. In this regard, Sommers has pointed out that

A major element in its city manager plan success rests upon the assumption that there are general principles in municipal administration....Thus it is possible to develop professional administrators who can move from one city to another and apply the principles successfully.[58]

Similarly, the locals would correspond in many respects to those occupational types which are felt to threaten the movement, occupational prestige, and stability.

Before proceeding, the conclusions which have been reached should be summarized: first, the city manager status is not a profession under the usual definition of that term; second, the city manager status should, very likely, be recognized as being an indeterminate occupational status, insofar as the particular occupational position is not, as yet, characterized by stringent requirements for entry into the occupation. Requirements and qualifications have shifted both in time and with the locale.[59] It should be recognized, however, that the International City

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[58] Ibid., p. 139.

[59] See the section of Chapter IV titled "The Changing Ideology of Managerial Government." The manager who intends to make the occupation a career will probably become an itinerant. This term has been used by George K. Floro in the title of his doctoral dissertation: The City Manager in the State of Michigan: A Case Study of an Itinerant Professional (University of Chicago, Department of Sociology). The availability of this work came to the attention of the writer too late for use to be made of it. Itinerancy, as an occupational ideal, increases the difficulty of certification, licensing, and other mechanisms of associational control.

Managers' Association urges that the occupation be recognized as a professional one. The point that should be stressed, however, is that the International City Managers' Association defines certain duties and rights for managers as if its membership thought and acted with monolithic unity. Rights and duties of actors occupying the manager status are likely known, approved, internalized, and followed by only a portion of the association's membership.[60]

It has been pointed out that the code and doctrine of the manager movement, as set forth by the International City Managers' Association, have been substantially revised since the inception of this local government form. It has also been suggested that there are two major schools of thought within the occupational group: that which supports the contemporary conception of the manager as community leader; and, an

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[60] The ideology and doctrine of the manager movement has not been static. The degree to which any manager can alter his behavior to match, for example, the occupational association's changing provisions in the code of ethics is a moot point. The chances would appear rather high that a manager firmly committed to a set of association prescriptions would experience some degree of personal disorganization should the reference group alter its prescriptions for behavior. In fact, it might be suggested that conflict involving a city council and a manager, during a period of changing occupational prescriptions, could be due to disparite expectations concerning managerial behavior. As Heberle has pointed out, "Certain experiences ...tend to be of decisive effect on the development of the individual's social philosophy and on his political attitudes." Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), p. 120. A manager of one "political generation" is apt, it seems to experience some degree of internal role conflict should his reference group alter its doctrine.

element which can perhaps be characterized as having an orientation

toward administration, without involvement in community leadership. As

has been suggested managers Turner and Bartlett are perhaps exemplary

of these positions. By a brief examination of policy and administration

these contrary perspectives may be made more apparent.

Policy and Administration: Community Leader or Administrator

Many political scientists have pointed out that the making of

authoritative and effective decisions and policies does not occur solely

at the level of legislative bodies:[61]

The function of policy-making can not actually be vested ex-
clusively at any one point or level in the government. Wherever

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[61] Some of the more valuable literature includes: Paul Appleby,
Policy and Administration (University, Alabama: University of Alabama
Press, 1949); William Brownrigg, The Human Enterprise Process and its
Administration (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1954);
Eugene L. Belisle and Cyril G. Sargent, "The Concept of Administration,"
in Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg, editors, Administrative
Behavior in Education (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 82-119;
Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government,"
Public Administration Review, I, No. 4 (Summer, 1941), pp. 335-350;
Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Re-
sponsibility," in Carl J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason, editors, Public
Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 3-24; Lawrence
J. R. Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," American
Political Science Review, LI, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 330-345; F.
Morstein Marx, "Policy Formation and the Administrative Process,"
American Political Science Review, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1939), pp.
55-60; James L. McCamy, "Analysis of the Process of Decision-Making,"
Public Administration Review, VII, No. 1 (Winter, 1947), pp. 41-49;

there is action affecting the public there is policy-making.[62]

David Easton, similarly, has pointed out that,

> A decision [a legislative prescription] alone is of course not a
> policy; to decide what to do does not mean the thing is done.
> A decision is only a selection among alternatives that expresses
> the intention of the person or group making the choice.[63]

The arriving at and making of a decision (a legislative prescription)

might be viewed as the formal phase in the process of policy formation;

but it is not necessarily the complete policy in relation to the specific

problem. As Easton has indicated, a legislature can decide to punish

monopolists, "But an administrator can destroy or reformulate the de-

cision by failing either to discover offenders or to prosecute them

vigorously."[64] The administrative action is as much a part of policy

as is the legislative prescription. Easton concludes:

> When we act to implement a decision, therefore, we enter the
> second or effective phase of policy. In this phase the decision
> is expressed or interpreted in a series of actions and narrower
> decisions which may in effect establish new policy.[65]

Herbert A. Simon, "Decision Making and Administrative Organization,"
Public Administration Review, IV, No. 1 (Winter, 1944), pp. 16-31;
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The MacMillan
Co., 1947); and Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of the
Political Theory of American Public Administration (New York: The Ronald
Press Co., 1948).

[62] Appleby, Policy and Administration, p. 20.

[63] David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State
of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 130.

[64] Ibid.   [65] Ibid.

Appleby's previously cited work emphasizes the same point made by Easton in attempting to indicate the error in assuming the presence of a policy-administration dichotomy.[66] In speaking of the oft-made distinction, Carl J. Friedrich has written:

> ...while the distinction has a great deal of value as a relative matter of emphasis, it cannot any longer be accepted in this absolute form....this misleading distinction has become a fetish, a stereotype in the minds of theorists and practitioners alike.[67]

Appleby would maintain that administrators are continually determining what the law is, what it means in terms of action, what the rights of parties are with respect both to "transactions in process and transactions in prospect."[68] Appleby also makes explicit another obvious form of administrative participation in the process of policy formation:

> Administrators...formulate recommendations for legislation, and this is a part of the functions of policy-making, even that policy-making which can be done fully only at the legislative level.[69]

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[66] It must be remembered that when evidence denying the existence of a policy-administration dichotomy is presented an "ought" value statement is not necessarily being made. The "is" observation does not mean, necessarily, approval.

[67] Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," pp. 5-6. Most commentators, like Friedrich, indicate that Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1900), was responsible for the origination and popularizing of a policy-administration dichotomy. On the other hand, there is some evidence that Goodnow's distinction has been overstated.

[68] Appleby, Policy and Administration, p. 7.   [69] Ibid.

Similarly,

> ...policy-making in administration is the exercise of discretion
> with respect to ...action.[70]

Contemporary observers of the manager plan hold conflicting

opinions in regard to the actual location of policy and administrative

functions in municipal governments operating under the manager form.

To one observer the existence of the policy-administration dichotomy is

seen to be fundamental to the governmental form.

> The basic contribution of the council-manager plan to local
> government progress is the separation of policy-making from
> administrative operations and their assignment to elected re-
> presentatives and appointed officials respectively.[71]

Sommers continues:

> The point is...that the council-manager form carries inherent
> in it a polarity of policy and administration which is usually
> written into the law and embodied in the city's administrative
> ordinances; eventually it becomes a fairly clear line in practice.
> Moreover, by establishing the polarity of policy and admini-
> stration the forays of one branch into the other are more easily
> distinguished as such.[72]

Wallace S. Sayre obversely maintains that the policy-administration

"dilemma" increasingly bedevils the manager plan in operation. He points

out that manager plan doctrine emphasizes council monopoly over policy

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[70] Ibid., p. 15.

