MAPPING THE CRISIS OF THE THIRD CENTURY JOHN NICOLS The Greek philosopher and sophist Protagoras would surely not mindthis reuse of one of his most famous statements. "Concerning thecrisis of the third century, I have no means of knowing whether therewas one or not, or of what sort of a crisis it may have been. Manythings prevent knowledge including the obscurity of the subject andthe brevity of human life."' Within these proceedings one finds strikingdisagreement about whether there was a crisis as the term has beenconventionally understood. And, if there was one, when did it begin?Dictionaries define our word crisis as: "An unstable condition, as inpolitical, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending abruptor decisive change". During the years 235 to 285, the Roman Empiresurely did enter a period of instability. The patterns of 'emperor mak-ing and breaking' and of barbarian invasion during this period markin my estimation the characteristics of a major political crisis. Indeed,when one compares the overall stability of the Roman imperial systemand government of the mid-second to that of the mid-third century,the differences are readily apparent both in terms of leadership anddefense.2 In sum, that there was a 'crisis' is a fundamental assumptionof this paper; but it is also a demonstrable proposition. I am moreoverespecially concerned here not only how to understand the nature ofthe crisis as a complex set of related events, but also how to explainthe complexities of the crisis to others, especially to students. One has only to read the standard textbooks on the subject to geta sense of the problem that has been examined within these proceed-ings. Some historians overwhelm the reader with details on the lives ofemperors elevated and eliminated. Other historians try to grapple withthe equally obscure accounts of the crisis as preserved in the ScriptoresHistoriae Augustae. That the 'lives' of emperors for the period 238-252 Originally in reference to the existence of the gods, DK 80b4 (DK refers tothe edition by H.A. Diels and W Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vórsokratiker (Berlin1966-1967). 2 On this issue see Wim Jongman's contribution in this volume. this is the Crisis of Trebonianus Gallusthe Third Century. VolusianusCBut the Empire was restored and stabilized bythe end. Much of the workwas done by the Illyrianemperors, Claudius, Aurelian Diocletian. Lc, co Aemilian Ak yy Valerian/A A pA A A A Valerian II C d II C Ak SaloninusClaudius II Gothicus 0,1 ,n of 0 rt-.. on tr, C‘I CNI 0 432JOHN NICOLSMAPPING THE CRISIS OF THE THIRD CENTURY433 are missing from this collection does not facilitate the discussion. Map-ping the crisis in a cartographic sense does, in my opinion, bring somemuch needed clarity to the problem, and that is the contribution ofthis paper. Here I am taking what economists would rightly label amacro approach to the crisis. In particular, I hope that by both map-ping the events and graphing some of the factors we can arrive at arepresentation of the problem that focuses on the critical issues andalso is comprehensible to students. It is also my hope that such anaccount may provide some guidance for scholars attempting to placetheir studies of individual elements into a larger perspective. Generally speaking, the crisis had internal and external dimensions.As noted above, the most visible signs of the crisis were: –the readiness of the soldiers to make and break emperors [a variantof the arcanum imperii thesis of Tacitus], and –the increasingly invasive barbarian intrusions deep into the RomanEmpire. Indeed the two phenomena are closely related: increasing pressure onthe frontiers made the martial prowess of the army more essential tothe survival of the Empire, just as the readiness of the armies to com-pete with one another, each to place its own man at the head of thestate, served to weaken the ability of the army to defend the Empire.How did these factors interact? And was one more important than, orprior to the other? To understand what follows it is important for the reader to turnto the Mapping History site on the Internet. This project, supportedby grants from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and vari-ous private donors in the United States, provides a set of interactiveand animated maps on a variety of historical problems. The URL is:http: / /mappinghistory.uoregon.edu. Open the section devoted to European history, and select the moduleentitled "Crisis of the third Century". The two elements mentionedabove, namely emperor making and invasions, have been summarizedin a variety of maps and charts. Following a brief introduction to theproblem (I), the user turns to a set of maps (II) that illustrates the ebband flow along the frontiers. From the principate of Augustus untilthe mid second century, it was the Romans who took the initiative onthe frontiers. From 150 until about 230, the frontiers stabilized and arough balance of power was established. After 240, the Roman fron-tiers broke down at many points from the North to the Black Seas andbeyond. In the