

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
TOWARD JAPAN, 1853-1869, AS ONE ASPECT OF
THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

by

MARY E. (BETTY) MACK

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of History
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

June, 1951

APPROVED:

(Adviser for the Thesis)

(For the Committee)

ew giff (4.86) 8207e

PREFACE

John Hay did not invent the Open Door policy. It is as old as American relations with Asia. The tap-root of American policy has been not philanthropy but the demand for protection of our nationals in the Far East and the objective of keeping open opportunity for them in the future. The resulting policy was one which has since become known as the Open Door policy. It received this name in 1899 just as it tended to assume a secondary position among American objectives in Asia.

The Open Door policy is an attempt to secure economic opportunity for the United States in Far Eastern markets. It would have a Far East orderly enough to furnish safe and lucrative markets, strong enough to prevent unilateral exploitation of her economic resources and yet not strong enough to threaten United States economic interests. One of the fundamental methods used was the ingenious device of the most-favored-nation clause. Caleb Cushing was the first to secure this guarantee to American opportunity in the Treaty of Wanghia with China in 1844.

Caleb Cushing also adopted the second means of sustaining the Open Door—that of preserving the administrative and territorial integrity of Far Eastern countries. The United States desired to prevent the other powers from obtaining exclusive concessions.

But, the United States being almost always unwilling or unable, in the last analysis, to use power to preserve the integrity of Oriental nations was forced to evolve a third technique—that of assisting them to develop and maintain effective and stable governments. To Humphrey Marshall, American Commissioner in China during the Taiping rebellion, the United States owed the discovery of the truth that the weakness or dissolution of China was a matter of national concern to the United States and that our true policy must be to strengthen and sustain the Chinese government against either internal disorder or foreign aggression.

Thus, we see that by 1853 the United States had developed all three of the techniques which cumulatively became known as the Open Door policy in 1899. Probably because in 1899, when the body of precedent which had constituted the Far Eastern policy of the United States in the nineteenth century received a name in Hay's Open Door notes, it was directed toward China, Americans have failed to apply the term "Open Door" to American relations with Japan before 1900. If early American policy in Japan is examined with the objectives and techniques of the Open Door policy in mind, it seems to become more clear and to possess more continuity than when treated in the usual chronological manner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE RISE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN JAPAN	1
II. COMMODORE MATTHEW CALBRAITH PERRY AND THE OPENING OF JAPAN	16
III. TOMESOND HARRIS AND THE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1858	54
IV. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN 1858-1869: THE COOPERATIVE POLICY	88
V. THE OPEN DOOR IN JAPAN	134
BIBLIOGRAPHY	138
APPENDIX	
A. TEXT OF THE FIRST TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, MARCH 31, 1854	148
B. THE TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN	152

CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN JAPAN

In order to make more clear the main features of early American foreign policy toward the Japanese Empire, it is necessary to deal briefly with the interests of the United States in the Pacific up to 1852 with special reference to Japan. It was in this early period that the United States made its first contact with the island Empire and certain necessities arose which made the opening of Japan a paramount objective of the United States in the Far East.

In the first year after the treaty of peace and independence with Great Britain was signed, on the 30th of August, 1784, an American ship, The Empress of China of New York, bore the flag of the United States for the first time into the port of Canton, China. So long before the government of the United States recognized the Japanese Empire, the people of America had come to cherish commercial relations with the countries of the Orient. The opening of Japan, a nation which had been closed to foreign intercourse since 1636, was a natural sequence of the partial unlocking of the doors of China by British arms, and early it was felt that the young republic of North America would bring about that important event. The English historian Creasy, in tracing the rapid growth of the United States, predicted the forcible

opening of Japan by this government.¹

The first American vessel to visit Japan was the Eliza (Captain Stewart) in 1797. Holland being at that time involved in the Napoleonic wars, the Eliza was chartered by the Dutch East India Company to make the annual visit allowed by the Japanese regulations to the factory on the island of Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. During the continuance of the war, other American vessels visited Nagasaki under similar charters. In 1803 the Eliza returned, still under the American flag, but from Bengal. Meanwhile both the Dutch and the Japanese had become aware that the Eliza was now employed by the British in an effort to create a British trade with Japan, and the vessel was refused a cargo. Captain Stewart was an Englishman and the vessel was probably entirely without legal right to fly the American flag.²

Very early in the nineteenth century, enterprising Americans had begun to challenge Japan's attitude toward other nations. One of the first was Captain David Porter, who in the War of 1812 had captured twelve British whalers in the Pacific before being taken himself. In 1815 he addressed a letter to Secretary Monroe on the subject of opening Japan. "The important trade of Japan has been shut to every nation except the Dutch, who by the most abject and servile means secured a

¹ E. S. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles Of The World from Marathon to Waterloo (New York: A.L. Burt Publisher, 1851), p. 329.

² Richard Hildreth, Japan As It Was And Is (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company, 1855), pp. 446-447. Hildreth cites Sir Stanford Raffles and also a pamphlet by Hagendorp, published in Boston in 1800, to prove that the Eliza was an English enterprise.

monopoly. Other nations have made repeated attempts at an intercourse with that country, but from a jealousy in the government and from other causes, (among which may be named a want of manly dignity on the part of the negotiators) they have all failed. . . . The time may be favorable, and it would be a glory beyond that acquired by any other nation for us, a nation of only forty years standing, to beat down their rooted prejudices, secure to ourselves a valuable trade, and make that people known to the world."³ In consequence of this it was intended to send Porter with a frigate and two sloops of war, but the plan was defeated. This proposal to open Japan may be said to have marked the high tide of American interest in the Pacific until 1839.

But American interests in the North Pacific did not diminish. On January 25, 1821, Dr. John Floyd, a member of the House of Representatives from Virginia, estimated that the United States already owned eight million dollars worth of property in the Pacific.⁴ Referring to Dr. Floyd's report, Senator Thomas Benton of Missouri spoke of the effect upon Asia of the arrival of Americans upon the Pacific Coast and declared: "Upon the people of Eastern Asia the establishment of a civilized power on the opposite coast of America, could not fail to produce great and wonderful benefits. . . . To my mind the proposition is clear, that Eastern

³Allan B. Cole, editor, "Captain David Porter's Expedition to the Pacific and Japan, 1815," Pacific Historical Review, 9:65, March, 1940.

⁴James H. Callahan, "American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900" (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 19, Nos. 1-3, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901), p. 32.

Asia and the two Americas, as they become neighbors should become friends; and I for one had as lief see American ministers going to the emperors of China and Japan, to the King of Persia, and even to the Grand Turk, as to see them dancing attendance upon those European legitimates who hold every thing American in contempt and detestation."⁵ Senator Benton claimed that the suggestion of sending American Ministers to Oriental countries was first publicly made in the United States by his speech. Thirty years later he said: "It was then a wild suggestion, but it is now history."⁶

By the Americans of the 1830's it was foreseen that someday their Pacific commerce would be great. This expectation reacted on American policy in the Far East in two ways. First, it made Americans increasingly alert to see that no other power should take any step which would later become a handicap to American interest; that is, it helped confirm an Open Door policy in China. Second, it raised questions of how this future commerce might receive adequate protection and thus sent Americans into the Pacific to look for harbors, to Japan for more open ports, and to Formosa for coal mines.⁷

The first official attempt to establish commercial relations was

⁵ Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View, or A history of the working of the American government for thirty years from 1820-1850 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1854), Vol. I, pp. 13-14.

⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁷ Tyler Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), pp. 182-183.

to have been made in 1832 when Edmund Roberts was appointed a special agent to negotiate treaties with Oriental nations.⁸ Death came too soon for his mission (1836). To the Secretary of State, Roberts had written optimistically: "I have no doubt. . . . that by judicious management all the principal ports of Japan would be thrown open to the American trade. The Americans are the only people who can probably effect it."⁹

Since the American nation had not existed at the time of the closing of Japan there was a feeling among Americans that they should not be held accountable for the misdeeds of Europeans and should not be put in the same category by the Japanese. There was even a naive faith that the Japanese would make this distinction.

The first disillusionment came in 1837. In that year an American businessman in Canton named C. W. King, one of the partners of the famous Olyphant Company, organized an expedition having a three-fold aspect—humanity, religion, and commerce. The Morrison was fitted out with the purpose of returning seven Japanese who had been picked up on the American continent to their homeland. This seemed to afford the opportunity to induce the Japanese government to relax its rules as to foreign intercourse. To avoid suspicion, guns and armament were left behind. The ship carried, besides the seven Japanese and several presents, three who did much for the cause of religion and civilization—namely, Drs. Peter Parker, Charles Gutzlaff and S. Wells Williams.

⁸ For the instructions of 1832, see: 32nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59 (Serial Number 620). Existing relations with Japan, p. 63.

⁹ A letter from Roberts to Secretary of State Livingston written June 22, 1833, quoted by Dennett, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

Of these, the last had learned the Japanese language from the shipwrecked Japanese who remained for some time in China, and whom it was the mission of the party to return home.

In place of proceeding to Nagasaki, which was well known to be the only port at which foreign intercourse was allowed, the vessel sailed direct to the Bay of Yedo on which the capital was located. The Morrison reached the Bay of Yedo on July 29, 1857, anchored at Uruga, and declared the purpose of the visit. The authorities refused to have any dealings with the Morrison, ordered her away and then opened fire upon the vessel from the forts. She weighed anchor and ran for the Kagoshima Bay, where she met the same reception, and then left the country without landing even the Japanese natives.¹⁰

Mr. King wrote a book—"The Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom, exhibited in notes of voyages made in 1857 from Canton in the ship Morrison, and the brig Himalah, under the direction of the owners"—in which he urged the American government to take up the insult to the American flag and to demand a treaty. S. Wells Williams returned to Macao much impressed with the superior strength and the culture of the Japanese, and felt that a "warlike attempt" upon Japan would lead to "fatal consequences." While the voyage of the Morrison

¹⁰ Dr. Williams sums up the result of this voyage: "Commercially speaking, the voyage cost about \$2000 without any return; and the immediate effects in a missionary or scientific way, were nil. But not finally. The seven men brought back were employed in one way or another, and most of them usefully." Frederick Wells Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889), p. 99.

reinforced the truth that Japan was not yet ready for foreign intercourse with any nation, including the United States, it may be said that from the time of its visit to Japan the subject of opening up the country was never to drop out of sight.¹¹

Eight years later another American attempt to return Japanese castaways was treated with more respect. The Manhattan (Captain Mercator Cooper) visited the Bay of Yedo on April 17, 1845 with twenty-two Japanese who had been picked up at sea. All of the Japanese seamen were landed at Yedo, the seat of the Tokugawa Shogun's government of Japan. Captain Cooper was received well, but no one was allowed to leave the vessel and they were permitted to remain only a few days.¹²

Meanwhile, in America, pressure upon Congress grew, and in 1845 a resolution was placed before the House by Zedec Pratt of New York calling for immediate measures to effect commercial arrangements with Japan and Korea on the ground that it was important "to the general interests of the United States that a steady and persevering effort should be made for the extension of American commerce, connected as that commerce is with the agriculture and manufactures of our country." "The day and the hour," he said, "have now arrived for turning the enterprise of our merchants and seamen into the harbors and the markets of these long secluded countries. Another year will not elapse before

¹¹ Bennett, op. cit., p. 248.

¹² An account of the visit of the Manhattan is in: 29th Congress, 2nd session, House Executive Document No. 96 (Serial Number 500). Letter of A.H. Palmer to Buchanan, p. 28.

the American people will be able to rejoice in the knowledge that the 'star spangled banner' is recognized as an ample passport and protection for all. . . .¹³

Though the resolution was tabled, the administration actually sent a man-of-war and a corvette to open negotiations with Japan. The command of this venture fell to Commodore James Biddle, a distinguished veteran of the War of 1812 and commander of the naval squadron in the East Indies.¹⁴ From the experience of this expedition Perry learned how not to succeed.

Alexander H. Everett, the first American Commissioner to China under the new treaty who sailed for China early in June of 1845, carried a commission to negotiate a treaty with Japan, and Commodore Biddle, who was conveying him to China, also had instructions from Secretary of the Navy Bancroft permitting him to make a visit to Japan in case Everett did not decide to accompany him. The illness of Everett sent Biddle on to China where he exchanged ratifications of the treaty and then on to Japan where he anchored in the Bay of Yedo, July 20, 1846, and inquired politely whether the government of Japan was willing to open its ports to Americans and to make a treaty. To this inquiry he received the following anonymous explanatory edict:

The object of this communication is to explain the reasons why we refuse to trade with foreigners who come to this country

¹³ 28th Congress, 2nd session, House Executive Document No. 158 (Serial Number 465). The Pratt resolution, pp. 1-3.

¹⁴ The primary source for Biddle's mission is: 32nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59, op. cit., pp. 65-73.

across the ocean for that purpose.

This has been the habit of our nation from time immemorial. In all cases of a similar kind that have occurred, we have positively refused to trade. Foreigners have come to us from various quarters, but have always been received in the same way. In taking this course with regard to you, we only pursue our accustomed policy. We can make no distinctions between different foreign nations—we treat them all alike, and you, as Americans, must receive the same answer with the rest. It will be of no use to renew the attempt, as all applications of the kind, however numerous they may be, will be steadily rejected.

We are aware that our customs are in this respect different from those of some other countries, but every nation has a right to manage its affairs in its own way.

The trade carried on with the Dutch at Nagasaki, is not to be regarded as furnishing a precedent for trade with other foreign nations. The place is one of few inhabitants and very little business, and the whole affair is of no importance.

In conclusion, we have to say that the Emperor positively refuses the permission you desire. He earnestly advises you to depart immediately, and to consult your own safety by not appearing upon our coast. 15

Such was the defiant expression of the exclusion policy in its dying hours.

In delivering the Shogun's letter there was an incident of an unpleasant character. The Commodore undoubtedly made the mistake of consenting to go on board a Japanese junk to receive the letter. Just as the Commodore was stepping on board he received a blow or push from a common Japanese soldier. Profuse apologies were afterwards offered and Biddle stated that he would be satisfied with whatever punishment for the soldier the Japanese law provided. Another diplomatic error was made in that the conversations were seriously handicapped by the

15. Ibid., p. 66.

lack of suitable interpreters.¹⁶

The magnanimous conduct of Commodore Biddle appears to have been misinterpreted by the Japanese as weakness and lack of dignity. Accounts of the insult, magnified and misunderstood, appear to have spread not only throughout Japan, but even to the Ryukyus and the Americans were made to appear as having accepted an insult with complacency. Undoubtedly, the Commodore made some serious mistakes, as pointed out above, but according to one Japanese interpreter of foreign policy:

The characteristics of American negotiations with the Japanese authorities under Commodore Biddle were honesty, directness, friendship and conciliation.

. . . . the Commodore proved himself as an unbiased and broad minded man who was ready to forgive rather than to revenge an insult such as he received from a common Japanese soldier. Such an incident might have appeared very grave and confusing to an unprepared and overbearing diplomat of the early nineteenth century. Perhaps the most important feature of the mission of Commodore Biddle was the fact that he respected the Japanese law as the law of a sovereign state.¹⁷

The peaceful policy of Commodore Biddle was certainly in line with the principles of Jacksonian democracy which ruled the day in the United States. The people of the United States were busy promoting that economic and industrial development which would soon make them more aggressively interested in the opening of Japan.

The islands of Japan became increasingly important as the number

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 67-69.

¹⁷ Taijūn Wada, American Foreign Policy Towards Japan During The Nineteenth Century (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1928), pp. 27-28.

of American whaling vessels in the North Pacific increased in the 1840's. Many whalers were wrecked on the coasts of Japan and all these ships desired a port of refuge there. "American public opinion with regard to Japan first grew out of the operations of her stout-hearted whalers."¹⁸

In 1846 the whaler Lawrence was shipwrecked and eight of the crew reached shore. These survivors met with varied treatment, some of which was severe. After seventeen month's imprisonment they were turned over to the Dutch factory and sent to Java. In February, 1848, the whale ship Lagoda was wrecked in the Japan Sea and the survivors were confined in Nagasaki.¹⁹ Upon receipt of the news of the confinement of these whalers, Commodore David Gaisinger ordered Commander James Glynn, on January 31, 1849, to proceed to Nagasaki in the Preble to rescue them. "You will be careful," read Glynn's instructions, "not to violate the laws or customs of the country, or by any means prejudice the success of any pacific policy our government may be inclined to pursue."²⁰ After a week of negotiations Glynn effected the release of the prisoners.

The complaints of the whalers became urgent in Washington.

¹⁸ Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895 (Stanford University; Stanford University Press, 1932), Vol. I, p. 9.

¹⁹ For interesting particulars, see: 52nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59, op. cit., p. 73.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 7

Added to this, commercial demands began to be heard. Upon Commander Glynn's arrival in New York in 1851, he urged President Fillmore to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan. It is interesting to note that the Commander was confident of an abundant coal supply and a large number of safe bays and harbors in Japan. He thought that such things would prove very useful for the United States if a line of steamers between Asia and America could be established. Consequently, he saw the importance of securing an American depot at any point upon the Japanese coast.²¹

Actually, the commercial motive had become of paramount importance. China and the Far East were rapidly coming to be looked upon as the great future market for American produce, especially manufactured cottons. A. H. Palmer of New York, director of the American and Foreign Agency, began a systematic study of the markets of Asia as early as 1839. He prepared at various times between 1846 and 1849 a number of reports for the Department of State, and even submitted a plan for a mission and a draft of a letter to be sent by President Taylor to the Emperor. Palmer was afterwards described by ex-Secretary of State Clayton as "entitled to more credit for getting up the Japan Expedition, than any other man I know of."²²

Meanwhile, the development of steam navigation brought the need by American shipping companies for coaling stations. The appeal of

²¹ Ibid., pp. 57-62.

²² 29th Congress, 2nd session, House Executive Document No. 96, op. cit., p. 35.

Commander Glynn to these interests was well based. Japan was believed, falsely, to have large supplies of coal, and her ports in the days of uncertain steam navigation were absolutely essential to the proposed line of American trans-Pacific steamers. Meantime, the settlement of the Pacific Coast by Americans, and especially the discovery of gold in California, yielded added argument for steam navigation in the Pacific. The various expansive movements, political, military, and commercial, which characterized the fifth and sixth decades of the last century of American history all created an atmospheric condition favorable to still further adventure.

Though outside of California there was little popular enthusiasm for an expedition to Japan, and the Democratic opposition feared that it might lead to war, the dreams of the expansionists had been unfolded so alluringly that action was finally taken. To the enticing reports of Palmer and Glynn was added the voice of William H. Seward, then a Senator in the Congress of the United States. In an eloquent speech he uttered the prediction: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great Hereafter."²⁵

Secretary of State Daniel Webster became interested, and in May, 1851, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy:

Commodore Aulick has suggested to me, and I cheerfully concur in the opinion, that this incident (the arrival of 17 shipwrecked Japanese in the United States) may afford a favorable opportunity for opening commercial relations with the empire of Japan; or,

²⁵ George E. Baker, The Works of William H. Seward (5 vols. New York: J.S. Redfield, 1853), Vol. I, p. 250.

at least, of placing our intercourse with that Island upon a more easy footing.²⁴

Commodore Aulick was given full powers to negotiate a treaty. His instructions signed by Mr. Webster, and the President's letter to the Emperor of Japan, bear date of June 10, 1851, and he sailed the following month.²⁵ When he reached China en route he was recalled, and the project which had begun at his suggestion was obstructed when it was about to be accomplished; another man, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, perhaps better fitted for the undertaking, entered into his labors.

Thus, American interests in the Orient developed to the stage where she was ready to take more aggressive action to attain an objective which now loomed as of much larger importance than it had even as late as the Biddle mission of 1845. Undoubtedly these American interests in Japan were the result of a gradual development of commercial and industrial activities both in the Far East and in the North Pacific.

On the other hand, the United States had already attained great internal development to such an extent as it would naturally give rise to territorial expansion. The shipping interests of New England, discouraged by European trade regulations, had early found an outlet in trade with the Far East. The super-abundant energy of the new republic had found new fields for national activities through the

²⁴ A letter from Webster to Graham, quoted by William E. Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1887) p. 283.

²⁵ 32nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59, op. cit., p. 80.

outlets towards the Far West and the Far East, both of which are in a way close neighbors to each other. Moreover, the growth of the American whaling industry had awakened the nation's interests in protecting American seamen in the North Pacific. To Americans, especially the mariner and the shipper, the islands of Japan were no longer a fiction but a substantial attraction. "How to bring Japan into friendly relations with the United States" became a major necessity in the foreign policy of the United States.

CHAPTER II

COMMODORE MATTHEW CALBRAITH PERRY

AND THE OPENING OF JAPAN

The foreign policy of the United States toward Japan in the period from 1852 to 1855 was a product of strong American interests in the North Pacific, which were accelerated by the enormous increase of her whaling industry, and the recent territorial expansion on the Pacific Coast, together with the prospect of her Oriental trade. The objective of the United States came to be the establishment of "peace, amity, and commerce" with reference to her relations with the Japanese Empire. This objective was in itself the means to secure three main objects which would satisfy the necessities of the United States. First, to get assurance of kind protection for American citizens who were shipwrecked on Japanese shores. Second, to obtain the opening of one or more Japanese ports where American ships could get necessary supplies. Third, to negotiate, if possible, a just and equitable treaty with the Japanese government which would allow commerce between the two nations.

The treaty gained by Perry in 1854 assured the first of these necessities. The second was obtained only in part, for Perry agreed

that coal could not be procured at Shimoda.¹ As to the third necessity, an exceedingly just and equitable treaty was obtained, but this treaty gave little satisfaction to the commercial interests of the United States.

The Perry mission saw the beginning of the application to Japan of those principles, developed in China, which later became known as the Open Door policy. From the first, the United States, as represented by the decisions of its naval diplomat, strove for equal opportunity to be guaranteed by the strengthening of Japan and efforts to develop a friendship between Japan and the United States. The objective of the Perry expedition was certainly the same as that of the Open Door policy. Both attempted to keep open opportunity for the United States in the Far East in the future, and in the mission to Japan the word "future" should be emphasized, for Perry felt that friendship with Japan was but the first step in a policy of expanding American influence in the Pacific.

The techniques used in an Open Door policy were certainly contained in the Perry policy. The first, that of securing equal commercial opportunity, was obtained by the means developed by Caleb Cushing—the most-favored-nation clause.

The second is the preservation of territorial and administrative integrity. At that time, when imperialistic European nations had not yet appeared on the scene in Japan as they had in China, it can only

¹55rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34 (Serial Number 751). Correspondence relating to the Perry expedition, p. 161.

be said that the fact that the United States did not itself demand territory or administrative rights, even including extraterritoriality, from Japan set a precedent which the other nations followed. Had the United States taken territory or demanded concessions in the ports, as had been the custom in the relations of the European powers with China, it is probable that the other Western countries would have done likewise.

As for the third means, that of assisting the Far Eastern countries to develop and maintain stable governments, it can be said that Perry intentionally did nothing to upset the government of Japan. The new developments in industry and armament which he insisted be brought to Japan as gifts certainly impressed the Japanese, and it was not long before they made a concerted effort to surpass even the American inventions. As Dr. S. Wells Williams expressed it, "in the higher benefits likely to flow to the Japanese by their introduction into the family of civilized nations, I see a hundred fold return for all the expenses of this expedition to the American Government."²

Certainly, the motives involved in an Open Door policy, and which lay behind the negotiations with Japan, contributed much to the success of American foreign policy toward Japan up to 1855. In following the means described above the United States secured the friendship of Japan, and was able to persuade the Japanese to abandon their seclusion.

²Frederick Wells Williams, The Life And Letters Of Samuel Wells Williams, op. cit., p. 224

For two centuries Japan had been practically a hermit nation. The adoption of this policy of exclusion and seclusion (for Japanese were no more allowed to leave Japan and return than were foreigners allowed to visit Japan) had come after a century of friendly and liberal relations with several European states. Beginning in 1542 with the discovery of Japan by storm-bound Portuguese, commercial relations developed first with Portugal, then with Spain, and later with Holland and England. The Japanese welcomed the foreign traders with their new wares and, especially, their firearms. In 1613 Ieyasu, founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate, gave to the English a charter which granted them privileges far more liberal than could have been found in any Western state, including even free trade and extraterritoriality.³

It may be inferred that it was never a policy of Japan to isolate herself from the commercial brotherhood of nations. But this she chose in order to free herself from the political menace of Western religion. It is difficult today to unravel all the motives from the skein of tangled political, religious, and economic elements, but there is reason to believe that if religious propaganda could have been divorced from commercial intercourse, the doors of Japan might never have been closed. As it was, the English East India Company abandoned its factory in 1623, the Spaniards were excluded in 1624, seclusion was

³George B. Sanson, Japan, A Short Cultural History (Revised edition, New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1943), p. 422.

decreed in 1638, and the Portuguese were excluded in 1639.⁴ The Dutch, who professed a different brand of Christianity, were transferred to Deshima, a small island in the harbor of Nagasaki, in 1641 and allowed a strictly regulated trade. The Chinese were also allowed to trade there under rigid restrictions. This policy was inaugurated by Iemitsu, the third of the Tokugawa Shoguns, who administered the country from 1625 until 1651.

It seems then that it was Tokugawa fear of the political side-effects of Roman Catholicism that was the main cause for the exclusion policy.⁵ Economic reasons against foreign trade were a complaint of a later period; neither did European politics or state-systems directly

⁴For complete details of the development of the exclusion policy and the persecution of Christians connected with it, see: Sanson, Ibid., pp. 441-455; Inazo Nitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1891), pp. 11-16.

