

THE UTILITY OF THE FORMER GERMAN COLONIES AND THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE RETURN OF THEM

by

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
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THE PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS IN GERMAN COLONIAL EXPANSION

An understanding of the colonial policies of nations today, and especially in relation to Germany's position, could not be complete without some attention being devoted to the historical aspects of German colonial efforts and achievements. In the story of the German colonies, from the first individual commercial enterprises in Africa through the fateful clauses of Versailles, can be found many factors explaining German actions today. Certainly an Empire that was founded, developed and lost in the space of an individual lifetime is of something more than passing interest.

In this discussion, however, the historical aspect must be studied only for the purpose of orientation, and will be subordinated wholly to the larger issues in question. For the same reasons the material in this section is gathered from the investigations of those who have worked in the field, not upon the writer's own research.

Colonization, in its broadest sense, meaning migration to adjacent territory, has been of importance throughout German history. Germany has never had any natural boundaries and has overflowed repeatedly into Eastern, Central and Western Europe. Colonization, in the sense in which we are to use it, that of economic imperialism, dates mainly from the second half of the 15th Century.

In the strictly economic sense of colonization, the Hanseatic

League should be mentioned. This movement began at Wisley, on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea, as a Guild of German Traders. In 1287 the association included many German cities and its rules became binding upon them. It also established trading stations in Norway, Iceland, Flanders and England. The German Hansa finally emerged in Germany itself, incorporating the other associations and including over seventy towns, divided into the Wiendish, the Saxon, the Westphalian, and the Prussian towns.

The principal region of activity of the Hanseatic League was the Baltic, and one of its chief purposes was to gain concessions and trading rights from those princes whose lands bordered the Baltic. It did not promote colonization, meaning settlement, in any sense whatsoever, even in the undeveloped Baltic lands, but carried on only a purely commercial policy. However this commercial expansion carried German civilization far afield and might well have prepared the way for an extended political expansion, had not a centralized dynastic nationalism arisen in the Scandinavian Countries and England to combat it.

Premature efforts of private trading firms marked the first half of the 16th century, the firms of Welsers and Fuggers setting up trading factories and securing trading privileges in Spain, Venezuela, the Antilles and West Africa, but all failed.

Colonization in terms of state-directed colonial policy pursued for both political and economic ends began largely under the Great Elector. This head of the House of Prussia was alive to the Hansa

tradition and wished to foster both maritime and colonial tradition. He established an East Indies, and an African commercial company, and gained protectorates, concessions and ports from several countries. Though his successors attempted to carry on his policies, they met with less success and more complications, and Prussian efforts ended in 1775 so far as any material results could demonstrate. Her gains were gradually all lost and she disappeared from Africa in 1725. Thus, though Prussian aims and ambitions outstripped her achievements, the early Hohenzollerns contributed the idea, if not the successful practice, of a state-directed commercial and colonial policy to German colonial history.

The reasons for the failure of this early official effort may be seen in the efforts of private endeavor to secure economic access to undeveloped regions for purposes of individual exploitation. This was opposed to any governmental policy. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism in the German States among the many German princes weakened the shadowy colonial empire; the dangerous rising nationalism of the other nations of Europe, the disintegrating forces of Protestantism and Particularism, and the destruction of the Thirty Years War all contributed to the failure during this period. "Individual efforts of the Middle Ages had failed for the lack of a strong, central, national government. The state-directed efforts of the early Hohenzollerns had failed for lack of a strong economic middle class. Not until these two were united could Germany hope to achieve a real colonial policy."¹

1. Mary E. Townshend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), ch. I, p. 28.

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In 1815 conditions were favorable for German entrance into the colonial field as far as the international picture went. France was out of the race and England for the time, was sated, whereas the Germans were experiencing the desire for national expansion and the feeling of national consciousness to some extent. Nevertheless, Germany again possessed no government strong enough, nor economic basis stable enough, to take advantage of the situation. The German Confederation was not fitted to embark upon any official colonial policy. Hence, it was left to individual effort and achievement of every kind to prepare the way for the ultimate acquisition of the colonial empire of pre-war days.

It has been often said that England built up her colonial empire in "a fit of absentmindedness". That is, with a lack of any pre-conceived plan, in accordance with the English characteristic to construct the policy to fit the facts. In Germany, however, the first phase of colonial movement was a theory, and an idea which was born and grew in a doctrinaire and abstract way.¹ Publicists of all kinds, political economists, historians, scientists and explorers pointed out the necessities and advantages of colonial expansion, with Treitschke, List, von Humboldt, and Duden as leaders. Their writings and influence created a colonial cult in accordance with the German practice of formu-

1. Mary E. Townshend, "Origins of Modern German Colonialism", Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922), LXXVIII, p. 46.

lating, a priori, an abstract theory as a guide to practice.¹

Commercial establishments and exploitation were the most effective forces encouraging colonial activity for the next period. German trade began to enter world trade by 1830; the old commercial centers of the Rhine and Hanse towns felt renewed activity, and demanded colonies, not for settlement but for economic development. The Hamburg firms of Witt, Busch, Geiser and especially Woermann, set up trading factories in West Africa, Liberia, and Kamerun. Their influence was also important in the South Seas trade. These activities were the first symptoms of an unorganized and inarticulate colonial policy. But this was not comprehended to any large extent by the German people, while the official attitude of the German states remained indifferent and efforts to get state action failed. It must be said, however, that the vigorous campaign promoted by these colonial firms to secure government protection and to further cause of expansion, created a situation requiring a response, having actual achievements, not abstract doctrine to argue for it. The commercial colonialists vitalized the colonial question, rescued it from the realms of theoretical debate and made it a practical, live reality with which the government was forced to reckon.

With the advent of the Bismarckian era, the situation began to change. The triumphs culminating in the Treaty of Frankfurt, brought

1. M. B. Tomshend, Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930), Ch. 2, p. 36.

forth a united Germany, with a high degree of nationalistic feeling and patriotism. The imperial officials demanded colonial bases as a background for naval growth, which, in turn, backed the demands of the growing German trade for naval protection. The industrial revolution was coming into its own in Germany at this time, with abnormally inflated production demanding markets, and the mushroom industries clamoring for raw materials. However, even in 1871, German public opinion was not generally favorable to colonial policy, because of probable friction with other colonial Powers and consequent interference with German security at home. The practical statesmen of the day were too conservative to appreciate the possibilities of the colonial movement, while the prevailing economic doctrine of *laissez-faire* was opposed to colonialism generally.

At this point it is well to consider the position of Bismark in regard to a colonial policy. He is generally spoken of as an anti-expansionist or at least a late convert to colonization. Historians and biographers assert that he was emphatically opposed to any policy of colonial expansion in any form whatsoever until it was forced upon him by the activities of the merchant class. As proof of this point of view they can quote Bismark's own speeches which emphatically deny any sympathy with oversea expansion. Furthermore, his official acts, directed against encouragement of a colonial policy by groups within the empire and the rejection of proposals for colonial establishment several times during his period of dominance strengthened that opinion. His one overruling aim was to establish the security of Germany in

Europe, and the popular theory is that he discounted or ignored the value of colonization in order to concentrate entirely upon this task. That this was not the case, however, is evident in the results of his diplomacy throughout the next twenty five years. Statesman as he was, he sensed the rising tide of economic imperialism and realized that without overseas expansion Germany could not hope to compete with other nations, and that she must foster colonization in order to secure and maintain a position of supremacy in Europe. A German official in this country, commenting upon an editorial in one of our leading newspapers which confirmed the popular attitude toward Bismarckian policy, emphatically refutes that opinion. He holds that though Bismark devoted the first decades of his work to the creation of a united German Reich, he realized in later years the need of colonies for his industrialized country to such an extent as to become the creator of the German colonial possessions. His statement that "the German colonies were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier" was made in 1876 with regard to a then existing Balkan dispute and was an expression of unwillingness to mangle in other countries affairs to the detriment of Germany.¹

The period from 1871 to 1876 was one of watchful waiting. Bismark showed a decided unwillingness to encourage any colonial undertaking. He rejected the French proffered colonies in 1871 and the demands of colonial merchants at home and abroad to establish protectorates,

1. New York Times, (Feb. 14, 1937), 18:7. Also see Round Table, XXVII, (December, 1936), pp. 106-109.

as well as the requests of native rulers for similar establishments. This official repudiation of colonial aspirations did not mean neglect altogether of opportunities for trade protection. Though rejecting the proposals for protectorates, he established postal and consular service for private colonizers. This course was the only wise one to pursue at the time. Engrossed, as he was, in the task of unifying and centralizing the empire, and allied politically with the National Liberals who opposed colonial expansion, no other course was expedient. Moreover, his policy of isolating France and fostering the friendships of England would prevent any colonial venture liable to come into conflict with English colonial policies or England's free trade principles. German expansion could only be carried on with Britain's cooperation. The whole policy of Bismarck during this period, when clearly analyzed, seems to imply a promise, a postponement, rather than a rejection of imperial expansion.¹

Beginning in 1876, a policy of protection of commercial enterprises abroad was begun, and up to 1884 the Chancellor appeared to play a double game. He quietly pursued a policy of encouraging colonial activity and endeavored to create public opinion on favor of it without appearing to do so, while at the same time publicly repudiating it to prevent the resentment of the Great Powers. It was thus a subordina-

¹ Mary E. Townshend, The Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930), Ch. 3, p. 67.

tion of colonial policy to foreign policy. A series of commercial treaties between 1876 and 1879 were consummated which marked active protection of oversea traders. Though officially it was declared that the government contemplated no attempts to secure colonies but only trade protection, the overseas trade protection and the endorsement of acquisition of naval stations was the inevitable introduction to annexation of territory.

In 1878 the liberal era in German politics ended, with Bismark breaking with the Liberals and reversing the fiscal system from free trade to protectivism. In 1879 he projected a plan for colonial encouragement in the Reichstag, though not labeled as such, signaled by the introduction of the Samoan Subsidy Bill providing for the underwriting German trading interests in Samoa to prevent them from falling into foreign hands and lowering German prestige in the South Seas. Though the true issue was camouflaged by appeals to national patriotism to protect German trade and prestige, the attacks on the bill centered on the colonial issue, and its failure in the Reichstag convinced Bismark that a policy of colonial expansion was not acceptable to the country yet. He voiced his true position, however, in the official press as follows: " . . . The Samoan Subsidy was a prelude to German colonial policy and the first practical expression of it. Neither the enemies of our greatness, nor the doctrines of the Manchester school, will succeed in preventing Germany from embarking upon that course which other nations have followed to advantage."¹ In practice however, he

1. Ibid. quoted, p. 74.

was forced to fall back on the policy of double dealing.

The domestic situation was gradually changing during this period in favor of encouraging colonial activity with a national colonial impulse arising, and with propagandists working up the feeling of the younger generation. The German colonial party founded the Kolonialverein in 1882, which soon gained large and influential membership and enlisted the aid of industrialists and trading concerns to agitate for colonial expansion. The international situation was greatly changed also, less dependence upon England and improved relations with France serving to strengthen Germany's position in Europe. The Chancellor seized the opportunity by encouraging anti-British feeling at home and made sharp protests against English non-protection of German interests in English spheres of influence in Africa. The evasive replies of England to his questions as to whether England would protect German interests in Southwest Africa, led him to declare on April 24, 1884, that the German settlements in Southwest Africa were under Imperial protection, and he thus created the first link in the German Colonial Empire.

During the next four years the remainder of the German colonial empire was to be constituted. The territory in southwest Africa, already mentioned, was secured in 1883 when the Bremen merchant, Luderitz, acquired the southern portion, from Angra Pequena to the Orange River, from a native chief. The official claim by Bismark extended the limits of the territory along the coast to the Portuguese territory at the mouth of the Cunene River. From 1884 to 1890 the Germans penetrated

to the desert of Kalahari and established the boundary with Great Britain on the edge of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In Togoland the Germans first gained concessions on the coast on the Little Popo Island. In 1884 Bismarck sent official orders to Dr. Nachtigal, an explorer whom he had appointed as consul to West Africa, to place certain districts there under imperial protection. As a result of his prompt action, Bismarck, in October, 1884, announced that the districts of Little Popo in Togoland were under German protection. Boundary questions with France and Great Britain over a strip of coast territory along the Gulf of Guinea were settled in 1885 by mutual concessions. Successive treaties with the tribal chiefs gave Germany the claim to the interior of the territory. The question of possession of the neutral zone between Togoland and the English colony on the Gold Coast was settled by a treaty with England on November 8, 1899, in which two-fifths of the zone was assigned to Germany and three-fifths to England.

Equally shadowy claims to Kamerun¹ were held by Germany, Great Britain and France. Germany had had trading interests there since 1870 competing with English traders. On July 14, 1884, Germany consolidated her claim by official occupation of the territory and by establishing a German protectorate over it. An Anglo-German treaty in

1. Named after the large estuary on the coast by the discoverer Fernando Po as Rio das Cameroes (river of prams), called and spelled in singular form, Kamerun, when Germany held it undivided. After mandate settlement, spelling Anglicized and refers to both French and British Cameroons.

1884 established the boundary between Kamerun and Nigeria from the coast to Lake Chad. In 1911 the Agadir Crisis and subsequent agreement with France increased the area of the German Kamerun quite materially by 107,000 square miles of jungle land, giving outlet in two places to the Congo River, in return for the recognition of the French protectorate over Morocco.

The most important colonial possession of Germany (has most potentialities for development in agriculture, mining, and commerce), that of German East Africa, was due largely to the work of Dr. Karl Peters, a curious mixture of genius and blackguard, and founder of the German Colonization Society, which was to unite with the Kolonialverein in 1887, but now devoted its main efforts to raising capital to finance colonial enterprises in East Africa. He finally succeeded in getting an imperial charter for German East African Company, which carried on active but not altogether successful trading ventures in East Africa. On October 1, 1884, Bismarck appointed Dr. Rolf's as consul for East Africa, and in February, 1885 extended imperial protection to all lands acquired by the Society for German Colonization.

Similar action followed in the South Pacific. A race with Britain over the part of the territory in the Oceanic group of colonies not occupied by the Dutch, finally resulted in 1885 in a treaty with England whereby German imperial protection was allowed to embrace a quarter of New Guinea, later christened Kaiser Wilhelm'sland, and a group of the Solomon Islands and other islands north of New Guinea, later named the Bismarck Archipelago. These territories were placed under the ad-

ministration of the New Guinea Company, which fourteen years later ceded them back to the state for four million marks.

Though the Marshall Islands had been discovered in 1788, German influence there dates from 1878 when a German coaling station was established in the port of Jaluit. In 1885 the islands were peacefully occupied by Germany. In 1888 Nauru was united to them by a treaty with the natives. In the meantime, an Anglo-German convention of 1886 recognised German influence over all of the Marshall Islands.

The rest of Germany's colonial possessions came a little later. In 1897 the murder of two missionaries at Kiaochau offered Germany the pretext for occupation of this important Chinese territory. The necessity for such occupation, as a result, was ascribed piously by William II to the necessity of "guarding the Holy Cross by the arms of St. George and St. Michael".¹ This possession soon came to be called the "Pearl of the Colonies." The port of Tsing-Tau in the Bay of Kiao-Chau was destined to become an important naval port and a distribution point for German products; and through this advantage Germany came to occupy first place among the European powers in Asia. This possession was strengthened by a treaty consummated with China in 1898 giving Germany a ninety-nine year lease over the shores of Kiao-Chau Bay.

The Caroline, the Palaoa and the Marianna Islands were gained from Spain after the Spanish-American War, exclusive of Guam (and Wake, which

1. Ibid., p. 188.

the United States was allowed to occupy in spite of the German contention that it was one of the Marshall group), for an indemnity of \$4,200,000, by the treaty of February 12, 1899. Spain reserved to herself only the right to establish a coaling station in each group. Germany had sought in 1886 to establish a naval base and coaling station in one of the groups but had failed.

In the Samoan Islands, Germany, England and the United States had all established trading privileges. Native revolts and bad feeling among the Powers led to the Anglo-German treaty of 1899 by which England renounced all her rights, receiving as compensation the Tonga Islands, the larger part of the Solomon group, and rectification of the boundary of the hinterland of Togoland. The territory was divided between the United States and Germany, the latter gaining the most important islands of Upolu and Savai.¹

The next decade saw a gradual but steady replacement of the rule of privileged companies by direct imperial government. This was due partly to the national rivalry stimulated by imperialism which involved diplomatic relations which the companies could not cope with, partly to internal demands of the colonial party which coincided with the accession of William II and his ideas of Weltpolitik. Furthermore, the in-

1. For material on African colonies see: Herbert Adams Gibbons, The New Map of Africa, (New York: The Century Company, 1917), Chs. 9 to 15; also Paola Giordani, The German Colonial Empire, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1916); for African and oceanic possessions: Mary E. Townshend, The Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire, Chs. V and VIII.

security of investment under company administration caused a lack of popular confidence.

By 1889 the limits of Bismark's original program to merely protect the individual merchant had been far exceeded. In Africa the government had administered Togoland and Kamerun from the outset as Crown colonies, entirely abandoning the use of chartered companies. By May, 1889 an imperial commissioner had been installed in Southwest Africa, and in East Africa the government had virtually superseded the East Africa Company. In the South Seas the government had been obliged to supplement the rule of New Guinea Company at the request of the latter. Thus, Bismark had paved the way for direct imperial control of colonies, while maintaining the fiction of the chartered company.

Bismark's successor, General von Caprivi, created in April, 1890, an imperial colonial office, as a section of the Foreign Office. This was the first step toward an independent colonial administration. However, until 1896, only strictly domestic business involving the internal organization of the colonies was referred to the colonial director, and even in that he was subject to the control of the Chancellor. The independence of this office was increased in 1891 by the creation of the Kolonialrat, an advisory council composed at first of nineteen members, representing not only those with economic interests in the colonies but all classes of the population. The Chancellor nominated the members from a list which he invited the companies and all those who had important overseas enterprises to submit.¹ The functions of

1. Mary E. Fownshend, The Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire, Ch. VI.

the council were strictly consultative and advisory, but it lent a certain stability to both internal and external colonial policy. Directly under the Chancellor, this form of central colonial administration endured until 1906, when the colonial director was promoted to a cabinet secretary, and the colonial office was transformed into a separate department of State.

Imperial administration continued the concession evil by granting wholesale concessions in land, mining, trading and railroad building to attract private capital. This did away with the necessity of trying to get appropriations from the reluctant Reichstag, but as a result the State was obliged to gradually efface itself from these activities. The custom became established almost everywhere in the colonies of giving away to individuals stretches of territory the size of German States, land which in this way became permanently alienated from the ownership of the German nation.

The government was thus obliged to center all its efforts upon the machinery of government as being the only thing reserved to the nation. The members of the militaristic, imperialistic and monarchical parties espoused the colonial cause, and the colonies naturally suffered from militarism and bureaucracy, from financial maladministration, and from the lack of any sound economic development, while the colonial cause at home became a political and partisan issue instead of a national affair. The mistake was made of expanding the resources of the country upon a plan of development and then making impossible any way of controlling that development. As one writer puts it, "The Administra-

tive structure was too heavy, too expensive and too oppressive for the economic structure and was therefore doomed to fall of its own weight.¹

The rapid transition of Germany from the chief power in Continental Europe to a prominent World Power after 1896 was due to the rapid and astounding economic growth of the nation from poverty to riches. The Industrial Revolution preceded the commercial revolution-- caused it by demanding outlets for its giant industries and for food-stuffs and raw materials to care for its rapidly growing population and the needs of its machines. The commercial revolution in turn demanded World Power and scrapped Bismark's cautious policy of alliances and subordination of colonial expansion to foreign policy. It identified colonial acquisitions with political ends and embarked upon economic imperialism seeking spheres of influence and economic concessions in already occupied territory.

