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**DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE  
UNITED STATES AND HAITI**


By

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## Preface

An adequate study of the diplomatic relations of the United States and Haiti cannot be made by the use of United States printed documents alone. A clear comprehensive picture can only be obtained by using the documents of both governments.

The purpose of this paper is to trace the problems arising between the two republics which finally resulted in the domination of the weak by the strong. As far as the author is able to determine no special study of the American-Haitian relations prior to 1914 has been made. The questions of controversy discussed in Part I throw much light on the Haitian character and help us to better understand the nation over which the United States has felt obliged to exercise a protective policy. In H. P. Davis' "Black Democracy", Millspaugh's "Haiti Under American Control", and Belch's "Occupied Haiti", there is no treatment of the material utilized in this part of the paper.

The subjects of the second part of the paper have been given attention in the above mentioned works. As the printed sources available to the author for this portion were limited it constitutes merely a narrative of the events of the intervention in 1915 with the authors own conclusions.

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## PART I

### RELATIONS BEFORE 1914

The island of Haiti lying about 1200 miles south of New York City forms the second link in the chain of islands inclosing the Caribbean Sea. Its nearness to the Panama Canal and its position between Cuba and Porto Rico has made its welfare of great importance to the United States.

Its area, about 20,000 square miles is unequally divided between the Republic of Haiti in the west and the Republic of Santo Domingo in the east. The territory is very mountainous making travel difficult and expensive and causing much variation in climate. The rainfall varies from 12 to 150 inches, the southwestern portion receiving an abundance while the North is dry and barren. Occasional hurricanes visit the land and often do considerable damage to the cities lying on the coasts. There are small mineral deposits of copper and gold but the chief source of livelihood is the rich fertile soil. In the future the forests may prove a source of wealth, but at present inadequate means of transportation have left them practically untouched. Agriculture is slowly improving under American intervention.

The Republic of Haiti comprises about one third of the total area of the island and has an estimated population of about 2,000,000. The lower classes which make up 60 per cent of the total, appear to be of pure negro stock. Most of these live in the rural districts and carry on a crude type of agriculture. Axes, hoes and plows are seldom seen, practically the only agricultural tool being the machete. With these

all clearing, plowing and cultivation is accomplished. Naturally the employment of such methods does not yield large returns. Coffee, before 1915, was not cultivated but picked from wild plants. The prosperous farms are few and the peasant manage to barely exist. Their houses are constructed of splints woven over a frame work of poles and plastered with mud. The floor is the ground on which the hut is built while glass windows are almost unknown. No furniture, not even beds, are to be seen and the cooking is done over an open fire. Wells are practically unknown, the chief water supply being numerous small streams. The language of this rural class is Creole, a mixture of French, Spanish and African dialects with a few dozen English words. Their religion is theoretically Roman Catholic but so many African Voodoo rites have been introduced that it can scarcely be recognized. Even the upper classes of Haitians still retain Voodoo beliefs, several of the presidents being Voodoo priests. Animals are often deified and a small amount of human sacrifice still exists.

Nearly all marketing was carried on by women. Men scarcely ever left their homes and entered a town for fear of being drafted into military service or of being captured by Cacos and made to serve in their bandit bands which infested the northern mountain regions.

The Caco bands were rude organizations who lived by plundering and aiding presidential aspirants who wished to overthrow the existing government. These bandits possessed no loyalty to any one administration but were ready to give their support to the highest bidder. They were feared by all people and absolutely controlled elections, for nearly the whole life of the Republic of Haiti the Cacos kept the nation in turmoil. The ignorant peasant who understood nothing of government organization could never be sure on leaving his home that it would still be there when he

returned. Had the government been capable of putting down the Gases, Haiti would never have been plunged into the economic, financial and political chaos which brought on the intervention by America in 1915.

The more intelligent classes of Haitians are of a different type than the masses. In fact there are "two Haitis" within one nation, the class just described who dwell in the rural places, and the "elite" who live in the cities. Besides being educated and cultured the elite are largely mulatto. Their civilization and ideals are not very different from our own. Their homes and home life is practically the same as in the United States. A distinction is made between the mulattoes and negro, the former considering themselves far superior to the latter. Political parties founded on color basis have been active from time to time.

The upper classes are also the governing classes. The greatest opportunities for the gaining of wealth were public offices. That grafting would be employed by a new president was almost as certain to occur as the inaugural address. Every citizen knew that if he could secure the support of enough Caca bands he could make himself president. One of the oldest business firms stated that before 1915 the profits were made by dodging custom dues. A mention of a few figures drawn from history backs up the statement that presidential aspirants were numerous. From the proclamation of independence in 1804 to the American occupation in 1915, a period of 103 years, 24 presidents were inaugurated. Of these 17 were deposed by revolution. Only two of the 24 retired peacefully, eleven served less than one year each, one was poisoned, one blown up in his palace and two were murdered. The term for which a president was elected was seven years but only eight managed to maintain their office the full period.

The facts just related should not lower in the estimation the ability of the Haitians. In establishing a Democracy the Haitians were try-



ing to take a step which it has taken other nations centuries to accomplish. When we consider that the greater part of the total population is scarcely one generation removed from savagery it is impossible to conceive of its attaining the level of others who are backed by experiment, experience and tradition. The theory of equality of opportunity thrust upon an untutored nation is similar to bestowing ten pounds of candy on a small boy, he eats until he becomes ill.

On December 6, 1492 Columbus entered the harbor of Male Saint Nicholas naming the whole island Hispaniola. The land was peopled by an indolent kindly tribe of Indians which were soon completely exterminated by the incoming whites. Up to 1625 the island was a Spanish colony in the hands of a few ruthless plantation owners.

In 1625 the French speculators and buccaneers began to settle in the island and gradually extend their control at the expense of the Spanish. The cultivation of indigo, sugar cane and coffee created such a demand for African slave labor that in 1791 these black slaves constituted nine tenths of the entire population. During the year 1791 the white people created a "General Assembly of the French Part of Saint Domingue" which made them nearly independent of France. The colored freedmen together with the mulattoes, many of whom were wealthy planters were given no political rights. Later the clamor of the freedmen and mulattoes became so loud and threatening that the whites were forced to concede to them equal political rights.

In 1794 the French National Convention abolished slavery in all French colonies. In July 1801 inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution and led by their national hero Toussaint L'Ouverture Haiti made her first declaration of independence. Napoleon, dictator of France, sent troops under his brother-in-law, Leclerc, to reduce the colony to

obedience and restore slavery. In this enterprise he received the support and assistance of the whites. Toussaint was captured and sent to France but the Haitians found able leaders in Dessalines and Christophe; their cause being greatly aided by the renewal of the struggle in Europe between France and England. In 1803 Dessalines became Emperor and issued a proclamation for the massacre of all the whites. Neither men, women or children were spared resulting in the complete extermination of the white population.

In 1822 the Spanish portion of the island was united with the Republic of Haiti only to secede again in 1844. The two peoples have since remained separate.

The independence of Haiti was recognized by Great Britain in 1825 and by France in 1830. But the United States delayed recognition until 1862. The southern sections of the United States feared that the recognition of a nation made up of black slaves who had risen in revolt against their white masters would have an ill influence on their own slaves.

On December 8, 1861, in his annual message to Congress, President Lincoln recommended to Congress that an appropriation for maintaining a charge 'd' affaires in Haiti be made. On July 12, 1862 Benjamin F. Whidden was appointed commissioner and consul general to Haiti. In 1864 a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation was signed between the two countries.

Between 1864 and 1868 however, the United States had had relations with Haiti. During the Civil War the United States leased Mole St. Nicholas for a coaling station. In 1861 an unsuccessful attempt was made to renew the lease.

