Finding a Role for Bilingualism:
Language Minorities in Portland Public Schools, 1975-2005

“Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education. We know that those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experience wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful.”

-Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas,
Writing for the majority in Lau v. Nichols, 1974
Van Truong developed bilingual skills at a young age. In early childhood she attended an all girls Catholic school that provided classes in two languages. By the time she was a teenager, Van was learning a third language in night classes at her local parish. She enjoyed going to school, loved reading and writing, and was particularly gifted in math. At the age of 14, Van was already succeeding in a pre-calculus course. As she entered adolescence, her educational future looked promising indeed. Then, in 1975 with North Vietnamese forces approaching Saigon, Van’s family fled their home in Vietnam to come to America. They settled in Portland and enrolled Van in Madison High School.

The educational climate at Madison in 1975 could not have been more different from what Van had known in Vietnam. In Vietnam, her school employed teachers who were fluent in both Vietnamese and French to served its bilingual community. In this environment, bilingualism was a goal to strive for rather than a problem to fix.

In contrast, Madison served an almost exclusively monolingual Northeast Portland community. This was an era of extremely low diversity in Portland Public Schools. District enrollment reports divided national-origin minorities into two broad groups: “Oriental” and “Spanish American.” In 1975 these students made up just 3.5 percent of the district’s population. Portland Public Schools did not collect data on language minorities in 1975 and it certainly had not developed any policies that could have accommodated students like Van Truong. In the following years, Madison added ESL courses and hired Vietnamese-speaking teachers, but these extra services were remedial and transitional. The goal was to move students from their mother tongue to English as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Van entered this climate of scant resources and faced the added challenges of culture shock. In the politically charged climate of 1975, the student body at Madison was less than
willing to accept a Vietnamese refugee. Although she had come to America with knowledge in pre-calculus, Madison placed Van in a remedial Title I math class because of her lack of language skills. In the absence of Vietnamese speaking teachers, small cultural differences like the American decimal point system confounded Van and placed roadblocks in her path to success. Physical education classes were alien to Van and she nearly failed them. Once a bright and successful student in Vietnam, Van would hide in the stairwells at Madison to escape from the pressure and shame of being lost in an American school.

Madison tried hard to hire Vietnamese-speaking teachers to meet the needs of the group of around 50 Vietnamese refugees who came to the school in 1975 and 1976. A nascent ESL program was in place at Madison by the 1975-1976 school year. By 1977 the school had hired teachers to provide math courses in Vietnamese. With the help of these language specialists, Van was able to correspond with her old school in Vietnam and transfer credits to help her graduate. Bethany Church, which had sponsored Van’s family’s move to Portland, was instrumental in convincing Madison to hire new Vietnamese-speaking staff. Even with all of this help, Van barely graduated from high school in 1979.

Her experience at Madison had been so trying that she thought she would never again set foot inside a school. In 1982, Van was married, raising children, and working full time at the two restaurants her family owned when Greg Wolleck from PPS called her. Since she had left high school, Portland’s Southeast Asian population had exploded and the district was in desperate need of Vietnamese-speaking staff. Shortly afterward, Van began working for the district as an ESL receptionist at Adams High School. She latter became an educational assistant in French and ESL classes. Then in 1983 a third wave of Southeast Asian refugees hit Portland and Van decided that she needed to go back to school and become a full-time teacher. After earning a degree in
education from Portland State University, Van began teaching at Madison. Her students were increasingly poor, rural, and uneducated refugees who struggled to stay afloat in American schools. Van realized how much her community needed her as a role model for both language minority and English-speaking students in an era of increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity. In 1987 Portland Public Schools paid for Van to earn an additional degree in administration so she could become a principal.

As principal of Franklin High School, Van recognized the importance of a well trained and culturally competent staff. She was an outspoken proponent of Portland Public Schools’ move towards an ESL endorsement requirement in the late 1990s. She later became principal of Mt. Tabor Middle School, which is home to a successful and popular Japanese immersion program. Van encouraged her mainstream staff to work towards ESL certification and created an environment where language minorities were a permanent and visible part of the community. Her experience at Madison, however difficult and unpleasant, led to one of the greatest success stories in the history of ESL/bilingual education in Portland.

Van’s story demonstrates the enormous challenge that PPS faced during the period under examination. Cognitively, she was ideally situated to learn English quickly and succeed in school. As PPS learned in the decades after Van left Madison, a student’s literacy in his or her mother tongue is a key factor in the ability to learn English. Van was fluent in Vietnamese and French and had been learning English for two years when she arrived in Portland. She also had a crucial support network made up of her family, her church, and Vietnamese-speaking teachers. The stars aligned in her favor and yet she suffered through an overwhelmingly negative experience at Madison and barely graduated.
In the three decades following Van’s 1975 arrival in America, Portland Public Schools would struggle to accommodate thousands of students who posed far greater challenges to the district than she ever had. In the words of one PPS administrator, the influx of language minorities was “a river that kept flowing and getting wider every year.”4 By the 1990s, the influx of 70 linguistic groups to the Rose City demanded radical change from Portland Public Schools. At stake was the national identity of these diverse newcomers. What type of American citizens would PPS make out of this disparate group?

