THE RED TURBAN REBELLIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC

CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE HAKKAS IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA

by

JAEYOON KIM

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of History
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

August 2005

"The Red Turban Rebellions and the Emergence of Ethnic Consciousness of the Hakkas

in Nineteenth-Century China," a dissertation prepared by Jaeyoon Kim in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of

History. This dissertation has been approved and accepted by:

_____

Dr. Cynthia Brokaw, Co-Chair of the Examining Committee

_____

Dr. Bryna Goodman, Co-Chair of the Examining Committee

July 25, 2005
Date

Committee in Charge: Dr. Cynthia Brokaw, Co-Chair
                              Dr. Bryna Goodman, Co-Chair
                              Dr. Andrew Goble
                              Dr. Richard Kraus

Accepted by:

_____

Dean of the Graduate School

An Abstract of the Dissertation of

Jaeyoon Kim   for the degree of   Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of History   to be taken   August 2005

Title: THE RED TURBAN REBELLIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC

CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE HAKKAS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA

Approved: _____
Dr. Cynthia Brokaw, Co-Chair

Approved: _____
Dr. Bryna Goodman, Co-Chair

My dissertation, "The Red Turban Rebellions and the Emergence of Ethnic

Consciousness of the Hakkas in Nineteenth-Century China," focuses on one of most

important and controversial minorities in China—and a group that significantly shaped

the country's nineteenth and twentieth century history: the Hakka or "guest people." Han

Chinese who migrated from western Fujian to Guangdong province in search of new

economic opportunities over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these

"guest people" challenged the economic control of earlier settlers in these provinces and

thereby sparked some of the most violent struggles of late Qing China. I examine, in

particular, how the participation of the "guest people" in a series of struggles, the Red

Turban Rebellions (1854-1856) and the Hakka-Punti War (1856-1867) in the Pearl River

Delta areas of South China, helped create among these people a distinct sense of identity,

a sharp sense of their own, different, Hakka, ethnicity.

My study is designed to provide a detailed historical analysis of the construction

of Hakka identity. I focus on the whole network of different interests and relationships

that led to the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War of the mid-nineteenth

century: the long-standing economic conflicts over land use; the part played by local

gentry and lineage organizations in Hakka-Punti feuds; the role that the state, and most

particularly local governments, played in intensifying existing tensions and thus drawing

"ethnic" lines. In short, in focusing intensively on one particular place and time, my work

provides a full and rich picture of all the factors--economic, political, as well as social--

that contributed to the definition of Hakka ethnicity. My dissertation thus helps us

understand more precisely the complex process by which ethnicity is constructed.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Jaeyoon Kim

PLACE OF BIRTH: Janghung, Republic of Korea

DATE OF BIRTH: December 22, 1968

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

> University of Oregon
> San Diego State University
> Chonnam National University

DEGREES AWARDED:

> Doctor of Philosophy in History, 2005, University of Oregon
> Master of Arts in History, 1997, San Diego State University
> Bachelor of Arts in History, 1992, Chonnam National University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

> Chinese History
> Japanese History

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

> Adjunct Faculty, Department of History, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Cuyamaca College, San Diego, 2003-2005
>
> Visiting Scholar, Department of History, Beijing University, Beijing, China, 2001-2002
>
> Teaching Assistant, Department of History, University of Oregon, Eugene, 1998-2001

GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:

Department of History, University of Oregon: Robert Lang Dissertation
Fellowship, 2003

Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Oregon: Freeman Student
Fellowships for Personalized Learning, 2001

Department of History, University of Oregon: Graduate Teaching Fellowship,
1998-2001

Department of History, University of Oregon: Paul Dull Memorial Scholarship,
2000

Chonnam National University: Full Tuition Exemption Scholarship for Academic
Excellence, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992

Chonnam National University: University Presidential Award for the Best Article,
1991

PUBLICATIONS:

Jaeyoon Kim, "Mimana Problem in Early Korea and Japan," *Daily Chonnam*,
Spring, 1991

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am truly indebted to a number of people, each of whom has contributed to making this dissertation possible.

First, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my Co-advisor, Professor Cynthia Brokaw. Cynthia has not only been a first class advisor but also a mentor to me. She provided me with the opportunity to fulfill my dream, believed in my ability since we first met, and has always been ready with a constructive word during the course of my research.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks and deep appreciation to my Co-adviser, Professor Bryna Goodman for her continuous precious support and assistance during the course of this research. I feel sure that this dissertation would never have come into existence without her help, patience and dedication.

I owe a great deal to Professor Andrew Goble for his teaching and support during my study at the UO. I have enjoyed every moment with him including great dinners at his home. I would also like to thank Professor Richard Kraus for kindly serving on my dissertation committee on a very short notice.

I am fortunate to have the opportunity to meet with a group of nice people in the history department. I want especially to thank Rebecca Lynn and Professor Jeffrey Ostler for their support and encouragement to finish this dissertation.

My research was partly funded by Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Oregon (Freeman Student Fellowships). I am also grateful to the history department and

the Graduate School, University of Oregon for helping me continue my research through the time of hardships.

I would like to thank my parent, Eung Ryul Kim and Kyungja Hong, for their continued encouragement and love during this work and throughout my life. I am especially grateful to my wife Kyehee Kim for her help, encouragement, and support. I thank her for doing the most important job of being a mother to Ha-eun Mary Kim who is the joy of our lives.

Most importantly, I acknowledge my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ through Whom I "live and move and exist" (Acts 17:28). I give back all the glory to Him, Jesus Christ. In Him all things are possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The mid-nineteenth century was a period of widespread insurrections, and with the

easy success of the Taiping rebellion, the most famous of these, other oppressed people

were inspired to increasing rebelliousness. One of the most chronically disturbed regions of

the empire during the nineteenth century was Guangdong province. Generally regarded by

Chinese officials as unhealthy and hard to govern, Guangdong, even before the Taiping

rebellion, was noted for its ethnic tensions, its hill gangs and river pirates, and its secret-

society activities.[1]

After about 1820, the swelling opium trade helped motivate a corresponding

increase in the level of illegal activities and the number of illegal groups engaged in them.

Guangzhou and the lower Pearl River Delta regions were the hub of these kinds of illegal

---

[1] Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 2-25.

associations, especially the Tiandihui 天地會 (Heaven and Earth Society).[2] At the same

time, pressures of overpopulation and increasing rural poverty built up in the countryside.

In response to these multiple factors, the Tiandihui groups gave birth to the Red Turban

rebellions (1854-56).

In 1854, a Red Turban leader from Foshan 佛山, rose in revolt against the Qing

government, declaring his intention of re-establishing the Ming dynasty. The rebels

attempted to take the city of Guangzhou, 15 miles from Foshan, that same year.[3] Though

they failed at this effort, several district cities such as Heshan 鶴山, Kaiping 開平, and

Enping 恩平 were captured by the Red Turbans.[4]

---

[2] Past studies on the Red Turban Rebellions have suggested that the movement was an expression of the Tiandihui (Heaven and Earth Society), a secret society that had inspired countless rebellions throughout south China. It is true that secret societies have played roles in anti-dynastic rebellions, though usually such activities were more the exception than the rule. Morever, not all such groups participated in revolts against the state. Recent scholarship on the Brotherhoods, such as that by Zhuang Jifa, Dian Murray, and David Ownby, have shown that the Tiandihui, which were among the most important of the secret societies in South China in the pre-1850 pre-Opium War period, did not originate as overtly anti-Qing organizations, but rather as mutual-aid and self-protection associations. See Zhuang Jifa 莊吉發, "Qingdai mimi huidang de tantao 清代秘密會黨的探討," *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* 中國歷史學會史學集刊, 16 (July 1984): 153-83; Dian H. Murray, *The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); David Ownby, *Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early Mid-Qing China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).

[3] Frederic Wakeman Jr., "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung, 1800-1856," in *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China: 1840-1950* ed. Jean Chesneaux (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 43.

[4] For a succinct account of the activities of the Tiandihui and militias, see Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-186* (Berkeley & L.A.: University of California Press, 1966), 117-148.

Faced with a critical situation during the peak of the rebellions in 1854, the local

magistrates, particularly in the Wuyi 五邑 areas (the five counties southwest of

Guangzhou), then took a step that was later thought to have done more than anything else

to provoke yet another disturbance, the Hakka-Punti War (1856-68). They called up braves

from among the Hakkas to fight against the Punti Red Turbans, intending to use the

hostility between the two groups to help quell the rebellions. Ironically the conflict that

resulted from this strategy, the Hakka-Punti War, lasted for almost ten years, engulfing as

many as eight counties—Xinning 新寧, Gaoming 高明, Heshan, Yangchun 陽春,

Yangjiang 陽江, Enping, Kaiping, and Xinxing 新興—until 1867, when the Hakka were

resettled in a newly created county, Chixi 赤谿, in southern Guangdong.[5] As witnessed by

John Scarth, the protracted war cost a million casualties in the province of Guangdong

within a year.[6] Many displaced peasants left the country to escape Qing wrath. It is

---

[5] S. T. Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their Neighbors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 74; David C. E. Liao, *The Unresponsive: Resistant or Neglected?: The Hakka Chinese in Taiwan Illustrate a Common Mission Problem* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1972), 86.

[6] John Scarth, *Twelve Years in China: The People, the Rebels, and the Mandarins* (Edinburgh: T. Constable and co., 1860). pp. 220-40, esp. 238.

estimated that during the Hakka-Punti War, more than a hundred thousand peasants left their hometowns.[7]

The Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War of Guangdong did not have nation-wide repercussions, and may appear to be dwarfed in significance by the cataclysmic upheavals that China was undergoing at this time. Nevertheless, they are of considerable interest and importance since they provide case studies for the interaction between local society, a rebellion motivated by problems internal to that society, and competing ethnicities.

1) Objectives

My purpose in this study is twofold: First, I am interested in studying the cause and significance of the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War and the relationship between these two disturbances, as it can be argued that the one spawned the other. I will focus my attention on the impact that endemic disorder has on the long-term relationships between subethnic groups and organizations within local societies. In particular, by looking at the long-lasting economic competition between these subethnic

---

[7] *Chixi Xianzhi* 赤谿縣志, 8.28a.

groups, at the formation of exclusive groups like secret societies (especially the

Tiandihui) and lineages, and at the creation of subethnic categories, I will examine their

impact upon the configuration of their local societies.

There are a number of excellent related studies on rural revolts,[8] on militias, and

on the role of secret societies in the Tiandihui rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century

China.[9] Surprisingly, however, no English works have treated the Red Turban Rebellions

and the Hakka-Punti War together in a detailed or systematic manner. Most important as

far as my study is concerned, however, past studies have also overlooked the most

fundamental issue of the rebellions of the Pearl River Delta during the mid-nineteenth

---

[8] Rural movements were endemic in nineteenth century China. The term 'rural' seems more appropriate to the subject of this study than the expression 'peasant.' Defined as a rural cultivator, the term 'peasant' excludes other participating categories sharing broad identities of interest and whose condition may in many respects is similar. See Henry A. Landsberger, *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change* (N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1973), 6-22 and Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 1.

[9] Studies on the subject of rebel groups and secret societies in nineteenth century China, such as Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Frederic Wakeman, Philip Kuhn, and Albert Feuerwerker, have similarly viewed it as a form of popular dissidence, a level of local militarization, or a stage of rebellion. Wakeman's study (1966) is the first work to present the broad themes surrounding the Red Turban rebellions. However, his work suffers from the narrowness of temporal perspective. According to Wakeman, the Opium War and subsequent British pressure stimulate a social disorder, anti-foreignism, the rise of gentry power, and the polarization of society. But, we cannot see these developments in conceptual perspective without a consideration of the local society before the Opium War. His work suffers from a failure to discuss the pre-1839 period and the long-run effect of regional or ethnic consciousness upon the integrity of the local society. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967); Wakeman, *Strangers*; Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China*; Albert Feuerwerker, *Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1975).

century: ethnicity and local socioeconomic competition.[10] Very little work has been done

on the effects of the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War on the organized

groups, people and society of the region. These conflicts produced not only the

strengthening of gentry control over the local society but also the strengthening of Hakka

ethnic self-consciousness, particularly as a consequence of the Hakka-Punti War.

Therefore, while defining the problems of understanding the Red Turban Rebellions and

the Hakka-Punti War in terms of the local context in which they occurred, this study will

provide a fuller and more accurate history of the uprisings and the Hakka-Punti conflicts.

Another major purpose of this study is to show how these forces, especially

through the course of the Red Turban Rebellions and the resulting Hakka-Punti War,

encouraged the strengthening of the ethnic consciousness of the Hakkas. The Hakkas

(*kejiaren* 客家人) or "guest people" were often in conflict with the Puntis (*bendiren*

本地人), the earlier settlers, in south China for a long time. It is my contention that

Hakka ethnic consciousness, though clearly constructed in nature, is more than mere

---

[10] For example, Xiao Yishan, Jean Chesneaux, Fei-ling Davis, and Lu Baoqian have only analyzed Tiandihui rebellions in terms of proto-nationalism, social protest, and anti-dynastic dissent. See Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Qingdai tongshi* 清代通史, Vol. I (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1962); Lu Baoqian 陸寶千, *Lun wan-qing Liangguang de Tiandihui zhengquan* 論晚清兩廣的天地會政權 (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1975); Jean Chesneaux, *Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971); Fei-ling Davis. *Primitive Revolutionaries of China* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1971).

cultural or social construction; Hakka ethnic consciousness instead originated from a far

more complex process. In the case of the Hakkas, for example, their sense of ethnic

identity developled from economic competition with the Puntis, lineage conflicts, secret

society formations, local rebellion in an area of multi-ethnic settlement, government

policy, and even foreign missionary intrusion, as well as cultural differences.

Most of the various theories about the origination of the Hakka ethnic identity

differ depending on the definition of ethnicity used.[11] From the Hakka historians' point of

view, ethnic identity is rooted in shared sentiments thought to derive from a common

---

[11] There is also no consensus on how the concept of ethnicity should be defined, but there is general agreement that it is a form of culturally based group identity. In the same vein, others have argued that ethnicity is the contemporary expression of a primordial sentiment. Anthony Smith, in a more nuanced version of the primordialist thesis, sees a distinctive shared culture and a shared history as being important components of the foundation of ethnic community. Barth, in his critique of perspectives that equate an ethnic identity with a given cultural content, nevertheless acknowledges the role of culture by noting that across in a given group use some cultural features of the variety available to them as over signals or signs— the diacritical features that people look for and exhibit to show identity, often such features as dress, language, house-form, or general style of life. His point in essence is that the ethnic boundary is reinforced by a cultural scaffolding of some sort and endures because of persisting cultural differences. See W. W. Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," *Ethnicity* 1 (1974): 111-24; Brackette Williams, "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation across Ethnic Terrain," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 401-4; George de Vos, "Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation," in *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*, eds., George de Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Charles F. Keyes, "The Dialectics of Ethnic Change," in *Ethnic Change*, edited by Charles F. Keyes (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981); Judith Toland, "Introduction: Dialogue of Self and Other: Ethnicity and the Statehood Building Process," in *Ethnicity and the State*, ed., Judith D. Toland (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1993); Anya Peterson, *Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *Old Societies and New States*, ed. Clifford Geertz. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963); Harold R. Isaacs. "Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology* 8 (1957): 130-45; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*, ed. Fredrik Barth (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 14.

primordial past and passed down from generation to generation. These bonds—based on

a common language, religion, and history—are believed to create the basis for ethnic

ties.[12] But as Eric Hobsbawm has illustrated in his study of what he calls "invented

traditions," what is important is that people believe "traditions" to be old, not that they are

in fact so.[13] Hakka genealogies reach back as far as possible and are considered evidence

of "pure Chinese" as opposed to "barbarian" status by Hakka historians, but these early

so-called "Hakka" were not an ethnic group.

Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their

Neighbors by S. T. Leong (1997) is really the first work to present a complex and

persuasive account of Hakka migration and evolution. Regional developmental cycles of

economic expansion and decline, Leong argues, fundamentally shaped the patterns of the

Hakka migration and their complex relations with native populations.[14] While economic

upturn in the regional core typically attracted migrants, the Hakkas, an eventual economic

downturn led to conflicts between the natives and the migrants. It was through these

---

[12] Leong, ""The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern China," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949,* eds. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung, 287-326. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 302-7.

[13] Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition* eds. Hobasbawm and Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press): 1.

[14] Leong, *Migration,* 28-29.

conflicts that ethnic consciousness developed.

Leong takes a situational approach in his analysis of the formation of ethnic consciousness. Following the insights of Orlando Patterson and Fredrik Barth, he questions the connection between cultural and ethnic groups and instead links the development of local expressions of Hakka ethnic awareness to specific regional situations of conflict and competition.[15] On this basis, the conflicts in Fujian province throughout the sixteenth century between the She (a non-Han minority) and the Han (who later became known as the Hakkas) provided the setting in which ethnic identity emerged. It was at this time that Leong believes the term "Hakka" made its first appearance.

Leong's work is impressive for the scope and breadth of his analysis and his ability to avoid simplification and over-generalization. *Migration and Ethnicity* is a persuasive application of William Skinner's groundbreaking core-periphery analysis and a valuable contribution to current literature on migration and ethnic history within China.

---

[15] The new scholarship on the Hakka studies, represented by Sow-theng Leong and Nicole Constable, owes a fundamental intellectual debt to the work of Fredrik Barth. Nicole Constable focuses on the notion of identity, which merges with 'ethnicity.' She provides a very useful review of what is known about the Hakkas and sets the essays and case studies into perspective. She looks for variation along some parameters for Hakka identity: entrepreneurial ethos, gender roles, Chineseness, ethnic consciousness and language. In my judgment, the conclusions are evasive. She doesn't clarify whether the Hakkas are much different from other 'subethnic' Chinese or not. For instance, it is not clear whether the consciousness of being Hakka in nature is very different from the consciousness of being from Chaozhou or not. See Ibid., 14- 15; Constable, Nicole, *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad,* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996); Idem., *Christian Souls and Chinese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong Kong* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

However, Leong has little evidence to prove the development of a self-conscious sense of difference among the Hakkas. He simply asserts that the economic conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created a distinct sense of identity, but is not able to provide any textual references that might support this assertion. Indeed, the label "Hakka," as used to refer to a distinct group of people, did not come into common use until the early twentieth century, and there is no evidence for its use at all before the very early nineteenth century.[16] Certainly, Leong argues persuasively that economic inequality created tensions that resulted in conflicts between the Hakkas and native populations before the middle of the nineteenth century. But socioeconomic conflict alone does not necessarily create ethnic self-consciousness. It was not just economic conflict, but the *convergence* of a range of long-standing economic and social tensions influenced, by the presence of western missionaries and traders, and, most significantly, the intrusion of the state, that stimulated the development of a distinct Hakka identity.

More promisingly, recent studies by Emily Honig, Stevan Harrell, and Pamela K. Crossley of the Subei people in Shanghai, the Yi people in Yunnan and the Manchus in the Qing empire respectively, have suggested that ethnicity should best be seen as

---

[16] See Constable, introduction to *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad,* ed. Nicole Constable. (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996): 9.

socially constructed.[17] It is, to be sure, quite useful to see Hakka ethnic consciousness as

a constructed tradition. But, in analyzing the process of the construction of Hakka

ethnicity, it is important to understand the full range of contributing factors—not only

social, but also economic, religious, linguistic, and political—as well as the complex

interaction of these factors.

The word Hakka, meaning "guest people," referred to their continuing

sojourning traditions; they had migrated extensively not only within, but also outside,

China to Taiwan, Singapore, India, and even America. Even in the midst of immigrant

societies in these areas, the Hakkas often held themselves aloof from other Chinese and

were, in turn, often treated as different by Chinese. In many cases, even today, the

memory of the historical animosity and competition between the Hakkas and Puntis plays

an important role in the maintenance of a clear sense of Hakka identity.[18] A study of this

---

[17] According to Honig and Harrell's studies, ethnicity is not an objective thing, such as blood ties, but rather a process. This idea appears to have been under the influence of discourse in the past two decades on modern nations as imagined communities. Members of an ethnic group imagine to share a cultural system, much as citizens of a modern nation/state share an imagined community. Based on this idea, Crossley argues that there was no primordial basis for Manchu ethnicity and that both Manchu culture and identity were created simultaneously with the Qing empire in the 1630s. See Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People In Shanghai, 1850-1980* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992); Stevan Harrell, "Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in Southwest China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32 (1990), pp. 51-548; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, *The Manchus* (Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell, 1997).

[18] The Hakkas in Calcutta is the good case of this. See Ellen Oxfelld. "Still 'Guest People': The Reproduction of Hakka Identity in Calcutta, India," in *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad,*

series of conflicts, then, will both illuminate the factors behind current ethnic tensions

and provide a basis for comparative analyses of the interaction of migrant groups within

the Chinese diasporas. My project, therefore, will contribute not only to the specific

history of the rural movements of the Pearl River Delta but also to the larger issue of

ethnicity in Chinese history.

2) Methodology and Sources

There are several different sets of secondary sources relevant to my project. First,

anthropological (and some historical and sociological) studies of ethnicity provide

comparative information and a variety of different theoretical approaches to the

understanding of ethnicity as a category; these have guided my interpretation of the

meaning of Hakka identity. Fortunately, too, the number of specific studies of the Hakkas,

based on field research in Hakka communities in China and other parts of the world, has

increased significantly in the past two decades. This literature contains little information

about the mid-nineteenth century conflicts that I am researching and, for the most part,

accepts the label "Hakka" as an essentialized, unchanging, and unproblematic marker of

---

ed. Nicole Constable, 149-175 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996)

identity. Nonetheless, this body of scholarship contributes significantly to my study by

providing useful information on the continuing evolution of Hakka identity.[19]

Second, the large collection of works by Hakkas, largely devoted to the

celebration of the Hakka myth, though of little use as a source of information about

Hakka history, supplies a very rich store of information about the nineteenth- and

twentieth-century construction of Hakka "ethnicity." Clearly such works have to be read

very carefully and selectively, but a study of their rhetorical strategies and arguments will

yield useful insights into the process of the social and intellectual construction of Hakka

difference.[20]

---

[19] See Fred C Blake., *Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Hong Kong Market Town*, Asian Studies at Hawaii, no. 27 (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981); Mylon L. Cohen, "The Hakka or 'Guest People': Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeastern China," *Ethnohistory* 15.3 (Summer 1968), 237-92; Harry J. Lamley, "Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch'ing Period," in *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society* eds. Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981): 282-318; *Leong, Migration and Ethnicity*; idem, "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern China," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949,* eds. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung, 287-326 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985); Burton Pasternak, *Kinship and Community in Two Villages* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).

[20] Interest in the Hakkas reached its height in the 1920s, a period that has been referred to as the peak of Hakka nationalism. It was during this time that Hakka historians began to develop their theories concerning Hakka migrations. By the early 1920s, due in large part to the establishment of the Tsung Tsin (Chongzheng: 崇正) association in Hong Kong, the name "Hakka" became more widely accepted as an ethnic label. In 1921, in response to a Shanghai Commercial Press publication of *The Geography of the World* that described the Hakkas as non-Chinese, the United Hakka Association held a conference in Guangzhou attended by over a thousand angry delegates representing Hakka organizations worldwide. The result was a forced retraction of the offending phrase. Since then Hakka associations continue to publish regularly works celebrating the "Hakka Spirit" and what is distinctive about Hakka culture. Astonishingly, mainland Chinese scholars have paid little attention to Hakka social history in nineteenth-century Guangdong, preferring to focus on the study of Hakka language. According to Erbaugh's essay, there are three reasons for this lack of interest in Hakka studies: ideals of Han unity; official categories that do not easily accommodate the Hakkas; and the slow, uneven construction of Hakka identity. See Blake, *Ethnic*

Finally, though there is little in the way of scholarly study of the Red Turban

Rebellions or the Hakka-Punti War in English, Japanese, or Chinese, there does exist a

considerable literature on peasant rebellions in the nineteenth century. This work is

important for analysis of the series of conflicts that I have chosen to study, for

comparison with other conflicts will help to identify the distinctive ethnic elements that

shaped the Red Turbans Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War.

Primary historical material on my study can be divided into three different

categories: official reports and observations and local histories; local community and

lineage records and genealogies; and foreign accounts of life in Guangdong. Detailed

reports by local officials from nineteenth-century China are rare, in part because of the

administrative practice of discarding lower-level reports and in part because of the series

of rebellions, wars, and revolutions that have destroyed so many primary documents from

pre-twentieth century China. By a curious irony of history, however, it was the British

who preserved the collection of Chinese official documents that provides the richest

source of information about the Red Turban Rebellions. When the British occupied the

---

Groups; Hsieh T'ing-yu, "Origins and Migrations of the Hakkas," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 13 (1929): 208-28; Luo Xianglin 羅香林, *Kejia yanjiu daolun* 客家研究導論, (Xinning: Xishan shucang, 1933); Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity*; Mary S. Erbaugh, "The Hakka Paradox in the People's Republic of China: Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence," in Constable, *Guest People*, 196.

office of the provincial government in Guangzhou in 1858, they took possession of all

papers they found there, including both administrative documents and private

correspondence between the viceroy of Liangguang 兩廣 (Guangdong and Guangxi) and

the Qing court; this collection was retained even after the conclusion of peace with China

and deposited in the British Legation in Beijing, where it served as a file of intelligence

materials. Eventually it was sent to London and finally came to rest in the Public Record

Office, where it is known as the Canton Archive.[21] Preserved as it was originally found, it

is a uniquely comprehensive record of provincial administration in the mid-nineteenth

century.[22]

---

[21] David Pong, *A Critical Guide to the Kwangtung Provincial Archives: Deposited at the Public Record of Office of London* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[22] Even though Chang Hsin-pao (1964) and Masaya Sasaki (1967) identified and introduced these documents, surprisingly, very few historians have used them to study the rebellions and ethnicity of the Pearl River Delta during the mid-nineteenth century. This source has been tapped to some extent in a study by Wakeman (1966); however, his work only relied on materials written in English among Foreign Office records, materials that give an incomplete picture of developments in the Pearl River Delta. The few accounts by Lu Baoqian (1975), J. Y. Wong (1976), J.A.G. Roberts (1968), and Liu Ping (2003) also used some of Canton Archive materials to describe conditions in Guangdong in the connection with the Red Turban Rebellions, but all these works ignore the most important issue of the time, ethnicity. See Chang Hsin-pao, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉, *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha* 清末の秘密結社 (Tokyo: Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai, 1967); Lu Baoqian 陸寶千, *Lun wan-qing Liangguang de Tiandihui zhengquan* 論晚清兩廣的天地會政權 (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1975); Frederic Wakeman Jr., "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung, 1800-1856," in *Popular Movements,* ed. Jean Chesneaux; Idem, *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-18* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); J. Y. Wong, *Yeh Ming-ch'en: Viceroy of Liang Kuang, 1852-8* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); J. A. G. Roberts, 'The Hakka-Punti War', unpublished D.Phil. thesis (University of Oxford, 1968); Liu Ping 刘平, *Bei yiwang de zhanzheng : Xianfeng Tongzhi nianjian Guangdong TuKe da xiedou yanjiu* 被遗忘的战争：咸丰 同治年间广东土客大械斗研究 (Beijing : Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003).

Since the Red Turbans were a direct threat to Guangdong province, the official reports in the Canton Archive include abundant manuscripts on their rebellions. Of the six chronologically ordered divisions of the archive,[23] the section of materials on the rebellions, secret societies, military organization and operation, and rebellion suppression, 1811-1857, is the most voluminous and useful for my work. In addition to military materials dealing with the suppression of the rebels from the field, there were also the confessions made by captured rebels and reports on such captives after interrogation or trial.[24] Imperial edicts in these documents also reveal government attitudes and policies toward the Hakkas and give us some sense of how the state "read" the ethnic identity of this group.

Some information on the Hakkas and their involvement in the Red Turban Rebellions is also contained in the form of memorials sent by provincial officials to the emperor, now in the Grand Council Reference Files (*Junjichu zouzhe lufu*

---

[23] The six topics are: Opium Trade and the Opium War, Central and local administration, 1765-1857, Foreign relations and foreign trade, 1810s-1857, Rebellions, secret societies, military organization and operation, and rebellion suppression, 1811-1857, The second Anglo-Chinese War (the 'Arrow' War), first phase, 1856-1857, and Maps and illustrations.

[24] David Pong, "The Kwangtung Provincial Archives at the Public Record Office of London: A Progress Report," *Journal of Asian Studies,* vol. 28, Issue 1 (Nov. 1968): 139-143.

軍機處奏摺錄副) in the First Historical Archives at Beijing.[25] The Emperor's response to

these memorials can be found in the *Daqing lichao shilu* 大清歷朝實錄. As reports from

high-ranking officials, these memorials detail the government reactions to the rebels and

ethnic feuds of the time; the imperial responses outline government policy toward these

problems.

The richest sources, however, for viewing the rebels and the Hakka ethnic issue

from outside Beijing are provincial, prefectural, and county histories or gazetteers. The

gazetteer is a special genre of literature in Chinese historical writing, and the Qing

dynasty marked the genre's most fruitful period. County gazetteers (*xianzhi* 縣志) from

Guangdong are particularly useful for my study, as they provide the most detailed local

information. For example, the dates, locations, and numbers of people involved in the

rebellions and ethnic feuds can be found in gazetteer sections on previous events or

---

[25] One of the most exciting developments for historians of China during the last twenty years has been the opening of archives on mainland China rich in materials on sensitive subjects of peasant rebellions and secret societies. Although there are many publications of archival documents from the Qing by Chinese archivists [for example, the edited collection of documents from the Number One Historical Archive in Beijing on the pre-Opium War Tiandihui: Qin Baoqi 秦寶琦 and Liu Meizhen 劉美珍 eds., *Tiandihui* 天地會. 7 volumes (Beijing: The Number One Historical Archive, 1981-89)], thousands of documents on various subjects have not yet been published. Thus, many historians still need to visit the Number One Historical Archive to pore through the enormous mass of poorly arranged documents for their research. For excellent guides to the use of these archival materials, see Beatrice S Bartlett, *Ch'ing documents in the National Palace Museum Archives,* (Taibei: National Palace Museum, 1975); idem, *Archival Materials in China on United States History*, (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985); idem, *Selected articles from Taipei National Palace Museum bulletin, 1972-1979*, (Taibei: National Palace Museum, 1972-79); Joseph Esherick, *Chinese Archives: An Introductory Guide*, (Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1996).

rebellions. Accounts of local suppression attempts are available in the military and

biographical sections. Often events are simply chronicled, however, and in these cases,

the information must be used with care because statistics are often inflated. A more

important shortcoming is the very apparent bias in these local histories in the accounts of

the Hakka-Punti War. Only one of the local histories, the *Chixi Xianzhi* 赤谿縣志, reports

the war from the Hakka angle. The others, without exception, give a version that is

wholly on the Punti side. As the purpose of my work has been to give a critical, and as far

as possible, objective account of what occurred, it has been necessary to use the local

histories cautiously.

Biographies, letters, and collections of anecdotes by both prominent officials

serving in the Pearl River Delta areas and local literati often include their impressions of

the rebellions and the Hakka-Punti ethic feuds. Thank to the efforts of the history

department of Zhongshan University, most of these writings as well as local gazetteers,

on the subject of the Red Turban Rebellions are now collected and published under the

title of *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料 (1992).[26] Of these sources,

---

[26] *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料, Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian (Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992).

the works by Chen Kun 陳坤 and Chen Dianlan 陳殿蘭 are particularly useful.[27] Besides

these sources, I also consulted several biographies and scholarly works of the time not in

the *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao*, such as and the *Sohak dongjumki* 西學東漸記, the

biography of a Korean gentry member who was traveling in the Guangzhou area during

the chaotic mid-nineteenth century.[28] Like gazetteers, most of these materials were

written almost entirely from the local (especially from the Punti) perspective and biased

by elite chauvinism. But, used with care, these works provide both exceptionally detailed

accounts of the rebels' activities and information about the sources of Hakka-Punti

conflict.

The other local records collected from the Pearl River Delta areas, such as the

genealogies of the Hakkas and grave, temple and other stele inscriptions, also supply

crucial data for the study of the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War. First,

they describe the actions of influential community figures, important historical events,

and the details of local conflicts. Second, they also help us to understand the growth of

Hakka enclaves, their social organizations, ethical codes, and religious practices, and

---

[27] Chen Kun 陳坤, "Yuedong jiaofei jilue 粤東剿匪紀略," in *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao*; Chen Dianlan 陳殿蘭, Gangcheng zhengeji 岡城枕戈記," in *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao*.

[28] Yong Kweng 容閎, *Sohak dongjumki* 西學東漸記, trans. Kwon Heechul (Seoul: Ulyumoonhwasa, 1974).

their relations with other local groups. Certainly, their credibility as historical records is

not unproblematic. Such sources are fragmentary, scattered, sometimes erroneous and

often elite-biased, and thus must be read critically. They are, however, particularly

valuable because they present the Hakka perspective on local conflicts and thus provide a

much-needed corrective to the official and Punti-oriented sources listed above.

The last primary sources I have used are the writings of nineteenth-century

foreigners in the central Guangdong area, including tourists' accounts, Consular Reports,

and, in particular, reports from missionaries.[29] These writings are useful as reflections of

contemporary views of the Red Turban Rebellions, the Hakkas and speculations about

their identity. These works often contain translations of narratives written by Hakka and

Punti leaders that supplement the information contained in other local sources. They can

also be used, to some extent and with much caution, as ethnographic records of Hakka

life and customs of the time.

Finally, a note about conventions. First, I use Pinyin Romanization throughout.

Second, with regard to place names, I have tried to use their late imperial forms, with a

---

[29] Most of these sources were scattered in church publications such as *The Chinese Review* and *The Chinese Recorder* and in the twenty volumes of the *Chinese Repository* and in the British Foreign Office file in the Public Record Office, London.

preference whenever possible for the ca. 1850 forms. Also, although there were various

names (xiang, ting, etc.) for the lowest-level political unit in the late imperial state, I

translate all as "county."

CHAPTER II

ENVIRONMENT

By "environment," we refer very broadly to the wider setting--in its physical,

economic, political, and historical aspects. Although we can as yet propose no elegant

hypotheses for the precise relationship between rebellions and environmental change, we

are certain of the importance of this exploration.[30] Was there an environmental crisis in

the form of famine, overpopulation, or alteration in the economic activities of the

Guangdong inhabitants that accounts for the surge in the powerful strain of rural

movements during the mid-nineteenth century? The testing of this question involves an

inquiry into local history of a new sort. To be sure, it is regional history, but the actions of

---

[30] Some scholars of China are ascribing outbreaks of popular movements and rebellions to ecological causes and to view them as "survival strategies" in environments, where resources were in short and unpredictable supply. For instance, Perry's accounts of rebellions in Huaibei (1989) emphasize the ecological circumstances that surrounded peasant life in North China. She contends that the Nian rebellions result from rational strategies of survival. Whether a particular strategy was "predatory" or "protective," it was conceived of as a sustained form of collective action that could, and often did, end in a rebellion when ecological conditions worsened. See Elizabeth J. Perry, *Revels and Revolutionaries, 1845-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980); Robert B. Marks, *Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-15.

the locals had ramifications that drew them ultimately into national and international

spheres where they could not escape contact with outsiders. Therefore, it may be useful

for us to discuss important events of this decade such as the Opium War and the Taiping

rebellion along with close analysis of the various local conditions in Guangdong and

especially in the Pearl River Delta before moving into the subject of the Red Turban

Rebellions.

1) The Physical Environment

Geographical Environment

With the exception of Hainan Island, which was separated from Guangdong and

redesignated a new province in 1988, Guangdong is the most southerly of the 22

provinces and 5 autonomous regions in China. It has an area of 85,000 square miles

representing merely 1.85% of China's total area. However, its coastline is the longest of

all provinces, amounting to 1,560 miles, or 10.52% of the country's total. This is

important for coastal and riverine shipping, as well as providing fishing and other marine

resources. Guangdong's population in 1995 reached 68.68 million, accounting for 5.67%

of China's population. This gives a population density of 382 persons per sq km, making

it the ninth densest of all provinces in China.[31] In the early nineteenth century it had

probably about twenty million people, and was one of the richest provinces in the

empire.[32]

Topographically, Guangdong is separated from the rest of China by the east-west

Nanling 南嶺 range. For the most part the province consists of fluvially dissected, rolling

to rugged hill country, with more mountainous country to the north and northeast. Only

23% of the province can be classified as plains: the major areas including the Pearl River

(Zhujiang 珠江) and Han (漢) River Deltas, the Leizhou (雷州) peninsula and coastal

plains surrounding Jianjiang (監江), and the karst plains and plateaus to the north and

northeast. Much of the province lies south of the Tropic of Cancer and thus Guangdong is

the only province, along with Hainan, with tropical and subtropical climates.

What distinguishes Guangdong from most parts of east China is not its summer

temperatures but its much higher winter temperatures. Rainfall displays a pronounced

---

[31] For the best bird's-eye views of Guangdong, see Guangdongsheng minzhengting 廣東省民政廳, ed., *Guangdongsheng zhengqu tuce* 廣東省政區圖冊, (Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng ditu chubanshe, 1995); Yoo Jangkun 俞長根, "Yangkwang jiyuckyi jayunkwa inmoon hwankyung 兩廣地域의 自然과 人文環境," *Joongkook yunkoo* (Fall, 1993): 26-43; Robert B. Marks, *Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16-52.

[32] Ho Ping-ti, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 52.

summer maximum, with the rainy season lasting from mid-April to mid-October.

Typhoons coincide with this rainy period and their occurrence can cause widespread

human and material destruction. The mild winter means that two or three crops of rice

can be grown everywhere in the province.[33] Yet as early as the eighteenth century

Guangdong had to import rice from neighboring Guangxi and abroad, chiefly from Siam

(Thailand).

This was due mainly to the rising population and the shortage of arable land, as

well as to the fact that much of the arable land was devoted to growing commercial

crops--sugar, cane, fruits, tea, tobacco, mulberry trees for silk production, etc.--instead of

rice.[34] Most of the arable land was concentrated in the Pearl River Delta and along the

West River, as well as in the Han River delta in eastern Guangdong. Most of the plateau

areas and even many of the lower, but steep hills were never cultivated.

---

[33] Yoo, "Yangkwang," 26-29; Robert B. Marks, *Tigers*, 17-31;*Guangdongsheng zhengqu,* passim.

[34] Chen Han sheng, *Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis in South China* (New York: International Publishers, 1936), viii, 1-2; Tang Shen 唐森 and Li Longqian 李龍潛 , "Mingqing Guangdong Jingji Zuowu de Zhongzhi ji Yiyi 明清廣東經濟作物的種植及意義," in *Mingqing Guangdong Shehui Jingji Xingtai Yanjiu* 明清廣東社會經濟研究 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 1-21.

Regional Differences

The geomorphology of Guangdong is diverse, being made up for the most part of rounded hills, cut by streams and rivers, and scattered and ribbon-like alluvial valleys. Thus, as a physiographic unit, Guangdong could be divided into four subregions that more or less fit together for convenience of our analysis. These regions include (1) eastern Guangdong consisting of Chaozhou 潮州 prefecture and Jiaying 嘉應 independent department; (2) central Guangdong composed of Guangzhou 廣州, Zhaoqing 肇慶, Huizhou 惠州, and Shaozhou 韶州 prefectures, as well as the independent departments (Zhilizhou 直隸州) of Luoding 羅定, Lianzhou 連州, and Nanxiong 南雄, and the independent sub-prefectures (Zhiliting 直隸廳) of Lianshan 連山, and Fogang 佛岡; (3) western Guangdong composed of Gaozhou 高州, Leizhou, Lianzhou 廉州, and Qiongzhou 瓊州 (Hainan) prefectures; and (4) the "water region" comprising the "inner ocean" on the South China and the Gulf of Tonkin along Guangdong's coast. The regions were further divided into over eighty local level administrative units: counties (xian 縣), prefectures (zhou 州), and subprefectures (ting 廳).[35]

---

[35] For discussion on the administrative subdivisions in the Qing period see H. S. Burnett and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, limited, 1912); G.W.

According to G. William Skinner's model of economic macroregions, most of

Guangdong fell into a single macroregion. Except for the eastern prefectures of

Chaozhou 潮州 and Jiaying 嘉應, most of the province of Guangdong falls within the

Lingnan 嶺南 macroregion, which also includes most of the province of Guangxi directly

to the west of Guangdong. Chaozhou and Jiaying prefectures fall into the more

fissiparous Southeast Coast macroregion, which extended northward and included most

of Fujian province and parts of southern Zhejiang province. Delineating the eastern edge

of the Nanling range, the southeastern uplands comprise a separate geologic formation.[36]

Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in *City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. W. Skinner, 275-352. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); and on Guangdong in particular see "Kwangtung Tung-chi, or a general Historical and Statistical Account of the Province of Canton," in *The Chinese Repository* XII (1843), 309-327. Skinner divides Guangdong into nine subregions: Hainan, North Hakka, Northeast Hakka, West Peripheral, Northwest, West Central, East Central, Teochiu, and Central. However, my discussion on the four regions of Guangdong has mainly benefited from Edward Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 9-13, and Robert James Antony, "Pirates, Bandits, and Brotherhoods: A Study of Crime and Law In Kwangtung Province, 1796-1839" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1998), 23-36 and Murray, *Pirates*, chap. 1.

[36] G. William Skinner's spatial scheme of macroregions, cores, and peripheries for explaining economic change has been challenged by many scholars. Analyzing China as a tenuous concentration of numerous regional systems whose individual political, social, and economic characters are more closely determined by internal than by external conditions is certainly appealing. There is an objection on the Skinnerian model. Economic activity is not that easily circumscribed. For instance, the Hakka heartland of Guangdong, Jiayingzhou, had ties to the Lingnan area, the central Yangzi valley area, and the southeastern coastal area (through Zhangzhou), but also formed a socioeconomic sub-unit of its own. As Skinner's model implies, there were no convenient lines of communication either overland or via waterways between the central areas and the eastern regions, but the two areas were hardly isolated from each other. Coastal shipping was highly developed and readily linked eastern Guangdong with other parts of the province. According to Fan I-chun (1992), interport trade in Guangdong was at least as prosperous as the commerce of many other regions more actively involved in interregional trade. It should also be noted that despite the natural barriers that separated this region from the rest of Guangdong province, central government and provincial-level officials observed the political and administrative boundaries of the province when formulating economic policies. This was readily apparent in official efforts to encourage land reclamation and to

Topographically distinct from the rest of Guangdong, the rivers of the eastern

upland have a distinct pattern, flowing southeasterly in trellis-tributary patterns to the sea.

East Guangdong is defined by the watershed between the Han River, which flows directly

into the sea like the other river systems in the southeast coastal region and the East River,

which has its outlet in the Pearl River Delta. Next to the Pearl River Delta, this area was

the most developed in Guangdong at the time. Chaozhou prefecture had the second

highest population density in the province in 1820, with 151.46 people per square

kilometer. Both rice and sugar were important crops there. The independent department

of Jiaying in this area was a much less developed one, with a population density in 1820

estimated at 146.01 people per square kilometer. Most of Jiaying was settled by Hakkas,

while Chaozhou was mainly populated by a mixture of Hakkas and Hoklos.[37]

---

alleviate overcrowding in eastern Guangdong during the eighteenth century. Official policy envisioned overpopulation as a provincial problem and promoted migration from eastern prefectures, including Jiaying and Chaozhou, to western prefectures. On the other hand, research on the structure of Guangdong's rice market (Robert B. Marks, 1991) tends to confirm the Skinner model. Statistical tests indicate that Chaozhou and Jiaying prefectures were not as closely integrated into the Guangdong grain market. See G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth Century China," in *City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. W. Skinner, 212-49 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Fan I-chun, "Long Distance Trade and Market Integration in the Ming-Ch'ing Period, 1400-1850" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1992), 249; Robert B. Marks, "Rice Prices, Food Supply, and Market Structure in Eighteenth-Century China," *Late Imperial China* 12.2 (December 1991), 64-116. For the debate surrounding the Skinnerian model, see Barbara Sands and Ramon H. Myers, "The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: A Test," *Journal of Asian Studies* 45, no. 4 (August, 1986), 721-43; Daniel Little and Joseph W. Esherick, "Testing the Testers: A Reply to Barbara Sands and Ramon Myers's Critique of G. William Skinner's Regional Systems Approach to China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (Feb., 1989), 90-99.

[37] Yoo Jangkun, "Yangkwang," 36-37.

Much of eastern and northern Guangdong consists of dissected uplands, but of the greatest economic value are alluvial deltaic plains formed by the three major rivers of the Pearl River system. Guangdong province is largely drained by three tributaries of the Pearl River, comprising the East River (Dongjiang), the North River (Beijiang) and the West River (Xijiang). Only the southwestern and northeastern parts of the province are not drained by tributaries of the Pearl River. The Pearl River Delta, referring to the area of the West River beyond the confluence, forms the core of not only central Guangdong but also of the entire province. It embraces the provincial capital, Guangzhou in the fertile and economically advanced Pearl River Delta. Estimates place the population of Guangzhou and its surrounding area about 580,000 in 1820, more than a third of the province's population (See Table 1).

The Pearl River Delta, which is the geographical focus of this study, is a filled-in bay, rather than a true delta; it is a flat country with isolated hills--formerly islands in the bay--rising sharply from the alluvium. The delta covers close to 11,300 square kilometers, of which approximately one-quarter is either water or hills and the remainder alluvial plains.[38] The delta has been one of the most intensively cultivated regions in the world.

---

[38] Chen Zhengxiang 陳正祥, *Guangdong Dizhi* 廣東地誌 (Hong Kong : Tian di tu shu you xian gong si, 1978), 162

Table 1. Population Densities (Guangdong, 1820)[39]

County	Population	Size (km^2)	Population Density
Total	21,197,741	205,500	103.15
Guangzhou	5,799,261	18,900	306.84
Jiayingzhou	1,314,050	9,000	146.01
Chaozhou	2,180,905	14,400	151.46
Gaozhou	2,335,516	15,600	149.71
Zhaoqing	2,516,149	18,600	135.28
Nanxiongzhou	332,161	3,300	100.65
Luodingzhou	674,816	6,900	97.79
Dianzhou	654,256	7,800	83.88
Huizhou	2,194,896	30,000	73.16
Shaozhou	1,021,482	15,900	64.24
Lianzhou 連州	298,500	6,000	49.76
Qiongzhou	1,324,068	34,500	38.38
Lianzhou	444,870	16,200	27.40
Fogang	52,299	3,300	15.84
Lianshan	54,512	5,100	10.68

Traditionally, the two main crops were rice and mulberries. Rice is the predominant product in the lower areas where conditions for irrigation are ideal and where the climate permits two and three harvests. On higher ground, especially to the west of Daliang 大良, mulberries used to take first rank, forming a basis for a silk industry. Fisheries in the canals and ponds are common and used to be skillfully associated with the silkworm industry as the fish add to the fertilizing qualities of the

[39] This table is based on Liang Fangzhong's study. See Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲, ed., *Zhongguo lidai renkou, tiandi, tianfu tongji* 中国历代人口，田地，田赋统计, (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1980), 277-78.

bottom mud used as manure for the mulberries and paddy fields and, in turn, the

discarded cocoons are used to feed the fish.[40]

In 1820, the population density over the delta was calculated to reach the then

already very high figure of 306.84 per square kilometer. This figure reflects primarily the

intensity of agricultural production. The region, however, has great commercial and

industrial significance as well and, apart from Guangzhou, there are many large cities

such as Foshan, Shunde, and Daliang. Beside the core delta, the central Guangdong

region also includes the areas along the West, North and East Rivers. The West River, an

important artery for grain supply, originated in Guangxi province and flowed across

Gaoyao 高要 and Deqingzhou 德慶州, Zhaoqing, Shanshui 山水, and Guangzhou, on its

way to the Pearl River Delta. Before the Opium War the North River was the main artery

linking Guangdong with the north; the imperial highway followed this river to the

Meiling pass into Jiangxi province and thence finally to Beijing. Nanxiong, Yingde 英德,

Shaozhou, Qingyuan 清遠, Panyu 番禺, and Nanhai are the major districts along the

North River. The East River entered Huizhou prefecture from the northeast and passed

through the commercial centers of Guishan 歸善, Heyuan 河源, Longquan 龍川, and

---

[40] Yoo Jangkun, "Yangkwang," 29-31; Miao Hongji 繆鴻基, *Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Shitu Ziyuan* 珠江三角洲水土資源 (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshe, 1988), 1-7.

Huizhou counties, before reaching the Pearl River Delta.[41]

Western Guangdong was the least developed region in the province in the nineteenth century. It includes the coastal belt, largely the Leizhou Peninsula, Gaozhou prefecture, and Lianzhou prefecture, contains considerable lowlands drained by short rivers flowing into the South China Sea or the Gulf of Tonkin. Some fifteen-mile offshore lies Hainan Island, an essentially mountainous continuation of the same geological structure as the southeastern coastal region, with peaks in the central range reaching 5,500 feet. Narrow alluvial lowlands, mostly in the north facing the Leizhou Peninsula, ring the island. Lianzhou was an important sugar producing area. The ethnic mixture of the entire region was one of the most diverse in all of Guangdong. There were not only Cantonese speakers but also the Hakkas and the Hoklos. On Hainan there was also a large population of native Li aborigines.[42]

Finally, the fourth and largest region encompassed the "inner ocean" off the coast. Guangdong is a maritime province with a coastline of over 1,560 miles, and is dotted with hundreds of small islands. If the people living inland were dependent on agriculture

---

[41] See G. W. Skinner, "Cities," 275-351.

[42] Edward Rhoads, *China's Republican*, 11-12; Robert B. Marks, *Tigers*, 25; Robert J. Antony, "Pirates," 35.

for their livelihoods, then those living along the coast depended upon the sea for their

livelihoods as fishermen, sailors, and merchants. In the early nineteenth century, it is

estimated that seventy percent of the coastal inhabitants were fishermen and that only

thirty percent were farmers. Dominating the seafaring communities were the Tanka

(danjia 蛋家) "boat people." Treated as outcasts, they made their homes aboard their

boats and engaged mainly in fishing for a living. When fishing or other legitimate

endeavors failed they would often turn to piracy and smuggling.[43]

Guangzhou and the lower Pearl River Delta were also the hub of this vast water

world. The delta is so dissected by countless river channels that the geographical

arrangement is like an inland sea dotted with numerous islands. In this geographical

setting, bandits and pirates could not limit their activities to either the land or the river for

the simple reason that they could not financially maintain their gangs by plundering a

limited area. Nor would it be to their advantage to confine themselves to a limited area in

case they were besieged by the imperial navy or even by other gangs of bandits.[44] The

---

[43] Robert, "Pirates," 35-36; Murray, *Pirates*, 7-10.

[44] Many of foreign and domestic merchant ships, as well as native fishing vessels, and coastal villages, fell prey to larger, well-armed bands of pirates who virtually ruled this water world during the first decade of the nineteenth century. See Robert, "Pirates," 35-36; Laai Yi-faai, "The Part Played by the Pirates of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces in the Taiping Insurrection" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1950), 25-32.

bandits consequently had to have a fleet or some other means of river or sea

transportation so as, on the one hand, to extend their activities to a wider area in order to

obtain more booty and, on the other hand, to enable them to escape to other localities in

case of necessity. He Liu 何六, the chief leader of the Red Turbans (1854-56), and all his

subordinates had long practiced banditry and piracy in the delta. It is then to these bandits,

who established rebel kingdoms, that we shall turn our attention in Chapter III since they

posed the most formidable threat to the stability and well-being of the province.

2) Historical and Social Environment

Early History

The Guangdong region, known as Nanyue 南越, Baiyue 百粵 and Lingnan 嶺南

in the history of China, was originally inhabited by Tai people and until the Ming it was

culturally divorced from its hinterland. Guangdong had already had contact with the

northern Chinese during the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.). During the latter

part of the Warring State Period (475-221 B.C.), the Han people started migrating to the

region from the north, resulting in the gradual integration of the migrants and the native

Yue people through interaction. Subsequently, the three major dialects spoken in today's

Guangdong, namely Cantonese, Chaozhou and Hakka, were developed at different

periods in history. It was during the time of the First Emperor of Qin (221-210 B.C.) that

closer ties between the region and North China were forged. The Qin state established in

south China three commanderies, of which Nanhai, with its seat at Panyu (later

Guangzhou), was one. The Qin emperor brought one hundred thousand or so troops there

and built the canal linking the region with the north. Subsequently, relatively advanced

technology was introduced, thus bringing about improvements to its agriculture and

handicrafts. The Qin-Han city of Panyu was tiny in comparison with later Guangzhou,

but it established early its position as a port of call for ships coming in from Southeast

Asia. Later, a Qin general named Zhao Tuo 趙佗 (d. 137 B.C.) founded the independent

kingdom of Nanyue, and built Guangzhou's first walls and palaces. By the Tang (618-907

A.D.), Guangzhou was a major international port, with its Indian and Persian

communities. The building of the Dayu 大庾 road in the Tang period greatly facilitated

communication with, and the migration into, Guangdong from the north.[45] Gradually, the

Guangdong region and China proper merged into one in terms of culture and ethnicity.[46]

---

[45] The road connects Guangzhou with Dayu, Jiangxi.

