TRAVEL, HOME AND THE SPACE BETWEEN: A FEMINIST PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES

by

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This dissertation seeks to recover a notion of agency for those who are caught in the interstices of transnational relationships, which are generally determined by practices of globalization. I examine notions of travel and home as corollary concepts that have been used metaphorically to describe the nature of the multicultural subject. Travel and home both highlight the sense of displacement caused by global capitalist markets as well as the capacity to remake and envision a new community. In this light, travel and home are understood as interpretive processes that guide social transformation in an increasingly multicultural world.

I first consider philosophical conceptions of the cosmopolitan self proposed by theorists who work on travel and diaspora. I then use this critical examination as a springboard for thinking about transnational identities, emphasizing themes of home and community as fundamental components for developing a conception of a multicultural
self. These themes also set the stage for a further consideration of multicultural selves in the context of feminist care ethics and a metaphysics of belonging. In a discussion of feminist care ethics, I examine care by highlighting the transnational relationships that connect one’s concrete caring practice to a global context. In order to articulate a metaphysics of belonging, I turn to the work of Josiah Royce and his notion of the “betweenness” relation as it emerges in his theories of provincialism, loyalty and community. This relation becomes the framework for a new understanding of multicultural selves in a transnational context.

In extending this analysis to the political context, I consider how a “betweenness” framework emerges through corollary processes of “world-traveling” conceived by Maria Lugones and “home-making” as theorized by Yen Li Espiritu in establishing transnational feminist communities. I end this dissertation by pointing out new directions in conceiving how a transnational framework might address the political challenges posed by indigenous claims to sovereignty against Asian American practices of settlement. Ultimately, I intend to show how a transnational framework can be a fruitful resource in conceptualizing the multicultural self who can respond to colonialism and oppression in an increasingly globalized world.
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To my loving soul mate, Ian, and my two beautiful sons, Forest and Ocean.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

NEGOTIATING THE SPACE-BETWEEN: TRAVEL, HOME AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Growing up in Los Angeles, CA, my neighborhood could be characterized as “transnational.” Although the families my brothers and I played with in the “concrete playgrounds” surrounding our neighborhood were Mexican and Filipino, there were also a few German and Italian families and one African American family. Living in Los Angeles, it was a norm that while people lived and loved living (some, in fact, were dutifully patriotic) in my neighborhood, there remained a sense of nostalgia or an emotional yearning for another place that was not here within the confines of my neighborhood or even within the bounded territories of the United States. My family, for example, maintained connections with the Philippines by offering our home (and sometimes my bed) to relatives and friends who were coming to or leaving the US bound to the Philippines or by sending huge cardboard packages, known as balakbayans, to the Philippines filled with clothes, shoes, candy, first aid supplies, and hospital equipment.
This sort of transnational migrant experience may lead to an alternative way of understanding the nature of the cross-cultural or multicultural self in discussions of multiculturalism and cultural diversity. I understand transnationalism as both the practices that are defined by global economic markets and the technologies of globalization, including practices of travel and border crossing, as well as the experience of those who are caught within these transnational interstices of exchange and travel. Understanding the multicultural subject within a transnational perspective emphasizes how agency is negotiated and created within the power differentials inherent in transnational practices.

In her book *Cultivating Humanity*, Martha Nussbaum argues, “The present-day world is inescapably multicultural and multinational” (1997, 8). This claim becomes sociologically evident when we consider the material conditions contemporary globalization has created on an interpenetrating and massive scale. Vertovec and Cohen in their anthology *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism* point out some of these conditions:

The relative ease and cheapness of transportation across long distances, mass tourism, large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in ‘world-cities’, the flow of commodities to and from all points of the compass and the rapid development of telecommunications (including cheap telephone calls, satellite television, email and the Internet) have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet, on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen (2002, 9).

The “intensity” of these material conditions brought on by current globalization practices seem to motivate theorists to think about how these practices affect who we are. If the changing world is insistently globalized due to migration patterns, capitalistic ventures, technological advances and political upheavals, how are we supposed to think about the cross-cultural conditions inescapably constituting our lived experience?
The rise in thinking about transnational and diasporic identities has been richly explored in disciplines such as cultural studies, ethnic studies, postcolonial studies, and women's studies. However, there has been scant attention in philosophy to utilizing this perspective in discussions of the multicultural subject or cosmopolitanism. In some cases, transnational identities and histories are referred to, but never quite developed, as in Kwame Appiah’s treatment of cosmopolitanism (2006). While Appiah refers to his diasporic history and his social location as being in between two countries, his resulting theory of cosmopolitanism leaves out an analysis of transnational identities and instead seeks a more universal understanding of a world citizen. I believe that a transnational perspective has much to offer in thinking about the multicultural subject.

Travel, border crossing, and movement are practices, the analysis of which can play an important role in thinking about the formation of transnational identities. As travel becomes an activity that interpenetrates our lives in the context of globalization, it becomes impossible to remove ourselves from these very practices, particularly when we have become so dependent on goods and resources from outside our borders. However, in thinking about travel, what becomes of our sense of home? Is home merely a place to depart from, or can we see travel as leading us to think about how homes must also be cultivated through movement? James Clifford argues that “Cultural centers, discrete regions and territories, do not exist prior to contacts, but are sustained through them, appropriating and disciplining the restless movements of people and things” (1999, 3). In this sense, travel plays a fundamental role in establishing cross-cultural contacts and encounters for cultural centers, thereby providing the context in which homes become
fluid and open for transformation. Travel challenges assumptions of home as rigid and fixed and reveals how homes are fluid and constantly changing through multiple encounters with culturally different communities. As a practical activity, travel mediates between multiple homes and hence changes the nature of cultural centers by introducing new ways of relating to culturally different others. Transnational identities articulate these ways of belonging through notions of travel and home. It is my intent in this dissertation to examine the relationships between travel and home as it fosters an understanding of transnational identities.

According to Eric Leed, the modern conception of travel, usually associated with leisure and escape, seems to be divorced from an ancient conception of travel that is more tied to pain, personal test, and effort. Leed understands the ancient conception of travel as tied more to one’s suffering, which greatly informs the traveler’s actions. Leed argues that, in this sense, the ancient conception of travel is related to notions of necessity, where one’s movement is determined by the situation, such as war, economic destitution, or by a god, rather than determined by an independent subject. However, the transformation of the subject begins at the moment the traveler loses a sense of her identity, her sense of self. This loss, according to Leed, “brings a gain of stature and certainty of self.” The traveler, “reduced to its essentials,” engages in a self-reflective activity, which allows “one to see what those essentials are” (2001, 6). Emphasizing this transformation within the context of the journey, which is laden with suffering and loss,

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1 Leed compares the writings of Odyssey and Gilgamesh as representative of the ancient conception of travel. For Leed, the ancients “valued travel as an explication of human fate and necessity.” Travel was seen as “a suffering, a penance.” In contrast, the moderns viewed travel “as an expression of freedom and an escape from necessity and purpose...and a means to pleasure” (2001, 5).
reveals a sense of travel that locates the subject between states of consciousness, moving from the old familiar self towards a new revitalized sense of self that emerges from self-reflection. The pain and suffering of travel marks a reflective space that provides for the transformation of the self.

The modern conception of travel is an escape from necessity or from the pains and trials of one’s situation and hence escapes self-reflection. Leed argues:

These factors – the voluntariness of departure, the freedom implicit in the indeterminacies of mobility, the pleasure of travel free from necessity, the notion that travel signifies autonomy and is a means for demonstrating what one “really” is independent of one context or set of defining associations – remain the characteristics of the modern conception of travel (2001, 11).

An unbridled sense of movement becomes possible, avoiding any experiences of suffering due to the exigencies of one’s situation and context. When one travels, one need not suffer the messiness of situations. The individual traveler’s experiences develop into the perspective of a spectator, one who is distinct from the daily social interactions of the people and landscapes the traveler presumably visits. This romanticized version of travel led to the development of the culture of travel in 19th Century Europe starting from the Grand Tour to current practices of tourism (MacCannell 1999). These practices have directly affected our ways of interacting with cultural difference by forming what John Urry calls “the Tourist Gaze” (1990). This gaze organizes our conceptions of how movement should and should not be conducted. This gaze has saturated our concept of travel and has led many theorists, such as Caren Kaplan, to question the use of the term
since it is usually associated with a history of exploitation, imperialism, and unchecked freedom of mobility.²

Moreover, bell hooks has questioned the viability of travel as a liberatory concept that speaks to the oppressed because she also sees the term as saturated with modern concepts of pleasure, leisure, and independence. In fact, travel cannot be an adequate way of describing the “Trail of Tears, Chinese immigrants, forced relocation of Japanese Americans, or the homeless” (hooks 1992, 173). Travel, from the perspective of the oppressed, is laced with terror and pain. Travel is rendered unintelligible as a concept in articulating the experiences of those whose movements are policed and regulated at the margins of society.

Rather than limiting our understanding of travel to the modern conception of travel, I would like to restore the self-reflective activity suggested by the ancient conception of travel. The process of self-reflection fosters an interactive dimension in the nature of travel, which involves staking ourselves in the journey, understanding the process of our own self-transformation through encounters with others, the environment and the conditions that determine the journey, rather than becoming isolated from the interactive process. The interactive component that refers to our lived experiences of travel also refers to an actual relationship that is formed when we travel. A traveling relation highlights a space between that connects what is foreign and what is familiar.

² Kaplan, like hooks, is suspicious of focusing too much on the term travel because the term is saturated with modern conceptions of pleasure, leisure and exploration, which have legitimated practices of exploitation. However, her project focuses on the term “displacement” as a way of working out the “historical taintedness of travel.” Thus, the “displacement” read in relation to travel will uncover the modern imperial assumptions regarding the movement and identity that produce our cultural representations, or the tourist gaze. Kaplan wants to maintain a notion of travel, but only in relation to notions of displacement. Kaplan understands travel as part of a modern legacy that prevents other perspectives from being recognized within a history of movement and travel (1996, 2).
Given the complicated and diverse backgrounds from which we as humans come, it is important to understand how travel underscores a relationship of interaction between differently situated subjects, rather than individual pursuits devoid of social interaction. By attending to the interactive character of travel, the realities of the marginalized will be part of the construction of the concept and recognized as part of the experience of travel itself. While the concept of displacement is important in thinking about how our travels can be involuntary and forced, it need not saturate our concept of travel as a kind of agency. While there is an involuntary component in travel, particularly in cases of displacement, it is important to see how travel cultivates a sense of the self who works out and creates her sense of agency within conditions of restraint. The traveler is not wholly determined by involuntary displacement, but can be seen as an agent creating her sense of the self within embedded and confining relationships. We see that travel underscores the relationships that both sustain us as human beings dependent upon the cultural influences of others and enables us to creatively design the nature of the interaction such that it resists exploitation and domination.

This notion of travel expands on María Lugones' concept of “world-traveling.” Lugones understands her notion of “world-travel” within the experiences of those “that have been subordinated, exploited, and enslaved, [who] have been forced to travel to ‘worlds’ in which they animate subordinate beings” (2002, 17). In other words, the notion of travel Lugones works with involves those who are displaced and live in their host communities as subordinated and oppressed beings. According to Lugones, oppressed peoples live in a tension between being a subject to oppression and resisting
oppression. Thus, their subjectivity is “placed” in between the different worlds and realities they have to negotiate. Lugones acknowledges similarities of her notion of world-travel with Kaplan’s notion of displacement. The practice of world-travel involves multiple placements and displacements and acknowledges that multiple locations are not easily “assimilable or equivalent” (Kaplan 1994, 150).³ However, rather than ending with these barriers that displacement acknowledges, Lugones seeks to “[free] this practice [world-travel] from its connection with subordination, shifting the directionality and intentionality of travel” (2002, 18). In other words, Lugones understands travel more interactively as a possible route for liberation and a creation of what she understands as an “active subjectivity,”⁴ one that is more attentive to the intricate relationships of domination because one is “placed” within them. In Lugones’ view, it is important to understand travel as a practice that embraces our sensibilities of resistance as subjects negotiating the oppressiveness and necessity of our relationships. Recognizing this tension “enables us to see the social” (2003, 7) and enables us to create our own subjectivities in a relational manner with others who are culturally different from us. Those who don’t pay attention to the traveling relation or to the ways in which we are social, do not travel, according to Lugones.

³ As cited in (Lugones 2003, 18).
⁴ According to Lugones, “active subjectivity” is an attenuated form of the modern understanding of subjectivity, which presupposes the “individual subject” or presupposes “collective intentionalities of the same” (2003, 6).

Nonetheless, what I would like to highlight is her commitment to a kind of subjectivity related to the concept of travel.
Following Lugones, I understand travel as a praxical activity that deeply informs the ways in which we are social. Travel is a social relationship that not only demands our attention to these relationships, but also understands how our subjectivities are constructed within these spaces of interaction with culturally different others. This notion of travel acknowledges the underside of history, which involves the narratives and experiences of travel by those who are regarded as subordinate, particularly immigrants.

According to Oscar Campomanes, immigration and imperialism are intimately connected. Attention to this relationship exposes how immigrants have "muted that national question" (1997, 539) and has forced the question of national identities to address international concerns because of their growing numbers in societies such as the US. From this perspective, a transnational framework is not only concerned with practices of travel, but also understands a corollary concept of home. A transnational framework recognizes the ways in which social relationships are informed by practices of imperialism, as well as how the immigrant transforms the very makeup of domestic identities. One's home is up for contestation once travel is tied to an interactive model that highlights encounters with culturally different others.

Following the insights of Campomanes and others theorizing Filipino American identities, the process of settlement is also included and seen as a corollary concept to travel. In her work surrounding Filipino American lives, Yen Li Espiritu begins

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5 I borrow this notion from Lugones who developed a theoretical maxim "so as to not be persuaded by the flights of fancy offered to me in the US academy: I won't think what I won't practice" (2003, 5). In this way, I see travel as a theoretical concept that is deeply informed by practices of travel, engagement with others rather than as individual pursuits of freedom. I assume a relationship between metaphor and lived experience.

6 For a sustained treatment of the role of home understood as a process of travel among Filipino Americans, see Espiritu 1995, 2003 and Okamura 1999. I will take up the notion of home in Chapter 5.
thinking about notions of home, belonging and community in what she terms “the space between” (2003, 10). Thinking within the space-between involves charting the lives of immigrants between languages, the old and the new, and between homes. Immigrants “do not merely insert or incorporate themselves into existing spaces in the US, they also transform these spaces and create new ones” (2003, 10). The space-between captures the contradictions, tensions, and realities of immigrant lives. Thinking about identities within the space-between admits to the ways in which the self is being made and remade by a wider community or nation. In this way, the space-between highlights the relationships of dependency that connect us to the wider international community. Espiritu argues that for immigrants, the return to home is not simply physical but also emotional and imaginative. Home is never a place that one leaves behind either literally or symbolically. Home functions as a geographical point of reference insofar as a sense of place becomes an important feature in the process of making a home. It serves as an anchor for our travels beyond our community as we interact with culturally different persons. Thus, Espiritu understands the space-between as a project of home-making for many immigrants. Home for Espiritu is understood not as an unproblematic geographical location, but a space between that challenges us to reassess our notions of community and our sense of belonging in a growing multicultural world.

Reconceiving travel and home as a process that generates agency is important because there needs to be a way in which we can open this terrain to the realities and lived experiences of the historically and philosophically forgotten travelers, including immigrants. Understanding travel and home as the space-between offers a rich resource
in conceiving the multicultural subject who must negotiate their journeys and their notion of home. A transnational perspective offers a theoretical approach to the space-between that envisions the realities and possibilities for maintaining relationships and connections between differently situated subjects. Our very mobility is in need of agency-oriented models of subjectivity that incorporate not just our bodies, but the social dimensions of the self. A transnational framework opens up the social boundaries that exist between selves and culturally different others when we do, in fact, travel. This approach highlights the boundaries of our social life that invite agency-oriented models of interaction, thus avoiding an isolated model of individual experience or "collectivities of the same" (Lugones 2003, 19). As concepts that constitute an understanding of the space-between, travel and home create new ways of thinking about our complicated sense of belonging in an increasingly multicultural world. The space-between cultivates a notion of agency within the lived tension of the social processes that constitute one's movement and settlement within multiple communities.

In this dissertation, I argue that concepts of travel and home characterize our lived experience and matter in discussions of identity for four reasons. First, processes of travel and settlement offer concrete ways to think about how relationships with culturally different others are formed. These processes guide our ways of interacting with culturally different others. In this sense, travel and home must be conceived of not simply as an activity of movement or a physical location, but as a social experience that emphasizes the establishment and maintenance of relationships between differently
situated others. In fact, one might argue that without practices of travel, cross-cultural relationships could not exist.

Second, insofar as travel establishes cross-cultural contact, it consequently plays a fundamental role in constituting the meaning of one's home and community through the complicated ways in which communities and home integrate these cross-cultural elements of social experience. Thus, travel disrupts the assumptions of home as fixed, closed, and static. Travel cannot be viewed as a benign activity of cultural transfers between destination points, but must be seen as an integral process that disrupts the rigid boundaries of communities. By connecting the community's identity with others beyond their borders, the disruption marks the possibility for social transformation of the community. For example, European expansion would not merely be viewed as movement inspired by capitalism, industry, and science. As Clifford argues, regional identities such as 'Europe' are not confined and bound to a fixed cultural category, but instead these identities are flexible, porous, and are constantly being remade "by influences beyond [the regional identities'] border" (1999, 3).

Third, travel generates a critical reflection of one's home community in relation to a culturally different one. I argue that travel involves a comparative dimension in how we come to know and understand the multicultural self. When we do engage with culturally different others through practices of travel, a reflective tendency emerges whereby, depending on where we travel, we either celebrate or criticize aspects of our social community. For example, the rigid mannerisms of some European countries might help us appreciate our more relaxed styles of engagement in the US. Alternatively, we
might come into contact with those whose social realities exist outside of capitalistic structures and thus engage us to think about the problems of US imperialism and hegemony. Understanding travel as a process that connects different cultural communities through social interaction and encourages comparative self-reflection establishes a way of thinking about the formation of the multicultural self. The social dimensions of a multicultural self must go beyond a narrow domestic narrative of social experience and must involve a cross-cultural perspective initiated by practices of travel in order to reconceive one's home.

Fourth, travel and home are conditioned by social categories including but not limited to gender, race, and ethnicity. The transnational space determining circuits of travel between nations occupies women of color in very specific ways, either emphasizing their exoticized sexualities, such as mail order brides, or their industrious bodies, working in sweat shops for multinational corporations. Travel is restricted and highly defined for those at the margins of mainstream society. Likewise, if travel is restricted for women of color, one's home is also up for contestation. The work done at First World homes becomes a prominent setting for many transnational dependency workers who are mostly women of color. In this case, travel and home become limiting activities that render the agency of these women invisible. It is important to understand how travel and home can be reconceived as a process of belonging that might be able to address the agency of these women in this transnational context.

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7 For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider only issues in race, ethnicity and gender, while only highlighting instances where class, age and ability intersect. My motivation for restricting this sort of analysis is not to suggest that class, age and ability are unimportant factors in articulating the multicultural self. Race, ethnicity and gender offer a good starting point in thinking about transnationalism and identity as seen in current scholarship (Grewal 1996, Kaplan 1996, Mohanty 2003).
Travel and home are integral concepts in thinking about identity not only because these concepts are grounded in concrete practical activities that shape human experience, but also because these concepts envision possibilities for larger international communities. Activities of travel and settlement have often negatively affected women by placing their subjectivities within subordinated positions. Power relations tend to determine gender norms, particularly when women of color are utilized as cheap labor in the global market. However, it is important to understand how these gendered norms can be resisted and re-organized such that a relationship is recognized between different cultural communities. In this way, home can be recovered for women of color within activities of travel that acknowledge a transnational relationship. Understanding the space-between as a theoretical space that envisions how larger communities are formed makes feminist pragmatism a good candidate in discussing the metaphysics of belonging.

A Feminist Pragmatist Perspective of Travel and Home: Feminist Dependency Theory and Roycean Pragmatism

Feminism and pragmatism offer important resources for thinking about the multicultural subject by articulating a model of interaction in understanding the formation of the self. Rather than appealing to abstract conceptions of humanity and ignoring the situated character of experience, feminism and pragmatism conceive of the self engaged in social interactions with others. Many theorists have considered the ways in which pragmatism and feminism can co-mingle as forming a distinct feminist and pragmatist
methodology. While I will not go into their specific arguments in detail, I would like to highlight three main commitments of feminist pragmatists. The first commitment underscores the importance of context and experience. According to Charlene Haddock Seigfried, pragmatists do share with feminists a disdain for the abstract, transcendent individual who is capable of obtaining a "God's eye" view without any appeal to experience. Feminists share with pragmatists the importance of social philosophy within philosophical theorizing (Seigfried 1996, 20). Attention to situated experience becomes a product of the mingling of both traditions.

The second commitment focuses on the relationship of politics and values, and the production of knowledge and metaphysics. Feminists can learn from pragmatists in part because of the pragmatist's attention to context that reveals the spatial and temporal backgrounds of which we are not conscious. This is where meaning and values arise. Feminists can teach pragmatists the "hidden assumptions" or "blind spots" (Sullivan 2001) in their analysis of context and experience. If we uncritically accept values, such as the subordination of women or other social groups, we acquiesce to these operative power structures and become passive participants in the formation of our lives. In this sense, pragmatism and feminism reveal how the lived experiences of women and other differently situated social groups are important factors within philosophical theorizing.

The third commitment emphasizes the need for diversity and thus dialogue among differently situated social groups. Pragmatists assume a fallibilism inherent in our processes of inquiry, that is, any theory utilized is never certain and thus requires us to be

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8 See *Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric* (Seigfried 1996), *Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism and Feminism* (Sullivan 2001), and *The Task of Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective* (McKenna 2001).
open to other experiences. According to Kathleen Abowitz, pragmatists value pluralism because diversity contributes to the growth of human beings within a social environment (1999). Feminists have enlarged pragmatist insights on pluralism through their important criticisms that relate hierarchy and power to difference and examine how these forces concomitantly influence the nature of our social relationships. The merger of both traditions results in a methodology that is more “inquiry-based” than “unified joining of identical philosophical perspectives” (Abowitz 1999, 7). In other words, while feminism and pragmatism may begin with similar assumptions about their approach to philosophical theorizing, feminist pragmatism highlights the dialectical and transformative power of philosophical theorizing within both traditions. Feminist pragmatists, through their commitment to diversity and modification of theories, allow for more hybrid (interdisciplinary) methodologies within philosophy.

However, for the most part, recent feminist pragmatism lacks an analysis of the experiential dimensions of interaction comprising our social relationships⁹ as I highlight them in my analysis of travel and home. I turn to care ethics as a starting point in thinking about how feminist pragmatism might expand the notion of social interaction. Additionally, I turn to Rocyeans pragmatism to further develop the metaphysics of the space between as it ties closer to our lived experience. This particular methodology under a feminist pragmatist framework offers a unique account of how the social self

⁹ In *Feminism and Pragmatism* (1996), Siegfried considers the history of feminism and pragmatism and is an attempt to recover the lost feminists in American Philosophy, such as Jane Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Within a feminist pragmatist framework, McKenna in *The Task of Utopia* (2001) seeks to reconstruct the idea of utopia from a static and debilitating view to a more workable and liberating possibility in social thought. While Sullivan in *Living Across and Through Skins* (2001) argues for a notion of transaction within Dewey’s thought in thinking about the body, she lacks an analysis of the social dimension of interaction between differently situated groups. She merely argues that transactions take place between people, but does not account for the specific ways in which the transactions take place.
relates to questions of multiculturalism and diversity. Linking a feminist pragmatist approach of care ethics to Royce’s metaphysics of the space-between offers important insights into the nature of the social dimensions of travel I highlighted earlier with an incisive perspective of how selves emerge within the context of colonization and imperialism.

My feminist pragmatist reconstruction of travel and home offers ways of understanding the theoretical space-between as being closely related to lived experience, specifically to concrete practices of travel and settlement. Understanding travel as sites of contact and exchange or boundary spaces, rather than a touristic activity that merely spectates from a comfortable and detached resort, underscores the process of interaction and mutual exchange necessary to the activity of travel itself. The space-between highlights an interactive dimension when we do encounter culturally different others. This interactive dimension inherent in the space-between does not suggest we leave our homes or our specific loyalties and commitments to our communities. We do leave home, but in a way we carry the roots of home, i.e. our loyalties and commitments, with us; these commitments guide our interpretations. Through travel, we enter into a state of “betweenness” where new relationships emerge and new connections are realized. In this sense, transnational subjects and immigrants can be seen from a more philosophical perspective. While these subjects live abroad from their country of origin, they are still connected to their original “home.” In the context of the transnational migrant, identities are indeed bound up with practices of travel and settlement where contact and exchange is sustained in transit.
Overview

In carving out a transnational philosophical framework for understanding the issues of multiculturalism, it is important to clarify our understanding of who the multicultural subject is and how international communities are formed in our current state of globalization. Chapter 2 examines two ways of thinking about the multicultural subject in the age of globalization: Martha Nussbaum’s philosophical exile and Rossi Braidotti’s nomadic subject. I argue that both views evade one’s particular social context and embedded relationships with culturally different others. These two strategies resonate with modern desires for travel based on pleasure and leisure rather than understanding travel as a form of social interaction, where commitments to culturally different others are made relative to the specific interaction. I argue that a transnational philosophical framework, which adheres to an interactive model of travel, provides an alternative model of the multicultural subject by highlighting the agency of culturally different others. An interactive model understands the self as constituted through social interaction and underscores the porosity of our identities, thereby exposing certain relationships of dependency we have with culturally different others.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I articulate a model of interaction, one that generates a notion of agency that is embedded within a specific context rather than one that appeals to abstract concepts of humanity. In Chapter 3, I turn to Eva Kittay’s work on dependency and Jane Addams’ work with immigrants. I argue that dependency and care can be expanded to a more cosmopolitan dimension through the philosophy and social work of Jane Addams. Kittay’s basic argument is that dependency is an inescapable fact of our
humanity, and thus a public ethos of care is important to address the inevitable consequences of human dependency. Addams provides resources in thinking about how a public ethos of care can extend to a transnational ethos of care, one that highlights the experiences of immigrants in the US in order to articulate an alternative model of social interaction. I argue that dependency not only underscores our embeddedness with other persons and greater communities, but also establishes a moral claim that guides our moral judgments to act in a responsive manner relative to these relationships. Addams exposes our transnational dependencies through her work with immigrants. Understanding the traveling relation as one of dependence emphasizes the connections and relations that necessarily manifest themselves when one travels to other countries or foreign communities. In this sense, dependency exposes the intimate relationships that connect us with culturally different persons. Thus, we are able to act in a responsive manner relative to these relationships of dependency.\(^{10}\)

In Chapter 4, I show how Josiah Royce’s notion of provincialism not only discloses the genuine loyalties we have with our specific communities, but also establishes a sense of connection with other communities outside our national boundaries. Royce offers a logical argument for the “space-between,” highlighting a rich application to the area of international relations. While care is emphasized as the ethical response to individuals understood as beings connected with others, Royce develops a notion of

\(^{10}\) Many globalization theorists have argued that US hegemony has made underdeveloped nations dependent on American goods and services (in the forms of loans and aid) and this dependence has hindered these nations’ flourishing and has perpetuated US colonialist domination. My argument, however, understands dependency as a necessary feature of the human condition and applies to every human being, not just those who are members of underdeveloped nations. Furthermore, dependency, conceived within feminist care ethics emphasizes an ethical component that criticizes acts of exploitation. My argument expands this notion of dependency to articulate the nature of cross-cultural relationships.
loyalty that serves as a logical and ethical principle in addressing the individual’s relationship to a community. Royce ultimately understands the self ensconced within a community of interpreters who actively engage with one another in the pursuit of meaning. For Royce, loyalty is the thoroughgoing commitment of a person to a cause that one genuinely accepts as one’s own. In the case of provincialism, loyalty is the mortar that binds individuals to a province that one genuinely embraces as one’s own community. His notion of provincialism not only emphasizes how we, as individuals, are connected with our own provincial communities, but affirms that our provincial communities are necessarily connected with a national identity, which is also necessarily connected to something larger still. Royce does not see our national identity solely as a sum of many provincial communities (more specifically, within a domestic perspective), but sees our provincial identities in relation to foreign and international communities, countries, and regions. Thus, for Royce, travel is an important activity in defining notions of ourselves insofar as people do occasionally leave their homes and come into contact with culturally and socially different others. A traveling relation emerges that ultimately connects our provincial and national identities to an international citizenry. In this sense, provincialism defines a way of understanding how our loyalties to our communities require responsiveness inside as well as outside the traditional norms and customs of our respective communities. The question my project lays out, inspired by Royce, is how do we travel in a way that is consistent with our loyalties to our communities?
Following this ontological analysis of community, I show in Chapter 5 how notions of travel and home work together to articulate the sense of interaction that defines the space-between, particularly in the case of feminist coalitional politics. I show how Lugones' notion of "world-traveling" and Espiritu's notion of "home making" are corollary concepts that address the importance of social interaction in the process of building transnational feminist coalitional communities. In feminist theory, the concepts of travel and home have been individually utilized to understand differences between women. I bring these two concepts together to articulate the possibility of envisioning meaningful coalitional communities that can guide the future of feminist politics.

In my concluding remarks, I examine an important challenge to transnational identities offered by Native perspectives. One of the problems of transnational identities is the process of settlement. Asian American identities are bound up with an insistent need to make a home in the US, as well as maintaining one's connections to the homeland. Rather than viewing travel, including immigrant travel, as "predatory" and unconnected to any sense of place as argued by Native Hawaiians (Trask 1994 & 2000), understanding travel through a transnational framework suggests how home is re-situated to a sense of place or, more aptly, to specific interactions with culturally different others and landscapes. Viewing practices of travel as an activity that anchors us to a sense of place might aid in establishing coalitions between different cultural groups, potentially addressing the politics of location between Native and immigrant groups.

Understanding the space-between as an interactive dimension inspired by feminist concerns with subordination and exploitation, and by pragmatists' commitment to a
social ontology that characterizes an individual's relationship to community, becomes a viable resource in reconceiving travel and home as practices that address the complicated nature of belonging in discussions of cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity. It is important to see how notions of travel and home understood as corollary concepts inform the theoretical space-between, which emphasizes the importance of social interaction.
CHAPTER II
RE-ROUTING COSMOPOLITAN THOUGHT IN
MULTICULTURALISM: TOWARDS A CRITICAL TRANSNATIONAL
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK

In philosophy, much of how we think about travel rests on the modern view of
tavel, which is associated with leisure, pleasure, and freedom of mobility. Travel is
usually associated with individual choice and is considered to be an activity one does
alone to achieve self-transformation. Immanuel Kant, in his essay “Perpetual Peace,”
views travel as a “temporary sojourn” to which everyone has a right. Mobility within
space is understood within Kant’s assumption that the earth is “the common possession”
we all share. Thus, it is our right to embark on journeys to other geographical places.
While Kant does not specify any obligations of the traveler while visiting other
geographical places, Kant details specifically the obligations of the host country. The
right of travel is guaranteed and universalized through the duty of hospitality.
“Hospitality means the right of the stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives
in the land of another” (Kant 1983, 118). While travel is not necessarily understood as a
social activity in which one engages and interacts with culturally different others, Kant's
notion of hospitality (understood in a negative sense of freedom) emphasizes the social
activity (albeit on the part of the host country and not the traveler) in determining the
ethical and moral nature of the cross-cultural interaction. As early as Kant, we see how
travel is theorized as a way of thinking about international communities.

