PROTEST AND SOCIO-POLITICAL EXPERIMENTATION: LESSONS FROM MAY'68, HONG KONG UMBRELLA MOVEMENT, AND SEATTLE 2020

by

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The creation and maintenance of a successful system of democracy is exceedingly complex and difficult. Any such system will have flaws and weaknesses, which can lead to democratic breakdown or backsliding as has been seen numerous times throughout history. Drawing on the work of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt examining the causes of democratic decay, and particularly the role of the loss of faith in democratic institutions, this paper aims to provide information which could support efforts to preserve democracy through changes to its specific structures and institutions. The range of data available through the study of existing democratic systems around the world is limited and many experience similar difficulties to those present in the United States so, partially inspired by the work of David Graeber, this paper studies the efforts made in long-term and large-scale protests of May ‘68, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, and Seattle’s Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone or Organized Protest. Each of these movements created new structures to make decisions, protect protesters in the areas they occupied, and meet their basic logistical needs, so they, and other protests like them, are of great value to study as natural experiments. Each protest experienced successes and failures in these areas and, with an understanding of why they faced the difficulties they did, future efforts could learn a great deal from the experiments that these protesters attempted. The aim of this paper is to offer useful insights itself, as well as to demonstrate a type of study with unutilized potential.

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Chapter 1: Introduction, Literature, and Methods

Literature - Inspiration and Motivation

The goal of this paper is significantly inspired by David Graeber's *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* (afterwards shortened to *Fragments* for convenience). In *Fragments*, Graeber proposes and argues for the value of a project documenting different social forms, which inspired the idea that became the goal of this project. Graeber argues that anthropology as a field is well-suited to support anarchism as a political ideology by studying cultures and communities and the ways that they organize themselves and, through making that information available, providing communities attempting to organize themselves in different ways with tools to use and information about the communities that have used them successfully. The idea of this project combined with the author's interest in protests and the United States political system, and particularly its weaknesses, to form the idea that inspired the goal of this paper.

Another key work that influenced the perspective that led to the inception of the concept of this paper was *How Democracies Die* by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. In this book, Levitsky and Ziblatt describe a breakdown of informal norms and unspoken rules that occurs in the course of democratic decay and accompanying distrust in and dissatisfaction with democratic institutions, creating opportunities for authoritarian regimes to take power in formerly democratic states. In the process of outlining this general process, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that modern trends in United States politics are following the pattern of this breakdown, with trends often originating in either the 1960s or 1990s but particularly escalating in the 2010s around Donald Trump. They do not argue that a fascistic dictatorship is necessarily the result of the path the United States are currently on, nor does the author of this paper believe it is, but they present a cogent argument why it should be taken seriously as a possibility.

The fusion of these two ideas inspired this project. Graeber saw value in an exploration of alternative structures and systems of organization to support the creation of something entirely new, and Levitsky and Ziblatt articulated potential dangers of continuing with the status quo unchanged, in the possibility of a complete breakdown of democracy if action is not taken. The political institutions of the United States are far from the only factor causing dissatisfaction with our political system, but there are many elements which contribute to a lack of belief in that system and hinder efforts to address significant issues. Because of these issues and the harm they cause, regardless of whether they ultimately lead to the collapse of democracy in the United States, there would be value in a project similar to the one proposed by Graeber to, studying alternatives and analyzing their results. Such a study would provide information for efforts to either reform or replace existing institutions, allowing efforts to do so much more effectively if that step becomes necessary. That exploration is the project which this paper hopes to begin, to provide a basis on which future efforts could build. If the classical models of liberal democracy that we see around the world and in the examples used by Levitsky and Ziblatt are vulnerable to this collapse into authoritarianism, perhaps a valuable place to look for alternatives and counterexamples would be in the efforts of those who are critical of modern power structures. So, this paper will study the alternatives offered by protesters dissatisfied with their political systems, people who have found their variously democratic systems lacking and chosen to push for something better. These protesters often experiment with the structures they use to organize their temporary communities, providing a valuable opportunity to observe the successes and failures of radically different systems that have been proposed as alternatives. By studying the successes and failures of these movements, we can provide a set of potential tools to address the issues of our current systems or, if necessary, build something new in their place.

Before moving further, the goal of this project is not primarily to analyze either the consequences or the reasonings behind the protest movements, but it will discuss both. In many cases, some of the consequences of a movement are extensions of the ideas and structures which protesters experimented with during the 'core' of the movement, and preexisting ideas and organizational structures were important in the formation of the social forms used during the protest. Knowledge of preexisting structures which contributed to what was possible during protest provides important context as to what may be necessary for versions of organizational systems used in those protests to be used elsewhere. Similarly, an understanding of the ideological factors which led each group of protesters to adopt the practices they did may help illustrate what issues they sought to address and determine what sorts of challenges their solutions may be suited to addressing.

Methods

This paper will examine the protests of May '68, the Umbrella Movement, and the Seattle Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone/Organized Protest, with some variance in the degree of detail for each. I intend to discuss how each organized itself, as well as the successes and failures of each on an organizational level, such as failing to meet the needs of protesters, generating dissatisfaction with their decision-making apparatus, or failing to maintain physical security within occupied areas. Though there will be some analysis in each section, the bulk of the analysis, and particularly analysis comparing movements to each other, will come in a separate section after each movement has been described. This analysis section will contain the bulk of the major arguments of this paper and should be largely comprehensible alone, but the earlier sections will contribute meaningful depth and context.

Chapter 2: Movements

May ‘68

May ‘68, or Mai ‘68, is a period of protest in France that has had a significant influence on French culture and has been the subject of considerable research, but is commonly poorly understood in France and is not well-known or understood in the United States. The conventional understanding of the event, as described by Chris Reynolds in *Memories of May ‘68*, spans the month of May, divided into three main sections. First is the “student crisis” from May 3-10, beginning with student protests against de Gaulle and the state of higher education in France, but with a harsh police response increasing public support for the students and the particularly brutal “Night of the Barricades” on May 10 generating a massive swell of support. The response to the “Night of the Barricades” led to the second phase of the event, the “social crisis” phase, lasting roughly from May 14-27. Moved to show their support for the students, France’s unions plan a one-day strike for May 13, but it extends into a weeks-long general strike, bringing the usual functioning of the country to a halt. The government attempts negotiations with the (separate but mutually supportive) student and worker protesters, but negotiations fail. The deal reached with union leaders is rejected by the workers, and similar failures meet efforts to persuade student protesters to disperse. At the height of this crisis, de Gaulle’s actions mark the shift into the third and shortest phase, the “political crisis” from May 27-30. The country is perceived to be on the brink of the overthrow of the Gaullist regime when de Gaulle disappears to Baden-Baden, creating a feeling of panic in his brief absence while he rallies support. When he returns, de Gaulle addresses the country, rallying public support, inciting fears of a communist revolution, and generating massive demonstrations in support of the government and himself, while also calling for new elections. This is the beginning of the end of the protests, with protesters