⁵One Japanese authority states:

That their (the Japanese) statesmen opposed was the religious activity of the Catholic nations, which endangered the existence of the land of "the Rising Sun." It was for "the tranquillity of the country," that the Christian nations were forced to depart. That for which Japan contended was the development and preservation of the "national state", for which the Teutonic nations were also struggling at the same time in Europe. The idea of the national state, or nation, rising against Emperor and Pope was the same in the Far East as in Europe. There is, however, a striking divergence between the paths by which in the Orient and in Europe the principles of national sovereignty were attained. In Europe, the Teutonic nations compelled the Catholic empires to recognize the Protestant states as sovereign equals, and laid the basis of the modern international society by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In the Orient, Japan instituted by positive law ten years before the Peace of Westphalia, an "inclusive and exclusive" policy, and preserved her sovereignty by remaining isolated from the society of the West.

(Seiji G. Hishida, "The International Position of Japan As A Great Power," [Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. 24, No. 3. New York: Macmillan Company, 1905], pp. 102-103.)

influence the inception of the exclusion legislation. These factors operated, however, and were probably the reasons Japan did not re-open her doors at a later period when the dangers from the Catholic church had diminished.

The political organization of Japan was unique when it came again into contact with the West. Japan had been a monarchy since the beginning of the nation, sometime near the beginning of the Christian era.⁶ The Emperor, however, soon ceased to rule directly, and in his place the duties of government passed to noblemen at the court. Later, a family of court nobles, the Fujiwara, controlled the administration, in the Emperor's name, from 670 to 1156. These courtiers were in turn replaced by one of the great military families who held the title of Sei-i-tai Shogun (Barbarian Subjugating Great General). The first of these leaders was Minamoto Yoritomo, who became Shogun in 1192. From 1199 until 1333, members of the Hojo family served as regents for titular Shoguns. In 1333 the Ashikaga family was established in the Shogunate, holding it until 1573. There then followed thirty years of civil war from which arose three great generals, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu, who beat the other feudal lords into submission, and the last of them founded the Tokugawa Shogunate, which held power from 1603 until 1867.

The Tokugawa Shoguns were the Emperor's regents, military chieftans, administrators of the treasury and foreign affairs, and masters

⁶The traditional date of the accession of Jimmu Tenno, the first Emperor of Japan, is 660 B.C., but this date is rejected by most modern historians.

of the clans of feudal Japan. About one quarter of Japan, including the capital city of Yedo,⁷ was retained by the Tokugawa's as their own domain. Under this dual system of government the Emperor resided at Kyoto, surrounded by his court but under the watchful eye of the Shogun. At Yedo was the Shogun, invested with supreme authority in political affairs.

The part of Japan that was outside of the domain of the Tokugawa was divided by them into about two hundred and fifty fiefs, and these were assigned to daimyo.⁸ Many of these feudal barons copied the administrative policy that the Tokugawa had applied to their own domain. In 1853 the society of Japan was no longer purely feudal. It had its decentralizing as well as its centralizing elements; and, strangely enough, there was a great measure of local self-government. The Shogunate exercised a measure of control over the feudatories through the law of compulsory residence at Yedo, the exchange of fiefs, and fines disguised as orders to carry out some costly public work.⁹

During its two and a half centuries of supremacy the Tokugawa had maintained peace, a fact which may partially account for Japanese military weakness in 1853. But the strength of the Tokugawa family

⁷ Present-day Tokyo.

⁸ Daimyo is literally translated "great names." It is the term applied to the holders of shoen (fiefs). Their position was similar to that of the feudal baron in medieval Europe.

⁹ See: Sanson, op. cit., pp. 455-524; J. H. Gubbins, The Progress of Japan, 1853-1871 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911), pp. 1-39.

had been sapped by the same trend that had previously weakened the Imperial dynasty. As the feudal lords had at one time contended for the right to rule in the name of the Emperor, so the councillors and the relatives of the Tokugawa contended for the right to rule in the name of the Shogun. During the later Tokugawa period the actual government very largely passed out of the hands of the Shoguns and was exercised by a council of five.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Shogunate was having its troubles. As early as the end of the seventeenth century, under the auspices of the Prince of Mito (1622-1700), a large history of Japan was undertaken. It was completed in 1715. This was a history in the sense of Freeman's definition—namely, "past politics." By reviewing the historical position of the Emperor, it cast doubt upon the validity of the Shogunal power. In 1827, Sanyo Rai wrote his History of Japan, which circulated widely. The spirit which permeated this work was reverence for the Emperor, and it contributed not a little to undermining the Shogunate. The revival of pure Shintoism, which involved the concept of the divine right and descent of the Emperor, also weakened the Shogun's complete power.¹⁰

There was, also, a problem of overpopulation; for the population, although not as great as today, was large for a country cut off from foreign trade whose only resource was agriculture. Class distinctions,

¹⁰ For an excellent study of the revival of this politico-religious doctrine, see: E.M. Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shintau" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. III, Appendix. Yokohama: R. Heiklejohn and Co., 1883), pp. 1-85.

which were a very important part of Japanese feudalism, were being blurred. The samurai or warrior class had lost their financial importance during the many years of peace, and it was not uncommon for them to go so deeply into debt that they were willing to give up their rank for financial relief. Some of them became country squires and thus helped to bridge the gap between the military caste and the peasants, creating an odd type of middle class. Others became restless wanderers—ronin¹¹—ready to use their swords for almost any cause. This more or less restless class leaned both to Western learning and to the classics which advocated the return of the Emperor to power.

Towns had grown up and in them guilds learned to govern themselves and to operate as pressure groups. At times they ran prices up to such a point that food riots resulted. The enforced living period in Yedo had contributed to the rise of a merchant class who yearned for the advantages of Western trade. The currency, issued by many fiefs as well as by the Shogun's government, was confused and debased.

In the words of Sir George Sanson:¹²

The country was full of restless spirits, dissatisfied with their condition and thirsting for activity. There were nobles who wanted independence and foreign trade, to develop the resources of their domains; samurai who wanted opportunities to use their talents, whether as soldiers or as officials; merchants who wanted to break the monopolies of the guilds; scholars who wanted to draw knowledge from new springs; humble peasants and townsmen who wanted just a little freedom from tax and tyranny. Every

¹¹ Literally "wave-man," a masterless warrior who no longer owed duty of service or employment to anyone.

¹² Sanson, op. cit., p. 524.

forces but conservatism was pressing from within at the closed doors; so that when a summons came from without they were flung wide open, and all these imprisoned energies were released.

It is to err, however, to think that Japan was hermetically sealed during her centuries of seclusion. Deshima was a keyhole through which some light entered. It was the Dutch who called to the attention of the Japanese the changes which were going on in the world at large, and there were some Japanese who appreciated the significance of these reports.¹³ There were, also, those Japanese who, in spite of the oppressive laws of the time, sought to obtain all available information concerning the West. Such were Watanabe and Takano, who in 1838 advocated foreign intercourse only to be arrested and punished.¹⁴ Many Japanese, a large number of whom came from the idle samurai class, early studied Dutch medicine and some had attempted to master the history, philosophy, military art and government of the West. By 1830 the students of Western science had begun to acquire such influence

¹³ While Perry's squadron was at Shimoda in 1854, some of the officers saw a Japanese book describing the Anglo-Chinese war of 1839-42. Williams, Samuel W., "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 37, Part 2. Yokohama: Fukuin Printing Company, 1910), p. 182.

¹⁴ "That the Restoration should have been combined with the opening of the country and the adoption of a policy of enlightened progress was a surprise to all. . . . No inconsiderable amount of credit, however, must in this respect be given to patriots and servants like Sihei Hayashi, Kwazen Watanabe, Choei Takano, Shozan Sakuma and others." (Prince Ito, as quoted by S. Ballard, "Sketch of the Life of Watanabe Noboru" [Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 32. Tokyo: Rikkyo Gakuin Press, 1905], p. 1.)

See also: George B. Sanson, The Western World and Japan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950) pp. 248-274.

that the Confucian scholars intrigued against them and for a short time "Dutch" studies languished. But a number of courageous men continued their criticism of the authorities, and though some of them paid with their lives they succeeded in convincing a few members of the administration and some of the daimyo that Japan could no longer stand still.

It would be incorrect to assume that none of the European nations were interested in Japan. The English had made several visits, but the only determined effort of the British to force their way into commerce was that of Sir Stamford Raffles.¹⁵ There is, however, very little sign of a strong interest on the part of English merchants in the possibilities of a valuable trade with Japan. Just prior to the opening of Japan it was thought by many English businessmen that Japan would have little to sell and therefore could not afford to buy English manufactures.¹⁶

Only the Dutch had been permitted to remain when the Spaniards and Portuguese were expelled in 1639, and they were confined to Deshima. Eight, subsequently two, and still later one, was the number of Dutch vessels that yearly could visit Deshima. The trade was not in

¹⁵In an attempt to break the Dutch monopoly he sent two vessels in 1813 and one in 1814, but did not succeed in his object and could obtain no government support for a further approach. W.C. Aston, "H.M.S. 'Phaeton' at Nagasaki in 1808" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 7, Part 4, Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn and Co., 1879), pp. 110 ff.

¹⁶It is significant that the agreement concluded with Japan in 1854 by Admiral Stirling does not mention trade.

a flourishing condition at any time in the nineteenth century.

The Dutch agents kept the Japanese informed as to the progress of political events in the outside world. William II, king of Holland, cautioned the Shogun in 1844, by reference to the Opium War and its consequences in China, to be prepared for defence, or, preferably, to open the country to foreign trade.¹⁷ When the Americans arrived in 1853 the Japanese were well informed of their approach as well as of the outcome of the recent war between the United States and Mexico.¹⁸ The Dutch were naturally interested in further trading rights. In fact, in 1852 they had gone so far as to draft a treaty. The appeals by them to end exclusion, and the Western knowledge which seeped into Japan from Doshima, did much to soften the Japanese and prepare them for intercourse with the West.

To one other Western country the opening of Japan was of prime importance, but for reasons far different than those of the United States. Russia, on the north, had pushed down into the Kurile Islands, and to round out her occupation of the Amur Valley sought the possession of Karafuto (Sakhalin). Her advance was ferred by Japan, for her commercial interests were small.¹⁹

¹⁷D. E. Greene, "Correspondence Between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan, A.D. 1844" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 34, Part 4. Yokohama: Fukun Printing Co., 1906), pp. 110 ff.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 99-110

¹⁹Payson J. Treat, The Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), p. 11.

In the early nineteenth century, Russia was the European power most interested in Japan. In the very year that Japan adopted a policy of exclusion (1638), the Russians had raised their standard on the Pacific, at Obootsk, and during the next two centuries they had consolidated their control. In 1792 Lieutenant Laxman was sent to return some Japanese seamen and to endeavor to open friendly relations. This attempt failed, as did a more elaborate one in 1804, under Resanoff. The Japanese knew of the growth of Russian power to the north, and this knowledge was one of the influences in arousing interest in foreign affairs during the early nineteenth century.²⁰

Further attempts to approach Japan were made by the Russians but it was not until 1849 that a determined program was undertaken when, under Neesalrode as Foreign Minister, Count Muraviev, who stood for an active policy in eastern Siberia, decided that it would be to the advantage of Russia to make friends with Japan in order to check British and American influence in eastern Asia. In 1852 the Tsar, Nicholas II, agreed to send an expedition to Japan, and an embassy headed by Putiatine reached Nagasaki in August, 1853, to find that Commodore Perry had already arrived at Uraga.

However, the European nations, particularly Russia, England, and Holland, although interested in Japan, had been in the nineteenth century preoccupied with European problems and, from the end of the Napoleonic wars, the English effort in commercial expansion was concentrated upon the East Indian and the China trade. Great Britain, France,

²⁰Sansom, The Western World and Japan, op. cit., p. 245.

and Russia were becoming occupied with the Crimean War leaving the Pacific for the moment more to the Americans than it had ever been before. Furthermore, the European nations were involved in the Taiping rebellion in China. The Perry expedition sailed at a time when only the United States could devote any great amount of attention to Japan, and before any European nation had become actively interested in trade with Japan.

By 1851 the subject of intercourse with Japan had excited sufficient interest in the United States to bring about the commissioning of Commodore Anlick, who was soon replaced by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, to head an expedition for the purpose of opening Japan to friendly intercourse. Of this interest, one of the main causes was the industrial and commercial growth of the Pacific Coast. The discovery of gold in California, the increasing trade with China after the establishment of treaty relations, and the development of steam navigation, made the United States feel the necessity of using Japanese harbors and obtaining Japanese coal. Hospitality and protection were also desired for shipwrecked whalers; and it was felt that to succeed in a task in which European powers had failed would redound to the glory of the United States.

Public opinion in the United States was not wholly united behind such a project; therefore, the choice of action would be limited from the outset. The press, both in America and Europe, was free in

its comments on the intended expedition.²¹ To most Americans, Japan was just one of the many outlandish Pacific islands, and the filibustering operations in the Gulf of Mexico were a more interesting speculation.

Nevertheless, the seclusion of Japan endangered American commerce with the Far East and seemed to endanger the lives of American seamen and whalers. Through the pressure of commercial interests as represented by Palmer, naval interests as represented by Clyn, and senatorial pressure as represented by Seward, the step of appointing a naval strategist to obtain the American objective of opening Japan to friendly intercourse was taken.

The appointment of a naval diplomat was dictated by precedent and because much depended upon the wise use of the naval force to be sent to Japan.²² Perry was appointed to the command of the East India

²¹A Washington correspondent of a Philadelphia paper writes that there "is no money in the treasury for the conquest of the Japanese Empire, and that the administration will hardly be disposed to pursue such a romantic notion." (The Public Ledger, Nov. 18, 1853, cited by Mitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States and Japan, op. cit., p. 43.) Not the less sarcastic were English comments. The Earl of Mlesmere confessed, in 1855, that a few years previous he "saw little prospect of relaxation in the Japanese code of rigid exclusion without the employment of actual force." (Journal of the London Geographical Society, Vol. 25, p. 114, cited by Mitobe, ibid., p. 44.) Perhaps this belief that the United States could not accomplish the opening of Japan helped reinforce an apparent lack of European interest in a project which might well have resulted in exclusive American concessions.

²²Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 9.

squadron, then consisting of three ships of war and two ships, which was to be reinforced by eight additional vessels.²³

The instructions issued to Perry by Acting Secretary of State C. H. Conrad, November 5, 1852,²⁴ were quite different in tone and more explicit in details than those issued Commodore Aulick. Perry appears to have had some influence in planning the methods by which the expedition would be carried out. Owing to the illness of Webster, he was permitted to draft his own instructions which were then submitted to the Department of State.²⁵ Whether any revision took place is not known, but certainly these instructions bore the stamp of a naval officer rather than that of a Webster.²⁶

While the objects of the expedition were left practically unchanged from those given in the Webster instructions to Commodore Aulick²⁷—protection for distressed American seamen, one or more ports open to trade, and the right to purchase coal—the means of securing them differed. The Japanese were described as "weak and barbarous people" whose conduct toward shipwrecked sailors demanded forced change.

²³ Only one of the additional ships arrived in time for the first visit to Japan. Two did not arrive at all.

²⁴ The Perry instructions are in: 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34, op. cit., pp. 4-9.

²⁵ Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, op. cit., p. 303.

²⁶ Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., pp. 260-277, feels that Perry's influence on the instructions was great. No other diplomatic history emphasizes this point.

²⁷ The Aulick instructions were issued June 10, 1851. See: 32nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59, op. cit., p. 80.

To secure these rights would be to satisfy the most urgent of the American objectives, and it was naturally believed that once the wedge in the exclusion policy had been driven additional rights would be forthcoming.

More significant than the statement of the objects to be obtained were the methods to be employed. First, Commodore Perry should explain to the Japanese government that the United States would not interfere with the religion of the Japanese people. Second, the Commodore should make clear to the Japanese government that the United States was an independent nation, since Japan entertained a prejudice against the English. Third, in order to avoid trouble with European powers, the Commodore should not obtain from the Japanese government any commercial advantages which would exclude other nations from beneficial participation. Fourth, the Commodore might use large discretionary power, and might feel assured that any departure from diplomatic usage or any error of judgment which he might commit would be viewed with indulgence by the government.

The Commodore was finally instructed that if argument and persuasion should fail to obtain any relaxation of the Japanese system of exclusion or even any assurance of humane treatment of American shipwrecked seamen, he was to state "in the most unequivocal terms" that American citizens wrecked on the coasts of Japan must be treated with humanity.

and that if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practised upon citizens of this country, whether by the government or by the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severely chastised.

Hewas also instructed that,

as the President has no power to declare war, his mission is necessarily of a pacific character, and (he) will not resort to force unless in self-defence in the protection of the vessels and crews under his command, or to resent an act of personal violence offered to himself, or one of his crews.

He was also to be

courteous and conciliatory, but at the same time, firm and decided. He will therefore, submit with patience and forbearance to acts of discourtesy to which he may be subjected, by a people to whose usages it will not do to test by our standards of propriety, but, at the same time, will be careful to do nothing that will compromise, in their eyes, his own dignity, or that of the country. He will, on the contrary, do everything to impress them with a just sense of the power and greatness of this country, and to satisfy them that its past forbearance has been the result, not of timidity, but of a desire to be on friendly terms with them.

A new letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor, a revision of the Webster letter which had been given to Aulick, was entrusted to Perry. It specified friendship, commerce, access to coal and provisions, and protection for distressed sailors as the objects. It was also suggested that Japan might, if not yet wholly willing to abrogate the laws forbidding foreign trade, at least try the experiment for five or ten years. "The United States often limit their treaties with foreign states to a few years, and then renew them or not, as they please."²⁸

Meanwhile, the Department of the Navy notified Commodore Perry, on the 13th of November, 1852, that the American East India squadron would be supplemented with eight additional vessels. The reason for

²⁸33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 84, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

this increase of vessels for an expedition to Japan was stated by Acting Secretary of State Conrad as follows: "It is manifest, from past experience, that arguments or persuasion addressed to this people (the Japanese), unless they be seconded by some imposing manifestation of power, will be utterly unavailing."²⁹ Thus Conrad spoke almost as did Perry himself.

These instructions recognized the conditions of the time. They recognized the Japanese attitude toward religion as well as their fear of imperialism as practiced by England. They were designed not to provoke any distrust or hatred from other interested Western nations. However, in attempting to realize American necessities, they suggested the use of force much more strongly than had any previous action toward Japan, and the negotiations were entrusted to a man who might easily be provoked into the use of force.

The makers of policy felt that a display of force might accomplish the objectives. While hoping that it would be unnecessary to use force in opening Japan, they intended that the United States should suffer no more insults such as that dealt out to Commodore Biddle at the hands of the Japanese.

The background, character, and personal convictions of Commodore Perry were sure to influence the diplomatic negotiations, for he had been granted large discretionary powers and American policy was executed by this one man.

At the time of his appointment Perry was fifty-eight years of

²⁹Ibid., p. 6.

age. Today he is considered "the dominating figure of the Navy between Decatur and Farragut."³⁰ The Commodore had a reputation for untiring industry and for an enthusiasm for his work that swept his subordinates along. Perry's name was guarantee enough of his devotion to the Navy. His father, four brothers, and two brothers-in-law had been naval officers; and at one time the rolls of the Naval Academy carried the names of seventeen Perry cousins. The Perrys had always played hard and played to win—for the United States, the Navy, and the name of Perry; but it was not always certain in just what order they honored these three causes.³¹ In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, written in 1851, Commodore Perry had not been backward about putting himself forward. He wrote:

Advance in rank and command is the greatest incentive to an officer, and having already been entrusted with two squadrons, one of them the largest one put afloat since the creation of the Navy, I could only look to the Mediterranean for advance in that respect, as that station in time of peace has always been looked upon as the most desirable. Hence it may not be surprising that I consider the relief of Commodore Mulick, who is much my junior and served under me in my second squadron, a retrograde movement in that great and deeply fostered aim of an officer to push forward; unless indeed, as I have before remarked, the sphere of action of the East India squadron and its force be so much enlarged as to hold out a well-grounded hope of its conferring distinction upon its commander.³²

Perry was, however, well cast in the role that he must fill. He

³⁰ Fletcher Pratt, The Navy: A History, quoted by Arthur Walworth, Black Ships Off Japan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 20.

³¹ Walworth, loc. cit.

³² A letter from Perry to Graham, quoted by Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, op. cit., p. 290.

was experienced in commanding, and he loved a good show. His natural liking for pomp and circumstance helped him to stage-manage a performance and to make it succeed. He would produce an original drama that would leave no doubt in Japanese minds about the power and prestige of the United States. These tactics caused some discontent among his subordinates, and even S. Wells Williams expressed his doubts: "As to . . . the plans of Commodore Perry, I have less confidence since I have seen more of his character. . . . Let us hope, however, for the best till we see the worst."³³

Calbraith Perry, as he preferred to be called, had always been a bit pompous when in uniform. "A queer strain of sky sensitivity," his biographer says, "always demanded he have an official excuse for bursting forth in glory."³⁴ The Commodore's love of personal importance was equaled by his reticence about himself as a man afterward. In keeping the log of one of his first ships, he had failed to record an incident of which he was the hero; and he had never exploited a wound that he once received in line of duty. But when given a valid reason for playing the part of a grandee, the Commodore would not have been a Perry if he had failed to make the most of it.

Perry held an iron grip upon the conduct of his men, and this was to be of utmost importance when they anchored off Japan. Evidence of

³³ Frederick W. Williams, The Life And Letters Of Samuel Wells Williams, op. cit., p. 185.

³⁴ Edward M. Barrows, The Great Commodore, p. 251, as quoted by Walworth, op. cit., p. 43.

this can be found in a complaint that appears in William's Journal.³⁵

...the vexatious manner in which Perry can annoy those under him without himself caring for the perplexity he occasions makes me glad that I never was disciplined to the navy, where undistinguishing obedience is required. One gets into such a heartless way of doing everything that the whole soul gets callous; praise is never given when a thing is done well, and scolding plentifully administered annuls any desire to exert one's self to please a superior.

Much credit is certainly due to the character of the Commodore himself. As Dr. Paullin said: "Perry's success was in no small measure the result of a rare combination of strong qualities of character—firmness, sagacity, tact, dignity, patience, and determination."³⁶

Perry was not without experience in getting concessions from people of weaker armament. In 1843 Perry had been ordered to command the African Squadron and to police the settlements that had been established in Nigeria by the American Colonization Society. He had decided to use a force larger than necessary, and by a "powder and ball policy" he had so impressed the tribesmen that the coast was made safe. In the war with Mexico, also, the Commodore had been justified in his policy of putting his trust in a display of force. It was traditional for the Perrys to insist on superior gunnery. It had been heavier armament, as well as courage, that had enabled Oliver Hazard Perry to report from Lake Erie that "we have met the enemy and they are ours." It was Perry's intention to enter Japanese waters with enough fire-power

³⁵ S. Wells Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)," (TASJ), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁶ Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations Of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1912), p. 281.

to give him the upper-hand from the beginning.

Perry's experience made him cognizant of the fact that an expedition such as that proposed for Japan could succeed only if complete and ample preparations were made. He was given great freedom in the selection of his subordinates. America and Europe were searched for publications which would be of service to the expedition. The charts were obtained chiefly from Holland, for which the government paid \$30,000.⁵⁷ The Commodore made visits to New York, Boston, and New Bedford to confer with captains of whaling vessels familiar with Japanese waters and merchants interested in the commerce of the East. Wishing to impress the Japanese with the products of American invention, the Commodore notified the Navy Department and several manufacturers of his desire to take along samples of everything from books to agricultural tools.

Even more vital than intelligence and materiel was the choice of personnel, and here again Perry showed sound sense in building upon experience and proved ability. Many of the officers selected had served under Perry in the Mexican War.

It was well that Perry's talents had been sufficient to cope with all the spadework, for had the Commodore depended upon his superiors the expedition might never have started, or, like Biddle's and Aulick's, set out without the equipment needed for success. William Graham, the Secretary of the Navy, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency in June, 1852, and thereafter took little interest in Japan or in Perry. When

⁵⁷Griffis, op. cit., p. 294.

John P. Kennedy took over the Secretaryship in July, the fishery dispute with Great Britain absorbed his attention.

The policy of Perry is much broader and more aggressive than is indicated by the terms of the treaty. Perry felt that he was laying the foundation for an American commercial empire in Asia and on the Pacific. Indeed, Perry appears to have been the first American in official position to view not merely the commercial but also the political problems of Asia and the Pacific as a unity.⁵⁸ Perry looked into the future and considered American commercial interests in the Far East from the standpoint of a naval strategist. There must be an ample number of ports of refuge and trade bases. In one of his dispatches he even went so far as to speak of the necessity of extending the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States beyond the limits of the western continent. "I assume," he wrote, "the responsibility of urging the expediency of establishing a foothold in this quarter of the globe, as a measure of positive necessity to the sustainment of our maritime rights in the east."⁵⁹

Commodore Perry left no doubt as to the nature of the policy he would like to pursue. The ships of Perry's squadron reached the

⁵⁸ According to Bennett, the extensive ambitions of Perry greatly influenced the subsequent treaty with Japan. Perry believed that he was taking but the first step in a very large program which in its entirety would be realized only by degrees. A treaty of friendship with Japan was but a detail in this program. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

⁵⁹ 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 54, op. cit., p. 81.

Ryukyu Islands⁴⁰ in late May, 1853. The port of Naha was made the rendezvous for the squadron and Perry successfully negotiated for a coal depot there.⁴¹ On his return voyage to Japan, Perry outlined, while at Naha, his course of action.⁴² He again decided to take the island of "Great Lew-Chew" under the "surveillance of the American flag" if the Japanese refused to assign a port of resort for our merchant and whaling-ships. His former visit had convinced him that this could be done without the use of force. The successful outcome of the treaty negotiations with Japan relieved Perry of taking this step, for it would certainly have been disavowed by the American government.⁴³

Perry's plans also included the Bonin Islands, which lay about five hundred miles south of Japan and in the direct path of navigation between Honolulu and Shanghai. In his first report from the Ryukyu

⁴⁰There was not, and still is not, agreement on the spelling of the name of these islands, or of the name of their chief city. In his Narrative, Perry referred to the Islands as the "Lew Chews", and the old (Chinese) name also has been written Liu Chiu, Lu Chai, Loochoo. The name of the capital is variously written Naha, Naha, and Napa. "Great Lew Chew" Island, on which the capital is located, is known as Okinawa.