following section (III) the course of the third century is displayed in more detail. Most importantly, the sequence of events isdisplayed in a manner that lends support to the theory that it was firstand foremost the breakdown of internal order that undermined thedefense of the empire. Thereafter (IV), data are presented that sum-marize visually many of the chief components of the crisis. Specifically,we consider the changes in wages of soldiers [rising], the silver contentof coinage [declining], and changes in climate that might have affectedthe barbarians along the northern frontier. Finally we offer a generalmodel to explain the crisis. Before going into the details of the module, it is worth consideringhow the basic problems are typically represented. Regarding the changesin regime, consider the attached chart (reused with permission of theauthor Kelley Ross). Here the details can overwhelm even an advancedstudent. When I show this chart to students who are uninitiated intothe study of the crisis, their immediate response is: "It is a mess! Do Ihave to know the details?" The Crisis of the Thirdco Centurycn Maximinus I Thrax A Gordian I Gordian II —•Ak kills Philip I the Arab......._ Philip IIappoints - C A k Decius --A A k Invasion, rebellions,Herennius --.0 Ak revolving door emperors—Hostilianus --.0 Ad killed by his troops son of Gallus, same fate killed by this troops captured by PersiansA k.of Valerian son of Gallienus son of Gallienus dIllyrian, defeated Goths U U p AurelaindetachedU P Gaul-Spain-Britain U sub-empire--captured by capures A AA k Illyrian, reunited empirePalmyrene sub-empire captured by Aurelian pelected by Senate appoints Ak half-brother of TacituscParombsuasppo:z/Atp—rkilled byhis troop htning Numenan \c IA k — son of Carus, assassinatedCarinus C A Ak defeated Diocletian, but murdered NN N^ n. 0,- CO 00 co Ncn en en nt 0,1I I l0 NM A A— Illyrian, begins Tetrarchy Balbinus PapienusGordian IIIC -ek¦ czco an Ntr,trt Legend kills k Ai A killed by his troops committed suicide son of I, killed in battle co-emperors elected by Senategrandson of I, nephew of II praetorian perfectson of I killed by Goths killed by Goths, son of Deciusson of Decius Legend: A = becomes Augustus C = becomes Caesar k = Killed d = dies p = made prisoner U = usurper Ak = becomes August killed in same year detachedPostumus Gaul-Spain-BritainVictorians sub-empire—captured byTetricus I AurelainTetricus II Palymyrene sub-empirecaptured by Aurelian Aurelian Zenobia Vabalanthus TacitusFlorianus U U U UUU U pUU U Diocletian 434JOHN NICOLSMAPPING THE CRISIS OF THE THIRD CENTURY435 More to the point: After the stable transfer of power during the secondcentury, the readiness of the armies to replace the emperor violentlyis striking and undeniable. The events of 41, 69, 96 and 193 certainlymay be perceived as anticipating the wave of imperial assassinationsthat characterize the mid third century. Nonetheless the earlier events,though in some cases traumatic, had been brief and in each case theimperial system had stabilized and produced yet another generation ofstability. In this sense the events of the third century have to be seen asa categorical departure from the earlier pattern [see below]. Regarding the invasions, consider this map. Admittedly, the map itself covers a much longer period than theone under discussion, but the problem is the same, namely the map(and others like it) gives the impression that the European part of theRoman Empire was subject to constant invasion over a two hundredyear period.' Yet this scenario clearly exaggerates the nature of thecrisis in respect to invasions. We are not dealing with continuous anddevastating incursions, but rather with raids that affected certain partsof the Empire more dramatically than others. Moreover, it is readilyapparent that many parts of the Empire had no direct contact withthe invaders. Of course, this is not to deny that anxiety about invasionwas wide-spread or that those who were spared direct attacks, wereunaffected by disaster elsewhere.' In the Mapping History project, we have tried to expand on theconventional representations of the problems in two ways. First, wehave developed animated maps that illustrate the evolution of theproblem more effectively than static maps can. Second, we have triedto use a variety of graphic images to illustrate the underlying natureof the historical problem.' A closer look at the period from 200 to 285 (III) provides moreinsight into the problem. In this set of maps, we illustrate both theevents on the frontiers and the emperor-making tendencies of theRoman armies. As the crisis evolves, it is more and more apparentthat the emperor 'making and breaking' was already frequent beforethe major barbarian incursions penetrated deeply and widely into the This map has been circulating on the internet for many years, and I have notbeen able to trace its origin or credit its author. 4 Cf. for instance the article by Werner Eck in these proceedings. 5 What I am presenting is best labeled as a 'work in progress' and, indeed, I welcomesuggestions that would enhance the product. 