

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION: ITS REGIONAL ASPECTS

by

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INTRODUCTION

The planning and negotiations resulting in the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations involved problems of regionalism. The relationship of regional arrangements and understandings to global organization arose in both cases. In the preliminary planning for the United Nations considerable attention was given to the idea of structuring the organization along regional lines.

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the political and security aspects of United States policy concerning participation in regional arrangements and organizations, and their relation to those of a more global or universal nature. A secondary aspect involves a consideration of the idea and possibility of erecting a post-World War II international organization upon a regionally structured foundation. These considerations involve the following general questions: What was the nature of United States regional interests? What were the effects of these interests on United States policy toward global organization? What, of regional significance, resulted from this policy? Although this study does not extend beyond the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, it should facilitate future study in the field of regionalism and United States policy.

Since World War II there has been a movement toward regional organization. This study was undertaken, first of all, because of a

general interest in questions of a regional nature and prospects for regional organization.

At present, the United States is a member of a considerable number of regional organizations and arrangements and it also aids and supports many others. A second reason for this study was the desire to investigate the preceding regional policy of the United States in order to provide a background for a study of its recent activities.

The United States has also, for over half a century, been a leading participant in the various institutions comprising the Inter-American system. This system now expressed in the Organization of American States stands today as the oldest and most highly developed system of regional co-operation. A particular interest in the regional activities of the American republics constitute a third reason for this study, although they are discussed only to the extent that they aid in accomplishing the purpose of this study.

Parts of this story have been told in memoirs, histories, and short studies dealing with particular aspects of this policy or with regionalism in general. However, no study seems to be available which recounts and examines United States policy with respect to regional organizations and arrangements and which deals in particular with official views of the relationship of these to organizations of a more global or universal nature.

"Regionalism", a comparatively new term, has not yet acquired an accepted precise definition. According to Hedwig Hintze, "It was first used in 1874 in the works of Provincial poet de Berluc-Pérussis but

did not come into wide currency until the 1890's."¹ In this early use, as it does today outside international relations,² regionalism refers to an area within a state in which there is an inclination toward provincialism or sectionalism. As used in this study, it is the concept, doctrine, or theory of organizing states on a regional basis. This includes a regionalism which is opposed to universalism, as well as that which is in conjunction with and complementary to universal undertakings.

"Regional organization" is a process. Just as universal international organization is the process of organizational efforts among all states, regional organization is a process of organizational efforts among certain states.

The problem of determining just what constitutes a region is one which has plagued geographers and students of international organization alike. It is said that when geographers speak of a region:

...they imply a comprehensive idea of an area with its natural formation and resources, natural equipment, railways and communications, and population. Areas characterized by certain unifying features, from the geographer's point of view may be characterized as a natural region.³

However, the noted geographer Richard Hartshorne, after carefully

¹Hedwig Hintze, "Regionalism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, XIII (1950), 208.

²Rupert Vance, "Implications of the Concepts 'Region' and 'Regional Planning,'" Papers of the American Sociological Society, XXIX (August, 1935), 85-93.

³Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Regionalism in World Politics," International Conciliation, No. 419 (March, 1946), 117.

examining several prominent theories for determining regions,¹ points out that "not only are laymen unaware of regions as definite objects, but in few if any cases would geographers agree on how much of the earth is included in a single region."² Furthermore, "...it is not possible to define sections of the earth surface as regions that form units in reality;...we cannot correctly consider them as concrete individual objects."³ While stating that, "...the fundamental function of geography--the understanding of the differences between different areas--requires the geographer to divide the world arbitrarily into areal parts,"⁴ Hartshorne concludes that "the region itself, we find is not determined in nature or in reality. We cannot hope to 'discover' it by research, we can only ask the most intelligent basis or bases for determining its limits...."⁵

A multitude of definitions of the term "region" have been formulated by students of international relations. This has led one scholar to correctly point out that, "Although regional organization is an accepted fact, just what constitutes a geographic 'region' capable of furnishing

¹Professor Richard Hartshorne fully discusses the various theories in chapters ix and x of The Nature of Geography (Lancaster, Pa.: Association of American Geographers, 1939).

²Ibid., p. 251.

³Ibid., p. 281.

⁴Ibid., p. 361.

⁵Ibid., p. 284.

a basis for such organization is a moot question."¹

A region would seem to be a geographical area which is either generally recognized as a region or is delimited by agreement by those states which comprise it or have a special interest in that area.

However, Professor Hill correctly points out that:

In practice it appears that a "region" in the field of international organization is more a matter of assumed interests than geography. Even where the geographic element is present it is only in the sense that the participants are neighbors, not in the sense that in some scientific way they constitute a geographic region.²

It can be said that a region is any part of the earth's surface which is recognized and delimited for a particular purpose. For this study, the purpose is generally that of establishing organizations and arrangements of a political and security character.

Simply stated, a "regional arrangement" is provided by a treaty or agreement which has a regional character. Regional arrangements may be designed to serve a variety of purposes. These purposes may be political, military, economic, cultural, or some combination of these. The framers of the United Nations Charter considered and refused to define regional arrangements. One definition proposed was that by the Egyptian delegate:

There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature groupings in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, com-

¹Norman Hill, International Organization (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 85.

²Ibid., p. 88.

munity of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations.¹

The proposal was rejected by Committee III/4 of the Conference on the ground that while it "clearly defined obvious legitimate and eligible factors for a regional arrangement," it probably failed to include all the situations which might be covered by such an arrangement.² To the framers of the Charter, according to Hans Kelsen, "the intended meaning of the term 'regional arrangements' is treaties concluded by some, not all, Members of the United Nations."³ In other words, an arrangement among a limited number of states is implied, although they need not be located in a closely defined geographical area.

Regional arrangements take a variety of forms. They may simply set down certain rules for the relations among the states concerned or they may establish an elaborate organization with permanent institutions and organs. Thus, a "regional organization" is that institution which is established by means of the regional arrangement. The United Nations Charter uses the term "regional agencies" which for all practical purposes is synonymous with "regional organizations" as herein used.

¹U.N. Information Organizations and U.S. Library of Congress, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, XII (1945-1954), p. 850. Hereinafter cited as UNCIO Documents.

²Ibid., p. 701.

³Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1950), p. 320.

A "regional understanding" is different from a regional arrangement. It is much less concrete and more ambiguous in nature. Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

It is not clear, however, that the Monroe Doctrine was, or is, a regional understanding. A regional understanding "may be entirely without machinery for the implementation of common policies. It suggests more of a common attitude than an integrated or even concerted action."¹

These definitions have their weaknesses and would perhaps not be suitable for a discussion of certain regional problems. For the needs of this study unduly circumscribed definitions would possibly eliminate from consideration certain aspects of regional organization, while all-inclusive generalizations would handicap attempts at a clear discussion.

The following arguments are usually presented when the question is raised: Are regional arrangements desirable among members of a universal organization?²

¹Norman Palmer and Howard Perkins, International Relations (2d ed. London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1957), p. 767.

²Only the most important aspects are presented here. For a more complete discussion of these and other aspects, see Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations, Eighth Report (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1953), pp. 27-34. cf. Pitman B. Potter, "Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organization," American Political Science Review, XXXVII (October, 1943), 850-62. Sarah Wambaugh, "Regional Versus Universal Solutions," Regionalism and

1. Security. Those favoring regional arrangements contend that states can more advantageously organize their defense by participating in a regional agency. This can be done better than is possible either through a universal organization or individual action. Even with modern weapons, defense is largely regional. If a group of states, with mutual confidence, have a common interest in defense from the same source of possible aggression, then it is beneficial to all concerned to engage in joint defense planning, preparation of bases, and acquisition of material. A universal organization may contain potential enemies; thus a regional arrangement provides opportunity for closer collaboration and cooperation. Historically, at least, states have usually defined their interests regionally, such as the Monroe Doctrine of the United States.

The universalist would contend that regional arrangements tend to decrease security as the situation is less stable among a few competing "blobs" than among many individual states. Although the arrangement may provide security within the region among its members, it may be viewed as a menacing threat to other states and groups of states. Problems of security are, for the most part, the concern of all states not just a few.

2. Pacific Settlement. On the one hand it is felt that procedures of peaceful settlement can be more effectively organized among states within a region than on the larger, global basis. Certain problems are

World Organization (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1944), pp. 44-54. More contemporary is Inis Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1956) pp. 111-25.

of a local nature and need not concern states outside the region. States having no direct interest could, if they became involved, hinder the disposition of the problem. It is said that states within a region have a certain degree of political community and mutual understanding which facilitates pacific settlement.

On the other hand it is held that the universal organization is more effective than the regional for pacific settlement of international disputes. Disinterested and distant third states can be utilized for mediation, investigation conciliation, or arbitration. The prestige of the universal organization would also assist in bringing states together for the settlement of their problems.

3. Co-operation. Some believe that regional arrangements promote international co-operation among the members. States within a region may have a high degree of political, economic, and social community so that it not only provides a base for effective political and military action for common defense, but it may lead to co-operation in trade, health, education, etc.

Those favoring the more universal organization contend that in many cases states in close proximity actually have little community of interest while having more in common with states which are quite distant. Regional arrangements could, rather than facilitate co-operation, promote imperialism or big-power hegemony vis-à-vis the smaller states in the region. Through an effective international organization the smaller states can be better protected from such a situation. This argument assumes that a region is of a geographical character, but as has been said, this is

not necessarily the case.

The foregoing discussion was not presented with the purpose of justifying either view. The validity of each argument depends on the circumstances of a particular regional arrangement. It is not possible to present a general characterization of regional arrangements as desirable or undesirable.

A useful observation, to which this writer fully adheres, is one by Pitman B. Potter:

The principal task of the student of international organization is not to waste time debating over regionalism versus universalism, but to study the ways in which, in concrete cases, the two principles can be utilized in combination and the standards to be applied in determining the dosage of each to be adopted.¹

The first chapter of this study attempts to demonstrate early United States interest in the Western Hemisphere and the American system. Chapter II examines the attempt of the United States to assist in the establishment of the League of Nations, the first international organization of a global nature, and the implications of regionalism involved therein. The third chapter discusses the planning for international organization within the Department of State from 1939 to 1945, in which basic decisions concerning regional and universal approaches were made. In the fourth chapter the attitudes of the Latin-Americans are considered. The events at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace and their significance for regional organization are discussed. Chapter V is concerned with the attitude toward regionalism of the United States

¹Potter, op.cit., p. 862.

delegation to the San Francisco Conference and the influence of other delegations on this attitude. The events of regional significance are described from the point of view of the United States position. Chapter VI contains the summary and conclusions.

Nearly all of the reference material used in making this study was obtained from the University of Oregon library. There was a considerable amount available on the San Francisco Conference and the developments in the field of regionalism which have followed the Conference. There were also adequate materials available dealing with the development of Pan-Americanism. Publications covering the other areas of this study were somewhat less than desirable as there has been relatively little written about regional organization, the League and regionalism, and the planning by the Department of State for a post-World War II international organization.

In dealing with the League of Nations, the outstanding collection of documents and commentary by David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, was especially valuable. Also useful was Volume Four of The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, edited by Charles Seymour.

The United States Department of State publication, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation was a necessity as it contained much information not otherwise available on Department of State activities concerning international organization from 1939 to 1945. Also helpful during this period were Cordell Hull's Memoirs and Sumner Welles' The Time for Decision.

For analyzing the events at San Francisco, the Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco,

were essential. Ruth Russell's, A History of the United Nations Charter, provided a useful over-all picture of the planning and activities from 1939 to 1945. This book, the newest and most comprehensive history of the United Nations to date, also included several Department of State documents which have not yet been otherwise made public.

CHAPTER I

EARLY INTERESTS IN THE "AMERICAN HEMISPHERE"

The foundation for the interest of the United States in Latin America, and indeed the "inter-American system," is to be found first of all in the commercial and cultural contacts between the thirteen colonies of English America and their neighbors to the south.¹

The interests of a more political nature with regard to Latin America originated in the relations of the United States with Spain and Portugal, and the other European powers, especially England and France. A summary of the important stages of United States policy in connection with Latin America will suffice to point out reasons for concern in this area and the development of the idea of the inter-American system. It will also provide an example of the developing interest of the United States in a region.

The region of the "Americas" or the "Western Hemisphere" is of particular importance in the study of United States policy toward regional organization. Efforts in regional co-operation in this area have exceeded by far any attempts by the United States toward such co-operation in other areas, and as a result there now exists in this region the most highly developed system of regional organization in the

¹See Harry Bernstein, Origins of Inter-American Interest: 1700-1812 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945).

world today.

With the political turmoil in Spain brought about by the installation of Napoleon's brother on the throne, President Jefferson put before his Cabinet the question of what policy to pursue toward the adjacent Spanish territories of Mexico and Cuba. The Cabinet, on October 22, 1808 agreed that sentiments should be expressed by agents of the United States to influential people within the two territories, making it clear that the United States could not now commit itself to any future course of action but would be:

...influenced by friendship to you, by a firm belief that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repugnance to see you either under the subordination to either France or England, either politically or commercially.¹

Thus, prior to the actual outbreak of revolt in Spanish America, the President of the United States had expressed a similarity of interests with areas of Latin America.

In 1813, former President Jefferson gave further expression to the idea of a distinct American system. In a letter to the expert on South America, Alexander von Humboldt, he observed of the struggling revolutionary governments of Latin America:

...In whatever governments they end, they will be American governments, no longer to be involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe. The European nations constitute a separate division of the globe; their localities make them part of a distinct system; they have a set of interests of their own in which it is our business never to engage ourselves. America has a hemisphere to itself. It must have a separate system of interest which must not be subordinated to those of Europe. The insulated state in

¹Samuel Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and co., 1943), p. 27, citing Cabinet Memoranda.

which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail it that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them.¹

The writings of Jefferson at this early date (ten years prior to Monroe's famous Message), clearly demonstrate that the idea of the Western Hemisphere and the American system as separate and distinct from the Old World was already quite developed.

The official policy of the United States toward the conflict between Spain and her colonies was one of neutrality. There were strong advocates for the recognition of the independence of the Latin-American states, the most vocal being Speaker of the House, Henry Clay. In a speech before the House on March 25, 1818 he declared that:

In the establishment of the independence of Spanish America, the United States have the deepest interest.... This interest concerns our politics, our commerce, our navigation. There can be no doubt that, Spanish America once independent, whatever may be the form of the governments established in its several parts, these governments will be animated by an American feeling and guided by an American policy.

We are their great example. Of us they constantly speak as of brothers, having a similar origin. They adopt our principles, copy our institutions, and in many instances employ the very language and sentiments of our revolutionary papers.²

In May of 1820, Henry Clay, supporting a resolution which favored sending ministers to several South American governments, exclaimed:

¹Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, XIV (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), p. 22.

²Samuel G. Inman, Problems in Pan Americanism (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), p. 136, citing U.S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., March 25, 1818, p. 1482.

It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the center, and in which all South America will act with us. In respect to commerce we should be most benefited.... We should become the center of a system which would constitute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World.... In spite of our coldness towards them, ...I have no earthly doubt, if our government would take the lead and recognize them, that they would become yet more anxious to imitate our institutions, and to secure to themselves and to their posterity the same freedom which we enjoy.¹

The United States, on June 19, 1822, became the first state to exchange diplomatic representatives with any of the newly established Latin-American governments. Recognition was accorded not only because the proper prerequisites existed and because of the desire of the United States to see the established republican governments maintained, but also because if it was withheld any longer the future relations between the United States and these governments might suffer.

President Monroe sought the advice of Jefferson in connection with Foreign Secretary George Canning's proposal of a joint declaration regarding any attempted European reconquest of Spain's lost colonies. Jefferson replied:

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. ... [Our] object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to interfere with the affairs of our [American] nations. It is to maintain our principle, not to depart from it. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.²

¹John Bassett Moore, Henry Clay and Pan Americanism (Frankfort, Ky.: Kentucky State Bar Association, 1915), pp. 6-7, citing U.S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., May 10, 1820, pp. 2226-27.

²Lipscomb, op. cit., XV, pp. 477-80.

The ideas which Jefferson had expressed in the years 1808 to 1813 are, for the most part, the principles included in Monroe's Message to Congress in December of 1823. His influence is clearly seen in the following pertinent excerpts from Monroe's Message:

...In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. ...With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious. ...The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. ...We should consider any attempt on their [the European powers] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. ...We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [the Latin-American states] or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. ...It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord.

Obviously, the statement by Monroe was a unilateral declaration of his administration. First and foremost, the interests of the United States were stressed. In this sense it can be said that it was a declaration for the defense of the United States. In effect, Monroe had established around the United States a defense zone which included all the independent states of the Western Hemisphere. However, in doing this the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed what had been recognized by Jefferson and others for several years: that there was, in the region of the Americas--the Western Hemisphere--an American system which was essentially distinct and apart from that of Europe. The states of the American system had in common certain ideals, practices, and institutions which could not be subjected to possible destruction from Europe. It was felt that the interests of the United States were more

immediately connected with those of the Americas.

With an understanding of the principles of Jefferson and the background of Monroe's Message, as well as its content, it is clear that there were strong elements of an American region and system which for the United States held high interest. This does not necessarily mean that this was merely a restatement of old policies. All of the concepts expressed in the Message had been put forth before, but not as an official policy of the Administration of the United States government.

It is important to note, as Professor Whitaker points out:

...Far from being a mere extension of existing policy, it marked the emergence of a new policy, namely, a special policy towards Latin America which was based on different principles from the policy of the United States toward the rest of the world.¹

Early projects of the Latin Americans toward confederation and the formation of a continental union among themselves and even the United States² had existed prior to the outbreak of the revolutions.³ Little interest was shown by the United States as the projects seemed doomed to failure.

Simón Bolívar did not send to the United States his invitation of December 7, 1824 which he issued to the various Latin American states for the purpose of meeting at an American Congress in Panama. However,

¹Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), p. 518.

²Joseph B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: its Beginnings (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), pp. 307-11.

³Ibid., pp. 263-311.

Vice-President Santander of Gran Colombia and Guadeloupe Victoria, President of Mexico issued an invitation to the United States with which the Central American States concurred. In explanation of the invitation Santander said:

With regard to the United States, I have thought it advisable to invite them to join us in the august assembly of Panama, as I am firmly persuaded that none among the allies will fail to see with satisfaction those sincere and enlightened friends take part in our deliberations upon subjects referring to our common interest.¹

President Adams was favorably inclined toward the Congress. Henry Clay, Secretary of State, already having in mind "A League of Freedom from the north to Cape Horn on the south, with its eastern and western frontiers the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,"² was eager to accept the invitation. However, it seemed advisable for Adams to approach the United States Congress cautiously, for slavery in Spanish America had been abolished and Haiti, a Negro state, was about to be recognized by the Spanish Americans. These factors were by no means conducive to the Southern members of Congress to support the United States sending representatives to a congress where an anti-slavery attitude prevailed.

Upon presenting the invitation to Congress, Adams found himself faced with the problem of perhaps going contrary to the traditional policy of avoiding all entangling alliances and foreign connections. When he was asked if accepting the invitation might perhaps change this

¹James Brown Scott (ed.), The International Conferences of American States, 1889-1928, I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. xxi.

²Ibid., p. ix.

traditional policy Adams replied that he was indeed mindful of the advise of Washington, but it must be taken into account that the domestic and external conditions have now become more favorable to the United States in the realm of foreign policy making.

As Adams observed, the purpose of the mission to Panama was "neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility to any other nation."¹ The President seemed to feel that the states of Latin America had certain ideals and principles similar or identical to those of the United States. It might very well be appropriate to have closer relations with the Latin Americans where such was not the case with Europe and its antagonistic system. Accordingly he said:

Those colonies have now been transformed into eight independent nations, extending to our very borders; seven of them Republics like ourselves, with whom we have an immensely growing commercial, and must have, and have already, important political connections; with reference to whom our situation is neither detached nor distant; whose political principles and systems of government, congenial with our own, must and will have an action and counteraction upon us and ours, to which we can not be indifferent if we would. ...America has a set of primary interests which have none or a remote relation to Europe ...and if she [Europe] should interfere, as she may...we may be called, in defence of our own altars and firesides, to take an attitude which would cause our neutrality to be respected, and choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, should council.²

¹Whitaker, op. cit., p. 574, citing U.S., Congress, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 834.

²Scott, op. cit., p. xi.

Adams was still basing his policy upon the national interests of the United States, but they now seemed to be somewhat broader. He not only pointed out the aspects of the American system which have previously been mentioned but now hinted at a new aspect of the American system, the principle of inter-American consultation.

Finally, after considerable debate the Senate approved the two appointed delegates and Congress appropriated the necessary funds. As is well known, neither of the United States representatives reached the Congress in Panama. One had died on the way and the other was informed that the Panama Congress had adjourned. Thus, prolonged debate in Congress had prevented United States representation at this first large-scale inter-American Congress.

It is useful, however, to look briefly at the instructions given to the United States delegates by Secretary of State Clay. They were not to enter into a discussion on the subject of the future prosecution of the war with Spain, but were to confine themselves to subjects in which all the American states, belligerent or neutral, would have an interest. With regard to commercial intercourse no special privileges were to be sought. The most-favored-nation principle was to be observed.

In connection with the Monroe Doctrine, the delegates of the United States without committing the parties to the support of any particular boundaries or to a joint resistance in any future cases, were desired to propose a joint declaration that each American State, acting for and binding only itself, would not allow a new European colony to be established within its territories.¹

Also included were instructions to inform the Latin Americans of

¹Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

the willingness of the United States to act as arbitrator in any boundary disputes; to express the preference for republican institutions, but to make it clear that the United States would refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of all states.

In these instructions the aversion of the United States to alliances is evident. But, the proposal which would have called for a joint declaration against further colonization of the American continents could be looked upon as a rudimentary step toward "continentalizing" a portion of the Monroe Doctrine. Principles of republicanism, non-interference, and peaceful settlement, which are indeed present elements in the American system of co-operation, were also included.