In an age of globalization and growing multicultural communities in societies
such as the US, travel as a concept continually persists in cosmopolitan literature (Tully
1995, Appiah 2006). Travel becomes a useful way of thinking about how the cross-
cultural dimensions inescapably determining our lives constitute notions of the self.
However, what we need are better ways of thinking about travel that highlight the space-
between emergent in our social relationships with culturally different others. Having a
better concept of travel enables us to think about the nature of multicultural subjects
without assenting to modern touristic assumptions about travel. Following Clifford, once
travel is understood as a cultural practice, the notion of home also becomes subject to
revision. Understanding how travel and home are mutually informing concepts
emphasizing relationships within the space-between changes the nature of philosophical
discussions of the self by emphasizing the ways in which selves are contextualized and
situated within processes of globalization and transnationalism. A transnational approach
assumes multiple perspectives and points of view rather than a narrow perspective on
travel, which is often associated with individual forms of leisure and pleasure and the
avoidance of social interaction.
In this chapter, I will locate my understanding of the multicultural or cross-cultural self by critically examining two philosophical perspectives that address the nature of the multicultural subject in the context of contemporary globalization: Martha Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and Rossi Braidotti's figuration of the nomad. Nussbaum describes the cosmopolitan self as one in exile, while Braidotti celebrates the virtue of nomadism in order to escape the constraining and often limiting theoretical constructions of the self in identity politics or in cases of ethnic separatism. Travel, for both theorists, allows us to find commonalities (for Nussbaum) or sustain difference (for Braidotti) when encountering culturally different others. I find both projects important in responding to the growing international forces impinging on our notions of the self. However, I think that we need to understand the cross-cultural or multicultural self in a way that highlights the specific and entangled relationships we have with the communities in which we live in and are a part of. Ultimately, any understanding of travel, especially when discussing a cross-cultural notion of the self, must focus on particular engagements with particular communities or specific individuals rather than a categorical identity based on singular master narratives of belonging or non-belonging.

The first two sections of the chapter criticize both Nussbaum’s construction of a liberal universal notion of the self based on the ideal of humanity and Braidotti’s postmodern self, which attempts to break free of any universal conceptions of the self. Both ultimately posit a view of the self that eschews group identifications, including any specific loyalties and commitments one may have to a particular cultural community, although they arrive at different conclusions. Moreover, this view of the self, which
resists certain loyalties and commitments to a specific community, reinstatiation a “homogenous” multiculturalism, which employs a single master narrative of identity and ignores the multiple and entangled experience of cross-cultural interaction. Given the lack of attention to the lived experiences of certain travelers in a multicultural world, I argue that both authors engage in what Caren Kaplan describes as “theoretical tourism.” Similar to the mass-based tourist industry, which involves the tourist consuming cultural experiences within an environmental bubble crafted and mystified by capitalistic structures, theoretical tourism engages and defends social prescriptions on multicultural issues in an ahistorical and romanticized fashion that escapes any analysis of the material realities determining the lives of many travelers, including transnational migrants. In response to these views, I show in the last section of the chapter how an understanding of a cross-cultural self, based within a transnational perspective, emphasizes the social dimension of travel and offers an alternative perspective by thinking about the nature of international communities as a socially embedded process, rather than viewing these social relationships from a detached distance.

In my criticisms of Nussbaum and Braidotti, I rely upon theorists such as Gloria Anzaldúa, Vine Deloria Jr., Jamaica Kincaid, Jane Addams, and Caren Kaplan to articulate the role of social engagement that usually is ignored in discussions of travel and the cross-cultural self. These criticisms of the individual abstract subject anticipate my reconstruction of an understanding of travel as transnational practices of care in Chapter 3, which emphasizes the embedded social relations of dependency and care that situate the social, political, and moral dimensions of our social lives.
Traveling Identities: The Cosmopolitan and Nomadic Self

The Cosmopolitan Exile

Nussbaum’s project in her book *Cultivating Humanity* offers a liberal, universal account of the self in response to the growing need in liberal education to address concerns of multiculturalism or diversity. The purpose of a liberal education today is to prepare students to become more “cosmopolitan,” “world citizens” in the face of a globalized market economy. While I find her project compelling and important, I think her rendition of the cosmopolitan self fails to address the concerns raised in identity politics, namely that one’s identity is inescapably bound up in specific commitments and loyalties to particular or multiple communities. As a result, Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan self ultimately avoids finding commonalities in specific encounters with culturally different others and, instead, transcends cross-cultural interactions to an abstract ideal of humanity.

Inspired by Diogenes, Nussbaum defends a notion of the multicultural self as a “world citizen.” Cultivating one’s humanity assumes that citizens’ primary loyalty is to human beings and not their specific loyalties to their national, cultural, or group affiliations. A weaker version of this world citizenship, the one that Nussbaum tries to defend in her book, recognizes the importance of our specific loyalties to our particular group affiliations and also recognizes over and against these specific loyalties that we are “bound by common human abilities and problems to people who lie at a great distance from us” (1997, 9). Nussbaum suggests that it is important for citizens who cultivate their humanity to identify themselves beyond specific group affiliations and to appeal to a
wider category of humanity, which requires us to “venture beyond narrow group loyalties and to consider the reality of distant lives” (1997, 10). Ultimately, Nussbaum attempts to make sense of the distance from culturally different others that is manifest in our experience. This distance, however, not only seems to create an impassable barrier between groups, it also requires that our interactions with culturally different others must occur from a distance, mediated by a vertical relationship to a transcendental ideal of humanity, rather than by a horizontal relationship that engages the specific cultural differences of the interaction.

Nussbaum’s epistemological position underscores the movement of the philosophical exile, which seeks a disconnected perspective to find commonalities between culturally different others. She argues:

Set in this context, the invitation to consider ourselves citizens of the world is the invitation to become, to a certain extent, philosophical exiles from our own ways of life, seeing them from the vantage point of the outsider and asking the questions an outsider is likely to ask about their meaning and function (1997, 58).

This enterprise as a philosophical exile celebrates a Socratic ideal that challenges the “old education” and establishes a “new education” based on critical examination of accepted truths. Unfortunately, according to Nussbaum, the philosophical exile is often a lonely figure standing apart from her own cultural norms and practices. However, it is unclear how she understands her solitude as a philosophical exile. Is she lonely because her self-identification is with a universal and transcendent community of humanity, which is in conflict with her specific loyalties and commitments to her local community, or is she lonely because of split loyalties and commitments she has with multiple communities? The difference between these experiences of loneliness is that the former transcends lived
social engagements, while the latter emphasizes conflicts and tensions that are felt in actual cross-cultural interaction.

I believe Nussbaum’s loneliness stems from an analytical and ahistorical category of exclusion, not one based on the inclusive and conflicting tensions one often faces when one is caught in the middle of multiple communities of the sort Gloria Anzaldúa describes in her notion of the borderlands (1999, 3). For those who occupy the borderlands of cultures, like Anzaldúa, loneliness is experienced as a sense of alienation from un choque, or the cultural collision of “two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference” (Anzaldúa 1999, 100). Rather than responding to this experience of cultural collision with flights to distant abstract communities or through exclusive thinking, the mestiza consciousness moves “toward a more whole perspective, one that includes rather than excludes” (Anzaldúa 1999, 101). Nussbaum posits an ahistorical account of exile whose experience of loneliness participates in exclusive thinking and functions above social interactions, unlike those at the borderlands who live in between conflicting loyalties and commitments.

Moreover, Nussbaum’s vision of exile exudes a romanticism indicative of modernity’s conception of the individual self and reveals touristic tendencies rather than liberatory possibilities. Caren Kaplan argues that twentieth century Euro-American expatriation, and I would include Nussbaum’s version of the philosophical exile as part of this tradition, has legitimated “aesthetic” dimensions of detachment and statelessness. This modern version of exile is not usually theorized from the experiences of those who are in exile and thus, as Kaplan argues, this aesthetic form of exilic displacement
“occupies a privileged position” (1996, 36). Kaplan further associates this place of privilege with touristic movement, in which one collects experiences of “otherness” rather than commercial products (1996, 46). The privileged aesthetic spectator of experience retains a similar detached perspective to Nussbaum’s flight to the ideal of humanity where specific differences are naturalized [all humans —read rational and moral — are equal]. In this position of privilege, there is no need to understand culturally different others in terms of their own perspective, since the ideal of humanity is what binds us all together.

Jamaica Kincaid offers a powerful critique against the touristic perspective, which functions apart from the place and the people the tourist visits. In Antigua, Kincaid describes the tourist perspective as one who watches from a distance the banalities of the life of culturally different others. This perspective ultimately sees the tourist as an ugly thing, that is what you are when you become a tourist, an ugly, empty thing, a stupid thing, a piece of rubbish pausing here and there to gaze at this and taste that, and it will never occur to you that the people who inhabit the place in which you have just paused cannot stand you, that behind their closed doors they laugh at your strangeness (you do not look the way they look) (Kincaid 1988, 17).

The consequences of this detached perspective, usually masked within a language of equality—such as the ideal of humanity—are the tourist’s unfamiliarity with the real living conditions of Antiguans: the bad roads, poor health care and education facilities, and the history of oppression in Antigua. Because the realities of the experiences of culturally different others are concealed within a language of escape and privilege, cultural difference becomes a touristic product to be consumed, rather than understood as subjects of social interaction. To visit Antigua would be to engage the local inhabitants
in order to understand their lives, rather than appealing to an ideal human community, an appeal that often masks a position of privilege and is not attentive to the power differentials that exist in social life. Ultimately, the philosophic exile establishes a vertical relationship to an abstract ideal of humanity, creating a kind of historical amnesia of particular cultural traditions, including her own.

The verticality in which we are supposed to identify ourselves becomes a theme in Nussbaum’s notion of cosmopolitanism. Diogenes, her cosmopolitan exemplar, posits a self-image that goes beyond his specific group identity as a Greek male. Rather, he identifies himself “in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns” (Nussbaum 1997, 52). The more universal community of humanity is where one is to be common with other culturally different persons and where differences do not exist or are epiphenomenal. Thus, our loyalties and moral obligations truly lie in this community. But what are the conditions for understanding this universal human community? What makes a person human? Nussbaum identifies two elements necessarily constituting humanity: reason and moral capacity (1997, 59). Humanity is not recognized in our place of birth, since this is an accidental feature of human experience. It is recognized only in the rational and moral capacities that allow us to resist an uncritical assimilation of dogmatic truths or the narrow localism of our cultural community’s customs and traditions. In fact, loyalty to one’s community is thought of as an uncritical enterprise and one must, as Diogenes suggests, maintain detachment, for it is through detachment that we are to become more critical and thus rational and moral, and hence human.

According to the Stoics, who expand Diogenes’ notion of a world citizen, the capacity of
reasoning endures longer, although it is less colorful than local tradition, and characterizes the fundamental or essential aspect of who we are as humans.

Treating culturally different persons with respect as humans is a noble project and appeals to one's common sense. Borrowing Kantian intuitions, one should not degrade another because humans are ends in themselves. From an international perspective, one has a duty to respect humanity even those considered “aliens on our soil” (1997, 59). One mustn’t, the sentiment goes, treat foreigners badly; out of respect for their humanity, it is our duty to see that they are treated hospitably and respectfully. The Stoics insist that our local problems within our specific communities can be solved once we see how our traditions and ways of life relate to the traditions and ways of life of other reasonably minded people. In other words, our specific local problems can be solved once our “imaginations are unconstrained by our narrow partisanship” (1997, 60). Again, it is this vertical relationship that characterizes cross-cultural relationships. One appeals to common-sense intuitions of humanity, that is, to our rational and moral capacities, as if these human capacities functioned apart and above our situated cultural and social communities and relationships.

While Nussbaum highlights the shared and universal quality of rationality as a defining feature of humanity, she does not indicate how one resolves communicative differences between culturally different persons who have radically different ontologies or conceptions of how the world is ordered. In other words, how might an understanding of us as rational beings resolve the anomalous cultural experiences that impinge on our field of experience? It seems that the problem of the translation of languages and cultural
assumptions remains as a barrier to any rational solutions of respect towards others simply because they are human. For example, Vine Deloria Jr. in *Power and Place* exposes the difference between Native ontologies, which assume a person model that ultimately rejects Western-inspired theories of causation, and Western ontologies, which assume a machine model that adheres to such theories. How might the fact that we share rational qualities resolve deep differences in ontology? James Sterba in *Three Challenges to Ethics* also recognizes the difference in ontologies, highlighting how Mayans understood themselves not in terms of rationality, as beings separate from nature, but as integral participants in the unfolding process of nature (2001, 82). If the self-world relation is ordered in a way that views humans as part of nature rather than in terms of a shared common capacity of rationality, how might we resolve differences in what we mean by "humanity"? In fact, Nussbaum's notion of a universal humanity is a conception grounded in a specific location. Who determines what constitutes humanity? These different ways of thinking about the world often result in miscommunication, the inability to resolve conflict, and finally violence. There is a risk that the communication process between disparate groups will result in assimilation, where the experience of cultural difference is entirely understood in terms of a single culture. Resolving different group ontologies is not a simple procedure that can be easily addressed by assenting to an ideal of humanity.

Nussbaum continues her appeal to a universal notion of humanity in her defense of Diogenes' notion of concentric circles. Each circle surrounding the self consists of one's familial, provincial, and national group identifications. The last circle
encompassing all these particular circles is the community of humanity, in which the goal of a world citizen is to “draw the circles somehow toward the center” (1997, 60). In this sense, one’s city, provincial, and familial relationships are subsumed under a common ideal of humanity. In this way, one does not need to give up specific group identifications; rather, the community of humanity is widened to incorporate all such affiliations. It is important to note that the way in which specific group identities are subsumed under the universal human community is through shared rational and moral qualities, not through intimate interactions with culturally different others.

As argued earlier, the move to subsume group differences under a common ideal of humanity risks assimilation. Moreover, this assimilative strategy fails to encourage interaction insofar as Nussbaum’s recommendation for a multicultural liberal education and often adheres to a scholastic ideal of knowledge accumulation, i.e. collecting information from varied cultural sources, rather than actually interacting with diverse cultural communities. Marilyn Fischer challenges Nussbaum’s recommendation of intellectual study with Jane Addams’ lived interactions with diverse immigrant populations at Hull House. Fischer argues that Nussbaum’s “citizen of the world” resembles the idea of cultivating an international mind forwarded by Nicholas Murray Butler, who was president of Columbia University and a long-time peace activist before World War I. Fisher comments that both Braidotti’s and Nussbaum’s sense of international citizenship assumes a “well-educated and traveled” person (2006, 8). Unlike this model, Fischer argues for a sense of cosmopolitanism that is attentive to one’s specific interactions with those that are culturally different. Through Addams’ work with
the immigrant population in Chicago (more of Addams’ work here will be explicated in Chapter 3), Fischer argues that if the motivation for thinking about cosmopolitanism is to lead to discussions of peace and social justice, then it is important to consider real interactions with culturally different people who are “planted in the mud: fully embodied, loving, hating, sometimes rational, sometimes not, strongly attached to their habits and conventions” (2005, 10). While studying other cultures is important, the day-to-day experience of living with culturally different others offers a different horizontal approach to cosmopolitanism. What Fischer is highlighting and what I am suggesting here is that Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan ideal avoids any specific interaction with the day-to-day lives of culturally different persons.

To clarify this point, I want to contrast the “psychic restlessness” Anzaldúa describes at the borderlands with Nussbaum’s restless philosophical exile. The psychic restlessness of Anzaldúa is brought on by the cultural collision, the lived experience of conflict, and tension between different cultures. Furthermore, Fischer’s description of cosmopolitanism, which incorporates the works of Jane Addams, and Anzaldúa’s model of the blending of cultures creating a new culture both highlight the interactive dimensions comprising our experiences. A philosophical exile functions much like a tourist cloaked in romanticizing and demystifying images of detachment and homelessness. The result is that one’s rootedness in specific cultural communities, including one’s own, is supplanted by a vertical relationship to an abstract and mystified sense of identity.
The Feminist Nomad

While Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism disregards one's specific cultural loyalties and commitments in defining one's identity, Rossi Braidotti offers a different image of the self as a nomad in order to address the state of multiculturalism in Europe. Rather than referring to the actual experiences of nomads, she presents this image as a political figuration that enables her to forge a new way of thinking about feminist subjectivity in resistance to hegemonic, phallocentric ways of thinking. Drawing from Deleuze and Guatarri's ideas of the nomad, this fictitious epistemological position is related to a "critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and behavior" (Braidotti 1994, 5). Opposed to a perspective that assents to an abstract ideal of humanity, Braidotti views nomadic subjectivity as highlighting "intensive interconnectedness" in describing the "flow from one set of experiences to another" (1994, 5). In contrast to Nussbaum, Braidotti attempts to establish a horizontal relationship with culturally different others. However, like Nussbaum, she views group identifications with one's specific cultural loyalties and commitments as problematic in effecting communication and interaction between disparate groups. While her intentions for creating an interconnected feminist subjectivity is a laudable and important project, I think that her understanding of nomadic subjectivity often relies on totalizing notions of escape and adheres to a master narrative of non-belonging. I argue that while Braidotti's notion of the nomad frees us from dogmatism and narrow localism and explores a kind of travel very different from the traditional tourist, this way of thinking about the self nonetheless ignores specific encounters with culturally different others. Utilizing
analysis from anthropologists\textsuperscript{11} studying the global nomad in the form of the backpacker. I show how Braidotti’s notion of travel in her version of the nomad resembles a place of privilege by creating a romanticized place of critique against the dominant form of tourist travel. I argue that Braidotti’s nomadic subject assumes a notion of travel that transcends cross-cultural interaction and ultimately engages in another form of “theoretical tourism.”

Braidotti uses Deleuze and Guatarri’s theory of nomadology in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} and \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, which highlights lines of escape against modernity’s universal and totalizing methods and assumptions. Caren Kaplan argues that their version of the nomad appeals to romantic and mystified notions of cultures at the periphery of dominant European society, rather than underscoring the “transnational circuits of capital and power in postmodernity” (1996, 89). She argues specifically that Deleuze and Guatarri’s strategy of “becoming minor” requires an “emulation” of other less privileged identities, while forgoing one’s own privileged location in dominant society. Kaplan identifies this move, despite its attempt to decolonize spaces for the colonized, as a kind of “theoretical tourism,” collecting cultural experiences as if they were consumer products (1996, 88). Following Kaplan’s insights, I also think that Braidotti’s figuration of the nomad begins at a privileged location, while simultaneously positing a non-romantic, non-mystified view of the subject by critiquing the very material structures that engender hegemonic phallocentrism. Hence, her notion of the nomad resists a form of romanticization and idealization and thus is not touristic in this sense. I

\textsuperscript{11} For a detailed treatment of this view, see \textit{The Global Nomad: Backpacker Travel in Theory and Practice} (Richards & Wilson 2004).
will take up this claim later in the chapter. For now, I would like to highlight a few characteristics of Braidotti’s political figuration of the nomad subject.

First, her theoretical position is an “anti-essentialist position” because her description of woman seeks to empower women by activating “sociosymbolic changes in their condition” (1994, 4) within physical and social categories defining woman. The nomadic subject refers to the simultaneous occurrences of the many different axes of differentiation, such as “class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and others” (1994, 4). The nomad, however, ultimately resists these “socially coded modes of thought and behavior” (1994, 5) and seems to transcend specific cultural affiliations and group identifications.

Second, the nomad as a polyglot (one who can speak many languages) provides another way of understanding the fluidity of movement the nomad embodies. The polyglot demonstrates the critical perspective within horizontal linguistic relationships. She argues, “The polyglot surveys this situation with the greatest critical distance; a person who is in transit between the languages, neither here nor there, is capable of some healthy skepticism about steady identities and mother tongues” (1994, 12). In between languages, the nomad as polyglot maintains a critical distance of any accepted socially and culturally inscribed truths.

While this description of the nomad as polyglot is inspiring since it challenges dogmatism and fixed assumptions and also offers a heterogeneous way of thinking through ontological differences sometimes coded in specific cultural language rules, I think her version of the nomadic polyglot runs into moments of nostalgia and primitive romanticism that Kaplan identifies in Deleuze’s and Guatarri’s notion of the nomad.
Braidotti argues that “the best gift to give anyone, but especially a polyglot is: a new word, a word s/he does not know yet” (1994, 13). Not only does this desire and aesthetic enjoyment of being “given” a new word represent a romanticized notion of spaces of the periphery reminiscent of imperialist discourses, but there also remains a capitalistic sense of theoretical tourism, where one does not purchase products but rather fetishizes cultural experiences of “uncolonized” or “undiscovered” topographies.

Nomad aesthetic, according to Braidotti, ultimately functions as a singular master narrative of non-belonging as opposed to Nussbaum’s master narrative of belonging. Nomadic writing, according to Braidotti, “longs for the desert: areas of silence, in between the official cacophonies, in a flirt with radical non-belonging and outsideness” (1994, 16). One might think that a radical state of non-belonging and outsideness would mean that one is perpetually homeless. However, Braidotti argues that the nomad is capable of inhabiting any space and recreating a home in any cultural environment, stating:

As an intellectual style, nomadism consists not so much in being homeless, as in being capable of recreating your home everywhere. The nomad carries her/his essential belongings with her/him wherever s/he goes and can recreate a home base anywhere (1994, 16). (My italics.)

In fact, the nomad subject is one who possesses many passports (1994, 33). In virtue of this fluid mobility, it appears that Braidotti’s nomadic movement occurs above specific cross-cultural interactions. The nomad participates in modes of totality within an aesthetic that seeks and freely moves within multiple places and destination points. Meaningful cross-cultural exchanges are limited since the nomad is always leaving and going somewhere else. Moreover, identities, according to Braidotti, are not permanent
for the nomad, but rather are transitory; connections made with specific cultural communities are only partial acceptances of that particular national or cultural identity.

A nomadic self is a varied subject unconstrained by the history and traditions of any cultural community, including her own originating community, and is thus capable of "recreating a home base" with any community in which she finds herself "adjusted." In *Custer Died for Your Sins*, Vine Deloria, Jr. worries about the attitude developed by anthropologists who think they can become "Indian experts" in Native communities. The nomad also develops this sort of attitude through her travels. The assumption that one can understand Native problems fosters a paternalizing attitude and leads to the misrepresentation of Indian concerns (1988, 27). While Braidotti argues that the nomad does not fully accept the particular national and cultural identity of the community in which she temporarily resides, it is unclear to what extent she is then able to "recreate a home base" in a particular cultural community. Deloria underscores an attitude of respect to cultural boundaries and argues for a "leave us alone law" where "in spirit and in fact" one respects the limits and boundaries for a cultural group (1988, 27). He observes the freedom of travel exhibited by whites who claim specious lines of ancestry to Native cultures and thus legitimate their sympathies with Native concerns. This privileged sort of travel must be tempered by prudent travel advice: "There are some places you just can't go." It is important to understand the limiting conditions of travel. While boundaries mark differences between cultures, it need not be understood as un-crossable. Deloria is concerned with the colonial attitude that ignores the awareness of certain cultural boundaries. For Deloria, the ease of travel assumed by whites to Native
Communities is conditioned by race and social privilege. The consequences when these boundaries are not respected involve an annihilation of the cultural group's autonomy through policies of paternalism.

Moreover, Braidotti's nomadic ahistorical master narrative of non-belonging ultimately conflicts with the lived experiences of transnational migrants. Braidotti opposes nomadic identity with immigrant communities, describing this sort of travel experience, which might be thought of as nomadic, as narrow, closed, and separatist.

While I agree with Braidotti that women play an important role "as loyal keepers of the original home culture" (1994, 22), I fully disagree with Braidotti's description of migrant experience as "compulsive displacement" (22). The problem with migrant communities, according to Braidotti, is that the migrant maintains commitments and loyalties to their country of origin. This has "the effect of destabilizing the present" (Braidotti 1994, 24). In other words, Braidotti assumes that one's connection to one's country of origin is a "past experience," and this past experience destabilizes present ways of interacting with one's host community. In fact, because the nostalgia migrants feel is temporalized as a past experience, it acts as a "burden" and a "blocked horizon," bearing a "fossilized definition of language," where the present can never fully emerge. Thus, according to Braidotti, migrant communities have emerged in an isolated state in European cities. She further diagnoses her inability as a white privileged European feminist to interact with foreign female domestic workers living in these migrant communities as indicative of the migrant's frozen and fossilized identity with their country of origin. This frozen and isolated state identifies dominant society as a "permanent object of longing and fear,"
thus encouraging “hybridization without joyful creative relief” (1994, 25). A nomadic subjectivity would not have this burden of past experience of belonging to one’s country of origin and would be capable of “hybridizing with joyful creative relief.” A nomadic subject is transient and is committed to living in the present, unconstrained by past commitments and loyalties to one’s country of origin.

One of the main problems of Braidotti’s rendition of the migrant and celebration of the nomadic subject is that she continually assents to romantic and mystified descriptions of placelessness and non-belonging. While she claims that she is not mystifying this particular subjectivity, she resorts to romanticized language of escape when describing identities, lived and felt by migrant communities, as frozen, past tense, and fossilized. She again colonizes the spaces of the other by describing a more adventurous and fashionable version of the nomad. What she fails to recognize is the complexity of the transnational connections transpiring between the female domestic worker in Europe and her country of origin as a present experience. The balakbayan packages, the frequency of visitors immigrating to a host country, the constant cultural translation that occurs within these spaces, even if they appear in communities where language and customs are maintained, should not be regarded as fossilized or separatist given the context and history in which these communities emerged.

While Braidotti understands immigrant communities as separatist or blocked, it is important to keep in mind Lisa Lowe’s argument in Immigrant Acts that it is impossible for any immigrant to remain separate from mainstream society. The insistence by countries such as the US on maintaining monolingual cultural values prevents immigrants
from being "closed" to dominant society. In Europe, where monolingual values may not be upheld, the economic structure also prevents immigrants from being "closed" to dominant society, since their very work is determined by the needs of privileged society (Lowe 1996). Interaction, translation, and negotiation are constant themes in the lives of many people of color. María Lugones has argued that "world-traveling" is a skill that many people of color develop because of their position in society. Braidotti, like other white feminists, seem to forget this fact.

Finally, I would like to suggest that Braidotti's notion of the nomad participates in "theoretical tourism," defined by Kaplan as an intellectual move reminiscent of imperialist discourses of travel. The nomad might be thought of as opposite to conceptions of the large group consumer-based tourist. In fact, the nomad "despises mainstream communication; the traffic jam of meanings waiting for admission at the city gates" (Braidotti 1994, 16). Rather than utilizing the routes of mainstream accounts of culture, the nomad travels with her own "theoretical tent." Braidotti describes her own writing as cartographic. The spatial metaphor "expresses the simultaneity of the nomadic status and of the need to draw maps; each text is like a camping site: it traces places where I have been, in the shifting landscape of my singularity" (1994, 17). The nomad carries her belongings and moves to different campsites setting up her own theoretical tent in places untreaded by other more "mainstream" tourists. Linda Alcoff criticizes the transitory nature of identity in Braidotti's nomad subject, arguing that this subject resembles a CEO or multinational business executive (2006, 277). Alcoff suggests that the nomad's tendency towards a celebrated state of homelessness is likened to an overt
sense of privilege, economic power, and jet-setting flexibility, possibly much like Nussbaum’s philosophical exile. However, I think Braidotti’s figuration of the nomad functions more like a backpacker, trotting around the globe in the least expensive way, striving for the more “authentic” experience by avoiding mass tourist routes and destinations. I turn to this backpacker theory to articulate the social context from which Braidotti’s notion of nomadic travel might stem, thus giving us further insight into the problems with her notion of nomadic subjectivity.

Recent work in anthropology highlights backpacking as a growing touristic mode of travel impacting the contemporary tourist industry. As Richards and Wilson argue, with the rise of Lonely Planet, also known as the “backpacker’s bible,” hostels and tour organizations are forging a new touristic market, and “the global nomad is also being incorporated in the ‘McDonaldized’ system of conventional tourism” (2004, 3). I would like to highlight a few of the global nomad’s characteristics as they resemble Braidotti’s notion of her theoretical nomad. I find this important because, while the nomad is inspired by the lives of nomadic peoples, her fictional nomad functions more like the idealistic backpacker, who avoids conventional routes of mainstream tourists/theorists.

One defining characteristic of the backpacker nomad is that this identity is posited against tourist identity (Welk 2004). Braidotti also continually highlights her desire to dis-identify with mainstream culture. However, because of these already scripted routes of “shoestring” travel, many places are catering to the backpacking subculture. With the rise in interest in backpacker travel, there are more places that cater to the guidebooks that attract the “off the beaten track” travelers. There is a sense in which the popularity
of this form of travel assumes that the backpacker gains more of an authentic experience than the mainstream tourist.

The rise of these subculture places that cater to shoestring guidebooks is often accompanied by stories and lore from other backpackers. It is interesting to note that Braidotti celebrates the unwritten maps the nomad can read "in the wind, on the sand and stones, in the flora" and that "the nomad’s identity consists in memorizing oral poetry" (1994, 17). Similarly, Cohen, an anthropologist who studies backpacking culture, argues that backpackers tend to share "mental maps" of destinations outside of the tourist purview (2004, 47). Unfortunately, most of the destinations backpackers frequent are also attractive to other backpackers, and the people one meets in these places are usually other backpackers. Cohen argues, "Though friendly local staff are appreciated by backpackers...relations with the locals in the enclaves are of secondary importance in comparison to those with other backpackers" (2004, 47). These similarities between Braidotti’s nomad and the backpacker display another kind of privileged traveler other than the CEO or mainstream tourist. There is a sense in which nomadic social interactions only take place among globe-trotting nomads, thus avoiding any kind of meaningful interaction with the “locals” they visit.

Furthermore, I want to highlight that while backpacking can be a rite of passage for many youths, the sense of freedom most backpackers seek is to pursue hedonistic pleasures, such as the Full Moon parties usually found within backpacking enclaves, under affordable circumstances (Cohen 2004, 51). I am not suggesting that Braidotti’s nomad participates in hedonistic practices of freedom; however, the transitory nature of
nomad identity, the possession of many passports, and the fleeting and superficial interactions the nomad has with the locals seem to lay the groundwork for individual pursuits of freedom associated with the modern version of travel. The theoretical tourism Braidotti engages in resembles a backpacker’s movement, which intentionally avoids dominant tourist travel, but ultimately recreates touristic structures, in which the “undiscovered” place becomes a fetishized product for the nomad’s enjoyment.

Towards a Transnational View of the Self: Diasporic Identities and Communities

Both Nussbaum and Braidotti utilize master narratives of belonging or non-belonging, which exclude the experiences of culturally different others in contexts of cross-cultural interaction. In order to cultivate a commonality among differences, Nussbaum introduces the philosophical exile that establishes a vertical relationship to an ideal of humanity. Braidotti, on the other hand, attempts to maintain a sense of radical difference by envisioning the subject as a nomad and consequently establishes a horizontal relationship with varied cultural communities. Both authors avoid theoretical analysis of the space-between and thus lack the resources for thinking of travel as a socially interactive process that is fundamental in understanding the cross-cultural nature of the self.

