IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABILITY:

INDIGENOUS POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRACTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECUADORIAN AMAZON

By

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Professor Derrick Hindery

Since the Spanish conquest, Ecuador's lowland indigenous groups have experienced two major periods of development: faith-based initiatives and petroleum exploitation. The early 1990s marked the beginning of a third, considerably more heterogeneous phase. In this current stage, which has followed missionary health and education services since the seventeenth century and petroleum exploration and exploitation since the 1930s, indigenous peoples have become increasingly organized politically. Though markedly distinct from and meant to be more sustainable than past efforts, how viable are the alternatives presented in this "post-petroleum" era of conservation-based development? This paper contextualizes sustainable development within the history of Ecuadorian Amazonian development in order to highlight the relatively sudden involvement of indigenous organizations and confederations, both regionally and internationally, in the political arena of economic, sociocultural and environmental development.

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INTRODUCTION

Faces and Spaces of the Ecuadorian Amazon

"Ecuador has been, is, and will be an Amazonian Country."[1]
— State motto adorning Ecuadorian government letterhead

Nearly half of the Republic of Ecuador's landscape is covered by tropical rainforest and lowlands that extend into South America's Amazon Basin. However, this region of the second-smallest country on the continent did not factor into the Ecuadorian national consciousness until the past half century. The people and places within Ecuador's Amazon, a region commonly referred to as the "Oriente," were not assimilated in the same manner or as completely as their Highland Ecuadorian ("Sierra") counterparts to the west during Spain's colonial rule.

With this project, I hope to shed light on distinct efforts to develop the Ecuadorian Amazon, processes that originated four centuries ago and have evolved alongside the development trends that have since been popularized. Nevertheless, these development projects have shared the same driving principles: deification of extractive development for maximum economic gain with a blatant disregard for the sociocultural and environmental effects that often result. Missionary development came first, paving the way for petroleum exploitation by serving as the first permanent contact between indigenous groups of the Oriente and the rest of the world, in effect converting them not only into Christians but also into viable citizens who no longer threatened outsiders.

Dominant models of development in the Oriente have been challenged by the recent galvanization of indigenous political movements that reject extractive development and its proponents, backed by domestic and foreign environmental and human rights

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[1] Original Spanish text: "Ecuador ha sido, es y será País Amazónico" (Goffin 1994: 38, Sawyer 2004: 38). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish to English are my own.

groups. Most recently, the Ecuadorian people approved the world's "greenest" Constitution to date, signed into law in September 2008. Nonetheless, opposition to the status quo of Amazon development is constantly confronted by those who seek to maintain it, placing Ecuadorian Amazon development at a veritable crossroads.

Do sustainable development models, based on human dignity and ecological protection, have the power to challenge centuries of development that have crowned economic progress king? This paper will analyze the viability of these models within the specific historical context that produced them. My goal is to bring to the forefront the social complexities that contributed to such a change in perspective among both developers and the developed.

The Oriente and Independence: A Novel Tool

The Republic of Ecuador's Independence from Spain on May 24, 1822, and from the Gran Colombia in 1830 meant more of the same for its indigenous peoples.[2] Article 68 of the first Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (1830) declared priests their "natural fathers and instructors," legalizing past Spanish colonial practices.[3] Such laws have been erased, in a judicial sense, by twenty subsequent constitutions, yet recent development practices indicate that similar attitudes still penetrate development discourse in Ecuador.

Juan León Mera's *Cumandá o un drama entre salvajes* (*Cumandá or a Drama Among Savages*), Ecuador's first novel, provides a literary perspective on these development-shaping principles in post-Independence Ecuador. Penned nearly fifty years after

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[2] Mera also composed Ecuador's National Hymn in 1865 (Balseca 144-5, Sánchez 25). Independence dates are from the CIA World Factbook. The Gran Colombia encompassed Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and parts of the surrounding territories.

[3] Maiorana 1, Coronel 200.

Independence in 1877, *Cumandá* contributed to the establishment of an Ecuadorian national identity, one which notably distanced itself from all Amazonian peoples and places.[4]

Given Mera's lifelong participation in politics, *Cumandá* carries considerable historical and political weight. An elite from the highland city of Ambato, Mera would much rather have been a Spanish intellectual like other Latin American intellectuals of his time, and his work demonstrates a high level of French and British influence for its wealth of references to classical myths and Western literature and music.[5] Post-Independence Ecuador itself was very much modeled after European cultural, political and economic standards.[6] In fact, the very concept of *Cumandá* was inspired by a tale related to Mera by Sir Richard Spruce, an Englishman searching for quinine.[7] That is to say, the first Ecuadorian novel was based on an outsider's Amazonian experience; similarly, Amazonian development discourse has, more often than not, devolved into a Western monologue.

Orientalism in *Cumandá*

The concept of the noble savage, based on observations from Christopher Columbus in Latin America and refined into a theory by Jean-Jacque Rousseau, pervades Mera's novel.[8] The author's prose is infused with the romanticism implicit in discussions of noble savagery and subsequently dehumanizes the Amazon as a whole. Mera is selective in his romanticism, however, choosing to embody the ideal "mestizaje" ("ethnic mixing," in

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[4] Balseca 143.
[5] Balseca 146.
[6] Balseca 149.
[7] Balseca 149.
[8] Maiorana 2.

this case, of Spanish and indigenous blood)— or, more accurately, the "blanqueamiento" ("whitening") of indigenous people— within the character of Cumandá.[9]

Mera's representation prompts questions regarding the civilization/evangelization/ Westernization of indigenous peoples and how to reconcile their presence— concrete evidence of the existence of an "Other" within the geographic limits of the country— with "progress" toward a European-style Ecuador. Development experts continue to debate this perceived dichotomy in the Oriente today.

Cumandá's first chapter, "Las selvas del Oriente" ("The Jungles of the Oriente"), describes, in exhaustive detail, the physical setting for the novel, dripping with exoticism. In Mera's rainforest,

> *You are your own master and nature's true king: you are in your own dominion: do what you will with yourself and your surroundings. Aside from God and your conscience, no one here sees you and there is no one to subjugate your actions.*[10]

The promise of solitude in the rainforest was (and remains) attractive to "modern," world-weary souls. The popular imagination of the Oriente as "tierras baldías" ("no man's land") has not ceased to be a dangerous rhetorical technique employed to distance the Ecuadorian public from the Amazon and facilitate the dehumanization of its people. As we will see, promoting the Amazon as "uninhabited" has historically prompted the government to legislate its occupation.

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[9] Balseca 147.

[10] Original Spanish text: "Eres dueño de ti mismo y verdadero rey de la naturaleza: estás en tus dominios: haz de ti y de cuanto te rodea lo que quisieres. Excepto Dios y tu conciencia, aquí nadie te mira ni hay quien sojuzgue tus actos" (Mera 46).

Mestizaje, Civilization and Modernity in *Cumandá*

Cumandá, the beautiful "white" indigenous girl for whom the novel is named, was meant to be a national symbol. The purpose of the relationship between Cumandá and Carlos Orozco, son of a priest and Cumandá's personal spiritual guide (and, ultimately, her brother), mirrors missionary mission statements to come: to recover the highest possible state of whiteness, erasing indigenous inklings to merge non-Catholic spirituality with strict religious doctrine.

Cumandá is peppered with instances of inhumanity, irrationality, noble savagery and ferocity among Oriente indigenous peoples.[11] The least severe insults claim that all housing is identical and art is rudimentary, accounted for by the fact that indigenous minds possess relatively little storage space.[12] Indigenous people are seen as a moderately rational subspecies with feral, animalistic qualities, ensuring that their cultures are understood to be static, homogeneous, anachronistic and completely unacceptable in the face of Ecuador's modernization project. Indigenous peoples throughout Latin America have been portrayed as "obstacles" to modernity, completely "sacrificeable" in the name of modernization.[13] Indigenous Latin Americans are believed to lack history, given their unorthodox political participation and generally higher levels of illiteracy.

Has Mera's attitude toward the Oriente budged, on a societal level, in the past 130 years? My answer is a hesitant affirmation. The persistence of this mindset is evidenced by the "reunited age-old bedfellows, racism and state-nationalism," though the neo-Carlos of

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[11] Mera 47.
[12] Mera 49, 105, 141.
[13] Fuentes 305-7.

the Amazon (missionaries and petroleum companies) and the neo-Cumandá (indigenous organizations) have begun to interact in decidedly distinct capacities.[14]

As of 1990, when the national indigenous movement was, at last, gaining political attention and momentum,

> *The concept of* indio [an Indian] *as an inferior being, created in the colonial period, still dominated Ecuadorean* [sic] *and Latin American culture. The false idea that indigenous people would be redeemed through integration into national society lingered. CONAIE* [Ecuador's national indigenous federation] *believed, on the contrary, that they should be viewed as distinct and that there should be alternatives for a new society.*[15]

Since the arrival of the Spanish, efforts to push the incorporation of the indigenous peoples into the white-mestizo national identity have attempted to Hispanicize the indigenous, delegitimizing it the process. Mestizaje has not meant "indianizing," as indigenous people have been unquestionably linked with "poverty and marginality, while the Spaniard, Creole or later the white man, is associated with wealth and political influence."[16] As long as Ecuadorian mestizos maintain the attitude that "Indian" implies being backward and "white" signifies progress, they remain susceptible to neocolonialism, globalization and cultural homogenization.[17]

Furthermore, they are less likely to call foul play in development projects that continue to delegitimize indigenous peoples. Collective shame does not guide a people to political, economic or social development; instead, it propagates a "memoria fraudulenta" ("fraudulent memory") that turns Ecuadorian mestizos into historically-void, politically invalid individuals.[18]

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[14] Sawyer 2004: 49.
[15] Goffin 1994: 129.
[16] Original Spanish text: "pobreza y marginalidad, mientras que el... español, criollo o posteriormente... blanco, se asocia con riqueza e influencia política" (Espinosa 23, 18, 219-20).
[17] Foote 270, Yépez 25, 38, 59.
[18] Espinosa 197.

> *From the Latin American experience we know... that none of the imported "theories and models of development" corresponded, not even minimally, to the social reality of the subcontinent. The imported theories faked a reality that never existed and drew up visions of the future that never had the smallest possibility of being effective. For this reason, foreign and poorly-adapted concepts of development have frequently served to deepen existing sociopolitical and economic differences and even legitimize them, given that they were presented and introduced— always in a pompous way— as the inarguable path toward progress.*[19]

This "fake reality" leaves little room for the strongest manifestation of indigenous culture in Ecuadorian national consciousness: nature personified. In Ecuador, redistributive "pre-Hispanic" ideologies are still in use, and even though Roman Catholicism is widely practiced, remnants of Kichwa history remain in the form of a "conciencia mágico-mítica agraria" ("magical-mythical agrarian consciousness").[20] Highland and lowland Kichwa peoples and mestizos alike believe in the power of the "Pacha Mama" ("Mother Earth"), whose will and rights all human beings must observe and obey.[21] It is for this reason that the vision of the earth as a mere object at human beings' disposal (influenced in part by agrarian reforms and agricultural capitalism) signifies a drastic change in deeply-rooted feelings regarding the personification of nature.[22] It is also for this reason that a widespread debate about extractive development has long flourished in discussions regarding the Ecuadorian Amazon.

An Introduction to the Ecuadorian Amazon

While the Amazon is often perceived as an "unknown," "ancient," "pristine," and "primitive" setting in the popular imagination, as evidenced by Mera's *Cumandá*, it is, in

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19 Original Spanish text: "De la experiencia latinoamericana sabemos... que ninguna de las 'teorías y modelos de desarrollo' importados correspondieron, ni siquiera mínimamente, a la realidad social del subcontinente. Las teorías importadas fingieron una realidad que nunca existió y trazaron visiones de futuro que jamás tuvieron la mínima posibilidad de llevarse a efecto. Por eso, con frecuencia, los conceptos de desarrollo foráneos, y mal adaptados, han servido para ahondar las diferencias sociopolíticas y económicas existentes y hasta para legitimarlas, por más que fueron presentados e introducidos— siempre en forma pomposa— como el camino indiscutible del progreso" (Acosta 2005: 20).

20 Bustamante 1995: 232, Espinosa 77.

21 Espinosa 79, 85; Acosta 2005: 33.

22 Espinosa 82-3, 86.

reality, constantly adapting to new input.[23] What we now understand to be the Región Amazónica Ecuatoriana (Ecuadorian Amazonian Region, or RAE) covers 100,000 square kilometers in eastern Ecuador.[24] Six provinces— from north to south, Sucumbíos (since 1989), Napo, Orellana (since 1998), Pastaza, Morona-Santiago and Zamora-Chinchipe— make up 48% of Ecuador, a parcel of land the size of the state of Alabama that houses between 4 and 4.5% of the nation's population, or 383,201 to 500,000 people.[25] Indigenous populations constitute between 25 and 50% of the regional population, or 85,000 to 250,000 people.[26] RAE humans share the land with 8000 to 12,000 plant species, or 5% of the world's total.[27]

One-quarter of the RAE's population lives in urban centers, less than half the national average; however, the population is growing quickly and RAE population density is the highest in the entire Amazon Basin.[28] Much of this growth can be attributed to the "boom town" status of cities like Puyo (Pastaza province) and Nueva Loja (Sucumbíos), more commonly known as "Lago Agrio" ("Sour Lake," named for Sour Lake, Texas, in honor of its connection with the oil industry).[29] Coca (more formally, Puerto Francisco de Orellana), Orellana's provincial capital, and Tena, capital of Napo province, have also experienced accelerated growth over the past 40 years. Although a full 75% of the population remains outside urban centers, the relatively high degree of urbanization has earned the RAE the distinction of being an "urbanized jungle."[30]

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23 Coomes and Barham 1997: 49-50.
24 Equivalent to 32 million acres or 13 million hectares (1 hectare = 10,000 square meters or 2.47 acres) (Kimerling 1991: 849, San Sebastián 2004, Tidwell 1994). Varea states that the region includes 131,137 square kilometers (Varea 1995: 39).
25 INEC 1991 in Ryder 2000, Varea 1995: 39, Kane 1995: 26, San Sebastián 2004.
26 Goffin 1994: xxiii, Varea 1995: 39, Kane 1995: 5, Kimerling 1991: 849, 853. A July 2009 estimate places Ecuador's population at 14, 573, 101 inhabitants (CIA World Factbook).
27 Kane 1995: 26.
28 Varea 1995: 39-40.
29 Ryder 2000, Acosta 2005: 28.
30 Ryder 2000, Beck 1996: 91 in Ryder 2000.

The cities, villages and "untouched" lands of the RAE are home to 400 different communities, belonging to at least seven indigenous nationalities.[31] Divisions of indigenous nations and the names and orthography of each differ greatly; I will adhere to the names and orthography used by the political organizations of each: Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar, Siona, Secoya, Cofán and Huaorani.[32]

The nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon share several fundamental commonalities.

> *There is a staggering tendency in Amazonian anthropology to stress the cultural homogeneity of lowland South American societies... Cross-cultural analyses present Amazonia as a distinctively hunter-horticulturalist cultural area, with societies sharing the same broad material culture, subsisting through hunting, fishing, and cultivating gardens, and sharing the same basic social organization of small, politically independent, and egalitarian local groups formed through cognate ties.*[33]

Most communities combine elements of subsistence, trade, and cash economies but still depend on the rainforest, using more than 700 of its plants in their diets, for the administration of traditional medicine, for domestic use and for spiritual rituals. Hunting and gathering and, in some cases, slash and burn agriculture, has had relatively minimal ecological impacts due to the low population densities of traditional Amazonian communities. Nevertheless, health among these nationalities has declined since they placed one foot squarely in the "modern" world. In recent years, diets have become simplified, exchanging protein and a variety of plants for carbohydrates. Such exchanges lead to malnutrition, which, in turn, results in higher susceptibility to illnesses for which there are

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31 Varea 1995: 40, Kane 1995: 72, Kimerling 1991: 849, San Sebastián 2004.

32 There are six ethnolinguistic denominations: Shuar, Achuar, Quichua, Siona-Secoya, Cofán and Huaorani (Varea 1995: 53, 57). The Kichwa and Shuar nations constitute the vast majority of RAE's indigenous peoples (Kimerling 1991: 853). The Siona, Secoya, Cofán and Huaorani have roughly the same number of survivors (Kane 1995: 27).

33 Overing 1983, Riviére 1984, Descola 1994, Descola and Taylor 1993, Viveiros de Castro 1996 in Rival 2002: 3.

no traditional cures, challenging the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institution of traditional medicine.[34]

I do not wish to present RAE nations as cultural museums. Recent agents of "modernization" and "civilization," namely missionaries and petroleum companies, have attempted to push most Ecuadorian Amazonian cultures into a melting pot; therefore, it is necessary to identify the indigenous groups of the Amazon not for anthropological reasons but rather to achieve a better understanding of the multifaceted story that will unfold.[35] What follows is a far-from-exhaustive introduction to RAE indigenous nationalities, in no particular order. The amount of information provided for each nationality reflects the amount of literature I was able to find for a given group, not my own favoritism, no matter how disproportionate levels of information provided may seem.



Map of Ecuador's Indigenous Populations. Source: conaie.nativeweb.org/images/map2.gif.

[34] Kimerling 1991: 854, 879; Rival 2002.
[35] Rivas 2001: 15, 18.

Kichwa

Today, there are an estimated 100,000 Kichwas in the RAE.[36] Kichwas are sometimes perceived by other indigenous groups as invaders because they have been in close contact with Ecuador as a whole since colonial times. Some even classify them as "colonos" ("settlers") and too market-oriented to be real indigenous people.[37] Due to their comparatively high degree of assimilation as a collectivity, there is a high level of political participation among Kichwas, who are closely related to highland indigenous groups and speak a form of the Quechua language transmitted by Incan conquerors as they extended their empire into Ecuador during the fifteenth century.

Siona-Secoya

The Sionas and Secoyas are often combined by authors to constitute one hyphenated nationality; I will distinguish between the two where possible, given the amount of information available. Siona means "toward the vegetable garden" in its language, Paico'ca (both Siona and Secoya languages belong to the Western Tucano linguistic group), and its descendents are genetically and culturally tied to the Sionas, Makaguaje and Coreguaje of Colombia and the Secoya and Angotero of Peru.[38] Together, Sionas and Secoyas constitute a population of about 350 individuals[39]; according to their own census, the Secoya alone number 260 (65 families).[40] Traditional housing patterns were fashioned around a male head of house and a shaman. The Siona-Secoya were unfamiliar

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36 Kane 1995: 27. "Kichwa" was commonly spelled "Quichua" until the year 2000 and many authors still use the original spelling. I will use the orthography currently preferred by the Kichwa nationality (Sawyer 2004: xiii).
37 Vallejo 2003: 56.
38 Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08.
39 Kimerling 1991: 853.
40 Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08.

with the concept of individual land ownership until recently, for such an outlook would have been incompatible with the reality of their hunter-gatherer society.[41]

Siona-Secoya spirituality displays "a complex cosmological system of supernatural spirits, forest demons, anthropomorphic animals and explanations of physical phenomena," often enhanced by shamans through the use of hallucinogenic plans called "yagé" (a collection of plant species from the genus *Banisteriopsis*). While many groups in this region of the Amazon use *Banisteriopsis* plants,

> *it is doubtful that there are many cultures to which it is more significant than the Siona-Secoya. To them it represents the medium through which all knowledge is learned, the assurance of a good hunt, the power of healing, and the gateway to the afterworld.*[42]

Under the influence of "yagé," shamans and community members visit the creator, "Baina," or the keeper of the peccaries in the underworld, "Weapo," for sustenance. The shaman is highly respected for maintaining a societal balance through minimal consumption of material goods.

Cofán

The Cofán, or A'ingae, once numbered 15,000; they have since seen their numbers dwindle to 849 individuals (162 families).[43] Cofán territory is now situated within the Reserva Faunística Cuyabeno (Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve) in Sucumbíos province but once shared a border with the Siona and Tetete nations.[44] Though Cuyabeno is meant to be a protected area, a highway runs through it to grant access to petroleum companies and the

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41 Vickers 1981: 52, 58-9.
42 Vickers 1981: 51.
43 Kimerling 1991: 853, Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08. Estimates are the Federation of the Cofán Nation of Ecuador's own, confirmed by other sources.
44 Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08.

Cofán have complained of trash being thrown in their rivers, of losing animals, and of losing the nature they live off of.[45]

Missionary effects on Cofán culture are visually represented by syncretized handicrafts in which crosses are incorporated into beetle, seed and bead adornments. Syncretization extends to the political realm, as well: some feel that the loss of the language of the Cofán, A'i, was exacerbated by non-representative leaders in the past, such as blond, blue-eyed Spanish monolingual Randy Borman.[46] Borman was born in Shell in 1955 to missionary parents working for the petroleum-friendly Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), the topic of the following chapter.

Prior to October 1991, the Cofán had "long been known as the most pacifist of the Oriente nations," fearful of "cusmas" ("white/mestizo people") who appeared on their territory. During this month, community members occupied the United States' Seiscom Delta facilities on Cofán land. Explanations for this occupation allege that the Cofán were "hit first and hardest by oil exploitation," that "for decades they had either run from the Company or died in its path. Finally, they had said no," having reached a breaking point as they found themselves confined to an increasingly smaller parcel of land in the northeastern corner of Ecuador near the Colombian border.[47]

Huaorani

The Huaorani are the best-researched group in the RAE despite experiencing contact later than all other nations. They are mistakenly known by many names, among

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[45] Goyes 1991.
[46] Goyes 1991.
[47] Kane 1995: 192, Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08.

them, Aushiri, Avijiria and Záparo (a group that has actually been killed off).[48] The most commonly-used erroneous designation is "Auca," a pejorative term meaning "savage" in Kichwa, the "traditional enemies" of the Huaorani.[49] The nation prefers to be called "Huaorani," meaning "the people" or "true human beings."[50] As previously indicated, the Huaorani nation was seen as an "obstacle" to overcome in Ecuador's citizenship project.[51] In the wake of 1958's first peaceful Huaorani contact, outsiders from various disciplines have swooped in with hopes of publishing works on the Huaorani.[52]

Huaorani demographics are particularly telling of the population boom brought on by post-contact Christian principles. In the 1960s, there were approximately 600 Huaorani; a 1991 estimate claimed that 1580 Huaorani are still living; a 1995 estimate guessed 1300 and a 2002 estimate places the Huaorani at 1400, 55% of those under the age of sixteen.[53] Yet another estimate claims that there are 3000 Huaorani living today, though this number is disputable and may or may not include branches of the two Huaorani nations that choose to remain in isolation.[54]

The Huaorani have settled in 26 to 32 communities in Pastaza, Napo and Orellana provinces, including Parque Nacional Yasuní (Yasuní National Park, or PNY), on a Massachusetts-sized territory of 600,000 to 809,339 hectares, yet the Huaorani claim 20,000 square kilometers (2,000,000 hectares) to be their traditional stomping grounds.[55] Huaorani are egalitarian, nomadic hunter-gatherers who establish small gardens around

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48 Rivas 2001: 17, Rival 2002: xiv.
49 Kane 1995: 17, Rivas 2001: 17, Rival 2002: xiv, Robinson 1981: 47, Wallis 1960: 273, Hitt 1959: 147, Elson 1962: 3. "Auca" can also be used to refer to any RAE native (Vickers 1981: 59).
50 Rival 2002: 51, Kimerling 1991: 885.
51 Rivas 2001: 19, Rival 2002: 164, Hitt 1959: 147.
52 Rivas 2001: 15.
53 Kimerling 1991: 853, Rival 2002: xiv, Kane 1995: 6.
54 Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08.
55 Kimerling 1991: 853, Rivas 2001: 23, Rivas 2001: 13, Kane 1995: 6, Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 11, Oilwatch 2007: 20.

"semisedentary villages" used as "base camps."[56] Like the Siona-Secoya, the Huaorani do not believe in ownership but accept the concept of protection and seek only help protecting their land, not instructions regarding how to do so.[57]

For years, the Huaorani have endured the side effects of deforestation. The "natural abundance" once provided by Huaorani territory grows increasingly limited, challenging the Huaorani belief that

> *the forest, far from being a pristine environment, is the product of the life activities of past generations that have transformed it into an environment rich in resources. These resources can be tapped without any sanction or moral obligation, and without anything being asked in return.*[58]

Until recently, the Huaorani were shrouded in mystery and outside knowledge relied on folklore about this group of "naked savages" that

> *fended off all comers: the Incas, the Spanish conquistadores; the rubber barons; the armies of Ecuador and Peru; modern-day colonists and prospectors; and, always, their land-hungry indigenous neighbors, the Quichua and the Shuar, who together outnumber the Huaorani by more than a hundred to one.*[59]

Indeed, Huaorani warrior culture cast the nationality in a negative light and instilled a sense of fear in bordering indigenous nations.[60] Before Westerners contacted the Huaorani, 41.7% of deaths were caused by spearings and 12.2% by infanticide.[61] One explanation for such high levels of homicide is psychological. Non-Huaorani are referred to as "cowode," meaning "nonhuman cannibals"; Huaorani mythology reinforces the assumption that any and all outsiders are threatening:[62]

> *It is not possible to differentiate real human attackers (for example, Zaparo* [sic] *slave raiders, rubber tappers, military, or colonists) from imaginary ones, and fights with outside enemies are no different from mythical encounters with* huene *demons because all attackers behave in the same*

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56 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 11, Kimerling 1991: 885.
57 Walker 1996.
58 Rival 2002: 92.
59 Kane 1995: 6, 16.
60 Rivas 2001: 17, Cabodevilla 1999: 387 in Rivas 2001: 26.
61 Yost 1978: 11 in Rivas 2001: 32.
62 Kimerling 1991: 885, Kane 1995: 18, Rivas 2001: 26, Wallis 1960.

predatory way and have the same evil intentions; they kill real people, suck their blood, and eat them.[63]

Missionaries had some degree of success in shifting the definition of "cowode" or "cowudi" to mean "foreign gift-givers" who posed no danger (which was arguable) but simply sought to award gifts in exchange for agreements, conversations, touring the community and buying crafts.[64]

In the tumult of the last several decades, Huaorani identity "has become fragmented and complex" but the nation has maintained its autonomy, at times through suicide, intent on avoiding a transformation into "Ecuadorian citizens, generic Indians, or civilized Christians."[65] Nevertheless, cultural changes are not always perceived as evidence of coercion and many Huaorani are excited about said transformations, for "'Huaoraniness' is not lived in a vacuum but in the context of shifting definitions of what being human means."[66] Formal education, immaculate hygiene, eating food from the outside and opting to dress Western are all cultural practices equated with modernity.[67] The Huaorani have maintained the traditions of face painting and ear piercing, though less visible and tangible cultural manifestations have been altered by the prolonged presence of missionaries.[68] A great deal of cultural homogenization has radicalized formerly dispersed and protective Huaorani bands, with Yasuní, Cacataro, Tihueno and Cononaco groups creating a shared memory since missionary involvement.

Two smaller indigenous groups thought to be related to the Huaorani, the Tagaeri and Taromenane, are the last known groups in voluntary isolation in the RAE. The two

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63 Rival 2002: 51.
64 Rivas 2001: 96-7.
65 Rival 2002: xvi, xix.
66 Rival 2002: 165.
67 Rival 2002: 164-5, Granda 1991.
68 Walker 1996.

bands are thought to have parted ways as early as 1969 and as late as 1989, after declining contact with missionaries and oil companies.[69] Some doubt that the Taromenane still exist amid rumors that the Tagaeri killed the last remaining members of the group in 2003. The Tagaeri are seen as the fiercest of Huaorani warriors and have recently been fired at from helicopters to avenge Tagaeri attacks on oil fields.[70]

Shuar

There are an estimated 50,000 Jívaro remaining in three ethnic subdivisions: Shuar, Achuar (4500 individuals) and Shiwiar (600).[71] The Shuar were once known for their ferocity; specifically, for their practice of head-shrinking, or making "tsantsas." Mera describes this process in *Cumandá*, alleging that the "small orange"-sized heads affirm personal value.[72] Today's Shuar are involved in agriculture, trade and colonization, evidence that their nationality has "adapted to the market economy more swiftly, and with greater success, than any other nation in the Oriente," yet the Shuar "are no less zealous" than they were pre-contact.[73]

Achuar

"Achuar" means "people of the palms," thought to have emigrated from Colombia and Venezuela.[74] The 4500 to 6000 (58 to 64 communities) remaining Achuar are, like their Jívaro relatives, the Shuar, "best known in the West as the head shrinkers of adventure

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69 Kimerling 1991: 886. A third group, the Oñamenane, is occasionally included as a voluntarily-isolated nation.
70 Vallejo 2003: 40-1.
71 Kane 1995: 27, Kimerling 1991: 853, Scully 2001.
72 Mera 51, 55; Corrales Pascual 24.
73 Kane 1995: 201.
74 Scully 2001, adventureinkapawi.com, kapawi.com.

stories and B movies."[75] Others consider the Achuar to be "a nation of warriors with a firm commitment to preserve their territory and way of life, and to resist the encroachment of extractive industries and a western [sic] style of development."[76]

The Achuar consider their ancestral lands— some of the last remaining primary forest in Ecuador— to span 681,218 hectares (two million acres) in Pastaza and Morona-Santiago provinces, only accessible to outsiders by airplane or canoe.[77] For this reason, the Achuar have remained more sheltered from mining, logging and petroleum enterprises than many of their counterparts in the northern RAE.[78] Nevertheless, Shell Oil debuted a base and landing strip in the 1930s near Achuar lands.[79]

Most Achuar territory was secured in 1992, when seven indigenous groups belonging to the Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza, or OPIP) marched on Quito to demand land rights; the Nacionalidad Shiwiar de Ecuador (Shiwiar/Shuar Nationality of Ecuador, or NASHIE) also signed an agreement with the Achuar political organization, Nacionalidad Achuar Ecuador (Ecuadorian Achuar Nationality, or NAE) for 6218 hectares on the Achuar-Shuar border. In several demonstrations against oil companies, the Achuar of Ecuador have joined forces with Peruvian Achuar, formerly separated by numerous Ecuadorian-Peruvian border conflicts.[80]

Toward Sustainable Development

"In theory, Ecuadorian national culture is homogeneous; in reality, it is ethnically diverse, with extremes of wealth and poverty... For Amazonian people, assimilation means rejecting their traditional beliefs and

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75 Scully 2001.
76 kapawi.com.
77 nacionalidadachuarecuador.org, kapawi.com.
78 nacionalidadachuarecuador.org.
79 kapawi.com.
80 nacionalidadachuarecuador.org.

ways of life, lowering their standard of living, and entering the lowest social and economic levels of Ecuadorian society. The loss of ancestral lands means they cannot and will not survive."[81]

— Judith Kimerling (1991)

Ecuador's current "Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010" ("National Development Plan"), put forth by the Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretariat for Planning and Development, or SENPLADES), anchors its twelve development objectives within a specific historical discourse. This dialogue began in earnest two years after Harry Truman initiated the concept of international help on January 20, 1949, when the United Nations seconded Truman's conflation of development with modernization and Americanization. At its inception, development was synonymous with economic growth, even if attaining such progress meant destroying local economies, cultural diversity, distinct systems of knowledge and collective memories.[82]

The first stage of Ecuadorian development occurred during Galo Plaza Lasso's presidency (1948-1952) and the five administrations of José María Velasco Ibarra (spanning a 40-year period, from the 1930s to the 1970s). Real development in Ecuador got underway in the aftermath of crises surrounding dictatorships in the Southern Cone, military reformism with Guillermo Rodríguez Lara and disenchantment with socialism.[83]

The import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies of the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, or CEPAL/ECLAC) sparked the foundation of an entire school of thought that called into question the economic dependency of Latin America. Agrarian reforms in 1964 and 1973 produced minimal gains in development and equality, instead paving the

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81 Kimerling 1991: 855.
82 Durán 1, Tortosa 1, Souza 5.
83 Ponce 110-12, Ponce 85, Bretón 134.

way for a debt crisis that reached its peak in 1982 and whose legitimacy is hotly contested on today's political stage.