In summarizing the state of affairs between the Latin Americans and the United States, as well as the mutual interest in an American system, it can be said that there was a reciprocal feeling on the part of the Latin-American states and the United States that they stood in special relation to each other. On the part of the Latin Americans this feeling was not always a source of pleasure; but when all allowances have been made, it is probably true that at the end of the period under discussion:

...there existed in Latin America both a considerable sense of gratitude to the United States for its sympathy and aid during the struggle for independence, and also the belief that the two Americas possessed common interests based on their geographical propinquity and the similarity of their political institutions.

There was also a desire for cooperation among the independent states of America, not excluding the United States. Then, as in our own day, there were many persons in both the United States and Latin America who found the same desire expressed in the "American system" of Monroe's famous message; but on this point Monroe and his contemporaries left it to future generations to forge their own policy.¹

¹Whitaker, *op. cit.*, p. 601.

During the period from the Congress of Panama of 1826 to the assembling of the First International Conference of American States in 1889, the United States and the Latin-American states acted as isolated neighbors. The United States was preoccupied with westward expansion, civil strife, and the building of a nation. Latin America was busy with its own civil wars and interstate conflicts, as well as intermittent attempts at confederation. Conferences involving only the Latin-American states were held to promote co-operation. At one of these, the Conference of Lima in 1864, the government of Columbia expressed the opinion generally held by most of the governments, that the United States should not attend the Conference. It was felt that the United States was too involved with its own problems, as well as the fact that its policy was adverse to all kinds of alliances. These attempts among the Latin-American states toward greater co-operation accomplished little. In summary, this period of over a half a century was characterized by a lack of Pan-American co-operation.

The first serious effort toward Pan-Americanism¹ brought about by the initiative of the United States took place in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Stimulated by the doctrines and efforts of Henry Clay, Secretary of State James G. Blaine was the leading exponent of the inter-American system and Pan-American co-operation.²

¹For an exhaustive discussion of the meaning and implications of the term "Pan-Americanism", see Joseph B. Lockett, Essays in Pan-Americanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939), pp. 1-22.

²For Blaine's attitude toward Pan-Americanism, see Ibid., pp. 51-69.

As Secretary of State under the late President Garfield, Blaine issued on November 29, 1881, with the approval of the new president, Chester A. Arthur, an invitation to all the independent states of North and South America to participate in a general congress to be held the following year in Washington, "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." However, with the assassination of Garfield and the presidency assumed by Chester A. Arthur, Blaine resigned and the invitations were withdrawn by the new Secretary of State Frelinghuysen. The new secretary of state had convinced the President that it was highly unlikely that, "partial confidence extended to 'selected friendly nationalities,' would conduce to peace."¹ He was also afraid that an exclusively American conference might be looked upon as an affront by friendly European powers.

Several bills were introduced into Congress authorizing the President to call an inter-American conference. Finally, on May 10, 1888 a bill was passed to that effect.² In accordance with the provisions of the act, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard, under President Cleveland, issued an invitation to the independent Latin-American states to meet in Washington in October of 1889, for the purpose of promoting trade and preserving peace among the free nations of the hemisphere. Other objects of the proposed conference included: the formation of an American customs union; the establishment of a uniform system of customs regulations; the

¹Ibid., p. 61.

²For the text of the Act, see Scott, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

establishment of free and regular communications between American ports; agreement upon uniform patent, copyright, and trade-mark laws; the acceptance of a uniform system of weights and measures; and agreement upon a definite plan of arbitration for the American states.¹

As if by an act of fate the champion of Pan-Americanism, James G. Blaine was again Secretary of State, being appointed by the newly elected President, Benjamin Harrison.

Blaine² welcomed the assembled delegates on October 2, 1889 with the declaration that, "No conference of nations has ever assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions so vast and to contemplate the possibilities of a future so great and so inspiring."³

However, the results of the conference were somewhat disappointing.

The specific objects of the conference were ineffectively acted upon.

The one tangible achievement of the meeting was the establishment of the International Union of American Republics which was shortly thereafter represented in Washington by the Commercial Bureau of American Republics, a regional agency for gathering and exchanging economic, scientific, and cultural information among the American states.

Not only was there the tangible result of the formation of the

¹For the text of the United States invitation, see Ibid., pp. 5-6.

²See Lockey, "Blaine and the First Conference," Essays in Pan-Americanism, op. cit., pp. 71-84.

³William S. Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations with the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 393, citing International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon, I (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1890), pp. 39-40.

Commercial Bureau of American Republics, now known as the Pan-American Union, but perhaps even more important was the less tangible achievement of the precedent set by the conference of 1889-1890. It was the first of what has now been a long series of inter-American conferences to discuss problems of common interest.

In summing up the work of the conference, its resolutions and recommendations, Secretary Blaine said:

If this Congress had only one of its acts to be proud of, we should call the world's attention to the reasoned, confiding and solemn consecration by the two vast continents of the maintenance of peace and prosperity, the offspring of peace. We look upon this new Magna Charta which suppresses war and substitutes arbitration among American governments in its place, as the first result and most important one of the International American Congress.¹

The Conference paid a fitting tribute to Secretary Blaine, the successor to the "Pan-American" heritage of Clay, Monroe, and Jefferson, when he was acknowledged as largely responsible for the Conference itself.

In tribute to the United States for its role toward inter-American co-operation the Latin-American delegates passed a resolution declaring:

That in behalf of our respective Governments we hereby tender to the Government of the United States of America our heartfelt thanks for its kindness in inviting the American Governments to meet at its national capital, on a peaceful, laudable, and profitable mission, and for the uniform courtesy with which we have been received and treated.²

Successive conferences were held in 1901-1902, 1906, and 1910, but no real progress was made in strengthening the political, economic, and

¹Inman, op. cit., p. 199, citing International American Conference, op. cit., II, p. 1167.

²Scott, op. cit., p. 47.

social ties between the United States and the other American states.

Intervention by the United States in various parts of Latin America coupled with the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine seriously hampered any Pan-American progress which might have been possible and served only to increase the fears of the Latin Americans as to the intentions of their more powerful neighbor to the north. However, the bond between the American states was much closer than that prevailing between the states of the world as a whole. The Union of American Republics was, for the most part, tentative in character. While certain common interests existed among its members, the Union lacked significant institutional character.

In summary, the United States from its earliest days had been interested in the Americas to the south. Jefferson, Monroe, and Clay felt that the Western Hemisphere should harbor a system separate and distinct from that of Old World Europe. This system was to involve republican institutions, self-government, non-intervention, and mutual co-operation. The United States although having a primary and particular interest in the Americas did not, however, really visualize the establishment of any institutions or arrangements for Pan-American co-operation until the efforts of James G. Blaine. Even then, these were rudimentary attempts. The real spirit of Pan-American co-operation did not appear until the late 1930's.

CHAPTER II

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

President Woodrow Wilson was an internationalist, but it has been said that he graduated "from regionalism to universalism."¹ The regional aspect of Wilson's policy toward international organization was arrived at with the assistance of his aide, Colonel Edward M. House. With the failure of European diplomacy and the outbreak of war in Europe, Colonel House was anxious to develop "a positive and permanent Pan-American policy, based upon the principle of conference and co-operation."² According to House: "It was my idea to formulate a plan, to be agreed upon by the republics of the two continents, which in itself would serve as a model for the European nations when peace is at last brought about."³

Wilson was enthusiastic and his first draft of a proposed Pan-American Pact included the following interesting point:

Mutual guarantees of political independence under republican form of government and mutual guarantees of territorial integrity.⁴

After further drafting, negotiations with various Latin-American

¹Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 125.

²Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), p. 207.

³Ibid., p. 209.

⁴Ibid., pp. 209-10.

ambassadors were undertaken. However, the Pan-American Pact was pushed to one side because of election activities at home and concern with the events immediately prior to the entry of the United States into the war.

The Pan-American Pact episode is important not only because it was the first time the United States had sponsored such an idea but more important, "Both in its specific language and in its general intent, the Pan-American Pact is the immediate prototype of the Covenant of the League of Nations."¹

Whether Wilson "graduated from regionalism to universalism," or as Professor Arthur Link maintains: "Since his youth...he had dreamed of an international association, a 'parliament of man,' based upon the American federal model,"² Wilson seemed to adhere to the League idea gradually. The European war was an important factor in developing his ideas on international organization. The situation presented at home and abroad "shook him loose from any sense of isolation and impressed upon him the role which the United States might play in an association not merely American, but world-wide in character."³

Colonel House, returning from talks with British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, brought with him a proposal that the United States and

¹Ibid., p. 232.

²Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 94. This position is also supported in Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), pp. 43, 331.

³Seymour, op. cit., IV, p. 2.

Great Britain join efforts to construct a League of Nations following the end of the fighting. President Wilson found the idea acceptable and in a letter to House on November 11, 1915 he said that Grey's ideas about a League contained the necessary program. According to Professor Buehrig, Foreign Secretary Grey saw a League as a means for bringing American power into play in a Europe which was seemingly no longer able to control itself.¹ "Grey was endeavoring through the new world to redress the balance of the old." Grey saw the League in terms of the European problem with it as a device for channeling American power and influence. Wilson, on the other hand, was much more idealistic and saw the League as an independent force in the world with universal application.

Wilson, on May 27, 1916, addressing an organization known as the League to Enforce Peace, declared his support for a League to preserve the peace of the world. He said that it was his belief that the American people would wish their government at the close of the war to favor an universal association of nations to preserve the freedom of the seas "and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world."²

Three days later in response to critics warning against "entangling

¹Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), pp. 273-74.

²Ray S. Barker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, IV (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), p. 188.

alliances," the President declared:

I believe that the people of the United States are ripe for entrance into an international league whose main object shall be to guarantee international justice and right in the whole world. George Washington warned us against mixing ourselves up in other peoples' conflicts or alliances. I shall never myself consent to any alliance that would mix us up in conflicts between other nations, but I shall be glad to join an alliance which will unite the peoples for keeping the peace of the world on the basis of universal justice. Therein is liberation; not limitation.¹

In conclusion, Wilson felt that there was "no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for."

Wilson's Secretary of State Robert Lansing was not fully in accord with Wilson and House on the ideas to be expressed in the speech of May 27. Lansing was ill and had not been consulted as to the content to be delivered, but he felt it his duty to frankly give Wilson his view on the subject.

In a letter to Wilson, Lansing said that he was in general accord with the principle of an agreement to submit all differences not settled by diplomatic negotiations to arbitration or a board of inquiry. He saw, however, no practical means by which parties could be compelled to submit disputes. Lansing was concerned with the effect of such a forced settlement upon the United States. "I do not believe that it is wise to limit our independence of action, a sovereign right, to the will of other powers beyond this hemisphere."²

¹Ibid., p. 195.

²U.S., Department of State, The Lansing Papers, I: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 17.

More important perhaps was Lansing's position on a universal organization with the necessary power to force peaceful settlement. He was convinced that the Senate would reject a treaty framed along such lines. The Secretary of State then, perhaps still under the influence of the regionalism of the earlier proposed Pan-American Pact, suggested that:

It is possible that the difficulties might be obviated by the establishment of geographical zones, and leaving to the groups of nations thus formed the enforcement of the peaceful settlement of disputes. But if that is done why should all the world participate? We have adopted a much modified form of this idea in the proposed Pan-American Treaty by the "guaranty" article. But I would not like to see its stipulations extended to the European powers so that they, with our full agreement, would have the right to cross the ocean and stop quarrels between two American Republics. Such authority would be a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine and a greater menace to the Pan-American Doctrine.¹

In Lansing's letter can be found the first position taken by a high official of the United States which included the concept of regional organizations on a world-wide basis.

President Wilson, addressing the Senate on January 22, 1917, discussed the place of a League to enforce peace in the postwar world.² Having fully "graduated to universalism" Wilson made it clear that, "No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war...." Recognizing the need for a system of "collective security" and the danger of alliances he maintained that mere agreements would not make peace

¹Ibid., p. 18.

²For complete text, see Barker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-14.

secure. A force must be created, greater than that of any one nation or of any alliance or projected alliance, so that no combination of powers could withstand it.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity,...that all nations should henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power.... There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When we all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. ...They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

This statement by Wilson raises the question of the compatibility of the idea of universal preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations of the world and the Monroe Doctrine. The former became embodied in Article 10 of the League Covenant while the alleged threat to preservation of the latter was used as a prime objection to the Article and the Covenant itself.

On February 28, 1917 Lodge, in the Senate, made his first public statement in which he definitely parted company with Wilson on the idea of a League of Nations. As for Wilson's proposal that the nations of the world adopt the Doctrine of Monroe, Lodge observed:

...the Monroe Doctrine is strictly local in its application; that is, it applies only to the American Hemisphere and is based on the theory that there are two spheres in the world which are entirely separate in their political interests.¹

¹For complete text, see Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), pp. 270-96.

Pointing out that the first portion of the Doctrine asserts that the American Continents are not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power, Lodge asks, "How is this proposition to be turned into a world doctrine?" It would follow that:

If all the European powers accepted that doctrine and agreed with us that they would attempt no colonization here we should have the recognition of the doctrine by European powers, but the doctrine would apply to the same territory as before.¹

Wilson's next official statement concerning a League to enforce peace was included in a message to Congress on January 8, 1918. The United States had been at war for about nine months and the President was stating what he expected to be accomplished following the war. Included in this message were his famous Fourteen Points upon which peace should be based. Point Fourteen called for:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

It was clear that Wilson was calling for a world-wide association to preserve the peace. He concluded that if peace were to be maintained, all states would have to subordinate their special, immediate interests to the common, long-run interest of preserving a system of international law and order. General co-operation of all nations through a League was the best prospect. All states would have to regard an attack upon one as an attack against all, rather than each state seeking security individually or in concert with several allies. There should be no place for special

¹Ibid., pp. 282-83.

groupings or blocs. This he made clear in an address delivered in New York on September 27, 1918:¹ "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations." Alliances, special groupings, and secret understandings went hand-in-hand with the Old World practice of balance of power. A League would eliminate the need for both. Furthermore, the existence of alliances or special power groupings would hinder the proper functioning of any League truly devoted to peace and co-operation among the states of the world. The only hope for the world was "a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights." As far as he was concerned, "only special and limited alliances entangle." The United States would not be a party to any such alliances.

President Wilson had not undertaken a study of the details of a League as he was primarily occupied with the prosecution of the war. It is also said that he did not wish a program formulated which he might later have to oppose.² However, after his Fourteen Points Speech, demands for formulating a plan became stronger and Wilson realized that the leadership of the League movement might pass to unofficial hands if action was not initiated.

On July 8, 1918 President Wilson asked Colonel House to rewrite the Phillimore draft. Wilson had apparently not read the British Plan

¹For complete text, see Barker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 253-61.

²Seymour, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 8.

and his request to have it rewritten has been regarded as nothing more than the desire that there should be an official American plan when the peace conference met.¹ The President did suggest that it be written "along the lines" of House's letter to Lord Robert Cecil in which House had included ideas of territorial guarantee and obligatory international police action against an aggressor (later these concepts became part of Article 10 and 16 of the Covenant), which struck at the tradition of American isolation.²

Shortly after receiving the House draft, President Wilson set forth his First Draft covenant. It was completed about August 15, 1918. The draft included, of course, a guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity of the members as well as provided that the contracting parties shall unite in coming to the assistance of a contracting party against which hostile action has been taken, "combining their armed forces in its behalf." Wilson's First Draft was the last pre-Armistice plan for the future League. It was not widely publicized because of Wilson's fear of premature discussion on details and methods of such an important undertaking.

Secretary of State Lansing was opposed to the positive guarantee of Wilson's draft of August, 1918, which provided that the Contracting Powers would act together to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of the states concerned. Lansing in a memorandum to Wilson

¹Felix Morley, The Society of Nations (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1932), p. 15.

²For text of House's letter to Cecil, see Seymour, op. cit., IV, p. 24.

on January 7, 1919,¹ proposed a negative guarantee. This meant that states rather than agree to act together in the event of aggression, would instead obligate themselves in a covenant "not to violate the territorial integrity or political independence of any party to the agreement." In criticizing the positive guarantee, Lansing said:

In the United States the positive guarantee is...openly opposed for national reasons. Its opponents declare...that to agree to joint coercion of an American republic would permit an interference with American affairs by European nations and destroy the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism; and that to bind the United States to unite in coercive measures would be violative of the traditional policy of the United States to abstain from "entangling alliances" with European governments.

Needless to say, the President was unconvinced by Lansing's arguments and went forward with his plans for a more positive guarantee.

When President Wilson arrived in Europe, he found the British in the midst of an election and the French as yet unprepared for the Conference. The President spent the next month touring Europe explaining to the world the value of a League and the position of the United States. He made it clear that:

If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination of power that is not the combination of all of us.²

It is interesting to note that at nearly the same moment this

¹For complete text, see David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, I (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), pp. 29-30.

²Denna Flemming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 100, citing Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, I (New York: n.n., 1924), p. 591.

utterance was being made Premier Clemenceau of France pleaded in the Chamber of Deputies for the making of alliances, and received an overwhelming vote of confidence.

Prior to the beginning of the Conference, Wilson on January 10, 1919 had completed his Second Draft of a covenant, known as Wilson's First Paris Draft. Article III contained a guarantee clause for the political independence and territorial integrity of League members, which caused David Hunter Miller, the legal adviser for the United States delegation, to assert:

Such an agreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine.

What the United States has done, is doing and will do for Europe, is enough, without making an unmasked sacrifice of her interests and those of Latin America, by giving up a policy which has prevented the countries south of the Rio Grande from being like Africa, pawns in the diplomacy of Europe.

That the future of the United States should not be left to inference but be beyond doubt or questions the constitution of the League of Nations should contain an express recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.¹

Mr. Miller then drafted the first suggestion for a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine:

The Contracting Powers recognize as a binding principle that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any extrinsic Powers.²

Wilson's Third Draft, based directly upon his Second, was formulated with the aid of suggestions from General Tasker Bliss, Colonel House, Secretary Lansing, and David Miller. Wilson, however, refused to elimi-

¹Miller, op. cit., II, p. 71.

²Ibid., p. 72.

nate the affirmative guarantee clause of Article III of the Second Draft. He did add the phrase "as against external aggression," for guaranteeing each others political independence and territorial integrity. Secretary Lansing again suggested that the Contracting Powers "guarantee against one's own acts, instead of a guarantee against the acts of another."¹ To Wilson, the affirmative guarantee was to be the essential part of any proposed covenant.

Lord Bustace Percy made the first real attempt at the amalgamation of the British and American drafts. The importance of this effort was that it led to the first real Anglo-American draft, the Cecil-Miller draft of January 27, 1919. Lord Robert Cecil and David Hunter Miller were able to reach an accord on many outstanding issues and the result was that this draft became a real basis for Anglo-American co-operation in the drafting of the Covenant. Further consultation between the British and the United States delegates resulted in the Hurst-Miller draft which eliminated nearly all issues of disagreement between the two countries.

At this point the preliminary drafts had included the substantial elements of what became Article 10 of the Covenant. None of the drafts, however, included any mention of the Monroe Doctrine or any truly regional provisions.

The Commission on the League of Nations, which developed the Covenant out of the Hurst-Miller (Anglo-American) draft, was nominated by the Peace Conference on January 25, 1919. Two delegates each were to represent the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.

¹Ibid., I, pp. 28-32.

Nine smaller powers were to be represented by one delegate each. The only Latin-American state included was Brazil. The Commission began its work on February 3, 1919.

The Commission carried on its work in three well-defined stages: (1) the period of initial consideration of the Hurst-Miller draft from February 3 to 14, after which President Wilson returned to the United States for a month; (2) the period of reflection and open criticism of the draft from February 14 to March 26; and (3) the period of completion when the final revisions were made from March 26 to April 28. On April 28, 1919 the Covenant was unanimously accepted by a plenary session of the Peace Conference.

The provision for guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political independence of League members was expanded by adding that in the event of aggression the Executive Council should advise the plan and means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. When completed, this became Article 10 of the Covenant and was perhaps the greatest single factor in the refusal of the United States Senate to accept the Covenant. It appeared to many Senators that not only would the United States be obligated to guarantee territorial integrity and political independence to all the members but would be disposed to follow the dictates of the League in doing so. However, such would not have been the case.

When Wilson returned from the United States on March 14, he brought with him certain criticisms set forth by Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic floor leader. Senator Hitchcock felt, in order to secure Senate approval it would be necessary to include, among other things, a reservation to

each Contracting Party of its exclusive control over domestic subjects and a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine.¹ These recommendations were supported by former President Taft, Elihu Root, and other Republican leaders.

On March 18 when the Monroe Doctrine came up for discussion and Wilson alluded to the fact that it had never been defined and that the Senate did not want it defined. He said that the Doctrine had been put forth to prevent the extension of the European system to the Americas. After pointing out that it was also directed against European colonization Wilson agreed that it would be impossible to put in the Covenant a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine without a similar reservation of an Asiatic doctrine of the Japanese, and accordingly the idea was disapproved.²

On March 18, 1919 former President Taft cabled Wilson urging a specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine. Taft felt that such a reservation would nearly assure Senate acceptance of the Covenant.

The first official draft of a reservation for the Monroe Doctrine was written by Britain's Lord Robert Cecil. It did not specifically mention the Doctrine but read as follows:

Where any coercive action has to be taken in the Western hemisphere under Articles X, XIII, XVI or XVII no power outside that hemisphere shall take part in such action except at the request of the United States of America and the other states members of the Ex. Council if any situated in that hemisphere.³

¹Morley, op. cit., pp. 125-26.

²Miller, op. cit., I, p. 215.

³Ibid., p. 297.

Even though this draft article had very little influence on Article 21 it would appear that it would have given considerable concessions to the United States and seemed to go further than Article 21 in acknowledging the Western Hemisphere as a specific region with peculiar interests. President Wilson did not like it; nor did he care for a draft by Miller. Neither included a specific mention of the Monroe Doctrine. Well aware of the need for a Monroe Doctrine reservation by now, the President declared, "The Senate will not be satisfied by mere *innuendo*."¹

The first draft which specifically mentioned the Monroe Doctrine and which contained the essential wording as adopted in Article 21 was of British origin. On March 25, Sir William Wiseman, technical adviser for the British delegation, brought to Miller's office the following draft which proposed not a reservation to Article 10, but the declaratory stipulation that:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to impair the validity of any international engagement or understanding for securing the peace of the world such as treaties of arbitration and the Monroe Doctrine.²

This draft was discussed along with several others which had been written. None of these drafts maintained their individuality for long as they were continually altered or amalgamated with others.