dispersing, generally satisfied with new elections, even when the elections result in increased power for the Gaullist faction (Reynolds, 39). This is a generally passable impression of the events of "May '68" in the most literal sense, but it leaves out a great deal of the movement, which was not truly isolated to the month of May. Workers and students were not uniformly acting together, but they cooperated far more deeply than is reflected in the traditional understanding of the event. Many of the strikes lasted into June, which is when much of the greatest violence occurred, and some groups formed in May '68 remained active for years into the future (Ross, 76). Ideas developed during the protests were influential for years to come, both in protest and in official policy (Ross, 32, Reynolds, 119-120). A full exploration of May '68 could be, and has been, the subject of a book in itself, so this work will not attempt to fully address these factors, but acknowledgement of the incomplete picture of the general history is important. Explorations of May '68 here will strive for the best understanding they can reach, but the sheer scope of the event, as well as the fact that much of the writing on the subject is in French, will create limitations.

An important element of this movement to note, and a limitation on the ability of this paper to cover it in the full depth possible, is that it was massive, one of the largest mass-movements France and the industrial world have ever seen, and far from homogeneous. Even within the classical divisions of 'student' and 'worker' protesters, there were different groups with different aims and opinions. Some saw this as an opportunity for political revolution, while others were interested in specific, though still radical, reforms in workplaces and higher education, while yet others aimed for a radical breaking down of established social barriers, and others were largely concerned with opposing police violence against protesters (Vigna 47-48, Reynolds 47, 79, Dormoy-Rajramanan 247, Ross 25, 28, 32, 157, 187-188, Pagis 82-83, 86).

This makes any thorough analysis of all of the goals pursued by protesters and all of the methods used in their pursuit utterly impossible in the scope of this paper. Instead of this impossible task, this paper will aim for some understanding of common features, as well as more in-depth exploration of specific elements of the movement and the tools they employed. This leaves much more work that could be done in pursuit of the same aim as this paper studying events in France during 1968, but still provides a wealth of potentially useful information for this paper to use in its analysis.

General Assemblies

The general assembly is a common idea in discussion of May '68 and something which this paper would be quite interested in examining. Unfortunately, details about how the general assemblies of May '68 functioned are difficult to find in English, leaving insufficient detail for any great depth of analysis, at least so far as I have been able to locate. What is available is that they were an experiment in direct democracy, often combined with a great many committees and meetings between various groups of people, attempting to bridge the considerable gaps between different groups in French society, seeking common ground to allow shared issues to be confronted. They were also noted to be easily distracted or bogged down dealing with a high volume of participants (Gregoire & Perlman Self Organization in General Assemblies). The movement, partially through the use of these structures, encouraged people to speak for themselves, rather than letting others speak for them. The considerable differences of opinion between those participating in the movement led to difficulties agreeing on a single position, but many of these forms, particularly when working at smaller scales, had significant success, with a different structure, the *Comités d'action*, or action committees, a notable example, as well as one with more information available in English.

Action Committees

Action committees were one of, if not the, primary systems to coordinate protester action in May '68. They had nearly no formal structure, including in leadership or membership. Anyone who was present and wished to participate was a member, and anyone who wished to could facilitate a meeting (Gregoire & Perlman, Citroën Action Committee — I). Action committees involved students and workers, with equal power for both, and often worked to communicate between both the two groups and different elements within them, though the primary national union, the communist-aligned *Confédération générale de travail* (CGT), was generally hostile to efforts to join student and worker action, with some variance between different sites (Gregoire & Perlman Citroën Action Committee — I & II). This hostility led the action committees focusing on coordinating student and worker action to try to work around the unions, trying to build direct contact between workers, students, and peasants, as well as working to bring the often sidelined or tangentially included foreign workers, who made up as much as sixty percent of the workforce, into the movement. Appeals to foreign laborers, coming from poor countries to work in France, included physically visiting the separate communities where they lived and organizing French language classes for the significant numbers of workers who did not speak French. One of the ultimate goals of these efforts was to encourage workers to form their own action committees, to take the decision-making power out of the hands of the comparatively moderate and anti-cooperation union establishment (Gregoire & Perlman Citroën Action Committee — I & II).

Beyond the communicative role that action committees attempted to play between students and workers, they were heavily involved in meeting general practical needs. Action committees formed whenever a group of protesters felt that something needed to be done and

was not, organizing themselves to meet that need. In a simple example, action committees formed in response to the need to prepare food and clean, coordinating volunteers to cook, to maintain bathrooms, and to provide medical support for protesters injured in clashes with police, handling the practicalities of the needs expressed in general assemblies (Gregoire & Perlman Exemplary Character of the University Occupation, Revolutionary Consciousness of Social Power).

Action committees had some successes early on, but their energy began to fade rather quickly as time went on. Even from the beginning, action committees often deferred in the moment to the decisions made by the pre-existing unions, regardless of how union goals and decisions compared to the action committees' priorities. In many cases, particularly any outside of basic logistics, action committees became unwilling to initiate or lead any action, waiting for another group to do so then joining their efforts (Gregoire & Perlman Self Organization in Action Committees, Partial Liberation of the Militants).

Worker and Student Involvement and Worker-Student Cooperation

There can be little question that students and workers were both major parts of May '68, though discussion of the event has often centered around the student aspect of the movement. Students occupied their campuses and took to the streets in their demonstrations, while the workers occupied their factories and joined the students on the streets (Ross, 71-72). The degree to which the different elements coordinated with each other varied across France, but it was often a priority for both students and workers. The strategies used by the workers and the goals that they pursued are varied, but this paper will work to outline some common strategies throughout France and the ideas which motivated them.

The tool most universally used by workers in their participation in May '68 is the strike. There was a general strike throughout France for half of May, with many regions maintaining their strikes well into June. The scale of this was massive, estimated at 9 million people on strike across the country (Ross, 184). The scale of the participation did, however, vary significantly between regions in France. Porhel notes that as many of 90 percent of the workers in Brittany, and 98 percent of the factories, were on strike (Porhel, 194) and striking continued through much of June (Reynolds 112), while in Alsace a student described the strike as weakly followed, and it reached its peak in late May (Reynolds 113-114). Even with this variance, a strike of this scale exerts immense pressure, grinding normal life to a near-total halt for over a month throughout all of France. Also common as part of the strikes was the occupation of factories, which enabled some significant features of the movement, influenced by the specific climate of each occupied factory.