I would like to articulate a sense of travel that avoids the pitfalls of Nussbaum’s philosophical exile and Braidotti’s nomadic subject and carve out a way of understanding cross-cultural interactions as socially enmeshed relationships rather than escaping them. Understanding the multiple engagements that occur within specific encounters dislodges
the possibility for any master narrative of belonging or nonbelonging to emerge. I turn to
diasporic or transnational communities as a way of articulating the space-between, which
views travel as a social process linked to the development of one’s home. In this way, I
hope to remain consistent with Lugones’ understanding of travel as a social process of
interaction rather than a modern view of escape. Diasporic narratives are multiple and
are often wrought with conflict, tension, and miscommunication. The processes of
negotiation, yearning, and the continual commitment to maintaining multiple loyalties in
different locations underscore how one can be entangled and have split loyalties, but also
have a way of maintaining connections with multiple communities. These experiences, I
argue, suggest new ways of thinking about the construction of community, both national
and international, within spaces in between.

Both Nussbaum and Braidotti utilize different traveling metaphors in order to
articulate the multicultural subject. However, as argued earlier in the essay, these
metaphors of travel contain assumptions of touristic travel, which prevent any embedded
and socially enmeshed cross-cultural relationships from emerging. Travel, as understood
by both theorists, is of a specific type and does not consider the historical lineage in
which touristic travel participates. The work of Nussbaum and Braidotti ultimately, for
James Clifford, “appear to be ideologies of one (very powerful) traveling culture” (1999,
36). Clifford’s theory of travel displays some salient qualities of the space-between that
characterizes the interactive model I propose in my feminist pragmatist approach in
articulating the multicultural subject.
One important implication of Clifford’s understanding of travel is its constitutive force for identity, which he describes as the phenomenon of “dwelling-in-traveling.” Travel ultimately becomes constitutive of cultural centers and constructs the very meaning of our homes. The cross-cultural or “border” experiences of travel, according to Clifford, should not be viewed as acculturation, where there is a linear progression from culture A to culture B, nor as syncretism, where two systems overlap one another. Rather, Clifford understands these cross-cultural or “border” experiences as instances of historical contact, “with entanglement at intersecting regional, national, and transnational levels” (1999, 7). A contact approach, inspired by Mary Louise Pratt’s “contact-zones,” emphasizes the intercultural interaction that takes place within these spaces of interaction and exchange. These spaces, according to Pratt, are highly contentious and improvisational. A contact approach, according to Clifford, views cultures already relationally constituted with different cultures, and new forms of relationships emerge through processes of travel and displacement (1999, 7).

If travel provides us with a way of articulating our international connections by emphasizing how our identities and our dwelling are already constituted by the transnational circuits of capital flow and the exigencies of colonial history, it is important to understand how diasporic or transnational identities create a new sense of community. According to Clifford, diasporas are distinct and should be thought of as distinct from the concept of borders or borderlands (1999, 246). Borders are defined by specific geopolitical boundaries, such as the US/Mexican border or the US/Canadian border, which also involve multiple crossings. Diasporas presuppose longer distances and time of
separation from the homeland, opposed to the proximate geography between two countries characteristic of borderlands. The spaces that diasporic or transnational communities inhabit are similar to the experiences of the borderlands, where one exhibits split commitments and loyalties to more than one country, invoking experiences of psychic restlessness.

Nonetheless, Clifford articulates some very basic characteristics of diasporic communities. First, Clifford observes that all communities, even local ones, retain organized travel circuits, “linking members ‘at home’ and ‘away” (1997, 253). Thus, there is a strong sense in maintaining connections between members of the host country and the country of origin. This connection, Clifford argues, must be able to resist the normalizing powers of assimilation, forgetting, and distancing. Secondly, diasporic communities maintain a richer sense of difference compared to the nationalist ideological trope of pluralism understood as a “melting pot.” Because diasporic communities live in tension between cultures, they are able to mediate cultural differences. Diasporic communities avoid a description of pluralism as simply the sum of mixed cultures. Finally, the transnational connections emphasized in diasporic communities break down binaries of minority and majority discourse, which structures projects of assimilation and resistance. If anything, the transnational context draws out the spatial/historical content of W.E.B. DuBois’ notion of a double consciousness.¹²

In Asian American Studies, the discourse of diaspora and displacements has gained much currency in articulating the complex experiences of Asian identity in America. In the anthology Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in America, the editors

argue that diasporic and transnational concerns emerged when the Pan-Asian identities, such as Taiwanese-American, Korean-American, and Filipino-American, prominent in the Civil Rights era, became insufficient in defining one’s specific cultural identity. This reconsideration of self-identification among many Asians in America prompted theorists to begin thinking about how one understands this “ethno-national self-definition” (Anderson & Lee 2005, 9). Historian Robin Cohen, cited in this anthology, describes this “nostalgic trope”:

Diaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of home but lived in exile...all diasporic communities settled outside their natal (or imagined natal) territories, acknowledging the ‘old country’ – a notion often buried deep in language, religion, custom and folklore – always has some claim on their loyalty and emotion (2005, 9).

This sense of yearning and attachment to one’s originating distant community must be understood within specific transnational practices, such as maintaining kinship relationships, political and economic networks, and the establishment of multiple homes (Anderson & Lee 2005, 9). Ultimately, because displacement becomes an important aspect in the lives of many transnationals, questions of place play a prominent role in understanding one’s identity. The concept of “home” and the “homeland” become contested terrains, particularly if one is excluded because of one’s sexuality, race, or class.

There are a few advantages in thinking about identity in a transnational or diasporic framework given my criticisms of Nussbaum and Braidotti. A transnational critical analysis situates our notions of the cross-cultural self in between international

For a different response to the use of Pan-Asian identities in the US, see Eric Liu’s The Accidental Asian: Notes of a Native Speaker. New York: Random House. 1998. Liu’s understanding of identity as individual choice ungrounded by any cultural community posits an opposing view to Asian identities as diasporic.
relationships. First, transnational identities do not ignore group identities as Nussbaum and Braidotti do. In fact, maintaining one’s specific cultural history in context of one’s residence in a host country constitutes the transnational situation for many immigrant communities. In these communities, one cannot transcend one’s cultural history or commitments in large part because of these emotional attachments and one’s sense of loyalty to multiple communities. Second, transnational experience emphasizes an emotional yearning for connection with one’s originating community. This sense of loyalty and emotional yearning seem to reveal an important relationship of dependency, which inevitably marks human experience. This sense of dependency is opposed to a negative political sense of dependency characterizing the economic relationship of First and Third worlds. Revealed in one’s yearning and emotional attachment, it signifies the ways in which we are interrelated with each other on an international scale. These yearnings and desires are not experienced as past memories, but as present desires, reinterpreting the barrage of cross-cultural elements in dislocation. Thus, there is a creative element within this sense of yearning that ultimately opens up the possibility of making a home in one’s state of dislocatedness. On the one hand, the currency of transnational discourses makes the case for envisioning America as dispensing with a domestic narrative of belonging. On the other hand, it also makes the case for incorporating the rebellious nature of individuals who fear a sense of belonging to a particular community. Moreover, transnationals respond to this sense of cross-cultural dependency with a caring response, which attempts to maintain and cultivate cross-cultural relationships, such as sending balakbayan packages, filled with food, clothes,
and hospital supplies. Finally, transnational experience emphasizes multiple cross-cultural relationships, thereby undermining any singular master narrative of belonging or non-belonging.

Drawing from feminist dependency theory and American pragmatism, in Chapters 3 and 4, I develop two ways of theorizing the space between that articulates the interactive model of travel I propose. Chapter 3 mingles Kittay's feminist dependency theory and Jane Addams notion of "affective interpretation" in the context of her work with immigrants, then applies this analysis to transnational relationships of dependency in the case of the foreign dependency worker in order to expose our obligations to culturally different others. Chapter 4 charts Royce's notion of the "betweenness relation" throughout his works in metaphysics, his ethics of loyalty and his social and political commentary on provincialism. I show how Royce's betweenness relation relates to a transnational framework that generates an alternative model in understanding the nature of international communities grounded within our notions of home, the nature of one's sense of belonging, and travel.
CHAPTER III

TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL DOULIA SYSTEM: KITTAY, ADDAMS AND
A TRANSNATIONAL ETHIC OF CARE

Since the subject of care has developed into a prolific area of study, I want to focus primarily in this chapter on how notions of dependency and care might extend into a larger international social framework. Rather than appealing to the type of abstract or romantic notion of the multicultural subject that I argued against in Chapter 2, I want to focus on how dependency and care situate notions of the cross-cultural self within embedded transnational relationships. These relationships, as I argued in Chapter 1, offer more concrete ways in thinking about the nature of the multicultural subject.

As the world becomes more related and connected through transnational global markets, more attention needs to be paid to how these relationships are fundamentally relationships of dependency. An ethics of care provides an important resource both for critically examining the ways in which social life is predicated on relationships of dependency, and for articulating how the role of care responds to the claims of relationships of dependency. An ethics of care provides an important contribution
towards understanding questions of obligation and responsibility within transnational relationships of dependency. One example that has not received much attention in care ethics is the case of transnational dependency workers,\(^\text{14}\) including many women from the Philippines, who leave their country of origin to work in First World households, such as in the United States. In my view, attending to the nested dependencies of transnational dependency workers reveals a more concrete and embedded perspective in care ethics, which can then be used to address the concerns of globalization and international relationships.

The need for dependency workers in First World countries has taken a toll in countries such as the Philippines. This need has generated the largest foreign currency in the Philippines totaling approximately 7 billion US dollars, mostly coming from migrant domestic workers. Care work in the Philippines is considered to be the country’s largest export to other countries. In fact, the Philippine government has identified a care crisis in the Philippines as more and more Filipinas leave home seeking better wages in order to care for their families back in the Philippines (Parreñas 2002). It is important to understand how dependency work has entered into a global context.

Many theorists studying this situation, such as Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Hochschild, identify a few challenges transnational Filipina mothers face. First, constant contradictory emotions besiege the transnational mother. She cares for her First World

\(^{14}\) I understand dependency worker and care worker in the same way. However, following Kittay’s terminology in *Love’s Labor*, I use dependency worker to emphasize the fundamental character of human social relationships marked by one’s inevitable dependencies. A dependency worker is attentive to the dependency relation through acts of care. In characterizing the foreign care worker as a dependency worker, I want to emphasize the work these women do attend to the claims of transnational relationships of dependency, which becomes more visible in a growing transnational context.
charge while her own children are left with family members in the Philippines. The complex experiences of loneliness and yearning for her own children at home inform the kind of care the First World charge receives. In many cases, Filipina dependency workers develop a closer relationship to their First World charge than to their own children because of this experience of loss. This, of course, has disastrous effects on the children of transnational mothers, who also continually yearn to be with their mothers.15 Arlie Hochschild characterizes this social reality as “globalization’s pound of flesh” (2002, 26). The emotional experience of loss, felt by both mother and child, is an effect of the global market economy.

Second, while it is clear that transnational dependency workers are dependent on the employment of First World countries, the reciprocating dependency of the First World on this dependency work largely remains invisible. As Ofelia Schutte has argued, on a macro level, global market economies directed by neo-liberal policies do not incorporate dependency work in the gross national product of the country (2002). Dependency work is often seen as a service that is paid for, in which the employee’s obligation to the employer is limited to an economic relationship, thereby masking the nature of the relationship. Since this dependency is not recognized among many First World employers, their responsibility to their workers is also concealed.

Third, care work paid or unpaid, is continually undermined and further devalued. The invisibility of the work and of the care workers themselves underscores the modes of valuation of reproductive labor in our society. This labor does not produce products, but

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15 For an excellent discussion on the effects of transnational children whose parents work outside of the Philippines, see Rhacel Parreñas’ *Children of Global Migration* (2005).
instead sustains people. In a market-driven economy, however, it is difficult to assess the value of this kind of work, and thus it is valued much lower than work that produces products. Hochschild argues “that the low value of care keeps the status of women and those who do it, and ultimately all women, low” (2002, 29).

Care theorists have analyzed the globalization of care (Robinson 1999) or the global context of care (Held 2006) in order to understand how care can be expanded to public and international domains rather than limited to familiar and proximate relationships. However, understanding our global situation as fundamentally characterized by transnational relationships of dependency demands that an ethics of care pay closer attention to concrete moral responses to those who are culturally different and, despite appearing foreign and distant, are living and working close at hand. My basic strategy in this chapter is to examine first the areas in care ethics that address the problem of caring for distant others, and then to offer a model of care ethics inspired by an expansion of Eva Kittay’s notion of the doula principle to transnational relationships of dependency through Jane Addam’s conception of care and dependency within the context of her social work with immigrant communities. Thinking about care ethics within transnational relationships of dependency recognizes concretely our moral obligations to others who are distant from us by looking more closely at our particular relationships with culturally different others who live close to us, such as transnational dependency workers. Nel Noddings has recognized this move in care ethics as “starting at home” (2002). However, it is important to understand one’s home as occupied by culturally different others, making one’s caring response less parochial and more transnational.
This allows us to understand our responsibilities to more distant others by recognizing transnational relationships of dependency that fundamentally characterize the human global experience.

**Caring About vs. Caring For: The Problem of Caring for Distant Others**

Nel Noddings conceives the problem of caring for distant others through a distinction between “caring-for” and “caring-about.” Caring-for entails face-to-face occasions in which one person, as carer, cares directly for another, the cared-for. There are many circumstances, however, in which we care about others even though we cannot care directly for them; that is, we are somehow touched by their plight and want to do something to improve it (Noddings 2002, 22).

Noddings seeks to rehabilitate the idea of caring-about; however, she recognizes that its success is dependent on ensuring that caring-for is practiced and maintained. This, of course, becomes difficult to assess in an international context when physical distance might hinder the more face-to-face or physical practice of “caring-for.” Moreover, caring-about might result in a kind of caring imperialism if not grounded within specific “caring-for” practices. This concern is drawn out by Joan Tronto’s work in recognizing certain harms that arise due to the nature of care.

Tronto identifies two problems that an ethics of care faces when addressing the problem of caring for distant others. The first is the problem of paternalism/maternalism. Tronto argues that often care-receivers are infantilized by the care-givers. This can be heightened “when the care-givers’ sense of importance, duty, career, etc., are tied to their caring role.” In this case, “we can well imagine the development of relationships of
profound inequality" (Tronto 1993, 170). In the case of the Filipina dependency worker, employers (who are often privileged women) understand their caring role by viewing the gainful employment (and citizenship benefits) they are providing for the transnational dependency worker as an instantiation of their caring responsibility. This attitude treats the transnational dependency worker as an infantilized other. Moreover, this type of paternalism/maternalism might translate into a form of imperialism, particularly in the form of structural adjustment policies that developed nations might demand from developing countries. It is not a coincidence that First World employers of transnational dependency workers may mirror the same imperialistic attitudes of concern embodied by global structural adjustment policies. Imperialistic caring may result in racializing the transnational dependency worker's capacities to care. Race and gender play a role in cultivating an association that women of color are more naturally inclined to care than even oneself. Just as calling the maquiladores' fingers "nimble," the capacity to care is racialized and gendered in ways that treat women of color as more suitable for this type of work. The First World employer's charity, framed by neo-liberal economic policies, is justified by an infantilizing rationale that is constructed by racism and sexism.

A second problem faced by an ethics of care is that care work is by nature parochial. Tronto describes this problem: "Those who are enmeshed in ongoing, continuing, relationships of care are likely to see the caring relationships that they are engaged in, and which they know best, as the most important" (1993, 170). As Tronto argues, if the paradigmatic relation of care is a mother-child relationship, how might a mother be more willing to care for a child starving in Somalia, when there are starving
children closer to home? Care might be too limited to care for distant others, particularly since practices of care occur within more proximate relationships. Furthermore, Tronto argues that there is a risk that “care’s parochialism” might mean “that there will be no reason why the privileged need to look beyond how their own caring needs are met in order to believe that they are caring” (146). Tronto refers to this attitude as “privileged irresponsibility.” Privileged irresponsibility might take the form of a universal doctrine of individualism, which assumes that one “makes it” on one’s own. This can contribute to the paternalism/maternalism of the employer of the transnational dependency worker. However, this detached perspective, or what Tronto calls the parochialism of care, may conceal the moral response of the privileged to those outside of their personal and private relationships. In transnational dependency work, the care received by the privileged is understood within an economic framework and hence not considered part of one’s personal or private obligation of care.

According to Fiona Robinson, care theorists, such as Tronto and, I would add, Noddings, who have conceived an ethics of care as extending out of its private contexts to more public domains still believe that the only viable solution to address the global context would be to insist that care is necessary for justice (Robinson 1999, 43). However, for Robinson, distance need not be a problem once we understand the realities of the “shrinking world.” She argues:

The notion of the ‘shrinking world’ suggests that, in some important way, distances are effectively being reduced, and that this shrinking, in turn, has a disembedding effect on places - the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically (1999, 45).
One of the results of the "shrinking world" view is that the nature of social relationships changes, thus fostering new forms of interaction that could be considered "face-to-face," such as internet or phone relationships. Distance and closeness are reinterpreted once we take into account the technologies of globalization.

Robinson cautions, however, that globalization need not imply a unified humanity. It consists of boundaries in the forms of exclusions, nationalism, and state sovereignties. How we think about these differences must stem from specific relationships in concrete situations. For Robinson, the relational moral character of an ethics of care makes it possible to understand the specific concerns and needs of culturally different others in an international context. An ethics of care does not view individuals as possessing "rights," but rather views them within interpersonal relationships. In a global context, a moral orientation towards particular others allows us to view our global responsibilities more connectedly. For example, in the case of global North-South relations, strategies to eradicate poverty would not assent to any conception of formal equality among the disparate parties under an ethics of care. This often results in cases of paternalism or a form of unwanted charity. Rather, an ethics of care would focus on our moral capacities to recognize the culturally different other as concretely real, rather than as an idealized version of humanity.

What Robinson seems to be suggesting, but not specifically addressing, is the presence of boundary conditions that inform our relationships with foreign and distant others. Some of these boundary conditions involve transnational practices and

\[16\] I understand boundary conditions as emerging within the global context of care. Boundaries emerge once exploitation and power hierarchies determine rules of inclusions and exclusions. I understand these
relationships that intimately connect us with those who are distant or outside our nation-state borders. These boundary conditions function and are policed within specific transnational practices that involve capitalist and imperialist hegemony as well as mutually engaged solidarity. It is within this tension between nation-states that our moral orientation of care should operate in order to address global concerns. Robinson notes, "Any approach to ethics which claims to address the moral problems of international relations cannot overlook the structural causes of patterns of moral inclusion and exclusion on a global scale" (1999, 47). The question of moral inclusions and exclusions, however, emerges within specific practices that concretely relate us to distant others.

In thinking about the "shrinking world," we mustn't shrink the boundary conditions in our analysis of international relations. For example, in the case of poverty, Robinson argues that an ethics of care should pay attention to the "lives, relations, and communities of people in developing countries" (1999, 47). It is important to see how the boundary condition motivates our attention to the ways in which the "lives, relations, and communities in developing countries" are specifically related to our more familiar relationships, or more close to home. Following Inderpal Gerwal and Caren Kaplan (1994), the practices that connect us with distant others occur within the transnational boundary spaces determined by forces of globalization. It is in this third place that our moral orientation of care should operate: negotiating through the maze of economic markets, citizenship rules, language barriers, and the translation of cultural value systems.

boundary conditions as an emerging ontological space of cross-cultural interaction that relates culturally different others by highlighting the common ground culturally different actors share. I will develop a more sustained treatment of the ontology of the space between in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I would like to highlight how these boundary spaces emerge in concrete practices of care.
Thinking about distant others requires attention to the boundaries that connect us to one another in an international context. It requires that we look closer to home in thinking about our responsibilities to others abroad.

In the next section, I will articulate an ethics of care within transnational boundary conditions so as to address the concerns of the Filipina dependency worker. In effect, this analysis generates a transnational public ethos of care that will avoid the problems of caring for distant others. My basic strategy will be first to examine Eva Kittay’s argument about dependency, and the way it generates a public ethos of care known as a doulia principle. Next, I will expand this notion of the doulia principle to a transnational context through Jane Addams’ conception of care and dependency in her work with immigrant communities.

Examining the Social Role of the Doulia Principle

Kittay’s work in dependency has generated much feminist scholarship in the areas of law, politics, subjectivity, ethics, and epistemology. Her work strikes me as an accurate portrayal of how the world works. Her practical wisdom, most notably formulated as “We are all – equally – some mother’s child” (Kittay 1999, 25), challenges individualistic models of justice, which emphasize rationality (that excludes emotional attachment) as central to human flourishing. Equality, for Kittay, is grounded in lived experience and is not a natural right based on “some common property we possess as individuals” (1999, 25). Moreover, her practical insight not only discloses the concrete realities we live in, but also underscores the varied relationships in which we are
Kittay argues that dependency is an "inescapable" reality that conditions the "life history of each individual." She understands this reality as manifest in "early childhood, illness, disability and old age" (Kittay 1999, 29). By virtue of our biological reality, we are inevitably dependent on others for care and sustenance for our very survival and growth. Kittay maintains:

The immaturity of infancy and early childhood, illness and disability that renders one nonfunctional even in the most accommodating surroundings, and the fragility of advanced old age, each serve as examples of such inescapable dependency. The incapacity here is determined neither by will nor desire, but by determinants of biology in combination with social circumstances (1999, 29).

It is important to note that the "incapacity" that characterizes one's dependencies is established "neither by will nor desire." In other words, one is constrained by these relations of dependency in lived experience, and it is impossible to remove oneself physically and willfully from these relationships. It is also worth noting how these unavoidable dependencies are determined not only by biology or the physical facts of one's body, but also by the social circumstances that determine what counts as being old, frail, ill, or disabled. Ultimately, the cultural dimensions in combination with one's physiological constraints condition what can be thought of as dependent, shaping the very concept of dependency.

In this sense, one's condition of dependency cannot be understood as an exceptional circumstance. For Kittay, to conceive of dependency in this manner "dismisses the importance of human interconnectedness," which is necessary for survival and "the development of culture itself" (1999, 29). Not only does dependency constitute
our physical lives, it also percolates into human social relations. To this extent, relations of dependency cross the lines of the pre-political or familial realities of our lived experience into the social and political institutions governing our public lives. In fact, dependency, "as a feature of the human condition, has crucial bearing on the ordering of social institutions and on the moral intuitions that serve to guarantee adherence to just institutions" (Kittay 1999, 37). The way in which one envisions the order of social institutions and conceptualizes moral intuitions is founded in large part by relationships of dependency. According to Kittay, if we recognize that our social and physical lives function in nested relationships, responsibility can be viewed relative to these relationships.

In fact, relations of dependency imply a responsibility to care for and have moral attachments with others within dependent relationships. This capacity to care is a mark of one's humanity (Kittay 1999, 38). The moral upshot of this claim is that one cannot thrive if this capacity is not cultivated within the moral and political practices of society. Nel Noddings views the notion of growth in care ethics as one that rejects rigidity. In the context of education, a child's growth must stem from her interests as an individual and must not be blocked by confining expectations (Noddings 2002, 185) from parents or the larger society. Following Dewey, Noddings argues that growth requires "time and care" of the individual. This notion of growth resonates with Kittay's claim that society cannot thrive if exploitation is a norm. Since the growth of the individual is tied to the growth of society, an exploitive society is one that blocks an individual's growth and in turn prevents society from achieving its own growth. Kittay seems to suggest the need for an
attitude of caring that ultimately cares for the process of caring itself if society is to thrive and grow. The growth of the individual and that of society are both dependent on the capacity to care. Thus, as Kittay argues, “at the nexus of these relationships of dependency is a moral responsibility” (1999, 50). In this sense, the moral responsibility involves an attitude of caring for caring in order to ensure that society continues towards growth.

In this respect, Kittay emphasizes the relationship between the dependency worker and her charge as a paradigmatic case of a dependency relationship. In this relationship, there remains an obvious vulnerability that is experienced by both the dependency worker and her charge. Since the dependency worker is in a position to either harm or benefit her charge, for Kittay, the work she does for her charge is infused with a heavy moral load. She acts on the basis of a moral claim “on the part of her charge for her attention, good will, and sincere efforts” (Kittay 1999, 49). Kittay argues that in most cases, moral claims can be made within relationships between individuals who are equal. Both parties can either accept or reject these moral claims to one another. However, the inequalities in the relationship between the dependency worker and her charge inhibit the dependency worker’s ability to accept or reject these moral claims on her own behalf. Her care for her charge must not cease lest her charge suffer unreasonably. Because the nature of dependency work requires selfless acts on the part of the dependency worker, there is a potential for failure to provide the care needed to sustain this dependent relationship. The dependency workers’ vulnerability exposes society’s obligation in caring for the process of caring. Kittay argues:
A system that pays adequate attention to the dependency relation will be one seeking both to empower the dependency worker with respect to her own interests and whenever possible, to decrease the dependency of the dependent as well. By relegating dependency to the status of an afterthought, neither caregiver nor charge is well-served (1999, 37).

By focusing on the dependency relation, our responsibility is understood as one of responsiveness, care, and trust, which sediments our bonds to the human community and the wider environmental community with which we are in relationship. Viewing our responsibility as an activity of sustaining dependent relationships provides us with a picture of ethics congruent with the "unassailable fact" of our dependencies.

Thus, Kittay offers a model of reciprocity, developing a doula system in thinking about how social responsibility is viewed if the dependency relation is seen as foundational to the ordering of just social institutions. A doula is "a postpartum caregiver who assists the mother, and at times relieves her" (Kittay 1999, 106). Rather than understanding the doula as replacing the mother's role as caregiver to her infant, "the doula assists by caring for the mother as the mother attends to the child" (Kittay 1999, 107). While the early Greek conception of the doula's service is related to the work done by slaves, which occurs within exploitive relationships, Kittay wishes to redirect the doula's notion of service as one of interdependence "that recognizes a relation - not precisely of reciprocity but of nested dependencies - linking those who help and those who require help to give aid to those who cannot help themselves" (1999, 107).

Recognizing the "nested dependencies" that arise by virtue of our caring responsibilities orients our attention to the subject who cares as one who is also in need of care.
According to Kittay, a model of interdependence based on the doulia system recognizes our need for care as human beings, and this should be made available to everybody, including those who do the work of caring. This principle of the doulia as defined by Kittay implies an extension to the public domain. This extension emphasizes a public ethos of care. The larger society must play a role in ensuring the well-being of the dependency worker. The need for care of the dependency worker signals a moral response from the society of which she is a part. The doulia principle, understood as a principle of caring for caring, anticipates Royce's similar principle of loyalty to loyalty, which I will further develop in Chapter 4. Loyalty to loyalty is understood as a logical principle that is necessary to the existence of meaningful relationships. The doulia principle, or caring for caring, establishes a similar principle of connection and attentiveness to relationships that is essential for the growth and well-being of society. This principle characterizes the responsibility of society to its dependency workers.

The principle of the doulia, understood as a public ethos of care according to Kittay, establishes two important tasks for society. First, it develops a specific “social responsibility (derived from political justice realized in social cooperation) for enabling dependency relations satisfactory to dependency worker and dependent alike” (1999, 109). The principle of the doulia recognizes the value of relationships of dependency as necessary for the health of all human beings. Second, the principle of the doulia as a public ethos of care would encourage social institutions to “foster an attitude of caring and a respect for care by enabling caregivers to do the job of caretaking without becoming disadvantaged in the competition for the benefits of social cooperation”
By respecting the dependency workers’ well-being, society ensures that the work of care continues under more favorable conditions for the dependency worker.

In caring for the dependency worker, society cultivates an attitude that values the work of caring. A public ethos of care, articulated through the doulia principle, would focus on the dependency worker’s well-being in virtue because she represents an embodied version of the dependency relation.

Kittay is committed in preserving the caring-for relation of the dependency worker by establishing a doulia principle that cares about the demands of dependency work. By establishing the requirements of care as fundamental in society, Kittay develops an ethics of care that allows one to care-about without falling into the pitfalls of abstraction or unwanted charity. However, how might we understand this doulia principle within transnational relationships of dependency, particularly in the case where the Filipina dependency worker is considered a foreigner, maintaining commitments to distant countries, yet nonetheless is proximate? Moreover, if we look at the transnational dependency worker as paradigmatic of international societies, what might global responsibilities look like? I seek to expand Kittay’s doulia principle to address the invisibility of one’s responsibility to Filipina dependency workers. Addressing the needs of the transnational dependency workers would reveal our inevitable transnational relationships of dependency and direct our associated global responses of care closer to

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Doula shares the same root as the word dulia, which refers to the attitude of reverence to the Virgin Mary. I thank Scott Pratt for pointing this out to me. It seems that Kittay’s principle of the doulia as a public ethos of care implies a kind of reverence, not in a religious sense to the Virgin Mary (although it does seem that the Virgin Mary may have signified an idealized notion of the dependency and caring relation that inspired reverence to her followers) but as a reverence to the dependency and care relation the dependency worker embodies.
home. Caring-about must be tied to concrete practices of care, which involve more face-to-face interactions. Rather than viewing caring-about as an attitude that can be applied in international contexts, such as giving money to starving children in Somalia without even realizing how we might directly relate to their experiences, it is best to view this moral orientation within one’s familiar engagements with culturally different others. This will encourage a moral orientation of care to be more flexible (less parochial) and less prone to instances of caring imperialism or paternalism/maternalism. In the next section, I show how Jane Addams’ notion of care and dependency is informed by her work with immigrant communities. Addams ultimately provides us with a flexible understanding of a moral orientation of care conceived within transnational relationships fostering interaction. This will lead my analysis to a formulation of a transnational doulia principle.

Addams and the Social Ethics of Dependency

Maurice Hamington understands Addams’ work at Hull House as exhibiting a social habit of care. For Hamington, Addams “provides what care ethics has often been accused of lacking: a strong social-political element” (2004, 103). It is my contention that Addams provides a unique contribution to care ethics by offering a social ontology to the social and political concerns surrounding the global context of care and dependency. I will examine how Addam’s notion of affectionate interpretation or sympathetic understanding implies a notion of the space-between that fosters social interaction. A
social ontology that emphasizes interaction can serve as a way of thinking about how Addam’s relational model of ethics can extend into a public ethos of care.

Affectionate Interpretation and Sympathetic Understanding as a Public Ethos of Care

The notion of sympathetic understanding has often been cited among Addams scholars as an important feature that links her philosophy and work at Hull House to feminist care ethics (Seigfried 1996, Fischer 2000, Hamington 2004). Sympathetic understanding is usually viewed as highlighting an epistemological or moral orientation that values care in moral judgments. Affectionate interpretation appears in Addams’ essay “A Modern Lear” and is used to articulate the notion of sympathetic understanding. However, I focus on the terminology of affectionate interpretation because I think her use of this term in this essay highlights her social ontology, which can similarly be understood within her notion of sympathetic understanding. In this way, her notion of sympathetic understanding is broadened to include questions of ontology as well as epistemology and values. This has implications for thinking about transnational relationships of dependency.