On March 24, Stephen Bonsal, Wilson's confidential interpreter wrote:

¹Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1944), p. 150.

²Miller, op. cit., I, p. 336.

I am probably the only person...who is not working on a draft of the reservation which the Senate demands on the Monroe Doctrine and which the President will see to it is inserted in the Covenant. Excellent draftsman that he is I'm surprised that the President does not take the matter in hand himself. But he doesn't, and my explanation is that the whole business disgusts him and he will have nothing to do with it except to see that it goes in--because it must.¹

Wilson did, however, draft a Monroe Doctrine reservation which was to be added to Article 10. It included the provision that nothing in the Covenant prevented any American state or states, whether members of the League or not, from protecting their independence and integrity. Also included was the right to object to or prevent the further transfer of American territory or sovereignty to any power outside the Western Hemisphere. The wording was not original with Wilson as it is substantially that as suggested by Taft on March 18. Wilson decided, however, not to present the amendment to the Commission.

The British had seen the proposed amendment and objected to any attempt to define the Monroe Doctrine, contending that any attempt to do so might limit or extend its application. Probably the British wished also to protect certain understandings of their own. On the following day the British presented to the United States delegation a proposed reservation which was nearly identical with that finally adopted as Article 21. According to Mr. Miller's conversation with Colonel House, House observed that Lloyd George of Britain "cared nothing whatever about the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine; but he was trying to bargain about it so as

¹Bonsal, op. cit., p. 150.

to get an agreement with Wilson on the subject of naval building."¹ The minutes of the American Commissioners of March 27 bear this out when they state that a reservation based on the British draft was defeated because of the opposition of Lloyd George for this reason.

An exchange of correspondence between Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel House took place concerning the problem of naval building programs. The British wanted naval limitation with recognized British superiority. On April 8, 1919 Colonel House in a letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George made it clear that to the United States there was no connection between the proposed Monroe Doctrine reservation and a naval building agreement. House also alluded to George and Lord Cecil that the establishment of an effective League would preclude naval competition between the United States and Great Britain. House told Miller to let Lord Cecil know that an American amendment on the Monroe Doctrine would be presented at the next session (April 10). The United States was not going to bargain on the two separate issues and the British could oppose the amendment if they wished.²

Lloyd George was probably not satisfied with the lack of a specific promise on the naval program but he did not allow this to interfere with Lord Robert Cecil's support for the Monroe Doctrine provision.

The amendment was presented on the evening of April 10 at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission in the identical form later accepted.

¹Miller, op. cit., I, p. 337.

²Ibid., p. 425.

It should be remembered that the amendment was presented by the United States at this time as a reservation to Article 10. The reservation read as follows:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

The Chinese delegate Mr. Wellington Koo did not object to the recognition by the League of this United States' policy. He did, however, wish to suggest that the Monroe Doctrine be named alone specifically and not be made one of a class of regional understandings. Obviously he was fearful of "regional" penetrations such as that of the Japanese in Manchuria. The term "regional understandings" was too broad. If there were other specific understandings in the minds of the delegates they should be specifically mentioned and the objectionable term altogether eliminated. President Wilson was willing, if necessary, to agree.

Lord Robert Cecil did not object to the proposed amendment at all. His position differed from Mr. Koo in that he saw the Monroe Doctrine mentioned only as an example of regional understandings. As for the Doctrine itself it should not be defined; any attempt might extend or limit its application. He stated that even though somewhat vague the Doctrine exists, has been acted upon, and has been accepted by other states. Britain had understandings of her own and in line with this Lord Robert Cecil objected to eliminating the term "regional understandings." He objected to a proposal by Mr. Koo that the words "hitherto commonly accepted" be added to "regional understandings." He pointed out that it is sometimes difficult to determine when certain "understandings"

were accepted and indeed which fell into this category. To the British, the Article as it then read, created nothing which did not already exist.

The French delegate, Mr. Larnaude opposed the article but for different reasons than Mr. Koo. As opposed to the British, the French wanted a clear definition of the Monroe Doctrine. The French were fearful that if an European war should break out the United States would determine her action toward the situation upon the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Larnaude thought it would be very unfortunate if the Monroe Doctrine should be interpreted to mean that the United States could not participate in any settlement of European affairs decided upon by the League. He wished to have an obligation imposed on the United States to take part in European affairs. The United States had come to the aid of the Allies in the war but he wished further assurances in case of future incidents. Minor objections on his part referred to the fact that this amendment referred to one particular country and that according to Article 20 all states were bound to make their agreements conform to the spirit of the League. If there was nothing in the Monroe Doctrine inconsistent with the Covenant, it would not be affected.

President Wilson assured the delegates that the Monroe Doctrine would not prevent League action in American affairs, nor would it prevent the participation of the United States in European or world affairs. The President said:

The Covenant provides that the members of the League will mutually defend each other in respect of their political and their territorial integrity. This Covenant is therefore the highest tribute to the Monroe Doctrine, for it is an international extension of the principle by which the United States said that it would protect the political independence and territorial integrity

of other American States.

When you try to understand what the Monroe Doctrine means, you should not study theoretical interpretations which have been placed upon it, but actions which have been taken thereunder. I am certain that no actions will be found to be inconsistent with the general principles of the Covenant.¹

It is again evident that Wilson saw Article 10 as merely an enlargement of, or an internationalizing of, the protection principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

The President made it clear that any understanding which infringes upon the territorial integrity or political independence of any states would be inconsistent with the Covenant and any state which signs the Covenant obligates itself under Article 20 to abrogate such inconsistent understandings. Including a mention of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant, "is in effect nothing but a recognition of the fact that it is not inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant."² Mr. Bourgeois of France felt that if the amendment were adopted there would, in effect, be two separate spheres: the United States and perhaps a substantial portion of the Western Hemisphere on the one hand and the European states on the other. President Wilson after again assuring the French that the United States would come to the aid of the European states when threatened under Article 10, declared: "In such a world League it seems out of place to talk about two groups."³

It was then suggested by Lord Robert Cecil that if the amendment

¹Ibid., p. 444.

²Ibid., p. 446.

³Ibid., p. 447.

was added to Article 20 rather than Article 10, the French misapprehensions would be taken care of. Wilson agreed. The French agreed also, but then added that a footnote should be added explaining just what the Monroe Doctrine was. There were objections to this from both Cecil and Wilson. After a brief summary of the Monroe Doctrine as a weapon against absolutism and a pointed question by Wilson to the French asking if it was conceivable that they wanted the United States to say it would not repudiate its obligations, the amendment was adopted. It was to be left to the next and Final Meeting of the Commission to find a logical place for it in the text.

The British had not been adverse to accepting the amendment, but wanted no definition of regional understandings. The French objections were not very serious and Mr. Miller declared that the French government never had any idea of insisting on them.¹ The objections of Mr. Koo seemed to be well met by the British. The main result was that the amendment was not to be included as part of Article 10.

The Japanese made no comments during these debates. Also it is worthy of mention that the Brazilian delegate did not enter into these discussions which would seem of substantial interest to Latin America.

The following evening, April 11, the Final Meeting of the Commission took place. When Article 20 came up for discussion, the French proposed another text for the Monroe Doctrine reservation. President Wilson did not care for the French proposal. The proposed text seemed to him to create the impression that there was an incompatibility between the Monroe

¹Ibid., p. 449.

Doctrine and the obligation of the Covenant, thus placing unwarranted suspicion upon the Doctrine.

Wilson insisted that if there was anything in the Doctrine inconsistent with the Covenant, the Covenant would take precedence over the Monroe Doctrine:

There is no thought in my mind that the Monroe Doctrine invalidates the Covenant, but there is in some minds the thought that the Covenant invalidates the doctrine, so that we are seeking to remove that, as I believe, erroneous impression by distinctly saying there is nothing in this Covenant inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine. Now, if there is anything in the Monroe Doctrine inconsistent with the Covenant, the Covenant takes precedence of the Monroe Doctrine, not only because it is subsequent to it, but because it is a body of definite obligations which the United States cannot explain away even if it wanted to explain.¹

The President made it clear that the inclusion of the American amendment would assure United States participation in the League.

Mr. Kramar, the Czecho-Slovak delegate, asked whether in the case of a dispute between two American states, Paraguay and Uruguay for example, the League would have the right to come to the aid of whichever of the states was supported by the Council. Wilson replied that the League would have this right. Wilson agreed with Lord Robert Cecil when he stated that the idea that the Monroe Doctrine would prevent the Council from taking action any place in the world, in the execution of an unanimous decision, was a perversion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. Koo, still in need of reassurance, proposed the addition of a clause which would specifically state that the regional understandings were not inconsistent with the Covenant. This was objected to and finally

¹Ibid., p. 459.

Mr. Koo proposed to add the words "or understandings" after the word "obligations" in Article 20. This was adopted and Mr. Koo's fears were somewhat allayed. Article 20 read as follows:

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

Still another French draft was proposed, but it was generally thought unsatisfactory. It was finally agreed that the amendment proposed by the United States and adopted the day previously would be maintained and that it should not be placed in the Covenant as a reservation to either Article 10 or 20. Instead, it was placed separately as Article 21 and the other articles following were advanced to the next number.

When the completed Treaty was placed before the Senate for its approval several objections and criticisms were raised and were embodied in fourteen reservations to the Covenant. The most pertinent for consideration was the fifth reservation. This reservation concerned the Monroe Doctrine. The United States would not submit to arbitration or inquiry by either the Council or the Assembly of the League, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depends upon or relates to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was to be interpreted solely by the United States and was wholly outside the League's jurisdiction. It was entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the treaty of peace (Covenant Article 21).

The opponents of the League held to a doctrine of two spheres, the

New World and the Old. The Monroe Doctrine was a purely American principle. Even President Wilson Himself had proclaimed in January of 1916: "The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility."¹ To many, this was an admission that the League was destroying the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was not a "regional understanding" but a unilateral policy of the United States.

The supporters of the League, however, pointed out that the League was designed to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations concerned, and was in this sense an extension of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. These principles would be protected not only by the United States, but by all members of the League. This had been the original intent of Wilson.

In a conference at the White House on August 19, 1919, the President discussed this and other questions with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On this occasion he said:

The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything contained in the Covenant and the expression "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine" was used, not because any one of the conferees thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere else in existence or in contemplation, but only because it was thought best to avoid the appearance of dealing in such a document with the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase.²

¹Barker and Dodd, op. cit., III, p. 443.

²Lodge, op. cit., p. 300.

There were, however, "regional understandings," although not similar to the Monroe Doctrine, as Lord Robert Cecil indicated during the Commission's meetings. Mr. Koo also thought there were other "regional understandings" and was fearful as to the broad interpretation that might be applied to this term.

The President felt that Article 21 was the most extraordinary sentence in the Treaty because all the nations which signed the Treaty, which admitted its validity, would accept the existence of the Doctrine. What did the Monroe Doctrine mean to Wilson? It meant that:

if any power outside this Hemisphere, tries to impose its will upon any portion of the Western Hemisphere, the United States is at liberty to act independently and alone in repelling the aggression; that it does not have to wait for the action of the League of Nations; that it does not have to wait for anything but the action of its own Administration and its own Congress. The Monroe Doctrine says that if anybody tries to interfere with affairs in the Western Hemisphere it will be regarded as an unfriendly act to the United States--not to the rest of the world--and...the United States will look after it, and will not ask anybody's permission to look after it. The document [Covenant] says that nothing in this document is to be construed as interfering with that.¹

When Wilson, on January 22, 1917, proposed that "the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world," he was actually proposing that only part of the Monroe Doctrine be "universalized." He felt that the guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence should be accepted by all states to apply universally. In the Monroe Doctrine this guarantee was the responsibility of the United States and was to extend only to the independent states of the Western Hemisphere. Article 10 of the League

¹Hamilton Foley (ed.), Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), pp. 90-92.

Covenant was to be the device which would extend the guarantee, as well as the responsibility, to all states.

However, this is only one aspect of the Monroe Doctrine. Other aspects include the assumption of permanent American neutrality toward Europe and political non-intervention by Europe in the affairs of the New World. Regardless of the appeal of the idea of non-involvement of the United States in European affairs, it is clear that the United States had not held to such a practice, as United States participation in World War I will attest. Nevertheless, the Senators who opposed the League were afraid that Article 10 might lead to the involvement of the United States in extra-hemispheric affairs with which they had not desired to be involved. Neither did they relish the possibility of any League action in the Western Hemisphere which might result in connection with carrying out the provisions of Article 10. Had not Wilson in the Commission debates said that the Monroe Doctrine would not prevent the League from activities in the Latin-American area? In this regard, as well as for insuring the continuation of the Monroe Doctrine to be unaffected as a unilateral policy of the United States, the Senate had called for a reservation in the Covenant concerning Article 10 and the Monroe Doctrine.

It can now be seen why Wilson, on the one hand, would state that Article 10 and the Monroe Doctrine were completely compatible, that actually the former was only an extension of the latter, while on the other hand, assuring the Senators that "The Monroe Doctrine... is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything contained in the Covenant..." It would seem that Wilson did not really intend to univer-

realize the Doctrine of Monroe as enunciated in 1823. This would have been a near impossibility. Wilson realized that it was the specific unilateral policy of the United States and should remain so. He did, however, feel that certain principles which could be derived from the message were not the sole property of the United States. The protecting of territorial integrity and political independence of certain states by another country (the United States), was a part of the Doctrine. To Wilson, this did not mean that the guarantee principle contained therein could not be usefully adopted and applied as a universal doctrine of collective security. As far as Wilson was concerned, the principles of the Doctrine itself remained intact, at least those setting forth United States ability to take action in the Western Hemisphere in the event extrahemispheric states attempted to interfere in that area.

What were the consequences of the inclusion of Article 21 in the Covenant? Did the Monroe Doctrine henceforth acquire a new validity? Was this "regional understanding" now recognized as such by the members of the League?

It is evident, from the summary of the Commission's negotiations, that Article 21 was "transformed into a declaratory stipulation from a provision which was drafted as a reservation and which could only be reasonably understood as such."¹ This is evidenced by the motives which were involved in the drafting of the Article. Reservations with similar

¹John H. Spenger, "The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant," American Journal of International Law, XXX (July, 1936), p. 408.

implications had been included by the United States delegation to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These reservations were tacitly consented to by the other signatories. "The doctrine is not international law but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law."¹ It is a unilateral policy of the United States which is to be unilaterally defined, although it may seem at times virtually undefinable. The most that can be said for the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine is that nothing in the Covenant would affect this traditional policy of the United States. The other states consented only to recognize this declaration, which was for all intents and purposes, a reservation.

The word "understandings" was inserted by the British in their second draft of the proposed reservation for the purpose of protecting their own undefinable understandings with regard to various protectorates and certain limited areas. The term "regional understandings" appears to have first been used in the amendment presented by Wilson at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission.

Whether the Monroe Doctrine was a regional understanding or became one by virtue of Article 21 will depend somewhat upon one's interpretation of "regional understanding." If it is to be interpreted as being an understanding or a "meeting of the minds" between states of a region, the Monroe Doctrine surely did not fit the description of regional under-

¹Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, V (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 440.

standing. During the discussions at a League of Nations disarmament committee meeting in 1928, the Argentine delegate declared: "It would be untrue; it is, in fact, quite untrue, to give, as Article 21 gives, even by way of example, the name of regional agreement to a unilateral political declaration...."¹ When the government of Mexico announced its accession to the League it announced on that occasion that "she has never recognised the regional understanding mentioned in Article 21 of the Covenant."²

On December 14, 1919, prior to Salvador's accession to the Covenant, the Salvadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the United States Department of State for its opinion on the actual status and possible future development of the Monroe Doctrine. The Department's reply of February 26, 1920 referred Salvador to the address made by President Wilson on January 6, 1916, at the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress.

Perhaps of more significance, at least from the point of view of the League itself, was the request of Costa Rica addressed to the Council of the League. The Council was asked to give a definition of the Monroe Doctrine which was mentioned in Article 21. The President of the Council in a letter of September 1, 1928, refused to do so on the ground that such a task concerns only "the States having accepted inter se engagements of this kind."³ The Council President then summarized the statement

¹Ibid., p. 444.

²Ibid.

³League of Nations, Secretariat, Information Section, "President of the Council to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, September 1, 1928," Monthly Summary (September 15, 1928), p. 225.

made by Lord Robert Cecil on April 10, 1919 which said in effect, that the Article could not give these engagements a validity or a sanction which they did not previously possess. Any attempt at defining such engagements or understandings was liable to have the effect of restricting or enlarging their sphere of application.

The Council did, however, consider itself competent to examine and clarify the relation of the Doctrine to the Covenant, as established by Article 21:

Article 21 gives the States parties to international engagements the guarantee that the validity of such of these engagements as secure the maintenance of peace would not be affected by accession to the Covenant of the League of Nations. In declaring that such engagements are not deemed incompatible with any of the provisions of the Covenant, the Article refers only to the relations of the Covenant with such engagements; it neither weakens nor limits any of the safeguards provided in the Covenant...

In regards to the scope of the engagements to which the article relates, it is clear that it cannot have the effect of giving them a validity or sanction which they did not previously possess.¹

Thus, in the League's most official statement concerning the meaning of Article 21, the assurance was made that the League does not regard the Monroe Doctrine as having any additional force because of the specific reference to it in the Covenant. The League also made it clear that any interpretation given the Doctrine by the United States is of no concern to the League.

If one insists on referring to the Monroe Doctrine as a regional understanding, it would seem to be so, as an understanding among any states, concerning a region, and not between states of a same region. It would

¹Ibid.

appear that this is the meaning to be extracted from Article 21 itself. Included in Article 21 are international engagements such as treaties of arbitration which may not necessarily be concerned with a region or connected with regional interests. The only understanding possible under this interpretation was that the framers of the Covenant, at least, and perhaps the members of the League, recognized that the United States policy known as the Monroe Doctrine was not affected by the Covenant and that this policy was concerned with a particular region--notably the Western Hemisphere. There was no understanding, however, as to what the Monroe Doctrine was, as it was not defined for this purpose. Neither was the acknowledgement of this policy to imply acceptance of its principles. John Spencer concludes that the Monroe Doctrine is of such a political and subjective character that Article 21 is of no consequence for the Doctrine. In fact, the Article itself is lacking, as the President of the League Council had indicated, in any real juridical effect.

If Article 21 can have, by reason of its terminology, no juridical effect as regards the Monroe Doctrine, it cannot, when viewed as a whole in the general framework of the Covenant, be deemed to possess any clear juridical significance.¹

It will be recalled that the Senatorial opponents denied the Monroe Doctrine was a regional understanding. The reservation on Article 21 set forth by the Senate made it clear that the Doctrine was to be interpreted by the United States alone and was wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League, as well as unaffected by any Covenant provision. The truth was, as Gaston Nerval somewhat caustically points

¹Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

out, "that the only 'regional understanding,' the only consensus, from Alaska to the Magellan Straits, about the Monroe Doctrine, is that it is not a regional understanding."¹

After the Senate's rejection of the Covenant, the Wilson Administration withdrew from all association with the League. The State Department became negligent in replying to communications from the Secretariat and other League organs.

When Harding, Coolidge, or Hughes expressed their view of the League they usually treated it as a European affair. Insofar as it appeared European quarrels the League was wished well. However, American representatives were present as both unofficial and official observers at many conferences dealing with armaments, economic, and commercial subjects. Even several treaties were signed and ratified by the United States.

The United States did not desire that the Latin American states co-operate fully with the League. It was never an official policy, but it seemed that the United States was in favor of keeping the affairs of the Americas as a field apart, to be dealt with whenever international action was required, through the agencies of the Pan-American Union.

Unable to co-operate fully with the "universal" League, the United States began to renew its efforts toward regional co-operation. As a consequence of this policy, the Pan-American Union now began to extend its activities in a manner not contemplated by its founders. The United States took a definite lead in this strengthening of American co-operation.

¹Gaston Nerval [Raúl Díez de Medina], Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 13.

The Latin-American states, while on the whole denying that the Monroe Doctrine prevented League action in the Americas, nevertheless generally considered it preferable for reasons of pride and because of the influence of the United States, that American conflicts be settled by Americans. When in the early 1920's a dispute arose between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia over the revision of earlier treaties between them, it was conceivable that the League under Article 19 could advise the parties. However, Chile, in a communication to the League on September 3, 1921, went so far as to deny League competence:

This claim concerns an exclusively American affair.

The use...of the expression "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine," in Article 21 of the Covenant, amounts to a formal recognition of the principle of American International Law, according to which the non-American States, and consequently the Assembly, cannot interfere in questions exclusively affecting countries of the New World.¹

True, not all Latin-American states were willing to go so far. In fact some would oppose this position, notably Argentina. On the whole most minor disputes between Latin-American states were settled through the good offices of the United States.² The conflict over Leticia between Colombia and Peru and the war over the Chaco involving Paraguay and Bolivia were met with attempts at settlement by both the League and the American states under the leadership of the United States.

¹Foreign Policy Association, "The Monroe Doctrine and Latin America," Information Service, IV (December 7, 1928), p. 403, citing Bolivia's Claim Against Chile for the Revision of the Treaty of Peace of 1904 (Geneva, 1921), A. 33, p. 3.

²See Robertson, op. cit., pp. 143-85.

Both Brazil and the United States were carrying on negotiations with Peru and Colombia concerning the Leticia dispute and were attempting to mediate. The disputants seemed, however, to prefer a settlement by the League, and both presented their cases before the League Council. Brazil abandoned her attempts to mediate and shortly thereafter the State Department confined itself to supporting the endeavours of the Council and its Advisory Committee. Secretary of State Stimson supported the League's admonition to Peru to cease intervention by force in the Colombian territory of Leticia and later supported the peace proposal made by a committee of the League Council. In May, 1933 the United States accepted representation on a committee of three (United States, Brazil, and Spain) to administer the evacuated territory pending the final settlement.