⁴¹33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34, op. cit., pp. 28-29. For an interesting account of Perry's activities at Okinawa, see: William Leonard Schwartz, editor, "Commodore Perry at Okinawa—from the unpublished diary of a British Missionary," American Historical Review, 51:262-278.

⁴²Senate Executive Document No. 34, ibid., p. 109.

⁴³Secretary of State Dobin replied to Perry (May 29, 1854) after consultation with President Pierce that "the President is disinclined to take and retain possession of an island in that distant country, particularly unless more urgent and patent reasons demanded it than now exist." (Senate Executive Document No. 34, ibid., p. 112.)

Islands, Perry expressed his opinion that Port Lloyd, Bonin Islands, must be made a free port for the vessels of all nations, and especially for the mail steamers of both England and the United States. His most important action in these islands was to secure a tract of land for the erection of wharves and coal-sheds.⁴⁴ Four months later, by Perry's order, the American flag was raised on the southern group of islands which had been named Baily's Islands by Captain Beechey of H.M.S. Blosson, in 1827, but which Perry rechristened Coffin Islands.⁴⁵

Perry defended his actions as necessary in order to work on the fears of the Japanese rulers, but he did not conceal his satisfaction at having secured an important port of refuge for the trans-Pacific trade.

The British did not allow this appropriation of territory to go unnoticed. While Perry was at Hongkong gathering forces for his second visit to Japan, Sir John Bonham, Superintendent of Trade, asked the Commodore for an explanation. Perry tactfully set up a counter claim on the grounds that Captain Coffin had preceded Captain Beechey to the island by at least three years.⁴⁶

To the end of his life Perry continued to advocate the settlement of the Pacific islands by Americans—"offshoots from us," he spoke of, "rather than, strictly speaking, colonies." In a speech on the Bonins, he said:

Here would be at once the beginning of a settlement such as in the course of time will inevitably be established in various parts

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 59.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 66-67.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 80-86.

of the Pacific. For it is not to be supposed that the numberless islands which lie scattered throughout this immense ocean are always to remain unproductive, and under the mismanagement of savages. The history of the world forbids any such conclusion. How, and in what way, the aborigines will be disposed of—whether by just or unjust means—cannot be known at the present time; but that they are doomed to mingle with, or give way to some other race, is as certain as the melancholy fate of our own red brethren.⁴⁷

Perry's policy can be summarized in that he believed intimidation necessary in securing concessions from Asiatic states, and that he assumed that some territorial occupation would be necessary to protect American interests. He considered that the question of sovereignty was not so important as that of an open door for the hospitable reception of all nations. Speaking of the extension of American trade in the East, he said, "What benefits the United States and extends American territory cannot but result advantageously to other powers."⁴⁸

The Japan Expedition,⁴⁹ consisting of two steamers and two

⁴⁷ Matthew C. Perry, "A Paper Read Before the American Geographical and Statistical Society," quoted by Walworth, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁴⁸ 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 79 (Serial Numbers 769, 770, 771). Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States. 3 vols. Compiled by Francis L. Hawks (cited as Hawks), Vol. II, p. 180.

⁴⁹ For complete details of Perry's expedition, see: Hawks, *Ibid.*; 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34, op. cit.; S. Wells Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)" (TASS), *op. cit.*; Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, op. cit.; Nitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan, op. cit., pp. 45-61; Bennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., pp. 260-279; Treat, The Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, op. cit., pp. 12-39; Walworth, Black Ships Off Japan, op. cit. For a good Japanese account of the negotiations, see: "Diary of an Official of the Bakufu" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd series, Vol. 7, Tokyo: The Kyo Bun Kwan, 1950), pp. 98-119.

sloops of war, anchored in the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853, and remained nine days. A native writer chronicles the effect of the arrival: "The popular commotion in Yedo at the news of a 'foreign invasion' was beyond description. The whole city was in an uproar. In all directions were seen mothers flying with children in their arms, and men with mothers on their backs. Rumors of an immediate action, exaggerated each time they were communicated from mouth to mouth, added horror to the horror-stricken."⁵⁰

Perry had almost at once succeeded in impressing the Japanese with the strength of his squadron, containing the largest naval force and the first steamers ever seen in Japanese waters. When the ships had anchored they were surrounded by small boats. On one of these was the vice-governor of Uraga, who asked to see the commander of the squadron. He was told the commander would confer with no one except a functionary of the highest rank. This was in line with the course which Perry had marked out for himself; to practice a little of Japanese diplomacy by allowing no one on board the ships except officers having business, and personally conferring with no one except an official of the highest rank.

He refused to retire and go to Nagasaki as ordered; and, when the Japanese evaded receiving the President's letter, he threatened to go on shore with force and deliver it himself. He ordered surveying boats to begin surveys of the bay and harbor. When requested to withdraw these boats, he moved the flag-ship, the Mississippi, still further up

⁵⁰Nitobe, op. cit., p. 46.

the bay in the direction of Yedo. The Commodore explained that these surveys were necessary because he intended to return in the spring with a "larger force."⁵¹

Before such threats and intimidations, the Japanese finally yielded and the letter was received with ceremony on shore. On the 14th of July, the day for the reception of Commodore Perry by the high Japanese functionaries, the Commodore landed and marched to the reception hall with the Japanese master of ceremony, Governor Kayama, and an escort of about four hundred of his officers and seamen in the midst of a large number of armed Japanese troops. All of this, Perry's official account explains, "was but for effect." After reaching the reception hall, the Commodore was formally received by Toda Idzu-no-kami (prince of Idzu), Edo Iwami-no-kami (prince of Iwami), with Governor Kayama and the chief interpreter. The Commodore then presented, through his subordinates, to the Japanese representatives the President's letter, the Commodore's letter of credence, and two other letters of the Commodore addressed to the Japanese Emperor, together with translations of the same into the Dutch and Chinese languages.

The Americans went back to their ships feeling highly gratified at what had been accomplished. They had received different treatment from any foreigners who had visited Japan for two centuries. While exhibiting firmness as to their rights, they had showed regard for the sovereignty and rights of the Japanese.

⁵¹ 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34, op. cit., pp. 43 ff.

General characteristics of Commodore Perry's negotiations may be said to be dignified, direct, and aggressive. He held to this same course as he departed from Japan for the first time; for, although he had been ordered to depart immediately, he ordered the whole squadron to get under way in the direction of Yedo. He paused just short of the point where his movements might be regarded as provocation, and retired from Japanese waters, having notified the Japanese that he would return in the spring with a larger force to receive an answer to the President's letter and the proposals for a treaty.

In reporting to Washington on his first visit to Japan, Perry again expressed his faith in the policy that he had followed from the beginning and that had now proved effective. "It is very certain," he wrote, "that the Japanese can be brought to reason only through the influence of their fears, and when they find that their seacoast is entirely at the mercy of a strong naval force they will be induced, I confidently hope, to concede all that will be asked of them."⁵² Again Washington was alarmed, and the Secretary of the Navy replied, too late to reach the expedition before its return to Japan the next year: "The President. . . desires to impress you with his conviction that the great end should be attained, not only with credit to the United States, but without wrong to Japan. I need not remind you that your mission is one of peaceful negotiation, and that. . . no violence should be resorted to except for defence. . . . As Congress alone has the power to

⁵²Ibid., p. 57.

declare war, too much prudence cannot be exercised."⁵³

During Perry's absence, the American request for friendship, commerce, supplies, and the protection of shipwrecked seamen had been seriously considered by the Shogun's officials. Among the Shogunate officials were men who were more or less informed concerning world movements, and they knew that it would be foolhardy to precipitate hostilities with a Western power. Although, without question, the Yedo government should have dealt with this situation on its own responsibility, Lord Abe, president of the Rejin, or Cabinet, was unwilling for the Shogunate to act alone. It was decided that the responsibility for war or peace should rest on the daimyo, and on August 5, 1853, Lord Abe took the unprecedented step of referring the President's letter to the Emperor and the daimyo for their consideration.⁵⁴

This action was the beginning of the process which eventually undermined the Shogun's power. In their replies to Lord Abe, almost all the daimyo favored the maintenance of the exclusion laws, and the Imperial Court instructed the Shogun to drive away the Americans.⁵⁵ Some few of them would try the experiment of foreign commerce for three years, others five and still others ten, to test how such a novel scheme would work. They were strengthened by the clause in the President's letter suggesting a terminal date for the treaty. In the meantime,

⁵³ Senate Executive Document No. 54, loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Cubbins, The Progress of Japan, 1853-1871, op. cit., p. 91.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 92.

although the Shogunate realized that a war could not be successfully waged, defensive measures were taken.

New fear was awakened in Japan and Perry's arguments strengthened when the Russian squadron under Admiral Putiatine visited Nagasaki in August, 1853, and again early in 1854.⁵⁶ It was the belief that both the French and Russian squadrons were about to visit Japan and seek treaties that caused Perry to hasten his return, and on January 14, 1854, he sailed again from Hongkong to Japan.

The Commodore had gone to China to recruit and reinforce his squadron, and to look after American interests in that empire imperilled by the civil war known as the Taiping rebellion. Embassy Marshall, our minister to China, was very persistent that Perry remain in Chinese waters, but Perry was too impressed with the importance of his mission to Japan to be diverted by the civil war in China.⁵⁷

Once more the squadron rendezvoused in the Ryukyus. There Perry received a letter from the Governor-general of the Netherlands India, advising him of the death of the Shogun and suggesting that he postpone his visit.⁵⁸ This news did not alter the Commodore's plans. The fleet, somewhat enlarged, but not so large as had been originally planned by the Fillmore administration, returned to the Bay of Yedo.

⁵⁶Hawks, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 62-63.

⁵⁷On Perry's determination to return to Japan immediately, see: John W. Foster, American Diplomacy In The Orient (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905), pp. 159-160; Hawks, Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 287 ff.

⁵⁸Hawks, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 305.

February 13, 1854. There was at first much disagreement as to where the conference would take place. A compromise was effected by which the conference was held at Yokohama, which is less than twenty miles from Yedo. There the conferences, formal and informal, over the terms of the proposed treaty were held.

59

It was found immediately that the Japanese were willing to open the port of Nagasaki under stringent regulations and would open a second port to the Americans at the end of five years. They were also prepared to give promises as to the reception of shipwrecked sailors. Perry would have nothing to do with Nagasaki, and asserted that he desired a treaty, offering as a basis for discussion the American treaty with China of 1844. The Japanese replied that they were not ready for the opening of such a trade. Despite clashes as to the number of ports to be opened, the area in which Americans could travel, etc., the negotiations proceeded with cordiality and courtesy.

During the course of the negotiations gifts were exchanged. Those from the United States included two telegraph instruments, a miniature locomotive, tender, cars and rails, books, weapons, tools and implements, wines and spirits, and many other objects of interest to the Japanese. A state dinner was held on the flagship at which the Japanese showed their appreciation of the champagne and other wines. As Sir George Sanson so aptly phrased it, "in the alcoholic world,

⁵⁹ The official account of the second visit of Perry to Japan, and the negotiations of the Treaty of Kanagawa is: Hawks, *Ibid.*, pp. 321-414; 33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34, op. cit., pp. 116-167.

there was a complete meeting of minds as between East and West.⁶⁰

So it appeared that most cordial relations had been established, and after one of the tipsy Japanese delegates had embraced the Commodore and announced that Japanese and Americans had the same kind of feelings, the signature of the treaty seemed assured. And so it was, for on March 31, a treaty of peace and amity was signed.⁶¹

The treaty presented a contrast to the methods by which it had been obtained, so much so in fact that some interpreters of foreign policy feel that in the art of negotiation the Japanese had surpassed the naval diplomat.⁶² This epoch-making treaty, which brought to an end the long period of Japan's seclusion, consisted of twelve articles. First, it established a "perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity" between the United States and Japan. The port of Shimoda was to be opened for supplies at once (Perry had refused to consider Nagasaki), and Hakodate (near the whaling-grounds) a year later. Shimoda was entirely without value as a port of trade and the harbor was of less utility than supposed by Perry. Shipwrecked Americans were to be well treated, and trade was permitted under temporary Japanese regulations and through the agency of Japanese officers on a cash basis. While permanent residence for Americans at either of the two ports was not contemplated, an American consul might

⁶⁰Sanborn, *The Eastern World and Japan*, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

⁶¹For the full text of the Treaty of Kanagawa, see Appendix A.

⁶²Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

be sent to Shimoda after eighteen months, and limits were set on the distance from the ports in which Americans would be free to travel.⁶³

The treaty contained, however, a most-favored-nation clause. By this the United States could enjoy any additional privileges that might be granted by Japan to other foreign powers. There was also one very significant omission. Perry had asked for no extraterritorial rights, and these were rights which the foreigner in China had already come to regard as too useful to be dispensed with. It is asserted that the absence of such a provision was due to the influence of Dr. S. Wells Williams, who accompanied the expedition as interpreter.⁶⁴ Being familiar with the situation in China, he was convinced that the imposition of extraterritorial rights upon a weak power by a strong one led to more evils than it remedied.

The treaty was actually little more than a shipwreck convention, and there was much criticism because a commercial treaty was not secured. On this point the Commodore had no illusions:

The treaty with Japan professes to be nothing more than a compact, establishing between the United States and that empire certain obligations of friendly intercourse with, and mutual protection to, the citizens and subjects of the contracting powers, and granting to American citizens rights and privileges never before extended to strangers. This treaty, in its concessions on

⁶³ Additional regulations were signed at Shimoda, June 10, 1854. Article I stated that any Americans "who are found transgressing Japanese laws may be apprehended by the police and taken on board their ships." This was a very weak form of extraterritoriality.

⁶⁴ Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, op. cit., p. 366n, cites a letter of Williams, dated February 8, 1863, as to his influence on the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause and the exclusion of extraterritoriality.

the part of the Japanese, far exceeds the most sanguine expectations, even of those who, from the first, advocated the policy of the Japan expedition. It purports to be a preliminary, and surely a most important step, in advance of a commercial arrangement to be agreed upon when the Japanese government may be better prepared by a more perfect knowledge of the usual requirements of international law and comity to enter upon additional pledges.⁶⁵

The Commodore believed that it was desirable to move slowly in bringing Japan into intercourse with the world at large.

Thus, in the eyes of Perry, his mission was successful. The first step had been taken; the rest would follow. When viewed in the light of Japanese history for two hundred years, it was a real achievement; and it was in fact what its language claimed—a treaty of friendship. Ratification of the treaty was advised by the United States Senate on July 15, 1854, and it was signed by the President on August 7. Ratifications were exchanged with Japan on February 21, 1855; and the treaty was proclaimed on June 22, 1855.

It has been customary, in many quarters, to consider this treaty as having been imposed by force.⁶⁶ But Perry had no such instructions, and there is no positive evidence that he had any such intentions. Indeed, Perry made much use of his powerful squadron as a means to compell the Japanese government to concede to his demands. Sudden movements of the squadron in the Bay of Yedo, a pompous parade of his armed escort on shore, and much firing of heavy-gun salutes served to play upon the fears of the Japanese. But, at the same time, a large

⁶⁵ Hawks, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 185.

⁶⁶ Sir Robert K. Douglas, *Europe And The Far East, 1506-1912* (Revised edition, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 153.

squadron was necessary because of the hostile nature of the exclusion laws. The Americans had not forgotten the reception given the Harrison in 1837. Undoubtedly, the display of force made a profound impression on the Japanese officials even though actual force was never used.

Circumstances within Japan certainly contributed to Perry's success, as did the groundwork laid by the Dutch. The timing was most opportune. Not only was the expedition ahead of any concerted effort on the part of other Western states, but Perry's arrival came between the period when the Japanese mind was unprepared for change and the period of civil war which followed. In one other respect the timing was perfect. The Japan expedition set out while the European nations were involved in the Crimean War. As a powerful and successful neutral in Asia, the United States was free to assume a position of great influence.

For his success in negotiating the treaty much credit is due to the Commodore himself. He was certainly patient, dignified, and determined. While courteous in dealing with the Japanese officials, he insisted upon the respect due his rank. He convinced the Japanese who came in contact with him of his real good-will toward their nation and people. On this point the testimony of the missionary-interpreter, Dr. Williams, is of decisive value. "The appointment of a naval man as the envoy was wise, as it secured unity of purpose in the diplomatic and executive chief, and probably Perry is the only man in our navy capable of holding both positions, which has been proved by the general prudence and decision of his proceedings since he anchored at Uraga

last July.⁶⁷ Thus, the best friend the Japanese had in the squadron had been convinced that they would suffer no evil from Perry, and was grateful that such a man had been appointed to carry out the difficult mission.

One wise decision of Perry's may well have been the deciding factor in the success of the expedition. This was the choice of the site of landing. Perry felt that he must confer only with the highest officials; therefore, he must go as near as possible to the capital. To come directly to Yedo was a bold stroke, and "it is to this daring policy that we must in great measure attribute his success."⁶⁸

Thus, the character of Perry—his love of showmanship and personal importance, his faith in a display of force, and his experience in the wise use of superior armament—contributed much to the success of the negotiations. More than this, his aggressive designs for future American policy in Asia undoubtedly influenced the treaty itself. He was more anxious to have the friendship of Japan than immediate coal depots and commerce, for he believed that the United States should have numerous ports of refuge and trade bases in the Pacific. The treaty of friendship with Japan was but the first step in this very large program.

⁶⁷ Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)" (TASJ), op. cit., p. 222.

⁶⁸ Mitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan, op. cit., p. 57.

CHAPTER III

TOWNSEND HARRIS

AND THE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1858

The policy of Townsend Harris in Japan is one of the brighter spots in American Far Eastern policy. By peaceful negotiation he secured from the Japanese a commercial treaty. The means used were primarily those of gaining the friendship and confidence of the Japanese and then advising them as to the best course to follow. In trying to understand the Japanese point of view and then reconciling his country's interests to those of Japan, Harris laid a foundation of friendship and understanding. Friendship is a necessary ingredient in the relations between two nations whose larger intercourse is calculated to be still in the future.

The policy of Townsend Harris in Japan has often been compared to that of Anson Burlingame in China. Both contained many of the elements of what later became known as the Open Door policy. As Tyler Dennett says, "American policy was not a pronouncement; it was a body of precedent to which Harris himself was in turn making important contributions in precision of statement."¹

¹Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 358.

The objective in 1855, like that of the Open Door policy, was to keep open opportunity for the United States in the Far East. The Perry treaty had been unsatisfactory to the commercial interests in the United States. These interests demanded the conclusion of a commercial treaty, and this Townsend Harris secured. The most-favored-nation clause had virtually assured the United States equal commercial opportunity. It was further fortified by Harris' advice to the Japanese regarding the evils of foreign concessions and the granting of special privileges.

A new innovation in the effort to preserve the administrative and territorial integrity of Far Eastern countries was the provision, in the treaty gained by Harris, that the President would mediate in disputes with Western powers and that granting Japan the right to purchase military and naval equipment and employ American experts. These provisions of promised assistance to Japan in developing and maintaining a stable government represent, in fact, Harris' contribution to the development of American policy.

Japanese domestic politics became even more confused after Perry's departure. The agitation which was to lead to the downfall of the Tokugawa and the restoration of Imperial rule developed rapidly. Because the abrogation of the exclusion laws was undertaken without the approval of the daimyo, the whole question of foreign relations became involved in the turmoil of domestic politics. The Imperial

party adopted the rallying cry, "Honor the Emperor and expel the barbarians."²

The policy adopted by the Tokugawa was one of drift. The majority of the councillors of the Shogunate were convinced of the wisdom of foreign intercourse. The Rojin, or Cabinet, was presided over by Lord Abe, who had directed the treaty negotiations. He soon fell ill, however, and was replaced by Lord Hotta. Hotta was another statesman who held enlightened views.³ A second council, of increasing importance, was the Tamarkume, or Council of State. Under the influence of Ii Ramon no Kami (Naosuke),⁴ an extremely capable and determined statesman, it also favored foreign intercourse. Being a strong supporter of the Tokugawa family, his approval of foreign intercourse ranged all the forces against the Tokugawa against the

²According to George Sanson, the period was one of plots and counterplots, quarrels and arguments, confusion between names and things, and misunderstandings and bewilderments. "From the highest sources issue proclamations that do not say what they mean or mean what they say. The throne rebukes great officers for doing what it has already approved, or enjoins them not to do what it knows they have already done. A fantastic ethos prevails throughout the land." (Sanson, The Western World and Japan, op. cit., p. 281) The very fact that the Shogunate had referred the matter of the Perry treaty to the daimyo and the Imperial court was a sign of how confused the situation had become. The Shogun, lacking power, had no choice but to approve the treaty; this the daimyo knew. But they took this opportunity to embarrass the Shogun's government by offering advice that could not be taken.

³For the influence of Lord Hotta, see: Count Shigenobu Okuma, compiler, Fifty Years Of New Japan (London: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1909), pp. 81-83; Shunkichi Akimoto, translator, Lord Ii Naosuke and New Japan by Katsumaro Wakamura (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1909), pp. 125-127.

⁴For the life of Lord Ii, see: Akimoto, ibid.

policy of adopting foreign intercourse and Westernizing Japan.

At the same time, a bitter controversy had developed over the appointment of an heir to the Shogun, Iesada. "The truth is that at this juncture antagonism to the Bakufu⁵ had in certain quarters grown to such a pitch that on any question, irrespective of its merits, powerful interests would range themselves on the side opposed to the government."⁶ Lord Nariaki⁷ urged the claims of his son, Keiki, and a powerful party supported them. But the Shogun and his confidential advisers, including Lord Ii, favored the young Lord of Kii (Kishiu), and eventually succeeded in gaining his appointment. This assured the position of Ii and Hotta. Their position remained very shaky, however, and, harrassed by domestic difficulties, they tried from day to day to put off the solution of problems in foreign affairs. "The Shogunate was struggling for its own life against powerful opposition, and to grant any favour to a barbarian was to give a weapon to its enemies at home."⁸

In general, the people at the open ports treated the occasional

⁵ Literally, "tent government." Originally meaning the headquarters of an army in the field, it came to be used as a description of the Government Headquarters of a military dictator, and Bakufu is the word usually applied to the government of the Shoguns.

⁶ Sanson, The Western World and Japan, op. cit., p. 284.

⁷ Leader of the Sanke (Three Houses) who was the Senior prince of Eito and opposed to foreign intercourse. His conduct was characteristic of this era; for while he led attacks on the Shogun for his failure to quell the barbarians, he encouraged foreign learning in his fief.

⁸ Sanson, The Western World and Japan, op. cit., p. 287.

foreign seamen with kindness and courtesy. To be sure, the Americans spoke of the "well known duplicity"⁹ of the Japanese; but doubtless the Japanese were quite as suspicious of American cunning.¹⁰ The Americans were impressed by the eagerness of the Japanese to learn.¹¹

Thus, the government in power in Japan was not opposed to foreign intercourse, rather, embarrassed by it because of the domestic situation. This is in striking contrast to conditions in China.¹²

It would be wrong to assume that the European powers continued to show no interest in Japan, for no sooner had Perry left than other Western nations arrived with renewed efforts to secure treaty rights in Japan. The Crimean War provided them with additional stimulus in

⁹S. Wells Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)" (TASJ), *op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹⁰For early Japanese suspicions of Westerners, see: E. W. Glenent, "British Seamen and Mito Samurai in 1824" (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 33, Part I. Tokyo: The Rikyo Gakuin Press, 1904), pp. 86-129.

¹¹Nitobe sums up the period as follows:

Immediately after Perry's squadron had left the Japanese waters, the rulers of the country, whether actuated by clear foresight and comprehension of the moment, or whether impelled by that mental confusion which attends sudden awakening from slumber and apprehension of the next moment, were aroused to immediate activity. Schools were opened for the study of foreign languages; academies shot up, where youths could receive instruction in military and naval tactics; raw recruits were drilled; foundries and smithies sprang into existence, and bellfries were selected to furnish metal for arsenals.

(Nitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan, *op. cit.*, p. 62).

¹²See: Tyler Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-348, for a good discussion of Japan's advantages over China in meeting the West. He lists greater unity, a more representative government with competent leadership, and patriotism.

this regard for the fleets of Britain, France, and Russia desired ports of refuge and supply in Japan.¹³ Admiral Sir James Stirling concluded a convention similar to Perry's in October, 1854, opening Nagasaki and Hakodate to British ships for supplies. It contained a "most-favored-nation" clause which secured for the British all that Perry had gained.¹⁴ This treaty was not satisfactory to the British for Sir John Bowring told Harris in Hongkong that he had received a commission to go to Japan with a large naval force and demand the opening of the country to foreign trade. The disturbances in China and the Indian Mutiny delayed this expedition for nearly two years.¹⁵

Two months after Stirling had signed the 1854 treaty, his antagonist, Vice-Admiral Putiatine visited Japan and asked for a treaty on behalf of the Russians. The Russian treaty of February 7, 1855,¹⁶ was similar to those which had preceded it; Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki were opened to Russian ships and a "most-favored-nation" clause was included. New clauses included bilateral extraterritoriality and the fixing of the boundary between Russia and Japan, assigning the island of Urup to Russia, Iturup and the Kuriles to Japan, and leaving

¹³ Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 27.

¹⁴ For details, see: Treat, Ibid., pp. 27-28. Treat quotes British Parliamentary Papers No. 2077 (1856), "Correspondence Relating to the Late Negotiations with Japan".

