# Gender, Theology, and Political Views among Mainline Clergy <br> Barbara Finlay, Benton Johnson, and Jean Stockard 

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The dominant image of religion and politics in the US recently is that religion, especially Christianity, is strongly associated with conservative politics and antifeminist values with respect to women and sexuality. Many more liberal and progressive Christians have criticized this onesided media focus, pointing out the strong traditional themes of support for peace, justice for the poor and marginalized groups, and love instead of judgment of neighbor. Even some evangelicals have decried the tactics and lack of concern for the poor of the Religious Right, and mainline leaders have strongly promoted progressive political change. While there are many studies that include religious affiliation, theological orthodoxy, and degree of commitment as predictors of political attitudes among lay members, there have surprisingly been fewer studies of the political and theological attitudes of mainline clergy on these issues. Moreover, since gender issues play a large role in conservative politics and religion, it seems important to study clergy attitudes in more mainline churches as well on these issues. Some studies find that women clergy in these denominations are more liberal on theological, social and political issues than men. If this is true, the increase of women in positions of church leadership is likely to influence congregational members in a more progressive direction. In this paper we present data from a survey of clergy in the state of Oregon, comparing mainline male and female clergy on a variety of theological and political opinions.

The Rise of Liberation and Feminist Theologies. Mainline Christian leaders have been influenced in recent decades by several theological movements that liberalized theological training and clergy attitudes: liberation theology and its various offspring, including feminist theology. Liberation theology arose out of Latin American progressive movements in the early 1960s, led by Catholic priests working with the poor, often against the more conservative hierarchy (Berryman 1986). Also associated with what Weber termed "prophetic" religion, this type of theological position emphasizes God's identification with the poor and marginalized in society (as modeled by the life of Jesus), and the importance of opposing oppression and working for justice in this world. Liberationists take a strong critical and political orientation, aiming to create the "Kingdom of God" on this earth, by opposing oppression, materialism, militarism, ecological destruction, violence, and inequality, and by working in various ways to organize and act for social change. According to one of its main themes, societies (and churches) should be judged by how they treat "the least" members of society (Berryman, 1986 ; Costas, 1989). Liberation-oriented pastors were often involved in the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s and later.

Most mainline clergy trained since the mid-1970s would have some exposure to this view of Christianity in their seminary training and their reading of contemporary theological, ethical, and ministry-related literature. Those who adopt such a stance would be expected to take a more activist stance toward political issues and to see this as a key aspect of their ministries. Yet, the 1980s saw a reaction against this more activist orientation, with the rise of more conservative and evangelical voices even in the mainline churches. It is probable that most clergy never completely identified with liberation theology, but it continues to have strong adherents among institutional leaders and seminary faculty. One would expect a theological liberationist, as
opposed to a conservative, evangelical, or moderate, to support public policies that uplift the poor or marginalized groups-including perhaps affirmative action, consumer protection, protection of women's rights, worker rights, and minority rights; and they would oppose military solutions to problems, tax policies that primarily benefits the wealth, welfare reform that requires more work and no educational opportunity, and so forth. Furthermore, they would see these goals as fully integral to their religious faith.

