The Policy of the United States towards The Philippine Islands

From the Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898 to the Ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Spain, February 6, 1899.

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Note: References and notes are found at the end of every chapter.

CHAPTER I

American Expansion In The Pacific

There is a general agreement among American statesmen and historians that the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, at the time of Dewey's brilliant victory at Manila Bay, was unforeseen and unexpected. It is also stated that the administration that embarked on a war with Spain to free Cuba had no knowledge, no idea, nor information of the existence of Spain's rich possessions in the Far East. President McKinley, speaking at Youngstown, Ohio, October 18, 1899, said: "When Dewey sank the ships at Manila, as he was ordered to do, it was not to capture the Philippines - it was to destroy the Spanish fleet, the fleet of the nation against which we were waging war, and we thought that the soonest way to end that war was to destroy the power of Spain to make war, and so we sent Dewey."(1) Even more striking is the statement of Dewey himself. While on his way to take command of the Asiatic Squadron, he devoted part of his time to reading information about the Philippines. This is what he has to say:(2)

> "The only reference to the Philippines was a short paragraph, to the effect that 'for some time the newspapers contained accounts of a rebellion in progress in the Philippines'; but that 'no official information has been received in relation thereto, and no information of any sort that shows American interests to be affected.'
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> "In fact, at that time the Philippines were to us a terra incognita. No ship of our service had been there for years. When, after my appointment as commander of the Asiatic Squadron, I sought information on the subject in Washington, I found that the latest official report relative to the Philippines on file in the office of naval intelligence bore the date of 1876."

Either Admiral Dewey had not made use of all the available sources of information or some one responsible was woefully negligent in not informing the admiral. Let me cite but a few instances. On September 5, 1887, Julius Voigt, then United States consul at Manila, in a report to the Department of State in which, after deploring the want of "enterprising agencies" at that port and the indifference to the "tastes . . . . of distant markets which are well worth studying," says: "The consulate is continually in receipt of inquiries and proposals from business-seeking home firms . . . . Of course the great want of an active young American establishment that would devote itself thoroughly to the introduction of home-made articles in these islands can not but be obvious under the existing circumstances, and the everlasting absence of such a house is much to be regretted."(3) Another enterprising American consul, Alexander R.Webb, sent a 17 pages report to the same department on August 1, 1888, going at length and in detail to subjects geographical, historical, commercial, etc., as witness the sub-headings of this very interesting report, to wit: "Geographical and Historical," "The Civilized Natives," "Public Revenue", "Currency," "Manila," "Foreign Trade," etc. "I am forced to the conclusion," he says at the beginning of his report, "that American business men, as a rule, know comparatively little of the vast and populous territory

embraced in the Philippine Archipelago or of its commercial possibilities, and that they will gladly receive something more than a merely statistical statement of last year's trade and commerce."(4) We learn in another part of this report that "Twenty-nine American vessels entered the port of Manila during the year with a total tonnage of 34,766.85."

A few years prior to the outbreak of the war with Spain, a scientific expedition, headed by Professor J.B.Stearns of the University of Michigan, and accompanied by Dean C.Worcester, also of the University of Michigan, and Frank S.Bourns and E.L.Mosley were leisurely exploring the islands in the manner of scientific men. There is no definite connection between the professional work of these gentlemen and the war with Spain or the later developments for that matter. It is significant, however, that Dean C.Worcester afterwards became a member of the First Philippine Commission sent to pacify the islands in 1899.

Of course, it may be said for Dewey that neither the reports of the enterprising consuls nor the activities of the learned men mentioned above could be of importance in his present venture. Nevertheless, they show that the government in Washington was not entirely ignorant of the Philippines as a reading of Dewey's statement quoted above would make us believe. Both Dewey's and President McKinley's statements have been quoted at length because, undoubtedly, above all others, they were the two men most responsible

for the acquisition of the Philippines. Admiral Dewey, by his decisive hammering of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, brought about a fait accompli; Presient McKinley, although reluctant at first, was finally instrumental in that acquisition.

Now let us turn to the historians. Le Roy says: "It is in entire agreement with the record of the times to assert that the idea of conquest of the Philippines was, up to and even Dewey's victory, almost as remote from the minds of the American people, who were, when the news came, half-astonished at calling to mind that Spain had possessions in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic." Foster speaks of three stages in the negotiations that led to the demand for the Philippine Islands. In the first stage, he says it is evident President McKinley, "who from the beginning to the conclusion guided the negotiations, was not in favor of demanding the sovereignty and possession of the islands."(5) He cites the language of the protocol to sustain this conclusion.

Lodge, the champion and defender of acquisition in the Senate and the contemporary historian of the Spanish-American War as well, says: "Dewey's victory had come with the shock of a great surprise as well as the splendor of a great glory. No one had dreamed that the war meant the entrance of the United States into the Orient. But there the flag was, there it fluttered victorious, and the stream of events, so much more powerful than human plannings when they are

the outcome of world forces, moved relentlessly on."(6) How strikingly similar to President McKinley's pronouncements! Tylor Dennett, one of the recent historians on the subject, says: "No relation whatever can be established between the outbreak of hostilities with Spain and the Far Eastern question except that there was a concurrence of dates in the disturbed conditions in China and the climax of the often recurring disturbance in Cuba, and that both synchronized with the expansive movement in American trade which had followed the recovery from the panic of 1893. The Sino-Japanese War had caused a very notable strengthening of Continental fleets in Chinese waters."(7) However, he adds: "The attack upon Manila by the American forces was not, however, accidental or unforeseen. Commodore George Dewey was ordered to Japan(October 21, 1897) to assume command of the Far Eastern Squadron . . . . The intent of these orders, however, appears plainly to have been to remove the menace of the Spanish fleet rather than to acquire Manila."(8)

What do these statements mean? They mean exactly what they say. First, that the United States upon the declaration of war with Spain was not aware of the existence of the Philippine Islands. They were at the time a terra incognita, to repeat the words of Admiral Dewey. Secondly, that when the idea of acquisition came they were regarded as a "gift from the gods" and accepted only after a careful consideration

of a sacred sense of duty.

Without attempting to disprove these statements, a task often impossible owing to conflicting conclusions among historians utilizing the same evidence, and at best leading only to endless controversy, let us note down certain tendencies in American history which will throw a great deal of light on the problem. They are: 1. The increasing interest of the United States in the Far East, politically and commercially; 2. The "westward movement" resulting in territorial acquisitions to the Pacific and beyond; 3. The gradual acquisition of the former territories of Spain in this hemisphere; and 4. The commercial and industrial expansion of the United States in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

The beginnings of American interest in the trade of the Far East after the Revolution are more or less familiar to the student of history. Partly due to necessity, the closing of the avenues of the lucrative trade with the West Indies, and the urgent employment of her idle merchant marine, it was not long before vessels of the young republic began to find their way into the forbidden ports of China. There was also the lure of fabulous profits too tempting to be ignored.

The first American trading vessel to reach China was the Empress of China which arrived in Canton on the 30th of August, 1784. Very soon enterprising merchants in Salem, Boston, Providence, New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk also fitted

vessels to share in this trade. In 1789 American trade in Canton was second only to that of Great Britain; in the four years ending with 1807, the average yearly export and import into that port was over $4,000,000.(9) The fur trade added enormously to this traffic.

How this trade grew by leaps and bounds in the following decades, it is not necessary to relate here. There were, however, consequences resulting from this commercial contact with the orient which cannot be overlooked. First, there was the problem of protection of the trade itself and the men and vessels engaged in it. Second, - and this became more important as international rivalry became more acute, - it was necessary that Americans be not excluded from the benefits of this trade by the European nations which began to impose unilateral commercial privileges upon oriental nations. Thus, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, we find the United States keenly interested in every development in the Far East, zealous in the protection of her trade and ever on the alert for increased privileges. Hardly had the ink on the Nanking treaty been dry when Commander Kearney secured under the "most favored nation basis" the same commercial privileges granted in that treaty to the British. In 1844 the Caleb Cushing Mission to China secured even better terms in the Treaty of Wanghia, July 3, 1844. This date marks the end of an epoch both for China and the United States, for the

former, it was the prelude to the great transformations that took place in the second half of the century, such as the great Taiping Rebellion; and for the United States, China had become a political question.

The same influences that led to intercourse with China worked in the case with Japan - trade and the protection of that trade. The result was the opening of Japan and the Perry Treaty of March 31, 1854. This treaty is regarded by some as a backward step for it did not contain the all important provision of extra-territoriality. However, as Dennett says, Perry had in mind a more far-reaching policy than Cushing had thought of in the Wanghia treaty with China. Perry "looked forward to the time when there would be on the Pacific and in Asia a large number of American 'settlements' which 'would be offshoots from us rather than, strictly speaking, colonies.'"(10) His order to Commander Kelley of the Plymouth to take formal possession of the Bonin Islands was significant.

In the decade preceding the Spanish-American War this increasing volume of trade with the orient was very noticeable. For the purpose of citing concrete figures, the volume of import and export trade to China and Japan during the decade from 1887 to 1896 inclusive are hereby shown, viz.:(11)

China	Years	Imports	Exports
	1887	$19,076,780	$6,246,626
	1888	16,690,589	4,582,585
	1889	17,028,412	2,791,128

China	Years	Imports	Exports
	1890	$16,260,471	$2,946,209
	1891	19,321,850	8,701,608
	1892	20,488,291	5,633,497
	1893	20,636,535	3,900,457
	1894	17,135,028	5,862,426
	1895	20,545,829	3,603,840
	1896	22,023,004	6,921,933
Japan	1887	17,114,181	3,335,592
	1888	18,621,576	4,214,382
	1889	16,687,992	4,619,985
	1890	21,103,324	5,232,643
	1891	19,309,198	4,807,693
	1892	23,790,202	3,290,111
	1893	27,454,220	3,195,494
	1894	19,426,522	3,986,815
	1895	23,695,957	4,634,717
	1896	25,537,038	7,689,685

The above figures showing the imports from and exports into China and Japan respectively are more or less variable and indifferent. Indeed, in the case of China, the year 1887 was rather unusual for the export of the United States to that country in that year was $6,246,626, whereas in 1896, at the end of a decade, it reached to only $6921,933, a very slight increase indeed. Disregarding the unusual circumstances of that year, however, one will notice a gradual increase in the volume of both the import and export trade with China and Japan during that decade.

In the next two years the increase of American exports to China was phenomenal. In 1897 it rose to $9,193,383 while in the following year, 1898, it was $11,911,339. Of the exports to China in 1897 $8,000,000 went through the port of Shanghai alone. Consul Fowler of Chefoo,

reporting to the State Department on August, 1898, says: "Comparing these figures with those for 1895, it will be seen that, while Great Britain has not quite doubled, the United States has trebled, her exports to China in the last three years; . . . . that the value of the United States exports to China is greater than those of all Continental Europe and the Russias, European and Asiatic."(12) Take a single item, flour, for example. "The value of American flour reported during this period was greater than for the combined years of 1894, 1895, 1896 and 1897," in the port of Chefoo in the period ending June 30, 1898. This, indeed, is "truly a wonderful increase," in the words of Consul Fowler. "There is not the least doubt that our trade in the north of China is of paramount importance," concludes the consul.