During this period, the appointments made by Kaiser William of a mere figure-head such as Prince Hohenlohe and expansionist von Bulow as Chancellors, reflected his policy of Weltpolitik. The Kaiser, furthermore, had the support of big business, the colonial party, the Navy League and of the Pan-German League. This change from Bismark's cautious attitude was demonstrated by the appearance of points of antagonism between Germany and England, such as over native revolts in Africa, the Anglo-Belgian treaty of 1894, and in German support of the Boers against England in 1895-1896, even going so far as an attempt by the Kaiser to establish a protectorate over the Transvaal in 1897.²

1. Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 172.

2. Ibid., Ch. 7.

Efforts to gain an Eastern naval base gained success in the seizure of Kiao-Chao on the Shantung Peninsula as already mentioned. This point had already been decided upon by naval and geographic experts as ice-free, giving access to the hinterland, and yet avoiding conflict with Russia. The German Foreign Office did not seem to realize that this foothold in the East had been gained at the cost of the Great Britain's increased hostility, of France's suspicion, and of the indignation of the rising Far Eastern Power, Japan.

The decade from 1896 to 1906 saw high handed domination of colonial policy over domestic interests and the interests of the colonies themselves. Dr. Paul Kayser, the first real director of the colonial department was an able man and was succeeded by the constructive-minded Richthofen. These men were followed by three inferior appointees, none fitted by experience, training or intelligence to administer the colonies as they should be. Concessions were granted in Kamerun, in East Africa and New Guinea, with unrestricted rights in perpetuity. This extravagant and wasteful handling of the nation's property brought criticism from all sides. The colonial scandale broke about that time; and governors in the African colonies such as Peters, Loist, Nehlan and von Pattinmer, were tried, convicted, and dismissed from the service for serious misgovernment, with resulting discredit upon the Colonial Office and the whole colonial policy. The bitter Parliamentary struggle over the colonies was intensified by a series of native revolts which served to discredit the entire colonial administration, while the great expense of their suppression in men, money and supplies brought added recrimination from the opposition. The

Herero Revolt in Southwest Africa at this time substantiated the charges of brutality, misgovernment and ill-treatment. The cruelty, lust, and brutality of the colonial administrators were attacked by the Catholic opposition; the tremendous profits enjoyed by the capitalists and concession companies in the colonies were the subjects of Socialist attack, as was also the graft carried on by the supply and transportation companies which served the state in all the colonial departments.

The battle in the Reichstag culminated in the rejection of the government estimates for colonial administration. This brought the immediate dissolution of the Reichstag by von Bulow. The government forces won the election of January, 1907, against the opposition of the Catholic Center and the Socialist Party.

The mandate to the government to continue the vigorous prosecution of a colonial policy, now frankly identified with world power, was one with much responsibility to the administration. Criticism had been too severe, revelations of mismanagement too clear, not to sound a warning. The Kaiser and his ministers were enjoined to direct their attention to the colonies themselves and to cease to exploit them as mere prizes and to take steps toward an efficient, scientific and economic rule which would contribute to the benefit of the whole German people and win their support.

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the first Secretary for the Colonies, was selected for his business ability and capacity to remedy these faults of bureaucracy, graft, economic inefficiency and general mismanagement which were ruining the colonies abroad as well as the colonial cause at

home. His own experience as bank manager and business man had prepared him with a knowledge of German economic life and acquaintance with business and financial groups, which was essential to a constructive colonial program; while the Reichstag debates had indicated the mistakes to be avoided and the evils to be corrected. He had the double task of resuscitating and popularizing the colonial sentiment in Germany, and of thoroughly reconstructing the political and economic administration of the land and peoples overseas. The first objective was promoted by a series of lectures all over the country. The membership of the colonial society increased greatly. A colonial institute was established to gather and disseminate information, to carry on research on colonial matters and to record information.

The colonial administration was reorganized by the Reichstag, and the colonial department thus transformed into a cabinet ministry, which became autonomous on May 17, 1907. The new office was divided into four divisions and managerial distribution was made according to subject. Dr. Dernburg abolished the Kolonialrat and instituted instead an agricultural and economic section with permanent officials who made surveys and researches, rendering valuable assistance in the development of the colonies.¹

The finances of the colonies were reorganized, the colonial law was revised and extended, and local administration improved; military

1. *Ibid.* Ch. 9.

and police services were regulated; legal and judicial methods reformed, and the civil service reconstituted and made uniform. This was demanded on account of the charges of bureaucracy and maladministration made during the Reichstag debates. Provision for apprentice training and university courses in administrative law and oriental language was made; in addition special schools for colonial medicine, education, hygiene and agriculture were provided, resulting in great improvement in administrative personnel. A system of decentralization of administration in units under the Governors to make the government less bureaucratic and to promote self-government was worked out.

Under the new economic program the government purchased as many of the colonial concessions as it could and put a decisive stop to any continuation of the practice of giving concessions. The Colonial Economic Committee, which had been founded in 1896 as a protest against the government's neglect of colonial development, tried to ascertain German needs of colonial raw materials and to develop the economic possibilities of the colonies. It sent out research expeditions all over the world, carried on researches in soils, seeds, plants, chemical testing of raw materials and products, diseases of plants and animals, and cooperated with trade and industry in dissemination of information. It put on fairs and expositions to stimulate public interest and worked in close collaboration with the Colonial Office in helping to focus and to perpetuate the scientific colonial policy which Dernburg was trying to establish.

Dernburg himself traveled to London where he studied the British

colonial system and then went to several of the British colonies to study the actual administration. He also traveled to the United States in 1909 to study cotton culture there.¹ One student of German colonial administration says in regard to this period: "The Germans were continually studying the results obtained by British and French administrators . . . The Germans, . . . owe much to the fact that they are the best students in the world of what others in the world are doing."²

Encouraging results of this policy were evident in agricultural development and mineral exploitation, while trade and general economic development of the colonies improved materially. While the potential value of the colonies was not inconsiderable, the actual economic value was not so encouraging. The increasing governmental activity increased the expense greatly and the deficits had to be met out of taxation in Germany. In 1914 Togoland was the only self-supporting colony. The situation improved however, with the total colonial deficit dropping from 131,420,000 marks in 1908 to 37,880,000 marks in 1913.³

In spite of the positive colonial policy established after 1907, there was a curious change in the governmental policy toward expansion. The colonial policy became again subordinated to foreign relations with the European situation ranking in importance over possibilities of colonial acquisition as in the day of Bismark. This was due partly to

1. *Ibid.*: Ch. 9, P. 251.

2. Herbert Adams Gibbons, *The New Map of Africa*, (New York: Century Company, 1917), Ch. 12, p. 237.

3. Mary E. Townshend, *The Rise and Fall of German Colonial Empire*, Ch. 9, p. 265.

the public enthusiasm which tended to lead the government rather than follow in what was feared might be a too reckless fondness for the policy of Weltpolitik. Also the gradual formation of the Entente Cordiale, followed by the cementing of the Triple Entente, created a stronger and more dangerous external opposition, transforming what had been clashes with single nations into conflicts with united groups.

The difficulties over Morocco with France and Great Britain in 1905 and the settlement was an example of the changed attitude.

German public opinion demanded a strong stand for German possession of at least part of the territory. William II, however, restrained his desire for colonial annexation in Morocco and subordinated it to the balance-of-power principle because he was playing for what he considered higher stakes in the Near East -- the pet project of the Bagdad Railway and friendship with Turkey, which had been worked for many years.

Furthermore, he did not wish to jeopardize his plans for the construction of a continental league as a protection against the growing encirclement of Germany. The succeeding crises in Morocco found the Kaiser maintaining his position, refusing to send in troops as France did, and suggesting alliance with France as the price of German withdrawal. The Franco-German pact of February 9, 1909, gave France Germany's promise to recognize the privileged position of France in Morocco. The administration pointed to the treaty as eliminating Morocco as an area of discord in German-French relations and as causing France to counsel peace to Russia in the Russian crisis which had intervened.

In the Agadir affair of 1911 the Kaiser maintained his peaceful efforts in opposition to his Secretary of State and general public opinion.

as long as he could. The ambitious dream of a German African empire promoted the sending of the German gunboat the "Panther" to bring pressure to bear in favor of the German claims, though ostensibly to protect German property. That inflammatory gesture brought instant response from the Triple Entente, with French and British battleships preventing German occupation, but William again opposed any idea of war and pressed for peaceful settlement. The final treaty, when negotiated, thus fell far short of original German demands, giving Germany 100,000 acres of jungle land in the French Congo, with French hegemony recognized over Morocco.

The cumulative avoidance of the opportunity to gain colonial territory which the Moroccan crises presented brought growing storms of protest which culminated in that of 1911, with public sentiment, business, industry and the press all condemning in the bitterest tone the peaceful and compromising attitude of the governments. The colonial party saw its hopes dashed and the general desire for a "place in the sun" found a negative response in the administration's action. Even the Social Democrats, who had from the first been opposed to colonial aggression, condemned the government's handling of the Moroccan affair.

In the Near East, at this same time, the Kaiser pressed ahead sacrificing acquisition in Morocco for imperialism in Mesopotamia. In Europe he subordinated all, even the Near Eastern project of efforts toward a counterpoising balance of power, while in the Near East he pressed vigorously toward the completion of the Bagdad Railway.

In diplomatic circles, in 1910, Germany capitalized on Russia's

resentment of England and France for their refusal of support in the Bosnian affair, and in the Potsdam agreement agreed to recognize Russia's exceptional political position in Northern Persia in return for complete equality of rights for German trade, and further, renounced the gaining of railway concessions in that territory in return for Russia's promise to cease opposition of the Bagdad Railway.

The Potsdam agreement released England from the Entente agreement and made desirable to both countries an Anglo-German agreement for which Germany had been angling for some time. The desire of the Kaiser to continue the building of the Bagdad railway only with the cooperation of Great Britain was evident in sending a minister to England with the express orders to create as good relations as possible with the English court and aristocracy. An agreement was finally reached, in February, 1914, and signed by Germany, reaching London on July 30, 1914; but the outbreak of the Great War put an end to it. By this agreement Germany had virtually surrendered southern Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf as a British sphere of influence, but had gained the cessation of British opposition to the Bagdad Railway so stubbornly maintained since 1903, and had created a community of interest between Germany and England in Asia-Minor, a make-weight against the Triple Entente and German isolation.¹

In October 1913, an Anglo-German rapprochement was initiated providing for disposal of the Portuguese colonies, not based solely upon

¹ Ibid., Ch. III

Portugal's applications for loans and possibility of default, as an earlier agreement had been,¹ but upon the occurrence of any disturbance in Angola or Mozambique endangering the lives or property of British or German subjects, or the vital interests of any adjoining British or German dominions. This agreement modified the frontier of Angola in favor of Germany and that of Mozambique in favor of England. Publishing of the treaty was not to be carried out until that autumn because of the fear that German public opinion would be again stirred up in opposition. The treaty had been expected to fulfill the dreams of Mittel Afrika which had been disappointed by the Agadir settlement. The War came in August, however, and made the publishing of the treaty too late for any effect.

On the eve of the war public sentiment remained strongly in favor of colonial expansion, while the Reichstag elected in 1912 favored even more than that of 1907 the development and acquisition of colonies, with the support of all parties except the Social Democrats. The leadership in the colonial office was conducive to the movement, with Dr. Solf coming to the post in 1912 and giving impetus to the colonial movement both at home and in the colonies. The government prosecuted its plans for colonial acquisition with caution and diplomacy, although subjected to the derision and criticism of the Pan-Germans and other over-enthusiastic colonialists.

1. Ibid. P. 90. The Anglo-German treaty of 1898 by which the Portuguese colonies should be divided if Portugal should fail to repay a proposed loan.

The English press and English public opinion was generally friendly, though watchful, while the French press was exceedingly bitter, especially in regard to German plans in Africa, warning Belgium, and continually building up suspicion of German motives in France.

The first four days of August, 1914, saw declarations of war made by the major nations of Europe and the Great War burst upon a placid world. The colonial territory of Germany was lost through military operations early in the war. The imperial government was not prepared for colonial warfare not could she keep the channels of communication open to troops even if she could have spared them, and soon found herself trapped by the Allied blockade. Togoland, Kamerun and the German Pacific colonies were occupied in 1914 by the enemy; German Southwest Africa surrendered in 1915, and only in German East Africa was resistance notable, where Lettow-Vorbeck with a force of 5,000 held out in guerilla warfare until the Armistice against overwhelming numbers. Thus a colonial empire of more than 1,000,000 square miles or more than five times the area of the German Reich, with a population of 14,000,000, or about one-fourth of the population of Germany was lost.¹

1. C. L. Heymann, "Germany's Colonies", Current History, XLV, (February, 1937), 35-41.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE COLONIES

Territorial Partition

The early loss of her entire overseas empire engendered a feeling of deep regret in Germany and gave a prominent place to territorial aspirations in the war aims of the government and the people, war aims which grew more ambitious with the apparent victory of the Central Powers early in 1918. Both official and unofficial agencies demanded, not only a reconstitution of the colonial empire, but also substantial additions thereto. Colonial enthusiasts even worked out a Mittel-Afrika scheme envisaging a compact German empire capable of defending itself and dominating the trade routes to the East. The plans of the colonial office were not quite as ambitious as these of the enthusiasts. Dr. Solf was extremely moderate in his statements, but did nevertheless insist upon annexing additional territory.

On the other hand, feeling in the countries of the Allies was being developed against any return of colonies. Propaganda to that effect took two forms. One dwelt upon the menace of German world power in colonial territory to which the demands of the German India and Mittel-Afrika enthusiasts in Germany lent reality. This view was maintained largely by the French. The other objection to return consisted in the attaching of all kinds of disrepute to the character of German colonial administration. The British backed this effort, as they had cooperated in aiding Germany's ambitions in Africa, and considered that

it would be left more suitably to the French, while they devoted themselves to heaping up of evidence condemnatory of German colonial rule in contrast to their own. This misgovernment propaganda ignored the testimony of impartial observers, many of them British, before the war as to the general excellence of the German rule and consisted mostly of trumped-up evidence and mud slinging.¹

The territorial clause of the Treaty of Versailles, Article 119, could do little but rubber stamp a situation which had been created by a series of secret treaties and agreements between the Allied Powers on the one hand, and Japan, the British dominions and Belgium on the other. The brevity of the acknowledgement needed to confirm such a fait accompli was evident in the statement that "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions". This was further elaborated in Part IV of the Treaty. In favor of Japan all German rights, titles and privileges in Shantung, particularly those concerned with Kiao-Chau were abrogated, while generally, in favor of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany was obliged to "recognize and accept all arrangements" which the Allies might make with Turkey. The right of the Allies to carry out such arrangements was subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Sevres.

In addition, all German rights under the Conventions and agreements

1. Mary E. Evans, The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, Ch. 12.

with France of 1911 and 1912, relating to Equatorial Africa, were renounced; all German rights, titles, benefits and privileges, whether commercial, economic or political, were cancelled in China, Liberia, Siam, Morocco and Egypt. Finally, all movable and immovable property belonging to Germany in those territories, as well as in those formerly owned by Germany, was to pass without indemnification to the new governments exercising authority over them.¹ Thus the German colonial empire was ended not only in regard to actual overseas territory, but also in relation to her commercial footholds, her spheres of influence, her economic penetration and her Imperialistic ambitions.

The reaction in Germany to the colonial settlement was, as could be expected, violent. Mass meetings all over the country, the press, even the Socialist organs discussed the subject. Petitions from every type of group besieged the German National Assembly. A petition was addressed to the American People and an Open Letter to President Wilson by the Colonial Society. The campaign crystallized in the official "Protest" voted by the German National Assembly on March 1, 1919, which characterized the colonial settlement as "Unbearable, unrealizable and unacceptable",² which was unanimously supported by every party except the Socialists. The burden of the argument was ever the same; the injustice of the discrepancy between the threatening dis-

1. International Conciliation, "Treaty of Peace with Germany", (September, 1919), no. 102.

2. Mary E. Tomahend, Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, quoted Ch. 12, p. 337.

possession of the colonial empire and Point V of the Fourteen Points upon which basis the Armistice had been signed.

The German delegation at the Peace Conference, with this national sentiment behind them, did all in their power to retain the colonies. It reiterated the injustice of the dispossession, claimed, as Germany's right to keep her colonies, her lawful acquisition of them recognised by the Powers before the war; her economic need of them, especially since the war, and her duty to cooperate in civilising of backward races justified by her record of native rule. The delegation put forward two proposals for colonial settlement: first, that a special commission handle the matter which would at least hear Germany's side, inasmuch as Point V provided for an "absolutely impartial adjustment"; second, that Germany be allowed to administer her colonies according to the mandate principles of the League Covenant, possibly as a mandatory of the League, if and when such a League was formed which she could enter as a member State on equal terms with other members.¹

These proposals were of course all rejected by the Allies as they would destroy that careful balance between selfish ambition and moral responsibility which they had worked out. It would also have brought dissension among the Allies by depriving them of their already achieved gains, and it would have been a repudiation of the well constructed program of propaganda against German native rule upon which the whole settlement was based. Their express argument was based almost

1. International Conciliation, (October, 1919), no. 143, pp 1240-1252.

1. International Conciliator, (November, 1919), no. 144, pp. 1872-1874.
2. Aaron M. Margalith, The International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 31.

The disposition of the colonial territory of the Central Powers was provided for by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was included in the Treaty of Versailles. Article 22 was not written by the Committee on the League of Nations. The language is

territories and the League.
This point is important in considering the relationship between the taken by the Supreme Council and not by the Council of the League.
This allocation of the mandates to the respective Powers was undertaken on May 17, where they had drafted the terms of the B and C mandates and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers had already met in London colonial empire.

legal right to carry out the last act in the destruction of the German rather than accept such a vindictive treaty, giving the Allies the though the Scheidemann ministry of Germany had resigned on June 20, the Treaty of Versailles was signed by Germany on June 28, 1919.

slavery, compulsory labor and militarization.
indicated German colonial rule generally on the grounds of slavery, natives to a date from which the war had delivered them, and severely return, that they could not permit the abandoning of "fourteen million wholly upon that point, declaring that the natives were opposed to

practically the same as Smit's Resolution of January 30, 1919, and was adopted by the Council as the principle by which the German possessions and the Turkish Near Eastern Provinces were supposed to be governed. The mandate principle was adopted as a compromise between the imperialistic desires of certain of the Dominions of the British Empire and Wilson's insistence on the mandatory principle. It was written by General Smuts in collaboration with Mr. Philip Kerr, editor of the Round Table. Its vagueness of phraseology proves that it did not pass through the hands of legal experts.¹

Article 22 provides that: "To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League".²

Article 22 then goes on to divide the mandates into three categories, A, B and C, in accordance with their location, economic status, and cultural development. Class A mandates are those lands formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, which have reached such a high stage of development that they may be recognized as independent nations, but

1. Aaron M. Margalith, The International Mandate, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), pp. 26-27.

2. George L. Beer, African Questions of the Paris Peace Conference, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923).

need administrative advice until they can exist unaided. In these territories, "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory".

Class B mandates are the less advanced central Africa territories formerly belonging to Germany, which are cared for by the mandatory Powers with a greater amount of supervision and with definite guarantees to the League for the welfare of the inhabitants. Of special importance is the provision that the mandatory is to "secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of the members of the League".

The Class C mandates included Southwest Africa and the Pacific Islands, both of which belonged to Germany. Because of their "sparseness of population, their small size and their remoteness from centers of civilization", they were assigned to neighboring Powers which should administer them "as integral portions of its territory subject to the safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population".

The recommendations of the Supreme Council as to the disposition of several of the German colonies are of interest in indicating the feeling toward the Colonies, though not all of them were accepted. In regard to Togoland, it was recommended that they were to be divided along ethnic lines and transferred to France and Great Britain, because the population belonged ethnically, in proportion of about two to one, to the adjacent colonies of French Dahomey and the British Gold Coast. It was held that the mandatory principle, insofar as it implies the maintenance of separate administration, would hamper the development of the small area.