The dollarization of Ecuador's currency in the year 2000 diminished the competitiveness of local producers, as did the neoliberal Washington Consensus, which left small producers at the mercy of the global market under the mantra of "privatization-liberalization-deregulation-and-decentralization."[84] Neoliberalism has been heavily criticized in various parts of the developing world for its seemingly sole focus on economics and has even been referred to as "terrorismo económico" ("economic terrorism").[85] It is an inherently shortsighted ideology, fails to respond to great inequalities and disregards the ecological destruction of the globe.[86] Certain organizations that filled the void left by the diminished neoliberal state served as mediators in the political realm, exerting ideological control in a more effective and less controversial form than outright military invasion.[87]

This broad range of setbacks justifies the creation of the "Plan": to protect the country from a new wave of manipulation from the "developed" world and avoid past pitfalls with international cooperation. Development is a human right declared by the United Nations as a crucial element of the equality, liberty and dignity guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.[88] The United Nations General Assembly's Declaración sobre el Derecho al Desarrollo (Declaration on the Right to Development, or

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[84] SENPLADES 16, 10, 17, 18, 28, 305, 335; Sawyer 2004: 12. During the 1990s, the Washington Consensus followed the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank's recipe for success: fiscal discipline, structural adjustment of public spending, privatization of public companies, general openness toward the market, deregulation, direct foreign investment and respect for private property (Acosta 2005: 18-9).

[85] Acosta 2005: 44.

[86] Acosta 2005: 17, Varea 1995: 143.

[87] Ponce 85-6, Varea 1995: 48. Although the World Bank has a poor reputation in many developing countries, the institution recently recognized that development is more than GDP (Tortosa 1). In 1995, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, defined as components of development peace, environment and justice (Tortosa 2). In 1997, the World Bank admitted that a strong, stable state is necessary for development (Zurbriggen 2008: 4). The Inter-American Development Bank also got on board with this idea, as they saw that loans in Africa and other parts of the world were having no effect or even negative effects (Zurbriggen 2008: 5).

[88] Angulo 2008: 2.

DDD), passed on December 4, 1986, states in its first article that social, cultural, economic and political development that benefits individuals and communities is an inalienable right.[89] Both of these declarations indicate that development is at least legally recognized as being part of living a dignified life.[90] However, the shape that development should take has been disputed by various agents of development for over 60 years.

Until recently, "development" in general (and especially among the aforementioned communities) has been synonymous with GDP growth.[91] This perspective implies an adherence to the "theory of the cornucopia," which erroneously imagines the resources of the world as being unlimited. Human-centered development, on the other hand, emphasizes both economic growth and satisfaction of basic needs, previously thought to be polar opposites incompatible within a single development framework.[92] De-developing, de-urbanizing, de-globalizing trade and product transportation, de-technologizing agriculture, de-petrolizing economies and decentralizing energy production and distribution are the new mandates of RAE development.[93]

"Sustainable development" is a floating signifier that first appeared in 1980 in an International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) document and is loosely defined, according to Pablo de Lora, as the satisfaction of "the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations."[94] The definition of sustainable development I will adhere to includes the following principles:

a) Consume non-renewable resources at a rate lower than their replacement rate;
b) Consume renewable resources at a rate lower than their renovation rate;

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89 Angulo 2008: 2-3.
90 Angulo 2008: 3.
91 SENPLADES 10.
92 Zurbriggen 2008: 6, Escobar 1999.
93 Oilwatch 2007: 63.
94 Flores 1/25/09. The question of sustainability also appeared at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with a nearly identical definition (Angulo 2008: 6).

c) Always re-introduce residues in quantities and compositions that natural systems can handle;
d) Maintain biodiversity; and
e) Guarantee the equal redistribution of surpluses.[95]

The RAE is living a constantly-evolving development reality, resulting from new interpretations of the freedoms of indigenous communities, of environmental law, of interactions with international agents of development, of interactions with the state and of the transformation of national identity. The following chapters will explore the three identifiable periods of development in the RAE, examining their pitfalls, acknowledging their positive effects, evaluating the sustainability of potentially sustainable practices and generating questions to guide future RAE development.

[95] Original Spanish text: "a) consumir recursos no-renovables por debajo de su tasa de substitución; b) consumir recursos renovables por debajo de su tasa de renovación; c) verter residuos siempre en cantidades y composición asimilables por parte de los sistemas naturales; d) mantener la biodiversidad; y e) garantizar la equidad redistributiva de las plusvalías" (Fernández 2009: 3).

CHAPTER 1

Faith-Based Development or the Business of Saving Souls

"Ecuador serves as a laboratory from which to study Protestant growth elsewhere. Ecuador's Coast offers insights into littoral areas throughout Latin America; its Sierra parallels the highland reaches of Central America and Mexico; and its Oriente compares to tropical rain forests in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. In Ecuador, all the historical, sociopolitical, and economical effects of climate and environment on people and their religious practices in Latin America can be viewed in one country."[96]

— Alvin M. Goffin (1994)

Since colonial times, religion has played a central role in the formation of an Ecuadorian national identity.[97] As a result, faith-based initiatives have been, and in some cases remain, vital components of RAE development. Serving the poor and underprivileged is considered a tenet of Christianity, whose followers are the main proponents of such development projects. Yet many believe that these faith-based efforts lack specialization and produce an unsustainable paradigm, spurring a decrease in a community's self-worth, increased economic dependency and hostility between missionaries and those they seek to help.[98] Furthermore, missionary development efforts have often gone hand-in-hand with petroleum exploration and exploitation.

French anthropologist Laura Rival believes that missionary efforts leave a lasting impression on the communities they come into contact with, imprints that can be observed in the modern Huaorani educational system:

> *Like in many third-world rural areas,* [the missionaries'] *task is not limited to giving instruction in the classroom; they must educate integrally, promoting new social habits and agricultural techniques, while creating a new frame of mind. In this particular context, they also represent the state and execute simple government functions.*[99]

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[96] Goffin 1994: xxii.
[97] The "great liberator" and founder of the short-lived Gran Colombia (1822-1830), Simón Bolívar, classified Venezuela as a military power, Colombia as an intellectual haven, and Ecuador as a religious center (Goffin 1994: 1).
[98] Fuentes 1997: 141.
[99] Rival 1992: 236-38 in Rival 2002: 164.

Little is recorded from the viewpoints of those on the receiving end of the conversion and development process, owing to their unwritten or newly-written languages. However, Ecuadorian indigenous groups have recently stepped onto the national stage with their own publications, due in part to the Summer Institute of Linguistics' (SIL) pro-literacy missionary work.

Involvement with the SIL proved to be a primary external fuel source for protective measures taken by the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian Amazon, most notably and dramatically, the Huaorani. This chapter will examine the history of faith-based influence, namely, the SIL's political, economic, educational and cultural functions within Ecuador to confirm it as a motivating factor for indigenous political mobilization in the RAE and a cohort of oil development.

Encountering the Outside: The Arrival of the Jesuits[100]

Beginning with the quest for the mythical, glittering city of El Dorado, the Amazon has since been idealized beyond recognition by various re-imaginings of the region.[101] The purported existence and economic promise of the "Cinnamon Lands" lured adventurers like Spaniard Gonzalo Pizarro, who reached the Napo River in 1541 and surrendered his power over the mysterious and fear-inducing "green hell" of the Amazon to Francisco de Orellana a year later.[102] Four hundred and fifty years ago, spices, wood, cacao, cinchona, sugar, tobacco, and, of course, gold, enticed foreigners; today, these goods have morphed into a single commonly-sought commodity: petroleum.[103] Throughout its experience with

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100 For an in-depth anthropological study of ancient cultures in the RAE, see Rival (2002), specifically "Chapter 2."
101 Varea 1995: 27.
102 Vallejo 2003: 33, Sawyer 2004: 30, Acosta 2005: 16, Kane 1995: 62, Goffin 1994: 3.
103 Acosta 2005: 16, Sawyer 2004: 39.

Europeans, the Oriente has been both marginalized and considered essential for inserting Ecuador into the global economy.[104]

Once the Americas had been "discovered" and subsequently "conquered," Catholic missionaries wasted no time settling down in South America's Northern Amazon, setting up camp between 1550 and 1615 to preach the word of God to all who would listen.[105] From 1578 and onward, indigenous rebellions in the Oriente contested the presence of colonizers and evangelizers, driving most foreigners out until the mid-twentieth century.[106] The first formal documents regarding control of the Ecuadorian Amazon appeared in July 1683, when a Spanish "cédula real" ("royal deed") awarded the Company of Jesus "exclusive rights" to the northern RAE and granted the Franciscans the Putumayo region. South American Jesuits were painstakingly selected for their level of education, their mission being to catechize the natives of America while simultaneously corralling them into settlements independent of Spanish and Portuguese colonizers. Indeed, Jesuit missionaries felt more strongly connected to Rome than to the Spanish Crown, an alliance that would eventually lead to their expulsion.[107]

Between 1709 and 1769, the Jesuits founded seventeen Siona-Secoya missions along the Aguarico, Putumayo and Napo rivers.[108] Dominican and Jesuit missionaries converged upon Achuar territory with military escorts via the Bobonaza River.[109] The principal purpose of these missions was to condense the widely-dispersed Siona-Secoya into settlements along rivers in hopes of facilitating conversion. The Jesuits traveled extensively to round up groups who often repelled each other (they believed that having

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104 Sawyer 2004: 40.
105 Vickers 1981: 53, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 52, Gerlach 2003: 51.
106 Goffin 1994: 5.
107 Vickers 1981: 53.
108 Vickers 1981: 51, 53.
109 kapawi.com.

too many shamans in too little space was causing new illnesses). Fears of being sold into slavery after being taught Kichwa caused the shaman Curazaba to attempt escape and spear Father Francisco Real, head of the San Miguel mission. From 1746 to 1750, no priest dared to preach in the RAE; by the late 1760s, there remained no more than two missions.[110] Threatened by the Jesuits' autonomy and their desire to protect the indigenous people from direct colonization, Spain's King Carlos III expelled the Jesuits from the Americas in 1767, effectively ending the first missionization period of the Ecuadorian Amazon.[111]

Rubber Exploration: The First of the Unsustainable Eras

Unleashed from Jesuit influence, the Siona-Secoya spent the 1800s contacting river traders, contracting illnesses from European settlers and fighting with the "Awishiras" (Huaorani) across the Napo River.[112] The rubber boom of the second half of the nineteenth century brought with it "a new wave of destruction, death, violent changes, and migrations."[113]

To the south of the Siona-Secoya in what are now Orellana and Pastaza provinces, the rubber boom hit Huaorani territory one hundred years before petroleum activity.[114] Folklore detailing Huaorani savagery originated at the turn of the century with ghost stories of brutal rubber-tapper and hacienda employee deaths, scaring guides and adventurers off of Huaorani lands. To avoid rubber tappers, the Huaorani ventured deep into the forest and did not emerge until the 1950s.[115]

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110 Vickers 1981: 53, 55.
111 Vickers 1981: 55, Muratorio 1998 in Vallejo 2003.
112 Vickers 1981: 55.
113 Rival 2002: 22, Hitt 1959: 147.
114 Vickers 1981: 55, Walker 1996, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 52, Gerlach 2003: 51, kapawi.com.
115 Rivas 2001: 24, Hitt 1959: 147.

Efforts to connect the Oriente to the rest of Ecuador by readmitting the Jesuits in 1870 and via rail in 1906 during the Liberal Revolution were impeded, just as rubber tappers had been, by the RAE's inhospitable terrain and highly mobile indigenous groups.[116]

Back to the Future: Permanent Protestant Missions

The rise of evangelical fundamentalism is thought to have sprung forth from the rise of the market-driven economy in the late 1800s, inspiring many to increase efficiency in areas of their lives other than the economic realm. In the case of religious fundamentalism in Ecuador with the SIL, the objective was to expedite the creation of God's "millennial kingdom on earth."[117]

The founder of the SIL, William Cameron Townsend (affectionately known as "Uncle Cam") ventured south to Guatemala in 1917 as a Bible salesman with the Central American Mission (CAM). Uncle Cam returned to the US in 1934 to found Camp Wycliffe (named after the Bible's first English translator, John Wycliffe), a training camp for Protestants interested in translating the Bible into "pre-literate" languages. Though the Camp initially boasted few followers, Uncle Cam was determined to expand the enterprise to translate the Bible into every language in the world, a goal that is halfway accomplished today.[118] His organization and others like it have enjoyed a remarkable conversion rate: between 1949 and 1989, the Protestant population of Latin America swelled from 3,172,000 to 48 million of the 480 million inhabitants of the region.[119]

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116 Vallejo 2003: 34.
117 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 53-4.
118 Goffin 1994: 53-4, Stoll 1984: 84.
119 Goffin 1994: xix.

The SIL declared itself completely independent of any governmental, non-governmental or ecclesiastical organization, fueling its operations with private donations alone; its work included "serving God through helping neighbors" in linguistics, anthropology, sociology, education, health and agricultural work in indigenous groups.[120] However, its primary explicit purpose is to combine linguistic studies with their practical application by translating the Bible.[121]

In Latin America, the SIL first focused its efforts on Central America, followed by the Andes and the Amazon after its translators were "jungle trained" in Chiapas, Mexico.[122] After founding the Wycliffe Bible Translators (WBT), or the "operational wing" that controls funds, recruits and public relations in the US and Europe, the SIL gained legitimacy as an organization. Creating the Jungle Aviation and Radio Services (JAARS) in 1947 allowed the SIL to overcome transportation problems encountered by North Americans in a hostile Amazonian environment.[123]

The SIL Arrives in Ecuador[124]

SIL translators arrived in the Amazon in 1948 and within five years commenced construction of "Little American villages" at bases from which they could comfortably

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120 Fuentes 1997: 134-5, Goffin 1994: 52-3. Missionary work in Guatemala during the 1940s and 1950s hints that SIL had anticommunist and anti-union policies. The SIL pushed Maya descendants to move from historically-established "traditional cooperative relations of production" and their "superstition and vice" to working against the clock. If workers wanted to protest directly, SIL missionaries told them to leave it up to God to make their bosses change their hearts. Other potential evidence of SIL ulterior motives and US links appeared in Cambodia, Vietnam, the Congo and Peru (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 55-6, Stoll 1982: 84).

121 Goffin 1994: 51.

122 Stoll 1984: 85, Goffin 1994: 56.

123 Goffin 1994: 51, 56; Ziegler-Otero 2004: 52; Stoll 1982: 84. The SIL and WBT gained official status in 1942 (Goffin 1994: 55).

124 The SIL was not the first Protestant group in Ecuador. Bible salesmen entered in the 1820s, though they were constitutionally forbidden from establishing full-fledged missions. For a history of early Protestant and Methodist missions, see Goffin (1994).

translate the New Testament.[125] President Galo Plaza Lasso officially permitted SIL access to the hearts and minds of the Amazon on January 30, 1953, though the signing of the contract was hurried and did not follow necessary legal procedures.[126] While the agreement made no mention of the SIL's intent to evangelize, also notably excluded from contracts in 1956 and 1971, the Ecuadorian government knew what it was getting into: it granted the SIL tax-exempt status, awarded only to religious agencies.[127]

Why did the Ecuadorian government allow evangelization to commence at this particular moment? In a nutshell, it didn't know what to do with its indigenous peoples, and, for the first time since the country's foundation in 1830, Roman Catholicism was no longer the country's official religion.[128] Modernization theory gained popularity among progressive leaders, putting emphasis on Western-style development and, in the case of Latin America, prodding wandering tribes toward the confines of the nation-state.[129] Lack of productivity was a sign of immorality and the government exercised its power to create citizens ("moral subjects"): nothing the indigenous people had done since the conquest was considered "work" in the eyes of outsiders, rendering their traditional lands "tierras baldías," up for grabs and just "waiting for the white man's industry."[130]

Granting the SIL entry was the cornerstone of Ecuador's progressive stage. For the first time, it pondered including the "far-off, primitive and mysterious world of oriental

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125 Robinson 1981: 46. Peru signed an SIL agreement in 1945 (Stoll 1982: 90). Confusion over boundaries following a territory dispute in 1941 between Ecuador and Peru might have facilitated entrance into Ecuador (Goffin 1994: 57).
126 Goffin 1994: 52, Fuentes 1997: 129, 135. The Ecuadorian agreement states that the SIL is affiliated with the University of Oklahoma and the WBT, in effect granting these organizations entrance, as well (Fuentes 1997: 130, 132). Though the SIL claims to be politically neutral, political conformity is another element of SIL policies: "Obey the government, for God is the one who has put it there" (Townsend in Stoll 1982: 85). The SIL was dependent on the state, unlike previous Catholic missions (Stoll 1982: 93, 95).
127 Goffin 1994: 57.
128 Although Eloy Alfaro's Constitution of 1897 allowed free religious expression, this was designed to limit the Catholic Church's power, Alfaro's worst enemy. No foreign religious orders were allowed to enter the country (Goffin 1994: 14).
129 Fuentes 1997: 129, 134.
130 Vallejo 2003: 29, Oilwatch 2007: 20, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.

jungles" in its national development projects.[131] Populist President José María Velasco Ibarra supported the SIL's actions in the 1950s, viewing its presence as a way to better exploit natural resources and reaffirm Ecuador's borders, diminished in the aftermath of a brief war with Peru in 1941.[132] The banana boom, which had fueled development projects nationwide, ended in the 1950s due to overdependence on this single export, natural disasters and the rise of the banana in Central America.[133] With the SIL's blessing, roads and buildings appeared where they never had before, spurring a sudden transition "into a society where money and favors bought things, people and significant policy changes" in formerly nomadic, "Stone Age" groups of "non-people" (i.e., indigenous nations).[134]

A Missionary Mindset

The era of modernocentrism ushered in a stage of development in which, for the first time, RAE indigenous peoples factored into national development projects. Examining the motivations behind missionary work illuminates potential areas for conflict with indigenous peoples. Firstly, SIL workers possess a "double identity" as missionaries and linguists.[135] Pseudoscientific status is perceived as a danger in that it masks the SIL's similarities with other fundamentalist/evangelical Christian missions to undertake "church planting" and exact "ethnocide and acculturation."[136]

Critics define missionaries as half of a duo— or even the foremost influence— responsible for spurring cultural changes among RAE indigenous peoples, the other entity

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131 Fuentes 1997: 129-30, Hvalkof 1981: 183.
132 Rivas 2001: 28.
133 Goffin 1994: 38.
134 Robinson 1981: 47.
135 Fuentes 1997: 132, Goffin 1994: 58.
136 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 53, Rivas 2001: 29.

being petroleum companies.[137] Work with the Huaorani, in particular, eventually brought about the expulsion of the SIL from Ecuador, in part due to allegations that

> *the Christianity which the SIL brings to indigenous communities goes far beyond mere theological indoctrination. The SIL brings the values of capitalism (including individual wage labor and competitiveness) accompanied by fervent anticommunism and a pro-*[North] *American stance that is communicated as being a necessary component of the process of becoming "Christian."*[138]

According to the SIL's website, the organization's main focus is to study, document and develop "the world's lesser-known languages." Those who speak these lesser-known tongues that "[lack] written alphabets" are "disadvantaged." There appears to be a conflation of written language with modernity, given that speakers of unwritten languages "often live in geographic, social, and economic isolation."[139]

To resolve this glaring lack of modernity, the SIL teams with "host governments," non-governmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous organizations and schools to carry out community development. The SIL expanded its original Bible translation services to encompass texts on such diverse topics as agriculture, nutrition/health, sanitation and "spiritual growth," all "requested by local communities." The amount of the Scripture to be translated is "decided in close interaction with churches and communities, and often with other partnership groups or organizations" and is only executed "where appropriate."[140]

Did the SIL intentionally target indigenous people during their time of "greatest weakness and fear"? Was SIL involvement in Ecuador a form of "legitimized occupation"/ neocolonialism/US imperialism, a path to exploitation of natural resources and, as a result,

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137 Rivas 2001: 18, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 52.
138 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 53.
139 sil.org.
140 sil.org.

masked economic infiltration? Was the SIL affiliated with the CIA?[141] Most importantly, are we asking the wrong questions by hunting for evidence of conspiracy theories with a fine-toothed comb?

> *... to me it seems largely irrelevant whether the SIL is or is not an active agent of the CIA or any other branch of the U.S. government or ruling class. What is plain is that its actions, whether dictated by some insidious agent of imperialism or self-selected, have served to advance the penetration of global capitalism and U.S. imperialism. The SIL, as a branch of the North American religious right, and the U.S. government share goals and ideology— their beliefs and actions are coterminous rather than necessarily coordinated.*[142]

The likelihood that SIL workers are actually US government agents is low and it is important to recall the "absolute sincerity and passion" with which SIL missionaries champion their global mission.[143] As an introductory example, missionary pilot Nate Saint "thought of [Huaorani] not as savages, but as a people for whom Christ died. The seed of compassion was planted in Nate's heart, and as time went on this seed grew into a real passion for the souls of these men of the forest."[144]

The SIL in the RAE

"Eugene the whiteman lived long ago. It is reported that he was really a sinful man. He sinned in every way. He was really a fierce one. It is reported that he lived long ago."[145]

— Excerpt from an SIL grammar book featuring sample Cofán sentences

Bilingual-intercultural education and literacy were top priorities for SIL missionaries.[146] By 1975, the SIL had established permanent contact with five nationalities

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141 Fuentes 1997: 130-1, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 52-4, Hvalkof 1981: 183, Stoll 1984: 85. Some degree of connection is probable but "institutional connections between CIA and SIL have never been substantiated" (Hvalkof 1981: 183).
142 From Vietnam to the Philippines "to the oilfields of the Amazon, where 'hostile' indigenous groups hindered the advance of extractive capitalism, the SIL has always acted to further the interests of the United States' ruling class" (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 55).
143 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 55.
144 Hitt 1959: 147.
145 Borman 1977: 308, 312, 326.
146 Fuentes 1997: 138, Kane 1995: 138-9.

in Ecuador, running 37 bilingual yet Western-style schools.[147] By 1990, seven Protestant schools had been put in place within the Huaorani protectorate alone, clashing with traditionally free-form, free-from-judgment Huaorani "education."[148] Secondary elements of SIL development were media (radio) and medicine (various Vozandes hospitals).[149] Many Huaorani communities became "school villages" in the 1990s, complete with airstrips and radios to the mission hospital in Shell Mera and SIL headquarters in Quito.[150]

All RAE indigenous nationalities have been affected by SIL "missionization" and education projects, as evidenced by the inclusion of the Cofán, Jívaro (Shuar), Secoya, Siona and Kichwa in SIL grammar books. What development story unfolds within the pages of these grammar books?

A Siona example describes the foreign white people who come to build.[151] In a Kichwa example, several sample sentences refer to increased modernization, alluding to colas and airstrips.[152] In addition to penning examples of native violence and concern for hygiene present in most chapters, the authors of a Záparo (a nation that has disappeared since the onset of the petroleum era) article explicitly give thanks to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Education for allowing them to undertake their work, confirming their interactions with government and education.[153]

> [The] *SIL takes pride in its good cooperation with the national governments. In view of the organization's ability to pacify and integrate the tribal groups— both necessities for any national development policy— there is perfect justification for the state to support SIL's work.*[154]

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147 Vickers 1981: 56.
148 Gerlach 2003: 52-3.
149 Robinson 1981: 47.
150 Rival 2002: 160.
151 Elson 1962: 42-4, 248.
152 Elson 1962: 124.
153 Elson 1962: 130, 168, 171, 190.
154 Hvalkof 1981: 183.

All of the groups highlighted below participated in bilingual education programs promoted by the SIL's joint partnership with the Ecuadorian Ministry of Education, constituting the best-documented examples of SIL intervention in RAE communities.[155]

Siona-Secoya

Following the SIL's visit to the Cuyabeno River in the mid-1950s, an airstrip, a school, health services and, of course, religious education, arrived in quick succession for the Siona-Secoyas. By March 1975, 200 people lived on the mission at San Pablo, the culmination of a seven-year effort to entice the newly-contacted to settle on the amenity-rich mission.[156]

The Siona-Secoya village school wove nationalist indoctrination into its curriculum. For a visual approximation of this effect, William T. Vickers notes that bilingual Siona-Secoya children sang the national anthem before the classroom's prominently-displayed shield and flag each day. As per the SIL-Ministry of Education agreement, religion was not officially part of the curriculum, yet many teachers were Christian community leaders.[157]

Health services provided by missionaries were meant to introduce the Siona-Secoya to a cash economy by asking for money in exchange for treatment. While it is arguable how often all services were paid for by indigenous people, the principle of the activity remained intact, updating pre-capitalist systems of exchange.[158]

The SIL pressed for a minimal, 7043-hectare Siona-Secoya land concession in 1977 from the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (Ecuadorian Institute

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155 Fuentes 1997: 136, Gerlach 2003: 52, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 57, Robinson 1981: 47.
156 Vickers 1981: 56.
157 Vickers 1981: 56.
158 Locals felt that they had few resources and did not want to spend them on health care; compensation was not always enforced by indigenous nurse's aides due to the rules of reciprocity and kin ties (Vickers 1981: 58).

for Agrarian Reform and Colonization, or IERAC). This land constituted ten percent of that claimed by Siona-Secoyas and seemed even less significant to the two nationalities in the face of looming population growth and inevitable increase in land needs for hunting and fishing that would result.[159]

Cofán

Sustained intimate contact with missionaries makes the Cofán nation's interaction with the SIL unique. Although "Mr. and Mrs. Bub Borman" once translated Bibles with head missionary Rachel Saint and Huaorani friend Dayuma's son, their son Randy Borman's extended presence (as mentioned in the Introduction) has both counteracted and reinforced traditional power relations in missionary-indigenous relationships.[160] Borman defends the actions of the SIL, which he claims has prevented Cofán culture from disappearing completely by holding the Ecuadorian state accountable for delivering on certain promises, such as establishing a 9000-acre Cofán territory. Nevertheless, as a community leader, Borman blames the SIL for leading the Cofán to believe that all outsiders were truly well-intentioned: Texaco soon degraded state-awarded lands by building roads, which some believe led to a near-complete Cofán ethnocide.[161]

Achuar and Shuar

The Achuar remained virtually uncontacted by the West until the late 1960s, when their previously "terra incognita" was flooded with long-term Protestant and Roman Catholic settlements. The missionaries are credited with mitigating violence, "vendettas"

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159 Vickers 1981: 60.
160 Wallis 1960: 183-4.
161 Kane 1995: 193-4.

and "continuing feuds" among the Achuar, along with other Jívaro groups like the Shuar, the Achuar's "distant kin."[162]

On the morality front, missionary Frank Drown initially compromised with the Shuar, allowing them to maintain polygamous practices because, he theorized, "Forcing additional wives to leave their husbands would drive them into immorality and leave them without means of survival." Nevertheless, the "Jivaros" soon decided, of their own accord, "that after a man became a Christian, he could not take additional wives."[163]

The biography of missionary-pilot Nate Saint alleges that, while the Shuar were usually "friendly" to European foreigners,

> *they are cruel and heartless in their intertribal warfare that has continued for generations. In former years, the victor in these battle-to-the-death encounters would cut off the head of his victim and by employing a mysterious pickling process, shrink the head of the vanquished into a gruesome tsantsa about the size of a baseball.*[164]

Saint's biography qualifies the Shuar as believers in "witchcraft" and "evil spirits." However, after just a brief period of contact, missionaries transformed the "seminomadic" Shuar into skilled hunters who traded in their blowguns for shotguns, which they proudly toted to all destinations— church included. The missionaries taught "Jivaros" (in this case, just the Shuar) "the rudiments of agriculture," marking the community of Macuma as "a sort of experimental jungle farm" next to a school and health clinic, both run by the SIL. Ample evidence is provided to describe high levels of disease present within the community, but no effort is made to address from whence the illnesses might have come (i.e., prolonged presence of outsiders in non-immunized communities).[165]

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[162] Scully 2001, Hitt 1959: 240, kapawi.com.
[163] Hitt 1959: 241.
[164] Hitt 1959: 240.
[165] Hitt 1959: 240-1.

Huaorani

Over the past 50 years, the Huaorani have enrolled in a crash course in Western development, education systems and religion that has, for better or for worse, guided them into an increasingly globalized world. Prior to the arrival of outsiders in their "wood-bees" (airplanes), the Huaorani practiced subsistence cultivation, formed family alliances to trade goods and women, and went to war both with each other as well as with groups like the neighboring Záparo.[166] This form of association would be transformed drastically in the mid-1950s in the most dramatic example of missionary-led development in the RAE, as much for its economic as well as its sociocultural implications, among them, providing fuel for future indigenous political platforms.