This paper will argue that a combination of vague federal guidelines, lack of appropriate state policy, and limited district resources answered that question for Portland Public Schools. The mother tongue of Portland’s language minorities became a constant inconvenience for PPS as threats of lawsuits and lost federal funding piled high. Despite the best efforts of dedicated teachers and administrators, any language other than English amounted to a “deficit” for the district.* Language minorities were seen as a costly problem that needed fixing; any additional resources provided to them were to be as remedial and temporary as possible.

However, a challenge to this deficit perspective eventually emerged in Portland. Through grassroots organization, two Portland communities succeeded in establishing two-way bilingual programs in their schools. These programs provided a way for language minorities to become permanent, integral, and desired members of their schools. The mother tongue of language

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* Researchers in the field of ESL/bilingual education frequently use the term *deficit perspective* to refer the view that native languages constitute a problem that needs to be fixed quickly through remedial programs. In my research I found early examples in Cummings, 1981 and Collier, 1987. Alternatively, some researchers use the *subtractive vs. additive bilingualism* paradigm to describe this conflict between linguistic assimilation and native language maintenance; see Crawford, 1989. I choose to focus on the *deficit perspective* in this paper because I believe it most aptly describes what emerged in Portland in light of the rhetoric of national policy and the fiscal realities of Portland Public Schools.
minorities became an asset rather than a liability. In the process, these communities proved that public schools can be agents of change and help span the cultural divides that plague U.S. society.

**Federal Definition of Language-Minority Education**

The responsibility of public education has traditionally been given to state and local government in the United States. Historically, federal funding has only represented from six to nine percent of annual district budgets. In the case of language minorities however, federal policy has been considerably more influential. Some of Portland’s most important bilingual programs relied exclusively on federal grants. Beyond budgetary issues, the rhetoric of national policy set the tone for how Portland approached the needs of its language minorities. As one congressman noted during deliberations on the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, “the message the federal government sends about bilingual education has a deep impact on state and local policies.”

Ironically, the same federal legislation that first identified the needs of language minorities in the late 1960s also created the atmosphere in which a deficit perspective could emerge and thrive in Portland.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federal government developed a two-fold role in the education of language minorities: enticement and mandate. With the Bilingual Education Act, the federal government used grant money to entice schools into meeting the needs of language minorities. Through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR), which was given the responsibility of enforcing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the federal government also used litigation to mandate that schools met the needs of language minorities. While both of these measures created more services for language minorities, they were ultimately unsuccessful in producing genuine equal opportunity for thousands of Portland students like Van Truong.
The rhetoric of the enticements provided by in the Bilingual Education Act, also known as Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1968, set a precedent that created a deficit perspective in the allocation of federal funds for language minorities. “One of the most acute educational problems in the United States,” the act stated, “is that which involves millions of children with limited English-speaking ability.” Language minorities were identified by the act as “problem” students with deficient abilities. Following this standard, “limited English proficient” (LEP) became one of the dominant labels for language minorities. The federal government had chosen to focus on the deficiencies of language minorities and ignore the possibility that they possessed a unique resource in their native languages.

This semantic distinction was emblematic of a wider controversy surrounding the goal of Title VII programs. Because the act neither required nor prohibited the use of languages other than English, the next 26 years (and five reauthorizations) of Title VII legislation were dominated by debate over language of instruction. In Portland, this created a distracting controversy over English-only versus native-language instruction that overshadowed other critical issues such as teacher certification and appropriate assessment. While Title VII funded some essential programs in Portland, its rhetoric also produced an unrealistic goal of rapid English acquisition based on politically charged ideology rather than sound pedagogical data.

Mandates regarding language minorities emerged from the OCR’s interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which banned discrimination based on national origin. In a 1970 document sent to schools districts with more than five percent “national-origin minority group children,” the OCR called for “affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students.” As with Title VII, specific focus was placed on the “deficiency” of language minorities. While 1970 memorandum succeeded in putting forth
the novel and essential idea that equal access to resources did not create equal opportunity for language minorities, it only called for vague “affirmative steps” to redress this issue.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Lau v. Nichols decision in 1974 upheld these OCR guidelines. In 1975, the OCR issued the so-called “Lau Remedies,” which it used to negotiate settlements in districts with alleged civil rights infractions. In these settlements, districts would draft “Lau Plans” that outlined exactly how they would meet the needs of their language minorities.\(^\text{11}\)

While the Lau Remedies did offer explicit guidelines for the identification of language minorities, assessment, professional standards, and program evaluation, they did not prescribe a specific program model.\(^\text{12}\) In practice however, the remedies favored rapid assimilation over native language maintenance and true bilingualism because that appeared to be a cheaper, politically popular model. Martin Gerry, head of the task force that drafted the remedies, would later recall: “The OCR’s intent was to move children into English-language classrooms as quickly as possible – not to make them proficient in two languages.”\(^\text{13}\) As debate on the goals of bilingual education raged on, federal policy continued to set a vague example for the nation’s school districts. It was under these circumstances that Van Truong and subsequent thousands of language minorities began to flood into Portland Public Schools.