[46] Useful summary accounts of Guangdong history are Jiang Zuyuan 蔣祖緣 and Fang Zhiqin 方志欽 et al., *Guangdong Tong Shi. Gudai* 廣東通史. 古代 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gao deng jiao yu chubanshe, 1996; idem, *Jianming Guangdong Shi* 簡明廣東史 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993); Lu

However, the large-scale development of the Guangdong did not take place until the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1278), when it experienced rapid growth in riverine and oceanic trade. Market towns and metropolises shot up along the navigational routes. The region's water transport network had had an intrinsic relationship with its social and economic growth. Guangdong's links with Central and North China through water transport networks and maritime trade facilitated the movement of both goods and people between Guangdong and the north, thus furthering the region's integration with China proper. Beginning with the Ming dynasty, however, restrictions or a total ban on maritime travel and trade drastically weakened the region's link with the outside world. They also seriously disrupted Guangdong's once flourishing foreign trade. By the Ming-Qing transition years, economically the province was divided into five sub-regions, namely, the Pearl River Delta, East, North, and West Guangdong and Hainan Island. Guangzhou, endowed with a water transport network, became the economic center of South China in the sixteenth century and enjoyed prosperity with a booming foreign trade.[47]

Mingzhong 呂名中, "Hanzu nanqian yu Lingnan Baiyue diqu de zaoqi kaifa 漢族南遷與嶺南百粵 地區的早期開發," *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* 中國史研究, No. 4 (1984), 17-24; an account on Zhao Tuo may be found in Harold J. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics* (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 33-141.

[47] For an excellent discussion of Song-era Lingnan, see Han Maoli 韓茂莉, "Songdai Lingnan diqu nongye dili chutan 宋代嶺南地區農業地利初探," *Lishi dili* 歷史地理 II (1993), 30-34.

The Manchu invasion of China in the seventeenth century rearranged the regional structure of Guangdong. In its early years the Qing dynasty encountered a serious challenge from anti-Qing elements. Several princes in the south attempted restoration of the Ming dynasty. The first three attempts were, all quickly suppressed by Manchu Bannermen and Chinese troops loyal to the Manchus headed by Li Chengdong 李成棟. However, Li Chengdong reversed his allegiance and invited another Ming prince to return to Guangdong as an emperor in 1648. He was defeated in 1649, and in the following year Guangzhou was once again surrounded by Manchu troops. The Manchus responded to this resistance with violence and cruelty, killing over 100,000 inhabitants.[48] The Ming loyalists of Guangdong, then emigrated in large numbers to Taiwan to continue their struggles under Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (Koxinga), whose supporters were continuously slipping into Fujian and Guangdong coastal villages for supplies and intelligence. In order to forestall any possible collaboration of the coastal population with Ming loyalists, the Manchus adopted the proposal of Huang Wu 黃梧 in 1662 and ordered all coastal Chinese to move inland about fifty *li* (about fifteen miles) and

---

[48] J. A. G. Roberts, "The Hakka-Punti War," 23.

prohibited any vessel, mercantile or fishing from going out to sea.[49] The implementation

of these orders was uneven, but Guangdong was very seriously affected. The local

gazetteer describes the drastic policy of the Qing:

> The government suspected that the people in this area still maintained contact
> with the rebels overseas. The officials surveyed the coastline and built barriers
> along its entire length at a distance of fifty *li* from the beach. All people living
> between the beach and barrier were removed inland behind the
> barrier…Violators were immediately put to death. The populace in these areas
> was mercilessly mobilized to build fortresses, bunkers, and watchtowers, and
> were taxed to maintain the military garrison. These things caused tremendous
> suffering among the people, and the whole area was devastated. Many people
> became homeless, and some of them starved to death on the roads.[50]

Still, the Sanfan 三藩 Rebellion, staged by Han Chinese military leaders of

Guangdong, Yunnan, and Fujian in 1673, was not suppressed until 1681 and gave the

Manchus a lasting suspicion of the loyalty of the south. Resistance from the Guangzhou

people took other forms, too, as countless people risked their lives to harass bannermen,

to circulate revolutionary poetry, or to participate in the secret societies which continued

to be the champions of anti-Manchu elements in times of distress. However, gradually the

---

[49] See his biography in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943-44), 355.

[50] *Xinning XZ,* 14:5a.

Manchus subdued Han Chinese resistance and gained the support of Han elite groups by

adopting almost wholesale the Chinese system of government.[51]

Records indicate that some eighty five percent of the coastal population of

Guangdong perished during the period of coastal evacuation.[52] The order to return was

given in 1684, but the groups who repopulated the coastal regions were in many cases not

the same as those who had been expelled. Among those moving into coastal parts of

Guangdong were the Hakkas and Minnan, always alert to the possibility of better lands.

Considerable competition between the Hakka and Yue communities marked the

reoccupation of coastal lands during this period, reflecting increasing competition for

land elsewhere in the Guangdong and Guangxi areas.[53]

---

[51] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 117-25; Wong, *Yeh Ming-Ch'en*, 26.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Aspects of Ming-Qing dynastic transition have attracted a good deal of attention about the brief reign of Prince Tang of the Ming in Fuzhou in the 1640's as well as the career of Zheng Chenggong and family. The effects of the coastal evacuation in the 1660's were also broadly outlined. On the late Ming court, see Lynn A. Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); for an Zheng Chenggong, see Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) and John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 91-104; on coastal evacuation, see Hsieh Kuo-ching, "Removal of the Coastal Population in Early Tsing Period," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 15 (1932), 559-96 and Luo Xianglin, *Kejia yuanliukao.*

Population Growth

With the 1683 Qing capture of Taiwan and the reopening of the coast for

shipping and foreign trade, Guangdong as well as the rest of China entered a period of

relative peace for over 150 years.[54] Consequently, the population grew steadily after the

consolidation of Qing rule in the late seventeenth century. The population of China as a

whole nearly doubled between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries,

jumping from 150 million in 1650 to 270 million by 1776. Guangdong also shared in this

demographic explosion; the population reached 14.8 million after having been recorded

as 6.4 million in 1749, and it doubled again to 28 million in 1851.[55] Although a recent

reexamination of Qing population history suggests that limitations on the government's

capability to compile accurate population data during the late Ming may have made the

increase more dramatic than it was during the transition from Ming to Qing, most

historians would agree that nationwide, population had roughly doubled by the end of

---

[54] Historians have eloquently described the grand achievements of this unprecedented era of peace and sustained economic and territorial expansion known as the "High Qing." See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., 'High Ch'ing: 1683-1839," in *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation*, ed. J. B. Crowley, 1-28. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970) and Susan Naquin and Evelyn Rawski, *Chinese Society in Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

[55] Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 207, 216; Ho Ping-ti, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 283. See also Table 1.

41

eighteenth century. And it is also clear that Guangdong continued to share in its unique

movement of population growth that did not end until the outbreak of the Taiping

rebellion in 1851.[56]

In itself, a rising population does not necessarily imply the existence of an

economic problem, and under other circumstances it might indicate an increase in

prosperity.[57] In South China, however, difficulty arose because the increase in population

was not met by a comparable increase in production. As early as 1723 there were

indications of what might lie ahead, for at about that time Guangdong became rice-

importing area.[58] According to Ho Ping-ti, the whole country arrived at the "optimum

condition," that is the point when a population reaches its maximum economic welfare

for the technological level of the day, between the years 1750 to 1775.[59] Thereafter

---

[56] William Lavely and R. Bin Wong, "Revising the Malthusian Narrative: The Comparative Study of Population Dynamics in Late Imperial China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 57.3 (August 1998), 714-48.

[57] Although population continued to grow while new sources of high-quality arable land were increasingly hard to find throughout the eighteenth century, it would be a serious mistake to suggest that China was on the verge of a Malthusian crisis in the eighteenth century. Recent research by William Lavely and R. Bin Wong has found "scant evidence that Chinese mortality rates in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century exceeded those of agrarian Europe before the Industrial Revolution," and nutrition and living standards were not significantly lower nor were they declining in the early nineteenth century. See Ibid., 738

[58] Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1960), 381.

[59] Ho, *Population*, 270.

further increases in population only led to a lowering of the standard of living. The

population of China was still rising rapidly and the decline in the standard of living soon

became noticeable.

In Guangdong the indications are that in the years following the attainment of the

"optimum condition," the rise in population continued unabated into the nineteenth

century. The population pressure was not accompanied by a comparable increase in

arable land. The amount of cultivated land in Guangdong increased by just 75 percent

from 1673 to 1853 while the amount of land (*mu*) per capita fell by about 50 percent in

Guangdong during the same period, reflecting the greater population density there.

Guangdong was among the most land-hungry provinces of the empire with less cultivable

land per person than all other provinces but Guizhou, Guangxi, Gansu, Fujian and

Anhui.[60]

The areas that gained relative weight in Guangdong were in Huizhou and

Gaozhou prefectures. The Pearl River Delta area, though quite fertile, was much more

densely populated than the rest of Guangdong. It experienced the largest growth in

population and, with about 300 people per square kilometer, was twice as densely

---

[60] See Perkins, *Agricultural*, 207-240; Marks, *Tigers*, 280-281; and Wakeman Jr., *Strangers*, 179.

populated as Gaozhou, the next most densely populated prefecture (Chaozhou and

Jiaying prefectures, which also had population densities about the same as Gaozhou).[61]

Land Reclamation

Early Qing land reclamation policies during the Shunzhi 順治 reign (1644-1661)

were formulated in a context quite different from that of the eighteenth century

population crisis. According to one estimate, only 30% of the land under cultivation

during the reign of the Ming emperor Wanli 萬曆 (1573-1619) was being tilled in 1651

during the Shunzhi emperor's reign. The land was abandoned not just because people

died during chaotic war periods, but also because they fled from war or taxes and because

of the relocation of the coastal population. More land was abandoned than can be

accounted for by the fall in population. Many either took to the hills to eke out a living

until better times returned or joined up with any of the numerous bandit and pirate gangs

operating at the time.[62]

The Qing government acted promptly and initiated a series of measures designed

---

[61] See Ibid.

[62] Jiang Taixin 江太新 and Duan Xueyu 段雪玉, "Lun Qingdai qianqi tudi kentuo dui shehui jingji fazhan di yingxiang 論清代前期土地干拓對社會經濟發展地影響," *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu* 中國經濟史研究 1 (1996), 47.

to alleviate economic distress and restore the government's fiscal base. Abandoned land, which fell into two categories--"abandoned lands without owners" (*wuzhu huangdi* 無主 荒地) and "abandoned lands with owners" (*youzhu huangdi* 有主荒地)--was a critical problem. For example, a survey of nine prefectures in Shanxi province revealed that 80% of the land was abandoned.[63] In 1644, the Shunzhi emperor issued an edict that allowed dislocated peasants to till "ownerless" land, and provided material assistance and tax breaks to landlords to encourage them to find new tenants. In 1649, another edict allowed dislocated peasants to take permanent possession of ownerless land and to be enrolled in the local *baojia* 保甲 register. However, peasants and landlords remained cautious in their efforts to reclaim land and did their best to hide land from the tax rolls. Peasants feared not just taxes but the more onerous corvee labor obligations, while landlords sought to avoid taxes.[64]

The Kangxi 康熙 emperor (1662-1722), with the firm establishment of Qing rule

---

[63] Peng Yuxin 彭雨新, *Qingdai tudi kaiken shi* 清代土地開墾史 (Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe, 1990), 6.

[64] Ibid., 7-12, 34-39. Historically, tax remissions were a form of disaster relief, but during the Qing dynasty tax remissions were also used to stimulate economic recovery. Some historians have argued that in addition to economic considerations, Qing emperors also saw tax remissions as a means to alleviate class and ethnic tensions. Whatever interpretation one prefers, tax remission policies clearly had political as well as economic motivations. See Hu Chunfan 胡春帆, Hua Yu 華羽, Huang Shiqing 黃世情, and Wen Ji 文檠, "Shilun Qing qianqi di juanmian zhengze 試論清前期地減免政策," *Qingshi yanjiuji* 清史研究輯 3 (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 150-65.

over China, extended tax concessions on newly reopened land to three, six or ten years

depending on the region and quality of the land in 1693. He also supplied more funds for

seeds, tools, and the repair of irrigation systems. These efforts apparently succeeded and

provincial officials no longer emphasized dislocated peasants and abandoned lands as

serious problems.[65] After the land tax problem was solved with the generous grants of tax

remissions in the early eighteenth century, however, a new problem arose: there is

evidence that the growing population was beginning to place strains upon the supply of

easily available land in Guangdong. In 1710 the emperor, in an edict, observed that the

population was increasing rapidly there beyond any comparable increase in the amount of

land for cultivation.[66]

It was this conclusion that had led to the encouragement of schemes for the

resettlement of farmers on uncultivated land that were to make some of poor counties of

Guangdong the most important emigration area in the province during the early Qing

---

[65] Ibid., 154. Tax concessions, however, created opportunities for tax evasion and brought a problem of "hidden land," which referred to reclaimed lands that were not reported to the central government for taxation. Apparently, this problem was widespread. Some high-level officials complained that despite seventy years of Qing rule, tax collections were only 10% of those collected in the Ming. For the taxation and land policy of early Qing government, see Madeline Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tale* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), Chapter 3; Wang Yeh-chien, *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 20-25; Peter Perdue, *Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan 1500-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 72-78.

[66] Hsiao, *Rural China*, 379.

period. For instance, Jiaying prefecture, with its ranges of low hills, is the poorest

agricultural area in the whole province. Its five counties (*xian*) comprise five out of the

seven *xian* in Guangdong that have the smallest proportion of cultivable land. In Xinning

county, only 2.40% of the land can be considered suitable for cultivation, even by the

twentieth century estimate.[67] The combination of a large population pressing on limited

food supplies, unsettled political and social conditions, and government resettlement

policies all contributed to a massive population shift in southeast China.

The agrarian economy of Guangdong had reached an important turning point

early in the Qianlong 乾隆 reign (1736-1795). Easily accessible, arable land was clearly

in short supply in Guangdong by this time, so the policy of tax exemption and of

financial support for the reclaiming lands was further extended during this period in an

effort to open new lands and encourage migration. The land that was brought into

cultivation during this period was not old, abandoned farmland, but land that had not

been farmed before, most of which was in the hills in the northern and western sections

of Guangdong. More residents of Huizhou, Chaozhou, and Jiaying were invited to

resettle the sparsely populated and unused land of poorer quality in Gaozhou, Leizhou,

---

[67] T'ien Ju-kang, *The Chinese Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure* (London: L.S.E. Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 12, 1956), 3.

and Lianzhoufu prefectures, land suitable only for potatoes, paulownia, and tea.[68]

According to a survey conducted in 1749, 67,988 *mu* had been reclaimed from the 75,782

mu available in the western prefectures.[69]

Alluvial Land and Lineages

Alluvial land was the most important source of new land in Guangdong

throughout the Qianlong period and was another important category of land that had been

outside the original tax quota. The Pearl River Delta was mostly a sea of islands in the

Ming dynasty. But, "river current and sea tide work daily and incessantly to bring

sediments and to form sandy but exceedingly fertile lands; and by protection and the

planting of a certain kind of grass thereon, they may be converted into cultivatable fields

within three years."[70] Land formed from silt deposit that collected in coastal areas at the

mouths of rivers or along riverbanks, was locally called *Shatan* 沙坦 (sand flats).

Through the river deposits, the sea of islands in the Ming dynasty was turned into a fertile

---

[68] *Da Qing Gaozong Chun (Qianlong) Huangdi shilu* 大清高宗純(乾隆)皇帝實錄 (Taibei: Hualian Chubanshe, 1964 reprint), 37:2a-b.

[69] *Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao Zouzhe* 宮中檔乾隆朝奏摺, Nongye lei 農業類 33 (Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1982 reprint), Qianlong 24.3.28.

[70] Chen Han-seng, *Landlord and Peasant in China* (Westport: Hyperion, 1973), 28.

cultivatable river delta in the Qing dynasty. These alluvial fields (*Shatian* 沙田: sandy

fields) occupied about one-sixteenth of all the cultivated land in the Guangdong province

and were most prevalent in the six counties--Nanhai, Panyu, Xiangshan, Dongguan,

Shunde, and Xinhui--located in the Pearl River Delta.[71]

Some of these sand flats certainly emerged by a natural process, but the majority

were constructed. The general practice was to build an embankment across the river, and

then to throw a large amount of big stones or iron pieces into the river to block the river

current. Once the currents slowed down, silt deposition would be quickened, and alluvial

sandy fields could be formed in a shorter time.[72] Because of the large amount of labor

required to create *shatan*, most projects were undertaken by wealthy families. Before the

Qing dynasty, the state reserved the right to build embankments in order to prevent the

concentration of land holdings into the hands of a few gentry. Those few who received a

state permit were not allowed to enclose more than 1,000 *mu*. However, in the Qing

dynasty, when the gentry class had formed lineages and expanded its power at the

---

[71] Ibid., 22; Nishikawa Kikuko 西川喜久子, "Qingdai Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Shatiankao 清代珠江三角洲沙田考," in *Lingnan Wenshi* 嶺南文史, tran. Cao Leishi 曹磊石 (Gungdongsheng Wenshi Yanjiuguan, 1983), 11-14.

[72] Peng, *kaikenshi*, 164; Marks, *Tigers*, 81. According to the seventeenth century writer Qu Dajun 屈大均, after three to five years, the *shatan* would be ready for rice. See Qu Dajun 屈大均, *Guangdong xinyu* 廣東新語 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), 2:57.

expense of county magistrate, the gentry *de facto* had a free hand to build embankments

and to enclose sandy fields.[73]

As early as 1739, officials complained that wealthy families and great clans were

monopolizing control of *shatan*.[74] Recent scholarship on the Pearl River Delta also

confirms the fact that arable land in that area was usually concentrated in a few hands.[75]

The lineages were the largest landowners of the Pearl River Delta, possessing as much as

50% of cultivated acreage in the Pearl River Delta and as much as 30% for the whole

Guangdong province.[76] Many lands were owned not by individual landlords but by

---

[73] See Fu Tongqin 傅同欽, 69-71, "Ming Qing shiqi di Guangdong shatian 明清時期地廣東沙田" in *Ming Qing Guangdong shehui jingji xingtai yanjiu* 廣東社會經濟形態研究, ed. Guangdong History Institute, 65-74. (Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985).

[74] *Xiangshan XZ*, 1789, juan5, 16b.

[75] The He lineage of the Panyu and Dongguan counties studied by Liu Zhiwei is the one of good example of this case. Even though Mark Elvin has suggested that since A.D. 1000, manorial landlordism had been slowly replaced by small holdings in many regions China, he has also indicated that his study does not apply to Guangdong and his reference on the Pearl River Delta shows that the few wealthy lineages controlled most of the lands. See Liu Zhiwei, "Lineage on the Sands: the Case of Shawan," in *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China,* eds. David Faure and Helen F. Siu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 21-43; Alvin Y. So, *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 37-45; Hsiao, *Rural China*, 383; Peng, *kaikenshi*, 34-41; Mark J. Elvin, "The Last Thousand Years of Chinese History," *Modern Asian Studies*, 4.2 (1970), 97-114; and Matsuda Yoshiro 松田吉郎, "Minmatsu Shinsho Kanton Juko-deruta no Shaden Kaihatsu Shihai no Keisei Katei 明末清初広東珠江デルタの沙田開発と郷紳の支配形成過程," *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* 社會經濟史學 Vol. 46 (1981) no. 6, 59-66.

[76] Robert Y. Eng, "Institutional and Secondary Landlordism in the Pearl River Delta," *Modern China*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (Jan. 1986), 4; Wong, *Yeh Ming-Ch'en*, 28. Sinologists have pointed out that powerful lineages and strong gentry class tended to locate in a river delta. See Maurice Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (London: Athlone, 1966); James Hayes, "Rural Society and Economy in Late Ch'ing: A Case Study of the New Territories of Hong Kong (Kwangtung)," *Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i* 3 (1976), 33-71; Jack Potter, "Land and Lineage in Traditional China," in *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*, ed. Maurice Freedman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).

associations (*tang* 堂) formed by groups of land investors and represented by gentry members.[77] Powerful lineages and their individual members, as well as schools and temples, came to control large tracts of alluvial land.[78] Given the expenses of reclamation and the possibly long period of gestation before profit realization, it was difficult for the poor and the weak to develop and hold onto the alluvial fields. The rural elite not only usurped the reclamation rights of the poor but also resorted to litigation, illegal methods, and even brute force to control alluvial land.[79]

Guangdong was well known for strong lineages that served economic as well as social and religious functions. There is little argument that before the mid-nineteenth century, patrilineal kinship, particularly in the form of lineages, was the major principle of social organization in South China, as it was in the rest of the country.[80] Several

---

[77] During the nineteenth century, some of influential gentry or merchants of the lineage created "tang" to control more of lands in the alluvial field. For the details on "tang," see Ye Xianen 叶显恩, "Ming Qing Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou tudi zhidu, Zongzu yu shangyehua 明清珠江三角洲土地制度, 宗族与商业化," *Zhongguo Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao* 中国文化研究所学报 6 (Guangzhou, 1997).

[78] One of best-known institutional landlords included the dominant lineages of Shawan 沙灣 in Panyu county and Mingluntang 明倫堂, the institution that managed school land in Dongguan county, controlling hundreds of thousands of *mu* in alluvial lands. See Eng, "Landlordism," 9; Hugh Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui* (London: Frank Case, 1968), 99-131.

[79] *Shunde XZ*, 1853, 3:35-36; 26:29, 32:26; *Xiangshan XZ*, 1920, 16:5-6.

[80] Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 35. Large corporate lineages (*zongzu* 宗族) began to form and multiply in south China during sixteenth century. Lineage growth was related to the spread of extensive local trading networks and the development of a more highly commercialized economy. See William S. Atwell, "International Bullion Flowers and the Chinese Economy Circa 1530-1650." *Past and Present* 95 (1982), 79-82; Evelyn S. Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China*

reasons can be given to explain why lineages concentrated in traditional south China.

Maurice Freedman stressed how the southeast coast provided the crucial material

environment for kinship principles to blossom into aggressive lineage communities.[81]

Freedman, who relied on lineage data from peasant villages in Guangdong and Fujian

provinces and adopted a socioeconomic functionalist stance, decided that corporately

owned land was the basic condition for the existence of Chinese lineages. He adduced the

predominance of rice cultivation,[82] the need for agnatic cooperation in production, the

existence of a "frontier" society, and concentrated settlement in lineage for self-defense[83]

as reasons in his explanation of why agnates are predisposed to form lineages into "single

surname villages" in coastal southeast China.[84] Also, for Freedman, ancestor worship is a

required ritual for lineages. The extension from ancestor worship by individuals and

---

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972),64-94. The subsequent spread of corporate lineages, boasting ancestral halls and estates with households numbering in the hundreds and thousands, helped to foster an uneven division of power and wealth within local society. Strong lineage communities tended to become rich at the expense of their weaker neighbors, as did their constituent families and overbearing kinsmen. Dominant lineages in the same vicinity also became bitter rivals.

[81] See Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeast Kwangtung* (London: Athlone, 1958) and *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (London: Athlone, 1966) on his various contributions to the study of Chinese lineage.

[82] Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 129-30.

[83] Idem, *Chinese Lineage*, 159-65.

[84] Idem, *Lineage Organization*, 129-30.

families to corporate ancestor worship by the lineage was for him an essential part of the

lineage—formation process.[85]

Freedman's arguments are supported by later scholars such as Hugh Baker, Jack

Potter, and to an extent, James Watson and Rubie Watson, whose premise is that

corporate estates, ancestral halls, and elaborate biannual rituals of kinship are constitutive

elements of Chinese lineages.[86] According to the land development project described in

the Qing state policy in 1740, the interpretation of "frontier provinces" was exceptionally

broad, including all provinces with any hilly or mountainous land. Under this policy, the

frontier situation existed even in the hinterlands of major cities in the Pearl River Delta.[87]

The land reclamation, especially in the delta areas, created tensions among

---

[85] Idem, *ed., Family and Kinship in Chinese Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970). David Faure, however, downplays the structuralist assumptions of patrilineal descent in Freedman's work and argues that lineage has meant more than kinship to its members. He contends that kinship and territory are related but must be treated as analytically separate, and that lineage formation involved their intertwining at particular historical moments of state-making. See David Faure, "The Lineage as a Cultural Invention: The Case of the Pearl River Delta," *Modern China* 15.1 (1989), 4-36; David Faure and Helen F. Siu, "Introduction," in *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China* eds. David Faure and Helen F. Siu, 1-20 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

[86] In Jack Potter's argument, along with that of other later scholars, south China is distinguishable by the presence of powerful local groups, organized in the form of lineages and linked together by common ancestors, written genealogies, and communal worship at ancestral shrines. Potter, in short, agrees with Freedman's interpretation. See Jack Potter, "Land and Lineage in Traditional China," in *Family and Kinship,* ed. Maurice Freedman, 121-38; Hugh Baker, *A Chinese Lineage: Sheung Shui* (London: Frank Class, 1968); and James Watson, "Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Approaches on Historical Research," *China Quarterly* 92 (1982), 589-627.

[87] See *Daqing huidian shili,* 164; edict quoted in Peng, *kaikenshi,* 125.

landlords of the delta, who fought over the construction of embankments and the drawing

of boundary lines.[88] Sandy fields enclosed within an embankment were turned into

private property, but nascent sandy farms that began to pile up against the walls of an

embankment would develop into more extensive plains a few decades later. Since these

nascent farms lay outside the embankment, they were not the property of the original

embankment builders. Thus there was no end to this embankment-building venture. In the

Pearl River Delta, layers and layers of embankments had been built against one another,

making it very difficult to distinguish one embankment from another. Added to these

boundary disputes was the perennial problem of flooding caused by imprudent

construction of *shatan* and the resulting blockage of waterways. Between 1796 and 1949,

there were 137 serious floods recorded in Shunde County alone. Many embankments

collapsed during the floods, further worsening the boundary disputes, since it was

impossible to demarcate property boundaries without an embankment.[89] As a result,

intensive lineage conflicts were bound to arise on the issues of embankment-building and

---

[88] He 何, Li 李, Luo 羅, and Long 龍 of the *shatian* in the Pearl River Delta are some of the lineages that vied with one another for the right of reclamation. See Eng, "Landlordism"; Faure, "Cultural Invention"; Sasaki Masaya 佐佐木正哉, "Juntoku ken kyoshin to Tokai jurokusha 順德縣鄉紳と東海十六沙," *Kindai Chugoku kenkyu* 近代中國研究 3 (1959), 161-232.

[89] *Shunde XZ*, 5.33; Peter Purdue, *Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University, Council on East Asian Studies, 1987), 219-32.

sandy farm enclosure. Such conflicts led to considerable local disputes, litigation, and

intervillage or interlineage warfare.[90]

Feuds

As Harry J. Lamley vividly describes, Guangdong was well-situated for lineage

feuding.[91] The people of Guangdong, compared to people in other parts of China, were

traditionally regarded as adventurous, progressive, and combative. Because government

authorities were remote and inefficient, the people in the area tended to take law into their

own hands whenever a dispute occurred, and to solve it by resorting to violence.[92]

Chinese officialdom considered the region to be violent and a similar view appears in

---

[90] Chen, *Landlord*, 29; David Faure, "The Lineage as a Cultural Invention: The Case of the Pearl River Delta," *Modern China*, Vol. 15 No. 1 (Jan. 1989), 25; Eng, "Landlordism."

[91] The Western scholar most closely identified with the study of Chinese lineage feuding (*xiedou*) is Harry J. Lamley, who essentially equates *xiedou* with feud and highlights the communal aspects of the violence. See Harry J. Lamley, "Hsieh-tou: The Pathology of Violence in Southeastern China," *Chi'ing-shih wen-t'i* 3.7 (1977), 1-39; *idem*, "Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch'ing Period," in *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*, eds. Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, 282-318 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981); *idem*, "Lineage and Surname Feuds in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung Under the Ch'ing," in *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China*, ed. Kwang-Ching Liu, 255-78 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); *idem*, "Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong Under Qing Rule," in *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counter culture,* Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell, 27-64 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990).

[92] Even though Guangdong was not the most violent area, it was more violent than the national average. See Lamley, "Lineage Feuding"; Thomas Buoye, "Economic Change and Rural Violence: Homicides Related to Disputes over Property Rights in Guangdong During the Eighteenth Century," *Peasant Studies* 17.4 (1990), 252-53; E. B. Vermeer, "Introduction: Historical Background and Major Issues," in E. B. Vermeer, ed., *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 5-34.

local gazetteers. The local gazetteer in 1734 describes the matter as follows:

> The people have a tendency to embroil themselves in private warfare even for a
> slight grudge. They seldom bring their disputes to government attention. Instead,
> they recruit private forces that often add up to several hundred men on both sides.
> Once a private war erupts, it is prone to involve a dozen large villages; both sides
> use whatever kinds of deadly weapons are available, and these wars, in some
> cases, drag on for years.... Meanwhile, both sides visit wanton upon one
> another.... The result of such warfare is many casualties and utter desolation of
> the communities involved.[93]

Simple hostility between members of two different villages could eventually

involve the entire membership of the respective villages or lineages, and then precipitate

a series of fierce battles. This form of communal feud became endemic in the coastal

prefectures of the region during the eighteenth century, and gave rise to serious armed

affrays that adversely affected local government and society. In the Yongzheng reign

(1723-35) such lineage and surname feud strife began to be labeled as *xiedou* 械鬥

(armed affrays) by concerned Qing officials.[94]

---

[93] *Kaiping XZ*, 21:16a.

[94] The term "*xiedou*" appears to have come into common usage only in the 1720's (as a contraction of such
four-character phrases as *chixie xiangdou* 持械相鬥), suggesting that *xiedou* were a Qing phenomenon
even if feud like violence had a long history. Gradually, the *xiedou* designation was also applied to
interlineage conflicts elsewhere as well as to communal feud strife between other types of rival groups
throughout China and among Chinese settlement overseas. Nevertheless, this term was used most
consistently in reference to the endemic lineage feuding that prevailed in Fujian and Guangdong where
xiedou outbreaks were first reported and continued to persist throughout the nineteenth and over much of
the twentieth century. See David Ownby, "Communal Violence in Eighteenth Century Southeast China:
The Background to the Lin Shuangwen Uprising of 1787" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989), 92-98

Disorder of this type was not new in the nineteenth century, nor does it appear to

have been a direct result of the increasing strain on resources. Freedman considers that

organized violence of this sort "cannot be dismissed as the sign of a particular crisis in

the southeastern China." The wealth and unity of powerful lineage was tolerated in South

China because in some ways they promoted stability in rural areas.[95] But the danger

inherent in the system, that powerful lineages would use their position to further their

interests at the expense of their neighbors, was recognized. And so the memorials of 1766,

referred to above, traced the cause of feuds to the unequal division of property among

lineages:

> If the [ritual] land is used lawfully to consolidate and harmonise [kinship
> relations]…it is not a bad practice at all. But if [it induces people] to rely on the
> numerical strength or financial power of their clans, to oppress other villages, or
> even worse, to assemble mobs and fight weapons…[such a practice] surely
> should not be allowed to spread. This wicked custom is especially prevalent in
> Fukien and Kwangtung province….[96]

Issues of local contention included land and boundary disputes and controversies

over water rights. Attempts to monopolize local markets, transportation systems, and

---

[95] Maurice Freedman claims that lineages in Fujian and Guangdong gradually increased their wealth and power until they were able not only to oppose rivals in their areas but also to fend off and make use of the state. See Freedman, *Chinese Lineage*, 115-16.

[96] Quoted by Hsiao, *Rural China*, 355.

mineral resources also created rivalries between lineage communities, as did competition

over grave sites and even marriage in localities where shortages of marriageable females

existed. Furthermore, intangible matters that were felt to be vital to communities at large

became issues involving feud rivalry. The redemption of debts, misunderstandings

concerning reputation and pride, and disputes hinging on ancestral and lineage honor are

common examples of such sensitive issues.[97]

During the late Qing period, as feuds expanded among lineage, increasingly large

segments of the population were affected by communal feud violence as well. These

villagers and townspeople also became subject to reprisals on the part of vengeful

adversaries and targets of abuse by venal local authorities. Closed off and under great

tension, they too grew more susceptible to the hostile, group inclinations of the feud. It

was not always the whole lineage that became involved in fighting; sometimes it was

merely individuals or small groups. But even when the origins of fighting were trivial, the

---

[97] Given these factors relating to historical causation, some scholars identified lineage feuding as an extreme form of competition for scarce resources, benefits, and things of an intrinsic value. See Lang Jingxiao 郎擎宵, "Zhongguo nanfang xiedou zhi yuanyinji jizuzhi 中國南方械鬥之原因及其組織," *Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌 30 no. 19 (1933), 81-96; Niida Noboru 仁井田陞, *Chugoku no noson kazoku* 中國の農村家族 (Tokyo, 1952); Hsiao, *Rural China*. Depending on the setting, the general character of local feud competition varied to some degree. Thus Elizabeth J. Perry has depicted feuding in the impoverished Huaibei 淮北 region of North China as a form of predatory violence. Viewed in the context of the stark ecology of this region, the communal feud seems to have been reduced to more of a struggle for the basic needs for human survival. See Perry, *Rebels*, 74-80.

resulting conflict was potentially serious.[98]

For members who took part in the fighting in a full-scale lineage battle, a lineage

provided incentives and rewards. The men would often be feasted before taking the field

and, if successful, on return. If they fell on the battle-field, their widows and families

would be cared for by the lineages, and their sacrifice would be immortalized by the

inclusion of their ancestor tablets on a special 'heroes' altar' in the main ancestral hall.

The lineage would, of course, provide the arms and ammunition and whatever other

logistic support was required. A household levy might be made if lineage funds were not

sufficient for the purpose.[99] Wealthy lineages or villages at feud often hired outside

mercenaries to fight their battles for them:

> If lineages engaged in *xiedou* are lacking in numbers, then they pay large sums of
> money to hire people to help. If a helper dies in the *xiedou*, his family is given a
> sum of money, and if he is injured, he is given money with which to convalesce.
> These fees come out of the ancestral coffers, or are assessed per amount of land

---

[98] During the nineteenth century, lineages at feud in south China resorted usually to more temporary alliances. These alliances also were generally formed through surname attachments. Because the same surname in China implies a common ancestor, at least in the distant past, common-surname (*tongxing* 同姓) identities enabled lineages to associate more readily on the basis of presumed descent. However, in a region where most of the population bore only a few surnames in common, feuds sometimes occurred between lineages (or sublineages) of the same surname. Then inter-lineage feud alliances were apt to be based on different-surname (*yixing* 異姓) identities or more solely on territorial considerations. See Lamley, "Surname Feuds," 262.

[99] See "Clanship among the Chinese," *The Chinese Repository*, Vol. IV no. 9 (1836), 413; Public Record Office (London) F.O. 228/470, no. 46, Robertson to Alcock (21, May 1869); Lamley, "Lineage Feuding," 45.

owned. The idle and the unemployed are happy to receive such employment. Even if they die they do not regret it.[100]

Later in the nineteenth century, with the accelerated import of more Western arms, so called gunmen (*chongshou* 銃手 or *qiangshou* 槍手), trained in the use of the new guns, were contracted as mercenaries by feuding lineages.[101] Brotherhood associations and secret societies also participated in *xiedou*:

> The people of Guangdong are willful and perverse. In every trivial incident, every affair involving fields and mountains, they do not await official adjudication, but rather hire outside bandits, choose a time and engage in *xiedou*. Those who lead the fighting are, in the main, people despised by the lineage heads, lineage gentry, and ritual leaders. They say it is a matter of two lineages, but in fact it is a bunch of temporarily hired bandits and salt smugglers, plus a kind of professional mercenary dare-to-die. Those who are called together number in the hundreds if not thousands, involved in several if not several tens of villages.[102]

These hired mercenaries or members of secret societies added to the terror

---

[100] Cited in Niida, *Chugoku*, 377-78, n.29.

[101] Lamley, "Lineage Feuding," 49.

[102] Cited in Lang Jingxiao, "Qingdai Yuedong xiedou shishi 清代粵東械鬥史實," *Lingnan xuebao* 嶺南學報 4.2 (1935), 144. Qing officials frequently linked *xiedou* and brotherhood associations and depict leadership of violence as having fallen into the hands of young toughs who used the process to enrich or empower themselves. Zhuang Jifa has related the emergence of surname alignments and secret society bands in Guangdong to local feud traditions. See Zhuang Jifa 莊吉發, *Qingdai Tiandihui yuanliugao* 清代天地會原流考 (Taibei: Shilin, 1982), 11-18.

spawned by feud strife. When not employed in *xiedou* violence, they were contracted for

other vengeful acts of violence, such as assassinations, or they robbed on their own. More

harmful to localities were the pillaging, acts of rape, and wanton destruction of fields,

corps, and villages.[103] As a result, villages became more heavily fortified, with stout walls,

cannon emplacements, and watchtowers.[104]

Migrations and Ethnic Tensions

In some cases feuds were fought between villages belonging to different ethnic

groups. Unlike the lineages, ethnic differences were less significant in the formation of

systems of social organization. In South China, ethnic differences were perceived as a

matter of cultural rather than racial attributes, for, at least by the eighteenth century,

inhabitants of south China were predominantly Han. Native tribes accounted for only two

percent of the whole population in south China. After the massive migration of the Han

into South China, most of the aboriginal groups (such as the Li and the Yao) either went

---

[103] Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, *Zhang Wenxiang Gong Quanji* 張文襄公全(Taibei: Wenhai, 1963; reprint 1937) juan 14, zouyi 14 (1886), 9a-b.

[104] In Guangdong there were plenty of indications to show how common and widespread the conflicts were, either in the fortifications that surrounded villages and market places, or in the damage and neglect resulting from the fighting. See Niida, *Chugoku*, 386.

across the border into mainland Southeast Asia, lived in remote areas in southwestern

China, or were assimilated by the Han. Nonetheless, South China was culturally more

heterogeneous than North China. While the North China plain served as a melting pot,

South China was the recipient of successive waves of migration from the north. It is also

hillier and conducive to the isolation of one social group from another. Hence, as late as

the nineteenth century, the Han people in South China still divided themselves into

various subgroups based on such differences as date of settlement and provincial origin of

their ancestors or cultural differences such as customs, habits, and dialects. In Guangdong

province, the Chinese inhabitants categorized themselves into four large groups: Punti,

including the Cantonese and the people of Chaozhou; Hakka; Hoklo; and Tanka.[105]

Subethnicity was important in South China before the twentieth century, since it

was responsible for frequent subethnic feuds and one major local war during the mid-

nineteenth century between the Hakka and the Punti people. This war affected many

---

[105] The Puntis were the earliest Han people to settle in South China. They migrated to the area during the tenth century along the North River route. A large majority lived in the Pearl River Delta, along the West River, and in western Guangdong. The Hoklo came to South China during the thirteenth century from Fujian province. They settled in the Han River drainage, particularly in the area of Chaozhou. At a later point in history, some Hoklo migrated to parts of Hainan Island. The Hakka came from North China during the seventeenth century. They settled in the watersheds of the Han, the East, and the North rivers. The Tanka were exiles during the Yuan Dynasty (1289-1368), when they were so discriminated against by local people that they had to live on boats. They were also excluded from taking the civil service examination. See Chen, *Guangdongdizhi*, 68-69, 141, 205, 229.

counties in central Guangdong, claiming more than one hundred thousand lives. The

origin of the war dates back to the seventeenth century. Under the Qing, vast inter-

regional migrations of population took place, in particular Sichuan, Jiangxi, Guangxi,

Manchuria, and to Taiwan. In some of these areas, for example Sichuan, the population

had been decimated by wars at the end of the Ming period, and there was consequently

land available for cultivation. In other areas, there were extensive upland regions, which

hitherto had been little used agriculturally. With the introduction of new crops, in

particular maize and sweet potatoes, these areas could now be developed.[106] Though

much migration took place voluntarily, other migrations took place with the active

encouragement of the Qing government, which saw the opening up of new land a way of

increasing revenue and of extending its control over under-populated areas.

What is significant here is that the Hakkas played a major role in several of these

migrations. When moving to Sichuan, Jiangxi and Taiwan, the Hakkas were joining main

streams of migration that involved other groups in South China. In their movement

westwards across Guangdong, to Hainan and to Guangxi however, they played the

leading part as colonists of hilly areas. In Hainan and Guangxi there were still, at the

---

[106] Ho, *Population*, 136-68; Marks, *Tigers*, 291.

beginning of the Qing period, large areas available for settlement, and these naturally attracted Hakka migrants. But, in contrast, those who settled in Guangdong were moving into areas where there was already a substantial and settled population.[107]

Some of the earliest Hakka settlers in central Guangdong went to those districts that had been affected by the policy of coastal evacuation. After the restrictions had been lifted, these areas were first re-occupied by the former inhabitants and their descendants. After twenty years of disruption, however, their numbers had been much reduced. By the time the ban was lifted, nearly 80% of the population had succumbed in eastern Guangdong areas alone and about 9 million *mu* had been abandoned in the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang.[108] The land left vacant attracted early Hakka settlers. The direction of the movement was principally to the center of the province, which is, to the areas already inhabited by Cantonese.

In a number of cases the early Hakka settlements were officially encouraged under the system of military colonies (*tuntian* 屯田). The system was one of great antiquity, dating as far back as the Han dynasty. Its purpose was to secure regions that

---

[107] For the comprehensive descriptions of the Hakka migrations, see Leong, *Migration*, Chapter 2 and Luo, *Kejia*, Chapter 2 and 3.

[108] *Chixi XZ*, 8:2a; Peng, *tudi kaiken shi*, 61.

had recently been conquered or resettled. Military colonists were farmers who obtained

their land rent-free in return for certain military and guard services. In addition, their land

could not be alienated. Under the Manchus the system was also used in the South, and

military colonies were established in Xin'an 新安, one of the districts affected by the

removal of the coastal population.[109] The farmers in this case were the Hakkas, who were

brought into the area from Jiayingzhou, Huizhou and also from Fujian and Jiangxi. The

date of the first establishment of these colonies is not known, but by the end of the

seventeenth century they could be found in the core counties of Dongguan, Huaxian, and

Heshan. By 1716 the number of colonists was sufficient to warrant their being given a

quota in the military examination.[110]

Another example of official encouragement of resettlement, and one which is of

particular interest in view of its later bearing on the Hakka-Punti War, was that to the

southwest of Guangzhou during the Yongzheng 雍正 period (1723-35). The policy of

---

[109] During the Southern Han dynasty, military colonies of this sort had been established in the present Hong Kong New Territories, and the Puntis there had been associated with them. This method of colonization thereafter fell into disuse, but was revived by the Ming, who used it to secure strategic regions along the Great Wall and by Qing for land reclamation. It survived until their final abolition in the twentieth century. See, Ho, *Population*, 137; T. R. Tregear, *Hong Kong Gazetteer to the Land Utilization Map of Hong Kong and the New Territories, with China and English Names* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1958).

[110] Leong, *Migration*, 60; Luo Xianglin, *Hong Kong and its External Communications* before 1842 (Hong Kong: Institute of Chinese Culture, 1963), 134, 147.

encouraging the settlement of wastelands had been reiterated at the beginning of the reign

in an edict calling upon officials to report the existence of wasteland within their

jurisdiction.[111] In the following years a number of edicts offered loans and remission of

taxes for persons opening up new land.[112] In mid-1732, the Governor of Guangdong, a

Manchu named E-mi-da 顎彌達, suggesting resettling the poor--especially those in the

"overpopulated" eastern Guangdong's Huizhou, Jiaying and Chaozhou prefectures--in the

districts southwest of Guangzhou on the basis of information he had derived from local

officials.[113]

E-mi-da had called upon influential businessmen to collect poor Hakka people

from eastern Guangdong, and to provide them with assistance in the way of lodgings,

rations and working capital.[114] From this it appears that the migrants were to be treated as

laborers or tenant farmers, and that the cost of their settlement would be recovered from

---

[111] In his edict, the Yongzheng emperor reasoned the land reclamation policy: "Population has increased of late, so how can [the people] obtain their livelihood? Land reclamation [kaiken 開墾] is the only solution." See *Da Qing Shizong Xian (Yongzheng) Huangdi Shilu* 大清世宗憲(雍正)皇帝實錄 (Taibei: Hualian Chubanshe, 1965 reprint), edict of YZ 1.4, 6:25.

[112] *Yongzheng zhupi yuzhi* 雍正硃批語旨 (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965 reprint), Memorial dated YZ10.6.9, 56a-58b.

[113] A report from the Grain Intendant Tao Zhengzhong 陶正中 about the wasteland in the southwestern side of Guangzhou initiate in resettlement of Hakka people into Xinning (Taishan) and other counties. See *Xinning XZ*, 2:38b; Leong, *Migration*, 60.

[114] Another example of official encouragement given to the Hakkas to migrate to the west was to the district of Guixian 貴縣 in Guangxi during the Daoguang period.

their services. In this way a sufficient supply of settler families had been obtained. Each

group of five families had been allotted an area of 100 *mu* to cultivate, and for security

reasons each of these groups had been organized into a *jia*, with a person responsible for

their behavior. The initial plan had been to settle 1600 families, and by the time of E-mi-

da's report some 300 families had already been established in Heshan and their number

was said to be daily increasing. By early 1735 over 200,000 *mu* had been resettled by

7,760 tenant farm families in Heshan, Enping, and Kaiping counties.[115]

Officially sponsored migrations, while interesting as illustrative of the official

attitude, were only a small part of the general pattern of migration. By far the greater

proportion of Hakka migration westward was without government assistance or official

recognition. By the end of eighteenth century, the Hakka settlements in the districts to the

southwest of Guangzhou had attained sizeable dimensions.[116] But most of the central

Guangdong areas were already densely inhabited by the Puntis, and in particular the areas

suitable for wet rice had already been brought under cultivation by the time of arrival of

---

[115] *Guangzhou FZ*, 20:21a. All of these areas became the major battle grounds of the Hakka-Punti War in the mid-nineteenth century; I will be talking about this more in detail in the ensuing chapter.

[116] Up to the end of the Qianlong period, the Hakkas had established settlements in all the districts of the Guangzhou and Chaoqing and had extended to Guangxi and Hainan. See *Chixi XZ* (1920), 8:3b; Herold J. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics: a discussion of the southward penetration of China's culture, peoples, and political control in relation to the non-Han-Chinese peoples of south China and in the perspective of historical and cultural geography* (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954), 272.

Hakkas. So, in central Guangdong, the districts in which the Hakkas settled in the greatest numbers were once again those that contained hilly land. To the southwest of Guangzhou, in the districts involved in the Hakka-Punti War, the topography was on the whole more favorable to agriculture than in Jiayingzhou. Over twenty percent of the land there was cultivable, except in the district of Enping, where the proportion fell to approximately thirteen percent.[117] But, as elsewhere, the best areas were already under cultivation. In Xinning the Hakka found that the only vacant land was in the hills, in regions that were desolate and barren.[118] Occasionally they settled in areas still occupied by non-Chinese groups.[119] In these hilly regions they cultivated cash crops like tea. But hilly areas of Guangdong had suffered badly from erosion by the nineteenth century and the Hakkas and other settlers eventually had to migrate down toward the fertile fields of the lowlands.[120]

When the growth of population and shortage of land had become apparent, migrant farmers such as the Hakkas appeared to the local inhabitants as dangerous

---

[117] J.A.G. Roberts, "The Hakka-Punti War," 45.

[118] *Chixi XZ*, 8:4a.

[119] *Enping XZ*, 13:23a.

[120] By the nineteenth century, erosion has caused the devastation of large areas of the province. See Articles in *China Mail* (11 Nov., 1858 and 14 Aug., 1856).

intruders. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the continuing expansion

of the Hakka population in the region stretching from the northeast to the southeast of

Guangzhou, especially in the vicinity of Sihui, Kaiping, Enping, and Taishan, led to

increasingly frequent conflicts with the Cantonese. One example of this was the feud

fought between Hakka and Punti villagers in the district of Guishan 歸山 to the east of

Guangzhou. In 1843 a quarrel occurred over the payment of rent for a market that the

Hakka had leased, and there was a clash between the two groups. Seven years later the

feud was revived, and the Hakkas, finding support from ninety villages in the

neighborhood, succeeded in capturing the principal fortress of the Punti village. The

fighting did not end at this point. After a further six years there was another outbreak,

which left the area devastated by the effects of the feud.[121] In Xin'an in the same period

feuding between Hakka and Punti villages was common. One German missionary

reported that the Puntis and the Hakkas in these districts were in constant warfare:

> On some occasions, when there is a grand fight, the forces on either side have
> been known to number nearly a thousand persons, armed with old gingalls,
> spears, or stones. The magistrates are totally unable to suppress these feuds.
> Fortunately, the fighting is of that description which does not cause much loss of
> life. These engagements frequently last three or four days.[122]

---

[121] *The Chinese and Japanese Repository* 3 (1865), 283-4, quoted by Hsiao, *Rural China*, 366-7.

[122] Lindesay Brine, *The Taiping Rebellion in China: a narrative of its rise and progress, based upon*

The district magistrate was neither willing nor able to intervene, and so feuds

dragged on in a sporadic fashion. In the southwest of Guangzhou, it appears that, until

1854, the animosity between the Hakka and the Punti was only one aspect of inter-village

feuding; after that time, however, the animosity between the two groups became the

principal motive for fighting between villages, and that this rapidly led to an expansion of

the feuds into more serious clashes. The most violent battles occurred after 1856 and

lasted until 1867, when the governor of the province decreed the establishment of the

sub-prefecture of Chixi as a sort of reservation where Hakka displaced by the fighting

could reestablish themselves.

Government Representation of Feuds

Such feuds were so commonplace in Guangdong that in 1823 the Ministry of

Justice had to make an exception in the law for this province, ordering that in the case of

conflicts involving the loss of lives, a distinction should be made between crimes

committed by individuals and large-scale fighting between lineages.[123] And yet, in

---

original documents and information obtained in China / by Commander Lindesay Brine ; with map and plans (London: John Murray, 1862), 107-8.

[123] F.O. 931.1193, Xu and Yeh to Emperor (31, Jan. 1850).

contrast to the frequent mention of the headaches caused by *xiedou*, records of official

prosecution of actual *xiedou* incidents are rare. The local authorities, in this situation,

could have sent regular troops to stop the feud. They generally refrained from doing so,

however, for the following reasons: first, they had to bear the burden of financing the

troops; second, they would have exposed themselves to the danger of being cashiered by

their superiors for being incompetent to deal with the controversy before it was too late;

third, the feud between the large lineages involved thousands of members, too many for

the local authorities to control.[124] The *Xunzhou fuzhi* 潯州府志 says:

> None of the local officials wanted to be exposed to the charge of mal-
> administration by memorializing the emperor that the region under their
> jurisdiction was infested with bandits or disturbers of the peace. Naturally the
> best thing for them to do was to pretend to be ignorant of the feuds; they hoped,
> by so doing, that they could escape the punishment for maladministration by
> transferring to another post in some other district or even province after the end
> of their term of office.[125]

This partly explains why lineage feuds were common and why the lineages could

have their own way in precipitating private war. Nor was this all. Powerful lineages made

---

[124] Acquisitive-minded civil and military officials, along with their avaricious underlings and soldiers, were often attracted to lineage feuds. For feud affrays offered the underpaid personnel of the Qing government a chance to reap lucrative bribes and fees. See Bian Baodi 卞寶第, *Bian Zhijun (Songchen) Zhengshu* 卞制軍 (頌臣)政書 (Taibei: Wenhai, 1968 reprint), 240, 277; Lamley, Surname Feuds, 268.

[125] *Xunzhou Fuzhi* 潯州府志, 56:11a-18b, quoted in Long, *Jingdetang*, 4:12b.

use of their influence to encourage their members to commit various crimes, ranging

from burglary to plundering. Lin Zexu 林則徐, the Imperial Commissioner for the

suppression of opium (1839-40), was not a man to shy away from difficult administrative

problems, but even he found the lineages daunting:

> In Huizhou and Chaozhou there are clans who made their fortunes through
> banditry; in such cases, the fact that their accomplices are numerous prevents the
> government from laying hands on them, since no one dares inform against them
> and no official dares arrest them. Sometimes entire clans or entire villages are
> bandits. Any attempt to arrest them may cause disturbances.... This is the reason
> that it is difficult to check the rampancy of banditry.[126]

The state was clearly not making a serious attempt to control the area in question.