Respecting the Cameroons, it was recommended that the area added

to the colony in 1911 at the expense of French Equatorial Africa by the threat of war should be returned to France; and that some territory be transferred to British Nigeria in order to make the boundary conform in a general way to ethnic and tribal facts. It was furthermore stated in the recommendations of the Supreme Council that the United States would be the most satisfactory mandatory to secure native rights and colonial cooperation, but if the United States was not disposed to accept the mandate it should be given to France.¹

The colony of German East Africa should be entrusted to the British Empire as a place of settlement for British East India, under mandate, recognizing India's need for a country for unrestricted settlement. It was recommended that the territory of German Southwest Africa be transferred to the British Empire for incorporation into the self-governing Dominion of South Africa. It was thought that the mandatory principle was inapplicable and inadvisable in this case, which was mainly concerned with land, not derelict peoples, and that the development of territory would be gravely handicapped if administered entirely apart from the adjoining Union of South Africa.²

As a result of lengthy negotiations, an agreement was signed on July 10, 1919, between France and Great Britain in respect to Togoland Kamerun. The Supreme Council had charged them with the task of coming to some territorial agreement upon the West African territories. They

1. George Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 265.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 264-75.

recommended that the territories should be placed under mandate, but that the mandate should take into consideration the interests of the natives, up to that time artificially separated, and the administrative difficulties which would be created by any attempt to constitute the areas into separate and distinct political units.¹

France gained the important concession of being permitted to recruit a military force in her share of Togo and Kamerun, not only for purposes of defense of the territory, but for defense of the territory outside the mandate.

The mandatory principle came legally into effect on January 10, 1920, when the Versailles Treaty was officially declared ratified. Fourteen mandates were created and distributed to eight mandatory Powers, five of which went to the British Empire or to some member thereof. Six B mandates were set up; Togoland was divided between France and Great Britain, 2/3 to the former and the rest to the latter; the Cameroons were divided into three parts, the so-called New Cameroons, consisting of 107,000 square miles was reincorporated into French Equatorial Africa; nine-tenths of the Old Cameroons was given to France, and one-tenth to Great Britain, both as B mandates. Former German East Africa was allotted to Great Britain as a B mandate, rechristened as Tanganyika, but later, to satisfy Belgium's claims, a small portion of 21,255 square miles on the northwest boundary adjoining the Belgium Congo, known as Ruanda-Urundi, was given as a B mandate to

1. *Ibid.* p. 265.

Belgium. Also a very small portion on the southern boundary was given to Portugal as an integral part of her colony of Mozambique.

In the C group, five mandates were granted, mostly to the British Dominions. German Southwest Africa was awarded to the Union of South Africa; "New Guinea", constituting former German Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Bismark Archipelago, and the German Solomon Islands was granted to Australia, German Samoa to New Zealand as Western Samoa, and the Caroline, Marshall, Marianne and Peley (Palao) Islands to Japan. Japan had been given Kiao-Chau outright because both it and the Shantung peninsula had been promised to her as a price for her assistance in the war and she threatened to leave the Conference if she were not so rewarded. This territory was restored to China in 1922 as a result of the Washington agreements. The tiny but valuable island of Nauru was granted to the joint mandatory of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, but Australia was given authority to exercise administrative power over it on behalf of the British Empire.¹

In September, 1923, more than one year after the Council's confirmation of the B and C mandates on July 20, 1922, the A mandates were designated as Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, in which territories Germany had possessed important spheres of influence and extensive ambitions. Syria was awarded to France, over the protests of over 60% of the native inhabitants, who had replied to an investigation

¹ Mary E. Townshend, The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930), Ch. 12, pp. 391-94.

committee sent out by the United States, and in distinct contradiction of the mandate principles.¹ Palestine was awarded to Great Britain, which had already, by the Balfour Declaration, promised to establish a Jewish Home there for Jewish immigrants. A mandate was never awarded for Mesopotamia, where, instead, the Arab kingdom of Iraq was set up by Great Britain under a treaty of alliance and supervision with that kingdom on October 10, 1922, which obtained the approval of the League Council on September 27, 1924. Mandate principles are carried out there however, and a good deal of British control is thus exercised.

1. Aaron M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 42.

The Tenets of Mandate Administration

It must be recognized that the same principle underlies all three classes of mandates. The difference between them are difference of degree, not of kind. The main difference between the B and C groups of territories are in their general administration and in the application of the equal opportunity and the Open-Door. As regards the B mandates, Article 22 states explicitly that the mandatory "will be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions such as . . . will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League." Professor Gini, in a study of raw materials under League direction, considers that the words quoted do not imply any contrast with the obligations of the mandatories with regard to the other categories of mandates. Referring to the clause in the C mandates, which says that the territories should be administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, but "subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population," he says, "This clearly refers to the guarantees enumerated for B mandates which are quoted above, and there can be no doubt, in my view, that the clause relating to equality of exchange and commerce is intended to protect also, not exclusively, the interests of the indigenous population."¹ He maintains also that Article 121 of the Treaty of Versailles, declaring that "the provisions of Section I and IV of Part X of the present treaty shall apply in the

1. Professor Gini, Report on the Problems of Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, (Geneva, 1921), p. 36.

case of these [German] territories whatever be the form of government adopted for them" confirms that view; that the sections named contain provisions regarding Germany's obligations to her territories and obligations imposed upon Germany in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers; and that the most plausible interpretation of Article 121 is that it was designed, in the interests of those Powers, to extend those same obligations to the mandatories administering the former German colonies. He concludes that in the C mandates, forming part of those territories, the Allied and Associated Powers should enjoy the most complete equality in trade and opportunity in industrial concessions, not only on the basis of Article 22 of the Covenant, but also in accordance with the other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.¹

The Open-Door is provided for in the A mandates, not in Article 22, but in the provisions of the mandate charters themselves. Discrimination is practiced in the C mandates however. This has given Germany cause for complaint; for equality of trade was permitted in these colonies when they were under her government. In practice the Open-Door privileges in the B mandates are granted to non-members of the League as well as the members, and Germany has no cause for complaint there.

Contrary to the provisions in the Wilson and Smuts drafts regarding the mandate administration, the League of Nations was not given the full control over the distribution of the mandated territories.

1. Ibid: p. 36.

The nations were to be governed on behalf of the League, and to the League was delegated the right of supervision over their administration, but only after the mandatories had been previously decided upon by the Supreme Council of the Allies.

Contrary also to the German proposal, the League is not given the right of direct supervision over the administration of the mandated territories. Supervision is strictly indirect, through communications and reports through the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The grant of powers to the mandatories over the B territories does not differ from that over the C mandates. In all cases they are given full powers of legislation and administration. British Togo and Cameroons, as well as Ruanda-Urundi are all B territories, but are governed as integral parts of the adjoining territory of the Mandatory Powers because in all these cases they form small areas contiguous to the much larger colonies of the Mandatories. A separate administration would involve difficulties and unnecessary expense with much duplication of many administrative functions.¹ The two classes have in common the safeguards put into their mandates in the interests of the native population, though several instances of abuses have come to public attention.

To the legally trained mind the legal concepts underlying Article 22 are of special interest. Margalith, in his very instructive work on the mandate system, has given a logical interpretation of these con-

1. Aaron M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 40.

cepts.¹ The first is the concept of trust or trusteeship, the "sacred trust" in paragraph one. This is an English contribution through the law of trusts in English Common Law. A clear analogy between trusts in private law and in the mandate principles cannot be drawn, but it can be inferred from the wording of Article 22 that the spirit of trusteeship influenced the authors of the mandate system. The question remains, however, as to who the trustee is, the League or the Mandatory.²

A second concept is that of guardianship or tutelage. This is drawn mainly from the Civil Law of the European Continent. In private law, guardianship is conceived as "The power or protective authority given by law and imposed upon an individual who is free and in the enjoyment of his rights, over one whose weakness, on account of his age, renders him unable to protect himself."³ It is again difficult to ascertain who the guardian is, the League or the particular Mandatory.

A third concept is that of "mandate."⁴ In Roman Law a mandate was a trust or commission, by which one person, the mandator, requested another person, the mandatory, to act on his behalf. The mandate was to be performed gratuitously and entered into voluntarily. The analogy between the principles of the international mandates and those of private law breaks down in a practical sense, however, as it cannot be determined who the mandator is. Legally, furthermore, no one can be forced to accept a benefit, as was done when the mandate for Syria was awarded to France against the wishes of the native population.

1. Ibid: p. 41.

2. Ibid: p. 40.

Therefore, the three concepts have exercised an influence, the first two in spirit, the last mostly in method, in the construction of Article 22. They can, however, in no way be considered a direct transfer from private to international law.

An extremely important principle in the mandate system is that of "no annexation". This is associated with the idea of international supervision which is to be exercised by the League of Nations assisted by a Permanent Commission. There is also evident in the plan the principle of gratuity or "no benefit". The mandatory is not to be paid for its work of administration, nor must it pass any legislation favoring its own nationals over other countries. The Open-Door, in this respect, does not mean free trade, however, or even limited tariff rates, but only equal opportunity for all and the policy of no discrimination.

The question of sovereignty in the mandated territory has come up for discussion, though no practical problem has come up for solution in regard to it. Many possible explanations of the location of sovereignty have been given and defended. In the first place, it would seem that the sovereignty of Germany and Turkey over these territories had ceased to exist. By the treaty provisions of Versailles and Sevres the ownership of these lands was given to the principal Allied and Associate Powers. Then, according to M. Van Rees, Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the sovereignty still resides in those

1. Ibid: pp. 45-47. Also see: Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), Ch. 9, pp. 375-90.

Powers, and the appointment of mandatories to govern them is merely a temporary delegation of authority and not a surrender of it.¹ This view has been upheld by the United States, who has insisted upon its right, as one of the Allied and Associated Powers, to have a voice in any matter respecting the former enemy territory. Balfour of Great Britain is also in agreement with this view. Japan has indirectly assented in this interpretation likewise by her denial of the League's right to terminate the mandates awarded her. Furthermore, there has been no authoritative evidence that the Powers have given up this sovereignty. The fact remains, however, that no body exists at the present time representing those Powers. There is no statement in the charters of the mandates that the Allied and Associated Powers reserved the sovereign right over them. On the contrary, the League was granted the right of giving consent to any change in the mandate terms. In practice, all important decisions with respect to the mandated territories, taken after their distribution, have been made by the Council of the League, which is composed of many States not members of the Supreme Council.

Practically speaking, however, the League cannot be said to hold strict sovereign powers, as it has no power in itself to enforce any decisions, nor has it the strict attributes of a State.

The sovereignty cannot remain with the Mandatory, as that would break down the whole mandate system in violation of the "non-annexation"

1. Aaron M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 146.

principle. If that were the case, the territories would have been counted among the reparations which Germany was to pay the Entente as a result of the outcome of the war.¹

Finally, sovereignty cannot remain in the mandated territory. The objective, clearly stated in the case of the A mandates, is self-government, which would imply at least internal sovereignty. That has been achieved, however, and even there only in part, solely in Iraq. In the rest of the mandated territories they are not even organized in such a way as to form a corporate unit which is a prerequisite for sovereignty.

From the information and proposals studied Mr. Margalith draws the conclusion that "At the time of distribution of the mandates the situs of sovereignty was purposely left unsettled. Furthermore, all steps taken by the Council subsequent to the coming into force of the mandates system have been marked by the hardly concealed intent to avoid the settling of this issue."² He thinks that this uncertainty has been found to be highly expedient, and, in fact, essential to the working of the mandate system, and that the concepts of sovereignty and independence which have been, and still are, at the basis of international relations between States, lose much of their importance in mandated territories with the fate of which international public opinion is greatly concerned.²

A well known authority in the field of colonial administration

1. A. M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), pp. 145-70.

2. Ibid: p. 208.

says, regarding the sovereignty of the mandates, that it is "... vested in the League acting through the Covenant amending process and is exercised by the mandatory with consent of the Council for eventual transfer to the mandated communities themselves."¹

The question of termination of a mandate has not come up for settlement, nor is it likely to be troublesome. The only way provided by Article 22 to end a mandate is that the conditions for native self-government must be reached, and that the inhabitants of a territory must have reached a stage in the development of their civilizations which will enable them to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. The terms of the Covenant therefore contemplate self-government as a natural fruition of the mandate system. This is of course most applicable to the A mandates, and the wording of Article 22 seems hardly to contemplate that possibility in regard to the B or C mandates.

Transfer of territory as a result of political bargaining is condemnable on its face, because the mandates are not the property of the mandatories and such transfer would be contrary to the duty of the Mandatory. The consent of the Council is necessary for any such change in the territory. The recent transfer by France of part of the mandated

1. Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 530.

P. 531: "... There is no legal presumption in favor of the exercise of unspecified powers by the mandatory, the mandated community or even the Council, but that the power and responsibility of each must be determined from the nature of the institution as found in the relevant documents, principles, and precedents, or if that is not possible, by action of the League through amendment of Article 22."

territory of Syria to Turkey is a case in point, and the attitude of the Council will be interesting to note. Italy has already denounced it as an example of France's customary violation of the League principles.

The possibility of taking away a mandate from a country remains, but it is a very bare possibility. The League would be the only agency having such authority, and it possesses no physical means to enforce its decisions, even it could come to such a decision, which is very unlikely.¹

The administration of each territory generally gets its powers from a constitutional act from the mandatory government. This act then becomes the constitution of the territory. In addition there are the mandate charters and the decisions of the Council of the League, and any act in the constitution of any such territory must be in accordance with the terms of the mandate which takes precedence. The distinct character of the mandate is preserved by special legislation.²

It must be obvious that any one attempting a transfer or re-distribution of the mandated territories has many perplexing questions to consider. The attitudes of the various mandatories toward return vary greatly with their past experiences, their colonial practices and their feeling toward Germany. The terms of the mandates differ materially from the three classes, which would make return of all the colonies on

1. A. M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), pp. 96-100.

2. Ibid: p. 108.

the same terms difficult. Finally, the question of who could legally decide as to whether the mandated territories should be given up and how such a decision could be enforced, remains unanswerable under present conditions.

CLAIMS OF THE DISPOSSED

Arguments of the Protagonists of Return

In any discussion of the value of colonies to their owners three common arguments are encountered which are most always relied upon by the proponents of return.

The first one of these, and one which appears logical upon its face, is that colonies serve as areas in which the surplus populations of overcrowded nations can find homes and livelihood. A nation which becomes dangerously overpopulated thus has a danger valve, such as the American frontier was for many generations, which can remove the menace of reduced standards of living and consequent internal trouble, as well as serve as an outlet for those adventurous souls who are potential revolutionists if their taste for action is not legitimately provided for.

A second claim of the imperialists is that colonies serve as a source of raw materials, which is extremely important in this industrial age. Such a source, it is contended, gives an industrial nation a degree of self sufficiency and it is not left entirely at the mercy of nations who possess quantities of raw materials and may prevent these needing them from obtaining them. Furthermore, in periods of economic depression, when lack of foreign trade makes the amount of foreign exchange available for purchase of foreign goods small and uncertain, it is of distinct benefit to have such raw materials under a

nation's control so as to be able to buy with the national currency and not have to use precious foreign exchange to purchase it with.

A third argument as to the value of colonies is that they serve as markets for the manufactured products of the industrial countries, and places for investment of surplus capital of those countries. The opportunity to sell their products is a vital problem to all industrial countries, and has become especially important the last few years. Markets for finished goods give employment at home; an improvement, generally, in the domestic situation follows the extended markets, and the effect is of distinct benefit to international trade. In backward territories there are often rich natural resources to be exploited in which large profits are to be made, and which private capital is to invest in. Governments, also, are often interested in control of such investments for reasons of strategy and defense.

Such are the usual arguments generally used to uphold colonial claims, and the German spokesmen have used them all as above delineated, and with variations. Later in the discussion these arguments will be analyzed and discussed, and the weaknesses in them indicated. For the present it is sufficient to note them and their utilization by the advocates of colonial redistribution.

Sentiments of the German Leaders

It is only natural that the opinion of Adolph Hitler should be considered carefully in any scrutiny of contemporary German opinion toward the colonial issue. Hitler, through the years, has been no more

consistent on the colonial issue than on some other matters. In his famous book, "Mein Kampf" written in 1924 while in prison, he denounces all colonial aspirations, and derides the colonial and commercial policy of William II as netting Germany nothing but the hostility of England. Differing in this respect from the rabid Pan-Germans, he holds that the great mistake of the pre-war policy was to embark upon an overseas colonial and trade policy which was bound to antagonize England and drive her into the arms of France and Russia.¹ He says: "Take care that the power of our people is not based on colonies but on land in Europe", and later, "We start anew where we terminated six centuries ago . . . We halt the eternal German move to the South and West of Europe, and turn our eyes on the lands to the East. We bring to a close the colonial and trade policies of the pre-war period and pass to the land policy of the future".²

Since that time, fifteen years ago, Hitler evinces a material change of attitude in his feeling toward colonies. The formidable growth of Russia has somewhat discouraged his plans for extension into Eastern Europe. At least it is questionable whether he wishes to come to grips with Russia over eastern expansion, though he has made many important acquisitions to the eastward in the period of a little over a year by his acts in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel. He bases his

1. Yale Review, (June, 1936), n.s., XVII, no. 4, pp. 678-98.

2. Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf, (New York: Houghton Company, 1937), p. 742.

claims on the usual ones, pointing out Germany's need for unhampered access to those raw materials which are unobtainable at home, and the overcrowded condition of Germany, though encouragement of that condition is pursued as an official policy. He rejects the possibility of settling the surplus Germans in the mandated territories, because of the loss of them as citizens which that would entail.¹ Replying to that suggestion in a press conference in 1937, he said, "Germans no longer want to leave Germany. They are quite happy here."² It is doubtful whether the disposition to migrate to the colonies would be much greater if Germany got them back. Not even the persecuted Jews wish to migrate to territory that remains under German control.

Hitler, at the above mentioned press conference, when asked whether Germany would be satisfied with other territory than that which she had possessed before the war replied: "That to which we have a moral right is that which belonged to us;" and, "It is quite intolerable that Germany should not have colonies with people under her own flag. It is not a fact that trade follows the flag. It is people who follow the flag and trade follows the people." At another time he says: "The objection that colonies would not help us much is unjustified. The government would know how to administer colonies economically after the results in Germany itself. Germany cannot import raw material because she cannot export to secure exchange to buy it with."

1. New York Times, (September 13, 1937), 1:3.

2. J. E. Williams, "Germany Wants its Colonies", Christian Science Monitor, (February 12, 1936), pp. 1-2.

Speaking about the necessity and aims of the German four-year plan, he said that, independently of this, "Germany, however, cannot relinquish her demands for a solution of her colonial needs;" that "The right of the German people to live is just as great as that of the people of other nations."¹

In a bitter attack on the policy of the colony-holding Powers, Hitler, in October, 1937, said: "There exist people who say that colonies are a heavy burden but they do not propose to surrender any of this burden. They assert colonies have no worth but show no desire to give back any of the worthless territory to its rightful owners. I employ the term 'rightful owner' only in a period and a world filled with ideals of League of Nations morality and respectability. Once upon a time we Germans gained our colonies according to these ideals and we lost them under others that are only too damnable from the standpoint of the League of Nations."²

In a speech to the Reichstag in the early part of 1938, the Fuehrer stated: "The claim for German colonial possessions will be voiced from year to year with increasing vigor. I should like to refute here the hope that such claims can be averted by granting credits. These possessions which Germany did not take from other countries, and which today are practically of no value to these Powers, are indispensable to our own people."³

1. New York Times, (September 10, 1936), p. 18:4.

2. Ibid: October 4, 1937, p. 9:2.

3. Ibid: February 21, 1938, p. 1:8.

Expressing the relationship of Germany to such colonies, Hitler said that colonies demanding an enormous armed force for their defense were worth nothing; that Germany regarded colonies as a purely commercial undertaking, and commercial exploitation was possible only under conditions of cooperation among the colonial Powers; that Germany needed colonies, "not because of political ambition but because of vital necessity."¹

An important factor in Hitler's change of face has been the influence of Schacht, former minister of finance and president of the Reichsbank. This very ardent and able Nazi has insisted from the first upon the necessity of colonies within the German currency sphere, so that Germany would not have to buy with foreign exchange the supply of which she is very short. [Schacht rejected the proposal of Lord Lugard, well known colonial administrator and member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, to apply the Open-Door principle to all colonies, as insufficient.] He ignored the attempts of self-sufficiency contemplated by the four-year plan, one reason for his drop from power, which was to make Germany independent of the world and then, presumably, of colonies.² He declared: "An attempt to shrink a great people through persistent external pressure must lead first to social misery and unrest, and then to some kind of an explosion. The allotment of colonial

1. *Ibid.* September 13, 1937, p. 113.