**Portland Schools Become Linguistically Diverse**

Portland Public Schools provided some English as a Second Language (ESL) classes on an individual, school-by-school basis as early as the mid 1940s, most notably to small groups of Mexican immigrants at Franklin and Cleveland high schools.\(^\text{14}\) A full-fledged program with district-wide coordination did not emerge, however, until after the flood of Southeast Asian immigration began in 1975. Prior to 1975, racial and linguistic diversity was extremely low in
Portland schools. In 1970, the year of the first OCR memorandum on language minorities, PPS did not even collect data on minority students other than “blacks.” By 1971, the district’s yearly enrollment report included figures of “Oriental” and “Spanish American” students. Combined, these two groups represented just 1.9 percent of the district’s total enrollment count. In the early 1970s there was no rush to comply with the OCR’s guidelines in Portland, especially given that its memorandum was only addressed to districts with more than five percent national-minority students.  

This does not mean that there was no debate about the education of language minorities in Portland during the early 1970s. In 1971 and 1973, the Governor’s Advisory Council on Chicano Affairs petitioned the state school board for more ESL and bilingual education, citing specific needs in Salem, Eugene, and Portland. These petitions mostly fell on deaf ears, gaining only a small concession on bilingual correspondence to parents and little more than empty promises of more Spanish-speaking staff.

By 1975 however, the influx of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao-speaking students convinced PPS to begin hiring people who had specific training in ESL like Darlene Durgan. The district named Durgan a department chair within the Special Education department and gave her the task of supervising Portland’s growing language minority population. Durgan wrote the proposal for the district’s first Title VII grant in 1975 and used the money to hire bilingual aides. By 1977, demographic change in Portland meant that PPS had finally fallen under OCR compliance review. PPS hired John Withers for the express purpose of drafting the district’s first Lau Plan. He was subsequently named coordinator of the district’s nascent ESL department, which was born as a sub-department of the district’s Special Education department.
With a M.A. in ESL from Portland State University, Withers had successfully designed and implemented an adult ESL program in Iran during his time in the Peace Corps. He came to the PPS with strong ideals about the “socio-linguistic values of native-language maintenance.” Withers believed the function of the ESL department needed to be “additive” rather than “subtractive.” This meant that the development and maintenance of a language minority’s mother tongue was crucial to his or her success in English-language acquisition. Withers would strive to make native language literacy one aspect of language minority education in Portland whenever possible.

This vision combined with Title VII grants to generate some beneficial programs for language minorities during the Withers era of the ESL department. For example, Withers increasingly noted “young people who were never going to graduate from our school system” in the second and third waves of Southeast Asian refugees. With the help of a bilingual aide from Burma, Withers started a refugee job preparation program for Hmong and Mien-speaking immigrants with no formal education and little hope of acquiring English-language skills in time to graduate from high school. The program taught them vocational skills in their native language and helped them find jobs in their communities.

In 1979, the ESL department used a Title VII grant to start newcomer centers. This program was “an intensive introduction to the American school system for recently arrived students with little or no English skills.” Native-language literacy was an essential component of the program. Withers began to see that teachers had more success in easing their students into English when they could provide some native-language instruction. This approach was true for students in regular schools as well ones at the newcomer centers. Looking back on this period,
Withers remembered that his colleagues in the early days of PPS ESL department were some of the most outstanding educators he ever worked with.

Unfortunately, PPS was not financially capable of supporting Withers and his colleagues in their vision of second language acquisition. In the seven years prior to Withers’ 1977 arrival to the district, PPS’s total enrollment had declined from 70,910 to 57,583.22 As language minorities flooded the district, the number of English-speaking students was declining due to gentrification and exodus of many middle class families to the Portland suburbs.23 The loss of wealthy, English-speaking families from PPS meant a drain on resources in this era when district budgets were dependent on the local tax base. Confounding this problem was the fact that language minorities were thinly spread out over the entire district. The ESL department did not have the resources to offer services in every school.

Durgan, who became an ESL supervisor under Withers, remembers: “We had to decide where programs could go and take space wherever the district could give it to us.”24 A scarcity of resources resulted in a system of cluster schools and itinerant teachers. In many cases, language minorities were bused from their neighborhoods to the schools that offered ESL classes and bilingual aides. Because the district could afford so few ESL teachers, some had to work at four different schools in a single day.25

Although the ESL department recognized the importance of native-language instruction, the reality was that the service it provided was mostly an English-language ESL “pullout” program with bilingual aides few and far between. Schools like Madison that had big numbers of one minority language could offer bilingual instruction in content courses. However, in schools like Franklin and Lincoln that had small numbers of two or three minority languages, students like Van Truong could only receive ESL pullout classes taught in English and spend the rest of their
day in the school’s “mainstream” content courses. A 1977 OCR audit found that this itinerant program provided as little as 20 extra minutes of instruction per week to some language minorities.26

Furthermore, in an environment of inadequate resources, identification and assessment of language minorities were constant challenges. At the time of the 1977 audit, the district estimated that it would have 750 language minorities needing extra services at the beginning of the 1977-1978 school year. When the district submitted its Lau Plan to secure federal funding in the fall of 1977, it estimated that it was actually servicing around 1400 language minorities.27 The district would continue to keep incomplete and otherwise problematic records of its language minorities until 1986.