The increase in exports of American goods to China was by no means recent, however. In fact, it became noticeable in the previous year. The main articles of export were kerosene oil; cotton goods, composed of drills, sheetings and jeans; flour and machinery. Up to 1894 American kerosene oil had enjoyed almost a monopoly in the Chinese markets, but in 1897 it began to feel Russian and Sumatran competition. In all the other articles, however, the United States had been steadily gaining while the decrease in the exportation of kerosene oil was more than compensated by the rise in price. Other American products, such as "condensed milk",

fire engines, bicycles, and electrical and telephone and telegraphic machinery began to find their way into the Chinese markets.

Especially noteworthy was the industrial and commercial awakening of China which was apparent to everybody. Consul-General Jernigan of Shanghai, reporting on December 22, 1896, says: "One of the most significant features of the year was the great increase in the value of imported machinery."(13) He mentions ginning mills, weaving mills and silk filatures "springing up as if by magic," in Shanghai and vicinity. Reports of increased activity have also been received by the Department of State from the consuls of Chefoo, Hankow, Amoy, Canton, Chinkiang and Tientsin.(14)

It is perhaps necessary to refer briefly to America's interest in Hawaii. Aside from its contiguity to the United States and therefore its strategical importance both from a military and naval point of view, it had been a convenient stopping place for American vessels going to and from the orient and the Northwest coast. During the Cleveland administration a treaty annexing the islands had actually been ratified by the Senate but was vetoed by the President. During the period under discussion the sentiment for the annexation of the islands was very strong indeed and President McKinley himself had urged it. The participation of the United States in the joint condominium over the Samoan

islands in 1899 is another proof of this increasing interest in the Far East and the regions of the Pacific.

The second factor in bringing about America's interest in the orient was the westward movement. Almost at the same time that American whalers and trading vessels began to round the Horn or the Cape of Good Hope in search of the products of the orient, settlers poured over the Alleghenies in increasing numbers; then across the Mississippi, and finally, over the Rockies, to the very slopes of the Pacific. There was the same motive in both cases, the search for new wealth. Sailing vessels were replaced by clippers, and clippers by steamships as the century progressed, each new invention increasing the traffic with the orient; while overland, the pack horse and the prairie schooner of the immigrant train were replaced by the steamboat and railroads. Oregon and California became parts of the union and, as if to disdain the barriers of distance, Alaska was also acquired. Hereafter, the United States became a next-door neighbor to the countries of the orient, the waters of the same ocean washing their shores, thus linking their destinies together stronger than mere human plannings and designs could do.

The third factor that ultimately brought the United States to the Philippines was the fact that this country, in the course of its century and a half of history as an independent nation, had almost invariably fallen heir to the territories of Spain, or the former territories of that nation, in the new world.

This fact is but one phase of that general conquest of all Spanish possessions by English-speaking peoples which took place in the last two centuries. The acquisition of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Oregon and New Mexico and California was no more accident by any means. "Manifest destiny" or call it what you may, the fact remains that the annexation of the Philippines was but the last in the series of this historical events. As Chadwick says: "The late war was but the culmination of difficulties which had their seed in the peace of 1763. They sprang into life twenty years later with the advent on the world's stage of the American union; remained in full vigor for half a century thereafter with scarcely an interval of repose, and waxed and waned for seventy-five years more, until finally war came in 1898 to remove the last cause of friction. Few of the one hundred fifteen years from 1783 to 1898 were free from bitterness of feeling. The war was thus but a final episode in a century of diplomatic ill-feeling, sometimes dormant, but more often dangerously acute."(15)

The last factor mentioned is the commercial and industrial expansion of the United States at the close of the nineteenth century. The "first years of the Buchanan administration occupied," according to Dennett, "in relation to Far Eastern affairs, a somewhat similar position to the first years of the McKinley administration. In each case the nation, having

recovered from a period of financial depression and panic, found itself with a surplus of produce for which a foreign market seemed desirable and necessary. In both instances the new mercantile energy of the American people was contemporaneous with the disorganization and uncertainty in the Far East to which was joined the fear that other nations might seize the opportunity to obtain preferred positions and perhaps to close the doors."(16) The question for the United States was whether it would establish protectorates or acquire territory in the Pacific and the Far East to protect her trade. "The task for American statesmen in the last three years of the century," he adds, "was to obtain for Americans a real equivalent for Hongkong."(17) This demand for equivalent became more pressing for "in March, 1897, the month of McKinley's inauguration, American steel rails began to sell in European markets at $18 a ton, and this was assumed to indicate that at last the American people had reached the point in their industrial development where they could no longer safely neglect the markets of the world. It was believed by McKinley, by Mark Hanna, perhaps by John Hay, and by some, though not all capitalists and 'captains of industry', that the American people were now ready to resume the task for which the policy of Daniel Webster and Caleb Cushing had proved to be so inadequate."(18)

Foster, referring to this same commercial tendency during

this period, says: "The argument for a complete cession(of the Philippines) from a commercial standpoint was that the recent enormous increase in productiveness of American industries and in the export trade required an extension of markets; that it was impossible to enter into competition with European countries without following their methods in securing a base for commercial operations; and that although the policy of the United States was 'the open door', this could not be maintained without asserting American political power, especially in the part of the world where the greatest markets were situated."(19)

Thus we see how these four factors: the trade interest in the orient, the continental expansion, the perpetual quarrel with Spain, and the commercial and industrial awakening of the United States during the last years of the nineteenth century all contributed, in more or less degree, towards the acquisition of the Philippines. One should not understand by this that these four factors worked directly, as if foreordained, towards that end. What is meant is that the factors were present and when the Spanish-American War broke out, the acquisition of the Philippines fitted in nicely with these tendencies. The wish also was not lacking. Secretary Seward predicted in 1851, during the agitation for the opening of intercourse with Japan, that: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter."(20) Again,

in 1852, by the bier of Clay, another expansionist, Seward, referring to the same question, said: "we are rising to another and more sublime stage of national progress - that of expanding wealth and rapid territorial aggrandizement. . . . Wherever that influence is felt, a desire for protection under these institutions is awakened. Expansion seems to be regulated, not by any difficulties of resistence, but from the moderation which results from our own internal constitution. No one knows how rapidly that restraint may give way. Who can tell how fast or how far it ought to yield? Commerce has brought the ancient continents near to us, and created necessities for new positions - perhaps connections or colonies there. . . . Even prudence will be required to decide whether distant regions, east or west, shall come under our protection, or be left to aggrandize a rapidly spreading and hostile domain of despotism. Sir, who among us is equal to these mighty questions? I fear there is no one."(21) Perry who advocated the acquisition of settlements as bases for commercial activities in the orient, said: "In the development of the future, the destinies of our nation must assume conspicuous attitudes; we cannot expect to be free from the ambitious longings of increased power, which are the natural concomitants of national success."(22)

Let us now consider the question asked at the beginning of this inquiry. Was the Philippines a <u>terra incognita</u> to

the Government of the United States at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War? By no means.

"Manila," says Dennett, "because of its geographical position, was an outpost of Canton for the trader whether he approached China by way of the Cape, the Horn, or the Northwest coast."(23) In 1817 an American consul was appointed at Manila. In 1819 there were 23 American vessels trading in sugar, indigo, coffee and cotton. These vessels also engaged in the rice trade between Manila and Canton. "The policy of the Spanish Government placed no special obstacles in the way of the growth of American trade though the consul was not recognized."(24) The Russell, Sturgis and Company, founded about 1825, had a branch in Manila. In the last six months of 1835, 13,876 tons of American shipping registered at this port.

Let us proceed further. During the Wilkes expedition, 1838-1842, to the Northwest coast, a vessel cruised about the Sulu waters, making observations and touched Manila.(25) The Caleb Chushing Mission to China also found occasion to send a vessel to the Philippine Islands. Perry, perhaps the most far-sighted of the leaders sent by the government to open intercourse with the orient, also sent a vessel to Philippine waters.(26) As a matter of fact, during almost the entire period of the 19th century after the United States obtained her independence, the Pacific Ocean and Chinese

waters teemed with American vessels; enterprising sea-captains from New England, eager for trade, and naval commanders, equally eager to secure trade concessions and privileges for their country.

The trade of the United States with the Philippines in the decades previous to the Spanish-American War was not at all inconsiderable. Taking three years arbitrarily, each separated by a decade, the amount of imports of agricultural products from the Philippine Islands into the United States is as follows: 1876, $6,085,439; 1887, $9,744,622.47 and 1897, $4,383,740. The latter year shows a decided decline. However, the first six months ending June 30, 1898, the total amount of imports was $3,424,515.93. The chief items imported in the order of their value are the following: hemp(Manila), sugar(cane), vegetable fibers, manufactures of vegetable fiber, straw manufactures and tobacco. In 1897, according to Consul Williams at Manila, the export of hemp from the Philippines to the United States showed 544% increase over the combined shipments to all other countries together. Furthermore, he declared that: "Of the total exports of hemp from the Philippines for the ten years ended 1897, amounting to 6,528,965(914,055 tons), 41 per cent went to the United States. During the same years, the Philippine Islands exported to the United States and to Europe 1,582,904 tons of sugar, of which 875,150 tons went to the United States,

666,391 tons to Great Britain, and 41,362 tons to Continental Europe; showing that of the total exports, more than 55 per cent went to the United States."(27) The United States during all this period was one of the greatest consumers of Philippine products, second only to Great Britain.

The exports of the United States to the Philippine Islands are harder to determine and, on the surface, insignificant. However, as various American consuls had pointed out over and over again in their reports to the Department of State, the figures in the customs books at Manila do not show the real amount owing to the practice of shipping American goods first to Hongkong, from thence to Manila, and credited to Hongkong in the official reports.(28) Consul Alexander R.Webb in his report in 1888 mentions of the case of a shipment of flour entered from Hongkong but showing San Francisco trade-mark on the sack. The average annual exports to the Philippines in the two or three decades before 1898 was from four hundred to five hundred thousand dollars according to the books. The main items were petroleum, coal, canned goods, furniture, drugs and chemicals.(29) Incidentally, it may perhaps be mentioned here that the interests in the United States who would most likely be affected by any movement for expansion, such as that which confronted the statesmen of this country in 1898 with regards to the Philippines, are the business men who import hemp, sugar, etc. from the Philippines and

those also who export petroleum, coal, canned goods, etc.

And so when in the last months of 1897 war with Spain loomed on the horizon the American administration had its eyes on the Philippines. Commodore Dewey, whose appointment was due largely to his capacity for prompt and energetic action, was ordered to take command of the Asiatic Squadron six months before the declaration of war with Spain. Historians insist that the sole purpose of sending the fleet to Manila Bay when war was declared was to remove the menace of the Spanish fleet which might attack California or Oregon. Perhaps some historian could tell us how the Spanish fleet in its sorry condition in the harbor of Manila on the eve of its destruction could have sailed across the Pacific to menace California and Oregon, and what more, to find a place to coal and refit. After destroying this fleet, the first message of Dewey to the President was a request for reenforcements "to control the Philippines."

References For Chapter I

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17. Ibid., p.608.
18. Ibid., pp.608-9.
19. Foster, Op.Cit., p.406.

20. Ibid., p.135.

21. Ibid., pp.401-2.

22. Dennett, Op.Cit., p.272.

23. Ibid., pp.33-4.

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25. See Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition by Lieutenant Charles Wilkes of the United States Navy, 1838-1842, in 5 volumes.