While the pragmatist and feminist traditions do not assume a rigid distinction between ontology, epistemology, and ethics, it is important to see how sympathetic understanding has usually been theorized as a moral orientation of care rather than as an explanation of the ontology of relationality. Hamington understands Addams’ notion of sympathetic understanding related to questions of knowledge. He writes, “knowledge is a prerequisite for embodied care because one cannot care for something about which one
knows nothing” (Hamington 2004, 99). For Hamington, how we know has much to do with the body. Sympathetic understanding brings us into relation with the communal needs of society by sympathetically engaging the lives of others, rather than being limited to one’s individual or parochial experiences. Sympathetic understanding is understood as an orientation of care that enables us to become more socially engaged, more related to others.

Seigfried understands Addams’ notion of sympathetic understanding as a social habit that we learn by directly engaging “on a day-to-day basis” with people who are culturally, politically, or ethnically diverse (1996, 217). It operates within the realm of action. In this way, our sympathies for one another break down rigid attitudes that suggest a singular access to morality. Morality, in this sense, necessarily seeks the diverse perspective that can only be attained by actually interacting with culturally different others, rather than assuming prior to the interaction a single principle of morality. Seigfried understands sympathetic understanding as a moral orientation that values care, important in thinking about what constitutes a just community.

In this way, Seigfried suggests that a commitment to diversity is essential in cultivating a non-exploitive society. She argues:

Through the mediation of sympathetic understanding, a space can be opened in which the viewpoint, values, and goals of others can become part of moral deliberation and social transformation. Only by letting them speak for themselves and not projecting our viewpoints on them or thinking we can unproblematically enter into their worlds through imagination can such collaboration take place without coercion or co-optation (2002, xxi).

It is important to recognize that a boundary space emerges between people such that mutual recognition is possible. The space-between need not be limited to individuals
since it also affects the commitments of the communities of which individuals are a part. Social awareness begins with individuals, but the possibility of social transformation happens when communities are open to the influences of culturally different others. In this way, rather than viewing an ethics of care as an individual moral orientation that one can apply to distant others, Addams' notion of sympathetic understanding underscores a social orientation of care by underscoring communities' flexibility for social change through encounters with communities that are culturally different. This boundary space becomes an important feature in Addams' work in thinking about larger social relationships that extend beyond one's individual or parochial relationships.

Sympathetic understanding, called "affectionate interpretation" here is introduced in Addams' discussion of the Pullman Strike of 1894. The Pullman Palace Car Company factory workers, working with the American Railway Union, led a strike against the Pullman Company seeking better wages. The strike ended unsuccessfully without arbitration for the factory workers and resulted in the federal government intervening in this conflict in order to open the railways. Furthermore, Pullman received broad public criticism regarding his paternalistic policies toward his workers, particularly his policy that required his employees to live, pay rent and buy food in the company town. In this case, the conflict was between the workers of the Pullman Company and the employer, who thought of himself as a benefactor to his employees who were ungrateful after he raised their rents in order to pay dividends to his investors. Addams compares the tragedies of the industrial relationship surrounding the workers' strike to the tragedies of the familial relationship in Shakespeare's *King Lear*. In the context of family
obligations, Addams is able to identify the problems of the Pullman strike by recognizing relationships of dependency between the employees and Pullman.

Much like King Lear, the president of the Pullman Company felt that the workers' strike was a sign of ingratitude for his acts of generosity. However, Addams comments that Pullman lost the ability to attain "a simple human relationship with his employees" (1912, 2). Addams identifies this faculty as affectionate interpretation and argues that it was lost to King Lear and Pullman as both succumbed to egoistic interpretations of the situation. This prevented both Lear and Pullman from affectively interpreting the concerns of Cordelia and the workers, respectively. Trapped in their own narrow perspectives, both Lear and Pullman lacked the means to understand how other people in the relationship can play a role in shaping their own experience. Moreover, Addams also felt the workers (and Cordelia) possessed a "narrow conception of emancipation" (1912, 5), which prevented them from finding a meaningful relationship with their employer. Because both sides of the relationship lacked the capacity to interpret the situation affectionately, there was "no mutual interest in a common cause" (1912, 3).

Addams suggests that affectionate interpretation brings the individual out of her narrow perspective and to seek a diversity of viewpoints. However, this move towards culturally and socially different others entails an element of suffering. Addams argues:

"It sometimes seems as if only hardship and sorrow could arouse our tenderness, whether in our personal or social relations; that the king, the prosperous man, was the last to receive the justice which can come only through affectionate interpretation (1912, 5)."

Addams seems to suggest that a requirement of affectionate interpretation demands that one must undergo a sense of suffering or loss of one's familiar beliefs and customs.
Suffering opens one to the possibility of social transformation. It signals a departure from one’s narrow or parochial conceptions and brings one into relation with other kinds of social experience. Consequently, affectionate interpretation not only suggests the embedded character of relationships of dependency, particularly in family relationships; but also underscores how the interaction is fraught with tension between one’s individual desires and one’s commitment to communal and social relationships. The departure prompts an inquiry into the meaning of one’s social relationships. One’s choices are dependent on how meaningfully and authentically one understands one’s relationship to others.

Placing oneself in between one’s individual perspective and one’s commitment to others requires that one must exhibit the virtue of humility (Addams 1912, 33) in order to achieve a sense of social justice. Reflecting on the old Hebrew Prophets’ three requirements, Addams reformulates the caring-for and caring-about distinction through an understanding the virtue of humility as the middle ground between the requirements of “loving mercy” and “doing justly.” Solely fulfilling the requirement of loving mercy by giving indiscriminately without understanding the concerns of others would lead to a form of unwanted charity. One merely “cares-about” in an abstract manner, and how one cares-for others might lead to paternalism/maternalism or possibly a caring imperialism. Solely fulfilling the requirement of doing justice would lead to dogmatic rules and strict policies governing our relationships with others, lacking any sort of sympathy. In other words, one does not consider how care plays an important role in justice and in effect, does not care at all.
Between these two requirements, Addams suggests that we should

“walk humbly with God,” which may mean to walk for many dreary miles beside
the lowliest of His creatures, not even in the peace of mind which the company of
the humble is popularly supposed to afford, but rather with the pangs and throes
to which the poor human understanding is subjected whenever it attempts to
comprehend the meaning of life (1912, 34).

Walking humbly requires us to engage with others regardless of the diverse perspectives
that constitute the larger society and one’s more personal and familiar relationships. In
other words, Addams views caring-about as grounded within the practices of caring-for.
This requires work and effort. As Seigfried understands Addams’ project of social ethics,
“the transformation is personal, but the means are social” (2002, xx). Affectionate
interpretation suggests that we find meaning in our moral orientation of care by traveling
with others, by walking humbly for many miles and experiencing the pain of maintaining
this social relationship. This can only be done by recognizing a third place or a boundary
place of social experience that both displaces us from our narrow conceptions and opens
us to the possibility of understanding others who come from different locations of social
experience.

The need for a social morality in ethics is prompted by an anxiety among
individuals seeking “their actual relations to the basic organization of society” (Addams
2002, 6). For Addams, a basic yearning for connection with others moves questions of
ethics into social experience. Understood within a social realm, ethics is conceived
relationally through the daily experience of living with one another. Addams writes, “We
are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained by traveling a sequestered
byway, but by mixing on the thronged and common road where all must turn out for one
another, and at least see the size of one another’s burdens” (2002, 7). The common road represents a boundary place constituted by travel, displacing the subjects from their familiar environments and thrusting them into a situation ready for transformation. It is the common road of experience that meaningfully brings us into relation with one another. This assumes that ethics is not about applying principles generated outside of specific interactions, but requires that moral guidelines emerge within actual day-to-day engagement with the lives of others within the boundaries of social experience characterized by our common efforts with one another.

Interacting with culturally different others becomes a necessary requirement for Addams in order to generate meaningful social relationships. Care is situated within an experimental method in which one learns how to become open to the diverse perspectives that make up social life. In this way, affectionate interpretation proposes a relational moral attitude that emphasizes the need for reciprocity within social relationships. According to Seigfried in the introduction to Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams understands the social relation as reciprocal (2002, xxi). Addams thinks that one’s personal transformation, which occurs within the boundaries of social experience with socially and culturally different others, fosters an attitude of care that cares for caring, much like Kittay’s doulia principle. Once one is transformed through the process of affectionate interpretation, one develops, according to Addams, a public ethos of care, which seeks “the betterment of humanity” (2002, 79). As Nodding describes growth in the process of caring-about, Addams develops a notion of growth in social ethics requiring that communities be flexible and experiment with the diversity of experiences.
Being closed to experience and to others prevents one from engaging in social transformation. Addams argues:

A man who takes the betterment of humanity for his aim and end must also take the daily experiences of humanity for the constant correction of his process. He must not only test and guide his achievement by human experience, but he must succeed or fail in proportion as he has incorporated that experience with his own (2002, 79).

Caring for caring, understood as a public ethos, is grounded upon the daily experiences of those who affectionately interpret the lives of others in social experience. Addams’ view of reciprocity extends to a larger public attitude that values the work of care in our day-to-day interactions with others, so that the well-being of society is well served. Attending to relationships of dependency in our daily lives through an attitude of caring for caring becomes a way of achieving the “betterment of humanity.” Addams’ sense of reciprocity cultivates a public ethos of care by opening up for transformation one’s own social ideals relative to the daily interactions with socially and culturally diverse others.¹⁸

In addition, Addams’ argument for the subjective necessity for social settlements views the individual’s well-being as tied to the well-being of society. She writes:

It is always easy to make all philosophy point to one particular moral and all history adorn one particular tale; but I may be forgiven the reminder that the best speculative philosophy sets forth the solidarity of the human race; that the highest moralists have taught that without the advance and the improvement of the whole, no man can hope for any lasting improvement in his own moral or material individual condition; and that the subjective necessity for Social Settlements is therefore identical with that necessity, which urges us on toward social and individual salvation (1902, 68).

¹⁸ Addams discusses an example of the charity visitor who visits tenement homes in Chicago. Addams identifies the charity visitor’s failed attempts to help these families that the charity visitor as her not open to her own social transformation. The charity she gives becomes empty and abstract to the lives of the tenement families she visits. Addams argues, “the young woman who has succeeded in expressing her social compunction through charitable effort finds that the wider social activity, and the contact with the larger experience, not only increases her sense of social obligation but at the same time recasts her social ideals” (2002, 33).
Affectionate interpretation makes a necessary synthesis, understanding the concerns of
the individual as related to a wider social process. Being attentive to connections and
relationships of dependency secures the possibility for social transformations.
Affectionate interpretation offers a relational method for understanding the continuity, or
relationships of dependency between the individual and the wider society.

*Affectionate Interpretation as a Transnational Public Ethos of Care*

Affectionate interpretation can be seen as a public ethos of care that pays particular
attention to the ways in which the individual is connected to and ensconced in social
activities and communities. Additionally, it serves as a way of bringing this public ethos
of care out of its parochial limitations within nation-state boundaries by recognizing that
the individual’s relationship to a social life necessarily percolates into international social
activities. As a notable peace activist, Addams’ view of social ethics extends beyond
nationalisms. The features of affectionate interpretation that generate a public ethos of
care can be extended to international social life. However, this transition is deeply rooted
in the daily activities that we choose to engage in with culturally different others.

For Addams, narrow perspectives lead to critical misunderstandings. The individual
perspective prevents the possibility of seeing other points of view and how one can find
meaning in social life. Social relationships imply the assumption that we are all
dependent on each other, not only for sustenance and care, but also to understand ethical
life. Without engaging with others, the individual perspective lacks moral meaning in the
sense that the individual’s views are not properly socialized. Hamilton comments that
this feature in Addams’ thought “is a demanding moral imperative” (2004, 105). In fact, Addams finds it a necessity to engage with others who are culturally different. Since our experiences are partial, it is of utmost necessity that we engage others who are culturally different in the communities in which we live. Caring for distant others risks the inability to care-for others concretely and makes the moral orientation of caring-about seem abstract and empty. Addams views this problem of caring for distant others close to home. She sees the work of caring practiced within the crowded urban cities where the clash of cultural difference is lived and experienced every day through the lives of immigrants. The crowdedness of social experience suggests that the work of caring is done in a proximate context. Addams is attentive to the transnational social relationships located in the immigrant quarters of Chicago, which greatly influence her notion of cosmopolitanism.

Immigrants become important in Addams’ conception of what it means to be internationally minded. In *Newer Ideals of Peace*, immigrants embody the faculty of affectionate interpretation due to their social position in society as newcomers facing the demands of the host country’s processes for becoming a citizen. These insights into the lives of immigrants prompt Addams to develop what I take to be a transnational public ethos of care based on the experiences of immigrants as they emerge in her interactions. Immigrants are not distant others in the sense that one need not travel outside the US to meet Italians, Russians, or Poles. For Addams, one can travel quite locally to encounter Italian, Russian, or Polish culture. While Robinson characterizes the shrinking world as a “disembedding place” due to globalization, Addams directs our attention to concrete
embedded places that are transnational, such as cosmopolitan urban centers, particularly immigrant neighborhoods.

Given the features of affectionate interpretation, it is important to understand the motivation behind Addams' emphasis on immigrants in relation to developing a more internationally-minded way of thinking that will lead towards international peace. First, Addams begins with the assumption that social morality has an "origin in social affections" (1907, 11). Affectionate interpretation demands that one be sympathetic to the concerns of others. King Lear lacked this capacity and failed to understand the plight of his daughter. Likewise, Pullman saw his role as being a benefactor to his employees, which prevented him from seeing their concerns. For Addams, social morality emphasizes emotion. In the context of international or cross-cultural experiences, this requires a cultivation of moral sentiment that is cosmopolitan in affection. Addams understands our international ethical relationships in the context of our more tribal or domestic relationships (1907, 11). She argues that a double conception of morality divides our ethical actions. The first conception is the relation within a "tribe" or social group. The second is the relation to "outsiders." However, these must be combined in order to develop an international model for peace. Otherwise, these divided sets of ethical actions will take on militarizing habits that will ultimately lead to war.19

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19 Addams thinks that a morality built upon a rigid separation between our relations with our domestic polity and our relations with outsiders cultivates a militaristic attitude since there isn't a common ground that can be shared between the two social relationships. In "Democracy or Militarism," Addams makes the case that peace is the "unfolding of life processes which are making for a common development" (1). Without an understanding of how we, as a domestic polity, might relate to foreign others, a militaristic spirit develops.
In combining these two ethical postures, what we ought to do in our country and what we ought to do with "outsiders," Addams argues that we should "naturally seek for [the synthesis of the two ethical postures] in the poorer quarters of a cosmopolitan city" (1907, 12). In seeking the development of this cosmopolitan social sentiment, we should look to more concrete social experiences that address cross-cultural relationships, such as the life of immigrants. Addams recognizes that "emotional sentiment runs high among newly arrived immigrants" (1907, 13) due to their own displaced status in a new country. Displacement cultivates "an unusual mental alertness and power of perception" (1907, 14). Immigrants have traveled, in the sense that they are willing to revise their cultural habits and renounce social customs they have practiced for many generations. In other words, they are willing to open themselves up for transformation. They are willing to participate in a larger social life that sometimes demands casting aside accepted customs and habits. Immigrants are also in a unique position to settle or "seek companionship in a new world" and thus "inevitably develop the power of association which comes from daily contact with those who are unlike each other" (1907, 14). Immigrants embody epistemic locations that can provide insight into the relationship between the domestic and the international. These epistemic locations take on the character of the space-between, which inhabit the interactions of immigrants and their host community. Through these interactions, immigrants contribute to the very make-up of their host community. Addams argues that just as immigrants’ hopes and dreams can be instructive in shaping city government, education, and charity work, "so their daily lives are a forecast of coming international relations" (1907, 16).
Addams’ commitment to experience can launch our inquiries into a cosmopolitan social morality in crowded cities. Crowded cities require a “deeper and more thoroughgoing unity” that only could be had among a “highly differentiated people” (1907, 16), rather than more stable and homogenous social collectivities. A “commingling” of many different kinds of people expresses a type of unity that negotiates a balance of opposing views and forces. The unity “gravitates” towards the common road or the daily interactions of people. Resolution of differences can only be accomplished through social means. Addams writes:

It is natural that this synthesis of the varying nations should be made first at the points of the greatest congestion, quite as we find that selfishness is first curbed and social feeling created at the points where the conflict of individual interests is sharpest (1907, 17).

Addams believes that through these daily encounters, narrow nationalist perspectives can be challenged, providing us with important insights into the development of an international public ethos of care towards peace.

At times, it is clear that Addams in these passages of Newer Ideals of Peace romanticizes the possibilities of cultivating a cosmopolitan sentiment for a social morality through the figure of the immigrant. She refers to them as “humble harbingers of the Newer Ideals of Peace” (1907, 19) or the “kindly citizens of the world” (1907, 18). In fact, one might argue that she places an unusual degree of responsibility on the immigrant, particularly in that the difficult task of living in a host country usually occupies their priorities, rather than becoming saints of cosmopolitanism, the bearers of international peace. More critically, Rivka Shpak Lissak argues that Addams’ strategy of
incorporating immigrants has assimilationist motives, rather than making a place for their specific ethnic traditions to play a role in American life (1989, 9).

Addams, however, is too entrenched in the daily lives of immigrants through her work in Hull House to make this idealistic and romanticized judgment. It is not their political positions regarding war and peace that make their situation promising. In fact, Addams suggests that many immigrants have advocated for war, rather than peace. The importance for Addams lies in the fact “that they are really attaining cosmopolitan relations through daily experience” (1907, 18). Through interactions with immigrants, Addams believes there is hope in uncovering the “vital relation - that of the individual to the race” (1907, 19). This is a task not only for immigrants. It is a mutual task that involves a caring attention, which involves utilizing the faculty of affectionate interpretation, and recognizing a transnational space of interaction that encompasses the realities of the immigrant’s life.

Addams employs a version of affectionate interpretation by highlighting the social interactions within transnational relationships that bring us into relation with culturally different others that extend outside our nation-state borders. Both the lives of immigrants and one’s specific interactions with immigrants serve as transnational relationships where one’s work of care is placed between social relationships that are not limited to the dichotomy of ethical postures, either focusing on relations within a domestic polity or with foreign others. By highlighting these social relationships with immigrants, Addams directs our analysis of cosmopolitanism to a realm of action and experience that pays

20 Seigfried argues in a footnote in the introduction to Addams’ *Democracy and Social Ethics* that Lissak misunderstands Addams’ philosophical project and thus misreads Addams’ analysis of immigrants (2002, xxxv).
particular attention to one's relationship with those who are considered both outside of and a part of a domestic polity.

Addams calls upon our skills of affectionate interpretation towards immigrants in the areas of the "Americanization" of immigrants and the education of immigrant children. According to Addams, rather than assimilating immigrants in the US through abstract concepts, such as rights or mere memorization of phrases of the constitution, we need to listen to their experiences of living in their country of origin. She argues, "We believed that America could be best understood by the immigrants if we ourselves, Americans, made some sort of a connection with their past history and experiences" (2002, 244). In this sense, Addams encourages us to stake ourselves and become open for transformation, as Americans, in our engagement with immigrants, thereby developing a new national narrative alongside the narrative of the immigrant. This would lead to widespread discussion of what it means to be an American in relation to the experiences of culturally different others.

In the case of the education of immigrant children, Addams encourages teachers to learn about the cultures of their students. In "The Public School and the Immigrant Child," Addams redirects the destinations of travel to more local situations. For Addams, the shrinking world is apparent in our own communities. One must seek these interactions and help restore to immigrants the knowledge of their culture, rather than viewing knowledge of other cultures as to be found strictly outside of the nation-state boundary. In these two instances, Addams encourages social habits of cosmopolitanism and brings the public ethos of care to international contexts. These two processes in
understanding the immigrant highlight the transnational spaces that determine the immigrant’s life, as well as invite new forms of international relationships to emerge in a domestic context, at home. In other words, the result of a social synthesis of the domestic and international relations occurs within transnational social relations between nations. What I take to be Addams’ transnational social ethos of care encourages Americans to develop cosmopolitan affectionate interpretations by achieving the sense of a common ground between culturally different others.

The common ground is a wider context of social experience that can facilitate mutual understanding between culturally different others. This notion of a common ground emerges in Addams’ work with immigrants in understanding cosmopolitan artwork and the formation of the Labor Museum. In one scenario at Hull House, Addams recounts an encounter with an “old pioneer,” who was “fiercely American” and thought the decline of the neighborhood was the fault of the rising numbers of “foreigners” settling into the cities. The old man complained to Addams of the many “foreign” artworks that decorated the walls of Hull House. Addams responds:

I endeavored to set forth our hope that the pictures might afford a familiar island to the immigrants in a sea of new and strange impressions. The old settler guest, taken off his guard, replied, ‘I see; they feel as we did when we saw a Yankee notion from Down East,’ – thereby formulating the dim kinship between the pioneer and the immigrant, both “buffeting the waves of a new development” (1902, 58).

The Labor Museum, which featured many crafts from the immigrant’s country of origin, facilitated presentations and workshops to help restore to the immigrants their past histories and traditions and bring them into relation with American cultural experiences. Addams thought the Labor Museum could be a model for that “educational enterprise
which should build a bridge between European and American experiences in such wise as to give them both more meaning and a sense of relation” (1902, 127). In this way, cultural misunderstanding could be mitigated once a larger relation or a common ground was established between the immigrant and American culture. Both instances strive to facilitate mutual understanding and synthesize the international and the domestic relation by providing the context, defined by certain practices and action such as artwork and the Labor Museum, in which citizens can be brought into relation with one another. This new relationship forges a new sense of what American life means.

Addams adds to an ethics of care a way of envisioning our relationships of dependency nested within transnational spaces of interaction, particularly in the case of immigrant neighborhoods. She understands the moral orientation of care to distant others closer to home by emphasizing the ways in which we concretely relate to culturally different others through interactions with immigrants. By situating the problem of caring for distant others within the context of one’s day-to-day encounters with culturally and ethnically diverse immigrants, one is able to develop a more cosmopolitan spirit based in concrete and embedded relationships with culturally different others, rather than abstractly caring-about geographically distant others. Addams emphasizes the transnational relationships that are conditioned by our choices to attend to these diverse perspectives, and which anchors our moral orientation to distant others within concrete and embedded social relationships within our specific interactions with immigrants. Her public ethos of care as characterized by her notion of affectionate interpretation is
transformed into a cosmopolitan sentiment as she seeks unity with other nations to further her activist goals of peace.

In the following section, I would like to bring together Kittay’s insights on the principle of the doulia and Addams’ transnational public ethos of care in order to address the concerns of transnational dependency workers. By looking at these workers’ concerns, I argue a transnational doulia principle develops, which has implications for thinking about the nature of international communities.

Towards a Transnational Doulia Principle: Making Visible Transnational Responsibilities

In her important contribution to feminism and globalization, Ofelia Schutte argues in her essay, “Women, Dependency and the Global Economy,” that neo-liberal policies are incapable of assessing dependency work as a type of productive labor in developing countries for two reasons. First, the unpaid care work is rendered invisible “and not considered productive itself” (2002, 143). Second, women are forced to go back home to offset the cuts in social services. According to Schutte, neoliberal policies fail in accounting for the time the woman would be engaging in had she been free from the demands of dependency work (2002, 143). This has serious effects on the “life projects” of many dependency workers. Schutte links the ability to form life projects for oneself, which requires time and energy, as essential for the health of the country. Policies should be geared in “raising the quality of people’s lives (including women’s lives), not undermining it” (2002, 144).
Developing this sentiment into transnational contexts, it is important to recognize the nested transnational dependencies of the Filipina dependency worker. The example of the Filipina dependency worker signals an opportunity to understand how caring-about distant others can be done in the context of caring-for the Filipina dependency worker in a transnational context. Given Addams’ insights about immigrants, one’s moral orientation of care to distant others should be predicated upon one’s attention to the closer transnational relationships that establish further connections to international or global communities. In fact, the commitment to growth requires that individuals also need the time and care to develop one’s own life projects. In the context of Filipina dependency workers’ growth, a transnational relationship of dependency exposes our responsibility to others beyond the nation-state. Since the lives of Filipina dependency workers are connected to their country of origin, our resulting care for distant others is anchored to the more proximate relationship we have with the Filipina dependency worker. This might change how transnational relationships are conducted.

Understanding our moral orientation of care to distant others within a transnational context recognizes the pervasiveness of transnational relationships in our global lives. One might argue that a more appropriate solution to the lives of care workers would be to abolish this practice altogether. First World nations must wean themselves from the labor of Third World women. Rather, monetary aid should be directed to countries that are needy so as to prevent mothers and fathers leaving their children. While these solutions do address the structural problems that compel many Filipinas to work as overseas dependency workers, a transnational framework begins
within relationships that can often be oppressive to those that are marginalized.
Beginning from this framework would envision solutions that recognize the Filipina
dependency worker’s agency rather than as subjects of oppression to be given aid.
Solutions within a transnational doulia system would take into account the agency of all
participants within these complicated and unequal relationships.

By focusing on the dependency relation, First World responsibility is understood
as one of responsiveness, care, and trust, which sediments social bonds to the human
community and the wider global community. Some recommendations by Arlie
Hochschild to address the “care crisis” among Filipina dependency workers in order to
ensure the overall well-being of the dependency worker, her First World charge, and her
own children in the Philippines include: provide paid visits to return home by the
employer, create domestic violence shelters for women in their country of origin, find
ways in which the children of dependency workers can also come and live in the host
country, more men could also help in the household, and finally the basic solution would
be that care is valued more in society (Hochschild 2002, 29).

These recommendations highlight a transnational doulia principle, which seeks to
address the human dependency claims of transnational dependency workers. There are
three requirements the transnational doulia principle demands of ethics and international
relationships. The first emphasizes the visibility of obligations beyond nation-state
boundaries through attention to encounters with foreign dependency workers. In this
sense, transnational relationships are experienced more close to home. The
recommendation of creating domestic violence shelters in the country of origin of the
transnational dependency workers highlights one's ethical attention to politics in another country. However, this global awareness of domestic violence is predicated on more local interactions.

The second requirement of a transnational doulia principle not only recognizes that the transnational Filipina dependency worker is constrained by the dependency work itself, but also recognizes that an emotional loss and suffering besiege the transnational dependency worker due to responsibilities in maintaining multiple homes and the pain of family separation. This experience of loss, even though not directly experienced by the citizens of the host country, prompts an inquiry into sustaining transnational relationships of dependency. The work of care, in this sense, contains a sense of yearning and connection that exceeds geographical distance. Placing one's ethical obligations within this transnational context exposes one's responsibility towards developing a more meaningful internationally minded community. The transnational doulia principle would attend to the dependency relation between multiple international homes. The transnational ethos of care serves as a more grounded conception of caring for distant others by focusing on maintaining and sustaining homes across borders.

Addams understands our social ethics to be narrow and isolated if we don't seek out a variety of diverse experiences. The experimental approach Addams practices in her work at Hull House demands a flexibility of one's individual and social lives in order for personal and social transformation to take place. Following Addams, a third requirement of the transnational doulia principle would direct everyone to seek out the diverse range of experiences that mark nested relationships of dependency. This would make visible a
large range of social experiences and ethical responsibilities currently made invisible by neo-liberal policies. The transnational doulia principle develops a caring-about attitude through a focus on local experiences with “strangers” living in one’s neighborhood and doing dependency work in one’s home. The transnational doulia principle requires that practices of care be more flexible and open to the transnational context pervading social life. It is these local interactions that bring one into relationship with an internationally minded community.

My analysis in this chapter points out how care ethics can engage within transnational spaces of interaction in order to address a more global or international social context. However, in this chapter, I do not develop a metaphysical picture of the “space-between,” or the boundary conditions of social experience. In this chapter, I have shown instances of caring practices between countries, particularly Addams’ work at Hull House with immigrant neighborhoods, and I highlight the importance of recognizing these spaces as fruitful in developing a more flexible and nationally porous care ethics. What is needed next is a theory of the experience of “betweenness” that both logically connects various distinct communities and meaningfully brings them into relation as an international community. In general, what is needed is a metaphysics of transnational community. In the next chapter, I examine Josiah Royce’s contribution in developing a transnational interpretation of community.
CHAPTER IV

COMMUNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL PROVINCIALISM: UNCOVERING THE "BETWEENNESS" RELATION IN ROYCE'S THOUGHT

Chapter 3 offered a concrete model for understanding the embedded nature of selves within an international context. A transnational doulia principle characterizes one's agency as a response of care to the inescapable relationships of dependency that mark human social life. Part of these relationships of dependency is situated within a transnational context that links foreign communities to one's own. In this chapter, I seek to understand the metaphysics of transnational communities through the works of Josiah Royce. Royce, unlike other American philosophers, examined the notion of community as an integral concept in thinking about questions of metaphysics. Since his notion of community tackles questions of the experience of betweenness as a way of thinking about unity, Royce offers an important contribution to thinking about the nature of transnational communities.

Prior to examining Royce's works, it is important to highlight some thematic similarities Royce shares with feminist dependency theorists, including the feminist care
ethics of Jane Addams. Mary Mahowald comments that while many American pragmatists, including Royce, were not especially “feminist” in their approach to philosophy, their understanding of philosophy contained “feminine” elements (1986-7, 411). Two “feminine” elements that bear a similarity to feminist dependency theorists are, first, a critique of rationalism and an emphasis on practical life, and second, an emphasis on community and relationships. First, Royce understands that knowledge is connected to social and practical life. In *Sources of Religious Insight*, Royce attempts to recover a notion of reason that is not limited to abstract formulaic rules, but associated with practical experience. He argues that successful reasoning processes involve “sorts of experience, forms of intuition...In brief, reason and experience are not in opposition” (1940, 91). Royce emphasizes the importance of experience in shaping universal ideas. He argues:

> Whoever is to be best able to survey the landscape from the mountain top must first have wandered in its paths and its byways, and must have grown familiar with its valleys and recesses (1940, 92).

Royce’s emphasis on the practical world bears a resemblance to the commitments of feminist dependency theorists, who argue against the detached individual subjectivity pervasive in traditional philosophy.

Second, Royce is committed to the quality of relationships and connections. He isn’t merely interested in the basic fact of relations or the fact that people were connected,

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21 According to Mahowald, the insights in American philosophy “are the very themes often invoked to describe the special traits of women, as different from men.” She understands these elements to be “feminine”. However, American philosophers did not explicitly take on projects that were “feminist,” or “a critique of the overall subordination of the interests of women to those of men by society-at-large” (1986-7, 411). One implication of this argument is that American pragmatism offers many resources to feminists. Likewise, pragmatism has a potential to be modified by feminism. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this relationship.
but is interested in thinking about the meaning and the quality of relationships. Much like care ethicists who view social relationships as characterized by dependency and sustained by care, Royce pays particular attention to how loyalty sustains social relationships. Throughout his career, Royce saw the quality of relationships as fundamental not only in a theory of ethics, but also in his metaphysical theory of community and his social and political analysis of provincialism.

Royce’s notion of provincialism analyzes the importance of local interactions in understanding more global relationships. This proves to be an important resource in thinking about how the multicultural subject is constituted within embedded international relationships. According to Royce, a province is something not defined by social, political, or legal boundaries. Rather, a province is “sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own unique ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of distinction from other parts of the country” (Royce 1967, 61).