Much less success was met with in the attempts to settle the Gran Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia. Not only was there a diversification of effort involving commissions representing three groups of states, but the United States, until near the end, made a strong effort to keep the affair out of the jurisdiction of the League.

When in 1928 the dispute began to erupt into armed conflict, the League Council reminded both parties of their obligations under the Covenant. At the same time the question was taken up by a conference of American States being held in Washington. The disputants agreed that a commission should be appointed by this body and the Neutral Commission including Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay was established. Assistant Secretary of State Francis White was the Chairman. This Commission succeeded for the time being in eliminating local incidents but failed

to solve the underlying problem.

With renewed fighting in 1932, both disputants protested the acts of the other to the League, but neither submitted the dispute for settlement. Again the Neutral Commission took over and called upon the disputants to settle their dispute and the American republics adopted the principles of the Stimson Doctrine. White dominated the Commission and in an effort to prevent League action sent overly optimistic notes to the League. The Great Powers on the League Council were reluctant to offend the United States by pressing for League action. The League offered to support the work of the Neutral Commission, but the League was not kept well informed. The Neutral Commission rejected a League suggestion that a commission be sent to the troubled area, and efforts in Washington continued. The League also called for an embargo on arms to the two parties, but the Senate of the United States refused, for the time being.

Another commission consisting of the neighboring states of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile made attempts to halt the conflict. Argentina resented the efforts of the Neutral Commission, as it was dominated by the United States. However, this second commission accomplished little.

After costly delay, the League established a commission along the lines of the Lytton Commission. Before it could be put into action the disputants both asked that the problem be taken up by the four neighboring states. Finally, the League Chaco Commission arrived on the scene, but a Pan-American Conference had been assembled in Montevideo. This conference did, however, declare itself "ready to cooperate with the

League of Nations in the application of the Covenant."¹

A new call for an embargo was this time adhered to by the United States. An Assembly committee of Latin-American states was to attempt conciliation. Brazil and the United States refused to accept the Assembly's invitation to co-operate. Finally, the United States agreed that it would take part in a proposed Peace Conference of Buenos Aires and as a member of a neutral military commission. When the Peace Commission finally met the League was no longer formally associated with the proceedings.

As has been demonstrated, United States policy, in the early years of the League, indicated strong isolationist influence. Very little communication existed between the United States and the League at this point. As a counterbalance the United States enlarged its efforts toward developing the regionalism of the Americas. Also these individuals favoring international co-operation saw no other outlet than Pan-Americanism for their zeal.

Successive efforts to strengthen Pan-Americanism and to allay the Latin American's fear of the United States were undertaken at the various Pan-American conferences. The era of increased inter-American co-operation seemed to be ushered in with the policies of President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. With the weakening of the League and the coming of the Second World War inter-American co-operation set a hitherto all-time high.

¹F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 532.

During the middle and latter years of the League the United States began to take a more interested and active part. Official observers attended nearly all important meetings of the League's bodies and several League sponsored treaties were signed and ratified. Increasing realization of the importance of League assistance in the settlement of "American" disputes was indicated by the later attitude of the United States in the Chaco conflict and as evidenced in the Leticia dispute. Growing co-operation and even leadership was demonstrated by the United States in connection with the Manchurian crisis and the Stimson Doctrine.

With the League decreasing in influence and effectiveness, the United States, as did the other states of the world, turned its attention to the growing prospects of war, a war which the League was incapable of preventing. As the United States again became involved in war, she also again became involved in plans for peace-plans for international organization.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING FOR A UNITED NATIONS: REGIONAL ASPECTS

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in the early days of September, 1939, the United States moved to bolster its defenses in the Western Hemisphere. The first Inter-American Consultative Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Panama City on September 23, 1939. The results of this meeting included a general proclamation of neutrality and the "Declaration of Panama," which proclaimed a neutrality zone extending approximately 300 miles around the neutral area of the Western Hemisphere. A special resolution was concerned with the colonial possessions of the European powers. It resolved:

That in case any geographic region of America subject to the jurisdiction of any non-American state should be obliged to change its sovereignty and there should result therefrom a danger to the security of the American Continent, a consultative meeting such as the one now being held will be convoked with the urgency that the case may require.¹

In view of the German victories, the Nazi threat to Latin America came to be regarded as the most immediate danger to American security. The American delegation to the Second Foreign Ministers Meeting in Habana was headed by Secretary Hull. At the Habana Conference, held from July 21 to July 30, 1940, Secretary Hull, aside from proposing

¹U.S., Department of State, Report of the Delegate of the United States of America to the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Panama, September 23 to October 3, 1939, Publication 1431 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940).

closer economic co-operation, supported a plan for collective trusteeship for European possessions in the Western Hemisphere in the event their status was threatened by events of the war. Another important declaration directed toward regional defense was passed. It was declared that any attempt by a non-American state "against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the states which sign this declaration."¹

A resolution of the Habana Conference had provided that in the event of an act of aggression against an American state by a non-American state, an inter-American meeting of consultation would be held. Thus, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was held in Rio de Janeiro from January 15 to 28, 1942. It was at this meeting that the Inter-American Juridical Committee was entrusted with "the formulation of specific recommendations relative to the international organization in the juridical and political fields, and in the field of international security."² An Inter-American Defense Board was created to facilitate the co-operative defense of the American Republics. Resolution I of the conference reaffirmed American solidarity and the

¹U.S., Department of State, Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940: Report of the Secretary of State, Publication 1573 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 71-72.

²U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, VI (February 7, 1942), 117-40.

determination to co-operate jointly but merely "recommended" the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, "in accordance with the procedures established by their own laws and in conformity with the position and circumstances obtaining in each country." Argentina did not act upon this recommendation until 1945 thus hindering hemispheric unity in the meantime.

This was the last Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics to be held until the Mexico City Conference which met in February, 1943. Relatively little consultation on security matters took place between the United States and the other American republics in the interim. Almost no consultation whatsoever took place with respect to postwar organization until immediately prior to the Mexico City meeting. The bulk of the planning for postwar international organization was done by various groups and committees within the Department of State.

By late December, 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw a need for longer-range policy preparation rather than the day-to-day policy formulation which was caused by the fluidity of the international scene. To assist in long-range policy planning, a committee was established within the Department of State. On January 8, 1940, Secretary Hull announced the creation of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. The purposes of this committee included the consideration of policy, "to limit and to end the war if possible, to clarify the requisite bases for a future peaceful world order, and, more immediately,

to strengthen the defense of the Western Hemisphere."¹

During the spring of 1940, prior to the increased German advances, the Political Subcommittee began to consider the prospects of a world organization following the war. Several questions were tentatively considered. Should the League of Nations be retained, and if so should the United States join it? Should the world be organized on a regional basis in view of the failure of the League and the successes of the inter-American organization? Could regional arrangements successfully be formed to collaborate with the League? These considerations were also shelved as the German advances and successes increased.

The Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations found itself handicapped in its postwar planning by its ad hoc nature and by the pressure of current problems. The planning for the postwar world began to taper off and for most purposes the Committee was no longer functioning, although it was not formally discarded.

It was on August 11, 1941 that British Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt issued the joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter. The eighth point of the declaration called for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of security...." This clearly implied that some form of world organization should eventually be instituted.

With the Atlantic Charter as "a further basis on which to build our structure for a postwar world," Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles in October, 1941 discussed with Roosevelt the whole problem of

¹U.S., Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939.

arrangements for postwar planning.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull, on December 22, 1941, wrote a letter to the President recalling these conversations and asked for approval of the establishment of an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. The proposed membership included not only State Department experts but prominent persons from private organizations. Among others added to the membership, were five Senators and three Representatives. Hull and Welles were to serve as chairman and vice-chairman respectively. Within the week, the President replied with a hearty approval. The Committee first convened on February 12, 1942.

The postwar planning for international organization was carried on, for the most part, within the Political Subcommittee and the Special Subcommittee on International Organization. Under Secretary Welles was chairman of the Political Subcommittee until January 30, 1943. The recommendations for international organization from early 1942 through the Spring of 1943 were considerably influenced by his views.

There was a fundamental conviction among the members of the Political Subcommittee that plans for a future international organization should be developed during the course of the war. It was this conviction that prompted Welles to create the Special Subcommittee on International Organization on July 27, 1942. Under Secretary Welles served as chairman of this special committee.

During the Summer of 1942 the work of the Special Subcommittee

1945, Publication 3580 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 23. Hereinafter cited as Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation.

consisted of examining past experience with international organization. The Covenant of the League of Nations was very closely studied and all articles given careful appraisal in terms of usefulness for postwar organization.

It was found that in organizing and conducting its work several choices of basic importance would have to be made. These choices became the basic assumptions in the drafting carried on by the Special Subcommittee. Not all members of the committee agreed as to the choices made, but all agreed that some basis for planning must be established.

A basic decision had to be made on whether a transitional or permanent international organization should be established. It was decided that a permanent organization should be brought into being by a series of steps, however, rather than by a single treaty. It was also felt that rather than attempting to revive the League of Nations Covenant through amendments, a new international organization should be established.

Of greater import to this study was the choice confronting the Special Subcommittee as to:

whether general international organization should be founded upon regional organizations of various kinds, with regional representation provided for in its executive organ or organs, or should be wholly or as nearly as possible universal in structure and character.¹

Opinion among the members of the Special Subcommittee on International Organization was never united. The regional ideas of Welles, however, were dominant during the period of his chairmanship.

¹Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 112.

Welles had long been a staunch supporter of the inter-American system. He had many times stated that the American republics had achieved "the most advanced regional system ever to have been evolved."¹ Welles could not believe that the United States and the other American republics would ever relinquish the inter-American system they had built up.² At the same time, the inter-American system could "not be taken as an exact model for an effective international organization," since the inter-American agreements then in effect included no provisions for the use of force to prevent or check war.³

The new postwar organization was to be permanent but was to proceed from a provisional organization which would function during the period of transition between war and permanent organization. During this time, the four major allied powers would maintain the peace and prepare for the installing of the permanent organization. This transitional period would be relatively short as military alliances usually do not promote extended co-operation among the parties over a long period of time and because the many smaller states would be virtually unrepresented in making world decisions.

As to the more specific nature of the permanent organization, Welles relates that during the early stages of planning:

¹Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 368.

²Sumner Welles, Postwar Specifications (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1942), p. 7.

³Welles, The Time for Decision, op. cit., p. 369.

I had come to believe that in the future international organization the difficulty arising from the need to reconcile the sovereign equality of all states with the inevitable demand by the major military powers to retain such freedom of action as might be required...to assure them of security, might best be solved by establishing the new world organization upon a foundation of regional organizations, each subordinate to the ultimate control of the world organization. Such regional systems, similar in general nature to the inter-American system of the Western Hemisphere, would be required to assume the primary responsibility for maintaining peace in their respective parts of the world. Only if these regional systems proved unable to compose disputes or to restrain an aggressor would the supreme universal authority be required to intervene. In that manner each state in every region, no matter how weak it might be, would be required as well as enabled to contribute in proportion to its resources the assistance needed in maintaining regional, and world peace.¹

Welles recognized that the founding of a permanent world order upon regional systems might be said to run counter to the Wilsonian concept of having no alliances within any League of Nations. The fears of Wilson lest a balance of power situation develop were well taken, but such a power struggle will exist only if the states attempt to utilize the regional systems as "offensive or defensive alliances, or as political or economic 'spheres of influence' to be exploited for the individual ends of the great powers dominant in each region."² This power struggle would be prevented or kept minimal through continuing control by the central, superior world agency and by increasing the participation of the smaller powers in the control of this executive council.

For the most part, Welles maintained that every region of the world possesses its own peculiar problems, its own special advantages, and its

¹Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), pp. 23-24.

²Welles, The Time for Decision, op. cit., p. 378.

own inherent difficulties. The states of a particular region are more familiar with their local problems than are those states spatially distant. States of a region are more likely to keep their own houses in order than to approve of other states bringing outside force to bear in maintaining the peace or in the settlement of disputes. Regional systems would also encourage inter-regional economic and financial development.

Welles was not the only high government official thinking in regional terms on postwar international organization. Vice President Henry A. Wallace said in late 1942, that:

As a practical matter, we may find the regional principle is of considerable value in international affairs.... Purely regional problems ought to be left in regional hands. This would leave to any federated world organization problems involving broad principles and those practical matters which affect countries of different regions or which affect the whole world.¹

"Franklin Roosevelt passionately believed that civilization could not survive unless an international organization was established." But at the same time, "he did not believe that a workable international organization could be built up upon the inadequate and weakened foundations of the League of Nations."² When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov visited Washington in May, 1942, Roosevelt in discussing future world order explained why the League had failed. Not only was there too great

¹Henry A. Wallace, "America's Part in World Reconstruction," an Address in Washington, December 28, 1942, cited in Louise Holborn (ed.), War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, I (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943), p. 149.

²Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 3.

a diffusion of responsibility for decision, thus too many nations having to be satisfied, but there was a lack of concentrated police power.

For the postwar era Roosevelt at this time visualized the maintenance of peace throughout the world by the co-operative efforts of the "Four Policemen." The present enemies and other troublemaking states were to be disarmed. Certain areas of the world were, perhaps, to be placed under some form of international trusteeship. A commission of neutrals might report any violations of the armaments restrictions or any acts of aggression to the policing powers who would then deal with the offending state. "After security was thus provided for, Roosevelt was prepared to accept a general organization 'something like the League,' which would carry on all the non-security functions that he thought it had performed so well."¹

No accurate investigation of Roosevelt's ideas concerning the form of postwar international organization can be carried out without examining the ideas of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It appears Churchill and Welles contributed the most in bringing Roosevelt to the position of favoring an international organization based upon the principle of regionalism.

Churchill first set forth his ideas to President Roosevelt in "Morning Thoughts: A note on Postwar Security," which he sent to Washington on February 2, 1943. The following paragraph of the "Morning

¹Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 98.

Thoughts," is of considerable interest:

It is the intention of the Chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organization for the preservation of peace, based upon conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organization an instrument of European government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of the former League of Nations. The units forming this body will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor as long established, but a number of Confederations formed among smaller States, among which a Scandinavian Bloc, a Danubian Bloc, and a Balkan Bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East, with different membership, and the whole will be held together by the fact that the victorious Powers intend to continue fully armed. Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organise a coalition resistance to any act of aggression committed by any Power, and it is believed that the United States will cooperate with her, and even possibly take the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into open war.¹

Churchill announced his ideas publicly in a radio address in March, 1943. When the collapse of Germany was evident, "the United Nations, headed by...the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States, and Soviet Russia, should immediately begin to confer upon the future world organization." Churchill said that he favored "a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, under which should be a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia."² Churchill seemed to stress a European Council which could be set up before the Far Eastern war was ended. The European Council would bring about a settlement on the Continent of Europe and insure its

¹Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Vol IV: The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 711-12.

²Great Britain, British Information Services, British Speeches of the Day, I (April, 1943), pp. 1-10.

security.

At this very time, Roosevelt was engaged in conversations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in Washington. Roosevelt, in preparation for these conversations, had been briefed by Welles on the planning for postwar organization as it stood at that time.

Welles states that, "At that stage the members of the departmental committee were almost unanimously of the opinion that any new world structure should be based on regional organizations similar to the Organization of American States."¹ Each of the regional organizations would elect representatives to a superior executive council which would have supreme authority, delegated by all the members of the United Nations. The executive council would have four permanent members, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China; each having a veto on the use of a United Nations police force. The seven remaining delegates would be elected by the regional organizations.

Welles relates that in general, the President "thought well of the project. However, he expressed considerable doubt whether regional organizations of the Near East and, for that matter, of Asia, could be expected to function efficiently in view of the lack of experience in self-government of most of the peoples in those areas."²

Welles also recalls that Churchill's speech "had given the impression

¹Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 184.

²Ibid., p. 185.

that he was interested solely in the creation of a regional European organization which the United States should be invited to join, and that he had abandoned his earlier support of a more general international organization.¹ Foreign Secretary Eden, who felt that the United Nations should be organized on a global basis, said he was sure Churchill had not meant to exclude the United States.

At the beginning of the talks with Eden, which lasted from March 12 to March 30, 1943, the President, according to Herbert Feis:

visualized three connected parts within the new organization which was to be world-wide; a general assembly in which all nations were to have a place; an advisory council of representatives of the great powers and some six to eight other countries; and an executive council made up of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.... In essence as expressed by the President, "... the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China, who would be the powers for many years to come and would have to police the world."²

At a meeting of Roosevelt and Eden, at which Hull, Welles, and Harry Hopkins, the President's aide were present, conversations took place as described by Hopkins:

There was general discussion about the organization of the United Nations after the war. The President and Welles were very emphatic that the United States could not be a member of any independent regional body such as a European Council; they felt that all the United Nations should be members of one body for the purposes of recommending policy; that this body should be world-wide in scope. That there would be under this body regional councils with similar advisory powers made up of the nations geographically located in the regions; but, finally, that the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia,

¹Ibid., pp. 187-88.

²Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 121.

and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world.¹

Churchill visited Washington in May, 1943 and on May 22, had important conversations concerning postwar world organization with congressional leaders, Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, and Under Secretary of State Welles. During these conversations, Churchill clarified his ideas on world organization.²

Churchill visualized a "three legged stool" structure, a world council resting on three regional councils. The world council would be composed of the four allied powers and "certain other powers," selected from the regional councils. The three subordinate regional councils would be for the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Pacific. The four powers would also sit on the regional councils in which they were directly interested. The United States would be represented on all three.

Would the European Regional Council under this structure have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs? Churchill stated that, "Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils."³

The Prime Minister attached great importance to the regional principle:

¹Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 717. cf. Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped the World, op. cit., p. 188.

²For a more elaborate account of these conversations, as well as a complete description of Churchill's plan, see Churchill, op. cit., pp. 802-07.

³Ibid., p. 807.

It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who would be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement, the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

But, "a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in."¹

As indicative of American thinking at the time, Churchill noted, "all the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines which I had propounded, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them."²

The Political Subcommittee in May, 1943 was, with regard to political action for the prevention of wars and enforcement procedures in connection with a postwar international organization, discussing such questions as:

Should the [political] procedure operate on a regional or universal basis, or on a combination of the two? If the latter be the case, should, for example, a difference between two European countries be brought before a European body, but a difference between a European and an American country be brought before a universal body? In case of regional procedure, should the United States participate in any non-American regional body? Should the procedures involved operate on a regional or universal basis, or on a combination of the two? If the latter be the case, what should be the relative scope of regional and universal enforcement procedures, and what should be the geographic basis of United States participation?³

¹Ibid., p. 804.

²Ibid., p. 807.

³Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 469.

By June, 1943 the Special Subcommittee on International Organization had completed, and Welles had presented to the President, a "Draft Constitution of International Organization."¹ This draft marked the end of the postwar planning by the Political and International Organization subcommittees under the direction of Sumner Welles. The draft was the most concrete proposal by the State Department to date and incorporated the regional principle as stressed by Welles in his earlier ideas. It did not incorporate the "three legged stool" of Churchill, but the principle of regional representation in the Council of the proposed organization (i.e., two from the Americas, one from the Far Eastern states, two from the European states, etc.). There was also the Executive Council much the same as visualized by Roosevelt and a General Conference composed of all members of the International Organization.

Article 13 on Regional Arrangements read as follows:

Nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to affect such regional arrangements, associations or agreements, now existing or which may be entered into, provided these arrangements are not inconsistent with the aims and purposes of this instrument. The Council or General Conference may encourage the establishment of such arrangements, associations or agreements, when deemed desirable to give effect to the general purposes of the International Organization.

In the event that any controversy arises as to the consistency of such arrangements, associations or agreements with the aims and purposes of this instrument, the Council may refer the legal aspects of the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion.

This article clearly was intended to provide for the preservation of the inter-American system so prized by the United States and perhaps for the establishment of a European Council as contemplated by Churchill.

¹For complete text, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 472-83.

Welles stated that the President heartily approved of the general structure proposed for the future organization. In particular, "He was attracted by the idea of regional election because this would diminish the probability that the delegates of the lesser powers would act primarily in the interest of their respective governments."¹

The "Draft Constitution" marked the end of the phase of work by the Political Subcommittee and the Special Subcommittee on International Organization under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

Welles, although recognizing the value of regional representation within an international organization did not see regional councils as the real basis or "legs" supporting the four policing powers. In summing up his thinking and that of the Department of State during this period from February, 1942 to July, 1943, Welles concludes:

The approach made by the Department of State to the problem of international organization was always universal. Most of us, I think, never believed that world peace could be maintained unless some international organization could be created which was universal in its scope. But most of us also believed that this organization should be fashioned in such a way as to leave to the nations in the several geographical regions of the world namely, the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Far East, and the Near East, the utmost responsibility for maintaining peace, and for furthering social and economic progress within their respective areas. It appeared to us not only that it would prove impossible to create new and artificial groupings of states, but that any such arrangements would tend to set up military spheres of influence, each state dominated by one major military power, and that eventually the creation of such spheres of influence would give rise to conflicts of interest which would promote, rather than check, new wars.²

¹Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 26.

²Ibid., p. 27.

One man who was not convinced of the value of the principle of regionalism was Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The President had been strongly influenced by Welles, the "Draft Constitution," and somewhat by Churchill. Hull later related that, "During the Spring of 1943 I found there was a basic cleavage between him [the President] and me on the very nature of the postwar organization."¹

Recalling his visits to the White House, Hull states that he and his advisers would argue against the regional proposals, but to no avail. At this time, Roosevelt "did not want an over-all world organization. He did favor the creation of regional organizations, but it was the four big powers that would handle all security questions."²

The regional ideas (of Welles, for the most part), in the "Draft Constitution," although different in important ways from those of Churchill, did not set well with the Secretary of State. Hull did not, however, formally approve or disapprove the proposals in the "Draft Constitution."

Hull realized the advantages³ of regional organizations in the adjustment of local disputes, as buffers between the nations and the universal organization. There was the possibility that a great power might cripple or hinder the work of the universal organization; thus, states could still look to the regional organization for assistance.

¹Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 1642. Hereinafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.

²Ibid., p. 1643.

³For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of regional organizations, see Ibid., pp. 1643-46.