"Operation Auca": The Birth of the Huaorani Post-Contact Period

Nate Saint's first description of the "Aucas" characterizes the group as "a Stone Age tribe who kill swiftly and silently from ambush— a tribe which no white man or Indian had entered peacefully in more than three hundred years."[167] Saint aided numerous Protestant missions in the RAE as a pilot for the nondenominational Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF), which employed World War II pilots as missionaries.[168]

Saint exhibits a sense of wonder when describing the "modern magic" that Shell Oil performed with its bulldozers on terrain that presented little more than an obstacle for the infrastructure necessary to declare the Oriente economically open for business.[169] Shell laid down $40 million of crushed rock over an 11-year span to counteract the "boggy

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166 Wallis 1960: 22, Rivas 2001: 23, Walker 1996.
167 Hitt 1959: 36.
168 Hitt 1959, 34-5, Goffin 1994: 45. World War II produced an unprecedented number of male pilots, some of them evangelical Christians, and "the battle with godless communism began" when war veterans and their wives and children began to work on missions (Robinson 1981: 46).
169 Hitt 1959: 143.

nature of the jungle soil," ending this project in 1949— the same year that Saint planned to take over oil land as its resident evangelizer.[170] Shell built many airstrips, all the while fearful of "Indians," specifically, the "Aushiris"/"Aucas." Saint claimed that at least 14 Shell workers were speared by the "completely uncivilized" Huaorani, who "even throw spears at the planes flying over them."[171] An adventure-seeker, Saint was intrigued by this yet-to-be-contacted and feared-by-all group.[172]

In 1951, the second and ultimately more prolific Saint, Rachel, visited her brother in "Shell Merita," boasting her Peruvian missionary success and "shar[ing] her desire of working with an unreached primitive tribe." Nate flew Rachel over "Auca" land, for there dwelled "the tribe which had never heard of Christ: 'There's your tribe, Sis, just beyond that ridge."[173] However, when Nate commenced strategizing "Operation Auca" to contact the Huaorani, he ultimately decided against including his sister in the plans.[174] He nevertheless enlisted Dayuma, Rachel's star pupil, to help with the Huaorani phrases needed to make contact.[175]

The SIL came into its own in Ecuador in response to the killings of five US missionaries that resulted from "Operation Auca."[176] Though not directly affiliated with the SIL, five MAF pilots— Saint, Roger Yoderian, Ed McCully, Jim Elliot and Peter Fleming—

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170 Hitt 1959: 143, 208.
171 Hitt 1959: 144.
172 Hitt 1959: 147.
173 Hitt 1959: 219. When Dayuma asked why Rachel Saint wanted to learn her language, Saint managed to communicate with her then-limited language abilities, "So that I can go to your people, and teach them not to kill, and to live well" (Wallis 1960: 23). Before working with the Huaorani, Saint had established herself as a missionary in Peru with the Shapra and Piros but couldn't let the Huaorani, as an untouched tribe, go on living as they were in sin (Wallis 1960: 27, Kane 1995: 85).
174 Hitt 1959: 275-6.
175 Goffin 1994: 58, Rival 2002: 157. Dayuma, a Guiquetairi Huaorani woman who had fled her settlement during intense internal warfare to work among Kichwa speakers on a "hacienda," was instrumental in delivering God's word to her people (Rival 2002: 157).
176 Rival 2002: 156.

were speared to death on Sunday, January 8, 1956.[177] The pilots operated under the philosophy that "[p]resenting gifts has always been a successful method of approaching primitive people."[178] On January 3, 1956, after fifteen gifts (that may or may not have been reciprocated by the Huaorani) had been dropped over a two-month period, the five pilots landed on the Curaray River's "Palm Beach."[179]

After spending three Huaorani-less days on the beach, Peter Fleming recorded in his diary that Nate slapped a shirt on one of the three Huaorani who finally arrived, took the man with him in the airplane and flew him around while the man screamed. The plane landed and the man left with his two companions; two days later, Nate flew over the same area to see that a group of Huaorani men was headed for the beach, which he promptly announced to his fellow pilots upon landing. Spears and the machetes given the Huaorani as gifts were found in the victims' bodies days later.[180]

What happened during this encounter is subject to debate. Missionaries claim that the men spent one peaceful night (some say five days) with the Huaorani, who then launched an "unprovoked attack" and "martyred" the pilots.[181] According to the Huaorani, one of their own was lost in the fray.[182] Identifying the reasons for which the spearings took place is beyond the scope of this project, though it is pertinent to note that the aftermath of the killings produced a "bitter competition among evangelical groups" for the

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177 Goffin 1994: 46, 58.
178 Hitt 1959: 277.
179 Goffin 1994: 59.
180 Goffin 1994: 59-61.
181 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 61; Gerlach 2003: 52.
182 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 61.

"pacification" of the Huaorani. Rachel Saint was the highest bidder, considering herself the Huaorani's God-sent protectress.[183]

The Mission Base at Tihueno

"For a long time you children have prayed for the Aucas. Now Auntie Rachel and Auntie Betty are living down in the jungle with the Aucas. Someday, perhaps soon, you may meet some of the men who killed Daddy. Daddy would want you to love them and thank our heavenly Father that our prayers for these Indians are being answered."[184]

— Marj Saint, Nate Saint's widow

"The only Auca you can trust is a Christian Auca."[185]

— Rachel Saint

"Operation Auca" was highly publicized in *Life Magazine*, by the Reverend Billy Graham, and on the June 5, 1957 telecast of "This is Your Life" with Ralph Edwards. Dayuma and Rachel Saint subsequently and suddenly found themselves showered with wealth and influence.[186] Three months after the spearings, Dayuma married her cousin, Quimo, and chose to live with her mother, Acahuo; Quimo's father, Guiqueta; Saint; and the wife of another slain pilot, Elizabeth "Betty" Elliot (and her three-year-old daughter).[187]

By 1958, the women had established a mission base near their home, Tihueno, and a flood of donations and volunteers arrived, constituting the first Huaorani "community of

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183 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 61, Wallis 1960: 29, Goffin 1994: 58. Years passed before Dayuma told Rachel Saint what happened in "Operation Auca" and that her own relatives were responsible: the Huaorani believed that "the missionaries were cannibals trying to lure them into their cooking pots" (Goffin 1994: 66-7). Some accounts indicate that the Huaorani thought that the cowudi had killed Dayuma and they were avenging her death (Wallis 1960: 176-7, "End of the Spear" 2005, Hitt 1959: 277). Anthropologist Laura Rival (1992) adds that the laws of reciprocity dictated by Huaorani culture were broken when the MAF dropped unsolicited food that had not been grown in Huaorani gardens from airplanes, justifying a sense of threat (Fuentes 1997: 142).

184 Hitt 1959: 302-3.

185 Kane 1995: 87.

186 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64, Kane 1995: 85, Wallis 1960: 93, Hitt 1959: 299. These two women continue to inspire missionaries today: many claim that the "Auca massacre" was their "call" to become missionaries. Saint and Dayuma were united in their belief that their brothers had killed each other in the 1956 struggle.

187 Rival 2002: 158.

believers."[188] Once integrated into the Tihueno base, missionaries completed the "progressive introduction of new garden crops, shotguns, dogs, and Western medicine, as well as the intensive use of air transport and radio contacts." This was known as "cowode abundance," quite distinct from the rainforest's natural bounty.[189] Violence and political conflict increased when Western supplies attracted nomadic Huaorani to the Tihueno settlement.[190] Critics who question the success of the SIL hypothesize that Tihueno's attraction was contained primarily in its distribution of steel goods, in exchange for which the Huaorani consented to superficial conversion.[191]

In the 1960s, the populist-leaning Ecuadorian government sought to expand the SIL's dominion, resulting in the concession of a 160,000-hectacre Huaorani protectorate/reserve— or less than ten percent of traditional lands— in 1969.[192] The protectorate was meant to promote the safety of all involved parties but the SIL was given full control over the reserve.[193] The formation of the reserve has been described as a "relocation" or "concentration" effort, moving some Huaorani hundreds of kilometers from home.[194] Saint employed various tactics to herd all Huaorani into the protectorate, among them, sending messengers and material bribes.[195] The Huaorani became sedentary, no longer dispersed in "semi-autarkic" nomadic bands of 30 to 40 members who inhabited

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188 Tihueno was situated halfway between Dayuma's native Guiquetairi group and the Kichwa village where she was raised, in western Huaorani territory (Rival 2002: 157-8, Goffin 1994: 66, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 62-3, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 11, Rivas 2001: 24, 32).
189 Rival 2002: 157, Kane 1995: 140.
190 Rivas 2001: 25, Ferguson 1990: 247.
191 Goffin 1994: 68.
192 Vickers 1981: 55, Fuentes 1997: 136, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64, Gerlach 2003: 51, Goffin 1994: 69, Rivas 2001: 35, Rival 2002: xiv, Oilwatch 2007: 20. "SIL's program of working through the tribes' own languages and cultures is seen as an effective alternative to Hispanized [generally Catholic] educational and cultural programs"; SIL often enters during liberal or populist eras like that of Velasco Ibarra, regarded as the best example of Ecuadorian populism (Hvalkof 1981: 183, Stoll 1984: 91).
193 Gerlach 2003: 52, Goffin 1994: 69.
194 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64, Rival 2002: 156-7.
195 Goffin 1994: 71.

the hills instead of river banks, for nomadism was branded as a lifestyle that disregarded God's will.[196]

Sedentarization separated the Huaorani from their previous ways of living: trekking in the rainforest and practicing sustainable hunting. Excessive hunting in certain areas ensued, meaning that resources eventually ran slim and men embarked on longer hunting missions.[197] Hunting taboos, the devil's work, were lifted so that all animals could be fair game; the appearance of livestock and crops roughly coincided with sedentarization and resource exhaustion.[198] Gender roles hardened as the Huaorani became increasingly dependent on missionaries, for, in this limited-resource environment, indigenous people stayed on their toes so as not to be thrown out of the community.[199] By 1973, only 100 Huaorani (one-sixth of the population) remained outside the protectorate, most likely including some Taromenane; the Tagaeri violently separated themselves from the protectorate, rejecting outside contact.[200]

Healthy Christian Values

Aside from sedentarization, the first major shift in Huaorani lifestyle after missionary contact involved overall level of health and attitudes toward sexuality, an interdependent pair radically altered on the reserve.[201] Saint's objectives were to create a Spanish-speaking, nationalist, God- and money-loving Huaorani populace that "rejected such heathen practices as shamanism, nomadism, nudity, and 'free love.'"[202]

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196 Rival 2002: 156-7, Rival 1996: 24 in Rivas 2001: 24, Kane 1995: 56, Gerlach 2003: 53.
197 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 65.
198 Kane 1995: 85-6, Gerlach 2003: 53.
199 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 65.
200 Rivas 2001: 25, 32, 34; Rival 2002: xiv.
201 Kane 1995: 86.
202 Kane 1995: 21.

The Huaorani had historically chosen two or three small bands with which to associate. At the base and on the reserve, they were expected to marry and peacefully coexist with traditional enemies and, though this endeavor was not initiated by the targeted groups, it succeeded in mitigating intertribal violence.[203] Responding to a conflict between warring Guiquetairi and Baihuari factions in 1968, Saint and Dayuma convinced groups to intermarry and observe two unbreakable rules: monogamy and no killing.[204] These two rules transformed demographics at the base. When women ceased to marry their older sisters' husbands, Tihueno's population tripled to a level four times larger than traditional Huaorani settlements: by 1973, 525 Huaorani inhabited Tihueno.[205]

Epidemics soon resulted, as no pre-planned, organized vaccination or sanitation efforts had been made. Accounts of the damage done by these epidemics differ greatly. Some say that not even Saint escaped the polio outbreak of 1969 which, at the height of contamination, claimed between ten and 20 lives each day.[206] Yet anthropologist James Yost alleges that the most notable polio outbreak occurred in 1968 and only 16 people died.[207] Regardless of the numbers behind this particular epidemic, most sources agree that poor health, food shortages and acceptance of the SIL as "the provider and giver of goods" made the reserve wholly unmanageable.[208]

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203 Rival 2002: 156-8.
204 Rival 2002: 158-9, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 57.
205 Rival 2002: 158-9, Rivas 2001: 25.
206 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 65, Goffin 1994: 73, Kane 1995: 87, Walker 1996.
207 Yost 1978: 11 in Rivas 2001: 34.
208 Rival 2002: 159, Rivas 2001: 25. Some interpret dependency as a result of Huaorani laziness, though, in Huaorani culture, work is an individual choice for specific ends; tasks are "undertaken with pleasure" without moral consequences for lack of work (Rival 2002: 171). While Huaorani "express a strong desire for an identity that requires the performance of civilized behavior and the consumption of a wide range of Western goods, they do not see hard work, surplus production, agriculture, and reciprocal exchange as essential components of a modern identity" (Rival 2002: 175).

Cutting Ties: The Expulsion of Rachel Saint and the SIL

The Huaorani achieved "total dependency" within Saint's "personal fiefdom."[209] Saint was head of all Huaorani SIL projects, controlling the protectorate entirely.[210] Heavily criticized for her dictator-like behavior, she and Tihueno were "investigated" in 1973 by SIL "evangelical anthropologist" James Yost.[211] Yost found that the Huaorani had become dangerously thin due to the fact that game and fish resources were virtually nonexistent; on a biocultural level, the Huaorani had embraced the use of guns, dynamite and DDT to manipulate their environments in search of food, further accenting a striking break from traditional sustainable practices.[212] Saint was forced to retire as a result of Yost's discoveries, revealed in his 1976 SIL report.[213] After fighting the decision for years, Saint left the territory in 1979.[214]

In 1975, Yost's proposed tension-diffusing breakdown of Tihueno came to fruition, dispersing formerly-dense populations along rivers in Napo, Pastaza and Orellana provinces.[215] After the foundation of self-sustaining, manageable groups, the SIL returned to the communities to translate Bibles without fostering dependencies of the past.[216] In fact, a self-evaluation produced by the SIL in 1981 and presented to the Ministry of Government shortly thereafter describes the organization's philosophy toward indigenous

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209 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 60, 65; Rivas 2001: 48.
210 Goffin 1994: 73, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64-5. Saint denied entrance to the Ecuadorian military, which wished to perform a census in 1974, and warned that male missionaries who dared to enter would be speared.
211 Goffin 1994: 72, Kane 1995: 86. Some point to Yost's "mixed allegiances" due to his double duty as an anthropologist and an evangelical, yet Yost had worked more than ten years with the Huaorani and knew their language (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 66).
212 Goffin 1994: 73.
213 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 66.
214 Goffin 1994: 73, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 66, Kane 1995: 86, Rivas 2001: 29.
215 Goffin 1994: 73, Rival 2002: 159-60, Rivas 2001: 25, 47. The large group disbanded and Huepeiri, Guiquetairi, Bahuairi, and Piyemoiri communities left to form new settlements in the protectorate. However, these lands were "owned" by the Guiquetairi and Piyemoiri, leaving subgroups from Cononaco, Yasuní and Tiputini regions to feel like outsiders in a "host-guest" dynamic.
216 Rival 2002: 160.

communities as one that promotes "self-sufficiency, self-realization and self-determination."[217]

The controversy regarding Saint's ousting ultimately worked against her as a tide of nationalism swallowed students, church officials, politicians, intellectuals, and, of course, indigenous organizations, following an international trend of expelling the SIL.[218] Left-wing President Jaime Roldós Aguilera officially expelled the SIL on May 22, 1981, claiming that its practices were "incompatible with the priorities of development in the Ecuadorean [sic] Amazon."[219] (Nevertheless, the SIL continued to work under the shelter of World Vision, another Protestant agency operating in the RAE.[220]) Soon after (officially) ridding the country of the SIL, newly-emerging indigenous movements and their supporters began to dissect the actions of this perceived proponent of "internal colonialism" and combine civil rights, land rights and "self-determination" in their mobilization efforts.[221] Burgeoning indigenous organizations began to single out the government and the SIL for racism and attempting to squeeze them out of their territory. What little appeal Christianity and material goods held for the Huaorani lost its sheen when communities began to equate the SIL with genocidal Spanish colonizers of the past.[222]

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217 Fuentes 1997: 140.
218 Goffin 1994: 73-4, Gerlach 2003: 53.
219 Goffin 1994: 74.
220 Goffin 1994: 73 in Ziegler-Otero 2004: 66, Goffin 1994: 131. Undeterred, Saint gave lectures in the US until she was granted funding from Oklahoma evangelicals. These funds allowed her to reenter Ecuador and Huaorani communities without having to officially adhere to SIL framework. "In truth, the SIL did not leave the country. Their missionaries continued their work, operating in the same manner as before, under a variety of different names and providing extensive material support for Rachel Saint's (now unaffiliated) work." Saint evangelized until her death in November 1995 in Toñampade; some claim that the base was called "Toñampari" and that Saint died in November 1994 (Goffin 1994: 73, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 66, Kane 1995: 86, Rivas 2001: 29). Saint gave several interviews during the documentary "Petróleo y Baratijas" (official English translation: "Trinkets and Beads") during which she denounced Huaorani beliefs as "witchcraft" and complained that nudity broken up by "G-strings" signified a continued need to be "civilized."[220] The Huaorani accuse Saint of lying, for she told them that God would appear and the world would end.[220]
221 Stoll 1982: 85, 94-5.
222 Cabodevilla 1994: 383-89 in Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64-5.

The SIL deserves a large portion of the blame for the explosive nature with which its relationship with Ecuador ended. However, an intersection of interests among the US government, capitalism and Protestant evangelism do not necessarily indicate that the SIL is an inherently evil institution for its impacts on indigenous groups; rather, its forays into development did not satisfy the needs or interests of all parties involved.[223]

The SIL snuck back into Ecuador as one of many conservative reactionary measures taken by León Febres Cordero's administration. Cordero approved of the SIL's "promotion of home maintenance and infant care," literacy efforts and specialized job training. Additionally, some Ecuadorian citizens felt that the national groups that had taken over SIL work were inadequate both in funding and education materials. However, President Rodrigo Borja refused to sign a new contract with the SIL when he was elected in 1988, signaling at least a formal end to what the indigenous peoples of Ecuador considered "genocide and dubious accomplishment" over a period of time spanning more than three decades.[224]

Lasting Effects: The Quest for "Modernity"

Relationships defined by dependency are characteristic of indigenous-missionary interactions. Indigenous people not only grow to expect goods and services but also "may become adept in playing outsiders against each other to achieve their own ends."[225] Manipulation occurs on both sides, and the Huaorani are definitely not helpless in this

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223 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 55.
224 Goffin 1994: 74-5.
225 Stoll 1982: 85.

dynamic: it was the Huaorani who complied and at least appeared to want what the missionaries had to offer.[226]

The SIL recognized God-given diversity in ethnicity and linguistics but could not come to terms with shamanic practices (gifts from the devil), bringing about a lack of self-esteem among the Huaorani.[227] The SIL and other evangelical organizations keep Rachel Saint's legacy alive and her teachings are now enforced by "Huegongui," or "God-Father." The term "Huaorani" itself now implies "civilized Huaorani," definitively separate from the "Auca," given that many Huaorani are embarrassed of their "precontact" nakedness.[228] The Tagaeri and Taromenane are mentally banished for refusing to assimilate. Though the youth are generally considered civilized, Huaorani elders do not approve of all changes and worry that the current generation has lost touch with ancestral knowledge.[229]

Huaorani communities today support themselves through production of crops, hunting and fishing for subsistence and, most recently, tourism and petroleum activity.[230] Bicultural schools uphold SIL values to some degree, yet, if a school closes, so does the town, like a city without a city center. Lifestyle changes are not necessarily permanent as modernity, formal education, the village and horticulture are temporarily forgotten.[231]

The Siona-Secoya underwent a similar process of reifying "modernity" and "civilization," welcoming Christian curriculum. SIL work has divided Siona-Secoya society into two constituencies: those who buy into the missionaries' message and those who do not, with Christian believers viewing traditional believers as sinners.[232] Shamans have been

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226 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 65.
227 Rival 2002: 161, Goffin 1994: 52-3.
228 Rival 2002: 163.
229 Rival 2002: 62-3.
230 Rivas 2001: 23.
231 Rival 2002: 172, 174, 176.
232 Vickers 1981: 58-9.

delegitimized and in some cases effectively shunned, causing the Siona-Secoya to look for guidance from Christian teachers, who "[enjoy] concrete advantages over the shamans as... cultural broker[s] due to [their] Spanish fluency, literacy and educational experience in the non-Indian world. This fact is not lost on the Siona-Secoya, who look to the articulate teacher[s] to represent them in dealings with outsiders."[233]

Though slightly outdated, William T. Vickers (1981) offers an explanation for the importance of being civilized to the Siona-Secoya:

> *Since the most flagrant cases of exploitation of Indians has been at the hands of petty officials, the military, river traders, and Mestizo* [sic] *neighbors (involving such abuses as forced labor, sales fraud, property theft, nonpayment of wages, forced conscription, kidnapping of children, rape and homicide) the "elevation" of Indians to "civilized" status may be of some value in correcting some of the more gross forms of injustice deriving from the traditional pattern of interethnic relations.*[234]

How can proponents of development move beyond this impulse to "modernize" and "civilize," according to Western definitions? How can development workers halt the conflation of "tradition" with "backwardness," "savagery" and "anti-modernity"? Native populations have been silenced by themselves in the past; when competition for resources, namely land, occurs, "the Indians usually lose because they are greatly outnumbered and are unable to mobilize the agencies of the national government to intercede on their behalf."[235] I have only just begun to deconstruct the validity of this statement by planting the seeds of the modern RAE indigenous political movement.

A Word on Concurrent Catholic Missions

"Similar in tone and content to the Catholic church's [sic] *response to North American fundamentalist Protestantism in the 1895-1990 period was the response of the indigenous people of Ecuador. Most of them viewed the proselytizing activities of Protestant groups as part of the most recent phase in a five-hundred-year conquest and the destruction of their way of life. Protestantism resembled traditional Catholicism to them*

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233 Vickers 1981: 59.
234 Vickers 1981: 59.
235 Vickers 1981: 61.

and brought with it such disasters as the exploration and exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources; the colonization of indigenous territories; the ravaging of distinctive ecological zones, including the ruin of the rain forest [sic] *and flora and fauna; and the eradication of native customs and religion.*"[236]

— Alvin M. Goffin (1994)

Contentious issues regarding the saving of souls in Ecuador often formed barriers between Protestant and Catholic evangelizing efforts. Catholics thought they had won over Ecuadorians long ago but found their religious monopoly threatened by Protestant missionaries in the 1950s; however, after the backlash against the SIL, the Catholic Church found itself fulfilling a new role among indigenous peoples: political moderator.[237] Guided by the doctrine of Liberation Theology, several Catholic missionaries have recently lent their services to indigenous groups attempting to strengthen their political voices through official organizations.[238]

This position, of trading in converting for defending, was decades in the making, for recent Catholic missions have not been without faults and failures of their own.[239] Unlike the Capuchin friars who also set up four small mission schools along the Napo River, the SIL did not *directly* "exploit people's work [physical labor, i.e., for constructing a saw mill] for the growth and sustenance of God's Will."[240] The Capuchins did not speak any of the Huaorani language, Huao Terero, and their pre-contact rites were to drop candy and pictures of the Pope and Saint Francis from airplanes. The "Auca" responded by attacking missionaries and Kichwas in Coca in 1965.[241]

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236 Goffin 1994: 125.
237 CIDSE 2009, Goffin 1994.
238 Varea 1995: 51.
239 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 60.
240 Robinson 1981: 47.
241 Robinson 1981: 47.

The Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progresso (Ecuadorian "Populorum Progresso" Foundation, or FEPP) was born in the 1970s with Liberation Theology-inspired support.[242] The Capuchins made significant Huaorani inroads with Apostolic Vicar Alejandro Labaca in the 1970s, joining the SIL in an intermediary capacity by mediating between communities and petroleum companies.[243] Labaca and Sister Inés Arango were killed in 1987 by the voluntarily-isolated Tagaeri, allegedly because the Tagaeri believed that these two missionaries were aiding state petroleum company Petroecuador in inching them off oil-rich land.[244] Labaca's successor, José Miguel Goldáraz, gave up converting for politics, hoping to help both colonos and indigenous groups fend off oil companies.[245]

What did Rachel Saint have to say about this occurrence? She wanted to see development on oil Block 16 so she could beat the Capuchins to the punch in contacting and converting the Tagaeri, "the most notorious of the last uncontacted Huaorani bands." Saint did not approve of Capuchin politics and scoffed that Labaca "wanted to be a martyr."[246] Linkages between the SIL and the petroleum boom have been confirmed by numerous sources.

Crude Connections

"Construed in the most positive light, these things, controlled and administered by foreigners and operated with the sanction of the state in the background, would be terribly destructive."[247]

— Lawrence Ziegler-Otero (2004)

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242 Garcés 1995: 375.
243 Rivas 2001: 25, 47.
244 Rivas 2001: 26, Goffin 1994: 62.
245 Kane 1995: 69.
246 Kane 1995: 89.
247 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 65.

In many Latin American countries, missionaries became friendly with governments in the twentieth century, realizing how each side could benefit from the pacification of native populations.[248] The results of this phenomenon can be observed in government-led efforts to open the RAE for oil exploration.

> *Capital scarce Ecuador faithfully reflects, then and now, the imperial condition: foreign capital interests exploiting resources and consumers... The growth of the missionary apparatus coincides with Ecuador's insertion into orbit within the international capitalist system.*[249]

Royal Dutch Shell's arrival in Ecuador signaled the arrival of a "hybrid process" of mingling religious with government and private (petroleum) interests.[250] The documentary "Trinkets and Beads" underlines the causality between the arrival of the missionaries with the influx of petroleum companies.[251] By entering already "civilized" communities, oil workers felt safer to "exploit resources," in the words of one Huaorani leader.[252] Nate Saint depended on the infrastructure established by Shell, such as the airstrip at Shell Mera, for his missionary operations in the Oriente; it would have been in his interest to pay them back, but it was his sister who carried this to completion.[253] The Huaorani protectorate was set aside by the government in order to carry out an unobstructed search for petroleum on Huaorani territory and "The Company" (Texaco) enlisted Dayuma and Rachel Saint to relocate the Huaorani.[254] Supposedly fearing for Huaorani health, Saint made sure that the Huaorani stayed out of these oil-rich areas, facilitating exploration and more effective evangelization while ensuring that no oil workers got speared, a fear that had previously

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248 Varea 1995: 49-50.
249 Robinson 1981: 46.
250 Varea 1995: 50. The SIL had done the same in Peru before arriving in Ecuador: indigenous "pacification," education, and capitalism in the form of natural resource exploitation were the three axes of SIL involvement in Peru, which were then transposed onto the Ecuadorian reality (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 56, Colby 1996: 107 in Ziegler-Otero 2004: 56).
251 Walker 1996, Stoll 1982: 86.
252 Walker 1996, Ponce 98-9, 115-16.
253 Hitt 1959: 209-10.
254 Vickers 1981: 55, Kane 1995: 86, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64, Varea 1995: 50.

prevented Shell from infiltrating the territory.[255] Huaorani were not invited when "*gringos* met with *gringos*" and drew up development plans for the region without undertaking a consultation process in the communities to be affected.[256]

In addition to enjoying support from the Ecuadorian government and seconding its goals for the national integration of indigenous peoples, the SIL received financial aid directly from the Texaco-Gulf consortium.[257] Scott S. Robinson had an answer ready when asked whether or not missionaries knew about simultaneous exploration of the "bountiful natural resources of Amazonia": "Of course they did."[258]

> *When indigenous groups occupying potentially valuable land are identified by a first wave of traders and explorers, missionaries enter the territory. The missionaries "gradually make contact with the indigenous peoples of the rainforest and constitute the buffer between them and the state as a whole." This, in turn, facilitates the colonization of the region and its true incorporation into the nation-state.*[259]

In 1989, PetroCanada managed to uproot a Huaorani community and drop it onto a reservation. Three years later, when Maxus acted in accordance with missionaries to plan petroleum extraction on Huaorani land, those who protested were paid off by the company, which signed a drilling agreement with the Huaorani in 1993.[260]

Until her death, Saint interrupted Huaorani political assemblies, causing at least one Huaorani political activist to refuse to attend meetings as long as Saint graced them with her presence.[261] Saint favored Maxus because it was run by William Hutton, an evangelical

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255 Goffin 1994: 69, Hvalkof 1981: 183, Stoll 1982: 86.
256 Robinson 1981: 48.
257 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 64, Rival 2002: 168. Texaco and other oil companies from North America and Europe stationed themselves south of the Napo River beginning in the 1970s.
258 Between 1941 and 1943, the Office of Strategic Services (predecessor to the CIA, supporting that alleged link) explored rubber, wood, minerals and oil in the RAE; Shell had drilled three test wells by 1939, preceded by geologists in the 1920s (Robinson 1981: 46).
259 Gray 1997: 76-77 in Ziegler-Otero 2004: 60.
260 Walker 1996.
261 Kane 1995: 155.

"environmentalist": "I don't think the Aucas could ask for much better than that," Saint stated in one interview.[262]

Environmental and economic exploitation of the region have become grounds for political mobilization among the Huaorani and can be traced to the petroleum boom era. Infrastructure and colonization arrived as side effects of petroleum exploration, putting 6000 new highland families in the area between 1971 and 1978 and causing some to hail this development as evidence of "ethnocidal" policies espoused by Ecuador itself.[263]

With collective ownership on the downswing, superstitions in check and nomadism all but abandoned as a principal way of life, the Huaorani and other indigenous nationalities were well on their way to being incorporated into the Ecuadorian nation-state. The arrival of the oil companies was the next step in modernizing the Oriente— and, inadvertently, in nurturing the seeds that had been planted for future indigenous political involvement.[264]

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[262] Kane 1995: 156.
[263] Goffin 1994: 68, Robinson 1981: 48. A definition for "ethnocide" is "the destruction of a people and a way of life" (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 59). "The combination of religious chauvinism, Western bias, naïveté and contempt toward the societies [missionaries] enter creates a deadly and ethnocidal mix" (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 58).
[264] Varea 1995: 77.