Later progressive movements took elements of liberation theology and applied them to specific social groups with particular needs and problems. For example, in the early 1970s, James Cone pioneered "Black Liberation Theology," (Cone 1970); feminist theology grew out of the women's movement's influence in the churches about the same time; and a number of related movements ('mujerista' and 'womanist' theologies, for example-see Isasi-Diaz, 1996, and Williams, 1993) soon developed out of the experiences of other social groups. Feminist theology adopted many of the principles of liberation theology but focused specifically on problems of women and gender. This movement has had a very strong impact on women's roles in the churches, and especially on education for the Protestant ministry, transforming the curriculum and faculty in most Mainline seminaries (Lehman 1993: 136-140). However, women students seem to be much more influenced than men by courses in feminist theology, women in ministry, and discussions of inclusive language and gender issues (Finlay 2003; Lehman 2000). Still, almost all recent mainline seminarians would have some exposure to feminist writings, even in general theology and biblical study courses. Among the issues addressed by feminist religious thinkers are not just "women's issues," but such traditional doctrines as the nature of God, the nature of authority within the churches, theologies of atonement, and the uniqueness of Christian revelation (Carr, 1992). On most of these issues, feminists take a strongly critical
stance toward traditional interpretations, pointing out that these doctrines were developed by privileged men who did not take women's experience (or the experiences of marginalized groups) into account. Like liberationists, feminists view Christianity as having political implications that are critical of injustice, racism, violence, and economic inequality, although they tend to focus more on issues related to women's oppression. Feminist theologians are also less likely than traditionalists to view Christianity as the unique revelation of God, and they tend to view women's reproductive rights and lesbian/gay rights as matters of justice, not personal morality. Thus, both liberationists and feminists are likely to view politics as an integral part of faith, and their politics are likely to be critical, progressive, and nonconservative.

Women in Ministry, Feminism, and Politics. Since the 1970s there has been a rapid increase of women attending mainline Protestant seminaries and entering ordained ministry careers, so that by the mid-1980s these seminaries were turning out about as many women as men (Hunter and Sargeant, 1993). Studies of women in ministry have pointed to some continuing resistance to their taking senior leadership roles, with many women pastors finding positions only in less prestigious and influential church locations than comparable men. Specifically, as compared to men, women are more likely to serve small congregations, smalltown or rural constituencies, poor congregations, or to be in associate rather than senior or sole pastor positions. In addition, women have higher drop out rates, even in seminary, but especially from actual clergy roles. They are also more likely to fill ministerial roles other than parish ministry. All of these findings have been verified by numerous studies, and in some ways they mirror research about women's problems in other professions as well (Nesbitt, 1997; Schneider and Schneider, 1997; Lummis and Nesbitt, 2000).

A few researchers have studied women who are engaged in clergy careers, often focusing on whether women differ in their approach to congregational leadership from men (e.g., Ice 1987; Lehman, 1993; Zikmund, Lummis, and Chang 1998; Lummis and Nesbitt, 2000), or on identifying barriers to their full integration into the clergy (e.g., Paula Nesbitt, 1997; Sullins, 2000). For example, some have found that women and men tend to take different approaches to administration and leadership, with women taking a less "hierarchical" approach to authority and attempting to share power and "empower" their congregational members (Lehman, 1993).

Many women came into the Protestant ministry on the second wave of feminism, a time when feminist theology was making an impact, and they bring to their careers attitudes that are somewhat different from those of their male counterparts. Zikmund, et al (1998) and Finlay (2003) found women clergy and seminarians to be much more likely than their male colleagues to adopt certain feminist stances toward the church and its work. Lehman (1993:136-140), likewise, saw feminist ideas as having a strong impact on women who attended seminaries after the 1970s, but not on men. Thus, he argues that feminism has enlarged the differences between male and female clergy on a number of dimensions for recent cohorts of clergy.

Most studies of women clergy or seminarians have focused on women's unequal status within their religious institutions, their religious leadership and ministry styles, and on their feminism within the church context, neglecting attention to how their religious beliefs may be related to attitudes and actions with respect to broader secular and political issues. A few studies have suggested that men are less concerned with social justice issues and are more conservative theologically than women (Stevens (1989), Ice (1987), Nason-Clark (1987), Hunter and Sargeant (1993:551-554). Although Lehman (1993) attempted to compare men and women clergy on degree of involvement in social issues, his measure was fairly vague, and as a result he found no
differences. Another recent study (Deckman, et al, 2003) describes a large "political gender gap" between male and female mainline ministers, drawing on data from a broad survey of mainline clergy. This study found clergywomen to be more politically liberal and more politically active than their male counterparts, but the women's political activities were not analyzed with respect to their religious beliefs. The evidence seems to point to both theological and political differences between male and female clergy, with women being less traditional.