From 1862 to 1900 our relations with Haiti were practically unimportant. Due to the frequent revolutions the United States often found

it necessary to send war ships to Haitian waters to protect Americans, but the acts were never of an aggressive nature. The diplomatic problems of this period may be classed under three heads, (1) those relating to questions of asylum afforded refugees who fled from Haitian authorities, (2) those concerning the abrogation of the treaty of 1866, and (3) the Syrians.

All through Haitian History there has scarcely been a time when political refugees could not be found in one or more of the several foreign legations established at Port au Prince or at the Consulates in other parts of the Republic.

The constant changes in the administration, usually accompanied by a revolution, tended to create scores of political refugees. The usual procedure for a revolution was for a leader in the northern mountain regions to capture some town, secure the assistance of a few Caco bands and march toward Port au Prince, the capital. The president whose army rapidly deserted him soon fled to a foreign country, or in cases where time was limited, sought protection in a foreign legation. Not only was the president forced to flee but his cabinet members, loyal army officers and sympathetic members of the Congress were regarded as enemies of the incoming administration. Often as many as twenty refugees could be found in a legation at one time. From the time of the Hon. Hamilton Fish the United States State Department had instructed its diplomatic representatives in Haiti not to give shelter to persons fleeing from Haitian authorities, but were difficult to carry out for two reasons. In the first place "the one you refuse shelter today is apt to be the executive the week or month after, in which case, for this indiscretion, if it may be so termed, the country that you represent suffers in its diplomatic relations, or else a request is conveyed to

to your government for your recall. Secondly, "one is compelled by the dictator of humanity to give shelter and protection an applicant, especially when he knows that in so doing he is saving the life of a fellow creature, who for the time being is under the displeasure of those in authority; or, it not, that saves him from one who is in excess of passion needs to wreak his vengeance upon another, under the guise that it is done for the Republic or government. Many times life has been saved by the prompt action of the several legations in affording protection to those who were persecuted for some unknown cause."

While thus benefiting those seeking asylum legations were often placed in embarrassing positions by these refugees. Many times the refugee had from within his asylum formulated plans and given aid which resulted in the overthrow of the government in power. While this was done unknown to the foreign representative it nevertheless made him appear as a conspirator in a plot to destroy the government. It was impossible for the head of a foreign legation to differentiate the worthy refugee from the one who merely wished a secure place from which to instigate plots.

Another particularly unpleasant feature in connection with this problem was the fact that all expense of maintaining the refugees in the foreign legation had to be borne from the minister's own purse. As the legation was none too comfortable under normal conditions the presence of one, two or a dozen refugees made quarters extremely crowded. On July 17, 1902, W. F. Rowell, American Minister to Haiti requested that the State Department send a definite set of rules defining who should be granted asylum and requiring that all refugees granted asylum furnish their own means of subsistence. This request was refused by A. Adee, acting Secretary of State.

When the question was again brought to the attention of the State

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Department in 1909, Elihu Root, Secretary of State, wrote to our minister, Mr. Purnice, stating that the United States did not recognize the right of asylum and that no more Haitian refugees should be admitted to shelter, and that no pretext should be afforded for re-opening the question so far as the Government of the United States was concerned. This announcement was published in Haiti in May, 1909. The Haitian Government expressed their appreciation for this act in a note to Bacon, acting Secretary of State, July, 17, 1909.

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The second important question coming up during the period from 1864 to 1916 was that concerning the abrogation of the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, which had been negotiated in 1800, the same year in which Haitian independence was recognized by the United States. The articles of the treaty giving rise to controversy were II, which stipulated most-favored-nation treatment, III, a statement of the causes of war, IV, a guarantee that property of citizens of one party residing in the territory of the other would not be confiscated in time of war, and V stating that "citizens of the high contracting parties residing or established in the territories of the other shall be exempt from all compulsory military duty by sea or by land, and from all forced loans or military exactions or requisitions; nor shall they be compelled to pay and contribute whatever higher or other than those that are or may be paid by native citizens."

On October 24, 1876 the Haitian Government passed a bill requiring that all foreigners, before opening a place of business must apply to the President of Haiti for a license. This license had to be renewed yearly but there was no charge for it excepting 15 cents for the stamped paper on which it was granted. On obtaining this license the merchant applied to the commercial council, which issued him a patent, for which he paid according to the tariff of the patent law. In August 1908 a new law was published requiring that the request for a license be accompanied by a receipt of the National Bank of Haiti testifying to the payment of a

license tax. Haitians were not to be subject to this tax. Our minister to Haiti, Mr. Battiste, protested against this law contending that it was a violation of Article V of the treaty of 1864.<sup>11</sup> The Haitian minister in Washington as well as the minister of Foreign Relations at home defended the law on the ground that article V was only a continuation of articles III and IV which provided for the safeguarding of the interests of the contracting parties in time of war. However justified this argument may have been the Haitian had spoiled its effectiveness by a previous admission of the American interpretation by acquiescence to the protocol of arbitration for the claims of J. D. Mityger and Company on October 18, 1899.<sup>12</sup> In this particular instance the Haitians had attempted to collect license from employees of Mityger and Company claiming that they were foreign clerks and their subject to a tax. Wm. R. Day who arbitrated the case awarded Mityger and Company \$5000, the basis of his decision being that the collection of these taxes was a violation of the treaty of 1864. Haiti accepted this decision of the treaty of 1864 and paid the \$5000. Soon after this, regarding other cases on the same topic, Mr. St. Victor the Haitian minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the United States minister, Mr. Powell, stating that, "in the meantime I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that my government gives its adhesion to the interpretation of article V of the Haitian-American Treaty of 1864 in the sense indicated by the Government of the United States of America."<sup>13</sup> This admittance of the correctness of the American interpretation successfully refuted the Haitian contention, so on March 16, 1904 Powell reported to the State Department that a higher license would not be demanded of Americans in business in Haiti.

Having failed in enforcing the law of 1903 against Americans the Haitian Government now tried to make it effective by arbitrarily denying foreigners a license to do business. Several firms applying in the

usual way for a license received the reply that a reasonable length of  
time would be given them to liquidate their business. When informed by  
Mr. Hay that the United States would not tolerate any such action the  
licenses were immediately granted. But on May 7, 1900, J. E. Leger the  
Haitian minister at Washington gave notice to Secretary of State, Hay,  
that the "treaty of 1808 would cease to be binding at the expiration of  
one year." A desire was expressed by him to negotiate a new treaty.  
The matter was thus settled for the time. Due to an unbroken series of  
revolutions and the constantly changing government no new treaty was  
negotiated with Haiti until the country was occupied by American marines  
in 1915.

The third question and that creating the greatest amount of friction  
was that concerning the naturalized citizens of the United States of  
Syrian origin in Haiti.

In 1900 there were in the various cities of Haiti about 200 Syrians  
who claimed to be American citizens, about 20 who claimed to be British,  
and about 400 who were under the protection of the French minister but  
were not citizens of France. These people were nearly all retail mer-  
chants and carried on a thriving business, some as actual shop keepers  
in the cities and some as peddlers who carried their packs into the in-  
terior and served the peasant at his door. Since 1870 there had existed  
in Haiti a law which forbade foreigners to carry on a retail business,  
but the law had never been strictly enforced. All foreigners engaged  
in business were required to apply each year to the Government for a  
license; without this license no firm could take goods from the custom  
houses. The Syrians in Haiti were extremely thrifty and could live more  
cheaply than Haitians from the same merchant class. They did much credit  
business and were persevering in visiting every home in the mountains

districts. By their frugal habits the Syrians forced many Haitian merchants to close their stores and the Haitian peonage to look for other employment. These small Haitian merchants demanded of the government that no more Syrians should be allowed to enter the country and that those who were already there should be forced to leave. In 1903 this clamor had become so loud that the government was obliged to pass a law excluding Syrians from its territory.