The deficiency of records can partly be attributed to the transitory nature of the additional services language minorities received. A language minority could be labeled as limited English proficient (LEP) in the fall but lose that label by the spring through marginal progress. In addition, the low priority the district gave to the ESL contributed to the problem. Through the 1980s, the ESL department continued to be a sub-department of the Special Education department. Durgan remembers, “Portland was very stingy with its directors.”28 Subsequent heads of the ESL department were either labeled “coordinators” or “assistant directors” until 1993. Sally Anderson, who directed the newcomer centers, remembers: “Any program of value needed a strong advocate and dedicated teachers to survive in that environment.”29 Another ESL department specialist put it much more bluntly: “The district never invested in its own bilingual programs.”30

The growth of national-origin minorities in PPS enrollment counts peaked in 1981 and leveled off through the mid 1980s.31 The system of itinerant teachers and cluster schools persisted and district efforts to meet the needs of language minorities remained half-hearted. The apparent
goal of the district was “paper compliance” with the Lau Remedies, not equal opportunity for all students.

Meanwhile, in 1982 John Withers began researching two-way immersion programs in California and Canada, alternative models that brought language minority and English-speaking students together to develop true bilingualism. In 1985 he petitioned the district to allow the ESL department to begin official research into starting a two-way program in Portland. The district did not share his enthusiasm and ignored his request. Withers stepped down as ESL coordinator in 1986.

In 1985, it would have been hard for PPS to predict the demographic explosion that would hit Portland in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1991, Darlene Durgan admitted: “All of us thought this was going to be a temporary problem.” This remark perhaps best captures the first era of language minority education in Portland. Even with the presence of talented and dedicated individuals like John Withers, the district lacked the vision to see that the diverse needs of language minorities had become a permanent fixture in Portland Public Schools.

**The Realities of a Deficit Perspective in Portland**

Enrollment in ESL programs in the 1981-1982 school year reached 2,821 students, with 190 full-time teachers supervising their instruction. After a decline in the early 1980s, enrollment was back up to 2,810 students in the 1990-1991 school year. This time, however, only 135 full-time teachers were teaching these students. Continual lack of district resources meant that the ESL department’s budget could not keep pace with its rapid growth and diversification. Between 1986 and 1993, the number of language minorities in Portland Public Schools increased by over 50 percent. In that same period, the total number of languages spoken by Portland’s language
minorities grew to 40.\textsuperscript{34} Grudgingly, the ESL department persisted with a system of cluster schools and itinerant teachers to meet the needs of this diverse group well into the 1990s.

Although the program had expanded considerably to include 22 schools by 1993, the dominant model of instruction continued to be immediate “mainstreaming” with ESL pullout courses taught in English.\textsuperscript{35} These ESL classes stressed “limited word sets and sentences of reduced complexity.”\textsuperscript{36} In focusing on rapid language assimilation over deep knowledge of academic English and continuous cognitive development in all subject areas, ESL pullout classes were arguably only preparing Portland’s language minorities for menial, low-wage jobs.

Schools that had a large enough group of one minority language could implement native-language instruction, but that service was viewed as strictly transitional. Darlene Durgan, who had taken charge of the ESL department when John Withers left in 1986, made this comment in 1991: “We are operating on a slim margin, especially since we are growing. Any cuts would be devastating.”\textsuperscript{37} In effect, the constant budgetary crises of the 1990s institutionalized a deficit perspective in Portland. With its slim operating margin, the ESL department could not afford to approach the native tongue of language minorities as anything but a barrier to success. The consequences of this perspective would be disastrous.

If the ESL department’s operating margin was “slim” entering the 1990s, Ballot Measure 5 rendered it paper-thin. Part of the 1990 measure dramatically decreased property taxes that went towards school funding. In addition, the measure transferred responsibility for school funding from local to state government in an effort to equalize district per-student budgets. The measure hit PPS particularly hard. Faced with dwindling funds, the district made the ESL department’s budget among its first sacrifices.\textsuperscript{38} Although a key development would come in 1994 when districts began receiving 50\% more funding for every student designated as Limited English
Proficient (LEP), this money would come too little and too late for PPS to save some of its essential bilingual resources.39

During his first year in the district, John Withers had made the key distinction that ESL classes were only one aspect of the comprehensive program that the department needed to offer.40 Unfortunately, with increasing budgetary problems ESL classes were becoming the only thing the department could afford to offer. PPS gave top priority to its full-time ESL staff because they were the teachers most directly involved with transitioning language minorities to mainstream English classes. The ESL department’s native-language resources were easier to eliminate.41

The district had to trim its budget from $328.6 to $305.1 million for the 1994-1995 school year. Enrollment in ESL and bilingual programs had grown by 500 students during each of the previous four years.42 The department was also faced with absorbing an additional 500 students in 1995 with no additional funding. Tou Meksavanh, who had replaced Durgan as ESL director in 1993, had no choice but to cut six ESL resource specialists, an assistant supervisor, and a psychologist in order to hire the 7.5 additional ESL teachers that would be necessary for the 1994-1995 school year.43