The disadvantages seemed, however, to far outweigh the advantages of regional organization. Hull was most critical of the ideas of Churchill with regard to regional councils. The universal organization would have to deal with groups of nations rather than individual states. Conflicts might spring up between the various regions. A regional organization would tend to set up a special relationship between the one or two great powers and the smaller states of a region which might lead to the domination of the region by the greater powers.

The Secretary of State, from the point of view of the United States, could see several other objections to international organization on a regional basis. By participating in several regional councils, the United States might find herself in the undesirable role of mediating between the great powers in these regions or be used by one region against another. Could the United States look with favor upon European or Asiatic powers participating in a Western Hemisphere Council? How would the Latin Americans react to the United States being placed officially as the dominant member of a Western Hemisphere Council? Hull felt also that the American people would be more willing to participate in a world organization than in any regional grouping except one embracing the Western Hemisphere.

For the most part, Hull was not opposed to "other special arrangements supplementary to the general organization," as long as these did not infringe on the powers residing in the universal association of states. The freedom of action of small states to make such regional arrangements among themselves as might be mutually beneficial was favored.

Hull also wished to see the Pan-American system of co-operation "continued and strengthened in the postwar period as part of the general plan for international organization." Groups of states in a given area could, with complete consistency, carry forward policies similar to those of the Pan-American system, within the framework and subordinate to the world organization, "provided they did not go further than the Pan-American system."

Therefore Hull:

could see no reason for a clash between the council of the world organization and a regional system of the Pan American type in these circumstances. Both the council and the local organization would have common purposes, the maintenance of peace. The world organization would in the end be supreme.¹

The work of the Advisory Committee of Postwar Foreign Policy was suspended by Secretary Hull on July 12, 1943. Two days later the Department of State received a British aide memoire, which formally set forth the British ideas on postwar organization. The memorandum contained the essence of Churchill's thinking along these lines. A recommendation for the establishment of a Commission for Europe raised again the basic issue of regionalism on which American policy thinking had been divided.

Secretary Hull did not formally reply to the aide memoire, deciding rather to formulate counter proposals which could be presented to the British at the forthcoming Quebec Conference. In a memorandum of August 9, 1943 entitled "International Activities in which the United States

¹Ibid., p. 1646.

must Participate to Reestablish and Maintain Peace and to Promote the General Welfare," certain aspects of the regional issue were commented upon. It was felt that short-run transitory agencies set up separately for Europe and the Far East were undesirable. A central agency of the United Nations powers should be established, which although transitory in nature, would prepare plans and create the necessary machinery for handling the long-range problems of world reconstruction and organization. This agency operating within the framework of unified and global policy could evolve into a functioning and permanent international organization. This evolution would be brought about by adaptation along functional and "in some cases" regional lines.

On August 10, 1943 Secretary Hull and his advisers consulted with the President. Roosevelt approved, basically, the memorandum, which Hull had outlined, but he was not yet ready for too many concrete proposals until a definite agreement of the intentions of the Great Powers could be obtained.

Following these White House discussions, a "Tentative Draft of a Joint Four-Power Declaration," was drafted for use at the First Quebec and Moscow Conferences. This proposal included the provision that the Four Powers, "recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization...open to membership by all nations..."¹

Another State Department memorandum of August 11, 1943 addressed itself to the issue of regionalism as raised by the British aide memoire,

¹Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 553.

In the memorandum Hull's advisers concluded:

(1) that the basis of international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that there are grave dangers involved in having the world organization rest upon the foundations of previously created, full-fledged regional organizations; and (3) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.¹

In the discussions at Quebec between Roosevelt, Churchill, Hull, and Eden, the issue of regionalism did not arise.

During the Fall of 1943, Congress began to make its voice felt concerning a future international organization in which the United States would possibly participate. In the House of Representatives, the Fulbright Resolution passed by a vote of 360 to 29 on September 21, 1943. The resolution expressed the favoring of the "creation of appropriate international machinery, with power adequate to establish and maintain a joint and lasting peace...."²

In the Senate, following the Moscow Conference, the Connally Resolution was adopted after considerable debate. This resolution of November 5, 1943 included, among other things, the statement:

That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.³

¹Unpublished Department of State memorandum quoted in Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 6, 7729.

³Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), pp. 263-64.

The wording of this resolution was adopted from the Moscow Declaration on General Security of November 1, 1943. During the Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference the problem of regionalism came up in the form previously set forth by the British with regard to Europe. British Foreign Secretary Eden indicated that his government felt it was desirable that small regional groupings be formed within Europe in which no great power was to take any separate area of responsibility for the purpose of creating spheres of influence.

Molotov, speaking for the Soviet Union, stated that he did not wish to see Europe divided into separate zones. He felt regional federations would prove detrimental to the interests of the smaller states. However, it now seems apparent that the Soviet Union wanted to prevent any strengthening of the smaller states by such associations.

The Soviet Union actually wanted to establish its own security area in Eastern Europe. This was to be done with a series of interrelated bilateral treaties with certain strategically located states. In December of 1943, a treaty of this nature was concluded with Czechoslovakia. One provision included in the treaty made it possible that any third country bordering either of the signatory states and being a victim of German aggression could, upon mutual consent, adhere to the original treaty. This provision made it possible to construct a regional security system tied to the Soviet Union.

Secretary of State Hull was opposed to the establishing of any spheres of influence and agreed with the British in this respect. He could not agree with the desirability of Europe divided into regionally

federated units. Also he did not wish to discuss at this time specific plans for European reconstruction. Rather Hull said:

...that the first step we should take was to agree upon a broad set of principles capable of world-wide application which would then guide our three countries in our consideration of separate and specific questions, of which the British proposal was one. I had in mind the Pan American principles of cooperation applied on a world-wide scale. My government, I added, had not sought to select any particular area or problem for special consideration before the general principles were agreed....¹

Some of these principles, at least, were those set forth in the Moscow Declaration. The most pertinent of these principles was that which was included in the Connally Resolution.

Hull points out that in analyzing the achievements of the Moscow Conference he said:

As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.²

Interestingly enough such statements are quite reminiscent of Wilson and his concept of the function and place of international organization in the affairs of states.

During the Teheran Conference in the latter part of November, 1943, Roosevelt and Stalin had the chance to discuss personally the future of international organization. Roosevelt expressed his ideas which incorporated the concept of the Four Policemen as the guarantors of security. As members of an executive committee, along with the four Great Powers,

¹Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1298-99.

²Ibid., pp. 1314-15.

would be representatives of various other groups of states: The British Commonwealth, and states in the respective European, Latin-American, Far Eastern, and Middle Eastern regions. There was also to be a world-wide assembly which would include all the United Nations.¹

Stalin was not sure the world would rest easy under the Four Policemen:

He thought that European states would resent having China able to apply pressure upon them; and in any event he did not think China would be very powerful at the end of the war. He suggested, as a possible alternative form for this organization, European and Far Eastern Committees--with Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union on both. Roosevelt recalled that Churchill had somewhat the same idea as Stalin: three regional committees (the third one being for the Americas). But he added that he doubted if the American Congress would agree to American participation in an exclusively European committee, which might be able to force the dispatch of American troops to Europe.²

Later in the conference Stalin told Roosevelt that after further thought he now felt that the international organization should be world-wide in character, rather than regional. Stalin's chief interest was in making sure the new organization would be able to prevent a revival of German power. He did not feel the President's proposals were sufficient in this respect. Roosevelt said, however, that he thought it would be premature to consider with Churchill at Teheran the proposals for world organization which he had outlined to Stalin.

Senator Connally relates that early in 1944 following his return

¹This Plan was based upon the "Draft Constitution" given to Roosevelt by Welles in June, 1943. Supra, p. 80.

²Ibid., op. cit., p. 270. cf. Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 785-87.

from Teheran, Roosevelt told him that he "no longer liked the regional concept." By early 1944, Roosevelt said that "both Churchill and Stalin had agreed to stop pushing for regional postwar organizations and were no longer opposed to a single world-wide organization."¹

Several months previously on August 14, 1943, Hull's advisers pursuant to the memorandum which rejected international organization on a regional basis, formulated a "Charter of the United Nations." This "Staff Charter" was to be used as a new "work paper" for the various technical groups working on international organization. It provided for an organization of definitely a global nature. All member states were to be represented in the General Conference. The Council was to have permanent as well as elected members. Regional representation was not involved. The only mention of regionalism was in Article 12, "Regional Arrangements," which stated that:

Nothing in this Charter shall affect regional arrangements, agreements or associations, now existing or which may be entered into between Members, which are consistent with the obligations assumed under this Charter.²

Little, if any official consideration was given to the draft because of the immediacy of the problems facing the President and the Secretary of State at the impending conferences at Moscow, Quebec, and Teheran.

Following Roosevelt's return from Teheran, Hull presented him with a "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," which was prepared by

¹Connally, op. cit., p. 265.

²Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 531.

Hull's advisers now known as the Informal Political Agenda Group. This proposal was discussed with the President by Hull on December 29, 1943 and was given formal approval by Roosevelt on February 3, 1944 as a basis for further preparation.

This "Outline Plan," as it was known, was the first set of proposals that can be said to have represented the official position of the Department of State.¹ Nothing of a regional nature was included. The construction of an international organization was envisaged on a universal basis.

Secretary Hull initiated a series of diplomatic exchanges with the British and Soviet Governments for the purpose of establishing a topical agenda as a basis for multilateral discussions to take place in the near future. On March 22, 1944 Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to request bipartisan support for his postwar planning. On April 25, 1944 representatives from this committee known as the "Committee of Eight" met with Hull and discussed the plans to date.² Complete approval of Hull's activities was not forthcoming; however, no stumbling block was placed in the Secretary of State's path.

In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand concluded a treaty of mutual assistance known as the ANZAC pact,³ in which they agreed that, "within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional defense zone comprising the Southwest and South Pacific areas" should

¹Russell, op. cit., p. 221.

²See Connally, op. cit., pp. 264-67.

³United Nations, Secretariat, Treaty Series, XVIII (1948), pp. 358-78.

be established and a Southwest Pacific Conference should be held in the near future for discussing regional security in the area. Prime Minister Churchill was in favor of such regional arrangements and in April he declared that there would be "room for all generous, free associations of a special character, so long as they are not disloyal to the world cause...."¹

The United States, however, told the governments of Australia and New Zealand that it was more desirable to reach an agreement on an international security system before any attempts were made to deal with regional security problems. It was felt that such exclusive arrangements might seriously hinder the founding of a global security system.

This incident indicated to the Informal Political Agenda Group the need for further consideration as to the place of regional arrangements within the structure of a world-wide organization. There was no doubt at this time that the postwar organization should be built upon a universal base and not of regional blocs. There was also no questioning the compatibility of regional organizations with a general world organization. Furthermore, it was agreed that such regional organizations should be permitted. The real question was: What was to be their role in maintaining peace and security? There was widespread agreement among the planners that regional agencies² should be subordinate to the world organization.

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Deb. 399, Col. 586, quoted in Russell, op. cit., p. 255.

²The Political Agenda Group considered five types of formal regional arrangements possible: Continental, as the inter-American system; sub-continental, as the Little Entente or Balkan Entente had

and that such regional agencies or agreements should not prevent the Executive Council from carrying out its duties if it was determined that there was a threat to the peace in any region. It was also felt that regional agencies should not attempt to become involved with disputes between states in more than one region. It was undecided, however, how far the Executive Council's authority was to go. Was it desirable that the Executive Council assist in setting up regional arrangements for enforcement purposes?

This general question pointed up several questions particularly of interest to the United States. How would the Monroe Doctrine be affected? How far would the Council be able to go in interfering in the Western Hemisphere? Also, should the regional agencies be allowed to use force? Would the regional agencies be primarily enforcement agents of the Executive Council or would they be allowed to act on their own? These questions went unanswered at this time. The Agenda Group was, however, quite agreed that regional agencies should be required to act with the authorization of the Executive Council rather than to use force on their own initiative.

The Informal Political Agenda Group during the Spring of 1944, formulated its general position in a note which read:

1. Local and regional agencies should be free to facilitate and promote the pacific adjustment and settlement of local and regional controversies.

2. In dealing with such controversies, local and regional agencies

been; insular, as the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission; oceanic, as a North Atlantic or North Pacific grouping might be; and "interest groups," as the British Commonwealth of Nations. See Ibid.

should be free to use nonmilitary and military measures of enforcement if they are determined to be necessary, provided that these measures are used in accordance with the purposes of the Organization and that the Executive Council is kept fully informed of measures undertaken.

3. The Executive Council should have the right to determine whether the measures undertaken are consistent with the purposes of the Organization and whether they are adequate to prevent a serious breach of the peace, and should have the right to take action in any case either on appeal or on its own initiation.

4. Where feasible, local and regional agencies should be used for enforcement action on the invitation of the Executive Council or with its authorization.¹

The Informal Political Agenda Group had completed, on April 29, 1944, a "Possible Plan for a General International Organization."²

This Organization was to be "world-wide in character," with no provision for any form of regional representation. Under Chapter IV, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," it was provided that:

Where feasible regional or other arrangements should be employed to bring about adjustment or settlement of local and regional controversies.

If the parties fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute, by the means above indicated, they should be obligated to refer it to the executive council for a just and equitable settlement.³

The question of organizing on a regional basis arose during a conference between Secretary Hull and several Senators on May 12, 1944. Hull was asked if it would not be wise to have a world organization based upon regional federations much the same as Churchill had suggested? Hull replied that he and his advisers felt that rather than establish regional

¹Unpublished Department of State memorandum quoted in Ibid., p. 256.

²This is essentially the same draft that Hull refers to as the draft of April 25, 1944 in Memoirs, p. 1652.

³Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 586.

structures "clothed with jurisdiction and authority that would extend into the very head of the organization; namely, the Executive Council," it would be more practical for the states in a region to agree in advance to join with its neighbors whenever a breach or threatened breach of the peace was discovered. At the same time they would also keep the Executive Council informed of any such activities.

It is interesting to note that although the Draft of April 29 did not formally provide for any form of regional representation or assignment, Hull told the Senators that, "The Assembly would no doubt select its nominees for the Council on a geographical basis."¹

Hull also recalls that a Senator asked him at this meeting, whether "reports were true that regional federations had been secretly agreed to for Europe by the President, Stalin, and Churchill." Hull replied that he "knew of no such agreements."²

Following initial diplomatic exchanges and Senate Committee conversations, the final pre-Dumbarton Oaks proposals were completed and dated July 18, 1944. This draft was known as "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization." The Tentative Proposals provided for an organization which should be open to membership by all sovereign and peace loving states, large and small, and should be world-wide in character. Paragraph I-A-4 provided that:

The organization should be so construed as to make possible the existence of regional organizations or other arrangements or policies

¹Hull, Memoirs, p. 1667.

²ibid., p. 1668.

not inconsistent with its purposes, and to enable such organizations and arrangements to function on their own initiation or by reference from the general organization on matters of security and peace which are appropriate for regional adjustment. The general organization should at all times be kept informed of the activities in matters of security and peace undertaken by regional organizations or under regional or other arrangements.¹

This was the most elaborate statement to date, except perhaps the "Draft Constitution" which bore the influence of Welles, for safeguarding regional arrangements and organizations and indicating their relation to the general organization. It may be even more significant when it is noted that this provision was included as part of Chapter I "General Character of an International Organization," under the section "Nature of the Organization."

It has been said that rather than to emphasize the provision within the world organization for the preserving of regional organizations, they were included at this point in order to de-emphasize the regional aspects of enforcement.² In the provisions concerning the enforcement machinery, it was then provided that the Executive Council, in formulating plans for a general agreement on forces and facilities to be provided by member states for carrying out enforcement action, that it should take account of the "geographic position," "regional or special obligations," of the member states.

It was also stated under Chapter V, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," that, "Where feasible, regional or other arrangements should be employed ✓

¹For text, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 595-606.

²Russell, op. cit., p. 256.

to bring about adjustment of settlement of local or regional controversies," and that the Executive Council could "employ regional or local procedures ...to effect a settlement."

American planning for postwar organization had been embodied in several drafts: the "Draft Constitution," the "Staff Charter," the "Outline Plan for the President," the "Possible Plan for a General International Organization," and the "Tentative Proposals." It is difficult, in some instances, to determine just what groups were responsible for various stages of planning. The membership and functions of some committees overlapped. In the beginning, the planning was undertaken by an expert staff, which drafted several preliminary working papers. Next, these were formulated into proposals for the Secretary of State by a technical or expert group. The Secretary of State then consulted with certain Senators, Representatives, and important private individuals. The final United States position was then established by the Secretary of State and the President. The really significant level in the planning, as far as regionalism was concerned, was that of the Secretary of State. When Secretary of State Hull took over a more active direction of the expert committees, the change in emphasis from an organization based on regional concepts to a universal or world-wide construction was highly evident.

Planning prior to the resignation of Welles included questions of not only how to provide for existing and future regional organizations and arrangements, but the more basic consideration of whether or not the foundation for international organization should be of a regional nature. When Hull began to guide the work of the planning committees the latter question was no longer given consideration. The Secretary of State

definitely did not favor an organization based upon regionalism. Thus, the planning which followed involved regional aspects only in so far as present and future regional organizations and arrangements for local co-operation and handling of local disputes should be preserved and their relation to the overall organization.

The thinking of the President did not change at this juncture. He had been influenced by Welles and to a lesser extent Churchill. He had been thinking for the most part in terms of a transition period between the conclusion of the war and the advent of a general international organization during which international peace and security would be maintained by the Four Policemen. The ideas of Hull and his advisers played no small part in eventually convincing the President that an organization of a more universal nature was desirable. The change in Roosevelt's thinking seems to have come about immediately following Teheran.

Why did Churchill, the leading advocate of a regionally based international organization, not object to this change in emphasis on the part of Roosevelt? The British realized the need for Soviet co-operation in postwar reconstruction and were aware that the Soviet Union strongly disfavored British plans for Central and South-Eastern Europe. More important:

From Churchill's point of view, there was much that seemed unrealistic in American attitudes, but acceptance of American leadership in postwar planning had the advantage of committing the United States to an active part in postwar international affairs. Thus the sacrifice of a scheme which, while far more attractive to Great Britain, was in all probability unworkable, seemed a small price to

pay for active American collaboration in the postwar world.¹

In summing up the situation concerning the commitment to a universally based international organization, Sir Charles Webster goes so far as to say:

the peoples of the United States and British Commonwealth instinctively rejected the idea of forming a naked Great Power Alliance. They wished it to be embedded in a larger organization and subjected to the restraints of an ordered constitution expressing a moral purpose. This object could only be achieved in a universal system. Thus, while the special position of the Great Powers and usefulness for certain purposes of regional organization still remained important, it was clear that they could only be put into practical effect inside the framework of a world organization embracing all states, great and small.²

The discussion over regionalism at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was quite limited. There was no question of whether the new international organization should be regionally based. The only discussion centered around the place of regional organizations and agencies, and their role in maintaining peace and security, as part of the structure of the general organization.

Initially, only British and American proposals were considered, as the Soviet Union offered none of its own. Great Britain felt that regional arrangements would be useful for security purposes and should be included in the enforcement section of the Proposals. The United States maintained that regional agencies would, many times (especially in the

¹William McNeill, America, Britain and Russia (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 323, cited in Geoffrey Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957), p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 13, citing Sir Charles Webster, "The Making of the Charter

case of local disputes), be more effective organs for maintaining the peace through procedures of peaceful settlement than could the world-wide organization. At the same time, the United States agreed that regional agencies could be valuable in enforcing peace. Both agreed that regional agencies should keep the Council informed of their pertinent security activities. The United States held that a regional agency could not be allowed to take enforcement action on its own initiative alone. Council authorization was to be first obtained.

The Soviet Union agreed with these positions. China also did not object to the regional provisions so far decided upon but stressed that it be required that all regional arrangements be subject to Security Council approval so as to insure compatibility with the purposes of the general organization. The United States objected to this, maintaining that the proviso which required regional agencies to keep the Security Council informed of any security activities was sufficient. The United States undoubtedly realized the strong protest such a provision would bring from the Latin Americans who would feel that the inter-American system was endangered and unduly subordinated to the general organization.

The provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which resulted from these particular discussions are contained in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section C of Chapter VIII:

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the Maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements of agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes

of the United Nations," Creighton Lecture delivered at the University of London, November, 1946.

and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The British raised another question which had certain regional implications: Would the prohibition of regional enforcement action, without prior consent by the Security Council, limit Allied freedom of action in enforcing surrender terms on enemy states? It had already been held that the Allies would not transfer the responsibility for enforcement of surrender terms to the Security Council, at least until methods and means of Security Council enforcement had become well established. The issue raised by the British seemed to reflect their earlier suggestions for the establishment of a European regional organization aimed at safeguarding Europe from future German designs. Also involved in this issue were the bilateral agreements of mutual assistance directed likewise against Germany, which were the basis for what is now a Soviet regional arrangement.

At first, the United States proposed that the regional provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals might be altered so as to allow for action concerning enemy states to be "taken or authorized by the governments having responsibility for such action," without any prior approval by the Security Council. The Soviet delegate contended that this would in effect permit all regional agencies to take action with regard to enemy

states. In order to prevent any such misunderstanding, the United States suggested that the regional provisions be left unchanged and a separate chapter be added which would include a provision for transitional arrangements and control of enemy states. The pertinent provision is Paragraph 2 of Chapter XII to the effect, "No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action."

Another matter of interest for regionalism arose in the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks over the composition of the Security Council. Great Britain and the Soviet Union felt that the number of permanent members in the Security Council should remain at five (it was assumed that France would eventually become the fifth member). However, the United States proposed that a Latin American state, specifically Brazil, be given a sixth permanent seat. Britain pointed out that this would stimulate pressures for other additions. Even the United States realized that an additional permanent member would necessitate expanding total Council membership to thirteen. The major argument advanced by the United States was that the addition of Brazil would insure representation from this vast region. This would, however, have opened the way for other, perhaps equally valid, claims. Finally, in the face of Anglo-Soviet opposition the proposal was withdrawn. Latin America would no doubt be adequately represented among the elected members of the Council. The Chinese later suggested that it should be specified that the elected members of the Security Council be chosen so as to be adequately representative of the

community of states. The United States felt that such a specification should not be included as part of the Charter as the General Assembly would probably adopt similar guiding principles in electing Security Council members.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals contained no specific reference to the right of self-defense or collective self-defense as contained in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This is especially interesting as several of the regional arrangements adhered to by the United States are based solely on this Article. It may be argued that the Proposals allowed this right as nothing was included to prevent such action. The issues involved over the question of collective self-defense at the San Francisco Conference had important implications for regionalism.