The charges brought against the Syrians were: (1) favoring the overthrow of the government and being in communication with its enemies, (2) being responsible for the scarcity of metallic currency, and trying to ship it from the country, (3) smuggling goods in and out of the country thus causing the government to lose the custom duties, (4) endeavoring to counterfeit the paper currency, (5) on leaving the country naturalized Syrians had given their papers to others who were not citizens but wished to enter and (6) they spent little money in the country and as soon as a sufficient sum was secured they left and others arrived to take their place. During the months of August and September, 1914, several cases of fraudulent naturalizations were discovered but they were not sufficient to condemn the whole Syrian population.

In 1903 a law for the exclusion of Syrians was passed. It provided: (1) from its promulgation "no individual called Syrian or their names in the popular language, shall be admitted into the territory of the Republic; (2) the President of the Republic should grant no Syrian a license to open any commercial establishment except that of a consignee merchant; (3) the Syrians who already possessed licenses could not have them renewed. (A delay of six months would be given them to liquidate their business); (4) no Syrian could have more than one commercial establishment; (5) for fines and imprisonments in cases of violations of the law. This law was



proclaimed June 8, 1904 and Powell was informed by the Secretary of foreign affairs that it did not apply to American citizens of Syrian origin who were operating stores in Haiti.

Six months after the proclamation all Syrian stores were to be closed. Several days before the closing was to take place Powell ordered that on that date all Americans of Syrian origin should close theirs in order to prevent disturbances among the lower classes. When they attempted to open their stores a few days later stones and other missiles were thrown through the windows. Powell called the attention of the Haitian government to the matter and was assured that these Americans would be properly protected.

On March 18, 1905 the President of Haiti issued a proclamation ordering all Syrians to leave the Republic by April 1. Many of those affected by this proclamation had goods in the customs houses which they would be unable to take out and sell before that date, and the Haitian authorities would permit them to return these goods to the firms from which they were purchased. Since most of the goods came from Americans, whose firms were thus given grounds for asking indemnity from the Haitian Government. When Mr. Powell explained this situation to the Haitian officials they consented to the return of the goods to the firm from which they had been ordered.

On April 1 the Syrian shops were all closed and by April 5 many Haitians who had been previously unable to compete, opened their stores. The effect upon the poorer classes was felt immediately. All types of merchandise and provisions advanced in price from fifteen to twenty per cent. Even among the better to do classes the change was felt. Bread and meat could be purchased only by the wealthy, while fruit and vegetables, which were plentiful were difficult to obtain due to the outrageous price asked for them. The cost of living was doubled, many were forced to sell their clothing in order to get food.

As the above order was not to apply to Syrians who were naturalized Americans it was Powell's view that the United States had no grievance. On June 9, 1905 the Haitian minister at Washington wrote to the acting Secretary of State, Loomis and asked what attitude the United States would take if a Syrian, who had through naturalization become a citizen of the United States, should now try to enter Haiti and establish a residence there. He explained that the Syrian situation in Haiti was identical with that of the Chinese in the United States. Loomis did not take any position on the question as no actual case had arisen requiring action. On August 5, however, a case did arise. Mr. Mansour Arreff an American citizen of Syrian origin, reported that the consul-general of Haiti at New York had refused to vise her passport. Loomis protested to Mr. Legor stating that the law was ambiguous in its definition of a Syrian. He also contended that all American citizens should be treated the same. Legor replied stating that the law contemplated the "origin of the person and not his adopted nationality." The United States at this time refused to recognize the similarity of her own Chinese exclusion acts and the Haitian-Syrian exclusion acts. We insisted that all American citizens be given equal rights.

During the summer of 1905 several cases arose where the American Syrian citizens were arbitrarily denied a license to do business. After investigating the cases Loomis, October 20, 1905, instructed Powell to demand that these licenses be granted.

All this controversy took place during the term of General Nord Alexis, President of Haiti (1902-1908). General Nord was deposed by a revolution in December, 1908, and his place was taken by F. Antoine Simon. During Simon's administration and the one year term of Leconte, the question was allowed to rest, but it was reopened in 1911.

On November 26, 1911, the Haitian State Department notified the United States minister, Mr. Furness, that the Haitian Government had renewed the

United States minister, Mr. Furness, that the Haitian Government had renewed the attack against foreign merchants, and that they intended to enforce the law of 1878 forbidding foreigners to sell at retail. (The only American merchants carrying on a retail business were of Syrian origin). A time limit was set for the liquidation of forces and the legations of Germany, France, Great Britain, Dominica and Cuba all protested against the revolution to enforce it. The reply of the United States State Department to this proposed enforcement of Haitian law brought no protest but merely a request that "Syrian firms in Haiti, of American nationality be given an adequate time to wind up their affairs." The reason why our government had now changed its attitude is not clear. Panama which was now virtually a protectorate of the United States had passed a similar law excluding persons of Syrian origin regardless of their nationality. In the case of Panama we recognized that their Syrian situation bore a strange likeness to our own Chinese problem, so it seemed a matter of consistency to recognize the same principle for Haiti.

On February 9, 1912, the British ambassador informed the United States Secretary of State that "His Majesty's Government cannot submit to such treatment of British subjects and failing compliance of the (Haitian) Government (His Majesty's Government) will be obliged to send ships of war to the Port of Prince." The United States acting Secretary of State, Wilson, replied that his action would not be justified in view of "the applicable principles of international law, in disputing the right of Haiti to exclude from its territory persons classed as undesirable by its local law upon avowed considerations of economic and political necessity." The United States refused to take steps to dispute the right of Haiti to her law. Great Britain never carried out

her threat.

There were, however, in Haiti some American citizens of Syrian origin who had become naturalized before the Haitian exclusion law of 1903. As these could not have been naturalized with an intent of avoiding the law, Haiti agreed that they should be allowed to continue in business. American citizens of Syrian origin could go to Haiti for business purposes and remain for short periods. This agreement should have settled the matter as it left only a few Syrians in Haiti but the Government officials continued to annoy them. It was learned by Furniss that the Government's intention was to make things so unpleasant for those remaining Syrians that they would of their own free will leave. Furniss reported that these people were prosperous, law abiding persons and were as much a credit to the United States as its citizens of other origins.

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On May 5, 1913 the Department of State informed the Haitian legation that the United States would "take all necessary measures to insure to the American citizens in question the protection and freedom from molestation which the Government now requests for them." On May 29, 1913, Furniss reported that the anti-Syrian campaign was at an end. Since then the question has not been opened.

The Syrians constituted the only immigrant group which has entered Haiti. In the Syrian exclusion acts the United States upheld Haiti in opposition to other foreign powers. During this period 1864-1913 no aggressive acts toward Haiti was made by the United States. In 1907 the United States had assumed control of customs in the Dominican Republic but no similar action was suggested regarding Haiti. Since the American occupation about 200 Syrians have again entered Haiti and are engaged in business enterprises.

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## PART II

### AMERICAN INTERVENTION

The intervention of the United States in Haiti was brought about by a complication of internal political and financial conditions which had been attracting the attention of foreign countries for several years. By 1915 revolutions had become an annual event in this republic. From 1911 to the election of Philippe Sudre Dartinguenave in 1915, six presidents held office, the overthrow of five being caused by revolutions. The circumstances under which the intervention of the United States came about may be classed under two heads: 1. Internal political strife and revolution creating financial situations which could not be ignored by foreign powers. 2. The fear in America that some European power, Germany in particular, might intervene and gain control of the island.