[71] William A. Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review,"
Western Political Quarterly, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), p. 137.

[72] Ibid., p. 138.

while "...practice underscores the necessity for policy leadership by the manager..."[73] In substantiation of Sayre's statement it is only necessary to turn to Leonard D. White's 1927 appraisal of the manager plan. White found that the plan attempts to make a sharp division between two major activities,

> ...assigning the duty of determining city policy to the council... and the duty of carrying out the policy...to the manager.[74]

White was unwilling, however, to accept the theoretical division of activities and said that it was necessary to inquire into the actual working relationships. His examination of city manager government in operation indicated that

> Observation of managers at work leads the writer to the conviction that...most managers, do in fact possess the initiative in most matters of policy....The office of city manager has become the great center of initiating and proposing (but not deciding) public policies as well as the sole responsible center of administration.[75]

Now the literature of the manager movement and its advocates puts continual stress upon the existence of the policy-administration dichotomy, regardless of the available information and contemporary administrative

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[73] Wallace S. Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," Public Administration Review, XIV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1954), p. 258.

[74] Leonard D. White, The City Manager (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 181.

[75] Ibid., p. 210.

doctrine. One advocate indicates that,

> ...the design of council-manager government is essentially
> functional. It is the simplest available structural arrangement
> for obtaining representative decisions on policy and competent
> execution of these decisions.[76]

The International City Managers' Association also attempts to construct

an image of the city manager as administrator, and the existence of a

sharp demarcation between policy and administration. Innumerable

references could be cited, but two will suffice:

> The council keeps hands off the administrative process, while
> the manager for his part does not enter into politics--the pro-
> vince of legislators on the council.[77]

> The most important aspect of local government is policy making
> and this duty rests exclusively with the council....On the other
> hand, the chief duty of the city manager is the administration of
> policy.[78]

Quite obviously, it is not only in the literature of the occupational associ-

ation that there is found emphasis upon the distinction between policy and

administration. Textbooks in municipal government also usually describe

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[76] John E. Bebout, "Management for Large Cities," _Public Admini-
stration Review_, XV, No. 3 (Summer, 1955), p. 192.

[77] _City Management--A Growing Profession_, p. 20.

[78] _Handbook for City Councilmen in Council-Manager Cities_
(Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1955), p. 1.

manager government in these terms.[79]

The contemporary city manager, it will be maintained here, is faced with a rather perplexing situation in terms of what shall be his behavior in the process of policy formation. On the one hand, the doctrine of the manager plan has historically stressed the policy-administration distinction; the manager as a relatively anonymous technician. Yet much of this same literature prescribes that the manager is to be a community leader and hence, must become intimately involved in the process of policy formation. Before proceeding it should be noted that these contrary prescriptions may lead to contrary expectations of proper managerial behavior on the part of those in the role-set of the manager. The likely result is municipal controversy involving the manager and the manager plan should prescriptions and expectations vary.

Some attention has been devoted to the manager as community

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[79] For a critique of municipal government texts see Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," American Political Science Review, LI, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 330-345. Herson, among his other criticisms, finds that most local government literature supports the dichotomy discussed above. For two relatively sophisticated treatments of the manager plan in textbooks the present writer would suggest Charles R. Adrian, Governing Urban America: Structure, Politics, and Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), and William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, State and Local Government in the United States (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951).

leader in an earlier chapter; at this point, however, it will be necessary

to elaborate on this aspect of manager doctrine insofar as it involves the

process of policy formation.

It is frequently asserted in the literature of the manager movement

that

If the council-manager plan of government has a serious weakness,
it lies in the fact that there is often a lack of leadership comparable
to that supplied by an aggressive mayor under the other forms of
municipal government.[80]

This conclusion, held by the occupational association, has led to the

community leader phase in the manager movement.

I am not for one moment suggesting the manager should assume
a role of political leadership or should carry matters over the
heads of his council to the electorate. I am saying a manager
must be more than a technical administrator! he must assume
the leadership and set the pace for the people serving under
his direction--he must find out the needs and desires of the
people of his community and recommend to council solutions
to those problems, including the ways and means to accomplish
them--he should be able to carry to the people of his city by
word of mouth an accurate and competent account of what his
city is doing--never as a political proposition, but as one
primarily interested in and responsible for the civic welfare of
his community.[81]

The above quotation and the functions cited therein would properly seem

to be the province of elected officials, but the city manager's occupa-

tional association, now in the community leader phase, prescribes these

as properly the duties of the appointed administrator. The manager must

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[80] Howell, What Are the Elements...?, p. 7.   [81] Ibid.

exercise community leadership, it is said, because of the inadequacies

of elected mayors and councilmen. Thomas Reed, a long-time advocate

of structural municipal reform, has written:

> The fact of the matter is that legislative bodies, as such, are
> incapable of initiating anything. They only can pass on pro-
> posals which are laid before them by individuals....City
> managers...find that the formulation of policy is a necessary
> complement of their duties of executive direction.[82]

Three decades ago Leonard D. White wrote that the manager form of muni-

cipal government was apt to suffer from lack of leadership. He attributed

this to the fact that the plan weakened a mayor's opportunity to exert

leadership because of "his separation from the active conduct of city

government."[83] Furthermore, the mayor and council were only part-time

amateurs. White, who was opposed to the even-then present tendency

toward community leadership by the manager, saw the existence and

growth of a problem caused by the disparity of theory and practice con-

cerning policy leadership in the community.[84] The doctrine of manager

government held, and still does, that,

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[82] Thomas Harrison Reed, _Municipal Management_ (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1941), p. 67.

[83] White, _The City Manager_, p. 165.

[84] White viewed the problem to be "...how to develop effective
leaders out of amateurs, who are cut off from power which control of
office may give." _Ibid._, p. 165.

> The ideal relationship between manager and mayor...assumes
> that the mayor will be a prominent figure in municipal affairs
> and will take an active lead in initiating city policy, in pre-
> senting it to the voters, in defending it against attack, and
> in protecting the city manager against criticism for whatever
> policy the council may embark upon. It assumes that the
> mayor will be the chief political figure in the city.[85]

Manager doctrine, according to White, also posited the policy-admini-

stration dichotomy. But he maintained that when administrative functions

were placed in the hands of an appointed officer the chances for the mayor

to exercise policy and political leadership were diminished.

> The ideal assumes ...that the mayor will keep his hands
> off the conduct of city business. Appointments to office, high
> or low, purchase of supplies, assignment to duties, discipline
> and discharge of employees, individual promotions and salary
> adjustments, the preparation of the budget, are not for him.
> Here the manager holds the exclusive responsibility. But it
> is precisely by the manipulation of these affairs that the
> American mayor has built up his power and maintained his
> leadership. With the foundation of his position thus knocked
> from under him, the mayor has, for the time being been be-
> wildered and unable to reconstruct his opportunities.[86]

The writer would suggest that within the manager movement there

are found those managers who resemble Turner of Springfield and those

who are most like Manager Bartlett. Some attempt to practice the com-

munity leader concept which is now stressed by the International City

Managers' Association; while others are characterized by their attempts

to remain outside active participation in policy development. Although

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[85] Ibid., p. 180.   [86] Ibid., pp. 180-181.

undoubtedly the community leader phase is in the ascendency it would
not be correct to characterize the occupational group as a single body
with similar behavior patterns.