The strength of lineage organizations was no doubt related to the weakness of central

political and military control, especially during the late imperial period. Under these

conditions, officials expected to find groups of armed men in the backwaters of South

China where state presence was at a minimum, and they recognized that a certain amount

of violence was inevitable. No special effort was made to enact laws to contain *xiedou*

simply because *xiedou* conformed to the social language of the south China--territory and

lineage. When Chinese officials looked at *xiedou*, they saw lineage and village leaders,

---

[126] Lin Zexu 林則徐, "Liangguang zougao 兩廣奏稿," in Lin Zexu 林則徐, *Lin wenzhonggong zhengshu*
林文忠公政書 (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1968 reprint), 3: 17b-19a.

not marginal young toughs or criminals. Lineage and village leaders were part of the

Confucian hierarchy, which was governed by "the rule of men" rather than by "the rule of

law." These considerations may explain the reticence of local officials to intervene in the

ongoing Hakka-Punti War of mid-nineteenth century. Subethnic *xiedou* remained more

tolerable than the uprisings led by secret societies.

3) Economic and Political Environment

Economy

By the early Qing, Guangdong merchants had traded far and wide, both in and

out of the province and abroad. In internal trade the West, East and North Rivers served

as the links between Guangdong and the neighboring provinces. Foreign trade boomed

during the Ming and Qing dynasties, as Guangzhou became the leading port of China. In

the early Qing, Guangdong's booming handicrafts and commercialization of agricultural

products led to the rise of its commerce.[127]

Guangdong's sugar refining industry can be traced back to the Eastern Han

dynasty and fine sugar had been manufactured around the sixth century. In the Ming and

---

[127] Wong, *Yeh Ming-Ch'en*, 29.

Qing, the Guangdong sugar industry experienced remarkable growth, with the acreage of

sugar cane plantation almost equal to that of rice paddies in the Pearl River Delta.[128]

Cotton was brought to the region from India no later than the Song and cotton textiles

experienced rapid development in the Qing dynasty, a development that paralleled the

already flourishing silk industry in the province. Foshan, Shantou 汕頭 (Swatow) and

Qiongzhou 瓊州 sprang up as centers of the textile production.[129] Foshan was also

important for the production of ironware, fireworks and parasols. Other industries like

porcelain flourished at Chaozhou and Dongguan, and embroidery at Guangzhou, Huizhou

and Shaozhou 韶州.[130]

   With merchants from Guangzhou and Chaozhou among the most prominent,

Guangdong merchants expanded their activities rapidly in the province and subsequently

into the rest of the country. The Chaozhou merchants even traded as far as in Southeast

Asia. Merchants from other provinces also converged in Guangzhou in the early Qing,

---

[128] Sucheta Mazumdar, "A History of the Sugar Industry in China: The Political Economy of a Cash Crops in Guangdong, 1644-1834" (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1984), 290-292.

[129] Ibid.

[130] David Faure, "What Made Foshan a Town? The Evolution of Rural-Urban Identities in Ming-Qing China," *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 11, No.2 (Dec., 1990), 1-31.

giving rise to its bustling trade activities.[131] Guangdong provided the largest share of

customs revenues in the coastal trade from 1735 to 1812, in large part due to the

transshipment of foreign goods.[132] From the first quarter of the eighteenth century to

1800, foreign trade in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, as measured in thousands of

tons, grew eightfold.[133]

The specialization and commercialization of agriculture in Guangdong was

further fueled in 1759 when the provincial capital, Guangzhou, became the only legal

port of entry for foreign trade.[134] Great amounts of silver imported to Guangzhou from

overseas were mostly used to purchase goods produced in the province. Basically, the

city's development was in line with its trade activities. Movement of goods in and out of

---

[131] Li Hua 李華, "Qingchao qianqi Guangdong de shangye yu shangren 清朝前期廣東的商業與商 人," *Xueshu Yanjiu* 學習研究, No, 2 (1982), 39-44.

[132] Fan I-chun, "Long Distance Trade," 241.

[133] Susan Naquin and Evelyn Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 103.

[134] Qing court made the trade on the Chinese side a monopoly under the control of a superintendent of maritime customs (the "*hoppo*" 粵海關監督) and a group of thirteen *hong* merchants (the *Cohong* 公行), who served as his agents. Guangzhou prospered even more under this monopoly, exporting the tea and silk of central and eastern China, and importing silver, copper, arms and other foreign goods. On the Canton system See John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), chaps. 1-4; Ch'iang T'ing-fu, "The Government and Co-hong of Canton, 1839," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, 15.4 (1932), 602-7; Chang Hsin-pao, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 14.

the province and abroad led to the rise of Guangzhou as metropolitan port city.[135] It is

important to note that throughout most of the eighteenth century China enjoyed a

favorable balance of trade with the Europeans. Chinese merchants and possibly silk

producers benefited from foreign trade during this period. The deleterious effects of

foreign competition on some handicraft industries and the rise in opium imports were not

acutely felt until the nineteenth century.[136]

The impact of foreign demand for Chinese products, especially for Chinese silk,

greatly contributed to the transformation of agriculture in the Pearl River Delta, where

farmers switched from rice cultivation and the fish pond and fruit tree system of farming

to the mulberry embankment and fish pond system in order to increase the supply of

mulberry leaves, silkworms, cocoons, and silk. The dike-pond system of the Pearl River

Delta is composed of three essential components: fish ponds, mulberry dikes and sugar

cane dikes. When the Qing government closed all ports except Guangzhou to foreign

---

[135] The price of silk, an important export commodity, rose steadily throughout the eighteenth century, thereby increasing the amount of silver circulating in the Guangdong economy. See Yeh-chien Wang, 364-5, "The Secular Trend of Prices during the Ch'ing Period (1644-1911)," *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong* 5.2 (Dec., 1972), 347-68.

[136] While the impact of imported textiles clearly hurt some native producers, in some areas the availability of cheap yarn boosted the development of local weaving. See Albert Feuerwerker, *Studies in the Economic History of Late Imperial China: Handicraft, Modern Industry, and the State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1995), 123-63.

trade, and at the same time limited the export of Taihu (太湖) silk, the demand for Yue

(Guangdong) silk increased abruptly and prices soared. Thus the conversion of rice fields

to the dike-pond system accelerated. This system was best developed in the central part of

the delta, where it centered principally on Shunde county, together with parts of

neighboring Nanhai, Zhongshan, Xinhui, and Heshan counties.[137]

With an extensive water transport system, peasants in Guangdong could devote

more time to the cultivation of cash crops. The importation of rice from abroad--mainly

from Thailand--and from neighboring provinces began as early as 1723. By the mid-

nineteenth century the Pearl River Delta had become a rice-deficit region.[138] A

nineteenth-century official reported, "Guangdong is the richest province in China and is

universally acclaimed for its wealth.... Sugar and silk are transported to the north and

west. It cannot be said that the profit attained is not vast. But the people are poor and

dependent because the production of rice is insufficient."[139] Whereas such cash crops

---

[137] See Kenneth Ruddle and Gongfu Zhong, *Integrated Agriculture-Aquaculture in South China: The Dike-Pond System of the Zhujiang Delta* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2-17; Marks, *Tigers*, 129.

[138] An ever-increasing population and a shortage of arable land led to a rice shortage in Guangdong. See Hsiao, *Rural China*, 381; Chen, *Landlord*, viii, 1-2; Tang Li, "Guangdong Jingji, 1-21.

[139] Li Wenzhi 李文治, et al., comps., *Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao* 中國近代農業史資料 (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1957), 1:472 cited in Marks, *Rural Revolution*, 47.

undoubtedly added to the wealth of the rich landowners and merchants, the plight of the

common folk was aggravated by the rapidly rising price of rice. By the middle of

eighteenth century, the demand for rice in this region led to the development of a well-

integrated market for rice centered on the provincial capital, Guangzhou.[140] As a result,

peasant households became dependent on the market to purchase rice and the impact of

commercialization was felt early and profoundly in this region. [141]

The Opium War and Social Disorder in the Pearl River Delta

Foreign pressures on China started just about the time that the dynasty's internal

difficulties began. The background to the onslaught was the growing disrespect for China

as the eighteenth century closed and the nineteenth century dawned and, more generally,

the increasing economic exploitation by the Europeans. The first results of this situation

were British attempts to resolve certain problems of trade and relations with China in

ways that violated Chinese laws. These attempts led to confrontation and, eventually, to

---

[140] Robert Marks, "Rice Prices, Food Supply, and Market Structure in Eighteenth-Century China," *Late Imperial China* 12.2 (Dec., 1991), 64-116.

[141] Violent disputes over property rights were a recurrent problem in the Pearl River Delta during the Qing dynasty. See Thomas M. Buoye, *Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in Eighteenth-century China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Chapter 5.

combat: the Opium War of 1839 to 1842 and another conflict, sometimes known as the

Second Opium War, from 1856 to 1860. The overwhelming foreign victories in both wars

and the treaties that came into existence as a result established the basis for Western

power in China for the next one hundred years.[142]

Military defeats in the Opium War not only contributed directly to the weakening

of the Chinese state, but also increased the financial hardship of the rural people. First,

the war made it possible for opium smuggling to be carried on more brazenly, without

further fears of punitive action. Consequently, the import of opium increased to 70,000

chests a year in the 1850s, and after legalization in 1858, imports of drug touched the

high point of 81,000 chests in 1884.[143] The resulting efflux of silver steadily raised its

value in terms of copper cash and exacerbated the problems of tax-paying peasants.

During the first years of the reign of the Daoguang emperor, which started in 1821, silver

was 1,200 cash a tael; it was 1,600 cash in 1838 and 2,300 cash in 1848.[144] As Kung-

---

[142] The following works have been especially useful in discussing relations with the European powers in the early nineteenth century: Chang Hsin-pao, *Commissioner Lin*; John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Canton Trade and the Opium War," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10, eds. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, 1978-87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); idem, *Strangers at the Gate*; James M. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Peter Ward Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975).

[143] Spence, "Opium Smoking," 151.

[144] Luo Ergang 羅爾綱, *Taiping Tianguo Shigang* 太平天國史鋼 (Shanghai, 1937), 16.

chuan Hsiao has remarked: "By the middle of the nineteenth century such deterioration

[of the rural environment] had reached a critical point; large numbers of rural inhabitants

in various parts of the empire were driven by destitution and hardships to the point of

despair."[145]

Second, the war increased the fiscal problems of the state. This and subsequent

conflicts ultimately led to bankruptcy. China suffered a loss of over $8,223,700 in its

trade with England alone.[146] In addition, at the end of the Opium War Beijing had to pay

23 million silver dollars (Mexican) as indemnity; at the end of the 1860 war, Beijing was

forced to pay 16 million silver taels.[147] After that China was continually in debt until the

establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Beijing imposed several additional levies,

hoping to relieve the exchequer, but these further impoverished the already suffering

peasantry.[148]

Last, the Opium War had not only exacerbated poverty in the rural society, but

---

[145] Hsiao, *Rural China*, 411.

[146] *Chinese Repository*, XII (1843), 514.

[147] 1 tael was 70 U.S. cents in local value.

[148] The import of foreign cloth and yarn also caused a certain amount of decline in the native handicraft textile industry driving out Chinese native products and cutting thus the subsidiary income of the rural people.

had also revealed the military weakness of the Manchu dynasty, contributing to social

disorder. One major condition has generally been given as both cause and result of the

military weakness: government corruption and inefficiency. Local officials did not

hesitate to keep the ruler in the dark by tolerating and falsely reporting the troubles. In the

Guangzhou fuzhi we find this statement:

> Where does the source of the present-day turbulence lie? It lies in those
> magistrates who are greedy and cruel…. Lower officials depend upon higher
> ones for protection, while higher officials rely on lower to serve as their outside
> agents in their common malpractices. The people have hated them all in the
> depth of their hearts for a long time. As soon as the crisis comes and the alarm is
> sounded, wicked elements take advantage of the situation….[149]

The Manchu banners had already lost their military effectiveness during the

eighteenth century. Their pay remained the same and could not have easily been

increased under the fixed government budget system. Under steady, slow inflation, prices

had risen, so that the real pay of the troops had declined. The number of paid soldiers in

the banners also remained the same, while the banner population increased. In addition,

the life of the idle banner elite had corrupted morale and reduced their value as a fighting

force. The Chinese professional troops, the Green Standard, had also been affected by the

---

[149] *Guangzhou FZ*, 127:24b.

general corruption and demoralization. Their salaries, which were low to begin with,

were often pocketed by officers, and the underpaid soldiers lived off the land. Training

was negligible and equipment was lacking; the army had become a typical part of the

corrupt bureaucratic organization, totally unprepared to deal with any major

emergency.[150] To supplement inadequate government troops, local officials hired

mercenaries; and to protect their towns and villages, the gentry as well as some

commoners formed militia, composed of either mercenaries or peasant minutemen. Thus,

the Opium War in the Pearl River Delta, as Frederic Wakeman and Philip Kuhn have

demonstrated, led to a militarization of that region's hinterland.[151]

The Opium War had had other effects on the internal Chinese development,

especially in the Pearl River Delta. Guangzhou was the principal city of Guangdong

province and the political and military headquarters of the area. Guangzhou had seen

most of the fighting during the Opium War and the changes brought about by the Treaty

of Nanjing had destroyed the trade monopoly formerly held by the merchants of the city.

The opening of Shanghai as a new center for trade brought the foreign merchants closer

---

[150] See Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth-Century China," introduction to Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964).

[151] Wakeman, *Strangers,* 12-70; Kuhn, *Rebellion,* 69-76.

to the tea and silk production areas,[152] which meant that the thousands of coolies and

boatmen, who earlier had been employed in transporting these commodities to

Guangzhou, were thrown out of work.[153] Coastal pirates, cleared from the high seas by

the British navy, invaded the river systems of Guangdong and Guangxi to harass and

pillage. The ranks of the lawless were further swelled by the soldiers discharged from

local militias after the conclusion of the war.[154]

In addition to the above problems, Guangdong province, and still more, Guangxi,

was settled by diverse ethnic populations as we have seen earlier. The Puntis and Hakkas,

major Chinese groups in the region, had maintained their special traditions and dialects

and were often involved in communal rivalries and clashes. A large number of tribal

people also lived in the two provinces, especially in Guangxi. People like the Miao 苗

and Yao 瑤, who had made up the pre-Han population of the area, had been pressed back

by Han settlement to less desirable land and mountainous regions. These tribal people

---

[152] Since the foreigners had already won the Opium War, they did not have to stay in Guangzhou and they started their business enterprise anew in Shanghai in which the foreigners found scope and opportunity for the full exercise of their new facilities and privileges and trading methods with more freedom than under the domination of the old Cohong system in Guangzhou. See Banister T. Roger, *A History of the External Trade of China, 1834-81* (Shanghai: Inspector General of Chinese Customs, 1931), 25; *Consular Report* Vol. 23 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889), 382.

[153] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 100.

[154] *Chinese Repository*, V. 3 (1834-5), 62; Laai Yi-faai, "Pirates of Kwangtung," 19-25.

had a latent hostility against the Chinese officials and farmers who had taken land and imposed taxes. One result of this was the Yao rising in the 1830s, the last determined attempt at resistance by a non-Chinese group on the mainland of Guangdong.[155]

The dislocation of the regional economy in the mid-nineteenth century, along with the diversity of ethnic composition and of occupational groupings, consequently made the province the favorite ground for the establishment of secret societies and bandit gangs, whose membership was drawn from the disaffected populations. Jobless porters, impoverished boatmen, and discharged soldiers and militiamen from the Opium War were ready recruits to underground secret societies. Discontented peasant tenants also joined the secret societies. The concentration of landownership in a few hands (the lineages and powerful gentry), meant that the majority of the farmers were tenants. By the early nineteenth century, the pressure of population and the shortage of arable land had considerably raised the price of land as well as rents, and the tenants were badly affected.[156] It is not surprising then, that tenants should "harbor deep resentment against

---

[155] For this rebellion, see Wei Yuan 魏源, *Shengwuji* 聖武記 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1995 reprint), 7:35a-39a, 41a-52a.

[156] As the population doubled during the eighteenth century and continued its growth in the following century, the limits of cultivable land in Guangdong reached by 1850. In spite of the fact that the amount increased from about 7 percent around 1713 to 13 percent in 1853 in terms of the percentage of the total Lingnan land area under cultivation, the amount of cultivated land in Guangdong did not increase after 1853, indicating that the limits of cultivable land had been reached by then. See Hsiao, *Rural China*, 383-

the clan leaders who enforced high rents or usury."[157] More and more began to join secret

societies, the champions of the oppressed, with their underground ideology transcending

lineage authority.[158] The formation of the secret societies was rampant around the Pearl

River Delta after the Opium War:

> In August 1843, a thousand men or more, Triads and members of the Ngo Lung
> Hwai (Sleeping Dragon Society) fought together with arms in the village of
> Yung-ki, in the district of Shun-te (Shunde)…. In 1844, the secret societies began
> to appear in public to entice people into the society. At first but a few scores
> would assemble for the purpose, and by night; but, in the course of time, bodies
> of several hundreds held their meeting publicly and in broad day…. Later, the
> secret societies began to rob merchants on a massive scale in daylight. Even on
> the White Cloud Mountains, close to the provincial city, meetings for enlistment
> were held at all times and seasons….[159]

All the elements discussed above combined to imprison the majority of the

Chinese in a state of poverty that breeds discontent. The Chinese rural population still

might have had the miraculous resiliency to rebound from their hardship. But once a

famine struck, this discontent developed into riots and eventually into revolts. Augustus F.

385; Marks, *Tigers*, 307.

[157] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 110, citing Hu Hsien-chin, *The Common Descent Group in China and its Functions* (New York, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1948), 90.

[158] Wakeman contends that the society was polarized into wealthy and poor by 1845 and that class interests were no longer softened by the lineages. See Wakeman, *Strangers*, chap. 10.

[159] George W. Cooke, *China and Lower Bengal: Being the Times Special Correspondence from China*, (London: Warne & Routledge, 1858), 435-45.

Lindley quoted Sir John F. Davis' observations about Chinese famine from 1838 to 1841:

"During the years 1838-1841, many parts of the empire became plunged in misery and want;--so severe was the famine, that many thousands perished, while multitudes were driven to insurrection."[160] By 1843, the Tiandihui groups were actively recruiting members in the settled villages around Guangzhou. In some cases, entire villages joined voluntarily because their inhabitants were faced with an economic crisis: the cottage weaving industry had declined, taxes had increased dramatically, and 1848-50 and 1852 were years of poor harvest.[161]

Other parts of China also fell again and again into the clutch of famine in the mid-nineteenth century. The calamities included drought, food, storm, sandstorm, hail, and failure of crops.[162] It was under these circumstances that not only the Red Turban Rebellions but also large-scale rural rebellions arose to threaten the Qing dynasty.[163] The greatest and best organized of these anti-dynastic insurrections was, no doubt, the Taiping

---

[160] Augustus F. Lindley [Lin-le], *Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Ti-ping Revolution,* Vol. I (London: Day and Son, Ltd., 1866), 101.

[161] Wong, *Yeh Ming-ch'en*, 96; Wakeman, *Strangers*, 127, 139-44; "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung," 37-41

[162] Luo, *Shigang,* 17-18.

[163] This was the larger context in which the Red Turban Rebellions of the 1850s took place. The numbers of district towns were seized before the Red Turbans (Tiandihui lodges) were defeated but not eliminated, as subsequent events were to be studied in detail in the ensuing chapters.

Rebellion (1850-1864). This uprising, which covered the whole of South China, was accompanied or followed by several others: the Nian Rebellion in Anhui and Shandong (1853-1868), the Southwest Muslim Rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873), and the Northwest Muslim Rebellion in Gansu, Shanxi, and Chinese Turkestan (1862-1877).

The Taping Rebellion

The growing disorder in China culminated in the Taiping Rebellion and the near overthrow of the dynasty. In the environment of Liangguang, the rebellion had much in common with the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War, as seen earlier in this chapter, and in its course it was to dominate much of the political and military scene for the next fifteen years.[164] The immediate impetus to the Taiping Rebellion was the dissatisfaction of a minority group, the Hakkas, in the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, where the revolt began. As seen earlier, the Hakkas remained comparatively unassimilated into the local society, spoke their own dialect, and were differentiated by special customs. They also suffered discrimination at the hands of the local majority, and

---

[164] The basic reasons behind the Taiping rebellion and the other rebellions were the general problems of the nation: increasing poverty, natural disaster, alienation, frustrated ambition, and a government too weak and corrupt to tackle the problem effectively. In addition, each uprising had its own special set of causes, depending on local circumstances and the sorts of people involved.

conflict between the Hakkas and others was often a spark for political and social conflict.

The Hakkas provided the basic cadre for the rebellion in its early stages, and

discrimination against them was an important source of discontent.

In addition to the special circumstances of the Hakkas, the foreign presence at

Guangzhou added fuel to local problems. The Qing government had suffered a loss of

prestige among the people of the South through its easy defeat at the hands of the

foreigners. In addition, the shift of trade to other ports in the aftermath of the Opium War

resulted in commercial dislocations in the area and added to its economic woes. The

foreign presence had also brought zealous, dedicated Christian missionaries to China's

shores.

The Taiping Rebellion began in 1851 in Guangxi province among a

predominantly Hakka group called the Society of God Worshippers, which was under the

leadership of Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 (1814-1864). The Taipings were significantly

different from the other uprisings of the time, because of the influence of Christianity.

The society's god was the Christian God, and its leader Hong Xiuquan claimed to be the

second son of God, who had received from the Heavenly Father the mandate to restore

China to a state of Christian grace.[165] In practical terms, this mission translated into

eradicating Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism and seizing political power from the

Manchu rulers who the Taipings demonized. Hong and his group envisioned an

egalitarian, classless society based on communal ownership of property and the

communal worship of God.[166]

By 1853 the Taiping army, now over a million strong, had advanced from its base

in Guangxi, overrun Hunan and Hubei, defeated Manchu armies in Anhui and the lower

reaches of the Yangzi River, and established the capital of Taiping Tianguo 太平天國

(The Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace) at Nanjing. Taiping influence extended over

six of the richest provinces of China. Hong installed himself as the Heavenly King. China

now had two dynasties, two kingdoms, vying for control of the country. The Taiping

government, however, lacked the stable underpinnings of the traditional Confucian state

---

[165] Hong's Christian utopia is a hybrid version. Hong's real intention was probably to use the new faith as a powerful means to launch his rural revolution. Most of Hong's preaching came from the Old Testament. Many Chinese traditional values and beliefs, including the concept of *Taiping* were combined with the alien Christian gospels. See, Jonathan Spence, *The Taiping Vision of Christian China* (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 1996), p. 14.

[166] Most useful on the Taiping Rebellion have been Eugene Boardman, *Christian Influence upon the Taiping Rebellion* (Madison, 1952); Philip A. Kuhn, "Taiping Rebellion"; Franz Michael with Chang Chung-li, *The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, Vol. 1, History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966); Vincent Y. Shih, *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1967); Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); *The Taiping Revolution* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1976); Jonathan D. Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996).

that served the Qing. Its leadership lacked unity and the organizational capacity that might have tilted the final outcome in its favor. The Taiping Rebellion attained the high point of its success and power by 1856; thereafter the movement lost its vigor and the upstart dynasty was liquidated in 1864.

After the forces of the Taiping moved north in 1851, the main body never returned to the Guangdong-Guangxi border region, where the rebellion had had its origins. However, other bodies in sympathy with the Taipings succeeded in crossing the Guangdong border. The first of these was a body of outlaws bearing the Ming banner, which reached the district of Qingyuan to the north of Guangzhou in the summer of 1850. In the following year secret society adherents in the neighboring district of Conghua 從化 joined them in revolt. In the summer of 1851, a Taiping supporter named Ling Shiba 凌十八 also crossed the border in the west and captured the city of Luoding 羅定, where he held out for a year until finally being bought off.[167]

In part the failure of the Taipings to achieve success in Guangdong can be explained by the military events of the first month of the movement. The principal access route to Guangdong was, of course, down the West River, but after the original agreement

---

[167] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 132.

between the Taiping and pirates who controlled the river had broken down, this route was

blocked to the main force.[168] Even after the capture of Yong'an 永安, the Taiping still

intended to carry their rebellion into Guangdong, but found their way barred by Imperial

forces.[169] It seems probable, however, that by this date Hong Xiuquan had already

conceived the idea of capturing Nanjing.[170]

The Taipings bypassed Guangzhou. This vast upheaval, however, left its mark on

the every side of China including the local societies around the Pearl River Delta. The

Chinese state that emerged from this blood-letting was in many significant ways different

from what it had been in 1850, fourteen years earlier.[171] Because of the importance of its

effect on affairs in the whole of China at the time, the subject of the Taiping Rebellion

will be referred to again in the following chapter.

---

[168] Laai Yi-faai, "River Strategy: a place of the Taiping's Military Development," *Oriens* 5 (1952), 303.

[169] Lindesay Brine, *The Taiping Rebellion in China* (London, 1862), 151.

[170] Wakeman gives us two reasons for the lack of Taipings in the Guangdong areas: 1) The real seedbed of discontent and zoned of recruitment for the Taiping forces was not Liangguang but Hunan and Jiangxi, full of unemployed boatmen and coolies; and the Yangzi valley, with its impoverished peasants and propertyless vagabonds. 2) The Heavenly Kingdom centered on Nanjing. See Wakeman, *Strangers*, 131.

[171] See Jen, *Revolutionary*; Robert P. Weller, *Resistance, Chaos and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts and Tiananmen* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994); Michael, *Taiping Rebellion*; Ssu-yu Teng, *New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966).

4) Summary

The Pearl River Delta is geomorphologically formed by sediment carried down by the West, East and North Rivers on their way to the South China Sea. The Delta is distinctive in that it is not a single extensive flat plain of low relief. Instead, it is a composite of several basins drained by a number of rivers and their tributaries. The confluence of the rivers and the conjunction of their basins take place near Guangzhou, the biggest urban center of the region. This composite delta is interlaced with many rivers and their branches, most of which are navigable year-round.

The delta is also distinguished by its natural endowment, which is most favorable for agricultural production. With a subtropical location, the delta enjoys warm temperatures (21-22 degrees Celsius yearly average), abundant precipitation (1,600-1,700 millimeters annually), and ample sunshine, the result being a year-long growing season suitable for double-cropping rice. Such favorable conditions, combined with superior fertile soil and a well-established waterway system for transporting and marketing farm products, have led to the development of an intensive farming system based on the production of rice, sugar cane, mulberry, and fruit, as well as silk cocoons and pond

fish.[172] Thus, despite the fact that the delta region was not richly endowed with energy

and mineral resources, agricultural and aquatic production provided a raw material base

diversified enough for flourishing small-scale manufacturing.

The increased output in farming and manufacturing had in turn led to increased

trade and prosperity as marketing and transport networks developed and grew. The

concentration of commercial activities and the specialization of production facilitated the

agglomeration of population in towns and cities. By the late nineteenth century, the delta

region had become one of the most urbanized economic regions in China, next only to the

lower Yangzi region.[173] In addition, the frontier location of the delta, separated from

China proper, has made the region serve as China's traditional southern gateway for

foreign trade and sea transportation. Guangzhou, the biggest port city in the delta, was

one of China's earliest trade outlets and enjoyed its role as the only port for international

trade before the Opium War.[174]

---

[172] Zheng Tianxiang 鄭天祥, *Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Jingji Dili Wangluo* 珠江三角洲經濟地理網絡 (Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press, 1991), 42.

[173] G.W. Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth Century China," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G.W. Skinner, 211-49 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977).

[174] Since the Tang dynasty, Guangzhou had been the center of commerce and shipping not only for inland merchants but also for foreign traders. By 1757 the Qianlong emperor had restricted all foreign trade to Guangzhou, and Sino-Western economic relations were governed for almost the next hundred years by the so-called Canton system. Each year hundreds of foreign vessels from Southeast Asia, Europe, and America sailed into the Pearl River estuary to do business with the Chinese.

The unique geographical location of the delta also merits special attention. By virtue of its location, the delta is relatively remote, situated at the southern end of the mainland far away from the political center of Beijing. This remoteness is further under scored by the existence of a wide range of high mountains (*nanlingshan* 南嶺山), which physically separates the delta from the vast territory of the dynasty.[175] It is such remoteness that has given the local people considerable flexibility in seeking development, and in some circumstances, the possibilities of rebellions. Then, around the nineteenth century, with the population continuing to grow and the limits of cultivable land filled up by 1850, a critical point had been reached. For the rural population, with the extent of cultivable land in Guangdong reached by mid-century, with farming techniques as developed as possible, and with yields stagnating, the question became one of obtaining more land at the expense of one's neighbors. Thus, fights between neighbors over land, water, and hills with trees became endemic in South China[176] by the middle of the nineteenth century, contributing to the lineage conflicts and feuds that so

---

[175] Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: the Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[176] For examples in eastern Guangdong, see Marks, *Rural Revolution*, 60-75.

distinguished the region,[177] to the conflict between the Hakkas and the Puntis, including the rise of the Taipings in Guangxi province, to the rise of secret societies and sworn brotherhoods, and to the Red Turban Rebellions in the 1850s.

On the eve of the Taiping Rebellion yet another event of profound importance took place, namely the Opium War of 1839-1844. The Opium War demonstrated the weakness of the military forces. In Guangdong the braves who had been levied to supplement them had, in many cases, become bandits, so adding to the disorder around the Pearl River Delta region. Until the Taiping Rebellion this disorder remained unorganized and undirected, and its main effect was a devastating and unsettling influence on the countryside. But the rapid success of the Taipings, and in Guangdong of the Red Turban Rebellions, exposed the degree of discontent that had developed by the middle of the nineteenth century. The connections between the emerging environmental crisis and the various social movements that originated in Guangdong, particularly in the Pearl River Delta region are more than coincidental. In short, the economic and social crisis around Guangzhou after the Opium War directly caused the massive rebellions of the 1850s.

---

[177] Harry Lamley, "Hsieh-tou."

CHAPTER III

THE RED TURBAN REBELLIONS

In the previous chapter, I examined various factors—the Opium War, lineages,

the Taipings, land reclamations, feuds, and the Hakka migrations—that facilitated chaos

and lawlessness around the Pearl River Delta areas. The major focus of this chapter is on

the Red Turban Rebellions, a series of little studied but significant uprisings by Tiandihui

members.[178] These rebellions, though themselves not explicitly about ethnicity, were

fueled by demographic and ethnic competition for land. Particularly in the Wuyi areas,

---

[178] Scholars agree that there were two large secret societies in China: the religiously inclined White Lotus Society, which prevailed in North China for several hundred or possibly even more than 1,000 years, and the Tiandihui. It is generally supposed that most southern secret societies were derived form the Tiandihui. The group of societies on which this chapter is focused is the Tiandihui, popularly known as 'The Triads' or the 'Hong league.' According to Xiao Yishan, the name 'Hong' was used only among the members themselves. In general, however, all these groups were usually lumped together under the name Tiandihui (Triads; Heaven and Earth Society), and this convention shall be followed here for convenience whenever discussing these societies in general. The term Triad was coined by the missionary William Milne in the 1820's, and has stuck with us ever since. By that time one of the most common names used by the secret societies in South China was *sanhehui* 三合會, which Milne translated as "The society of the Three United, or the Triad Society." This association, he claimed, had earlier been known as the Tiandihui, or "The Society that unites Heaven and Earth." See William Milne, "Some Account of a Secret Association in China, entitled the Triad Society," *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 1 (1827), 240; Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Jindai mimi shehui shiliao* 近代秘密社会史料 vol.1, (Changsha: Yuelu shu she :Hunansheng xinhua shudian faxing, 1986), 4; Chesneaux, "Secret Societies," 2.

the Red Turban Rebellions emerged out of a local Tiandihui network and an alliance

between this network and the Puntis, to this network, an alliance that created ideological

differences between the Hakkas and the Puntis, thereby intensifying pre-existing cultural

differences.

Eventually, the Red Turban Rebellions in the Wuyi region justified the Puntis to

mobilizing against their Hakka competitors. By inviting the formation of loyal Hakka

militia to suppress the largely Punti rebels, Qing administrators militarily pitted the

Hakkas against the Puntis and permitted the Hakkas (by virtue of their enhanced identity

as loyal Qing supporters) to take violent punitive action against the Puntis. These

disruptions of local society, particularly in the Wuyi region, set the stage for the Hakka-

Punti War. Thus an understanding of the dynamics of the Red Turban Rebellions is

essential to the analysis of the process whereby Hakka consciousness was formed.

Although national events had major impact on the timing and evolution of the

rebellions, the contention here is that the origin and activities of the Red Turbans are

inextricably linked to an ongoing process of adaptive competition within the Pearl River

Delta area. I will now proceed to a discussion of those activities and the rebellions

undertaken by the Tiandihui at the Pearl River Delta.

1) The Course of the Red Turban Rebellions

A Series of Incidents Lead To The Red Turban Rebellions

In Guangdong the year following 1850 was a period of growing disorder. The trouble had begun with the Taiping incursions across the border from Guangxi. Of these, the one headed by Ling Shiba had been the most difficult to subdue. Ling, a native of the prefecture of Gaozhou, went to Guangxi in 1847 and joined the Taipings. Then in May 1851, he returned to his native land and set up Taiping headquarters at a place called Luojing 羅鏡. Severe fighting between the rebels and the Qing forces continued throughout the year of 1852. The war effort by Xu Guangjin, a Viceroy of Liangguang, against Ling Shiba in Gaozhou made little headway.[179] In same year, the border city of Wuzhou 梧州 was under siege by a Tiandihui rebel group led by Tian Fang 田芳. Other Tiandihui rebels closer to the delta were inspired to attack Conghua, only tens of miles from Guangzhou.[180]

---

[179] Xu Guangjin was a Viceroy of Liangguang.

[180] To save the city from imminent attack, a thick barrier of garrison troops and hired mercenaries was set up between the delta and the borderland. Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen, successive viceroys of Liangguang, personally led armies into the mountains. By August 1852 they had blocked the rebel descent, decisively crushing Ling Shiba at Luoding 羅定. See F.O. 931.1190. Correspondence regarding a rebel, Ling Shiba (1850); F.O. 931.1281. Draft memorial by Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen regarding Ling Shiba (April 10, 1850); *Daqing Lichao shilu, Xianfeng period* 大清歷朝實錄, 咸豊朝 (Taibei, 1964 reprint), 32.11; Wakeman, *Strangers*, pp. 132-133.

Rebel incursions and the failure of the provincial authorities to deal with them

effectively were not the only cause of discontent. The gentry had become increasingly

alienated by the extent to which they were called upon to finance operations against

rebels, not only in Guangdong and Guangxi, but also in other provinces. This burden fell

particularly heavily on the gentry of the Pearl River Delta. They were further incensed by

the discovery that a local magistrate had concealed a remission of taxes within the

province in 1851. In a number of districts, they reacted violently refusing to pay any land

taxes. The situation further deteriorated in 1852, after heavy flooding in the delta had

destroyed much of the harvest. The provincial authorities, however, were in such

desperate need of funds that they continued making demands on the gentry. In 1853 they

were asked to supply one month's rent on all their property to the provincial treasury.

Eventually, these burdens were passed on to the tenant farmers who had already suffered

much over the past several years.[181]

By far the most significant event took place in 1853, when the Taipings captured

Nanjing and established this city as their Heavenly Kingdom. Local disaffected elements,

---

[181] Nishikawa Kikuko 西天喜久子, "Juntoku danren sokyokuno seitatsu 順德團練總局の成立," in *Toyobunka kenkyusho kiyo* 東洋文化研究所紀要105 (Tokyo University, 1988), 14-16; Liu Weizhang 廖伟章, "Taiping tianguo gemingshi Qingchao Guangdong caizheng 太平天国革命时清朝广东财政," in *Taiping tianguo yu jindai zhongguo* 太平天国与近代中国, (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993), 366; Wakeman, *Strangers*, pp.132-136; idem, "Secret Societies of Kwangtung," pp.38-39.

especially the secret societies, were very much excited by these disturbances, and they kept

the local officials and officers very busy indeed. One of the secret society proclamations,

which appeared among British Foreign Office papers, reads, "The ancient books tell us that

once in five centuries some man of talent beyond his fellows will appear, on whom the hope

of the nation will depend. That period has elapsed since the rise of the Ming dynasty, and it is

full time that a hero should come forward and save the nation."[182]

In 1853, soon after the Taiping occupation of Nanjing, disturbances fomented by

the Tiandihui once again occurred in the vicinity of Guangzhou. Large numbers were said

to be joining the Tiandihui.[183] The society was anti-dynastic, but in its early stages this

fresh burst of activity consisted merely of undirected attacks and banditry, prompted by

economic grievances and the shortage of rice. In that same year Amoy and Shanghai were

captured by secret society bands. In Guangdong they were not to achieve the same

success, but they were convinced that it was high time for them to take action.

Fearful of Taipings penetration into Guangdong, Qing authorities made strenuous

efforts to raise money for defense.[184] Their fund-raising generally took the form of

---

[182] F.O. 17.126, Bowring-Clarendon, Desp. 18 (Jan. 9, 1855).

[183] *China Mail* (Hong Kong, 1845-1911), 14 (April 1853).

[184] The Qing government was mortally afraid that the Taipings would link up with the Tiandihui rebels and

surtaxes or of "contributions" that were anything but voluntary. These exactions roused

opposition in Shilong 石龍, a village of Dongguan county. Many local Tiandihui

members actively participated in the tax-resistance movement.[185] In October 1853, the

situation further deteriorated when a band allied with the Small Sword rebels of Amoy

were driven out of their center at the Bogue, to the south of Guangzhou, and established

themselves in Huizhou. In the following months severe disorders were reported in

Huizhou and Dongguan.[186] The provincial commander-in-chief was sent to the area, and

reported a victory that was punished with great severity. Banner troops were unleashed to

wipe out not only alleged local Tiandihui members but also entire villages.[187] The

disturbed state of the province provided an ideal setting for the further widespread

disturbances known as the Red Turban Rebellions.

---

magically transform them into a military juggernaut. In the sources, an occasional statement can even be found to the effect that the Taiping leaders instructed the Tiandihui leaders and others on tactics and molded them into effective troops. A memorial of Ye Mingchen said, 'The rebellious bandits of Jiangnan had secretly sent their cohorts back to Guangdong to get all evil elements in league with them and start riots at the same time. Gaoming, Shunde, Huilai and other districts and the city of Chaoqingfu had been lost to them.' See Yong Kweng, *Sohak*, 63; Luo, *Taipingtianguo shiqi* vol. 2, 54-55; "Taipingtianguo chunguan zheng chengxiang zhuodeng zhi Folingshi tongbing dayuanshuai Lideng diewen 太平天国春官正丞相桌等致佛岭市统兵大元帅李等牒文," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 62-63; F.O. 931.1599 Note concerning interrogation of Gan Xian 甘先.

[185] Nishikawa Kikuko, "Juntoku," 13-16.

[186] *China Mail* 27 (October 1853); *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.2b.

[187] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 138.

The Beginning and High Tide of the Red Turban Rebellions[188]

By the beginning of 1854, Ye Mingchen, Governor-general of Liangguang, was already receiving urgent dispatches from his agents informing him that every day in the suburbs of Guangzhou, hundreds upon hundreds of people were secretly assembling and then as secretly dispersing. These assemblies were in fact secret society gatherings held to admit new members.[189]

In early 1854, the Tiandihui groups in the Pearl River Delta areas apparently embarked on a greater enterprise under the leadership of a Tiandihui leader, Chen Song 陳松.[190] In March 1854, Chen sent a Tiandihui agitator, Zhong De 鐘德, into Xinqiao 新

---

[188] For a comprehensive outline of the history of the Red Turban rebellions, See Wakeman, *Strangers*, Chapters. XIV and XV; idem, "Secret Societies."

[189] F.O. 931.1512. A report on the Sanhehui (1854/1855); F.O. 931.1513. A summons to war against the Sanhehui in Foshan (1854/1855)..

[189] *Shunde XZ*, 23:5.b, translated in Wakeman, *Strangers*, p. 139

[190] Nothing concrete is known of Chen Song's personal background other than his Tiandihui activities in Guangdong. Through his activities, several Tiandihui lodges were created in Guangdong in the mid-nineteenth century. The Tiandihui in mid-nineteenth century Guangdong was organized in a loose confederation of local lodges (*shantang* 山堂) that retained complete control over their individual courses of action and finances. Every branch of the Tiandihui adopted the name of a certain mountain as its fancy name. The name adopted did not necessarily correspond to an actual mountain. There were also various fancy names of "halls," derived from the Zhongyitang 忠義堂 (the Hall of Loyalty and Righteousness) in the novel, Shuihuzhuan 水滸傳. The most notable Tiandihui local lodges around Guangzhou areas at the time were He Liu's Hongyitang 洪義堂, the Hongshuntang 洪順堂 led by Chen Kai and Li Wenmao, the Hongxingtang 洪興堂 led by Chen Jinkang 陳金剛, and the Hongdetang 洪德堂 led by Liang Peiyou 梁培友. See Hirayama Shu, "Zhongguo," 81-82, Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies*, 168; Davis, *Primitive*, 103; Hu Zhusheng 胡珠生, *Qingdai Hongmenshi* 请代洪门史 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1996), 309.

橋 and Dongguan to contact the leaders of local Tiandihui lodges such as Chen Xianliang

陳顯良, He Liu 何六 and Yuan Yushan 袁玉山 in the hope of stirring up a general

uprising.[191] After Zhong De's arrest by the Qing authorities, Chen Song appointed Li

Wenmao as a leader of the Tiandihui lodges around Guangzhou (Pingjingwang 平靖王)

and planned an uprising for early July.[192] But the first major outbreak came a month

earlier than their original date, with the revolt of He Liu.[193]

On 17 June 1854 He Liu, a leader of a Tiandihui local lodge (Hongyitang 洪義

堂) in Shilong, animated by Chen Song's direction, seized the opportunity to rise up by

proclaiming revenge for his blood-oath brothers who had been killed during the

suppression of the Qing purge at Shilong. He Liu and his followers attacked the district

[191] Wakeman argues that there is no evidence to show that the rebellion was planned in advance. "Rather, rebellion engendered rebellion, in a distinct crescendo of disorder after He Liu's revolt." But Wakeman failed to provide an explanation of how such a large number of people could have gathered so suddenly and make an organized attack on an administrative seat. In contrast to Wakeman's contention, many documents show us that there was plotted conspiracy under the Tiandihui leader, Chen Song. The shadowy secret society networks with which Chen Song 陳松 were involved provided a useful organizational framework that allowed much swifter mobilization of followers than would otherwise have been possible. See "Huifei zongtoumu Chen Song shiyou 會匪總頭目陳松 事由,"in Sasaki Masaya 佐佐木正哉, edit. *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha-Shiryō hen* 清末的秘密結社 -資料篇,(Tōkyō: Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai, 1967), 21; F.O. 931.1090. Information regarding bandits in Guangzhou (1850s); idem, 1439. Reports on Chen Song (1854); idem, 1484. List of 36 Red Turban rebels in the Nanhai area (1854). For Wakeman's argument, see Wakeman, *Strangers*, p, 139.

[192] "Huifei zongtoumu," in Sasaki, *Shimatsu*, . 21; F.O. 931.1090. Information regarding bandits in Henan (1850s).

[193] He Liu was from a merchant family in Shunde county and said to have moved into Shilong village, Dongguan county, where he come under the influence of the Tiandihui leader Chen Song. See F.O. 931.1439. A report on Chen Song (1854).

city, Dongguan and sacked it.[194] This was soon followed by outbreaks of rebellions in all

the districts surrounding Guangzhou. Rebellions soon engulfed the Pearl River Delta

areas. Town after town fell to insurgents, who held several administrative seats

continuously for several years (see Map 1). The government was unable to suppress these

rebellions until early1855, when massive reinforcements were transferred from

neighboring provinces.[195]

All the insurrectionists and their collaborators wore red turbans as an identifying

sign, which earned them the name of Hongjinze 紅巾賊 (Red Turban Bandit) or

Hongtouze 紅頭賊 (Red Head Bandit). They were also called Hongbing 洪兵 (Vast

Soldiers or Triad Soldiers) since the Red Turbans used the insignia and watchwords of the

Tiandihui.[196] The principal prize was, of course, Guangzhou itself, and in the summer of

1854 the Red Turbans came close to taking the city.[197]

---

[194] A number of factors had to come together to precipitate the revolt, including maladministration by the local magistrate, Jiang Zhaoen 江肇恩. See *Junjichutang zouzhe lufu* 軍機處檔錄副奏摺 (Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1982 reprint), Xianfeng 4.7.25; *Dongguan XZ*, 35.7.

[195]Jian Youwen 簡又文, *Taiping Tianguo quanshi* 太平天国全史 (Hong Kong: Jianshi mengjin shudian, 1962), 888-93.

[196] Soda Yo 相田洋, "Kokinko 紅巾考," in *Toyoshi kenkyu* 東洋史研究, 38.4 (March 1980), 38-4, 57; Wakeman, *Strangers*, Chapter 14.

[197] The sources regularly mention almost 34 major rebel leaders and many minor ones. See F.O. 931.1497. A list of 34 Red Turban leaders (1854); Lu, *Tiandihui Zhengquan*, 133-142.

At Dongguan, the Red Turbans halted their attacks on Guangzhou and took time out to organize their rebel groups more fully. The rebels needed time to recoup and reorganize their forces, incorporating the many new recruits they had gained. More important still may have been the need to clarify the chain of command among the Tiandihui leaders. The critical military situation that would face them at Guangzhou made it all the more necessary to strengthen the fighting spirit by a promise of great rewards.

Map 1. Counties of the Pearl River Delta.

After the sudden arrest of Chen Song by the Qing authorities on October, 1854,

all Tiandihui lodges concentrated their bands in the Dongguan area, where they formed

an alliance and elected Li Wenmao and Chen Kai, co-leaders of the strongest group

(Hongxuntang 洪順堂), as *mengzhu* 盟主 (Lords of the Alliance).[198]

In late 1854, the Tiandihui leaders assembled in a temple at Foshan and started

their rebellion with a sacrifice to the five-colored banner indicating the legendary

founders of Tiandihui.[199] This matter of formality symbolized something concrete in the

Tiandihui organization. For example, during the ceremony of sacrifice to the Tiandihui

banner, the rebels used to recite verses such as this:

> Five men began fighting against the Qing troops; They founded the invincible
> Family of the Hong Brothers; After we have taken province, district, and region,
> We shall overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming.[200]

The concentration of bands under the leadership of Li Wenmao and Chen Kai

indicates that the Tiandihui groups were trying to build a unified force out of scattered

---

[198] Tiandihui symbolism marked many aspects of the rebellions. Li and Chen's chosen title—"alliance leader" (*mengzhu*)—resonates with the terminology of brotherhoods and associations. Rebels added the *hong* character to the ranks of some of the generals. Perhaps more importantly, rebels retained the language and some of egalitarian practices associated with brotherhoods. See F.O. 931.1439. Report on Chen Song (1854); "Dongguanxian shilong difang qishi yuanyou 東莞縣石龍地方起事緣由," in *Tiandihui*, 21.

[199] See *Enping XZ*, 14.2

[200] As Wakeman depicts the anti-Manchu slogan by the Red Turbans, "Overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming. (*fan-Qing fu-Ming*) was "more than a heroic echo of the past." It gave the rebels political relevance, even providing a form of social respectability. See Liu, *Tiandihui*, 10.32; Wakeman, *Strangers*, 35.

and incoherent branches. The sacrifice to a flag implies not only that the disunited and

disorganized Tiandihui groups had rallied under one standard, but that they were pledged

to a greater enterprise—rebellion. The unification of the numerous branches formerly led

by local *tangzhu* marked a higher degree of centralized organization over the previously

scattered forces.[201] Yet this coalition, though representing greater unity, did not last,

because it was not yet founded on an institutional reality. Immediately after its formation,

the combined force met a test that resulted in disaster.

Li Wenmao divided his lodge into four groups for the campaign: Chen Xianliang

陳顯良, with his army of about 30,000 from the east; Gan Xian 甘先 from the north; Li

himself from the west; and Lin Guanglong 林洸隆 from the south—all were to attack the

city. Chen Kai 陳開 also agreed to lead his army, upwards of 100,000, to join in the

attack on Guangzhou. Li also asked He Liu of Hongyitang to bring his troops, 10,000

strong, to reinforce Chen Xianliang in attacking Guangzhou from the east. They started

with conspicuous success, capturing the important city of Foshan, only 15 miles from

---

[201] Though the supreme leader of the complex Tiandihui groups always made the major decisions concerning external affairs, the sub-leaders provided a secondary level of command. In the event of the leader's death or absence, they could take over to prevent the alliance's disintegration, taking primary responsibility for their own followers while seeking to restructure the rebel groups according to the previously established hierarchy. Li Wenmao and other top leaders could thus keep the Red Turban forces without jeopardizing their control after Chen Song's death. See Ibid.; F.O. 931.1440. A Red Turban Proclamation (1854).

Guangzhou, on July 14. The Red Turban leader there, Chen Kai, proclaimed his intention

to restore the Ming dynasty, and made some attempt to institute a popular program.[202] In

the time-honored tradition of Chinese rebels, Chen Kai used imperial trappings to bolster

his legitimacy. Chen declared that a new reign period was in effect: it was now the first

year of the Daning 大寧 (Great Peace) reign.[203]

In other parts of Guangdong Red Turban bands first attacked the chief towns of

the districts in which they had originated. To the southwest of Guangzhou, in the districts

that were later to be involved in the Hakka-Punti War, the pattern of events was similar.

Risings are recorded as having taken place in Xinning by on July 21, in Kaiping on

August 12, and in Gaoming and Heshan at about the same time. The district cities of

Heshan and Kaiping were captured by the Red Turbans (Hongdetang 洪德堂) led by

Liang Peiyou 梁培友, and the district city of Enping was also besieged.[204] The Red

---

[202] F.O. 931.1558 Deposition regarding rebel activities in Zengcheng, Dongguan and Foshan areas in 1854 (April, 1855).

[203] Imperial imagery was mixed. Chen himself assumed the title of Zhennanwang 鎮南王 and was particularly emphatic in his claim to be restoring the Ming dynasty, a claim that explains—and adds credence to—the tales linking his revolt to the machinations of the Tiandihui. Edicts and proclamations were invariably issued in the name of the Ming as well. See *Xunzhou FZ*, 27.5; F.O. 931.1532. A report on the Red Turbans in Panyu (1855); F.O. 931.1569. Deposition of the rebel (July 1855).

[204] *Enping XZ*, 14:7b; *Guangzhou FZ*, 82:10b; *Kaiping XZ*, 21:3a; Su Fengwen 苏风文. "Pinggui jilue 平桂纪略," in *Hongbing Qiyi shiliao*, 772-813; Idem., "Gufei zhonglu 股匪总录," in *Hongbing Qiyi shiliao*, 814-840.

Turbans were particularly active in the prefectures of Guangzhou and Zhaozhou; in these

areas more district cities fell to the insurrectionists, such as Huaxian, Qingyuan,

Zengcheng, Conghua, Longmen, Kaijian 開建, Yingde, and Changluo. The Red Turbans

also terrorized the prefecture of Jiayingzhou.[205] It is estimated that the total number of

rebels around Guangzhou was estimated more than 200,000.[206]

Qing Forces

The initial failure of the Qing forces against the Red Turban rebels revealed the

failure of the methods of rural control employed by the Qing government. To prevent the

development of local disorder, the Qing had continued and improved the sub-

administrative apparatus of control that had existed under the Ming. The most important

of these was the *baojia*. For the Qing the *baojia* had two purposes. All households and

individuals were compelled to register and to be formed into groups of households, the

bao and *jia*. In this respect it resembled a form of census, at the same time singling out

---

[205] Su, "Pinggui," 800-812; Wakeman, *Strangers*, Chapter 14; Jian Youwen 簡又文, *Taiping tianguo quanshi* 太平天國全史, Vol. II, Chaps. 1 and 2.

[206] Qing force at Guangzhou had to rely on the braves from Chaozhou and delta braves from Dongguan. There were about two thousands Chaozhou braves and four thousands Dongguan braves stationed at Guangzhou. See *Dongguan XZ*, 72.4a; Scarth, *Twelve Years*, 229; Wong, *Yeh Ming-Ch'en*, p. 96.

persons responsible for carrying out the system. Its other function, which was probably

considered the more important, was the duty imposed on *baojia* heads to report the

occurrence of crimes and the existence of criminals and rebels in their neighborhood.[207]

Although the *baojia* system of collective security was often shown to be

defective in the details of its operation, in the relatively peaceful years of the eighteenth

century there seemed little to indicate that it might be inadequate as a method of rural

control. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, there was plenty of

evidence to show that the system could not control the growing disorder. Even when

working well, the *baojia* as a system of maintaining local security had limitations.