Royce’s notion of provincialism emphasizes the importance of local identities in relation to larger collectivities. A province’s distinctive boundaries serve as a way of understanding how larger collectivities can be formed. In addition, Royce understands provincialism as having three requirements. The first is the “tendency for the province to possess its own customs and ideals” (1967, 61). In other words, there needs to be an actual community that shares common social habits, values, and future life goals. The second requirement is having a unified sense of “the totality of these customs and ideals” (1967, 61). Understanding the totality of these customs and ideals as an additive sum lacks the sense of meaning in which these ideals come together and form a unified social
collective. For Royce, these customs and ideals represent the community's common interests, forming the unified identity of the community. However, that a community is unified through common interests is not enough for Royce. He is interested in the quality of the unification and emphasizes the third requirement: provincialism must include "the love and pride, which leads the inhabitants of the province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs and aspirations" (1967, 61). An individual's loyal devotion to her provincial community characterizes Royce's sense of provincialism.

In this chapter, I examine two contemporary interpretations of Royce's theory of provincialism as it relates to understanding the nature of ethnic communities. One view offered by John Smith is cautious of Royce's provincialism as it might foster sectional interests among ethnic groups. However, another perspective offered by Griffin Trotter views Royce's notion of provincialism as overcoming sectional ethnic interests by subordinating ethnic commitments to the larger province. In other words, Trotter takes a reductionist approach to ethnic differences in his interpretation of provincialism. I argue that provincialism need not lead to the development of ethnic separatism, nor does it lead to a diminution of ethnic differences. I argue that Royce's notion of provincialism highlights the "in between" character of transnational identities that underscores the process of interaction emergent between ethnic communities. Both approaches leave out an understanding of the promise transnational or border communities embody for understanding the experience of "betweenness" in thinking about ethnic differences.

Royce's work on community, loyalty, and provincialism offers important resources for thinking about how a transnational perspective transforms an understanding
of international communities. I will next examine the transnational scope of Royce’s work through his analysis of the “betweenness” relation. “The problem of difference,” sometimes understood as “the problem of incommensurability,” in discussions of multiculturalism, frames cultural difference as anomalous and marginal to dominant society. Royce, however, does not reduce the problem of difference to the dichotomy of majority and minority communities, but emphasizes a third place, or space-between, which offers ways of sustaining difference without resulting in cultural separatism or reductionism. My basic strategy is to examine the two differing interpretations of provincialism, then discuss the “betweenness” relation emergent within Royce’s work on loyalty and community. Lastly, I apply this interpretation to transnational identities by drawing out similar themes of transnationalism in the work of Randolph Bourne, a contemporary of Royce, as a response to both Smith’s and Trotter’s interpretations of provincialism. By the end of this chapter, I hope to show how transnational identities can be thought of within Royce’s work by emphasizing key themes of travel and home as they relate to understanding the relationship of the individual and the community.

**Provincialism and Ethnic Differences—Between Separatism and Reductionism**

Royce describes one of the dangers that his notion of a wise provincialism will correct as “false sectionalism — which always disunites” (1967, 64). However, he argues that a wise provincialism need not lead to a “disloyalty to the nation” (1967, 64), or a “narrowness of spirit” (1967, 64), or “further the development of jealousies between various communities” (1967, 64-65). In other words, a wise provincialism will promote
unity while remaining loyal to provincial uniqueness. Royce lists three evils an unwise form of provincialism might generate. The first is the problem of immigration. The newcomer poses problems to the community if she is not harmoniously incorporated within the host community. The second evil is the leveling tendency among communities that are not open to the influences of others. The third evil is the problem of the mob, in which uncritical narrow perspectives produce social damage and violence. I will focus on the first evil to contextualize Smith's and Trotter's concern of ethnic separatism and their respective interpretations of provincialism.

Citing his own migration as a native Californian, born in a mining camp in 1855, moving to San Francisco and finally to Harvard, as representative of a global phenomenon of travel he sees happening during his time, Royce sees a problem with immigrants not integrating harmoniously in the host country. The individual is lost in a community insofar as she cannot share its customs and ideals. Royce cites the failure of the integration of the immigrant either from the host community, which lacks skills of hospitality or the newcomer who does not accept the community's ideals and social habits as her own. It is important to note that Royce's characterization of the problem of immigration and travel might appear as a problem that can be solved by social projects of assimilation. Assimilation, however, implies closed, homogenous communities in which the differences of the newcomer are subsumed under a larger abstract collective. For Royce, a province implies boundary conditions, which serve as the context for mutual exchange between different provinces. Rather than assume an abstract notion that defines larger collectivities, provinces situate the identities of larger collectivities within
specific locations at the boundaries of provinces. These boundaries emphasize the importance of interaction, enabling communities to become porous and open to other forms of difference.

The danger of newcomers remaining loyal to their origins and not to the new place is that they are closed to and often times in direct conflict with others who are distinct from themselves. Smith understands Royce’s concern with immigration and travel as a problem of “initiation and incorporation” (1992, 149) of the newcomers. According to Smith, Royce seeks a way in which newcomers are incorporated in small communities that are visible. Provincial loyalties serve as a way of establishing the visibility of small communities. A newcomer who is not readily incorporated into a visible community is an example of the detached individualism Royce seeks to remedy. According to Smith, large urban settings may not provide the immigrant with a sense of community in association with her host country,

for it seems that newcomers to these areas, especially those who belong to minority groups, are apt to find there no community apart from that provided by the segregated groups of their fellows, a fact which does nothing to establish faith in the openness of a democratic society (1992, 149).

Smith sees immigrant communities as ill adjusted to the host country’s social customs and values due to a lack of hospitality on the part of the host country, which does not make these values present for the immigrant. As a result of the lack of visibility of community, immigrants tend to become part of the segregated groups that constitute their ethnic community. Thus, Smith admits that it is unclear whether Royce’s provincial loyalties “do not in the end express themselves in the form of sectional interests – political and economic - so powerful that they work against the general welfare” (1992,
In other words, it is not clear whether Royce’s wise provincialism might reproduce pernicious forms of sectionalism in the form of “closed immigrant communities.”

One important drawback to Smith’s understanding of immigrant communities and hence Royce’s notion of provincialism is the idea that immigrant communities are “closed” and separatist. Smith implies that an immigrant’s sense of belonging tied to her ethnic community in the host country is immediately considered separatist. Following Lugones, immigrant communities can never be understood as closed and separatist given the fact that their very lives are consistently interacting with the dominant society. Moreover, following Espiritu, immigrants are constantly engaging in the process of “home-making” as a means of settlement into a new community. This process involves intimate interactions with the customs and ideals of the host community.\(^{22}\) Smith unfortunately does not recognize the transnational space that marks the lives of many immigrants, which understands the notion of community as open and porous to other different influences. A closed and separatist understanding of immigrant communities leaves Smith worrying about the possibility that provincial loyalties may lead to sectional divisions of segregated groups. However, Smith does not recognize the in-between character in Royce’s notion of provincialism, which consequently avoids any type of pernicious separatism.

Similar to Smith, Trotter finds that ethnic communities enact separatist habits towards their host country and other ethnic communities. However, unlike Smith, who views this problem in light of the failures of the host country, Trotter views this problem in light of the value of incommensurability, which values cultural differences. This

\(^{22}\) See my discussion of this subject in Chapter 1.
position most notably comes from the nationalism expressed by Molefi Kete Asante in *The Afrocentric Idea*. But Trotter doesn’t limit his analysis to African American ethnic communities. His interpretation of provincialism also applies “to all ethnic communities” (1994, 233) and thus seeks to address the problems of ethnic separatism, what he terms as “toxic nationalism,” (1994, 260) in areas such as the Middle East, Bosnia, and Germany and the ethnic tensions that led to the riots in Los Angeles, CA. The point that appears to emerge from Trotter’s analysis of “toxic nationalism” is that the individual is too devoted to her ethnic community, which leads to disunity and hinders meaningful cross-cultural interaction. According to Trotter, “proponents of incommensurability,” again mostly focusing on Asante’s work, “are quick to use newly-developed ethnocentric concepts to effect a thorough criticism of the cultures whose influence they seek to escape, as if, finally, they have discovered a truly neutral metatheory that can be used for transcultural analysis” (1994, 232). Ultimately, Trotter seeks a way of understanding how to resolve difference without invoking “an ethnic notion of the self” (1994, 233). To put it more bluntly, in order to resolve ethnic difference, one must put aside any notion of oneself as being part of an ethnic community. In effect, one reduces the “ethnic notion of the self” to a cultural anomaly.

While Smith is suspicious of Royce’s notion of provincialism in the context of ethnic or immigrant communities, Trotter finds provincialism helpful in combating the leveling and mob-like tendencies to those who hold a toxic nationalism. Let me say that I do think Trotter is correct in holding the view that toxic nationalism is a risk and a reality that we face in our contemporary world. As stated earlier, Royce, too, was concerned
with the dangers of false sectionalism and sought to combat this ever-present risk to international politics through his notion of provincialism. However, in Trotter's attempts to attenuate the importance of ethnic commitments for all ethnic communities, he fails to recognize the value of cross-cultural incommensurability in thinking about multiculturalism.\(^{23}\)

Moreover, I think that Trotter is quite right when he discusses Royce's view of provincialism, and his theory of loyalty and community. However, I disagree with Trotter's conclusions drawn from provincialism and how it leads to a strategy of ethnic reductionism. Trotter believes that provincialism entails a subordination of one's specific community commitments to the larger province. He interprets provincialism in relation to cultural diversity in two ways, both highlighting the lack of importance of ethnic differences. First, he argues that Royce would not agree that Native Americans have the sole scholarly authority to publish a work on the Cherokees. Trotter defends this claim in the following way:

He [Royce] would want to point out that there are manifold sources of diversity other than ethnic background, and that too intense a focus on ethnic differences neglects an ultimate commonality of interests, as well as the capacity of individuals of differing ancestry to have similar experiences and sympathies (1994, 264).

\(^{23}\) I would also add that he ignores how different ethnic communities view their commitments in terms of cultural survival. In *Power and Place*, Wildcat argues that the process of indigenization in Indian education involves, "making our own" approach to pedagogy. This involves a revitalization of cultural knowledge that has been suppressed for many years (2001, viii). In *Homebound*, Yen Li Espiritu reveals how the homeland plays an important role in the Filipino American's process of homemaking in America (2003, 14). In thinking about borderland identities, recall Anzaldúa's claim that "Wherever I go I carry home on my back" (1999, 43). For many ethnic individuals, one's commitments to one's ethnic community cannot be reduced in light of the history of colonization, racism, classism, and sexism in America. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on how Trotter ignores the positive aspects of incommensurability and, ultimately, the betweenness relation in Royce's thought.
In other words, there are many ways of being different other than through one’s ethnic community. For Trotter, one’s ethnic commitments would prevent us from seeking commonalities.

Second, Trotter understands individual choice not as involving one’s choice to be a member of an ethnic community, but as one’s choice to belong to a province. Here, he makes a distinction between an ethnic community and a province. One’s choice is defined by one’s loyalty to a province since it is un-coerced by the demands of ancestry of one’s ethnic community.24 In this sense, Trotter thinks that Royce “would recommend that persons subordinate their devotion to an ethnic community to their devotion to a province” (1994, 264).

A few remarks are indeed called for on Trotter’s analysis of Royce’s view on cultural diversity. The first point is that Royce would certainly agree that ethnic differences need not be absolute, but that does not commit Royce to the conclusion that ethnic differences play an inferior role in resolving cultural differences. Second, Trotter understands ethnic incommensurability in opposition to one’s sense of belonging to a province, which ultimately represents one’s sense of agency and choice. However, Trotter does not understand the importance of ethnic or cultural incommensurability in thinking about cultural diversity. According to Ofelia Schutte’s discussion of cross-cultural communication, the principle of incommensurability can be seen as a “site of

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24 Trotter defines an ethnic group as “An ethnic group is any smaller subset of the population of a nation or province which maintains a separate identity by virtue of ancestrally-acquired cultural memories, immediate or removed, which members hold as an essential and fundamental part of their personal identities” (1994, 235). I disagree with this definition of an ethnic community because he frames ethnic groups as the minority and hence not integral to the makeup of provincial communities. This view conceals an understanding of transnational migrant communities. These communities cannot be seen as exclusive given the history of colonization, racism, and sexism in America.
appreciation” rather than as an indication of separatism. One common way of conceiving incommensurability is “arithmetically,” as Schutte describes:

> What I get from the differently situated speaker is the conveyable message minus the specific cultural difference that does not come across. Theorized in this manner, the way to maximize intercultural dialogue would be to devise a way to put as much meaning as possible into the plus side of the exchange, so as little as possible remains on the minus side (2001, 49).

However, this quantitative description of incommensurability, as Schutte argues, does nothing to help us understand what cultural difference is. For Schutte, taking an existential approach, incommensurability resonates a kind of “strangeness,” a “displacement of the usual expectation.” Taking into account the cultural differences of others, one does not “bypass these experiences or subsume them under an already familiar category” (Schutte 2001, 49). Schutte recommends using “non-totalizing” concepts to account for difference. Pluralism and diversity are all concepts that need to be re-examined if what counts as pluralism or diversity is made to “fit within the overall rationality that approves and controls the many as one” (Schutte 2001, 50). In the case of provincial identities, larger identities should not subsume our more familiar ethnic identities. Rather, for Royce, ethnic identities play a role in constructing provincial identities. This requires an attention to how incommensurability is treated in social experience.

A second important argument is the concept of intersectionality. Schutte claims that most Latin American cultures “intersect” various cultures’ temporalities (African, indigenous, Spanish colonial, and modern) given the history of colonization and slavery in the Americas. Thus a speaker’s discourse in Latin America may intersect with various
other cultures' discourse and temporalities. Furthermore, immigrants to the United States bring these "forms of cultural difference and hybridity" (Schutte 2001, 50).

Through cross-cultural encounters and intersections, one is able to reconstruct a "non-totalizing" translation. This requires an act of choice. Through the process of translation, one's ethnic commitments remain distinct as well as provide a way of unifying cultural difference through processes of hybridity and cross-cultural interactions. In this sense, ethnocentric concepts need not lead the theorist of incommensurability into contradiction when these very concepts are used to form larger metatheories of transcultural or cross-cultural dialogues, as Trotter suggests.

More generally, Trotter maintains a majority and minority framework in thinking about cultural diversity and pluralism. This prevents his analysis of Royce's notion of provincialism from seeing the "in-between" character of ethnic and provincial loyalties as well as the ways in which transnational ethnic communities do, in fact, change the identity of the nation they encounter. Incommensurability and ethnic differences need not lead to separatism, as Smith suggests, nor would they demand a reduction of one's ethnic commitments, as Trotter proposes. I think Royce, much like Schutte, would see these incommensurable moments among culturally different others as "sites of appreciation." Experiences of incommensurability are indications of a need to find meaning in this world. They force one to consider other points of view and possibly modify one's own. They put one into relation with others to whom one may have never been exposed if left to one's familiar community. However, in order to make a case for
this view, I will draw out the “betweenness” relation in Royce’s view of loyalty, community, and provincialism.

Travel and Home: The Paradox of the Individual and the Community

During Royce’s first year at Harvard, he produced his first historical manuscript about California. It was apparent that Royce insistently held on to his provincial commitments to California throughout his philosophical writings. Royce was concerned with land disputes, newcomer and settler issues, and community order, very local issues that spoke to his frontier experience as a native Californian (Clendenning 1999, 130-144). Travel played an important role in Royce’s thought. He took frequent ocean trips to other countries, such as Australia, as a cure for his mental breakdowns, often returning to California with a renewed sense of loyalty for his family.25 Additionally, as a California immigrant living on the East Coast, his dislocation developed a yearning for California life, despite its intellectual limitations for him. Even after living in Boston for many years, Royce, in a 1915 speech at the Walton Hotel, looks back affectionately to life in California as a starting point for his philosophical inquiry:

The sunsets were beautiful. The wide prospects when one looked across the Sacramento Valley were impressive, and had long interested the people whose love for my country I heard much. What was there then in the place that ought to be called new, or for that matter, crude? I wondered, and gradually came to feel

25 See Oppenheim’s analysis on how Royce’s voyage to Australia played an important role in developing his philosophy (1980). Moreover, as Clendenning notes, Royce’s first literary effort at the age of 8 involved the travels of “Pussy Blackie,” a confined and lonely cat who left home often and went on various travels only to return home always with a renewed sense of understanding for his family (1999, 29-30). Clendenning also notes that Royce’s philosophical works have been in response to his childhood concerns and anxieties (1999, 29). “Pussy Blackie’s Travels” reveals how Royce problematized his philosophical concerns in terms of travel and a return to home. In this chapter, I draw out this concern in Royce’s work of provincialism as a resource in thinking about the nature of transnational communities.
that part of my life's business was to find out what all this wonder meant (2005 (1), 31-32).

His reflections near the end of his career suggest that while travel served as a backdrop for his philosophy, one might read an accompanying theme of home—through his recurring reflections on California life while constantly finding a home at Harvard—as he developed his theory of loyalty, community, and provincialism.

In *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, Royce identifies an important paradox in the relation between the individual and the community. Royce identifies two necessary but contrary principles. The first hearkens back to Kant's principle of autonomy, "or self-direction of the rational will of each moral being" (1995, 14). Royce argues, "Your duty is what you yourself will to do in so far as you clearly discover who you are and what your place in the world is" (1995, 14). The requirement of the principle of autonomy is self-knowledge. One needs to know who one is, what one's "place" is in the world. How might one know one's place in the world? This leads to the second principle of self-knowledge:

I can never find out what my own will is by merely brooding over my natural desires, or by following my momentary caprices. For by nature I am a meeting place of countless streams of ancestral tendency. From moment to moment, if you consider me apart from my training, I am a collection of impulses. There is no one desire that is always present to me. Left to myself alone, I can never find out what my will is (1995, 14).

The fundamental ambiguity of self-knowledge conflicts with the requirement of the principle of autonomy. While it is important to know who one is, the self, according to Royce, is a "meeting place," a confluence of the various streams of social histories that constitute our experiences. Left to mere introspection abstracted from these social
histories, it becomes impossible to know one’s will. A further ambiguity arises in understanding the character of this meeting place or the confluence of social encounters.

The paradox of the individual emerges for Royce in ethical situations because, on the one hand, “I and only I, whenever I come to my own, can morally justify to myself my own life plan. No outer authority can ever give me the true reason for my duty” (1995, 16). In forming one’s life’s plans, choice is a deeply individual act. On the other hand, “I, when left to myself, can never find a plan of life. I have no inborn ideal naturally present within myself” (1995, 16). Since the self is a “meeting place” of our social histories, without social interaction the self remains directionless, lacking the purpose and ability to form a life plan, and goes on “crying out in a sort of chaotic self-will, according as the momentary play of desires determines” (1995, 16). The question Royce lays out for us is how can the individual preserve her sense of choice and autonomy in a state of dependence on others for the development of self-knowledge and formation of life plans and sense of meaning? Implicit in this paradox is Royce’s insistence on thinking about the nature of human belonging, or finding “one’s place” in this world. This involves taking into consideration one’s yearning for a place in a community as well as one’s desire to remain an individual, to think and to act from one’s choices and not from the social control of others.

Situating Royce’s paradox in terms of travel and home, Doug Anderson highlights the importance of wandering in Royce’s work as it “serves both as a guide for our own philosophical endeavor and as an allegory for the hope for an American and, ultimately, a human community” (Anderson 2006, 35). Anderson characterizes Royce’s travels as a
kind of movement accompanied by an existential transformation, which recognizes our finitude and sense of displacement. The resulting sense of loss, however, is a productive loss that prompts us to seek the necessary connections, which unify the fragments of our "selves." In "The Problem of Job," Royce accepts suffering as a necessary condition of our finitude. The suffering of the wanderer "becomes part of a strenuous whole of life" and is not to be interpreted as "mere experience" (2005 (2), 853). Royce is not only concerned with the complicated sense of belonging, or knowing "one's place" in the world, but is also concerned in formulating a practical strategy for the wise traveler interested in finding meaning and truth in her life of finitude, or her home. It is because we begin with a sense of our finiteness as human beings that we are able to begin our "road" to inquiry.

In The World and the Individual, Royce establishes the relationship between travel and home in situating the nature of inquiry. He argues, "Faith has its glories; but the hard toil of critical reflection brings its own rewards. None prize the home-coming more than those who wander the farthest" (1904, 5). Travel, in this context, highlights some important features that recognize one's "road" to self-knowledge. First, Royce understands travel as a departure from home. The wanderer should not be rigidly circumscribed by her home and must eventually leave. This departure refers back to Royce's understanding of the self as a "meeting place" of various social histories. Without various social interactions, the self is incapable of forming choices and life plans. Rigidly remaining within a familiar community prevents the possibility of interaction. Second, travel is an activity that involves toil and suffering, unlike touristic
forms of travel, which entail activities of leisure. Critical reflection involves degrees of discomfort and constant effort. Travel is not a benign activity, but one that involves emotional and physical work.

Third, travel brings us into relation with what is foreign and what is familiar. New experiences might appear foreign to the traveler or to the community encountering difference, however, it is important to view this sense of newness as underscoring connective transformations of the community, bridging what is familiar and what is new or experienced as foreign. As Anderson points out, Royce views the wanderer in *The World and the Individual* as possessing a sense of purpose, not as a lost free-floating sojourner in experience. The wanderer travels with a sense of home and community in mind. Travel and home provide resources for thinking about Royce’s answer to this paradox of the relation between the individual and the community. Let us now move to an examination of his answer to the problem of travel and home in the philosophy of loyalty.

**The Philosophy of Loyalty and the “Betweenness” Relation**

Loyalty might be viewed as an ethical response to the problem of human meaning in this world. The project of ethics for Royce leads the individual from a state of estrangement and being lost towards a sense of home, of belonging within a larger social experience. Royce argues, “I want to know the way that leads our human practical life homewards, even if that way prove to be the infinitely long” (1995, 6-7). The desire for home, the desire to belong to some social experience or to some community, forms the
basis of Royce's ethics of loyalty. Loyalty "fixes," "centers," "stabilizes," and "unifies" (1995, 12) our life such that our efforts are directed towards that to which we are loyal, our cause. Royce defines loyalty as "The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" (1995, 9). The two requirements of this definition include, first, the choice of the individual to devote herself to a cause, and second, the practical and sustained manifestation of this devotion through acts of loyalty. These two requirements represent the characteristics of the devoted loyal subject. Loyalty to one's cause, be it a family, a gang of pirates, or a captain's ship, binds the self to others in some form of unity. However, it is not a superficial kind of unity (i.e. a collection of individuals) that binds us to others. Loyalty is experienced as a personal affection to others as well as a superpersonal devotion to the larger social collectivities to which we belong. Ultimately, for Royce, loyalty solves the conflict of the wayward individual lost in her private experiences and the risk of the individual conforming to social standards. Loyalty affirms both the individual will and the social realities in which we live.

Keeping this existential starting point in mind, it is also important to understand Royce's project of loyalty as affirming an ethical and logical principle: loyalty to loyalty. Loyalty to loyalty can be understood as a formal conception of relations to the existential situation of the loyal individual. If loyalty is thoroughly an individual choice and is considered a supreme good of humanity, then fostering this capacity rather than diminishing it should also be an accompanying value. Royce argues:

...we see that the best in human life is its loyalty; while the worst is whatever has tended to make loyalty impossible, or to destroy it when present, or to rob it of its own while it still survives (1995, 55).
In cases where causes conflict, the principle of loyalty to loyalty directs the ethical evaluation of certain causes by the standard that encourages the "furtherance of loyalty to loyalty in my fellows," a cause that, "despite the loyalty it arouses in me," can be "destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellows" (1995, 56) and is considered evil. Bearing a similarity to the doulia principle I discussed in Chapter 3, loyalty to loyalty as a moral principle seeks to cultivate and sustain connections within relationships.

As a logical principle, loyalty to loyalty functions as the supreme limiting condition of human action, thus making loyalty necessary in rational activity. Royce identifies this logical function of loyalty as a self-reinstating principle, which entails modes of actions that are not "contingent and arbitrary, but as so implied in the nature of our rational activity that the effort to remove them from our world would inevitably imply their reinstatement" (1913, 368). In other words, the very act of negating a mode of action, such as loyalty, implies a reinstatement of the mode of action negated. To negate loyalty implies one is loyal to the process of negation. The limiting condition of rational thought turns out to be a principle of inclusion. Loyalty to loyalty suggests that loyalty is necessary for any logical claim; even the process of negating loyalty involves its reinstatement in practice.26

To further examine this logical relationship of loyalty to loyalty, I turn to Royce's logical treatment of the betweenness relation in the World and the Individual, relate this interpretation to his metaphysical work on "order," then apply these interpretations back to loyalty to loyalty. I show how the "betweenness" relation offers ways of

26 The notion of a self-reinstating principle emerges again in my discussion of home-making in Chapter 5.
understanding how loyalty supports individual choice without denying the social histories in which one lives.

In *The World and the Individual*, using geometric formulations, Royce describes the intermediate point $m$ as a "blending" of the two distinct points $a$ and $b$.

Following the mathematician Thomas Kempe’s insight, Royce argues that since $m$ lies in between $a$ and $b$, $m$ contains within it both aspects of $a$ and $b$. In this example, Royce highlights the ways in which $a$ and $b$ are related through $m$. However, $m$ is much a point on the number line as $a$ and $b$ are, but is distinct from $a$ and $b$ through its mediating character. As opposed to a dyadic structure, which highlights a dual relationship between two points, Royce proposes a triadic structure and argues that a third object exists, namely $m$, which articulates the point of difference, likeness, contrast, or similarity:

The generalization here founded upon Mr. Kempe’s paper will show us that contrast and comparison involve, in general, a relation of at least three objects, viz. $a$ and $b$, that illustrates the point wherein they differ, or that helps to determine the sort, degree, or direction of their difference. This something may be an object of the exact character here ascribed to $m$ (1904, 80).

The betweenness relation asserts a triadic function in the cognitive processes of comparison and distinction, highlighting the agential component inherent in metaphysics. $m$ represents a process of relation and mediation, which imply agential capacities of discrimination and comparison. Moreover, the betweenness relation asserts that the intermediary point is not external to $a$ and $b$, but that the intermediary is “in” them – “as their nature is diversified into their differences” (1904, 81). How $a$ and $b$ are distinct from one another occurs between their points and is not decided apart from their relationship. $m$ represents the point that marks the difference between $a$ and $b$, but as
Royce argues, $m$ also establishes a link between the points, a link that would not have been present if we were not attentive to them. Thus, $a$ and $b$ represent not only distinct points, but also inherent in $a$ and $b$ is the possibility of a "common nature" that is dependent on a third agent who brings the two into relationship through an active process of an agent's attention, desire, and purpose.

The triadic structure assumed in the betweenness relation invokes a transformation of its members. According to Royce:

For in so far as we define such a triad, we discover how we could conceive one member of our original pair as transformed into the other, by means of a process that involves first distinguishing the intermediary between the two from one of the extremes, and then the other member from the object thus distinguished (1904, 87).

Royce understands this process of transformation ($a$ transforms to $b$) as a mediating activity represented by $m$. In this sense, the mediating character of $m$ brings into relation $a$ and $b$ and hence establishes a connection between them that would not have been present if not attentive to the reality of $m$. Royce articulates the general postulate of betweenness as follows: "Between any two objects of the world there is always another to be found" (1904, 88). Scott Pratt, commenting on Royce's logic, views the betweenness relation as making "both diversity and connection possible regardless of the things in relation" (2007, 138). In this sense, $m$ maintains its own distinct character and preserves the distinctness of $a$ and $b$ because of its "insistent" character of emergence between them, while at the same time connects $a$ and $b$ through its mediating function.

27 Pratt also views Royce's project of logic as framed by the betweenness relation. He writes, citing Royce, "Logic, or the Science of Order will be the study of 'the single question, What for us is implied by discriminating $a$ from $b$?'" (Pratt 2007, 138).
For Royce, the intermediaries expose to us “fragments” on a continuum, and the optimistic message implicit in his postulate of betweenness provides some logical measure of security that a relationship can be found. The “insistency” of the middle point’s emergence reveals to us the many discrete entities on a continuum, a sort of radical pluralism. However, implicit in the proliferation of many discrete individuals the insistent middle represents, there is also a corollary message of hope, a logical security that a relationship of connection between entities emerges into existence. While Royce acknowledges that the “ideal continuity” contained in his postulate is a “provisional goal” we hold, it produces a methodology in which we are to “observe facts, and then look for their linkages” (1904, 99). In this way, the postulate underscores two corollary requirements in inquiry. First, through the process of discrimination, being attentive to the uniqueness and variation found in intermediaries preserves individuality. Second, the postulate underscores a logical security of hope that relationships are ordered in such a way that meaning arises in between any disparate concepts, ideas, or objects by invoking a provisional goal.

Since the postulate of betweenness implies that any intermediary employs agential acts of discrimination and comparison that form relationships between entities, Royce gestures towards the possibility of a larger collection that goes beyond the narrow interests of the individual members. However, it is important to understand this larger collection as one that does not require the subordination of a person’s ethnic or provincial loyalties. In his encyclopedia entry entitled “Order,” Royce argues that, unlike laws that function as “top down” and posit generalities among a given collection, order emphasizes
a more horizontal approach, highlighting the individual’s relationship relative to other individual members in the collection (1917, 208). What makes the order “lovable” (1917, 227) to its members involves a horizontal relationship to individual members in the collection, rather than subsuming one’s individuality within a larger collective. This kind of relationship establishes the ethical context in which the character of the collection is defined:

To conceive a world in which there is such order is to conceive what makes possible the realization of those ethical ideals most characteristic of organized communities (1917, 227).

Community formation and order, under this view, are revealed when acts of inference occur. As we have discussed in the betweenness relation, these acts of inference occur within intermediary spaces. Royce argues that in a sea of chaos, such as a marketplace, one is able to identify a certain order by observing individuals in relation with other individuals. One must observe the “business” that goes on between people to know the order. In this sense, observation is placed between individuals such that comparison and discrimination is possible. More general observations expand once discrete comparisons are made. These observations mediate between discrete entities. The mediation of multiple entities creates generalizations of a particular community order.

This process of inference is necessary in determining the nature of a community and is predicated on the idea of an open series. The concept of an open series enables one to infer beyond the individual and narrow interests of a single individual or a single community. Royce defines an open series as “series which do not return to themselves, and which possess no repetitions of a member” (1917, 216). Events in an open series,
thus, do not repeat. Ultimately, for Royce, it is the open series that allows us to interpret beyond ourselves by seeking intermediaries at the borders of our experience, making possible the movements in our life. An open series makes transformation possible for each discrete entity. The insistency of the middle point underscores the infinite ways in which discrete individuals can be related. Thus, an open series supports the idea of the postulate of betweenness by exposing the incompleteness of discrete individuals. While the intermediaries practically bring discrete individuals into relation (as well as preserve their own uniqueness and the uniqueness of the entities in which they are relating), they also expose the porosity of the discrete individuals. The transformative character, implicit in the mediating activity of the intermediary, challenges the narrowness and rigidity of discrete individuals. Royce’s notion of an open series gestures towards a hope that abides by the postulate of betweenness. Since the intermediaries are, in fact, infinite, the possibilities for a community are endless, their boundaries porous to the infinite possibilities of future interactions with other communities of experience that will lead to its transformation. An open series, then, understands the events and deeds of a transformation as unrepeatable. However, there will always be an opportunity to transform a community due to the postulate of betweenness.