In 1910 the charter of the Banque Nationale was cancelled due to mismanagement and the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti was organized to take its place. The citizens of each foreign nation holding claims against the Haitian Government participated in this organization. German interests, which practically controlled the commerce of Haiti were at first opposed to any participation by Americans but the French insisted so that when the final arrangement was made, 2500 shares went to Disconto Gesellschaft, 6000 to three New York banking houses of close German affiliations, 2000 to the National City Bank of New York, and the rest of the 40,000 shares, save a very few which were held by Haitians, were held in France. The bank possessed a French charter and was therefore considered a French institution. The Government of Haiti owned no stock nor did it

furnish any of the capital, the only relation between the two being found in contracts making the Bank the depository of the government and providing for a loan by the Bank to the government of 3,000,000 francs. The Bank was to receive all government revenues and make payments therefrom for the accounts of the government, and have the exclusive note issuing privilege maintaining a gold reserve equal to one third of the amount of notes issued. The principal aim of the Bank was an entire monetary reform. In August, 1910, President Simon had secured a loan from a syndicate of French, German and American bankers of 85,000,000 francs bearing interest at five percent. Ten million francs were set aside for the retirement of government bills. The proceeds of the rest of the loan were to be used for the payment of the government debt to the old bank and for the retirement of internal debts. This loan was secured by a tax of one dollar on each hundred pounds of coffee exported and by a surtax of 15 percent on import duties. Besides these contracts and agreements the Bank had made, each year, a convention with the government by which the sums necessary to meet the governmental expenses were advanced.

The finances of Haiti had never been in good condition. In 1825 the price demanded by Charles X the French king for recognition placed a debt upon the new born country of 150,000,000 francs. In the almost continuous chain of revolutions the government was forced to borrow money at exceedingly high rates. The revolutionary leaders borrowed from merchants, mostly French and German, promising that if the revolution was successful the debt would be paid from the national treasury. Foreign loans were paid at the sacrifice of salaries and the resulting claims were bought up by

clause which reserves to the Bank the exclusive privilege to issue paper currency. In the meantime Davila Theodore had been successful in his revolution and was elected President November 13, 1914. Theodore's financial position was extremely embarrassing. He possessed no money with which to pay his base chiefs and the unpaid soldiers of the Republic were not interested in fighting the cart-burets in the north. The Bank as receiver of customs duties, which were practically pledged to guarantee loans, held all the revenues of the nation and as the convention budgetaire had not been renewed they refused to advance any money to the government. Theodore could see no other way out than to issue 12,000,000 gourdes in treasury notes, which were accepted for a time but the refusal of the Bank to recognize them soon made them worthless. As Theodore's position depended upon the immediate securing of funds, he threatened to resort by force to the gold held in the Bank for the redemption of paper currency. When news of this threat reached the New York office the Bank at Port au Prince was told to prepare the gold for shipment. The Bank did not dare to transport the funds for fear of seizure, so on December 3 the New York office requested that Secretary of State Bryan authorize the first United States warship leaving Port au Prince to transfer the money. The U. S. S. Machias was sent to Port au Prince for this purpose. As there was considerable excitement in the streets at the time the American minister, Blanchard, was authorized to land as many marines as he deemed necessary for the safe conveyance of the gold to the Machias. On December 17, unarmed marines were landed and \$500,000 in gold removed from the vaults of the Bank. The Haitian

Government through their minister at Washington protested to this act stating that the funds removed were "allotted for the redemption of paper money and unquestionably and exclusively belonged to the Haitian nation."

The right of the Bank to remove these funds may be disputed. It is true that the money was loaned to the Haitian Government, but it was at the same time pledged for the redemption of paper currency. Had the money been withdrawn by President Theodore there is no doubt that it would have been used to pay off the Cass chiefs who had helped put him in power. If this had occurred the following revolutions would probably have been postponed but certainly not forestalled. With no backing the paper currency would have dropped to a value of zero and the country would have developed a state of anarchy. It must also be noted that the stand of the Bank was supported by the most prominent lawyers in Haiti."

On December 31, 1914 Haitian officials took from the vaults of the Bank \$60,010, placed seals on the safe containing the balance of the retirement fund and promulgated a law for the creation of a new bank and a liberal issue of paper money. The United States protested stating that the Bank was "owned and operated by Americans and other foreigners," to which the Haitian Government replied that article 23 of the contract prohibited diplomatic intervention and since the Bank was a French corporation the fact that a French legation was maintained in Haiti excluded in any way American intervention. In answer to this the United States replied that in case the Bank was forced



to close, the United States would refuse to recognize any forfeiture of the charter.

On February 9, the depository and all other treasury functions were taken from the Bank and various merchants, designated by the Haitian officials were entrusted with the custom receivership. The Government was ignoring all interest and sinking fund payments on foreign debts. Protests were made by the American and French legations. The treasury service remained out of the Bank until American intervention.

A second dispute of the Haitian Governments which must be considered in connection with intervention is that with the National Railroad of Haiti. August 5, 1910 an American, James P. McDonald, secured a contract from the Haitian Government, supposedly by bribing the Haitian Congress, which provided that "two unfinished lines of railroad, one from Cap-Haitien to Port au Prince and Archaie, and the other from Gonaives to Hinche and Gros Morne, should be consolidated into one system." The term of the concession was fifty years, the government guaranteeing 6 per cent interest on bonds issued by the company up to a total construction cost of \$35,000 per mile plus a payment of one per cent for sinking funds. By another concession McDonald secured control over a stretch of land twenty kilometers on either side of the railroad for the cultivation of bananas. This concession included about 1/3 of the total area of the country. The President Antoine Simon, withheld his approval of this act for several days. It is alleged that his approval was finally obtained through bribery. McDonald managed to hold a conversation with Celeste

tine Sison, a vedee priestess, and daughter of the President over whom she exercised much influence. McDonald informed Celestine that all princesses of Europe possessed costly jewels and asked to see hers. When the lady replied that she had none McDonald displayed a string of pearls stating that when the President signed the railway concession they would be hers. The act was signed this same afternoon and by evening Celestine was the proud owner of the pearls, said to have cost the crown but five dollars.<sup>16</sup>

The bond issues made by the company were floated in France. In 1911, however, the company went bankrupt and came under control of interests closely connected with the National City Bank, of New York City, which had not been repaid for a loan made to the company. McDonald was no longer in the company. Roger L. Farnham, an employee of the National City Bank had become president in 1911.

By 1914 only three disconnected stretches of road had been built, one from Ford au Prince to St. Marc, a distance of 6 miles, another, a twenty mile stretch from Emory to Conaiver and a third from Cape Haitian to the logwood country. In all there were about 110 miles of track. The government made two interest payments on the \$3,345,000 worth of bonds which were issued and then refused to make further payments stating that the company had not completed the road and thus failed to fulfill its contract which provided for a complete road and not three unconnected projections.<sup>16</sup> Mr. Farnham declared that the terms of the contract provided that payments should be made for each section of the road that was built and that revolutions had prevented the completion of the work. Mr. Farnham's interpretation of the contract is correct, but before 1915 there were no revolutions to

to interfere with construction. The death of Leconte in 1912 and Auguste in 1912 were not accompanied by any revolutionary movements. The revolution led by Oreste in 1913 and 1914 did tend to hinder all types of industry throughout the country, but construction had already stopped.