¹⁵ The Dutch at Nagasaki gave the Japanese warning of Bowring's proposed expedition. Akinoto, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁶ The text of this treaty can be found in: Gubbins, The Progress of Japan, 1853-1871, op. cit., pp. 235-237.

both countries in joint occupation of Sakhalin.

At Nagasaki the Dutch were still laboring under the ancient regulations which made residence at their trading-post a virtual imprisonment. On November 9, 1855, the Netherlands Commissioner to Japan, J. H. Donker Curtius, signed a Preliminary Convention, which was to become void if a treaty were signed soon after but which would remain in force if ratified by both rulers.¹⁷ This was followed by a more elaborate treaty which was signed January 30, 1856, but had not yet been ratified when Harris arrived.¹⁸ The only important difference between the two documents was the withdrawal of the privilege previously given for the sale of dwellings and warehouses and the lease of land at Deshima to the Dutch. These agreements marked several notable advances in concessions to foreigners. Extraterritoriality was granted, as well as the stipulation that the Dutch would be allowed "to practice their own or the Christian religion within their buildings."

By virtue of the most-favored-nation clause in the Treaty of Kanagawa, the United States had gained all the rights granted in these later treaties. However, none of the arrangements satisfied the need for a regular commercial treaty.

The United States continued to be the only country free to devote any great effort to improving relations with Japan. After the Crimean War (1854-1856), France and Britain demanded enforcement of their

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 245-250.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 250-255.

treaties with China, reparations for losses incurred in the recent Taiping rebellion, and greater trade concessions. The United States was invited to join in coercive measures against China, but declined. China was again to find herself humbled by the troops of Western nations.

The Perry pact was a disappointment to American commercial interests. It was little more than a convention for shipwrecked sailors; the lack of any commercial provisions made it of little value to traders. There were not a few of his countrymen who publicly asserted that Perry's mission had come far short of expectations.¹⁹ The newspapers did not fail to complain because an immense trade was not immediately secured, and because Perry did not gain a commercial treaty. This disappointment is understandable when it is realized that in 1852 it had been estimated that the direct trade between the United States and Japan would become at least \$200,000,000 annually.²⁰ Commercially, Perry had just got his foot in the door. It was not open.

However, American public opinion in general was still not excited by the events in Japan. President Pierce gave the opening of Japan (undertaken by a rival Whig administration) but two sentences in his annual report to Congress, and the *North American Review* wondered why "the funeral of Bill Poole or the fillibustering operations in the Gulf of Mexico have awakened more interest among the people, than has

¹⁹ Mr. Hildreth is very severe in this respect. See Richard Hildreth, *Japan As It Was And Is*, op. cit., Preface.

²⁰ J. Willet Spalding, *The Japan Expedition; Japan And Around The World* (New York: J.S. Redfield, 1855), p. 358.

the opening, by peaceful diplomacy, of the Italy of the East to the intercourse of the world.²¹ Thus, again, it would be the pressure of only a small interested segment of public opinion which would support American action in Japan.

Moreover, the United States was at this time torn by the slavery controversy following the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in 1854. And there was diplomatic tension between the United States and Great Britain concerning the activities of the British minister in recruiting Americans for the Crimean War and American recognition of the Walker government in Nicaragua.²² The negotiations in Japan could, at the most, come in a weak third in American interest in the 1850's.

Already American pioneers of commerce had visited Japan. The first appearance of a foreign vessel in the Bay of Yedo after Perry was that of the American clipper-ship Lady Pierce. It was fitted out from San Francisco for a pleasure voyage, the owner having anticipated the success of Commodore Perry and wishing to boast the honor of being the first trading vessel to enter a Japanese port. En route, at Honolulu, a shipwrecked Japanese was taken aboard and returned to his homeland. The ship returned from Japan with presents having been favorably received by the Japanese.²³ Then came a surveying expedition

²¹ North American Review, July, 1856, 83:236, cited by Hitobe, op. cit., p. 62.

²² For a discussion of the diplomatic tension between the United States and Great Britain in this period, see; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Second edition, New York: F.S. Crofts and Company, 1942), pp. 298-301.

²³ Hildreth, op. cit., pp. 312-313.

fitted out by the U.S. Navy and led by Cadwalader Ringgold.²⁴ This expedition, which was by 1855 under the leadership of Lt. John Rodgers, arrived in Japan only to become involved with the governor of Shimoda over the problems of American residence and trade under the Treaty of Kanagawa, for Americans were arriving for residence. Two of them who intended to establish a grogshop for visiting seamen in Shimoda were forced to leave by the American commander himself.²⁵ On June 27, many of the disgruntled American merchants returned to the states, notably Reed and Dougherty, who said that a new commercial treaty must be negotiated, with naval pressure if necessary.²⁶

On June 11, 1855, Rodgers had reported²⁷ that there were ten Americans residing in the Temple of Yokushen near "Simoda", five men, three ladies, and two children. He called them "my countrymen colonizing Japan," and advised that there should be some American authority in Hakodate since the American whalers were riotous on shore and were a source of potential trouble, as well as that a consul in Shimoda was necessary since it was unfair that an American be treated as a merchant in the Japanese sense of caste. Rodgers said that the provision of the treaty that we be permitted to exchange articles or goods was forbidden.

²⁴Allen B. Cole, editor, Yankee Surveyors In The Shogun's Seas. Records of the United States surveying expedition to the North Pacific Ocean, 1853-1856 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 5-9.

²⁵Ibid., p. 16.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 16-17; Hawks, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, etc., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 453.

²⁷Cole, ibid., p. 57.

"No Japanese merchant can get permission to exchange goods, and no one dare do it without permission. No trade in Japan can flourish except by the acquiescence of the government."²⁸

American objectives had not been secured by the Perry treaty. It had been only a beginning, and in order to secure the coveted trade with Japan the United States had to secure a commercial treaty and fair treatment for traders as well as shipwrecked sailors. Thus, in accordance with the terms of Perry's treaty, the United States government determined to send a consul to reside at Shimoda. He was not only to concern himself with the protection of American citizens who might frequent that port, but he was also to endeavor to secure an audience with the Shogun, and, if possible, convince the officials of the wisdom of further enlarging the commercial intercourse between the two

²⁹nations. When it was determined to appoint a consul for Japan, Townsend Harris was selected upon a joint recommendation of Commodore Perry and Senator William H. Seward.³⁰

The man selected by the United States government to complete the opening of Japan was one who until recently was practically unknown

²⁸Ibid., p. 60.

²⁹Six instructions were given to Harris in September-October, 1855. The most important of these are quoted in Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1653-1895, op. cit., pp. 36-41.

³⁰Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, p. 816. For complete details of the Harris appointment, see: Mario Emilio Cosenza, introduction and notes by, The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, First American Consul General and Minister to Japan (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1930), pp. 1-16.

to his countrymen.³¹ Townsend Harris was derived from Welsh stock, which crossed the Atlantic with Roger Williams and settled first of all in Massachusetts. He was born in 1804 in Sandy Hill, New York, and was the youngest of five boys. His education, except for the very competent instruction of his mother, was limited to that provided by the primary school and academy. His grandmother taught him "to tell the truth, fear God, and hate the British," and all three things he did all his life.³²

When but thirteen years old, in 1817, he was taken by his father to New York to begin his business career in a dry-goods store. He later joined his father and brother in the business of importing china and earthenware. His brother, John, was the real businessman of the family however. As Dr. Griffis says, "trade was not the law of Townsend Harris's life, but its necessity only, and the chosen means to a higher end,"³³ yet his business career proved an excellent apprenticeship for the years of diplomatic bargaining which were to

³¹The primary sources for the life and diplomatic work of Townsend Harris available in most libraries are: Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, and 1879; Cosenza, The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, ibid.; William E. Griffis, Townsend Harris, First American Envoy In Japan (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895); Shio Sakanishi, editor, Some Unpublished Letters of Townsend Harris (New York: Japan Reference Library, 1941).

³²Griffis, Ibid., p. 4.

³³Ibid., p. 5.

came. At the same time, his fondness for the languages and literature of France, Spain and Italy had a broadening influence which lifted him above the lower interests of a merchant's life.

Regretting his own lack of an adequate education, Mr. Harris was from the first interested in the public school system. An active member of Tammany, he used his political influence to gain a position on the Board of Education of the city of New York, and in 1846 and 1847 was its president. He used his office to push through his pet project, which was the establishment of a free academy for the youth of New York. He thus became the creator of what is now known as the College of the City of New York.

His desolation at the death of his mother and a depression in the family business³⁴ seem to have turned his stay-at-home existence into a kind of restless wanderlust. In 1849 he left New York for California and the Orient. On arriving in San Francisco he started a sea cruise which was to last for six years. In his Journal for Christmas Day 1856, Harris notes that he had spent the Christmas of 1849 in the North Pacific Ocean, that of 1850 at Manila, that of 1851 at Fulo Penang, that of 1852 at Singapore, that of 1853 at Hongkong, that of 1854 at Calcutta, and that of 1855 in Ceylon.³⁵ With his thirty years of experience in commerce in New York and six years of actual contact with the peoples and problems of the Far East, he seems

³⁴ For details of Harris' failure as a businessman, see: Carl Crow, He Opened The Door Of Japan (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1939), pp. 14-17.

³⁵ Cosenza, op. cit., p. 293 (Entry of Thursday, Dec. 25, 1856).

almost the ideal person to complete the work which Perry had commenced in Japan.³⁶

While in China Harris showed some tendency toward a policy which would have agreed with that of Perry by advocating in a letter to Secretary of State Marcy the purchase of Formosa.³⁷ He felt that the island would be important to the United States as a coaling-station and depot, and for political and commercial advantages. He did not advise gaining this territory by conquest, but rather by the characteristic American method of purchase.

Harris was, however, not an experienced diplomat; nor did he have the legal training which would have been of help to him in the negotiations and especially in the writing of the texts of conventions and treaties. Had his skill in framing the agreement been equal to the integrity of his purpose, the Japanese may have been spared one of the great faults of the commercial treaty which Harris negotiated—the conventional tariff.

³⁶Cosenza, *ibid.*, pp. 6-7, says:

This commercial wandering from place to place gave Townsend Harris the ideal training and preparation for his later diplomatic intercourse with the Japanese. It helped remove that feeling of shock or of puzzled attitude which takes hold of so many men when suddenly brought face to face with a different civilization and with strange manners and customs. It taught Harris to be tolerant and sympathetic, and, above all, to be patient—for patience has ever been the supreme and special prerequisite for all successful intercourse with the peoples of the East. Finally, it gave him a knowledge of the life and the mind of the Oriental that even an extended course of reading of selected books could scarcely have given him.

³⁷Griffis, *Townsend Harris, First American Envoy In Japan*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

During the summer of 1853 when Perry's squadron was in Shanghai, Harris asked the Commodore in vain for permission to accompany him to Japan.³⁸ This refusal did not discourage Townsend Harris. At about the same time (the spring of 1853), he applied for the position of American Consul at either Hongkong or Canton, describing himself as a resident of Hongkong.³⁹ Instead of either of these posts he was assigned to the consulate at Ningpo (August 2, 1854), an unimportant and trivial post. Instead of proceeding to this post he set sail for the United States on May 21, 1855, after having appointed the Rev. Dr. Daniel Jerome Macgowan his Vice-Consul for Ningpo.⁴⁰ In the meantime Townsend Harris' friends were exerting themselves in his behalf. In the United States he received the active assistance of the Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, Senator William H. Seward, and General Prosper M. Wetmore, and in the Orient of Sandwich Drinker of Macao and

³⁸In a letter from Mr. S. Robertson, written on June 13, 1859 to congratulate Harris on his success in Siam and Japan, there appears this interesting paragraph:

I often smile to myself when I recollect how anxious you were at Shanghai to accompany Commodore Perry on his first visit to Japan, and your annoyance at his refusal. The "G" little thought at the time, that he was then refusing a man who would accomplish greater achievements and acquire more renown in Japan (than Commodore Perry himself) while he would at the same time throw additional lustre on the name of Perry. But so wags the world. (Letters and Papers of Townsend Harris, Vol. I, No. 175, quoted in Cosenza, op. cit., p. 2.)

³⁹Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 348.

⁴⁰Ningpo Consular Letters, Vol. I, June 22, 1855, Macgowan to Marcy, cited by Dennett, loc. cit.

other friends.⁴¹

Upon his arrival in Washington, Harris wrote to President Pierce (August 4, 1855): "I have told your Excellency that I have long had a strong desire to visit Japan; and so deep has this feeling become that, if I was offered the choice between Commissioner to China or Consul to Japan, I should instantly take the latter. I have a perfect knowledge of the social banishment I must endure while in Japan, and the mental isolation in which I must live, and am prepared to meet it."⁴² As it happened, earlier that day the President had confirmed Harris' appointment as the first Consul General to Japan.⁴³

To the duties of the American representative to Japan were added those of special agent to secure a new treaty with Siam which was to be negotiated en route to Shimoda. Harris left New York on October 17, 1855 and proceeded to Penang where he waited for the arrival of the steam frigate San Jacinto, which bore his interpreter, Henry G. J. Hausken of New York. Reaching Bangkok on April 15, 1856, Harris succeeded in signing the new treaty with Siam based on the British treaty of 1855.⁴⁴ Although American relations with Siam did

⁴¹For a complete account of the pressure exerted by influential friends of Harris, see: Cosenza, op. cit., pp. 5-15.

⁴²Files of the Bureau of Appointments, Washington, D.C., quoted by Cosenza, ibid., p. 9.

⁴³Cosenza, ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁴These treaties included a clear statement of extraterritoriality, the free importation of opium but regulations as to its sale, open trade at all ports but residence only at Bangkok, freedom of religion and the right to build places of worship, and low import and export duties.

not become important, the negotiations gave Harris some experience in treaty-making.

Perhaps the most important qualification for any man selected to win from the Japanese commercial privileges would be an ability to understand the point of view and procedure of the Japanese. Harris approached the situation with a sympathetic mind and a desire to develop mutual understanding and friendship. After his first interview with the local officials he recorded in his journal: "We were all much pleased with the appearance and manners of the Japanese. I repeat that they are superior to any people east of the Cape of Good Hope."⁴⁵ His experience in the Orient was helpful; moreover, he was anxious to help the Japanese. On first sighting the Japanese islands, he thus recorded his impressions: "I shall be the first recognized agent from a civilized power to reside in Japan. This forms an epoch in my life, and may be the beginning of a new order of things in Japan. I hope I may so conduct myself that I may have honorable mention in the histories which will be written on Japan and its future destiny."⁴⁶

The San Jacinto arrived at Shimoda August 21, 1856.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁵ Cosenza, op. cit., p. 208 (Entry of Monday, August 25, 1856).

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 196 (Entry of Tuesday, August 19, 1856).

⁴⁷ The Japanese chronicle of this momentous event says very simply: "During the same (7th) month an American named Harris arrived at Shimoda in Idzu, bearing a letter. He stated that he was entrusted by his nation with full powers, and that he was instructed to reside in Japan. He also requested leave to present his credentials to the Shogun." (E. M. Satow, translator, Kinse Shiraku: A History of Japan from the First Visit of Commodore Perry in 1853 to the Capture of Hakodate by the Mikado's Forces in 1869 [Tokyo: Nalgwai Shuppan Nyokwai, 1906], p. 6.)

consul was not welcome. The Japanese officials urged him to leave and stalled off his landing permanently until September 3. They protested on the grounds that the eleventh article of the Treaty of Kanagawa provided that "a consul was to come if both nations wished it"; the American version read "if either nation wished it." Despite continuous delays Mr. Harris began residence at the temple of Gioku-shen, Kakigaki, and on September 4 hoisted the first American consular flag displayed in Japan.⁴⁸ The San Jacinto then sailed away and left him—to be unvisited by any naval vessel for fourteen months and without communication from the Department of State for eighteen months.⁴⁹

The isolation to which Harris alluded in his letter to Pierce requesting the post in Japan was thus anything but an exaggeration of fact. He was not only neglected by his own government, but also regarded with natural suspicion by the Japanese. Harris did not bear all this with the angelic patience which has been sometimes ascribed to him. The Japanese accounts make not infrequent reference to his

⁴⁸ Griffis, Townsend Harris, First American Envoy in Japan, op. cit., pp. 18, 19, 42, gives details of Harris' difficulties with the officials; Harris' Journal as printed in Griffis, pp. 44-51, describes the setting up of the first consular office. See also: Cosenza, op. cit., pp. 199-226.

⁴⁹ It looked very much as though the State Department, after taking strong measures to have a representative in Japan, had completely overlooked the fact that one had been sent. In his Journal for May 5, 1857, Harris wrote: "I have not a word from Washington since I left the United States, say October 1855. What can be the cause of this prolonged absence of an American man-of-war? I am only nine days from Hongkong, yet I am more isolated than any American official in any part of the world." (Cosenza, ibid., p. 357)

As Dennett, op. cit., p. 353, says: "No representative of the American Government was ever left more to his own devices."

nervousness and quickness of temper. It is evident though that the loneliness was difficult to bear.⁵⁰

But Harris stayed, though he must often have regretted it in moments of complete loneliness. His purpose was to extend the scope of the treaty of 1854 to include commerce and he carried a letter from the President that he intended to present to the Shogun in person. For some months, as one can tell by his diary, he encountered obstruction and made little progress. His official notes were left unanswered because (he was told) "it is not customary to reply to the letters of foreigners." He was surrounded by spies who tried to restrain his movements. By slow degrees he brought the authorities to comprehend and respect his rights as a foreign representative, and it is interesting to note that on September 11, 1857, he could write:

I am happy to state that my relations with the Japanese authorities are of the most agreeable kind. By pursuing a mild, yet firm course, I have broken down, one after another, a great number of absurd regulations calculated to restrain my liberty, yet in so doing I have not in any case caused unpleasant feelings. . . . I have never been molested or annoyed in any way by the people, and although my house has more than twenty doors, not one of which has either lock, bolt, or bar, I have not been

⁵⁰ Writing to his friend, Mrs. Sandwich Drinker, on July 16, 1858, Harris said: "You cannot conceive the mental isolation of a solitary being like me; nor, can you imagine the void that is created in my soul, by the want of some object to protect and love, and be loved by in return. This feeling, the source and support of the noblest actions, have become in me, 'a mighty hunger of the heart'; an unquenchable longing, that never can be satisfied; a Canker that corrodes all the pleasures that flow from worldly success and honors. The fatal sound of, 'You are alone, you are alone!' never ceases to strike on my heart." (Sakanishi, Some Unpublished Letters of Townsend Harris, op. cit., Letter No. 3)

robbed of the most trifling article in a year's residence here.⁵¹

By June 17, 1857, Harris had succeeded in gaining the confidence and good will of the Japanese to the extent of being able to sign a convention in which the Japanese conceded directly by treaty what had by inference accrued to the Americans in the British, Russian and Dutch conventions. This treaty also tended to remedy certain defects in the existing treaty. The Japanese had denied the Americans the right to reside in the treaty ports. They had also fixed, under the terms of the Perry treaty, a very inadequate value on American coins. Citizens of the United States had to exchange one Mexican dollar for one ichibu⁵² which was really worth only thirty-four cents.

This Convention "for the purpose of further regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the Empire of Japan"⁵³ opened the port of Nagasaki for supplies, permitted Americans to reside at Shimoda and Hakodate, provided for the exchange of coins by weight, and granted extraterritoriality to the Americans. The convention also permitted the direct purchase of goods for the consul's use without immediate government supervision and greatly enlarged the personal freedom of Harris by admitting his right to travel beyond the limits

⁵¹ Despatch No. 15 (Dept. of State) cited by Cosenza, op. cit., p. 392.

⁵² One bu; a bu being a certain weight of silver or gold, not a coin.

⁵³ W. H. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers (61st Congress, 4th session, Senate Document No. 357), Vol. I, pp. 998-1000.

of seven ri⁵⁴ set in the Perry treaty.

Although the convention much improved the status of Americans in Japan, Harris realized that he had made only a beginning. He wrote:

Am I elated by this success? Not a whit. I know my dear countrymen but too well to expect any praise for what I have done, and I shall esteem myself lucky if I am not removed from office; not for what I have done, but because I have not made a commercial treaty that would open Japan as freely as England is open to us.⁵⁵

There still remained two important missions to perform. One was to present his credentials at Yedo, and the other was to secure, if at all possible, a real commercial treaty.

He therefore requested an interview with the Shogun in order to present a letter from the President of the United States and to make certain communications. On September 22, Harris was informed that he would be escorted to Yedo in a most honorable manner, there to have an audience with the Shogun. The significance of the step which Harris took in leaving Shimoda and visiting the Yedo court is best shown in the official notifications of the time. One of these addressed to officials read:

The present audience of the American Ambassador will be a precedent for all foreign countries, and must, therefore, be attended to with the greatest care. As intercourse with foreign countries necessitates the repeal of old regulations and restrictions, the matter is attended with difficulty, and the possible evils cannot be foreseen; you must therefore neglect

⁵⁴One Japanese ri is equivalent roughly to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

⁵⁵Cosenza, The Complete Journal Of Townsend Harris, op. cit., p. 374 (Entry of Monday, June 8, 1857)

nothing, but attend to all things with the greatest care, as the Tycoon's orders require.⁵⁶

Two months were occupied in preparing for the visit, and on November 23, Harris, accompanied by a party of about three hundred and fifty, set out.⁵⁷ The trip itself was a continuous pageant in which Harris himself played the leading role. The authorities of the various districts greeted him by "knocking heads", a ceremony performed by those of certain high ranks to their superiors. To Harris such ceremonies were "utterly repugnant to any Republican principles" but he realized that the ultimate success of his mission might depend upon the state and ceremony observed on the journey.⁵⁸

Therefore, he refused to eat unless joined by some member of the royal family or the Prime Minister, and when he was received by the Shogun on December 7 he stood erect and bowed three times, while princes and members of the Great Council were prostrate on their faces. In this respect the Japanese were far wiser and more considerate than the Chinese. The latter had insisted upon the kowtow, but the Japanese held that only the forms of respect customary in the West would be expected.

The friendly reception in Yedo encouraged Harris to proceed to

⁵⁶ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1879, p. 622 (translated from Japanese sources).

⁵⁷ Interesting details of Harris' visit to Yedo are to be found in: Ibid., pp. 621 ff.; Cosenza, op. cit., pp. 411-558; Sakanishi, Some Unpublished Letters of Townsend Harris, op. cit., Letters No. 2 and 3.

⁵⁸ Sakanishi, op. cit., Letter No. 2.

the real object of his mission, the negotiation of an adequate treaty of commerce. His instructions as to the terms of such a treaty were vague. The draft treaty with Siam had been considered satisfactory by Secretary of State Marcy for a treaty with Japan--"at least for a beginning." He was thus to induce Japan to allow a resident minister at the capital and consuls at the open ports, free their commerce from government restriction, and set import and export duties. Although Harris was to secure missionaries the right to pursue their work unmolested in Siam, he was cautioned that in Japan the prejudice against missionaries would probably prevent any such liberty. In addition to the written instructions Marcy appears to have given some oral ones, including the necessity for securing extraterritoriality. Marcy said such a stipulation was necessary for the Senate would not ratify a treaty in which it was lacking.⁵⁹ Extraterritoriality had in fact been gained through the "most-favored-nation" clause and the Convention of 1857.

The first move in the direction of obtaining the commercial treaty was taken when on December 12 Harris visited Lord Hotta.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ In a letter written years later Harris stated: "The provision of the treaty giving the right of extraterritoriality to all Americans in Japan was against my conscience. In a conversation with Governor Marcy, the Secretary of State in 1855, he strongly condemned it as an unjust interference with the municipal law of a country which no western nation would tolerate for a moment; but he said that it would be impossible to have a treaty with an Oriental nation unless it contained that provision." (A letter quoted by E.H. House, "The Martyrdom of an Empire," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1881, 47:622).

⁶⁰ The details of this visit are summarized in *Cosenza*, *op. cit.*, pp. 484-487. A fuller account is in *Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1879*, pp. 627 ff.

The object which Harris had in view was to impress the Japanese with the wisdom of voluntarily abandoning the remaining features of the exclusion system and coming into full intercourse with the world at large. Fortunately, he was dealing with one of the most enlightened of the Shogun's officials. He argued that intercourse with the United States should consist of free commerce and diplomatic representation, emphasizing that the United States government was prohibited from acquiring possessions in Asia.⁶¹ He warned Japan that Britain and France wanted Formosa and Korea and might well divide China, explaining that England feared Russia and wanted Japan to be her buffer for the East Indian possessions. He outlined the advantages of making a treaty with an individual rather than a man backed by naval force. He offered the services of American military and naval officers to help Japan strengthen her defenses, and intimated that the United States might be willing to act as mediator in any conflicts between Japan and the western powers. In conclusion, Harris argued that Japan's best safeguard against threatened aggression was to abandon seclusion and admit all nations freely to her trade, thus making the rivalries of the Western world her ally in an effort to preserve her integrity.

It can be seen that Harris based his arguments on fear rather than the benefits of world commerce. But instead of making threats in the name of the United States he used England and France as ogres. In making these assertions, he was doubtless correctly reflecting

⁶¹ Harris probably remembered the failure of the United States to act on his proposal regarding Formosa and the refusal to admit the Sandwich Islands in 1854.

current public opinion and was strengthened by his own Anglophobia.