It seems important to look at how religious and political beliefs intersect to create this gender gap between men and women in mainline ministerial roles, an approach not taken by many researchers. Finlay's (2003) study of seminarians did examine this interrelationship, finding women to be more activist and liberal in their political views, a phenomenon that was strongly associated with their more feminist and liberationist theological stances. Men who favored liberation and/or feminist theologies were similar to women in their support of progressive political causes-but men were much less likely to favor these theological stances. These relationships were especially strong when the political question had to do with the divisive issues of abortion and homosexuality. In addition, those men and women supporting liberationist/feminist theological positions were more likely to have engaged in political action on a number of causes, including pro-choice and antiwar activism. In the present study, we build on this earlier work to look at measures of theological orientation and political opinions among male and female practicing clergy, examining the interrelations among these variables. We would expect, based on logic and previous studies, that women might be more likely to see themselves as feminist in theological orientation, and perhaps more likely to adopt a liberation stance. We would also expect that men and women who adopt these theological stances would hold more progressive or liberal views on a variety of social and political issues, including
attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, cohabitation, affirmative action, nuclear disarmament, capital punishment, and the Equal Rights Amendment. We also expect that, within categories of theological position, the gender-difference on political issues might disappear, supporting the notion that gender differences in the political stands of clergy are closely tied to their theological orientations.

## Hypotheses:

Based on the previous discussion, we present the following hypotheses for testing:

1. Women will be significantly more likely than men to designate their theological position as "feminist," "liberal," and "liberation," and less likely to identify themselves as "conservative," "evangelical," or "neo-orthodox", or "fundamentalist."
2. Women will be less orthodox on a series of religious-belief questions representing traditional Christian doctrine.
3. Women will be more supportive than men of using inclusive language in worship.
4. Women will be more likely to favor the Democratic party than men, and less likely to favor the Republican party.
5. Women will be more liberal on a series of political and social issues, including questions about abortion, homosexuality, affirmative action, capital punishment, and cohabitation.
6. When theological position is controlled (feminist and liberation), the difference between men and women will disappear on political and social issues.

## Methods

Data examined in this paper come from a mail-out, mail-back survey administered to clergy in the state of Oregon in the late 1980s. Lists were obtained through the cooperation of regional ecclesiastic leaders in the various denominations. Standard follow-up procedures to improve the return rate were used.

While the original sample included clergy from a wide range of denominations, the analysis in this paper is limited to mainline groups that had women clergy: the United Methodists, Presbyterians, and UCC. Thirty three (18\%) of the 185 UMC respondents, 13 (10\%) of the 129 Presbyterians, and $7(20 \%)$ of the UCC clergy were women. In total, 53 of the 349 respondents (15\%) were women.

The survey was limited to the state of Oregon for both practical and theoretical reasons. The first simply reflects the nature of our personal contacts and the ability to obtain accurate lists of clergy within the chosen denominations, which are generally maintained on a state-wide basis. The second reflects the nature of social networks and cultural differences among denominations from one area of the country to another. Churches, even within the same denominational framework, can differ substantially in their beliefs and attitudes from one part of the country to another. Thus, our decision to limit our sample to only one state provides an important control, for we remove variations in belief that could be caused by regional and cultural differences.

The clergy completed an eighteen-page survey that covered three general areas. The first included many questions related to theology and the church, tapping pastors' theological views, their conception of the proper mission of the church, their personal spiritual practices, their position on various church practices, and some basic information about the churches they pastor. Information from this section of the survey was used to develop measures of the pastors' theological positions and demographic information about their churches. The second general area included a number of questions regarding contemporary social and moral issues and their political affiliations and views. Questions from this area were used to develop measures of the pastors' attitudes regarding political and moral issues and their self-described political
orientations. Finally, a series of questions concerned the pastors' personal lives. Information from this section was used to develop measures of demographic and background characteristics.