As the company was making no further effort to complete the road the government informed Mr. Farnham that on September 27, 1914, it would foreclose, declaring that Article II of the contract required that five sections of the road be completed annually unless prevented by force. Farnham protested to the United States, stating that such procedure was in violation of Article X of the concession.<sup>17</sup> Secretary Bryan instructed Blanchard to inform the Haitian Government that if it intended to foreclose the "United States will feel compelled to take such measures for the safeguarding of the right of this company as it may deem necessary." The Haitians pointed out that Article XVI of the contract prohibited absolutely any diplomatic intervention regarding the interpretation of the contract, and that in case a dispute did arise the contract called for arbitration. Apparently Bryan recognized the Haitian contention as correct because in reply to their arguments he asked that a three months stay of proceedings be granted the company during which period the United States would endeavor to secure the naming of an arbitration commission to settle matters. This time extension was granted. After Jean Vilbrun Guillaume, Sam became president further extension were granted so<sup>18</sup> that actual foreclosure never took place.

That the Bank desired American control of customs was never denied by the officials and is conclusively shown in the message from Smith to Bryan.<sup>19</sup>

As the Railroad Company was closely affiliated with the Bank, it was merely an added voice in the call for intervention.

Lying at the root of the financial distress of Haiti were the political quarrels and revolutions which were taking place at the time. The intervention which took place in 1915 was not the first time that American Battle ships had appeared in Haitian waters. In 1868, 1869, 1870, 1888, 1889, 1892, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1909, 1911, 1912 and 1913 situations had arisen where our representatives had deemed the presence of a battle ship necessary for the protection of foreign life and prosperity.

During the short term of Senator Michel Oreste the government was chiefly occupied in trying to suppress an insurrection in the north caused by opposition to Oreste's effort to reduce military expenditures. On January 5, 1914, Minister Smith reported that the situation at Port au Prince was "exceedingly grave" and suggested that a naval vessel be sent at an early date. January 27, President Oreste left the city and sought refuge aboard the German war ship Veneta. As there was now nobody to maintain order at Port au Prince, France, Germany and the United States landed marines and seaman as logation guards and to protect their respective nationalities, this act of foreign powers tended to pacify the city. On February 9, Oreste was elected president by the assembly and Mr. Smith asked if he should recognize the government. In the reply of Secretary Bryan, February 26, 1914, we gain the first knowledge of any desire on the part of the United States for a custom control of Haiti.

"You will immediately seek an interview with the minister of

of Foreign Affairs of the de facto government of Port au Prince and state to him that the Government of the United States will be preferably disposed to recognize the Government of Geste Zemor as the duly elected constitutional Government of the Republic of Haiti, since it appears from the support which it received in the north and in the other parts of the Republic that the advent of this government is based upon the consent of the governed.

You will further state that the Government of the United States has always considered that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon public conscience and approval; that the United States will always lend its influence to the realization of these principles in practice; and that, desiring the peace and prosperity of all its sister republics, this Government desires to extend its genuine disinterested friendship and aid for the continuation of peace and prosperity in Haiti.

"In your conference with the minister of foreign affairs you will suggest to him that the United States is, as is natural, on account of the vested interests of American citizens in the Republic of Haiti, interested in the proper administration and collection of customs and will be well disposed toward lending all its aid in any practical way to the Government of Haiti if such were desired.

"Further that on account of the opening of the Panama Canal the United States is interested in the proper location of light houses along the coasts of the different countries and islands by which the traffic will pass to enter the Panama Canal. In this connection the Government will be most willing to lend any expert assistance to the

Government of Haiti in aiding her to determine the points most necessary for lighthouses.

"At the time of the visit of Mr. Osborne, assistant Secretary of State to Haiti in 1913, the matter of Male Saint Nicholas as a naval station was under discussion. Different views were exchanged and an understanding was arrived at by which it was promised that no power other than the United States should gain a foothold in that section of the Republic. In presenting this last letter to the minister of Foreign Affairs, you will use your utmost tact and discretion in conveying to him the idea that while this Government has, for the present no intention of entering into negotiations regarding Male Saint Nicholas, it nevertheless desires that the understanding between President Oreste and the Assistant Secretary of State remain undisturbed.

"You are instructed to cable immediately whatever reply is made by the minister of Foreign Affairs to these various suggestions and the Department will then instruct you as to recognition."<sup>21</sup>

As Zamor would give no definite replies to the above suggestion, Smith was ordered March 1, 1914 to recognize his government.

In the meantime the insurrection in the north, led by Davilemar Theodore had become so serious that on March 23, the minister of Foreign Affairs made an informal request to Smith that Consul Livingston at Cape Haitien give aid in arranging for the cessation of hostilities. The private secretary of the President Zamor made two calls on Smith requesting him "in the name of the President" to instruct Livingston to act in this conjunction.<sup>22</sup> The request was granted and Livingston in the company of the Bishop of Cape Haitien was to

make a visit to Guaymarts, the headquarters of Theodore. Before making the journey, however, Livingston called upon President Zanar and received a signed note from the same expressing much gratitude for the services which Livingston intended to render. Here is an instance where American aid to settle purely internal affairs was actually asked for by those in authority. The mission of Livingston proved unsuccessful as Theodore had by this time become determined to make himself president.

June 10, 1916, Livingston reported that the revolution was interfering with the railroad and that a warship was necessary. The next day the same request for a naval vessel was made by Smith at Port au Prince.

On July 2, 1916, Bryan sent a draft of a proposed convention between Haiti and the United States, fashioned after the convention with the Dominican Republic, with instructions to "sound the government of Haiti for an expression of its attitude toward the proposed convention and its views of the terms of the draft." Before the proposal could be presented the palace was attacked and martial law was proclaimed. The Zanar government was without funds making its downfall inevitable. In conveying this news to the State Department, Blanchard stated:

"There remains but one known guarantee which could be used to float a small loan. This guarantee is the revenue from stamp taxes and is valued at \$100,000 a year. The chambers are now attempting to raise \$500,000 upon this guarantee. It is reliably reported that

the German minister has warned all German residents that the German Government will not support any claims based upon subscription to the proposed loan. The Bank Nationale de la Republique d' Haïte has formally refused to advance a loan owing to the disturbed conditions, but has admitted that the guarantee offered is worth the amount sought. With the refusal of aid from these two sources, it is doubtful whether the proposed loan can be consummated, although there is always the possibility of the government obtaining a loan at exorbitant rates from other sources."

In October Blanchard approached Zamor concerning negotiations for a treaty according to the instructions he had received. When news of this came out, Zamor was accused by his enemies of selling his country to the Americans. It so weakened his position, which was already uncertain that a general uprising took place in Port au Prince on October 29. President Zamor fled, leaving the city without a government. Heavy firing took place so the Battle Ships Kansas and Hancock, carrying 800 marines were ordered to Port au Prince with instruction to take charge of the city. Their instructions were carried out and on November 6, a memorandum was sent by Secretary Lansing to Blanchard proposing that the coming elections be held under the supervision of the United States. This suggestion was not acted upon for on November 7, Duvalier Theodore entered Port au Prince and was elected President by the National Assembly. On November 12, Bryan cabled to Blanchard stating:

"If in your opinion Government headed by Theodore is de facto, you are instructed to inform him that recognition by the United States will be granted him as provisional President when a commission to be named by the Haitian Government with full powers to act upon certain questions of interest to this Government and to the Republic of Haiti



named by the Haitian Government with full powers to act upon certain questions of interest to this Government and to the Republic of Haiti is in position to give necessary assurance.