2. *Ibid.* February 10, 1936, p. 111.

territory is the expedient solution of existing difficulties.¹ He denounced recommendations of birth control as a crime against God and nature as long as the earth as a whole offers the necessary possibilities for feeding the people living in it.

Schacht admitted that colonies could not solve all Germany's troubles, but emphasized the fact that, because of present world trade conditions, Germany would go into the development of colonies with quite a different intensity than before the war when she could buy what she needed where she pleased.² If Germany had her old territories back she could feed herself without suffering egg and fat shortages.³ He deplored the Nazi barter plan, saying that it is a "medieval, barbarous method", and that economic life should be free. He blamed the Allies for imposing a sort of economic serfdom, suffocating Germany, but hamming the whole economy of Europe as a result.³

Another outspoken advocate of colonial return is Goebbels. He lays the increase of unemployment to seasonal factors and the shortage of foreign raw materials. He sees the need for colonies in the army's increasing demand for copper, wool and other standard raw materials. "A nation can get along without butter but never without cannon", is his analysis of the problem.⁴

As an example of other than official opinion toward the colonial

1. Ibid: December 10, 1936, p. 1:2.

2. Ibid: December 10, 1936, p. 1:2.

3. Ibid: July 23, 1936, p. 3:6.

4. Ibid: January 18, 1937, p. 1:3.

question, the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in 1937 made a statement classifying Germany's raw materials and exchange troubles as colonial problems; declaring that in a struggle among highly industrialized states for vital raw materials, Germany, because of her lack of her own sources of supply is, "exposed to the fortuitous movements of the world market,"¹

More extreme statements as to the value of colonies have been made by other responsible German citizens, writing in our leading periodicals. As an example: "Let us remember, too, that the prosperity which was on the point of developing in pre-war Germany was due to the possession and exploitation of her colonies. Were the colonial injustice undone, Germany would be in a position gradually to liquidate her remaining unemployment. Our economy would receive a new impetus and that impetus would in turn be communicated to world economy. Furthermore, because of the restored mobility of German currency management, frozen credits could be thawed more easily. Such economic improvement would contribute also to a further pacification of world political conditions."² In the same article it is said, "It cannot be over-emphasized that Germany would never put herself in the wrong before the world through the annexation of foreign territory, ... merely desires the abolition of the enforced administration and the restoration to Germany of full sovereign rights

1. *Ibid.*: December 10, 1936, p. 1:2;

2. "Colonies: A Debate", *Living Age*, (November, 1936), v. 351, p. 258.

over her own colonial possessions,¹

Oswald Pirow, South African Minister of Defense, though unalterably opposed to any return of any part of former German Southwest Africa, declared that influential quarters in Britain agreed that "there could be no permanent basis for peaceful agreement with Germany unless the Germans are given adequate compensation for their colonies in Africa." He holds that German cooperation in Africa was vital to maintenance of white civilization there, and would welcome the settlement of the colonial question on a basis equitable to all parties.²

In the former German colony of Tanganyika, the German settlers are reported to be expecting to be returned to Germany, especially after an unconfirmed statement of the British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs that "the time will doubtless come when we shall have to give back Tanganyika to Germany." The natives there, however, are opposed to transfer as an end to "trust holding".³

There is some feeling in Britain, at least there was prior to Hitler's territorial grabs, that some territorial concessions might be desirable if Germany's sense of injury, injustice and humiliation could be alleviated. If such a result could be achieved by the surrender of Togoland or Cameroon, the price would not be too high, or the sacrifice of New Guinea in the interests of world peace would be worthwhile, some

1. Ibid: p. 239.

2. New York Times, July 15, 1937, p. 10:3.

3. Ibid: April 6, 1937, p. 10:4.

think. Also, it might be of advantage to have another European Power with interests in the Pacific between Australia and the Far East.¹

Since the aggressions of Japan and Italy in colonial fields, Germany remains as the only Great Power not having colonies. This tends to increase Germany's sense of injury and discrimination. The possession of colonies does indeed add to national prestige and satisfies a sort of urge for national territory, which makes nations very reluctant to part with territory when once gained.

German demands for colonial restitution are backed by Japan, who, however, would not countenance the return to Germany of any of Japan's war gains. A Japanese Foreign Office spokesman in 1937, declared that there was more hope in distribution of colonial territories than in the Balance of Power theory, or the League of Nations, both of which, he asserted, had failed. He divided nations into three categories: those who had enough and were content; those who possessed large resources but lacked vitality to develop them, and those who had vitality but lacked the resources.² Germany is apparently in the last class. Even in the United States, a supporter of some plan of return was found in Colonel House, who, in 1937 declared that world peace depended upon re-distribution of colonial possessions to meet the needs of Italy, Germany, and Japan. He saw in Italian expansion in Africa a way to keep her

1. "The German Colonial Question", Round Table, (September, 1936), LXVI, pp. 848-850.

2. New York Times, February 11, 1937, p. 8:7.

from "exploding in Europe".¹

The Germans back their claims for colonial return by legal arguments also. They assert that Great Britain violated her solemn assurance at the beginning of the World War that it did not wish to annex the German colonies, and then proceeded to consummate secret agreements with the other Allied Powers as to division of them at the end of the war. The most common argument put forward is that Article 119 of the dictated treaty of Versailles violated the Lansing Note and Point V of the Fourteen Points, which Germany accepted as the sole basis for settlement. The latter provided for free, generous and absolutely impartial settlement of all colonial claims, which was disregarded in the Treaty. They declare that the seizure of colonies was not justified as part of the prize for losing the war, and that the value of the colonies was not considered at all in tabulating the amount of reparations to be paid by Germany.

It cannot be denied that the Allies ignored the territorial treaties confirming Germany's title to her colonies which were entered into before the war. That was a natural consequence of the war. It is also contended, however, that the seizure of colonies was a violation of Article 2 of the Congo Acts, wherein, it is asserted, the contracting parties solemnly obligated themselves not to extend any European war to the colonies of Central Africa. According to the Germans the British violated this agreement by opening hostilities on August 5, 1914, in

1. *Ibid.* September 5, 1937, p. 15:2.

German East Africa. †

Study of this question by George L. Beer gives reason for a different conclusion, however. The neutrality section of the Berlin Act of 1885 was framed specifically to meet the needs of the Independent State of Congo, which was in process of formation. It provided that any state exercising "the rights of sovereignty or protectorate" over territories within this area should have the option of declaring such territory neutral, and the signatories of the Act, on their part, bound themselves to respect such neutrality. The Congo State availed itself of this option on August 1, 1885, by declaring itself to be "perpetually neutral", but no other state in the area took this course and the situation was not guaranteed. They agreed to respect this neutrality, but did not assume any obligation to prevent its violation. There was also an optional clause in the treaty whereby belligerents had liberty of action in regard to respecting the neutrality of the territories. Beer draws this conclusion: "Thus, at the outbreak of war in 1914, Belgian Congo, alone, had been declared neutral and the belligerents were entirely free to decide as to the neutrality of the rest of the Conventional Basin." Belgium wished to remain neutral in relation to the German colonies, in spite of the events in Europe, but France and Britain wanted to attack, and the German attack upon Belgian Luknga violated the neutrality of the Congo and gave Belgium reason to cooperate with the Allies. Germany appealed to the American government, whose representatives in 1885 had proposed the neutrality provision, to intercede to maintain the neutrality of the German colonies, but as the

United States had refused to ratify the Berlin Act, it could do nothing toward securing neutralization of the German colonies in the Basin of the Congo.¹

* Perhaps the biggest argument for restoration of the colonies is that it would be a means of acknowledging Germany's equality among the leading Powers. The forced confession of "colonial guilt" in the Treaty of Versailles was difficult for Germany to accept, and impartial observers before the war and since have very generally refuted the misgovernment claim. The German rule advanced by the Allies was harsh, and showed slight consideration for the natives as human beings, or for anything but for the benefit of Germany. But, as in the case of the wise slaveholders in our own South, after the scientific era of colonization under Dernburg set in the colonial administrators recognized the added value to themselves of proper native rule and improvement in native welfare began. Travelers in Africa testify that the towns in the German colonies were the cleanest and most attractive of any in Africa. Hygiene was taught the natives, large sums were spent for prevention of disease and general health improvement. An educational system was set up, and efforts made to teach the natives practical arts that would be useful in their lives.² In summarizing the German rule in the former German colony of the Cameroons, one observer says, "The

1. African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923), pp. 260-284.

2. See Heinrich Schnee, German Colonization, Past and Future, (New York: Knopf, 1936), for a strong defense of Germany's whole colonial policy; also Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).

German rule was severe, military and brutal, though efficient, orderly and, to the natives appearing just. The colonies advanced in prosperity, sanitation, and law and order." . . . "Nevertheless, the natives remained in constant respectful fear of the Germans, and had no rights or consideration except as of use to the Fatherland."¹ Another writer gives a more sympathetic interpretation of German native rule: "Only in Great Britain, among all the European colonizing Powers, has there been as much humanitarianism and idealism as in Germany with regard to the establishment and maintenance of a just and enlightened colonial regime . . . In France, in Belgium, in Portugal, in Italy, in Russia, one looks in vain to find as widespread and as important a championing of the cause of native races as one finds in Germany."²

It was largely upon these grounds of mismanagement and misgovernment that the colonies were taken from Germany. If equality with other Powers is conceded Germany has equal rights in helping to develop backward people. The question remains at the present time, however, with the aggressive policies of Hitler disturbing the world, and with his racial legislation and persecution of the Jews shocking people of all nations, whether handing back the colonies at this time would right the wrong committed against Germany only at the cost of a greater wrong against the native races of those territories. Do German policies

1. A. H. Young-O'Brien, "Brothers to the Gods", Harpers, (September, 1938), CLXXVII, p. 420.

2. H. A. Gibbons, The New Map of Africa, (New York: Century Company, 1917), p. 242.

toward non-Nordic races prove Germany unworthy to educate alien people? A German proponent holds that, "The meaning of German racial legislation lies in the respecting and developing such characteristics within the territory of the German Reich", and that Germany does in no way intend to interfere in the racial sphere of native peoples, but only to prevent penetration of alien races into the German people.¹ This view, however, does not explain what would be the treatment of the natives if again submitted to German rule. Hitler's statement that he regards the colonies as useful solely for economic exploitation, would not appear to indicate much concern for native welfare. The natives could certainly not become German citizens in view of the Nazi racial policy. Would they not be sacrificed to the exigencies and the demand and pursuit of self-sufficiency? Certainly the territories that were taken, ostensibly at least, in the interests of the native populations, and disposed of on similar grounds and for similar purposes, should not be handed back to their former owner without careful consideration being given to this question.

1. Franz von Epp, "Colonies: A Debate", Living Age, (November, 1936), CCCLII, p. 240.

OPPOSITION TO RETURN

The Fallacies in the "Colonial Advantages" Arguments

The assertion that colonies are of value as outlet valves for the mother country's surplus population is of long standing. The evidence, however, does not substantiate this view. Before emigration can be very large to any territory, the potential emigrants must be reasonably confident that they will be able to survive the climatic conditions of the territory and compete economically with the indigenous population. Furthermore, to be successful, emigration must be a voluntary affair.

The population record of the colonies indicate that, in many instances, the conditions for successful settlement have been lacking. In 1913 there were less than 25,000 Germans in all of the German colonial empire. That is less than one-fourth as many as make their living in the city of Paris, and is less than there are today in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In 1931 there were less than one-half as many Europeans of all nationalities in all the Italian colonies than there were Italians on the island of Manhattan. In fact, though nearly three-fourths of all the territory outside of Europe and controlled by European governments is in Africa, there are more than seven times as many foreign-whites in New York City as all the European emigrants to all of Africa in the last half-century. Of the 19.3 million Europeans of all nationalities who have gone overseas to stay in the last half-century, not more than one-half million have migrated to the territories

over which European countries had political control.¹

The results of Japanese colonial acquisition upon relieving population pressure is no more encouraging. Japan has possessed Formosa for forty-three years, but the Japanese population is only 264,000 out of a total population of five million or about 5.2%. She has had Korea for thirty years, but her population there is only 560,000 out of twenty-one million people, or about 2.6%. Though dominating Manchuria since the Russo-Japanese war, and completely occupying it for the last seven years, prior to 1931 the Japanese population there was less than 1% of the total, and since then the actual number of agricultural emigrants has been only about 5,000, in spite of government subsidies encouraging emigration.² In all these areas today the number of Japanese do not equal the annual increase in the population of Japan itself. The climate in Manchuria is not at all conducive to Japanese settlement, and in all of these territories even the low standard of living of the Japanese cannot compete with the native populations.

Climatic conditions in most of the African territories are not conducive to European settlement. In the former German African possessions, Togoland and the Cameroons must, accordingly, be left largely to the natives. The plateau land of East Africa, and former

1. Grover Clark, "The Dangerous Fallacies of Imperialism", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (July, 1933), CLXXXVI, pp. 6-15.

2. Dr. Hu Shin, "To Have Not and Want to Have", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XCVIII, (July, 1938), pp. 59-64.

German Southwest Africa could absorb white population as far as the climatic conditions go, but there again, there would be no possibility of European laborers competing with native laborers. There is opportunity for lucrative employment of a small handful of colonial administrators, planters with their own capital, the managing personnel of businesses such as mining, banking, shipping and railroads, and officers in the colonial and military police, but nothing like any noticeable percentage of the population.

Population pressure, today, is not synonymous with mere numbers or density of population. It must be thought of in terms of pressure upon the standard of living. Such pressure must be considered in not merely the relationship of the presence or absence of a quantity of consumable goods, but in addition, a mode of life and a set of life expectations. The combination of large numbers and a high standard of living makes population pressure, as a factor in war psychology, vastly more significant than it can possibly be in the case of a low-standard population. An industrial people fight for markets and sources of raw materials, not indeed to prevent starvation, but to safeguard and improve a standard of well-being. This view translates population pressure into economic pressure, and as a cause of war, appears to reach its maximum in a high standard population, having a well-integrated national life and its standard of living is reduced by economic policies applied by other nations.¹ Sir Arthur Salter states the problem

1. Ibid: Frank H. Hankins, "Pressure of Population as a Cause of War", pp. 101-08.

similarly. "There is no such a thing as a surplus population anywhere in the world, except one that is relative to, and caused by, the existing commercial and economic system. There is no reason why a country should not develop a population . . . in a highly industrialized area and still maintain itself if it could draw freely upon the resources of the rest of the world."¹

In the British colonies there is no restriction of immigrants on grounds of race or nationality, and German settlers would be just as welcome as any there. That is not satisfactory to the German leaders however, nor would it solve the problem if it was. "In any case, even the transfer of whole Dominions to the dissatisfied Powers would never solve the problem of an expanding population. The real solution for that problem lies in industrialism."²

Dr. Clarence Little, the well-known biologist, refutes emphatically the over-population argument for colonies. He maintains that a program of stimulating population is a program of war and that the dictators would try to limit population if they really wanted colonies because of that need. "Militarism is the obvious motive for expansion and excess population is to give weight in the councils of nations."³ This view is affirmed by other writers who say: "Reduction of numbers is not wished in any powerful nation. Being surrounded by unfriendly

1. Peace and the Colonial Problem, National Peace Council, p. 6.

2. "Are Colonies a Benefit?" Review of Reviews, May, 1937, v. 98, p. 51.

3. New York Times, January 24, 1937, p. 14:2.

neighbors with a greater population increase causes of German justification for the encouragement of larger number of births."¹

Sir Norman Angell points out in this connection that the British Empire does not relieve England's and Wales's population density, which is nearly twice that of Italy, because the Dominions impose immigration laws on English citizens as well as others. Even if restrictions were not imposed, such immigration would merely increase the Dominion's unemployment problem. He cites the case in 1934, when 20,000 more Britons returned from the overseas possessions as went thereto.² The average British citizen has shown the usual reluctance to emigrate to the African colonies, in the same way that the Italians and Germans have.

The raw material advantage in possessing colonies will also stand closer examination. An examination of the potential sources of raw materials in the former German colonies should be rather discouraging to the ardent colonialist. Excluding British Dominions and India, the former practically independent and the latter approaching that status, all dependent territories together supply a disproportionately small share of the world's demand for raw materials. They lack coal and iron almost entirely. They do supply about 10% of the world's output of nickel, from 10 to 20% of the copper, bauxite and manganese, from 20 to

1. "Levels of Living and Population Pressure", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (July, 1936), CLXXVIII.

2. Norman Angell, Raw Materials, Population and War, (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1936), p. 58.

50% of the graphite and tungsten, from 20 to 50% of the chrome ore, and about one-half of the tin. They also have a practical monopoly of the present natural supply of rubber and of the output of vegetable oils. Of these amounts, however, under the present condition of development, the whole continent of Africa, which is composed mostly of colonies, produces only about 3.6% of the world's output of all raw materials. Their share in the world output is about 5% of the olive and palm oil, 10% of the copra, 3.6% of the natural phosphates, while Tanganyika produces about one-third of the world total of sisal.¹ A study made by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, concludes that rubber is the only very important colonial raw material. Copra and palm oil are almost exclusively colonial materials, but the latter is interchangeable with other vegetable oils from such sources as American cottonseed and Indian ground nuts.²

There are some mineral possibilities in Tanganyika, and some mining development in Former German Southwest Africa, but no appreciable amount in proportion to Germany's large needs. Important natural phosphate deposits are found in Nauru in Oceania. There is some cotton culture in central Africa, sisal in East Africa, and some wool in East and South Africa, but again not an appreciable amount. The principle food products of the former German colonies appear to be cocoa, groundnuts, some

1. John C. de Wilde, "Raw Materials in World Politics", Foreign Policy Reports, (September 15, 1936), XII, No. 13.

2. Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1936, p. 17.

meat, tropical fruits, and some cereal products.¹

A League Commission, appointed to study the problem of raw materials, reaches the conclusion that most raw materials are produced wholly or to a great extent in independent countries; that colonial products are limited in number and quantity, and in cases of necessity become interchangeable with other products through substitution or synthetic production. The present production of all commercially important raw materials in colonial territories of about 5% of the world total production, is a substantially smaller percentage than is the proportion of the population of these territories to the world population, which is about 12½%.²

In a more fundamental sense, nations do not always obtain the raw materials which their colonies produce. As one writer puts it: "Raw materials in general are color blind and recognize no national flag. They follow the laws of supply and demand, distance and transportation costs."³ The colonial raw materials cannot be reserved by the owning country to its own industries, except by extreme state regulation. They are exploited by European companies who sell their goods not to a man because he is an Englishman or Frenchman, but because he can pay a certain price for the product. Raw materials are valuable to exploiters only because they can demand a certain price. If they are to

1. Supra -- see tables at end of study.

2. League of Nations Documents, Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials, Geneva, 1937.

3. P. T. Moon, Imperialism and Politics, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 543.

yield a profit they must be sold, and if political control is used to raise prices customers will go elsewhere to buy. Raw materials are wealth only if the producer can get rid of them, and the State possessing them has but one purpose -- to sell them.