CHAPTER IV

FROM MEXICO CITY TO SAN FRANCISCO

The state of relations between the United States and the other republics of the American system during these last few months of intensive planning for a postwar international organization are highly significant in tracing the regional policy of the United States. To what degree did the United States consult with the other members of the sole regional organization of which it was a member? What were the effects of the wishes of the other members of the Pan-American organization on the planning undertaken by the United States?

No consultations of any consequence were initiated by the United States with the Latin-American governments prior to the Summer of 1944. The Latin Americans had been somewhat aware of the struggle between regionalism and globalism which had been going on in the Department of State. When the emphasis was placed on the global approach, they began to fear that their regional system would be foresaken in the plans for a world organization. The approach of the United States in this matter was one of informing rather than genuine consultation. Secretary Hull relates that, "Prior to and during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference I had made every effort to keep the Latin American Republics...as fully informed as possible."¹ Of course the justification, reasonable enough,

¹Hull, Memoirs, p. 1709.

for not consulting with them and other smaller powers was that the successful establishment and maintenance of an international organization was dependent primarily upon the agreement and co-operation of the great powers.

The Department of State, taking note of the growing dissatisfaction of the Latin Americans, informed them on June 26, 1944 of the impending Dumbarton Oaks Conference to be held in August of that year. In a circular telegram of July 11, 1944, it was stated that in its planning the United States "had devoted particular attention to the special relationship that exists between the United States and the other American Republics," and that this relationship would be taken fully into account in the forthcoming Dumbarton Oaks conversations.¹ It is said that "the United States believed that the inter-American system had an even more important role to fill in the future than in the past." The specific role of the system had to await the clearer definition and formation of the general organization.²

On September 6, 1944 Hull assured the American republics that their suggestions were being kept in mind and he informed them of the general progress at Dumbarton Oaks to date. At two conferences with their ambassadors, on September 15 and 16, Hull further briefed them on the current state of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. He stressed that at Dumbarton Oaks, the United States was trying to preserve on a world-wide

¹Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 279.

²Ibid., p. 280.

basis the principles developed in this Hemisphere and that the inter-American system would have an important role in the framework of the world organization. Hull promised that further consultations with the American republics would be held shortly after the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been completed.

These consultations were begun on Columbus Day, 1944 with a reception for the ambassadors of the American republics held at the Blair House. On that same day, President Roosevelt, in a public address, declared:

The bonds that unite the American republics into a community of good neighbors must remain strong. We have not labored long and faithfully to build in this New World a system of international security and co-operation merely to let it be dissipated in any period of post-war indifference. Within the framework of the world organization of the United Nations, which the governments and people of the American republics are helping to establish, the inter-American system can and must play a strong and vital role.¹

The Blair House meetings and others which extended over a period from October 12, 1944 to February 9, 1945 were again not consultations in the true sense. Because of the nature of the great-power planning it was not possible for the United States to arrive at unified or closed views with the other American republics. From the point of view of the United States these meetings were for the purpose of clarifying the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in an informative and "educational" manner. The United States wanted also to create the feeling among the Latin-American governments that many of the things which they desired were actually contained in the Proposals and that other things had not been included in the Proposals for good and reasonable reasons.

¹U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XI (October 15, 1944), 398.

It was hoped that "a common informed understanding" favoring the Proposals could be arrived at.¹

The Latin Americans' chief concern was in maintaining the Western Hemisphere system and insuring the principle of the equality of states. Although formally recognizing the necessity of establishing a global peace and security organization, for the most part they felt that its area of operation should be narrowly defined so as to permit prior recourse to the inter-American peace and security machinery in any American dispute before such a situation should be deemed within the competence of the Security Council. Quite specific provisions for the safeguarding of regional systems should be included within the United Nations Charter. There was considerable Latin-American pressure for the strengthening of the inter-American peace and security facilities before the United Nations Charter was framed, with a view toward reducing the degree of its subordination to the United Nations.

The attitude of the Latin Americans toward regionalism had changed considerably since the institution of the League of Nations. Many of the republics had looked upon the League as a means of protection from what was considered United States hegemony. Now it was feared that a general organization might interfere with their regional system which had developed more favorable aspects under the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States. They were disturbed over the prospects of a world power

¹For an additional explanation of the regional aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the relation of the inter-American system to the world-wide organization, see Durward Sandifer, "Regional Aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals," U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XII (January 28, 1945), 145-47.

structure which included an increasingly strong Soviet Union.

The Latin Americans had been pressing for a consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers but the United States opposed the meeting, which should have been held in 1943, because it feared that Argentina would disrupt the proceedings. In November, the Mexican Foreign Minister approached Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. with the suggestion that a special meeting could be held which included all the American states collaborating in the war effort to discuss urgent war and postwar problems. This would automatically exclude Argentina. By January 13, 1945 it was definitely established that an Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace would be held in Mexico City on February 21, 1945.¹

The agenda for the Conference, the United States felt, should include problems brought about by the war, preparations for an Inter-American conference to strengthen the hemisphere system, the necessary regional developments to be taken pending the establishment of the world organization, the Argentine situation, as well as various social and economic problems.

Extensive preparations were undertaken by the Department of State. Various knotty problems arose as to the relation of the Inter-American system as a means of preserving peace and security in the Americas with the over-all responsibility of the proposed United Nations organization.

¹For a day-to-day summary of Conference events, see Samuel G. Inman, "An Inside View of the Inter-American Conference," The South and World Affairs, VII (April-May, 1945), 1-40.

Such questions involved the issue of self-defense and the nature of acts of aggression.

Secretary of State Stettinius headed the United States delegation with Nelson Rockefeller as alternate delegate. Among the Congressional advisers were Senators Tom Connally and Warren Austin, the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The primary aim of the United States was to achieve a common front at the Conference in support of the proposed world charter. Another interest was the future strengthening of the inter-American system. These two areas of interest were interrelated as the United States felt the strengthening of the inter-American system should not take place until after the scope and powers of the world organization had been agreed upon and that the regional system should fit into the framework of the global organization.¹

In an address before the Plenary Conference on February 22, Secretary Stettinius set forth the general purposes and position of the United States:

¹The United States delegation was somewhat divided on these two objectives. See James B. Reston, "Stettinius' Aides Landed in Mexico," New York Times, March 5, 1945, p. 5. Summer Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 207, maintains that a majority of the Department of State officials wanted only to obtain support for the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and had no desire for strengthening a regional system which they felt would hinder the establishment of the proposed world organization. The minority, led by Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, felt that "while the regional system of the Americas must necessarily be subordinated to the over-all authority of the coming United Nations organization, it should nevertheless be strengthened and consolidated so that it might in fact, become a strong pillar of the United Nations organization."

We have met here in order to carry further our discussions of the world organization before the United Nations conference at San Francisco. We will not, of course, in this inter-American meeting take decisions on questions of policy that will be explored by all the United Nations together at San Francisco.

However, we should, I believe, examine what steps need to be taken to strengthen the inter-American system for the major role it should play in the world of the future.

The United States Government believes that the stronger we can make the inter-American system in its own sphere of activity the stronger the world organization will be.¹

Committee II, on World Organization of which Secretary Stettinius was chairman, was where the United States attempted to obtain united support for the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals with a reference to the inter-American system as a regional arrangement within the meaning of the Proposals. As it related to the general organization, the United States felt that modifications should be made in the inter-American peace machinery so the Western Hemisphere system could handle the pacific settlement of disputes within that area and could accept initial responsibility for enforcing peace under authorization of the world organization.

The other American governments were willing to co-operate for the establishment of a world organization based generally upon the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. However, before these Proposals were written into the United Nations Charter, they wanted numerous changes to be made. The various objections and suggestions were co-ordinated by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister and a list of specific changes was formulated on which a general Latin-American consensus existed. The delegates wanted this specific list of changes incorporated into any resolution which supported,

¹U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XII (February 25, 1945), 279-80.

in principle, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

The United States, as one of the sponsors of the Proposals, was in a somewhat embarrassing position. At first, it suggested that a synthesis of the Latin American views be assembled and that it be transmitted to the other United Nations separately from the resolution. This idea was not acceptable to the other delegations. The solution to the problem was reached by excepting the United States as an adherent to these specific proposed changes. This was accomplished by stating in the resolution (Resolution XXX), that these specific suggestions were those of "the Republics here represented which did not take part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations." The suggestions of pertinence referred to:

The desirability of solving controversies and questions of an inter-American character, preferably in accordance with inter-American methods and procedures, in harmony with those of the General International Organization;

The desirability of giving an adequate representation to Latin America on the Security Council.¹

These recommendations indicated that the Latin Americans were going to make themselves felt at the San Francisco Conference in preserving their regional system and in attempting to achieve assured representation for Latin America in the Security Council. Although the United States was a party to this resolution, the Latin Americans were unable to obtain a commitment from the United States in support of their position at San

¹U.S., Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21 to March 8, 1945, Publication 2497 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 103-04. Herein after cited as U.S., Delegation Report.

Francisco. The United States wanted to go to San Francisco with a relatively free hand. One consideration may be, as John Houston suggests, that the United States wanted to afford the Soviet Union as little pretext as possible for concluding that the Latin-American states were to be used as counters in a game of power politics within the United Nations, thereby providing justification for a similar policy on the part of the Soviet Union.¹

The Latin Americans transmitted a record of this resolution and other related documents, including the Inter-American Juridical Committee's report to all the other states invited to San Francisco. It is worth pointing out that the Juridical Committee, at the request of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, which met at Rio de Janeiro in early 1942, formulated several recommendations on postwar problems and international organization. Among these recommendations was one on the character of the New Association of Nations:

Character of the new association of nations. The new organization should be based on the cooperation of all states, no state being privileged to remain outside. The principle of universality of membership must be reconciled with the existence of regional groups, which may operate autonomously in matters which do not concern the entire world community. The new world organization should be assigned functions "as comprehensive as the political, economic and social needs of the community require."²

Resolution XXX, "On the Establishment of a General International

¹John A. Houston, Latin America in the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), p. 16.

²For complete text, see International Conciliation, No. 387 (February, 1943), 119-25.

Organization," included a general declaration of intention to co-operate in establishing a world organization toward which the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provided a "basis" and a "valuable contribution." It was also specifically mentioned that the signatory governments retained "full liberty to present and support in the San Francisco Conference...all the viewpoints they consider pertinent."¹

The problem of the relationship of the regional system to the world organization was dealt with in Committee III, on the Inter-American System. The Latin-American states wished to see a reorganization of the hemisphere system so that it could handle regional security problems with considerable independence from the world organization. It was desired that a stronger American regional system be instituted before the San Francisco Conference convened. The most important proposals seeking to accomplish this end were submitted by Colombia and Uruguay.

Both draft resolutions provided for hemispheric security measures in the event of an act of aggression upon an American state. These measures would be carried out in harmony with the provisions of the world organization once its character had been formulated.

These two drafts were worked into a single draft which provided that all American states would use any measures necessary, including the use of arms, in the event any of them was attacked or threatened with invasion. Immediate action was obligatory upon all American republics on the vote of a majority of the twenty-one governments.

¹For complete text, see U.S., Delegation Report, pp. 102-04.

The United States could not accept such a formula. Not only was the United States unwilling to allow a majority of the American states to commit it to any such action but it was also felt that it would be unwise to submit such a far-reaching proposal to the Senate before it had considered the future United Nations Charter. There was also some feeling that the proposals for collective defense might jeopardize the world organization and further the creation of regional arrangements in other areas of the world, especially in Eastern Europe where the Soviet Union was in the process of concluding mutual assistance pacts with Poland and Yugoslavia as it already had with Czechoslovakia.

It became apparent that the Latin Americans were ready to adopt the unified draft. However, as this draft was available only in Spanish, Senator Austin, representing the United States, asked that the vote be delayed because the lack of translation had hindered a detailed study of the draft by the United States delegation. He also pointed out that Senator Connally, who would be concerned with the contents, had not yet arrived.

The United States delegation had not envisaged such a far-reaching proposal. Senator Austin later related that the delegation was "astounded" to find "the Latin-Americans, who formerly regarded the Nation up North as a sort of club over their heads, now were not only willing but eager to participate in the Monroe Doctrine."¹ The Latin Americans were now ready to join in collective guarantees with the United States. The United

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1 Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 2, 2024.

States delegation favored such a co-operative spirit, but was still somewhat fearful of strengthening the American regional system too greatly before the charter of the world organization could be completed.

There was also some concern over the power of the Executive to commit the United States to such strong international action as proposed by the new draft. The President's war powers were considered sufficiently extensive to cover a broad guarantee against aggression for the duration of wartime activity. However, beyond this period such action, it was felt, would require Senate approval.

Finally, after considerable negotiation and a final approval by President Roosevelt, Resolution VIII, known as the Act of Chapultepec, was adopted. It included a declaration that acts of aggression by both non-American and American states against another would be considered as an act against all. The states were bound, however, only to consult among themselves in order to agree upon advisable measures.

A definition of aggression was included in the Act of Chapultepec: "In any case of invasion by armed forces of one State into the territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith shall constitute an act of aggression."¹ The provisions for mutual consultation in the event of an attack against any one of the states was limited to the period of the war; thus the functioning

¹Senator Connally indicates that the United States delegation insisted upon the inclusion of the words, "and demarcated in accordance therewith," in order to avoid the "disputes over nebulous and hazy boundaries in Central and South America," in Connally, *op. cit.*, p. 270. U.S., Delegation Report, p. 19, states that this provided "a non-exclusive criterion for determining aggression."

of the Executive of the United States constituted no problem. This was quite short of the Latin-American demand for a more permanent system. However, Senator Austin, with reference to the proposal in the unified draft that a majority of American republics could bring about an obligation on the part of the United States to use armed force in the event of any act of aggression, stated that such a provision was "impossible for any country whose constitution required that a declaration of war should be made by its legislative body," unless a treaty for such troop mobilization had been previously concluded, approved, and ratified.¹

It was recommended that following the establishment of peace, the governments of the republics of the Western Hemisphere should "consider the conclusion, in accordance with their constitutional processes, of a treaty," which would establish similar procedures for meeting future threats or acts of aggression. This was merely a moral commitment by the United States to undertake, at a later date, the negotiation of an inter-American treaty for collective security. It is noteworthy that such consultations did not take place until August, 1947 when the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was concluded.

The United States delegation insisted that the declarations and recommendations of the Act of Chapultepec be clearly put in perspective with the world organization. Thus, Part III of the act announced that:

The above Declaration and Recommendation constitute a regional arrangement for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this Hemisphere. The said arrangement, and the pertinent activities and procedures, shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization

when established.¹

Another resolution, although of lesser importance for general organization than the Act of Chapultepec, was Resolution IX on the "Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System." This resolution was based largely on a draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation, with modifications resulting from a Mexican proposal on the same subject. The draft of the United States on the "Improvement and Strengthening of the Inter-American System," resolved:

That the inter-American system should be further improved and strengthened in the light of inter-American experience and tradition for the better implementation of the solidarity of the American Republics in the solution of their common problems, and to enable it to carry out the responsibilities which they may undertake in relation to the general international organization, when established;

That definitive measures to improve further and strengthen the inter-American instruments necessary thereto should be undertaken by the Ninth International Conference of American States, which should be held at the earliest practicable date....²

Specific proposals for the consolidation and integration of the existing system were put forth. The functions of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union were to be expanded, as well as, the establishment of an Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

The Mexican draft suggested that the inter-American system be reorganized on a less centralized basis through the formulation of a new organic charter by the Ninth International Conference of American States to be held in Bogotá in 1946. The Mexican proposal contained the provi-

¹U.S., Delegation Report, p. 75. Italics mine.

²Ibid., p. 195.

sion that "adequate machinery should be established" so that it could, if necessary, "use preventive measures or sanctions against" an American state because it would be advisable to "avoid extra-continental intervention."¹

In its final form, Resolution IX provided that the inter-American system should "be further improved and strengthened for the purpose of adjusting and solving inter-American problems..." It further declared that the inter-American system should "maintain the closest relations with the proposed general international organization and assume the appropriate responsibilities in harmony with the principles and purposes of the general international organization." It was provided that the Governing Board of the Pan American Union should prepare a draft charter to be considered at the next regular conference of American states, which was scheduled to be held in Bogotá, in 1946.²

The Latin Americans no longer retained any fear that the United States would forsake the inter-American system in its plans for a United Nations. Both the United States and the Latin Americans wanted the system preserved and strengthened. The Latin Americans wanted it strengthened prior to the San Francisco Conference while the United States made it clear that this would have to wait until after the general organization had been established. The United States did suggest possibilities for increasing the responsibility of the inter-American system and its institutional structure in the not too distant future. The United States was, however, unable to obtain a strong common front in support of the Dumbarton Oaks

¹Ibid., p. 192.

²For complete text, see Ibid., pp. 76-80.

Proposals. The Latin Americans were going to make themselves heard at San Francisco.

CHAPTER V

SAN FRANCISCO AND THE REGIONAL DILEMMA

The central problem of regional significance at San Francisco involved the relation of regional arrangements and organizations to the new general organization. There were also several lesser issues with regional implications. The first of these was the participation of Argentina in the Conference. Argentina's participation, although opposed by the Soviet Union, was finally resolved when the two Soviet republics were admitted by unanimous consent. Latin-American support for this was brought about by a strong United States stand supporting the admission of Argentina,¹ "in entire accord with the desire of her sister republics in this hemisphere."² Argentina's admission was then approved over Soviet protests in both the Executive Committee and the plenary meeting of the Conference on April 30.

The United States later made it clear that "the vote of the United States in favor of admitting Argentina did not constitute a blanket endorsement of the policies of the Argentine Government."³ The real

¹Although President Truman felt the adherence of Argentina to the conditions of the Act of Chapultepec were somewhat insincere, he had instructed Secretary of State Stettinius "to support the admission of Argentina at the opportune time in order to promote Western Hemisphere solidarity," Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, I: Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 282.

²UNCIO, Documents, III, p. 380.

³Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Report on the San Francisco Conference,"

significance of the Argentine incident was that it solidified the Latin Americans against what they feared would be a series of Soviet attempts to interfere in American regional affairs. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a United States delegate, felt that the whole business had "done more in four days to solidify Pan America against Russia than anything that ever happened."¹

Another issue concerned the composition of the Security Council. The Latin-American republics, at the Mexico City Conference, had made it clear in Resolution XXX that they would seek "an adequate representation to Latin America on the Security Council," either in the form of a permanent seat or a specific allocation of non-permanent seats. Although the United States had, at one time during the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, proposed the addition of another permanent member, specifically Brazil, it had since maintained that such an addition would only open the way for other demands for permanent membership. Additions to permanent membership were not in harmony with the concept upon which the structure and function of the Security Council was based. The Sponsoring Powers stood firmly together, preventing any alteration of their special position within the Security Council. Neither did the United States favor the inclusion of specific criteria for non-permanent member selection. Any specific mention of certain criteria would only lead to the demand that other criteria be included. Finally, upon a British

U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XII (June 3, 1945), 1107.

¹Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 182.

suggestion, it was agreed that non-permanent members would be selected with:

due regard being especially paid in the first instance to the contribution of members of the Organization towards the maintenance of international peace and security and towards the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographic distribution.¹

The last of the smaller problems with regional implications was involved with the nature of the Military Staff Committee which was to be established under the authority of the Security Council. As constructed under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the Military Staff Committee was not provided with any regional subcommittees or other regional agencies, although Provision VI.D.2 concerning the procedures of the Security Council provided that:

The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

The United States delegation's memorandum of April 19 to the President had indicated that it felt this provision should be eliminated from the proposed Charter.² It was thought that only swift and effective action could be obtained in matters of security by the Great Powers and that the establishment of regional subcommittees would only hamper centralized action. On May 2, the United States proposed an amendment for deleting the words: "including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff

¹UNICIO, Documents, III, p. 624. Italics mine.

²Memorandum for the President: Charter for the International Organization, "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 678.

Committee."¹

Several other suggestions were put forth by the other Great Powers and the Latin Americans. As a result the following provision became Paragraph 4 of Article 47 of the Charter:

The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

This article satisfied some of the desires of the small states, especially the Latin American, with a provision that retained the idea of regional subcommittees and by necessitating consultation with regional agencies before their establishment, thus giving these agencies some voice as to their nature. However, the Security Council retained the power of authorization which could allow the Great Powers to prevent any regional subcommittees from coming into existence.

One of the foremost problems confronting the delegates to the San Francisco Conference was that involving the relationship of regional organizations and arrangements to the world organization. There were those who advocated a highly centralized authority in the global organization. Others, however wished to grant considerable responsibility to regional organizations for the maintenance of security and peace. The dilemma was clearly seen by Senator Vandenberg:

The grave problem is to find a formula which will reasonably protect legitimate regional arrangements without destroying the over-all responsibility of united action through the Peace League and without inviting the formation of a lot of dangerous "regional

¹"Changes in Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as Suggested by the United States Delegation," Ibid., p. 680.

spheres of influence" etc.¹

Varying interests of several states were involved in the issue concerning the status of regional arrangements. Not only was there a desire on the part of some states to increase the autonomy of regional arrangements, but there was a related demand that a more explicit statement be developed providing for enforcement action to be taken against the enemy states of the Second World War in the event of a resurgence of aggression.

The Latin-American delegation came to the Conference with a strong desire to safeguard their regional system which had been expanded by the Act of Chapultepec only six weeks earlier. Section C of Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals² had provided for the existence of regional arrangements, but stated that "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." The real significance of prior Security Council authorization for enforcement action had not been fully realized at the Mexico City Conference as complete knowledge of the Yalta voting formula was not available at that time. The Latin Americans now were well aware that a negative vote by any of the permanent members of the Security Council could prevent their system of security from functioning.

At the same time, the states of the newly formed Arab League (March 22, 1945), for whom Egypt acted as spokesman, were equally concerned lest

¹Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 187.