A few days after this interview Harris recorded in his journal: "I may be said to be now engaged in teaching the elements of political economy to the Japanese and in giving them information as to the working of commercial regulations in the West."⁶² His experience as a merchant was now to be put to use, for there were no libraries to consult and the language difficulty was great; for example, "the axiom that 'demand and supply regulate each other' took some days to be understood by them, for it brought up the whole principle of entire freedom of action among the producing classes of a country. Now, nothing could possibly be more directly opposed to Japanese ideas and customs than this very freedom of action."⁶³

At Harris' hotel the commissioners of foreign affairs inquired concerning the ceremonials and needs of a resident minister, his rights, duties and rank, and in what respect he differed from a consul. When Harris replied that all these things were regulated by "the law of nations," the commissioners curiously asked, "What is the law of nations?" Numerous questions were also put as to foreign trade practices, the principles of tariff and custom administration, and the procedure of treaty negotiations. The commissioners confessed that they were in the dark and as "children" in regard to these points.

⁶²Cosenza, *op. cit.*, p. 490. (Entry of Thursday, December 17, 1857)

⁶³Letters of Townsend Harris of July 3 and 6, 1858, reprinted from the Washington Union, in "Consul Harris in Japan," Littell's Living Age, February 26, 1859, 60, 567.

which he then explained to their satisfaction.⁶⁴

Thus, by kind advice seasoned with polite menace, Harris gained the confidence of the Shogun's government and finally induced it to enter into treaty negotiations on January 18, 1858.⁶⁵ For a month the negotiations proceeded, twenty sessions were held, and point after point was argued exhaustively. Many of these points, such as the number of open ports, became a matter of compromise by Harris. At other times his advice was modified. He showed the Japanese how government revenues might be met in part or even in whole by tariffs on foreign trade, warning them against the evils of export duties and holding up the advantages of a relatively high tariff. They preferred a flat 12½ per cent on both imports and exports, but Harris, to whom the Japanese had entrusted the duty of devising the tariff, induced them to agree to a schedule more advantageous to American ships desiring supplies. On the two major points in a commercial treaty—unrestricted trade and a Resident Minister—he yielded not at all.

Finally, when the treaty was ready for signature, the protests of hostile daimyo caused a delay until the approval of the Emperor at Kyoto might be obtained. The Shogun's representatives felt this could easily be secured, especially since the government had

⁶⁴Cosenza, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-492. A full and detailed account can be found in Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1879, pp. 631-634.

⁶⁵Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1879, pp. 635-636.

determined not to receive any objections from the Mikado.⁶⁶ Harris agreed to a sixty day postponement and on March 10 returned to Shimoda.

The treaty thus completed but not yet signed became the basis of Japan's foreign relations until 1894. It consisted of fourteen articles and seven trade regulations.⁶⁷

The first article of the treaty of amity and commerce provided for the reciprocal right of residence of a diplomatic agent at each capital and of consuls or consular agents at the open ports of Japan and at any or all of the ports of the United States. Such privileges the Japanese government did not readily grant to the United States. Mr. Harris stated in his diary: "I had at one time serious (fears) that the whole treaty might be wrecked on this point. They went over the ground of objections, the claims of the daimyo to exclusive jurisdiction in their own principalities, then furious objections to any infringements of their ancient rights, and the certainty that serious difficulties would arise from the clause."⁶⁸

Article II stated that "the President of the United States, at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly mediator in such matters of difference as may arise between the Government of Japan and any European Power," and it also promised the friendly aid

⁶⁶ Cosenza, op. cit., p. 539 (Entry of Wednesday, February 17, 1858)

⁶⁷ For the complete text of the Treaty of 1858, see Appendix B.

⁶⁸ Cosenza, op. cit., p. 547 (Entry of Friday, February 19, 1858).

of American ships of war and consuls to Japanese vessels on the high seas or in foreign ports. Similarly, Article X permitted the Japanese to "purchase or construct in the United States ships of war, steamers, merchant ships, whale ships, cannon, munitions of war, arms of all kinds" and to engage "scientific, naval, and military men, artisans of all kinds and mariners to enter its service." These articles were expected to win the approval of the daimyo opposed. They went far in the direction of political alliance.

Article III, which caused the greatest difficulty in negotiating, opened, in addition to Hakodate, the ports of Kanagawa and Nagasaki from July 4, 1859; Niigata from January 1, 1860; and Hiogo from January 1, 1863. In these ports the right to lease land and erect buildings was granted. It was also provided that after January 1, 1862, Americans might reside in Yedo and after the first of the next year in Osaka. This article also provided for open trade without the intervention of Japanese officers, with the exceptions that munitions of war should be sold only to the Japanese government and foreigners, that no rice or wheat should be exported as cargo, and that the government would sell at auction any surplus copper. ~~This was Japan opened to trade in a~~ protected manner.

Other articles granted the United States the right to land naval stores without duty; forbade the importation of opium; permitted the circulation of foreign coins in Japan, weight for weight, and the right to export coins; defined American extraterritorial rights; granted to Americans the free exercise of their religion and the right to build houses of worship. Apparently as a concession to Japanese fear of

missionaries, the article granting religious freedom to Americans also stipulated that neither Americans nor Japanese were "to do anything that may be calculated to excite religious animosity."

Article XIII stated:

After the 4th of July, 1872, upon the desire of either the American or the Japanese governments, and on one year's notice given by either party, this Treaty, and such portions of the Treaty of Kanagawa as remain unrevoked by this Treaty, together with the regulations of trade hereunto annexed, or those that may be hereafter introduced, shall be subject to revision by commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who will be empowered to decide on, and insert therein, such amendments as experience shall prove to be desirable.

Thus the tariff was a "conventional" one, that is a part of the treaty in such a way that its revision became a revision of the treaty itself. As a means of further cementing the good relations between the two nations, Article XIV fixed July 4, 1859 as the date when the treaty should go into force, and designated Washington as the place where the ratifications should be exchanged.

Accompanying the treaty were the regulations under which American trade was to be conducted in Japan. The regulations were more liberal than before and tarrage duties given up. As to tariffs, Harris had persuaded the Japanese to accept a sliding scale. On exports a five per cent duty would be levied. The tariff on imports was levied on goods in four classes. Class 1, which included gold and silver, coined and uncoined, wearing apparel in actual use, household furniture and printed books not intended for sale, and the property of persons coming to reside in Japan, was free of duty. Class 2, consisting of food-stuffs, ship's articles, certain metals, and timber for building houses, paid five per cent. Class 3, including all intoxicating

liquors, was subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent; whereas a duty of twenty per cent was fixed for the class 4, which included all other goods not mentioned in the three preceding classes.

In this manner the import duties were greatly reduced on the articles which interested American traders, while British manufactures were taxed at twenty per cent and French wines at thirty-five per cent to provide the bulk of revenue for the Japanese government. Harris reported to Secretary Cass on August 7, 1858: "I have drawn regulations with a view to the protection of the revenue, and the tariff is arranged with a view first to secure an income to the Japanese Government, and second to enable our whaling ships in the North Pacific Ocean to obtain their supplies on reasonable terms."⁶⁹

The significance of the Harris treaty lay in the new concessions granted by the Shogunate, and in the codification of certain articles found in the earlier treaties. Important new features were the right of residence of a minister in Yedo; the opening of new ports and cities; the right to lease land and erect buildings; the provision for free commerce; the establishment of a regular tariff; and, to the Japanese, the American promise of mediation and assistance. The extra-territorial article, the ban upon opium, and the free exercise of religion had been conceded by earlier agreements.

Free commercial intercourse between the United States and Japan had thus been obtained by means of peaceful diplomacy. Harris had

⁶⁹Japan Despatches, Vol. I, August 7, 1858 (Dept. of State), quoted by Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 359.

negotiated without the benefit of "Black Ships." Arguments intended to play upon the fears of the Japanese regarding the intent of other European powers were the only hint of force in the negotiations.

"There was no American man-of-war within one thousand miles of me for months before and after the negotiations. I told the Japanese at the outset that my mission was a friendly one; that I was not authorized to use any threats; that all I wished was that they would listen to the truths that I would lay before them."⁷⁰ Yet, in the background, there was fear of Russia, France and England whose records in the East gave force to Harris' argument.

The treaty was in intent and provisions more just to Japan than existing treaties with China. Yet some of the articles proved to be most disadvantageous to Japan. Harris received great censure for inserting the extraterritorial clause in this treaty. However, it was already to be found in the first Russian and Dutch treaties and the Harris convention of 1857. Moreover, Harris had been instructed that such a clause was necessary to obtain Senate ratification. More than once Harris confessed that the article was against his conscience and sense of justice.⁷¹

Harris probably did not foresee that the right to export gold and silver coin might work to the detriment of the Japanese, nor that the conventional tariff would bind Japan to a treaty-made tariff until

⁷⁰ A letter of Townsend Harris reprinted in "Consul Harris in Japan," Littell's Living Age, op. cit., p. 572.

⁷¹ House, "The Martyrdom of an Empire," Atlantic Monthly, op. cit., p. 622.

the revision of 1894. It would also have been better had the treaty expired in 1872, rather than being open to revision. His intention was that after the Japanese had gained experience in foreign affairs, they should take up the matter again.⁷² But the Japanese were to be disillusioned in 1872 when they found that revision could come only with the consent of all the treaty powers; and it actually was not accomplished until 1894. This last mistake might not have been made by a man more skilled in the language of diplomacy.

Despite these errors of judgment the Japanese have been grateful to Townsend Harris for introducing them to world intercourse in an honorable manner. When, four years later, the Japanese government learned that he was to return to the United States, they expressed marked appreciation for what he had contributed to the welfare of Japan in an official communication to Secretary Seward, which read in part as follows:

He has a perfect knowledge of the state of affairs in our empire, and he has always been friendly, and made suitable arrangements without cold feeling. By so doing, our friendly relations, not only with your empire, but also with the other treaty powers, have been drawn more closely; this, in fact is to be attributed to the efforts and exertion of Mr. Harris, for which we are most grateful. . . . Mr. Harris has been instructed

⁷²In a letter written to E. H. House by Harris, he said: ". . . I constantly told the Japanese commissioners that before the time came around for revising the treaties they would have gained such experience as would enable them intelligently to deal with the matter (of tariffs) themselves; remarking that, while 10 years was an important part of a man's life, it was as nothing in the life of a nation. . . ." (House, *ibid.*, p. 614).

to return, which we consider as a necessity to be regretted; and it is desirable that he may come back here.⁷³

The treaty was not signed in April, as had been anticipated. The first envoys of the Shogun to the Emperor, in February, to seek the Imperial approval failed completely. The next month Lord Hotta himself went to Kyoto but the Imperial court was overshadowed by the anti-Fukugawa party and, in order to embarrass the Shogunate, the approval was withheld. Meanwhile the Dutch stood ready to sign a less objectionable treaty. To thwart the Dutch and save his own treaty, Harris secured a written agreement that the Japanese would not sign any other treaty until thirty days after his own was signed.⁷⁴

Two conditions combined to bring about the actual signing of the treaty. On June 23 and 24, 1858, the U.S.S. Mississippi and Powhatan arrived at Shimoda with the news of the Western victory in China and the signing of the treaties of Pientsin. The Japanese officials were concerned and a special meeting of the higher officials was called in which a majority favored immediate signing of the treaty. The arguments of Harris had obviously impressed the Shogun's officials. Lord Ii, the Regent, felt that the Imperial approval should be obtained, but he yielded to the wishes of the majority of his colleagues and took upon himself the responsibility for concluding

⁷³Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, p. 812.

⁷⁴Cosenza, The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, op. cit., p. 561 (Entry of Wednesday, June 8, 1858).

the treaty.⁷⁵ The treaty was signed on board the Foghaten July 29, 1858. It did not have the approval of the Emperor and this was to precipitate much domestic trouble.

Four other treaties followed: with the Netherlands, August 18; with Russia, August 19; with Great Britain, August 26; and with France, October 7.

Townsend Harris had been sent to Japan to secure a commercial treaty with that nation. By 1858 he had obtained this objective. Not only could United States citizens trade and reside in Japan, they could also trade under favorable conditions at a larger number of ports and be protected by extraterritoriality from "Oriental justice." President Buchanan said in his annual message, dated December 6th, 1858, with respect to the treaty of 1858: "I am happy to announce that through the energetic yet conciliatory efforts of our consul general in Japan a new treaty has been concluded with that Empire, which may be expected materially to augment our trade and intercourse in that quarter and remove from our countrymen the disabilities which have heretofore been imposed upon the exercise of their religion. The treaty shall be submitted to the Senate for approval without delay."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ For a good Japanese account of the decision to sign the treaty, see: Adamoto, Lord Ii Naosuke And New Japan, op. cit., pp. 143-161.

⁷⁶ James D. Richardson, A Compilation Of The Messages And Papers Of The Presidents (11 vols, New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1910), Vol. IV, p. 3037.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN 1858-1869

THE COOPERATIVE POLICY

The period from the signing of the treaties of 1858 to the recognition of the new Imperial government by the foreign powers in 1869 saw the completion of those precedents which the United States followed toward Japan for the rest of the nineteenth century. This phase of American-Japanese relations was marked by efforts to retain the rights won in the preceding years in the face of anti-foreignism and civil war in Japan. It is also the period when policy was directed by Secretary of State Seward, who endeavoured by means of what is known as the "cooperative policy" to maintain equal opportunity for the United States in a decade of civil strife at home and rising British influence in the Orient. His withdrawal from the State Department marked the end of active cooperation with the other treaty powers—a policy to which John Hay returned, in a modified form, in 1899.

The objective remained the same—equal commercial opportunity—but was more difficult to obtain by unilateral action. American cooperation led the United States into a more aggressive policy than she had used before in Asia. Even though Americans participated in action which interfered with the integrity of the Japanese government

and agreed to a tariff revision in 1866 which was detrimental to Japan, they continued to give aid to the Japanese government in an effort to preserve its administrative and territorial integrity. Twice the United States used force in an effort to strengthen the Tokugawa government. American representatives in Japan endeavoured to make more moderate the demands of the other treaty powers, and Japan was able to emerge almost unscathed from a period of weakness and disorder.

The signing of the treaty of 1858 greatly increased the complaints against the Tokugawa shogunate by its enemies. Spurred on by the threat of foreign aggression and largely in an effort to further embarrass the Shogunate, those in opposition to the government linked the slogan Son-no (Revere the Emperor) to the cry Jo-i (Expel the Barbarian). Jo-i was an effective slogan strategically, since it provided a legal cloak to the openly rebellious anti-Bakufu movement and at the same time inspired incidents which entangled the Bakufu with foreign powers.

The treaty had been signed without the consent of the Emperor; and he had been asked to give that consent. During the next ten years foreign affairs were retired to a secondary place in Japanese public interest, and yet they were so entangled in the domestic struggle to end the rule of the Tokugawa that the foreigner was faced with possible assassination in addition to the demands for his expulsion. The Shogunate was openly committed to one policy, the court to another, and opinion throughout the country was bitter and divided. A clash

was inevitable.¹

To add to the general Japanese opposition, based on the violation of the ancient traditions of the land and the disobedience of the Imperial will, were added certain immediate evils of foreign intercourse. In the first place, such was the demand for export articles that their prices rose from one hundred to three hundred per cent, and this rise in turn affected other commodities.² The rise in prices was especially felt by the poor and by those on fixed salaries such as the samurai, many of whom already desired the return of the Emperor to power. Moreover, many of the new merchants had just come over from China and they conducted themselves in a manner not pleasing to the Japanese. Mr. Harris reported on the conduct of the foreigners that:

unfortunately, a portion of them are neither prudent nor discreet, and they are numerous enough to imperil the safety of the orderly and well-disposed, and seriously endanger the amicable relations that have been established with so much difficulty and labor with this government.³

Thus, the Shogun's government faced on the one hand the foreigners, who insisted that the treaties be lived up to in spirit and in letter, and on the other they faced the rising power of the court, which demanded that the old law of exclusion be enforced. They could not control the bands of restless ronin who not only attacked the foreigner but also the officers of the Tokugawa government. Lord Ii

¹George B. Sanson, The Western World And Japan, op. cit., p. 297.

²Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, p. 795.

³Ibid., p. 793.

himself was assassinated on March 24, 1860. The assassins were samurai of the Mito clan, one of the leaders in the anti-Bakufu movement, but before the attack they dissolved their clan connection and became ronin. Their reason for the attack was that It had allowed the foreigners to come into Japan, thus sacrificing national honor. He had not only set aside national custom and injured national dignity, but the policy followed had no Imperial sanction.⁴ After the death of this minister the power of the Shogunate rapidly declined.

In this situation where the cry of anti-foreignism was combined with the hatred of rival clans for the Tokugawa and the demand of classical students to a return of the Emperor to power, not only the lives of the foreigners but the treaties themselves were placed in jeopardy.

The foreign representatives were unable to fathom the mysteries of the political situation and could not, for several years, understand the hidden forces which were working against the maintenance of the treaties. From their point of view the treaties had been concluded with the proper authorities. They could not see the rising influence of the Emperor,⁵ and it was not until 1863 that the American Minister,

⁴ Saburo Shimada, "Japan's Introduction To The Comity of Nations," in Okuma, Fifty Years Of New Japan, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 82-83.

⁵ Of the relations between the Emperor and the Shogun, it has been said that:

A long time ago, Townsend Harris, the first consular representative in Japan of the United States, said, in effect, that nothing taxed his brain so much as the Mikado of Dai Nippon."
(Naotchi Masaoaka, editor and compiler, Japan's Message To America, [Tokyo: 1914], p. 250)

Mr. Pruyn, was able to point out the absolute necessity of securing the Emperor's approval of the treaties.

Although the signing of the Treaty of 1858 gave additional impetus to the already declining power of the Tokugawa, it was probably wise that the Shogunate had determined to sign with or without the Emperor's approval. The European powers were now free to turn to Japan. Within a few weeks after the signing of the Harris treaty the representatives of Russia and Great Britain arrived from China, to be followed a little later by the envoy of France. From Nagasaki came the Dutch agent, also seeking a new treaty. So four treaties were promptly completed, all based upon Harris' draft. Lord Elgin, in the British treaty, fixed the date of operation at July 1, instead of July 4, 1859, and secured the listing of cotton and woolen manufactured goods in the five per cent duty class. This was the first modification in the tariff, and, although enjoyed by all powers, worked to the advantage of British manufacturers.⁶

British policy became more and more active during this period, and by 1866 the United States had yielded to England its position of priority in Japan.⁷ This lessening of American influence was largely due to conditions in the United States. Like Japan itself, the

⁶ It is not entirely fair to place the blame for reducing the tariff on Great Britain as Payson J. Treat does in his Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865, op. cit., p. 117. Harris had been equally diligent to secure tariff rates advantageous to American interests. (cf. ante, p. 83).

⁷ Tyler Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 392.

United States was rapidly moving toward civil war. Throughout the war the primary necessity of the Union government's foreign policy was to keep the European states neutral; that is, to prevent their giving aid to the Confederacy. Trade and influence in the Orient became a subsidiary consideration, while on the side of the European powers it increased.

The United States, looking to the future, could not allow the concessions gained by Perry and Harris to be lost. Because of the domestic situation in Japan the treaties were in danger, and yet the United States did not have the power to resort to force. Moreover, in the situation, coercive measures might be used by the European powers against Japan, and the United States, realizing that these measures might destroy equal commercial opportunity and that they would be detrimental to Japan, could do very little for fear of incurring the displeasure of these powers and thereby endangering the greater necessity of keeping them neutral.

In such a difficult situation it would seem that the United States did not even possess continuity in its representation; for four men represented American interests in Japan during this period. Townsend Harris remained in Japan as the first Minister Resident until April, 1862. He was replaced by Robert H. Pruyn who served three years after which A. L. C. Postman became Charge d' Affaires for one year. R. B. Van Valkenburg arrived in August, 1866, and retired in November, 1869.

While such frequent changes in the service could not be otherwise than costly to American interests, there was a certain continuity of policy provided by the continued friendship of the United States

for Japan based on the policy inaugurated by Townsend Harris, and the presence of a Secretary of State who, despite the difficulties caused by the American Civil War, gave, unlike his predecessors, a great deal of attention to Asiatic affairs.

William H. Seward was born in Florida, Orange county, New York on May 16, 1801.⁸ Before he was 15 he entered Union College, graduating with honors in 1820. Admitted to the bar in 1822, he was soon active in politics and in 1834 he was nominated for Governor of New York, but was defeated by William L. Marcy. Four years later, however, running on the Whig platform, he was successful.⁹ After the expiration of his term, in 1843, he returned to Auburn to practice law but he continued to be active in politics and in February, 1847 was elected a United States Senator.

It was as a Senator that he began to give evidences of a great interest in Asiatic affairs. More than most men of his day Seward

⁸There is a great deal of material on the life of Seward. These include: George E. Baker, The Works Of William H. Seward, op. cit.; Frederick W. Seward, William H. Seward (3 volumes, New York: Darty and Miller, 1891); Olive Risley Seward, editor, William H. Seward's Travels Around The World (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1873); Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (2 vols, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1900). His Far Eastern policy is analyzed in Tyler Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," American Historical Review, October, 1922, 28:45-62.

⁹The administration of Governor Seward has been considered in many respects the most remarkable in the history of the Empire state, and has been regarded by many as having exercised a most powerful influence in shaping the political issues which afterwards grew up in the country." (The National Cyclopedia of American Biography [New York: James T. White and Company, 1892], Vol. II, p. 78)

faced West. It has been intimated that he developed this interest for political reasons.¹⁰ His speeches on the prospects of future American commercial expansion in the Orient were eloquent and politically safe.

He believed in the Perry expedition and expressed the conviction that the proper question for the Senate to ask was not why it had been sent, but why it had not been sent before. In a speech of July 29, 1852, he gave evidence of his faith that American commerce in the Pacific would benefit not only Americans, but the Asiatic states as well.

Even the discovery of this continent and its islands, and the organization of society and government upon them, grand and important as these events have been, were but conditional, preliminary, and ancillary to the more sublime result now in the act of consummation—the reunion of the two civilizations, which, having parted on the plains of Asia four thousand years ago, and having travelled ever afterward in opposite directions around the world, now meet again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific Ocean. . . . It will be followed by the equalization of the condition of society and the restoration of the unity of the human family.¹¹

He felt that this change was to be wrought not by means of wars and conquests, but by commerce.

Seward was a very conspicuous prophet of territorial expansion. In a political letter written in 1846, he said: "Our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the North, and to encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific."¹² Persons not in sympathy with his prophecies maintained that he was in

¹⁰ Bancroft, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 69.

¹¹ Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 248-249.

¹² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 409.

favor of adding at least a part of China to the national domain. This did him no injustice as he himself made evident, in 1861, when he wrote to Cassius M. Clay: "Russia and the United States may remain good friends until, each having made a circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet each other in regions where civilization first began, and where, after so many ages, it has become now lethargic and helpless."¹³

Seward's position as the outstanding man in the newly formed Republican party¹⁴ virtually compelled Lincoln to offer his defeated rival the Secretaryship of State. Seward accepted the office for he felt that the country could not spare him and that his mission was to grasp the helm while the inept Lincoln occupied the role of figure-head.¹⁵

It seems that Lincoln could not have chosen a man who would bring to the Far Eastern question more previous thought and conviction. Seward believed in the future greatness of American commerce in the Pacific; therefore, he was determined that the civil disturbances in Japan should not result in a lessening of American rights. He desired

¹³Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1861, Vol. I, p. 293.

¹⁴On the first ballot in the Republican convention of 1860 Seward received 173½ votes to Lincoln's 102; but because Seward, by his active fight against slavery, had made many enemies he was by-passed in favor of the less known candidate.

¹⁵H. W. Temple, "William H. Seward," in S. F. Bemis, editor, The American Secretaries Of State And Their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), Vol. VII, pp. 22-23.

at the same time to preserve American influence in Japan and Japanese friendship for the United States. The United States, occupied with the Civil War, had no force to apply. Seward adopted the policy of acting in concert with the European treaty powers.

In China the policy of consulting and cooperating with the other representatives was carried through by Anson Burlingame. He was the leader of the foreign envoys at Peking and he succeeded in persuading the other representatives to adopt a tolerant attitude toward the vexed Chinese government.¹⁶ In China the policy was a great success for it may have prevented further partitioning of the Chinese Empire which would have been detrimental not only to China but also to American commercial interests.

In Japan the problem was more difficult. The policy of cooperating with other powers to prevent treaty rights being lost in the turmoil of Japanese domestic politics and that of showing moderation towards the Japanese government were often opposed to each other. American ideals were several times sacrificed for the cooperative policy.¹⁷

Although the opening of the transcontinental telegraph in 1862 brought Japan within a month of Washington, Seward was unable, because

¹⁶ See: Dennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., pp. 372-378.

¹⁷ However, as Tyler Dennett points out, "... after 1868 American interests in Asia steadily receded until three decades later when the American Government resumed the policy of cooperation. The withdrawal of the United States from cooperation was one, though not the only, cause of this retirement of American influence." (Dennett, ibid., p. 421)

of the difficulties arising from the American Civil War and an understandable lack of comprehension of the conditions within Japan, to give complete directions to the American ministers. The policy adopted to meet the exigencies of each situation as it arose thus remained largely the policy of Americans. There were, however, only two instances in which the ministers abandoned the policy of cooperation with the European powers which Seward so strongly advocated.

Of the diplomats who had signed the treaties of 1858, Townsend Harris was the only one who remained at his post and endeavored to secure their full enforcement. On January 7, 1859, by a unanimous vote of the Senate, Harris was made Minister Resident of the United States to Japan.¹⁸ The American legation was established in Yedo on July 7th, 1859. Harris entered upon his ministerial duties with an admiration for the Japanese people and a sympathetic understanding of the problems before the Japanese government which his colleagues did not possess. From China, a not too excellent training ground for a post in Japan, came Rutherford Alcock, the first British Consul-general and later Minister, while France sent M. de Bellecourt.