CHAPTER 2

The Extractive Era or GDP as God

"Is it possible to achieve sustainable development in the Amazon while still exploiting petroleum?"[265]
— Anamaría Varea (1995)

Petroleum was touted as the economic savior that would propel Ecuador into a phase of modern-style development. It has had quite the opposite effect and, in fact, been widely denounced for destroying the environment and threatening indigenous cultures.[266] Three indigenous groups have already been extinguished since the beginning of the oil era: the Záparo, Tetete and Sansahuari, fondly referred to by other indigenous nations as the "missing peoples."[267] Surviving nations of the RAE term "ethnocide" the sudden introduction of a market economy, conservation, extracting natural resources and management of territories.[268] All of these outside contributions have helped build a platform for reclaiming indigenous economic, political, ecological and general knowledge systems.

Many names are used to describe what has resulted from the clash of oil companies with the opposition movement, "eco-conflicto" ("eco-conflict"), "guerra verde" ("green war") and "anarquía institucionalizada" ("institutionalized anarchy") among them. "Both directly and indirectly, these oil operations tore indigenous communities apart in the northern Oriente through disease and displacement, contamination and corruption,"

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265 Original Spanish text: "¿Es posible lograr un desarrollo sustentable en la Amazonía y mantener la explotación petrolera?" (Varea 1995: 94)
266 Vallejo 2003: 9, Navarro 1995: 256.
267 Vallejo 2003: 36, Acosta 2005: 29, Tidwell 1994, Texaco Tóxico 2007, Cerda 11/13/08, Oilwatch 2007: 28, 38. The Záparo were not contacted by missionaries or colonizers until the end of the nineteenth century and disappeared rapidly "through miscegenation and genocide" (Rival 2002: 33).
268 Rivas 2001: 15, Iguiñiz in Acosta 2005: 34, Navarro 1995: 243.

Texaco being the industry's shining example of a broader tendency to "deify economic activity" ("endiosar la actividad económica").[269]

The modern era in Ecuador meant a turn toward "lo salvaje" ("the wild")— more specifically, how to better exploit it. The RAE is commonly seen as "no man's land," yet the Ecuadorian populace began to take note of changes imposed on and accepted by the RAE during the rubber boom, the evangelization period, conflicts with Peru, logging, touristic endeavors, mining, colonization, conservation, scientific research, pharmaceutical plant extraction, and development projects, taking note of the diverse sources of income the region had to offer.[270]

It is not uncommon for poor countries to have very rich reserves of exploitable resources.[271] Nor is it rare for these countries to remain impoverished despite the value of their lands: "Nearly 25 years after the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the *Oriente*, Ecuador remains dependent on foreign capital and technology to find and develop its reserves," claims ecological activist Judith Kimerling.[272] She asserts that agro-mining exportation is even more vulnerable to the fickle international market than were past agricultural booms of cacao, coffee and bananas.[273]

What could be a potentially sustainable answer to Ecuador's economic woes? Economic diversification, for a start.[274] This chapter will lead us through the origins, boom, and demise (or not?) of the petroleum industry in Ecuador, to the current goal of establishing a diversified economy and

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269 Varea 1995: 18, Sawyer 2004: 13.
270 Villamil 1995: 341, Rivas 2001: 69, Varea 1995: 34.
271 Schuldt 2006.
272 Kimerling 1991: 859.
273 Kimerling 1991: 859, Varea 1995: 72.
274 Schuldt 2006.

a post-petroleum Ecuador: a modern economy and a projection for sustainability over time cannot depend on the mono-exportation of one product whose exploitation has, moreover, a high impact on the destruction of the natural heritage of the country and in the degradation of its principal ecosystems.[275]

A New Role for the State

One of the principal realities to be addressed in future petroleum development is "the cycle of environmental destruction-poverty-environmental destruction" that has resulted from the first 40 years of the industry's work in the RAE.[276] One concern is the powerful role the government holds as the sole owner of all Ecuadorian mineral rights, even on legally-recognized indigenous lands.[277]

As in most "third world" countries, political and economic elites have had the power to make decisions about natural resource management. In Ecuador's case, government neglect has complemented this underlying theme.[278] In response to indigenous calls for an exploration moratorium in new oil blocks and for acknowledging development alternatives, Miguel San Sebastián and Anna-Karin Hurtig suggest that the Ecuadorian government follow the precautionary principal: "when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically."[279]

Furthermore, if it is to attempt to be sustainable, "modern oil and gas development" needs to participate in "comprehensive environmental planning." Extensive monitoring and control systems should be legally enforced by communities, local

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275 Original Spanish text: "un Ecuador post-petrolero: una economía moderna y con proyección de sostenibilidad en el tiempo no puede depender de la mono exportación de un producto cuya explotación tiene, además, un alto impacto en la destrucción del patrimonio natural del país y en la degradación de sus principales ecosistemas" (SENPLADES 2007: 42).
276 Original Spanish text: "el círculo destrucción del medio ambiente-pobreza-destrucción del medio ambiente" (Varea 1995: 8).
277 Kane 1995: 18, Walker 1996, Sawyer 2004: 58.
278 Varea 1995: 153, Navarro 1995: 256.
279 San Sebastián 2004: 209.

governments and NGOs. Oil companies must answer to communities, verifying that they benefit from development, listening and discussing plans with them and performing frequent chemical testing of water and soil.[280]

> *The permanent misunderstanding and absence of the State regarding the problems of the Amazon region has provoked a social phenomenon that is perfectly comprehensible but anomalous, regarding what is traditionally understood as a State-society link, that is, Amazon institutions and inhabitants have identified themselves as valid interlocutors to the state and foreign petroleum companies that operate within the region.*[281]

Petroleum companies in Ecuador are responsible for education, health and general social wellbeing and "prácticamente han sustituido al Estado" ("have practically taken the State's place") as the military simultaneously absorbs the task of ensuring the security of the companies. However, as petroleum profits increase, social spending in the areas that produce it does not.[282] Unsatisfied demands include sewage systems, electricity, schools and hospitals.[283] An ethical argument would maintain that it is unacceptable for the state to "outsource" social management to the private sector, which has no clearly identifiable stake in the wellbeing of Ecuador's future generations.[284]

The Ecuadorian government's involvement in petroleum activity has been to prioritize economic progress above all else, meaning extraction for exportation; a turn away from planning; little investment of petroleum profits in their source (the Amazon); not implementing policies or monitors for petroleum companies; not focusing on relationships between petroleum companies and indigenous peoples; failing to link colonization and

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280 San Sebastián 2004: 209.
281 Original Spanish text: "El permanente desentendimiento y ausencia del Estado frente a los problemas de la región amazónica, ha provocado un fenómeno social perfectamente comprensible pero anómalo, frente a lo que tradicionalmente se entiende como vinculación Estado-sociedad, esto es, las instituciones y los habitantes amazónicos han ubicado como válidos interlocutores a la empresa estatal petrolera y las empresas extranjeras que operan en la región" (Navarro 1995: 242-3).
282 Villamil 1995: 350, San Sebastián 2004: 209, Schuldt 2006: 77-8, Rivas 2001: 46.
283 Garzón 1995: 267.
284 Navarro 1995: 261, Vickers 1981: 55-6.

violence with petroleum development; and failing to conduct studies to mitigate these and other concerns.[285] Yet the "maldesarrollo" ("underdevelopment" or "poor development")

> *is not exclusively the fault of imperialism, or of the International Monetary Fund, or of the possession of natural wealth, or of mining or petroleum companies. The problem lies in governments, businesspeople and even the citizenry of our underserved countries: we have not been able to generate ideas for required economic policies and legal-structural reforms, nor could we consolidate the alliances and consensuses necessary to take advantage of the enormous possibilities and ensure the transition of dependent economies to self-dependent economies, with national integration and an internal market; in summary, toward self-sustaining societies.*[286]

Oil Origins

As of 2004, there were 16 petroleum companies in Ecuador, among them 12 foreign corporations to complement state oil company Petroecuador and three other domestic companies.[287] Before oil was discovered in the Oriente, what little oil development that was being undertaken in Ecuador was headquartered on the southern coast's Santa Elena Peninsula beginning in 1878.[288] Oil exploration commenced in the northeastern RAE on 500,000 hectares of land; today, Napo and Sucumbíos provinces provide the greatest level of petro activity and northeastern Ecuador produces 99% of the country's oil.[289]

From 1923 to 1950, the Leonard Exploration Company, Royal Dutch Shell, the Anglo Saxon Petroleum Company and Esso Standard Oil carved up millions of hectares of

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285 Rivas 2001: 49, Gudynas 2009: 2.

286 Original Spanish text: "no es culpa exclusivamente del imperialismo, ni del Fondo Monetario Internacional, ni de la posesión de riquezas naturales, ni de las empresas mineras o petroleras. El problema radica en los gobiernos, los empresarios e incluso la ciudadanía de nuestros países subadministrados: no hemos sido capaces de idear las políticas económicas y las reformas lega-estructurales requeridas, ni pudimos conformar las alianzas y los consensos necesarios para aprovechar las enormes potencialidades y asegurar la transición de economías dependientes hacia economías autodependientes, con integración nacional y mercado interno; en suma, hacia sociedades autosustentables" (Schuldt 2006: 81).

287 San Sebastián 2004: 205-6.

288 Varea 1995: 72, texaco.com/sitelets/Ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.

289 Navarro 1995: 244, Varea 1995: 75.

the Ecuadorian Amazon for exploration.[290] The first major exploratory efforts took place in the late 1930s and 1940s under the supervision of Shell in Villano (Pastaza province), on Huaorani territory.[291] The military arrived to safeguard the area soon after and never left.[292] By the 1960s, nearly all of the RAE had been parceled into zones for oil exploration, paying little attention to the presence of indigenous communities.[293]

The decades following oil exploration were largely fruitless. Shell built the region's first highway, a gateway from the highlands to the Amazon, in 1937.[294] The Lago Agrio and Shushufindi fields were discovered first, prompting the construction of a 318-mile pipeline from the RAE to Esmeraldas on the Pacific coast, with a road running alongside it to sustain oil workers, businesspeople and colonos.[295]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the oil boom ran full-force.[296] The "second exploratory wave" embraced Texaco-Gulf, Shell and Petro Canada's search of a new "El Dorado" in the northern RAE, this time with black gold and helicopters.[297] Texpet, a subsidiary of the Texaco-Gulf consortium, was "invited" to the RAE by Ecuador on March 5, 1964; Texaco-Gulf had been searching for oil in Ecuador since the 1940s and found it in 1967, leading to a rapid increase in infrastructure.[298] This was the turning point in oil exploration in Ecuador, for "if oil had not been discovered [around Lago Agrio] in 1967, the

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290 Varea 1995: 72, Bustamante 1995: 222.
291 Rivas 2001: 31, Sawyer 2004: 62.
292 Sawyer 2004: 62.
293 Vickers 1981: 55, Cerda 11/13/08.
294 Vallejo 2003: 34, texaco.com/sitelets/Ecuador/en/history/background.aspx. The road remained largely un-trafficked for ten years.
295 Vickers 1981: 55.
296 Rivas 2001: 40.
297 Vallejo 2003, Walker 1996: 34.
298 Stephens 2007: 1, texaco.com/sitelets/Ecuador/en/history/background.aspx, Gerlach 2003: 51, Vickers 1981: 55, Rivas 2001: 31, San Sebastián 2004: 205, Kimerling 1991: 857. In 1972, construction was completed on the pipeline, which opened in June 1972 and carried 250,000 barrels per day (Kane 1995: 70, Sawyer 2004: 11, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx, Vickers 1981: 55).

northeastern Oriente might still be an inaccessible periphery."[299] Texaco, the SIL and the Ecuadorian government united to relocate the Huaorani in hopes of facilitating oil exploration after a series of violent interactions.[300] Following Texaco's big discovery, RAE oil development "proceeded virtually without regulation."[301]

The Oil Boom and Aftermath

Military dictatorship in the 1960s signified dramatic political, economic and social changes. The second military regime of the decade used institutions tied to the burgeoning oil industry to consolidate a new national identity.[302] This government participated in President John F. Kennedy's proposed Alliance for Progress (fearing Cuban Revolution repeats) with an agrarian reform, leading to colonization of the RAE and the coast.[303] The 1964 Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law) handed out parcels of land with the understanding that colonos would relieve the land they were given of half of its vegetation.[304] For this reason, the law was less a redistributive and more a colonizing force.[305]

The state petroleum company, Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation, or CEPE) was created in 1972 and purchased one-quarter of Texaco-Gulf's area in 1974. CEPE inherited a 62.5% share of the

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299 Ryder 2000, Kane 1995: 70, Sawyer 2004: 11.
300 Rivas 2001: 31.
301 Kane 1995: 5.
302 Bustamante 1995: 223.
303 Vallejo 2003: 35, Gerlach 2003, Varea 1995: 78, Sawyer 2004: 43-4, San Sebastián 2004: 205.
304 Vallejo 2003: 35, Ryder 2000, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.
305 Sawyer 2004: 44. Poor, rural migrants from the Highlands, serfs dismissed by the agrarian reform and modernization efforts in the agricultural sector that required fewer workers, flocked to the Oriente. Along with settlers from the Sierra came workers from the economically-suffering central coastal province of Manabí and drought victims from both Manabí and Loja, in the Southern Highlands, hoping that Lago Agrio would prove to be more promising than the search for urban jobs. In all, the country lost 6,500,000 hectares to colonization, 4,500,000 of those in the Oriente and 1,800,000 in Pastaza province alone (Sawyer 2004: 44). As of 1990, 8334 people lived within the boundaries of the Cuyabeno Reserve, 74.4% from the highlands, 17.9% from the coast, 6.4% from the Amazon and 1.3% from Colombia (Garcés 1995: 371).

consortium with partners Gulf Oil and Texpet on December 31, 1976, and became the sole owner and operator of the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline (SOTE) on October 1, 1989. CEPE then obtained sole ownership rights to Texaco's land in 1990.[306] The formation of CEPE was a central element of the military junta's focus on development and nationalist reforms; it was seen as "unpatriotic" to speak out against oil development.[307] Partly responsible for this undeniable shift toward petroleum exportation was Ecuador's astronomical external debt, which totaled $300 million in 1970 and $380.4 million by 1973, or the equivalent of the country's GDP.[308] Ecuador became highly involved in the exploitation process, the results of which included great economic growth, increased infrastructure and external debt.[309]

In 1973, the military junta decided to join the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose decision to quadruple petroleum prices greatly benefited Ecuador.[310] Crude covered half of the state's budget and was used for urbanization purposes during the import substitution industrialization (ISI) era, which took most of Latin America under its wing; Ecuador borrowed loans with the faith that oil production would soon pay for them.[311] However, external debt grew from 18 to 60% of GDP between 1974 and 1982. The government had accumulated $6.95 billion of debt by 1984, nearly doubling by 1991 to $12.4 billion— more than 1988's GDP.[312]

> *Once petroleum was controlled by the State for the first time in the nation's history, the State could count on sufficient resources to undertake a series of territorial integration and economic development policies with its own resources and without regional conditions. However, this massive*

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306 Stephens 2007: 1, Varea 1995: 75, Rivas 2001: 49; Varea 1995: 72, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.
307 Vallejo 2003: 34-5, Cerda 11/13/08.
308 Kane 1995: 111, Simbaña 1/15/09.
309 Vallejo 2003: 34-5.
310 Sawyer 2004: 11, Rivas 2001: 49. Ecuador was then OPEC's second-smallest producer but third-best exporter in Latin America, behind Venezuela and Mexico.
311 Sawyer 2004: 11.
312 Sawyer 2004: 11, Simbaña 1/15/09, Kimerling 1991: 860, Kane 1995: 111.

income— the highest amount that the country has ever received in its entire republican history— did not allow for the establishment of a more autonomous and self-centered outline for development. As a result, after a short time, exacerbated by the problems derived from the international economic crisis, the country found itself enveloped in one of its most problem-ridden periods, undone by increasing external debt payments.[313]

Until the early 1980s, there was little opposition to the establishment of the CEPE-Texaco consortium in northern Sucumbíos, Napo and Pastaza provinces.[314] Nevertheless, CEPE initiated a series of community-oriented organizational facelifts during the 1980s. The state corporation formed a Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal (Community Development Fund) in November 1984 to humor the Huaorani and other groups with which they had negotiated, granting them access to a meager portion of oil profits through small-scale infrastructure projects.[315] After CEPE became Petroecuador on September 26, 1989, negotiations with the Huaorani resulted in more formal Programas de Desarrollo Comunitario (Community Development Programs).[316] A Unidad de Protección Ambiental (Environmental Protection Unit), complete with Contamination Control Fund, was created in February 1990 with the stated intention of preserving areas at risk of petroleum degradation.[317] September 21, 1992 marked the creation of a Fund for Regional Eco-development of the Amazon, a component of Petroecuador's Environmental Protection Unit 258 (ECORAE). The Eco-development Fund was meant to siphon money from

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313 Original Spanish text: "Al estar el petróleo controlado por el Estado, por primera vez en la vida nacional, éste pudo contar con recursos suficientes para emprender una serie de políticas de integración territorial y desarrollo económico, con recursos propios y sin condicionamientos de tipo regional. Sin embargo, todos estos enormes ingresos –los mayores que ha recibido el país en toda su historia republicana- no permitieron establecer un esquema de desarrollo más autónomo y autocentrado. Por lo que, en poco tiempo, agravado por los problemas derivados de la crisis económica internacional, el país se vió [sic] envuelto en una de las épocas con mayores problemas, desatada por el creciente pago de la deuda externa" (Varea 1995: 72).

314 Navarro 1995: 245.

315 Rivas 2001: 49, Navarro 1995: 258.

316 Varea 1995: 75, Rivas 2001: 50, Navarro 1995: 258.

317 Varea 1995: 75, Navarro 1995: 258.

petroleum to RAE communities, funds that were often invested in indigenous organizations.[318]

There is no doubt that oil has become an integral part of the Ecuadorian economy. The financial importance of petroleum since the 1970s, when Ecuador was among Latin America's poorest, cannot be ignored: the country has since experienced an average annual growth rate of 7%.[319] Most estimates show that oil revenues constitute 40 to 50% of the country's export income, 14 to 60% of its GDP and half of the national budget.[320] Half of each oil dollar was forwarded to external debt payment in 1994, making Ecuador's debt per capita the highest in Latin America and branding the country as a "high-risk" investment location.[321] The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank intervened in the 1990s, seeking to expand petroleum exploration in order to finance debt repayment.[322]

Many of the companies that are encouraged by the government to set up shop in the RAE have been accused of committing indigenous rights abuses, promoting racist policies and carrying out environmental destruction. The Seventh Round of Bidding in January 1994 alone gave free rein to seven different companies, all of which had been involved in environmental and social wrongdoing in such diverse settings as Papua New

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318 ECORAE was in charge of planning, coordinating and evaluating all proposed projects/productive activities in the Amazon, working in cooperation with NGOs (Navarro 1995: 262-3).
319 San Sebastián 2004: 205.
320 Kimerling 1993 in Ryder 2000; Kimerling 1991: 859; Tidwell 1994; Kane 1995: 18; Varea 1995: 144, 296; San Sebastián 2004: 205; CIA World Factbook; Oilwatch 2007: 9. Over 81% of Ecuador's energy is derived from fossil fuels (CIA World Factbook).
321 Sawyer 2004: 94-5.
322 Martínez 1995: 190, 201. Two World Bank laws designed to further Ecuadorian petroleum were the Modernization Law (October 1993) and Hydrocarbon Law (November 1993), both behind the Seventh Round of Bidding for oil concessions (Sawyer 2004: 109).

Guinea, Burma, South Africa, Venezuela, Guatemala, France, the US (with Navajos and native Americans in Wyoming) and other areas of the RAE.[323]

The regional economic crisis that resulted from this state-led development, along with the current global recession, has lowered the profitability of the oil industry and put pressure on Ecuador to drill in protected areas and on indigenous lands.[324] Despite its economic weight, the story of Ecuadorian petro-politics over the past 25 years has been marked by mass opposition to exploration on these pressured territories due to health and environmental degradation.

Indigenous Involvement in the Industry

Petroleum conflicts have affected how RAE indigenous peoples dress, eat, make crafts, practice their religions and view their own histories.[325] Nonetheless, many indigenous peoples have taken advantage of temporary employment opportunities offered by oil companies, even though stable positions are hard to come by as skilled and semi-skilled workers are often imported from outside the RAE.[326]

Siona-Secoya men are usually employed for one or two months at a time, "clearing sites for camps, building shelters, and clearing trails through the forest."[327] Huaoranis were hired to cut seismic trails for Conoco, "the hardest, dirtiest, and worst-paying work in the exploration process."[328] PetroCanada employed 100 Huaorani workers from Dayuno, Huamono, Zapino and Golondrina communities for two months in spring 1989 to build a platform for the company's exploratory well. However, each village sought exclusive work

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323 Martínez 1995.
324 San Sebastián 2004: 209, Gudynas 2009: 2.
325 Villamil 1995: 344, 352.
326 Kimerling 1991: 881.
327 Vickers 1981: 55.
328 Kane 1995: 50, Gerlach 2003: 53.

rights and asked for modern tools "in exchange for the right to work on Huaorani land without disruption or disturbance"; no consensus was reached and tensions rose among the communities involved.[329] Repsol-YPF also provides short-term employment that does not grant workers social security or health insurance and pays Huaorani one-sixth of what outside workers earn in a day-by-11-hour-day payment system. Fearing potential sanctions from the company, the Huaorani opt against forming unions.[330]

The health conditions of workers have been called into question. Eyewitnesses claimed that a few Siona and colonos received a small amount of money to skim petroleum from the surface of contaminated bodies of water and place it in plastic bags to be thrown into unlined pits. These workers complained of headaches and skin and respiratory irritation, yet no move was made toward treatment or protection with medicine and clothing by the companies involved.[331]

Foreign oil workers live in company camps and leave the area during vacations to visit far-away family members, leading to lower levels of investment in the local economy than some indigenous peoples and colonos would prefer.[332] Though foreign workers enjoy the amenities of first-world living, locals are often left without electricity.[333] A wall of isolation surrounds oil camps,

> *islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty, with air conditioners, hot showers, twenty-four hour electricity, video movies, good food, and potable water, luxuries unknown in the surrounding communities. Expatriate oil workers report that "money is no object," and "millions of dollars are wasted," as they use helicopters to fly to Quito or deep into the forests to go fishing or crocodile hunting.*[334]

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329 Rival 2002: 169.
330 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 10. If health care is offered, it is often unaffordable (Kane 1995: 185, 189).
331 Kimerling 1991: 883-4.
332 Kimerling 1991: 881, Rival 2002: 168.
333 Varea 1995: 30.
334 Kimerling 1991: 881.

Reaching the Breaking Point

Opinions regarding the effects of the oil boom on indigenous communities differ greatly, especially in the case of the Cofán. "A small but thriving nation" prior to the construction of the first commercial Texaco well and company road at the Dureno community in 1972, it has since dwindled dramatically in number and vivacity to "a listless and defeated bunch."[335] While the number of Cofán remaining after three decades of drilling is arguable, it is noted that tensions rose in the mid-1990s and resulted in the deaths of several oil workers.[336]

The Dureno District was founded by the Cofán in the 1970s to flee oil drilling on ancestral lands, though Texpet soon commenced drilling in Dureno. Dureno Cofán began the process of gaining legal title to their land by 1974 but could not keep up with Texpet drilling near Dureno's core. The land is now enveloped by oil wells and colonos, prompting a new search for lands by elders and a land agreement between the Secoya and Cofán to minimize the "Texaco invasion."[337]

The occupation organized by the Cofán on November 1, 1993, provides a clear illustration of the "breaking point" that several indigenous communities have since reached with regards to oil exploration. Randy Borman and 35 Cofán surrounded a Petroecuador well with spears and guns on this date and, with no response to letters they had sent to Petroecuador, the group burned a drilling platform that had been constructed without Cofán permission and kidnapped 23 "trespassers" who had sought to perform seismic tests in 1991. After a day and a half, the company promised to perform an environmental impact

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335 Walker 1996, Kane 1995: 5, 183. Anthropologist Eduardo Bedoya claims that the Cofán population has actually tripled during the past half century (Stephens 2002: 7, texaco.com).
336 Walker 1996.
337 Indigenous People's Issues Today 8/8/08, Texaco Tóxico 2007.

study (EIS) and give 60 solar panels to the Cofán to put on their roofs. Borman justified the occupation with a "three-point explanation": "One, all the acts were unavoidable. Two, we pursued every possible alternative means before acting. Three, all the acts were unavoidable." The event planted the fear of "green castigation" in oil company management; however, perhaps the most surprising aspect of this conflict was the fact that it took place entirely within the confines of the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve, illuminating another sore spot for indigenous peoples of the RAE: reconfiguring pre-established zones that prohibit petroleum exploitation.[338]

Going Underground: Drilling in Indigenous Territories and National Parks

The Ecuadorian Ley Forestal y de Conservación de Áreas y Vida Silvestre (Law of Forestry and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife) was drafted in 1990 to mandate that natural areas and national parks be left "unaltered," explicitly declaring oil extraction on said territories illegal.[339] At this time, protected areas like Parque Nacional Yasuní (Yasuní National Park, or PNY), Reserva Faunística Cuyabeno, Limoncocha Reserva Biológica and parts of the Reserva Cayambe-Coca, Parque Nacional Podocarpus and Parque Nacional Sangay covered 10% of the RAE.[340] Nevertheless, threats from foreign petroleum companies to halt investments led to the cancellation of the ruling and oil extraction was negotiated in all of these areas.[341]

Cuyabeno became Ecuador's first wildlife reserve in 1991, encompassing 655,781 hectares (1.6 million acres) inhabited by the Siona, Secoya, Cofán and Kichwa.[342] It had

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338 Tidwell 1994.
339 Kimerling 1991: 850, Kane 1995: 62.
340 Kimerling 1991: 850.
341 Kimerling 1991: 850, Kane 1995: 62, Varea 1995: 35-6, 299-300.
342 Kane 1995: 183, Garcés 1995: 367, 370.

been a protected area since 1979 and settled by colonos since 1970, but production by Petroecuador, Texaco, England's Clyde Petroleum and Occidental Petroleum continued.[343] Though the public was assured that the reserve "enjoy[ed] the highest level of environmental protection afforded under Ecuadorian law," one-third of Cuyabeno was covered by roads.[344]



Protected Areas in Ecuador. Source: adventure-associates.com/photo/maps/protected_areas.jpg.

Yasuní, a Biosphere Reserve declared by UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program, was created on July 26, 1979, amassing 679,730 hectares, one-third of which belong to the Huaorani.[345] Nearly one-quarter of Block 16, now owned and operated by

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343 Kimerling 1991: 882-3, Garcés 1995: 367.

344 Kane 1995: 183. Even if drilling is not carried out in a protected area, contamination often travels through waterways (Martínez 1995: 215). The Cuyabeno reserve not only suffers from oil production but also encroachment from colonos (Varea 1995: 119).

345 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 3-4. The Huaorani's original protectorate gained 66,570 hectares in 1983 for a total of 612,000 hectares and was increased to 678,220 hectares on April 3, 1990, by President Rodrigo Borja and the IERAC, constituting

Repsol-YPF, fits squarely within PNY and Huaorani territory; Petrobras' Block 31 is situated at the heart of PNY; Canada's ENCANA on Block 14 sits 65% inside the park; and Block 22 has also been chiseled out of PNY.[346]

Of these concessions, Block 16 was PNY's red flag, for, under Conoco's control,

> *Within a typical concession, at least 800 miles of trails are cut, as well as some 1,500 helicopter pads, deforesting up to 2,000 acres. Noise from cutting and blasting scares away much of the wildlife, and the new understory growth inhibits its return. Fructivores— toucans, monkeys, turkeys— won't move into cleared areas, and their absence means not only a loss of game but diminished regeneration of the forest, because these species distribute the seeds of the large fruiting trees.*[347]

The 200,000-hectare block was established in the center of Huaorani territory.[348] Early estimates guessed that ten Huaorani lived on Block 16 but it was later determined that a full ten percent of the nationality's population, or 141 Huaorani, inhabited the land.[349] Conoco began exploring in 1984 and drilled three years later; it soon surrendered, claiming that the endeavor would not be sufficiently profitable. It opted to share the concession with several other petroleum companies starting in 1990.[350] Conoco pursued Block 22, promising that Yasuní would not end up like Cuyabeno; nonetheless, "many indigenous and environmental groups in Ecuador and other countries are concerned that Conoco's proposed activities will threaten the survival of the Huaorani, their environment, and 'protected' natural areas."[351]

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the largest indigenous territory in the country (though still "tiny," by some standards, due to the fact that 80% of the Huaorani currently live on this land) (Kimerling 1991: 886, Rivas 2001: 35-6, Rival 2002: xvi, Oilwatch 4/12/07, Kane 1995: 86, 181). In 2002, the PNY Management Plan of the Huaorani Territory increased the grand total to 809,339 hectares (Oilwatch 2007: 20). The Ecuadorian government maintains subsurface rights to this territory, however, rights that have since been sold to Conoco, Petro-Canada, Elf Aquitaine, Petrobras, and others (Kimerling 1991: 886).

346 Rivas 2001: 43, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 4, Kimerling 1991: 888. PNY is a world center for plant diversity and endemism, so declared by a Joint IUCN-WWF Plants Conservation Program and IUCN Threatened Plants Unit (Kimerling 1991: 888).

347 Kane 1995: 49.

348 Kimerling 1991: 884, Rivas 2001: 43.

349 Kane 1995: 68.

350 Vallejo 2003: 54, Rivas 2001: 45, 50.

351 Kimerling 1991: 884-5, Vallejo 2003: 54, Rivas 2001: 45.

The Campaña Amazonía por la Vida (Campaign Amazonia for Life), a conglomeration of 12 Ecuadorian environmental groups, and Corporación de Defensa de la Vida (Corporation for the Defense of Life, or CORDAVI) proposed a ten-year drilling moratorium on Block 16 to allow the Huaorani time to organize, demarcate their land clearly and carry out environmental impact assessments.[352] The Nature Conservancy, thought to be part of "the Company" (Conoco) drafted a management plan for PNY in 1989, a venture that was funded entirely by Conoco and configured in conjunction with the Ecuadorian state. Not surprisingly, half of the park was devoted to industrial use.[353] The management plan was rejected by Ecuadorian environmental groups and indigenous organizations, yet USAID joined forces with The Nature Conservancy, CARE and Wildlife Conservation International to manage $15 million for park administration, tourism efforts and "'sustainable' resource extraction" in PNY and two other reserves.[354]

Conoco agreed to complete an environmental impact statement but did not halt activity pending the approval of this document.[355] The company soon gave way to consortium-mate Maxus, which took the reins on Block 16 in 1991.[356] Maxus soon developed a Plan de Desarrollo Socio Económico y Cultural-Comunitario Huaorani (Huaorani Socioeconomic and Cultural-Community Development Plan), aiming to reinforce the Huaorani political organization; established a Departamento de Relaciones Comunitarias (Department of Community Relations) to take care of Huaorani relations; and funded education, health and infrastructure.[357] A 1993 deal with the Huaorani allowed

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352 Kimerling 1991: 885.
353 Kane 1995: 61-2.
354 Kane 1995: 62. USAID has been accused of mismanaging its budget for ecotourism and sustainable extraction, lodging their workers in expensive hotels for extended periods of time (Kane 1995: 175-6).
355 Kimerling 1991: 890.
356 Vallejo 2003: 54, Walker 1996.
357 Rivas 2001: 54.