Thus, his doctrine of order consists not just of mathematical or geometrical concepts of collectivity, but also applies to social theory and the character of society. He argues:

It is, therefore, not a matter of mere accident or of mere play on words that, if a man publishes a book simply ‘A Treatise on Order’ or the ‘Doctrine of Order’, we cannot tell from the title whether it is a treatise on social problems or on preserving an orderly social order against anarchy or with studying those
unsymmetrical, transitive relations, those operations and correlations upon which the theories of arithmetical, geometrical, and logical order depend (1917, 223).

His insistent holism between the logical and mathematical sciences and social theory is predicated on the notion of an open series and the postulate of betweenness. He argues, “The bridge that should connect our logic and mathematics with our social theories is still unfinished. The future must and will find such a bridge” (1917, 223). It is the bridge that we know exists because of the postulate of betweenness, but desire and attentiveness are required for the construction of this bridge. It is not conceived from above, but between the disparities. Moreover, the future is the ethical possibility in which communities are sustained and guided towards their own growth and flourishing.

Loyalty to loyalty accomplishes the two tasks of the betweenness relation. First, it sustains connections between individuals and communities. Preserving loyalty among others means preserving their very expression of individuality and sense of meaning. Rather than rejecting either the tendency towards individualism or social conformity, Royce seeks the reconciliation and unification of both individualist and social tendencies. This, according to Royce, “is the essence of loyalty” (1995, 59). Second, loyalty to loyalty accomplishes the task of creating hope. Royce believes that loyalty goes beyond the narrow self-interests of individuals and argues, “It is a universally human good. For it is simply the finding of a harmony of the self and the world, - such a harmony as alone can content any human being” (1995, 58). Loyalty to loyalty not only puts us into relationship with others in our social experience, but also provides an idealization of a community of humanity that is formed by this very principle. Royce suggests, “What I sought for myself I should then be explicitly seeking for my whole world” (1995, 60).
Moreover, loyalty to loyalty ensures that individual loyalties will not be given up in the face of transformation. Royce recognizes the need for loyalties to be organic and evolving. "Moreover, my loyalty will be a growing loyalty. Without giving up old loyalties I shall annex new ones. There will be evolution in my loyalty" (1995, 63). Loyalty to loyalty ensures that individuality is preserved in the process of social interaction as one's loyalties intersect with others. New loyalties develop and eventually connect the disparate loyalties.

_The World and the Individual_ and his understanding of order are essential in thinking about his mature work in _The Problem of Christianity_. These ideas laid the foundation for his theory of interpretation and mark its development in his understanding of time and the community process and what he later calls communities of interpretation. In thinking about the problems of cultural diversity, Royce provides us with a philosophical critique of methods that do not socially interact with others and encourages the wanderer/philosopher to engage in socially interactive methods of travel that demand a departure from one's home and seek the intermediary road of knowledge. With each new connection, one returns home with a new vision of possibilities for one's own community. One ultimately is able to establish the connections and find the relationships that bring the various aspects of one's experiences to a larger unity.

_Self-Consciousness and the Community of Interpretation_

Both the postulate of betweenness and the theory of order reveal the social ontology embedded in Royce's understanding of the self. In his theory of order, the
ethical character of a collection is predicated on the individual’s relationship to other individuals in the collection. His postulate of betweenness can be understood in a dual sense, as a methodological starting point in thinking about relationships between individuals and also as a logical principle guaranteeing the possibility that disparate individuals are indeed related to something outside their own individuality. The community serves as the larger collection one lives in and inhabits. Following his understanding of order, however, the community serves as the larger order because it is constituted by the individual’s relationship to other members in the community. Thus, the community cannot be conceived as an aggregate social group, but a living situation that grounds the individuality of its members.

One aspect of Royce’s social theory of the self involves a commitment to complexity and variation in our social life. In Royce’s essay, “Consciousness, Self Consciousness and Nature,” we learn that social communication presupposes that there must be “other experience than mine, not merely as possible experience, but as actual experience” (1901, 438). Self-consciousness arises from processes of imitation when we observe our fellows in communication within a social environment. In The Problem of Christianity, Royce further argues that human conduct is predicated on a social environment. Other “foreign” individuals or communities “startle” us out of our individual bubble and socially interfere with our normal day-to-day activities. For Royce, this constitutes the beginning of self-inquiries, which “train us to higher and higher grades and to more and more complex types of self-consciousness regarding what we do and why we do it” (2001, 108). His social ontology suggests that the more
complicated activities we engage in that “startle” us out of our isolated individuality, the more we become self-conscious of ourselves and thus are able to understand the reasons why we act ethically. The more routinized, insular, and predictable lifestyles we create for ourselves, the less self-consciousness we develop and are less able to reflect upon our ethical conduct. The more uniform our understanding is of our social environment, the less we are able to understand the implications of human conduct. It is the “conscious imitation and conscious social interaction between man and man – these are the sources of each man’s consciousness of his own conduct” (Royce 2001, 108-9). The correlative analysis of complexity and self-knowledge abides by Royce’s understanding of the open character of serial orders and communities. This also suggests that interpretation is never complete and is always open to the anomalies of experience. Rather than rejecting this complexity, Royce sees its fruitful possibilities in positioning us to a perspective greater than our own. Keeping the dual commitment of the postulate of betweenness in mind, it is important to think about how the need for complexity relates to “communities of interpretation.”

Royce understands the self engaged in processes of interpretation of its past in order to define its present and shape its future. Expanding on Peirce’s theory of signs, interpretation for Royce consists of three elements and forms a triadic relation. The first element is the term that is being interpreted, A. The second element is the term in which the interpretation is directed towards, B. The third is the mediator or translator that serves as the basis for the interpretation, C. This triadic relationship forms a determinate order, C interprets A to B. In this case, C brings some determinate order to the dyads, A
and B (2001, 287). One important implication to the triadic structure of interpretation is that the interpretation itself, C, becomes a new term that is open to interpretation as well and is also open to be placed in some determinate order. Every new interpretation becomes a term or sign that requires interpretation (2001, 290). The process of interpretation anticipates future relationships and order.

In communities of interpretation, Royce temporalizes the many aspects of the self, insisting that “a self is, by its very essence, a being with a past” (2001, 244). It is the past that also defines communities and marks its difference between a group at a picnic or a dangerous mob (2001, 243). For Royce, human deeds are a record for others to remember, and this reveals the fact that the self is not “mere present datum, or collection of data” (2001, 245), but is an interpretation of the meaning behind one’s life activities, which includes various social histories that we inherit. A community, thus, is formed by the interpretation of many selves understanding themselves in relationship to some historical event that provides a common organizing past. The New Zealander’s memory of his ancestors arriving on a canoe serves as this reminder that a common past links the many individual members to form a community, thus enabling the proclamation among its members to claim “We are a community.” The hopes and desires of the self are intimately connected to its relationship to her past. Royce argues that a community of memory is formed when each of its members accept “in his own individual life and self the same past events that each of his fellow-members accepts” (2001, 248). Loyalty to a cause involves a commemoration of certain past events that make the development or
history of the cause shared by many people, which underscores the personal and affective relationship one has with one’s community.

Moreover, the self also projects its future in relationship to the past events. In a community of expectation or a community of hope, the individual members not only share the personal or affective relationship with the past, but are also able to form life plans along with the community. Jacqueline Kegley understands this process as a personal narrative one creates of herself in relation to a community. She argues that “identities have a collective aspect” (Kegley 2005, 222) and this phenomenon can be understood within Royce’s notion of a community of expectation or hope. In this sense, the individual is not only defined by the interpretation of one’s own past, but also by one’s interpretation of the future. In other words, one is able to create a life plan for oneself with the ideals of one’s community in view. Following the dual commitment of the postulate of betweenness, while communities are linked to a common past, communities also operate much like an open serial order that allows for multiple transformations relative to how one interprets one’s own future expectations relative to one’s commitments to their community. According to Royce, “The concept of the community depends upon the interpretation which each individual member gives to his own self, - to his own past, - and to his own future” (2001, 249). Understanding a community in this way allows us to view the unity of many selves in light of a historical and living community, rather than an abstract principle of social pluralism or a collection of individuals as a mere aggregate body.
The triadic structure embedded in a community of interpretation allows for the possibility that any of its members can serve as mediator. New communities of interpretation can form once the members change their positions in the triad of knowledge, since there is a determinate order to every reconfiguration of positions within a community of interpretation. In this case, the ideal observer is not reducible to a single person but is, as Joseph Orosco argues, an attitude of public discourse. Orosco understands Royce's concept of "community of interpretation" in the context of globalization as a "communicative framework of cooperation among the actual existing communities of humanity that will facilitate their mutual understanding" (2003, 210). The community of interpretation's triadic structure allows for the possibility that autonomous agents are "brought into conversation" without trumping one another with their own interests. Rather, the role of the interpreter strives to develop "mutual understanding of their differences, as well as their areas of overlapping concern" (Orosco 2003, 210). Thus, communities of interpretation both encourage mutual understanding by sustaining unique community differences and bring disparate communities together by creating intersecting perspectives that bridge divergent interests.

Royce's Transnational Provincial Loyalties

Once the betweeness relation is charted throughout Royce's metaphysical and ethical works, one of its social and political manifestations emerges in his notion of a "wise provincialism." Opposed to any abstract notion of citizenship, Royce returns to a sense of provincialism that emphasizes the specific commitments and interests of one's
more intimate community. However, both Smith and Trotter worry that too strong a devotion one may hold to their ethnic community would result in a kind of toxic nationalism, which prevents the possibility of any kind of unity beyond the province. It is important to point out that both views ignore the realities of immigrants’ day-to-day lives as inescapably participating in the dominant social values of their host country. Provincial loyalty, as Royce understands it, bears much resemblance to Randolph Bourne’s sense of transnational identities, which constantly re-make the American social fabric.

Bourne articulates four components in a trans-national view of America, which share Royce’s notion of the betweenness relation. First, the principle of interaction manifests in a need to move away from an abstract identity, such as the “melting-pot” metaphor to an identity based in lived experience. Immigrants’ “diverse nationalistic feelings” (Bourne 1916, 86) should not be perceived as alien or unpleasant, but rather underscore an epistemic location through a principle of interaction that seeks to engage in practices of travel and translation to make sense of their multiple commitments within various countries. Second, the principle of voluntarism arises in Bourne’s emphasis on the importance for immigrants to retain their loyalties and commitments to their country of origin. This entails that immigrants should not be subject to the imposition of a singular Anglo Saxon immigrant narrative of belonging. Third, a trans-national America “reweaves” the social fabric of America by forming a distinct and interactive international community where a cosmopolitan spirit is made through the experiences of immigrants traveling back and forth and making the necessary social adjustments.
Fourth, growth emerges as a creative act when immigrants “blindly [strive] to weave themselves into a novel international nation, the first the world has seen” (Bourne 1916, 95). Growth, for Bourne, represents the myriad crossings between countries, keeping an open (nationally porous) view of the American self and rejecting any forces that “confine” our thinking or any attempts to “dye the fabric one color” (1916, 96).

Rather than view Royce’s provincial loyalties as leading to sectionalism or as a strategy of ethnic reductionism by subordinating one’s ethnic commitments to a larger community, it is important to keep in mind the betweenness relation within Royce’s thought. The first requirement of the betweenness relation involves the desire for unification of divergent entities. In the case of distinct countries, the transnational space of exchange and travel provides infinite ways in which countries can be related. While choice may not characterize the reasons why travel is conducted in every case, choice is important in directing and creating the translation between the different countries. The principle of voluntarism suggests how one’s home is re-made through practices of travel, thereby ensuring that the connections are maintained. However, these choices are bound up in communities that continually mediate between the home and adopted countries. These communities might be thought of as border communities of interpretation that emerge because of the persistence of travel and exchange that occurs on an international level. These communities, insofar as they unite multiple communities, are “communities of interpretation” that strive to unify the diverse national and provincial tendencies of individuals and provinces.
The second requirement of the betweenness relation involves the attitude of openness to other foreign influences. Part of the consciousness of the provincially loyal involves a constant "longing for the improvement of the community" (Royce 1967, 102). In this sense, a wise provincialism is open to foreign influences from abroad. It is a consciousness that does not become mired in separatist logic but seeks transnational relationships that enable the interpretation of other forms of loyalty in relation to our own so as to improve and reassert meaning for our own loyalties. This can only be done when provincial loyalties are porous and open to social influences outside of the local community to which one belongs. Royce understands provincialism as a form of a loyal attitude which "does not mean a lack of plasticity, an unteachable spirit; it means a determination to use the spiritual gifts from abroad in our own way and with reference to our own social order" (1967, 105). Much like the process of imitation central in developing self-consciousness, provincialism presupposes a comparative faculty necessary in developing a sense of belonging to one's home. Royce encourages the activity of travel to be practiced by all, even though economic conditions might limit and determine the nature of these travels. However, travel, in Royce's view, cannot dispense with a concept of home. This theme is similar to the one Bourne identifies in his characterizations of a transnational America. America cannot be thought of as homogenous but as a myriad of crossings between countries. Between one extreme of the unwillingness to travel and the other extreme of being a lost wanderer, Royce's notion of travel encourages a reflective element that seeks out the education of foreign influences while always maintaining an anchor to one's home. Home is never a place
one leaves completely and travel reasserts its meaning. This transnational conception of provincialism allows us to understand the importance of putting our own provincial loyalties in relation to a social experience outside one's own community.

Finally, understanding a wise provincialism as a form of consciousness allows us to see transnational circuits of exchange as participating in the interpreting process of belonging to a home. While provincial loyalties are specific and particular, they are never closed and fixed. A sense of belonging understood as a provincial loyalty is an infinite process in much the same way a middle point insistently arises between points on a number line. Royce offers a view of transnational provincial loyalties as both processes of discovery as well as invitations for the individual to assert freedom. In this way, one can see how transnational migrant communities can never be understood as closed communities as Smith and Trotter might suggest. Not only do immigrant communities continually interact with dominant culture out of a need for survival, but in so doing, border communities emerge between immigrant communities and larger communities. To the extent that these communities make survival and growth possible, variety and multiplicity of various provincial communities should be fostered and maintained. Royce understands this variety and attention to provincial loyalties as integral in understanding the larger plight of the community of humanity. In the *Hope of the Great Community*, Royce argues:

The distinct national unities must remain intact, each with its own internal motive for loyalty and with its modes of expression whereby the loyalty of its individual citizens will be won and sustained in the community of mankind, which the ideal future must contain if humanity is to be really saved (1916, 53).
Royce suggests that provincial loyalties maintain a superpersonal perspective that views the loyalties of others as tied to one’s own. A citizen of the world is not loyal to an abstract notion of humanity, nor does she subordinate her loyalties to a larger community. She is loyal to a real province and, for some, a real ethnic community that serves as a basis for understanding one’s sense of belonging to the larger community of humanity. According to Royce, “the loyal indeed are always home” (1995, 43). The loyal are always home because one remains connected to their sense of home and to their sense of community regardless of how far they depart from home both physically and mentally. Being at home for the loyal subject is a process of interpretation within the context of displacement and sense of loss. Royce provides some important resources in thinking about Anzaldúa’s insistence of carrying her home whenever she travels (Anzaldúa 1999, 34). In this sense, transnational provincial loyalties relate distinct communities together even as they form an ideal extension of the self towards a community of humanity recognized through our specific commitments to our own particular communities.

Moreover, this understanding of Royce’s notion of provincialism connects with Addams’ work at Hull House in two ways. First, Hull House became a transnational space that sought to link the immigrants’ sense of home from their country of origin to their process of settlement into the host country. This process of relation does not view the ethnic commitments of the immigrant as separatist or closed and hence subordinated under a larger collective identity, but views the process of settlement necessarily engaging and interacting one’s ethnic commitments, customs, and ideals, which quite possibly changes the very nature of the identity of the larger collective. This kind of
interpretation was inspired by efforts such as the Labor Museum and the art gallery at Hull House.

Second, Hull House's project of social change was experimental in scope. The nature of boundary spaces involves an attitude of openness and fluidity. The interaction is constantly in flux and requires a more flexible approach in genuinely addressing the concerns of the immigrant neighborhoods. A settlement project that is geared towards rigid rules and abstract principles prevents the possibility for mutual exchange and social transformation. Thus, it is important to see Hull House as a boundary space of interaction that does not reject one's ethnic commitments, but seeks to bring into relation multiple homes to which we belong in the process of settling in a new community. New identities emerge within this interaction at the boundary spaces of community.

In the next chapter, I wish to concretely show how notions of travel and home work together in defining the space between. Travel and home have been used in feminist theory to articulate feminist coalitions of solidarity, given the fractured state of feminist politics in light of the concerns raised in identity politics. I turn to feminist theory at this point to show how the metaphysics of belonging are contextualized within political discussions of coalitions, which envision future possibilities for larger unified communities. This understanding of community plays an important role in understanding how the multicultural subject is brought into relation within a larger transnational vision of community.
CHAPTER V

“HOME-MAKING” AND “WORLD-TRAVELING” IN FEMINIST POLITICS: CONCEIVING THE BORDERLANDS IN TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST COMMUNITIES

The answer is never just to completely ‘let go’ or ‘transgress,’ but neither is it to always ‘contain yourself’ or ‘repress.’ There’s always some liminal (as opposed to subliminal) space in between which is harder to inhabit because it never feels as safe as moving from one extreme to another.

bell hooks (1994, 211)

Travel and home are corollary concepts that work together to frame a metaphysics of belonging and are crucial resources in conceiving the nature of transnational identities. Understanding care within a transnational space situates one’s responsibilities to distant others in more concrete terms rather than relying upon abstract notions of humanity. Moreover, Royce shows us that a wise provincialism assumes a porosity between communities, and travel enables a community to learn and realize its connections with other communities. However, as I argued in Chapter One, home may be a confining concept for women or those who deviate from the social norm of the home. Additionally,
homes may not be hospitable to many people who must leave home and never return. In this sense, home is understood as a place, and travel, it might appear, depends on the notion of home as a place that one leaves.

Elizabeth Bohls problematizes this notion of travel and home in the context of slavery. She asks, “Can a slave have a home? Can a slave be a traveler?” (2005, 45). Bohls begins with an understanding of Orlando Patterson’s notion of the “natal alienation” experienced by slaves. Since the masters have defined homes for slaves, Bohls argues, “a slave cannot have a home in the way that a free person can” (2005, 54). However, for Bohls, a notion of home is operative within the slave narratives of Mary Prince, who restores her humanity in two ways that reference home. First, Prince’s yearning for her native place denies “the slaves’ natal alienation” (Bohls 2005, 60). The yearning is understood as Prince reflects on her commitments to her family. Second, Prince links her connections with her family and her country and hence becomes a kind of cosmopolitan: “learning and growing through her involuntary or quasi-voluntary travels, each journey moving her further toward the sense of self she will need to narrate her life story for publication” (2005, 61). This sense of home underscores a process of making an identity for a slave woman, such as Mary Prince, within social conditions that strip a home from her.

Much like Mary Prince’s understanding of home, the kind of home that I seek to recover is a home in process, and hence I see home in the active sense of “home-making.” Home, in the transnational sense, gives one a way of staking oneself and one’s community in the process of transformation in encounters with other foreign
communities. In this sense, notions of travel and home enable the possibility of resisting homogeneity by transforming one’s communities relative to the encounters with other foreign communities.

In this chapter, I examine how travel and home percolate into attempts in feminist theory to cultivate feminist coalitional communities, given the fractured state of feminist politics due to the concerns of difference raised in identity politics. I examine the theoretical space-between, in feminist theory through the lens of a metaphysics of belonging framed by notions of travel and home. Feminist theory has a history of examining the fundamental nature of the space between in thinking about categories of “woman” and strategies for coalitional politics. This provides a more concrete context to envision how travel and home may provide important resources in understanding the nature of the multicultural self. Patricia Hill Collins observes the “interlocking” nature of oppression and how a “matrix” of domination exists that affects the diverse “axes” of identity (1990). This powerful theoretical approach in criticizing dominant epistemology highlights methods of intersectionality crucial for understanding women’s lives. In many ways, feminist theory has been a leading force in the academy and activist activities in realizing the importance of the space-between.

One of the main theoretical contributions in thinking about the space-between is María Lugones’ notion of “world-traveling,” which addresses the problems of exclusion in feminist coalitional politics. This groundbreaking concept has been cited in numerous fields outside of feminist theory, including political theory, philosophy, social science
research, and medical ethics. The importance of this work not only exposes the need for a model of understanding relationships between disparate individuals, but also highlights the importance of recovering social boundaries as a space of encounter, rather than rendering this space as marginal or merely as marks of separations and distinctions. "World-traveling" is an excellent metaphor that relates to one's lived experience at the social boundaries of what is familiar and what is foreign. I find Lugones' concept of "world-traveling" inspiring and foundational to the project of recovering the space between in feminist theory. Because of the importance of this concept, I seek to examine how this concept is taken up in feminist theory and also to show how "world-traveling" is associated with a correlate concept of "home-making."

My basic strategy in this chapter is to examine this notion of home-making within the landscape of feminist intersectional theory, then to assess critically two strategies of world-traveling that address feminist coalitional politics, arguing that both strategies lack the corollary concept of home-making. Finally, I show how transnational feminist theory revives this notion of home, as a process, in their understanding of world-traveling and thus provides an important contribution in addressing the state of feminist coalitional politics.

The Landscape of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory: Situating Home-Making and World-Traveling

In this section, I would like to contextualize the discussion of home-making, world-traveling, and the space-between in feminist theory with three important

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28 See Suzanne Jaeger's "World-Traveling as a Clinical Methodology for Psychiatric Care" (2003).
theorists/activists (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Bernice Johnson Reagon and Gloria Anzaldúa) who have made significant contributions in developing a theory of intersectionality. In examining these three theorists, I want to highlight the tension of home that animates their discussion of intersectionality. More specifically, Crenshaw and Reagon wrestle with a notion of home as a place (which can be confining) and offer the negation of home (not at home) as a way of resisting the limitations of home. However, in leaving home, Crenshaw and Reagon envision another kind of home that seeks social transformation and hence does not completely abandon the notion of home. Anzaldúa brings together this tension of home and underscores the process of social transformation in her understanding of the borderlands.

Crenshaw’s important contribution in critical race theory includes an analysis of the intersection of race and gender. In “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Crenshaw examines the intersections of race and gender and shows how a singular approach in understanding identity fails to address the complexities of the lives of women of color in the context of violence. While identity politics serves as a way of recognizing the social constructedness of identities, it nonetheless “conflates or ignores intragroup differences” (Crenshaw 1995, 357). For women of color, this conflation of their identities resulted in political and social inequities, which rendered situations of domestic violence invisible and unintelligible in a social and political system that was meant precisely to help women in situations of violence.
While Crenshaw develops a theory of intersectionality to address violence against women of color, she understands an intersectional framework also to “mediate the tension between assertions of multiple identity and the ongoing necessity of group politics” (1995, 375). An interesting element in Crenshaw’s notion of intersectionality is that categories, such as woman or Asian or middle class, need not be stripped of all meaning as they can serve an important function in coalitional politics. While these categories have been created by power and used to marginalize groups, the problem with these categories is not their existence, but “the particular values attached to them and the way those values foster and create social hierarchies” (1995, 375). Thus, Crenshaw views categories of identity as sites of agency in which subordinated groups “can and do exert in the politics of naming” (1995, 375). Rather than eliminate the categories of identities, Crenshaw believes that a source of agency for subordinated groups would “defend a politics of social location” (1995, 375).

Her defense for the importance of social location seems curious after she systematically exposes the rigidities of social identities, which leave women of color who occupy multiple social locations vulnerable to structural inequities and violence. So what do group identities amount to, for Crenshaw? Ultimately, Crenshaw views categories of identities as “coalitions, or at least potential coalitions waiting to be formed” (1995, 377). Rather than view identities as rigid and fixed, identities are formed as multiple and intersecting social collectives. In the context of anti-racist politics, intersectionality would reconceptualize race as a coalitional concept for both men and women of color rather than as an inert, fixed identity. Understanding identity as a coalitional concept
emphasizes that the agency of subordinated groups in determining the meaning of their
identities is an active process that negotiates the multiple and intersecting aspects of their
social identities.

According to Crenshaw, a coalitional identity understands social group identities
as "home" to us, in the name of the parts of us that are not made at home" (1995, 377). Here Crenshaw seems to shift between a notion of home as a place that may be confining for those who are marginalized and a notion of home as a coalition that entails a sense of possibility and a process of becoming. The sense of being not "at home" assumes an encounter with differently situated others in a social group. Intersectionality highlights the space-between, which requires "a great deal of energy and arouses much anxiety" (1995, 377). It is a social space created at sites where identities intersect or encounter one another. However, the notion of home as a place from which one must depart need not saturate the term of home as a fixed geographic location. In fact, Crenshaw highlights the sense of home as a flexible ideal of belonging, an imaginative space that seeks to make the necessary connections between diverse social actors. Home, in this sense, reveals a sense of liminality, of betweenness, that invites potential coalitions and connections to be made.

Bernice Reagon Johnson in her speech to a 1981 West Coast Woman’s Festival in Yosemite takes a more critical approach to the notion of home, as she pares down the notion of home to a "barred room." While the barred room initially is a nurturing place in which one's sense of self is developed in a community, the barred room also functions as an exclusive place. "In fact, in that little barred room where you check everybody at the
door, you act out community” (Reagon 1983, 358). Community grounds one’s identity through acts of exclusion. The only way in which “coalescing” can be done is to open these barred rooms, allowing those who are different to one’s community enter and mingle within the barred room. At this point, Reagon observes, “And it ain’t home no more. It is not a womb no more. And you can’t feel comfortable no more” (1983, 359). Coalescing is a process that seeks a disruption of home. Those who were “outsiders” to one’s community now disrupt the nurturing space of home. The home that served as a ground for one’s identity is uprooted and displaced.

However, for Reagon, this sense of displacement, of leaving the womb, is a necessary step in developing coalitions. For Reagon, “Coalition work is not work done in your home” (1983, 359). While home may again serve as a limiting concept that prevents the possibility for coalition building, Reagon invites the audience to seek out a liminal space that departs from understanding home as a fixed place in order to develop coalitions. This liminal space that we enter when leaving home is fraught with tension and demands persevering effort. In this sense, commonalities between disparate groups must be created and developed in a social space, rather than intellectually fashioned. The social space is a space of action. The departure from home, from the barred room, need not imply a wholesale rejection of a place of comfort. The departure from home situates the self in between homes, in between identities, in order to form alliances. Thus, leaving home immediately places us in the space-between, which seeks further alliances with others who are culturally and socially different. In this way, Reagon maintains a sense of home as a coalition, as a process that seeks a collective belonging. However, the process
of coalition building, of making a home, must be engaged as a place of action. Coalitions are not fixed centers or closed homes but processes that change the nature of homes. Rosemary Marangoly George views Reagon’s sense of identity as “mini-coalitions,” which evoke a temporary sense of home, “yoking together sexuality, race, gender, class, and countless other ideologies working toward locations where all of me could feel at home for the time being” (George 1996, 33). This interpretation of Reagon underscores the tension of belonging that comprises the self’s departure from home as well as the need for the self to develop coalitions with others who are differently located. The boundaries of communities represent the space in which belonging is created through effort and where communities are constructed without rigid borders.

In my analysis, I argue that while both Crenshaw and Reagon take a critical stance—in varying degrees—to the notion of home, both their respective approaches to intersectionality and coalition resonate a sense of belonging and a sense of home conceived in a liminal space in between communities and identities. In this space-between, home cannot be conceived as rigid or fixed and hence cannot be wholly viewed as a closed place where one is nurtured and isolated from the social realm. Home motivates our very yearning for belonging. This evokes a reflective process that continually demands one’s re-interpretation of the self. This can be understood as the “insistent middle” that keeps emerging between the disparate points Royce discusses. The “insistent middle” represents the psychological longing for connections between homes in the experience of displacement. It is not something that can be repressed but

29 This aspect in their work recalls Royce’s self-reinstating principle. The very act of negating home necessarily brings the notion of home back into their theories. This exposes how the space-between engenders a principle of inclusion.
rather embraced. Gloria Anzaldúa’s seminal work *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* offers an embodied experiential account of the space-between in her theory of the borderlands, which understands home as both a place of confinement, oppression, and exclusion as well as a place that generates a sense of belonging and establishes temporary homes, open for further interpretations.

While Anzaldúa understands borders as a “dividing line” that separates communities, borderlands are a “vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary” (1999, 25). Similar to the experience of being not at home, the inhabitants of the borderlands are “the prohibited and forbidden” (1999, 25). The residual emotions of borderlands are fraught with tension and anxiety even as they evoke a sense of yearning for connection. Boundaries viewed within the borderlands appear “unnatural,” fictions created by the arrogance of the dominant community’s power to name. Borderlands are those physical places that emerge between communities, constantly insisting on an interpretation for their existence.

Nonetheless, the borderlands are homes to those who are multiply oppressed. The “psychic restlessness” that Anzaldúa brings to her audience demands a departure from “the familiar and safe homeground to venture into the unknown and possibly dangerous terrain” (1999, 35). Borders may provide a safe haven, much like Reagon’s notion of a barred room; however, for those who are multiply oppressed, the displacement is fraught with terror. Anzaldúa dislodges a possible treatment of travel as a touristic act in response to one’s banal life. The border crosser is forced to leave home, and this departure reveals the liminal space-between where she lives out of necessity and survival.
on a "thin edge of barbwire" (1999, 35). While borderlands may appear to be antithetical to fixed communities, in my view, borderlands evoke a sense of yearning for connection, which establishes continuities between homes. Anzaldúa also describes the borderlands as "in a constant state of transition" (1999, 25). This experience manifests in her analysis of *mestizaje*, the process of "continual intermarriage between Mexican and American Indians and Spaniards" (1999, 27). This process ultimately created a new race, *la raza nueva*. The process of *mestizaje* formed under conditions of contact and encounter with "gold-hungry conquistadors and soul-hungry missionaries from Mexico," who came along with many mestizos and Indians to the American Southwest. While Anzaldúa highlights the kind of colonial travel enacted by conquistadors and missionaries, she also identifies the return of many Indians to their homeland, Aztlán. This return made Chicanos "secondarily indigenous to the Southwest" (1999, 27). The return to the "homeland" is important as it incorporates a mode of travel that maintains a sense of home through seeking to sustain otherwise lost cultural centers. The process of *mestizaje* ensures that the "Indian heritage" remains in Mexico and the US Southwest despite the persistence of colonialism. However, these lost cultural centers are considerably transformed because of this process of interaction. This historical interpretation of colonization and return to the homeland anticipates her theory of the self at the borderlands.