While this chapter has centered attention on some different
approaches which might be utilized in the examination of the activity,
behavior, and role of the city manager in the community, some slight
attention should be given to a restatement of what the writer considers
to be dilemmas in the community leader-manager doctrine. First, there
is what might be termed the political involvement problem: manager
doctrine frowns upon any partisan activity in the community, yet
manager plan supporters in a community are urged to organize to give
aid to the manager and the plan. City managers are enjoined against
becoming involved in local politics, but at the same time the doctrine
and the occupational association's code of ethics indicates that the
manager must assume the position of policy initiator and public defender
of prescriptions laid down by the council because of the inability or
unwillingness of elected officials to do so.[87] Second, the doctrine of

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[87] Bert Balmer, The Political Role of the Tacoma City Manager,
unpublished draft of case submitted to the Inter-University Case Program,
dated May 7, 1957, has posed some interesting questions with which the
manager association has not yet dealt specifically: "When policies es-
tablished by a city council lead to an attempt by forces within a community
to overthrow the council-manager form of government, can a manager assume
his role as defender of policy and community leader without also assuming

the movement has historically emphasized, and continues to do so, that the manager is an administrator, and that policy results from action by the elected council. On the other hand, the competency of elected officials is seriously questioned. Thus, the manager is urged to become in practice not simply the agent of the council, but rather the community leader whose function it is to be an active force in the process of policy formation.[88] The administrator has, basically, become the primary source of policy recommendations, the council's source of information, and the defender of policy prescriptions made by the elected body, as well as the executor of these prescriptions. It is still unclear to the writer how the community leader manager can remain outside of politics in the community. By being intimately involved in policy recommendation and discussion it would seem that he axiomatically becomes a political figure, not simply an administrator.

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the role of political leader? Can a city manager, at the time of such political controversy, refrain from speaking on the political issues involved, and yet properly defend and support the manager form of government? At a time of political attack upon the council-manager form of government, when loyalties within the administration are divided, can the manager demand, as a condition of employment, that active opposition from within will not be tolerated?" pp. 1-2.

[88] The advocates of manager government make some distinction between policy leadership and community leadership which is unclear to the writer. Thus, for example: "The political leadership of elected representative should not be confused with the community leadership that covers the suggestion and recommendation of new programs and the discussion of them in community forums and, more essential, with the council itself." Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review," p. 142.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Public Administration

In this study the writer has tried to suggest some additional
approaches to the study of council manager government and to provide
a slight antidote to the hortatory literature of the manager movement.
A possible approach to conflict situations has been suggested through
the introduction of role theory, and an attempt has been made to show
that the community leader city manager is only one, although perhaps
dominant, of at least two conceptions of possible managerial behavior
patterns. Since the International City Managers' Association directs so
much attention to the community leader type manager , the writer feels
that an important point has been made in making explicit that variable
behavior is very possible from occupants of the same status position.

Within the literature of the manager movement there would seem
to exist an assumption that in those cities which have experienced
conflict concerning the city manager the causal factor can be found in
the activity of politicians. Sometimes this is explicit but usually it is
only to be recognized after removing mentally a layer of verbiage. It
would be unfair to say that the adherents of manager government are

politically naive. Yet, in their enthusiatic ardor for the supposed

benefits of the manager plan they often offer the easy and simple ex-

planation for events in the community. It is almost as if it is always

possible to separate the forces of evil and the forces of good. A note

of shocked horror resounds in this literature when a manager is dis-

missed, and responsibility is solely the council's when a manager is

fired. For example, Stone, Price, and Stone have written:

> Short tenure in these...cities was caused either by political
> factors which led the councils to select unqualified or unsuitable
> city managers or by frequent political changes in the councils
> which resulted in the dismissal of managers.[1]

> The political habits of the community, rather than the character
> of the manager, accounted for most of the instability in the
> position of city manager. In cities that adopted city manager
> government chiefly as a means of political reform, the plan often
> remained a political issue and the opposition frequently focused
> its attack upon the city manager. When the opposition succeeded
> in electing a councilmanic majority, the manager was usually dis-
> charged.[2]

As is probably true of most explanations there is likely some degree

of truth in these statements; yet, implicit in them is an attitude which

almost unquestioningly accepts that the manager plan is an expression

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[1] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn Stone, City Manager
Government in the United States (Chicago: Public Administration Service,
1940), p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 65.

of some ultimate truth and that any question raised about the manager

plan is somewhat sacrilegious. Approximately three decades ago John

Dewey wrote of the meaning of political reforms and his statement has

some applicability to the manager movement.

> These things are devices evolved in the direction in which the
> current was moving, each wave of which involved at the time of
> its impulsion a minimum of departure from antecedent custom and
> law. The devices served a purpose; but the purpose was rather
> that of meeting existing needs which had become too intense to
> be ignored, than that of forwarding the democratic idea. In
> spite of all defects, they served their own purpose well.
> Looking back, even with the aid which ex post facto experience
> can give, it would be hard for the wisest to devise schemes which,
> under the circumstances, would have met the needs better....The
> doctrines served a particular local pragmatic need. But often
> their very adaptation to immediate circumstances unfitted them,
> pragmatically, to meet more enduring and more extensive needs.
> They lived to cumber the political grounds, obstructing progress,
> all the more so because they were uttered and held not as
> hypotheses with which to direct social experimentation, but as
> final truths, dogmas. No wonder they call urgently for revision
> and displacement.[3]

How can variable behavior on the part of occupants of the same

position be accounted for? How can conflict involving a city manager

and those in his role-set be accounted for? The writer feels that satis-

factory, although partial and tentative, answers have been suggested to

these related questions.

Let us first consider variable behavior by occupants of the same

position. The International City Managers' Association is a voluntary

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[3] John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 145-146.

association of appointed local government officials who have disparate

backgrounds and disparate commitments to the association's contem-

porary ideal. As has been pointed out the doctrines of the International

City Managers' Association have undergone certain changes in emphasis

since the inception of the manager plan. These alterations are made

explicit in a reading of the association's several codes of ethics. What

the writer has called, for lack of a better phrase, different and distinct

"political generations" of managers are found occupying the position of

city manager and are members of the occupational association. On one

extreme is to be found the manager who has "the administrator orien-

tation." These individuals might be vestiges of an earlier phase of

the manager movement. Their emphasis is on the existence of a policy-

administration dichotomy. They view their function to be the execution

of policy while remaining in the background of community affairs. On

the other extreme stands the occupational ideal of today--the community

leader city manager. Managers Bartlett and Turner of Springfield seem

to be good representatives of these political generations. The writer

would make no claim that what he has identified as variable behavior

on the part of Bartlett and Turner in the process of policy formation is

due solely to vocational perspective and the degree to which the actor

has internalized the association's prescriptions for managerial behavior.

This consideration, the writer feels, has been neglected in past

investigations. Simply the awareness that working city managers do not conceptualize their function in a single way is an antidote to the monolithic conception of the occupation and manager doctrine which is publicly fostered by the International City Managers' Association and the advocates of manager government.