Particularly in Guangdong, where lineages were strong, the system was modified to take

into consideration local organization. For the purposes of the *baojia*, lineage villages

were not divided, but treated as a single unit under a local head. This conformed with the

Qing policy of encouraging clan solidarity, but it did little to advance the purposes of the

baojia, for the interests of the lineages did not necessarily coincide with those of the

authorities, nor could the clan be expected to act against members of the lineage. The

gentry were incorporated into the *baojia*, although in recognition of their status they were

---

[207] Hsiao, *Rural China*, pp. 43-83.

relieved of the duties prescribed under the system. But in order to maintain a balance of

power in rural areas, the gentry were not allowed to take control of the *baojia*. These

organizational arrangements were only partially successful in practice. In a number of

ways the gentry opposed their inclusion under the *baojia*, and in the words of Hsiao

Kung-chuan "probably prevented police control from being completely or consistently

effective in every part of the empire."[208] Until the end of the eighteenth century they

made little attempt to try to gain control of the *baojia*, and rather stood aside from it. But

in the nineteenth century the gentry, impelled by fears for their own security, became

much more interested in, and often gave active support to the *baojia*.[209]

The *baojia* was intended to prevent the development of disorder in rural areas.

But to deal with more serious threats to security, the Qing government had at its

command a large standing army. This was organized in two great divisions, the Banner

troops and troops of the Green Standard. In Guangdong the Banner troops, nominally

numbering about 5,000, were under the command of the Manchu General and all

stationed at Guangzhou. The Green Standard troops, numbering approximately 70,000,

---

[208] Ibid., p. 69.

[209] F.O. 931.1751 Regulations for the prevention of bandits. (n.d.); F.O. 931.1173 Regulations regarding organization of *baojia* for the prevention of rebels (1850s).

were distributed throughout the province. The system of military control had remained

largely unchanged since the Manchu conquest, and the disinclination of the Manchus to

place complete trust in the Green Standard forces was displayed by the practice of

dividing the army into separate commands. The greater part of the forces was under the

Provincial Commander-in-Chief (提督), and was stationed in Huizhou. Under him also

were the naval forces. But both the Governor-general and the Governor had separate

forces under their command, the former largely stationed at Zhaoqing, and the latter at

Guangzhou. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, although the military

headquarters of the various commands were territorially separate, there was no territorial

division of military responsibility, and the forces of each command were distributed

throughout the province.[210]

Certainly military garrisons were distributed in most of the rural areas of

Guangdong; however, there was insufficient protection of the local officials against the

threat of rebellion. While the magistrate had overall responsibility for the security of his

district, the forces at his disposal were extremely limited. Military garrisons were not

---

[210] The commander-in-chief of the land forces was stationed at Huizhou. His troops consisted of four brigades (*zhen* 鎮), namely, Shaozhou, Chaozhou, Gaozhou and Qiongzhou 瓊州. Humen, on the other hand, was the headquarters of the marine forces, which consisted of four squadrons, two on each side of Humen along the coast. For details on the distribution of military forces in Guangdong, See *China Repository*, Vol. 4 (1835-6), 284, and Vol. 20 (1851), 54, 254.

under his command. In order to make arrests, he could use the yamen-runners, who in

some ways served as a police force. But if there was any disorder in the district, the

magistrate had either to find local aid to deal with it, or to call for assistance from outside,

laying himself open to a charge of incompetence. This problem is rooted in the absence

of central government structure below the county level, coupled with laws prohibiting

magistrates from serving in their home districts. During the Qing at the village level there

were local constables, headmen, and gentry families, and even government units for

purposes of taxation, but "no formal government of any sort existed below the *zhou*

[department] and *xian* [county] levels."[211]

In this period, most counties had a population ranging from 100,000 to 250,000,

numbers very difficult to keep under close surveillance.[212] To be sure, the district

magistrate had subordinates charged with collecting taxes and information, but they could

be bribed or intimidated by powerful local interests, including the secret societies

themselves. Other difficulties of county officials included insufficient staff, lack of funds,

and short terms in office, all of which in some situations could lead to unfamiliarity with

---

[211] Ch'u T'ung-tsu, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 1.

[212] Hsiao, *Rural China*, 5.

local conditions.[213] With no more than a small constabulary at their immediate command, most magistrates were not equipped to deal with large, well-armed rebels. In any case, from the viewpoint of the average local official, for whom the slightest hint of unrest could mark the end of his career, any attempt to suppress local trouble was extremely perilous. Unless sure of success, most magistrates sought to ignore the suppression directives that periodically descended upon them from their less vulnerable superiors.[214]

The incompetence of local magistrates against rebel threats was only part of the Qing local security problem; another problem lay in the soldiers themselves. There had been several cases of Manchu brigadier generals who reported that they had won the great victories, though in fact they had fled from their posts at the approach of the rebels. The lies were later discovered after an investigation by Qing censors.[215] Often brigadier

---

[213] *Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), pp.52-53

[214] One can find herein another reason—government negligence and connivance—for the rebels' continuation and development. In 1803 the Jiaqing emperor said that since avaricious officials took advantage of people's legal disputes and feuds for the purpose of blackmail, the people first resented, then hated, and finally fought against the officials. "Are the people to be blamed for their conduct?" the emperor queried. "They were actually incited by local officials." The emperor noticed that, because the disorders in a district would bring disgrace and penalty to the magistrate, many local officials in recent years had ignored important local disorder cases. This was especially true in later period in Humen where the oppressiveness of the garrison soldiers had led many local people to join secret societies, eventually resulting in armed attacks on the soldiers. See *Da Qing Renzong*, 117.18; 347, 17-18; Wakeman, "Secret Societies," 36. F.O. 931.1163 A report on the longstanding hostility between the soldiers garrisoned at Humen and the local population. (1850s).

[215] For instance, a Provincial judge, Xu Xiangguang 徐祥光 was impeached by Governor-general, Ye Mingchen for bad military organization, false victory reports regarding the fall and recovery of Xingan, and corruption. See F.O. 931.1412 Draft Memorial of Ye Mingchen (Nov. 20, 1853). F.O. 931.1395 A

generals were too old to totter along, but they were still commanders at the front.[216]

Under such weak generals and poor political and social conditions, the morale of the

soldiers was very low.[217] For instance, two Mongolian officers each commanded more

than one thousand cavalry, all of whom had been in the service for more than ten years;

they were tired, ill, and homesick, and they had no desire to fight.[218] The Green Standards,

too, had deteriorated. They were in arrears on pay for years on end. And without good

officers, the soldiers became inefficient. The guard posts also disintegrated. By the mid-

nineteenth century, a foreign eyewitness, the Reverend Krone, wrote that on his visit to

some of them, 'he found neither guns nor soldiers', and that 'the places themselves

showed no signs of fortification save a dilapidated wall'.[219]

The average county garrison numbered between 150 and 300 soldiers raised from

among the young men of the county, whose main responsibility was to ensure security

---

confidential letter from the prefect of Huizhou regarding the falsifying reports of the magistrate for exaggerating a military emergency and shunning responsibilities.

[216] F.O. 931.1662 An Edict regarding a case of alleged negligence by Qing forces. (Oct. 6, 1857).

[217] The phrase "the officers and soldiers had no desire to fight (*shi wu douzhi* 士無鬪志)" appears frequently in government documents. See Ibid., F.O. 931.1395.

[218] F.O. 931.1760 List of soldiers and an officer who interfered with official matters. (n.d.)

[219] Krone, "A notice of the Sanon District,' *China Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Transactions*, (1859), 71-105.

within the county boundaries. When troubles were reported in outlying areas these troops

were supposed to take independent action to suppress the rebels. However, the local

garrison, apart from a few well-meaning youths who volunteered to protect their home

county, generally attracted the same rough sorts who joined the rebel forces or the

government army. Indeed, the same man could even be bandit one day and soldier the

next. At worst, someone in the magistrate's office itself might even be in collusion with

the rebels, selling them information about suppression plans.[220] What happened at Foshan

may serve as a good example. On 25 May 1855, three suspects were arrested during a

house-to-house check. The suspects confessed that they were soldiers from a company

stationed in the neighborhood, but at the same time they were members of the Tiandihui

and had joined the forces of Chen Kai, who had occupied the town the year before.[221]

Statements made in the same case provided evidence of the soldiers' drug-addiction,

gambling, prostitution, illicit dues, and affiliations with the Tiandihui.[222] Often greedy

---

[220] For instance, a Brigade General, Wang Pengnian 王鵬年 was impeached by Xu Guangjin for his attempt to conceal the facts in connection with a case of piracy. Some minor Xiangshan officials also collaborated with the Red Turban rebels. See F.O. 931.1285 Memorial of Xu Guangjin (April 28, 1851); F.O. 931.1504 A letter reporting on the Red Turbans under Chen Kai (1854).

[221] F.O. 931.1522. Report on three rebels. (1855); F.O. 931.1493 and F.O. 931.1133. Reports on three executed rebels at Foshan (June 1855).

[222] Ibid. Soldiers and militiamen of the Opium War were discharged when the foreign menace was apparently disposed of after 1849 and many of them became bandits or joined secret societies as soon as they were discharged. According to Wang Tianjiang, there were approximately sixty to seventy percent of

soldiers relished the opportunity to collect the loot of the rebels for themselves. For

example, during the battle against Chen Ji 陳吉 of Shunde, they immediately fell on the

booty left by the rebels who were routed, despite the order to pursue the rebels and wipe

them out.[223]

Banner troops stationed at the provincial city had similar problems. The standard

of living of the average Banner solder had declined considerably by the mid-nineteenth

century. Groups of idle young Bannermen wandered about the city of Guangzhou,

provoking trouble wherever they could, and became a serious problem. As a result, it was

suggested to the governor-general that he take advantage of the urgent demand for

soldiers during the siege of Guangzhou in 1854 to recruit the jobless Bannermen into a

mercenary force attached to their own Banner to strengthen the defense of the city.[224]

In late 1854 Red Turban rebels appeared everywhere in the Pearl River Delta and

government forces were in disarray. In mid-nineteenth century, Guangzhou was supposed

to have an authorized 15,000 government troops. In reality the total number of soldiers

---

the Green Standard and Hunan Armies in the secret societies during the 1860s. See Wang, "*mimi shehui*," 85-6.

[223] F.O. 931.1722. Note on rebellious societies along the coast of Guangdong (c. 1855)

[224] F.O. 931.1744. Five proposals for the defense of Guangzhou (1854).

available in Guangzhou was less than 5,000, and, since the generals cared only for the

protection of their own provinces, the isolated units were frequently surrounded and

harassed by their foes.[225] For instance, Ye Mingchen in 1855 made a sharp complaint to

the throne against the Qing forces from other provinces. He said that he could not

command any troops in the neighboring provinces, and the soldiers were either still at

their original stations or had purposely slowed down in their movements so that others

might go first and bear the brunt of fighting. Thus no other governor made much of an

effort to aid in the defeat of strong forces of the Red Turbans in Guangdong.[226] In other

words, the incompetence and low morale of the Qing officers and men was one of the

major reasons for the prolonged war against the rebel forces.

But most importantly, the poor relationship between soldiers and civilians long

delayed of military success. For many years the government could not count on civilian

support for the imperial soldiers, who did innumerable horrible things to the people. The

soldiers commonly occupied people's private houses, burning the tables, chairs, and other

---

[225] More than two thirds of the troops were temporarily disabled because of on-going troubles in rural areas and in neighboring province. For instance, upwards of 3,000 soldiers were sent to fight the Taipings in Hunan and many were also transferred to north Guangdong to fight against the rebels. See F.O. 17.217. Desp. 59, Incl., Morrison's report (Nov. 9, 1854); F.O. 931. 1098 A list of officers and numbers of troops (1850s).

[226] F.O. 931.1609 Ye to Commander-in-chief of Guangxi (1855); Jian, *Quanshi*, 852.

furniture to keep warm. They swarmed in city streets, and blackmailed shopkeepers.

Taking vegetables, fruit, and miscellaneous articles without paying, they often beat

peddlers to death when payment was demanded. The devastation the soldiers caused

made the people flee from their town and villages when they heard that government

troops were to pass through. [227] Such behavior created bad relations between the

government and people. In the words of the classic aphorism, "the officials compelled the

people to rebel (*guanbi minfan* 官逼民反)."[228] Such events were a constant theme in real

life as well as in fictionalized, romantic accounts of banditry like the *Shuihu zhuan*,

implying that behind every rebel was the action (or inaction) of some uncaring official. In

Guangdong, the situation was certainly bad. The conduct of officials serving in the

province was regarded as the basic cause of disorder in the early years of the Red Turban

Rebellions:

> Where does the source of the present day turbulence lie? It lies in those
> magistrates that are greedy and cruel. Let us speak of western Guangdong. When
> disorder had not yet arisen in western Guangdong, officials who held posts in
> this region…perceiving that the custom there is primitive and the people are
> ignorant, treated the latter as if they were birds, beasts, or savages that deserve no
> affection or care.

---

[227] *Qinding Daqing huidian shili* 欽定大清會典事例, (Taibei: Xinwenfeng, 1899 edition), 779.13a-19b.

[228] Shi Naian, *The marshes of Mount Liang : a new translation of the Shuihu zhuan*, trans. John and Alex Dent-Young (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994), Pt. 1, 25.

The writer goes on to say that superior officials are themselves corrupt, and abet

their subordinates, whom they treat as their agents. As a result:

> The local people have hated them all in the depth of their hearts for a long time.
> As soon as the crisis comes and the alarm is sounded, wicked elements take
> advantage of the situation [and start a revolt]. Vagabonds join them; and ignorant,
> destitute people, after having been subjected to some pressure [applied by the
> rebels] and having found it impossible to get food, follow them gladly. The
> conditions for a great upheaval are thus brought to completion.[229]

Of course, famine and economic depression were also factors facilitating the Red

Turban development. The worst floods along the Pearl River during the years of 1852 and

1853, for instance, compelled many helpless people to turn to Tiandihui groups.[230] The

inflation of silver, the devaluation of the coinage, and the rapid increase of prices for

daily commodities affected the Pearl River Delta areas. During the widespread famine of

1853 and 1854, rural insurgents led by local Tiandihui lodges simply overran the countrys

ide.[231]

---

[229] *Guangzhou FZ*, 129.24b, quoted by Hsiao, *Rural China*, pp. 469-70.

[230] In the summer of 1853, Guangdong had severe floods, ruining many crops and eventually leading much
of rural population to starvation. See *Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfengchao*, 67.19 Imperial Edict (Sept. 11,
1852); Idem., 104.25. Imperial Edict (Sep. 26, 1853); F.O. 931.1319 Report on forts damaged by severe
weather (1852).

[231] Records in local gazetteers during the 1850s give enough evidence to show that climatic calamities fell

2) The Nature of the Rebellions

The Composition of the Red Turban Rebels

What social groups or classes then dominated the Red Turban forces? It is

difficult to be precise about the social composition of Red Turban followers. One source

dismisses them as a group of vagrants, monks, sorcerers, and artisans.[232] Others state that

rebel groups assembled several tens of thousands of poor people, presumably peasants, to

oppose tax abuse.[233] The leadership of the Red Turban rebel groups is certainly of critical

importance in any assessment of their character. Among the rebel leaders, there were

fortune-tellers, bean-cake sellers, carpenters, sailors, actors, barbers, blacksmiths, rice

pounders, miners, medicine men, merchants who dealt in illegal trades such as smuggled

salt and opium, hired laborers, robbers, pirates, pawnshop owners, and members of the

lower intellectual class such as clerks and graduates of public examinations; to these

many more might be added, such as petty officers of the courts, military deserters,

runners, peddlers, and smugglers. All these groups were not distinctly separate, but

---

upon almost the entire area of the Pearl River Delta. See *Guangzhou FZ*, 163.35b-36b; *Huizhou FZ*, 18.21b; *Deqing Zhouzhi*, 15.29a; *Xinning XZ*, 14.18a; Wakeman, *Strangers*, 136.

[232] Sasaki Masaya, "Kampo yonen Kanton Tenchikai no haran 咸豐四年廣東天地會の反亂," in *Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu Senta iho* 近代中國研究センタ彙報, 2.3 (1963).

[233] Maeda Katsutaro 前田勝泰郎, "Shindai no Kanton ni okeru nomin toso no kiban 清代廣東における農民斗争の基盤," in *Toyo gekuho* 東洋學報, 51 (March 1969), 1-38.

overlapped each other.[234]

Chesneaux identified these people as semi-proletarian intellectuals or impoverished semi-proletarian vagrants who had fled from their home villages.[235] The principal Red Turban leader, Li Wenmao, was a wandering actor; and many other Red Turban leaders were semi-proletarian vagrants.[236] Some of these vagrants were drawn to the search for a new political authority because of many setbacks that they had encountered after leaving their native places; others embraced a new political vision because their social or occupational positions allowed them to see the degenerate reality of the ruling state. These people inhabited a world very different from that of the peasants involved in local rent and tax resistance, for even the poorest tenant was tied to his land and even the propertyless cultivator clung to the plot he rented in order to go on living. The objective conditions that brought them to the leadership of political rebellions were supplied by the great mass of desperate marginalized vagrants who were appearing in greater numbers in nineteenth century.

There is little doubt that the majority of Red Turban groups were led by members

---

[234] Ibid; Lu, *Liangguang de Tiandihui*, 133-142.

[235] Chesneaux, *Peasant Revolts*, 16.

[236] See Table 2, Occupation of the major Red Turban leaders in Guangdong, 1854-1855.

of the local secret societies. Equally indisputable is the fact that poor people constituted

the majority of the rank and file Red Turban members. Wang Tianjiang's study reveals

that the bulk of secret societies in the nineteenth century were composed of six main

types of social persons: dispossessed peasants, artisans, small traders, small owner-

mangers of various land and water transport vehicles, laborers or porters, and disbanded

soldiers of the Taiping and imperial forces.[237]

According to Chesneaux, smugglers, sorcerers, geomancers, victims of floods,

droughts and other disasters were also numerous in secret societies.[238] The features

common to all these categories of people were of course their relative poverty and

mobility. They came to be known as "the drifting population (*youmin* 游民)." In brief,

members of secret societies tended to come directly from those classes of society

conspicuous for their poverty, their despised occupations and their inferior status, which

also implied an absence of kinship ties or residence.

---

[237] Wang Tianjiang 王天奖, "19世纪下半的中国地秘密社会19shiji xiaban de zhongguo di mimi shehui," *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 (Beijing, 1963) no. 2, p. 83.

[238] Chesneaux, *Secret Societies*, 6-20; Idem., *Peasant Revolts*, 70-72.

Table 2. Occupation of the Major Red Turban Leaders in Guangdong, 1854-1855[239]

Occupation	Names	Number
Artisan	Zhu Hongying 朱洪英, Chen Jingang 陳金剛	2
Bandit	Chen Songnian 陳松年, Gao Mingyuan 高明遠, Chen Liangkang 陳娘康, Fan Yayin 范亞音, Chen Zhiguang 陳志廣, Liang Peiyou 梁培友	6
Boxer	Chen Kai, Di Huagu 翟火姑, Huang Zhenshan 黃鎮山, Zhang Jiaxiang 張嘉祥, Yao Xinchang 姚新昌	5
Fortune Teller	Gu Shengyang 古聲揚	1
Low Degree Holder	Wu Lingyun 吳凌雲, Zhou Yingnian 周永年	2
Monk	Heshang Neng 和尚能, Seng Liang 僧亮	2
Not Known	Yin Changying 尹昌英, Zou Xinmao 鄒新茂 Deng Xingque 鄧興雀, Liang Xianfu 梁獻甫	4
Servant	Su He 蘇賀, Lu Cuijin 呂翠晉	2
Soldier	Guan Ju 關鉅, He Mingke 何名科, Huang Jinliang 黃金亮, He Wan 何晚, Zhang Gaoyou 張高友, Huang Dingfeng 黃鼎鳳, Feng Liu 馮六	7
Strolling Player	Li Wenmao 李文茂	1
Tough	Tanya Erman 覃亞兒滿, Li Shibao 李石保	2

This picture of the social composition of secret societies largely holds true for the

composition of the Red Turban rebels. For these drifting populations, most of whom were

likely to be men of an economically low status, secret societies were sometimes explicitly

political tools, to be wielded against the local authorities or even the dynasty, either for

reform or –more likely—rebellion. Table 2 presents information on the occupational

---

[239] Source: Lu, *Liangguang de Tiandihui*, 134-142.

background of thirty-four major rebel leaders. Over eighty percent of these leaders were

from the rootless sector—disbanded soldiers, strolling players, local toughs, vagrants,

etc.[240]

Many rebel followers were famine refugees, another fruitful source of rebel

recruits when they failed to find work at the end of their wanderings. What most

characterized these rebels was their landlessness. The social and psychological

implications of this fact were profound, for possession or non-possession of land was a

basic criterion of peasant society. The landless were accordingly the "out" class in much

of rural China, forced to live on the outskirts of the village, and subject to various kinds

of discrimination.[241] Unable to accumulate wealth, the accepted avenues of social

advancement closed, people like these had nothing to lose and everything to gain from

confrontation. The decision to become a secret society member, soldier, bandit, or a rebel

was less agonizing than usual since there was little alternative.

Besides their generally impoverished conditions, the other characteristics of the

---

[240] See Table 2. See also Davis, *Primitive Revolutionaries*, p. 93; she includes the following list of 39 Guangzhou Tiandihui leaders which was confiscated by officials in 1855: Number of Salaried Workers – 10, of Small Traders [Peddlers?] – 8, of Farmers – 6, of Fishermen – 5, of Artisans – 5, of Mendicants –2, of Smugglers –1, of Minor government employees –1, of Gentry –1, and of Total-39.

[241] Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village, Taitou, Shantung Province* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).

rebels were their chronic underemployment and high geographic mobility.[242] As

examined in Chapter 2, Sino-British tensions as well as the shifting of the trade routes

that caused the decline of exports in Guangzhou had a very significant effect upon the

economic situation of the Pearl River Delta regions. This meant the unemployment of

thousands of people involved in foreign trade, especially boatmen and porters. The

following passage reveals the desperation that drove these people:

> At present the bandits along the West and North Rivers have not been pacified.
> Yet trade between us and the barbarians has long been stagnant. The boatmen
> and the porters, being poverty-stricken people, when they are once unemployed
> do not have other means of making a living, and are forced to join the bandits.[243]

Had they been financially able in normal times to save enough to take care of

themselves in bad years, their financial condition would not have been so serious. As a

matter of fact, however, they earned just enough to maintain subsistence. The question of

hunger probes the important issues of poverty, misery, and marginalization.

---

[242] Zhuang Jifa found that most of the men who joined the secret societies in the nineteenth century were poor people who had difficulties in earning an adequate living. Most secret society members were men who did not hold steady employment, whose work was very precarious and unpredictable, and whose families were landless. See, Zhuang Jifa, *Qingdai mimi huitang*, 1793-1795.

[243] *Xianfengchao chou ban yi wu shi mo* 咸豐朝籌辦夷務始末 40 juan (Beijing, 1928 reprint), 19.8b.

Table 3. Place of Origin of the Rebels Captured in Qujiang County.[244]

Place of Origin	Number
Qujiangxian 曲江縣	10
Huaxian 花縣	8
Nanhaixian 南海縣	6
Yingdexian 英德縣	1
Qingyuanxian 清源縣	2
Dabuxian 大埔縣	1
Renhuaxian 仁花縣	1
Nanxiongzhou 南雄州	1
Jiayingzhou 嘉應州	1
Shixingxian 始興縣	2
Hepingxian 和平縣	1
Nankangxian 南康縣 （Jiangxi 江西）	1
Changningxian 長寧縣 （Jiangxi 江西）	1
Ganxian 贛縣 （Jiangxi 江西）	1
Guiyangxian 桂陽縣 （Hunan 湖南）	1
Yizhangxian 宜章縣 （Hunan 湖南）	1

The lack of adequate employment opportunities accounts in a large measure for the high geographic mobility of these men. Table 3 shows us that in a group of thirty-nine convicted rebels, twenty-nine men had joined a rebel group outside their native counties, and the rest had joined within their native county. These were exactly the sorts of people—hired workers, porters, peddlers, boatmen, itinerant actors, fortune tellers, etc.— who were constantly traveling up and down the rivers and roads, and who were the most

[244] Source: F.O. 931.1753 List of 39 Rebels (n.d.).

apt to seek the help and protection of brotherhoods while away from their homes.[245]

The Red Turbans had no apparent restrictions on recruiting their forces. The rebel participants ranged widely in age and even several women were allowed to join the rebel forces.[246] As presented in Table 4, the youngest were in their early twenties and the oldest in their late forties. However, most members were adult males aged between twenty and thirty-two years old. The government report of the captive of twenty rebel leaders in *Hongbing Qiyi Shiliao* confirms that most of rebel followers were poor and marginalized immigrants who did not have local kinship ties: nine had no living parents and siblings, twelve had never married, and only three had living parents and siblings.[247] Lacking family or village ties, linked only to regional markets or even the road itself, their rootlessness made rebellion a relatively easy decision when an economic downturn destroyed the system's cohesion.

---

[245] Simply because these rebels did not belong to any settled community or family, they were most likely viewed with suspicion and fear by members of settled communities. So, in addition to lacking the protection and economic ties provided families and attachment to a native place, these men were often ostracized or treated with some hostility by resident of settled communities. See Table 3.

[246] One of powerful rebel leader, Di Hua'gu 翟火姑 is a good example of female rebel participant. See Wu Bingheng 吳秉衡, "Xinfeng shouchengji shilue 信豐守城記事略," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 1126-27.

[247] *Hongbing Qiyi*, 95-129.

Table 4. Age Distribution of Red Turban Rebels Captured in Yingde County.[248]

Age	No.	Age	No.
23	2	24	3
25	1	27	5
28	3	32	11
33	1	34	1
35	2	36	1
37	2	38	1
40	1	42	1
43	1	45	1
47	1	Total Number	39

The Red Turban method of recruiting seemed to follow the tradition of the

Tiandihui, both attracting volunteers and compelling others to join.[249] Numerous accounts

in government sources tell us that the Red Turbans used generous distributions of money

and food to the poor in order to enlist new members. After sacking government treasuries

and private pawnshops, the Red Turbans distributed part of the booty to the people to win

their hearts.[250] For example, the Red Turban leader Chen Kai wasted very little time once

he had taken Foshan in proclaiming his promise of good treatment to population, officials,

---

[248] Source: F.O. 931.1729 List of 35 Rebels (n.d.)

[249] Members were recruited to the Tiandihui in a number of ways: by voluntary enlistment or persuasion, or, failing this, sometimes by blackmail, physical threat or kidnapping. See Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, pp. 57-8.

[250] *Xiangshan XZ*, 22.58; *Shunde XZ*, 23.6.

and officers if they offered no   resistance.[251] Despite his connection with the Tiandihui,

Chen relied largely upon secular slogans to rally his followers. His call for an end to

extraordinary tax levies was a far more potent source of support than his Ming

restorationism.[252] Many families were in arrears, and dissatisfaction was widespread. In

his proclamations, Chen railed against the harsh tax burden and other abuses perpetrated

by the government. He abolished surcharges and remitted the land tax for three years,

after which it was to be collected at the basic rate. One source states that he acquired

---

[251] F.O. 931.1476 A Proclamation by Chen Kai (Nov. 29 1854).

[252] Latent traditions of rebellion contrary to Confucianism but instead bound to an egalitarian set of mores re-emerged at such times. Red Turbans marched under colorful banners inscribed *Taiping* 太平 (Great Peace) and *Pingjun* 平均 (Equality). The Tiandihui lodges most often perceived a blissful past that had been overtaken by the current strife and oppression. Each era of agrarian crisis, these dreams of a golden ancient past revived and the lodges and even the sects took them up. Rituals of fellowship were appropriated from the popular epics *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *The Water Margin*; concepts of redistribution and equalization of land-holdings were derived from the probably apocryphal ancient system called 'well-field'; and even the mode of rebel dress and the character of military formations were borrowed from ancient uprisings. At least in their ideals, the Red Turbans, as Tiandihui brotherhoods, often shared this egalitarianism. And in some cases, the rebels distributed goods to the poor and carried banners reading 'kill the officials, kill the rich, spare the poor.' To this egalitarian emphasis were added what look to be Ming restorationist slogans as well as symbols of legitimacy derived from a variety of tradition. At first glance, the restorationism seems obvious from the explicit mention of the Ming on the banners used by the rebels and from the selection of title of rebel leaders as "Generalissimo of the Great Ming Dynasty (*Daming douyuanshuai* 大明都元帥)." Given the historical connection to the pro-Ming stance, one can assume that the Red Turban Rebellions expressed a simple desire to oust the Qing and return to Ming rule. However, when we examine more closely the rebel forces, it is more difficult to determine the nature of the ideology of the rebels. With the exception of the banners, there is no explicit expression of pro-Ming sentiment in rebel confessions or other accounts of the mass action. For egalitarian slogans and policy of the rebels, see F.O. 931.1440 A Red Turban Proclamation; F.O. 931.1466 Proclamation of Chen Kai (Aug. 27, 1854); F.O. 931.1477; "Tao Daqing xiwen 討大清檄文," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 38-39; "Oath Taken by Members of the Triad Society, and Notices of Its Origin," *The Chinese Repository*, Vol. Xviii, no. 6 (June, 1849), Article 7.. For the terms related to Ming restorationism, see F.O. 931.1531 Proclamation by "Commander in Chief for the Restoration of Ming," (1855); "Daming Douyuanshuai xiwen 大明都元帥檄文," in Hongbing Qiyi, 50-51; "Fuming zongbing dayuanshuai hong gaoshi, 复明总兵大元帅洪告示," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 61.

several thousand followers in this way.[253]

More often, however, the Red Turban rebels forced young men to fight for them.

According to a local gazetteer, *Foshan Zhongyi Xiangzhi,* "Wherever the Red Turban

bandits went, they set houses on fire and forced men into their service."[254] The following

document dates from a somewhat later period but recounts well how outlaw bands

developed into secret societies in the late nineteenth century:

> *Hui-fei* (society bandits) have been most rampant in Szechwan, Hunan,
> Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. At first they were lawless wandering
> people who burned incense and organized societies. When their organizations
> have waxed strong and their members become numerous, they rely on their
> strength to tyrannize their neighborhoods and victimize the good people. The
> humble people, being helpless, may join their societies for self-protection. Such
> societies assume diverse names, for example, *Ke-lao* (Elder Brother), *An-ch'in*
> (Contentment-affection), *T'ien-ti* (Heaven-earth), and *San-tien* (Three-dots).
> They operate in every *chou* and *hsien.* Each local unit numbers several dozen or
> several hundred men. All the units keep in touch one with another.[255]

During periods of widespread uprisings and social unrest, as was the case in

1854, whole communities joined in the disturbances. At such times rebel forces were

---

[253] *Xunzhou FZ* 27.4-5.

[254] *Foshan Zhongyi Xiangzhi* 佛山忠義鄉志, 11.14.

[255] Quoted in Hsiao, *Rural China,* 460—a memorial submitted to the Emperor by the Governor of
Guangdong in 1899.

flooded with new recruits made up of the normally settled peasant farmers, and not just

the rootless poor. Much of the initial Red Turban success was due to sudden switches of

allegiance by the local people. Whole villages and blocs of villages might hoist the red

flag and temporarily join the insurrectionist camp.[256] Some might have done so out of

patriotic Chinese anti-Manchu sentiments, but the majority were primarily concerned

with their own security or motivated by the thought of gain. Depending on the specific

context, joining the insurrectionists might afford advantages in the conduct of inter-clan

or inter-village relations.[257] Similarly, the non-joiners were not all motivated by reasons

of loyalty to the Manchus or to the established order; they might simply be acting in

accordance with their own interests.[258]

While the Red Turbans seem certainly to have come largely from the humbler

segments of society, rebels also managed to recruit several members of the local elite.

The principal Red Turban leaders, men like He Liu and Li Wenmao, were illiterate, and

many other Red Turban leaders were also uneducated.[259] But, though bravery was

---

[256] *Xiangshan XZ*, 15.30-40; *Huizhou FZ*, 18.25; *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.8.4.

[257] Wakeman, "Secret Societies," 34-35.

[258] Ibid. ; "Shundexian huifeilan duanyuanyou 德縣會匪亂端緣由." in Sasaki, *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha .Shiryō hen,* 51; *Xuxiu nanhai XZ* 續修南海縣志, 21.4.

[259] *Dongguan XZ*, 35.4; *Xuxiu nanhai XZ*, 26.13, 18.14; *Panyu XZ*, 22.27.

essential for fighting, brains were needed for planning. This need was filled by a number of "half-baked" scholars, some of whom had received the first degree through the civil service examination.[260]

These political advisers transformed Tiandihui leaders into rebel kings. A notable example of the work of these scholars was Chen Kai's proclamation as Zhennanwang 鎭南王 (Guardian King of South), which was planned by a licentiate (*xiucai* 秀才), Lü Zigui 呂子桂. He helped Chen perform the imperial ceremony of sacrificing to heaven and earth; together they drew up regulations and formed a military system. Chen Kai also rewarded his chief lieutenants with titles and offices, issued proclamations, stepped up his recruitment efforts and finally created his own kingdom, Dachengguo, in 1855, all acts presumably recommended by Lü or other educated advisers.[261] The military adviser for Chen Kai's rebel kingdom was also a stipendiary *shengyuan* 生員, Chen Dingxun 陳鼎勳.[262]

Theoretically these intellectuals should have been loyal to the imperial dynasty,

---

[260] There are some instances of lower degree holders working with the rebels. See Jian, *Quanshi*, vol. 2, 824; *Nanhai XZ*, 15.12a; F.O. 931.1500. A note on gentry rebel who had led rebels in an attack on Xinhui (1850s).

[261] "Lü Zigui gongci 呂子桂供詞," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 108-110; Xu, *Lingnan*, 236.

[262] *Yulin zhouzhi* 鬱林州志, 18.60.

but in fact, a small number of them broke the moral bonds that had been weakening since

the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time the weakness and corruption of the

Manchu empire was being uncovered by foreigners and by the Taipings. Some alert and

educated men began to wonder at the subtle distinctions between obedience and rebellion.

Certainly some local elites participated in the rebellions, but the image of rebels

mainly composed of a 'drifting population (*youmin*)' still emerges as the dominant one.

However, merely depicting the social background of the rebel participants is not

sufficient. A discussion of the groups according to their ethnicity would give us a much

clearer understanding of the significance of the Red Turban Rebellions. The Qing

archival records used in this study shed much light on the identities of rebel participants.

The ethnic composition of the Red Turban rebels was no simple, static matter, but rather

tempered by regional variation.[263]

As we have previously seen in the case of the Increase Brothers Society in Boluo

county, feuding in Guangdong also created rebels. Often the local Tiandihui lodges took

---

[263] The types of Red Turban groups also varied along with differences in cropping and landholding patterns. For instance, Northeastern Guangdong, with a less productive agriculture based upon wheat , maize, and beans, was the home of more egalitarian Red Turban units in which the leaders—often peasants themselves—were treated as brothers. The central region saw the development of Red Turban units comprised of demobilized soldiers, brigands, and local bullies. On the other hand, the Wuyi regions of the Central Guangdong, known for high rates of tenancy without sufficient lands, saw Punti tenants dominate Red Turban units known as a *tang*. See Yoo, *Kundae*, 258-275.

advantage of ongoing feuds to enhance their position. One of the most enduring of such

feuds was the ethnic struggle between the Puntis and the Hakkas in the Wuyi regions.[264]

Although the Puntis alleged that their Hakka neighbors were Red Turban rebels, [265]

archival records from Central Guangdong show, on the contrary, that the Hakkas were

notably absent in the lists of rebel-participants.[266] There were certainly some Hakkas

among the Red Turbans but most of Hakka rebel participants were from East

Guangdong.[267] In view of what happened later, there seems no doubt that, in the districts

to the southwest of Guangzhou, the Wuyi regions, most of the rebels were Puntis.[268]

The Tiandihui members were more numerous in the Wuyi region during the mid-

nineteenth century, in part because of the mass emigrations of the early nineteenth

---

[264] The Wuyi region indicates five counties adjacent to Guangzhou and lying to the southwest of the Pearl River delta, a region that has sent thousands of its residents to North America. The inhabitants of these five counties (Xinning, Kaiping, Enping, Xinhui, and Heshan), speak the same dialect and believe that they share the same subculture.

[265] This accusation was brought by the Punti tenants during their struggles with Hakka tenants in Xinning. See *Xinning XZ* 14.34b.

[266] According to Lu Baoshan's research, there was only one Hakka rebel leader among twenty-eight major Red Turban rebel leaders. See Luo, *Lun wanqing*, 133-142.

[267] A band of Tiandihui rebels who attacked Kowloon on 19 August 1854 were reported to have been nearly all Hakka stonecutters from Xin'an county. See C.O. 129.47. Governor of Hong Kong to Sir George Grey (Aug. 21, 1854).

[268] "Enping Tuke hudou yanyou 恩平土客互鬥緣由," in Qin, *Tiandihui*, 243-244; "Huitang Xiaoxi 會黨消息," Jin Yudi 金毓黻 ed., *Taiping Tianguo shiliao* 太平天國史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1953), 497-499.

century, when millions fled there from starvation. The new settlers provided eager

recruits for the protection that Tiandihui membership offered, and some even utilized

their Tiandihui affiliations to launch attacks against their long-standing neighbors, the

Hakkas. The Hakkas often responded by forming militias aiding Qing forces, to secure

greater organizational strength against the newcomers.[269]

Red Turban efforts to recruit Wuyi people increased in 1854 and continued in the

period immediately following the first Tiandihui attack on Guangzhou. However,

interethnic hostility proved to be more powerful than either the Tiandihui "cause" or

general popular animosity toward the Qing state. In late 1854, ethnic strife pushed the

Punti tenants and vagabonds in Heshan county into open rebellion against the Manchus

under the guidance of Liang Peiyou. Although local details of rebel organization in

Heshan at the time are scarce, sources clearly indicated that Punti resentment of the

Hakkas was a subsidiary cause of the Red Turban Rebellions.[270]

But soon, this ethnic division brought the failure of the rebellions in the Wuyi.

Before the arrival of Qing forces, the rebels' main opponents were ethnically organized

---

[269] *Enping XZ*, 14.7b; *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.10b, *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3a.

[270] See China Mail 22 May 1856; 10 May 1855.

bodies of Hakka militias. Local Tiandihui leaders, for instance, those leading the Red

Turbans in Xinning, could not have raised forces district-wide without the mobilizing

power of ethnic anger. On the other hand, the Qing fight against the Red Turban rebels

would have been even more protracted without the aid of the Hakka militia. The Red

Turbans' efforts to forge a pan-ethnic alliance failed, and much of the violence of the

rebellions pitted the Punti rebels against the Hakka militias. In this sense, ethnicity was

central to the failure of the rebellions.[271]

As we have stated before, a great variety of groups became rebels. Among these

groups were many whose interests conflicted. It is clear from the above discussion of the

Punti relations with the Hakka in the Wuyi regions that, at least in these regions, the great

driving force that welded the rebels together, despite conflicts among themselves, was the

dialect, Cantonese, shared by all the groups joining the rebels. In other words, through the

Red Turban Rebellions, there developed a kind of tradition of violence that, in areas

particularly vulnerable to socio-economic competition like the Wuyi region, could easily

explode into conflict drawn on subethnic lines, as exacerbated by ideological difference

(or the different positions of rebel/loyalist that developed with the Red Turbans) and also

---

[271] Ibid.

by the actions of the state. By focusing on the Red Turban Rebellions in the Wuyi region,

I will trace the development of subethnic conflict, explaining the outbreak of the Hakka-

Punti War.

Taiping Connection

Another opportunity for the development of the Red Turbans was the Taiping

rebellion. There is no doubt that the advent of the Taipings had a considerable effect on

most of China. It encouraged the spread of rebellion even among those who knew little or

nothing about its ideology. It certainly did so in Guangdong. There were a number of

observable similarities between the Taipings and the Red Turbans and some Taiping

leaders gave the Red Turbans a ready welcome as recruits. Both shared a hatred for the

Manchus, went unshaven, wore clothing after the style of the late Ming dynasty, and

dressed their heads with red turbans. Some Red Turban rebel groups tried to imitate the

Taipings in their imperial ambitions. For instance, Chen Kai adopted the presumptuous

title of king and flags that similar to the Taiping flags. The uniforms of the Red Turbans

were largely imitations in color and style of the Taipings. After occupying Huaxian, Chen

Kai even put the characters on his flag, "Heavenly King of the Taiping Kingdom 太平天

國正命天王." Why did these Red Turbans do such things? It was probably because the

Taipings had greater power and prestige than did the Red Turban organization; the latter

tried to copy the Taipings' appearance in order to overcome their timid governmental

opponents. Another motive for imitation may have stemmed from the good reputation

and propaganda of the Taiping expedition, which inspired numerous rebels and affected

the reshaping of the Red Turban organization from small to larger units. [272]

Various facts also demonstrate substantial Taiping influence over the Red Turban

Rebellions. Both groups caused the Manchu dynasty a great deal of trouble and both dealt

it near-fatal blows. Both were able fighters in the eyes of the imperial government, and

they were the products of the same general political and social conditions. In Guangdong

and Guangxi, beset by a wide variety of natural disasters and political conflicts, subethnic

alignments were a natural organizational device for disparate speech groups. This was in

fact the case that the alignments on the basis of subethnicity could result in ever

expanding aggregates of people being pitted against each other. And this is what

---

[272] See Luo Baoshan 骆宝善, "Guangdong Hongbing qiyi luelun 广东洪兵起义略论," in *Lingnan Wenshi* 岭南文史 (Guangzhou: Guangdongsheng wenshi yanjiuguan, 1983), 87；Zhong Zhenwei 锺珍维,"Chen Kai, Li Wenmao lingdaode hongjinjun qiyi 陈开， 李文茂领导的红巾军起义," in *Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue* 中学历史教学9 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1958), 17; Cai Xiaoqing, "Lun Taipingtianguo yu Tiandihui guanxi 論太平天國與天地會關係," *Zhongguo jindai huidangshi yanjiu* 中國近代會黨史研究, 158-171.

happened in Guangdong and Guangxi. The organizational means for spreading the

conflict had been provided by Hakka gentry and their militia units and by Tiandihui

differentiated on the basis of dialect.[273]

Certainly the Hakka-Punti conflict was a relevant factor for both rebellions. Yet

the differences between the Taipings and the Red Turban rebels were manifold.

Interestingly, the key difference between the Red Turbans and the Taipings lies also in the

way subethnicity was linked to other patterns of social differentiation. For instance, the

Hakka settlements in the Wuyi, Guangdong, were older and more stable than those in

Guangxi, and this had contributed to the development of a more influential Hakka elite

group. Unlike the Hakkas in Guangxi, therefore, the Wuyi Hakkas were called upon to

assist local Qing force against the Red Turban rebels. In addition, the Red Turbans'

political and military institutions were less highly organized than those of the Taipings.

---

[273] Philip Kuhn argues that the religious notions of the God-worshippers provided Hakka ethnicity in the conflicted frontier environment of Guangxi with a new set of concepts for its expression (just as it demanded a new organizational framework—the God-worshipping Society). However, Kuhn's position is ultimately unsatisfactory. It proceeds from an equation of prior events in Guangdong province in which the Hakkas and the Puntis engaged in long-term quarrels forming a backdrop to the onset of the Taiping Rebellion, to argue that these same factors were operative in Guangxi. But Guangxi was a much more complex social context in that there was present a third major group, the Zhuang. The Zhuang, a ethnic minority, were more numerous than the Hakkas. Any explanation which analyzes ethnic tensions and yet fails to embrace the diverse ways in which the Zhuang participated in the rebellion cannot be fully satisfactory. See Philip A. Kuhn, "The Taiping Rebellion." in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, Part I. ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); idem, "Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Volume 19, (1977), 365; Huang Xianfan 黄现璠, *Zhuangzu tongshi* 壮族通史. (Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 1988).

The Taipings also had a clear political, economic, social, and religious ideology bridging ethnic and localistic loyalties.[274] The Taiping message went beyond simple economic or subethnic antagonism. The Taipings distinguished not between the rich and the poor or the Hakkas and the Puntis, although they paid some attentions to this distinction, but fundamentally between the group of believers and the non-believers.[275] This religious ideology eventually permitted the Taipings to appeal to more groups than could the Red Turbans, whose main members were the Puntis. The Taipings were something more than the Red Turbans and their more complex message permitted them to appeal to various groups including intellectuals, peasants, and various ethnic groups.

The Taipings also exercised political and military control over a definite territory, but after 1856, the Red Turbans simply sought food and safety. Although later some Red Turban forces did become Taiping allies in the more desperate stages of the fighting against the imperialists, the alliance was born of military necessity and never constituted an organic union. As Hong Xiuquan himself recognized, an alliance or partnership

---

[274] For good summaries on this, see Vincent Y. C. Shih, *The Taiping ideology; its sources, interpretations, and influences,* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967); Teng Ssu-yu, *New Light on the History of Taiping Rebellion*, (New York, Russell & Russell, 1966); Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973).

[275] Shih, *The Taiping Ideology,* xiii.

between the two organizations was rendered impossible by fundamental differences in

political objectives, religious beliefs, and moral ideals and practices:

> Though I never entered the Triad Society, I have often heard it said that their object is to subvert the Tsing and restore the Ming dynasty. Such an expression was very proper in the time of Khang-hi (K'ang-hsi), when this society was at first formed, but now after the lapse of two hundred years, we may still speak of subverting the Tsing, but we cannot properly speak of restoring the Ming. At all events, when our native mountains and rivers [the Empire] are recovered, a new dynasty must be established. How could we at present arouse the energies of men by speaking of restoring the Ming dynasty? There are several evil practices connected with the Triad Society, which I detest: if any new member enter the society, he must worship the devil, and utter thirty-six oaths; as sword is placed upon his neck, and he is forced to contribute money for the use of the society. Their real object has now turned very mean and unworthy. If we preach the true doctrine [Christianity], and rely upon the powerful help of God, a few of us will equal a multitude of others. I do not even think that Sun-pin, Woo-khi, kung-ming, and others famous in history for their military skills and tactics, are deserving much estimation, how much less these bands of the Triad Society.[276]

Theodore Hamberg described the story of the eight chiefs of the Tiandihui who

wanted to join the Taiping forces with their bands. Hong Xiuquan demanded from them

and their followers the acceptance of the Taiping religious beliefs and code, which was to

be taught to them by sixteen Taiping tutors. When one of these tutors retained the money

given by the bandit chieftain instead of handing it over to the common treasury, he was

---

[276] Theodore Hamberg, *The Visions of Hung-siu-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection*, (Hong Kong, 1854), 55-56.

executed.[277] This example gave the eight chiefs an uncomfortable feeling and they left the

Taipings, complaining that these laws were too strict.[278]

There is no doubt that splinter groups of Taiping did come in contact with the

Red Turban rebels.[279] But the relationship was not always harmonious and was rarely

close. The earliest contact between the Taipings and the Guangdong Tiandihui groups, we

may remember, occurred in 1851, through Ling Shiba's revolt. Loyal to the Taiping cause,

Ling Shiba fought from Guangxi to Xinyi, Guangdong, where his unit was mercilessly

wiped out by Governor-general Xu Guangjin in July 1852.[280]After Ling's revolt, the

Taipings apparently sent agencies to stir up a rebellion in Guangdong; however, no

formal alliance with the Tiandihui groups was concluded. This was a time when the

Taipings were at the height of their strength; cooperation with a motley group of local

---

[277] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[278] Immediately after the Taiping rose up, the local Tiandihui leaders Zhang Zhao 张钊 and Tian Fang, who had migrated inland from the Pearl River Delta, were similarly at war with local society but saw for themselves a political future: they consider linking their forces with the Taipings and actually joined their encampment at Jintian for a short time. Unable to stomach the Taipings' strict discipline and stern religion, they departed. In 1852 they sold their services to the Qing side for a time but soon returned to outlawry and were killed in 1853. See Zhou Yumin 周育民, "Zhongguo huidang wenti yanjiu shuping 中国会党问题研究述评," in Zhongguo huidangshi yanjiu hui 中国会党史研究会 ed., Huidangshi yanjiu 会党史研究 (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 1984), 340.

[279] Ibid. Some members of the Tiandihui, including Ling Shiba, Luo Dagang, and Zhang Zhao joined the Taipings at different times.

[280] Xinyi XZ 新宜縣志, 8.4; Guo Tingyi 郭廷以, Taiping tianguo shishi rizhi 太平天國史事日誌 (Taibei: Shangwu Printing Co., 1976), p. 73. .

secret societies in Guangdong probably seemed a liability to be avoided.[281] Several years

later the situation had changed dramatically. The Taipings suffered from serious internal

dissension and severe military losses. Inasmuch as the Red Turbans had also undergone a

series of defeats, it was to the advantage of both groups to effect an alliance.

3) The Demise of the Red Turbans

Reasons for the Red Turban Failure

In the districts around Guangzhou, the Red Turban successes continued

unchecked until early 1855. After nearly seeing the city fall into rebel hands, the

provincial authorities were saved less by their own efforts than by four factors that

eventually brought about the defeat of the rebellion. The first was the failure of the rebels

to coordinate their activities. One of the greatest weakness of the rebel forces in the

campaigns against the Qing force was lack of harmony and cooperation among the rebel

groups. The alliances of the various Red Turban groups were a normal part of Tiandihui

strategy, but the unity thereby achieved was often circumscribed by the need of individual

---

[281] At this time, the Taipings rigidly rebuffed alliances with the 'impure' pro-Ming secret society lodges. A point well put in Kuhn's volume, *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China, militarization and social structure, 1796-1864*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

leaders to retain their followers' loyalty. Although lesser leaders might recognize another's superior ability, their ultimate motivation was either survival or self-advancement.

Not surprisingly, a rebel groups' internal harmony varied according to its fluctuating fortunes. Although Chen Kai, the rebel supreme leader surrounded himself with other Tiandihui confederates right up to his death in 1861 at Xunzhou, the problem of maintaining authority over his sub-leaders had always been a thorny one for him. Chen Xianliang's experience provides useful examples. After failing to be a king of Dacheng kingdom, Chen bore a grudge against Chen Kai and returned to Guangdong without following Chen Kai's force in Guangxi.[282] Li Wenmao was always on bad terms with Chen Kai. For instance, Li played safe to protect his own headquarters at Liuzhou 柳州 and refused to cooperate with Chen Kai to protect Xunzhou from the counter attack of Qing forces in 1861.[283] These are only a few examples of the bad relations that prevailed among the rebel leaders fighting a common foe. The disagreements among rebel leaders

[282] Hu, *Qingdai Hongmenshi*, 320.

[283] Chen Kai, after establishing his rebel government, minted new money, "Hongfu tongbao 洪福通寶." The fact that Li Wenmao circulated his own money, "Pingjing shengbao 平靖勝寶" while he was still in collaboration with Chen to fight against Qing force indicated the uneasy relations between Chen and Li as well. See "Chen Song shiyou 陈松事由," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 212-213; "Gufei zonglu 股匪总录," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 824-830.

naturally caused a lack of coordination in fighting.[284] During the protracted attack against

Guangzhou, there were frequent disagreements and disorganization among the rebel

groups near the front. These gave the Qing force the time to bring in more troops from

other provinces.[285] In 1861, the governor-general of Liangguang, taking advantage of the

internal trouble of the rebels, summoned troops from Hunan to destroy the rebel front.[286]

On the basis of presently available material, one may conclude that although the Red

Turbans did have a united force, it was not very solid or systematic.

Another reason for the Red Turban military failure was that they did not have

enough soldiers and weapons to enlarge their rebellion. Nor was the Red Turban army a

professional one, being composed mainly of marginalized wandering people.[287] Even

though they claimed to have a huge following and the imperial government officials

reported large rebel armies in order to gloss over their own defeats, the actual Red Turban

combatants were not large in number. From beginning to end most records about rebel

---

[284] The authorities were equally aware of this fact, and frequently exploited it in attempts to put down the rebels. See Wang Xin 王鑫, *Wangzhuang wugong weiji* 王壮武功违集, 13.319 (1892).

[285] Foreigners observed that 'there seems no unity of purpose nor combined action among the different bands of rebels.' See F.O. 17.218, Bowring-Clarendon, Desp. 235, (Dec. 23, 1854).

[286] Hu, *Qingdai hongmenshi*, 318-320.

[287] Zhou Yumin 周育民, *Zhongguo banghuishi* 中国帮会史 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1993), 154.

numerical strength are exaggerated. The total number of the Red Turban rebels who

participated in the first attack on Guangzhou reported at approximately 200,000 in

1854.[288] But one scholar estimated that the actual rebels numbered only around 40,000 in

1856.[289] This is a surprisingly small fighting force and reveals the inadequacy of the rebel

army.

Popular support for the Red Turbans began to disappear when they failed to enter

Guangzhou. The failure to take the provincial capital must have had great psychological

effect on the Red Turban leaders as well as on their potential followers; they had no more

prestige and no bright future. They made several abortive attempts to attack Guangzhou.

Instead of distributing food and valuables to attract followers, the Red Turban leaders had

to force the peasants to join them by holding swords to their necks.[290] Soon the rebels

would have to risk alienating the local populace. Large-scale recruitment to join the

Tiandihui seems to have stopped with the failure of the Red Turban attacks on

Guangzhou in 1855.[291]

---

[288] Jian, *Quanshi*, 830-8.

[289] Zheng, "Dachengguo," 19.