As Mr. Alcock aptly remarked, it was one thing for the ambassadors to secure the treaties of 1858 from the alarmed Japanese, and quite another to make the treaties "practical, every-day realities" in the

¹⁸ William E. Griffis, Townsend Harris, First American Envoy In Japan, op. cit., p. 522.

presence of the aroused hostility of the country.¹⁹ The inauguration of the treaties was apparently marked by two violations. The first question of treaty interpretation to be raised was concerned with the port of Kanagawa. Lord Ii had decided to create a new port at Yokohama, three miles from Kanagawa, rather than establish a port at Kanagawa as specified by the treaties. The change was made to protect the foreigners from possible attacks by hostile samurai.²⁰ Both Harris and Alcock protested against the change, but the Western merchants really decided the matter for they realized the commercial advantages of Yokohama.

The currency question proved more difficult of solution than that of the location of the open port. This was due to the fact that Japanese silver coins had a token value greater than their intrinsic value, while silver and gold coins stood at the ratio of five to one, instead of fifteen to one as in the West. The foreigners were not slow to see the profit that could be gained by bringing their silver to Japan, exchanging it for Japanese silver and then buying Japanese gold at the low ratio. This gold could then be exported and disposed of

¹⁹ Sir Rutherford Alcock, The Capital Of The Tycoon: A Narrative of Three Years Residence in Japan (2 vols., New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1863), Vol. I, pp. xvi-xvii.

²⁰ Kanagawa was located on the Tokaido, the great highway running from Kyoto to Yedo, along which passed the daimyo processions as the feudal lords of the west proceeded to and from their fiefs and the capital. Many of these lords were hostile to the Shogunate and it was feared by Lord Ii that their samurai might attack the unwelcome foreigners.

according to the higher rates of international exchange.²¹ To prevent the drain on their gold supply, the Japanese government issued a special coin for the foreign trade. To this infraction of the treaty stipulations, Harris and Alcock objected and the Japanese withdrew the coins from circulation.²² The debasement of her coins aggravated the economic crisis in Japan. Although the Japanese tried to prevent the export of their gold, an illegitimate trade continued from which the Japanese greatly suffered.

Although the provision in the Harris treaty stipulating that ratifications should be exchanged in Washington within one year was inserted by the Japanese, they soon asked Harris for a delay for this visit to the United States.²³ Some of the hostile daimyo were demanding the enforcement of the ancient seclusion laws. It was felt that for the Embassy to leave would give this hostile element the excuse for asking the death penalty formerly imposed on Japanese who left the islands and then returned. Finally, on February 11, 1860, the Japanese embassy left Japan for the United States on board the Rowhaten.

²¹"An American in Japan in 1858," after boasting of his bargain, "paying only \$2.32 $\frac{1}{2}$ for coin which is intrinsically worth \$9.76," remarked: "How A Wall Street broker might turn over his Mexican dollars, were he here with his bags, and were there no law against the export of Japanese gold!" ("An American In Japan In 1858," Harpers Monthly, January, 1859, 18:229).

²²Alcock, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 352.

²³36th Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 25 (Serial Number 1051). Correspondence concerning the proposed mission from Japan. Pp. 4-5.

accompanied by the Japanese war steamer Kanrin Maru under the command of Katsu Awa, the organizer and historian of the modern Japanese navy. The welcome the members received in the United States strengthened the good impression of America which Harris had labored so hard to create.²⁴

Meanwhile, affairs in Japan were becoming difficult for both the Shogun's government and the foreigners. Within eighteen months of foreign intercourse four Westerners and two Asiatics in their employ had been cut down by Japanese swordsmen. The anti-foreign feeling seemed to be gaining strength. It became evident to Townsend Harris that he had been too optimistic regarding the readiness of Japan for general foreign intercourse. On August 1, 1860, he advised his government that the opening of Yedo to foreign residence on January 1, 1862, as provided in the treaty, might lead to conflict and jeopardize the promising trade which had already been established.²⁵ The British and French ministers were in agreement. In this respect they anticipated the broader request of the Shogunate a few months later which requested that the opening of Yedo, Osaka, Hiogo, and Niigata be postponed for a period of seven years, because the Japanese empire found much uneasiness in political and economic conditions arising out of her new policy of establishing freedom of trade. Harris was granted discretionary power to act in concert with the European representatives

²⁴ For a good Japanese account of this mission, see: Junichi Fukuyama and Roderick H. Jackson, The First Japanese Mission To America (1860): Being a diary kept by a member of the Embassy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1938).

²⁵ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, pp. 793-794.

in Japan in a way which he might deem most advisable for the mutual interests of the two countries.²⁶

Early in January, 1861, the seventh assassination among the foreign community took place. This time the deed struck very close to Mr. Harris, for the victim was C.J. Heusken, his interpreter and secretary. The death of such a prominent person tried the faith of all the foreign representatives, but Townsend Harris, although "suffering deeply from the tragedy", did not hesitate to point out that Heusken lost his life through failure to heed the repeated warnings which had been given against going out at night.²⁷

The immediate result of this assassination was the withdrawal of the foreign representatives to Yokohama where they would be under the protection of the fleet until the government had given satisfaction for past breaches of the treaty and guarantees for the security of life and property.²⁸ Mr. Harris refused to cooperate in this move and remained alone in Yedo. In arguing against the withdrawal to Yokohama, Harris pointed out the difficulty he had met with in securing the

²⁶ Id., pp. 795-796, 813-815.

²⁷ In reporting to Secretary of State Seward on November 23, 1861, Harris wrote:

I have heretofore informed you of the great imprudence of Mr. Heusken in being out at night after repeated warnings from the Japanese that he ran a risk of being murdered by exposing himself in the way he did. I firmly believe that his death was chiefly owing to his disregard of the warnings of the Japanese, and I equally believe that, had he followed my example, he would have been a living man at this date."

(Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, p. 805).

²⁸ See Alcock, The Capital Of The Tycoon, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 55-61.

article providing for the residence of a minister in Yedo, and he, at least, would not endanger the exercise of that right. He felt that the representatives must trust the Japanese government and added:

I had hoped that the page of future history might record the great fact that in one spot in the Eastern world the advent of Christian civilization did not bring with it its usual attendants of rapine and bloodshed; this fond hope, I fear, is to be disappointed.

I would sooner see all the Treaties with this country torn up, and Japan return to its old state of isolation, than witness the horrors of war inflicted on this peaceful people and happy land.²⁹

Harris remained alone in Yedo for more than a month. He was alone in more than one way, for when the news of Mr. Heusken's murder reached Washington, Mr. Seward, the new Secretary of State, initiated a proposal to the treaty powers—France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia—for a joint naval demonstration against Japan to compel Japan to comply with the treaty stipulations.³⁰ Harris' later dispatch of May 8 cleared up the situation and the matter was dropped. Seward insisted, however, that satisfaction of some marked kind be received

²⁹Treat, Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865, op. cit., p. 164, quoting British Parliamentary Papers.

³⁰With this proposal was submitted a convention for carrying it into effect: "This projected convention contemplates the dispatch of a fleet of steamers adequate to impress the Japanese government with the ability and the determination of the states engaged, to secure a performance of its treaty stipulations." The note was qualified in that it was not to be obligatory on the United States until the sanction of Congress had been obtained. (Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, pp. 814-816, 547.)

for the murder of Mr. Heusken.³¹

This proposition for a joint naval demonstration was a very unusual one. A "gun-boat policy" had never been engaged in by the United States. Furthermore, the United States was involved in the Civil War and could hardly afford to spare naval vessels for a demonstration against Japan. While the policy suggested by Seward may have been part of a larger policy to divert the European nations from intervening in the American Civil War, he several times intimated that the United States would join in coercive measures against Japan.³² But never again did the United States take the lead in proposing joint operations against the Japanese.

After receiving discretionary power to deal with the Heusken affair, Harris met with the Japanese on November 27. They agreed to give any satisfaction in their power, and agreed to pay \$10,000 for the support of Heusken's widowed mother.³³ This was not to be considered payment for his blood, or an atonement for the murder, or a release

³¹ Ibid., p. 815.

³² On December 13, 1862, Seward wrote:

You cannot too strongly advise the Government of Japan that it can only have friendship or even peace with the United States by protecting the citizens and subjects of foreign powers from domestic violence.

(Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1055).

³³ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, pp. 806-807.

This sum should be compared with those demanded by the British. These ranged from \$10,000 for wounding two members of the British legation a few months later, to £125,000 demanded for the murder of Richardson in 1862. The latter sum was exemplary rather than compensatory.

from the obligation to arrest the murderers. Thus, by means of peaceful diplomacy the matter was settled without ill feelings.

Following an attack on the British legation on July 5, 1861, Harris tried to bring about a satisfactory settlement between the Japanese government and the British. Harris urged the Japanese ministers for foreign affairs to adopt a firm policy in protecting the foreigners and warned them, "if you do not promptly arrest and punish the authors of this last deed of blood, the most lamentable consequences to your country will inevitably ensue; for if you do not punish these men, it will show that you do not wish to do so. I urge you earnestly to consider this friendly and serious warning."³⁴ The Japanese government complied with this advice and Minister Alcock finally became satisfied that the Shogun's government was doing all in its power to insure the safety of the foreign residents.

The moderation and conciliation expressed by Townsend Harris certainly impressed the high officials of Japan with his continued friendship for them.³⁵ He had not held the government responsible for the acts of uncontrolled individuals, and he had realized that the treaties called for too rapid an increase in Western contacts and so had advocated the postponement of the opening of the additional ports.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 800.

³⁵ Viscount Shibasawa, then an officer of the Shogunate and later a financier, has said: "This incident (Harris' remaining in Yedo after the murder of Heusken) won for America the good will of Japan." (Ei-ichi Shibasawa, "Japanese-American Relations and Myself," in Maseoka, Japan's Message To America, op. cit., p. 21).

The fact that the attack upon the British legation did not result in another withdrawal of the foreign representatives to Yokohama is proof of the wisdom of his policy of remaining in Yedo and putting his trust in the Japanese government.

On July 10, 1861, Townsend Harris asked to be recalled on the ground of impaired health and advancing years. His resignation was accepted with "profound regret."³⁶

In the selection of a successor to Townsend Harris the United States was again most fortunate in its choice. Seward considered the post in Japan very important and in looking for a representative on whom he could rely he decided on Robert Hewson Pruyn.³⁷ Pruyn was an intimate friend of Seward's and his strong political supporter. A graduate of Rutgers College and for many years a prominent lawyer in Albany, New York, Mr. Pruyn had served in the State Assembly, having been Speaker of that body in 1854. It was on Mr. Seward's strong personal request that Mr. Pruyn accepted the difficult and remote post at Yedo.

In his instructions, dated November 15, 1861, Secretary Seward emphasized the maintenance of friendship with the Japanese, but at the

³⁶ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, p. 816.

³⁷ Payson J. Treat in his Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865, op. cit.; and in his later book, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., gives much material from the private correspondence of Robert H. Pruyn. These papers have not been published.

same time pointed out the difficulties presented by Japanese hostility to foreign intercourse:

You will find no open questions for discussion in your mission. It is important to preserve friendly and intimate relations with the representatives of other western powers in Japan. You will seek no exclusive advantages, and will consult freely with them upon all subjects, insomuch as it is especially necessary, at this time, that the prestige of western civilization be maintained in Yedo as completely as possible. In short, you will need to leave behind you all memories of domestic or of European jealousies or antipathies. . . .³⁸

On April 25, 1862, Mr. Pruyn arrived at Kanagawa. His position was a very difficult one. The civil war at home prevented the presence of an American fleet in Eastern waters to support him and placed American prestige at a low ebb, especially among the European representatives. The close cooperation of France and Britain, a survival of the Crimean alliance, gave their representatives a dominant voice. The political situation within Japan was becoming even more threatening for the foreigners. Fortunately, Pruyn was able to recognize with unusual clearness the difficult position of the Shogunate and believed in their efforts to protect him. Furthermore, he preferred to think for himself. In one of his early dispatches he wrote:

I regret to say that many idle rumors are constantly agitating the foreign residents at Yokohama, many of whom are too ready to believe anything to the prejudice of the Japanese. For my part I am amazed. . . . that there is so much freedom of intercourse and so little appearance of hostility.³⁹

In one respect Pruyn entered upon his mission under favorable

³⁸Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1862, pp. 817-818.

³⁹Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1040.

circumstances. The friendship which Townsend Harris had gained made the Japanese trust him and turn to him as their adviser and mediator as they had in the case of Harris. In fact, the French Minister confessed that the American Minister alone could secure results, and that soon "everything will have to be done through the Americans."⁴⁰ Such trust on the part of the Japanese was well placed, for Fryn tried to continue the policy of helping their government and thereby strengthening it. Less than two months after his arrival the government asked to send some Japanese to the American legation in order to receive instruction in the English language as the means to lessen past inconveniences in diplomatic interviews and negotiations with foreign representatives. Minister Fryn gladly complied with this request although it placed a burden on the legation.⁴¹

Soon another alarming event occurred. On the night of June 26, 1862, a single Japanese invaded the British legation, struck down two of the British sentries and then committed suicide. Fryn felt that the attack had been caused either by resentment at the presence of foreign soldiers and sailors as guards, some quarrel between the native and foreign guards, or an act of revenge on the part of relatives of those who had lost their lives in the preceding attack on the

⁴⁰ Private correspondence of Fryn, a letter dated March 12, 1863. Quoted by Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 130.

⁴¹ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1052.

legation.⁴² Mr. Pruyn at once expressed his astonishment and grief at such an outrage, and advised the Japanese to act with vigor in arresting the guilty participators.⁴³ The question now resolved itself to one of indemnity. The British demanded a compensation of £10,000 to be levied on the estate of the daimyo in charge of the guard. The Japanese felt this too severe since the act had been that of an individual.

While this matter was still under discussion, there came the most fateful of all the attacks on foreigners. On September 14, four British subjects, riding on the Tokaido near Yokohama, met the train of Shimadzu Saburo, father of the daimyo of Satsuma and a leader of the Imperial faction. The foreigners were attacked by the samurai and one of them, C.L. Richardson, was fatally wounded.⁴⁴

This affair presented several complicating features. It was not deliberate murder but apparently a blow delivered to avenge an insult

⁴²Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1034. Pruyn reported: "You know England nor France nor the United States, would allow any such things as foreign guards to be landed in their cities."

⁴³Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1037.

⁴⁴For Pruyn's report of this incident, see: Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1048-1051. For a British account, see: John R. Black, Young Japan: Yokohama and Yedo. A narrative of the settlement and the city from the signing of the treaties in 1858 to the close of the year 1879 with a glance at the progress of Japan during a period of 21 years (Yokohama: Kelly and Company, 1880), pp. 124-144.

to one of the most powerful lords in the land.⁴⁵ Mr. Pruyn reported that "sometime before the attack was made, Mr. Marshall (one of those attacked and wounded) exclaimed 'For God's sake, Richardson, do not let us have any trouble!'" To which Mr. Richardson replied, "Let me alone; I have lived in China fourteen years, and know how to manage this (sic) people!"⁴⁶ Moreover, at this critical period of domestic politics, to have the leading Imperial supporter become involved with the most determined of the foreigners and to be compelled to punish him, was a situation which seemed to spell disaster for the Shogunate.

The Shogun's government frankly admitted that they could do little to punish the retainers of the daimyo of Satsuma and waited for the presentation of British demands. In the meantime, in order to prepare for the civil or foreign war which might grow out of this complication, the Japanese government turned to Mr. Pruyn and requested that they might exercise their treaty right to purchase three war steamers in the United States. Although the Japanese might choose to

⁴⁵ A Japanese statesman, writing 16 years after this event, said: "There were many cases where fatal collisions were purposely provoked by foreigners. . . . Such was the case of Richardson, the Englishman who willfully tried to ride through the train of the state procession of the prince of Satsuma, and was killed by a retainer of the prince, an act which, at that time of feudalism, was entirely justified because discourtesy to a princely retinue was deemed an unpardonable outrage." (Makoto Matsuyama, "Japan and the Western Powers," North American Review, November, 1878, 127:412).

⁴⁶ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1064.

use these ships against the treaty powers, Pruyn approved of the request and himself became the commercial agent for the Japanese government in the transaction.⁴⁷

On January 31, 1863, the Japanese foreign ministers, fearing civil war, inquired of Pruyn "what would be the feeling and action of the United States." Pruyn replied that the government of the United States would render not only moral but also material support as would be justified by international law, because self-defense should lead Americans to support the Shogun's government rather than that of the anti-foreign Imperial forces.⁴⁸ Six months later, however, Pruyn was to experience a great change in attitude.

The Secretary of State apparently approved of Pruyn's conduct thus far, for he wrote:

The President does not fail to observe that some of the agents of some others of the treaty powers pursue, in their intercourse with the Japanese, a course more energetic, if not more vigorous, than that which you have followed under the instructions of this department. He, nevertheless, approves your decision to persevere in your past course, which so far at least, has attained all desired objects, while it seems to have inspired the Japanese authorities with sentiments of respect and friendship towards the United States.⁴⁹

The conflict involved in the policy of cooperation with moderation is evidenced by the fact that on June 29, 1863, Seward stated:

⁴⁷See: Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, pp. 671-674, 678, for details regarding this transaction.

⁴⁸Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, pp. 1066-1069.

⁴⁹Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1065-1066.

The United States having no grievances of their own to complain of against Japan, will not unite in hostilities against that government, but they will at the same time take care not to disapprove of or censure, without just cause, the measures of Great Britain which will result in greater security for all.⁵⁰

On April 6 the British ultimatum was delivered to the Japanese governors for foreign affairs.⁵¹ The Shogun's government, because they had not punished the murderers, was to give a formal apology and £100,000 as a penalty. From the daimyo of Satsuma, because his retainers had committed the crime, the British demanded the execution of the chief perpetrators of the murder and an indemnity of £25,000. The demand was unusual in that the British government could hardly demand redress from the clan of Satsuma, with whom it had no treaty relations, and there was no proof that the Shogun's government had had any part in the outrage. Moreover, failure to grant this request would, according to Russell's instructions, result in measures of reprisal or blockade or both against either the government of Japan or Satsuma or both.⁵²

The demands came at a most difficult time, for the Shogun was on his way to Kyoto. Not since 1634 had a Shogun gone to Kyoto, and then

⁵⁰Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1126.

⁵¹The ultimatum was framed in London by Earl Russell and was later criticised in debates in both Houses of Parliament. See: Treaty, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 157-159, citing British sources.

⁵²These measures were carried out, for in July, 1863, the British bombarded Kagoshima, a Satsuma city. A large part of this city burned as a result of fires started by the shelling.

the mission had been one of respect. The trip of 1863 was by Imperial command, and the Emperor intended to demand the complete expulsion of the foreigners. The English demand would certainly give strength to the Imperial desires.

The French were prepared to act with the British. Pruyn had no instructions, but he felt that the demands were uncalled for and came at a most unfortunate time. Therefore, he worked to secure an extension to the ultimatum and Colonel Neale, the British Charge^e acting in the absence of Alcock, granted an extension from April 27 until May 11.⁵³ Pruyn also urged the Japanese to comply with the demand in order to prevent a far larger demand later, and advised Mr. Seward that if the Japanese would not agree he would recommend to them to propose submitting the whole case for settlement to the President of the United States or some other mediator.⁵⁴ On June 14, the Japanese ministers agreed to pay the indemnities demanded of the Shogun by July 30, and offered to pay as well the £25,000 levied on Satsuma. On June 24th the indemnity of £110,000, covering both the attack on the legation and that on Richardson, was paid to the British Charge^e. At the same time the foreign ministers were informed of the outcome of

⁵³ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1078. Neale took pains to note that the extension was made in consequence of the Japanese appeal, and not because of the request of Pruyn. (Treat. Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 166, citing British Parliamentary Papers).

⁵⁴ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, pp. 1071-1079.

the Shogun's visit to Yedo:

I have received orders from his Majesty the Tycoon, now residing at Kioto, and who received orders from the Mikado to cause the opened ports to be closed and the foreigners (subjects) of the treaty powers to be removed, as our people will have no intercourse with them; hence negotiations on this subject will afterwards take place with your excellency.⁵⁵

The Shogun had entered Kyoto on April 21, and conferred with the Emperor on May 6. The result of the first conference was the acceptance by the Shogun of Imperial commands to expel the barbarians. This was to be done by peaceful negotiation if possible. The extremists demanded more; consequently, another conference was held early in June and the date was set for the expulsion. June 24 was the day appointed by the Emperor, and the daimyo were notified to that effect and instructed to defend their coasts, and, when invaders came, sweep them away. The agreement of the Shogun to this move was not a case of wanton duplicity; for "the Shogunate, seeing that it was impossible to maintain its erstwhile supremacy, was struggling for its existence and endeavouring to conciliate both the court and the great feudatories in the hope of bringing about an amalgamation of civil and military power."⁵⁶

Upon hearing of the expulsion order, Mr. Pruyn sent for the Governors for Foreign Affairs and asked for an explanation. The answer was that although the orders had been received, the Yedo authorities proposed to disregard them, for "the ministers at Yedo

⁵⁵ Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1120.

⁵⁶ Sanson, The Western World And Japan, op. cit., p. 301.

knew that the orders could not be executed; they had neither ships-of-war nor arms to accomplish this; besides, the tycoon⁵⁷ had made the treaties and wished to observe them.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it was Pryn's duty to give a strong reply to the order of expulsion. He stated:

A solemn treaty has been made by the government of Japan with the United States granting to its citizens the liberty to reside and trade at these ports. The right thus acquired will not be surrendered, and cannot be withdrawn. Even to propose such a measure is an insult to my country, and equivalent to a declaration of war.⁵⁹

The representatives of the treaty powers were all in agreement. They would not even discuss the right of the Japanese to denounce the treaties.

At this critical time Mr. Pryn submitted to his government an astounding proposal. He advised a joint naval demonstration, as suggested by Seward in 1861, designed for securing the ratification of the treaties by the Emperor. Until this was done, he said, "the position of foreigners must continue precarious, and their presence occasion intrigues, and perhaps civil war, because not sanctioned by the rightful sovereign, which the Mikado doubtless is, theoretically and practically, should the daimios gather around him."⁶⁰ Mr. Pryn was thus the first to realize where the troubles of foreign intercourse

⁵⁷A term used by the foreigners to indicate the Shogun. They also usually called the Emperor, "Mikado."

⁵⁸Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1118.

⁵⁹Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1121.

⁶⁰Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1125.

lay. If the treaty powers intended to insist upon the maintenance of intercourse they must remove anti-foreignism from the cries of the Imperial party.

The situation was tense, but the foreigners in the open ports were safe since the enforcement of the Imperial decree was in the hands of the Shogun alone. According to the ancient laws, no daimyo could act on his own responsibility. But Tokugawa Iyemitsu did not interest the lord of Choshu, and on the day set for the expulsion of the foreigners—June 24, 1853—he fired on the first foreign vessel which tried to pass through the Straits of Shimonoseki.⁶¹ This vessel was the American steamer Pembroke en route from Yokohama to Shanghai. Within a few days a French and a Dutch vessel were also fired upon.⁶² This prince had taken literally the Emperor's orders to expel the barbarians and the straits remained closed for more than a year.

One fact seemed to stand out clearly; the foreigners to maintain their place in Japan and to defend themselves must retaliate. At this time there was in the harbor of Yokohama the American steam war vessel, Tyoming. Commander McDougal of the Tyoming decided that he should proceed to Shimonoseki and seize or destroy the two offending vessels. Minister Pryn supported him in this contention for he felt that if the outrage were not promptly punished the anti-foreign daimyo would feel that the United States was weak and could be attacked with

⁶¹The Straits of Shimonoseki separate the islands of Honshu and Kyushu.

⁶²Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, pp. 1129-1137.

impunity. On the other hand, he felt that the Shogun's government would welcome any punishment meted out to the leader of the anti-Tokugawa and anti-foreign forces.⁶³ The Plymouth proceeded to Shimonoseki where, although fired on itself and losing five seamen, it succeeded in sinking a steamer and a brig. The United States had struck the first blow in defense of treaty rights, not against the government of Japan, but against a strong clan which the Shogunate seemed unable to control. The retaliation of the Plymouth coupled with the decision of the British to act directly against Satsuma did reduce the opposition of these strong Western clans to foreign intercourse. For a time the Shogunate was strengthened.⁶⁴ This aggressive step to protect American treaty rights was certainly consistent with the American policy of assisting Asiatic states in maintaining a stable and effective government, the third technique of the Open Door policy.

Secretary of State Seward was in full accord with Pruyn's policy. Moreover, he instructed Pruyn to demand that the Yedo government settle all American claims, for "the Government of Japan has failed to keep its faith solemnly pledged by treaty,"⁶⁵ and, also, the United States

⁶³Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1131, 1138-1141.

⁶⁴Sir George Sanson says:

Both Satsuma and Choshu had received a valuable lesson, and though the action of the treaty powers has been described as unwarrantable there can be little doubt that it served a good purpose by showing the futility of the expulsion policy and by preventing the bloodshed and humiliation that would have followed an attempt to carry out the instructions of the court.

(Sanson, The Western World And Japan, op. cit., p. 302).

⁶⁵Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1863, Vol. II, p. 1149.

could not maintain its dignity by remaining so moderate when the other powers were making much greater demands. Pruyn asked for \$32,000—\$10,000 for the burning of the American legation which had occurred in May, \$20,000 for assaults on Americans at Yokohama, and \$2,000 for an American citizen who had been deported from the Bonin Islands by the Japanese. A \$10,000 payment for the Pembroks had already been made. He reminded the Japanese that the United States had not yet agreed to the postponement of the opening of Osaka, Hiogo, and Niigata, and might withhold this consent.⁶⁶ Less than a month later, however, he felt that relations were improving and counseled moderation in presenting the demands. He wrote to Mr. Seward:

The dictates of an enlightened humanity have justified the friendly and patient forbearance which has heretofore characterized our relations with this government; and it is pleasant to believe that such forbearance is still compatible with our true interests as being best calculated to overcome the obstacles arising from the laws and institutions of the government and the prejudices of the ruling class.⁶⁷

An important by-product of the conferences over the American ultimatum was the securing of a convention lowering to five per cent the import duty on machines and machinery, iron in pigs and bars, sheet iron and iron ware, tin plates, sugar, glass, clocks, watches, wines and liquors.⁶⁸ The Japanese doubtless thought this concession a small

⁶⁶Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1864, Vol. III, pp. 476-478. Harris had advised this postponement to the United States and the other treaty powers, but the U.S. Senate had not yet taken action.