"Department desires this commission to consist of three persons who will come to Washington to negotiate a convention or conventions with the United States covering following questions, and that the de facto government instructs them accordingly:

1. Customs convention between the United States and Haiti in accordance with Department's instructions. (Proposed treaty).
2. Settlement of questions outstanding between Government of Haiti and the American Railroad.
3. Settlement of questions outstanding between government of Haiti and the Bank.
4. Agreement of Haiti to give protection to all foreign interests in Haiti.
5. Agreement by Haiti never to lease any Haitian territory at Male St. Nicholas or anywhere else in the country to any European Government for use as a naval or coaling station."

This was the price Theodore must pay for recognition. When Blanchard recommended recognition, November 16, the United States refused to do so until the above request had been complied with. When the news became public that the United States was endeavoring to gain control of customs so much opposition was expressed that the minister of Foreign Affairs informed Blanchard that the Government found it impossible to appoint a commission to carry out the negotiations desired. When the draft of the proposed convention was presented to

the Senate the minister of Foreign Affairs was accused of trying to sell his country and a riot was nearly created and as a result the minister resigned.

On November 23, the United States State Department tried another device to bring about the appointment of the committee for negotiations. Bryan, who knew that Theodore was in desperate financial straits instructed Blanchard to "inform Theodore that the Department is ready to use its good offices with the Bank to secure, first, a small loan to cover legitimate traveling expenses of this commission, second, as soon as you report that the credentials of the commission are satisfactory a further loan to take care of the running expenses of the Government during the time that the commission is in session."

The Haitian Government was willing to accept the proposals relative to the lease of territory and the protection of foreign interests, but a counter project providing for the settlement of all outstanding disputes of the Haitian Government; a modification of the Bank contract; the granting of special concessions to American citizens; and the assistance of the United States in securing a loan for Haiti was suggested. But before this counter project reached the United States the State Department had apparently changed its mind concerning the grounds for recognition, for on December 15, Blanchard was instructed to "please say to the Haitian Government that this nation has no desire to assume responsibilities in regard to Haiti's fiscal system except in accordance with the wishes of the Government. In expressing a willingness to do in Haiti what we are doing in Santo Domingo, this Government was actuated wholly by a disinterested desire to render assistance. If for any reason the Government thinks

it best not to consider this proposition further you will not press the matter. If the Government again intimates a desire to consider the subject you may proceed in accordance with the instructions already received.

"You may further say to the Government that the question of recognition will be considered on its merits and that recognition will be granted whenever this Government is satisfied that there is in Haiti a government capable of maintaining order and meeting the country's obligations."

There is no definite reason why Bryan changed his plans at this point, but it has been alleged that it was due to a conference with President Wilson.

In the interval from the proposal of the custom convention, December 2, and the appearance of Admiral William B. Caperton at Cape Haitien, January 23, 1915, the U. S. S. Machias had transported the \$500,000 in gold to the United States and a bill for the issuance of 16,000,000 gourdes, paper currency had been passed by the Haitian legislature.

In January 1915, Consul Livingston requested that a war vessel be sent to Cape Haitien as the north was "boething with revolutionary spirit" and a report had been made that a Haitian warship was planning an attack. On January 20, Vilbrun Guillaume Sam proclaimed himself "Chief of the Disaffections" at Cape Haitien. The revolution had taken place without fighting as Sam was supported by all sections. Theodore had been unable to pay his troops who quickly deserted him, hoping that immediate adherence to the revolutionary leader would

gain a monetary reward. Livingston reported that the situation has more the appearance of a great holiday than a revolution. There is the utmost tranquillity and respect both of foreign and native interests.

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When Admiral Caperton arrived on the U. S. S. Washington, Jan., 23, 1916, Livingston informed him that Sam intended to proceed to Port au Prince by way of Genaires and St. Marc, capturing these towns as he went along. At the request of Livingston, Admiral Caperton interviewed Sam unofficially and secured a promise from him that there should be no looting or destruction of property on this proposed journey. When Sam started on his way Caperton also called for Port au Prince, but he had left gun-boats at each of the various ports with "orders to meet the General outside of the city and make him again promise us that they would not loot or burn down the cities or fire in the cities, because I consider that not humane." "Upon the whole," continued Caperton, "he did very well, considering everything. He kept his word very well in that respect."

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General Sam entered Port au Prince, February 25, and on March 4, was constitutionally elected president. On February 29, Bryan reported that President Wilson had decided to make an attempt to secure a satisfactory settlement of the difficulties in Haiti. Ex-governor Fort of New Jersey and Charles Cogswell Smith of New Hampshire together with Mr. Blamhard were appointed as a commission to arrange a settlement.

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Smith and Fort arrived at Port au Prince the day after the election of Sam and secured an interview with the President, March 10. Before the interview took place Fort reported that the "situation looks encouraging for quick results," but he was, it

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seems disillusioned for on March 12, he reported that "the commission had full possession of the facts and a longer stay or further efforts would not accomplish more." The commission departed March 13. In May, Paul Fuller Jr. visited Port au Prince, a minister Plenipotentiary of the United States and presented a project for a treaty providing:

- (1) That the United States would protect Haiti against all foreign attack.
- (2) That the United States would assist Haiti to suppress insurrection by the use of all forces needed.
- (3) Haiti agrees not to sell or lease Gade St. Nicholas in any way to any foreign government or the nationals thereof.
- (4) Haiti agrees to enter into arbitration agreement for the settlement of foreign claims.

The Haitian Government accepted clauses 2, 3 and 4, adding a fifth to the effect that all disagreements arising from the convention should be submitted to the Hague. That the United States would encourage the entrance of capital into Haiti for business purposes, would aid in unifying the debt, in modifying custom guarantees and in establishing monetary reform, was substituted for clause 2. Haiti promised to appoint only trustworthy men in the customs service and to organize a rural mounted constabulary. If internal strife arose, American troops might be employed only after a consultation between the two governments, to be recalled at the first request of the constitutional authority. Another revolution broke out in June and further negotiations were prevented. Fuller left June 15.

On March 23, our minister at Santo Domingo reported that Doctor Revalve Babo, ex-minister of the interior had issued a revolutionary call to Haitians from his headquarters at Santo Christe, using the proposed American control of customs as a means of stirring patriotism.

Babo was arrested by the Dominican Government, May 19, but it was not long until he was again active. On April 25, the government troops at Fort Liberte revolted and on May 6, Babo entered Cape Haitien. On June 10, the revolutionists threatened the French Consulate so fifty marines were landed from the French cruiser Descartes. When news of this landing reached American authorities, Admiral Caperton, then at Vera Cruz, was ordered to go immediately to Cape Haitien. Here he informed Babo that he would permit no fighting in the town and that "he had no intention of questioning the sovereignty of the Haitian nation, or of maintaining any but a neutral attitude towards the contending factions." On July 3, he landed a few troops and informed the commanding officer of the Descartes that he (Caperton) was prepared to protect the interests of all foreigners.

On July 27, an uprising led by Charles Bonor occurred in Fort au Prince. Caperton was informed that the presence of a war ship was necessary so he withdrew his troops and proceeded to Fort au Prince. A gunboat was left at Cape Haitien and when requested by the French Consul, landed 20 marines.

When Caperton reached Fort au Prince, he found that President Sam, who had been largely deserted by his army, was trying to still maintain his precarious position. Babo was threatening to enter the city by force, but Caperton informed him that fighting would not be tolerated. On July 26, a small band of men led by Charles de Selva charged the personal guard of Sam, who finding himself entirely deserted sought refuge at the French Legation.