[290] *Guangzhou FZ* 82.17 and 134.25.

[291] Rebels' desperate resort to plunder antagonized the general populace particularly after their failures on attacking of Guangzhou in 1855. See *Nanhai XZ*, 13.40a, 17.13a-15b; F.O. 17/215, Incl. 1 in Desp. 112

In addition, muddle-headed leadership generated political corruption among the

rebels. The leaders of Red Turban forces were often short-sighted and were limited in

education and ability. Incompetent leadership created internal trouble. Most rebel leaders

were stubborn and narrow-minded and could not take advice from others. For instance,

Su Qiumei 蘇秋湄, a military adviser for the Red Turban force at Foling 佛嶺, advised

Chen Kai to hire gentry member for the purpose of efficient rural control, but his

proposal was never accepted.[292] Li Wenmao was even not interested in holding an official

examination in his rebel government to select more literate advisers.[293] Often the rebel

government alienated the literati by their unnecessary cruelty.[294] Even though a few

lower-level local elite member participated in the Red Turban forces, on the whole, the

Red Turbans lacked men of ability to serve as staff members or military officers. Because

of this problem, the Red Turbans failed to keep a unified military force with

interchangeable military commands for a long time, nor did they achieve effective central

control over appointments.

(July 20, 1854); Wakeman, "Secret Societies," p. 42.

[292] See "Foling Tiandihui junji wenfang sishi tiaochen 佛嶺天地會軍機文房司事條陳," in Sasaki, *Shimatsu*, 218.

[293] Jian, *Quanshi* vol. 2, 935.

[294] *Panyu XZ*, 212.218; *Xuxiu nanhai XZ*, 212.215; *Foshan zhongyi xiangzhi*, 11.14.

A lack of modern weapons and ammunition was another cause of the Red Turban

failure. Qing forces were able to use powerful weapons supplied by foreigners. On the

other hand, the Red Turbans used swords, lances, spears, tridents, matchlocks, and jingals.

The Red Turbans were aware of their shortcomings in this respect and tried their best to

acquire foreign guns, pistols, and even steam-ships. Unfortunately for them, the weapons

they bought were 'foreign frauds.'[295]

Foreign Interventions

The second factor was the part played by foreigners in the suppression of the

rebels. Officially the foreign powers, such as British and France, proclaimed a policy of

'strict neutrality' from the beginning of the revolt.[296] However, this policy wavered when

the British residents became anxious about the fate of foreign property in Guangzhou. By

early 1855, having taken Dongguan, the Red Turban forces under the leadership of Chen

---

[295] F.O. 17/352, 28 Mar. 1861; F.O. 931.1749 Intelligence Report (1854).

[296] The British policy of neutrality on China as formulated by Bonham was approved by Clarendon, followed by Bowring and others, and served as an official line in China for almost a decade. The British home government preferred neutrality; the aggressive Palmerston had left the Foreign Office in December 1851, and his successor, Clarendon, stood for mediation. The rising power of the Second Empire under Napoleon III, and the deepening Crimean crisis, also necessitated a policy of non-commitment in the Far East. British diplomats in China liked such a policy because it gave them ample room for action. Bonham's strategy was to sit tight until higher Chinese officials asked for aid, so that greater demands could be made with greater assurance of acceptance. See F.O. 17.200, no. 17, Hong Kong, 10 Mar. 1853; F.O. 17.218, Desp. 226, Incls., Robertson-Bowring, (Dec. 2 and 5, 1854); Wakeman, *Strangers*, 146.

Xianliang, who set up the rebel headquarters at Xinzao 新造 (Blenheim Reach), had

surrounded Guangzhou on four sides, and were ready for the assault on the city. From the

east Lin Guanglong was to sail up the Pearl River with 145 junks; He Liu and his fleet

were to attack from the south. The combined forces of Kan Xian and Zhou Chun

including about 20 junks, were to attack from the west. Finally Li Wenmao was to attack

from the north.[297] At this point, problems arose between the Red Turbans and the

foreigners, whose presence in Hong Kong was of major importance. The river

communications were immediately interrupted by the insurgent fleets that extended ten

miles along the Pearl River.[298] To prevent a severance of communication between Hong

Kong and Guangzhou, the British and American authorities agreed to grant permission

for the British and the United States flags to be flown aboard Chinese boats.[299] This

measure had two major effects: it secured the supply line of armaments to the Qing forces

from the foreign merchants,[300] and it inaugurated the *Arrow* incident in 1856.[301]

---

[297] Jian, *Quanshi*, pp. 859-60.

[298] F.O. 931.1086 A report giving a brief account of military action in north of Guangzhou (Jan. 1855); Jian, *Quanshi*, 844.

[299] W. C. Costin, *Great Britain and China, 1833-1860*, (Oxford, The Clarendon press, 1937), 178; Zheng Piexin 郑佩鑫, "Dachengguo de fanqing qiyi 大成国的反清起义," in *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 (Henan renmin chubanshe), Dec. 1958, 19.

[300] The Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P & O), among others, had done a roaring trade by using steamers to tow "up the River to Canton, Chinese vessels and goods in the nature of supplies

The motive for abandoning the policy of neutrality was primarily the protection of British commercial interests including opium, the import of which was then increasing.[302] The other motive was the British desire to show a favorable response to Qing court's conciliatory policy. After signing the peace treaty with the Qing government, there was a clear realization that more commercial advantages would be forthcoming from a recognized government. The British were not willing to support the rebels.[303] The other motive was reaction against the rebels' attitude of superiority. The Red Turbans' first contact with foreign diplomatic and commercial representatives came in the year 1854 when the British received Chen Xianliang's invitation to his camp. However, suspecting correctly that foreign ships were supplying armaments and grain to the Qing forces, Chen changed his attitude to the foreigners. He treated the British officers as

---

and munitions of war." The rebels gave notice of a blockade of Guangzhou. See F.O. 17.226, Stirling to Bowring 12 Jan. 1855, enclosed in Bowring to Clarendon, Desp. 31, 15 Jan. 1855. Stirling was the British rear-admiral commanding the China station of the Royal Navy.

[301] Thus the present study confirms the fact that an important origin of the Arrow War may be found in the Red Turban Rebellions and the Taiping Rebellion, which simultaneously ravaged central and southern China. The Qing government was exhausted by these upheavals, thus presenting a golden opportunity for the British again to wage a war on China, a war they could expect to win easily. Such a consideration makes strategic sense, and may have swayed Parkes and Bowring when they reported the unrest to London. See F.O. 228.213 Desp. 157, Parkes to Bowring, (Oct. 13 1856).

[302] F.O. 17.358, Lt.-Col. Neale's report, Peking, (Dec. 20 1861)

[303] Stanley Wright, *The origin and development of the Chinese Customs Service, 1843-1911 An historical outline*. (Shanghai, 1939), 147.

tribute bearers, and wanted them to recognize him as the lord of all kingdoms, demanding

that they stop selling armaments and grain to the Qing forces. Meanwhile, the rebels

irritated the foreigners more and more by continuous bombarding and looting of foreign

merchant ships. The foreigners were furious and began to lose their patience with the

rebels. This ineptness in foreign relations arose naturally from the very narrow experience

of the leadership that eventually became a fatal weakness for the Red Turban rebels.[304]

When the revolt spread along the whole Pearl River system and Guangzhou, the

capital of Guangdong province, was besieged for months, the Qing authorities in

Guangzhou were in such a desperate situation that they were eager to seek the aid of the

British in the suppression of the insurgents.[305] Though not actively responding to the

Chinese request, the British authorities did send their naval forces to Guangzhou under

the pretext of protecting their national interests.[306] In Guangzhou, Sir John Bowring allied

---

[304] Most of rebel leaders had never seen or made the acquaintance of a foreigner. Only Chen Xianliang had business dealing with foreigners in Guangzhou and he presumably spoke some pidgin English. Ineptness in foreign relations was one of major factor of rebel demise. See Wakeman, *Strangers*, 146-147; F.O. 17.228, Desp. 108, Incl., Robertson-Ye, (Feb. 23, 1855); F.O. 17.228. Bowring-Clarendon, Desp. 108 (Feb. 28, 1854).

[305] Ye had been asking the British help since the beginning of December, 1854. He made the request that the British ships of war which were 'also in the river for purposes of protection' should join in the suppression of ' the thieves in this river.' See F.O. 17.218, Desp. 230, Bowring-Claredon, 11 (Dec. 1854); Mai Bingjun 麦秉钧 ed., "Heshan Maishi zupu ji yutu jishi lunlue 鹤山麦氏族谱及舆图记事 伦略," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 1016-1017.

[306] Various aspects of British assistance to Qing officials during the Tiandihui siege of Guangzhou are documented in both British and Qing sources. See F.O. 17.218, Des. 230, Incl., Bowring-Ye, (11 Dec.

the British fleet with Governor-general Ye Mingchen's forces, and thus contributed to the

'extermination which desolated the province of Guangdong.'[307] Ye said that 'the persons

executed by his order were over 100,000.'[308] Ye dared to do this because he was being

supported by the British forces. Bowring denied any responsibility, claiming that it was

no part of his duty to interfere with the domestic affairs of China, but that he had gone to

Guangzhou with a large naval force to protect the factories.[309] The presence of the British

naval force along the Pearl River impeded seriously the river fleet operations of the

insurgents in the regions. This was one of the reasons, as claimed by some authorities, for

the sudden collapse of the Red Turbans.[310]

After some disorganized fumbling, the authorities mustered several thousand

---

1854); Scarth, *Twelve*, p. 278; "Heshan Maishi," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 1016-1017; Luo Ergang, *Taiping tianguo shiliao kaoshiji* 太平天國史料考釋集, (Beijing: Shanlian, 1956), p. 143; *North China Herald*, No. 301 (may 3, 1856), and No. 359 (June 13, 1857); Thomas T. Meadows, *The Chinese and Their Rebellions*, (London: Smith, Elder, 1856), 453; Jian, *Quanshi, 2*, appendix to ch. 11, illustration 7; Parliamentary Papers, 1857, vol. XII, [2173] Correspondence relative to entrance into Canton, 1850-55, pp. 27-28. Commissioner Ye to Sir J. Bowring, Dec 7, 1854; Sir J. Bowring to Commissioner Ye, Hong Kong, Dec. 11, 1854.

[307] G. W. Cooke, *China*, 406; Luo Baoshan, "Guangdong Tiandihui qiyi qijian zhongwai fandongpai de goujie 广东天地会起义期间中外反动派的勾结," in *Taipingtianguo xuekan* 太平天国学刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 416-429.

[308] Ibid.

[309] Stanley Lane-Poole, *The life of Sir Harry Parkes, K.C.B., G.C.M.G., sometime Her Majesty's minister to China and Japan.*, Vol. i. (London, New York: Macmillian and co., 1894), 221.

[310] Eitel, p. 304; Hirayama Shu 平山周, *Zhongguo mimi shehuishi* 中國秘密社會史 (Shanghia, 1912), 1935 edition, p.p. 26-27.

troops to deal with the rebels. Included among them were reinforcements from a

formidable Qing general Shen Dihui 沈棣輝, hundreds of specifically recruited

Chaozhou 潮州 mercenaries, militias from the Ninety-six villages of Nanhai county and

an augmented personal militia of a military *juren* 舉人, Zhou Guoxing 周國興. In March

1855, the siege of Xinzao 新造 was lifted and the city of Foshan was recaptured.

Guangzhou was at last saved. Chen Kai and Li Wenmao chose to avoid direct

confrontations with government troops as much as they could. They moved toward

Guangxi with their men and established the Dacheng Kingdom (Dachengguo 大成國) in

Xunzhou 潯州.[311]

The other Red Turban armies such as the bands of He Liu, Chen Jinkang,[312] and

Zhou Chun 周春 (alias Dou Pichun 豆皮春)[313] were also repulsed. Their flight now

described a rough arc: first they moved north through Yizhang 宜章, Chenzhou 郴州 and

Guiyangzhou 桂陽州 of Hunan province for a final stand. Government troops, mostly

those under the command of Wang Xin 王鑫, were in constant pursuit of the rebels.[314]

---

[311] Jian, *Quanshi*, pp. 859-60; F.O. 931.1692. List of captured rebels in area south of Guangzhou (n.d.); F.O. 931.1606. Details about militia in Nanhai district (1855); F.O. 931.157. A list of Red Turban leaders (1855).

[312] "Gufei zonglu," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 836; "Sihui XZ 四会县志," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 1593-1594.

[313] "Zhen'geshi biji 枕戈氏笔记," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 853.

[314] "Qing Wenzong Xianfeng Shilu 清文宗咸丰实录," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 1152-53.

The Red Turbans periodically paused to attack towns, but without success. For the most part, they just tried to stay ahead of their pursuers. He Liu was killed in action on January 3, 1856 near Chenzhou and the rebel ranks thinned steadily in combat. Kan Xian led remnants of the band back to Guangdong by a roundabout route and was himself killed near Huaxian in September.[315]

In early 1856, Qing forces took their revenge on the helpless civilian population in the villages surrounding Guangzhou. Some claimed that a million people were killed in the "White Terror" on suspicion of involvement in the rebellions. Mass executions were held at Guangzhou and Zhaoqing 肇慶. Thousands were rounded up and sent in chains to the capital, where they were executed in a barbaric fashion. [316] The gentry took advantage of the government policy of indiscriminant repression to present their private enemies as rebels to be executed, using the dynasty's severity as a means of settling their own local grievances. Around Guangzhou the gentry used this opportunity so effectively that, with the eclipse of the local administration and the destruction of their opponents, they gained

---

[315] "Yahu Caoshi zupu 雅湖曹氏族谱," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, ed. Cao Fengzhen 曹凤贞, 851; 'Kan Xian Shilue 甘先史略,' in *Sanyuanli renmin kangying douzheng shiliao* 三元里人民抗英斗争史料, 201.

[316] According to Yong Kweng's account, *Sohak Dongjumki*, 75,000 people were executed by Ye Mingchen's order in Guangzhou alone and more than half of these people were not directly related to the Red Turban rebellions. See, Yong Kweng, *Sohak*, pp. 63-65. See also G. W. Cooke, *China: being 'The Times' special correspondence from China in the years 1857-8, with corrections and additions*, (London, 1858), 407; Wakeman, "Secret Societies," 246.

complete and undisputed control of the countryside.[317]

Militias

Lastly, resistance from the gentry organized militias helped defeat the Red

Turban armies. In face of the failure of the regular troops in time of crisis, the first

response of the Qing military leadership was to hire paid fighters, or *yong* 勇, to

supplement the regular forces. Broadly speaking, the term *yong* was used to denote any

irregular forces of a loyalist character. Thus the militia of a *tuanlian* 团练 association was

sometimes described as *tuanyong*. But generally *yong* referred to forces on a higher level

of militarization: men who were entirely detached from their communities and who

depended for their sustenance upon pay or loot. Some such units were recruited directly

by government officials, such as notorious *yong* from Chaozhou.[318] There were

numerous mercenaries employed by the Qing at Guangzhou at the beginning of the Red

---

[317] Ibid.; Wakeman, *Strangers*, 149-151. However, regaining control of urban areas did not mean the end of the rebellions; countless marauding bands were still at large, plaguing the countryside. Qing army was still engaged in a vigorous campaign of rural recovery as late as the end of 1857.

[318] The river valleys of eastern Guangdong, particularly in the area of Chaozhou and Jiaying, which notorious for their tradition of fierce lineage feuding, furnished recruits for both orthodox and heterodox forces in the civil wars of the mid-nineteenth century. The Hot-blooded Chaozhou mercenaries (Chaoyong) that stiffened Qing armies in the early years of the anti-Qing struggle were as unruly and contumacious as they were aggressive in battle; and proved thereby a headache to their government masters and a plague to the populace. See Jian, *Quanshi*, Vol. 1, 370.

Turban Rebellions, but as the war wore on, there was an acute shortage of government

funds,[319] and the gentry were induced by the governor-general, with the promise of

honors, titles or even offices, to use their own resources to hire their clansmen as

mercenaries and to organize their clans into self-financing militia units.[320]

The local gazetteers point to a trend of local militarization that began in the early

nineteenth century. This upsurge of local militarization was historically new. Although

Guangdong traditionally had militias organized to defend its villages from pirate attacks,

the formation of militia was strongly discouraged by the Qing government on the grounds

that it gave the gentry military and political power at the expense of the local

government.[321] Moreover, lineage conflicts and kinship divisions in the Guangdong

countryside also prevented the militia from growing into a regional organization.

Therefore, lineage militia before the 1840s remained illegal and localized.

However, the threat of foreign conquest had served to realign the power structure

---

[319] Shortage of military funds was another reason for the prolonged war. The financial structure of the Qing dynasty was rigid and incompatible with the needs of special circumstances. The Ministry of Finance could barely make ends meet even in time of peace, and in wartime the central government could only issue mobilization orders and dispatch troops to the front, without being able to give them adequate weapons and provisions. These had to be furnished by the locality where the war occurred. See F.O. 931.1092. A report regarding military preparation for attacking rebels (1850s).

[320] F.O. 253A. 3. 56. Regulations against banditry, etc. (1855)

[321] Wakeman, *Strangers*, :31

of Guangdong in new ways. First, militias became organized on a higher level than the

village. The Sanyuanli militia, for instance, involved 103 villages and tens of thousands

of people.[322] Second, militias began to gain formal legitimacy under the guise of being

local academies or *shexue* 社學, which were mainly educational institutions before the

1840s. At the peak of the antiforeign movement, however, the local academies were

transformed into organizations to recruit men and to raise money for regional defense.[323]

These organizations were called local academies rather than *tuanlian* (militia) because the

former term sounded eminently Confucian and could, thereby, receive official blessings

from the Qing court.[324] Third, while the local academy was a gentry organization, it

received more mass support than before. The drain of silver out of China, the importation

of opium, and the threat of foreign conquest had given the gentry class an ideological

basis to unite both the rural population and the city craftsmen to fight against foreign

---

[322] Hsiao, *Rural China*, pp. 493-95.

[323] Started as gentry-led institutions to promote local education, the academies became centers of political networking. In times of relative peace, they created channels by which kinsmen could go through the civil service examinations. In times of dynastic decline, such as from the mid-nineteenth century on, they were commissioned by county officials to organize regional self-defense. They were also entrusted with rent collection for urban-based corporations that owned vast estates in the sands. By 1850s, the *shexue* gave practically no public lectures but devoted all their time to keeping the peace. As a result, newly created institutions of this type could rather be called *ju* (*gongju* 公局), which meant a local council. See F.O. 931.1493. and 1522, 1142 and 1143. Reports on rebels, etc. (1855)

[324] Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 495; Wakeman, *Strangers*, p. 64.

intrusion.[325] In sum, the militia now organized on a wider regional scale with semiofficial

blessing and mass support. As a result, the gentry class was able to strengthen its power at

the time of foreign conquest.[326] Although the militia units formed during the Opium War

were disbanded, the same organizations and the same gentry leaders were to take a

prominent part in the suppression of the Red Turban Rebellions of 1854.

The Red Turbans' drive through the Pearl River Delta areas in the 1850s

galvanized residents to re-mobilize for self-defense. Now, in the cities and the larger

market towns, officials and elites resurrected the procedures used in Sanyuanli in 1841—

the formation of militia or self-defense bureaus, the recruitment of mercenaries, the

organization of *baojia* as a patrol system and conscription pool. The mobilization appears

to have been much fuller than in 1841, giving the defense efforts of the 1850s a depth that

the earlier ones lacked. Whereas the pertinent sources for 1841 are virtually mute on the

subject of militarization in places other than cities and the larger market towns, the

---

[325] Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 493.

[326] The militia was one of those key institutions in China that to some extent represented a convergence of the interests of state and society. For rural inhabitants, a viable defense structure means protection of their livelihood against the threat of banditry. To the government, the militia was a means of maintaining its mandate in the face of rebellion. Official encouragement of local defense was forthcoming when the regime found itself unable to cope with serious rural unrest. For a cogent analysis of the role of militia in the history of China, especially in the late Qing periods, See Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*. For an excellent overview of militia activities during the Red Turban Rebellions in Guangdong, see Wakeman, *Strangers*, pp. 144-156.

materials for 1850s speak repeatedly of the formation of militias in countryside. These

rural defense groups, most commonly called "white soldiers" (*baibing* 白兵) for the

white cloth they wrapped around their heads to distinguish themselves from the 'red-

turbaned' rebels, are usually identified by the name of the small market town or village

that served as their headquarters, suggesting that natural, as opposed to administrative,

units formed the basis of organization.[327]

The most formidable militia complex around the Pearl River Delta was organized

in Shunde county. Like other counties, Shunde county was badly hit by the Red Turbans.

In addition to the usual village-by-village devastation, there were also ruinous raids of

Red Turbans from other counties. When the Red Turbans captured the county capital in

1854, the country magistrate of Shunde fled and the local government dissolved.[328] After

the downfall of the local government, the gentry class in Shunde country quickly

reasserted itself. It reorganized militia in villages and in a few months, drove the Red

Turbans out of Shunde county. It was reported that 13,000 rebels were executed in the

course of the suppression. Subsequently, when the order from the provincial governor to

---

[327] Xuxu 徐续, *Lingnan gujinlu* 岭南古今录 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992), 236-237.

[328] *Shunde XZ*, 1929, 23.5-7.

form a militia arrived, the gentry greatly expanded the scope of the local militia to form

the Shunde County Central Militia Bureau on May 7, 1855.[329]

Another powerful militia unit was formed, called the Ninety-Six Villages in

Nanhai county and situated somewhere between Guangzhou and Foshan. They were so

well organized and efficient that they not only successfully defended their villages, but

also brought a halt to the advance of Chen Kai's troops on Guangzhou.[330] The

contributions by these militias towards the suppression of rebellions and policing of the

local areas were considerable.

In mid-west Guangdong, especially the Wuyi regions, however, the revolt could

not be defeated, nor could the areas be pacified in the same way. In these districts there

was not the tradition of gentry organization and gentry-led militia that had developed in

the districts around Guangzhou. As the area was cut off from provincial capital by rebel

bands, there was no hope of obtaining assistance to deal with the revolt. District

magistrates had no forces at their command, and on their own they were powerless.

Moreover the magistrates of Heshan and Kaiping had been killed, or had committed

---

[329] Ibid., 3.1, 16.3, 23.7.

[330] This was a vital for the survival of Guangzhou because it prevented Chen Kai joining forces with the rebels besieging the city. See F.O. 931.1455. Report from three leaders of the gentry on campaign against rebels near Foshan (Aug. 1854).

suicide when their cities had been captured. Faced with a critical situation, in a number of

districts the magistrates took a step that was later to be considered to have done more

than anything else to provoke the Hakka-Punti War – they summoned Hakka braves to

fight against the Red Turbans, most of whom are the Puntis.[331] The Hakkas now formed a

gentry-led militia similar to the militia around Guangzhou and defeated the rebel forces at

the gate of Xinning district town, a victory that eventually stemmed the rebel tide in this

area.[332]

While the need to use local forces at a time of emergency was recognized,

officials regarded the raising of militia as potentially dangerous. As a consequence, there

was a difference between the concept of the *tuanlian* held by officials, and that held by

the gentry. For officials the *tuanlian* was an immobile and non-professional force, the

direction of which should come under the district magistrate, who should also approve

the immediate leaders. For the gentry, the *tuanlian*, unlike the *baojia*, system offered

them direct influence in local affairs.[333] At the time of the Red Turban Rebellions, the

---

[331] This incident eventually created the sharp ethnic consciousness of the Hakka and the process of this will be dealt in detail in the following chapter. See *Enping XZ*, 14.7b; *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3b.

[332] *Xinning XZ*, 14.18b-21b.

[333] Philip Kuhn, "The T'uan-lien Local Defense System at the time of the Taiping Rebellion," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 27 (1967)

weakness of the government allowed the gentry to exploit their potential strength as

leaders of the rural community. For instance, having such a strong county militia bureau,

the gentry class in Shunde was able to established gentry hegemony in the aftermath of

the Red Turban Rebellions. Since nearby Xiangshan county was still under the threat of

the Red Turbans, the gentry of Shunde county had an excuse to take over the control of

the police forces of the polder farm in Xiangshan county, which was known collectively

as 'Donghai Shiliusha 東海十六沙 (Sixteen delta lands of the Eastern Sea).'[334]

A few years later, the Arrow War also provided the gentry from the districts

around Guangzhou with the opportunity of taking the lead in the resistance movement.

The uncoordinated units of *tuanlian* south of Guangzhou were provided with leadership

by a body known as the Guangdong Militia Bureau, which, until 1859, pursued a policy

of harassing the European forces. The effect of permitting the gentry to take control of

---

[334] The Shunde gentry then asked the polder farm owners to donate 0.6 tales per *mu* annually as a protection fee. Since there were 460,000 *mu* of polder far in Xiangshan county, this meant an annual revenue of 276,000 tales to the gentry in Shunde county. With such a strong financial base, the gentry in Shunde county were able to donate huge sums of money to finance the provincial military as well. In the year after the Red Turban Rebellions, the Shunde gentry donated 900,000 taels—about one-seventh of the total provincial budget. Another source of revenue for the gentry class was *lijin* 厘金-namely, transit tolls levied on articles of commerce. Each subdivision (called *gongyue* 公約) of the Shunde Central Militia Bureau was functionally charged with the management of funds in conjunction with the hiring of militia, the distribution of relief, and the reconstruction of local schools. The subdivision obtained those funds by erecting customer barriers around major market towns. For instance, the Longjiang gongyue 龍江公約 , which had 100 braves and an annual expenditure of 10,000 derived its revenue by collecting donations from the cocoon, butcher, and mulberry activities. See *Shunde XZ* 3.2-11, 23.7; *Xiangshan XZ*, 1920 16.5-7.

local defense was described in an article in the *Overland China Mail*:

> In availing themselves of locally directed efforts of mercenary 'braves,' whether among the Hakkas or in other parts of the country (among the Puntis), the authorities in Canton were unwittingly calling into existence a power which was designed to usurp, in a very few years, a large share of the functions of government. The 'gentry'…being the persons most capable of influencing their fellow villagers, were now everywhere formed into committees, and invested for the first time with official powers. They levied and disposed of funds, led armed bodies into the field, executed prisoners, were universally employed as pacificators, and may be said to have saved the Province. The official standing thus acquired (their private leadership in their own villages had always, naturally, existed) has grown more extensive year by year; and the Provincial Government of today finds that no fiat can be executed in the country without the concurrence of the *Kung-ku*, Committee or Municipal Council-by whom the affairs of the District are administered as *ad-latus* to the actual Magistrate.[335]

In sum, the Red Turban Rebellions had again realigned the power structure of the local Chinese communities, with the gentry and the Hakkas emerging from the rural upheavals considerably strengthened at least in some areas.[336] In the 1850s, the gentry obtained the legitimacy to reorganize regional militia, to have its own tax base to finance the militia, and to use the militia for regional hegemony.[337]

---

[335] *Overland China Mail* 11 (July 1863)

[336] This kind of case was still not happened in the Wuyi, for the position of the Punti gentry could not be considered undisputed so long as the Hakkas could still hold out against them.

[337] For example, in just a few years after the rebellions, 8,641 *mu* of communal land were acquired to build a new educational institution called Qingyun Wenshi 青雲文社 (Blue Cloud Academy). See *Shunde XZ* 4.34-36.

4) The Red Turban Rebellions Interpreted

In the great wave of rural insurgencies that enveloped China in the mid-nineteenth century the Red Turban Rebellions stand as only a minor incident, overshadowed by more massive upheavals such as the Nian and Taiping rebellions. The unstable situation, particularly created by the Taipings, undoubtedly influenced the local Tiandihui leaders and their followers in the Pearl River Delta. Yet as the preceding analysis has shown, the Red Turban Rebellions were not simply spontaneous products of the influence from the Taipings. Their history—the social relations and conditions out of which they arose, the specificities of their development and their place in the social process—reveals a multi-layered complexity. Involving a multiplicity of identities, informal networks and invisible connections amidst social and economic change, the movement draws attention especially to the interpenetration of class and ethnicity and Tiandihui organization in the emergence of insurgent politics.

In this chapter I have attempted to focus on the set of events that led up to the Red Turban Rebellions and to describe the rebellions themselves. The factors giving rise to the Red Turbans and the details of their development are of interest for a number of reasons.

First, the local conditions of the mid-nineteenth century suggest that the level of conflict in the Pearl River Delta was high, that outbursts of collective violence were common, and rationales for rebellions were readily available within Chinese popular culture. The evidence suggests that the origin of the Red Turban Rebellions owed much to the special historical circumstances of mid-nineteenth-century Pearl River Delta— crippling natural disasters exacerbated by inefficient government, increased taxes, and the success of the Taiping rebels. Most of the rebel groups were spurred to rebellions by a combination of economic conditions and government demands. Not only natural disasters, but also government abuses and excessive tax demands could easily push people below the margin of subsistence. Therefore, government commutation of taxes was often a major issue for the Red Turban rebels. Violence was already endemic to the Pearl River Delta.

Second, the local violence was further aggravated by the heavy-handed practices of the Qing state against local Tiandihui lodges which became centers for the organizers and perpetrators of the Red Turban Rebellions. While many of the individual outbreaks that collectively made up the Red Turban Rebellions were directly linked to events that threatened the livelihood of the people, subsistence crises alone do not provide an

adequate explanation. In the Pearl River Delta, the decision to rebel seems to have been made deliberately in almost every case.

Most of the rebels did not rise against the government on the spur of the moment, as someone acting out of blind fury would do. Both Chen Kai and Li Wenmao spent several months preparing for revolt under the leadership of Chen Song, and their risings were both related to subsistence-threatening tax demands and to the Tiandihui direction.[338] He Liu's Tiandihui lodge spent more than a year organizing to resist excessive tax demands related to commutation.[339] To borrow the phraseology used by the Tillys in the European context, "There is outrage, all right, but nothing like blind fury. The whole sequence bespeaks premeditation and prior organization."[340] The same can be said about the Red Turban Rebellions; the rebels—that is, the Tiandihui leaders and their committed members—weighed the alternatives and made their decision. In other word, the ambitions of certain Tiandihui leaders that intensified and transformed local discontents into massive rebellions against the state.

---

[338] *Foshan Zhongyi Xiangzhi*, 11.14-15; "Chen Song Shiyou," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 212-213; Yoo, *Kundae*, 284.

[339] He Liu organized the Tiandihui in his area for at least a year before he was pushed into large-scale, active rebellion. See "He Liu deng shilong qishi yuanyou 何六等石龙起事缘由," in *Hongbing Qiyi*, 214.

[340] Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 179.

Third, although people of different ethnic groups and different social strata

banded together against the Qing government, the revolt particularly in the Wuyi regions

was caused largely by a pervasive subethnic hostility. At the low level of society, the

Punti rebels in the Wuyi regions tended to direct their hostility primarily at Hakka people.

The solidarity demonstrated by Punti rebels and by Hakka militias is one of interesting

findings of this study. After the suppression of the Red Turban rebels, the Hakka-Punti

armed conflicts continued for more than ten years (1856-1867) and covered most of the

Wuyi regions along the Pearl River valley. These had an unquestionable influence on the

development of the ethnic consciousness of the Hakkas, as we shall see in the next

chapter.

Fourth, the Red Turban Rebellions had again realigned the power structure of the

local Chinese communities, with the gentry emerging from the local disorder

considerably strengthened. What G. William Skinner has termed "community closure"

began to take effect.[341] Lineages, sublineages, and villages turned inward for protection

while competition and feuding among communities intensified. Economic activity at the

regional level and economic mobility became constricted; protective confederations and

---

[341] G. W. Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (1971): 270-281.

boundaries hardened. As magistrates hesitated to interfere, as lineage leaders were able to

defy civil servants, and as disaffection with the government spread, Qing governance

became ever more superficial. Villagers took the law into their own hands. In the 1850s

during the Red Turban Rebellions, the gentry obtained the legitimacy to reorganize

regional militia, to have its own tax base to finance the militia, and to use the militia for

regional hegemony.

Last, the suppression of the Red Turban Rebellions with the aid of foreign troops

was not only brutal and devastating but also shortsighted in terms of political action. The

human and material destruction was immense and incalculable, sowing profound

bitterness and xenophobia in the minds of survivors. Thousands of these had been driven

from their homes and livelihood, while others emigrated abroad, some as indentured

laborers in the Americas. In addition to hundreds of villages, some thirty-two different

administrative seats in Guangdong ranging from the district to the prefectural level were

lost to the insurgents during the period of 1854 to 1855. Most were quickly recaptured,

but several were held by the rebels continuously for more than several years. For example,

Deqingzhou in Zhaoqing county was held by the rebels until April 1858.[342] The

---

[342] Yoo, *Kundae Zoongkuk'yi Bimil kyulsa*, p. 279.

provincial capital never fell, but it came perilously close on two occasions. Towns were

reduced to rubble, fields were overgrown with weeds, and large tracts of the province

were depopulated.[343]

A foreign traveler in the late 1850s observed that after defeating the Red Turban

rebels, "The mandarins burnt all the villages they had occupied. It was a heart-rending

sight to see these deserted desolate ruins... Land, meanwhile, remains uncultivated,

famine follows, and trade is disarranged."[344] In this period, the Shunde gazetteer also

indicates that the local economy had greatly deteriorated during the rebellions and many

roads and bridges were damaged.[345] The other problem involved the flooding of the area.

---

[343] The devastation in the Pearl River Delta, including the burning of numerous houses, was not caused by the rebels alone, but by the imperial troops and local militias as well. The living of many of the displaced refugees were lost not only through the fighting, but through hunger, pestilence, and other tragedies as well. The Red Turban advance meant war, and war meant the destruction of crops, the disruption of trade routes, pillage, rape, and death. As reiterated in account after account, Qing troops were responsible for much of the wrack and ruin in Guangdong, to the point that, as one gentryman lamented "the people fear the Qing soldiers, but not the Red Turban rebels." See F.O. 931.1461 A letter advising against the demolition of civilian house as a method of defense. (July 9, 1854).

[344] Scarth, *Twelve Years*, pp. 230-232.

[345] *Shunde XZ*, 3.26. At Guangzhou, the Red Turban rebels besieged that city in the latter part of 1854 and into 1855. After their defeat, rebel discipline broke down quickly, and bands of marauders ravaged the countryside. The instability cast doubt on the ability of the Chinese to maintain a steady supply of silk. Not surprisingly, British merchants began looking to alternative sources of supply. There were already such alternative sources outside China. By the time of the Arrow War, India, Turkey, Egypt, and Holland had become substantial rivals to China as suppliers of raw silk to the United Kingdom. Once a trading relationship had been consolidated with these alternative sources, businessmen would be reluctant to go back to the old supplier even after conditions in China returned to normal. Thus the rebellions had one serious damage to the local silk industry as well. For statistical information about the quantities of raw silk supplied by the various parts of the world to the United Kingdom in 1850s, see *Shunde XZ*, 4.1; Parliament Papers 1859, Session 2, v. 23, 319 and v. 65, 292.

For instance, Shunde County is a part of the Pearl River Delta and for the most part lies only slightly above high tide line in the summer rainy seasons. In July and August, these low lying lands were subjected to severe flooding, thereby reducing rice cultivation from the usual two crops per year to one crop annually. In the 1850s, this flooding problem was getting worse as a result of the lack of repair of embankments after the Red Turban Rebellions.[346]

The cost of the rebellions was appalling in terms of lives, property damage, and funds required for suppression. Reliable figures are difficult to find. But, more than 26,000 people in Panyu and Shunde counties and 10,000 people in Zhaoqing county were executed by Qing government.[347] According to one scholar's estimate, about 400,000 people died in Guangdong province because of this "White terror" by Qing court.[348]

In sum, the Red Turban Rebellions was compounded of many ingredients, including adverse ecological conditions, which led to increased competition for

[346] Due to the weakening of state controls after the rebellions, the state could not prevent the gentry from depositing stones in the course of a river, which led to the blocking of river flow, the quickening of silt deposits, and the extending of the river delta toward the sea. This artificially created river delta quickened the pace with which the gentry accumulated land ownership, and caused the water level to rise above the embankments, enhancing the danger of flooding. See *Shunde XZ*, 4.1; *Nanhai XZ*, 1873, 7.7-8.

[347] Luo Baoshan 駱寶善, 'Taiping tianguo shiji Guangdong Tiandihui qiyi shulue 太平天國時期廣東天地會起義述略,' *Zhongshan Daxue xuebao* 中山大學學報, 4-1 (1981), 58-59.

[348] Xu Xu, *Lingnan*, 244.

resources; government abuses and mal-administration; communal frictions; and the activities of the Tiandihui. The Taiping rebellion also played an important role in the timing of the Red Turban Rebellions. Without it, unrest in the Pearl River Delta would probably not have exploded with such intensity. It was the coming together of a number of different socioeconomic and historical rhythms at a particular time that brought about series of rebellions, of such massive dimensions.

Seemingly, the explosive situation underlying the Hakka-Punti War was concentrated in certain local communities, the Wuyi region rather than evenly permeating the peasantry of the Pearl River Delta. Therefore, in the following chapter, I examine in detail the emergence of the ethnic consciousness of the Hakkas, focusing on the Wuyi.

CHAPTER IV

ETHNICITY, LOCAL INTERESTS, AND THE STATE

Subethnic rivalry arose in the Pearl River Delta during the Qing period as a result of heterogeneous Chinese immigration and settlement. In particular the intercommunity competition among the two major subethnic groups,[349] the Hakkas and the Puntis, which emerged within the South China, influenced internal migration and local patterns of settlement. In the case of the Wuyi region in Guangdong, however, this rivalry spread and intensified during the Red Turban Rebellions and grew even after the end of the rebellions.

In the face of the Red Turbans most Hakka clans remained loyal to the Manchu

---

[349] Tribal, national, and racial ethnicity is the most prevalent forms of ethnicity. However, in China—as in other parts of the world where pervasive cultures or civilizations with "great traditions" have existed— major subcultural distinctions have often led to separate ethnic identities apart from tribal, national, or racial ascriptions. Hence "subcultural ethnicity or subethnicity" may also be recognized as a widespread type. The term "subethnic" refers to the shared village, native place, and the shared branch or subgroup of a lineage on a small scale. On a large scale it is the shared lineage, speech group, the shared surname, as well as the sense of different species of people. See Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic conflict and political development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 23-25; Bryna Goodman, "The Locality as Microcosm of the Nation?-Native Place Networks and Early Urban Nationalism in China," *Modern China*, Vol. 21 No. 4 (October 1995), 387-419.

officials. Most of the Punti tenants, in contrast, joined the Red Turbans until brutally

suppressed by Ye Mingchen, Governor-general of Liangguang. Feuds among the two

subethnic groups intensified when the Puntis attacked Hakka villages in retaliation for

their support of the Manchu government during the Red Turban Rebellions. This local

rivalry among the Hakkas and the Puntis also spread and sparked subethnic disturbances

in other areas. Extensive feud patterns formed between the Punti and the Hakka

groupings in many parts of the Pearl River Delta estuary. The struggle turned into open

warfare in which the officials were powerless to interfere and which continued long after

the end of the Red Turban Rebellions. It is estimated that subsequent intercommual wars

involving the Hakkas and the Puntis led to some half-million deaths in Guangdong.[350]

Subethnic conflict of this magnitude eventually perpetuated local tensions and

consolidated the boundaries between contending communities and enclaves, thereby

enabling subethnic rivalry to become an enduring and deeply rooted phenomenon in the

local society. Most importantly, these conflicts were in turn important in consolidating the

ethnic identity of the Hakka people.

My primary aim in this chapter is to analyze the historical causes of the

emergence of ethnic consciousness of the Hakkas and to show how conflicts between the

Hakkas and the Puntis during the Red Turban Rebellions contributed the strengthening of

---

[350] Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 3.

Hakka identity. In order to do this, it is necessary to provide a description and analysis of the relationship between the Hakkas and the Puntis in the Wuyi region.

1) The Wuyi Region in Historical Perspective

Geography of the Wuyi

The main channel of the West River of Guangdong forms the west side of the Pearl River delta. West across the river the pronunciation and vocabulary of spoken Cantonese changes to that of the Siyi sub-group (see Map 2). Siyi 四邑 (Sze-yup; four counties) is the collective term referring to the four counties of Xinhui, Xinning (Taishan), Kaiping, and Enping. To this groups is added Heshan so that is now becomes the Wuyi 五邑 (Ng-yup; five counties).[351]

Descriptions of the Wuyi terrain follow two main themes. The first focuses upon the beauties of land. Most of the Wuyi regions were described as "a beautiful abundant place at the edge of the Southern Sea, inland there are flat

---

[351] See HIM Mark Lai, *In Search of Roots, A Course* (Chinese Cultural Center: University of San Francisco); Chen Chengxi 陳承禧, *Guangdong dizhi* 廣東地誌 (Hong Kong: Tiandi chubanshe, 1978), 3-4, 31; Chunfat Lau, *The Decline of the General Hakka Accent in Hong Kong: A Comparison of "Old-Style" and "New-style" as spoken by the indigenous inhabitants* (München: Lincom Europa, 2000), 2; Guangdongsheng fangyan diaocha zhidaozu 广东省方言调查指导组, ed., *Siyiren xuexi putonghua shouce* 四邑人学习普通话手册 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1958).

plains, hills and high mountains."[352] However, the more common and grimmer

second theme emphasizes the limited arable land for agriculture.

Map 2. Wuyi (Five Counties) in the Pearl River Delta.

Certainly the Wuyi region is a pretty place with blue skies, white clouds,

and fields laid out in a patchwork of varying shades and textures of green tucked

---

[352] Tan Xin 潭心，ed., *Siyi fengguang* 四邑風光 (Hong Kong: Wanye Chubanshe, n.d.), 49.

between tree-covered hills. These hills, which are so picturesque, pose the greatest

obstacle to economic development because their limited productiveness make it

difficult to increase the amount of cultivated land and they make the cost of

building roads, railroads or canals, which might improve commerce, prohibitively

expensive. Xinning, for instance, by 1893 could produce only enough grain to feed

its inhabitants for half a year. Such limits to economic growth posed serious

problems.[353]

Much of the Wuyi is rugged: hills, tablelands, and high mountains

occupy an estimated 76 percent of the total area; plains and basins merely 24

percent. The narrow alluvial plains along the eastern coastline were quite

extensively settled during the Qing period. Foothills rise sharply from the coastal

plains and then spread inland. Many of the habitable foothill areas were also

settled during the Qing period, as were the larger interior valleys.[354] The region's

physical features tended to divide it into highland and lowland sections. The vast

---

[353] Although the land is broad, rural areas are narrow, probably sixty or seventy percent mountains and seas. An examination of production reveals that it is certainly not enough to satisfy necessity. The people of this place consider this a matter of life and death. The insufficiencies suffered by the people are why many of the Wuyi people hire themselves out overseas. See *Xinning XZ*, 8.6b; *Xinning xiangtu dili* 新寧鄉土地理 (Taishan: n.p., 1900).

[354] Chen, *Guangdong*, 3-4, 31, 65.

interior featured mountainous terrain indented by river valleys and upland basins.

To the east, only the lowland valleys and basins, together with the scattered

alluvial plains along the seacoast, provided relatively level landscapes.[355]

In addition, the Wuyi region faces the unenviable situation of being

surrounded by neighboring areas better endowed by nature to become wealthy. It is

close to three international ports: Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Macao, and sits

near the market-oriented Sanyi 三邑 region (three counties, Nanhai, Panyu, Shunde,

located south of Guangzhou).[356] Unfortunately, the Wuyi region has neither the

natural waterways nor the acres of rich alluvial soil needed to duplicate the

success of these nearby regions.[357] Graham Johnson describes central Xinning;

"...Its prospects for growth and development were, until recently, hampered by

---

[355] Most of the Wuyi regions are landlocked except some parts of Xinhui and Kaiping counties and, like the rest of western Guangdong, has a hilly topography. Some 70 percent of its land is barren and unproductive. Kaiping county is, however, somewhat more fortunate than other counties, for the Tan River 潭江 and some of its tributaries flow through Kaiping on the way to the important port of Jiangmen. Most of Kaiping's arable land is found in the valleys along the Tan and its tributaries, where the bulk of Kaiping cash crops are cultivated. See *Kaiping XZ*, 56-62.

[356] A number of factors account for the vitality and prosperity of the Sanyi region, which had been blessed by nature in various ways. Overall, it had the most fertile and productive land within the province. What is more, it had an ideal natural environment for internal and international trade. Its many inland waterways served to link different counties within the region, and the long, curved coastline offered fine harbors, connecting the region to economies overseas. As early as 1730, the Emperor Yongzheng noted: "..region is surrounded by the ocean on three sides, where merchants arrived from various provinces and foreign barbarians come with money to purchase goods. Trade is very heavy." See *Zengcheng XZ*, Introduction, 10.

[357] Liang Rencai 梁仁彩, *Guangdong Jingji dili* 廣東經濟地理 (Beijing: New Science Publishers, 1956), 21-24, 78-79.

inadequate communications."[358]

Agriculture was the cornerstone of the Wuyi region's local economy, as it still is today. Late nineteenth century statistics reveal that four hundred out of six hundred thousand people in Xinning county depended upon agriculture in full or in part to make a living.[359] Double-cropping of rice is common, with cereals and sweet potatoes being the staple crops. But, only one-quarter of the food supply was grown locally.[360] The raising of cattle, goats, and pigs as well as fishing were major activities, and the chief exports included peanuts, fish, meat, animal hides, hemp, clothing, grass sacks, grass mats, tobacco, and tea.[361]

Dependence upon the land was particularly risky in a poorly endowed place like the Wuyi region. Frederic Wakeman estimates that in 1812, there was only 1.67 *mu* of land for each person in Guangdong province, or one-quarter of an

[358] Graham Johnson, "Family Strategies and Economic Transportation in Rural China: Some Evidence from the Pearl River Delta." In Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell, eds., *Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1993), 112.

[359] Zheng Dehua 鄭德華, "Shijiou shiji mo Taishan qiaoxiang de xingcheng ji pouxi 十九世紀末台山僑鄉的形成及剖析," *Guangzhou huaqiao yanjiu* 廣州華僑研究 4 (1986), 68.

[360] Unlike the central Sanyi region near the provincial capital, where land was relatively fertile and conditions sometimes prosperous, the Wuyi region was capable of maintaining themselves when conditions were stable but slow to recover from disruptions. The hilly land yielded little, and productive capacity was low. The importation of rice from abroad—mainly Thailand—and from neighboring region began as early as early eighteenth century. See Hsiao, *Rural China*, 381.

[361] Liang, *Guangdong*, 21-24, 78-79.

acre.[362] In the Wuyi region, the situation was more dire because of the poor

quality of the soil, which was red or yellow in color and often mixed with stones,

sand or salt.[363] The local gazetteer states that the Wuyi region was not a good place to

live and work. "This section of the country is generally remote, desolate, and

sickly....Until a generation ago, politically undesirable and criminal elements were

banished into this region."[364] Virtually all local gazetteers depict the area, time and again,

as a distant and unwholesome place. They also suggest in unequivocal terms that the

Wuyi was considered an underdeveloped and poor region compared to neighboring

counties. Therefore, during the fall and winter seasons and during times of poor harvest,

people from these areas, especially Xinning and Enping counties, went to other counties,

such as the Sanyi region, to seek employment as artisans and other types of workers.[365]

People from this less developed Wuyi region often entered the delta's commercial

---

[362] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 179. This figure contrasts sadly with the 4.0 mu needed for bare subsistence. See Ng Chin-keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683-1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 15-16.

[363] For example, fifty-six percent of the surface area of the Xinning county is taken up by hills and mountains and only 1,659,100 *mu*, or 34.9 percent of total land area of 4,748,000 *mu*, is cultivable. See Taishanxian dang'anguan 台山县档案馆, ed., *Taishan dilizhi* 台山地理志 (Taishan: Zhongguo Taishanxian weiyichuanbu, 1984), 30; Zheng Dehua and Cheng Luoxi 成露西, *Taishan qiaoxiang yu Xinning tielu* 台山僑鄉與新寧鐵路 (Guangzhou: Sanlian shudian, 1991), 2.

[364] *Enping XZ*, 1.2a.

[365] *Enping XZ*, 4.12.

network as suppliers of labor.

Early History

The Wuyi region had originally been the homeland for aborigines called "Yao" tribes (Yaozu 瑤族). The Yao people remained culturally stagnant for many centuries, and had subsisted primarily by hunting and gathering.[366] The Han Chinese, who themselves were a racial intermixture from north China, began to colonize Guangdong province as a whole in 234 B.C.[367] In this early stage, the Han Chinese were reluctant to venture out from their civilization. Consequently, the original colonizers of this remote region were said to have been banished criminals and political exiles.[368] However, southward migration of the Han Chinese increased whenever Han areas in the north were devastated by the onslaughts of nomadic people from the steppes and deserts further north. Other causes of migration were natural calamities in the forms of flood and drought, which brought famine. For these various reasons the Han Chinese moved south

---

[366] Herold J. Wiens, *Han Chinese Expansion in South China* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1967), p, 51, 106

[367] Ibid., 132.

[368] *Enping XZ*, 1.2a, 1.7.

and east in a constant search for peace and arable land during the fifth and sixth centuries.

Meanwhile, the cultural frontiers of the Han Chinese expanded steadily toward the south

along with the migrating people. With their superior farming technology, the newly

settled Han Chinese were able to cultivate the choice lands and build teeming villages as

they advanced to the south.[369] In the settling process of the Han Chinese, the

aborigines either ran away into the mountains or were absorbed into the dominant

group.

An intensive effort for the economic development of Guangdong began during

the Ming dynasty. Increasingly Han Chinese penetrated and settled in areas inhabited by

other ethnic groups such as the Yao, She, Zhuang and Li. During the mid-fifteenth

century the Ming government abandoned its policy of indirectly ruling non-Han peoples

through appointed native headmen. Instead these areas were put under direct Han

Chinese rule and the people encouraged the adoption of Chinese language and customs.

This policy of sinicization led to friction and resistance. This was reflected in historical

---

[369] *Kaiping XZ*, 2.19a-20a.

chronicles by the occurrence of numerous Yao, She, Zhuang and Li uprisings in Guangdong during this period.[370]

During the sixteenth century the Portuguese arrived off the China coast. They established one of their earliest bases on Shangchuan 上川 (St. John) Island off the Xinning (Taishan) coast. In 1551 Father Francis Xavier landed on the island seeking permission to enter China to launch a missionary effort. But there he sickened and died and was buried in 1552. The Portuguese abandoned this base after they occupied Macau in 1557.[371]

The population of the Wuyi regions was then depleted by Qing attempts to eradicate the pirate Koxinga (also known as Zheng Chenggong), by forcing all Chinese living on the coasts of Guangdong and Fujian to move approximately 15 kilometers inland. Enacted in 1661, this drastic policy forced people to leave the Wuyi areas altogether. Many never returned. After this order was rescinded in 1683, the population of the Wuyi regions began to grow again, by natural increase

---

[370] Ibid.

[371] Despite this proximity to the ocean and early foreign contacts, the Wuyi region never became a center even for local, much less coastal or international trade. See Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier, his life, his times*, Vol. 4 (Rome : Jesuit Historical Institute, 1973-1982), 640-644.

and through official edicts. In 1683, government attempts to resettle vacated

coastal areas attracted groups of Hakka settlers.[372]

When competition for land became fierce in the mid-nineteenth century, these

differences ignited a major conflict between the Cantonese speaking people and their

"guests." But during the eighteenth century, tensions had yet to arise, and as late as 1732

a government official, Tao Zhengzhong, inspected barren lands in Xinning and assigned

Hakka to come and till them. During the course of the Qianlong (1736-95) and Jiaqing

(1796-1820) reigns, 30,000 Hakkas came from Huiyang, Chaozhou, and Jiaying

prefectures and settled in southeastern Xinning. Now two subethnic groups, Cantonese

and Hakka, prevailed in the Wuyi region. Most of the Cantonese speakers inhabited the

eastern lowlands and coastal areas. The Hakkas were concentrated in the rugged

hinterland but they were also spread over the highlands of Enping, Xinning and

mountainous Heshan counties.[373]

Lineages were common throughout the region among both the Cantonese

---

[372] For a detailed description of this see Chapter 2 above.

[373] The local history records that wherever a Hakka moved onto a piece of land there soon developed a teeming village. For a period of 110 years, from 1740 to 1850, the Hakka population within Xinning county grew from a handful to 300,000. This was a little less than half of the total population of the district, and they lived off one-third of the tilled lands in the district. See *Chixi XZ*, 8.5b-6a.

and Hakka population. Variations in lineage size and structure in different areas

seem to have reflected mainly ecological influences rather than subethnic

distinctions. Lineages located in lowland areas where the population was dense,

arable land relatively extensive, and riverine and sea trade active tended to be

larger and wealthier on the whole than those situated in impoverished highland

areas containing poorer resources and fewer communications. Powerful lineages

were concentrated more in the prosperous lowlands and coastal centers of Xinhui

and Jiangmen. These lineages varied widely in size, ranging from several hundred

to ten thousand or more. Single lineages of this size sometimes occupied entire

villages. In some areas stretches of villages were occupied by people with the

same surname and same lineage or related lineages. For example the Huang 黃

(Wong) clan was numerous in the north half of the Xinning county. One source

listed 163 Huang hamlets, or approximately 40 percent of Huang hamlets in the

entire county.[374]

Highly organized armed feuds reportedly developed first among the

flourishing lineage concentrations especially in Cantonese-settled areas like

[374] Most of the prominent lineages had their headquarters along the lower and middle courses of the Tan River. See *Kaiping XZ*, 64, 90.