In this exploratory analysis, we examine data from a sample of Oregon clergy in three mainline denominations which ordain women-the United Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church (USA), and the United Church of Christ. Using crosstabulation and relevant statistical tests, we compare men and women first on their self-designated theological positions (including liberation and feminist). We then look at a series of more specific theological questions, to see how they compare on these beliefs. Next we compare women and men on political opinions on a variety of issues. Finally, we look at the relationship between general theological position and political opinion, separately for men and women.

## Demographic description of the sample:

Age: As might be expected, given women's recent integration into the clergy profession, and perhaps as well their greater tendency to drop out of this career, women were significantly younger than men, averaging 41 years to men's 47 . Only 23 percent of the women were over 50, for example, compared to 43 percent of the men; and 30 percent of women, but only 16 percent of men, were under 35. Almost half the women were between 35 and 49, compared to 41 percent of men.

Marital status: Women were also less likely to be currently married than men, (62 percent vs. 92 percent, respectively). About 21 percent of the women were previously married, and 17 percent, never married. These figures go along with similar findings by Deckman, et al., (2003) for mainline clergy.

Denomination: Just over half (53 percent) of the respondents were United Methodist ministers, with 37 percent Presbyterian and 10 percent UCC. Women were slightly more likely
to be Methodist ( 62 percent vs. 51 percent of men) and less likely to be Presbyterian ( 26 vs. 39 percent men), with 13 percent women and 10 percent male UCC clergy. If anything, this distribution should make the women more conservative, since Methodists are generally a bit more theologically and politically conservative than Presbyterians and United Church of Christ members. However, we do not believe the gender-based denominational differences are of much significance in this study.

Clergy position and type of church served: Of those in traditional parish positions, men were somewhat more likely to be "pastors" rather than "associate pastors," although the majority of each were pastors (overall, about 91 percent of men were "pastors," compared to 79 percent of women-most of the difference being in the middle-age range). However, women were more likely to hold part-time positions, especially if they were in the older group ( 35 or older) — 37 percent of women vs. 11.3 percent of men in this age range were in part-time positions. Women and men were also equally likely to say they were "very glad" (about 70 percent of each) or "glad" (27 percent of each) they had chosen ministry as a career.

Confirming findings in other studies, women were serving smaller churches, as measured by average Sunday attendance: the mean attendance for women's churches was 129.6 , compared to 162.7 for men. Older women, especially, were less likely to be serving large churches of 250 or more attendance. In the over-50 age group, 41 percent of male ministers were serving in churches with over 250 members, as compared to only one of the 12 women ( 8.3 percent), although the average was lower for women in every age group. Two-thirds of women were in churches with average attendance under 100, compared to 42 percent of men.

## Analysis and Results

The first question we addressed is the extent to which women and men mainline ministers differ in their theological beliefs. Here we look at several questions, including how they designate their own theological positions, using a number of categories, including "liberation," "feminist," "moderate," and "conservative." Our hypothesis predicted that women would be more likely to view themselves in the more liberal positions (liberation, feminist, liberal), while men would be more likely to choose more conservative designations (conservative, neoorthodox, fundamentalist). Each possible position was presented in the survey as an item that the respondent could check or not as representing their own theological position. The categories are not mutually exclusive, so the percentage do not sum to 100 . In Table 1, we see strong differences between men and women in their general theological orientations, all in the directions expected. Women are significantly more likely to designate their own theological position as "liberal," "feminist," and "liberation," and less likely to identify as "conservative" or "evangelical." The neo-orthodox difference is not significant, but that is partly because of the small number of respondents who chose that category. The wide margin of gender difference is surprising for the most progressive categories of liberation and feminist theologies-60 to 26 percent for liberationists, and 77 to 19 percent of feminists. Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed: women ministers were much more likely to hold liberation or feminist theological positions, and less likely to hold conservative or evangelical positions.