The aims of worker protesters were many, and often not well recorded, but they certainly went beyond simply increased wages, with many workers expressing a desire for a reduced work week or more involvement in the running of the factories in which they worked (Vigna 48, Ross, 32). This goal of increased democratization of the workplace contributed to the ideological unity that existed between the students and the workers, allowing each group to see in the other a parallel of their own fight to have their voices heard (Reynolds 115). Partially due to the events of May '68, this general goal solidified into the idea of autogestion, that workers and their representatives should run their workplaces, a lasting goal of the French labor movement (Vigna 52, Porhel 199, Reynolds 120). In some cases, this combined with the occupation of factories to enable workers to independently maintain and work towards reopening the factories they

controlled, working to show that they could run factories, organized in a manner of their choosing and without the need for management staff (Reynolds 119-120).

Even when they did not take the step of working towards reopening their factories, the fact of their occupation provided the workers with an opportunity to converse with each other, even those who they would not typically interact with, resulting in conversation and debate around their goals, contributing to a shift in the French working class's membership and aims (Vigna 52-54). This shift contributed to a dynamic in the organization of these groups that changed radically over the course of the protest. Early in the protest, traditional union structures dominated the organization of the worker protesters, with union leaders often acting as the public face of the workers and handling matters such as negotiation (Vigna 50), but, over the course of the protest, a gap between the union stance and the stance of many workers became clear, likely contributing to notable events such as the rejection by workers of the Grenelle agreements, which had been approved by union leadership, as well as ongoing challenges to the structure and priorities of unions in France (Reynolds 48, Vigna 52-55, Ross 70). Despite the challenges that workers raised to union leadership and structure, the demonstrations of May '68 significantly increased awareness of and participation in unions, as well as the ability of unions to negotiate with managers (Porhel 195, Pagis 102).

In addition to their workplace protests, which students joined to various degrees throughout May and June and across the country (Reynolds 114-115), workers also joined the students in the streets in great numbers (Ross 71-72). This happened in spite of the difficulties presented by occupation, necessitating that at least some workers remain in factories, and the hostility of the communist-aligned *Confédération générale de travail* (CGT) towards the student movement and its efforts (Reynolds 40-41, Vigna 53), likely both contributing to and indicative

of the changing opinions of French workers and the shift occurring in their relationship with their unions. In addition to the student protesters, there was also often some degree of support for the worker movement from peasants and agricultural laborers. In multiple regions around the country, peasants participated in worker-led demonstrations and/or provided food and logistical support for student and worker protesters, in some cases participating in joint meetings and to draft sets of shared demands (Vigna 197, Martin 206-208, Reynolds 112). Beyond providing food, many of these peasant protesters had experience in various forms of direct action and protest and shared concerns with workers about dangers to regional economies, increasing their support for each other.

As was the case with the early student demonstrations, attempted police interventions to disperse protesting workers were met with, at best, mixed results. In some cases, students joined workers to defend against police efforts, building solidarity between the two groups, regardless of the success of the intervention at dispersing protesters (Vigna 53). In other cases, it is likely that police intervention renewed the determination of the workers, allowing them to extend strikes well beyond when they otherwise would likely have run out of momentum (Zancarini-Fournel 186).

There were significant obstacles to cooperation between students and workers during May '68. Despite this, they made significant efforts to cooperate and frequently joined each other in their protest areas, but their ability to do so was often limited by the hostility of the CGT towards cooperation with students. Even though the movement was not as unified as many participants would have liked, the workers' portion of the movement showed an impressive ability to organize itself and cooperate with supportive peasants to meet the needs of the striking workers.

Education Reform

One area where specific details are more lacking than would be ideal, at least in English, but that had a clear effect on broader French society, and that provides lessons we can learn from, is the calls for educational reform made during the movement. For many of the students involved, reform of their educational system was a key priority (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 247). Because of this, many of them took the opportunity provided when they occupied their campuses to collaborate with teaching staff, forming committees to discuss issues and produce lists of concrete proposals for educational reform (Reynolds, 88, 112, 116-117, 120), with many working to meet with people from other disciplines in the process, to create a dialogue and help create workable proposals (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 247). A variety of ideas were proposed but there were some common ideas, many of which appeared in official forms after "May '68" had ended. The priorities that these groups, in general, considered most significant were reducing the state's involvement, increasing in the role of students in decision-making to make them an important part of a reformed system, increasing interdisciplinary contact and opportunities, reiterating their opposition to a selection system (a significant issue in recent years at the time of the protests), and providing a critique of lectures and end-of-year exams, major elements of the system at the time (Reynolds, 89-90). When the French higher education system was reformed by the new Minister of Education, Edgar Faure, he consulted a variety of people associated with schools in various ways, working with them to craft a set of reforms addressing the flaws of the existing system. The "Faure reform" project was ambitious and designed a new set of structures to replace the old Napoleonic model, with a new system designed to allow interdisciplinary contact and involve both students and non-academic members of the community in the councils responsible for making decisions, as well as de-emphasizing the end-of-year exams and taking

steps to allow a reduction in the power of the central government in the newly reformed universities (Reynolds, 90-92). Among the specific changes made was the introduction of credit units to replace "annual certificates", providing more flexibility and greater potential for interdisciplinary study (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 249)

Another official act that was, in many ways, a continuation of May '68 was the creation of the experimental university that has become Paris VIII-Saint Denis University, originally located in and known as Vincennes, which it will be referred to as here. Vincennes was founded in the aftermath of May '68 and included people associated with the protests among those responsible for shaping it. In addition to the direct and pragmatic issues for which protest committees proposed ideas for reform, there was also an ideological challenge to the role of schools in French society, with some protesters wishing for a more open form of universities in general (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 247). This was the foundation on which the idea of Vincennes was built, resulting in classes being offered over a wider range of times to accommodate working students (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 251-252) and allowing students to register without the baccalauréat qualification that was typically required to attend university in France (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 245), as well as involving the elements of pluridisciplinary study and university democratization that were more broadly an element of the Faure reform (Dormoy-Rajarmanan, 249-250).

The specific proposals for academic reform made by protesters in May '68 are of less value for addressing modern difficulties than are the strategies they used to come up with those proposals. One of the reasons for this uneven degree of utility for modern efforts is because, in many cases, modern academic institutions, particularly in France, have much in common with the ideas proposed by the students and teachers who participated in May '68. But, the idea of

teaching staff and students from different universities meeting with each other to discuss the difficulties they have and try to find solutions is still a useful way to produce proposals for change. The protesters of May ’68 used these meetings to learn what issues were common and which were unique to individual universities, and that understanding helped them propose ideas of ways that those issues might be addressed. Once they produced a proposal, they could then bring those proposals to those working to reform that system. More broadly, the idea of different people affected by a system in different ways meeting with each other to learn how others are affected is not exactly earth shattering, but it is a valuable tool and the academic reforms in the aftermath of May ‘68 are an excellent demonstration of the ways in which it can help move change forward, with radical changes being made within a few years of the protest incorporating proposals made during the protest.