Maxus to extract oil from the Huaoranis' Massachusetts-sized territory with a guarantee against anti-development demonstrations and moratorium proposals.[358]

In spite of these agreements, the Huaorani vocally expressed their discontent with Maxus, whose practices, in their opinion, had turned out to be more objectionable than those of the petroleum companies that preceded it. Argentina's Repsol-YPF absorbed 85% of Maxus' share in 1996 and undertook an advertising campaign to promote conservation.[359] Thought it might appear that Repsol caught the green bug, many remain skeptical about ecological consciousness in the oil industry.[360] Local communities had witnessed oil greenwashing before in Maxus' reforestation efforts, which involved the use of fertilizers and the planting of non-native species.[361] Repsol treated PNY as its playground and enjoyed a great deal of power over the armed forces used to protect the company.[362]

To date, 19 companies have been implicated in damaging PNY and/or Huaorani territory, in alphabetical order: "Arco, Britoil, Canan Offshore, CEPE, Conoco, Elf-Aquitane, Maxus, Murphy Ecuador Oil Company, Nomeco, Occidental, Opic, Pérez Companc, Petrobras, Petrocanada [sic], Petroecuador, Shell, Vintage Oil, Unocal, and YPF"; Rival (1992) claims that over 50 companies operate within said region.[363]

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358 Walker 1996, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 12.
359 Vallejo 2003: 54-5, Rivas 2001: 45.
360 Varea 1995: 49.
361 Martínez 1995: 187.
362 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 14.
363 Vallejo 2003: 54.



2003 Oil Blocks. Source: petroecuador.com/ec/donde.htm.

Development led by petroleum companies in the RAE has been inspired primarily by self-interest of various kinds. One environmentalist goes so far as to say that PNY, along with the other national parks, was created as one of the "pretexts for future state and corporate incursions into indigenous territory."[364] In certain cases, foreign petroleum companies are not allowed to negotiate directly with indigenous groups, a measure put in place to protect all involved but one that also allows ARCO and Texaco to justify ignoring indigenous voices and making no effort to ensure that indigenous peoples know their rights.[365]

As mentioned above, the state often ignores indigenous demands, as well, leaving basic services up to companies like Maxus (which effectively replaced the SIL by taking care of Huaorani health and education) and Repsol (which signed an agreement with the

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364 Sawyer 2004: 56.
365 Kane 1995: 161.

Ministry of Education to pay for a professor's salary, school supplies, necessary infrastructure and breakfast for students, but has not carried out its responsibilities).[366] In other cases, the pledging of these services has been used to seduce communities in order to obtain permission for extracting petroleum on indigenous lands.[367] Anthropologist Julio Enrique Vela of Petroecuador's Bureau of Ethnic Affairs organized community conferences and promised to build roads and hospitals with oil wealth, "conditioned on disassociation from indigenous organizations."[368] Bribes are commonly used to "neutralize" the power of indigenous organizations to mobilize against oil development.[369]

However, the opposition has not been silenced. Indigenous communities are concerned that laws and regulations regarding extraction are formulated without first consulting a territory's inhabitants, resulting in degradation of health, environmental and social bonds.[370] I will analyze some of the most outstanding cases against petroleum development voiced by indigenous communities.

Texaco Tóxico and Other Health Concerns

"The Amazon region has the worst infrastructure and the lowest socioeconomic and health indicators in the country."[371]

— Miguel San Sebastián and Anna-Karin Hurtig (2004)

The most widely-cited statistic in Ecuadorian literature regarding Chevron-Texaco, arguably the most vilified corporation in Ecuador, is "The Spill." Over a 17- to 18-year

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366 Kane 1995: 161, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 12.
367 Walker 1996. In addition to producing bilingual Kichwa-Spanish coloring books, the Maxus freeway, designed to facilitate drilling, has altered interactions between the newly-conjoined Huaorani and Cofán territories (Kane 1995: 160, Walker 1996). The freeway runs next to housing structures and receives regular deposits of petroleum leftovers to save money on disposal (Walker 1996).
368 Kimerling 1991: 878.
369 Kane 1995: 221, 226.
370 Walker 1996.
371 San Sebastián 2004: 208.

period, 16.8 million gallons of petroleum drained into the environment from the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline and, as Texaco was responsible for the construction of the SOTE, it has been blamed for putting the lives of 300,000 people in danger due to contamination of surrounding ecosystems and illnesses that have resulted from pollution.[372]

The amount, 400,000 barrels from the SOTE alone in 30 major spills, is 50% more than the 10.8 million gallons of the Exxon-Valdez spill off the coast of Alaska.[373] Between 1972 and 1993, more than 30 billion gallons of crude and waste were set free into Amazon waters.[374] Though Texaco blamed some of this spillage on a 1987 earthquake, it was no secret that during Texaco's nearly 30-year reign as Ecuador's main foreign oil producer, "Texaco used deteriorating and outmoded equipment (technologies long illegal in the United States)," shoddy workmanship and rusty pipes, leading to environmental contamination and health difficulties.[375]

When Texaco did undertake a cleanup project, this usually implied cover-up, was done long after the fact or involved dumping untreated waste into open pits. By the 1990s, Texaco's land exhibited one of the worst cases of oil pollution in the world, featuring 627 pools of toxic waste mostly in northern Oriente water sources and swamps, exposing locals who sought to clean up the mess, often without gloves, to mercury and arsenic.[376]

> *Texaco took negligible environmental precautions, allowing the company to engage in practices that, while illegal at home, boosted corporate revenues by the billions... At each juncture Texaco employed minimal equipment, outmoded technology, and cheap labor. Unmonitored industrial activity over the past quarter-century contaminated water and soil systems and detrimentally affected local populations throughout the region.*[377]

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372 Varea 1995: 81, Martínez 1995: 184, Garzón 1995: 269-70.
373 Kane 1995: 5, 70; Sawyer 2004: 101; Tidwell 1994; Kimerling 1991: 849, 872; Varea 1995: 84; Martínez 1995: 184; San Sebastián 2004: 207; Texaco Tóxico 2007; Goldman Prize 2008; Voices from the Frontlines.
374 San Sebastián 2004: 207.
375 Sawyer 2004: 13, 44, 101; Kane 1995: 184; Varea 1995: 84; Garzón 1995: 290.
376 Sawyer 2004: 101, Kane 1995: 184, Cerda 11/13/08.
377 Sawyer 2004: 100. Texaco blamed some spills on "terrorists," "communists" and "guerrillas," which have never been found (Kane 1995: 186).

Maxus has been criticized for constructing the Vía Auca, a 180-kilometer-long, nine-meter-wide road running through Huaorani territory and PNY. The rusty pipeline that traces the Vía Auca has suffered a great deal of wear and tear and, at times, rests on the road or sits on stilts.[378] Since its construction in 1994, both legal and illegal PNY deforestation and colonization have proceeded, unchecked, and the Vía's pipeline has been incorporated into the infrastructure of local Huaorani and Kichwa communities: "Men tether their horses to it, women spread their washing on it to dry, and children play on it."[379] Maxus financed and built houses along the road, thought to be an effort to appease the opposition. These houses have zinc rooftops and are situated within deforested areas, which is not exactly what the Huaorani had in mind; nevertheless, they have formed communities along the road, sometimes known as "Km. 36" or "Km. 58."[380]

Along with traffic and pollution, the road has brought cultural change to these communities.[381] Among the social ills listed by Vía communities are domestic violence; increased alcoholism, especially among men, and subsequent abuse and imprisonment of alcoholics by the companies' military forces; 103 cases of rape of indigenous women, according to one study; the alleged presence of a brothel at Km. 36; and the dependency created by unfulfilled promises from oil companies.[382] Hunger, several cases of hepatitis B and increased sexual disease (including a possible HIV case) among the Vía Auca's indigenous peoples are harbingers of the general decline in health observed among these communities.[383]

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378 Kane 1995: 27, Oilwatch 2007: 26, Martínez 1995: 187, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 9.
379 Kane 1995: 27-8, Oilwatch 2007: 24, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 9, 13.
380 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 9.
381 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 10.
382 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 11, Oilwatch 2007: 38, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 12.
383 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 11-12, Oilwatch 2007: 38, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 12.

Measures to minimize petroleum contamination have not been widely put to use in Ecuador, and the environmental and health impacts of oil exploration/exploitation processes have affected all aspects of life in the Amazon.[384] When surrounding areas are destroyed, the entire forest dries up, due to its manner of recycling 50 to 75% of its water by evapo-transpiration and direct evaporation.[385] Chain reactions produce a domino effect in the ecosystem if only one species of plant or animal is affected. What has been identified thus far, in terms of environmental and sociocultural effects, "are probably just the tip of the iceberg," the most "acute impacts" identified by scientists unable to predict what more large-scale production will mean for protected areas and the communities that inhabit them.[386]

Many endemic species are threatened by petroleum activity. Deforestation for infrastructure adversely affects species, as do pools and chemicals.[387] Helicopters and felling trees make wildlife abandon their offspring due to excessive noise pollution; explosives used for fishing and hunting minimize resources.[388] The burning of oil and gas pollutes the air with nitrogen, sulfur and carbon oxide forms, irritating lungs and providing the raw materials needed to form acid rain.[389] Many Huaorani now receive food rations to make up for lost hunting and fishing reserves and have adopted a diet similar to that of oil company workers.[390] Malnutrition has reached 98% in some oil-adjacent communities.[391]

The most troubling development in RAE health is the pollution of water sources with drilling waste. Pollution dissolves oxygen essential to aquatic life, thus infiltrating the

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384 San Sebastián 2004: 206, Vallejo 2003: 36.
385 Kimerling 1991: 852.
386 Kimerling 1991: 899.
387 Varea 1995: 42, 82-3.
388 Kimerling 1991: 861, Villamil 1995: 346.
389 Kimerling 1991: 870.
390 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 13, Rival 2002.
391 Kane 1995: 70, San Sebastián 2004: 208.

food chain at its most basic level.[392] Water pollution adversely affects fish populations, leading to bioaccumulation of petroleum derivatives within the food chain even in such large water sources as the Napo, Tiputini and Sacha rivers.[393] Yet in spite of "several requests from environmentalists, oil companies in Ecuador have not made chemical data about their drilling wastes available to the public."[394]

In 1992, Quito-based human rights group CORDAVI discovered a hydrocarbon concentration 2000 times the acceptable amount in aquatic ecosystems.[395] In 1993, Harvard scientists tested RAE water at 33 sites, discovering levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) 100 times as high as the US allows; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that this crude oil element puts anyone in contact with any amount of it at a high risk of developing cancer.[396] Volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which also cause cancer, and carcinogenic heavy metals have been discovered in abnormally high levels in water supplies.[397] A March 1994 study by the Center for Economic and Social Rights in New York performed drinking water tests on Texaco's former concessions and found polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons at ten to 10,000 times the EPA's maximum limits.[398] Assorted studies from the EPA, the Department of Tropical Medicine at the University of London and others have published similar results.[399]

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392 Kimerling 1991: 863, San Sebastián 2004: 207-208.
393 Walker 1996, Kimerling 1991: 874, Vallejo 2003: 36, Tidwell 1994, Martínez 1995: 187, Garzón 1995: 269, Goldman Prize 2008. The Tiputini River has been fishless since 2001, thought to be a result of toxic waste dumping (Oilwatch 8/4/04: 12).
394 Kimerling 1991: 863. Drilling waste contaminates the air and can results in oil fires, sometimes within lakes and rivers. US data shows that drilling waste contains aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, magnesium, mercury, nickel, zinc, benzene, naphthalene, phenanthrene, assorted hydrocarbons, and chlorides in toxic quantities.
395 Sawyer 2004: 103.
396 Kane 1995: 190.
397 Sawyer 2004: 102.
398 Tidwell 1994, San Sebastián 2004: 207.
399 Sawyer 2004: 103.

As of 1999, petroleum companies were supposed to have been monitoring their pollution and reporting to Ecuador's national government, yet these documents are not available to the public and one company managed to find a government representative to approve its levels of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), which, for scale, were 500 times the European Community's limits.[400]

Indeed, the waste disposal techniques of oil companies have been inadequate in many cases and have, as a result, brought about health difficulties in indigenous communities.

> *Both colonists and indigenous people report that many local streams and rivers, once rich in fish, now support little or no aquatic life. Cattle have died, their stomachs destroyed by drinking from contaminated streams and rivers. These are typically the same waters people use for drinking, cooking, and bathing; colonists report that bathing in these waters causes skin rashes, especially after heavy rains, which accelerate the flow of wastes from nearby pits into the streams.*[401]

These water sources are what people drink, cook with, bathe in, wash their clothes in and give to livestock, for no outside source has provided communities with potable water.[402] Drilling waste can cause a great variety of illnesses, including skin rashes (eczema) and bronchitis due to inhalation of gas fumes; gastrointestinal illnesses result from consumption of infected water.[403]

Doctors have declared the petroleum infestation of the Sacha River the cause of many of the respiratory and dermatological problems, infections and diarrhea observed in the area.[404] San Carlos Parish inhabitants have noted high rates of maladies as diverse as various forms of cancer, fungi, throat problems and spontaneous abortions.[405] The Manuel

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400 San Sebastián 2004: 207-8.
401 Kimerling 1991: 869-70. Garzón concurs that rainfall helps transmit contamination in one area to others (Garzón 1995: 274).
402 Garzón 1995: 275, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 12, Texaco Tóxico 2007.
403 Walker 1996, Kane 1995: 189.
404 Garzón 1995: 269.
405 Texaco Tóxico 2007.

Amunárriz Institute of Epidemiology and Community Health (funded by a local Catholic church and an NGO from Spain) assembled a veritable laundry list of ailments thought to be related to oil production and disposal: rashes, dermatitis, higher death rates, abnormally high incidences of brain defects, birth defects and a cancer "epidemic."[406] In a study released in 2000 that had documented transformations from 1985 to 1998, cancer rates were higher in communities where 20 years of oil drilling had taken place.[407]

When health care is administered, it is often done with the oil companies' interests in mind: many doctors are employed by petroleum companies.[408] The Centro Médico de Coca (Coca Medical Center) stated that the Huaorani suffer gastrointestinal, respiratory and skin illnesses due to dust and other air pollution. Oil companies pay for low-cost fixes—bites and cuts, not breaks— but leave the Huaorani to pay for more expensive illnesses, traveling outside of their communities to Coca or Tena, or even as far as Quito, for treatment.[409]

Judith Kimerling paints a grim and comprehensive portrait of the rate at which wellbeing has declined among RAE indigenous peoples:

> *In oil production areas, indigenous Cofan* [sic], *Secoya, and Siona have been pushed into small pockets of land that are entirely surrounded by outsiders. These lands cover only a fraction of their traditional lands, straining the subsistence base of the people and severely limiting their range for hunting, fishing, gathering, and gardening activities. Important resources in the forests that remain have also been destroyed or degraded by pollution from nearby oil facilities. Already, Cofan* [sic] *are no longer able to support themselves from their traditional lands, and some groups recently migrated into new areas. Others have traveled to nearby boom towns to sell crafts to tourists, and a few have turned to prostitution. Some reportedly sell wildlife products. Some Quichua and Huaorani have also lost lands and resources in oil producing areas.*[410]

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406 San Sebastián 2004: 208-10, Kane 1995: 70, Goldman Prize 2008.
407 San Sebastián 2004: 208, Oilwatch 2007: 38.
408 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 12.
409 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 12.
410 Kimerling 1991: 877.

The demands of affected communities have been redirected toward the government, insisting that it supply them with the means to achieve "a better quality of life," defined as access to electricity, water, health care, and, above all, waste cleanup. These firm requests do not emanate only from indigenous communities but also from colonos and "campesinos" ("farmers").[411] Despite their widespread support, the complaints have garnered nominal school-building and waste-pit-covering, with few efforts made to "fac[e] the root causes of the problem."[412] Exchanging road blockades and protests for small amounts of food or money has formed a new kind of dependency among some politically-charged Huaorani communities.[413] One legal case, the conclusion to this chapter on oil development, incorporates all of the previously-outlined elements of this period of RAE development and introduces the final chapter on sustainable alternatives.

The Suit: Chevron-Texaco's Amazon Chernobyl

"Chevron is sympathetic to the plight of the citizens of the Oriente. The major health concerns in the Oriente region are not the result of oil operations, but are related to lack of water treatment infrastructure, the lack of sufficient sanitation infrastructure and inadequate access to medical care. However, we firmly reject the notion that Chevron should be held accountable for addressing the overall problems of the region, caused because the government and the state oil company are unwilling or unable to shoulder their responsibility."[414]

— Texaco in Ecuador

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411 San Sebastián 2004: 208.
412 San Sebastián 2004: 208.
413 Oilwatch 8/4/04: 13.
414 texaco.com, Texaco's "Open Letter," texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.

Anti-Chevron-Texaco Community Demonstration. Pablo Fajardo, head plaintiff lawyer, stands on the right. Source: goldmanprize.org/files/images/fajardo_demonstration.jpg.

The "case of the century," termed "the Rainforest Chernobyl," stems from a series of collective complaints on behalf of 30,000 northern RAE colonos, campesinos, Cofán, Siona, Secoya and Kichwa people (80 communities) filed against Texaco (acquired by Chevron in 2001) for 28 years of environmental degradation, from 1964 to 1992.[415]

Texas was the site of the first lawsuit, the Sequihua class action suit filed on August 31, 1993 and dismissed by a federal district court on January 27, 1994, with no appeal.[416] On November 3, 1993, Cristobal Bonifaz, an Ecuadorian human rights lawyer living in Massachusetts, worked in conjunction with a US law firm to sue Texaco for $1.5 billion in a class-action suit in New York, for "the Indians [had] no chance of receiving justice in Ecuador."[417] This case, called Aguinda, was dismissed two years later.[418] This time, however, plaintiffs appealed and won a decision reversal.[419]

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415 Acosta 2005: 27, Oilwatch 2007: 67, Simms 2006: 28, Democracy Now 8/5/08, Texaco Tóxico 2007, Goldman Prize 2008.
416 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx.
417 Kane 1995: 251, Stephens 2007: 2, Tidwell 1994, Oilwatch 2007: 67, Isikoff 8/4/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08, Texaco Tóxico 2007.
418 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx, Democracy Now 8/5/08.
419 Goldman Prize 2008.

These lawsuits scared Texaco and Ecuador into establishing a Settlement Agreement on May 4, 1995, in which Texpet paid $40 million for remediation efforts, social programs and medical facilities.[420] A supposedly independent environmental audit found that Texpet had done nothing wrong, according to environmental policies— yet the independent source thought that Texaco should spend $13.2 million on cleanup for "localized damages," which soon snowballed to $40 million.[421] Having put forth remediation funds proportionate to its 33% share in the Texpet-Petroecuador consortium, Texpet was "finally" freed from all duties in Ecuador in September 1998, six years after terminating all oil exploration and extraction in Ecuador.[422]

The case would be dismissed a total of four times in the US, for, in Texaco's opinion, "the U.S. court system was not the proper venue."[423] Joseph Kohn, a plaintiff lawyer, alleges that Chevron-Texaco sought to send the case to Ecuador because they thought that it would never be filed there.[424] The US Court of Appeals granted Chevron its wish to have the case addressed in Ecuador in 2002, along with a warning that if Chevron attempted to evade Ecuadorian judgment, the US judicial system would have to step in.[425]

The communities were not satisfied with Texpet's remediation efforts and filed another lawsuit, this time to the Corte Superior de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice) in Lago Agrio on May 7, 2003, and to the Superior Court of Tena in August 2003.[426] The Tena case was dismissed in September 2003 due to a "failure to meet procedural

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420 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx.
421 Stephens 2007: 2, Texaco's "Open Letter." Plaintiffs accuse Texaco of covering 200 pits with land, a process purportedly captured on film. Houses were then erected over the pits, perched atop almost "pure petroleum" mixed with stones, grass, clay and earth (Texaco Tóxico 2007).
422 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/, Texaco's "Open Letter."
423 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.
424 Fox News 5/31/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08.
425 Goldman Prize 2008.
426 Acosta 2005: 28, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx, Goldman Prize 2008.

requirements."[427] In 2006, Bonifaz's own clients fired him in San Francisco, California, for purportedly fabricating plaintiff cancer stories.[428] Nevertheless, the case continues in Lago Agrio today and could eventually be settled out of court.[429]

Plaintiffs allege that Texpet's negligence harmed the environment, leading to adverse effects on community health.[430] The main complaint was that Chevron-Texaco did what was cheapest, knowing that it could very well be contaminating.[431] The communities were insulted by the double standards employed by Texaco, pointing out that the technology used by the company is illegal in the US.[432] Yet the company claims that "During its years of operations, Texaco Petroleum consistently complied with the laws of Ecuador and international petroleum industry environmental standards," for better or for worse. Texaco seems proud of the fact that Texpet used helicopters, where possible, to access oil instead of building roads, an environmentally questionable approach that nonetheless caught on among other companies in the Oriente.[433]

Texaco operated a parcel of land the size of Rhode Island, building and then abandoning between 900 and 1000 open oil waste oil pits, 350 wells, and dumping 18 billion gallons of waste into RAE waterways, opting to save one to three dollars per barrel by failing to establish a reinjection system that would have mitigated pollution.[434] Plaintiffs allege that they are "poisoning themselves on a daily basis" and officially attribute 428 deaths to Texaco, due in part to rates of cancer nearly triple the national average (31%

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427 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx.
428 Stephens 2007: 2.
429 Oilwatch 2007: 67.
430 Acosta 2005: 28.
431 Acosta 2005: 28.
432 Acosta 2005: 29, Stephens 2007: 1.
433 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx.
434 Democracy Now 8/5/08, Texaco Tóxico 2007, Goldman Prize 2008.

compared to 12.3%).[435] Chevron-Texaco counters that cancer death rates in Lago Agrio are dwarfed by Quito's cancer death rates, according to official government data: polluted water is really a result of human and animal waste dumping, leading to bacterial contamination, the *real* source of RAE health issues.[436]

Texaco's primary counterargument is that it stopped working in Ecuador in 1990 (when Petroecuador took over 62.5% of the consortium and became the only field operator) and that it is not responsible for the 800 spills (3 million gallons leaked) that have transpired since then.[437] Instead, Texaco blames Petroecuador, "widely seen as one of the most inefficient state oil companies in Latin America"; in 2006, the Energy Ministry's Miguel Muñoz upholds that, "for over 30 years, PetroEcuador [sic] has done absolutely nothing to remediate those pits under its responsibility."[438] The company claims that 75% of the samples presented by plaintiffs are from land that Petroecuador, not Texaco, operates.[439]

According to Chevron and Texaco, they are being sued because rightfully blaming Petroecuador would not generate a profit for activists and lawyers and what the plaintiffs seek "is to extort a large financial windfall from Chevron." Texaco broadcasts on its website that Petroecuador claims responsibility for spills and pit cleanup, for Petroecuador did not fulfill its share of remediation "and, since Texpet's exit from Ecuador, has compiled an atrocious and well-documented record of environmental neglect and misconduct. The environmental degradation present in Ecuador today is the result of Petroecuador's poor operations and the Ecuadorian government's unwillingness to fund

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435 Democracy Now 8/5/08, Acosta 2005: 29, Tidwell 1994. Pablo Fajardo claims that rates of cancer in RAE affected areas are seven times the national average (Goldman Prize 2008).
436 Texaco's "Open Letter," texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx.
437 Stephens 2007: 1, Goldman Prize 2008, Texaco's "Open Letter".
438 Stephens 2007: 1.
439 Texaco's "Open Letter," texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.

adequate remediation."[440] The mere fact that the case continues is evidence of an "embarrassing display of hometown injustice."[441]

It has been difficult to quantify in monetary terms the health, social, environmental and economic claims of the plaintiffs.[442] Billions of dollars of damage in spills, contamination of waterways, gas burning, two million acres of deforested land, loss of biodiversity, illness, underpaid workers, and harming the Kichwa, Huaorani, Cofán, Siona, Secoya and colonos economically, socially and culturally are all charges that have been brought against Texaco. The company denies that it has had any adverse affects on RAE cultures or that any populations have decreased in number.[443] In spite of the company's pleas, in April 2008, a court-appointed specialist argued for Chevron to pay $8.3 to $16 billion for cleanup.[444]

The "astronomical estimate" of wrongdoing, in financial terms, is meant "to frighten the company into settlement," says Texaco.[445] Chevron "says a loss could set a dangerous precedent for other U.S. multinationals"; an unidentified Chevron lobbyist claims that "Ecuador has mistreated a U.S. company" and "We can't let little countries screw around with big companies like this— companies that have made big investments around the world."[446]

Texaco, originally headquartered in New York, and Chevron, based in California, have responded to the figure, which has since risen to $27 billion, by lobbying the former

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440 Texaco's "Open Letter."
441 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.
442 Oilwatch 2007: 67.
443 Acosta 2005: 29, Tidwell 1994, Goldman Prize 2008, texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx.
444 Isikoff 8/4/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08, Fox News 5/31/08, Goldman Prize 2008.
445 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.
446 Isikoff 8/4/08.

Bush administration.[447] A Chevron-Texaco lobbying team, led by former Senate majority leader Trent Lott, asked former President George W. Bush to withhold trade preferences awarded by the Andean Preference Program from Ecuador if it did not drop the case. US Trade Representative Susan Schwab was considering this move.[448]

Regime changes in the US and Ecuador have all but canned this initiative. Current Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denounces the lobbying as "geopolitical blackmail" and wholeheartedly backs the case as a public demonstration that "Ecuador is no longer for sale."[449] Texaco claims that, although the plaintiffs' soil and water tests were "analyzed by an unaccredited laboratory" and Texaco's own testing of its remediated sites exonerated the company, the communities stopped testing and started protesting at every turn.[450] There is no chance that there will be a fair trial with Correa now in power and the appointment of a new judge, who ended the evidentiary period and put an Ecuadorian mining engineer in charge of evaluating environmental destruction: "this case has now descended into a judicial farce."[451]

Correa sees things differently. He believes that Chevron-Texaco *can* get a fair trial in Ecuador and that any claims to the contrary are sad excuses to evade justice. Correa believes that "the damage was there" before Petroecuador took over, although he admits some Petroecuador responsibility. The president believes that "there is a moral issue here" and that the lawsuit is "not an attack! It's justice." The intention is to make people more "careful" with oil extraction in the developing world and to shirk the "double standard"

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447 Fox News 5/31/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08, El Comercio 4/1/09.
448 Isikoff 8/4/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08, Democracy Now 8/5/08.
449 Democracy Now 8/5/08.
450 Texaco's "Open Letter," texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.
451 texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.

that companies like Texaco subscribe to.[452] Should Ecuador win (Correa believes that this case affects the entire country), the international community will be morally obligated to ensure that Chevron pays.[453]

Plaintiff lawyer Steven Donziger mentions the double standards and unacceptable technology offered by Texaco.[454] A friend of then-Illinois Senator Barack Obama, Donziger partnered with senior Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy to compose a letter to Obama in 2006, who "is on record as being against what Chevron wants to do" and in favor of the case being settled in Ecuador.[455] Chevron lobbyists tried and failed to gain approval from the Bush administration in 2008 and now have little chance of finding compassion for their cause in Obama.[456]

The case is building on the momentum of its own leaders, as well. Pablo Fajardo, head lawyer on the case, and Luis Yanza, founder of the Amazon Region Defense Front formed to combat Texaco, shared the 2008 Goldman Prize for Latin America.[457] Yanza has already devoted sixteen years of his life to the case, being one of the proponents of the original 1993 lawsuit.[458] He declares that the communities are determined to win, no matter how long it takes, as a tribute to regional and international environmental justice efforts.[459]

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452 Democracy Now 2/11/08.
453 Democracy Now 2/11/08, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 18.
454 Stephens 2007: 1.
455 Democracy Now 8/5/08, Isikoff 8/4/08.
456 Democracy Now 8/5/08.
457 Goldman Prize 2008, Texaco Tóxico 2007. Fajardo's brother was killed soon after he became a part of the legal team and no one has investigated this murder; Fajardo himself has been threatened, along with Yanza, and both were "issued precautionary measures" from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS in December 2005 (Texaco Tóxico 2007).
458 Texaco Tóxico 2007, Goldman Prize 2008.
459 Texaco Tóxico 2007.

Managing Conflict: Alternative Economic Models and Negotiation

Given the diverse and contradictory interests involved in the RAE petroleum industry, conflict is inevitable.[460] Historically, the state's role has been to protect traditional development projects, frequently leaving ecological proposals by the wayside; recently, President Correa has advocated for the interests of the RAE and its inhabitants.[461] Oil production has not been halted entirely, yet the current government pledges to obtain more money per barrel instead of blindly increasing extraction rates.[462]

As I will demonstrate in the next and final chapter, Correa's administration has offered the first government-led initiative toward a post-petroleum Ecuador. We have already seen how petroleum companies shape the natural resource conflict; in the following chapter, we will observe the altered role of the state and elaborate on agricultural and tourist uses as well as, of course, participatory democracy, the lack of cohesion of threatened communities, and contradictory beliefs among indigenous groups and between indigenous nations and other parties involved.[463] In short, we will examine opportunities to build a post-petroleum Ecuador— and to guarantee that there is still an Amazon to work with once the oil inevitably runs dry.[464]

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460 Varea 1995: 15.
461 Varea 1995: 45.
462 Schuldt 2006: 83, 88.
463 Varea 1995: 143.
464 Varea 1995: 147.