In order to rule out the possibility that these theological differences were due to age differences, we next compared men and women on liberationist, feminist, moderate and conservative orientations while controlling for age category. We expected that, since younger ministers might have been more exposed to feminist and liberationist perspectives in their training, they might be more likely to adopt these positions. Table 2 shows the age by sex
percentages of those designating their own positions feminist, liberationist, moderate, or conservative. We can see that age does not affect the theological position of men in any of these categories, and that in the under-50 age groups, the differences in theological orientations are even stronger than in the overall table. Young male ministers were not more likely to see themselves as feminist or liberationist than older men; however, younger women-under age 50-were much more likely than women over 50 to view themselves in these terms. This difference for women is significant. The younger age-group, of course, represents the majority of women clergy, those who came of age after the rise of the second wave of feminism. Hence, we can see that age differences cannot explain the observed divergence of male and female clergy theological positions. Men in every age-category are much less likely than women to designate themselves "feminist;" and they are much less likely in the under-50 groups to identify with liberation theology. Similarly, they are more likely to see themselves as conservative than women, though this is not their majority position.

Specific theological questions. In order to understand in more detail the difference in beliefs between men and women, we compared them on several specific questions of relevance to theological stance. We hypothesized that women would have less traditional or orthodox views on these questions. Table 3 presents the results of these comparisons. Here we see some differences and similarities in the orthodoxy of the ministers, with women less likely to say they believe in the doctrine of the Trinity; less likely to believe that "saving souls" is the most important work of ministry; more likely to hold a pluralistic attitude toward other faiths (that is, they are less likely to believe that "Christ is the only way" to salvation or Christianity the only religion through which God speaks to humanity); and probably less likely to believe in Biblical inerrancy and the personal return of Christ (significant at the .1 level). In these ways, the
hypothesis is supported. On the other hand, women are more likely than men to believe in the immortality of the soul, a result that contradicts the hypothesis and seems inconsistent with the other findings. Overall, the most striking difference observed is the more open-minded attitude of women to other faiths, but the tendency seems to be for women to be somewhat less orthodox theologically than men.

At the bottom of this table, we can see the test of Hypothesis 3, which predicted that women would be more supportive of the use of inclusive language in worship. The results definitely support the hypothesis, with about 87 percent of women and only 47 percent of men strongly favoring inclusive language. At the other extreme, over 17 percent of the men actually oppose the use of inclusive language, as compared to no women.

Opinions on Political and Social Issues. Next we examined the opinions of the clergy in our sample on various social and political issues, first testing the hypothesis that women would be more liberal and more likely to favor the Democratic party, given their stronger feminist and liberationist theological positions. Women were indeed more likely to identify their favored party as Democrat (85 percent vs 67 percent of men), while men were more likely to say they favored "both" (14\%) or "Republican (19\%). Only 11 percent of women favored Republicans. (The difference was significant with $\mathrm{p}=.029$, using a $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ test.)

Table 4 presents the responses to items measuring attitudes to selected social and political issues. The social attitudes pertain to attitudes about sexual relationships, mostly about hypothetical situations among members of the congregation. As expected, on all but one of these (relating to an extramarital affair), the women were more likely than men to have "no objection" to the situation. The differences are largest on attitudes toward gay and lesbian relationships. The percentage of women ministers saying they would have no objection to a stable gay or
lesbian relationship is about twice that of men (60 percent of women vs. 31 percent of men). Men were also less accepting of children born to unmarried women or to cohabitation. Thus, the male ministers in mainline congregations appear to be more traditional and conservative on sexual issues than are the women.