Hong Kong Umbrella Movement

In 2014, a massive number of people in Hong Kong joined protests over the recently announced plans to tightly control the nomination candidates for Hong Kong’s chief executive, part of a long history of both the local government and the national government in Beijing abandoning or limiting steps towards democratization in Hong Kong (Lee 1, 4-5, 18-19). It has been estimated that approximately twenty percent of the Special Administrative Region’s population of 7.2 million participated in the protests in some form, which began with student class boycotts and developed into a total of seventy-nine days of mass occupation of public spaces in the city (Lee 1, 4, 18-19). The key chain of events that triggered the escalation from a significant protest, but one still primarily made up of students, to the mass demonstration that the Umbrella Movement became was the students’ decision to occupy Civic Square, a symbolically significant site as the location for successful student protests in prior years which had since been

closed to the public (Yuen 57). When this occupation was met with police violence and arrests, very much disrupting Hong Kongers' expectations of police restraint and professionalism, major demonstrations began in support of the students. These protests were met with tear gas fired into the crowd of peaceful protesters, caught live on television and broadcast to the city, provoking the sudden occupation of three "camps" around the city (Lee 1, 4, 18-19). These camps had supporters and members from a variety of material and ideological backgrounds and, over the next few months, were a constant presence and developed a collection of strategic, tactical, and organizational tools to express their discontent with Hong Kong's government and police, as well as the control exerted by Beijing.

Ideological Alliance and Division

A variety of groups from different ideological backgrounds and with different specific issues and proposed plans of action participated in the Umbrella Movement. The degree of cooperation and conflict within the movement, along the lines of these divisions, varied, but understanding of the elements that made up the Umbrella Movement is critical to understanding the protest more broadly and the ways in which it both organized and failed to organize itself. Law describes four general schools of thought within the movement, which roughly align with other representations of the movement and the ideological factions which made it up. The categories described by Law are the classical and moderate prodemocracy movement, the radical democrats, the progressive localists, and the extreme or right-wing localists.

The classical prodemocracy movement has a considerable history and was very strong before the handover of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China, but has gradually weakened (Law 77). They prioritized the democratization of Hong Kong as a way to protect against authoritarianism from the mainland government in Beijing and included most of the

prodemocracy political parties at the time, as well as many professionals such as lawyers. This provided the group with a strong middle to upper-middle class identity and definitively liberal political orientation, in the global sense of the term. They tend to highly prioritize civility in protest, which is not uncommon in Hong Kong's protest culture in general, tending to avoid confrontational or disruptive tactics (Law 77-78, Yuen 54-55). Due to a combination of factors, this group was significant in planning which led to the Umbrella Movement, but was much less thoroughly involved in the movement itself, particularly the leadership of the movement (Sing 144-147), in part because the various democratic parties that made up much of the leadership of this faction failed to reach a consensus on their priorities (Sing 158) and partially because growing public dissatisfaction with the moderate camp meant few looked to them for leadership (Sing 147).

The radical democrats included some political parties, as well as many of the student groups which were involved in the Umbrella Movement. The radical democrats were critical of the moderates, arguing that their tactics lacked any ability to apply pressure and relied on the good will of the mainland government to achieve any results, which they did not consider a viable strategy. They shared the classical movement's prioritization of democratization as their strategic priority, but supported the use of more overt and disruptive tactics, rather than the semi-ritualized protests employed by the moderate camp (Law 77-79, Yuen 55-56). Particularly relevant to the tactical orientation of the radical democrats in the Umbrella Movement were Joshua Wong and Scholarism and their successful campaign against the Moral and National Education proposal in 2012 (Lee 16-18). They also contributed significantly to the overall ethos of the movement and the decentralized and antiauthoritarian identity it developed, partially influenced by the informal leadership roles taken up by Scholarism and the Hong Kong

Federation of Students (HKFS), particularly in the Admiralty occupation zone (Lee 19). As a further note, the growing distance between the radical and moderate wings of the prodemocracy movement was a significant motivating factor in the organization of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) campaign, which was a factor in the birth of the Umbrella Movement and will be discussed in more depth later.

The progressive localists had many similarities to the radical democrats in their tactical approaches, but they specifically prioritize the need to protect Hong Kong and its interests from the threat posed by Beijing and the mainland, culturally, politically, and economically. To that end, they support greater democratization in Hong Kong, but it is, to them, primarily a tool to defend against encroachment from Beijing and the mainland, with their primary goals ranging from self-determination to full independence for Hong Kong (Yuen 56). Localist political parties existed, but they were much less significant for the organizational structure of the group than political parties were for the democrats (Law 79-80). Concerns about economic harm for the residents of Hong Kong due to prioritization of the mainland was a significant factor for many participants in the Umbrella Movement (Lee 9-12), but it was particularly a concern for localists. Localists had also contributed significantly to the development and increasing normalization of more confrontational protest tactics in Hong Kong in the years leading up to the Umbrella Movement, sharing the radical democrats' dissatisfaction with the results of the non-confrontational tactics employed by the moderates (Lee 16-18), and tended to be more militant than both camps of democrats (Yuen 56).

The radical localists were more antagonistic towards both Beijing and the other ideological groups within the Umbrella Movement, viewing Beijing as a threat to Hong Kong in much the same way as the progressive localists, while also viewing the other factions,

particularly the non-militant and non-confrontational ones as ineffectual and lacking commitment to the movement at best, and as self-interested traitors willing to undercut the movement for their own gain (Law 80-82). The radical localists were generally the most militant wing of the protest, and their primary goal was typically for Hong Kong to realize some degree of political independence (Law 80-81). The radical localists became the dominant ideological group within the protest camp in Mongkok, so further information about their priorities and tactical approaches can be seen in that camp and the ways in which it functioned.

The differences between these groups contributed to the scope of the movement, with the variety of perspectives providing more capability to appeal to a broad group of people, but the scope of the movement likely also contributed to its ideological diversity, reflecting the perspectives of a fifth of the people in an incredibly populous city. And, creating problems for the movement, internal divisions and the lack of an ability to produce a consensus on the movement's goals resulting from that division grew into increasing fracturing over time, contributing to issues which became clear towards the end of the occupations.

Before the Occupations

Well before occupations began, Benny Tai began organizing a campaign, hoping to bring together different prodemocracy groups and revitalize the democracy movement in Hong Kong after an extended period of minimal successes. Following in the model established by other movements such as Occupy Wall Street, Tai began planning Occupy Central, hoping to bring together the moderate and radical wings of the movement with occupation, breaking the established norms of protest in Hong Kong to help win the support of the radicals and allow the movement to apply greater pressure, but with careful planning and moderation to keep the occupation strictly nonviolent. Benny Tai also organized extensive planning well in advance of

any occupation to know who would participate and allow a consensus to be reached on a specific policy proposal for the movement to support, with the aim of strengthening the bargaining position of the pan-democrat coalition. In this process, Benny Tai joined Rev. Chu Yiu-ming and Professor Chan Kin-man to form the organizing group for Occupy Central, eventually known as the Occupy Trio (Law 83).