There were at this time in the prison at Fort au Prince about two hundred political prisoners, many of whom belonged to prominent

Haitian families. Early in the morning of July 27, one hundred and sixty seven of these were massacred. Whether Sam was responsible for this act has not been definitely proved, but all these men had been imprisoned by him as enemies. The news of this deed so infuriated the citizens that a huge mob gathered at the French Legation and threatened to forcibly remove Sam. Just at this time the vessel bearing Admiral Caperton steamed into the port. The mob, believing that foreign troops would prevent them from administering to Sam what they considered his just deserts, sent a small body of men into the legation, seized Sam and threw him to the angry mob, which dismembered his body and paraded it through the streets.

The British Charge d'affaires and the French minister informed Caperton that Port au Prince was under mob rule, the existence of any authority being entirely lacking. Both begged that forces be landed as quickly as possible. That same afternoon Caperton received instructions to land the marines from the U. S. S. Washington and to request the captains of the British and French warships which were proceeding to Port au Prince, not to land their marines, and to assure them that American forces would protect all interests. Late in the afternoon marines and blue jackets were landed, guards placed at the legations and military rule established. After consulting a committee of public safety, which had hastily been organized, Caperton began the disarmament of citizens and soldiers. There were in Port au Prince at this time about 1500 Cacos, disarmed but organized, they controlled politics and demanded the election of Sade. Congress was so terrorized by these bands that only the influence of Caperton kept them from complying with the Caco demands. A stable government was impossible until

these cases, "new imperative at Port au Prince if United States desires to negotiate treaty for financial control." When asked by the committee which investigated American intervention in Haiti and Santo Domingo what he meant when the above statement was made, Caperton replied that if a treaty was to be negotiated, he knew that financial control would be one part of it. He further stated that he had been informed of no policy of the Navy Department relative to this matter. A letter from ambassador Lansing to the investigation committee in 1922 states that the two reasons for intervention at this time were:

"To terminate the appalling conditions of anarchy, savagery and oppression which had been prevalent in Haiti for decades, and to undertake the establishment of domestic peace in the Republic in order that the population who had been seen trodden by dictators and innocent victims of repeated revolutions should enjoy prosperity and an economic and industrial development to which every people of an American nation are entitled.

"A device to forestall any attempt by a foreign power to obtain a foothold on the territory of an American nation, which if the seizure of customs control by such a power had occurred, or if a grant of a coaling station or naval base had been obtained, would most certainly have been a menace to the peace of the western hemisphere and in flagrant defiance of the Monroe Doctrine."

A very hurried glance over the history of Haiti since 1804 is sufficient to show that the country had never enjoyed a stable government promoting the general welfare and improving conditions of the masses. The period 1804 to 1918 witnessed the making of 12 different constitutions and the deposition by revolution of seventeen presidents.



In theory, at least, the nation had a republican form of government, but in actual practice it was merely a military dictatorship. The chief ambition of the elite was to obtain a civil office, once there it was expected that he would graft. One Haitian lady said, while lamenting the fact that her husband had lost a government position paying \$30 per month, that it wasn't the monthly salary which counted, but his position gave him a chance to make \$1,000 a year. As is shown in the counter project offered to Mr. Fuller, the Haitians were perfectly willing to be protected against intervention by foreign powers, but they could give no assurance, save a weak promise that they would try to expel honest officials for the collection of customs, to the United States that graft would cease.

The great masses of the people lived in poverty, filth and ignorance. Few had ever heard of the simplest types of machinery. When Caperton first took charge of Port au Prince, he issued an immediate call to the Red Cross for relief work.

The legislative branch of the Government was representative of the entire nation in theory only. In a letter to Bryan, February 27, 1916, Mr. Blanchard stated that "elections as understood in America do not exist in Haiti. Elections being simply a continuation of military system under which the country is governed. The population generally takes no part in elections, the voting being done by soldiers acting under instructions. Few voters vote many times." The money paid out for military expenses was so great that by 1916 the country had completely exhausted its credit. Financial reorganization and stability could not have been attained without foreign aid.

The fear that some European nation would gain control of Haiti

was undoubtedly the second reason on the part of the United States for intervention. Although the German government has flatly denied that they had in any respect tried to gain a foothold in Haiti their maneuvers at the time tended to arouse suspicion in the United States. Germany, France and England were all creditors of Haiti. During the early part of 1914 a law suit owned by British subjects for which a claim to the amount of \$12,000 was entered against the Haitian government. When payment of this sum was delayed an ultimatum was sent to Haiti threatening intervention. The money was paid May 7, 1914, the amount being advanced by the National Bank.

That Germany did entertain ideas of receiving control in Haiti can scarcely be doubted. In 1913 the State Department learned that Germany was proposing a \$2,000,000 loan to Haiti to be secured by port rights, control of customs and the right to establish a cooling at Male Saint Nicholas. Our minister to Haiti at the time was totally ignorant of any such proceedings. As this point is backed by no documentary evidence it is difficult to determine its value, but it does show that there were rumors which Secretary Lansing deemed to be fairly authentic. In 1914 the German government denied this charge, but stated that "the German government has joined with other European governments in representing to Washington that the interests of European countries in Haiti are so large that no scheme of reorganization or control can be regarded as acceptable, unless it is under international auspices." When Caperton assumed control of the customs houses in August, 1915, Germany protested to Washington stating that such control should be administered by all creditor nations in proportion to the debts owed them. Since Germany was one of the

conflict of interest which might have caused serious embarrassment."

That Germany may have desired a submarine base in Haiti is probable, but there is no proof of any such desires. By July 1915, all dangers of European intervention were very slight. The representatives of France and Great Britain were perfectly willing to allow Admiral Caperton to assume control in Port au Prince. Germany was anxious to maintain the friendship of the United States even if her intentions were other wise she could have done little more than register protest.

#### MAKING OF THE TREATY

On August 7, 1915, Dr. Babo who had styled himself "Chief Executive Power in the North" resigned his position, dismissed his cabinet members and generals and told the latter to deposit their arms with the American forces at Cape Haitien for the purpose of disbanding to Cacos. Dr. Babo returned to Port au Prince with the commission.

All classes of Haitians now clamoured for the immediate election of a president. Although there was a universal feeling of relief at the presence of American troops the people feared that if a president was not elected at once the United States would not permit Haiti to continue her independence. There were two serious candidates, Babo and Philippe Sudde Dartiguenave, the United States openly favoring the latter, because he had expressed the sentiment that "Congressmen are agreed that Haiti must and will accede gladly to any terms proposed by the United States-----Only they beg to avoid as far as possible humiliation. They insist that no government can stand except through  
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the protection of the United States."

The Haitian Congress set the date for the election of a president for August 12. On August 10, Secretary Lansing wrote to

The Haitian Congress set the date for the election of a president for August 12. On August 10, Secretary Lansing wrote to Charge Davis stating: "Let Congress understand that the Government of the United States intends to uphold the president elected." Candidates should understand before elections that the United States expects to be entrusted with the practical control of the customs, and such financial control as is deemed necessary for efficient administration. The United States has no designs upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti."

Several days before elections occurred Caperton arranged an interview with Dr. Babo and Senator Dartiguenave to ascertain their views towards the United States. When asked if they would support whichever candidate was elected and accept the guidance offered by the United States, Dartiguenave replied in the affirmative while Babo, becoming very angry, replied that he alone was fit to be president of Haiti and would give his support to no one else. In the election which occurred on August 12, Dartiguenave was elected. In his testimony before the Senate committee in 1921 Caperton denied that any pressure had been brought to bear upon the assembly in order to secure the election. Dartiguenave, president of the Senate had never taken part in a revolution, while Babo's chief support lay in the Caco bands of the north. Had not the American forces prevented a Caco riot, Babo would probably have been elected, not because he was popular but because the assembly feared the Cacos.