In comparison with 120 full-time ESL teachers who were 80 percent Caucasian and monolingual, these six resource specialists spoke five of the most common minority languages in the district – Vietnamese, Russian, Spanish, Mien, and Lao.44 John Withers had begun hiring resource specialists in 1981. “An ESL teacher alone is not enough,” he explained, “students needed a link between school and home.”45 In addition to providing native-language assistance in content areas, the resource specialists served as counselors and helped students with college and scholarship applications. Withers and Durgan also realized that resource specialists were a crucial tool for reaching gang-affected students and other potential dropouts. Although the resource
specialists were later reinstated after public outrage and demonstration, the message that PPS sent to the city’s language minority community was clear: ESL classes taught exclusively in English were more important than the department’s bilingual resources.

Newcomer centers were the next to go. Withers, Durgan, and Meksavanh all remembered newcomer centers as a necessary aspect of the service that the ESL department provided to language minorities. The newcomer centers recognized that recently arrived immigrants did not necessarily understand how American schools worked. Withers recalled: “They were the first step towards success in American schools.” At the centers, newcomers would learn habits that regular schools took for granted in their students, such as how to stand in a line or raise a hand to ask a question. Durgan praised their “specially designed, intensive, all day instruction.” The centers also taught the type of language skills necessary for survival during a regular school day in America, such as how to ask to go to the bathroom. Meksavanh remembered: “They quickly taught essential oral language skills.” These centers were a crucial resource for hundreds of students with little or no English skills, some of whom had never stepped foot inside a school before.

In 1986 the centers were consolidated into one program at Vestal Elementary School. Sally Anderson was the project director from 1986 to 1996 and formed partnerships with Portland State University and local refugee agencies to hire native-speakers to assist the program. Anderson remembered: “The goal of the program was not to make kids fluent in English because we recognized that fluency takes many years. The goal was to help them succeed in school.” To reach this goal, the Vestal newcomer center provided ESL, native-language literacy, native-language math, and classes about American school culture. Meetings with parents about immunizations, homework, and extra-curricular activities were also provided. In one case,
Anderson had to explain to a recently arrived Somali family that Americans were not actually worshipping witches on Halloween. She recalled: “Some of these students had never played with a toy before. We had to teach them about that too.”

The newcomer center at Vestal relied almost exclusively on Title VII grants, which were always allocated in five-year cycles with the assumption that funding for quality programs would eventually be taken over by state or local government. By the mid 1990s, federal money was drying up and PPS was in no position to give the program any more than it already had. Anderson recalled: “Every year we were being squeezed a little more and having to make more sacrifices. By 1995 it was not worth keeping open because it was no longer the stellar program it once was.” The Vestal newcomer center finally closed its doors in 1997.

Ironically, widespread uproar about cuts to ESL department did not arise until the district began to cut full-time ESL teachers who taught in English Exclusively. Heading into the 1996-1997 school year, nine teachers with no prior ESL experience were assigned to ESL classrooms. A seniority clause in the teacher’s union contract meant that these teachers, who had previously taught music, shop, and business, could not be laid off before younger ESL teachers. The real problem was that Oregon was one of six states in the country that did not offer an ESL endorsement through its Teacher Standards and Practices Commission. This meant that ESL teachers were not valued as professionals with a specialized set of skills. Any teacher working towards a “Certificate of Accomplishment” could teach in an ESL classroom. These certificates required little coursework or training in ESL. Some teachers earned them during their summer vacations by traveling to Mexico.

Outrage following the 1996 assignment of nine unqualified teachers to ESL classrooms set off a new round of debate over language minority education in Portland. This time, those wanting
more bilingual resources for language minority students were not the only ones angry with the ESL department. Supporters of rapid English-language acquisition and English-only instruction were now upset that the PPS was not assimilating language minorities thoroughly and efficiently enough. By 1998, each LEP brought his or her district $2,250. This meant that Oregon taxpayers paid nearly $60 million for ESL and bilingual programs in 1998. Advocates of English-only and bilingual education alike were now calling for more accountability from the district. OCR monitors became permanent fixtures at PPS school board meetings.

PPS drafted a new Lau Plan every year from 1994 to 1998 and each year a new complaint was sent to the OCR. Activists like Richard Lucetti, head of Portland’s Hispanic Parents Association, called for Tou Meksavanh’s resignation. Meanwhile, conservatives like Oregonian op-ed columnist David Reinhard called for a return to an English-only, sink-or-swim model. Both sides were primarily concerned with the issue of OCR compliance, which after 30 years did still not offer a clear path to equal opportunity. Ironically, both sides also illustrated the folly of supposing that politicized debate can create educational equality. Meanwhile, a program model focusing on long-term second language acquisition, one based on actual educational theory rather than cultural politics, had existed in Portland since the mid 1990s.