²Supra, pp. 100-101.

their system not be given appropriate safeguards and some measure of autonomy.

Australia was anxious that a certain degree of regional freedom of action be maintained, especially in the event the Security Council was unable to authorize regional action. A similar desire on the part of Belgium was expressed.

More directly related to the problem of possible renewed aggression by the enemy states, were the wishes of the Soviet Union and France. The Soviet Union wanted to insure the exception from any restrictive control under the Charter its system of bilateral mutual assistance pacts. France also desired that it be made clear that freedom of action existed in case of new German aggression without prior Security Council authorization.

During the preliminary consultations among the Sponsoring Powers at the beginning of the San Francisco Conference, the Soviet Union brought up the issue of treaties and arrangements directed at possible future German aggression. Chapter XII of the Dumbarton Oaks dealing with transitional Arrangements provided that:

No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov pointed out that the chapter heading "Transitional Arrangements," implied that any arrangements made under this provision were of a temporary character. This, he felt, was not to be inferred of the Soviet pacts, some of which were to be in force for twenty years with the right of renewal. Thus, a question was raised as to the relation between Chapter XII and the regional provisions of the

Proposals. Molotov wanted a specific exemption from Council authorization for enforcement action taken under the Soviet pacts. Enforcement action under these treaties should not be subject to prior Council authorization as was the case for other regional enforcement measures. The Soviet Foreign Minister felt that only those treaties concluded prior to Charter ratification should be exempted.

The British Foreign Minister thought it unwise to exclude possible future treaties of a similar nature. He also felt that such action as contemplated under such treaties should only be taken without prior Council authorization until the United Nations had been given the responsibility for maintaining peace and security in connection with former enemy states as well as the rest of the world.

From the point of view of the United States, these proposals were unduly involved. It was only necessary to include "other special arrangements" in Paragraph VIII-C.2 along with "regional arrangements and agencies." Once the transitional period was ended and the Security Council took over the responsibility for action against renewed German aggression such "special arrangements" would have the same status as other security treaties and would fall under Chapter VIII dealing with regional arrangements.

The Soviet Union still held that a more specific reference must be made in order to safeguard its defensive arrangements. Molotov proposed that Paragraph VIII-C.2 be amended, as the French had wished, which would exclude from prior Council authorization "the measures contemplated in the regional arrangements directed against the renewal of the policy of

aggressors in the present war."¹ Molotov thought no direct relation of such a provision to Chapter XII would be necessary.

The United States, however, did not want to leave this relationship unclear. The intention of the Big Four at Dumbarton Oaks had been to eventually place the responsibility for dealing with renewed enemy aggression with the Security Council. Chapter XII would, therefore, be in effect for a limited time, albeit an indefinite period. When this transfer of responsibility would take place would be determined by the Big Five, thus, any such decision could take place only when all were satisfied that the transitional period was over. Then the treaties directed at enemy states would come under Chapter VIII. No amendment, it was felt, was needed to make explicit what was an inherent situation. However, no harm would be done by adding the amendment which would calm the fears of the French and the Soviets.² A joint amendment to Paragraph VIII.C.2 was then agreed upon:

...no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against enemy states in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2, or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such states, until such time as the Organization may, by consent of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by a State now at war with the United Nations.³

¹UNCIO, Documents, III, p. 392.

²Senator Vandenberg, the United States delegate most directly concerned with the issues involving regionalism, observed that "I could not object to this [the Soviet Amendment] because it is in line with my January 10th speech demanding a permanent military alliance, outside the Peace League, to keep the Axis disarmed." Vandenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³UNCIO, Documents, III, p. 688. Italics indicate amendment.

The United States delegation was satisfied with this amendment as it related to the enemy states. However, it soon became apparent that "this amendment opened up serious collateral considerations."¹ Although the amendment did not actually alter the situation that had previously existed under Chapter XII, it only served to increase the demand of the Latin Americans that enforcement action under their regional system be exempted from prior Security Council authorization. Even though the inter-American regional security enforcement system was not specifically directed at the Axis states, the Latin Americans could see no essential difference in their plans and Soviet-French plans for defensive action.

Senator Vandenberg, United States representative to the regional committee, noted that:

Europe would have freedom of action for her defensive regional arrangements (pending the time when the Peace League shall prove its dependability as a substitute policeman) but the Western Hemisphere would not have similar freedom of action under its Pan-American agreements.... Therefore, in the event of trouble in the Americas, we could not act ourselves; we would have to depend exclusively on the Security Council; and any one permanent member of the Council could veto the latter action (putting us at the mercy of Britain, Russia or China). Thus little is left of the Monroe Doctrine.²

While consulting with Nelson Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Vandenberg was told that the Latin Americans were "up in arms" on this same issue. Vandenberg thought that "a limited extension of the European exemption to the Western Hemisphere" could be achieved by adding to the joint amendment the following:

¹Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 187.

²Ibid.

...and with the exception of measures which may be taken under... the Act of Chapultepec of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War, signed at Mexico City on March 8, 1945, until such time as the Organization may, by consent of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be charged with this function.¹

Rockefeller was pleased with this formula and no doubt the Latin American's would have been too, as the specific mention of the Act of Chapultepec was, to them, highly desirable. Vandenberg submitted a letter containing his proposal to Secretary Stettinius on May 6.

When the letter had been circulated among the United States delegates the temporarily dormant feelings of the delegates over the issue of regionalism became aroused and on May 7 the delegation found itself split on this important question.

Vandenberg's position was generally supported by John Foster Dulles, Nelson Rockefeller, and Representatives Sol Bloom and Charles Eaton.

Vandenberg and his supporters did not:

...see how we could tolerate a possible situation in which (under the Charter) we could not deal with a bad Pan-Am situation at all because (1) we are not permitted to act under Chapultepec and (2) the Security Council is stopped by a Russian or a British or a Chinese or a French veto.²

There was considerable feeling that Soviet vetoes on any matter dealing with the American system were a real possibility. It was thought by Vandenberg's group that exempting measures under the Act of Chapultepec would be a "legitimate" regional exception and at the same time avoiding the exemption of illegitimate "regional balance-of-power groups." The

¹Ibid., p. 188.

²Ibid., p. 189.

Senator felt that the United States could not "desert the demands of our united Pan-Am neighbors in this matter."¹

Those opposing these views, Harold Stassen and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Leo Pasvolsky in particular, maintained that the exemption of regional pacts directed at the enemy states was quite consistent with the Charter. However, if the Act of Chapultepec is exempted and the Security Council is denied the right to intervene in Western Hemisphere disputes how can the United States insist upon a right to veto any action undertaken by possible European, Pacific, or Middle Eastern regional arrangements. If another exemption was made surely there would be pressure for others and the authority of the Security Council and the world organization would be unduly weakened from the very beginning. World security would then be, in effect, in the hands of regional groups which would undoubtedly be little more than great-power spheres of influence which would eventually result in the world being divided into several armed camps.²

Senator Vandenberg presented an interesting summary of the May 7 delegation meeting:

...Pasvolsky said that if there was a Pan-Am dispute requiring the use of force and any permanent member of the Council votes against it (and thus vetoed it) we would go ahead to suit ourselves (and the Peace League would be all through). I argued that any such latitude as this, reserved to each State, would be a far greater threat to the League than would a frank exemption of Pan-America

¹Ibid., p. 187.

²Cf. James B. Reston, "Propose Relating Pan-American Plan to World Security," New York Times, May 10, 1945, pp. 1, 17. Arthur Krock, "Regional Pacts a Problem," New York Times, May 9, 1945, p. 19.

(under Chapultepec) to use regional force itself in the first instance. Dulles argued that there was nothing in Dumbarton Oaks which prohibits "self-defense" and that under the Chapultepec agreement "self-defense" in the Western Hemisphere is a partnership affair and that the Monroe Doctrine is still part of it. I served notice on the Delegation, as a matter of good faith, that if this question is not specifically cleared up in the Charter, I shall expect to see a Reservation on the subject in the Senate and that I shall support it.¹

Nobody in the United States delegation wanted to destroy the Pan-American security system. The problem was that of reconciling the Pan-American and world security systems without weakening either. At the same time, the problem involved the retention of some independence over the settlement of hemispheric disputes without inviting other states to set up their own regional systems virtually independent of United Nations authority. In the minds of the United States delegates, it was not a question of one thing or another but a matter of finding the least difficult way out of this dilemma.

The United States delegation was subject to various pressures over the regional issue. To begin with, the Soviets had gained a specific exemption for their regional pacts aimed at the enemy states. The Latin Americans were strongly demanding that an explicit safeguard for the inter-American system be included in the Charter. Some Latin-American delegates had, in fact, made it clear that they would no longer support the provision for independent Soviet action unless a similar measure of independent action was accorded the Pan-American states. There was also pressure from other states, particularly those of the Arab bloc, for various degrees of regional autonomy. Another source of pressure was the United

¹Vandenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

States itself. There was a growing fear that, unless the United States was free to carry out the Monroe Doctrine, a specific reservation on this point would be demanded by the Senate, as Senator Vandenberg had threatened. According to James B. Reston, it was the fear of a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine by the Senate which, more than anything, "has at least brought the United States delegation to agreement that something must be done to minimize the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council on regional questions."¹

Following further discussion within the United States delegation, Senator Vandenberg, on May 9, noted that the delegation was no closer to a settlement of the regional dilemma. "Since it involves basic national policy, the whole thing will have to be put up to the President."² Dulles relates that President Truman, during a telephone consultation at this juncture, "instructed the Delegation to try to work out a formula which would permit of an Inter-American system that could act for peace free of Security Council veto."³

Finally, the technical experts and advisers of the delegation presented an exposition of the factors involved, upon which the President could be asked to make his decision.⁴ It was agreed that the following

¹James B. Reston, "Attack Opened on Big 5 Veto Right," New York Times, May 10, 1945, p. 17.

²Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 190.

³John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 91.

⁴See Russell, op. cit., p. 697.

considerations were involved: (1) The prospect that a permanent member of the Security Council might veto inter-American security action. The alternative was the danger that regional and mutual assistance arrangements exemptions would not allow the United States to have an adequate voice in Europe and other parts of the world or that the United States could not maintain the right to veto enforcement action taken under these arrangements; (2) It would not be possible specifically to exempt both mutual assistance pacts and regional arrangements without weakening the world organization. However, the Latin-Americans would not be satisfied if some safeguard for the inter-American system was not provided; (3) In the event of an act of direct aggression, the right of immediate action could not be denied either the victim or the states most directly affected in any region. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine was safeguarded by the right of self-defense; (4) In order to protect and assure the over-all authority of the world organization it could be required that any defensive actions taken by states be reported immediately to the Security Council. The Council could then take appropriate action if it desired to exert its superior authority.

On the basis of these considerations, United States advisers began to work on a draft amendment on self-defense which the delegates would

The United States position since the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, with regard to the right of self-defense, was that although this right was not specifically mentioned in the Proposals it definitely was implicit. During the review and preparation period the delegation in its April 19 memorandum to the President, stated that it had considered, but deferred making a decision on formulating a definition of the right of self-defense. See Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 678.

then submit for presidential approval, thus hoping to solve the regional dilemma.

Meanwhile, Technical Committee 4 of Commission III, whose functions were to prepare and recommend to Commission III draft provisions for the Charter relating to matters dealt with in Chapter VIII, Section C (Regional Arrangements), had held an organizational meeting on May 4. The delegate of the United States to this committee was Senator Vandenberg. At the second meeting on May 9, the committee appointed a subcommittee to clarify the comments and amendments which had been submitted to it. During the early discussions within the subcommittee, the question arose as to the degree of autonomy to be accorded to regional systems. At this point Senator Vandenberg pointed out that:

...we do not propose to desert the 100-year old Monroe Doctrine, the 50-year old Pan American Union, and the recent Act of Chapultepec, but...we do not propose to give regional arrangements any such supremacy as will destroy the unity of the world organization, and invite a general break-up of the world into regional groups.¹

He then announced that the United States delegation was collaborating and would submit an amendment intended to reconcile the global organization of the collective security system and the continued operation of the inter-American system.² With this statement, Chairman Alberto Camargo of Colombia announced that the Latin-American states would hold their various amendments pending the submission of the United States proposal.

The draft amendment on which the United States delegation's advisers

¹Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 191.

²UNCIO, Documents, XII, p. 834.

were working was to be added to Section VIII.B dealing with action against aggression rather than to Section VIII.C on regional arrangements. Instead of excepting the Act of Chapultepec from the authority of the Security Council, the draft cited the Act of Chapultepec as an example of self-defense against armed attack. By this method, the Inter-American system was not accorded special privilege while at the same time, it was felt, hemispheric solidarity was maintained.

Telephone conversations with Washington indicated that former Secretary Hull and several high military officials were fearful that the proposed amendment would overemphasize regionalism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemingly wanted to make sure that the United States would have some say on the use of other regional enforcement measures in Europe and the Pacific, while at the same time, insuring American action in the Western Hemisphere should the world security system break down.

British Foreign Minister Eden was somewhat opposed to the idea that self-defense would operate outside national territorial limits. Eden favored the French position which reserved to members the right to take individual action in the interests of peace and justice only if the Council failed to act.

The draft amendment, unanimously adopted by the United States delegation and approved by President Truman, took the following form:

Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and should aggression occur by any state against any member state, such member state possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right to take such measures for self-defense against armed attack shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against all of them. The taking of such measures shall be immediate-

ly reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹

On May 12 the United States draft amendment was presented to the other members of the Big Five. The United States pointed out that the proposal contained the essential elements of the earlier French amendment (to Chapter VI),² but that it was being proposed as an addition to Section VIII-B as it dealt with action to be taken in response to aggression.

The Soviet and British delegates thought the amendment would tend to contribute to the formation of various regional agencies acting independently of the general organization. Stettinius pointed out that the proposal provided only for self-defense in the event of an armed attack and was much more restrictive than the latitude given in connection with aggression by the enemy states. However, no agreement could be obtained.

During the next day, the British and United States delegates worked on the rewording of the amendment. Stettinius explained that the United States was not in the least attempting to weaken the general organization. It was rather, a practical way of decreasing the chance of a Senate reservation on the matter of the Monroe Doctrine and its special Western Hemisphere arrangements. At the same time, something had to be done to assure the approval of the Latin Americans. It was, therefore, important

¹Unpublished Department of State memorandum quoted in Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 698.

²For text of French Amendment, see UNCTO, *Documents*, III, p. 385.

that the inter-American system and the world organization be compatible.

Finally, a British delegate proposed a revised amendment incorporating the essentials of the French and United States amendments:

Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the right of self-defense against armed attack, either individual or collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary steps to maintain or restore international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹

The United States, although somewhat dissatisfied that no specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec had been included, agreed that this new draft should be the basis for further negotiation. The United States realized that obtaining a specific mention of the Act of Chapultepec would be extremely difficult in view of the attitudes of the other Big Five powers. At the same time, it was felt that the demands of the Latin Americans had, for the most part, been provided for. By this time Vandenberg had "about come to the conclusion that this is the best course, to use general language in the Charter... (and) then pass a Delegation Resolution notifying the Senate of our interpretation."²

On May 15 the United States delegation met with the chairmen of several of the more important Latin-American delegations. The Latin Americans were not completely satisfied with the language of the proposed amendment. They still thought a specific reference to the Act of

¹Unpublished Department of State memorandum quoted in Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 699.

²Vandenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

Chapultepec to be the best method of safeguarding the American system. They could not quite believe that the words "collective self-defense" would adequately fulfill their desires.

Senator Vandenberg pointed out that it was next to impossible to obtain an explicit mention of the Act of Chapultepec, and even if it was possible it would be undesirable as it would only open the way for more specific exemptions. The draft amendment would not only preserve the powers of the global organization, but would allow the American states to act collectively in the event any one of them was attacked. The United States delegation would inform the Senate of its interpretation of collective self-defense and make it clear that such action was directly related to such treaties as the Act of Chapultepec.

There was no need for the Latin Americans to fear that the United Nations might someday declare the Inter-American system inconsistent with the Charter. This would require a concurring vote of the permanent members of the Security Council. It was unthinkable that the United States would agree to such a thing.

The United States was asked to meet further Latin American desires: that the United States should enter into a postwar treaty similar to the Act of Chapultepec and that the Charter would contain a stronger reference encouraging the use of regional arrangements for pacific settlement.

Secretary Stettinius consulted with President Truman by telephone and with his approval agreed to the proposals set forth by the Latin Americans. After informing the other members of the Big Five of these happenings, Secretary Stettinius, that same evening, issued a press release

explaining the new situation.¹ In this important statement, Stettinius, with President's approval, explained that:

As a result of the discussion with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the Charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world organization.

These proposals will:

1. Recognize the paramount authority of the world Organization in all enforcement action.
2. Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense either individual or collective, remains unimpaired in case the Security Council does not maintain peace and security and an armed attack against a member occurs. Any measures of self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
3. Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means.

The second point will be dealt with by an addition to Chapter VIII of a new section. [The substance of the proposed draft amendment on self-defense was announced.]

The third point would be dealt with by inclusion of a specific reference to regional agencies or arrangements in Chapter VIII, section A, paragraph 3,² describing the methods whereby parties to a dispute should, first of all, seek a peaceful solution by means of their own choice.

The United States Delegation believes that proposals as above outlined if adopted by the Conference would, with the other relevant provisions of the projected Charter, make possible a useful and

¹The press release would not ordinarily have been issued, at this time, but there was the feeling that United States-Latin-American agreement had to be emphasized and the situation made clear. See Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 91, who feels that the United States by publicly committing itself to the draft amendment on self-defense would force the Soviet Union, whose delegate was then temporarily in Moscow, to go along with the idea.

²When referred to the technical committee, the amendment added "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" to Paragraph VIII-A-3 and stated in Paragraph VIII-C-1 that members of regional agencies should "make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through" such agencies before bringing them before the Security Council. These amendments eventually became parts of Articles 33 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.

effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security.

This applies with particular significance to the long established inter-American system. After the conclusion of the Conference at San Francisco, it is the intention of the United States Government to invite the other American republics to undertake in the near future the negotiation of a treaty which, as provided for in the Act of Chapultepec itself, would be consistent with the Charter of the world Organization and would support and strengthen that Organization, while at the same time advancing the development of the historic system of inter-American cooperation.¹

With the Latin Americans generally satisfied, the proposals were presented to the other members of the Big Five for discussion. The British, French, and Chinese had no significant objections. The Soviet delegate, however, had to submit the proposals to Moscow. It was not until May 19 that Soviet approval was obtained. In the meantime the technical experts of the Big Five reworked the phraseology and the joint amendment was submitted to Subcommittee III/4/A on May 21 in the following form:

Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.²

¹Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Relationship of Regional Agencies," Press Release, May 15, 1945, U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XII (May 20, 1945), 930. of. UNCIO, Documents, III, p. 635.

²The only noteworthy change from the previous draft was that the words "in the event of the Security Council failing to take necessary steps to maintain...security," were replaced with "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary...." This change was made primarily at the request of former Secretary Hull who felt the former wording might suggest that the United Nations had failed.

The new amendment was said by the United States to be, for all practical purposes, an amalgamation of those various amendments offered earlier by the Latin-American states, France, Australia, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey. It was intended that it be Paragraph 12 of Chapter VIII, Section B. The Subcommittee unanimously approved the new article and recommended that it be made Section D of Chapter VIII. The other proposed changes (involving paragraph VIII-A-3 and VIII-C-1) were also accepted with no dissenting votes. The subcommittee's members then agreed that the earlier amendments of the various states no longer merited further consideration as the Sponsoring Powers proposals had been accepted.

At this subcommittee meeting an interesting amendment was proposed to Paragraph VIII-C-1 by the Egyptian delegation.¹ It was decided that this amendment proposal be sent to the Executive Committee for further consideration.

At the meeting of Committee III/4 on May 23 various speeches were given and several interpretations of the regional provisions put forth.² Senator Vandenberg was paid a tribute for his efforts in regional matters.

The Soviet delegate then opposed the idea that the new paragraph on self-defense be made a new section of Chapter VIII. He felt that it should logically be included as part of Section B of Chapter VIII as it was concerned with the right of a member to take self-defensive action in case of an act of aggression. Section B dealt not only with acts of

¹Supra, pp. 5-6.

²See UNCIO, Documents, XII, pp. 679-88.

aggression, but also with the duties of members and of the Security Council in this respect. The new amendment involved the duty of states taking action in self-defense to report these measures to the Security Council. He therefore proposed that the amendment be added as Paragraph 12 of Section B, Chapter VIII.

Senator Vandenberg felt that the question of the placement of this paragraph was not within the jurisdiction of Committee III/4 (although it had recommended that it be made a new Section D to Chapter VIII). The question was one for the Coordination Committee to decide.¹

At the subcommittee meeting of June 1 the proposed Egyptian amendment was brought up for discussion after being returned by the Coordination Committee. The Egyptian delegate stated that some definition of regional arrangements was necessary in order to distinguish between those provided for under Chapter VIII, Section C and purely military arrangements.

The Egyptian proposal was not favorably received. There was some fear, especially on the part of the United States, that any attempt at

¹Despite the recommendation of Committee III/4, the Coordinating Committee, upon the advice of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, placed Article 51 at the end of Chapter VII. It was felt that "...the article should not be placed after Chapter VIII, as a separate section as Committee III/4 had proposed, because it might have the effect of limiting the right of self-defense only to regional arrangements, thus depriving a state which was not a party to such arrangements of that right. Such a conclusion was not clearly permitted." Cited in Department of State memorandum, "Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations," included in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 107. Also in Subcommittee III/4/A debate on June 1, the view was generally expressed that the paragraph on self-defense "was all-embracing and that its application was by no means restricted to regional arrangements." See UNCTO, Documents, XII, p. 858.

such definition would only reopen the delicate regional issue. Vandenberg said, that in his opinion, a naked offensive and defensive alliance, as such, is totally different from a mutual assistance pact and obviously not a regional arrangement within the meaning of the Charter.¹

Further discussion of this point was undertaken at the June 8 meeting of Committee III/4. At this session Senator Vandenberg observed that the question of defining the term "regional arrangement" had already been debated, and the decision had been reached that reliance should be placed upon the general terms of the Charter. The United States delegate further pointed out that:

While the language submitted by the Delegate of Egypt clearly defined obvious legitimate and eligible factors for a regional arrangement, it was probable that it failed to cover all the situations which might be embraced by regional arrangements. The attempts to enter into definitions would entail indefinite discussion and interminable delays.²

The Egyptian proposal was then rejected by the Committee as being unnecessary.