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30 My interpretation of home in Anzaldúa's work is similar to Lugones' interpretation of Anzaldúa's border subject. In her essay, "On Borderlands/La Frontera: An Interpretive Essay," Lugones is concerned with a reading of Anzaldúa's sense of crossing-over as a solitary act. However, she argues, "If rebellion and creation are understood as processes rather than as acts, then each act of solitary rebellion and creation is anchored in and responsive to a collective, even if disorganized, process of resistance" (Lugones 1992, 36). I view this dual response of resistance and creation as a process of home-making, which highlights the continuity of the self who border crosses through a process of interpreting and revising communities.
In examining notions of the self at the borderlands, many theorists have commented extensively on Anzaldúa’s notion of the self as *Coatlicue, la facultad, la Llorona* or *mestiza consciousness*, but to my knowledge, no one has commented on the image of herself as the turtle. In characterizing the movement of resistance, she explains the nature of her departure from “home” as follows:

I was totally immersed *en lo mexicano*, a rural, peasant isolated *mexicanismo*. To separate from my culture (as from my family) I had to feel competent enough on the outside and secure enough inside to live life on my own. Yet in leaving home I did not lose touch with my origins because *lo mexicano* is in my system. I am a turtle, wherever I go I carry ‘home’ on my back (1999, 43).

The turtle image represents her confidence to rebel and criticize her culture because *lo mexicano* pervades her identity. This embodied commitment to her culture will not disappear simply because she leaves her home. Her notion of travel retains this sense of her culture, which anchors her voyages outside of her culture to a sense of place and community within the borderlands. These anchored voyages establish, on the one hand, a continuity between her “home” community with the “outside,” and yet on the other hand, also characterize her reflective process as interactive, where she is able to “live life on her own” through skills that involve “being secure” of her identity at “home” as well as having competency in the outside world. The sense of home the turtle represents continually re-examines one’s community in the hope of transforming it.

Interestingly, this process of interaction she emphasizes is also characterized by her “fear in going home” because she criticizes her cultural traditions, i.e. those that enslave women. However, her criticism of her culture does not mean she is disloyal to her cultural community, since she is able to “defend” her culture from non-mexicans.
Anzaldúa’s sense of home connotes an embodied dimension in the fact that home, her commitments, to community are something she can never easily dispense with. Her travels are not characterized as autonomous, individual acts of movement but as being anchored to her community. This prevents her from fully identifying with culturally different others because “every sinew and cartilage” of her body is permeated by “home” (1999, 43). Her criticism of her culture is represented at its edges, marked by her “leaving home,” and thus attempts to ultimately transform her cultural community.

Anzaldúa’s use of the turtle reminds the audience of home, both as a nurturing place that can also breed oppression, demanding an inevitable departure as well as the possibility that homes can be transformed by recognizing the borderlands as an interactive place, which invite unknown and possibly dangerous encounters with differently situated others. These perilous spaces establish a sense of continuity between communities and enable social transformation to take place. Anzaldúa represents this temporary psychic state of connection in the following way:31

It passes through my body and comes out of the other side. I collapse into myself - a delicious caving into myself – imploding, the walls like matchsticks softly folding inward in slow motion... Not the heterosexual white man’s or the colored man’s or the state’s or the culture’s or the religion’s or the parents’- just ours, mine (1999, 73).

The self is multiply harmonizing into a pluralistic rhythm, slowly engaging the various supports of the encounter at the borderlands. The transformation is characterized initially as a sense of the self being blocked by the confining forces of home as a place. However, Anzaldúa articulates a process that “passes through her body.” The “walls” of her

31 I thank Mariana Ortega for pointing this out to me at the First Annual Latina Feminism Roundtable held at John Carroll University, April 2004.
identity cave in as a new self is formed. There is a sense in which the experience of transformation entails that selves are separated and fractured, and yet these chasms are overcome by a creation of a new identity that harmonizes the various aspects of the self. Coalition emerges as a new identity that involves a transformation of the self as well as the community. It does not dispense with a notion of home, but seeks a vital transformation of it:

And suddenly I feel everything rushing to a center, a nucleus. All the lost pieces of myself come flying from the deserts and mountains and the valleys, magnetized toward that center. Completa (1999, 73).

Much like Royce’s wanderer, Anzaldúa seeks to bring together the various aspects of her experiences. This sense of a center, a nucleus, or a home perhaps exists in the space between homes. It represents not just a place, but an un-repressible psychic space created by the yearning for a sense of belonging, for a new interpretation between communities. It is the felt presence of the “insistent middle” that animates the condition for the possibility of conceiving larger communities.

Crenshaw, Reagon, and Anzaldúa recognize the importance of home despite the inevitable departures from it. Both Crenshaw and Reagon identify the notion of home as confining and hence a place from which to depart. While it may appear as a place of nurturance, home, as a place, cannot ground coalitions. Hence the notion of “not at home” becomes a place in which coalitions may be constructed. However, “not at home” implies another sense of home as a process of becoming, a possible future where coalitions are formed. Anzaldúa identifies the phenomenological experience that captures the notion of home as a limiting condition but also as a process that envisions
the formation of new identities within a social collective. Home is never something one leaves, but serves as a process that seeks social transformation. It is not fixed or closed, but conceived as a reflective process that establishes “mini-coalitions” or “transitory homes” that enable the possibility for multiple communities to remain connected. Instances of travel indicate possibilities for new connections, new relationships and thus serve as a way of thinking about transnational communities.

World-Traveling Feminists and the Process of Home-Making

Given the importance of home in thinking about coalitions, I seek to highlight the element of “home-making” in an examination of “world-traveling.” In my view, underscoring the notion of home-making reveals how the project of world-traveling has become an important theoretical resource in thinking about feminist coalitional politics. Since Lugones’ important paper calling for feminists to “playfully world-travel” in order to bridge the social and cultural differences between women, many feminists have incorporated this concept in projects addressing pluralism.

In this section, I criticize two feminist thinkers (Christine Sylvester and Sonia Kruks) who expand Maria Lugones’ concept of “world-travel” as a method of understanding empathy between differently situated women. For both theorists, empathy serves as the possibility for coalition in feminist politics. While I think both theorists’ work in empathy is important in cultivating a cohesive feminist politics, I argue that both Sylvester’s notion of “empathetic cooperation” and Kruks’ concept of “respectful recognition” fail in addressing the necessity of home and consequently the social
dimensions of interaction, which are foundational to the project of "world travel." In response to these feminists' understanding of world-travel, I consider the process of home-making theorized by Yen Li Espiritu in her work with Filipino American communities as an alternative model of empathy, which relies on imaginative journeys to the worlds of others while recognizing the literal ways in which one is embedded and entangled in multiple relationships.

Responding to the different tendencies in feminist politics, Christine Sylvester sees the project of world-travel as "a method of empathetic cooperation" while taking into account the differences between women (1995, 942). For Sylvester, feminist politics should not be viewed as a "lifestyle of feminist ad-ons," (1995, 945) much like the tourist who merely passes through without establishing any kind of commitment to culturally different others. This kind of subject maintains an underlying "I" or center, which is fixed and encompasses her in the familiar borders of home. The kind of subjectivity Sylvester proposes relies on Lugones' notion of world-travel. Sylvester argues, "This form of world traveling relies on empathy...It moves us, in other words, to places of subjectivity that shift and hyphenate into the worlds of others" (1995, 946). For those who are in privileged positions, world-travel must be willfully imposed. However, for some border crossers, world-travel is done out of necessity and hence the traveler is not necessarily conscious and reflective of her travels. Between these two modes of travel, Sylvester seeks to understand empathy as neither willfully imposed nor done compulsively out of survival, but as "something you do" in a "pluralistic mode" (1995, 949).
Sylvester's overall project is important as it suggests the possibility that women of differently situated experiences can develop relationships of solidarity central to feminist politics. However, her method is epistemically abstract as it is difficult to understand concretely how we are to imagine, let alone act upon, the concept of empathetic relational identities. Sylvester gives an example of African world traveling that entails the narrator, Sekai Nzenza, a displaced Zimbabwean in the UK attempting to reconcile her location and politics against colonialism, mentally world-traveling to the "historical era of slavery in the US for insight into her quandaries" (1995, 949). Rather than actually engaging in discussions or interactions with those who are affected by slavery or with US anti-black racism, this kind of traveling imagines the lives of distant others without actually encountering them. This mental world-traveling represents for Sylvester "a hyphenation of identity" in which she can be empathetic to a distant world and era, namely the era of slavery in the US. In this example, Sylvester is not clear about the processes of this mental world-travel and how this might develop any kind of empathy. Presumably, Nzenza is able to establish a sense of solidarity with US slaves without engaging in their lives. In this sense, Sylvester dismisses the interactive dimension or the social space between that anchors the self in a social collective.

The abstract nature of empathetic relational identities, which dismisses the social space of interaction, becomes evident in Sylvester's discussion of "empathetic cooperation." She describes the world traveler as:

a subject moving in, through, and around subject statuses of the self and other as she goes abroad (read mentally-my insertion). Hers is not a journey of isolation that has one wandering around lost in the 'strange' streets of exotica. It is a series of journeys of empathetic social recognition, of acknowledgement, which lead the
traveler into cooperations to ‘negotiate respectfully with contentious others’ (1995, 954).

It is unclear how a mental journey to distant cultures can be understood as “cooperative.” This assumes that the distant other also has a stake in the interaction. Given the example of being empathetic to others who share similar struggles in distant temporal places, there is no clear point of interaction. Furthermore, who decides the norms that should guide the cooperation? In Sylvester’s notion of empathetic cooperation, it is unclear how this decision is conducted, particularly if this is an individual mental journey, which need not require the interaction with others. Her empathy is a solitary act and does not seek an encounter with distant others nor ground her sympathy within a social collective. The social collective involves encounters with others where their experiences are recognized and play a role in the development of sympathy. Nzenza’s world-travels to the distant lives of US slaves is a partial and solitary act and does not consider the experiences of those affected by US slavery.

Moreover, Sylvester does not concretely provide a way of understanding how privileged persons can “willfully” embrace this notion of identity and how this willful embrace can be understood as a process of interaction, where one is in an entangled relationship with persons outside of dominant culture. The subject looks more like a researcher seeking to learn from others, rather than engaging in the messiness of coalitional politics.

Unlike Sylvester, Kruks attempts to provide a less abstract sense of world-travel by highlighting the embodied experiential dimensions to world-travel through feminine embodiment. However, Kruks’ rendition of world travel, nonetheless, does not address
the social experience of interaction or possess a sense of home central for understanding
the project of world travel. Kruks seeks an experiential account of world travel,
highlighting the affective dimensions of empathy that avoid the problem of full
identification. In Kruks’ mind, Lugones’ notion of world-travel assumes not only a
perceptual or cognitive shift, but an ontological shift as well. Lugones’ world-traveler is
one who can actually “be” the different person and embody their cultural personality
(Kruks 2001, 157). Given what Lugones says about her notion of world-travel as
anchored within a social collective, I believe Kruks misreads Lugones’ notion of the
ontological shift in world-travel as a case of fully identifying with differently situated
women. I believe this misreading stems from Kruks’ failure in understanding the
ontological significance of the space-between. According to Kruks, empathy can be
reached between women because of shared similar feminine bodily experiences.
Ultimately, this allows for the possibility of understanding how empathy can be
“willfully embraced” by privileged world travelers.

One example that situates for us what Kruks’ notion of world-travel looks like is
her rendition of her experience with a Nigerian woman in a battered woman’s shelter,
which illustrates how her notion of feminine embodiment can explain the affective
dimensions of empathy. This is what she extracts from her experience: First, Kruks felt
that the social differences between the two women were “temporarily suspended for me”
(2001, 166). What remained for Kruks was this immediate affective sentient response.
Second, she felt her body was connected to the Nigerian woman’s body as she imagined
the blows that rained down her face and that her dissimilar pain she experienced was
something that was provoked by a feeling-with her pain. Third, because the Nigerian woman possesses a female body, Kruks argues that she shares similar key invariants of her body with the Nigerian woman. To a certain degree, Kruks subscribes to a kind of sexual solipsism, as she is able to feel-with the Nigerian woman’s pain more so than a man’s physical pain. For Kruks, feminine embodiment does not guarantee a bond between all women, but she suggests that it is one of the conditions for the possibility of traveling to the other worlds of women.

In this example, it is clear that Kruks is attempting to concretely account for the social dimensions of world travel by highlighting the social settings and institutions that characterize her exchange with the Nigerian women. However, while her analysis reveals the minimum conditions for cross-cultural interaction, Kruks fails to address the processes in which the self is engaged with culturally different others within particular social settings. What are the reflective processes that go into the embodied dimension of empathy that actually consider the points of view of other differently situated women? Her methodology focuses on how the individual world traveler experiences the social exchange between women. While feelings of empathy did emerge when she encountered the Nigerian woman at the battered woman’s shelter, she interprets for her a “temporary suspension” of social differences between the two women. However, it is a suspension that occurs only for Kruks, as she does not consider whether or not the Nigerian woman also felt this temporary suspension of social differences. In other words, focusing on the capacity of the individual to feel-with another’s experiences seems to deny the basic fact that the differently situated woman might also feel-with and possibly quite differently to
Kruks. To deny the other differently situated woman’s experience in this way reduces her subjecthood to an effect of one’s experience, thus preventing meaningful social relationships to emerge. In other words, having shared bodily experiences does not engage in a mutual process of reflection that generates meaning.

Moreover, Kruks’ methodology of world travel seems to imply a notion of the privileged individual traveler. In fact, she specifically makes a case to “venture forth” from Reagon’s “barred rooms” in understanding feminist solidarity because it is contentious and resembles a Hobbsian sense of survival. In this way, her notion of world-travel is limited to individual perceptual changes that do not require the presence of others or a sense of home. As mentioned earlier, the felt anxiety and tension of “barred rooms” is predicated on actual interaction, actual “coalescing” with culturally different others. Escaping this tension through individual shifts of mental states would not guarantee coalition. While female bodily experiences may be shared in order to escape this tension and anxiety, this strategy ultimately seems to escape the space-between, the space in which social transformation is possible by being enmeshed with culturally different others.

One possible reading of Sylvester and Kruks may suggest that their respective strategies of world-traveling involving empathy are a minimal claim in understanding differences between women. In other words, empathy, understood as world-traveling, serves as the condition for the possibility of entangling oneself in social relationships and

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32 In colonial travel literature, for example, the writings are based on the implicit fact that the colonial travelers were the only ones traveling and did not even consider the obvious fact that traveling was possible for the natives they were visiting. See Mary Louise Pratt’s *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transcultural*. 
generating meaningful social interaction with differently situated women. However, this reading of world-travel limits the notion of travel to individual experiences prior to actively seeking out encounters with culturally different others. This view assumes that an attitude of sameness must develop prior to an interrogation of what those standards of sameness might be. The temporary suspension of social differences that occurs only for Kruks already has determined the conditions of the social without considering whether the Nigerian woman may also have a role in determining these social conditions and individual experiences. The project of world-traveling, as Lugones understands it, pays attention to the social (2003, 20). Those who don’t pay attention to the social, in Lugones’ mind, do not travel. The social is something that involves tension and anxiety over the conditions that determine the encounter. It assumes that knowledge is partial and that meaning emerges within a shared encounter with others rather than assuming that isolated individual experiences have a more reliable access to knowledge. It seems almost impossible to develop a notion of world-traveling prior to any encounter with culturally others. Moreover, Lugones understands her notion of travel within the experiences of those who are subordinated, in which they practice world-traveling everyday. This does not assume a mere perceptual shift in individual states of consciousness to distant cultures or to distant social experiences. These shifts are predicated on actual experiences of engaging with culturally different others within a space-between that occupies multiply located subjectivities. The partiality of knowledge assumes that individual experiences only reveal a limited view of the social interaction. This recognition of a lack in knowledge should guide inquiry into the ontological space-
between, which demands that one actually engages with differently situated others and mutually constitute meaning.

While Sylvester and Kruks may wrongly view the social interaction of world-traveling as formed by individual knowers willfully shifting their perceptions without investigating the point of view of another, I believe they are right in pointing out the imaginative element in world-travel that moves individual subjects into the space-between. Espiritu’s work with Filipino American communities reveals a sense of being “home-bound” as an imaginative process in which Filipinos are “bound for home, and they are also bound to and by home” (Espiritu 2003, 22). Being “home-bound,” in this dual sense, centers one’s imaginative mental world-traveling to actual commitments one may have to one’s country of origin or sense of home. Espiritu understands the immigrants’ notion of home as “not only a physical place that immigrants return to for temporary and intermittent visits but also a concept and a desire – a place that immigrants visit through the imagination” (2003, 10). Hence, there is a literal and symbolic component in thinking about the process of migration that defines the kind of transnational framework informing Espiritu’s research (2003, 11).

Moreover, rather than understanding Filipino displacement in terms of “enforced homelessness,” Espiritu seeks to reassert a notion of home that many Filipinos have articulated “by memorializing the homeland and by building on familial and communal ties” (2003, 14). Quoting Rosemary George, Espiritu argues, “imagining a home is as political an act as is imagining a nation” (2003, 14). The commemoration of home
signifies a process that defines one’s identity and builds communities despite geographical distances. Espiritu argues:

Memory of place is significant because it helps to locate the individual in a community, to bind family members together, and to shape personal identity (2003, 14).

According to Espiritu, ties to the homeland through memory are important not only because they serve as a “lifeline” for many immigrants, which form the basis of their group identity, but they also serve as a source that guides the ways in which they build communities and stake their political commitments in their host country (2003, 14). In this sense, Espiritu conceives Filipino American identities within a tension of home, “between the necessity and inevitability of a desire for ‘home’ and the accompanying dangers of that desire” (2003, 15).

Home-making places the subject within a process of social interaction as immigrants carefully create a home in their host country, while remaining insistently home-bound in their country of origin. Rather than view home as an unproblematic geographic location, Espiritu seeks to politicize geography by underscoring the realities that “belonging and origin” (2003, 15) are not always the same thing. This kind of imaginative journey to distant countries is not abstract, but part of the lived experience of those who live in-between nations. This kind of mental world-traveling does not dispense with the tension and anxiety of social differences, but transforms this anxiety to something else as a political act in their process of home-making. Home-making as a concept in social and political life underscores the ways in which the social is realized when one “world-travels.” Empathetic journeys to other worlds must be anchored to a
sense of home, which ultimately guides the social and political sense of one’s belonging in a social collective.

"World Traveling" and "Home-Making" in Transnational Feminist Communities: The Politics of Belonging in Feminist Coalitional Politics

My criticisms of Sylvester and Kruks should not suggest that world-traveling is a skill that is available to only immigrants and other subordinated, less privileged groups. In fact, Lugones makes it clear that white privileged feminists should practice world-traveling in order to address what Mariana Ortega identifies as their "loving, knowing ignorance" (Ortega 2006, 68). According to Ortega, the "loving, knowing ignorance" attempts to theorize "about women of color without checking and questioning about their actual lives, without actively trying to participate in their actual lives, without knowing any flesh-and-blood women of color, or without practical engagement with them" (2006, 68). Ortega reminds privileged feminists of their fear of "plurality that emerges when encountering women of color" (2006, 68). This fear of plurality can also be understood as a fear of home-making. In contrast to Lugones' sense of engagement in her notion of world-traveling, privileged feminists, such as Sylvester and Kruks, ignore the messiness of home-making that is corollary to world-traveling. This involves staking one’s political and social commitments in pluralistic encounters with culturally different others. This might entail critically examining one’s location of privilege. According to Ortega, feminism becomes an imagined homeland for many women of color because white feminists have guarded the doors of feminism (2006, 71). In this sense, the felt and
actual displacement guides the criticisms of women of color, such as Ortega, to encourage white privileged feminists to actually engage, not just theoretically include, the concerns of women of color. This situates privileged feminist subjectivities in the space-between, the pluralistic encounters, which places their own theoretical homes in actual encounters with women of color.

In this sense, world-traveling is not just a shift in individual states of minds to distant cultures or social experiences as a method that produces heterogeneity or a plurality of selves, in which to resist the traditional notion of the self as an underlying "I." World-traveling can also be seen as a method of appealing to a "togetherness or continuity," (Ortega 2001, 16) of the self, as Ortega suggests. Relying on Heideggerean accounts of the self and the world, the world-traveler self need not assume a "driver," a "conductor," or a substantial unified "I" systematizing one's experience. This sense of togetherness manifests when Lugones recognizes that in the process of world-traveling, the "I" in one world is different to the "I" in another world. This recognition of difference need not assume a fractured sense of the self. The recognition of difference stimulates a critical reflective process in understanding the continuity of the "I" that similarly is recognized in both worlds. Ortega views the world-traveler self as one that falls between a traditional model of subjectivity, which posits a unified knower as well as a radically fractured subject, lacking any kind of cohesive subjectivity.33 This sense of the world-traveler self possesses a sense of home-making, a kind of "differential consciousness" (Sandoval 1991) that has more to do with a process of becoming, seeking

33 For an interesting treatment of Ortega's sense of being in-between, see her essay, "Exiled Space, in-between space: Existential Spatiality in Ana Mendieta's Siluetas Series."
unity within cross-cultural encounters rather than assuming antecedent to the interaction
shared traits or social experiences. The world-traveler self's sense of unity is lived and
practiced. According to Ortega, the world-traveler self is “not a mental substance but an
active self in making, which relates to the world and is capable of reinterpreting the world
and itself; and a self that is situated in a social and historical milieu” (2001, 19). Given
the experience of heterogeneity and plurality, the self's reinterpretation requires located
and situated instances of travel in the process of home-making. It is in this practical sense
that world-traveling offers a path to solidarity.

Locating agency within situated historical places and interactions characterizes
Chandra Mohanty's sense of the self as “transnational.” Similar to Ortega's concern that
Western/white feminists engage in “loving, knowing ignorance,” Mohanty seeks to
challenge the traditional idea that Third world feminism and white feminism are merely
situated knowledges, consisting of the “add and stir” method of inclusion. Mohanty
agrees with Sylvia Walby's insight that saw her work as a project of solidarity and shared
values, one that views feminism as a process of engagement between western/white
feminism and third world/women of color feminism in defining feminist communities
(Mohanty 2003, 224). According to Mohanty, communities are defined as:

…the product of work, of struggle; it is inherently unstable, contextual; it has to be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political priorities; and it is the
product of interpretation, interpretation based on an attention to history, to the
concrete (2003, 104).

By understanding experience in the realm of action and engagement as well as place,
Mohanty understands the local as an important insight in thinking about the global.
Understanding the local and the global in this way does not assume any universal notions
of sisterhood or an “experiential ‘unity’ among women across cultures” (2003, 120). This process of relation is what I have been highlighting in this chapter as a process of home-making.

Home-making, for Mohanty, appears as two themes in her examination of the state of feminist politics and solidarity, which resemble the two requirements of the betweenness relation I articulated in Chapter 4; namely that, first, the insistent middle necessarily connects disparate entities and, second, the possibility of hope that in the future, connections will be maintained. The process of home-making that is implicit in Mohanty’s work operates in the space-between, in the intersections of global, racial, sexual, capitalistic inequities. Locating the self engaged within these struggles is an act of choice. Similar to Espiritu, politicizing geography entails that one’s home, understood as a sense of belonging, is as much a political act as making a home in a host country. While one’s travel or one’s place of birth may not be of one’s own choosing, placing oneself within relationships of struggle fundamentally centers a sense of belonging and provides a sense of unity of the self. One’s subjectivity is understood as cultivating a sense of belonging, which highlights the unity of the subject as anchored within a social collective.

Mohanty’s view of transnational feminist community satisfies the first requirement of the betweenness relation, which argues that insistent middles emerge and connect disparate entities. Mohanty argues that disparate identities are always connected in-between our ethical and political mappings of boundaries. In “What’s Home Got to do with it?” Mohanty seeks to challenge the notion that homes are absolutely separate,
“based on absolute divisions between various sexual, racial or ethnic identities” (2003, 86). Reflecting on Minnie Bruce Pratt’s essay, “Identity: Skin Blood Heart,” on the subject of home, Mohanty writes:

The historical grounding of shifts and changes allows for an emphasis on the pleasures and terrors of interminable boundary confusions, but insists, at the same time, on our responsibility for remapping boundaries and renegotiating connections. These are partial in at least two senses of the word: politically partial, and without claim to wholeness or finality (2003, 87).

According to Mohanty, and unlike Sylvester and Kruks, theorizing experience places the theory within the realm of action. The space-between is conceived as acts of choice in which the claims of ethics and politics move the subject to establish connections and remap boundaries. The insistence of the self as an actor creating her location within situated histories and places provides the possibility in which distinct entities will become connected. Understanding choice within a particular location ensures that boundaries will be remapped in a way that establishes connections. Moreover, this sense of connection is partial, never claiming wholeness, finality, and substantiality of the self, mostly because there are infinite ways in which connections and mappings are established. There can be a sense of unity, but no claim of a final interpretation for connections, since the middle point insistently emerges between settled identities.

This sense of unity that lacks finality positions Mohanty’s transnational subject of feminist coalitional politics as one ascribing to the second requirement of the betweenness relation; namely, a sense of hope is cultivated to ensure the possibility for future connections to be remade. The transnational feminist subject provides a more concrete account of the development of the multicultural self, opposed to Nussbaum’s
philosophical exile or Braidotti's nomadic subject. Through a commitment to home, the transnational feminist subjectivity anchors discussions of the multicultural self to actual commitments to her community. In her essay, "Sisterhood, Coalition, and the Politics of Experience," Mohanty commends Reagon’s attention to "our strategic locations and positionings" (2003, 118). This strategy locates experience within the ethical and political remappings between disparate entities. Mohanty understands the "old-age perspective" Reagon uses as a prescription for coalitional politics as a transnational or cross-cultural perspective (2003, 119). The "old-age" perspective rejects universal abstractions of unity, but is "forged on the memories and counternarratives" (2003, 119), on the basis of a politics of engagement that opens up the possibility of self-transformation with culturally different others. This demands the skill of humility, "the gradual chipping away of our assumed, often ethnocentric centers of self/other identifications" (2003, 119). Mohanty feels this transnational perspective criticizes totalizing "homes" by "going beyond ourselves" (2003, 119). Reagon’s call of "throwing yourself into the next century" (Reagon 1983, 365), for Mohanty, is a strategy that demands that selves must go "beyond ourselves" if one is to take up the task of self-knowledge seriously. Understanding difference through this epistemological dislocation does not result in divisions, but seeks an interpretation, a remapping of boundaries, that demands the skill of humility, "a disruption of ethnocentric centers of identities" (Mohanty 2003, 119). "Throwing yourself in the next century" demands that concerns are not wholly bound up within present differences. Maintaining connections is an act of hope that guides future actions in order to sustain communities.
I see these two requirements of the betweenness relation exemplified by Mohanty as a process of home-making. The necessity of an insistent middle that connects disparate entities and the hope, a commitment for the future that connections are maintained, reveal the process of agency, the complex processes of belonging, within the struggles of a social collective. Mohanty writes, “But location, for feminists, necessarily implies self— as well as collective definition, since meanings of the self are inextricably bound up with our understanding of collectives as social agents” (2003, 122). She also suggests that the fragmented nature of the self, the world traveler displaced from her home, “must be historicized before it can be generalized into a collective vision” (2003, 122). In this way, it makes no sense to understand world-traveling as simply a solo individual activity that is enacted by privileged world-travelers; a corollary concept of home-making must be incorporated in order to highlight how self-definitions are collectively created. Feminist solidarity and struggle must be accompanied by acts of world-travel as well as home-making in order to guide one’s act of choice within a politics of location and geography.

Since there is no final destination or place involved in world-traveling and home-making, Mohanty understands the self as a “temporality of struggle,” in which the self must move on and ultimately remap further boundaries and connections. Her notion of the self is a continual process of “reterritorialization through struggle that allows me a paradoxical continuity of self, mapping and transforming my political location” (122). Home-making is a process that pays particular attention to the rootedness of the struggle and engagement with multiple commitments in which acts of choice emerge as a process
of creation within the space-between. The sense of political agency generated by this concept enables a more grounded interpretation of coalitional communities within the dominant society. Beginning with these specific struggles in mind “anchors” Mohanty’s “belief in the future and in the efficacy of struggles for social change” (2003, 123).

I conclude this chapter with a quote from a speech given by Patricia Evagelista, who, at the time, was a 19 year old Mass Communications sophomore of the University of the Philippines. This speech was voted unanimously as the winner among 60 other speakers from English-speaking countries in an International Public Speaking contest in 2004. She writes, “Leaving sometimes isn’t a matter of choice. It’s coming back that is.” It is important to understand feminist politics avoiding fancied flights to the worlds of other women relying on natural or sociological universals to sustain solidarity. It is important to understand the return to home as a process of home-making, a politics of engagement and transformation, essential in one’s travels. Mohanty’s experiences of travel and border-crossing “always provoke reflections of home, identity, and politics” (2003, 135). This understanding of world-travel resembles Anzaldúa’s image of the self as a turtle. Carrying home on one’s back provokes questions of how the self is located between transnational relationships as one negotiates the terrain of hegemonies and exclusions, as well as sites for autonomy. This image of the turtle correlates with the image of the anchor. Mohanty and I have used the word “anchor” to characterize the attachment of the self to a social collective. I think “anchor” both summons the phenomenological experience of being connected to a secure community as well as the

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34 Mohanty sees sociological universals in the same way as natural universals. According to Mohanty “secondary sociological universals” bind “women together in an ahistorical notion of the sameness of their oppression and, consequently, the sameness of struggles” (2003, 112).
desire for an anchorage when lost at sea. Choosing to anchor or to return to an anchorage is an act of choice and should be seen as continuous with the experience of travel. While we may see travel as the trope that symbolizes freedom and self-discovery, it is important to recognize how the process of self-discovery – even through travel – is also a fundamental yearning for a home, a process of the self engaging in practices of home-making. In the voyage of self-discovery, one never leaves without an anchor. Through the process of home-making, feminist coalitional politics must be anchored within a politics of engagement that includes a belief in the future of feminist solidarity.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION:

SENSE OF PLACE IN TRASK'S NOTION OF LAND AND ESPIRITU'S NOTION OF HOME: NEW DIRECTIONS IN NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITIES

All the chapters in this dissertation stress the importance of the space-between in thinking about the ways in which our social, political, and ethical relationships are conceived within a transnational framework. Conceiving the nature of identities within a transnational framework situates and concretizes our understanding of the nature of international communities. In this dissertation, I analyzed the notion of travel as a way of thinking about the transitory nature of mobile identities in a transnational world. However, in thinking about the space between in a transnational framework, a corollary concept of home emerges alongside discussions of travel. Travel and home serve as important concepts in order to address the ways in which identities are not firmly circumscribed within territorially defined communities, nor are they entirely separate and free floating from one's community. The space between characterizes the encounters, the
tensions and anxiety of the realities of engaging social relationships. I have characterized the social element of the space between framed within concepts of the processes of travel and home. The space between conceived within a transnational framework fosters a way of thinking about difference and continuity without reducing identities under homogenous and universal concepts.

In Chapter two, I discussed how philosophical discussions of the cosmopolitan self conceive a narrow notion of the cosmopolitan traveler and hence engage in a type of "theoretical tourism," which avoids the interactive dimension that the actual practice of travel assumes. Nussbaum's cosmopolitan traveler escapes the banalities of lived experience and concrete practical actions to an abstract realm of humanity that subsumes all differences under a common human capacity of reason. In attempting to foster tolerance and openness to other cultures, Nussbaum articulates a kind of travel that intellectualizes group differences rather than actually encountering culturally different others. Braidotti similarly engages in a type of "theoretical tourism" as she posits a nomadic subject who is ungrounded from a sense of concrete encounters with culturally different others. Rather than conceiving the cosmopolitan subject appealing to a transcendent or unified subject, the nomadic subject perpetually travels everywhere. Encounters are always shallow since the nomad is constantly moving. This kind of subjectivity cultivates a sense of escape, rather than a sense of commitment to the cultures in which the nomad visits, and consequently ignores the interactive dimension to travel. Both views ignore the space-between as a source for understanding the promise of
transnational theory in conceiving a concrete, non-transcendent notion of the cosmopolitan subject.