**The Emergence of Two-Way Bilingual Education in Portland**

Developed simultaneously in Quebec and Florida in the early 1970s, two-way bilingual education, also known as dual language immersion, has three main goals: helping language minorities learn English and succeed in all school subjects, helping English-speakers learn a foreign language without sacrificing their success in school, and promoting linguistic equity to bridge gaps between cultures. As opposed to one-way immersion, these two-way immersion programs included a strong representation of language minorities. In the 50:50 model, half of the
school day is given to instruction in each language. In the 90:10 model, students spend 90 percent of their kindergarten schooldays in the minority language, with that percentage gradually dropping to 50 percent by the 5th grade. In both models, the ratio of English-speakers to language minorities is ideally 50:50 and cannot exceed 70:30.

In the 1990s, two-way bilingual education was hardly a novel idea in Portland. At a media fair in downtown Portland in 1976, the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory highlighted the success of two-way models in Quebec and California.61 That same year, a chairman from the National Advisory Council on Bilingual Education told PPS: “Ideally, bilingual classes should be 50 percent minority students and 50 percent majority students. Subjects other than the new language could be taught in the students’ native tongue until all children could profit from instruction on any subject in either language.”62 In 1982 John Withers began investigating two-way programs in California, and as previously mentioned, in 1985 he unsuccessfully petitioned Portland Public Schools to start a two-way pilot program.

Inspired in large part by the popularity of Portland’s private French-American School, PPS started a one-way immersion program in 1986 as a separate entity from the ESL department.63 The French-American School had opened in the affluent Sylvan neighborhood of Portland’s west side in 1979. All of its students were native English-speakers whose parents wanted them to learn French. One of these parents remarked: “The world is getting smaller, and we’re going to need to know two languages.”64 Parents of English speaking students at PPS were beginning to agree with that sentiment, especially in an era when second language proficiency was increasingly becoming a prerequisite to entrance in the nation’s elite universities.65 These parents began demanding more from the district’s second language programs. Above all, they wanted their children to start
learning a second language earlier. It was not long before such parents looked to the French-American School and decided to demand similar programs from PPS.  

The Ainsworth immersion program was the brainchild of the Ainsworth Local School Advisory Committee. This group of parents wanted their children to start learning Spanish well before high school, which at the time was the earliest their neighborhood schools could offer. After a two-year process of research and negotiation among the school’s site council, faculty, and staff, PPS allocated $131,000 from its budget to help Ainsworth start the program for kindergarteners and first graders in 1986. One grade was added each subsequent year until Ainsworth had a full K-5 program by 1991. Although 10 spaces in each grade were reserved for Spanish-speakers, the primary goal of the Ainsworth program was to make native-English speakers bilingual. Two years after the Ainsworth program began PPS added a Japanese immersion program at Richmond elementary school. This program involved no native Japanese-speaking students during its first five years. While PPS had rejected Wither’s two-way immersion proposal in 1985, it was quite open to the possibility of the Ainsworth program and subsequent one-way immersion models.

While these programs were lauded by English-speaking parents who wanted their children to become bilingual, they only further embittered activists in the language minority community. Joseph Tam, an investigator for the Oregon Bureau of Labor Industries, believed that racial and cultural prejudice was driving the district’s approach toward language minorities. He remarked in 1993:

It is OK for [Portland] schools to teach Anglophone students a second language, but they would not put forth the effort in assisting minority-language students to maintain their home language. At no time are we saying we would even consider
not teaching our children English. We understand that it is the majority language. What we are saying is that that should not be accomplished at the expense of the home languages and the home cultures.\textsuperscript{70}

What Tam perhaps did not know in 1993 was that research accumulating since the mid 1980s showed that two-way bilingual programs could realize that vision for Portland’s language minorities.

Virginia Collier and Wayne Thomas were not the first to conduct long-term research on the effectiveness of two-way bilingual programs, but their findings were certainly the most influential on Portland educators. Beginning their study of the rate of second-language acquisition of language minorities in 1986, they soon found that language minorities were reaching age and grade level norms of their English-speaking peers much faster when they received some instruction in their native tongue.\textsuperscript{71} In 1995 they published a landmark study reviewing their research findings. They concluded that two-way bilingual programs were the more effective than four other dominant program models. They found that ESL pullout classes and transitional bilingual education peaked in effectiveness in the second and third grades. Late-exit or maintenance bilingual education programs were successful in bringing students up to the average performance levels of native-English speakers by the 10\textsuperscript{th} grade. Two-way programs however brought their students up to par with native-English speakers across all content areas by the 5\textsuperscript{th} grade. Students enrolled in these programs then took off in the middle school years. By the time they graduated from high school, students in two-way programs were performing well above the native English-speaker average according to the 1995 Thomas and Collier study.\textsuperscript{72}

Even before that study had been published, Cynthia Cosgrave was convinced that the district needed a two-way pilot program. Cosgrave had been with the district since 1980 as a
resource specialist and supervisor of ESL staff development, and had closely followed Thomas and Collier’s research since 1987. Her experience both in the classroom and in staff development had also given her first hand evidence of the importance of native-language literacy in second-language acquisition. When she became an immersion coordinator in 1988, Cosgrave realized that language minorities were not being represented fairly in the district’s immersion programs. She helped write a Title VII grant proposal to start a two-way program in Spanish at Beach Elementary in North Portland in 1994. Although the neighborhood had a large enough Spanish-speaking population to support wider participation, the two-way program at introduced at Beach Elementary was a fairly small one. Still, the precedent set by Beach paved the way for bolder programs to emerge.