⁶⁷Ibid., Vol. III, p. 485.

⁶⁸Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 479-481.

one since the whole tariff would be subject to revision after July 1, according to the treaties of 1858.

The expulsion ultimatum had been withdrawn in November of 1863, the Richardson affair had been closed, and the Americans were once more urging moderation. Although the Japanese were sounding out the Western powers on the possibility of closing Yokohama until the internal disorder was quieted, relations between the Shogun and the foreign representatives were once more peaceful. The only outstanding question was that Choshu continued to keep the Straits of Shimonosaki closed. Foreign ships avoided using this waterway; no one felt that any great good could come of forcing it open.

In March, 1864, Sir Rutherford Alcock returned to his post after an absence of two years in England. This event, according to one author,⁶⁹ was the factor which caused the foreign representatives in Japan to change from a policy of "patient forbearance" to the strong policy of "securing peace by making war." Alcock came to the conclusion that measures of a hostile and decisive nature should be taken against Choshu as an example to the other hostile daimyo. The ministers were in agreement, Frayn included, for it was felt that an expedition would strengthen the Shogun, and the plans were made with the secret approval of its government.⁷⁰

On July 5 the decision was reached to open the Straits of

⁶⁹Treat, Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865, op. cit., pp. 314-326.

⁷⁰Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1864, Vol. III, p. 542.

Shimonoseki if the Japanese failed to do so. After agreeing that punishment of Choshu was the action best qualified to meet the exigencies of the hour, the representatives agreed to five principles which would serve as a basis for future cooperation: first, the neutralisation of Japan; second, the maintenance of treaty rights; third, the protection of the open ports against any attack, considered by them improbable in consequence of any operations in the straits; fourth, the determination not to ask for or to accept any concession of territory or any exclusive advantage, in the open ports or elsewhere in Japan; fifth, the abstaining from all interference in the jurisdiction of the Japanese authorities over their people, as well as from all intervention between the contending parties in the country.⁷¹ Here was a statement of the Open Door policy. The action taken, however, was to be an unusual one in American Far Eastern policy for it was not to be implemented unilaterally but cooperatively.

On the 28th and 29th of August, 1864, the joint expedition set sail from Yokohama. It consisted of nine British, four Dutch, three French, and one United States ship. The only American ship in Japan was the sailing ship, Jamestown, which would have had to be towed to Shimonoseki. Therefore, in order that the American flag might be represented, Mr. Prayn chartered the little American steamer Ta-Kiang (600 tons) and placed one gun on it. On September 5, the forcing of the straits was commenced, and in three days the batteries were destroyed. The representatives of the Lord agreed to keep the straits

⁷¹Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 528-533.

open in the future, build no more forts, and to defray the expenses of the expedition.⁷²

The four representatives at Yokohama were not to experience much gratification, however, for they at last received instructions from their governments while the fleet was still at Shimoda. At the suggestion of the British Foreign Minister, Lord Russell, France, Great Britain and the United States had agreed to act in concert in accordance with the moderate proposals suggested by Mr. Pruyn on May 13. This policy consisted in:

1. Giving every encouragement and support to each of the Shogun's Ministers, and to such of the Daimios as are favorable to foreign trade, and thus lead to the ultimate weakening of the feudal system and of the protectionist theory of Japan.

2. To make arrangements with the Japanese government for the protection of the foreign settlement at Yokohama.

3. To keep for the present a strong squadron in the Japanese seas.

4. To endeavour to establish an understanding with (the other treaty powers) with a view to our common interests in Japan.⁷³

If there had been telegraphic communication the joint naval demonstration of the treaty powers against Japan would never have occurred.

Mr. Pruyn prepared a dispatch justifying his conduct. He pointed out that the operations were really designed to sustain the Shogun's government, and that the expedition had "greatly contributed to, if

⁷²For more complete details of the Shimoda expedition, see: Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1864, Vol. III, pp. 544-585; Treat, Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1855-1865, op. cit., pp. 340-384.

⁷³Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1864, Vol. III, p. 584.

it has not secured, altogether, our safety in Japan.⁷⁴ On the receipt of this dispatch, the expedition was approved by President Lincoln and Secretary Seward.⁷⁵ Alcock was also vindicated and promoted to Feking.

Rather than have the foreign powers deal directly with a rebellious daimyo, the Shogunate again agreed to assume itself the payment of the expenses and indemnities of the Shimonosaki expedition. The Yedo officials agreed (September 23) to abrogate the order closing the port of Yokohama and promised to seek the Emperor's approval of the treaties.⁷⁶ On October 22, a convention was signed in which the Shogun agreed to pay an indemnity of \$3,000,000 in six quarterly installments. The method of division of the sum was left to the powers, and it was agreed that the powers would exchange the indemnity for the opening of Shimonosaki or some other port on the Inland Sea.⁷⁷

There seems to be little to commend the Shimonosaki expedition

⁷⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 553-558. An evidence of the restoration of the Shogun's power was the order of September 30, cancelling the one of 1862 which relieved the daimyo of spending part of each year in Yedo.

⁷⁵ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1865, Vol. III, p. 229.

⁷⁶ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1864, Vol. III, pp. 559-575, 581-584.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Vol. III, p. 582. The share of the United States was \$795,000, an amount greatly in excess of the actual cost of the expedition to the United States. After many years of debate, in February, 1868, a bill passed Congress returning this amount to Japan. The money was used by the Japanese to build the breakwater in the harbor of Yokohama as a lasting form of good will.

except its success, and this was illusory. It did not save the Shogunate, for a little more than three years later the Emperor was restored to power. It did not weaken Choshu, for this clan was to play a prominent part in the civil war which followed and in the new government of Japan. Moreover, "It was a marked departure from traditional American policy both in its cooperative aspects and in its confessed purpose to intervene in the domestic conflict of the Japanese Empire."⁷⁸ American action in this case was the price paid for cooperation. Such expeditions in China had resulted in loss of territory and administrative rights; that such was not the case in Japan may have been due to the moderation exercised by the American minister.

Early in May, 1865, the American Minister, Mr. Pruyn, left Japan for a vacation in the United States. In Mr. Pruyn's absence the legation was entrusted to Mr. A. L. C. Fortman, the Secretary of the legation, as Charge d' Affaires. Pruyn had intended to return but personal reasons caused him to offer his resignation on October 25.

Although untrained in diplomacy,⁷⁹ Minister Pruyn did remarkable work in following his instructions in difficult circumstances. Like

⁷⁸Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 401.

⁷⁹Although Pruyn had no diplomatic training, Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is reported to have said that Mr. Pruyn's correspondence was unsurpassed in ability by any other American envoy, with possibly the single exception of Charles Francis Adams. (The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, op. cit., Vol. XIII, p. 430). An examination of the correspondence from Japan during his three years as Minister is proof of this.

Harris before him, he could see American interests were linked with Japan's internal politics. He possessed a very good understanding of the embarrassing problems created by foreign intercourse, and retained a sympathy for the Shogunate in its difficulties. He joined in the Shimonoseki expedition because he was convinced that it would strengthen the lawful authority of the Shogunate. He was willing to use force unilaterally and cooperatively in following the third technique of the Open Door policy.

His policy was to maintain the treaty rights intact, but he would not commit a wrong to preserve a right. Although the British demanded \$125,000 for the murder of Mr. Richardson, Pruyn only asked annuities for the families of the slain and for the wounded when the Nyoming was fired upon. He was the first to see that the treaty powers must secure the Emperor's ratification of the treaties. His policy succeeded in that the United States and the other treaty powers weathered the period of anti-foreignism without losing any of the rights gained by Perry and Harris, and without subjecting Japan to a foreign war.⁸⁰ "If Perry opened the gates of Japan, and Harris threw them open wide, then Robert M. Pruyn is entitled to no little credit for preventing their being closed again."⁸¹

Portman, the Charge¹ in Pruyn's absence, had much experience in

⁸⁰ In this respect Japan was more fortunate than China. In 1857, while China was torn by the Taiping Rebellion, demands for increased treaty rights were made which resulted in a war with Great Britain and France.

⁸¹ Treat, The Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 131.

Japan. A Hollander by birth, he had first visited Japan as Dutch interpreter with Commodore Perry and had returned with the Japanese embassy in 1860, thereafter acting as Dutch interpreter and secretary of the American legation. Although Portman was experienced and had a great friendship for the Japanese,⁸² the absence of a man such as Pruyn who was able to make his influence felt on the cooperating powers as well as the Japanese was unfortunate at this time. For on July 18 the successor to Sir Rutherford Alcock arrived in Japan.

In Sir Harry Parkes the British had a very forceful representative who dominated the diplomatic body during his eighteen years of service in Tokyo.⁸³ He had twenty-four years of experience in China and by many Americans was regarded as the prime evil genius in the relations between the foreigners and the Asiatics. Although Lord Russell had always cautioned moderation, Parkes, as one American writer has said, "knew what his government desired, and he proceeded to

⁸²In the discussion of the indemnities in 1865, he suggested to Mr. Seward that the full amount of \$3,000,000 was too much and that a portion of it, "say \$500,000," might be employed in the improvement of the foreign and Japanese settlements at the open ports. "In no manner that I am aware of," he said, "could any portion of such indemnity be employed to greater advantage and be of more lasting benefit to both our political and commercial relations with this country." (Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1865, Vol. III, p. 257).

⁸³An uncritical biography of Parkes is, F.V. Dickens and S. Lane-Poole, The Life Of Sir Harry Parkes (2 vols., New York: Macmillan Company, 1894). A very critical estimate is E.H. House, "The Martyrdom of an Empire," Atlantic Monthly, op. cit., pp. 610-623.

accomplish it.⁸⁴ The United States, without an experienced diplomat on the scene, and troubled with internal affairs at home, was to steadily lose influence among the diplomatic corps in Japan.

The Japanese request for delay in making the Shimonoseki payments gave the new British minister the opportunity he desired, for he wished to secure the opening of another port. At first, the French preferred the indemnity, but the French representative in Japan was persuaded to support the British proposal for the remission of part of the indemnity in return for the opening of Hiogo, the written ratification of the treaties by the Emperor, and the reduction of the tariff to a uniform rate. The negotiations were to be carried on in Osaka, a port near Kyoto.⁸⁵ Nine ships were sent, the whole procedure resembling very much a naval demonstration. This expedition, in which Portman represented the United States on a British war vessel, for no American ship was available, arrived off Osaka on November 4, 1865.⁸⁶

Veiled threats backed by the strong fleet succeeded, and on November 24 the representatives were notified that the Emperor had ratified the treaties, and that the Shogun agreed to a reduction of the tariff, but rather than advance the opening of Hiogo the full Shimonoseki indemnity would be paid.⁸⁷ Thus the representatives gained

⁸⁴Treat, The Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865, op. cit., p. 395.

⁸⁵Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1865, Vol. III, pp. 265-267.

⁸⁶Ibid., Vol. III, p. 268.

⁸⁷Ibid., Vol. III, p. 276.

two of their three demands without having to relinquish any of the indemnity.

In this way the suggestion made by Prussia in 1863 was carried out. It was an important move for now the treaties had the Emperor's sanction. Up to this time opposition to the foreigner had been evidence of loyalty to the Emperor. One Japanese writer states that "this act of the Imperial ratification was a death blow to anti-foreignism. As the hostile attitude of the Emperor had been the mainstay of the Jo-i party, so the change in his position produced corresponding results in the minds of many of his subjects."⁸⁸

The procedure by which the Imperial ratification was obtained was not, however, one of which to be proud. This is largely because of the tariff convention which followed. This convention was signed in Yedo, June 25, 1866, and was to be subject to revision on July 1, 1872.⁸⁹ The influence of Sir Harry Parkes was supreme in drafting its terms and they much resembled those of the treaty he had assisted in forcing on China in 1858, for the duties were made specific and the precise amounts estimated on ad valorem basis of five per cent. It was, like the Harris treaty, a conventional tariff and thus remained in force long after the promised date of revision. The convention

⁸⁸ Inazo Nitobe, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan, op. cit., p. 83.

⁸⁹ For the terms of this convention, see: Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1866, Vol. II, pp. 189-192; Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, And Agreements between the United States and Other Powers, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 1012-1021.

also gave the right of individual Japanese to trade at the open ports and buy ships and go abroad, a free mint was established, and no tax or transit duties were to be levied on goods sent to the open ports.

Although the representative of the United States was following long-standing instructions to cooperate with his colleagues peacefully in every matter in which foreign rights were involved, American participation in this convention is notable. It was one of the few instances in the nineteenth century in which the United States entered into a joint treaty. The convention also stated an untruth. Although it was stated that the foreign representatives had "received from their respective governments identical instructions for the modification of the tariff", Portman had received no such instructions.⁹⁰ The treaty, however, was duly ratified by the American government, for, once it had become a fact, non-ratification would only mean the loss of equal commercial benefits. Such a low tariff which could only be revised with the consent of all the treaty powers was surely a detriment to Japanese development. Having surrendered its tariff autonomy, Japan found itself helpless to protect its industries against Western competition.

On August 12, the new American Minister arrived at Yokohama.

⁹⁰His only instruction was a brief message from Seward regarding American participation in the demonstration at Osaka. "I am authorized by the President to assure you that they are fully approved." (Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1866, Vol. II, p. 200). Gideon Welles strongly dissented from this approval. (Welles, Gideon, Diary of (5 vols., Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1911), Vol. III, p. 89.)

Robert B. Van Valkenburg was, like Pruyn, a New York lawyer. He had served three years in the state legislature. He had been elected to Congress in 1860 on the Republican ticket, and served until 1865. While still a member, he had commanded the 107th regiment and had seen action at Antietam. He was a typical American diplomat of the period, devoid of technical experience but acquainted with public affairs, especially political affairs.

His first action on arriving in Japan was, in cooperation with Parkes, to issue a notification warning American ships not to visit any but the open ports, and citing penalties for taking part in rebellions.⁹¹ This action was necessitated by the hostilities already in progress between the Tokugawa and the Choshu clan. Van Valkenburg arrived in Japan to find the struggle already underway which would result in the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor Meiji. By January 25, 1868, the Tokugawa had fallen because it had ceased to govern.⁹² In the struggle which ended in the Restoration nothing in the nature of foreign official influence was brought to bear. The foreign powers preserved an attitude of strict neutrality.

From Seward, Van Valkenburg had originally received instructions to adhere to the Shogunate as long as that government retained its

⁹¹Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1866, Vol. II, pp. 213-220.

⁹²The history of the Japanese Civil War, as viewed by American representatives, can be found in: Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 805-845. See also: J.H. Gibbins, The Progress Of Japan, 1853-1871, op. cit., pp. 153-187.

power.⁹³ The Secretary of State later said that he had "little dreamed that the Mikado would excel the dethroned Tycoon in emulating Western civilization."⁹⁴ During the crisis the envoys at Yedo dealt, as usual, with the Shogun's officials. In the period following the Restoration in which the Imperial forces operated to completely defeat the Tokugawa, the Ministers dealt with the new government at Kyoto. On February 14, the treaties had all been formally ratified by the Imperial government and the foreign representatives had issued neutrality proclamations. Only one troublesome question presented itself. This was the matter of deciding what should be done with the foreign-built war vessels which the Shogunate had purchased and which were on their way to Japan. Of these the most powerful was the ram Stonewall, purchased in the United States.⁹⁵ The ministers agreed that the delivery of war vessels would be a breach of neutrality, and that they would use their utmost endeavors to prevent any deliveries until they received instructions from their governments.⁹⁶ The Stonewall was sent to Hong Kong upon her arrival.

On January 4 and 5, 1869, the foreign ministers were received

⁹³ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1868, Vol. I, p. 705.

⁹⁴ Olive Risley Seward, William H. Seward's Travels Around The World, op. cit., p. 257.

⁹⁵ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1868, Vol. I, p. 677. The ram Stonewall was a Confederate ironclad built at Bordeaux for the Danish navy but sold to the Southern government.

⁹⁶ Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 676-678.

in audience by the Emperor. Van Valkenburg reported:

If the Sovereignty of the Mikado be only nominal at present, it is to be hoped that it may become a reality at an early day, as it seems impossible that this Country can ever be reunited and strong under any other chief than the one, whose recent reception of the Foreign Representatives has given such satisfaction to all.⁹⁷

On February 8, the notifications of neutrality were withdrawn, and the Stonewall was turned over to the Imperial forces.⁹⁸

This change of government form was of immense importance to Japan. During the preceding years the Imperial forces had become convinced of the wisdom of foreign intercourse, and in the succeeding years Japan entered fully into the world of nations. This enlarged intercourse was based, however, on the treaties made by the Shogunate with the Western powers.

American policy during this period was easy to define but difficult to carry out. The American government insisted that treaty rights be maintained, sought no exclusive advantage, urged the constant cooperation of the treaty powers, and continued to try to aid the Japanese government. Cooperation caused two difficulties. It led the United States into such actions as the joint expedition against Ghoshu and the joint expedition to secure the Emperor's ratification of the treaties. It is doubtful that the United States realized that

⁹⁷ Van Valkenburg's Dispatch No. 134 (Dept. of State), quoted by Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895, op. cit., p. 337. No volume of Foreign Relations was issued for 1869.

⁹⁸ Van Valkenburg's Dispatch No. 12 (Dept of State), quoted by Treat, ibid., p. 339.

the Joint Convention of 1865 would be detrimental to Japanese advancement. Moreover, under a cooperative policy the British gained ascendancy in influence.

It is difficult to see how any other policy would have succeeded any better however. The United States had no power, and the situation in Japan demanded the unity of interest of all the treaty powers. American representatives always counseled moderation and forbearance in dealing with Japan during these troubled years, and no action could be cooperatively taken among the foreign ministers unless their views were recognized. There were also times when the ministers of the United States did not support their colleagues as when Harris stood alone in Yedo, and when Prayn sought to temper the British ultimatum in 1863. Following the American Civil War, American influence in Japan might once more have become ascendant if the United States had not returned to a policy of isolation.

The United States did not, however, lose the friendship of the Japanese. One Japanese writer says of the period:

Notwithstanding these attacks upon foreigners, the policy of the United States toward Japan was as generously and so wisely conducted by Secretary Seward, on the basis of accepting 'no exclusive advantage,' but of acting in cooperation with the other treaty powers, that Japan was led to look with favor upon western civilization.⁹⁹

For the treaty powers, the policies adopted to meet the rapidly changing situation in Japan were successful. The cry of "expel the

⁹⁹Seiji G. Hishida, "The International Position of Japan As A Great Power" (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law), op. cit., p. 125.

barbarian" had been eliminated from the Imperial program. The whole Japanese nation had come to recognize the benefits to be derived from foreign trade and foreign learning. The lessons learned at Shimozeki had convinced the most determined of the anti-foreign element of the necessity of adopting at least the tools of Western civilization.¹⁰⁰ The Emperor's ratification of the treaties was the guarantee that the work of Perry and Harris would not be lost.

¹⁰⁰Abbins, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

CHAPTER V

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY IN JAPAN

The Foundation of American foreign policy toward Japan and the "Open Door policy" are synonymous. It seems almost an oversight of diplomatic historians that they have failed to point out that the United States, by 1865, had developed an Asiatic policy, equally applicable to both Japan and China. This is true because, in the nineteenth century, American objectives were the same for both nations, the maintenance of equal opportunity. The United States was expanding to the West, and, therefore, toward the Orient. The traders, certain politicians, and many of those Americans who lived on the west coast realized that the Orient offered lucrative markets. These were markets of the future, for sufficient demand had not yet been created on either side of the Pacific for this commerce.

Three techniques were developed for securing these markets of the future. The first, equal commercial opportunity or most-favored-nation treatment, was explicitly stated in the Perry treaty and in every subsequent treaty with Japan before 1894. The second technique, that of preserving the administrative and territorial integrity of Far Eastern countries, was not as vital a part of American policy in Japan as in China. The United States had taken the initiative in opening Japan to foreign intercourse. Because, as Perry and Harris

had both discovered, the United States was dedicated to a policy of abstaining from territorial possessions in the Pacific. Japan was not immediately subjected to loss of sovereignty as China had been. While precedent alone might not have protected the Japanese from subsequent loss of rights, it was strengthened by Harris' promise of American mediation and assistance and by American cooperation with the treaty powers in the period of greatest weakness in both the United States and Japan.

It was, on the third technique, that of assisting Asiatic states to develop and maintain effective and stable governments, that the greatest American efforts were concentrated in Japan. Perry advised moderation in bringing Japan into intercourse with the world at large. Harris devoted much time to training the Japanese so that they would be able to meet this enlarged intercourse and went far toward making a military alliance with the Japanese government by concluding a treaty by which the Japanese could purchase military and naval equipment from the United States and employ American experts. The success of his policy of moderation and trust in the Japanese government during the period of anti-foreign attacks resulted in the adoption of similar policies by the other diplomatic representatives. When the treaties were in jeopardy because of the weakness of the Tokugawa government, the United States took the unprecedented action of joining in a "gun-boat policy"; but it was not directed against the government of Japan, rather against the clans which threatened that government, and in the hope that they might be weakened, thereby strengthening the government.

with which the treaties had been made.

Such a policy naturally resulted in the development of friendship between the United States and Japan. However they might use it in the future, the Japanese realized that they owed much of their strength to the fact that they had been introduced to Western intercourse by the United States.¹

It was in this period that cooperation with the other treaty powers was recognized as the means by which American objectives might be realized. By cooperating, the United States could moderate the demands of European states even though their interests were inimical to those of the United States for their trade was of the present, not of the future. John Hay, in requesting the cooperation of all the powers in maintaining the principles of the Open Door in 1899, was returning to the principles of Seward. The United States never had the power to assure the Open Door by isolated action. In Japan, after 1868, the cooperative policy was changed from one of cooperating with the treaty powers to one of cooperation with Japan. This cooperation

¹Of the many statements by Japanese of their debt to the United States, that of Count Okuma, a famous statesman of modern Japan, is

(since European countries and have sent their diplomatic representatives and technical experts) could not at all compare with the United States in number of their agents and grandeur of ideals. Therefore, it is never unjust to say that Japan is indebted to the United States in the highest degree for her progress and advancement in the path of modern civilization. (Count Shigenobu Okuma, "Japan's Debt to America," in Shin Nippon, February 6, 1915, reprinted in Toyokichi Iyenaga, editor, Japan's Real Attitude Toward America [New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1916], p. 3.)

never went so far as to concede the guaranties of equal commercial opportunity secured by the early treaties; for, although the United States repeatedly agreed to tariff revision, it was always with the reservation that the other treaty powers also agree.

Although the United States withdrew from cooperation in 1868 because American interests differed from those of the other treaty powers and might involve the United States in European politics, it seems that the success of the American policy had already become apparent to Great Britain for Japan was forced to grant no further concessions to Western states.

The foreign policy of the United States toward Japan in the nineteenth century was based upon the treaties made with Japan before 1867, the techniques of the Open Door policy, and the friendship inaugurated by Townsend Harris and inherent in an Open Door policy. It has been stated that it was the "utter wreck of the cooperative policy which made it necessary for the United States to retain the Philippines,"² thus making Japan, whom we had helped make strong so that she could resist European demands which would destroy equal commercial opportunity, a threat to our Far Eastern policy. Thus, it can be said that in satisfying our earlier necessity we created another necessity. This very fact is also a measure of the success of the Open Door policy in Japan.

² Bennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 679.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS

Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States. These documents were transmitted to Congress with the annual message of the President from 1861 following, except in 1869. These may be found in the State Department edition and in the Congressional documents. Those sections pertinent to this study are:

1861, Vol. I, pp. 457-441
1862, Vol. I, pp. 793-823
1863, Vol. II, pp. 1027-1152
1864, Vol. III, pp. 445-526
1865, Vol. III, pp. 227-277
1866, Vol. II, pp. 189-228
1867, Vol. II, pp. 16-82
1868, Vol. I, pp. 605-636
1879, Vol. I, pp. 620-636

28th Congress, 2nd session, House Document No. 138 (Serial Number 465).
The Pratt resolution. 5 pp.

29th Congress, 2nd session, House Executive Document No. 26 (Serial Number 500). Letter of A.H. Palmer to Buchanan. 39 pp.

32nd Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 59 (Serial Number 620). Existing relations with Japan. 67 pp.

33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 34 (Serial Number 751). Correspondence relating to the Perry expedition. 195 pp.

33rd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 79 (Serial Numbers 769, 770, 771). Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States. Compiled from the original notes and journals of Commodore Perry and his officers, at his request, and under his supervision, by Francis L. Hawks (cited as Hawks). 513, 414, and 705 pp.

36th Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 25 (Serial Number 1031). Correspondence concerning the proposed mission from Japan. 13 pp.

37th Congress, 2nd session, Senate Executive Document No. 33 (Serial Number 1149). Report relative to the building of ships-of-war for the Japanese Government. 8 pp.

Malloy, W.M., Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers, Vols. I and II are 61st Congress, 2nd session, Senate Document No. 357; Vol. III is 87th Congress, 4th session, Senate Document No. 348; Vol. IV is 75th Congress, 3rd session, Senate Document No. 134.

B. BOOKS

Akimoto, Shunkichi, translator, Lord Ii Naosuke And New Japan by Katsumaro Nakamura. Tokyo: Japan Times, 1909. 187 pp.

Alcock, Sir Rutherford, The Capital Of The Tycoon: A Narrative of Three Years Residence in Japan. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1863. 2 vols., 469 pp. and 539 pp.

Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History Of The American People. Second edition. New York: F.S. Crofts and Company, 1942. 830 pp.

Baker, George E., The Works Of William H. Seward. New York: J.S. Redfield, 1853. 3 vols., 538, 666, and 674 pp.

Bancroft, Frederick, The Life Of William H. Seward. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1900. 2 vols., 533 pp. and 549 pp.

Bemis, Samuel F., editor, The American Secretaries Of State And Their Diplomacy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928. 10 vols.

Benton, Thomas Hart, Thirty Years View, or A history of the Working of the American government for thirty years from 1820-1850. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1854. 2 vols., 739 pp. and 788 pp.

Black, John R., Young Japan: Yokohama and Yedo. A narrative of the settlement and the city from the signing of the treaties in 1858 to the close of the year 1879 with a glance at the progress of Japan during a period of 21 years. Yokohama: Kelly and Company, 1880. 2 vols., 418 pp. and 499 pp.

- Brinkley, Captain F., and Kikuchi, Baron, A History Of The Japanese People, from the earliest times to the end of the Meiji Era. New York: Encyclopedia Britannica Company, 1915. 740 pp.
- Cole, Allan B., editor, A Scientist With Perry In Japan, The Journal of Dr. James Morrow. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1947. 295 pp.
- _____, editor, Yankee Surveyors In The Shogun's Seas, Records of the United States surveying expedition to the North Pacific Ocean, 1853-1856. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. 161 pp.
- Cosenza, Mario Emilio, Introduction and notes by, The Complete Journal Of Townsend Harris, First American Consul General and Minister to Japan. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1930. 589 pp.
- Creasy, E.S., The Fifteen Decisive Battles Of The World from Marathon to Waterloo. New York: A.L. Burt Publisher, 1851. 386 pp.
- Crew, Carl, He Opened The Door Of Japan. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1939. 272 pp.
- Dennett, Tyler, Americans In Eastern Asia. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. 707 pp.
- Dickens, F.V., and Lane-Poole, S., The Life Of Sir Harry Parkes. New York: Macmillan Company, 1894.
- Douglas, Sir Robert K., Europe And The Far East, 1506-1912. Revised edition; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1926. 455 pp.
- Foster, John W., American Diplomacy In The Orient. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1905. 476 pp.
- Fukuyama, Junichi, and Jackson, Roderick H., The First Japanese Mission To America (1860): being a diary kept by a member of the Embassy. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1938. 85 pp.
- Cowan, Herbert H., Five Foreigners In Japan. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1936. 282 pp.
- Griffin, Eldon, Clippers And Consuls: American consular and commercial relations with Eastern Asia, 1845-1860. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1938. 502 pp.
- Griffis, William Elliot, Matthew Calbraith Perry. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1887. 425 pp.

- Griffie, William Elliot, The Mikado's Empire. Twelfth edition, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1915. 324 pp.
- , Townsend Harris, First American Envoy In Japan. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895. 345 pp.
- Gubbins, J. H., The Making Of Modern Japan. London: Seeley, Service and Company, Ltd., 1922. 316 pp.
- , The Progress Of Japan, 1853-1871. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. 315 pp.
- Hildreth, Richard, Japan As It Was And Is. Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company, 1855. 572 pp.
- Iyemaga, Toyokichi, editor, Japan's Real Attitude Toward America. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1916. 94 pp.
- Matsuda, Naoki, editor and compiler, Japan's Message To America. Tokyo, 1914. 262 pp.
- National Cyclopedia of American Biography. New York: James T. White and Company, 1892.
- Nitobe, Inazo, The Intercourse Between The United States And Japan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1891. 191 pp.
- , and others, Eastern Influences In Modern Japan: A series of papers on cultural relations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931. 523 pp.
- Norman, E. Herbert, Japan's Emergence As A Modern State. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. 242 pp.
- Obakura-Kahzo, The Awakening of Japan. New York: The Century Company, 1921. 225 pp.
- Olama, Count Shigenobu, compiler, Fifty Years Of New Japan. London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1909. 2 vols., 646 pp. and 616 pp.
- Oliphant, Laurence, Narrative Of The Earl of Elgin's Mission To China And Japan, in the years 1857, '58, '59. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859. 2 vols., 492 pp. and 496 pp.
- Paske-Smith, M., Western Barbarians In Japan And Formosa In Tokugawa Days, 1603-1868. Kobe: J.L. Thompson and Company, Ltd., 1930. 408 pp.

- Paullin, Charles O., Diplomatic Negotiations Of American Naval Officers, 1778-1885. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1912. 365 pp.
- Richardson, James Daniel, A Compilation Of The Messages and Papers Of The Presidents. New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1910. 11 vols.
- Sakunishi, Shio, editor, Some Unpublished Letters Of Townsend Harris. New York: Japan Reference Library, 1941. 71 pp.
- Sanson, George B., Japan: A Short Cultural History. Revised edition; New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1943. 535 pp.
- _____ , The Western World And Japan, A study in the interaction of European and Asiatic cultures. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. 504 pp.
- Satow, Sir Ernest Mason, translator, Kinse Shiriaku: A History of Japan From The First Visit of Commodore Perry in 1853 to the Capture of Hakodate by the Mikado's Forces in 1869, by Shozan Yashi. Tokyo: Naigwai Shuppan Kyokwai, 1908. 148 pp.
- Seward, Frederick W., William H. Seward. New York: Derby and Miller, 1891. 3 vols., 822, 638, and 552 pp.
- Seward, Olive Risley, editor, William H. Seward's Travels Around The World. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1873. 776 pp.
- Spalding, J.W., The Japan Expedition: Japan and Around the World. New York: J.S. Redfield, 1855. 377 pp.
- Treat, Payson J., Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1895. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1932. 2 vols., 593 pp. and 568 pp.
- _____ , The Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States And Japan, 1853-1865. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917. 459 pp.
- Tupper, Eleanor, and McReynolds, George B., Japan In American Public Opinion. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 454 pp.
- Uyehara, George E., The Political Development Of Japan, 1867-1909. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1910. 289 pp.
- Wada, Taijun, American Foreign Policy Towards Japan During The Nineteenth Century. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1928. 575 pp.

Walworth, Arthur, Black Ships Off Japan, The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. 278 pp.

Welles, Gideon, Diary of, Introduction and notes by John T. Morse, Jr. Boston and New York; Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1911. 3 vols., 549, 653, and 589 pp.

Wildes, Harry Emerson, Aliens In The East, A new history of Japan's foreign intercourse. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937. 349 pp.

Williams, Frederick Wells, The Life And Letters Of Samuel Wells Williams. New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889. 490 pp.

C. ARTICLES FROM LEARNED JOURNALS

Aston, W. G., "H.M.S. Phaeton at Nagasaki in 1808," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 7, Part 4. Yokohama; R. Meiklejohn and Company, Printers, 1879. Pp. 327-344.

Ballard, S., "Sketch of the Life of Watanabe Noboru," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 32. Tokyo; Rikkyo Gakuin Press, 1905. Pp. 1-23.

Callahan, James Morton, "American Relations in the Pacific and Far East 1784-1900," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 19, Nos. 1-8. Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901. Pp. 1-177.

Clement, E. W., "British Seamen and Mito Samurai in 1824," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 33, Part 2. Tokyo; Rikkyo Gakuin Press, 1905. Pp. 86-135.

Cole, Allan B., editor, "Captain David Porter's Proposed Expedition to the Pacific and Japan, 1815," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 9, March, 1940. Pp. 61-66.

Coleman, H. E., translator, "The Life of Shoin Yoshida," by Iichiro Tokutomi, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan Vol. 45, Part 1. Tokyo; Z.P. Maruya Company, 1917. Pp. 119-188.

Dennett, Tyler, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," American Historical Review, Vol. 28. New York; American Historical Association, October, 1922. Pp. 45-62.

Hayashi

"Diary of an Official of the Bakufu," translated for the Society, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, second series, Vol. 7. Tokyo: The Kyo Bun Kwan, 1930. Pp. 98-119.

Greene, D. E., "Correspondence Between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan, A.D. 1844," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 34, Part 4. Yokohama: Fukuin Printing Company, 1906. Pp. 99-133.

Hattori, Yukimasa, "The Foreign Commerce of Japan Since the Restoration, 1869-1900," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 22, Nos. 9 and 10. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, September-October, 1904. Pp. 1-79.

Hishida, Seiji G., "The International Position of Japan As A Great Power," Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. 24, No. 3. New York: Macmillan Company, 1905. Pp. 1-284.

Satow, Ernest Mason, "The Revival of Pure Shintau," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 3, Appendix. Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn and Company, Printers, 1883. Pp. 1-83.

Schwartz, William Leonard, editor, "Commodore Perry at Okinawa—from the unpublished diary of a British missionary," American Historical Review, Vol. 51. New York: American Historical Association, January, 1946. Pp. 262-276.

Treat, Payson J., "The Mikado's Ratification of the Foreign Treaties," American Historical Review, Vol. 23. New York: American Historical Association, April, 1918. Pp. 531-549.

Williams, Samuel W., "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853-1854)," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 37, Part 2. Yokohama: Fukuin Printing Company, 1910. Pp. 1-259.

D. PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"An American In Japan in 1858," Harper's Monthly, 18:228-231, January, 1859.

"Consul Harris in Japan," Littell's Living Age, 60:567-575, February, 26, 1859.

House, E. H., "Foreign Jurisdiction in Japan," New Princeton Review, 5:207-219, March, 1888.

_____, "The Martyrdom of an Empire," Atlantic Monthly, 47:610-623, May, 1881.

_____, "The Tariff in Japan," New Princeton Review, 5:66-77, January, 1888.

Hatsuyama, Makoto, "Japan and the Western Powers," North American Review, 127:406-426, November, 1878.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF THE FIRST TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN, MARCH 31, 1854

"The United States of America and the Empire of Japan, desiring to establish firm, lasting, and sincere friendship between two nations, have resolved to fix, in a manner clear and positive, by means of a treaty or general convention of peace and amity, the rules which shall in future be mutually observed in the intercourse of their respective countries; for which most desirable object the President of the United States has conferred full powers on his Commissioner, Matthew Calbraith Perry, Special ambassador of the United States to Japan; and the August Sovereign of Japan has given similar full powers to his Commissioners, Hayashi Daigaku-no-Kami; Ido, Prince of Tsus-sima; Iwaza, Prince of Mima-saki; and Udono, Member of Board of Revenue.

"And the said commissioners, after having exchanged their said full powers, and duly considered the premises, have agreed to the following articles:

"ARTICLE I. There shall be a perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America on the one hand, and the Empire of Japan on the other, and between their people respectively, without exception of persons or places.

"ARTICLE II. The port of Shimoda, in the principality of Idzu, and the port of Hakodate, in the principality of Mutsu, are granted by the Japanese as port for the reception of American ships, where they can be supplied with wood, water, provisions, and coal, and other articles their necessities may require, as far as the Japanese have them. The time for opening of the first-named port is immediately on ~~signing this treaty; the last-named port is to be opened immediately~~ after the same day in the ensuing Japanese year.

"Note—A tariff of prices shall be given by the Japanese officers ~~of the things which they can furnish, payment for which shall be made~~ in gold and silver coin.

"ARTICLE III. Whenever ships of the United States are thrown or wrecked on the coast of Japan, the Japanese vessels will assist them, and carry their crews to Shimoda or Hakodate, and hand them over to their country men, appointed to receive them; whatever articles the shipwrecked men may have reserved shall likewise be restored, and expenses incurred in the rescue and support of Americans and Japanese who may thus be thrown upon the shores of either nation are not to be refunded.

"ARTICLE IV. Those shipwrecked persons and other citizens of the United States shall be free as in other countries, and not subjected to confinement, but shall be amenable to just laws.

"ARTICLE V. Shipwrecked men and other citizens of the United States, temporarily living at Shimoda and Hakodate, shall not be ~~subject to such restrictions and confinement as the Dutch and Chinese~~

are at Nagasaki; but shall be free at Shinoda to go where they please within the limits of seven Japanese miles (or ri) from a small island in the harbor of Shinoda marked on the accompanying chart hereto appended; and shall in like manner be free to go where they please at Hakodate, within limits to be defined after the visit of the United States squadron to that place.

"ARTICLE VI. If there be any other sort of goods wanted, or any business which shall require to be arranged, there shall be careful deliberations between the parties in order to settle such matters.

"ARTICLE VII. It is agreed that ships of the United States resorting to the ports open to them shall be permitted to exchange gold and silver coin and articles of goods for other articles of goods, under such regulations as shall be temporarily established by the Japanese government for that purpose. It is stipulated, however, that ships of the United States shall be permitted to carry away whatever articles they are unwilling to exchange.

"ARTICLE VIII. Food, water, provisions, coal, and goods required shall only be procured through the agency of Japanese officers appointed for that purpose, and in no other manner.

"ARTICLE IX. It is agreed, that if at any future day the government of Japan shall grant to any other nation or nations privileges and advantages which are not herein granted to the United States and the citizens thereof, that these same privileges and advantages shall be granted likewise to the United States and to the citizens thereof, without any consultation or delay.

"ARTICLE X. Ships of the United States shall be permitted to resort to no other ports in Japan but Shimoda and Hakodate, unless in distress or forced by stress of weather.

"ARTICLE XI. There shall be appointed by the government of the United States, Consuls or Agents to reside in Shimoda, at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the signing of this treaty, provided that either of the two Governments deem such arrangement necessary.

"ARTICLE XII. The present convention having been concluded and duly signed, shall be obligatory and faithfully observed by the United States of America and Japan, and by the citizens and subjects of each respective Power, and it is to be ratified and approved by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and the August Sovereign of Japan, and the ratification shall be exchanged within eighteen months from the date of the signature thereof, or sooner if practicable.

"In faith whereof we, the respective plenipotentiaries of the United States of America and the Empire of Japan aforesaid, have signed and sealed these presents.

"Done at Kanagawa, this thirty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, and of Kayei the seventh year, third month, and third day."

APPENDIX B

THE TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

"The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the Ty-Coon (Tycoon) of Japan, desiring to establish on firm and lasting foundations the relations of peace and friendship now happily existing between the two countries, and to secure the best interest of their respective citizens and subjects by encouraging, facilitating, and regulating their industry and trade, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Amity and Commerce for this purpose, and have, therefore, named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: the President of the United States, his Excellency Townsend Harris, Consul General of the United States of America for the Empire of Japan; and his Majesty the Ty-Coon of Japan, their Excellencies Ito-no-ye (Inoue), Prince of Sinano (Shinano), and Iwasay (Iwase), Prince of Hogo (Higo); who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

"ARTICLE I. There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friendship between the United States of America and His Majesty the Ty-Coon of Japan and his successors.

"The President of the United States may appoint a Diplomatic Agent

to reside at the City of Yedo, and Consuls or Consular Agents to reside at any or all of the ports in Japan which are opened for American commerce by this Treaty. ~~The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General of the United States shall have the right to travel freely in any part of the Empire of Japan from the time they enter on the discharge of their official duties.~~

~~"The Government of Japan may appoint a Diplomatic Agent to reside at Washington, and Consuls or Consular Agents for any or all of the ports of the United States. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General of Japan may travel freely in any part of the United States from the time they arrive in the country.~~

~~"ARTICLE II. The President of the United States, at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly mediator in such matters of difference as may arise between the Government of Japan and any European Power.~~

~~"The ships-of-war of the United States shall render friendly aid and assistance to such Japanese vessels as they may meet on the high seas, so far as can be done without a breach of neutrality; and all American Consuls residing at ports visited by Japanese vessels shall also give them such friendly aid as may be permitted by the laws of the respective countries in which they reside.~~

"ARTICLE III. In addition to the ports of Simoda (Shimoda) and Hakodate (Hakodate), the following ports and towns shall be opened on the dates respectively appended to them, that is to say: Kanagawa, on the 4th of July, 1859; Nagasaki, on the 4th of July, 1859;

Nee-e-gata (Niigata), on the 1st of January, 1850; Hiogo (Hyogo), on the 1st of January, 1853.

"If Nee-e-gata (Niigata) is found to be unsuitable as a harbor, another port on the west coast of Nipon (Nippon) shall be selected by the two Governments in lieu thereof. Six months after the opening of Kanagawa, the port of Simoda (Shimoda) shall be closed as a place of residence and trade for American citizens. In all the foregoing ports and towns American citizens may permanently reside; they shall have the right to lease ground, and purchase the buildings thereon, and may erect dwellings and warehouses. But no fortification or place of military strength shall be erected under pretence of building dwellings or warehouses; and, to see that this article is observed, the Japanese authorities shall have the right to inspect, from time to time, any buildings which are being erected, altered, or repaired. The place which the Americans shall occupy for their buildings, and the harbor regulations, shall be arranged by the American Consul and the authorities of each place, and, if they cannot agree, the matter shall be referred to and settled by the American Diplomatic Agent and the Japanese Government.

"No wall, fence, or gate shall be erected by the Japanese around the place of residence of the Americans, or anything done which may prevent a free egress and ingress to the same.

"From the 1st of January, 1862, Americans shall be allowed to reside in the City of Yedo; and from the 1st of January, 1863, in the City of Osaka (Osaka), for the purposes of trade only. In each of

these two cities a suitable place within which they may hire houses, and the distance they may go, shall be arranged by the American Diplomatic Agent and the Government of Japan. Americans may freely buy from Japanese and sell to them any articles that either may have for sale, without the intervention of any Japanese officers in such purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payment for the same; and all classes of Japanese may purchase, sell, keep, or use any articles sold to them by the Americans.

"The Japanese Government will cause this clause to be made public in every part of the Empire as soon as the ratifications of this Treaty shall be exchanged.

"Munitions of war shall only be sold to the Japanese Government and foreigners.

"No rice or wheat shall be exported from Japan as cargo, but all Americans resident in Japan, and ships, for their crews and passengers, shall be furnished with sufficient supplies of the same. The Japanese Government will sell, from time to time at public auction, any surplus quantity of copper that may be produced. Americans residing in Japan shall have the right to employ Japanese as servants or in any other capacity.

"ARTICLE IV. Duties shall be paid to the Government of Japan on all goods landed in the country, and on all articles of Japanese production that are exported as cargo, according to the tariff hereunto appended.

"If the Japanese Custom House officers are dissatisfied with the

value placed on any goods by the owner, they may place a value thereon, and offer to take the goods at that valuation. If the owner refuses to accept the offer, he shall pay duty on such valuation. If the offer be accepted by the owner, the purchase-money shall be paid to him without delay, and without any abatement of discount.

"Supplies for the use of the United States navy may be landed at Kanagawa, Hakodate (Kokodate), and Nagasaki, and stored in warehouses, in the custody of an officer of the American Government, without the payment of any duty. But, if any such supplies are sold in Japan, the purchaser shall pay the proper duty to the Japanese authorities.

"The importation of opium is prohibited; and, any American vessel coming to Japan for the purposes of trade having more than three cetties (four pounds avoirdupois) weight of opium on board, such surplus quantity shall be seized and destroyed by the Japanese authorities. All goods, imported into Japan, and which have paid the duty fixed by this Treaty, may be transported by the Japanese into any part of the empire without the payment of any tax, excise, or transit duty whatever.

"No higher duties shall be paid by Americans on goods imported into Japan than are fixed by this Treaty, nor shall any higher duties be paid by Americans than are levied on the same description of goods if imported in Japanese vessels, or the vessels of any other nation.

"ARTICLE V. All foreign coin shall be current in Japan and pass for its corresponding weight of Japanese coin of the same description. Americans and Japanese may freely use foreign or Japanese coin in

making payments to each other.

"As some time will elapse before the Japanese will be acquainted with the value of foreign coin, the Japanese Government will, for the period of one year after the opening of each harbor, furnish the Americans with Japanese coin in exchange for theirs, equal weights being given and no discount taken for re-coining. Coins of all description (with the exception of Japanese copper coin) may be exported from Japan, and foreign gold and silver uncoined.

"ARTICLE VI. Americans committing offences against Japanese shall be tried in American Consular courts, and, when guilty, shall be punished according to American law. Japanese committing offences against Americans shall be tried by the Japanese authorities and punished according to Japanese law. The Consular courts shall be open to Japanese creditors, to enable them to recover their just claims against American citizens; and the Japanese courts shall in like manner be open to American citizens for the recovery of their just claims against Japanese.

"All claims for forfeitures or penalties for violations of this Treaty, or of the Articles regulating trade which are appended hereunto, shall be sued for in the Consular courts, and all recoveries shall be delivered to the Japanese authorities.

"Neither the American or Japanese Governments are (sic.) to be held responsible for the payment of any debts contracted by their respective citizens or subjects.

"ARTICLE VII. In the opened harbors of Japan, Americans shall be

free to go where they please, within the following limits:

"At Kanagawa, the River Logo (Rokugo) (which empties into the Bay of Yedo between Kawasaki and Sinagawa), and 10 ri in any other direction.

"At Hakodade (Hakodate), to 10 ri in any direction.

"At Hiogo (Hyogo), 10 ri in any direction, that of Kioto (Kyoto) excepted, which city shall not be approached nearer than 10 ri. The crews of vessels resorting to Hiogo shall not cross the River Enagawa, which empties into the Bay between Hiogo and Osaca (Osaka). The distance shall be measured inland from Goyoso (Goyoshi), or town hall of each of the foregoing harbors, the ri being equal to 4,275 yards American measure.

"At Nagasaki, Americans may go into any part of the Imperial domain in its vicinity. The boundaries of Nee-a-gata (Niigata), or the place that may be substituted for it, shall be settled by the American Diplomatic Agent and the Government of Japan. Americans who have been convicted of felony, or twice convicted of misdemeanors, shall not go more than one Japanese ri inland from the places of their respective residences, and all persons so convicted shall lose their right of permanent residence in Japan, and the Japanese authorities may require them to leave the country.

"A reasonable time shall be allowed to all such persons to settle their affairs, and the American Consular authority shall, after an examination into the circumstances of each case, determine the time to be allowed, but such time shall not in any case exceed one year, to be

calculated from the time the person shall be free to attend to his affairs.

"ARTICLE VIII. Americans in Japan shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and for this purpose shall have the right to erect suitable places of worship. No injury shall be done to such buildings, nor any insult be offered to the religious worship of the Americans. American citizens shall not injure any Japanese temple or shrine, or offer any insult or injury to Japanese religious ceremonies, or to the objects of their worship.

"The Americans and Japanese shall not do anything that may be calculated to excite religious animosity. The Government of Japan has already abolished the practice of trampling on religious emblems.

"ARTICLE IX. When requested by the American Consul, the Japanese authorities will cause the arrest of all deserters and fugitives from justice, receive in jail all persons held as prisoners by the Consul, and give to the Consul such assistance as may be required to enable him to enforce the observance of the laws by the Americans who are on land, and to maintain order among the shipping. For all such service, and for the support of prisoners kept in confinement, the Consul shall in all cases pay a just compensation.

"ARTICLE X. The Japanese Government may purchase or construct in the United States ships-of-war, steamers, merchant ships, whale ships, cannon, munitions of war, and arms of all kinds, and any other things it may require. It shall have the right to engage in the United States scientific, naval and military men, artisans of all kinds, and

mariners to enter into its service. All purchases made for the Government of Japan may be exported from the United States, and all persons engaged for its service may freely depart from the United States; provided that no articles that are contraband of war shall be exported, nor any persons engaged to act in a naval or military capacity, while Japan shall be at war with any Power in amity with the United States.

"ARTICLE XII. The Articles for the regulation of trade, which are appended to this Treaty, shall be considered as forming a part of the same, and shall be equally binding on both the Contracting Parties to this Treaty, and on their citizens and subjects.

"ARTICLE XIII. Such of the provisions of the Treaty made by Commodore Perry, and signed at Kanagawa, on the 31st of March, 1854, as conflict with the provisions of this Treaty are hereby revoked; and, as all the provisions of a Convention executed by the Consul General of the United States and the Governors of Simoda (Shimoda), on the 17th of June, 1857, are incorporated in this Treaty, that Convention is also revoked.

"The person charged with the diplomatic relations of the United States in Japan, in conjunction with such person or persons as may be appointed for that purpose by the Japanese Government, shall have power to make such rules and regulations as may be required to carry into full and complete effect the provisions of this Treaty, and the provisions of the Articles regulating trade appended thereto.

"ARTICLE XIII. After the 4th of July, 1872, upon the desire of

either the American or Japanese Governments, and on one year's notice given by either party, this Treaty, and such portions of the Treaty of Kanagawa as remain unrevoked by this Treaty, together with the regulations of trade herewith annexed, or those that may be hereafter introduced, shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who will be empowered to decide on, and insert therein, such amendments as experience shall prove to be desirable.

"ARTICLE XIV. This Treaty shall go into effect on the 4th of July, 1859, on or before which day the ratifications of the same shall be exchanged at the City of Washington; but if, from any unforeseen cause, the ratifications cannot be exchanged by that time, the Treaty shall still go into effect at the date above mentioned.

"The act of ratification on the part of the United States shall be verified by the signature of the President of the United States, countersigned by the Secretary of State, and sealed with the seal of the United States.

"The act of ratification on the part of Japan shall be verified by the name and seal of His Majesty the Ty-Coon, and by the seals and signatures of such of his high officers as he may direct.

"This Treaty is executed in quadruplicate, each copy being written in the English, Japanese, and Dutch languages, all the versions having the same meaning and intention, but the Dutch version shall be considered as being the original.

"In witness whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have

hereunto set their hands and seals, at the City of Yedo, this 29th day of July, in the year of Our Lord 1858, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-third, corresponding to the Japanese era, the 19th day of the 6th month of the 5th year of Ansei, Ema (year of the horse)."

TYPED BY:

Mary E. (Betty) Mack