436JOHN NICOLSMAPPING THE CRISIS OF THE THIRD CENTURY437 empire. Of course to many historians this will not come as a startlingrevelation, but the representation here provides, we believe, a moreintuitive sense of the process. Even if we can map the crisis more effectively and generate a morecompelling representation of the sequence of events, we still want toknow what prompted the changes. The final section of the module(IV) summarizes some of the factors that historians have introduced toexplain both the internal and external dimensions of the problem.6 The first tab graphs the relationship between soldiers' wages andthe content of silver in Roman coinage. As the wages treble, the silvercontent dropped from 90 to 30% and then sank even lower. As theRoman soldiers themselves were responsible for so much of the violenceand demanded ever greater bonuses, it is reasonable to believe thatwhatever gain the soldiers made in terms of pay was undermined bythe decline in silver content in their wages. Admittedly, it is not easyor necessary to claim that one was the cause of the other; but thedemands for ever higher wages, and the degradation in the real valueof those wages, may have demoralized the soldiers and encouragedthe cycle of violence. The second tab graphs another indicator, namely the higher cost ofimperial administration. One of the strategies that the emperors usedto minimize the potential internal revolt was to increase the number ofprovinces and to make each smaller. In theory, then, the potential rebelwould find it more difficult to secure the support needed to challengethe status quo. Indeed, as the crisis deepens, the number of provincesincreases dramatically, indeed doubling during the critical years betweenA.D. 180 and 300. Whether the doubling of provinces actually doubledthe costs of the imperial system is not clear, but it is readily apparentthat the administrative structure changes as the crisis deepens and thatthere must have been some costs associated with the shift. The third tab provides data on the changes of climate, primarily inthe regions that drain into the Black Sea. The congruence between arelatively more benevolent climate in the first and second centuries andthe peace and stability of the years of the principate stands in contrast The scholarship on these tabs derives from a variety of publications, the mostimportant of which are K. Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy, (Berkeley andLos Angeles 1986); H.H. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World (London and NewYork 1982); and P.D. Jones and M.E. Mann, "Climate over Past Millenia" Reviews ofGeophysics 42 (2002), 1-42. to the comparably unfavorable conditions during the third century, sug-gesting that a changing and less benevolent climate may have been afactor in driving the northern barbarians to enter the Roman Empire.Again, it is difficult to make the case that changes in climate could bethe sufficient cause to explain the movement of barbarians during thisperiod, but when taken together with the other factors represented here,a more coherent pattern of cause and effect may be deduced. In the final section we offer a model to explain the process. Duringthe first and second centuries there were sufficient resources/surplusesavailable to cover the cost of defense and the development of the urbaninfrastructure. As the costs of government rose, the surpluses weretransferred to cover the rising costs of defense, especially the demandsof the military. As the crisis deepened, more resources were pulled outof the cities and we begin to see a genuine process of urban decline. Of course, these are not all of the factors that may have affectedthe events of the third century. Regarding the role of the army, forexample, the pattern of recruitment especially after A.D. 200 suggeststhat the soldiers were being drawn increasingly from the provinces,and perhaps also from less urban and less civilized contexts.' In thiscase, they may have been less sensitive to the nuances of the Augustansettlements and the need to preserve the arcanum imperii.8 Even then,it is not readily apparent why the events of 69 and of 193 failed toproduce the kind of chain reaction that characterized the events of themid third century. In the next phase of development of this module,the material relative to the recruitment of the legions will be incorpo-rated into the model.° In sum, the Mapping History project offers a system to illustrate thosehistorical problems that lend themselves to this kind of cartographicrepresentation. Though funding was originally provided to make avail-able material for instructional purposes, there is no reason why thesame structure cannot be employed to illustrate the scholarly data onother historical problems. ' G. Forni, Il recrutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano (Rome 1953). 8 The argument of M. Rostovtzeff in the Social and Economic History of the RomanEmpire (Oxford 1957). 9 As stated before, this is work in progress and I am interested in suggestions thatmay help address this and related problems.