Needless to say, conflict involving the concept of manager government, the city manager, and those in the role-set of the manager in the locale can be attributed, in certain circumstances, to what might be termed a lack of role consensus. The writer feels that those who attribute municipal conflict to the workings of the "forces of evil" have a rather naive conception of political life which is typical of American reform elements, and which today finds its views expressed in publications such as the National Municipal Review. As Dewey has written, the manager plan, like other reforms, should be treated like a hypothesis, not as a final truth. A more realistic explanation which will partially account for the conflict situations which arose in Springfield can be subsumed under the general heading of role conflict. This concept is obviously not a new one. Writers of varied interest have commented upon its relevance, although not always referring to role theory. For example:

> ...it should be clear...that there must be some agreement
> between such a responsible agent and his principal concerning

the action in hand or at least the end to be achieved.[4]

Effective relationships between people require that there be some agreement or consensus with respect to objectives of the system and how these objectives are attained.[5]

It would seem that the basic source of disturbance in the role-set is the structural circumstance that any one occupying a particular status has role-partners who are differently located in the social structure. As a result, these others have, in some measure, values and moral expectations differing from those held by the occupant of the status in question.[6]

In many circumstances the leader...may have norms different from those of other members of the group. In such circumstances differences in status will obviously lead to misunderstanding....It is merely a matter of good patterns of communication.[7]

Even in the creation of a new organization, people bring with them predispositions which greatly influence the pattern of roles that emerges....The problem of reconciling the role—or, more frequently, the different roles—that others in the situation expect of him with the role dictated by his professional knowledge and conscience is not subject to any final resolution.[8]

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[4] Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in Carl J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason, editors, Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 3.

[5] Eugene A. Wilkening, "Consensus in Role Definition of County Extension Agents between the Agents and Local Sponsoring Committee Members," Rural Sociology, 23, No. 2 (June, 1958), p. 185.

[6] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 370.

[7] Josephine Klein, The Study of Groups (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 138.

[8] Eugene L. Belisle and Cyril W. Sargent, "The Concept of Administration," in Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg, editors,

When conflict situations are viewed from this perspective the tendency to bring the investigator's value system into operation will be diminished. For example, the ardent supporter of manager government is likely apt to view municipal conflict involving the city manager with insufficient objectivity. The "goods" and the "bads" have probably already been identified. The writer would suggest that if the goal in the community is the amelioration of conflict, the proper starting point is an investigation of the behavior prescriptions and expectations held by the status occupant (the manager) and those in the role-set (mayor, council, employees, etc.). If this is done, then, mechanisms are available for the adjustment or abridgement of the actor's role-set relationships.[9]

Advocates of manager government often view conflict in the community as having little positive value, especially when this conflict involves the manager. This approach would deny that conflict has any utility, and likely results from the inclination to deny that the city manager, especially the community leader variety, is intimately

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Administrative Behavior in Education (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 115-116.

[9] For example, see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 371-379. Merton discusses what he calls "social mechanisms for the articulation of roles in the role-set."

involved in politics. When controversy or conflict involving the

manager arises responsibility can be placed on those in the role-set

of the manager. But by becoming intimately involved in the process of

policy formation, as the community leader manager undoubtedly is, he

also becomes involved in politics. The process of policy formation is

viewed here as a political act because values in the community are

being authoritatively allocated; some actors and groups will be rewarded

and others will be denied scarce status, power, or resources. When

Manager Turner, for example, acted to negotiate between proponents of

annexation and the city and the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company he was

involved in a political act, and in so being the writer feels that quite

justifiably he could have become the subject of controversy. And if

conflict centering on the manager had arisen in this instance there

would have been little justification for a claim that an attack was

being made by evil politicians or disgruntled elements. Such contro-

versy could probably be explained on the basis of contrary prescrip-

tions, held by the manager, and non-consensual expectations con-

cerning proper managerial behavior held by others in his role-set.

The emphasis which has been given to the political involvement

of the community leader city manager is felt to be of some importance

because, in the writer's opinion, the occupational association and the

plan's supporters have incorrectly portrayed the city manager. On one

hand he is urged to become involved in the process of policy formation in the community (primarily because of the supposed inadequacies of elected officials); yet, an image of the political eunuch is also fostered-- the uncommitted professional administrator who willingly regulates his involvement in local affairs. This rather paradoxical picture of the manager is accentuated by the fact that the International City Managers' Association frequently urges, as has been shown by several previous citations, the manager to become a manipulator. The writer's objection to this recommendation needs no comment.

Political Theory

It has been frequently maintained that discussion of public administration eventually must lead to a concern for political theory. Wallace Sayre has thus stated:

> Public administration is ultimately a problem in political theory: the fundamental problem in a democracy is responsibility to popular control; the responsibility and responsiveness of the administrative agencies and the bureaucracies to the elected officials (the chief executive, the legislators) is of central importance in a government increasingly based on the exercise of discretionary power by the agencies of administration.[10]

The adherents of manager government would maintain that there exists no problem in responsibility or responsiveness in the adoption of the

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[10] Wallace S. Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," Public Administration Review, XVIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1958), p. 105.

manager plan nor in the appointment of a manager by a council. And it
is true enough that the council has authority to dismiss a manager at
any time; similarly, since ultimate formal authority for the formation of
policy rests in the legislative body the adherents of manager government
can present an argument to the effect that the problems outlined by Sayre
do not exist in this municipal government form. Now this writer would
agree that little, if any, evidence exists that city managers have been
overtly unresponsive to council direction. But is this the basic problem?
The writer thinks not. Discussions of responsibility and responsiveness
often focus on the dramatic event, the situation of realistic social con-
flict and the struggle for scarce power or resources. If these dramatic
situations are absent the tendency is likely to exist to maintain that
all is well and that democratic values are being preserved; that govern-
mental structures are in an equilibrium of checks and balances; that
policy and administration are in fact disparate activities; and that the
legislative holds administration responsible for its actions.

The German sociologist Karl Mannheim wrote of the necessity of
enlarging the sphere of activity of the intellectual elite in an age of
planning.[11] The intellectual elite was considered to meet leadership
requirements because of its detachment from class structure and the

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[11] See Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951).

industrial society. Being free of partisan interest the intelligentsia

would be capable of comprehending the needs of the great society.

Mannheim thus, according to Fisher, became involved in a dilemma

form which he never was able to extricate himself:

> Having posited a theoretical structure in which the establish-
> ment of general principles is dependent upon detachment from
> particular events and interests, Mannheim is faced with the
> problem of re-entry to the practical level of interest while
> preserving the broader perspective....He never recognizes the
> problem of the extent to which the interest of the whole, repre-
> sented by the intellectual elite, becomes in fact its particular
> interest.[12]

In other words, Mannheim expects the intellectual elite to be detached

from political commitments, and yet, by necessity, the elite is to be-

come involved in politics at the level of fundamental policy deter-

mination; this would seem a most difficult task.

Quite obviously, Mannheim was not writing at the mundane level

of municipal affairs. His interest was of a much larger scope. Never-

theless, this writer would suggest that the Mannheim paradox is

implicit in any discussion of the doctrine and practice of the city

manager, especially the manager whose model of behavior is the

International City Managers' Association's contemporary ideal--the

community leader.

It need not be reiterated that the occupational association

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[12]Margaret Fisher, Leadership and Intelligence (New York:
Columbia University, 1954), p. 3.

stresses the manager as being a professional, as regulating his involve-

ment in local affairs, and as being uncommitted to factions, parties, or

interests. As is stated in the occupational association's code of ethics

a distinction is drawn between policy and administration:

> To achieve effective and democratic local government, the
> council-manager plan provides that policies shall be determined
> by the governing body...and that the administration of such
> policies shall be vested in the city manager....[13]

Similarly, the manager is enjoined to regulate his involvement in local

affairs by utilizing the merit system in employment and by avoiding con-

troversy with the council.