On August 13, Charge Davis was instructed to call upon president Dartiguenave and tell him that the United States wished the president

to be approved to "conclude without modification the treaty submitted to you." Recognition of the president was not to be granted until a resolution to this effect had been passed. The treaty contemplated providing for a much more rigid supervision than that of July 2, 1914. New articles were also introduced providing: (1) A Haitian constabulary to be organized and officered by Americans. (2) No territory was to be surrendered "by sale or lease or otherwise," or territorial jurisdiction granted to any country but the United States. No treaty could be entered into with another country which would impair the independence of Haiti. (3) Arbitration for the settlement of foreign claims. (4) Haitian Government should pass "such measures as in the opinion of the government of the United States may be necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the republic." (5) The United States was to "have authority to prevent any and all interferences with the attainment of any of the objects comprehended in this convention as well as the right to intervene for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." This treaty was delivered to Dartigouneau August 17. Davis reported that the president was favorable to the project, but sentiment was gradually rising against it due to: (1) The restoring to the National Bank the treasury service which president Sam had transferred to private banking houses. Caperton made this restoration after investigation had led him to believe that the funds were being squandered by parties powerful enough to force them from the banks. (2) The assumption of customs control by Caperton almost immediately after the election of Dartigouneau. Mene, minister to the United States protested against this act as a "premature

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enforcement of the draft of convention between the two governments."

According to instructions sent by the United States State Department on August 19, the customs receipts were to be used; (1) for maintenance of a constabulary, (2) for conducting public works to give relief to the unemployed and for the paying of discharged soldiers, (3) for the support of the government. The Charge, Davis, was directed to have the president solicit this action, but whether he did so or not Davis was to carry out these orders.

On August 27, a reply from the president was sent to Davis in which the whole text of the treaty was changed. The president and his cabinet while willing to comply with American demands were trying to conciliate the Haitian elite who had reaped such large rewards under the old regime. They were willing to concede customs control, but not custom administration. Caperton and Davis were both informed that only this modified form of the treaty would be signed. On September 1, Caperton informed the United States Secretary of Navy that in view of newspaper propaganda and uneasy feelings an outbreak at Port au Prince was possible. So on September 3, he proclaimed martial law. The effect of this proclamation was immediate, for on September 7, the president and his cabinet agreed to accept the treaty as originally proposed by Davis. The ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Public Works refused to accept the treaty and were consequently dismissed. In order to become effective ratification by both the senate and deputies was necessary.

On October 3, Dartinguenaue informed Davis that funds were needed to pay salaries and meet expenses as the customs, constituting

the only source of revenue were in the hands of Americans. Funds had been used for the first purposes specified in the State Department's instructions of August 19, but none had been given for governmental expenses. This left Dartiguenay at the mercy of the Americans. Toward evening on October 5, Dartiguenay was told by Caperton that the desired funds would be available as soon as the treaty was ratified. <sup>19</sup> On October 6, the treaty was ratified by the chamber, but the senate continued its opposition. Caperton, then acting on orders from the War Department informed the cabinet that the United States "has the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure tranquillity necessary to such development of the country and its industry as to afford relief to the starving populace now unemployed." On November 11, the senate cast 23 votes for ratification of the treaty and 7 against it. <sup>20</sup>

The main points in the treaty were: (1) Appointment by the president of Haiti, upon nomination by the president of the United States, a General receiver of customs and a Financial Advisor who will aid in devising an adequate system of public accounting and in increasing the revenues, investigate debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying revenues, and assist the minister of Finance in any way necessary. (2) Establishment of a Haitian police force, *Gendarmerie d' Haiti*, organized and officered by Americans. (3) The United States promises to preserve Haitians independence and maintain an adequate government. (4) The treaty was to remain in force ten years and for another term of ten years if either party saw fit to do

The facts here presented concerning the ratification of the treaty show clearly that the United States employed coercive means to compel a weak nation to accept a form of government to which it was opposed. But in the employment of force the United States was merely resorting to the time honored Haitian method of securing the desired ends. The opposition to the treaty came from the elite who would no longer be allowed to use public officers to satisfy their own personal ambitions. To the peasants the intervention has brought a sense of security which was not known before 1915. He "no longer looks upon the intervention with distrust, but now rather regards it as a friend. A typical incident merits relating. A treaty official visiting the interior of the country had finished his duties and was about to leave when he noticed an old man regarding him intently. His curiosity aroused, he asked the old man the reason for his peculiar action. He replied: "Do you know I would fight for you and so would my sons? Formerly we had no peace. My sons were taken away from us, and my crops were destroyed. You have come and given us peace. I can now work my garden and sell my crops. I am protected and assisted. We would fight for you."

"The spirit of animosity held, a few years ago, by a small group of Haitians against Americans is gradually fading. They are realizing that the sole desire of the United States is to advance the welfare, both moral and material, of the Haitian people, that our intervention in Haiti, based upon the obligations of the treaty of 1915, is designed to assure the happiness, tranquillity, and welfare of the Haitian people."

At the time the treaty of 1915 was ratified by Haiti the convention of 1907 with the Dominican Republic had been in force for over



seven years and the United States had good reason to believe that it was successful. In 1907, the total exports of the Republic were \$7,628,356, by 1915 this figure had risen to \$15,209,061 while the volume of trade with the United States showed an increase of over \$13,000,000. As the first draft of a convention with Haiti was modeled on the one with Santo Domingo there is no doubt that Bryan was convinced of its success. <sup>24</sup> The complete abolition of civil and political liberties, in Santo Domingo, by the American military government did not take place until 1916, so that the events in Santo Domingo could not have instilled fear into the Haitian legislature in 1915 forcing it to ratify the treaty.

If we omit the consideration of nationalistic sentiments and consider the general welfare of the country, American intervention has been good for Haiti. The currency has been stabilized, salaries are regularly paid, a sanitation and health program is in operation, arrears of amortization and interests on the public debt have been paid, highways connect all parts of the country and attempts to educate the peasant and improve his condition are being made. <sup>54</sup> The country has by no means been transformed into a paradise. The progress is slow, the Americans have made mistakes and much is left to be done, but for the first time in generations, peace has been established through-out Haiti.

It can scarcely be charged that the United States intervened in Haiti to further her own economic interests. In 1913, a year before intervention started 59.4 per cent of the total imports of Haiti came from the United States. After the customs receivership was established the country enjoyed a period of peace and the volume of trade was greatly increased. From 1913 to 1920 the per cent of imports from

the United States had risen to 83.1 per cent and the per cent of exports to the United States jumped from 4.9 to 62.2 per cent. During this period nearly all Europe was involved in the Great War so it was only natural that the great bulk of business should be transacted with the United States. It is interesting to note here that although the bulk of Haitian exports go to the United States, the greatest proportion is carried by French vessels. The policy of the United States State Department has been to give citizens of all foreign nations in Haiti the same treatment accorded Americans. In 1916, a logwood contract negotiated by American interests was rejected by Secretary Hughes, because of its monopolistic features.

The occupation of Haiti in 1915 was merely one item in the whole Caribbean policy of the period. In 1907 a custom receivership was established in Santo Domingo and complete control of the Republic was assumed in 1916. In 1916 the exclusive right to build and operate a canal through Nicaragua was secured by treaty and on January 17, 1917 a treaty for the purchase of the Danish West Indies was ratified by the United States Senate. The position of all Caribbean and Central American nation in relation to the Panama canal made the maintenance of peace and order of vital importance to the United States. No efforts at annexation have been made. In 1925 the marines were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua indicating that their prolonged visit was merely to maintain peace and order.

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