It would appear, then, that the conquest of territory is not necessary to ensure adequate supplies of raw materials. Political "ownership" in Canada by British subjects, does not mean that Englishmen, by virtue of that relationship, but as individuals, own possessions there. Conquest, by the usage of nations, does not change private ownership. In times of peaceful and normal commerce, raw materials of all nations are open to all who can pay for them. No force is necessary to insure the constant supply of all needed materials, for the industries of nations. Access to raw materials is indispensable to any industrial nation, but is not enough in itself. It must be accompanied by the command of markets, which depends upon an efficient industrial structure.

The control of raw materials is of great value only if a country can command all or nearly all of the essential raw materials in its own territory or its colonial possessions.

George Cornwall Lewis points out that if a nation is able to secure raw materials from colonial sources, it must be through the granting of special commercial privileges to the colony's goods. The mother country charges lower duties on colonial products than on foreign goods, and higher prices are the result of purchasing them by the mother country. This expense is higher than it would be if similar

goods were purchased from other countries without such commercial privileges being given colonial goods.¹

Adam Smith likewise criticizes the practice of monopoly of colonial products. The exclusion of the competition of other nations raises the rate of profit both in the new market and in the new employment and draws produce from the old market and capital from the old employment.² He says: "It (the monopoly) depresses the industry of all other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies without in the least increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country in whose favor it is established." It reduces, he maintains, by discouraging industrial development, the wages of labor; by raising the rate of mercantile profit, it discourages the improvement of land and the natural increase of the rent of lands; by raising the rate of profit, the monopoly keeps up the market rate of interest higher than it would otherwise be.

No nation, or group of nations can be completely self-sufficient, nor can they secure political control of all possible sources of raw materials. The United States and Russia, the two richest nations in the world in raw materials, are not totally self-sufficient, the former lacking natural rubber resources and important metals and minerals used in chemical industries, the latter rubber and copper. No readjustment could give any nation more than the British Empire controls

1. Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Government of Dependencies, (Washington and London: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), Ch. 8, p. 147.

2. Ibid: Adam Smith, Essay on Colonies, p. 61, from Wealth of Nations.

at the present time, but that has not alleviated England's troubles. France after fifty years of imperialism is still only 10% self-sufficient. Among the poorest in raw materials, and yet the most prosperous and peace minded nations are the Scandinavian countries, but they are making no colonial demands, or even intimating that they would want them.

The argument that political control is necessary to provide a sure source of raw material and security in time of war is also weak. If self-sufficiency is practically impossible in time of peace, it is still more so in time of war. Access to raw materials anywhere, colonial or foreign, depends upon a nation's ability to keep communications open with the regions where the raw materials are. Political control over these regions has nothing to do with maintaining communications in time of war. Germany during the World War saw the uselessness of political control in the absence of the naval power to keep her trade channels open to them. Similarly, a nation such as Great Britain, that has the ability to carry on trade with colonial territories during war, would not be dependent upon that source only; raw materials could be just as easily secured from Canada, Australia, the United States or Argentina.

One must come to the conclusion then that there can be no solution of the raw material difficulties of the 'have-not' nations through the redistribution of territory. Eugene Staley, in his study of raw material problems holds that shifts in political boundaries can accomplish little unless they wipe out most of the existing boundary

lines and reduce the number of states to a mere fraction of the total number. "In fact, the problem of access could never be solved by the transfer of territory unless whole continents were transferred; the only real possibility of improvement lies in a greater freedom of trade."¹ The remedy consists then in reducing the economic significance of political boundaries. Another student of the problem, Sir Norman Angell, thinks that self-sufficiency, even of a high degree, does not solve the characteristic economic problems of our time, and is no guarantee of prosperity. He says: "The trouble with raw materials is not their scarcity, nor that nations tend to keep them to themselves, nor any difficulty of access; the trouble is to find means of payment."² Any territorial changes to permit self-sufficiency today would not assure it for the future with the rapid advances in inventions and changes in needs. "The reshuffling of colonies and mandated territories might have important psychological effects, but the most drastic reshuffling politically thinkable would not result in any important reduction in the existing raw material interdependence of nations."³ This in general seems to be the consensus of opinion on this point.

It is necessary next to consider the assertion that colonies

1. Raw Materials in Peace and War, Council on Foreign Relations, (New York: 1937), Ch. 1, p. 7.

2. Raw Materials, Population Pressure and War, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936), Ch. 1, p. 11.

3. Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), p. 7.

serve as markets for the manufactured goods of the mother country, and as places for investment of idle capital. There are some that hold that investments do follow the flag; and in the British Dominions, the return on the investments in the colonies has been greater than the profits on trade. There is some excuse for the belief that preference is given in the colonial markets to the goods of the mother country, in the case of nations that practice the application of the mercantilist technique of regulating the economic development of her colonies to make them fit into her own economic system, instead of giving to them a well-rounded economic life of their own or allowing in them equality of opportunity to all countries. The dynamic country of Japan is the worst offender in this however. France also practices it to a lesser degree. In this day of industrial surpluses, it has been suggested that it might pay a country to subsidize a colony which would take surpluses off its hands.

The trade records of Germany and Italy do not throw too bright a light upon the trade advantages of colonies. Of German foreign commerce before the war, 99% was independent of her colonies. About one-half of one percent of her exports went to her colonies. From 1894 to 1913, Germany's trade with all of her colonies, including Kiaochau, was 972 million marks. In the same period, her colonial expenses, not including those for Kiaochau, were 1,002 million marks. Furthermore, while Germany's share of world trade increased between the decades 1894 to 1903 and 1904 to 1913, her share of the trade of her own colonies fell

off from 35.2 percent to 26.6 percent.¹ In Italy the record is still worse. All of her trade with her own colonies, from 1894 to 1932 was 5,561 million lire, or less than one percent of her total external trade in that period. In that same time Italy spent 6,856 million lire, or 1,300 million lire more than the value of all the colonial trade in forty years.² The expenses for these twenty years amounted to \$850 a square mile for every mile of Italy's colonies, almost all of which is barren desert.³

Not one of Japan's colonies has been able to pay its local costs out of local revenues, even including borrowing but not including contributions from Tokyo. The net deficit, after deducting those contributions amounting to 616.8 million yen, amounts to 216.9 million yen. The costs do not include anything for military expenses but they do cover 663 million yen for public works and various other "special undertakings" of the colonial governments.⁴

In the case of the United Kingdom rather surprising figures are found. Since 1894, in the trade with the overseas British countries, a steadily increasing share has been with the Dominion areas which are self governing, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with the other

1. Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 11.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Grover Clark, "The Dangerous Fallacies of Imperialism", The Annals of Political and Social Science, (July, 1936), XLXXVI, pp. 6-16.

4. Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), Table XI, p. 41.

Dominions, by the Statute of Westminster have been freed from the last remnants of any control whatsoever from London; but at the same time the trade of Great Britain with them has increased from less than one-half of their trade to a little under two-thirds. Notwithstanding this, the British share of the trade of India and Ceylon has had complete political control and has spent millions of pounds developing them. This trade has declined from 43.5% of British intra-empire trade in 1894 to 24.2% in 1934. The presence or absence of political control has had only an incidental influence, if any, upon inter-empire trade, it depending upon economic development of the separate territories. J. A. Hobson, in his well known work on Imperialism, condemns all such adventures as uneconomical and trouble-breeding. "Imperialism, whether it consists in a further policy of expansion or in the vigorous maintenance of all those vast tropical lands which we have lately earmarked as British spheres of influence, implies militarism now and ruinous wars in the future."¹ He quotes from Professor Alleyne Ireland to show that, "The total import trade of all the British colonies and possessions has increased at a much greater rate than the imports from the United Kingdom, and the total exports of all the British colonies and possessions have increased at a much greater rate than the exports to the United Kingdom."² Again he says, ". . . while Great Britain's dependence upon her Empire for trade is stationary, the dependence of her Empire

1. Imperialism; A study, (New York: James Pott and Company, 1902), Part 2, Ch. 1, p. 137.
 2. Ibid: Quoted from Tropical Civilizations, p. 125.

upon her for trade is rapidly diminishing."¹ Commenting upon trade conditions in 1901, he notes that, ". . . while imperial expansion is attended by no increase in the value of our trade with our colonies and dependencies, a considerable increase in the value of our trade with foreign countries had taken place."² Quoting from another student of this field, Professor Flux, he says, "The great source of the growth of British colonial trade is very clearly shown to be the growth of trade with the colonies to which self-government has been granted."³ Professor Hobson then comes to the conclusion that, ". . . excluding our commerce with India, the smallest, least valuable, and most uncertain trade is that done with our tropical possessions."⁴ Similarly, it is said, "The only advantage in colonies is to make them prosperous and able to buy from the mother country. To do so, conditions must be mutually agreeable and the colony must be placed on the same footing economically as a foreign country."⁴ Then a conquering nation, to benefit from its victory must let the conquered territory go on in its own fashion as though the conquest had not taken place.

It is a question today whether trade follows the flag. It would seem more likely to go to the most efficient producer regardless of nationality; to the producer, that is, who can lay down goods of

1. *Ibid.*: Part I, p. 37.

2. *Ibid.*: Part I, p. 38.

3. *Ibid.*: Quoted from "The Flag and Trade", Journal of the Statistical Society, (1899), p. 39.

4. Sir Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1913), Ch. 6, p. 118.

quality equal to others at a lower price and on easier credit conditions.
 "It may be safely included that the flag has little influence on trade
 . . . in the tropical countries the trade is small relatively, and an
 increase of thirty persons in their population is less profitable to the
 United Kingdom than an increase of one person in the population of
 Australasia or Canada." He sees in the flag control relief from trade
 restrictions and considers such trade restrictions ". . . They remain
 today the greatest menace."¹ It is possible that political control
 might be utilized to enable national companies to handle, almost as
 monopolies, essential products for national industries. It is still
 possible, however, that such companies would have secured at least
 part of the same trade with the same regions without political control.

To get the benefits that expansion envisages, markets, raw
 materials, profits, the trade to keep men employed and industry sol-
 vent, it is necessary to develop the industries expanded into. Goods
 can be bought by a country only if its own goods can be sold. When a
 colony has reached the stage of development when it yields its greatest
 benefit to the ruling country it has already become economically in-
 dependent of the ruling country, and in time may even become a success-
 ful competitor of the mother country. This has been the case in the
 Philippines and India, where many of the products developed interfere
 with the interests of the producers at home. Britain has also arrived
 at the situation in which British capitalists in India develop cotton
 industries there, that, with low labor costs damage Lancashire mill
 markets. Furthermore, home industry finds it very difficult to get

¹ L. Alleyne Ireland, Tropical Colonization, (New York: Macmillan
 Company, 1899), p. 113.

tariff protection against the low standard of living areas' trade competition, while the Dominions and India do apply tariffs against British products.¹ As G. Cornwall Lewis has pointed out, tariffs imposed to protect colonial industries cause prices at home to be higher than for similar goods bought in the foreign market.

The desire of German colonialists, such as Dr. Schnee, for colonies in order to buy in their own currency and thus avoid having to buy with foreign exchange has encountered difficulties in practice.

"Colonies are very apt to rapidly develop fiscal independence. Dominions such as Australia and the colony of Hong Kong have their own currencies liable to a varying rate of sterling exchange. The exchange restrictions in Australia have been very severe, in fact."

Norman Angell goes so far as to say that in a fiscal position colonies are foreign nations.²

If the hypothesis that colonies might be valuable as a source of markets is accepted, one may still raise the question of what are the possibilities of markets in those areas. The former German possessions are all inhabited by natives of a low social and economic standard of living. It has been estimated that the total income of the native population of British East Africa can scarcely exceed five million pounds.

1. Sir Norman Angell, Raw Materials, Population Pressure and War, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936), p. 24.

2. The Great Illusion, (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1913), Ch. 6, p. 118.

out of which food and taxes must be paid. In 1913 six million natives in British East Africa and Uganda purchased from the United Kingdom only one million pounds worth of manufactured goods which is "not as much as a few score inhabitants of Park Lane would purchase."¹ The natural indolence of the natives of that region is not conducive to any efforts that their own environment will not satisfy. Moreover, the most-favored-nation clause in treaties did secure, up to the time of the depression, equality of access to national markets.

Equality of trade and investment opportunity is provided for in both the A and B mandated territories, the former by the terms of the mandates, the latter by Article 22 for all members of the League. This policy of no discrimination is carried on by Great Britain in most of her colonial possessions. It would seem then that Germany would have no cause for complaint if she should be permitted to go in on equal terms with other nations, (which she is permitted to do in practice) to get those advantages. It cannot be denied, however, that the mandatory does control a greater share of the trade. Local governments naturally obtain their supplies from the home country. In the mandates it is provided that requirements for raw materials or finished products for large public works are to be submitted for international tender, though again the mandatory is permitted to organize, at least in the B mandates "essential public works and services on such terms and con-

1. Leonard Woolf, Economic Imperialism, (London: Swarthmore Press, 1920), Ch. 2, p. 58.

ditions as he thinks just." Government officials are usually the chief consumers of imported goods and naturally prefer the products of their country. The official language, legal system, local business practices and currency all tend to favor the business interests of the mandatory. (In spite of this advantage the mandatory is not the chief supplier of imports in several cases, notably, Syria, British Cameroons, French Togo and Ruondo Urundi.¹)

There is, furthermore, a breach in the open-door policy in allowing the mandated territories to enter into customs unions, provided that the other members of such unions themselves preserve the Open-Door. Portuguese, British, French and Belgian mandated territories have all entered into customs unions with other colonies which fall within the area covered by the Congo Basin Convention. "Obviously, such arrangements discriminate in favour of those other colonies and hence the mother countries."²

Countries holding colonies have all found their maintenance expensive. Creating trade and investment opportunities becomes an added financial burden. British Parliament debates disclosed that, prior to 1926, free grants to Tanganyika were as much as \$772,000; that over \$3,150,000 had been lent, a large part of free of interest for a number of years; that five and one-half million dollars had been raised in open

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press), Appendix III.

2. Ibid.: p. 59.

market for colonial aid.¹ The railroad serving Kenya area still represents an unrefunded cost of twenty million dollars.² Government encourages larger investments in the colonial territories, but profit results from the higher priced products, the expense of which is borne by the home markets.

If Germany wants colonies for purposes of investment, conquest of territory is not necessary to gain investment opportunities. There are British investments in South American and in the United States. The American citizens have large interests in Canadian firms. Shares of colonial and Dominion enterprises can be purchased by capitalists of any nation on any stock exchange. Appendix figures at the close of this study will show large German control over African mining interests though she implies that that is impossible without political control. The only value of colonies is in the possibility of trade with them. That is certainly all Great Britain can get from her Empire, and the probability is that she would get that if even the bonds of tradition and the Crown holding the empire together now were dissolved. "Colonies which do not have that result trade possibilities have little value, and countries which possess this importance for a nation, even though not its colonies, are, in this decisive point a substitute for colonial possessions."³ It follows that Nigeria, one of the few colonies pro-

1. Lord Lugard, "The Right to Possess Colonies", Christian Science Monitor, (October 14, 1936), pp. 1-2.

2. Ida C. Greaves, Foreign Affairs, (July, 1936), XIV, p. 627.

3. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1918), p. 136.

ducing any important amount of any mineral, from which the United Kingdom imports only 400,000 pounds worth of tin, is less valuable to the United Kingdom than Bolivia, from which 2,000,000 pounds worth is imported.¹

There is an obvious difference between the desire for cheaper sources of raw materials, and the desire for colonies as an independent source of supply regardless of cost. The latter is merely an extension of the area of national autarky. When raw materials are developed in colonial territories for this purpose, economic retaliation results. Such production is often uneconomic because more expensive than the natural product purchased on the open market. In this class is the Japanese oil production at the Fushen Colliers in Manchuria, produced at a much higher cost from oil bearing shale rock than it could be purchased on the open market. This is an avowed defense expenditure in the same class as Japanese battleships. Attempts toward self-sufficiency may also explain, in part, Italy's invasion of Albania, with her poor oil resources. Self-sufficiency is merely "a self imposed blockade."² It gives greater financial independence but also gives lowered economic strength which finally effects a country's military strength.

It has been asserted that to attain success an empire must lay the conditions for ultimate failure. An analogy between imperialism in international economy and inflation in domestic policy is drawn. Both

1. Leonard Woolf, Economic Imperialism, (London: Swarthmore Press, 1920), Ch. 2, p. 61.

2. Dr. C. R. Whittlesey, "The Cost of Self Sufficiency", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (July, 1938), CXCVIII, p. 20.

work successfully in their earlier stages, providing a stimulant that energizes. Imperialism through the 19th century was a stimulant giving Western economic system body, vitality and growth. As long as it could be continued without conflict with other civilized powers the system remained outwardly healthy. It can be continued no longer, however, there are no new worlds to conquer and develop. Imperialistic countries can only snatch at other's partially developed areas. "When colonial territories are fully developed and economically independent, they will constitute better markets than they ever did as colonies."¹

One commercial advantage of colonies might be mentioned here, though small in magnitude. English settlers, employees of banking concerns, mines, railroads and shipping countries, in accordance with the practice of colonial tropical administration, are given furloughs of around six months in length, for every two or three years on duty. In Rhodesia alone, it has been estimated there is an annual flow of new cash from there to England of five million dollars in the expense accounts of vacationers, which expense is borne by Rhodesia. There is also a financial benefit to the mother country in ship subsidies. Firms in the colonies naturally tend to ship by means of their own flag vessels, and employees similarly use those ships. In Rhodesia, then, there is an estimated ten million dollars in imports, fifteen million dollars in exports, five million in cash to the home country by vacationers, and

1. Nathaniel Peffer, "The Fallacy of Conquest", Harpers, (January, 1936), CLXXII, p. 136.

ship subsidies to the extent of 2,000 passages.¹

It would appear from the foregoing that political control of overseas territories has not been useful in any important way in relieving population pressure; that it does not, in itself, add to security in time of war, that it does not give significant advantages in access to raw materials, that it does not result in any important amount of trade which could not be secured more dependably and economically by purchase without that control, and finally that the costs of getting and keeping the colonies have been more than any possible profits on colonial trade, especially for those colony holders that have used military force to gain their colonies.

Then Why Want Them?

Opinions differ on the real reason for the German demands for colonies. Some authorities think that the raw material question, though basically economic, has become political, psychological and even pathological. Whether the claimants actually need colonies, or whether their actual needs would be met by possessing colonies is, in the light of world conditions today, not the important question. The important fact is that they say they need them, they have been told over and over that they need them, and they have the power to take them or disturb the peace of the world in attempting to take them.² There is the possibility,

1. W. D. Hubbard, "What Europe Sees in Africa", Review of Reviews, (September, 1936), XCIV, pp. 46-50.

2. New York Times, (January 26, 1937), Sect. VII, p. 4.

seen by some, that Hitler is following Bismark's policy of subordinating the colonial policy to foreign policy, and is raising the colonial issue today to sag the moral strength of Great Britain's position by bringing differences of opinion between portions of the empire over the question of redistribution, to sow discord between the colonial and non-colonial Powers among Germany's neighbors, and to confuse and divide British public opinion. These would be diplomatic objectives well worth achieving in Hitler's program. The difficulty in any reasonable settlement is that dictators do not take part in international conferences to work out, peacefully and equitably, their differences. "The curse of their lives is that they must demand things arrogantly and be given them meekly if their prestige is to be kept keyed up to the pitch necessary for their own continuance in power."² Hitler's declaration for colonies at Nuremberg, in 1936, and since is "nothing more than an attempt to explain to his own people the shortage of raw materials and to hold out to them the hope of meeting these deficiencies by ultimately acquiring territories outside of Europe."³ The demands are a bluff behind which is the effort to sustain agitation and fear to divert the people's minds from the hardships of the Hitler policy of self-sufficiency by harping on the theme of "if we had the colonies back." The psychological appeal outweighs the economic appeal in the demand for

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1. "Germany's Colonial Strategy", Round Table, (December, 1936), XXVII, pp. 106-109.
 2. "Germany and Colonies", Contemporary Review, (April, 1937), CLI, pp. 486-87.
 3. New York Times, (September 11, 1936), p. 24:3.

colonies because, furthermore, it is stimulated by a sense of outrage at the humiliation and injustice of the terms of the Versailles treaty.¹

Hitler may also be finding the colonial loss claim useful as a means of excusing to his people his very obvious territorial robberies in Eastern Europe. He might say, "If we had our colonies back to provide us with raw materials and markets, we should not be forced into taking the land in Europe that becomes necessary to our national existence."