Kaiping and Jiangmen. From these Cantonese areas the feuding fashion also

radiated to the less productive coastal areas of Xinhui and Xinning and inland to

the Hakka-dominated hinterland of Enping and Heshan as well as to other

mountainous sections of the region over the later half of the eighteenth century. In

the more thinly populated highland areas there were fewer concentrations of

powerful lineages. Hence local feud patterns appear to have developed on a less

extensive scale. Severe conflicts between the Punti and the Hakka people were

still not reported in areas of mixed habitation in the Wuyi.[375]

Sometime during the eighteenth century, however, the balance tipped,

and Wuyi people began to feel insecure on the amount of land they had to farm. As

the Hakka population grew, the acquisition of lands in the Wuyi by the Hakkas

also increased. Hence, simultaneously with the advancing tide of Hakka

settlements, the tide of Punti settlements receded. This situation in the Wuyi united

the Punti tenants and the Punti landlords against the Hakkas: the Punti tenants

were in competition with the Hakkas for land, and the Punti landlords were

alarmed at Hakka assertiveness on acquiring of more lands. Hence, the Puntis and

---

[375] Zhang Fenqian 張奮前, "Kejia minxi zhi yanhua 客家民系之演化," *Taiwan Wenxian* 臺灣文獻 13.4 (Dec., 1962), 60.

the Hakkas were increasingly divided into two hostile camps. These hostilities

finally exploded in 1854 in the Wuyi, and this communal war, called the Hakka-

Punti War, continued to devastate the community for the next decade.

2) The Hakka-Punti Conflicts in Retrospect

Hakka Controversy

Let us now proceed to the sources of conflict among locals. Local societies

were derived from two subethnic lines—the Hakkas and the Puntis who were the

principal cause of conflict within Wuyi local societies in the mid-nineteenth century. The

myths and realities of migration and cultural diffusion in south China have

always held a fascination for scholars with an interest in ethnic relations. In the

nineteenth century, few who lived in the prosperous towns and villages of the

Pearl River delta would have questioned their identity as legitimate members of

the Chinese empire. They might have acknowledged differences in dialect, living

habits, and marriage customs among themselves, but all traced their origin from

the central plains (*zhongyuan* 中原).[376]

---

[376] See Wolfram Eberhard, *Social Mobility in Traditional China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962); Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun.*

Both the Hakkas and the Puntis were all obviously Han. Yet a sense of

subethnic identity clearly existed among them.[377] Particularly after the subethnic

group of the Hakkas, another Han Chinese group who arrived during the early

modern period from farther north in search of better lands, many Cantonese felt

rather besieged in their own homelands. Since ethnic consciousness is often

strengthened when a group must compete with others for land, it is not remarkable

that the Cantonese were more likely to think of themselves as a people apart than

are many subethnic groups among the Han.[378] The sense of the Cantonese as

somehow different from other Chinese cuts both ways. In a chapter titled "We and

They" in a book describing the early contests of south China with the Europeans,

Frederic Wakeman states, "Chinese from other provinces often stressed the

uniqueness of the Cantonese. They were considered uncommonly bellicose, and

they were often looked down upon as serpentine Yeman 野蠻 (savage southern

barbarians) whose habits were bizarre and uncouth." The Cantonese responded

---

[377] The Cantonese-Hakka conflict raged mainly within the territory of the Wuyi. It is convenient to regard the Puntis as an indigenous Cantonese group for this writing, although many Punti surnames claim by their legends that they too had entered Guangdong from the north. Similar legends of common origin are recorded among the Hakkas, and are given of the Dan by the Puntis. See Chapter II.1-2 above.

[378] Ross Terrill goes so far as to describe "Cantonese chauvinism." See Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 68.

with an intense, though defensive, pride in their origins.[379]

For a long time, the Hakkas were described by foreigners, even by anthropologists and linguists, as if they constituted a non-Han minority nationality within China. In 1946, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was still calling them a people of "doubtful" origin who "may be related to the Burmese and Siamese" and contrasting them with the "true Chinese."[380] Hakka people were also consistently stereotyped by other Han Chinese groups. They were often described as minority people who liked to live in the mountains, sing special 'mountain songs' and lamentations and tended to be poor by comparison with other people living in the plains. Certainly it is the case that there are differences between the Cantonese and the Hakkas. If Cantonese and Hakka people were principally distinguished by their mutually unintelligible dialects, they could also be differentiated by other features.[381] Hakka women, for example, did not bind their feet and favored distinctive hair styles. There were also religious differences in regard to festivals, temple names, and deities. Distinctions in dress,

---

[379] Wakeman, *Strangers*, 57.

[380] *Encyclopaedia Britannica, a new survey of universal knowledge* (Chicago and London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1946).

[381] The Hakkas are somewhat taller than other South Chinese groups. See S.M. Shirokogoroff, *Anthropology of Eastern China and Kwangtung Province* (Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch, Extra Vol. IV: Shanghai, 1925).

architecture, and eating habits likewise led Cantonese and Hakka to associate with

their own kind and to discriminate against others. The Hakkas preserved detailed

traditions which claimed for them an origin in the north of China. These traditions were

collected and recorded in the nineteenth century by European missionaries who were

working among them.[382] Since then the subject has been discussed at greater length by

modern scholars.[383]

A great deal of the speculation about the Hakka people is colored by the

term "Hakka" of which usage led some Chinese to look upon the Hakkas as if

they were really outsiders-that is, as if they were a non-Han people.[384] In reality,

however, the Hakkas are but another of the subethnic groups among the Han.[385] The

---

[382] Hamberg, "The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tshuen"; E. J. Eitel, "An Outline History of the Hakkas"; Charles Piton, "On the Origin and History of the Hakkas," *China Review* 2 (1873); R. Lechler "The Hakka Chinese," *Chinese Recorder* 9 (1878); George Campbell, "Origin and Migrations of the Hakkas," *Chinese Recorder* 43 (1912).

[383] Luo Xianglin, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*; Hsieh T'ing-yu, "Origin and Migrations of the Hakkas," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 13 (1929); J.A.G. Roberts, The Hakka-Punti War; S. T. Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*; and Nicole Constable, *Guest People, Hakka Identity in China and Abroad* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996)

[384] Leong, *Migration*, 63-67.

[385] Luo Xianglin 羅香林, "Kejia yuanliukao" 客家原流考 in *Kejia yanjiu* 客家研究, eds. Zhang Weidong 張衛東 and Wang Hongyou 王洪友, 3-5 (Shanghai: Tongji daxue chubanshe, 1989); Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*; S. T. Leong, "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern China," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949,* eds. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985): 287-326 As the Hakkas were also granted Guest Families (*kehu* 客戶: legally registered status) status, they used this to identify and call themselves Ke (客) or Kejia (客家), or in their language "Hakka." The Punti (Mandarin: *bendi* 本地) are the earliest Han Chinese inhabitants of a region. This term is often translated as "natives" or "indigenous inhabitants." In

usage appears to represent nothing more complex than an archaic way of

distinguishing the newcomer from the original inhabitant. There is historical

precedent in various parts of China for using the twin terms "host" (*zhu* 主) and

"guest" (*ke* 客) to distinguish an original population from more recent arrivals.

One Song dynasty census, for example, divided the population of Guangdong

Province into two basic categories: the hosts, or native non-Han peoples, and the

guests, who were at the time the Han settlers.[386]

Usage of the term "Kejia" to mean an ethnic group or language was

never seen in books or papers before the seventeenth century.[387] County gazetteers

of many "pure" Hakka-dwelling counties did not refer to their communities as

being Hakka before the nineteenth century. In Northern and Western Guangdong,

the Hakka speech group was named "Ngai" (derived from the Hakka word *ngai*

meaning "I" or "me"). In Guangxi, they were called the "New People (*xinren*

Guangdong the Punti are Yue (粵 Cantonese speakers); in Fujian they are Min (閩 *Hokkien*). In both cases this distinguishes the Chinese who were already settled in the area from the Hakkas and other later arrivals. Often the Hakkas regarded themselves as the Punti in their heartland, Meixian (梅縣).

[386] Herold J. Wiens, *China's March toward the Tropics* (Hamden: Shoestring Press, 1954), 105-06, 269-72.

[387] Leong, *Migration*, 64; Hu Xizhang 胡希张, et al., *Kejia fenghua* 客家风化 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1997).

新人)" or the "Newcomers (*lairen* 來人)."[388] In western Fujian, some Hakka

speakers think that "Hakka" are those who live in Guangdong sharing their

language.[389] The label "Hakka" did not begin to appear in county gazetteers of

mixed Hakka dwellings counties (particularly in the Wuyi) until around 1700.

Also, "Kejia" was never mentioned in historical documents of Hakka speaking

areas in Taiwan or Sichuan, instead, the people are recorded as "Yueren" or

"Guangdongren."[390] The term "Kejia" has never been found in genealogical

records of Hakka speakers.[391] On the contrary, identification as "Chinese" or

Tangren 唐人 was always emphasized.[392] In other words, Hakka-dialect

communities are not found to have called themselves Hakka until quite recently.

They did not use the name "Hakka" by themselves, but they were named or told to

---

[388] Mantaro J. Hashimoto, *The Hakka Dialect: a Linguistic Study of its Phonology, Syntax and Lexicon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 1.

[389] David Prager Branner, *Problem In Comparative Chinese Dialectology: the Classification of Miin and Hakka* (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), 42-44.

[390] Cui Yingchang 崔榮昌, *Sichuan Fangyan yu Bashu wenhua* 四川方言与巴蜀文化 (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1996).

[391] Chen Ganhua 陈干华, "Yuexi Lianjiang de Kejiaren 粤西廉江的客家人," *Kejia yanjiu jikan* 客家研究集刊, Vol. 9 (1996), 55-60.

[392] According to recent studies on the Hakkas, there were no people calling themselves "Hakka" and no ethnic group existed as Hakka before the end of the Ming dynasty in Southern Jiangxi Hakka speaking areas. The Pengmin 棚民 of northern Jiangxi, whose ancestors were also composed largely of Hakka speech group, did not get named Hakka, nor do they have any sense of being "Hakka." See Leong, *Migration*, 109.

name themselves in this fashion. The development of a positive Hakka identity is a

process that took several decades; the first sign of it is appeared in early

nineteenth century by a few Hakka gentry, but then the conflicts later in the

century, particularly through the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War,

confirmed and expanded that sense of identity.

Hakka History

Concerning the origin and history of the Hakka people, there have been many

theories based on different studies. In many parts of South China, these "guest people"

are still treated as outsiders and intruders even though everyone now concedes that they

are Han Chinese. More interestingly, the Hakka people today adopted the term for a

guest as their ethnic name call themselves "Hakkanyin" (Kejiaren 客家人: Guest

Person) to differentiate themselves from the neighboring people. Most Hakka people

today follow the conclusions of Luo Xianglin, a Hakka historian, who claimed that the

Hakkas are the "noble pure blood Han from the Central Plain," and have been

migrating to the South since the third century in five waves.[393] Luo categorized the

---

[393] Mostly based on the Hakka genealogies, Luo reconstructed five stages of migration of Hakka people: (1) A.D. 311-873, starting in Eastern Jin dynasty when the northern China was occupied by northern

ethnic groups in Guangdong into two major types, Han and non-Han. He argued

that the extant sub-groups within the Han included the Cantonese, the Chaozhou,

and the Hakkas. In terms of blood purity, the Cantonese were least pure, for they

inherited the blood of many non-Han groups including not only the Miao, Yao, Bai,

Dan, but also Negroes, Persians, and Arabs. The blood of the Chaozhou was purer

than that of the Cantonese, but even that still mixed substantially with that of the

She and the Dan minorities. Among the three Han ethnic groups, Luo asserted, the

blood of the Hakka was comparatively the purest, although it still might possibly

have assimilated with the blood of the She.[394] The conclusion was, therefore, that

in Guangdong it was the Hakka that were closest to the Han.

Luo's claim about the origin of the Hakka serves as the spiritual support of

the Hakka-speaking people today. However, this view is now challenged by many

modern scholars. Here I do not note this fact to nullify Luo's theory, which has been

---

barbarians; (2) 874-1276, investigating the impact of Huang Chao Rebellion on the migration of Hakka people to western Fujian and southern Jiangxi; (3) 1276-1682, the migration to eastern Guangdong during the Song-Yuan transition; (4) 1682-1867, the Hakka's movement into the Sichuan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong and even to the Taiwan partly because of the population increase in this period; and (5) 1867 to present, discussing about the migration of the Hakkas from eastern Guangdong to other parts of Guangdong, Jiangxi, Taiwan, other parts of Asia, Pacific Islands, America and Africa. See Luo, *Kejia yuanliu kao*, Chap. 2.

[394] Luo Xianglin, "Guangdong minzu gailun 广东民族概论," *Minsu zhoukan* 民俗周刊 63 (special issue), 1929.

considered elsewhere.[395] The most important weakness of this theory, however, lies in

the derogatory view of the neighboring groups, a Hakka version of racism. Luo also

failed to keep his promise of a detailed account Cantonese and Hoklos, which makes a

contrast of the three groups impossible.[396] In addition, the notion of "Ke" or "Kehu

客戶" in the Jin dynasty at the fifth century as the origin of the Hakka suggested by

Luo could not have been correct, because "Kehu," as a term simply indicating

immigrants, was ubiquitous in China. There is also evidence to suggest that at least the

first three of the five waves of migration were common to all Southern Chinese. By

comparing the genealogical records of the Hakkas, Cantonese, and the Hoklos, Chen

Zhiping (1997) found out that these speech groups shared common ancestors as late as

the Ming dynasty. He further argued that Hakkas were not only similar to other non-

---

[395] Recently, there are objections to Luo's theory, such as Fang Xuejia 房學家 who suggests that the Hakka people are sinicized and the so-called Hakka-migrations are pure inventions. According to the Fang's study, there was indeed some northern ethnic people migrated to south, however, the number of people migrated from north was really small and there was no evidence of massive migration from northern to southern China from the historical records. The mixture of both Yue and northern culture brought by these small numbers of migrants eventually produced the special Hakka culture. The primary ancestors of the Hakkas were Yue people in the south not very few northern immigrants. Zhang Kuangyu 张光宇, on the other hand, contends that the Hakka people is a mixture of Han and the She 畲 minority. Therefore, the definition of "Hakka people" is itself controversial. See Fang Xuejia 房學家, *Kejia yuanliu tan'ao* 客家源流探奧 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994); Zhang Kuangyu 张光宇, "Lun Kejiahua de xingcheng 论客家话的形成," *Qinghua Xuebao* 清华学报, Vol. 25.2 (1995), 161-180.

[396] Luo himself also admitted in his book, *Kejia yuanliu kao* (p. 43), the descriptions in the Hakka genealogies are fragmented and give very vague information. He also mentioned the error of listing few counties in Fujian as pure Hakka areas but actually are pure Hoklo areas. See Chen Zhiping 陈支平, *Kejia yuanliu xinlun* 客家源流新论 (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), section 2.23.

Hakka in their origins, but also not much different in culture, customs and civilization.

Therefore, the notion of a pure Hakka line is more of an imagined identity based on racial

prejudice than a fact.[397] When, then, does the "Hakka" become a named identity for the

Hakka speakers indicating all of the Hakka speakers? Let us examine the general stages

of Hakka settlement in the Wuyi during the Qing period to answer the above question.

Hakka Settlements in the Wuyi

Like other Han Chinese residents of southeastern China, Hakka speakers traced

their ancestral roots to areas of central China. However, as relative latecomers to the

south, they were often forced to settle in less desirable upland regions populated by

groups of non-Han Chinese such as the She, with whom they intermixed and

intermarried.[398] Alternatively, they pushed on to the flatlands, where they became tenant

farmers for earlier settlers like the Cantonese.

According to S.T. Leong (1985), the dispersal of Hakka sojourners over a wide

territory of southern China and across different economic regions mitigated against the

---

[397] Ibid.

[398] Mary S. Erbaugh, "The Hakka Paradox in the People's Republic of China: Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence," in *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad,* ed. Nicole Constable (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 210.

development of a uniformly shared Hakka identity. The expansion of the Hakka speech

group began after the middle of the Ming dynasty as a result of economic cycles. They

began to move to Northern Guangdong, Huizhou, Boluo, and also south to Chaozhou

speaking regions. This resulted in local disputes, but as the government officials regarded

them as Chinese, they ended up having the right to stay there. Because of the *xiangyue*

鄉約 system,[399] they were always grouped together and they built up their own villages,

which resulted in Hakka dialect islands. A *xiangyue* was a collection of neighboring

villages (but not necessarily all the villages in one area) operating as a unit and

sometimes holding a common estate. Often the complexes of *xiangyue* were formed in

the Hakka villages to protect their interests against the natives. But these Hakka speech

---

[399] *Xiangyue*, a term with a long history in Chinese local government and administration, appears first in Northern Song, when a Confucian scholar set out a scheme for a kind of self-governed village in which country people were to promote among themselves morality, education, social solidarity, and mutual aid. The plan seems to have enjoyed some vogue in Ming times, but the early Qing rulers took over the term to give it a new meaning: *Xiangyue* became a public lecture system by means of which the masses were to be indoctrinated with the political ethics of Confucianism in a kind of adult education. Yet by the nineteenth century *xiangyue* had once again undergone a transformation, a lecture system having developed into a framework of state control to the point where *xiangyue* was sometimes taken to be synonymous with *baojia* and *lijia*. On the other hand, a contrary process was also at work, moving *xiangyue* back some distance towards the kind of self-government which had originally been conceived under its name. It is on record that in places in Guangdong province the heads of Xiangyue assumed roles of leadership in such a way as to take command of local affairs. Moreover, *xiangyue* were used as a framework for organizing militia for local defense. Through these *xiangyue*, the Hakkas in Guangdong developed extra-local organization for interethnic conflict later. For the studies on the *xiangyue*, see David Faure, The structure of Chinese rural society : lineage and village in the eastern New Territories, Hong Kong, (Hong Kong ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1986); James Hayes, *The Rural Communities of Hong Kong: Studies and Themes* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983); and P. H. Hase, "The Mutual Defense Alliance (Yeuk) of the New Territories," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 29 (1989): 384-88; Hsiao, *Rural China*, 66.

immigrants had not named themselves "Hakka," nor were they recognized as being so,

right after their settlement in the area.[400]

As discussed in Chapter II above, the Hakkas who settled in the northeastern

part of Guangdong were always ready to leave the area because of immense population

pressure. In 1670 the Hakkas took the golden opportunity for expansion by accepting the

Manchu government's invitation to reclaim and settle empty lands on the coast. The Qing

even granted the new immigrants money and seeds if they moved to the coast. To

distinguish themselves from the aborigines, they could register themselves as "Ke" or

"Keji 客籍" so that they could receive subsidies. Thousands of people from Huizhou,

Chaozhou, and Jiaying prefecture, which comprised the central core of the Hakka

speaking people, responded because their homelands were too crowded.[401] They were

eager to be "Keji" because they would receive benefits.[402] This was the beginning of

Hakka settlements in the Wuyi. A memorial by the governor of Guangdong in 1730 set

---

[400] There is no mentioning of "Hakka" as minority in the county gazetteer. Instead, many Hakka expressions were listed as part of the dialect of the county. When one searches into the historical documents, one cannot find the term "Hakka" as a name for a group before the eighteenth century. Even in the recognized center for the Hakkas, Meixian identified themselves as Chengxiangren 程鄉人 as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. Hakka as a dialect was first mentioned in a book describing the dialects of Xinfeng 新豐 county in 1756. See *Jiaying ZZ*, 7.86b; Zhou Rijian 周日健, *Xinfeng fangyanzhi* 新丰方言志 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990);Leong, *Migration*, .64-64.

[401] *Chixi XZ*, 8.3-4.

[402] *Kaiping XZ*, 20.21a.

these forth in some detail:

> The waste land of Kaiping and Enping is also abundant, probably in excess of ten or twenty thousand *mu*. At the moment, five thousand odd *mu* have been surveyed out from the whole. On account of the sparseness of the local population, although money-subsidies for the opening up of the waste land are available in the treasury, very few are willing to take them. Your minister has instructed the wealthy merchants and gentry families to recruit indigent people from Huizhou and Chaozhou, and to provide them with cottages, food and provisions, and working capital. For a unit of five households, they should be organized into the *baojia* system, and their names entered into the local government registry and be provided with a hundred *mu* of land. Further, in view that they had come from distant places and although at the moment they have secured a livelihood by farming, they might be apprehensive of future disputes over the title of the land with the landlords, it is necessary to reassure them by long-term planning….At the present moment, the poor people from the two prefectures of Huizhou and Chaozhou who have come to cultivate and registered at Heshan already number more than three hundred households. Their number is rapidly increasing, for as news of their decent treatment travels back, more people are to be persuaded to join them….[403]

It is obvious that the Hakka speaking migrants came as tenant farmers under the joint patronage of the state and of the local men of substance.[404] It was not the migration of a people *en masse*. The first immigrants were the marginal men who could

---

[403] *Huangqing zouyi* 皇清奏議, comp. Qinchuan jushi 琴川居士, (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1967), 30.16-18

[404] Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 112-114.

not scrape together a living in their homeland went first.[405] In the initial stage of their

arrival, they settled interspersed among the Puntis who provided them with land,

provisions, implements, and even housing. This arrangement was mutually profitable. As

the Punti landlords were short of manpower, this increased the value of their land, and it

afforded sustenance to the indigent Hakkas. There was no irresolvable conflict of

interests.[406] The Punti tenants had pre-empted the best land available, they were the

overwhelming majority, and were moreover backed by strong kinship and territorial

organizations.[407]

In an early stage of the Hakka settlement, their dispersed dwellings were

consolidated into more compact settlements. This development was necessitated by the

pooling of manpower and resources for irrigation as well as for defense, and was

reinforced by the fact that people invariably seek their own kind for congenial

companionship. Once they had established a foothold in any locality, their more remote

kinsmen in their homelands who felt the urge to emigrate in search of a better life were

---

[405] Myron L. Cohen, "The Hakka or "Guest People," Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeast China," in *Guest People* , Constable, 51.

[406] The Puntis were at first quite pleased to see the arrival of the new immigrants because they could not get enough manpower to work in their fields. The Hakkas and Puntis formed a kind of "symbiotic" relationship for a few decades. See Ibid., 53-54.

[407] Ibid., 50.

likely to follow the line of least resistance and come to join them. Thus throughout the

eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, a trickle of Hakka immigration into

these districts had continued uninterrupted. The Puntis were still the dominant majority,

but the initial extreme of numerical and economic disparity had diminished to a

considerable extent.[408]

The additional acreage of land to absorb the ever-swelling agrarian Hakka

population could be conditioned by several factors. The most important of these involved

the system of land tenure in the Wuyi. As examined in the Chapter II above, much of the

land reclamation efforts of the Pearl River Delta areas were done by the elite, the locally

powerful and wealthy households. Many plots were owned not by individual landlords

but by associations (*tang*) formed by groups of land investors and represented by gentry

members, as well as schools and temples, which came to control large tracts of reclaimed

lands.[409] The concentration of land in the hands of lineages reached its peak in the

districts around Guangzhou, but in the Wuyi the tendency was still very marked. In

---

[408] Barth, *Bitter Strength*, 25.

[409] According to the Robert Eng's study, an institutional land such as lineage land accounts for as much as 50% of cultivated acreage in the Pearl River Delta. See Robert Y. Eng, "Institutional and Secondary Landlordism in the Pearl River Delta, 1600-1949," *Modern China*, Vol 12 No. 1 (Jan. 1986), 4.

Xinning it reached 50% and in Enping, Kaiping and Heshan, 40%.[410] Not only were these

lineages large landlords, but they also tended to be absentee landlords, because

undeveloped, unoccupied, or mountainous regions were remote and sparsely populated.

Tax evasion provided another cause for prevalent absentee landlordism. With increasing

urbanization and the flight of the gentry and the wealthy to towns and cities since the

early Qing, it appears that fewer and fewer landlords took a direct hand in reclamation

and management after establishing their claim with the government. Zhang Zhidong in a

later period reported that most landlords rented out to tenants, who would pay no rent for

several years while they were reclaiming the land.[411] In the Wuyi, according to Eitel's

report, the Hakkas were nearly everywhere to be found "either dispersed in small villages

and paying top-soil rent to the Puntis, or congregated in larger villages...."[412]

This kind of land tenure system along with the local situation developed

in the Wuyi region was very favorable to Hakka tenants and was directly

responsible for the flourishing social organization and self-direction evident there

[410] Chen Han-seng, *Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis in South China* (New York: International Publishers, 1936), 34.

[411] Zhang Zhidong 张之洞, *Zhang Zhidong quanji* 张之洞全集 (Shijiachuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1998), 28.16a.

[412] In many places the Hakkas depended on land which they rented from Punti absentee landlords. See E. J. Eitel, *Notes and Queries* 1, 49.

at the mid-nineteenth century. The vastness of the reclaimed lands made it difficult

for town-based lineage estates to extend their reach. They relied on tenant

contractors who managed the outposts and secured harvests. These functionaries

were mainly local Hakka farmers who rapidly acquired enough power to carve out

their own base.[413] Some of these Hakka tenants retained a portion of the rented

land after reclamation and cultivated it with hired short-and long-term labor. Often

these tenants had subleased most or all of the land they rented. In effect, these

primary tenants functioned as landlords and were recognized as such in popular

parlance as "secondary landlords."[414]

During the Qing effort to pacify Taiwan, the coastal people were ordered to

move inland in 1653. Consequently, many of the alluvial fields in the Wuyi were also

abandoned and the owners were forced to rent to the secondary landlords at rock bottom

---

[413] *Junjichu zouzhe lufu* 軍機處奏摺錄副: *Nongmin yundonglei* 农民运动类, 3.166.8947.14 (July 28, 1864), Microfilm 2296-2298.

[414] Secondary landlordism closely resembled the "two lords to one field" (yitian liangzhu 一田兩主) system that had become increasingly prevalent throughout China since the Ming-Qing transition. Under such a system, the landlord owned the subsoil whereas the tenant possessed the topsoil, which amounted to the right of permanent tenancy and which could be sold without reference to the landlord. The main difference between secondary landlordism and the "two lords to one field" system lies in the terms of tenancy, which was for a fixed period for the former and permanent for the latter. Typically, the length of the tenure for the Guangdong secondary landlords was ten years. See Evelyn S. Rawski, *Agricultural change and the peasant economy of South China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 19; Eng, "Institutional," 3-37.

25

rates. Tenants could also co-opt income from the offspring alluvia (*zisha* 子沙) that were

unknown to the owners of the mother alluvia (*musha* 母沙). Thus, some of the Hakkas

settled in the Wuyi were lucky enough to find tracts of suitable land on which they could

establish permanent settlements. The western Xinning was such an area, and the Hakka

settled in large numbers on the low hills there.[415] In settlements of this sort they were

largely independent economically from the Puntis.[416] Around the mid-eighteenth century,

Hakka tenants came to control land in newly-established villages near the sea as well as

in distant mountainous areas. The Hakkas purchased land which the Puntis had already

brought under cultivation. With their lower standard of living, they had an advantage over

the Punti tenants in bidding for land leases from Punti landlords.[417]

The Hakkas have a reputation for industry, and as their women played a role in

providing agricultural labor, they had a certain advantage over the earlier settlers. They

first served as "hired laborers, but through industry and thrift acquired most of the land of

their masters."[418] For instance, in Kaiping, after the Yongzheng period, the Hakkas were

---

[415] *Chixi XZ*, 8.37a.

[416] Cohen, "The Hakka," 53.

[417] F.O. 228/213, Robertson to Bowring (July 16, 1856).

[418] Barth, *Bitter Strength*, 25.

said to have flourished to such an extent that they were able to buy up cultivated fields

and houses.[419] After arriving in the Wuyi as poor farmers, the Hakkas had in the space of

a few generations greatly improved their position. One indication of their progress can be

seen in the fact that by the time of the Hakka-Punti War, there were Hakka gentry in all

the districts which were involved. In Xinning in particular the Hakkas prospered. No less

than thirty Hakka gentry played a role in the war, and of these, eight had obtained their

degree by purchase. From this one may conclude that some Hakkas at least had become

landowners on a considerable scale.[420]

The Source of Conflict

Subethnic considerations had of course played a role in migration and

settlement patterns in the Wuyi, and violence did on occasion follow subethnic lines.

Before 1800, however, the relative sparseness of settlement and the common challenges

of wresting and reclaiming polder farmland in many instances led to cooperation between

the natives and migrants. Prior to the nineteenth century, Guangdong had been

characterized by both frequent violence and subethnic social organization, but not

[419] *Kaiping XZ*, 17.4a.

[420] *Xinning XZ*, 12.10-11b; *Chixi XZ*, 8.7.

consistently by subethnic violence within the Wuyi areas. Except for the eastern part of

Guangdong (especially Jiayingzhou), the Hakkas were concentrated in widely separated

areas. Even though some Hakka communities joined together to fight against their

neighboring Punti communities, there was no centralized plan for anti-Punti resistance

before the Red Turban Rebellions. No unified command or Hakka leadership ever

emerged. That is to say, the Hakkas were never a united ethnic group.

In the eyes of the Punti people, the Hakka-speaking people were no more than a

group of migrants from the eastern mountains. They did enjoy a "honeymoon period" of

peace and symbiosis at the beginning when the Punti landlords needed labor.[421] However,

the situation worsened when the Puntis felt that these migrants threatened their survival.

More and more Hakka people bought land from their Punti landlords and built their own

towns. The acquisition of new holdings brought in its train new settlements, while

conversely, loss of the land holdings brought decline and eventual termination of the old

settlements. Hence, simultaneously with the advancing tide of Hakka settlements, the tide

of Punti settlements receded. In 1832, Long Qirui depicts this change in quite absolute

terms. "The Hakka people have been hired to cultivate the lands. For several generations,

---

[421] Cohen, "The Hakka," 54.

their descendants multiplied so greatly that they [outnumbering the Punti] reverse the

dominance of the Punti."[422] Some Punti people began to flee from their own homes and

left the whole area for the intruding Hakka people.[423] A Protestant missionary described

this kind of phenomenon in the nineteenth century Guangdong:

> It is an impressive picture, that of the old Punti villages, enclosed by ivy-covered
> brick walls and towers half in ruins and surrounded by ditches, and all about the
> rows of white houses of the Hakkas, into whose hands the great part of the lands
> have fallen, soon after the appearance of a Hakka house inside the walls of a
> Punti village, the Punti disappeared completely. It is, however, in the main, a
> peaceful acquisition by diligence and thrift, though in some instances trickery
> and force are said not to have been entirely absent from the methods of
> occupation....[424]

Naturally the displaced Punti people did not entertain charitable opinions of the

Hakka migrants who displaced them. In the face of the tangible perils of a common

enemy their sense of community of interests was aroused. They could not help viewing

with suspicion and fear the compact Hakka settlements with their teeming thousands.[425]

One way in which the Puntis expressed their resentment was by blocking the attempts of

---

[422] Long Qirui, *Jingdetang wenji* (Taibei: Yiwen, 1970), 2.24a.

[423] Mai 麦 family in Shenzhen is a good example of this. See Xiao Guojian 萧国健, *Shenzhen diqu jiazu fazhan* 深圳地区家族发展 (Hong Kong: Xianchao Shushi, 1992).

[424] D. Ochler, article in Milton T. Stauffer, ed., *Christian Occupation of China* (Shanghai, 1908), 351.

[425] *Chixi XZ*, 8.32b-33.

recent Hakka immigrants to register with the local government. Without local registration,

a man was not eligible to participate in the local civil service examination, for which each

district had a fixed quota. As registration matters were in the charge of the taxation

secretary of the district magistrate, to be managed at his discretion, the Puntis were

generally successful in thwarting the Hakka immigrants' attempts to register. They were

apparently not willing to admit the latter into the avenue for academic success and social

prestige, which would have afforded their rival a further lever for dislodging or

undermining them. With the consent of the central government, the impasse was resolved

by compiling a separate registry of residence for the Hakkas of these districts and

assigning them a special quota of *shengyuan* 生員 for each examination, over and above

that in force.

Under normal circumstances, Hakka-speaking *shengyuan* were barred from the

prefectural and district schools which dispensed stipends. The separate quota for the

Hakka speaking immigrants in the Wuyi was established late, the earliest record was in

1789.[426] Whereas the intention of the government in providing special quotas for

particular categories of persons appears to have been intended to satisfy their desire to

[426] See *Xinning XZ*, 12.10-11b, Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1955), 81.

participate in the system and to avoid a possible source of grievance between them and

the dominant group in which they were living, in practice the policy proved ineffectual

and short-sighted. Referring to the special quotas for the Pengmin in Jiangxi, Chang

Chung-li comments that "this policy may have sometimes increased the psychological

barrier between these groups and others under special quotas."[427] This would also seem

true of the special quotas provided for the Hakkas, which left neither side satisfied, and

created friction between the two groups.[428]

On the Hakka side, they could, with some justice, say that the quotas were at

the best only a grudging recognition of the extent of their settlement in the Wuyi.

Whereas in some cases, for example the Pengmin mentioned above, the special quota

gave the candidates who were eligible a better chance of success than those who

competed in the regular quota, this was not true in the case of the Hakkas. At the most the

special quotas only provided them with eight places, out of a total of nearly four hundred

places of the prefectures of Guangzhou and Zhaoqing. Also, there were restrictions

---

[427] Chang, *The Chinese Gentry*, 81.

[428] But institutionalizing the linguistic groupings actually hardened the communal lines, for it erected a wall between the gentry classes who were the natural leaders of their respective communities and who should have been the most promising element in reconciling and uniting the divided populace. Because of the nature of this dispute, it played an important part in placing the gentries of both Hakka and Punti in the lead when hostility between the two groups developed into the war. See F.O. 228/213, Robertson to Bowring (July 16, 1856).

placed on the special quotas which had been granted to them.[429] On the Punti side the

idea that the Hakka should be allowed to take part in the examinations was itself

distasteful, and every attempt by the Hakkas to increase their quotas was greeted with

opposition. This opposition of course came from the Punti gentry, for it was they who

found their position in the examination system threatened when it was amended to make

provision for the Hakkas. Then they were faced with a challenge to their social position

with the emergence of a local Hakka gentry.[430]

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Hakkas constituted between a

quarter and a third of the total population in some districts of the Wuyi; in Xinning, for

instance, their settlements were alleged to cover a third of the territory. Some of their

consolidated settlements sprawled across county boundaries and actually enabled them to

enjoy a numerical superiority over the Puntis in some restricted localities. One of these

localities lay in the junction between Xinning, Kaiping, and Enping, and another was

astride the borders of Kaiping and Heshan. Nearly every large Hakka community could

boast of a few *shengyuan* in its midst, who, like their counterparts elsewhere in China,

---

[429] Chang, *The Chinese Gentry*, 80-81.

[430] *Enping XZ*, 14.11b.

held the reins of power in village-level politics.[431]

The numerical increase in the Hakka population was accompanied by an effort to expand and secure the land which they were farming. Such activities on the part of a population definable in linguistic terms led to the formation by both Hakka-speakers and Cantonese-speakers of common dialect groups in order to pursue interests relating to the securing of agricultural holdings.

In the early nineteenth century, partly in response to Hakka examination successes in Guangdong province, and partly in reaction to struggles taking place between the Hakkas and other groups, a few Hakka intellectuals also began articulating positive statements of a unified and historically constituted Hakka culture. S. T. Leong (1985) identifies the first spokesman for the Hakka ethnic group as the scholar Xu Xuzeng 徐旭曾.[432] Xu, as a Hakka leader, began to shape the term "Hakka" into a totem

---

[431] Leong, *Migration*, 75-77.

[432] Leong identifies the first consciously "ethnic" statement articulating the origins and "ethos" of the Hakkas as appearing around 1808, in a lecture presented by a scholar named Xu Xuzeng (徐旭曾). Many of Xu's views, and those of other isolated Hakka spokesmen of the nineteenth century identified by Leong, were reiterated by Hakka intellectuals during a period of strong Chinese nationalism after the turn of this century. Certainly by the 1920s, with the emergence of international Hakka associations and the visions and rhetoric they produced, Hakka ethnicity became the basis for the action. However, the puzzle arises why "Hakka" is never used before the Qing dynasty, if Hakka was a glorifying term to represent "true Chinese traits." See S. T. Leong, "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern China," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949*, eds. David Pong and Edmund S. K, Fung, 287-326 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 303-308.

suggesting that Hakka people were the true Chinese from the North who had migrated

southward in the twelfth century to avoid Mongol rule. He "introduced all the themes that

would be repeated tirelessly in Hakka ethnocentric writings… of the claim to

Chineseness that was equal, if not superior, to that of other Chinese."[433]

The Punti responded with an intense, defensive, pride in their origins.

Their dialect (Cantonese) was more like ancient Chinese than was Mandarin, the

Puntis pointed out; they were purer representatives of Chinese culture, they

asserted, since the north had long been defiled by barbarian influences culminating

in Manchu conquest; they were more observant of the family duties prescribed by

the Confucian tradition, since the lineage system was far stronger in south China

than in north China.[434] In this framework the Puntis could present themselves as

the most faithful bearers of the Great Tradition and looked down upon the Hakka

migrants who had fallen away from the ancient norms.

The Puntis often tended to dismiss the Hakkas as an uncultured and poverty-

---

[433] Then this idea got supports from many Hakka scholars who reached a maximum momentum by Luo Xianglin. See Ibid., 303.; Xu Xuzeng, "Fenghu Zaji 豊湖雜記," in *Kejia Shiliao huipian* , Luo Xianglin, 297.

[434] Punti literati argued that compared with the dialects of many other provinces, Cantonese came closer to Sui and Tang dynasty pronunciation, because most Guangdong people migrated to the south from central China in as early as the Tang dynasty. See Wakeman, *Strangers*, 57; *Panyu XZ*, 6.16b.

stricken people. Punti scholars also commented on the Hakka dialects in negative

terms. In the 1820 edition of Zengcheng county gazetteer it is stated: "More and

more Hakkas have moved into the county. They have not changed their village

dialect, which is so noisy that you can tell without asking them their hometowns

that these people have come from other places."[435]

Yet despite this long period of conflict between the Hakka speakers and the

Puntis, even by the end of the Qing it is unlikely that all of the Hakka speakers of

Guangdong had any notion of their ethnic consciousness. Even Hakka ethnic

assertiveness in the Pearl River Delta "in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

should not be constructed as an all-Hakka phenomenon. The 'Hakkas' were segmented by

regional contexts of time and place, and some had more reason than others to assert their

ethnicity."[436] Certainly there had been land disputes between the Hakkas and the Puntis in

the Wuyi, but most struggles seem to be locally focused and were isolated events.

Nonetheless, the symbiotic relationship between Hakka tenants and farm

laborers and the Punti landlords was upset during the mid-nineteenth century. As

we have seen in Chapter II above, armed conflict was not confined to the Wuyi,

[435] *Zengcheng XZ*, 2.29a.

[436] Leong, *Migration*, 63.

and fights between subethnic groups were a regular feature of the Pearl River

Delta as well. There was, however, an eccentricity to the society of Wuyi that, in

an unquantifiable but very real way, created a predisposition toward the formation

of Hakka ethnic solidarity through intensive violence and lawlessness. This

peculiar feature was, as we shall see, the byproduct of government action.[437]

Hakka-Punti Disputes

By the late eighteenth century the Hakkas in some part of the Wuyi,

especially in Xinning, not only had the necessary population but had also

developed to the point where Hakka inhabitants had started to look to an end to

dependence on wealthy Punti families. By approximately the early nineteenth

century the Wuyi region started to have enough Hakka gentry leaders for it to have

had some access to the local government, which would have facilitated any moves

to throw off dependence on the Punti landlords. Finally, by the early nineteenth

---

[437] Disputes between new comers and local inhabitants are no big deal in the past history of China. This happened almost everywhere and every century. Sometimes it resulted in bloodshed. But normally, there are three outcomes: (1) The incoming group has either higher culture, large number of people or higher political status. The local people become assimilated into the incoming immigrants. (2) Opposite to (1), the incoming people are of small number, poorer or less educated. They learn the way of life of the local people. (3) Both group are of similar number, education background and political status. The incoming group will maintain their culture in their new home. The third model is less common and is always the source for ethnic dispute. "Hakka" belonged to the third type of immigrants when they moved to the Wuyi.

century, at least some Hakkas had enough wealth to act as local leaders.[438] Since

the late Qing some of these rich Hakka tenants retained a portion of the rented land after

reclamation and cultivated it with hired short- and long-term labor. The majority of these

tenants had always subleased most or all of the land they rented. They found collection

from tenants easier than supervising workers. Often the subletting of land did not stop at

one level; tenants of secondary landlords in turn might sublet to other tenants, and so on

down the line.[439]

However, this kind of land tenure system could prevail only when the

fertility of the soil was high or land was abundant; the rent charged the ultimate

tenant must have been astronomical to support several levels of landlords and

intermediaries.[440] Unlike fertile alluvial fields in the Sanyi areas, however, the

Wuyi regions did not have sufficient land. As previously indicated, the Wuyi region

was traditionally a land-hungry area. The local gazetteer pointed out that the land-

---

[438] The wealthy Hakka areas were those from which the men who had invested in the reclamation had come Kaiping, Heshan, and Xinning. These areas seem to have produced many of the early Hakka leaders. The Hakkas in these areas formed the Confederation to fight against the Red Turbans later.

[439] Eng, "Institutional and Secondary Landlordism."

[440] Majority of theses tenants had always subleased most or all of the land they rented. For instance, as many as a five layering of landlordism could be found in the delta. See Ibid.

population ratio reached a saturation point by the third quarter of the eighteenth century.

The only remaining wasteland in the northwestern corner of the region was filled by

Hakka migrants before the turn of the century.[441] The swelling population during the

eighteenth century made the situation worse and the local economy was thus heavily

strained. Population had increased dramatically over the course of seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. For instance, in 1838 the population of Xinning county reached

196,972, an increase of 1,440 percent since 1657.[442] The tremendous population

increase of the Puntis and the Hakkas brought the two peoples into closer physical

proximity, and intensified conflicts between the two hostile groups over the issues

of precious land titles and all important tomb sites became more and more frequent.

These signs of overpopulation that had become apparent by the end of the eighteenth

century caused elites and local officials to worry about possible social disorder.[443]

At this point, some of the Hakkas, who were beginning to dominate the

economic life of the Wuyi, came to be blamed for having contributed to the pauperization

of the Punti tenants, many of whom became so impoverished that they turned to banditry.

---

[441] *Kaiping XZ*, 20.21a-21b.

[442] *Taishan dilizhi*, 21-22.

[443] *Xinning XZ*, 14.28a.

The poor Punti were jealous of the affluence of the wealthy Hakkas. A more concrete

source of resentment was the alienation of Punti lands. The Punti demanded the return of

land alienated to outsiders, usually the Hakkas. They looked upon the land as a sort of

ancestral heritage, which had been illegitimately taken away from them. In practical

terms, they found it increasingly difficult to produce enough for subsistence as their land

shrank to ever smaller dimensions.[444] The Punti refuges who had migrated into the Wuyi

recently, escaping from the disorder of other parts of Guangdong, were in particularly

dire straits, barely eking out a living from their miserable land. They would open

marginal tracts of polder farms, but often they had to endure suffering from the floods

and droughts. Many apparently were squatters or tenants, and they were usually much too

poor to be in a position to fleece the Hakkas.[445] Resentment toward the Hakkas

occasionally boiled over into riots in which a Punti mob would attack the Hakka

community, beating up the villagers and plundering their houses. On the one hand, there

was widespread Hakka resentment against the presence of the newly arrived Puntis in

their midst, when they regarded as having caused their own impoverishment. On the

---

[444] Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 114-115.

[445] *Junjichu zouzhe lufu*, 3.166.8947.29 (Mar. 13, 1866), Microfilm 2383.

other hand, both the Hakka and Punti tenants harbored a deep hatred of the Punti absentee

landlords whom they accused of frequently subjecting them to oppression and

harassment.[446]

Conditions were ripe for a violent upheaval in the Wuyi region. A severe

drought in the year 1851 was followed by one of the worst recorded floods the following

year. Consequently, an inevitable famine that began in 1852 added to discontent in the

community.[447] Although an outward quiet prevailed in the area until the year 1853, it was

the calm on the eve of a storm. The local residents must have sensed the uneasy peace in

their villages, where people felt a sullen lethargy caused by hunger, but filled with a

potential for violence which could explode at any moment. Easily cultivable land had

been exhausted. Therefore the young peasants, especially Punti peasants, many of them

under-employed, sought membership in the Tiandihui.[448] They were forced to cultivate

miniscule plots too small to provide a living, sometimes serve as tenants on the land of

the Hakkas, or leave the land to engage in banditry on lakes and rivers. Many

---

[446] Ibid.; Chen Kun, "Yuedong," 400; Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 79-82, 98-99.

[447] *Xinning XZ*, 14.18a; *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3a.

[448] At this time the regions were already infested with the Tiandihui groups under the leaderships of Tian Fang, Zhang Zhao 張釗, and Liang Peiyou. See Su Fengwen 蘇鳳文, *Gufei zonglu* 股匪總錄 (Taibei : Xiangsheng chubanshe, 1975), 3.3a, 9.a; Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 115.

impoverished Punti tenants left the area to join the secret societies of Guangzhou area.[449]

In this shift migrant workers and rural poor, especially Punti tenants, formed new solidarities aimed precisely at upper-strata Hakka peasants and others in local society who, in their eyes, had become exploitative violators of communal morality. Many of these Punti peasants felt the need to band together either for self-protection or to take revenge. The Tiandihui thus provided a convenient means for such purposes. It was only natural that the Tiandihui would eventually become involved in a direct confrontation with the Hakkas. Indeed, several months before the outbreak of the Red Turban Rebellions, several members of the Tiandihui in the Wuyi area were tortured and killed for having illegally entered a Hakka farm to collect firewood.[450]

---

[449] The key feature of the Punti tenants was that in addition to agriculture and cotton craft production, various forms of (below subsistence) wage labor formed a major or primary source of family income. By the early nineteenth century, the interconnected effects of tenancy, the small size of holdings, and the overcrowding created a situation where agricultural and craft income could no longer cover family subsistence. Hence they need for additional income. To obtain this, males from the communities along the river often worked as dockers, loaders and laborers on the commercial boats the piled the Pearl River and, seasonally, as coolie-transporters and agricultural laborers in the Sanyi districts to the north. Although these people signified declining economic status of Punti peasants, by routinely placing peasant-workers beyond the boundaries of the village and local marketing networks, and in freeing them from the direct constraints of the Wuyi's powerful resident landlords, it created a tactical latitude which family farmers did not enjoy. Scholars have identified the importance of this type of tactical mobility in the emergence of rebellion. The greater geographical mobility which it engendered not only exposed Punti tenants to a world beyond the village, but especially, in the years prior to the planned rising, it enabled them, either directly or indirectly, to gain and transmit news of the Red Turban advance. See Ibid.; Eric. R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, Harper & Row, 1969); Elizabeth J. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).

[450] Zhao, "Hongbing jishi," 103; *Enping XZ*, 14.7b.

The Tiandihui activity began to increase after the late eighteenth century in the

Wuyi, fed by the growing number of men forced by financial hardship to leave their

native places and seek employment elsewhere.[451] As economic conditions worsened over

the course of the nineteenth century, the Tiandihui became bolder. In the mid-nineteenth

century, bandits from Xinhui and Xinning often held meetings in broad daylight to solicit

new members. Several hundred would gather at a crossroad, post guards with guns, and

encourage local peasants to join. Farmers left responsible for their own protection joined

the Tiandihui for 300 copper coins to avoid onerous extractions. During these times, even

subclerks, yamen runners, and district magistrates in local government became Tiandihui

members.[452]

The fact that these Punti tenants joined the Tiandihui immediately after the

initial rising of the Red Turbans indicates that there had already joined members of the

Tiandihui in the Wuyi. In this situation the Tiandihui served as a reservoir to receive any

Puntis who were dislodged by the Hakkas. The Tiandihui was in turn becoming not

merely a secret society but also the champion of the Punti tenants in the Wuyi. As an

---

[451] *China Mail* (May 10, 1855 and May 22, 1856); *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.10b; *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3a.

[452] F.O. 931.1512. A Report on the Sanhehui (1854/1855);Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 68-78.

organization championing the interest of the Punti tenants, the Tiandihui extended its

influence quickly into Punti districts. This partly explains why its members were mostly

found in the Punti villages of the Wuyi.[453] Looking for the cause of the Red Turban

Rebellions in the Wuyi in 1854, Qing officials invariably concluded that the social-

economic-ethnic conflicts between the Hakkas and the Punti were one significant

factor.[454]

Animosity between the Hakkas and the Puntis continued to grow. E. J. Eitel

wrote that "the Hakkas… congregated in large villages, and then continually fighting

with the Puntis for the ownership of the hills and fields occupied by them."[455] Had the

local authorities intervened in time, the feuds could have been nipped in the bud. But the

bureaucrats at the time had already degenerated into a very corrupt group. The Wuyi was

a poor region. Intervention in the local feuds on the part of the authorities meant the

necessity of sending troops , which, in turn, meant the expenditure of money not provided

for in the regular budget of the local government. This extra money would have to be

---

[453] Zhao, "Hongbing jishi," 100-06; *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.18 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2288.

[454] Ibid.; *Guangzhou FZ*, 129.18a-20a.

[455] E. J. Eitel, "Ethnographical Sketches of the Hakka Chinese," *Notes and Queries on China and Japan* I (6), 65-67.

obtained from the superior officials, but none of them wanted to be exposed to the charge

of maladministration by reporting that their jurisdictions were infested with bandits or

disturbers of the peace. Naturally the best thing for them to do was to pretend to be

ignorant of the feuds; they hoped, by so doing, that they could escape the punishment for

maladministration by transferring to another post after the end of their term of office.[456]

All these factors—the quarrel between the Hakkas and the Puntis, the disturbances

created by the Tiandihui, and the negligence on the part of the provincial authorities

toward the area—produced the volatile situation in the Wuyi before the coming of the

Red Turbans.

3) History and the Emergence of Hakka Ethnic Consciousness
Red Turbans in the Wuyi

In the year 1854, natural calamities of flood and famine recurred.[457] The

price of rice jumped so high in the Wuyi that "innumerable people starved to

death."[458] Worse still, it was during this year that the Red Turban rebels spread into

---

[456] Long, *Jingdetang wenji*, 4.12b.

[457] Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 73.

[458] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3a-3b.

this area.[459] Unlike the frequent clan feuds, these were great province-wide armed

rebellions which were tinged with secret society activities; all were obliged to take

sides either for the rebels or for the government. The principal efforts of the Red

Turbans in 1854, however, were still directed at establishing control over the Sanyi region

where the Wuyi Punti peasants regularly sought employment. All during the 1854 then,

through their movement on the river and in and out of the accessible areas of the Sanyi,

the Punti tenants from the Wuyi areas were in a position to acquire and transmit

knowledge of the Tiandihui.[460] By late 1854 news of the rebel victories had in fact

spread throughout the Wuyi.[461] The poor and oppressed, particularly Punti peasants,

joined the rebel ranks, while most of the Hakka clans under conservative leadership

prudently remained loyal to the government.[462] Consequently, the Hakkas were more

immune from suspicion of collaboration with the rebels. More and more the Punti

---

[459] Tan Zuen 谭祖恩, "Xinhui jingbian shilue 新会靖变识略," in *Hongbing qiyi*, 953-958.

[460] Many of the Tiandihui members in the Sanyi areas especially in Shunde were the Puntis drawn from the areas of the Wuyi, particularly from the Xinhui and Xinning. See *Donghua quanlu (daoguangchao)* 東華全錄 (道光朝) , (Taibei, 1963 reprint), 51.5b.

[461] *Xinning XZ*, 14.18b-21b.