26. See Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 276.

27. House Document, Vol.76, 55th Congress, 3d Session, 1898-99, Commercial Relations, No.266, Vol.1., Pt.1, p.1149ff.

28. See Report of Consul Alexander R.Webb to the State Department, August 1, 1888. House Executive Document, 51st Congress, 1st Session, 1889-1890, Vol.44, pp.179-196.

29. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

Dewey's Victory And After

The interval from the Battle of Manila Bay till the decision to take the Philippines was made - whenever that may have been - may be termed as a period of suspense. However, if such period of suspense or indecision, in so far as the administration was concerned had ever existed at all, it did not last long. This will be shown immediately.

Dewey's victory at Manila Bay occured on the famous morning of May 1, 1898. Then the wires to Europe and America began to hum.. Before the cable to Hongkong was cut by the Spaniards they sent a message establishing their defeat. It was quickly flashed to Europe and from there, by means of indirect sources, it reached Washington. Admiral Dewey's own message announcing his great victory was sent by boat to Hongkong and cabled to Washington where it was received on May 4(1). In this message the admiral requested the immediate dispatch of re-enforcements.

The excitement in Washington caused by the news of this victory was indeed profound. Senator Proctor who, if the reader cares to recall was responsible for Dewey's appointment, could hardly contain himself upon receipt of the message of victory and burst into Roosevelt's room exclaiming words to this effect: Didn't I tell you so!

However, let us pass over these moments of exultation hurriedly. It is more important to know what measures the administration took upon receipt of Dewey's message.

President McKinley cabled his message of congratulation to Dewey to Hongkong on May 3. Dewey received this message at Manila Bay by boat from Hongkong. But what is surprising is the fact that, upon the statement of R.A.Alger himself, then Secretary of War, the orders for the assembling of volunteers at San Francisco were given three days before receipt of Dewey's cable, that is on May 1(2). There is also a statement contained on page 176 of the Report of Major General Commanding the Army, 1898, that these orders were given on May 3. The official date which is commonly accepted by historians is that of May 4. On May 7, when a cabled message was sent to Admiral Dewey informing him of his promotion to the rank of rear-admiral, he was asked how many troops ought to be sent to him. His response to this inquiry, May 13, was that he needed 5,000 men to "control the Philippine Islands."

Let us recall at this juncture the announcements of disinterestedness with which the war with Spain had been waged. It was for the purpose of freeing Cuba from cruelty and oppression. No mention was made of the Philippine Islands. Indeed, to repeat the words of Admiral Dewey, they were at the time a "terra incognita". At the opening of hostilities, on a beautiful May morning, the admiral stumbles into Manila Bay

and annihilates the Spanish fleet. On the very same day he sent a "laconic message" to President McKinley announcing his great victory. Yet he found occasion to ask for re-enforcements to "control the Philippine Islands". In Washington, even if it is conceded the Secretary Alger's statement is incorrect, things began to move and orders for assembling the troops at San Francisco were given on May 4. Why Dewey's request for re-enforcements on the very same day of his victory? And why the quick response from the administration in the above cited orders?

There was foresight and precision in both instances; Admiral Dewey at Manila Bay and the administration in Washington both moving with perfect coordination. While it is not presumed to establish a fact by these deductions, there is a strong presumption that more had been decided and agreed upon than could be proven by documentary evidence. Le Roy, on the other hand, explains these facts by the following:(3)

> "Simple obedience to the rules by which war is waged, however, implies that every effort shall be made to cripple the enemy, and that every advantage shall be followed up while war lasts; and this step of preparation was all the more natural at that early date, if we suppose that Dewey's letter of March 31, expressing his confidence that the Spanish fleet could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one day, had reached Washington before the news of victory came."

Granted that Le Roy's interpretation is correct. In an address to Congress on May 9, the President again had recourse to his happy phrases. "At this unsurpassed achievement(Dewey's victory)," he said, "the great heart of our nation throbs,

not with boasting or greed of conquest, but with deep gratitude that this triumph has come in a just cause and that by the grace of God an effective step has thus been taken toward the attainment of the wished for peace."(4) Could assurance be doubly assured? A feeling of shame overwhelms the doubter for having impugned, or even entertained the least suspicion, regarding the unselfish motives of the administration. Yet, ten days later, right on the heels of this proclamation, the President sent the following communication to the Secretary of War:(5)

> "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severence of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. . . . . It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights."

In an identical communication to the Secretary of the Treasury, he said: "I have determined to order that all ports or places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces by conquest shall be opened, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the rates of duty which may be in force at the time when the goods are imported." (6)

Here again the impartial student cannot help but arrive at disturbing conclusions. Either the two orders cited

above manifest meticulous foresight with respect to the military measures of the commander-in-chief, certainly not warranted by military possession, or they are evidence of an intention of aggression at this early date. Let the reader draw his own conclusions.

The first military expedition under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M.Anderson sailed from San Francisco on May 25. Two more contingents, under the command of Brigadier-General Francis V.Greene and Major-General Wesley Merritt, respectively, the latter designated as commander of the new "Department of the Pacific", left in June, bringing the total number of American forces up to July 31 to over 10,000 officers and men. This considerable force had been sent to the Philippine Islands nearly two months before the reply to the Spanish request for cessation of hostilities, July 30, the date generally regarded as the first time when the administration manifested any intention at all of retaining those islands.

Admiral Dewey requested only 5,000 men to "control the Philippine Islands", in his despatch of May 13 to the President. Evidently the administration believed that a bigger force was necessary. Why? Incidentally, it is important to mention here that the first expedition under Brigadier-General Anderson seized Guam on the way on June 21.

Two facts should be kept in mind in order to understand the attitude of the administration at this time. First: what to

do with the Filipino "insurgents"; second: how to deal with the delicate international situation in the Far East at this time, augmented as it was by the offensive attitude of the German fleet in the harbor of Manila.

Admiral Dewey seemed to have Aguinaldo well in hand from the beginning. At their first interview, he had urged "Don Emilio" not "to give it up". Thereafter, the "insurgent" leader had been winning victory after victory over the Spaniards whom he had penned within the fortifications of Manila. So well gratified was the admiral over the performance of his protege that he made mention of this in his reports to the Navy Department. On June 6, he made the following entry: "Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of Cavite during the last week; they have had several small victories, taking prisoners about 1,800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native."(7) On June 12, another entry was made, viz.: "Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila. They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised."(8)

Why was it necessary to assure Washington that the Filipinos "do not intend to attack the city proper until the arrival of United States troops thither?"

The last sentence in the second report referred to above is significant. It clearly reveals Admiral Dewey's policy

of urging the Filipino "insurgents" against the Spaniards pending the arrival of re-enforcements he asked for on May 13. It further reveals a plan to prevent the Filipinos from capturing Manila before the arrival of American troops. The reason for this is obvious. While the Filipino forces were useful in decimating the enemy, they must not be permitted to occupy Manila, a situation that might prove embarrassing to the plans they already then had in contemplation and in the future negotiations with Spain.

Unfortunately, things suddenly took a different aspect. On June 18, Aguinaldo issued a declaration of independence and was followed by a proclamation establishing a "revolutionary" government. Senator Lodge blew up in rage over this proclamation and said:". . . Aguinaldo, destitute of either loyalty or gratitude, forgetting the hand which had raised him up, and swelling with a sense of his own importance, felt it necessary to establish a government, of which he duly apprised Admiral Dewey."(9) On another occasion, the Senator said: "All around Manila were the insurgents, supporters in theory, but untrustworthy, treacherously led, and capable at any moment of actions which might endanger our relations with other powers, or of intriguing with these same powers against us."(10) Admiral Dewey, however, could regard the situation with perfect equanimity for, on June 30, the first expedition under Brigadier-General Anderson arrived before Manila.

The second important fact was the international situation.

Dewey, according to his own words, thoroughly appreciated the dangers of the situation. The incidents between the American naval commander and officers of the German fleet, both at Hongkong and Manila Bay, hardly need relating here for they are well known by every student of American history. The altercation between Admiral Dewey and Vice-Admiral Von Diedricks of the German fleet was not important in itself, except to thrill the imagination of later generations perhaps, but, nevertheless, it revealed the tenseness of a situation in the Far East at the time, due to causes deeper and far more potent of mischief. The "significant event of this period was the action of the three European powers which only three years before had intervened to demand the recession of the Liaotung peninsula to China and subsequently forced the empire to lease the various ports already referred to as well as to grant the spheres of influence. Germany, especially, had revealed an alarming land hunger, and was known to be intriguing in Europe to bring about intervention in the Spanish-American War."(11) Lodge also says that "on either hand were the warships of unfriendly powers watching sullenly and eagerly for an error, for a sign of weakness, for the least excuse for interference."(12)

Let us now see if we could discover what has been transpiring in the minds of the men who, at this time, held in their hands the destiny of an alien people. McKinley,

Roosevelt, Lodge, as well as a host of others, --- how much easier would our task be if we could lay our hands on the things they said or did which would prove conclusively what they intended to do with the Philippine Islands at the time. Surely they must have pondered on this perplexing problem!

Tradition - and history - by the way, has handed down to us a picture of President McKinly which it is difficult to change by later conclusions. With a tinge of the religious, detached, almost sad and lonely, he reminds us of another great American in this respect: Abraham Lincoln. There is his own statement in his account of how he decided to acquire the Philippines. That he was also oppressed by a sense of the great responsibilities before him, there is no doubt. "The President is again looking careworn," writes Mr.Cortelyou in his diary on May 15, 1898, "the color having faded from his cheeks and the rings being once more noticeable about his eyes."(13) Still he devoted himself unsparingly to looking after the enormous details connected with the war. He read despatches till very late in the evening, received interviews from anxious mothers and fathers who had sons fighting in Cuba or the distant Philippines, etc. "The President watches the war situation most earnestly and intently," again Mr.Cortelyou writes down in his diary on June 17, 1898.

What had been going on in the mind of the President regarding the Philippines? If he had formed decisions between the

date of the Battle of Manila Bay and the request for cessation of hostilities by the Spanish Government on July 22, 1898, he had kept them to himself. The testimony of the men near him is that he was reticent on this subject. Lodge, writing to Roosevelt on July 12, expresses alarm over the apparent indecision of the President. He says: "He(McKinley) is entirely clear as to Cuba ---- and I think also to Porto Rico. He is also very firm against European interference, but he is worrying over the Philippines ---- he wants to hold them evidently but is a little timid about it."(14)

However, there is reason to believe that the President's indecision was only on the surface. For Lodge goes on to say: "There is one thing that has given me great encouragement and that is the taking of the Ladrones Islands ---- he must have ordered this far back in May when the Charleston left San Francisco."(15) Referring again to the taking of these Islands, he adds:(16)

> ". . . now why the President should have taken those islands unless he expects to hold on to the Philippines I cannot conceive. He intends to hold something in the Philippines and the single point that I have made with him and have made with everybody is whatever happens we cannot return to Spain the people whom we have set free. To hand Aguinaldo and his men back to Spain would be an infamy. Day is very weak about the Philippines but I am hoping for the best."