Despite Benny Tai's hopes, Occupy Central had limited success bringing together the different camps of the prodemocracy movement. Many moderates were concerned about how the public would respond to occupation, and by some of the rhetoric Benny Tai used while formulating the plan, including referring to occupation and civil disobedience as a "lethal weapon" for Pan-Democrats (Veg). At the same time, the addition of "with Love and Peace" to the campaign, making it Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), and Benny Tai's reassurances to concerned moderates that the main reason to plan occupation was to exert pressure through simple discussion of the idea, rather than needing actual occupation, concerned radicals and led many to believe that this would become another toothless, symbolic, gesture, like all of the established moderate strategy they were critical of, and that the organizers were prioritizing the, in their eyes, ineffectual moderates over taking the action necessary for real change (Law 83-85, Yuen 56-57).

Many of the radical democrats, concerned that OCLP might back down on occupation and believing that the pressure of occupation was necessary to achieve any significant results, formed alternate groups to carry out the occupation plan even if the moderates backed down. These groups made efforts to reach out to and involve the public, rather than primarily the political and intellectual classes that were most heavily involved in OCLP (Law 85-86). Among those uncertain of the willingness of OCLP to commit to actual occupation were the Hong Kong

Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism, who organized a "rehearsal occupation" to demonstrate to protesters and the government alike the capability and commitment of the protesters, where they successfully followed all the procedures established by OCLP in their overnight protest (Law 86). Their rehearsal occupation demonstrated their capability and helped establish the student groups as potential leaders, but the most significant result of these mobilization efforts came later, when the actions of HKFS and Scholarism and their consequences began the Umbrella Movement.

On August 31, the regime issued a ruling that left little space for negotiation, leaving OCLP and the pan-democrats lost and unsure how to proceed. They held rallies, but no longer had a plan for how to move forward. Students responded by organizing class boycotts, culminating in a rally where student protesters briefly occupied Civic Square. The arrest of student leaders generated a massive increase in public support and triggered the initial occupation of all of the Umbrella Movement's occupied areas. The protesters all maintained the principle of nonviolence, with differing definitions of the idea which will be discussed later, without the clear central leadership or universally agreed-upon list of demands which OCLP had hoped to help provide and generate, the consequences of which became more apparent as time went on (Law 86-88).

While the full OCLP plan never came to fruition, the planning that went into it was significant in the eventual development of the Umbrella Movement. Students planned occupation partially because of the OCLP plan, the Marshal team that was organized by OCLP was active early in the Umbrella Movement, and planning for OCLP may have contributed to the degree of public support that the Umbrella Movement received. And, while the specific procedures the team developed were not followed, their emphasis on nonviolent protest remained.

Inside the Protest Zones

Over the course of their occupation, the Umbrella Movement protesters radically transformed the spaces they occupied. Occupation lasted 79 days and, in that time, they built a functional parallel society within each of the occupied areas, creating a variety of systems and structures to support their new communities, transforming the streets they occupied into habitable communities where some people lived for extended portions of the occupation. Most of the systems that were built existed based on mutual aid between protesters and functioned on the basis of reciprocity and solidarity (Chow 35-37). People donated supplies, food, and their time to these endeavors and, for many, they were a major reason for their participation in the movement or one of their main ways of engaging with it (Chow 36-38, Yuen 60).

The ability of Umbrella Movement protesters to create general infrastructure was nothing short of incredible. Thousands of tents were set up for participants to stay overnight, with many donated for use by those who wished to stay and did not have the ability to provide their own, because the protest sites had everything necessary for people to remain in them full-time. Protesters maintained public hygiene, cleaning and recycling, including creating and maintaining toilets for protesters and building a bathroom with a bathtub and shower. They built adaptations and staircases to make the streets and freeways they occupied navigable by foot. Groups were organized to cook and distribute food, as well as planting and maintaining gardens, to manage other types of supplies, and to provide medical care for those who needed it. Postal workers could even deliver mail to addresses in the occupied areas (Chow 37). The only mention I have found even indicating difficulty maintaining this impressive spontaneous community organization is that, for some protesters, lack of money was a reason for declining ability to support the movement (Chow 47).

In addition to these systems for meeting basic needs, a high portion of protesters were still students, and spaces meant to specifically support them were also established. A library and study spaces were organized inside the occupied area, with room for about two hundred people to study and, using power from a wind turbine and stationary bikes, have access to good wifi, phone chargers, and electric lighting (Chow 37). Many also offered their help as tutors for others in the protest area and teaching groups were formed on democratic, discussion-focused, and participatory models for teaching and for teachers and students to talk with each other and get to know each other (Chow 40-41, Ho 199).

Supporting these community efforts, protesters organized a lot of meetings to discuss various topics. They worked to organize the logistics needed to keep the camps running, but also discussed strategy and their broader goals for the movement. These meeting places could also act as social gathering places more generally and places for protesters to interact with the movement's leaders, proposing ideas and providing their input on major issues (Chow 39-40), though distrust and dissent between different factions involved in the protest limited the ability to implement some proposed ideas, such as internal votes on major questions (Chow 45-46, Law 82).

Protesters also made efforts to extend their community connections beyond the areas they were occupying. They were ordinary people with connections to their communities and they brought people they knew into the protests with them. The majority of protesters were "self-mobilized" and joined the protests because of a personal connection to someone who was involved, so a wide variety of people had connections to the protests. Chow noted a local restaurant owner who delivered hundreds of meals (Chow 38), and members of the Mongkok protest organized efforts to reach out to the surrounding communities and make an effort to

support businesses that might be hurt by the Umbrella Movement and the occupation of Mongkok (Yuen 66).

Issues also emerged within protest communities, however. In Mongkok, there was a pronounced divide between the more militant, typically localist, protesters and the more classical prodemocracy protesters, whether they were moderates or radicals. The militant participants felt that the more celebratory atmosphere of leisure activities was inappropriate with the conflicts that had been needed for the defense of the protest area. This divide escalated, resulting in a geographic partitioning of the camp, with militants taking the center while various non-militant groups and participants were either pushed to the periphery of the protest, or pushed out of the protest entirely, and leisure activities were increasingly frowned upon and discouraged inside the occupied area (Yuen 66-68).