[462] Hakka people, by the middle of the nineteenth century, were accustomed to defending their local rights against outside demands, and the ambiguities of state policy toward migration reinforced their expectations. The early Qing government encouraged Hakka migrants clear wasteland by providing them seeds, tools, cattle, and tax exemptions. In each case, local Hakka community members had reason to expect official support for their mobilization against the hated outsiders and naturally more royal to the officials. See *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.18 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2288; Zhao, "Hongbing jishi," 104-113.

absentee landlords were worrying about the situation in the Wuyi where the Punti

peasants joined the rebel force.[463]

As more of Punti peasants joined the rebel forces, the Red Turban

movement tried to gather momentum in this area to form a genuine peasant uprising

against the Manchus. The frantic government officials, thereupon organized a

mercenary force out of the Hakka populace and positioned it against the advancing

rebels. This was a clever scheme designed to exploit the old animosity between the

Puntis and the Hakkas. Hakka and government forces succeeded in checking the

rebel advances in this area. Thus, in the villages of the Wuyi area new resentments

against Hakkas were added to older, more deeply rooted ones at the precise moment

when the Red Turban Rebellions were gaining ground in a nearby region. Conflict

between the Hakkas and the Puntis may have made the state's job easier—it could use

one faction of people against another. Ironically, in reacting to these threats by forming

Hakka militia, the local government created a new organizational field for further

disturbance in the region.[464]

---

[463] Punti landlords were expressing their frustrations when they were attacked by the Punti peasants in 1855. See Zhao, "Hongbing jishi," 108-111; Yoo, *Kundae*, 270-274.

[464] *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.18 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2288; *Chixi XZ*, 8.36.

In Enping, when the revolt broke out, the district magistrate had summoned

both the Punti and the Hakka militias to defend the district city, and to destroy rebel

forces within their area of his jurisdiction. The Hakka braves distinguished themselves in

the north of the district and captured and executed many rebels.[465] In Kaiping rebel forces

had converged on the district city from all directions, and the district magistrate, faced

with defeat, had committed suicide. A Hakka named Cai Yunsheng 蔡韻笙, who had

played a role in the defense of the city, also killed himself rather than face capture.[466]

For local Hakka leaders, the escalating local disorder that accompanied the

rebel invasion was a major preoccupation. Feuds between residents of the Wuyi had been

a problem for years. At this time, the local Tiandihui lodges took advantage of other

ongoing feuds to enhance their position. In the midst of this chaos, the Tiandihui began to

gain strength throughout the area, recruiting new members to their ranks. Crowds of

Punti residents, variously identified as local bandits, peasants, and tenants joined the Red

Turbans and looted rich households. Again the targets were often, though by no means

always, selected on more specific grounds than wealth.[467] In some outbreaks, punishment

---

[465] Chen, "Yuedong," 711; *Enping XZ*, 14.7b.

[466] Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 98101; *Kaiping XZ*, 21.3b.

[467] Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 68-79.

was reserved for all those rich households who, relying upon their influence to collect

their rents, had incurred the long-standing resentment of the Punti peasants and those who

were harsh in rent and debt collection. Most often these targets were the Hakka secondary

landlords.[468]

Some of the fiercest and most extensive conflicts took place in Heshan county,

where the numbers of Hakka villages were roughly the same as the Punti. The Red

Turbans captured the city and overran much of the countryside. The Hakkas at Yunxiang

雲鄉 offered them stout resistance. A wealthy Hakka, whose youngest son had been

kidnapped and murdered by the Punti Red Turbans, vowed to avenge his murder and put

up all he was worth to combat them. With the assistance of other like-minded people, he

raised a private army and put it under the charge of two military *juren* 舉人, Ma

Conglong 馬從龍 and Zhang Baoming 張寶銘.[469]

On October, 1854, the Red Turbans made a foray into Heshan but were

intercepted by the Hakka forces and defeated. The Hakkas were then entrusted by the

---

[468] Mai Bingjun 麦秉钧, "Heshan Maishi zupu ji yutu jishi lunlue 鹤山麦氏族普及舆图记事沦略," in *Hongbing qiyi,* 1014-1018.

[469] In actual fact, as often happens, the quarrel over the unfortunate boy was only a comparatively minor incident in a long-standing rivalry between the two communities, but it was sufficient to trigger the outbreak of hostilities. The real reason was undoubtedly the struggle for "living room" in the Wuyi between the Punti and the Hakka. See *Junjichu ZL,* 3.166.8947.18 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 222288, 2292; *Kaiping XZ,* 21.4a-b.

Qing force with the principal role in the recapture of the city. There is no record of a

militia bureau being formed at the time, but Ma Conglong received some form of warrant

to do so from the Governor-general, Ye Mingchen, who had deliberately used the hostility

between the Hakkas and the Puntis as a means of containing the revolt. Consequently the

Hakkas participated in the extermination campaigns and their mission took them farther

outside the confines of Heshan.[470]

A similar situation developed in Xinning, where a Red Turban force under Tan

Yashou 譚亞受 and Yu Zhaobiao 余兆表 crossed the Xinhui river at Dihai 狄海 and

attempted to attack the district city. The magistrate, when organizing the defense, called

on a Hakka named Yang Jinlan 楊金瀾 to collect Hakka braves, and with the assistance

of braves collected by the Punti gentry, the Red Turbans were driven back to

Changsha.[471]

As in other areas where the Hakkas and the Puntis lived side by side, the

relationship between the two groups had often been antagonistic. It had further

---

[470] The makeshift solution to which local officials most frequently resorted was to pit rival groups against each other, "using the people to control the people" (以民制民). the government's formal recognition of armed Hakka bands as a legitimate militia in the Wuyi and the awards bestowed on these forces for their stand against rebels during the Red Turban Rebellions provide a notable instance. See Ibid.; *Chixi XZ, 8.6b and Kaiping XZ, 21.4a-b.*

[471] *Chixi XZ*, 8.6b.

deteriorated in the atmosphere of disorder in the years since mid-nineteenth century.[472]

But it was the disorganization brought about by the Red Turban Rebellions that really

brought into the open the antipathy existing between them. The relaxation of rural control

probably accounted in large part for this, but a particular grievance among the Punti was

the way in which the Hakka braves summoned to deal with the Red Turban rebels had

taken the opportunity to make attacks on them. In 1856 the British consul at Guangzhou

described:

> At the time of the troubles in that quarter nearly two years ago they readily
> responded to the call of the authorities to form themselves into train-bands, and
> whilst the Pentis [Punti] showed little disposition to assist the government, the
> Hakkas retook from the Triads the District cities of Ganping [Enping] and
> Kaeping [Kaiping]. They have of course obtained by this behavior a high
> position in the opinion of the authorities, and they now avail themselves of the
> power to avenge their old wrongs.[473]

Therefore, the first major clash between the Hakkas and the Puntis occurred

while the Red Turban Rebellions were still at their height. After having helped in the

relief of the district city of Enping, the Hakkas in the north of the district were said to

---

[472] *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.30b.

[473] F.O. 228/213, Consul Canton to Bowring, (July 16, 1856). In the summer of 1854, a similar account of the sequence of events happened in Enping where the Hakkas, after their success over the Red Turbans, had begun to despise the Punti and to plot against them. See *Enping XZ*, 14. 8a.

have armed themselves in preparation for an attack on the Puntis.[474] Elated by the

success of their service to the government, the emboldened Hakkas began to take

held of lands belonging to the Puntis. The Puntis were naturally very alarmed by

Hakkas, land grabbing, which exacerbated their deep seated and long-standing

bitterness toward the Hakkas.[475] On November 1854, the Hakkas were alleged to have

attacked a Punti village in Kaiping.[476] Two months later there was a series of clashes

between Hakka and Punti villages on the Kaiping and Enping border. On one occasion

Punti braves from Kaiping crossed the border to assist a village in Enping which had

been threatened by the Hakkas. On another, the Hakkas were reported to have collected

together confederates from the neighboring districts of Heshan, Gaoming, Xinxing,

Enping, Kaiping and Yangchun, in an attempt to destroy the Puntis in the area.[477]

---

[474] *Enping XZ*, 14.8a.

[475] In the atmosphere of growing suspicion, the long-standing grievances relating to land-ownership and payment of rent became increasingly bitter. Hakka tenant farmers, taking advantage of the disturbances and the authorities' reliance on them to assist in the suppression of the revolt, took the opportunity to withhold payment of their rents. While the Punti gentry might have accepted Hakka assistance in fighting the rebels, as landlords this action would have incensed them in particular. See *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.18 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2288; Ibid.

[476] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.4a.

[477] Under the guidance of the Hakka gentry, the Hakka villages of these counties gathered under the banner of the Hakka Confederation of Six Counties. The Hakka forces of this Confederation were called "Black Soldiers (Heibing 黑兵)." See Mai , "Heshan Maishi zupu," 1018-1019; *Enping XZ*, 14.8a-10a; Zhao, "Hongbing jishi," 127; Liu, *Bei yiwang de*, 104-107.

At this time the Qing authorities were still preoccupied with quelling the Red Turban rebels throughout the province, and had no time to interfere in the quarrel which was developing between the Hakkas and Puntis. In Kaiping the Punti gentry had at last organized a force of braves, and offered their service to the local government to quell the Red Turbans. The district city was finally recaptured on early January, 1855, but a body of Red Turbans held out in the south of the district for a further month.[478] By then the rebels were in general retreat around Guangzhou and the prefectural city of Zhaoqing had been recaptured.[479]

The defeat of the Red Turbans in Guangdong was followed by a "White Terror" in which thousands of persons were executed on suspicion of having been implicated in the rising.[480] This was a turbulent period and often the normal procedure of judicial trial for crimes carrying the death penalty was suspended. Particularly in the Wuyi region, most of the people who perished in these summary trials were the Puntis—a trend which could hardly be viewed with complacency by the large number of the Puntis who had collaborated with the Red Turbans during their period of ascendancy. Given the reservoir

---

[478] F.O. 228/213, Consul Canton to Bowring (July 16, 1856).

[479] Chen, "Gangcheng," 902-909..

[480] Ibid.

of hostility toward the Hakkas which had been building up for over a time, it took no

great ingenuity for these men to convince their fellow Puntis that the Hakkas were

capitalizing on the Governor-general's mandate to supplant them, that the Puntis as a

group were in jeopardy and that something had to be done to avert the danger. Being

well-armed and with a tradition of pugnacity nurtured in local feuds, they naturally

resorted to force. Once fighting got under way, the bloodshed of kindred people and the

spreading tales of enemy atrocities set in motion the self-perpetuating mechanism of

suspicion, fear, and hatred. It tended to spread by contagion to adjacent areas where the

kindred populations of the feuding parties lived.[481]

The Hakka-Punti War

The Hakka-Punti clashes, which had begun in the confusion caused by the Red

Turban Rebellions, continued after the Red Turbans had been dispersed. The incidents

were most frequent in Enping. The Hakkas again attacked the Puntis in the district and

raided as far as the Yangjiang border, looting as they went in 1855.[482] Punti villagers were

---

[481] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.4b-5; *Chixi XZ*, 8.6b.

[482] *Chixi XZ*, 8.8b.

forced to flee, and the whole area became involved. Both the Hakkas and the Puntis from

villages across the border of Enping joined in the fighting. There the Punti gentry leaders,

Guan Weicheng 關維城 organized a "Mutual Security" hall (*Lianbaotang* 聯保堂) and

sent arms to help their fellows in the north.[483] In 1856 the relationship between the

Hakkas and the Puntis in these districts worsened, and from this year the so-called the

Hakka-Punti War began.[484] Lechler made a succinct narration of this event:

> The rebels…found numerous adherents among the Punti people, whereas the
> Hakkas [there] remained loyal, and assisted the Mandarins against the rebels.
> This exasperated the Puntis very much, and they swore vengeance against the
> Hakkas…. The Puntis commenced hostilities with the Hakkas. The district of
> Heshan was the first in which disturbance broke out, and the fortunes of war
> were variously experienced on both sides, until finally the Puntis, being stronger
> in men and means, conquered the Hakkas in this and other districts, and expelled
> those who were not killed….[485]

The most significant feature of the clashes between the Hakkas and the Puntis

---

[483] Guan Weicheng had played a leading part in the organization of the Punti militia that had been raised in the previous year to assist the magistrate in the recovery of the district city. This new organization, *Lianbaotang*, would appear to be a direct descendant of the previous one that was to play a role against the Hakka organizations. See *Kaiping XZ*, 21.5b-6a.

[484] Of course, this was not a war in the sense of an armed conflict between nations, nor was it, in ordinary terms, a civil war, for the Hakkas do not seem to have been intending a rebellion. The term "war" is used, because this is what to contemporary observers the struggle seemed to be. It had developed beyond the stage of feuds and had become a protracted conflict spreading over a large area. For the complete details of the Hakka-Punti War, see Liu, *Bei yiwang de*; Zheng Dehua 鄭德華, "Guangdong Zhonglu Tuke Xiedou Yanjiu 廣東中路土客械鬥研究," (Ph.D. diss., University of Hong Kong, 1989); Roberts, "The Hakka-Punti War."

[485] Rudolf Lechler, "The Hakka Chinese," *Chinese Recorder* 9 (1878), 354.

was the way in which the disorder was showing signs of developing from inter-village

feuding, which in the Pearl River Delta at the time was so common that it might be

regarded as the rule rather than the exception, into subethnic feuds in which

reinforcements were brought in across district borders. Now, those involved in the Punti-

Hakka conflicts had little freedom to choose between the warring parties. They

automatically belonged to one or the other side by virtue of their speech.[486]

Fairly large raiding parties were launched by both sides at infrequent intervals.

Destruction was horrifying whenever a village was taken by assault. In this initial stage

of the war, both the Hakka and the Punti gentry began to take an active part in the

struggle.[487] In July 1856 fighting commenced on a larger scale encompassing Kaiping,

Enping, and the whole districts of Xinning and Xinhui.[488] At this time, the Guangdong

provincial government at Guangzhou was engrossed in a diplomatic crisis with the

British over the Arrow Affair, which was to usher in armed hostilities and eventually, a

two-year occupation of the city by the combined British and French forces.[489] With the

---

[486] Punti villages fought under the red flag and the Hakkas under the white flag. See *Chixi XZ*, 8.9b.

[487] *Chixi XZ*, 8.9a.

[488] *China Mail* (July 10, 1856).

[489] J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams*.

intervention of the provincial government ruled out, the local government authorities with their token military forces were helpless in the face of armed clashes of this nature.[490]

Initially, the Hakkas seemed to have the advantage, not only holding their own, but also harassing the Punti villages that surrounded theirs. In June 1856, they stormed the Punti stronghold of Songbai mountain (松柏山) in Enping, annihilating more than two thousand of their adversaries.[491] Certainly, the principal battle-fields of the Hakka-Punti War, particularly Xinning and Enping, were indications that the dispute had reached the stage where the two groups had come to regard each other indiscriminately as threats to their security and livelihood. However, many of the smaller Hakka settlements in the eastern region of the Wuyi were ill-prepared for a showdown and after some preliminary encounters were abandoned. Their inhabitants sought refuge in the bigger Hakka settlements or in hastily constructed quarters in the mountains. Thus, many different Hakka villages solidified into a bigger group based on their speech. The Puntis "being stronger in men and means, eventually defeated the Hakkas in this area and expelled those not killed."[492]

---

[490] *Xinning XZ*, 12.16-21.

[491] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.5-6.

[492] Lechler, "The Hakka," 354; *Xinning XZ*, 10.11b-16b.

It is hard to estimate the actual numbers of the Hakkas and Puntis who

participated in the Hakka-Punti War, but for the Wuyi-wide concern, there is no doubt

that the Puntis far outnumbered their adversaries. For example, the number of Hakka

villages in Xinning county approximated those held by the Puntis, but as Punti villages

were usually two or three times larger than Hakka villages, this still afforded them a

numerical superiority of at least two to one.[493] The local gazetteer narrates this:

> At this time there was plundering and looting, and seizing and murdering,
> without a day's respite. The Hakka villages were overwhelmed one by one, and
> those who escaped fled elsewhere. In those villages that had not yet fallen, the
> people, thinking the local people numerous and the Hakkas few, and fearing that
> it would be difficult to resist, also for the most part removed to Dongshan 東山,
> Chishui 赤水, Nafu 那扶, and Shenjing 深井.[494]

By the end of 1857 the dislodged Hakkas fled with their wives and children,

and in the course of their flight were intercepted, massacred, or taken prisoner by the

Puntis. The only Hakka settlement in the east that survived was the one Caochong 曹沖,

situated on a sparsely-populated peninsula.[495]

After the full scale eruption in 1856, the events in the Wuyi were overshadowed

---

[493] The situation could not have been much different in the other districts. See *Chixi XZ*, 8.45, 10.11b-16b.

[494] *Chixi XZ*, 8.15a.

[495] *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.25 (Oct. 25, 1867), Microfilm 2351-2355; *Chixi XZ*, 8.21b.

by the Arrow War and the assault on Guangzhou. In the local histories it was the

hostilities with the British and French that occupied the pages for the years between 1857

and 1858.[496] Information on the Hakka-Punti War is therefore meager. What there is

suggests that fighting continued between the Hakkas and the Puntis. There was only

desultory fighting, however with no major changes in the balances of power and no major

incidents were reported.[497] In 1860 and the first half of 1861 there was a lull in the

fighting between the Hakkas and the Puntis, which offered hope that a settlement might

be achieved. Some time early in 1860, the Guangzhou provincial government appointed a

Punti gentry, Liang Yuangui 梁元桂 to mediate. Liang, together with the magistrate of

Enping, called for cooperation between the Hakkas and the Puntis, and summoned Hakka

leaders from Enping, Kaiping, Heshan and Gaoming to take part in discussions. The

gentry of both sides established a committee, and began to discuss the question of

restitution of property.[498] In May 1861 the provincial authorities issued instruction to all

the Wuyi to bring cooperation between the Hakkas and the Puntis.[499]

---

[496] J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams*.

[497] *Chixi XZ*, 8.22b; *Nanhai XZ*, 14.30.

[498] F.O. 228/344, Canton Intelligence Report (May 1, 1863).

[499] *Guangzhou FZ*, 82.39a.

However, the truce came to an end just two months after their initial cooperation effort. According to one report, fighting began first in Gaoming, provoked by "some obscure circumstances."[500] Once the news of fighting in Gaoming and Heshan had reached Kaiping and Enping, the uneasy truce in these counties quickly came to an end.[501] In 1862 Hakka-Punti fighting was reported throughout the Wuyi region and even as far north as Gaoyao. According to a later commentator, it was at this time that the contest was at its height, and local governments were entirely suspended in several counties.[502] No external factor can account for this sudden change, nor was there, as far as is known, any particular catalyst of events. It was rather that the feeling aroused in the previous years of disorder, and the revelation of the impotence of the authorities, led the gentry on both sides to believe that they could act without danger of interference. In the report from the *Overland China Mail* at the time also stated that after the first incident in Gaoming "the Punti villagers rose *en masse* to avenge the memory of 1854."[503] In other words, popular hated of the Hakkas, especially of the role they had played in the Red

---

[500] *Overland China Mail*, (July 11, 1863).

[501] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.8a; Chen, "Gangcheng," 908-943.

[502] *China Mail* (June 29, 1867).

[503] *Overland China Mail*, (July 11, 1863).

Turban Rebellions, provided massive support for a renewed Punti attack on the Hakkas.

After the wave of attacks, the Punti gentry asserted that they were the victims

of a conspiracy formed by the Hakkas and branded the Hakkas bandits and rebels, and

even characterized the Hakkas as not a Chinese race to justify their attacks on the

Hakkas.[504] Within three years, the task of pacifying the "Hakka rebels" was completed.[505]

The Punti forces had begun to reduce the Hakka settlements in the Wuyi one by one. By

the end of 1862, the Hakkas were outnumbered and driven towards the coast. The

dislodged, dispossessed Hakkas became roaming bandits who descended in vengeance

upon unexpecting Punti villages. There was no means for reconciliation, as the Hakkas

only wanted liberty to live while the Puntis refused to be sheltered under the same heaven

with them.[506] The desperate Hakkas then stormed and occupied the fortified town of

Guanghai 廣海, west of Macao on their way to Caochong, the only surviving Hakka

settlement in the whole district.[507]

---

[504] This attack was even fostered in the county gazetteers by the Punti gentry. Thus, in the section recording the feuds, the Hakkas were labeled as *"fei"* (bandits) in the gazetteers. See *Xinhui XZ* 10.7; *Xinning XZ* 8.6b, and *Gaoyao XZ* 2.29b-30b.

[505] *Kaiping XZ*, 21.8-10.

[506] Eitel, "Outline History of the Hakkas," Rev. II, 163-164.

[507] *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.19 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2290-2293; *Xin'ning XZ*, 14.31.

At this point the Punti gentry petitioned the provincial authorities to send troops so that these "Hakka rebels" could be settled by force. The Punti gentry already had an ally in the persons of the local government. Local enforcement, often undertaken by local Punti gentry or militias under the command of the magistrate or other imperial officials, partook of the local Punti cultural ethos, one which was often actively and vociferously anti-Hakka. Virulent anti-Hakka sentiment may be found in the memorials of many local Qing officials.[508]

The news of this outbreak of hostilities had also reached Beijing. In a decree dated May 6, 1862, the Governor-general was taken to task severely for having failed to report the clashes that had occurred between the Hakkas and Puntis in the Wuyi and the death of an official near Guanghai where the Hakkas had dared to capture the garrison town, an act tantamount to overt rebellion.[509] For the first time the Hakkas were officially

---

[508] The powerful factor working in the Punti's favor was their accessibility to the government authorities. Clustered as they were in the environs of the district cities, they had the ear of the district magistrates, and also of the provincial and central governments, since the Puntis had a shengyuan 生員 quota several times greater than that of the Hakkas and consequently were better represented at these levels of power. By pressing their version of the story first and then constantly repeating it, they usually succeeded in prejudicing the minds of government officials, who generally had neither the opportunity nor the inclination to verify what they were told. Government intervention on behalf of the Puntis was a crucial factor in the collapse of the Hakkas' resistance effort all along the line. See Ibid., 14.26b; *Enping XZ*, 14.22a.

[509] *Chixi XZ, 8.26-27.*

condemned for their activities; "they really have no regard for the laws."[510] The Imperial

government had just weathered one of its most serious political crises,[511] and now with

the Tongzhi Restoration, was in a mood to resume again the civil administration of the

country. Under orders from the central government, the provincial troops of Guangdong

were mobilized into two expeditions to chastise the "Hakka bandits." The Hakkas were

massacred or driven into hiding.[512]

In September, 1866, the Governor of Guangdong, Jiang Yili 蔣益澧 sent

eight thousands troops to Caochong to compel the Hakkas to give up their arms and

disperse. To prevent further difficulties with the Puntis, two hundred thousand taels

were set aside for distribution to the Hakka (eight taels to each adult and four to

each child), with passes and protection to enable them to migrate to Guangxi,

Hainan, and other regions where wastelands existed in abundance. The small district

of Chixi was marked out from Xinning and set apart for the Hakkas to reside in

1867.[513]

---

[510] *Daqing Muzong Yi (Tongzhi) Huangdi shilu* 大淸穆宗毅（同治）皇帝實錄, (Taibei: Taiwan huawen shuju, 1968) 24.32b.

[511] The occupation of Beijing by the British and French forces.

[512] *Chixi XZ*, 8.40b.

[513] Ibid., 8.26b-27, 43b-44b; *Junjichu zouzhe*, 3.166.8947.19 (April 25, 1866), Microfilm 2290-2293.

Aftermath

It is difficult to form a satisfactory estimate of the numbers who died, for

there are no accurate figures for the population of the areas concerned; nor is it

known how many moved away from the area during the course of the war. But as

early as 1865, the memorial from the Governor-general estimated that the dead on

both sides exceeded a million.[514] According to Luo Xianglin's study, the killed,

wounded and missing on both sides amounted to 500,000-600,000.[515] While there is

no consensus on the casualties that resulted from the Hakka-Punti War, it is safe to

say that the war did have severe and damaging consequences to the areas involved.

Many of the population died, not from wounds, but from disease and starvation, the

inevitable concomitant of a war in which large numbers of peasants were uprooted.

Even twenty years after the war ended, a missionary who visited the Wuyi wrote

that the "blighting effects" of the "Hakka rebellion" were still visible.[516]

The end of the Hakka-Punti War also led numerous officials to put forward

programs intended to redress the problems that had caused the war and to initiate

---

[514] Ibid., 8.38a.

[515] Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 3.

[516] B.C. Henry, *Ling-Nam, or Interior Views of Southern China* (London: S.W. Partridge, 1886), 86;

effective reconstruction measures. There was a flurry of activity, and a few changes did

take place; but most of them were superficial and temporary; no fundamental change

emerged in the relationship between the Hakkas and the Puntis. The war ended in a

clear victory for the Puntis, for they succeeded in the almost complete expulsion of

the Hakkas from the districts involved in the war. The principal exception to this

was the Hakka enclave which was allowed to remain at Chixi. As far as the Hakkas

now confined in Chixi were concerned, the long ordeal that they had together

endured naturally increased their bond of Hakka solidarity. In other words, the

effect of the establishment of the sub-prefecture was to reinforce the pre-existing

subethnic spirit of the people by giving it a more strongly territorial grounding, as

well as an official sanction.[517]

Yet the settlement was a forced one, and it was received with

dissatisfaction on both sides. On the Hakka side the feeling of resentment was

stronger, and lasted much longer. Despite the efforts to appease them, in particular

---

[517] In 1912, the provincial government of Guangdong, in a drive for economy and the rationalization of the local administrative system, decided to abolish the sub-prefecture of Chixi as a distinct administrative unit and merge it into the district of Xinning. Its principal reason for this decision was that Chixi's fixed quota of seven hundred-odd taels of silver for land tax was far below the minimum cost for the operation of the new district government. But this contemplated move was strongly opposed by the Hakkas of Chixi who voluntarily raised the tax quota six fold to four thousand taels. This incident dramatizes the subethnic spirit of the Hakkas in Chixi. See *Chixi XZ*, 4.12.

by the provision of examination quotas in Chixi and in the districts to which they

had been sent with assistance, the Hakka gentry found it difficult to accept the

settlement. Soon after the end of the War in 1878, a Hakka named Lin Daquan

林達泉 wrote a note in which he condemned the Guangdong administration's action

towards the Hakkas, and the injustice of their expulsion. Lin circulated a treatise,

"keshuo 客說," on the Hakkas and attacked the local authorities for referring to the

Hakkas involved in the feuds as "Hakka bandits" and for aiding the Puntis in driving

them out.[518] His treatise was a glorified and romanticized image of their past history:

"true sons of the Golden Age, descendants of the upper class of the Central Plain,

with a speech that showed a clear affinity with the ancient speech of the north."[519]

This coincided with the views of the gentry who had been expelled from the Wuyi,

and on a number of occasions they attempted to obtain permission to return. In

about 1875, some of the Hakka gentry who had moved to Guangxi contacted others

who had been sent to Gaozhou and Leizhou and jointly presented petitions to the

Censorate asking that they should be allowed to return to the Wuyi. Nothing came

---

[518] Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 5.

[519] Lin Daquan 林達泉, "Keshuo 客說," in *Chayang sanjia wenchao* 茶陽三家文鈔, ed. Wen Tingjing 溫廷敬, 131-35 (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966).

of this, but the matter was raised again in 1885 and in 1905. However, the proposals

were continuously rejected on the advice of local officials, who pointed out the

possible dangers of such a course, and declared that the Hakkas had no cause for

grievance.[520]

The attitude of condescension and contempt harbored by both the Hakkas and

the Puntis toward each other remained essentially unaltered and even worsened. The

Puntis were also resentful that the Hakkas had been allowed to retain the Chixi

peninsula, small though that was. Now the period of armed conflict between the two

groups took the form of a literary battle. The Punti gentry in the late nineteenth-century,

could not refrain from writing that the Hakkas were ignorant, their practices stupid, and

their natures fierce. Such attitudes were fostered in the county gazetteers that labeled the

Hakkas as bandits (*fei* 匪).[521] Some gazetteers even described the Hakkas as Yao or Lao

aborigines.[522]

The Hakkas, at times stridently, insisted that they belonged to the mainstream

of Chinese culture through their own versions of the local gazetteers. Wen Zhonghe

---

[520] *Chixi XZ*, 8.54a; *Kaiping XZ*, 21.13a-b.

[521] *Xinhui XZ* 10.7; *Xinning XZ* 8.6b, and *Gaoyao XZ* 2.29b-30b.

[522] *Gaoyao XZ*, 25.39b; *Yangjiang XZ*, 7.4, 20.

溫仲和, a Hakka Hanlin academician, made cases in the 1880 edition of *Zhenping*

county Gazetteer (鎮平縣志 *Zhenping Xianzhi*) and in the 1898 edition of Jiaying *Sub-*

Prefectural Gazetteer (嘉應州志 *Jiaying zhouzhi*) that include extensive treatises on

Hakka customs and rituals to identify the Hakkas with the Han Chinese.[523] Like the

Cantonese, Wen Zhonghe also associated the Hakka dialect with the Sui-Tang

speech in order to show the northern origins of the Hakkas. Wen concluded that "the

Hakka dialect should be regarded as one of the oldest of Chinese dialects" since

certain words in Tang poems rhyme only in Hakka but not in other dialects, showing

that "Hakka" was true spoken Chinese language.[524]

Based on these gazetteers and Hakka genealogies, Luo Xianglin, in his book,

Kejia Yanjiu Daolun (1933), also fought the idea that "the Hakkas are non-Chinese" and

concluded that the Hakkas were originally from northern China and more Chinese than

non-Hakkas.[525] Therefore, the name 'Hakka' became more and more glorious since Luo's

publication of his book among the Hakka-speaking world. An editorial preface from the

Hakka yearbook clearly demonstrates this kind of glorification:

---

[523] *Zhenping XZ* 鎮平縣志; *Jiaying ZZ* 嘉應州志.

[524] Ibid., 7.84b.

[525] Luo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, Chapter 2.

Our people's distant ancestors migrated from the fertile (northern) plains into the barren hills (of the south) where they forged a character of resistance and nonappeasement. Here our people have steadfastly served the ancestors by multiplying and carving out a niche in which to survive. By developing independently, our customs have remained distinct from the local people's, and we have not mixed as easily as does water with milk.[526]

These writings, compiled or written by respected members of the community as a means of mobilization for ethnic interaction fostered "group cohesiveness and maintained the ethnic boundary, even though these were not their only purposes."[527]

Hakka Emigration

For the great majority of the Hakkas who survived the war, their lot was willing or unwilling departure from the area. Having failed to maintain their lands in the Wuyi, some returned to the east, and many resumed the general direction of the Hakka migration during the Qing, towards the west. Official assistance was provided for those Hakkas who wished to leave the province, and some accepted the

---

[526] Chongzheng Editorial Staff (1971:1), quoted by Blake, *Ethnic Groups*, 50.

[527] Leong, *Migration*, 81.

offer, were given rations and sent under escort to Guangxi. The Hakkas were

guaranteed land on which to settle in the districts to which they were to be moved,

and promised that a quota would be provided for them in the civil service

examinations.[528]

The Hakka dispersal took three years, from 1866 to 1869. In a number of

instances the arrival of the Hakka settlers in their new areas provoked unrest. For

instance, when Hakka dispersed from Kaiping and Enping reached Hainan early in

1867, the local authorities had failed to make arrangements for their arrival. The

Hakkas settled down apart from the existing population, and in Danzhou 儋州 on

occasion hired themselves out as braves to hostile villages. This brought a reproof to

the prefect of Hainan.[529]

Another phenomenon that added to the highly volatile nature of this situation

was the animosity between the native villagers and Hakka Christian converts among the

migrants. Some of Hakka people found refuge in the reserves that the Christian

missionaries were instrumental in creating during the nineteenth century, and in this

---

[528] *Chixi XZ*, 8.29b, 31a.

[529] F.O. 228/448, Intelligence Report, (April 9, 1868).

context the missionaries played an important part in the construction of Hakka identity.

Roman Catholics had penetrated the Wuyi area early in the eighteenth century and had

made several thousand converts especially from the Hakka communities by the early

nineteenth century.[530] The missionaries' goal was to 'civilize' the people on the mission

reserves, by teaching them to plough, to read, and to assist in the administration of their

communities. To this end, they saw fit to make ethnic distinctions amongst the refugees

who flocked to their protection. They sought to distinguish between the Hakkas and the

natives, regarding the Hakkas as more amenable to civilization than the Punti people.[531]

Rev. Rudolph Lechler in his article, "The Hakka Chinese" described the Hakkas from a

missionary point of view:

> On the whole the Hakkas are not as bigoted as the Puntis, and the Gospel has
> found easier access to them than to the latter. It is also comparatively easier to
> make friends of them than of the Puntis. It is perhaps owing to their standing
> constantly in fear of their own countrymen, the Puntis, that any sincere sympathy
> which is shown them by foreigners finds more reciprocity, and is thankfully
> availed of.[532]

---

[530] F.O. 228/407, Mayers to Alcok, (October 30, 1866).

[531] F.O. 228/407, Mayers to Alcok, (October 30, 1866).

[532] Rudolph Lechler, "The Hakka Chinese," 352-359, *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal*, Vol. 9 (Sep-Oct., 1878), 358.

Another missionary who had lived among the Hakkas once depicted the Hakka

as "the cream of the Chinese people," and soon this statement became a favorite citation

used by Hakka scholars from time to time.[533]

Typical of all Christian missionaries elsewhere in China, the foreigners were

overzealously protective of their converts, some of whom frequently took advantage of

their foreign connection to breach the law and bully their native neighbors. For instance,

the enmity between the Hakka Catholic migrants and the local inhabitants was noted by

the officials of the Leizhou peninsula. About 11,000-12,000 Hakka settlers arrived

Leizhou in 1867, where French missionaries had already been active before Hakka arrival

in the area. The Hakkas had moved from the Wuyi and were Catholic converts.[534] Soon

after their arrival, the prefect of Leizhou received a letter from Monseigneur Guillemin,

the Catholic bishop of Guangzhou, which stated that the land on which the Hakkas were

settled was very inferior, and he wished to have the island of Weizhoutun 圍州墩, off the

mainland, for their settlement. Even though local Qing government did not accept this

---

[533] Historically, Christian missionaries were important in the ethnogenesis of the Hakka. Accounts written by Basel missionaries Eitel and Lechler were used by Hakka scholars to bolster the legitimacy of Hakka identity. These late-nineteenth-century missionary descriptions continue to be cited by contemporary Hakka specialists. See Ellsworth Huntington, *The Character of Races* (New York: Arno Press, 1924), 168; Eitel, "Ethnographical Sketches"; Lechler, "The Hakka Chinese"; Constable, *Christian Souls*; Lutz and Lutz, *Hakka Chinese*.

[534] *Chouban yiwu shimo* 籌瓣夷始末 (Beijing, 1930), 44.32a-b.

proposal, some Hakka converts moved on to the island.[535] The aggressive tactics of

Roman Catholic missionaries who were supporting the interests of Hakka settlers

alarmed the native population and several anti-foreign and anti-Hakka incidents occurred.

Three times between 1867 and 1870 Hakka churches there were burnt down.[536]

One of the protestant missions, the Basel Mission, also concentrated on Hakka

areas. A missionary from the Basel Mission, the above-mentioned Rudolf Lechler, visited

Xinning in 1865 and took charge of the Hakka refugees who reached Hong Kong.[537]

Some 3,000 of the Hakka refuges were brought to the colony, and as they were destitute,

they were taken care of by the government and merchant community. Some of these

refugees settled permanently in Hong Kong and some migrated to the Hawaii through the

arrangement of Lechler.[538]

---

[535] F.O. 228.448, Service Report (August 7, 1868).

[536] F.O. 682.341; Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-70* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 219.

[537] Lechler, "The Hakka," 355.

[538] The Basel Mission was in their missionary politics aware, that to grant independence to the indigenous sub-churches as soon as possible was of important help to their goal: to spread Christianity even if it was adapted to local or societal circumstances. This led to the early foundation of the Tsung Tsin Associations (崇正會), first in Hong Kong and later with new branches in other countries where Hakka had emigrated. The process of this has had certain consequences for the Hakka ethnic consciousness: it has helped the creation of the "pan-Hakka" identity. See Leong, *Migration*, 87; Tin-yuke Char and Wai Jane, *Chinese Historical Sites and Pioneer Families of the Island of Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 100.

Although Chinese emigration overseas began before the Opium War, massive

emigration to sell labor power started in the mid-nineteenth century. Besides the change

in economic structure, there were other important reasons. During the mid-nineteenth

century, after the abolition of slavery and the termination of the black slave trade, the

large plantations in Central and South America faced a critical labor shortage.[539] In

addition, the discovery of gold in California, the construction of transcontinental railways

in the U.S. and Canada, and the development of mines and plantations in Southeast Asia

all required cheap labor.[540] Thus, the Westerners turned to Asia, and to China specifically,

attempting to replace black slaves with Chinese coolies. In the meantime, under the

military and diplomatic intimidation of the foreign powers, the Qing government changed

its traditional isolationist policy and legalized foreign labor recruitment activities in China.

The surrender of Hong Kong to the British and the opening of five ports to foreign trade

facilitated this recruitment. Agents of foreign capitalists established labor recruitment

---

[539] Marshall K. Powers, "Chinese Coolie Migration to Cuba" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1953), 2.

[540] One of the most effective inducements was offering simple-minded peasants a conveyance to the gold hills in California or Australia. A peasant with an acquisitive bent easily fell into such a trap laid by one of the ubiquitous coolie agents. See Kil Young Zo, *Chinese Emigration into the United States: 1850-1880* (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 39.

stations in Guangzhou, Swatow (Shantou), Amoy (Xiamen), and other coastal cities.

Hong Kong and Macau became centers for the coolie trade.[541]

An important source of coolie labor was prisoners of war taken in the frequent clan

wars in southeastern China. During and after the Hakka-Punti War in the Wuyi areas, able

bodied prisoners were sold to the coolie agents by their captors.[542] Still, many war refugees

gave themselves up out of despair to the coolie recruiters and willingly signed up to be

contract laborers overseas. As noted more succinctly by the Xinning Gazetteer of 1893:

"Ever since the destruction of the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War, the

numbers of people going abroad have increased dramatically. The strong and healthy

regularly go to the four corners of the earth."[543] These emigrants received a few dollars,

advanced by the coolie agents, which they sent back to their starving families. The Gazetteer

estimated that the Hakkas thus shipped to the Western Hemisphere who survived the ordeal

of being coolies numbered up to 30,000 men by the turn of the century.[544]

---

[541] Yen Ching-hwang, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 54, 76; Persia C. Campbell, *Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), 94.

[542] *Chixi XZ*, 8.28a.

[543] *Xinning XZ*, 8.6b.

[544] *Chixi XZ*, 8.28a.

After the Hakka-Punti War, both contract laborers and free immigrants from

Guangdong formed permanent communities throughout the Western Hemisphere. There

were about 7,000 Hakkas in Hawaii alone. The second largest district association among

the Chinese community in California was also created by those who came from the Wuyi;

and there was also a separate association for Hakka emigrants.[545] Hakkas were also

officially authorized and encouraged to emigrate to Taiwan after 1876. In the second half

of the nineteenth century the main migratory movement, however, was to Southeast

Asia.[546] The Malayan tin-mines attracted many emigrants, and later there was a steady

demand for labor there and in the Dutch East Indies. As considerable numbers of these

came from the Wuyi; they included many who had emigrated as a direct consequence of

the war and others who had taken part in the hostilities or who had bitter memories of the

conflict.

Consequently among these overseas Chinese, subethnicity has remained an

important factor in social organization until the present day. Clashes of interest have often

coincided with subethnic grouping. It is not therefore surprising to find indications that

---

[545] Barth, *Bitter Strength*, 90; Stephen Thernstrom, ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 231.

[546] Clyde Y. Kiang, *The Hakka Odyssey & Their Taiwan Homeland* (Elgin: Allegheny Press, 1992), 68-69.

the hostility between the Hakkas and the Puntis continued even when they had moved away from the scene of the war. In Hong Kong, in 1866, by which time a substantial number of Hakka immigrants had reached the colony, it was reported that clashes on a small scale occurred between the two groups.[547] The best information on the extension of Hakka-Punti hostility overseas comes from Malaya. In Perak, Malaya, Larut Wars broke out between the two groups over possession of the Larut tin fields between 1862 and 1873. These disturbances have been supposed to have been in some way connected with the Hakka-Punti War.[548] Subethnic conflicts between the Hakkas and the Puntis continued long after the end of the Hakka-Punti War in various places and it was clearer than ever in Guangdong at least, who was Hakkas, and who were not.

4) Ethnicity and the Hakkas

In this chapter, I provided background information on the Hakkas, and specifically explored their settlement in the Wuyi area. Focusing on ethnographic cases in

---

[547]See *Overland China Mail* (February 15, 1866).

[548] Thus Leon Comber has written: "This bitter struggle will help to explain the traditional secret society hostility between the Cantonese and Hakka emigrants in the Straits Settlements during the same period." See Leon Comber, *Chinese secret societies in Malaya; a survey of the Triad Society from 1800 to 1900* (Locust Valley, N. Y., Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J. J. Augustin, 1959), 29.

the Wuyi, I have also continued the treatment of the Hakka-Punti distinction less in terms

of static ethnic categories and more in terms of intense relationships enacted in the

process of major events, the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War especially

in the Wuyi area.[549] The fluid and constructionist nature of Hakka identity is not only

manifested in relation to 'place' and local interactions, but also through time and

changing state-sociery relationships.

Many Hakkas today perceived their identity as being inherited from their

ancestors. The history of family and ancestors plays an important role in Hakka culture.

The Hakkas have a strong sense of identity, emphasizing their common language and

blood relationship even among settlements in various countries across the world.

Research by Hakka scholars, especially by Luo Xianglin, strengthened the idea of a

'common imagination' of the Hakkas across regional boundaries: the Hakkas may have

lived in the Wuyi, Jiayingzhou, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and America, but they are

the Hakkas sharing the same blood, and speaking the same language. Differing from Luo,

---

[549] I see ethnicity as a fluid, artificial boundary drawn between groups whose economic and political interests are locked in competition. In other words, ethnicity is not a "thing" but a summation of a set of relations. See Choi Chi-chenug, "Descent Group Unification and Segmentation in the Coastal Area of Southern China," (Ph.D. diss., University of Tokyo, 1987); James Hayes, *The Hong Kong region, 1850-1911 : institutions and leadership in town and countryside* (Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1977); John L. Comaroff, "Of Totemism and Ethnicity: Consciousness, Practice and the Signs of Inequality." *Ethnos* 52. 3-4 (1987): 301-23.

however, Chen Zhiping (1997) contends that the Hakkas do not have a bloodline that

differs significantly from other groups in Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi. He sees the

blood relationships among these groups to be mingling and mixing.[550] Nicole Constable

(1994) also points out that the key to Hakka identity is not language, shared political

interests, shared cultural practices, religion or native place, but it is the way in which

these and other elements are invariably tied to Hakka history.[551]

Of course cultural symbols are in fact potent shapers of ethnic consciousness.

For instance, ethnic language or dialect is considered a powerful symbol of ethnic identity,

and it is in this category where a sharp contrast between the groups is obvious. Thus the

"Indian Hakkas" pride themselves on their preservation of the Hakka dialect even in

India; they regard their dialect as an important attribute of their ethnic identity.[552]

Difference in customs, too, did play a role in the construction of Hakka identity. But

exactly when and where Hakka cultural differences coalesced into an expression of social

group differences is difficult to say. Moreover, it is clear that a conscious, collective

---

[550] Chen, *Kejia yuanliu,* 147.

[551] Constable, *Christian Souls*, 76.

[552] Dialect served as an external indicator of Hakka ethnic identity in Calcutta, India, and a symbol through which the Hakkas could be differentiated from other Chinese groups. Oxfeld, "Still 'Guest People'."

group identity did not come form in all regions where Hakka speakers existed.[553] Thus, in

the case of the Hakka, language and customs—"culture"—were not sufficient markers of

ethnic difference. They alone cannot explain the formation of Hakka ethnic

consciousness.

Political action (and inaction) also played a role. The state, in fact, played a

crucial part in the development of subethnic rivalry in the Wuyi. Ineffective restrictions

and government policy of migration helped to bring about the heterogeneous immigration

and settlement that gave rise to Hakka subethnicity in the Wuyi. Subsequently, weak

governmental control allowed and, indeed, encouraged the formation and preservation of

bellicose rival communities. In other words, official concessions to one or other

subcultural group or local group (e.g., examination quotas) not only fostered subethnic

rivalry but also set precedents for competition of an economic, social, and political sort.

More overtly influential was the active support of the Qing court in the formation of the

Hakka Confederation by some Hakka gentry in 1856 to combat the Red Turban threat.

In sum, it was in the course of a complex series of events—socioeconomic

conflicts between local groups, Red Turban Rebellions, and the resulting Hakka-Punti

---

[553] Constable, *Guest People*, 12.

War—that the early cultural solidarity of the Hakka-dialect speakers was forged into a full ethnic consciousness. To summarize the crucial factors here: The Punti absentee landlords of the Wuyi areas, in the process of enclosing polder farms and reclaiming land, fought among themselves under the disguise of lineage feuding, and they made use of the newly immigrated Hakka tenants in these contests to carry out frontier cultivation. This enabled some Hakkas eventually to become secondary landlords. But then, as these Hakka secondary landlords became more prosperous, they threatened the security and dominance of the Puntis (both landlords and tenants), and economic conflict between the two groups escalated. This conflict helped create the tensions that sparked the Red Turban Rebellions. Then, in the effort to defeat the Red Turban rebel forces, the state was placed in the position of legitimizing the Hakka gentry's efforts to organize their own confederation. This confederation did assist in the defeat of the Red Turbans, but it also attempted to dominate the Punti tenants and to enclose polder farms owned by the absentee Punti landlords. As a result, the power struggles in the Wuyi areas during the Red Turban Rebellions came to take the forms of subethnic feuds rather than the conventional form of interclass struggle or lineage feuds.

This ethnic struggle analysis also highlights the complex connection between

human agency and structural constraints. Throughout this chapter, both Hakka and Punti

elites were portrayed as the actors in the Wuyi areas. Both sides skillfully procured the

endorsement of the state in legitimizing their attacks on their enemies and they

manipulated subethnic sentiments in dominating the local regions, thus eventually

creating a clear demarcation between the Puntis and the Hakkas.

The Hakkas, first, were identified as different by people who looked down upon

them and explained their difference in derogatory terms. Then, as economic and social

conflicts developed and as the Hakkas began to do rather well, this sense of difference

was sharpened on both sides, and eventually the Hakkas began to define themselves as

distinctive in more positive terms, as the lieratus Xu Xuzeng did in 1808. As the Hakkas

and the Puntis were drawn into armed struggle, encouraged by the government, the sense

of difference was heightened and extended, so that after the Hakka-Punti War, Hakka

"theorists" like Wen Zhonghe wrote extensive definitions of Hakka customs, language—

in short, of Hakka identity.

Religion, both Chinese and foreign, added an important dimension here. Hakka

identity was historically influenced by Western imperialism and nineteenth-century

Christian evangelism. In the midst of the turmoil of the nineteenth century, the Puntis

were able to gain some security and mutual aid from "traditional" Chinese religious

organizations and secret societies (like the Red Turbans) that were based in settled Punti

communities. In contrast, the fragmented kinship and settlement patterns of the Hakkas in

Guangdong provided no firm social base, so the Hakkas utilized the ideas and institutions

of the foreign missionaries for their protection.[554] In some cases, turning to the

missionaries was probably a last resort in an effort to escape poverty and homelessness.

Alliance with the missionaries, powerful because they had the backing of their

governments, also provided the Hakkas with a useful counterweight to the Puntis.

In any event, European missionaries found that the Hakkas provided more fertile

ground for sowing the seeds of the gospel than the Puntis. In converting their charges, the

missionaries, pursuing what Stevan Harrell has named "the Christian Project," hoped to

elevate the Hakkas to what they perceived as the superior level of Western civilization.

Confronted then by these missionary attempts to educate them to be "civilized," Hakka

communities were forced to reflect on who they were and how they were different from

the foreigners attempting to "civilize" them. Thus contact with Western missionaries

---

[554] Kuhn, "Origins of the Taiping," 365.

served to stimulate the ethnic self-consciousness of the Hakkas.[555]

In short, this chapter focused on the whole network of different interests and relationships that led to the Red Turban Rebellions and the Hakka-Punti War of the mid-nineteenth century in the Wuyi: the long-standing economic conflicts over land use; the different religious allegiances and associational ties that divided migrants from natives; the part played by local gentry and secret societies in Hakka-Punti feuds; the role that the state, and most particularly local governments, played in intensifying existing tensions and thus drawing "ethnic" lines.

---

[555] Stevan Harrell, ed. *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1994): 20-29.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to overestimate the role that ethnicity and perceived ethnic

differences have played in late imperial Chinese history. At many turning points in late

Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) history, underlying subethnic factors,

perceptions of group interests at the regional level, and local value systems have been

crucial elements in events that shaped the future of the empire. Even today, the

perception of one Chinese about another is likely to be colored by knowledge of his

native place or of the dialect group to which he belongs, as evidenced by his

pronunciation of Standard Chinese. Thus, the survey of subethnic groups within China

not only reveals the complexities of dialect or local folklore, but also becomes necessary,

a basic step, in the effort to understand Chinese history and society better.

The recent proliferation of works by historians and anthropologists on ethnic

groups in China brings us closer to this understanding.[556] Yet only the most preliminary

work has been done on one of the most influential and controversial minorities in China:

the Hakkas. Taking off from (and to some degree contesting) the important work of Sow-

Theng Leong (1997), I have examined the formation of a distinct Hakka identity in the

nineteenth century. Through a study of Hakka involvement in the Red Turban Rebellions

(1854-56) and the Hakka-Punti War (1856-68), I have focused on how the Hakkas

conceived of their identity and how they expressed it through their voices, their

settlements and migrations, and their conceptions of the way their local history was

linked to broader Hakka and Chinese history. I contend that Hakka ethnic identity is

constructed in relation to antagonistic interactions between the Hakkas and the Puntis.

Hence, even though there was some basis for positive Hakka identity before the conflicts

later in nineteenth century,[557] it was the experience of the Red Turban Rebellions and the

resulting Hakka-Punti War that reinforced and extended that sense of identity.

---

[556] See Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People In Shanghai, 1850-1980* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992); Stevan Harrell, "Ethnicity, Local Interests," 51-548; Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," *Late Imperial China*, 11 (1990): 1-35; Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1991); David Ownby, "The Ethnic Feud in Qing Taiwan: What is This Violence Business, Anyway? An Interpretation of the 1782 Zhang-Quan Xiedou," *Late Imperial China* 11 (1990): 75-98.

[557] Xu Xuzeng's speech, made in 1808, is a good example of the development of a positive ethnic consciousness before the mid-nineteenth century.

The Hakkas were originally set off from the Puntis by their more recent settlement in the Pearl River Delta and by their distinctive dialect (along with some distinctive cultural practices). Economic tensions between the two groups, as land grew scarce, intensified the differences between the two groups, leading the Puntis to develop derogatory labels and descriptions of the Hakkas. The state failed to ease these tensions and inadvertently intensified them by establishing inadequate quotas for the examination system.

By early in the nineteenth century, at least some Hakka literati (represented by Xu Xuzeng) had developed a positive sense of their separate identity, responding to Punti slurs with an ideology of Hakka superiority. Increased economic decline in the early nineteenth century sparked lineage feuds and the growth of the Tiandihui among the Puntis in particular. Then, the Red Turban Rebellions spread disorder and resulted in the greater impoverishment of the countryside; and the governments' reliance on the Hakka braves to defeat some of the rebels particularly in the Wuyi region further fueled ethnic tensions. Shortly after the defeat of the Red Turbans, these tensions sparked the Hakka-Punti War, which, by explicitly and violently pitting the Puntis against the Hakkas, served to consolidate and strengthen Hakka ethnic consciousness.

Protestant and Catholic missionaries reinforced the sense of the difference between the Hakkas and the Puntis by embracing and perpetuating the Hakka ethnic ideology. And finally, the state, in creating a new and separate county for the defeated Hakka of the Wuyi, confirmed and gave political approval to the Hakka-Punti distinction.

In sum, the construction of a distinct Hakka ethnic identity, one that claims the allegiance of Hakka even today was a long-term process, beginning with the arrival of the "Guest People" in Guangdong. It was also a complex process, shaped not just by cultural difference (language and customs), but also by socioeconomic conflict, state action (and inaction), and religious and ideological difference, fuled in part by the presence of foreign missionaries in Guangdong.

The influence of subethnic identities on Chinese society and culture has become a topic of increasing interest among scholars of China recently and over the past years scholars have also become increasingly sensitive to histories and construction of Hakka identities.[558] While I was conducting archival research for this writing in Beijing from August 2001 to January 2002, a special documentary TV series on the Hakka people was regularly on the air on the CCTV (China Central Television). That documentary program

---

[558] See Leong, *Migration*; Constable, *Guest People*.

described Hakka kinship and village structures (including the famous circular walled

villages of northwestern Fujian), agricultural practices, folk arts, folk songs, and ritual

practices. The Hakka world and customs portrayed by the TV special documentary

program was very colorful, meaningful and intrinsically appealing for those who desired

to identify with the greater world of Hakka culture.