Colonel Roosevelt, writing to Senator Lodge "in camp, near San Antonio, Texas," May 25, replies: "I earnestly hope that no truce will be granted and that peace will only

be made on consideration of Cuba being independent, Porto Rico ours and the Philippines taken away from Spain."(18) On June 12, on the day of the embarkation of his regiment at Port Tampa, Florida, bound for Cuba, Roosevelt again wrote Lodge, saying: "Naturally this is not a letter that can be shown to anyone, but I am going to keep you informed as to the facts, and for the credit of the country and administration I wish you would try to straighten things out. I know what a fight you have on strictly the lines of your own duties, old man, and of course you must not neglect that, no matter what happens to the administration you must get Manila and Hawaii; you must prevent any talk of peace until we get Porto Rico and the Philippines as well as secure the independence of Cuba. . . ."(18)

The following replies of Lodge to Roosevelt are doubly significant for the reason that they do not only reveal his own views but that of President McKinley, Day, and others as well. On June 15, he informs Roosevelt:". . . I have, I think, done something to force Hawaii to the front, and the House votes on it to-morrow. It will carry by a large majority, and I do not believe the Senate can hold out very long, for the President has been very firm about it and means to annex the Islands any way. I consider the Hawaiian business as practically settled. The whole policy of annexation is growing rapidly under the irresistible force

of events. You may judge a little of the change when I tell you that Judge Day said to me two or three days ago, 'there is of course no question about Porto Rico, everyone is agreed on that, the only question for us to consider is how much we should do in the Philippines.'"(19) Nine days later, he again writes to Roosevelt, as follows: "He(Day) dined with me the other night and Mahan and I talked the Philippines with him for two hours. He said at the end that he thought that we could not escape our destiny there. The feeling of the country is overwhelming against giving the Philippines back to Spain. That is clear to the most casual observer. Bryan announced that he is against colonization, and Cleveland, in a ponderous speech, has come out against us as much as he dares and utterly against annexation. We shall sweep the country on that issue in my judgement. The Republican Conventions are all declaring that where the flag once goes up it must never come down . . . . and it seems hardly worth while to tell you that I am devoting all my strength to securing the annexation of Hawaii."(20)

The correspondence between Lodge and Roosevelt establishes several important things. Both Roosevelt and Lodge were agreed on getting the Philippines from the beginning and, if they had their own way, would have pursued a more vigorous and definite policy. President McKinley appeared worried and taking his own counsel but had taken steps leading towards

the acquisition of the Philippines. He had ordered the taking of the Ladrones Islands and urged the annexation of Hawaii. The sentiment for annexation also was growing insistent, although we suspect that it was being carefully fostered by Lodge and his followers.

The conclusion, therefore, is that President McKinley had figured on taking the Philippines sometime before the drafting of the reply to the Spanish Government's request for a cessation of hostilities. If his mind was not definite on the subject, he was not averse to bringing about a situation, as shown in his various military orders, which would have no other outcome. Mr.Cortelyou says that President McKinley had shown him a copy of a memorandum which the president himself had prepared on the very same day that the communication from the Spanish minister for cessation of hostilities had been received, July 26. In this memorandum, it was written:(21)

> "Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy, and will hold, the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

Lodge's letter to Roosevelt on July 23 corroborates this statement, as follows:(22)

> "I had a long talk with the President before leaving Washington and he was very clear and strong about both Cuba and Porto Rico. He is not giving such consideration to the Philippines but the question in his mind is how much he will take there. I think his imagination is touched by the situation, and I think he grasps it fully. We ordered the taking of the Ladrones way back in May, and they are of value <u>only as a stepping stone</u>. He did everything to secure the annexation of Hawaii, and speaks of it as <u>a step in a policy</u>."

References For Chapter II

1. President McKinley states in his Second Annual Message, December 5, 1898, that this despatch was received on May 7. See Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol.14, p.6315.
2. Le Roy, The Americans in the Philippines, p.173. See also footnote, no.2.
3. Le Roy, Op.Cit., pp.173-4.
4. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol.14, pp.6298-9.
5. Ibid., p.6569. The italics are mine.
6. Ibid., p.6572.
7. Navy Department Report, 1898, Appendix, p.102.
8. Ibid., p.106.
9. Lodge, The War With Spain, p.206.
10. Ibid., p.207.
11. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p.619.
12. Lodge, Op.Cit., p.206ff.
13. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, Vol.II, p.54.
14. Lodge to Roosevelt, July 12, 1898, Selections from Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Vol.1, p.323. The italics are mine.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p.323-4.
17. Ibid., p.301.
18. Ibid., p.309.
19. Ibid., p.311.

20. Ibid., p.313.

21. Olcott, Op.Cit., p.69.

22. Lodge to Roosevelt, July 23, 1898, Op.Cit., p.330. The italics are mine.

CHAPTER III

Was Independence Promised?

The situation which Dewey had to face at Manila Bay was extremely delicate. He was several thousand miles away from his home base and a not too friendly fleet was in the harbor watching his every move. On top of these, there were the Filipino "insurgents" whom he had brought over and encouraged and aided to renew their rebellion against Spain. Verily, a more trying situation had never faced an American naval officer in foreign waters. Let him describe his own feelings in his own words, viz.: "Among the situations I had to deal promptly as they arose, when I could not delay to consult Washington, the most complicated was that of the Filipino insurgents. Before the squadron had left Hongkong a cable, dated April 24, had been received from our consul-general at Singapore, saying that Emilio Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief, was at Singapore and would proceed to Hongkong to see me if I so desired. I requested him to come, as it was possible that he might have valuable information to impart at a time when no source of information was to be neglected."(1)

Dewey, at the suggestion of Consul Pratt, brought over Aguinaldo to Manila. For what purpose, aside from the "valuable information" the Filipino leader may possess and which may be valuable to the admiral? "From my observations of Aguinaldo and his advisers," declared Dewey, "I decided that it would be unwise to cooperate with him or his ad-

herents in an official manner . . . . In short, my policy was to avoid any entangling alliance with the insurgents, while I appreciated that, pending the arrival of our troops, they might be of service in clearing the long neck of land that stretches out from Cavite peninsula to the environs of Manila."(2) This is a plain and unaffected recital of a policy to use the Filipinos "in clearing the long neck of land" and others presumably. He speaks as if he was bringing over a band of condottieri from the moon instead of the leaders of a people who have been fighting against Spanish oppression.

Let us turn again to Senator Lodge and see what he has to say. As if to anticipate the future disagreement between the Americans and Filipinos, his version of the early relation between the two forces goes one step farther. He says: "The insurgent chiefs, however, stimulated by the approach of trouble between the United States and Spain, put themselves in communication with Mr.Wildman, our consul at Hongkong, and opened negotiations with him. They declared that they desired annexation to the United States, above all independence of Spain and relief from Spanish rule, and wished to aid the Americans in all possible ways. Admiral Dewey took the obvious course of encouraging them . . ."

Dewey's Autobiography was written long after the events he records, and of which he was the principal actor, took place. Other testimonies on this subject are elucidated in a series

of hearings before a Senate committee in 1902, published as Senate Document 331, Pt.3. Mr.Lodge's work on the subject, "The War With Spain," was written and published almost contemporaneously with these events. Both Dewey's and Lodge's statements agree on the following points: 1. That Dewey encouraged and aided the Filipino "insurgents" in their war against the Spaniards; 2. That this aid was sought because it was of service and importance to the American naval and military operations. Lodge, let it be repeated, went farther and declares that the Filipinos "desired annexation to the United States."

A more recent opinion on this subject is that of Tylor Dennett who says: "While Dewey was careful to make no promise to Aguinaldo, he did give no little encouragement and turned over to him the arsenal at Cavite and permitted him to organize his insurgent forces within the American lines. Consul-General Rounsevelle Wildman had also assisted the insurrectos to purchase arms in Hongkong. Aguinaldo gave out the statement to the Filipinos that the United States would assist the insurrectos . .. In other words, Consul-General Pratt, Admiral Dewey, and many more were reaffirming what had been stated hundreds of times by American representatives in the East since the days in 1832 when Edmund Roberts made his treaties, viz., that the United States had neither the intention nor the constitutional right to acquire colonies. In support of this opinion there

was also the very recent declaration of President McKinley at the outbreak of the war that the acquisition of territory was not the purpose of the United States."(3) General Anderson, in an interview published in the Chicago Record, February 24, 1900, said: "Every American who came in contact with the Filipinos at the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months after hostilities began probably told those he talked with . . . . that we intended to free them from Spanish oppression. The general expression was 'we intended to whip the Spaniards and set you free!"(4)

These are conflicting versions on the much discussed question as to whether Dewey, Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams, or any other official representative of the United States in the Philippines or the Far East, who have had contact with the Filipinos during these days, had promised independence to them. Let us review the facts over carefully.

The outbreak of the Spanish-American war found a group of Filipino leaders of the abortive rebellion of 1896 against Spain in Hongkong, nursing a scheme towards the renewal of the war of liberation against that power. Here was a situation full of possibilities: Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipinos and Dewey, the commander of the Asiatic Squadron, both in Hongkong! Both had a common aim, the destruction of Spain's power in the Philippines. What a happy coincidence! And yet, as events proved, little did that small band of Filipino

revolutionary leaders in Hongkong dream at the time that their "cooperation" or "alliance" with the representative of this new power was to end disastrously for their cause.

It was inevitable that Dewey and Aguinaldo were brought together. "There had been some communication between Dewey and the insurgents in Hongkong during March and April(1898), supposedly with regard to the latter accompanying the fleet to Manila for the purpose of stimulating the native opposition to the Spaniards." However, "whatever were the propositions then discussed, it came to nothing on either side."(5)

For some reason not quite well known, Aguinaldo departed for Singapore on April 7, and arrived there on the 21st. A Mr.Bray, in true Anglo-Saxon fashion, sensing the possibilities in the presence of Aguinaldo and the approaching war with Spain, arranged for an interview between the former and Consul-General Pratt, United States consul at that place. There is a much-colored story of the interview between the two men, of how a Filipino string band then in Singapore serenedad the consul's residence while questions of empire were being discussed, of how both men stepped out on the veranda, the consul's right arm around the "insurgent" leader's shoulder while he offered a toast to the future Philippine Republic! "Just exactly what passed between the two principals to the interview perhaps only the interpreter could tell, as the stories of the principals conflict. Consul-General Pratt

reported officially at the time, and has always maintained, that he limited himself to endeavoring to secure the cooperation of Aguinaldo as a leader of insurgents with the American fleet; that this cooperation was, so far as his negotiations went to be unconditional; and that he declined to discuss the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines. Aguinaldo claims that he was promised in these interviews that the United States 'would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under a naval protectorate,' and that there was no need for putting the agreement in writing, as he asked, since 'the words of Admiral Dewey and the American consul were sacred.'"(6)

In the absence of positive evidence who of the two men would one believe, Pratt or Aguinaldo? Granting that Pratt was a rascal, one would be bold to suppose that he, Pratt, did actually deceive himself for a moment into believing that he was in a position to contract an alliance with Aguinaldo. The latter's credulity, on the other hand, if his statement is true, is easy to understand, due, partly to a racial trait, his ignorance of constitutional law and, perhaps, also to a desire to bolster his own cause.