Chapters three, four, and five articulate the ethical, metaphysical, and social and political dimensions in thinking about transnational identities. In Chapter Three, I showed how the transnational space between nation-states serves as an important model in extending the ethics of care into a global context. Rather than conceiving care as parochial or attentive to more local and familial relationships, I championed a concept of the transnational doulia principle in order to address transnational dependency workers, whose very agency is concealed within transnational relationships of dependency. Jane Addams' conception of social ethics and her work with immigrants exposed one's ethical obligations closer to home. A transnational space between highlights the ways in which one is entangled within a proximate distance with the lives of culturally distant others. In this way, care's concern would be directed towards the space-between, characterized as transnational relationships of dependency when thinking about the global context.

Chapter Four highlights the metaphysical and ontological significance of the space between in social life. Josiah Royce's "betweenness" relation exposes two requirements of the space between. First, the insistent middle always emerges between disparate entities and hence maintains both differences and connections. Second, the insistency of the middle point also represents a logical security for hope that future connections will always be present. These two requirements of the betweenness relation frame Royce's notion of provincialism as a way of thinking about the nature of transnational identities as an ethical theory of loyalty. The community of interpretation
represents the “insistent middle”—and meets the first requirement of the betweenness relation—that logically and practically emerges between distinct entities, including individuals, “provinces,” nation-states and so on. The Hope of the Great Community represents the second requirement of the betweenness relation in that future international communities will emerge out of communities of interpretation. The ontological significance of the space between underscores how both travel and home are important corollary concepts in thinking about the continuity and transformations that emerge between disparate communities. Royce’s theory of provincialism underscores how transnational identities “reweave” the social fabric of American life since the process of travel seeks out connections between nation-states through their insistence of making a home in the host country. In this way, national identities are conceived as porous communities, rather than fixed and static nation-states.

Chapter Five concretely applies the notion of travel and home framed by the theoretical space-between in feminist theory’s attempts to reconcile the concerns of difference raised in identity politics. Thus, I examined how the liberatory potential in the project of “world-traveling” is associated with the corollary project of “home-making.” A result of this analysis exposes a transnational feminist subjectivity that satisfies the two requirements of Royce’s betweenness relation and can serve as an alternative model in conceiving the multicultural self, opposed to Nussbaum’s philosophical exile and Braidotti’s nomad subject.

I find transnational theory promising in the areas of ethics, politics, and theories of the self in accounting for how identities are lived and created within spaces that restrict
and determine as well as recover one’s path to liberation. In this way, one’s freedom is entangled within their commitments to their communities. While transnational selves seek to retain their distinctness, a corollary desire to develop connections in their fractured existence remains. This, I believe, becomes a promising theoretical resource to address the splintered nature of identity politics. By emphasizing a sense of place, a transnational framework highlights a social process that continually seeks meaningful connections between distinct communities.

As I conclude this dissertation, I would like to point out future directions in which a transnational framework might address problems within itself. Thus, I engage in an immanent critique of transnational theory in the following discussion of Native identities. Opposed to defining diasporic or transnational identities by pointing out their essential features, Clifford seeks to “relationally position” diasporic identities amongst other types of identities. Two types of identities that are “caught up and defined against” diasporic identities include (1) “norms of the nation-state” and (2) “indigenous, and especially autochthonous, claims by ‘tribal’ peoples” (Clifford 1999, 250). In this dissertation, I have only addressed how transnational identities are conceived in relation to a fixed conception of the nation-state. I have argued how a fixed understanding of national identity is impossible given the growing transnational world that animates contemporary global life. I have shown how transnational influences have shaped and changed the identity of nation-states. However, I have not considered how my project of “world-traveling” and “home-making” can be conceived within the “first claims” to the land that form the basis of many sovereignty claims among Indigenous tribes.
The tension of settlement claims between transnational identities and Native identities appears with great force in the context of Asian Americans in Hawai‘i. Asian American and Pacific Island American identities have historically been elided together as recognized group identities in academic scholarship, such as the designation Asian/Pacific American (APA), Asian and Pacific Islander (API), and Asian and Pacific Islander American (APIA). The assumption here is that Asian American and Pacific Island identities share a history of exclusion within US dominant narratives of citizenship and national discourses of belonging. These groups formed as a way of creating coalitional communities in order to voice their shared political agendas (Nomura 2003, 19). Both group identities have suffered the yoke of racism, sexism, and imperialism from US colonial ideologies and domestic and international policies. However, recent literature concerning Asian American identity issues has sought to recognize differences between the two ethnic groups. The importance of this demarcation is forcefully presented by Native Hawaiians, who argue that both groups have distinct political agendas and interests. While the Native Hawaiian seeks sovereignty and self-determination, the Asian American immigrant seeks civil rights and participates in existing US constitutional procedures. The elision between Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Island American people with Asian American identity is a false association where the contradiction is exposed in their distinct political projects relating to sovereignty and civil rights. Moreover, any shared political identity, such as APA or API, has historically marginalized Pacific Islander voices and concerns (Nomura 2003, 20).
Given the rise of this criticism, scholarship has responded in seeking out ways in which Asian American identities can address their own practices in their host country with the indigenous population, which historically preceded their arrival. In 1998, the editors of the anthology *Q & A: Queer in Asian America* recognized arguments about the peculiarities of eliding Asian and Pacific Islander identities together and have chosen to “not use the designation ‘Asian Pacific Islander’ (API)” (Eng & Hom 1998, 19). Rather, they encourage “further examination of the intersection of and interaction between Asian American and Pacific Islander contexts” (Eng & Hom 1998, 19). In 2000, *Amerasia Journal* sought to consider this issue in further detail and released a special edition on this subject. The editor of this edition, Candace Fujikane, calls for a reexamination of Asian American Studies objectives, which traditionally have been built on “local” narratives and immigrant perspectives. She argues in her introduction to this issue that Asian settlers in Hawai‘i and on the continent must “hold ourselves accountable for our actions” (2000, xxi) and thus must understand the ethical implications of travel, even as immigrants who are products of US imperialism.

Recently, some attention has been given towards seeking out ways in which Asian/Pacific Islander American can be theorized together. In the introduction to the anthology, *Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology*, Gail Nomura carefully elides these identities together without “suggesting that Asian Americans and Pacific Islander Americans are a single homogenous group” (2003, 20). The editors of this anthology seek to find new ways of understanding the intersections of these relationships and expand research and interpretive frameworks that make it possible
for building coalitions between ethnic groups. For Nomura, exposing the heterogeneity between and within Asian American and Pacific Islander American identities underscores the process of coalition building, a process that takes place at the "borderlands of interactions and separations" (2003, 20).

I seek to continue the process of exploring the intersections of Asian and Pacific Islander American relationships by highlighting not only the ethical commitments Asian Americans have with Pacific Islander concerns, but also the need for understanding the theoretical frameworks, which serve to demarcate, as well as to build, coalitions between Native Hawaiian/Pacific Island and Asian American identities. In attending to the transnational space between Asian American and Pacific Identities, I believe a sense of place, framed by notions of travel and home, can serve as a viable political strategy to change the conception of the differences between Asian American and Native Hawaiian identities. Some of these concepts that constitute the basis of identity include the notion of land as theorized by indigenous perspectives and the concept of home as theorized by Asian Americans seeking coalitional pursuits in politics and Filipino conceptions of transnational identity formation. While I do not think I will provide answers in thinking about Asian and Pacific Islander American relationships, I hope to provide a theoretical outline of the ways in which Pacific Islander and Asian Americans identify themselves, underscoring their ontological similarities and differences. Once a clear picture is painted of the ways in which identities are constructed within these distinct groups, I would like to suggest a way of understanding how concepts such as the land and home
cultivate a sense of place for individuals to be connected with larger ethnic and political communities of coalition.

Pacific Island Identity: Identifications with Land and Ocean Geographies

In an impassioned essay entitled “Settlers of Color and “Immigrant” Hegemony” published in a special issue in *Amerasia Journal*, Haunani Kay Trask criticizes the dominant political Asian immigrant population in Hawai‘i. She argues that Asian immigrants, namely the politically dominant Japanese Americans, claim Hawai‘i as their home, while at the same time deny its indigenous history and continually benefit from Native Hawai‘ian land dispossession initiated by US colonial powers. Trask calls for a distinction between immigrants and Native Hawaiians in order to recognize the distinct political positions of people of color whose histories are bound up with US colonial practices. Ultimately, Trask argues that all Asian immigrants are what she terms “colonial settlers”; i.e. “someone who benefits from stolen Native lands and the genocide so well documented against America’s Native peoples” (2000, 20).

Trask argues that the colonial settler ideology is rooted in the “local” identities of immigrants in Hawai‘i. Part of this local identity submits to the immigrant tale where hard work and perseverance will earn political and economic power and success. It is important to note that this immigrant tale that gives rise to “local” identities in Hawai‘i is influenced by domestic and American values. In other words, “local” identities see no difference between Native Hawaiians, Asian immigrants, and haole settlers. We can see this criticism in the context of Royce’s notion of an unwise provincialism, which entails a
leveling tendency that mitigates the heterogeneity of a province. According to the concept of the "local," difference is homogenized and consequently is broadened in a leveling way to include both Asian immigrants and Native Hawaiians. This leveling of difference between these two ethnic groups initially provided solidarity against the US racist and colonialist state, however, "local" identities have consequently masked the continued political and land dispossession of Native Hawaiians as evidenced by the JACL (Japanese American Citizens' League) and political leaders such as Daniel Inouye (Trask: 7).

Rather than invoking a settler ideology employing "local" identities, Trask argues that Native Hawaiians were forcefully "included" under the paternalistic category of "wards" within the US hegemonic state (1993, 26-7). As wards of the state, Native Hawaiians were robbed of any agency or capacity for self-determination, especially recognizing their status as an indigenous people. According to Trask, the US Constitution is framed outside the concerns of Native Hawaiians and thus does not constitute Native Hawaiian conceptions of self-identity (1993, 26). Ultimately, the forced inclusion of Native Hawaiians within the political frameworks of the US Constitution obliterated the possibility for Native self-determination because this "settler document" sanctioned the colonial takeover of Native lands. Native self-determination, therefore, cannot be founded within the frameworks of the US Constitution. US Civil

35 Under a wise provincialism, Royce views provinces maintaining a sense of heterogeneity. He does not view provinces as rigid or fixed but constantly growing and changing because of new influences outside its borders. Because of the realities of migration, Royce is concerned with the dangers of the potential imperialism of newcomers. Thus, while Royce values heterogeneity in provinces, the danger is that newcomers would level all differences within the province and hence prevent its growth.

36 According to Trask, JACL and Inouye embarked on a smear campaign against Mililani Trask, who criticized Inouye's interference in the US Federal reconciliation hearings for Hawaiians.
Rights is a strategy built within the perceived rights of the Constitution. Thus, Native Hawaiian interests are at odds with the arguments for civil rights among Asian American immigrants.

Since the constitution does not offer Native Hawaiians a political footing to argue for their cause of sovereignty, Trask recommends the strategy of “cultural nationalism” in order to facilitate efforts in decolonization. Nationalist efforts challenge hegemony as well as create a new way of thinking about Native Hawaiian self-identity, one that dis-identifies with the US hegemonic state. First World visions of the Pacific archipelagos are often associated with images of fantasy and escape and thus, according to Trask, are indicative of a “state of mind” rather than a sense of place and geography. The problem with “local” identities for Trask seems to be framed as a problem of rootlessness among Asian American immigrants. As a result of their commitment to a US political ideology and not to a specific place and geography, “local” identities fail in accounting for Native Hawaiian concerns. According to Trask, a failure to understand the geography and place of Hawai‘i is also a failure in understanding the political motivations for Native Hawaiians to seek sovereignty.

Land and place become important features in understanding Native Hawai‘ian identity. According to Trask, Native Hawai‘ian identity is based on a non-linear genealogy. The past, present, and future are interrelated for Native Hawaiians. Rather than the Western linear assumption of time suggesting a sense of progress towards an ideal of civilization, Native Hawaiians view the movement of time as moving towards a sense of harmony understood as familial. Trask writes, “The land is our mother, and we
are her children. If we care for our mother, she will care for us in return. The relationship is more than reciprocal; it is familial” (1996, 406). It is this relationship to the land, rather than to an abstract political document, that distinguishes the political agendas of Asian American immigrants and Native Hawaiians. Trask, moreover, identifies not only with the land but also with the sea, namely the Pacific Ocean. The ocean, in fact, displaces the “continental” political perspective and supplants it with that of “Islander eyes.” Islander eyes, for Trask, include familial attachment to the land and sea. It is because of this familial relationship with the ocean and land that Pacific Islander politics become distinct from Asian American political objectives. The Pacific Ocean becomes a site of attachment and contestation in the context of nuclear military projects in the Pacific. Trask argues:

More the children of the sea than the land, Pacific Islanders know their survival as distinct peoples depends on the survival of the Pacific itself. The First World nations must still learn what Pacific Islanders have known for millennia: upon the survival of the Pacific depends the survival of the world (1993, 53).

The suggestion Trask is making here is that the ocean is a place that orients or orders our concern and care since it not only pervades the Pacific archipelagos, but also pervades continental or mainland life. How our relationships are ordered is dependent upon our relationship to the land and ocean, to a sense of place and geography.

Other Pacific Island nations have also echoed this identification with the land and sea. In fact, Pacific Island resistance to the nuclear policies of the Pacific (Tahiti, French Polynesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, and Guam) maintains a notion of identity that is linked to the land. In Daughters of the Pacific, Lijon Eknilang, a Native Pacific Islander, explains:
Many people don’t really think that our tiny island of Rongelap is very important to us. But it is our home. We are meant to be there. Our land is everything, our medicine, our food, our houses, our everyday supply (Ishtar 1994, 33).

Opposed to Western democratic assumptions of property and ownership, which understand the landowner as having “individual rights” and is free to do whatever he or she pleases with their land, Eknilang suggests an alternative way of relating to the land. The land is what sustains and shelters the people. It is one’s home. It is something that is shared, not owned. The sickness of the land is directly related to the sickness of the people. This integral relationship with the land offers an alternative relationship to the capitalistic individualistic frameworks of understanding the land. The Western fear is that this claim to the land (and it is usually argued by Pacific Islanders in a natalistic sense, “we were meant to be here” language) would necessarily exclude all foreigners from living in that region. However, relating Trask’s argument that a sense of place and geography must be cultivated, the invitation is to reconsider the relationship to the land as “capital” or “resources” to be used or even as a “state of mind.” The relationship that is called to be cultivated is not exclusivity, but a sense of flourishing that does not degrade the environment and culture.37

Asian American Identity – A Process of Home-making

Lisa Lowe’s influential study of Asian American identity in her book Immigrant Acts offers important insights towards understanding the legal and juridical practices that have largely defined Asian Americans through passages of various immigrant acts.

37 In Daughters of the Pacific, narratives from Pacific Island nations indicate that tourism can be incorporated within a sense of place avoiding capitalistic structures and mass based, large hotel tourism.
These acts have defined notions of citizenship as well as a sense of belonging for many Asian immigrants. One interesting point about Lowe's notion of identity is that it is constantly changing, never fixed, and never essentialized. She argues that rather than conceptualizing Asian American identity, it would be more accurate to analyze Asian American practices. In fact identity and practice seem to refer to the same thing for Lowe. The benefit in understanding identity as a practice is that it leaves room for transformation and rejects a vertical or unchanging view of cultural identity distinct from history and context.

Lowe provides a compelling argument as to how Asian American identity has been policed and regulated by US administrative and legal actions pertaining to immigration laws. How one understands citizenship becomes a racialized and gendered project, ultimately characterizing Asian American identity as foreign or alien to US culture. Lowe points out quite convincingly that Asian American identity, understood as alien, contradicts the discourses of assimilation in American culture. Focusing on race as socially constructed reveals its precarious and shifting meanings in light of changing and conflicting immigration laws.

I find it interesting that aspects in Asian American identity consider the original home of the immigrant as a constitutive force in constructing identity. The transnational dimensions of Filipino Americans, for example, indicate that Filipinos were already defined within an American context in the form of colonization prior to them immigrating to the US. These interesting aspects of history are important since the immigrant, Lowe argues, challenges the US dominant position by remembering this
tainted and violent history of colonization. At the end of chapter 1, she makes a case for an alternative vision of community, which resists assimilation and nativist narratives. The immigrant, because of their transnational histories of colonial violence, is capable of horizontally creating community, rather than vertically assenting to a false ideal of multiculturalism, which unfortunately submits to an assimilationist discourse. The implication I want to draw here is that it seems that part of this horizontal relationship one has with the community is initiated by the material connections the immigrant maintains with their original homeland. Transnational elements in Asian American identity serve to guide one to develop strategies in maintaining a sense of community. This skill seems to be born out of one’s split loyalties and commitments to two (often distant) places. It is this lived tension that seems to give rise to community building, rather than an abstract ideal of diversity.\(^3^8\)

Since Asian American identity is predicated by different experiences of American colonization and exclusion as well as transnational connections unsettling the abstract universal vision of US nationalist discourse, Lowe argues that Asian American identity can be understood as one of hybridity, heterogeneity, and multiplicity. The variety of experiences from many Asian Americans in relation to race, class, and gender has produced a conception of identity as one in process, rather than a fixed state. Understanding the multiple layers of social relationships surrounding Asian American identity allows for the possibility of conceiving agency within these differential power

\(^{38}\) It is not surprising in Asian American Studies that there has been a “transnational turn” in articulating Asian American experience (See Okamura 2004). A domestic perspective denies the international linkages that many migrants feel and experience in their host country.
relationships. Agency is best understood as a process of dis-identification, which negates the laws and immigrant acts determining one’s citizenship and sense of belonging to the US and elevates this identity to one of resistance, participating in counter hegemonic practices that cannot be separated from one’s subjugation. Thus, Lowe argues that women of color theorists and activists participate in an immanent critique of the US hegemonic state.\textsuperscript{39}

Lowe identifies certain Asian American practices as constituted by a historical amnesia of US hegemonic narratives, which forget the history of US colonization around the world. The counter hegemonic strategy is to underscore a remembrance of this US imperial history. Locating Asian American identity within the counter hegemonic strategy of remembrance highlights the transnational elements comprising Asian American as well as American identity formation.

While Lowe offers a way of viewing Asian American identity as one of resistance predicated on one’s relationship of exclusion to US citizenship, based on the passage of immigrant acts, Yen Le Espiritu presents a view of Asian American identity as establishing a sense of place, consequently establishing a notion of agency, despite the “unwelcome practices” of the US dominant society. In \textit{Homebound}, Espiritu offers an interesting perspective in thinking about the relationship between conceptions of the self

\textsuperscript{39} Part of this imminent critique demonstrated by women of color activists and theorists emerge in Lowe’s understanding of the role of testimony and narrative. Lowe argues, “This mode of reading and reception seeks to situate different cultural forms in relation to shared social and historical processes and to make active the dialectic that necessarily exists between those forms because of their common imbrication in those processes. It seeks to understand Asian American cultural production critically and broadly and to interpret the interconnections between testimony, personal narrative, oral history, literature, film, visual arts, and other cultural forms as sites through which subject, community, and struggle are signified and mediated” (1999, 157). The point she makes indicates that agency resides in part through processes of mediation, which includes our capacity to receive and read women of color’s testimonies of oppression and abuse.
and the dual concept of "home." On the one hand, home is a vision of the self ensconced within a collective identity, usually associated with loyalties and commitments to one's original home. On the other hand, home functions like a verb, emphasizing the processes in which home is constructed not only in the geographical sense, but also in articulating the desires, needs, and wants of transnational migrant experience. This aspect in Espiritu's work is important since it offers us a way of understanding Asian American identity outside the narratives of the nation-state.

Rather than thinking about Asian American identity, particularly Filipino American identity, as one of exclusion (Lowe 1999), Espiritu sees Filipino American identity constituted largely by what she terms as differential inclusion. Filipinos were understood as US nationals, however, not as citizens. They were allowed to enlist in the Navy or to work in the US as cheap labor, but they could not vote. Unlike other Asian immigrants, such as the Chinese, the US hostile takeover of the Philippines created an atmosphere in which Filipinos were not alien, but were, nonetheless, excluded from the benefits of US citizenship. Because of this history, Filipinos were already actively engaged in making the US a home for them to "return" to. Seeing how the processes of US colonization actually constitute this identity is important in understanding how Filipino Americans have envisioned the home-making process in America.

The experience of Filipino immigrants has been described as transnational, not only because US empire building initiated this transnational link, but also because Filipino Americans seem persistently to "carry their home on their backs." To return home or to leave home can be a literal or physical act, as well as one that takes place in
one's imagination. Home functions like a geographical point of analysis insofar as a sense of place becomes an important feature in the process of making a home. This becomes an interesting image given the complicated nature of home. Home can be exclusionary, especially if one is a Filipino daughter living in America with conservative Filipino parents or if one is gay. Nonetheless, as Espiritu argues, the notion of home is a site of tension and conflict between the desire for belonging (and not necessarily linked to origin) and the dangers that risk the consummation of this desire. It is interesting that Espiritu does not resolve this conflict but accepts this tension and seeks a curative path for one to "make a home" in relationship to the "departure from home." By doing this, she underscores a continuity between leaving and creating a new space, a space in between, for creative social relationships and communities to emerge.

Land and Home: Cultivating a Sense of Community through a Sense of Place

There are a few interesting points this analysis of Pacific Island and Asian American identities reveals. First, both Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans have a shared history of colonization in their places of origin, either in the Pacific Islands or in Asia. Second, both groups have experienced exclusion as well as differential inclusion within the US hegemonic state. Filipino Americans were allowed into the country as nationals, but not as citizens. Native Hawaiians were forcefully included as wards of the state. Both were denied a place of belonging within the US national narrative of citizenship. Third, and what I would like to focus on in this section, both held specific strategies for decolonization and the creation of counter hegemonic narratives. Both, I
argue, utilize a sense of place to reassert their specific group’s cultural identity and self-determination. Both invoke a sense of place that, on the one hand, has been taken away from them because of US colonial practices, and, on the other hand, recovers their agency and subjectivity by centering their commitments to a community, which guides their process of settlement. I would like to highlight these concepts and explore the various ways in which conceptions of land and home offer a sense of place in order to build meaningful communities of coalition among Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans.

Situating this problem within the space between framed by notions of travel and home offers some important resources in addressing the fractured nature of Asian American and Native Hawaiian coalitional politics. In Chapter 3, the space-between emerges between nation-states as a place in which our moral acts of care are fostered in order to envision the growth of a larger international community. This space between orients our capacity to care for distant others closer to home. Identifying the transnational relationships that mark our social life as relationships of dependency can help in addressing the larger processes of globalization and transnationalism that condition the nature of settlement and travel.

Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians have been subject to colonization, and the ways in which re-settlement occurs for both groups, while vastly different, nonetheless, overlap in meaningful ways. One notable way in which they overlap is in the process of yearning for a home, either in terms of distance or historical era. The social aspects that ground one’s culture are not close at hand. According to Trask, Asian Americans imagine the process of settlement as being tied to the US Constitution, whereas Native
Hawaiians imagine the process of their re-settlement in terms of sovereignty. While both groups may possess different methods of making a home, it is important to keep in mind that the concept of home both groups operate under assumes a porous and flexible home. This flexibility in shifting the visions of each of their respective imagined homes might serve as a starting point in resolving the fractured political goals of both groups.

Both Native Hawaiian and Asian American understandings of identity view their respective notions of land and home as flexible. According to Trask, colonial thinking has made her a “captive” (1996, 407) and prevented her from interacting with the land. The land is an actor, a mother for Native Hawaiians, and the mother needs to be cared for in a familial sense. Native Hawai’ian land dispossession has obliterated this logic of place for Native Hawaiians. Asian immigrants who embody a “settler ideology,” according to a logic of place, does not relate to the land and its inhabitants in a meaningful way. Rather, Asian immigrants view “their” place ordered within the US Constitution and not to the geography and actual location of Hawai‘i. Their view of the land is bound up with notions of individualism and rights.

Moreover, a way of thinking that cannot be flexible is problematic for Trask. This can be seen in Trask’s criticism of white feminism. She argues:

Feminism and white feminists are out of place here, that is, out of geographic and cultural and historical place...Thus, justice for our Native people in the form of our own land base, cultural integrity, and government is generally perceived as an injustice to non-Natives, particularly white people who keep publicly asserting, in their own words, that ‘Hawai‘i is, after all, part of the United States’...But here is precisely the deep-rooted problem. White American women are American, not Hawai‘ian. White American feminist women are still American. Their loyalties are to the United States of America (1996, 409-10).
Feminism's "fitness" to Hawai'i is ill begotten. In other words, white feminism does not work in Hawai'i because of Native Hawaiian's specific links to the land. The land serves as an ordering relation that constitutes Native Hawaiian identity. Her criticisms of US American women is not exclusionary of all haole women (although her rhetorical statements that encourage haoles to go home seem to suggest otherwise), but should be read as a call to change one's relationship to the land from an abstract document of citizenship and belonging. If feminism is to employ strategies based on the constitution's notions of rights and equality, where their sense of place is a "state of mind," then feminism is "out of place" or is not fit for the land and its inhabitants.\(^4\) If feminism is to "work" for Native Hawaiians, it must change its colonial logic of place to a more concrete and geographical sense of place, thus requiring feminism to support Native Hawaiian political stance on sovereignty.

It might be argued that there is a land essentialism lurking in this notion of place. It has been argued by a number of theorists (Clifford 1999) that immigrant and Native narratives conflict with one another because of their different commitments to place; one is from that particular place, and the other is not. However, situating this dichotomy in terms of a logic of place, one might see how place functions as a mode of relation to a specific geographical location. As Scott Pratt argues in his analysis of Native conceptions of land:

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\(^4\) Feminism might see Native Hawaiian relationship with the land as gendered, and this supports stereotypes of a weak femininity, such that women constantly need care, and also supports this historical elision between nature and women that is problematic for many ecofeminists. According to Trask's use of the logic of place, this sort of feminism does not belong for Native Hawaiian women since it does not portray genuinely their relationship with the land as a mother, which is grounded in their notions of kinship and ecological conceptions of nature as a healthy ecosystem.
the logic of place directs that relocation and other changes be carried out in a way that reestablishes suitability in response to the new land (or the new land inhabitants of the lands). The link between land and people is close, but it is also reciprocal and dynamic (2002, 157).

One of the results of a logic of place might involve an “outsider” who becomes part of the land and community that inhabits her/him. A logic of place is not exclusionary. In fact, other Pacific islanders have commented how their notion of identity is inclusive (Ishtar 1994); however, when utilizing a logic of place, one might see how this inclusion is viable only when taking into consideration the place one inhabits.

Following this theme of inclusion, Espiritu’s notion of home also functions within a logic of place. Home, for Espiritu, is built on the possibility that home is “carried” on the backs of Filipinos. The “transnational space,” or space in between, is a process of establishing connections with places. Like Trask, who feels captive because of this obliteration of a logic of place, the immigrant also feels captive by the constraining modes of assimilationist narratives that obliterate this logic of place in relation to their homeland. The role of imagination among transnational Filipinos serves as a way of recovering their sense of place with their homeland. Native Hawaiians, according to Trask, have often been accused of remaining nostalgic in their yearning for the past (1996, 413). US narratives have described the yearning of Filipinos for their homeland as a nostalgic experience as well. Trask argues that US narratives have assumed that the past (non-US location) is “strangely inferior” and “undeveloped.” A logic of place challenges this criticism and provides an alternative way of understanding ourselves in
relation to a specific geographical location. The role of imagination in Espiritu’s and Trask’s sense serves as a way of recovering this sense of place.

The process of homemaking is a difficult process for those who are forced to travel under conditions of imperialism and colonial economic forces. In fact, many respondents in Espiritu’s research claim that they did not “fit” in this place or that they wanted to go home. America was not a place where they felt a sense of place or community. There was always a desire to “stay connected” with the homeland through transnational practices of *balakbayan* packages, remittances to the Philippines, telephone calls and travel back to the Philippines. However, one of the ways in which Filipino American families attempted to “make a home” in a hostile country involved community development built on shared histories and backgrounds from the Philippines. If the transnational Filipino yearns for home, then community is built upon this desire.

Community associations representing different provinces and villages from the Philippines emerged in San Diego. What began as a group of Navy Filipino wives reasserting their relationship to the Philippines through hosting social events, such as community picnics, Thanksgiving and holiday celebrations for Filipino Navy visitors, and celebrations featuring folk dances, has turned into a huge social organization determining much of Filipino American life in San Diego. The place of San Diego has transformed as well as its people.

The homeland, the Philippines, can also change given the new place immigrants have moved to. Part of these changes occurs in the context of Filipino girls who live in the US. Modes of conduct, such as strict rules limiting Filipino girls’ movement in order
to ensure her virginity and chastity, were seen from the perspective of the parent as resisting US culture, its "sinfulness," and its normalizing values of promiscuity. While some parents are critical of US social values, some parents learned to be less strict with their daughters due to the psychological turmoil involved for both the parents and children. Parents, in some of these cases, argue, "What can you do?" Adaptation to a place becomes a contested practice; however, it is their relation to a place that changes their visions of the homeland.

Building Communities of Coalitions among Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans

The promising element in both Asian American and Native Hawaiian sense of home and land can be understood in terms of the space between framed by concepts of travel and home. A transnational framework underscores the nature of the multicultural subject composed within relationships. A transnational understanding of relationships highlights how subjects are confined within relationships determined by power and hegemony. Nonetheless, a transnational framework underscores the possibility in which the subject restores a sense of agency. This sense of agency is tied to notions of travel, in the sense that one is displaced from their home, and to notions of home, in the sense that one yearns for a sense of belonging. This transnational framework can be understood as instances in which care operates to sustain relationships on an international scale and also as a possibility of changing the nature of domestic communities. The transnational framework offers a theoretical basis in understanding the space between as a resource for cultivating vital coalitional communities.
In the Native Hawaiian and Asian American case, both groups view their respective notions of home and land as flexible and open for transformation. This can serve as a starting point in envisioning connections between both groups. The ethical and political remapping of the boundaries between both groups is possible within a framework of identity that allows for the possibility of transformation. That both groups see their notions of identity as flexible, however, needs to be accompanied by what Reagon suggests in her notion of coalition: “throwing yourself into the next century” (1983). This entails that both groups must see their respective identities mutually formed in order to create new ways of coalescing with one another. The future requires a source of action that involves intelligent mappings of the boundaries between the two groups. While both groups necessarily attempt to transform the dominant culture in which they live, it is important to see how the various aspects of their respective identities might interpret their encounters with each other in a way that historicizes their collectivities through effort, rather than from a common experience of oppression.

While a transnational framework may not provide specific answers to the question of Asian American and Native Hawaiian conflicts of identity, it does highlight future directions in which coalitions can be constructed. Through the process of world-traveling and home-making, both groups may be able to view the common road of human experience as co-creators, fellow travelers, and home-makers, moving towards a future that encompasses both of their senses of belonging.