The last difficulty over the regional provisions was that raised by France. France was concerned with the phraseology of Paragraph VIII-C-2, the paragraph which had greatly concerned the Big Five at the beginning of the Conference. This provision had exempted from Security Council control any action taken against renewed aggression by the enemy states. This exemption was to apply until the world organization had assumed responsibility for security with respect to the former enemy states "by

¹UNCIO, Documents, XII, p. 858.

²Ibid., p. 701.

consent of the Governments concerned." The French were fearful that action taken under mutual assistance pacts after the Security Council had assumed responsibility might not be allowed under this provision. The French wanted to make it clear that "Governments committed by treaties of mutual assistance" could "by common consent" turn over authority to the Security Council and only thereafter would they be required to obtain Security Council permission before taking action under the treaties.

Again it was feared that any prolonged discussion of this point would lead to a reopening of the whole regional problem. At the same time, the United States was concerned that it might be excluded from the action proposed in the provision as it was not a party to any of the mutual assistance pacts. This was seemingly unwarranted as the United States, as a signatory of the Moscow Declaration could exercise its rights under Chapter XII which dealt with transitional arrangements. Finally, the United States suggested that if the wording in the already approved Sponsors' amendment (VIII-C-2) could be altered to replace "by consent of" with "on request of," the French desires could be met. This would then make it clear that the initiative rested with the governments concerned rather than the Security Council. Actually the effect was the same as in either case the Council could not act without the approval of all five permanent members. The United States interpreted the words, "the governments concerned," to refer to both the governments which were responsible for transitional action concerning the enemy state under Chapter XII and those states involved in mutual assistance arrangements directed at the

enemy. It was further pointed out that nothing in the paragraph impaired the regional provision already approved and detracted in no way from the right of self-defense. The paragraph related solely to the problem of the permanent control of enemy states.¹ This change was approved by the committee.

On June 11 the work of Committee III/4 was concluded and on that same day the final report of the committee was transmitted to Commission III. The provisions and amendments as approved by the committee were then finally and fully approved by the Commission and the Conference.

At the June 13 meeting of Commission III, at which the regional provisions were unanimously adopted, Senator Vandenberg, expressing the attitude of the United States delegation, said:²

...We have found a sound and practical formula for putting regional organizations into effective gear with the global institution... We have found the way to utilize for our common advantage those regional relationships which bind good neighbors together in mutual pursuit of their own more intimate welfare and peace. In my view we have infinitely strengthened the world organization by thus enlisting, within the over-all supervision, the dynamic resources of these regional affinities. We do not thus subtract from global unity on behalf of the world's peace and security; on the contrary, we weld these regional king-links into the global chain.

One of these "king-links" was the Pan-American system--"the oldest and happiest regional arrangement in the world." Vandenberg was sure that "it would measure up to every requirement of regional cooperation with the International Organization..." At the same time, "...we are no less faithful to the world ideal and to the dominant supremacy of the

¹Ibid., p. 702.

²Ibid., pp. 52-53.

United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security." In fact, the world organization would be the benefactor, for the integration of this regional system with the global organization would strengthen the foundations of a better world.

With regard to the substance of Articles 51, 53, and 107:

...We here recognize the inherent right of self-defense, whether individual or collective, which permits any sovereign state among us or any qualified regional group of states to ward off attack pending adequate action by the parent body. And we specifically recognize the continuous validity of mutual protection pacts to prevent a resurgence of Axis aggression, pending the time when all the states concerned may be satisfied to rest this exclusive responsibility with the new Organization.

In other words, we strengthen our over-all objective by giving it every resource at our command....

Only brief mention need be made of the United States Senate's concern with the regional provisions of the United Nations Charter which it was asked to approve. Not only was the collective mind of the Senate more inclined to accept a world organization than it had been in 1920, but the Charter had adequately anticipated any demands for the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan-American system.

During the Senate hearings, Pasvolsky made it clear of the articles with regional implications (especially Article 51), that, "The Monroe Doctrine is completely safeguarded." Senator Millikin, however, suggested that the Monroe Doctrine was not a regional arrangement and that it went further than self-defense against an actual act of aggression. Dr.

Pasvolsky replied:

The Monroe Doctrine...is a doctrine of non-intervention.... The whole international Organization is based on the principle of non-intervention; so that as long as the Organization functions, the Monroe Doctrine does not need to come into play. It is only if the Organization should fail to function in the sense of main-

taining international peace and security...that the Monroe Doctrine might have to be invoked. This contingency is covered by the provisions for self-defense, which are stated in Article 51.¹

Senator Vandenberg agreed stating that, "...under my theory the Monroe Doctrine survives in its entirety, unless the Charter somewhere specifically limits it, and that the purpose of the Charter is to strengthen the Doctrine rather than to weaken it."²

The accomplishment of the objectives of the United States at the San Francisco Conference with respect to regional arrangements was adequately stated by Senator Connally in his report to the Senate:

The United Nations Charter is based on the fundamental assumption that in the shrinking world in which we live world peace is indivisible. We all realize, however, that under certain circumstances it may prove desirable to have disputes of a regional or local character settled by regional peace machinery. The Charter makes ample provision for such regional arrangements to function under the supervision of the Security Council. Thus the ground work is laid so that the Act of Chapultepec and our inter-American peace machinery in general can be properly integrated into the over-all world organization. Neither the effectiveness of the inter-American system nor the authority of the United Nations organization will be impaired.³

Although the Senators were concerned with certain other aspects of the Charter, the provisions dealing with regionalism were not of any great concern once reassurance had been given as to the status of the Monroe Doctrine. The Senate approved the ratification of the Charter on July 28, 1945 by a vote of 89 to 2.

¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 304.

²Ibid., p. 307.

³U.S., Congress, Senate, "The Charter of the United Nations," Remarks of Hon. Tom Connally, June 28, 1945, Senate Document 58, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

Three principal modifications of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were adopted at San Francisco:

(1) an amendment to Chapter VIII, Section A, Paragraph 3 (Article 33 of the Charter) adding regional agencies of arrangements to the processes of pacific settlement, and a closely related amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 1 (Article 52 of the Charter) providing that parties to regional arrangements should attempt to solve local disputes through regional arrangements;

(2) an amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 (Article 53 of the Charter) stipulating the right to take preventive action under regional arrangements against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of enemy states; and

(3) an amendment to Chapter VIII, Section B, adding a new Paragraph 12 (Article 51 of the Charter) recognizing the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack.

As set forth under the United Nations Charter, the existence of regional arrangements and agencies was explicitly provided for. These agencies may deal with security problems which are appropriate for regional action. It was specified that all such activities must be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.

In general, members, which are also parties to regional arrangements, should make every effort to settle local disputes by regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. At the same time, the Security Council should encourage the use of these regional agencies in this manner.

Although in principle no enforcement action could be taken by regional agencies without the prior authorization of the Security Council, there were three exceptions. First, measures directed against the ex-enemy

U.S., Department of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, Publication 2349 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 104.

states, at least until, at the request of the Great Powers, the Council assumed full responsibility for preventing further aggression by these ex-enemy states. The second exception related to action against the enemy states taken or authorized as a result of the war by the governments having appropriate responsibility. Thirdly, there was the exception in Article 51.

Although not a part of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter dealing with regional arrangements, Article 51 was a direct result of the crux of the regional dilemma. Article 51 insures, not only for members which are parties to regional arrangements, but all members, the right to take action either individually or collectively as a matter of self-defense in the event of an armed attack. These measures must be reported to the Security Council, but can be continued until the Council has taken appropriate measures. This provision in no way impairs the authority and responsibility of the Security Council.¹

From the point of view of the United States, the regional aspects of the provisions dealing with peaceful settlement were quite in accord with United States participation in the inter-American system. At the same time, the United States was fully satisfied that the authority of the Security Council had not been impaired.

The United States favored the exemption from prior Security Council

¹No attempt can be made here to discuss the legal and political implications of the various interpretations placed on this highly controversial article. For an excellent treatment of the subject (self-defense and the United Nations Charter), see D. W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 182-248.

authorization of action taken under mutual assistance treaties and regional arrangements which was directed at renewed aggression by the enemy states. This was in accord with United States policy toward the enemy states and earlier policy commitments.

The issue of increased autonomy for regional organizations was of direct concern to the United States and the other American republics. The adoption of the amendment, now Article 51, provided for an adequate measure of action which could be taken either individually or collectively in the event of an armed attack. Not only were the demands of the Latin Americans satisfied and the inter-American system maintained, but it was felt that this article preserved the Monroe Doctrine. These things had been accomplished, the United States felt, without lessening the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations. In fact, it is perhaps true that some of the delegates saw the article as necessary insurance against an eventuality which they earnestly hoped would never arise. Thus if the United Nations should fail to maintain international peace and security, there was always the resort to collective or individual action.

Summing up the position of the United States with regard to the regional provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Chairman of the United States delegation in his report to the President, stated:

...It may be said that from the point of view of the national interest of the United States, the provisions on regional arrangements...insure the preservation of the inter-American system based on the Good Neighbor Policy as an integral and valuable element of an effective collective security system on a world-wide basis. It is believed that this has been accomplished without establishing

a precedent which might engender rivalry between regional groups at the expense of world security.¹

¹U.S., Department of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, op. cit., p. 108.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The leaders of the newly formed republic thought of the United States as belonging to a New World, separate and distinct from the Old World of Europe. This is reflected in the statements of Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and others. To them, this involved not only geography, but interests, forms of government, and foreign policy. Included in the New World were those states to the south which were struggling for and finally achieved independence from the European powers.

Jefferson, Clay, and Monroe thought that the states of the American hemisphere should constitute an American system apart from the embroils of Europe. This system was not to be of an institutional character, but was merely to reflect the common interests of commerce, independence, republicanism, and non-entanglement with Europe.

These considerations were factors leading to the Monroe Doctrine. This pronouncement made it clear that the Western Hemisphere was an area of primary importance to the United States and that the independent states thereof constituted an American system distinct and apart from the Old World. Any attempt by the powers of the Old World to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere would be viewed by the United States as dangerous to its peace and safety.

This proclamation was not the policy of a crusading nation ready to assist in the establishment of independent and republican governments

throughout the world, or even in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Nor did it involve any concept of mutual defense or assistance between the United States and the other American republics. It was simply a unilateral doctrine for self-defense--the self-defense of the United States. The United States was attempting to extend its area of concern, for its own safety, to those portions of the Western Hemisphere which maintained common and compatible interests with its own.

Thus, by 1823, the United States had recognized as a matter of policy that the American hemisphere was an area of peculiar and primary importance. This special interest was maintained through 1945.

Upon the initiative of the United States, the first step toward institutionalizing the American system was taken in 1890. Since then, Pan-American co-operation has increased and institutional growth continued so that today the Pan-American system is the most complete and highly developed system for regional co-operation in existence.

The United States had a special interest not only in a particular area, but in a particular regional system of co-operation. This interest in the Western Hemisphere and the inter-American system was continuously upheld. Although varying in intensity and sometimes subordinated to world interests and global organization, it was never subordinated to other regional interests or other regional organizations. This interest has influenced United States policy toward international organization.

The inter-American system had a relatively insignificant effect on the efforts of the United States in the establishment of the League and its failure to adhere to the Covenant. This system was rudimentary in

nature and true Pan-American co-operation had not yet developed to any extent. The Latin Americans were not fearful at this time, as they were in 1945, that the global organization would destroy or handicap the inter-American system. Not only was there little to preserve as yet, but many Latin Americans felt that the League would provide a counterweight to the United States, a powerful neighbor whose motives and intentions were not always trusted. From the point of view of the United States, the inter-American system provided little as a political and security arrangement and offered little possibility for such in the near future, except in the view of Secretary Lansing. Thus there was little pressure upon Wilson at home or from the Latin Americans to provide for this regional system in the League Covenant or to strengthen the system itself.

Wilson was strongly opposed to special groupings and alliances either as a part of the League's structure or outside it. He placed his hopes for world peace in a global League and not in any regional system, even the inter-American.

Wilson, at first, did seek to apply his ideas of collective security to the inter-American system through a Pan-American Pact. He was, however, an internationalist and when he later saw the opportunity to extend his ideas to the whole world by means of a League, the proposed Pact was pushed aside. The essentials of the guarantee principle were incorporated into Article 10 of the League Covenant.

The only aspect of the League which had regional implications in any way for the United States was Article 21 of the Covenant. Wilson, although at first feeling it unnecessary, finally yielded to senatorial and other

pressures calling for a reservation in the Covenant safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine.

The motives behind the desire for such a reservation involved primarily the fear that the traditional and unilateral policy of the United States would be endangered by obligations assumed under the Covenant. The rights and duties which the United States had assigned itself through the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent interpretations concerned the Americas, an area which the United States felt to a certain extent, its particular preserve. The League might threaten the special prerogatives of the United States in the Americas by becoming active in this area.

The provision on which Article 21 was based was originally intended to be a reservation to Article 10. However, its final form in Article 21 was that of a declaratory stipulation stating that nothing in the Covenant shall affect the validity of regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine. The fact that the Monroe Doctrine was referred to as a regional understanding meant little or nothing. The United States continually maintained that the Doctrine was a unilateral policy to be interpreted solely by itself and that Article 21 in no way affected its validity. The President of the League Council reinforced this view by declaring that the engagements and understandings are neither increased nor decreased in scope and their validity unaffected by the Article.

By the time the United States began planning for a post-World War II international organization the inter-American system had been considerably strengthened through better United States-Latin-American relations under

the "Good Neighbor Policy" and early steps toward insuring hemispheric defense at the beginning of the war. Those in the Department of State responsible for this planning were always in favor of maintaining and preserving the inter-American system, although enthusiasm varied.

Although Pan-American co-operation was at an all-time high and it was generally felt that the inter-American system should be maintained, the Latin Americans were not consulted on plans for a general international organization until after Dumbarton Oaks. The United States was involved in a world-wide war and as one of a few great powers, it realized that future world peace could only be maintained through world organization by itself and the other Great Powers. Thus the Administration was planning globally and consulting largely with the Great Powers.

A plan for structuring the new organization upon regional foundations was never proposed by the Department of State, although President Roosevelt was for a short time influenced favorably by the ideas of Churchill. Even Sumner Welles the most regionally oriented member of the planning committees realized that the new organization would, for the most part, have to be global in character. One of the chief reasons for the greater concern of Welles for the regional aspects of global organization over that of Hull was Welles special desire to see the inter-American system strengthened and developed.

The United States in the planning and subsequent negotiations for the United Nations was aware of and influenced by its regional interests. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provided for the existence of regional arrangements within the framework of the general organization, largely

in order to preserve the inter-American system. However, the scope of action under the general organization was considerably limited.

At Mexico City the United States agreed that after the United Nations was established, the inter-American system should be strengthened and its scope of responsibility expanded. The United States also entered into a temporary defense treaty and agreed to conclude one of a permanent character after the war had ended. The United States at the San Francisco Conference was well aware of the implications of not allowing for more regional autonomy. The Latin Americans also lost no opportunity to remind the United States that the Soviet Union was given virtual freedom of action under its regional arrangements directed at former enemy states. No enforcement or defensive action was allowed in the event of trouble in the Western Hemisphere without the consent of the Security Council, and the Soviet Union could probably be expected to look unfavorably toward any action proposed by the inter-American system. When the entire United States delegation became convinced of the problem, Vandenberg's suggestion became the basis for a solution. This solution was Article 51 which provided for individual and collective self-defense in the case of armed attack.

The position of the United States, until San Francisco at least, was that regional organizations and arrangements such as those of the inter-American system were legitimate and should continue to exist. They should, however, be maintained and function under the over-all authority and within the framework of the universal organization.

At San Francisco the United States, under the pressure of the Latin

Americans and aware of possible Soviet vetoes on inter-American action, sought to increase slightly the range of activities and functions coming under the scope of regional responsibility. The functions and responsibilities of the global organization were still held to be of uppermost importance. The problem was one of attaining a proper balance between the global and the regional.

The United States since the early 1940's has viewed regional and global organization not as contrary or contradictory, but in proper balance, as complementary. A major goal of the United States policy concerning international organization from 1940 to 1945 was to achieve this complementary balance. The United States, as of 1945, believed that the proper balance had been found at San Francisco.

Since the events at San Francisco there have come into existence a number of regional arrangements and organizations. Many of these are primarily of a security and military character and are based largely on Article 51 of the Charter. The effect of such arrangements on international organization has not yet been definitely established. The United States since 1945 has greatly assisted in strengthening the inter-American regional system and has become a leading member and proponent of several other important regional arrangements.

This study provides the historical background for an examination of postwar regional policies and activities of the United States. On the basis of this study several tentative generalizations and hypotheses are proposed.

Regionalism, for whatever purpose, is not just the concept and

theory of organizing the world into natural regions. States are little concerned whether their regional arrangement encompasses an area which is characterized by such unifying features as to cause geographers to designate it as a natural region. States organize themselves into limited groupings, generally termed regional arrangements or regional organizations, for certain specific purposes, usually to further political co-operation and security based upon what they consider to be common political and strategic interests.

States, for the most part, have indicated that no general characterization of regional understandings and arrangements is desirable. The United States was against doing so in the case of the Monroe Doctrine as it was the unilateral policy of the United States. The League itself later refused to define the scope of engagements and regional understandings included in Article 21. At San Francisco only Egypt and the other Arab League members sought to define regional arrangements. The United States felt that any attempt at definition would only re-open the whole delicate regional problem by attempting to define something upon which all the states would not be able to agree. Nearly all the states agreed that the proposed definition probably failed to cover all the situations which might be embraced by regional arrangements. Under these circumstances it would seem impossible to generally characterize regional arrangements as desirable or undesirable. The most that can be said is that some contribute to peace while others are dangerous.

Historical experience tends to demonstrate that states usually define their political and security interests regionally. In the case of the

United States the Monroe Doctrine provides an outstanding example. The efforts of the United States at Pan-American co-operation since 1889 also add support. Wilson, however, saw the interests of the United States best being served by a global organization, but Congress felt otherwise. The policy of the United States concerning post-World War II organization also deviated temporarily from this generalization. The Latin-American states have continually defined their interests regionally, except perhaps when they adhered to the League partially in order to counter-balance United States "domination" of the Western Hemisphere.

When regional arrangements grow out of long historical contact and interest they are more likely to be more easily formed, and to endure if established. The American republics, although having many dissimilar interests, had sufficient similarity of interest over a long period to create what has become the oldest and most highly developed system of regional co-operation.

A satisfactory experience with a regional system may well serve as a factor influencing a state's policy toward global organization for making allowances for regional activity. The United States and the Latin-American states, to varying degrees, sought at all times to preserve the inter-American system and to provide for it in the United Nations system. Such an experience may also provide a precedent for establishing other regional systems. This cannot be examined, however, without going beyond 1945.

There is a tendency for a powerful state, in order to further its own power objectives, to seek to form a regional system composed of less

powerful states, while the smaller powers unite around the large power in order to better influence its policies or to thereby increase their own protection. The United States, after its rejection of the League, attempted to consolidate the inter-American system and to exert a greater influence in its activities in order to prevent the League from becoming too active in the Western Hemisphere. The United States, when it felt its interest threatened in the late 1930's and early 1940's, also sought to increase hemispheric solidarity. The Latin-American states, perhaps visualizing an unco-operative and overly powerful Soviet Union, worked toward a greater strengthening of the Pan-American system both at Mexico City and San Francisco.

These same examples also indicate that some states feel that regional arrangements facilitate a stable balance of power. This could involve an internal regional balance of the large and smaller powers, as well as balancing one regional grouping against another power or grouping.

It appears that members of a regional arrangement, when they think the existence of their system threatened, will seek to consolidate and strengthen it. The action of the United States following the establishment of the League, as well as the action of the Latin-American republics at Mexico City and San Francisco lends support to this contention.

Participation in a regional arrangement may cause a state to change or adjust its policies and may cause it to feel that its freedom of action is somewhat limited. Thus the views and policies of the United States were altered to a certain extent at Mexico City and even more so at San Francisco.

It is also possible that states which are members of universal organizations which include states or groupings of states which are hostile or unco-operative tend to seek the more restricted but more co-operative atmosphere of a regional grouping. The purpose could be that of better achieving concrete results within the smaller grouping or to afford themselves increased protection from those hostile states of the larger organization. The strengthening of the inter-American system and increasing the autonomy of regional arrangements at San Francisco may provide an example of United States-Latin American action of this type.

The United States aggravated the League's weaknesses by its failure to adhere to the Covenant. Shortly thereafter the United States attempted to strengthen the inter-American system and to utilize it to settle "American" disputes. The proposed United Nations, some felt, had its weaknesses and provision should be made for regional action in the event action by the global organization failed. This might suggest that in the event states cannot further their objectives through the larger organization, they will turn to those of a more limited or regional nature.

This points further to the proposition that some states feel that some of their interests can be better served by regional rather than global international organizations. Many states at San Francisco wanted to insure their particular regional systems and interests. Many felt that certain activities were more appropriate for regional rather than global action. Articles 33 and 52 specifically provide for the use of regional agencies and arrangements in the settlement of local disputes. Article 52 indicates that there are "such matters relating to the maintenance of

international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action."

It is clear that some states feel that both regional and universal organizations are needed for successful collective action and that the two are compatible. It is evident that the United States felt that both, in proper balance, were needed and that they were in fact complementary. It then remains to find the most workable relationships which should be maintained between them legally, administratively, and politically.

Of course, this relationship would depend upon the nature of both types of organizations and the needs of each, as well as the existing conditions. The general relationship determined at San Francisco was felt by the United States at that time to be the best obtainable. Is it the most desirable or best obtainable today?

The answer to this question and the verification or invalidation of the several propositions of this study will perhaps be the result of other studies of the regional policies of other states and a comparative analysis of these policies. The regional activities which have taken place since 1945 provide a fertile field for investigation.

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