CHAPTER 3

A Syncretic Approach or the "Conservation" Era

This final chapter addresses the question of sustainable development, the guiding force behind the current wave of development in the Ecuadorian Amazon. More specifically, it will explore how an emphasis on political participation has influenced relations between RAE indigenous organizations and actors from the public sector, the private sector and civil society.

Anamaría Varea (1995) calls for a transformation in the management of the environment and socio-environmental conflicts, revising the perception of our "deberes comunes" ("common duties") as human inhabitants of Planet Earth. The primary conflict lies "entre el *homo economicus* y los recursos naturales" ("between *homo economicus* and natural resources"), manifested most dramatically in the petroleum conflicts outlined in the previous chapter and infused by the Protestant work ethic that preceded the oil boom.[465] The broad gamut of actors with vested interests in the RAE has led to resentment and violence, as each of these actors desires to establish its own territory with which to do what it wishes, be it a petroleum company seeking capital, a colono fleeing economic hardship, a biologist examining new plant and animal species, a tourist searching for refuge or a state protecting its borders.[466]

In the RAE, these interests are mapped onto what indigenous nations consider to be *their* territory. In the past 20 years, indigenous peoples have entered national development discourse and it has been revealed that they do not see themselves as

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[465] Varea 1995: 5-6.
[466] Varea 1995: 6, Vallejo 2003: 17.

underdeveloped, but rather that their past marginality was related to a lack of participation in political processes.[467] Decentralized post-structural development scholars, such as Arturo Escobar, advocate a more multifaceted, self-defined approach to development, much like the one that is being experimented with in the Ecuadorian lowlands.[468] In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate how the indigenous peoples of the RAE have reconciled their own perspectives on politics and development with "modern" politics and traditional development paradigms.

Neoliberalism, Globalization, Localization and Glocalization

The Ecuadorian indigenous movement has, over the past 20 years, extended itself from a purely localized level to reach regional, national and transnational heights, including views from indigenous peoples, non-indigenous peasants, the Ecuadorian government and corporate representatives.[469] The driving force behind this movement is the "reivindicación indígena" ("indigenous reclaiming"), in the words of Luis Macas, a founder of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Federation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE). A Saraguro from Loja (in the southern Ecuadorian Sierra), Macas shares the wishes of many RAE indigenous groups to legally establish a plurinational/pluricultural Ecuadorian state to avoid further cultural losses in the face of globalization and the homogenization it implies.[470]

RAE indigenous peoples rejected neoliberalism and its "applicability in Ecuador of the Smithian wisdom that there exists a fundamental harmony of interests between the

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467 Varea 1995: 35, Bustamante 1995: 222.
468 Escobar 1999, Leys 1996, Mehta 2001, Bhattacharyya 1995.
469 Sawyer 2004: 21.
470 Granda 1991.

activities of profit-seeking, self-interested, rational individuals and the general good of society as a whole."[471] Indeed, "neoliberal policies have been neither smoothly implemented nor passively received" in Ecuador, resulting in five major indigenous uprisings against neoliberal policies and countless other demonstrations based on similar complaints.[472] The indigenous peoples of Ecuador demonstrate how economic globalization can prompt intensified localization: as inequalities deepen, "oppositional identities and counter-dreams" become evident.[473] This unforeseen side effect of globalizing economic reforms has "unintentionally produced transgressive political subjects."[474]

A Note on Highland/Lowland Distinctions

Though many of their demands coincide, indigenous peoples of the Sierra and the Oriente underwent distinct historical transformations to arrive at their current proposals. The Sierra was pulled into the Spanish conquest and became part of the global economy much sooner than the Oriente.[475] Conversely, RAE indigenous peoples did not serve the state, nor did it offer them rights, before the last half century.[476] Divergent histories aside, both Highland and Amazonian indigenous groups have been "dinamizado" ("dynamized") by the achievements of international groups (notably, US native and Australian aboriginal rights fights) and an increased interest in socialism and civil rights.[477] Furthermore,

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471 Sawyer 2004: 13.
472 Sawyer 2004: 14. Why did so many indigenous organizations establish themselves during the same period? The economic crisis of the 1980s, limiting urban employment; increasingly dense population in the continent's more densely-populated state; and help from the Catholic Church are all thought to have been motivating factors (Brooke 1991).
473 Sawyer 2004: 16.
474 Sawyer 2004: 15.
475 Vallejo 2003.
476 Rival 1994 in Rivas 2001: 66.
477 Bustamante 1995: 234, Ziegler-Otero- 2004: 79.

Highland and Lowland indigenous organizations have partnered on many occasions, as we will observe in subsequent sections.

Foundations of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement

The central demands of the Ecuadorian indigenous movements are communal land titles, the right to enter state-level political discussions and the freedom to maintain cultural traditions long into the future.[478] Currently, 3500 indigenous communities are associated with CONAIE, with the Organización de Personas Indígenas de Pastaza (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza, or OPIP) and the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Federation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon, or CONFENAIE) being two of the most involved organizations.[479]

Prior to 1980, indigenous nations were seen as part of a classist/campesino movement. There has since been "una revitalización indígena" ("an indigenous revitalization") to cancel out the state's centralizing and homogenizing tendencies.[480] Some believe that indigenous organizations themselves, however, have become relatively homogeneous: thanks in part to missionary work, there are generally fewer conflicts among ethnic groups, meaning fewer struggles among organizations.[481]

The formation of any kind of organization, relatively uniform or otherwise, was a feat, considering the SIL's opposition to political activity of any kind. The RAE's first indigenous organization, the Federación de Centros Shuar (Federation of Shuar Centers), developed throughout the 1960s. Salesian priests helped establish this federation under the

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478 Bustamante 1995: 234, 238-9; Varea 1995: 54; Sawyer 2004: 42.
479 Martínez 1995: 190.
480 Varea 1995: 52.
481 Varea 1995: 57, 100.

guidance of Liberation Theology, and the principles of the Shuar organization proliferated not only in the Amazon but also in the Sierra during the 1970s.[482] Nevertheless, it was strongly opposed by other missionaries who deemed it communist and even sponsored the formation of a rival "conservative" Shuar party in the most missionary-controlled areas.[483]

According to Rachel Saint, CONFENAIE was also a communist organization; RAE indigenous peoples did not heed her warning "to stay away from such dangerous organizations" and CONFENAIE was founded in 1980.[484] CONFENAIE is generally ruled by Kichwa and Shuar representatives, the two most populous indigenous nations of the Oriente "and its most acculturated politically and economically."[485]

The nationalities of the RAE had formed nine local federations at the time of the 1992 march on Quito, with 960 communities representing the Achuar, Cofán, Kichwa, Huaorani, Shuar, Siona and Secoya.[486] The organizations were concerned for the already "missing nations" and that the Huaorani, Siona, Secoya and Cofán were nearing the end.[487] Education was also worrisome, as the organizations suspected that national education efforts were being employed as an assimilating tool; this preoccupation helped prompt a revalorization of indigenous education.[488]

The national indigenous federation, CONAIE, was founded in Quito in November 1986.[489]

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482 Sawyer 2004: 42.
483 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 57, 78.
484 Kane 1995: 73, 89.
485 Kane 1995: 73, Kimerling 1991: 856, Sawyer 2004: 43.
486 Kimerling 1991: 856, Sawyer 2004: 43.
487 Goffin 1994: 127.
488 Rival 2002: 154.
489 Sawyer 2004: 43, Goffin 1994: 126. In 1997, the federation's political party, Pachakutik, was established and named in honor of the ninth governor and first emperor of the Incan Empire (Tahuantinsuyo) (Sawyer 2004: 223). The rainbow-colored Tahuantinsuyo flag is the symbol of CONAIE and Pachakutik, now a major "political pressure group," thus visually reclaiming past indigenous might to promote indigenous pride today (Sawyer 2004: 47, CIA World Factbook).

> *For the indigenous people of Ecuador, the founding of CONAIE began a new phase in the long, arduous history of indigenous response to foreign intrusion in all of its manifestations, including that of North American fundamentalist Protestantism. In their view, CONAIE represented a modern-day outcry against the abuses, exploitation, extortion, and annihilation of indigenous people.*[490]

Prior to this consolidation, regional organizations like CONFENAIE, Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (Kichwa for "Indigenous Masses Awake"/"Ecuadorian Awakening Man," or ECUARUNARI) and the Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Ecuadorian Coast, or COICE) operated on different agendas that all stipulated land, spiritual and cultural protection.[491] When the groups made efforts toward organization, they were met with opposition, however indirect, from the national government. President León Febres Cordero attempted to create his own indigenous organization, "Jatun Ayllu" ("Big Family" in Kichwa), to undermine indigenous movements initiated by indigenous people.[492] In 1995, the Secretary General of the National Development Council and then-Minister of Energy and Mines, Galo Abril, targeted CONAIE as a communist organization. The government had misread CONAIE's call for a plurinational state as a desire to overthrow the central government or as evidence of an ethnic secessionist movement; according to the indigenous peoples, distinguishing themselves as members of a nationality and promoting a plurinational state refutes the popular claim that they are beings without history.[493]

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490 Goffin 1994: 127.
491 Goffin 1994: 126, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 79, Wilson 2003: 166.
492 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 79.
493 Sawyer 2004: 115.

Initial Uprisings

The first indigenous march on Quito in May and June 1990 propelled the indigenous movement, most notably CONAIE, CONFENAIE, OPIP and ECUARUNARI, onto the national stage as political actors to be reckoned with.[494] Ten indigenous nations were represented, 150,000 people having compiled an extensive list of demands: legal recognition of ancestral lands, redistribution of estates, plurinational status for Ecuador, control of archaeological sites, state-funded bilingual education, funding for research of traditional medicine, and the formal expulsion of the SIL ("accused by many Indians here of destroying traditional culture").[495]

The protest was as shocking for Ecuadorian authorities as it was for the public, resulting in compliance with certain demands. (The Huaorani gained land, yet mineral rights remained firmly in the hands of the state.[496]) Those involved in the march were offended by the state's reaction that "foreign agitators and Marxist priests stirred up the nation's traditionally docile Indian population."[497] The demonstration was, in fact, the culmination of centuries of frustration, brought about by lack of recognition and respect for indigenous capabilities and rights.

A second protest in April 1992 involved a 250-mile trek from Pastaza province to Quito in the name of "land adjudication and constitutional reform" for two million communal hectares— 70% of Pastaza— and plurinational state status. By the time the protesters reached Carondelet (the Presidential Palace, located in Central Quito), the original 2000 protesters had grown to 5000, 100 of which earned an audience with

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[494] Rivas 2001:36, Goffin 1994: 130.
[495] Goffin 1994: 130, Rivas 2001: 36, Brooke 1991.
[496] Rivas 2001: 36-7.
[497] Brooke 1991.

President Rodrigo Borja.[498] The march was, more than anything, about being "recognized as political subjects," and, after three weeks of deliberation, the protesters received 55% of what they had asked for, seen as a great success for Pastaza.[499]

The land granted Pastaza indigenous peoples was carved into 19 blocks, "chaotic demarcations that were intended ultimately to divide the integrity of indigenous nationalities, undermine their solidarity, and erode the deeply embedded cultural practices of living in a landscape."[500] The IERAC assigned indigenous names to the arbitrarily-divided land parcels and Borja established a "security zone" 40 miles wide between Peru and Pastaza, controlled entirely by the military but inhabited by thousands of indigenous people.[501]

Despite experiencing a variety of setbacks, the protests increased public awareness of indigenous demands, for, "in their protests, marches, paralyzations [sic], and assemblies, indígenas usurped a political space in which to construct a new democratic, participatory order that emanated from el pueblo."[502] These protests also fomented the organization of a regional pan-indigenous protest as the 500-year anniversary of Christopher Columbus' "discovery" of the Americas drew near. On this historic date, 20,000 Latin American indigenous people converged on Quito for a "500 Years of Resistance" protest to counter the Ecuadorian state's sincere celebration of Columbus' arrival.[503]

> [CONAIE] *understood too that their struggle was the same one faced by indigenous people all over the Western Hemisphere. What had happened in Ecuador during the past five centuries had*

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498 Sawyer 2004: 27-9, 41.
499 Sawyer 2004: 30, 41, 50. Pastaza indigenous peoples also wanted to recover what they thought was legally theirs, which a Kichwa shaman and warrior named Palati had obtained when he marched on Quito: he had been granted a land title for all of Pastaza, but this paper was buried with him. Slight gains were made in 1947, with the establishment of some communal areas, yet Pastaza indigenous peoples wished to regain all of what they felt was theirs (Sawyer 2004: 42).
500 Sawyer 2004: 51.
501 Sawyer 2004: 50-1.
502 Sawyer 2004: 216.
503 Kane 1995: 219, Goffin 1994: 129.

also happened in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, the United States, and Canada.[504]

ONHAE: Internal and External Barriers to Political Organization

The Huaorani were absent from the anti-Columbus Day demonstration, as they did not believe that they had ever been conquered. What they shared with other RAE nationalities, however, was the fact that the authorities and missionaries were aligned against their political organization and their chief political entity had also been termed "communist" by the SIL, intended as an insult. According to Kichwa activist/director of OPIP's Instituto Amazanga, Leonardo Viteri,

> [The evangelical missionaries] *follow a plan of work that is very sophisticated, well-planned, and very right-wing— they speak always of "communists" and they call the peoples' organizations communist. I see the strong influence that this has on the Huaorani, that they don't feel free, they've been made to accept in a certain manner this way of thinking and they have to liberate themselves from this influence in order to develop a plan of action, a plan of development, that is truly their own.*[505]

The 1980s brought about the initial push for the creation of ONHAE, officially founded and named in March 1990.[506] CONAIE, CONFENAIE and OPIP had supported the formation of the Organización de la Nacionalidad Huaorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Organization of the Huaorani Nationality of Amazonian Ecuador, or ONHAE, meaning "flower" in their language, Huao Terero) in the late 1980s.[507] ONHAE's establishment came about rather abruptly, due to the fact that the very (male) products of mission schooling, made wise in the intricacies of the Ecuadorian

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504 Goffin 1994: 135.
505 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 56-7, Sawyer 2004: 27.
506 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 77, Rivas 2001: 23.
507 Kane 1995: 18, 146; Ziegler-Otero 2004: 103. CONFENAIE helped ONHAE acquire the largest indigenous territory in the country (960,000 hectares or 2600 square miles, one-third of their traditional land) on April 10, 1990.[507] The Huaorani were forbidden from obstructing any development on this gigantic plot of land, which they had no prior experience legally managing; they experienced difficulties negotiating with the oil companies that sat within the boundaries of their territory.[507] The territorial gains were also taken with a grain of salt, due to the fact that Huaorani territory is seen as limitless and ever-changing. In the fall of 1993, the government incorporated the Huaorani as part of PNY's administration (Kane 1995: 232).

white/mestizo realm and somewhat fluent in Spanish, allowed Huaorani "to see the rejection of the missionaries as a viable alternative." The environmental destruction brought about by the construction of the Vía Auca road in eastern Huaorani territory furthered political awakening and cemented ONHAE's status as an intermediary between petroleum companies and affected communities.[508]

ONHAE prioritizes the protection of Huaorani communities against exploitative development instigated by petroleum companies and the central government, yet also grants attention to education, territorial rights, health, community development and tourism.[509] The organization has a unique style of governance, embodying indigenous political syncretism: "modern" elections in assemblies are combined with "traditional" appointments of men and women based on seniority, and decisions are reached through consensus.[510]

The second round of ONHAE elections in February 1993 were sponsored by Maxus, causing half of the Huaorani present to walk out of the elections meeting. Co-founders Moi and Nanto left ONHAE altogether, leaving Enqueri, the most Westernized of the four founders, in charge.[511] Enqueri signed a deal with Maxus in August 1993, forcing the company to build schools for the Huaorani. Nevertheless, ONHAE continued

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[508] Ziegler-Otero 2004: 78-80. Note on ONHAE's founders: Moi, Nanto, Enqueri and Amo, all distant cousins, crafted the idea for ONHAE in 1986 (Ziegler-Otero 2004: 80). The four founders were in their twenties when they became active, all sharing a desire to preserve Huaorani culture and land (Kane 1995: 18, Rival 2002: xvi, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 80-1). The four varied in degrees of Westernization. Enqueri, whose father had partaken in the MAF pilot spearings, was a promising student who had been sent outside of the territory and exposed to indigenous peoples who had already begun to organize "into federations of a decidedly leftist bent"; when he returned to form ONHAE, Rachel Saint turned his family against him by labeling him a communist (Kane 1995: 20-1). For more information on ONHAE's founders, see Ziegler-Otero (2004) and Kane (1995).

[509] Fuentes 1997: 145, Rivas 2001: 23, Ziegler-Otero 2004: 103, Oilwatch 8/4/04: 13.

[510] Rivas 2001: 23, Oilwatch 84/04: 13.

[511] Kane 1995: 230.

to utilize the education infrastructure put in place by missionaries and the organization effectively belonged to Maxus following the agreement.[512]

The Huaorani case helps disassemble the illusion of indigenous solidarity. In the early 1990s, conflicts arose between ONHAE and Valerio Grefa of CONFENAIE, for the Huaorani did not believe that the Kichwa leader considered Huaorani demands and felt no obligation to represent them, failing to invite the Huaorani to federation meetings.[513] The Huaorani are not the only nationality to butt heads with CONFENAIE and other groups consider it to be overly power-hungry.[514]

Both internal and external conflicts have shaped recent Huaorani political interventions and the degree to which ONHAE is associated with the nation-wide indigenous movement is arguable. Are the Huaorani an integral part of CONFENAIE or do they merely accept the regional organization as an example to follow in its own solitary efforts?[515] Aside from contradictions within the indigenous movement and obvious conflicts of interest with missionaries and petroleum companies, the Huaorani have also taken issue with certain environmental groups.[516]

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512 Kane 1995: 230-32, accionecologica.org. ONHAE members who work as tour guides or as temporary oil employees are sometimes met with suspicion. Additionally, companies like Repsol have been accused of attempting to work intergenerational divisions among Huaorani to their advantage by using young, Spanish-speaking Huaorani to negotiate issues that elders do not support (Oilwatch 8/4/04: 13).

513 Kane 1995: 158-9, 200.

514 Kane 1995: 202, Gerlach 2003: 53. Nonetheless, CONFENAIE and ONHAE joined forces in 1996 against the OAS' Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Inter-American Human Rights Court, or CIDH), stating that the Ecuadorian government and petroleum companies had violated the rights of indigenous peoples. A subsequent investigation confirmed the physical and cultural threats posed by these actors to the Huaorani (Oilwatch 4/12/07: 12-13).

515 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 77. Maxus used "divide and conquer" tactics to obtain permission to build a road: the Kichwa agreed, while the Huaorani would not (Kane 1995: 158-9, 174).

516 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 77. Often, foreign NGO workers end up transplanting social movements that failed in their own countries, many times Marxist (Ponce 3). CONAIE and other indigenous groups have shied away from being associated with certain NGOs for this reason, highlighting the conflict between NGOs and their "beneficiaries" (Ponce 80).

Joe Kane (1995), a freelance environmentalist documenting the early political dynamics of ONHAE, details the obstacles that have deterred foreign environmentalists from getting involved:

> *While I was home* [in San Francisco, California] *I talked to quite a few people who had taken up the cause of the Huaorani, or their land. But none of them had a relationship with the Huaorani that was anything more than tangential, because working with the Huaorani was a high-risk, low-reward proposition: Travel to the territory was expensive, dangerous, and time-consuming (and, often, illegal); communication was nearly impossible; the cultural gulf was enormous; the Company* [Maxus] *was all-powerful; and the Huaorani themselves were utterly unpredictable.*[517]

Many environmentalists who fervently defend the Huaorani from abroad have spent very little time in the Oriente, a fact that puzzled ONHAE's founders who felt that outsiders sought to speak *for* them rather than *in solidarity with* them.[518] Those who familiarized themselves with the RAE, such as the aforementioned Judith Kimerling, were often threatened by companies and governments. Kimerling arrived in the RAE in 1989 with the intention of convincing the Ecuadorian government to establish the country's first attempts at environmental regulations for oil activity; she was nearly deported and has been arrested and threatened several times by the military (hoping to disillusion her to the point that she decides to leave permanently).[519] Petroecuador had intended to make public Kimerling's findings, but was initially "dissuaded by the American embassy, which argued that making an international incident of Kimerling's investigation would draw further attention to it."[520] Clearly, Kimerling's investigation has since become common knowledge.

Other "ecochicas," like Acción Ecológica's Esperanza Martínez, "put in twelve- and fourteen-hour days; they set up picket lines; they occupied offices; they confronted

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517 Kane 1995: 77.
518 Kane 1995: 200.
519 Kane 1995: 70, 208-9.
520 Kane 1995: 70. For Kimerling's history in Ecuador and with the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), see Kane (1995).

businessmen; they made noise; they danced all night" and generally stirred up media attention for ONHAE. For the first time, Huaoranis picketed in Quito, the first three-day strike having been arranged by the ecochicas in conjunction with then-CONAIE President Luis Macas.[521]

A fundamental problem with ecologist support for the indigenous movement is that environmentalists tend to romanticize indigenous peoples and do not understand that indigenous groups are not just providing voices for nature but also for their ways of life, two aspects of the same problem: "la cuestión ecológica no puede ser entendida de manera separada respecto a la cuestión étnica" ("the ecological question cannot be understood separately from the ethnic question").[522] Many environmentalists operate on the sole belief that loss of biodiversity is one of the world's "common challenges," in the words of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).[523] Indigenous communities have encountered difficulties in working with environmentalists and other NGOs due to the inability and/or unwillingness of some development workers to conceptualize the diversity of indigenous peoples (numerous nations, indigenous cattle ranchers/loggers) and reconcile differences between Western and RAE indigenous ideals of environmentalism. These conflicts forced several outside NGOs to abandon indigenous movements by the mid-1990s.[524]

Ecuadorian environmental advocates like Acción Ecológica (AE) constitute the deeply-rooted environmental movement in Ecuador, capable of weathering occasionally fickle international support. Founded in 1987, AE was "arguably the most radical

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521 Kane 1995: 206-7.
522 Varea 1995: 116.
523 Kane 1995: 21, Vallejo 2003: 25.
524 Wilson 2003: 168, Vallejo 2003: 19, 23.

environmental organization in Ecuador at the time [of the 1993 OPIP-ARCO conflict] fighting for social and environmental justice," promoting indigenous and colono demands over petroleum interests, based on arguments gleaned by attending CONAIE and CONFENAIE meetings.[525]

AE engages in discussions with 40 other domestic environmental agencies in the Comité Ecuatoriano para la Defensa de la Naturaleza y el Medio Ambiente (Ecuadorian Committee for the Defense of Nature and the Environment, or CEDENMA), founded in June 1993.[526] Another collective environmental effort taking place in Ecuador is the Campaña Amazonía por la Vida (Amazon Life Campaign), originally founded by AE in 1990 to stimulate the realization of socioenvironmental audits.[527] The campaign enjoys the support of indigenous groups, foreign environmentalists, Catholic missionaries and human rights activists, all with similar anti-exportation, anti-capitalist and environmentally-protective goals.[528] These NGOs have succeeded in bringing national and international attention to RAE conflicts, negotiating with the state, oil companies, colonos, campesinos and, of course, indigenous groups.[529]

OPIP: The ARCO-Sarayaku Conflict and 1994 Protest

"We cannot keep losing our resources for hunting, fishing, diverse fruits of the jungle; the affected jungle contains our history, tradition and culture; children's education should be able to recover the millenary knowledge of our people, generated in contact with nature; the jungle is our pantry and pharmacy; the Amazonian indigenous cultures have been forgotten and trampled; the world should grant itself the right to enrich its cultural heritage with the knowledge of the Amazonian Indian peoples."[530]

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525 Sawyer 2004: 83, Varea 1995: 310-11, Martínez 1995: 192.
526 Martínez 1995: 191.
527 Martínez 1995: 192, Varea 1995: 304.
528 Vallejo 2003: 41.
529 Stiglitz 2004: 10 in Acosta 2005: 17, Varea 1995: 93.
530 Original Spanish text: "No podemos dejar de perder nuestro alimento de caza, pesca, frutos diversos de la selva; la selva afectada encierra nuestra historia, tradición y cultura; la educación de los niños debe poder recoger el conocimiento milenario de su pueblo, generado en contacto con la naturaleza; la selva es nuestra despensa y farmacia; la cultura amazónica como las culturas indígenas, ha sido desconocida y pisoteadas; el mundo debería darse el derecho de enriquecer su acervo cultural con el conocimiento de los pueblos indios amazónicos" (Villamil 1995: 344).

— Former OPIP President Héctor Villamil (1995), on the ARCO-OPIP conflict

Founded in 1973 and legalized in 1992, OPIP was one of the first and most vocal RAE indigenous organizations, a driving force behind the 1992 protests.[531] Critics have frowned upon OPIP for being "Quichua-dominated"; additionally, OPIP has international ties to Boston-based NGO Oxfam USA and other non-indigenous organizations like AE.[532] Indigenous "purists" perceive such alliances as threats to indigenous rights.

OPIP's most heated protest involved the Asociación de Centros Indígenas de Sarayaku (Association of Sarayaku Indigenous Centers; Sarayaku means "corn river"), one of OPIP's 11 associations.[533] Like other RAE communities, Sarayaku Kichwas passed through periods of missionary work, rubber tappers and petroleum activity. Organized resistance to petroleum commenced in November 1988 against the US' ARCO International Oil Gas Company.[534]

In June 1988, ARCO obtained rights to 200,000 hectares of one million hectares belonging to Sarayakus and 32 other indigenous communities in Pastaza.[535] Exploration was halted half a year later by the Kichwa, who expelled seismic crews from French Compagnie Générale du Géophysique (CGG), a move that ARCO responded to with bribery. The Kichwa rejected bribes and instead spent 12 days confiscating helicopter keys and CGG equipment, resulting in the drafting of the Sarayaku Accord. This treaty recognized the environmental disruptiveness of seismic work and its high level of noise

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531 Sawyer 2004: 43, 45.
532 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 103, Sawyer 2004: 82-3.
533 Acosta 2005: 101.
534 Villamil 1995: 338.
535 Sawyer 2004: 4, 64; Villamil 1995: 339-40.

pollution and stated that all indigenous territory would be legalized in Pastaza, ecological damage would be paid for and subsequent seismic activity halted.[536]

However, President Rodrigo Borja warned that the Accord would not be adhered to, as it was reached through force. ARCO began anew in spring 1990 in the more petro-friendly Kichwa community of Moretecocha (near Sarayaku).[537] Borja also rejected OPIP's request for territorial demarcation, causing OPIP and supporters like San Francisco's Rainforest Action Network (RAN) to embark on a 400-kilometer march from Pastaza to Quito in late August 1990.[538] This march attracted the attention of the military and Pastaza Kichwas were conceded 1,115,574 hectares.[539] Additionally, the march forced ARCO to carry out an environmental evaluation on Block 19 and to create a fund for social development and conservation.[540]

The next episode in the OPIP-ARCO saga involved a heated exchange of letters between OPIP and the CEO of ARCO in Los Angeles in August 1993. ARCO was accused of "dividing and conquering" by establishing a shadow indigenous organization, the Directiva Intercomunitaria de Comunidades Independientes de Pastaza (Intercommunity Directive of Independent Communities of Pastaza, or DICIP), and granting it more authority than OPIP.[541] At the time, DICIP had 100 members; OPIP had 15,000 and was 14 years in the making when DICIP arrived on the scene.[542] Though ARCO claimed that DICIP leaders had approached the oil company to offer support for exploration, ARCO refused to deny, in writing, that it did not *indirectly* fund the actions of

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536 Sawyer 2004: 64-5.
537 Sawyer 2004: 66.
538 Varea 1995: 114, Villamil 1995: 352.
539 Varea 1995: 115, 117.
540 Varea 1995: 115. Documentation of ARCO's weak environmental policy and lack of analysis of ecological impact was revealed by a team of University of California (Berkeley) researchers in March 1992 (Villamil 1995: 353).
541 Sawyer 2004: 4, 6, 71; Villamil 1995: 340-1.
542 Sawyer 2004: 8.

DICIP.[543] OPIP itself was not opposed to petroleum activity, given that many community members were lured toward temporary oil employment by decent wages. However, OPIP *did* demand that two dollars per barrel of ARCO crude be set aside for supplying basic services for OPIP communities.[544]

DICIP was firmly on ARCO's side and called OPIP protesters "invaders," "subversives," and "Peruvians," a considerable insult given the three "jungle wars" fought against Peru in the twentieth century.[545] ARCO's control over DICIP, OPIP theorized, was related to the meager incentives— Ecua-volley courts, houses, schools and supplies— that the company presented the DICIP community.[546] The rival organization ignored OPIP's calls "for real development, for integral health, education, transportation, communication programs defined by indígenas" in favor of "nefarious bribes," in the words of then-OPIP President Villamil.[547]

When OPIP traveled to Quito on January 24, 1994, to protest the Seventh Round of Bidding for oil concessions (four of the ten proposed blocks sat within Pastaza indigenous territory), DICIP declared war on OPIP. OPIP also faced setbacks due to the fact that ONHAE had exchanged rights to Block 16 with Maxus for education and health care.[548] OPIP's Leonardo Viteri believes that ARCO convinced ONHAE to participate in the DICIP meeting in which war was declared on OPIP.[549]

OPIP had fought for bilingual Kichwa-Spanish education for years and achieved approval in 1992. "It was a project of and for the future: of identity creation, community

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543 Sawyer 2004: 6, 128.
544 Sawyer 2004: 81.
545 Sawyer 2004: 61-3. See Appendix C.
546 Sawyer 2004: 9, 61, 80.
547 Sawyer 2004: 9, 60-1, 80.
548 Sawyer 2004: 91-2.
549 Sawyer 2004: 124.

formation, and self-determination... It represented the emergence of local alternatives to state and corporate discrimination, exploitation, and disavowal."[550] DICIP dropped out of the bilingual program, purportedly due to ARCO opposition, and DICIP went the way of the Huaorani, whose educational supplies were provided by Maxus.[551]

Viteri states that the root of OPIP's differences of opinion with organizations like DICIP and ONHAE is that

> *we don't want saviors from other places— not companies, not ecologists, nor people from the government— coming to resolve our internal problems. In every pueblo there are difficulties and disagreements, just as there are harmonies and solidarities, all of this. But these internal dynamics are solely a concern internal to the indigenous communities.*[552]

The June 1994 protest was the largest Ecuadorian indigenous demonstration in the 1990s, featuring others of Ecuador's "poor," such as colonos and campesinos, in central roles. Colonos had historically upheld very strained relations with OPIP, yet due to threats against their land emanating from the government of Sixto Durán Ballén, they joined the cause.[553] All small-scale agricultural workers involved in the demonstration refused to pay the interest proposed by Congress' Agrarian Development Law on lands given them by the Banco Nacional de Fomento (National Support Bank).[554] The government feared that these lands would not be sufficiently productive if "ancestral" farming methods continued to be used.[555] In the eyes of indigenous people, the government conveyed a sense of grossly oversimplifying "ethnic essentialism" (or even racism) by opining that indigenous peoples opposed the law because they did not understand it.[556]

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[550] Sawyer 2004: 127.
[551] Sawyer 2004: 120-1, 127.
[552] Sawyer 2004: 126.
[553] Sawyer 2004: 163, Bustamante 1995: 239. This partnership began on February 12, 1994, when OPIP members and campesinos marched against the national holiday celebrating the "discovery" of the Amazon (Sawyer 2004: 163-4).
[554] Sawyer 2004: 164.
[555] Sawyer 2004: 200.
[556] Sawyer 2004: 202-3.