Male and female ministers also differed significantly on a number of political issues, again supporting the hypothesis. Women were more likely to strongly oppose capital punishment and to strongly favor Affirmative Action, the latter by a wide margin. Similarly, women were more supportive of abortion in cases when the woman's life is not in danger, and they were much more strongly in favor of the Equal Rights Amendment and the advertising of condoms. The only issue that did not differentiate men and women was their equal support of nuclear disarmament. Overall, then, we can see that women mainline ministers are much more liberal on a variety of social and political issues, including issues relating to women's rights. These differences might have important implications for the way they carry out their ministries, for the content of their teachings and sermons, and for their influence on their congregations.

Relation between politics and theology. Finally, we test the hypothesis concerning whether a person's identification as theologically liberationist or feminist could explain their political views. For selected political variables that showed significant differences in the previous table we cross-classified political opinion by sex, controlling for theological position (feminist or liberationist), allowing us to compare men and women to see if the sex differences might disappear when theological position was controlled. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of this analysis, with descriptive percentages in the first table and gamma coefficients and significances in the second.

Here we do find some evidence that feminist or liberationist theological position is strongly associated with political opinion on a variety of issues, and that to some extent sex differences are explained by women's greater tendency to hold these theological orientations. In Table 5, for example, the wide disparity between men and women on attitude toward gay and lesbian relationships practically disappears within feminist and nonfeminist categories. Both men and women who identify as feminists theologically say they would have no objection or might approve a stable lesbian or gay relationship-in fact, the men in this category are more likely to be positive toward the relationship than the women. On the other hand, women and men who do not identify with feminist theology are much less likely to approve of a lesbian/gay stable relationship. Similarly, liberation theology proponents are much more likely to support such relationships, while neither men nor women who do not identify with liberation theology do so. The sex difference is still apparent for liberationists, whose men still do not support lesbian/gay relationships as strongly as the women, but for nonliberationists, the sex difference disappears.

The results are similar for the other political variables. Feminists and liberationists are much more supportive of abortion than are nonfeminists and nonliberationists, whether male or female, and the sex differences remaining after control of theology are nonsignificant. On Affirmative Action, women are still more supportive than men, but the difference is much smaller and is not significant except for nonliberationists. ${ }^{1}$ Similarly with attitude toward capital punishment-here the feminist and liberationist men are more strongly opposed than the women, but all members of both sexes are opposed at least mildly. For nonliberationists, women

[^0]are still significantly more opposed to capital punishment. It is only the nonliberationist and nonfeminist men for whom less than a majority "strongly oppose" capital punishment, and a closer look at the data shows that even the majority of these men either "mildly" or "strongly" oppose it. In large part, then, the final hypothesis is supported.

Overall, we find that at least for some important political and social opinions, there is a strong correlation with certain theological positions. These are positions on which men and women clergy differ significantly, however, and the differences appear to have important implications for their political and social attitudes on a variety of issues.

## Conclusion

The gender differences we have found between these mainline clergy reinforce and expand our knowledge of women in ministry. If these differences exist across the denominations, and if they are maintained over time, then the increase in women in ministry should have an impact on the churches. On the other hand, if women leave the ministry due to resistance to their "difference," then it is possible that only those women who fit the traditional mold will be retained, and their potential influence will be less.

Explanations and implications
A. women and men come to ministry with different experience and expectations

For men, it is a traditional occupation, associated with conventional values
For women, it is by definition a break with tradition
B. Women in church leadership are in a position to influence opinion. Especially in terms of young women. To the extent that they remain in their positions and are able to influence others, they may have a liberalizing impact on members of these churches.

This is very different from the conservative and fundamentalist churches, who preach women's subordination and (in many cases) forbid women's active pastoral leadership.

Thus, when we look at the influence of religion on political attitudes, it is critical that we break down Protestants into specific types of denominations. In addition, the impact of women leaders is potentially great.

The caveat-women more likely to drop out. Less likely to hold the most influential positions. But where they succeed, they bring a different vision of leadership and social ministry to their congregations.