Whichever be the true account regarding this farcical interview, both Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo were satisfied. It was a great game. Indeed, so well satisfied was Mr.Pratt that on April 27, he cabled to the State Department the

following message: "General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey cooperation insurgents in Manila." Three days later, he sent a statement of Aguinaldo's demands in a despatch to the same department. On May 5, he sent a clipping from the Singapore Free Press of May 4 which printed an account of his interview with Aguinaldo. On June 22 followed another despatch to the State Department from the happy consul, praising himself for having 'assisted the cause of the United States by securing Aguinaldo's cooperation.' Had Mr.Pratt stopped to reflect for a moment upon the proverbial ungratefulness of republics, he probably would have kept his emotions to himself. On June 8 he sent another clipping from the Singapore paper, under the same date, where Mr.Bray was quoted as saying that 'independence is the only possible solution of the Philippine question.'"(7)

Did Dewey committ himself to Aguinaldo regarding the independence of the Philippines? In an interview between the two on May 19, on board the Olympia, "Aguinaldo claims the American admiral assured him that he 'must have no doubt concerning the recognition of Philippine Independence on the part of the United States'; that 'America was rich in lands and money and did not need colonies.' That any such specific declaration was ever made by Admiral Dewey rests upon the unsupported testimony of Aguinaldo; it had been many times expressly denied by Admiral Dewey and all the attributary

circumstances support the denial."(8) Le Roy, from whom the above statement is taken, does not explain what these attributary circumstances.were.

Newspaper accounts of alleged assurances given to Aguinaldo by the consuls at Hongkong and Singapore and by navy officials began to reach the State Department and so an official report was demanded of Dewey. "The latter replied at length on June 27, reiterating his statement that the United States had not been compromised with the insurgents in any way, denying that he had given them direct assistance, and saying that Aguinaldo was acting independently of the Squadron. At the same time, he stated that Aguinaldo had been allowed to organize his army under the American fleet's guns, that he had conferred personally with the insurgent leader, and had given him to understand that he considered the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy, and that he had allowed recruits, arms, and ammunitions for Aguinaldo to pass the blockade and had let him take Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal."(9) Yet in his own statement before the Senate Committee of 1902, testified to the following, when asked as to what passed between him and Aguinaldo during the interview he had with him, viz.: "Aguinaldo came to see me, I said, 'well, now, go ashore there; we have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavite, go ashore and start your army.' He came back in the course of a few hours and said, 'I want to

leave here; I want to go to Japan.' I said, 'Don't give it up Don Emilio.' I wanted his help,you know. He did not sleep ashore that night; he slept on board the ship. The next morning he went on shore, still inside my lines, and began recruiting men."(10) Asked as to why he accepted Aguinaldo's help, the admiral replied: "I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure that the Filipinos could not take Manila, and I thought that the closer they invested the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work."(11)

To be sure this hearing was instituted in order to silence forever the criticism which some pious persons levelled against the men who were responsible for this farce. From a moral point of view, it was pure waste of effort, for it is hardly possible to justify or condemn fully one side or the other. Perhaps from a military point of view a great deal has to be said for Dewey. That this country to which he was bringing over Aguinaldo and his men happened to be their country, - that is their misfortune.

If we turn to the various statements enunciated by President McKinley and men prominent in the Republican administration of the time, what do they reveal to us? In his annual message to Congress on December, 1897, he declared that if the conditions in Cuba necessitated intervention on the part of the

United States, it would not be made the occasion for annexing new territories. Responding in the same vein, Senator Lodge stood up and said: "We are there(meaning Cuba) because we represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new time, and Spain is over against us because she is medieval, cruel, dying. We have grasped no man's territory, we have taken no man's property, we have invaded no man's rights. We do not ask their lands."(12) Doubts as to the sincerity of these expressions of disinterestedness were expressed at home and abroad. As if to quiet and reassure these doubting spirits, it was solemnly declared in the declaration of war, to wit:(13)

> "Fourth: That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Aguinaldo and his followers at Hongkong knew of these declarations on the part of the United States. There were the official pronunciamentos themselves. Furthermore, every American in official and unofficial capacity with whom they came in contact repeated the same assurances. To be sure the solemn guarantee made in the declaration of war was in reference to Cuba. But could anyone doubt for a moment that Aguinaldo took the obvious conclusion that if the United States was disinterested in Cuba it could not contemplate

aggression in the Philippines? In his address to President McKinley,"President of the Republic of the Great American Nation," he renders thanks to the American people "for the efficient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba." He adds: "The Philippine people . . . . have seen in your nation, ever since your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here . . . . the angel who is the harbinger of their liberty; and they rose like a single wave . . . . as soon as I trod these shores; and captured in ten days nearly the whole garrison of this province of Cavite in whose port I have my government --- by the consent of the admiral of your triumphant fleet."(14)

After all what has been said regarding alleged or actual promises that had been made to the Filipino "insurgents" concerning independence the decisive factor in the case was the attitude of the administration itself. For even if it were to be admitted that Dewey, Pratt, Williams and Wildman made such promises to Aguinaldo, they were acting beyond their constitutional rights and without the consent of the authorities in Washington. It seems also that the Department of State had warned Consul Wildman at Hongkong to have no dealings with the "insurgents" as early as December, 1897. In a message sent to Dewey on May 26, he was given the following

instruction: "It is desirable as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future."

These communications lead to several conslusions. First, that the administration had been apprised of the informal negotiations with the "insurgents" is obvious; second, the authorities in Washington, while not making any explicit prohibition, warned against "political alliances" that "would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." The last phrase deserves a moment's pause. Their cause against whom? Spain? Impossible, for both were already waging war against that power. The United States? If the latter is meant, it proves that the statesmen in Washington were following an opportunist policy utterly inconsistent with their proclamations to the world.

On June 17, Consul Pratt was instructed by cable to 'avoid unauthorized negotiations with the insurgents.' In a letter sent from Washington the day before, he was told: "To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their

purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this Government any recognition. The United States, in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will do in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them. If,in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved."(15)

Somewhat later, both Consul Wildman at Hongkong and Williams at Manila were warned not to commit themselves with the "insurgents." To the latter, it was stated: "Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is approved."(16)

The policy of the administration was clear from the beginning, viz.: not to involve themselves with the "insurgents" in a way that would form an obstacle to whatever plans they already had then in contemplation regarding the Philippines. On the other hand, what could Aguinaldo do under the

circumstances? From the standpoint of international law, his cause had a latent weakness in that his government had never been recognized officially by the United States or by any other power. Perhaps, knowing this, he contented himself with vague and illusory promises trusting that God helps those that help themselves. But unfortunately, even the God of Battles has a partiality for numbers and superiority of equipment.

In view of such conflicting evidence and more conflicting conclusions, our original question as to whether independence had been promised to Aguinaldo still remains unanswered. The literature on the subject is enormous. Scarcely a historian - the word is used here advisedly - had not taken one side or the other. The majority of opinion, however, seems to rest on the conclusion that no promise of independence had been made to Aguinaldo either by Dewey, Consuls Pratt, Wildman, or Williams. The writer, therefore, can do no harm in hazarding his own opinion.

Prior to the actual outbreak of the war with Spain, the whole world knew that it was coming. There was President McKinley's annual message to Congress on December, 1897. It was at once a warning and a menace to Spain. Even the proverbially sleepy orient heard the rumblings of the coming storm. The Filipino Revolutionary Junta in Hongkong heard it and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams also heard it. It would not be natural if they did not. To the Filipinos it

was a voice of hope; to the latter, it was an invitation to be "up and doing." And "up and doing" they were, especially Consuls Pratt and Wildman. Claiborne in West Florida, Jackson at Pensacola, Houston in Texas, what glorious traditions, let us suppose, had not been evoked in the minds of these would-be empire builders! Pratt and Wildman had only to dangle vague promises to Aguinaldo. Wildman, writing to Aguinaldo on June 25, 1898, said: "Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings for the Filipinos."(17)

As for Dewey, it would not be easy even to this day to question the truth of his assertion that he made no promises to Aguinaldo, for the sanctity that does hedge the memory of the victor of Manila Bay remains an obstacle to historical inquisitiveness. Asked in one of the Congressional committee investigations regarding the truth of Aguinaldo's assertion in his Resena veridica, in which it was stated that Dewey promised him independence, the admiral called the "insurgent" chief a liar. Le Roy also dismisses the incident with the simple statement that between the word of Admiral Dewey and Aguinaldo there cannot be hesitation in favor of the admiral.

Granted that Dewey had made no promises to Aguinaldo, the fact still remains that he sought Aguinaldo's cooperation

and urged "Don Emilio" not "to give it up" when the latter showed signs of faltering. "I wanted his help, you know," was his blunt explanation. And Aguinaldo went on to fight, at the risk not only of his own life but of thousands of his own countrymen, because he trusted blindly, not even exacting a promise, verbally or on paper, for his faith and that of his people was higher than the word of Admiral Dewey and the rising ambition of the American people. The whole miserable business may be summed up in the words of Senator Mason who, speaking during the debate on Senator Hoar's resolution in the Senate that the United States had no right under the constitution to acquire territories, said: "That we have assisted the Filipinos is undoubtedly true. That they assisted us is also true. We are told that Aguinaldo could not have got back there but for Dewey. Then Dewey put him back. Then under all the laws of common honesty he is our ally. Caesar with all his cruelty, aye, Nero, never accepted the assistance of an ally and whipped his enemy and then turned his guns upon the men who helped him."(18)

References For Chapter III

1. Autobiography of George Dewey, p.245ff.
2. Ibid.
3. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p.618.
4. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912, p.19.
5. Le Roy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol.I, p.179.
6. Ibid., p.180ff. Aguinaldo's account of this interview as well as that he had with Dewey is contained in his Resena Veridica(True Account). "This Resena Veridica," comments Le Roy, "is so inaccurate and uncandid that it will not do to accept any statement resting on its authority."
7. Ibid., p.181.
8. Ibid., p.184.
9. Ibid., p.185. The italics are mine.
10. S.D. 331, Pt.3, p.2927. See also Blount, Op.Cit., p.20.
11. Ibid., p.2936.
12. Congressional Record, April 13, 1898, p.3701ff.
13. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol.14, p.6298.
14. S.D. 62, p.362.
15. S.D. 62, p.354; Le Roy, Op.Cit., p.187. See also footnote.
16. S.D. 62, p.329.
17. Congressional Record, April 17, 1900, p.4287. See also Blount, Op.Cit., p.19.
18. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Pt.I, Vol.32. January 10, 1899.

CHAPTER IV

Making The Peace Treaty

The request of the Spanish Government for a cessation of hostilities was transmitted by M.Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Washington, to the President on July 26, 1898. How low Spain had fallen is gleaned in the almost pathetic statement of her desire to come to peace. "And so we do wish to learn from the President of the United States," concluded this note, "upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba, and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island."(1) Not a word about the Philippine Islands. Even the reference to Cuba was merely with respect to "pacifying the island." Little did the Spanish Government dream at the time that they would be forced to relinquish the Philippine Islands.

Mr.Olcott, in his biography of President McKinley, tells of a trip down the Potomac in a lighthouse tender, to which the members of the cabinet were invited by the President, for the purpose of discussing the terms of a reply to the Spanish Government's communication. The question of what to do with the Philippines was the most important and absorbing one. Secretary Bliss and Attorney-General Griggs were in favor of annexing the whole islands; Secretaries Gage, Long and Day wanted a naval base only. President

McKinley's decision was "to keep all the islands, at least temporarily, and await developments."(2) Naturally this view prevailed.