A statement from the involved parties alleges that the law

> *threatens indigenous communal property, facilitates the open selling of land to the highest bidder, privatizes irrigated water, and permits land which now produces for the family table to change its agricultural vocation and produce for export: When we don't eat flowers! Privatization measures directly affect our lives and the future security of our children because it is the hands of* indígenas *and* campesinos *that feed this country.*[557]

This was an abrupt change from the three decades of hostility that had previously defined campesino/colono-indigenous relations. It was also successful, convincing the government to change the neoliberal law.[558] An outcome that had favored "universal and absolute" agrarian laws, according to those involved, would have been "horribly naïve, disingenuous, or downright cruel."[559]

Colonos, Agriculture and Traditional Medicine: Alternative Forest Products

"Past experience suggests that the Ecuadorian Amazon will not be controlled or planned by its residents, because the region is at the mercy of exogenous forces. If alternative income opportunities remain scarce in Ecuador's largest cities, colonists will invade the rain forest in spontaneous waves each time foreign enterprises provide access roads designed to extract a natural resource."[560]

— Roy Ryder and Lawrence A. Brown (2000)

The degree to which colonos are vilified by indigenous organizations differs greatly. Some recognize the familiar cycles of dependency constructed between colonos, the private sector and the state; others reduce them to "depredadores de la selva" ("predators of the jungle").[561] The first wave of colonos— primarily poor, rural, small-scale farmers driven from their lands by the agricultural oligarchy, droughts and ever-increasing population density— arrived in the 1960s as a result of the Agrarian Reform (see Chapter 1).

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557 Sawyer 2004: 168.
558 Sawyer 2004: 180.
559 Sawyer 2004: 194.
560 Ryder 2000.
561 Varea 1995: 51, Kimerling 1991: 856.

Subsequent stages of migration included Colombians and Ecuadorian citizens hiding in the RAE to escape legal problems.[562]

Government officials and the Huaorani fault these particular colonos for high levels of violence and delinquency in the RAE.[563] Colonos are accused of disrespecting ancestral land divisions and are often racialized as Kichwa, mestizo or Afro-Ecuadorian.[564] Conversely, indigenous opposition to colonos has led the government to accuse indigenous groups of being secessionist.[565]

Environmental degradation is often blamed on colonos. Such diverse eco-socioeconomic wrongdoings as mono-cultivation, harmful for the land and the nutrition of the cultivators; cultivation of erosion-inducing but profitable crops like coffee, corn, naranjilla and cacao; introducing livestock and making pasturelands; logging; and involvement in or complicity with the private sector (supposedly, hundreds of colono men work for petroleum companies and palm cultivators) are attributed to colonos.[566]

Agriculture has recently emerged as a potential element of sustainable development in the RAE. Unfortunately, outsiders are often unaware that the soil of the Amazon is poor, "perched on a fragile and finely tuned ecological foundation." Recycling nutrients within an interdependent ecosystem keeps this delicate dance working in areas that generally have low resistance to environmental alterations and that have already greatly degraded the far-from-robust soil.[567]

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562 Garzón 1995: 268, Kimerling 1991: 875.
563 Garzón 1995: 268, Rivas 2001: 84.
564 Rivas 2001: 84-5, 87.
565 Kimerling 1991: 857.
566 Varea 1995: 49, 52, 59-60; Garzón 1995: 268; Kimerling 1991: 875. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are known for promoting the expansion of livestock and soy production in Latin America (e.g., Bolivia) (FOE 12/08).
567 Kimerling 1991: 852, Acosta 2005: 96, Kane 1995.

Searching for spices and orchids; planting mango, cacao, rubber, palms and assorted fruit and nut trees; extracting resins, seeds and fibers; identifying possible medicinal plants; and using live organisms (germoplasma, or enzymes, cells, animal and vegetable fibers and genes) for biotechnology projects are all contained under the umbrella term "productos forestales no-maderables" ("non-wooden forest products," or PFNM).[568] PFNM can be incorporated into everything from soaps and lotions to ice cream, and supporters view the extraction of such materials as a successful combination of conservation and economic activity; critics question how increased harvesting and the introduction of new species will affect the integrity of the forest.[569]

African palm plantations were established in the 1970s and 1980s, covering 10,000 hectares of the RAE.[570] Ali Sharif, the father of RAE permaculture, christens the region "the Saudi Arabia of vegetable oil" due to its diversity in palm species.[571] While it is true that plantations can be economically viable, this does not equate to ecological or social feasibility.[572] In 1975, 9850 hectares were set aside for a palm oil plantation next to the largest Siona-Secoya settlement, affecting hunting patterns and deterring fruit-eating birds.[573] Some suggest that monocultivation, especially of non-native species, be seriously researched, monitored, analyzed and accompanied by a rigid certification process.[574] Judith Kimerling, on the other hand, declares that "monocrop agriculture is not sustainable in a

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568 Ryder 2000; Moegenburg 2001: 103, 107; Kimerling 1991: 851; Varea 1995: 43.
569 Sawyer 2004: 54, Moegenburg 2001: 103.
570 Goffin 1994: 129, Varea 1995: 49.
571 Kane 1995: 106.
572 Moegenburg 2001: 104-5, Ryder 2000.
573 Vickers 1981: 56, Varea 1995: 20, Moegenburg 2001: 106-7, 116.
574 Moegenburg 2001: 119, Varea 1995: 26.

tropical rain forest environment" and regeneration, if possible, would take hundreds of years once soil has been eroded and degraded.[575]

Do all signs point to conservation, or is there room for certain economic activities within the framework of sustainable development? I will address this question by identifying the diverse ways in which conservation has been defined and monetized.

One indigenous-versus-Westernization battle is centered on the question of how to incorporate traditional medicine into "modern life," for another threat of monocultivation and environmental destruction is the loss of a wealth of medicinal plants, many of which have been used in the pharmaceutical industry.[576] Aside from medicinal plants, the entire institution of traditional medicine in the RAE has been devalued and delegitimized by outsiders from within and without Ecuador and by indigenous peoples themselves.[577] The Achuar illustrate the tension between traditional and modern medicine in their Westernized school system, which seemingly diminishes the relevance of the oral tradition essential for passing on ancestral knowledge. Achuar also see themselves medically threatened, partly due to the onset of new outside-contact-related illnesses that have challenged traditional cures in the past few decades. Flu and small pox, not to mention the illnesses contracted through exposure to toxic petroleum waste, are cured with modern medicine.[578]

In some cases, outside help is being administered to continue the diffusion of indigenous medicine. Pharmacists without Borders (along with other organizations) has worked with Kichwa, Shuar and Achuar communities in Morona-Santiago province in their efforts to preserve traditional medicinal knowledge. Beyond merely promoting "the rational

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575 Kimerling 1991: 852.
576 Varea 1995: 41.
577 ARUTAM 2000, Costa 2005.
578 Costa 2005.

use of natural resources and the recuperation of deforested areas," the Shuar work with Pharmacists without Borders for the "revalorization of the knowledge and use of medicinal plants."[579] In the Shinkiatam de Transkutuku Shuar community, three hours on foot from the nearest hospital in Taisha, Pharmacists without Borders has aided in planting an orchard near Taisha's high school so that, as the students care for it, they absorb the importance of protecting this element of their culture. The entire community works to clean the orchard, to create a "semillero" ("seed bank") to avoid the extinction of medicinal species, and to prepare enough plants for each family to have. The leaders of the traditional medicine movement hope to add natural remedies to the local pharmacy and to obtain the support of Western hospitals to administer traditional remedies. They seek participation from shamans, intricately linked with the psychosocial health and spiritual protection of the community.[580]

Despite prejudice against traditional forms of medicine, Amazon plants have played a role in Western pharmaceutical development. Critics of the use of medicinal plants in the pharmaceutical industry carry this to an extreme in the example of ecological debt. The NGO Friends of the Earth International's Ecological Debt Campaign calls for the repayment of billions of dollars' worth of traditional knowledge utilized free of charge by pharmaceutical companies in developed countries.[581]

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[579] ARUTAM 2000.
[580] ARUTAM 2000. In Ecuador, there is no legal framework for the administration of indigenous medicine and, in extreme cases, a natural healer could be imprisoned for practicing traditional medicine. Some practitioners have formed associations that communicate with authorities, legalized by the Ministry of Health with little impact other than a lukewarm promotion of tolerance (Zamudio 2007).
[581] FOE July 2002: 5.

Ecological Debt

"WE ARE NOT DEBTORS! WE ARE CREDITORS OF AN HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL DEBT!"[582]

— Deuda Ecológica (Ecological Debt)

The ecological debt movement is a 20-year-old effort emanating from Latin America, Asia and Africa to declare external financial debt "ilegítima, inmoral, ilegal y que no se pague más" ("illegitimate, immoral, illegal and one that will no longer be paid"). The economic debt crisis in Latin America began in 1982 when interest rates on foreign loans leapt from 6 to 21% as petroleum prices dropped simultaneously. Indebted countries felt forced to accept loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, many of which were granted with political, economic, ecological and social strings attached. In order to pay off the loans, affected countries destroyed their own biodiversity and standards of health.[583] Put simply, ecological debt is

> *the cumulative debt of northern industrialized nations to Third World countries for resource plundering, biodiversity loss, environmental damage, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes from industrialized countries, among others.*[584]

Forms of ecological debt include historical debt (mainly slavery), extractive development, bio-piracy of plant goods used in the pharmaceutical industry, large-scale infrastructure projects, external debt from international financial institutions, wars, and destruction of the ozone layer.[585] These alternative "debts" are currently being used to leverage external economic debt.

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582 Original Spanish text: "¡NO SOMOS DEUDORES! ¡SOMOS ACREEDORES DE UNA DEUDA HISTÓRICA, SOCIAL Y ECOLÓGICA!" (deudaecologica.org)

583 accionecologica.org.

584 FOE July 2002: 5.

585 deudaecologica.org. The effort is affiliated with various NGOs from both the developing and developed world, such as Oilwatch, Friends of the Earth International and Acción Ecológica, Oilwatch South America's headquarters (Oilwatch 2007: 73).

The driving principles behind the concept of ecological debt are the accumulation of wealth from primary resources in the developing world, a dependency theory argument implying that the "first world" was created with the goods and peoples of the "third world."[586]



Map of Ecological Debtors and Creditors.
Source: newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42234000/gif/_42234506_eco_debt_cred_416416.gif.

Conservation Efforts

Ecological debt exposes questions regarding the commoditization of the environment and loss of biodiversity in the face of conservation efforts. What does loss of biodiversity mean to international organizations? The state? Indigenous peoples?[587] Is it possible to conserve land in the "third world" today, or is this an unimaginable luxury when faced with growing populations and increased economic need?[588]

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[586] deudaecologica.org.
[587] Vallejo 2003: 12.
[588] Garcés 1995: 393-4.

To address these inquiries, conservationists loosely subscribe to one of the following two paradigms: conservationism, an anthropocentric ideal of conservation, states that nature does not have value if it does not serve human needs; and preservationism, which indicates that nature should be protected, even if it does not present significant value for humans.[589]

Most RAE indigenous people align with the second perspective, a kind of "ecolatría" ("ecolatry") or nature worship.[590] The government's approach has historically held the management of conservation development projects out of reach of indigenous organizations, feeling pressured to ensure that conservation is a profitable venture through questionably viable endeavors like ecotourism, sustainable agriculture and forestry.[591] In this context, indigenous peoples are seen as "threats" to economics-centered conservation.[592]

Over the past thirty years, the government has established a system of protected areas that covers 18% of Ecuador's territory, including national parks, ecological reserves, biological reserves, wildlife reserves, geo-botanical reserves and national recreation areas, considered a great achievement for conservationists. However, many of these areas feature petroleum exploration and exploitation teams with well-established facilities; the same military regimes that encouraged the colonization of the Amazon also promoted the establishment of protected areas.[593]

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589 Flores 1/25/09.
590 Flores 1/25/09.
591 Lohmann 1993 and Maiguashca 1994 in Varea 1995: 37, Vallejo 2003: 53.
592 Vallejo 2003: 56.
593 Varea 1995: 86-7, Vallejo 2003: 12, 42, 50.

The communal benefits of fortress-style protected area conservation are disputable.[594] When the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve was established, Cofán hunting territory was minimized and the 1991 expansion completely engulfed Cofán lands. The Cofán soon tired of this management system and obtained 80,000 acres within the new protected area, dividing it into three sections: One maximizes the best soil along the river for gardening and housing; Two is for hunting and gathering, fishing and finding materials for crafting canoes and blowguns; and Three is "wild," replenishing hunted species from Section Two, providing fishing sites and allowing limited tourism activity.[595]

PNY was founded on November 20, 1979 and became a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1989. In spite of international recognition for its astounding biodiversity, the presence of oil companies within PNY cannot be denied, as demonstrated in Chapter 2.[596] An innovative effort currently aims to prevent exploitation on new blocks within Yasuní, steering clear of errors committed on Blocks 16, 17 and 22.[597]

The Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) Project on Block 43 is a drilling endeavor proposed for these three oil fields, worth 800 to one billion barrels of oil and 440 million tons of carbon.[598] PNY's reserves are low in value and highly polluting, consisting primarily of heavy crude oil.[599] After government officials determined that even increased environmental protection measures and enhanced technology (such as underground pipelines) would not be able to even partially redeem this venture in ecological terms, AE

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[594] Vallejo 2003: 65.
[595] Kane 1995: 195.
[596] Rivas 2001: 38-9, Goffin 199: 128, Oilwatch 2007: 20, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 9, Gordon 9/21/07.
[597] Goffin 1994: 128, Vallejo 2003: 54.
[598] Oilwatch 2007: 9, 22-3; Gordon 9/21/07; Oilwatch 4/12/07: 27.
[599] Oilwatch 2005.

encouraged leaders like Minister of Energy Alberto Acosta to make a novel proposal in early 2007: keep the oil underground.[600]

President Rafael Correa presented the idea, known as "The Fund for Energy Transition" (and the plea for a one-year drilling moratorium), to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24, 2007, as "a proposal that questions the perception of the dominant model of unlimited and unsustainable growth based on competition and market forces."[601] This qualifies as a step toward a post-petroleum Ecuador by way of the "symbolic sale of oil." Ecuadorian leaders reason that they would receive a net of less than the $2 billion drilling the fields would produce, internalizing ecological and social externalities.[602] Although Correa asks for donations from NGOs, individuals, governments and industries through internet donations, this amount is expected to yield 50% of what exploitation would bring in annually, or $350 million (simplified to $5 per barrel).[603]

Given that PNY is a biodiversity hotspot, the symbolic sale of oil, a preventative solution, is seen as more effective than minimizing measures like the Kyoto Protocol. Since its inception, the idea of "suppressed crude" or "compensation for benefits not obtained" has captured the attention of the German Parliament, the Norwegian Parliament, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, Italy and the World Bank.[604]

The project has been criticized for lack of specificity, however, spurring a flurry of questions about the sustainability of the proposal. What will donated money finance? Will future governments uphold the integrity of the project or will it be reversed at some point

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600 Oilwatch 2007: 3, 23, 67; Gordon 9/21/07. Acosta believes that national parks should be entirely off-limits for drilling (Oilwatch 2007: 67).
601 Oilwatch 2007: 3, 36; Gordon 9/21/07; Oilwatch 7/22/08. Correa proposed the alternative to the ITT Project on March 30, 2007. One source claims that an original proposal was to disallow bidding from international companies but that Petroecuador could develop the ITT fields if it could not be kept underground (Oilwatch 4/12/07: 8).
602 Oilwatch 2007: 3, 31.
603 Oilwatch 20007: 3, 8-9; Gordon 9/21/07; Oilwatch 4/12/07: 4, 28; Oilwatch 7/22/08.
604 Gordon 9/21/07, Oilwatch 7/22/08.

if less populist, less "green," more multinational-focused, less indigenist governments regain control of the country? Is there any way to guarantee that the oil will *never* be extracted?[605] If the goal is left unreached, will future governments argue that they have tried "the green way" and that it did not work? Most critically, why should Ecuador receive money to avoid doing something it should not be considering in the first place, especially when other countries have respected their own national park boundaries?[606]

Backers of the project argue that leaving oil underground is the only option: they do not accept any kind of carbon offsetting, denouncing this alternative as a band-aid solution that could even worsen the problem by failing to recognize ecological debt.[607] The key problem is fossil fuel dependency, they maintain, which Westerners will not tackle, and carbon offsetting is designed to help the Global North sleep at night while countries like Ecuador are "castiga[dos] doblemente" ("doubly punishe[d]") by climate change, suffering from degraded ecosystems and harmful solutions that do not address root causes of climate change.[608]

One year after its inception, the goals of the project had morphed, allowing foreign debt exchange and carbon bonds to pay for the oil. Critics claim that, since Correa has declared much of Ecuador's external debt illegitimate, debt cancellation does not help Ecuador economically because that debt would not have been paid. The fundamental problem faced by the project is that its instigators cannot overcome the belief that buyers must receive something tangible in exchange for funding the proposal. Correa alleges that

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605 Oilwatch 4/12/07: 4.
606 Gordon 9/21/07.
607 Oilwatch 9/10/08.
608 Oilwatch 4/12/07: 5, Oilwatch 9/10/08. A March 2007 *Wall Street Journal* article claimed that the carbon market is a way of "cheating the regulation process" that actually benefits contaminating companies; *Newsweek* published a similar article in the same month and *The Guardian* has discounted the Kyoto Protocol (Oilwatch 7/22/08).

potential donors have failed to pay; many of these entities retort that their hesitation results from their lack of trust that the government will not exploit the reserves.[609]

The Intangible Zone and Voluntarily-Isolated Peoples: the Tagaeri and Taromenane

Along with the environmental integrity of the RAE, the two major groups remaining in voluntary isolation, the Tagaeri and Taromenane, hang in the balance against ITT oil exploitation.[610] A "zona intangible" ("intangible zone") enclosing between 700,000 and 980,000 hectares was established on January 29, 1999 by presidential decree. Theoretically, no industrial activity of any kind— petroleum, mining, deforestation, colonization and the like— is permitted within the limits of the territory.[611] The untouchability of the zone has been questioned, for, although it is nestled in the southern part of PNY, Blocks 16, 31, 32 and the ITT overlap on both Huaorani and the isolated groups' hunting lands.[612]

The zone is a glaring example of how poorly-enforced Ecuador's national parks system is. Without having been introduced to the handling of environmental boundaries in the RAE, it would seem redundant to establish an intangible area within a national park.[613] Moreover, critiques state that the zone, delimited in 2006, "does not protect all the isolated indigenous people of the Yasuní. It only protects minimally the space where they have

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609 Oilwatch 7/22/08.
610 Oilwatch 4/12/07: 14.
611 Rivas 2001: 71, 75; Oilwatch 4/12/07: 9; Oilwatch 2007: 21; Oilwatch 4/12/07: 9.
612 Rivas 2001:74, Oilwatch 2007: 21, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 6, 14.
613 According to the 1998 Ecuadorian Ley Forestal y de Conservación de Áreas Naturales y Vida Silvestre (Forest and Natural Area Conservation and Wildlife Law), no exploitation or occupation is allowed in national parks, so determined for their biodiversity and greater-than-10,000-hectare size. Additionally, a 1994 IUCN mandate declared that no exploitation or occupation that compromises the protection of ecosystems develop in national parks (Rivas 2001: 74-5).

moved with frequency."[614] On May 10, 2006, the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights made a move to protect the Taromenane and Tagaeri, and, on April 18, 2007, President Correa followed up with a detailed plan to shield these peoples from various external threats to their autonomy. Motivations stemming from fear and the desire to safeguard these groups and their ecosystems have mingled in the wake of a May 2003 slaughter of Taromenane at the hands of Tagaeri and a possible May 2006 killing.[615]

Little is known about these groups. The Tagaeri and Taromenane are identified, like the Huaorani, as "societies of abundance," descended from the same Woadani family.[616] The Taromenane (sometimes spelled "Taromenani") are a complete enigma; all that is known of the 50-strong Tagaeri is that they have forcefully sought to avoid outside contact since the SIL established the Tihueno base.[617] The isolated clans of the RAE have enriched the mythology and popular imagination of the region, partially responsible for the RAE's recent surge in tourism and international attention.

How Sustainable is Sustainable Tourism?

"Ecuador is a veritable laboratory for community-based ecotourism, with some environmentalists contending that revenues earned from tourism in the Amazon rainforest could eventually outstrip oil earnings."[618]

— Sylvie Blangy (1999)

By 1995, tourism had become Ecuador's fourth-largest foreign exchange industry, having risen 12% since 1987 in total Oriente visitors and, by 1991, reached 18,000 tourists

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614 Oilwatch 2007: 21, Oilwatch 4/12/07: 9.
615 Oilwatch 4/12/07: 6, 24.
616 Oilwatch 2007: 28.
617 Rivas 2001: 72-3, Oilwatch 2007: 28. The Tagaeri got their name from their leader, a Huaorani named Taga, who violently led the group back into the forest and away from missionaries (see Chapter 1). A captured Tagaeri woman stated in 1993 that the Tagaeri and Taromenane still intermarried. The three isolated clans are "los últimos seres libres del Ecuador, auténticos guerreros" ("the last free people in Ecuador, true warriors"), producing what they need to live (Oilwatch 4/12/07: 24, Cabodevilla 1999 in Rivas 2001: 72).
618 Blangy 1999. This assertion is supported by Tidwell (1994).

in Napo province alone.[619] Ecotourism has increased even more rapidly in Ecuador in recent years, providing a steady stream of tourists from primarily "developed" countries to fund conservation efforts.[620]

The International Ecotourism Society (TIES) defines ecotourism as

> *travel to fragile, pristine, and usually protected areas that strives to be low impact and (usually) small scale. It helps educate the traveler; provides funds for conservation; directly benefits the economic development and political empowerment of local communities; and fosters respect for different cultures and for human rights.*[621]

While many development workers see ecotourism as a crucial step toward sustainable development in the RAE, others deem it a "threat" to PNY.[622] The history of RAE tourism is brief and fragmented, but I will attempt to illuminate perceived drawbacks and achievements in the industry since its recent inception.

Tour groups first discovered the RAE in the 1970s, passing through the Siona-Secoya village of San Pablo.[623] The Huaorani were contacted by tourists, without the nationality's permission or provocation, during the same decade and into the 1980s, in part propelling the formation of the ONHAE as a protective organization against new, non-petro forms of Western "invasion."[624]

Much of the Huaoranis' skepticism regarding tourism can be traced to its missionary roots. As evangelical contact "pacified" RAE indigenous peoples to make way for oil companies, it also opened the floodgates for tourists, accused of inventing exotic and otherizing identities for the Huaorani.[625] The SIL and the Capuchin mission were put

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619 Kane 1995: 195, Ryder 2000.
620 Zanotti and Chernela 2008: 497.
621 Honey 2002b: 381 in Medina 2005: 283.
622 Oilwatch 4/12/07: 19, Oilwatch 2005.
623 Vickers 1981: 58.
624 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 80.
625 Rivas 2001: 89, Vallejo 2003: 58. Dayuma's son, Samuel, who considered Rachel Saint to be a second mother, used his fluency in Kichwa, English and Spanish to found an ecotourism endeavor in Toñampare (Kane 1995: 119).

in charge of Huaorani tourism when the tourism industry was finding its footing in Huaorani territory, benefitting from visits to the site of the 1956 missionary spearing.[626]

CONFENAIE has since published a set of guidelines for ecotourism management and the Ecuadorian Ecotourism Association's environmentally-evaluative tools are now being used throughout Latin America.[627] Conservationists have determined fines for unlawful local hunting of toucans, parrots and other species more commonly sought by tourists; hunting zones within the Cuyabeno reserve have instituted quotas for various species; and hunting and ecotourism zones remain separate.[628]

Certification is generally seen as a step forward, a much-needed quality control in an often disorderly industry. However, assorted logistical problems complicate the certification process for would-be ecotourism outlets. Charging for entrance to indigenous territories for all outsiders is common but occasionally draws criticism, as it is perceived to imply a commoditization of culture when rituals and crafts are shared with the outside, if the price is right.[629] Furthermore, guide courses must be taken in Spanish, often excluding indigenous peoples who are not fluent in the language; obtaining a tour guide license can require more than a year's pay.[630]

In spite of this, ONHAE addressed the growing popularity of tour-guiding among Huaorani youth by demanding employment for local Huaorani guides and rejecting military territorial control in 1991. Competition between Huaorani communities has created new and enhanced old rivalries and divisions within the ethnic group.[631] Nevertheless, profits are said to be divided equally among families in amounts double what oil companies pay

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626 Rivas 2001: 90.
627 Blangy 1999.
628 Blangy 1999.
629 Rivas 2001: 91, 93-4, 99; adventureinkapawi.com.
630 Kane 1995: 23, Rivas 2001: 91.
631 Rivas 2001: 92-5.

and have kept most loggers and new oil at bay.[632] The Huaorani often welcome visitors as potential vessels for spreading the word of their plight to the rest of the world.[633]

In 1993, the Cofán established themselves as the owners of the first ecotourism outlet in the entire Amazon "that can truly be said to be run by the local people." They incorporated this form of income into the nationality's "sustainable forest economy," which previously consisted of subsistence farming, hunting, fishing, coffee-growing and craft-making.[634] Much of the success of Cofán ecotourism is attributed to the aforementioned Randy Borman, who had worked as a US tour guide and offered to train Cofán as guides, thus successfully merging both "worlds": the indigenous and the Western.[635] The Cofán constructed a tourist village apart from their own and did not obligate every community member to participate in the endeavor, yet profits were equitably distributed and a high percentage was used to finance Cofán protests.[636]

Cofán and other indigenous nationalities of the northern RAE have experienced adverse effects on ecotourism from external forces, like the construction of a highway in August 2000, which split Cofán forest in two; logging and colono encroachment; and the arrival of Colombian immigrants and refugees, some linked to the 50-year-old FARC-Colombian paramilitary civil war.[637]

The Kapawi Ecolodge and Reserve is the RAE's current shining example of ecotourism. The lodge, situated on the Capahuari River and run by the Achuar people (who own the surrounding area), is 100 miles from the nearest road and accessible solely by

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632 Blangy 1999.
633 Ziegler-Otero 2004: 96, Blangy 1999.
634 Kane 1995: 195, Lundmark 2002.
635 Kane 1995: 195.
636 Kane 1995: 195, Tidwell 1994.
637 Lundmark 2002, Seattle Times 1999 in Ryder 2000. A month-long FARC kidnapping of twelve foreign tourists and oil company workers in September 1999 evoked fear and adversely affected tourism.

air.[638] Although tourists can only reach the lodge by the most polluting form of transport, Achuar ecotourism is touted as an "alternative development path" that "brings revenue, training and a connection with potential allies from the outside world." The industry provides a solid alternative to oil and logging, as well as the cattle ranching undertaken by the Achuar prior to the founding of the lodge.[639]

The FINAE (or NAE) was formed in 1991 to combat petroleum presence and "the majority of the Achuar" are members of this group, the Federation of Indigenous Achuar Nationalities of Ecuador.[640] In 1993, Carlos Perez Perasso, a journalist from the daily newspaper *El Universo* and founder of the Ecuadorian Canodros tourism company, teamed with NAE to lift an ecotourism project off the ground by 1995, putting down an initial investment and providing management and technical backup.[641] The Achuar used their traditional style of architecture and rainforest products to construct the lodge's cabins and 65% of the employees are Achuar, meaning that 45% of community income is generated by direct employment and craft manufacturing. The lodge and project were meant to be delivered entirely to the Achuar in 2001; this was realized seven years later, on January 1, 2008, and full Achuar management is expected in 2011.[642]

In addition to young people, elders and shamans "actively sought the partnership" with San Francisco's/Quito's Pachamama Alliance, formed in 1996, which seeks to stop rainforest loss and destruction of indigenous knowledge by mixing the remote with the "modern."[643] Aside from on-site education through guides and a library, culture is preserved with "behavior requests," which include refraining from taking pictures and

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638 Scully 2001, kapawi.com.
639 Scully 2001, kapawi.com, adventureinkapawi.com.
640 kapawi.com, Sturdey 2/20/07.
641 adventureinkapawi.com, kapawi.com.
642 Sturdey 2/20/07, Scully 2001, adventureinkapawi.com, kapawi.com.
643 adventureinkapawi.com, Scully 2001, kapawi.com.

respecting designated female and male areas within the Achuar reserve.[644] On an ecological note, the lodge is powered by solar energy and a diesel generator, has equipped canoes with noise- and pollution-reducing four-stroke outboard engines, mitigated sewage by covering it with yeast, and created a recycling program.[645]

The project has been considered a success, for, according to NAE's president, Santiago Kawarim, FINAE has upheld its two goals, cultural and land protection:

> *Our traditions are still intact, our land untouched by logging or oil companies, our skies covered by flocks of colorful macaws. We have fought for this conservation. Now we want to start this project so that we can lead toward a sustainable development for our people.*[646]

For its attention to cultural preservation, the environment and economic development, outsiders promote Kapawi as a model for other indigenous groups to follow. The Achuar no longer have the option to remain isolated, given that "forces of modernization and pressures for economic development threaten all parts of the Amazon basin"; nevertheless, they wish to prevent the environmental degradation that plagues the northern RAE on their own land by funding NAE with tourism dollars.[647] The organization has succeeded in driving ConocoPhillips from its land, for, according to company spokesperson Charlie Rowson, "The Achuar tribe is not on board and we don't want to go ahead without their support."[648]

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

In light of increased attention garnered by indigenous political movements worldwide, the United Nations approved a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

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644 Scully 2001, adventureinkapawi.com, kapawi.com.
645 adventureinkapawi.com, kapawi.com.
646 Sturdey 2/20/07.
647 Scully 2001, Sturdey 2/20/07.
648 Sturdey 2/20/07.