After leaving the district in 1986, John Withers took a year sabbatical to learn Spanish. He returned to PPS as principal at Atkinson Elementary School in 1988 and immediately began to focus on language at the school. Through Title VII grants, Atkinson began to offer native language literacy and math to its Vietnamese, Cambodian, Russian, and Spanish-speaking students. Withers realized that this genuinely bilingual instruction had the advantage of increasing the level of parental involvement: “We saw that we were really excluding these kids from the educational process if the language of the school was not the language of the parents.” Seeing the success of these classes, English-speaking parents began demanding a Spanish immersion program similar to Ainsworth’s in 1994. Withers was hesitant about the merits of that model: “My own children had gone through a one-way immersion school. They came out bilingual, but had not been exposed to the actual culture of the language.” After convincing the parents that a two-way model could help close the achievement gap for both language minorities and English-speakers, Withers, Cynthia Cosgrave, and Atkinson’s site council began, over a three year period, to develop
a and implement the program. The biggest challenge was convincing the teachers at Atkinson that a two-way program could work in the school. In a 1995 site council vote, parents supported the program while teachers overwhelmingly rejected it. Over the next year, Withers and Cosgrave took parents and teachers to visit immersion programs in Eugene and Salem and organized a trip to the California Association of Bilingual Education’s annual conference on two-way bilingual education. When the program came to a vote again in 1996, the entire site council supported it.

The Atkinson two-way program began as a K-1, 50:50 model in the 1997-1998 school year. After one year, English-speaking parents asked for a 90:10 model because they wanted their children to get more Spanish earlier. By 2001, a full K-5 program was in place at Atkinson. The site council also negotiated with the district to start a middle school two-way program so that the students could continue learning in two languages after they left Atkinson. In 2002, Hosford Middle School began a two-way bilingual program in Spanish to accommodate graduates of Atkinson. Cosgrave remembered that it was at Hosford that students began to achieve remarkable results: “Those kids learned math and science in Spanish and they did marvelously.”

Finding data to support that kind of claim was a constant challenge for proponents of two-way bilingual education. When the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 adopted an official five-year target for second-language acquisition, it mandated Average Yearly Progress (AYP) reports to track the progress of the students it was now labeling as English Language Learners (ELLs). Ironically, the results of those assessments in Portland proved that two-way bilingual education, which had a longer time frame than five years, was achieving superior results than programs that focused on rapid English assimilation. Although the No Child Left Behind Act expunged all references to the word “bilingual” in federal education policy, the tests it mandated arguably added legitimacy to two-way bilingual education.
Test results at Beach Elementary, while far from overwhelming, were encouraging considering the school’s history of low test scores. It served a North Portland community with endemic poverty; 87 percent of its students received free or reduced meals between 2003 and 2005. Beach Elementary, and all of the schools within the Jefferson High School cluster, had been plagued with poor test scores for decades. The fact that its language minorities were performing anywhere near the district average was cause for celebration in the eyes of some bilingual education advocates. By 2005, Beach’s ELLs were performing 7 percent above the district ELL average in reading and 4 percent below the district ELL average in math. Considering that when AYP testing began three years earlier Beach’s language minorities were performing 10 percent below the district ELL average in both reading and math, the marginal 2005 numbers did not challenge the effectiveness of the two-way model.

Results at Atkinson were much more promising for supporters of two-way bilingual education. Between 2003 and 2005, its ELLs consistently performed above the district ELL average in reading and math. These numbers were especially remarkable because ELLs made up more than 30 percent of the school’s population. John Withers attributed these higher scores to the fact that Atkinson had a much more extensive program than Beach and also used the 90:10 model.

AYP results at Hosford Middle School were the most encouraging to advocates of two-way bilingual education. They viewed middle school scores as the key indicator of success in light of the 1995 Collier and Thomas study. By 2003, its ELLs were performing 14 percent above the district ELL average in reading. 2003 was the year that the first graduates of the Atkinson program reached eighth grade. Their high assessment scores were used as proof that a mature two-way bilingual program taking a long-term approach towards second language acquisition was Portland’s best option for language minorities.
These test results were far from perfect. Critics argued that there was no proof that the gains made in two-way programs were being sustained at the high school level. Nor could successful two-way programs in Spanish be celebrated as a silver bullet for a district with over 70 linguistic groups. PPS began to develop two-way programs in Russian and Mandarin Chinese, but the fact remained that there were thousands of language minorities in Portland who could never realistically profit from two-way bilingual education.

Still, these programs offered an attractive alternative to ones based on the deficit paradigm within their communities, a perspective that had wreaked havoc upon the district’s ESL department during the 1990s. Educators like John Withers and Cynthia Cosgrave were ready for a different approach. They found that the attitude of a community toward linguistic diversity changed radically once the school valued language minorities as a resource rather than a deficit. Cosgrave remembered: “[Atkinson] was a school with a large achievement gap. The attitude and enthusiasm that two-way bilingual education brought to the school lifted and ultimately saved it from that gap.” Whether or not assessment had proven their effectiveness, the two-way programs at Atkinson and Hosford began to generate long waiting lists of both English-speakers and language minorities.