Leadership

The Umbrella Movement had an interesting and unsteady relationship with leaders and leadership. Though they were quite well organized on a smaller scale, the protests did not have any form of strong central leadership, with the closest thing to central leadership being the student leaders of HKFS and Scholarism. These groups were significant, with their actions launched the protests and they often acted as the public faces of the movement, particularly internationally, but they lacked any particular ability to direct or make decisions for the protests on the whole and were seen by many as being rather detached from the normal protesters and their experiences. There are several reasons why strong leadership was unlikely to emerge in the Umbrella Movement, many of which also contributed to the proliferation of smaller groups within each of the occupied areas.

The political differences within the movement were one factor in this difficulty, as Benny Tai and OCLP discovered. These preexisting tensions could easily lead to fragmentation and dissatisfaction between the different camps, as occurred in the course of the planning of OCLP, with groups of radicals splitting off to form their own groups to try to ensure that occupation went forward regardless of the decision made by the Occupy Trio. And, of course, the differences between the goals of democrats and localists create an obvious space for division to appear. Localists who want independence or self-determination for Hong Kong as their primary goal will not necessarily be satisfied with the decisions that would be made by any group of democrats primarily concerned with the democratization of Hong Kong. Because this range of ideological stances were involved in the protests, there was not a strong history of cooperation between groups to help produce clear leadership for the whole movement. Even when groups did have preexisting relationships with each other and attempted to coordinate, they did not have effective methods to coordinate at the ultimate scale of the protests (Chow 42-44, Law 86-87).

Further complicating matters, the "self-mobilized" protesters were not affiliated with preexisting groups, and were instead mobilized by their politically active, and also typically unaffiliated, friends, family, and acquaintances. This led to significant numbers of protesters without any existing ties to any of the groups potentially inclined to act as leaders, further limiting the ability of those groups to effectively step into a leadership role. It also contributed to a weak connection between the leadership that did exist and the majority of the protesters, which manifested in an increasing perception of distance between the decisions made by the leaders at the "main stage" in Admiralty and the general population of protesters (Chow 42, 44-47, Lee 13-14, 20).

As a consequence of the degree to which protesters were self-mobilized, there was minimal presence of and affiliation with organizations, even those commonly connected with prodemocracy movements throughout history around the world. Hong Kong's prodemocracy parties would have seemed obvious groups to lead the movement and, though they helped provide logistical and organizational support, many of the protesters were dissatisfied with the leadership of the parties in the years leading up to the Umbrella Movement and their failure to achieve substantial gains. During the movement, few protesters were mobilized by their support for political parties, and disagreements between the different political parties contributed to the limitations of the Five-Party Platform, a group made up of various established prodemocracy organizations, as a decision-making body for the movement (Sing 144-147, 158). Another common element in democratization movements which might have been expected to be active in the Umbrella Movement, given the significant number of middle- and lower-class participants, was trade unions. Hong Kong has multiple trade unions, a significant wing of which have supported the democratization movement historically, but they were not heavily involved in the Umbrella Movement (Chan 123-124, 126-127)). The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the alliance of prodemocracy unions, was involved in the planning of OCLP and mobilized to the best of its ability, with members joining the marshals, aiding in running Admiralty's main stage, and with calls made for a strike, though that call was not well followed (Chan 128-130). Their ability to be a significant factor was also limited because there is a significant pro-Beijing wing in Hong Kong's trade unions which weakened the organizing power of the prodemocracy unions and their ability to take any mass action, and they were further limited by their weak ties to the prodemocracy parties, due to those parties' middle- to upper-class and liberal orientation (Chan 135-137).

Another factor which should not be ignored is the context surrounding and the ideological stance of the protests. For all of their differences, the protesters had a strongly antiauthoritarian and anticentralization ethos, and many were skeptical of any form of strong central authority, as that was what they were protesting against (Lee 19). Even the largely informal and often symbolic main stage in Admiralty drew criticism as authoritarian and stifling the movement (Chow 44, Law 89-90). Adding on to that, the mass protests began in response to arrests of students, and particularly student leaders, for their actions protesting the government. This established a fear of reprisal against people who challenged Beijing that stifled efforts to establish any large-scale protest leadership structures and reduced people's willingness to be involved in efforts to establish them (Chow 47). Both opposition to potentially authoritarian leadership structures and fear of reprisal pushed protesters towards smaller groups and organizing leadership no further than that scale, many of which have endured in some form even past the end of the Umbrella Movement itself (Chow 42, 49).

One of the most common points of reflection for those involved in the Umbrella Movement was the difficulty it encountered in taking any action after the start of occupation. Consensus was not to be able to be reached and, without established leaders or the ability to reach consensus, it was near-impossible for any new large-scale action to be taken. While many believe this to have been a factor in the movement's difficulty producing major results, the protester's difficulties with leadership and broad coordination did not interfere with the protest camps' ability to arrange impressive structures to meet basic needs.

Nonviolence

Hong Kong has a long history of nonviolent and civil protest, which led the Umbrella Movement, despite its decentralization, to adopt a widespread emphasis on maintaining

nonviolence. The specifics of the stances adopted by protesters varied, but they were, at the least, broadly opposed to initiating any direct physical conflict. But the protests also began in response to police violence and the use of tear gas against peaceful protesters, so they were also prepared to defend themselves. This is, in fact, where the name “Umbrella Movement” originated, with umbrellas being a commonly used tool for protesters defending themselves against police violence. The need for and emphasis on defense varied between camps, most emphasized in the occupied area in Mongkok, but it was an aspect of the culture of the entire protest, which was a significant element of the Umbrella Movement’s departure from the established norms of protest in Hong Kong. Beyond the self-defense efforts of individual protesters, a common element in the occupied areas were groups of ‘marshals’, theoretically acting as defense against external attackers as well as mediators in internal conflicts. Early in the movement, marshals came from OCLP preparation, but accusations of abuse led them to generally be replaced by members of student groups (Chow 38, 44, Yuen 52, 54-56, Lee 14-16).

Because it was the greatest break from both the norms of protest in Hong Kong and with the pattern followed by the rest of the Umbrella Movement, Mongkok’s relative militarism has received significant attention, making it a more practical site to study. It was also, contributing to its more militant culture, far more heavily targeted by police, counter protesters, and other attackers, some of whom are suspected to have been affiliated with organized crime, so its defense mechanisms were tested in a much higher-stress environment. Because it has the most information available, it will also be the focus of this section’s analysis.