Cabinet discussion on the subject continued till July 30 when the reply to the Spanish Government was sent. Mr. Cortelyou testifies in his diary to the assiduous and painstaking care with which the President met all the details. "The final changes in the document," he says, "were largely his own and his guiding hand will be seen at every point in the negotiation."(3) It should also be kept in mind that the President had, on or about the day of the receipt of the Spanish Government's note on July 26, prepared in a memorandum a demand regarding the Philippines, which demand was included verbatim in the note of July 30 to the Spanish Government. This demand is as follows:(4)

> "Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy, and will hold, the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."

The wording of this article obviously requires knowledge of the content of the foregoing one. "The President," it was stated in article two, "desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forth any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he can not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and

property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must therefore require the cession to the United States, ... of Porto Rico, etc. . . ." The demand for the Philippines was therefore a part of the demand for indemnity in spite of the strange disclaimer at the beginning of the article.

The Spanish Government replied on August 7, dated Madrid. Her Majesty's Government entered a protest against that article regarding the Philippines. The paragraph stating the Spanish contention throws such a great deal of light on the situation as it stood then that it is quoted here at length, viz.:(5)

> "The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can not be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guarantee. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not <u>a priori</u> renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable.
>
> "The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the above-mentioned declarations."

Secretary Day's reply to this note was sent to M.Jules Cambon on August 10, part of which is as follows: " . . . . I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which

it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit."(6) For the purpose of avoiding misunderstanding in the future, he proposed that the two Governments embody the terms in a protocol, a draft of which, on the part of the United States, was included in the communication. The article regarding the Philippines said:(7)

> "Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."

The protest of the Spanish Government of August 7 proved fatal. Whether it furnished the United States Government the necessary idea to strengthen their position with regards to the Philippines, one may surmise. At any rate, the delay occasioned in the signature of the protocol enabled the American forces before Manila to enter that city on August 13. The protocol was signed at Washington by Mr.Day and M. Cambon at 5 p.m., August 12, while the Americans entered Manila at 6 a.m. on August 13. A great deal of controversy arose later on the question whether the occupation of Manila rested by virtue of the protocol or of conquest.

In accordance with the fifth article of the protocol, the President appointed the following commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace with Spain: William R.Day, chairman;

Cushman K.Davis, William P.Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. John Bassett Moore acted as secretary and counsel. Mr.Day, who resigned his position as Secretary of State to become member of the commission, was a Republican; Mr.Davis was United States Senator from Minnesota; Mr.Frye, of Maine; Mr.Gray, of Delaware. Senators Davis and Frye were Republicans, Senator Gray was the lone Democrat in the commission. Mr.Reid was also a Republican. They were not outstanding men nor afterwards became so, except John Bassett Moore, but were typical of the ordinary run of politicians of the time.

The President's intruction to the Peace Commissioners was drafted on September 16. It said: "It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. . . . The lustre and moral strength attaching a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgement of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. . . ." Followed a statement of what would be demanded from Spain. As for the Philippines, it declared: "The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The

march of events rules and overrules human action . . . . Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all . . . The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possession than upon an adequate commercial basis . . . . In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon . . ."(8)

The most interesting part of this instruction is the demand for "the cession in full right and sovereignty of the Island of Luzon." Was the administration following a shrewd policy of feeling its way or did it have no policy in view at all? We will see how in the progress of the negotiations at Paris this demand for a part of the Philippines finally culminated in a demand for the entire archipelago.

The American and Spanish peace commissioners began their sessions on October 1 at Paris. Before departing from the United States the President had placed in the hands of the American commissioners admiral Dewey's opinion regarding the advisability of demanding the cession of Luzon. Mr.Day inquired from Mr.Hay, then Secretary of State, by cable

whether the admiral had any other island in mind. The former was informed that General Merritt, who was on his way to join the peace commissioners, would give him the necessary information.

General Merritt arrived at Paris on or about October 6. He had statements with him from General Greene, Surgeon Bourns(9), Major Bell, Admiral Dewey, Colonel Jewett, personal opinions of the Belgian consul, Andre, as well as correspondence of the American military officers in the Philippines with Aguinaldo. The substance of these statements is that the Filipinos were not capable of self-government; that Aguinaldo maintains but a precarious hold upon the people due to racial, tribal and religious differences; that the Filipinos would submit to American rule if just and firm government were assured; that the islands would drift into anarchy and be seized by a European power if left to themselves, etc. The suggestion that created the most powerful impression was that of Consul Andre who declared that the United States must take all or nothing at all. Mr.Foreman, who has written a book on the Philippines, was at Paris at the time and also gave evidence before the commission. Mr.Day cabled these informations to the President but it is evident that the President had them before hand.

The crucial point in the fate of the Philippine Islands in the negotiations of the treaty of peace at Paris was reached simultaneously on October 25, the first at Washington, in a letter dictated to the peace commissioners by President

McKinley, the second, in a memorandum sent by the commissioners themselves expressing their individual views. After requesting the commissioners to cable their opinion, the President said: "There is very general feeling that the United States, whatever it might prefer to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot let go. The interdependency of the several islands, their close relations with Luzon, the very grave problem of what will become of the part we do not take, are receiving the thoughtful consideration of the people, and it is my judgement that the well-considered opinion of the majority would be that duty requires we should take the whole archipelago."(10)

The opinion of the commissioners was cabled to the President on the same day. Messers Davis, Frye and Reid signed a joint opinion. Aside from political, moral and other considerations, they declared that: "Commercially, division of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept. Present prosperity of Manila depends on its being natural center of import and export trade for the whole group. Large part of its business derived from Iloilo, Cebu, and other points south. To yield these to unfriendly rivals would be to provide beforehand for diversion of business from our own possessions."(11) Mr.Day's recommendation was to secure Luzon and adjacent islands for "strategic advantage," leaving the rest to Spain

provided she agreed to a "treaty stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the United States. Mr.Gray opposed annexation of the Philippines on the ground of being a reversal of accepted continental policy of the United States and might prove more disastrous in the end than the material benefits claimed. "But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon . . . . the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world . . . . for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed." (12) The same opinions were re-iterated in a message sent to Mr.Hay on November 11 expressing the individual recommendations of the commissioners, Mr.Moore taking occasion for the first time to join in the demand for a "naval and commercial base in the Far East."

Mr.Hay replied to Mr.Day next day. The content is quoted in full, as follows:(13)

> "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responisbility."

Thus the last stage in the demand for the entire Philippine archipelago was reached by the administration on October 26.

How the President finally came to this decision will always be an interesting subject for study on the part of the curious and the historian. There is the President's own statement as told in an interview he had with General James F.Rusling, Bishop Thomas Bowman, Bishop John F.Hurst, Dr.Samuel Upham and Dr.John M.Buckley, all members of the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church then in session in the city of Washington on or about November 21, 1899, when the interview with the President took place. The Christian Advocate printed an account of the interview on January 22, 1903 and Mr.Olcott, one of the recent biographers of President McKinley, quotes it in full on pages 109-111, Vol.II of his book. The substance of this statement - according to General Rusling, is that the President,inspired by a zeal to "uplift and civilize and Christianize" the Filipinos, then decided to ask for the entire islands. Perhaps the whole truth will never be known. There is no doubt, however, that the opinions of Admiral Dewey, Generals Merritt and Greene, Mr.Foreman and, especially, of Consul Andre, so we are told, who were all on the spot in question and undoubtedly knew conditions had very decisive effect in the mind of the President.

The demand for the entire Philippine archipelago was

presented by the American peace commissioners on October 27. The Spanish commissioners stoutly resisted such a demand on the ground that no government could live in Spain which accepted such sacrifice. Even the American commissioners felt surprised for on November 3 Mr.Day cabled Mr.Adee that American demand can not be based on conquest. Followed a prolonged argument and discussion as to the nature of the occupation of Manila by the American forces, whether it rested by virtue of the protocol of August 12 or the military occupation of August 13. For a time the Spanish commissioners threatened to break off negotiations completely. Finally, on November 29 they were brought to accept the American demand regarding the Philippines after concession has been given by the United States regarding compensations. The President cabled his thanks to the commissioners on the same day. Spain agreed to relinquish the Philippine Islands to the United States upon payment by the latter of the sum of $20,000,000.

References For Chapter IV

1. President's Message and Foreign Relations, No.1, 1898, 55th Congress, 3d Session, 1898-9, p.819. (House Documents Vol.1.)
2. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, Vol.II, p.63.
3. Ibid., p.66.
4. President's Message and Foreign Relations, Op.Cit., p.821.
5. Ibid., p.823.
6. Ibid., pp.823-4.
7. Ibid., p.824.
8. Ibid., p.907.
9. Ibid., pp.918-22.
10. Olcott, Op.Cit., pp.107-8.
11. President's Message and Foreign Relations, Op.Cit., p.933.
12. Ibid., p.935.
13. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

The Battle For Ratification

"The struggle in the Senate over the ratification of the treaty," says Olcott, "marked one of the most critical periods in the administration of President McKinley. The sudden acquisition of great possessions in Asiatic territory brought new problems which could not be readily grasped nor their real significance foreseen."(1) This statement is repeated here with certain reservations. If the American people "could not readily grasp . . . . the sudden acquisition of great possessions in Asiatic territory," such was not the case with the men in Washington. "I send you," wrote Roosevelt to Lodge, "an advance copy of a poem of Kipling(2) which is rather poor peotry, but good sense from the expansion standpoint."(3) On January 12, 1899, he again wrote to Lodge, to wit: "On thinking matters over, it seemed to me it might help if the New York legislature passed a resolution in favor of the treaty."(4) About the close of 1898 President McKinley started on a tour in the middle west to win popular support in favor of the ratification of the peace treaty with Spain. And we shall see how a small group of men, fired by zeal and endowed with all the gifts of eloquence and persuasion, were able to bring popular pressure that became "insistent" when certain Senators showed signs of weakening.

At a banquet of the Board of Trade and Associated Citizens of Savanah, Georgia, December 17, 1898, President McKinley said: "If, following the clear precepts of duty, territory falls to us, and the welfare of an alien people requires our guidance and protection, who will shrink from the responsibility, grave though it may be? (Applause) Can we leave these people, who, by the fortunes of war and our own acts(very true), are helpless and without a government(?), to chaos and anarchy, after we have destroyed the only government they have had?"(5) (Applause) Perhaps it never occured to the President nor to the audience that it was not necessary to destroy that government. "Having destroyed that government," he continued, "it is the duty of the American people to provide for them a better one." (Applause) This was an appeal to their sense of duty, or responsibility, or whatever that may be. But that was not enough. "Dewey and Merritt," proceeded the President, "took them (Great Applause), and the country instantly and universally applauded. Could we have brought Dewey away without universal condemnation at any time from the first of May, the day of his brilliant victory which thrilled the world with its boldness and heroism? (Great Applause) Was it right to order Dewey to go to Manila and capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and despatch Merritt and his army to re-enforce him? (Cries of "Yes!" Great Applause) Then the President quoted a poem of Bryant, viz.:

"Thou my country, thou shalt never fall --
Seas and stormy air
Are the wide barrier of thy borders, where
Among thy gallant sons that guard the well
Thou laugh'st at enemies who shall then declare
The date of thy deep-funded strength, or tell
How happy, in thy lap, the sons of men shall dwell."(6)

President McKinley's western tour was a virtual triumphal progress. He brought all the powers of his persuasion and eloquence into play, appealing to the pride, vanity, and sense of duty of a people that had just recently tasted the sweets of world admiration. The glorious victory of Manila Bay, the famous cruise of the "Oregon", what themes indeed to thrill the common multitude!