The modest success of two-way bilingual education was, unfortunately, the exception to the rule of the deficit perspective at PPS. The idea that minority languages were a problem that needed fixing continued to thrive in Portland into the 21st century as a majority of language minorities continued to receive an education based primarily on and ESL pullout model. However, the change in attitude toward language minority education within various Portland communities was perhaps more important than the individual successes of Beach, Atkinson, and
Hosford. By 2005, a significant number of Portlanders had discovered an essential and valuable role for minority languages within their public schools.

**The Language of American Opportunity**

During the emergence of two-way bilingual education in Portland, none of its advocates argued against the long-held notion that the role of public education is to foster American citizenship. They were merely pursuing a different and at times unpopular vision of what constitutes a successful, productive American citizen. Their vision was based on educational theory rather than the cultural politics of assimilation. They valued continual cognitive development over unrealistic expectations of quick English language acquisition. They viewed an American citizen as someone with a complete set of educational skills, not just remedial English.

In writing for the majority in *Lau v. Nichols*, Justice Douglas asserted that English skills are “the very core of what these public schools teach.” The educators who started two-way programs in Portland would not have questioned that opinion. Withers, Durgan, and Cosgrave all reiterated the point that the main goal of two-way bilingual education is to help language minorities learn English. Withers remembered: “I never once met a student or family that did not want to learn English.” However, these advocates of two-way bilingual education also believed that language learning could not be isolated from other developmental issues. They argued that over-emphasis on rapid second language acquisition affects a student’s long-term opportunity in America.

Unfortunately, approaches to educating language minorities in a language they can understand were threatening to people who valued the primacy of English in America. Bilingual education programs of all types have met (and continue to meet with) all manners of irrational fears. The celebrated historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote in 1991:
Bilingualism shuts doors. It nourishes self-ghettoization, and ghettoization nourishes racial antagonism…The bilingual campaign has created both an educational establishment with a vested interest in extending the bilingual empire and political body with a vested interest in retaining a Hispanic constituency…

Most ominous about the separatist impulses is the meanness generated when one group is set against another.88

Schlesinger’s association of minority languages and bilingual education with the “separatist impulses” of a “bilingual empire” was more than a little irrational. The fact is that minority language groups want to learn English and become productive members of American society. The real issue at hand is how to help them achieve that result.

As the bankroller of the majority of the nation’s bilingual programs, the federal government has been the most vulnerable to these irrational fears of cultural separatism. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan remarked: “It is absolutely wrong and against American concepts to have a bilingual education program openly, admittedly dedicated to preserving their native language.”89 Reagan appointed William J. Bennett as U.S. secretary of education in 1985. In an inauguration speech, Bennett proclaimed: “The responsibility of the federal government must be to help ensure that local schools succeed in teaching non-English speaking students English, so that every American enjoys access to the opportunities of American society.”90 Not surprisingly, school districts were nine times less likely to be monitored for Lau compliance under the Reagan administration than under the Ford and Carter administrations.91

In overemphasizing the goal of learning English, critics of bilingual education like Reagan and Bennett neglected the importance of all the other subjects that they found so vital for English-speaking students. Whether or not language minorities learned math, history, sex education,
science, and all of the other subjects taught to native English-speakers was of little importance to them. This perspective may have been successful at making English-speakers out of language minorities, but it also created citizens who were ill prepared for life and success in American society.

8 Crawford, Educating English Learners, 107-148.
10 J. Stanley Pottinger, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Memorandum, May 25, 1970.
11 Crawford, Educating English Learners, 158.
12 Ovando et al., Bilingual and ESL Classrooms, 64-65.
13 Crawford, Educating English Learners, 114.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
A product of collaboration between PPS, Portland State University, and Lewis and Clark College, the ESL endorsement eventually became a requirement in 2001 and involved coursework in linguistics, language acquisition, and cultural diversity. Additionally, teachers were required to prove that they were fluent in a second language.

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24 Ibid.
26 Wilson, “Speaking in Tongues.”
27 Rubenstein, “ESL Paves Path.”
29 Oregon Administrative Rules 58-23-100.
34 Hoover, “Portland Bilingual Program Feels Pain.”
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
44 Sharon Chasko, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2007. A product of collaboration between PPS, Portland State University, and Lewis and Clark College, the ESL endorsement eventually became a requirement in 2001 and involved coursework in linguistics, language acquisition, and cultural diversity. Additionally, teachers were required to prove that they were fluent in a second language.
45 Ibid.
50 Crawford, Educating English Learners, 131.
55 Michael Bacon, phone interview by author, Oct. 27, 2007
56 Ibid.


Ibid.

Wilson, “Speaking in Tongues.”


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

“Special Program Students.”


Ibid.


Ibid.


Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America, cited in Crawford, Educating English Learners, 140.

Crawford, Educating English Learners, 120.


Crawford, Educating English Learners, 126.