In fact, the special documentary program on Hakka customs and culture was a

product of the recent surge of interest in Hakka culture occurring among Chinese both in

the PRC and overseas. The Annual International Conference on Hakkaology is only one

of the most recent examples. Its more than 100 scholarly papers written by Chinese from

the PRC and overseas communities attests to a vigorous interest in Hakka history,

language, and culture both within and outside China. This sort of ethnic revitalization,

according to Mary Erbaugh,[559] has also emerged among Hokkien and Cantonese as well

as Hakka, a process that she attributes in part to the return visits of Overseas Chinese

looking for their roots.[560]

The overseas Hakka groups often adjusted to their new environment and to other

---

[559] Erbaugh, "The Hakka Paradox," 228.

[560] The Hakka ethnic revitalization was well demonstrated by the floods of publications on the Hakka history, which were often sponsored by Hakka emigrants from all over the world, and which preserved memories of the original Hakka settlements and the history of the Hakkas.

subethnic groups without losing their subethnic identity. Abner Cohen has called attention

to similar situations in which immigrant groups, rather than losing their cultural identities

through integration, have recognized their own traditional customs or developed new

customs under traditional symbols in an effort to become more distinct. He has called this

process "ethnic continuity" or "revival."[561]

The establishment of Hakka University (Jiaying University 嘉应大学)[562] and

Hakka Research centers[563] where none existed before, a vital aspect of the mainland

China's modernization projects, has been an important catalyst in the continuing

construction of identity among the Hakkas.[564] As a Hakka University was first set up in

---

[561] Abner Cohen, "Introduction: The Lessons of Ethnicity." In *Urban Ethnicity, Abner Cohen*, ed., ix-xxiv. ASA Monographs, no. 12 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974), xiv; Erbaugh, "The Hakka Paradox," 227-229.

[562] Jiaying University, located in Meizhou Prefecture, Guangdong Province, was established in 1985 with the approval of the provincial government and the support of overseas Chinese, especially a successful Hakka businessman in Taiwan. Accordingly, the Jiaying university is focusing on Hakka culture in their outreach to overseas Chinese. See Eriberto P. Lozada, Jr., *God Aboveground: Catholic Church, Postsocialist State, and Transnational Process in a Chinese Village* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 184-185.

[563] Recently many Chinese universities both from the mainland and Taiwan established Hakka Research centers with the hope of encouraging academic research, implementing plans related to Hakka culture, cooperating with external organizations, promoting creation and preservation of Hakka culture and history. Followings are the major Hakka Research Centers: Hakka Research Institute (Jiaying University, Guangdong); Hakka Research Society (Shenzhen University, Guangdong); International Hakka Research Institute (National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan); Center for Hakka Studies (National Central University, Taiwan)

[564] Erbaugh, "The Hakka Paradox," 227-228.

Meixian, Guangdong,[565] it also became the avenue through which the children of the

Hakkas from different areas could come into contact with one another. They not only

became literate in a standard Hakka language (Meixian Hakka language), they also learn

a common set of values and shared a common experience. Meizhou prefecture now plays

that role for the "true Hakka" and the label "Hakka" is regarded with pride throughout the

Hakka population in the world. The Hakkas accepted the whole story of Luo Xianglin to

gain a sense of superiority and more and more Hakka speakers have now formed "Hakka

Associations" and claimed themselves "Hakka."[566]

How do we interpret the renewed attractiveness of Hakka or other forms of

subethnic identities to Chinese? Will new types of mass media (such as the internet)

intensify the creation of new forms of imagined communities?[567] Analysts of global

trends have noted the divergent tendencies for new communications technologies to both

foster more universalistic identities, as well as to enhance more localized

---

[565] Meixian lies in an area generally referred to as the "Hakka heartland." Located in the mountains between western Fujian and eastern Guangdong, Meixian exhibited many features that Luo identified as being typical of Hakka county. Namely it was hilly, poor, isolated, and handicapped for trade. See Zheng, "Guangdong Zhonglu."

[566] Tsung-Tsin Associations throughout the world are the best example of this. See Hu Xizhang, et al., *Kejia Fenghua*.

[567] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London & New York: Verso, 1991).

identifications.[568] In fact, the attraction to subethnic ties may actually reflect a more depoliticized form of Chinese identity, a renewed identification with localized ancestral traditions—a sanitized version of a past that has now been safely transcended. The recent scholarly interest in global cultural flows that transcend national boundaries has directed increasing attention to the far flung populations often associated with these flows, and a new scholarly discourse on diasporic cultures and identities.[569] The wishes of young Hakkas living in different non-Chinese settings reassert ethnic bonds through network and recover individually one's cultural roots (i.e. by being eager to study the Hakka dialect or history is the most important cohesive element for a subethnic group). Participating in the Annual Hakka International conference and chatting through the Hakka websites provides important contest for the enhancement of Hakka group consciousness.[570]

We discovered that the subethnic rivalry in the Wuyi had other long-lasting effects. Despite the complex pattern of the Hakka migrations, wide distribution of the

---

[568] S. Hall, ed., *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage, 1997).

[569] James Clifford, *On the Edges of Anthropology : Interviews* (Chicago, University Press Marketing, 2003)

[570] Through the Hakka International Conference and the Internet, the Hakka Diaspora is connecting each other. One such Hakka community in cyberspace illustrates how transnational processes shape what it meant to be Hakka all over the world, including in the Hakka homeland.

Hakka people and their varied historical experiences, the sense of a single Hakka identity has still remained strong. "Hakka culture" is, however, not constant but subject to change.[571] That is, the criterion for Hakka identity has changed from dialect to an imagined and more abstract ideology of Hakka identity, an ideology that gives a widely scattered community a belief in a common Hakka identity. Hakka people today are living in many different countries but connected each other through various ways including established Hakka user groups on the internet. These Hakkas, in this age of globalization and internationalization continue to make their own history.

---

[571] Howard J. Martin, "The Hakka Ethnic Movement in Taiwan, 1986-1991." In Constable, *Guest People*, 176-195.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations Used in Footnotes

C.O.   Colonial Office Archives, Public Record Office. London.

F.O.   Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office. London.

FZ   Fuzhi 府志 (Prefectural Gazetteer).

XZ   Xianzhi 縣志 (County Gazetteer).

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* London & New York: Verso, 1991.

Antony, Robert James. "Pirates, Bandits, and Brotherhoods: A Study of Crime and Law In Kwangtung Province, 1796-1839." Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1998.

Averill, Stephen C. "The Shed People and the Opening of the Yangzi Highland," *Modern China* 9.1 (Jan. 1983): 84-126.

Baker, Hugh. *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui.* London: Frank Case, 1968.

Barth, Gunther Paul. *Bitter strength; a history of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.

Barth, Fredrik. "Introduction." In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference.* ed. Fredrik Barth. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969.

Bartlett, Beatrice S. *Ch'ing documents in the National Palace Museum Archives.* Taibei: National Palace Museum, 1975.

----------. *Archival Materials in China on United States History.* White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985.

----------. *Selected articles from Taipei National Palace Museum bulletin, 1972-1979.*

Taibei: National Palace Museum, 1972-79.

Beattie, Hilary J., *Land and lineage in China: a study of Tüng-chëng County, Anhwei, in the Ming and Chïng dynasties.* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Bian Baodi 卞寶第, *Bian Zhijun (Songchen) Zhengshu* 卞制軍(頌臣)政書. Taibei: Wenhai, 1968 Reprint.

Blake, C. Fred. *Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Hong Kong Market Town.* Asian Studies at Hawaii, no. 27. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981

Blythe, W. L. *The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study.* London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Boardman, Eugene. *Christian Influence upon the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864.* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1952.

Branner, David Prager Branner. *Problem In Comparative Chinese Dialectology: the Classification of Miin and Hakka.* Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000.

Brine, Lindesay. *The Taiping Rebellion in China: a narrative of its rise and progress, based upon original documents and information obtained in China / by Commander Lindesay Brine; with map and plans.* London: John Murray, 1862.

British Foreign Office Archives on file in the Public Record Office (FO 17: General Correspondence, F.O. 228: Embassy and Consular Archives, F.O. 405: Confidential Prints, F.O. 931: Papers in the Chinese Language, C.O. 129: Hong Kong Dispatches, C.O. 273: Static Settlements, Original Correspondence, 1839-1919), London.

Buoye, Thomas M. "Economic Change and Rural Violence: Homicides Related to Disputes over Property Rights in Guangdong During the Eighteenth Century." *Peasant Studies* 17.4 (1990): 233-259.

----------. *Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in Eighteenth-century China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Burnett, H. S. and V. V. Hagelstrom. *Present Day Political Organization of China.* Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, limited, 1912.

Cai Shaoqing 蔡少卿. *Zhongguo Jindai Huidangshi yanjiu* 中国近代会党史研究. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987.

----------. *Zhongguo Mimi Shehui* 中国秘密社会. Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1989.

----------. "Guanyu Tiandihui de Qiyuan Wenti 關于天地會的起源問題." *Beijing Daxue Xuebao* 北京大學學報 1 (1987): 53-64.

----------. "Lun Taipingtianguo yu Tiandihui guanxi 論太平天國與天地會關係." In Idem. *Zhongguo jindai huidangshi yanjiu* 中國近代會黨史研究. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987: 158-171.

Campbell, George. "Origin and Migrations of the Hakkas." *Chinese Recorder* 43 (1912).

Cao Fengzhen 曹凤贞 ed., "Yahu Caoshi zupu 雅湖曹氏族谱," In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 851-852. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Chang Chung-li. *The Chinese Gentry.* Seattle: University of Washington, 1955.

Chang Hsin-pao. *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Char, Andrew. "Social Origins of Ethnicity: The Hakka in Central Kwangtung." *Stone Lion Review* 9 (Harvard University, Spring 1982): 53-78.

Char, Tin-yuke and Wai Jane. *Chinese Historical Sites and Pioneer Families of the Island of Hawaii.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983.

Chen Chengxi 陳承禧. *Guangdong dizhi* 廣東地誌. Hong Kong: Tiandi chubanshe, 1978.

Chen Dianlan 陳殿蘭. Gangcheng zhengeji 岡城枕戈記." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 895-947. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Chen Ganhua 陈干华. "Yuexi Lianjiang de Kejiaren 粤西廉江的客家人." *Kejia yanjiu jikan* 客家研究集刊. Vol. 9 (1996): 55-60.

Chen Han sheng. *Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis in South China.* New York: International Publishers, 1936.

Chen Kun 陳坤. "Yuedong jiaofei jilue 粤東剿匪紀略." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 665-772. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

"Chen Song shiyou 陈松事由." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 212-213. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Chen Yundong 陳運棟. *Kejiaren* 客家人. Taibei: Lianya chubanshe, 1978.

Chen Zhengxiang 陳正祥. *Guangdong Dizhi* 廣東地誌. Hong Kong : Tiandi tu hu youxian gongsi, 1978.

Chen Zhiping 陳支平. *Kejia yuanliu xinlun* 客家原流新論. Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997.

Chesneaux, Jean. *Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century.* Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971.

----------. *Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1973.

Ch'iang T'ing-fu. "The Government and Co-hong of Canton, 1839," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, 15.4 (1932): 602-7.

China Mail 10 (May 1855), 22 (May 1856), 27 (October 1853).

Chinese Repository III (1834-5), IV (1836), XII (1843).

Chixi Xianzhi 赤谿縣志. (Gazetteer of Chixi County). 1920.

Choi Chi-chenug. "Descent Group Unification and Segmentation in the Coastal Area of Southern China." Ph.D. diss., University of Tokyo, 1987.

Chouban yiwu shimo 籌瓣夷始末. Beijing, 1930.

Ch'u T'ung-tsu. *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Clifford, James. *On the Edges of Anthropology : Interviews*. Chicago, University Press Marketing, 2003.

Cohen, Abner. "Introduction: The Lessons of Ethnicity." In *Urban Ethnicity*, ed. *Abner Cohen*, ix-xxiv. ASA Monographs, no. 12. London: Tavistock Publications, 1974.

Cohen, Myron L. "The Hakka or 'Guest People': Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeastern China." *Ethnohistory* 15.3 (Summer 1968): 237-92.

----------. "The Hakka or "Guest People," Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeast China." In *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad*. ed. Nicole Constable, 36-79. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Cohen, Paul A. *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-70*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Comaroff, John L., "Of Totemism and Ethnicity: Consciousness, Practice and the Signs of Inequality." *Ethnos* 52. 3-4 (1987): 301-23.

Comber, Leon. *Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya; A Survey of the Triad Society from 1800 to 1900* . Locust Valley, N. Y., Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J. J. Augustin, 1959.

Constable, Nicole. *Christian Souls and Chinese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong Kong*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994

----------. ed. *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Consular Report Vol. 23. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889.

Cooke, George W. *China and Lower Bengal: Being the Times Special Correspondence from China*. London: Warne & Routledge, 1858.

Costin, W.C. *Great Britain and China, 1833-1860*. Oxford: The Clarendon press, 1937.

Cressey, George B. *China's Geographical Foundation*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1934.

Croizier, Ralph C. *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Crossley, Pamela Kyle. "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," *Late Imperial China*, 11 (1990), pp. 1-35.

----------. *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

----------. *The Manchus*. Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell, 1997.

Cui Yingchang 崔榮昌. *Sichuan Fangyan yu Bashu wenhua* 四川方言与巴蜀文化. Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1996.

Daoguangchao donghualu 道光朝東華錄, 1899.

Davis, Fei-ling. *Primitive Revolutionaries of China: a study of secret societies in the late nineteenth century*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1971.

"Daming Douyuanshuai xiwen 大明都元帥檄文." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 50-52. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Da Qing Gaozong Chun (Qianlong) Huangdi shilu 大清高宗純(乾隆)皇帝實錄. Taibei: Hualian Chubanshe, 1964 Reprint.

Daqing Lichao shilu, Daoguang period 大清歷朝實錄, 道光朝. Taibei, 1964 Reprint.

Daqing Lichao shilu, Xianfeng period 大清歷朝實錄, 咸豐朝. Taibei, 1964 Reprint..

Daqing Muzong Yi (Tongzhi) Huangdi shilu 大清穆宗毅(同治)皇帝實錄. Taibei: Taiwan huawen shuju, 1968 Reprint.

Da Qing Renzong Rui (Jiaqing) huangdi shilu 大清仁宗睿(嘉慶)皇帝實錄. Taibei Shi : Faxingzhe Huawen shuju, 1968 Reprint.

Da Qing Shizong Xian (Yongzheng) Huangdi Shilu 大清世宗憲(雍正)皇帝實錄. Taibei: Hualian Chubanshe, 1965 reprint.

Da Qing Xuanzong Cheng (Daoguang) huangdi shilu 大清宣宗成(道光)皇帝實錄. Taibei: Huawen shuju,1964 Reprint.

Deqing Zhouzhi 德慶州志, 1909.

Dongguan Xianzhi 東莞縣志. 1765. Taibei : Chengwen chubanshe. 1969 Reprint.

Donghua quanlu (daoguangchao) 東華全錄 (道光朝). Taibei, 1963 Reprint.

Eberhard, Wolfram. *Social Mobility in Traditional China.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962.

Eitel, E. J. "Ethnographical Sketches of the Hakka Chinese." *Notes and Queries on China and Japan* I.5 (31 May 1867), I.6 (29 June 1867), I.7 (July 31, 1867).

----------. "An Outline History of the Hakkas." *China Review* 2 (July 1873-June 1874): 160-64.

Elvin, Mark J. Elvin "The Last Thousand Years of Chinese History." *Modern Asian Studies*, 4.2 (1970): 97-114.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, a new survey of universal knowledge. Chicago and London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1946.

Eng, Robert Y. "Institutional and Secondary Landlordism in the Pearl River Delta." *Modern China*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (Jan. 1986).

Enloe, Cynthia H. *Ethnic conflict and political development.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.

Enping Xianzhi 恩平縣志. 1934.

Erbaugh, Mary S. "The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as Hakka Enterprise." *China Quarterly* 132 (Dec. 1992): 937-68.

----------. "The Hakka Paradox in the People's Republic of China: Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence." In *Guest People*: *Hakka Identity in China and Abroad.* ed. Nicole Constable, 196-231. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Esherick, Joseph. *Chinese Archives: An Introductory Guide.* Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1996.

Fairbank, John K. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Fan I-chun. "Long Distance Trade and Market Integration in the Ming-Ch'ing Period, 1400-1850." Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1992.

Fang Xuejia 房學家. *Kejia yuanliu tan'ao* 客家源流探奧. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994.

Faure, David. "The Lineage as a Cultural Invention: The Case of the Pearl River Delta." *Modern China* 15. 1 (1989): 4-36.

----------. "What Made Foshan a Town? The Evolution of Rural-Urban Identities in Ming-Qing China." *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 11, No.2 (Dec., 1990): 1-31.

----------. The structure of Chinese rural society : lineage and village in the eastern New Territories, Hong Kong. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Faure, David and Helen F. Siu. "Introduction." In *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China.* Eds. David Faure and Helen F. Siu 1-20. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Fay, Peter Ward. *The Opium War, 1840-1842.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.

Feuerwerker, Albert. *Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China.* Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1975.

-----------------------. *Studies in the Economic History of Late Imperial China: Handicraft, Modern Industry, and the State.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1995.

Foshan Zhongyi xiangzhi 佛山忠義鄉志. 1830.

"Foling Tiandihui junji wenfang sishi tiaochen 佛嶺天地會軍機文房司事條陳." In *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha-Shiryō hen* 清末の秘密結社-資料篇. Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉. Tokyo: Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai, 1967.

Freedman, Maurice. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung.* London: Athlone, 1966.

----------. *Lineage Organization in Southeast Kwangtung,* London: Athlone, 1958.

----------. ed. *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

Friedman, Edward. "The Revolution or Just Another Bloody Cycle: Swatow and the 1911 Revolution." *Journal of Asian Studies* 29.2 (Feb. 1970): 289-308.

"Fuming zongbing dayuanshuai hong gaoshi, 复明总兵大元帅洪告示." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 61-62. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Fu Tongqin 傅同欽. "Ming Qing shiqi di Guangdong shatian 明清時期地廣東沙田." In *Ming Qing Guangdong shehui jingji xingtai yanjiu* 廣東社會經濟形態研究. ed. Guangdong History Institute, 65-74. Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985.

Gaoming xian zhi 高明縣志. 1756.

Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States." In *Old Societies and New States.* ed. Geertz, Clifford. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963.

Gladney, Dru C. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic of China.* Cambridge: Harvard University, 1991

Gongzhongdang Jiaqingchao Zouzhe 宮中檔嘉慶朝奏摺, 1982. Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan.

Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao Zouzhe 宮中檔乾隆朝奏摺, Nongye lei 農業類 33. Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1982 Reprint.

Goodman, Bryna. "The Locality as Microcosm of the Nation?-Native Place Networks and Early Urban Nationalism in China" *Modern China*, Vol. 21 No. 4 (October 1995), 387-419.

Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Guangdongsheng fangyan diaocha zhidaozu 广东省方言调查指导组. ed. *Siyiren xuexi putonghua shouce* 四邑人学习普通话手册. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1958.

Guangdongsheng minzhengting 廣東省民政廳. ed. *Guangdongsheng zhengqu tuce* 廣東省政區圖冊. Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng ditu chubanshe, 1995.

Guangdong Tongzhi 廣東通志. 1822.

Guangzhou Fuzhi 廣州府志. Taibei chengwen chubanshe, 1966 Reprint.

Guo Shouhua 郭壽華. *Kejia yuanliu xinzhi* 客家原流新志. Taibei, 1964.

Guo Tingyi 郭廷以. *Taiping tianguo shishi rizhi* 太平天國史事日誌. Taibei: Shangwu Printing Co., 1976.

Hall, S. ed. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London: Sage, 1997.

Hamberg, Theodore. *The Visions of Hung-siu-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection*. New York: Praeger, 1854.

Han Maoli 韓茂莉. "Songdai Lingnan diqu nongye dili chutan 宋代嶺南地區農業地利初探." *Lishi dili* 歷史地理 II (1993): 30-34.

Harrell, Stevan. ed. *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1994

----------. "Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in Southwest China." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32 (1990): 51-548.

Hase, P. H. "The Mutual Defense Alliance (Yeuk) of the New Territories." *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 29 (1989): 384-88.

Hayes, James. "Rural Society and Economy in Late Ch'ing: A Case Study of the New Territories of Hong Kong (Kwangtung)." *Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i* 3 (1976): 33-71.

----------. *The Rural Communities of Hong Kong: Studies and Themes.* Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983.

----------. *The Hong Kong region, 1850-1911 : institutions and leadership in town and countryside.* Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1977.

Henry, B.C. *Ling-Nam, or Interior Views of Southern China.* London: S.W. Partridge, 1886.

"He Liu deng shilong qishi yuanyou 何六等石龙起事缘由." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 214-215. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Heshan Xianzhi 鶴山縣志. 1754.

Hirayama Shu 平山周. *Zhongguo Mimi Shehuishi* 中國秘密社會史. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1912.

Hobsbawm, Eric. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." In *The Invention of Tradition.* eds. Hobasbawm and Ranger, 11-14. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1983.

----------. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries.* New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959.

Ho Ping-ti. *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Honig, Emily, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People In Shanghai, 1850-1980.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992

Hsiao Kung-chuan *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960.

Hsieh Kuo-ching. "Removal of the Coastal Population in Early Tsing Period." *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 15 (1932): 559-96.

Hsieh T'ing-yu. "Origins and Migrations of the Hakkas." *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 13 (220), 1929: 208-28

Hiseh, Winston. "Triads, Salt Smugglers; and Local Uprisings: Observations on the Social and Economic Background of the Waichow Revolution of 1911." In *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China: 1840-1950,* ed. Jean Chesneaux, 145-164. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

Hobsbawm, Eric. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." In *The Invention of Tradition.* eds. Hobasbawm and Ranger. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hu Chunfan 胡春帆, Hua Yu 華羽, Huang Shiqing 黃世情, and Wen Ji 文棨. "Shilun Qing qianqi di juanmian zhengze 試論清前期地減免政策." *Qingshi yanjiuji* 清史研究輯 3. Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1984; 150-65.

Hu Hsien-chin. *The Common Descent Group in China and its Functions.* New York, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1948.

Hu Xizhang 胡希张. et al. *Kejia fenghua* 客家风化. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1997.

Hu Zhusheng 胡珠生, *Qingdai Hongmenshi* 请代洪门史. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1996.

Huang Tinggui 黄廷桂. "Shijiu shiqi zhongyede Guangdong Tiandihui 十九世纪中叶的广东天地会." In *Xueshu yanjiu* 学术研究 No. 1. Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1963.

Huang Xianfan 黄现璠. *Zhuangzu tongshi* 壮族通史. Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 1988.

Huangqing zouyi 皇淸奏議. comp. Qinchuan jushi 琴川居士. Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1967.

Huizhou Fuzhi 惠州府志. 1881. Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1966 Reprint.

Hummel, Arthur W. ed. *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943-44.

Huntington, Ellsworth. *Civilization and Climate.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924.

Isaacs, Harold R. "Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe." In *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience.* eds. Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Isajiw W. W. "Definitions of Ethnicity." *Ethnicity* 1 (1974): 111-24.

Jen Yu-wen. *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.

----------. *Taiping Tianguo quanshi* 太平天国全史. Hong Kong: Jianshi mengjin shudian, 1962.

Jiang Bingzhao 蔣炳釗. "Lun kejia yu dangdi minzu zhu guanxi" 論客家與當地民族諸關係. *Xiamen daxue xuebao, zhe she ban* 廈門大學學報哲社版. 1992.4 (Oct. 1992): 106-12.

Jiang Taixin 江太新 and Duan Xueyu 段雪玉. "Lun Qingdai qianqi tudi kentuo dui shehui jingji fazhan di yingxiang 論清代前期土地干拓對社會經濟發展地影響." *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu* 中國經濟史研究 1 (1996).

Jiang Zuyuan 蔣祖緣 and Fang Zhiqin 方志欽 et al. *Guangdong Tong Shi. Gudai* 廣東通史. 古代. Guangzhou: Guangdong gao deng jiao yu chubanshe, 1996.

----------. *Jianming Guangdong Shi* 簡明廣東史. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin

chubanshe, 1993.

Jiaying Zhouzhi 嘉應州志. 1898.

Jin Yudi 金毓黻 ed. *Taiping Tianguo shiliao* 太平天國史料. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1953.

Johnson, Graham. "Family Strategies and Economic Transportation in Rural China: Some Evidence from the Pearl River Delta." In *Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era*. eds. Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell. Berkeley: California University Press, 1993.

Junjichu zouzhe lufu 軍機處奏摺錄副, Nongminyundonglei 農民運動類. Beijing: Fist Historical Archives.

Junjichutang zouzhe lufu 軍機處檔錄副奏摺. Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1982 Reprint.

Kaiping Xianzhi 開平縣志. 1823.

Keyes, Charles F. "The Dialectics of Ethnic Change." In *Ethnic Change*. ed. Charles F. Keyes. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981.

Kiang, Clyde Y. *The Hakka Odyssey & Their Taiwan Homeland.* Elgin: Allegheny Press, 1992.

Kuhn, Philip A. "Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 3.

----------. *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China, militarization and social structure, 1796-1864.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

----------. "The T'uan-lien Local Defense System at the time of the Taiping Rebellion." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 27 (1967).

----------. "The Taiping Rebellion." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, Part I. ed. John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Krone. "A notice of the Sanon District.' *China Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Transactions.* (1859).

Laai Yi-faai. "The Part Played by the Pirates of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces in the T'ai-p'ing Insurrection." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. 1950.

----------. "River Strategy: a place of the Taiping's Military Development," *Oriens* 5 (1952).

Lamley, Harry J. "Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch'ing Period." In *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society.* eds. Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, 282-318. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.

----------. "Hsieh-tou: The Pathology of Violence in Southeastern China." *Chi'ing-shih wen-t'i* 3.7 (1977): 1-39.

----------. "Lineage and Surname Feuds in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung Under the Ch'ing." In *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China.* ed. Kwang-Ching Liu, 255-78. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

----------. "Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong Under Qing Rule." In *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counter culture.* eds. Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell, 27-64. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.

Landsberger, Henry A. *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change.* N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1973.

Lane-Poole, Stanley. *The life of Sir Harry Parkes, K.C.B., G.C.M.G., sometime Her Majesty's minister to China and Japan.* Vol. I. London, New York: Macmillian and co., 1894.

Lang Jingxiao 郎擎宵. "Zhongguo nanfang xiedou zhi yuanyinji jizuzhi 中國南方械鬥之原因及其組織" *Dongfangzazhi* 東方雜誌 30 no. 19 (1933): 81-96.

----------. "Qingdai Yuedong xiedou shishi 清代粵東械鬥史實." *Lingnan xuebao* 嶺南學報 4.2 (1935).

Lary, Diana. *Region and Nation: the Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Lau, Chunfat. *The Decline of the General Hakka Accent in Hong Kong: A Comparison of "Old-Style" and "New-Style" as spoken by the indigenous inhabitants.* München: Lincom Europa, 2000.

Lavely, William and R. Bin Wong. "Revising the Malthusian Narrative: The Comparative Study of Population Dynamics in Late Imperial China." *Journal of Asian Studies* 57.3 (August 1998): 714-48.

Lechler, Rudolph. "The Hakka Chinese." *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal.* Vol. 9 (Sep-Oct., 1878): 352-359.

Lee, James. "Migration and Expansion in Chinese History." In *Human Migration.* eds. William H. McNeil and Ruth S. Adams, 20-47. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Leong, S. T. "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern China." In *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949.* eds. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung, 287-326. Lanham: University Press of America, 1985.

----------. *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their Neighbors.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997

Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲. ed. *Zhongguo lidai renkou, tiandi, tianfu tongji* 中国历代人口，田地，田赋统计. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1980.

Li Hua 李華. "Qingchao qianqi Guangdong de shangye yu shangren 清朝前期廣東的商業與商人." *Xueshu Yanjiu* 學習研究, No, 2 (1982): 39-44.

Li Mo 李默. "Lun kejia de xingcheng ji minzu ronghe" 論客家的形成及民族融合. *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 中國史研究. (1993.4): 117-29.

Li Wenzhi 李文治, et al. comps. *Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao* 中國近代農業史資料. Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1957.

Liao, David C. E. *The Unresponsive: Resistant or Neglected?: The Hakka Chinese in Taiwan Illustrate a Common Missions Problem.* Chicago: Moody Press, 1972.

Liang Rencai 梁仁彩. *Guangdong Jingji dili* 廣東經濟地理. Beijing: New Science Publishers, 1956.

Lin Daquan 林達泉. "Keshuo 客說." In *Chayang sanjia wenchao* 茶陽三家文鈔. ed. Wen Tingjing. Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966.

Lin Zexu 林則徐. "Liangguang zougao兩廣奏稿." In *Lin wenzhonggong zhengshu* 林文忠公政書. Lin Zexu 林則徐. Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1968 Reprint.

Lindley, Augustus F. *Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Ti-ping Revolution,* Vol. I. London: Day and Son, Ltd., 1866.

Little, Daniel and Joseph W. Esherick. "Testing the Testers: A Reply to Barbara Sands and Ramon Myers's Critique of G. William Skinner's Regional Systems Approach to China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (Feb., 1989): 90-99.

Liu Ping 刘平, *Bei yiwang de zhanzheng : Xianfeng Tongzhi nianjian Guangdong Tuke da xiedou yanjiu* 被遗忘的战争：咸丰同治年间广东土客大械斗研究. Beijing : Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003.

Liu Weizhang 廖伟章. "Taiping Tianguo Gemingshi Qingchao Guangdong Caizheng 太平天国革命时清朝广东财政." Chap. in *Taiping Tianguo yu Jindai Zhongguo*太平天国与近代中国. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993.

Liu Zhiwei. "Lineage on the Sands: the Case of Shawan." In *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China.* eds. David Faure and Helen F. Siu, 21-43. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Lo, Wan. "Communal Strife in Mid-Nineteenth Century Kwangtung: The Establishment of Ch'ih-ch'i." *Papers on China* 19 (Harvard University, Dec. 1965): 85-119

Long Qirui 龍啟瑞, "Yuexi duanlian jiluexu 粵西團練輯略序." In *Jingdetang wenji* 經德堂文集. Taibei: Yiwen, 1970 Reprint.

Lozada, Eriberto P. Lozada, Jr. *God Aboveground: Catholic Church, Postsocialist State,*

and Transnational Process in a Chinese Village. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Lu Baoqian 陸寶千. *Lun wan-qing Liangguang de Tiandihui zhengquan* 論晚清兩廣的天地會政權. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1975.

Lu Mingzhong 呂名中. "Hanzu nanqian yu Lingnan Baiyue diqu de zaoqi kaifa 漢族南遷與嶺南百粵地區的早期開發." *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* 中國史研究, No. 4 (1984): 17-24.

"Lü Zigui gongci 呂子桂供詞." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 108-110. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Luo Baoshan 骆宝善. "Guangdong Hongbing qiyi luelun 广东洪兵起义略论." In *Lingnan Wenshi* 岭南文史. Guangzhou: Guangdongsheng wenshi yanjiuguan, 1983: 82-89.

----------. "Guangdong Tiandihui qiyi qijian zhongwai fandongpai de goujie 广东天地会起义期间中外反动派的勾结." In *Taipingtianguo xuekan* 太平天国学刊. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983: 416-429.

----------. "Taiping tianguo shiji Guangdong Tiandihui qiyi shulue 太平天國時期廣東天地會起義述略." *Zhongshan Daxue xuebao* 中山大學學報. 4-1 (1981): 54-62.

Luo Ergang 羅爾綱. *Tiandihui Wenxianlu* 天地會文獻錄. Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1943.

----------. *Taiping Tianguo Shigang* 太平天國史鋼. Shanghai, Shanghai shudian, 1937.

----------. *Taiping tianguo shiliao kaoshiji* 太平天國史料考釋集. Beijing: Shanlian, 1956.

Luo Xianglin 羅香林, comp. *Kejia shiliao huipian* 客家史料匯篇. Hongkong: Zhongguo xueshe, 1965.

----------. *Kejia yanjiu daolun* 客家研究導論. Xinning: Xishan shucang, 1933

----------. "Kejia yuanliu kao" 客家原流考. In *Kejia yanjiu* 客家研究. eds. Zhang Weidong 張衛東 and Wang Hongyou 王洪友, 3-77. Shanghai: Tongji daxue chubanshe, 1989.

----------. *Hong Kong and its External Communications* before 1842. Hong Kong: Institute of Chinese Culture, 1963.

----------. "Guangdong minzu gailun 广东民族概论." *Minsu zhoukan* 民俗周刊 63. Special issue, 1929.

Nakagawa Manabu 中川學. "Chugoku kyakka shi kenkyu no shin doko" 中國客家史研究の動向. *Hitotsubashi ronso* 一橋論叢 77.4 (1977): 69-81

Lutz, Jessie G. and Lutz, Rolland Ray. *Hakka Chinese Confront Protestant Christianity,1850-1900: With the Autobiographies of Eight Hakka Christians, and commentary.* Armonk & London: M.E. Shape, 1998.

Maeda Katsutaro 前田勝泰郎. "Shindai no Kanton ni okeru nomin toso no kiban 清代廣東における農民斗争の基盤." *Toyo gekuho* 東洋學報, 51 (March 1969): 1-38.

Mai Bingjun 麦秉钧. "Heshan Maishi zupu ji yutu jishi lunlue 鶴山麦氏族普及與图记事沦略." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 1014-1024. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Mantaro J. Hashimoto. *The Hakka Dialect: a Linguistic Study of its Phonology, Syntax and Lexicon.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Marks, Robert B. *Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
----------. "Rice Prices, Food Supply, and Market Structure in Eighteenth-Century China." *Late Imperial China* 12.2 (December 1991): 64-116.

Martin, Howard J. "The Hakka Ethnic Movement in Taiwan, 1986-1991." In *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad.* ed. Nicole Constable, 176-195. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Matsuda Yoshiro 松田吉郎. "Minmatsu Shinsho Kanton Juko-deruta no Shaden Kaihatsu Shihai no Keisei Katei 明末清初広東珠江デルタの沙田開発と郷紳の 支配形成過程." *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* 社會經濟史學 Vol. 46 (1981) no. 6: 59-66.

Mazumdar, Sucheta. "A History of the Sugar Industry in China: The Political Economy of a Cash Crops in Guangdong, 1644-1834." Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1984.

Meadows, Thomas T. *The Chinese and Their Rebellions.* London: Smith, Elder, 1856.

Meskill, Johanna Menzel. *A Chinese pioneer family : the Lins of Wu-feng, Taiwan, 1729-1895.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Miao Hongji 繆鴻基. *Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Shitu Ziyuan* 珠江三角洲水土資源. Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshe, 1988.

Michael, Franz. "Regionalism in Nineteenth-Century China," introduction to Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.

Michael, Franz with Chang Chung-li. *The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, Vol. 1, History.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966.

Milne, William. "Some Account of a Secret Association in China, Entitled the Triad Society." *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 1 (1827).

Morgan, W. P. Triad Societies in Hong Kong. *Hong Kong: Government Press, 1960.*

Murray, Dian H., in collaboration with Qin Baoqi. *The Origins of the Tiandihui the Chinese Triads in Legend and History.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

----------. *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987.

Nanhai Xianzhi 南海縣志. 1872. Taibei : Chengwen chubanshe. 1967 Reprint.

Naquin Susan. *Millenarian Rebellion in China : The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976

----------------. *Shantung Rebellion : The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Naquin, Susan and Evelyn Rawski. *Chinese Society in Eighteenth Century.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

Niida Noboru 仁井田陞. *Chugoku no noson kazoku* 中國の農村家族. Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku, 1952.

Nishikawa Kikuko 西天喜久子. "Juntoku danren sokyokuno seitatsu 順德團練總局の成立." *Toyobunka kenkyusho kiyo* 東洋文化研究所紀要105 (1988).

----------. "Qingdai Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Shatiankao 清代珠江三角洲沙田考." In *Lingnan Wenshi* 嶺南文史. tran. Cao Leishi 曹磊石, 11-14. Gungdongsheng Wenshi Yanjiuguan, 1983.

North China Herald, No. 301 (may 3, 1856), and No. 359 (June 13, 1857).

Overland China Mail. Hong Kong, 1848-1909.

Ownby, David. "The Ethnic Feud in Qing Taiwan: What is This Violence Business, Anyway? An Interpretation of the 1782 Zhang-Quan Xiedou," *Late Imperial China*, 11 (1990), pp. 75-98

----------. *Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early Mid-Qing China: The Formation of A Tradition.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

----------. "Communal Violence in Eighteenth Century Southeast China: The Background to the Lin Shuangwen Uprising of 1787." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989.

----------. "The Heaven and Earth Society as Popular Religion," in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 54, no. 4 (Nov. 1995): 1023-1046.

Oxfelld, Ellen. "Still 'Guest People': The Reproduction of Hakka Identity in Calcutta, India." In *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad.* ed. Nicole Constable, 149-175. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Pan, Lyn, Paul De Angelis, ed. *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora.* Kodansha America Inc., 1994

Panyu Xianzhi 番禺縣志. 1871. Taibei : Chengwen chubanshe. 1967 Reprint.

Parliament Papers 1859, Session 2, v. 23

Pasternak, Burton. *Kinship and Community in Two Villages*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1972.

Peng Yuxin 彭雨新. *Qingdai tudi kaiken shi* 清代土地開墾史. Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe, 1990.

Perkins, Dwight H. *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.

Perry, Elizabeth J. *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980.

Peterson, Anya, *Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Piton, Ch. "On the Origin and History of the Hakkas." *China Review*, 2 (July 1873-June 1874): 222-26.

Polachek, James M. *The Inner Opium War.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Pong, David. *A Critical Guide to the Kwangtung Provincial Archives: Deposited at the Public Record of Office of London.* Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1975.

----------. "The Kwangtung Provincial Archives at the Public Record Office of London: A Progress Report," *Journal of Asian Studies,* vol. 28, Issue 1 (Nov. 1968).

Potter, Jack. "Land and Lineage in Traditional China." In *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society.* ed. Maurice Freedman. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

Powers, Marshall K. "Chinese Coolie Migration to Cuba." Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Florida, 1953.

Purdue, Peter. *Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850.* Cambridge: Harvard University, Council on East Asian Studies, 1987.

Qin Baoqi 秦寶琦 and Liu Meizhen 劉美珍. eds. *Tiandihui.* 天地會 7 vols. Beijing: The Number One Historical Archive, 1981-89

----------. *Qing Qianqi Tiandihui Yanjiu* 清代前期天地會研究. Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 1988.

Qinding Daqing huidian shili 欽定大淸會典事例. Taibei: Xinwenfeng, 1899.

Qingshi 淸史 (History of the Qing Dynasty). Taibei: Huawen shuju, 1961 Reprint.

"Qing Wenzong Xianfeng Shilu 清文宗咸丰实录." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 1137-1202. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Qu Dajun 屈大均. *Guangdong xinyu* 廣東新語. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985.

Qujiang XZ 曲江縣志, 1875.

Rawski, Evelyn S. *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972.

Renhua XZ 仁化縣志, 1883.

Rhoads, Edward. *China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Roberts, J. A. G. "The Hakka-Punti War." Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1969.

Roger, Banister T. *A History of the External Trade of China, 1834-81*. Shanghai: Inspector General of Chinese Customs, 1931.

Ruddle, Kenneth and Gongfu Zhong. *Integrated Agriculture-Aquaculture in South China: The Dike-Pond System of the Zhujiang Delta*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Sands, Barbara and Ramon H. Myers. "The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: A Test," *Journal of Asian Studies* 45, no. 4 (August, 1986): 721-43.

Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉. *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha-Shiryō hen* 清末の秘密結社-資料篇. Tokyo: Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai, 1967.

----------. "Juntoku ken kyoshin to Tokai jurokusha 順德縣鄉紳と東海十六沙." *Kindai Chugoku kenkyu* 近代中國研究 3 (1959): 161-232.

-----------. "Kampo yonen Kanton Tenchikai no haran 咸豐四年廣東天地會の反亂" *Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu Senta iho* 近代中國研究センタ彙報, 2.3 (1963): 1-17.

Scarth, John. *Twelve Years in China: The People, the Rebels, and the Mandarins*. Edinburgh: T. Constable and co., 1860.

Schoppa, R. Keith. *Chinese Elites and Political Change : Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1982.

Schlegel, Gustave. *Thian Ti Hwui: The Hung League or Heaven-Earth League*. Batavia: Lange and Co., 1866.

Schurhammer, Georg. *Francis Xavier, His Life, His Times*, Vol. 4. Rome : Jesuit Historical Institute, 1973-1982.

Shaozhou Fuzhi 韶州府志, 1843.

Shepherd, John Robert. *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Shi Naian. *The Marshes of Mount Liang : A New Translation of the Shuihu zhuan*, John and Alex Dent-Young, trans. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994.

Shih, Vincent Y. *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences.* Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1967.

Shils, Edward. "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties." *British Journal of Sociology* 8 (1957): 130-45.

Shirokogoroff, S. M. *Anthropology of Eastern China and Kwangtung Province.* Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch, Extra Vol. IV: Shanghai, 1925.

Shunde Xianzhi 順德縣志. 1929. Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1966 Reprint.

"Shundexian huifeilan duanyuanyou 順德縣會匪亂端緣由." In *Shinmatsu no himitsu kessha-Shiryō hen* 清末の秘密結社-資料篇. Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉. Tokyo: Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai, 1967.

Sihui Xianzhi 四會縣志. 1896. Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin chubanshe, 1996 Reprint.

Skinner, G. William. "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems." In *City in Late Imperial China.* ed. G. W. Skinner, 275-352. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

----------. "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (1971): 270-281.

----------. "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth Century China." In *City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. W. Skinner, 212-49. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

So, Alvin Y. *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory.* New York: State University of New York Press, 1986.

Soda Yo 相田洋. "Kokinko 紅巾考." *Toyoshi kenkyu* 東洋史研究, 38.4 (March 1980).

Spence, Jonathan D. *The Taiping Vision of Christian China.* Waco, TX: Baylor University, 1996.

----------. *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996.

Stauffer, Milton T. ed. *Christian Occupation of China.* Shanghai: China Continuation Committee 1922.

Struve, Lynn A. *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984.

Su Fengwen 蘇鳳文. *Gufei zonglu* 股匪總錄. Taibei: Xiangsheng chubanshe, 1975 Reprint.

----------. "Pinggui jilue 平桂纪略." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 772-813. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Taishanxian dang'anguan 台山县档案馆. ed. *Taishan dilizhi* 台山地理志. Taishan: Zhongguo Taishanxian weiyichuanbu, 1984.

Tan Xin 潭心. ed. *Siyi fengguang* 四邑風光. Hong Kong: Wanye Chubanshe, n.d.

Tan Zuen 谭祖恩. "Xinhui jingbian shilue 新会靖变识略." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Tang Shen 唐森 and Li Longqian 李龍潛. "Mingqing Guangdong Jingji Zuowu de Zhongzhi ji Yiyi 明清廣東經濟作物的種植及意義" In *Mingqing Guangdong Shehui Jingji Xingtai Yanjiu* 明清廣東社會經濟研究. Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1985, 1-21.

"Tao Daqing xiwen 討大清檄文." " In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 38-40. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Teng Ssu-yu. *New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.

Terrill, Ross. *800,000,000: The Real China.* Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

The Chinese and Japanese Repository 3 (1865).

The Taiping Revolution. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1976.

Thernstrom, Stephen. ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

T'ien Ju-kang. *The Chinese Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure.* London: L.S.E. Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 12, 1956.

Tilly, Charles, Louise, and Richard. *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Toland, Judith. "Introduction: Dialogue of Self and Other: Ethnicity and the Statehood Building Process." In *Ethnicity and the State*, ed., Toland, Judith D. New Brunswick, N.J.: Tansaction Publishers, 1993.

Tregear, T. R. *Hong Kong Gazetteer to the Land Utilization Map of Hong Kong and the New Territories, with China and English Names.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1958.

Vermeer, E. B. "Introduction: Historical Background and Major Issues." In *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries*. ed. E. B. Vermeer, 5-34. E. J. Brill, 1990.

Vos, George de. "Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation." In *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*. eds. George de Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung, 1800-1856" In *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China: 1840-1950*. ed. Jean Chesneaux. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

----------. "'High Ch'ing: 1683-1839." In *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation*. ed. J. B. Crowley, 1-28. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970.

----------. *Strangers at the Gate*. Berkeley and L.A.: Univ. of California Press, 1966.

----------. "The Canton Trade and the Opium War." In *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10. ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, 1978-1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Wang Tianjiang 王天奖, "19shiji xiaban de zhongguo di mimi shehui 19世纪下半的中国地秘密社会," *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究. No. 2. Beijing, 1963.

Wang Xin 王鑫. *Wangzhuang wugong weiji* 王壮武功违集, 1892.

Wang Yeh-chien. *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Watson, James. "Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Approaches on Historical Research." *China Quarterly* 92 (1982): 589-627.

Wei Yuan 魏源. *Shengwuji* 聖武記. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1995 reprint.

Weller, Robert P. *Resistance, Chaos and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts and Tiananmen*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994.

Wiens, Harold J. *China's March Toward the Tropics: a discussion of the southward penetration of China's culture, peoples, and political control in relation to the non-Han-Chinese peoples of south China and in the perspective of historical and cultural geography*. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1954.

----------. *Han Chinese Expansion in South China*. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1967.

Williams Brackette. "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation across Ethnic Terrain." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 401-4.

Wolf, Eric R. *Peasants*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

----------. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York, Harper & Row, 1969.

Wong, J. Y. *Yeh Ming-ch'en : Viceroy of Liang Kuang 1852-8*. Cambridge [Eng.]; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976.

----------. *Deadly Dreams : Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China*. Cambridge [U.K.]; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.

----------. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York, Harper & Row, 1969.

Wright, Stanley. *The Origin and Development of the Chinese Customs Service, 1843-1911 An Historical Outline*. Shanghai, 1939.

Wu Bingheng 吳秉衡. "Xinfeng shouchengji shilue 信豐守城記事略." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 1125-1136. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Wu Zhaoqing 吳兆清 and Hao Zhiqing 赫治清. *Zhongguo Banghuishi* 中國幫會史. Taibei: Wenzhi chubanshe, 1996.

Xianfengchao chou ban yi wu shi mo 咸豐朝籌瓣夷務始末. Beijing, 1928 Reprint.

Xiao Yishan 蕭一山. *Jindai Mimi Shehui Shiliao* 近代秘密社会史料 Vol.1. Changsha: Yuelu shu she Hunan sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 1986.

----------. *Qingdai tongshi* 清代通史, Vol. I Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1962.

Xiao Guojian 蕭国健. *Shenzhen diqu jiazu fazhan* 深圳地区家族发展. Hong Kong: Xianchao Shushi, 1992.

Xiangshan Xianzhi 香山縣志. 1923. Taibei : Chengwen chubanshe. 1967 Reprint.

Xinning Xianzhi 新寧縣志. 1893.

Xinning xiangtu dili 新寧鄉土地理. Taishan: n.p., 1900.

Xinyi XZ 新宜縣志. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993 Reprint.

Xunzhou Fuzhi 潯州府志. 1874.

Xuxiu nanhai Xianzhi 續修南海縣志. 1872

Xuxiu Guangzhou Fuzhi 續修廣州府志. 1759.

Xuxu 徐续. *Lingnan gujinlu* 岭南古今录. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Xu Xuzeng 徐旭曾, "Fenghu Zaji 豐湖雜記." In *Kejia shiliao huipian* 客家史料匯篇. comp. Luo Xianglin, 279-99. Hongkong: Zhongguo xueshe, 1965.

Yang, C. K. "Some Preliminary Patterns of Mass Actions in Nineteenth-Century China."

In *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*, eds. Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

----------. *Chinese Village, Taitou, Shantung Province*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

Yeh-chien Wang. "The Secular Trend of Prices during the Ch'ing Period (1644-1911)." *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong* 5.2 (Dec., 1972): 347-68.

Yen Ching-hwang. *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.

Ye Xianen 叶显恩. "Ming Qing Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou tudi zhidu, Zongzu yu shangyehua 明清珠江三角洲土地制度, 宗族与商业化." *Zhongguo Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao* 中国文化研究所学报 6. Guangzhou, 1997.

Yong Kweng 容閎. *Sohak dongjumki* 西學東漸記. Kwon, Heechul. tran. Seoul: Ulyumoonhwasa, 1974.

Yongzheng zhupi yuzhi 雍正硃批語旨. Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965 Reprint.

Yoo Jangkun 유장근. *Kundae Joong'Kukyi Bimil Kyulsa* 근대중국의 비밀결사. *Seoul: Koryowon, 1996*.

----------. "Yangkwang jiyuckyi jayunkwa inmoon hwankyung 兩廣地域의 自然과 人文環境," *Joongkook yunkoo* (Fall, 1993): 26-43.

Yulin zhouzhi 鬱林州志. 1894. Taibei : Chengwen chubanshe. 1967 Reprint

Zhang Fenqian 張奮前. "Kejia minxi zhi yanhua 客家民系之演化." *Taiwan Wenxian* 臺灣文獻. 13.4 (Dec., 1962).

Zhang Kuangyu 张光宇. "Lun Kejiahua de xingcheng 論客家话的形成." *Qinghua Xuebao* 清华学报. Vol. 25.2 (1995): 161-180.

Zhang Zhidong 張之洞. *Zhang Wenxiang Gong Quanji* 張文襄公全. 1886. Taibei: Wenhai, 1963 Reprint.

----------. *Zhang Zhidong quanji* 张之洞全集. Shijiachuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1998.

Zhao Yuanying. 趙沅英, "Hongbing jishi 紅兵紀事." In *Hongjinjun qiyi ziliaoji* 紅巾軍 起義資料輯 (Guangdong Jindaishi Ziliao), 94-144. Guangzhou : Guangdongsheng Zhongshan tushuguan, 1992.

Zelin, Madeline. *The Magistrate's Tale*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Zengcheng Xianzhi 增城縣志 (Gazetteer of Zengcheng County). 1754.

Zheng Dehua 鄭德華. "Shijiou shiji mo Taishan qiaoxiang de xingcheng ji qi pouxi 十九世紀末台山僑鄉的形成及剖析."*Guangzhou huaqiao yanjiu* 廣州華僑研究 4 (1986).

----------. "Guangdong Zhonglu Tuke Xiedou Yanjiu 廣東中路土客械鬥研究." Ph.D. diss., University of Hong Kong, 1989.

Zheng Dehua and Cheng Luoxi 成露西. *Taishan qiaoxiang yu Xinning tile* 台山僑鄉與新寧鐵路. Guangzhou: Sanlian shudian, 1991.

"Zhen'geshi biji 枕戈氏笔记." In *Guangdong hongbing qiyi shiliao* 廣東洪兵起義史料. Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan, Zhongshan daxue lishi xibian, 853-862. Guangzhou : Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1992.

Zheng Piexin 郑佩鑫. "Dachengguo de fanqing qiyi 大成国的反清起义." *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊. Henan renmin chubanshe (Dec., 1958): 14-19.

Zheng Tianxiang 鄭天祥. *Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou Jingji Dili Wangluo* 珠江三角洲經濟地理網絡. Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press, 1991.

Zhong Zhenwei 錘珍维."Chen Kai, Li Wenmao lingdaode hongjinjun qiyi 陈开，李文茂领导的红巾军起义." *Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue* 中学历史教学 9. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1958: 16-18.

Zhou Rijian 周日健. *Xinfeng fangyanzhi* 新丰方言志. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990.

Zhou Yumin 周育民. "Zhongguo huidang wenti yanjiu shuping 中国会党问题研究述评." In Zhongguo huidangshi yanjiuhui 中国会党史研究会 ed. *Huidangshi yanjiu* 会党史研究. Shanghai: Dueling Chubanshe, 1984.

----------. *Zhongguo banghuishi* 中国帮会史. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1993.

Zhuang Jifa 莊吉發. *Qingdai Mimi Huidangshi Yanjiu* 清代秘密會黨史研究. Taibei: Wenshi zhexue chubanshe, 1994.

----------. "Qingdai mimi huidang de tantao 清代秘密會黨的探討," *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* 中國歷史學會史學集刊, 16 (July 1984).

----------. *Qing Gaozong Shiquan Wugong Yanjiu* 清高宗十全武功研究 Taibei: Gugong bowuyuan, 1982.

----------. "Qingdai Min-Yue Diqu de Renkou Liudong yu Mimi Huidang de Fazhan 清代閩越地區的人口流動與秘密會黨的發展." *Jindai Zhongguo Chuqi Lishi Yantao Huilun Wenji* 近代中國初期歷史研討會論文集. Taibei: Academia Sinica, 1990.

----------. *Qingdai Tiandihui Yuanliugao* 清代天地會原流考. Taibei: Shilin, 1982.

----------. "Qingdai mimi huidang de tantao 清代秘密會黨的探討," *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* 中國歷史學會史學集刊, 16 (July 1984): 153-83

Zo, Kil Young. *Chinese Emigration into the United States: 1850-1880*. New York: Arno Press, 1978.

Zhupi zouzhe 硃批奏摺, *Nongminyundonglei* 農民運動類. Beijing: Fist Historical Archives.