Mongkok was noted to be more militant by participants and later observers, which developed into an aspect of the identity of the camp, setting it apart from Admiralty and Causeway Bay. One factor in the development of this identity is that Mongkok was more heavily

targeted counterprotesters and various pro-regime groups, including attacks by suspected members of gangs and the triad (Yuen 59-61). Mongkok was also more the focus of police attention once counterprotest efforts diminished, including an assault on October 17 that briefly dispersed protesters and allowed traffic to resume before protesters "reclaimed" the camp (Yuen 62). With these threats to the camp for the entire time it existed, protesters in Mongkok were more likely to build barricades or support the use of physical means to defend the camp (Yuen 53, 59-61), but, even with this considerable break with Hong Kong's typical passive and unobtrusive protest, many protesters in Mongkok still opposed aggressive violent action, distinguishing between that 'violence' and the 'militant' atmosphere they had adopted - in effect, they supported physical violence to defend themselves and the camp from attack, but not initiating further conflict (Yuen 63). Once this reputation and the new norms of Mongkok were established, they became self-sustaining, in a way. Pressure on Mongkok and protesters' support of physical defense of the camp led to the perception of Mongkok as a place well-suited to people who wanted to more directly and proactively defend the movement, whose presence and actions within the camp then furthered the norms that originally drew them there, increasing the chances of others seeing Mongkok in the same way (Yuen 62-63). In all of this, a particularly notable aspect of Mongkok is that it did not have any more preexisting organization than the other protest sites. It developed well-organized and effective defense groups and mechanisms organically in response to the need for them after the protest began (Yuen 64).

Seattle, June 2020

For most of the month of June 2020, protesters occupied an area in Seattle's Capitol Hill neighborhood, around Cal Anderson Park and the Seattle Police Department's East Precinct building. This occurred in response to the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police and

police use of tear gas on protesters in the wake of that murder. After clashes with the police at the East Precinct building, police retreated and left protesters to control the area, where they established a protest community, calling for the police budget to be cut in half and that funding to go to other services. It lasted from June 8 until it was dispersed by police July 1, after several shootings in and around the occupied area.

This section will be somewhat different than the previous two, for a variety of reasons. Many of these stem from the recency of the events and the influence which that recency has on the available sources. There are few academic sources specifically discussing Seattle during the summer of 2020, due to the combination of limited time between the events of that summer and the writing of this paper and the dramatic scale of the events of the summer as a whole reducing the amount of focus given to Seattle. As a result, this section will be less detailed and will be working with primarily popular news sources.

Logistics

There were a variety of logistical considerations needed for the occupied area to function, which were organized in a variety of ways. Some were handled directly by the protesters, but they also received assistance from the community and the city in some areas. Protesters started an urban farm in the occupied park, which has survived past the end of the protest (Weinberger), they organized a “no cop co-op” that offered free supplies and snacks, while protesters also cooked and handed out food, as well as medical stations to treat injuries that were sustained in the area (Gupta, Golden, Morse, Burns, Buncombe). Members of the local community also helped the protesters, with businesses offering water, bathrooms, and food to the protesters, especially at the start of the occupation (Britschgi), and with some businesses in the area reopening after closing for the pandemic (Royale). City officials also assisted in some areas,

setting up portable toilets in the area and providing sanitation services, attempting to maintain a friendly relationship with protesters where possible (Baker, Morse). Police, of course, stayed out of the occupied area, which also led to other emergency services doing the same, potentially contributing to the death of one of the victims of a shooting in the occupied area (Reeve & Guff).

Decision-Making

The decision-making structure used in Seattle's protests most commented on in the sources found for this paper is the general assembly. Specific details were not provided, and may not exist in a recorded form, but general assemblies were mentioned as a means of both distributing information within the protest and making decisions. They were also noted, however, to not be particularly effective, described as "meandering" and without many notable successes in making decisions (Gupta, Royale). The protesters did, however, provide a unified set of demands: the reduction of Seattle's police budget by 50%, the reallocation of those funds for other services, with particular emphasis on supporting black communities, and protesters not facing charges for their actions in the protest (Gupta, Royale). Of additional note in this area, none of the sources referenced specific or consistent leaders of the protest area, and some specifically commented on the lack of specific leaders as a reflection of both ideological and practical concerns of the protesters (Gupta, Morse).

Security

Security was a major concern for the protesters. Many saw this as an opportunity to show what a police-less society could look like, so they hoped to maintain security without the use of police. They were also concerned about potential attacks by far-right counter protesters or, as the situation developed, gangs. To try to create a safe protest area, they established a group of

'Sentinels' who protected the occupied territory, carrying weapons but only meant to use lethal force in response to lethal force (Reeve & Guff).

The success of the Sentinels in avoiding conflict was, at best, questionable. There were several shootings around the occupied area, which contributed to the end of the occupation, and many blamed the increased violence on the lack of usual police presence. There were also several allegations of sexual assault happening in and around the protest site, which many blamed on the protests, though it has also been argued that these are not wildly outside the norm for the area and received increased attention because of the protest (Burns, Reeve & Guff, Golden, Gupta). An unfortunate element of the situation in an analytical sense is that, due to the number of additional factors, it is difficult to say how the Sentinels compared to the police they replaced as a peace-keeping force, but it is clear that safety in and around the protest area was not as certain as any of the protesters hoped. Sentinels have made comments that they were not trained in de-escalation and conflict resolution and so felt ill-equipped for many of the situations they found themselves in (Reeve & Guff, Gupta), emphasizing the need for those sorts of skills in a group meant to keep peace and protect a community.

Chapter 3: Analysis and Findings

Despite their considerable differences, these movements also had a significant degree of similarity, which was one of the factors in their selection. All three involved protesters associated with specific politically-oriented groups, but they drew in massive support from both other groups and the general public after harsh responses by police attempting to disperse them. These dramatic influxes in support overloaded what organizational and decision-making structures were in place, requiring new alternatives to be developed in their place. The movements had varying degrees of success in different areas, and the patterns of their successes and failures can provide a valuable set of insights into the challenges that different types of organization represent, with their failings hopefully allowing future efforts to learn and find new approaches to address those shortcomings.

Leadership and Decision-Making Systems

This is the area where each of these movements seems to have encountered the greatest difficulties. Each attempted to create some structure for communal decision-making, but encountered serious issues from the combination of their scale, particularly in the cases of May '68 and the Umbrella Movement, and internal ideological differences. In France and Hong Kong, leaders emerged as the public face(s) of their movements, but their ability to guide the movement was rather limited and they had difficulty acting as anything more than spokespeople. Seattle, in contrast, did not even produce such a leader for the media and interactions with members of broader society.