In the Senate the ratification of the treaty excluded every other problem for the time being. Constitutional questions had to be explained and moral scruples satisfied. No less important was its probable effect upon the coming elections, the Republicans espousing heart and soul the annexation of the Philippines while the Democrats as strongly opposed. Around these questions were gathered various groups representing shades and varieties of opinion. Three groups could be fairly distinguished. There were the avowed imperialists and expansionists led by Lodge, Spooner, Foraker and Platt, all Republicans; the opposition and anti-imperialists taking their

cue and inspiration from Hoar, Carl Schurz and ex-President Harrison; while a third group, men of the type of Mason, McEnery, Bacon and Allen occupied the twilight zone between the two former groups. The first was a compact organization, acting with cohesion and discipline under the masterful guidance of President McKinley, Lodge and Roosevelt; the second and third group were united for the time being only in their vocal opposition, but lacked that unity and determination of purpose essential to victory.

Senator Hoar, who led the attack on the constitutional right of the United States to acquire colonies, based his arguments on the consent of the governed and the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Reading the debates in the Congressional Record as the Senator from Massachussetts declaimed his ponderous arguments one gets the painful impression that the Senator was hopelessly out of the times. There were moments, however, when the earnestness and eloquence of Senator Hoar created a profound impression. But this was only temporary. Senator Foraker brushed aside contemptuously the arguments of Senator Hoar by referring him to the series of territorial acquisitions since the Louisiana purchase. He taunted the Senator for having voted in favor of Hawaiian annexation. Did his constitutional scruples deter the Senator from Massachussetts in the case of Hawaii. Pray, why then object to the acquisition of the Philippine Islands?

"Mr.President," concluded Senator Foraker, "the trouble with these gentlemen is that they are talking about a theory instead of a condition that exists. What is the practical condition about which we are concerned, and what have senators on the other side offered for the solution of the situation? We had a war with Spain; I need not recount why. The fortunes of war carried us to the Philippines. When the war ended, those islands either had to be returned to Spain or they had to be taken by other nations, as other nations might see fit to take them, or the people of those islands had to be left in a state of anarchy, without government - for they had none then and have none yet - or else they have to be taken by the United States."(7)

The arguments of Senator Foraker showed the principal weakness of the opposition. The latter based their contention on a principle of right and the potency of an instrument which no longer possessed the power to render justice especially, as in this instance, when an alien people was involved. Practical and hard-headed business men in the Senate looked grave and nodded their heads but remained as stanch in their conviction that what is expedient is moral. Senator Hoar and his followers, whose sincerity and earnestness is beyond doubt, nevertheless, were placed in a very difficult position of obstructing the only possible solution to a grave problem, without themselves being able to present a substitute. The doctrine of the consent of the governed became a farce when Senator Mason declaimed: "You cannot govern the Philippines without taxing them.

You have not yet their consent to tax them. You propose again to tax without representation. Look out for tea parties. These semi-social functions are liable to occur, for Yankee Doodle and Dixie and the Star-Spangled Banner have been heard in the Archipelago."(8)

Strangely enough misgivings as to the morality of the transaction aroused the greatest interest. Senator Bacon asked what the difference was that made necessary a settlement with regards to the Philippines different from that of Cuba. "Just this, Mr.President," responded Senator Foraker, "In the case of Cuba there was no complication whatever involving any other power except only the powers of Spain and the United States, and in the case of the Philippines Islands there were complications which I cannot speak of here in this open chamber with propriety." (9) This explanation was not convincing to some Senators. As Senator Mason put it: "Tell me why we should adopt one plan for Cuba and another for the Philippines. Do you say with the explosionists - I mean the expansionists - 'we promised we would not steal Cuba, but we did not promise to steal the Philippines?' Do you say with Shylock, 'Is is so nominated in the bond?' . . . . Will you tell me please, how grand larceny and criminal aggression in Cuba become high Christian civilization in the Philippines? Is there some place in the Pacific Ocean where we change the code of ethics and good morals as we change the calendar and the ships' clock in crossing?"(10)

The reference to foreign complications made by Senator Foraker evoked further discussion in the Senate. Senator Mason asked why a similar declaration as that contained in the Teller Amendment would not be advisable in the case of the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty.

Senator Teller: "I wanted it (the Teller Amendment) for its effect upon Europe. I wanted it as a guarantee to them of what we are declaring we are going to do."

Senator Mason: "Is there any less reason for giving the guarantee of good faith to European nations now than there was when we passed your resolution?"

Senator Teller: "The European nations have nothing to do with the question now. They are not interfering; they are entirely satisfied to let us do as we will."

Senator Mason: "What had they to do in the other case?"

Senator Teller: "They were threatening intervention, as the Senator knows."

Senator Mason: "Is it not true, as stated by everyone who has spoken on your side, that they are threatening intervention now?"

Senator Teller: "No, they are not."

Senator Mason: "The German ships are not there?"

Senator Teller: "Germany is not threatening intervention and will not intervene so long as we are in possession or indicate that we want to remain in possession. The conditions are entirely different." (11)

An interesting sidelight on the events of this period which persistently confronts the student of history is the extent of England's influence in the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States. There were rumors and counter-rumors of an alliance of the two English-speaking peoples in order to offset the aggressions of the continental powers in the Far East.

The British government and public were decidedly sympathetic to the American cause and it is beyond dispute that it was this friendly attitude that chilled any project of intervention that may have been contemplated by the European nations at this time. "Why is it?" asked Senator Bacon during the debate on his resolution on the floor of the Senate on January 18. It was in order "to back up Great Britain's policy in the Far East by retaining the most important base of operations in the event of war over China," declared the Senator in answer to his own question.

While some Senators discussed principles of right and morality, a considerable number looked upon the annexation of the Philippines as a purely business transaction. As Senator Tillman said three days before the ratification of the treaty: "The commercial instinct which seeks to furnish a market and places for the growth of commerce or the investment of capital for the money-making of the few, is pressing this country madly to the final and ultimate annexation of these people regardless of their own wishes and at whatever cost to them or us."(12) Senator Allen spoke of the "great gang of agents" sent to the Philippine Islands by the "money power" to search for "gold mines and silver mines and copper mines." "If we have these islands with their tropical productions, which are our main imports," declared Senator Stewart, "we shall have the balance of trade in our favor. Heretofore, it has been against us, owing to the importations of tropical products, such as sugar, coffee, and tobacco."(13)

Warnings against the dangers of the commercial instinct were not lacking. "How far," asked Senator Bacon, "will that be carried? We want the trade of the world, and we intend to have our share of it. Are we, therefore, to obtain it by carrying this doctrine of expansion to the uttermost parts of the earth? If territorial expansion means national trade, where are we going to stop?"(14)

On January 26 Senator Mason moved to have printed in the records a number of articles published in newspapers representing various sections of the country against the acquisition of the Philippines on commercial grounds. The Maine Farmer, Augusta, said:"The proposed expansion means endless and vexing foreign complications; vast expenditures of fortifications; large increase of army and navy; great waste of life and treasure; dangerous increment of political corruption in the foolish effort to ingraft a colonial policy upon our system, and enormously increased taxation."(15) The Practical Farmer, Philadelphia, said: "To us imperialism, so far as the agricultural interests of this country are concerned, appears to be an evil . . . . Certainly the agricultural interests of the United States should earnestly protest against any policy and the passage of any laws which would place the slavish coolie labor of Hawaii and the Philippines . . . . on an equality with Northern and Southern labor , and drive our products out of our own markets."(16) The Rural New Yorker, New York, saw

humor in the proposed annexation and voiced its opposition in the following verse(doggerel!):(17)

"What's this I hear? Australia has the job of selling sheep?
To feed our Yankee boys in blue? That makes my dander creep!
See here, young man, is this thing true? Is this here sale a fact?
If 'tis, I'll put my glasses on and read the riot act,
What do I hire you for, young man, How do you earn your pay?
To set and let Australia feed them sailors while you play?
No, sir; not by a darn sight - You help this country's trade,
And Yankee farmers pay the tax with which you folks are paid.
Confound your big "expansion" and your darn old "open door,"
If that's a sample of it, don't give us anymore."

Other arguments for and against, such as the sentimental and religious motives, also played a prominent part in the debates in the Senate. How far these influenced their votes is very difficult to determine. To those who are inclined to accept the material interpretation of human actions, the commercial motive would seem to have played the dominant part. It would be truer to say, perhaps, that these learned and sophisticated men in the Senate, in contrast to the great multitude outside who are swayed by sentiment, much as they waxed eloquent over moral and sentimental considerations were finally induced in their actions by the practical dictates of the hour. "Manifest Destiny" was bandied back and forth, others solemnly declared that "wherever the flag is raised there let it float forever." As for the religious or missionary argument, some intimation as to its influence in the Senate may be gleaned from the words of Senator Tillman, viz.: "We are a christian people and our

missionaries or those imbued with the missionary spirit, clamor for the annexation of those islands for the purpose of shedding over them the light of the gospel. We are asked to do as Mahomet did with his creed - carry the Christian religion to these people upon the point of a bayonet, as he spread Islamism over Western Asia and Eastern Europe and Northern Africa on his scimitar."(18)

As the day for voting on the treaty drew near, the practical consideration overshadowed all the moral and sentimental arguments against the treaty. "There ought to be no attempt now, Mr. President," said Senator Spooner, "to mystify or obscure that situation. We go forward from today upon the theory that by this treaty and the acceptance of this cession the United States has succeeded to the title of Spain and the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Archipelago."(19) More effective were the arguments of Senator Lodge. "Suppose," he said, "we reject the treaty or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That will hand the islands back to Spain; and I cannot conceive that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we reject the treaty; what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the re-establishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world,

and the repudiation of the President in such a matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of the civilized mankind and brands us as a people incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the greatestof the world powers. . . . The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain with bated breath, 'I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been toovictorious, and that you have yielded us too much, and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from you.' I do not think that any American President would do that, or that any American would wish him to."(20)

Senator Lodge's arguments had the desired effect. They made certain the ratification of the treaty.

Nevertheless, we can not help thinking that the sentiment of the Senate and the public at large was better expressed in the words of Senator Mason, to wit:(21)

> "In the contemplation of the heroic work of Dewey and the Army and Navy we have grown so heroic that we know not where to stop; and in love of power we have forgotten the high purpose and the lofty plan upon which the declaration of war was founded."

References For Chapter V

1. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, Vol.II, p.136.

2. "The White Man's Burden."

3. Roosevelt to Lodge, January 12, 1899, Selections from Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, Vol.I, p.384. The italics are mine.

4. Ibid., p.388. Resolutions urging the ratification of the treaty were sent to the Senate by the legislatures of the States of Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming and Oregon.

5. Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900, pp.174-5.

6. Ibid.

7. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.I, p.571. January 11, 1899.