One section of the association's code directs the manager to be

a community leader. Now, as the writer has previously suggested, the

very concept of community leadership would seem necessarily to involve

activity at a level of politics and policy. The occupational association,

however, attempts to make a distinction between politics and community

leadership. It is said that political leadership is to be the activity of

elected officials. Politics, to the reform-oriented organization, is

generally activity associated with political parties, or elections--a

very limited definition. When the manager is directed to not become

involved in local politics reference is being made to the items covered

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[13] Preamble, Code of Ethics, International City Managers'
Association, 1952 revision. See Appendix C of this study.

in the following statement:

> The city manager does not participate in election campaigns.
> He does not support candidates or identify himself with any
> party or faction....His own opinions are not published in ad-
> vance of council consideration and decision. The manager has
> no favorites among councilmen...[14]

What does a leader in the occupational association imply by the

usage of the phrase "community leadership?"

> I am not for one moment suggesting the manager should assume
> a role of political leadership...I am saying a manager must be
> more than a technical administrator; he must assume the leader-
> ship and set the pace for the people serving under his direction--
> he must find out the needs and desires of the people of his com-
> munity and recommend to council solutions to those problems,
> including the ways and means to accomplish them--he should be
> able to carry to the people of his city by word of mouth an
> accurate and competent account of what his city is doing--never
> as a political proposition, but as one primarily interested in and
> responsible for the civic welfare of his community.[15]

The city manager as community leader is instructed to "...outline

desirable community goals for the council..."[16] The literature of the

manager movement is replete with managerial prescriptions in regard to

community leadership. He is regarded as an educator:

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[14] City Management--A Growing Profession (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 26.

[15] Leonard G. Howell, What Are the Elements of Continued Success- ful Operation for the Council-Manager Plan of Municipal Government? (Boulder, Colorado: Colorado Municipal League, 1951), p. 7.

[16] Handbook for City Councilmen in Council-Manager Cities (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1955), p. 25.

In educating his council to good management practices and
policies, the city manager has a big job....The manager is
placed in the position of leader and educator. [17]

City managers spend the bulk of their time educating the
public, the city council, the city staff, and employees. [18]

Sommers makes the distinction between political leadership and com-

munity leadership in the following manner:

The political leadership of elected representatives should not
be confused with the community leadership that covers the
suggestion and recommendation of new programs and the dis-
cussion of them in community forums and, more essential, with
the council itself. [19]

Somehow the city manager, the professional outsider, is directed to be

"responsible for giving the council all possible assistance...in deter-

mining city government policies..."[20] and yet, he is said not to be in-

volved in politics. At the same time the occupational association's code

of ethics states that the manager is to present policy proposals and that

he is to go into the community and defend the council's actions:

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[17] Steve Matthews, "Types of Managerial Leadership," Public
Management, XXXIX, No. 3 (March, 1957), p. 52.

[18] Ibid.

[19] William A. Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review,"
Western Political Quarterly, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), p. 142.

[20] Guideposts on Assuming a City Manager Position (Chicago:
International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 23.

The city manager as community leader submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis of making decisions on community goals. The city manager defends municipal policies publicly only after consideration and adoption of such policies by the council.[21]

Like Mannheim's intellectual elite the city manager is on one hand directed to be detached from particular events and interests, and on the other, by acting in the capacity of community leader he would seem to become inextricably involved in politics because of activity at the level of policy recommendation, negotiation, and execution.

Substantial and Functional Rationality

It would seem that the city manager as community leader is very apt to lead to increasing dependence and reliance being placed on an appointed official for information, recommendation and negotiation leading to the formation and activation of policy. Even admitting that the city manager can be removed at any time by the city council and that the manager is a formal subordinate, the writer would urge that democratic values can better be realized and preserved by the development and utilization of greater substantial rationality on the part of the citizenry, and especially elected officials.

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[21] Section 4, Code of Ethics, International City Managers' Association, 1952 revision. See Appendix C of this study.

Substantial rationality has been defined by Karl Mannheim as "...an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation."[22] In contrast to substantial rationality there is what Mannheim has called functional rationality. Functional rationality basically refers to the coordination of means so as to attain most effectively a given end.

> But in sociology as well as in everyday language, we also use the word "rational" in still another sense when we say, for instance, that this or that industry or administrative staff has been "rationalized". In such cases we do not at all understand by the term "rational" the fact that a person carries out acts of thinking and knowing, but rather that a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position or role. Such a functional organization of a series of actions will, moreover, be at its best when, in order to attain the given end, it co-ordinates the means most efficiently.[23]

This writer would suggest that democratic theory demands that citizen and elected official be capable of exercising substantial rationality, and that they also control the exercise of functional rationality. Ideally the manager is recognized as being responsible for the exercise of functional rationality--he co-ordinates the available resources in order to achieve an end defined by the council. When a manager assumes community leadership is not the danger present that he will also assume the exercise of substantial rationality? Certainly the occupational

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22 Mannheim, Man and Society, p. 53.   23 Ibid.

association and adherents of manager government have frequently

spoken of the inadequacies of the elected official and the necessity

for the manager to recommend policies as well as execute them. One

commentator has stated the issue in the following manner:

> The result of this centralization of decision-making has been
> the increase of functional rationality....But the rise of
> functional rationality, by its very nature, has deprived the
> average individual of opportunity to develop individual insight
> and understanding of complex situations...
> Decisions calling for the use of substantial rationality are made
> by a small managing minority of society.[24]

The city manager, when acting as community leader, is apt to be

a factor in diminishing the amount of substantial rationality exercised

by the community. His very success in the exercise of functional

rationality will likely mean that even more responsibility, hence sub-

stantial rationality will accrue to him. Elected officials will tend to

place even greater reliance in his information, recommendations, nego-

tiations, and execution of legislative prescriptions. The advocate of

manager government, in answer to such an argument, will stress that

the council makes and is responsible for prescriptions. Yet, the writer

would suggest, the danger is implicit that the council will become only

a pro forma agency for the ratification of managerial recommendations

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[24]
    Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Decision-Makers
(Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 14.

and goals. Adherence to democratic ideals would seem to make it

necessary that government, at whichever level, should have as its goal

not simply efficiency, economy, or functional rationality, but the pro-

posal of alternative solutions to the authoritative allocation of values

in the society, group, or local community. This is not done when

reliance for policy proposals is thought to be the responsibility of an

appointed official, whose goals are not necessarily the same as the

community's. This situation would seem to demand mechanisms to

insure the growth of substantial rationality in the community. The

danger of diminishing substantial rationality on the part of the com-

munity and its accretion to an appointed official has been pointed out

by Bernard Barber:

> Executives in democratic associations face still other problems....
> In short, the executive must formulate the interests of the group to
> some extent, as well as realize them. Continuous day-to-day,
> ad hoc decisions may cumulate into policy for the association.
> This process may be called "executive legislation"...This exe-
> cutive legislation may be approved ex post facto by the membership...
> But there is always the possibility that the executive will get out
> of touch with the wishes of the membership...[25]