Another element of decision-making which presented something of an issue was reaching any form of consensus on what demands protesters wished to make. The Umbrella Movement's efforts to build a set of demands beyond the idea of a democratic process for the election of the

city's chief executive were stymied by the movement's internal decisions, its leaders' status as primarily spokespeople, and its failure to establish an effective forum for participants to come together and attempt to come to a consensus. The French protesters in May '68 had a similar set of issues, with the movement as a whole lacking a shared set of goals or agreement on what the protests sought. Particularly notable in that case is the negotiation of an agreement by union leaders and representatives for a return to work which was rejected by a significant proportion of the workers, who continued their strike and protest alongside the students. Also notable as an exception to this trend are the events around education, where students, teachers, and other faculty met with each other and worked to produce a set of proposals for reform and restructuring in France's educational system, many of which were implemented in some form in the wake of the protests. Protesters in Seattle, perhaps surprisingly given their lack of clear leaders, also produced a specific list of demands, centered around the police violence which had initially sparked the protest movement that their occupation grew out of. It seems that the concrete plan they agreed upon was, at the least, quite similar to the policy proposals of Kshama Sawant, the member of Seattle's City Council representing Capitol Hill (Britschgi, Gupta), but they are notably set apart from both the Umbrella Movement and May '68 by their ability to produce a relatively short and apparently quite well agreed-upon list of demands.

There are a few key points that emerge from these examples. First, it seems that building a decision-making apparatus that is satisfactory for a wide range of differing participants is difficult, particularly without prior work. This is, in large part, a starting assumption of the project of this paper, but this confirmation of the difficulty in creating a structure for a large group of people to make communal decisions helps demonstrate its importance. Second, none of these movements were able to effectively leverage pre-existing structures or plans for their

whole movements to coordinate, as they were overwhelmed by the sheer scale of participation when efforts were made to do so, but they were of great value in supporting coordination on a smaller scale. The value of this organization should not be ignored simply because it was not able to extend to the movement as a whole, and indicate that, in future events, it would be worthwhile for efforts to be made to prepare systems meant for large-scale participation, to see if they could be effectively implemented. Third, it is notable that the successes in producing a list of goals were centered around a more specific area of issues. Student and teacher protesters in France produced a list of priorities and proposals for educational reform, while the protesters in Seattle generated a list of demands around their core issue of police violence and social overreliance on the police for issues they are poorly suited to.

Logistics and Basic Needs

The limitations of the protesters' leadership and decision-making structures did not, as one may expect, seem to have a particularly pronounced effect on their basic logistical capacity. This is, from the literature reviewed in this essay, likely the strongest element of the organization across all three protests. Systems were established to provide food and other basic needs for protesters in all three, functioning through donations from protesters, members of the community, and, in the case of France, agricultural laborers less directly involved in the protests in other ways. Hong Kong and Seattle were both noted to have established medic stations to care for anyone injured inside the protest communities, staffed by protesters with various degrees of medical training and responding to a variety of medical needs, as well as restroom facilities inside their protest areas, enabling protesters to remain there long-term. In the sources found for this paper, no mention was made of similar tools in France, though those protesters often made greater use of various existing structures, reducing the need for new solutions. Quite notable,

however, as a demonstration of the organizational capacities of the French protesters were the efforts made by workers to resume some form of operation in their occupied factories, where they successfully demonstrated at least a plausible ability for workers to run factories without the need for traditional management. Overall, all of these movements demonstrated an impressive ability to ensure that the basic needs of their members were met, even without preparing for anything approaching the scale of participation which they had, or even specifically preparing to meet the material needs of anyone before the dramatic start of the movement.

Security

One of the areas where these movements differed most was in the safety of protest areas, and the spaces around them. There were several additional external factors that contributed to these differences, but there were also differences in the security tools they used. Limited information was included in the sources I studied relating to May '68 and any sort of protest security, but a comparison between the marshals of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement and the Sentinels of Seattle's occupied Capitol Hill. The Umbrella Movement's marshals were partially organized in advance by the Occupy Central with Love and Peace team, including members of various prodemocracy labor unions, though the team developed over the course of the movement. After criticisms against the initial team started to appear, they were replaced by members of the NGOs, political parties, and student organizations that made up the Five-Party Platform, which eventually narrowed down to just members of the student organizations (Chow 44). The primary role of the marshals was acting as mediators for conflicts between protesters, with the physical defense of Mongkok, the most legitimately physically threatened of the camps, being a task taken up by all of its participants. There were no indications that the Umbrella Movement's marshals were armed. The Sentinels were not pre-organized in the way that the

marshals were, due to the absence of planning for occupation before it began, but did draw from pre-existing organizations, with Reeve & Guff noting that members of the Puget Sound John Brown Gun Club, among other groups and miscellaneous volunteers, aided with the security and defense of the occupied area, and were concerned about the possibility of attack by militant far-right groups such as the Proud Boys. Because of this concern, there were armed Sentinels, but it seems that most of the members were typically not armed, and their primary function was also de-escalation and conflict resolution when conflict began between protesters.

There were likely other factors which also contributed, so it should not be assumed that the difference is wholly due to differences in the structure of their security forces, or necessarily even influenced by it directly. There were two deaths and several injuries in and around the shorter-lived Seattle protest area than in the Umbrella Movement, most likely due to increased access to firearms for both protesters and counterprotesters, as well as the members of nearby gangs who many protesters blamed for the violence which happened around the protest area. The accounts found in the process of researching this paper mentioned more altercations between protesters in Seattle, but none of this included specific data and it is possible that this impression is inaccurate.

Ultimately, regardless of the specifics of how they compared, neither the Umbrella Movement's marshals nor the Sentinels met the hopes of the protesters who helped organize them. Marshals were accused of abuse, authoritarianism, and a lack of commitment to the movement, while the Sentinels were not well-prepared for the challenges they faced and may have contributed to the violence around Capitol Hill. There are not clear solutions to the lack of trust towards the Umbrella Movement's marshals, but the Sentinels in particular demonstrate the importance of preparation. The Sentinels were best prepared to face attacks on the camp, and did

not universally have experience in the sort of conflict resolution that was necessary for their primary responsibility of resolving conflicts within the protest area. This is not something that could be provided after the Sentinels as a group were formed, but it is something which both of these examples show is of great importance for any group meant to keep the peace in a community.

Chapter 4: Conclusion and Future Research

Further work in the area of this paper would be of great value for the project it set out on. Interviews and fieldwork would both be of great value, going into greater depth on a single protest movement with the goal of understanding how the movement structured itself and what the successes and failures of those choices were, and were only not used in preparation for this paper due to the dramatic increase in scope they would have required. Further research into any of the movements studied for this paper could potentially produce insights by using those tools, and there is also information that was unavailable for the author of this paper which another may be able to make use of. At the time of this writing, there is limited published academic work on what happened in Seattle during the summer of 2020, but time could easily change that and allow much more detail to be found. There were also several sources which seemed likely to include more information about May '68 but were only available in French, so someone with proficiency with that language could likely learn more than this paper's author was able to, and the same is likely true of the Umbrella Movement and Mandarin and Cantonese. Another way to expand on this project would be to study another protest movement, or set of protest movements, with a similar approach. This is not a project which can ever truly be finished, because there will always be more movements that could be studied and learned from, and there will always be sources and information that were unavailable and missed, but that should not be taken as a reason not to attempt it.

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