## APPENDIX: TABLES

Table 1. Comparison of Female and Male ministers' "Own theological positions"

| Theological Position: | Women | Men | Significance* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Liberal | 54.7 | 41.9 | . 057 |
| Neo orthodox | 13.2 | 20.6 | . 142 |
| Feminist | 77.4 | 18.9 | . 000 |
| Liberation | 60.4 | 26.0 | . 000 |
| Moderate | 39.6 | 43.2 | . 369 |
| Conservative | 5.7 | 20.6 | . 005 |
| Evangelical | 28.3 | 42.2 | . 038 |
| Fundamentalist | 1.9 | 0.7 | . 391 |

*Exact significance (1-sided) (2X2 table)

Table 2. Comparison of Female and Male Clergy Theological positions, controlling for age
AGE GROUP

|  | 20-34 |  | 35-49 |  | 50 \& older |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men |
| \% Own position feminist | 87.5 | 14.9 | 92.0 | 19.8 | 33.3 | 19.5 |
| \% Own position liberation | 75.0 | 27.7 | 68.0 | 25.6 | 25.0 | 25.8 |
| \% Own position moderate | 37.5 | 31.9 | 32.0 | 47.1 | 58.3 | 43.8 |
| \% Own position conserv. | 6.3 | 21.3 | 4.0 | 15.7 | 8.3 | 25.0 |

For females, relation between age and position on feminist theology is significant (gamma $=$ $-.679, p=.008$. The association for males is not significant.
For females, relation between age and position on liberation theology is significant (gamma $=$ $-.549, \mathrm{p}=.009$. The association for males is not significant.
Relation between age and "moderate" position is not significant for either sex.
Relation between age and "conservative" position is not significant for either sex.

Table 3. Comparison of Orthodoxy of Beliefs of Female and Male Clergy

| Orthodoxy of Beliefs: | Women | Men | Gamma* | Approx sig. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Believe in Trinity (yes) | 68.6 | 82.0 | -. 341 | . 053 |
| Bible is inerrant(yes, yes w/res) | 30.7 | 42.4 | -. 233 | . 075 |
| Immortality of the soul (yes) | 84.6 | 69.9 | . 427 | . 003 |
| Full deity of Christ (yes) | 68.6 | 72.2 | -. 084 | . 591 |
| Heaven a real place (yes) | 27.5 | 43.3 | -. 161 | . 132 |
| Bodily resurrection (yes) | 63.5 | 59.5 | . 077 | . 559 |
| Personal return of Christ (yes) | 32.7 | 46.2 | -. 183 | . 097 |
| Mst. impt. work saving souls (yes) | 19.2 | 32.0 | ***************** |  |
| Relation of Christianity to other faiths: |  |  |  |  |
| Christ only | 4.1 | 15.0 | -. 454 | . 002 |
| Christ fullest | 59.2 | 66.3 |  |  |
| Christ one of many | 36.7 | 18.7 |  |  |
| Use of inclusive language |  |  |  |  |
| In worship (Strongly favor) | 86.8 | 46.6 |  |  |
| Mildly or Str. Oppose | 0.0 | 17.5 |  | . 000 |

* The first 8 items in the table had ordinal response categories, "yes," "yes, with reservations," "not sure," and "no." The gamma coefficients measure the strength of association between the response across these categories and $\operatorname{sex}$ (female=1, male=2). For the final item, the three ordered categories are given in the table.