Relevant to any discussion of substantial and functional ration-

ality is the well-known debate which occurred between Carl Friedrich

and Herman Finer, concerning administrative responsibility. Friedrich's

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[25] Bernard Barber, "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations,"
in Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1950), pp. 495-496.

position was that,

>   ...the responsible administrator is one who is responsive to these two dominant factors: technical knowledge and popular sentiment.[26]

His emphasis, however, was decidedly on the former factor--technical

knowledge. Thus, he could write:

>   Administrative officials seeking to apply scientific "standards" have to account for their actions in terms of a somewhat rationalized and previously established set of hypotheses. Any deviation from these hypotheses will be subjected to thorough scrutiny by their colleagues...[27]

>   ...the fact remains that throughout the length and breadth of our technical civilization there is arising a type of responsibility on the part of the permanent administrator, the man who is called upon to seek and find the creative solutions for our crying technical needs, which cannot be effectively enforced except by fellow technicians who are capable of judging his policy in terms of the scientific knowledge bearing upon it.[28]

Stated in its most dogmatic form, Friedrich seems to have been

arguing that to the administrative official must accure the responsibility

for the exercise of both functional and substantial rationality. He can

place blame for "many of the most severe breakdowns in contemporary

administration..." on "contradictory and ill-defined policy as embodied

in faulty legislation."[29] But Professor Friedrich can argue public senti-

ment can still check the administrator.

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[26] Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," p. 12.

[27] Ibid.   [28] Ibid., p. 14.   [29] Ibid., p. 4.

The mere knowledge that the representative assembly can stop
a policy from going forward, that a row in the public press may
destroy all chances of initiating an activity which the admini-
strator holds to be desirable will make him keenly interested
in and desirous of anticipating the reactions of public and
Parliament...Too little attention has been directed to the fact
that political influence works most effectively through such
anticipation, rather than through the reversals of policies after
they have been adopted.[30]

But in the community which has not developed, or which has lost, the

capacity for substantial rationality will the above-mentioned mechanisms

be operative?

Professor Finer, on the other hand, takes a dim view of admini-

strative officials being responsive to "the fellowship of science," the

discard of anonymity, and the entry of the official into the political

arena by the advocacy of policy. He says, "...the result to be feared

is the enhancement of official conceit and what comes to be known as

'the new despotism'."[31]

As this writer has argued, our goal should not be reliance on the

appointed official for both functional and substantial rationality in the

community. The answer is not to bemoan, as does the International

City Managers' Association, the lack of capacity of elected officials,

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[30] Ibid., p. 15.

[31] Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic
Government," Public Administration Review, I (Summer, 1941), p. 340.

and then to replace them with community leader city managers. On the

contrary, substantial rationality must be nurtured in the community and,

thus, in the elected officials. As Professor Finer says,

> The legitimate conclusion from the analysis of the relationship
> between Parliament and administration is not that the admini-
> stration should be given its head, but on the contrary that
> legislative bodies should be improved.[32]

Our concern, as Finer maintains, should not be with "...responsibility

as a relationship between a man and a science," or loyalty to pro-

fessional standards. Democratic values demand that X be responsible

to Y for Z. This end can be attained most satisfactorily by the ex-

pansion in the community of substantial rationality.

It has been written that,

> When a community is faced by new problems, it may often find it
> necessary to develop new skills to solve them. The skills may
> be found to exist in the community, they may be learned by one
> of its members, or they may be sought outside.[33]

The city manager form of municipal government would urge that the latter

course be followed. The non-involved itinerant professional who

commands an expert knowledge is recommended as a primary means to

solve these problems. One document of the International City Managers'

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[32] Ibid.

[33] A. K. Rice, "The Role of the Specialist in the Community,"
Human Relations, II, No. 2 (Spring, 1949), p. 177.

Association thus states:

> To enlighten the democratic determination of policy by giving
> adequate information and disinterested expert advice is the most
> difficult and the most important task of the administrative
> official. The wishes and desires of the public cannot translate
> themselves into legislation or put themselves into effect; a
> governing body of laymen needs technical advice and information
> on which to base its decisions of policy, and technical assis-
> tance in the preparation of those formal orders by which it con-
> trols its expert subordinates.[34]

This is not, however, the scope of the community leader city manager's

activity. And even if it were, the writer rejects the tendency to allow

the so-called expert to dominate the process of policy formation.

> ...one kind of authority...has grown in extent and in general
> acceptance....This is the authority of the expert. Specializa-
> tion of study and specialization in the development of techniques
> have grown concomitantly and interactively....To the extent that
> we depend upon others with claims to expertness in specialized
> processes integral to our way of living, whether for information,
> advice, or skill with respect to the conduct of those processes,
> to that extent we are subjects of the authority of experts.[35]

Numerous writers continually stress the necessity of leadership

in municipal government. And as has been pointed out there is some

feeling that policy leadership is not developed to any extent in manager

cities, unless the manager acts in this function. It is obvious that the

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[34] The Technique of Municipal Administration (Chicago: Internation-
al City Managers' Association, 1945), p. 24.

[35] Kenneth D. Benne, A Conception of Authority: An Introductory
Study (New York: Columbia University, 1943), p. 34.

writer objects to this, not that he fears necessarily the values or

objectives of a city manager, but simply because it is apt to initiate

a reaction which will lead to a diminished capacity on the part of the

citizenry to handle problems, to cope with complex situations, to

gather and process information. What is being said is simple that the

community leader city manager is likely to frustrate the needs of the

community. As Alvin W. Gouldner has stated:

> The tendency of leadership studies...is...to concentrate on
> limited aspects of the leader-follower relationship: principally,
> to ascertain methods of enhancing the control of leaders over
> their followers. Studies which culminate in knowledge that
> facilitates the control of leadership by followers find no nourish-
> ment....It seems as important for us to know how to get rid of a
> leader as how to get one. Such knowledge is a life-and-death
> matter for a people determined to remain democratic. [36]

> It is noteworthy that the situationists emphasize the role of a
> leader in satisfying the needs of his group, almost to the com-
> plete exclusion of the leader's role in frustrating the needs of
> his group. [37]

Government is the institution through which values are allocated

in society or the community. Our goal should be the growth of partici-

pation in the making of the decisions which allocate these values. Is

this goal not hindered by the development of institutional offices which

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[36] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Introduction," in Alvin W. Gouldner, ed.,
Studies in Leadership, pp. 47-48.

[37] Ibid., p. 48.

diminish and atrophy the community's capabilities to exercise substantial rationality in complex situations?

Summary and Recommendations

It is customary that a study such as this conclude with some suggestions for further research. And, of course, this was a primary object of this exploratory study. But first, let us turn very briefly to a consideration of some generalizations which emerged from this study.

First, the writer feels that if suitable mechanisms were developed it would be possible to empirically identify at least two dominant types of city managers, based on the degree of adherence to the contemporary prescriptions for behavior as enunciated by the International City Managers' Association. These types might be identified as the community leader manager and the anonymous-administrator-engineer manager. Variable behavior by occupants of the same position can obviously be attributed to a whole range of factors including personality, political habits of the community, the status occupant's expectations of those in the role-set, etc. However, the writer would emphasize the training and political generation of the status occupant.

Second, community conflict involving the concept of manager government, the city manager, and those in the role-set can, it would seem, in many instances be attributed not simply to a struggle for scarce power, status, or resources, but rather to a lack of consensus concerning

what is proper behavior for the occupant of the status position and those with whom he associates.[38] The writer feels that in many instances conflict is justified and has positive value, but conflict which can be attributed to lack of knowledge or contrary evaluations of proper behavior for others would seem to be socially wasteful.