The policy of blackmail that Hitler is using with such successful results in Europe is one important reason for the stiffening of opposition to return the last year. This leads us to the second reason why Germany wants her colonies back and the most important excuse that the mandatories have for holding on to this "worthless territory". This is the military and strategical value of the colonies in a world over which war clouds are looming more ominously all the time. Oswald Villard, writing in the nation, urges that the main reason the dictators have for demanding colonies is in the chance of gaining native man power from them for war purposes. "As long as war continues, I fear we shall have the imperialistic Powers clinging to their colonies in order to squeeze out every black soldier that they can."² France would cling to its colonies for that reason even if they put her deeply in the red. She needs those colored troops more than ever today with her falling

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 7.

2. "Issues and Men", Nation, (February 20, 1937), CXLIV, p. 319.

man-power. The colored troops put in the field by France in the Great War, especially the Senegalese, did very fine work for the Allied cause. The concession of France, which permitted her to recruit troops in her B mandates for imperial defense outside of the mandated territory, is significant in this respect, even though such militarization has not been carried out. There are no detachments of colonial troops in any of the mandates and the natives are not subject to conscription, though in the regular colonies each has its native battalion expertly trained, and presenting a picture of keen, alert smartness.¹

Since the emergence of a formidable Nazi State, and its success in carrying out a policy of intimidation and territorial grabbing, British opinion is becoming more opposed to any further concession which would seem to further that program. "Colonial concessions are impossible when Germany is fostering a war mentality,"² "if British and the South African governments meet such claims before a system of collective peace has been established they are likely to perpetuate power politics instead of destroying them. The war mentality would be encouraged instead of eradicated,"³ Another source comments: "To make concessions for the sake of pacifying Germany would be to repeat

1. A. H. Young, "Brothers to the Gods", Harpers, (September, 1938), CLXXVII, pp. 422-25. In World War, a total of 845,000 natives served in the French Army. In 1917, there were 51 battalions of Senegalese on the Somme; these won great reputation as fighters, and were, for years, regarded as the most effective branch of the colonial military service.

2. New York Times, Editorial, (September 11, 1936), p. 24:5.

3. Ibid.

Ethelred's mistake and the new form of Danegeld would prove as futile as the old.¹

When the colonial demands were first made, Great Britain was opposed to any settlement except through the agency of the League of Nations. By 1937, however, colonial concessions were considered as worthwhile if part of a "general settlement", by which other Powers would give up some of their possessions at the same time. But the general opinion was that Hitler was concerned with colonies only as a bargaining weapon with which he could hunt bigger game.

Opposition of the imperialists and militarists to colonial return revolved around strategical arguments. They contend that restoration of Tanganyika to Germany would cut the British air route from Cairo to Cape Town, of immense importance to imperial communication. Tanganyika, situated facing on the Indian Ocean, if restored to Germany, would in addition, bring German naval power into those waters. The threat of Italian dominance in the Mediterranean Sea has forced Britain to depend upon, as her ultimate "lifeline", the longer but safer route around Africa for access to India and her other valuable possessions in the East. It is urged that if any part of West Africa were restored to Germany this alternate route would be made useless. A British government statement declared that a German submarine base established in British Togoland could control 4,000 miles of ocean. In fact, it is asserted by military authorities in Britain that there is not a single

1. "The German Colonial Question", Round Table, (September, 1936), XXVI, p. 849.

sizable part of the British colonial domain that could be surrendered without making the empire still more vulnerable than it is today.¹

Still others say that if Germany were reinstated she would brew trouble for Belgium in the Congo and for Portugal in her colonies, as well as try to detach the Union of South Africa from the Empire.² This view is reflected by the British Dominion's official statements. Though the government of the Union of South Africa expressed sympathy with the German needs in regard to Southwest Africa, the official policy backed by public opinion, "refuses to contemplate any transfer of the territory from its mandatory status for restoration to German sovereignty."³ Oswald Pirow, South African minister of defense, stated: "In no circumstances can South Africa or Great Britain envisage the return of either Tanganyika or Southwest Africa to Germany. Some other diplomacy must be found to satisfy Germany's colonial aspirations. British Africa is united in a common defense policy."⁴ It is also urged that the return of Southwest Africa would not be wise because of its proximity to the valuable Rand gold fields.⁵

The plea of General Smuts at the peace conference for a Monroe Doctrine for the Southern hemisphere is expressed today by Australia. He said at that time: "The young nations who form the Dominions of the British Empire . . . should not be asked to consent to the restoration

1. New York Times, (November 14, 1937), Sec. 4, p. 5:6.

2. Ibid. (February 19, 1936), p. 11:4.

3. Ibid. (April 29, 1936), p. 10:5.

4. Ibid. (August 15, 1936), p. 9:4.

5. Ibid. (December 2, 1937), p. 21:1.

to a militant Germany of fresh footholds for militarism in the Southern hemisphere, and thus endanger the future of their young and rising communities who are developing the waste spaces of the earth. They want a new Monroe Doctrine for the South as there has been a Monroe Doctrine for the West, to protect it against European militarism.¹ Australia, refusing to enter into any plan of redistribution, asserts that her share of these colonies was purchased with Australian blood; that she had achieved a tremendous task in organizing a health service and stamping out disease which should not be abandoned now. Any plan of transfer to Germany as a mandate would cease to have meaning with Germany's customary scrapping of treaty obligations, and another Siegfried line would be built in the northern part of Papua.² At another time it was stated that Australia would not consider giving up New Guinea because it was essential to Australia's security in providing a demilitarized zone which maintained a condition of equilibrium in the Pacific.³ In answer to the proposal of a "colonial pool" which was to be contributed to by all mandatory powers given to Germany, she placed William M. Hughes in the cabinet as Minister of External Affairs. He was in a good measure responsible for making a clean sweep at Versailles of the German Colonial possessions, and would now deal with any questions

1. G. L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1925), quoted, p. 61.

2. "The German Colonial Question", Round Table, (September, 1936), LXVI, p. 849.

3. New York Times, (March 14, 1936), p. 816.

of return.¹

Belgium, one of the mandatory Powers, refused to discuss any plan of redistribution that would effect the Congo. She will confer only so far as mandates are concerned and is quite ready to discuss the return of Ruanda-Urundi. This attitude is the only exception to the general opposition to any return. Belgium, however, does not consider herself the owner of these territories, and public opinion would not oppose the relinquishing of them as a contribution to a general settlement. Many Belgians, in fact, regret taking the small strip of former German territory ceded to them after the war. It contains many Germans at Eupen which make a disturbing nucleus for German propaganda.²

France's attachment to her colonial empire was demonstrated clearly during the winter of 1938-1939 when Italy made belligerent and pointed demands for colonies. Though her mandated territories are among her less valuable African territories, strong opposition to return of them is apparent. Strategical reasons are also put forward for retaining them. General Jean Filho says that France will not be bluffed into surrendering any of her mandated territories to Germany, as, "The French colonial mandates in Africa are the key to her security, and their surrender to Germany would shortly provoke war anyway."³

France has likewise evinced some interest in the "colonial pool" proposal. This plan proposes that all those Powers holding territory in West Africa shall pool parts of their territory where their

1. Ibid: (November 30, 1936), p. 115.
 2. Ibid: (December 10, 1937), p. 71.
 3. Ibid: (December 2, 1937), p. 211.

boundaries come together so as to form a contiguous area to be given to Germany. Those mandatory Powers not holding colonies in West Africa should compensate the sacrificing Powers otherwise. France emphasizes the need of the German guarantee of good faith and conduct before the colonies are redistributed. She contends, furthermore, that Germany must first rejoin the League, and until she does the Democracies should retain the colonies as the last hold on Germany except the threat of war itself.¹ In respect to this condition, however, German commentators oppose any demand for guarantees by Germany, as "the Reich's claim is a right that cannot be subject to barter and demands for peace guarantees are not only unnecessary but unacceptable."² A German official comments upon Germany's needs as follows: "The Colonial demand is comprised for us today in two words -- in bread and honor. Germany . . . demands for her own that which rightly belongs to her before God and man."³

While the government party in Great Britain, and the militarists of practically all of the colonial Powers oppose return of any territory to Germany on military and strategical grounds, the Conservatives in Great Britain and colonial officials in other countries oppose it on grounds of solicitude for the native welfare.

The French attitude toward restoration on that ground is stated by

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1. Ibid: (November 14, 1937), Section IV, p. 5:6.
 2. Ibid: (November 30, 1937), p. 1:5.
 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), quoted from speech by General von Epp, Governor of Bavaria, p. 7.

the ministry of the colonies as "impossible to return the Cameroons to Germany and expose the natives to the German racial regime." The statement declared that the colony had prospered under French control and that the native population had increased by 300,000 since taken from Germany.¹

Another observer, writing on the native attitude toward return, says that the fear of return is paralyzing investment and industry in Tanganyika; that in South Africa, it is generally feared that Germany would not rule under mandatory provisions solely in the interest of the natives.² Those of German blood in South Africa are attached to the old imperial regime, not the Nazi policies, and realize that they would lose the market of the Union of South Africa if transferred. The Union makes an annual provision of 200,000 pounds to meet the budget deficit of former German Southwest Africa it is stated.³

Lord Lugard, with wide experience in colonial administration, opposes return of colonies under any plan worked out without native understanding and agreement. Such an act would, he says, violate the mandatory pledges not to transfer natives without their consent, and would treat the natives as negotiable chattels. He maintains that the protectorates and mandates think of themselves as much citizens of the British Empire as the inhabitants of the Crown colonies do themselves.⁴

1. New York Times, (April 24, 1936), p. 1014.

2. Spectator, (March 26, 1936), CLVIII, p. 579.

3. New York Times, (April 20, 1936), p. 1015.

4. Lord Lugard, "Africa and the Powers", Living Age, (November, 1936), CXXIX, pp. 199-204.

It will not be out of place to devote a short space here to a discussion of the colonial policies of the various nations in relation to any proposed change in territorial government. Earlier in this study, the charges of misgovernment were largely debunked in regard to Germany, at least after an official colonial policy was set up in 1906. It is still held by many, however, that though German colonial government benefited the colonies as a whole, it was not aimed primarily at benefitting the natives. The Germans practiced the Roman methods of colonization, which, though efficient, and orderly, was severe and military. The native was not regarded as having any value in himself except as a means of supplying raw materials cheaply and enabling Germany to be self-supporting. The possibility of that remains today, if these areas were restored to Germany. Would there be any intention that the natives should gain the benefits of German civilization or have any place in the German empire, or would they merely be something to be exploited in Germany's effort at self-sufficiency?

In Tanganyika today there are 30,000 Indians who can now appeal to Delhi in cases of abuse. What would they do under German rule? There is a Jewish population of between two and three million there also.¹ Would the German policy be any more humane to the Jews there than it is in Germany, or would they be just that many more unfortunates without a country such as the Nazi government has been so prolific in pro-

1. "Positions in Tanganyika", Spectator, (March 27, 1937), CLVIII, p. 579.

ducing recently? The German demand for race purity would not tolerate any inter-marriage, such as the French permit and even encourage; nor is it likely that they would be given any representation in the German government as the French now provide. Still less likely is the probability that Germany would permit any degree of self government as is the British policy in the mandates.

The governing practices of major colonial nations are usually of two types. There is the policy of incorporation, which attempts to destroy and combat all native customs and traditions and to replace them with the culture of the colonizing Power. This is usually accompanied by direct administration by colonial officials who are directly responsible to the Colonial Office at home. French colonial rule is the best example of this type of government. French colonial territories have representation, in many cases, in the French Parliament. Algeria is an example of this practice, having been made into one of the French Departments, with representation in the national Parliament.¹

The French believe in the superiority of their culture, but differing from the British, wish to develop it over the world and impress it upon backward peoples. They try to make Frenchmen out of the Africans, and think that the first duty of the native is to become a good Frenchman in sentiment, and to fight and produce for France. The edu-

1. Aaron M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), p. 106.

cated natives become naturalized citizens of France with the same status as her European citizens. The bulk of the natives are subject to the "indigénat system", with little personal rights and are forced to pay a labor tax.¹

The natives in the French mandated territories, with memories of German arrogance and later British nonchalance, are puzzled by customary sight of French officials with native wives and mistresses, and of subordinate white officials saluting black superiors. Nevertheless, with all the equality in racial feeling between the French and natives, the French have not permitted equality in the administration of the colonies. There are fewer natives in the French administrative departments than in the British. In the French West African possessions, with three times the area of Britain's West African territory, but with only five-eighths of the population, the French have an administrative personnel of 31,000 whites. In Britain's West African territories there is a total white population of only 11,000. The British depend upon natives for technical and clerical staffs much more than do the French.²

The second important type of colonial administration is what is called a policy of autonomy.³ This is one of indirect rule and administration, and is followed generally by Great Britain. The British tend to encourage local customs and institutions whenever they are not

1. A. H. Young-O'Brian, "Brothers to the Gods", Harpers, (September, 1938), CLXXVII, pp. 422-25.

2. D. Whittlesey, "British and French Colonial Technique in West Africa", Foreign Affairs, (January, 1937), XV, pp. 362-65.

3. A. M. Margalith, International Mandates, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930), pp. 107-108.

contrary to public morals. They govern through the native rulers as much as possible, the local leaders are supported and are made full use of in the attempt to raise the level of civilization of the lower classes. As the above population figures indicate, The British do not contemplate settlement by Europeans and do not try to change the natives except in the improvement of conduct and living conditions.¹ The British concentrate on trade development with their colonies, but only to the extent that it does not prejudice native interests, and with a minimum amount of interference with local government.

The colonial chiefs in this administration are given letters of appointment by which they are authorized to rule justly and according to the laws of the protectorate. This is an attempt to restore to the native chiefs the prestige and authority they enjoyed before German control and which they lost by that control. The governing policy goes on the assumption that the system of government must have its roots in the framework of the indigenous society; the natives are to be kindly treated, rewarded when doing well, dispassionately punished when they commit crimes, and carefully and patiently trained to be good Africans, not Europeans.² The administrators are carefully selected and trained in the discipline of the English Public School to play the game according to the rules of sportsmanship.

Colonial experience, on the whole, tends to prove that the policy

1. D. Whittlesey, "British and French Colonial Technique in West Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, (January, 1937), XV, pp. 362-65.

2. A. H. Young-O'Brian, "Brothers to the Gods", *Harpers*, (September, 1938), CLXXII, p. 422.

of autonomy and indirect administration is best liked by the natives. With that they can keep their time-honored customs and traditions, and feel a minimum of coercion and fear. France organizes her colonies with at least half an eye to protection of her Rhineland frontiers, and is trying to develop the resources of that empire so as to free herself from the dependance on outside sources of supply. Value of the exports of her colonies has increased over 200% in three years, one source states.¹ In the mandates, France is making an effort to improve the individual, economic and cultural welfare of the native. The number of natives medically treated during the last four years has increased over 100%, while agricultural commissions have been established for the purpose of indicating to the native farmers the best methods of crop cultivation.²

Quincy Wright thinks that the great majority of the native populations of the mandated territories are not advanced far enough to understand or appreciate any difference between the governing policies of the mandatories and those of the German government. However, those who are advanced sufficiently politically, economically, and socially to comprehend the efforts of the mandatory powers do prefer the indirect rule of the British.²

An observer of native reactions in former German Togoland, which has been in turn under the government of Germany, then under Great

1. *Ibid.* p. 426.

2. Mandates Under the League of Nations, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930).

Britain during the war, and finally under the French mandate, says that a number of natives frankly state that they prefer German to French rule. Others admit that the Germans were extremely severe, but they would welcome the return of the British. Bismark has been quoted as saying, perhaps with reason, that, "The British have colonies and colonists; the Germans have colonists but no colonies; the French have colonies but no colonists." Regardless of the motives impelling the "have" nations to put it forward, the native welfare argument should be the most important factor to be considered in any question of re-distribution.

L. A. H. Young-O'Brien, "Brothers to the Gods", Harpers, (September, 1938), CLXXVII, p. 426. Elizabeth van Maanen-Helmer, in her book, The Mandate System in Relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands, P. S. King and Sons, Ltd., 1929, holds that in the Dominion mandates, particularly in the Union of South Africa, the welfare of the natives is sacrificed to the land policy of the whites, and that the mandate principle is not observed as it should be.

BASIC DIFFICULTIES IN ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS AND TRADE

Underlying Factors

The value of any particular territory as a source of raw materials can only be appreciated through understanding of geographic factors to be considered in relation to access, as well as in relation to the value of the raw material product to the importing country.

Public opinion is too often led to believe that the existence of raw materials in a particular territory means that they are available for economic exploitation. In normal circumstances, however, it is the possibility of exploitation which is of primary importance. For certain minerals, the bulk of which is great in comparison to their value, any more than a relatively small distance from the sea is an almost insuperable obstacle. For instance, raw materials for the heavy industries, coal and iron ore, can, if mining for local purposes be left out of account, be economically produced only in Europe, North America, and within a zone of about sixty miles from the coast in other parts of the world. Phosphates may also be considered exploitable within this zone. On account of the growing industrialism, the most densely populated regions of Asia should be added. The area of profitable exploitation of oil may be extended somewhat, and copper still further. The study carried on by the League of Nations Commission shows almost a complete correlation between the prices paid for the products and the

actual size of the zone of exploitation.¹

The same thing is also true of the cheaper and bulkier vegetable products. One of the most important elements in the selling-price of the cheaper raw materials is maritime freight costs. Thus, for many forms of raw materials, the potential production of the great colonial areas in the interior is not commercially possible because not accessible, just as the potential production in the interior of certain sovereign States is equally impossible or impracticable under present conditions.