8. Ibid., p.529. January 10, 1899.

9. Ibid., p.572. January 11, 1899.

10. Ibid., p.531. January 10, 1899.

11. Ibid., p.921ff. January 23, 1899.

12. Congressional Record, 55 th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.II, p.1532. February 11, 1899.

13. Ibid., p.1736.

14. Ibid., p.1489ff.

15. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.I, p.1064ff.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Congressional Record, 55th Congress - 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.II, p.1532, February 7, 1899.

19. Ibid., p.1492. February 6, 1899.

20. Olcott, Op.Cit., pp.138-9. See also Storey and Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines, p.80ff.

21. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.I, p.528ff. January 7, 1899.

CHAPTER VI

"The White Man's Burden"

That the ratification of the treaty of peace by the Senate was conceded even by the opponents of annexation was shown by the feverish haste of their last-minute rally. No less than six resolutions were introduced, varying in sense from an attempt to commit this country to a pledge to set the Philippines free, "when a stable and independent government shall have been established therein," to a declaration that they shall not be incorporated into the United States nor shall the inhabitants become citizens thereof. Senator McEnery's resolution, as amended by Senator Bacon, was the most comprehensive, viz: (1)

> "Resolved, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgement of the government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the Islands to their people."

Immediately, an outcry arose against this resolution. Vainly did Senator Caffery explain that it "provides for nothing more than a protectorate coupled with sovereignty on the part of the United States . . . . That gives us the power to alienate them, to sell them, to dispose of them in any manner, shape of form that suits the prevailing majority in the Congress

of the United States. . . . In other words, it is a despotic protectorate, without any guarantee of independent self-government whatever upon the part of the United States toward these people. They are only to be educated up to what we are pleased to term local self-government, and in due time we are to make such disposition of them as will best promote, first, the interests of the citizens of the United States, and then the people of the Philippine Islands - our interest primary, paramount all the time, without any consideration whatever of the wishes of those people."(2) "I do not propose by my vote," declared Senator Cray with vehemence, "to surrender to Tagals whose guns are pointed at General Otis' army . . . ."(3) "Why shall we make promises to Filipinos," asked Senator Lindsay, "who are shooting down our soldiers today, which we did not make and have not made and have not been asked to make to the Cubans, who have been our friends all the while?"(4)

President McKinley never doubted for a moment that the treaty would be ratified by the Senate. On December 21, he issued a proclamation which was broadcasted by the American military forces in the Philippines. After stating in plain language that the Philippine Islands were acquired by right of conquest, it declared that "the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine islands are ceded to the United States" by Spain. In other words, possessory right by conquest was confirmed by act of cession

on the part of the Spanish Government. Let us follow the rest of the proclamation, as follows: "In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty," it said, "thus acquired and the responsible obligations thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory."(5) An effort was made to win the peaceful submission of the Filipinos "by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of 'benevolent assimilation' substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule." Should the Filipinos resist this policy of 'benevolent assimilation', "they will be brought within the lawful rule . . . . with firmness if need be . . . ." Thus concluded this curious mixture of cajolery and intimidation.

Senator Caffery aptly characterized the President's proclamation on the floor of the Senate as assimilation "after the manner of the anaconda that swallows its victim." There is also a very noticeable change in the tone and wording of this proclamation as compared with the Presidents former pronouncements. It was matter of fact, terse and firm. No

longer was it necessary to preface it with: we didn't want them, don't you see? Now he merely announced: we got them, what are you going to do about it?

The promulgation of this proclamation finally convinced the Filipinos that the United States was determined upon their conquest. A petty deception practiced by General Otis by omitting the words "sovereignty" and "immediate extension of authority" in the President's proclamation which the general caused to be broadcasted heightened their distrust and suspicion. The tension between two hostile forces facing each other at Manila was bound to result in actual clash of arms.(6) The fateful event took place on February 4, 1899, two days before the ratification of the treaty in the Senate.

Responsibility as to who fired the first shot and thus started the war is still a matter of controversy. However, the consequences thereby had now become historical facts. The exponents of annexation were able to point to it as an act of treachery, of rebellion against the constituted authority of the United States. The treaty ceded the Philippines to the United States and it was theirs to rule. Would Senators obstruct the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain while their soldiers are being shot down by the "insurgents" and the flag insulted? No! no! and Senators squirmed in their chairs.

It has been whispered in various quarters that hostilities were begun at the instigation of the administration with the

aim in view of influencing the decision of the Senate. Senator Patterson said: "That attack of February 4 and 5 became an absolute necessity for the success of the imperialist marplots at Washington. The treaty was before the Senate. It had been agreed that a vote upon it would be taken on February 6. It was known to everyone that there were lacking two votes of the number required to ratify it. The Filipinos were praying that its ratification would be defeated, for then the treaty would be amended so that Spain would relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines as it provided for Cuba. The Filipinos had all to gain by preserving the status of the armies as it was before February 6. The imperialists had everything to gain by precipitating a conflict."(7)

On the other hand, Senator Spooner characterized the affair as a "premeditated and wanton" attack by the Filipinos upon the American forces. The rather foolish and precipitate flight of Agoncillo, representative of the Filipino government in Washington at the time, furnished an excellent circumstantial evidence for Senator Spooner's charge. "Yesterday morning, Mr.President," he said, "until a cablegram was received from Manila, neither the President nor anyone in this country had the least suspicion, so far as I know, of any purpose over there to attack Manila, to attack our outposts, to bring on an engagement with our troops. Saturday night, many hours before we learned of the attack at Manila

Agoncillo and his associates, who have been spending some time in the city of Washington, whom our Department has properly refused to recognize 'folded their tents like the Arabs and silently stole away' to Canada. Some one may be able to find some satisfactory explanation of that consistent with the theory that Agoncillo did not know of this proposed attack, but have not been able to do so."(8)

The United States, however, must shoulder the responsibility. As Senator Caffery put it: "Very well. I say that on account of the relations that have existed between these people and the United States such occurence, although deplorable, was likely to happen. We are there as conquerors. We did not bear the message of peace and kindness to these people. We bore the message of subjugation to these people."(9)

The voting on the treaty was set for February 6. Tension increased as the fateful day approached. Party leaders lined up their charges, urging, cajoling and threatening when this became necessary. Every weapon of political strategy and tactics was employed. The opponents of annexation tried to have a vote on the various resolutions introduced but of no avail. Senator Hoar's resolution to the effect that the United States had no power under the constitution to acquire colonies was tabled after two adverse votes. The McEnery resolution met the same fate. Votes were bargained like pieces of merchandise. Senator Allen vigorously denied that he promised to

vote in favor of the treaty upon the promise of the administration to secure his re-election in Nebraska.(10) Senator Tillman openly declared on the floor of the Senate that "a great many of the votes have gone to the treaty . . . . have been cast by men who have been in great doubt as to their duty, and have at last yielded to pressure than to any conscientious or calm consideration of the result."(11) Even Senator McEnery voted for the treaty in the end.

The vote on the treaty stood 57 for and 27 against. The closeness of the vote indicates a narrow escape for the administration. It is not probable, however, that the result could have been otherwise. The sentiment for annexation was too strong to be defeated at the time, and the circumstances more than providentially favorable. The real decisive factor, however, was the beginning of the war with the Filipinos whom Americans, at the time, regarded as rebels against the United States and even the most obdurate anti-imperialists were hard put to squaring their opposition with their sense of duty.

Mr.Bryan was mainly responsible for the ratification of the treaty. He urged his personal followers in the Democratic party to ratify the treaty. If his opposition to annexation was sincere, for once his political sagacity failed him. Explaining his conduct in this instance, he said: "The ratification of the treaty instead of commiting the United States to a colonial policy really clears the way for the recognition of

the Philippine Republic . . . . Could the independence of the Filipinos be secured more easily by diplomacy from a foreign and hostile nation than it can through the laws passed by Congress and voicing the sentiments of the American people? If independence is more desirable to our people than a colonial policy, who is there and what is there to prevent the recognition of Philippine independence? It is absurd to say that the United States can be transformed from a republic to an empire without consulting the voters." (12) How the great Commoner came to this strange conclusion perhaps sone one of his future biographers will be able to explain.

We have seen how the battle in the Senate over the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain centered principally over the annexation of the Philippine Islands. We have also seen how the "logic of events," strengthened by considerations of practical expediency, pointed to the one and only solution. The group of men who led the fight in favor of the treaty did not only succed in silencing all opposition, but were actually able to build up a philosophy that made the acquisition of the Philippines a moral and sacred duty. And as though in answer to what the statesmen and the public had been groping for, there appeared in one of the magazines Kipling's famous poem: "The White Man's Burden."

Strange to tell, however, this poem was read in the Senate the day after the ratification of the treaty. And what is

even more strange is that it was read as an argument, too late to be sure, against the acquisition of the Philippines. Senator Tillman read the first stanza, as follows:(13)

"Take up the White Man's Burden --
Send forth the best ye breed --
Go, bind your sons to exile,
To serve your captives' need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild --
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child."

"Why do we as a people," he asked, "want to incorporate into citizenship ten millions more of different or of differing races, three or four of them?" Reads second stanza:

"Take up the white man's burden --
No iron rule of kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper --
The tale of common things.
The ports ye shall not enter,
The roads ye shall not tread,
Go, make them with your living
And make them with your dead."

Now, he asked, "How many more victims are we to offer up on this altar of mammon or national greed?" Reads last stanza:

"Take up the White Man's Burden --
And reap his old reward --
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard --
The cry of hosts ye humor
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light --
'Why brought ye us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?'"

"Those peoples," Senator Tillman concluded, "are not suited to our institutions. They are not ready for liberty as we understand it. Why are we bent on forcing upon them a civil-

ization not suited to them and which only means in their view degradation and a loss of self-respect, which is worse than the loss of life itself?"

During the closing years of the nineteenth century when war with Spain over Cuba appeared certain the Philippine Islands suddenly became important in the eyes of the United States government. American interest in this section of the world was by no means recent, however. Partly due to trade and partly as a result of its own territorial expansion to the Pacific Ocean, the United States had manifested great concern in the affairs of the Far East in the last half of this century. The partition of China which appeared imminent in the last decade of this century, synchronizing as it did with the industrial and commercial expansion of the United States, made it imperative that this country secure a "base" on or off the Asiatic mainland to protect its trade in this part of the wrold. Perhaps, when the war with Spain finally broke out this country had no intention of aggression in the Philippine Islands. The brilliant victory of Dewey, however, coupled with its glamor and its significance for the future created a demand for annexation which finally became irresistible.

References For Chapter VI

1. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.II, p.1479. February 6, 1899.

2. Ibid., p.1490.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol.14, p.

6. Dean C.Worcester in his book "The Philippines Past and Present," 2 volumes, presents an immense amount of evidence in his work in an attempt to prove that the Filipinos precipitated the conflict. See Blount's The American Occupation of the Philippines for the other side of the argument.

7. Storey and Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines, p.96.

8. Congressional Record, 55th Congress 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.II, p.1493. February 6, 1899.

9. Ibid., p.1491.

10. Ibid., p.1480.

11. Ibid., p.1530.

12. Storey and Lichauco, Op.Cit., p.83.

13. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Vol.32, Pt.II, p.1532.

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