Peoples in September 2007. The lengthy preamble of the document is followed by 46 brief articles that specify the overarching themes presented in the introduction: unity in diversity, equality and the right to be different, and right to land, among other topics, all recognizing

> *that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.*[649]

This includes valuing indigenous forms of knowledge and cultural practices as elements of sustainable development and ecological management, as well as the "demilitarization" of indigenous territory in the name of peaceful development (Article 30). "Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality" (Article 6), meaning that indigenous nations can implement their own programs and institutions while still electing to fully belong to the geopolitical entity in which they find themselves (Article 5).

If Ecuador were to take seriously the weight of the articles of the Declaration, it would find itself forced to undertake a complete restructuring of the country's development system and shift thinking on a societal level. The indigenous peoples of the RAE would have to be allowed the right to self-determination in development (Article 3). Hearkening back to the relocation of indigenous peoples during the SIL's reign in the RAE, no such relocation would now be permitted "without the *free, prior and informed consent* of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return" (Article 10, italics are my own). Thus, missionary development a la 1950s is forbidden under the Declaration, and communities should be compensated for wrongfully seized lands and degraded territories (Articles 28, 29). Petroleum companies and the states that permit their presence would also be

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649 UN 2007.

implicated for failing to properly store and dispose of harmful chemicals (Article 29). In seemingly direct dialogue with the central demands of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, Article 26 declares that states must recognize that indigenous peoples deserve rights "to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired" and "to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use" (Article 32).

This Declaration marks the increasing success that indigenous political movements have experienced worldwide in promoting their visions. The Declaration itself recognizes that the rights it mandates are "the minimum standards" and that there is much work to be done in terms of culturally, environmentally and economically protecting indigenous peoples (Article 43). With these internationally-determined rights in mind, I will examine portions of documents specific to Ecuador that interact with indigenous development discourse.

CONAIE'S Constitutional Proposal

The newest version of the Ecuadorian Constitution, approved by voters on September 28, 2008, is unquestionably the state's most indigenous-influenced document. Long before indigenous demands gained attention globally, conservation of biodiversity was quietly becoming a crucial part of being Ecuadorian. In 1996, the Ministry of the Environment was founded; since its inception, it has promoted several slogans and frequently-cited factoids about Ecuadorian biodiversity: "Ecuador megadiverso," Ecuador is the most biodiverse county per hectare, biodiversity is the "patrimonio nacional del

Ecuador" ("Ecuador's national heritage"), et cetera.[650] National pride translates to national responsibility, though some, like former CONAIE President Luis Macas, fear that nationalizing nature implies that the state actually *owns* Ecuador's biodiversity.[651]

The 1998 Constitution advertised biodiversity conservation as the public's best interest, detailing a Management Plan for PNY.[652] In the midst of this "green" fervor, the 1998 Constitution granted communities the right to approve or decline oil exploration plans, though enforcement was a different matter entirely.[653] CONAIE and its political party, Pachakutik, presented proposals to the Constitutional Assembly of 1998, most notably, plurinational status, which was subsequently denied.[654]

CONAIE's plan for the 2008 Constitution resulted from meetings between groups from all three mainland regions of Ecuador and was presented to the Constitutional Assembly by 8000 indigenous people in a march on Quito on October 22, 2007.[655] The proposal built upon the 1997 proposal for the 1998 Constitution, the 2001 Proyecto de Ley de Nacionalidades (Law of Nationalities Project), the 2006 Propuesta de Ley de Instituciones Indígenas (Law of Indigenous Institutions Proposal), among others.[656] Indigenous peoples had been all but completely excluded from the writing of the past 19 Ecuadorian constitutions and sought to sculpt a political space in which other excluded and exploited groups could partake in the democratic process.[657]

Not surprisingly, the first CONAIE constitutional demand called for the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state, which would indicate a step toward

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650 Vallejo 2003: 43-5.
651 Vallejo 2003: 48.
652 Vallejo 2003: 44.
653 San Sebastián 2004: 209.
654 Wilson 2003: 166, Sawyer 2004: 214-5.
655 CONAIE 2007: 2, 4.
656 CONAIE 2007: 4.
657 CONAIE 2007: 1.

decolonization and territorial control and a step away from past fears that CONAIE wished to plant a state within a state.[658] Aside from plurinationalism, the most radical proposals within the CONAIE proposal involve economics and development. An objective of the CONAIE proposal asks that an overhaul of the current neoliberal economic system be written into the Constitution by

> *replacing it with an autonomous, ecological, well-planned, equitable, unified, equality-promoting, reciprocal, intercultural, participative, community-centered and social economic model, with future generations in mind.*[659]

"Desarrollo con identidad" ("development with identity") goes hand-in-hand with a revised economic system in recognizing ancestral knowledge and relationships between people and nature.[660] Development should not be improvised, as it has been in the past, but rather include communities in the decision-making process.[661]

Central to the CONAIE proposal are two Kichwa concepts: attaining "sumak kawsay" ("good life") and respecting the rights of the "Pacha Mama" ("Mother Earth"), for environmental rights are an essential element of human rights.[662] Within these concepts lie CONAIE's suggestions for greening the oil industry, such as enforcing legal limitations, both environmental and cultural, for oil companies; "toda la cadena productiva, estará en manos del Estado" ("the entire production chain will be in the hands of the State") and the affected populations; and rehabilitating and restoring ecosystems degraded by the petroleum industry.[663]

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658 CONAIE 2007: 5, 9-11.
659 Original Spanish text: "Desmontar el modelo económico neoliberal y reemplazarlo por un modelo de economía soberano, ecológico, planificado, equitativo, solidario, propiciador de la igualdad, recíproco, intercultural, participativo, comunitario y social, pensando en las generaciones futuras" (CONAIE 2007: 20).
660 CONAIE 2007: 25.
661 CONAIE 2007: 26.
662 CONAIE 2007: 21, 47.
663 CONAIE 2007: 22, 28, 36, 39.

In terms of land use, small-scale and ancestral agricultural production should be preserved and the "pueblos libres de contacto" ("contact-free peoples," or the Tagaeri and Taromenane) should be left alone, with exploration or exploitation of any kind prohibited on their territory.[664] High-quality education in indigenous languages is central to the CONAIE education platform, which also includes intercultural curriculum and medicine.[665]

While it remains to be seen what effects the 2008 Constitution will have and how its articles will be put into action, it is considered to be the greenest constitution in Latin America, viewing nature from a common Ecuadorian indigenous perspective: as a sentient being with its own rights. Ecuador is the first country on the planet to grant nature constitutional rights, praised by conservationists but critiqued by those who are skeptical of government administration of what is theoretically the public's responsibility to maintain.[666] To clarify the statements made in this legal document, I will analyze the 2008 Constitution, highlighting sections that specifically address indigenous points of contention.

The 2008 Constitution: How "green" is it?

"Don't be lazy, don't lie, don't steal."[667]

— Article 83 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, regarding common responsibilities

The very Preamble of the Constitution boasts novel word choices. It acknowledges the diversity among peoples, the fact that its citizens come from and depend upon the Pacha Mama, gives equal billing to a Christian God and "formas diversas de religiosidad y espiritualidad" ("diverse forms of religiosity and spirituality"), and appreciates the richness

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664 CONAIE 2007: 34, 38.
665 CONAIE 2007: 42-4.
666 McBurney 12/9/08.
667 Original Kichwa text: "Ama killa, ama llulla, ama shwa" (Constitución 2008: 59).

of various forms of knowledge.[668] As in the CONAIE proposal, the Constitution outlines sumak kawsay as a strategy to harmoniously coexist with the environment in a spiritual and philosophical way.[669]

The Constitution's first article states that Ecuador is a "unitario, intercultural, plurinacional" ("unitary, intercultural, plurinational") state.[670] Article 2 grants official intercultural relation linguistic status to Kichwa and Shuar, though this designation is not explained. Within their territories, other "ancestral languages" are official and the state "respetará y estimulará su conservación y uso" ("will respect and stimulate their conservation and use"), as per the CONAIE proposal.[671] The Constitution acknowledges transnational indigenous nationalities like the Achuar (Article 57) and respects the validity of all forms of self-determined expression, including indigenous justice courts.[672]

It is telling that the third Article (of hundreds in the Constitution) declares that diversity equals strength, and that this diversity must be maintained by the state through careful planning of sustainable, poverty-*eradicating*, redistributive national development.[673] This development includes the right to media and communication in one's native language, in addition to intercultural and bilingual education that is off-limits to corporations and occasionally develops outside the classroom.[674] The state pledges to promote conservation with government-led programs and the cooperation of local communities and without

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668 Constitución 2008: 15.
669 Constitución 2008: 15, Acosta 2005: 85.
670 Constitución 2008: 16. Furthermore, Article 6 clearly states that indigenous peoples will not be discriminated against for belonging to coexisting nations (Constitución 2008: 18).
671 Constitución 2008: 16.
672 Constitución 2008: 42, 96. Article 171.
673 Constitución 2008: 16-17.
674 Constitución 2008: 25, 28, 35, 42, 161. Articles 16, 28, 45, 57, 347.

endangering sacred sites, plants and animals used for alternative/ancestral/traditional medicine and knowledge, in accordance with the UN Declaration.[675]

The sumak kawsay and protection of the Pacha Mama sit at the center of the state's Régimen del Desarrollo (Development Regimen). The state's newly-defined responsibilities are to emphasize biodiversity conservation, plan and regulate development, include local communities in the process, decentralize planning and make it participatory within the framework of the national development plan, to be analyzed below.[676] Both national and foreign investments will be valued, with a premium on national development and with a firm legal infrastructure in place to ensure that foreign investment stays within the limits of the functions that it has explicitly agreed to perform.[677]

Indigenous communities, Afro-Ecuadorians, montubios (coastal farmers) and those living on communes are all granted collective rights that fall within the CONAIE's call for "development with identity." Ancestral forms of organization, rituals, tax-exempt communal and ancestral lands are all respected; racism and discrimination are forbidden, and, in the event that they do make themselves evident, must be paid for. It is unclear how discrimination and racism will be monetarily compensated, but the inclusion of this clause marks, at the very least, an official recognition of the complaints and demands of minority groups.[678] Article 42 details the rights of individuals and communities that have been displaced: humanitarian aid, dignified living conditions and resources, and the right to return.[679] If this constitutional right were to be fully enforced, indigenous peoples

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675 Constitución 2008: 42, 165-6, 173-4. Articles 57, 360, 362, 363, 385.
676 Constitución 2008: 135-6, 177. Articles 275, 277, 278, 279, 395.
677 Constitución 2008: 158. Article 339.
678 Constitución 2008: 41. Article 57.
679 Constitución 2008: 33. The Constitution mandates limits for military activity on indigenous lands and refuses the presence of any foreign military or security base, engaging in a dialogue with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People's call for demilitarizing indigenous zones (Constitución 2008: 18, 43; Articles 5, 57).

"transferred" to other lands by missionaries, oil companies and the Ecuadorian government would be entitled to these opportunities.

All exploration, exploitation and commercialization of natural resources discovered on communal lands must be undertaken with extreme caution and only after obtaining full and informed consent from all communities involved. Environmental, social and cultural side effects will be remunerated, in addition to the economic benefits the communities receive from such activities. Voluntarily-isolated peoples are exempt from any and all extraction on their lands and all protected areas are intangible to the point that biodiversity and ecological functioning are preserved.[680] No concessions or land titles will be granted to lands in protected areas, yet the Constitution leaves room for some ambiguity regarding extractive activities: if extraction is in the public's interest, the President and National Assembly have the power to consult the public regarding non-renewable extraction, and mining rights remain in the hands of the state.[681]

The basis of Ecuadorian rights is the belief that every citizen must live in an ecologically-sound environment, complete with potable water and nutritious (and, preferably, locally-produced) alimentation; on a more basic level, Mother Earth herself has rights.[682] An entire Chapter of the Constitution is devoted to detailing the rights of the Pacha Mama, the first article of which mandates "el mantenimiento y regeneración de sus ciclos vitales, estructura, funciones y procesos evolutivos" ("the maintenance and *regeneration* of its [nature's] vital cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes," italics are my own); any individual or community can hold public authorities accountable

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[680] Constitución 2008: 41, 43, 179. Articles 57, 397.
[681] Constitución 2008: 180-1, Delgado 2008. Articles 405, 407, 408.
[682] Constitución 2008: 24, 50, 52. Articles 12, 13, 14, 66.

for protecting the Pacha Mama.[683] Amazonian provinces are granted special attention under this legislation, due to their importance for the planet's environmental balance, and any social, economic, environmental or cultural project must be integrated within a sustainable plan.[684]

The Constitution rejects all imperialist and neo/colonial attempts to undermine regional development and industrial efforts in Latin America. To free Ecuadorians from oppression, the Constitution mandates that the government promote Andean, South American and Latin American integration, including free-flowing borders and unified economic, environmental, labor and cultural diversity legislation for all Latin Americans.[685] I will compare this regional focus to other regional approaches within Latin America that engage directly with RAE development.

SENPLADES and the National Development Plan

Although the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010 (National Development Plan) preceded the Constitution, this document influenced many of the sustainable development ideals that the Constitution would ultimately reinforce. In January 2007, officials from the Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretariat of Planning and Development, or SENPLADES) began the process of producing this 500-page, state-revalorizing and human development-centric plan, calling for the radical democratization of every imaginable aspect of life.[686] The Plan aspires to address each point of the sustainable development triangle: the environmental, the social and the environmental,

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683 Constitución 2008: 52, 181. Articles 71, 409.
684 Constitución 2008: 124, 127, 178. Articles 250, 259, 397.
685 Constitución 2008: 184, 187. Articles 416, 423.
686 SENPLADES 2007: 10.

constituting the sumak kawsay guaranteed for each citizen by the Constitution.[687] It recognizes the many faces of poverty, not only its economic form, but also health, education, gender and ethnic versions.

Above all, the Plan looks upon itself with a "mirada integradora" ("integrative look") to promote the synergy of the Plan's proposals. By viewing the Plan as an entity instead of as several disparate and independent ideals, the authors of the Plan hope that foreign and domestic proponents of development do not continue to reinvent the development wheel.[688] Development becomes *qualitative* in this way, not merely quantitative (human/social/sustainable development versus purely economic growth).

Alberto Acosta, an outspoken Ecuadorian politician, reminds us that, though the Constitution may seem revolutionary, it is not the state that grants rights; it is the citizens' responsibility to define and ensure their rights.[689] It remains to be seen whether or not these new legal tools— the UN Declaration, the Constitution and the National Development Plan— will actually do their job: to identify problems and castigate, when necessary.

Regional Approaches to Amazonian Development

"Who lives in the rainforest? The popular version presents the Amazon rainforest as inhabited on all fronts by colonos, road-builders and miners, and defended by an alliance of natives, and conservationists."
— O.T. Coomes and B. I. Barham (1997: 51)

To conclude this exploration of development histories and projections for future development in light of indigenous political involvement in the Amazonian lowlands of

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687 SENPLADES 2007: 6.
688 SENPLADES 2007: 7.
689 Acosta 2008: 7.

Ecuador, I will analyze the practicability of several of the regional development approaches I have come across during the course of my research.

The first of these regional development approaches includes all inhabitants of the Amazon River Basin. The Amazon boasts the world's most extensive tropical forest—7.5 million square kilometers, or two-thirds of the world's tropical forests, to be exact, containing one-third of the known species in the world and 15% of the world's freshwater— and covers sections of Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana.[690] It goes without saying that conservation must be systemic due to the high degree of interrelatedness and interdependency within ecosystems in the Basin.[691]

In this approach to development, it is crucial to recognize the heterogeneity of but also the similarities present within the entire basin, devoting particular attention to which programs and projects have been tried and failed or succeeded, and where.[692] At the current rate of deforestation, by 2050, 40% of the Amazon rainforest will be devoted to cattle and soy production, environmentally threatening the 220 indigenous groups that have called the Amazon their home for millennia.[693] The region has already seen how the Brazilian military's "mega-proyectos desarrollistas" ("developmentalist mega-projects") harmed the Brazilian Amazon over the past 50 years; cattle and soy production are not viable development solutions for this environment.[694]

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690 FOE 12/08: 12; Varea 1995: 9-10, 38; Acosta 2005: 24; Oilwatch 4/12/07: 5.
691 Acosta 2005: 25.
692 Coomes and Barham 1997, Acosta 2005: 127.
693 FOE 12/08: 12.
694 Vallejo 2003: 16-17, FOE 12/08.

> *In the diverse countries that share the Amazon Basin... a series of productive and extractive projects have been carried out that have, more or less, followed the same path: the exploitation of the most profitable natural resources and the colonization of "no man's lands."*[695]

To overcome past pitfalls, future RAE development projects necessitate an emphasis on interdependence.[696] Not only the environment but also the peoples of the Amazon Basin are linked by a shared history. Organizations like the Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin, or COICA), created in 1984, acknowledges that indigenous peoples from Bolivia, Colombia and Peru join Ecuador in its suffering from hydrocarbon activity.[697] Proponents of indigenous unity argue that the Huaorani, Shuar, Achuar, Secoya, Siona and Cofán are threatened in a way similar to the Mapuche in Chile and the Yanomami, Uru Eu Wau Wau, Wimiri-Atroari and Guaja in Brazil, along with others in the region.[698] Regional Amazonian development plans are centered on quality of life and of the environment and wish for the demarcation of protected areas, full indigenous management of indigenous territories and sustainable resource extraction.[699]

More than 30 local leaders (indigenous and not) from Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela met in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, in September 2004.[700] This meeting was a follow-up to the October 2001 Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Proyecto Regional Amazonía Sostenible (Sustainable Amazon Regional Project), which established a common definition for sustainable development in the Amazon: respect for traditional knowledge, a self-defined "good life," sustainable control of the environment

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695 Original Spanish text: "En los diversos países que comparten la cuenca amazónica... se ha llevado a cado [sic] una serie de proyectos productivos y extractivos que, más o menos, han seguido una misma línea: la explotación de los recursos naturales más rentables y la colonización de esas tierras 'baldías'" (Varea 1995: 39).
696 Varea 1995: 25-6.
697 San Sebastián 2004: 210.
698 Goffin 1994: 141.
699 Acosta 2005: 127.
700 Acosta 2005: 129.

and spiritual fulfillment, objectives guided by the collective belief that future generations should also enjoy all of these aspects of life.[701]

Amazon indigenous peoples, specifically those affiliated with the Comunidad Ecológica de Naciones Amazónicas (Ecological Community of Amazon Nations), are not against development, as some outsiders have believed; rather, they wish to point out that said development has been carried out poorly and hope to remediate this through integrative development.[702] States the Community,

> *We, the peoples of the Amazon, wish to further our own processes of organization and to design our own programs for life. We have the ability to do it, even though we have been presented as weak, irresponsible or even as "savages." Our response is that others are irresponsible; they are the ones who impose their development plans, marginalize citizen participation, and espouse violence or destroy Nature.*[703]

Taking this theme of solidarity a step further, Cristina Zurbriggen longs for the days when Latin America had identifiable schools of thought (like dependency theory in the 1960s) that represented the region more accurately than outside theories that have since been applied and adapted, with varying degrees of success (i.e., neoliberalism).[704] A comprehensive shift in Latin American and Caribbean thinking could satisfy this need by promoting regional energy sovereignty, accepting reasonable contributions from each country; by resisting extractive models of development; by establishing a regional currency; and by banding together to declare external debt illegitimate and definitively reject neoliberalism.[705] North America could easily get involved, as environmental justice issues

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701 Acosta 2005: 70-1.
702 Acosta 2005: 126.
703 Original Spanish text: "Nosotros, pueblos de la Amazonía, deseamos llevar adelante nuestros propios procesos de organización y diseñar nuestros propios programas de vida. Tenemos capacidad para hacerlo, aunque se nos ha presentado como débiles, irresponsables o incluso como 'salvajes.' Nuestra respuesta es que los irresponsables son otros; son aquellos que imponen sus planes de desarrollo, marginan la participación ciudadana, y generan la violencia o destruyen la Naturaleza" (Acosta 2005: 126).
704 Zurbriggen 2008: 10.
705 Moreano 2/10/09, CIDSE 2009: 2, Schuldt 2006: 83, CONAIE 2007: 49.

receive more attention in the northern part of the continent for the same human rights and ecological rights violations that companies like Texaco carry out in the southern region.[706]

This kind of multi-faceted, multi-party protest begs the question: Should there be a unified front for indigenous groups, campesinos and all other habitants of the Amazon, with few or no subdivision in the process of Ecuadorian Amazonian development? Is this just another extreme in a long history of polarizations in Ecuadorian Amazon development? Or is this an oversimplification, making a melting pot of a legitimately diverse group of actors with equally legitimate and diverse claims?

Conclusions and Projections for Future Research

"Many come to the Amazon seeing trees and animals as money, but the Amazon inhabitant sees it as medicine, as food, as shade or as a spirit house. It is true that in the Amazon there are millions: but they are millions of leaves, millions of insects."[707]

— Alberto Acosta (2005)

The RAE is a place of diametrically-opposed fundamental beliefs and nuanced versions of those beliefs. In the interest of continuing this trend, I will propose that Ecuador continue with what has been mandated by the government and that which rebuts missionary-led development, petroleum-industry-led development, neoliberalism, or some combination of these models.

The concept of "decrecimiento" or "crecimiento cero" ("zero growth") emerged from the ecological crisis 30 years ago and has been both warmly and begrudgingly received.[708] Zero growth, in a material sense, implies a cooperative, relative and holistic

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[706] Voices from the Front Lines.
[707] Original Spanish text: "Muchos llegan a la Amazonía para ver a los árboles y animales como dinero, pero el amazónico lo percibe como medicina, como alimento, como sombra o como la casa de los espíritus. Es cierto que en la Amazonía hay millones: pero son millones de hojas, millones de insectos" (Acosta 2005: 129).
[708] Fernández 2008: 1.

growth; that is, economics influenced by the biophilia of conservationists and communities, or bioeconomics.[709] Proponents of zero growth believe that it is necessary to replace anthropocentrism with biopluralism.

My fundamental belief and underlying motivation in undertaking this research project can be summarized in the following sentence, which, though slightly dated, remains relevant in the context of shifting development paradigms in the RAE today.

> *The future of the Ecuadorian Amazon requires a new social dynamic that permits active management from the different actors that inhabit it: indigenous peoples, colonos, religious representatives, scientists, state entities, non-governmental organisms, etc., will have to facilitate innovative proposals that respond to their necessities and create a more stimulating atmosphere.*[710]

Nevertheless, at this point, how much can be done? Are all negotiations too little, too late, as ecological wealth has already been degraded to an immense degree, blindly following the logic of a market-oriented perspective?[711] As evidenced by the proposals introduced in this chapter, development efforts in the RAE no longer fit neatly into separate development compartments. However, these efforts share common goals: to achieve sustainability and community-based conservation and development, though the manifestations and definitions of these concepts differ greatly between projects. Development work in the conservation era, a catch-all title I use to refer to the current stage of RAE development, should recognize the heterogeneity of the environmental, economic and social situations it seeks to address.[712] Developers should take note of how people have developed themselves for generations, if not centuries, and expand on these principles to sustainably manage the forest and its inhabitants, both human and otherwise.

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709 Fernández 2009: 7, Varea 1995.
710 Original Spanish text: "El futuro de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana requiere de una nueva dinámica social que permita la gestión activa de los diferentes actores que en ella habitan: indígenas, colonos, religiosos, científicos, entidades estatales, organismos no gubernamentales, etc., deberán agilitar propuestas innovadoras que respondan a sus necesidades y vaya creando un escenario más alentador" (Varea 1995: 144).
711 Varea 1995: 89.
712 Coomes and Barham 1997: 48, Acosta 2005: 24.

APPENDIX A

Abbreviations

Environmental Agencies

AE	Acción Ecológica
CEDENMA	Comité Ecuatoriano para la Defensa de la Naturaleza y el Medio Ambiente
CORDAVI	Corporación en Defensa de la Vida
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
PNY	Parque Nacional Yasuní
RAE	Región Amazonica Ecuatoriana
RAN	Rainforest Action Network
TIES	The International Ecotourism Society
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development

Indigenous Organizations

COICA	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica
COICE	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
CONFENAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
DICIP	Directiva Intercomunitaria de las Comunidades Independientes de Pastaza
ECUARUNARI	Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui
FCUNAE	Federación de Comunas Unión Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
FINAE (NAE)	Federación de Indígenas Achuar del Ecuador
NASHIE	Nacionalidad Shiwiar de Ecuador
ONHAE	Organización de la Nación Huaorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
OPIP	Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza

Non-governmental and Multi-governmental Organizations

CARE	Cooperative American Relief Everywhere
CEPAL/ECLAC	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)
DDD	United Nations General Assembly's Declaración sobre el Derecho al Desarrollo (Declaration on the Right to Development)
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FEPP	Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progresso
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OAS	The Organization of American States
OPEC	The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Missionary Organizations

CAMF	Christian Airmen's Missionary Fellowship
JAARS	Jungle Aviation and Radio Services
MAF	Missionary Aviation Fellowship
SIL	Summer Institute of Linguistics
WBT	Wycliffe Bible Translators

State Entities

CAN	Coordinadora Agraria Nacional
CEPE	Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana
ECORAE	Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo de la Región Amazónica Ecuatoriana
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
IERAC	Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización
INCRAE	Instituto Nacional de Colonización y Reforma Agraria en la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
MEM	Ministerio de Energía y Minas
SENPLADES	Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo

APPENDIX B

Military Presence and Oil Exploration

Not only have conflicts resulting from oil exploration in the RAE been militarized, but militarization has also led to greater exploitation of petroleum.[713] Aside from wars between indigenous communities over the past several centuries, armed conflict in the RAE can be traced to a territorial dispute, also referred to as a "so-called border war," "a brief conflict" or "invasion" from Peru in July 1941.[714]

The 1941 conflict would be followed by two more small wars in the twentieth century regarding 78 kilometers of disputed border.[715] On the surface, the significance of these skirmishes seems entirely territorial but has, in fact, had serious implications for indigenous groups (the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Achuar were separated geopolitically) and the environment.[716] The dispute has been linked to advancing oil exploration and differing levels of restrictions in Ecuador and Peru: "the war had little to do with Ecuadorean-Peruvian boundaries and everything to do with British and North American oil companies who were battling over petroleum concessions," among them, New Jersey's Standard Oil and Shell.[717] The annexation granted Peru 40 to 50% (most estimates fall within this range) of Ecuador's total territory, or 200,000 square kilometers, and facilitated drilling.[718] It is unclear what finally stopped the seizure of oil-rich land, but one theory presents a "strong

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713 Varea 1995: 19, 36; Vallejo 2003: 40.
714 Goffin 1994: 37, Kane 1995: 62, Bustamante 1995: 222, Ryder 2000, Herz 2002: 13.
715 Herz 2002: 43.
716 Herz 2002: 17, kapawi.com. This piece of land has been disputed since the 1800s (Herz 2002: 17). The Ecuador-Peruvian border is currently 1420 kilometers long (CIA World Factbook).
717 Goffin 1994: 37, Oilwatch 2007: 46, Sawyer 2004: 38. Occidental Petroleum and the Peruvian state oil company favored the subsequent Rio de Janeiro Protocol, signed on January 29, 1942 (Kimerling 1991: 853, Goffin 1994: 37, Herz 2002: 13). In 1960, President Velasco Ibarra denied the legitimacy of the protocol, which remained hotly contested until 1995 (Herz 2002: 35). The next of the two "skirmishes" or "almost wars" occurred in January 1981, known as the Paquisha Incident (Ryder 2000, Herz 2002: 36, Goffin 1994: 40). Ecuador lost again: the mediating countries had been the guarantors of the Rio Protocol (Herz 2002: 36).
718 Kimerling 1991: 853, Ryder 2000, Herz 2002: 34, Sawyer 2004: 38.

case" stating "that the only thing that stopped the Peruvians from advancing further was the Huaorani."[719]

January 26, 1995, marked the beginning of the Cenepa War in the Condor Region's Cenepa Valley, which lasted between one week and one month.[720] Guides and indigenous soldiers participated in this conflict, recruiting warriors from previously untapped sectors.[721]

The RAE remains highly militarized. Conflicts continue on the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border, although Ecuador's post-2000 maps demonstrate that it has officially conceded the territory.[722] Violence has moved north, toward the Colombian border (Putumayo region), where colonos, indigenous groups, oil companies, Colombian immigrants and refugees, and warriors from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) come into contact, each attempting to maintain their identity through the violence that occurs on the border.[723] Armed conflicts in this particular region have increased since former President George W. Bush's Plan Colombia was put into action.[724]

Violence related to oil exploration continues around Coca and Lago Agrio, which demonstrate the highest levels of violence in the country due to a lack of social services and a high cost of living.[725] The continued development of the RAE as a whole is thought to exacerbate drug, agricultural and logging conflicts between Peru, Colombia and

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719 Kane 1995: 62-3.
720 Kane 1995: 62, Herz 2002: 36.
721 Kimerling 1991: 854. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US helped mediate this conflict without the help of multilateral institutions between 1995 and 1998, arriving at a peace treaty in 1998 (Herz 2002: 13, 49; Ryder 2000; CIA World Factbook). Authorities established a binational park to promote peace in the area following the Ecuador's acceptance of the Rio Protocol (Vallejo 2003: 36).
722 Varea 1995: 99, Sawyer 2004: 38.
723 Vallejo 2003: 36, Oilwatch 2007: 46, Varea 1995: 20, 98.
724 Vallejo 2003: 36.
725 Martínez 1995: 183.

Ecuador.[726] In general, the military justifies its continued presence by claiming that outsiders have planted harmful ideas in indigenous groups, causing them to mobilize against oil, a mentality that has jailed environmentalists and human rights activists in recent years.[727]

[726] Oilwatch 4/12/07: 25.
[727] Kane 1995: 23.

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