Third, once it is possible to identify the community leader manager it would be the writer's hunch that in those communities political apathy will develop the longer the manager remains and the greater is his "success." In other words, greater reliance will be placed in the manager and the council will become dependent upon him for leadership in the process of policy formation. While the writer has no fear of dictatorship by the manager, a danger which opponents of the manager plan stress, he does feel that democratic values, or at least his own value system, demand political and governmental structures which will enhance the ability of the layman to participate in the making of political decisions and the handling of complex information.

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[38] For empirical studies of role consensus see Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); and Wilkening, "Consensus in Role Definition of County Extension Agents between the Agents and Local Sponsoring Committees," Rural Sociology, 23, No. 2 (June, 1958), pp. 184-197.

In concluding this study some questions for further research will

be suggested by drawing upon the available literature.

> What...accounts for the fact that in some cities members of
> the council have actively supported changing to the manager
> form, while in other cities the councilmen have as vigorously
> opposed the plan?[39]

Once the manager plan has been put into operation it is likely that

various patterns of interaction between the manager and those in his

role-set emerge. Although this study has suggested that commitment

to the contemporary "professional" ideal and the engineer or anonymous

administrator orientation might explain variable behavior,

> We do not know what factors of personality, what tradition,
> what concepts of responsibility produce these variations in
> behavior.[40]

This study has made the warning that the exercise of community leader-

ship by the city manager will lead to less substantial rationality on the

part of the citizen and elected official.[41] Obviously, this is only the

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[39] "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager
Government," in "Research in Political Behavior," American Political
Science Review, XLVI, No. 4 (December, 1952), p. 1011.

[40] Ibid.

[41] "Dewey in The Public and Its Problems, for example, sees the
problem of controlling the indirect consequences of the actions of people
as the fundamental political problem. But the capacity to perceive these
consequences and to take appropriate action is a function of intelligence.
Thus, for Dewey, the problem of politics is fundamentally a problem of
method in organizing intelligence." Vincent Ostrom, An Approach to the
Study of Political Behavior in the Community (n.p.: mimeographed,
March, 1954).

writer's surmise.

Does the adoption of the manager plan have any effect upon political participation? [42]

Why do business organizations usually support the adoption of the manager plan? The writer would suggest that they feel it removes government from "politics." On the other hand,

> From the limited evidence available, it appears that business and professional groups find the weak-mayor or commission forms of government less satisfactory to their interests than the strong-mayor or manager form... [43]

Does the adoption of the manager plan alter the process of policy formation in the community? It has been suggested that,

> The form of city government influences administrative behavior and affects the types of personalities and skills recruited for municipal executive positions. The interaction pattern of a manager with his council is probably different from that of a mayor with his council. The pattern of communication between a manager and organized groups and parties is also likely to be different from that of an elected administrator in the same relationship. [44]

Such questions and generalizations as have been suggested above are unanswered and untested. Local government research is largely a neglected area of concentration, consequently there is a great deal of acceptance of untested dogma, especially concerning the city manager form of government and its effect on the community.

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[42] "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government," p. 1012.

[43] Ibid., p. 1012.   [44] Ibid.

APPENDIX A

Given below are excerpts from the Code of the City of Springfield which pertain to the city manager.[1]

Article II

Sec. 16. The city manager shall be the administrative head of the city government. He shall be chosen by the council without regard to political consideration and solely with reference to his executive and administrative qualifications.

Sec. 18. No member of the council shall in any manner, directly or indirectly, by suggestion or otherwise, attempt to influence or coerce the city manager in the making of any appointment or any removal, or in the purchase of supplies, nor shall any member of the council exact any promise relative to any appointment from any candidate for manager....Any violation of the foregoing provisions of this section shall work a forfeiture of the office of the offending member of the council who may be removed therefrom by the council or any court of competent jurisdiction. Nothing contained herein, however, shall be construed as prohibiting the council, while in open session, from discussing with or suggesting to the manager anything relating to city affairs.

Sec. 19. Duties of the city manager:

(a) To prepare the annual budget;
(b) To act as purchasing agent for all departments;

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[1] Taken from The Code of the City of Springfield, Oregon, 1955: The Charter and General Ordinances of the City.

(c) To appoint and remove with or without cause all employees and department heads, including the recorder and treasurer, subject to the right of the common council to approve or reject appointments of department heads;

(d) To enforce all city ordinances;

(e) To act as business agent for the council in the sale of real estate and other matters relating to franchises, leases, etc.

(f) To prepare and furnish all reports as requested by the council;

(g) To perform such other and further duties as shall be directed by the common council;

(h) In his discretion, to organize, disband, and reorganize the various departments of the city government;

(i) To direct and be responsible for the installing, maintenance, and operation of all public improvements of the City of Springfield.

Sec. 22.   The duties of all employees shall be assigned to them by the city manager and they shall be responsible and accountable to the city manager.

Sec. 24.   The city manager may be removed with or without cause at any time by the common council.

APPENDIX B

Found below is a partial copy of a full-page advertisement sub-
mitted by the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company which appeared in the
Springfield News, October 10, 1955.

Justice would say--vote NO on annexation

1. The people on Weyerhaeuser's management staff of Springfield
    realize that some of the home owners in the annexation area
    have a serious sanitary and drainage problem....

2. In an election campaign, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company would
    prefer to remain completely neutral. We regret that we must
    take an active part in this instance. But this annexation pro-
    posal seeks to annex the Weyerhaeuser plant. If the plant
    were annexed, Weyerhaeuser would be forced to pay a large
    sum in city taxes each year. Yet the company would receive
    no city services in return for those taxes....

3. ...We feel it is unfair that the company plant should be
    annexed purely to finance a sewer system and other city
    services our plant cannot use.

4. When Weyerhaeuser Timber Company located its plant near
    Springfield, it was purposely built well outside the city
    limits. The company put in all of the facilities any city
    government could possibly furnish....If our plant were annexed,
    we would still have to maintain these company-owned facilities.
    Yet the annexation group would ask Weyerhaeuser to finance a
    costly sewer system and other services our plant could not use.
    Does this seem fair?

5. Some people in the annexation group argue that Weyerhaeuser
    created problems for the city....Are jobs and business oppor-
    tunities problems?

6. It is generally agreed that cities are formed to permit people to go together in a group and pay for services that each person, individually, could not provide for himself.... Obviously, the purpose of forming a city implies that city residents pay city taxes because they receive such services. But Weyerhaeuser Timber Company receives no services. Yet it would have to pay city taxes if its plant were annexed.

7. A move was made last year to annex a large area in East Springfield. At that time the group favoring annexation wanted to bring into the city residential areas south of the Southern Pacific tracks and north of Industrial Avenue. But these areas were carefully left out of the present annexation proposal. Why? Because the people in these areas voted heavily against annexation in 1954. Knowing this, the annexation leaders drew the boundaries to exclude these people. The annexation leaders tried to draw the boundaries to insure a favorable vote....Were the boundaries fairly drawn?

8. Wherever it has operated, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company has sought to do its share in supporting worthwhile community projects. Employees of the company, acting on their own, have also been active in community life and community activities. Whether Weyerhaeuser has done its share in Springfield must be left to your own judgment.