Table 4. Comparison of Female and Male clergy on Social and Political Opinions

| Social attitudes | Women | Men | Signif of gamma* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No objection child out of wedlock | 31.4 | 17.4 | .005 |
| No objection stable lesb/gay relation | 59.6 | 30.6 | .000 |
| Disapprove living out of wedlock | 21.2 | 32.3 | .036 |
| Disapprove affair | 92.3 | 95.6 | .482 |
| No objection homosexual relations | 50.0 | 29.2 | .001 |
| Political Issues |  |  |  |
| Capital punishment (str oppose) | 56.6 | 46.6 | .023 |
| Abortion save the life of mother (str fav) | 84.9 | 77.3 | .170 |
| Abortion, can't support (str+mildly favor) | 58.5 | 42.9 | .003 |
| Abortion if mother wants (str+mildly favor) | 36.5 | 19.1 | .001 |
| Nuclear disarmament (str fav) | 84.6 | 80.6 | .929 |
| Affirmative Action (str favor) | 84.9 | 55.6 | .002 |
| Equal Rights Amendment (str fav) | 86.8 | 62.1 | .001 |
| Advertising condoms (str favor) | 49.1 | 34.6 | .007 |

[^1]Table 5. Political beliefs by feminist and liberationist theological position and sex
$\begin{aligned} & \text { Theological position: } \\ & \underline{\text { Wominist }} \\ & \underline{\text { Fem Men }} \\ & \underline{\text { Women Men }} \underline{\text { Nonfeminist }} \\ & \underline{\text { Liberation }}\end{aligned} \underline{\underline{\text { Nonliberation }}}$
How react, lesbian/gay

| stable relationship (\% no | 65.3 | 75.5 | 27.3 | 20.2 | 84.4 | 64.5 | 20.0 | 18.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

objection/might approve)
Abortion if mother can't

| Support (SF+MF) | 61.0 | 73.2 | 50.0 | 35.7 | 68.7 | 67.6 | 42.8 | 34.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Abortion if mother wants <br> (SF+MF) | 44.0 | 32.1 | 9.1 | 16.0 | 53.1 | 36.4 | 10.0 | 13.0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Affirmative Action (SF) | 90.2 | 82.1 | 66.7 | 49.4 | 90.6 | 77.9 | 76.2 | 47.7 |
| Capital punishment (SO) | 58.5 | 76.8 | 50.0 | 39.5 | 53.1 | 75.3 | 61.9 | 36.4 |

Table 6. Gamma coefficients for political beliefs by sex (1=female, $2=$ male), controlling for feminist and liberation theological position.

| How react, Lesbian/gay stable relationship ( $0=$ no objection, 4=disapprove) | Theological position |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Feminist | Nonfem | Liberation | Nonlib. |
|  | -. 143 | . 064 | . 510 ** | . 131 |
| Abortion if mother can't support ( $1=\mathrm{SF}, 5=\mathrm{SO}$ ) | -. 077 | . 174 | . 157 | . 146 |
| Abortion if mother wants $(1=\mathrm{SF}, 5=\mathrm{SO})$ | . 159 | . 079 | .322* | . 176 |
| Affirmative Action (1-SF, $5=\mathrm{SO}$ ) | . 398 | . 341 | $.465^{2}$ | . $586 * *$ |
| Capital punishment | $.336{ }^{3}$ | -. 175 | .394* | $-.422 * *$ |

Approx. significance:
*. 05
**. 01
***. 001

[^2]
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CORRECTIONS TO DO:
RUN EVANGELICAL INSTEAD OF MODERATE IN TABLE 2, BY AGE GROUP.
WRITE CONCLUSIONS


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The gamma coefficients are somewhat misleading here, as the distributions of the responses is very different for feminists and nonfeminists and liberationists vs nonliberationists.

[^1]:    * On the social issues, the ordered response categories were "no objection," "Might approve," and "disapprove." For the political issues, the ordered response categories were "strongly favor," "mildly favor," "not sure," "mildly oppose," and "strongly oppose." The table presents only the percentage in the indicated category, but the gamma significance represents the relationship with all response categories run against sex (1-female, $2=$ male).

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ In this case, both males and females who were liberationists were all in either the Strongly or Mildly favor category - the males were somewhat less likely to strongly favor Affirmative Action, but none opposed it.
    ${ }^{3}$ Here, the male feminists were more strongly opposed to capital punishment, but both men and women opposed it.