The fact is commonly stressed that mineral products occupy a more central position as raw materials for industry than do vegetable and animal products. It is not sufficiently known, however, that the aggregate value of all the base metals, except iron, is much less than the value of the textile raw materials and even less than the value of the materials for the production of vegetable fats. The value of the trade in these metals exceeds that in vegetable oils, however. The League Commission points out that most important countries import substantial quantities of foodstuffs and that these imports are more essential to them than industrial raw materials; for without industrial raw materials the economic structure of the country would be threatened, but without the foodstuffs their population might be exposed to severe privation. The quantity of industrial raw materials which a country can import, depends not only on the price of these raw materials themselves,

1. Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials, League of Nations Document, Geneva, 1937.

but also on the quantity and price of the foodstuffs which it is compelled by circumstances to import, since the purchase of these forms a first charge on its external financial resources.¹

Metals enter into industrial processes at an early stage, leading largely to capital goods. Industrial fats, however, are consumed after very short industrial processes, leading to alimentary or other consumable products; and no very large amount of industrial labor in the importing countries depends upon the supply of these raw materials. Textile raw materials take an intermediate position; they go into industries employing a large number of men, but these workers produce consumer's goods. Furthermore, vegetable and animal products, classified either as foodstuffs or as industrial raw materials, may be said to represent the value of natural resources to a much smaller extent than do mineral products, even including metals extracted from the ores. The price paid for vegetable products, such as cotton and wheat, includes larger wage costs than does the price paid for most mineral products; while metals in particular are the product of comparatively little labor, although form the necessary basis for capital industries.¹

Furthermore, the supply of any raw material is not necessarily composed of the whole output of new goods, but only of that part which the producer or holder is disposed to put on sale. The supply may be considerably greater than the new output, whenever the holder puts on sale previously accumulated stocks. Inversely, requirements cannot

1. *Ibid.* p. 34.

possibly be deduced from demand, and still less from consumption. Demand corresponds only to that part of requirements which the consumer thinks he has sufficient means to purchase. Consumption corresponds only to a part of demand, that part which has been able to be actually satisfied.¹

International raw material problems have become an armament problem today. Because of political insecurity felt by every nation, governments must neglect considerations of standards of living and seek national military power above all else. The difficulties in procuring a number of raw materials have been increased by the heavy expenditure on armaments incurred by most countries. In all countries progress is handicapped by the fact that their industries are partly diverted from manufacture for productive purposes to manufacture for unproductive military purposes. If the countries that are poor, that is, deficient in supplies of foreign exchange employ their reduced foreign exchange which is available for raw materials primarily for purposes of armaments, "they may well have difficulty in obtaining the raw materials required for normal purposes."²

Speaking of this problem, and of the related one of self-sufficiency, Dr. Leo Grebler, writing in the "Annals", says: "If economic resources are not available through international exchange, there is only one way to get them--political possession of territory. Since no country can

1. Professor Gini, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials and Food-stuffs, League of Nations Documents, Geneva, 1921

2. Report of the Committee for the Study of Problems of Raw Materials, League of Nations Document, Geneva, 1937, p. 23.

make itself entirely self-sufficient, a policy of isolation inevitably breeds a lust for resources which happen to be located in more fortunate countries.¹ He maintains that self-sufficiency develops "dynamics of its own-dynamics that pave the way for war."¹ Though a policy of autarky may permit a reduction in foreign exchange resources required for the importation of raw materials, a charge will be imposed by such a policy on the internal economy of the country and its capacity to export will be adversely affected.

The dynamic countries have intensified their foreign-exchange difficulties in several ways. They have erected elaborate exchange controls in order to maintain their currencies at quite artificial levels, and this has caused their goods to be too expensive to find a wide market abroad.² Italy, Japan and Germany have all obstructed their markets by their political acts, Italy by its conquest of Ethiopia, Japan by the invasion of China, and Germany by the persecution of the Jews. The dictator countries have been outspoken on their need for raw materials for their armament industries, and their claim for "cannon instead of butter."³ One member of the Committee appointed by the League of Nations to study the raw material problems, H. Rosenblum, financial expert and representative of the U.S.S.R., recommended that the Committee should show clearly that obstacles, especially of a financial nature, in the way of access to raw materials of which certain in-

1. "Self-Sufficiency and Imperialism", The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, CXCVII, (July, 1938), p. 8.

2. "Are Colonies a Benefit?" Review of Reviews, (May, 1937), XCV, P. 51.

ustrial states complained, were due, in the first place, to their armaments policy, their ambitions and their aggressive acts; that the attention of the Assembly should be drawn to the fact that in these times of political disturbances raw materials were being used by certain States for aggressive and warlike purposes.¹ It cannot be denied, however, that dependence upon insecure resources, whether colonial or foreign, provokes, in a world of power politics, efforts toward greater self-sufficiency, and that this in turn gives rise to volcanic internal pressures demanding strategic as well as economic relief. "In the foreground of the economic aspect of war today is the problem of access to essential raw materials and foodstuffs."²

Regardless of the assertions of the "haves", that no discrimination is being practiced against the "have-nots", the fact remains that there are restrictions which impede the access to raw materials. Some of these restrictions which impede are deliberate in nature, which include all those measures which tend to restrict, divert or otherwise control the available supply of raw materials. These, fortunately, are few in number and rather limited in efficacy. Other restrictions, more numerous and serious, consist of those factors which limit the purchasing power of industrial nations or the effective demand for raw materials. These factors can all be considered as results of the break-

1. Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problems of Raw Materials, Geneva, 1937.

2. "Colonial Raw Materials", The Round Table, (March, 1936), XXVI, p. 607.

down in international trade during the last ten years. The direct restrictions upon access to raw materials will be discussed first.

Sir Samuel Hoare, in addressing the League of Nations Assembly, said: "The view of His Majesty's government is that the problem of raw materials is economic rather than political and territorial. It is the fear of monopoly -- of withholding of essential raw materials -- that is causing alarm. It is the desire for a guarantee that the distribution of raw materials will not be unfairly impeded that is stimulating the demand for further inquiry."¹ He went on to assert that no British colony was withholding its raw materials from any prospective purchaser.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs has made a study of the direct restrictions on access to colonial resources. The first one is the preferential export duty. This may be a normal method of raising revenue, but may also be used to discriminate in favor of the industry or shipping of the mother country. In the British colonial empire, particularly in Nigeria, it is employed in regard to tin. Great Britain, as an investing country, is interested in maintaining or raising primary prices because, though she has to pay the same prices as Germany for these raw materials, she reaps in profits from her investments much if not all of the additional price she has to pay for her needs.² Preferential duties are employed to quite an extent by

1. Record of XVI Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Geneva, 1935.

2. "Colonial Raw Materials", The Round Table, (March, 1936), XXVI, p. 310.

Portugal and France; but neither they nor Great Britain enjoy anything like a monopoly of any raw material. The lack of such a monopoly limits the benefit which they can get from preferential duty application.

A second restriction upon access is any national policy of restricting exploitation of natural resources. Equality of exploitation, as mentioned earlier, is provided in the A and B mandates and in the Conventional Basin of the Congo. In the British colonies the only exception to equality of exploitation is in regard to petroleum, leases for development of which are restricted to British subjects. In cases where concessions are granted to single companies, natural bias is in favor of national concessionaries. This practice gives grounds for complaint when the concession is very large. The only restriction in the Netherlands Empire applies to mining. Foreign companies can obtain mining concessions only when they have their headquarters in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies and when a majority of their directors are residents of either the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies.

France places far-reaching restrictions in the way of foreign capital; and this explains in part why the resources of the French colonies are relatively undeveloped. Belgium also restricts foreign capital in the Congo Basin, despite the Berlin Act and the provision of St. Germain.

The passage of the last few years has witnessed quite a growth in international restrictions schemes, such as commodity control schemes.

1. Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 46-48.

These were established because of the immense expansion of productive capacity during the war which was followed by the sudden contraction of demand during the world depression, and were an attempt to enable all producers to weather the depression. These schemes indirectly restrict access to raw materials insofar as they cause a rise in prices. Potentially they may be open to the criticism that they give rise to the dangers of monopolistic control. The League Committee, in commenting on this possibility, says, ". . . the few monopolies in existence do not constitute real obstacles to the circulation of raw materials."¹ The Committee went on to say that the regulation schemes carried on by the governments have generally been an important factor in the improvement in economic conditions in the producing countries during the depression, as well as an aid to international trade. The Committee, however, ". . . feels that it is very important that the consuming countries should be given every assurance that the schemes will be operated in a reasonable manner."² Abuses of the control practice may be counteracted by the expansion of output by low-cost producers outside the scheme, and by "recovery" of used materials, as well as by the increased use of substitutes. Consumer interests have been regarded in the new tin and rubber control schemes by the appointment of consumer panels to advise in working the control.³ These means of control do not benefit the home country directly, though

1. Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials, Geneva, 1937, p. 21.

2. *Ibid.* p. 20.

3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, p. 49.

larger profits may come to a few, because all consumers, whether nationals or foreigners pay the same price for the raw materials.

The difficulty in regard to direct and deliberate attempts to prevent the industrial nations from getting the raw materials they need does not appear to be great. "On the whole it cannot be said that the supply of raw materials is subject to severe restrictions except in certain cases. Countries producing primary products are generally most anxious to sell them, even at extremely low prices."¹

The real core of the raw material problem must therefore be sought in the insufficient purchasing power of the consumer countries and the causes of this lack of purchasing power. It is commonly known that, as a result of the depression, foreign capital investment very largely ceased. The debtor countries, such as Germany, found themselves deprived of foreign capital, and at the same time found their ability to export was being restricted by the tariff policies of the other countries. The depreciation and devaluation of currencies in most of the major countries of the world enhanced the currency difficulties of those nations that were unwilling or unable to do the same. These countries were therefore obliged to adopt the alternative course of reducing imports as far as possible.

The sharp increase in production in many countries during the last decade has not been accompanied by a corresponding improvement in inter-

1. John C. de Wilde, "Raw Materials in World Politics", Foreign Policy Association Reports, (September 15, 1936), XII, no. 13.

national trade. In 1935 the volume of international trade was still 21% below that of 1929, and the gold value of that trade was 66% below that of 1929. World production, however, as a whole had already reached pre-depression totals.¹

By the spring of 1936 Germany's industrial production had already risen about 80% since 1932, while German exports ran only slightly larger than the previous year and were still 20% below the 1932 average. Maintenance of this production was carried on only by rigorously excluding all non-essential imports, by drawing on the existing stocks, and by exploiting to the limit the domestic sources of raw materials.²

In the policy of economic nationalism, therefore, can be found the main cause for the breakdown in international trade, and the consequent raw material difficulties. "It is a commonplace of elementary economics that so long as trade and investments are free, territorial possession is a matter of secondary importance. If possession involves no discrimination against the foreigner, the fact of possession confers no major gain and its absence no important disadvantages." The author of the above statement goes on to say that if the principles of economic nationalism holds sway, the situation changes. "If it can truly be said by the leaders of a hungry people -- 'Your poverty is the result of their policy. Your deprivation is the result of their possession.' -- then there is grave risk of war." He says also: "It is not possible to conceive of a redistribution of possessions which would put this

1. Ibid: p. 168.

2. Ibid: p. 169.

right. What is needed is a lowering of all those barriers to trade and investment which give the dictators and others a real pretext for the argument that the accident of history which marked out their particular area was also an accident which doomed its inhabitants to an avoidable poverty. Until that is done the danger of war will persist.¹

Economic nationalism is evident in all the barriers to trade that are erected between nations. Under such conditions the tendency to confine economic operations of all kinds within the restricted area of each political unit becomes more marked. This tendency is marked by the tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions which have been raised to prohibitive levels. As one investigator of the problem puts it: "Germany is unable to get necessary raw materials, not because of the lack of colonial territory, but because they cannot pay for them. They cannot pay for them because of the protective tariffs imposed, not only by the colonies having raw materials, but by the United States, the United Kingdom and France."² The refusal of colony "Owners" to take Fiat cars and Solingen steel in exchange for cotton, rubber, palm oil and debt payments forced the debtor countries to similar actions in defense. The tariff erected by the United States and the quotas imposed by France had more disastrous effects on international trade than the barriers erected in reply by Germany and Italy. "As long as there are obstacles to international trade which do not apply

1. Lionel Robbins, "The Consequences of Economic Nationalism", International Conciliation, no. 323, pp. 475-478.

2. Lionel Birch, The Demand for Colonies, (London: League of Nations Union, January, 1936), p. 41.

to domestic trade, it must always be somewhat easier to purchase materials within one's own currency area.¹ International trade still lags behind international recovery. Unless barriers to exchange practically confine trade within national boundaries, a country needs raw materials within its trading area, although not necessarily within its political boundaries. Norman Angell says: "Peace and economic security are not to be found in attempts to make economic nationalism workable, but in the introduction of enough economic internationalism to make possible that degree of political nationalism which we all desire for non-economic reasons."²

A form of indirect restriction upon access to raw material is the system of preferential colonial import duties instituted by the major colonial Powers. The effect of this practice upon the foreign exchange position of non-colonial countries is slight, as foreign exchange can be secured by selling goods in any foreign market that is unhampered by exchange restrictions, while colonial markets represent less than 10% of this world market. More serious, however, is the tendency toward exclusive trade agreements whether bilateral or multilateral. These become especially objectionable only if they are exclusive, not if the low tariff groups are, in practice, open to all countries to join.

The best example of this type of restriction is the colonial pre-

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 34.

2. Sir Norman Angell, Raw Materials, Population Pressure and War, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936).

ferences set up by the Ottawa Conference of 1932, which established imperial preferences over the whole Empire except in the Open-Door colonies and the mandates. This did not contribute to any expansion of world trade and placed countries like Germany at a greater disadvantage in all imperial markets except of those two classes. The British Empire trade amounted to 29.1% of the world total in 1934. France also has a much more extended preferential system with customs unions instituted over the Empire. The French Empire controlled about ten percent of the world trade in 1934. The United States and Japan also discriminate in regard to their own territories. The Netherlands has the most liberal colonial policy, and controls with her colonies, about five percent of the world trade. The open-door is maintained as a matter of principle in her colonies, but import quotas in recent years have been imposed which discriminate against Japan. Belgium, by international treaty, is required to maintain the Open-Door in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.¹

A discrimination in imports is a discrimination in exports. It becomes more advantageous for a buyer to purchase his goods in the country where he can sell his products. The basis of imperial preferences, from the point of view of the colonies, is that the more they take of British goods, the more they will be able to sell in Britain. The converse holds true also -- the less they take of foreign goods the

¹ John C. de Wilde, "Raw Materials in World Politics", Foreign Policy Association Reports, (September 15, 1930), XII, No. 15.

less they will be able to sell in foreign markets. Hence, imperial preferences in the colonies is at bottom a form of discrimination against foreign countries in respect to their access to the things the colonies produce.¹

1. "Colonial Raw Materials", The Round Table, (March, 1936), XXVI, p. 14.

PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION OF THE RAW MATERIAL PROBLEM

"Direct restrictions are not at present far-reaching or important. They are a potential not an actual barrier. Access is hampered far less by them than by indirect restrictions caused by the failure of international trade to revive."¹ This statement seems to be a fair appraisal of the situation. Preceding evidence appears to indicate that raw material problems today are largely armament problems. In view of that fact the first steps should be to take measures to establish collective security against war so that nations can regard war materials in some other light than as armaments. "Among the causes of war are the repressions of economic nationalism, and economic nationalism is intensified by fear of war. The two, like the problems of security and disarmament, must be attacked simultaneously."² Then measures must be taken to reduce economic nationalism so that it will not be necessary for a nation to have political control over raw material sources and markets in order to be sure of access to them in time of peace.

Eugene Staley, in his investigation of the problem of opening up raw material trade possibilities has made several valuable suggestions.³ The first one is to afford secure and equal access for the purchase of

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 5.

2. "Colonial Raw Materials", The Round Table, (March, 1936), XXVI, p. 306.

3. Raw Materials in Peace and War, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), pp. 180-181.

all essential raw materials to all peoples in time of peace and to remove the barriers to trade that give rise to friction such as monopolies, control schemes of various types, and discriminations against foreign investors. A second one is to afford secure and equal access to markets for the raw material industries of producing countries, insofar as their production meets the tests of productive efficiency such as those that would be afforded by free competition with other producers. It must be remembered that feelings of insecurity are not limited to industrial countries. Countries producing raw materials are similarly afflicted with respect to markets for their commodities. Their prosperity and well-being is as dependent upon the sale and exchange of their raw materials as the industrial country is on the sale of manufactured goods. A third object of policy should be to insure that whatever administrative controls are to be operated, either by governments or private combinations, in the field of raw material production and marketing shall be managed on the principles of public interest rather than for the exclusive benefit of the producers. This implies publicity of data and frequent careful study of control scheme operations by outside experts as well as supervision of, or active participation in, control committees by international public agencies. Still a fourth object is to provide for the conservation of exhaustible raw material resources anywhere in the world where important wastes might be prevented by international action.

Paul Van Zeeland, as a result of a rather exhaustive investigation carried out at the request of the League Council, made the

following proposals: Taxes, prohibitions and restrictions on the export of raw materials should be abolished; the complete regime of mandates should be internationalized; the open-door should be applied to all colonies in guaranteeing equality of economic treatment and opportunity in them to all persons irrespective of nationality; privileged companies should be created for the exploitation of colonial territories; and the direct exchange of colonial raw materials in return for the execution of important public works by industrial states should be forwarded.¹ In another place he was quoted as recommending a general tariff truce to be followed by a gradual reduction of tariff duties of exceptional character; institution of most-favored-nation treatment for all international trade with exceptions permitted to combat "dumping" and to regularize regional agreements; the suppression of industrial quotas, but possible retention of agricultural quotas dealing with seasonal problems; and the establishment of an international monetary standard to be followed by the gradual elimination of exchange controls and adjustment of external debts and trade accounts through the Bank for International Settlements. These provisions or as many as possible were to be incorporated in a pact of international collaboration with the five great trading countries, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy taking the lead.²

1. "Proposals for the Removal of Barriers to Trade", World Economic Survey, 1937-38, Geneva, 1937, p. 161.

2. New York Times, (January 28, 1938), p. 1:1.

Lord Lugard contends that difficulty will be encountered in making the idea of a "collective mandate" work. Government by commission has never proved very satisfactory when tried. The dissatisfied nations would have to be given a dominant voice in such collective control to be at all satisfied. The officer appointed as governor would dictate the policy of the mandate and his government would become "de facto" the mandatory. Furthermore, it would be difficult to create a board of qualified men of varying nationalities who could work together in the administrative duties demanded by such control under the League. The present Permanent Mandates Commission is the nearest approach to such a body; but it would be unsuited for the work because its duties are purely advisory and because it has no direct authority.¹

Professor Gini, in his study of the raw material problem, advances three possible solutions which deal with the raw material supply alone. The first plan of solution is the nationalist plan, according to which every nation should have the right to obtain from a territory under its control sufficient raw material and foodstuffs for its own population and industries. This plan could not be completely carried out except to the advantage of certain nations, and from the international point of view it cannot claim to be called a solution. The State solution is the second, according to which all the raw materials and foodstuffs of the world would be acquired by a central organization and equitably distributed by it in the common interest among the various states, ac-

1. "Africa and the Powers", Living Age, (November, 1935), CCCXLIX, pp. 200-204.

ording to the requirements of each. This plan would give rise to many practical difficulties, as well as run counter to the ideas of sovereignty held by the nations of the world. The third solution is that of "Free Trade", which would establish complete freedom of international trade and economic relations among individual states. This plan would only be expedient if a super-state organization could guarantee the continuity of such a policy during a period of economic crisis, and, further, exclude the possibility of wars which would result in destruction of any policy of free trade.

Professor Gini thinks that the first step in any solution should be in the direction of encouraging and assisting in the formation of customs unions among groups of states, followed by efforts to secure representation of the interests of third parties in commercial treaties and conventions between two states.

Lord Lugard is the outstanding advocate of the application of the open-door principle to all colonial territories, which would provide for absolute equality of trade and opportunity for investment in those territories. A very similar proposal is that for the international guarantee of free access to all raw material sources, colonial or otherwise.

Another widely supported proposal is for the extension of the national mandates system to cover all the colonial territory. This

1. Professor Gini, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials and Food-stuffs, Geneva, 1921, p. 30.

would extend the four key proposals of the present B mandates to all colonial territory, namely: the well-being of the native peoples to be considered as a primary trust; the open-door applied to all; no militarization of population or territory; and the annual examination of the mandatory by the Mandates Commission. Under different world conditions, this plan might be worked out, but under present conditions the difficulties in its way would prove insurmountable.

There has also been advanced the proposition of including in the civil service personnel of the mandated territories a certain percentage of qualified officials from foreign lands. This might have a positive effect on a portion of the present difficulty, but a very small portion; and some form of international control would be necessary to make it of any benefit.

Any and all of these suggestions have elements of good and all have possibilities of use in them, but they do not get down to the root of the matter. Reapportionment of territories, changing the administration of the colonies, international chartered companies, any or all of the proposals advanced, can really help the situation only when the underlying causes for the paralysis of international trade and commercial intercourse are done away with. World peace and international good will must be more than catch-words, inflammatory propaganda must cease, coercion or "forcible persuasion" must be replaced by sincere efforts to work out difficulties. All nations, the United States, Great Britain and France, as well as Germany, Italy and Japan, will have to realize that other nations can buy only if they can sell. Inter-

national trade and a constructive nationalism must take the place of strained efforts at self-sufficiency and economic nationalism.