9. Some of the people favoring annexation will admit privately that annexation of the Weyerhaeuser plant would be unfair. They will admit that the only excuse for annexing the company's plant is to get additional valuation for taxation purposes. But is this the fair thing to do?

WE BELIEVE THAT A NO VOTE IS THE FAIR VOTE ON ANNEXATION

WERE THE ANNEXATION
BOUNDARIES FAIRLY DRAWN?

HOW THE ANNEXATION BOUNDARIES WERE CHANGED TO GET VOTES

INCLUDED IN 1954
(LEFT OUT)

ANNEXATION PROPOSAL IN 1955
(COUNTY ROAD NO. 221)

AREA OF 1955 ANNEXATION PROPOSAL

INCLUDED IN 1954
ANNEXATION PROPOSAL
(LEFT OUT IN 1955)
OREGON AVENUE

APPENDIX C

The Code of Ethics
of the
International City Managers' Association
1924

"In order that city managers might maintain a high standard of professional conduct the following code of ethics was adopted by the International City Managers' Association on September 25, 1924:

1. The position of city manager is an important position and an honorable position and should not be accepted unless the individual believes that he can serve the community to its advantage.

2. No man should accept a position unless he believes in the council-manager plan of government.

3. In personal conduct a city manager should be exemplary, and he should display the same obedience to law that he should inculcate in others.

4. Personal aggrandizement and personal profit secured by confidential information or by misuse of public time is dishonest.

5. Loyalty to his employment recognizes that it is the council, the elected representatives of the people, who primarily determines the municipal policies, and is entitled to the credit for their fulfillment.

6. Although he is a hired employee of the council, he is hired for a purpose--to exercise his own judgment as an executive in accomplishing the policies formulated by the council; and to attain success in his employment he must decline to submit to dictation in matters for which the responsibility is solely his.

7. Power justifies responsibility, and responsibility demands power, and a city manager who becomes impotent to inspire support should resign.

8. The city manager is the administrator for all the people, and in performing his duty he should serve without discrimination.

9. To serve the public well, a city manager should strive to keep the community informed of the plans and purposes of the administration, remembering that healthy publicity and criticism are an aid to the success of any democracy.

10. A city manager should deal frankly with the council as a unit and not secretly with its individual members, and similarly should foster a spirit of co-operation between all employees of the city's organization.

11. No matter how small the governmental unit under his management, a city manager should recognize his relation to the larger political subdivisions and encourage improved administrative methods for all.

12. No city manager should take an active part in politics.

13. A city manager will be known by his works, many of which may outlast him and, regardless of personal popularity or unpopularity, he should not curry favor or temporize, but should in a far-sighted way aim to benefit the community of today and of posterity."

The Code of Ethics
of the
International City Managers' Association
1938

"In order to achieve effective, democratic government, the council-manager plan provides that municipal policy shall be determined exclusively by a legislative body elected by the people and that the administration of policy shall be vested in the city manager, as administrative head of the city, who shall be appointed by and responsible to the council. The International City Managers' Association is a professional organization of city managers; its purpose is to increase the proficiency of city managers and to aid in the general improvement of municipal administration. To further these objectives, the Association believes that these ethical principles should govern the conduct of every professional city manager:

1.   No member of the profession seeks or accepts a position as city manager unless he is fully in accord with the principles of council-manager government and unless he is confident that he is qualified to serve under these principles as city manager to the advantage of the community.

2.   The city manager has a firm belief in the dignity and worth of the services rendered by government and a deep sense of his own social responsibility as a trusted public servant.

3.   The city manager is governed by the highest ideals of honor and integrity in all his public and personal relationships in order that he may merit the respect and inspire the confidence of the administrative organization which he directs and of the public which he serves.

4.   The city manager believes that personal aggrandizement or personal profit secured by confidential information or by misuse of public time is dishonest.

5.   The city manager is in no sense a political leader. In order that policy may be intelligent and effective, he provides the council with information and advice, but he encourages positive decisions on policy by the council instead of passive acceptance of his recommendations.

6. The city manager realizes that it is the council, the elected representatives of the people, which is entitled to the credit for the fulfillment of municipal policies and leaves to the council the defense of policies which may be criticized.

7. The city manager keeps the community informed on municipal affairs but keeps himself in the background by emphasizing the importance of the facts.

8. The city manager, in order to preserve his integrity as a professional administrator, resists any encroachment on his control of personnel, insists on the exercise of his own judgment in accomplishing council policies, and deals frankly with the council as a unit rather than secretly with its individual members.

9. The city manager handles all matters of personnel on the basis of merit. Political, religious, and racial considerations carry no weight in appointments, salary increases, promotions, and discipline in the municipal service.

10. The city manager curries no personal favors. He is the administrator for all the people and handles each administrative problem without discrimination on the basis of principle and justice.

This revision of the first code adopted in 1924 was approved on September 29, 1938, at the Twenty-fifth annual conference of the International City Managers' Association."

The Code of Ethics
of the
International City Managers' Association
1952

"To achieve effective and democratic local government, the council-manager plan provides that policies shall be determined by the governing body elected by the people and that the administration of such policies shall be vested in the city manager who shall be appointed by and responsible to the governing body. The purpose of the International City Managers' Association, the professional organization of city managers, is to increase the proficiency of city managers and to aid in the improvement of municipal government. To further these objectives, the Association believes that certain ethical principles should govern the conduct of every professional city manager.

1. No member of the profession accepts a position as city manager unless he is fully in accord with the principles of council-manager government and unless he is confident that he is qualified to serve to the advantage of the community.

2. The city manager has a firm belief in the dignity and worth of the services rendered by government. He has a constructive, creative, and practical attitude toward urban problems and a deep sense of his own social responsibility as a trusted public servant.

3. The city manager is governed by the highest ideals of honor and integrity in all his public and personal relationships in order that he may merit the respect and confidence of the governing body, of other officials and employees, and of the public which he serves. He believes that personal aggrandizement or profit secured by confidential information or by misuse of public time is dishonest.

4. The city manager as a community leader submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis of making decisions on community goals. The city manager defends municipal policies publicly only after consideration and adoption of such policies by the council.

5. The city manager realizes that the council, the elected repre-
    sentatives of the people, is entitled to the credit for the
    establishment of municipal policies. The city manager avoids
    coming in public conflict with the council on controversial
    issues. Credit or blame for policy execution rests with the
    city manager.

6. The city manager considers it his duty continually to improve
    his ability and his usefulness and to develop the competence
    of his associates in the use of management techniques.

7. The city manager keeps the community informed on municipal
    affairs. He emphasizes friendly and courteous service to the
    public. He recognizes that the chief function of the local
    government at all times is to serve the best interests of all
    the people on a nonpartisan basis.

8. The city manager, in order to preserve his integrity as a
    professional administrator, resists any encroachment on his
    responsibility for personnel, believes he should be free to
    carry out council policies without interference, and deals
    frankly with the council as a unit rather than with its indi-
    vidual members.

9. The city manager handles all matters of personnel on the
    basis of merit. Fairness and impartiality governs the city
    manager in all matters pertaining to appointments, pay
    adjustments, promotions, and discipline in the municipal
    service.

10. The city manager curries no favors. He handles each problem
    without discrimination on the basis of principle and justice.

This code, originally adopted in 1924 and amended in 1938, was revised
again in 1952 and approved by the vote of the members of the International
City Managers' Association."

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