EVIDENCES IN THE RAW MATERIAL QUESTION

The contention that this study is upholding, namely, that the solution of the economic difficulties of Germany will not be found in a territorial redistribution plan, necessitates the submission of evidence upholding that position. To do so, the facts of the raw material situation must be presented.

Raw materials are divided into two classes, primary raw materials and secondary raw materials. The primary group includes, in an approximate order of their importance, the following: coal, iron, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, tin, nickel, petroleum, sulphur, and the vegetable raw materials, rubber, fibers such as cotton, wool, and silk, vegetable oils, and timber. The secondary group includes the ferro-alloys, indispensable to the metallurgical industries which are: manganese, chromium, molybdenum, antimony, and tungsten; fibers such as jute, flax and hemp; the nitrates, natural phosphates, and potash, all of which are being supplanted somewhat by synthetic products, and such industrial materials as graphite, used for crucibles and lubricants, asbestos, and mercury.¹

Of the above-mentioned materials, Germany produces a large share of the world's coal, most of which is excellent for coaling purposes.

¹ John C. de Wilde, "Raw Materials in World Politics", Foreign Policy Association Reports, (September 15, 1936), XII, p. 164.

which becomes of great importance in her steel industries. However, she has to import some of the finer grades of coal for use in producing certain types of steel. Her coal production ranks third in the world and represents 11.26% of the world total. She also has a large surplus of potash, being the largest single source of that and representing 66.34% of the world total. She has sufficient supplies of these two materials only. German production of zinc supplies about half of the domestic requirements.¹ She produces small and far from adequate quantities of iron ore, petroleum, copper, lead, sulphur and wool. Bauxite, rubber, manganese, nickel, chromium, tungsten, antimony, tin, mercury and mica are completely lacking.

In 1913 Germany's iron and steel industry was twice as large as Britain's and four times as large as that of France. She was the chief iron exporting country in the world. As a result of the war, she lost Lorraine and Upper Silesia, and the Saar Basin became part of the French customs union. The dispossession of this territory caused a loss of 80% of her production of iron ore, 38% of her steel works, and 30% of her rolling mills.² She was deprived also of the phosphates of Mauritania, now controlled by Australia and cassiterite from the tin mines of Patino.³

A glance at Germany's chief exports today will throw some light

1. *Ibid.* p. 168.

2. League of Nations Document, Population and Natural Resources, Geneva, 1927.

3. World Economic Survey 1937-38, Geneva, 1938, p. 180.

upon her raw material needs. During 1937 both imports and exports increased. Imports rose mainly as a result of larger purchases of foodstuffs, which was due to the comparatively poor German crops (imports of wheat rose from 74,000 tons to 1,219,000 tons, and of maize, from 172,000 tons to 2,159,000 tons). The most marked increase in raw material imports was in minerals, and mineral ores, the result of re-armament and capital investment. There was a rise in exports due to the increased exports of manufactured goods, practically all of which except textile goods increased during 1937. There was a rapid expansion of German export trade in motor-vehicles, an increase of 79% taking place in such exports between 1936 and 1937.

Quantities of certain articles imported by Germany in 1937 as a percentage of 1929:

Iron ore -----	122	copper, raw -----	100
manganese ore -----	142	cotton -----	73
other ores -----	153	wool -----	62
iron and steel, raw --	121	timber -----	28
coal -----	58	oil seeds -----	57

Germany, in 1937, imported \$2,200,046,000 worth of goods and exported \$2,379,856,000. Her chief imports are wool, cotton, iron ore, mineral oil, wheat, coffee, butter, fruit, timber and copper ore. She imports considerable cocoa, taking almost one-half of the Gold Coast's supply. In 1936 she imported 2,995 metric tons from the French African possessions and 68,857 metric tons from the British African possessions. Germany also imports large quantities of hides, a total of 91,144 metric tons being imported in 1936. Only 4,500 metric tons

were imported from the African territories.¹

The German government has set up special companies for the recovery of iron from poor ore, for distillation of petrol and coal, and for the manufacture of synthetic textiles and synthetic rubber called Buna, for the protection of which a heavy duty on imported rubber is charged. This is all part of the German four-year plan to make Germany independent as far as possible of foreign supplies.

The percentage of total German supplies of goods obtained from:

year	industry handicrafts	agriculture	imports	all sources
1928	55.3	20.5	23.4	100
1932	46.7	30.7	22.6	100
1937	62.7	21.6	15.7	100

The incorporation of Austria may give some benefits in Germany's desire for autarky, but will also create new problems. It eased the German foreign exchange problem temporarily, giving Germany fairly large gold reserves. There may be a loss in foreign exchange in the future however, as goods will be sold to Germany instead of foreign countries. Austria can aid in producing commodities, and has small mineral resources, but is more dependent than Germany upon outside sources for the majority of foodstuffs.²

In the light of Germany's needs, what could the mandates now or in the future offer? In respect to mineral production, South Africa has large iron resources, estimated at about 150 million tons, of various

1. Trade in Certain Raw Materials and Foodstuffs-1936, Geneva, 1937.

2. Ibid. p. 81.

grades, and equally large resources of coking coal. Copper is quite important, coming mostly from the Belgian Congo. Rich deposits occur also in Southern Rhodesia. Some mining is being carried on in South Africa but not in large quantities. Gold is mined extensively in Africa which produces the largest amount of any continent. A total of 435,000 kg. comes from Africa as a whole in 1936-37, and 364,986 of that came from the Union of South Africa, mostly from the Transvaal. Southern Rhodesia also has rich deposits. Some gold has been found in the Gold Coast region, and New Guinea has also produced considerable quantities in recent years. Tanganyika produces the most of any mandate however, which was 2,350 kg. in 1937. The mandates cannot be said to be very valuable as a source of gold, as very little of the total is produced in the mandated territories. Southwest Africa has considerable quantities of lead ore, also some zinc. Most of the African deposits of the latter are in Rhodesia.¹ In view of the mineral possibilities it can be seen that the mineral raw material deficiencies of Germany could not be met to any appreciable degree by restoration of the mandates, as practically all the mineral development or potentialities are in parts of Africa other than the mandated territories.

Of the textiles produced in Africa, cotton is the most important. The greatest production is carried on in Egypt. Tanganyika is capable of large development on this product if better transportation can be provided and irrigation carried out in certain districts. Many sections

¹ J. H. Vanstone, The Raw Materials of Commerce, (London: Putnam and Sons, 1929), II.

of Africa could be developed for cotton production if better transportation and a more efficient organization of native labor and supervisions could be provided. Sisal is an important African textile product. It is of coming importance in the Gold Coast; east and south Africa grow it extensively, and it is possibly the most important product in Tanganyika, where one-third of the world production is grown. Rubber is found in the various varieties of wild rubber plants on the east and west coast of Africa. It is little exploited at present, but with better development of transportation facilities it might become profitable. Vegetable oil is an important African product. West Africa is the world's chief source of palm kernel oil and east Africa supplies large amounts of ground nuts. Cereals are not produced extensively in Africa, though maize is of considerable importance in Kenya, Portuguese East Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Wheat is produced only in South Africa and Rhodesia in any quantity, and they supply only two-thirds of their own needs. Sugar is raised in large quantities in Queensland and Natal, while Kenya and Uganda also produce some. Oranges and bananas are raised in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Coffee production is increasing in East Africa, especially in Tanganyika and Kenya. Cocoa is of the greatest importance in the Gold Coast, which is the largest cocoa producer in the world, supplying over one-half of the world's supply.¹

1. Ibid.

Colonial Statistics

During the five years preceding 1914, the average advances by the German treasury for colonial expense were roughly 60 million marks yearly. While a considerable part of these sums were spent for purposes giving fair promise of being ultimately reproductive, as a business venture, the colonies were a failure, considering that German trade with them during the same period averaged only about eighty million marks yearly.

Trade Figures

1909	61.8	million marks
1910	85.4	" "
1911	82.2	" "
1912	91.3	" "
1913	94.6	" "
Total	415.3	million marks

Colonial Deficit

year	colonial revenues	colonial expenses
1904	12.7 million marks	133.8 million marks
1905	13.4 " "	196.6 " "
1906	16.5 " "	161 " "
1907	21.7 " "	167.5 " "
1908	22.4 " "	215 " "

Expenses incurred by Germany for her African colonies in 1913
(in thousands of marks)

<u>colony</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Deficit</u>
East Africa	13,489	20,078	6,589
Cameroons	8,712	13,059	4,435
Togoland	3,308	3,974	666
Southwest Africa	31,238	46,589	14,351 ¹

The shift from German to mandate control has apparently not

¹ George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, Ch. 3, p. 25.

materially affected the development of the total trade of these areas. While the export balance under German control changed from an import excess of 19.9 million marks in 1904 to an export surplus of 2.1 million marks in 1913, the balance was again "unfavorable" by the equivalent of 7.2 million marks in 1935. Both in 1929 and 1933, however, the British mandate areas showed substantial export surpluses (equivalents of 7.6 and 17.8 million marks respectively) while the French and Belgian mandate regions had import surpluses (equivalents of 14.8 and 7.4 million marks respectively). The British areas have thus served more as sources of raw materials than as markets, while the French and Belgian mandates have served more as markets than as sources of raw materials.¹

Area and Population of Mandates:

I. British mandates ²	Area	Population
Southwest Africa (Union of South Africa)	322,393 sq. mi.	240,520 (30,420 Europeans)
Tanganyika	366,632 " "	5,063,660 (8,455 ")
Cameroons	34,081 " "	797,512
Togo	13,041 " "	293,714
New Guinea (Australia)	693,000 " "	666,000 (3,191 ")
Western Samoa (New Zealand)	1,135 " "	55,946
Nauru, (British Empire)	8 " "	2,692
II. French mandates ³		
Cameroons	166,489 " "	2,300,000 (2,300 ")
Togo	20,072 " "	733,606

1. Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), Table 3.

2. World Almanac, 1939, p. 193.

3. Ibid. p. 232.

Area and Population of Mandates (contd.)

III. To Belgium ¹	Area	Population
Ruanda-Urundi	20,535 sq. mi.	3,509,094 (932 Europeans)
IV. To Japan ¹		
Total of 623 islands north of Equator. Total area of all of them is only 629 square miles.		
Marianne (or Iandrona) Islands		64,819 population
Marshall Islands		9,700 "
Caroline Islands		23,222 "

Above figures from 1929 census. There were 21,422 Japanese in 1930 in all the islands, chiefly in Marianne group. Seat of government is in Paoa in the Caroline Islands.

The British Cameroons are attached administratively and for commerce figures computation to Nigeria. Similarly, British Togo is attached to the Gold Coast. French Togo is attached administratively to Dahomey, but production and commerce figures are computed separately. Ruanda-Urundi is united administratively to Belgian Congo.

Mandates	Trade Statistics of Mandates ²	
	Total commerce (in old U.S. gold dollars, 1937)	
French Cameroons	7,400,000	
Gold Coast	46,400,000	(British Togo included)
Nigeria	56,700,000	(British Cameroons included)
Ruanda-Urundi	1,800,000	
Southwest Africa	10,900,000	
Tanganyika	16,400,000	
French Togo	2,000,000	
Japanese Mandated Islands	4,300,000	
Nauru	1,300,000	
New Guinea	7,300,000	
Western Samoa	900,000	

1. Ibid.

2. League of Nations Document, Statistical Year Book, Geneva, 1938.

Export and Import Figures:¹ (1937) (in dollars)

	Imports	Exports
Gold Coast (British Togo included)	58,920,000	78,661,000
Nigeria (Br. Cameroons included)	85,500,000	96,000,000
Southwest Africa	11,682,000	18,485,000
French Cameroons	9,142,000	12,529,000
French Togoland	3,555,000	3,386,000
Tanganyika	18,624,000	27,767,000
Ruanda-Urundi	2,370,000	3,047,000
New Guinea	6,433,000	12,359,000
Western Samoa	846,000	1,523,000
Nauru	846,000	2,201,000

Commerce of B Mandates with Different Countries:² (1934)

Tanganyika	
Imports	Exports
27.6% from United Kingdom	20.5% to United Kingdom
19.7% from other British possessions	36.4% to other British possessions
9.8% from Germany	11.7% to Germany
British Cameroons	
19.5% from United Kingdom	6.2% to United Kingdom
42.2% from Germany	79.8% to Germany
French Cameroons	
25.8% from France	52.2% to France
17 % from United Kingdom	3.5% to United Kingdom
French Togo	
16.1% from France	47% to France
39 % from United Kingdom	8% to United Kingdom

British Togo

Percentages from British Togo are omitted in view of negligible value of its foreign trade. In 1934 its imports totaled 14,480 pounds, and its exports, 78,143 pounds.

Ruanda-Urundi	
18.5% from Belgium	93.4% to Belgium
34.5% from Japan	

1. World Almanac, 1939, p. 351.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and Colonies, Appendix III.

Raw Material Production of the Mandates

I. Tanganyika

coffee, 1937-38, 138,000 metric quintals exported
 tea, 1937-38, 221,000 pounds exported
 salt, 1936, 9,000 metric tons produced
 tobacco, 1934-35, 1,071,000 pounds
 sesamum, 1937-38, 47,000 metric quintals exported
 copra, 1937, 76,000 metric quintals exported
 cotton, 1937-38, 117,000 metric quintals exported
 cotton seed, 1937-38, 273,000 metric quintals produced
 sisal, very important, one-third of world production
 tin ore, 1936, 20 metric tons
 gold, 1937, 2,350 kg.
 tungsten, 1936, 1,000 kg.

II. Southwest Africa

maize, 1936, 60,000 metric quintals produced
 gold, 1936, 126 kg. produced
 tungsten, 1936, 28,000 metric tons produced
 copper, 1932, 2,400 metric tons produced
 lead ore, 400 metric tons produced
 lead smelter products, 400 metric tons produced
 silver, 1932, 6,100 metric tons produced
 vanadium, 1936, 540,000 metric tons, largest source in the world.

III. British Cameroons

cocoa, 1936-37, 45,000 metric quintals
 palm oil, 1936-37, 18,000 metric quintals net exports

IV. French Cameroons

cocoa, 1936-37, 286,000 quintals
 palm oil, 1936-37, 100,000 quintals
 palm kernel oil, 173,000 metric quintals
 maize products, 1936, 342,000 quintals
 sesamum products, 1934-35, 35,000 metric quintals
 ground nuts, 1936-37, 372,000 metric quintals
 gold, 1936, 500 kg.

V. British Togoland

cocoa, 1936-37, 215,000 metric quintals

VI. French Togoland

cocoa, 1936-37, 25,000 metric quintals
 palm oil, 1936-37, 17,000 metric quintals
 palm kernel oil, 97,000 metric quintals
 copra, 1936, 30,000 metric quintals exported
 ground nuts, 1936-37, 60,000 metric quintals produced
 cotton seed, 1935-36, 38,000 quintals produced
 cotton, 1935-36, 15,000 quintals produced

Raw Material Production of the Mandates, (continued)

VII. Ruanda-Urundi

maize, 1936, 376,000 metric quintals produced
ground nuts, 1936, 14,000 metric quintals produced
gold, 1936, 422 kg. produced
potatoes, 1936, 1,210,000 metric quintals produced

VIII. New Guinea

copra, 1937, 776,000 metric quintals produced
gold, 1936, 7,029 kg. produced
silver, 1937, 3,000 metric tons produced
cocoa, 1926, 1,000 metric quintals produced
raw hides of cattle, 1936, 1,212 metric tons exported

IX. Western Samoa

cocoa, 1936-37, 11,000 metric quintals produced
copra, 1936-37, 132,000 metric quintals produced

X. Nauru

natural phosphates, 1936, 556,000 metric tons produced

XI. Japanese Mandated Islands

maize, 1937, 2,000 metric quintals produced
copra, 1936, 122,000 metric quintals exported
natural phosphates, (Palau Islands) 70,000 metric tons, 1936
cane sugar, 1935-36, 491,000 metric quintals produced¹

GERMAN STATISTICS

Mineral Production and Control by Germany

Aluminum, produced in 1934 37,200 metric tons, 21.8% of world production;
controls 142,999 metric tons in Italy

Bauxite, produced in 1934 6,560 metric tons, .3% of world production.

1. For all figures on Mandate production see: Statistical Year Book, 1937-38, League of Nations Publication, Geneva, 1938; also see "Population and Natural Resources", League of Nations Economic Conference Documentation, Geneva, 1927; and Trade in Certain Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 1936, Geneva, 1937.

Copper, produced in 1934, 25,970 metric tons, 2.0% of world production, controls in Southwest Africa, 11,300 mine production; owns in Austria, 21,100 metric tons mine production, and in Czechoslovakia, 2,500 metric tons mine production.

Iron ore, produced in 1934, 4,213,869 metric tons, 3.4% of world production

Pig iron, produced in 1937, 15,706,000 gross tons,¹

Steel, produced in 1937, 19,536,999 gross tons.

Lead, produced in 1934, 57,000 metric tons, 4.2% of world production, now owns 7,500 metric tons in Austria, and controls 13,300 metric tons, mine production in Southwest Africa.

Zinc, produced in 1934, 142,467 metric tons, 7.7% of world production, now owns 3,960 metric tons in Austria and controls 11,000 metric tons in Poland.

Gold, produced in 1934, 200 kg.

Silver, produced in 1934, 116,734 kg.

Vanadium, produced in 1934, 515 metric tons.

Non-Metals

Barite, produced in 1934, 354,868 metric tons.

China clay, produced in 1934, 841,480 metric tons.

Coal

anthracite and bituminous, produced in 1934, 136,228,000 metric tons, lignite, produced in 1934, 135,995,000 metric tons, together 21.3% of world production.

Fluorspar, produced in 1934, 70,045 metric tons.

¹ William P. Rawles, The Nationality and Commercial Control of World Minerals, (American Institute on Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, Inc., 1933). All figures on control of minerals, and the 1937 figures are quoted from this work. For the other figures quoted see, U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Raw Materials, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937).

Graphite, produced in 1934, 17,535 metric tons, in Bavaria only.

Gypsum, produced in 1934, 810,000 metric tons, 10.3% of world production.

Mangnesite, produced in 1934, 11,100 metric tons.

Petroleum, produced in 1930, 1,285,000 bbls crude oil, controls 1,024,000 bbls, domestically produced .09% of world crude production in Argentina.

Phosphate rock, produced in 1930, 735 metric tons, in Prussia only.

Potash, produced in 1934, 1,329,428 metric tons, approximately 63% of world production.

Pyrites, produced in 1934, 230,000 metric tons.

Sulphur, produced in 1934, 27,760 metric tons, recovered from gases and pyrites.

Talc and soapstone, produced in 1934, 6,934 metric tons.

Basic slag, produced in 1934, 1,342,000 metric tons, first in the world with 32% of world total.

Super phosphates of lime, produced in 1934, 660,000 metric tons.

Germany's chemical industry is still the outstanding one of the world. She exported 23% of the world's chemical needs in 1926. In 1924 the total value of the world's chemical industries was eighteen milliards of gold marks of which Germany produced 17%. Germany produced 11,790 metric tons of artificial silk in 1924, which increased to 59,800 metric tons in 1936, showing the importance of the chemical industries in just one field.¹ Germany's production of wool is quite small, producing 34,599,000 tons in 1936. German production of tobacco in 1936 amounted to 74,846,000 pounds.

¹ Population and Natural Resources, Geneva, 1927, and Statistical Year Book, Geneva, 1938.

German Production of Food Products in 1936-1937

Wheat -----	169,387,000 bushels
Oats -----	393,690,000 bushels
Barley -----	159,236,000 bushels
Rye -----	301,558,000 bushels
Hops -----	22,271,000 pounds
Potatoes -----	1,702,070,000 bushels (excelled only by Russia.)
Sugar -----	12,622,00 short tons from sugar beets

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